STATEMENT OF

GENERAL LAURA J. RICHARDSON

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMA

BEFORE THE 118TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

12 MARCH 2024 

ND
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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished committee members, 

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) celebrated its 60th anniversary this past 

year. Since 1963, USSOUTHCOM, working alongside our Allies and partners, has advanced 

security and stability throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. For 60 years, the brave men 

and women of USSOUTHCOM have steadfastly devoted themselves to a cause greater than their 

own – an Enduring Promise to the region – that in the face of tyranny, corruption, pandemic, and

natural disasters, the United States of America will always stand beside those who seek and 

promote peace, prosperity, and the democratic ideals upon which they flourish. 

Today, democracy and democratic values are under attack globally. The People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are strategic competitors who operate without regard for 

international law or norms. They condone and perpetrate corruption, disinformation campaigns, 

cybercrime, and human rights abuses that undermine the existing democratic political processes 

of fragile democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean and bolster the authoritarian rule of 

regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

Meanwhile, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) fuel violence and corruption 

throughout the region, enriching themselves while undermining democracy and co-opting the 

legitimate governance functions of our partners. They traffic drugs, weapons, persons, wildlife, 

and a range of illicit items, leaving citizen and environmental insecurity, death, and instability in 

their wake. TCOs bear direct responsibility for the mass quantities of drugs that continue to pose 

a threat to American lives.

i

In response, and as the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines, we embrace the 

opportunity to expand our partnerships and bolster “economic resilience, democratic stability, 

and citizen security” throughout the region.ii Integrated Deterrence means leveraging all
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instruments of national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics – and doing so 

in concert with Allies, partners, non-governmental organizations, academia, and the private 

sector. It’s what I call Team Democracy. Together, we must step forward and act with a greater

sense of urgency to outcompete our adversaries by providing alternatives to PRC-centric 

solutions. We must remain the region’s most trusted defense and security partner. Our partners 

need our help, and as one senior leader in the region recently told me, “When you need a rope to 

grab, you aren’t necessarily looking to see who threw it.” We must be the ones throwing the 

rope, not our Strategic Competitors. 

The NSS recognizes the direct link between this region’s prosperity and security to that 

of our own.iii Over my two-plus years in command, I have made it my priority to meet our 

partners where they are - to hear and understand firsthand the issues and challenges they face. 

I’ve learned that presence absolutely matters. If we want to win, we must be on the field. 

USSOUTHCOM’s presence in the region builds the capacity of our partners, helps counter our 

adversaries’ malign intent, and contributes to our homeland defense. The many challenges this 

hemisphere faces are a Call to Action. 

USSOUTHCOM’s strategy focuses on three lines of effort: Strengthening Partnerships, 

Countering Threats, and Building our Team. We remain committed to coordinating, 

collaborating, and synchronizing with our Allies, partners, U.S. Interagency, and Non-Federal 

Entities to outcompete our Strategic Competitors, defeat the pervasive threats, and overcome the 

challenges within the Western Hemisphere. 
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Expanding Challenges in the Region 

Strategic Competition with the People’s Republic of China

The United States and the PRC are engaged in geopolitical competition based on 

opposing views of the value of the international rules-based order. The PRC, through the 

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), seeks to supplant the United States as the world’s leading 

economic and military power. 

The PRC understands the importance of economics and the intertwined role of the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in achieving its Chinese Dream – the PRC reclamation of 

China’s central role in world affairs. In Latin America and the Caribbean, USSOUTHCOM 

recognizes the opportunity to collaborate with our partners, build their capacity, and increase 

their resiliency to the pervasive challenges and threats they face. Conversely, the PRC is 

exploiting a fragile security environment and taking advantage of the region’s need for economic 

investment to gain influence and advance its malign agenda. The PRC knows that economic 

power is a prerequisite for global military power and it is imperative that we view the PRC’s

economic activities, particularly in the Americas, as connected to their global political and

military desires.

With a population of 1.4 billion people, the PRC must look beyond their shores for the 

resources to sustain both its large populace and consolidation of power at home. Latin America 

and the Caribbean offer such resources. The PRC is laying claim to the abundant food, water, 

and critical earth minerals found in the Western Hemisphere. This region is home to 31 percent 

of the planet’s fresh-water resources and by 2028 will account for 25 percent of global 

agriculture and fisheries exports.iv v

 The PRC has not extended itself into the Western 
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Hemisphere to offer win-win, high-quality investment - they have come to extract, and they 

intend to gain access and influence by employing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a “natural 

extension of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”

Twenty-two of the 31 countries in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) are 

now signatories to the BRI, which the PRC portrays as expanding economic, financial, and trade 

opportunities. The PRC has now surpassed the United States as South America’s top trading 

partner and is Central America’s second-largest trading partner.viii In 2002, PRC trade with 

Latin America and the Caribbean was just $18 million; in 2022 it ballooned to $450 billion. That 

number is expected to increase to $700 billion by 2035.ix 

But it’s not just access to resources that the PRC seeks with its investments; it’s the 

furtherance of political and military objectives to increase isolation of Taiwan. Globally, only 12 

countries recognize Taiwan, seven of which are in my AOR. PRC pressure to abandon existing 

recognition is mounting and is often a precondition for investment. Last year, Honduras, home 

to Joint Task Force-Bravo, cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan and signed onto the BRI. 

The PRC is playing the “long game” with its development of dual-use sites and facilities

throughout the region. The PRC messages its investments as peaceful, but in fact, many serve as 

points of future multi-domain access for the PLA and strategic naval chokepoints. These 

investments include critical infrastructure such as deep-water ports, cyber facilities, and space 

facilities. In Panama, PRC-controlled State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) continue to bid on 

projects related to the Panama Canal – a global strategic chokepoint. Meanwhile, in Argentina, 

another SOE is attempting to secure the rights to build dual-use maritime installations, which 

would support sustainment and power projection in proximity to the Strait of Magellan, the 

Drake Passage, and Antarctica. This would dramatically improve the PRC’s ability to access the 

vi vii 
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Antarctic region and its fisheries and impact U.S. strategic mobility to an area reserved for peace 

and science.

The PRC blueprint for development and subsequent dual-use of deep-water ports

elsewhere in the world is already a matter of public record.xi xii Here in the Western Hemisphere, 

a Chinese SOE will be the first with majority ownership and control of a country’s port 

infrastructure - the future $3.6 billion mega-port in Chancay, Peru. The port will serve as a PRCproclaimed “gateway from South America to Asia.”xiii 

To shape positive perceptions of both the PRC and the CCP, Beijing pours billions of 

dollars into foreign information operations.xiv Their approach includes information manipulation 

using “propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international 

organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control 

of Chinese-language media.”xv A recent Department of State special report on the PRC notes, 

“the PRC suppresses critical information that contradicts its desired narratives on issues such as 

Taiwan, its human rights practices, the South China Sea, its domestic economy, and international 

economic engagement.”xvi 

Partnering with the PRC and agreeing to the terms of their funded projects leaves some of 

our partners saddled with debt, exorbitant interest rates, and poorly constructed infrastructure 

that worsens already dire environmental crises, as is the case with the hydro-power station at the 

Coca Codo Dam in Ecuador. Some geologists argue that the dam has “so disrupted the Coca 

River’s natural flow and accumulation of sediments” that it accelerated an erosion process that 

would normally take thousands of years into five.xvii 

x

 
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The PRC’s resource extraction is not limited to land. Each year, the PRC subsidizes a 

distant water fishing fleet of about 200 to 600 vessels operating near the Galapagos and other 

coastal nations’ Exclusive Economic Zones in South America, often engaging in illegal, 

unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing practices. This fleet often exhibits concerning fishing 

behavior, with some vessels disabling AIS transponders. Illegal fishing in the western 

hemisphere alone comes at a cost of approximately $2.7 billion annually in lost revenue. xviii xix xx 

But it’s not just financial cost at play - it’s opportunity cost. Our partners’ constrained maritime 

resources are being diverted away from fully engaging in other critical missions to take a leading 

role in combating these environmental and economic crimes. 

The PRC has also taken a keen interest in expanding its access and control of the space 

domain, viewing it as the “ultimate high ground.”

xxiii

xxi There are at least 10 PRC-linked space 

facilities across five countries in the region, the most PRC space-enabling infrastructure outside 

mainland China. Despite its public stance against the weaponization of space, the PLA continues 

to invest and improve its military space capabilities, including a deep space station in Argentina, 

providing the PLA with global space tracking and surveillance capabilities. These space-based 

capabilities could translate into global military capabilities “that could support the monitoring, 

tracking, and targeting of our forces” and affect “conventional and nuclear targeting, ground-airsea operations, precision conventional strike capacities, and missile defense.” xxii 

As Latin American and Caribbean governments and their telecommunication industries

seek faster, cheaper, and more inclusive communication coverage, PRC SOEs or associated 

entities, such as Huawei and ZTE, penetrate virtually every country through a mixture of 

funding, equipping, or servicing core and radio access networks. Some partners have privately 

told us about 'buyer's remorse' for allowing Huawei to set up 5G networks in their countries due 
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to increased potential for PRC exploitation. Huawei has built and continues to build a robust 

The PRC's control over Huawei, and its funding related to the deployment of 

telecommunication networks, threatens our partners' national assets, sovereignty, and 

freedoms.

xxiv Huawei’s 5G infrastructure could contain backdoors that allow the Chinese 

government to collect and centralize massive quantities of data and give Beijing the necessary 

access to attack communications networks and public utilities. Ultimately, this could provide the 

PRC with unrestricted access to information and other capabilities that can be used for 

espionage, as coercive levers to gain unfair advantage, and to exert malign influence to achieve 

its goals. 

Huawei routinely violates local laws in countries where it operates. The U.S. Justice 

Department has obtained an indictment against Huawei charging fraud, money laundering, 

violating U.S. sanctions against Iran, and stealing trade secrets from its U.S. business partner, TMobile. Huawei was linked to the theft of intellectual property from Cisco, and U.S. startup 

CNEX sued Huawei and its deputy chairman alleging conspiracy to steal trade secrets. Huawei’s

opaque operational nature and “mysterious ownership structure, contribute to concerns about the 

company’s operations and intentions.”

xxvii

xxv As Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Wray has 

publicly stated, the PRC is the greatest espionage threat that democracy has ever faced. xxvi The

scale of its informational theft is unprecedented.

network of 2G, 3G, 4G, and 5G mobile and internet infrastructure in the region. The company 

has engaged with our partners for the last 15 years and invests significantly across 24 nations in 

the AOR. 
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Russia as an Acute Threat

It has been two years since Russia’s unprovoked and unlawful invasion of Ukraine. 

Vladimir Putin’s assault has “disrupted global supply chains, agricultural production, and energy 

resources,” which has slowed Latin America and the Caribbean’s recovery from the COVID-19 

pandemic.xxviii Putin’s authoritarian hand serves as a model for and bolsters the authoritarian 

regimes of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. 

Within the AOR, Russia continues its attempts to frustrate United States goals and 

interests, undermining democratic institutions and the rule of law, and props up problematic 

regimes in exchange for strategic access and resources.

xxxii

xxix Moscow is working hard to disrupt 

relations between the United States and our partners to extoll the virtues of a multipolar world.xxx 

To do so, Russia employs a host of malign activities within the gray zone, including malicious 

cyber activities, disinformation campaigns, and periodic high-level visits and military force 

projection.xxxi 

Moscow and affiliated cybercriminal groups seek to destabilize democracies by targeting 

public institutions and sensitive government frameworks, disrupting critical infrastructure, and

stealing information.

xxxiii Recently, a Partner Nation fell victim to such an attack which targeted 

dozens of institutions, including a key ministry.

Russian disinformation in the region is increasing in scope since Russia invaded 

Ukraine.xxxiv The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, think tanks, and the 

oligarchy guide the narratives employed by propagandists at state-controlled and regional media 

providers such as Actualidad RT, Sputnik Mundo, and Telesur. These media outlets spread antiU.S. messaging across traditional and social media platforms to their millions of followers in 
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Latin America and around the world.xxxv

xxxvi

 Their false media narratives commonly blame the 

United States for creating a global food crisis and supporting Nazism in Ukraine, while

portraying the United States as a greedy and imperialist state concerned with maximum 

extraction of the continent’s resources. 

At the same time, Russia has been leveraging its diplomats and periodic military force 

projection to maintain and gain regional influence. Last April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 

Lavrov visited Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The trip’s purpose was to increase 

cooperation with the countries it views as critical to creating a multipolar world where Russia,

China, and others act as a counterbalance to the United States.xxxvii

xxxviii

xxxix

 Lavrov again visited Brazil, 

Cuba, and Venezuela at the end of February 2024. In January 2023, the Russian frigate Admiral 

Gorshkov tested its strike capabilities in the Western Atlantic Ocean, running a computer 

simulation on hypersonic missiles. Then, in July, the Russian Navy training ship Perekop 

docked in Cuba for three days before making stops in Nicaragua and Venezuela. Russian 

presence aims to prop up dictatorial regimes who share a common worldview, while expanding 

authoritarian influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Transnational Criminal Organizations 

TCOs remain the primary obstacle to lasting security and stability. Moreover, TCOs 

imperil the security of the American people and the values at the heart of this hemisphere’s 

democracies. USSOUTHCOM estimates that approximately 200 TCOs and four terrorist groups 

are operating in the region, including Mexican cartels such as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel

and the Sinaloa Cartel. Through a combination of corruption and intimidation, and outright 

attacks on government officials and institutions, TCOs undermine the rule of law and disrupt 

legitimate governmental functions.
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The National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–

People’s Army (FARC-EP), FARC-Segunda Marquetalia (FARC-SM), and Shining Path (SL) 

are designated terrorist organizations that use criminal activities to fill their coffers. TCOs traffic 

in weapons, drugs, persons, wildlife, gold and minerals, commodities, and counterfeit goods, 

resulting in earnings of approximately $330 billion annually, five times the combined military 

budgets of every nation in Latin America and the Caribbean. Consequently, TCOs are often 

better funded, equipped, and manned than the security forces trying to fight them. They are 

brutal and vicious, setting fire to public transportation, murdering innocent civilians, and 

exerting control over significant swaths of urban and rural territories. In response, regional 

militaries are increasingly called on to respond to this threat, further eroding democratic norms, 

which in turn opens space that the PRC and Russia can exploit. 

Mexican criminal groups like the Sinaloa Cartel and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación

work with primarily PRC-based companies and brokers to source fentanyl, fentanyl precursors, 

and pre-precursors, which are then mixed into both cocaine and counterfeit prescription 

medications and trafficked into the United States, Mexico, Central America, and South 

America.

xl The result is the deadliest drug epidemic our country has ever faced and an ongoing 

economic crisis throughout our neighborhoods. TCOs are killing hundreds of thousands of 

Americans and draining valuable resources from struggling communities and states.xli xlii 

Iran

Iran seeks to increase its ideological influence in Latin America with the support of 

terrorist organizations such as Hizballah.xliii Using Spanish-language media, social networks, 

and satellites, Iran’s National Ministry of Intelligence and Security is engaging in large-scale 

psychological warfare to promote its interests in attacking the West and Latin America.xliv 
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Moreover, “Iran has moved from categorizing and tracking targets for possible attacks...to 

launching plans, including the attempted assassination of Israeli businessmen in Colombia.”xlv 

Hizballah continues to leverage the Shi’a diaspora in Latin America to disrupt Western 

objectives and surveil against enemies of the Iranian regime, to include targets with Jewish 

heritage.

Additionally, this past year Iran completed a naval deployment that circumnavigated the 

globe and included a port call in Brazil. Iran also delivered coastal defense missile patrol boats 

to Venezuela. 

Regional Humanitarian Crises 

Irregular Migration. TCO-driven violence, economic desperation, political instability, 

and climate change, are just a few of the cross-cutting challenges that are driving unprecedented 

levels of irregular migration throughout the region. A significant number of these migrants are 

from Venezuela, Ecuador, and Haiti, all home to both security and interconnected economic 

challenges that drive migration. Additionally, a growing number of Chinese migrants are 

moving through the AOR to the United States. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) encountered approximately 24,314 Chinese migrants along the 

Southwest Border, a 10-fold increase of migration from the previous fiscal year. 

Panama’s Darien Region is a likely route to the north for those whose travel originates in 

South America. Among the dense jungle, mountains, and swamps, TCOs, such as the Gulf Clan

and Tren de Aragua, facilitate smuggling operations, exploiting the most vulnerable. Migrants 

are subjected to extortion, robbery, sexual violence, wild animals, and disease, among so many 

other dangers. Nevertheless, hundreds of thousands are willing to brave these conditions, and
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the number of people passing through the Darien has more than doubled to 505,674 from FY

2022 to FY 2023. 

Haiti. Nowhere is more indicative of the destabilizing effect of criminal groups than 

Haiti, where gang violence has increased, overwhelming the capacity of the Haitian National 

Police. Gangs recently coordinated attacks, control an estimated eighty percent of Port-au-Prince 

and have a significant presence beyond it, dictating many aspects of daily life under their control, 

including the ability to move freely, seek medical assistance, or attend school.

xlvii xlviii

xlvi United Nations 

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently cited a report that recorded the brutality of these 

gangs, with 3,758 intentional killings between October 2022 and September 2023. 

Exposure to severe disease, lack of food, potable water, and sanitation services are just a 

few of the heartbreaking challenges resulting in the internal displacement of 200,000 Haitians.

xlix Moreover, Haiti’s geographic location leaves 96 percent of its citizens on the precipice of 

disaster – from earthquakes and hurricanes to flooding and mudslides. l Government agencies 

lack the capacity and capability to mitigate and then subsequently respond to frequent 

emergencies effectively. Political instability, unprecedented levels of violence, and tragic 

poverty have resulted in increased irregular migration, with more than 70,000 Haitians 

encountered at the United States Southwest Border in FY 2023. 

USSOUTHCOM continues to support U.S. Government efforts promoting deployment of 

a United Nations Security Council-authorized Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in 

Haiti. The MSS mission is to augment and build the capacity of the Haitian National Police to 

maintain security and counter gangs. 
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Nicaragua. The Ortega regime maintains an iron grip upon Nicaragua’s governmental 

institutions and its people as it continues to engage in repressive attacks on human rights, 

fundamental freedoms, and civil society.

li Aligned in shared values and interests, Nicaragua and

the PRC remain engaged in negotiations on a free trade agreement with PRC Foreign Minister 

Wang Yi.

lii Additionally, the Ortega Regime openly supports Russia’s illegal invasion of 

Ukraine and was the sole Latin American country to participate in 2022’s Russian Vostok war 

games.

liii

Cuba. Food, medicine, fuel, electricity, and political freedom remain scarce in Cuba. 

President Miguel Diaz-Canel and his government continue to repress and disproportionately 

punish all forms of public dissent. According to reports, during the past two years, more than 

400,000 Cubans have fled the island amid an economic crisis.

liv Conditions on the island have 

become so difficult that Russian exploiters have even lured Cuban citizens to join the Russian 

military in its war against Ukraine.lv 

Both the PRC and Russia are taking advantage of the existing conditions within Cuba to 

deepen cooperation across all elements of national power, with President Diaz-Canel

commenting during last summer’s BRICS Summit in South Africa that Cuban-Chinese relations 

were at an all-time high.lvi On 6 November, President Xi Jinping met with Cuban Vice Prime 

Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz in Beijing, affirming China’s willingness to support Cuba’s 

defense of national sovereignty. Havana continues to assert its willingness to carry out the BRI

and strengthen ties. We remain focused on monitoring and assessing the PRC’s and Russia’s

malign activities on the island, including defense cooperation, military deployments, intelligence 

collection, or any other activity that poses a threat to the United States – especially since these 

activities are occurring just 90 miles from our shores. 
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Venezuela. Nicolas Maduro presides over an unmitigated humanitarian disaster in 

Venezuela, as his stewardship of Venezuela’s economy has worsened living conditions for 

desperate Venezuelans who have limited access to food, water, and fuel, spurring many to 

migrate.

lviii

lxiii

lvii Recently, the authoritarian regime held a referendum to “claim sovereignty over the 

oil- and mineral-rich” Essequibo region in Guyana. We are monitoring this issue and support 

a diplomatic resolution. Maduro and his representatives have done little to stop drug trafficking 

and human rights abuses.

lix Extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and 

prosecution without due process have been undertaken by the security forces in Venezuela.lx lxi 

Maduro representatives are responsible for the worst ecocide in the history of Venezuela.

lxii 

Consequently, record numbers of Venezuelans are leaving their homes in search of a better life – 

more than 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled their country since 2013. Venezuelans are now the 

primary migrant nationality from the SOUTHCOM AOR encountered at the United States

Southwest Border.lxiv

Levers: Overcoming Threats and Challenges in the AOR

Today’s complex threats and challenges span all domains and the spectrum of conflict. 

To counter and overcome them, we need an integrated, whole-of-society approach that leverages 

all instruments of national power. The threats presented by the PRC today are substantially

different than those presented by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, where competition 

centered on military capability. lxv Specifically, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the 

Communist vision offered by the Soviets and their regional acolytes provided little to the 

populace.lxvi Today’s PRC offers our partners the veneer of modernization – airports, railways, 

deep-water ports, internet access, inexpensive technology, and available financing expeditiously. 
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To counter, we must expand beyond our traditional mechanisms and increase American 

economic investment in the region. 

After more than two years in command, I am convinced that Economic Security is 

National Security, and many of the challenges in the Americas are directly tied to a lack of 

economic investment and opportunity. USSOUTHCOM’s support of initiatives like the 

Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity will mobilize high-standard investment in this

hemisphere into critical infrastructure and supply chains to expand economic prosperity and 

opportunity. U.S. investment can enable regional competitiveness, bring transparency to the 

construction of critical infrastructure, and provide alternatives to PRC SOEs within our 

hemisphere. 

Moreover, with support from the U.S. Government, U.S. companies need to raise their 

profiles in the region and improve the branding of Team USA, both in messaging and 

advertisement of what good quality U.S. investment brings to the Americas. U.S. companies 

employ international environmental and labor standards, have strong anti-corruption measures, 

invest in local communities, ensure the safety of their locally hired workers, and adhere to 

principles of transparency – a stark contrast to the PRC and the disinformation narratives 

perpetuated by Russia. Additionally, more legitimate job opportunities for local populations 

diminish TCO support and reduce opportunities for corrupt practices. Economic Security is 

National Security – as it drives global influence, prosperity, and reinforces other vital elements 

of national power. 

USSOUTHCOM, with our Allies, partners, U.S. Interagency, non-governmental 

organizations, and the private sector, seamlessly campaigns across all domains to overcome the 

many challenges to the Western Hemisphere. The safety of our homeland is directly linked to 
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the resilience, stability, and security of our Latin American and Caribbean partners. As such, 

USSOUTHCOM is laser-focused on Strengthening Partnerships and Countering Threats. 

Strengthening Partnerships and Countering Threats

Strengthening partnerships means building trust and being present. Trust is an 

investment and cannot be surged.lxvii Our alliances and partnerships are our greatest strategic 

advantage. They are directly connected to the region’s collective ability to meet its evolving 

security challenges. In the face of our adversaries’ pervasive malign influence, we continue to 

substantively engage with our Partner Nations to build trust while maintaining our status as their

preferred partner. USSOUTHCOM does this through a pre-existing foundation of trust, mutual 

respect for democratic values, and shared interests in cooperation and interoperability. Our 

engagements, presence, and policies remain flexible, consistent, and responsive as we campaign 

in strategic competition. Putting Integrated Deterrence into action, USSOUTHCOM works by, 

with, and through our Allies and partners to improve Partner Nation capability, capacity, and 

resilience. Every day we leverage Security Cooperation exercises, training, and education 

activities to build trust. 

Concurrently, cross-cutting threats and transboundary challenges put at risk sovereignty, 

democratic values, and security. USSOUTHCOM aggressively counters threats through 

campaigning and integrating deliberate multi-domain operations and exercises alongside our 

Allies and partners. Team Democracy can deny our adversaries the ability to expand their 

presence and influence and increases regional stability, security, and prosperity. 

Security Cooperation. In a resource-constrained theater, USSOUTHCOM continues to 

work with the U.S. Interagency and Allies to maximize efforts in exchanges, training, equipping, 
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and exercises to build Partner Nation capabilities or capacities and to advance regional Partner 

Nation interoperability. Building Partner Capacity Programs are the main lever for partner 

engagement and provide meaningful opportunities to strengthen partnerships and develop 

military capabilities. In FY 2024, we have planned 1,014 activities by, with, and through our 

regional partners. We appreciate congressional support of this critical program and will continue 

maximizing all resources to build our willing partners’ capacity. 

The Security Cooperation funds provided by Congress are critical to delivering 

equipment and capabilities to our partners, and these resources have significantly accelerated and 

expanded the capacity of our efforts to counter the PRC, Russia, and TCOs. Key examples are

the contracts awarded to Ecuador and Peru for King Air Maritime Patrol Aircraft. These aircraft 

will significantly enhance the Maritime Domain Awareness capability by illuminating the 

current threat of IUU fishing and monitoring and detecting illicit maritime movements. 

Department of State Security Assistance. Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programs increase 

interoperability with our partners while supporting their security requirements. These programs 

are critical tools to counterbalance PRC military engagement in the region. In December 2023, 

the Chilean Air Force signed an FMS letter of acceptance for the modernization of their F-16 

fleet. This modernization will increase the lifespan of their fleet by 15 years, provide NATO 

interoperability, and continue to provide access, presence, and influence with a critical partner. 

Our partners increasingly face a choice between seeking equipment and training from the U.S. or 

our Strategic Competitors and other malign actors. The superior goods and strong relationships 

built by our programs enable us to meet the needs of our partners in a timely manner while

outcompeting our adversaries. 
19

USSOUTHCOM executes the Department of State’s International Military Education and 

Training (IMET) program that provides professional military education emphasizing 

professionalism and democratic values to personnel from 28 countries in the region. In FY 2023, 

our IMET allocation to our Partner Nations provided professional military education for 

approximately 800 international students in U.S. schools. This opportunity to influence our 

partners is important, as the personnel attending these schools often become senior military 

leaders in their countries. Currently, three ministers of defense and 13 chiefs of defense have 

attended IMET-funded courses at U.S institutions. 

Additionally, regional educational institutions such as the William J. Perry Center for 

Hemispheric Defense Studies and the Inter-American Defense College provide executive-level 

education and help cultivate lasting relationships, improve regional understanding of U.S. policy, 

and ensure the sustainability of U.S. Security Cooperation investments. These institutions’ 

influential alumni networks foster whole-of-hemisphere collaboration in resolving top security 

and defense challenges in the Americas. 

Joint Exercise Program. Our Joint Exercise Program continues to provide an outsized 

return on investment to strengthen partnerships and interoperability among our Allies, partners, 

U.S. Interagency, and Non-Federal Entities. Over 13,500 participants from 36 Nations were 

integrated into our exercises this past year. I traveled to Colombia in July for the 64th annual 

UNITAS, the world’s longest-running multinational maritime exercise. There, I saw firsthand

how 7,000 people from 27 countries across the globe collaborate, innovate, and experiment with 

emerging technologies and naval concepts – including the integration and management of 

unmanned systems – to deter Malign State Actors and foster security and stability across the 

global commons. Honing our warfighting skills has primacy in all we do. 
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Last August, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States put Integrated Deterrence into action during Exercise SOUTHERN STAR, a 

multi-lateral special operations exercise hosted throughout Chile that focused on countering 

threat networks in the AOR. Through subject matter expert exchanges, tactical operations, and 

command and control exercises, over 1,100 Chilean, 500 U.S. service members, and dozens of 

Allies and partners came together to enable global collaboration and interoperability while

building Allied and Partner Nation capacity to conduct contingency operations. 

USSOUTHCOM’s exercises CENTAM GUARDIAN and TRADEWINDS focus on 

countering TCOs and bringing together the Department of State, Department of Justice, and the 

Department of Homeland Security, along with our Allied and Partner Nation military and 

security forces, to enhance readiness, domain awareness, interoperability, and intelligence and 

information sharing. 

Through training on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR), Human 

Rights, and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), these exercises not only provide year-long 

engagement opportunities throughout the AOR but also serve as forums to enhance force

professionalism and underscore democratic principles. 

Theater Maintenance Partnership Initiative. The Theater Maintenance Partnership 

Initiative (TMPI) builds partner capacity from the tactical level (operator maintenance) to the 

operational level (Ministry of Defense logistics and sustainment functions). Maintenance and 

sustainment are hard for our U.S. military, and TMPI invests in our partners by teaching and 

building a culture of maintenance readiness. TMPI is a seven-year program and will build 

capacity through education by establishing nine Maintenance Centers of Excellence in the AOR. 

It will also address maintenance requirements of U.S.-provided defense articles our partners 
21

utilize. Fostering an integrated approach to logistics, TMPI will improve readiness and readiness 

reporting so that Allied and Partner Nations can visualize materiel readiness, apply resources, 

communicate challenges, and request needed support. Additionally, USSOUTHCOM is working 

to create Multinational Logistics Courses to promote NATO standardization, Life Cycle 

Management, and the conduct of logistics at the Operational and Strategic levels. TMPI will

enhance interoperability, self-sufficiency, and resiliency among Allies and partners, leading to 

sustainable readiness improvements that increase regional stability. 

CONTINUING PROMISE. This past year, from August to September, the USNS 

BURLINGTON and 120 crewmembers embarked upon a 52-day humanitarian assistance (HA), 

readiness building, and goodwill mission that touched Colombia, Grenada, Panama, and Trinidad 

and Tobago. This evolution marked the 13th CONTINUING PROMISE mission to the AOR 

since 2007 – a joint military and civilian effort that provides expeditionary medical care, 

veterinary care, training, and subject matter expert exchanges with our Partner Nations. While 

CONTINUING PROMISE missions typically feature the USNS COMFORT hospital ship, 

which is currently undergoing maintenance, the mission relied on the USNS BURLINGTON as 

the deploying platform. The “fast, flexible, and maneuverable” ship served as a proof of concept 

for transporting personnel and equipment in support of regional disaster relief and humanitarian 

operations.lxviii 

During the mission, CONTINUING PROMISE personnel delivered medical care to 6,100 

patients, administered 950 vaccinations, dispensed 8,750 prescriptions, and repaired $500,000 

worth of Partner Nation medical equipment. Additionally, U.S. Navy Seabees led construction 

and engineering projects benefiting schools, hospitals, and local communities. The 

CONTINUING PROMISE mission is a critical soft power asset that creates and sustains an 
22

immeasurable amount of goodwill from our partners and their people, offsetting PRC influence 

in the region while building the legitimacy and capacity of our Partner Nations. 

Key Leader Engagements. The importance of maintaining and cultivating relationships 

with senior leaders within my AOR cannot be overstated. Since taking command in October 

2021, I have been to the region 48 times, visited 17 countries, and conducted over 150 Key 

Leader Engagements with Allied and Partner Nation ministers and chiefs of defense. 

Additionally, I have met with 17 heads of state, three vice presidents, and three prime ministers. 

These engagements and the enduring Congressional and Staff Delegations to the region assist in 

establishing and successfully executing our shared security objectives while generating mutual 

trust and understanding. Moreover, they reinforce diplomacy and U.S. Interagency initiatives. 

After many discussions with the region’s leaders, it remains apparent that our partners need our 

assistance in combatting their many challenges. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) continues 

to provide vital support to the USSOUTHCOM AOR by executing an extremely diverse program 

that not only builds infrastructure and capacity, but also ensures that considerations for 

environmental sustainability, climate resiliency, and at-risk indigenous populations, are factored 

into their projects. Wherever we have a USACE effort, we are facilitating presence and access. 

USACE currently has activities in 17 countries within the AOR and has some form of full-time 

presence in eight of them. For example, they are managing large construction efforts in 

Colombia and Peru, providing humanitarian assistance projects in Guatemala and Belize, and 

executing technical assistance in agreements with the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Ecuador. 

USACE builds projects in support of our exercises, incorporates work with Allies and the U.S. 

Interagency, executes exchanges with partners having complex engineering challenges, and 
23

works to select contractors internal to that country or region to enable investment in the local 

economy. The quality work and the transparent nature in which they do business are providing

National Guard State Partnership Program. 2023 marked the 30th anniversary of the 

State Partnership Program and 30 years of the National Guard assisting our Partner Nations’ 

military and security forces to build capacity and meet ever-evolving security challenges. 

USSOUTHCOM has the largest State Partnership Program of all the Combatant Commands, 

spanning 30 countries. Since 2010 our program has completed 3,629 events, with 426 events 

completed in FY 2023 and another 328 planned for FY 2024. Improving regional 

interoperability and the readiness of both Partner Nations and U.S. forces to respond to crises 

and threats, the State Partnership Program is instrumental in the conduct and success of not only 

our operations, but also our enduring relationships throughout the region. 

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. Regional geography and climate 

change leave our Partner Nations vulnerable to extreme weather events and natural disasters. 

Before, during, and after a catastrophe, we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our partners to

provide assistance. USSOUTHCOM engages regularly with our Partner Nations, encouraging 

and assisting them to take the necessary steps toward preparedness, mitigation, and resiliency. In 

FY 2023, USSOUTHCOM completed 256 HA and three Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)

projects in 29 countries. 

HA activities address the basic needs of civilian populations and build partner capacity

by improving Partner Nation disaster preparedness and risk reduction, health, education, basic 

an environmentally conscious and more technically sound alternative to outcompete the PRC. 

These projects, programs, and Integrated Deterrence efforts increase our regional 

competitiveness, facilitate interoperability, and build Partner Nation resilience. 
24

infrastructure, and HMA activities. Over the last year, USSOUTHCOM planned and conducted

25 medical civic-action projects, constructed or renovated nine medical and dental clinics and 14 

schools, executed 18 projects to provide potable water to towns and villages, and constructed and 

equipped four Emergency Operations Centers/Disaster Relief Warehouses. Moreover, we

conducted 22 projects to provide local firefighters with equipment, radios, and personal 

protective equipment during the outbreak of wildland forest fires in Chile. Of note, 

USSOUTHCOM conducted 18 projects to support the governments of Colombia and Panama in 

their efforts to provide humanitarian services to mitigate the suffering of migrants in the Darien 

region. These projects demonstrate our commitment to building Partner Nation capacity and

meeting humanitarian needs, while simultaneously increasing the United States’ access, 

visibility, and influence in a time of strategic competition throughout the region. 

Countering PRC Malign Efforts. The PRC is America’s pacing threat; countering their

aggression and malign influence requires a whole-of-society approach. USSOUTHCOM

continues to coordinate with non-governmental organizations, the private sector, academia, and

the U.S. Interagency, including both the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, 

to source U.S. and Allied solutions as alternatives to PRC offerings in critical infrastructure, 

cyber, and telecommunications. By methodically identifying and synchronizing separate 

initiatives, from building cyber capability to exposing PRC malign activities, we can strengthen 

critical infrastructure to improve our collective ability to operate in the face of the PRC’s multidomain threats. 

The PRC is working overtime to expand its network of port access and space 

infrastructure. As such, we remain focused on building our relationships and interoperability 

with our partners and Allies through sustained Security Cooperation engagement and investment. 
25

Moreover, we continue to illuminate and expose the malign intent and dual-use nature of PRC 

infrastructure and space sites. Information sharing with our partners paints a vibrant portrait of 

the PRC’s past, present, and future steps to undercut our partners’ sovereignty while expanding 

theirs. Armed with the facts and U.S. and Allied investment alternatives, our partners are better 

able to make informed decisions regarding engagement with the PRC. 

We will WIN this strategic competition by emphasizing and seizing upon our strengths. 

A global network of Allies and partners guided by democratic values and principles gives the 

United States an unrivaled advantage over the PRC. We continue to campaign across all 

domains and the conflict spectrum while instituting Integrated Deterrence into all our activities, 

operations, and investments. By doing so, USSOUTHCOM demonstrates its commitment to the 

region, forges stronger partnerships, and enhances regional resilience, stability, and security 

across the Western Hemisphere.

Countering Russian Malign Influence. We remain postured for competition with 

Russia through the coordination and application of information-related capabilities. Russian 

malign activities are ever present, and the associated fallout continues to plague the region. 

USSOUTHCOM’s approach empowers our partners and exposes Russian disinformation and 

malign activity to limit its reach and effectiveness.

Our Allies and partners support efforts that impose costs on Russia, and this past year, we 

have successfully collaborated with partners to counter Russian malign activities occurring in the 

information environment. Additionally, we continue to work with our partners to exchange 

Soviet-era equipment for newer NATO-interoperable, U.S.-made equipment in the future. We 

must continue to coordinate and collaborate expeditiously with our partners, especially when 

assisting them in replacing antiquated equipment and maintaining operational readiness. The 
26

stakes are too high; we cannot allow Strategic Competitors or other malign actors to fulfill the 

needs of our partners due to self-imposed inefficiency. 

Countering TCOs. Utilizing a whole-of-government effort, Joint Interagency Task 

Force-South (JIATF-South) monitors both the air and maritime domains in our region to detect 

deadly drugs and contraband headed toward the shores of the United States. In FY 2023, this 

statutorily directed mission saved 3,030 American lives and resulted in the disruption of 361 

illegal smuggling events, including the disruption of almost 308 metric tons of cocaine and 78 

metric tons of marijuana, with a combined wholesale value of $7.7 billion. Additionally, 

evidence and information gathered from these disruptions assist U.S. Interagency and 

international law enforcement in prosecution efforts that further degrade TCOs. 

Our Partner Nations continue to be critical enablers in countering TCO smuggling 

operations. In coordination with JIATF-South, our Partner Nations have participated in 79.5% 

percent of operations, resulting in the removal of 240.675 metric tons of cocaine routed toward 

the United States. The success of these operations relies upon Partner Nation collaboration, 

which we systematically nurture and support throughout our routine military-to-military 

engagements, training, and exercises. A key investment in this shared fight is the contracted 

Ship Special Mission (SSM), an afloat forward staging base embarking Partner Nation Navy and 

Coast Guard interceptor teams, extending their reach hundreds of miles offshore where TCOs 

traffic their illicit commodities. In FY 2023, the SSM embarked teams from six Partner Nations 

in the Pacific, Caribbean, and Atlantic Oceans while conducting nine separate counter-TCO 

operations. Our partners operating from the SSM seized over 12 metric tons of cocaine and 10 

thousand pounds of marijuana, with a combined street value of approximately $500 million. 
27

U.S.-led, multinational counternarcotics operations ultimately result in our partners 

taking the lead on their own operations, as Peru recently did during Operation MAR DE GRAU. 

This operation showcased the value of Integrated Deterrence and resulted in 2.897 metric tons of 

cocaine seized or disrupted in three separate cases. This level of success is directly tied to 

continued U.S. investment in training and equipping our military and security partners. 

Moreover, USSOUTHCOM works hand-in-hand with the Department of Treasury to 

counter malign actors’ ability to generate, store, move, and use funds. This includes revenue 

from corruption, drugs, weapons, human trafficking, and illegal trade in natural resources and 

wildlife. During the past year, USSOUTHCOM supported Treasury’s designation of Los 

Huistas, who facilitated the importation of precursor chemicals from China to manufacture 

methamphetamines, as a Drug Trafficking Organization. 

Notwithstanding our significant achievements over the decades in this mission space, 

there is still more to do, especially in support of efforts to combat TCOs who directly threaten 

the democratic stability of the region. As U.S. resources against this threat decline, we will 

continue to innovate by re-examining and creatively leveraging current authorities and 

unconventional tools, like contract assets, commercial data, and artificial intelligence and 

machine learning. We are also working to better align counternarcotics efforts with our larger 

campaign focus on strategic competition, such as supporting U.S. law enforcement efforts to 

sever state-crime alliances related to illicit finance, cybercrime, and the use of proxies. 

Confronting Climate Change. Climate change and environmental degradation reduce

military readiness by expanding requirements and diminishing resources. This AOR is 

disproportionately affected by extreme weather events and natural disasters, conditions that 

impact the region’s access to food, water, healthcare, and energy. El Niño and other naturally 
28

occurring phenomena are exacerbated by elevated surface temperatures, which dry out soil and 

render farmland less productive, further contributing to irregular migration. This weather pattern 

also results in less rainfall in Central America and Northern South America, which affects the

water levels required to operate critical infrastructure such as the Panama Canal, through which 

five percent of global commerce passes through annually. Low water levels have limited the 

number of vessels able to transit each day, at a time when global shipping is further challenged 

by threats in the Red Sea. 

Alongside our Partner Nations, USSOUTHCOM builds resiliency and increases capacity 

to respond to extreme weather events and environmental disasters by holding subject matter 

expert exchanges and incorporating energy and climate security scenarios into our major 

exercises. We also leverage an integrated approach with the Pacific Disaster Center in Hawaii

and other civilian partners, who facilitate HA/DR training and assessments with our Partner 

Nations. 

USSOUTHCOM is executing a program to assist partners in the Western Hemisphere to 

provide training to defense and security partners in how to plan against, prepare for, and respond 

to climate contingencies, leveraging data-driven decision making and analytic tools. The 

program will fund additional bilateral and multilateral research on climate security in the 

Western Hemisphere. In 2024, USSOUTHCOM will co-host sub-regional symposia and a 

region-wide Capstone Conference on addressing the impacts of climate change. The program’s 

goal is to catalyze regional collaboration and response mechanisms leading to climate-resilient 

outcomes. 

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. The increasing urgency to address the 

severity of the economic, human, and environmental consequences of IUU fishing and associated 
29

labor abuses continues to grow throughout the globe. President Biden has cited IUU fishing as 

In partnership with other U.S. Government initiatives, USSOUTHCOM is promoting a 

whole-of-society effort to better use commercial data, analytics, and emerging technology to 

improve maritime domain awareness. Through Enhanced Domain Awareness, a secure, 

unclassified, virtual environment, we provide partners with a consolidated, near real-time picture 

of IUU fishing activities, trends, and reports that contribute to counter-IUU fishing operations as 

well as other issues such as migration, human trafficking, and illegal mining. lxxii Our decisive 

actions are a bulwark against unsustainable PRC resource extraction. Simultaneously, they 

reduce lost Partner Nation revenues and impede the ability of our adversaries to engage in 

nefarious activities in the region. Countering IUU fishing is one more way to bolster our 

partners’ national and economic security. 

Cyber. Cyber is an all-encompassing domain that links every facet of society, including 

defense. The interconnectedness of the cyber domain continues to grow exponentially with 

emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. This means cybersecurity and cyber 

defense are challenges confronting more than just information technology specialists. These 

difficulties span the full spectrum of government and society, from presidents to average 

citizens. Successful plans for countering adversary activities in the cyber domain require 

one of the greatest threats to the world’s oceans. lxix It contributes to the “collapse or decline of 

fisheries that are critical to the economic growth, food systems, and ecosystems” of our Partner 

Nations. lxx Additionally, it can “undermine port and maritime security, as criminal elements 

may use similar trade routes, landing sites, and vessels...for trafficking arms, migrants, drugs, 

and other contraband.”lxxi 
30

allocating increased resources and integrating whole-of-government solutions to deliver the 

required support quickly and in sufficient quantity. 

We support our partners’ advancement of their defensive cyber capabilities and develop 

cyber resiliency through cybersecurity defense training, software, and equipment with the Joint 

Combatant Command Cyber Assistance Teams – USSOUTHCOM’s cyber quick reaction force – 

and Defend Forward Operations. Latin America suffered about 12 percent of global cyberattacks even though it only accounts for eight percent of the world’s population.lxxiii Over the 

last year, Team Democracy came together to help a requesting Partner Nation recover from a 

massive Malign State Actor-supported cyberattack against government ministries that resulted in 

over $10 million in losses. We successfully leveraged internal and external resources through 

multiple engagements to support recovery and fortify their cyber resiliency. As a result, this 

partner pursued telecommunications solutions that conform to the Budapest Convention on 

Cybercrime and eliminated certain Malign State Actors from competition. 

Competing in the Information Space. Democracy’s adversaries continue to flood the 

information space with disinformation, seeking to advance their malign narratives and agendas 

upon the “smokeless battlefield.”lxxiv USSOUTHCOM’s information operations team works 

tirelessly to shape pro-U.S. and pro-democracy narratives that “tell our story” and highlight the 

truthful, positive outcomes in the region from our collective efforts. By synchronizing and 

coordinating with our Allies, partners, and the U.S. Interagency, we aggressively pierce the 

information space to expand our partnerships, underscore the enduring value of human rights and 

the rule of law, and retain the offensive in exposing and countering the harmful activity and

disinformation generated by the PRC, Russia, and other malign actors. 
31

Agile Processes. The window to seize the strategic initiative is now. We must continue 

to innovate and support our partners at the speed of relevance. Our adversaries work in an 

authoritarian system that is not checked by transparent processes or accountability, offering our 

partners equipment, services, and education on an expedited basis. Our status as the preferred 

partner is jeopardized by bureaucratic inefficiencies that result in overpromising and 

underdelivering. Our Strategic Competitors fill this void. 

The United States must use all the instruments of national power to propel innovation and 

operate at the cutting edge of technology. Through collaboration with academic and private 

industry partners, this command seeks to take innovative technologies from a controlled 

laboratory environment to a permissive practical application environment, establishing the 

USSOUTHCOM AOR as an innovation hub. In October, U.S. Naval Forces Southern 

Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet held its Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event, hosting 47 Department of 

Defense Commands, 10 foreign partners, and 18 industry partners to foster innovation and 

experimentation to inform the Unmanned Campaign and Hybrid Fleet. Over the course of the 

week, unmanned systems were evaluated in advanced kill chains, contested operations, 

survivability, and sustainment at sea. Additionally, USSOUTHCOM has focused on striking 

bilateral agreements with our Partner Nations to mutually advance military technologies so that 

we can work together quickly to create new beneficial capabilities. 

I have made it a priority to integrate tomorrow’s technology into our operations and 

exercises today. Continued investment and advancements in the areas of robotics, cyber 

technology, and artificial intelligence and machine learning will overmatch our adversaries and 

assist the region’s democracies to emerge as global leaders in science and technology. 
32

Coast Guard Support. The U.S. Coast Guard remains a key partner and enabler of 

USSOUTHCOM’s priorities and missions. The U.S. Coast Guard maintains unique authorities 

and capabilities, which, in coordination with the Joint Force, our Allies, and Partner Nations, 

disrupt TCOs, IUU fishing, terrorism, and irregular migration. Moreover, they support 

USSOUTHCOM Theater Security Cooperation initiatives and conduct a variety of lifesaving and 

HA mission support across the region by delivering critical aid in the wake of a disaster. Jointly 

with the U.S. Army, the U.S. Coast Guard, as part of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative -

Technical Assistance Field Team, bolsters the capabilities of Caribbean Partner Nations’ 

maritime assets in support of regional security and counter-trafficking while simultaneously 

displacing PRC influence. As always, USSOUTHCOM can faithfully rely on the U.S. Coast 

Guard to ensure the safety, security, and stewardship of the region’s waters.lxxv 

Building Our Team – People First

“People execute the strategy.” lxxvi USSOUTHCOM continues to invest in its people to 

Build Our Team. With their trust being the foundation of our profession, the health, safety, and 

welfare of our people remains paramount. USSOUTHCOM maintains a professional atmosphere 

that offers educational opportunities, leverages broad expertise, and fosters diverse and

innovative thought to generate solutions to the dynamic problem set in the Americas. 

Housing, Cost of Living Allowance, and Locality Pay. Service members, civilians, 

contractors, and their families are the heart and soul of USSOUTHCOM. Our success is tied to 

the welfare of our team. While South Florida is the geographic gateway to the Americas, living

and working in the area has many economic challenges that have affected our command, 

especially as it relates to the cost of housing. Through the hard work of the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army, along with the support of federal and 
33

state officials and local leaders, we have physically broken ground on the USSOUTHCOM 

privatized housing project and expect phased completion between the summers of 2026 and 

2027. This project will house nearly 200 service members and their families. 

Our service members and civilian teammates continue to be negatively impacted by the 

rising cost of living in the South Florida area. Miami has recently been identified by U.S. News 

& World Report as the fourth most expensive city in the United States, with a 5.7 percent 

increase in basic goods and services and a 10.1 percent increase in rent of primary residence over 

the course of CY 2023 - while car insurance rates in Florida have increased 55 percent over the 

2023 national average.lxxvii lxxviii lxxix lxxx USSOUTHCOM remains in contact with state and 

federal officials, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the 

Army, as well as policymakers, to voice concerns and advocate on behalf of our team. 

Joint Interagency Task Force-South Resiliency. JIATF-South is currently spread across 

four buildings that are 70-plus years old and do not meet requirements to support their important 

mission. Design for a new and consolidated facility will be completed in July 2024. We 

appreciate the continued support as we look to build a resilient facility for this critical mission of 

our nation. 

Women, Peace, and Security. USSOUTHCOM’s WPS program promotes women’s 

meaningful participation, leadership, and engagement in decision-making at all levels throughout 

the AOR. USSOUTHCOM integrates gender perspectives within our operations, activities, and 

investments to maximize the talents of women in the force through their recruitment, retention, 

training, and advancement. In May 2023, USSOUTHCOM and 14 Partner Nations gathered in 

Colombia for the 6th Senior Enlisted Leader Women, Peace, and Security Seminar. With over 

300 in-person and 1000 remote attendees, this three-day seminar featured panel discussions, 
34

working group sessions, and a forum to highlight the professional growth, capability, and 

integrity of women filling the Senior Enlisted Leader ranks. 

Through our ongoing WPS engagements, we build the capacity of our Partner Nations 

and better enable their military and security forces to engage with local populations, gain gender 

perspectives, and better assess the needs of all the citizens they proudly serve. I have made it a 

priority to incorporate WPS events into all my travel within the region, hosting events this past 

year in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, and 

Uruguay – showcasing the power of example. Our partners continue to make historic strides. In

Colombia, the first female naval officer was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral and the first 

72 female Marines graduated from Infantry boot camp. In Uruguay, the Uruguayan Senate 

approved, for the first time, the promotion of three female military officers to the rank of Colonel 

this past September. Women play an important role in increasing readiness and sustaining 

regional stability, security, and prosperity, and so we must redouble our efforts to integrate and 

institutionalize Women, Peace, and Security initiatives internally and among all our partners. 

Total Force. The trends in the Latin America and Caribbean region require a total force 

approach that maximizes the integration and strong relationships between the National Guard, 

Active Component, and Reserve forces. This approach is exemplified by the Navy Reserve Joint 

Intelligence Operations Center 0174, whose reserve sailors supported the intelligence and 

evidentiary package that led to sanctioning action on Pingtan Marine Enterprise, Ltd., along with 

eight other affiliated entities involved in IUU fishing. Our Reserve Component is integrated into 

our daily operations, including staffing our Joint Operations Center, planning and participating in 

joint exercises, and managing the State Partnership Program. 
35

What Resources Does USSOUTHCOM Need? 

In this region, a small investment – whether in time, physical resources, funding, or 

collaboration – goes a long way. We don’t have to outspend the PRC to outcompete, but we 

must be present on the field and deliver at the speed of relevance. This requires having a timely 

budget – continuing resolutions are disruptive to U.S. and Partner Nation efforts to defend 

against threats. The PRC and Russia are already here in the Western Hemisphere; time is of the 

essence.

Security Cooperation. USSOUTHCOM has adopted a proactive approach to identify 

opportunities to expedite delivery of equipment from Security Cooperation and Security 

Assistance programs. The command maintains frequent communication with all Security 

Cooperation stakeholders to anticipate or recognize factors that might generate delays on FMS, 

FMF, and Section 333 cases. We then engage with the organizations involved at a senior level to 

ensure all teams pre-emptively take actions to mitigate risk and accelerate deliveries to build 

necessary partner capacity to address mutual security threats. We appreciate Congress’ support 

for USSOUTHCOM’s security cooperation activities, as these engagements are our main lever in 

maintaining strong partnerships that help us edge out the PRC in the region. 

Intelligence. Congress has also supported innovative pilot programs that increase 

domain awareness in the theater. Given the Department’s demand for and limited availability of 

exquisite Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets, USSOUTHCOM aims to 

mitigate our ranking priority in the collection posture with Commercial Imagery. Commercial 

Imagery bypasses the task-saturated national system and provides expedited, relevant, and 

unclassified data that has proved crucial during a recent high-profile Haitian Kidnap for Ransom 

incident, increased irregular migration, and in monitoring the malign behavior of PRC, Russia, 
36

and Iran as tension in the region continues to rise. We also rely heavily on intelligence gained 

through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Section 702 authorities. Without a reauthorization 

of Section 702, we would lose significant domain awareness and insight into the threats and 

challenges in our own hemisphere. 

Technology and Innovation. I have made it a priority to integrate tomorrow’s 

technology into our operations and exercises today. Continued investment and advancements in 

the areas of robotics, cyber technology, artificial intelligence and machine learning will 

overmatch our adversaries and assist the region’s democracies to emerge as global leaders who 

feed and fuel the world. Additionally, we must improve our information networks, cybersecurity 

posture, and interoperability. Improving our networks enhances situational awareness, 

accelerates decision-making, and ensures communication readiness across all echelons and with 

mission partners operating throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Investments in Mission 

Partner Environment and Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control will underwrite 

these and future objectives. Moreover, continued Congressional support of exercises in the 

Western Hemisphere will ensure the United States’ ability to evaluate cutting-edge technologies 

in operationally relevant environments. These activities operationally refine future warfighting 

capabilities and accelerate technologies for deployment to meet military requirements. 

USSOUTHCOM’s operational experimentation helps transition research and development from 

concept to implementation across all Combatant Commands and domains and, in the end, 

strengthens Integrated Deterrence and Team Democracy. 

Ambassadors. The United States has nine posts operating without an Ambassador, our 

number one diplomat who coordinates and synchronizes Team USA’s in-country ground game. 

These absences are a national security issue and send the message to our Partner Nations that 
37

they are not a priority to the United States at a time when the PRC continues to elevate its 

presence throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Senate could take action on the five WHEM 

nominees for Ambassadorial positions that have already been sent to Congress. 

Economic Engagement in the Region. USSOUTHCOM is aware of multiple legislative 

efforts to encourage economic engagement and investment in the countries of the Western 

Hemisphere. National security rests on economic security, and any increases in economic 

opportunities for the countries and people of this neighborhood will mitigate many of the 

challenges we face as a hemisphere. If people have jobs to sustain their families, they will be 

less likely to consider illegally migrating to the United States for opportunities or working with 

the TCOs to make ends meet. If governments in the region have the option to work with U.S. or 

other Western companies, they are less likely to choose to work with the PRC. Legislative 

efforts that responsibly incentivize U.S. and Western investment in the region could greatly add 

to a whole-of-society approach to national security.

Beijing Convention. Ratification of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

Relating to International Civil Aviation, otherwise known as the Beijing Convention, would 

expand our ability to cooperate with Partner Nations for the prevention and prosecution of 

certain criminal activities, including certain criminal uses of civil aviation. 

Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School. We appreciate 

Congress’ support of the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School 

(NAVSCIATTS) in FY 2024 and look forward to working closely with the Department of the 

Navy, U.S. Special Operations Command, and Congress to keep this important facility 

operational for years to come. The rivers and littorals are critical pathways in securing the 
38

hemisphere, and NAVSCIATTS is uniquely positioned to train our Partner Nations on how to 

secure this domain as it has for the past 54 years, training 13,000 personnel from 123 countries. 

Conclusion 

This is a Call to Action! Our adversaries’ malign actions and intent, coupled with the 

numerous transboundary threats, are a growing challenge – replicating the first and second island 

chain – to our homeland. USSOUTHCOM, alongside our Allies and partners, stands ready to 

defend the democratic values, ideals, and institutions that will continue to enable this vibrant 

region to feed and fuel the world. Through Integrated Deterrence and utilizing all instruments of 

national power, we will ensure that the safety, security, and prosperity of Latin America and the 

Caribbean endure for this generation and all those to come. 
39

i Congressional Research Service, China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role, IF 10890, Barrios, Ricardo; Lawrence, Susan V., and Rosen, 

Liana W., Congressional Research Digital Collection, September 28, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890. ii “The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy.” The White House, 12 Oct. 2022, p. 12, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf iii Id. at 40. iv “World Water Day: Latin America Leads in Water Management but Inequalities in Access Remain.” World Bank, 

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/03/22/world-water-day-latin-america-achievements-challenges. v Latin America and the Caribbean will account for more than 25% of global agricultural exports by 2028, says FAO - Brazilian-American 

Chamber of Commerce (brazilcham.com)

vi Wang Yi, “The Belt and Road Initiative Becomes New Opportunity for China-Latin America Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 

People’s Republic of China, September 18, 2017

vii “Belt and Road in Latin America: A Regional Game Changer?” Atlantic Council, 9 Oct. 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depthresearch-reports/issue-brief/belt-and-road-in-latin-america-a-regional-game-changer/. viii “How Should the U.S. Respond to China’s Influence in Latin America?” United States Institute of Peace, 

https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/how-should-us-respond-chinas-influence-latin-america. ix “China’s Engagement in Latin America: Views from the Region.” United States Institute of Peace, 

https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/chinas-engagement-latin-america-views-region. x Brady, Anne-Marie. China’s Expanding Antarctic Capacity and Interests. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017, pp. 7–7. JSTOR, 

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xi Berg, Ryan C. Combating Chinese Dual-Use Infrastructure: Bringing In the Private Sector. Dec. 2022. www.csis.org, 

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xxxvi Id. xxxvii “Lavrov in Latin America: Russia’s Bid for a Multipolar World.” United States Institute of Peace,

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lvi “China’s Xi Vows to Support Cuba in Defending Its National Sovereignty.” Reuters, 24 Aug. 2023. www.reuters.com, 

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