* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

.

R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-50797

(Summary Calendar)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JEFFREY WILLIAM HOWARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(USDC No. P-97-CR-65-1)

- - - - - - - - - - August 5, 1998

Before JOLLY, SMITH and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey William Howard appeals his

conviction and sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment for possession

of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Howard claims that the district court erred in denying his motion

to quash the indictment, contending that neither the prior felony

conviction nor the firearms he was charged with po ssessing were

specified sufficiently to allow him to present an adequate defense.

The record shows, however, that he possessed copies of documents2

regarding his prior conviction and that the Government provided him

with documents regarding all of the firearms that were seized.

Howard has failed to allege any prejudice resulting from the

absence in the indictment of the specification of his prior

conviction and failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from

the absence in the indictment of the specification of the firearms.

United States v. Nevers , 7 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1993).

Howard further argues that the district court erred in denying

his motion for change of venue without first conducting a hearing

and without questioning the jury panel regarding prejudice.

Howard’s motion was not sufficiently specific t o warrant an

evidentiary hearing. Even on appeal, Howard fails to state any

particulars concerning the nature and amount of publicity that he

contends was prejudicial. He does not aver what evidence he would

have produced if given the opportunity. Howard has not shown that

the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for

change of venue without conducting an evidentiary hearing. U nited

States v. Smith-Bowman

, 76 F.3d 634, 637 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

,

518 U.S. 1011 (1996).

Howard next complains that the district court erred in denying

his motion to suppress. He argues that the evidence of the

firearms seized after his arrest should have been suppressed

because he was arrested without a warrant and without probable

cause. Based on the facts known to the authorities, probable cause

existed for the arrest of the occupant of the Oldsmobile that was3

traveling with the Suburban, and Howard was that occupant. The

district court did not err in denying Howard’s motion to suppress.

Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States

v. Tellez , 11 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1993).

Howard insists that the Government “introduced no proof that

[he] had been convicted of any offense punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year.” We find that the evidence of

H oward’s prior felony conviction was sufficient based on the

testimony of ATF Agent Young and Deputies Howell and Rivera.

Howard urges that ATF Agent Robert White’s testimony was

insufficient to prove the element of “in and affecting commerce.”

White testified that all of the subject firearms were manufactured

outside the State of Texas. An expert’s testimony that the firearm

was manufactured outside the state in which it was found is

sufficient to prove interstate nexus. U nited States v. Privett

, 68

F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1995).

Howard does not adequately argue, by way of record citations

or by application of the facts to the law, the issue of

insufficiency of the eviden ce relating to his possession of the

firearms. We therefore deem this issue to have been forfeited.

United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez

, 932 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir.

1991).

Howard also argues th at the “Resolution of Disputed Factors

procedure in U.S.S.G. Section 6A1.3 was not followed by the court.”

He further contends that “[a]dequate opportunity to present1 Although it appeared from his statement of the issues

that Howard also intended to challenge the district court’s

calculation of his base offense level based on his possession of

several Norinco rifles, in the argument portion of his brief,

Howard merely mentions this objection but does not provide any

argument. His argument focuses on the number of firearms only.

Thus, any issue relating to the base offense level is considered

forfeited. Valdiosera-Godinez , 932 F.2d at 1099.

4 information to the Court was not afforded. Additionally, the

required hearing procedures in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1) were not

f ollowed and Defendant had no notice of the Court’s tentat ive

findings prior to sentencing.” He asserts that he had no

meaningful opportunity to rebut the Government’s facts. Howard

contends t hat the Government failed to prove that his conduct

involved five to seven firearms, su pporting a two-level upward

adjustment. 1

The district court did not clearly er r in determining that

Howard was in possession of not only the two firearms in his own

vehicle but was in constructive possession of the seven firearms in

the Suburban. See United States v. Ramos , 71 F.3d 1150, 1157 and

n.25 (5th Cir. 1995).

Finally, Howard fails to explain how the sentencing procedures

employed by the distric t court, which included notice of the

probation officer’s recommendations in the PSR, an opportunity to

object to the PSR, a sentencing hearing, and a specific factual

finding on his objection, failed to comply with the cited rules.

We do not address these arguments because Howard failed to brief

them adequately. Valdiosera-Godinez , 932 F.2d at 1099.5

AFFIRMED.