COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

FRANCISCO ORTEGA 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1867-98-4 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 MARCH 14, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Donald M. Haddock, Judge 

 George J. Wooditch (Office of the Public 

Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 The trial judge convicted Francisco Ortega of five counts 

of burglary and five counts of grand larceny and acquitted him 

of burglary while armed. On appeal, Ortega contends (1) the 

trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior crimes and 

(2) the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt his identity as the burglar. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm Ortega's convictions. 

 I. 

 Between January 6 and 20 of 1998, six burglaries occurred 

in the Del Ray and Rosemont sections of the City of Alexandria. 

Detective Barry Schiftic testified that the burglaries had 

numerous similarities. All the burglaries occurred during the 
daytime at residences; each residence was extensively ransacked; 

similar items, particularly electronic equipment and jewelry, 

were stolen from each residence; the burglaries all occurred 

within a one-mile radius of one another; each burglary occurred 

on a Tuesday or a Wednesday in the morning or early afternoon; 

each residence, except one, was entered by force; and in each 

residence the burglar took sharp knives from the kitchen and 

left them in other rooms. The detective also testified that, 

historically, only thirty percent of the burglaries in 

Alexandria have been residential, that the ransacking of a 

residential burglary site is highly unusual, and that, contrary 

to the typical residential burglary, no silverware, silver 

trays, candle sticks, or rugs were taken, although those items 

were present in most of these residences. He further testified 

that the moving of knives from the kitchen to another room was 

highly unusual and that one of the knives, which had been stolen 

from one residence, was left at another residence. 

 In addition, the detective testified, over objection, that 

he had investigated a series of burglaries in 1994 which 

involved a strikingly similar pattern. He described those 

earlier burglaries as having the following pattern: 

 Back in 1994 . . . we handled a series of 

burglaries . . . , and the same type of 

items were taken. The same mode of 

operation, a person going through the rear 

of the home, incorporating the glass or the 

door. They go in, and these homes were 

located in the Del Ray/Rosemont area also. 

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 They occurred during the daylight hours. 

Entry was forced. The ransacking was the 

same. There was more ransacking, again, 

with these than I had ever seen before, and 

the same types of items were taken, 

electronic equipment, things of that 

kind. . . . [K]nives were left throughout 

the houses on these different cases. 

In addition, one of the homes burgled in 1994 was also burgled 

in 1998. The detective also testified that Ortega was arrested 

and convicted for the 1994 burglaries. 

 Carolyn Duncan, who lives in the area where the burglaries 

occurred, testified that at noon on January 20, which was the 

day the last burglary occurred, she answered a knock at her door 

and saw two men. During her testimony, she identified Ortega as 

the man who was at her door and asked "if Miranda was home." 

When she told him that no such person lived there, he mentioned 

a street name. She then directed him to that street; however, 

the men walked away in another direction. The next day, after 

she learned of the burglary that occurred a block away, she 

called the police and described the men to Detective Schiftic. 

One day later, the detective showed her a photograph spread that 

did not contain Ortega's photograph. In April, however, she saw 

another photographic spread and selected Ortega's photograph as 

the person who was at her door on January 20. 

 Keith Davis testified that he and Ortega committed the 

burglaries. He has known Ortega for almost nine years and, at 

the time of the burglaries, they lived together at Davis' 

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grandmother's house. Davis described in detail each of the five 

burglaries and the property they took from each house. After 

each burglary, they took the property to Davis' grandmother's 

home. 

 Charles Clark testified that in January 1998 he saw Davis 

and Ortega carrying televisions and jewelry into Davis' 

grandmother's house. In court, he identified some jewelry taken 

during one of the burglaries as jewelry he saw in Davis' and 

Ortega's possession. Clark also testified that in January 1998 

he had seen a jacket that was taken during one of the burglaries 

and that at Davis' request he had pawned some of the stolen 

items. 

 The trial judge convicted Ortega of the five burglaries and 

the five larcenies. He sentenced Ortega to twenty years in 

prison with ten years suspended. 

II. 

 Ortega contends the evidence concerning the 1994 burglaries 

was inherently prejudicial and served only to prove criminal 

propensity. The Commonwealth argues that the evidence was 

properly admitted to prove identity. 

 "Evidence that shows or tends to show a defendant has 

committed a prior crime generally is inadmissible to prove the 

crime charged." Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 

S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998). "This is because such evidence confuses 

one offense with the other, unfairly surprises the defendant 

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with a charge he is unprepared to meet, and, by showing that the 

[defendant] has a criminal propensity, tends to reverse his 

presumption of innocence of the crime on trial." Lewis v. 

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983). 

 Although evidence of other crimes is not admissible when 

offered merely to show the accused's propensity for such crimes 

or acts, see Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 

S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970), it is admissible when it is "relevant to 

an issue or element in the . . . case." Sutphin v. 

Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 245, 337 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1985) 

(citation omitted). 

Thus, evidence of other crimes is allowed 

when it tends to prove motive, intent, or 

knowledge of the defendant. Among other 

exceptions, evidence of other crimes also is 

allowed if relevant to show the 

perpetrator's identity when some aspects of 

the prior crime are so distinctive or 

idiosyncratic that the fact finder 

reasonably could infer that the same person 

committed both crimes. 

Guill, 255 Va. at 138-39, 495 S.E.2d at 491 (citations omitted). 

 When offered to prove identity, the prior crime does not 

have to be a "signature" crime; however, it must show "'a 

singular strong resemblance to the pattern of the offense 

charged.'" Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 

609, 616 (1990) (citation omitted); see also Chichester v. 

Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 448 S.E.2d 638 (1994), cert. denied, 

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513 U.S. 1166 (1995). The identify of the burglar was at issue 

in this case. 

 The detective described a series of similarities among the 

1998 burglaries. In addition, his testimony proved that those 

same similarities existed between the 1994 and 1998 crimes. 

Significantly, the evidence proved that in each burglarized home 

knives were taken from the kitchen and put in other rooms. This 

was a highly unusual circumstance that was common to each 

burglary and was "sufficiently idiosyncratic to admit an 

inference of pattern for purposes of proof." Spencer, 240 Va. 

at 90, 393 S.E.2d at 616. From this evidence, the fact finder 

could reasonably infer that the same person had committed both 

crimes. See id. 

 Ortega pled guilty to his involvement in the 1994 

burglaries, each of which contained "a strong resemblance to the 

pattern of the offense charged in this trial." Id. Thus, 

evidence in the 1994 crimes was probative and relevant. We 

hold, therefore, that the trial judge did not err in admitting 

the evidence. 

 Ortega also argues that the evidence concerning the 1994 

burglaries should not have been admitted because other persons 

were known to have been involved in those crimes. The detective 

testified that Keith Davis, Carlton Davis, and Ortega were 

suspects in the 1994 burglaries. Although Keith and Carlton 

Davis were implicated in the prior burglaries, the evidence 

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proved that Ortega was also a perpetrator in those burglaries. 

While the evidence does not definitively establish that Ortega, 

rather than one of the Davises, was the person who moved the 

knives, Ortega's presence at both the 1994 and the 1998 

burglaries is a sufficient connection between the two sets of 

crimes to permit "the fact finder [to] reasonably . . . infer 

that the same person committed both crimes." Guill, 255 Va. at 

139, 495 S.E.2d at 491. "We cannot say that the trial court 

abused its discretion in concluding that the prejudicial effect 

of admitting evidence of [Ortega's] involvement in the [1994 

burglaries] was outweighed by the probative value of that 

evidence." Chichester, 248 Va. at 328, 448 S.E.2d at 649. 

III. 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 

appeal, we "review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom." Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 

App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). So 

viewed, the evidence proved that five burglaries occurred within 

a fourteen day period and within a one-mile radius of each 

other. Clark identified several of the stolen items and 

testified that he saw Davis and Ortega with those items shortly 

after the burglaries. 

 Duncan, who lives one block away from the house where the 

last burglary occurred, identified Ortega as one of two men who 

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knocked on her door the day the burglary occurred. Although 

Ortega contends that Duncan's identification of him was the 

result of an unduly suggestive procedure, the evidence does not 

support his argument. 

The factors to consider in determining 

reliability are: (1) the witness' 

opportunity to view the criminal at the time 

of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of 

attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' 

prior description of the criminal; (4) the 

level of certainty demonstrated by the 

witness at the confrontation; and (5) the 

length of time between the crime and the 

confrontation. 

Charity v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 258, 262-63, 482 S.E.2d 59, 

61 (1997). 

 Duncan spoke with Ortega for three minutes and could see 

him clearly as they spoke. The next day, she described him to 

the detective. Two days after the event, Duncan viewed a group 

of photographs, which contained a photograph of Ortega's 

brother. Duncan said that the photograph of Ortega's brother 

"looks the most like him"; however, she said he was not the 

person she saw. Several months later, when Duncan was shown 

another photograph spread containing Ortega's photograph, she 

identified Ortega as the man who came to her door. Because 

Duncan apparently recognized similar features in Ortega's 

brother and later identified Ortega, the identifications support 

rather than detract from the conclusion that Ortega was in the 

neighborhood when the burglary occurred. 

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 Although Duncan initially told the detective that the man 

at her door was five feet, ten inches tall, which is two and 

one-half inches taller than Ortega, that discrepancy is not 

sufficient to undermine her positive identification. The facts 

in totality establish the reliability of the identification. 

See id.

 In addition, Davis testified that he and Ortega committed 

the five burglaries. Davis identified the houses and explained 

in detail how he and Ortega gained entry, what items they stole, 

and how they disposed of them. He explained that before 

deciding whether to burglarize a house, they would knock on the 

door to determine whether the residents were at home. That 

conduct was consistent with Duncan's testimony. 

 The evidence also proved that property taken during the 

1998 burglaries was found at Davis' residence and in a pawn 

shop. After Ortega's arrest, no burglaries occurred involving a 

similar pattern. 

 Although Davis' testimony must be considered with caution 

because he is also implicated in the crimes, given the other 

corroborating evidence, his testimony was sufficiently reliable 

to prove Ortega's guilt. See Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. 

App. 57, 63, 480 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1997) (noting that sufficient 

evidence corroborated the codefendant's testimony to prove the 

defendant was present at the scene of the crime). Indeed, a 

defendant "may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of 

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an accomplice." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 525, 527, 298 

S.E.2d 99, 101 (1982). 

 Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Ortega was guilty of the five burglaries 

and the five grand larcenies. We affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed. 

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