JOHN THOMAS GOTRO, 

FORMER HUSBAND,

Appellant,

v.

CATHERINE SUZANNE 

GOTRO, FORMER WIFE,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-1863

_____________________________/

Opinion filed May 5, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Victor L. Hulslander, Judge.

Brian P. North of Kenny Leigh & Associates, Pensacola, for Appellant.

Anderson E. Hatfield, Gainesville, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the former 

husband raises four issues: (I) the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded 

$2,500 in permanent alimony to the former wife; (II) the trial court abused its 
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discretion in creating equitable distribution; (III) the trial court abused its discretion 

when it ordered the former husband to pay all of the former wife’s attorney’s fees 

and costs; and (IV) the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the former 

husband to maintain life insurance on the alimony award. Our reversal of the 

equitable distribution scheme necessitates reversal on Issues I and III as well. We 

also reverse Issue IV and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

The parties were married for approximately thirty-nine years and share four 

children, none of whom were dependent at the time of dissolution. It was undisputed 

that the former husband was the bread-winner and had a substantially larger earning 

potential than the former wife. The former husband had several bank accounts, most 

of which were properly considered to be marital assets by the trial court. Of 

particular significance were two BBVA Compass Bank accounts. The former wife 

submitted evidence that the combined balance of the two BBVA accounts was 

$8,345.00 at the time the petition for dissolution was filed in May 2015. However, 

at the final hearing, the former husband provided unrebutted testimony that the 

combined value of the two BBVA accounts had been significantly reduced to 

$2,432.00. He further testified that these two accounts had been used for his living 

expenses and to pay bills associated with the marital home. The former husband 

asked the trial court to use the balance of the accounts at the date of the final hearing 
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as opposed to the date of filing. The trial court denied the request and used the 

balances of the accounts at the time of filing, initially dividing the $8,345 combined 

value of the two accounts equally between the parties. The trial court later 

redistributed the value assigned because the former wife was to forgo receipt of her 

cash-out share from the two BBVA accounts ($4,172.50) along with her cash-out 

from two other assets. This led to the trial court assigning an equalizer payment to 

the former wife in the amount of $8,612.99. The former husband argues the trial

court abused its discretion by including the value of the depleted BBVA accounts, 

which resulted in a disparate equalizer payment being assigned in favor of the former 

wife.

In equitable distribution under section 61.075(7), Florida Statutes (2015), the 

trial court may select a valuation date of the marital asset that the court determines 

in its discretion to be “just and equitable under the circumstances.” Different assets 

may be valued as of different dates in the trial court’s discretion. § 61.075(7), Fla. 

Stat. (2015). However, “[a]s a general proposition, it is error to include assets in an 

equitable distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the 

dissolution proceedings.” Winder v. Winder, 152 So. 3d 836, 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2014) (quoting Roth v. Roth, 973 So. 2d 580, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)). The 

exception is when a parties’ misconduct during the proceedings results in dissipation 

of the asset, which misconduct may serve as a basis for assigning the asset to the 
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spending spouse. Winder, 152 So. 3d at 838. However, assignment due to 

dissipation must be based on the trial court’s “specific finding of intentional 

misconduct based on evidence showing that the marital funds were used for one 

party’s ‘own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the 

marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.’” Id. (quoting Walker v. 

Walker, 85 So. 3d 553, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)). 

The former wife lodged general allegations of misconduct, but they were not 

directly related to the funds in the two BBVA accounts. More importantly, the trial 

court made no findings of misconduct. The former husband’s undisputed testimony 

was that these two accounts were used for his living expenses and to pay bills 

associated with the home. The former husband was also paying the former wife 

temporary alimony and temporary attorney’s fees as well as a majority of the marital 

expenses during the pendency of the proceedings. There was no evidence of 

misconduct other than generalized allegations, and the undisputed testimony showed 

the money was diminished to pay at least some marital expenses during the 

proceedings. We agree with the former husband that, absent a finding of 

misconduct, it was error to utilize the value of these two BBVA accounts before 

dissipation. We reverse the equitable distribution portion of the final order and 

remand for further proceedings. Because the error in equitable distribution of the 
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two BBVA accounts was integral to the calculation of the equalizer payment, that 

portion of the final order is also reversed and remanded.

The former husband also argues that the trial court erred in awarding the 

former wife $2,500 in permanent alimony. As to the trial court’s decision to award 

permanent alimony, the parties’ thirty-nine year marriage was of such a duration that 

the former wife was entitled to an initial rebuttable presumption favoring permanent 

alimony. See § 61.08, Fla. Stat. (2015) (a long-term marriage entitled to the 

rebuttable presumption is defined as a marriage having a duration of seventeen years 

or longer). The trial court’s order determined that the former wife had a need for 

$2,500 per month in alimony and carefully considered all of the factors in section 

61.08(2)(a)-(i), Florida Statutes (2015). Factors weighing in favor of the former 

wife’s need were the parties’ high middle-class standard of living during the 

marriage and the former wife’s inability, due to age, health, and education, to support 

herself in a fashion consistent with her previous standard of living. After the divorce, 

the former wife would also have to pay her living expenses and secure health 

insurance as the former husband had paid the majority of expenses during the 

marriage. In determining the former husband’s ability to pay, the trial court found 

his income was approximately 3.67 times greater than the former wife’s earned 

income. The trial court’s finding that the former husband had the ability to pay 

permanent alimony was also supported by the record. We find no error in the trial 
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court’s decision to award permanent alimony to the former wife. See Broemer v. 

Broemer, 109 So. 3d 284, 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“An appellate court will not 

disturb an alimony award where competent substantial evidence supports the award 

and the trial court complies with the governing law.”). However, because we are 

reversing and remanding the equitable distribution portion of the final order, the 

alimony award is also remanded for recalculation. See Watson v. Watson, 124 So. 

3d 340, 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (finding that the reversal and remand of the 

equitable distribution portion necessitated remand of the alimony award). We also 

remand the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees in Issue III as the fee award is 

impacted by the reversal of the equitable distribution award as well. See Nolan v. 

Nolan, 188 So. 3d 977, 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (reversal of equitable distribution 

scheme necessitated reversal and remand of alimony and attorney’s fees portions of 

the final judgment as well).

Finally, in Issue IV, the former husband argues that the trial court erred in 

ordering him to maintain a $100,000 life insurance policy to secure the alimony 

award. The trial court had the authority to require the former husband to maintain a 

life insurance policy with the former wife as beneficiary in order to secure the 

alimony payment. See § 61.08(3), Fla. Stat. (2015); Therriault v. Therriault, 102 So. 

3d 711, 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). In Therriault, this Court held that, in so requiring, 

the trial court “must make specific evidentiary findings as to the availability and cost 
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of insurance, the [former husband’s] ability to pay, and the special circumstances 

that warrant such security.” Id. (quoting Kotlarz v. Kotlarz, 21 So. 3d 892, 893 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2009)). Special circumstances that warrant this security include, among 

other things: a spouse left in “dire financial straits” after the obligor spouse’s death, 

a supported spouse with limited earning capacity, an obligor spouse in arrears on 

support obligations, and cases where the obligor spouse agreed on the record to 

secure an award with a life insurance policy. Therriault, 102 So. 3d at 713-14. The 

amount of insurance must also be related to the extent of the obligation being 

secured. Id. Although the life insurance policy was preexisting and there was 

testimony that it cost the former husband approximately $213 per month, the trial 

court failed to make any specific evidentiary findings as to the former husband’s 

ability to pay and the special circumstances that warranted such security. While 

there may be a basis in the record for such a finding, on remand, the trial court should 

include the required specific findings to require the security.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, C.J., ROWE and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.