NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PATRICIA ANN THOMAS ,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
ANDREW M. SAUL , Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant

- Appellee. No. 1 8

- 35866
D.C. No. 1 : 1 7

- cv - 00912

- MC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael J. McShane , District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 7, 2019 ** Portland, Oregon Before: GILMAN, * * * PAEZ, and RAWLINSON , Circuit Judges. Patricia Ann Thomas appeals the district court’s judgment , which affirm ed
the administrative law judge’s (ALJ ’s ) determination that Thomas is no longer

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

DEC 16 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

disabled. We review de novo the district court’s judgment and will reverse only if
the ALJ ’ s decision was not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard

. Molina v. Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012).
1. The ALJ’s decision to dis count certain aspects of Thomas’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms was based on “specific, clear and convincing
reasons.” See Smolen v. Chater , 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Most notably , the ALJ determined that the objective medical evidence in Thomas’s case
i s inconsistent with her testimony. T his analysis was based on a comprehensive neurological examination of Thomas conducted in February 2013, along with other assessments completed during her treatment. “ Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant ’ s subjective testimony. ” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin

. , 5 3 3 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).
This reason alone is thus sufficient to support the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding
in this case

. See id. at 1162

– 63.
2. The ALJ did not err in evaluating the lay

- witness statements of Thomas’s
father , Albert Thomas

. Contrary to Thomas’s suggestion , the ALJ did not disregard or discount these statements. Rather, the ALJ took account of Albert’s description of Thomas’s dail y activities, as well as his testimony regarding her difficulties in various aspects of life. Because Albert’s statements “regarding the claimant’s activities of daily living suggest [that] she is capable of at least simple3

tasks,” the ALJ reasoned that t hose statements did not support a finding of disability. The ALJ did, however, find the statements “somewhat persuasive in terms of identifying areas in which the claimant experiences limitations.” If the ALJ’s findings are supported by inferences reason ably drawn from the record, they will be upheld. Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin. , 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). The ALJ appropriately considered Albert’s statements, and her analysis of those statements was supported by inferences reasonably drawn from
the record.
3. In 2013, psychologist Joshua Boyd stated , as part of his evaluation of Thomas, that Thomas would “need an understanding supervisor.” The ALJ
concluded that the need for “ an understanding supervisor” was not a proper
limitation that could reasonably be addressed by a vocational expert (VE) , and thus
excluded it from the hypothetical posed to the VE. Thomas’s contention that the ALJ erred in doing so is without merit

. The district court’s determination that this limitation “is simply too vague and unquantifiable to incorporate into the
claimant’s RFC [ r esidual f unctional c apacity] or into a VE hypothetical ” is persuasive. As that court noted, o ther district

- court judges in this circuit have

come to a similar conclusion.
Thomas , however, cites Embrey v. Bowen , 849 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 19 8 8), in
which this court wrote that hypothetical questions posed to a VE “ must set out all4

the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant .” Id. at 422 (emphasis in original). But the limitations in Embrey were specific characteristics of the plaintiff , such as his “ need to rest periodically, his back and chest pains, and the dizziness and blurred vision caused by his diabetes

. ” Id. at 423.
T he need for “ an understanding supervisor” does not represent the same type
of restriction. H ow an ALJ or a VE c ould interpret that phrase to give it more

concrete content is quite unclear

. We fail to see , for example, how a V E could
evaluate how many jobs of a particular type with an understanding superv isor exist in the relevant economy. Nor does Thomas offer any meaningful support for her
alternat ive theory that the need for an understanding supervisor should be interpreted as a reasonable accommodation.
4
. T here is no apparent conflic t between psychologist Boyd’s assessment
that Thomas could not handle “detailed instructions” and the fact that the jobs identified by the VE require General Educational Development Reasoning Level
Two. At this level, individuals must “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry
out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) , App. C, 1991 WL 688702 (4th ed. 1991)

. As the district court noted , the Social Security Administration use s a
different scheme to assess individuals’ abilities than does the DOT. The ALJ was not obligated to conclude that Boyd intended to use the word “detailed” in exactly5

the same sense in which the DOT employs it . Boyd’s other observations reinforce
this analysis

. For example, h e commented that Thomas was capable of performing “simple, routine type work.” Boyd also noted that Thomas’s ability to deal with “detailed instructions” was only “moderately,” rather than “markedly,” limited. Read as a whole, Boyd’s report does not co nflict with the conclusion that Thomas is capable of Level Two r easoning. The two primary cases that Thomas relies on to show otherwise are distinguishable. First, in Zavalin v. Colvin , 778 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2015), this court held that there was an apparent conflict between an RFC to perform “simple, repetitive tasks” and the demands of Level Three r easoning. Id. at 847. T he jobs at issue in the present case , in contrast, require only Level Two r easoning abilities

. Second, in Rounds v. Comm issioner Soc ial Sec urity Admin istration , 807 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2015), this court held that there was an apparent conflict between the
claimant’s RFC limiting her to “one

- and two

- step tasks” and the requirements of
Level Two r easoning. I

d. at 1003. But n othing in the record suggests that Thomas
is limited to one

- or two

- step tasks. Indeed, the Rounds court explicitly distinguished that case from other decisions where courts have concluded that “ an
RFC limitation to ‘ simple ’ or ‘ repetiti ve ’ tasks is consistent with Level Two reasoning. ” Id. at 1004 n.6 (collecting cases). For all of the above reasons, we AFFIRM

.