In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3461

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH BANKS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08 CR 688 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Defendant Joseph Banks was

convicted of committing or attempting to commit four sepa‐

rate robberies over a 12‐month period between 2007 and

2008, and was sentenced to 432 months’ imprisonment. On

appeal, Banks challenges both his conviction and his sen‐

tence. He claims that the district court violated his right to

counsel under the Sixth Amendment not only by permitting
2 No. 14‐3461

him to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se on the

eve of trial, but also by not rescinding the waiver when it be‐

came clear during trial that he would forgo participating in

most of the trial proceedings. We disagree. The district court

permitted Banks to proceed pro se only after concluding that

his waiver of his right to trial counsel was both knowing and

voluntary.

In addition, Banks argues that the district court commit‐

ted procedural error during his sentencing hearing by failing

to adequately justify his sentence, by failing to address sev‐

eral of his principal mitigation arguments, and by treating

the federal sentencing guidelines as mandatory. However,

we find that the district court adequately explained the rea‐

sons for Banks’s sentence, addressed his principal mitigation

arguments, and did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory.

So we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Banks was charged with two counts of bank robbery and

two counts of attempted bank robbery in connection with

four separate incidents that occurred between August 2007

and August 2008. All four incidents involved the use of a

gun, and two were particularly violent. On one occasion,

Banks pulled one bank employee to the ground and pointed

a gun at him. Afterward, he hit another employee over the

head with the gun, causing the employee to turn pale, fall to

the floor, and hyperventilate. On another occasion, Banks

forced a bystander into the bank at gunpoint.

A. Trial Proceedings

Over four years elapsed between the filing of a criminal

complaint against Banks in September 2008 and the com‐
No. 14‐3461 3

mencement of his trial in December 2012. Much of the delay

is attributable to Banks repeatedly terminating his counsel—

five separate times in total. The final termination—the only

relevant one on appeal—took place on the first day of trial.

Shortly before jury selection was to commence, Banks’s

counsel informed the district court that Banks had “relieved”

him, and that Banks intended to proceed “in propria persona”

(which the counsel understood to mean pro se). A colloquy

between Banks and the district court ensued in which Banks

insisted that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. After the

court asked Banks’s counsel to stay on in a stand‐by capaci‐

ty, the colloquy continued. Banks was informed of the

charges against him and the potential penalties he would

face if convicted. He confirmed that he intended to represent

himself at trial, and noted that he had been studying the law

while in custody. He also confirmed he understood that pro‐

ceeding pro se was a serious decision that no one had pushed

him to make, and that the court would not provide him with

any advice. The court ultimately concluded that Banks had

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and

the trial continued.  

Banks’s participation in the trial was minimal. He de‐

clined to object to the government’s motions in limine, strike

any jurors, present his own witnesses, cross‐examine the

government’s witnesses, object to any of the government’s

questions, or comment on the jury instructions. Rather, his

participation was often confined to stating that he was “cap‐

tive” and would not be “partaking in this proceeding.” In

addition, he repeatedly asked (unsuccessfully) to be excused

from attending the trial, and rebuffed the district judge’s

numerous suggestions that he permit his standby counsel to
4 No. 14‐3461

represent him. Banks did attempt, however, to make open‐

ing and closing statements, but when he failed to confine his

remarks to trial evidence (expected or presented) the district

judge cut him off. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury con‐

victed him on all four counts.

B. Post‐Trial Proceedings

Several days after the jury rendered its verdict, Banks es‐

caped from the downtown Chicago prison where he was be‐

ing held pending sentencing. He and his cellmate cut a hole

in the cinderblock wall and, using a rope comprised of bed‐

sheets and dental floss, rappelled 17 stories down the build‐

ing’s exterior wall in the middle of the night. After a two‐

day manhunt, law enforcement apprehended Banks several

miles from the prison. (The government initially charged

Banks with escaping from federal custody but later dis‐

missed the complaint voluntarily.)

Shortly after Banks was returned to custody, he consent‐

ed to representation by counsel, who filed on his behalf a

motion for a new trial and for acquittal. Banks argued that

he had not knowingly or voluntarily waived his right to

counsel, and that the district court should have permitted his

stand‐by counsel to make a closing argument for him upon

terminating his closing remarks. The district court denied

the motion, concluding that Banks clearly demonstrated that

he did not want to be represented by counsel and that the

court was not required to compel attorney representation.

The court also emphasized that she had repeatedly warned

Banks to focus his closing argument on admitted evidence

before she cut him off.
No. 14‐3461 5

In preparation for sentencing, the probation office pre‐

pared a presentence report (PSR) that calculated a total of‐

fense level of 38, a criminal history category of VI, and a

Guidelines range of 360 to 390 months’ imprisonment. In

advocating for a 180‐month sentence, Banks argued that his

criminal history overstated the degree of harm he posed to

the public, and that a shorter sentence was warranted due to

his poor self‐representation at trial and the likelihood that

the harsh prison conditions he had endured post‐escape

would continue. The government advocated for a 540‐month

sentence and asked the court take Banks’s escape into ac‐

count. The district court adopted the PSR’s offense‐level and

criminal‐history calculations, and concluded that the Guide‐

lines recommended a sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment

to life. After hearing arguments and testimony from both

parties, the court sentenced Banks to 432 months’ imprison‐

ment.  

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Banks claims that the district court erroneous‐

ly concluded that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived

his right to counsel before jury selection occurred, and that

the court should have revoked his waiver when Banks re‐

fused to participate in the trial. Banks also argues that the

district judge committed various procedural errors in arriv‐

ing at and explaining his sentence. We disagree.  

A. No Error to Allow Banks to Represent Himself

Both parties here insist that we generally review a waiver

of one’s right to counsel for abuse of discretion and cite cases

that are in accordance. But as the government correctly con‐

cedes, there is a separate line of cases indicating that de novo
6 No. 14‐3461

review is the proper standard. See generally United States v.

Clark, 774 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.

Todd, 424 F.3d 525, 530 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005). We need not re‐

solve this disagreement, since Banks’s claims fail under ei‐

ther standard.

1. Banks’s Waiver Was Knowing and Voluntary

The Constitution guarantees all defendants the right to

counsel during a criminal trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806, 807 (1975). It is equally well established, however, that a

criminal defendant may waive that right and proceed pro se

when he knowingly and voluntarily elects to do so. Id. at

834–35. When such a waiver is timely made by a competent

defendant, a trial court may not deny it. Imani v. Pollard, No.

14‐3407, 2016 WL 3434673, at *3 (7th Cir. June 22, 2016).

Waiver is permissible even though the defendant “may

ultimately conduct his own defense to his detriment.” United

States v. Avery, 208 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2000). But he must

still “be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of

self‐representation, so that the record will establish that he

knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes

open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (citation and internal quota‐

tion marks omitted); see also United States v. Boultinghouse,

784 F.3d 1163, 1171 (7th Cir. 2015) (instructing trial courts to

“engag[e] the defendant in a colloquy”). To determine

whether a waiver was knowing and voluntary, we examine

the record as a whole and consider four factors: (1) the extent

of the district court’s formal inquiry into the defendant’s de‐

cision; (2) the evidence in the record about whether the de‐

fendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self‐

representation; (3) the defendant’s background and experi‐

ence; and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision. United
No. 14‐3461 7

States v. Volpentesta, 727 F.3d 666, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (cita‐

tions omitted).  

We conclude that Banks knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel. The court’s colloquy with Banks

was wide‐ranging and thorough. She inquired into Banks’s

legal education, as well as his familiarity with the Federal

Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure, history of self‐

representation, and objection to the court’s jurisdiction over

him. In addition, the court stressed that if Banks proceeded

pro se, she would not advise him about how to proceed in the

courtroom and would follow the Federal Rules of Evidence

regardless of whether he made the appropriate objections.  

This colloquy adequately apprised Banks of the dangers

of proceeding pro se. The district court had the government

explain the charges and possible penalties and reiterated the

maximum penalties—80 years in prison and a $1,000,000  

fine. She also repeatedly told Banks that deciding to proceed

without counsel was a very serious decision, and advised

that he should allow his appointed counsel to represent him.

See United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 409 (7th Cir. 2001)

(upholding waiver where district court advised defendant

that he “would be far better off being defended by a trained

lawyer and that it would be ‘unwise’ to defend himself be‐

cause of the complexity of the legal issues involved”).  

The context of Banks’s decision further suggests that his

waiver was knowing and voluntary. Banks fired his trial

counsel (at least in part) in order to make his sovereign‐

citizen defense that the court lacked jurisdiction over him.1

                                                 

1 “Defendants claiming to be ‘sovereign citizens’ assert that the fed‐

eral government is illegitimate and insist that they are not subject to its
8 No. 14‐3461

We have repeatedly observed that “[a] waiver is likely

knowing and voluntary if the defendant gave it for strategic

reasons or after repeatedly rejecting the assistance of coun‐

sel.” United States v. England, 507 F.3d 581, 588 (7th Cir.

2007); see also, e.g., Volpentesta, 727 F.3d at 678 (finding that

defendant’s waiver “was a strategic decision he made so that

he could pursue the case as he desired”). Moreover, the dis‐

trict judge clearly informed Banks that, although she was

denying his sovereign‐citizen argument, he was free to ap‐

peal that ruling at the conclusion of the case.  

Although Banks was not a legal practitioner, he noted

that he had been engaged in legal study while awaiting trial

and that he was familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence

and Criminal Procedure. This alone may not demonstrate

that Banks “appreciated the gravity of his waiver.” Volpentes‐

ta, 727 F.3d at 677; see id. (concluding that the defendant’s

background supported a finding of waiver where he had

graduated from high school and had taken community col‐

lege classes, had been involved in three bench trials and a

bankruptcy in connection with his business, and had been a

defendant in an earlier criminal trial). However, all four fac‐

tors, taken together, clearly demonstrate that Banks’s waiver

was both knowing and voluntary—a finding that Banks

himself supported by expressly confirming during the collo‐

quy that his “decision to proceed here without a lawyer

[was] entirely voluntary,” and that no one had “push[ed]”

him into his decision.

                                                                                                             

jurisdiction. The defense has ‘no conceivable validity in American law.’”

United States v. Jonassen, 759 F.3d 653, 657 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting

United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990)).
No. 14‐3461 9

Banks contends that the waiver inquiry was unnecessary,

since he did not “clearly and unequivocally” invoke his right

to self‐representation to begin with, but instead merely con‐

veyed his desire to fire his counsel. In support, Banks points

to the following discussion at the outset of his colloquy with

the district judge:

THE DEFENDANT: Objection, your Honor. I am here. I

am appearing in propria persona today.

THE COURT: All right. And that means you want to

represent yourself.

THE DEFENDANT: No. I am here in propria persona.

* * * *

THE COURT: Are you representing yourself?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Who is representing you?

THE DEFENDANT: My status is sui juris. I’m here in

propria persona today.

But when viewed in context of the remainder of the col‐

loquy, however, it’s clear that Banks was preoccupied with

making his sovereign‐citizen defense known to the court; he

was not asking that replacement counsel be appointed. For

example, the district court began asking questions relating to

knowledge and voluntariness immediately after the ex‐

change below:

THE COURT: All right. Well, I will tell you what. I un‐

derstand that you are relieving Mr. Brindley and his of‐

fice from representing you. I am going to ask that they

remain here as standby counsel. But you are certainly

free under the Constitution to proceed on your own.  

THE DEFENDANT: Exactly. That’s what I so choose, your

Honor.
10 No. 14‐3461

(emphasis added). So the district court correctly understood

Banks was waiving his right to counsel.  

2. No Error in Not Rescinding Waiver During Trial

Banks argues that his refusal to participate in the trial

proceedings should have prompted the district court to re‐

scind his waiver. But Banks was not completely unwilling to

participate—he attempted to make opening and closing

statements. And his unwillingness to focus on facts during

those arguments, coupled with his general inaction, under‐

scores his strategy of pressing his sovereign‐citizen view‐

point. The fact that that strategy was unwise, without more,

is irrelevant. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 385, 391

(7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he right to self‐representation cannot be

denied merely because a defendant lacks legal knowledge or

otherwise makes for a poor advocate.”).

Nor did Banks engage in the sort of obstructionist behav‐

ior that warranted waiver rescission in United States v. Brock,

159 F.3d 1077 (7th Cir. 1998), and United States v. Brown, 791

F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1986). Although Banks’s refusal to partici‐

pate in the proceedings, repeated challenges to the court’s

jurisdiction, and repeated requests to be removed from the

courtroom may have delayed the proceedings and tested the

patience of the district court and the government, they in no

way “made it practically impossible [for the trial] to pro‐

ceed.” Brock, 159 F.3d at 1080–81 (observing that defendant

“refused to cooperate, even minimally, with the court,” even

after several contempt citations). More importantly, even if

Banks’s actions did warrant rescission—and they did not—

the district judge was not obligated to rescind. See Berry, 565

F.3d at 391 (“The Constitution may have allowed the trial

judge to block his request to go it alone, but it certainly
No. 14‐3461 11

didn’t require it.”); accord United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d

872, 879 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jonassen, 759 F.3d 653,

661 n.4 (7th Cir. 2014).

Banks’s reliance on Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748 (7th Cir.

1992), is misplaced. As Banks notes, we observed in Cain that

“defendants forfeit self‐representation by remaining silent at

critical junctures before or during trial.” Id. at 750. What

Banks ignores, however, is the fact that Cain involved a de‐

fendant who acquiesced to representation by counsel by stay‐

ing silent throughout the proceedings. In doing so, he effec‐

tively forfeited any right to argue later on that he was denied

his right to represent himself. This aspect of Cain does not

apply to defendants who proceed pro se but decide for stra‐

tegic reasons to remain silent.  

3. Banks’s Other Arguments Are Meritless

Banks attacks the district court’s waiver decision on sev‐

eral other grounds, all of which lack merit. First, he suggests

that the court should have rejected his waiver as untimely.

But the request was timely, since it was made before the jury

was empaneled. United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 668

(7th Cir. 2000). And even if the request was untimely, Banks

does not claim that the court was required to reject it. Nor

could he. See United States v. Oakey, 853 F.2d 551, 553 (7th

Cir. 1988) (concluding that “where a request to proceed pro

se is untimely, a court may, in its discretion, deny the motion”

(emphasis added)); cf. United States v. Kosmel, 272 F.3d 501,

506 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that a district court “has broad

discretion in granting mid‐trial requests to proceed pro se”).

Banks also contends that the trial itself somehow violated

his due process rights because the government was not
12 No. 14‐3461

forced to present its case subject to an adversarial process

(because of Banks’s nonparticipation). But poor self‐

representation alone does not amount to a due process viola‐

tion. United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2003)

(rejecting claim that pro se defendant’s “readily apparent de‐

ficiency in performance at trial offends not only the defend‐

ant’s rights but also undermines public confidence in the in‐

tegrity of judicial proceedings”); cf. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834

n.46 (“[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot

thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense

amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”).

Lastly, Banks argues that the district court erred in failing

to acknowledge her authority to reject his pro se request.

However, Banks has not cited any case law (and we are not

aware of any) that requires a judge to expressly reference this

authority. Nor does the record suggest that the district court

misunderstood her authority; indeed, had she believed she

was obligated to approve Banks’s pro se request, both the

lengthy colloquy and her ultimate knowledge/voluntariness

finding would have been unnecessary. In sum, the court cor‐

rectly permitted Banks to represent himself during the trial.

B. No Procedural Errors During Banks’s Sentencing

Banks argues that the district court procedurally erred in

determining and explaining his 432‐month sentence. Specifi‐

cally, he claims that the court failed to address three of his

principal mitigation arguments, failed to adequately explain

his sentence, and treated the Guidelines as mandatory.  

We review de novo whether a district court has commit‐

ted procedural error during sentencing. United States v. Mar‐

in‐Castano, 688 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2012). Procedural error
No. 14‐3461 13

occurs when a court “fail[s] to calculate (or improperly cal‐

culate[s]) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as

mandatory, fail[s] to consider the § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail[s] to ade‐

quately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). District courts must also “consider a

defendant’s principal, nonfrivolous arguments for lenience.”

United States v. Martin, 718 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (per

curiam). In considering such arguments, the judge must

demonstrate that she “has considered the parties’ arguments

and has a reasoned basis for exercising [her] own legal deci‐

sionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356

(2007). A brief explanation is often acceptable “where the

context and record make clear the reasoning underlying the

district court’s conclusion.” United States v. Schroeder, 536

F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 2008). We typically will not find a sen‐

tence to be procedurally unreasonable so long as the record

demonstrates that the court meaningfully considered the de‐

fendant’s arguments, “even if implicitly and imprecisely.”

United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2010).  

1. Sentence Adequately Explained  

Banks argues that the district court failed to explain why

the 432‐month sentence was necessary. While Banks con‐

cedes that the court explicitly referenced a need to protect

society and help Banks “recognize, in a realistic way, who he

is,” he suggests that the 180‐month sentence he proposed

may well have satisfied these objectives. We find, however,

that although the district court may not have discussed the

§ 3553(a) factors in a checklist fashion—which it was not re‐

quired to do, United States v. Perez, 581 F.3d 539, 548 (7th Cir.
14 No. 14‐3461

2009)—the court provided an adequate statement of its rea‐

sons at the sentencing hearing.

In concluding that a “very substantial” sentence was re‐

quired, the district court emphasized that Banks had en‐

gaged in “extremely costly, menacing, dangerous activity.”

She discussed the violent nature with which Banks wielded

his weapon, as well as the emotional and financial trauma

that his victims suffered in the wake of his robberies. The

court also referenced Banks’s personal history and character‐

istics—in particular, his refusal to accept full responsibility

for his crimes, his artistic talents, and his troubled upbring‐

ing. And the court touched upon the available alternative

sentences, as she compared the government’s proposed 45‐

year sentence and Banks’s own suggested sentence against

the retributivist and public‐safety reasons that, in the court’s

mind, warranted a “significant” sentence. In sum, the district

court’s analysis reflects “an individualized assessment based

on the facts presented” that allows for “meaningful appellate

review and ... promote[s] the perception of fair sentencing.”

Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

2. Mitigation Arguments Addressed

Banks also argues that during his sentencing hearing, the

district court failed to address three of his principal mitiga‐

tion arguments: (1) that the “unusually harsh” confinement

conditions he had endured following his escape would likely

continue post‐sentencing; (2) that his criminal‐history cate‐

gory overstated his prior criminal conduct; and (3) that his

conviction was based on evidence that was never “meaning‐

fully tested,” due to his poor self‐representation. While the

court’s response to these arguments was indirect and brief, it

was not so deficient as to constitute procedural error.
No. 14‐3461 15

The district court adequately addressed Banks’s argu‐

ment regarding confinement conditions. The court began by

acknowledging that it “may very well be true” that prison

officials “overreacted” to Banks’s escape with the confine‐

ment conditions they imposed on him. She then observed

that “trying to thwart even the simple efforts to maintain se‐

curity in a federal correctional facility is really a step too

far,” and explicitly referenced the balance between “the

harm that’s been done to the victims” with “the harm that

we are now going to do to the defendant in return.”  

The district court also adequately addressed Banks’s ar‐

gument that his criminal‐history category overstated his ear‐

lier unlawful actions. The court found Banks’s description of

himself as “anti‐gun” untenable, since he had used a gun,

often violently, in all four of his robberies. She also rejected

the notion that Banks was a “peacemaker,” noting that he

“made havoc in this case” and “created very serious terror

and disturbance in several banks and for several victims.”

And she described Banks’s robberies as “the conduct of a vi‐

olent man,” described him generally as “a threat and a men‐

ace to anybody who might work in a bank,” and discussed

his escape “as part of a larger pattern of [his] rejection of the

system.”

In addition, the district court indirectly addressed

Banks’s argument regarding his poor self‐representation, in‐

sofar as she criticized him for “reject[ing] the services of

lawyers ... who prepared amply for his defense, [and] who,

throughout the trial, day after day ... stepped into the court‐

room.” She also noted that these attorneys “begged” her at

closing argument to “allow them to make a closing for

[Banks], because they saw an opportunity for a defense.”
16 No. 14‐3461

Critically, the court disparaged Banks for “cho[osing] to

adopt the sovereign citizen defense, which he confesses now

was an act.” When viewing these statements in the aggre‐

gate, it’s clear that the district court found Banks to be unde‐

serving of any sympathy for deciding to proceed pro se

throughout the trial.

3. Guidelines Not Treated as Mandatory

Finally, Banks contends that the district court treated the

Guidelines as mandatory, based on a brief colloquy between

the court and a probation officer at the hearing. After an‐

nouncing the 432‐month sentence, the district court noted

that the sentence on each of the four counts would run con‐

currently. But doing so would not have resulted in the an‐

nounced sentence, since none of the counts carried a maxi‐

mum that exceeded 240 months. The probation officer called

the court’s attention to this error, prompting the court to

clarify that Counts I and II would be served consecutively to

Counts III and IV.  

This clarification was consistent with the Guidelines. See,

e.g., United States v. Craig, 703 F.3d 1001, 1002 (7th Cir. 2012)

(per curiam) (explaining that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) “tell[s] the

judge to sentence consecutively when necessary to bring the

total sentence into the guidelines range”). But that, by itself,

does not demonstrate that the district court considered her‐

self to be bound by the Guidelines. We have explained that

when the Supreme Court declared the Guidelines to be advi‐

sory, “it expected that many (perhaps most) sentences

would continue to reflect the results obtained through an

application of the Guidelines.” United States v. Mykytiuk, 415

F.3d 606, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). Banks also ignores several facts

that indicate the court believed herself to be unbound—she
No. 14‐3461 17

entertained Banks’s argument for a below‐Guidelines sen‐

tence and imposed the 432‐month sentence before discussing

whether and to what extent the counts would run concur‐

rently or consecutively. So Banks has failed to establish that

the district court committed any procedural errors.

III.  CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.