FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT AUGUST 29, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [D O N OT P UBL ISH] IN TH E U NITE D S TAT ES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E E LE V EN TH C IR C U IT

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N o. 04- 1228 6 N on -A rg um en t C ale nd ar

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- D. C. Docket N o. 00-07884 -CV -JIC TI MOT HYST . F LE UR, Plaintiff-AppellantCross-Appellee, ve rs us CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, amun i c i p a l i t y, De fendant-AppelleeCr oss -Appe llant.

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(Augus t 29 , 200 5) Be fo re ED M ON D SO N , C hi ef Ju dg e, HU LL an d WIL SO N , C ir cu itJu dg es .2

PE R CU RIA M:

Inthi s c as e al le gin g r ac e an d natio na l or igi n di sc ri m inatio n, in vio la tio n of T itl e V II , 42 U . S. C. §§ 2 000e e t se q. , and 4 2 U . S. C. § 19 83, P la int if f- Appe llant T im oth y S t. F le ur appe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of his pos t- j udgm en t m oti on for re consideration, construed bythis Court as a m otion to vacate j udgm ent under Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 60( b) . P la int if f al so c ha lle nge s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r on attorney s’ fee s. D efendant-Appellee the City of Fort L auderdale (“ the City ”) has fil eda cro ss -ap pe al on th e fee award . No rev ers ib le erro r ha s b een sh own ; we a f f i rm. Pl ai nti ff , a bla ck H ai tian m al e, obt ai ne d aj ur y ve rd ic t and d am ag es a ga ins t his e m plo y er , the Ci ty , on thr ee c ount s of T itl e V II dis cr im inatio n and o n on e co unt of § 19 83 d isc ri m inatio n ba se d onthe Ci ty ’ s a lle ge d pr ac tic e an d c ust om of treating Ha itian em

ploy ees in a discrim inatory m anner. T he j ury

aw arded Plaintiff a tot al of $75 , 000 fo r the T itl e V II c la im s and $ 400, 000 fo r the § 19 83 c la im . T he Ci ty f ile d apos t- tr ia l m oti on f

or j udgm en t a s am atte r of

law , pur suant t o Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 50, on a ll cl ai m s. O n 26 January 200 4, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e Ci ty ’ s R ule 50 m oti on o n th e T itl e V II c la im s; b ut the c ourt gr an te d th e m oti on o n3

the § 19 83 c la im . T ha t day , the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d af ina l am en de d j udgm en t i n favor of P la int if f fo r $75, 000. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d P la int if f ane xte nsi on o f tim e to f ile am oti on f

or re co nsi de ratio n of

the or de r gr an tin g th e Ci ty ’ s R ule 50 m oti on o n th e § 19 83 claim . On 18 Februar

y 2004 , P laintiff m oved for reconsideration. P laintiff argued that, a m ong oth er

thi ngs, in gr an tin g j udgm en t a s am atte r of lawon the § 19 83 cl ai m , the dis tr ic t c ourt ( 1) im pr ope rl y w ei ghe d th e ev ide nc e on whe the r the Ci ty h ad a c u s t o m

an dp o l i cy o f d i s cr i m i n at i o n , ( 2 ) f ai l ed t o cr ed i tPl ai n t i ff

’s presentation of certain evidence as proof of discrim ination , ( 3) failed to re cognize Plaintiff’ s other evidence suppo rting his § 1983 claim , ( 4) did not allow P laintiff to present certain additional evidence sup porting his § 19 83 claim , ( 5) m ade an inc onsi ste nt r

uli ng whe n th e co urt a llo w ed the j ur y ve rd ic t t o st an d onthe T itl e V II c la im s, w hic h P la int if f as se rt ed ha d th e sam e el em en ts o f pr oof a s hi s § 1 983 claim , and (6) failed to rec ogni ze P laintiff’ s evidence that the City ’ s policy -m akers acquiesced in direct discrim ination . The district court sum m arily denied Pl ai nt iff’s m ot io n fo r rec on si de rat io n. Pl ai nt iff ul ti m at el y

m ov edfor$3 70 ,43 2.5 0 i n a tt orne y s’ fees an d fo r co st s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt aw ar de d P la int if f $200 , 362. 75 i n a tto rn ey s’ f ee s and $ 50, 193. 45Plaintiff spe cifica lly asser ts: (1) the district c ourt improperly allowed the City to r aise its alleg ed 1 “prompt reme dial action” as a defe nse to the § 1983 claim; (2) Plaintiff pr esente d sufficie nt evidence f o r a j ur y t o f i n d i nh i s f av o r o nth e § 1 9 8 3 c l a i m ; an d ( 3 ) t h e j u r

y d e t e r m i n at i o no nth e T i t l e V II 4 in c ost s. P la int if

f an d th e Ci ty

the n purs ue d th ei r re spe ct ive appe al and c ro ss- ap pe al . A panel of this Court determ ined that we lac ked jurisdiction to cons ider an ap pe al f ro m the a m en de d f

ina l j udgm en t: Pl ai nti ff

’ s m oti on f

or r ec onsi de ratio n, fi le d m or e than te n day s a ft er f ina l j udgm en t w as e nte re d, did not tol l the pe ri od fo r ap pe al ing the f

ina l j udgm en t. W e state d th at “ the appe al s sh al l be li m ite d to a de te rm inatio n of

w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n inde ny ing [P la int if f] ’ s m oti on, c onstru ed

a s a[ Ru le ] 60( b) m oti on t o va cate the j udgm en t, an d i t s ha ll no t ex te ndto th e v al id it y of t he un de rlyin g ju dg m en t p er s e.” Bu t we d et er m i n ed th at we d i dh av e ju ri s d i ct i o n t o re v i ew Pl ai n t i ff ’s an dth e C i t y’ s ch al le nge s to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r on atto rn ey s’ f ee s and c ost s.

D en ia l of Ru le 60( b) Mo tio n O n a ppe al , P la int if

f ar gue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n in de ny ing his m oti on f

or r ec onsi de ratio n; h e poi nts to vari ous al le ge dly e rr one ous ap pli catio ns o f lawby

the dis tr ic t c ourt i n gr an tin g th e Ci ty ’ s R ule 50 m oti on o n t h e § 1 9 8 3 c l a i m. 1claim that the City did not “promptly

reme diat e” prec luded the district cour t from makingan a lle g e dly inc on sis te nt c on c lus ion

on the § 1 98 3 c la im. Rule 60(b) a llows a d i s t rict cour t to gr ant re lief fr om a final judg ment for these rea sons: “(1) 2 mistake, inadver

tence , surprise, or

excusable neg lect; (2) newly discovere d evidenc e which by due diligenc e could not have been discovere d in time to move for a new tria l under Rule 59(b) ; (3) fr aud . . . misrepre sentation, or other misconduct o f an ad v er se par ty ; (4) the judg ment is void; (5) the judgme nt has bee n satisfied, re lease d, or discharg ed, or a prior judgme nt upon which it is based has been r ever sed o r otherwise va cate d, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec tive application; or (6) any other reason just ifying relief from t he oper ation of the judg ment.” Fe d.R.Civ.P . 60(b). 5 W e re view a district court’ s order deny ing relief under Rule 60(b) for an ab use of dis cr et ion . W ad de ll v. H en dr y Co unty S he ri ff ’ s O ff ic e, 329 F . 3d 1 300, 1309 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) . T he sc ope of an a ppe al of ar uli ng o n aRu le 60( b) 2 m oti on i s “ narr ow ”: the appe al a ddr es se s “ onl y the pr opr ie ty

of the de nia l or

gr an t of [ Ru le 60( b) ] r el ie f” and “ doe s no t r ai se iss ue s inthe und er ly ing j udgm en t f or re vie w . ” A m . Banke rs I ns. Co . of F la . v. N orthw es te rnN at ’ l I ns. Co . , 198 F.3 d 1 33 2, 1 33 8 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 9) . D es pit e our

dir ec tio n inthe j ur isd ic tio na l or de r, P la int if f onl y nom ina lly ar gue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n inde ny ing the m oti on f or re co nsi de ratio n, c onstru ed a s aRu le 60( b) m oti on. P la int if f doe s c or re ct ly state that the pr ope r standard

of r ev ie wis “ ab use of

dis cr et ion . ” Bu t P la int if f doe s no t ap ply that st an dard

to the de nia l of

Ru le 60( b) r el ie f. I nst ea d, P la int if f dir ec ts the subs tanc e of

his arg um en ts t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a lle ge d le ga l e rr or s ingr an tin g the City ’ s Rule 50 m otion on the § 19 83 claim . And w e note that Plaintiff doesWe n ote that Pla int if f l a be le d h is m oti on

for reco ns ide ra

tio n a s ari sin g“ purs ua

nt t o 3 Fe d.R.Civ.P . 59 and/or 60” ; but Pl aintiff provide d the district court with no fur ther guidance on what provisions of Rule 60(b) mig ht have a pplied to his situation.

6 not c ite Ru le 60( b) ; he doe s no t e xpl ai n w ha t pr ovi sio n of Ru le 60( b) w oul d e nti tle him to relief. 3 E ve n a ssum ing P la int if

f is r eque sti ng r el ie f ba se d onthe “ catc ha ll pr ovi sio n” in Ru le 60( b) (6 ), P la int if f ha s pr es en te d no gr ound s f or Ru le 60( b) (6 ) re lie f ei the r in h is m oti on i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt or in his appe llate br ie f. S ee Ri ce v. Fo rd Mo tor Co . , 88 F . 3d 9 14, 918 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( co nstru ing Ru le 60( b) m oti on as arising und er ( b)(6) where m ovant failed to specify grounds for r elief under Rule 60(b)). W e have observed that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “ is an extraordinary

rem edy which m ay

be invok ed only

upon a showing of exceptional circum stances.” Cra

pp v. City of Miam i Beac h, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001 ) (c itatio n om itt ed ). P la int if f poi nts to nothin g “ ex ce pti ona l” about thi s c as e th atwou ldwarran t re li ef u nd er Ru le 60 (b )(6 ). In ste ad , P la int if

f ha s a tte m

pte d to use Ru le 60( b) “ to c ha lle nge m ist ak es of laww hic h c oul d have be enr ai se d ondir ec t a ppe al . ” A m . Banke rs I ns. Co . , 198 F. 3d at 13 38; se e Se ve n E lve s, I nc . v. E skana zi , 635 F . 2d 3 96, 402 ( 5thCi r. U nit A Jan. 198 1) ( lis tin g f

ac tor s c ourts c onsi de r in c onsi de ri ng 6 0( b) r el ie f) . A nd this ap pr oa chis ins uf

fi ci en t t o sh owthat the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n inTh e City , in its c ro ss-appeal repl y bri ef an d w ith out de ta il, state s in a fo otn ote that it

a lso 4 c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c os t awa rd a s e xce ssi ve . B ut t

he City fa ile d to make thi s argume nt i n its ini tial cross-a

ppeal brief: we do not c onsider it. See United States v. Whitesell, 314 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating t hat t his Court ref uses t o consider issues raised f or the fir st tim e in a reply brief) , cer

t. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2628 (2003). 7 de ny ing Ru le 60( b) r el ie f to P la int if f. S ee G ar

y W . v. S ta te of

L a. , 622 F . 2d 8 04, 8 0 5 (5 t h Ci r. 1 9 8 0 ) ( s t at i n g th at p ro p erwa y t o ra i s e i s s u e o f d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s al l eg ed l y i m

p ro p erap p l i ca t i o n o f t h e l aw wa s b y ap p ea l o f d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s underly ing rulin g, not by appeal of denial of Rule 60(b) m otion ). Attorney s’ Fee s Pl ai nti ff and the Ci ty

a lso c ha lle nge the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r on atto rn ey s’ fees. Plaintiff a sserts that the district court -- w ithou t supp ly ing th e proper de ta ile d f ind ing s and r ea sons - - re duc ed too m uc h hi s law y er s’ hourl y

r at es and h o u rs ex p en d ed . Th e C i t y i n i t s cr o s s -ap p ea l ar g u es th at th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s as se ssm en t of

hourl y r at es and h our s e xpe nde d w as too ge ne ro us. 4 W e re vie wf

or an a buse of dis cr et ionadis tr ic t c ourt’ s aw ar d of a tto rn ey s’ fees. Sier ra C lub v. Hankin son, 351 F.3d 1358 , 1361 (11th Cir. 2003). W e af ford district courts “ wide discretion” in determ ining the proper fee level; but the court8

“ m ust art ic ulate the de ci sio ns i t m ak es , giv e pr inc ipl ed r ea sons f or tho se de ci sio ns, an d sh owthe spe ci fi c fe e ca lc ulatio ns. ” I d. “ A dis tr ic t c ourt a buse s it s di sc re tio n w he n it f ai ls t o a ppl y the appr opr ia te le ga l st an dard , f oll ow s im pr ope r pr oc ed

ur es , orrel ie s upo n c le arl y

erro ne ou s fi nd in gs of f

act .” Id . The district court abused no discretion in determ ining the attorney s’ fee aw ard. T he district court correc tly cited our caselawthat, in fa shion ing a fee aw ar d, the c ourt “ is t o m

ult ipl y hours r ea sona

bly e xpe nde d by

ar ea sona

ble hourl y rate . ” N orm anv. H ous. Auth . of Ci ty of Mo ntg om er

y , 836 F . 2d 1 292, 129 9 ( 11th Cir. 1988 ). In determ ining the rea sonable ho urly rate, the district court refe renced (1) the court’ s own expertise and knowledge, ( 2) Plaintiff’ s affidavit of a loca l em plo ym en t l awy er , W ill iam A m lon g, e sta

bli shi ng $ 300 pe r hour

a s ar ea sona

ble rate f or Plaintiffs’ two trial lawy ers, (3) P laintiff’ s citation of cases in the Southern D istri ct of F lor ida w he re the f

ee f or e xpe ri en ce d e m

plo ym en t di sc ri m inatio n lawy ers w as set betwe en $250 and $300 per hour, and (4) the City ’ s objection that Am long had greater

expertise than Plaintiff’ s lawy ers. T he district court noted that the case involved “ issues of low to m oderate com plexitywith no novel iss ues of law ” and that Plaintiff’ s counsel perform ed capably . The c ourt therefore abused no di sc ret io n i n d et erm in in g a“ reas on ab le ho ur ly rate” of $ 25 0 fo r Pl ai nt iff’s twoWe n o te th at P la inti f f r e qu e s ts $ 3 0 0 p e r

h o ur f o r Cl y n e an d E v e r e tt an d $ 2 0 0 p e r h o ur f o r D iaz; 5 the City asser ts that $150 pe r hour for Cly ne and Evere tt, a

nd $135 per hour

for Dia z, is rea sonable. 9 trial law y ers, Reginald Clyne and Cy nthia Everett, $175 for A ntoin ette D iaz, 5 $ 1 3 5 fo r ju n i o r a s s o ci at es , a n d$ 8 5 fo r p ar al eg al s . We d i s ag re e w i t h th e C i t y’ s co n t en t i o n th at th es e r at es co n s t i tu t ed an i m p ro p er“ wi n d fa l l ” f

o r P l ai n t i ff

’s law y er s. S ee T ir e K ing dom , I nc . v. Mo rg anT ir e & Auto , I nc . , 253 F . 3d 1 332, 1337 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( statin g th at hourl y r at e de te rm inatio n sh oul d be “ ba se d on the r ea sona

ble w orth o f se rv ic es r en de re d, so l ong as the r at e re sul ts i n no w ind fa ll fo r the pr ev ai lin g party ”) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y appl ie d th e law , gave re as ons be hin d it s de ci sio n, and d id n ot b as e its de ci sio n onac le ar ly e rr one ous fa ct f ind ing . Also, the district court abused no discretion in reducing Plaintiff’ s total hours claim ed by

30 percent. The district court notedthat Plaintiff’ s lawy ers had inc lud ed ti m e spe nt o n “ dis cr et e unsu cc es sf ul c la im s, ” dupl ic at ed

e ff orts, ex ce ssi ve m ee tin gs b etw ee n a tto rn ey s, bil lin g f or a dm ini str at ive ta sks , se nio r co unse l’ s bi lli ng f

or le ga l r es earc h th at

c oul d have be ena ssi gne d to an a sso ci at e or paralegal, and billin g at full rates f or non-legal tasks lik e travel and clerical func tio ns. S ee N orm an , 836 F . 2d at 13 01 ( le av ing to dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sc re tio n

“ exclusion s for exce ssive or unn ecessar y work on given tasks”). B ut the dist rict10

co urt a lso c or

re ct ly r ef er en ce d th e publ ic be ne fi t ari sin g f ro m suc ce ssf ul l aw sui ts ag ai nst m uni ci pa l de fe ndants . S ee V ill an o v. Ci ty of Bo ynto n B ea ch , 254 F. 3d 1 302, 130 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( re co gni zi ng tha t su cc es sf ul c ivi l r igh ts a ct ion s against pub lic bodies “ vind icate a publ ic interest”). In reducing the fee award, the district court noted that Plaintiff w as successful on his Title V II c laim s, but wa s unsu ccessful on his § 19 83 claim . See Shannon v . B ellSouth Telecom m unication s, I nc., 292 F.3d 712, 717 (11t h Cir. 2000 ) (c ourt sh oul d no t aw ar d f ee f or unr el at ed , uns uc ce ssf

ul c la im s) . A nd whil e Plaintiff corr ectly

notes that Title V II and § 19 83 dis crim ination cases m ay share som e of the sam e re qui re m en ts o f pr oof , se e Cr oss v. S ta te of

A la . , 49 F . 3d 1 490, 1508 (11th Cir. 1995), a § 1983 p laintiff also m ust sh ow proof of a

m unicipal custom or policy to establish m

unicipal liabi lity , see Gr iffin v. C ity of O pa-L ocka, 261 F.3d 129 5, 1307-08 (11t h Cir. 2001 ) (plaintiff c laim ing di scrim ination under § 19 83 m ust sho we xis te nc e of

gov er nm en t c ust om

or pol ic y that m igh t l ea d to im posi tio n of

gov er nm en t l ia bil ity ); se e al so B as s v. Bd . of Co unty Co m m ’ rs of Or ange County , F la., 256 F.3d 1095 , 1103 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that Title V II an d § 19 83 pro vi de “ se pa rat e, no n- ex cl us iv e cau se s o f act io ns an d re m ed ie s” ). E ve n if , a s P la int if

f cl ai m s, his T itl e V II and § 198 3 c la im s are c los el y r el at ed , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ee aw ar d w as an a

ppr opr ia te r ed

uc tio n: P la int if

f’ s de gr ee ofWe also reje ct t he C ity ’s contra ry argument that the district court should have reduc ed Plaintiff’s 6 atto rn e y s’ fe e s by at le a st 50 pe rc e nt be c a us e Pla int if

f a c hie ve d “ e xtre me ly

lim ite d s uc c e ss” : th e City points to t he compa

ratively small damag es obtained ( $75,000) compa red to the total amount reque sted ($2,030,000). We see no abuse of discretion in the degree of the district cour t’s reduc tion. See Vi l l ano, 254 F .3d at 1307-08 (where compensatory damag es ar e primar

y relief soug ht and obtained, damag es awa

rded may be considere d as one fac tor in f ee calc ulation; but other fa ctors ar e public benef

it of succe ssful suit aga inst publi c body and re sults obtained). 11 suc ce ss w as le ss than th e re lie f he w oul d have obt ai ne d ha d he suc ce ed ed on h is § 198 3 claim . See Shannon, 292 F.3d at 717 (fee r eduction app ropriate w here

“ re lie f, how ev er

sig nif ic an t, is lim ite d inc om

pari son to the sc ope of

the li tig at ion as a whole”). W e thus rej ect Pla intiff’ s contentio n that he obtain ed “ exceptional re sul ts” w ar

ranti ng a f ee e nhanc em en t. 6 And w e re

j ect Pla intiff’ s and the City ’ s claim s that the dist rict court abused its dis cr et ionby

f ai lin g to e nga ge in a m or e de ta ile d, ta sk- by -t as k ana ly sis of w hic h f ee s it w as dis al low ing . P la int if f’ s c ouns el c la im ed

ove r 1, 500 hour s f

or com pensation : “ these hours are extensive enough that we do not expect the district co urt . . . to co nduc t an ho ur -b y -h our ana ly sis . ” V ill an o, 254 F . 3d at 13 11. In s u m , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ab u s ed n o d i s cr et i o n i n (1 ) d en yin g Pl ai n t i ff ’s m oti on f or r ec onsi de ratio n, c onstru ed a s aRu le 60( b) m oti on f or pos t- j udgm en t re lie f an d ( 2) f

as hio nin g P la int if

fs ’ a tto rn ey s’ f

ee aw ar d. AFFIRMED.