[Cite as State v. Cleavenger, 2020-Ohio-73.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 CASE NO. 2019-P-0036

 - vs - : 

CAROL CLEAVENGER, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

Criminal Appeal from the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2017 CR 

01095. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant 

Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Wesley C. Buchanan, Buchanan Law, Inc., 195 South Main Street, Suite 202, Akron, 

OH 44308 (For Defendant-Appellant). 

MATT LYNCH, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Carol Cleavenger, appeals from the judgment of the 

Portage County Court of Common Pleas, convicting and sentencing her following the 

entry of a guilty plea for Endangering Children and Obstructing Justice. The issues to 

be determined in this case are whether the entry of a guilty plea waives a statute of 

limitations defense, whether a guilty plea can be voluntarily given when the statute of 

limitations may have expired, and whether judicial fact-finding is permitted when a court 

orders consecutive sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the 
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lower court. 

{¶2} On December 26, 2017, Cleavenger was indicted by the Portage County 

Grand Jury for Endangering Children, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 

2919.22(A)(2), and Obstructing Justice, a felony of the third degree, stated in the 

indictment as a violation of R.C. 2919.22(A)(2) but properly characterized as a violation 

of R.C. 2921.32. No error has been assigned as to this issue. 

{¶3} Cleavenger filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 30, 2018, arguing that “the 

charge of communicating false information to a law enforcement officer” should be 

dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations, since she was charged 11 years after 

the conduct occurred. 

{¶4} A plea hearing was held on June 5, 2018, at which Cleavenger entered a 

guilty plea to the two counts charged in the indictment. A summary of the conduct 

constituting the offenses was not provided at the plea hearing but, pursuant to the PSI 

and victim statements made at the sentencing hearing, the charges relate to the victim, 

Cleavenger’s daughter, being sexually abused by her stepfather and Cleavenger’s 

failure to disclose the abuse to the police and/or cooperate in the investigation of this 

matter. Defense counsel indicated they were withdrawing the Motion to Dismiss. The 

judge reviewed the rights Cleavenger waived by entering the plea as well as potential 

penalties and accepted her plea. A Judgment Entry memorializing the plea and a 

Written Plea of Guilty were filed on June 6, 2018. 

{¶5} At the February 15, 2019 sentencing hearing, the State argued that the 

victim had suffered psychological harm and requested consecutive sentences. The 

victim stated that Cleavenger “chose to keep [her] rapist husband over [her] child” and 
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that she covered up her abuse. Cleavenger’s counsel emphasized her lack of a 

criminal record and argued that her husband had concealed the abuse from her. 

Cleavenger expressed that she was sorry for causing harm to her family. The court 

found that Cleavenger had “isolated [her] daughter,” protected her husband, could have 

stopped the abuse, and lied to police. The judge stated that she had reviewed the 

record, including the victim’s statements and PSI and ordered Cleavenger to serve a 

term of three years for each offense, to be served consecutively. The court 

memorialized the verdict and consecutive sentencing findings in a February 21, 2019 

Order and Journal Entry.1 

{¶6} Cleavenger timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error: 

{¶7} “[1.] The trial court committed structural error by permitting Carol to 

change her plea to guilty. 

{¶8} “[2.] Carol’s plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently[] made. 

{¶9} “[3.] The trial court engaged in judicial fact finding, which is 

unconstitutional. 

{¶10} “[4.] Carol received ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

{¶11} In her first assignment of error, Cleavenger argues that the trial court 

committed “structural error” by permitting her to plead guilty to the offenses when the 

statute of limitations had expired for both. 

{¶12} “Structural errors” are those which “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ 

standards” because they “‘affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather 

than simply [being] an error in the trial process itself.’” State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 

 

1. A Nunc Pro Tunc Order was issued on March 12, 2019, correcting the statutory section under which 

Cleavenger was convicted for Obstructing Justice, from R.C. 2919.22 to R.C. 2921.32. 
 4

127, 2003-Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 9, citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 

309 and 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio 

St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 50. A structural error “permeate[s] ‘[t]he 

entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end.’” State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 

2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 17, quoting Fulminante at 309. Structural errors 

have been found “only in a very limited class of cases,” such as where the trial judge 

was biased, there was a complete denial of counsel, or racial discrimination occurred in 

grand jury selection. State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 N.E.3d 

1092, ¶ 133. Cleavenger cites to no authority for the proposition that the principle of 

structural error applies in the case of a defendant entering a guilty plea when the statute 

of limitations has expired. 

{¶13} Furthermore, the Ohio Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court 

“have cautioned against applying a structural-error analysis where, as here, the case 

would be otherwise governed by Crim.R. 52(B) [plain error] because the defendant did 

not raise the error in the trial court.” Perry at ¶ 23. Finding an error not brought to the 

court’s attention to be structural “would * * * encourage defendants to remain silent at 

trial only later to raise the error on appeal where the conviction would be automatically 

reversed.” Id. While Cleavenger raised the statute of limitations issue in a motion to 

dismiss, she agreed to withdraw the motion when entering the plea; therefore, it would 

be more properly evaluated under a plain error standard. State v. McClurkin, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 11AP-944, 2013-Ohio-1140, ¶ 31 (“[i]n light of that withdrawal [of 

defendant’s motion to suppress], the issue was not brought to the trial court’s attention, 

and appellant has forfeited the issue on appeal * * *”). 
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{¶14} Moreover, several appellate districts, including this one, have repeatedly 

held that entering “a plea of guilty acts to waive the benefits of the application of 

statutes of limitations” and thus, the merits of such arguments cannot be raised on 

appeal. State v. Ware, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L-154, 2008-Ohio-3992, ¶ 14, fn. 2; 

State v. Keinath, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-11-032, 2012-Ohio-5001, ¶ 25 (“[b]ecause the

expiration of the statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional defect, we conclude that 

appellant is precluded from raising this issue on appeal”); State v. Brown, 43 Ohio 

App.3d 39, 43-44, 539 N.E.2d 1159 (1st Dist.1988); see also Daniel v. State, 98 Ohio 

St.3d 467, 2003-Ohio-1916, 786 N.E.2d 891, ¶ 7 (“the expiration of a statute of 

limitations is not a jurisdictional defect”) (citation omitted). However, to the extent that 

the issue of the statute of limitations can be raised in relation to the voluntariness of a 

guilty plea, particularly regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, we will address that 

argument below. State v. Talley, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2017-L-143 and 2017-L-144, 

2018-Ohio-5065, ¶ 32. 

{¶15} The first assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶16} We will next address Cleavenger’s fourth assignment of error, wherein she 

argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel’s 

failure to raise the statute of limitations defense as well as the issue of preindictment 

delay. 

{¶17} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove 

“(1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 

(2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an 

unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding.” State v. Madrigal, 87 
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Ohio St.3d 378, 388-389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 

{¶18} It has been consistently held by this court that a plea of guilty waives 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel “except to the extent that the errors 

precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his or 

her guilty plea.” Talley, 2018-Ohio-5065, at ¶ 32; State v. Bregitzer, 11th Dist. Portage 

No. 2012-P-0033, 2012-Ohio-5586, ¶ 17. 

{¶19} As an initial matter, the State argues that Cleavenger waived this 

argument by entering a guilty plea. It has been held, however, that trial counsel’s failure 

to advise of the statute of limitations can avoid the application of the waiver requirement 

as it impacts the voluntary nature of the plea. State v. Seeley, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 

2001 CO 27, 2002-Ohio-1545, ¶ 32-35 (finding the defendant demonstrated that 

counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to raise a statute of limitations defense prevented him 

from entering a knowing and voluntary plea). Thus, we will consider the merits of 

Cleavenger’s arguments. 

{¶20} First, as to the offense of Endangering Children, Cleavenger argues that 

she was not advised that she could have asserted the statute of limitations defense nor 

that she was waiving such defense by pleading guilty. 

{¶21} We recognize that the statute of limitations for Endangering Children is six 

years, R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a), and that more than six years had passed between the 

time the acts constituting the offense occurred and the initiation of the charge against 

Cleavenger. However, we must emphasize that the record in this matter is completely 

devoid of any indication as to why the statute of limitations defense was not raised for 
 7

this offense in the present matter. 

{¶22} The record does not indicate whether the statute of limitations for 

Endangering Children was discussed between defense counsel and Cleavenger, why a 

motion to dismiss due to the statute of limitations was filed for Obstructing Justice but 

not Endangering Children, or, even, as the State suggested, whether Cleavenger might 

have been aware of the statute of limitations but chose to enter a plea of guilty as a 

means to reconcile with the victim and atone for her serious criminal acts. Cleavenger’s 

contention that she involuntarily entered the guilty plea is premised upon an assumption 

that trial counsel failed to advise her of the applicability of the statute of limitations, a 

fact which by itself cannot be proven in the absence of an affidavit or other evidentiary 

materials supporting such a claim. The record as presented to this court simply 

contains nothing to assist this court in determining the propriety of defense counsel’s 

actions and representation. 

{¶23} While we recognize the possibility that the statute of limitations had 

expired at the time Cleavenger entered her plea and that Cleavenger was unaware of 

this fact, we do not find that justice is served by determining this issue in the absence of 

a clear record and by pure speculation, especially given the “strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. “[I]t is almost always 

difficult, if not impossible, to adjudicate a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

with reference solely to matters contained in the record” of the original proceedings 

since the record is based on the guilty plea of the defendant rather than “the issue of 

trial counsel’s effectiveness.” State v. Hennis, 165 Ohio App.3d 66, 2006-Ohio-41, 844 
 8

N.E.2d 907, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). “Where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 

based on evidence that is outside of the record, it is more properly pursued in a petition 

for post-conviction relief since such a claim is ‘impossible to resolve on direct appeal.’” 

(Citation omitted.) State v. Hall, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2019-L-027 and 2019-L-031, 

2019-Ohio-4000, ¶ 21; State v. Moore, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2018-A-0050, 2019-

Ohio-1597, ¶ 14 (“[w]hen affidavits or other proof outside the record are necessary to 

support an ineffective assistance claim * * * it is not appropriate for consideration 

on direct appeal”) (citation omitted). This allows for proper resolution of the disputed 

issues and prevents prejudice against the State by “adjudicating the issue of trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness without having had an opportunity to explore the subjects of 

the attorney’s advice to his client and the client’s instructions to his attorney.” Hennis at 

¶ 11. 

{¶24} Thus, while we cannot resolve this issue on direct appeal, Cleavenger has 

available the more appropriate remedy of a postconviction petition where she can 

introduce documentary evidence and an affidavit to support her alleged claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. 

{¶25} The record also fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel as 

to the offense of Obstructing Justice. Counsel did raise, through the Motion to Dismiss, 

the argument that the charge should be dismissed as being initiated outside of the 

statute of limitations. This motion was withdrawn a few days later when the guilty plea 

was entered. Although the reason for the withdrawal was not discussed at the change 

of plea hearing, this does indicate at least a potential awareness of this issue by 

Cleavenger. 
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{¶26} Further, it is at least arguable whether the statute of limitations on the 

Obstructing Justice offense had expired. Pursuant to R.C. 2901.13(G), “[t]he period of 

limitation shall not run during any time when the corpus delicti remains undiscovered.” 

The corpus delicti is “the body or substance of the crime and is made up of two 

elements: (1) the act itself and (2) the criminal agency of the act.” State v. Climaco, 

Climaco, Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., L.P.A., 85 Ohio St.3d 582, 586, 709 

N.E.2d 1192 (1999). “[A] criminal statute of limitations may be tolled when the corpus 

delicti of the offense is not immediately discoverable.” State v. Cook, 128 Ohio St.3d 

120, 2010-Ohio-6305, 942 N.E.2d 357, ¶ 23. “In cases other than those involving child 

abuse, discovery of the corpus delicti occurs ‘when any competent person other than 

the wrongdoer or someone * * * [equally at fault] with him has knowledge of both the act 

and its criminal nature * * *.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Beck, 2016-Ohio-8122, 75 

N.E.3d 899, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). 

{¶27} This principle has been most commonly applied in cases where an act of 

deception/perjury has occurred but the only person who knew of the criminality of the 

conduct was the offender himself. See State v. Cleveland, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 

08CA009406, 2009-Ohio-397, ¶ 35 (“It is, at the least, arguable that if Avery testified 

under oath at the January 2008 hearing differently than he did at the five previous trials 

with regard to Blakely’s murder, he could be prosecuted for perjury because the 

limitations period would have been tolled until the State ‘discovered’ the perjury.”); Cook

at ¶ 37 (although falsified deeds were created in 2001, “the corpus delicti of the offense 

herein was not discovered until February 2004, the date that the church trustees 

discovered the deeds,” at which time the statute of limitations began running). A 
 10 

legitimate argument could be raised that the failure of police to discover the offense was 

due to the deception by Cleavenger which then might extend the statute of limitations. 

{¶28} Given this legitimate potential strategy by counsel, and the lack of 

evidence to the contrary in the record as discussed above, we also find no ineffective 

assistance of counsel was demonstrated as to the Obstructing Justice offense. 

{¶29} The fourth assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶30} In her second assignment of error, Cleavenger argues that her pleas to 

Endangering Children and Obstructing Justice were not knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently given since “the trial court did not inform [her] that she was waiving her 

claim that the statute of limitations had expired” and, thus, should not have been 

accepted by the trial court. 

{¶31} When “a criminal defendant admits his guilt in open court, he waives the 

right to challenge the propriety of any action taken by the court or counsel prior to that 

point in the proceeding unless it affected the knowing and voluntary character of the 

plea.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Miller, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2017-G-0136, 2018-

Ohio-4379, ¶ 15. To the extent that Cleavenger argues her pleas were involuntary, it is 

appropriate to consider the merits of her argument. 

{¶32} In a felony case, “the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty or no 

contest without first addressing the defendant personally” and complying with 

requirements to “[d]etermine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved * * *”; 

inform the defendant of the effect of his plea and that the court may proceed to 

judgment and sentencing; and advise the defendant of the rights waived by entering the 
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plea. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c). 

{¶33} Here, there is no question that the court advised Cleavenger of her 

constitutional rights, the offenses to which she was pleading guilty, and the maximum 

penalties faced, as well as inquired whether she had reviewed the plea and was 

satisfied with her counsel. The issue is whether she needed to be advised of the statute 

of limitations and expressly state that she was waiving her right to raise that defense for 

the court to accept her plea. 

{¶34} Since there is no right to be informed that one is waiving a defense 

relating to the statute of limitations expressed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the standard of 

substantial compliance applies. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 

897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 14-15. “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the 

circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and 

the rights he is waiving.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 15. 

{¶35} In support of the contention that Cleavenger’s plea was involuntary since 

she was not informed by the court that she was waiving the statute of limitations 

defense, she relies upon State v. Hollis, 91 Ohio App.3d 371, 632 N.E.2d 935 (8th 

Dist.). In Hollis, the Eighth District considered whether a plea was knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently entered where, during the plea colloquy, defense counsel, 

the court, and the prosecutor all expressed that they were unsure whether the statute of 

limitations had elapsed, but the court continued on with proceedings and accepted the 

defendant’s guilty plea. Id. at 374-377. In determining that the defendant should have 

been allowed to withdraw her plea, the appellate court concluded that the “continuing 

uncertainty regarding the applicable statute of limitations precluded appellant from 
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entering a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea.” Id. at 377. 

{¶36} We do not find Hollis to be applicable to the present circumstances. The 

Hollis court itself noted that the “reversal is limited to the unique facts of the instant case 

and the state of its record.” Id. In fact, the Eighth District has distinguished subsequent 

cases from its holding in Hollis, where there was not a demonstrated lack of confusion 

over the statute of limitations: “there is no indication on the record that appellant or his 

attorney was unaware of the statute of limitations, or that there was a possibility the 

prosecution was untimely.” State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 75423, 2000 WL 

193219, *2 (Feb. 17, 2000). 

{¶37} Cleavenger’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss based on statute of 

limitations issues for the offense of Obstructing Justice, indicating awareness that 

statute of limitations issues were considered by counsel. At the plea hearing, the State 

and defense counsel both stated that Cleavenger would be withdrawing her pending 

motion and moving forward with a plea of guilty. Immediately after this discussion, the 

court inquired whether counsel’s description was her “understanding of the plea 

agreement,” to which she responded affirmatively. In other words, this is not the case 

where the parties were entirely unaware a statute of limitations issue existed or where 

the record demonstrates confusion existed over this issue. At the least, the record fails 

to support Cleavenger’s assertion that her pleas were involuntary. Based upon the 

record before this court, we find no grounds to determine that there was confusion 

surrounding the circumstances of the pleas such that they were not voluntarily and 

intelligently made. 

{¶38} The second assignment of error is without merit. 
 13 

{¶39} In her third assignment of error, Cleavenger argues that the trial court 

erred in sentencing her by taking into consideration facts outside of the record when 

sentencing her, constituting judicial factfinding “which is unconstitutional.” Apprendi v. 

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (“Other than 

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”). 

{¶40} “The court hearing an appeal [of a felony sentence] shall review the 

record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the 

sentencing court.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “The appellate court may increase, reduce, or 

otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing * * * if it 

clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the record does not support the sentencing 

court's findings under division * * * (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or * * * [t]hat the sentence 

is otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) and (b). However, since 

Cleavenger failed to object to her sentence, “our review is limited to consideration of 

whether the trial court committed plain error.” State v. Snyder, 11th Dist. Ashtabula 

Nos. 2017-A-0041, et al., 2018-Ohio-2826, ¶ 12. 

{¶41} While Cleavenger cites to Apprendi for the conclusion that trial courts 

cannot make factual findings, this principle does not apply to judicial factfinding in 

relation to consecutive sentences, which the court made here. As the Ohio Supreme 

Court has recognized, its prior understanding that Apprendi stood for the proposition 

that “requiring judicial fact-finding prior to imposing consecutive sentences violated the 
 14 

Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury,” was “dispelled in Oregon v. Ice.” State v. 

Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 2 and 18, citing State 

v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. In Oregon v. Ice, the 

United States Supreme Court held that judicial fact-finding before imposing consecutive 

sentences is constitutionally permissible. 555 U.S. 160, 171-172, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 

L.Ed.2d 517 (2009). In fact, “judicial fact-finding is * * * required to overcome the 

statutory presumption in favor of concurrent sentences.” Bonnell at ¶ 23. 

{¶42} In performing the factfinding necessary to order consecutive sentences, it 

is proper to consider “the record, and information presented at the hearing, any 

presentence investigation report, and any victim impact statement.” (Citation omitted.) 

State v. Jirousek, 2013-Ohio-5267, 2 N.E.3d 981, ¶ 49 (11th Dist.) (relying upon such 

information “does not run afoul of * * * Apprendi * * * because Ohio law does not 

mandate the court to make findings based upon such information to increase an 

otherwise maximum-authorized penalty”); State v. Kitts, 5th Dist. Knox No. 17 CA 09, 

2018-Ohio-366, ¶ 25-26. To make its consecutive sentencing determinations, the trial 

court had to consider available facts surrounding the child endangering offenses and 

the false statements made to police, including the impact the offenses had. Contrary to 

Cleavenger’s argument, there was nothing improper about the court’s statement that 

“this was the worst form of the offense,” which played a part in the determination that a 

consecutive sentence was warranted, supporting the finding that the harm was so great 

that such a sentence was necessary to adequately reflect the seriousness of 

Cleavenger’s conduct. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). 

{¶43} While Cleavenger contends that the “trial court took into consideration 
 15 

facts outside of the record,” it is not evident which facts she is referencing. The court’s 

conclusions, as it stated, were based upon the PSI as well as the statements made at 

the sentencing hearing, including the victim’s statement. Although Cleavenger takes 

issue with the fact that the victim’s statements were read at sentencing in relation to 

both the offenses committed by Cleavenger and her husband, who was sentenced 

separately, she cites no law that this was improper. The facts of the husband’s case 

were tied to the facts of the present matter and the statements were provided by the 

same victim for conduct surrounding that activity. 

{¶44} As an additional note, and although this is not specifically argued by 

Cleavenger, the State asserts that the court made all of the necessary findings for 

ordering consecutive sentences. We do not disagree, as the court found such 

sentences were necessary to protect the public from future harm or to punish the 

defendant, the sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of her conduct 

and the danger she poses to the public, as well as made the additional finding that the 

harm caused by the two offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term 

would adequately reflect the seriousness of her conduct. These findings satisfied the 

requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

{¶45} The third assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶46} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant. 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

MARY JANE TRAPP, J., 

concur.