Self-representation 

Turcios argues that the district court abused its discretion 

when it granted his motion for self-representation. He claims he decided 

to represent himself under duress due to a conflict with the public 

defender, although he does not explain• the substance of this alleged 

conflict. He also argues his decision to waive counsel was neither knowing 

nor intelligent. We disagree. 

A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation. 

See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975); see also Nev. Const. 

art. 1, § 8. On review, this court defers to the trial court's decision. 

Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124, 912 P.2d 234, 238 (1996) (noting that 

Itihrough face-to-face interaction in the courtroom, the trial judges are 

much more competent to judge a defendant's understanding than• this 

court"). "In order for a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel to 

withstand constitutional scrutiny, the judge need only be convinced that 

the defendant made his decision with a clear comprehension of the 

attendant risks." Id. 

This court looks at "the facts and circumstances of each case, 

including the defendant's background, experience, and conduct" in 

assessing the waiver of counsel. Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 54, 176 P.3d 

1081, 1084 (2008). For a waiver to be effective, this court has held that it 

must be "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" made. Id. at 53-54, 

176 P.3d at 1084. Trial courts must examine whether the defendant is 

competent "to choose self-representation, not his ability to adequately 

defend himself." Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 341, 22 P.3d 1164, 1172 

(2001) (internal quotations omitted). 

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The trial court record reveals that Turcios clearly did not have 

the requisite skill to competently defend himself at trial. However, this 

courtS will not overturn a district court's decision allowing selfrepresentation based on the defendant's performance at trial. See id. The 

relevant concern is whether the defendant waived that right freely, 

intelligently, and voluntarily. Hooks, 124 Nev. at 53-54, 176 P.3d at 1084. 

We conclude that he did. First, the record shows that 

Turcios's decision to represent himself was not based solely on an 

unresolved conflict with his public defender. Instead, the record shows 

that Turcios also did not want a long continuance, that he wanted to bring 

certain issues to the court's attention, and that he believed he would be 

acquitted. Second, despite the complexity of the case, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in granting Turcios's request. Turcios informed 

the court that he could read and write English well, had sufficient 

education to understand the proceedings, and knew the State's burden of 

proof. The district court also repeatedly admonished Turcios that he could 

jeopardize his case by representing himself, but Turcios said that he 

nonetheless wished to waive the right to counsel. Third, the timeliness of 

his request does not invalidate the waiver. Although Turcios now claims 

that the court should have denied his request to represent himself because 

he had just a little more than one week to prepare his defense, this 

argument is not persuasive. Turcios sought to represent himself, in part, 

to prevent additional trial delays and he fails to explain how his defense 

would have been enhanced had he been allowed additional time to 

prepare. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it granted Turcios's motion to waive his right to counsel. 

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Admissibility of statement to police 

Turcios argues that the district court erred when it admitted 

his statement to police at trial. He first argues that his statement was 

inadmissible because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his 

Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He claims 

that the police ambiguously responded when he said he did not 

understand the warnings and that the detective's responses undercut the 

warnings and their magnitude. Next, Turcios argues that his statement 

was inadmissible because police used coercive tactics to make him confess. 

We will address the validity of the Miranda waiver and the voluntariness 

of the confession in turn. 

Validity of Miranda waiver 

Whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 

or her Miranda rights "is a question of fact, which is reviewed for clear 

error. However, the question of whether a waiver is voluntary is a mixed 

question of fact and law that is properly reviewed de novo." Mendoza v. 

State, 122 Nev. 267, 276, 130 P.3d 176, 181 (2006). 

For a defendant's Miranda waiver to be effective, the waiver 

must be "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." Id. For the statement to 

be admissible at trial, the State must show that the defendant waived his 

or rights by a preponderance of the evidence. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 

560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010). The State must also establish that law 

enforcement informed the defendant of his or her Miranda rights, the 

defendant understood the warnings, and the defendant then provided 

admissions without coercion. Id. at 384-85. But if law enforcement 

"threatened, tricked, or cajoled" the defendant into a waiver, it is not 

voluntary. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 

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In the instant case, a police detective testified that he read the 

Miranda warnings to Turcios directly from a card prepared by the police 

department. The detective also testified that Turcios initially had 

questions about the language in the warnings, but the detective said he 

explained them and Turcios then confirmed he understood and agreed to 

continue speaking. We are not persuaded by Turcios's argument that his 

waiver was not voluntary because the detective inappropriately suggested 

that only some of the statements, not all of the statements, could be used 

against him. During the interrogation, Turcios said to the detective, "So if 

I speak, everything will be against me or, or will be used against me." The 

detective responded, "It can be. It depends on what you tell me." The 

detective's response was not coercive; it was both straightforward and 

honest. The response also did not undermine the significance of the 

warnings. Thus, we conclude that Turcios knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 

Voluntariness of confession 

"Moluntariness determinations present mixed questions of 

law and fact subject to this court's de novo review." Rosky v. State, 121 

Nev. 184, 190, 111 P.3d 690, 694 (2005). This court will not impose its 

judgment in place of the district court's so long as the district court's 

ruling is based on substantial evidence. Steese v. State, 114 Nev. 479, 488, 

960 P.2d 321, 327 (1998). "Substantial evidence is that which a 

reasonable mind might consider adequate to support a conclusion." Id. 

"[F]indings of fact in a suppression hearing will not be disturbed on appeal 

if supported by substantial evidence." State v. McKellips, 118 Nev. 465, 

469, 49 P.3d 655, 658-59 (2002) (alteration in original) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

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A confession is only admissible as evidence at an accused's 

trial "if it is made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or 

inducement." Franklin v. State, 96 Nev. 417, 421, 610 P.2d 732, 734 

(1980). The defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of 

law is violated "if his conviction is based, in whole or in part, upon an 

involuntary confession, . .. even if there is ample evidence aside from the 

confession to support the conviction." Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 

213, 735 P.2d 321, 322 (1987). Voluntariness is determined by "the 

totality of the circumstances." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 

(1960) (quoting Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957)). Specifically, 

we will look to the Passama factors, see Passama, 103 Nev. 212, 735 P.2d 

321, and whether the police used intrinsic or extrinsic falsehoods to secure 

the confession, see Sheriff, Washoe Cnty. v. Bessey, 112 Nev. 322, 914 P.2d 

618 (1996). 

Passama factors 

This court has held that "[t]he question [of voluntariness] in 

each case is whether the defendant's will was overborne when he 

confessed." Passama, 103 Nev. at 214, 735 P.2d at 323. The trial court 

must consider factors such as "the youth of the accused; his lack of 

education or his low intelligence; the lack of any advice of constitutional 

rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of 

questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of 

food or sleep." Id. 

Based on Passama, we conclude that the totality of the 

circumstances shows that the police did not coerce Turcios during the 

interrogation. 

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First, Passama requires that the court examine "the youth of 

the accused." Id. The record shows that Turcios was 46-years-old at the 

time he spoke with police. Therefore, the police did not coerce Turcios by 

taking advantage of his youth. 

Second, the court considers the education and intelligence of 

the accused. Id. The record shows that Turcios progressed to the ninth 

grade in school and the record does not indicate that his intellect was 

below average. Turcios also subsequently informed the court that he had 

sufficient education to understand the proceedings. Therefore, the police 

did not overbear Turcios by taking advantage of him through a lack of 

education or intelligence. 

Third, the court assesses whether the accused was advised of 

his constitutional rights. Id. As we explained previously, Turcios received 

his Miranda warnings, indicated that he understood the warnings, and 

expressly waived his rights. Therefore, the police did not 'overbear' 

Turcios's will by failing to advise him of his constitutional rights. 

Fourth, the court looks at "the length of detention." Id. The 

detective testified that police contacted Turcios at his residence and then 

transported him to police headquarters for questioning. Nothing in the 

record suggests that Turcios was detained between the times that police 

detained him at his home and transported him to the police station. The 

record also does not suggest that Turcios was detained between the time 

he arrived at the police headquarters and the time the interrogation 

began. Therefore, the police did not overbear Turcios's will through a 

lengthy detention. 

Fifth, the court must determine whether the questioning was 

"repeated and prolonged." Id. Police detectives questioned Turcios on 

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only one occasion, so the questioning was not repeated. Also, the 

transcript of the voluntary statement shows that Turcios's interrogation 

began at 8:53 p.m. and concluded at 9:56 p.m.—just an hour and three 

minutes later. Therefore, this was not a prolonged interrogation. 

Lastly, the court must decide whether police inflicted "physical 

punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep" upon the accused to 

secure a confession. Id. The record does not reflect that police mistreated 

Turcios; in fact, Turcios said that the detectives were polite and respectful 

to him during the entire interview and that they did not threaten him in 

any way. Therefore, the police did not use physical punishment to 

overbear Turcios's will and coerce a statement. 

Accordingly, Turcios's will was not overborne when he made 

his statement to the police. 

Police deception 

This court has held that trial courts should also consider police 

deception in evaluating the voluntariness of a confession. Sheriff, Washoe 

Cnty. v. Bessey, 112 Nev. 322, 325, 914 P.2d 618, 619 (1996). Police 

deception does not automatically render a confession involuntary. Id. 

Police subterfuge is permissible if "the methods used are not of a type 

reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement." Id. at 325, 914 P.2d at 

620. This court has distinguished between intrinsic falsehoods and 

extrinsic falsehoods. Id. at 325-26, 914 P.2d at 620. Intrinsic falsehoods 

imply the existence of implicating evidence and are more likely to secure a 

truthful confession from a defendant. Id. at 326, 914 P.2d at 620. 

Extrinsic falsehoods involve issues that are collateral to the crime and are 

more likely to overbear a defendant's will and secure a false confession or 

"a confession regardless of guilt." Id.; see also Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 

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528, 534 (1963) (concluding that a confession was coerced when police 

threated a defendant that "state financial aid for her infant children would 

be cut off, and her children taken from her, if she did not 'cooperate"). 

Deceptions that are likely to produce a false confession are not permissible 

and render a confession involuntary. Bessey, 112 Nev. at 326, 914 P.3d at 

620. 2 

21n Bessey, we provided examples of both intrinsic and 

extrinsic falsehoods: 

Examples of intrinsic falsehoods would include 

misrepresentations regarding the existence of 

incriminating evidence such as placement of the 

defendant's vehicle at the crime scene, physical 

evidence linked to the victim in the defendant's 

car, presence of defendant's fingerprints at the 

crime scene or in the getaway car, positive 

identification by reliable eyewitnesses, and 

identification of the defendant's semen in the 

victim or at the crime scene. Examples of 

extrinsic falsehoods of a type reasonably likely to 

procure an untrue statement or to influence an 

accused to make a confession regardless of guilt 

would include the following: assurances of divine 

salvation upon confession, promises of mental 

health treatment in exchange for confession, 

assurances of more favorable treatment rather 

than incarceration in exchange for confession, 

misrepresenting the consequences of a particular 

conviction, representation that welfare benefits 

would be withdrawn or children taken away 

unless there is a confession or suggestion of harm 

or benefit to someone. 

112 Nev. at 326, 914 P.2d at 620-21 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 

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Turcios cites three specific lies the police used to secure his 

confession: (1) he needed to confess in order for the judge and jury to hear 

his side of the story; (2) he needed to confess before the police received the 

results of the DNA tests; and (3) he needed to confess, like the codefendant in a hypothetical scenario that detectives posed, so that the 

court would be lenient with him. He claims that these deceptions tricked 

him into confessing and that his statement was therefore involuntary and 

inadmissible. We are not persuaded by this argument. 

Turcios first complains that the detectives implied that a 

judge and jury would not hear his side of the story unless he confessed. 

However, this implication is not an extrinsic falsehood which constitutes 

coercion. By implying that a confession would allow his side of the story to 

be heard, police sought to induce a truthful confession—not a confession 

regardless of his guilt. Cf. Bessey, 112 Nev. at 326, 914 P.2d at 620. We 

conclude that the police employed a permissible tactic when they 

encouraged Turcios to tell his side of the story so that a judge and jury 

would not solely rely upon the victim's allegations. See id. at 325-26, 914 

P.2d at 620. The implication of the detectives' statement focused Turcios's 

attention on the intrinsic facts of the victim's allegations; the implication 

did not divert Turcios's attention to issues extrinsic to the allegations. 

Next, Turcios complains that false representations about DNA 

evidence and the need to confess before the results were received 

constitute extrinsic falsehoods and unlawfully coerced his confession. 

Turcios is incorrect. This court has determined that misrepresentations 

about DNA evidence are intrinsic falsehoods and permissible in obtaining 

a confession. Id. at 326, 914 P.2d at 620. Telling Turcios that DNA 

evidence existed and that the results of DNA tests would prove whether he 

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touched the victim and with which parts of his body he touched her would 

only motivate Turcios to confess if he had indeed committed the alleged 

acts. The threat of DNA evidence and the need to confess before police 

received results would not motivate Turcios to make a false admission, 

especially after the detective told Turcios that "no two people in the 

history of human beings have had the same DNA." The threat of 

conclusive DNA evidence would cause Turcios to consider "his own beliefs 

regarding his actual guilt or innocence, his moral sense of right and 

wrong, and his judgment regarding the likelihood that the police had 

garnered enough valid evidence linking him to the crime." See Holland v. 

McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992). Additionally, telling 

Turcios that he needed to confess before they received the results is an 

intrinsic falsehood, not an extrinsic, because the statement was not 

collateral to the crime or one that was "likely to procure an untrue 

statement or to influence an accused to make a confession regardless of 

guilt." See Bessey, 112 Nev. at 326, 914 P.2d at 620. Had he not 

committed the crime and believed that the condemning evidence was 

forthcoming, the deception would not have motivated him to confess. 

Accordingly, we conclude the detectives' use of intrinsic falsehoods 

regarding DNA evidence did not render Turcios's confessions involuntary 

or inadmissible. 

Lastly, Turcios complains that the police deceived him by 

suggesting that the court would be lenient if he confessed. A detective 

posed a hypothetical scenario to Turcios in which video surveillance at a 

convenience store shows two men stealing milk. The first man claims that 

the court cannot prove he committed the crime. The second individual 

confesses, explains he did not have the money to purchase the milk for his 

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baby, and expresses remorse. The detective then asked Turcios which of 

the two thieves, the one •who is defiant or the one who is remorseful, a 

court would likely treat better. In response to the detective's question, 

Turcios asked if they would be merciful with him if he admitted guilt. 

Rather than telling Turcios that an admission would lead to favorable 

treatment, the detective corrected Turcios and said that this was his 

opportunity to explain whether the victim exaggerated or minimized the 

actual crimes committed. However, the record does not reflect that the 

police made any promises of leniency to Turcios, explicit or implicit. Thus, 

we do not believe that the hypothetical scenario was deceitful or that it 

rendered the confession involuntary or inadmissible. 

Because all of the misrepresentations that Turcios complains 

of are either intrinsic falsehoods, which we have determined are 

permissible, see Bessey, 112 Nev. at 325-26, 914 P.2d at 620, or are not 

falsehoods at all, we conclude that the police did not coerce Turcios's 

statement and that the district court correctly concluded that the 

statement was admissible. 

Accordingly, we find that Turcios' statement was voluntary 

and that the detectives' use of deception did not overbear his will. 

Other arguments 

Prosecutorial misconduct 

Turcios alleges that several incidences of prosecutorial 

misconduct prejudiced him and denied his right to due process. 

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when "a prosecutor's statements so 

infected the proceedings with unfairness as to make the results a denial of 

due process." Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 47-48, 83 P.3d 818, 825 

(2004). "Reversal, however, is unnecessary if the prosecutor's [comments] 

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are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 

511, 516, 118 P.3d 184, 187 (2005). 

Comments regarding P.B.'s demeanor and the heinous 

nature of the crime 

Turcios claims that the prosecutors' comments about P.B.'s 

demeanor on the witness stand and the heinousness of the crime inflamed 

the jurors and prejudiced them against him. The prosecutor merely 

related her observations of the victim and this does not constitute 

misconduct. Likewise, the prosecutor's statement about the heinous 

nature of sexual assault of a minor under 14 can be objectively verified by 

reading NRS 200.366(2). Accordingly, a new trial is not warranted 

because the statements did not "infect[ ] the proceedings with unfairness." 

Thomas, 120 at 47; 83 P.3d at 825; see also Anderson, 121 Nev. at 516, 118 

P.3d at 187 (finding prosecutorial misconduct sufficiently prejudicial to 

warrant new trial). 

Bolstering witness testimony 

Turcios also argues that the State impermissibly bolstered 

P.B.'s testimony. We agree that the State impermissibly bolstered the 

victim's testimony. The State erred by describing one of P.B.'s friends, 

who testified at trial for the State, as a "hero," a "knight in shining armor," 

and a "36-year-old trapped in a 14-year-old's body." See DeChant v. State, 

116 Nev. 918, 926, 10 P.3d 108, 113 (2000) (concluding the prosecutor 

committed reversible error by paraphrasing a witness's stricken 

testimony, that the defendant's claim of a mob hit, was a "fairytale"). The 

State also erred by eliciting testimony from this witness that she acted 

appropriately by telling the school dean about P.B.'s sexual abuse and 

P.B.'s trustworthy nature. However, we conclude that these errors were 

harmless. See NRS 178.598. The State further erred when it elicited 

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testimony from McIlvaine, P.B.'s former school counselor, that P.B. was 

good person, but this error was not plain. See Patterson v. State, 111 Nev. 

1525, 1530, 907 P.2d 984, 987 (1995) (holding that this court's review is 

generally precluded when a party fails to object at trial but it may review 

for plain error, which occurs when the error is "so unmistakable that it 

reveals itself by a casual inspection of the record" (internal citation 

omitted)). Consequently, reversal is not warranted. 

Leading witnesses during direct examination 

Turcios argues that the State committed misconduct by asking 

P.B. and her friend from school leading questions during direct 

examination. We conclude that admission of the leading questions was 

not plainly erroneous from a casual inspection of the record. See id. See 

also Anderson v. Berrum, 36 Nev. 463, 470, 136 P. 973, 976 (1913) (noting 

that "[w]hether leading questions should be allowed is a matter mostly 

within the discretion of the trial court, and any abuse of the rules 

regarding them is not ordinarily a ground for reversal"); Barcus v. State, 

92 Nev. 289, 291, 550 P.2d 411, 413 (1976) (concluding that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion or prejudice the defendant when it 

allowed the prosecuting attorney to ask eight- and nine-year-old witnesses 

leading questions during direct examination). Accordingly, reversal is not 

warranted. 

Introduction of hearsay testimony 

Turcios argues that the district court erred when it admitted 

evidence that P.B. allegedly made prior disclosures that Turcios assaulted 

her. We conclude that the district court properly admitted the testimony 

as evidence of the victim's prior, consistent statements. See NRS 

51.035(2)(b). 

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Discovery motion 

Turcios contends that the district court erred when it denied 

his pre-trial discovery motion for production of P.B.'s mental health and 

counseling records. We reject this argument. Because the records are 

protected by state law, Turcios is not entitled to P.B.'s counseling records. 

See NRS 174.235(2)(b). We also reject his argument that the State 

committed a Brady violation by withholding this evidence because Turcios 

did not show that P.B.'s mental health and counseling records would 

benefit him. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

Motion for an independent psychological examination 

Turcios argues that the district court erred in denying his 

motion for an independent psychological examination of P.B. We conclude 

that Turcios did not prove a compelling need for P.B. to be independently 

examined. See Abbott v. State, 122 Nev. 715, 725-27, 138 P.3d 462, 469-70 

(2006); Koerschner v. State, 116 Nev. 1111, 1116-17, 13 P.3d 451, 455 

(2000). 

Recalling the complaining witness 

Turcios alleges that the court's denial of his motion to recall 

P.B. prevented him from presenting a defense and violated his federal 

constitutional rights under the due process and compulsory process 

clauses. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied Turcios's motion because Turcios had a full opportunity to 

cross-examine the victim when she testified for the State and Turcios did 

not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the inability to recall P.B. See 

Collins v. State, 88 Nev. 9, 13-14, 492 P.2d 991, 993 (1972). 

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Sufficiency of the evidence 

Turcios argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

his convictions. We disagree. This court will not reverse a jury's verdict 

"[w]here there is substantial evidence to support" it. LaPierre v. State, 108 

Nev. 528, 530, 836 P.2d 56, 57 (1992)). In sexual assault cases, this court 

has "repeatedly held that the testimony of a sexual assault victim alone is 

sufficient to uphold a conviction," so long as "the victim[ ] testif[ies] with 

some particularity regarding the incident." Id. at 531, 836 P.2d at 58 

(emphasis in original). At trial, P.B. testified with particularity regarding 

incidences of sexual assault and lewdness. Moreover, because the district 

court properly admitted Turcios's voluntary statement to police, his 

confession corroborates P.B.'s testimony. A rational trier of fact could 

determine that any supposed inconsistencies in P.B.'s testimony or lapses 

in P.B.'s recollection of the incidents were excusable because Turcios's 

confession supports the material elements. Accordingly, the State 

produced sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to convict Turcios. 

Cruel and unusual punishment 

Turcios asserts that the statutorily mandated sentence the 

court imposed is cruel and unusual because it is more severe than the 

sentence for first-degree murder and requires that he serve a minimum of 

105 years before he will be eligible for parole. We are not persuaded that 

his sentence is cruel or unusual under the United States or Nevada 

Constitutions. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 

(1987); Lloyd v. State, 94 Nev. 167, 170, 576 P.2d 740, 743 (1978). 

Cumulative error 

Lastly, Turcios contends that even if any of the individual 

errors of which he complains do not warrant reversal, the cumulative 

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effect of those errors warrants reversal. We disagree. The only errors 

were the prosecution's vouching for P.B.'s friend from school and eliciting 

testimony from the friend and the school counselor about P.B.'s 

trustworthiness. These errors are few and minor. Also, the evidence 

against Turcios was overwhelming. Although the crimes of which he was 

accused are grave, we conclude as a matter of law that reversal is not 

warranted. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1196, 196 P.3d 465, 481 

(2008) (discussing the factors for determining whether cumulative errors 

require reversal). 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

/ Leo 45-.0 .J 

Hardesty 

gausike‘algitn Parraguirre 

Gibbons 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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