Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1504-JV-236 | December 16, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven Knecht

Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C.

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Karl M. Scharnberg

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

T.M.J.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 16, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A02-1504-JV-236

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Faith Graham, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D03-1501-JD-2

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1504-JV-236 | December 16, 2015 Page 2 of 5

[1] T.M.J. appeals his adjudication of delinquency for an act that would be theft as 

a Class A misdemeanor1 if committed by an adult. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 5, 2015, T.M.J. and his friends, C.D. and W.D., were at the bus 

depot when they spotted a woman looking at her phone. The three boys 

discussed a plan to take the woman’s phone. They decided W.D. would take 

the phone from the woman when she stepped outside to catch her bus, and 

W.D. would run away. T.M.J. advised W.D. to avoid “get[ting] caught with 

it.” (Tr. at 57.)

[3] The boys did not take the phone from the first woman because W.D. objected 

to taking the phone from someone with a child. They then selected a female 

foreign exchange student named Xi Peng. T.M.J. and C.D. encouraged W.D. 

to complete the robbery by saying, “There goes your chance, there goes your 

chance.” (Id. at 62.) W.D. walked away from the other boys and nearer to 

Peng. When there were fewer people around, W.D. stepped past Peng, took 

the phone from her hands, and all three boys started running away. T.M.J. 

again reminded W.D. not to be caught in possession of the phone.

[4] The boys ran about twelve blocks. Lafayette Police Officer Jason Savage saw 

the boys walking and started following them. The boys then ran into a nearby 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1504-JV-236 | December 16, 2015 Page 3 of 5

neighborhood. Officer Savage called for backup and the officers cornered the 

boys and arrested them. W.D. indicated he stuffed the phone into his 

underwear while they were running and it fell out.

[5] On January 7, 2015, the State alleged T.M.J. was a delinquent child because he 

committed what would be Level 5 felony robbery,2 Class A misdemeanor theft, 

and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement3 had the offenses been 

committed by an adult. The trial court adjudicated T.M.J. as a delinquent for 

the theft allegation, finding the State presented sufficient evidence he acted as 

an accomplice.

Discussion and Decision

[6] T.M.J. argues the State did not present sufficient evidence he acted as an 

accomplice to the theft of Peng’s phone. When reviewing the evidence to 

support a juvenile adjudication, we do not assess the credibility of the witnesses 

or reweigh the evidence. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013). We 

look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom supporting the 

judgment, and we affirm if the record contained probative evidence that would 

allow a reasonable factfinder to infer the offense was committed. Id. Therefore, 

we may reverse only “if there is no evidence or reasonable inference to support 

any one of the necessary elements of the offense.” Id.

 

2 Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2015).

3 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a) (2015).
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[7] There was sufficient evidence T.M.J. was W.D.’s accomplice. “A person who 

knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit 

an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. We consider four 

factors to determine whether someone is an accomplice: “(1) presence at the 

scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure 

to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and 

after occurrence of crime.” Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012). 

The mere fact a defendant was present during a crime and did not oppose the 

crime is not sufficient to convict him based on accomplice liability. However, 

“presence at and acquiescence to a crime, along with other facts and 

circumstances” may be considered. Id.

[8] The facts most favorable to the trial court’s decision are that T.M.J. was present 

when W.D. took Peng’s phone. W.D. testified he, C.D., and T.M.J. rode the 

bus together to the crime scene. T.M.J. encouraged W.D. to take the phone 

from Peng and advised W.D. to avoid getting caught with it. Finally, T.M.J. 

ran when officers chased the three. T.M.J. offers an alternate version of events 

and suggests he was incapable of exerting authority over W.D. due to their two 

year age difference, but those are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence, 

which we cannot do. See K.W., 984 N.E.2d at 612 (appellate court cannot 

reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses on appeal).
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Conclusion

[9] The State presented sufficient evidence to support T.M.J.’s adjudication as a 

delinquent for an act that would be Class A misdemeanor theft if committed by 

an adult. Accordingly, we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.