Slip Op. 06 – 148 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

U.S. TSUBAKI, INC., 

 Before: Richard W. Goldberg, 

 Plaintiff, Senior Judge 

 v. Court No. 01-00519 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant. 

OPINION

[Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied in part. 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.] 

Dated: October 10, 2006 

Barnes, Richardson, & Colburn (Brian Francis Walsh, Christine 

Henry Martinez, Kazumune V. Kano) for Plaintiff U.S. Tsubaki, 

Inc. 

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Barbara S. 

Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office, 

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of 

Justice (James A. Curley), for Defendant United States. 

GOLDBERG, Senior Judge: This case involves an action to review 

a denial of protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (2000). Plaintiff 

U.S. Tsubaki, Inc. (“Tsubaki”) moves the court, pursuant to 

USCIT Rule 56, to enter summary judgment in its favor, and to 

order the defendant U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(“Customs”) to reliquidate the entries at issue and refund, with 

interest, the excess duties paid by Tsubaki. Customs also moves 

for summary judgment, contending that while five of Tsubaki’s 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 2 

entries are deemed liquidated by operation of law, the majority 

of them are not. See Def.’s Br. Part. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 

3 (“Def.’s Br.”).1

 

Five of the entries2

 are deemed liquidated because Customs 

waited longer than is permitted under 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (d) 

(Supp. V 1984) to liquidate at the rate determined by the U.S. 

Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) administrative review. 

Tsubaki is therefore entitled to a refund of antidumping duties 

paid on them. However, the Court agrees with Customs that with 

the exception of these five entries, the entries at issue are not 

deemed liquidated. 

I. BACKGROUND

 A. Procedural History 

Tsubaki imports roller chain from Japan into the United 

States. Pl.’s Mot. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 3 (“Pl.’s Br.”). From 

1979 to 1983, Tsubaki made fifty-six entries of roller chain 

through various ports, which were subject to an antidumping duty 

order. During this time, Commerce held two periods of 

 

1

 With respect to the five entries subject to deemed liquidation, 

Customs concedes that Tsubaki is entitled to a refund of any 

excess duty paid and interest assess upon liquidation, with 

interest on the refund as provided by law. See Def.’s Br. 3. 

2

 These entries are No. 83-952658-0, which corresponds to protest 

no. 3001-01-100030, and Nos. 83-676679-6, 83-677277-7, 83-

677819-5, and 83-677859-3, which correspond to protest no. 2720-

01-100107. See Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 9; Def.’s 

Br. 17-18. 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 3 

administrative review: (1) December 1, 1979 through March 31, 

1981 (“the first period”); and (2) April 1, 1981 through 

September 1, 1983 (“the second period”). Liquidation of the 

entries was suspended pending the final results from the 

administrative reviews. The results from the first period were 

published in the Federal Register on December 4, 1986. See

Roller Chain, Other Than Bicycle From Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,755 

(Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 4, 1986) (final admin. review). The 

weighted average final dumping margin for the roller chain at 

issue during the first period was 0.07%. There was no cash 

deposit required for entries from this period of review. 

The results from the second period of review were published 

in the Federal Register on May 8, 1987. See Roller Chain, Other 

Than Bicycle, From Japan, 52 Fed. Reg. 17,425 (Dep’t of Commerce 

May 8, 1987) (final admin. review). There was no cash deposit 

required for the merchandise at the time of entry,3 but Commerce 

subsequently determined that the weighted average dumping margin 

over the period of review ranged from 0.18% to 0.36%. 52 Fed. 

Reg. at 17,427. 

Commerce issued liquidation instructions to Customs on 

September 18, 2000 for both the first and second periods of 

 

3

 There was no cash deposit required for entries filed from April 

1, 1981 through September 4, 1981. The cash deposit rate for 

entries filed from September 5, 1981 through September 1, 1983 

was 0%. Pl.’s Br. 4. 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 4 

review. Customs then liquidated these entries between October 

2000 and February 2001. Thereafter, Tsubaki filed protests 

under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 claiming that the entries at issue were 

deemed liquidated by operation of law under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). 

Tsubaki argued that Customs should have liquidated the entries 

at 0%, as that was the cash deposit rate in effect at the time 

of entry. The protest was denied, and Tsubaki subsequently 

commenced this action. 

 B. Relevant Statutory History 

The primary issue before this Court is which version of 19 

U.S.C. § 1504(d) applies in this case. In 1978, Congress 

promulgated its first statute governing “deemed liquidation.” 

Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. 

L. No. 95-410, § 209, 92 Stat. 888, 902-03, 19 U.S.C. § 1504. 

Congress made minor changes to this statute in 1984.4

 Section 

1504 generally provides that if merchandise is not liquidated 

within one year from the date of entry, it is “deemed 

liquidated” at the rate asserted at the time of entry by the 

importer. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (Supp. V 1984). However, 

 

4

 Congress made a technical amendment to § 1504 by striking out 

“his consignee, or agent” and replacing it with “of record” in 

subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d). See Trade and Tariff Act of 

1984, Pub. L. 98-573, § 191, 98 Stat. 2948, 2970. This was the 

last amendment made to 19 U.S.C. § 1504 until the 1993 

amendment, which is discussed in further detail below.
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 5 

special rules apply if liquidation has been suspended. From 

1984 until 1993, § 1504(d) provided: 

(d) Limitation - Any entry of merchandise not 

liquidated at the expiration of four years from the 

applicable date specified in subsection (a) of this 

section, shall be deemed liquidated at the rate of 

duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted at 

the time of entry by the importer of record, unless 

liquidation continues to be suspended as required by 

statute or court order. When such a suspension of 

liquidation is removed, the entry shall be liquidated 

within 90 days therefrom. 

Id. § 1504(d) (emphasis added). At first glance it appears that 

Customs must liquidate an entry within ninety days after 

suspension of liquidation is removed, but courts have 

interpreted the ninety-day time limit as directory, not 

mandatory. See Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 191 F.3d 

1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[E]ntries not liquidated within 90 

days after removal of suspension are not deemed liquidated by 

operation of law . . . .”)(citing Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. 

United States, 884 F.2d 563, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Because 

this time limit is discretionary, 

[t]he statute had an unfortunate anomaly that made 

deemed liquidation available for entries for which 

removal from suspension occurred within the four-year 

period, but not for entries for which removal from 

suspension occurred even one day after the four-year 

time limit. In those circumstances, Customs had an 

unlimited amount of time in which to liquidate 

entries. 

Koyo Corp. of U.S.A. v. United States, 29 CIT __, __, 403 F. 

Supp. 2d 1305, 1308 (2005). 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 6 

Section 1504(d) was amended by the North American Free 

Trade Agreement Implementation Act in 1993. See Pub. L. No. 

103-182, § 641, 107 Stat. 2057, 2204-05. The 1993 version 

provides as follows: 

(d) Removal of suspension. When a suspension required 

by statute or court order is removed, the Customs 

Service shall liquidate the entry within 6 months 

after receiving notice of the removal from the 

Department of Commerce, other agency, or a court with 

jurisdiction over the entry. Any entry not liquidated 

by the Customs Service within 6 months after receiving 

such notice shall be treated as having been liquidated 

at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of 

duty asserted at the time of entry by the importer of 

record. 

19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). Unlike the 

1984 version, there is no discretionary ninety-day time limit. 

The 1993 version provides explicitly that merchandise is “deemed 

liquidated” at the rate asserted at the time of entry if Customs 

fails to liquidate an entry within six months after receiving 

notification that the suspension was removed. 

In light of the differences between the 1984 and 1993 

versions of § 1504(d), Tsubaki claims that its merchandise 

entered between 1979 and 1983 should be deemed liquidated as a 

matter of law because Customs failed to liquidate that 

merchandise within six months after suspension of liquidation 

had been removed. Customs disagrees, and asserts that 

application of the 1993 version in this case would have an 

impermissible retroactive effect. Instead, Customs argues that 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 7 

the 1984 version’s ninety-day discretionary limit should govern. 

Furthermore, as the 1984 version’s four-year time limit applies 

to only five of the fifty-six entries at issue, the majority of 

Tsubaki’s entries are not deemed liquidated by operation of law. 

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action 

commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in 

part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1581(a) (2000). This action is timely and jurisdiction is 

proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews protest denials de novo. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2640(a)(1) (2000) (“The Court of International Trade shall 

make its determinations upon the basis of the record made before 

the court in . . . [c]ivil actions contesting the denial of a 

protest.”); see also Rheem Metalurgica S/A v. United States, 20 

CIT 1450, 1456, 951 F. Supp. 241, 246 (1996), aff’d 160 F.3d 

1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if “the 

pleadings [and discovery materials] show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(c). 

In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, if no genuine 

issue of material fact exists, the court must determine whether 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 8 

judgment as a matter of law is appropriate for either party. 

Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 679, 684, 69 F. 

Supp. 2d 1371, 1375 (1999). Summary judgment is proper in this 

case because there are no genuine issues of material fact. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The 1993 Version Would Have an Impermissible Retroactive 

Effect If Applied to These Facts

1. The Test for Retroactivity

In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, The Supreme Court 

identified the proper analysis for determining whether a statute 

should apply if it was enacted after the events giving rise to 

the lawsuit. 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). A court first must 

determine whether Congress expressly “prescribed the statute’s 

proper reach.” Id. If Congress has not done so, the court must 

decide whether the statute would “operate retroactively.” Id. 

A statute’s application is not retroactive “merely because it is 

applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s 

enactment . . . .” Id. at 269. However, it is retroactive if 

the new statutory provision “attaches new legal consequences” to 

those events.5

 Id. at 269-70. 

 

5

 The Landgraf Court provided some further guidance in deciding 

whether a provision is retroactive: 

The conclusion that a particular rule operates 

"retroactively" comes at the end of a process of 

judgment concerning the nature and extent of the 

change in the law and the degree of connection between 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 9 

When a statute operates retroactively, “our traditional 

presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear 

congressional intent favoring such a result.” Id. at 280; see

also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 

(1988) (“Retroactivity is not favored in the law.”). Therefore, 

unless Congress clearly intended otherwise, a statute that 

operates retroactively with respect to events that took place 

before its enactment will not be applied. 

It is not merely a “simple or mechanical task” to determine 

when a statute is retroactive.6 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268. A 

 

the operation of the new rule and a relevant past 

event. Any test of retroactivity will leave room for 

disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to 

classify the enormous variety of legal changes with 

perfect philosophical clarity. However, retroactivity 

is a matter on which judges tend to have “sound 

instincts,” . . . and familiar considerations of fair 

notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations 

offer sound guidance. 

511 U.S. at 270 (citation omitted). 

6

 There are three situations where the application of a new 

statute to past events is “unquestionably proper.” See 

Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273-75; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 341-43 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). These three 

categories are (1) procedural rules, (2) changes in law that 

provide prospective forms of relief, and (3) jurisdictionstripping statutes. None of these categories apply here. First 

of all, the 1993 amendment to § 1504(d) is clearly not a 

jurisdiction-stripping statute. Additionally, it does not 

provide any prospective relief. Instead, the remedy of “deemed 

liquidation” under § 1504(d) is “quintessentially backward 

looking.” See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 282. Because the 1993 

amendment attaches a new legal burden (i.e., deemed liquidation) 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 10 

statute operates retroactively if it would (1) impair the rights 

a party possessed when he acted, (2) increase a party’s 

liability for past conduct, or (3) impose new duties with 

respect to transactions already completed. See id. at 280. In 

deciding whether the application of legislation would be 

retroactive, a court must look at the “interrelationship between 

the new law and past conduct.” Travenol Labs., Inc. v. United 

 

to conduct that has already occurred, the statute is 

retroactive. See id. 

Finally, the 1993 version of § 1504(d) does not fall within 

the category of new procedural rules that can be applied to past 

conduct and pending cases. It is true that because rules of 

procedure “regulate secondary rather than primary conduct,” they 

generally do not operate retroactively. Id. at 275. A 

procedural rule is not retroactive if it does not “impose an 

additional or unforeseeable obligation” upon a party. Id. at 

278 (quoting Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 721 

(1974)). However, in this case, § 1504(d) governs how long 

Customs can wait before it must liquidate entries before they 

are “deemed liquidated” by operation of law. Customs’ failure 

to liquidate Tsubaki’s entries within six months after 

suspension of liquidation was removed is the conduct that is 

squarely at issue in this lawsuit. Furthermore, if the 1993 

version of § 1504(d) applied in this case, it would impose an 

unforeseeable obligation on Customs. Under the 1984 version of 

the law, Customs suffered no consequences if it failed to 

liquidate entries that were at least four years old after the 

suspension of liquidation was removed. See supra Part I.B. By 

contrast, under the 1993 statute, any entries, regardless of 

age, would be deemed liquidated if Customs failed to liquidate 

them within six months of receiving liquidation instructions 

after removal of suspension. Customs properly liquidated all 

but five of the entries according to the 1984 version of the 

statute. Because the 1993 version would impose an unforeseeable 

legal obligation on Customs, it would operate retroactively in 

this case. Cf. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 n.29 (“A new rule 

concerning the filing of complaints would not govern an action 

in which the complaint had already been properly filed under the 

old regime . . . .”). 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 11 

States, 118 F.3d 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1997). If the conduct that 

“triggers” a particular statute’s application occurs before the 

law’s effective date, the statute’s application to that conduct 

would be retroactive. See id. (citation omitted). To select 

the appropriate triggering event, the Court will examine at 

which point in the importation process the 1993 version 19 

U.S.C. § 1504(d) becomes relevant.

2. Application of the Test for Retroactivity

In a case that is exactly on point, the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) stated that 

“[t]he ‘triggering event’ for the running of the 6-month time 

period under [the 1993 version of 19 U.S.C. §1504(d)] is the 

lifting of the suspension on liquidation . . . .” Am. Permac, 

191 F.3d at 1381. Prior to 1993, Customs faced very different 

legal consequences if it failed to liquidate within six months 

after suspension of liquidation was removed. See id. Under the 

older statute, Customs was under no statutory mandate to 

liquidate entries within a particular time period. Instead, 

Congress merely suggested that Customs liquidate the relevant 

entries within ninety days. Even if ninety days passed after 

removal of the suspension, the entries would not be deemed 

liquidated.7

 In contrast, after the 1993 amendment, Customs is 

 

7

 As discussed above, if liquidation was suspended, “deemed 

liquidation” would only occur if (1) the entries were less than 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 12 

required to liquidate entries within six months after suspension 

has been removed. If Customs fails to do so, the entries will 

be deemed liquidated. This mandated deemed liquidation is a new 

legal consequence of removal of suspension that was not present 

under the 1984 version. 

The suspension on liquidation of the two sets of Tsubaki’s 

entries was lifted in December 1986 and May 1987, when Commerce 

published the results of its administrative reviews. See Int’l 

Trading Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 596, 606, 110 F. Supp. 2d 

977, 986 (2000), aff’d 281 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 

(suspension removed when final results published by Commerce). 

As the suspension was removed well before the 1993 amendment to 

§ 1504(d), the 1993 version would have a retroactive effect in 

this case. As there is no evidence that Congress contemplated 

that the statute apply retroactively, the presumption against 

retroactivity requires that the 1993 amendment does not apply to 

these facts. See Am. Permac, 191 F.3d at 1381-82 (citing Plaut 

v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 237 (1995)). 

Citing American International, Tsubaki argues that the 

statement by the American Permac court identifying the relevant 

“triggering event” as the removal of suspension is a dictum. 

 

four years old, (2) suspension of liquidation was removed, and 

(3) Customs failed to liquidate within that same four-year 

period. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (Supp. V 1984); see Koyo, 29 CIT at 

__, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1308. 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 13 

The American International court described American Permac’s 

narrow holding as follows: “It [is] impermissible to apply § 

1504(d) as amended in 1993 when the removal of suspension, the 

running of the six-month period, and the date of liquidation by 

operation of law all occurred prior to the effective date of the 

1993 amendment.” See Am. Int’l Chem., Inc. v. United States, 29 

CIT __, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1265 (2005). Unlike in American 

Permac, there was no retroactive effect in American 

International because all the relevant events occurred after the 

1993 amendment. Significantly, in the present case, the removal 

of suspension, the running of the six-month period, and the date 

of liquidation by operation of law all occurred prior to 

December 8, 1993. Therefore, even under the narrower American 

Permac holding restated in American International, the 1993 

version would operate retroactively if applied to Tsubaki’s 

entries.8

 

8

 Tsubaki argues that this case “parallels” that of Fujitsu 

General, in which the court applied the 1993 version of § 

1504(d). Pl.’s Br. 14 (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United 

States, 24 CIT 733, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (2000), aff’d 283 F.3d 

1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). That case involved entries which took 

place between 1986 and 1988. The importer challenged the final 

results of an administrative review, which was completed in 

1991. The Federal Circuit ruled that suspension of liquidation 

was not removed until 1996, when the time to petition the 

Supreme Court expired. In contrast, the suspension of 

liquidation of Tsubaki’s entries was removed when the final 

results of the administrative review were published, in 1986 and 

1987, well before 1993. Tsubaki did not challenge the results 

of the final administrative review, and therefore no injunction 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 14 

With the support of Travenol, Tsubaki asserts that the 

triggering event should be Customs’ liquidation of the entries. 

However, Tsubaki’s reliance on Travenol is misplaced. To begin 

with, the provision at issue in Travenol was 19 U.S.C. § 

1505(c), which is not the statute at issue in the present case. 

Section 1505(c) relates to the interest that is owed for either 

an underpayment or overpayment of estimated duties. See

Travenol, 118 F.3d at 753. The Travenol court held that the 

triggering event for § 1505(c) is the liquidation or 

reliquidation of an entry because § 1505(c) “comes into play 

only after there has been a determination that interest is due . 

. . .” Id. Because Customs cannot assess interest until after 

an entry is liquidated, liquidation must occur before Customs 

can decide how much an importer owes. Under such circumstances, 

it is clear that liquidation sets in motion, or triggers, the 

process by which the rate of interest is determined. 

In this case, the issue is not the rate of interest but at 

what rate goods can be liquidated after suspension has been 

removed. Under the 1993 version of § 1504(d), that rate is 

determined by reference to the date Customs received notice that 

suspension was removed. Therefore, it is impossible for 

liquidation, namely the event which concludes the process, to be 

 

to continue suspension of liquidation was requested or issued 

after publication of the final results of the administrative 

reviews. 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 15 

the triggering event. Under the circumstances of this case, the 

event that began the running of the six-month period was the 

date Commerce published the final results of the administrative 

review, thereby lifting the suspension of liquidation and 

providing Customs with notice of the same. See Int’l Trading 

Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 

(“Int’l Trading II”) (notice requirement of § 1504(d) as amended 

in 1993 is met when Commerce publishes the final results of the 

administrative review in the Federal Register). 

The Court therefore holds that the application of the 1993 

version of § 1504(d) would have an impermissible retroactive 

effect if applied to a case where the following events have 

occurred before the enactment of the 1993 amendment: (1) 

Commerce published the final results of its administrative 

review (thereby simultaneously lifting the suspension of 

liquidation and giving notice to Customs) and (2) the six-month 

time limit imposed by the 1993 amendment has run. Therefore, 

the 1984 version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) must apply to these 

facts. 

B. Pursuant to the 1984 Version of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), the 

Entries at Issue Are Not Entitled to Deemed Liquidation 

Prior to 1993, the first sentence of § 1504(d) provided 

that if an entry is not liquidated within four years from the 

date of entry, it will be “deemed liquidated” unless the 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 16 

liquidation is suspended. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (Supp. V 

1984). In this case, all but five of Tsubaki’s entries were 

under suspension for longer than four years. Because the 

suspension of liquidation orders were not removed until after 

the four-year time limit expired, the language in the first 

sentence of § 1504(d) simply does not apply in this case. See

Canadian Fur Trappers, 884 F.2d at 565-66; Dal-Tile Corp. v. 

United States, 17 CIT 764, 769, 829 F. Supp. 394, 398 (1993), 

aff’d, 26 F.3d 139 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (merchandise under 

suspension more than four years after date of entry falls under 

exception to the four-year time limit). 

The second sentence of § 1504(d) contains a specific 

exception to the four-year time limit for liquidation suspended 

either by statute or by court order. It provides that such 

entries “shall be liquidated within 90 days [after the 

suspension of liquidation is removed].” 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) 

(Supp V 1984). As discussed above, this language was directory, 

rather than mandatory. Even if Commerce removes the suspension 

of liquidation, and ninety days pass, the entries are not deemed 

liquidated as a matter of law. See Canadian Fur Trappers, 884 

F.2d at 566. 

Tsubaki’s merchandise entered more than four years before 

the suspension of liquidation was removed in 1986 and 1987. 

Therefore, Tsubaki’s entries are not liquidated as a matter of 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 17 

law because they fall under the 1984 version of § 1504(d), which 

does not mandate deemed liquidation on these facts. In line 

with Canadian Fur Trappers and American Permac, the Court finds 

that none of Tsubaki’s contested entries are entitled to deemed 

liquidation under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (Supp. V 1984). 

C. Five of Tsubaki’s Entries Are “Deemed Liquidated” under the 

1984 version of § 1504(d) 

Entry Nos. 83-952658-0, 83-676679-6, 83-677277-7, 83-

677819-5, and 83-677859-3 were made between May 23 and July 25, 

1983. The removal of suspension of liquidation of these entries 

occurred on May 8, 1986, when Commerce published the final 

results of its administrative review. Because four years did 

not pass between the date of entry and the date suspension of 

liquidation was removed, the language in the first sentence of § 

1504(d) (Supp V 1984) applies. As Customs properly concedes, 

these entries are therefore deemed liquidated by operation of 

law. See Nunn Bush Shoe Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 45, 46-48, 

784 F. Supp. 892, 893-94 (1992). 

D. The Existence of an E-mail Sent by Commerce to Customs on 

June 9, 2000 Is Not Relevant 

Finally, Tsubaki makes the alternative argument that 

because Customs allegedly received e-mail notice from Commerce 

regarding the lifting of suspension after the effective date of 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 18 

§ 1504(d) (Supp. V 1993), the 1993 amendment applies.9 Tsubaki 

alleges that that Commerce e-mailed liquidation instructions to 

Customs on February 2, 2000, well after the effective date of 

the 1993 amendment. Pl.’s Br. Opp. Def.’s Cross Mot. Summ. J. 

11 (“Pl.’s Br. Opp.”). Tsubaki reasons that because Customs did 

not receive e-mail instructions in this case until 2000, 

adequate notice did not occur until that time. Id. (citing Am.

Int’l Chem., 29 CIT at __, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1269-70 (ruling 

that liquidation instructions e-mailed from Commerce to Customs 

constituted adequate notice that the suspension of liquidation 

had been lifted)). 

The problem with Tsubaki’s argument, however, is that in 

American International, Commerce e-mailed liquidation 

instructions to Customs before it published the final results of 

the administrative review in the Federal Register. Id. at 1261. 

The issue in that case was whether, absent such publication, email instructions constituted adequate notice. That court ruled 

that it did. Id. at 1269-70. In the case at hand, however, the 

results of the administrative review were published long before 

 

9

 The existence of this e-mail is disputed by the parties. See

Def.’s Reply 7 (“The plaintiff offers no proof of the contents 

of the e-mail, or that Commerce sent the e-mail, or that Customs 

received the e-mail.”), but as it is irrelevant to this lawsuit, 

it is not a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.”). 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 19 

Commerce allegedly sent Customs liquidation instructions via email. See Pl.’s Br. Opp. 2 (stating that the final results of 

the administrative reviews were published in 1986 and 1987, and 

the e-mail was sent to Customs in 2000). Notice is effected 

upon publication in the Federal Register. See Fujitsu Gen. Am., 

Inc., 283 F.3d at 1381-82; Int’l Trading II, 281 F.3d at 1275-

76; Am. Int’l Chem., 29 CIT at __, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1267. The 

mere fact that Customs did not receive an e-mail until 2000 does 

not render meaningless the publication of final results in 1986 

and 1987. See Am. Int’l Chem., 29 CIT at __, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 

1267 (publication is the “hallmark of proper notice under § 

1504(d)”). It is therefore irrelevant that Commerce may have 

sent e-mail liquidation instructions in 2000. 

V. CONCLUSIONS

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies in part 

Tsubaki’s motion for summary judgment and grants Customs’ motion 

for summary judgment. Pursuant to the 1984 version of 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1504(d), fifty-one of the entries at issue in this case are 

not deemed liquidated by operation of law because the four-year 

time limit did not apply. Five of the entries are deemed 

liquidated because less than four years had passed between the 

date of entry and the date the suspension of liquidation was 

removed. These five entries should be reliquidated by Customs 

as entered, and any excess antidumping duties and interest 
Court No. 01 - 00519 Page 20 

assessed upon liquidation should be refunded to Tsubaki with 

interest on the refund as provided by law. Judgment shall be 

entered accordingly. 

 /s/ Richard W. Goldberg

 Richard W. Goldberg 

 Senior Judge

Date: October 10, 2006 

 New York, New York