REVERSE AND REMAND; and Opin ion Filed April 4, 2024 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00323-CV ALANI CONSULTING, INC. AND B1 2 CONSULTING, LLC, Appellants V. ALAN GOERNER, Appellee On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-01748 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Smith Opinion by Justice Smith Alani Consulting, Inc. and B12 Consulting, LLC appeal the trial court’s order granting appellee Alan Goerner’s no-eviden ce summary judgment motion. In two issues, appellants contend that the order should be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion, and violated thei r right to due course of law under the Texas Constitution, in refusing to consider their summary judgment response. In a third issue, appellants assert that the order should be reversed because they presented more than a scintilla of evidence in support of their claims. We–2– reverse the trial court’s summary judgment order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Background Alani Consulting is an information t echnology consulting company; its parent entity, B12 Consulting, is a consulting and technology company. In February 2022, they sued Goerner, a former Alani Consulting employee, alleging that he misappropriated proprietary, confidential in formation and trade secrets and used the information to solicit Alan i Consulting’s existing and pr ospective clients on behalf of Goerner’s new employer, UST Global Inc. 1 Appellants asserted causes of action against Goerner for violation of the Texa s Uniform Trade Secret s Act, breach of contract (both an employment confidentia lity agreement and a mutual nondisclosure agreement), breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and misa ppropriation, and conspiracy. On December 2, 2022, Goerner file d a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, challenging elements of each cause of action alleged against him, and the trial court set the motion for hearing on Ja nuary 5, 2023. The discovery period was ongoing, and appellants took Goerner’s de position on December 15. On December 29, seven days before the scheduled hearing, appellant s filed a twenty-five-page

1 Appellants also sued UST Global. UST Global filed a special appearance, which the trial court granted after a period for jurisdictional discovery and a hearing. This Court affirmed the trial court’s special appearance order. See Alani Consulting, Inc. v. UST Global, Inc. , No. 05-22-01139-CV, 2023 WL 8539773 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 11, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).–3– response, along with a sixty-page evidentia ry appendix, to Goerner’s motion. As part of their response, appellants also requested a continuance of the summary judgment hearing so they could obtain outst anding discovery. And, aware that the trial court imposed a twenty-five-page limit on motions, briefs, and appendices, appellants separately filed a motion for leave to file the sixty-page appendix. On December 30, the trial court reject ed appellants’ filing because appellants did not obtain a signed order for leave to file the appendix exceeding the twentyfive-page limit. The next business day, January 3, 2023, ap pellants filed an amended, twenty-five-page appendix. On January 4, the trial court he ld the summary judgment hearing. 2 There was no discussion regarding the merits of Go erner’s motion. Counsel for appellants explained that they had hoped, but were unable, to get Goerner’s agreement on their request for leave to file an appendix in ex cess of twenty-five pages. Counsel also noted that responding to the motion, which challenged six different claims, with only a twenty-five-page evidentiary appendix ha d proved impossible. The trial court, however, refused to consider appellants’ motion for leave because it had been filed “at the 11th hour” and was not set for hear ing in advance of the summary judgment hearing. On January 5, the trial c ourt signed an order granting Goerner’s noevidence summary judgment motion. The or der noted that, in ruling on the motion, the trial court considered “the lack of response to the M.S.J.”

2 The trial court sua sponte moved the summary judgment hearing from January 5 to January 4.–4– On January 6, appellants filed a moti on for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court vacate the summary judgment order and consider its response and appendix, asserting the documents, along w ith their motion for leave to file an appendix in excess of twenty-five pages, were timely filed. On February 3, appellants filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the page-limit rule was not effective because it did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 3a and enforcing the rule, notwithstanding appella nts’ diligent and good-faith efforts to comply, violated appellants’ right to due c ourse of law under the Texas Constitution. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration following a hearing, and the motion for new trial was denied by opera tion of law. This appeal followed. Rejection of Summary Judgment Response and Appendix In their first issue, appellants assert that the trial court abus ed its discretion in refusing to consider their summary judg ment response and evidentiary appendix because the page-limit rule, found in a ge neral order signed by the Dallas County Civil District Courts and a “Policies a nd Procedures” document posted on the trial court’s website, was not in effect. Goer ner responds that the trial court properly granted his motion because appellants faile d to timely place a responsive pleading before the trial court prior to the summary judgment hearing. A trial court has broad discretion in managing its docket, and we do not interfere with its exercise of that disc retion absent a showing of clear abuse. Bagwell v. Ridge at Alta Vista Invs. I, LLC , 440 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex . App.—Dallas 2014,–5– pet. denied); see, e.g. , Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B. , 298 S.W.3d 280, 297–98 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review trial court’s invocation of local rule to strike summary judgment response and appendix). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or without reference to a ny guiding rules or principles. Bagwell , 440 S.W.3d at 292 (citing Gunn v. Fuqua , 397 S.W.3d 358, 377 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied)). The Supreme Court of Texas, which has “full rulemaking power in the practice and procedure in civil actions,” see T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 22.004, adopted the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to govern procedure in justice, county, and district court civil actions. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 2, 814. The ru les have the same force and effect as statutes, In re City of Georgetown , 53 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 2001), and we may not ignore their plain meaning. United Mktg. Tech., Inc. v. First USA Merch. Serv., Inc. , 812 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied). Texas Rule of Civil Proce dure 3a permits trial courts and administrative judicial regions to make and amend local rules governing practice before the courts.
See T EX
. R. C IV . P. 3a(a). As it existed at the time this suit was filed and when the trial court rejected appellants’ summary ju dgment filing, rule 3a required that a proposed local rule or amendment be submitted to and approved by the Supreme–6– Court in order to become effective. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 3a(3), 785–86 S.W.2d xxxi, xxxvi (Tex. April 24, 1990, amended 2022). 3 A party may file and serve a response and opposing affidavits to a summary judgment motion not later than seven days before the hearing on the motion. See
T EX
. R S
. C IV
. P. 166a(c)–(d), 21a. Appellants’ response and evidentiary appendix were timely filed and complied with the re quirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither those rules nor the Lo cal Rules of the Civil Courts of Dallas County, which were appr oved by the Supreme Court on January 15, 2014, 4 impose a page limit applicable to summary judgm ent filings. The trial court, however, rejected appellants’ summary judgment re sponse and evidentiary appendix because the appendix exceeded twenty-five pages in violation of a page-limit rule found in a general order signed by the Da llas County Civil District Courts and in the trial court’s policies and procedures. The general order provides: [n]o Motion or Brief filed with the Court may exceed 25 one-sided pages in length. Only one appendix, also limited to 25 one-sided pages in length may be filed supporting any Motion or Brief. . . .

3 Rule 3a was amended in 2022. Effective January 1, 2023, it requires that a local rule, instead of being approved by the Supreme Court, must be published on th e Office of Court Administration’s website to be effective. T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 3a(c); see Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 3a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.2 of the Texas Ru les of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 10 of the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration , Misc. Docket No. 22–9081 (Tex. Sept. 23, 2022, eff. Jan. 1, 2023).
4 The local rules are published on both the Dallas County District Clerk website and the Office of Court Administration website. See Local Rules of the Civil Courts of Dallas County, https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/dist rict-clerk/Local-Rules-for-Civil-District-CourtsWith-Appendixes-Included.pdf; Local Rules for Civil Courts of Dallas County , https://topics.txcourts.gov/LocalRu lesPublic/PreviewAttachment/1203.–7– Permission to file a brief in exce ss of these page limitations may be granted by the Presiding Judge of a ny particular Court upon a showing of compelling reasons. 5 The general order does not appear on the Dallas County District Clerk’s website, where the local rules are published. Instea d, it is available through a link labeled “Amended Local Rule” on the tr ial court’s website and, as of October 7, 2023, it was posted on the Office of Court Administration’ s website. The text of the general order also is incorporated verbatim in a doc ument posted on the trial court’s website through a link labeled “Policies and Procedures.” 6 Under the plain meaning of rule 3a as it applied to this case, the page-limit rule relied upon by the trial court when it rejected appellants’ summary judgment response and appendix was not in effe ct because the Supreme Court had not approved either the general order or the trial court’s “Policies and Procedures” document. Therefore, we conclude that th e court abused its discretion in rejecting, and not considering, appellants’ filing. See, e.g. , In re El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd. , 225 S.W.3d 146, 152, 156 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding) (trial court abused discretion by ordering party to retain local counsel when, among other

5 Dallas County Civil District Cour ts General Order (April 6, 2020), https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/c ourts/civil-district/14/Amended-Local-Rule.pdf; Local Rules, Forms and Standing Orders, Office of Court Administration, https://topics.txcourts.gov/LocalRulesP ublic/CourtDetailsForDocument/1633.
6 See Policies and Procedures, 14th J udicial District Court, https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/c ourts/civil-district/14/Court-instructions20220707.pdf.–8– reasons, the order was not supported by a ny published local rule that had been approved by supreme court); cf. Esty , 298 S.W.3d at 297–98 (trial court abused discretion by invoking local rule to strike response and appendix and using local rule to adjudicate summary judgment); United Mktg. Tech. , 812 S.W.2d at 611 (trial court abused its discretion by allowing local rule to change time for filing amended pleadings in manner inconsistent with rule 63). We further conclude that the trial court’ s error was harmful. Because the trial court improperly rejected appellants’ fili ng (and found a “lack of response to the M.S.J.”), the summary judgmen t record is incomplete for our consideration of whether appellants presented more than a scintilla of evidence in support of their claims. 7 Accordingly, the trial court’s e rror prevented appe llants from properly presenting the case to this Court. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 44.1(a). Goerner, for the first time in oral argum ent, asserted that appellants waived their complaint by raising it only in their mo tion for new trial. We disagree. As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the complaining party made a timely , sufficiently specific request, objection or motion in the trial court and the cour t ruled on it or refused to do so. See T EX
. R.
A PP
. P. 33.1(a). “In a civil case, the overru ling by operation of law of a motion for new trial or a motion to modify the j udgment preserves for appellate review a

7 We note too that Goerner had no opportunity to lodge objections, if any, to appellants’ summary judgment evidence.–9– complaint properly made in the motion, unless taking evidence was necessary to properly present the complain t in the trial court.” Id. 33.1(b). Here, determining whether a local rule was effective was a ques tion of law that did not require the trial court to take further evidence. See In re Siemens Corp. , 153 S.W.3d 694, 698–99 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, orig. proceeding) . Accordingly, we conclude that appellants, by raising the error in the moti on for new trial, sufficiently presented the trial court an opportunity to correct it and, in this case, preserve d their complaint for our review. We sustain appellants’ first issue. Having concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in re jecting and not considering appellants’ summary judgment response and appendix, we need not cons ider appellants’ second issue regarding whether their right to due course of law under the Texas Constitution was violated. And, because appellants’ response was not ac cepted for filing and considered in the trial court, we do not reach appellants’ third issue regarding the merits of Goerner’s no-evidence summary judgment motion. We re mand this case to the trial court for filing of the summary judgment response a nd evidentiary appendix tendered to the trial court on December 29, 2022, and the tria l court’s consideration of the merits of Goerner’s no-evidence summary judgment motion. See T EX
. R. A PP . P. 43.2(d).–10– Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s order gr anting Goerner’s no-ev idence motion for summary judgment. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

230323F.P05 /Craig Smith / CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE–11– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
ALANI CONSULTING, INC. AND B12 CONSULTING, LLC., Appellants
No. 05-23-00323-CV V. ALAN GOERNER, Appellee On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-01748. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Partida-Kipness and Nowell participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s January 5, 2023, summary judgment order is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedi ngs consistent with this opinion. It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered this 4th day of April 2024.