RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0031-MR

MAURICE GASAWAY APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE KEN M. HOWARD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CR-00927 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: DIXON, GOODWINE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Maurice Gasaway brings this appeal from August 30, 2019, 

judgments of the Hardin Circuit Court upon jury verdicts finding Gasaway guilty 

of possession of marijuana and possession of a controlled substance, heroin, and 

sentencing him to thirty-days’ incarceration and to three-years’ imprisonment to be 

served consecutively. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND

The facts underlying Gasaway’s arrest and subsequent indictment are 

as follows. On the morning of August 30, 2018, Gasaway was working for his 

employer, Knight’s Mechanical, located in Hardin County, Kentucky. Gasaway 

and two other employees were working in the sheet metal shop at Knight’s 

Mechanical. One of Gasaway’s co-workers, Austin McClanahan, was walking 

across the shop when he noticed a plastic bag about the size of a fingernail on the 

floor. Just as McClanahan picked up the plastic bag, his supervisor, Josh Bush, 

walked up behind McClanahan. Bush instructed McClanahan to take the plastic 

bag to Bush’s office. McClanahan complied, went into Bush’s office, and placed 

the bag on Bush’s desk. Bush covered the small plastic bag with a sheet of paper. 

Suspecting the plastic bag contained drugs, Bush called his supervisor. Bush’s 

supervisor then contacted his supervisor, Jeremy Knight, and informed him of the 

situation. 

After lunch, Knight went to Bush’s office. Knight looked at the 

plastic bag and then reviewed security video footage from that morning of the area 

where the bag was found. Knight believed the video footage revealed that the 

plastic bag fell from Gasaway’s pocket when he removed his cell phone. After 

reviewing the video footage, Knight gave the plastic bag to another employee, 
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Brian Tharpe. Tharpe contacted Detective Robert Dover of the Greater Hardin 

County Narcotics Task Force.

The following day, Detective Dover came to Knight’s Mechanical. 

Tharpe gave the plastic bag to Detective Dover, and he conducted a field test on 

the substance. The substance tested positive for heroin. Tharpe then showed 

Detective Dover the video footage from the previous morning. Detective Dover,

likewise, believed that the video depicted Gasaway dropping the plastic bag while 

he was retrieving a cellphone from his pocket. Thereafter, Detective Dover and 

two other police officers on the scene approached Gasaway. The officers 

explained to Gasaway they were there because of the heroin. Gasaway was 

handcuffed, given his Miranda rights, and escorted outside. Once outside, 

Gasaway realized that two parole officers1 were also present and became 

belligerent. Gasaway was then placed in the back of a police cruiser. 

A search of Gasaway’s person did not yield anything illegal but the 

police officers did discover a key fob in Gasaway’s pocket. The key fob unlocked 

the truck Gasaway drove to work which was parked nearby in the company 

parking lot. Detective Dover ran the license plate on the truck and discovered it 

 

1 Maurice Gasaway was on parole as the result of a previous drug-related offense for trafficking 

in a controlled substance, first degree, cocaine, and for possession of a handgun by a convicted 

felon.
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was registered to a Michelle Gasaway at the same address as Gasaway. Gasaway 

denied a request for consent to search the truck; nevertheless, a search ensued. 

Detective Dover found a plastic bag that contained two separate 

plastic bags of marijuana in the console of the truck. There was also a plastic bag 

containing a pill with a “Superman” insignia printed on it. The pill was believed to 

be ecstasy but was later tested and determined to be methamphetamine. 

Additionally, Detective Dover discovered a few marijuana roaches in a cupholder 

ashtray and marijuana shake around the ashtray. The search also yielded an object 

known as a “Whizzanator,” which drug users frequently utilize to thwart drug 

detection in urinalysis testing. Gasaway asked Detective Dover if he was going to 

jail. Detective Dover responded in the affirmative and further explained that 

Gasaway was facing charges for possession of methamphetamine, ecstasy, and 

heroin. Gasaway responded, “I’m not worried about the weed or ecstasy, and you 

damn sure didn’t find no three grams of heroin. And in Louisville, that’s just a 

citation.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.

On September 20, 2018, Gasaway was indicted by a Hardin County 

Grand Jury upon Possession of a Controlled Substance, First Degree, Heroin 

(Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415), Possession of a Controlled 

Substance, Second Degree, Schedule I Non-Narcotic, Ecstasy (KRS 218A.1416),

and Possession of Marijuana (KRS 218A.1422). By Supplemental Indictment 
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dated March 28, 2019, Gasaway was also indicted upon one count of Possession of 

a Controlled Substance, First Degree, Methamphetamine (KRS 218A.1415).

2

Gasaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his 

vehicle. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing, and by order entered 

April 25, 2019, the trial court denied Gasaway’s motion to suppress. A jury trial 

ensued. By Trial Verdict and Judgment entered May 14, 2019, the trial court 

announced a hung jury as to the possession of heroin charge, not guilty upon the 

possession of methamphetamine charge, and guilty upon the possession of 

marijuana charge. The possession of methamphetamine charge was dismissed with 

prejudice. However, the trial court did not sentence Gasaway upon the guilty 

verdict for possession of marijuana at this time. 

The Commonwealth elected to retry Gasaway upon the possession of 

heroin charge. Following the retrial, the jury found Gasaway guilty upon the 

possession of heroin charge. By Judgment and Order Imposing Sentence entered 

August 30, 2019, Gasaway was sentenced to three-years’ imprisonment upon the 

possession of heroin charge. By separate order, also entered August 30, 2019, the 

trial court additionally sentenced Gasaway to thirty-days’ incarceration upon the 

 

2 After laboratory testing revealed that the pill containing the “Superman” insignia was 

methamphetamine rather than ecstasy, the Commonwealth of Kentucky made a motion to 

dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled substance, second degree, schedule I nonnarcotic, ecstasy, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, a Supplemental Indictment was 

returned charging Gasaway with possession of a controlled substance, first degree, 

methamphetamine.
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possession of marijuana charge. The sentences were ordered to be served 

consecutively. This appeal follows.

Gasaway raises four issues in this appeal. First, he contends the trial 

court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle

after his arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Section Ten of the Kentucky Constitution. More particularly, 

Gasaway asserts that officers lacked probable cause to search his vehicle and that 

his status as a parolee did not subject him to unlimited warrantless searches. 

Second, Gasaway asserts that the prosecutor presented an improper hypothetical 

regarding reasonable doubt during voir dire at the trial. Third, he argues the trial 

court erred by allowing the introduction of evidence of his possession of 

methamphetamine and marijuana that was addressed in the first trial. Finally, 

Gasaway argues that the trial court erred by allowing opinion testimony of the 

video that showed the heroin package falling out of Gasaway’s pocket that resulted 

in his arrest. We shall examine each issue in the order raised.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review upon a trial court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence requires a two-step analysis. First, the trial court’s factual 

findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Milam v.

Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2015). Second, the court’s application 
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of law to those findings of facts is reviewed de novo. Simpson v. Commonwealth,

474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015). As concerns the remaining issues raised in this 

appeal, our standard of review will be abuse of discretion as discussed in the 

analysis for each issue raised.

ANALYSIS

It is uncontroverted that at the time of the search, Gasaway was on 

parole and under the supervision of the Kentucky Department of Corrections. It is

also well-settled that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, persons on parole have a greatly diminished expectation of privacy.

See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006). In fact, “parolees have 

fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to 

imprisonment than probation. . . . [P]arole is an established variation on 

imprisonment of convicted criminals[.]” Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d

411, 414 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 850). Paramount to this appeal,

the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Bratcher, specifically held that “the Fourth

Amendment presents no impediment against a warrantless and suspicionless search

of a person on parole.” Id. at 415. 

Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has addressed a parolee’s 

privacy rights as to a search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution, it has not addressed same under Section 10 of the Kentucky 
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Constitution. See Bratcher, 424 S.W.3d at 416 (holding “[w]e have not . . . 

affirmed a construction of a parolees’ privacy rights against police searches based 

upon the Kentucky Constitution.”). However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has 

clearly recognized that Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution is coextensive with 

the Fourth Amendment to the United Sates Constitution. Marino v.

Commonwealth, 488 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Ky. App. 2016) (quoting Watkins v.

Commonwealth, 307 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Ky. 2010)).

In view of such precedent, we are constrained to adhere to same and 

conclude that Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution would, likewise, present no 

impediment against a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee or his 

vehicle.

3

 Thus, it is irrelevant whether officers possessed reasonable suspicion to 

search Gasaway’s vehicle as it is unnecessary to possess such suspicion to search 

the vehicle of a parolee. We, therefore, conclude that Gasaway’s argument to the 

contrary is without merit. 

Gasaway’s next argument on appeal is that during voir dire of the 

potential jurors at the retrial for the possession of heroin charge, the 

Commonwealth “improperly presented the jury with a hypothetical to explain what 

 

3 As an intermediate appellate court, pursuant to Rules of the Supreme Court 1.030(8)(a), we are 

bound to follow Kentucky Supreme Court precedent; however, we encourage the Kentucky 

Supreme Court to specifically address this issue as concerns an unreasonable search and seizure 

of a parolee under Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution.
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would satisfy the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard.” Gasaway’s Brief at 9. Gasaway 

acknowledges this issue is unpreserved but requests review for palpable error 

pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. 

Pursuant to RCr 10.26, an unpreserved error may be reviewed and 

relief granted if appellant’s substantial rights were affected and a manifest injustice 

resulted. Kiper v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 736, 747 (Ky. 2012). A manifest 

injustice occurs where the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity[sic] or 

public reputation” of the judicial proceeding so as to be “shocking or 

jurisprudently intolerable.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 462 S.W.3d 407, 410 (Ky. 

App. 2015). Furthermore, a trial court is granted broad discretion in its control 

over the voir dire examination pursuant to RCr 9.38. Rogers v. Commonwealth,

315 S.W.3d 303, 306-7 (Ky. 2010). Although it is certainly “within the discretion 

of the trial court to limit the scope of voir dire, that discretion is not boundless. 

Appellate review of such limitation is for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 306-07 

(quoting Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 583 (Ky. 2005)). Our review 

shall proceed accordingly.

The specific statements made by the Commonwealth during voir dire

upon Gasaway’s retrial on the possession of heroin charge were as follows:

 We, the standard here is the highest standard in the 

legal community. Okay. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt. 

You all have an opportunity to try a civil case, I don’t 

wish that on you, but, um, if you do, they have a different 
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standard. Here, it’s the high standard. Beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

 I didn’t say beyond any doubt. Okay. But beyond 

a reasonable doubt. The, we are not allowed to define 

that for you. Alright. We’re just not allowed to. You 

have to come up, whatever that means to you. Okay. 

You, you come up with that on your own. We can’t 

define if for you.

 But, I want to give you an example. Alright. 

Has anyone in here ever heard of Tiger Woods or Roy 

McIlroy? Anybody play golf? Okay. The, uh, pretty 

good golfers. Wouldn’t you say? Alright. The, you play 

golf? [Juror says, “I’m not good at it.”] I’m not, yeah, I 

don’t know what I play is golf. Okay. I got golf clubs 

and go to the golf court and, three, up there, they’ve got a 

three par, a par three up there at the American Legion.

 But, who in here believes if I was to go out and 

play golf with Roy and Tiger, that it’s possible, possible 

that I could beat them in nine holes. Does everyone 

agree it’s possible. Anything’s possible. Both their arms 

could fall off. Okay. It’s possible. Maybe extreme, but 

it’s possible. Anything could happen, okay.

 Is it reasonable to believe that I would beat both of 

them? No. No, it’s not reasonable. Um, it’s not. If you 

play golf, you know its not reasonable. Does everybody 

understand the difference between possible and 

reasonable though? Okay. Now, does everybody agree 

to hold this man responsible for his actions if I meet my 

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt?

Gasaway’s Brief at 11. 

The Kentucky Supreme Court, in accordance with RCr 9.56, has 

consistently held that “reasonable doubt” cannot be defined for the jury. See, e.g.,
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Commonwealth v. Callahan, 675 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Ky. 1984); Johnson v. 

Commonwealth, 184 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Ky. 2005). The prohibition against 

defining reasonable doubt extends to both the Commonwealth and defendant, and 

it applies to all stages of the trial, including voir dire. Callahan, 675 S.W.2d at 

393. 

Conversely, our Supreme Court has held it is permissible to define

what reasonable doubt is not. See Rogers v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 303, 308 

(Ky. 2010) (finding permissible counsel’s statement to the jury that “beyond a 

reasonable doubt” is not the same as the standard utilized in a civil trial which is 

“beyond a preponderance of the evidence”); Johnson, 184 S.W.3d at 548-49

(finding permissible counsel’s statement that “beyond a reasonable doubt” is not 

the same as “beyond a shadow of a doubt”). However, in Marsch v. 

Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 830, 833-34 (Ky. 1987), the Court held that the 

Commonwealth’s extended discussion with a potential juror during voir dire about 

reasonable doubt using a hypothetical to contrast “reasonable doubt” with “beyond 

a shadow of a doubt” did violate the rule against defining reasonable doubt.

In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth engaged in more than just 

merely stating what reasonable doubt is not. Rather, the Commonwealth provided 

a lengthy hypothetical that juxtaposed what is reasonable versus what is possible. 

Consequently, we agree with Gasaway that the Commonwealth’s statements 
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violated the prohibition against defining reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, we hold 

that the unpreserved error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial proceeding so as to be shockingly or jurisprudently 

intolerable. See Williams, 462 S.W.3d at 410. Accordingly, we conclude the 

unpreserved error did not rise to the level of manifest injustice as there was 

overwhelming evidence to support Gasaway’s conviction upon possession of 

heroin. Therefore, any error did not rise to the level of palpable error under RCr 

10.26.

Gasaway next contends the trial court erred during his retrial on the 

possession of heroin charge by allowing introduction of evidence of Gasaway’s 

possession of marijuana and possession of methamphetamine. At the trial, 

the Commonwealth announced its intention to introduce evidence that

methamphetamine and marijuana had been discovered in Gasaway’s truck. In the 

first trial, Gasaway had been acquitted of the possession of methamphetamine 

charge but had been found guilty of the misdemeanor charge of possessing 

marijuana. Gasaway objected to the introduction of evidence of both the 

methamphetamine and the marijuana. 

At trial, the Commonwealth acknowledged it would be improper to 

introduce the results of Gasaway’s first trial but contended it could reference the 

discovery of methamphetamine and marijuana pursuant to Kentucky Rules of 
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Evidence (KRE) 404(b). In support thereof, the Commonwealth noted that in 

addition to the methamphetamine and the marijuana discovered in Gasaway’s 

truck, there was also a urinalysis drug detection device, which would indicate he 

was trying to thwart detection of his drug use. And, the Commonwealth argued 

that the methamphetamine and marijuana provided context to Gasaway’s statement 

to Detective Dover that “I’m not worried about the weed or ecstasy, and you damn 

sure didn’t find no three grams of heroin. And in Louisville, that’s just a citation.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 5. The trial court ultimately ruled that evidence of the

methamphetamine and the marijuana discovered in Gasaway’s truck was 

admissible under KRE 404(b). The trial court also gave an admonition to the jury. 

Regarding the introduction of the methamphetamine, Gasaway had 

been acquitted upon the possession of methamphetamine charge during the first 

trial. And, it is well-settled that the Commonwealth is prohibited from introducing 

evidence of charges that were “dismissed or set aside.” Meyer v. Commonwealth,

393 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. App. 2013) (citation omitted). However, whether 

evidence of the conduct, as opposed to evidence of the criminal charge, can be 

introduced into evidence is another issue entirely. 

The United States Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in 

Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990). In Dowling, the Supreme Court 

held that an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the prosecution from 
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introducing evidence of the same conduct in a subsequent trial. The holding in 

Dowling has been cited by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See Hampton v. 

Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Ky. 2004). And Dowling also held that a 

limiting instruction or an admonition to the jury is proper, if requested. See

Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348-49.

In this case, the Commonwealth did not attempt to introduce evidence 

of the criminal charge of possession of methamphetamine; rather, the 

Commonwealth merely introduced evidence that methamphetamine was 

discovered in Gasaway’s truck along with the marijuana and the urinalysis drug 

detection device. And, the trial court gave an admonition to the jury. Therefore, 

pursuant to the holdings in Dowling, 493 U.S. 342 and Hampton, 133 S.W.3d 438, 

we do not perceive any impediment to the admission of the evidence that

methamphetamine was discovered in Gasaway’s vehicle simply because he was 

acquitted of the charge. Again, the Commonwealth did not introduce evidence that 

Gasaway was charged with methamphetamine only that it was discovered in his 

truck. We find no error regarding its admissibility. 

As concerns the marijuana, the trial court ruled that the evidence was 

discovered in Gasaway’s vehicle and could be introduced under the exceptions 

provided for in KRE 404(b). Gasaway contends this was in contravention of the 
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evidentiary rule. Accordingly, we must examine whether evidence of the

marijuana was properly admitted pursuant to KRE 404(b). 

KRE 404(b) provides:

Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 

a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. 

It may, however, be admissible:

(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident; or

(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other 

evidence essential to the case that separation of 

the two (2) could not be accomplished without 

serious adverse effect on the offering party.

Under KRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

generally inadmissible to demonstrate “a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes 

in order to show that he or she committed the charged crime.” Robert G. Lawson,

THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 2.30(1)(a) (5th ed. 2013). However, 

evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible to prove “motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 

or accident[.]” KRE 404(b)(1). It is also admissible if the evidence is so

inextricably intertwined with other essential evidence that separation of the two 

could not occur without serious adverse effect on the offering party. KRE 404

(b)(2). And, KRE 404(b)(2) is “intended to be flexible enough to permit the 
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prosecution to present a complete, un-fragmented . . . picture of the crime . . .

including necessary context, background and perspective.” See Major v. 

Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700, 708 (Ky. 2005). Evidence that is deemed 

admissible under KRE 404(b) must also satisfy the probative versus prejudice 

analysis of KRE 403. Helton v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Ky. 2020). 

The trial court’s ruling upon the admissibility or exclusion of evidence is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d

575, 577 (Ky. 2000).

In this case, the Commonwealth asserts that both the 

methamphetamine and marijuana evidence from the first trial were admissible 

pursuant to 404(b)(1) to demonstrate Gasaway’s intent and/or was admissible 

under KRE 404(b)(2), as inextricably intertwined with the possession of the 

heroin.

4

 More particularly, as to KRE 404(b)(2), the Commonwealth asserts:

 Regardless, the evidence that Gasaway possessed 

marijuana and ecstasy [later determined to be 

methamphetamine] was admissible under KRE 404(b)(2) 

because it was necessary for the Commonwealth to 

present its entire case to the jury. “KRE 404(b)(2) is 

intended to be flexible enough to permit the prosecution 

to present a complete, un-fragmented, un-artificial 

picture of the crime committed by the defendant, 

including necessary context, background[,] and 

perspective.” Major v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700, 

 

4 We have previously concluded that the methamphetamine was properly introduced at trial, 

notwithstanding Gasaway’s acquittal on that charge. This evidence would also be admissible 

under our Kentucky Rules of Evidence 404 analysis for the marijuana.
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708 (Ky. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Clark v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.3d 

668, 681 (Ky. 2008) (events were admissible under KRE 

404(b)(2) because they “were germane to the overall 

sequence of events surrounding the crimes and to the 

events which led to them being reported to authorities.”).

 The Whizzanator was circumstantial evidence that 

Gasaway possessed heroin. McClanahan testified that 

the employees of Knight’s Mechanical are subject to 

random drug screens. Someone using controlled 

substances would likely need to circumvent that 

requirement, and Gasaway could have used the 

Whizzanator to do just that. It’s also important that 

Gasaway kept the item in his vehicle, where he could 

presumably access it if his place of employment 

demanded a urine sample without giving him prior 

notice. And the circumstances surrounding the search of 

Gasaway’s vehicle were also relevant: Because the 

Whizzanator was substantive evidence of Gasaway’s 

guilt, his pugnacious response to the prospect that law 

enforcement would search his vehicle – where the item 

was found – was also probative of his guilt.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 20-21 (citation to record omitted).

Upon review of the Commonwealth’s argument as to admissibility 

under KRE 404(b)(2), we are inclined to agree that the trial court properly 

admitted evidence of the marijuana discovered in Gasaway’s truck as it was

inextricably intertwined with the other essential evidence and that separation of the 

two could not occur without serious adverse effect on the offering party. See Kerr

v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 250, 261-62 (Ky. 2013). Likewise, we view the 

probative value of the evidence as outweighing any potential prejudicial effect
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thereof. See KRE 403. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the marijuana or methamphetamine 

discovered in Gasaway’s truck. 

Gasaway’s final argument is that the trial court erred by allowing 

certain witnesses to offer improper opinion testimony of the video footage that

depicted the heroin falling out of Gasaway’s pocket as he removed his cell phone. 

More particularly, Gasaway asserts that it was error to allow Knight, Tharpe, and 

Detective Dover to convey to the jury that they had watched the video footage and 

that it depicted heroin falling out of Gasaway’s pocket. 

It is well-established that KRE 602 and KRE 701 set forth the rules 

governing the admissibility of narrative testimony. See Morgan v. Commonwealth,

421 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Ky. 2014). In Morgan, the Kentucky Supreme Court 

explained:

KRE 701 limits opinion testimony by a lay witness to 

that which is “[r]ationally based on the perception of the 

witness; [and] . . . [h]elpful to a clear understanding of 

the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in 

issue.” KRE 701(a)-(b). In addition, KRE 602 requires a 

witness to have personal knowledge before being allowed 

to testify about a subject.

Morgan, 388 S.W.3d at 392. And, the Morgan Court also noted that a lay witness 

should not interpret video evidence because doing so “invades the province of the 

jury” which is tasked with making those determinations of fact based upon the 
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evidence presented. Id. at 392 (citation omitted). It was, likewise, held in Morgan

that it is permissible for witnesses to identify an individual on video where the 

identification is based upon the “witnesses’ personal knowledge from prior 

exposure” to the person’s physical appearance. Id. at 392.

In the case sub judice, Knight and Tharpe both worked with Gasaway, 

and they were familiar with his physical appearance. As such, it was proper for 

them to identify Gasaway in the video based upon their personal knowledge. As 

for Detective Dover, we believe the court erred in the admission of his testimony 

about the video. However, we find this error to be harmless because the jury was 

shown the video; consequently, the jury was “in a position to interpret the security 

footage independently from the testimony.” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 

126, 132 (Ky. 2014). Upon the whole, we believe the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by allowing Knight and Tharpe to testify about the video footage and 

any error regarding Detective Dover’s testimony was harmless.

For the foregoing reasons, the August 30, 2019, judgments of the 

Hardin Circuit Court are affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Brandon Neil Jewell

Steven J. Buck

Assistant Public Advocate 

Department of Public Advocacy

Frankfort, Kentucky 

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR 

APPELLANT:

Erin Yang

Assistant Public Advocate 

Department of Public Advocacy

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Frankfort, Kentucky

Christopher Henry

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR 

APPELLEE:

Christopher Henry

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky