IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

RAHIM MUHAMMAD,

Appellant.

No. CR-21-0073-PR

Filed July 15, 2022

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County

The Honorable Delia Neal, Judge

No. S1100CR201700597

AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two

250 Ariz. 460 (App. 2021)

VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL:

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Linley Wilson, Deputy Solicitor 

General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Tanja K. Kelly (argued), 

Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Steven Czop (argued), Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Higley, Attorney for Rahim

Muhammad
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

2

JUSTICE KING authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES

BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, and MONTGOMERY joined.

JUSTICE KING, opinion of the Court:

¶1 This case asks us to determine whether, in a case where a 

criminal defendant’s competency has been put at issue, a trial court must 

make a specific finding of heightened competency before determining the 

defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury trial is knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent. We conclude that Arizona law does not require such a specific 

finding of heightened competency with respect to a jury-trial waiver.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2016, Rahim Muhammad was incarcerated in the Arizona 

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”). From February through 

September 2016, Muhammad sent a series of threatening letters to J.G., an 

employee of ADOC, in violation of two consecutive injunctions against 

harassment. The State charged Muhammad with thirteen felony counts of 

aggravated harassment.

A. Evaluation of Muhammad’s Competency

¶3 In August 2017, Muhammad’s counsel asked the trial court to 

order a preliminary competency examination of Muhammad, pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.2(c) (authorizing preliminary 

competency examination to determine whether reasonable grounds exist 

for further examination). The trial court granted the motion and 

appointed Dr. Cooper-Lopez, a psychologist, to conduct the preliminary

competency examination. Following the examination, Dr. Cooper-Lopez 

concluded that Muhammad’s “ability to understand his case and discuss 

his rights and responsibilities within the court system was significantly 

impaired.” Dr. Cooper-Lopez further noted Muhammad “may have 

exaggerated his lack of legal knowledge during the exam,” and 

“recommended this be assessed further in subsequent evaluations.”
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

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¶4 In October 2017, the trial court ordered a full Rule 11 

examination to determine if Muhammad was competent to stand trial. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(a)(1) (authorizing examination to determine if 

defendant is competent to stand trial); see also A.R.S. § 13-4503(A) (to same 

effect). The trial court appointed two psychologists, Dr. Harris and 

Dr. Geary, to conduct the examination. See A.R.S. § 13-4505(A)(2).

¶5 Dr. Harris and Dr. Geary each examined Muhammad. In 

Dr. Harris’ report, she identified Muhammad’s symptoms and diagnosis 

and explained that Muhammad displayed “an inadequate understanding 

of basic legal information,” including “any familiarity of the charges against 

him in this matter, as well as the possible consequences associated with 

conviction.” Nonetheless, she “share[d] Dr. Cooper-Lopez’s concerns that 

he may be exaggerating his lack of understanding.” Dr. Harris concluded 

Muhammad was “not competent to proceed to trial,” but “it should be 

possible for [him] to be restored to competence” with “aggressive 

treatment” and “education to remediate deficits in his understanding of 

basic legal information.”

¶6 Dr. Geary also concluded Muhammad was “not competent to 

stand trial or assist his attorney in his defense.” Dr. Geary noted

Muhammad was “clearly affected by significant mental illness,” but there

“were no observed difficulties with judgment.” Moreover, while

Muhammad “professed to have neither factual nor rational understanding 

of [the] charges against him,” he “extensively feigned [his] lack of 

knowledge about legal/judicial matters” and there was “an element of 

malingering in this case.” Dr. Geary determined Muhammad’s “potential 

for restoration appear[ed] to be low because of [his] indifference and 

resistance.”

¶7 Consequently, in January 2018, the trial court found 

Muhammad incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to participate in an 

outpatient restoration to competency program with Dr. Cooper-Lopez. 

Muhammad participated in the program. In April 2018, Dr. CooperLopez concluded Muhammad was competent to stand trial. As 

Dr. Cooper-Lopez explained in a written report, while Muhammad may 

have “a bonafide psychiatric condition,” various test results indicated he 

had “quite likely . . . been exaggerating his memory, psychiatric, and legal 
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

4

knowledge deficits.” Based on her nine meetings with Muhammad, she 

reported he “appear[ed] to possess a rational and factual understanding of 

his charges and legal situation, as well as the capacity to appropriately 

consult with counsel.”

¶8 In May 2018, the trial court determined Muhammad

“understands the proceedings and is able to assist counsel with [his] 

defense” and “is competent to stand trial.” Noting that “the current 

medication regime is necessary to ensure [Muhammad’s] ongoing 

competency,” the trial court ordered Muhammad to “take all medications”

and “follow any treatment plan as prescribed,” and further ordered “the 

Court Clinical Liaison [to] continue to monitor” Muhammad for his

“medication and treatment plan needs.”

¶9 In October 2018, after Muhammad requested and was 

appointed new counsel, his attorney requested a second competency

examination under Rule 11.2(a)(1). The State objected in part, arguing that 

any examination should be only a preliminary examination under Rule

11.2(c). The trial court conducted a hearing and concluded a preliminary 

examination was “necessary to determine whether a further Rule 11 

evaluation [was] necessary.” The trial court appointed Dr. Vega, a 

psychologist, to conduct a preliminary examination of Muhammad under 

Rule 11.2(c).

¶10 In December 2018, Dr. Vega concluded that, although 

Muhammad was suffering from certain symptoms, he was competent to 

stand trial and required no further examination. Dr. Vega explained that

Muhammad (1) “has a full understanding of the reason for his arrest and 

the seriousness of his offense,” (2) “has a factual and rational understanding 

of the nature of the proceedings against him,” and (3) “will be able to assist 

counsel in the preparation of his own defense.” In addition, Muhammad

“understands [the] legal process and court procedures,” including “the 

concept of a plea agreement versus taking a case to trial and the roles of the 

pertinent parties in court.”

¶11 In January 2019, the trial court reviewed Dr. Vega’s report and 

determined Muhammad was competent to stand trial. The trial court also 
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

5

concluded no additional examinations under Rule 11 were necessary. 

Consequently, the parties moved forward with pretrial proceedings.

B. Muhammad’s Waiver of a Jury Trial

¶12 In April 2019, before trial commenced, Muhammad

personally signed a “Waiver of Trial by Jury” form. The form’s stated 

purpose was “to advise you of your right to trial by jury and to allow you 

to give up that right if you so choose.” The form explained the rights that 

were being waived:

I understand that I am entitled to a trial by jury 

on these charges and, if applicable, on facts used 

to aggravate any sentence. The right to a trial 

by jury means the right to have my guilt or 

innocence, or, if applicable, facts used to 

aggravate any sentence, decided by a group of 

citizens whose decision must be unanimous.

Muhammad’s counsel also signed the form, acknowledging he had 

“explained to [Muhammad] the right to trial by jury” and “consent[ed] to 

[Muhammad’s] waiver of it,” and filed the waiver with the trial court.

¶13 On June 25, 2019, the first day of trial, Muhammad repeated

his request for a bench trial on the record. Muhammad’s counsel 

explained “the reasoning behind this is with a name like Rahim 

Muhammad, my client believed he could not get a fair trial in front of a 

largely white jury.” The trial court then engaged in a personal colloquy 

with Muhammad:

THE COURT: Have you had any drugs, 

alcohol or other medication in the past [twentyfour] hours?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Are you taking 

medication prescribed in the jail?
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

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MUHAMMAD: Yes.

THE COURT: And does that medication 

help you understand what’s going on?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you believe you 

understand what’s going on today?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you. 

Sir, is it your intention to waive your right to a 

trial by a jury and instead allow the Court to 

decide the verdict?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

¶14 The trial court explained to Muhammad that waiving his 

right to a jury trial meant “giving up some important rights.” Specifically, 

in a jury trial (1) “all the jurors would need to agree unanimously as to [his] 

guilt,” and (2) jurors would “decide any aggravating factors that could 

increase the possible length of [his] prison term.” The trial court informed 

Muhammad that, if he proceeds with a bench trial, the judge will decide 

“whether or not the state has proven the charges beyond a reasonable 

doubt” and “whether any aggravating factors exist in [his] case.” The trial 

court also reviewed with Muhammad the charges against him, as well as 

the sentencing possibilities and consequences. In addition, the trial court 

confirmed he was not forced or threatened into waiving his right to a jury 

trial, nor was he promised anything in exchange for waiving this right.

¶15 After this personal colloquy, Muhammad confirmed that he 

preferred to proceed before a judge, rather than a jury, and he understood 

the consequences of doing so. The trial court concluded Muhammad had 

“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial”

and signed the “Waiver of Trial by Jury” form.
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

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¶16 Thereafter, during a brief discussion about pretrial rulings 

and the option for Muhammad to plead and have the trial court review his

mental health records, Muhammad’s counsel noted he “is on psychotropic 

medication. He does hear voices.” In response, the trial court asked 

Muhammad, “Is that affecting your decision today in going forward with 

the bench trial?” Muhammad responded, “No.” Muhammad’s counsel 

affirmed, “That is his desire, Judge, to go forward with the bench trial and 

not submit and plead to the [thirteen] counts. So we’re ready to proceed.”1

C. Muhammad’s Bench Trial

¶17 The parties proceeded with a bench trial. In the middle of 

the first day of trial, Muhammad asked to break and resume proceedings 

the next scheduled trial day. Muhammad said he felt “incoherent” and 

“just not all there right now,” and the “medication [was] taking a strong 

[e]ffect” on him and “making [him] really drowsy.” Muhammad

indicated he needed “to sleep this off.” The trial court asked, “If we took 

a break and came back on Friday, do you think you would be feeling better 

by then?” Muhammad stated, “Yes,” and “we’ll be able to finish on 

Friday.” The trial court concluded proceedings that day, ordered the 

parties to reconvene three days later, and advised Muhammad to be 

prepared “to be in court all day.”

¶18 The parties reconvened as scheduled three days later. 

Neither Muhammad nor his counsel indicated that Muhammad was 

suffering from any symptoms that day. In fact, Muhammad proceeded to 

testify in his own defense after establishing he was taking medications that 

“help [him] think better and more rationally.” Muhammad testified that 

1 On the first day of trial, counsel for Muhammad stated Muhammad

“does not believe he’s getting adequate medical care, particularly 

psychiatric/psychological care” in ADOC, his goal “is to get placed in the 

state hospital,” and the week before Muhammad was “hearing voices” and 

having “hallucinations.” Nonetheless, Muhammad personally affirmed 

on the first day of trial that he was taking prescribed medication that helped 

him understand what was going on, and he in fact understood what was 

going on that day. Supra ¶ 13.
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

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he wrote the letters to the ADOC employee because, due to his “power of 

discernment,” he knows that “she works for the pharaoh, Charles Ryan, 

and she is satan herself.” He also referred to himself as “Moses.” After 

a two-day bench trial, the trial court found Muhammad guilty on all counts 

of aggravated harassment.

¶19 Muhammad appealed his convictions and sentences to the 

court of appeals. He argued that (1) “his waiver of a jury trial was 

constitutionally insufficient,” and (2) “the trial court erred in not sua sponte

ordering a third” competency examination in the middle of trial. State v. 

Muhammad, 250 Ariz. 460, 462 ¶ 1 (App. 2021). Relying on State v. 

Cameron, 146 Ariz. 210, 212 (App. 1985), the court of appeals concluded it 

was error for the trial court “not to make a specific on-the-record finding of 

[Muhammad’s] competency to waive the jury trial.” Muhammad, 250 Ariz. 

at 466 ¶ 18 (quoting Cameron, 146 Ariz. at 212). Thus, the court of appeals 

remanded for a hearing to determine if Muhammad met “‘the higher 

standard of competency required to waive the right’ to a jury trial: whether 

Muhammad was making a rational and reasoned decision to make that 

waiver.” Id. at 467 ¶ 23 (quoting Cameron, 146 Ariz. at 213). The court of 

appeals found no error in the trial court’s failure to order a third 

competency examination. Id. at 468 ¶ 31.

¶20 We granted review to determine whether, in a case where a 

criminal defendant’s competency has been put at issue, a trial court is 

required to make a specific finding of heightened competency before 

determining the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

waived the right to a jury trial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, 

section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶21 “We review questions of law de novo.” State v. Urrea, 244 

Ariz. 443, 445 ¶ 6 (2018). In addition, we review a trial court’s finding as 

to a defendant’s jury-trial waiver for an abuse of discretion. See State v. 

Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 495 (1992). We look only to see whether reasonable 
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

9

evidence supports the trial court’s finding, and we consider the facts in the

light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s finding. Id.

B. The Standard for Waiving a Jury Trial under Arizona Law

¶22 Rule 18.1 sets forth the procedures and standards applicable 

to jury-trial waivers. A “defendant may waive the right to a trial by jury 

if the State and the court consent.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b)(1). However,

“[b]efore accepting a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial, the court must 

address the defendant personally, inform the defendant of the defendant’s 

right to a jury trial, and determine that the defendant’s waiver is knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b)(2) (emphasis added). 

In addition, a “defendant’s waiver of a jury trial must be in writing or on 

the record in open court.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b)(3).

¶23 This Court has previously observed that the “knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent” standard and the procedures in Rule 18.1(b) are

appropriate and adequate. “The pivotal consideration in determining the 

validity of a jury trial waiver is the requirement that the defendant 

understand that the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not 

a jury.” State v. Conroy, 168 Ariz. 373, 376 (1991). In Conroy, the trial 

“court carefully explained to defendant that he had a right to a jury trial, 

that by waiving the right he was abandoning the privilege of allowing a 

jury to determine the facts of his case and agreeing to let the trial court 

determine the facts and determine his guilt or innocence.” Id. This Court 

explained, “We believe this is all that is required to accomplish the 

intentional waiver of a known right.” Id. In sum, “[w]hat is required for 

a waiver is that it be made knowingly—that is, the abandonment of a known

right or privilege—and that it be intentional.” Id. (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

18.1(b)).

¶24 Muhammad does not take issue with the requirements for a 

jury-trial waiver in Rule 18.1. But he contends Arizona case law and the 

Arizona Constitution support the application of a heightened competency 

standard—above and beyond the finding of a knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent waiver—in cases where a defendant’s competency has been put 

at issue. We review the authority Muhammad cites to determine whether 

Arizona law requires such a heightened competency standard.
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

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¶25 Muhammad claims State v. Butrick, 113 Ariz. 563 (1976),

supports a heightened competency standard for a jury-trial waiver. In 

Butrick, the defendant signed a jury-trial waiver form, but the trial court 

failed to accept the waiver or determine that it was knowing, voluntary, 

and intelligent until after the bench trial. Id. at 565–67. Noting that 

“[w]hether there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury 

trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each 

case,” this Court concluded that the defendant’s “waiver of the right to a 

trial by jury was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” Id. at 566. And

“although the trial judge fulfilled his obligation under [R]ule 18.1(b)(1) 

somewhat belatedly, he did fulfill it.” Id. at 566–67.

¶26 Muhammad emphasizes the language in Butrick that a 

“competent” waiver depends on the “unique circumstances of each case.” 

But the full context of Butrick makes clear this language was used in 

conjunction with the Court’s ultimate conclusion that the defendant

“knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived a jury” under 

Rule 18.1(b)(1). Id. at 566–67. Thus, Butrick did not create a heightened 

competency standard; instead, it reiterated that a defendant must have

“knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived a jury.” Id. at 567.

¶27 Muhammad seeks to establish two different standards: a

competency standard for standing trial, and a heightened competency 

standard for waiving the right to a jury trial. But the Supreme Court has 

already indicated that a defendant who is competent to stand trial is also 

competent to waive constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the 

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and the right to confront 

one’s accuser. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396–402 (1993) (applying 

test for competence to stand trial and citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 

402, 402 (1960)). Here, the decision to waive the right to a jury trial does 

not “require[] an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the 

decision to waive other constitutional rights”; it is “no more complicated 

than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make 

during the course of a trial.” Id. at 398–99. As the Supreme Court 

explained, “[t]he purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry . . . is to 

determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance 

and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is 
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

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uncoerced,” id. at 401 n.12, and this standard applies to decisions to waive 

other constitutional rights throughout trial, id. at 400.

¶28 We recognize there are situations involving “gray-area 

defendants” who are competent to waive the right to counsel but may not 

have the mental capacity or ability to manage basic trial tasks and represent

themselves at trial. See id. at 399 (“[T]he competence that is required of a 

defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive 

the right, not the competence to represent himself”); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 

U.S. 164, 174–76 (2008) (noting a “gray-area defendant” is deemed 

competent to stand trial but may be “unable to carry out the basic tasks 

needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel”); see also 

Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150, 150 (1966) (discussing competency to 

waive constitutional right to assistance of counsel and conduct a defense).

¶29 But the decision to waive a jury trial is fundamentally different 

from the decision by a “gray-area defendant” seeking to waive counsel and 

represent himself at trial, which would necessarily require the defendant to 

manage trial proceedings and present a defense. As the Supreme Court 

has recognized, “a defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at trial 

presents a very different set of circumstances, which in our view, calls for a 

different standard.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174–75. This Court has also

noted that

[a] defendant who waives the assistance of counsel in a 

criminal trial is by that very act doing something that calls 

into question his rationality, and the United States Supreme 

Court has indicated that greater care must be taken in 

allowing a person to waive his right to an attorney than it does 

in finding him competent to stand trial.

State v. Decello, 111 Ariz. 46, 48–49 (1974).2

2 The standard applicable to a “gray-area defendant” is not before us, and 

we leave that issue for another day. See State v. Gunches, 225 Ariz. 22, 25 

¶ 11 (2010) (explaining the standard for a gray-area defendant to waive 

counsel is “an issue we need not decide here”).
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

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¶30 The cases Muhammad relies on involving defendants seeking

to self-represent at trial do not support a heightened competency standard 

for a jury-trial waiver because of the “very different set of circumstances”

presented by “gray-area defendants” who choose to waive counsel and 

represent themselves in a criminal trial. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174–75; 

Decello, 111 Ariz. at 48–49. This case is not about Muhammad’s mental 

capacity to participate at trial as an advocate, carry out basic trial functions, 

formulate a defense strategy, or engage with the court, counsel, and 

witnesses. Therefore, the cases Muhammad cites regarding the waiver of 

counsel are not instructive. See Gunches, 225 Ariz. at 25 ¶ 12 (deciding

“Gunches was not a ‘gray-area’ defendant” and “the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding Gunches competent to waive counsel and 

represent himself” at trial); State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 321–24 (1994) 

(rejecting defendant’s argument that his “waiver of counsel was invalid”); 

State v. Evans, 125 Ariz. 401, 404 (1980) (affirming defendant as competent 

and his waiver of counsel as knowledgeable); State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 

146 (1967) (applying the test of “whether one is legally capable of waiving 

counsel”).

¶31 Muhammad also cites State v. Wagner, 114 Ariz. 459 (1977), 

which he contends required the trial court to make further factual inquiries 

regarding his competency. But Wagner does not support a heightened 

competency standard here. In Wagner, the “record [was] silent whether 

the trial court did, in fact, determine defendant’s competency to enter his 

plea”; therefore, this Court remanded to the trial court to make that finding.

Id. at 463. Here, however, the record is not “silent” but instead explicitly 

shows the trial court found Muhammad was competent to stand trial and 

he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived a jury trial.

¶32 In addition, Muhammad claims the Arizona Constitution 

provides grounds for a heightened competency standard for a jury-trial

waiver. The Arizona Constitution provides that “[i]n criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to have a speedy public 

trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to 

have been committed.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. Further, “[t]he right of 

trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23; see also Ariz.

Const. art. 6, § 17 (to same effect). Muhammad claims Arizona’s 

“inviolate” right to a jury trial supports a heightened competency standard, 
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Opinion of the Court

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noting this phrase does not appear in the United States Constitution. See

U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 

the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 

district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”).

¶33 As an initial matter, the adjective “inviolate” in the Arizona 

Constitution—which is the word Muhammad emphasizes—modifies the 

phrase “right of trial by jury.” See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23; Ariz. Const. 

art. 6, § 17. By writing the text in this manner, the drafters provided that 

this right would be subject to legal protection, see inviolable, New 

Websterian Dictionary (1912) (“that cannot be profaned or injured; 

unbroken. Inviolate”), but did not mandate a heightened standard for a 

defendant’s waiver of that right. See Bowden v. Nugent, 26 Ariz. 485, 486-

88 (1924) (reviewing prior version of art. 2, § 23 which provided the “right 

of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”). Indeed, this Court has 

“consistently held that the phrase ‘shall remain inviolate’ preserves the 

right to jury trial as it existed at the time Arizona adopted its constitution.” 

Derendal v. Griffith, 209 Ariz. 416, 419 ¶ 9 (2005) (citing Benitez v. Dunevant, 

198 Ariz. 90, 93 ¶ 4 (2000); Bowden, 26 Ariz. at 488). Arizona’s 

“constitutional guarantee of trial by jury is not a grant, but a reservation of a 

pre-statehood right. Thus, those offenses linked to jury trial at common 

law at the time the constitution was adopted are protected by the 

constitutional guarantee.” Benitez, 198 Ariz. at 93 ¶ 4 (internal citations 

omitted). In application, this means that a defendant charged with certain 

misdemeanor offenses may be entitled to a jury trial in Arizona even 

though those offenses may not have entitled him to a jury trial under the 

United States Constitution. See Derendal, 209 Ariz. at 419 ¶ 9 (“[O]ur

constitution requires that the state guarantee a right to jury trial for any 

defendant charged with an offense for which a jury trial was granted prior 

to statehood.”).

¶34 Accordingly, the phrase “shall remain inviolate” provides the 

right to a jury trial to a broader class of defendants than the Sixth 

Amendment, but it does not provide broader protection forthose defendants 

than the Sixth Amendment does, nor does it require a greater 

demonstration of the waiver of the right. See Benitez, 198 Ariz. at 94 ¶ 10 

(“Arizona operates with a broader jury eligibility standard, providing its 

citizens with greater access to jury trials than the federal constitution 
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Opinion of the Court

14

mandates.”); see also State v. Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570, 577 ¶ 18 (2002) 

(“Arizona’s right to an impartial jury is no broader than the Sixth 

Amendment.”). The Arizona Constitution does not require a heightened 

competency standard for a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial.

¶35 We also find it significant that the Arizona Constitution

affirmatively provides criminal defendants the right to seek a bench trial. 

Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 17 (stating “trial by jury may be waived . . . by the 

parties with the consent of the court in any criminal cause”). If we were 

to impose a heightened competency standard for a jury-trial waiver, we

would necessarily impose additional burdens on defendants with mental 

illnesses who would otherwise be competent to stand trial and who wish to 

exercise their constitutional right to proceed by bench trial. The Arizona 

Constitution does not distinguish between defendants with mental illnesses

and those without as it pertains to jury trials, and we decline to do so today.

¶36 We note that a defendant’s attorney always remains in a 

position to alert the trial court to any new facts suggesting incompetence at 

the time of the jury-trial waiver. See § 13-4503(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(a). 

And the trial court itself remains in a position to observe any changes in 

behavior at the time of the waiver that may suggest a need for further 

examination. See § 13-4503(A)–(B); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(a)(1), (c); see also 

State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 443 ¶ 48 (2004) (“In determining whether 

reasonable grounds exist [for another competency hearing], a judge may

rely, among other factors, on his own observations of the defendant’s 

demeanor and ability to answer questions.”). If a trial court observes

conduct suggesting incompetence at the time of the waiver, it “may order 

the defendant to undergo a preliminary examination” to help determine if 

any further examination is necessary. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(c). These 

factors weigh against imposing a heightened competency standard.

¶37 The court of appeals held that “a prior finding of general 

competency to stand trial does not suffice . . . ‘because it does not measure 

the defendant’s capacity by a high enough standard.’” Muhammad, 250 

Ariz. at 465 ¶ 16 (quoting Cameron, 146 Ariz. at 212). In so holding, the 

court of appeals explicitly relied on Cameron, which had applied the Ninth 

Circuit’s higher standard of competency from Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 

(9th Cir. 1973). Id. Significantly, however, the Supreme Court in Godinez
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Opinion of the Court

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expressly rejected Sieling’s higher standard of competency. 509 U.S. at 397

(concluding “the Ninth Circuit . . . err[ed] in applying two different 

competency standards” in Sieling). We also repudiate Sieling’s higher 

standard of competency. Accordingly, the court of appeals erroneously

relied on Cameron—a case applying Sieling’s two competency standards, 

which the Supreme Court has expressly rejected.

¶38 For all these reasons, in cases where a defendant’s 

competency has been put at issue, we conclude Arizona law does not 

require a finding of heightened competency for a jury-trial waiver. 

Instead, before such a defendant may waive a jury trial, the trial court must

have concluded the defendant (1) is competent to stand trial, and “if a 

defendant has already been adjudicated competent, the court [may] rely on 

the record supporting that previous adjudication,” Moody, 208 Ariz. at 443 

¶ 48 (citing State v. Contreras, 112 Ariz. 358, 360–61 (1975)), see Godinez, 509 

U.S. at 401–02;3 and (2) knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived 

the right to a jury trial pursuant to Rule 18.1(b).

C. Muhammad’s Waiver of a Jury Trial

¶39 We must now determine whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in concluding Muhammad knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently waived his right to a jury trial and proceeding with a bench 

trial. For the reasons below, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion.

¶40 First, this Court has already recognized that “[u]nlike the 

waiver of assistance of counsel or plea of guilty, the waiver of a jury may 

well be in the defendant’s best interests.” Decello, 111 Ariz. at 49. The

waiver of a jury trial “is more often than not a question of trial strategy in 

which the subjective evaluations of the attorney for the defendant play a 

3 As the Supreme Court explained in Godinez, a trial court is not required 

to make a competency determination in every case in which a defendant 

seeks to waive a constitutional right. 509 U.S. at 401 n.13. “As in any 

criminal case, a competency determination is necessary only when a court 

has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence.” Id.
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

16

more important role than the discretion of the defendant.” Id. Here, 

Muhammad was entitled to believe the jury-trial waiver was in his best 

interest. Before trial, counsel for Muhammad offered the reason why 

Muhammad chose to waive a jury trial: “with a name like Rahim 

Muhammad, [he] believed he could not get a fair trial in front of a largely 

white jury.” Supra ¶ 13. In addition, Muhammad and his counsel both 

signed the “Waiver of Trial by Jury” form that described the specific rights 

Muhammad was waiving, a further indicator that Muhammad believed the 

waiver was in his best interest. Supra ¶ 12. And when they signed the 

form and explained the reason for the waiver to the trial court, neither 

Muhammad nor his counsel indicated Muhammad’s judgment was 

clouded in any way.

¶41 Second, Muhammad repeatedly affirmed his decision to 

waive a jury trial. Muhammad signed the “Waiver of Trial by Jury” form 

after consulting with counsel two months before trial. Supra ¶ 12. And

on the first day of trial, Muhammad reiterated several times on the record 

his decision to waive a jury trial. Supra ¶¶ 13–16.

¶42 Third, the trial court engaged in a proper personal colloquy

with Muhammad, in compliance with Rule 18.1(b), before determining he

had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. 

Supra ¶¶ 13–15. Muhammad argues, however, that the trial court’s 

questions during the colloquy were insufficient because they were designed 

to elicit only a “yes” or “no” response. See supra ¶ 13. Although asking 

questions that elicit more than a “yes” or “no” response may be a better

practice, particularly when a defendant’s competency has previously been 

called into question, Arizona law does not require the trial court to ask

open-ended questions. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b). The trial court’s

questions were legally sufficient.

¶43 Fourth, there is no evidence Muhammad did not understand 

the consequences of waiving a jury trial. After Muhammad’s participation 

in the restoration to competency program, he was re-evaluated and found 

competent to stand trial by two psychologists. Supra ¶¶ 7, 10. The trial 

court made repeated findings that Muhammad was competent to stand 

trial. Supra ¶¶ 8, 11. On the first day of trial, Muhammad confirmed he 

was taking medications that helped him “understand what’s going on.” 
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

17

Supra ¶ 13. He also confirmed his medications and the “voices” he heard 

did not affect his decision to proceed with a bench trial. Supra ¶ 16.4 And 

his attorney apparently agreed with Muhammad’s self-assessment by not 

correcting it.

¶44 Fifth, it was proper for the trial court to rely on its previous 

finding that Muhammad was competent to stand trial when it concluded 

his jury-trial waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Supra ¶¶ 8, 

11, 15. Where “a defendant has already been adjudicated competent, the 

court must be permitted to rely on the record supporting that previous 

adjudication.” Moody, 208 Ariz. at 443 ¶ 48.

¶45 Muhammad contends, however, that questions were raised 

about his jury-trial waiver in light of his testimony days later that he was 

“Moses,” the victim was “satan,” and Charles Ryan was “the pharaoh,” as 

well as his counsel’s comment that Muhammad is “on psychotropic 

medication” and “does hear voices.” Supra ¶ 18. But a defendant who is 

mentally ill is not necessarily incompetent to stand trial, nor unable to 

exercise constitutional rights. See A.R.S. § 13-4501(2) (“The presence of a 

mental illness, defect or disability alone is not grounds for finding a 

defendant incompetent to stand trial.”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1(b) (to same 

effect). A defendant is “incompetent to stand trial” only if “as a result of 

a mental illness, defect or disability a defendant is unable to understand the 

nature and object of the proceeding or to assist in the defendant’s defense.” 

§ 13-4501(2); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1(a)(2) (to same effect).5

4 Muhammad points out that when Dr. Cooper-Lopez asked him about

the role of a jury, he responded, “I’m not too sure.” But this does not

demonstrate the lack of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. 

First, Dr. Cooper-Lopez and Dr. Vega both found him competent to stand 

trial. Supra ¶¶ 7, 10. Second, Muhammad gave this response before the 

role of a jury was explained to him via the “Waiver of Trial by Jury” form, 

supra ¶¶ 12, 14, and the trial court’s personal colloquy with him, supra ¶ 13.

5 “Mental illness, defect, or disability” is defined as “a psychiatric or 

neurological disorder that is evidenced by behavioral or emotional 

symptoms, including congenital mental conditions, conditions resulting 
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

18

¶46 Indeed, this Court has held that a defendant was competent 

to stand trial even though he was suffering from a paranoid personality 

disorder causing him to believe in a vast conspiracy involving his counsel, 

the police, the court, and several government officials. State v. Glassel, 211 

Ariz. 33, 43–44 (2005). In Glassel, although the defendant’s “condition 

worsened after the original competency hearing and . . . he had 

incorporated his new counsel into his conspiracy delusions,” neither fact 

was “inconsistent with the trial court’s original conclusion that [the 

defendant], although mentally ill, was nonetheless competent to stand 

trial.” Id. at 44 ¶ 30; see also Evans, 125 Ariz. at 403–04 (concluding there 

was a competent waiver of counsel despite defendant having been 

“diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic”).

¶47 A trial court “may order the defendant to undergo a 

preliminary examination” to assist in determining if any further 

examination is necessary. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2(c); see also § 13-4503(B). 

We note that ordering such a preliminary examination is a best practice 

when the defendant’s conduct raises questions about competency. But 

here, as in Contreras, the record does not show “some reasonable ground to 

justify another [examination or] hearing on facts not previously presented 

to the trial court in order for us to say that the trial judge abused his 

discretion in not ordering such [an examination or] hearing.” 112 Ariz. at

360–61. Indeed, Muhammad “made no request for” an examination at the 

time of his jury-trial waiver or at any time during trial. See id. at 361. And 

furthermore, this record does not reveal any facts demonstrating that

Muhammad was “unable to understand the nature and object of the 

proceeding or to assist in [his] defense,” which is the standard for 

“incompetent to stand trial.” 6 § 13-4501(2) (defining “incompetent to 

from injury or disease, and developmental disabilities as defined in A.R.S. 

§ 36-551.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1(a)(1).

6 Although Muhammad reported he felt “incoherent” and drowsy from 

medication on the first day of trial, he then stated he just needed “to sleep 

this off” and affirmed he would feel better after a break. Supra ¶ 17. 

When the parties reconvened three days later, neither Muhammad nor his 

counsel disclosed any symptoms or requested an examination. 

Supra ¶¶ 18, 36.
STATE V. MUHAMMAD

Opinion of the Court

19

stand trial”); see also Decello, 111 Ariz. at 49 (concluding that Westbrook does 

not “mandate[] that a defendant who is represented by counsel and is 

competent to stand trial must be given, absent other facts, a further hearing 

by the court as to his competency to waive his right to a jury”). Thus, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Muhammad had

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.

III. CONCLUSION

¶48 In a case where a criminal defendant’s competency has been 

put at issue, Arizona law does not require a specific finding of heightened 

competency for the defendant’s waiver of a jury trial. Instead, before such 

a defendant may waive a jury trial, the trial court must have concluded the 

defendant (1) is competent to stand trial, and if a defendant has already 

been adjudicated competent, the court may rely on the record supporting 

that previous adjudication, and (2) knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently waived the right to a jury trial, pursuant to Rule 18.1(b). The

trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Muhammad’s jury-trial 

waiver. We therefore affirm the trial court. We vacate ¶¶ 11–23 and 32 

of the court of appeals’ opinion.