IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ROBERT and KATALIN RADER, as individuals and as trustees for The 

Rader Family Trust dated September 6, 2002; DELBERT and HEATHER 

LEWIS, as individuals and as trustees for The Delbert R. Lewis Jr. Family 

Trust U/T/A dated December 31, 1997; JANE BARTELME, as an 

individual; KAREN E. LAMB, as an individual and a trustee for The 

Karen E. Lamb Living Trust dated February 26,2007; MARK LOBERG, as 

an individual; DAVID STANTON, as an individual and a trustee for The 

David Brian Stanton Revocable Trust dated August 25, 2004; LOUIS and 

THELMA VAZQUEZ, as individuals; WALTER J. CLARKE, as an 

individual; DONALD FRUCHTMAN, as an individual; TOM and 

NANCY LUTZ, as individuals; SUSAN THARP and MICHAEL 

NORMAN, as individuals and as trustees for The Norman Tharp Family 

Trust #3 dated July 19, 2002; JAN STERLING, as an individual and a 

trustee for The Jan M. Sterling Living Trust dated January 4, 1995; DAVID 

and HANNA FURST, as individuals and as trustees for the DHF 

Corporation Retirement Trust and the Furst Family Trust, 

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, a New York limited liability partnership, 

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0299

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2012-013308

The Honorable Arthur T. Anderson, Judge

AFFIRMED
2

COUNSEL

Johnson & Weaver, LLP, San Diego

By Brett M. Weaver, Frank J. Johnson

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Dessaules Law Group, Phoenix

By Jonathan A. Dessaules

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington DC

By Kevin M. Downey, Kenneth C. Smurzynski, Colette T. Connor

Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Galbut & Galbut, P.C., Phoenix

By Martin R. Galbut, Michaile J. Berg

Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

OPINION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Appellants challenge the superior court’s dismissal of their 

claims against Greenberg Traurig, LLP as time-barred, asking this court to 

adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling. Because Appellants have not shown the

superior court erred in granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss, the dismissal 

is affirmed.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mortgages Ltd., a now-bankrupt Arizona real estate 

investment company, solicited investors using private offering

memoranda. In 2006, Mortgages Ltd. retained the law firm Greenberg 

 

1 In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 

this court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged in the 

complaint. Fidelity Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 191 Ariz. 222, 224 ¶ 4, 954 P.2d 

580, 582 (1998). 
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

3

Traurig to review and draft offering memoranda. Appellants claim they 

relied on these offering memoranda to invest in securities offered by 

Mortgages Ltd. between March 2006 and June 2008.

¶3 Scott M. Coles managed Mortgages Ltd. from 1997 until his 

suicide on June 2, 2008. Appellants allege that, “[b]y 2005, Mortgages Ltd. 

stood at the brink of bankruptcy” and, after issuance of an audit report for 

2007, “Mortgages Ltd. was forced into bankruptcy” on June 20, 2008. On 

April 30, 2009, Appellants filed an action against the estate of Scott Coles in 

Maricopa County Superior Court. In December 2009, most Appellants

entered into a written agreement with Greenberg Traurig tolling the 

application of “any statutes of limitations and/or any statutes of repose” 

against Greenberg Traurig from December 15, 2009 to December 15, 2010.

This tolling agreement was not extended.

¶4 On May 11, 2010, Mortgages Ltd. investors filed a putative 

class action against Greenberg Traurig and others in the United States 

District Court for the District of Arizona, captioned Facciola v. Greenberg 

Traurig LLP, No. 10-CV-1025 (the Facciola Action). In March 2012, the

putative class in the Facciola Action was certified and Appellants were class 

members. After discovery and motion practice, the court in the Facciola

Action preliminarily approved a settlement reached with Greenberg 

Traurig. Appellants later filed a notice of intent to opt out of that settlement.

On August 31, 2012, the same day the court in the Facciola Action 

“confirmed that [Appellants] had properly excluded themselves from” the 

class and the settlement with Greenberg Traurig, Appellants filed this 

action.

¶5 Appellants’ complaint in this action asserted five claims

against Greenberg Traurig: (1) primary statutory liability under Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 44-2003(A) (2015);

2 (2) aiding and abetting 

“common law securities fraud;” (3) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 

duty; (4) intentional misrepresentation and (5) negligent misrepresentation 

and nondisclosure. Greenberg Traurig moved to dismiss, arguing 

Appellants’ claims: (1) generally were subject to a two-year limitations 

period (with the intentional misrepresentation claim subject to a three-year 

limitations period); (2) accrued on Mortgage Ltd.’s June 20, 2008 

bankruptcy; and (3) were time-barred, given this case was not filed until 

August 31, 2012. Appellants argued the limitations period was “tolled 

 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

4

during the entire time that they were members of the Facciola” Action (from 

May 11, 2010 until August 31, 2012), making their claims timely. After 

briefing and oral argument, the superior court rejected Appellants’ tolling 

arguments and granted Greenberg Traurig’s motion to dismiss, finding 

Appellants’ claims were time-barred.

¶6 This court has jurisdiction over Appellants’ timely appeal 

from the resulting judgment pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 

6, Section 9, and A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1) and -120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 The sole issue on appeal is whether Arizona should adopt 

cross-jurisdictional tolling, whereby the filing of a class action in one 

jurisdiction tolls the limitations period for claims by class members in a 

different jurisdiction during the pendency of the class action. If crossjurisdictional tolling does not apply, Appellants do not dispute that their 

claims are time-barred. Because this involves a purely legal issue, this 

court’s review is de novo. US W. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 201 

Ariz. 242, 244 ¶ 7, 34 P.3d 351, 353 (2001); see also Andrews ex rel. Woodard v. 

Eddie’s Place, Inc., 199 Ariz. 240, 241 ¶ 1, 16 P.3d 801, 802 (App. 2000)

(applying de novo review to grant of motion to dismiss claims as timebarred). To claim the benefit of tolling of a limitations period, “the burden 

is on the plaintiff to show the statute should be tolled.” Ulibarri v. 

Gerstenberger, 178 Ariz. 151, 155, 871 P.2d 698, 702 (App. 1993) (citation 

omitted). 

I. Intra-Jurisdictional And Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling. 

¶8 Intra-jurisdictional tolling, whereby the filing of a class action 

may toll the limitations period for claims by class members in the same 

jurisdiction during the pendency of the class action, was first recognized in 

American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). See generally David 

Bober, Comment, Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling: When and Whether a State Court 

Should Toll Its Statute of Limitations Based on the Filing of a Class Action in 

Another Jurisdiction, 32 Seton Hall L. Rev. 617 (2002). In American Pipe, the 

State of Utah filed a timely putative class action alleging civil antitrust 

violations. 414 U.S. at 541–42. Several months later, the district court ruled 

the case could not proceed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23 because the putative class was not “‘so numerous that joinder 

of all members was impracticable.’” Id. at 543 (citation omitted). Days later, 

purported members of the putative class moved to intervene as plaintiffs. 
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

5

Id. at 543–44. The district court, however, denied intervention, finding any 

claims by the putative interveners were time-barred. Id. at 544. 

¶9 On those facts, the United States Supreme Court recognized 

what has become known as intra-jurisdictional tolling.

We hold that in this posture, at least where class 

action status has been denied solely because of 

failure to demonstrate that “the class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable,” the commencement of the 

original class suit tolls the running of the statute 

for all purported members of the class who 

make timely motions to intervene after the court 

has found the suit inappropriate for class action 

status.

Id. at 552–53. American Pipe added that failing to recognize this type of 

tolling during the pendency of a putative class action where class 

certification was denied based on a lack of numerosity would create 

mischief and unnecessary litigation and “deprive Rule 23 class actions of 

the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the 

procedure.” Id. at 553–54.

Potential class members would be induced to 

file protective motions to intervene or to join in 

the event that a class was later found unsuitable. 

In cases such as this one, where the 

determination to disallow the class action was 

made upon considerations that may vary with 

such subtle factors as experience with prior 

similar litigation or the current status of a 

court’s docket, a rule requiring successful 

anticipation of the determination of the viability 

of the class would breed needless duplication of 

motions. 

Id. Thus, American Pipe found “the rule most consistent with federal class 

action procedure must be that the commencement of a class action 

suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of 

the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to 

continue as a class action.” Id. at 554. American Pipe also noted that tolling 

was “in no way inconsistent with the functional operation of a statute of 
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

6

limitations” because the putative class action would put a defendant on 

notice even if class certification ultimately was denied. Id. at 554–55. 

¶10 The United States Supreme Court later held that American Pipe

tolling also applied to putative class members who, after the denial of class 

certification, timely filed a separate suit in the same court where the 

putative class action had been pending (sometimes called intrajurisdictional tolling). See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–

54 (1983). “Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled 

for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied. At 

that point, class members may choose to file their own suits or to intervene 

as plaintiffs in the pending action.” Id. at 354. 

¶11 Although binding precedent in federal court, state courts 

have taken different positions when addressing American Pipe tolling, with 

the following results:

If the applicable tolling rule is that the 

jurisdiction does not recognize American Pipe

tolling, the individual will not be able to take 

advantage of tolling and will be bound by the 

statute of limitations clock itself. If the 

applicable rule permits only intra-jurisdictional 

American Pipe tolling, the individual will be able 

to take advantage of tolling law if her new case 

is lodged in the same jurisdiction as that in 

which the class suit was filed. If the applicable 

rule encompasses cross-jurisdictional American 

Pipe tolling, the individual will be able to take 

advantage of tolling law no matter where the 

initial class suit was filed.

William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 9:67 (5th ed. 2014). 

Appellants ask this court to adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling, which they 

concede Arizona has never done. 

II. Arizona Case Law Discussing American Pipe Tolling. 

¶12 Three Arizona appellate court decisions have considered 

American Pipe tolling. Hall v. Romero did not adopt American Pipe tolling 

because the defendant in the putative class action was not the same 

defendant as was named in the individual class members’ suits. 141 Ariz. 

120, 126, 685 P.2d 757, 763 (App. 1984).
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

7

¶13 In Hosogai v. Kadota, the Arizona Supreme Court found 

equitable tolling was appropriate during the pendency of a wrongful death 

suit resulting in a jury verdict that was vacated on appeal for lack of proper 

service of process and then refiled in the same court. 145 Ariz. 227, 229, 700 

P.2d 1327, 1329 (1985). In that context, and recognizing that the court was 

construing a statutory limitations period adopted by the Legislature, 

Hosogai noted that “Arizona does not have a general savings statute for civil 

actions.” Id. at 230, 700 P.2d at 1330. Hosogai then rejected a “presumption 

that mere silence on a particular subject necessarily indicates legislative 

disapproval in all cases,” adding that it found no bill had been presented to 

the Legislature “for a general civil savings statute” or any legislative 

“disapproval of savings statutes generally or the equitable tolling doctrine 

in particular.” Id. at 230–31, 700 P.2d at 1330–31. Hosogai added that “[a]

court has a legitimate interest in the procedural rules that govern lawsuits, 

especially to prevent such rules from becoming a shield for serious 

inequity. Accordingly, a court may under certain circumstances make 

narrow equitable exceptions to statutes of limitations.” Id. at 231, 700 P.2d 

at 1331 (citations omitted).

¶14 In concluding such a narrow equitable exception was 

appropriate in that context, Hosogai cited American Pipe for the proposition 

that courts have “applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to successive 

identical actions arising within the same court system,” noting “[t]here is 

no general savings statute in federal civil actions.” Id. at 231, 233, 700 P.2d 

at 1331, 1333. Hosogai, however, had no need to consider or adopt American 

Pipe tolling. Hosogai did, however, evidence caution by the Arizona 

Supreme Court against broadly adopting tolling concepts in construing 

statutory limitations periods. Hosogai noted that the “narrow equitable 

exception to the statute of limitations” on the distinguishable facts of that 

case “is far from the equivalent of a savings statute.” Id. at 234, 700 P.2d at 

1334. And recognizing that equitable tolling, in substance, involves 

construing statutory limitations periods, Hosogai concluded that “[a]s 

overseers of the judicial system in this state, we call upon the legislature to 

pass a general savings statute in civil actions.” Id.

¶15 In response to the call in Hosogai, the Legislature enacted a 

general civil savings statute in 1986, currently codified at A.R.S. § 12-504. 

See Jepson v. New, 164 Ariz. 265, 271, 792 P.2d 728, 734 (1990). The key 

provision of that statute currently provides:

If an action is commenced within the time 

limited for the action, and the action is 

terminated in any manner other than by 
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

8

abatement, voluntary dismissal, dismissal for 

lack of prosecution or a final judgment on the 

merits, the plaintiff, or a successor or personal 

representative, may commence a new action for 

the same cause after the expiration of the time 

so limited and within six months after such 

termination. If an action timely commenced is 

terminated by abatement, voluntary dismissal 

by order of the court or dismissal for lack of 

prosecution, the court in its discretion may 

provide a period for commencement of a new 

action for the same cause, although the time 

otherwise limited for commencement has 

expired. Such period shall not exceed six 

months from the date of termination.

A.R.S. § 12-504(A). Appellants voluntarily sought exclusion from the class 

in the Facciola Action and do not argue that A.R.S. § 12-504 would apply to 

their claims.3 The enactment of A.R.S. § 12-504 supersedes at least some of 

the force of Hosogai, although as discussed below, its reasoning is still 

instructive. See Jepson, 164 Ariz. at 270–71, 792 P.2d at 733–34.

¶16 The third Arizona appellate court decision considering 

American Pipe tolling is Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 227 Ariz. 121, 254 

P.3d 360 (2011). In Albano, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed certified 

questions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding “that American 

Pipe tolling does not apply to the statute of repose in [A.R.S.] § 12-552.” Id.

at 128 ¶ 34, 254 P.3d at 367. In doing so, Albano noted that the Arizona 

Supreme Court “has never determined whether American Pipe and its 

progeny apply to class actions” and stated that American Pipe “aptly stated 

that its ‘judicial tolling of the statute of limitations’ was simply a matter of 

‘recognizing judicial power’ to do so in federal courts.” Id. at 124 ¶ 11, 127 ¶ 

25, 254 P.3d at 363, 366 (citation omitted). To resolve the certified questions,

Albano “assume[d] without deciding that the filing of a class action in 

Arizona tolls the applicable statute of limitations for non-named class 

members until class certification is denied.” Id. at 124 ¶ 11, 125 ¶ 17, 254

 

3 At oral argument before this court, both Appellants and Greenberg 

Traurig argued A.R.S. § 12-504(A) would not apply to Appellants’ claims, 

an issue this court need not address. Similarly, there is no contention that 

other statutory tolling provisions would apply to Appellants’ claims. See, 

e.g., A.R.S. § 12-501 (tolling for absence from state); A.R.S. § 12-502 (tolling 

for minority and insanity). 
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

9

P.3d at 363, 364. Accordingly, Albano did not address or resolve the issue 

presented here.

III. Appellants Have Not Shown That Arizona Should Adopt CrossJurisdictional Tolling. 

¶17 Contrary to Appellants’ argument, Albano did not adopt intrajurisdictional tolling in Arizona. Indeed, Albano expressly stated that it 

“need not answer” whether to do so because the certified questions 

addressed a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations. Id. at 125 ¶ 17, 254 

P.3d at 364. Moreover, even if Albano could be construed as adopting intrajurisdictional tolling, it would not apply to Appellants’ state court claims 

here, given the Facciola Action is a federal case, which the court certified as a 

class action. See Albano, 227 Ariz. at 123 ¶ 2, 254 P.3d at 362 (assuming, 

without deciding, that limitations period was tolled “until an order denying

class certification is entered”) (emphasis added); id. at 125 ¶ 17, 254 P.3d at 

364 (same); see also William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 9:67 

(5th ed. 2014) (discussing distinction between intra-jurisdictional and crossjurisdictional tolling).

¶18 As Albano noted, however, whether class certification is 

granted may be an important consideration in addressing subsequent 

tolling requests. Other courts have been reluctant to extend American Pipe

tolling where class certification was granted. See, e.g., Warren Consol. Sch. v. 

W.R. Grace & Co., 518 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“Plaintiff has 

failed to persuade us that the American Pipe rule should be extended to the 

situation where, as here, the class is certified and the plaintiff elects to 

pursue its own case.”) (citations omitted). Tellingly, none of the state court 

cases Appellants cite adopted cross-jurisdictional tolling when class 

certification was granted and class members elected to opt out to press their 

own individual claims. See Dow Chem. Corp. v. Blanco, 67 A.3d 392 (Del. 

2013); Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 247 P.3d 244 (Mont. 2010); Vaccariello 

v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 160 (Ohio 2002); Staub v. 

Eastman Kodak Co., 726 A.2d 955 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Lee v. Grand 

Rapids Bd. of Educ., 384 N.W.2d 165 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). Here, Appellants 

opted out of the Facciola Action after the case was certified as a class action 

and, in fact, after the court preliminarily approved the class settlement after 

a fairness hearing. The facts of this case are therefore distinguishable from 

the state cases relied upon by Appellants.

¶19 Federal cases have, at times, refused to apply American Pipe

tolling where, as here, class certification was granted. Compare Wachovia 

Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 346 n.7 (D.C. 
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

10

Cir. 1980) (holding appellants could not claim American Pipe tolling where 

“certification of the class was granted, not denied”) with Tosti v. City of Los 

Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying American Pipe tolling 

where class was certified). Recognizing the interests of class members are 

protected by class certification, one commentator has noted such an 

approach “will encourage class members to seek vindication through the 

class action suit” and a contrary approach “would sanction duplicative 

suits.” Note, Statutes of Limitations and Opting Out of Class Actions, 81 Mich. 

L. Rev. 399, 429–30 (1982). Because the class in the Facciola Action was 

certified, this approach would not toll the limitations period for Appellants’ 

claims here.

¶20 Appellants cite federal cases applying American Pipe tolling 

after a class action was certified. See, e.g., Realmonte v. Reeves, 169 F.3d 1280, 

1284 (10th Cir. 1999); Adams Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Asbestos Corp., 7 F.3d 717, 718 

n.1 (8th Cir. 1993); Tosti, 754 F.2d at 1488; Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 717 

F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir. 1983), judgment vacated on other grounds and remanded, 

468 U.S. 1201 (1984). Those cases, however, are distinguishable; unlike 

Arizona after the enactment of A.R.S. § 12-504, “[t]here is no general savings 

statute in federal civil actions.” Hosogai, 145 Ariz. at 231, 700 P.2d at 1331. 

Even the diversity case Appellants cite that applied American Pipe tolling 

after certification of a class action did so noting that, although current state 

law did not provide for tolling, a new statute provided “clear evidence of 

the North Dakota legislature’s intent” that plaintiff’s claims were not barred 

by the statute of limitations. Asbestos Corp., 7 F.3d at 719.

¶21 Regardless of whether American Pipe tolling is limited to cases 

filed following the denial of class certification, the lack of a general savings 

statute in the federal system is important in deciding whether to adopt 

cross-jurisdictional tolling by case law in Arizona. Because there is no 

general federal savings statute, the legislative void resulting in American 

Pipe remains in the federal system, while in Arizona, the Legislature filled 

that void by enacting A.R.S. § 12-504. Appellants do not argue that the 

Legislature failed to account for cross-jurisdictional tolling when enacting 

A.R.S. § 12-504. Indeed, Arizona’s saving statute applies to an action timely 

filed in another jurisdiction and later refiled in Arizona. See Templer v. Zele, 

166 Ariz. 390, 391, 803 P.2d 111, 112 (App. 1990). Thus, by enacting this 

general Arizona savings statute, the Legislature adopted a form of crossjurisdictional tolling, just not in the form Appellants claim should apply to 

their claims here. Given this history leading up to the enactment of A.R.S. § 

12-504, and the scope of that statute, Appellants have not shown that 

Arizona nonetheless should adopt broader cross-jurisdictional tolling by 

case law.
RADER v. GREENBERG

Opinion of the Court

11

¶22 Appellants cite several legitimate reasons supporting intrajurisdictional and cross-jurisdictional tolling, including resolution of 

disputes on the merits and a lack of prejudice to defendants. Had the 

Legislature not enacted the general Arizona savings statute in A.R.S. § 12-

504 following the call by Hosogai, those arguments would have greater 

weight. But the Legislature did enact A.R.S. § 12-504. As a result, Appellants 

effectively are asking this court to adopt a doctrine broader than what the 

Legislature adopted in a statute enacted in response to a call by the Arizona 

Supreme Court. This court declines to do so. Cf. State ex rel. Morrison v. 

Anway, 87 Ariz. 206, 209, 349 P.2d 774, 776 (1960) (“[C]ourts cannot read 

into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the 

legislature as gathered from the statute itself.”).

¶23 Although addressing a different type of tolling, Albano noted 

that, pertinent to its analysis in “determining whether to apply class action 

tolling, ‘[t]he proper test is . . . whether tolling the limitation in a given 

context is consonant with the legislative scheme.’” 227 Ariz. at 127 ¶ 22, 254 

P.3d at 366 (citation omitted). There is no suggestion here that recognizing 

cross-jurisdictional tolling for claims that may not fall within the protection 

of A.R.S. § 12-504 is consonant with Arizona’s legislative scheme. This is 

particularly true given that the Legislature’s limitations periods and 

savings statute involve “very delicate policy decisions that properly belong 

to the legislative branch of government.” Florez v. Sargeant, 185 Ariz. 521, 

528–29, 917 P.2d 250, 257–58 (1996); see also Albano, 227 Ariz. at 127–28 ¶ 29, 

254 P.3d at 366–67 (declining tolling when it conflicts with statute of repose;

“[i]f the Legislature wishes to permit class action tolling under [A.R.S.] § 12-

552, it may of course amend the statute to so provide”). Given these 

legislative balances, Appellants have not shown that Arizona should adopt 

cross-jurisdictional tolling by case law. Accordingly, the superior court 

properly dismissed Appellants’ claims as time-barred. See A.R.S. § 12-542; 

A.R.S. §§ 44-2004(B), -3241(B). 

CONCLUSION

¶24 The superior court’s judgment is affirmed.