J-S32014-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ROCKY WILLIAM ANTILL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 545 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0008977-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 19, 2021

Rocky William Antill appeals pro se from the trial court’s order dismissing 

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 

9541-9546, and granting PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw pursuant to the 

dictates of Turner/Finley.

1

 After careful review, we vacate and remand.

Antill was charged with one count each of rape of a child (F-1),

2

rape—

forcible compulsion (F-1),3involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI)—

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1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c).

3 Id. at (a)(1).
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person less than 13 years of age (F-1),

4

IDSI—child (F-1),

5

IDSI—person less 

than 16 years of age (M-2),6 aggravated indecent assault of child (F-1),

7 and 

indecent assault—person less than 16 years of age (M-2).

8

 The charges 

stemmed from allegations that Antill had sexual intercourse with his minor 

stepdaughter, A.C., fifteen times. N.T. Jury Trial, Vol. II, 7/6/17, at 86. After 

a jury trial, held on March 8, 2017, the trial court declared a mistrial when the 

jury could not reach a unanimous verdict.9 Antill was re-tried before a jury 

on July 6, 2017. 

At the retrial, A.C. testified that when she reported the incidents to her 

mother, a fight broke out during which Antill told A.C.’s mother that she was 

drunk and “teaming up on him” by fabricating the sexual assault story to get 

him in trouble. Id. at 82. A.C. also testified that during a community event 

she told people that the rape did not occur. Id. at 97. A.C., however, testified 

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4 Id. at § 3126(a)(7).

5 Id. at § 3123(b).

6 Id. at (a)(7).

7 Id. at § 3125(b).

8 Id. at § 3126(a)(8).

9 Antill was originally charged with the above-mentioned crimes, in addition 

to aggravated indecent assault without consent, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(1), 

corruption of minors, id. at § 6301(a)(1)(ii), recklessly endangering another 

person (REAP), id. at § 2705, criminal solicitation, id. at § 902(a), and 

unlawful contact with minor, id. at § 6318(a)(1). The jury found Antill not 

guilty of REAP, but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining 

counts.
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that she truthfully reported the sexual assault and denied that anyone had 

instructed her to fabricate the report. Id. at 98, 100, 119.

Defense witness, Dylan Ellison, testified that he was friends with A.C. 

and attended a community festival in 2016, where A.C. was also in 

attendance. Id., 7/7/17, at 133. Ellison testified that, at the festival, A.C. 

told him that her mother had forced her to falsely report the rape allegations 

to the police so that Antill would get arrested and A.C.’s mother could sell 

Antill’s expensive sports items. Id. at 133-34.

On July 10, 2017, the jury found Antill guilty on all counts.10 On 

December 11, 2017, the trial judge sentenced Antill to an aggregate sentence 

of 200-450 months’ incarceration, followed by a 10-year probationary tail. 

Antill filed timely post-sentence motions, challenging the weight of the 

evidence, which the court denied on January 3, 2018. Antill filed a direct 

appeal challenging the court’s rulings during voir dire and its evidentiary 

rulings as well as the discretionary aspects of his sentence. On July 9, 2019, 

our Court affirmed Antill’s judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Antill, 

194 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed July 9, 2018) (unpublished memorandum 

decision). Antill filed an unsuccessful petition for allowance of appeal with the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See id., 269 WAL 2019 (Pa. filed Aug. 8, 

2019); Id. 194 WDA 2018 (Pa. filed Feb. 12, 2020).

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10 On retrial, the Commonwealth withdrew the crimes of unlawful contact with 

a minor, aggravated indecent assault without consent, endangering the 

welfare of children, corruption of minors, REAP, and criminal solicitation—

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child.
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Antill filed the instant, timely pro se PCRA petition on January 10, 2021. 

Antill’s petition included the following grounds for relief: newly-discovered 

exculpatory evidence; a Brady11 violation; and ineffective assistance of 

counsel.12 See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 1/10/21, at 4-21. The court appointed 

PCRA counsel, Robert Carey, Esquire, who entered his appearance on 

February 19, 2021. On March 16, 2021, Attorney Carey filed a “no-merit” 

letter seeking to withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley and declaring that “trial 

counsel was effective and [Antill] does not have a valid after[-]discovered 

evidence claim.” Turner/Finley “No-Merit” Letter, 3/16/21, at 1. On March 

17, 2021, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss 

Antill’s petition. Antill filed a pro se response to the Rule 907 notice on March 

29, 2021. On April 7, 2021, the court dismissed Antill’s pro se petition without 

a hearing and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Antill filed a timely pro 

se notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Antill presents the following issues for our consideration:

(1) Whether the PCRA court erred in granting PCRA 

counsel’s motion to withdraw where PCRA counsel’s 

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11 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

12 Antill raised two specific claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness: (1) counsel

failed to retain an expert witness to refute the Commonwealth’s expert 

medical witness, Karen Morris, M.D.; and (2) counsel failed to present relevant 

evidence “known and available to him at the time of trial” that supported the 

victim’s financial motive to fabricate allegations against him and that 

corroborated witness Ellison’s testimony. See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 1/10/21, 

at 12-21.
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no-merit letter was deficient under the standards of 

[]Turner and [] Finley.

(2) Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing [Antill’s] 

claim of ineffective assistance, relating to trial 

counsel’s neglect of impeachment evidence, where

[Antill] established merit, unreasonableness, and 

prejudice.

(3) Whether PCRA counsel was constitutionally ineffective 

for failing to file an amended petition raising the 

ineffectiveness of trial counsel, relating to trial 

counsel’s neglect of impeachment evidence.

(4) Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing [Antill’s] 

claim under Brady[,] where the prosecution failed to 

disclose extrajudicial statements by a prosecution 

witness that the witness had fabricated the allegations 

against [Antill].

(5) Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing [Antill’s] 

PCRA petition without a hearing where the PCRA 

petition presented claims raising genuine issues of 

material fact.

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

On appeal from the dismissal of a PCRA petition, this court must 

determine whether the post-conviction court’s findings were supported by the 

record and whether the court’s order is otherwise free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 647 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. 1994). The findings 

of the post-conviction court will not be disturbed unless they have no support 

in the record. Id. Finally, “a PCRA court’s credibility determinations are 

binding upon an appellate court so long as they are supported by the record.” 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 82 A.3d 998, 1013 (Pa. 2013) (citation 

omitted).
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In his first issue on appeal, Antill claims that the PCRA court improperly 

granted PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw where counsel’s Turner/Finley 

no-merit letter was deficient. Specifically, Antill claims that PCRA counsel 

failed to include, in his no-merit letter, Antill’s ineffectiveness claim regarding 

“trial counsel’s failure to present evidence in possession of the defense that 

would have corroborated the testimony of defense witness Dylan Ellison.” Pro 

Se Rule 907 Response, 4/7/21, at 1-2; see also Appellant’s Brief, at 40.

13

 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 904 sets forth a PCRA 

petitioner’s right to assistance of counsel for his or her first PCRA petition; 

once counsel is appointed, counsel must either amend the petitioner’s pro se 

petition or seek to withdraw from representation by complying with the 

mandates of Turner/Finley. Commonwealth v. Cherry, 155 A.3d 1080, 

1082 (Pa. Super. 2017). “If appointed counsel fails to take either of these 

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13 In his brief, Antill argues that there was no objectively reasonable basis for 

PCRA counsel not to include his ineffectiveness claim in the no-merit letter 

and that actual prejudice resulted from PCRA counsel’s error. See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 42. In his petition, Antill alleged that trial counsel “failed to elicit or 

present . . . evidence that [A.C.’s mother] and maternal aunt [] did, within 

mere days of [Antill’s] arrest, make unauthorized withdrawals from [Antill’s] 

bank account, depleting the account of an estimated seven-thousand five 

hundred dollars ($7,500.00), and effectuated [an] unauthorized sale of 

[Antill’s] collection of sports memorabilia, valued in excess of five-thousand 

dollars ($5,000.00).” Pro Se PCRA Petition, 1/10/21, at 17-18. Antill claims 

that this evidence would have provided “overt [proof] of a financial motive to 

contrive and perpetuate false claims against” him, “implicates the credibility 

of these witnesses[,]” and “corroborate[s] the testimony of defense witness[,] 

D[ylan] E[llison.]” Id. 
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steps, our courts have not hesitated to find that the petition was effectively 

uncounseled.” Id. at 1083. 

In Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768 (Pa. Super. 2014), our 

Court reiterated that:

The Turner/Finley decisions provide the manner for postconviction counsel to withdraw from representation. The 

holdings of those cases mandate an independent review of 

the record by competent counsel before a PCRA court or 

appellate court can authorize an attorney’s withdrawal. The 

necessary independent review requires counsel to file a “nomerit” letter detailing the nature and extent of his review 

and list each issue the petitioner wishes to have 

examined, explaining why those issues are meritless. 

The PCRA court, or an appellate court if the no-merit letter 

is filed before it, see Turner, supra, then must conduct its 

own independent evaluation of the record and agree with 

counsel that the petition is without merit. See

[Commonwealth v.] Pitts, [] 981 A.2d 875, 876 ([Pa.]

2009)[.]

In Commonwealth v. Friend, [] 896 A.2d 607 ([Pa. 

Super.] 2006)[,] abrogated in part by Pitts, supra, this 

Court imposed additional requirements on counsel that 

closely track the procedure for withdrawing on direct appeal. 

Pursuant to Friend, counsel is required to 

contemporaneously serve upon his client his no-merit letter 

and application to withdraw along with a statement that if 

the court granted counsel’s withdrawal request, the client 

may proceed pro se or with a privately retained attorney. 

Though Chief Justice Castille noted in Pitts that this Court 

is not authorized to craft procedural rules, the Court did not 

overturn this aspect of Friend[,] as those prerequisites did 

not apply to the petitioner in Pitts. See Pitts, supra at 

881 (Castille, C.J. concurring).

After the decision in Pitts, this Court held in 

Commonwealth v. Widgins, [] 29 A.3d 816 ([Pa. Super.]

2011), that the additional procedural requirements of 

Friend were still applicable during collateral review.
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Commonwealth v. Rykard, [] 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 ([Pa. Super.]

2012)[.]

Id. at 774-75 (emphasis added).

The Commonwealth acknowledges that one of the requirements to 

withdraw from representing a PCRA petitioner is listing, in a no-merit letter, 

each issue the petitioner wished to have reviewed. Appellee’s Brief, at 10. 

Case law has been clear that this is a prerequisite to a trial court permitting 

PCRA counsel withdrawal. Recognizing that PCRA counsel failed to list one of 

Antill’s PCRA claims in his no-merit letter, and the fact that the court permitted 

counsel to withdraw despite this omission, the Commonwealth “defers to this 

Court to determine whether the PCRA court correctly allowed counsel to 

withdraw.” Appellee’s Brief, at 10. 

After careful consideration, we decline to overlook counsel’s omission in 

light of established case law on the proper collateral withdrawal procedure and 

the precept that PCRA counsel seeking to withdraw “must review the case 

zealously.” Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (citation omitted). See Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 206 A.3d 1135, 

1139 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“Where PCRA counsel’s no-merit letter does not 

discuss all of the issues that the convicted defendant has raised in a first PCRA 

petition and explain why they lack merit, it does not satisfy these mandatory 

requirements and dismissal of the PCRA petition without requiring counsel to 

file an amended PCRA petition or a further, adequate no-merit letter is a 

deprivation of the right to counsel on the PCRA petition.”). See also 

Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 945-47 (Pa. Super. 2003); 
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Commonwealth v. Glover, 738 A.2d 460, 464-65 (Pa. Super. 1999); 

Commonwealth v. Mosteller, 633 A.2d 615 (Pa. Super. 1993).

14

 

Accordingly, because counsel’s no-merit letter fails to comply with the 

Supreme Court’s mandate in Turner, as explained by this Court in Finley, we 

must vacate the PCRA court’s order dismissing Antill’s PCRA petition and 

granting counsel’s petition to withdraw. See Kelsey, supra at 1140 (where 

counsel’s no-merit letter fails to discuss all issues raised by petitioner in first 

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14 We are also mindful of our Supreme Court’s recent decision, 

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 2021 Pa. LEXIS 3819 (Pa. filed Oct. 20, 2021), 

that recognized the need to enact a “more appropriate mechanism for the 

enforcement of effective assistance of counsel in proceedings under the 

[PCRA].” Id. at *1. In Bradley, the Court adopted a new procedure whereby 

PCRA petitioners could raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in a 

collateral appeal, after a PCRA court has denied relief and the petitioner either 

has obtained new counsel or is acting pro se. Id. In reaching its holding, the 

Court “scrutinized” the procedure behind Rule 907, noting that the rule is 

silent on ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel or claim preservation and the 

burden that is placed on a pro se petitioner if he or she is required to timely 

respond under Rule 907 with such claims. Id. at *43, *46. 

Instantly, the Commonwealth states that on April 7, 2021, Antill filed a second 

pro se response to the court’s Rule 907 notice. See Appellee’s Brief, at 3. 

Notably, this is the same day that the court’s order dismissing Antill’s PCRA 

petition and granting PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw was filed. However, 

Antill’s second Rule 907 response is not included in the certified record on 

appeal. In addition, we do not know when Antill received notice of the court’s 

intent to dismiss his petition—thus, we cannot establish when the 20-day Rule 

907 clock started ticking. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) (“The defendant may 

respond to the proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice.”). 

Moreover, even if twenty days had passed by the time Antill filed his second 

response, under Bradley, Antill is not precluded from raising any PCRA

ineffectiveness claims in his current collateral appeal. See Commonwealth 

v. Vo, 235 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2020) (Rule 907 response is opportunity 

for petitioner to object to dismissal and alert PCRA court of perceived error, 

permitting court to discern potential for amendment to petition).
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PCRA petition and explain why they lack merit, dismissal of petition without 

requiring counsel file amended PCRA petition or adequate no-merit letter is 

deprivation of right to counsel on petition). The trial court is directed to have 

counsel fully comply with the dictates of Turner/Finley, including listing in 

his no-merit letter each issue Antill raised in his pro se PCRA petition,15 with 

a detailed explanation of why each issue is meritless, if he seeks withdrawal 

upon remand.16 

Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.17

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15 We also direct the court, upon remand, to address whether Antill filed a 

timely, second pro se Rule 907 notice, and, if so, instruct counsel to be mindful 

of any issues raised in that response that should be addressed in his no-merit 

letter and, thereafter, in any forthcoming Rule 1925(a) opinion by the trial 

court.

16 As our Court recognized in Kelsey, supra, even though the PCRA court 

conducted an independent review of the claims it believed were asserted in

Antill’s pro se petition, the error here is not the sufficiency of the PCRA court’s 

Rule 1925(a) opinion or whether the claims in Antill’s petition are meritorious. 

206 A.3d at 1140. Rather, the error stems from the denial of assistance of 

counsel. Id. (“Even where a pro se first PCRA petition appears on its face to 

be meritless, the defendant is entitled to representation by counsel before that 

determination is made.”) (citations omitted).

17 Because we have determined that vacation and remand is necessary based 

on Antill’s first issue on appeal, we need not reach his remaining issues. 

Kelsey, supra.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/19/2021