* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Se nior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTONIO CASTELLANO, Petitioner-Appellant,
v. LELAND MCEWAN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. No. 10-55681 D.C. No. 8:09-cv-871-SVW-E
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted January 9, 2013 Pasadena, California Before: GOODWIN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, Senior District Judge. ** Antonio Castellano, who was convicted in California of domestic battery and related offenses, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

# FILED
FEB 11 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 The appeal focuses on the admissibility of testimony given at a preliminary hearing by the victim, Irene Sanch ez Castellano (“Sanchez”), and on statements she made to police officers. Castellano argues that as a result of the enactment of Proposition 115 in 1990, preliminary hearings in California do not pr ovide an adequate opportunity for full and fair cross-examination because the “purpose of a preliminary hearing [is] to establish whether there exists probable cause to be lieve that the defendant has committed a felony” and not to undertake discovery. Cal . Penal Code § 866(b). Consequently, he argues the testimony at such hearings is never admissible at trial. This argument ignores the fact that the purpose of a prelim inary hearing was always to establish the existence of probable cause and involved a “l ess searching exploration into the merits of the case than a trial.” California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that, unless defe nse counsel “appear[ed] to have been significantly limited in any way in the scope or nature of his cross-examination of the witness . . . at the preliminary hearing,” such testimony was admissible at trial. Id
. This holding was not dependent on whether the witness was ava ilable to testify at trial. See id
. Picking up on the caveat in Green , Castellano also argues that the scope of his cross-examination at the preliminary h earing was significantly limited because the3 preliminary hearing judge sustained two obj ections to questions posed to Sanchez by the defense about: (1) an uncharged in cident which took place in 2003 and (2) Sanchez’s state of mind during one of the charged incidents. These questions sought to elicit evidence of minimal relevance. I ndeed, had Sanchez testif ied at trial and had the same objections been sustained, we would have had little trouble concluding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and that, even if he did, any error was harmless. Castellano introduced evidence at trial re lating to the prior uncharged incident and Sanchez testified on direct examination at the preliminary hearing regarding her state of mind during the charged incident at issue. Moreover, Castellano also introduced letters written by Sanchez which included admi ssions that she had lied to the police and attempted to take respons ibility for all that had gone wrong between them, and a voicemail message from Sanchez th reatening to falsely accuse him of domestic abuse if he did not financially support her. Except for the letter explaining her refusal to testify at trial, which pos t-dated the preliminary hearing, the other impeachment evidence was in Castellano’ s possession and not obtained through any discovery. Significantly, Castellano’s brie f acknowledges that because of this evidence “Sanchez’[s] preliminary heari ng testimony largely exonerated Castellano; [and demonstrated] that Sanchez was the aggr essor and that she lied to manipulate and4 control Castellano.” Castellano also argues that the trial j udge’s decision to admit the testimony of police officers relaying statements made to them by Sanchez violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Sanchez’s hearsay statements to the officers were admitted to impeach her preliminary hearing testimony. Castellano had an opportunity to cross-examine Sanchez about those statements at the preliminary hearing. Indeed, with one exception, which the jury’s verdict suggests was harmless, he also had the opportunity to examine th e police officers at bo th the preliminary hearing and at trial. Thus, Castellano’s only objection to the admissibility of their testimony fails because it rests on the same ground as his objection to the admissibility of Sanchez’s testimony. AFFIRMED.