Filed 5/20/15 In re Levi R. CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

In re LEVI R., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 B258280 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK63288) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

ANNA L. et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Anthony 

Trendacosta, Commissioner. Conditionally reversed with directions. 

Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Anna L. 

 Merrill Lee Toole, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Richard R. 
2

 Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________ 

 Anna L. (Mother) and Richard R. (Father) appeal from an August 5, 2014 order 

terminating their parental rights over Levi R. (born in 2010) contending that substantial 

evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that proper notice was given under 

the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). Mother argues that the 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the inquiry 

and notice requirements of the ICWA because the notice did not include all available 

information regarding maternal relatives; the notice sent to the United Keetoowah Band 

was sent to the wrong designee; and DCFS failed to notice a federally recognized Navajo 

tribe. Mother requests that the order terminating parental rights be conditionally reversed 

and the matter remanded for compliance with notice requirements. Father joins in 

Mother’s arguments. DCFS concedes in a letter brief that Mother’s arguments are 

meritorious and requests this court to enter a limited reversal of the order terminating 

parental rights. 

We agree with Mother’s and Father’s contentions and conditionally reverse the 

August 5, 2014 order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. We remand the 

matter to the juvenile court with directions to: Order DCFS to complete new notice 

forms after interviewing Mother and all known maternal relatives; order DCFS to send a 

new notice to Mother and Father, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Secretary of the 

Interior, and all bands of the Cherokee and Navajo tribes to the designees listed on the 

current federal registry, including the Colorado River Indian Tribe; and hold a new 

section 366.26 hearing at least 60 days after the tribes receive the new notices.1 If, after 

receiving proper notice, a tribe determines Levi R. is an Indian child as defined by the 

ICWA, the court shall proceed in conformity with the provisions of the ICWA. If no 

1 DCFS recommended that 60 days would be needed for the tribes to evaluate the 

notices and to “ensure the parents are noticed for the hearing and re-appointed counsel.” 
3

tribe indicates that Levi is an Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA, the court 

shall reinstate the order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights over him. 

BACKGROUND 

 We discuss only the facts pertinent to this appeal regarding the ICWA notice and 

not the facts leading up to the filing of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 

petitions on behalf of Levi and the termination of parental rights.2

 On June 1, 2013, Mother denied that Levi had Indian ancestry. On June 5, 2013, 

Mother filled out a parental notification of Indian status form, stating that she might have 

Indian ancestry, specifically the Navajo and Cherokee tribes. Her handwritten notations 

referenced “GG Mo,” “Gracie,” and “James Allen [P.]” She also wrote the name of 

maternal great-aunt “Mary [L.]” and a phone number. Father filled out a parental 

notification of Indian status form, indicating he had no Indian ancestry. 

Mother and Father were in custody but appeared at a June 5, 2013 detention 

hearing. “Maternal grandmother and great uncle” were also present at the hearing. The 

juvenile court noted that Mother indicated that she had Navajo and Cherokee heritage. 

When asked whether she, her parents, or grandparents were registered members of any 

tribe, Mother answered that maternal grandmother “could better answer that.” Maternal 

grandmother then stated that her grandmother’s mother, Gracie, was “100 percent 

Cherokee.” Maternal grandmother believed Gracie may have been a registered member 

of a tribe. Mother stated that maternal great-aunt Mary L. “has all the information on 

that” and gave the court Mary L.’s telephone number. Maternal grandmother also stated 

that her grandfather, James Allen P., was full Cherokee. Father denied Indian ancestry. 

The juvenile court ordered DCFS to complete a full investigation, including 

interviewing Mary L. at the telephone number provided by Mother and re-interviewing 

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

Failure to comply with the ICWA is the only basis for Mother’s and Father’s appeals. 

We therefore do not address the juvenile court’s findings leading up to termination of 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. 
4

Mother and maternal grandmother. It also ordered DCFS to notice “the appropriate tribes 

and the [BIA] if necessary.” The court found that the ICWA did not apply as to Father. 

On July 23, 2013, maternal aunt Rebecca B. and maternal grandmother reported to 

DCFS that the family had Cherokee heritage. They stated that Mary L. had constructed a 

family tree showing Cherokee heritage. On July 23, 2013, DCFS left a message for Mary 

L. regarding the family’s Cherokee heritage. 

On July 24, 2013, DCFS sent a notice of custody proceedings for an Indian child 

to the BIA, the Secretary of the Interior, and to three Cherokee tribes. The notice 

contained the names and addresses of Mother, Father, and maternal grandmother. It did 

not contain any information regarding Gracie or James. As pertinent to this appeal, the 

notice for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians was sent to Sonya Cochran at 

P.O. Box 746, Tahlequah, OK 75565. A September 9, 2013 letter from the Cherokee 

Boys Club, Inc., stated that Levi was not registered with, nor eligible to register as, a 

member of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. 

On November 5, 2013, DCFS sent a notice of custody proceedings for an Indian 

child to the Secretary of the Interior, the BIA, the Navajo Nation, two contacts for the 

Navajo Region, and the Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. The notice contained the 

names and addresses of Mother, Father, and maternal grandmother. It did not contain 

any information regarding Gracie or James. Return receipts were received from the 

Secretary of the Interior, the BIA, the Navajo Region, the Ramah Navajo School Board, 

Inc., and the Navajo tribes. 

On October 15, 2013, at the jurisdictional hearing, Mother and Father waived their 

rights to a court trial and pleaded no contest to the section 300 petition. The juvenile 

court found Levi to be a minor described by section 300, subdivision (b). At the 

dispositional hearing on December 10, 2013, the court declared Levi a dependent under 

section 300, subdivision (b) and removed him from the care of Mother and Father. The 

court determined that notice had been given to all appropriate parties, the ICWA did not 

apply, and the court had no reason to know that Levi was an Indian child as defined by 
5

the ICWA. On August 5, 2014, the court terminated parental rights of Mother and 

Father. Mother and Father appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

Substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that proper notice 

was given under the ICWA 

 Mother and Father contend that DCFS failed to comply with the inquiry and notice 

requirements of the ICWA because the notice did not include all available information 

regarding maternal relatives; the notice sent to the United Keetoowah Band was sent to 

the wrong designee; and DCFS failed to notice a federally recognized Navajo tribe.3 We 

agree.4

“Congress passed the ICWA in 1978 ‘to promote the stability and security of 

Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian 

children from their families and placement of such children “in foster or adoptive homes 

which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (In re 

Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1164.) If the court “knows or has reason to 

know that an Indian child is involved” in a dependency proceeding, the social worker or 

probation officer shall provide notice to the child’s tribe. (§§ 224.2, subd. (a), 224.3, 

subd. (d).) 

 Pursuant to section 224.2, subdivision (a) “(3) Notice shall be sent to all tribes of 

which the child may be a member or eligible for membership, until the court makes a 

determination as to which tribe is the child’s tribe in accordance with subdivision (d) of 

3 Father contends that even though he does not claim Indian heritage, he has 

standing to appeal because either parent of a child claiming Indian heritage has standing 

to challenge an order made in violation of the ICWA. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 

Cal.App.3d 403, 411, fn. 6.) DCFS does not contest Father’s standing to appeal and 

therefore we do not address the issue of whether Father has standing. 

4 We follow the line of authority holding that issues regarding deficient notice 

given under the ICWA are not forfeited even though the parties did not raise the issues in 

the juvenile court. (In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1435.) DCFS does not 

claim that the notice issues under the ICWA were forfeited by the parties’ failure to raise 

them below. 
6

Section 224.1, after which notice need only be sent to the tribe determined to be the 

Indian child’s tribe. [¶] (4) Notice, to the extent required by federal law, shall be sent to 

the Secretary of the Interior’s designated agent, the Sacramento Area Director, Bureau of 

Indian Affairs. If the identity or location of the parents, Indian custodians, or the minor’s 

tribe is known, a copy of the notice shall also be sent directly to the Secretary of the 

Interior, unless the Secretary of the Interior has waived the notice in writing and the 

person responsible for giving notice under this section has filed proof of the waiver with 

the court.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(3), (4).) 

 “If the court or the Department ‘knows or has reason to know that an Indian child 

is involved, the social worker . . . is required to make further inquiry regarding the 

possible Indian status of the child, and to do so as soon as practicable, by interviewing the 

parents, Indian custodian, and extended family members . . . , contacting the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs . . . [,] the tribes and any other person that reasonably can be expected to 

have information regarding the child’s membership status or eligibility.’ (§ 224.3, 

subd. (c); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).) The circumstances that may provide 

reason to know the child is an Indian child include, but are not limited to, ‘A person 

having an interest in the child, including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an 

Indian organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the child’s extended 

family provides information suggesting the child is a member of a tribe or eligible for 

membership in a tribe or one or more of the child’s biological parents, grandparents, or 

great-grandparents are or were a member of a tribe.’ (§ 224.3, subd. (b)(1).)” (In re 

Gabriel G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1165–1166.) 

 The juvenile court’s findings whether proper notice was given under the ICWA 

and whether the ICWA applies to the proceedings are reviewed for substantial evidence. 

(In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 403–404.) 

Failure of the notice to contain information about Mother’s family members 

Mother and Father contend, and DCFS concedes, that the notice failed to include 

available information regarding Mother’s family members, namely Gracie and James. 
7

“ICWA notice requirements are strictly construed” and must contain enough 

information to be meaningful. (In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 703; id.

at pp. 700, 704 [DCFS did not comply with notice requirements where child family 

history section in ICWA notices were “largely left blank” and DCFS did not include “any 

background information” regarding paternal grandmother, even though father claimed 

Indian heritage and DCFS “easily could have contacted the paternal grandmother for 

additional pertinent information”].) “It is essential to provide the Indian tribe with all 

available information about the child’s ancestors, especially the ones with the alleged 

Indian heritage. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 703.) Notices must include “[a]ll names known of 

the Indian child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, or Indian 

custodians, including maiden, married and former names or aliases, as well as their 

current and former addresses, birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment 

numbers, and any other identifying information, if known.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(5)(C).) 

DCFS failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the ICWA 

because the notices did not contain all available information regarding Mother’s family 

members, namely Gracie and James. Further, the record does not show whether DCFS 

continued to attempt to contact Mary L. after leaving a message for her on July 23, 2013. 

Incorrect tribal contact

 Mother and Father contend, and DCFS concedes, that DCFS sent a notice to the 

incorrect tribal agent designated for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, 

and the error was not harmless because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the 

tribe received actual notice. (In re J.T. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 986, 994.) 

 Section 224.2, subdivision (a)(2) provides that notice to the tribe shall be sent to 

the tribal chairperson, unless the tribe has designated another agent for service. “The 

BIA . . . ‘periodically publishes a current list of designated tribal agents for service of 

notice, along with the appropriate mailing addresses, in the Federal Register.’” (In re 

Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 210.) In May 2010, Sonya Cochran was one of 

two registered agents for service of notice to the United Keetoowah Band. (ICWA: 

Designated Tribal Agents for Service of Notice, 75 Fed.Reg. 28103, 28126 (May 19, 
8

2010).) In July 2013, Sonya Cochran was no longer the designated tribal agent for the 

United Keetoowah Band; instead the designated agent was Joyce Fourkiller-Hawk. (Id., 

77 Fed.Reg. 45815, 45838 (Aug. 1, 2012).) DCFS, however, incorrectly sent the notice 

to Sonya Cochran. DCFS did not file a return receipt or letter from the United 

Keetoowah Band. 

 Accordingly, we conclude that upon remand the juvenile court must order DCFS 

to send a new notice to the designee listed on the current federal registry. 

 Failure to notify a Navajo tribe 

Mother and Father contend, and DCFS concedes, that DCFS failed to notice a 

federally recognized Navajo tribe. 

 DCFS noticed the Navajo Nation, one contact at the Navajo Region, and Ramah 

Navajo School Board, Inc. But DCFS failed to send notice to a federally recognized 

Navajo tribe, the Colorado River Indian Tribe. (ICWA: Designated Tribal Agents for 

Service of Notice, 77 Fed.Reg. 45816, 45846 (Aug. 1, 2012).) 

In sum, DCFS failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the 

ICWA because the notice did not contain all available information regarding maternal 

relatives, namely Grace and James, DCFS addressed its notice to the wrong tribal contact 

for one of the Cherokee tribes, and notice was not sent to a federally recognized Navajo 

tribe. Therefore, we conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights. (In re Gabriel G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168 

[limited reversal appropriate to ensure that ICWA requirements are met].) If, after proper 

notice, the court finds that Levi is an Indian child, the court shall proceed in conformity 

with the ICWA. If it is determined on remand that Levi is not an Indian child, the 

juvenile court shall reinstate its order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. 

DISPOSITION 

The July 23, 2012 order terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights is 

conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with the following 

directions: Order DCFS to complete new notice forms after interviewing Mother and all 

known maternal relatives; order DCFS to send a new notice to Mother and Father, the 
9

Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the Interior, and all bands of the Cherokee and 

Navajo tribes to the designees listed in the current Federal Registry, including the 

Colorado River Indian Tribe; and hold a new Welfare and Institutions Code section 

366.26 hearing at least 60 days after the tribes receive the new notices. If, after receiving 

proper notice, a tribe determines that Levi R. is an Indian child as defined by the ICWA, 

the court shall proceed in conformity with the provisions of the ICWA. If no tribe 

indicates that Levi R. is an Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA, the court shall 

reinstate the order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights over him. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 BENDIX, J.*

We concur: 

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. 

CHANEY, J. 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.