[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13364

____________________

QUINCY A. WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER RADFORD, 

c/o Alexandria Williams 

Office of the General Counsel 

501 S Calhoun Street 

Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 

in his individual capacity, 

CAPT. SCARPATI, 

in his individual capacity, 

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WILKINSON, 

in her individual capacity, 

OFFICER BADCOCK, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13364

Correctional Officer, in his official capacity, 

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SHORT, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-14107-RLR

____________________

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

Quincy Williams, a Florida prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights 

suit against several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Captain Albert Scarpati retaliated against him in various 

ways—including placing him in disciplinary/segregated confinement—because of complaints he made and grievances he filed. He

also alleged that Officer Erick Radford beat him while he was handcuffed, and that Officers Brian Babcock and Cameron Short held 

him down and failed to intervene during the assault. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Captain Scarpati and Officers Radford, Babcock, and Short on all of 

Mr. Williams’ claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams, and with the benefit of oral argument, we 

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vacate the grant of summary judgment except as to one of the alleged instances of retaliation.

I 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo. See Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 

2019). Summary judgment is warranted “when the evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a 

matter of law in favor of the moving party.” Owusu-Ansah v. 

Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We credit the “specific facts” that Mr. Williams testified to, 

including those set out in his verified pleadings and filings. See, 

e.g., Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir.1986). 

A

Mr. Williams contends that when he complained about Captain Scarpati’s behavior, he set off a chain of events that were meant 

to intimidate and silence him. The first relevant incident took place

on Friday, October 27, 2017, when Mr. Williams tried to send out 

legal mail. That day, the running of meals was delayed as it “normally” was, “[a]nd for some reason the [mail official] sa[id] I’m 

done. [I’m] fixing to leave.” D.E. 113-1 at 28. Mr. Williams stated

in his affidavit that the mail official said “that she had waited long 

enough an[d] no one showed up and she was leaving.” D.E. 121-1 

at 19. Mr. Williams was told he would have to wait until Monday 

to send out his mail. See D.E. 113-1 at 28–29. As waiting until the 

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following week would cause him to miss a legal deadline, Mr. Williams asked Captain Scarpati, “[Y]ou can’t get her to come back? 

. . . You’re not going to let her come back so we can get this?” Id.

at 29. 

Captain Scarpati responded: “Hey, she [is] gone. See you 

Monday.” Id. Mr. Williams then tried to complain to the assistant 

warden. Mr. Williams explained that when Captain Scarpati saw 

him “trying to talk to” the assistant warden he “sent an officer and 

told him to put [Mr. Williams] in handcuffs.” Id. at 36. Mr. Williams testified that he was then handcuffed and told by Captain 

Scarpati, “Look, you disrespect[ed] me just then. You know you 

just disrespected me? . . . In my face, you [are] going to try to go 

over my head?” Id. at 37. 

Mr. Williams “was place[d] in [disciplinary/segregated] confinement for several day[s] without a written disciplinary report.”

D.E. 121-1 at 20. Following the incident, Mr. Williams filed a grievance against Captain Scarpati for “retaliation for trying to get [his] 

legal mail out which [he had] a right to do.” D.E. 113-1 at 43. He 

asserted in his verified complaint that no one responded to this 

grievance. See D.E. 1 at 7.1 

1 At times, Mr. Williams refers to “jail” or “confinement” when discussing his 

disciplinary/segregated confinement. During his deposition, Mr. Williams 

testified that “jail” means “segregated confinement.” See D.E. 113-1 at 38. He 

went on to explain that there is “administrative confinement” and “disciplinary confinement.” Id. at 39. For clarity, we will use “disciplinary/segregated 

confinement” throughout this opinion. 

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According to Mr. Williams, Captain Scarpati “continue[d] to 

retaliate[ ] against” him. See D.E. 121-1 at 20. On November 14, 

2017, Captain Scarpati and another official went to Mr. Williams’

cell during inspection. Captain Scarpati made Mr. Williams get off 

his bunk, “got in [his] face,” and “told [Mr. Williams] he would 

write [him] up anytime he feels like it.” D.E. 113-1 at 43–45. See 

also D.E. 121-1 at 20. Captain Scarpati further told Mr. Williams

that he’d “personally” take him to “jail.” D.E. 113-1 at 45. Undeterred, Mr. Williams filed a grievance about this new threat. See

D.E. 1 at 8 (“Again I wrote this incident up under reprisal and 

threats of harm which was denied.”). 

Soon thereafter, in December of 2017, a correctional officer 

came into Mr. Williams’ cell. The officer “grabbed [Mr. Williams’] 

mattress” and “[threw] it out in the hallway.” D.E. 113-1 at 48. She 

also grabbed his “legal material, [his] bag, [and his] canteen bag and 

dumped it out there.” Id. The officer told Mr. Williams to “stop 

writing up [Captain] Scarpati.” D.E. 121-1 at 21. See also D.E. 113-

1 at 49. She told Mr. Williams’ roommate, “Look, I’m fixing to 

search your bunk and stuff because he wants to keep writing up 

[Captain] Scarpati.” D.E. 113-1 at 47. See also D.E. 121-1, Exh. A 

(Declaration of Inmate Tony Harris, explaining that the officer told 

Mr. Williams to “stop writing up Capt. Scarp[ati]”). Mr. Williams 

submitted a grievance about this incident as well. See D.E. 113-1

at 48. 

Later that month, four correctional officers came to Mr. 

Williams’ cell. They placed Mr. Williams and his cellmate in 

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handcuffs and conducted a search of the cell. The officers showed 

Mr. Williams a homemade knife that they said had been found in 

his pillow. See D.E. 113-1 at 56–57. See also D.E. 121-1 at 21. One 

of the officers told Mr. Williams that Captain Scarpati had “told 

them to come down there and tear up [Mr. Williams’] house.”

D.E. 113-1 at 53. Mr. Williams testified that an officer “admitted 

they . . . plant[ed] that knife when [he] didn’t have a knife.” Id. 

Following the search, Mr. Williams was escorted to disciplinary/segregated confinement. While being taken there, the escorting officer said to Mr. Williams “you need to leave [Captain] 

Scarpati alone,” and Mr. Williams got into a “verbal dispute” with 

her. See D.E. 113-1 at 59; D.E. 121-1 at 22. See also Appellees’ Br. 

at 5 (conceding that any threats Mr. Williams made were verbal, 

not physical).2

Because Mr. Williams was “causing a disturbance,” he was 

taken directly to disciplinary/segregated confinement. The normal protocol at the prison appeared to call for an inmate to be 

taken to the medical unit for a “pre-confinement” evaluation 

2 Mr. Williams allegedly told the escorting officer, “You are a fag and want to 

be a man[,] so I am going to hit you like a man[,] bitch.” D.E. 113-6 at 1. He 

also reportedly said, “I have a life sentence, you are fucking with the wrong 

one. You better watch your back.” Id. This resulted in a disciplinary charge

being filed against Mr. Williams, who pled not guilty to the charge. See D.E. 

113-6 at 5. Mr. Williams was found to have threatened the officer, but the 

warden later overturned that finding. See D.E. 1 at 12. 

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before being placed in disciplinary/segregated confinement. See

D.E. 121-1 at 22. See also D.E. 113-1 at 68.3

When Mr. Williams reached the confinement area, several 

officers, including Officers Radford, Babcock and Short, were 

there. See D.E. 113-1 at 70. Officer Radford “grabbed” him from 

the escorting officer. See id. at 70-71. According to Mr. Williams, 

Officer Radford then “rammed [him] into the wall where [Officers] 

Short and Babcock held [him,] when [Officer] Radford hit [him] 

several time[s] with glove[d] fist in the face and head.” D.E. 121-1 

at 22. Here is how Mr. Williams described the assault at his deposition: 

[Officer Radford] just grabbed me from [the escort officer] and sa[id] “Oh, you being disorderly,” and when 

he grabbed me, I’m already handcuffed in hand restraints behind my back. He grabbed me and grabbed 

me by the neck. . . . And bent me over and ran me 

into the wall. And [Officers] Short and Babcock came 

3 Captain Scarpati and Officers Babcock, Short, and Radford asserted that Mr. 

Williams was taken for a pre-confinement medical examination but was uncooperative and refused a medical exam. See D.E. 114 at 4. They provided a 

“Refusal of Health Care Services” form as evidence of Mr. Williams’ refusal. 

See D.E. 114-11. The form, dated December 23, 2017, provides a space for the 

inmate to sign, certifying that he is refusing certain services—here, the preconfinement evaluation—but Mr. Williams did not sign and the signature line 

states “refused to sign.” Id. Meanwhile, a “Report of Administrative Confinement,” also dated December 23, 2017, indicates that on that date, Mr. Williams 

“was escorted to medical and was seen by medical staff for pre-confinement 

physical.” D.E. 113-10.

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over there and held me, assisted him and he got off 

like six or seven good hits in my face, head, everywhere. . . [H]e just swung on me, just punching me 

. . . and I got my head down trying to avoid [him] 

hitting me in the face, but he busted my lip and hit 

me in the head. [He] [c]hoked me, hit me around the 

head and held me. 

D.E. 113-1 at 71–72. 

Mr. Williams sustained injuries from the beating, including 

“knots on [his] head,” a swollen jaw, and a busted lip. See id. at 73. 

Mr. Williams told Captain Scarpati that he needed medical assistance but Captain Scarpati “refused to let [him] get medical help.”

See id. at 74–75. See also D.E. 121-1, Exh. B (Declaration of Inmate 

Kunta Kinte Porter: “Officer Radford punched inmate Quincy Williams in the mouth busting his bottom lip as he requested medical 

attention by Captain Scarpati which he refused inmate Williams 

medical attention and threaten[ed] him with chemical agents if he 

didn’t stop requesting medical attention.”). At some point—“[10] 

days, a week, 10, 15 days later”—Mr. Williams saw medical personnel. See D.E. 113-1 at 75. He “[s]till had a scar on [his] face, still 

had bruises . . . [his] jaw was still hurting, [he] had migraine headaches,” and he had two “loose teeth.” Id. 

At a later disciplinary hearing, Mr. Williams was found to 

have possessed a weapon—the knife found in his cell—despite his 

claim that the officers had planted the knife at the direction of Captain Scarpati. He was also found to have made threats to his 

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escorting officer while he was being moved from general population into disciplinary/segregated confinement. The finding regarding the threats, however, was subsequently overturned by the warden. See D.E. 1 at 12.

B 

In 2018, Mr. Williams filed a § 1983 civil rights suit against 

Captain Scarpati for retaliation, Officer Radford for excessive force, 

and Officers Babcock and Short for failure to intervene. The defendants moved for summary judgment and Mr. Williams filed a 

response in opposition to that motion. The magistrate judge issued 

a report recommending that the defendants’ motion be granted as 

to these claims.

In evaluating the retaliation claim, the magistrate judge focused exclusively on the alleged planting of the knife in Mr. Williams’ pillow and did not consider the evidence that Mr. Williams’

complaints and grievances caused Captain Scarpati to place him in 

disciplinary/segregated confinement and to order a search of his 

cell. The magistrate judge concluded that because Mr. Williams 

conceded that he was found guilty of possession of a weapon in a 

formal disciplinary proceeding—and thus provided due process—

and because there was some evidence supporting that infraction, 

our decision in O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d. 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 

2011), foreclosed his ability to raise a retaliation claim. See D.E. 

128 at 14–18. 

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The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report as 

to Mr. Williams’ retaliation claims concerning his placement in disciplinary/segregated confinement and the search of his cell. See

D.E. 133 at 1. The district court concluded that Captain Scarpati 

presented evidence that Mr. Williams was placed in disciplinary/segregated confinement because he “violated protocol” in 

the manner he submitted his complaint about the mail, and said 

that Mr. Williams cited “no evidence” to suggest he was placed in 

such confinement because of his constitutionally protected speech. 

See id. at 2. The district court credited Captain Scarpati’s declaration that the search of Mr. Williams’ cell was random, and discounted Mr. Williams’ statement in his deposition that one of the 

officers told him that Captain Scarpati had ordered the search. See 

id. The district court thus concluded that Mr. Williams had “not 

pointed to evidence to indicate the existence of a causal connection 

between his exercise of his First Amendment rights and any action 

taken by [Captain] Scarpati.” Id. at 2–3. 

With regard to the excessive force claim, the magistrate 

judge noted that Officers Radford, Babcock, and Short denied that 

the alleged beating ever occurred. Thus, Mr. Williams’ “version of 

events” had to be credited. See D.E. 133 at 8. Nevertheless, the 

magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Williams admitted that he had 

been “disorderly.” And the disciplinary report about the threats 

made to the escorting officer cut against Mr. Williams’ argument 

that the force was applied “maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 14 (citation omitted). Because the 

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existence of an excessive force violation is a prerequisite for a failure to intervene claim, the magistrate judge further concluded that 

the claims against Officers Babcock and Short necessarily failed. 

See id.

The district court did not separately address the excessive 

force or the failure to intervene claims in its order. It adopted the 

magistrate judge’s report on these claims.

II 

We begin with Mr. Williams’ retaliation claims against Captain Scarpati. Mr. Williams asserted three separate instances in 

which he was punished for complaining about Captain Scarpati. 

First, he was placed in disciplinary/segregated confinement for 

“disrespecting” Captain Scarpati by “try[ing] to go over [his] head” 

when talking to the assistant warden about his issue with legal mail. 

Second, his cell was searched and “trashed” on Captain Scarpati’s 

orders and he was warned to “stop writing [Captain] Scarpati up.” 

Third, officers planted a knife in his pillow so that he would once 

again be subject to disciplinary/segregated confinement. We conclude that only the third of these instances of retaliation was 

properly resolved by summary judgment and that the first two 

should proceed to trial. When the facts are viewed in Mr. Williams’ 

favor, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

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verdict” in his favor on those two retaliation claims. See Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).4

To establish a retaliation claim, a prisoner must demonstrate 

“that the prison official’s actions were the result of his having filed 

a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Williams can prevail on a 

retaliation claim if “(1) his speech was constitutionally protected; 

(2) [he] suffered adverse action such that the administrator’s allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary 

firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected 

speech.” Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008).

A

When an inmate “complains to the prison’s administrators 

about the conditions of his confinement,” he is exercising his First 

Amendment right of freedom of speech. See id. Mr. Williams testified that he complained to the assistant warden about the mail,

and that he filed grievances against Captain Scarpati based on the 

disciplinary/segregated confinement he received and the search 

and trashing of his cell. See, e.g., D.E. 113-1 at 43 (“I wrote that up 

4 In the district court, Captain Scarpati did not make any substantive arguments about qualified immunity on the retaliation claims, see D.E. 113 at 7, 

and he does not assert qualified immunity on appeal. We therefore do not 

address qualified immunity as to him. 

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that [Captain Scarpati] locked me up in retaliation for trying to get 

my legal mail out”). 

Mr. Williams also described the “adverse actions” taken 

against him—e.g., the disciplinary/segregated confinement and 

the search and trashing of his cell—that would deter any ordinary

inmate from making subsequent complaints. See, e.g., id. at 45

(“[Captain] Scarpati told me he would write me up anytime he feels 

like it. He [said] if I . . . write him up, he will write me up anytime 

he feel[s] like it . . . . He told me I’ll take you to jail and I’ll take you 

personally[.]”). We have already held that the search of an inmate’s 

cell and the destruction of his possessions and materials can support a First Amendment retaliation claim. See Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986). And we now agree with 

our sister circuits that placing an inmate in disciplinary/segregated

confinement constitutes an adverse action for purposes of a First 

Amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., Burns v. Martuscello, 890 

F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Burns has provided evidence that he 

was subjected to a pretextual [involuntary protective custody]

hearing, and placed on this restricted status for over six months.

Such an injury more than suffices to show an adverse action.”); 

Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e believe 

that several months in disciplinary confinement would deter a reasonably firm prisoner from exercising his First Amendment 

rights.”); Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Certainly, placing an inmate in administrative segregation could deter 

a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment 

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rights.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Herron v. 

Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2000) (placement in administrative segregation is an adverse action which could dissuade a person of reasonable firmness from exercising his First Amendment 

rights); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(placement in administrative segregation constitutes an adverse action for a retaliation claim). 

The next question is whether Mr. Williams has presented

sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to a causal relationship between his complaints about Captain Scarpati and his subsequent placement in disciplinary/segregated confinement, the 

search and trashing of his cell, and the planting of a weapon in his 

pillow. We think that he has done so with respect to the first two 

alleged instances of retaliation. 

In determining whether Mr. Williams has established a 

causal connection between his complaints and grievances and the 

adverse actions he suffered, “we ask[ ] whether [Captain Scarpati]

w[as] subjectively motivated to discipline [Mr. Williams] because 

[he] complained of some of the conditions of his confinement.” 

Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278. This motive analysis is subject to a burdenshifting framework. See id. (noting “that most courts resolve this 

subjective motivation issue under” the burden-shifting framework 

established in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 

429 U.S. 274 (1977), which concerned employment retaliation). 

First, Mr. Williams must show that his constitutionally-protected 

speech was a “motivating factor” in Captain Scarpati’s decisions to 

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carry out the adverse actions. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. If 

Mr. Williams satisfies that burden, then Captain Scarpati must 

show that he would have implemented those adverse actions irrespective of Mr. Williams’ complaints. See id. See also ThaddeusX v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying the Mt. 

Healthy burden-shifting framework to the prison context: “Once 

the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected 

conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm, the burden of 

production shifts to the defendant. If the defendant can show that 

he would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.”) 

(citation omitted). 

The first instance of alleged retaliation involved Captain 

Scarpati placing Mr. Williams in disciplinary/segregated confinement. The district court credited Captain Scarpati’s explanation 

that Mr. Williams “was placed in segregated confinement because 

he violated protocol the way that he had made his complaint about 

the mail, acted in a disorderly manner, and disrespected a correctional officer.” D.E. 133 at 2. See also D.E. 114-3 at 2 (Declaration 

of Captain (now Major) Scarpati: “Inmate Williams was placed in 

administrative confinement for disobeying orders.”). The district 

court went on to say that Mr. Williams did not cite to any evidence 

“to indicate that he was placed in segregated confinement for exercising his First Amendment rights.” D.E. 133 at 2. But, as set out 

below, that was incorrect. 

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Mr. Williams testified that he was handcuffed and sent to 

disciplinary/segregated confinement because Captain Scarpati saw 

him “trying to talk” to the assistant warden about his legal mail and 

trying to “go over [Captain Scarpati’s] head.” D.E. 113-1 at 36–37.

In his deposition, Mr. Williams explained that Captain Scarpati told 

him he was being disorderly (not that he was in fact disorderly) as 

pretext—“the quickest catchall”—for placing any inmate in disciplinary confinement. See id. at 36. In fact, Mr. Williams testified 

that he was sent to disciplinary/segregated confinement after Captain Scarpati saw him trying to speak to the assistant warden directly about the mail issue. See id. In addition, Mr. Williams 

averred that Captain Scarpati told him a month later that he did not 

care about the grievances and warned him that he could lock him 

up anytime because it was his prison. See D.E. 1 at 8. Captain 

Scarpati also said to Mr. Williams that when he filed a grievance 

against him, it “comes back to him.” Id. 

The district court seemed to take Captain Scarpati at his 

word and ignored Mr. Williams’ testimony (and the reasonable inferences which could be drawn from it). Viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to Mr. Williams—as we must on summary 

judgment—we think that a reasonable jury could find that Captain 

Scarpati was motivated by (and wanted to deter) Mr. Williams’ 

complaints against him. This first retaliation claim therefore survives summary judgment on the “motivating factor” issue. 

We come to the same conclusion with respect to the second 

retaliation claim, the one concerning the search and trashing of Mr. 

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Williams’ cell. Again, the district court seemed to credit Captain 

Scarpati’s statements and discount Mr. Williams’ version of events. 

The district court said that Mr. Williams “cite[d] to no evidence to 

indicate that the search of his cell was not random and was at [Captain] Scarpati’s request.” D.E. 133 at 2. But Mr. Williams provided 

enough evidence to support a jury finding that Captain Scarpati ordered the search and trashing of the cell because of the former’s

complaints. 

Some time after Mr. Williams submitted a grievance regarding the incident with the legal mail, Captain Scarpati went to Mr. 

Williams’ cell, “told [him] he d[id] not care about [his] grievances,”

and warned that he would “lock [Mr. Williams] up anytime he fel[t] 

like” it. See D.E. 1 at 8. Indeed, he said that “he w[ould] personally 

take [Mr. Williams] to confinement.” Id. Captain Scarpati also told 

Mr. Williams that “when you write him up it comes back to him.” 

Id. When Mr. Williams submitted another grievance regarding 

this threat, an officer came to his cell, “trashed [his] stuff,” and 

warned him to “stop writing [Captain] Scarpati up.” See D.E. 113-

1 at 47–49. Mr. Williams submitted a grievance about this second 

threat, and soon thereafter officers executed a search of his cell (and 

allegedly planted a knife) on Captain Scarpati’s orders. See id. at 

49, 52–53 (“[A]nd when I was escorted, she told me that [Captain] 

Scarpati had told them to come down there and tear up my house. 

She admitted they had them to plant that knife when I didn’t have 

a knife.”). Mr. Williams’ testimony directly contradicts Captain 

Scarpati’s assertion that the initial search was “random.” The

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evidence—when viewed in Mr. Williams’ favor—shows a causal 

connection between the submission of complaints and grievances 

and the initial search and trashing of the cell. Summary judgment 

was therefore not warranted with respect to the alleged retaliatory 

search and trashing of Mr. Williams’ cell.5 

B 

We end with the third and final instance of alleged retaliation—the purported planting of the knife in Mr. Williams’ pillow—

which we think the district court (and the magistrate judge) got 

right. There is certainly evidence (as with the two previous instances) to support a finding that Mr. Williams satisfied each of the 

elements necessary to establish a retaliation claim. But there is one 

important difference: Mr. Williams was charged with unlawful 

possession of the knife, received a disciplinary hearing on that 

charge, and was found to have possessed the knife. Under our precedent, if an inmate is “found guilty of an actual disciplinary infraction after being afforded due process,” and “there was evidence to 

support the disciplinary panel’s fact finding,” he cannot assert a retaliation claim. See O’Bryant, 637 F.3d. at 1215. 

Mr. Williams admits that he received a disciplinary hearing. 

See D.E. 113-1 at 76. Pursuant to the prison’s policy (and assuming 

it was followed because Mr. Williams does not allege that it was 

5 In his summary judgment motion, Captain Scarpati did not make any argument about the second step of the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework. 

We therefore do not address this issue.

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not), Mr. Williams was “advised of the charge[ ] against” him, was 

able to “request staff assistance” to prepare his case, and had the 

right to present witnesses through written statements to support 

his innocence. See, e.g., D.E. 113-5 at 2 (disciplinary report for possession of weapon charge). He also had “the opportunity to make 

a statement in writing regarding the charge and provide information relating to the investigation.” Id. According to his own 

testimony, Mr. Williams did in fact call witnesses at his hearing. 

See D.E. 113-1 at 76. He also provided a witness statement denouncing the legitimacy of the search and characterizing it as retaliation for his grievances. See D.E. 113-12. But Mr. Williams’ evidence did not persuade the prison officials at the hearing because,

after considering “all statements, documents, and evidence” before 

them, they found that he had indeed possessed the knife. See D.E. 

113-5 at 4.

Mr. Williams maintains on appeal that the knife was planted 

in his cell, but he does not deny that he was afforded a hearing or 

that the prison officials based their findings on evidence. O’Bryant 

therefore controls, and Mr. Williams cannot pursue his retaliation 

claim concerning the planting of the knife. The district court 

properly granted summary judgment in favor of Captain Scarpati

on this third retaliation claim. 

III 

We next address Mr. Williams’ Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Officer Radford. The ultimate question is 

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 

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restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quotation and citation 

omitted). 

A 

The magistrate judge explained that the case presented a debate about the reasonableness of the force used. See D.E. 128 at 

12–13. Because Mr. Williams had been “disorderly” and made 

threats against the escorting officer, he could not show that Officer 

Radford applied force maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of 

causing harm. See id. at 14. As noted earlier, the district court 

adopted the magistrate judge’s report on the excessive force claim 

but did not separately address it.

We disagree with the magistrate judge and the district court. 

At summary judgment, the inquiry is not whether the force used 

was definitively malicious or sadistic, but whether “the evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a 

reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley 

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986)). Under that standard, and given 

the evidence in the record, summary judgment was inappropriate. 

Mr. Williams provided specific testimony about the incident 

from his first-hand experience of the encounter. He testified that 

while he was handcuffed, and being held by Officers Babcock and 

Short, Officer Radford grabbed him by the neck, slammed him into 

a wall, hit him six or seven times in the face, “punch[ed]” him, 

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“choked” him, “busted [his] lip,” and struck him in the head. See 

D.E. 113-1 at 71–72. See also D.E. 121-1, Exh. B (Declaration of 

Inmate Kunta Kinte Porter: “I observed Officer Radford punch inmate Quincy Williams in his mouth while being held by Officer 

Babcock . . . on December 23, 2017.”). His injuries were significant 

enough—a busted lip, knots in his head, a swollen jaw, a crook in 

his neck, loose teeth, and bruises—to warrant medical treatment, 

which he sought the day after the alleged attack. See D.E. 131-1 at 

73–78, 89. See also D.E. 113-16 (inmate sick-call request dated December 24, 2017). The pain from the beating persisted, and Mr. 

Williams said that he continued to suffer from headaches and that 

his prior back problems were aggravated after the incident. See 

D.E. 113-1 at 78.6

In evaluating an excessive force claim, we adhere to two 

equally important principles. The first is that unreasonable or unnecessary force does not necessarily constitute excessive force for 

purposes of the Eighth Amendment. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 

The second is that even though “the Constitution does not require 

comfortable prisons, it does not permit inhumane ones.” Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1362. The Eighth Amendment excessive force 

6We acknowledge that Officer Radford denied ever hitting or striking Mr. Williams. See D.E. 113-14 at 1. And the nurse who saw Mr. Williams stated in 

her medical report that there was “no indication for treatment” and that he 

had asked her to falsify her report to reflect that he sustained certain injuries. 

See D.E. 113-17. But given that we are required to view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Mr. Williams at summary judgment, we credit his version of events, understanding that the actual facts may be different. 

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standard reflects these two principles. Force that is “applied in a 

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” is acceptable,

while force that is inflicted “maliciously and sadistically to cause 

harm” is prohibited. See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. To determine 

where force falls along this spectrum we look to five factors: “(1) 

the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the 

relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) 

any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response; and 

(5) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of facts 

known to them.” Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1375 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

The record indicates that Mr. Williams got into a “verbal 

dispute” with the escorting officer, “raising his voice,” getting 

“loud with her,” and making some threats. See D.E. 121 at 2; D.E. 

113-1 at 58. But a prisoner initiating a verbal altercation does not 

give prison guards carte blanche to use force sadistically and maliciously. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. 

Williams under the Campbell factors, Officer Radford was not entitled to summary judgment.7

7 The magistrate judge seemed to believe that Mr. Williams admitted he was 

being “disorderly” while he was being escorted from his cell. But Mr. Williams 

testified only that the officers characterized him as disorderly, not that he in 

fact was disorderly. See D.E. 113-1 at 70 (“[Officer] Swain called it [in] and said 

we got an inmate that’s being disorderly and we [are] sending him straight to 

confinement.”). See also id. at 71 (“And when [Officer Radford] grabbed me 

he sa[id], ‘Oh, you being disorderly.’”). Moreover, Mr. Williams pled not 

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The first Campbell factor is the extent of the injury. As 

noted, Mr. Williams suffered injuries—a busted lip, knots in his 

head, a swollen jaw, a crook in his neck, loose teeth, and bruises—

which warranted medical treatment. Those injuries weigh in his 

favor under Campbell at summary judgment. As the Supreme 

Court has explained, “[a]n inmate who is gratuitously beaten by 

guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim 

merely because he has the good fortune to escape serious injury.” 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38. 

The second Campbell factor—the need for application of 

force—weighs in favor of Officer Radford. Mr. Williams engaged 

in a verbal altercation with, and made threats to, the escorting officer. Our cases recognize that prison officials “may use force when 

necessary to restore order and need not wait until disturbances 

reach dangerous proportions before responding.” Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990). 

The remaining Campbell factors consider the relationship 

between the need for use of force and the amount of force used, 

the efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response, and 

the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates reasonably 

perceived by the responsible prison officials. Viewing the record in 

guilty to the charge that he had threatened the escorting officer, and the finding on that charge was later overturned. See D.E. 1 at 12. For purposes of our 

analysis, we assume without deciding that the magistrate judge’s understanding was correct.

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the light most favorable to Mr. Williams, these factors weigh in his 

favor at summary judgment. 

Mr. Williams was no longer in his cell (where the knife was 

found) and he was not armed. And he was handcuffed and being 

held by Officers Babcock and Short when Officer Radford used 

force. Although Mr. Williams was being disorderly, the altercation 

between him and the escorting officer was verbal and not physical. 

Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Williams physically resisted being handcuffed and transported to disciplinary/segregated confinement before force was used against 

him. A reasonable jury could find, if it views the evidence and inferences in Mr. Williams’ favor, that the threat to the safety of 

prison staff and other inmates—as perceived by those on the 

ground—was low. 

Officer Radford did not make any efforts to temper a forceful response. He slammed Mr. Williams into a wall and repeatedly 

hit him while he was being restrained, causing him a number of 

injuries that required medical attention. We note in this respect 

that Officers Radford, Babcock, and Short do not assert that a certain level of force was, in their view, necessary under the circumstances, as they deny using any force against Mr. Williams. See 

Perry, 786 F.2d at 1095 (reversing summary judgment in favor of 

officers on inmate’s excessive force claim in part because the “officers d[id] not state that unusual force by them was justified by [the 

inmate] resisting or himself using force,” and instead “sa[id] that 

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they took him one by each arm and led him or escorted him into 

the [barber] shop”).

On this record a reasonable jury could find that the amount 

of force used against Mr. Williams violated the Eighth Amendment. If Mr. Williams’ version of events is believed, the evidence 

supports “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of 

pain”—Officer Radford repeatedly struck a handcuffed, restrained, 

and unarmed prisoner several times because he “rais[ed] his voice.” 

Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1375.

B 

Officer Radford relies in part on Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1530–

31, where we rejected an inmate’s § 1983 claim of excessive force 

and upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the correctional officers who had been sued. At the end of the day, Bennett 

does not help Officer Radford. We explain why below.

According to Mr. Bennett, when he asked a prison guard 

why he couldn’t use the gymnasium, the guard “grabbed him by 

the throat” and yelled racial slurs at him. After Mr. Bennett “struggle[d]” to break free from the guard’s grasp, another guard pushed 

him against the cell bars. Then the first guard (Officer Jackson) hit 

him with a nightstick. As a result, he suffered considerable and 

long-lasting pain. See id. at 1530–31, 1533. 

We concluded that Mr. Bennett had not shown a constitutional violation. See id. at 1533. First, although other inmates had 

submitted affidavits saying that two officers grabbed Mr. Bennett 

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by the throat and pushed him against the bars, “no other evidence 

support[ed] his claim that Officer Jackson struck him with a 

nightstick.” Id. Second, an inmate had to show “some evidence of 

injury beyond a minimal one,” and the medical records “contain[ed] no report of head injuries or treatment for pain following 

the incident, even though [Mr. Bennett] had daily opportunities to 

seek medical assistance.” Id. at 1533. 

To the extent that Bennett suggests (or can be read to hold) 

that an inmate’s first-hand account of excessive force needs corroboration to survive summary judgment, it is no longer good law in 

this circuit. Sitting en banc, we held several years ago that an affidavit which satisfies Rule 56 and is based on personal knowledge 

“may create an issue of material fact and preclude summary judgment even if it is self-serving and uncorroborated.” United States 

v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 854 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc). The same 

principle, of course, applies to a witness’ first-hand account provided at a deposition. See, e.g., Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1, 9 

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that homeowner’s uncorroborated deposition testimony created an issue of fact as to the circumstances surrounding the shooting of the family’s dog: “Corroboration goes to 

credibility, a question for the jury, not the court.”).8 

8 As noted earlier, Mr. Williams’ testimony about the alleged assault by Officer 

Radford was corroborated in part by the declaration submitted by Mr. Kinte 

Porter, another inmate. See D.E. 121-1, Exh. B. 

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In addition, after Bennett was decided, the Supreme Court 

held that a prisoner “who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not 

lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim [under the Eighth 

Amendment] merely because he has the good fortune to escape

without serious injury.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38–39 (explaining that 

the Eighth Amendment focuses on the “nature of the force” used). 

Insofar as Bennett implied that serious or permanent injuries are 

required, any such implication has been abrogated by Wilkins.

IV 

Finally, we consider Mr. Williams’ failure-to-intervene claim 

against Officers Babcock and Short. We conclude that the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim must also be vacated.

“[A]n officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take 

reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” Velazquez v. 

City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To survive summary judgment, Mr. Williams had to present sufficient evidence to permit a 

reasonable jury to find that Officers Babcock and Short were (1) in 

a position to intervene in an ongoing constitutional violation and 

(2) failed to do so. See Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 

919, 924 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n officer can be liable for failing to 

intervene when another officer uses excessive force.”). 

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Of course, a failure-to-intervene claim requires an underlying constitutional violation. “[A]n officer cannot be held liable for 

failing to stop or intervene when there was no constitutional violation being committed.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1312 

(11th Cir. 2019). The magistrate judge and the district court 

granted judgment in favor of Officers Babcock and Short based on 

their determination that Mr. Williams had not shown any Eighth 

Amendment violation. See, e.g., D.E. 128 at 14 (“[E]ssential to any 

failure to intervene claim lies a central assumption: excessive force 

was applied.”). Because the magistrate judge and the district court 

concluded that Officer Radford did not use excessive force, Officers 

Babcock and Short did not have any obligation to intervene. 

As we have explained, however, genuine issues of material 

fact exist as to whether Officer Radford used excessive force against 

Mr. Williams. We therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officers Babcock and Short on the failure-to-intervene claim and remand for reconsideration of that claim. We express no view on its proper resolution. 

V 

We vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

in favor of Captain Scarpati and Officers Radford, Babcock, and 

Short, with the exception of the retaliation claim against Captain 

Scarpati relating to the allegedly-planted knife. As to that claim, 

we affirm because Mr. Williams was found to have possessed that 

knife following a disciplinary hearing. On remand the district court 

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can consider any summary judgment issues that remain outstanding, including those related to qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 

 

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