J-E01001-20

2021 PA Super 37

RONALD SCOTT HANGEY AND 

ROSEMARY HANGEY H/W

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

HUSQVARNA PROFESSIONAL 

PRODUCTS, INC., HUSQVARNA GROUP, 

HUSQVARNA U.S. HOLDING, INC., 

HUSQVARNA AB, AND TRUMBAUER'S 

LAWN AND RECREATION, INC.

Appellees No. 3298 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order September 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No: 1015 March Term, 2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., 

NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and 

McCAFFERY, J.

DISSENTING OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: MARCH 8, 2021

I would conclude that the trial court acted within its permissible 

discretion in sustaining preliminary objections to venue in Philadelphia County. 

I therefore respectfully dissent. 

Our courts of appeal have explained many times that trial courts enjoy 

“considerable discretion” in determining whether venue is proper, and we will 

reverse only where the trial court abuses its discretion. Purcell v. Bryn 

Mawr Hosp., 579 A.2d 1282, 1284 (Pa. 1990); Zampana-Barry v. 

Donaghue, 921 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 
J-E01001-20

- 2 -

366 (Pa. 2007). The outcome in each case depends on its own facts. Monaco 

v. Montgomery Cab Co., 208 A.2d 252, 256 (Pa. 1965) (citing Shambe v. 

Delaware and Hudson R.R. Co., 135 A. 755, 757 (Pa. 1927)). Accordingly, 

an appellate court will not overturn the trial court’s decision so long as it is 

reasonable in view of the facts. Id.

Here, the record shows that from 2014 to 2016, approximately .005% 

of the United States sales revenue of Appellee Husqvarna Professional 

Products, Inc. (“HPP”) came from direct sales in Philadelphia County. HPP also 

delivers products to the distribution centers of big box retailers such as Lowe’s 

and Home Depot, but none of those distribution centers is located in 

Philadelphia County and HPP does not control the ultimate point of sale after 

it delivers its products to the big box distributors. The question presented is 

whether HPP “regularly conducts business” in Philadelphia County as per Rule 

2179(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer depends 

on our review of the trial court’s application of a quantity/quality analysis. 

Quality acts are “those directly, furthering, or essential to, corporate 

objects; they do not include incidental acts.” Monaco, 208 A.2d at 256. The 

trial court concluded that HPP’s activities were sufficient in quality to support 

venue in Philadelphia County. HPP furthers its business interests by selling 

products directly to two Philadelphia retailers, which in turn sell those products 

to the public. Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/18, at 5. The parties do not dispute 

that HPP has quality contacts with Philadelphia County. “By ‘quantity of acts’ 
J-E01001-20

- 3 -

is meant those which are so continuous and sufficient to be termed general or 

habitual.” Monaco, 208 A.2d at 256. The trial court found that .005% of 

HPP’s national sales revenue was de minimus and therefore of insufficient

quantity. Id. at 6. 

I believe the trial court’s conclusion was reasonable, in accord with 

applicable case law, and therefore not an abuse of discretion. For example, 

in Singley v. Flier, 851 A.2d 200 (Pa. Super. 2004), this Court affirmed an 

order transferring venue from Philadelphia to Delaware County. The plaintiff 

slipped and fell in a parking lot on the campus of Villanova University in 

Delaware County. The plaintiff argued for venue in Philadelphia County based 

on three graduate courses Villanova conducted at the Philadelphia Naval Yard. 

Villanova owned no property and conducted no other activity in Philadelphia. 

This Court concluded that Villanova’s activities in Philadelphia failed both the 

quality and quantity prongs of venue analysis, writing with regard to the latter 

that “the quantity of these contacts—three graduate level courses—is lacking 

when viewed in light of the University’s entire academic program, which 

includes several graduate degrees, as well as a law school.” Id. at 203. In 

other words, the trial court reasonably found quantity lacking where the 

defendant conducted a proportionately very small amount of its activity in the 

plaintiff’s county of choice. That is precisely what the trial court considered 

occurred in this case on appeal. 
J-E01001-20

- 4 -

Other cases reinforce this point and the discretion exercised by the trial 

court. In PECO Energy Co. v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 802 A.2d 

666 (Pa. Super. 2002), the plaintiff sued the defendant in Philadelphia County 

alleging losses stemming from water pipes that ruptured in Montgomery 

County. All affected water customers lived in Montgomery County. The 

defendant had no connection to Philadelphia County other than one mile of 

transmission pipeline—representing .036 percent of its piping system—

passing through. Id. at 670. In 2000, defendant conducted a one-time 

purchase of 300,000 gallons of water from the City of Philadelphia, 

representing .0007% of its water purchases over ten years. Id. This Court 

concluded that the defendant’s contacts to Philadelphia County were not 

essential to the furtherance of its business, and “minimal and incidental, at 

best.” Id. 

In Battuello v. Camelback Ski Corp., 598 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Super. 

1991), the plaintiffs sued the defendant ski resort in Philadelphia County for 

their son’s fatal accident that occurred at the defendant’s resort in Monroe 

County. In support of venue, the plaintiffs cited, among other things, that the 

defendant sent promotional brochures to residents of Philadelphia County; 

that the defendant advertised in Philadelphia County; and that defendant 

worked with a tour company in Philadelphia that regularly brought Philadelphia 

residents to its resort. Id.at 1028. This Court affirmed the order transferring 

venue to Monroe County, reasoning that solicitation of business in Philadelphia 
J-E01001-20

- 5 -

County did not establish sufficient quality, and that the sale of business 

generated for the defendant by the Philadelphia-based tour company was “far 

too small to qualify as ‘general or habitual’” and therefore did not establish 

sufficient quantity. Id. at 1030; see also Mathues v. Tim-Bar Corp., 652 

A.2d 349 (Pa. Super. 1994) (holding that the York County defendant’s 

“isolated and limited” activities in Montgomery County were insufficient to 

support venue there). 

Granting the trial court considerable discretion, as we must, and 

considering the authority of Singley, PECO Energy, and Battuello, I do not 

believe we can conclude the trial court’s decision was unreasonable. Those 

cases teach that quantity is lacking where a defendant’s activity in a county is 

insignificant in relation to its overall activity.1 I recognize that other cases 

have found that venue will lie against a defendant in a county where it 

conducts a comparatively small amount of its business. See Monaco, 208 

A.2d at 256 (holding that venue would lie in Philadelphia County against a 

____________________________________________

1

 The Majority misses the mark in distinguishing these cases because the 

courts in those cases found a lack of quality and quantity of contacts between 

the defendant and the forum. Majority Opinion, at 7-8. The law clearly 

requires both quality and quantity of contacts, and they are distinct. Under 

the Majority’s analysis, however, prior cases finding a lack of quantity did so 

primarily because quality contacts were absent. Instantly, in contrast, the 

existence of quality contacts leads inexorably to the existence of a sufficient 

quantity of contacts, regardless of the fact that HPP’s contacts with 

Philadelphia County represent a tiny fraction of its business. Thus, the 

Majority renders the quantity prong largely irrelevant, as quantity seemingly 

always follows quality in the Majority’s view, which I view as an improper 

application of law. 
J-E01001-20

- 6 -

defendant that conducted five to ten percent of its cab business there); 

Canter v. American Honda Motor Corp., 231 A.2d 140, 143 (Pa. 1967) 

(holding that one to two percent of a defendant’s business was sufficient to

establish the quantity test described in Monaco); Zampana-Barry, 921 A.2d 

at 506 (three to five percent of a law firm’s legal services conducted in 

Philadelphia supported venue in Philadelphia County). I also recognize that 

the jurisprudential law in this area is lacking in clarity. See Zampana-Barry, 

921 A.2d at 506-09 (Klein, J. concurring). I do not believe, however, that any 

of the foregoing cases support the Majority’s decision to overrule the trial 

court’s discretion. Rather, I believe that our appellate standard of review—

which requires us to afford the trial courts considerable discretion and directs 

us not to overturn any reasonable result—is a product of the inherent difficulty 

in articulating precise standards governing a quality and quantity analysis. 

Put simply, the lack of precise alignment in our case law in this area may be 

explained by the broad discretion given our trial courts to decide these issues. 

Moreover, “[a] finding by an appellate court that it would have reached 

a different result than the trial court does not constitute a finding of an abuse 

of discretion.” Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (Pa. 

2000). Rather, “an abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has 

rendered a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, 

has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill will.” Id. at 1124. “Where the record adequately supports the trial court’s 
J-E01001-20

- 7 -

reasons and factual basis, the court did not abuse its discretion.” Id. Thus, 

the law recognizes that different judges might consider similar facts and reach 

different results, with neither committing an abuse of discretion. Some degree 

of uncertainty in the law is therefore unavoidable, and this brings with it the 

inherent difficulty in reconciling the results of all of our prior precedent on this 

issue. 

In my view, the Majority reverses the trial court in this case because the 

Majority would have reached a different result. Nothing in the Majority’s 

Opinion supports a conclusion that the trial court overstepped the bounds of 

its considerable discretion in applying a relatively imprecise body of law to the 

facts of this case. Under our existing jurisprudence, all of which the Majority 

leaves intact, trial courts have discretion to assign great weight—even decisive 

weight—to the fact that a defendant conducts a vanishingly small percentage 

of its business in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. In contrast with existing 

precedent, the Majority has all but forbidden trial courts to transfer venue on 

that basis. If five one-thousandths of a percent is sufficient to establish 

quantity, it is difficult to imagine a percentage that is too small. 

The Majority reasons that its result is warranted, at least in part, 

because HPP is a large, multi-billion dollar company conducting business 

throughout the United States and the percentage of its sales revenue in any 
J-E01001-20

- 8 -

county is likely to be a tiny percentage of its overall sales revenue.2 Majority 

Opinion at 9. I am willing to assume that this is true, but I believe it is entirely 

irrelevant to question before us. Faithful application of the quantity analysis 

under existing jurisprudence will not leave plaintiffs without a forum in which 

to pursue claims against large companies. Rather, it will simply restrict the

choice of forum according to the well-established criteria of our Rules of Civil

Procedure. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, I would not disturb the trial court’s 

exercise of discretion in transferring venue in this case from Philadelphia to 

Bucks County. 

I respectfully dissent. 

Judge King joins the dissenting opinion.

____________________________________________

2

 As noted above, HPP does not direct the distribution or sales of its products 

by big box retailers. Moreover, Appellants failed to create a record as to sales 

of HPP products at big box retailers in Philadelphia County.