I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5293 

To address non-compliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations under 

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 30, 2014 

Mr. ROGERS of Alabama (for himself, Mr. FORBES, and Mr. TURNER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions 

as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To address non-compliance by the Russian Federation of 

its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Consequences for Rus5 sia’s Arms Control Violations Act of 2014’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) A public report in the New York Times on 

2 January 29, 2014, revealed that the Russian Fed3 eration is no longer in compliance with the Treaty 

4 Between the United States of America and the 

5 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimi6 nation of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter7 Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the Inter8 mediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed 

9 at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into 

10 force June 1, 1988. 

11 (2) On April 29, 2014, Acting Assistant Sec12 retary of State for Arms Control, Verification and 

13 Compliance Anita E. Friedt stated in testimony be14 fore the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

15 of Representatives that, ‘‘[w]e have concerns about 

16 Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. We have 

17 raised them with Russia and are pressing for clear 

18 answers in an effort to resolve our concerns because 

19 of the importance of the INF Treaty to Euro-Atlan20 tic security. We’ve briefed our NATO allies on our 

21 concerns and will continue to coordinate with them 

22 on this and other matters that affect our common 

23 security. We have been keeping Congress informed 

24 on this matter through briefings with relevant con25 gressional committees and will continue to do so. We 


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1 will continue to work with Russia to resolve our con2 cerns, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster 

3 a more stable, resilient, transparent security rela4 tionship. We’re not going to drop the issue until our 

5 concerns have been addressed.’’. 

6 (3) On March 5, 2014, the Deputy Assistant 

7 Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile De8 fense Policy, Ms. Elaine Bunn said to the Com9 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate, ‘‘[W]e are 

10 concerned about Russian activity that appears to be 

11 inconsistent with the Intermediate Range Nuclear 

12 Forces Treaty. We’ve raised the issue with Russia. 

13 They provided an answer that was not satisfactory 

14 to us, and we will, we told them that the issue is not 

15 closed, and we will continue to raise this.’’. 

16 (4) On April 2, 2014, the Commander, U.S. 

17 European Command, and Supreme Allied Com18 mander Europe, General Breedlove, stated that, ‘‘A 

19 weapon capability that violates the INF, that is in20 troduced into the greater European land mass is ab21 solutely a tool that will have to be dealt with . . . 

22 I would not judge how the alliance will choose to 

23 react, but I would say they will have to consider 

24 what to do about it . . . It can’t go unanswered.’’. 


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1 (5) The Russian Federation succeeded to the 

2 INF Treaty obligations of the Union of Soviet So3 cialist Republics in a declaration issued at Biskek, 

4 Kyrgyzstan, in October 1992. 

5 (6) The flight test or deployment of any INF6 banned weapon delivery vehicle by the Russian Fed7 eration constitutes a militarily significant violation 

8 of the INF Treaty. 

9 (7) The INF Treaty has unlimited duration, 

10 but, under the terms of the Treaty, inspections and 

11 continuous monitoring of Russian missile production 

12 under the Treaty ceased on June 1, 2001, thus the 

13 Treaty no longer offers any verification to detect any 

14 militarily significant violations. 

15 (8) A major problem exists with respect to the 

16 application of the INF Treaty to any new ballistic 

17 or cruise missile that is flight tested or otherwise 

18 flown once at a range not prohibited by the Treaty 

19 (that is a range less than 500 kilometers or more 

20 than 5,500 kilometers) but will be flown at a range 

21 that is banned by the Treaty (at a range that is be22 tween 500 and 5,500 kilometers) as a weapon deliv23 ery vehicle. 

24 (9) President Obama has not made use of any 

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1 compliance with the Treaty, to include convening a 

2 meeting of the Treaty’s Special Verification Commis3 sion under Article XIII of the Treaty. 

4 (10) The Committee on Foreign Relations of 

5 the Senate noted in its 1988 report on the INF 

6 Treaty that, ‘‘In the event Soviet actions appear to 

7 contradict their obligations under the treaty, Con8 gress should be kept fully informed. Any question9 able activity should be fully discussed in the Special 

10 Verification Commission. If the Soviet Union has 

11 not, after a sufficient period of time, satisfied 

12 United States concerns or ceased the activity in 

13 question, and if the Soviet activity is deemed to be 

14 militarily significant, the President should propose 

15 implementation of an appropriate and proportionate 

16 response.’’. 

17 (11) The Administration has not made any seri18 ous or credible effort, over several years, to respond 

19 to violations by the Russian Federation of its obliga20 tions under the INF Treaty. 

21 (12) The INF Treaty is no longer effectively 

22 verifiable. 

23 (13) The Russian Federation’s actions, as de24 tailed in the January 29, 2014, report of the New 


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1 York Times have defeated the object and purpose of 

2 the INF Treaty. 

3 (14) Continued noncompliance by the Russian 

4 Federation with its obligations under the INF Trea5 ty and continued United States adherence to the 

6 INF Treaty, in light of failure to respond in a timely 

7 manner to Russian noncompliance, places the su8 preme interests of the United States and its allies in 

9 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 

10 jeopardy. 

11 (15) The Russian Federation has violated its 

12 obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum 

13 on Security Assurances and has rendered null the ef14 fect and assurances of the NATO–Russia Founding 

15 Act of 1997. 

16 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

17 It is the sense of Congress that— 

18 (1) the Russian Federation, through its flight 

19 testing of both a ballistic missile intended for inter20 mediate-range targets as well its flight testing of a 

21 ground-launched cruise missile prohibited by the 

22 INF Treaty has acted contrary to the object and 

23 purpose of a central purpose of the Treaty and is 

24 therefore in material breach of its obligations under 

25 the Treaty; and 


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1 (2) the President, after consultation with 

2 United States allies directly affected by such Rus3 sian Federation ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, 

4 should take such actions as the President determines 

5 to be necessary to deny the Russian Federation any 

6 militarily significant advantage resulting from its 

7 noncompliance with the INF Treaty. 

8 SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, 

9 OR ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA BILAT10 ERAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION. 

11 No funds made available to the Department of State 

12 may be used to carry out programs, projects, or activities 

13 of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission until 

14 the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 

15 committees that the Russian Federation as of the date of 

16 the certification has or has not flight tested a ballistic mis17 sile at strategic range in a configuration (booster stages, 

18 post-boost vehicle, or reentry vehicles) that is unlike a con19 figuration that is used for remaining tests of the system 

20 at ranges that are prohibited under the INF Treaty. 


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1 SEC. 5. PROGRAM TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOP GROUND2 LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE AND GROUND3 LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILI4 TIES. 

5 (a) PROGRAM REQUIRED.—The President shall es6 tablish and carry out a program to research and develop 

7 ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched bal8 listic missile capabilities, including by modification of 

9 exiting United States military capabilities, with a range 

10 between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. 

11 (b) STUDY AND REPORT.— 

12 (1) STUDY.—The President shall conduct a 

13 study for potential sites of the cruise missile and 

14 ballistic missile capabilities specified in subsection 

15 (a). In conducting the study, the President shall 

16 consider selecting sites on United States overseas 

17 military bases and sites offered by United States al18 lies. 

19 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 

20 date of the enactment of this Act, the President 

21 shall submit to the appropriate congressional com22 mittees a report that contains the results of the 

23 study. 

24 (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require25 ment to establish and carry out the program under sub26 section (a) if, on or before October 1, 2014, the President 


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1 certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 

2 that— 

3 (1) the Russian Federation is in compliance 

4 with all of its obligations under the INF Treaty; and 

5 (2) the Russian Federation has verifiably and 

6 completely eliminated any military system that it has 

7 developed, flight tested, and deployed in violation of 

8 the INF Treaty. 

9 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

10 authorized to be appropriated to the President 

11 $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2015 to carry out the pro12 gram under subsection (a). 

13 SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE RESPONSES TO RUSSIAN 

14 FEDERATION’S VIOLATION OF INF TREATY. 

15 The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Aegis 

16 Ashore sites in Romania and Poland are deployed, con17 sistent with the timelines established in the Ballistic Mis18 sile Defense Review of 2010, with an operational capa19 bility to defend against short-, medium-, and intermediate20 range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched by the 

21 Russian Federation. 

22 SEC. 7. SANCTIONS. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—If, on or before the date that is 

24 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, 

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1 sional committees that the Russian Federation is not de2 veloping or deploying any military system that violates or 

3 circumvents the INF Treaty, the President shall impose 

4 the sanctions described in subsection (b). 

5 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions referred 

6 to in subsection (a) are the following: 

7 (1) The President shall suspend any coopera8 tion with the Russian Federation related to any as9 pect of the United States program for national, the10 ater, or regional missile defense, including any provi11 sion of any data generated by the United States in 

12 any test of any missile defense technology. 

13 (2) The President shall deny any license pursu14 ant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 

15 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077 b.) for the export of any nu16 clear material, equipment, or technology to the Rus17 sian Federation. 

18 (3) The President shall terminate the United 

19 States of the Agreement Between the Government of 

20 the United States of America and the Government 

21 of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the 

22 Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, entered 

23 into force January 12, 2011, in accordance with the 

24 provisions of Article 20(1) of that Agreement. 


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1 (4) The President shall not award any United 

2 States Government contract to a private or public 

3 entity in the Russian Federation. 

4 (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require5 ment to impose sanctions under this section beginning on 

6 or after the date on which the President certifies to the 

7 appropriate congressional committees that the Russian 

8 Federation has provided to the United States the fol9 lowing: 

10 (1) A list of all intermediate-range and shorter11 range missiles, as such terms are defined in the INF 

12 Treaty, as well as their launchers, support struc13 tures, and support equipment that are not inter14 mediate-range and shorter-range missiles listed 

15 under Article III of the Treaty as existing types and 

16 which have been designed, developed, flight tested or 

17 deployed by the Russian Federation since June 1, 

18 2001. 

19 (2) A list of all deployment bases for any inter20 mediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as such 

21 terms are defined in the INF Treaty, including in 

22 particular, any base for any road-mobile, ground23 launched ballistic and cruise missiles that are not 

24 bases at which such missiles were located on June 

25 1, 2001. 


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1 (3) A list of all flight tests carried out by the 

2 Russian Federation for any new type of ground3 launched ballistic or cruise missile which has been 

4 flight tested at one or more times below a range of 

5 500 kilometers or above 5,500 kilometers. 

6 (4) A list of all production facilities used for the 

7 design and development of any ballistic or cruise 

8 missile that is prohibited under the INF Treaty. 

9 (5) A description of the reasons that the Gov10 ernment of the Russian Federation has provided for 

11 undertaking the design, development, and deploy12 ment of any ballistic or cruise missile that is prohib13 ited under the INF Treaty. 

14 SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS. 

15 In this Act: 

16 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT17 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com18 mittees’’ means— 

19 (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the 

20 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 

21 on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select 

22 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep23 resentatives; and 

24 (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the 

25 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 


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1 on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee 

2 on Intelligence of the Senate. 

3 (2) INF TREATY OR TREATY.—The term ‘‘INF 

4 Treaty’’ or ‘‘Treaty’’ means the Treaty Between the 

5 United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

6 Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In7 termediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, com8 monly referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nu9 clear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed at Washington 

10 December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 

11 1988. 

Æ 


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