# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ INDACON, INC., Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.

FACEBOOK, INC., Defendant

- Appellee

______________________

2015

- 1129

______________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in No. 5:10

- cv

- 00966

- OLG, Judge Orlando L. Garcia.

______________________

Decided: June 6, 2016

______________________

P RATIK A. S HAH , Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff

- appellant. Also represented by Z E

- WEN J ULIUS C HEN , E MILY C URTIS J OHNSON , J AMES E DWARD T YSSE

.

T HOMAS G. H UNGAR , Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant

- appellee. Also represented by B LAIR A. S ILVER , L UCAS C. T OWNSEND ; H EIDI L YN K EEFE , M ARK R. W EINSTEIN , Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, CA; M ICHAEL G RAHAM R HODES , San Francisco, CA.

______________________INDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 2

Before N EWMAN , R EYNA , and S TOLL , Circuit Judges.

S TOLL , Circuit Judge

. Following the district court’s claim construction order, Indacon, Inc. and Facebook, Inc. stipulated to noni nfringement

, and the district court entered final judgment in favor of Facebook. In dacon appeals

, disputing the district court’s construction of several claim terms. B ecause the district court correctly construed the claim terms “alias,” “custom link,” “custom linkin g relatio nship,” and “link term, ” we affirm.

B ACKGROUND

Indacon owns U.S. Patent No. 6,83 4 ,276, which is directed to a system and method for search ing , index ing

, perus ing , and manipulat ing files in a dat a base , partic ularly through the insertion of automatically generated hyperlinks. ’276 patent col. 3 ll. 50

– 54

, col. 4 ll. 56

– 58, col. 5 ll. 34

– 47. Exemplary c laim 1 recites : 1. A data acquisition and perusal system, compri sing:

a database selection module that enables selection of a plurality of files for inclusion into at least one selectable database;

a link module th at enables custom links to be d efined between selected terms of selected files of the at least one database;

wherein the link module enables association of

any link term with any of the plurality of files in the at least one selectable database; and

wherei n the link module enables at least one alias
term to be defined for the any link term to enable a link to be established between the at least one alias term and the any of the plurality of files;INDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 3

a database index generator module that enables generation o f a searchable index of the data co ntained in the at least one selectable database, i ncluding the custom links , the generator module enabling only valid custom links to be added to the searchable index; and

a search module that enables a search of the

sear chable index to be performed according to a search criterions.

Id. col. 34 l. 56 – col. 35 l. 9 (emphas e s added)

. Indacon filed a patent infringement suit against Facebook, alleging that the software architecture for Facebook’s social network infringes claims 1– 4 and 8

– 11 of the ’276 patent. The district court construed several claim terms in the ’276 patent. Following cla im constru ction, the parties stipulated to noninfringement

, and the district court entered final judgment in Facebook’s favor

. On appeal, Indacon disputes the district court’s constru ction of four claim terms: “alias,” “custom link,” “custom linking relat ion ship,” and “link term .” W e have jurisdi ction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

D ISCUSSION

“ The ultimate construction of the claim is a legal question and, therefore, is reviewed de novo.” Info

- Hold, Inc. v. Applied Media Techs. Corp. , 783 F.3d 1262, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015). While subsidiary factual findings r egarding extrinsic evidence are reviewed for clear error, we review claim construction based solely upon intrinsic evidence de novo. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.

, 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). Because the district court considered only intrinsic evidence in construing the disputed claim terms, our review here is de novo.
“[T]he specification ‘ is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it i s the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term. ’ ”INDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 4

Phillips v. AWH Corp. , 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996 )) . The prosec ution history of a patent i s also part of the intrinsic ev idence and “can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the inve ntion in the course of prosecution.” Id. at 1317.

I. Alias
Several of the claims require a link to be established between an “alias” or “alias term” and a plurality of files. The district court construed the claim term “alias” as a

“ textual expression that the user can define to serve as an alternative name or la bel.” Indacon, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. ( Claim Constr. Order )

, No. 5:10

- cv

- 966

- OLG

, Dkt. No. 111, at 22 (W.D

. Tex. Sept. 6, 2013) (emphasis added). Indacon acknowledges that “alias” and “alias term” are used interchangeably in the ’276 patent. Ind acon argues that this term encompasses a “textual or graphical hyperlink,” and not just “textual expression.” Appellant Br. 19. Thus, Indacon essentially raises two disputes with the district court’s construction: (1) whether “alias” encompass es graphical ex pression as well as textual expression, and (2) whether an “alias” is a hype rlink.
We agree with the district court that “alias” and “alias term” are limited to textual expression. The district court first construed “term” as “textual expression, such as words,” finding an express definition of “term” in the specification as “words, number s , spaces, etc.” Claim Constr. Order at 17

– 18 (citing ’276 patent c ol. 12 l. 55). Then

, finding that the specification described an alias as a term, t he district court looked to this construction of “term” to determi ne that “alias” is similarly limited to textual expression.INDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 5

Indacon argues that the district court erred by basing its construction of “alias” on its construction of “term .” Indacon has not appeal ed the district court’s construction of “ term, ” but instead argues that “alias” is not dependent on the meaning of “term.” W e agree with the district court’s approach and conclusion regarding the constru ction of “alias.” T he ’276 patent defines “term” by refer rin g to forms of textual expression ( “ words, number s , spaces, etc. ” ). See id

. As the district court explained, t he use of “etc.” in this definition implies additional, but similar forms of expression and does not reasonably encompass graphical expression

. Indaco n also recognizes that exe mplary claim 1 is not directed to just an “alias,” but actually requires an “alias term.” Thus, Indacon’s argument that the construction of “term” is ir relevant to the construction of “alias” is unconvincing.
Further, n othi ng in the specification suggests that “alias” en compasses graphical expression. Instead, the specification consistently describes an alias as a term, which , as explained above, is limited to textual expre ssion. The “Summary of the Invention” introduces t he concept of an “alias, ” explaining: “The link module may further enable at least one alias term to be defined for any selected link term to enable a link to be established between each alias term and any of the files in the dat abase.” ’276 patent c ol. 5 ll. 64

– 67 (emphases added)

. Similarly, a ll examples of an “alias” in the specifica tion consist of textual expression

. See id. col. 11 ll. 34

– 36 (“For example, the user may define the terms ‘grape’,

‘ tomato’, ‘raspberry’, etc., as aliases of a link term ‘vine fruit’.”) (emphases added) ; id

. col. 24 ll. 46

– 48 (“For e xample, a user may want to use aliases or synonyms so that ‘equine’ is also linked when ‘horse’ is the primary pattern.”) (emphas i s added)

. The prosecution history also fails to support an interpretation of an “alias” encompas sing graphical expression.INDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 6

Indacon uses the specification’s reference to file fo rmats that ma y contain graphical elements as support for its view that an “alias” can be graphical. See

, e.g. , id. col. 10 ll. 15– 17 , col. 22 l. 59 (referencing HTML and RTF files). But nothing in the specification ties these file types, or their potentially graphical elements, to an “alias.” To the contrary, with respect to RTF files, the specification teaches “discard[ing] all image b yte sequen ces without affecting the absolute position determination of visible characters in words.” Id. col. 22 ll. 63

– 65. We find no support in the intrinsic evidence for Indacon’s assertion that the claimed alias can be graphical.
We also agree with the district court that an “alias” is not a hyperlink, contrary to Indacon’s assertions. The specification explains that “[t]he link module may further enable at least one alias term to be defined for any selec ted link term to enable a link to be established between each alias term and any of the files in the database.” Id. col. 5 ll. 64

– 67. As such, a link can be established to
connect an “alias” or other link term to files in the dat abas e, but the alias is not itself the link

. Thus, we adopt the district court’s construction of “alias” as a “ textual expression that the user can define to serve as an altern ative name or label .”

II. Custom Link, Custom Linking Relationship, and Link Term

The district court construed “custom lin k” as “a link the user can define using a chosen term that allows each instance of the term in the plurality of files to be ident ified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without modifying the original database files” ; “custom linking rel ationship” as “a linking relationship the user can define using a chosen term that allows each instance of the term in the plurality of files to be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without modifying the original database fil es” ; and “link term” asINDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 7

“a term chosen by a user that can be displayed as a link to a file specified by the user whenever the user encounters the term in the plurality of files

. ” Claim Constr. Order at 26–27 (emphases added). Indacon raises a single issu e with respect to the construction s of “custom link,” “custom linking relationship,” and “link term” (collectively, “the link claim terms”), and do es not make any distinct arg uments for the se individual claim terms

. Specifically, I ndacon objects to the district court’s co nstructions of the link claim terms to the extent they exclude creation of a link for less than all instances of a defined term, disputing the district court’s construction that allows each instance of the defined term to be ident ified a nd displayed as a link. We disagree and adopt the district court’s construction s of the link claim terms as being limited to allowing each instance of a link term to be identified and displayed as a link.
Facebook argues that the link claim terms have no accepted meaning in the art. We agree with Facebook that these terms have no plain or established meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art. As such, they ordinarily cannot be construed broader than the disclosure in the specification

. Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp. , 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent such an accepted meaning [in the art], we construe a claim term only as broadly as provided for by the patent itself.”)

. The specification explains that “[t] he link module enables association of any selected link term with any of the plurality of files in the sel ectable database.” ’276 patent col. 5 ll. 62

– 64 (emphasis added). The specification repeatedly demonstrates that all link terms are capable of being identified and displayed as a link. See

, e.g. , id

. col. 11 ll. 29

– 32 (“ [ W ] hen a link term is encountered in a file or document, the link term is indicated or otherwise highlighted so that the user can select the indicated link term to jump to the linked file.”) (emphases added) ; id. col. 30 ll. 22

– 26 (“A user can instruct the database indexINDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 8

generator to insert custom links by entering a custom link word in a New Custom Link Word ed it box and then entering a path and name of a file or document to which all such words should link in the File to Link To edit box.”) (emphas i s added) ; id. col. 30 ll. 34

– 37 (“[ W ] henever
a user encounters the custom link word in any document displayed in the document view window, except the corr esponding file to link to file, it is set off from surrounding text.” ) (emphases added). Thus, we agree with the district court that , consistent with the teachings of the specific ation, the link claim terms are properly construed as allowing each instance of a defined term to be identified and displayed as a link.

T he prosecution history provides additional support for the district court’s constructions of the link claim
terms . In distinguishing prior art, the patentees stated : Applicants ’ invention provides a user with a lin king control panel in which the user can designate a specific file to be linked with every instance of a specified word (and any associated alias terms) in the database. After the index is generated, the
program displays every instance of that custom term (and its alias terms, if any) as a hyperlink to the designated file. . . . These innovations disti nguish Applicants’ invention from [the prior art].
Joint Appendix ( “ J.A. ” ) 1182

– 83 (emphas e s added)

. The patentees then summarized the differences between “Applicants’ Invention” and the prior art, explaining that their invention “[e]nables user [s] to associate all instances of a specified word with a specific file.” J.A. 118 6 (emph asis added )

. Facebook argues that these statements in the pros ecution history , consistent with the specification, provide further evidence that the patentees understood the inve ntion as limited to allowing each instance of a defined term to be identified and displ ayed as a link . But, to the extentINDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 9

these claim terms might otherwise have a broader mea ning in the art

, Facebook argues in the alternative that the prosecution history evidences a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope. We agree that the patentees’ description of their invention during prosecution as allowing every instance or all instances of designated terms to be linked to a file bolsters the district court’s constructions

. Because the link claim terms lack a plain

or ordinary meaning in the art, and because the specific ation suggests limiting the scope of these claim terms to allowing each instance of a defined term to be identified and displayed as a link, we need not determine whether the patentees’ statements during prosecution rise to the level of clear and unmistakable disclaimer.
In response, Indacon argues that because the refe rences to “every instance” in the prosecution history were not the “ critical contrast that applicants were trying to make over the cited reference,” these statements cannot form the basis for disavowal. Appellant Reply Br. 12 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As explained above, we need not find disclaimer where the specification does not permit a broader interpretation of these claim terms and the terms otherwise lack a n ord inary meaning in the art. Moreover, “the interested public has the right to rely on the inventor’s statements made during prosecution, without attempting to decipher whether the examiner relied on them, or how much weigh t they were given.” Fenner Invs

. , Ltd. v. Cellco P’ ship , 778 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, the patentee s repeatedly described their invention both in the specification and the prosecution history as allowing “every instance ” or “ all instances ” of a defined term to be identified and displayed as a link. J.A. 1182 –8 3, 1186

. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in limiting the link claim terms as such.
Finally, Indacon argues that claim differentiation pr ecludes the district court’s construction s of the link claimINDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 10

terms because certain claims recite linking instances while other claims recite linking all instances of the link
terms

. Specifically, Indacon points , on the one hand, to claims 2 and 9, which recite “ wherein the l ink module is operable to link instances of the one or more text strings in the selected files ” (claim 2) and “ wherein the step of defining the linking relationships includes . . . linking instances of the one or more text strings in the selected files ” (c laim 9)

. ’276 patent col. 35 ll. 20– 21

, col. 37 ll. 29

– 32 (emphases added)

. I n contrast, Indacon points to claims 14 and 15, which both recite “automatically gene rating links between all instances of the link term within the plurality of selected source files and the designated file .” Id. col. 38 ll. 65

– 67

, col. 40 ll. 1–3 (emphasis added). Importantly, however, all of claims 2, 9, 14, and 15 are independent claims, and we have declined to apply the doctrine of claim differentiation where, as here, the claims are not otherwise identical in scope. See World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp. , 769 F.3d 1120, 1125

– 26 (Fed. Cir. 20 14); Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites

, LLC , 474 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Further,

“ [a] lthough claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot enlarge the meaning of a claim beyond that which is supported by the patent documents, or relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution his tory.” Fenner , 778 F.3d at 1327

. Thus, we adopt the district court’s constructions of the link claim terms. “Custom l ink” is properly construed as “a link the user can define using a chosen term that allows each instance of the term in the plurality of f iles to be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without modifying the original database files”; “custom linking relationship” is properly construed as “a linking relationship the user can define using a chosen term that allows e ach instance of the term in the plurality of files to be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without modifying the original dat a-INDACON , INC

. v. FACEBOOK , INC

. 11

base files”; and “link term” is properly construed as “a term chosen by a user that can be displaye d as a link to a file specified by the user whenever the user encounters the term in the plurality of files.”

C ONCLUSION
We find no error in the district court’s constructions of “alias,” “custom link,” “custom linking relationship,” and “link term.” As s uch, we affirm the judgment of noni nfringement.

AFFIRMED