Filed 5/17/21 In re Nathaniel G. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re NATHANIEL G., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile

Court Law.

 B307090

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 20CCJP01025A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VICTOR G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Reversed in part 

and affirmed in part. 
2

Jacques Alexander Love, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, Acting County Counsel, Kim 

Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

______________

Victor G., the father of eight-year-old Nathaniel G., appeals 

the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order 

declaring Nathaniel a dependent of the court and removing him 

from Victor’s custody after the court sustained a petition 

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivisions (a) and (b)(1).1 Victor contends the court’s 

jurisdiction findings and its disposition order were not supported 

by substantial evidence. Although we reverse the finding as to 

Victor under section 300, subdivision (a), as not properly stating 

a basis for dependency jurisdiction, we affirm the court’s finding

of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and its 

disposition order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Nathaniel’s Family

Diana T. is Nathaniel’s biological mother. Her 

whereabouts have remained unknown throughout the 

dependency proceedings. Mariela R., Victor’s girlfriend, was 

found by the juvenile court to be Nathaniel’s presumed mother. 

When dependency proceedings were initiated, Victor, Mariela and 

Nathaniel lived in the paternal grandparents’ home. The three of 

them shared a bedroom. Mariela’s sister Gabriela also lived in 

1 Statutory references are to this code.
3

the home and watched Nathaniel when Victor and Mariela were 

at work.

2. The Sustained Second Amended Petition and the 

Juvenile Court’s Disposition Order

On February 4, 2020 the Los Angeles County Department 

of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral 

stating that Nathaniel had bruises on his arm and Mariela was 

physically abusing Nathaniel on a daily basis, including pinching 

and biting him. The report also said Mariela had attacked the 

paternal grandmother when she tried to protect Nathaniel.

Following an initial investigation, the Department detained 

Nathaniel on February 18, 2020 pursuant to a protective custody 

warrant and initiated dependency proceedings. Ultimately the 

Department filed a six-count, second amended dependency 

petition to protect Nathaniel from Victor, Mariela and Diana. 

The Department’s operative petition, filed July 8, 2020,

alleged in identical language as a basis for dependency 

jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical 

harm) and (b)(1) (failure to protect), that Mariela had physically 

abused Nathaniel on one occasion by striking his arm, inflicting a 

bruise, and on other occasions by pinching and striking his arm 

and hand and striking his buttocks with her hand and that such 

abuse was excessive and caused Nathaniel unreasonable pain 

and suffering. These two counts further alleged Victor knew of 

the physical abuse and failed to protect Nathaniel.

In additional counts pursuant to section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), the sustained second amended petition alleged 

Nathaniel was at substantial risk of harm because Victor had a 

history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine, was a 

current abuser of marijuana and alcohol, and had used and been 
4

under the influence of marijuana while Nathaniel was in his care, 

all of which rendered him incapable of providing regular care for 

the child; Victor had a history of engaging in violent and 

assaultive behavior, including physical assaults against 

Nathaniel’s paternal grandparents; Victor had established a 

detrimental and endangering home environment for Nathaniel by 

allowing Mariela to reside in the home and have unlimited access 

to Nathaniel while knowing she was a current abuser of 

marijuana and alcohol and, together with Victor, had been under 

the influence of marijuana while Nathaniel was in Victor’s care; 

and Diana had a history of substance abuse and was a frequent 

user of methamphetamine, which rendered her incapable of 

providing regular care for Nathaniel. 

The court sustained the second amended petition as 

pleaded at a jurisdiction hearing on July 29, 2020 at which the 

court received into evidence the Department’s reports and proof 

from Mariela that she had enrolled in a parenting class and was 

participating in drug testing and heard argument from counsel. 

Proceeding to disposition, the court ordered Nathaniel removed 

from the care and custody of Victor and Mariela, noting in 

particular “the still-unaddressed anger and substance use” 

issues. The court ordered family reunification services for Victor 

and Mariela, including a full drug and alcohol program with 

weekly testing, a parenting program and individual counseling to 

address anger management, appropriate child discipline and 

substance abuse, with monitored visitation at a minimum of 

three times per week for three hours per visit. Mariela was also 

ordered to participate in an anger management program. As to 

Nathaniel, the court ordered an autism assessment and 

individual counseling, with conjoint counseling with the parents 
5

if recommended by his therapist. No reunification services were 

ordered for Diana, whose whereabouts remained unknown, 

pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1).

3. The Department’s Reports to the Court 

a. The detention report

The detailed detention report, admitted into evidence at the 

jurisdiction hearing, described a visit by the social worker to the 

paternal grandparents’ home on February 4, 2020 following the 

report of physical abuse by Mariela. The paternal grandmother 

showed the social worker a photograph of Nathaniel’s bruised 

arm, dated December 20, 2019. Although Nathaniel had initially

told his grandmother he did not know how he had been bruised, 

he later told her Mariela had caused it. During the interview the 

paternal grandmother, who appeared scared or nervous to the 

social worker, indicated Victor had hit her in the past. The 

paternal grandmother also reported that Victor regularly used 

marijuana. The paternal grandmother subsequently provided 

videos that showed large containers of marijuana accessible to 

Nathaniel while Victor and Mariela had left the child at home. 

Victor denied any physical abuse of Nathaniel. He 

explained he and Mariela disciplined Nathaniel in three steps: a 

verbal warning; a “hand pop”; and, if those steps were 

unsuccessful, spanking on the butt with a hand. With respect to 

the bruise, Victor said Nathaniel had told him he hit himself on a 

rack at a store when with the paternal grandmother. Victor 

acknowledged his use of marijuana, but initially said he only 

used it about twice a week and always outside the home. He 

denied storing marijuana at the house. When asked by the social 

worker about the strong smell of marijuana in his room, however, 

Victor admitted he sometimes smoked in the house. Mariela 
6

confirmed the three-step discipline system, denied causing any 

bruises on Nathaniel and said she did not pinch or bite the child. 

Mariela told the social worker she consumed marijuana edibles, 

which she kept in her purse.

Nathaniel told the social worker he received “pops” from 

Victor and Mariela when he was in trouble and said the bruise on 

his arm was from bumping into something at a store with his 

grandmother. He denied telling anyone Mariela or Victor hit him 

or left bruises on him. Interviewed the following day by a 

sheriff’s deputy, however, Nathaniel finally admitted that 

Mariela pinched him and hit him on his arm and hand, but still 

denied she caused any bruising. When the deputy told Victor 

that Nathaniel had disclosed that Mariela was hitting and 

pinching him, Victor argued with the deputy and said he did not

believe her. The paternal grandparents told the deputy they 

were afraid of Victor and did not feel safe with him in their home. 

On February 5, 2020 the social worker contacted Victor’s 

ex-wife, Ariana F., as had been suggested by a paternal uncle. 

(Ariana remained in contact with the paternal grandmother so 

Nathaniel could have a relationship with Ariana’s son, 

Nathaniel’s half-brother.) Ariana reported that Nathaniel had 

called her the prior day to say he was being hit by Mariela and 

had recently left a voicemail for her mother asking for protection 

from Mariela. The social worker subsequently obtained a copy of 

that voicemail in which Nathaniel said his grandmother told him 

the person being called was going to help him because Mariela 

had been hitting him a lot. Ariana indicated Victor could be 

violent and said she had seen him punch the paternal 

grandmother and paternal grandfather on a few occasions during 

arguments. 
7

In a follow-up interview with the paternal grandmother 

conducted by a Spanish-speaking social worker, the paternal 

grandmother said she had seen suspicious bruises on Nathaniel’s 

face and arms prior to December 2019; but when she asked about 

them, Nathaniel would not answer. The paternal grandmother 

also reported she heard Victor and Mariela yelling at the child a 

lot, and Nathaniel told her he was afraid of them because they hit 

him. She said Victor and Mariela smoked marijuana every day 

and she believed they did so in Nathaniel’s presence. The 

paternal grandmother also described an incident in October 2019 

when Victor had aggressively pulled her and threw her across the 

room and then attacked the paternal grandfather when he 

attempted to come to her aid. 

b. The jurisdiction/disposition report

Interviewed again for the jurisdiction/disposition report, 

Nathaniel repeated that Victor and Mariela hit his hand when he 

was in trouble, denied either of them pinched him and denied 

they used any objects when disciplining him. He now explained 

the bruising on his arm was the result of a fall from a scooter. He 

said he was not afraid of Victor, or Mariela or Gabriela.

Victor explained that he and Mariela worked from 

2:00 p.m. to midnight. He and Mariela smoked marijuana every 

day when they woke up at noon and again after midnight when 

they returned home from work. Victor insisted they only smoked 

outside on the patio and said he stored the marijuana in a jar on 

a shelf out of Nathaniel’s reach. Gabriela took Nathaniel to and 

from school. Victor denied ever assaulting the paternal 

grandparents.

The paternal grandfather told the social worker when 

interviewed in early April 2020 that he had seen fresh pinch 
8

marks on Nathaniel’s cheeks, fingers and hands. The 

grandfather asked Nathaniel in front of Victor who had pinched 

him. Nathaniel said Mariela. Victor rejected the answer. The 

paternal grandfather reported Victor had pushed him in the past 

during arguments, but had not hit him. 

In her further interview the paternal grandmother said 

Nathaniel had asked her not to leave him alone with Mariela 

because she hit him. She also confirmed the assault in October 

2019, saying Victor had lifted and dropped her three times. The 

paternal grandmother reported Victor had used 

methamphetamine in the past (something Ariana had told the 

social worker several months earlier) and expressed her belief he 

was using again, explaining he did “not sleep for days, sometimes 

three days in a row” and was “easily irritable, violent, aggressive 

and desperate,” symptoms she said she recognized as indicating 

someone was using methamphetamine. 

Victor was enrolled in random drug testing. In the period 

February through April 2020 he had two positive tests for 

marijuana and six “no shows.” Mariela in February and March 

2020 had two positive tests for marijuana and four “no shows.” 

c. The last minute information reports

In a last minute information for the court filed on July 15, 

2020, the Department reported that Nathaniel in a June 9, 2020

interview, questioned about the fact his grandmother said he had 

a lot of bruises, said Mariela “would get mad at me and hit me 

with her black sandal. She hit me on my hands lots of times. 

Like more than 10 separate times. She hit me like 5 times every

time she got mad. I am scared of her because sometimes she is 

nice, other times she is mean, especially when my dad is not 

home.” When Nathaniel told his father, Victor called Mariela 
9

who denied using a sandal to hit the child. Victor accused 

Nathaniel of lying. Nathaniel continued, “My dad believes 

[Mariela], but not me. I’m scared of [Mariela] because I had told 

my dad she hits me with her black sandal. I can tell she’s mad at 

me because she always tell [me] not to lie, even though I am not 

lying.”

A last minute information dated July 29, 2020 (the day of 

the continued jurisdiction/disposition haring) reported that Victor 

and Mariela continued to live with the paternal grandparents. 

Both parents remained inconsistent in their drug testing and had

tested positive for marijuana. The report also detailed an 

incident in which Mariela, after being told by a testing facility 

that she could not leave in the middle of her test to speak to 

Victor, became extremely angry, yelled profanities and 

threatened staff members. As a result the facility notified the 

Department neither Mariela nor Victor could continue to test in 

that location.

CONTENTIONS

Victor contends Nathaniel was physically disciplined, not 

physically abused.2 He also asserts marijuana and alcohol were 

used only when Nathaniel was asleep or away from the house. 

Conceding he assaulted the paternal grandmother on one 

occasion, Victor argues that event did not create a substantial 

risk of harm to Nathaniel because the child had not been present 

2 Although Mariela has not appealed the court’s section 300, 

subdivision (a), finding that she physically abused Nathaniel, the 

court’s finding that Victor failed to protect Nathaniel from 

Mariela’s physical abuse provides him with standing to challenge 

the evidence supporting the court’s determination Mariela 

exceeded permissible limits of reasonable physical discipline. 
10

during the altercation. Finally, Victor contends, even if 

Nathaniel was properly declared a dependent child of the court, 

reasonable means existed to protect him without removal from 

Victor’s custody.

DISCUSSION

1. Governing Law

The purpose of section 300 “is to provide maximum safety 

and protection for children who are currently being physically, 

sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being 

exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and 

emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.” 

(§ 300.2; see In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289; In re 

Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 599.) In addition, the 

Legislature has declared, “The provision of a home environment

free from the negative effects of substance abuse is a necessary 

condition for the safety, protection and physical and emotional 

well-being of the child.” (§ 300.2.)

Section 300, subdivision (a), provides that jurisdiction may 

be assumed if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial

risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted 

nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian. 

For purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a 

substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in 

which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated 

inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings, or a 

combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian 

that indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm. . . . 

‘[S]erious physical harm’ does not include reasonable and ageappropriate spanking to the buttocks if there is no evidence of 

serious physical injury.” “Nonaccidental” generally means a 
11

parent or guardian “acted intentionally or willfully.” (In re R.T.

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.) 

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), allows a child to be 

adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court when “[t]he child has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or 

inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise 

or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the 

child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the 

child . . . .” A jurisdiction finding under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), requires the Department to prove 

three elements: (1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct 

or failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and

(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of 

serious physical harm or illness. (In re L.W. (2019) 

32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848; In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 

537, 561; see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 624 

[“section 300(b)(1) authorizes dependency jurisdiction without a 

finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or 

inability to supervise or protect her child”].)

Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to 

the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing 

(In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146), the court need not 

wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume 

jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. (In re 

Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383; In re N.M. (2011) 

197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165.) The court may consider past events in 

deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection. 

(In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774]; In re Christopher R. 

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215-1216; In re N.M., at p. 165.) 
12

A parent’s “‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions’ 

if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.” 

(In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461; accord, 

In Kadence P., at p. 1384.)

Before the court may order a child removed from the 

physical custody of a parent with whom the child was residing at 

the time the dependency proceedings were initiated, it must find 

by clear and convincing evidence that the child would be at 

substantial risk of physical or emotional harm if returned home 

and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be 

protected without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c); In re T.V. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135; see In re Anthony Q. (2016) 

5 Cal.App.5th 336, 347.) “The parent need not be dangerous and 

the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is 

appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the 

child.” (In re T.V., at pp. 135-136.)

2. Standard of Review

“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we 

determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings 

and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the 

light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note 

that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial 

court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment, but merely determine if there are 

sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’” 

(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) We review the whole 

record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to 
13

determine whether it discloses substantial evidence such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could find that the order is appropriate. 

(Ibid.; accord, In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) 

In evaluating the propriety of a disposition order removing 

a child from a parent or guardian pursuant to section 361, in 

view of the requirement the juvenile court make the requisite 

findings based on clear and convincing evidence, we “must 

determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains 

substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could 

have made the finding of high probability demanded by this 

standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,

1005 (O.B.); see In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155 [O.B. is 

controlling in dependency cases].)

3. Victor’s Failure To Protect Nathaniel from Physical 

Abuse by Mariela Supports Jurisdiction Under 

Subdivision (b), but Is Not a Proper Basis for a Finding 

of Jurisdiction Under Subdivision (a)

As Victor emphasizes, there was conflicting evidence about 

the nature of Mariela’s discipline of Nathaniel. She and Victor 

insisted they utilized a relatively benign three-step process that 

culminated in age-appropriate spanking. However, Nathaniel, 

while initially denying any form of discipline other than a “pop” 

on his hand, admitted in an interview with a Department 

investigator that Mariela repeatedly struck him with her sandal 

when he misbehaved. Similarly, while giving several different, 

innocent explanations for the bruise on his arm, Nathaniel told 

his paternal grandmother that Mariela had caused it by hitting 

him. And when the grandmother subsequently asked about fresh 

pinch marks on his face and hands, Nathaniel said that Mariela 

had done it to him. In addition to speaking to his grandmother 

about his fear of Mariela, Nathaniel called Ariana and Ariana’s 
14

mother, seeking protection from Mariela’s abuse. He also 

admitted to the sheriff’s deputy investigating the child abuse 

referral that Mariela pinched and hit him. When told of these 

incidents, Victor’s response was to label his son a liar. 

Drawing all inferences in support of the juvenile court’s 

finding, as we must, specifically including its implied credibility 

determination disbelieving Mariela’s version of her gentle method 

of discipline, there was ample evidence Nathaniel was at a 

substantial risk of serious physical harm due to Mariela’s 

nonaccidental infliction of physical harm within the meaning of 

section 300, subdivision (a). (See In re Mariah T. (2008) 

159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438 [jurisdiction proper where mother 

punished three-year-old child by striking him with belt on

stomach and forearms leaving deep purple bruises]; 

compare In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 640-642 

[section 300 protects against excessive discipline, not 

reasonable discipline; spanking child on buttocks with hand or 

sandal did not constitute serious physical harm under 

section 300] with In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, 

1472 [repeated pinching of two-year-old child that left “visible 

pinch marks” supported dependency jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivision (a)].) It may be that none of these 

incidents, although leaving marks and bruises on Nathaniel’s 

body, caused him serious physical injury. However, as discussed, 

jurisdiction is justified when one or more less serious injuries 

evidence a risk of future serious injury—a risk aggravated in this 

case by evidence of Mariela’s inability to manage her anger and 

her manifestations of aggression.

Contrary to Victor’s argument, affirming the juvenile 

court’s finding that Mariela engaged in excessive discipline is not 
15

inconsistent with the holding of the court of appeal in Gonzalez v. 

Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 

223 Cal.App.4th 72 that a single spanking of a 12-year-old with a 

wooden spoon that left bruising constituted reasonable physical 

discipline and did not justify inclusion of the child’s mother in the 

Child Abuse Central Index under the Child Abuse and Neglect 

Reporting Act. Noting that the mother was concerned her 

daughter was showing increased interest in criminal street gangs 

and other forms of discipline had failed, the court held neither 

use of a wooden spoon to administer a spanking nor infliction of 

visible bruises necessarily required a finding that the limits of 

reasonable discipline had been exceeded and that the parent had 

engaged in criminal child abuse. (Gonzalez, at pp. 91-93.) But 

the court explained, “We believe that visible bruising demarcates, 

or at least very nearly approaches, the outer limit for the 

quantum of ‘damage’ to be tolerated. However, we do not believe 

that it necessarily compels a finding of abuse unless there are 

grounds to find that the parent intended to inflict bruises, knew 

his or her conduct would do so, or should have known that 

bruises were likely to result from the amount of force applied and 

the method of its application.” (Id. at p. 93.) 

The paternal grandparents in the case at bar reported 

seeing bruises and marks on Nathaniel on multiple occasions, 

and the record clearly supports the inference that Mariela knew 

striking Nathaniel with her sandals and pinching his face would 

inflict damage beyond the limits that must be tolerated as 

appropriate parental discipline. 

The evidence of Victor’s failure to protect Nathaniel from 

Mariela’s abuse—his repeated willingness to disbelieve reports 

describing Mariela’s inappropriate discipline not only from his 
16

son and his mother (the paternal grandmother) but also from the 

sheriff’s deputy who had interviewed Nathaniel, as well as 

Victor’s repetition of the false narrative about the origin of the 

serious bruising on Nathaniel’s arm—plainly supports a 

jurisdiction finding as to Victor under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1). 

Contrary to the juvenile court’s finding and the 

Department’s argument in its brief on appeal, however, Victor’s 

failure to protect Nathaniel is not a basis for jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivision (a), which concerns the nonaccidental 

infliction of serious physical harm by a parent or guardian, not 

the failure of a parent to protect his or her child from such harm. 

Nor is Mariela’s intentional infliction of inappropriate discipline 

a basis for finding jurisdiction as to her under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1). The Department’s combined allegation in a 

single count of Mariela’s nonaccidental infliction of harm and 

Victor’s failure to protect as a basis for jurisdiction against both 

parents under subdivision (a), and then again in identical 

language as a basis for jurisdiction under subdivision (b), was 

error. The juvenile court’s finding that the allegation was true as 

to Victor under subdivision (a) and as to Mariela under 

subdivision (b) was also error. And the Department’s defense on 

appeal of the finding under subdivision (a) as to Victor 

inexplicably ignores the complete disconnect between the 

statutory language and the evidence regarding Victor’s role in 

this case.3

3 In light of our holding substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding Victor is an offending parent under 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based on his failure to protect 

Nathaniel from Mariela’s physical abuse, we need not consider 
17

4. Substantial Evidence Supports the Disposition Order 

Removing Nathaniel from Victor’s Custody

As of the date of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Victor 

continued to live with Mariela in the paternal grandparents’ 

home. Victor’s failure to protect Nathaniel from Mariela’s 

continuing physical abuse, combined with the undisputed 

evidence he had his own anger issues, had physically assaulted 

his parents during arguments and he and Mariela smoked 

marijuana on a daily basis, amply support the juvenile court’s 

determination Nathaniel would be at a substantial risk of harm if 

returned to Victor’s custody in that environment.

While not seriously disputing that conclusion, Victor 

contends reasonable means existed to protect Nathaniel without 

removing the child from his custody: The court could have 

required him to move out of the paternal grandparents’ home, 

ordered Mariela (and, presumably, Mariela’s sister) not to live 

with Victor and Nathaniel, required Victor to participate in a 

drug treatment program and anger management classes and 

authorized unannounced visits by the Department to ensure 

there were no problems. 

his challenge to the court’s other section 300, subdivision (b)(1), 

findings. (See In re D.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 911, 917; 

In re J.C. (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 1, 4; In re Drake M. (2012) 

211 Cal.App.4th 754, 763; see also In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at 

p. 773 [“‘[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds 

for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency 

court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile 

court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the 

statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the 

petition is supported by substantial evidence”]; In re Alexis E.

(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [same].)
18

Victor’s suggestion is seriously flawed. Enrolling in

programs, whether for substance abuse or anger issues, is not the 

same as having made substantial progress toward resolving the

underlying problems. And neither Victor nor Mariela gave the 

juvenile court any assurance either of them would agree to, let 

alone comply with, the restrictions Victor’s counsel now outlines. 

Indeed, despite having talked for months about moving out of the 

paternal grandparents’ home, by the time of the disposition 

hearing Victor and Mariela were still living there. In addition, 

Victor now proposes that Mariela might not live with him only on 

a “temporary” basis, a troublesome limitation given his failure to 

recognize the danger she posed to Nathaniel. Finally, Victor 

offered no plan for Nathaniel’s care if the paternal grandparents, 

Mariela or Mariela’s sister were no longer available during the 

time Victor was either working or using marijuana—activities 

that consumed most of his waking hours. In sum, substantial 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that no reasonable 

means existed to protect Nathaniel without removing him from 

Victor’s custody.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction as to Victor 

under section 300, subdivision (a), is reversed. Its jurisdiction 

finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and the disposition 

order removing Nathaniel from Victor’s custody are affirmed.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.