UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

KEVIN TAMAR DAVIS, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

DAN SCHNURR, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 20-3048 

(D.C. No. 5:19-CV-03062-SAC) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Kevin Tamar Davis, proceeding pro se,

1

 challenges the Kansas Department of 

Children and Families’ (DCF) decision classifying him as a “perpetrator of sexual 

abuse” and requiring him to register on the state’s Child Abuse and Neglect Registry. 

The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 

to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Seeing no error, we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Davis is pro se, we construe his filings liberally, but we do not act 

as his advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 27, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

I. 

 In February 2015, Davis was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent 

liberties with a child and sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life 

imprisonment. State v. Davis, 416 P.3d 171, *1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (table). The 

DCF determined Davis was a “perpetrator of sexual abuse” and placed his name on 

the Kansas Child Abuse and Neglect Registry for three years, barring him from 

working, volunteering, or residing at a childcare facility. Davis v. Kan. Dep’t for 

Children and Families, 410 P.3d 164, *1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (table). Davis 

administratively appealed the determination. Id. After several years of 

administrative review, the State Appeals Committee ultimately rejected his position, 

agreeing with the DCF that Davis’ status as a “perpetrator of sexual abuse” was 

substantiated because his guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at his criminal 

trial. Id. at *2. 

 Next, Davis petitioned the Kansas state trial court for review of his 

administrative claim. Id. The trial court denied Davis relief, concluding “the 

evidence overwhelmingly support[ed] the DCF,” and caselaw provided no support for 

his position. Id. (alteration in original). Davis appealed the trial court’s denial to the 

Kansas Court of Appeals, which denied relief and affirmed the DCF’s determination 

that Davis was a “perpetrator of sexual abuse.” See id. at *3–*10. 

In April 2019, Davis filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in district court, again 

challenging the DCF’s administrative decision to classify him as a “perpetrator of 

sexual abuse” and requiring him to register. See Davis v. Schnurr, No. 5:19-CV-
3 

03062 (D. Kan. 2019). Pointing out that § 2254 petitions are used to challenge “the 

validity of a conviction and sentence,” the district court instead liberally construed 

Davis’ challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because he was not challenging his 

criminal conviction but rather the DCF’s administrative action. Aplt. App. at 748. 

The district court dismissed, holding both that the state court judgment had 

preclusive effect, and that Davis’ challenge was barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Id. at 748–50. 

Davis moved to reconsider, or in the alternative, for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis (IFP) on appeal. Id. at 752–54. Construing his motion as a Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) motion, the district court denied relief, explaining Davis 

had “not provid[ed] any persuasive challenge to the dismissal.” Id. at 760–61. 

However, the district court granted Davis the right to proceed IFP on appeal. Id. at 

761–62. 

On appeal, Davis reiterates the claims made in his memorandum brief before 

the district court. See Aplt. Br. at 5; Aplt. App. at 31–59. At bottom, Davis attacks 

the state court’s decision to uphold the DCF’s determination that he is a “perpetrator 

of sexual abuse.” See, e.g., Aplt. App. at 57 (“The [Kansas] Court of Appeals thereof 

its Memorandum Opinion [sic] only undermined Petitioner arguments.”).2

2

 Davis makes the same arguments here that he made to the state appellate 

court. We interpret this as a challenge to the state court’s ruling on these same 

issues. Compare Aplt. App. at 32, with Davis, 410 P.3d at *3. To the extent we 

could construe Davis’ claims as independent, merit-based challenges—and not 

challenges to the state court’s decision on these issues—we would still dismiss the 

action. Federal courts are required to give full faith and credit to state court 
4 

II.

 We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo. Kline v. Biles, 861 F.3d 1177, 

1180 (10th Cir. 2017). 

 Federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction over claims decided in state court. 

See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); see also Kline, 861 F.3d at 1180–81. This 

jurisdictional rule, called the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, prevents a party who lost in 

state court “from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state 

judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the 

state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 

U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994) (citations omitted). 

Here, the centerpiece of Davis’ challenge is to the correctness of the state 

court’s decision to uphold the DCF’s determination. See, e.g., Aplt. App. at 57 

(“[T]he Appeals Court Opinion [from the Kansas Court of Appeals] was based on an 

unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceeding . . . .”). Therefore, we do not reach the merits of his claim, and 

judgments, giving the judgment the same effect it would have in a court of that state, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1738, provided the parties were given the “‘full and fair opportunity’ 

to litigate the claim” in the state proceeding, Bolling v. City and Cty. of Denver, 790 

F.2d 67, 68 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 

461, 480–81 (1982)). Here, Davis fully litigated his alleged complaints with the 

DCF’s determination before the state court, imbuing that judgment with a preclusive 

effect. See Cain v. Jacox, 354 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Kan. 2015) (explaining Kansas’ res 

judicata standard barring successive litigation); see also Stone v. Dep’t of Aviation, 

290 F. App’x 117, 123 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). 
5 

accordingly affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss pursuant to RookerFeldman. 

III. 

 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.3

 

Entered for the Court 

Allison H. Eid 

Circuit Judge 

3

 As we noted above, the district court liberally construed Davis’ § 2254 

petition as, instead, a § 1983 action. This subjects Davis to the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act’s (PLRA) three-strikes provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We do not 

assess a PLRA strike as a result of today’s dismissal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Carbajal v. McCann, 808 F. App’x 620, 630 (10th Cir. 2020) 

(unpublished) (declining to assess a strike where the dismissal was not based on a 

§ 1915(g) ground); see also Washington v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 

1048, 1058 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding dismissal based on Younger abstention did not 

warrant a PLRA strike).