alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 3338 

To revise the boundary of the Ste. Genevieve National Historical Park in 

the State of Missouri, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 8, 2021 

Mr. BLUNT (for himself and Mr. HAWLEY) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

A BILL 

To revise the boundary of the Ste. Genevieve National Historical Park in the State of Missouri, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ste. Genevieve Na5 tional Historical Park Boundary Revision Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. STE. GENEVIEVE NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK 

7 BOUNDARY REVISION. 

8 (a) MAP.—Section 7134(a)(3) of appendix C of the 

9 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (16 U.S.C. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3338 IS

1 410xxx(a)(3)), is amended by striking ‘‘numbered 571/ 

2 149,942, and dated December 2018’’ and inserting ‘‘num3 bered 571/177,464, and dated September 2021’’. 

4 (b) AUTHORITY TO CORRECT ERRORS IN MAP.—Sec5 tion 7134(d) of appendix C of the Consolidated Appropria6 tions Act, 2018 (16 U.S.C. 410xxx(d)), is amended— 

7 (1) by striking ‘‘The Map’’ and inserting the 

8 following: 

9 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Map’’; and 

10 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

11 ‘‘(2) AUTHORITY TO CORRECT ERRORS.—The 

12 Secretary may correct any clerical or typographical 

13 errors in the Map.’’. 

14 (c) VISITOR CENTER.—Section 7134(e) of appendix 

15 C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (16 

16 U.S.C. 410xxx(e)), is amended by adding at the end the 

17 following: 

18 ‘‘(3) VISITOR CENTER.—The Secretary— 

19 ‘‘(A) may acquire, by donation, the land 

20 (including any improvements to the land) 

21 owned by the city of Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, 

22 and used as the visitor center for the Historical 

23 Park, as generally depicted on the Map as ‘Pro24 posed Boundary Addition’; and 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 3338 IS

1 ‘‘(B) on acquisition of the land described 

2 in subparagraph (A), shall revise the boundary 

3 of the Historical Park to include the acquired 

4 land.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### JOSEPH STOFFER v. W. H. GRIFFIN, Trading as ELECTRIK MAID BAKE SHOP.

(Filed 28 October, 1925.)

Appeal from Dueham Superior Court, *Calvert, J.*

Action hy Joseph Stoffer against W. H. Griffin, trading as Electrik Maid Bake Shop. Judgment for plaintiff on a jury verdict and defendant appeals. No error.

*Fuller & Fuller for plaintiff.*

*Brawley & Gnatt for defendant.*

Pee Cueiam.

The verdict was as follows :

> “1. What amount, if any, is the defendant due on his contract of 24 October, 1922? Answer: $2,750 with interest from 16 January, 1923.

> “2. Is the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the property taken on claim and delivery? Answer: Tes.

> *“3.*What was the reasonable market value of the property at the time it was taken on claim and delivery? Answer: $2,750.

> *“4.*Did the plaintiff’s assignor, the Electrik Maid Bake Shop, breach that part of the contract providing that it agreed ‘to furnish said party of second part the services of its master baker for not exceeding -two *870weeks to break in the baker to be employed by the said second party and familiarize him with the use- of said equipment? Answer: No.

> “5. If so, what damage, if any, did the defendant sustain by reason of said breach of such contract ? Answer: .”

The defendant’s exceptions relate to the competency of evidence pertaining to the third issue and to the contentions of the plaintiff as given to the jury in the charge.

The case was correctly tried, and the controversy on the third issue was wholly within the domain of fact, and that has been determined by the jury in a trial free from prejudicial error.

Let it be certified that there is

No error.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM DECEMBER 31,
1996 AND 1997 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
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<CASH>                                          15,917                  10,912
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   38,652                  32,376
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,541                 (1,268)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,931                     644
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,610                 (1,912)
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</TABLE>
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No.**  **DA 22 -**  **0742 LITTLE BIG WARM RANCH, LLC**  **and MARK FRENCH** Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v. **WILFRED L. DOLL** Defendant/Cross
- Appellant. **BRIAN ROBINSON** Defendant. **ORDER GRANTING THIRTY (30) DAY EXTENSION** 

Pursuant to the authority granted under M.R.App.P. 26(1), Appellant is given an extension of time until April 5, 2023 to prepare, file and serve Appellant's opening brief. Dated this day of _________, 2023.

______________________ 

### Bo wen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court Cc: H ertha L

und, Ben Stormes, Monica Tranel, Ross Miller and Philip McCreedy Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court February 24 2023

02/24/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0742
#### D. M. ROBERSON and Wife, ETHEL G. ROBERSON, v. W. D. BOONE, Substituted Trustee.

(Filed 21 September, 1955.)

Mortgages § 30g—

Foreclosure may not be enjoined on tbe ground that the Federal Government had filed a tas lien against the lands, and that therefore the land would not sell at its true value because of the right of the Government to redeem the land under the provision of Title 28, USOA, sec. 2410, at any time within one year from the date of sale. G.S. 45-21.34.

Winborne and Higgins, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Appeal by plaintiffs from *Fountain, Special Judge,*April Term, 1955, of Martin.

This is an action instituted on 30 March, 1955, to restrain the defendant W. D. Boone, substituted trustee, from foreclosing a certain deed of trust on the plaintiffs’ lands in Tyrrell County, North Carolina, securing an indebtedness in the principal sum of $36,400.00, plus interest, which indebtedness is past due and unpaid.

*599On 1 October, 1951, the United States Government filed a tax lien in the office of the Register of Deeds of Tyrrell County against the plaintiffs in the principal sum of $63,058.45, plus interest, and on 14 January, 1955, filed an amended tax lien reducing the amount of such lien to $62,624.55, plus interest.

A temporary restraining order was obtained on the alleged ground that, since the United States Government has one year from the date of the sale of lands foreclosed under a lien superior to its lien, to redeem such lands under the provision of Title 28, USCA, section 2410, the land will not sell for its true value at public auction under the power of sale in said deed of trust.

When the cause came on for hearing in the trial below, the court vacated and dissolved the temporary restraining order. The plaintiffs appeal, assigning error.

*Peel & Peel and Rodman & Rodman for plaintiffs.*

*W. D. Boone for defendant.*

Per Curiam.

The plaintiffs contend that under the provisions of G.S. 45-21.34, they are entitled to have the ruling of the court below reversed and the temporary restraining order continued to the hearing.

In our opinion, no legal or equitable ground has been shown that would justify the continuance of the temporary restraining order heretofore issued in this cause, pursuant to the provisions of the above statute or otherwise. Hence, the ruling of the court below is

Affirmed.

WiNBORNE and Higgins, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">David Herbert,<br><br>against<br><br>Margaret Maranga, Respondent-Tenant-Appellant and Adam Oyunge, Respondent-Undertenant- Appellant, and "John and/or Jane Doe," Respondents-Undertenants.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Respondents Margaret Maranga and Adam Oyunge appeal from a final judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Sabrina B. Kraus, J.), entered May 15, 2019, after a nonjury trial, which awarded possession to petitioner in a holdover summary proceeding.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Final judgment (Sabrina B. Kraus, J.), entered May 15, 2019, reversed, with $30 costs, and a final judgment awarded in favor of respondents dismissing the petition, without prejudice. </p><p>Petitioner, the sole owner of a condominium apartment, sought possession of the premises from his former paramour, respondent Margaret Maranga, and their son, respondent Adam Oyunge, based on the termination of an oral month-to-month tenancy. The evidence at trial showed that Adam was born as the result of an affair between petitioner and Maranga. When Adam was about four years old, Maranga needed a larger apartment and wanted to live in a neighborhood that had a good public school for Adam to attend. As a result, petitioner, who never resided with respondents, purchased the Third Avenue apartment at issue.</p><p>Both petitioner and Maranga testified as to their respective versions of an oral agreement permitting respondents to occupy the apartment. The trial court credited substantially petitioner's testimony that the parties' agreed that petitioner would purchase the subject condominium "in lieu of paying child support" so that respondents could reside there until Adam turned 21 years of age or "old enough to be on his own." Since Adam was 21 years old at the time of trial, the court awarded petitioner possession.</p><p>Exercising our authority to review the record developed at a the nonjury trial (<i>see <font color="FF0000">[*2]</font>Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford</i>, 60 NY2d 494, 499 [1983]), and accepting the court's fully supported findings of fact and credibility, including its finding that petitioner agreed that respondents "could live in the subject premises until [Adam] was emancipated," we find that Civil Court should have dismissed the proceeding as premature. Adam had not yet turned 21 when this proceeding was commenced and petitioner offered insufficient evidence at trial that Adam was "old enough to be on his own." In the circumstances presented, the petition was prematurely commenced and should have been dismissed without prejudice. Since Adam has since turned 21 years of age, our disposition is without prejudice to any future proceeding. We reach no other issue.</p><p>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.</p><br>I concur I concur<br>Decision Date: October 24, 2019<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

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<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-1999
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  383,437
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               43,727
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  425
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             17,095
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 1,388
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               150
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</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-21146 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ARTHUR RAY LEVERTON, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-96-CR-87-ALL

-------------------- August 30, 2001 Before JOLLY, BARKSDALE, AND DEMOSS, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM: * Arthur Ray Leverton appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following the revocation of his term of supervised release. Leverton argues that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence allowed. A sentence imposed after the revocation of a term of supervised release will be upheld unless it is in violation of the law or is plainly unreasonable. United States v. Gonzalez , 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 2001). Leverton was originally convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and forNo. 00-21146 -2- making false statements in the acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) & (g)(1). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), these offenses carry a maximum prison term of ten years, making them class C felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3). A district court may revoke a term of supervised release and require a defendant to return to prison. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). However, where the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class C felony, the defendant may not be required to serve more than two years in prison. Id. The district court may also impose a term of supervised release to be served after imprisonment, but only when the term of imprisonment is less than the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). Here, the district court sentenced Leverton to a two-year term of imprisonment to be followed by a two-year term of supervised release. Because Leverton was sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), the district court was prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) from imposing a subsequent term of supervised release. Accordingly, Leverton’s sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court for resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
- NCRPMemo042798
- NCRPMemo042798ATTACHMENTS.pdf
Exhibit 31.2

Certifications

I, Donald T. Grimes, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Keystone Automotive Operations, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge,
this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report,
fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and we have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal
quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of
the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) All significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.

Date: November 12, 2007



|    |  |                        
|--- |  | -----------------------
|By: |  | /s/ DONALD T.GRIMES    
|    |  | Donald T. Grimes       
|    |  | Chief Financial Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3348 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 3348

To reauthorize the Freedom's Way National Heritage Area, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            December 8, 2021

Mr. Markey (for himself and Ms. Warren) introduced the following bill; 
   which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To reauthorize the Freedom's Way National Heritage Area, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Freedom's Way National Heritage Area 
Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF FREEDOM'S WAY NATIONAL HERITAGE AREA.

    (a) Removal of Total Funding Limit.--Section 8006(i) of the Omnibus 
Public Land Management Act of 2009 (54 U.S.C. 320101 note; Public Law 
111-11; 123 Stat. 1260) is amended by striking paragraph (1) and 
inserting the following:
            ``(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        to carry out this section not more than $1,000,000 for each 
        fiscal year.''.
    (b) Reauthorization.--Section 8006(j) of the Omnibus Public Land 
Management Act of 2009 (54 U.S.C. 320101 note; Public Law 111-11; 123 
Stat. 1260) is amended by striking ``the date that is 15 years after 
the date of enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``September 30, 
2036''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 99

[DENDRITE LETTERHEAD]

March 29, 2002

Arthur
Andersen LLP (Arthur Andersen) has represented to Dendrite
International, Inc. (the Company) that its audit in connection with
the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December
31, 2001 was subject to Arthur Andersens quality control system for the
U.S. accounting and auditing practice to provide reasonable assurance that the
engagement was conducted in compliance with professional standards and that
there was appropriate continuity of Arthur Andersen personnel working on the
audit, availability of national office consultation and availability of
personnel at foreign affiliates of Arthur Andersen to conduct the relevant
portions of the audit.

|DENDRITE INTERNATIONAL, INC.By:         LUKE M. BESHAR
Name:    Luke M. Beshar
Title:      Senior Vice President and 
                Chief Financial Officer
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------