United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2011-1134 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in case no. 09-CV-151, Judge Gregory W. Carman. 

__________________________ 

Decided: August 10, 2012 

__________________________ 

GREGORY G. GARRE, Latham & Watkins, LLP, of 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. On the 

brief was MATTHEW W. CALIGUR, Baker & Hostetler, LLP, 

of Houston, Texas. Of counsel was PAULSEN KING 

VANDEVERT, Ford Motor Company, of Dearborn, Michigan. 

JUSTIN R. MILLER, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of New York, New York, argued for defendantappellee. With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, of 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 2

Washington, DC; and BARBARA S. WILLIAMS, Attorney in 

charge, of New York, New York. Of counsel on the brief 

was YELENA SLEPAK, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, 

International Trade Litigation, United States Customs 

and Border Protection, of New York, New York. 

__________________________ 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, DYK and REYNA, Circuit 

Judges. 

REYNA, Circuit Judge. 

This case concerns the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade to review U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s (“CBP’s”) assessments of duties on goods 

imported into the nation. The process for bringing such 

customs transactions to final resolution is called “liquidation.” 19 C.F.R. § 159.1. In this case, the importer filed 

for declaratory judgment that CBP had failed to liquidate 

in the time required by law. Its complaint asserted 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the Tariff Act’s 

grant of residual jurisdiction to the Court of International 

Trade over matters concerning enforcement and administration of, inter alia, duty assessment. We hold that this 

was a valid invocation of the court’s residual jurisdiction, 

as the importer could not have asserted jurisdiction under 

any of the other enumerated provisions of § 1581. We 

further hold that post-complaint efforts by CBP to clear 

the importer’s accounts did not undo such jurisdiction, 

and reverse the Court of International Trade’s contrary 

order. We also reverse the Court of International Trade’s 

finding that one of the importer’s subsequent pleadings 

conceded a dispositive issue, which the court held made 

certain claims non-justiciable. Finally, we vacate the 

court’s discretionary dismissal of the importer’s remaining 

claims, concluding that that order was too interlinked 

with the jurisdiction and justiciability errors to survive 
3 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

appeal. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 

2d. 1302 (Ct. Int’l Trade July 22, 2010) [hereinafter 

Dismissal Opinion]. 

I 

As automotive enthusiasts will know, in 2004, Ford 

Motor Company (“Ford”), owned and operated the British 

car maker Jaguar. In 2004 and 2005, Ford imported 

Jaguar-brand cars from the United Kingdom into the 

United States. On the cars’ entry into the United States, 

Ford deposited estimated duty payments with CBP. Ford 

subsequently concluded that its estimates were too high, 

and that it had overpaid on the duty actually owed. 

Ford filed reconciliation entries with CBP, laying out 

its math and seeking a refund. This appeal concerns nine 

such entries, filed between August 2005 and October 

2006. Ford hoped that CBP would review each entry, 

agree with the reasoning therein, and then liquidate the 

entry, upon which Ford would get a refund. The total 

refund claimed by Ford, across the nine disputed entries, 

was about $6.2 million. 

For purposes of this short summary, it is not necessary to chart each entry’s detailed progress through CBP’s 

reconciliation apparatus. It is enough to fast-forward to 

April 15, 2009, and recount a few considerations as they 

appeared at that time, as it was on that date that Ford 

filed suit in this case. 

It is undisputed that at the time of filing of Ford’s 

complaint, CBP had not affirmatively liquidated any of 

the nine entries. It is also undisputed that the general 

one-year time period imposed by Congress for liquidating 

such entries had long since expired. See Tariff Act of 1930, 

§ 504(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a). 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 4

The third and final consideration comes from Ford’s 

complaint. Ford alleged that, from the entries’ filing until 

April 2009, CBP neither extended nor suspended the 

period available for liquidating the entries. 2d Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 67–68, Ford Motor Co. v. United States, No. 09-

151 [hereinafter Ford] (Ct. Int’l Trade Aug. 18, 2009), 

Dkt. #19; Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 

457, 473–74 (2007) (“When a plaintiff files a complaint in 

federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, 

courts look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.”). It is not disputed that CBP has authority, in 

certain circumstances, to extend the time to liquidate 

entries by up to three years. See Tariff Act of 1930, 

§ 504(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b); see also 19 C.F.R. 

§ 159.12(a). But Ford said it received no notice of such an 

extension or suspension, and urged that notice was required for any putative extension to be effective. Because 

it viewed CBP as having exceeded the statutory deadline, 

in April 2009 Ford believed it was entitled to have the 

entries liquidated and the refunds paid to it. It therefore 

sought declaratory judgment deeming the nine entries 

liquidated by operation of law and ordering CBP to pay 

Ford the claimed refunds. 

A few months after initiation of the lawsuit, there was 

new action from CBP. In June–August of 2009 CBP’s 

computer system “auto-liquidated” three of the disputed 

entries. By the end of September, CBP had “reliquidated” 

them, which concluded the reconciliation process. Appellee Br. 7 & n.6. Ford administratively protested each of 

these acts before CBP and, when its protests were denied, 

initiated separate litigation before the Court of International Trade to appeal the denials. Then, in mid-2010, 

CBP announced that it had liquidated a fourth entry and 

that its computer system had auto-liquidated a fifth, 
5 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

which was scheduled to be “reliquidated” by CBP later in 

the year. 

In light of this post-complaint activity, and pursuant 

to a motion from the government, the Court of International Trade dismissed Ford’s case in its entirety. Dismissal Op. The court’s opinion contained three holdings 

relevant to this appeal. First, the court held that CBP’s 

post-complaint activity stripped the court of subject 

matter jurisdiction as to the affected entries. Id. at 1310–

11. Second, the court found that in a recent filing Ford 

conceded that CBP had extended the time for liquidation 

of five of the nine entries, so the court ruled that no case 

or controversy remained as to Ford’s claims that there 

had been no extension. Id. Third, the court acknowledged that there remained four non-liquidated entries for 

which Ford continued to argue that CBP had acted 

unlawfully. The court concluded that it had subject 

matter jurisdiction over the case as to those claims, and 

that Ford had made no dispositive concessions, but declined to issue declaratory judgment. Id. at 1313–14, 

1315 (diagramming holding). 

Ford timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction over 

final judgments of the Court of International Trade. 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). 

II 

This court reviews the Court of International Trade’s 

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. 

Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1244, 

1250 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This court also reviews dismissals 

for non-justiciability de novo. King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon 

Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 6

III 

A 

The first question presented by this appeal is whether 

the Court of International Trade correctly applied its own 

jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1581, and the precedent 

of this court to Ford’s case. We are specifically concerned 

with the interactions between the enumerated grants of 

jurisdiction set forth in subsections (a) through (h) of this 

statute and the grant of residual jurisdiction in subsection 

(i). It is the residual grant of subsection (i)(4) that Ford 

contends covers this case: 

(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon 

the Court of International Trade by subsections 

(a)–(h) of this section and subject to the exception 

set forth in subsection (j) of this section, the Court 

of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the 

United States, its agencies, or its officers, that 

arises out of any law of the United States providing for-- 

(1) revenue from imports or tonnage; 

(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the 

importation of merchandise for reasons other 

than the raising of revenue; 

(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise for 

reasons other than the protection of the public 

health or safety; or 

(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in paragraphs 

(1)–(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)–

(h) of this section. 
7 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). 

This court has on several occasions considered subsection (i)(4)’s jurisdictional implications. Recognizing that 

litigants might be tempted to use subsection (i)(4)’s broad 

language to avoid various requirements of subsections (a) 

through (h), this court has repeatedly held that subsection 

(i)(4) “may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of § 1581 is or could have been available, 

unless the remedy provided under that other subsection 

would be manifestly inadequate.” Miller & Co. v. United 

States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Int’l 

Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324, 1327 

(Fed. Cir. 2006); Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United 

States, 963 F.2d 356, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 

The government asks this court to simply apply those 

cases to this, and thus to affirm. The government argues 

now that since CBP has fully liquidated some of the 

entries, Ford can—and in fact did—dispute those liquidations administratively and, failing that, could (and did) 

bring a separate lawsuit under the jurisdiction enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (conferring jurisdiction over 

lawsuits contesting protest denials under Tariff Act 

section 515). The availability of a remedy under subsection (a), says the government, blocks the path to jurisdiction under subsection (i). 

The government’s reasoning, however, masks a crucial fact: at the time Ford initiated this lawsuit, none of 

these liquidations had yet occurred. Ford could not, 

therefore, have exhausted the administrative remedies 

necessary to establish jurisdiction under § 1581(a). 

Numerous opinions of the Supreme Court hold that 

subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of 

the complaint, and (at least in diversity cases) does not 

depend on subsequent events. E.g., Grupo Dataflux v. 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 8

Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570–71 (2004) (“It 

has long been the case that ‘the jurisdiction of the court 

depends on the state of things at the time the action is 

brought.’ This time-of-filing rule is hornbook law (quite 

literally) taught to first-year law students in any basic 

course on federal civil procedure.”) (quoting Mollan v. 

Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)) (internal 

citation and footnote omitted). Both the Supreme Court 

and this court have also held that the case-or-controversy 

requirement of Article III (also a matter of subject matter 

jurisdiction) must be satisfied at the outset and at all 

later stages. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 

724, 732-33 (2008) (noting that a case or controversy 

“must exist at the commencement of the litigation” and 

“must be extant at all stages of review”); Prasco, LLC v. 

Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 

2008); GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp., 90 F.3d 

479, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

The government argues that the general time-of-filing 

rule, however well-established, should not control this 

case. It cites authority holding that the time-of-filing rule 

is not absolute in cases where the task is to assess federal 

question jurisdiction as opposed, for example, to diversity 

jurisdiction (which was at issue in Grupo Dataflux and 

other cases applying a strong time-of-filing rule). The 

government argues for a similar result here. It endorses 

the Court of International Trade’s statement that it is 

§ 1581(a), not 1581(i), which is “the preferred jurisdictional vehicle established by Congress.” Dismissal Op., 

716 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. To that end, the government 

suggests that CBP should be privileged to apply its “normal administrative process.” Having liquidated the 

claims, argues the government, CBP is entitled to have 

the propriety of those liquidations tested in litigation 

brought under § 1581(a) jurisdiction, and to permit juris-
9 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

diction under § 1581(i) subverts the Congressional intent. 

The government distinguishes this case from those 

strongly endorsing the time-of-filing rule by pointing out 

that CBP’s actions here did not defeat the jurisdiction of 

the Court of International Trade, as happened in the 

other cases, but only modified its basis from § 1581(i)(4) to 

1581(a)—though, in practice, the result here would be 

dismissal of the case. 

The government is correct that, when it comes to assessing federal question jurisdiction, federal courts may 

consider developments emerging after the plaintiff’s firstfiled complaint. As already mentioned, the Supreme 

Court in Rockwell International endorsed the practice of 

considering amended complaints when determining 

federal question jurisdiction. But we note: the Court 

viewed this as no departure from the logical foundation of 

the time-of-filing rule: 

 The rule that subject-matter jurisdiction “depends on the state of things at the time of the action brought,” Mollan, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 539, 

does not suggest a different interpretation. The 

state of things and the originally alleged state of 

things are not synonymous; demonstration that 

the original allegations were false will defeat jurisdiction. So also will the withdrawal of those allegations, unless they are replaced by others that 

establish jurisdiction. 

Rockwell Int’l, 549 U.S. at 473 (citation edited and other 

citations omitted). 

Consistent with Rockwell International, this court has 

not hesitated to consider post-complaint developments 

when the case warrants. We are mindful of this court’s 

decision in Prasco, where this court consented to take into 

account a plaintiff’s recitation of post-filing events to 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 10

establish jurisdiction in its Amended Complaint. 537 

F.3d at 1337. A later case, Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. 

Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 

2010), reaffirmed that certain baseline requirements, 

such as the existence of a justiciable controversy, had to 

be met at filing and had to remain at all later stages. See 

also GAF Bldg. Materials, 90 F.3d at 483. While these 

cases are from a different statutory realm than the present appeal, we find them nevertheless instructive. 

Reviewing the law of our sister circuits, we note that 

they, like us, have not hesitated to consider postcomplaint developments as required in some circumstances, though some have expressed doubt that the timeof-filing rule uniformly governs subject matter jurisdiction 

in federal question cases. See, e.g., Iowa Tribe of Kan. & 

Neb. v. Salazar, 607 F.3d 1225, 1236–37 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(finding no subject matter jurisdiction where the Interior 

Department, post-complaint, took certain land into trust 

for an Indian tribe’s benefit, an action for which Congress 

had expressly not waived sovereign immunity); ConnectU 

LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 93 (1st Cir. 2008) (declining to limit jurisdictional analysis to the initial complaint, 

where amended complaint set forth a proper jurisdictional 

basis); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 784–85 

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding subject matter jurisdiction 

divested because federal cause of action had been dismissed without prejudice); New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. 

v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 

1497–1502 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding no subject matter 

jurisdiction where the federal defendant, over whom 

original federal jurisdiction could have been exercised, 

had been dismissed from the case); Shaw v. Gwatney, 795 

F.2d 1351, 1354 (8th Cir. 1986) (taking amended complaint into account in assessing federal question jurisdiction); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 507–
11 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

08 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding no jurisdiction after plaintiff 

dropped claims that had invoked original federal jurisdiction); Albert v. Kevex Corp., 729 F.2d 757, 760–62 (Fed. 

Cir. 1984) (finding no jurisdiction where plaintiff, whose 

claim was premised on existence of a patent interference, 

made a post-complaint disclaimer of all interfering subject 

matter), reh’g denied, 741 F.2d 396 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 

Having reviewed these cases, we note that most of 

them—including New Rock Asset Partners, 101 F.3d at 

1497–1502, on which the government relies—involve a 

federal claim or party removed from the case by the 

plaintiff.1 Such cases are easily reconciled with Rockwell 

 1 See, e.g., Iowa Tribe of Kan. & Neb., 607 F.3d at 

1233 (“The time-of-filing rule is a judge-made doctrine, 

supported in the diversity context by sound policy considerations. . . . In contrast, the time-of-filing rule has been 

applied only rarely to federal question cases. . . . Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that the Supreme 

Court’s statements regarding the time-of-filing rule in 

diversity cases control our analysis.” (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted)); ConnectU, 522 F.3d at 92 

(“Notwithstanding the impressive pedigree of the time-offiling rule, it is inapposite here. The letter and spirit of 

the rule apply most obviously in diversity cases, where 

the rule originated, and where heightened concerns about 

forum-shopping and strategic behavior offer special 

justifications for it. These concerns are not present in the 

mine-run of federal question cases, and courts have been 

careful not to import the time-of-filing rule indiscriminately into the federal question realm.” (internal citations 

omitted)); New Rock Asset Partners, 101 F.3d at 1503 

(“[T]he letter and spirit of the [time-of-filing] rule apply 

most clearly to diversity cases. The Supreme Court set out 

the rule in the diversity context. In addition, the Court 

crafted the rule for the removal of actions from state 

court, which involves a more lenient standard not relevant here. . . . The rule that jurisdiction is assessed at the 

time of the filing of the complaint has been applied only 

rarely to federal question cases. Moreover, in these rare 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 12

International, as they involve not changes in the underlying facts of the case, but changes in the legal theories 

plaintiff seeks to have applied to those facts. That is not 

what happened in this case. 

Here, it is post-complaint action by the government as 

defendant that is presented as changing the jurisdictional 

picture. The appellate courts generally allow the government to defeat jurisdiction by post-complaint action only 

in the presence of some specific indication of Congressional intent that such action would defeat jurisdiction. 

In Iowa Tribe of Kansas & Nebraska, for example, the 

Tenth Circuit relied on Congress’s express withdrawal of 

its sovereign immunity waiver in finding jurisdiction 

divested by the government’s post-complaint land acquisition. 607 F.3d at 1237. Absent such an indication of 

legislative intent, the federal appellate judiciary has not 

hesitated to apply the general jurisdictional guidance of 

the time-of-filing rule. See, e.g., Kabakjian v. United 

States, 267 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the 

time-of-filing rule to retain jurisdiction irrespective of the 

government’s post-complaint activity); Kulawy v. United 

States, 917 F.2d 729, 733–34 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). 

Nonetheless, we need not decide in this case whether 

post-filing actions by a defendant can ever defeat jurisdiction in a federal question case under the time-of-filing 

rule because it is clear that where the jurisdictional 

question is really a question of exhaustion, a defendant 

cannot defeat jurisdiction by simply creating a new avenue for exhaustion of administrative remedies that had 

not been available at the time of the original filing. 

Indeed this precise question was decided by the Supreme 

 

cases, the rule has often been applied axiomatically, 

without extensive discussion or analysis.” (internal citations omitted)). 
13 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

Court in Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967), and 

Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974), within the 

context of examining the exhaustion requirement for 

habeas corpus review of state court convictions.2 In 

Roberts and Francisco, the Supreme Court held that a 

petitioner who has exhausted his state court remedies 

and then filed a habeas petition in federal court need not 

return to the state forum even where there has been an 

intervening change in the state court’s construction of the 

federal constitution, creating the availability of a potential remedy in state court. See Roberts, 389 U.S. at 43; 

Francisco, 419 U.S. at 63. Thus, Roberts and Francisco

made clear that subsequent availability of a remedy does 

not defeat prior satisfaction of a statutory exhaustion 

requirement. 

Here, the government’s post-filings actions in liquidating the entries may have opened up a new avenue for 

judicial review under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), but the actions 

cannot defeat subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i). 

The statute contains no indication of contrary intent. The 

government points to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) as purportedly 

requiring that post-complaint action by CBP divest any 

§ 1581(i) jurisdiction, and redirect disputes over liquidation back into the administrative protest scheme. But we 

find no such provision there. Section 1514(a) states that 

the actions of CBP “in any entry, liquidation, or reliquida-

 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c), “[a]n application for 

a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has 

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 

State,” and “[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have 

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 

State . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to 

raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 14

tion,” as well as “decisions of [CBP],” are final unless 

protested administratively or, following the administrative protest, judicially. It makes no endorsement of the 

administrative protest system for importers’ claims that 

CBP unlawfully failed to act. Nor can we see how the 

administrative protest process would even address such a 

claim, as the process is predicated on CBP taking some 

action that then results in a protest. We therefore see no 

basis in § 1514(a) for abandoning the time-of-filing rule. 

Nor do we see any contrary intent in the jurisdictional 

statute itself, § 1581. That statute enumerates that the 

Court of International Trade may adjudicate disputes 

stemming from denials of protests once the importer has 

exhausted its administrative protest options. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(a); see also United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 

U.S. 360, 365 (1998) (“A protest, as indicated in 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1514, is an essential prerequisite when one challenges 

an actual Customs decision.”). Subsection (a) does not 

reach the circumstance of this case, where the importer 

alleges that CBP failed to enter either an approval or a 

denial within the prescribed time. For § 1514’s protest 

provisions to be invoked, “Customs must engage in some 

sort of decision-making process[.]” Xerox Corp. v. United 

States, 423 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Where, as 

here, there has been an allegation that CBP unlawfully 

failed to make any such decision, we cannot see how an 

administrative appeal could have been initiated pre-filing, 

and we decline to hold that subsection (a) permits the 

importer to be forced back into the administrative process 

post-complaint. 

Neither do § 1581’s subsections (b)–(h) require any 

different outcome. Each of these subsections enumerates 

the Court of International Trade’s jurisdiction in matters 

not directly presented by this case. No party contends 
15 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

that Ford could have brought the present claim under any 

of those subsections. 

Finally, we do not embrace the argument, presented 

by the government and inherent in the trial court’s opinion, that this court’s opinions concerning subsection (i) 

(the residual grant of jurisdiction) provide a platform for 

the Court of International Trade to depart from the timeof-filing rule in this case. This court has held that 

§ 1581(i) jurisdiction is unavailable to an importer if 

another of § 1581’s jurisdictional subsections could have 

been asserted. E.g., Int’l Custom Prods., 467 F.3d at 

1327. Those opinions turn on the jurisdictional options 

that were or could have been available to the plaintiff at 

the time of his complaint. They express no view at all 

concerning the jurisdictional effect of post-complaint 

action by CBP in a case where plaintiff at the time of 

filing his complaint had no jurisdictional option save 

subsection (i). 

Having concluded that the government cannot defeat 

jurisdiction under section 1581(i) by creating a new remedial opportunity under section 1581(a) which had not 

been available at the time of the original filing, we must 

determine whether Ford’s Second Amended Complaint set 

forth proper grounds for the Court of International Trade 

to exercise § 1581(i)(4) jurisdiction at the time the lawsuit 

was filed. We hold that Ford met this requirement. 

Ford alleged that as of April 15, 2009, CBP had 

unlawfully failed to either timely liquidate the entries at 

issue, or to extend the time for liquidation, and that Ford 

was thus entitled to declaratory judgment of liquidation 

as a matter of law. With no administrative action to 

protest, none of the jurisdictional avenues enumerated in 

subsections (a) through (h) of § 1581 were available to 

Ford. These allegations satisfied this court’s require-
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 16

ments for the exercise of jurisdiction under subsection 

(i)(4). Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 

F.3d 1581, 1590 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 

The government’s counterargument is unpersuasive. 

It urges that the entries in this case were, in fact, properly extended, even at the initiation of this lawsuit. The 

government therefore suggests that Ford’s declaratory 

judgment case was premature and therefore not “ripe.” 

This argument fails for two reasons. First, arguments 

concerning the merits of Ford’s claims are not appropriate 

for this jurisdictional inquiry. It is well-established that a 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction concerns its authority 

to take up a case, and not the case’s ultimate resolution. 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 

89 (1998). Ford invoked the Court of International 

Trade’s authority by alleging unlawful action by CBP that 

could not be remedied with a lawsuit under § 1581(a)–(h). 

The government’s protest that Ford is not actually entitled to relief in this case can be taken up on a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 

granted or on summary judgment—not on a motion to 

contest jurisdiction. See also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 

U.S. 500, 511 (2006). 

The government’s invocation of the justiciability doctrine of ripeness is also unavailing. The ripeness inquiry 

in a declaratory judgment case such as this asks whether 

the case presents “a substantial controversy, between 

parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 

judgment.” Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 

498, 506 (1972) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil 

Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). There is no question here 

that Ford’s complaint, by contending that CBP had failed 

to take action within the statutory deadline and so waived 
17 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

its right to contest Ford’s refund requests, alleged a 

controversy ripe for judicial resolution. 

We therefore reverse the Court of International 

Trade’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of 

Ford’s claims concerning entries that CBP liquidated 

post-complaint. 

B 

We next turn to the Court of International Trade’s 

dismissal of certain Ford claims for lack of case or controversy. The court concluded that Ford “abandoned” certain 

claims with a dispositive concession in one of its briefs. 

Dismissal Op., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1310–11. Although the 

Court of International Trade did not use the term, we 

view this dismissal as rooted in the well-recognized rule 

that if its underlying controversy disappears, a case is 

moot and non-justiciable. See, e.g., Kaw Nation v. Norton, 

405 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding case moot 

where one party voluntarily abandoned its arguments). 

On appeal, Ford argues that it made no such concessions, 

and the court erred in dismissing the claims. As already 

stated, this court reviews dismissals for non-justiciability 

de novo. King Pharms., 616 F.3d at 1282. 

The trial court’s mootness dismissal affects only 

Ford’s first “cause of action,” i.e., its claim for declaratory 

judgment on the grounds that the disputed entries were 

neither extended nor liquidated within the one-year 

period set by Congress. See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66–70. 

Ford pled numerous other “causes of action” seeking the 

same relief (declaratory judgment of liquidation) on 

alternative legal theories, e.g., that if there were extensions, they were invalid because CBP did not issue notices 

(cause of action 2); that if CBP did issue notices, the 

extensions were invalid because CBP did not give the 

required reasons (cause of action 3); and that if CBP did 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 18

give reasons, those reasons were legally improper (cause 

of action 4). The propriety of such pleading is not disputed. See Ct. Int’l Tr. R. 8(e)(2) (permitting a party to 

plead claims “alternately or hypothetically, either in a 

single count or defense or in separate ones”). 

The court predicated its dismissal of the first cause of 

action on the following statement by Ford: 

 Although Ford has only just learned of this 

development, . . . it appears that on March 29, 

2009, [CBP] extended the liquidation of all but 

one of Ford’s 2006 Reconciliation Entries. Notwithstanding any deficiencies in [CBP’s] attempt 

to extend the entries, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 

§ 159.12(a)(1), the extensions expired on March 

29, 2010. 

Ford Mot. for TRO, Ford (Ct. Int’l Tr. June 23, 2010), Dkt. 

#36. The court read this as a concession that the six 

entries in question “were validly extended.” Dismissal 

Op., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1311. Since Ford’s first cause of 

action was predicated on the entries not having been 

extended, the court concluded that Ford had abandoned 

its claim applying that line of argument to those entries. 

The court subsequently confirmed, however, that Ford 

remained free to argue that these “extensions” were not 

procedurally valid or were otherwise unlawful. Ford, slip 

op. at 3 (Ct. Int’l Tr. Oct. 15, 2010), Dkt. #45 (denying 

reconsideration of Dismissal Opinion). 

On appeal, Ford contends that the dismissal was improper because its statement did not plainly concede these 

claims. Ford points to the paucity of record evidence on 

the question of whether CBP did or did not administratively “extend” these entries and contends that, in these 

circumstances, its statement should be interpreted as at 

best equivocal. 
19 FORD MOTOR CO v. US

We agree with Ford. Neither on its own nor in context does the quoted statement demonstrate that the 

dispute between Ford and the government as to whether 

the entries had been extended had become moot. We read 

Ford’s statement as only acknowledging that CBP had 

taken some administrative action with the purpose of 

extending liquidation, and not necessarily as conceding 

that extension had been effectuated. 

The government’s argument that Ford retained its 

right to contest the legal validity of any extension by CBP 

misses the mark. It is not the right to contest the extension’s validity that was prematurely dismissed, but the 

right to contest that an extension had occurred at all. 

We therefore reverse the Court of International 

Trade’s dismissal of Ford’s first cause of action for lack of 

case or controversy. 

C 

Finally, the reasoning expressed above requires that 

we vacate the Court of International Trade’s dismissal of 

those claims over which the court acknowledged it had 

subject matter jurisdiction. The court’s dismissal of these 

claims was discretionary, but the court’s reasoning extended in significant part from its flawed jurisdictional 

analysis. For example, the court reasoned that because 

Ford had conceded the extension of certain entries (a 

finding we have now reversed), “its remaining claims form 

a weak basis for granting declaratory relief.” Dismissal 

Op., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1313. We therefore vacate the 

court’s discretionary dismissals, with the understanding 

that the Court of International Trade retains authority, 

but no obligation, to revisit this question on remand. 
FORD MOTOR CO v. US 20

IV 

For the above-stated reasons, the judgment of the 

Court of International Trade is reversed-in-part, vacatedin-part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

REVERSED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND 

REMANDED 

COSTS

No costs.