NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 12a0339n.06 No. 10-2223 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

GA RRY SEGEL, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. K I M B E R L Y - C L A R K C O R P O R A T I O N , a Delaware Corporation; KIM BERLY-CLARK GLOBAL SAL E S , LLC, a Delaware Limit ed Liab ility Com pany, join tly and severally, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE EASTE RN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COOK, M cK EAGU E and ROTH, Circuit Judges. * M c K e a g ue , C ir c ui t J ud g e . G a r r y Se g el sued Kimberly -Clark, his former employ er, all e g in g violations of the Ag e Discrimination in Employ ment Act and Michig an’s Elliot-L arse n Civil Rights Act. The district court g rante d summary judge ment in favor of Kimberly -Clark. On appea l, Seg el contends t h at t he district court misconstrued the fac ts and improperly applied the law. For the

rea sons that follow, we AF F IRM the district court. I. BACKG ROUND Appellant Gar

ry Seg el beg an working for Kimberly -Clark in 1985 as a sales repr esenta tive. Appe l l ant Br

. at 6. Seg el’s sales rec ord was outstanding, and his annual perf ormanc e revie ws

The Honora

ble J ane R. Roth, United States Circuit J udg e for the United States Court of * Appea ls for the Third Circ uit, sit ting by desig nation.No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. consistently indicated that he “mee ts perf ormanc e expectations” o r “e x cee ds perf ormanc e expectations” for his position. See, e.g ., R.76-4, Ex cer pts f rom the Personnel File of Gar ry Seg el. As ear ly as 2000, howeve r—a y ear wher e Seg el’s overa ll perf orman ce rating “excee d[ed] expectations”—Seg el was encour ag ed to work on being more flexibl e. Id. at 223 (noting that Seg el should “continue to work on his flexi b i l ity with reg ards to chang es which occur [] at Kimberly

Clark”)

. As an example of “obser ved behavior ” rela ting to this job s kill, Seg el’s revie wer noted: “Ve ry flexibl e in adapting to chang es implemented by [customers] ; [a] t times, less flexibl e/under standing of chang es occur ring i n Ki m b er ly -Clark.” Id. at 222. Seg el’s 2002 evalua tion ag ain counsele d him to be more flexibl e. Id. at 205. Seg el’s 2002 perf ormanc e revie wer explained that Seg el was “[a] littl e neg ative with [Kim berly -Clark] chang es, but alway s eff ectively moves forw ard a

nd acc omplishes what needs to be done.” Id. at 204. S egel was promoted to Customer Business Manag er I I I (“CB M I I I ”) in 2004. Id. 3 2 8

. Seg el’s 2004 revie wer g ave him an overa ll rating of “mee ts expectations” for his new position, but flexibi lity and interper sonal skills wer e rate d as “does not meet” expectations. R. 74-6 at 3. Th e 2004 revie wer descr ibed “adaptabili t y / flexibi lity ” as Seg el’s “bigg est skill opportunity .” Id. The revie wer continued: “He become s so focuse d on his objectives [t hat he] does not alway s addre ss the other pe rson[’] s needs. His sty le nee ds to chang e whe n he re ceive s push back.” Id. I n 2005, Kimberly -Clark initiated a new perf ormanc e appra isal sy stem in which employ ees

rec eived fee dback on their “Results” and their “L eade rship Qualities.” Appellant Br

. at 5. Although Seg el’ s o v erall perf

ormanc e rating for his “L eade rship Qualities” was “Eff ective,” many of the revie wer ’s comments sug g ested that Seg el’s interper sonal skills wer e lacking

. R. 76-7, Seg el 2005 - 2 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. Review. For example, the revie wer praised Seg el as “one of the best CBM’s I work with,” but also cautioned tha t “[S eg el] needs to keep a n ey e on his r eac tions during disag ree ments or conf lict and try not to l et others g et under his skin. During customer prese ntations [S eg el] has g otten confr ontational with the customer.” Id. Additionally , the re v iewer noted that Seg el “tends to b ec o m e involved in too many disag ree ments wher e he has littl e to g ain. I f [S eg el] wer e mor e selec tive i n choosing his battles he would have more succe ss . . . . I n the future he needs to focus

more on c ompromise and cr eating mutually benef icial ag ree ments.” Id. I n 2006, Seg el’s “L eade rship Qualities” wer e rate d as “improvemen t re q u i red.” R. 76-9, Seg el’s 2006 Review, 141. Among other criticisms, the revie wer noted that Seg el “ca n be inflexi ble when prese nted with new ideas and sug g estions. He needs to listen to others, be more objective in siz ing up situations, and be rea dy to adjust his approa ch when better way s of doing things come up.” Id. Additionally , the reviewer noted t hat S egel’s “inability to find positions that benef it both [t he

cu s t o m er] and Kimberly Clark has hurt his rela tionship with [a] key customer.” Seg el was ag ai n urg ed “to be come less c onfrontational with the c ustomer.” Id. The “ k ey customer” ref

ere nced in Seg el’s personnel review was Meijer. As of November 2006, Seg el’s contac t at Meijer was Fiona Hein, a Senior Buyer in the baby depar tment at Me ijer. Meijer was Seg el’s primary customer. Additionall y , b ec au s e Hein was the buy er for milli ons of dollars of produc ts, R. 89 at 109, keeping Hein happy was of signific ant i mportance to Kimberly

Clark. By Seg el’s own acc ount, he did not enjoy a g ood rela tionship with Hein. For her part, Hein complained to Kimberly -Clark about Seg el on multipl e occasions. Hein found Seg el “diffic ult to - 3 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. work with” in a varie ty of contexts, and she reg istered her conce rns wi t h m u ltiple lay ers of manag ement at Kimberly -Clark. Ultimately , Hein informed Kimberly -Clark manag ement that she would pref

er to wor k with someone other tha n Seg el. On April 10, 20 0 7 , Ki m berly -Clark placed S eg el on a 90-day “Perf ormanc e I mprovement Plan” (“PI P”) to improve his le ader ship skills. The PI P cited a dec line in Sege l’s leade rship skills and a “neg ative and co n fr o n t at ional sty le which has an adver se eff ect on the [Kim berly -Clark] Team.” R. 76-10, Perfor mance I mprovement Pl an for Seg el. The PI P also ref ere nced comments from Seg el’s customers “who have expressed an unwillingness to have [S eg el] cont ac t them” beca use “he is hard to work with.” Id. Notably , the PI P ref ere nced Seg el’s problematic rela tionship with H ein, and attributed the following comments to he r: “[Sege l] doesn’t g et it, I can’ t w ork with him, He can’ t fig ure it out, y our competition fig ures it out, he asks too many questions and delay s.” Id. The PI P identified eig ht are as for Seg el to improve, including the need for Seg el “to become

more flexibl e in his dealing s with the Cust o m er an d his Team.” Id. Finally , the PI P war ned that “[ f]ailure to complete this Plan succe ssfully and maintain acc eptable perf ormanc e may resul t i n employ ment action up to and including termination of employ ment.” Id. Seg el did not succe ssfully complete h i s PI P beca use he continued to demonstrate inflexi bility

. R. 76, Ex

. 16, Seg el’s L ast Chance Ag ree ment. I nstead of being terminated, howeve r, Kimberly -Clark and Seg el agr eed to a 30-day L ast Chance Agr eeme nt (“A g ree ment”) on J uly 10, 2007. Id. The Ag ree ment allowed Seg el 30 day s to “bec ome more flexibl e in his dealing s with the Customer and his Team.” Id. The Ag ree ment conclude d: - 4 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. [S eg el] is fully awa

re and ag ree s that continuation of employ ment is depende nt upon succe ssful completion of the above descr ibed plan and his continuing to su s t ain improvement if this plan is c ompleted. [S eg el] unde rstands that if he does not meet this Action I tem or later fails to sustain his perf ormanc e, he will be terminated from employ ment with the Company

. This Ag ree ment does not alter the otherwise at-will rela tionship between . . . Seg el and Kimber ly -Clark. Id. Seg el fa iled to satisfactorily complete the A g ree ment, and on or about Aug ust 13, 2007, Seg el
was ter minated. R. 15, Defe ndant’s Answe r, at 7. Seg el filed a timely char g e with the Equal Employ ment Oppo r

tu n it y Co mm is s io n ( “ E E O C” ). R. 111 at 2. Seg el also sued Kimberly -Clark for violating the Ag e Discrimination in E mploy ment Act (“A DEA” ), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (2006), and Michig an’s Elliot-L arse n Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. L aws § 37.2202 (L exis Nexis 2011). R. 11, Am. Compl. Seg el alleg ed that, beca use he was 53 y ear s old, Kimberly -Clark (i) unfairly evalua ted his perf

ormanc e, (ii) plac ed him on a PI P, and (iii) terminated his employ ment. Id. I n support of his claim, Seg el argued that the exis tence of other ag e discrimination case s p en ding ag ainst Kimberly -Clark constituted rele vant pattern- or-pr actice evidenc e. Id. At the close of discovery , Kimberly -Clark moved for summary judgme nt. The district court hear d o r a l a

r g u me nt and reque sted supplemental briefs reg arding Seg el’s argument that the exis tence of sever al other ag e discrimination c ases pending ag ainst Kimberly -Clark was rele vant pattern- orprac tice evidence. The dist rict court g rante d Kimberly -Clark’s moti on for s u mmary judgme nt on Aug ust 31, 2010. This ti mely appea l followed. On appea l, Seg el contends: (1) the district c ourt err ed in f inding the only fac ts e stablishing Seg el’s ag e discrimination claim wer e those surrounding his repla ceme nt; (2) the district court err ed

- 5 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. in finding Seg el’s rebuttal of Kimberly -Clark’s leg itimate business rea sons for h i s t reatment and termination insufficient to establish pretext; (3) the district court err ed in de termining Seg el failed
to show circ umstances tending to prove ag e discrimination was more likely than not the rea son for his tre atment and termination; and (4) the district c ourt misconstrued Six th Circ uit law by holding Seg el to an improper ly

high pr oof re quirement.

II. ANALYSIS Standard of Re view This Court revie ws de novo a district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt. Geiger v. Tower Auto. , 579 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgme nt i s proper when the moving party shows “ther e is no g enuine dispute as to any materia l fac t and the movant is entitled to judgme nt as

a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

. A court must view the fac ts and construe infere nces in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party

. Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc. , 663 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2011). Relevant L aw The Ag e Discrimination in Employ ment Act of 1967 (the “ADE A”) makes it “unlawf ul for

an employ er . . . to di s ch ar ge an y individual

. . . beca use of such individual’s ag e.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1). Subject to exceptions not applicable here , ADEA protec tion ap p l ies to “individuals at least 40 y ear s of ag e.” Id. at § 631(a ). “An employ ee may establish a claim under the ADEA by offe ring either direc t or circ umstantial evidenc e of ag e di s cr i mination.” W exle r v. W

hite’s Fine Furniture , Inc ., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth ., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997). - 6 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp.

“ McD onnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have ‘established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the prese ntation of proof in

. . . discriminatory -treat m en t case s.’” Ree ves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)( omission in orig inal)(quoting St. Mary ’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993))

. The Mc Do n nell Douglas framework proce eds in three stag es: First, the plaintiff must establish a prima fac ie ca s e o f discrimination. McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Gree n , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1 9 7 3 ). I f the plaintiff succe eds in establishing a prima fac ie case , the bu rd en s h i ft s to the defe ndant to articula te a leg itimate nondiscriminatory rea son for the challeng ed action. Id. Third, if the defe ndant satisfies its burden, the plaintiff is then “af

forde d a fair opportunity to show that [defendant’ s] stated rea son . . . was in fac t pretext.” Id. at 804. The parties ag ree for the purposes of this appea l that Seg el established a prima fac ie case of ag e discrimination. Plaintiff-Appellant Br

. at 29; Def endant- Appellee Br

. at 25 n.9. K im berly -Clark addre ssed the second McD onnell Douglas prong by explaining that it terminated Seg el beca use “an important part of his position as a CBM was to dev el o p and maintain strong rela tionships with Kimberly -Clark’s customers,” and Se g e l’ s “ c o n f r o n ta ti o n a l s ty le a d v e r s e ly im p a c ted his rela

tionship with his customer.” Def

endant- Appellee Br

. at 26. I n response , Seg el argues that Kimberly -Clark’s stated re asons for his te rmination are prete x t f or ag e discrimination. Plainti ff- Appellant B r. at 31. Seg el has not alleg ed any direc t evid en ce o f age discrimination. Acc ording ly , Seg el m ust establish prete x t throug h circ umstantial evidenc e. Geiger , 579 F.3d at 620. Circumstantial evidenc e “is proof that does not on its fac e establish discriminatory animus, but does allow a fac tfinder to

- 7 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. draw a rea sonable infere nce that discrimination occur red.” Id. Seg el has the burden of demonstrating that ag e wa s the “but-f or” c ause of

Kimberly -Clark’s a dverse action. Id. To establish prete x t, Seg el must prove that: (1) Kimberly -Clark’s rea sons for his termination had no basis in fac t; (2) Kimberly -Clark’s proff ere d rea sons did not actua lly motiv at e Seg el’s discharg e; or (3) Kimberly -Clark’s rea sons wer e insufficient to motivate Seg el’s discharg e. Manzer v. Diamond Shamroc k , 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 ( 6th Cir. 1994). Seg el’s brief addre sses the Manzer fac tors by arguing that “[t] here is a plethora of evidenc e which indicates that the proff ere d basis for Seg el’s termination is not based in fac t, is not worthy of

cre dence or was insufficient to justify termination.” Plaintiff-Appellant Br

. at 33. Ra t h er than analy ze eac h fac tor in turn, Seg el offe rs a five-pa g e long list of alleg ations and leave s it to this Court
to sift throug h his laundry list and ascer

tain which fa ct is meant to apply to eac h fac tor. See id. at 33-38. B elow, we identify the most salient points from both Seg el’s brie f and the rec ord that best support Seg el’s ADE A ac tion. Fa ctor One First, Kimberly -Clark’s rea sons for Seg el’s termination are richly supported by the rec ord. Seg el’s annual perf

ormanc e revie ws persistently expressed conce rn reg arding Seg el’s inflexi bility toward his col l ea gues and his clients as ear ly as 2000. When Seg el’s 2006 perf ormanc e revie w indicated a

heig htened level of dissatisfaction with Seg el’s inflexibil ity , Kimberly -Clark provide d Seg el with both a 90-day PI P and a 30-day L ast Chance Ag ree ment to improve his behavior

. Both documents highlig hted Seg el’s inflexi bility as the rea son for Seg el’s probationar y status with Kimberly -Clark a

nd made c lear

that Seg el’s fa ilure to improve would re sult in t ermination.

- 8 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. Seg el does not dispute this rec ord. Rather, he emphasizes his trac k rec ord as an exemplary salesman. See Plaintiff-Appellant Br

. at 33-38. This eff ort, howeve r, does not undermine the wellsupported fa ctual basis that Kimber ly -Clark provide d as a f oundation for Sege l’s termination. As such, Seg el’s ef

forts to establish the first Manzer prongare unavailing

. Fa ctor Two Second, S eg el argues that Kimberly -Clark’s proff ere d rea son for termination – Seg el’s inflexi bility – did not actua lly prompt Kimberly -Clark’s adver se employ ment action. I n support of this point, Seg el argues that “fle x ibilit y ” is an entirely subjective criter ion, and that “[ s ] u b jective
assessments are easily susceptible to manipulation in order to mask the interviewe r’s true motivations

. ” Id. at 37. Seg el cites two case s in support of this proposition: W hite v. Baxter Healthcare Corp ., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008), and Meac ham v. Knolls Atomic P o w er L a b , 554 U.S. 84 (2008). Ne ither ca se is persua sive. I n W hite , an Afric an-A merica n employ ee appeal ed the district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt in favor of his pr ior employ er. 533 F.3d at 384. The employ ee in this case had rec eived

s t el lar perf

ormanc e revie ws and was interviewe d for an internal promotion; ultimately , howe v er , another candida

te was selec ted for the job. Id. at 386-87. The employ er ex p l ai n ed that the other candida te was selec ted because the interviewe rs c o n s i d er ed the employ ee “extremely ag g ressive” and “conf

rontational.” Id. at 387. This Court reve rsed the district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt, holding that: any evaluation of [pl aintiff’s] interview p er fo rmanc e is an inhere ntly subjective deter mination, and thus easily susceptible to manipulat ion in order to mask the interviewe r’s true rea sons for making the promotion decision. I ndeed, since the very - 9 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. issue in dispute is whether the rea sons g iven by these interviewe rs for their decision should be believed, i t would be highly inappropria te for us to a ssume . . . that their own subjective pe rce ptions of [ plaintiff] were a ccur ate. Id. at 394. Acc ording ly , this Court found that a jury could rea so n ab l y d isbelieve the employ er’ s proff ere d explanation and that the employ ee’ s case was e ntitled to go for war d. The fac ts in this case are distinguishable from W hite. The rec ord in this case prese nts a longsta nding conce rn wit h Seg el’s flex ibilit y ; wher eas t he adverse employ ment decision i n W

hite

occur red in a vacuum of otherwise g lowing revie ws, Kimberly -Clark’s decision to terminate Seg el took place afte r y ea rs o f documented conce rns reg arding his flexibi lity

. Fur ther, the plaintiff in W hite was interviewe d by only four people on one occa sion, whereas Seg el was evalua ted by a g reater number of individuals on multipl e occa sions over the course of many y ear s. So, even though

a subjective term like “ag g ressive” was not a sufficie ntly clea r motivating fac tor in W

hite , we f ind that a simil arly subjective term—“infle x ib le”—is adequate wher e it was repe atedly utiliz ed by vary ing pe ople on numerous oc casions. This case is much more simil ar to Chen v. Dow Chemical Company , 580 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009). I n Chen , the employ ee “strug g led t o fit in socially ,” and “ [b] oth coworke rs and customers found her combative

. . . .” Id. at 397. After the employ er documented these interper sonal problems in the employ ee’ s perf

ormanc e revie ws, the employ ee was put on a PI P, and ultimately terminated. Id. at 398. The e mploy ee a ppeale d the district court’s grant of summary judgme nt by arguing that the employ er’ s rea son for termination was prete x tual. Id. at 401. This Court reje cted the employ ee’ s arg ument: “ When a

n employ er rea sonably and honestly relies on particula rized fac ts in making an

- 10 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. employ ment decision, i t is entitled to summary judgme nt on prete x t ev en if its conclusion i s later shown to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or base less.” Id. L ike in Chen , Seg el’s perf ormanc e problems wer e documented in his revie ws and his PI P. When Kimberly -Clark subsequently terminated Seg el, its decision was based on d o cu m ented “par ticularized fac ts” that Seg el consistently failed to be appropr iately flexibl e with his c ustomers and his collea g ues. Seg el’s relianc e on Meac ham is also unavailing

. I n Meac ham , an employ er laid off 31 employ ees as a result of an involuntary reduc tion in forc e. 554 U.S. at 87. Thirty of these employ ees

wer e at least 40 y ear s old, and twenty -eig ht of them alleg ed a d i s p ar at e- i mpact violation of the ADEA. Id. at 88. The employ er explained that it selec ted employ ees for lay off based on t heir

s u p e r v is o r s ’ e v a lu a

ti o n o f e mp lo y e e s ’ p e r f

o r ma n c e , f le x ibilit y , and critica l skills, there by articula ting

a “re asonable fac tors other than ag e” (“RF OA”) aff irmati v e d efe nse under § 623(f)

. Id. at 88. I n response , the employ ees “re lied on a statistical expert’s testimony to the eff ect that results so skewe d

acc ording to ag e could rar ely occur by chanc e; and that the score s for ‘flexibili ty ’ and ‘ critica lity ,’

over which manag ers had the most discretionar y judgme nt had the firmest statistical ties to the outcomes.” Id. at 88-89. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Court of Appea ls reve rsed, finding that the employ ee had not car ried the burden of persua sion with reg ard to the rea sonablene ss of the employ er’ s non-ag e fac tors. Ultimately , the Supreme Court va cate d and rema nded, holding that an employ er defe nding a disparate impact claim und er t h e AD EA bear s both the burden of production and the burden of persua sion for the RFOA aff irmative defe nse under § 623(f)

. Id. at 102. - 11 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. L ike the plaintiffs in Meac ham , Seg el makes a statistical argument in support of his prete x t arg ument, arg uing tha t his case repr esents one of many simil ar case s ag ainst Kimberly -Clark. See Plaintiff-Appellant Br

. at 42. This, howeve r, is wher e the simil arities betwee n the two case s end. Seg el was not laid off as a result o f a reduc tion in forc e; he was laid off beca use of poor work perf ormanc e. Additionally , wher eas the Meac ham case utiliz ed a statistical expert to buttress their claims, Seg el fails to marshal any meaning ful statistical evidenc e. Kimberly -Clark makes the point well: Segel ’s identification of 105 unadjudicate d EEOC char g es filed ag ainst Kimberly

Clark and i t s various subsidiaries throug hout the United States over the past five y ear s is me aning less. I ndeed, Seg el fails to set forth any compar ative data (such as the total numbe r of Kimberly -Clark employ ees, the number of employ ees under 40 who have been terminated, the number of Kimberly -Clark employ ees who are over 4 0 who have not filed charg es, t he entity which employ ed the char g ing part y , et c. ) fr o m wh i ch the court could deter mine whether the 105 char g es sug g est any thing, much less a pattern of ag e discrimination acr oss the approximately 56,000 employ ee org anization of a For

tun e 1 5 0 company . I n the absenc e of any context for these ch ar g es, the mere fac t the char g es themselves exis t is not a ‘statistic’ and has n o probative va lue with respe ct to the pre text inquiry

. Def endant- Appellee Br

. at 41-42. Kimberly -C l ar k al s o corr ectly noted t hat “Sege l fails t o advise the Court tha t the EEOC has not found rea sonable cause to conclude that Kimberly -Clark violated the ADEA in any of the 105 char g es identified.” Id. at n. 16. As such, Seg el’s relianc e on Meac ham is unpersuasive. Seg el also complains that his 2006 perf ormanc e revie w was “manipulated” and inacc urate

. Plaintiff-Appellant Br

. at 33. Towar d that end, Seg el appea rs to be arguing that discrimination can be infe rre d from (1) the fact that his supervisor “manipulated” his ranking s; (2) that “H ein had no complaints about Seg el in 2006,” and there fore his 2006 evalua tion was inacc urate; an d (3 ) t h at - 12 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. “He in did not corr oborate ” his supervisors’ conce rns. Id. at 33-38. I n addition, Sege l claims that “he was trea ted differ ently compar ed to his counter -par t, Mancine lli, who was substantially y oung er than him, had few er responsibilities, and had an overa ll lower score on the 200 6 Perfor mance Appra isal.” Id. at 29. K im b e r ly

- Cl a r k a d mi ts th a t Se g el’s supervisor “incor rec tly transcr ibed a numerica l ranking , ” Def endant- Appellee Br

. at 31. Nonethele ss, as Kimberly -Clark points out, “the rec ord is devoid of any evidenc e that the mistake was motivated by a discriminatory animus,” and the numerica l ranking had no bear ing on the numerous critica l comments reg arding Seg el’s inflexi bility

. Id. at 31-32. I n this context, even an “undenia bly suspicious” alteration is “ultimately irrele vant.” Geiger , 579 F.3d at 625. Second, Seg el complains that “He in t es t i fi ed that she had no complaints about Seg el in 2006.” Plaintiff-Appellant Br

. at 34. The reco rd confirms that Hein, who had only worke d with Seg el for two months at that point, had not complained about Seg el in 2006. R. 89 at 105. Be cause the Kimberly -Clark supervisor who completed Seg el’s revie w admits that he does not reme mber when he started rec eiving complaints from Hein, this does not raise a g enuine dispute over a materia l fac t. Seg el maintains that this “tempora l disconnec t” is evidenc e that Kimberly -Clark retroa ctively justified its actions and sug g ests that this provides circumstantial e vidence of ag e dis crimination. Plaintiff-Appellant B r. at 34. The rec ord simply does not support this argument. First, g iven that Seg el’s 2006 evaluation did not take place until Marc h 31, 2007, R. 76-9 at 141—three full months into 2007—it is possible that Hein’s complaints from ear ly 2007 seepe d into Seg el’s 2006 perf ormanc e revie w. Second, Hein - 13 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. is never mentioned in Seg el’s 2006 revie w – the revie w only ref ere nces Seg el’s need to improve his rela tionship with Meijer, and Hein repor ted that her prede cessor likewise experience d difficulty with Seg el. Ultimately , howeve r, Seg el fa i l s to make a cog nizable alleg ation of circ umstantial discrimination g iven that Hein’s deposition thoroug hly supports the conclusion that she experience d signific ant difficulties while working with Seg el. As Hein’s testimony makes clea r, she found Seg el “diffic ult to work with” and reque sted the opportunity to work with someone else at Kimberly Clark. Acc ording ly , even assuming the 2006 evalua tion prema turely ref ere nced events from 2007, as Seg el alleg es, Hein’s deposition thoroug hly corr oborate s Kimberly -Clark’s position th at S egel’ s interper sonal difficulti es wi th Hein animated Kimberly -Clark’s decision to terminate Seg el. A c cording ly , Seg el’s arguments that “He in did not corr oborate ” his supervisor’ s cri ti c is ms , Pl a in ti f f

Appellant B r. at 37, a

re likew ise belied by

the re cord. Finally , we consider Seg el’s asser tion that Kimberly -Clark trea ted him differ ently from his y oung er c olleag ue, Manc inelli. F or Seg el to use Mancine lli to establish prete x t throug h Manzer ’s second option, Seg el has the burden of establishing that Mancine lli is simil ar in “all of the rele vant aspec ts.” Pierce

v. Commonwealth L ife Ins. C o. , 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994). Amongother things, Seg el must prove that he and Mancine lli eng ag ed in t he same conduct whic h serve d as the basis for his termination, but that he was the only one who suffe red an adver se employ ment action. See Colvin v. Veterans Adm in. Med. Ctr. , 390 F. App’ x 454 (6th Cir. 2010) (“ This Court has held that in the disciplinary co n t ex t, to be found simil arly situated, the plaintiff and his proposed compar ator must have eng ag ed in acts of compar able seri o u s n e s s . ” ) ( in te r n a l a lte rations and citations omitted). I n this case , then, Seg el must establish t h at Mancine lli had the same interper sonal - 14 -No. 10-2223

Segel v . Kimberly-Clark Corp. shortcoming s that s er v ed as the basis for Seg el’s termination. Mancine lli’s 2006 annual revie w makes clea

r that this is not the case . Acc ording ly , Seg el fails to identify a compar ator at Kimberly

Clark to establish circ umstantial evidence of discrimination. Prong Three Seg el also complains that Kimberly -Clark’s stated rea sons for Seg el’s termination we re insufficient to motivate the adver se employ ment action. Plaintiff-Appellant Br

. at 33-38. I n support of this claim, Seg el repeate dly ref ere nces his excellent sales record. Id. As this Court made clea r in Chen , 580 F.3d at 4 0 1 , an em ploy ee’ s interper sonal difficulties are sufficie nt g rounds for an adver se employ

ment action. See also Viergutz v. L ucent Techs., Inc. , 375 F. App’ x 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010). III. CONCLUSION Be cause Seg el failed to satisfy any of the Manzer prong s, Seg el did not establish that Kimberly -Clark’s adver se employ ment action was prete x tual. As such, Seg el did not demonstrate that ag e wa s a “but-f

or” c ause f

or his termination. Acc ording ly , we AF F IRM the district court.

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