Geoffrey Sinckler, Plaintiff,
v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil ActionNo. Federal Communication Commission, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 

# FILED "JUL 1 6i,G09 Clerk, U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts 

# 09 1313

The plaintiffhas filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a pro se complaint. The Court will grant the application and will sua sponte dismiss the complaint withoutprejudice for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction. The brief, one-paragraph, complaint asserts that the recent Congressionally-mandated switch from analogue to digital television signals violates the plaintiffs speech rights underthe First Amendmentbecause the switch "has left many Americans without a way or means to receive [the plaintiffs] message." CompI. at 1. The complaint alleges that these people, "who through
...purchasing a television set have shown their desire to receive [the plaintiffs] message and the message ofother citizens like [the plaintiff]" are subjectto a de facto "form a censorship betweenthose who can afford to receive [the digital signal] and those who cannot." 

### Id The complaint describes the plaintiffs First Amendmentright as a right to broadcasthis message "[n]otjustto those citizens who can afford the FCC's expensive switchto digital, but [to] all citizens." 

### Id The complaint also alleges that while the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") is forbidden to do so, it is nonetheless charging citizens through the sale ofequipment. 

### Id. As relief, the complaint seeks an orderrequiring the FCC to reinstate the analogue signal. 

### Id. Asserting that "the actions ofthe FCC has infringed upon all ofour freedoms," the plaintiff"is simply asking the court to give Americans, back, their constitutional rights to 'Free' airwaves as well as their right to choose." 

### Id. The complaint does not indicate whetherthe plaintiffsmessage is opinion or commercial, and it does not allege that the plaintiff is unable to communicate his message viathe digital television signal. A federal court is limited bythe Constitution to considering matters thatpresent an actual
case orcontroversy. 

## u.s. Const. art. III, § 2. Standing is one ofthejusticiability doctrines that has developed to give meaning to Article Ill's case or controversyrequirement. 

### Nat 'I Treas. Employees Union v. 

### UnitedStates, 101 F.3d 1423,1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Article III standing is comprised ofthree elements. First, standingrequires a plaintiffto have suffered an injury in fact, which is an invasion ofa legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminentrather than conjectural or hypothetical. 

### Lujan v. 

### Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). "The complainantmust allege an injuryto 

### himself that is distinct and palpable." 

### Whitmore v. 

### Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). Second, standing requires that "the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action ofthe defendant, and not the result ofthe independent action of
some third party not before the court." 

### Lujan v. 

### Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Third, for a plaintiffto have standing, it "mustbe likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." 

### Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]henthe plaintiffis not himselfthe object ofthe government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish." 

### Id. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2Here, the plaintiffhas not alleged facts showing that it is plausiblethat he has suffered a concrete and particularized actual injury in fact. Rather, he has merely speculated that his message is notreaching some unstated number ofpeople that he presumes it would have reached ifthe analogue signal had not been discontinued. In addition, the complaint does not allege facts showing that it is likely that granting the reliefrequested will address any injury in fact. Because the plaintiffhas not established two ofthe three elements ofArticle III standing, and because standing is a matter ofsubject matterjurisdiction, the Court concludes that this action mustbe dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

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