UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4802

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMAL PULLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District 

Judge. (8:01-cr-00439-DKC-1)

Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 31, 2015

Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan Skelton, Appellate 

Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Thomas P. Windom, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jamal Pulley was sentenced to 54 months’ imprisonment, to 

be followed by a 3-year term of supervised release, after he 

pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Upon release from 

imprisonment, Pulley violated his terms of supervision and the 

district court revoked his supervised release, sentenced him to 

time served, and reimposed two years of supervised release. 

During this second period of supervision, the district court 

found that Pulley again violated his terms of supervision by 

(1) failing to report to the probation office within 72 hours of 

his release from custody, (2) leaving the district without 

permission, and (3) committing new offenses. The district court 

sentenced Pulley to 17 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 18 

months’ supervised release. On appeal, Pulley argues that the 

district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) and his 

rights to due process and confrontation by admitting hearsay 

evidence to prove that he committed new offenses and failed to 

self-surrender on outstanding charges. We affirm.

We review a district court’s ruling to admit hearsay 

evidence during a supervised release hearing for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Ferguson, 752 F.3d 613, 616 (4th 

Cir. 2014). “Supervised release revocation hearings are 

informal proceedings in which the rules of evidence, including 
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those pertaining to hearsay, need not be strictly applied.” 

United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2012). 

However, due process affords a releasee a limited right “to 

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses” at a revocation 

hearing “unless the hearing officer specifically finds good

cause for not allowing confrontation.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 

U.S. 471, 489 (1972). Prior to admitting hearsay evidence in a 

revocation hearing, “the district court must balance the 

releasee’s interest in confronting an adverse witness against 

any proffered good cause for denying such confrontation.” 

Doswell, 670 F.3d at 530. Further, the due process guarantee is 

embodied in the procedural rule that a releasee is “entitled to 

. . . question any adverse witness unless the court determines 

that the interest of justice does not require the witness to 

appear.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C). However, evidentiary 

rulings are subject to harmless error review, such that any 

error is harmless if we conclude “that the error had no 

substantial and injurious effect or influence on the outcome

. . . .” Ferguson, 752 F.3d at 618 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Regardless of whether the hearsay evidence was properly 

admitted, we hold that any alleged error was harmless. Pulley 

does not contend that the district court lacked sufficient 

grounds to revoke his supervised release, or that he should not 
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have served a term of imprisonment, or even that his sentence 

was plainly unreasonable. Rather, Pulley argues that the 

district court improperly assessed a Grade B violation instead 

of a Grade C violation against him because it relied on hearsay 

evidence to show that Pulley committed new offenses while on 

supervision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 7B1.1(a) 

(2013). The district court, however, explicitly stated that it 

would impose the same sentence against Pulley even if it did not 

think he had committed the new offenses, based on Pulley’s 

admitted failure to report to the probation office after his 

first revocation hearing. We accordingly conclude that any 

evidentiary error was harmless.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED