O n ap p eal
, t he ap p el l ant ap p arent l y co nt est s o nl y hi s co cai ne co nvi ct i o n. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 25, 200 7 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE 

### v. M A R ON D ON TA BR OW N

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Bradley County

No. 02-009 R. Ste ven Bebb, Ju dge

No. E2006-01038-CC A-R3- CD - F iled March 31, 2008

The a ppellant, Maron D onta B rown, pled g uilty in the Br adley

County Criminal Court to one count of possess i o n o f m o re than .5 g rams of c ocaine with the intent to sell or deliver a nd one count of speeding

. The appellant rec eived a total sentenc e of f ifteen y ear s as a Rang e I Imultipl e off ender

. 1 As part of the plea a g ree ment, the appellant proper ly rese rved a cer tified question of law, c halleng ing the stop and subseque nt searc h of his vehicle dur ing w hich the coc aine wa s discovere d. Upon our revie w of the r ecor d and the pa rties’ brie fs, we a ffirm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J
., joined. J err

y L . Smit h, J ., filed a dissenting opinion.

M. J eff rey Whit t, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Maron Donta B rown.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Att o rn ey Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; Cameron L . Hy der, A ssistant Attorney Ge n er al ; J erry

N. E s t es , Di s t ri ct At t o rn ey Ge n er al ; an d J o s e p h Ho ff er an d An dre w F re i b er g, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On J une 18, 2001, Troope r Ke ven Hoppe stopped the appe llant for spee ding a nd conducte d

a sea r c h o f th e a p p e ll a n t’ s v e h ic le
, d is c o v e r in g a ta p e d p a c k a g e c o n ta in in g o v e r 3 0 0 g r a ms of

coca ine. S ubsequently
, the appellant filed a motion to suppress the c ocaine , alleg ing that the scope of the tra ffic stop wa s exceede d; he did not knowingly and voluntarily

consent to t he sea

rch; the scope of his consent, if any , was e x cee ded; and the c onsent, if any , was th e re s u l t o f the unlaw ful-2-

stop.

At the suppression hea ring , Trooper Ho p p e testified that on June 18, 2001, he wa s parke d about one mile inside the Bra dley County line near mile marke r 17 on I nterstate 75. H is vehicle, a 1998 Crown Victoria , was c lear ly marke d as a K -9 unit. Trooper Gibson was a l s o p ar k ed at that location, albeit in a se parate police cruiser. The troopers wer e obser ving nor thbound traff

ic on the i n t e r s t a t e

. A t a

p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 : 0 0 p

. m

. , T r o o p e r H o p p e s a w a C a d i l l a c b e i n g f

o l l o w e d c l o s e l y b y a d a r k C h e v r o l e tIm p a l a

. T r o o p e r H o p p e r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e Im p a l a w a s t r a v e l i n g a ta

s p e e d o f s e v e n t yeig ht mi l es p er h o u r in a seve nty -mile-per -hour zone, and the Cadillac wa s traveling at a similar speed. The Cadillac had a Texas license plate

. Trooper Hoppe be lieved that the Cadillac and the I mpala we re tra

veling too closely

for that r ate of

speed. A dditionally
, Trooper Hoppe testified that based upon his training in drug interdiction, he knew that “[d] rug car tels, mule drug hauler s” often use a de coy

vehicle to purposely

drawan off

icer ’s attention from a

nother ve hicle by

speedingor dr ivi nge rr a tic a lly . T ro op e r H op pe no te d th a t us ua lly the de c oy ve hic le wi ll p ur

po se ly have a lic e ns e plate fr om a hig h dr

ug a re a su c h a s Te xas. Tr oo pe r Ho pp e be lie ve d th a t on e of the ve hic le s w a s a decoy vehicle.

Ba sed upon the spee ding a nd his suspicion that one of the vehic les was a decoy vehi cl e, Trooper Hoppe be g an pursuing the I mpala, and Trooper Gibson beg an pursuing the Cadillac. The troopers employ ed the blue l ights located on top of t heir vehicles. After pursuit was initiated, the Cadillac’s speed incre ased to a pproxi mately 100 miles per hour. Tr ooper H oppe re called that after the initiation of pursuit, the driver of the I mpala “f ailed to maintain his lane of trave l,” drifted, a nd reduc ed the ve hicle’s spe ed.

After sever al miles of pursuit, the I mpala stopped on the side of the intersta te. Troope r Ho pp e sa id t

hat th e I mpa la ha d da

rk , tint e d w ind ow s, bu t he wa s a ble to s e e the dr ive r o f t

he ve hic le

move aro u n d q u ite a bit in the vehicle. B eca use the I mpala wa s parke d close to interstate traff ic, Trooper Hoppe approa ched the I mpala on the pa sseng er side. T he appe llant was alone in the vehicle.

Trooper Hoppe looked in the f

ront passeng er side window and told the appellant that he ha d “cloc ked” the appellant dr iving se venty -eig ht miles per hour. The appellant denied that he had be en speeding . Trooper

Hoppe notice d two or three cellular telephones in the f

ront seat of

the vehicle

. He a lso notic e d s e v e r a l a ir f r e s h e n e r s in th e v e h ic le

. H e a s k e d th e a p p e ll a n t w h y h e h a d been moving a round so much in the vehicle a fter the stop. The appe llant responded that he was moving beca use he ha d spilled a cup of w ater ; however , Trooper Hoppe sa w no evidenc e of spilled water. Trooper Hoppe obse rved that the appellant wa s acting very suspiciou s ly , explaining that he wa s “ner vous,” “sha

king,” and had a

conce rned e x pression on his fac e.

Tr oo p e r H o p p e a s k e d t h e a p p e l l a n t t o s t e p o u t o f t h e v e h i c l e o n t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e a ndto produce his dr iver’s license. When the appellant stepped out of the vehicle , Trooper

Hoppe notice d a “bulge ” in th e a

p p e ll a n t’ s p o c k e t; th e r e f

o r e , h e p att e d

d o w n th e a

p p e ll a n t f o r w e a p o n s

. T he

a pp e lla nt p os se sse d n o w e a

po ns bu t ha d a

larg e ri ngof

ke y s and a

lig hte r i n h is f

ro nt p a nts po c ke t. Tr oo pe r H op pe a sk e d th e a pp e lla nt wh o own e d the ve hic le

. Th e a pp e lla nt r e sp on de d th a t th e I mpa la-3-

belong ed to his stepfathe r. Troope r Hoppe asked the appellant f rom wher e he w as t rave ling, a nd the appellant r eplied that he had jus t left hi s g irlfriend at the University of Tennessee at Chattanoog a. The trooper testified that he usually asks these ty pes of questions of people he stops “ to g aug e what kind of person they are .” Trooper Hoppe took the appellant’ s driver’ s license to the police cr uiser and ca lled dispatch to che ck the dr iver’s lice nse and the vehicle’ s license plate. He learne d that the loc a l c omp ute rs we re no t w or kin g , s o h e ha d to c a ll “ B loc k Hi g h Wat c h Ce nte r” in N e w O rl e a ns , L ouisian a, to run the driver ’s license and license plate. While speaking with the trooper, the appellant c rossed his ar

ms severa l times and would not make ey e contac t w ith the trooper. T rooper Hoppe state d that he found the appellant’ s “body lang uag e . . . ver

y suspicious in nature.”

Whil e aw aiting a

response from “B lock Hig h Wa t ch Center,” Trooper Hoppe a sked the appellant if he had eve r bee n in trouble and if ther e we re illeg al items in the vehicle. The appellant

answe red no. Tr ooper H oppe next asked the a ppellant i f he could “ take a quick look,” g esturing toward the vehicle. T rooper Hoppe testified that the appellant sa id, “Yea h, g o ahea d.” The troope r inquired if ther e wa s any thing in the ve hicle such a s marijuana, co ca i n e, methamphetamine, or he ro in. Th e a

pp e lla nt r e pli e d in

the ne g a tiv e . T ro op e r Ho pp e asked the a pp e lla nt i f h e wa s a “straig ht up guy ,” and the appellant r esponded a ffirmatively

.

Tr oo pe r H op pe be g a n se a rc hin g the ve hic le wh ile the a pp e lla nt sto od in f

ro nt o f a g ua rd ra il
ten or twelve f

eet a way . Trooper

Hoppe immediately

picked up a

n item that had pre viously attrac ted his a tte nti on : a bro wn c a rd bo a rd bo x that look e d like so me thi ng in wh ic h an a ir fi lte r fo r a v e hic le would be pac kag ed. The box was “ oddly taped . .

. with non- standard tape which said ‘G M’ on it.” The troope r aske d the appe llant to ex plain what wa s in the box . I nitially , the appe llant said that he did no t kn ow wh a t it wa s; the bo x ha d be e n in the ve hic le wh e n he g ot it. Th e n, the a pp e lla nt s a id that he believe d it wa s a prese nt from his sister to his mot her. Tr ooper H oppe testified, “ Iknew at that point probably it wa s contra band.” At the suppression hea ring , the following colloquy occur red:

[Tr oo pe r H op pe :] Ife lt i t f ir st a nd Ic ou ld f e e l li ke a br ic k, jus t

on e bigbr ic k in

it, a nd the n th e re ’s a br ok e do wn zip- loc k ba g

. Ife lt the brick in ther e.
[The court:] S o y ou wer e fe elingbefor e y ou ever tore it open.

[Trooper Hoppe :] Ifelt the bric k in it. You could fee l it.

Aft e r f e e li n g th e b o x, T r o o p e r H o p p e p e e le d u p a c o r n e r o f th e ta

p e , s me ll e d th e b o x, and detec ted the odor of

coca ine. Troope r Hoppe told the appellant to g et down on the ground, a nd the appellant c omplied. T ro o p er H oppe then ha ndcuff ed the a ppellant and attempted to convince the appellant to par

ticipate in a c ontrolled delivery . The a ppellant re fused.

T ro o p er Ho p p e r et u rn edt o h i s p o l i c e c ru i s er an d p l ac edt h e p ac k age i n s i d e. “B l o ckHi gh Watch Center” called T rooper Hoppe, and he informed them that he “had a seizure.” He finished opening the box and found-4- a big zip-lock ba[g] with rock coca ine .

. . just the way it’s chunked up cut off a

kilo. And the other one was a perf ect kilo, what y ou

wo u l d t h i n k a kilo would look like, and it looked like it was g ree n materia l but it’s g ot some kind of g el or like a x le g rea se or something around it I g uess to ma sk the odor of it, or that’s what it looked like.

Trooper Hoppe a cknowledg ed that he ha d a drug detection dog i n his police cr uiser, but he explained that he did not have an opportunity to use the dog

. He also stated that he usually relies on verba l consent instead of

using c onsent to sear ch for ms beca use a fellow officer had been shot a nd killed while returningto his poli ce c ruiser to obtain a consent for

m.
A videotape of the stop w as play ed for the trial cour

t. At the conclusion of the suppr ession hear ing, the court said, “ Idon’t see a ny thing wr ong at all with the stop.” The court said that a fter listening to the videota

pe, he thoug ht he hea

rd the a ppellant say

“o k ay ” or “y es” to indicate that Trooper Hoppe c ould searc h the vehicle . The c ourt stated:

I ’m g oing to be as fr ank as I can w ith y ou all. Idon’t know, Ithink this is a very close question no matter how the Court r ules, and my fee ling is that the c lose question is not whe ther they exceede d the scope of the conse nt. Idon’t have any problem with an a

ppeal on that part at al l beca

use that’s pa

rt of the que stion, but I fee l like if the
consent was valid that the officer did not ex cee d the scope , even if he had to unwra

p the pac kag e. The n ag ain Ithink of my self out on the interstate a

nd a police office r st ops me for speedingand I look around and I ’ve g ot nothing in the ca r and I say , “Sure, go ahea d and look around,” do I ex pect that he ’s g oing to unwr ap all my Christmas prese nts in the back seat. Idon’t kn o w, and so that may be more signific ant than I think it is. And i n this case whe n the offic er pic ked that up he say s he smelled it and that it fe l t l i k e a brick. So I ’m thinking that th at proba

bly isn’t as an impressive issue to the Court

o f A p p e a ls o r th e Su

p r e me Co u rt a s ma

y b e th e v o lu

n ta r ine ss of the

c on se nt.

The c ourt found that the appellant g ave unequivoca l c onsent to se arc h his vehicle, knowing th a t th e tr o o p e r w a s s e a r c h in g f o r dr u g s

. A d d it io n a ll y , th e c o u rt f o u n d th a t th e c o n sent was “uncontaminated by

duress or c oerc ion.”

Following the trial court’s ruling
, the appellant pled g uilty to spe eding and to possession of more than .5 g rams of c ocaine with the intent to sell, prope rly rese rving a ce rtified question of law : (1) whe ther the sc ope of the traff ic stop was excee ded; (2) w hether the appe llant knowi n g ly and voluntarily consente d to a search of the vehicle; (3) whether the scope of the consent was exceede d; and (4) whether

the conse nt, if any , was “fr uit of the poisonous tre e” beca use it wa s directly

related from the a lleg edly

illega l detention.-5- II. Ana lys is

I n revie wing a trial c ourt’s dete rminations reg ardinga suppre ssion hearing , “[q] uestions of

cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the evidence, a nd resolution of conf

licts in the evidenc e are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fac t.” State v. Odom

, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . T hu s, “ a tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t in a su pp re ssi on he a ri ngwi ll b e up he ld u

nle ss the evidenc e pre ponderates o t h erw ise.” I d. Neve rtheless, a ppellate c ourts will review the trial court’s application of law to the fac ts pur ely de novo. See State v. Walton

, 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001). F urthermor e, the State, a s the preva iling par ty , is “entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence adduce d at t he suppression hear ing as well as a ll reasona ble and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e vidence .” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23.

A. Scope of

Detention

As his first issue, the appe llant questions

[w] hether the s cope of the dete ntion following the tra ffic stop fo r s pe e din g wa s e x ceede d by Tr oo pe r H op pe , w ith ou t r e a so na ble

su sp ic ion or pr ob a ble c a us e , in vio la tio n o f t

he [app e lla

nt’ s] r ig hts under a rticle I
, section 7 of t he Te nnessee Constit ution and the United Sta te ’s Con sti tut ion , F ourt h A me ndme nt.

I nitially , we note that b o t h t h e Fo urth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

a rt ic le I , s e c tio n 7 of

the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion pr ov ide pr ote c tio n f

or c iti zen s a g a ins t

“ un re a so na

ble se a rc he s and

se izur e s. ” Ge ne ra lly , a warr a ntl e ss s e a rc h is c on sid e re d p re su mpt ive ly

unrea sonable, thus violative of constitutional protections. See State v. Walker

, 12 S.W .3d 460, 467 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; se e a lso Sta te v. Hi c ks
, 55 S.W. 3d 51 5, 52 7 (T e nn

. 20 01 ). Un de r b oth c on sti tut ion s,

e vid e nc e dis c ov e re d a s a re su lt of a wa rr a ntl e ss se a rc h is “ ‘s ub

je c t to su pp re ssi on un le ss t he Sta te demon s t ra t es t h at t he sea rch or seizure was c onducted pur suant to one of the na rrowly define d exceptions to the war

rant requireme nt.’” State v. Bine tte, 33 S.W .3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Yea

rga n , 9 5 8 S .W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997)); se e also Coolidge v. New H ampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971).

The United St ates Supreme Court announce d one such e x ception to the wa rra nt require ment in Terr y v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968), holding that a law e nforc ement off icer may conduct a brief inve stigatory

stop of an indi vidual if the offic er ha s a re asonable suspicion based upon specific and ar

ticulable fa cts that a c riminal offe nse has be en, is b eing , or is about to be committed. See also State v. Ke ith, 978 S.W .2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998). This standard a lso applies to the investigatory

stop of a vehic le. Dela

war e v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979); State v. Watkins, 827 S

. W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992). In other wor ds, a law e nforc ement office r may

stop a vehicle if the office r possesses a r easona ble suspicion supported by specific and articula ble fa cts that an off

ense ha s been, is b ei n g, o r is about to be committed. Watkins, 827 S.W .2d at 294.-6-

The Supreme Court has observe d that “[a]rticulating pre cisely what ‘r easona

ble suspicion’

. . . me a n [s ] is n o t p o s s ib le

. ” O r n e la s v

. U n it e d St a te s , 5 1 7 U

. S. 6 9 0
, 6 9 5
, 1 1 6 S. Ct . 1657, 1661 (1 99 6) ; se e a lso Sta te v. Smith, 21 S.W. 3d 25 1, 25 6 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). “R eason a ble suspicion is a particular ized and objective b as is for suspec ting the subje ct of a stop of criminal activity .” B inette, 33 S.W.3d at 218 (citing Or nelas, 517 U.S. at 6 9 6
, 1 1 6 S

. Ct. at 1661). “The specific and articula

ble fac ts must be judge d by an objec tive standard, not the subje ctive belief s of the offic er making the stop.” State v. Norwood, 938 S.W .2d 23, 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Un ite d St a te s v . Co rt e z, 4 49 U. S. 4 11 , 4 17 -1 8, 10 1 S. Ct. 69 0, 69 5 ( 19 81 )) . A c c or din g ly , in evaluating the val i d i t y o f an investigatory stop, a court must consider the totality

of the circ umstances. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct . 1581, 1585 (1989); Watkins, 827 S.W .2d at 294. These circ umstances include , but are not limi t ed t o , “[ t he off icer ’s] objective observations, information obtained from other police of f ic e r s o r a g e n c ie s , information obtained f rom citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offender s. A court must also consider the rational infere nces a

nd deductions that a trained poli ce office r may drawfrom the f

acts a nd circ umstances known to him.” Watkins, 827 S .W.2d at 294 (citations omitt ed).

Taking the fore g oing into conside ration, we note t hat t he proof adduce d at the suppre ssion hear ing w as that Troope r Hoppe stopped the appe llant’s vehicle, at least in part, bec ause the

a pp e lla nt w a s d ri vin g se ve nty -e ight-mi le s- pe r- ho ur in a se ve nty -m ile s- pe r- ho ur

zon e . B e c a

us e speedingis a traf

fic infr action, the or igina l stop was valid. See State v. B err ios, 235 S.W .3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2 0 0 7 ); State v. Cox , 171 S.W .3d 174, 180 (Tenn. 2005) . Moreove r, “r equests for driver’ s licenses a nd vehicle r eg istrat i o n d o cu m en t s , i n qu i ri es co n ce rn i n g t ra v el p l an s an d v eh i cl e o wn er s h ip,

c omp ute r c he c ks , a

nd the iss ua nc e of c itatio ns a re inv e sti g a tiv e me tho ds or a c tiv iti e s c on sis te nt w ith the lawf ul scope of any traff

ic s top.” State v. Robert L ee H ammonds, No. M2005-01352-CCA-R3- CD, 2006 WL 3431923, at *8 (Te nn. Crim. App. at N ashville, Nov. 29, 2006). There fore , Trooper Ho p p e d id n o t v io late th e s c o p e o f th e s to p b y a s k in g th e a p p e ll a n t f o r h is dr iv e r ’ s li c e n se, fr om wher e he w as trave ling, or who was the owner

of the ve hicle.

During an investig atory

traff ic stop, an off

icer ’s ac tions must rea sonabl y re l at e to the

c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r o mp t i n g t h e s t o p

. S t a t e v

. T r o x e l l
, 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 6 6
, 8 7 1 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 2 )

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, the detention must not last longer than nee d ed t o eff

ectuate the re ason under ly ing the stop. I d. F ur the r, “ the of

fi c e r sh ou ld e mpl oy the le a st int ru siv e me a ns re a so na

bly a va ila ble to inv e sti g a te his or her susp ic io n s in

a s h o rt p e r io d

o f ti me

. ” I d

. “ [T ]h e p r o p e r in qu ir y is w h e th e r

d u r in g the detention, the police dilig ently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly .” State v. Simpson, 968 S .W.2d 776, 783 (Tenn. 1998) (c iting United States v. Sharpe, 4 7 0 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. C t. 1568, 1575 (1985)). H oweve r, fur ther de tention will be justified if, during a valid stop, law e nforc ement off icer s d evelop a

rea sonable suspicion that the individual wa s eng ag ed in othe r criminal activity

. See United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 1998).

I n th e ins tant c a se , a ft e r e ff e c tuatin g the lawf

ul sto p Tr oo pe r Ho pp e a sk e d the a pp e lla nt t o ste p o ut o f t

he ve hic le , a

nd he patte d th e a

pp e lla nt d ow n f or we a po ns . T he a

pp e lla nt c on te sts bo th actions. Troope r Hoppe testified that the appe llant’s vehicle w as par ked too close to tra ffic f

or the trooper to stand be side the driver’s s ide of the vehicle. The video of the stop supports the trooper’ s-7-

testimony . The United States Supre me Court has obser ved:

The ha zard of ac cidental injury from passing t ra ffic to a n

o ffice r standing on the driver ’s side of the ve hicle may . . . be

a pp re c ia ble i n some sit

uatio ns . Rathe r t

ha n c onve rs ingwh ile standing exposed to movi ng traff ic, t he officer prudently

may pref er to ask the driver

of the vehicle to step out of the ca r and of f onto the shoulder of the road w here the inquiry may b e p ursued with g reater safe ty to both.

Pennsy lvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977). Our supre me cour t has stated that an off

icer order ing oc cupants out of a vehicle dur ing a

traff ic st o p i s at m o st a “mer e inc on ve nie nc e .” B e rr ios
, 23 5 S.W. 3d a t 10 7. “ ‘Wh a t is a t mo st a me re inc on ve nie nc e c a nn ot p re va il wh e n b a lanc e d a g a ins t le g iti ma te c on c e rn s fo r the of fi c e r’ s sa fe ty .’ ” I d. (q

uo tin g Mim ms, 43 4 U .S. at 109-11, 98 S. Ct. at 333). We conclude that, based upo n the fore g oing, T rooper Hoppe wa s justified in asking the appellant to step out of the ve hicle.

Fur ther, afte r removing an individual f rom a vehicle, “an office r may conduct a pat-down f

or

wea pons if he has rea sonable suspi cion t hat t he driver m ay be armed.” Be rrios, 235 S .W.3d at 108. Trooper Hoppe state d that when the a ppellant s t ep p ed o u t of the ve hicle, he sa w a “ bulge ” in the appellant’ s pocket. I n order to de termine that the appellant did not have a we apon, Troope r Hoppe patted down the a

ppellant. He te stified that the “b u l ge” was “ a lar g e thing of key s and may be a lighter .” In other wor ds, the trooper patted the appellant down “for of fice r saf ety .” See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112, 98 S. Ct . at 334. Given the fore g oing fac ts, w e conclude that Trooper Hoppe’ s pat-down of the a ppellant was r easona

ble.

B. Consent

1. Whether Consent Given

As his second issue, the a ppellant questions

[w] hether t h e [ appellant] consented to a sear ch of the vehicle, a

nd whether such conse nt was knowing
, intelligent and voluntary under article I , section 7 o f t h e Te nnessee Constit ution and the United States Consti tution, Fourth Amendment.

Additionally , the appe llant challeng es

[w] hether t h e co nsent, assuming consent e x isted, was itself fr uit of the poisonous tree be cause it was made dur ing a nd direc tly

resulted from the illeg al detention.

As previously

noted, a wa

rra ntless searc h of a ve hicle is presumed unrea sonable unless the-8-

State demonstrates that the sear ch wa s conducte d pursuant to one of the narr owly define d exceptions to the war rant re quirement. B inette, 33 S.W.3d at 218. One exception to the war rant re quirement is a s ea rc h co n d u cted pur suant to an individual’s consent. Tr ox ell, 78 S.W .3d at 871 (c iting Schneckloth v. B ustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2059 (1973)) . Howeve r, “[i] n order
to pass consti tutional muster, consent to sear ch mus t be unequivoc al, spec ific, intellige ntly g iven, and uncontaminated by duress or coer cion.” St ate v. Ashw orth, 3 S.W .3d 25, 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting State v. Br own, 836 S.W .2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1992) ). The State be ars the bur den of showing by

a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the consent to a war rantless sear ch wa s fre ely and

v o lu n ta r il y g iv e n

. I d

. a t 2 8

- 2 9

. T h e qu e s ti o n o f w h e th e r a n a c c u s e d

v o lu n ta r il y c o n s e n ted t o a

sear ch is a que stion of fac t to be deter mined by the totality

of the c ircumstance s. I d. at 29.

After asking brief que stions about the appellant’s de stination and the owner ship of the vehicle, T rooper

Hoppe r eque s t ed t h e appellant’s driver’ s license a nd, as a matter of c ourse f or a traff ic s top, called dispatch to chec k his license and reg istration. Trooper Hoppe testified that the local computer s were “down,” and he c alled “B lock Hig h Wa t ch C en t er ” in L ouisiana to run the

a pp e lla nt’ s li c e ns e

. Whil e a wa iti ng the inf or ma tio n, the tr oo pe r a sk e d th e a pp e lla nt f or c on se nt t o

sear ch the ve hicle.

Trooper Hoppe testified that he re quested c onsent to sear ch while the a ppellant’s drive r’s lic e ns e inf

or ma tio n w a s b e inginv e sti g a te d. Th e tr oo pe r a dv ise d th e a pp e lla nt t hat he wa nte d to

sear ch the vehicle for drug s. Trooper Hoppe stated that the appellant fre ely g ave consent to sea rch. The trial c ourt deter

mined that the appellant g ave unequivocal consent to sear ch his vehicle and that the conse nt was “unc ontaminated by duress or c oerc ion

. ” T h e t ri al cour t was conc erne d that the appellant wa s not advised of his righ t t o re fu s e consent to sea rch; howe ver, our

courts have not require d an off

icer to inform a per son of his or her rig ht to refuse bef

o re consent will be dee med valid. State v. Cox , 171 S.W .3d 174, 183-84 (Te nn. 2005).

On appe al, the appe llant contends that it is difficult to decipher from the video w hat the appellant’ s response was to T rooper Hoppe’ s inquiry of “you mind me taking a quick look? ” The appellant a sserts that at the suppre ssion hearing , the trial cour t found that t h e ap pellant re plied,

“ Ye s. ” Th e a

pp e lla nt ar g ue s tha t, in lig ht of Tr oo pe r Ho pp e ’s qu e sti on , “th e re sp on se of ‘y e s’ wo uld be a r efusa l to consent to a sea rch of any thing – ‘ Yes, I

mind if y ou take a

quick look.’”

At the conc lusion of the suppression hea ring , the trial cour

t said, “What I hear d on the tape was the of

fice r appr oachinghim, asking him s ev er al questions, and say ing ‘ is it okay

if Ilook around,’ and [the appellant say ing] ‘okay .’ That’ s what I hear d.” L ater , during argument, the fo llo wi ngc oll oq

uy oc c ur e d b e tw e e n th e Sta te a nd the tr ia l c ourt :
[The Sta t e:] . . . [The trooper] say s this is what I ’m looking for, y ou don’t have any

of those [drug s] i n y our ca r. He’ s educating the [appell an t ] t o what he’ s looking for , and then he say s, “Do y ou mind if I take a

look around in there ? ” No w, wh at Ihear when I listen to the t ape is Ihear the [appellant] say ing, “ Yes, sir, g o ahea d and look.” I f y ou look at the transcr ipt of what the of

fice r testifies to,-9- y our Honor, is ba sically
, “Ye s, g o ahea d, g o look.” All rig ht, that’s what I hear on the tape, that’s what the of fice r testifies to.

[The court:] May

be I ’m dea f, but Ihear d “y es.”

[The State:] Yes.

[The court:] That’s all Ihear d, “y es.”

The trial c ourt’s comment, “ May be I ’m dea f, but I

hear d ‘y es,’” must be considere d in the

c on te xt of

his c omm e nts a nd

ru lin g a s a

wh ole . In o ur

vie w, th e tr ia l c ourt

wa s e xpre ssi ngits op ini on that th e a

pp e lla nt h a d c on se nte d to the se a rc h. Alth ou gh th e ap pe lla nt a sse rt s th a t hi s aff irmative re sponse to the question “y ou mind if I take a quick l ook” meant “y es, I do mind,” the trial court obviously

interpre ted the appe llant’s answe r, i nflec tion, and beha vior as conse nt to searc h. Our re view of the rec ord, incl uding the video of the stop, lea ds us to the same conc lusion. The appellant c ontends that he de nied co n s en t , but his “will was overbor ne” by Trooper Hoppe pr oc e e din g to s e a rc h. I n o ur vie w, the a

pp e lla nt c le a rl y c on se nte d to the se a rc h. L ike the tr ia l c ourt , we be lieve that the a

ppellant responded “okay ” to Trooper Hoppe ’s re quest to sear ch. Althoug h the exact lang uag e used by

the appellant is difficult t o discern, it is clea r from the inflec tion of his voice that he g ave a ssent. M o re o ver, f rom the trooper ’s continued que stioning re g ardingwhether the trooper would find drug s during the sear ch, the appellant was awa re that the trooper w anted to sea rch the ve hic le fo r d

ru g s and he a g re e d to the se a rc h. Se e Cox, 171 S.W. 3d a t 186. Th e re is n oth ingto ind ic a te that th e a

pp e lla nt’ s w ill wa s “ov e rb or

ne ” by Tr oo pe r Ho pp e

. We ca n f ind no e vid e nc e to preponde rate ag ainst the trial cour t’s finding that the appe llant ga ve conse nt to se arc h his vehicle a nd that the conse nt was uncontaminated by coer cion, especially in light of the f act that the c onsent was g iven af ter a lawful stop. State v. Kelly , 948 S.W .2d 757, 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. 2. Scope of Consent

The appel la

n t’ s f in a l c o n c e r

n is “ [w ]h e th e r

th e s c o p e o f

th e [a p p e ll a n t’ s ] a ll e g e d

c o n s e nt extended to the inside of the vehicle and of container s located there in.” I n other words, the a ppellant argues that “the scope of the consent would have been limit ed to merely taking a ‘quic k look,’ and would not have e ncompassed con sent to open any seale d or locke d container s found within the vehicle.”

This court has pr eviously explained:

The scope of a pa

rt y ’s consent is m easur ed by a standa

rd of

“ ‘o bjec tiv e ’” re a so na

ble ne ss - wh a t w ou ld t

he ty pic a l r e a so na

ble person ha ve under stood by

the exchang e betwe en the office r and the

su sp e c t.” Th e un de rs tand ingof a “ ty pic a l r easo na

ble pe rs on ” wi ll g ener ally depend, in turn, upon the object of the sear ch. Thus, . . . wh e n a n o ff ic e r inf or ms a mot or ist that he is s e a rc hin g fo r n a rc oti c s, it is objectively rea sonable for the officer to conclude that a g ener al-10- consent to sea

rch the motorist’s vehicle includes co n s ent to sear ch

c on ta ine rs wi thi n th e ve hic le tha t mi g ht c on ta in d

ru g s.

Sta te v. Mc Cr a ry , 4 5 S. W.3 d 3 6, 44 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ) (q uo tin g F lor ida v. Jime no , 5 00 U. S. 248, 251, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04 (1991))

. When T rooper Hoppe asked for a “quick look” in the

v e h ic le
, it w a s e qu iv a le n t t o a

r e qu e s t f o r a se a r c h o f th e v e h ic le

. Se e U n it e d

St a te s v

. M e le n d e z, 301 F.3d 27, 32 ( 1 Cir. 2 0 0 2 ); Un i t ed S tates v. Crain, 33 F .3d 480, 484 (5 Cir. 1994); United st th States v. Bouc her, 909 F.2d 1170,1174- 75 (8 Cir. 1990); J acobs v. State, 733 So.2d 552, 555 (F la. th Di st. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 9 9 )

. H o w e v e r , i n M c C r a r y , w e c a u t i o n e d t h a ti ti s u n l i k e l y

t h a ta mot or ist consenting to a sea

rch of a vehic le likewise c onsents to breaking o p en a locke d briefc ase or other seale d container

within the vehicle. Mc Crary , 45 S.W .3d 36 at 44.

Th e a pp e lla nt’ s c on se nt to se a rc h a llo we d Tr oo pe r Ho pp e to l e g iti ma te ly e nte r t he ve hic le and beg in a sea

rch. Consent to sear ch a ve hicle nec essar ily encompa sses consent to at lea st touch items, including locke d or sea led pac kag es, conta ined within the vehicle. A s part of the sear ch, Trooper Hoppe picked u p t h e tape d, seale d packa g e conta ining c ocaine . Whil e we ag ree that the appellant’ s consent li kely did not authorize Trooper Hoppe to tear open the heavily -tape d packa g e, we do not believe that mere ly picking up and feeling the out side of t he packag e ex cee ded the sc ope of the a ppellant’s conse nt. See McCra ry , 45 S.W .3d at 44 n.3; see also J imeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S. Ct . at 1804. Reg ardle ss, Trooper Hoppe testified that he was trained in drug inter diction. During the conse nsual sear ch, Trooper Hoppe discovere d the packa g e in the front passe ng er f loorboard of
t h e v eh i cl e. T ro o p er

Ho p p e t es t i fi edt h at , s i mp l y b y fe el i n g t h e pa ck age , t h e co n t en t s o f t h e p ac k age

wer e inher entl y re cognizable as a “bric k” of c ocaine . The trial c ourt implicitl y acc redited the
tr oo pe r’ s te sti mony . T hu s, the tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s g a ve Tr oo pe r Ho pp e pr ob a ble c a us e to be lie ve the ob

je c t ins ide the pa c ka g e wa s c on tr a ba nd , th e re by

g ivi ngthe tr oo pe r p ro ba

ble c a us e to open the pa ckag e and disc over the coca ine within. See State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 524 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ). Ac c or din g ly , th e tr ia l c ourt c orr ect ly den ie d th e a

pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to suppress.

III. Conclusi on

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, w e af firm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGL E, J UDGE