SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3213-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RAHEEM JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted September 28, 2022 – Decided October 14, 2022

Before Judges Messano and Gilson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 13-05-0503.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel, 

on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-3213-20

A jury found defendant Raheem Jones guilty of the murder of L.S. and 

related weapons offenses. State v. Jones, No. A-5394-15 (App. Div. Dec. 14, 

2018) (slip op. at 2).1 We affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, vacated the 

sentence imposed by the trial judge, and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 4. 

The judge re-sentenced defendant to life imprisonment with a period of parole 

ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, 

and the Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. 

Jones, 238 N.J. 426 (2019). 

Defendant filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief (PCR)

in which he alleged trial counsel provided ineffective assistance (IAC). Among 

other things, defendant claimed counsel: failed to properly advise him of his 

sentencing exposure if he went to trial compared to the State's more favorable 

plea offer; failed to investigate a third-party guilt defense; and failed to properly 

advise him of his right to testify in his own defense. PCR counsel was appointed 

to represent defendant. In his brief and at oral argument, PCR counsel presented 

defendant's claims and additionally argued trial counsel failed to investigate 

defendant's alibi defense in addition to a third-party guilt defense. 

1

 We use initials only because we did so in our prior opinion.
3

A-3213-20

In support of the petition, defendant served a Paterson Police Department 

report recounting the officers' interview of Clive Haughton. Haughton told 

police that on the night of the murder, he was on the phone with the victim, who 

he first met at work. The victim said she could not speak with Haughton because 

her boyfriend, who had assaulted her in the past, would not let her go to the 

laundromat without him. Defendant's investigators attempted to locate 

Haughton in 2019 to no avail; their efforts were documented in several 

supplemental reports. 

In addition, the investigators attempted without success to locate Sherell 

Pointer, defendant's cousin. PCR counsel claimed defendant told trial counsel 

he was with Pointer in Plainfield on the night of the murder, and they went to 

New York to do Christmas shopping. Again, several documents detailed 

investigators' efforts to locate Pointer. Defendant sought an evidentiary hearing 

on his PCR claims.

The PCR judge, who was also the trial judge, rendered an oral opinion 

addressing defendant's arguments and denying the petition. He entered a 

conforming order on July 7, 2020, and this appeal followed.

To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must meet the two-prong test 

enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and applied 
4

A-3213-20

by our Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). First, a defendant must 

show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "To satisfy prong one, [a defendant] ha[s] 

to 'overcome a "strong presumption" that counsel exercised "reasonable 

professional judgment" and "sound trial strategy" in fulfilling his 

responsibilities.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013) (quoting State v. 

Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 147 (2011)). "[I]f counsel makes a thorough investigation 

of the law and facts and considers all likely options, counsel's trial strategy is 

'virtually unchallengeable.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004)). 

Second, a defendant must show a "reasonable probability" that the 

deficient performance affected the outcome. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. "A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 583 (2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52). 

Our rules anticipate the need to hold an evidentiary hearing on a PCR 

petition, "only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of postconviction relief." R. 3:22-10(b). "A prima facie case is established when a 
5

A-3213-20

defendant demonstrates 'a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing 

the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately 

succeed on the merits.'" State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (quoting R.

3:22-10(b)). "[W]e review under the abuse of discretion standard the PCR 

court's determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v. 

Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013) (citing State v. Marshall, 

148 N.J. 89, 157–58 (1997)).

Before us, defendant reiterates the arguments made to the PCR judge. He 

contends the judge should have held an evidentiary hearing on his IAC claims 

because trial counsel's "misadvice led [defendant] to reject the State's plea 

offer," there were available "alibi and third[-]party defenses" counsel failed to 

present, and trial counsel's ineffective assistance "denied [defendant] his 

constitutional right to testify in his own defense." We disagree and affirm.

We begin by noting our review is limited because none of the facts 

defendant asserts to support his claims regarding his sentence exposure if he 

went to trial, or that he was with Pointer on the night of the murder, or that he 

wished to testify on his own behalf but trial counsel dissuaded him from doing 

so, are supported in the appellate record by defendant's verified petition, or a

certification or affidavit from any witness. See R. 3:22-8 ("The petition shall 
6

A-3213-20

be verified by defendant and shall set forth with specificity the facts upon which 

the claim for relief is based, the legal grounds of complaint asserted, and the 

particular relief sought." (emphasis added)). Instead, we are furnished only with 

PCR counsel's brief and the argument he made to the judge. This procedural 

deficiency would be enough for us to affirm without considering the merits of 

defendant's IAC claims. Nevertheless, because the State has failed to raise the 

issue and for the sake of completeness, we address defendant's arguments.

In support of defendant's claim that trial counsel misadvised him of his 

sentencing exposure if he went to trial, defendant furnished the PCR judge with 

the Pretrial Memorandum completed by defense counsel and signed by 

defendant. Question four asked if "a mandatory period of parole ineligibility 

appl[ied]," and, if so, as to which count. Contrary to defendant's assertion that 

question four was left blank and unanswered, handwritten next to "85% Law 

Term" on the form was "Life," and "66 1/2 yrs" after "Term." Although the 

"yes/no" answer to question four was not circled, the PCR judge concluded, "it 

[wa]s amply clear . . . [defendant] was aware he was exposed to a life term with 

a lengthy parole ineligibility." We agree. Moreover, the form explicitly said 

the State's plea offer was a forty-five-year term of imprisonment subject to 

NERA, and restitution for the victim's funeral expenses. The record before us 
7

A-3213-20

demonstrates defendant was fully aware of the penal consequences of going to 

trial versus accepting the State's plea offer. 

There is another reason why defendant's claim that he would have 

accepted a plea bargain if he knew what his potential sentence exposure was

lacks merit. Defendant has uniformly asserted throughout the PCR proceedings 

that he had viable alibi and third-party guilt defenses that trial counsel failed to 

investigate or fully assert, thereby implicitly asserting his innocence. As the 

Supreme Court made clear in State v. Taccetta, a PCR petitioner cannot assert 

that he would have pled guilty but for his attorney's deficient performance, and 

at the same time assert his factual innocence. 200 N.J. 183, 196–97 (2009).

Without doubt, the "[f]ailure to investigate an alibi defense is a serious

deficiency that can result in the reversal of a conviction." Porter, 216 N.J. at 353. 

It is equally without doubt that "[w]hen a petitioner claims his trial attorney 

inadequately investigated his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation 

would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the 

personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification." Ibid.

(quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999)); see

also State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311–12 (2014) ("[T]o entitle a PCR petitioner 

to an evidentiary hearing, 'bald assertions' are not enough—rather, the defendant 
8

A-3213-20

'must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard 

performance.'" (quoting Porter, 216 N.J. at 355)). 

The PCR judge rejected defendant's claim that trial counsel failed to 

investigate his alibi defense, stating:

[T]here's nothing, absolutely nothing, which 

establishes that this is anything other than a recent 

fabrication on the part of [defendant]. There's no 

certification from Ms. Pointer. And absent that, this 

utterly unsupported contention cannot be the basis for 

a prima facie showing of any . . . ineffective assistance 

of counsel.

We agree, and the argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

We explain the context for defendant's related claim—counsel failed to 

investigate and assert a third-party guilt defense—which is equally unavailing. 

At trial, the jury heard the victim's 9-1-1 call in which she "told the operator[,]

'I was stabbed to death. My boyfriend stabbed me . . . all over my body.'" Jones, 

slip op. at 6. Defendant's PCR counsel asserted the victim's reference to her 

boyfriend was a reference to Clive Haughton. 

At trial, the victim's mother and other witnesses said she was dating Clive 

at the time she was murdered, and that defendant was her ex-boyfriend. In her 

summation, defense counsel vigorously argued that when the victim told the 
9

A-3213-20

dispatcher her boyfriend stabbed her, she meant Clive, not defendant. In short, 

trial counsel fully presented a third-party guilt defense, but given the other 

substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, the jury rejected the contention. That 

does not mean counsel's performance was deficient.

Defendant implies Haughton should have been called as a witness. 

However, the police spoke with him, and, if Haughton testified consistently with 

the information he gave to police as cited above, his testimony would not have 

helped defendant in the least.

Lastly, the record belies defendant's claim that he wished to testify and 

trial counsel dissuaded him from doing so without explanation. Trial counsel 

engaged in extensive questioning of defendant under oath, and the exchange 

illustrates counsel fully explained defendant's right to testify, the possible 

consequences of his choice, and the option to have the jury instructed to draw 

no inference from defendant's choice not to testify, and that defendant 

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. The PCR judge found that 

to be the case, and so do we. 

Affirmed.