1

Filed 1/10/22 In re T.B. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re T.B., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A160837

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 

J2000237)

The juvenile court sustained allegations of a Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 6021 petition alleging T.B. committed robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) 

and grand theft (id., § 487, subd. (a)). The court placed minor in the home of 

her mother under various terms and conditions, including an alcohol testing 

condition. On appeal, T.B. (1) contends the finding on the grand theft count 

must be reversed as a lesser included offense of robbery; and (2) challenges 

the alcohol testing condition as unconstitutionally vague and otherwise 

unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent).

2

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Superseded on another ground as stated in People v. Moran (2016) 

1 Cal.5th 398, 403, footnote 6.
2

We reverse the finding on the grand theft count but otherwise affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In October 2019, a Victoria’s Secret loss prevention officer saw then 16-

year-old T.B., along with another minor, putting bottles of perfume into their

bags and subsequently leaving the store. The officer identified himself and 

called out to the minors to stop. They did not do so and took off running 

through the mall. The officer was able to catch up to T.B. and once again 

ordered her to stop while displaying his badge. T.B. continued to flee and 

split up from her coparticipant. The officer called 911. While on the phone,

T.B. reached into her bag and began throwing perfume boxes at the officer. 

He was able to grab the bag and told her to stop throwing the perfume boxes. 

T.B. then punched the officer in the face with a closed fist, knocking his 

glasses off. As he reached down to grab his glasses, T.B. bit him on his 

shoulder, puncturing his skin and causing him to bleed. 

Roseville Police Officer Shannon Rauls received the call from dispatch. 

Officer Rauls was in the Victoria’s Secret store at the time of the incident 

because he had been responding to an earlier theft incident. Officer Rauls 

proceeded to the parking lot to cut off the fleeing suspects. When he exited 

the mall, he saw “two females running through the parking lot” with the loss 

prevent officer “trailing at a distance.” Officer Rauls subsequently detained 

both minors. A search of T.B. revealed the keys to her mother’s car which 

was parked nearby. When Officer Rauls looked inside, he saw approximately 

10 boxes of Victoria’s Secret perfume in the empty car with the sensors still 

attached. All total, 37 boxes of perfume and merchandise were recovered 

valued at “approximately $2,600.” 

The Placer County District Attorney filed a section 602 petition 

alleging one count of felony second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and one 
3

count of felony grand theft (id., § 487, subd. (a)). The Placerville juvenile 

court sustained both allegations contained in the petition, and then 

transferred the case to Contra Costa County for disposition. 

After the case was transferred, the Contra Costa juvenile court 

adjudged minor a ward of the court, the parties stipulated the “maximum 

custodial time will be 5 years,” and the court placed T.B. at her mother’s 

home subject to several conditions, including that T.B. “[s]ubmit to drug and

alcohol testing as directed by the [Department Probation Officer].” 

DISCUSSION

Grand Theft

Before sustaining the allegations, the Placer County juvenile court 

heard from counsel. The deputy district attorney stated the minor had a blue 

purse with her containing “approximately $377 worth of merchandise” and a 

Zara bag containing “$545 of merchandise.” Additionally, there “was over 

$700 worth of merchandise” recovered from T.B.’s mother’s car.3 The 

prosecutor continued that T.B. “who was clearly stealing, used force in order 

to attempt to retain possession of that property, and that use of force elevates 

this from a theft to a robbery. The People would ask . . . the Court finds the 

allegation true of a violation of Penal Code Section 211, and also established 

is that she stole by herself and in conjunction with her co-participant over 

$950 worth of merchandise and the allegation of grand theft is also true.” 

The court, in turn, stated this was “the clearest case of robbery I have 

seen in 26 years on the bench,” and further the “same is true as to the grand 

theft charge, again, without a doubt. The value of the perfume was well over 

the $950 limit.” The court sustained the allegations in the petition. 

3 Minor’s coparticipant had a bag containing “approximately $963

worth of merchandise.” 
4

Before the Placer County juvenile court transferred T.B.’s case to 

Contra County for disposition, it noted on the order sustaining the 

allegations that the maximum confinement was five years eight months (five 

years for the robbery plus eight months for the grand theft). The court also 

wrote on the order, “court finds this was a flagrant Estes[4] robbery, court 

encourages judge to review video.” (Italics added.) The case was then 

transferred to Contra Costa for disposition.

Before the Contra Costa County juvenile court announced disposition, 

the court asked, “So I had a quick question related to the sustained offenses. 

Was it basically the same course of conduct; the robbery and the grand theft?” 

T.B.’s counsel replied, “It appears so, yes.” Later on in the proceedings when 

determining restitution, the court once again asked, “I don’t think it should 

be double this since this is the same course of conduct. I do understand that 

two separate offenses were sustained, but it seems as if this is only one 

course of conduct. Is that correct? [¶] I mean, I asked this earlier[,] but it 

sounds like there was no separate grand theft from another store; is that 

correct?” T.B.’s counsel replied, “That’s my understanding from the limited 

information that I have. . . .” 

The court went on to state, “Right. So I don’t think it’s fair to basically 

double the restitution fine when it’s the same course of conduct. [¶] 

Similarly, I haven’t gone back to look, I’m assuming it’s a six-year max for the 

robbery, but they did not add extra time for the grand theft because it seems 

like it would be subject to [Penal Code section] 654.” T.B.’s counsel 

responded, “I think a five-year max.” The court continued, “Well, I’m just 

asking because I took the time to look at the maximum custodial time. It had 

five years and eight months, and that’s why I am thinking there was a 

4

 People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 (Estes).
5

tacking on.” The court went on, the Placer County “set the time, and so that’s 

why I am kind of confused because it would seem as if . . . [¶] . . . [¶] a max of 

potentially five years because I think that’s the max for the robbery, but then 

I thought I was wrong.” 

After an off-the-record discussion, the court stated, “It would appear 

that way, but I really don’t know what was considered by the other judge. 

I’m just not entirely sure. [¶] . . . My thought would be if there is an 

agreement that this was a continuous course of conduct and that this really 

would be [Penal Code section] 654, that it really should be a max of five 

years, but I only have a dispo report and very limited documents from Placer 

County. But I just wanted to confirm that from my reading of the report it 

seemed like it’s the incident from Victoria’s Secret that the [Penal Code 

section] 487 was essentially—it was part of the continuous conduct of the 

robbery.” 

The prosecutor responded, “Judge, I’m fine with that. I mean, I don’t 

know if maybe because they found the additional merchandise in the car they 

are counting that, I don’t know. I am fine with stipulating to five years. 

That’s fine. I have very limited information as well so I can see how it 

appears to be just the [Penal Code section] 211, and so I think five years is 

appropriate.” 

The court then stated, “Because it seemed to be a—if there is a 

stipulation to set it at five years I will do so. I just, I don’t want to second 

guess what happened but I just want to clarify that from the report it seems 

to be the same related conduct and will potentially be subject to [Penal Code 

section] 654.” 

On appeal, T.B. contends the original juvenile court erred in sustaining 

both the robbery and grand theft allegations because multiple convictions are 
6

prohibited where one offense is necessarily included in another.5 (People v. 

Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692 (Ortega), overruled on another point as 

stated in People v. Reed (2006) 28 Cal.4th 1224, 1230-1231.)

As T.B. points out, “theft, whether grand theft or petty theft, is a 

necessarily included offense of robbery.” (Ortega, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 694; 

Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 28.) Accordingly, T.B. is correct in 

asserting she could not be convicted of both robbery and grand theft based 

upon the same conduct. (Ortega, at p. 699.)

In Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d 23, a security guard at a store saw the 

defendant remove clothing from a rack, put it on, and leave without paying. 

(Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 26.) The guard followed the defendant 

outside to a parking lot, identified himself, and asked him to return to the 

store. (Ibid.) The defendant refused and began walking away. When the 

guard attempted to detain him, defendant pulled a knife, and swung it at the 

guard while threating to kill him. (Ibid.) A jury convicted the defendant of 

both robbery and petty theft. (Ibid.)

5 It is clear from the record that the Contra Costa County court was 

concerned about the implication of Penal Code section 654. However, on 

appeal, T.B. raises a slightly different issue: that as theft is a lesser included 

offense of robbery, the finding on the grand theft allegation must be reversed. 

The Attorney General also categorizes this as a Penal Code section 654 issue. 

Since the analysis is the same, we address respondent’s counter argument. 

Penal Code section 654, subdivision (a) provides, “An act or omission that is 

punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished 

under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be 

punished under more than one provision.” “This provision ‘protects against 

multiple punishment, not multiple conviction. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] 

Although it ‘literally applies only where such punishment arises out of 

multiple statutory violations produced by the “same act or omission,” ’ we 

have extended its protection ‘to cases in which there are several offenses 

committed during “a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time.” ’ ”

(People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1062.) 
7

On appeal, defendant asserted, among other things, that he could not 

be convicted of robbery, as the property taken “was not taken from a person 

since the security guard did not have the authority or control over the 

property.” (Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 26.) He also maintained that 

since “theft is a lesser included offense within robbery,” he could not be 

convicted of both robbery and petty theft. (Id. at p. 28.) 

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the first contention but agreed with 

the latter. As to the latter, the court concluded “[w]here there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the conviction of the greater offense, the conviction of the 

lesser offense must be reversed.” (Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 28.) 

And “[s]ince there is substantial evidence to support the conviction of 

robbery, we must reverse the conviction for petty theft.” (Id. at p. 29.) 

The Attorney General posits that because the Contra Costa County 

juvenile court did not stay the sentence on the grand theft finding under 

Penal Code section 654, it can be inferred the court determined the grand 

theft allegation was based on a “burglary” earlier in the day “that resulted in 

the 10 boxed perfumes with Victoria’s Secret magnetic tags, located in 

appellant’s mother’s car.” The sustained grand theft allegation, in turn, 

necessarily involved T.B.’s return to the store and encounter with the 

security guard. 

Respondent’s argument fails for several reasons. First, there was no 

burglary alleged in this case; rather, the two sustained allegations were 

second degree robbery and felony grand theft of property over $950.

6

 Second, 

6

 We note that when the case was tried, the prosecutor asserted the 

value of merchandise found in T.B.’s mother’s car was approximately 

“$700”—not sufficient to support grand theft. (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a) 

[grand theft is theft committed when “the money, labor, or real or personal 

property taken is of a value exceeding nine hundred fifty dollars ($950)”].) 
8

the timeline of events suggested by the Attorney General is not apparent 

from the record; rather, the record suggests otherwise. Although it is not 

clear from the limited record whether the Placer County juvenile court made 

an express finding that the alleged crimes resulted from a single sequence of 

events, it is clear that the court considered the robbery a “flagrant Estes 

robbery.” (Italics added.) It is also readily apparent that the Contra Costa 

juvenile court, which did not try the case, did not have a clear understanding 

of the exact circumstances and therefore asked defense counsel, “Was it 

basically the same course of conduct; the robbery and the grand theft?” T.B.’s 

counsel replied, “It appears so, yes,” and the prosecutor did not disagree. 

Accordingly, on this record, we conclude Estes applies, and the finding 

on the grand theft allegation must be reversed.7

Alcohol Condition

The court imposed the following probation condition: T.B. must 

“[s]ubmit to drug and alcohol testing as directed by [the department 

probation officer].” 

Vagueness

“[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process 

concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the 

due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing 

adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are 

‘embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California 

Constitutions. (U.S. Const., Amends V, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.)’ ” (In re 

While an itemized receipt was admitted into evidence, that receipt is not in 

the record before us on appeal.

7 Although reversal of the grand theft finding is required, it does not 

affect T.B.’s sentence because the juvenile court did not include the grand 

theft count in determining the maximum term of confinement. 
9

Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) “A probation condition ‘must be 

sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and 

for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to 

withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.” (Ibid.) Probation 

conditions are given “ ‘ “the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, 

objective reader.” ’ ” (In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261.) 

For the first time on appeal, T.B. contends the probation condition is 

vague because she “can only guess at what might be required of her.” 

Specifically, she does not know if she is “required to provide urine samples,” 

or if she could be “required to submit to a blood draw at any time without 

notice.” 

When, as in this case, a minor is found to be a person described by 

section 602 and the court does not remove the minor from the physical 

custody of her parent, section 729.3 expressly permits the juvenile court to 

require the minor to submit to urine testing.8

In addition, when, as in this case, a minor is also adjudged a ward of 

the court, section 730 authorizes the court to “impose and require any and all 

reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end 

that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward 

enhanced.” (§ 730, subd. (b).) Section 730 has been held to authorize 

probation conditions requiring drug and alcohol testing by blood, breath, or 

urine. (In re P.A. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 23, 33, 40 [upholding probation 

8 Section 729.3 provides, “If a minor is found to be a person described 

in Section 601 or 602 and the court does not remove the minor from the 

physical custody of his or her parent or guardian, the court, as a condition of 

probation, may require the minor to submit to urine testing upon the request 

of a peace officer or probation officer for the purpose of determining the 

presence of alcohol or drugs.”
10

condition requiring ward to “ ‘[s]ubmit to chemical test(s) of blood, breath, or 

urine for alcohol/controlled substances, as directed by the probation officer’ ”]; 

see In re Jimi A. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 482, 487–488 [upholding probation 

condition requiring ward to submit to “random drug testing”]; In re Jose R. 

(1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 278–280 (Jose R.) [upholding probation condition 

requiring ward to submit to “ ‘any tests’ ” to determine alcohol and drug use].)

Accordingly, the condition is not unconstitutionally vague, and we turn 

to whether the alcohol testing condition via urinalysis is reasonable.

9

 

Lent and Other Constitutional Challenges

At a probation interview before disposition, T.B. admitted to regular 

marijuana use. She smoked marijuana with her coparticipant “every other 

week,” and she had “smoked marijuana [on] the day” of the incident. She 

denied using “any other substances or alcohol.” The probation department 

assessed T.B. as “moderate” risk in “Substance Abuse,” and noted her 

assessment “suggest[ed] a need for monitoring and intervention.” 

At the dispositional hearing, minor’s counsel objected to the alcohol 

testing condition, arguing “[i]t does not appear that that was a factor in this 

case. It’s not something that [T.B.] has used in the past, not anyone in her 

family uses, under ‘Ricardo,’ I don’t think it’s related to the incident or future 

criminality or past behavior by [T.B.]” 

The juvenile court disagreed, stating, “I know that you’ve acknowledged 

using marijuana regularly, and while there has been no acknowledgement of 

using alcohol that I can recall, you are not to use or possess it. I think that is 

an appropriate term of probation, and I hope there will be no positive alcohol 

test or marijuana test.” 

9 T.B. makes separate challenges to the testing condition “via blood 

draw,” which we address ante.
11

“ ‘The purposes of juvenile wardship proceedings are twofold: to treat 

and rehabilitate the delinquent minor, and to protect the public from 

criminal conduct.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo 

P.).) When imposing probation conditions, the juvenile court considers the 

circumstances of the offense as well as the minor’s entire social history. (In 

re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81, overruled on other grounds as stated in In 

re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 130, 139.) Moreover, “ ‘[a] condition of 

probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not 

necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision 

from the juvenile court.’ ” (Ricardo P., at p. 1118.) 

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion (Ricardo P., 

supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1118), upholding juvenile court orders unless “ ‘the 

condition is “arbitrary or capricious” or otherwise exceeds the bounds of 

reason under the circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.) 

Under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, a condition “will not be held invalid 

unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was 

convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and 

(3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future 

criminality.’ ” (Id, at p. 486.) The Lent test is “conjunctive—all three prongs 

must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” 

(People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) Additionally, the Lent 

test “governs in juvenile and adult probation cases alike.” (Ricardo P., supra, 

7 Cal.5th at p. 1119.) 

As she did in the juvenile court, T.B. contends the alcohol testing 

condition is not reasonably related to future criminality in violation of 

Ricardo P., and also violates her constitutional rights to privacy and her 
12

Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures. Her arguments 

have long since been rejected by the courts. 

In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704 (Kacy S.) is directly on point. 

In that case, the minors admitted to being within the provisions of section 

602, were not removed from the physical custody of their parents, and were 

placed on six months’ probation subject to various conditions, including that 

they “ ‘submit to urine testing to determine the presence of alcohol and illegal 

drugs in [their] system[s] pursuant to section 729.3.” (Kacy S., at pp. 707–

708.) On appeal, the minors contended the court abused its discretion in 

imposing the urine testing condition because “neither [of] their offenses nor 

their social histories suggest substance abuse,” “the condition violates their 

constitutional rights to privacy, protection from unreasonable searches and 

seizures, due process of law and equal protection.” (Id. at p. 708.)

First, the court determined that the condition was reasonable under 

Lent. The court noted, the “urine testing condition is designed to detect the 

presence of substances whose use by minors is unlawful. (Cal. Const., art. 

XX, § 22 [alcohol]; Health & Saf. Code, § 11000 et seq. [drugs].) Thus, the 

testing ‘ “relates to conduct which is . . . in itself criminal.” ’ ([Lent, supra,]

15 Cal.3d [at p.] 486. . . .) Moreover, in enacting section 729.3, the 

Legislature has found that ‘alcohol and drug abuse’ are ‘precursors of serious 

criminality. . . .’ (Stats. 1989, ch. 1117, § 1, subd. (a)(2). . . .) Thus, the 

testing is also ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality.’ ’ (Lent, supra, 

15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Because the testing condition relates to criminal 

conduct and is reasonably related to future criminality, its imposition is 

within the juvenile court’s discretion even as measured by the Lent 

formulation.” (Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 710.) 
13

Next, the Kacy S. court rejected the argument that the testing 

condition was an unreasonable invasion of privacy, subjecting the minors to 

unreasonable searches and seizures. (Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 710–711.) The court noted, “a probationer’s expectations of privacy are 

diminished by his probation status and are subordinated to governmental 

activities which reasonably limit the right of privacy. [Citation.] [¶] The 

testing condition is a reasonable intrusion upon a probationer’s expectation of 

privacy. [Citation.] The governmental interest in testing is strong. The 

juvenile court’s goals are to protect the public and rehabilitate the minor.” 

(Id., at p. 711.) Sections 729.3 and 730 serve both goals. Section 729.3 

“protects the public by establishing procedures to deter or prevent use of 

alcohol and unlawful drugs by minors. It advances the rehabilitation of 

young offenders by seeking to detect alcohol or drug use as a precursor of 

criminal activity in order to facilitate intervention at the earliest time.” 

(Kacy S., at p. 711; see § 730, subd. (b) [“The court may impose and require 

any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to 

the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of 

the ward enhanced.” Italics added.].) Although testing “constitutes an 

intrusion on privacy, the effect of the intrusion is outweighed by the 

government’s legitimate interest in closely monitoring the rehabilitation of 

minors who are granted probation and returned to the custody of their 

parents.” (Kacy S., at p. 711.)

T.B. acknowledges Kacy S. but asks to revisit that case in light of 

Ricardo P., decided 20 years later.

10 

10 T.B. also points to the dissent in Kacy S. as enunciating the reason 

why testing “should not be permitted as a juvenile probation condition in a 

case where alcohol was not related to the offense.” The dissent stated there 

was no “demonstrable relationship” between the offense—using bad language 
14

Nothing in Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113, alters the analysis or our 

conclusion. In that case, after placing the minor on probation, the juvenile 

court imposed a warrantless search condition “solely to enable probation 

officers to monitor whether Ricardo is communicating about drugs or with 

people associated with drugs.” (Id., at p. 1119.) The Supreme Court granted 

review on the issue of whether the electronic search condition was reasonably 

related to future criminality as is required under Lent. Thus, the high court 

assumed the condition was neither related to the underlying offense nor 

related to conduct which was itself criminal. (Id., at pp. 1116, 1118–1119.)

In concluding the condition was not reasonably related to future 

criminality, the Supreme Court held the record before it, which contained “no 

indication that Ricardo had used or will use electronic devices in connection 

with drugs or any illegal activity,” was “insufficient to justify the substantial 

burdens imposed” by the search condition. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 1116.) As the court explained, “Lent’s requirement that a probation 

condition must be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a 

degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation 

condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition.” (Id. at 

p. 1122.) Since the sweeping electronic search condition imposed “a very 

heavy burden on privacy with a very limited justification,” it was not 

on the school ground—and alcohol or drug use. In the case of section 729.3 

which is permissive and subject to a test of abuse of discretion, if “there is no 

indication that substance abuse by the minor played a direct role in the 

offense or was a factor in bringing the offense about, the sentencing court 

abuses its discretion in imposing search or testing conditions pertaining to 

such substance abuse.” (Kacy S., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 713–715 [dis. 

opn. of Blease, Acting P.J.].) Here, however, T.B. did admit to regular 

substance use and admitted that she had used marijuana on the day of the 

incident. 
15

“ ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ ” and was therefore invalid 

under Lent. (Id. at p. 1124, italics omitted.) 

T.B. compares her situation to that presented in Ricardo P, stating 

Ricardo, like herself, “stole property on a day when he used marijuana. Yet 

the California Supreme Court concluded that he had not wholly forfeited his 

right to privacy, and that a probation officer could not rummage at will 

through his electronics, searching for evidence of marijuana use.” 

T.B.’s comparison falls short for several reasons. First, unlike an 

electronics search condition that intrudes upon a wide range of otherwise 

lawful activity, the drug and alcohol testing condition relates solely to 

discovering evidence of minor’s unlawful actions. The testing condition is 

valid under Lent for that reason alone. (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 375, 

379 [the three-part Lent test is conjunctive, and “all three prongs must be 

satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation condition”].) 

Further, the burdens imposed by the testing condition are proportional to 

achieving the legitimate goal of preventing future criminality by monitoring 

T.B.’s drug or alcohol use and establishing the means for early intervention 

to aid in her rehabilitation. (See Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122 

[“ ‘conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so 

strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime’ [citation] so long as they are 

‘reasonably directed at curbing [the defendant’s] future criminality’ ”].) 

Finally, we note, T.B. does not challenge the drug testing condition, which 

could also involve blood and urine analysis. Given this, any burden placed on 

T.B. is significantly lessened. 

Finally, T.B. makes separate challenges to the alcohol testing condition 

“via blood draw.” For the reasons stated above, we also conclude chemical 

testing, including means other than urine testing, such as blood testing, is 
16

also reasonable under Lent. Indeed, courts have upheld testing conditions by 

means of blood, breath, or urine, and we look to P.A., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 

23, as illustrative. 

In that case, the court rejected a minor’s challenge to a condition that 

he “ ‘[s]ubmit to chemical test(s) of blood, breath, or urine for 

alcohol/controlled substances, as directed by the probation officer or any law 

enforcement officer.’ ” (P.A., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 32.) The court held 

that “[b]ased on the plain language of sections 729.3 and 730 and the 

legislative history of section 729.3, we conclude that the enactment of section 

729.3 was not intended to affect the court’s discretion under section 730 to 

impose blood or breath testing as a condition of probation when it is 

permissible to do so under that statute.” (P.A., at p. 40.) 

T.B. acknowledges P.A. held blood, alcohol or urine tests were allowed 

under section 730. However, she asserts the case was wrongly decided for 

two reasons. First, she contends “a specific statutory provision always 

controls over a general one,” and here the section “specifically addressing 

testing of juvenile delinquents for drug and alcohol use is section 729.3, and 

it therefore controls over section 730.” Second, she asserts that as section 

729.3 was enacted after section 730, section 730 “was amended by 

implication” because it “conflicts” section 729.3. 

P.A. addressed both of these contentions. The minor in that case also 

relied on the rule of statutory construction that specific statutory provisions 

control over general provisions. In response, the court stated,“If section 

729.3 provided that the court shall not require minors to submit to blood 

testing, Minor’s argument would be appropriate. The specific provision (no 

blood testing) would clearly control over the general provision (court may 

impose reasonable conditions). Section 729.3, however, does not prohibit 
17

blood testing on minors; it merely authorizes urine testing. Moreover, this 

rule of construction ‘is merely an aid in determining legislative intent. It will 

not be applied so as to defeat legislative intent otherwise determined.’ 

[Citation.] . . . [I]n enaction section 729.3, the Legislature did not intend to 

preclude blood testing when it is otherwise permissible under section 730.” 

(P.A., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 40, fn. 14.) 

Next, the court stated “if the Legislature intended to abrogate the 

existing judicial authority to impose blood testing as a probation condition 

under section 730, it could have easily done so, but did not. Section 730 was 

enacted in 1961. (Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2, pp. 3459, 3487.) At least one 

court relied on that statute to approve of a probation condition that required 

submission to ‘any test’ for drug or alcohol use prior to the enactment of 

section 729.3 in 1989. (. . . Jose R., supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at pp. 278–280.) If,

at the time section 729.3 was enacted, the Legislature intended to abrogate 

Jose R. or limit the court’s ability to impose such a condition, it could have 

done so by amending section 730 or otherwise making clear that blood testing 

was not permitted. Expressly authorizing urine testing in section 729.3 and 

saying nothing as to blood or breath testing does not indicate such intent.” 

(P.A., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 39.) 

Given T.B.’s regular use of marijuana, including on the day of the 

robbery and the probation report concluding T.B. was at “moderate” risk of 

substance abuse, the juvenile court acted well within its discretion to order 

T.B. to submit to both drug and alcohol testing.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s true finding on the grand theft count is reversed. 

In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
18

_________________________

Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

_________________________

Margulies, J.

A160837, In re TB