RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0587-16T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

W.L.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and 

J.J.,

Defendant.

____________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF S.K.L., a minor.

____________________________________

Submitted May 23, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Leone. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, 

Docket No. FG-11-39-16.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Louis W. Skinner, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 21, 2017
2 A-0587-16T4

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; 

Melvina D. Fennell, Deputy Attorney General, 

on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor (Lisa M. Black, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

W.L. ("Mother") appeals the September 20, 2016 judgment 

terminating her parental rights over her daughter S.K.L. In her 

oral opinion, Judge Audrey Peyton Blackburn found the New Jersey 

Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("Division") satisfied 

the best-interests test under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). We affirm.1

I.

The trial court's oral decision found the following facts. 

S.K.L. was born in June 2014. Mother has four other children, 

born in 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2013. Mother was twice substantiated 

for abuse or neglect regarding other children and lost custody of 

her four other children. 

The Division has been involved with Mother since October 2005 

based on concerns regarding Mother's use of drugs and alcohol. 

Moreover, Mother has made three suicide attempts and has previously 

 

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the 

biological father, J.J. (Father). The termination of his rights 

is not at issue in this appeal.
3 A-0587-16T4

been hospitalized for depression. The Division found Mother to 

need treatment for alcohol abuse and a mental health evaluation. 

In November 2013, Dr. Alan S. Gordon performed a psychological 

evaluation of Mother. Dr. Gordon found she had a severe mental 

disorder. His diagnoses included that she suffered from major 

depression with psychotic features, post-traumatic stress 

disorder, and general anxiety disorder. He recommended Mother 

attend individual psychotherapy as well as parenting classes. 

In June 2014, just three days after her birth, the Division 

removed S.K.L. from Mother's care due to untreated mental health 

concerns. The trial court granted the Division custody. A few 

weeks after her birth, S.K.L. was placed with her current 

caregiver, an unrelated resource parent. 

After a psychological evaluation, Mother completed domestic 

violence counseling and parenting classes as recommended.

Initially, Mother attended supervised visits with S.K.L. However, 

in November 2014, after an incident with Father, Mother stopped 

attending services and was terminated from several programs. 

The trial court also ordered Mother to have individual 

therapy, but she failed to do so. In December 2014, Mother was 

sent for counseling at Greater Trenton Behavioral Health, but her 

attendance was sporadic and she insisted she did not need therapy. 

She was also sent to a psychiatrist for counseling and medication 
4 A-0587-16T4

monitoring, but she never took her medication. Mother's visitation 

with S.K.L. became inconsistent, and she was terminated by the 

agency which supervised her visits. Visitation resumed under the 

supervision of the Division, but Mother attended sporadically and 

then stopped attending visitation and other services. When trial 

commenced, she had not visited S.K.L. for about ten months. 

Mother never completed any mental health services. Mother 

admitted in her testimony that she had not completed services at 

Greater Trenton Behavioral Health, as she did not believe she 

needed its services. 

Following the August 2016 trial, the trial court credited and 

adopted the testimony of the Division's psychologist Dr. Brian 

Scott Eig and caseworkers Yonely Rosa and Kimberly Noel. The 

court terminated Mother's parental rights. Mother appeals.

II.

"Appellate review of a trial court's decision to terminate 

parental rights is limited[.]" In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 

N.J. 440, 472 (2002). Our task is to determine whether the 

decision "is supported by '"substantial and credible evidence" on 

the record.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 

N.J. 420, 448 (2012) (citation omitted). "We ordinarily defer to 

the factual findings of the trial court because it has the 

opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the 
5 A-0587-16T4

witnesses who appear on the stand; it has a 'feel of the case' 

that can never be realized by a review of the cold record." N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) 

(citation omitted). 

"Particular deference is afforded to family court factfinding because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and 

expertise in family matters." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 

Permanency v. N.C.M., 438 N.J. Super. 356, 367 (App. Div. 2014) 

(citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)), certif. 

denied, 222 N.J. 18 (2015). Thus, "[w]e will not overturn a family 

court's factfindings unless they are so '"wide of the mark"' that 

our intervention is necessary to correct an injustice." F.M., 

supra, 211 N.J. at 448 (citation omitted). We must hew to our 

deferential standard of review.

III.

"A parent's right to enjoy a relationship with his or her 

child is constitutionally protected." In re Guardianship of 

K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). However, this protection "is 

tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect 

the welfare of children." Id. at 347; see N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a). 

Under Title Thirty, the Division must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the 
6 A-0587-16T4

best interest of the child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(c); F.M., supra, 

211 N.J. at 447. The Division must show:

(1) The child's safety, health, or 

development has been or will continue to 

be endangered by the parental 

relationship; 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to 

eliminate the harm facing the child or 

is unable or unwilling to provide a safe 

and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to 

the harm. Such harm may include evidence 

that separating the child from his 

resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or 

psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts 

to provide services to help the parent 

correct the circumstances which led to 

the child's placement outside the home 

and the court has considered alternatives 

to termination of parental rights; and 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not 

do more harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] 

A.

We first address whether the Division presented clear and 

convincing evidence to satisfy prongs one and two of the bestinterests test. The first two prongs "relate to the finding of 

harm arising out of the parental relationship." In re Guardianship 

of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 378 (1999). They "are related to one 

another, and evidence that supports one informs and may support 
7 A-0587-16T4

the other as part of the comprehensive basis for determining the 

best interests of the child." Id. at 379. 

The first prong "requires that the State demonstrate harm to 

the child by the parent" in the form of "endangerment of the 

child's health and development resulting from the parental 

relationship." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348. The second prong 

requires the Division show "the harm is likely to continue because 

the parent is unable or unwilling to overcome or remove the harm." 

Ibid. 

"Mental illness, alone, does not disqualify a parent from 

raising a child. But it is a different matter if a parent refuses 

to treat [her] mental illness, [and] the mental illness poses a 

real threat to a child[.]" F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 450-51. 

Mother's mental illness, which she refused to treat, prevented her 

from parenting S.K.L. since she was born in 2014. "A parent's 

withdrawal of [parental] solicitude, nurture, and care for an 

extended period of time is in itself a harm that endangers the 

health and development of the child." DMH, supra, 161 N.J. at 

379.

We have held that "suffering from mental disorders which 

adversely affect [one's] ability to parent" can be sufficient 

evidence to satisfy the first prong. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001), certif. 
8 A-0587-16T4

denied, 171 N.J. 44 (2002). Moreover, if the parents lack "the 

mental status sufficient to eliminate the risk of future harm to 

the child," that speaks to "whether the child's safety, health or 

development will be endangered in the future and whether the 

parents are or will be able to eliminate the harm" under the second 

prong. Ibid.

Dr. Eig conducted a psychological and parenting fitness 

evaluation of Mother. He testified that, despite her history of 

mental health problems, Mother "did not believe she needed services 

or treatment." He found Mother "showed some significant reality 

testing difficulties, some difficulties with being able to think 

clearly and accurately. She did not appear to see the world the 

way most other people do." As a result, she tended to misperceive 

herself and others and did "not make good judgments."

Given Mother's sixth-grade education and "below average level 

of intellectual functioning," Dr. Eig found Mother "would struggle 

with being able to understand the child's emotional and behavioral 

needs" and "she would have difficulty problem-solving the more 

complex and ambiguous situations that often arise during 

childcare." He concluded Mother, "who is inflexible and has 

longstanding difficulties, is not supported as a caregiver for a 

child now or in the foreseeable future." Dr. Eig testified he

"would not support [Mother] as being an independent or sole parent 
9 A-0587-16T4

to a minor child, nor would [he] expect her parenting fitness to 

change appreciably in the foreseeable future." This is sufficient 

evidence that Mother "would be unable to protect and care for 

[S.K.L.] on a daily basis." Id. at 436.

Although Mother completed other services, she did not believe 

she needed mental health services and admitted she had not 

completed any mental health services. Thus, Mother was "unwilling 

or incapable of obtaining appropriate treatment" for her mental 

health issues. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. H.R., 431 

N.J. Super. 212, 223 (App. Div. 2013). 

The trial court gave little credence to Mother's "litany of 

inadequate excuses" for not complying with services. We agree, 

and note Mother's excuses demonstrated the low priority she placed 

on visiting S.K.L. and receiving services which would have helped 

her remediate the conditions which kept S.K.L. from her care.2 Her 

lack of effort to complete any mental health services, and her 

belief that she did not require the services despite multiple 

recommendations, evidenced that Mother was "unwilling or unable 

to eliminate the harm facing the child" stemming from her mental 

health issues. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). 

 

2 For example, Mother admitted missing visitation services to go 

drinking with friends in New York. 
10 A-0587-16T4

Further, "proof of the abuse or neglect of a sibling is 

admissible in considering harm to a child in a Title 30 

Proceeding." Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. T.U.B., __ N.J. 

Super. __, __ (2017) (citing J. v. M., 157 N.J. Super. 478, 493 

(App. Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 490 (1978)). "All any court 

can rely upon in determining whether to sever parental rights is 

the parents' past course of conduct, whether to the child in 

question or to other children in their care." J., supra, 157 N.J. 

Super. at 493. Here, S.K.L.'s four older siblings had already 

been removed, and Mother had been substantiated for neglect on 

several occasions. "We cannot conceive that the Legislature 

intended to guarantee to parents at least one chance to [neglect] 

or abuse each child." Ibid. 

Mother claims she obtained a stable place to live in September 

2015. She argues the trial court "did not completely address" her 

housing situation. In fact, the court did not rely on Mother's 

housing situation. When the court noted "[n]either of [S.K.L.]'s 

biological parents is able to provide a safe and stable home for 

this child," the court was referring to Mother's failure to 

complete mental health services and her refusal to acknowledge she 

had a problem. 

The trial court found Mother had not remediated the 

circumstances which lead to S.K.L.'s removal. We find there was 
11 A-0587-16T4

sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that the 

Division satisfied prongs one and two.

B.

To satisfy prong three, the Division must have "made 

reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct 

the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the 

home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

The trial court found the Division made reasonable efforts, 

as detailed in "the credible testimony" of Rosa and Noel. Mother 

was given a psychological evaluation and was sent to a psychiatrist 

for counseling and medication monitoring. She was provided with 

domestic violence counseling and parenting classes. The Division 

continuously provided supervised visitation with S.K.L., often 

changing supervisors and locations to accommodate Mother and 

address her concerns about Father. Mother was provided counseling 

at Greater Trenton Behavioral Health. She was given repeated 

opportunities to receive mental health treatment.

Mother's refusal to engage in certain services, her noncompliance, and the lack of effectiveness of the programs provided 

is not a measure of the Division's effort. "'The diligence of 

[the Division]'s efforts on behalf of a parent is not measured by' 

whether those efforts were successful." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 
12 A-0587-16T4

452 (citation omitted). Rather, the Division's efforts are 

measured "against the standard of adequacy in light of all the 

circumstances of a given case." DMH, supra, 161 N.J. at 393. 

Here, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find

the Division satisfied prong three. 

Mother also argues the Division failed to consider her 

brother, J.L., whom she referred as a possible placement for S.K.L. 

The Division is required to explore relative placements:

In any case in which the [Division] accepts a 

child in its care or custody, including 

placement, the department shall initiate a 

search for relatives who may be willing and 

able to provide the care and support required 

by the child. . . . The search will be 

completed when all sources contacted have 

either responded to the inquiry or failed to 

respond within 45 days. The [Division] shall 

complete an assessment of each interested

relative's ability to provide the care and 

support, including placement, required by the 

child.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a) (emphasis added).]

"The Division must perform a reasonable investigation of such 

relatives that is fair, but also sensitive to the passage of time 

and the child's critical need for finality and permanency." N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 87 

(App. Div. 2013), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 587 (2014). 

Mother testified she talked to J.L. about S.K.L.'s placement 

and provided the Division with his cellphone number. Rosa
13 A-0587-16T4

testified she telephoned J.L. and left a voicemail, but he never 

returned her call. Moreover, Mother did not provide J.L.'s address

or other identifying information. "[A] parent can[not] expect the 

Division to locate a relative with no information[.]" N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. 568, 582 (App. 

Div. 2011). Without this information, and without any response 

or expression of interest from J.L., the Division's efforts were 

reasonable.3

Further, Mother alleges kinship legal guardianship was never 

explored by the Division. A court must appoint a caregiver as a 

kinship legal guardian if "adoption of the child is neither 

feasible nor likely." N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3). Here, the current 

caregiver stated her "desire to adopt, [so] the statutory 

requirement that adoption is neither feasible nor likely is not 

satisfied." H.R., supra, 431 N.J. Super. at 230–31.

C.

To satisfy the fourth prong, the Division must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that "[t]ermination of parental rights 

will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). 

Prong four "serves as a fail-safe against termination even where 

 

3 Rosa believed J.L. was in a severe car accident shortly 

thereafter and was in a coma for a month. Mother states it was a 

different brother who was in the car accident. Even if true, J.L. 

still failed to respond to the Division's call. 
14 A-0587-16T4

the remaining standards have been met." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 609 (2007).

Generally, to satisfy the fourth prong, the Division should 

present comparative bonding "'testimony of a well qualified expert 

who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, 

and informed evaluation of the child's relationship' with the 

natural parents and the foster parents." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 559 (2014) (quoting In re 

Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992)). Here, the court 

scheduled a bonding evaluation for Mother, but she failed to 

appear. We find this is one of the "few scenarios in which 

comparative evaluations would not be required." N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 

2009). 

Dr. Eig testified there "was a secure, warm and strong 

attachment" between S.K.L. and her resource parent. S.K.L. had 

been with the resource parent since she was one month old, and she 

was her psychological parent. Dr. Eig found S.K.L. "would be at 

relatively high risk for suffering severe and enduring 

psychological or emotional harm if her relationship with [the 

resource parent] was permanently ended." By contrast, Dr. Eig 

testified S.K.L. "would be at low risk for suffering severe and 

enduring harm if her relationship with [Mother] was to be 
15 A-0587-16T4

permanently severed." The trial court expressly credited those 

conclusions. 

The trial court found Mother could not provide permanency. 

Dr. Eig found "the longer that permanency is delayed, the higher 

the risk of [S.K.L.] suffering severe and enduring harm." We 

recognize "the paramount need the children have for permanent and 

defined parent-child relationships." J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 26. 

"A child cannot be held prisoner of the rights of others, even 

those of his or her parents. Children have their own rights, 

including the right to a permanent, safe and stable placement." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 

111 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 456 (2004). "Keeping 

the child in limbo, hoping for some long term unification plan, 

would be a misapplication of the law." A.G., supra, 344 N.J. 

Super. at 438. The court properly found sufficient evidence to 

satisfy the fourth prong.

Affirmed.