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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

TRACEY SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

February 20, 2018

v No. 335985

Genesee Circuit Court

UNITED WAY OF GENESEE COUNTY and 

UNITED WAY WORLDWIDE,

LC No. 16-106968-NZ

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SERVITTO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this wrongful termination and defamation action, plaintiff appeals as of right an order 

dismissing defendant United Way Worldwide, with prejudice from this wrongful termination, 

defamation, and slander action. During the same motion hearing, a second order was entered

dismissing, with prejudice, defendant United Way of Genesee County. We affirm as to both 

orders.

I. RELEVANT FACTS

On August 17, 2015, plaintiff began serving as an AmeriCorps VISTA member in two 

Flint-area schools. Plaintiff’s status as an AmeriCorps VISTA member was managed through 

the Corporation for National and Community Services (CNCS), a federal organization. 

However, United Way Worldwide, through its local affiliate United Way of Genesee County, 

oversaw plaintiff’s placement on a local level. 

On November 13, 2015, plaintiff was dismissed from her service placement, and placed

on administrative leave with pay, pending plaintiff finding another service placement. CNCS 

sent plaintiff a letter on November 19, 2015, informing her that her placement had been 

terminated, per United Way Worldwide’s request, due to plaintiff’s “failure to meet the service 

hour requirement and communication challenges with partnering site staff members.” Plaintiff 

was officially terminated from the AmeriCorps VISTA program on December 7, 2015. 

Acting in propria persona, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging wrongful termination, 

slander, and defamation of character solely against United Way of Genesee County. Plaintiff 

claimed that despite performing excellent work, she was dismissed from her service placement 

without being disciplined. Plaintiff alleged that an employee of another organization who was 
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“not a very honest individual,” had told fabricated stories about plaintiff’s performance to United 

Way of Genesee County. 

Moving pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), United Way of Genesee County argued that 

plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and requested that the 

trial court dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, with prejudice. The trial court granted United Way of 

Genesee County’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. The trial court 

denied United Way of Genesee County’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s defamation claim, and 

ordered plaintiff to amend her defamation claim within 28 days by pleading specific facts to 

support her claim. 

Plaintiff did amend her complaint by adding United Way Worldwide as a defendant. 

Plaintiff went on to allege that United Way of Genesee County and United Way Worldwide 

“gave negative feedback to [CNCS] and requested that . . . plaintiff be removed from her service 

position.” Plaintiff maintained that her removal was “petty,” and that she had never been 

previously disciplined. According to plaintiff, the only basis for her termination was an 

individual employed by another organization did not like her, and therefore, provided negative 

feedback regarding her job performance. However, plaintiff did not detail any specific incidents 

or articulate any specific defamatory comments to support her claim. The only support plaintiff 

provided was the November 19, 2015 letter she had received from CNCS. 

United Way of Genesee County filed a renewed motion for summary disposition 

regarding plaintiff’s defamation claim. Likewise, United Way Worldwide filed a motion for 

summary disposition, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), regarding plaintiff’s defamation claim. The 

trial court granted both motions on the record during a hearing on November 14, 2016. 

II. DEFAMATION CLAIM

Although it is difficult to discern what, exactly, plaintiff argues in her brief on appeal, it 

appears as though plaintiff contends that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by 

granting United Way of Genesee County and United Way Worldwide’s motions for summary 

disposition regarding plaintiff’s defamation claim. We disagree. 

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. 

Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion for summary 

disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, and 

should be granted when the complaint is so legally deficient that recovery would be impossible 

even if all well-pleaded facts are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Id. at 119. Accordingly, only the pleadings may be considered by the trial 

court when deciding a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Id. at 119-120. 

As an initial matter, we note that plaintiff makes no mention of United Way of Genesee 

County in her brief on appeal. Rather, United Way Worldwide is the only defendant listed in the 

caption and on the proof of service. Further, plaintiff does not actually advance any arguments 

relating to her defamation claims against either United Way of Genesee County or United Way 

Worldwide. Plaintiff instead focuses the entirety of her brief on the actions of Crim Fitness 
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Foundation, a defendant in a separate action. See Docket No. 335988. Any mention of United 

Way of Genesee County or United Way Worldwide is cursory, at most. 

“An appellant may not merely announce [her] position and leave it to this Court to 

discover and rationalize the basis for [her] claims, nor may [she] give only cursory treatment 

with little or no citation of supporting authority.” Kubicki v Mtg Electronic Registration Sys, 292 

Mich App 287, 291; 807 NW2d 433 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, 

plaintiff has essentially abandoned her claims on appeal. Regardless, we will briefly address 

plaintiff’s claim on the merits. 

To successfully plead a defamation claim, the plaintiff must prove the existence of:

(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged 

communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the 

part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of 

special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the 

publication. [Edwards v Detroit News, Inc, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d 

___ (2017) (Docket No. 334058); slip op at 6, quoting Lakin v Rund, 318 Mich 

App 127, 133; 896 NW2d 76 (2016).]

“A plaintiff claiming defamation must plead a defamation claim with specificity by identifying 

the exact language that the plaintiff alleges to be defamatory[.]” Sarkar v Doe, 318 Mich App 

156, 179 n 13; 897 NW2d 207 (2016) (citation omitted). This Court is required to analyze each 

“allegedly defamatory statement identified in” the complaint. Id. at 179. 

Plaintiff failed to plead her defamation claim with the specificity required by Michigan 

law. In her original complaint, plaintiff failed to identify any specific statement, false, 

defamatory, or otherwise, made by an employee of United Way of Genesee County. At most, 

plaintiff claimed that an individual employed by another organization at her service placement

was “not a very honest individual,” and that individual had told fabricated stories about 

plaintiff’s work performance to United Way of Genesee County. Those stories, plaintiff alleged, 

resulted in her termination as an AmeriCorps VISTA member. Plaintiff failed to provide any 

details regarding these fabricated stories. 

Instead of dismissing her defamation claim outright, the trial court provided plaintiff with 

an opportunity to amend her complaint in order to plead any potential defamation claim with 

more specificity. In amending the complaint, plaintiff added United Way Worldwide as a 

defendant, but did nothing to make her defamation claim more specific. Instead, plaintiff 

surmised that she had been removed from her service placement due to “petty reasons.” Plaintiff 

attempted to support her claim by attaching a letter from CNCS, which stated plaintiff was 

removed from her service placement, in part, due to “communication challenges with partnering 

site staff members.” However, this letter is not sufficient to support a defamation claim, as it 

does not specifically identify “the exact language that the plaintiff alleges to be defamatory[.]” 

Sarkar, 318 Mich App at 179 n 13. Without explicitly stating who, what, where, and when, 

plaintiff cannot meet the specific pleading requirements of Michigan law. 
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We also briefly address United Way Worldwide’s argument that even if plaintiff had 

identified a specific defamatory statement made by an employee of United Way Worldwide, that 

statement would be covered by qualified privilege. 

The defendant has the burden of proving the existence of a qualified privilege in a 

defamation action. Dadd v Mount Hope Church, 486 Mich 857, 861; 780 NW2d 763 (2010), 

citing Lawrence v Fox, 357 Mich 134, 141; 97 NW2d 719 (1959). “An employer has the 

qualified privilege to defame an employee by making statements to other employees whose 

duties interest them in the subject matter.” Gonyea v Motor Parts Fed Credit Union, 192 Mich 

App 74, 78-79; 480 NW2d 297 (1991). To show the existence of qualified privilege, the 

defendant must show

(1) good faith, (2) an interest to be upheld, (3) a statement limited in its scope to

this purpose, (4) a proper occasion, and (5) publication in a proper manner and to 

proper parties only.” [Prysak v Polk Co, 193 Mich App 1, 15; 483 NW2d 629 

(1992).] 

“A plaintiff may overcome a qualified privilege only by showing that the statement was made 

with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.” Id. 

The letter sent to plaintiff by CNCS indicated that United Way Worldwide had requested

that plaintiff be terminated from her service placement due to plaintiff’s “failure to meet the 

service hour requirement and communication challenges with partnering site staff members.” 

Therefore, any defamatory statements would have been made by an individual within plaintiff’s 

supervising organization, United Way Worldwide, through its local affiliate United Way of 

Genesee County, to CNCS, specifically regarding plaintiff’s performance in her AmeriCorps 

VISA placement. Therefore, any defamatory statement would have been limited in scope, for a 

proper purpose, and made to the proper parties. Further, plaintiff has failed to show that any 

defamatory statement made was done with actual malice, “i.e., with knowledge of its falsity or

reckless disregard of the truth.” Prysak, 193 Mich App at 15 (emphasis removed). 

Based on the foregoing, even if all allegations are taken as true and viewed in a light most 

favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff’s defamation claims against United Way of Genesee County and 

United Way Worldwide are legally deficient. The trial court properly granted United Way of 

Genesee County’s renewed motion for summary disposition and United Way Worldwide’s 

motion for summary disposition, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Maiden, 461 Mich at 118. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro