## In th e Court of Appeal s Second Appellate District of Te xas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 22

- 00064

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal f

rom the Probate Court Denton Coun ty, Te xas Trial Court No. PR

- 2016

- 00404

- 01
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack 

### J ACKIE 

### M. M ERITT 

### , I NDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

### I NDEPENDENT 

### E XECUTRIX

OF THE 

### E STATE OF 

### B OBBY 

### J OE 

### M ERITT 

### , Appell ant

V


### . M E RITT 

### B UFFALO 

### E VEN TS 

### , LLC; X ERNIE 

### M ERITT 

### ; T EXAS 

### F AR M 

### C RED IT 

### S ERVICES 

### , FLCA; S ANGER 

### B ANK 

### ; AND 

### B RITTANY 

### W EAVER 

### , Appellees2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Jackie M. Meritt, Individually and as Indepe ndent Execu trix of the
Estat e of Bobby Joe Meritt , attem pts to appeal from the trial court ’ s “ Order Granting
Successor Receiver ’ s Motion for Security for Costs and to Clarify Rates ” (the Order).
Bec ause we conclude the Order is not final for purposes of ap peal, we di smiss this appeal for want of juris diction. As ref lected in the Order, various parties had deposited $50,000 int o the

re gistry of the trial court “ as security for costs for payment of taxes, insurance, ongoing electricity, trash service, and oth er utili tie s and maintenance costs stemming from the entities at issue ” at the reque st of an initial receiver appointed by the trial

court. The trial court later appointed a successor receiver, and Appellant moved for
her p ortion of the funds deposited i n to the court ’ s r egistry to be released while the

successor receiver moved for the funds to be considered security for ongoing costs.
In the Order, the trial co urt ordered “ that the $50,000 in the registry of the court account created for th is case shall c on stitute security for costs

. . . [and] pai d only after application of the successor receiver submitted to and reviewed by the [trial court]. ” In the Order, the trial court also denied Appellant ’ s motion for the release of her portion of the fu nds that h ad been placed in the c ourt ’ s registry. On February 25, 2022, we notified Appellant of our concern that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the Order did not appear to be a final judgment or appeal able inte rlocutory order. We informed her that unless she or any party3

des iring to contin ue the appeal filed a response by March 7, 2022, showing grounds for continuing the appeal , we could dismis s the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a) , 44.3. Appellant filed a response, bu t it does no t show grounds for continuing th e appeal. Generally, appeals may be taken onl y from final judgments or interlocutory orders that are au thorized by statute. Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195,
200 (Tex. 2001). A judgment or order is final if it disposes of every pending claim and party. Id. at 205. Probate proceedings are an exception to the one

- final

- judgment rule bec ause they may involve multiple orders on discrete issues, each of which may be final for purpos es of app eal. De Aya la v. Mackie , 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (op. on reh ’ g). However, not a ll interlocutory probate orders are appealable. Id. Where no statute expre ssly provides that a particular probate order is final and appeal able, such an ord er is interlocu tory a nd not sub je ct to immediate appeal unless it di sposes of all parties or issues in a particular phase of the proceedings. Id. at 579; Estate of
Harris , No. 02

- 17

- 00265

- CV, 2017 WL 4172585, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth
S ept. 21, 2017, pe t. d enied) (per curia m) (mem. op. ). Appellant has not identified any statute that expressly authori z es an appeal from the Order. Rather, Appellant relies on the law that probate proceedings are an exception to the one

- final

- j udgment rule , pointing out tha t “ [a] probate order is appealabl e if it finally ad judicates a substantial right, whereas if it merely lea ds to further hearings on the issue, it is interlocutory. ” But, here, the Order contemplates4

that there will be fur ther hearings per taining to this particular phase of th e proceeding

— it states that the $50,000 deposited into the registry will be “ paid only after application of the successor receiver submitted to and reviewed by the [trial court]. ” Thus, th e O rder is interl ocutory. See De Ayala , 193 S.W.3 d at 579; Harris , 2017 WL 417 2585, at *1; see also In re Guardianship of Conis , No. 12

- 14

- 002 18

- CV,
2014 WL 4922643, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Sept. 30, 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) ( “ [A]n order requ iring the deposit of funds as security for costs i s not a final ord er under the test applied in De Ayala

. ” ); In re Mitchell , 342 S.W.3d 186, 192 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2011, no pet.) ( “ An order requiring the deposit of funds as security for costs is not a fina l orde r [in the p robate conte xt ]. ” )

. Accordingly, we dismiss thi s appeal for want of juri s diction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a) , 43.2( f).
/s/ Dana Womack Dana Womack Justice Delivered: March 31 , 2022