United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 23-1045 

 23-1046 

 23-1047 

 23-1048 

 23-1049

IN RE: THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO

RICO, AS REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; THE

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, AS 

REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE PUERTO RICO SALES TAX FINANCING 

CORPORATION, a/k/a Cofina; THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, AS REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE 

EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, AS REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE 

PUERTO RICO HIGHWAYS AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; THE FINANCIAL 

OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, AS 

REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY 

(PREPA); THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO 

RICO, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PUERTO RICO PUBLIC BUILDINGS 

AUTHORITY,

Debtors.

THE ABRAHAM GIMÉNEZ PLAINTIFF GROUP, a/k/a Group Wage Creditors 

in the Litigation Captioned Abraham Giménez, et al. v. 

Department of Transportation and Public Works, CASP Case No. 

2021-05-0346; THE CRUZ HERNANDEZ PLAINTIFF GROUP, a/k/a Group 

Wage Creditors in the Litigation Captioned Carmen Socorro Cruz 

Hernandez, et al. v. Family Department, ARV, and AIJ of the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Case No. K AC 1991-0665; THE 

BELTRAN-CINTRON PLAINTIFF GROUP, a/k/a Group Wage Creditors in 

the Litigation Captioned Francisco Beltran-Cintron, et al. v. 

Family Department, ARV, and AIJ of the Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico, CASP Case No. 2021-05-0345; THE ACEVEDO-CAMACHO PLAINTIFF 

GROUP, a/k/a Group Wage Creditors in the Litigation Captioned 

Madeline Acevedo-Camacho, et al. v. Family Department, ARV, and 

AIJ of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, CASP Case No. 
2016-05-1340; THE ACEVEDO AROCHO PLAINTIFF GROUP, a/k/a Group 

Wage Creditors in Litigation Captioned Prudencio Acevedo Arocho, 

et al. v. Puerto Rico Department of Treasury, Case 

No. K AC-2005-5022, 

Appellants,

v.

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, AS 

REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO,

Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Laura Taylor Swain,* U.S. District Judge]

Before

Montecalvo, Lipez, and Thompson, 

Circuit Judges.

Jesus E. Batista Sánchez, with whom The Batista Law Group, 

PSC, was on brief, for appellants.

Shiloh A. Rainwater, with whom Timothy W. Mungovan, John E. 

Roberts, Martin J. Bienenstock, Brian S. Rosen, Mark D. Harris, 

and Proskauer Rose LLP were on brief, for appellee. 

February 9, 2024

* Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York, sitting 

by designation. 
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MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. We consider again the 

application of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 

Stability Act ("PROMESA"), this time in the context of 

administrative-expense-priority provisions of the federal 

Bankruptcy Code that are incorporated into PROMESA. Appellants 

are five groups of current and former public employees in the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the "Commonwealth") who allege they 

are owed millions of dollars in back pay for work they performed 

before and after commencement of the Commonwealth's debt 

restructuring case under Title III of PROMESA (the "Five Groups").

They appeal an order by the court overseeing the Commonwealth-wide 

debt restructuring litigation (the "Title III court") on their 

motions to secure administrative-expense priority for their back

pay claims. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the Title 

III court's ruling on these motions.

I. Background

In response to the government debt crisis in Puerto Rico, 

Congress passed PROMESA in 2016, which created the Puerto Rico 

Financial Oversight and Management Board (the "Board") to 

restructure the Commonwealth's massive debt. See 48 U.S.C. 

§§ 2121, 2194(m). Title III of PROMESA authorizes the Board to 

file a debt-restructuring case on the Commonwealth's behalf, see

48 U.S.C. §§ 2164, 2175, and the Board commenced such a case in 

May 2017.
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In various litigation and administrative actions

separate from the Title III case, appellants have claimed that 

their public employers' decisions to adjust upward the wages paid 

to other employees who previously were paid below the minimum wage 

while leaving appellants' wages unchanged eliminated merits-based 

distinctions and rendered inoperative the progressive compensation 

system mandated by Puerto Rico law. Each of the Five Groups

previously sued their public employers (in Puerto Rico

commonwealth courts, not federal courts) for back pay to compensate 

for the employers' failure to adjust appellants' wages upward. 

One of the Five Groups, the Cruz-Hernandez Group, has 

already had a judgment entered in its underlying litigation in 

Puerto Rico court against the group members' public employers. 

The parties in that case reached a settlement agreement in the 

underlying litigation concerning updated pay scales, and, in 2006, 

the court entered judgment approving that settlement. The 

outstanding unpaid claims for that group are for back pay for work 

performed prior to the 2017 Title III petition. Thus, we refer to 

these claims as "pre-petition" and "post-judgment" claims. 

The underlying cases filed by the other four groups 

against their public employers remain pending in Puerto Rico court

-- there has not yet been a determination of liability or final 

judgment entered in those cases (i.e., they are all "pre-judgment" 
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claims).1 Those cases seek back pay for work performed both preand post-Title III petition. 

In June 2022, the Five Groups moved the Title III court 

for administrative-expense priority for their claims for back pay 

for work performed both before and after the 2017 Title III 

petition date. "Administrative-expense priority" refers to the 

priority status that expenses qualifying as "administrative 

expenses" receive in the order of payment in a bankruptcy case. 

See In re Powermate Holding Corp., 394 B.R. 765, 771-72 (Bankr. D. 

Del. 2008). This category of expenses is paid by debtors to 

creditors earlier than other categories of expenses in a Title III 

case. See id.; In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 7 F.4th 

31, 37 (1st Cir. 2021). The definition of "administrative expense" 

in a Title III case comes from section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy 

Code, which PROMESA incorporates. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); 48 

U.S.C. § 2161; see also In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 

7 F.4th at 37. The provision provides:

(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be 

allowed administrative expenses, other than 

claims allowed under section 502(f) of this 

title, including—

1 The Acevedo-Arocho Group had a partial judgment entered 

in February 2017 dismissing most of the Group's claims as 

time-barred, but that judgment has since been reversed in part by 

the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. That case is now remanded for a 

claimant-by-claimant determination of timeliness; the remanded 

action remained pending as of the time the parties briefed this 

case. 
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(1)

(A) the actual, necessary costs and 

expenses of preserving the estate 

including—

(i) wages, salaries, and 

commissions for services rendered 

after the commencement of the case; 

and

(ii) wages and benefits awarded 

pursuant to a judicial proceeding or 

a proceeding of the National Labor 

Relations Board as back pay 

attributable to any period of time 

occurring after commencement of the 

case under this title, as a result 

of a violation of Federal or State 

law by the debtor, without regard to 

the time of the occurrence of 

unlawful conduct on which such award 

is based or to whether any services 

were rendered, if the court 

determines that payment of wages and 

benefits by reason of the operation 

of this clause will not 

substantially increase the

probability of layoff or 

termination of current employees, 

or of nonpayment of domestic support 

obligations, during the case under 

this title[.]

§ 503(b). Congress added subsection (ii) above as an amendment to 

the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse 

Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"). Bankruptcy 

Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 

109–8, § 329, 119 Stat. 23, 101 (2005); see also In re Powermate, 

394 B.R. at 772.
- 7 -

The Title III court had previously, in 2021, rejected 

earlier efforts by individual plaintiffs in the appellant groups 

to assert administrative-expense priority for back pay for work 

performed before the Commonwealth's petition date. In re Fin. 

Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., No. 17-BK-3283 (Bankr. D.P.R. filed 

Apr. 18, 2022) (docket no. 20569). In rejecting these efforts, 

the Title III court held that only claims attributable to the 

post-petition period can qualify as administrative expenses. Id.

at 3. 

The subsequent June 2022 motions to secure 

administrative-expense priority by the Five Groups concerned back

pay for work performed both before and after the 2017 Title III 

petition date. In an oral order, the Title III court made the 

following three general categories of rulings on the

administrative-expense-priority claims. 

First, the court denied the requests to the extent they 

sought immediate payment of back pay for claims still 

pending/lacking final judgment in the underlying commonwealth 

court and agency proceedings, reasoning that "administrative 

expense claimants have the burden of conclusively establishing the 

liability of the debtor before seeking a ruling on entitlement to 

priority treatment." 

Second, the court declined to rule on whether any of the 

claims arising from work performed post-petition qualified for 
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administrative-expense status because those claims were contingent 

on appellants obtaining judgments in the still-pending underlying 

commonwealth court and agency actions. The court explained that 

though it was "not ruling on [whether the still-pending postpetition work claims qualified for administrative-expense status] 

today," the court was "leaving it to the Debtor to handle 

liquidation and any payment of that claim or objection to that 

claim in the ordinary course of resolution of claims" after 

judgment issued in the underlying cases. Relatedly, the court 

denied the requests for a "comfort order" that appellants' postpetition wage claims would count as administrative expenses if 

they won the underlying still-pending cases (at a future date). 

It also denied the requests for the court to order the Commonwealth 

to set aside hundreds of millions of dollars in a reserve to pay 

the judgments if appellants won the underlying still-pending cases 

in the future. The court explained:

Any comfort orders with respect to the future 

treatment of [appellants'] potential . . . 

post[-]petition claims would be a premature 

and improper advisory opinion, because the 

Commonwealth's liability has not yet been 

established. Further, [appellants'] request 

that the Court order the Commonwealth to set 

aside funds to satisfy potential future 

rulings is unsupported by any basis in law or 

in fact. 

Third, the court denied the motion to the extent that it 

sought administrative-expense priority for back pay claims arising 
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from pre-petition work by the Cruz-Hernandez Group (the group that 

had already obtained a judgment). It denied that request for the 

same reason it denied the similar requests in 2021 (described 

above). Specifically, the court explained that the wages 

attributable to the pre-petition period did not qualify for 

administrative-expense priority under the "plain language" of 

§ 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) because they are not "wages and benefits 

awarded pursuant to a judicial proceeding . . . as back pay 

attributable to any period of time occurring after commencement of 

the case under this title." (emphasis added).

The court issued a brief written order denying the 

motions described above "[f]or the reasons stated on the record" 

in its oral order. The employee groups subsequently filed a motion 

for reconsideration of that order, which the Title III court denied 

in a written order that found no errors of fact or law in its 

previous ruling that would justify reconsideration. In that latter 

order, the court again explained its view that the pre-petition 

claims did not qualify as administrative expenses because they 

were not attributable to a period of time after commencement of 

the Title III petition and again clarified that although the claims 

for administrative-expense status for the post-petition claims 

were filed prematurely, those claims were not "disallowed or 

expunged." 
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Before us, the Five Groups appeal the Title III court's 

order on both the pre- and post-petition back pay claims.2

II. Standard of Review

"We review the Title III court's legal conclusions de 

novo" and its "application of the law to the facts for abuse of 

discretion." In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 7 F.4th 

at 36. The Title III court's determination of whether a claim 

qualifies for administrative-expense treatment under 

§ 503(b)(1)(A) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See id. at 

39. 

III. Discussion

Appellants challenge the Title III court's ruling on 

administrative-expense priority as to two separate groups of 

claims: (1) claims for back pay for work performed prior to May 

2017 when the Title III case commenced (the "pre-petition claims") 

and (2) claims for back pay for work performed after May 2017 when 

the Title III case commenced (the "post-petition claims"). We 

review the Title III court's ruling as to these two groups of 

claims in turn. 

A. Pre-Petition Claims

Appellants first take issue with the Title III court's 

ruling that back pay claims arising from work performed 

2 The consolidated appeal before us was originally five 

separate appeals by each of the Five Groups individually. 
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pre-petition do not qualify as administrative expenses under 

§ 503(b). The statutory definition of "administrative expenses" 

includes, in relevant part:

wages and benefits awarded pursuant to a 

judicial proceeding or a proceeding of the 

National Labor Relations Board as back pay 

attributable to any period of time occurring 

after commencement of the case under this 

title, as a result of a violation of Federal 

or State law by the debtor, without regard to 

the time of the occurrence of unlawful conduct 

on which such award is based or to whether any 

services were rendered . . . .

§ 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). "The burden of proving 

entitlement to administrative expense priority payment" lies with 

the party requesting it, In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 954 F.2d 

1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992), and administrative-expense provisions are 

narrowly construed, see In re Nichols, 450 B.R. 307, 311 (Bankr. 

D. Mass. 2011); In re 710 Long Ridge Rd. Operating Co., II, LLC, 

505 B.R. 163, 172-73 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014). 

The Title III court ruled that the pre-petition work 

claims were not for "back pay attributable to any period of time 

occurring after commencement of the case" and thus did not qualify 

for administrative-expense priority. We agree that the prepetition work claims are not "attributable to" a post-petition 

time period and therefore cannot qualify as administrative 

expenses under § 503(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
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Appellants' only argument as to how the pre-petition 

work claims could qualify as "attributable to any period of time 

occurring after commencement" of the Title III case is that because 

the back pay remains unpaid, damages "continue[d] to flow to 

[a]ppellants" after the petition date.3 This theory makes little 

practical sense. As appellee, the Board, points out, appellants' 

theory would mean that in every instance in which a creditor has 

a pre-petition claim that has not yet been paid, the debtor would 

be considered to have failed to pay the claim during the postpetition period, and thus the claims would be considered 

"attributable to" the post-petition period. We do not read the 

"attributable to" language as supporting such a theory. 

Appellants' primary argument concerning the pre-petition 

work claims focuses on the second underlined clause in the 

statutory text quoted above: the part that reads "without regard 

to the time of the occurrence of unlawful conduct on which such 

award is based." § 503(b)(1)(A)(ii). Appellants interpret this 

passage to mean that, in their case, it does not matter that the 

unlawful conduct -- the employers' failure to pay appropriate wages

-- occurred prior to the petition date. They assert that it was 

erroneous for the Title III court to deny administrative-expense 

3 The post-judgment plaintiff group (the Cruz-Hernandez 

Group) has not argued that it has any post-petition claims in 

addition to its pre-petition claims at issue in this case. 
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status to the pre-petition claims based on the claims having "long 

predate[d] the debtors' Title III petitions" when the time of

occurrence of the unlawful conduct is "without relevance under 

[§] 503(b)(1)(A)(ii)." 

As some other courts have noted, § 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) 

appears somewhat confusing because of the potential contradiction 

between the "attributable to" and "without regard to" phrases: 

"the plain meaning of the statute requires a court to determine if 

a claim relates to a post-petition time period despite the fact 

that the violation timing is of no regard." In re Calumet 

Photographic, Inc., No. 14-08893, 2016 WL 3035468, at *3 (Bankr. 

N.D. Ill. May 19, 2016); see also In re Powermate, 394 B.R. at 

774-75. 

There are no cases from this court or district or 

bankruptcy courts within the circuit interpreting the current 

§ 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) language, following its addition to the 

Bankruptcy Code in 2005.4 Out-of-circuit courts that have applied 

4 The Board urges us to rely on First Circuit cases 

interpreting and applying older versions of the statute, prior to 

the 2005 BAPCPA amendment. The language at issue in those cases, 

however, is significantly different from that at issue here. In 

re Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc., and In re FBI Distribution 

Corp. interpreted the language that now appears in subsection (i) 

of § 503(b)(1)(A), not the new subsection (ii) provision added by 

BAPCPA and at issue in this case. Compare In re Bos. Reg'l Med. 

Ctr., Inc., 291 F.3d 111, 118 n.6 (1st Cir. 2002), and In re FBI 

Distrib. Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003), with

§ 503(b)(1)(A)(i), (ii). The language discussed in those older 

cases defined administrative expenses as including "wages, 
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this provision consistently do not interpret the "without regard 

to the time of the occurrence" clause to override the separate 

requirement that the claims be "attributable to any period of time 

occurring after commencement of the case." § 503(b)(1)(A)(ii); 

see, e.g., In re Powermate, 394 B.R. at 774-75 ("A closer reading, 

however, reveals that the only relevant consideration is the former 

time, the time to which the back pay is attributable . . . and how 

that time relates to the petition date."); In re Phila. Newspapers, 

LLC., 433 B.R. 164, 175 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (interpreting 

§ 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) as including a requirement that back pay be 

"awarded for any period of time 'attributable to any time occurring 

after commencement of the case'" despite the "without regard to" 

clause); In re Truland Grp., Inc., 520 B.R. 197, 203-04 (Bankr. 

E.D. Va. 2014) (adopting the Philadelphia Newspapers

salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the 

commencement of the case . . . ." In re Bos. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 291 

F.3d at 118 n.6; In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330 F.3d at 41; see 

also § 503(b)(1)(A)(i). Subsection (ii)'s language is 

significantly different in that it uses the broader terms 

"attributable to" in defining the timing requirement. See

§ 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) ("[W]ages and benefits awarded . . . as back 

pay attributable to any period of time occurring after commencement 

of the case." (emphasis added)). Additionally, the subsection (i) 

language discussed in the older cases does not include the "without 

regard to the time of the occurrence of unlawful conduct" 

subsection (ii) clause on which appellants now rely. See In re 

Bos. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 291 F.3d at 118 n.6; In re FBI Distrib.

Corp., 330 F.3d at 41. Another case that the Board points to, In 

re Mammoth Mart, Inc., involves an even older version of the 

statute. See 536 F.2d 950, 953-55 (1st Cir. 1976). Those older 

cases are thus of limited significance for the statutory 

interpretation issues before us now. 
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interpretation of subsection (ii), which applies the "attributable 

to" requirement despite the "without regard to" clause). Multiple 

courts have denied administrative-expense treatment to prepetition claims despite the "without regard to the time of the 

occurrence" language. See, e.g., In re Calumet Photographic, Inc., 

2016 WL 3035468, at *3-*4, *3 n.15; In re Powermate, 394 B.R. at

778; In re Trump Ent. Resorts, Inc., 2015 WL 1084294, at *4 (Bankr. 

D. Del. Mar. 9, 2015).

Where the out-of-circuit courts diverge is on the 

precise meaning of "attributable to." There is a dispute in the 

case law over whether the date on which the back pay claims "vest" 

or "accrue" is the date to which the claims are "attributable." 

The In re Powermate court held that the vesting or accrual date is 

the relevant time period: 

[T]he only relevant consideration is . . . the 

time to which the back pay is attributable 

which is when the rights or claims vest or 

accrue, and how that time relates to the 

petition date. If a claim vests pre-petition, 

then the back pay is attributable to the time 

occurring prior to the commencement of the 

case and therefore it is not an administrative 

expense claim. . . . When the unlawful conduct 

occurred and/or services were rendered does 

not affect this determination.

In re Powermate, 394 B.R. at 774-75 (emphasis omitted). Other 

courts disagree that the statutory text supports such an 

interpretation. See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC., 433 B.R. at 

174 ("Had Congress intended to condition subsection (ii) on when 
- 16 -

a right or claim for back pay 'vested' or 'accrued,' it could have 

said so. It did not and, for that reason, this Court will not 

impose that requirement on this new subsection to 

§ 503(b)(1)(A)."); In re Truland Grp., 520 B.R. at 203 ("The focus 

on the timing of vesting, in the Court's view, is inconsistent 

with the plain language of subsection (ii) of [§] 503(b)(1)(A)--

that the employees are entitled to an administrative expense 

'without regard to the time of the occurrence of unlawful conduct 

on which such award is based or to whether any services were 

rendered[.]' Powermate's focus on vesting cannot be squared with 

the 'without regard to the time' language of the statute." 

(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Appellants 

reference this dispute in arguing for administrative-expense 

treatment of their pre-petition claims, suggesting that the notion 

that "the work which underlies the [§] 503(b)(1)(A) claim must 

have been 'incurred' or 'vested' post-petition" is based on "widely 

rejected" case law. 

We need not wade into this debate because the parties 

have not explained, nor do we see, any reason why the question of 

whether "attributable to" refers to the vesting or accrual date 

would make a difference with regard to the administrative-expense 

treatment of the pre-petition back pay claims at issue here. The 

pre-petition claims here are based on work that was entirely 

performed prior to the May 2017 petition date. There is no 
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allegation that any statute or regulation would make the claim for 

these back pay wages vest or accrue after the 2017 petition date. 

Thus, "[t]he latest date any portion of the [pre-petition claims]

to which back pay could conceivably be attributable" was before 

the petition date. In re Trump Ent. Resorts, Inc., 2015 WL 

1084294, at *4 (recognizing the divergent interpretations of 

"attributable to" but explaining, without taking a position on 

which interpretation is correct, that even under the 

interpretation most favorable to the party seeking administrativeexpense priority the judgment at issue could not be attributable 

to a post-petition time period). 

Finally, appellants contend that the Title III court's 

analysis of and decision on the pre-petition claims was essentially 

an application of subsection (i) of § 503(b)(1)(A) rather than 

subsection (ii), reflecting the court's failure to acknowledge and 

apply Congress's expansion of what can constitute an 

administrative expense by its addition of subsection (ii) in the 

2005 amendment. Appellants argue that, under subsection (ii), 

administrative-expense treatment is no longer limited to claims 

regarding services performed post-petition; the standard instead 

requires analysis of whether the damages that flowed from the 

wrongful conduct in any way impacted the claimant post-petition. 

As explained above, we do not interpret subsection (ii) (and the 

"without regard to" language, specifically) as eliminating the 
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need to show that claims are "attributable to" the post-petition 

time period, nor do we view the mere fact that the claims continue 

to go unpaid as sufficient to show, without more, that the claims 

are "attributable to" the post-petition period. Our

interpretation does not render subsection (ii) indistinguishable 

from subsection (i) because subsection (ii) expands 

administrative-expense treatment to certain types of claims not 

covered by subsection (i).5 See, e.g., In re Tristar Fire Prot., 

Inc., 466 B.R. 392, 402 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012) (distinguishing 

subsection (i) from subsection (ii) on the basis that subsection 

(ii) "does not require that any services actually be rendered after 

the commencement of the case in order to support the allowance of 

an administrative expense claim"). 

5 For example, subsection (ii) expands administrativeexpense treatment to claims based on situations where the debtor 

committed a violation of law before the petition date that resulted 

in the deprivation of wages after the petition date. This would 

include cases in which a wrongful discharge pre-petition resulted 

in the deprivation of wages that would have been paid postpetition. The wages that were constructively earned during the 

post-petition period (but not actually earned, because the 

employee was not actually working during the post-petition period) 

in those cases would not qualify as administrative expenses under 

subsection (i) because that first subsection only covers "wages, 

salaries, and commissions for services rendered after the 

commencement of the case." § 503(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added); 

see also In re Tristar Fire Prot., Inc., 466 B.R. 392, 402 (Bankr. 

E.D. Mich. 2012).
- 19 -

We find no abuse of discretion in the Title III court's 

holding that appellants' pre-petition back pay claims do not 

qualify for administrative-expense treatment. 

B. Post-Petition, Pre-Judgment Claims

Appellants also challenge the Title III court's decision 

on their motion for administrative-expense priority for back pay 

claims concerning work performed post-petition but for which there 

has not yet been any judgment in the underlying commonwealth court 

and agency proceedings. This post-petition, pre-judgment claim 

issue involves a different portion of the same statutory provision

-- the following underlined phrase: 

(ii) wages and benefits awarded pursuant to a 

judicial proceeding or a proceeding of the 

National Labor Relations Board as back pay 

attributable to any period of time occurring 

after commencement of the case under this 

title, as a result of a violation of Federal 

or State law by the debtor, without regard to 

the time of the occurrence of unlawful conduct 

on which such award is based or to whether any 

services were rendered . . . .

§ 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). As described above, the Title 

III court declined to rule on whether any of the claims arising 

from work performed post-petition qualified for administrativeexpense status because those claims were contingent on appellants 

obtaining judgments in the still-pending underlying commonwealth 

court and agency actions. 
- 20 -

The Title III court explained in its oral ruling at the 

hearing that although it was "not ruling on [whether the 

still-pending, post-petition work claims qualified for 

administrative-expense status] today," the court was "leaving it 

to the Debtor to handle liquidation and any payment of that claim 

or objection to that claim in the ordinary course of resolution of 

claims" after judgment issued in the underlying cases. Relatedly, 

the court denied the requests for a "comfort order" that 

appellants' post-petition wage claims would count as 

administrative expenses should they win the underlying stillpending cases (at a future date).6

The Title III court's decision to defer a ruling on 

whether the post-petition claims qualify as administrative 

expenses until a later time, rather than granting any "comfort 

order" saying prospectively that certain post-petition claims will 

qualify as administrative expenses if the Puerto Rico courts or 

agencies determine that the public employers are liable for the 

back pay, was a decision within that court's discretion. The court 

was clear in both its oral ruling and its written ruling on the 

6 The assertion in appellants' reply brief that appellees 

wrongly recharacterized appellants' claim as a "comfort order" is 

meritless, as at least one of the Five Groups called its requested 

relief a "comfort order" in its original application for allowance 

and payment of administrative-expense claims, and the Title III 

court judge referenced the requested "comfort order" relief in her 

oral ruling on the motions. 
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motion to reconsider that it was not disallowing or expunging these 

claims for administrative-expense status for post-petition claims 

altogether. 

In general, "district courts have the inherent authority 

to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the 

efficient and expedient resolution of cases." Dietz v. Bouldin, 

579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016); see also Rivera-Aponte v. Gomez Bus Line, 

Inc., 62 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2023) ("To ensure the fair and prompt 

adjudication of cases, a district court must be able to manage its 

docket effectively and efficiently. To this end, we afford 

district courts a wide margin of discretion in the performance of 

their case-management functions."); In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 

F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[D]istrict courts have substantial 

inherent power to manage and control their calendars."). Although 

"the exercise of an inherent power cannot be contrary to any 

express grant of or limitation on the district court's power 

contained in a rule or statute," Dietz, 579 U.S. at 45, appellants 

have not pointed to any provision in the relevant statutes or other 

rule that would prohibit the Title III court from deferring 

resolution of the post-petition claims issue to a slightly later 

time in the proceedings. 

Out-of-circuit administrative-expense case law supports 

the notion that the Title III court did not abuse its discretion 

in deferring its decision on the claims that had not yet reached 
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final judgments. For example, the court in In re Tristar Fire 

Protection, Inc., took a similar approach to the Title III court 

here in declining to rule on the administrative-expense status of 

particular claims before a decision-making body with jurisdiction 

to award back pay entered judgment. See 466 B.R. at 403. That 

court reasoned:

since no award of wages and benefits for back 

pay has thus far been made either by the 

[National Labor Relations Board] or in a 

"judicial proceeding," and because this Court 

lacks jurisdiction to make such award, [the 

party asserting the administrative-expense 

claim] is not entitled, at least for now, to 

the allowance of an administrative-expense 

claim under § 503(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the 

Bankruptcy Code.

Id.

Appellants primarily point to two out-of-circuit cases, 

In re Truland Group, 520 B.R. 197, and In re 710 Long Ridge Road

Operating Co., II, LLC, 505 B.R. 163, in arguing that the Title 

III court abused its discretion in declining to rule on the claims 

that had not yet received a judgment. However, while those cases 

support the notion that the court here could have issued a

conditional order in advance of judgment on the underlying claims, 

they do not suggest that the court was required to issue that 

order. The courts in those cases considered debtors' requests to 

expunge or dismiss an administrative-expense claim for back pay on 

the ground that the claimant had not yet been awarded a judgment. 
- 23 -

See In re 710 Long Ridge Rd., 505 B.R. at 174-75; In re Truland 

Grp., 520 B.R. at 204-05. Those courts did grant conditional 

rulings stating that if judgment enters supporting the claims in 

the future, then those claims will qualify as administrative 

expenses for purposes of the bankruptcy proceedings. See In re 

710 Long Ridge Rd., 505 B.R. at 176 (holding that "the Claims 

attributable to the First Period are an administrative expense 

when and if a final judgment is awarded in the [National Labor 

Relations Board] proceedings"); In re Truland Grp., 520 B.R. at

204–05 ("[T]he Court holds that any wages and benefits that may be 

awarded pursuant to the WARN Act shall constitute administrative 

expenses under subsection (ii) of [§] 503(b)(1)(A) of the Code."). 

But those cases do not suggest that a court is forbidden from 

deferring resolution of the administrative-expense status of 

claims to a later time in the proceedings, after there is a 

judgment on liability as to those claims. Thus, those cases do 

not establish that the Title III court in the present case abused 

its discretion in deferring resolution of the pre-judgment claims. 

We hold that the Title III court did not abuse its discretion and 

affirm its decision to defer ruling on the pre-judgment claims.7

7 To the extent appellants seek orders requiring immediate 

payment of back pay claims or requiring the Commonwealth to set 

aside a reserve as security for their claims, they have waived 

those requests by not addressing them in their opening brief. See

Vazquez-Rivera v. Figueroa, 759 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 2014)

(explaining that arguments not raised in a party's opening brief 
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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Title III 

court's decisions as to the pre- and post-petition claims that are 

the subject of this appeal. 

are deemed waived). In fact, they seem to have disclaimed at least 

the "immediate payment" request in their opening brief by arguing, 

"[a]s the record evinces, Appellant was not seeking immediate 

payment of the amounts in controversy; rather, Appellant was 

seeking to protect their legal rights by -- even if on a 

conditional basis -- hav[ing] the claim be deemed allowed as an 

administrative claim."