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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42968

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ERIC MICHAEL ROSS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2016 Opinion No. 47

Filed: July 6, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to suppress, reversed; judgment of conviction for unlawful 

possession of a firearm and trafficking in methamphetamine, vacated; case

remanded.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Reed P. Anderson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Reed P. Anderson argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Russell J. Spencer argued.

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MELANSON, Chief Judge 

Eric Michael Ross appeals from his judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a 

firearm and trafficking in methamphetamine. Specifically, Ross challenges the district court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order denying 

the motion to suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand.

Officers stopped Ross’s vehicle for failing to signal for five seconds. When asked for his 

driver’s license and vehicle registration, Ross explained that the car was a rental and that he had 

no driver’s license. Dispatch informed the officers that the rental car company confirmed that 

the car was rented to another individual and that Ross was not a driver authorized by the rental 

car company. After approximately twenty-five minutes, the officer issued Ross a citation for 
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driving without privileges. The officer then called the rental car company, which requested the 

officer arrange for the car to be towed to the local rental office. The officer informed Ross that 

the vehicle was being towed. 

At that time, Ross asked to retrieve his luggage from the vehicle. There were three 

backpacks and one duffle bag in the trunk and an additional backpack in the back seat of the 

vehicle. The duffle bag and two of the backpacks in the trunk belonged to Ross (collectively 

referred herein as Ross’s “luggage” herein), while one backpack in the trunk and the backpack in 

the back seat of the vehicle belonged to Ross’s passenger. The officer told Ross he would 

retrieve the luggage for Ross, but that the officer needed to check the luggage to ensure it did not 

contain guns or other weapons before giving Ross possession of the luggage. Ross became 

agitated and refused to consent to the search of his luggage. The officer asked Ross, “If there’s 

no weapons or anything inside the bag or contraband of any kind that you’re worried about, 

what’s the holdup of us taking it to make sure there’s nothing in there and giving it to you?” 

Ross responded, “Just tow the vehicle please.” The officer then told Ross that the rental car 

company would allow Ross to retrieve his luggage from the office to which the vehicle was 

being towed. Ross’s passenger was also told it was necessary for the officer to search the 

passenger’s bags prior to the officer allowing the passenger to take the bags from the vehicle. 

The passenger consented to a search of his bags and Ross was informed that the passenger 

consented. The passenger was given his bags after they were searched. The officer told Ross 

that there were three bags remaining in the trunk and asked if they belonged to Ross. Ross stated 

that the two backpacks were his and that the duffle bag belonged to the lessee of the vehicle. 

Ross told the officer that the lessee would recover the duffle bag from the rental car company 

after the vehicle was towed.

The officer told Ross that he and the passenger were free to leave the scene. Again, Ross 

repeated that the two backpacks belonged to him and that the duffle bag belonged to the lessee.

Having been told he was free to leave, Ross elected to walk toward the nearest town. As Ross 

was leaving the scene, he was told that, despite his refusal to provide consent, his luggage would 

be searched and inventoried in preparation for the vehicle’s towing. At that time, Ross repeated 
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that the duffle bag belonged to the lessee and not Ross.1 Ross and the passenger walked away 

from the scene and the officers searched Ross’s luggage. The officers found a stolen handgun 

and methamphetamine.

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 Ross was charged with driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001; unlawful possession of 

a firearm, I.C. § 18-3316; trafficking in methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4); and being a 

persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514. Ross filed a motion to suppress all evidence, asserting that 

the search and seizure were unlawful. The district court denied Ross’s motion, holding that he 

lacked standing to challenge the search. Alternatively, the district court held that the detention 

was not unreasonably extended and that the search was a reasonable inventory search. Ross pled 

guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and trafficking in methamphetamine, and the state 

dismissed the persistent violator enhancement and driving without privileges charge. Ross 

appeals.

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 

motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

Ross appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, alleging that his 

luggage was illegally seized and searched. The Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches and seizures are 

presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 

 

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The handgun and methamphetamine for which Ross pled guilty were found in the duffle

bag. Accordingly, Ross only challenges the officers’ actions with regard to the duffle bag. 

Although our analysis of the legality of the seizure and search will focus on the duffle bag 

specifically, it is no less applicable to Ross’s backpacks.

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In addition, the officers found methamphetamine, a scale, and small plastic bags in one 

of Ross’s backpacks. However, the state concedes that the backpack was illegally seized and 

that the evidence from the backpack would be suppressible if it was the basis for the charge.
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127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). The state may overcome this presumption by 

demonstrating that a warrantless search or seizure either fell within a well-recognized exception 

to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Id. 

The state argues that Ross does not have standing to challenge the seizure or search of the 

duffle bag because it was voluntarily abandoned when he disclaimed ownership. Generally, one 

who challenges the legality of a search must establish that he or she had a legitimate expectation 

of privacy in the thing searched. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). One who 

voluntarily abandons property prior to the search cannot be said to possess the requisite privacy 

interest. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). Abandonment, in the Fourth 

Amendment context, occurs through words, acts, and other objective facts indicating that the 

defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his or her interest in his or 

her property. State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999). If the 

abandonment is caused by illegal police conduct, however, the abandonment is not voluntary. 

Id. It is undisputed that Ross abandoned the duffle bag when he disclaimed ownership. 

However, Ross argues that his abandonment was the result of illegal police activity and, 

therefore, was not voluntary. The sole issue here is whether Ross’s abandonment was caused by 

illegal police activity. 

Ross’s abandonment of the duffle bag followed the officers’ refusal to allow him to take 

the duffle bag and officers notifying Ross that the duffle bag would be searched and inventoried. 

As conceded by the state, the seizure of Ross’s duffle bag was illegal. It is clear from the video 

of the stop that Ross became agitated when the officer refused to allow him to take his luggage. 

Ross became further agitated when the officers similarly refused to give the passenger his bags 

and the passenger consented to a search of his bags. Based upon the state’s concessions that the 

officers’ conduct with regard to Ross’s luggage was illegal, we hold that Ross’s abandonment 

was the result of illegal police activity. Thus, we hold that Ross’s abandonment was not 

voluntary and, therefore, did not divest him of standing to challenge the search of the duffle bag.

Ross has shown that he had standing to challenge the search of his duffle bag because his 

abandonment was not voluntary. In addition, as the state concedes, the seizure of Ross’s duffle 

bag was illegal. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Ross’s motion to suppress. 
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Therefore, we reverse the order denying Ross’s motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of 

conviction, and remand.

Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.