J-S19002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: D.A.R., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.A.S. FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 61 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2022-0173a

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: AUGUST 2, 2023

M.A.S. (Father) appeals from the decree, entered on December 16, 

2022, that granted the petition filed by the York County Office of Children 

Youth and Families (CYF) to involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his 

son, D.A.R. (Child), born in July of 2021. Following our review, we affirm the 

decree on appeal.1 

CYF filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. The orphans’ court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion 

indicates that it adopted its opinion that was stated on the record at the end 

of the termination of parental rights hearing, held on December 14, 2022, and 

December 16, 2022. See Orphans’ Court Opinion (OCO), 2/14/23, at 1; N.T., 

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of M.G.R. (Mother) were also terminated on the same 

date; however, Mother did not file an appeal. 
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12/16/22, at 159-200. The orphans’ court also indicates that it took “judicial 

notice of the statements made in the amended motion for judicial notice that 

was filed December 12, 2022. That statement outlines the findings made in 

the underlying dependency action and comports with the orders that were 

entered as identified in that motion.” OCO at 3 n.8 (citing N.T., 12/14/22, at

15). From the foregoing, we glean the following facts. 

This matter began on July 16, 2021, shortly after Child was born. An 

order for emergency protective custody was issued and Child was placed in 

foster care. Although at first Father questioned paternity, he withdrew this 

claim and requested partial supervised visitation, which was granted and over 

time expanded, but with continued supervision. Father was employed, 

working the third shift, which caused Father to fall asleep and not be attentive 

to Child during visitation. Moreover, Father’s home was found not to be 

appropriate. Father was ordered to complete a parenting capacity 

assessment, continue participation in individual therapy, cooperate with 

Catholic Charities, and continue to comply with supervised visitation. Child 

was doing well in the foster home. 

Following a permanency review in December of 2021, Father was found 

to be moderately compliant with the permanency plan. He continued to work 

third shift and was scheduled for the parenting capacity assessment in January 

of 2022. His goals were outlined as follows:

i. Father’s therapeutic goals to be addressed were (1) safe 

decision making, (2) responses to situation and 
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environment, and (3) assuring that Father’s relationships 

are safe for himself and the minor child.

ii. Father’s advocacy goals were (1) housing, (2) 

employment, (3) finances and budgeting, (4) 

transportation, (5) parenting capacity, (6) assuring 

participation in the minor child’s appointments, and (7)

domestic violence and anger management. 

Amended Motion for Judicial Notice (AMJN), 12/12/22, at 9. Although Father’s

progress was rated as moderate, “there continue[d] to be some concerns 

regarding the anger management services and the completion of the Parenting 

Capacity Assessment.” Id. In response to recommendations suggested to 

Father, he attended individual counseling, but did not start couples counseling 

or anger management classes. Although Father did not attend Child’s Early 

Intervention sessions, he did continue to visit with Child, which went well. 

In a status review order issued by the trial court on March 18, 2022, the 

orphans’ court determined that Father was making moderate to significant 

progress with fully supervised visitation with Child, which was moved to 

Father’s home. He continued to work full time and could financially support 

Child. He attended weekly counseling for anger management and domestic 

violence, which “was adjusted to accommodate Father’s borderline intellectual 

functioning.” Id. at 13. 

In the permanency review order issued on June 1, 2022, the orphans’

court found Father’s compliance to be only moderate. He remained employed 

at Burger King. In his home, Father kept a large snake in the bedroom in 

which Child would reside if reunified with Father. A lot of people resided in 
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Father’s home, including his significant other, who needed to complete a 

parenting capacity addendum, and Father was to continue visitation coaching, 

parenting education, and bi-weekly outpatient counseling. Father was 

discharged from anger management classes, had completed a parenting 

capacity assessment, and was diagnosed with unspecified trauma. It was 

determined that Father may be able to parent a child if he had support. It 

was recommended that Father’s visits with Child transition to partial 

supervision, but there was a need to continue placement of Child outside the 

care and custody of Father. 

The findings and conclusions provided in the status review order, dated 

September 12, 2022, indicated that concerns remained as to Father’s 

residence and that police were frequently called there due to domestic 

disputes. Father reported he had changed jobs but provided no 

documentation. Partial visitation with Child continued at Father’s home; 

however, when caseworkers made visits, it was noted that broken glass was 

found in the home which made the location unsafe for Child. It was also noted

that Father allowed his significant other to take Child to the store even though 

she had a lengthy history with CYF. Concerns continued about Father’s 

significant other and the necessity to have frequent contact with the police. 

Father was not in individual therapy as was recommended. As for Child, he 

continued to do well in the foster home and was bonded with his foster 

parents. Child continued with Early Intervention, but Father had not attended 

any of these appointments. It was also reported that Child experienced night 
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terrors after visits with Father. In light of these findings, the court determined

that “the current placement goal was not appropriate and/or feasible in that 

neither parent ha[d] made significant progress toward[] reunification.” Id. at

20. Therefore, the court changed the primary goal to adoption, but

reunification with Father was a concurrent goal. 

The November 16, 2022 permanency review order provided that 

Father’s compliance with the permanency order was moderate. Father

reported that he continued employment but provided no pay stubs or 

verification to CYF. He also indicated that he would be moving from the house 

he shared with his significant other, but continued to remain in their home

despite the fact his significant other seemed to perpetuate the conflicts 

between her and Father, and he took no steps to reduce the conflict. His 

significant other reported that he hit her during one of Child’s visits. Father 

admitted to arguments but denied domestic violence. Therefore, visits with 

Child returned to fully supervised. Father also missed a visit with Child and 

declined a Zoom visit. He also did not provide the necessary special brand of 

diapers and milk that Child required due to acid reflux, eczema and rashes 

from milk protein. Rather, the foster mother provided these necessities. 

Father was attentive to Child during visits but did not feed Child or parent him. 

The court concluded that “Father made minimal progress toward alleviating 

the circumstances which necessitated the original placement.” Id. at 23. 

Additionally, in the November order, the court discussed how well Child 

was doing in the foster home. He was receiving weekly occupational therapy
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and was working on feeding and food aversions. Although given notice by the 

foster mother, Father did not attend medical appointments or Early 

Intervention sessions. The court determined Child’s placement outside 

Father’s custody continued to be needed. Thus, the court found that it was in 

Child’s best interest to be free for adoption and that he could remain with the 

only parents providing for his care. 

As noted above, the hearing on the termination petition was held on 

December 14th and 16th of 2022. CYF presented the testimony of a caseworker

involved in the matter and the foster mother. Father testified on his own 

behalf. The court then issued its decree terminating Father’s parental rights 

to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption 

Act. Thereafter, Father filed a timely appeal to this Court, setting out the

following issues in his brief: 

I. Whether the orphans’ court erred in terminating the parental 

rights of Father pursuant to [S]ection 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and 

(8) of the Adoption Act?

a. The evidence did not support by clear and convincing 

evidence that Father had evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to [C]hild or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties. 

b. The evidence did not support by clear and convincing 

evidence that [C]hild was without parental care or control 

or that the conditions which led to the initial placement 

would not or could not be remedied by Father.

c. There was not clear and convincing evidence that [F]ather

could not or would not remedy the conditions which led to 

the initial removal. 
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d. There was not clear and convincing evidence that the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of [C]hild 

continued to exist and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of [C]hild. 

II. Whether the orphans’ court erred in concluding that 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of ... Child pursuant to [S]ection 2511(b) of the 

Adoption Act? 

III. Whether the orphans’ court erred in concluding Father failed 

to meet many of his goals as Father was doing well until [] his 

visits were changed back to supervised visits due to “concerns” 

about domestic violence, which were never substantiated? 

Father’s brief at 6-7.2 

Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases 

implicate[s] the following principles: 

In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our 

standard of review is limited to determining whether 

the order of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate 

consideration to the effect of such a decree on the 

welfare of the child.”

In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.D.T., 

Jr., 934 A.2d 703 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, ... 950 A.2d 

270 ([Pa.] 2008)).

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. ... We must employ 

a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order 

to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence. 

____________________________________________

2 Father listed a fourth issue, but in the Argument Section of his brief he 

withdraws that “issue from this Court’s consideration.” See Father’s brief at 

36. Therefore, we do not include it in the list of issues raised. 
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In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), 

appeal denied, ... 863 A.2d 1141 ([Pa.] 2004) (internal citations 

omitted). 

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder 

of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of 

witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be 

resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof 

is on the party seeking termination to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so. 

In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights 

is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination 

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 
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However, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d at 384. 

We therefore consider the orphans’ court’s termination of Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide: 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.-The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

This Court has stated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §

2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the

child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more

from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the
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removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and

welfare of the child.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003); see

also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).

“Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy

the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re A.R.,

837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the twelve-month period has

been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that

led to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable, good faith

efforts of CYF supplied over a realistic period. Id. The “relevant inquiry in

this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied

and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of

the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d at 11. This Court has acknowledged:

[T]he application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the 

parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems 

that had led to removal of her children. By allowing for

termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to

exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s

life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to

perform the actions necessary to assume parenting

responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.

In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 997 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting I.J., 972 A.2d at

11-12).

With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to section

2511(a)(8) and (b), we have observed:
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[I]nitially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, 

under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is 

on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an

evaluation of the “needs and welfare of the child” prior to

proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the

“developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the

child.” Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for

the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent. 

Moreover, only if a court determines that the parent’s conduct

warrants termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to

Section 2511(a), does a court “engage in the second part of the

analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the

child.” Accordingly, while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section

2511(b) direct us to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,”

we are required to resolve the analysis relative to Section

2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the

child], as proscribed by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct

in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section

2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en

banc) (citations omitted). “Section 2511(a)(8) does not require an evaluation

of the remedial efforts of either the parent or [the Agency].” In re B.C., 36

A.3d 601, 611 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007).

With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite

analysis as follows:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect

on the child of permanently severing that bond. However, in cases

where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child,

it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946

A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of
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the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

The thrust of Father’s argument relating to subsection (a)(8) is that CYF 

did not carry its burden. Although Father concedes that the 12-month period

required in subsection (a)(8) has elapsed, he “does not concede that the 

conditions which led to the removal of [C]hild continue to exist or could not 

be remedied promptly.” Father’s brief at 28. He asserts that the initial 

concerns were with Mother and that he made progress during much of the 

case and his visits with Child became partially supervised visits in his home. 

Father also points out that he maintained employment and stable housing. 

Additionally, he asserts that he “complied with the Agency’s request for a 

Parenting Capacity Assessment[] and engaged in counseling and anger 

management counseling.” Id. at 29. He further relies on the Parenting 

Capacity Assessment that showed he could raise Child with support. He also

argues that the record did not support the court’s conclusions that there were

domestic violence concerns. With regard to subsection (b), Father asserts 

that the bond between him and Child is limited because of the amount of time 

he spends with Child. He also contends that he is ready to have Child in his 

home and that he “has extended family in the area that would be supportive

and would love to see [C]hild.” Id. at 32. 

The orphans’ court responded to Father’s arguments set forth in his first 

and second issues, specifically, those relating to subsections (a)(8) and (b) as 

follows: 
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The [c]ourt has noted that [Father] had some instances of 

progress in remedying the conditions that initially caused 

placement. However, these instances were only brief windows of 

time in which [Father] showed minimal motivation to fully remedy 

those conditions to achieve reunification. Brief instances of 

improvement do not negate that the second element of this factor 

is satisfied. Though an unpublished opinion, we find compelling a

Superior Court decision that affirmed a trial court’s finding 

regarding similar conduct by a parent when it terminated the 

parental rights of a mother under § 2511(a)(8), when the mother 

made inconsistent and sporadic progress towards remedying the 

conditions that led to the initial removal only to subsequently

rescind on that progress each time. As the court so aptly stated:

It was proper for the trial court to conclude that 

Mother has exhibited a pattern of poor judgment and 

bad decision making, and that she failed to correct 

that pattern.

In the Interest of J.M.K., 159 A.3d 44 (Pa. Super. ... 2016)

([u]npublished).[3]

Similarly, although [Father] achieved some progress toward

addressing the conditions that led to [C]hild’s removal, the second 

element of this factor is still satisfied, as he shows a clear pattern 

of poor judgment and bad decision[-]making which resulted in 

conditions re-emerging and leaving [C]hild to languish in care.

For example, [Father] would appropriately change [h]is work 

schedule, but changed it back. [Father] progressed to partially 

unsupervised custody, but then required full supervision. [Father]

picked which treatment and programs he wanted to participate in, 

but refused to entertain most attempts to assist him.

Specifically, [Father] did not adequately or consistently 

address his housing or his employment issues, which were the 

issues that le[]d to the initial removal. He found suitable housing, 

but quickly returned to unsuitable housing. He switched to work 

a shift that would permit basic childcare, and then returned to 

working 3rd shift without developing any plan for supervision of 

[C]hild by a competent adult while he was at work. Over the 

course of sixteen (16) months, [Father] made arbitrary and poor 

____________________________________________

3 We remind the orphans’ court that only unpublished non-precedential 

memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be 

cited for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). 
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decisions on what resources he did and did not feel like utilizing.

He made poor judgment about what constituted proper housing 

or working hours that would allow for basic childcare. At one 

point, he even declined the Agency’s offer of bus passes to help 

with transportation to [C]hild’s medical appointments. Although 

we need not consider the parent’s ability or willingness to remedy 

these conditions under this subsection, [Father] showed through 

his inconsistencies that he had the potential to remedy the 

conditions when he felt inclined, but would do so ... only for short 

periods of time.

Like the Superior Court’s findings in In the [I]nterest of 

J.M.K., the record reflects that [Father] had a pattern of poor 

judgment and bad decision[-]making that he failed to correct. The 

trial court submits that this is enough to satisfy § 2511(a)(8).

[Father’s] statement also contends that the [orphans’] court 

erred in concluding that the third prong of the § 2511(a)(8) 

analysis was satisfied, and that termination of parental rights

would not best serve the needs and welfare of [C]hild pursuant to 

§ 2511(b) of the Adoption Act.

The [orphans’] court submits that it found termination would 

best serve the needs and welfare of [C]hild based on clear and 

convincing evidence presented by the [Agency]. In addition to 

the daily needs being met exclusively in the foster home, [C]hild 

has required specialized care for his multiple health issues.13 The 

foster parents provided most, if not all, of the required supplies

for these issues for nearly [C]hild’s entire life. The foster parents 

also ensured that the [C]hild attended ongoing medical 

appointments and followed treatment plans. [Father] was not 

able to consistently provide for [C]hild’s basic and special needs, 

even with coaching and notice, at any time leading to the filing of 

the petition. [Father] did not ask about [C]hild’s progress in 

physical therapy or for any updates on [C]hild. [Father’s] inability 

to provide consistent care would be particularly harmful to a child 

with ongoing medical issues who requires a parent who can 

perform tasks such as timely administer[ing] [C]hild’s medication 

and ensur[ing] [C]hild attends his scheduled appointments. 

13 [C]hild’s health concerns include reoccurring eczema 

diaper rashes, muscle issues in his neck, eye[]tracking 

issues, food aversion, lactose intolerance, and other 

gastrointestinal issues that require special diapers and 

formula. 
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Furthermore, the Superior Court has held that common 

sense dictates that when courts consider termination, they must 

additionally consider whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home, 

and whether the child has a bond with their foster parents. In re 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267-69 (Pa. Super. 2013). The record

shows that [C]hild has bonded with his foster parents, and that 

his foster parents provide for his emotional needs as well. Again, 

[C]hild’s foster parents were his caretakers for nearly his entire 

life. Foster mother testified that [C]hild refers to his foster 

parents as “mom” and “dad”, respectively. There was no 

indication the Child had bonded with [Father], and it was reported 

[C]hild experienced night terrors after visiting with him. [Father] 

acknowledged in his own testimony that [C]hild does not refer to 

him as “dada”. [Father] also acknowledge[d] [C]hild has little to 

no interest in interacting with him during visits, and that there is 

no bond between them. In light of these facts and [Father’s] own 

admissions, [C]hild would suffer no long-term harm from severing 

his contact with [Father], because there is little to no bond to 

sever. Therefore, the trial court submits that termination of

parental rights best serves the needs and welfare of [C]hild. 

OCO at 5-10 (footnotes citing pages in the N.T. omitted). 

Based upon the facts found by the orphans’ court, which our review 

reveals are supported by the evidence of record, we discern no abuse of 

discretion by the court in its conclusion that the asserted grounds for seeking 

termination of parental rights are valid and, additionally, that terminating 

Father’s parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of Child.4

The entire thrust of Father’s third issue is essentially a restatement of 

the facts that were found in his favor and his contention that some of the 

court’s findings were not substantiated by the evidence. Again, we are 

____________________________________________

4 We further observe that the attorney representing Child joined CYF’s brief 

that was in support of the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate Father’s 

parental rights. 
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compelled to disagree with Father’s argument. Rather, the court’s extensive

review and discussion is supported by the record. Moreover, as noted earlier, 

the orphans’ court is the sole finder of fact and the determiner of credibility of

the witnesses. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1116. We, therefore, conclude 

that the court did not abuse its discretion or commit reversible error in 

terminating Father’s parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the decree from 

which Father appealed. 

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/2/2023