This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0405 Linda E. Walsh, Appellant,

vs. Richard J. Walsh, et al., Defendants, Warrenn C. Anderson, et al., Respondents. Filed December 27, 2016 Affirmed Rodenberg, Judge Swift County District Court File No. 76-CV-12-436 Thomas Gunther, Gunther La w Office, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) William M. Hart, Bradley M. Jones, Julia J. Nierengarten, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents) Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Kirk, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N RODENBERG , Judge Appellant Linda E. Walsh challenges the district court’s dismissal of her legalmalpractice and breach-of-fiduciary-duty clai ms against Fluegel, Anderson, McLaughlin2 & Brutlag, Chartered (FAMB), and Warrenn C. Anderson (co llectively respondents). We affirm. FACTS After 45 years of marriage to Richard Wals h, appellant initiated divorce proceedings in October 2010. During the divorce pro ceedings, Richard Walsh was represented by FAMB, which had previously represented the c ouple in other matters. Appellant dismissed the divorce proceeding in December 2010, and later signed a conflict waiver assenting to FAMB’s representation of Richard Walsh. After appellant dismissed the divorce proceeding, FAMB did estate-p lanning work for appellant and Richard Walsh. FAMB drafted documents creating Walsh Family Fa rm, LLC, and irrevocable trusts for both Richard Walsh and appellant. In February 2011, Richard Walsh and the couple’s son, Jason Walsh, brought appellant to FAMB’s office, where appellant and Richard Walsh signed various documents that FAMB prepared for them. Appellant later started a second divorce action. Appellant claims that, in the course of litigating the marri age dissolution, she learned “there were no real estate assets in the marital estate beca use they were all in irrevocable trusts.” In July 2012, appellant sued Richard Walsh, Jason Walsh, FAMB, Anderson, Walsh Family Farm, LLC, and the tw o trusts. Among othe r claims, she alleged breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice against respondents. All claims against Richard Walsh and Jason Walsh were later settled, the comp laint dismissed with prejudice by stipulation, and the trusts dissolved, removing the LLC and th e trusts from the litigation. Respondents are the only remaining defendants in this action.3 After appellant sued respondents, she serv ed an amended complaint and attached to it an affidavit signed by her attorney stating th at the attorney had revi ewed the facts of the case with an expert witness, and that the expe rt would opine that respondents deviated from the applicable standard of care. Appellant la ter disclosed to respondents an expert report dated December 1, 2012. The expert report was not signed by appellant’s counsel, but in March 2013, appellant incorporated the expert report in her answers to interrogatories, which were signed by her attorney. The expert report is ten pages long. It lists the expert’s credentials, summarizes the facts of the case, describes the mechanics of proving a legal-malpractice claim, and concludes with two pages of “opinions and anal ysis.” The report describes Anderson as “a lawyer and principal of [FAMB]” and indi cates that he represented appellant and Richard Walsh on a variety of le gal matters over a period of 20 years. The “opinions and analysis” section does not refer to Anderson at all. The report details the attorney-client relationship between FAMB and appellant, the st andard of care the expert believes FAMB owed to appellant, and FAMB’s claimed breache s of that standard of care. The expert concludes by explaining the effect of the trus t transactions, which were “advantageous to Richard and the children and disadvantageous to [appellant].” According to the expert: The apparent purposes and overriding effects of the scheme were to exclude [appellant] fro m control and management of the farm properties and to deprive [her] of any claim to the farm properties as marital assets in the event of a divorce. All significant features of the docum ents tended to those purposes. The report makes two comments concerning caus ation, first opining that “FAMB and its lawyers deviated from the standard of care in their representation of [appellant], causing4 injury to [appellant],” and later stating that “[appellant] was caused to accept and enter into the transactions by the malpr actice of FAMB and thereby sust ained injury. Whether that injury may be remedied by resc ission or other relief remains to be determined. At the least, she has been injured by the uncertainty and expens e of seeking relief.” On August 19, 2013, respondents moved to dismiss, arguing that the expert report did not adequately explain its opinions about FAMB’s or Anders on’s conduct as to satisfy the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 544.42 (2012), which requires a summary of the anticipated expert testimony as to each element for which an expert opinion will be offered at trial. The district court determined that the expert report meets the minimum standards set out for expert disclosure in all respects except that the disclosure lacked an attorney signature, which the court determ ined was a minor technical pr oblem that had already been remedied. It denied responde nts’ motions to dismiss. On January 21, 2014, respondents submitted a letter to the district court seeking permission to file a motion for reconsideration. On September 4, 2015, the district court granted respondents’ request for reconsiderati on in light of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Guzick v. Kimball , 869 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2015). Respondents then filed a motion for reconsideration of the earlie r motion to dismiss, arguing that Guzick required dismissal of this case. On January 8, 2016, the district court issued an order applying Guzick and concluding that the expe rt report “failed to provide any meaningful information on [the expert’s] opinion regarding causation.” Accordingl y, it dismissed appellant’s claims.5 This appeal followed. Anders on filed a related appeal, arguing that the district court erred when it denied Anderson’s original motion to dismiss. D E C I S I O N In a legal-malpractice case where expert testimony is necessary to prove the claim, the plaintiff must produce two affidavits co ncerning the expert testimony. Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 2 (2014). 1 First, the plaintiff must attach to her pleading an affidavit of expert review, stating that the attorney has re viewed the facts of the case with an expert and that the expert will opine that the defend ant “deviated from the a pplicable standard of care and by that action caused injury to the plaintiff.” Id. , subds. 2, 3 (2014). Second, she must “serve upon the opponent within 180 da ys” an affidavit of expert disclosure. Id. , subds. 2, 4 (2014). This affida vit must identify the experts to be called at trial, describe the substance of their expected testimony, and summarize the grounds for the testimony. Id. , subd. 4. The expert disclosure requi rement may be satisfied by answers to interrogatories, but whether submitted as answer s to interrogatories or as a stand-alone affidavit, the disclosure must be signed by the plaintiff’s attorney. Id. The purpose of the expert disclosure re quirement under Minn. Stat. § 544.42 is to “provide for the early dismissal of frivolous malpractice claims.” Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co. , 732 N.W.2d 209, 217 (Minn. 2007). To that end, failure to produce an affidavit of expert review or expert disclosure is fatal to a legal-malpractice claim.

1 In 2014, Minn. Stat. § 544. 42 was amended to modify certain time limits in subdivisions 2 and 4. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 153 §§ 3 at 111; 4 at 111. Because these amendments do not affect our analysis of whether the affida vits were legally adeq uate, we reference the most recent version of the statute.6 Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 6 (2014). On mo tion, a district court must dismiss with prejudice a malpractice action not su pported by adequate affidavits. Id. Before dismissal, however, the statute contains a safe-harbor provision, requiring the court to give the plaintiff “specific findings as to the deficienci es of the affidavit,” and allow “60 days to satisfy the disclosure requirements.” Id. , subd. 6(c); Guzick , 869 N.W.2d at 47. However, “[i]n order to give life” to the expert disclo sure requirement, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the safe-harbor provision is mean t only for curing minor technical deficiencies in an otherwise legally sufficient expert disclosure. Guzick , 869 N.W.2d at 48; BrownWilbert , 732 N.W.2d at 217-18. To qualify for the 60-d ay safe harbor to remedy the technical problems of an expert disclosure, the initial expert disclosure must “provide some mean ingful information, beyond conclusory statements.” Brown-Wilbert , 732 N.W.2d at 219. This meaningful information must include identification of the expert and an explana tion of the expert’s opinion on each element of the plaintiff’s pr ima facie case of malp ractice for which the plaintiff needs to call an expert. Guzick , 869 N.W.2d at 48. A prima facie case of legal malpractice requires a litigant to establish “( 1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) acts constituting negligence or breach of contract; (3) that such acts were the proximate cause of the plain tiff’s damages; and (4) that but for [the attorney’s] conduct the plaintiff would have been successful in the prosecution or defe nse of the action.” Id. at 47 (quotation omitted). The district court dismissed appellant’s legal-malpractice and breach-of-fiduciaryduty claims on reconsideration for failure to satisfy Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 4. While7 appellant’s affidavit of expert review was ad equate, the district court found the expert report did not meet the requirements of Minn . Stat. § 544.42 or qualify for safe-harbor treatment. The district court determined that the report sufficiently establishes a prima facie case for the existence of an attorney-client relationshi p and the breach of a standard of care, but it determined that the report “failed to provide any meaningful information on [the expert’s] opinion regardin g causation.” The district c ourt also determined that the expert report did not contain sufficient informa tion on damages, but determined that expert testimony was not required for that element, a determination that neither party has appealed. We review the dismissal of a legal-malpra ctice action for failure to comply with expert disclosure requirements under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at 46; BrownWilbert , 732 N.W.2d at 215. However, we re view statutory cons truction de novo. Guzick , 869 N.W.2d at 46. The question of whether expert testimony is required for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of a particular element is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 46-47. Generally, when determining if an expert di sclosure is adequate , a court must first assess whether the plaintiff is required to make an expert disclosure, a question which “must be determined on a case by case basis for each element of the prima facie case of malpractice.” Id. at 48-49. A plaintiff need not us e expert testimony to establish an element of her case if a lay jury can adequately evaluate the attorney’s cond uct without an expert opinion. Hill v. Okay Constr. Co. , 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d 107, 1168 (1977). Here, appellant admits that her cl aims require expert testimony to establish proximate causation. We therefore move to the s econd step of the inquiry a nd assess whether appellant’s disclosure was sufficient to ex plain the expert’s opinion on ca usation. When making this determination, we apply the safe-harbor standard because, so long as an expert disclosure meets this standard, the plainti ff is entitled to specific findings of insufficiency and 60 days to cure. Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 6. We must assess whether the party’s disclosure related to that element imparts a meaningful summary of the expe rt’s opinion “beyond conclusory statements.” Guzick , 869 N.W.2d

. at 49; Brown-Wilbert , 732 N.W.2d at 219. “A summary requires more than an implication; rather, a sufficient summary explicitly explains the expert’s opinion on how the negligent acts were the proximate cause of the injury.” Guzick , 869 N.W.2d at 51. An affidavit which “read as a whole may very well imply” causation does not qualify for safe harbor. Id. The district court determined appellant’s expert report inadequate concerning proximate cause because it makes only “two c onclusory statements” regarding plaintiff’s injuries and how respondents caused them. The statements allege that FAMB caused harm to appellant and that appellant “sustained injury” because of FAMB’s actions. Because neither statement details the ch ain of events that make up causation, the district court concluded that the expert report “fails to provide any meaningful information or explanation as to the causal-link between th e alleged breach of duty by FAMB and its attorneys and the inju ries, if any, suffered by [appellant].”9 We agree with the district court that th e expert report, thou gh quite thorough on the issues of duty and breach, lacks “ca usational detail” in the fashion Guzick requires. A comparison to Guzick , where the expert disclosure was al so found lacking, bears this out. Guzick was a dispute related to a power of attorn ey drafted for an elderly client without fully consulting with the client about the implications accompanying execution of a power of attorney. Id. at 44-45. The disclosure in Guzick identified ten acts that deviated from the standard of care and “caused damages.” Id. at 45. The statement that the actions “caused damages” was the only line in the expert disclosure related to causation. The supreme court determined that “the affida vit read as a whole may very well imply” proximate causation, but this is “not enough to satisfy Brown-Wilbert , which requires an affidavit to provide meaningful information that ‘summarizes the e xpert’s opinion.’” Id. at 51 (quoting Brown-Wilbert , 732 N.W.2d at 219). Appellant attempts to distin guish her expert’s report from the expert disclosure in Guzick because her expert does more than simp ly allege that FAMB “caused damages.” Although appellant’s expert report contains tw o pages of legal opinion, most of the opinion section focuses on explaining the deviations from the standard of care. The expert’s analysis flows logically from FA MB’s duty to its client, appe llant, to its breaches, to the effects of the breaches. Appellant argues thatthese statements are not conclusory when viewed as a whole. However, an implication of proximate cause is just as insufficient as a mere legal conclusion. Id. at 47, 51. Appellant ’s expert report contai ns both implications and conclusions concerning causation, but does not provide a description of how the breaches of duty caused appellant damages. Accordingly, the di strict court acted within its10 discretion in dismissing the ac tion under Minn. Stat. § 544.4 2, as interpreted by the supreme court. Appellant argues that the district court shou ld have afforded her safe harbor under Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subd. 6. Although appella nt poses this argument in the alternative, courts apply the safe-harbor standard when de termining whether an e xpert disclosure meets statutory requirements. See id. at 51. The district court dete rmined that appellant’s expert report did not sufficiently describe the expert’s analysis of proximate cause, as required by Brown-Wilbert and Guzick . Accordingly, the safe-harbor provision is unavailable. Id. at 49; Brown-Wilbert , 732 N.W.2d at 219. Appellant atte mpts to argue that the report meaningfully explains causation and meets the Brown-Wilbert standard when analyzed “in
toto.” But Guzick holds that even an affidavit that “read as a whole may very well imply” proximate causation does not qualify for the st atutory safe harbor. 869 N.W.2d at 51. Appellant’s argument concerning the safe-harbor provision is at its core an attack

on Brown-Wilbert and Guzick. She argues that “the goal of expediency and finality that a section 544.42 dismissal can offer should not come at the expens e of ensuring that all cases are decided upon their true merits.” It is true that Guzick and Brown-Wilbert place a heavy burden on a malpractice plaintiff. See Guzick , 869 N.W.2d at 55 (Lillehaug, J., concurring) (examining the more stringent requirement for professional malpractice cases than medical malpractices cases to qualify for safe harbor)

. And appellant’s expert report appears to be far more specific and detailed than the five-sentence expert disclosure in Brown-Wilbert , which stated that the experts were “expected to testify as to the conclusions set forth in the complaint, based upon the facts alleged in the complaint,” or Guzick ’s expert disclosure, a11 repurposed affidavit of expert review which listed deviations from the standard of care and concluded that these actions “caused damages.” Id. at 45; Brown-Wilbert , 732 N.W.2d at 214. However, the supreme court reaffirmed Brown-Wilbert ’s narrow interpretation of the safe-harbor provision in Guzick . 869 N.W.2d at 51. As an error-correcting court, it is not for us to assess whether Guzick and Brown-Wilbert interpret the safe-harbor provision too narrowly. See State v. Ward , 580 N.W.2d 67, 74 (Minn. A pp. 1998) (“[W]e are not in position to overturn estab lished supreme court precedent.”). It is our duty to ensure that the district court properly applied Guzick and Brown-Wilbert to the facts of this case. It did. Finally, appellant argues that the district c ourt improperly changed its analysis in its order granting respondents’ motio n to dismiss on reconsiderati on. But between the district court’s initial denial of respondents’ motion to dismiss and its gran t of that motion on reconsideration, Guzick was decided. Appellant cites no authority supporting her argument that a district court may not change its findings or its conclusion when reconsidering a prior order in light of a change or clarification in the relevant law. We are aware of no law prohibiting a district court, before the entr y of judgment, from reconsidering an earlier order after a change in the lega l landscape governing a claim. Because we affirm the district court’s dism issal of all claims against Anderson, we do not reach the issue raised by Anderson’s re lated appeal. Affirmed.