IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Steven DiCarlantonio, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 1682 C.D. 2017

 : Submitted: March 9, 2018

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Oldcastle Precast, Inc.), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: May 11, 2018

Steven DiCarlantonio (Claimant) petitions for review of the Order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the decision of a 

Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) granting Claimant’s claim petition and 

awarding Claimant workers’ compensation (WC) benefits for the closed period from 

September 14, 2015, to October 8, 2015, at which point the WCJ terminated benefits 

based on the resolution of the work-related injury.1 On appeal, Claimant argues his 

benefits should not have been terminated on October 8, 2015, because his workrelated injury, contact dermatitis stemming from occupational exposure, is an 

ongoing condition that, while currently resolved, would recur if he returns to work. 

 

1 The WCJ also denied a penalty petition filed by Claimant. Claimant did not appeal that 

denial.
2

Claimant also asserts his WC benefits should not have been terminated because the 

experts opined he could only return to work with protective clothing and the finding 

of full recovery as of October 8, 2015, is not supported by substantial evidence. 

Because Claimant did not establish that he had an ongoing disability as a result of 

his contact dermatitis, and the credited testimony established that Claimant’s 

condition had resolved as of October 8, 2015, we affirm.

Claimant worked at Oldcastle Precast, Inc. (Employer) for four years, most 

recently as a supervisor who was also required to work with rebar. (WCJ’s Finding 

of Fact (FOF) ¶ 1.) He worked with black steel, galvanized steel, and steel covered 

in epoxy. On March 11, 2015, Claimant noticed a rash on one arm, which 

subsequently moved to both arms. Claimant sought treatment from Patient First, 

which gave him cream and a steroid, and the steroid improved the rash. Unsure of 

the rash’s cause, he continued his employment and, when the rash recurred, was 

again given a steroid. Claimant subsequently obtained a steroid from his primary 

care physician, which helped the rash go away. However, each time the steroid wore 

off, Claimant’s rash would re-appear. Eventually, in September 2015, Claimant 

sought the opinion of a board-certified dermatologist (Claimant’s Dermatologist). 

Claimant stopped working on September 14, 2015, due to the continuation of the 

rash and the pain associated with the rash becoming too much. Claimant told his 

supervisor of the rash and that this was why he was leaving his job. On September 

29, 2015, Claimant filed the claim petition, describing his work injury as contact 

dermatitis caused by his work environment. 

The WCJ held a hearing, at which Claimant testified to the above history. He 

also explained that his rash would improve whenever he was away from work for 
3

more than a day and that, since he has stopped working, the rash has resolved. While 

Claimant believed he could perform his job, he was afraid of getting the rash again. 

Claimant’s Dermatologist testified by deposition and opined that “Claimant 

had contact dermatitis which [is] . . . an allergic reaction to something Claimant was 

exposed to in the environment” and, based on Claimant’s history, the rash came from 

a chemical. (Id. ¶ 3b.) Claimant’s Dermatologist stated the only treatment to resolve 

the contact dermatitis is to remove the person from the cause and that, when 

Claimant stopped working, the rash improved. However, he also explained that, 

while there was a risk the rash could recur, he did not know if the rash would recur 

if Claimant returned to work and that it could have been a one-time reaction that 

would not happen again. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 58a, 86a.) According to 

Claimant’s Dermatologist, Claimant’s rash was gone by October 8, 2015, and there 

was no sign of it at a subsequent visit on March 22, 2016.

Employer presented the deposition testimony of a board-certified 

dermatologist (Employer’s Dermatologist), who opined, based on the history 

provided by Claimant, his examination of Claimant, and a review of the medical 

records related to treating the rash and a list of chemicals used by Employer, that 

Claimant “had a diagnosis of a resolved contact dermatitis . . . likely caused by 

exposure to things at work.” (FOF ¶ 4e.) However, Employer’s Dermatologist noted 

that there was no exact determination of what chemical caused the allergy because

no patch test had been done. He agreed with Claimant’s Dermatologist’s opinion 

that Claimant was fully recovered as of October 8, 2015. Employer’s Dermatologist 

“was unable to give an opinion of what would happen if the Claimant went back to 

that work environment, although he was comfortable with the Claimant returning 

with protective clothing and equipment.” (Id. ¶ 4g.)
4

The WCJ found that the medical experts essentially agreed and, based on 

those opinions, the WCJ held that Claimant was temporarily disabled from his work 

due to his work-related contact dermatitis from September 14, 2015, to October 8, 

2015, at which time Claimant was completely recovered. (Id. ¶ 6.) The WCJ noted 

that “while both of the[] experts recognize the possibility that the rash could return 

upon the Claimant’s return to work, neither of them had adequate information to lead 

them to opine that it would return upon return to work.” (WCJ Decision at 7.) Thus, 

the WCJ granted the claim petition, awarded benefits for a closed period, and 

terminated those benefits as of October 8, 2015. 

Claimant appealed to the Board, arguing, inter alia, that the WCJ’s findings 

were not supported by substantial evidence and that the decision was contrary to 

Schrader Bellows Pneumatics v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Earle), 711 

A.2d 578 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). The Board concluded the expert testimony supported 

the findings, particularly the finding that Claimant’s injury had resolved on October 

8, 2015. (Bd. Opinion at 5-6.) The Board found Claimant’s reliance on Schrader 

Bellows misplaced because, in that case, there was unequivocal medical testimony 

that, if the claimant attempted to work, he would continue to experience dermatitis 

and, thus, he could not continue to work for the employer. Here, the Board 

concluded, there was no such unequivocal testimony that would allow Claimant to 

meet his burden of proving that his disability continued beyond October 8, 2015. 

(Id. at 6.) Claimant now petitions this Court for review.2

 

2 This Court’s “review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, 

whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law[,] or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence.” City of Phila. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sherlock), 934 

A.2d 156, 159 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
5

On appeal, Claimant argues it was error to terminate his benefits as of October 

8, 2015, because his work-related contact dermatitis is an ongoing condition and, 

although he is not currently exhibiting symptoms, his return to work would result in 

his re-exposure to the chemicals that caused the dermatitis and recurrence of the 

rash. Citing numerous cases, Claimant asserts that, under these circumstances, he is 

entitled to ongoing benefits without having to subject himself to further exposure. 

He further argues the termination of benefits is improper where a claimant requires 

ongoing work restrictions, Ernst v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Rollins 

Transportation System), 720 A.2d 1085 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), and here, the experts 

considered his return to work possible only with the use of protective clothing. 

Finally, Claimant argues termination of his benefits was not proper because there 

was no evidence that he had fully recovered from the underlying condition as of 

October 8, 2015. We will address these arguments in turn.

In a claim petition proceeding, the claimant bears the burden of establishing 

all of the elements necessary to support an award of WC benefits, including the 

existence of an injury and disability, and a causal relationship between the injury 

and the work incident. Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Thomas), 

725 A.2d 873, 876 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Disability is the loss of earnings or earning 

power that is caused by the work-related injury. Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lanier), 727 A.2d 1171, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). The burden 

remains on the claimant to show that his work-related injury continues to cause 

disability throughout the pendency of the claim proceeding. Somerset Welding & 

Steel v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lee), 650 A.2d 114, 119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). 

“[A] WCJ is authorized, when considering a claim petition, to award compensation 

for a work-related injury and, in addition, to terminate benefits as of the date the 
6

disability ceased, although a termination petition has not been filed, if the claimant 

has not carried [his] burden of proof to establish a continuing disability.” Ohm v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Caloric Corp.), 663 A.2d 883, 886 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1995). 

Claimant first argues this matter is on all fours with Schrader Bellows and 

Henry Paul Cadillac, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Stephens), 

496 A.2d 1364 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), which hold that a claimant is entitled to ongoing 

benefits without subjecting himself to further exposure if the contact dermatitis can 

or will recur from renewed exposure. He also asserts, pursuant to Farquhar v. 

Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Corning Glass Works), 528 A.2d 580 (Pa. 

1987), and Lash v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (General Battery 

Corporation), 420 A.2d 1325 (Pa. 1980), that once a claimant establishes through 

medical evidence an ongoing condition that is work related and that a return to work 

would risk further physical harm, the claimant is entitled to ongoing benefits absent 

proof from the employer that the risk of further harm is not related to the 

compensable injury. Claimant maintains the expert testimony here establishes that 

his contact dermatitis was caused by work exposure; the dermatitis is an ongoing 

condition; the treatment for the dermatitis is his removal from that environment; and 

it is “almost certain” that the rash would recur if he returned to work. (Claimant’s 

Br. at 24.) 

Employer responds that Schrader Bellows is distinguishable because in that 

case the medical expert testified that the claimant would experience a recurrence if 

he continued to work. With regard to Farquhar and Lash, Employer argues that, 

unlike here, the claimants in those cases suffered from residual work injuries that 

were never resolved, respectively thrombosis and lead poisoning, and the medical 
7

evidence established that these claimants should never return to their pre-injury 

positions. Employer contends Claimant’s reliance on these cases is misplaced 

because the experts’ testimony here is uncertain as to the potential of recurrence if 

Claimant returned to his position. The WCJ, according to Employer, recognized the 

lack of certainty in the expert testimony and properly limited benefits to the closed 

period from September 14, 2015, to October 8, 2015. 

A claimant may be considered disabled by a work-related injury despite the 

resolution of his symptoms “if there is evidence that [the symptoms] are likely to 

recur once he returns to work.” Schrader Bellows, 711 A.2d at 581 (emphasis added) 

(citing Farquhar, 528 A.2d 580). Thus, where a claimant “establish[es] that [he is]

unfit or unable to perform [his] duties when [he] return[s] to work” by unequivocal 

medical testimony, ongoing disability can be established. Id. However, “[t]he 

possibility of a future recurrence does not constitute a compensable disability.” 

Swartz v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dutch Pantry Rest.), 543 A.2d 201, 204 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (emphasis added). Medical testimony that a claimant’s return 

to work “might” or “could” precipitate an adverse reaction does not establish that a 

claimant is unable or unfit to return to work. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Boles), 677 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). 

At its essence, the question before us is whether the expert testimony 

establishes that Claimant’s return to his pre-injury position would result in a 

recurrence of his contact dermatitis rendering him unfit or unable to perform his 

duties if he returned to work. The WCJ found that both experts recognized the 

possibility that Claimant’s rash could return if he returned to work, but “neither of 

them had adequate information [available] to lead them to opine that it would

return upon [Claimant’s] return to work.” (WCJ Decision at 7 (emphasis 
8

added).) After reviewing the record, we conclude this finding is supported by 

substantial evidence.3

Claimant’s Dermatologist testified as follows:

Q: If the claimant were to go back to work and be exposed to those 

chemicals, do you believe that the rash would reappear?

A: It could reappear. I don’t know.

. . . .

Q: Do you feel that if he were to go back to work, it would put him at 

greater risk of the rash coming back?

A: That’s a risk, yes.

(R.R. at 58a (emphasis added).) On cross-examination, Claimant’s Dermatologist 

agreed it was possible that this was a one-time reaction that Claimant will not 

experience again. (Id. at 86a.) After noting that no patch test had been performed 

on Claimant, Employer’s Dermatologist testified about Claimant’s return to work 

without protective equipment, stating that it was “very, very hard to predict what 

would happen after this extended period” and that “once the skin is healed and 

recovered” a patient can go “back into the workplace and [he] can function fully 

without issue.” (Id. at 124a, 130-31a (emphasis added).) Claimant points to 

Employer’s Dermatologist’s testimony that “if [Claimant] does have an allergy to 

something to which he’s going to have direct skin exposure at his work, I would 

expect that he’s going to get the rashes again[;]” however, Employer’s 

Dermatologist added that “it’s hard to predict without the information that we’re 

missing.” (Id. at 131a (emphasis added).)

 

3

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” City of Phila. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kriebel), 29 

A.3d 762, 769 (Pa. 2011).
9

Considering this testimony and the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom

in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below, Hoffmaster v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Senco Products, Inc.), 721 A.2d 1152, 1155 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1998), a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to support the WCJ’s 

finding that neither expert opined that Claimant’s rash would recur if he returned to 

work. This testimony does not establish with “almost certain[ty],” (Claimant’s Br. 

at 24), that the rash would recur, but is more like the “could” and “might” language 

this Court has found to be insufficient to establish that a recurrence was likely and 

that the claimant was unfit or unable to perform his duties if he returned to work. 

Boles, 677 A.2d at 860. Thus, the WCJ’s finding is supported by substantial 

evidence.

Claimant’s reliance on Farquhar, Schrader Bellows, and Henry Paul Cadillac

is misplaced because, in those cases, there was testimony that the symptoms or injury 

were likely to recur resulting in the claimants’ inability to return to their pre-injury 

positions. In Farquhar, the claimant’s physician testified that the claimant, who 

suffered from work-related thrombosis, should never perform her work duties again 

and, to do so, “would expose her to great risk of another, potentially more dangerous 

thrombosis attack” and was akin to “playing Russian Roulette.” 528 A.2d at 583. 

In Schrader Bellows, the claimant suffered, over numerous years, multiple incidents 

of contact dermatitis due to the coolants used by the employer, and the claimant’s 

physician testified that, due to the airborne nature of the coolants, “regardless of 

where in the plant or which type of position [the e]mployer would provide, [the 

c]laimant will continue to experience the dermatitis as long as he is working at [the 

e]mployer’s facility.” 711 A.2d at 580. In Henry Paul Cadillac, a claimant’s 

physician testified that the claimant had become sensitized to particular allergens 
10

over his years of work such that the physician did not “think [the claimant] can do it 

anymore, because the least exposure now that he has, even if it’s minimal, he’s 

probably going to break out.” 496 A.2d at 1366. Although the physician in Henry 

Paul Cadillac used the word “probably,” the facts in that case made the recurrence 

likely because the claimant had a prior compensable injury of contact dermatitis, had 

a recurrence upon his return to work, had a patch test performed to determine his 

exact allergy, and the known allergen was used in the employer’s daily business of 

car washing. In all of these cases, the testimony found to be substantial evidence 

established that the claimants would suffer a recurrence of their symptoms or injury 

rendering them unfit or unable to perform their duties if they returned to work. 

Farquhar, 528 A.2d at 587-88; Schrader Bellows, 711 A.2d at 580-81; Henry Paul 

Cadillac, 496 A.2d at 1366. The testimony here does not rise to this level of certainty 

as to either the recurrence of Claimant’s contact dermatitis or his inability to perform

his duties if he returned to work.

While our Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t would be barbaric to require an 

employee to continue in a position where he is exposed to a toxic substance until he 

is so ill that he physically is incapable of performing his job,” Lash, 420 A.2d at 

1327, this situation is distinguishable from Lash. The claimants in Lash sought 

partial disability benefits because, as a result of their becoming “lead absorbers,” 

meaning that they absorbed lead into their blood at abnormally high rates which 

made future exposures of lead hazardous, they were reassigned to lower paying, nonlead handling positions. Id. at 1325. Although the claimants’ health had not yet 

deteriorated to advanced lead poisoning, the Supreme Court held they did not have 

to work until they became ill in order to establish a compensable injury because the 

evidence established that their becoming “lead absorbers” was a direct result of their 
11

work and future exposure to lead would be perilous to their health. Id. at 1326. 

Unlike the evidence in Lash, the testimony here does not establish that Claimant’s 

contact dermatitis will recur if he returns to work or that his return to work would be 

perilous to his health. 

Accordingly, there is substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s finding that 

neither expert opined that Claimant’s contact dermatitis would recur if he returned 

to work. Absent such testimony, Claimant could not establish his ongoing disability 

on that basis and, therefore, did not meet his burden of proof on the claim petition. 

Claimant next argues that termination of his benefits as of October 8, 2015, is 

not appropriate because Employer’s Dermatologist testified that Claimant could 

return to work only if he was provided reasonable accommodations for his allergy. 

According to Claimant, an expert opinion that a claimant can return to work, but 

with restrictions, may not support the termination of benefits. Ernst, 720 A.2d at 

1088. Here, when asked whether he would be comfortable with Claimant returning 

to work with protective clothing, Employer’s Dermatologist responded yes. (R.R. 

at 131a.) Employer responds, inter alia, that Claimant is attempting to shift the 

burden of proof before he established all of the necessary elements for obtaining 

ongoing benefits. 

Initially, we observe that Ernst involved a termination petition, which placed 

the burden on the employer to prove by expert testimony that the claimant had fully 

recovered and could return to work without restrictions related to the work-injury. 

Ernst, 720 A.2d at 1088. This matter involves a claim petition, and the burden is on 

Claimant to prove, inter alia, an ongoing disability as a result of a work-related 

injury. Claimant did not meet that burden and, therefore, the burden never shifted 

to Employer. 
12

Additionally, while the WCJ’s finding that Employer’s Dermatologist “was 

unable to give an opinion of what would happen if the Claimant went back to that

work environment, although he was comfortable with the Claimant returning with 

protective clothing and equipment,” (FOF ¶ 4g), reflects Employer’s 

Dermatologist’s testimony, (R.R. at 131a), it is unclear that such testimony was, as 

Claimant asserts, the equivalent of an imposition of work restrictions. A review of 

Employer’s Dermatologist’s testimony in its entirety reveals that he did not impose 

those restrictions on Claimant’s return to work. Employer’s Dermatologist 

explained that, for his patients who experienced contact dermatitis, he first tried to 

figure out the source of the allergy and then, based on that, suggested reasonable 

accommodations be made to eliminate direct skin exposure to the allergen or to 

provide protective equipment and that, if these were followed, “it was very likely 

that the patient could return to work.” (R.R. at 125a, 127a, 131a.) However, on 

cross-examination, Employer’s Dermatologist clarified that he was not 

recommending modifications to Claimant’s job duties or the use of protective 

gear. (Id. at 134a.) Thus, while he was comfortable with Claimant returning to 

work with protective equipment, Employer’s Dermatologist did not, as Claimant 

asserts, require that those modifications be implemented before Claimant could 

return to work. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Claimant’s argument that the 

Board’s decision should be reversed on this basis. 

Finally, Claimant asserts that, technically, neither expert opined that Claimant 

was fully recovered from his underlying condition, i.e., an allergy to some work 

chemical, as of October 8, 2015, and, therefore, the termination date is arbitrary and 

not based on substantial evidence. Employer replies that the WCJ’s decision to cease 

benefits as of October 8, 2015, is supported by the testimony of both Dermatologists.
13

Although Claimant’s Dermatologist testified that the underlying allergy

remained, he also testified that the contact dermatitis for which Claimant sought 

treatment had resolved by October 8, 2015. (Id. at 73a, 80a.) He also agreed that 

the March 22, 2016 appointment was not related to the prior episode of contact 

dermatitis because Claimant had already been released by him in October as 

recovered. (Id. at 74a.) Based on Claimant’s treatment notes and the history 

Claimant provided him, Employer’s Dermatologist agreed that Claimant had 

recovered by October 8, 2015, and remained recovered as of March 22 and 31, 2016, 

Claimant’s most recent appointments with Claimant’s Dermatologist and 

Employer’s Dermatologist, respectively. (Id. at 127a-28a.) This testimony supports 

the WCJ’s finding that Claimant had fully recovered from his condition as of 

October 8, 2015. The fact that there is other evidence in the record that could support 

a contrary finding is of no moment. Hoffmaster, 721 A.2d at 1155 (“[I]n a 

substantial evidence analysis where both parties present evidence, it does not matter 

that there is other evidence in the record which supports a factual finding contrary 

to that made by the WCJ[;] rather, the pertinent inquiry is whether there is any 

evidence which supports the WCJ’s factual finding.”). 

Moreover, as discussed above, because the evidence did not establish that 

Claimant’s symptoms would likely recur upon his return to work, Claimant did not 

meet his burden of proving ongoing disability. Thus, while Claimant may have 

established that he had a compensable injury, he did not establish “that the injury 

continue[d] to cause disability throughout the pendency of the claim petition 

proceeding.” Somerset Welding and Steel, 650 A.2d at 119. Having not met his 

burden of proving an entitlement to ongoing benefits, there was no error in 

terminating benefits as of October 8, 2015. Ohm, 663 A.2d at 886. 
14

Accordingly, the Board’s Order is affirmed.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision in this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Steven DiCarlantonio, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 1682 C.D. 2017

 :

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Oldcastle Precast, Inc.), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, May 11, 2018, the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board, entered in the above-captioned matter, is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge