J-S14045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL RAY JAMES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1316 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 19, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0000939-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: May 18, 2023

Michael Ray James (James) appeals from the October 19, 2022 order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County (PCRA court) dismissing as untimely 

his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We affirm.

Only a brief procedural history is necessary to our disposition. Following 

a jury trial, James was convicted of conspiracy to commit possession with 

intent to deliver (PWID) a controlled substance, endangering the welfare of 

children, two counts of PWID, possession of drug paraphernalia and two 

counts of possession of a controlled substance.2 He was sentenced to an 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 et seq.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903 & 4304(a)(1); 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (32) & (16).
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aggregate of 9 years and 9 months to 19.5 years of incarceration and this 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. James, 318 

WDA 2014, at *10 (Pa. Super. Nov. 10, 2014) (unpublished memorandum).

James filed his first PCRA petition in 2015 raising several claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court dismissed the petition 

without a hearing and we affirmed. Commonwealth v. James, 4 WDA 2016, 

at *9 (Pa. Super. Oct. 11, 2016) (unpublished memorandum). He filed a 

second petition in 2021 that challenged the legality of his sentence pursuant 

to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).

3

 The PCRA court dismissed 

the petition as untimely and James did not seek further review.

James then filed the instant petition on July 14, 2022. He again 

contended that his sentence was illegal under Alleyne, but argued that his 

petition was timely under Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 

2021).4 He argued that his first PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to 

pursue his Alleyne claim, and that the instant petition was his first 

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3 James was sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment based 

on the weight of the heroin and cocaine found in his possession. See 18 

Pa.C.S. § 7508. We note that the verdict slips in the certified record include 

handwritten notations stating “if guilty, the weight of the cocaine [and heroin]

proven beyond a reasonable doubt was” with a blank line, which the jury filled 

in as 128.9 grams and 53.6 grams, respectively. See Verdict Slips, 11/13/13, 

PWID—Cocaine & PWID—Heroin.

4

In Bradley, our Supreme Court held that a PCRA petitioner may raise 

ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel “at the first opportunity to do so, even when

on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 401 (Pa. 2021).
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opportunity to address that ineffectiveness pursuant to Bradley. He did not 

cite any specific exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.

The PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss the petition 

without a hearing. It concluded that the petition was untimely because 

Bradley did not recognize a new constitutional right. It further held that the 

Alleyne claim had been previously litigated in James’ second PCRA petition. 

James filed a response arguing that the procedure for challenging PCRA 

counsel ineffectiveness outlined in Bradley constituted a newly-discovered 

fact that was not previously discoverable with due diligence. He further 

contended that he was prevented from raising his Alleyne claim through 

government interference, as the PCRA court had ruled in response to his first 

petition that the claim was not cognizable under the PCRA. The PCRA court 

dismissed the petition and James timely appealed. He and the PCRA court 

have complied with Pa. R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, James argues that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his 

petition as untimely under the exceptions to the jurisdictional time-bar for 

newly-discovered facts and government interference.

5

 “A PCRA petition, 

including a second and subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 

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5 Whether a PCRA petition is timely filed is a question of law over which our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations

omitted).
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the date the underlying judgment becomes final.” Commonwealth v. 

Graves, 197 A.3d 1182, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “[A] 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

James’ judgment of sentence became final in 2014 when proceedings 

on his direct appeal concluded. The instant petition, his third, was filed in 

2022. Accordingly, it is facially untimely and he must plead and prove one of 

the three exceptions to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar: (1) government 

interference with the presentation of the claim; (2) newly-discovered facts; or 

(3) a newly-recognized constitutional right. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

In addition, a petitioner invoking a time-bar exception must file the petition 

raising the claimed exception within one year of the date the claim could have 

been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

First, James asserts that his petition is timely under the exception for 

newly-discovered facts because he learned only after Bradley that he could 

challenge the effectiveness of his first PCRA counsel. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii). To establish timeliness pursuant to the newly-discovered 

facts exception, “the petitioner must establish only that (1) the facts upon 

which the claim was predicated were unknown and (2) they could not have 

been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 
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146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016). However, this Court has repeatedly held that 

developments in case law do not constitute new “facts” for the purposes of 

the jurisdictional time-bar. Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 235 

(Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 

2011) (“[S]ubsequent decisional law does not amount to a new ‘fact’ under 

section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA.”). Accordingly, James cannot rely on 

Bradley as a newly-discovered fact to overcome the time-bar.

Next, James argues that he was prevented from raising his Alleyne

claim earlier due to the PCRA court’s incorrect statement of law in his initial 

PCRA proceedings. To establish the time-bar exception for government 

interference, a petitioner must plead and prove “the failure to raise the claim 

previously was the result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i). Notably, a petition invoking this exception must now be filed 

within one year of the date the claim could have been filed, but the previous 

version of the statute granted petitioners only 60 days to bring the claim.

6

 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344 (Pa. 

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6 As of December 24, 2018, Section 9545(b)(2) states that any PCRA petition 

invoking a time-bar exception must be filed within one year of the date the 

claim could have first been presented. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 

146, § 2, effective Dec. 24, 2018. The amendment applied to claims arising 

on or after December 24, 2017.
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Super. 2017) (holding that petitioner did not satisfy timeliness requirement of 

Section 9545(b)(2) in a government interference claim when he failed to

explain why he waited approximately four years to seek relief).

James refers to the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss without a 

hearing issued in response to his first petition: “The claims Petitioner raised 

in the pro se PCRA were largely included in the PCRA filed by counsel. 

Petitioner also raised an Alleyne claim, which is not cognizable under the 

PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Riggle, [119 A.3d 1058] ([Pa. Super.] 2015). 

It will therefore not be addressed.” Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Pursuant 

to Pa. R. Crim. P. 907, 10/8/15, at 3 n.2. In Riggle, this Court held only that 

Alleyne enunciated a procedural rule that did not apply retroactively to cases 

on collateral review in which the judgment of sentence became final before 

Alleyne was decided. Riggle, supra, at 1067. Here, however, James 

proceeded to trial and sentencing after Alleyne was decided. A petitioner 

who received an illegal sentence under Alleyne may seek relief under the 

PCRA if his petition is timely and the judgment of sentence was not final when 

Alleyne was decided. Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 177 A.3d 182, 191 (Pa. 

2018). James contends that the PCRA court’s error of law resulted in his 

counsel waiving the Alleyne claim even though he repeatedly asked counsel 

to amend the petition to include it.

No relief is due. As James acknowledges, the PCRA court’s notice of 

intent to dismiss his first PCRA petition was issued in October 2015, and he 
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was aware at the time that he filed the petition that he wanted to pursue an 

illegal sentencing claim under Alleyne. He provides no explanation for why 

he waited to raise this claim until July 2022, nearly seven years later, when 

he was required to present his claim within 60 days of the erroneous PCRA 

court ruling based on the prior version of Section 9545(b)(2).

7

 Because he 

has failed to plead and prove this element of the exception, the PCRA court 

did not err in dismissing the instant petition as untimely.8

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/18/2023

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7 Moreover, James first presented his Alleyne claim in his second petition, 

which was also dismissed as untimely when he failed to plead and prove an 

exception to the time-bar. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA without a 

Hearing, 11/18/21, at 3-5 (pagination supplied); Final Order, 12/22/21. The 

instant petition merely attempts to present the same claim reframed under 

timeliness exceptions he could have pled previously.

8

In a final, one-sentence argument, James urges this Court to review his 

petition sua sponte for timeliness. James’ Brief at 17. “This Court will not act 

as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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