### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 13

‐ 3193

L ABORERS L OCAL 236, AFL

‐ CIO, et al.

, Plaintiffs

‐ Appellants

,

v.

S COTT W ALKER

, Governor of Wisconsin, et al.

, Defendants

‐ Appellees

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 11

‐ cv

‐ 462

‐ wmc

— William M. Conley

, Chief Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED F EBRUARY 24, 2014

— D ECIDED A PRIL 18, 2014

____________________

Before F LAUM and R OVNER

, Circuit Judges

, and K ENDALL

,

District Judge

. 

F LAUM

, Circuit Judge

. This case raises more challenges to

the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s Act 10, which we last

addressed in Wisconsin Education Association Council v. Walk

‐

er

, 705 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013) (“ WEAC ”). Act 10 made sig

‐

 Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.2 No. 13

‐ 3193

nificant changes to Wisconsin public

‐ sector labor law: it

prohibited government employers from collectively bargain

‐ ing with their general employees over anything except base

wages, made it more challenging for general

‐ employee un

‐

ions to obtain certification as exclusive bargaining agents,

and precluded general

‐ employee unions from using auto

‐

matic payroll deductions and fair

‐ share agreements. The

plaintiffs, two public

‐ employee unions and an individual

union member, argue that these changes infringe their First

Amendment petition and association rights. They also argue

that Act 10 denies union members the equal protection of the

laws.

The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional

theories and granted judgment in Wisconsin’s favor. We af

‐

firm.

I. Background

Prior to 2011, Wisconsin granted broad protections and

privileges to public

‐ sector unions. Under the State Employ

‐

ment Labor Relations Act and the Municipal Employment

Relations Act, state and municipal employers were obligated

to bargain in good faith with employee representatives over

a wide range of subjects, including wages and conditions of

employment. Unions could petition the Wisconsin Employ

‐

ment Relations Commission for an election to certify the un

‐

ion as the employees’ exclusive bargaining agent; certifica

‐

tion required only a simple majority of those voting, and the

union remained certified until thirty percent of the employ

‐

ees in the bargaining unit petitioned for a decertification

election. Unions were also permitted to negotiate “fair

‐

share” agreements requiring nonunion employees to pay a

portion of the costs associated with the collective

‐ bargainingNo. 13

‐ 3193 3

process. In addition, unions could utilize the state and mu

‐ nicipal payroll systems to automatically collect membership

dues.

Much of that changed when the Wisconsin legislature

passed the “budget repair bill” known as Act 10. See Wis.

Act 10, 2011–12 Leg., Jan. 2011 Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011). The

Act divided Wisconsin state and municipal employees into

two categories: “public safety employees,” which includes

police officers, firefighters, deputy sheriffs, county traffic po

‐

lice officers, state troopers, and state motor vehicle inspec

‐

tors; and “general employees,” i.e., everyone else. See Act 10

§§ 214, 216, 268, 272. 1 Public safety employees, and their un

‐

ions, continue to enjoy the protections and privileges of Wis

‐

consin’s preexisting scheme.

General employees, on the other hand, became subject to

Act 10’s various restrictions. To begin with, the Act reduced

state and municipal employers’ collective

‐ bargaining obliga

‐

tions with respect to these employees. Public employers are

still required to collectively bargain with their general em

‐ ployees over base

‐ wage increases (though such increases

cannot exceed a change in the Consumer Price Index). After

Act 10, however, state and local employers are no longer re

‐ quired to bargain over anything else. See Act 10 §§ 210, 245,

262, 314. And in addition to limiting the scope of obligatory

bargaining, Act 10 separately prohibited municipal employ

‐

1 Shortly after Act 10’s enactment, the Wisconsin legislature passed Act

32, which reinstated the collective

‐ bargaining rights of certain municipal

transit employees. See Wis. Act 32, 2011–12 Leg., 2011–12 Sess. (Wis.

2011). However, this modification does not affect the analysis in the pre

‐

sent case.4 No. 13

‐ 3193

ers from collectively bargaining with their general employ

‐

ees about non

‐ wage issues. Act 10 § 169.

Further, Act 10 mandated that general

‐ employee unions

submit to a recertification election every year (instead of al

‐ lowing unions to remain certified indefinitely). Certification

now requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of

all employees in the bargaining unit, not just those voting.

Act 10 §§ 242, 289. Act 10 also barred state and municipal

employers from deducting union dues from their general

employees’ earnings. Act 10 §§ 227, 298. Finally, the Act pre

‐

vented unions from imposing fair

‐ share agreements on gen

‐

eral employees. Act 10 §§ 213, 219, 267.

We have already rejected one challenge to Act 10’s con

‐ stitutionality. In WEAC

, we held that Act 10’s prohibition on

payroll deductions did not violate the First Amendment. We

found that the unions’ previous use of the payroll system

was the equivalent of the state subsidizing the unions’

speech; accordingly, we reasoned that Wisconsin was free to

withdraw this subsidy from certain groups so long as it did

so on a viewpoint

‐ neutral basis. WEAC

, 705 F.3d at 645. And

we concluded that Act 10’s distinction between public safety

and general employees was, in fact, viewpoint

‐ neutral. Id. at

648.

The WEAC plaintiffs also raised an equal

‐ protection chal

‐ lenge to Act 10’s limitations on statutory collective bargain

‐ ing, its stricter recertification requirements, and the payroll

‐

deduction prohibition. They argued that Act 10’s distinction

between public safety and general employees—along with

how the law classified particular employees—denied the

general employees equal protection. Id. at 653. However, be

‐

cause Act 10 did not employ a suspect classification, and be

‐No. 13

‐ 3193 5

cause we found that none of the three challenged provisions

implicated a fundamental right, we applied rational

‐ basis

review. Id. The law’s distinction between public safety and

general employees held up under this standard. Id. at 654–

57.

At this litigation’s outset, the plaintiffs—two general

‐ employee unions that represent city of Madison and Dane

County employees, and an individual union member—

raised arguments similar to those asserted in WEAC

. (For

ease of reference, we’ll call all three plaintiffs “the unions.”)

But the unions also pled other First Amendment and Equal

Protection Clause theories unique to this case. Finding that

these arguments failed to state a constitutional violation, the

district court granted Wisconsin’s motion for a judgment on

the pleadings. See Laborers Local 236 v. Walker

, No. 11

‐ cv

‐ 462

‐

wmc, 2013 WL 4875995 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 11, 2013). The un

‐

ions appeal.

II. Discussion

In evaluating the state’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a

court must determine whether “the complaint sets forth facts

sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory.” Scherr v.

Marriott Int’l, Inc.

, 703 F.3d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 2013). On ap

‐ peal, we answer this question de novo. Id.

We begin, however, with statutory interpretation. The

two sides have a fundamental disagreement about Act 10’s

effect upon municipal employees’ collective

‐ bargaining

rights. Because our Article III jurisdiction over most of the

unions’ claims depends on the outcome of this dispute, we

must settle it before proceeding to the merits.6 No. 13

‐ 3193

A. The meaning of Wis. Stat. § 66.0508(1m)

As discussed above, Act 10 altered Wisconsin’s public

‐

sector collective

‐ bargaining law in more than one way. First,

the Act amended the State Employment Labor Relations Act,

Wis. Stat. § 111.81 et seq. (“SELRA”), and the Municipal Em

‐ ployment Relations Act, Wis. Stat. § 111.70 et seq. (“MERA”),

to only require state and municipal employers to collectively

bargain with their general employees over base

‐ wage in

‐

creases. See Act 10 §§ 210, 262. In addition, however, § 169 of

the Act created a new code section, Wis. Stat. § 66.0508, titled

“Collective bargaining.” This new section reads in relevant

part:

(1) In this section, “local governmental unit”

has the meaning given in s. 66.0506(1). [ 2 ]

(1m) Except as provided under subch. IV of ch.

111 [the amended, post–Act 10 MERA], no lo

‐

cal governmental unit may collectively bargain

with its employees.

(2) If a local governmental unit has in effect on

June 29, 2011, an ordinance or resolution that is

inconsistent with sub. (1m), the ordinance or

resolution does not apply and may not be en

‐

forced.

2 Wis. Stat. § 66.0506(1) defines “local governmental unit” as “any city,

village, town, county, metropolitan sewerage district, long

‐ term care dis

‐

trict, transit authority

... local cultural arts district

... or any other politi

‐

cal subdivision of the state, or instrumentality of one or more political

subdivisions of the state.” This definition tracks MERA’s definition of

“municipal employer,” see Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(j), and we follow the

parties’ lead in using the terms interchangeably.No. 13

‐ 3193 7

...

Wis. Stat. § 66.0508.

The unions point to (1m) as the source of their constitu

‐

tional troubles. They argue that this language prohibits mu

‐ nicipal employers from collectively bargaining with their

general employees about anything other than base wages—

even if the employers want to bargain outside of MERA’s

statutory framework. For example, the city of Madison, act

‐ ing as an amicus curiae, tells us that it voluntarily engaged

in collective bargaining with its employees in the 1950s, be

‐

fore Wisconsin established statutory collective bargaining in

1959. Amicus Br. 1. Madison and the unions read

§ 66.0508(1m) to now bar the city from negotiating these

kinds of agreements with its general employees. See id. (“Act

10 actually strips municipalities of the primary tool used for

decades to craft tight budgets and maintain positive rela

‐

tions with their employees.”).

Wisconsin, to the contrary, urges us to read § 66.0508(1m)

more narrowly. The state claims that the provision incorpo

‐

rates the definition of “collective bargaining” set forth in

MERA: “the performance of the mutual obligation of a mu

‐ nicipal employer

... and the representative of its municipal

employees in a collective bargaining unit, to meet and confer

at reasonable times, in good faith, with the intention of

reaching an agreement

... with respect to wages for general

employees.” Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a). Thus, Wisconsin ar

‐

gues:

in the context of Wis. Stat. § 66.0508(1m), “col

‐

lective bargaining” means only the statutorily

‐

created “mutual obligation” of a municipal em

‐8 No. 13

‐ 3193

ployer and a bargaining unit representative to

negotiate a labor agreement.

... In other words,

“collective bargaining” in Wis. Stat.

§ 66.0508(1m) is an act of legislative grace

... . As a result, Wis. Stat. § 66.0508(1m) merely

prohibits statutory collective bargaining for

general municipal employees outside of

MERA.

Appellees’ Br. 14–15.

Wisconsin’s interpretation comes as a surprise to the un

‐

ions—and to us—for it would mean that Madison and other

local governments are still free to sit down at the table with

their general employees and bargain collectively over any

‐ thing they like. But if that is so, then the constitutional

“right” the unions think Act 10 infringes is actually un

‐

touched by the Act. Most of the unions’ constitutional claims

derive from the fact that, in their view, Act 10 precludes

their employers from even voluntarily bargaining with

them. So if Wisconsin’s interpretation is correct, then the un

‐

ions have nothing to complain about—and there would be

no “case or controversy” for us to resolve. See Wis. Envtl.

Decade, Inc. v. State Bar of Wis.

, 747 F.2d 407, 410 (7th Cir.

1984) (“Federal courts established pursuant to Article III of

the Constitution do not render advisory opinions.”).

However, we find the unions’ interpretation of

§ 66.0508(1m) more plausible. Wisconsin contends that the

provision “merely prohibits statutory collective bargaining

for general municipal employees outside of MERA.” Yet

Wisconsin uses the term “statutory collective bargaining” to

refer to the collective

‐ bargaining obligations imposed on

municipal employers under MERA

. Taken literally, Wiscon

‐No. 13

‐ 3193 9

sin is saying that Act 10 prohibits municipal employers from

collectively bargaining under MERA outside of MERA. We

cannot figure out what this command would mean.

Perhaps what Wisconsin means to say is that

§ 66.0508(1m)’s only effect is to obligate municipalities to

collectively bargain with their general employees to the ex

‐

tent set forth in MERA. If that is the case, though, then

§ 66.0508(1m) is entirely redundant. Other provisions of

MERA—as amended—already make explicit the newly lim

‐

ited scope of the municipalities’ statutory obligation. See

Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a) (giving the definition of “collective

bargaining” quoted above); id. § 111.70(4)(mb) (listing “[a]ny

factor or condition of employment except wages” as a “pro

‐

hibited subject[] of bargaining” under MERA with respect to

general employees). And Wisconsin law follows the general

rule of statutory interpretation that “[s]tatutory language is

read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word,

in order to avoid surplusage.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit

Court for Dane Cnty.

, 681 N.W.2d 110, 124 (Wis. 2004).

In the absence of an authoritative interpretation from the

Wisconsin Supreme Court, 3 we must interpret § 66.0508(1m)

as we think the state’s highest court would construe it.

Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d

3 Act 10’s collective

‐ bargaining limitations have been challenged in the

Wisconsin state courts. So far, none of the decisions have addressed

§ 66.0508(1m) specifically. See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker

, No.

11CV3774, 2012 WL 4041495 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2012), certified to the

Wis. Sup. Ct. by No. 2012AP2067, 2013 WL 1760805 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr.

25, 2013), petition to certify granted by 839 N.W.2d 619 (Table) (Wis. 2013);

Wis. Law Enforcement Ass’n v. Walker

, No. 12CV4474 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23,

2013).10 No. 13

‐ 3193

503, 507 (7th Cir. 1998). Wisconsin law requires courts to “fo

‐

cus primarily on the language of the statute,” as Wisconsin

courts “assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in

the statutory language.” State ex rel. Kalal

, 681 N.W.2d at 124.

Therefore, giving effect to § 66.0508(1m)’s plain language,

we interpret the provision to prohibit municipal employers

from reaching binding agreements with their general em

‐ ployees on a collective basis, if the agreement concerns any

‐ thing other than the employees’ base wages.

B. The First Amendment

Having concluded that Act 10 is as sweeping as the

unions believe, we can now address the merits of their

constitutional claims. The unions articulate several theories

attacking Act 10 under the First Amendment. However, they

are imprecise in their framing. As best we can tell, they are

making two distinct claims: first, that the collective

‐ bargaining prohibition just discussed—§ 68.0508(1m)—

violates their members’ rights to petition the government for

redress of grievances, and second, that Act 10’s various

restrictions, in their cumulative effect, violate their

associational rights. Although the district court analyzed the

theories together as a single claim of a violation of the right

“to associate, assemble and express their views in concert,”

Laborers Local 236

, 2013 WL 4875995, at *2, we find it helpful

to address the petition and association arguments

separately.

1. The Petition Clause

We begin our First Amendment analysis by emphasizing

that § 66.0508(1m) does not proscribe any conduct by the un

‐

ions themselves. It does not prohibit the unions from form

‐No. 13

‐ 3193 11

ing. It does not forbid them from meeting. Nor does it pre

‐

vent the unions from advocating on behalf of their members

in any way they see fit.

Instead, the collective

‐ bargaining restriction acts upon

government employers

. The statute tells these employers that

they may not enter into binding agreements with their em

‐ ployees on a collective basis about anything other than base

wages. Thus, as the district court recognized, “[u]nder Act

10, general employees remain free to associate and repre

‐

sented employees and their unions remain free to speak;

municipal employers are simply not allowed to listen.” La

‐

borers Local 236

, 2013 WL 4875995, at *5. We agree with the

district court that under Supreme Court precedent, such a

law is constitutional.

There are two cases on point. The first is Smith v. Arkan

‐

sas State Highway Employees, Local 1315

, 441 U.S. 463 (1979)

(per curiam). In Smith

, the Arkansas State Highway Com

‐

mission refused to recognize employee grievances filed by a

union on behalf of its members. Instead, the Commission on

‐ ly considered grievances filed by the employees themselves.

Id. at 463. The union argued that the Commission’s practice

of “bypassing the union” violated the First Amendment be

‐

cause it denied the unions the ability to effectively represent

their members. Id. at 463–64.

The Supreme Court disagreed. It reasoned that the Con

‐

stitution’s protection of speech and petition “provides no

guarantee that a speech will persuade or that advocacy will

be effective.” Id. at 464–65. Accordingly, the Court held, “the

First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obliga

‐

tion on the government to listen, to respond or, in this con

‐

text, to recognize the association and bargain with it.” Id. at12 No. 13

‐ 3193

465. Smith ’s analysis accorded with precedent from our cir

‐

cuit holding that state entities have no constitutional duty to

engage in collective bargaining. See Hanover Twp. Fed’n of

Teachers Local 1954 v. Hanover Cmty. Sch. Corp., 457 F.2d 456,

461 (7th Cir. 1972); Indianapolis Educ. Ass’n v. Lewallen

, 1969

WL 11147, at *2 (7th Cir. 1969).

The unions acknowledge that Smith prevents them from

claiming an entitlement to a mandated collective

‐ bargaining

procedure—or to any response from the state at all. But the

unions argue that Act 10 goes one step further than the

withdrawal of previously existing labor protections: as dis

‐

cussed above, § 66.0508(1m) precludes state employers from

engaging in collective binding negotiations over anything

but wages. The unions maintain that Wisconsin cannot con

‐ stitutionally deny municipal employers their ability “to

choose whether to listen.” In short, the unions claim a First

Amendment right to ask their public employers to bargain,

knowing that the employers could (but need not) accept

their invitation.

This argument is foreclosed by the second Supreme

Court case on point, Minnesota State Board for Community Col

‐ leges v. Knight

, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). Knight concerned a Min

‐

nesota statutory scheme that divided public employees into

bargaining units and allowed each unit to designate an ex

‐

clusive representative. Id. at 273–74. The state employer was

required to “meet and negotiate” with that representative on

a host of specific matters that the law considered terms and

conditions of employment (a process the Court described as

“mandatory bargaining”). Id. at 274. But the Minnesota law

also granted professional employees the right to “meet and

confer” with their employers about other employment

‐No. 13

‐ 3193 13

related matters (called “nonmandatory subjects”). Id. The

meet

‐ and

‐ confer process, unlike the meet

‐ and

‐ negotiate pro

‐

cess, did not require the employer to negotiate in good faith

to reach an agreement. Id. However, if a particular bargain

‐ ing unit had designated an exclusive representative for the

meet

‐ and

‐ negotiate process, the law, in turn, prohibited the

employer from participating in either process with anyone

other than that representative. Id. at 274–75. This meant that

“[i]f professional employees forming an appropriate bar

‐ gaining unit [had] selected an exclusive representative for

mandatory bargaining, their employer [could] exchange

views on nonmandatory subjects only with the exclusive

representative.” Id. at 273.

In Knight

, faculty instructors who did not wish to join the

union serving as their bargaining representative argued that

Minnesota’s “restriction on participation in the nonmanda

‐

tory

‐ subject exchange process” violated their First Amend

‐

ment rights. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the instructors’

claim. The Court explained, as it had in Smith

, that

“[n]othing in the First Amendment or in this Court’s case

law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associ

‐

ate, and petition require government policymakers to listen

or respond to individuals’ communications on public is

‐

sues.” Id. at 285. And nothing about the plaintiffs’ status as

public employees, the Court continued, gave them a greater

entitlement to a receptive audience—or any audience at all—

with the state. Id. at 286–87. Accordingly, the Court reaf

‐

firmed the principle from Smith

, and held that the instructors

“have no constitutional right to force the government to lis

‐

ten to their views.” Id. at 283, 286–87.14 No. 13

‐ 3193

The fact that the Supreme Court applied Smith ’s holding

to the distinct facts in Knight directs our outcome here. The

unions’ complaint is that Act 10 bars Wisconsin public em

‐ ployers from voluntarily entering into binding negotiations

with a group of employees. But that was the case in Knight as

well. Under the Minnesota statutory scheme, when it came

to the formal meet

‐ and

‐ negotiate and meet

‐ and

‐ confer pro

‐

cesses, state community colleges were prohibited from lis

‐ tening to the faculty instructors individually. Id. at 274–75.

Yet the Court was untroubled, reasoning that “Minnesota

has simply restricted the class of persons to whom it will lis

‐

ten in its making of policy.” Id. at 282.

True, the Knight opinion emphasized that while individ

‐

ual instructors could not utilize the meet

‐ and

‐ negotiate and

meet

‐ and

‐ confer processes, nothing prevented the employer

from listening to the excluded instructors in a less formal

setting. See id. at 276–77 & n.4 (“[T]he prohibition on the em

‐ ployer’s holding ‘meet and confer’ sessions with anyone but

the exclusive representative has been understood to bar only

a certain type of formal exchange, not other exchanges of

views.”). The present situation is no different in this regard.

Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 66.0508(1m), or Act 10 generally, pre

‐

cludes the unions or their members from expressing their

views to their municipal employer or from trying to per

‐

suade the employer to adopt a particular policy. In fact,

since Act 10’s enactment, some local employers and unions

have collaborated informally in order to make changes in the

workplace. See Milwaukee, Wis., Code of Ordinances § 340

‐

3(2)(a) (requiring Milwaukee’s department of employee rela

‐

tions to “[m]eet and confer with employees and employee

groups, including currently and previously

‐ certified em

‐ ployee groups, for the purpose of communicating, solicitingNo. 13

‐ 3193 15

and exchanging information, views, ideas and interests con

‐ cerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employ

‐

ment”); Steven Greenhouse, Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions

, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2014, at BU1 (describing how a teachers’

union in Racine held “nearly 30 meetings—technically not

bargaining sessions—with district officials,” who ultimately

agreed to incorporate terms that had previously been in the

teachers’ contracts into a district handbook on school poli

‐

cies).

The unions, ignoring Knight

, assert that “[t]he ability of

municipal employees to engage in the activity of bargaining

collectively with their employers, in the hope of reaching a

voluntary agreement regarding their wages and other condi

‐

tions of employment, is a fundamental right.” Reply Br. 2.

The unions further aver that both the Supreme Court and

our court have long recognized that the Constitution pro

‐

tects this right, citing language from NLRB v. Jones & Laugh

‐

lin Steel Corp.

, 301 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1937), Amalgamated Utility

Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York

, 309 U.S. 261,

263–64 (1940), Thomas v. Collins

, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945), and

McLaughlin v. Tilendis

, 398 F.2d 288, 288–89 (7th Cir. 1968).

There are three problems with this assertion. First, two of the

cases the unions cite— Jones & Laughlin and Amalgamated

Utility Workers —involved private employers. So the “right”

the Court was referring to in those cases could not have been

constitutional. E.g.

, The Civil Rights Cases

, 109 U.S. 3, 17–18

(1883). Second, the relevant discussion in each case stands

only for the proposition—unquestioned by Wisconsin and

the district court—that individuals have a right (constitu

‐

tional or otherwise) to associate together in a union, to dis

‐

cuss matters pertaining to union membership, to select their

own representatives, and to attempt to use their collective16 No. 13

‐ 3193

weight to advocate for change. None of those cases establish

what the unions assert here: that they have a constitutional

entitlement to an opportunity to collectively bargain with

the state. And we find the unions’ contention that this is a

long

‐ standing fundamental right difficult to square with the

fact that several states have prohibited public

‐ sector collec

‐

tive bargaining over at least some topics. 4

We are also skeptical that this right could be recognized

going forward. Again, the unions say that they are entitled

to an opportunity to engage in voluntary collective bargain

‐ ing with their state employers in the hope of reaching an

agreement. How would that right operate in practice? The

unions contend that a state may not statutorily bar local

government employers from collectively negotiating with

their employees. But what if the employer itself—say, a

school district—adopted a written policy that it would no

longer collectively bargain? 5 What if the district administra

‐

4 See, e.g.

, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95

‐ 98 (declaring any agreement or contract

between a state or local government unit and an employee bargaining

agent to be illegal) (enacted 1959); Va. Code § 40.1

‐ 57.2 (prohibiting any

state or local government unit from collective bargaining with its em

‐ ployees on any subject) (enacted 1993); Ind. Code 20

‐ 29

‐ 6

‐ 4.5 (prohibiting

school employers from collectively bargaining over anything other than

salary, wages, and salary

‐ and wage

‐ related fringe benefits) (enacted

2011). See generally Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bar

‐ gaining Distort Democracy? A Perspective from the United States

, 34 Comp.

Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 277 (2013) (describing these and other state laws and

court decisions prohibiting or limiting public

‐ sector collective bargain

‐ ing).

5 We note that this was the case (analogously) in Smith : the Arkansas

State Highway Commission “adopted” the grievance procedure at issue,

under which “the Highway Commission [would] not consider an em

‐ ployee’s grievance” unless the employee submitted it directly to the Ar

‐No. 13

‐ 3193 17

tor consistently declined to sit down at the negotiating table?

Or simply refused to take the union’s calls? Surely the line

between constitutionality and unconstitutionality is not

drawn according to how open a state decisionmaker is to

what you have to say. Without a principle to delineate the

amount of solicitude the Constitution requires of state offi

‐

cials, the federal courts should steer clear. “Public officials at

all levels of government daily make policy decisions based

only on the advice they decide they need and choose to hear.

To recognize a constitutional right to participate directly in

government policymaking would work a revolution in exist

‐ ing governmental practices.” Knight

, 465 U.S. at 284.

We therefore conclude that Act 10’s prohibition on collec

‐

tive bargaining does not run afoul of the Petition Clause.

2. Right of association

We next address whether Act 10’s provisions, in their

cumulative effect, violate the unions’ associational rights.

The freedom of association is implicit in the First Amend

‐

ment’s protections. E.g.

, NAACP v. Button

, 371 U.S. 415, 430

(1963); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights,

Inc.

, 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006) (“ FAIR ”) (“The reason we have

extended First Amendment protection in this way is clear:

The right to speak is often exercised most effectively by

combining one’s voice with the voices of others.”). The gov

‐

ernment might burden this right in a number of ways: for

instance, by punishing group membership, see Elfbrandt v.

Russell

, 384 U.S. 11, 16–18 (1966), interfering in the group’s

internal affairs, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees

, 468 U.S.

kansas State Highway Department. Ark. State Highway Emps. Local 1315 v.

Smith

, 459 F. Supp. 452, 453–55 (E.D. Ark. 1978), rev’d

, 441 U.S. 463 (1979).18 No. 13

‐ 3193

609, 622–23 (1984), or distorting the group’s message, see Boy

Scouts of America v. Dale

, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).

The unions cannot claim that Act 10 does any of those

things. As we said before, nothing in Act 10 prohibits unions

from forming, meeting, or organizing. To the contrary, Wis

‐

consin affirmatively protects these activities. See Wis. Stat.

§ 111.70(2) (“Municipal employees have the right of self

‐ organization, and the right to form, join, or assist labor or

‐ ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives

of their own choosing, and to engage in lawful, concerted

activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other

mutual aid or protection.”). None of Act 10’s provisions dis

‐ advantage employees who choose to join a union. Act 10

does not tell unions how to conduct their internal affairs.

And as we emphasized in WEAC

, “Act 10 places no limita

‐

tions on the speech of general employee unions, which may

continue speaking on any topic or subject.” 705 F.3d at 646.

Instead, the unions complain that Act 10’s various re

‐

strictions and obstacles make it more difficult for them to

accomplish what they were formed to do: represent their

members’ interests through the collective

‐ bargaining pro

‐

cess. The unions argue that public employees will find the

prospect of joining far less appealing now that general

‐ employee unions can only negotiate agreements about their

base wages (and even then, only to the extent of a cost

‐ of

‐ living increase). In the unions’ view, this diminished sup

‐ port—exacerbated by Act 10’s stringent recertification re

‐ quirements, its prohibition on automatic payroll deductions,

and its prohibition on fair

‐ share agreements—will necessari

‐ ly “undermine the ability of the labor organization to con

‐

tinue to function.” Appellants’ Br. 21.No. 13

‐ 3193 19

But the First Amendment does not require the state to

maintain policies that allow certain associations to thrive.

For the most part, “[t]he Bill of Rights enshrines negative

liberties. It directs what government may not do to its citi

‐

zens, rather than what it must do for them.” WEAC

, 705 F.3d

at 645. Again, Act 10 only acts upon the state. The law’s

changes prevent public employers from acting in certain

ways, or adopting certain procedures, that were once benefi

‐

cial to Wisconsin public

‐ sector unions and their members.

We take the plaintiffs’ point that Act 10 will likely have the

effect of making things more challenging for general

‐ employee unions. Cf. Smith

, 441 U.S. at 465–66 (assuming

that the Highway Commission’s policy of refusing to recog

‐

nize union

‐ submitted grievances “tends to impair or under

‐

mine—if only slightly—the effectiveness of the union in rep

‐ resenting the economic interests of its members” (footnote

omitted)). “But this type of ‘impairment’ is not one that the

Constitution prohibits.” Id. at 466. 6

The unions protest that they are an expressive association

whose core purpose is to bargain with state employers on

their employees’ behalf. By enacting laws that prevent the

unions from accomplishing this purpose, the unions argue,

6 The Supreme Court has “held laws unconstitutional that require disclo

‐

sure of membership lists for groups seeking anonymity” on the grounds

that these laws “made group membership less attractive, raising the

same First Amendment concerns about affecting the group’s ability to

express its message.” FAIR

, 547 U.S. at 69 (citing Brown v. Socialist Work

‐

ers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio)

, 459 U.S. 87, 101–02 (1982)). But there is a

significant difference between a law that “makes group membership less

attractive” because it opens the group’s members up to harassment and

retaliation and a law that makes membership less appealing solely by

decreasing its utility.20 No. 13

‐ 3193

Wisconsin has weakened their association to a devastating

extent. But that simply is not how the First Amendment

works. An organization cannot come up with an associa

‐

tional purpose—even a purpose that involves speech—and

then require support from the state in order to realize its

goal.

In Smith

, the Supreme Court observed that “[f]ar from

taking steps to prohibit or discourage union membership or

association, all that [the state] has done in its challenged

conduct is simply to ignore the union. That it is free to do.”

441 U.S. at 466. The same holds true here. The unions cannot

wield the First Amendment to force Wisconsin to engage in

a dialogue or continue the state’s previous policies. For this

reason, none of Act 10’s proscriptions—individually or cu

‐ mulatively—infringe the unions’ associational rights.

C. The Equal Protection Clause

Finally, the unions invoke the Equal Protection Clause.

Their claim tries a different angle from the one we rejected in

WEAC

. There, the issue was Act 10’s distinction between

public safety and general employees. Here, the unions argue

that Act 10’s collective

‐ bargaining rules impermissibly dis

‐ advantage “represented employees,” i.e., employees who

choose to express their grievances by joining a union, as op

‐ posed to “individual employees,” those who prefer to go it

alone. 7

7 On appeal, the unions also argue that Act 10 treats labor organizations

differently than other organizations. Specifically, they point out that the

Act’s prohibition on collective bargaining applies only to organizations

made up of employees. See Wis. Stat. § 66.0508(1m). They suggest that, in

theory, municipal employers are still free to bargain with other kinds ofNo. 13

‐ 3193 21

Government line

‐ drawing that does not infringe a fun

‐

damental right and is not based on a suspect classification is

subject only to rational

‐ basis review. FCC v. Beach Commc ʹ ns,

Inc.

, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). However, the unions contend

that Act 10’s line

‐ drawing infringes fundamental First

Amendment rights. They argue that under Act 10, local gov

‐

ernments cannot make binding agreements with a general

employee’s bargaining representative regarding most em

‐ ployment terms and conditions—but that local governments

are not similarly limited when it comes to their making such

agreements with individual employees. This differential

treatment of represented employees and individual employ

‐

ees, they argue, amounts to the state punishing the former

for exercising their petition and association rights. Accord

‐ ingly, the unions maintain, strict scrutiny applies, and Wis

‐

consin must put forth a compelling interest for its law and

show that it is narrowly tailored to that interest.

We must again reject the union’s characterization of the

law. Wisconsin is not treating employees differently based

on the employees’ exercise of their associational rights. At

the risk of repeating ourselves, we stress that Act 10 does not

mandate any form of unfavorable treatment for union mem

‐

bers. These employees still possess every right, and are giv

‐

en every opportunity, that the state grants to their colleagues

who elect not to join a union. It’s just that Wisconsin has re

‐

groups. We have difficulty coming up with another type of organization

that would wish to make a binding agreement with a municipal employ

‐

er about its employees’ terms and conditions. But in any event, the un

‐

ions did not raise this particular equal

‐ protection theory before the dis

‐

trict court. It is therefore waived. Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co.

, 624

F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010).22 No. 13

‐ 3193

fused to participate in an activity that the represented em

‐ ployees want the state to engage in. Wisconsin has chosen to

recognize individual employees as appropriate bargaining

partners for municipal employers, but not union representa

‐

tives. That is Wisconsin’s choice to make. The association

right does not compel public employers to sit down at the

table with whomever an employee may wish to represent

them.

Having concluded that none of Act 10’s provisions impli

‐

cate the First Amendment, we need only examine Wiscon

‐

sin’s distinction between represented and nonrepresented

employees for a rational basis. See WEAC

, 705 F.3d at 653.

The district court upheld the distinction under this highly

deferential standard. Laborers Local 236

, 2013 WL 4875995, at

*5–6; see also WEAC

, 705 F.3d at 653 (“[Act 10] is presumed

constitutional, and we impose a weighty burden on the Un

‐ ions—they must ‘negative every

... basis which might sup

‐ port’ the law because we will uphold it ‘if there is any rea

‐ sonably conceivable state of facts’ supporting the classifica

‐

tion.” (quoting Heller v. Doe

, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993))). The

unions have conceded that Act 10’s collective

‐ bargaining re

‐

striction passes muster if we apply rational

‐ basis review.

Reply Br. 11–12. This was a prudent concession, as we have

previously found Wisconsin’s limitations on the scope of

statutory collective bargaining rationally related to a legiti

‐

mate government interest: “promot[ing] flexibility in state

and local government budgets by providing public employ

‐

ers more leverage in negotiations.” WEAC

, 705 F.3d at 654.

So our equal

‐ protection analysis can end here.No. 13

‐ 3193 23

III. Conclusion

Act 10 does not violate the First or Fourteenth Amend

‐

ments to the United States Constitution. We therefore

A FFIRM the district court’s judgment in favor of the state.