UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ KEVIN TAMAR DAVIS, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. DAN SCHNURR, Respondent - Appellee. No. 20-3048 (D.C. No. 5:19- CV-03062-SAC) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , KELLY , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Kevin Tamar Davis, proceeding pro se , 1 challenges the Kans as Department of Children and Families’ (DCF) decision classi fying him as a “perpetrator of sexual abuse” and requiring him to register on the st ate’s Child Abuse and Neglect Registry. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Seeing no error, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Davis is pro se , we construe his filings liberally, but we do not act as his advocate. Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 27, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 I. In February 2015, Davis was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life imprisonment. State v. Davis , 416 P.3d 171, *1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (table). The DCF determined Davis was a “perpetrator of sexual abuse” a nd placed his name on the Kansas Child Abuse and Neglect Regi stry for three years, barring him from working, volunteering, or resi ding at a childcare facility. Davis v. Kan. Dep’t for Children and Families , 410 P.3d 164, *1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (table). Davis administratively appealed the determination. Id. After several years of administrative review, the State Appeals Committee ultimately rejected his position, agreeing with the DCF that Davis’ status as a “perpetrator of sexual abuse” was substantiated because his guilt was proven be yond a reasonable doubt at his criminal trial. Id. at *2. Next, Davis petitioned the Kansas st ate trial court for review of his administrative claim. Id. The trial court denied Da vis relief, concluding “the evidence overwhelmingly supp ort[ed] the DCF,” and casel aw provided no support for his position. Id. (alteration in original). Davis app ealed the trial court’s denial to the Kansas Court of Appeals, which denied re lief and affirmed the DCF’s determination that Davis was a “perpetr ator of sexual abuse.” See id. at *3–*10. In April 2019, Davis filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in distri ct court, again challenging the DCF’s administrative decision to classify him as a “perpetrator of sexual abuse” and requiri ng him to register. See Davis v. Schnurr , No. 5:19-CV-3 03062 (D. Kan. 2019). Pointi ng out that § 2254 petitions ar e used to challenge “the validity of a conviction and se ntence,” the district court instead liberally construed Davis’ challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3, because he was not challenging his criminal conviction but rather the DCF’s administrative ac tion. Aplt. App. at 748. The district court dismissed, holding both that the state court judgment had preclusive effect, and that Davi s’ challenge was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 748–50. Davis moved to reconsider, or in th e alternative, for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. Id. at 752–54. Cons truing his motion as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) motion, the dist rict court denied re lief, explaining Davis had “not provid[ed] any persuasive challenge to the dismissal.” Id. at 760–61. However, the district cour t granted Davis the right to proceed IFP on appeal. Id. at 761–62. On appeal, Davis reiterates the claims made in hi s memorandum brief before the district court. See Aplt. Br. at 5; Aplt. App. at 31 –59. At bottom, Davis attacks the state court’s decision to uphold the DCF’s determination that he is a “perpetrator of sexual abuse.” See, e.g. , Aplt. App. at 57 (“The [Kansa s] Court of Appeals thereof its Memorandum Opinion [sic] only undermined Petitioner arguments.”). 2

2 Davis makes the same arguments here that he made to the state appellate court. We interpret this as a challenge to the state court’s ruling on these same issues. Compare Aplt. App. at 32, with Davis , 410 P.3d at *3. To the extent we could construe Davis’ clai ms as independent, mer it-based challenges—and not challenges to the state court’s decision on these issues—we would still dismiss the action. Federal courts are required to give full faith and credit to state court4 II. We review a district court’s dismissa l for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo

. Kline v. Biles , 861 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2017). Federal courts lack appella te jurisdiction over claims decided in state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983); see also Kline , 861 F.3d at 1180–81. This jurisdictional rule, called the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, prevents a party who lost in state court “from seeking what in substance would be appe llate review of the state judgment in a United States di strict court, based on the lo sing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy , 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994) (citations omitted). Here, the centerpiece of Da vis’ challenge is to the correctness of the state court’s decision to uphold the DCF’s determination. See, e.g. , Aplt. App. at 57 (“[T]he Appeals Court Opinion [from the Kans as Court of Appeals] was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence pres ented in the state court proceeding . . . .”). Therefore, we do not reach the merits of his claim, and judgments, giving the judgment the same effect it would have in a court of that state, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738, provided th e parties were given the “‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the claim” in the state proceeding, Bolling v. City and Cty. of Denver , 790 F.2d 67, 68 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 480–81 (1982)). Here, Davis fully litigated his alleged complaints with the DCF’s determination before the state cour t, imbuing that judgment with a preclusive effect. See Cain v. Jacox , 354 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Kan. 2015) (explaining Kansas’ res judicata standard barring successive litigation); see also Stone v. Dep’t of Aviation , 290 F. App’x 117, 123 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).5 accordingly affirm the district cour t’s decision to dismiss pursuant to RookerFeldman

. III. For the reasons explained above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal. 3

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge

3 As we noted above, the district c ourt liberally construed Davis’ § 2254 petition as, instead, a § 1983 action. This subjects Davis to the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) three-strikes provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We do not assess a PLRA strike as a result of t oday’s dismissal for l ack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Carbajal v. McCann , 808 F. App’x 620, 630 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (declining to assess a strike where the dismissal was not based on a § 1915(g) ground); see also Washington v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t , 833 F.3d 1048, 1058 (9th Ci r. 2016) (holding dismissal based on Younger abstention did not warrant a PLRA strike).