ARTEMIO MILARES BUCSIT, FORMER HUSBAND , Appellant,

v. MARIE JEAN CAMARA BUCSIT, FORMER WIFE , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D 17

- 801

_____________________________/ Opinion filed October 18 , 2017. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Clay County

. Gary L. Wilkinson , Judge

. Anthony P. Penoso, Jacksonville , for Appellant. Roberta E. Blush, Orange Park , for Appellee.

JAY, J

. We affirm in all respects the Amended Order on Al l Pending Motions, which grants in part and denies in part each of the parties’ respective petitions to modify2 the earlier Consent Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. 1 We write only to explain the propriety of the trial court’s decision

— without notice to, or input from, either party

— to “rehear” and amend its initial o rder

. The trial court’s power to do

so directly derives from the unambiguous provisions of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(d)

. Within nine days of entering its Order on All Pending Motions, the trial court
entered an amended order , explain ing its reason for doing so as follows: Following the entry of this Court’s January 24, 2017, Order on All Pending Motions, the Court realized that the provisions of the Order pertaining to overpayments of child support by Former Hu sband, including paragraphs 4 and 5, are in error. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12.530, Florida Family Rules of Procedure, and Rule 1.530, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, this Amended Order modifies those provisions . . . . (Emphasis added.) Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530 provides that in the ordinary course of family law matters, “[m]otions for new trial and rehearing and amendments of judgments shall be governed by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.530. ” Parties , therefore, believing the final judgment to be in error, are authorized by rule 1.530(a) to file a motion for rehearing, whereby the trial court “may open the

1 “[T] he orders entered in modification proceedings have all of the aspects of final judgments. We therefore conclude that they are final judgments, subject to motions for rehearing under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a), and appealable as plenary appeals. ” Roshkind v. Roshkind , 717 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)

.3 judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony , and enter a new judgment.”
Bu t, r ule 1.530(d) permits the trial court

— perceiving error

— to act on its own
motion to correct it , without the participation of the parties . The rule states: (d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 15 days after entry of judgment or within the time of ruling on a timely motion for a rehearing or a new trial made by a party , the court of its own initiative may order a rehearing or a new trial for any reason for which it might have gra nted a rehearing or a new trial on motion of a party

. [ 2 ]
T he plain text of the rule alerts the reader that for any reason a party may move for rehearing , so may the trial court on its own “initiative.”
Preliminar il y, w e recognize that t he f inality of a trial court’s jud g ment is one
of the cornerstone s of our system of justice. See Witt v. State , 387 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)

. It is a doctrine that “ should be abridged only when a more compelling objective appears, such as ensuring fairness and uniformity in individual adjudications. ” Witt , 387 So. 2d at 925. Therefore, “ [u] nless a proper [rehearing] motion or petition is filed within the allotted time, the judgment or order of the trial
court becomes absolute. ” Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson , 236 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1970) . Of course, there must be a n appropriate balance between this

2 In 2013, subdivision (d) was amended to lengthen the deadline from ten to fifteen days for a trial court to act of its own accord. See In re Amendme nts to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure , 131 So. 3d 643, 651 (Fla. 2013) (Mem.). As will be seen, the cases cited in this opinion involved the pre

- amendment deadline of ten days.4 need for certitude and the interest in making necessary corrections to final
orders

. Balmoral Condo. Ass ’ n v. Grimaldi , 107 So. 3d 1149, 11 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). This symmetry is reflected in rule 1.530(d) , where the trial court, on its own
motion , may grant a timely rehearing. Id. By granting rehearing , the trial court is given a second opportunity to evaluate

“ any error, omission, or oversight that may have been committed in the first
consideration.” Cole v. Cole , 130 So. 2d 126 , 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). It is provided with a mechanism to reassess “ some point which it overlooked or failed to
consider . . . .” Id. A nd, i t is given a chance to “ reopen the case and reconsider any or all of the provisions of its final decree. ” Langer v. Aerovias, S.A. , 584 So. 2d 175, 176 (F la. 3d DCA 1991). Rule 1.530(d) permits the trial court to do all of this on its own initiative , if it is accomplished in a timely fashion . I n Romano v. Mechaia Investments, LLC , 201 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), th e Third District said as much, and included a pointed reminder to all litigants:

“ The effect of the rehearing rule ‘ is to put the world on notice that at any time within ten days after entry of a decree by a court of equity in Florida the court may, on petition for rehearing or on its own initiative , order a rehearing or enter a new or amended decree. Any person that acts in rel iance upon such a decree within that time does so at his own peril

. ’ ”
Id. at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting Marsh & McLennan v. Aerolines Nacionales Del
Ecuador , 530 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (on motion to dismiss)).5 T he decision in DND Mail Corp. v. Andgen Properties, LLC , 28 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), is consistent with this conclusion

. There, t he Broward circuit
court, sitting in its appell ate cap acity, found that the county court erred in vacating

a default final judgment. Id. at 112. Specifically, it determined that the county cour t did not have jurisdiction to vacate the defaul t final judgment because the court did not have the authority to sua sponte reconsider its initial ruling

. Id. at 112

- 13.
On a petition for writ of certiorari to t he Fourth District Court of Appeal , the
Fourth District quashed the circuit court’s decision , finding that the county court lawfully “ reconsidered the default final judgment the day after the judgment was
rendered and well within the ten days permitted ” under rule 1.53 0(d)

. Id. at 113.
St ated differently, the county “ court [was] permitted to sua spont e order rehearing .

. . within ten days after entry of a judgment. ” Id. ; see also Muniz v. Muniz

- Baerga , 679 So. 2d 888, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“ Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by sua sponte reversing its judgment that the appellant was entitled to have her attorney ’ s fees paid. We affirm for the reas on that rule 1.530(d) . . . authorizes the action taken within the time period provided by the rule. ” ) (e mphasis added) ; Crum
v. State , 507 So.2 d 759, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (“ In nonjury cases, the trial court may, either on motion of a party or on its own initiative, grant rehearing and, in its discretion, consider additional evidence. ”).6 H ere , when it reconsidered its initial order and corrected its preliminary error , the trial court was ensuring that its ruling s were accurate and reflect ive of the
evidence and the equities presented. By entering its amended final order , the trial

court exercised a power expressly afforded it by rule 1.53 0(d), which it carried out
in a manner consistent with the terms of, and the essential rationale behind , this important rule.
AFFIRMED. ROWE and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.