Filed 10/30/14 Marriage of Shannon CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re the Marriage of DENNIS P. and MARY SHANNON.
DENNIS P. SHANNON, Respondent,

v. MARY SHANNON, Appellant. F067406 (Super. Ct. No. S-1501-FL-622161)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

BY THE COURT: It is ordered that the opi nion filed herein on October 21, 2014, be modified as follows: 1. On page 1, the first sentence, we co rrect the misspelled name to henceforth read as follows: Stephen D. Schuett, Judge. There is no change in the judgment.

__________________ _________ HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

________________________ GOMES, J.

________________________ CORNELL, J.Filed 10/21/14 (unmodified version)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of DENNIS P. SHANNON and MARY SHANNON.
DENNIS P. SHANNON, Respondent,

v. MARY SHANNON, Appellant. F067406 (Super. Ct. No. S-1501-FL-622161)

OPINION

THE COURT * APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Kern County. Stephen D. Shuett, Judge. Mary Shannon, in pro. per.; Richard Mo nahan; Law Offices of Donald C. Duchow and Donald C. Duchow for Appellant. The Law Offices of Edward J. Quirk, Jr., and Edward J. Quirk, Jr., for Respondent.

* Before Hill, P. J., Gomes, J. and Cornell, J.2 -ooOoo-

Wife appeals from the judgment of dissolution, challenging the order for reimbursement of husband’s separate property contribution to the purchase of the family residence and the awards to wife for spousal support and attorney fees and costs. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The parties were married fo r 11 years eight months. Bo th parties retired prior to the dissolution. During the ma rriage, they purcha sed a residence whic h they shared until separation; title to the residence was held in jo int tenancy. Husband testified he paid the $160,000 purchase price, using the procee ds from the sale of a separate property residence he owned prior to marriage. Wife contended at trial that placing title in the names of both parties as joint tenants constitute d a gift of husband’s separate property to the community. The trial cour t determined the residence wa s presumed to be community property, but husband was entitled to reimbursement for his separate property contribution to its acquisition. It ordered th at the residence be sold, that husband receive the first $160,000 of the net proceeds of sale, and that any remaining proceeds be divided equally between the parties. The trial court set spousal support to be paid by husband to wife at $400 per month. This was less than the $800 pe r month temporary support wife had been receiving prior to judgment. The trial court also awarded wife $1,500 in attorney fees
and costs. Wife challenges the trial court’s judgme nt, contending there was no substantial evidence to support tracing the source of the funds used to purcha se the residence to husband’s separate property, the trial court abused its discretion by reducing the spousal3 support award without a change in circumstance s, and the trial court abused its discretion by failing to state its reasons for the amount of the award of attorney fees and costs.
DISCUSSION I. Family Residence
Wife contends there was insufficient evid ence that the funds us ed to purchase the family residence were husband’s separate property. She asserts funds paid from a commingled account are presumed to be community funds, rebutting that presumption requires tracing of the funds to a separate pr operty source, and the evidence tracing the funds to a separate property source was insufficient. Husban d contends this issue was not
raised in the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. “‘A party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To permit hi m to do so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing litigant .’ [Citations.]” ( In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501 ( Broderick ).) There is an exception “when the issue involves purely a legal question which rests on an uncontroverted record which could not have been altered by the presenta tion of additional evidence.” ( Ibid .) In the trial court, wife argued the re sidence was community property “although purchased in all or in part from [husband’s] separate funds.” She argued the separate funds used to purchase the pr operty were a gift to the community. She contended the joint tenancy form of ownership gave rise to a presumption that the residence was community property, and the presumption coul d only be rebutted by a clear statement in the deed that the property was separate prope rty or proof that th e parties had a written agreement that the property was sepa rate property. (Fam. Code, § 2581.) 1 In the trial court, husband contended that , even if the residence was presumed to be community property, he was entitled to reimbursement for his separate property

1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unle ss otherwise indicated.4 contribution to the purchase of the residen ce pursuant to section 2640. Section 2640 provides that, unless a party has waived the ri ght to reimbursement in writing, “the party shall be reimbursed for the party’s contributi ons to the acquisition of property of the community property estate to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source.” (§ 2640, su bd. (b).) Husband testified he paid the entire purchase price
for the residence out of funds he obtained fr om the sale of a house he owned prior to marriage. Wife presented no evidence cont radicting husband’s te stimony; she presented no evidence and no argument that the residenc e was paid for with commingled funds. Thus, wife’s theory that husband was not entitled to reimbursement for his contribution to acquisition of the family resi dence because he failed to trace the funds used to purchase the residence back to a se parate property source is a new theory, not
raised in the trial court. It does not fall with in the exception that pe rmits consideration of some issues for the first time on appeal. It is not a pure issue of law resting “on an
uncontroverted record wh ich could not have been altered by the presentation of additional evidence” ( Broderick, supra , 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 501); if the issue had been raised in the trial court, husband would have had an opportunity to presen t further evidence to support his claim the residence was paid fo r entirely with his separate funds. In any event, substantial evidence suppor ts the trial court’s determination that the $160,000 purchase price for the residence wa s paid out of husband’ s separate property funds. Wife testified the purchase price of the home was $160,000. Husband testified he paid $160,000 to purchase the residence out of the proceeds of the sale of his separate property house. He stated he was carefu l to keep his money in his own name; wife conceded the parties kept their money separa te, in separate accounts, during marriage.
Wife also admitted she did not have an account with husband with $160 ,000 in it. Thus, there was no evidence of commingling of hus band’s separate funds with community funds requiring elaborate tracing to determine the source.5 “Whether the spouse claiming a separate pr operty interest has adequately met his or her burden of tracing to a separate prope rty source is a question of fact and the trial court’s holding on the matter must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” ( In re Marriage of Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 10 57-1058.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that husba nd contributed $160,000 of his separate property to the purchase of the residence and was entitled to reimbursement of that

amount. II. Spousal Support The trial court awarded wife $400 per mo nth spousal support. Wife contends the trial court improperly reduced her support fro m that awarded prior to judgment without any change in circumstances and failed to pr ovide an adequate re ason for doing so. A change in circumstances is not necessary in order to include in the judgment of dissolution an award of spousa l support that is different from the amount awarded pendente lite. ( In re Marriage of McNaughton (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 845, 849.) “There
are fundamental differences in the functions and purposes of pend ente lite support and permanent support orders. The court, in making each award, is governed by different authority.” ( Ibid .) The purpose of a temporary support order “is to maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties as cl osely as possible to the status quo, pending
trial and the division of the assets and obligations of the parties.” ( Ibid .) In contrast, “[t]he purpose of permanent spousal support is to ‘... provi de financial assistance, if appropriate, as determined by the financial circumstances of the parties after their dissolution and the division of their community property.’ [Citation .] The determination of permanent spousal support at trial must be de novo. Only at trial is all the evidence presented. The permanent order is to be ba sed upon circumstances existing at trial, and a change of circumstances from the time of the pend ente lite order is irrelevant to a determination of the amount of support which is ‘just and reasonable’ at that time.”6 ( Ibid .) Consequently, the trial court did not err in awarding a different amount of spousal support in the judgment than it awarded as temporary support. 2 Wife complains that, althou gh the trial court in its judgment discussed the relevant factors to be considered is setting the amount of spousal support, “the record on appeal is devoid of any information that will supp ort the court’s sudden modification of the original spousal support order.” She conclu des awarding a different amount of spousal support in the judgment was an abuse of discretion. Again, the factors to be considered in setting temporary spousal support and awarding spousal support in the judgment are different. 3 The fact that the trial court reached a different result in determining te mporary support than it did in determining support to be awarded in the judgment, in itself, does not indicate any abuse of discretion in setting the latter amount. Both parties are retired. The trial court took into account the
amount of husband’s retirement income and wife ’s Social Security in come. It noted the purposes of permanent spousal support, and di scussed the relevant factors under section 4320. The trial court recogn ized that husband’s income from his retirement will be reduced postjudgment because of the division of his retirement benefits between the parties. Wife will receive her share of thos e benefits. After discussing all the relevant factors, the trial court balanced them and de termined the amount of spousal support to be
awarded. “In setting the amount of spousal support, a wide discretion is vested in the trial court [citation], ‘and thus an appellate court must act with cautious judi cial restraint, even

2 The cases on which wife relies to support he r contention the trial co urt could not change the amount of spousal support awarded in th e absence of changed circumstances are distinguishable. They all involved postjudgment requests to modify the spousal support awarded in the judgment. (See Edwards v. Edwards (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 12; In re Marriage of Kuppinger (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 628; Hester v. Hester (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1091.) 3 Temporary support is governed by section 3600. Support awarded in the judgment of dissolution is governed by section 4320.7 though the particular award might appear on appeal to be modest or generous under the particular circumstances.’ [Citation.] A tria l court has abused its discretion when, after calm and careful review of the entire record, it can fairly be said that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the same circumstances.” ( In re Marriage of
Roesch (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 96, 102.) After considering th e entire record, we cannot say no reasonable judge would make the same order under the same circumstances. We
find no abuse of discretion in th e award of spousal support. III. Attorney Fees
“‘It is well settled that the award of attorn ey fees and costs in family law matters is
within the broad discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision in a particular case will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abus e of discretion.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 272, 279- 280.) Wife contends the trial court did no t adequately explain w hy it awarded wife only $1,500 in attorney fees. Ev idence in wife’s September 5, 2012, request for spousal support and attorney fees, as well as the accompanying inco me and expense declaration, indicated she had paid her attorney $1,600 in attorney fees at th at time. The record
contains no other evidence of the amount of a ttorney fees wife incurred. Wife has not met her burden of establishing an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Husba nd is entitled to his costs on appeal.