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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MARSHA THOMAS, MICHAEL WOODCOCK, CINDY DELONG, RICHARD GUTE, MICHAEL GRAHAM, JAN GRAHAM, SALVATORE SCOZZARI, TIMOTHY TONER, PATRICIA TONER, GEORGE CUMMINGS, KELLY CUMMINGS, JOSEPH YOUNG, ELLEN YOUNG, MICHAEL KLUTZ, SHERYL KLUTZ, KENNETH PASSAGE, TONI PASSAGE, RICHARD HESS, DONALD SUIDA, CAROL SUIDA, PHILLIP STROPKE, SHARON STROPKE, LORENZO DIAZ, DICK VANWIEREN, DONNA VANWIEREN, DANIEL MITCHELL, JERRY MORROW, LYNDA HESS, THERESA TURNER, JAMES FIELDER, and DENISE FIELDER,

Plaintiffs/Counter DefendantsAppellees/Cross-Appellants, UNPUBLISHED June 9, 2015

V No. 320382 Clare Circuit Court WHITE BIRCH LAKES RECREATION ASSOCIATION, ROBERT BRIGGS, TERESA STEPHENS, KEVIN DOMBROWSKI, MARY COX-PERKINS, STEV E BRYANT, and DAWN HOLZER, LC No. 11-900526-CH

Defendants/Counter PlaintiffsAppellants/Cross-Appellees.

MARSHA THOMAS, MICHAEL WOODCOCK, CINDY DELONG, RICHARD GUTE, MICHAEL GRAHAM, JAN GRAHAM, SALVATORE M. SCOZZARI, TIMOTHY TONER, PATRICIA TONER, GEORGE CUMMINGS, KELLY CUMMINGS, JOSEPH YOUNG, ELLEN YOUNG, MICHAEL KLUTZ, SHERYL KLUTZ, KENNETH PASSAGE, TONI PASSAGE, RICHARD HESS, LYNDA HESS, THERESA-2- TURNER, JAMES FIELDER, DENISE FIELDER, DONALD SUIDA, CAROL SUIDA, PHILLIP STROPKE, SHARON STROPKE, LORENZO DIAZ, DICK VANWIEREN, DONNA VANWIEREN, DANIEL MITCHELL, and JERRY MORROW,

Plaintiffs/Counter DefendantsAppellants,

v No. 322836 Clare Circuit Court WHITE BIRCH LAKES RECREATION ASSOCIATION, ROBERT BRIGGS, TERESA STEPHENS, KEVIN DOMBROWSKI, MARY COX-PERKINS, STEV E BRYANT, and DAWN HOLZER, LC No. 11-900526-CH

Defendants/Counter PlaintiffsAppellees.

Before: G LEICHER , P.J., and K. F. K ELLY and S ERVITTO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. These consolidated appeals arise from disputes over recreation al uses of lots composing the several subdivisions of the White Birch Lakes Recreation As sociation (“the Association”). In docket no. 320382, defendants, w ho are the Association and s everal lot owners sympathetic to it, appeal as of right from the ci rcuit court’s orders insofar as the circuit court decreed that the Association had no authority unde r the pertinent covenants and restrictions, articles of incorporation, or associ ation bylaws to prom ulgate rules restri cting lot owners t o one recreational vehicle per lot at a time. In docket no. 322836, plaintiffs (s everal other lot owners) challenge the circuit court’s decisions requiri ng them to remove recreational vehicles from their lots on a seasonal basis, and rejecting their theory of discriminatory ru lemaking or enforcement without benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiffs additionally ass ert that the circuit court acted capriciously and arbitrarily in i ssuing a final order that was not entirely consistent with certain earlier decisions. We affirm in both dockets.

I. FACTS

Plaintiffs initiated this cause of action to prevent defendant s from forcing the removal of plaintiffs’ camping-related vehi cles from their lots during the established off-season. At issue is interpretation of the Associatio n’s articles of incorporation, declaration of covenants and restrictions, and bylaws, and als o an order resulting from earl ier litigation.

Article I of the Associati on’s bylaws, as amended in 2011, pro vides as follows:-3- The Association shall be responsible for the Management, Maint enance, Operations and Administration of the Common Properties and the affairs of the Development in accordance with the Declarations, these By-Laws, the Articles of Incorporation, duly adopted rules and regulations of the Associ ation and applicable laws.

All Owners and other persons using or entering upon or acquiri ng any interest in any Lot or the Comm on Properties shall be subject t o the provisions and terms set forth in the Declar ations, these By-Laws, the Art icles of Incorporation, the duly adopted rules and regulations of the As sociation and the laws of the State of Michigan.

The articles of incorporation pr ovide that the Association was incorporated in 1978 “to promote pleasure, social, recreation and sports activities for its members . . . and to develop and maintain a recreationally orient ed environment,” and also to “m ake and perform any contract and to exercise all powers necessary incidental or convenient to th e purposes set forth above.” The articles further set forth the intent to “provide a means for t he promulgation and enforcement of all regulations necessary to the governing of the use and enjoy ment of such . . . recreational facilities or other amenities and such other recreational facil ities within the Development as may be conveyed to the Association.”

As the trial court noted, a “1988 court case involved a lawsui t by landowners of Subdivision 7 to enforce an amendment to their [covenants and r estrictions] and have landowners remove their camping units from November 1, until th e next Memorial Day weekend, limit lots to one camping unit and other concerns such as fire rings and setbacks.” The parties settled that case, as re flected in an order which resol ved the questions of seasonal placement of campers and related equipment in pertinent part as follows:

[C]amping shall be allowed without the necessity of a permit ea ch year from the beginning of the Memorial Day weekend through October 31, and a t such other times during the year (“off-seas on camping”) only in accordance with permits that may be issued by the Board of Directors of the [Association], t he granting of such permits to not be unreasonably withheld, but which will not, in any event, permit off-season camping for any landowner for a duration of more tha n fourteen (14) consecutive days . . . .

The order further decreed that it would govern the issue unless and until the restrictive covenants were amended by appropriate process. As the instant circuit co urt noted, the 1988 court order “did not limit the number of c amping units that could be put ona lot.”

Also coming to bear is the Association’s declaration of covena nts and restrictions as amended in 2002, which incorporat ed the 1988 order with the fol lowing provision:

Camping shall be allowed without t he necessity of a permit eac h year from the beginning of Memorial Day we ekend through October 31, and a t such other times during the year (“off-season camping”) only in accordance with permits issued by the Board of Directors of the [Association]. The gra nting of such-4- permits to not be unreasonably withheld, but which will not, in any event, permit off-season camping for any landowner for a duration of more tha n fourteen (14) consecutive days.

The amended covenants and restri ctions do not expressly limit t he number of camping units allowed on a lot.

Plaintiffs advise that the lots within the Association are gen erally large, some comprising more than an acre, and that some lot owners have houses on thei r lots, but most do not. According to plaintiffs, “For many decades, lot owners owning the ‘vacant’ parcels have placed trailer homes on their lots for single family residential use,” and “the use of the lots for this purpose was always encouraged by the Association, and was a maj or marketing tool . . . to sell (and resell) the lots,” but that disputes among lot owners conc erning proper land uses arose before and after the 1988 settlement.

Plaintiffs commenced this action in November 2011, seeking dec laratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs asserted that the Association’s board of di rectors, “through . . . actions . . . including the adoption of resolut ions or purported Board rules or policies, has undertaken actions which significantly and unlawfully restrict the property rights of the Plaintiff lot owners.” Plaintiffs specified “unwarranted regulations, discriminatory a pplication of same, improper imposition of fines,” and “the requirement of unwarranted permi ts.” Plaintiffs further complained that the board of dir ectors “has undertaken discrimi natory enforcement of rules or policies governing trai lers and campers,” including by having “ required the outri ght removal of trailers and campers from lots on or by October 31 each year ev en though no covenants or restrictions, and no order of the Court . . . , require this or restrict the property owners from storing trailers or campers on t heir own lots throughout the en tire year.”

Defendants counterclaimed, seeking abatement of nuisance, inju nctive relief, and declaratory relief confirming “the validity and enforceability of the Covenants and Restrictions applicable to the Development as well as the right for the boar d of the . . . Association to enforce such Covenants and Restrictions through the implementation of r easonable rules and regulations.” Among the latter was a bulletin setting forth ca mping and fire pit regulations, which advised that “Only 1 camper unit is permitted on a . . . Lot,” but that a second such unit “may be permitted for a maximum of 14 days if a permit is obtai ned from the [Association’s] office.”

The circuit court entertained arguments on cross-motions for s ummary disposition in May 2013, at the end of which the court stated as follows:

[I]t’s long been . . . established that the property owners can join together and do a development and restrict certai n property rights, and that’s wh at happened here.

The other aspect is . . . the law has always said that [covena nts] and restrictions are to be construe d strictly against those creatin g and enforcing ‘em.

And so . . . the ultimate question is . . . what is the power of the board? The power of the board is derived through their articles of inc orporation and-5- through the [covenants] and restri ctions, and [the articles of incorporation] provide a means for the promulgation and enforcement of all reg ulations necessary to the governing of the use and enjoyment and public safety of such . . . recreational facilities or other amenities and such other recre ational facilities within the development as may be conveyed to the association.

I don’t see anywhere in there wh ere they were given the author ity to make regulations regarding camping on lots.

. . . [T]here’s nothing in the restrictions on camping that sa ys the board can promulgate any rules regard ing camping other than what’s in that section.

There is no authority there.

. . . [T]here’s no specific pow er given and you want to claim that there’s an implied power.

The court elaborated:

If they want to put in camping r estrictions then they should pr obably go ahead and amend your [covenants] and restrictions to specifically give ‘e m that authority, but the way I read the [covenants] and restrictions they don’t have that authority unless you take it by implication, and I don’t read the case la w to say that you take something by implication to gi ve them the authority to do it.

The circuit court further state d, “if there are any discrimina tory actions in the plaintiff’s [sic] complaints then they need to be dealt with individually . . . . So if there is anything in there then we are gonna continue this case and hold the trial on thos e discriminatory regulations— actions individually.”

An order followed on August 14, 2013, styled as “partially” gr anting plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition and denying that of defendants. The or der stated that plaintiffs’ motion was granted “insofar as the Cour t has held that the Board of [t he] Association has no express authority under the Association’s Covenants and Restrictions, A rticles of Incorporation or Bylaws to create regulations r egarding camping that are not exp ressly contained in those documents.”

Plaintiffs followed with a motion for declaratory ruling and p ermanent injunction, and defendants followed with a new motion for summary disposition. At the hearing on the motions the circuit court stated, “Well I want to make it pretty clear my ruling was really limited . . . to saying that their regulations that they issued weren’t enforcea ble and they didn’t have the authority to issue those regulat ions. I really tried to narrow my focus of that ruling.” The circuit court added, “I ruled that they did not have an authority to ma ke . . . regulations on camping . . . [a]nd so I didn’t rule that . . . they couldn’t limit it to one because . . . I never approached that issue.” The circuit court further stated that interpretation o f the covenants and restrictions remained a matter in issue.-6- Plaintiffs’ attorney argued th at plaintiffs’ camping activitie s in fact comported with the single-family residential purpose, and also that plaintiffs wer e the victims of discriminatory or disparate treatment on the ground that “some of the defendants who are persons with a permanent residence on their pr operty are using their property to also contain trailers and they don’t limit themselves to one tra iler and they don’t require th eir trailer to be removed in the offseason.” The circuit court took the matter under advisement to review the 1988 case to “see what in the heck occurred in that case and how they came to a s ettlement.”

When proceedings resumed, plaintiffs’ attorney requested an ev identiary hearing to resolve matters not yet decided, specifying “the issue concerni ng discriminatory treatment of sheds and decks relative to the lots in which there are no perm anent structures,” and asserted that the Association had authorized sheds and decks for some, but no t all, lot owners, and argued that it had done so with “no standards applicable to who gets such a pproval and who does not.” Counsel for defendants retorted that there is no cause of actio n for discriminatory enforcement in connection with private, as oppos ed to governmental, entities, and suggested that recognition of that principle should obviate any ne ed for an evidentiary heari ng.

The circuit court ruled as follows:

[O]n this matter I did make a pri or ruling, it was a very limit ed ruling and based on information I have in front of me of this vague restrictions and covenant amendment and settlement from the 1988 case and originally this case was filed to stop White Birch from making lot owners remove their campers from their lots and also regarding discriminatory treatment regarding the sheds and decks, you really haven’t shown any case la w that would allow you to have a due process argument against [the Association] regarding discriminatory enf orcement and without some kind of cas e law that allows that kind of a lawsui t I’m going to have to grant summary disposition to [defendants] on that.

. . . [Y]ou give up some of th e property rights by buying into an association which has restri ctions and [covenants].

Because the documents were so vague the Court did pull out the 1988 file, very interesting, . . . what happene d is that the lot owners of . . . Subdivision seven didn’t like campers being out on the lots, so the lot owners al l added their own restrictive [covenants] and c onditions regarding camping and te mporary structures and then they filed that lawsuit to make people remove their tr ailers/campers from the lots. . . . [T]he attorneys an d the judge approved some po or language in that settlement and . . . it would have been awfully easy for them t o write in there that you can’t store campers on your lots, but they didn’t, they cam e out with their settlement agreement which talked about camping from May to Oct ober 31st and then by permit for the rest of the year.

When I was dealing with the language in my first ruling, . . . I’m looking at it strictly . . . because it never said that . . . you can’t store campers on there

. . . .-7- But now looking at the facts that 1988, [the Association] sued to make people remove their campers and then here we go 25 years we hav e lot owners suing to try and keep their campe rs on the lots to stop [the As sociation] from removing the campers from the lots.

I think that gives me a clear indication that the settlement o f the 1988 case was . . . that you can’t store campers on the lots.

It’s too bad they just didn’t come out and write that in there , but what they did do is they said from May to October 31st, you can camp ther e without a permit and thereafter you have to have permit.

The implication would be that you can’t store it there and bas ed on the facts from the 1988 case of what occurred . . . the Court’s gon na take [the] implication because this is so poorly worded you could easily s ay the implication was . . . that you didn’t need a permit you could store your ca mper there but if it wanted to use it you had t o have a permit to do it.

* * *

But when you put in the facts of the 1988 case why it was done

, . . . nobody can conclude . . . other than c ampers cannot be stored o n the lots.

So the Court is granting summary disposition to [defendants] o n all
counts.

The circuit court continued, “I want to stress . . . that [in] 1988 one of the complaints . . . was no more than one campers [sic] could be one [sic] a lot and that language was not included in the settlement, so . . . it’s not included in these restrict ions.” Accordingly, the circuit court held that “you can still have more than one camper on your lot. ” When plaintiffs’ attorney showed some exasperation over the circuit court’s apparent chan ge of heart, the c ourt explained, “I’m going back in modifying, my, m y prior ruling was very limi ted . . . .”

A written order followed on January 28, 2014, which included t he following:

It is clear to this court in reviewing the 1988 case that [the resulting order’s] language meant that camping units would be removed in the off-season unless being used for camping by permit. This clause mandates that the . . . lots shall not be used for storage of recreational vehicles, campers , trailers or other camping accessories from November 1 through the next Memorial D ay weekend. During this off-season period, a ll recreational vehicles, campe rs, trailers or other camping accessories shall be physically removed from any landow ner’s lot, absent a permit issued by the As sociation Board and their use f or camping purposes. Off-season camping permits should not be issued for the purpose of storage of recreational vehicl es, campers, trailers or other ca mping accessories.-8- The order further decreed that defendants’ motion for summary d isposition “related to removal of campers and trailers from Oc tober 31 through the next . . . Memorial Day weekend is granted,” but that the motion as it related to defendant’s desi re to “limit camping and usage of recreational vehicles, campers, trailers or other camping acces sories to one recreational vehicle, camper, or trailer per lot is denied.” The order denied plaint iffs’ request for an evidentiary hearing, and dismissed the attendant claim of discriminatory ru lemaking or enforcement, on the grounds that “[t]here is no governme ntal action in this case. It is a private association that plaintiffs voluntarily joined.”

These appeals followed.

This Court reviews a trial cour t’s decision on a motion for su mmary disposition de novo as a question of law. Ardt v Titan Ins Co , 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). Likewise, “[t]he interpretation of restrictive covenants is a q uestion of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Johnson Family Ltd v Wh ite Pine Wireless, LLC , 281 Mich App 364, 389; 761 NW2d 353 (2008).

II. DOCKET NO. 320382

A. LIMITATION OF CAMPING UNITS PER LOT

Not at issue is that plaintiffs took title to their lots subje ct to a requirement to abide by the Association’s policies and rule s concerning land uses. Covenan ts applicable to a subdivision “are, in nature, reciprocal negative easements.” Northwestern Home Owners’ Ass’n v Sheehan
, 310 Mich 188, 192; 16 NW2d 712 (1944) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he rationale of the doctrine of reciprocal negative easemen ts is based upon the fairness inherent in placing uniform res trictions upon the use of all lo ts similarly situated . . . .” Civic Ass’n of Hammond Lake v Hammond Lake Estates No 3 Lots 126-135 , 271 Mich App 130, 137; 721 NW2d 801 (2006) (internal quota tion marks and citation omit ted).

In this case, defendants cite p rovisions of the articles of in corporation and covenants and restrictions that set forth the objective of single-family resi dential character, and also the Association’s duty to promote that character, and insist that “ [b]ecause such broad authority was granted, specific delineation of categories of rules is simply unnecessary.” Defendants thus assert that the Association has the authority to restrict lot u ses to a single camping vehicle at a time by implication arising from th e general provisions of the governing documents.

The circuit court, however, emphasized its understanding of a duty to avoid recognizing such implied covenants. The circuit court has statutory law onits side: “No covenant shall be implied in any conveyance of real estate, except oil and gas le ases, whether such conveyance contain special covenants or not.” MCL 565.5. This Court has held that “covenants would be implied only where the implication must arise from the language used or was indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties . . . .” Bobenal Investment, Inc v Giant Super Markets, Inc
, 79 Mich App 31, 40; 260 NW2d 915 (1977) ( internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendants protest that, without limitations in place, there w ould be nothing to stop a lot owner from loading up his property with ten camping-related veh icles, raising the specter of-9- several such lot owners creating the feel of a trailer park in obvious contravention of the wellestablished single-family residential character of the developm ent. However, the circuit court’s ruling that the governing documen ts do not authorize the Associ ation to limit lots to a single such vehicle each does not mean that no degree of crowding of campin g-related vehicles onto a lot lay within the Association’s regulato ry reach. The circuit court d etermined only that the singlefamily residential character of t he development, as clearly set forth in the governing documents, was not necessarily defeated by allowing more than a single suc h vehicle on a lot; the circuit court did not decree that no dens ity of such vehicles could eve r produce that effect. Accordingly, the circuit court’s determination that the governing documents did not authorize the Association to limit each lot to a single camping vehicle otherwise left op en the question of how great a proliferation of such vehicles w ould sufficiently contravene th e governing documents’ provisions for single-family residential ch aracter that those provisions themselves would in fact authorize the Association to take steps remediate the situation. Thus, d efendants fail to show that the circuit court erred in holding that the Association lacked auth ority under the relevant documents to limit lot owners to a single camping-related vehicle per lot

.

III. DOCKET NO. 322836

A. SEASONAL PLACEMENT OF CA MPING-RELATED EQUIPMENT

Plaintiffs argue that “all landowners pay the same annual asse ssments to support the Association, with equal voting rights,” but that defendants tre at themselves as “a separate elitist class where they, or their favored ‘insiders,’ may place multip le trailers, year-around, on their property, while denying the same property rights to other prope rty owners such as Plaintiffs.” Plaintiffs acknowledge as a major basis for the different treat ment is that some lot owners “have built a ‘house’ (even if it is only occupied in the summer)” wh ile others are “ ‘mere landowners,’ ” meaning owners of lo ts without residential dwellings , “who wish to use their property to place their trailer homes on their property.” Plaintiffs ad ditionally assert that the Association “has been applying and enforcing the . . . Covenants and Restri ctions in an arbitrary [and] discriminatory manner, including by “allowing ‘sheds or decks’ for some vacant lot owners and not others.”

Concerning seasonal, as opposed to year-round placement of hou se trailers or camping vehicles on the lots, plaintiffs do not dispute the circuit cou rt’s statements concerning the nature of the litigation that resulted in the 1988 order. Taking guid ance from that earlier litigation, the circuit court concluded that t he 1988 order’s p rovisions concer ning camping, as incorporated into the amended covenants and restrictions that followed, “mea nt that camping units would be removed in the off-season unless being used for camping by perm it,” in other words that the “lots shall not be used for storage of recreational vehicles, c ampers, trailers or other camping accessories from November 1 through the next Memorial Day weeke nd” and that “[d]uring this off-season period, all recreationa l vehicles, campers, trailers or other camping accessories shall be physically removed from any landowner’s lot, absent a permit .”

The circuit court’s reasoning was sound. The distinction betw een the on- and off-season would mean little to those concer ned with preserving the single -family residential character of the development if it meant that camping equipment on the lots would remain year-round, with-10- the only seasonal difference being that such equipment would be more conservatively used during the off-season. The circu it court reasonably concluded that the parties settled the 1988 litigation with the understandi ng that the development would fe ature substantially unfettered camping activities during the sp ecified camping season, then wo uld be substantially uncluttered with camping equipment during t he specified off-season.

The differentiation between lot s with and without residential dwellings reasonably reflects the single-family residential purpose of the developme nt. A lot with a house on it obviously comports with the single -family residential aspiratio n of the development, and continues to emanate single-family residential character even i f storing a trailer or other camping equipment thereupon year-round. Not so a lot that has no ancho ring residential dwelling but that is loaded with equipment for camping, which activity differs fr om the purely residential by involving “people . . . temporarily lodged in tents, huts, or o ther makeshift shelters,” or “more or less permanent . . . shelters[] us ed for vacationing or other r ecreational purposes.” American Heritage Dictionary (2d college ed, 1985), p 232.

Article II, § B of the amended covenants and restrictions is i nstructive as another manifestation of the differentiat ion between lots with and with out residential dwellings:

No accessory outbuildings shall be erected on any of said lots prior to the erection thereon of a single-fa mily dwelling house. In no even t shall any such accessory outbuilding or temporary structure which may be const ructed upon such lot under these restrictions ever be used as a residence or dwe lling house or place of human occupancy or habitation.

Thus, lots with residential dw ellings are given the privilege o f accessory outbuildings.

For these reasons, the Association has engaged in no perniciou s discrimination by recognizing that lots with resid ential dwellings can retain the ir single-family residential character after constructing attendant sheds or decks, or while storing r ecreational equipment, in ways that lots lacking resident ial dwellings cannot.

B. DISCRIMINATORY RULEM AKING OR ENFORCEMENT

The circuit court summarily disposed of plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination by pointing out that the constitutional Equa l Protection doctrine is a guar d against only governmental, not private, action, and noting that plaintiffs “have shown no law in support of their position.” On appeal, plaintiffs take pains to disclaim that they are trying to apply constitutional rules in this litigation between private parties, but argue nonetheless that the Association violated its own principles by creating two classe s of lot owners as a consequen ce of its decisions on applications for permits for trailers, sheds and decks.

However, plaintiffs do not suggest that this alleged creation of two classes resulted even in part from any differentiation by race, religion, age, or any other characteristic that establishes invidious discrimination against a class, and do not dispute th e circuit court’s assertion that they presented it with no legal authority for the proposition that t he discretionary approvals, or withholding thereof, of which the y complain constitute actionab le discrimination. Nor do-11- plaintiffs offer such author ity on appeal, but for citing, appa rently for the first time, the following two provisions from MCL 450.2304, whi ch is part of the Nonprofi t Corporation Act: 1

(2) A corporation organized on a membership basis may have 1 o r more classes of members. Except as otherwise provided in this act, any provision for classes of members and the relative number, voting rights, qual ifications, liquidation rights, preferences, and limitations, and other rig hts, preferences, and limitations of or on each class shall be set forth in the artic les of incorporation or the bylaws. Each member of any class of members has equal righ ts with all members of that class.

(3) Except as provided in the a rticles of incorporation or byl aws, each member of a corporation, regardless of class, is entitled to 1 vote on each matter submitted to a vote of members, unless the articles of incorpor ation or bylaws deny, limit, or otherwise prescribe the voting rights of any cl ass of members. The members and each affected class of members of a corporation org anized on a membership basis, if any, shall adopt, amend, or repeal any byl aw denying, limiting, or otherwise prescribi ng the voting rights of any cla ss of members.

However, plaintiffs neither set forth the factual particulars o f how any such permitting or enforcement decisions on the Association’s part went beyond nor mal discretion and created distinct classes of advantaged and disadvantaged lot owners for purposes of the Nonprofit Corporation Act, nor cite authority to aid in identifying such actionable private discrimination. See Houghton v Keller , 256 Mich App 336, 339; 662 NW2d 854 (2003) (“An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to disc over and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give issues cursory treatment with littl e or no citation of supporting authority.”). Plaintiffs have fa iled to show that the circuit court erred in granting defendants summary disposition of their cla im of unlawful discrimination.

C. CAPRICIOUS AND A RBITRARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs argue that to the extent that the circuit court’s o rder of January 28, 2014, and its statements from the bench leading up to it, was not consistent with its order of August 14, 2013, and statements leading up to it, the circuit court erred for ha ving acted capriciously and arbitrarily. Plaintiffs direct this argument at the circuit co urt’s ultimate conclusions, respectively, that defendants w ere entitled to insist on remova l of plaintiffs’ camping equipment during the off-season when not in use, and that no evidentiary hearing was required to decide the claim of discriminatory rulemaking and enforcement.

However, the rule for present purposes remains that “an order entered by a trial court may be modified before entry of the final judgment,” and that among the reasons a court may do so

1 MCL 450.2101 et seq.-12- for is “to reflect a more correct adjudication of the rights an d liabilities of the litigants.” Meagher v Wayne State Univ , 222 Mich App 700, 718; 565 NW2d 401 (1997).

Moreover, the circuit court in this instance did have a reason ed basis for issuing a final order that departed in some respects from its innuendos from ea rlier in the case. The circuit court initially deemed it a “big problem” that the governing do cuments did not grant the Association’s board “the authorityto make regulations regardin g camping on lots,” and its August 14, 2013, order in turn stated that “the Board of [the] Association has no express authority under the Association’s Covenants and Restrictions, A rticles of Incorporation or Bylaws to create regulations r egarding camping that are not exp ressly contained in those documents.” In later proceedings in the case, however, the cou rt repeatedly reminded plaintiffs that this ruling was “very limited,” and also that it had under taken to review the litigation underlying the 1988 court order reflecting the parties’ settlem ent. Only upon having advised itself of the nature and outcome of that earlier litigation did the circuit court conclude defendants could properly insist on removal of such equipment when not in use by permit during the offseason as a prerogative that inhered in the 1998 settlement ord er, regardless of the lack of the specification of such authority in the articles of incorporatio n, the covenants and restrictions, or the bylaws. This evolution in t he circuit court’s thinking was not arbitrary or capricious.

Likewise that the circuit court initially signaled the intenti on to decide plaintiffs’ discrimination claim on an indivi dual basis through separate tr ial proceedings, but then concluded that that claim should be dismissed on the basis of the legal authority presented to it. The circuit court did not act ar bitrarily or capriciously in in itially supposing that any claims of wrongful discrimination would have to be decided on the basis o f what the evidence indicated in connection with each such claimant, and then to determine that any such claims failed on the basis of the legal authorit y, or lack thereof, presented by the parties.

For these reasons, plaintiffs f ail to show that the circuit co urt erred in issui ng a final order that departed from some of the i mpressions the circuit court co mmunicated in connection with earlier proceedings.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly /s/ Deborah A. Servitto