Filed 6/24/14; pub. order 7/22/14 (see end of opn.) 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

LILAS MOUA, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

PITTULLO, HOWINGTON, BARKER, 

ABERNATHY, LLP et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

 B251787 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BC471183) 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Joseph 

R. Kalin, Judge. Affirmed. 

 OsbornLaw, Richard G. Osborn and Blair J. Berkley for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 Nemececk & Cole, Jonathan B. Cole, Claudia L. Stone, and Mark Schaeffer for 

Defendants and Respondents. 
2 

 Lilas Moua (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court 

granted summary judgment in favor of Pittullo, Howington, Barker, Abernathy, LLP; 

P. Timothy Pittullo (Pittullo) and Jonathon A. Zitney (Zitney) (collectively respondents) 

on appellant’s claim against respondents for legal malpractice. We affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Appellant was born and educated in the United States. She began living with Alex 

Ng (Ng) in 1998. Appellant and Ng participated in a traditional Hmong marriage 

ceremony in February 2000.1 Ng paid a dowry, and they lived together as husband and 

wife. Ng signed numerous formal documents and filed tax returns indicating he was 

married. The couple had two children together. Appellant believed she was married to 

Ng. Ng informed appellant that he would take care of any papers or documents that were 

needed with respect to the marriage. However, no marriage license was ever obtained. 

 On April 9, 2009, appellant retained respondents to assist her in obtaining a 

property settlement and child support from Ng. On April 23, 2009, respondents filed a 

petition for dissolution of marriage in the matter captioned Moua v. Ng, San Bernardino 

County Superior Court case No. FAMRS 901291 (“family law case”). Pittullo 

represented to appellant that there was a 50 percent chance that the family court would 

find her to be Ng’s putative spouse.2 Pittullo further represented to appellant that she 

could win $1.5 to $2 million if the family court determined that she was Ng’s putative 

spouse. Pittullo also advised appellant that if she did not prevail on her putative spouse 

 1 “The Hmong are an Asian ethnic group from the mountainous regions of China, 

Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.” (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hmong_people>.) 

2 “‘Under the equitable putative spouse doctrine, a person’s reasonable, good faith 

belief that his or her marriage is valid entitles that person to the benefits of marriage, 

even if the marriage is not, in fact, valid.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 

179 Cal.App.4th 973, 980.) 
3 

claim, she could file a civil action pursuant to Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 

(Marvin), along with a paternity action.3

 In August 2009, appellant instructed respondents to stop work because she and Ng 

were negotiating a settlement. In August and September 2009, respondents 

communicated with appellant regarding the status of the settlement negotiations. In late 

August 2009, appellant informed respondents that she and Ng had reached a settlement, 

which included a one-time payment of $550,000. Ng later offered to enter into a 

stipulated judgment in the family law case providing, in part, that Ng would pay the sum 

of $550,000 to appellant. 

 In a letter dated October 30, 2009, Zitney informed appellant that there were 

significant risks involved with trying the putative spouse issue, and informed her that if 

she were to lose that issue, she could walk away with nothing. 

 In a letter dated April 27, 2010, Pittullo wrote to appellant informing her of his 

“strong” recommendation that she accept Ng’s settlement offer of $550,000. Pittullo 

wrote: “Considering that you have a 50% chance of losing and walking away from 

$500,000, we have recommended that you accept the offer. However, the final decision 

is yours to make.” 

 Appellant did not accept Ng’s offer. On May 6, 2010, appellant advised 

respondents to stop working on the settlement because she was not interested in settling. 

On May 14, 2010, Pittullo sent appellant a letter indicating that because appellant 

expressly agreed to a judgment in court, and the court asked that such a judgment be 

drafted and presented, respondents were still drafting the agreement pursuant to the 

court’s directive. Pittullo indicated that the court may have “significant issues” with 

appellant’s decision to renege on the agreement. 

 3 In Marvin, the California Supreme Court held that unmarried adults who live 

together are free under general principles of contract law to make agreements concerning 

their property and earnings. 
4 

 On May 28, 2010, Ng’s attorney, Howard D. Pilch, faxed respondents the 

negotiated attachment to judgment signed by Ng. It provided, in part, for payments 

totaling $605,000. 

 On June 1, 2010, appellant emailed respondents with a request to postpone all 

court dates on her case. On June 2, 2010, respondents sent appellant a copy of the 

attachment to judgment for her review. 

 On June 4, 2010, appellant retained Stolar & Associates (Stolar) to represent her in 

the family law case. On June 7, 2010, Pittullo received a letter from Evan Bardo of 

Stolar indicating that appellant had retained Stolar and enclosing a substitution of 

attorney signed by appellant. The same day, Zitney sent an email to appellant’s new 

counsel with the attachment to judgment signed by Ng. On June 10, 2010, Pittullo sent 

Stolar the signed substitution of attorney, which was filed with the court that day. 

Appellant did not enter a settlement agreement while represented by respondents. 

 On June 18, 2010, Steven L. Finston of Stolar wrote appellant a letter advising her 

to accept the $605,000 settlement offer. Finston indicated his opinion that appellant’s 

chances of winning the putative spouse issue were “far lower” than 50/50. Appellant did 

not accept the offer. Instead she offered to settle for $750,000. Ng declined.4 

Ultimately, Ng’s motion to dismiss the family law case was granted on the ground that 

appellant was not a putative spouse, and appellant received nothing from Ng. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Appellant filed the present legal malpractice lawsuit against respondents and 

Stolar, among others, on October 7, 2011. Appellant’s fourth amended complaint was 

filed October 15, 2012. It alleged one cause of action against respondents for legal 

malpractice. 

 On November 5, 2012, respondents filed their motion for summary judgment. In 

it, they argued that there was no proximate causal connection between the alleged breach 

 4 Appellant’s counsel insisted at oral argument that it was Ng who made the 

$750,000 offer. On the contrary, the record reveals that it was appellant who made the 

offer, which Ng declined. 
5 

and appellant’s injury due to the fact that appellant’s case was taken over by new 

attorneys prior to the conclusion of the matter. Further, respondents argued that 

appellant’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil 

Procedure section 340.6. 

 The motion was heard on August 15, 2013, and the matter was taken under 

submission. On August 20, 2013, the trial court issued an order granting the motion. The 

court explained its conclusion that “[t]here are no triable issues of material fact to show 

any causation of alleged damages caused by [respondents’] conduct. [Respondents] 

recommended that [appellant] accept the settlement offers.” Judgment in favor of 

respondents was entered on September 13, 2013. 

 On October 2, 2013, appellant filed her notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of review 

 The standard of review for an order granting or denying a motion for summary 

judgment or adjudication is de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

826, 860 (Aguilar).) The trial court’s stated reasons for granting summary relief are not 

binding on the reviewing court, which reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. 

(Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878.) 

 A party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there 

is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.) “There is a triable issue of material 

fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the 

underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the 

applicable standard of proof.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “A defendant bears the burden of 

persuasion that ‘one or more elements of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question ‘cannot be 

established,’ or that ‘there is a complete defense’ thereto. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

 Generally, “the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of 

production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of 

material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing 
6 

party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie 

showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. . . . A prima facie showing is 

one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [Citation.]” 

(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851, fn. omitted.) 

II. Elements of legal malpractice cause of action 

 “In a legal malpractice action arising from a civil proceeding, the elements are (1) 

the duty of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or 

her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate 

causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or 

damage resulting from the attorney’s negligence. [Citations.]” (Coscia v. McKenna & 

Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1199.) Significantly, “‘[i]f the allegedly negligent 

conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action in tort. [Citation.] . . .’ 

[Citation.]” (Baltins v. James (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202.)5

 In the present matter, appellant argues that respondents’ representation that there 

was a 50 percent chance that the family court would find her to be the putative spouse of 

Ng caused her to decline Ng’s settlement offers of $550,000 and $605,000. Appellant 

asserts that she was damaged when the family law matter was dismissed and she 

recovered nothing. 

 5 Reasonable reliance is not an element of the tort of legal malpractice, therefore we 

decline to address in detail appellant’s discussion of this concept. However, we note that 

appellant attempts to argue that it is never possible to conclude that a plaintiff’s reliance 

on a representation was unreasonable without stepping into the role of the trier of fact and 

weighing the evidence. This position is incorrect. Appellant cites only one case, which 

is not controlling authority: Hoyt Props. v. Production Res. Group, L.L.C. (Minn. 2007) 

736 N.W.2d 313, 321. Appellant completely ignores the substantial body of California 

law on the topic of reasonable reliance. In California, the question of “whether a party’s 

reliance was justified may be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to 

only one conclusion based on the facts. [Citation.]” (Guido v. Koopman (1991) 1 

Cal.App.4th 837, 843; see also Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38, 54 

[“‘If the conduct of the plaintiff in the light of his own intelligence and information was 

manifestly unreasonable, . . . he will be denied a recovery’”].) 
7 

III. Respondents’ burden: the nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact 

 In their motion for summary judgment, respondents argued that there was no 

triable issue of material fact as to proximate causation. “[T]he question of proximate 

cause . . . becomes one of law where the facts are uncontroverted and only one deduction 

or inference may reasonably be drawn therefrom. [Citations.]” (Whinery v. Southern 

Pac. Co. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 126, 128.) 

 Respondents point out that they recommended to appellant that she settle the case, 

advised her that there was significant risk in trying her case, and warned her that she 

could walk away with nothing if she lost the putative spouse issue. Respondents 

negotiated a stipulated judgment providing that Ng would pay appellant $605,000, which 

Ng signed. Respondents urged appellant to accept the settlement. Shortly thereafter, 

appellant retained new counsel, who also recommended that appellant accept the 

$605,000 offer. In spite of both counsels’ recommendations, appellant rejected the 

settlement. Based on these undisputed facts, respondents take the position that it was 

appellant’s own actions, in rejecting her attorneys’ advice, which was the direct cause of 

her damage. 

 In addition, respondents argue that appellant’s retention of subsequent counsel 

(Stolar), who independently advised appellant about Ng’s offer of $605,000, broke the 

causal chain between respondents and appellant. In support of this argument, 

respondents cite several cases. The first, Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 

38 Cal.3d 46 (Steketee), involved a plaintiff who claimed that the defendant law firm and 

two of its members negligently failed to file an action for medical malpractice on 

plaintiff’s behalf within the limitations period. (Id. at p. 50.) However, the attorneyclient relationship between plaintiff and defendants was terminated in January 1979, and 

the plaintiff’s cause of action for medical malpractice did not expire until September 

1979. (Id. at p. 57.) The Supreme Court concluded, “An attorney cannot be held liable 

for failing to file an action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations if he ceased 

to represent the client and was replaced by other counsel before the statute ran on the 

client’s action. [Citations.]” (Ibid.; see also Stuart v. Superior Court (1992) 14 
8 

Cal.App.4th 124, 127 [attorney “entitled to summary judgment because he was not the 

attorney of record for [plaintiff] at the time his former client is alleged to have lost the 

right to pursue the personal injury action”].) Similarly, respondents argue, an attorney 

cannot be held liable for a client’s failure to accept a settlement when the attorney ceases 

to represent the client and is replaced by other counsel while the settlement offer is still 

open. 

 Respondents also rely upon Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154 

(Filbin). Filbin is a “settle and sue” case, “which involves a former client suing after 

litigation has been settled. Depending on whether the disgruntled client was the plaintiff 

or the defendant in the antecedent lawsuit, the basis of the claim is that the settlement was 

less than it should have been, or more than it had to be, by reason of the negligence of the 

party’s attorney.” (Id. at p. 157.) In Filbin, the trial court awarded former clients more 

than half a million dollars for malpractice by their former attorney. The Court of Appeal 

reversed, “concluding that as a matter of law there [was] no causal connection between 

the attorney’s assertedly negligent acts and omissions and the amount the clients received 

when they settled.” (Ibid.) 

 The matter involved an eminent domain proceeding initiated by San Luis Obispo 

County against the Filbins. An appraiser hired by Fitzgerald, the Filbins’s attorney, 

appraised the property at $4,535,000. However, Mr. Filbin, a former real estate broker, 

believed the property was worth between $12 million and $15 million. (Filbin, supra, 

211 Cal.App.4th at p. 159.) Fitzgerald advised the Filbins that they were required to 

make a final settlement offer under the mandatory settlement provisions found in Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1250.410. He also informed them that the law generally requires 

that the property owner make a settlement demand in a figure less than the appraisal 

opinion. (Id. at pp. 159-160.) This statement was incorrect, as no authority requires such 

a reduced demand. (Id. at p. 168.) 

 However, the Court of Appeal pointed out that “attorney breaches of the standard 

of care are not per se actionable. [Citations.]” (Filbin, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

169-170.) The court concluded that “nothing Fitzgerald did, or did not do, up to the time 
9 

he departed as the Filbins’ counsel caused the Filbins to do anything to their detriment.” 

(Id. at p. 170.) Indeed, the trial court noted, the Filbins refused to follow his advice and 

refused to lower their demand to the amount stated by the appraiser. (Ibid.) Thereafter, 

they acquired new counsel, and it was with that new attorney’s impartial advice that they 

proceeded. The court concluded, “Their decision to settle was theirs and theirs alone, 

made with the assistance of new counsel, with no input from Fitzgerald. The 

consequences of that decision are likewise theirs alone.” (Id. at p. 171.) 

 Similarly, respondents argue, appellant refused to follow their advice and accept 

Ng’s settlement offer. Thereafter, appellant acquired new counsel, and it was with her 

new counsel’s impartial advice that she proceeded. Appellant’s ultimate decision not to 

settle, in spite of her attorneys’ advice that she do so, was hers alone, and the 

consequences of that decision are likewise hers alone.6

 We find that the cases cited by respondents support their position that there is no 

triable issue of material fact as to causation. Appellant disregarded respondents’ advice 

to accept the initial settlement offer from Ng. Appellant retained new counsel while Ng’s 

offer of $605,000 was still pending. Appellant’s new counsel also strongly encouraged 

her to accept the settlement. It was her own decision, against the advice of her attorneys, 

to decline. No causal connection exists between any alleged malpractice and appellant’s 

loss as a matter of law. 

 6 Appellant attempts to distinguish Filbin on the ground that it was a “settle and 

sue” case. Here, appellant argues, there was no settlement. Appellant is suing because 

she declined Ng’s settlement offers to her substantial detriment. We find this factual 

distinction to be insignificant under the circumstances. Appellant is complaining of 

essentially the same thing: she got less than what she could have. 

 Appellant also attempts to distinguish Filbin because the Filbins rejected 

Fitzgerald’s advice. Appellant insists: “Obviously, after the Filbins rejected Fitzgerald’s 

advice and hired new counsel, there could be no reliance on Fitzgerald or causation.” 

However, the facts here show that appellant did exactly the same thing: she rejected 

respondents’ advice to accept Ng’s settlement offer, then hired new counsel. Following 

appellant’s own logic, there can be no reliance or causation under these facts. 
10 

IV. Appellant has failed to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to 

proximate cause

 Because respondents have met their burden of production, there is a shift, and 

appellant is subjected to a burden of production of her own to make a prima facie 

showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to the element of causation. 

(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.) As set forth below, we find that appellant 

has failed to meet this burden. 

 Appellant states that, in reliance on respondents’ negligent representation that 

there was a 50 percent chance the family court would find her to be Ng’s putative spouse 

and award her $1.5 to $2 million, she declined to accept Ng’s settlement offers. 

Appellant insists that if respondents had advised her that there was less than a 50 percent 

chance that she would be declared Ng’s putative spouse, she would have accepted Ng’s 

settlement offers. In other words, appellant claims, but for respondents’ negligence, she 

would have obtained a greater reward.7

 Appellant argues that the trial court failed to credit her declaration, which states 

“In reliance on [respondents’] representation that there was a 50-percent chance that the 

family court would find me to be Ng’s putative spouse and award me $1.5 to $2.0 

million, I declined to sign the Attachment to Judgment (Family Law) that Ng signed on 

May 28, 2010, that provided for a payment of $605,000 to me.” Appellant argues that it 

is axiomatic that a trial court may not weigh the evidence on summary judgment, thus it 

was improper for the trial court to reject this evidence in her declaration. 

 Appellant’s insistence that she relied on respondents’ representation that she had a 

50 percent chance of winning is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to legal 

causation. “[A]n issue of fact is not raised by ‘cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory 

assertions.’ [Citation.]” (Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190, 

 7 Appellant’s reliance on Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170 regarding 

the concept of but-for causation is misplaced. Charnay addresses the sufficiency of legal 

malpractice allegations on demurrer. Here, the question is whether appellant can 

establish causation as a matter of law on the undisputed facts of this case. 
11 

196.) A 50 percent chance is just that: you might win, you might lose. Respondents did 

not encourage appellant to gamble on this 50/50 chance. On the contrary, the undisputed 

facts show that respondents strongly encouraged appellant to accept Ng’s settlement 

offer. Appellant does not deny that respondents encouraged her to accept the settlement. 

The undisputed evidence shows that she simply ignored this advice. Appellant was not 

relying on her attorneys’ advice in rejecting the settlement, as her attorneys’ advice was 

to accept the settlement. Appellant’s conclusory assertion to the contrary does not create 

a triable issue of fact.8

 Appellant also disputes respondents’ position that her replacement of respondents 

with new counsel broke the chain of causation, based on language in Cline v. Watkins 

(1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 174 (Cline). Cline was a legal malpractice case which stemmed 

from a divorce proceeding. Watkins, Cline’s former attorney, filed a divorce action on 

January 21, 1969, claiming several items as community property. Cline’s former 

husband stated that he was receiving $376.15 per month in “Air Force retirement pay.” 

However, Cline’s community interest in the retirement pay was not asserted in the 

dissolution action. (Id. at p. 177.) 

 On May 13, 1969, a substitution of attorney was filed relieving Watkins of 

representation of Cline. A week later, an attorney named Scott was substituted as 

counsel. (Cline, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 177.) When Cline filed a malpractice action 

against both attorneys for their failure to assert her community property interest in the 

retirement money, Watkins demurred on the ground that there was no causal connection 

 8 Appellant cites law suggesting that it is improper for a court to resolve issues of 

credibility on summary judgment. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank 

(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1065 [“A court generally cannot resolve questions about a 

declarant’s credibility in a summary judgment proceeding”].) In determining that 

appellant’s declaration does not create a triable issue of material fact, we need not make 

any credibility determinations nor weigh any evidence. Instead, we are making a 

judgment regarding legal proximate causation based on undisputed evidence. 

Appellant’s alleged reliance on a single statement that gave her only a 50 percent chance 

of winning was not the legal cause of her failure to obtain a settlement. The legal cause 

of her failure to obtain a settlement was her own decision to reject two separate attorneys’ 

recommendations that she accept the settlement. 
12 

between his negligence and Cline’s damage because he was relieved before judgment 

was entered and subsequent counsel could have cured the error. 

 The trial court sustained Watkins’ demurrer, but the Court of Appeal reversed. 

The question addressed was “whether the negligence of Scott disclosed by the file in the 

dissolution action to have occurred after that of Watson is a superseding cause which as a 

matter of law excuses the latter from liability. [Citation.]” (Cline, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 178.) Thus, both attorneys were alleged to have committed the same negligence: 

failing to secure Cline’s community property interest in her former husband’s retirement 

fund. The question was whether the second attorney’s negligence superseded Watkins’ 

negligence. Finding the question to be one of foreseeability, the Court of Appeal 

determined that a factual issue existed. 

 Appellant has not raised an issue here regarding superseding negligence. She 

specifically asserts that it was respondents who put her chances of winning at 50/50; 

appellant’s subsequent counsel put her chances “far lower.” Nor do respondents argue 

that the negligence of Stolar was a superseding cause of appellant’s damage. Instead, 

respondents argue that Stolar, operating independently and within the standard of care, 

advised appellant that her chances of winning the putative spouse issue were not good 

and encouraged her to take Ng’s settlement. In other words, subsequent counsel did

attempt to prevent any harm that may have been caused by respondents’ alleged 

overestimation of success on the putative spouse issue. Appellant chose to ignore this 

good advice. It was that choice which was the proximate cause of her damage. Because 

we are not addressing an issue of superseding negligence, Cline, and the lengthy 

foreseeability discussion therein, are inapplicable.9

 9 The Restatement Second of Torts section 452, discussed in Cline, is captioned 

“Third Person’s Failure to Prevent Harm.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 452.) The restatement is 

plainly inapplicable to the facts before us. It covers a situation in which “after the 

original actor has been negligent and so has created an unreasonable risk of harm to 

another, a third person has the opportunity, by taking affirmative action, to avert the 

threatened harm. This implies that if such action were taken, it would prevent the 

negligence of the original actor from causing the harm which has in fact resulted.” 
13 

 In sum, appellant has failed to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact 

as to causation under the undisputed facts of this case. 

V. Statute of limitations issue 

Respondents have raised a second ground for summary judgment. They argue that 

the malpractice action against them is barred by the one-year statute of limitations found 

in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The parties raise various conflicting arguments 

about when exactly appellant’s cause of action accrued. 

 Because we have determined that appellant cannot show the existence of a triable 

issue of material fact regarding the element of proximate cause, we decline to address the 

statute of limitations issue. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 

836, 845, fn. 5 [“appellate courts will not address issues whose resolution is unnecessary 

to disposition of the appeal”].) 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs of appeal. 

 

 ____________________________, J. 

 CHAVEZ 

We concur: 

__________________________, P. J. 

BOREN 

__________________________, J.* 

FERNS

 

(Rest.2d Torts, § 452, Com. a.) Again, neither party here is suggesting that Stolar failed 

to prevent appellant’s harm. The undisputed facts show that Stolar -- like respondents -- 

made every effort to prevent harm to appellant by encouraging her to take the settlement. 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
14 

Filed 7/22/14 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

LILAS MOUA, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

PITTULLO, HOWINGTON, BARKER, 

ABERNATHY, LLP et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

 B251787 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BC471183) 

 ORDER FOR PUBLICATION 

THE COURT:* 

 The opinion in the above entitled matter filed on June 24, 2014, was not certified 

for publication. 

 For good cause it now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official 

Reports and it is so ordered. 

 

*BOREN, P. J., CHAVEZ, J., FERNS, J.† 

† Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.