[ PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________
No. 20

- 13364

____________________ QUINCY A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus CORRECTIONAL OFFICER RADFORD, c/o Alexandria Williams Office of the General Counsel 501 S Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32399

- 2500 in his individual capacity, CAPT. SCARP AT I, in his individual capacity, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WILKINSON, in her ind ividual capacity, OFFICER BADCOCK, USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 1 of 292 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364 Correctional Officer, in his official capacity, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SHORT, et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 2:18

- cv

- 14107

- RLR

____________________ Before J ORDAN , L UCK , and L AGOA , Circuit Judges. J ORDAN , Circuit Judge : Quincy Williams, a Florida prisoner
, filed a pro se civil rights suit against several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . He alleged that Captain Albert Scarpati retaliated against him in various ways

— including placing him in disciplinary /segregated confinement

— because of complaints he made and grievances he filed. He also alleged that Officer Erick Radford beat him while he was handcuffed
, and that Officers Brian Babcock and Cameron Short held him down and failed to intervene during the assault. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Captain Scarpat i and Officers Radford, Babco c k, and Short on all ofMr. Williams’ claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams, and with the benefit of oral argument, we USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 2 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 3

vacate the grant of summary judgment except as to one of the alleged instances of retaliation.
I
We r eview a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo

. See Marbury v. Warden , 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is warranted “when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party.” Owusu

- Ansah v. Coca

- Cola Co.
, 715 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). W e credit the “specific fact s” that Mr. Williams testified to, includ ing those set out in his verified pleadings and filings. See , e.g., Perry v. Thompson , 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir.1986)

. A
Mr. Williams contends that when he complained about Captain Scarpati’s behavior, he se t off a chain of events that were meant to intimidate and silence him

. The first relevant incident took place on Friday, October 27, 2017, when Mr. Williams tried to send out legal mail

. That day, the running of meals was delayed as it “ normally ” was , “[a]nd for some reason the [ mail official] sa[id] I’m done. [I’ m] fixing to leave.” D.E. 113

- 1 at 28. Mr. Williams stated in his affidavit that the mail official said “ that she had waited long enough an[d] no one showed up and she was leaving.” D.E. 121

- 1 at 19. Mr. Williams was told he would have to wait until Monday to send out his mail

. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 28

– 29

. As waiting until the USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 3 of 294 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364 following week would cause him to miss a legal deadline, Mr. Williams asked Captain Scarpati
, “ [Y] ou can’t get her to come back?

. . . You’re not going to let her come back so we can get this?” Id.
at 29. Captain Scarpat i responded : “ H ey, she [is] gone. See you Monday.” Id

. Mr. Williams then tried to complain to the assistant warden

. Mr. Williams explained that when Captain Scarpati saw him “trying to talk to” the assistant warden he “sent an officer and told him to put [Mr. Williams] in handcuffs.” Id . at 36. Mr. Williams testified that he was then handcuffed and told by Captain Scarpati, “ L ook , you disrespect[ed] me just then. You know you just disrespected me? . . . In my face, you [are] going to try to go over my head?” Id

. at 37. Mr. Williams “was place[d] in [disciplinary/segregated] confinement for several day[s] without a written disci plinary report

. ” D.E. 121

- 1 at 20. Following the incident, Mr. Williams filed a grievance against Captain Scarpati for “retaliation for trying to get [his] legal mail out which [he ha d ] a right to do .” D.E. 113

- 1 at 43. He
assert ed in his verified complaint that n o one responded to this grievance. See D.E. 1 at 7. 1

1 At times, Mr. Williams refers to “jail” or “confinement” when discussing his disciplinary/segregated confinement. During his deposition, Mr. Williams testified that “jail” means “segregated confinement.” See D.E. 113

- 1 at 38. Hewent on to explain that there is “administrative confinement” and “disciplinary confinement.” Id . at 39. For clarity, we will use “disciplinary/segregated confinement” throughout this opinion. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 4 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 5 According to Mr. William s , Captain Scarpati “continue[d] to retaliate[ ] against” him. See D.E. 121

- 1 at 20. On November 14, 2017, Captain Scarpati and another official went to Mr. Williams’ cell during inspection

. Captain Scarpati made Mr. Williams get off his bunk, “got in [his] face,” and “told [Mr. Williams] he would write [ him ] up anytime he feels like it.” D.E. 113

- 1 at 43

– 45. See also D.E. 121

- 1 at 20. Captain Scarpati further told Mr. Williams that he’d “personally” take him to “jail

. ” D.E. 113

- 1 at 45. Undeterred, Mr. Williams filed a grievance about this new threat. See D.E. 1 at 8 (“Again I wrote this incident up under reprisal and threats of harm which was denied.”). Soon thereafter, i n December of 2017, a correctional officer came into Mr. William s’ cell

. The officer “grabbed [ Mr. Williams’ ] mattress” and “[threw] it out in the hallway .” D.E. 113

- 1 at 48. She also grabbed his “ legal material, [his] bag, [ and his] canteen bag and dumped it out there.” Id

. The officer told Mr. Williams to “stop writing up [ Captain ] Scarpati

. ” D.E. 121

- 1 at 21. See also D.E. 113

- 1 at 49. She told Mr. Williams’ roommate
, “ L ook, I’m fixing to search your bunk and stuff because he wants to keep writing up [Captain] Scarpati.” D.E. 113

- 1 at 4 7. See also D.E. 121

- 1, Exh. A (Declaration of Inmate Tony Harris
, explaining that the officer told Mr. Williams to “stop writing up Capt. Scarp[ati]”). Mr. Williams submitted a grievance about this incident as well

. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 48.
Later that m onth
, four correctional officers came to Mr. Williams ’ cell . They placed Mr. Williams and his cellmate in USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 5 of 296 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364

handcuffs and conducted a search of the cell

. The officers showed Mr. Williams a homemade knife that they said had been found in his pillow. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 56

– 57. See also D.E. 121

- 1 at 2 1

. One of the officer s told Mr. Williams that Captain Scarpati had “ told them to come down there and tear up [Mr. Williams’] house

. ” D.E. 113

- 1 at 5 3. Mr. Williams testified that a n officer “admitted they

. . . plant [ed] that knife when [he] didn’t have a knife.” Id

. Following the search, Mr. Williams was escorted to disciplinar y/s egregated confinement

. While being taken there
, the escorting officer said to Mr. Williams “you need to leave [Captain] Scarpati alone, ” and Mr. Williams got into a “verbal dispute” with her

. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 59; D.E. 121

- 1 at 22. See also Appellees’ Br. at 5 (conceding that any threats Mr. Williams made were verbal, not physical). 2 Because Mr. Williams was “causing a disturbance,” he was taken directly to disciplinary/segregated confinement . The normal protocol at the prison appear ed to call for an inmate to be taken to the medical unit for a “p re

- confinement” evaluation

2 Mr. Williams allegedly told the esc ort ing officer, “You are a fag and want to be a man[,] so I am going to hit you like a man[,] bitch.” D.E. 113

- 6 at 1. He also reportedly said, “I have a life sentence, you are fucking with the wrong one. You better watch your back.” Id. This resulted in a disciplinary charge being filed against Mr. Williams , who pled not guilty to the charge. See D.E. 113

- 6 at 5. Mr. Williams was found to have threatened the officer , but the warden later overturned that finding

. See D.E. 1 at 12. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 6 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 7 before being placed in disciplinary /segregated confinement

. See D.E. 121

- 1 at 22. See also D.E. 113

- 1 at 68. 3 When Mr. Williams reached the confinement area , s everal officers, including O fficer s Radford, Babcock and Short, were there. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 70. Officer Radford “grabbed” him from the escorting officer. See i d. at 70

- 71. According to Mr. Williams
, Officer Radford then “rammed [him] into the wall where [Officers] Short and Babcock he ld [him
, ] when [Officer] Radford hit [him] several time[s] with glove [d] fist in the face and head.” D.E. 121

- 1 at 22. H ere is how Mr. Williams described the assault at his deposition: [Officer Radford] just grabbed me from [the escort officer] and sa[i d] “Oh, you being disorderly,” and whenhe grabbed me, I’m already handcuffed in hand restraints behind my back. He grabbed me and grabbed me by the neck. . . . And bent me over and ran me into the wall. And [ O fficers] Short and Babcock came

3 Captain Scarpat i and Officers Babcock, Short, and Radford asserted that Mr. Williams was taken for a pre

- confinement medical examination but was uncooperative and refused a medical exam. See D.E. 114 at 4. The y provide d a “Refusal of Health Care Services” form as evide nce of Mr. Williams’ refusal. See D.E. 114

- 11. The form, dated December 23, 2017, provides a space for the inmate to sign, certifying that he is refusing certain services

— here, the pre

confinement evaluation

— but Mr. Williams did not sign and the signature line states “refused to sign.” Id

. Meanwhile, a “Report of Administrative Confinement , ” also dated December 23, 2017, indicates that on that d ate, Mr. Williams “was escorted to medical and was seen by medical staff for pre

- confinement physical.” D.E. 113

- 10. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 7 of 298 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364

over there a nd held me, assisted him and he got offlike six or seven good hits in my face, head, everywhere. . . [H]e just swung on me, just punching me

. . . and I got my head down trying to avoid [him] hitting me in the face, but he busted my lip and hit me in the head. [He] [c]hoked me, hit me around the head and held me.

D.E. 113

- 1 at 71

– 72. Mr. Williams sustained injuries from the beating, including “knots on [his] head,” a swollen jaw , and a busted lip. See id. at 73

. Mr. Williams told Captain Scarpati that he needed medical assistance but Captain Scarpati “refused to let [him] get medical help

. ” See id. at 74

– 75

. See also D.E. 121

- 1, Exh. B (Declaration of InmateKunta Kinte Porter: “Officer Radford punched inmate Quincy Williams in the mouth busting his bottom lip as he requested medical attention by Captain Scarpati which he refused inmate Williams medical attention and threaten [ed] him with chemical agents if he didn’t stop requesting medical attention. ”). At some point

— “ [10] days, a week , 10, 15 days later”

— Mr. Williams saw medical personnel. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 75. He “[s]till had a scar on [his] face, stillhad bruises . . . [his] jaw was still hurting, [he] had migraine headaches
, ” and he had two “loose teeth.” Id

. At a later disciplinary hearing, Mr. Williams was found to have possessed a weapon

— the knife foun d in his cell

— despite his claim that the officers had planted the knife at the direction of Captain Scarpati. He was also found to have made threats to his USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 8 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 9

escort ing officer while he was being moved from general population into disciplinary /segregated con finement. The finding regarding the threats , however, was subsequently overturned by the warden

. See D.E. 1 at 12.
B In 2018, Mr. Williams filed a § 1983 civil rights suit against Captain Scarpati for retaliation, Of ficer Radford for excessive force
, and O fficers Babcock and Short for failure to intervene

. The defendants moved for summary judgment and Mr. Williams filed a response in opposition to th at motion. The magistrate judge issued a report recommend ing that the defendants ’ motion be granted as to the se claims

.In evaluating the retaliation claim, the magistrate judge focused exclusively on the alleged planting of the knife in Mr. Williams ’ pillow and did not consider the evidence that Mr. Williams’ complaints and grievance s caused Captain Scarpati to place him in disciplinary /segregated confinement and to order a search of his cell

. The magistrate judge concluded that because Mr. Williams conceded that he was found guilty of possession of a weapon in a formal disciplinary proceeding

— and thus provided due process

— and because there was some evidence supporting th at infraction, our decision in O’Bryant v. Finch , 637 F.3d. 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) , foreclosed his ability to raise a retaliation claim. See D.E.
128 at 14

– 18. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 9 of 2910 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364 The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report as
to Mr. Williams’ retaliation claims concerning his placement in disciplinary /segregated confinement and the search o f his cell. See D.E. 133 at 1 . The district court concluded that Captain Scarpati presented evidence that Mr. Williams was placed in disciplinary / segregated confinement because he “violated protocol” in the manner he submitted his complaint about the mai l
, and said that Mr. Williams cited “no evidence” to suggest he was placed in such confinement because of his constitutionally protected speech. See i d. at 2. The district court credited Captain Scarpati’s declaration that the search of Mr. Williams’ cel l was random
, and discounted Mr. Williams’ statement in his deposition that one of the officers told him that Captain Scarpati had ordered the search. See i d. The district court thus concluded that Mr. Williams had “not pointed to evidence to indicate the existence of a causal connection between his exercise of his First Amendment rights and any action taken by [Captain] Scarpati.” Id

. at 2

– 3. With regard to the excessive force claim, the magistrate judge noted that O fficers Radford, Babcock, and Short denied that the alleged beating ever occurred

. Thus, Mr. Williams’ “version of events” had to be credited. See D.E. 133 at 8. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Williams admitted that he had been “disorderly

. ” A nd the dis ci plinary report about the threats made to the escort ing officer cut against Mr. Williams ’ argument that the force was applied “ maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of caus ing harm.” Id. at 14 (citation omitted)

. Because the USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 10 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 11existence of an excessive force violation is a prerequisite for a failure to intervene claim, the magistrate judge further concluded that the claims against O fficers Babcock and Short necessarily fail ed

. See i d.
The district court did not separately addre ss the excessive force or the failure to intervene claims in its order. It adopted the magistrate judge’s report on these claims

. II We begin with Mr. Williams’ retaliation claim s against Captain Scarpati. Mr. Williams asserted three separate instances in which he was punished for complaining about Captain Scarpati. First, he was placed in disciplinary /segregated confinement for “disrespecting” Captain Scarpati by “try[ing] to go over [ his ] head” when talking to the assistant warden about his issue with legal mail. Second, his cell was searched and “trash ed ” on Captain Scarpati’s orders and he was warned to “stop writing [ Captain ] Scarpati up. ” Third, officers planted a knife in his pillow so that he would o nce again be subject to disciplinary /segregated confinement. We conclude that only the third of these instances of retaliation was properly resolved by summary judgment and that the first two should proceed to trial . W hen the facts are viewed in Mr. Will iams’ favor, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 11 of 2912 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364

verdict” in his favor on those two retaliation claims

. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 4 To establish a retaliation claim, a prisoner must demonstrate “that the prison official ’ s actions were the result of his having filed a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Will iams can prevail on a retaliation claim if “(1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) [he] suffered adverse action such that the administrator’s allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such s peech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected speech.” Smith v. Mosley , 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008).
A
When an inmate “complains to the prison’s administrators about the conditions of his confineme nt,” he is exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech. See i d

. Mr. Williams testified that he complained to the assistant warden about the mail
, and that he filed grievance s against Captain Scarpati based on the disciplinary/segregated con finement he received and the search and trashing of his cell

. See , e.g. , D.E. 113

- 1 at 43 (“ I wrote that up

4 In the district court, Captain Scarpati did not make any substantive arguments about qualified immunity on the retaliation claims, see D.E. 113 at 7, and he does not assert qualified immunity on appeal. We therefore do not address qualified immunity as to him. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 12 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 13 that [Captain Scarpati] locked me up in retaliation for trying to get my legal mail out ”).
Mr. Williams also described the “adverse actions” taken against him

— e.g. , the disciplinary/segregated confinement and the search and trashing of his cell

— that would deter an y ordinary inmate from making subsequent complaints. See , e.g. , i d. at 45 (“[Captain ] Scarpati told me he would write me up anytime he feels like it. He [said] if I

. . . write him up, he will write me up anytime he feel [s] like it . . .

. He told me I’ll take you to jail and I’ll take you personally [.] ”)

. We have already held that the s earch of an inmate’scell and the destruction of his possessions and materials can support a First Amendment retaliation claim. See Wright v. Newsome , 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986). And we now agree with our sister circuits that placing an inmate in disciplinary /segregated confinement constitutes an adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim. See , e.g. , Burns v. Martuscello , 890 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2018) (“ Burns has provided evidence that he was subjected to a pretextual [ i n voluntary p rotective c ustody] hearing, and placed on this restricted status for over six months. Such an injury more than suffices to show an adverse action. ”) ; Mitchell v. Horn , 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e believe that several months in disci plinary confinement would deter a reasonably firm prisoner from exercising his First Amendment rights.”); Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Certainly, placing an inmate in administrative segregation could deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 13 of 2914 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364 rights.”) (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted); Herron v. Harrison , 20 3 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2000) (plac ement in administrative segregation is an adverse action which could dissuade a person of reasonable firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights); Watison v. Carter , 668 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (placemen t in administrative segregation constitutes an adverse action for a retaliation claim)

. The next question is whether Mr. Williams has presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to a causal relationship between his complaints about Captain Scarpati and his subsequent placement in disciplinary /segregated confinement, the search and trashing of his cell, and the planting of a weapon in his pillow . We think that he has done so with r espect to the first two alleged instances of retaliation. In determining whether Mr. Williams has established a causal connection between his complaints and grievance s and the adverse actions he suffered, “we ask[ ] whether [Captain Scarpati]

w [as] subjectively motivated to discipline [Mr. Williams] because [he] complained of some of the conditions of his confinement.” Smith , 532 F.3d at 1278. This motive analysis is subject to a burden

shifting framework. See i d. (noting “that most courts resolve this subjective motivation issue under” the burden

- shifting framework established in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle
, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) , which concerned employment retaliation ). First, Mr. Williams must show that his constitutionally

- protected speech was a “motivating factor” in Captain Scarpati’s decisions to USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 14 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 15 carry out the adverse actions

. See Mt. Healthy , 429 U.S. at 287. If Mr. Williams satisfies that burden, then Captain Scarpati must show that he would have implemented those adverse actions irrespective of Mr. Williams’ co mplaints. See i d. See also Thaddeus

X v. Blatter , 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying the Mt. Healthy burden

- shifting framework to the prison context: “Once the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected conduct was a motivat ing factor behind any harm, the burden of production shifts to the defendant. If the defendant can show thathe would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment. ” ) (citation omitted )

. The first instance of alleged retaliation involved Captain Scarpati placing Mr. Williams in disciplinary /segregated confinement. The district court credited Captain Scarpati ’s explanation that Mr. Williams “was placed in segregated confinement because he violated protocol the way that he had made his complaint aboutthe mail, acted in a disorderly manner, and disrespected a correctional officer.” D.E. 133 at 2. See also D.E. 114

- 3 at 2 (Declaration of Capt ain (now Major ) Scarpati: “Inmate Williams was placed in administrative confinement for disobeying orders.”). The district

court went on to say that Mr. Williams did not cite to any evidence “to indicate that he was placed in segregated confinement for ex ercising his First Amendment rights. ” D.E. 133 at 2. But , as set out below, that was incorrect

. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 15 of 2916 Opinion of the Court 20

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Mr. Williams testified that he was handcuffed and sent to disciplinary/segregated confinement because Captain Scarpati saw him “trying to talk” to the assis tant warden about his legal mail and trying to “go over [Captain Scarpati’s] head.” D.E. 113

- 1 at 36

– 37. In his deposition, Mr. Williams explained that Captain Scarpati told him he was being disorderly (not that he was in fact disorderly) as pretext

— “the quickest catchall”

— for placing any inmate in disciplinary confinement. See id. at 36. In fact, Mr. Williams testified that he was sent to disciplinary/segregated confinement after Captain Scarpati saw him trying to speak to the assistant warden directly about the mail issue. See i d. In addition, Mr. Williams averred that Captain Scarpati told him a month later that he did not care about the grievances and warned him that he could lock him up anytime because it was his prison. See D.E. 1 at 8. Captain Scarpati also said to Mr. Williams that when he filed a grievance against him, it “comes back to him.” Id. The district court seemed to take Captain Scarpati at h is word and ignored Mr. Williams ’ testimony ( and the reasonable inferences which could be drawn from it ). V iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams

— as we must on summary judgment

— we think that a reasonable jury could find that Capta in Scarpati was motivated by (and wanted to deter) Mr. Williams’ complaints against him . This first retaliation claim therefore survive s summary judgment on the “motivating factor” issue

. We come to the same conclusion with respect to the second retaliation claim
, the one concerning the search and trashing of Mr. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 16 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 17

Williams’ cell. Again , the district court seem ed to credit Captain Scarpati’s statements and discount Mr. Williams’ version of events. The district court said that Mr. Williams “cite[d] to no evidence toindicate that the search of his cell was not random and was at [Captain] Scarpati’s request. ” D.E. 133 at 2. But Mr. Williams provided enough evidence to support a jury finding that Captain Scarpati ordered the search and trashing of t he cell because of the former’s complaints.
Some time after Mr. Williams submitted a grievance regarding the incident with the legal mail, Captain Scarpati went to Mr. Williams ’ cell, “ told [ him ] he d[id] not care about [his] grievances
, ” and warned that he would “ lock [Mr. Williams] up anytime he fel[t] like” i t. See D.E. 1 at 8. Indeed, he said that “he w [ould] personally take [Mr. Williams] to confinement.” Id

. Captain Scarpati also told Mr. Williams that “when you write him up it comes back to him.” Id

. W hen Mr. Williams submitted another grievance regarding this threat, a n officer came to his cell , “trashed [ his ] stuff
, ” and warned him to “ stop writing [ Captain ] Scarpati up

. ” See D.E. 113

- 1 at 47

– 49. Mr. Williams submitted a grievance about this second threat, and soon thereafter officers executed a search of his cell (and allegedly planted a knife) on Captain Scarpati’s orders. See id. at 4 9 , 52

– 53 (“ [A]nd when I was escorted, she told me that [Captain] Scarpati had told them to come down there and tear up my house. She admitted they had them to plant that knife when I didn’t have a knife. ”). Mr. Williams’ testimo n y directly contradict s Captain Scarpati’s assertion that the initial search was “random.” The USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 17 of 2918 Opinion of the Court 20

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evidence

— when viewed in Mr. Williams’ favor

— shows a causal connection between the submission of complaints and grievances and the initial search and trashing of the cell. Summary judgment was therefore not warranted with respect to the alleged retaliatory search and trashing of Mr. Williams’ cell. 5
B
We end with the third and final instance of alleged retaliation

— the purported planting of the knife in Mr. Williams ’ pillow

—
w hich we think the district court (and the magistrate judge) got right. There is certainly evidence ( as with the two previous instances) to support a finding that Mr. Williams satisfied each of the elements necessary to establish a retaliation claim

. But there is one important difference : Mr. Williams was charged with unlawful possession of the knife, received a disciplinary hearing on th at charge, and was found to have possessed the knife. Under our precedent, if an inmate is “found guilty of an actual disciplinary infraction after being afforded due process ,” and “ there was evidence to support the disciplinary panel’s fact finding,” he cannot assert a retaliation claim. See O’Bryant , 637 F.3d. at 1215

. Mr. Williams admits that he received a disciplinary hearing

. See D.E. 11 3

- 1 at 76

. Pursuant to the prison’s policy ( and assuming it was followed because Mr. Williams does not allege that it was

5 In his summary judgment motion, Captain Scarpati did not make any argument about the second step of the Mt. Healthy burden

- sh ifting framework. We therefore do not address this issue. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 18 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 19
not), Mr. Williams was “advised of the charge [ ] against” him, was able to “ request staff assistance” to prepare his case, and had the right to present witnesses through written statements to support his innocence

. See, e.g ., D.E. 113

- 5 at 2 ( d isciplinary r eport for possession of weapon charge) . He also had “the opportunity to make a statement in writing regarding the charge and provide information relati ng to the investigation.” Id. According to his own testimony, Mr. William s did in fact call witnesses at his hearing. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 76. He also provided a witness statement denouncing the legitimacy of the search and characterizing it as retaliation for his grievances. See D.E. 113

- 12. But Mr. Williams’ evidence did not persuade the prison officials at the hearing because
, after considering “all statements, documents, and evidence” before them , they found that he had indeed possessed the knife

. See D.E.
113

- 5 at 4. Mr. Williams maint ains on appeal that the knife was planted in his cell, but he does not deny that he was afforded a hearing or that the prison officials based their findings on evidence. O’Bryant therefore controls, and Mr. Williams cannot pursue his retaliation claim concerning the planting of the knife. The district court properly granted s ummary judgment in favor of Captain Scarpati on this third retaliation cla im.
IIIWe next address Mr. Williams’ Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Officer Radford. The ultimate question is “whether force was applied in a good

- faith effort to maintain or USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 19 of 2920 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364 restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to caus e harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy , 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quotation and citation omitted).
A The magistrate judge explained that the case presented a debate about the reasonableness of the force used. See D.E. 128 at 12

– 13. Because Mr. Williams had been “diso rderly” and made threats against the escort ing officer, he could not show that Officer Radford applied force maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. See id. at 14. As noted earlier, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s r eport on the excessive force claim but did not separately address it. We disagree with the magistrate judge and the district court. At summary judgment, the inquiry is not whether the force used was definitively malicious or sadistic, but whether “the evi dence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Campbell v. Sikes , 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley v. Albers , 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986))

. Under that standard, and given the evidence in the record, summary judgment was inappropriate. Mr. Williams provided specific testimony about the incident from his first

- hand experience of the encounter. He testified that while he was handcuffed, and b eing held by Officers Babcock and Short, Officer Radford grabbed him by the neck, slammed him into a wall, hit him six or seven times in the face, “punch[ed]” him, USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 20 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 21 “choked” him, “busted [his] lip,” and struck him in the head. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 71

– 72. See also D.E. 121

- 1, Exh. B (Declaration ofInmate Kunta Kinte Porter: “I observed Officer Radford punch inmate Quincy Williams in his mouth while being held by Officer Babcock . . . on December 23, 2017.”). His injuries were significant enough

— a busted lip, knots in his head, a swollen jaw, a crook in his neck, loose teeth, and bruises

— to warrant medical treatment, which he sought the day after the alleged attack. See D.E. 131

- 1 at 73

– 78, 89. See also D.E. 113

- 16 (inmate sick

- call request dated December 24 , 2017). The pain from the beating persisted, and Mr. Williams said that he continued to suffer from headaches and that his prior back problems were aggravated after the incident. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 78. 6 In evaluating an excessive force claim, we adhere to two equally important principles. The first is that unreasonable or unnecessary force does not necessarily constitute excessive force for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. See Whitley , 475 U.S. at 319. The second is that even though “the Constitution does not require comfortable prisons, it does not permit inhumane ones.” Campbell , 169 F.3d at 1362. The Eighth Amendment excessive force

6 We acknowledge that O fficer Radford denied ever hitting or striking Mr. Williams. See D.E. 113

- 14 at 1. And the nurse who saw Mr. Williams stated in her medical report that there was “no indica tion for treatment” and that he had asked her to falsify her report to reflect that he sustained certain injuries. See D.E. 113

- 17. But given that we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams at summary judgment, we cr edit his version of events, understanding that the actual facts may be different. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 21 of 2922 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364 standard reflects these two principles. Force that is “applied in a good

- faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” is acceptable
, while force that is inflicted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” is prohibited. See W ilkins
, 559 U.S. at 37. To determine where force falls along this spectrum we look to five factors: “( 1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent of the thre at to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of facts known to them.” Campbell , 169 F.3d at 1375 (internal quotation marks omitted). The record indicates that Mr. Williams got into a “verbal dis pute” with the escort ing officer, “raising his voice,” getting “loud with her,” and making some threats. See D.E. 121 at 2; D.E.
113

- 1 at 58. But a prisoner initiating a verbal altercation does not give prison guards carte blanche to use force sadistical ly and maliciously. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams under the Campbell factors , Officer Radford was not ent it led to summary judgment. 7

7 The magistrate judge seemed to believe that Mr. Williams admitted he was being “disorderly” while he was being escorted from his cell. But Mr. Williams testified only that the officers characterized him as disorderly, not that he in fact was disorderly. See D.E. 113

- 1 at 70 (“[Officer] Swain called it [in] and said we go t an inmate that’s being disorderly and we [are] sending him straight to confinement.”). See also id. at 71 (“And when [Officer Radford] grabbed me he sa[id], ‘Oh, you being disorderly.’”). Moreover, Mr. Williams pled not USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 22 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 23

The first Campbell factor is the extent of the injury. As noted, Mr. Williams suffered injuries

— a busted lip, knots in his head, a swollen jaw, a crook in his neck, loose teeth, and bruises

— which warranted medical treatment. Those injuries weigh in his favor under Campbell at summary judgment. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape serious injury.” Wilkins , 559 U.S. at 38. The second Campbell factor

— the need for application of force

— weighs in favor of Officer Radford. Mr. Williams engagedin a verbal altercation with, and made threats to, the escorting officer. Our cases recognize that prison officials “may use for ce when necessary to restore order and need not wait until disturbances reach dangerous proportions before responding.” Bennett v. Parker , 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990).
The remaining Campbell factors consider the relationship between the need fo r use of force and the amount of force used, the efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response, and the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates reasonably perceived by the responsible prison officials. Viewing the record in

gu ilty to the charge that he had threatened the escort ing officer, and the finding on that charge was later overturned. See D.E. 1 at 12

. For purposes of ouranalysis, we assume without deciding that the magistrate judge’s understanding was correct. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 23 of 2924 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364

th e light most favorable to Mr. Williams, these factors weigh in his favor at summary judgment

. Mr. Williams was no longer in his cell ( where the knife was found ) and he was not armed. And he was handcuffed and being held by Officers Babcock and Short whe n Officer Radford used force. A lthough Mr. Williams was being disorderly, the altercation between him and the escorting officer was verbal and not physical. Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Williams physically resisted being h andcuffed and transported to disciplinary/segregated confinement before force was used againsthim. A reasonable jury could find, if it views the evidence and inferences in Mr. Williams’ favor, that the threat to the safety of prison staff and other inmat es

— as perceived by those on the ground

— was low.
Officer Radford did not make any efforts to temper a forceful response. He slammed Mr. Williams into a wall and repeatedly hit him while he was being restrained, causing him a number of injuries that req uired medical attention

. We note in this respectthat Officers Radford, Babcock, and Short do not assert that a certain level of force was, in their view, necessary under the circumstances, as they deny using any force against Mr. Williams. See Perry , 78 6 F.2d at 1095 (reversing summary judgment in favor ofofficers on inmate’s excessive force claim in part because the “officers d[id] not state that unusual force by them was justified by [the inmate] resisting or himself using force,” and instead “sa[id] that USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 24 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 25 they took him one by each arm and led him or escorted him into the [barber] shop”).
On this record a reasonable jury could find that the amount of force used against Mr. Williams violated the Eighth Amendment. If Mr. Williams’ version of events is believed, the evidence supports “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain”

— Officer Radford repeatedly struck a hand cuffed
, restrained
, and unarmed prisoner several times because he “rais[ed] his voice.” Campbell , 169 F.3d at 1375.
B Officer Radford relies in part on Bennett , 898 F. 2d at 1530

– 31, where we rejected an inmate’s § 1983 claim of excessive force and uphe ld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the correctional officers who had been sued. At the end of the day, Bennett does not help Officer Radford. We explain why below. According to Mr. Bennett, when he asked a prison guard why he couldn’t use the g ymnasium, the guard “grabbed him bythe throat” and yelled racial slurs at him. After Mr. Bennett “struggle[d]” to break free from the guard’s grasp, another guard pushed him against the cell bars. Then the first guard (Officer Jackson) hit him with a ni ghtstick. As a result, he suffered considerable and long

- lasting pain. See id. at 1530

– 31, 1533.We concluded that Mr. Bennett had not shown a constitutional violation. See id. at 1533. First, although other inmates had submitted affidavits saying th at two officers grabbed Mr. Bennett USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 25 of 2926 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364 by the throat and pushed him against the bars, “no other evidence support[ed] his claim that Officer Jackson struck him with a nightstick.” Id. Second, an inmate had to show “some evidence of injury beyond a minimal on e,” and the medical records “contain[ed] no report of head injuries or treatment for pain following the incident, even though [Mr. Bennett] had daily opportunities to seek medical assistance.” Id. at 1533. To the extent that Bennett suggests (or can be read to hold) that an inmate’s first

- hand account of excessive force needs corroboration to survive summary judgment, it is no longer good law inthis circuit. Sitting en banc, we held several years ago that an affidavit which satisfie s Rule 56 and is based on personal knowledge“may create an issue of material fact and preclude summary judgment even if it is self

- serving and uncorroborated.” United States v. Stein , 881 F.3d 853, 854 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc). The same principle, of course, applies to a witness’ first

- hand account provided at a deposition. See, e.g., Robinson v. P e

zzat , 818 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016 ) (holding that homeowner’s uncorroborated deposition testimony created an issue of fact as to the circumstances surroun ding the shooting of the family’s dog: “Corroboration goes to credibility, a question for the jury, not the court.”). 8

8 As n oted earlier, Mr. Williams’ testimony about the alleged assault by Officer Radford was corroborated in part by the declaration submitted by Mr. Kinte Porter, another inmate. See D.E. 121

- 1, Exh. B. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 26 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 27
In addition, after Bennett was decided
, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner “who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose hi s ability to pursue an excessive force claim [under the Eighth Amendment] merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins , 559 U.S. at 38

– 39 (explaining that the Eighth Amendment focuses on the “nature of the force” used)

. Insofar as Bennett implied that serious or permanent injuries are required, any such implication has been abrogated by Wilkins

. IV Finally, we consider Mr. Williams’ failure

- to

- intervene claim against Officers Babcock and Short. We conclude that the d istrictcourt’s grant of summary judgment on this claim must also be vacated. “[A]n officer who is present at the scene and who fails to takereasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force can be held liable for his nonf easance.” Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To survive summary judgment, Mr. Williams had to present sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that Officers B abcock and Short were (1) in a position to intervene in an ongoing constitutional violation and (2) failed to do so. See Priester v. City of Riviera Beach , 208 F.3d 919, 924 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n officer can be liable for failing to intervene when another officer uses excessive force.”). USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 27 of 2928 Opinion of the Court 20

- 13364
Of course, a failure

- to

- intervene claim requires an underlying constitutional violation. “[A]n officer cannot be hel d liable forfailing to stop or intervene when there was no constitutional violation being committed.” Sebastian v. Ortiz , 918 F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019). The magistrate judge and the district court granted judgment in favor of Officers Babcock and Short based on their determination that Mr. Williams had not shown any Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., D.E. 128 at 14 (“[E]ssential to any failure to intervene claim lies a central assumption: excessive force was applied.”). Because the magistrat e judge and the district court concluded that Officer Radford did not use excessive force, Officers Babcock and Short did not have any obligation to intervene. As we have explained, however, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Officer Rad ford used excessive force againstMr. Williams. We therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officers Babcock and Short on the failure

- to

- intervene claim and remand for reconsideration of that claim. We express no view on its proper reso lution.
V We vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Captain Scarpati and Officers Radford, Babcock, and Short, with the exception of the retaliation claim against Captain Scarpati relating to the allegedly

- planted knife. As t o that claim, we affirm because Mr. Williams was found to have possessed that knife following a disciplinary hearing. On remand the district court USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 28 of 2920

- 13364 Opinion of the Court 29can consider any summary judgment issues that remain outstanding, including those related to qualified immun ity.
A

FFIRMED IN P ART , V ACATED IN P ART , AND R EMANDED

. USCA11 Case: 20-13364 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 04/04/2023 Page: 29 of 29