COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

DAMEINE J. GRIFFIN, S/K/A 

 DAMEINE JEFFREY GRIFFIN 

v. Record No. 2347-94-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JANUARY 11, 1996 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Robert B. Cromwell, Jr., Judge 

 Lynndolyn T. Mitchell, Assistant Public Defender, 

for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

 brief), for appellee. 

 Dameine J. Griffin (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial 

for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 

Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment 

of the trial court. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, 

and we recite only those facts necessary to a disposition of this 

appeal. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, the evidence is 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to 

it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The 

judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury, is entitled to 

the same weight as a jury verdict and will be disturbed only if 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated 

for publication. 
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plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Id. The 

credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and 

the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for 

the fact finder's determination. Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 

194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

 The record discloses that Officers Floyd and Shields, of the 

Virginia Beach Police Department, responded to a complaint 

regarding "suspicious activity" of several individuals seated in an 

automobile parked at a local motel. The officers approached the 

vehicle from the rear and observed three men in the back seat, with 

defendant to the far left, adjacent to the car door. Officer 

Shields directed the men to "keep their hands in plain view and 

. . . come out of the vehicle." Immediately after defendant exited 

the car, Shields "looked in and noticed . . . a white baggy . . . 

in the corner right where [the defendant] was sitting," "on top of 

the [seat] cushion." Subsequent analysis revealed that the baggie 

contained cocaine. 

 Police Sergeant Liverman and Detective Hodges joined the 

investigation at the scene, and defendant "agreed to talk" after 

Hodges "read him . . . Miranda warnings." Initially, defendant 

identified himself as Darnell Smith, stated that he was eighteen 

years old, and denied any knowledge of the cocaine. Upon learning 

that Hodges intended to charge him with possession of cocaine, 

defendant claimed that he was seventeen years of age. Hodges then 

advised that the "interview was over" and began "walking away." 

Defendant responded, "Please stay. I'm eighteen, but I'm just real 
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scared," and promised to "tell the truth." 

 Defendant then admitted that he "sold heroin . . . and crack" 

for his cousin, who had been "killed" a few days earlier. However, 

he again denied knowledge of the cocaine found in the car and 

suggested that it probably belonged to another passenger, Carter.1

 Defendant recalled Carter "talking about the cocaine," which he 

estimated at "about twelve grams," and admitted that "he 

[defendant] was there to make sure . . . everything was safe," to 

provide "protection, . . . [and] to help a friend." Defendant 

added later that the driver had given Carter the cocaine to hold 

and that "they were at the hotel to sell the cocaine." 

 Such evidence provides ample proof that defendant was acting 

as a principal in the second degree, aiding and abetting Carter in 

the offense. See Code § 18.2-18. 

 [T]o prove defendant was an aider and abetter, 

"the evidence must show that [the defendant] 

was not only present but that [the defendant] 

procured, encouraged, countenanced, or approved 

commission of the crime. In other words, [the 

defendant] must share the criminal intent of 

the party who actually committed the [crime] or 

be guilty of some overt act in furtherance 

thereof." 

Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 540, 399 S.E.2d 823, 826 

(1991) (quoting Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306 

S.E.2d 886, 888-89 (1983)). "'[S]hare the criminal intent' has 

been interpreted to mean that 'the accused must either know or have 

reason to know of the principal's criminal intention and must 

 

 1Carter was seated next to defendant in the vehicle. 
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intend to encourage, incite, or aid the principal's commission of 

the crime.'" Id. (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 

427, 270 S.E.2d 729, 732 (1980)). 

 Here, defendant was present when Carter knowingly possessed 

the cocaine with the intent to distribute it. Defendant was 

clearly aware of the nature and character of the drug and Carter's 

related intentions and admitted participation in the criminal 

enterprise. Defendant's statements were corroborated by his 

interaction with police investigators, which independently evinced 

a "'consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself,'" supporting 

the inference that "he was untruthful in order to conceal his 

guilt." Welch v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 525, 425 S.E.2d 

101, 106 (1992) (citation omitted). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 

 

 Affirmed.