Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-CR-610 | May 19, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Lorie Bohannon

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Henry A. Flores, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lorie Bohannon,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 19, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1409-CR-610

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Helen W. Marchal, 

Judge

Case No. 49G16-1405-CM-27008

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Lorie Bohannon appeals her conviction for class B misdemeanor harassment 

following a bench trial. She argues that the evidence is insufficient to support 

her conviction and that she was denied effective assistance of counsel. 
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Concluding that the evidence is sufficient and that she was not deprived of 

effective assistance of counsel, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts most favorable to the conviction follow.1 In June 2013, Bohannon 

went to Samuel Hutton’s workplace and saw him hugging Carla Morrison. 

Bohannon became upset and said to Hutton, “[T]his is why you f’ing not taking 

my calls, texting or coming by because of her.” Tr. at 5. Bohannon and Hutton

engaged in a “heated argument.” Id. at 6. Bohannon turned to Morrison and 

asked, “[W]ho the f was [she] and what was the extent of [her and Hutton’s] 

relationship.” Id. at 7. Bohannon repeatedly stated that she was in a 

relationship with Hutton. Hutton told Bohannon that he was never in a 

relationship with her and that he was in a relationship with Morrison.

[3] After that encounter and until March 2014 when charges were filed against 

Bohannon and a no-contact order was issued, Bohannon called and texted 

Morrison over a hundred times using at least five different phone numbers. 

Morrison knew that Bohannon was calling her because Bohannon identified 

herself. When Bohannon called her, Morrison would tell her to stop calling 

and hang up. Bohannon told Morrison that “she is going to play with ... 

someone will be ... hurt and it will not be her.” Id. at 33. Bohannon sent texts 

 

1

 In the statement of facts in her appellant’s brief, Bohannon neither supports the facts by page references to 

the record and the appendix nor sets forth the facts in accordance with our standard of review as required by 

Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6).
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to Morrison regarding Hutton. For example, Bohannon texted Morrison that 

Hutton came to Bohannon’s home and got into bed with her. Id. at 18. 

Bohannon texted Morrison to tell “our man [that] we’re done.” Id. at 30. She 

texted Morrison that she bought Hutton’s daughter Christmas presents

accompanied by a photograph of Bohannon sitting on Morrison’s car. Id. 

Morrison changed her phone number to attempt to stop Bohannon’s calls and 

texts, but Bohannon discovered her new number and continued calling and 

texting. Morrison downloaded an app to block Bohannon’s calls.

[4] Also between the June 2013 encounter and March 2014, Morrison saw 

Bohannon driving by or sitting outside her home and once saw Bohannon 

peeking through her window. In February 2014, Morrison was at work and 

saw Bohannon standing outside next to Morrison’s car. Morrison went out to 

confront Bohannon, but she was gone. Morrison noticed that her car 

windshield was broken and two tires were slashed, and she called the police. 

Bohannon told a detective that she called and texted Morrison a couple of times

and did so because she was frustrated with the Hutton situation.

[5] The State charged Bohannon with class A misdemeanor criminal mischief and 

class B misdemeanor harassment. The trial court found Bohannon not guilty of

criminal mischief but guilty of harassment. Bohannon appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The evidence is sufficient to support Bohannon’s 

harassment conviction.

[6] Bohannon contends that her harassment conviction is unsupported by sufficient 

evidence. Our standard of review is well settled:

[When] reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a 

criminal conviction[,] ... we neither reweigh evidence nor judge 

witness credibility. We consider only the evidence supporting the 

judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such 

evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence 

of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have 

concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008) (citations omitted).

[7] To convict Bohannon of class B misdemeanor harassment the State was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she called Morrison with 

intent to harass, annoy, or alarm her but with no intent of legitimate 

communication. Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(1); Appellee’s App. at 2. Here, the 

evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that Bohannon was upset by 

Morrison’s relationship with Hutton, called and texted Morrison over a 

hundred times even though Morrison repeatedly told her not to call, and 

threatened to hurt Morrison. This is sufficient evidence from which a 

reasonable factfinder could conclude that Bohannon called Morrison with the 

intent to harass, annoy, or alarm her, but with no intent of legitimate 

communication. Bohannon asserts that the State’s evidence does not show that 

she is the person who called Morrison and that Morrison’s testimony is 
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inconsistent with other evidence. Bohannon’s argument is merely an invitation 

to reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility, which we must decline. 

Accordingly, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Bohannon’s 

harassment conviction.

Section 2 – Bohannon was not denied effective assistance of 

trial counsel.

[8] Bohannon also contends that she was deprived of effective assistance of trial 

counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must 

demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

defendant’s case was thereby prejudiced. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 

2012) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish 

deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s 

representation “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing 

errors so serious that the defendant did not have the counsel guaranteed by the 

Sixth Amendment.’” Reed v. State, 866 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ind. 2007) (quoting 

McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002)). In assessing whether 

counsel’s performance was deficient, we recognize that even the finest, most 

experienced criminal defense attorneys may not agree on the ideal strategy or 

most effective way to represent a client, and therefore there is a strong 

presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Smith v. State, 

765 N.E.2d 578, 585 (Ind. 2002). To establish prejudice, the defendant must 
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show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Latta v. State, 743 

N.E.2d 1121, 1125 (Ind. 2001). “‘A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694). 

[9] Bohannon asserts that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he 

(1) limited the amount of time he spent on her case because she refused to pay 

him additional money, (2) failed to file a motion to dismiss the charging 

information, (3) failed to subpoena Morrison’s cell phone records, (4) failed to 

introduce discovery, and (5) failed to confer with her about sentencing. To 

support her assertions, Bohannon presents a narrative of her meetings and 

discussions with her trial counsel. However, because she brings her 

ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, the narrative she provides is merely her 

unsubstantiated version of events, and we have no testimony from her trial 

counsel that might explain his decisionmaking. 

[10] We observe that “in the context of assessing ineffectiveness claims, typically a 

‘factual record must be developed in and addressed by the [trial] court in the 

first instance for effective review.’” Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1216 (Ind. 

1998) (quoting United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995)).

A “postconviction hearing is normally the preferred forum to adjudicate an 

ineffectiveness claim.” Id. at 1219. “‘When the only record on which a claim 

of ineffective assistance is based is the trial record, every indulgence will be 

given to the possibility that a seeming lapse or error by defense counsel was in 
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fact a tactical move, flawed only in hindsight.’” Id. at 1216 (quoting United 

States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1991)). Here, without the 

development of a factual record, Bohannon’s argument does not overcome the 

strong presumption that her trial counsel rendered adequate assistance. 

Therefore, we conclude that she was not denied effective assistance of counsel. 

[11] Basing on the foregoing, we affirm Bohannon’s harassment conviction.2

[12] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

2 Bohannon also seeks reversal of her conviction based on the alleged inadequacy of the probable cause

affidavit. However, our supreme court has held that “lack of probable cause is not grounds for dismissing a 

charging information.” Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Ind. 2000); see also Felders v. State, 516 

N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 1987) (“An invalid arrest does not affect the right of the State to try a case nor does it affect 

the judgment of conviction.”). “‘The probable cause affidavit is ... a means of satisfying the constitutional 

and statutory requirements that the pre-trial detention of the accused be based on a determination, by a 

neutral and detached magistrate, that probable cause exists to believe that the accused committed the crime.’” 

Id. (quoting Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 80, 383 N.E.2d 297, 303 (1978)). Therefore, at this stage in the 

proceedings, Bohannon cannot rely on a deficient probable cause argument to obtain reversal of her 

conviction.