alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 247 (Tuesday, December 26, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 66804]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-31212]



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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Title II Results Report Draft Guidelines; Availability

AGENCY: United States Agency for International Development.

ACTION: Notice.

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    Pursuant to the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1990, 
notice is hereby given that the Fiscal Year 1995 (FY 95) Public Law 
480, Title II Results Report Draft Guidelines are being made available 
to interested parties for the required thirty (30) day comment period.
    Individuals who wish to review and comment on the draft guidelines 
should contact: Office of Food for Peace, Room 323, SA-8, Agency for 
International Development, Washington, DC 20523-0809. Contact person: 
Sheila Royston, (703) 841-2700.
    The thirty day comment period will begin on the date that this 
announcement is published in the Federal Register.

    Dated: December 15, 1995.
H. Robert Kramer,
Director, Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Humanitarian Response.
[FR Doc. 95-31212 Filed 12-22-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6116-01-M
#### STATE v. JUNIOR TROUTMAN and ROY BARRETT.

(Filed 14 January, 1959.)

1. Criminal I/aw § 133—

Where sentences against defendants are not ordered to begin at the expiration of prior sentences imposed upon them, tlie subsequent sen- ' fences run concurrently.

2. Criminal I/aw § 164—

. Where sentences entered against defendants in certain prosecutions run. concurrently, with other sentences theretofore imposed, and will have expired before the expiration of the other sentences, defendants cannot be prejudiced.

*399Appeal by defendants from *Pless, J.,*July, 1958 Term, Gaston Superior Court.

Criminal prosecution upon a bill of indictment charging the defendants with the crime of rape. At the time of arraignment the solicitor for the State “announced in open court the State would not seek a verdict of guilty of rape, but would seek a .verdict of assault with intent to commit rape.” The jury returned a verdict of guilty of assault on a female. From the judgment of not less than 18 months nor more than 24 months in j ail, to be assigned to work on the roads, the defendants appealed.

*Malcolm B. Seawell, Attorney General, Claude L. Love, Ass’t. Attorney General, for the State.*

*Mullen, Holland & Cooke, By: Fred P. Cooke, for defendants, appellants.*

PER Cueiam.

In Case No. 149, now before this Court, the same defendants appealed from judgments imposing total sentences of four years on the roads, and the judgments have this day been upheld.

The sentences in this case were not ordered to ¡begin at the expiration of the prior sentences, consequently they run concurrently with them. By upholding the sentences in this case, the defendants will complete serving them before the expiration of the first of the prior sentences. The defendants, therefore, are not prejudiced by the judgment involved in this appeal. Moreover, the assignments of error appear to be without substance.

No Error.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22 - 0211 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BRANDEN CONRAD MIESMER,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including October 26, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 19 2022

09/19/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0211
EXHIBIT 10.99



 Exhibit 10.99 
 August 6, 2009 
 Deltek, Inc. 
 13880 Dulles
Corner Lane 
 Herndon, VA 20171 
 Attn: Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer 
  

	 	Re:	Waiver of Shareholders’ Agreement Restrictions 

 Dear Kevin:

 Reference is made to the Shareholders’ Agreement, dated as of April 22, 2005 (as it has been and may be amended from time to
time, the “Shareholders’ Agreement”), by and among Deltek, Inc., a Delaware corporation (formerly Deltek Systems, Inc., a Virginia corporation) (the “Company”), the shareholders of the Company listed on the
signature pages to the Shareholders’ Agreement and, with respect to Sections 3.3 and 3.4 thereof, New Mountain Partners II, L.P., New Mountain Affiliated Investors II, L.P. and Allegheny New Mountain Partners, L.P. (collectively, the
“NMP Entities”). 
 This letter is to confirm our agreement as follows: 
 1. Each of the Company and the NMP Entities hereby waives any compliance by the Company’s employees (other than the Chief Executive Officer) with
Section 3.1 of the Shareholders’ Agreement. 
 2. In all other respects, the Shareholders’ Agreement shall remain in full
force and effect in accordance with their respective terms. 
 If the foregoing corresponds to your understanding of our agreement, please
sign this letter and the enclosed copy in the space provided and return one copy to us. 
 [Remainder of page intentionally left blank]









					
	
	Very truly yours,
	
	NEW MOUNTAIN PARTNERS II, L.P.
		
	By:	 	New Mountain Investments II, L.L.C., its general partner
			
		 	By:	 	 /s/ Steven B. Klinsky

		 	Name:	 	Steven B. Klinsky
		 	Title:	 	Managing Member
	
	NEW MOUNTAIN AFFILIATED INVESTORS II, L.P.
		
	By:	 	New Mountain Investments II, L.L.C., its general partner
			
		 	By:	 	 /s/ Steven B. Klinsky

		 	Name:	 	Steven B. Klinsky
		 	Title:	 	Managing Member
	
	ALLEGHENY NEW MOUNTAIN PARTNERS, L.P.
		
	By:	 	New Mountain Investments II, L.L.C., its general partner
			
		 	By:	 	 /s/ Steven B. Klinsky

		 	Name:	 	Steven B. Klinsky
		 	Title:	 	Managing Member


  

			
	 ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED TO
 AS OF THE DATE
FIRST WRITTEN ABOVE

	
	DELTEK, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Kevin Parker

	Name:	 	Kevin Parker
	Title:	 	Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
#### William T. Lutterell *v.*Louisa Caldwell et al.

Í *Instructions—Division' Fence—Trespass.*

It is error to give an instruction which has no basis in the evidence.

*31[Opinion filed February 21, 1889.]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the lion. Cyrus Epler, Judge,.presiding.

Messrs. Morrison & Whitlock, for appellant.

Messrs. Brown *&*Kirby, for appellees.

*Per Curiam.*

This suit grew out of a contention between the parties hereto as to the true location of the line dividing their farms, and consequently whether Lutterell was a trespasser in plowing up a hedge claimed by one to be on such line, and by Lutterell as being entirely on his land.

The court gave the following instruction:

> “ That if they believe, from the evidence, that the old fence, moved by the plaintiffs to make room for the setting of the hedge in question, was placed there by the defendant Lutterell as a temporary fence, to remain only until Mr. or Mrs. Caldwell should set a hedge upon the line between their lan.Is, and that such fence was never recognized or admitted by the plaintiffs or those under whom they claim title to be the true line, then plaintiffs were not estopped thereby to place tlicir hedge upon the true line between said lands, although the true line might differ from the line of the old fence.”

We fail to find any evidence in the record upon which this instruction could be based. It was misleading, for it tended to make the jury suppose that the court was referring to the original fence as built by the ancestor of appellant, and there was no evidence to show that it was built for a temporary purpose.

This was an important question in the case, and we think this instruction tended to mislead-the jury upon it, and therefor- there should be a new trial.

The judgment of the Circuit Court will be reversed and the cause remanded.

*Reversed and remanded.*
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 244 (Wednesday, December 20, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65670-65671]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-30848]



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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Petrotechnical Open Software Corporation

    Notice is hereby given that, on November 2, 1995, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301, et seq. (``the Act''), Petrotechnical Open 
Software Corporation (``POSC'') has filed written notifications 
simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission disclosing changes in its membership. The notifications were 
filed for the purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting the 
recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified 
circumstances. Specifically, the following additional parties have 
become new, non-voting 

[[Page 65671]]
members of POSC: Energy and Minerals, Victoria Fitzroy, Victoria, 
AUSTRALIA; Beijing Research Institute of Petroleum, Beijing, PEOPLES 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA; and Matra Datavision, Les Ulis Cedex, FRANCE.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of POSC.
    On January 14, 1991, POSC filed its original notification pursuant 
to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a 
notice in the Federal Register pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on 
February 7, 1991, (56 FR 5021).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on July 17, 
1995. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
section 6(b) of the Act on November 28, 1995 (60 FR 58643).
Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 95-30848 Filed 12-19-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-01-M
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1
 
                       VITESSE SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION
 
           STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE
 
                 (IN THOUSANDS EXCEPT SHARE AND PER SHARE DATA)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                             FISCAL YEARS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,
                                            -----------------------------------
                                               1996        1995        1994
                                            ----------- ----------- -----------
   <S>                                      <C>         <C>         <C>
   Net income (loss)......................  $    12,645 $     1,507 $    (4,141)
                                            =========== =========== ===========
   Shares
     Weighted average common shares
      outstanding.........................   17,383,677  15,195,498  14,773,137
     Common stock options (as determined
      by application of the treasury stock
      method).............................    2,760,742   2,111,509         --
                                            ----------- ----------- -----------
   Adjusted weighted average common and
    common equivalent shares outstanding..   20,144,419  17,307,007  14,773,137
                                            =========== =========== ===========
   Net income (loss) per share of common
    stock.................................  $      0.63 $      0.09 $     (0.28)
                                            =========== =========== ===========
</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Prince, Appellant.

[773 NYS2d 325]

Appeal from a judgment of the Livingston County Court (Ronald A. Cicoria, J.), rendered October 22, 2002. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law § 170.25), defendant contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. We reject that contention. There is no basis to conclude that the jury failed to give the identification evidence the weight it should be accorded *(see People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). We further reject the contention of defendant that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. With respect to defense counsel’s alleged failure to obtain expert testimony or evidence, defendant has not demonstrated that such testimony or evidence was available or that it would have assisted the jury in its determination *(see People v Jurgensen,*288 AD2d 937 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 684 [2001]; *People v Castricone,*224 AD2d 1019, 1020 [1996]; *see also People v Skinner,*224 AD2d 916 [1996]). The *1099further contention of defendant that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was advised by counsel not to testify “implicates strategic discussions between defendant and counsel that are dehors the record,” and thus that contention is not reviewable on direct appeal *(People v Sanders,*289 AD2d 101, 101 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 760 [2002]; *see People v Pozo,*285 AD2d 520 [2001], *lv denied*99 NY2d 538 [2002]). The remaining instances of alleged ineffective assistance lack merit. Viewing the evidence, the law and the circumstances of this case, in totality and as of the time of the representation, we conclude that defendant received meaningful representation *(see generally People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). The sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe. Present—Pine, J.P., Wisner, Kehoe, Gorski and Hayes, JJ.