alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T GU AN GWE I S UN , P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 08- 73348 A ge nc yN o. A 079- 537- 657 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

a n O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d Jul y12, 2011 ** B efo re: S C H R O E D E R , A L A R C Ó N , an dL E A V Y , C i rcu i tJu d g es. G uangw e i S un, ana t i ve a nd c i t i z e n of C hi na , pe t i t i ons pr o s e f orr e vi e w of the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ order di sm i ss i ng her app ea l fr om an i m m i gr a t i on j udge ’ s de c i s i on de ny i ng he rappl i c a t i on f ora s y l um , w i thhol di ng of r e m ova l , and r e l i e f

unde rthe C onve nt i on A ga i ns tT ortur e ( “ C A T ” ) . W e ha ve 

# FI LED JU L 22 2011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS2 08- 73348

j ur i s di c t i on unde r8 U . S . C . § 1252. W e r e vi e w f ors ubs t ant i a l e vi de nc e the a g e n c y ’s f

a c tu a l f in d in g s . See G u v. G on zales , 45 4 F . 3d 10 14 , 10 18 (9th C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) . We d e n yth e p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w. S ub st ant i alevi dence s up po rt s the agency’ s f i nd i ng s that , even i f c re di bl e, S un fa i l ed t o est abl i sh pastpers ec ut i on because herdet ent i on and p hysi ca l m is tr e a tm e n t d idn o t r is e to th e le v e l o f p e r s e c u tio n . Se e id. a t1019- 21 ( de t e nt i on, b eat i n g an di n t erro g at i o n d i dn o tco m p el a fi n d i n g o f p astp ersecu t i o n b y C h i n ese p o l i ce o n acco u n to f u n san ct i o n edrel i g i o u s p ract i ce). S ub st an t i al ev i d en ce al so s upport s the a ge nc y ’ s f

i ndi ng tha tS un f

a i l e d t o e s t abl i s h aw e l l - f ounde d f e arof f u tu r e p e r s e c u tio n . Se e id . a t 1 0 2 2 . A c c o r d in g ly , S u n ’s a s y lu m c la im f a ils . B e c au s e S u n d idn o t m e e t th e lo w e rb u r d e n o f p r o o f f o ra s y lu m , h e rc la im f o rw ith h o ld in g o f

r e m o v a l n e c e s s ar ilyf

a ils . See Zehat

ye v. G on zales , 453 F . 3d 11 82 , 11 90 (9th C i r. 20 06 ). F i nal l y, subst ant i alevi dence s up po rt s the agency’ s deni alof C A T re l i ef because S un fa i l ed t o sho w i ti s m ore l i kel y than n otshe w i l l be t ortured i f r eturned to C h in a . See W

akkaryv. H

older , 55 8 F . 3d 10 49 , 10 67 -68 (9th C i r. 20 09 ). P E T I T I ON F OR RE V I E W DE NI E D.
#### BANK OF ASHE v. J. L. DICKSON, Executor of D. D. DICKSON, Deceased, MRS. MARTHA J. DICKSON, and C. M. DICKSON.

(Filed 9 November, 1932.)

Bills and Notes A a — Widow received no consideration for execution of note in this case and was not liable thereon in action hy payee.

Where a husband executes a note as maker for money borrowed from the bank which note is signed by another as surety, and after the death of the husband, his widow, upon request of the surety, executes a note in like amount in substitution therefor which is also signed by the surety in the same capacity: *Held,*in a suit by the bank to recover the amount borrowed an instruction that if the jury believed the evidence the *501widow would not be liable is correct, tbe action being to recover tbe amount of the husband’s indebtedness and not on tbe note executed by tbe widow, and the widow having received no consideration for tbe note.

Appeal by defendant, C. M. Dickson, from *Stack, J.,*at July Term, 1932, of Ashe.

No error.

This is an action to recover of the defendants the sum of $1,316, the amount of the indebtedness of G. D. Dickson, deceased, to the plaintiff, at the date of his death.

At bis death, which occurred prior to 26 December, 1928, G. D. Dickson was indebted to the plaintiff, Bank of Ashe, in the sum of $1,316, for money loaned to him. This indebtedness ivas evidenced by seven notes aggregating the sum of $1,316, each executed by G. D. Dickson as principal and C. M. Dickson, as surety, and all payable to tbe plaintiff. After tbe death of *G.*D. Dickson, at tbe request of J. L. Dickson, who bad duly qualified as bis executor, and of O. M. Dickson, tbe defendant, Mrs. Martha J. Dickson, widow of G. D. Dickson, deceased, on 26 December, 1928, executed a note for tbe sum of $1,316, payable to tbe plaintiff and due six months after date. This note was signed by G. M. Dickson, as surety, and was delivered to tbe plaintiff. Tbe defendant, Martha J. Dickson, received no consideration for this note from tbe plaintiff, or from any one else. This action was begun on 17 June, 1930.

Under instructions of tbe court, tbe jury answered tbe first issue, to wit: “In what amount, if any, is tbe defendant, Mrs. Martha J. Dickson, indebted to tbe plaintiff bank on tbe note sued on in their action?” “Nothing.”

From judgment that plaintiff recover nothing of tbe defendant, Mrs. Martha J. Dickson, tbe defendant, O. M. Dickson, appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

*W. B. Austin for defendant, 0. M. Dickson.*

*T. G. Bowie for defendant, Mrs. Martha J. Dickson.*

Per Curiam.

There was no error in the instruction of the court to the jury that if the jury believed all the evidence, they should answer the first issue, “Nothing.” This is not an action to recover on the note executed by the defendant, Mrs. Martha J. Dickson, widow of G. D. Dickson, but to recover of the defendants the amount of the indebtedness of G. D. Dickson to the plaintiff at bis death. All the evidence was to the effect that she received no consideration for said note either before or after the death of her husband. *Loan Association v. Swaim,*198 N. C., 14, 150 S. E., 668. Tbe judgment is affirmed.

No error.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

# FILED**~£P** 

## L02010
David Ezell Simpson, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Clerk, U.S. District &Bankruptcy Courts forthe DistrictofColumbia Petitioner,


### v. Civil ActionNo. 

# 10 

# 1589 Judith Simon Garrett et aI., Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter, broughtpro se, is before the Court on its initial review ofthe petition for a writ ofmandamus and application to proceed informapauperis. The Court will grant the application to proceed informapauperis and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner is a federal prisoner confined at a state or local facility in Raleigh, North Carolina, awaiting trial on state charges. He seeks issuance ofa writ ofmandamus to compel his "immediate return to federal custody." Pet. at 14. Because this claim is properly pursued by applying for a writ ofhabeas corpus, mandamus reliefis not available. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) ("Challenges to the validity ofany confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province ofhabeas corpus[.]") (citation omitted); Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (where "habeas is an available and potentially efficacious remedy, it is clear beyond reasonable dispute that mandamus will not appropriately lie"). Moreover, only the Court havingjurisdiction over petitioner's immediate custodian, namely, the United States District Court for the Eastern District ofNorth Carolina, may entertain the habeas claim. See Rooney v. Sec

## y of Army, 405 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (habeas 

# 3"jurisdiction is proper only in the district in which the immediate, not the ultimate, custodian is located.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Simpson v. Dep 't of Justice, Civ. Action No. 10-0920 (Transfer Order, June 4, 2010) civil action). A separate Order of**dismissava"'~J.,,"**



### Date: Septembel!!-,2010 d States District Judge

2
EXHIBIT 32

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB/A-2 of Solar Energy Limited (Registrant) for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (Report), I, Andrew Wallace, chief executive officer and chief financial officer, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1)     This Report complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in this Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition of Registrant

| | at the end of the period covered by this Report and results of operations of Registrant for the period covered by this Report.
| | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/s/ Andrew Wallace

Andrew Wallace

Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

April 24, 2006

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by Registrant for the purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. This certification shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of this Report), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.

A signed original of this written statement required by §906 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### HERBERT JENKINS v. PAUL H. PARKER.

(Filed 22 September, 1926.)

Reference — Trial by Jury — Objections and Exceptions — Issues.

In order for either iiarty to a compulsory reference under our statute to preserve bis right to a trial by jury, he must except to the order at the time it is made, and preserve this right by filing exceptions to the report of the referee, if adverse, and further tender proper issues and demand a jury trial thereon. If the report of the referee be favorable, he must tender issues and demand a jury trial on his adversary’s exceptions.

Appeal by defendant from *Sinclair, J.,*at October Term, 1925, of HERTFORD.

Civil action for trespass, with title to land in dispute and involving a complicated question of boundary.

A compulsory reference was had under C, S., 573, exceptions duly filed to the report of the referee, and a jury trial demanded on some of the exceptions, but no issues tendered.

From a judgment adopting the report of the referee, with additional findings by the judge, and denying the motion for a jury trial on exceptions taken to the referee's report, the defendant appeals.

*Alexander Lassiter and Winston & Matthews for plaintiff.*

*W. H, S. Burgwyn, E. R. Tyler and Stanly Winborne for defendant.*

Stagy, C. J.

The appeal presents the question as to whether the defendant is entitled to a jury trial on any of his exceptions filed to the report of the referee. "We think not.

When a compulsory reference is ordered, the party who would preserve the right to have the issues found by a jury, must duly except to the order of reference; and, upon the coming in of the referee’s report, if it be adverse, he must file «exceptions thereto in apt time, properly tender appropriate issues, and demand a jury trial on each of the issues tendered, and, if the referee’s report be in his favor, he *189must seasonably tender issues on tbe exceptions, if any, filed to tbe report by tbe adverse party, and demand a jury trial tbereon, or else tbe right to bave tbe controverted facts determined by a jury will be deemed to be waived, so far as be is concerned. *Driller Co. v. Worth,*117 N. C., 515; *Baker v. Edwards,*176 N. C., 229.

Tbe reason tbe successful party before tbe referee is required to tender issues on tbe exceptions filed by bis adversary and demand a jury trial tbereon, in order to preserve bis right to bave tbe controverted facts settled by tbe jury, is apparent when it is remembered that tbe losing party before tbe referee may waive bis right to a jury trial on exceptions filed by him or withdraw bis demand therefor at any time. *Robinson v. Johnson,*174 N. C., 232.

Here, it is conceded, tbe defendant tendered no issues on tbe exceptions filed by him to tbe referee’s' report. This was a waiver of bis right to bave tbe controverted matters of fact determined by a jury. *Simpson v. Scronce,*152 N. C., 594.

Other objections to tbe validity of tbe trial were argued on tbe bearing, but as they cannot be sustained, and present no new question of law, we deem it unnecessary to deal with them in an opinion.

Affirmed.
#### STATE v. D. M. JAMIESON.

(Filed 29 November, 1950.)

Criminal Law §§ 17c, 60b—

A plea of *nolo contendere*bas the same effect as a plea of guilty and supports the imposition of judgment, and defendant may not complain of such judgment on the ground that the plea was entered in order that the judge should hear the evidence, find the facts, and render such verdict as the testimony indicated.

Johnson, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this ease.

Appeal by defendant from *Phillips, J.,*at May Term, 1950, of UnioN-

Criminal prosecution upon warrant charging that defendant “unlawfully and willfully, did possess, transport, sell, offer for sale, and place in Union County, for the purpose of being operated numerous illegal punch boards, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided,” etc.

The minute docket of Superior Court of Union County contains these entries : “The defendant D. M. Jamieson, through his counsel, tenders to the State a plea of *nolo contendere*to the charge” described verbatim as *732in the warrant above, “which plea is accepted by the State,” and that thereupon the court entered judgment imposing sentence as specified.

On the other hand, the case on appeal states that the defendant entered a plea of *nolo contendere*and agreed that the judge should hear the evidence, find the facts, and render such verdict as the testimony indicated.

From judgment pronounced defendant appeals to Supreme Court and assigns error.

*Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Bruton for the State.*

*Elbert E. Foster and J. F. Flowers for defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

Defendant, having entered plea of *nolo contendere*to the charge against him, finds himself in like situation to that of defendant in *S. v. Shepherd,*230 N.C. 605, 55 S.E. 2d 79. His plea, for purposes of judgment and disposition, has the same effect as a plea of guilty. Hence as in the Shepherd ease the judgment must be, and it is

Affirmed.

JOHNSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

March 9, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 133199 & (62)(63) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, HEALTHSOURCE, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 133199 COA: 270482 Wayne CC: 05-531775-CZ URBAN HOSPITAL CARE PLUS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion fo r immediate consideration is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the December 14, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion for stay of proceedings is DENIED.

d0306 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 9, 2007

Clerk
An official website of the United States government         Here's how you know         
**Official websites use .mil**
A **.mil** website belongs to an official U.S. Department of Defense organization in the United States.
**Secure .mil websites use HTTPS**
 A **lock (lock )** or **https://** means you’ve safely connected to the .mil website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Skip to main content (Press Enter).

United States Space Command

USSPACECOM

                - 
                - 
                - 
                - 
                - 

Search

Search
Search

-  Home		 
-  About    -  Mission         
  -  Warfighting Units         
  -  Frequently Asked Questions         
  -  Strategic Vision         
  -  Emblem 
-  Leaders    -  Commander         
  -  Deputy Commander         
  -  Command Senior Enlisted Leader         
  -  Chief of Staff 
-  Support    -  Inspector General         
  -  FOIA      -  Making a FOIA Request         
    -  Reading Room 
  -  Equal Opportunity Coordinator         
  -  Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocate         
  -  Command Chaplain         
  -  Commandant         
  -  Resilience Program 
-  Newsroom    -  News      -  FY2025 Testimony 
  -  Photos and Videos         
  -  Speeches         
  -  Publications 
-  Contact		 
-  Partnerships and Outreach    -  Academic Engagement Enterprise      -  AEE Articles of Interest         
    -  AEE Members         
    -  AEE Multimedia         
    -  AEE Research Library 
  -  Careers      -  Civilians         
    -  Internships 
  -  Industry Engagement Portal 
-  Newcomers    -  Newcomer Information         
  -  Checking In 

# PHOTOS ANDVIDEOS

Search

Search

                                - All Images 
                                - Other 
                                - Space Shuttle 

                                - Upload Date
                                - Photo Date
                                - Title

Clear Search12 results found.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 6376** 

SADAT MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. HAROLD W. CLARKE , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. John A. Gibney, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:14

- cv - 00105

- JAG

- RCY )

Submitted : July 6, 2015 Decided: July 16, 2015

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Sadat Muhammad Abdullah, Appellant Pro Se. Robert H. Anderson, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Sadat Muhammad Abdullah seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion for a certificate of appealability. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealab ility will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists w ould find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural gr ounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record an d conclude Abdullah has not made the requisite showing. Abdullah’s appeal is essentially duplicative of his appeal in Abdullah v. Clarke , 600 F. App’x 178 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 14

- 7830) . Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to p roceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented3 in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5699 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to acquire approximately 44 acres 

of land in Martinez, California, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 13, 2014 

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to acquire approximately 44 acres of land in Martinez, California, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘John Muir National 

5 Historic Site Expansion Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. JOHN MUIR NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE LAND ACQUI7 SITION. 

8 (a) ACQUISITION.—The Secretary of the Interior may 

9 acquire by donation the approximately 44 acres of land, 

10 and interests in such land, that are identified on the map 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5699 IH

1 entitled ‘‘John Muir National Historic Site Proposed 

2 Boundary Expansion’’, numbered 426/127150, and dated 

3 November, 2014. 

4 (b) BOUNDARY.—Upon the acquisition of the land 

5 authorized by subsection (a), the Secretary of the Interior 

6 shall adjust the boundaries of the John Muir Historic Site 

7 in Martinez, California, to include the land identified on 

8 the map referred to in subsection (a). 

9 (c) ADMINISTRATION.—The land and interests in 

10 land acquired under subsection (a) shall be administered 

11 as part of the John Muir National Historic Site estab12 lished by the Act of August 31, 1964 (Public Law 88– 

13 547; 78 Stat. 753; 16 U.S.C. 461 note). 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 35.1

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (Item 1123)

Residential Funding Company, LLC

RALI Series 2007-QS3 Trust (the Issuing Entity)

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Residential Funding Company, LLC, as servicer (the Servicer) pursuant to the Series Supplement, dated as of February 1, 2007, and the Standard Terms of Pooling and Servicing
Agreement, dated as of December 1, 2006 (as amended from time to time, the Agreement), among Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., as company, Residential Funding Company, LLC, as master servicer, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company
Americas, as trustee, does hereby certify that:

1. A review of the Servicers activities during the period covered by the Issuing Entitys report
on Form 10-K and of the Servicers performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such
review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the
undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 24th day of March 2008.



|       |  |                     
|------ |  | --------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
|Name:  |  | Anthony N. Renzi    
|Title: |  | Managing Director