1

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL LAURA J. RICHARDSON

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 118

TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MARCH 8, 2023
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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished committee members, 2022 

marked two important milestones for U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM): the 25th

anniversary of our move from Panama to Miami in 1997, and the 25th anniversary of our Human 

Rights Initiative. For a quarter of a century, the brave women and men of USSOUTHCOM have 

called Miami home, while working with allies and partners to improve security, advance 

democratic ideals, and promote peace and prosperity throughout our shared neighborhood. 

At the end of the Cold War, the United States, its allies, and partners believed that 

democracy would displace authoritarianism around the globe. Twenty-five years later, the 

strategic environment in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has changed significantly. The 

2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) states, in no uncertain terms, that “autocrats are working 

overtime to undermine democracy.”1 We see this right here in our own hemisphere that external 

malign actors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are aggressively exerting 

influence over our democratic neighbors.

The NSS also states “no region impacts the United States more directly than the Western 

Hemisphere.”2 Presence and proximity absolutely matter, and a stable and secure Western 

Hemisphere is critical to homeland defense. After traveling across LAC and meeting our partners 

face to face, I can confirm our security at home is directly impacted by the challenges facing this 

strategic region.

Our adversaries use a multidisciplinary and multidomain approach to counter democracy

and SOUTHCOM, our allies, and partners must use the full weight of integrated deterrence,

leveraging the whole of government, industry, private sector, and academia, in order to 

1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy10.2022.pdf

2 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy10.2022.pdf
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effectively respond. With shared purpose and mutual trust, we must collectively act with a much 

greater sense of urgency to ensure this hemisphere remains a stronghold for democracy.

Today, the PRC has both the capability and intent to eschew international norms, advance 

its brand of authoritarianism, and amass power and influence at the expense of the existing and 

emerging democracies in our hemisphere. This is a decisive decade and our actions or inactions 

regarding the PRC will have ramifications for decades to come.

While the PRC remains our pacing challenge, other malicious actors erode regional 

security. Russia continues its extensive disinformation campaigns and bolsters authoritarian 

regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) spread 

violence and corruption throughout the region and beyond. These TCOs traffic drugs that 

contribute to the deaths of thousands of Americans in cities and towns across the country, from 

Alabama to Washington, from Rhode Island to Mississippi and everywhere in between. TCOs 

foment violence and instability that contribute to irregular migration, forcibly displacing 

hundreds of thousands of people who risk their lives to reach U.S. territory each year. TCO 

corruption creates insecurity, deteriorates rule of law, and leaves partner nations susceptible to 

the actions of malign state and non-state actors.

We aren’t alone in our efforts to create a stable and peaceful hemisphere. Integrated 

Deterrence includes campaigning with our partners and allies as force multipliers for achieving 

success in this resource-constrained reality. With our partners and allies from the United 

Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Netherlands, we recently adopted the Framework for Western 

Hemisphere Collaboration. The framework commits us to more frequently share information, 

and work more closely together on our aligned strategic interests. 
4

Our USSOUTHCOM lines of effort in the face of these challenges are clear: by 

strengthening alliances and partnerships, collectively countering threats, and building our 

team, we are working to preserve democracy in our shared neighborhood. While doing so, we 

are pioneering ways to outcompete even our most innovative adversaries and address these 

transnational challenges.

Expanding Challenges in the Region

Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China – A Decisive Decade

When regional leaders and experts discuss the PRC’s engagement in the Western 

Hemisphere, they focus largely on trade and investment. In 2002, PRC trade with Latin America 

and the Caribbean was just $18 billion; in 2022 it ballooned to $450 billion. That number is 

expected to increase to $700 billion by 2035. Conversely, current U.S. trade within the region

amounts to $700 billion, which suggests that the United States’ comparative trade advantage is 

eroding.3,4

What concerns me as a Combatant Commander is the myriad of ways in which the PRC 

is spreading its malign influence, wielding its economic might, and conducting gray zone 

activities to expand its military and political access and influence in the AOR. The PRC is 

investing in critical infrastructure, including deep-water ports, cyber, and space facilities which 

can have a potential dual use for malign commercial and military activities. In any potential 

global conflict, the PRC could leverage strategic regional ports to restrict U.S. naval and 

commercial ship access. This is a strategic risk that we can’t accept or ignore. These activities 

are heavily subsidized through PRC state-owned enterprises (SOE), allowing them to underbid 

3 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri

4 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/china-lac-trade-four-scenarios-in-2035/
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on infrastructure projects, quickly displacing local and international competitors. SOEs are 

developing deep-water ports in seventeen countries, particularly around strategic maritime 

chokepoints in this region. In Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, PRC SOEs abused commercial 

agreements by conducting military functions at host-country ports. What’s to keep them from 

doing the same right here in this hemisphere?

In Panama, PRC-sponsored companies are engaged in, or bidding on, several projects 

related to the Panama Canal - a global strategic chokepoint. These projects include port 

operations on both ends of the canal, water management, and a logistics park. Meanwhile, in 

Argentina, a PRC SOE is attempting to secure the rights to build dual-use maritime installations 

near the southern port city of Ushuaia, which would support sustainment and power-projection 

while providing proximity to the Strait of Magellan, Drake Passage, and Antarctica. This would 

be a potential game-changer for the PRC, dramatically improving its access to Antarctica. 

The PRC also sees this region as key to expanding its space domain awareness and 

improving its military space capabilities. There are at least 11 PRC-linked space facilities across 

five countries in this region, more than any other geographic combatant command’s AOR, that 

provide Beijing with space tracking and surveillance capabilities. This includes a joint spacemonitoring facility in Chile and a deep space station in Argentina that is managed by an agency 

subordinate to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).5

Our nation’s leaders have expressed concern about the insidious nature of the PRCsponsored 5G technology providers for years now. In our region alone, five countries adopted 

Huawei’s 5G technology, and 24 countries have existing Chinese telecommunication 

infrastructure (3G/4G), increasing their potential to transition to Chinese 5G. There are also 

5 https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/
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twelve countries using PRC-created Safe City programs that provide persistent surveillance and 

give PRC SOE technicians access to government networks. These actions, among others, create a 

potential counterintelligence threat to the U.S. military, our civilian personnel, and our regional 

partners. The proliferation of this technology has also led even more partner nation military 

personnel to travel to China to receive training on cybersecurity and military doctrine.

The PRC relies heavily on resources, including food sources and minerals from the 

USSOUTHCOM AOR. This region is one of the richest in the world in critical rare earth 

minerals. The PRC’s efforts to extract South America’s natural resources to support its own 

population of 1.9 billion people are conducted at the expense of our partner nations and their 

citizens. These actions have the potential to destabilize the region and erode the fundamental 

conditions needed for quality private sector investment.

Environmental crimes such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF), illegal 

logging, and illegal mining continue to have devastating impacts on the region and the PRC is

the largest perpetrator of these biodiversity crimes. Every year, there are between 350 and 600 

Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-subsidized vessels fishing off the coast of South America. 

These vessels severely deplete fish stocks, disregard environmental safeguards, destabilize the 

economies of coastal states, and exacerbate security challenges at a cost of nearly $3 billion in 

lost revenue annually.6 When I meet with our partner nations, IUUF, along with transnational 

criminal networks and cyber security, is consistently among their top national security concerns. 

As a result, their militaries are increasingly being asked to play a leading role in combating this 

illegal activity. 

6

(U) Online Publication: American University Center for South America and Latino Studies; 12 July 2022; (U) Latin 

America-Caribbean: Illegal Fishing is Environmental Security Challenge; https://aulablog.net/2022/07/21/latinamerica-caribbean-illicit-fishing-is-environmental-security-challenge/
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Russia as an Acute Threat

The impacts of Vladimir Putin’s illegal, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine reverberated 

around the world, worsening a global energy and food crisis. The USSOUTHCOM AOR has not 

been spared. Families across the region are struggling to put food on the table and gas in their 

cars because of the sharp rise in prices, compounding the negative impacts in this region from 

COVID-19.

Through military engagements and gray zone operations, Russia colludes with 

authoritarian regimes in the region to undermine U.S. influence. In the past year, Russia 

continued its military engagements with both Venezuela and Nicaragua. Last year Venezuela 

hosted Sniper Frontier 2022, a shooting competition and subcomponent of Russia’s International 

Army Games. Nicaragua has publicly supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, voting – along 

with only North Korea, Syria, and Belarus – against a UN resolution condemning Russia for its 

invasion. These engagements increase Russian influence with nations who are destabilizing 

forces in the region. 

Russia uses disinformation to further its malign influence, sow instability and undermine 

democracy in the region, activities that promote Russian geopolitical goals and undermine U.S. 

national security interests. For example, Russia spreads false narratives about its invasion of 

Ukraine through its Spanish-language media arms, RT en Español, Sputnik Mundo, and its 

various social media sites. RT en Español’s Facebook page has 18 million followers, more than 

its English-language site or even CNN’s Spanish-language channels.7 Despite efforts by 

Facebook and Twitter to take down accounts spreading disinformation, Russian operators 

continue to generate bot accounts to spread falsehoods quickly. We are in a constant fight to 

7 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/09/business/russia-propaganda-spanish-social-media.html
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counter and remove the disinformation spread by fake accounts and correct the misperceptions 

this disinformation propagates. It is in our interest to help develop our partner nations’ 

knowledge and understanding of these tactics and false information before this malign activity 

permanently erodes this hemisphere’s confidence in democracy.

Transnational Criminal Organizations

Although many partner nation leaders recognize the threats the PRC and Russia pose to 

democracy in the region, they see TCOs as their primary security challenge. The number one 

cause of death among citizens ages 15-49 years old in Latin America and the Caribbean is 

violence and more than 60% of the world’s most crime-stricken cities are in this region.8

USSOUTHCOM estimates that there are 200 TCOs and four terrorist groups operating 

throughout the region. TCOs such as the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel in 

Mexico are spreading their reach to the region. The National Liberation Army (ELN), 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), Segunda Marquetalia, 

and Sendero Luminoso continue to operate along primary cocaine trafficking corridors. First 

Capital Command (PCC) operates in Brazilian urban streets, the Amazonian jungle, in 

neighboring Paraguay, Bolivia, and in the United States. In Haiti, gangs control roughly 60 

percent of the country, blocking roads for much-needed food and fuel. 

TCOs are engaged in a wide variety of illicit activities, including drug smuggling, arms 

dealing, illegal logging and mining, human trafficking, IUUF, and manufacturing counterfeit 

goods. They are also invested in numerous legitimate enterprises, including, but not limited to,

commercial banking, manufacturing, agriculture, consumer sales, and real estate. Their diverse 

8 https://www.maplecroft.com/insights/analysis/latin-america-hosts-over-60-of-worlds-most-crime-stricken-cities--

global-ranking/
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activities amount to a war chest of roughly $310 billion annually, five times the combined 

military budgets of every nation in Latin America and the Caribbean. TCOs are better funded, 

equipped, and manned than the security forces trying to fight them and increasingly rely on PRCconnected criminal organizations to launder billions of dollars around the world.

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Drug trafficking originating from this region contributes to the deaths of more than 

100,000 Americans every year. Interdicting the flow of drugs directly saves lives by removing 

product from the pipeline. It also reduces TCO revenue. The type of contraband or destination is 

irrelevant as the money remains in the Western Hemisphere and TCOs use their illicit funds to 

exacerbate regional corruption, insecurity, and instability. This in turn disrupts legitimate

economic opportunity, compromises the rule of law, allows malign state actors the opportunity to 

make inroads, and drives irregular migration. TCOs victimize migrants, by extorting them, 

forcing them into human trafficking, and saddling them with debt. The human toll TCOs cause is 

heartbreaking.

Iran

Iran is focused on rebuilding its economic and diplomatic ties in the region and pursuing 

opportunities to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Tehran's intelligence and security activities continue 

to be a concern and over the past two years Iran has increasingly used Venezuela to assert its 

presence in the region.

9 https://www.propublica.org/article/china-cartels-xizhi-li-money-laundering
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Regional Humanitarian Crises

Fragility. The COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted the economies of Latin America 

and the Caribbean, driving 170 million people into poverty.10 Countries in the region suffered 

disproportionately from the pandemic. While accounting for only eight percent of the world’s 

population, Latin America and the Caribbean suffered nearly 29% of the world’s COVID-19 

deaths. Fragility and instability drive irregular migration and create an environment ripe for 

corruption and exploitation.

Haiti. In recent years, Haiti has suffered an onslaught of setbacks including corrupt 

leaders and political assassinations, rampant gang violence, disease, and devastating natural 

disasters. Violence in Haiti is at its worst level in decades, according to the UN, characterized by 

gender-based violence, homicides, and kidnapping for ransom. Civil unrest, inter-gang fighting, 

and road blockages hinder commerce and humanitarian access. Today, Haitian citizens are 

suffering, and its government faces a myriad of challenges to include insecurity, limited 

governance capacity, and health concerns. The chaos caused more than 69,000 Haitians to seek 

refuge in the United States in fiscal year 2022.

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Nicaragua. President Daniel Ortega’s regime continues to detain and prosecute political 

opponents, even targeting clergy and shutting down hundreds of civil society organizations and 

independent media outlets.

Since switching diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to the PRC in December 2021, 

Nicaragua has engaged with the PRC in bilateral talks for a comprehensive Free Trade 

Agreement. In September 2022, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Nicaraguan Foreign 

10 https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/number-of-latin-americans-living-in-poverty-expected-to-surpass-onethird-of-total/

11 https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters
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Minister Denis Moncada on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, highlighting that the new 

bilateral relationship has already yielded “early harvests.”12

Cuba. President Miguel Diaz-Canel’s government continues to repress all Cuban citizens 

critical of the regime. The government engages in arbitrary detention, including children, and

limits access to information and freedom of expression, and incarcerates political dissidents. The 

Cuban government’s oppressive tactics have forced more than 230,000 Cubans to seek refuge in 

the United States in fiscal year 2022.13 In September 2022, Hurricane Ian struck Cuba, 

devastating homes, causing flooding, and knocking out power to many communities.

Venezuela. The humanitarian crisis caused by the Maduro regime in Venezuela remains 

one of the most severe in the world. President Nicolas Maduro’s regime and security forces 

continue to target and deny access to critical services to any citizen who speaks out against them. 

His regime continues to engage in extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and 

prosecution without due process. The International Criminal Court is currently investigating 

possible crimes against humanity in Venezuela.

The Maduro regime’s oppressive tactics and gross economic mismanagement have 

caused more than seven million Venezuelans to seek refuge elsewhere, causing instability and 

deepening challenges for those nations that have welcomed them. U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection statistics show that more than 187,000 Venezuelan migrants were encountered at the 

U.S.-Mexico border in FY 2022.

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12 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/kjgzbdfyyq/202209/t20220921_10769061.html

13 https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters

14 https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters
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Levers: Overcoming Threats and Challenges in the AOR

The pervasive threats and challenges highlighted above pose significant risks to U.S. and 

regional security interests. We cannot accept such risks so close to home and we confront them 

by strengthening partnerships, countering threats, and building our team. 

Strengthen Partnerships 

As the Secretary of Defense said, “you can’t surge trust at the eleventh hour; trust is 

something you have to work on every day.”15 We need to continuously engage our partner 

nations to build and sustain that trust and be their preferred partner. As we campaign in strategic 

competition to enable integrated deterrence and build enduring advantages, our engagements, 

presence, and policies must be flexible, consistent, and responsive to counter malign influence in 

the region. 

The best way to outcompete our adversaries is to help partner democracies deliver for 

their populations at the speed of relevance. We achieve this by improving partner nation 

capability, capacity, and resilience through security cooperation, exercises, and training 

programs while upholding democratic values to ensure malign influence and autocratic 

alternatives do not further take root in this region.

The main priority in our USSOUTHCOM Campaign Plan is to expose and mitigate PRC 

malign activity. Ultimately, strategic competition with the PRC is an ideological one between 

democracy and authoritarianism. Presently, the majority of nations in the Western Hemisphere 

are democracies, and eight of the 14 nations that still recognize Taiwan are located in 

15 Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, speech to U.S. and NATO troops in Bulgaria, 18 March 2022.
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USSOUTHCOM's AOR. Beijing is seeking to reduce that number and increase influence 

throughout the region while putting the defense of the U.S. homeland at risk. 

Security Cooperation. Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs are my main lever for 

engaging partners in this posture-limited theater. These programs allow us to be on the field and 

engaged, to strengthen our partnerships, and develop military capabilities to counter a broad 

spectrum of threats and challenges. From high-end technical training that keeps partner 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the air, to building institutional 

capacity that develops logistics and lifecycle management disciplines, to professional military 

education, we are developing trust and interpersonal linkages. USSOUTHCOM’s BPC programs 

aim to make our partners resilient to the adversaries operating in this hemisphere. 

Our embedded Ministry of Defense Advisors and field service representatives within 

partner nation security ministries, such as those in Colombia, support modernization and 

innovation efforts in such areas as personnel, defense intelligence, and doctrine development to 

help our partners meet threats to their national security.

The U.S. Colombia Action Plan enables Colombia to provide training and readiness 

directly to several countries, including Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, the 

Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Paraguay in Spanish, and at a fraction of the cost of U.S.-

provided training. We really appreciate congressional support of this program.

These security cooperation programs offer a huge return on investment as they build 

trust and enhance capabilities and security throughout the region -- a little goes a long way here.

Department of State Security Assistance. State security assistance programs increase 

interoperability with our partners while meeting their individual security requirements. Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 
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programs produce an exponential return in this AOR. Brazil recently made an FMS purchase of

$15.8 million of 12 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles as part of the Brazilian Marine Corps 

modernization plan, strengthening its ability to counter threats and enhancing interoperability 

with U.S. forces. The former U.S. Coast Guard cutters Albacore, Cochito, and Gannet were 

delivered to Uruguay on November 12, 2022. These ships greatly enhance the maritime security 

of Uruguay and demonstrate that the United States is the preferred partner in the region. The 

Colombian Army received 86 armored vehicles in 2022 via the EDA program, giving Colombia 

a more modern capability to counter threats facing the country. 

USSOUTHCOM executes State’s International Military Training and Education (IMET) 

program that provides professional military education to personnel from 28 countries in the

region. In 2022, USSOUTHCOM countries were allocated $13.9 million for the IMET program. 

On average, this allocation provides professional military education for approximately 800 

international students in U.S. schools. The IMET program is one of USSOUTHCOM’s strongest 

levers for countering the PRC and other malign actors in the region by acquainting international 

students with democratic ideals and professional military doctrine. Partner nation personnel who 

attend these schools often go on to become senior military leaders in their countries. The 

relationships built at these schools last a lifetime.

Joint Exercise Program. Our Joint Exercise Program continues to provide an outsized 

return on investment not only in building readiness, but also in strengthening partnerships that 

allow us to counter malign influence. In 2022 we had over 11,000 participants from 34 nations 

take part in our exercises, demonstrating once again that the United States has the convening 

power to bring nations together. These complex training events were multi-domain in nature and 
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provided us year-long engagement opportunities across the AOR, to include engagements with 

key leaders. 

USSOUTHCOM’s exercise program in the counter-TCO realm also brings together the 

Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Department of State, and Department of Homeland 

Security (including the U.S. Coast Guard), along with partner nation and allied military forces to 

enhance readiness, interoperability, and domain awareness, and to increase intelligence and 

information sharing. 

Additionally, our exercises include training on human rights and on Women, Peace, and 

Security, which helps to enhance professionalism and advance democratic principles.

USNS COMFORT. The USNS COMFORT hospital ship deployed to five countries in 

the region from October to December 2022 – Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, the Dominican 

Republic, and Haiti – taking part in a humanitarian assistance, readiness building, and goodwill 

mission. The USNS COMFORT’s crew included military and civilian personnel as well as 

personnel from non-governmental organizations and partner nation militaries. Since its inception 

in 2007, the Continuing Promise mission has treated more than 580,000 patients overall and 

conducted over 7,000 surgeries. The USNS COMFORT mission to the USSOUTHCOM AOR 

historically lasts approximately 159 days, but even during this year’s reduced mission of 52 days, 

the COMFORT managed to treat over 30,000 patients, conduct 350 surgeries, and positively 

impact 100,000 people with its outreach activities. This tremendous soft power asset will have 

lasting effects not just on the individuals who were treated, but also on the entire region. 

Operation Health Engagement Assistance Response Team (HEART). During Operation 

HEART, a team of 34 medical professionals and 17 support personnel conducted orthopedic, 
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ophthalmology, and dental surgeries in Guatemala and Honduras. In just 56 days, Operation 

HEART treated 993 patients and conducted a knowledge exchange with medical residents and 

doctors from Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador.

Key Leader Engagements. Since I last addressed this committee, I have visited 13 

countries and conducted over 90 key leader engagements with ministers and chiefs of defense. 

Increasingly, I have also met with heads of state and vice presidents as the appetite grows 

amongst our partners to engage at senior levels with the United States. To date, I have engaged 

eight presidents, three vice presidents, and two prime ministers, and I have a full calendar of 

engagements planned throughout 2023. Establishing and cultivating these relationships is vital 

and we must step up our presence in the region to maintain relevance. Relationships absolutely 

matter, and our partner democracies are desperate for assistance from the United States, but if 

we’re not there in time, they have no choice but to take what’s available, creating opportunities 

for the PRC to expand its influence. Just like with the COVID-19 vaccine, they wanted a U.S. 

vaccine, but some partner nations had to take the Chinese Sinopharm or Russian Sputnik 

vaccines at 50-60% effectiveness because we weren’t there with our Pfizer or Moderna 

vaccine.16, 17

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Infrastructure is one of our partners’ critical needs, and 

the PRC is leveraging that need to achieve influence overmatch in the region. We need to step up 

with much greater responsiveness in our processes if we want to address our partner nation 

requirements and outcompete the PRC in this domain. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) works with USSOUTHCOM and partner nations to advance security, preserve 

16 https://apnews.com/article/china-gao-fu-vaccines-offer-low-protection-coronavirus675bcb6b5710c7329823148ffbff6ef9

17 https://absolutelymaybe.plos.org/2022/04/20/did-we-ever-find-out-how-effective-sputnik-v-vaccine-actually-is/
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environmental sustainability and climate resiliency, and protect at-risk indigenous populations. 

USACE is providing technical support to the Panama Canal Authority to help ensure the canal 

operates successfully for the next 50 years. It also supports Ecuador to mitigate the negative 

effects of a substandard PRC construction project at the Coca Coda Dam. In January 2023, at the 

request of the embassy and the government of the Dominican Republic, USACE assigned a 

subject-matter expert embedded within the Dominican Republic’s Agency of Mines and 

Minerals to assist with developing efforts to preserve rare earth materials. 

From a defense and security cooperation perspective, USACE’s recent agreement with 

the Peruvian Navy to build out Peru’s port facilities, and its continued construction efforts on 

Tolemaida Air Base in Colombia, facilitating the development of the largest rotary wing training 

and maintenance facilities in the region, will increase our partners’ capacity to counter TCOs in 

the region. 

State Partnership Program. Through the State Partnership Program (SPP), the National 

Guard continues to develop relationships with our partner nations. Eighteen U.S. states, Puerto 

Rico and the District of Columbia have active partnerships with defense and security forces from 

30 nations in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. By providing long-term and 

consistent support and building trust and teamwork, National Guard servicemembers give us the 

presence on the field that is so critical. For example, this year, the South Dakota National Guard

worked with its partner Suriname to renovate a school for 450 children and provide medical and 

dental care to three separate rural and underserved communities, impacting approximately 2,500 

civilians. This year, the Regional Security System (RSS), consisting of seven Eastern Caribbean 

nations, conducted 25 events across the RSS and in the continental United States.
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SPP’s success is enhanced through National Guard participation in partner nation 

exercises like those in Brazil and Colombia. The National Guard also provided medical service 

members from Puerto Rico, Louisiana, Arkansas, and South Carolina to our successful 

Continuing Promise operations through the USNS COMFORT deployment. 

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR). Latin America and the 

Caribbean are susceptible to hurricanes, earthquakes, droughts, and other extreme natural 

disasters. The United States is there with assistance before, during, and after disaster strikes. 

USSOUTHCOM engages our partner nations regularly, encouraging and assisting them to take 

positive steps toward disaster risk reduction, mitigation, preparedness, and resiliency. Several of 

our annual exercises, including TRADEWINDS and CENTAM GUARDIAN, have a HA/DR 

component to help build resiliency and readiness related to climate change and natural disaster 

response. 

A recent example of our support is our response to Haiti’s widening political and 

humanitarian crises. Supporting a whole-of-government effort led by the U.S. Agency for 

International Development and the State Department, USSOUTHCOM delivered thousands of 

gallons of much-needed fuel and 300,000 cholera treatment packets to Haiti. This operation 

relieved strain on the local healthcare system and enabled the U.S. Embassy to remain open to 

facilitate life-saving assistance. 

Humanitarian assistance activities also address basic needs of the population and build 

partner capacity to maintain a healthy population. Activities emphasize public health capacity 

building, such as improving medical facilities, disease surveillance systems, and providing basic 

medical equipment, education, prevention, and training. Basic infrastructure activities focus on 

building partner capacity to provide essential services, like potable water. Finally, we recently 
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joined with 12 other countries to identify logistics processes, procedures, and protocols that are 

required to improve the military logistics support to HA/DR activities in the Western 

Hemisphere.

Confronting Climate Change. This is one of the regions most impacted by climate 

change. Hurricanes, rising sea levels, flooding, and drought are causing grave harm to the 

region’s health, food, water, energy, and socioeconomic development. Extreme weather events 

impact our partners’ national security, displacing populations and increasing irregular migration 

already accelerated by TCOs and insecurity.

These calamities know no borders. In 2022, Hurricane Fiona slammed into the 

Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, Hurricane Ian ravaged western Florida and Cuba, and 

Hurricane Julia caused landslides and wiped-out crops in Central America. To help address 

threats from climate change and support humanitarian assistance, USSOUTHCOM works to 

strengthen our partners nations’ ability to address more demanding disaster response roles, 

mitigate the effects from climate change, protect the environment, and enable the transition to 

clean energy through subject-matter expert exchanges and by incorporating energy security 

scenarios in exercises. Successfully confronting this complex issue requires a true integrated 

approach. For example, USSOUTHCOM partners with the Pacific Disaster Center in Hawaii to 

facilitate disaster response training and conduct National Disaster Preparedness Baseline 

Assessments with our partner nations. These assessments promote a multi-agency approach to 

disaster risk reduction and national disaster preparedness, in collaboration with partner nations’

national disaster management agencies. 
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Countering Threats

Countering PRC malign efforts. In alignment with the 2022 National Defense Strategy’s

integrated deterrence approach, we strive to use all levers through campaigning to deny the PRC 

the perceived benefits of aggression. USSOUTHCOM leverages the expertise of the Executive 

branch, to include the Departments of State and Commerce, to improve partner nations’

knowledge of effective legal frameworks to develop reliable and secure telecommunication 

infrastructure and cyber resilience, while highlighting state-of-the-art substantive alternatives to 

counter PRC state-owned enterprise expansion in the region.

By methodically identifying and synchronizing separate initiatives, from building cyber 

capability to exposing PRC malign activities, we can strengthen critical infrastructure to improve 

our collective ability to operate in the face of multi-domain threats posed by the PRC. 

Information sharing with our partners on the malign activities of the PRC in other nations and 

regions that have undercut sovereignty is critical to ensuring our partners can make informed 

decisions on their engagements with the PRC. However, information sharing alone is 

insufficient. Collectively, in a whole-of-nation integrated approach, we must also provide viable 

alternatives for partnerships and offer significantly more incentives through campaigning for 

critical infrastructure investment and port development in the region.

While the PRC consistently works to expand its network of military space infrastructure 

across the AOR, we are focused on strengthening relationships with our allies and partners 

through sustained engagement and investment with what we currently have, including by 

assisting our partners to build capability to conduct space operations to meet their needs. By 

focusing on strengthening relations, the United States demonstrates what a true partner looks 

like, which stands in stark contrast to the transactional nature of PRC engagements. This 
21

strategy, coupled with continued exposure of the military purpose of the PRC’s scientific or 

academic space sites in the region, may slow and possibly reverse the expansion of the PRC’s 

space network in our neighborhood.

Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported Fishing. IUUF is another area where we must leverage 

diverse capabilities and authorities. We have teamed up with the Department of State, partner 

nation stakeholders, the private sector, civil society, international organizations, and an 

interagency team of U.S. government experts to confront this issue head on. The U.S. Coast 

Guard is conducting various IUUF missions in the AOR, and USSOUTHCOM has four ongoing 

IUUF initiatives that are complementary in nature.

Enhanced Domain Awareness is a secure, unclassified, virtual environment where 

USSOUTHCOM, interagency, and foreign partners can leverage commercially and publicly 

available information and analytics. This allows us to collaborate on diverse security challenges 

including strategic competition and IUUF as well as issues like migration, human trafficking, 

and illegal mining. 

USSOUTHCOM has signed a memorandum of understanding with Global Fishing Watch 

and has a longstanding relationship with Florida International University through which we 

partnered to create the Security Research Hub—a virtual research community that brings 

together the United States, partner nations, academic institutions, civil society, and the private 

sector to foster shared understanding of the most pervasive security issues, to include IUUF. 

USSOUTHCOM is also exploring areas of cooperation and opportunities to provide 

technical assistance and support to the Eastern Tropical Pacific Marine Corridor, a voluntary 

regional cooperation mechanism created by the coastal states of Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia, 

and Panama. 
22

Finally, working with 14 partner nations and the National Maritime IntelligenceIntegration Office, U.S. Navy South leads the way for an intergovernmental approach to 

information-sharing efforts. When fully implemented, they will collectively foster timely, 

actionable information sharing, multifunctional collaboration, and multinational trust. This 

collaboration will illuminate nefarious actors negatively impacting our partner nations’ 

economies and populations.

Countering Russian malign influence. USSOUTHCOM is postured to compete with 

Russia through the coordination and application of information-related capabilities. While Russia 

may seem distant, its presence and influence is felt in our hemisphere, actively undermining the 

security and stability of our partner nations. Our multifaceted approach aims to bolster partner 

efforts and expose malign activities, with the goal of blunting Russian exploitation in the 

information environment.

Our partners are inclined to support efforts that impose costs on Russia. Some are willing 

to exchange their Soviet-era equipment for NATO-interoperable, U.S.-made equipment. 

However, as our partners agree to support efforts against Russia, the United States must have 

responsive mechanisms in place to rapidly provide replacement assets to maintain partner nation 

readiness – if not done right, we could lose this opportunity.

Cyber. Cyber is an all-encompassing domain capable of affecting every sector of society, 

not just defense. USSOUTHCOM partners with other U.S. agencies and organizations such as 

the Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice along with U.S. Cyber 

Command, our National Guard SPP teammates, and the U.S. Coast Guard, to deliver the right 

support at the right time to assist our partners with their cyber-related challenges. 
23

Through our cyberspace advise and assist efforts, including subject-matter expert 

exchanges and leveraging the expertise of our Joint Combatant Command Cyber Assistance 

Teams, we support our partners’ efforts to advance their defensive cyber capabilities and develop 

cyber resiliency. These programs are enablers that help our partners tactically defend against the 

threats posed by Russia and its proxies in the cyber domain. However, with the significant 

increase in nation-state cyber attacks and hacktivist attacks in the region, our partner nations are 

struggling to protect their citizens in the cyber domain, and we are in a race to help them protect 

their cyber assets before they choose competitor solutions.

18

Competing in the Information Space. Additionally, our information operations team 

shapes pro-U.S., pro-democracy narratives, counters disinformation by promoting fact-based 

information, and works aggressively to reduce U.S. adversary influence in the information 

environment. This team highlights democratic ideals such as respecting human rights and 

protecting the rule of law. This capability is postured to provide accurate, timely, and valid 

information to support reasonable decision making, resulting in better outcomes and ultimately 

decreasing the effectiveness of propaganda. 

Agile Processes. To outcompete our adversaries and win through campaigning, we need 

to be agile and support our partners at the speed of relevance. While we are committed to 

transparent processes, we must be faster and more innovative to outcompete our adversaries. 

Right now, our partner nations are quickly losing confidence in the U.S.’s ability to deliver 

capability. At a recent event when I spoke about what I call “Team Democracy,” a term I use to 

describe integrated deterrence and working together to counter adversary malign activity, a head 

of state responded that there aren’t very many on “Team Democracy” anymore, citing multiple 

18 https://www.recordedfuture.com/latin-american-governments-targeted-by-ransomware
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examples of countries turning away from democracy because the U.S. overpromises and 

underdelivers. FMF, FMS, and Security Cooperation are great levers that can make huge inroads 

in the AOR when delivered at the speed of relevance for our partners. However, these programs 

are only as good as the processes by which we execute them. While a little goes a long way in 

this AOR, we need to do better to support and react at the speed of need, armed with the 

capabilities our partners can implement quickly and sustain for the long term. When we don’t 

support our partners at the speed of need, our competitors willingly fill the gap. 

To help improve processes, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has 

established two working groups to break down barriers to our success. The Campaigning in the 

Western Hemisphere Group brings together entities within the Department of Defense that play a 

role in building partner capacity, and the Defense Opportunities Group convenes interagency 

partners that have a stake in a stable and secure Western Hemisphere. We aspire to quickly gain 

efficiencies across the U.S. Government so we may apply all levers of national power in this 

vital strategic competition.

Countering TCOs. Our Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) conducts the 

statutorily-directed mission to detect and monitor illicit drugs transiting toward the United States 

in the maritime and air domains, delivering a high return on modest investments. In Fiscal Year 

2022, JIATF-South facilitated the disruption of 371 illegal smuggling events, including a total of 

almost 300 metric tons of cocaine and over 140,000 pounds of marijuana, with a combined 

wholesale value of $7.5 billion and saving an estimated 2,976 American lives. In addition to 

saving U.S. lives and reducing TCO revenue, JIATF-South-facilitated drug trafficking

disruptions produce evidence in the form of contraband, detainees, and other information. Our 
25

interagency and international law enforcement partners use this evidence, to help affect judicial 

end states that degrade and dismantle TCOs.

I want to highlight our international partners’ participation in these operations, as they are 

key to overall mission success. Our international partners participated in 76% of the JIATFSouth-facilitated disruptions (up from 62% last year) and were responsible for removing 475,000 

kilograms of transit zone cocaine headed toward the United States. This is a testament to their 

commitment to support this regional effort and build their capability and capacity. 

U.S.-led, multinational counternarcotics operations ultimately result in our international 

partners taking the lead on their own operations, as Colombia does via their Operation Orion. 

Colombia executed two iterations of Orion in 2022, leading a coalition of 41 countries, resulting 

in the disruption of more than 180,000 kilograms of cocaine and seizing dozens of conveyances. 

This is an excellent example of integrated deterrence return on investment – gained by 

combining willing and able international partners with a committed U.S. presence in the Western 

Hemisphere. Each of these operations was only successful because of the U.S. investment to 

train and equip our Colombian military and security partners.

Notwithstanding our significant achievements over the decades in this mission space, 

there is still more to do. As U.S. resources against this threat decline, we will continue to 

innovate – both in strategy, like re-examining current authorities, and unconventional resourcing, 

like contract assets, commercial data, and artificial intelligence and machine learning.

Combating Money Laundering. Systemic political corruption and lack of strong antimoney laundering policies make the region a permissive environment for illicit financial activity. 

USSOUTHCOM continues to identify TCO financial support networks, providing direct analytic 

support to U.S. Treasury Department and other interagency partners that facilitate sanctions, 
26

arrests, and prosecutions against TCOs. Recently, USSOUTHCOM supported Treasury’s 

designation of Ecuadorian national Wilmer Emilio Sanchez Farfan, one of the most significant 

drug traffickers in the world and a major cocaine supplier to the Sinaloa cartel.19 While 

continued disruptions of illicit drug movements toward the United States remain critical, to truly 

disrupt these billion-dollar conglomerates, we must also support interagency efforts to follow the 

money.

Coast Guard Support. The U.S. Coast Guard is one of USSOUTHCOM’s strongest 

partners, with its National Security Cutters and Fast Response Cutters providing the bulk of our 

counterdrug forces. U.S. Coast Guard assets enhance operations with unique capabilities and 

authorities which, when used in conjunction with the U.S. Navy and partner nation platforms, 

maximize the effectiveness of a variety of missions. The Coast Guard is executing its largest 

fleet recapitalization since World War II. These recapitalization efforts will provide capabilities 

that support three USSOUTHCOM strategic initiatives: enhancing Theater Security Cooperation, 

countering IUUF, and combating TCOs. Additionally, the Coast Guard provides valuable 

humanitarian mission support across the region, saving lives and delivering much-needed aid 

when natural disasters suddenly strike the region.

Building our Team – People First

Housing. Our service members and families are our strength and foundation. While 

having our headquarters and two subordinate commands in South Florida offers a great synergy 

with our AOR, our team faces extraordinary pressures with the expensive, competitive, and 

volatile housing market. In September 2022, Secretary Austin announced immediate and long19 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0592
27

term actions to help strengthen the economic security and stability of service members and their 

families. We benefited with automatic increases in the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for 

the Miami-Dade and Broward County areas that have carried forward in the Calendar Year 2023 

BAH rates. We are seeking similar relief for the Key West area. We are also continuing our work 

with the Department of the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on a housing 

solution to address servicemember concerns about cost and availability of housing in the Miami 

area. 

JIATF-South Resiliency. JIATF-South is currently operating out of 70-year-old facilities 

that are severely degraded. We received full fiscal year 2023 planning and design funding to 

complete the design for a new command and control facility. We appreciate this continued 

support as we look to finalize the design and request the military construction funding to 

construct a resilient facility for this critical mission for the nation.

Women, Peace and Security (WPS). At USSOUTHCOM, we deliberately integrate 

gender perspectives throughout all ranks into our operations, activities, and investments, 

exemplifying a truly diverse joint force and encouraging our partner nations to do the same. Our 

main objective is to maximize the talents of the force through recruitment, retention, training, 

and advancement. We also highly encourage partner nation leaders to increase their numbers of 

women who participate in IMET and other special programs. We are seeing results. In August 

2022, the Florida National Guard and Guyana’s Defense Force hosted the first Caribbean 

Regional WPS conference with leadership from 12 partner nations – including Guyana’s First 

Lady Arya Ali and the AOR’s first female Chief of Defense, Jamaica’s Staff Rear Admiral 

Antonette Wemyss-Gorman, advocating for gender inclusivity and advancing regional influence 

in ways that our adversaries cannot. In September 2022, Colombia appointed its first female 
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Senior Enlisted Leader of the Colombian Military Services, Command Sergeant Major Consuelo 

Diaz Alvarez, and in October 2022, for the first time in its history, the Colombian Navy 

promoted two female Navy Captains, Beatriz Helena Garcia Restrepo and Carolina Gomez de 

Castillo, to the rank of Rear Admiral. Although much work remains, these are just a few of the 

examples that demonstrate USSOUTHCOM and its partners’ commitment to provide 

opportunities for women to become leaders in the defense and security sectors. 

Total Force. The United States military is the most powerful in the world, and 

USSOUTHCOM leverages all available personnel, making us flexible and agile to counter any 

challenges we may face. Of the service members at USSOUTHCOM, up to 20 percent at any 

given time are Guard or Reserve members conducting operations in more than 20 locations 

throughout the AOR. 

One such total force mission has been ongoing for a decade. Since 2003, Air National 

Guard Airmen have supported JIATF-South’s detection and monitoring mission through the 

Host Nation Rider Program. This program provides technical language support and 

translation/interpretation that has been instrumental in achieving successful detection and 

monitoring of air operations within the AOR. In fiscal year 2022, this program was involved in 

the seizure of over 49,000 kilograms of cocaine, 24,000 pounds of marijuana, and the 

apprehension of 154 detainees.

The Reserve Component is a force multiplier used in a cyclic manner to provide 

predictability, operational capability, and as a strategic force, providing depth to support a full 

spectrum of conflicts. Guard and Reserve support is critical to USSOUTHCOM’s mission 

continuity and success.
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What Resources Does USSOUTHCOM Need?

In this region, a small investment – whether in time, physical resources, funding, or 

collaboration – goes a long way. We don’t have to outspend the PRC to outcompete, but we must 

be present on the field and deliver at the speed of relevance. This requires having a timely budget 

– continuing resolutions are disruptive to U.S. and partner nation efforts to defend against 

threats. If we don’t, China and Russia will fill the void.

Security Cooperation is our main tool for building the capability of our very willing 

partners. These partners take our small investments and immediately employ them against the 

threats and challenges that affect our entire hemisphere. Our partner nations are a force 

multiplier in a posture-limited theater. The support Congress provided for the fiscal year 2023 

budget toward making our partners more capable makes us all stronger. We look forward to 

putting those funds to good use to support both our fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024 

programs for security cooperation in our region.

Security Assistance goes hand-in-hand with security cooperation. The security assistance 

we provide to countries like Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama is a game-changer for our partners 

who are working every day to counter illicit trafficking, address irregular migration, and secure 

our region. However, in contrast, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are currently not 

eligible for FMF. We will work with the Department of State to consider tailored solutions to 

advance regional policy goals. 

Domain Awareness is key to countering PRC, Russia, and TCO malign activities that 

threaten hemispheric security, as well as assisting our partners during disaster relief. Air, 

maritime, land, space, and cyber domain awareness projects in the region fill debilitating 

coverage gaps and enable our partners to counter drug smuggling, IUUF, money laundering, 
30

human smuggling, weapons trafficking, and illegal trade in natural resources. These projects 

reveal shared problems, illuminate opportunities, foster enhanced collaboration, and enable us to 

export security regionally. The ability to sense, make sense, and share data with our partners is 

critical. Maintaining a comprehensive threat picture with our allies and partners through our 

Enhanced Domain Awareness platform enables us to react quickly to threats and to collaborate in 

real time as we engage in combined operations and activities. Critical to building this shared 

picture is commercial imagery, open-source intelligence, and off-the-shelf bulk data analytics 

that allow us to harness this data in the public and commercial space to address critical gaps. 

Aerial ISR is also paramount to maintaining domain awareness. To stay ahead of the 

growing pernicious threats that state and non-state actors pose, we require long-range, longdwell, next-generation aerial ISR, such as solar-powered aircraft with a greater range and time 

over target. Aerial ISR aircraft have been critical to our ability to detect and deliver actionable 

information to other U.S. agencies and partner nations that enable their counternarcotics and 

counter-TCO operations. In fiscal year 2022, information provided by airborne ISR assets

operating overland accounted for the seizure of 322 metric tons of cocaine and deprived TCOs of 

over $9 billion in profits. To further enhance our ability to enable counternarcotics and counterTCO operations, we are pursuing ISR technologies with a greater ability to detect active drug 

production laboratories. When deployed, this capability will allow us to collect over a 4x larger 

area with twice the sensor resolution of any comparable platform in the U.S. Government’s 

inventory.

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) also remains a key intelligence 

provider in meeting U.S. Southern Command’s priorities. Warning decision-makers of the 

breadth and depth of challenges in the Western Hemisphere requires geospatial analysis at speed 
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and scale. We appreciate Congress’s continued support for NGA’s budget request and for their 

personnel supporting the Combatant Commands.

Innovation, Science, and Technology. Today we face a more level playing field in 

technology, and we need to rapidly adjust how fast we get technology to the warfighter to 

maintain dominance and confound the adversary. The USSOUTHCOM AOR provides a 

permissive environment that has a high tolerance for technology experimentation, willing 

partners, and diverse climates and geography, all close to the U.S. homeland. This affords us

great opportunities to conduct innovative activities with our partners that help gain and maintain 

a strategic advantage over the PRC, Russia, and other malign actors. 

We take every opportunity to capitalize on these benefits. We are developing green 

energy capabilities, working on the first unmanned persistent solar-powered aircraft with a 300-

pound payload, creating small-scale autonomous low-profile vessels, and developing laser 

communications systems with a low probability of detection and faster speeds than conventional 

solutions on the market. 

A good example of this innovation is our collaboration with the Office of Naval 

Research, which has designed an experimentation series known as SCOUT. SCOUT's inaugural 

cycle automates antiquated processes and places capabilities into warfighters’ hands faster. The 

SCOUT team, comprised of warfighters, engineers, academia, and industry partners, executes 

small-scale, discovery-focused events that provide multiple opportunities to test and measure 

technologies. This year we will conduct our first main event in JIATF-South to integrate 

prototype solutions focused on enhancing counternarcotics operations. 

Information Related Capabilities. To compete in the information environment, 

USSOUTHCOM needs an adequate force structure with the requisite skills to counter the 
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overwhelming threat from malign state actors in the information domain. Our adversaries are 

dedicating significant effort and resources with unrestrictive policies to undermine democracy in 

this region. We must do better to keep pace with them and outcompete them.

NAVSCIATTS. While considering modern warfare, we tend to focus on five domains: 

the high seas, inland regions, air, space, and cyber. However, littorals and rivers are the lifeblood 

of maritime commerce, large population centers, and bustling seaports for most of the 31 LAC 

countries. Ensuring security in these vital areas is essential to good governance, economic 

growth, and long-term prosperity. Malign state and non-state actors know the significance of 

littorals and rivers and routinely use them to transport bulk currency and illegal drugs, smuggle 

people and a vast array of illicit commodities, and enable illegal mining and logging activities 

that imperil the environment.

We appreciate the support Congress offered last year for the Naval Small Craft 

Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) in Stennis, Mississippi. The 

maritime training and education programs at NAVSCIATTS generate outsized return on 

investment, providing invaluable opportunities to military and law enforcement personnel from 

the United States and our allies and partners, most of whom operate smaller craft. Expertise

shared at NAVSCIATTS generates reciprocal trust, shared knowledge and understanding, 

collaboration, and multifaceted technical skills that enable integrated deterrence against the PRC 

and other malign actors. They also reduce environmental damage and protect natural resources. 

Ambassadors. We truly appreciate Congress’s efforts to confirm additional ambassadors 

in the Western Hemisphere last year. Having a confirmed ambassador in country is critical to 

maintaining strong relationships and, conversely, not having one in place can have a detrimental 
33

effect and opens the door to our adversaries in the region. We look forward to Congress’s

continued support in the effort to strengthen diplomatic ties in our neighborhood.

Conclusion

The defense of the U.S. homeland is directly linked to the resilience, stability, and 

security of the Latin America and Caribbean region. Proximity places us on the frontline of 

strategic competition, as we share transboundary challenges and global threats. This requires the 

USSOUTHCOM team to be a trusted partner and pursue efforts that meet our partners where 

they are, maximizing our efforts where their priorities align with our own national interests. 

Meeting these challenges requires campaigning through an integrated approach to utilize all 

available levers across the DOD, U.S. interagency, Allies and Partner Nations to establish the 

desired conditions of security, peace, and prosperity throughout our neighborhood.