REPORTED 

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

 

No. 470 

September Term, 2015 

______________________________________ 

STEVEN BURNETT 

v. 

CERETA SPENCER 

______________________________________ 

 Eyler, Deborah S., 

Arthur,

Wilner, Alan M. 

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 

JJ.

______________________________________ 

Opinion by Arthur, J.

______________________________________ 

 

 Filed: September 28, 2016 
This case concerns Md. Rule 2-651, the so-called “wild card”1 provision for 

collecting judgments. A judgment-creditor asked the Circuit Court for Baltimore County 

to employ Rule 2-651 to enter a charging order against the corporate interest of a 

recalcitrant judgment-debtor. The court entered the charging order, and the debtor 

appealed. We affirm. 

I. Background 

 Cereta Spencer and Steven Burnett were divorced in the Circuit Court for 

Baltimore County in 2010. In connection with the divorce, the court granted Spencer a 

monetary award of $3.7 million. This Court affirmed the judgment in an unreported 

opinion. Burnett v. Burnett, No. 2855, Sept. Term 2010 (Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 19, 2012). 

On July 3, 2012, the clerk docketed two money judgments in favor of Spencer and 

against Burnett. The judgments, in the amounts of $912,500.00 and $1,612,500.00, 

appear to represent unpaid portions of the monetary award. 

 Spencer alleges that Burnett resisted payment, apparently preferring to have 

interest accrue at the post-judgment rate of 10 percent per annum than to satisfy his 

obligations to his ex-wife. Spencer claims that, in his efforts to resist payment, Burnett 

filed a bankruptcy petition, which was dismissed as a bad-faith filing. 

 On November 3, 2014, Spencer obtained writs of garnishment of wages on 

Burnett’s employer, CAEI Inc., and on Burnett’s bank. Three days later, on November 6, 

2014, Spencer filed a motion for ancillary relief under Rule 2-651. 

 

1

 Paul V. Niemeyer, Linda M. Schuett & Joyce E. Smithey, Maryland Rules 

Commentary 752 (4th ed. 2014). 
 2 

 The motion for ancillary relief was directed to CAEI, a Subchapter S corporation 

in which Burnett is the majority owner. In the motion Spencer asked the court to 

“charg[e]” Burnett’s “equity interest” “with the payment of all amounts due and owing” 

on the judgments. 

In response, CAEI and Burnett filed a number of dilatory papers – a motion for a 

more definite statement from CAEI; from Burnett, a motion to quash, alleging defects in 

service. 

 On December 9, 2014, apparently unaware of the motion for a more definite 

statement and the motion to quash, the circuit court granted the motion for ancillary 

relief. Its orders “charged” Burnett’s “equity interests” in CAEI “with the payment of all 

amounts due” on the two judgments against him. In addition, the orders “enjoined” 

Burnett and CAEI from “transferring any assets by way of dividend, loan or otherwise” 

to Burnett. Instead, the orders required that “any distributions payable or any other 

money that is or becomes due to” Burnett “by reason of his corporate stock shares in 

CAEI” “be directed” to Spencer. 

 Burnett and CAEI moved for reconsideration. After some motions practice and 

communications among the court and counsel, Burnett and Spencer reached an agreement 

on February 9, 2015, which was embodied in a consent order that was signed by the court 

on March 16, 2015, and docketed on March 25, 2015. Under the consent order, Burnett 

could join in CAEI’s motion for reconsideration, which was to be heard on February 10, 

2015, but he withdrew his objections to service and his motion for reconsideration of the 

court’s original charging orders of December 9, 2014. The consent order gave Burnett 
 3 

until February 26, 2015, to elect his exemptions, if any, from Spencer’s action to collect 

on her judgment, but the order made no other provision for registering substantive 

challenges to the relief that the court had ordered. 

On February 10, 2015, the day after Burnett and Spencer reached the agreement 

that became the consent order, the circuit court conducted a hearing on CAEI’s motion 

for reconsideration. At the hearing, Mr. Burnett’s counsel joined the company in arguing 

for the amendment of some aspects of the December 9, 2014, orders. In an order signed 

by the court on February 19, 2015, and docketed on March 9, 2015, the court amended its 

earlier order in two respects: (1) it permitted CAEI to reimburse Burnett for legitimate 

business expenses incurred on CAEI’s behalf; and (2) it permitted CAEI both to make 

and to forgive loans to Burnett, provided that the company gave advance notice to 

Spencer’s attorneys. 

In accordance with the agreement that became the consent order between Burnett 

and CAEI, Burnett claimed several exemptions on February 26, 2015. At the same time, 

Burnett filed what he called “a motion to release property from levy” under Md. Rule 2-

643(c). In that motion Burnett asked the court to release the “levy” on his corporate 

interest. He contended that a charging order could reach only partnership, and not 

corporate, interests.2

 

2

It is unclear whether a person can “levy” on intangible personal property, such as 

an interest in a corporation. See Md. Rule 2-642(b) (instructing the sheriff to levy upon a 

judgment-debtor’s interest in personal property “by obtaining actual view of the property, 

entering a description of the property upon a schedule, and (1) removing the property

from the premises, or (2) affixing a copy of the writ and schedule to the property, (3) 

posting a copy of the writ and schedule in a prominent place in the immediate vicinity of 
 4 

In an order dated April 21, 2015, the circuit court denied Burnett’s motion to 

release property from levy. The clerk made a record of that ruling on the docket on April 

27, 2015. 

On May 21, 2015, Burnett appealed. Spencer has moved to dismiss the appeal. 

II. Questions Presented

Burnett presents two questions, which we quote: 

1. Whether orders entered under the authority of Md. Rule 2-

651 validly attach a judgment-debtor’s interest in a corporation, 

charge the interest with payments of all amounts due on the 

judgment, and direct all of the judgment-debtor’s shareholder 

distributions to be paid on to the judgment-creditor when the 

General Assembly has not adopted a statute making the charging 

order remedy available to creditors of a shareholder-debtor of a 

corporation[.] 

2. Whether the court can exempt a judgment-creditor from 

her burden to prove which portion of a judgment-debtor’s 

shareholder distributions is subject to enforcement of the judgment.

III. Spencer’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal 

Before proceeding to the merits of the appeal, we must consider Spencer’s motion 

to dismiss the appeal. In support of that motion, Spencer makes two arguments. First, 

she argues that Burnett has no right to appeal because he “consented to the validity” of 

the charging order when he entered into the consent order on February 9, 2015. Second, 

 

the property and affixing to each item of property a label denoting that the property has 

been levied upon by the sheriff, or (4) posting a copy of the writ and schedule in a 

prominent place in the immediate vicinity of the property without affixing a label to each 

item of property if affixing a label to each item of property is possible but not practical”

(emphasis added)). Consequently, it is unclear whether a person can move to release a 

“levy” on intangible personal property. The issue, however, is not before us, because 

Spencer did not object to the form of relief that Burnett requested.
 5 

Spencer argues that Burnett’s appeal is untimely because, she says, he was required to 

note his appeal within 30 days of March 25, 2015, the date when the clerk docketed the 

consent order. 

 Spencer’s conclusions are incorrect because her premise is incorrect. Burnett has 

not appealed from the consent order, in which he consented to service of process and 

withdrew his motion for reconsideration of the court’s original charging orders of 

December 9, 2014. Burnett has appealed from the denial of his “motion to release 

property from levy.” 

Under Maryland Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 12-303(1) of the Courts and 

Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), Burnett had the right to appeal from the order 

denying that motion, because it is an order “with reference to the receipt or charging of 

the income, interest, or dividends” of the “property with which the action is concerned,” 

or “the refusal to modify, dissolve, or discharge such an order.” The court did not deny 

that motion until April 21, 2015, and the clerk did not enter it on the docket until April 

27, 2015. Burnett noted his appeal on May 21, 2015, less than 30 days after the clerk 

docketed the appealable interlocutory order. Because Burnett’s appeal, therefore, is 

properly before us, we deny Spencer’s motion to dismiss. 
 6 

IV. Scope of Review

Both parties agree that because this case requires an interpretation of the scope of 

a procedural rule, it involves a question of law, which is subject to de novo review. We 

proceed on that supposition. 

V. Authority to Issue Charging Orders Under Rule 2-651 

 Maryland Rule 2-651 provides, in full, as follows: 

Upon motion and proof of service, a court in which a judgment has 

been entered or recorded may order such relief regarding property subject 

to enforcement of the judgment as may be deemed necessary and 

appropriate to aid enforcement of the judgment pursuant to these rules, 

including an order (a) to any person enjoining the destruction, alteration, 

transfer, removal, conveyance, assignment, or other disposition of such 

property, (b) to any person enjoining the negotiation, transfer, assignment, 

or other disposition of a document representing an interest in such property, 

(c) to any person directing the disclosure to the sheriff of the whereabouts 

of such property, (d) to any person directing that any such property which 

has been removed from the jurisdiction, concealed, or made inaccessible for 

the purpose of avoiding levy be delivered to the sheriff or made available 

for levy, (e) to any person directing the surrender to the sheriff of such 

property located in the state, and (f) to the sheriff of any county where such 

property is located directing the sheriff to take physical possession of and 

sequester such property. The motion shall be served on the person against 

whom the order is sought in the manner provided by Chapter 100 of this 

Title for service of process to obtain personal jurisdiction and if that person 

is not the judgment debtor, a copy of the motion shall be mailed to the 

judgment debtor's last known address. 

 Rule 2-651 supplements the five, specific mechanisms set forth in the Maryland 

Rules for enforcing a judgment: a writ of execution (Rules 2-641 and 2-642), a general 

writ of garnishment (Rule 2-645), a writ of garnishment of an account in a financial 

institution (Rule 2-645.1), a writ of garnishment of wages (Rule 2-646), and a charging 

order on a partnership interest (Rule 2-649). Although those mechanisms cover most of 
 7 

the circumstances that a judgment-creditor may confront in enforcing a judgment, Rule 2-

651 “provides a ‘wild card’ that may be used in extraordinary circumstances.” Paul V. 

Niemeyer, Linda M. Schuett & Joyce E. Smithey, Maryland Rules Commentary 752 (4th

ed. 2014).

 “The Rule was derived, in part, from former Md. Rule 628d, which allowed a 

court to ‘pass such order as will subject the property or credits of the judgment debtor 

either in his own hands or in the hands of any person to the operation of the judgment.’” 

McKinney v. State of Md. Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 99 Md. App. 124, 137 (1994). 

In his principal argument, Burnett objects to the use of Rule 2-651 to fashion a 

charging order against an interest in a corporation. He points out that Maryland Code 

(1975, 2014 Repl. Vol.), § 9A-504 of the Corporations and Associations Article, 

expressly authorizes a court to impose a charging order against partnership interests and 

that Rule 2-649 facilitates that authorization. He also points out the absence of any 

statute that expressly authorizes a court to impose a charging order against a 

shareholder’s interest in a corporation. He objects to the use of Rule 2-651 to devise a 

species of charging order that has no explicit statutory authorization.

According to Burnett, the “true function” of Rule 2-651 is “to provide relief that is 

supplementary or complementary to a statute authorizing it.” He seems to say that a 

court cannot order a form of relief under Rule 2-651 unless the relief has some 

corresponding statutory basis. 

 Burnett’s argument ignores Rule 2-631, which concerns the “[e]nforcement 

procedures available” for judgment-creditors. Rule 2-631 states that “[j]udgments may 
 8 

be enforced only as authorized by these rules or by statute.” (Emphasis added.) Because 

the rule employs the disjunctive term “or,” it is obvious, as a matter of logic and 

grammar, that a person may enforce a judgment by a method that is authorized by the 

rules alone: the method need not also be expressly authorized by statute. See, e.g., Hoile 

v. State, 404 Md. 591, 608-09 (2008). 

 In any event, Burnett himself agrees that his “corporate interest is apparently 

subject to attachment under” CJP § 3-305, which states that “[a]n attachment may be 

issued against any property or credit, matured or unmatured, which belong to a debtor.” 

In particular, Burnett agrees that “distributions are arguably ‘property or credits, matured 

or unmatured.’” In fact, Burnett does not contest the proposition that his corporate 

interest is subject to attachment under CJP § 3-305. Id. (“[t]hat point is not herein 

contested”). Those concessions would seem to put an end to his contention that the 

circuit court lacked a statutory basis for issuing the charging order.3

 

Turning to the language of Rule 2-651 itself, Burnett concedes that it is “not 

unreasonable” to interpret the rule to permit a court to issue a charging order against a 

judgment-debtor’s corporate interest. He writes: “To be fair, one could interpret the rule 

as giving the court authority to fashion any relief that would help the creditor collect 

when other methods have not been provided by statute, or when previous statutory 

 

3

If Burnett’s interest were contingent, rather than matured or unmatured, it would 

not be subject to attachment. See Consolidated Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Simpson, 372 Md. 

434, 447-48 (2002). Burnett, however, does not contend that the charging order reaches a 

contingent interest, such as the right to future distributions if the corporation has 

sufficient profits to justify them. Consequently, we assume that the order reaches an 

interest that is either matured or unmatured. 
 9 

remedies have failed.” Id. He adds: “Arguably, the catch-all language ‘such relief [] 

regarding property [subject to enforcement of the judgment] as may be deemed necessary 

and appropriate to aid enforcement’ comports with the authority given by Md. Rule 2-631 

that ‘judgments may be enforced only as authorized by these rules or by statute.’” Id. at 

12-13. 

 We accept Burnett’s concessions. Burnett’s corporate interest was property 

subject to enforcement of the judgment because he admits that the “distributions are 

arguably ‘property or credits, matured or unmatured” within the meaning of CJP § 3-305. 

In prohibiting the corporation from making distributions to Burnett and directing it to 

make those distributions to Spencer instead, the circuit court entered an order enjoining 

the transfer, conveyance, or other disposition of property that was subject to enforcement 

of the judgment. On the basis of the arguments presented to us, therefore, we conclude 

that under Rule 2-651 the circuit court had the power to issue the charging order against 

Burnett’s corporate interest.4

 

4

In the only reported opinion that specifically concerns Rule 2-651, this Court 

considered an order that required a person to pay certain funds into the registry of a 

circuit court, provided that those funds came into her hands. If and when she paid the 

funds into the registry of the court, the court would determine whether she or the 

judgment-creditor was entitled to them. In affirming that order, Chief Judge Wilner, for 

this Court, wrote that “[s]o long as the person holding the property and making claim to it 

has proper notice and the opportunity for a hearing and so long as the judgment creditor 

makes a reasonable, prima facie showing that the property is or may be subject to the 

judgment, the court may afford what is essentially an interlocutory form of relief.” 

McKinney, 99 Md. App. at 137-38. Burnett does not contend that Rule 2-651 authorizes 

only “interlocutory form[s] of relief,” under which a court effectively freezes an asset 

pending an adjudication of a creditor’s rights to it. Consequently, we do not consider any 

such contention.
 10 

In arguing for a contrary conclusion, Burnett cites 91st Street Joint Venture v. 

Goldstein, 114 Md. App. 561 (1997), a case concerning charging orders against 

partnership interests under Rule 2-649. In 91st Street Joint Venture, this Court held that 

under Rule 2-649 a receiver did not have the authority to transfer a judgment-debtor’s 

partnership to judgment-creditors in partial satisfaction of a judgment. Id. at 578. 91st 

Street Joint Venture has no bearing on this case, because the circuit court did not transfer 

Burnett’s corporate interest to Spencer. Rather, the court enjoined the corporation from 

making certain distributions to him and directed that they be made to his ex-wife instead. 

In another argument, Burnett asserts that although Rule 2-651 “allows a court to 

enjoin” the transfer of his property, the creditor must first “attach[]” (or, more precisely, 

garnish) the property under Rule 2-645. Suffice it to say that nothing in the rules 

supports that assertion, and Burnett cites no authority for it. See HNS Dev., LLC v. 

People’s Counsel for Baltimore Cnty., 425 Md. 436, 458-59 (2012) (case, statutory, or 

constitutional authorities are a necessary part of any argument). 

 In a final argument, Burnett appears to assert that the court exceeded its 

constitutional authority by charging his corporate interest in the absence of a statute that 

expressly authorizes that relief. Burnett, however, never presented that argument to the 

circuit court. Consequently, he has failed to preserve it for our review. See Md. Rule 8-

131(a) (“[o]rdinarily, the appellate court will not decide any . . . issue,” other than issues 

of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, “unless it plainly appears by the record to 

have been raised in or decided by the trial court”); see also Baltimore Teachers Union, 

American Fed. of Teachers, Local 340, AFL-CIO v. Maryland State Bd. of Educ., 379 
 11 

Md. 192, 205-06 (2004) (“[i]t is particularly important not to address a constitutional 

issue not raised in the trial court in light of the principle that a court will not 

unnecessarily decide a constitutional question”). Even if he had preserved the argument, 

however, we would reject it, because on the basis of the arguments that he has presented 

to us, we have concluded that under Rule 2-651 the circuit court had the power to issue 

the charging order against Spencer’s corporate interest.

VI. Spencer’s Alleged Failure of Proof

 Burnett contends that, even if the court could enter a charging order against his 

interest in the corporation, the court erred in allegedly “exempting” Spencer from the 

burden of proving which portion of the corporate distributions are (in the words of Rule 

2-651) “subject to the enforcement of the judgment[.]” In support of that argument, 

Burnett explains that because CAEI is a Subchapter S corporation, it has no obligation to 

pay federal income taxes to the extent that it distributes its income to its shareholders, 

like Burnett. The shareholders, however, must pay income taxes on the distributions that 

they receive. 

Under the charging order, CAEI is required to pay Spencer “any distributions 

payable or any other money that is or becomes due to” Burnett “by reason of his 

corporate stock shares in CAEI.” Under the charging order, therefore, CAEI is required 

to pay Spencer the portion of the distributions that Burnett would otherwise use to pay 

the income taxes that he owes as a result of the distributions. In other words, the 

charging order leaves Burnett without any source of funds to pay the tax liability that he 

incurs as a result of the distributions.
 12 

 Burnett makes a number of opaque arguments to the effect that some portion of 

the distributions – perhaps the portion that would represent his tax liability – belong to 

CAEI and not to Burnett himself. He complains that Spencer did not discharge her 

alleged burden of quantifying the proportion of the distributions that allegedly belong 

only to him. 

The difficulty with Burnett’s arguments, aside from their opacity, is that he failed 

to present them to the circuit court. “Ordinarily,” this Court “will not decide any issue,” 

other than an issue of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, “unless it appears to have 

been raised and decided by the trial court.” Md. Rule 8-131(a). Because we cannot fault 

the circuit court for not crediting an argument that Burnett never made, we conclude that 

he has failed to preserve his argument that the court erroneously “exempted” Spencer 

from proving which portion of the distributions allegedly belong to CAEI as opposed to 

Burnett. 

Nevertheless, even if Burnett had preserved this argument, we would find it 

unmeritorious as presented. The declaration of a dividend creates a debtor-creditor 

relationship between a corporation and its shareholders. If the corporation decides to 

distribute $100 to its shareholders, it owes $100 to each shareholder – not $100 minus the 

shareholder’s individual tax liability on account of the distribution. The charging order 

simply allows Spencer to attach the debt that the corporation owes to its shareholder, 

Burnett. 
 13 

APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

DENIED. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY 

AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY ALL 

COSTS.