[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 238 (Tuesday, December 12, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 63648-63651]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-30034]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 553

[Docket No. 90-25; Notice 2]
RIN 2127-AD78


Rulemaking Procedures

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: NHTSA is amending its procedural regulations that apply to 
judicial review of regulations issued under Chapters 301, 325, 329, and 
331 of Title 49 of the United States Code. The provisions at issue 
address the time within which affected persons may seek judicial review 
of a final rule issued by NHTSA under those statutes if a petition for 
agency reconsideration of that rule has been filed. The amendment will 
make the regulation consistent with the judicial review provisions of 
the statutes and with recent judicial decisions.


[[Page 63649]]

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made in this rule are effective January 
11, 1996.
    Any petitions for reconsideration must be received by NHTSA no 
later than January 26, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Any petitions for reconsideration should refer to the docket 
and notice number of this notice and be submitted to: Docket Section, 
Room 5109, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh 
Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590. (Docket Room hours are 9:30 a.m.-
4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth N. Weinstein, Assistant Chief 
Counsel for Litigation, Office of Chief Counsel, National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, DC 
20590. Telephone: (202) 366-5263.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Certain provisions of the former Motor 
Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (``Cost Savings Act'') and the 
former National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (``Safety Act'') 
provide for judicial review of rules and standards issued thereunder. 
These statutes were recently recodified, ``without substantive 
change,'' as various chapters of Title 49 of the U.S. Code. Section 6 
of Pub. L. 103-272.
    With respect to Chapter 301, ``Motor Vehicle safety,'' 49 U.S.C. 
30161(a) (formerly section 105(a) of the Safety Act) provides that any 
person adversely affected by an order prescribing a motor vehicle 
safety standard under chapter 301 may file a petition for judicial 
review of the order in an appropriate United States Court of Appeals 
``not later than 59 days after the order is issued.''
    With respect to Chapter 325, ``Bumper Standards,'' 49 U.S.C. 
32503(a) (formerly section 103(a) of the Cost Savings Act) provides 
that any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued 
under section 32502 may file a petition for judicial review of the 
standard in an appropriate United States Court of Appeals ``not later 
than 59 days after the standard is prescribed.''
    With respect to Chapter 329, ``Automobile Fuel Economy,'' 49 U.S.C. 
32909 (formerly section 504(a) of the Cost Savings Act) provides that 
any person who may be adversely affected by a regulation prescribed 
under sections 30901-30904, 32908, or 32912(c)(1) may file a petition 
for judicial review of the regulation in an appropriate United States 
Court of Appeals ``not later than 59 days after the regulation is 
prescribed.''
    With respect to Chapter 331, ``Theft Prevention,'' 49 U.S.C. 33117 
(formerly section 610 of the Cost Savings Act) provides that a person 
who may be adversely affected by any regulation prescribed under that 
chapter may obtain judicial review of that regulation in accordance 
with 49 U.S.C. 32909, as described in the previous paragraph.
    None of these statutory provisions require parties to seek 
administrative reconsideration before filing a petition for judicial 
review. However, NHTSA has authorized the filing of petitions for 
reconsideration of standards and regulations issued under the Chapters 
301, 325, 329, and 331. 49 CFR 553.35. Time limits and other procedures 
applicable to such petitions are set forth in 49 CFR 553.35-553.39.
    Section 553.39 currently provides as follows:

    The filing of a timely petition for reconsideration of any rule 
issued under this part postpones the expiration of the 60-day period 
in which to seek judicial review of that rule, as to every person 
adversely affected by the rule. Such person may file a petition for 
judicial review at any time from the issuance of the rule in 
question until 60 days after publication in the Federal Register of 
the Administrator's disposition of any timely petitions for 
reconsideration.

    Unfortunately, this regulatory provision contains several erroneous 
statements. First, the applicable time period for filing petitions for 
judicial review under these chapters is actually 59 days rather than 60 
days. Prior to the recent recodification, the statutory language 
provided that petitions for review had to be filed ``prior to the 
sixtieth day'' after the order in question was issued. Each of the 
courts that considered the issue had ruled that this language required 
petitions to be filed not later than 59 days after the issuance of the 
order. The recodified language in each of the four chapters explicitly 
states that the applicable review period is 59 days.
    Second, recent judicial decisions construing the judicial review 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and similar statutory 
review provisions have made it clear that a person who files a petition 
for agency reconsideration of a regulation may not simultaneously seek 
judicial review of that regulation, since the original decision is 
rendered ``nonfinal'' as to that person. See, e.g., Wade v. F.C.C., 986 
F.2d 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United Transp. Union v. I.C.C., 871 F.2d 
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1989); West Penn Power Co. v. U.S. EPA, 860 F.2d 581 
(3rd Cir. 1988). See generally I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987); Bellsouth Corp. v. F.C.C., 17 F.3d 1487 
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
    Third, these decisions also demonstrate that the filing of a 
petition for agency reconsideration by one person does not affect the 
judicial review rights of other persons affected by the rule. See ICG 
Concerned Workers Ass'n v. United States, 888 F.2d 1455 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); West Penn, supra; Winter v. I.C.C., 851 F.2d 1056 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 308 (1988) [GET U.S. CITATION]; Petroleum 
Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 22 F.3d 1164, 1171 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 
1994).
    Finally, contrary to NHTSA's current regulation, a person who files 
a petition for reconsideration may not file a petition for judicial 
review ``at any time'' prior to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations. Rather, a petition for review that is filed by a party 
prior to the agency's action on his or her petition for reconsideration 
is ``incurably premature'' and does not ``ripen'' when the ruling on 
reconsideration is issued. TeleSTAR, Inc. v. F.C.C., 888 F.2d 132 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989).
    On the basis of its review of the case law, NHTSA issued a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (``NPRM'') to correct the erroneous portions of 
section 553.39. 55 FR 45825 (October 31, 1990). First, the agency 
proposed to eliminate the inaccurate reference to a 60-day limitations 
period for judicial review. The proposal did not refer to a 59-day 
period, however, since Part 553 applies to regulations issued under 
statutes other than the four chapters identified above that have 
statutory 59-day limitations periods. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. Chapters 323 
and 327.
    In addition, the agency proposed language to clarify that the 
filing of a petition for reconsideration tolls the limitations period 
for judicial review only as to the petitioner, and not as to other 
interested persons, and that such a petitioner may not seek judicial 
review until the agency acts on the petition for reconsideration.

Discussion of Comments

    Three commenters responded to the NPRM: Chrysler Corporation 
(Chrysler), the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers 
(AIAM), and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA). (MVMA 
has subsequently changed its name to the American Automobile 
Manufacturers Association.)
    None of the commenters objected to the elimination of the erroneous 
reference to 60 days as the time period within which a petition for 
judicial review may be filed. However, Chrysler 

[[Page 63650]]
and MVMA sought clarification as to what constituted final agency 
action upon a petition for reconsideration and asked when ``a 
petitioner [is] presumed to have notice of that action.''
    In the absence of a petition for reconsideration, regulations and 
standards promulgated under Chapters 301, 325, 329, and 331 are deemed 
final for purposes of judicial review when they are ``issued'' (49 
U.S.C. Sec. 30161(a)) or ``prescribed'' (49 U.S.C. Secs. 32503(a) and 
32909(b)). (In this context, NHTSA interprets the word ``prescribed'' 
to be synonymous with the word ``issued.'') The agency deems a decision 
in response to a petition for reconsideration, which usually will be 
either a denial of the petition or a revision to the regulation or 
standard that generated the petition, to be final for judicial review 
purposes on the date that it is issued or prescribed.
    A petitioner is presumed to have notice of the agency's action when 
it is published in the Federal Register. See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 1507; 
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). However, 
the language of each of these statutes indicates that the time period 
for judicial review does not begin to run on the publication date; 
rather it runs from the date that the regulation, standard, or decision 
on reconsideration is ``issued'' or ``prescribed'' by the agency.
    MVMA and AIAM opposed the remainder of the proposed amendment, 
arguing that one party's petition for reconsideration should stay the 
statute of limitations for judicial review for all interested parties, 
not merely for the petitioner. They asserted that the proposed 
amendment was not compelled by the case law described in the NPRM. They 
also suggested that the amendment would increase paperwork and reduce 
efficiency and could lead to the filing of unnecessary petitions for 
reconsideration and/or protective petitions for review.
    None of the commenters dispute the agency's conclusion that the 
filing of a petition for reconsideration stays the running of the 
limitations period for the petitioner because the filing of the 
petition renders the prior decision ``nonfinal'' as to that petitioner. 
(In this regard, NHTSA is aware that in a recent case, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a petition to reopen a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals does not toll the limitations period or otherwise 
affect judicial review of the Board's decision. Stone v. I.N.S., 115 S. 
Ct. 1537 (1995). However, the Court based its ruling on the specific 
language of the judicial review provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and policy considerations arising under that statute. 
Indeed, the Court explicitly confirmed that, in general, the filing of 
a request for agency reconsideration renders the underlying order 
nonfinal for purposes of judicial review and that the petitioning party 
cannot seek judicial review until the reconsideration is concluded. 115 
S. Ct. at 1543.)
    The commenters also agreed that persons who have not sought agency 
reconsideration may seek judicial review immediately, without waiting 
for the completion of the reconsideration process. However, in 
suggesting that such other persons should be able, at their option, to 
await the agency's decision on reconsideration before seeking judicial 
review, the commenters lose sight of the fact that the reason such 
persons may seek judicial review promptly is that the regulation is 
final as to them. ``If a party has sought only judicial review, agency 
action can be deemed final and hence reviewable as to that party, 
regardless of whether other parties have moved for administrative 
reconsideration.'' ICG Concerned Workers, 888 F.2d at 1457.
    Given that the regulation is final as to all persons not seeking 
reconsideration, there is no basis on which the agency (or the courts) 
could legally extend the limitations period applicable to those parties 
beyond the 59 days provided by statute. The case law clearly 
demonstrates that ``finality with respect to agency action is a party-
based concept.'' IGC Concerned Workers, 888 F.2d at 1457, citing West 
Penn, 860 F.2d at 586-87; Winter, 851 F.2d at 1062; and American Farm 
Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 541 (1970).
    It is true that the cases on this subject have focussed primarily 
on whether a nonpetitioning party may seek judicial review of an agency 
action while another party's petition for reconsideration of that 
action is pending, rather than on whether such a party must seek such 
review within the statutory limitations period. However, in the 
agency's view, the latter principle necessarily follows from the fact 
that the original decision is final as to all nonpetitioning parties.
    NHTSA recognizes that under this amendment, some parties may feel 
compelled to file protective petitions for reconsideration or judicial 
review that might ultimately be withdrawn depending on the agency's 
response to another party's petition for reconsideration. However, to 
the extent that this is ``wasteful,'' it is not the fault of the 
amendment; it is required by the case law. As noted in the NPRM, an 
agency's regulations may not expand the jurisdiction of the Federal 
courts beyond that established by Congress. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers 
of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 336 (1957); City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 
F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
    The agency believes the public interest would be disserved by a 
regulation that erroneously purported to confer Federal court 
jurisdiction that does not exist, since a person might improperly rely 
on the regulation to his or her detriment. To further reduce the 
possibility of confusion or misunderstanding, NHTSA is adding a phrase 
at the end of the first sentence of the amended regulation that 
explicitly states that the expiration of the review period is not 
postponed for persons who have not sought agency reconsideration.
    Chrysler requested clarification as to the amended rule's impact 
upon associations composed of various member companies. Chrysler 
suggested that an association's petition for reconsideration should 
stay the limitations period for judicial review for the members of the 
association as well as for the association itself.
    NHTSA realizes that some individual members of an association might 
want to wait for the agency's response to their association's petition 
for reconsideration before deciding whether to seek judicial review. 
However, as MVMA emphasized in its comments, other members might want 
to seek such review immediately. Consistent application of the 
principle of finality requires that if individual members of an 
association are permitted to seek judicial review of the original 
regulatory action following disposition of the association's petition 
for reconsideration, they must be precluded from seeking immediate 
judicial review during the pendency of that petition.
    Thus, when an association files a petition for reconsideration 
solely in its own name, such a petition would only extend the right of 
the association itself to seek judicial review following 
reconsideration. Under those circumstances, the members would not have 
any right to an extended period for seeking judicial review derived 
from the association's petition. However, if the association explicitly 
files its petition for reconsideration on behalf of all of its members, 
or some specifically identified members, those members would each be 
deemed as having filed a petition. Of course, under that scenario, none 
of the identified members could individually seek judicial review while 
the petition for reconsideration is pending.
    The purpose of the amended rule is not to encourage pre-mature 
requests for judicial review; rather, the amendment seeks to provide 
notice of the applicable 

[[Page 63651]]
law. Thus, each person who considers himself or herself to be aggrieved 
by a NHTSA rule or standard must file a timely petition for 
reconsideration or a timely petition for judicial review in order to 
preserve his or her ability to challenge the underlying rule.
    NHTSA wishes to emphasize two additional points. First, this 
amendment does not preclude any person who is aggrieved by the agency's 
action in response to a petition for reconsideration from seeking 
judicial review of that response, since such a response is itself a 
reviewable agency action. Second, a person who files a petition for 
reconsideration may obtain judicial review of all aspects of the 
original order, not merely the portion of that order on which he or she 
sought reconsideration. See Bellsouth Corp., 17 F.3d at 1489-90. 
However, persons who did not seek timely reconsideration or timely 
judicial review of the original agency action may only challenge the 
actions taken by the agency in response to the petition for 
reconsideration. All other issues were final as to the nonpetitioning 
parties at the time of the original action. Therefore, any court 
challenge by nonpetitioning parties to agency actions not affected by 
the response to the petition for reconsideration must be made within 59 
days of the original agency action.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This rulemaking was not reviewed under E.O. 12866. NHTSA has 
analyzed this rulemaking determined that it is not ``significant'' 
within the meaning of the Department of Transportation's regulatory 
policies and procedures. Because the changes are only procedural in 
nature, they will not have any cost impacts.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    NHTSA has also considered the impacts of this final rule under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act. For reasons discussed above, I hereby 
certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    There are no requirements for information collection associated 
with this final rule.

National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has also analyzed this final rule under the National 
Environmental Policy Act and determined that it will not have a 
significant impact on the human environment.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

    NHTSA has analyzed this rule in accordance with the principles and 
criteria contained in E.O. 12612, and has determined that this rule 
will not have significant federalism implications to warrant the 
preparation of a Federalism Assessment. No State laws will be affected.

Civil Justice Reform

    This final rule does not have any retroactive or preemptive effect.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 553

    Administrative practice and procedure.

PART 553--RULEMAKING PROCEDURES

    In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR part 553 is amended as 
follows:
    1. The authority citation for part 553 of title 49 is revised to 
read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 1657, 30103, 30122, 30124, 30125, 
30127, 30146, 30162, 32303, 32502, 32504, 32505, 32705, 32901, 
32902, 33102, 33103, and 33107; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 
1.50.

    2. Section 553.39 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 553.39  Effect of petition for reconsideration on time for seeking 
judicial review.

    The filing of a timely petition for reconsideration of any rule 
issued under this part postpones the expiration of the statutory period 
in which to seek judicial review of that rule only as to the 
petitioner, and not as to other interested persons. For the petitioner, 
the period for seeking judicial review will commence at the time the 
agency takes final action upon the petition for reconsideration.

    Issued on: December 5, 1995.
Ricardo Martinez,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 95-30034 Filed 12-11-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P