IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 29, 2021

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. STEPHEN A. SIMPSON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Loudon County

No. 2018-CR-63 Jeffery Hill Wicks, Judge

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No. E2020-01340-CCA-R3-CD

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The Loudon County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Stephen A. Simpson, with one count 

of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one count of simple possession of a Schedule 

II controlled substance. Following trial, a jury convicted Defendant of both counts. For 

the DUI count, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days,

suspended to forty-eight hours in confinement and the remainder to serve on supervised 

probation. For possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, the court sentenced 

Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. 

The trial court ran the sentences concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his DUI conviction. Following a thorough review of the record and 

applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES 

CURWOOD WITT, JR., and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Walter Johnson, Lenoir City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Stephen A. Simpson.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Russell Johnson, District Attorney General; and Joe Caldwell and 

Alyson Kennedy, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

08/09/2021
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OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

Motion to Suppress

Loudon County Sheriff’s Department Deputy James Ketner testified that, in the 

early morning of February 27, 2016, he was “sitting stationary on Highway 11, Spring 

Street” and that “the [Defendant’s] truck passed [him].” Deputy Ketner was facing 

perpendicular to the roadway. He “looked inside the windshield, looked inside the cab of 

the truck, and noticed the driver wasn’t wearing a seat belt.” Deputy Ketner then initiated 

a traffic stop around 2:40 a.m. Deputy Ketner agreed that, as a law enforcement officer, 

he had been trained in viewing seat belts, “whether it be in the day or nighttime.” Deputy 

Ketner testified that he was able to see that Defendant was not wearing a seat belt because 

the headlights of his patrol car were on so that “when the vehicles pass [him,] [he] can look 

inside the truck or car to see how many people are in there and whether or not they’re 

wearing a seat belt.” He cited Defendant for not wearing a seat belt. 

On cross-examination, Deputy Ketner stated that the only reason he stopped 

Defendant was because he saw that Defendant was not wearing a seat belt. Deputy Ketner 

said that Defendant was driving average speed, not particularly slow or particularly fast. 

He testified that he did not recall whether Defendant had the lights on in the cab of the 

truck. Deputy Ketner could not recall how long he was able to see into Defendant’s vehicle. 

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Deputy Ketner “saw the 

Defendant coming by without a seat belt on” which “would give the officer probable cause 

to stop the vehicle.” The case proceeded to trial.

Trial

At trial, Detective Ketner1testified to his interactions with Defendant on February 

27. He described where his patrol car was positioned and stated that he saw Defendant 

drive by him without a seat belt on. Detective Ketner agreed that he “specifically 

position[ed] [his] car in a manner to be able to see . . . into the cab” and that he did look 

for the “strap” of the seat belt. After noticing that Defendant was not wearing his seat belt, 

Detective Ketner activated his blue lights and pulled Defendant over. Detective Ketner 

stated that the weather that night was “cold and dark.” Detective Ketner approached 

Defendant’s vehicle at approximately 2:30 a.m. Defendant was in the driver’s seat, and 

Mr. Timothy Crawley was in the front passenger’s seat. Detective Ketner could “smell the 

 

1 Deputy Ketner was promoted after the suppression hearing to detective. 
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alcohol coming from inside the vehicle,” and he noticed an “open container of beer in the 

cupholder.” Detective Ketner recalled that he asked Defendant to exit the vehicle and 

described Defendant as “kind of lethargic.” He explained that Defendant was “[j]ust slow 

to move, slow to answer questions.” Detective Ketner agreed that this type of behavior is 

“consistent with somebody who is impaired.” 

After Defendant exited the vehicle, Detective Ketner took Defendant to his police 

car to talk to him. He smelled “the odor of alcohol” coming off of Defendant. Defendant 

stated that he had “one beer” and had been at a bar “down the road.” Detective Ketner 

asked Defendant if he was on any type of medication. Defendant advised that he had a 

fentanyl patch on his shoulder and that he also had taken “Oxycodone or OxyContin.” 

Detective Ketner explained that a fentanyl patch is a “patch just to put on [your] arm to 

relieve the pain. It’s . . . prescription only.” Detective Ketner agreed that “fentanyl patches 

cause an impairment.” Detective Ketner testified that he “patted [Defendant] down on the 

outside” and found a metal container in one of Defendant’s pockets which contained five 

Oxycodone pills. Detective Ketner testified that Defendant told him he had a prescription 

but that Defendant was unable to produce one. Detective Ketner sent the fentanyl patch

and the pills to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) to be tested. 

Detective Ketner began to administer the three standardized field sobriety tests

(“HGN,” walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand); however, due to Defendant’s physical 

condition -- “troubles with his hip” and “pins in his shoulder” -- Detective Ketner let 

Defendant perform a dexterity test and an alphabet test instead of the one-leg stand. 

Detective Ketner said that he took Defendant’s medical condition into account when 

administering the sobriety tests. Defendant performed “satisfactory” on the dexterity test

and performed “consistent with someone who’s impaired” on the walk-and-turn and 

alphabet tests.

2

When Defendant first stepped out of the vehicle, he was not wearing a coat. 

Detective Ketner testified that he did not feel it was safe for Defendant to get back inside 

the vehicle to get his coat until additional officers arrived. Detective Ketner agreed that it 

was “not exactly easy for anybody to stand out there in the cold . . . and try to do some of 

[the] physical tests.” 

On cross-examination, Detective Ketner agreed that there were multiple things 

Defendant did that indicated he was not impaired. Detective Ketner agreed that, before he 

pulled Defendant over, Defendant was driving “very well.” Detective Ketner further 

agreed that maintaining speed and maintaining lane control are two things officers look for 

in determining whether someone is impaired and that Defendant maintained both his speed 

 

2 There is nothing in the record to indicate Defendant’s performance on the HGN test.
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and lane control prior to the stop. It took Defendant forty-three seconds to pull over, which 

Detective Ketner felt was “too long.” Detective Ketner agreed that Defendant was 

“coherent” when he spoke with him and that Defendant said “he had his seat belt on.” 

Detective Ketner agreed that Defendant did not have trouble standing up on his own.

However, Detective Ketner ultimately determined that Defendant was impaired and 

placed him under arrest for DUI. Detective Ketner testified that he based this determination 

on “everything that [he] witnessed and everything that [he] saw at the time: [t]he odor of 

the alcohol, the vehicle, his performance on the standardized field sobriety test[s], the 

prescription medications [he] found on [Defendant], [and] the fentanyl patch on his 

shoulder.” Detective Ketner’s patrol car had an “in-car” video camera which captured 

these events. Portions of the video were played for the jury, and Detective Ketner pointed 

out Defendant’s actions that led him to conclude that Defendant was impaired. 

On the way to the jail, Defendant told Detective Ketner that he had taken one 

Oxycodone. Detective Ketner asked Defendant if he would consent to a blood draw and 

read Defendant the implied consent form. Detective Ketner testified that Defendant took 

five minutes to think about it but ultimately said “no.” 

TBI Agent Dawn Mackey testified that she tested the patch and pills found on 

Defendant. The patch tested positive for fentanyl, and the pills tested positive for

Oxycodone. 

Mr. Timothy Crawley testified that he was with Defendant on the night of February 

27 when they were stopped by Detective Ketner. Mr. Crawley stated that they were coming 

from “Bud’s Bar” where Mr. Crawley worked and that Defendant came there to give him 

a ride home at approximately 11:00 p.m. Mr. Crawley testified that Defendant waited on 

him to finish stocking the coolers. While Defendant was waiting, Mr. Crawley stated that 

he “bought [Defendant] a beer, but [Defendant] didn’t drink it.” Mr. Crawley was drinking 

“heavily” that night but could not give a specific number of drinks that he had. Mr. 

Crawley did “not really” remember talking to Detective Ketner after he stopped 

Defendant’s vehicle. 

Detective Ketner was recalled as a rebuttal witness. Detective Ketner recalled that 

he talked to Mr. Crawley on February 27 after additional officers arrived at the scene. 

Detective Ketner asked Mr. Crawley how many beers he saw Defendant consume that 

night, and Mr. Crawley told him he saw Defendant drink “four or five” beers at the bar. 

The jury convicted Defendant of DUI and of simple possession of a Schedule II 

controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of 

eleven months and twenty-nine days with a seventy-five percent release eligibility, 
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suspended to forty-eight hours to serve in jail, and the remainder to be served on supervised 

probation. Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied 

following a hearing. Defendant now timely appeals.

Analysis

On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to 

suppress evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop. He contends that the officer’s reason 

for the stop did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion required. Defendant also argues 

that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his DUI conviction because the proof did not 

show beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was impaired.

Motion to Suppress

The applicable standard of review for suppression issues is well-established. A trial 

court’s findings of fact are binding on this court unless the evidence in the record 

preponderates against them. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn. 2012) (citing 

State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). “Questions of credibility of the 

witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence 

are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Id. The prevailing party is 

entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing 

and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id. The trial 

court’s application of law to the facts is reviewed under a de novo standard with no 

presumption of correctness. Id. (citing State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)). 

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this court may consider the 

entire record, including the proof presented at the suppression hearing as well as at trial. 

State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 248 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 

(Tenn. 2001); State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 297-99 (Tenn. 1998). “Findings of fact 

made by the trial judge after an evidentiary hearing of a motion to suppress are afforded 

the weight of a jury verdict, and this court will not set aside the trial court’s judgment unless 

the evidence contained in the record preponderates against his findings.” State v. Adams, 

859 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Generally, “under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or 

seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to 

suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted 

pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. 

Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 525, 629 (Tenn. 1997). A warrant is not required for an investigatory 

stop “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable 

facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” State v. Bridges, 963 

S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. 
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Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630; State v. Watkins, 

827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992). 

Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 

subject of a stop of criminal activity . . . , and it is determined by considering the totality 

of the circumstances surrounding the stop[.]” Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218 (citing Ornelas v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 

Circumstances relevant to [evaluating reasonable suspicion] include, but are 

not limited to, the officer’s personal objective observations, information 

obtained from other police officers or agencies, information obtained from 

citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offenders. A court must also 

consider the rational inferences and deductions that a trained officer may 

draw from the facts and circumstances known to him. 

Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 632 (citing Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at 294; United States v. Cortez,

449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 

The trial court implicitly credited the testimony of Detective Ketner in finding that 

he had reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief, investigatory stop on Defendant’s vehicle.

The trial court stated that the officer “said that he saw the [D]efendant coming by without 

a seat belt on. That would give the officer probable cause to stop the vehicle.”3 Detective 

Ketner’s personal objective observations led him to believe that Defendant was driving 

without a seat belt. His patrol car was positioned so that he could see passing vehicles, and 

his headlights were on so that he could see inside the vehicle. Detective Ketner was trained 

in seat belt detection when it is dark outside, and he was able to look into Defendant’s 

vehicle and see that Defendant was not wearing a seat belt. Failure to wear a seat belt is a 

criminal offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-603 (2016). Thus, Detective Ketner had a 

particularized and objective basis for believing that Defendant was committing the criminal 

activity of not wearing a seat belt while driving. Therefore, based on the totality of the 

circumstances, Detective Ketner had reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief, investigatory 

stop of Defendant’s vehicle. Further, the Sixth Circuit and this court have upheld 

investigatory stops based on seat belt law violations. See U.S. v. Draper, 22 Fed. Appx. 

413, 415 (6th Cir. 2001); State v. Carl Martin, No. W2002-00066-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 

57311, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 2, 2003). The evidence does not preponderate against 

the trial court’s findings. Therefore, the investigatory stop was proper, and the trial court 

did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this 

issue. 

 

3 While the trial court found the officer had “probable cause” to stop the vehicle, reasonable 

suspicion is all that was required. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence

Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is “whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(e). Questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and weight of the evidence 

are resolved by the fact finder. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). This

court will not reweigh the evidence. Id. Our standard of review “is the same whether the 

conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 

370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence, replacing it with a 

presumption of guilt. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 

(Tenn. 1982). The defendant bears the burden of proving why the evidence was 

insufficient to support the conviction. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 

914. On appeal, the “State must be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 

514, 521 (Tenn. 2007). 

It is unlawful for a person to drive an automobile on any public roadway or highway 

while “[u]nder the influence of any intoxicant, . . . controlled substance, . . . drug, substance 

affecting the central nervous system, or combination thereof that impairs the driver’s ability 

to safely operate a motor vehicle by depriving the driver of the clearness of mind and 

control or oneself that the driver would otherwise possess.” Tenn. Code Ann. 55-10-401(1)

(2016). Oxycodone and fentanyl are controlled substances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-

408(b)(1)(M) (2016); § 39-17-406(b) (2016). Alcohol is an intoxicant. State v. Clark, 355 

S.W.3d 590, 594 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).

Here, Defendant was in the driver’s seat of a truck driving on a public highway. 

Detective Ketner testified that he smelled alcohol coming from the vehicle and from 

Defendant himself and that he saw an open container inside of the vehicle. Defendant 

openly admitted that he had taken an Oxycodone, which Detective Ketner testified can 

cause impairment. Defendant also had a fentanyl patch on his arm. Detective Ketner, a 

trained law enforcement officer, administered multiple standardized field sobriety tests to 

Defendant, and he ultimately concluded that Defendant was impaired. This court has 

previously held that sufficient evidence existed for a DUI conviction when the trial court 

only relied on the arresting officer’s testimony that the defendant was driving under the 

influence. State v. Vasser, 870 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Taken in the 

light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to 
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find that Defendant drove under the influence as prohibited by law. Defendant is not 

entitled to relief on this issue.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

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ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE