alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NO T FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO F ILE MOTION FOR REHEARIN G AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED J.C., MOTHER OF J.W. AND H.S. , CHILDREN

, Appellant

, v. Case No. 5D 2 2

- 2774 LT Ca se No. 2016

- DP

- 5 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES AND GUARDIAN AD LI TEM

,

Appellee s. ________________________________/ Decisio n filed Jun e 1, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hernando County

, Stephen E. T oner, Jr.

, J udge.

J.C., Mother, Quincy, pro se.

Stephanie C. Zimmerman, D eputy Director & Statewide Director of Appeals, o f Children’s Legal S erv ices, B radenton, a nd Rachel B atten

, of Children’s Legal Services, Brooksville, fo r Appellee

, Department of Children and Families

.

Sara E

. Goldfarb, Statewide Director of A ppeals

, and A manda V ictoria Glass, Senior Attorney, of Statewide Guardian ad Litem Offic e, Tallahassee

, for A ppellee

, Guardian ad Litem

.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BOATWRIGHT, KILBANE and MACIVER, JJ., con cur.
#### Charles H. Eddy and others, Respondents, v. Alvin Davis, Appellant.

Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event.

Opinion by

Learned P. J.;

Bockes, J., dissents.
UNITED STATES NAVY–MARINE CORPS

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

_________________________

No. 201700033

_________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH B. TOZER

Corporal (E-4), U.S. Marine Corps

Appellant

_________________________

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Lieutenant Colonel Leon J. Francis, USMC.

Convening Authority: Commanding Officer, Marine Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle Squadron 3, MAG 24, 1st MAW, MCBH Kaneohe Bay, HI.

Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation: Major Christopher W. 

Pehrson, JAGC, USN.

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Viczorek, USMCR.

For Appellee: Brian K. Keller, Esq.

_________________________

Decided 22 June 2017

_________________________

Before MARKS, JONES, and LOCHNER, Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

After careful consideration of the record, submitted without assignment of 

error, we affirm the findings and sentence as approved by the convening 

authority. Art. 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). 

For the Court

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court
#### Burwell B. Link, Appellant, v. The Town of Brunswick, Respondent.

Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event. Opinion by

Learned, P. J.
!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

!(

New York

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania

Maryland

Chemung

Subbasin

Upper

Susquehanna

Subbasin

Middle

Susquehanna

Subbasin

West Branch

Susquehanna

Subbasin

Juniata

Subbasin Lower

Susquehanna

Subbasin

Corning Area

Fredericksburg

Area

Spruce

Creek

Roaring

Spring

Area

State College

Area

Octoraro

Creek

Hanover

Area

PA Fruit Belt

Hershey

Area

Manheim- Lititz Area

Bonneauville Shale Belt

Diabase

Diabase

Tioga

River

Lycoming

Creek

Lackawanna

River

Chenango

River

Bald Eagle

Creek

Swatara

Creek

Conewago Creek

Conestoga

River

Tunkhannock

Creek

Meshoppen

Creek

Mahanoy Creek

Codorus

Creek

York

Renovo

Elmira

Towanda

Sunbury

Altoona

Oneonta

Norwich

Corning

Scranton

Cortland

Lewistown

Lancaster

Harrisburg

Clearfield

Binghamton

Cooperstown

Williamsport

Wilkes- Barre

Havre de

Grace

1

0 10 20

Miles

Dislaimer:UseofMapforAnyPu rposeon“AsIs” Basis,NoWarrantiesProv ided;SRBC(1653d)10-19-2022

Priority Watersheds For Consumptive Use Mitigation

in the Susquehanna River Basin

River/

Stream

Subbasin

Boundary

County

Boundary

State

Boundary

Potentially

Stressed Area

Water Challenged

Area

Priority

Watershed
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 15 (Monday, January 25, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Page 4081]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-01412]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[License No. 06/06-0347]


Escalate Capital Partners SBIC III, L.P.; Notice Seeking 
Exemption Under Section 312 of the Small Business Investment Act, 
Conflicts of Interest

    Notice is hereby given that Escalate Capital Partners SBIC III, 
L.P., 300 W. 6th Street, Suite 2230, Austin, TX 78701, a Federal 
Licensee under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended 
(``the Act''), in connection with the financing of a small concern, has 
sought an exemption under Section 312 of the Act and Section 107.730, 
Financings which constitute Conflicts of Interest of the Small Business 
Administration (``SBA'') Rules and Regulations (13 CFR part 107). 
Escalate Capital Partners SBIC III, L.P. proposes to provide debt 
financing to Everspring, Inc., 1007 Church Street, Suite 420, Evanston, 
IL 60201. UTIMCO, an Associate of Escalate Capital Partners SBIC III, 
L.P., holds an indirect ownership interest in Everspring, Inc. of 
greater than 10 percent. Therefore, Everspring, Inc. is an Associate of 
Escalate Capital Partners SBIC III, L.P.
    The financing is brought within the purview of Sec.  107.730(a) of 
the Regulations because Everspring, Inc. is an Associate of Escalate 
Capital Partners SBIC III, L.P. Therefore this transaction requires a 
prior SBA exemption.
    Notice is hereby given that any interested person may submit 
written comments on the transaction, within fifteen days of the date of 
this publication, to the Associate Administrator for Investment and 
Innovation, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 Third Street SW., 
Washington, DC 20416.


Mark L. Walsh,
Associate Administrator, Office of Investment and Innovation.
[FR Doc. 2016-01412 Filed 1-22-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
NO. 07-04-0305-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL D

	DECEMBER 3, 2004

	______________________________

	EDWARD L. MARTINEZ, APPELLANT

	V.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

	NO. 2004-405,843; HONORABLE CECIL G. PURYEAR, JUDGE

	_______________________________

Before QUINN and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

	CONCURRING OPINION

	I fully concur with the Court’s decision to abate the appeal and remand this case to the trial court for determination of the matters set out in the Court’s opinion.  For the reasons discussed in opinions such as the First Court of Appeals’ order in Cormier v. State, 85 S.W.3d 496 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.), however, I continue to be of the opinion that a Texas criminal defendant does not have a right or entitlement to represent himself on appeal.

							James T. Campbell

							        Justice

Publish.
| Skip to contentSocial Security Online | Trust Fund Data |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|

| www.socialsecurity.gov | Home  FAQs  Contact Us  Search | **Search**  |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|

| Office of the Chief Actuary | Effective Interest Rates, 1940-79   Historical document   |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Effective interest rates

Trust fund data | Estimated effective interest rates earned by the      Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and      Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds are shown below      for 1940-1979.  (OASDI refers to the two funds combined.) |
|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

**Estimated Effective Interest Rates Earned By theAssets of the OASI and DI Trust Funds, 1940-79**[Percent]CalendaryearOASIDIOASDI CalendaryearOASIDIOASDI1940............2.4--2.4 1960............2.62.62.61941............2.4--2.4 1961............ 2.72.92.81942............2.3--2.3 1962............2.82.92.81943............2.1--2.1 1963............2.93.02.91944............2.0--2.0 1964............3.13.23.11945............2.1--2.1 1965............3.23.43.21946............2.0--2.0 1966............3.53.73.51947............1.9--1.9 1967............3.74.13.81948............2.8--2.8 1968............3.94.44.01949............1.3--1.3 1969............4.45.14.41950............2.0--2.0 1970............5.05.85.11951............2.9--2.9 1971............5.26.05.31952............2.2--2.2 1972............5.36.05.41953............2.3--2.3 1973............5.76.25.81954............2.3--2.3 1974............6.26.56.21955............2.2--2.2 1975............6.66.76.61956............2.4--2.4 1976............6.76.86.71957............2.52.32.5 1977............6.97.17.01958............2.52.42.5 1978............7.27.57.21959............2.62.52.6 1979............7.48.07.5OASI refers to the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, DIrefers to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, and OASDI refers to the twofunds combined Privacy Policy      | Website Policies        & Other Important Information      | Site Map     Last reviewed or modified Thursday Nov 12, 2009Need Larger Text?
#### Saloma Shaffer v. The Travelers’ Insurance Company, etc.

*Accident Insurance—Condition in Policy—Voluntary Exposure to Unnecessary Danger.*

An attempt to reach the ground from a second story window by means of a strip of ticking selvage, is within a clause of an accident policy, relieving the insurer from liability in case of voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger.

[Opinion filed January 21, 1889.]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermillion County; the Hon. C. B. Smith, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. George R. Tilton and W. R. Lawrence, for appellant.

Messrs. F. Bookwalter and J. B. Mann, for appellee.

Conger, J.

This was an action brought to recover upon a policy of insurance upon the life of Charles Shaffer, in favor. . of his mother, the appellant.

*113The policy contained, among others, the following clause:

> “This insurance does not cover disappearances, nor injuries of which there is no visible mark on body, nor accident, nor death or disability resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from any of the following causes, or while so engaged or affected: * * * voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger.” * * *

Sarah Allison, the woman from whose room deceased attempted to get away at the time he was killed, testified that he came to her room about half past five in the evening; that a few minutes afterward policemen came to her room, hammered at the door with their clubs and demanded admittance, which she refused; that deceased went into the hallway twice to get down by the stairs, then returned and prepared to go out of the front window; that he took a piece of selvage that was lying on the floor, torn from bed-ticking cloth, which was about six inches wide. He tried the strength of it over his knee with both hands, and then under his foot, and then said he knew it would hold him. He then tied it to the leg of a sewing machine sitting near the window, and, holding to the strip, started out of the window to let himself down to the brick sidewalk, about fifteen feet below.

Parties out in the street state that they saw deceased come out of the window and let himself down a foot or two, when the strip of bed-ticking broke and he fell, striking his feet against an iron circle that projected from the store door beneath him, which turned him over so that he struck the walk upon his head, and received such injury as caused his death.

The bare statement of the manner that deceased came to his death brings it, we think, clearly within the clause of the policy of “ voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger,” and fully justified the trial court in taking the case from the jury and directing them to find for appellee.

A verdict upon such evidence in favor of appellant could not be supported, and therefore the judgment of the Circuit Court will be affirmed.

*Judgment affii'mcd. '*
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 239 (Wednesday, December 13, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64044-64045]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-30316]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. RP94-227-004]


Transwestern Pipeline Company; Notice of Proposed Changes in FERC 
Gas Tariff

December 7, 1995.
    Take notice that on November 30, 1995, Transwestern Pipeline 
Company (Transwestern) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas 
Tariff, Second Revised Volume No. 1, the following tariff sheets:

Effective October 17, 1995

3rd Revised Sheet No. 83
2nd Revised Sheet No. 84


[[Page 64045]]

    Transwestern states that the above-referenced tariff sheets are 
being filed in compliance with the Commission's October 17th Order and 
set forth revisions to Section 24, ``Purchase Gas Adjustment Alternate 
Rate Recovery Mechanism (PGAR Mechanism),'' of the General Terms and 
Conditions of Transwestern's FERC Gas Tariff, Second Revised Volume No. 
1.
    Specifically, Transwestern has revised three subsections. First, 
Section 24.1(b) has been revised to provide for the following order of 
discounting: (1) GRI demand surcharge; (2) base reservation charge; and 
(3) PGAR reservation surcharge. Second, Section 24.1(c) has been 
revised to provide that the estimated interest for the period beginning 
June 1, 1994 shall be CFR 154.67(c)(2)(iii)(A).1 Third, Section 24.3, 
which was set forth in Pro Forma Sheet No. 84 (filed with 
Transwestern's Initial Comments) and which included a true-up 
mechanism, has been revised to delete such true-up mechanism, and to 
provide for the following: (i) Termination of the PGAR surcharge upon 
recovery of total PGAR Costs, plus interest, including possible early 
termination prior to October 31, 1996; (ii) Transwestern's payment of 
any refunds, plus interest; and (iii) Transwestern's submitting a 
report demonstrating compliance with the order of discounting set forth 
in Section 24.1(b).
    Transwestern states that copies of the filing were served on its 
gas utility customers, interested state commissions, and all parties to 
this proceeding.
    Any person desiring to protest said filing should file a protest 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC, 20426, in accordance with Rule 211 of the Commission's 
Rules of Practice and Procedure. Pursuant to Section 154.210 of the 
Commission's Regulations, all such protests must be filed no later than 
12 days after the date of the filing noted above. Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-30316 Filed 12-12-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### H. O. PARSONS and His Wife, A. M. PARSONS, v. C. C. BESHEARS et al.

(Filed 20 March, 1935.)

Appeal by plaintiffs from *Oglesby, J.,*at October Term, 1934, of Wilkes.

Affirmed.

This is an action to recover damages for a trespass by the defendants upon land owned by the plaintiffs. In their answer to the complaint, the defendants denied the allegation that the plaintiffs are the owners of the land described in the complaint.

The action was begun on 9 April, 1927. The issues raised by the pleadings and involving the title to the land were tried at October Term, 1930, of the Superior Court of Wilkes County and answered in accordance with the contentions of the plaintiffs. In the judgment on the verdict it was ordered that the action be continued for the trial of the issues involving damages resulting from the trespass by the defendants, or any one of them, as alleged in the complaint.

At the trial of the issues at October Term, 1934, as to damages, at the close of the evidence, the plaintiffs submitted to a judgment of non-suit as to the defendants other than O. O. Beshears, and the motion of *821said defendant for a judgment of involuntary nonsuit as to bim was allowed.

From judgment dismissing tbe action as to defendant C. 0. Beshears, plaintiffs appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

*Tñvette & Holshouser and F. J. McDuffie for plaintiffs.*

*Chas. G. Gilreath for defendant.*

Pee OueiaM.

We find no evidence in tbe record on tbis appeal tending to sbow a trespass on tbe lands of tbe plaintiffs by tbe defendant 0. C. Beshears, as alleged in tbe complaint. For tbat reason, tbe judgment dismissing tbe action as to said defendant is

Affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50991 Summary Calendar

DAVID M. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus CITY OF SAN ANTONIO; ET AL., Defendants, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. SA-97-CV-500

- - - - - - - - - - July 1, 1999 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * David Moore appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his action against the City of San Antonio (“the City”) for its alleged violation of both his constitutional right to free speech and a state whistleblower statute. Moore contends that the district court erred in denying his motions for extension of time to respond to the City’s summary judgment motion.No.98-50991 -2- Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), a court may, under certain circumstances, extend the period in which an act is required or allowed to be done. If an enlargement of time is requested before the expiration of the original period or a previous extension thereof, the court may grant the enlargement “for cause shown.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). However, if a motion for extension is filed after the expiration of the specified period, the court may grant the extension only if the failure to act resulted from “excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Moore asserts that he failed to timely file his summary judgment response because his counsel made the tactical decision that Moore should refrain from responding to the City’s summary judgment motion until the district court ruled on the City’s motion to substitute the cover sheet of its summary judgment motion. Because Moore has shown neither cause nor excusable neglect for the late filing of his summary judgment response, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moore’s motions for extension of time. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation , 497 U.S. 871, 895-97 (1990); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co. , 919 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1990). AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          14,527
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          10,857
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 8,900
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                   709
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                      7,030
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          23,299
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            23,707
<LOANS>                                        131,750
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,526
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 203,569
<DEPOSITS>                                     173,824
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,066
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        17,836
<OTHER-SE>                                      10,843
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 203,569
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  3,151
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                  412
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    40
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 3,603
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               1,415
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,415
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            2,188
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      150
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  1,788
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    680
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         520
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       520
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.16
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.15
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    1.21
<LOANS-NON>                                        508
<LOANS-PAST>                                       209
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   578
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                     48
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,489
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      116
<RECOVERIES>                                         3
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,526
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             1,139
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            447
        


</TABLE>
<Page>

PAGE 30
                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.1.6

                           RENCO STEEL HOLDINGS, INC.
                         30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA SUITE 4225
                                NEW YORK NY 10112

                                                                    212-541-6000
                                                          FACSIMILE 212-541-6197



                           RENCO STEEL HOLDINGS, INC.

                      8.75% PROMISSORY NOTE DUE UPON DEMAND

$3,400,000

               FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, Renco Steel Holdings,
Inc., an Ohio corporation ("Renco Steel"), hereby promises to pay to the
order of The Renco Group, Inc., a New York corporation ("Renco"), the
principal amount of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($3,400,000)
together with interest, compounded monthly, on the principal amount hereof
and accrued interest at the rate of 8.75% per annum from the date hereof
until paid, such interest to be payable together with the principal amount
upon demand by Renco, which demand may be made at any time.

               The undersigned may prepay, at any time, the entire balance of
principal and interest owed under this Note without penalty or premium of any
nature.

               Renco's right to payment pursuant to this Note is hereby
contractually subordinated in right of payment to Renco Steel's obligations
under Renco Steel's 10 7/8% Senior Secured Notes, due 2005.

               Should the indebtedness represented by this Note be placed in
the hands of attorneys for collection, the undersigned agrees to pay, in
addition to the principal and interest due and payable hereon, all costs of
collecting this Note, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses.

               This Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of New York.

               This note is dated February 27, 2002.

                                       RENCO STEEL HOLDINGS, INC.



                                       By:  /s/ Ira L. Rennert
                                            ---------------------------------
                                            Name:   Ira L. Rennert
                                            Title:  Chairman