Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2876 | May 22, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kelly M. Starling

Marion County Public Defender Agency 

Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Angela N. Sanchez

Tina L. Mann

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

N.H.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

May 22, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JV-2876

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Danielle P. Gaughan, 

Judge Pro Tempore

The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1908-JD-977

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2876 | May 22, 2020 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] N.H. appeals the juvenile court’s true finding that she committed the delinquent 

act of escape, a Level 6 felony1if committed by an adult. The only issue she 

raises on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted

State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 into the record, over her objections.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In early August of 2019, the State placed N.H. on electronic monitoring as a 

pretrial condition in relation to another case. On August 13, the State filed a 

delinquency petition in which it alleged that N.H. committed the delinquent act

of escape. The juvenile court conducted a fact finding hearing on September 27 

at which Lidiana Adams (“Adams”), N.H.’s Marion County Juvenile 

Probation Officer, testified that, on August 7, N.H. was released from detention 

and, as a condition of her release, was placed on a GPS electronic monitoring 

system in the form of a monitor on an ankle strap. Adams testified that ankle 

monitors allow the community adjustment team (“CAT”) of the Marion 

1

 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-4(b) (“A person who knowingly or intentionally violates a home detention order or 

intentionally removes an electronic monitoring device or GPS tracking device commits escape, a Level 6 

felony.”).
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County Juvenile Probation Department to monitor a juvenile’s location at all 

times. 

[4] On August 12, CAT received an alert that N.H.’s ankle monitor was either 

malfunctioning or had been tampered with. Because the probation department 

was unable to contact N.H. otherwise, Adams and members of CAT went to 

N.H.’s home. N.H. was not there, but Adams and the other probation officers 

found an ankle monitor lying in the driveway of N.H.’s home with the strap cut 

and a pair of scissors lying next to the ankle monitor. From the information 

Adams had up to that point, she believed the discarded ankle monitor belonged 

to N.H. The probation officers collected the ankle monitor and filed a notice of 

probation violation.

[5] Dave Akers (“Akers”), the supervisor of Marion County CAT, also testified. 

Through Akers, the State offered into evidence two exhibits. Akers testified 

that he had printed out both exhibits from the computer system CAT uses to 

monitor juveniles on community release. He stated that computer system is

“from” a company out of Colorado called Behavioral Interventions Total 

Access, which services the monitoring equipment and provides CAT with alerts 

when certain activities occur, such as tampering with ankle monitor straps. Tr. 

at 15. Exhibit 1 was a printout of an activity summary indicating that a 

“Tracker Strap Tamper” had occurred on August 12, 2019, for the ankle 

monitor provided to N.H.. Ex. 1. N.H. objected to Exhibit 1 as “hearsay,” and 

on the grounds that the State had only provided the document to N.H. right

before the hearing. Tr. at 16. The juvenile court asked Akers if there was any
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information in Exhibit 1 “that hasn’t been talked about today in court,” and

Akers replied in the negative. Id. at 19. The court overruled the objection and 

Exhibit 1 was admitted.

[6] Akers also testified as to Exhibit 2, which was another document he had printed 

out from the system owned by Behavioral Interventions. Exhibit 2 contained a 

“history” of activity on N.H.’s ankle monitor from August 8 through September 

24, 2019. Tr. at 22. Akers stated that the documents in both Exhibits 1 and 2 

are documents CAT “keeps in its regular course of business.” Id. at 23. N.H. 

objected to the admission of Exhibit 2 on the grounds that (1) it was provided to 

her only right before the hearing and (2) it is hearsay. As to the latter, N.H. 

noted the document in Exhibit 2 is from a computer system “from [Behavioral 

Interventions] Total Access,” and Akers is “not the keeper of that system.” Id. 

N.H. further stated: “We don’t have anybody here from Total Access to 

authenticate that these [exhibits] are accurate or anything about the [computer] 

system.” Id. The juvenile court overruled the objection and Exhibit 2 was 

admitted into evidence.

[7] On November 8, 2019, the court issued its written order finding it true that 

N.H. committed the delinquent act of escape, a Level 6 felony if committed by 

an adult, and placing her on probation. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision

[8] N.H. appeals the juvenile court’s admission of State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 into 

evidence. A trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of 

evidence, and we review such rulings for an abuse of discretion. E.g., Cornell v. 

State, 139 N.E.3d 1135, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Nicholson v. State, 963 

N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 

court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it. Id.

[9] As an initial matter, the State asserts that N.H. has waived her appeal of the 

admission of Exhibits 1 and 2 because her objections to those exhibits lacked 

specificity. Indiana Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that 

an error is preserved for appeal only if a party makes a timely objection that 

states a specific ground, “unless it was apparent from the context.” The State 

contends that the hearsay objections to its exhibits were insufficient because 

they did not reference Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(6), commonly referred to 

as the “business records exception” to hearsay. 

[10] However, N.H.’s hearsay objection to Exhibit 2 was specific enough as it 

asserted a lack of authentication by the record keeper, which is a requirement of 

the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. Ind. Evid. R. 

803(6)(D). And N.H.’s general hearsay objection to Exhibit 1 was sufficient to 

preserve the issue of its admissibility on appeal, as the ground for the objection 

was apparent from the context. See Evid. R. 103(a)(1); Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 
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752, 756 (Ind. 2016) (cautioning appellate courts not to unrealistically “insist on 

detailed doctrinal arguments during the exigencies of trial,” and observing that 

an objection need simply be sufficient “to let the trial judge make an informed 

decision and prevent the objecting party from switching theories on appeal”);

K.T. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (“In re O.G.”), 65 N.E.3d 1080, 1086-76 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016) (finding a general hearsay objection sufficient to preserve the issue 

of admissibility for appeal, even when the objection did not specifically identify 

the business records exception to the hearsay rule), trans. denied. N.H. did not 

waive appeal of the admissibility of State’s Exhibits 1 and 2.

[11] N.H. contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted State’s 

Exhibits 1 and 2 into evidence. Specifically, she maintains that those 

documents do not fall within the business records exception to the rule against 

hearsay. See Evid. R. 803(6). However, even assuming—without deciding—

that the exhibits were inadmissible hearsay, their admission was harmless error. 

“The fact that evidence was erroneously admitted does not 

automatically require reversal, and we will reverse only if we 

conclude the admission affected a party’s substantial rights.” [In 

re A.J., 877 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.]

“In general, the admission of evidence that is merely cumulative 

of other evidence amounts to harmless error as such admission 

does not affect a party’s substantial rights.” In re Paternity of 

H.R.M., 864 N.E.2d 442, 450-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).”

D.B.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 20 N.E.3d 174, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), 

trans. denied; see also Sibbing v. Cave, 922 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind. 2010)

(“[R]eversible error cannot be predicated upon the erroneous admission of 
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evidence that is merely cumulative of other evidence that has already been 

properly admitted.”(quotation and citation omitted)); E.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs. (“In re Des.B.”), 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“To determine 

whether the admission of evidence affected a party’s substantial rights, we 

assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the finder of fact.”(citation 

omitted)).

[12] Here, State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 were merely cumulative of the testimony 

provided by Adams. She testified that: N.H. was on electronic monitoring; the 

probation department received an alert on August 12, 2019, that N.H.’s 

monitor was either malfunctioning or had been tampered with; Adams and 

other probation officers went to N.H.’s house when they could not otherwise 

get in touch with her; N.H. was not at home; Adams and other probation 

officers found an ankle monitor lying in N.H.’s driveway with a cut strap; and 

they also found a pair of scissors lying next to the monitor in the driveway. 

From that evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that N.H. 

intentionally removed her electronic monitoring device, thus committing the 

delinquent act of escape. I.C. § 35-44.1-3-4(b). The evidence in Exhibits 1 and 

2 provided no additional information that was necessary to reach such a 

reasonable inference. The only new information in the exhibits was the specific 

number of N.H.’s ankle monitor, and that information was not necessary to 

support the reasonable inference that the ankle monitor with the cut strap found 

in N.H.’s driveway was N.H.’s monitor. Therefore, the only new information

in the challenged exhibits likely had no impact on the juvenile court’s decision. 
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See In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 834. Any error in the admission of State’s Exhibits 

1 and 2 was harmless.

Conclusion

[13] N.H. preserved her appeal of the admission of the State’s exhibits into evidence

by timely objecting on hearsay grounds. However, assuming without deciding 

that the admission of those exhibits was erroneous, the error was harmless as 

the relevant information in the exhibits was cumulative.

[14] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.