II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 3267 

To reform the antitrust laws to better protect competition in the American 

economy, to amend the Clayton Act to modify the standard for an 

unlawful acquisition. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 18, 2021 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR (for herself, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Ms. HIRONO, and Mr. 

BOOKER) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To reform the antitrust laws to better protect competition 

in the American economy, to amend the Clayton Act 

to modify the standard for an unlawful acquisition. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Consolidation Preven5 tion and Competition Promotion Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES. 

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 

8 (1) competitive markets, in which multiple 

9 firms compete to buy and sell products and services, 


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1 are critical to ensuring economic opportunity for all 

2 people in the United States and providing resilience 

3 to the economy during unpredictable times; 

4 (2) when companies compete, businesses offer 

5 the highest quality and choice of goods and services 

6 for the lowest possible prices to consumers and other 

7 businesses; 

8 (3) competition fosters small business growth, 

9 reduces economic inequality, and spurs innovation 

10 and job creation; 

11 (4) in the United States economy today, the 

12 presence and exercise of market power is substantial 

13 and growing; 

14 (5) the presence and exercise of market power 

15 makes it more difficult for people in the United 

16 States to start their own businesses, depresses 

17 wages, and increases economic inequality, with par18 ticularly damaging effects on historically disadvan19 taged communities; 

20 (6) market power and undue market concentra21 tion contribute to the consolidation of political 

22 power, undermining the health of democracy in the 

23 United States; 

24 (7) the anticompetitive effects of monopoly 

25 power or buyer market power include higher prices, 


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1 lower quality, lessened choice, reduced innovation, 

2 foreclosure of competitors, and increased entry bar3 riers; 

4 (8) monopsony power or seller market power al5 lows a firm to force suppliers of goods or services to 

6 accept below market prices or to force workers to ac7 cept below market wages, resulting in lower quality 

8 products and services, reduced opportunities for sup9 pliers and workers, reduced availability of products 

10 and services for consumers, reduced innovation, fore11 closure of competitors, and increased entry barriers; 

12 (9) horizontal consolidation, vertical consolida13 tion, and conglomerate mergers all have potential to 

14 increase market power and cause anticompetitive 

15 harm; 

16 (10) extensive consolidation is reducing com17 petition and threatens to place the American dream 

18 further out of reach for many consumers in the 

19 United States; 

20 (11) since 2008, firms in the United States 

21 have engaged in over $10,000,000,000,000 in merg22 ers and acquisitions; 

23 (12) the acquisition of nascent or potential ri24 vals by dominant firms can present significant long25 term threats to competition and innovation; 


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1 (13) the acquisition, by one of its competitors, 

2 of a maverick firm that plays a disruptive role in the 

3 market—by using an innovative business model or 

4 technology, offering lower prices or new, different 

5 products or services products, or by other means 

6 that benefit consumers—can present a threat to 

7 competition; 

8 (14) section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 

9 18), is the primary line of defense against anti10 competitive mergers; and 

11 (15) in recent years, some court decisions and 

12 enforcement policies have limited the vitality of the 

13 Clayton Act to prevent harmful consolidation by— 

14 (A) discounting previously accepted pre15 sumptions that certain acquisitions are anti16 competitive; 

17 (B) focusing inordinately on the effect of 

18 an acquisition on price in the short term, to the 

19 exclusion of other potential anticompetitive ef20 fects; 

21 (C) underestimating the dangers that hori22 zontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers will 

23 lower quality, reduce choice, impede innovation, 

24 exclude competitors, increase entry barriers, or 


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1 create buyer power, including monopsony 

2 power; and 

3 (D) requiring the government to prove 

4 harmful effects of a proposed merger to a near 

5 certainty. 

6 (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are to— 

7 (1) enhance competition throughout the Amer8 ican economy by strengthening antitrust enforce9 ment by the Department of Justice, the Federal 

10 Trade Commission, the State enforcement agencies, 

11 and private parties; 

12 (2) revise the legal standard under section 7 of 

13 the Clayton Act to better enable enforcers to arrest 

14 the likely anticompetitive effects of harmful mergers 

15 in their incipiency, as Congress intended, by clari16 fying that the potential effects that may justify pro17 hibiting a merger under the Clayton Act include 

18 lower quality, reduced choice, reduced innovation, 

19 the exclusion of competitors, or increased entry bar20 riers, in addition to increased price to buyers or re21 duced price to sellers; 

22 (3) amend the Clayton Act to clarify that an 

23 acquisition that tends to create a monopsony violates 

24 the Clayton Act; and 


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1 (4) establish simple, cost-effective decision rules 

2 that require the parties to certain acquisitions that 

3 either significantly increase concentration or are ex4 tremely large bear the burden of establishing that 

5 the acquisition will not materially harm competition. 

6 SEC. 3. DEFINITION. 

7 In this Act the term ‘‘antitrust laws’’— 

8 (1) has the meaning given the term in the first 

9 section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12); and 

10 (2) includes— 

11 (A) section 5 of the Federal Trade Com12 mission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that 

13 such section applies to unfair methods of com14 petition; and 

15 (B) this Act and the amendments made by 

16 this Act. 

17 SEC. 4. UNLAWFUL ACQUISITIONS. 

18 (a) MARKET POWER.—Section 1(a) of the Clayton 

19 Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)) is amended by adding at the end 

20 the following: 

21 ‘‘the term ‘market power’ in this Act means the 

22 ability of a person, or a group of persons acting in 

23 concert, to profitably impose terms or conditions on 

24 counterparties, including terms regarding price, 

25 quantity, product or service quality, or other terms 


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1 affecting the value of consideration exchanged in the 

2 transaction, that are more favorable to the person or 

3 group of persons imposing them than what the per4 son or group of persons could obtain in a competi5 tive market.’’. 

6 (b) UNLAWFUL ACQUISITIONS.—Section 7 of the 

7 Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18) is amended— 

8 (1) in the first and second undesignated para9 graphs, by striking ‘‘substantially to lessen’’ each 

10 place that term appears and inserting ‘‘to create an 

11 appreciable risk of materially lessening’’; 

12 (2) by inserting ‘‘or a monopsony’’ after ‘‘mo13 nopoly’’ each place that term appears; and 

14 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

15 ‘‘In a case brought by the United States, the Federal 

16 Trade Commission, or a State attorney general, a court 

17 shall determine that the effect of an acquisition described 

18 in this section may be to create an appreciable risk of ma19 terially lessening competition or to tend to create a monop20 oly or a monopsony, in or affecting commerce, if— 

21 ‘‘(1) the acquisition would lead to a significant 

22 increase in market concentration in any relevant 

23 market; 

24 ‘‘(2)(A) the acquiring person has a market 

25 share of greater than 50 percent or otherwise has 


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1 significant market power, as a seller or a buyer, in 

2 any relevant market, and as a result of the acquisi3 tion, the acquiring person would obtain control over 

4 entities or assets that compete or have a reasonable 

5 probability of competing with the acquiring person 

6 in the same relevant market; or 

7 ‘‘(B) as a result of the acquisition, the acquir8 ing person would obtain control over entities or as9 sets that have a market share of greater than 50 

10 percent or otherwise have significant market power, 

11 as a seller or a buyer, in any relevant market, and 

12 the acquiring person competes or has a reasonable 

13 probability of competing with the entities or assets 

14 over which it would obtain control, as result of the 

15 acquisition, in the same relevant market; 

16 ‘‘(3) the acquisition would lead to the combina17 tion of entities or assets that compete or have a rea18 sonable probability of competing in a relevant mar19 ket, and either the acquiring person or the entities 

20 or assets over which it would obtain control pre21 vents, limits, or disrupts coordinated interaction 

22 among competitors in a relevant market or has a 

23 reasonable probability of doing so; 

24 ‘‘(4) the acquisition— 


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1 ‘‘(A) would likely enable the acquiring per2 son to unilaterally and profitably exercise mar3 ket power or materially increase its ability to do 

4 so; or 

5 ‘‘(B) would materially increase the prob6 ability of coordinated interaction among com7 petitors in any relevant market; or 

8 ‘‘(5)(A) the acquisition is not a transaction that 

9 is described in section 7A(c); and 

10 ‘‘(B)(i) as a result of such acquisition, the ac11 quiring person would hold an aggregate total 

12 amount of the voting securities and assets of the ac13 quired person in excess of $5,000,000,000 (as ad14 justed and published for each fiscal year beginning 

15 after September 30, 2022, in the same manner as 

16 provided in section 8(a)(5) to reflect the percentage 

17 change in the gross national product for such fiscal 

18 year compared to the gross national product for the 

19 year ending September 30, 2021); or 

20 ‘‘(ii)(I) the person acquiring or the person being 

21 acquired has assets, net annual sales, or a market 

22 capitalization greater than $100,000,000,000 (as so 

23 adjusted and published); and 

24 ‘‘(II) as a result of such acquisition, the acquir25 ing person would hold an aggregate total amount of 


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1 the voting securities and assets of the acquired per2 son in excess of $50,000,000 (as so adjusted and 

3 published), 

4 unless the acquiring or acquired person establish, by 

5 a preponderance of the evidence, that the effect of 

6 the acquisition will not be to create an appreciable 

7 risk of materially lessening competition or tend to 

8 create a monopoly or a monopsony. In this para9 graph, the term ‘materially’ means more than a de 

10 minimis amount.’’. 

11 SEC. 5. POST-SETTLEMENT DATA. 

12 Section 7A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a) is 

13 amended by adding at the end the following: 

14 ‘‘(l)(1) Each person who enters into an agreement 

15 with the Federal Trade Commission or the United States 

16 to resolve a proceeding brought under the antitrust laws 

17 or under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 

18 41 et seq.) regarding an acquisition with respect to which 

19 notification is required under this section shall, on an an20 nual basis during the 5-year period beginning on the date 

21 on which the agreement is entered into, submit to the Fed22 eral Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General, 

23 as applicable, information sufficient for the Federal Trade 

24 Commission or the United States, as applicable, to assess 

25 the competitive impact of the acquisition, including— 


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1 ‘‘(A) the pricing, availability, and quality of any 

2 product or service, or inputs thereto, in any market, 

3 that was covered by the agreement; 

4 ‘‘(B) the source, and the resulting magnitude 

5 and extent, of any cost-saving efficiencies or any 

6 benefits to consumers or trading partners that were 

7 claimed as a benefit of the acquisition and the extent 

8 to which any cost savings were passed on to con9 sumers or trading partners; and 

10 ‘‘(C) the effectiveness of any divestitures or any 

11 conditions placed on the acquisition in fully restoring 

12 competition. 

13 ‘‘(2) The requirement to provide the information de14 scribed in paragraph (1) shall be included in an agreement 

15 described in that paragraph. 

16 ‘‘(3) The Federal Trade Commission, with the con17 currence of the Assistant Attorney General, by rule in ac18 cordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, 

19 and consistent with the purposes of this section— 

20 ‘‘(A) shall require that the information de21 scribed in paragraph (1) be in such form and con22 tain such documentary material and information rel23 evant to an acquisition as is necessary and appro24 priate to enable the Federal Trade Commission and 

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1 petitive impact of the acquisition under paragraph 

2 (1); and 

3 ‘‘(B) may— 

4 ‘‘(i) define the terms used in this sub5 section; 

6 ‘‘(ii) exempt, from the requirements of this 

7 section, information not relevant in assessing 

8 the competitive impact of the acquisition under 

9 paragraph (1); and 

10 ‘‘(iii) prescribe such other rules as may be 

11 necessary and appropriate to carry out the pur12 poses of this section.’’. 

13 SEC. 6. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STUDY. 

14 Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment 

15 of this Act, the Federal Trade Commission, in consulta16 tion with the Securities and Exchange Commission, shall 

17 conduct and publish a study, using any compulsory proc18 ess necessary, relying on public data and information if 

19 available and sufficient, and incorporating public comment 

20 on— 

21 (1) the extent to which an institutional investor 

22 or related institutional investors have ownership or 

23 control interests in competitors in moderately con24 centrated or concentrated markets; 


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1 (2) the economic impacts of such overlapping 

2 ownership or control; and 

3 (3) the mechanisms by which an institutional 

4 investor could affect competition among the compa5 nies in which it invests and whether such mecha6 nisms are prevalent. 

7 SEC. 7. GAO STUDIES. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months after 

9 the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General 

10 of the United States shall— 

11 (1) conduct a study to assess the success of 

12 merger remedies required by the Department of Jus13 tice or the Federal Trade Commission in consent de14 crees entered into since 6 years prior to the date of 

15 enactment of this Act, including the impact on main16 taining competition, a comparison of structural and 

17 conduct remedies, and the viability of divested as18 sets; and 

19 (2) conduct a study on the impact of mergers 

20 and acquisitions on wages, employment, innovation, 

21 and new business formation. 

22 (b) UPDATE.—The Comptroller General of the 

23 United States shall— 

24 (1) update the study under paragraph (1) 3 

25 years and 6 years after the date of enactment of this 


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1 Act based on the information provided under section 

2 7A(l) of the Clayton Act, as added by section 5 of 

3 this Act; and 

4 (2) identify specific remedies or alleged merger 

5 benefits that require additional information or re6 search. 

7 SEC. 8. OFFICE OF COMPETITION ADVOCATE. 

8 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

9 (1) the term ‘‘agency’’ has the meaning given 

10 the term in section 551 of title 5, United States 

11 Code; 

12 (2) the term ‘‘covered company’’ means any 

13 company that has, at any time, been required to 

14 make a filing under section 7A of the Clayton Act 

15 (15 U.S.C. 18a); 

16 (3) the term ‘‘Office’’ means the Office of the 

17 Competition Advocate established under subsection 

18 (b); 

19 (4) the term ‘‘Chairman’’ means the Chairman 

20 of the Commission; and 

21 (5) the term ‘‘Commission’’ means the Federal 

22 Trade Commission. 

23 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established within 

24 the Federal Trade Commission the Office of the Competi25 tion Advocate. 


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1 (c) COMPETITION ADVOCATE.— 

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Office shall 

3 be the Competition Advocate, who shall— 

4 (A) report directly to the Chairman; and 

5 (B) be appointed by the Chairman, with 

6 the concurrence of a majority of the Commis7 sion, including at least 1 Commissioner who is 

8 not a member of the same political party of the 

9 majority members of the Commission, from 

10 among individuals having experience in advo11 cating for the promotion of competition. 

12 (2) COMPENSATION.—The annual rate of pay 

13 for the Competition Advocate shall be equal to the 

14 highest rate of annual pay for other senior execu15 tives who report to the Chairman of the Commis16 sion. 

17 (3) LIMITATION ON SERVICE.—An individual 

18 who serves as the Competition Advocate may not be 

19 employed by the Commission— 

20 (A) during the 2-year period ending on the 

21 date of appointment as Competition Advocate; 

22 or 

23 (B) during the 5-year period beginning on 

24 the date on which the person ceases to serve as 

25 the Competition Advocate. 


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1 (d) STAFF OF OFFICE.—The Competition Advocate, 

2 after consultation with the Chairman of the Commission, 

3 shall retain or employ independent counsel, research staff, 

4 and service staff, as the Competition Advocate determines 

5 is necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties 

6 of the Office. 

7 (e) DUTIES AND POWERS.—The Competition Advo8 cate shall— 

9 (1) recommend processes or procedures that 

10 will allow the Federal Trade Commission and the 

11 Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to 

12 improve the ability of each agency to solicit reports 

13 from consumers, small businesses, and employees 

14 about possible anticompetitive practices or adverse 

15 effects of concentration; 

16 (2) publicly provide recommendations to other 

17 Federal agencies about administrative actions that 

18 may have anticompetitive effects and the potential 

19 harm to competition if those actions are carried out; 

20 (3) provide recommendations to other Federal 

21 agencies about administrative actions that may have 

22 procompetitive effects and the potential benefit to 

23 competition if those actions are carried out; 

24 (4) publish periodic reports on— 


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1 (A) market competition and its impact on 

2 the United States, local geographic areas, and 

3 different demographic and socioeconomic 

4 groups; and 

5 (B) the success of remedies required by the 

6 Department of Justice or the Federal Trade 

7 Commission in consent decrees; 

8 (5) collect data regarding concentration levels 

9 across industries and the impact and degree of anti10 trust enforcement; and 

11 (6) standardize the types and formats of data 

12 reported and collected. 

13 (f) SUBPOENA AUTHORITY.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Competition Advocate 

15 may either require the submission of or accept vol16 untary submissions of periodic and other reports 

17 from any covered company for the purpose of assess18 ing competition and its impact on the United States, 

19 local geographic areas, and different demographic 

20 and socioeconomic groups. 

21 (2) WRITTEN FINDING.—Before issuing a sub22 poena to collect the information described in para23 graph (1), the Competition Advocate shall make a 

24 written finding that— 


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1 (A) the data is required to carry out the 

2 functions of the Competition Advocate; and 

3 (B) the information is not available from a 

4 public source or another agency. 

5 (3) MITIGATION OF REPORT BURDEN.—Before 

6 requiring the submission of a report from any com7 pany required to make a filing under section 7A of 

8 the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a), the Competition 

9 Advocate shall— 

10 (A) coordinate with other agencies or au11 thority; and 

12 (B) whenever possible, rely on information 

13 available from such agencies or authority. 

14 (g) DATA CENTER.— 

15 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established 

16 within the Office the Data Center. 

17 (2) DUTIES.—The Data Center shall— 

18 (A) collect, validate, and maintain data ob19 tained from agencies, as defined in section 551 

20 of title 5, United States Code, commercial data 

21 providers, publicly available data sources, and 

22 any covered company; and 

23 (B) prepare and publish, in a manner that 

24 is easily accessible to the public— 

25 (i) a concentration database; 


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1 (ii) a merger enforcement database; 

2 (iii) any other database that the Com3 petition Advocate determines is necessary 

4 to carry out the duties of the Office; and 

5 (iv) the format and standards for Of6 fice data, including standards for reporting 

7 financial transaction and position data to 

8 the Office. 

9 (3) REGULATIONS.—The Competition Advocate 

10 shall promulgate regulations relating to the collec11 tion and standardizing of data under paragraph (2). 

12 (4) CONFIDENTIALITY.— 

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Data Center may 

14 not disclose any confidential data collected 

15 under paragraph (2). 

16 (B) REQUIREMENTS.—Data obtained from 

17 an agency shall be subject to the same confiden18 tiality requirements and protection as the agen19 cy providing the data. 

20 (C) INFORMATION SECURITY.—The Com21 petition Advocate shall ensure that data col22 lected and maintained by the Data Center are 

23 kept secure and protected against unauthorized 

24 disclosure. 

25 (h) DIVISION OF MARKET ANALYSIS.— 


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1 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established 

2 within the Office the Division of Market Analysis. 

3 (2) LEADERSHIP.—The head of the Division of 

4 Market Analysis shall be the Director of Market 

5 Analysis, who shall— 

6 (A) report directly to the Competition Ad7 vocate; and 

8 (B) be appointed by the Competition Advo9 cate, with the concurrence of a majority of the 

10 Commission, including at least one Commis11 sioner who is not a member of the same polit12 ical party of the majority members of the Com13 mission. 

14 (3) DIVISION STAFF.—The Division of Market 

15 Analysis shall retain or employ independent legal, 

16 economic, research, and service staff sufficient to 

17 carry out the functions, powers, and duties of the 

18 Division. 

19 (4) DUTIES AND POWERS.—The Division of 

20 Market Analysis— 

21 (A) shall, at the direction of the Competi22 tion Advocate or the Commission, conduct in23 vestigations of markets or industry sectors to 

24 analyze the competitive conditions and dynam25 ics affecting such markets or industry sectors, 


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1 including the effects that market concentration, 

2 mergers and acquisitions, certain types of 

3 agreements, and other forms of business con4 duct have on competition, consumers, workers 

5 and innovation, and shall publish reports on the 

6 results of such investigations; 

7 (B) shall, at the direction of the Competi8 tion Advocate or the Commission, conduct in9 vestigations concerning the competitive effects 

10 of acquisitions that have been consummated no 

11 less than 2 years prior to the start of the inves12 tigation, which shall include recommendations 

13 concerning appropriate enforcement action to 

14 remedy any anticompetitive effects discovered 

15 and may include assessments of— 

16 (i) the conditions of the relevant mar17 kets affected by the acquisition, over the 

18 period since the acquisition was con19 summated, including, but not limited to, 

20 the potential impact that the acquisition 

21 has had on— 

22 (I) the prices of goods or serv23 ices, including wages in any affected 

24 labor markets; 


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1 (II) the output and quality of 

2 goods and services; 

3 (III) the entry or exit of competi4 tors; 

5 (IV) innovation; 

6 (V) consumer choice and product 

7 variety; 

8 (VI) the opportunity of suppliers 

9 and works to sell their product or 

10 services; 

11 (VII) coordinated interaction be12 tween competitors; and 

13 (VIII) subsequent mergers and 

14 acquisitions activity; 

15 (ii) whether the acquiring person or 

16 its successors in interest— 

17 (I) complied with all obligations 

18 under any agreement with the Federal 

19 Trade Commission, the United States, 

20 or State law enforcement authorities 

21 to resolve a proceeding brought under 

22 the antitrust laws; and 

23 (II) achieved measurable, trans24 action-specific efficiencies, which did 

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1 tions of output, as a result of the ac2 quisition; and 

3 (iii) whether any agreements with the 

4 Federal Trade Commission or the United 

5 States to resolve a proceeding brought 

6 under the antitrust laws regarding the ac7 quisition was effective in mitigating the 

8 anticompetitive effects from the acquisi9 tion; 

10 (C) shall rely on public data and informa11 tion, public comment, information from other 

12 Federal agencies, information from the Data 

13 Center, information obtained pursuant to the 

14 Competition Advocate’s subpoena authority 

15 under subsection (f) of this section and may use 

16 compulsory process under section 6(b) of the 

17 Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 

18 46(b)) as necessary to carry out the functions 

19 set forth in subsections (h)(3)(A) and (h)(3)(B) 

20 of this section; and 

21 (D) shall report any evidence it obtains 

22 that any person, partnership, or corporation has 

23 engaged in transactions or conduct that may 

24 constitute of a violation of the antitrust law to 

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1 vestigation, initiate enforcement proceedings, or 

2 refer such evidence to the Attorney General. 

3 SEC. 9. MARKET DEFINITION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Establishing liability under the 

5 antitrust laws does not require the definition of a relevant 

6 market, except when the definition of a relevant market 

7 is required, to establish a presumption or to resolve a 

8 claim, under a statutory provision that explicitly ref9 erences the terms ‘‘relevant market’’, ‘‘market concentra10 tion’’, or ‘‘market share’’. Statutory references to the term 

11 ‘‘line of commerce’’ shall not constitute an exception to 

12 the foregoing rule that establishing liability under the 

13 antitrust laws does not require the definition of a relevant 

14 market. 

15 (b) DIRECT EVIDENCE.—If direct evidence in the 

16 record is sufficient to prove actual or likely harm to com17 petition, an appreciable risk to competition sufficient to 

18 satisfy the applicable statutory standard, or that the effect 

19 of an acquisition subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act 

20 (15 U.S.C. 18) may be to create an appreciable risk of 

21 materially lessening competition or to tend to create a mo22 nopoly or a monopsony, neither a court nor the Federal 

23 Trade Commission shall require definition of a relevant 

24 market in order to evaluate the evidence, to find liability, 


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1 or to find that a claim has been stated under the antitrust 

2 laws. 

3 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec4 tion may be construed to prevent a court or the Federal 

5 Trade Commission from considering evidence relating to 

6 the definition of proposed relevant markets to evaluate the 

7 merits of a claim under the antitrust laws. 

8 SEC. 10. ADDITIONAL REMEDIES; RULES OF CONSTRUC9 TION. 

10 (a) ADDITIONAL REMEDIES.—The rights and rem11 edies provided under this Act are in addition to, not in 

12 lieu of, any other rights and remedies provided by Federal 

13 law, including under section 4, 4A, 15, or 16 of the Clay14 ton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, 25, 26) or section 13(b) of 

15 the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 53(b)). 

16 (b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act 

17 may be construed to— 

18 (1) impair or limit the applicability of any of 

19 the antitrust laws; and 

20 (2) prohibit any other remedy provided by Fed21 eral law. 

Æ 


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