IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-30701

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

DEREK WYANDON,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:10-CR-175-1

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to modify 

his sentence, which he characterizes as a motion under Rule 36 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant believes that, during imposition of 

sentence on February 17, 2011, the district court made an oral pronouncement 

that Appellant would receive federal sentencing credit for the time he spent in 

federal custody prior to his federal sentencing. Appellant now asks for the 

district court’s written judgment to be modified to reflect the oral 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 1, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-30701

pronouncement. On appeal, the parties dispute which standard of review we 

should apply to the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion, and whether 

these proceedings should more properly have been brought under 28 U.S.C. § 

2241.

We need not resolve these issues, however, in the present appeal. The 

Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons, is responsible for computing

sentencing credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, as the Supreme Court explained in 

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1992). The district court has no 

authority to make these computations during the oral pronouncement of 

sentence. A prisoner may only “seek judicial review of these computations 

after exhausting [his or her] administrative remedies,” which cannot occur 

until “[a]fter a district court sentences a federal offender.”1 Here, Appellant 

has now exhausted his administrative remedies, but obviously could not have 

done so when the district court imposed sentence on February 17, 2011. At 

that time, the Attorney General’s computation of credit had not yet been made.

The district court therefore had no authority to make any binding 

decision regarding sentencing credit during the oral pronouncement of 

Appellant’s sentence. In the present appeal, moreover, Appellant has never

argued that the Attorney General’s computation of his sentencing credit was 

wrong on any basis other than its deviation from the district court’s oral

pronouncement. The Attorney General was not bound, however, by a 

1 Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334-35; see also United States v. Setser, 607 F.3d 128, 132-33 (5th 

Cir. 2010) (“[T]he prisoner must first seek administrative review of the computations of his 

credit, and, once he has exhausted his administrative remedies, the prisoner may only then

pursue judicial review of these computations.”) (internal alterations and quotation marks 

omitted); Hull v. United States, 199 F.3d 438, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Crumedy v. 

United States, 180 F.3d 261, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); United States v. Dowling, 962 

F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that “§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to 

compute credit for time spent in official detention at sentencing” because “credit awards are 

to be made by the Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons, after sentencing”).

2

 

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pronouncement that the district court had no authority to make. The denial of 

Appellant’s motion, therefore, is AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED.

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 Case: 13-30701 Document: 00512615408 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/01/2014