[Cite as In re D.R., 2012-Ohio-5341.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF: ) CASE NO. 12 MA 16 

) 

D.R., ) O P I N I O N 

) 

ALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court, Juvenile Division, Case No. 

 11JA702. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Appellant: Attorney Paul Gains 

Prosecuting Attorney 

Attorney Ralph Rivera 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

For Appellee: Attorney John Juhasz 

7081 West Boulevard, Suite 4 

Youngstown, Ohio 44512 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Dated: November 14, 2012 
[Cite as In re D.R., 2012-Ohio-5341.]

VUKOVICH, J. 

{¶1} Appellant State of Ohio appeals the decision of the Mahoning County 

Juvenile Court that dismissed the complaint against alleged delinquent child-appellee 

D.R. The complaint asserted that D.R. was delinquent because he committed two 

counts of statutory rape. The basis for dismissing the complaint was the Ohio 

Supreme Court’s decision in In re D.B., 129 Ohio St.3d 104, 2011-Ohio-2671. The 

Juvenile Court interpreted that decision to stand for the proposition that the statutory 

rape provision in the rape statute is unconstitutional as applied to a child under 13 

years of age who is alleged to have had sexual conduct with another child under the 

age of 13. 

{¶2} We have two issues to decide in this case. The first is a procedural 

issue. It is whether the state’s objection to the magistrate’s decision to dismiss the 

complaint complied with Juv.R. 40 and, thus, preserved the merit argument. 

Specifically, D.R. asserts that the objection was general and not specific enough to 

preserve the issue for appeal. If this court finds that there is no merit to the 

procedural issue, the merit issue is whether the Juvenile Court misinterpreted and 

misapplied the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in In re D.B.

{¶3} For the reasons expressed below, the judgment of the trial court is 

hereby affirmed. Procedurally, the state’s objection to the magistrate’s decision is 

specific enough to satisfy the Juv.R. 40 requirements. However, the state’s merit 

argument fails because the Juvenile Court did not misapply In re D.B.; dismissal of 

the complaint was required.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

{¶4} On May 26, 2011 a complaint was issued against alleged delinquent 

child D.R. The complaint alleged that on or about April 6, 2011, D.R. committed two 

counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), statutory rape, first-degree 

felonies if committed by an adult. D.R. was 11 years old at the time of the alleged 

offense. The victim, A.S., was 4 years old at the time of the alleged offense. 

{¶5} The police reports and children services’ reports indicate that D.R. 

pulled down A.S.’s pants and licked her vagina and buttocks/anal area. The report 
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also indicates that A.S. licked D.R.’s penis. One report indicates that A.S. stated that 

she “accidently” said yes to D.R.’s request that she lick his penis. 

{¶6} The inappropriate sexual conduct was discovered when at bath time 

A.S.’s mother noticed that A.S.’s vagina was red. She asked A.S. if anyone 

inappropriately touched her. A.S. then relayed the above discussed sexual conduct. 

A.S.’s mother contacted D.R.’s mother about the incident. This resulted in a 

discussion between D.R. and his mother in which he admitted to the conduct. A.S. 

and D.R.’s mothers talked to the children about the inappropriateness of the conduct 

and both mothers agreed that they would take the children to counseling. Once the 

children went to counseling, the counselors were under a duty of law to report the 

incident to children services and the police. 

{¶7} In June 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court released its decision in In re 

D.B. Thereafter, in September 2011, D.R. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on 

the basis of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision. A hearing was held on the motion in 

early October 2011. After taking the matter under advisement, the magistrate issued 

a decision to dismiss the complaint based on the In re D.B. decision. 11/04/11 

Magistrate’s Decision. Within five days of the magistrate’s decision the state filed an 

objection. 11/09/11 Objection. On November 14, 2011, the juvenile court adopted 

and incorporated the magistrate’s decision, but did not rule on the objection. In 

January 2012, the juvenile court overruled the objection and once again adopted the 

magistrate’s decision. 01/05/12 J.E. 

{¶8} D.R. timely appeals from that decision. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶9} “The Juvenile Court abused its discretion when it dismissed the 

complaint against D.R. when it found that R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) was unconstitutional 

as-applied to him (an 11-year-old boy), because the statute was utilized as a shield to 

protect A.S. (a 4-year-old girl) from sexual abuse, rather than a sword to arbitrarily 

adjudicate D.R. a delinquent for engaging in sexual conduct.” 
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{¶10} As aforementioned, there are two issues for this court to address. The 

first is whether the state complied with Juv.R. 40 when it objected to the magistrate’s 

ruling that the complaint should be dismissed. 

{¶11} Juv.R. 40 is the rule that governs magistrate’s rights and duties in the 

juvenile courts. It provides that written objections to a magistrate’s decision are to be 

filed within 14 days of the filing of the decision. The failure to file objections waives 

the party’s right to appeal any factual findings or legal conclusions, except for plain 

error. Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iv). The rule requires specific objections; it provides that 

“[a]n objection to a magistrate’s decision shall be specific and state with particularity 

all grounds for objection.” Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(ii). Appellate courts have held that the 

failure to file specific objections is treated the same as the failure to file any 

objections. In re K.M.D., 4th Dist. No. 11CA3289, 2012-Ohio-755, ¶ 15; In re D.R.,

12th Dist. No. CA2009–01–018, 2009–Ohio–2805, ¶ 29; In re Sox, 7th Dist. No. 

06MA35, 2006-Ohio-7116, ¶ 28. 

{¶12} The objection in this case consists of three paragraphs. The second 

paragraph contains the objection and in one sentence states: 

 For cause, the state of Ohio contends that the Magistrate’s 

Decision to Dismiss the Complaint filed in the above referenced matter 

was unreasonable and a judicial misinterpretation of the Supreme 

Court’s Decision in In re D.B., 129 Ohio St.3d 104, 2011-Ohio-2671. 

11/09/11 Objection. 

{¶13} This objection is based on the legal conclusion drawn by the 

magistrate. This objection clearly attacks the magistrate’s interpretation of In re D.B. 

Granted the objection could have provided further argument as to how the magistrate 

misinterpreted In re D.B. and indicated the correct application of In re D.B. However, 

this is not a typical general objection, such as objecting to the dismissal of the 

complaint. Rather, the objection is clear as to the legal conclusion the state is 

disputing. 
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{¶14} D.R. quotes a portion of a prior decision from our court, DePaul, and 

contends that the objection at issue here is as general as the objection in that case. 

In DePaul we stated: 

 In the first two of his three assignments of error, Phillips argues: 

 “The court committed an error of law and abused its discretion in 

admitting a psychological report and opinion of Dr. Palumbo into 

evidence when Dr. Palumbo neither administered nor scored the two 

psychological tests upon which his report and opinion were based.” 

 “The court committed an error of law and abused its discretion in 

admitting a psychological report and opinion of Dr. Palumbo into 

evidence that relied on an able assessment, which was administered 

but not scored by Mr. Jerald Heinbaugh and which is not a generally 

accepted test in the field of psychology in terms of verifiability and 

reliability.” 

 However, we cannot address the substance of either of these 

assignments of error since Phillips did not raise these issues in his 

objections to the trial court. Juv.R. 40(E)(3)(b) requires that a party's 

objection to a magistrate's decision “be specific and state with 

particularity the grounds of objection.” “A party shall not assign as error 

on appeal the court's adoption of any finding of fact or conclusion of law 

unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion under this 

rule.” Juv.R. 40(E)(3)(d). 

 In this case, the magistrate gave detailed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law in its decision. Phillips then filed objections to that 

decision, but those objections were general, not specific. Those 

objections argued as follows: 
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 “Pursuant [to the magistrate's decision], the Defendant objects to 

said Magistrate's Decision based upon the fact that the Magistrate 

committed an error of law and abused her discretion relative to the 

proceedings in this matter. That is, pursuant to the proceedings in this 

matter, the evidence as presented to the Court clearly showed the 

Defendant's ability to parent his child; as well as refuting any allegations 

of inappropriate conduct by the Defendant with respect to the parties' 

subject minor child, Alexia DePaul. 

 “Therefore, the Magistrate abused her discretion and committed 

an error of law with respect to her Order that it is in the subject minor's 

best interest that the Plaintiff/Mother be designated as the residential 

parent of the subject minor child; that it was an abuse of discretion and 

an error of law in determining that the Defendant/Father's 

companionship shall be supervised at the Hope House for an 

indeterminate period into the future and that it was an abuse of 

discretion and an error of law for this Court to order both parties into 

mediation prior to a Motion to Modify Parental Rights and 

Responsibilities relative to the above matter in an attempt to resolve the 

current issues in these proceedings.” 

 Notably, these objections do not mention in any way the issues 

Phillips raises in his first two assignments of error regarding whether 

the trial court should have admitted the report of Dr. Palumbo despite 

the fact that the magistrate specifically addressed those issues at 

paragraph 22 of the decision. 

 As we have previously stated, a party's failure to make a 

particular argument in its objections to a magistrate's decision waives 

that argument; general objections do not preserve specific issues. See 

Solomon v. Solomon, 7th Dist. No. 03 MA 204, 2004-Ohio-2486, at ¶ 
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11; Jefferson County Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Brown 

v. Horkulic, 7th Dist. No. 02 JE 43, 2003-Ohio-1242, at ¶ 10; see also 

State ex rel. Cleveland Steel Erectors Corp. v. Stewart (1999), 86 Ohio 

St.3d 578, 580-581, 1999-Ohio-0127. Thus, Phillips has waived the 

arguments in his first and second assignments of error and we will not 

address them in this appeal. 

In re DePaul v. Phillips, 04 MA 271, 2005-Ohio-6784, ¶ 12-20. 

{¶15} The objections in DePaul are more general than the objection here. 

Here, the objection is specific as to a question of law, i.e. the interpretation of the 

Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in In re. D.B., which is the same argument made on 

appeal. Accordingly, we hold that although the objection could have been more 

specific, it complied with Juv.R. 40. As such, the issue was preserved for appellate 

purposes. 

{¶16} Having resolved the procedural issue, our analysis now turns to 

whether the Juvenile Court misapplied In re D.B. We apply a de novo standard of 

review in determining the correctness of the Juvenile Court’s decision to dismiss the 

indictment. State v. Saxon, 9th Dist. No. 09CA009560, 2009–Ohio–6905, ¶ 5. 

{¶17} In In re D.B., the Ohio Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 

R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), the statutory rape provision, was unconstitutional as applied to 

a child under the age of 13 who is alleged to be the perpetrator of the sexual activity. 

In re D.B. 129 Ohio St.3d 104, 2011-Ohio-2671, 950 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 1. In that case, 

two boys under the age of 13, one was 12 years old and the other was 11 years old, 

engaged in sexual activity. The 12 year old, D.B., was charged with both forcible 

rape and statutory rape. After considering the evidence, the court found that it could 

not find that D.B. used force. However, he was adjudicated delinquent based on a 

finding that statutory rape occurred. 

{¶18} On appeal to the Fifth Appellate District, D.B. argued that the 

application of the statutory rape provision to him violated his federal rights to due 

process and equal protection. The court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of 
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R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) as applied to D.B. In re D.B., 5th Dist. No. 2009 CA00024, 

2009-Ohio-6841, ¶ 23, 28. 

{¶19} In a unanimous decision, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the 

appellate court’s decision. All of the Justices found that application of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(b) to a child under 13 years of age violated due process. In re D.B., 

2011-Ohio-2671. All but one of the Justices found an equal protection violation. In 

re D.B., 2011-Ohio-2671 (Justice Cupp concurred in judgment, syllabus and opinion 

of the court on the basis of due process analysis only). 

{¶20} As to the due process violation, the Court stated: 

 As applied to children under the age of 13 who engage in sexual 

conduct with other children under the age of 13, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) 

is unconstitutionally vague because the statute authorizes and 

encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. When an adult 

engages in sexual conduct with a child under the age of 13, it is clear 

which party is the offender and which is the victim. But when two 

children under the age of 13 engage in sexual conduct with each other, 

each child is both an offender and a victim, and the distinction between 

those two terms breaks down. 

In re D.B., 2011-Ohio-2671, ¶ 24. 

{¶21} The court then went on to explain that the case at hand provides an 

example of the temptation for a prosecutor to label one child the offender and the 

other child the victim. Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶22} That is a true assessment of that case since it was an 11 and 12 year 

old engaging in sexual conduct and there was no force found. However, as the state 

in our case points out, those are not the facts here. We have an 11 year old and a 4 

year old. The state argues that given the ages, it is very unlikely that the 11 year old 

is not the perpetrator. Thus, according to it, the possibility of arbitrary and 

discriminatory enforcement does not seem a factor given the facts of the case at 

hand. 
-8-

{¶23} While it is easy to see the state’s point, the specific holding in In re D.B.

that, “R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is unconstitutional as applied to a child under the age of 

13 who engages in sexual conduct with another child under the age of 13.” Id. at 

syllabus, ¶ 33. This holding does not focus on the age span between the alleged 

victim and alleged perpetrator, but rather on the fact that both parties are under the 

age of 13. Id. at syllabus, ¶ 24, 26, 28, 30-33. 

{¶24} Furthermore, it is important to remember, as the In re D.B. case 

explains, that statutory rape is a strict liability offense that prohibits sexual conduct 

with children under the age of 13. Force is not an element because children under 

the age of 13 are legally presumed to be incapable of consenting. Id. at ¶ 13. Even 

an alleged perpetrator who is under the age of 13 is incapable of consenting: 

 It must be emphasized that the concept of consent plays no role 

in whether a person violates R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b): children under the 

age of 13 are legally incapable of consenting to sexual conduct. 

* * * 

 The plain language of the statute makes it clear that every 

person who engages in sexual conduct with a child under the age of 13 

is strictly liable for statutory rape, and the statute must be enforced 

equally and without regard to the particular circumstances of an 

individual's situation. R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) offers no prosecutorial 

exception to charging an offense when every party involved in the 

sexual conduct is under the age of 13; conceivably, the principle of 

equal protection suggests that both parties could be prosecuted as 

identically situated. Because D.B. and M.G. were both under the age of 

13 at the time the events in this case occurred, they were both 

members of the class protected by the statute, and both could have 

been charged under the offense. Application of the statute in this case 

to a single party violates the Equal Protection Clause's mandate that 

persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. 
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Id. at ¶ 27, 30. 

{¶25} Therefore, based on this analysis and holding, if both the alleged victim 

and the alleged perpetrator are under the age of 13, neither party can be charged 

with statutory rape. As explained above, in the context of statutory rape, the ages of 

the alleged victim and alleged perpetrator do not make a difference when both are 

under the age of 13. 

{¶26} It is easy to sympathize with the state’s position given the physiological 

and emotional age disparity between the alleged victim and alleged perpetrator in 

this case. However, the analysis and holding in In re D.B. does not allow us to ignore 

the plain holding of the Ohio Supreme Court. As such, we conclude that the 

Mahoning County Juvenile Court did not err in dismissing the complaint for statutory 

rape against D.R, who was under the age of 13 at the time of the alleged offense. 

{¶27} That said, we note that the determination that a child cannot be charged 

and found guilty of statutory rape does not mean that children under the age of 13 

cannot be found guilty of rape. As the Ohio Supreme Court has noted, a child may 

be found guilty of rape as long as additional elements are shown, such as: 

 [T]he offender substantially impairs the other person's judgment 

or control, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(a); the other person's ability to resist or 

consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical 

condition, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c); or the offender compels the other 

person to submit by force or threat of force, R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). 

Id. at ¶ 28. 

{¶28} Moreover, given the facts of cases such as the one before us, the Ohio 

Supreme Court may limit its holding in In re D.B. Or the general assembly may take 

it upon itself to address situations like the one before us where both the alleged 

perpetrator and alleged victim are under the age of 13, but there is such a physical, 

mental, and emotional age disparity that it is clear who is the perpetrator and who is 

the victim. 
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{¶29} In conclusion, the state’s sole assignment of error lacks merit. While 

procedurally the state preserved the issue for review, its merit argument fails 

because the Juvenile Court did not misinterpret and/or misapply In re D.B. to the 

case at hand. 

{¶30} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby 

affirmed. 

Waite, P.J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.