Filed 7/17/14 In re A.B. CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re A.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. H039890 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 12-JV-39421E)

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. A.B., Defendant and Appellant.
In re J.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. H040054 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 3-13-JV40062A)

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. J.S., Defendant and Appellant.2 I NTRODUCTION The juvenile court found that minors A. B. and J.S. committed attempted robbery (Pen. Code, 1 §§ 664/211-212.5, subd. (c)) and that J.S. committed battery (§§ 242-243, subd. (a)). The court also sust ained the allegation that J.S. personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the attempted ro bbery (§§ 667 & 1192.7). On appeal, J.S. contends that the punishment imposed for battery must be stayed pursuant to section 654. A.B. challenges the juvenile court’s findings that he aided and abetted the attempted robbery on insufficiency of ev idence grounds. A.B. also argues, and the Attorney General concedes, that the dispositional order mu st be modified to clarify that he is not personally responsible for attorney fees. For the reasons set forth below, we will m odify the dispositional order as to J.S. to stay the punishment for battery. We will also modify the dispositional order as to A.B. to clarify that A.B. is not pe rsonally liable for attorney fe es. As so modified, the dispositional orders are affirmed.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND On May 3, 2013, the dist rict attorney filed a juve nile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, su bdivision (a), alleging that A.B. committed attempted robbery in the second degree ( §§ 664/211- 212.5, s ubd. (c)). On May 17, 2013, the district attorney filed a petition, also under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that J. S. committed attempted ro bbery in the second degree (§§ 664/211- 212. 5, subd. (c), misdemeanor battery (§§ 242- 243, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The petition also alleged that J.S. personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the attempted robbery (§§ 667 & 1192.7).

1 All further statutory references are to th e Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 The Underlying Offense At the joint contested jurisdictional heari ng, the victim, C.M., testified as to the events that led up to the charges against A.B. and J.S. On May 1, 2013, C.M., who was a 16 year old student at Indepe ndence High School, was walkin g home from school on the Penitencia Creek Trail. As he passed th e Interstate 680 highway overpass, C.M. saw three individuals standing approximately fi ve feet away from him. One of the individuals, A.B., asked C.M. if he had ca sh or a lighter. C.M. responded, “ ‘I’m sorry. . . . I don’t have any cash or a lighter.’ ” C.M. continued walking. About 15 sec onds later, one of the other individuals, J.S., approached C.M. J.S. demanded that C.M. give him a ll his “stuff.” C.M. asked, “ ‘Why?’ ” and said “ ‘I don’t want to cause a ny trouble.’ ” J.S. then pulled out a knife. C.M. tried to run, but J.S. blocked him. J. S. pulled on C.M.’s backpack and then punched C.M. in the lip, causing it to bleed. C.M. reca lled that J.S. put the knife away before J.S. punched him. During the entire time J.S. wa s with C.M., A.B. and the third individual
watched from a pproximately half a kilometer away. C. M. testified that he could still see A.B., even though he was “far away.” After J.S. punched C.M., C.M. ran away. C.M. testified that all three individuals
chased after him. 2 C.M. stopped and showed them his phone and said that he was going to call the police. At some point, the thre e individuals stopped ch asing C.M., and C.M. called the police.

2 On re-direct examination, C.M. provide d some contradicti ng testimony. The prosecutor asked “at some point all three of th em were together again; is that right?” C.M. responded “No. . . . Guy No. 2 . . . trie d to rob my stuff while guy No. 1 and 3 was, um was together far away.” The prosecutor aske d, “And then after that you told us that they chased you; is that right?” C.M. respo nded, “No. They didn’t chase me, they were watching till [ sic ] what I’m doing, but I didn’t do anyt hing else. I just keep on running away from them. If I stop—I ju st stopped they try to go af ter me, but I just run back away from them . . . .”4 After C.M. called the police, Officer Eric Rosengren and another officer responded to the scene of the incident. C.M. we nt with the officers to try to find the three individuals. The police located A.B. in front of his apartment. C.M. was able to identify
him as the individual who had asked him for money or a lighter. When Officer Rosengren first questioned A.B., A.B. acted as if he had no idea why the police were talking to him and as if he did nothing wrong. A.B. then changed his st ory and admitted that he had been with two classmates during th e attempted robbery. A.B. told the officers that he was a reluctant participant and had tried to talk his classmates out of the robbery. A.B. denied that he asked C.M. for money. Days after the incident, Detective Barb ara Melloch met with C.M. to conduct a photographic lineup. C.M. iden tified J.S. as one of the pe rpetrators. Detective Melloch
interviewed J.S. about the incident at the Penite ncia Creek Trail. J.S. initially said that he was just there, and he denied doing anything . Detective Melloch to ld him that she knew he was lying. J.S. then admitted that he took part in the offense. J.S. told the detective that he took a knife from a picnic table and us ed it to rob C.M. J.S. also admitted to hitting C.M., but he claimed that he accidentally hit him during a struggle. J.S. said that
he was with “A.J.” 3 and “Sneezy” at the time of the incident. A.B.’s Prior Offense At the jurisdictional hearing, the prosecu tion introduced evidence of A.B.’s prior robbery in order to prove a co mmon plan or scheme. J.A., the victim of A.B.’s prior robbery, testified that in November 2012, he was walking home from school on the Penitencia Creek Trail. J.A. was 15 ye ars old at the time and was a student at Independence High School. As he was walk ing around the highway overpass, J.A. encountered a group of about five individuals. J.A. recognized one of the individuals as A.B. from middle school. A.B. approached J. A. and asked “ ‘Do you remember me?’ ”

3 A.B. is also known as “A.J.”5 J.A. replied that he remembered him. A.B. told J.A. “ ‘I was going to rob you but I know who you are so I’m not going to . . . .” A.B. then asked J.A. if he had anything in his backpack. J.A. handed over his backpack, and A.B. hand ed it back once he realized there was nothing but school work inside. A.B. th en asked what was in J.A.’s pockets. J.A. had an iPhone, but he refused to give it to A.B. A.B. then “swept out [J.A.’s] leg
numerous times” until he fell. A. B. grabbed the iPhone and sa id he was going to use it to
call his mother. A.B. returned the phone to J.A., but shortly thereafter, A.B. ran after J.A. to take the phone a second time. J.A. to ok the phone and ran away. A couple months later, J.A. used the GPS locator to r ecover the phone at a flea market. The Sustained Petitions At the conclusion of the jurisdictional he aring, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petitions and found that A. B. and J.S. committed attempted robbery and that J.S. committed misdemeanor battery. The court also found true the special allegation that J.S. personally used a de adly weapon in the commission of the attempted robbery. Pursuant to the prosecution’s motion, the cour t dismissed the allegation that J.S. resisted a police officer. The juvenile court declared J.S. a ward of the court and ordered him to serve 30 days on the Electronic Mo nitoring Program (EMP). The court placed J.S. on probation with various terms and conditions, and it set the maximum time of confinement at three years two months. The court also d eclared A.B. a ward of the court and ordered him to serve 90 days on EMP. The court pl aced him on probation with various terms and conditions, and it set the maximum time of conf inement at seven years four months. The court also noted that “[A.B.’s] attorney’s fees will be set at $200 with four appearances.”
D ISCUSSION A. The Punishment for J.S.’s Batte ry Offense Must Be Stayed
J.S.’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court violated section 654 when it imposed a separate punishment for his ba ttery offense. J.S. argues that he cannot6 be punished for both attempted robbery and ba ttery because the crimes were part of an indivisible course of conduct with one objec tive. J.S. asserts that the correct remedy would be to stay the punishment for ba ttery and to modify the maximum time of confinement accordingly. 4 The Attorney General argues that separate punishment for the battery offense was proper, as it was a separate “gratuitous vi olent act” committed after the attempted robbery had ended. According to the Attorney Gene ral, the attempted r obbery concluded once J.S. put away the knife. Additionally, the A ttorney General contends that the juvenile
court could have inferred that J.S. had a se parate objective for committing battery such as punching “out of anger, or to prevent or intimidate C. M. from calling the police.” Subdivision (a) of section 654 provide s that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different pr ovisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest pote ntial term of imprisonm ent, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under mo re than one provision. . . .” The purpose of the statute is to ensure that the punish ment is commensurate with the defendant’s culpability. ( People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 550-551 ( Perez ).) “The proscription against double punishme nt in section 654 is applicable where
there is a course of conduct which violates more than one statute and comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute w ithin the meaning of section 654. The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are inci dent to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one.” ( People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 376.) “On the other hand, if the evidence disclo ses that a defendant

4 Although J.S. did not object to the juvenile court’s imposition of sentence on section 654 grounds, failure to make such an objection does not waive the claim unless the sentence is imposed pursua nt to a plea agreement. ( People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 296.)7 entertained multiple criminal objectives wh ich were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for the independent vi olations committed in pursuit of each objective even th ough the violations were part s of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.” ( Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 551, fn. omitted.) “Whether section 654 applies in a given cas e is a question of fact for the juvenile court, which is vested with broad la titude in making its determination.” ( People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) On appeal we defer to express or implicit determinations that are based up on substantial evidence. (Cf. People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730-731.) In imposing a concurrent te rm for battery, the juvenile court implicitly found that defendant had a separate objective to commit th e battery. However, the evidence here is insufficient to support such a finding. According to C.M. , J.S. demanded that C.M. give him all his “stuff” and pulled out the knife s hortly thereafter. C.M. attempted to leave,
but J.S. blocked him. J.S. then pulled on C.M.’s backpack and punched C.M. in the lip. After the punch, C.M. ran away. Although C.M. testified that J.S. had put away the knife before the punch, nothing in these facts support the Attorney General’s assertion that the attempted robbery had conclude d immediately after J.S. put the knife away. Rather, the punch occurred as a part of the course of the attempted robbery and was not a separate
and distinct act. The facts show that when J.S. threw the punch, he had pulled on C.M.’s backpack, presumably to try to forcefully retrieve C.M.’s possessions. Thus, the attempted robbery was ongoing when J.S. committed battery, and it only concluded after the three individuals stopped chasing C.M. Thus, the facts support that J.S. committed battery with the intent to take away C.M.’s property. Accordingly, as section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the attempted robbery and the battery, the proper remedy is to stay the terms im posed on the battery count and to modify the maximum time of confinement. (See People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 358-359; People v. Lopez (1992) 11 Cal.Ap p.4th 844, 849.)8 The juvenile court set the maximum time of confinement for J.S. at three years two months. Although the court did not explai n its calculation of th e maximum term, it is apparent that it set the term in accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 726
and Penal Code secti on 1170.1. Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (d) provides that if “the court elects to aggregate the period of physical confinement on multiple counts . . . the ‘maximum term of im prisonment’ shall be the aggregate term of imprisonment specified in subdivision (a) of Section 1170.1 of the Pe nal Code.” Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) provides , in relevant part: “the aggregate term of imprisonment
for all these convictions shall be the sum of the principal te rm, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed for applicable enhancements for prio r convictions, prior prison terms, and Section 12022.1. The principa l term shall consist of the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes . . . . The subordinate term
for each consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed . . . .” Here, it is apparent that th e juvenile court followed this statutory formula and calculated the maxi mum time of confinement by adding three years, which is the upper term for attempte d robbery (see §§ 213 & 18), plus two months,
which is one-third of the middle term for the subordinat e misdemeanor battery (see § 243). Because the juvenile court imposed a tw o month term for the misdemeanor battery offense, we will stay the two month term pursuant to section 654 and reduce the maximum time of confinement to three years.
B. There Was Sufficient Evidence of A.B’s Attempted Robbery The juvenile court found that A.B. had aided and abetted in the attempted robbery of C.M. On appeal, A.B. contends that th ere was insufficient evid ence to support the court’s finding. A.B. argues that his conduc t prior to the incident (i.e., asking C.M. for cash or a lighter) was innocent, that he st ood far away from J.S. during the attempted9 robbery, that there was no evidence that he was a “lookout,” and that there was
insufficient evidence that he chased C.M. Additionally , A.B. argues that the evidence of his prior robbery “lends little suppor t to the common pl an theory.” When considering a challenge to the su fficiency of the evid ence to support a criminal conviction, we determine whether th ere is substantial ev idence, such that a
reasonable trier of fact coul d find the defendant guilty bey ond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, we review the whol e record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence that support it, and we presume the existence of every fact the trie r of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Conversely, we do not reweigh the evidence, resolv e conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319- 320; People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577-578.) “ ‘A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purp ose of the perpetrator, (ii) a nd with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or en couraging commission of the crim e, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigat es the commission of the crime.’ ” ( People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409 ( Campbell ), quoting People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.) Neither mere presence when a crime is committed, nor failure to prevent it, is sufficient. ( Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 409. ) It is often said that various “ ‘factors’ ” may be “ ‘considered’ ” in determining whether a defendant’s conduct constituted aiding and ab etting, and that these include “ ‘presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.’ ” ( Ibid., quoting In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App. 3d 1087, 1094.)
Based on the record in th is case, there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that A.B. aided and abetted the robb ery by selecting the victim, acting as lookout, or as otherwise standing by in preparation to provide aid to J.S. (See10 People v. Silva (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 162, 169 [per son who is present “to serve as a lookout . . . is a principal in the crime committed”]; People v. Moore (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 303, 306 [presence as a lookout is sufficient to aid and abet a crime]; People v. Luna (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 662, 665 [def endant aided and abetted an assault where he “stood by prepared to take a hand” in a fight involving a codefendant and “aggressively entered it when he thought the proper time had arrived”].) A factfinder could reasonably conclude th at A.B. “did not independently happen by the scene of the crime.” ( Campbell , supra , 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) A.B. was with J.S. and another individual before the attemp ted robbery occurred. A.B. had approached C.M. to ask if he had cash or a lighter, a nd then only 15 seconds later, J.S. confronted C.M. Additionally, during the time J.S. con fronted C.M., A.B. and the other individual remained in sight and watched the confronta tion take place. Since there was no evidence that A.B. was surprised by or attempted to in terfere with J.S.’s conduct, the court could have reasonably concluded that A.B. knew of the plan ahead of time and agreed to serve as a lookout or as a back-up in the event that J.S. needed assistance. This inference is further bolstered by A.B.’s admi ssions to the police. He ad mitted that he was a reluctant participant and that he tried to convince his friends out of the robbery. His admissions show that he knew of the plan to rob C.M. ah ead of time and that he had agreed to take some part in it. Furthermore, there was also evidence that A.B. chased C.M. when the attempted robbery failed. We note that t hough there was some am biguity with C.M.’s testimony about whether A.B. chased C.M., 5 any evidentiary disputes must be resolve in favor of the judgment. ( People v. Johnson , supra , 26 Cal.3d at pp. 577-578.) Moreover, the evidence of A.B.’s prior robbery also supported the juvenile court’s finding that he aided and abetted the instan t robbery, as there were many similarities
between the two robberies. The victim in both crimes had been walking home on

5 See fn. 2, ante

.11 Penitencia Creek Trail after school, and th e offense occurred arou nd the same location (i.e., under the I-680 overpass) and the same time of day. As with the present case, A.B. had been with a group of other individual s when he approached the victim, who was walking alone. Also similar to the instant case, A.B. had asked the victim if he had anything in his possession befo re he or another group memb er used force. Given all these similarities to the prior robbery, a plau sible inference was that A.B. was involved in a plan or scheme to execute a similar robbery in this case. Accordingly, the evidence, taken togethe r, was sufficient for th e juvenile court to reasonably infer that A.B. had knowledge of the attempted robbery prior to the commission, had the intent to assist J.S. in committing the offense, and had affirmatively played a role in the crime by se lecting the victim and acting as a look out or a back-up for
J.S.
C. Using the Appropriate Standard of Proo f, the Juvenile Court did not Err in Finding that A.B. Knew the Wrongfulness of His Conduct On appeal, A.B. contends that the j uvenile court erred in finding that he understood the wrongfulness of hi s conduct under section 26. First, A.B. contends that the court erred by using a clear and convincin g evidence standard rath er than a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard to fi nd that he knew the wrongfulness of his conduct. While he acknowledges that our Supreme Court in In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229 ( Manuel L. ) held that the clear and convincing ev idence standard is the appropriate standard of proof, he maintains that Manuel L. is “no longer good law.” Second, under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, he argues th at the evidence is insufficient to prove that he knew the wrongfulness of his act. Under section 26, “[a]ll persons are ca pable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] One—Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.” Notwithstanding the presumption of section 26, the juvenile12 court in this instance determined that “there is sufficient evidence, clear and convincing proof, that’s been adduced to show that the minor knew the wrongfulness of his act or the criminal charge.” Specifica lly, the court mentioned “the te stimony of Officer Rosengren, that the minor denied doing anything wrong, ch anged his story, tried to stop or talk the others out of robbery. Ther e’s evidence of the chasing of the victim that the minor’s denial of knowledge, denial asking for money, conflicting statements. And then the other
issue is the court case on the issue of the 11 01(b), that is, the plan, the scheme and the flight. All of the evidence shows clear and convincing proof that the minor was involved in the alleged acts.”
1. The Juvenile Court Properly Ap plied the Clear and Convincing
Evidence Standard A.B. first contends that the juvenile c ourt should have app lied a proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard to de termine whether A.B. knew the wrongfulness of his act.
In Manuel L., the California Supreme Court de termined that the clear and convincing evidence sta ndard applies to a section 26 finding. ( Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 232.) In doing so, the court distinguished the nature of this requirement
from the elements of a criminal offense. “The issue of the j uvenile’s capacity remains, as historically it has been, subject to a distinct standard of proof. Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, continues to define the prosecution’s burd en of proving the juvenile’s capacity in section 602 proceedings. Section 701 establishes its burden with respect to all elements of the offense necessary to a findi ng that the minor violat ed any law defining a crime.” ( Id. at p. 236.) The court reasoned that “cr iminal capacity is not an element of the offense and thus is not the type of fa ct [that] requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, it is akin to the question of sanity, which due process does not require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” ( Id. at p. 238.) A.B. acknowledges that this court would ordinarily be bound to the holding in
Manuel L . ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455.)13 Nonetheless, he contends that Manuel L. is no longer valid in li ght of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 ( Apprendi ). In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that a fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum pe nalty for an offense must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but the co urt explicitly did not consid er “the State’s power to manipulate the prosecutor’s burde n of proof by, for example, relying on a presumption
rather than eviden ce to establish an element of an o ffense, [citations], or by placing the
affirmative defense label on ‘at least some elements’ of traditional crimes.” ( Id. at p. 475.) A juvenile’s capacity to commit a criminal offense is not an element of a criminal offense, nor is it a sentencing factor that in creases the maximum penalty for an offense. As the California Supreme Court explained in Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 238 a juvenile’s capacity to commit a criminal offens e (§ 26, subd. One) is akin to an adult’s sanity (§ 26, subd. Two). In People v. Ferris (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 773 ( Ferris ), the
defendant claimed that Apprendi applied to the issue of sanity and required the prosecution to prove sanity be yond a reasonable doubt. In Ferris, the jury had been
instructed that the defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance that he was insane. ( Id. at p. 777.) The Fifth District Cour t of Appeal rejected the defendant’s attempt to characterize sanity as an element of the offense for Apprendi purposes. ( Id. at p. 780.) Sanity, like a juvenile’s capacity to commit a criminal offense, concerns the individual’s ability to understa nd the wrongfulness of the crimin al act at the time of its commission. ( Ferris, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 780; § 26.) Since the issue of sanity is
not an element of the offense for Apprendi purposes, it follows that a juvenile’s capacity
is not an element of the offense for Apprendi purposes. Therefore, Apprendi does not require that capacity be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we remain bound by14 Manuel L. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455), and we conclude that the juvenile court a pplied the correct standard of proof.
2. There was Sufficient Evidence that A. B. Knew the Wrongfulness of his
Conduct Applying the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, the juvenile court did not err in deciding that A.B. knew the wr ongfulness of his conduct. “On appeal, we must review the whole record in the light mo st favorable to the judgment and affirm the juvenile court’s findings that the minor u nderstood the wrongfulness of his conduct if they are supported by ‘substantia l evidence—that is, evidence th at is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact c ould have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof. [Citations.] ’ [Citations.]” ( In re James
B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872 ( James B .).) “In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial eviden ce such as the minor’s age, experience, and understanding, as well as the circumstance s of the offense, including its method of commission and concealment. [Citations.] Generally, the older a child gets and the closer he approaches the ag e of 14, the more likely it is that he appreciates the wrongfulness of his acts. [Citations.]” ( James B., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 872- 873.) At the time of the offense, A.B. was 13 years and 11 months old. A.B. was very close to the age of 14, and thus, it was more likely that he understood the wrongfulness of his actions. ( James B., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 872-873.) When A.B. was questioned by the police, he initially acted as if he had no idea why the police were contacting him and as if he had done nothing wrong. He then changed his story and admitted being at the scene of th e attempted robb ery and being a reluctant participant in the o ffense. Additionally, he denied ever asking C.M. if he had any money, which contradicted C.M.’s test imony that A.B. asked him whether he had15 any cash or a lighter. A.B. al so admitted that he tried to convince his friends out of the robbery. A.B.’s initial denial, his conflicti ng statements, and his ad mission regarding his
efforts to convince his friends out of the offense indicate that he was aware that his part in the attempted robbery was wrong. Moreover, as the juvenile court found, th e evidence of A.B.’s prior robbery also
demonstrates that he understood that commit ting the present offense was wrong. A.B. was prosecuted and was found delinquent for his prior robbery. Ha ving been prosecuted and punished for a robbery that had a simila r plan and design as the attempted robbery here (see ante , at p. 11), the juvenile court coul d have reasonably in ferred that A.B. appreciated the wrongfulness of his par ticipation in the pr esent offense. Given A.B.’s age, the circum stantial evidence of his be havior and his conduct, and his involvement in a pr ior robbery similar to the one at issue here, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that A.B. und erstood the wrongfulness of aiding and abetting the attempted robbery.
D. The Dispositional Order Should Clar ify the Attorney Fees Provision Lastly, A.B. argues that the juvenile c ourt was not authorized to order him to reimburse the public defender. A.B. asserts that the order must be modified to clarify that his parents, and not A.B. personally, are responsible for the attorney fees because (1) requiring a minor to pay is unauthorized by law, (2) there was no finding of an ability to pay, and (3) such an orde r violates equal protection prin ciples. The Attorney General concedes that the dispositional order should be clarified to state that A.B. is not personally liable for the attorney fees . We accept this concession.
Under Welfare and Institutions Code sec tion 903.1, subdivision (a), “[t]he father, mother, spouse, or other person liable for the support of a mino r, the estate of that person, and the estate of the minor, shall be liable for the cost to the county or the court, whichever entity incurr ed the expenses, of legal servi ces rendered to the minor by an attorney pursuant to an orde r of the juvenile court.” The statute makes no provision for16 imposing personal liability on the minor for the attorney fees incurred in representing him or her in the juvenile proceeding. Our Su preme Court has explained that Welfare and
Institutions Code section 9 03.1 “is merely declarative of the parents’ preexisting obligation to provide reasonabl e and necessary support to their minor children, and to reimburse third persons provi ding that support upon the parents’ failure to do so. [Citation.]” ( In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 521.) Moreover, the imposition of attorney fees as a condition of probation is pr ohibited in both adult criminal cases and in juvenile delinquency proceedings. ( People v. Faatiliga (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1280, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 1059, 1068; In re Elizabeth S. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 450, 454.) At the dispositional heari ng, the juvenile court ordered that “[t]he minor[’s] attorney’s fees will be set at $200 with four appearances.” Though it is not so clear from the record, it appears th at the order for attorney fees wa s a condition of A.B.’s probation. The record does not specifical ly mention whether the cour t ordered A.B. personally responsible for these attorney fees. However, the probation order states generally: “The minor and his parents are jointly and severa lly responsible for the payment of fines, penalty assessments, and/or restitu tion, as ordered by the Court.” As the dispositional order stands, the orde r may be construed as imposing personal liability on A.B. for reimbursement of attorney fees. As explained above, imposing such personal liability on a minor w ould be unauthorized by law. To avoi d any ambiguity, we shall modify the dispositional order as to A.B. to clarify that the minor is not personally responsible for reimbursement of attorn ey fees incurred in the proceedings. 6

6 Because we modify the order to clarify th at A.B. is not personally liable for the attorney fees, we need not address his argum ents regarding the ab ility to pay finding and the equal protecti on violation.17 D ISPOSITION In appeal No. H040054, th e penalty for misdemeanor battery is stayed. The dispositional order is modified to state that J.S.’s maximum time of confinement is three
years. In appeal No. H039890, the dispositional orde r is modified to clarify that A.B. is not personally liable for the re imbursement of his attorney fees assessed by the juvenile

court. As so modified, the orders are affirmed.

__________ _______________ _____________ RUSHING, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

___________________ _________________ PREMO, J.

___________________ _________________ ELIA, J.