alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 236 (Friday, December 8, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 63060]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-29970]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
[NAFTA-00414 and 00414A]


Gentek Building Products, Inc., Woodbridge, NJ and Gentek 
Building Products, Inc., Franklin Park, IL; Amended Certification 
Regarding Eligibility To Apply for NAFTA Transitional Adjustment 
Assistance

    In accordance with Section 250(a), Subchapter D, Chapter 2, Title 
II, of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2273), the 
Department of Labor issued a Certification for NAFTA Transitional 
Adjustment Assistance on May 9, 1995, applicable to all workers at 
Gentek Building Products, Inc. located in Woodbridge, New Jersey.
    New information received from the company shows that worker 
separations will take place at Gentek's Franklin Park, Illinois 
production facility. The layoffs are the result of a shift in 
production to the subject firm's Canadian plant. The Department is 
amending the certification to include the Franklin Park workers.
    The intent of the Department's certification is to include all 
workers of Gentek Building Products, Inc. who are adversely affected by 
increased imports.
    The amended notice applicable to NAFTA-00414 is hereby issued as 
follows:

    ``All workers of Gentek Building Products, Inc., Woodbridge, New 
Jersey (NAFTA-00414), and Franklin Park, Illinois (NAFTA-00414A) who 
became totally or partially separated from employment on or after 
March 29, 1994 are eligible to apply for NAFTA-TAA under Section 250 
of the Trade Act of 1974.''

    Signed at Washington, DC this 28th day of November 1995.
Russell T. Kile,
Acting Program Manager, Policy and Reemployment Services, Office of 
Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 95-29970 Filed 12-7-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSEPH O’CONNOR and Surety, TAR HEEL BOND COMPANY, and Sureties on Supersedeas Bond, C. P. BARRINGER and MAE H. BARRINGER.

(Filed 22 March, 1944.)

Appeal by Tar Heel Bond Company from *Williams, J.,*at November Term, 1943, of HaeNett.

Affirmed.

Defendant Bond Company, surety upon an appearance bond, appealed from an order denying motion under C. S., 600, to set aside judgment absolute. The other defendants signed *supersedeas bond.*On appeal here the judgment was affirmed. *S. v. O’Connor,*223 N. C., 469. The opinion of this Court having been certified down, the court below entered decree affirming the judgment by default final against the defendant Bond Company and rendered judgment on the *supersedeas*bond against the individual defendants with interest from the January Term, 1942, at which term the judgment by default final was entered. The defendant Bond, Company excepted and appealed.

*855
      *Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Patton for the State.*

*H. Paul Strickland and M. 0. Lee for Harnett County Board of Education, appellee.*

*Neill McK. Salmon and H. L. Mangum for defendant, appellant.*

Pee Cueiam.

Tbe only exceptive assignments of error contained in the record are directed to. the judgment against the individual defendants. We do not concede that a judgment upon an appearance bond does not bear interest. G. S., 24-5 (C. S., 2309). Even so, the individual defendants are the ones affected. If the defendant Bond Company is required to pay interest it will be required to do so by virtue of the terms of the statute. It cannot present here a contention in behalf of the other defendants. There is no merit in the appeal. The judgment below is

• Affirmed.
EX-35.1
ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.

American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-1,
Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1

I, David M. Friedman, a duly authorized officer of American Home Mortgage
Servicing, Inc., as servicer (the "Servicer"), pursuant to the Servicing
Agreement, dated as of January 26, 2007 (the "Agreement"), among Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., as Master Servicer, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as
Trustee, American Home Mortgage Corp., as Sponsor, and the Servicer, hereby
certify that:

1. A review of the Servicer's activities during the period from and including
January 1, 2007 through and including December 31, 2007 (the "Reporting Period")
and of the Servicer's performance under the Agreement has been made under my
supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled
all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout
the Reporting Period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 10th
day of March, 2008.


By: /s/ David M. Friedman
Name: David M. Friedman
Title: Executive Vice President
4818-5545-8734.1

EXHIBIT E

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 5227-5 Filed: 12/31/19 Entered: 12/31/19 07:28:24 Page 1

of 2
4818-5545-8734.1 Exhibit E

DETAILED EXPENSE ENTRIES (COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP) FOR 

THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1, 2019 THROUGH NOVEMBER 30, 2019

Costs Advanced Amount

Court Reporter – U.S. Legal Support – Sac $3,854.63

Total Costs Requested: $3,854.63

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 5227-5 Filed: 12/31/19 Entered: 12/31/19 07:28:24 Page 2

of 2
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk May 25, 2010

p0517 

# Order

May 25, 2010

140600

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 140600 COA: 294870 Livingston CC: 94-008094-FC JACKIE AARON ERWIN, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 27, 2010 order of the Court of Appeals is consider ed, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.
#### The Phœnix Mills, Respondent, v. James A. Miller, Appellant.

Judgment and order reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event. Opinion by

Bockes, J.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5353 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5353

  To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to extend for 5 years 
payment parity with Medicare for primary care services furnished under 
             the Medicaid program, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 31, 2014

  Mr. Lewis introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to extend for 5 years 
payment parity with Medicare for primary care services furnished under 
             the Medicaid program, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Medicaid Parity Act of 2014''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF MEDICAID PAYMENT PARITY WITH MEDICARE FOR PRIMARY 
              CARE SERVICES.

    (a) In General.--Section 1902(a)(13)(C) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13)(C)) is amended by striking ``2013 and 2014'' 
and inserting ``2013 through 2019''.
    (b) Extending Increased FMAP for Additional Payments for Primary 
Care Services.--Section 1905(dd) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1396d(dd)) is amended by striking ``and before January 1, 2015'' and 
inserting ``and before January 1, 2020''.
                                 <all>
```
#### David Locks *vs.*Commonwealth.

September 20, 1995.

*Supreme Judicial Court,*

Superintendence of inferior courts.

David Locks filed a motion to dismiss a criminal complaint pending against him in the West Roxbury Division of the District Court Department. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (c) (1), 378 Mass. 871 (1979). The motion to dismiss was denied. Locks then sought relief from the denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3 (1994 ed.). After hearing, a single justice of this court denied Locks’s request for relief. “A denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (c) (1) . . . may not be appealed until after trial, and relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is not available as a matter of right.” *Epps*v. *Commonwealth,*419 Mass. 97, 99 *1004(1994) . “To obtain review, a defendant must demonstrate both a substantial claim of violation of his substantive rights and irremediable error, such that he cannot be placed in statu quo in the regular course of appeal.” *Morrissette*v. *Commonwealth,*380 Mass. 197, 198 (1980). Locks’s claim does not satisfy the two-part test set forth in *Morrissette, supra.*The single justice did not reserve and report the issue; nor did he decide the issue. The single justice simply denied relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in a situation where Locks’s rights can be protected in the normal course of appeal.

*Daniel J. Veerman,*for the defendant, submitted a brief.

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### REBECCA W. HOPPE, by Her Next Friend, R. W. HOPPE, v. R. N. DEESE and SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

(Filed 22 November, 1950.)

Master and Servant § 22c—

Demurrer of corporate defendant is properly sustained to a complaint alleging that it sent its employee to the home of plaintiff on a business mission and that while there the employee committed an assault upon the *■feme*plaintiff with licentious intent and purpose, since the complaint discloses that the assault was made to carry out an independent and licentious purpose of the employee and not to accomplish the business mission entrusted to him, and that therefore the employee in making the assault was not acting within the course and scope of his employment.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Patton, Special Judge,*at the September Term, 1950, of MeckleNbueg.

Civil action by the *feme*plaintiff to recover damages of the corporate defendant and its employee, the natural defendant, for an assault and battery committed upon her by the latter.

The complaint alleges in specific detail that on 24 December, 1949, the corporate defendant, the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, sent its employee, the male defendant, R. N. Deese, into the home of the *feme*plaintiff, Rebecca *W.*Hoppe, on a business mission; that while in the home on such mission the male defendant willfully and maliciously committed an assault and battery upon the *feme*plaintiff by picking her up in his arms and placing her upon a bed; and that such assault and battery was committed upon the *feme*plaintiff by the male defendant “with licentious intent and purpose.”

The corporate defendant, the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, demurred in writing to the complaint upon the ground that such pleading did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against it. Gr.S. 1-127, subsection 6. The court entered judgment sustaining the demurrer, and the plaintiff appealed.

*Orr & Hovis for plaintiff, appellant.*

*Pierce •& Blakeney for defendant, appellee.*

EbviN, J.

A master is civilly liable for an assault and battery by his servant on a third person if, and only if, it is committed while the servant is acting within the course and scope of his employment. According to the allegations of the complaint, the male defendant assaulted the *feme*plaintiff to carry out an independent and licentious purpose of his own, and not to accomplish the business mission entrusted to him by the corporate defendant. This being true, the ruling on the demurrer was correct; *699for it appears upon tbe face of tbe complaint tbat tbe wrongful act of tbe male defendant was outside the scope of his employment. *Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,*216 N.C. 322, 4 S.E. 2d 889; *Robinson v. McAlhaney,*214 N.C. 180, 198 S.E. 647; *Snow v. DeButts,*212 N.C. 120, 193 S.E. 224; *Smith v. Cathey,*211 N.C. 747, 191 S.E. 505. Tbe judgment sustaining tbe demurrer is

Affirmed.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.



## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2009-3110 LINDA A. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,
v. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent. Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in

PH0752080427-1-1. ON MOTION ORDER Upon consideration of the Department of the Army's unopposed motion to suspend the briefing schedule pending the court's disposition of the Merit Systems Protection Board's motion to reform the caption, IT IS ORDERED THAT: The motion is granted.
FOR THE COURT

Date
cc: Linda A. Williams Elizabeth A. Speck, Esq. Calvin Morrow, Esq. s19 Jan Horbaly Clerk U.S. COURT FI O AP PEALS APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
APR 2 8 2009 

### APR 2, 8 ?PO, /s/ Jan Horbaly
exhibit10_27.htm




Exhibit 10.27





inVentiv Health, Inc.

500 Atrium Drive

Somerset, New Jersey  08873

August 6, 2009





Mr. Eran Broshy

88 Central Park West, Apartment 1W

New York, NY 10023





Dear Eran:





This will confirm the understandings reached with the Board of Directors of inVentiv Health, Inc. (the "Company") regarding your reconfirmation as Chairman of the Board of Directors as of August 1, 2009, and your acceptance of
such position:





1.  You will be entitled to a retainer at a rate of $100,000 per annum for so long as you serve as Chairman and per meeting fees at the rates paid to other members of the Board of Directors.





2.  For so long as you serve as Chairman, you will be entitled to participate in any health care or dental care plans, policies or arrangements which the Company maintains in accordance with the written terms of such plans, policies or arrangements.





3.  You will be eligible to receive equity grants on the same terms as other non-employee members of the Board of Directors.  Accordingly, you shall be awarded a grant on or about August 12, 2009 having a value determined in accordance with FAS 123R of $360,000 vesting in
equal installments on the first four anniversaries of the grant date, which grant shall be subject to the terms of the Company's 2006 Long-Term Incentive Plan and the Company's standard grant documentation.





4.  Vesting of your previously awarded equity grants will no longer be subject to acceleration based on any acceleration events specified in the Employment Agreement dated as of June 11, 2009 between the Company and you (the "Employment
Agreement") other than, for so long as you continue to serve as a director, a Change in Control (as defined therein), death or Disability (as defined therein).  In addition, however, to the extent the stock options and restricted awards granted to you prior to the date hereof would have vested had you remained a director of the Company on June 14, 2011, such vesting shall be accelerated if (a) you are not renominated to the Board of Directors, other than for Cause or by reason of your refusal
to be renominated, and (b) as a result your service as a director terminates prior to June 14, 2011.  For purposes hereof, "Cause" shall have the meaning, and shall be determined, as set forth in the Consulting Agreement dated as of the date hereof between the Company and you.





Please execute this letter where indicated below to confirm your agreement with the foregoing.





Very truly yours,

INVENTIV HEALTH, INC.









by           /s/ Per G.H. Lofberg                                                                

Name:  Per G.H. Lofberg

Title:  Member, Compensation Committee of theBoard of Directors





by           /s/ Mark Jennings                                                      

Name:  Mark Jennings

Title:  Member, Compensation Committee of theBoard of Directors





AGREED:









/s/ Eran Broshy                                           

Name:  Eran Broshy
#### V. COPELAND CRAIG, Executrix Under the Will of DAVID J. CRAIG, and V. COPELAND CRAIG, Individually, v. DAVID J. CRAIG, JR., J. THOMAS CRAIG, FRANCES CRAIG CHERRY, and JAMES C. CRAIG.

(Filed 29 November, 1950.)

Executors and Administrators § 15k—

In tbe absence of testamentary provision to the contrary, the Federal Estate Tax is chargeable to the residuary estate and not against the specific legacies or devisees.

Johnson, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Appeal by defendants from *Patton, Special Judge,*October Term, 1950; of MecKleNbueg.

Affirmed.

*F. Grainger Pierce for plaintiffs, appellees.*

*David J. Graig, Jr., for defendants, appellants.*

*730Per Curiam.

Defendants appealed from tbe ruling of the court below on facts agreed that the Federal Estate tax paid by the executrix of David I. Craig was chargeable to the residuary estate, and that the executrix had no right to reimbursement from the beneficiaries under the will for their proportionate part of the tax so paid.

This ruling is supported by the holding of this Court in *Buffaloe v. Barnes,*226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E. 2d 222, and is in accord with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions. 28 A.J. 136; 142 A.L.R. 1137. No contrary testamentary provision appears in the will. In *Y.M.C.A. v. Davis,*264 U.S. 47, it was said: “What was being imposed here (by Congress) was an excise upon the transfer of an estate upon death of the owner. It was not a tax upon succession and receipt of benefits under the law or the will. It was death duties as distinguished from a legacy or succession tax. What this law taxes is not the interest to which the legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but the interest which ceased by reason of the death.”

Judgment affirmed.

JOHNSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
#### M. M. RICKMAN v. R. J. HOLSHOUSER and R. J. HIGGINBOTHAM, Trading and Doing Business as MOORESVILLE IRON WORKS.

(Filed 10 April, 1940.)

Assignments § 2—

An assignment by an employee of wages earned and due bim by tbe employer is valid without acceptance by tbe employer, and tbe assignee may sue tbe employer tbereon, C. S., 446, tbe provision of chapter 410, Public Laws of 1935, being applicable only to wages to be earned in the future.

*378Appeal by defendants from *Gwyn, J.,*at November Term, 1939, of IREdell.

Affirmed.

Action to recover $5.50 wages due one of defendant’s employees which had been assigned by him to the plaintiff. From judgment for plaintiff on agreed statement of facts, defendants appealed.

*W. 0. Coughenhour and B. Lee Wright for plaintiff.*

*Walter 11. Woodson for defendants.*

Devin, J.

The right of the assignee of a chose in action arising out of contract to sue therefor in his own name has been declared by statute (C. S., 446), and has been upheld in numerous decisions of this Court. *Fertilizer Works v. Newbern,*210 N. C., 9, 185 S. E., 471; *Horne-Wilson, Inc., v. Wiggins Bros., Inc.,*203 N. C., 85, 164 S. E., 365; *Trust Co. v. Williams,*201 N. C., 464, 160 S. E., 484; *Craig v. Stewart,*163 N. C., 531, 79 S. E., 100; *Vaughan v. Davenport,*159 N. C., 369, 74 S. E., 967; *Harris v. Burwell,*65 N. C., 584.

The contention of defendants that the assignment of wages by an employee is invalid unless accepted in writing by the employer, as provided by ch. 410, Public Laws 1935, cannot avail, since that act applies only to assignments of wages to be earned in the future. Here it is agreed that the amount sued for is based upon the assignment of wages already earned and due by the defendants to the assignor. The fact that another instrument executed by the employee refers to wages to become due is immaterial.

The judgment below is

Affirmed.
#### SALLIE COUNCIL v. DICKERSON’S, INC.

(Filed 18 April, 1951.)

Appeal by defendant from *Bone, J.,*at the February Term, 1951, of Waee.

Civil action to recover damages for actionable negligence heard upon motion to strike allegations from complaint.

This is a companion ease to the action this day decided entitled *Mrs. T. C. Council versus Dickerso.n s, Inc.*The plaintiff, who was riding in the automobile belonging to Mrs. T. C. Council, sued the defendant for damages for personal injury allegedly sustained by her in the same acci*477dent. Sbe couched her complaint in practically the same language as that employed in the complaint in the *Mrs. T. C. Council case,*and the defendant moved to strike therefrom allegations virtually identical with those set out in its motion in the *Mrs. T. G. Council case.*The presiding judge made rulings on the motion similar to those made in the *Mrs. T. G. Council case,*and the defendant appealed, assigning such rulings as error.

*Simms •& Simms and John M. Simms for plaintiff, appellee.*

*Bickett & Banks for defendant, appellant.*

EeviN, J.

For the reasons stated in the *Mrs. T. G. Council case,*this cause is remanded to the Superior Court of Wake County with directions that an order be entered striking out the three portions of paragraph 5 of the complaint designated with particularity in the defendant’s motion.

Error and remanded.
Exhibit 10.2 [siga10q073110ex102001.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102002.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102003.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102004.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102005.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102006.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102007.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102008.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102009.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102010.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102011.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102012.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102013.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102014.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102015.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102016.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102017.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102018.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102019.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102020.jpg]   [siga10q073110ex102021.jpg]
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5639 

To strengthen the disclosure requirements for creditors under the Truth 

in Lending Act. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To strengthen the disclosure requirements for creditors under 

the Truth in Lending Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Online Credit Card 

5 Disclosure Act of 2014’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ONLINE PAYMENT TIMING DISCLOSURES. 

7 Section 127(b)(11)(D) of the Truth in Lending Act 

8 (15 U.S.C. 1637(b)(11)(D)) is amended— 

9 (1) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and insert10 ing a semicolon; 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5639 IH

1 (2) in clause (ii), by striking the period and in2 serting ‘‘; and’’; and 

3 (3) by inserting at the end the following new 

4 clause: 

5 ‘‘(iii) if the consumer has an online 

6 account with the creditor under the con7 sumer credit plan, be disclosed in a con8 spicuous and prominent location on a 

9 webpage of such creditor.’’. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS