alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ex10-7.htm




SHAREHOLDER’S AGREEMENT









THIS AGREEMENT is made as of the 24th day of July, 2009





AMONGST:

Neurokine Pharmaceuticals Inc., a company incorporated under the laws of British Columbia having a registered office at Suite 1820 Cathedral Place 925 West Georgia Street  Vancouver, BC V6C 3L2





(the “Issuer”)





AND:                Francine Salari, of 5-15415 Marine Drive, White Rock BC V4B1C8





(the “Shareholder”)





(collectively, the “Parties”)





WHEREAS:






	
A.  
	
The Shareholder is the holder of a certain number of common shares of the Issuer (the “Shares”);





	
B.  
	
The Shares were issued to the Shareholder at or near the inception of the Issuer; and





	
C.  
	
The issuer wishes, and the Found agrees, to limit the amount of shares which may have restrictive legends removed by the Shareholder.








NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the promises and covenants contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by the parties, the Parties hereto agree as follows:






	
PART 1
	
PAYMENT









	
1.1
	
Payment of Consideration








The Issuer agrees to pay the Shareholder CAD $10 as consideration for entering into this Agreement.  The Shareholder’s execution of this Agreement shall be sufficient proof that such consideration was delivered to the Shareholder at the time this Agreement was executed by the Parties.

 

 



 



1







 





 


	
PART 2
	
RESTRICTIONS









	
2.1
	
Restriction on Sales and Legend Removal








The Shareholder agrees to remove restrictive legends and sell the Shares in reliance on Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Rule 144”) only in compliance with the limitations of securities sold found in Rule 144(e)(1).  The Found is limited to selling:

 


	
a)  
	
One percent of the shares or other units of the class outstanding as shown by the most recent report or statement published by the Issuer, or




 


	
b)  
	
The average weekly reported volume of trading in such securities on all national securities exchanges and/or reported through the automated quotation system of a registered securities association on the date of receipt of the order to execute the transaction by the broker or the date of execution of the transaction directly with a market maker.






 


	
2.2  
	
Restriction on Transfer








Transfers of the Shares shall not be valid unless and until the transferee executes a joinder to this Agreement and any other agreements reasonably required by the Company pursuant to which such transferee(s) agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Agreement.









SHAREHOLDER:





/s/Francine Salari

Francine Salari                                                           













NEUROKINE PHARMACEUTICALS INC.







/s/Ahmad Doroudian

Ahmad Doroudian

Title: President

 

2
#### Harriet S. Rumsey and others, Appellants, v. New York and New England Railroad Company, Respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Opinion by

Pratt, J.;

Barnard, P. J., not sitting.
#### Addie Rohn et al. v. Ann Harris and Mary F. Byers.

*Jurisdiction—Ferry—Franchise—Title—Practice.*

1. "This com t is without jurisdiction of an appeal involving a ferry right which is a franchise.

2. A proceeding for partition of a ferry right involves title.

3. Where this court is without jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the appeal, it will dismiss the same on its own motion.

[Opinion filed February 21, 1889.]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cass County; the Hon-Cyrus Epler, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. Morrison *&*Whitlock, for appellants.

Messrs. Henry Phillippa and G. Pollard, for appellees.

Pleasants, J.

This was a bill filed by appellees for a partition, or if that should be found impracticable, a sale of the *27ferry property, consisting of the franchise and its appurtenances, at Beardstown.

Complainants claimed an undivided half interest therein, setting forth in full their chain of title, and that defendants or some of them owned the other half. The other defendants defaulted, but Addie Bohn and Katherine Bohn answered, denying that complainants had any interest, and claiming the whole of record and by limitation for said Addie. They also claimed that the property was chattel, and therefore not susceptible of partition by this proceeding.

On final hearing upon the pleadings and proofs, the court finding that complainants owned one, and defendant Addie Bohn the other undivided' half interest, and that partition could not be made without injury, ordered a sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds according to the rights of the jiiarties as found, directing the value of boats, etc., to be ascertained, and requiring complainants to pay said defendant one half thereof. .Defendants appealed. The arguments filed here are very elaborate, but confined to the consideration of the nature of the property and the conflicting claims thereto of the respective parties. Though it is recognized by both as a franchise, the question of the jurisdiction of this court is not raised. Yet we can not ignore it.

That a ferry right is a franchise is beyond doubt. People v. Hotz, 92 Ill. 426. And that a proceeding for partition necessarily involves title is also settled. Carter v„ Penn, 99 Ill. 390; Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Ill. App. 521.

A franchise being involved, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Supreme Court. This court has no jurisdiction of such a case. B. S. 1887 (Hurd), Ch. 37, Sec. 25, and Ch. 110, Sec. 89.

This appeal will therefore be dismissed, with leave to appellants to withdraw the record, abstracts and briefs, to be filed in the Supreme Court, if ¡hey shall so desire.

*Appeal dismissed.*
#### James W. Betro, Appellant, v Enessa M. Carbone, Respondent.

[773 NYS2d 319]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Michael E. Daley, J.), entered October 7, 2002. The judgment granted the parties joint custody of their two children with primary physical custody to defendant and ordered plaintiff to pay child support.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the amount of child support awarded and as modified the judgment is affirmed without costs, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Oneida County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of divorce that, inter alia, granted primary physical custody of the parties’ children to defendant and ordered plaintiff to pay child support. Supreme Court’s custody determination has a sound and substantial basis in the record and thus we will not disturb it *(see Steele v Rose,*309 AD2d 1242 [2003]; *Matter of De Felice v De Felice,*303 AD2d 1017 [2003]; *see generally Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 173-174 [1982]). We agree with plaintiff that the court erred in sustaining defendant’s objection to testimony concerning the amount of time in which defendant was engaged in an extramarital affair and the impact of the affair on the welfare of the children *(see Matter of Blank v Blank,*124 AD2d 1010 [1986]; *see also Linda R. v Richard E.,*162 AD2d 48, 52 [1990]). The error is harmless, however, because that testimony was otherwise presented during other lines of questioning and thus was properly before the court *(see Palmer v Wright & Kremers,*62 AD2d 1170, 1171 [1978]). Contrary to the further contention of plaintiff, we conclude under the circumstances of this case that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion

*1111for an adjournment of the trial to enable him to secure additional records and witnesses *(see Pinto v Pinto,*260 AD2d 622, 623 [1999], *lv denied*93 NY2d 817 [1999], *rearg denied*94 NY2d 876 [2000]; *York v York,*250 AD2d 841 [1998]).

We agree with plaintiff, however, that the court erred in failing to adhere to the requirements of the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) in calculating child support *(see*Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [c]). Although the court rejected the child support amount calculated pursuant to the CSSA formula, the court was nevertheless required to set forth those calculations and to explain the factors it considered in deviating therefrom *(see Bast v Rossoff,*91 NY2d 723, 727-728 [1998]; *see also*§ 413 [1] [g]). The court failed to do so here. We are unable to determine plaintiff’s child support obligation on the record before us because the parties’ financial information, although before the court, is not included in the record on appeal *(cf. Marino v Marino,*229 AD2d 971, 972 [1996]). We therefore modify the judgment accordingly, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for a recalculation of plaintiffs child support obligation pursuant to the CSSA. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Scudder, Gorski and Hayes, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                            9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Dec-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 Jan-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   Sep-30-2000
<CASH>                                         10,333,594
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               15,247
<TRADING-ASSETS>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    33,025,449
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         33,635,889
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           3,036,392
<LOANS>                                        260,902,056
<ALLOWANCE>                                    3,361,881
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 331,379,462
<DEPOSITS>                                     267,929,848
<SHORT-TERM>                                   22,926,063
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            2,548,924
<LONG-TERM>                                    5,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       59,298
<OTHER-SE>                                     37,915,329
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 37,974,627
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                13,804,320
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              1,961,162
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               901,492
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               16,666,974
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             8,597,015
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             9,515,278
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          7,151,696
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  1,586,302
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             (4,203)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                7,992,250
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,822,547)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     (1,822,547)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,136,723)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.20)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                 0
<LOANS-NON>                                    2,654,839
<LOANS-PAST>                                   3,840,618
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               1,858,040
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  154,287
<RECOVERIES>                                   71,180
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              3,361,881
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           3,361,881
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                            0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        0



</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES -OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of Belden & Blake Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the knowledge of the undersigned:

         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

Date: March 24, 2003                /s/ John L. Schwager
                                    -------------------------------------
                                    John L. Schwager, Director, President
                                    and Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 15.3
 Letter of KPMG to the Securities and Exchange Commission
 Securities and Exchange Commission
    
    Our ref
    
    KL/AKMY/10058040/1000/05100 F Street, N.E.Washington, DC 20549
    
    Contact
    
    Alice Yip(852) 2978 8152June 30, 2010
   1)
    
    on September 11, 2008, Qiao Xing Mobile Communication Co., Ltd. board of directors, on the
recommendation of its audit committee, approved the appointment of Grobstein Horwath & Company
LLP to serve as independent registered public accounting firm for Qiao Xing Mobile
Communication Co., Ltd.;
 2)
    
    with regards to any consultations with Grobstein, Horwath & Company LLP;
 3)
    
    the personnel of Grobstein, Horwath & Company LLP joined Crowe Horwath LLP, resulting in the
resignation of Grobstein, Horwath & Company LLP as the independent registered public
accounting firm of Qiao Xing Mobile Communication Co., Ltd.; and
 4)
    
    on January 12, 2009, the board of directors of Qiao Xing Mobile Communication Co., Ltd.
appointed Crowe Horwath LLP as the new independent registered public accounting firm.
#### THE CORBITT COMPANY v. JOHN P. NUTT CORPORATION, CAROLINA MOTOR SERVICE, INC., W. C. MILLER, ABRAHAM HILLMAN, and. W. R. CROSBY.

(Filed 15 December, 1937.)

Appeal and Error § 37e—

The findings of fact by the referee, approved by the trial court, are-conclusive on appeal when supported by evidence.

Appeal by defendant John P. Nutt Corporation from *Grady, J.,*at May Term, 1937, of New HaNoveR.

Affirmed.

This was an action to recover the balance due for certain motor trucks, and for parts and repairs thereto, sold by plaintiff to Carolina Motor Service, Inc., which debt it was alleged defendant John P. Nutt Corporation had assumed, upon taking over all the assets and property of the Carolina Motor Service, Inc.

By consent, the cause was referred to Marsden Bellamy, Esq., to hear the evidence and report his findings of fact and conclusions of law to the court. The referee reported his findings of fact that John P. Nutt Corporation, in consideration of receiving the property of the Carolina Motor Service, Inc., agreed orally and in writing to pay plaintiff’s claims, and that of certain other creditors, and that the balance of plaintiff’s debt, $4,262.22, was now due by the defendant. The referee concluded that plaintiff was entitled to judgment therefor.

Upon exceptions duly filed, the cause was heard in the Superior Court and judgment rendered overruling all of defendant’s exceptions to the report, and adopting and affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the referee. The defendant John P. Nutt Corporation appealed.

*667
      *C. C. Holmes and I. C. Wright for plaintiff, appellee.*

*Stevens & Burgwin for defendant John P. Nutt Corporation, appellant.*

Pee Oueiam.

An examination of the record and the evidence produced before the referee leads us to the conclusion that there was evidence to support the findings of fact by the referee. These findings having been adopted and approved by the judge below, his ruling thereon is conclusive upon this Court. *Mineral Co. v. Young,*211 N. C., 387; *Anderson v. McRae,*211 N. C., 197.

The judgment is

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 17 (Wednesday, January 27, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 4269]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-1384]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 71

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0705; Airspace Docket No. 09-ASO-25]


Establishment of Class E Airspace; Hertford, NC

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Direct final rule; confirmation of effective date.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action confirms the effective date of a direct final rule 
published in the Federal Register September 14, 2009 that establishes 
Class E Airspace at Harvey Point Defense Testing Activity, Hertford, 
NC.

DATES: Effective Date: 0901 UTC, January 27, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melinda Giddens, Operations Support 
Group, Eastern Service Center, Federal Aviation Administration, P.O. 
Box 20636, Atlanta, Georgia 30320; telephone (404) 305-5610.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Confirmation of Effective Date

    The FAA published this direct final rule with a request for 
comments in the Federal Register on September 14, 2009 (74 FR 46892), 
Docket No. FAA-2009-0705; Airspace Docket No. 09-ASO-25. The FAA uses 
the direct final rulemaking procedure for a non-controversial rule 
where the FAA believes that there will be no adverse public comment. 
This direct final rule advised the public that no adverse comments were 
anticipated, and that unless a written adverse comment, or a written 
notice of intent to submit such an adverse comment, were received 
within the comment period, the regulation would become effective on 
December 17, 2009. No adverse comments were received, and thus this 
notice confirms that effective date.

    Issued in College Park, Georgia, on January 14, 2010.
Myron A. Jenkins,
Acting Manager, Operations Support Group, Eastern Service Center, Air 
Traffic Organization.
[FR Doc. 2010-1384 Filed 1-26-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
#### Charles Welde, Respondent, v. Sarah H. Henderson, Appellant

Order affirmed, with costs and disbursements.

Opinion by

Pratt, J.;

Dykman, J., not sitting.
#### Charles H. Perkins, Respondent, v. John Thorp, Appellant.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by

Boardman, J.
COURT OF APPEALS

REBECA C. MARTINEZ

 CHIEF JUSTICE

PATRICIA O. ALVAREZ

LUZ ELENA D. CHAPA

IRENE RIOS

BETH WATKINS

LIZA A. RODRIGUEZ

LORI I. VALENZUELA

 JUSTICES

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

CADENA-REEVES JUSTICE CENTER 

300 DOLOROSA, SUITE 3200

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78205-3037

WWW.TXCOURTS.GOV/4THCOA.ASPX

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, 

CLERK OF COURT

TELEPHONE

(210) 335-2635

FACSIMILE NO.

(210) 335-2762

November 18, 2022

Renee Ramirez

The Law Office of Derek D. Morales, 

PLLC

800 Broadway St

San Antonio, TX 78215-1517

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Brett B. Rowe

Evans, Rowe & Holbrook

10101 Reunion Place, Suite 900

San Antonio, TX 78216-4175

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Derek Morales

The Law Office of Derek D. 

Morales, PLLC

800 Broadway

San Antonio, TX 78215

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 04-22-00097-CV

Trial Court Case Number: 2020-CI-06670

Style: Sharyn Dacbert 'Cross-Appellee'

v.

 Medical Center Ophthalmology Associates, L.L.P. and Michael 

Singer 'Cross- Appellants'

Enclosed please find the order which the Honorable Court of Appeals has 

issued in reference to the above styled and numbered cause.

If you should have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Very truly yours,

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court

______________________

Cecilia Phillips

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 5-3221 

cc: Nicki Elgie (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

Ryan G. Anderson (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 18, 2022

No. 04-22-00097-CV

Sharyn DACBERT,

Appellant / Cross-Appellee

v.

MEDICAL CENTER OPHTHALMOLOGY ASSOCIATES, L.L.P. and Michael Singer 

Appellees / Cross- Appellants

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020-CI-06670

Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant/cross-appellee’s second motion for an extension of time to file her responsive 

brief is granted. The brief is due on or before December 5, 2022. No further extensions will be 

granted absent extenuating circumstances.

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 18th day of November, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50294

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSEPH LEE STRAIT, JR

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:05-CR-185-ALL

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Joseph Lee Strait, Jr., has moved for

leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Strait has not filed a response. Our independent review of

the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 10, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
#### HATTIE A. COX v. L. B. JENKINS.

(Filed 15 December, 1937.)

1. Process § 15—

Complaint *held*sufficient to state cause of action for abuse of process under authority of *Ledford v. Smith, ante,*447.

3. Pleadings § 15—

A demurrer for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action must be overruled if the complaint, liberally construed, C. S., 535, is sufficient to state any cause of action.

3. Pleadings § 37—

If defendant desires a more certain and definite statement of the cause of action alleged, the proper remedy is a motion under C. S., 537.

Appeal by defendant from *Hamilton, Special Judge,*at August Term, 1937, of LeNoik.

Affirmed.

This is an action for abuse of process, etc., brought by plaintiff against defendant, alleging damages. The defendant demurred to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled by the court below. Defendant excepted, assigned error, and appealed to the Supreme Court.

*Allen ■& Allen and Albion Dunn for plaintiff.*

*Wallace & White, John G. Dawson, R. A. Whitalcer, and J. A. Jones for defendant.*

Pee Cueiam.

¥e think the court below properly overruled the demurrer of defendant. We will not analyze the complaint in detail, as the defendant must answer and a trial will be had. We think the allega*668tions sufficient, at least, to base a cause of action on for abuse of process. *Ledford v. Smith, ante,*447.

While the complaint was lengthy, yet under our liberal practice (C. S., 535), if it sets forth one good cause of action it cannot be overthrown by demurrer. The general rule is that, if there is any cause of action stated in the complaint, however inartificially expressed, the demurrer will be overruled. If the defendant desired a more certain and definite statement of the alleged cause of action, the proper remedy was a motion to “require the pleading to be made definite and certain by amendment.” N. C. Code, 1935 (Michie), sec. 537.

For the reasons given, the judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.