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Gen. Stephen Whiting’s remarks at Space Symposium 39 keynote address Apr. 9, 2024 

Good morning, and thank you so much for being here. 

I want to thank the Space Symposium for the opportunity to speak at 8:45 in the morning. And 

congratulations to all of you for being here on time. That's not easy. In fact, that's hard to, to get up in a 

in a strange hotel room, find your clothes, get dressed, get your coffee and be in seats on time. But you 

know, what else is hard? Space is hard. And yes, space is hard, but it's also incredibly important and 

serious. 

Now, space was hard for humanity to get to that only happened 66 and a half years ago within the lives 

of some of you in this room. And the hard won benefits that space has brought to us are a foundation for 

our modern way of life and how we secure our nations. And what's on my mind today is how peace 

loving people everywhere can win in space and competition in crisis and in conflict. As President John 

F. Kennedy said, we want to see space governed by a banner of peace and freedom. Now sometimes we 

military space professionals forget our history, and we kind of act like space has only recently become 

an arena for great power competition. But in reality space was birthed in great power competition. In 

1957, the Soviet Union won the opening chapters of the space race when they launched the first object 

Sputnik, the first animal, the first man and the first woman, and that created a crisis of confidence 

certainly here in the United States. Now ultimately, the United States won that that space race when Neil 

Armstrong walked out on the lunar surface in 1969. But throughout the Cold War, we saw countries like 

the United States and Soviet Union go to space for strategic advantage, and we even saw the 

development of capabilities to hold at risk other space systems, and we saw the development of the first 

military space commands in the 1980s, in fact, right here, in Colorado Springs. 

Now, sometimes we think of DESERT STORM as the first space war, not because Saddam Hussein 

took us on in space, but because for the first time we used space capabilities to enable a tactical 

battlefield and actually reduce the number of fatalities that were involved and speed up those conflicts. 

But since January of 2007, when the People's Republic of China conducted their hit to kill ASAT test 

that has left over 3,500 pieces of long-lived debris we're still having to deal with, we have seen both 

China and Russia continue to conduct irresponsible tests demonstrating they have turned space into a 

warfighting domain. 

I can assure you that all of us at U.S. Space Command are closely watching our strategic competitors as 

an intelligence-led organization. Now both the PRC and Russia have made rapid advancements in 

fielding capabilities which threaten the peaceful use of space. The People's Liberation Army has made 

their terrestrial forces space enabled as well. And frankly, China is moving at a breathtaking speed. 

Since 2018. China has more than tripled their on-orbit intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

satellites. And with these systems, they've built a kill web over the Pacific Ocean to find, fix, track, and 

yes, target United States and allied military capabilities. And they built a range of counterspace weapons 

from reversible jamming all the way up to kinetic hit-to-kill direct ascent and co-orbital ASATs. 
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And in that same period, Russia has more than doubled their total number of satellites. Moscow's war 

with Ukraine has proven the indispensable role of space in modern conflict. On the opening day of 

Russia's invasion, they even did a cyber-attack against a commercial SATCOM company, knocking off 

the air tens of thousands of SATCOM modems. Despite failing to achieve their war aims in Ukraine, 

Russia continues to invest in counterspace weapons. Russia appears more and more to be relying on 

asymmetric capabilities like space, cyber and nuclear. 

Now in 1957, before Sputnik was even launched, Major General Bernard Schriever, of the United States 

Air Force, presciently said, “in the long haul our safety as a nation may depend upon achieving space 

superiority.” 

Several decades from now, the key battles may not be sea battles or air battles, but space battles, and we 

should be sending a certain spending, a certain fraction of our national resources, to ensure we do not lag 

in obtaining space superiority. 

But let me be crystal clear, those of us in U.S. Space Command, do not want a war to start in or extend 

into space. War in space is not inevitable. And in fact, it would be detrimental to the United States and 

our allies and our way of life. Americans, our allies, indeed all of humanity, have become accustomed to 

the benefits that we derive from space – communications, entertainment, precision, agricultural, global 

timing – we don't even worry about where our teenage children are anymore because we can track them 

on their phones and we know they'll be able to get home to us using GPS. And while we've built the 

world's best space architectures, our current military space constellations are optimized for a benign 

environment. 

Now despite this strong foundation, we have a lot of work to do to obtain the collective advantage we 

need to when in crisis and conflict. As Jeff said, at U.S. Space Command, we take our mission so 

seriously that we speak in terms of fulfilling our moral responsibilities. We must deliver space 

capabilities to the Joint Force, the nation, and our allies. They assume they will have access to those 

capabilities through all levels of conflict, despite whatever threats there may be, and their slot sized 

accordingly. 

Number two, we must protect and defend our current constellations against the threats now arrayed 

against us, and we must protect our Joint Force from space-enabled attack of others. Now, to protect our 

national security interest in space the Department of Defense leverages capabilities from across a whole 

series of stakeholders to deter aggression and if deterrence fails to prevail in conflict. 

Now as a combatant command, the Unified Command Plan is an order from the President of the United 

States that lays out our five unique responsibilities. Space Operations – that includes all the legacy 

missions we've done so long and so well, communications, position, navigation and timing, missile 
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warning, ISR, but it also includes protect and defend and human spaceflight support. Global Sensor 

Manager – we have the responsibility of integrating space domain awareness sensors, missile warning 

sensors and Missile Defense sensors. Global SATCOM Operations Manager – managing satellite 

communications for the entire Department of Defense; Transregional Missile Defense planning and 

operational support, and then we are the space Joint Force provider. 

Now the UCP has also given us, Space Command, what we call an astra graphic area of responsibility 

that starts 100 kilometers over our head and extends to infinity. These different responsibilities mean we 

are both a supporting command and a supported command. As a supporting command, we're only as 

successful as those we have to support each and every day. And as a supported command we're 

responsible for conducting operations in our AOR and receiving support from others to be successful. 

So, our job is to make sure we continue to support others and that we protect and defend ourselves in our 

AOR to do so. 

Now to get after these Unified Command Plan responsibilities, we are pursuing four priorities. Number 

one, prepare and posture, we must maximize combat readiness by 2027. All of us at U.S. Space 

Command are laser focused on improving all of our existing forces and capabilities, so that we can stitch 

them together seamlessly when called upon. Now sometimes, this is referred to as closing the kill chain. 

Now we're also working with capability providers to try to deliver as much new capability as we can 

within the next three years. 

Our second priority is countering threats. The threats we've been talking about for years are no longer 

theoretical possibilities. They are deployed in the domain and terrestrially and many of them are now on 

combat duty in China and Russia. They hold at risk our modern way of life and how we defend this 

nation. And we must be able to deter and counter these threats when called upon to achieve space 

superiority. 

Our third priority is strengthen relationships. Relationships matter and spaces a team sport, no one 

country, command, service, agency or department can do all that we have to do in space to be 

successful. And like the best teams, we are truly successful when we pursue outcomes over equities. At 

U.S. Space Command we are committed to building a coalition of teammates to achieve a collective 

advantage, and we're committed to being great teammates ourselves. 

Now, it's often said that America's, one of one of our greatest advantages, is this system of allies and 

partners that we have around the world – likeminded nations who share our values and interests in 

ensuring space remains safe, sustainable, secure. 

Now, operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER is our named operation in space that today is conducted with 

four countries – the United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. I am proud to announce 

today that we have invited three new allies to join OLYMPIC DEFENDER – Germany, France, and 
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New Zealand. Our international Allies and Partners provide strategic and operational advantages. We 

share intelligence, we plan together, and we work to ensure that space is safe for all. And we're working 

to even improve our integration through improved command and control and planning to make sure that 

we get even better in the future. I've been proud to work alongside Germany, France and New Zealand 

for many years. And I look forward to their consideration of our invitation for them to join operation 

OLYMPIC DEFENDER. But OOD, as we call it, is only the beginning of our partnerships. 

Back in February of this year, out of Vandenberg Space Force Base, we hosted exercise Global Sentinel. 

It involved 25 countries, with two observer nations, and even the NATO Space Center of Excellence. 

Global Sentinel allows us to come together and figure out improved ways to operate together to develop 

space domain awareness. And our missile defense war game which we call Nimble Titan will also have 

25 countries joining us when we get together at the end of May for our tenth senior leader event in the 

20-year history of that exercise. 

The U.S. commercial aerospace industry is also one of our nation's biggest advantages, and it's an 

advantage that is growing. Today we have multiple companies in our Commercial Integration Cell at 

Vandenberg Space Force Base. And I'm excited to announce today that we are inviting eight additional 

companies to enter the Integration Cell so we can share information and gain insights into how each 

other's constellations are operating again, to make space more safe and secure. 

And we partner with commercial companies at our Joint Commercial Operations Cell right here in 

Colorado Springs, which now has nodes on three continents with countries from companies from 

multiple countries. 

We've also embedded cyber experts on the operations watch floor of the space Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center, also here in Colorado Springs. That's an industry focused working group to share cyber 

threats. 

And U.S. Space Command has now signed 185 space domain awareness, data sharing agreements, and 

later this week, I will sign another one with the country of Uruguay. By sharing space information with 

spacefaring allies and partners and academic institutions, we promote trust required for coalition unified 

action. 

Now our fourth priority is to expand our warfighting advantage. At U.S. Space Command, our primary 

focus is on our real time mission. So, I like to say our event horizon goes out to about 2027, but we must 

be thinking beyond 2027 as well, to help shape military and military space power for the future fight. 

My predecessor General Jim Dickinson used to emphasize that we must prepare for a war not yet fought. 

So, I'm announcing today that U.S. Space command’s Capability Assessment and Validation 

Environment, or CAVE, as we call it has achieved minimum viable capability. CAVE is our modeling 
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and simulation laboratory which enables us to perform analysis on warfighting, on plans, on 

campaigning, and we'll use that to derive better ways of deterring, and planning to conduct operations 

for a war that's never happened and a war we don't want to happen. We'll also use it to figure out our 

combatant command requirements and gain insights into multidomain joint warfighting concepts. 

So, what are the actions we need to take to maintain to win in competition and deter conflict? Now those 

of you in the military sphere are likely aware of the Chief of Space Operations, General Chance 

Saltzman’s theory of success called competitive endurance. It's built on three principles: avoid 

operational surprise, deny first mover advantage and perform responsible counterspace campaigning. At 

U.S. Space Command, we subscribe to these tenants. And in our campaign plan we use those tenants to 

allow us to compete and develop the sets and reps we need to rapidly transition when called upon to 

confront any potential adversary and crisis, and when directed, defeat an enemy in conflict in such a way 

as to assure future generations have access to and in space. 

So, what are those actions we need to take to win in a crisis or conflict? First, we must build a 

committed coalition with shared objectives. Next, we must campaign together – joint and combined 

unified action will deter competitors in strategic competition. We want them to know we're always 

watching together. We’ll execute combined training and exercises where we develop our command and 

control, and plans, and we demonstrate interoperability. We’ll close friendly kill chains to improve the 

speed that Joint Force commanders can make decisions by linking friendly sensor-to-shooter 

information. We will reveal to deter, and we will conceal to win. And by presenting a potential 

adversary with synchronized and compounding dilemmas, it’s our job to instill doubt, so that every 

morning they wake up and say, ‘today is not the day for armed conflict.’ 

But if deterrence fails, we prefer to fight with our likeminded Allies and Partners. The coalition's 

resilient and redundant space architectures will enable us to absorb a first strike, and then quickly 

reconstitute and respond when directed. We must be able to achieve and maintain space superiority. 

Space superiority enables the coalition to counter an adversaries’ C5ISRT kill web. 

Now in INDOPACOM, they talk about this as having the ability to blind, see, and kill enemy targets in 

any domain. This is vital to protect the Joint Force from the space-enabled attack of others. We will 

protect and defend our systems, our ground infrastructure, and our links so that we can defend friendly 

assets to assure delivery of critical space capabilities to friendly forces. 

Now, U.S. Space Command does not want any war, let alone a war that starts in or extends into space, 

which would be particularly bad for our domain. Direct space combat would be economically and 

environmentally devastating, perhaps for decades. We want to remain in enduring competition, and not 

progress into crisis or conflict. And to do that, there are a couple important capabilities that we need to 

field quickly. 
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It's time to bring dynamic space operations and on-orbit logistics and infrastructure to the space domain. 

The days of energy neutral positional operations in space need to end. It's time to bring sustained space 

maneuver to the AOR. Now, sustained space maneuver will change how we operate, opening up new 

tactics, techniques and procedures and operating concepts and allowing operations until the mission is 

complete – not until the fuel we launched with runs out. Sustained space maneuver includes on-orbit 

refueling, replenishment sustained, sustainment system repair, and forward sustainment. Investment in 

sustained space maneuver technologies is critical to assess our ability to achieve and maintain space 

superiority, and to fortify how we win, we must be ready to use limited contingency capabilities and 

activate a commercial reserve. 

Now those of us at U.S. Space Command applaud the work of U.S. Space Forces recent tactical 

responsive space and launch operations, which are demonstrating the promise of reconstitution, 

replenishment, and augmentation. But let's acknowledge we have a lot to do in space. 

So, let's do a thought experiment for a moment. There was a time when our country didn't have to spend 

anything on space or do any space operations because it was before the Space Age. And there'll be a 

time in the far future where we'll likely have to do a lot more and spend more because humanity will go 

back to the moon, and then on to Mars and the asteroids. But today, we've got a lot to do – we've got to 

make all of our constellations more resilient; we've got to protect and defend those constellations against 

the threats now arrayed against us; we have to protect the Joint Force from space-enabled attack; and we 

must have a test and training enterprise that convinces us that these capabilities will work in a conflict 

which has never happened. 

And let's constantly ask ourselves, are we doing all we can to assure America maintains our position as 

the world's leader in space while we work with our international partners? Accordingly, I'm calling for a 

committed coalition of U.S. government stakeholders, allies and partners, commercial industry and 

academic institutions. Such commitment must take bold action, and it starts with information sharing to 

increase trust and support our shared interest. 

Now, a prime example of this is the recent approval of the Department of Defense's new space security 

classification guidance policy, but we must now diligently work to operationalize this new policy. If we 

don't change because of that policy, we are failing, and we need to do so quickly. We must continue to 

leverage our nation's lead in commercial space technology. 

Our commercial industry will deliver innovative state-of-the-art capabilities. We have to modernize our 

legacy systems, ensure they all work together seamlessly, and deliver new capabilities by 2027 to 

counter the threats that we now see. Moreover, we must invest in capabilities, which won't deliver until 

after 2027, to ensure we remain postured to be successful in space. Together, these next necessary steps 

will ensure that all of us, as a team, win in competition and in conflict. 
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Now, space is the final frontier, yet it extends as far as we can comprehend and is infinite in its 

possibilities. Just as NASA through the Artemis Accords, with 30 other countries is taking humanity 

back to the moon in 2026, so we will work with a coalition of peace-loving nations to ensure space 

remains safe, sustainable, and secure for future generations. And if we do this, I'm confident that in my 

lifetime, we will see humans on Mars, and in the lifetime of some of you younger than me in this 

audience, I think we'll see humanity permanently living out in the solar system, while here on terra 

firma, we continue to live in peace while enjoying all the benefits space brings to us. 

So thank you, and let's all work together to ensure there is never a day without space.