J-S44007-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DENNIS TINSEL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 772 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 27, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008735-2015, 

CP-51-CR-0008737-2015, CP-51-CR-0008749-2015, 

CP-51-CR-0008751-2015, CP-51-CR-0008753-2015, 

CP-51-CR-0008755-2015, CP-51-CR-0008757-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2018

Dennis Tinsel (a.k.a. Dennis Tindal), appeals from the judgment of 

sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after 

a jury convicted him of seven counts each of aggravated assault,1 attempted 

murder,2 and possessing instruments of crime,3 as well as one count of 

criminal conspiracy to commit murder.

4

 Following the recording of the verdict, 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 907.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(c).
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the trial court found Tinsel guilty of possession of a firearm.

5

 Upon careful 

review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts as follows:

[On June 22, 2015, on the 700 block of East Hilton Street in the 

Kensington section of Philadelphia,] multiple gunshot blasts 

emanate[ed] from a sawed-off shotgun being wielded by Keith 

Warren. As Warren marched down the street he was seen by [] 

Basil Elliott, who immediately fled toward F Street. Warren began 

firing the shotgun in Elliott’s direction, completely disregarding the 

children playing on E. Hilton Street that day. Basil Elliott was shot 

in his liver and kidney. In addition, ten-year-old Dale Koch, threeyear-old[] Yesenia Nieves and nine-year-old[] Katrina Vega, were 

shot while playing in an inflatable pool situated on the sidewalk. 

Christina Koch, Dale and Yesenia’s mother, was struck with a 

shotgun blast as she [] rushed to shield the children. [] Shawn 

Jones was shot in the back of his head while fleeing, and Anthony 

Miles was shot in the back of his neck[,] fracturing it.

Warren fled while still holding the black shotgun with the pistol 

grip . . . [A]s he ran toward Madison Street after [the shooting] 

on Hilton Street, he was seen running through a vacant lot located 

at G and Madison Street by a local delivery man, Nestor Nieves.

[] Nieves, who worked for a beverage company and was visiting 

a customer in the area, was driving by E. Hilton Street when he 

heard several gunshots. He then saw people scrambling a couple 

of blocks away after which he parked near his customer’s 

business. While sitting in his car, he saw [] Warren running in his 

direction[.] Warren was carrying a shotgun and had nothing 

covering his face. [] Nieves then observed Warren run north on 

G Street and then turn onto Madison Street where he ran through 

a vacant lot. 

[] Nieves gave a statement to police describing what he observed. 

During the interview, [] Nieves took part in a photo identification 

session during which he identified a photograph of [] Warren. He 

stated that he was “95 to 98%” sure that the photograph he 

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5 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.
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identified depicted the male he saw running on the afternoon of 

the shooting.

Numerous police officers and emergency medical personnel 

rushed to the scene to care for the multiple victims, all of whom 

were rushed to a nearby hospital. Police searched the area and 

collected numerous pieces of ballistic evidence including the 

shotgun, which was found in the abandoned lot at the corner of G 

and Madison Streets. Police traced the shotgun to Devin Tindal 

(hereinafter Devin), [Dennis Tinsel’s] brother.

Devin testified that [Tinsel] sold drugs in the area of G and Hilton 

Streets and had done so for ten years. Devin also testified that 

on March 1, 2012, [Tinsel] had him illegally purchase a shotgun 

and ammunition. Devin identified the shotgun recovered by police 

at G and Madison Streets as the weapon he purchased for [Tinsel]. 

Devin never again saw the shotgun after he purchased it for [his 

brother].

In late June, 2015, Devin received a telephone call from [Tinsel] 

during which [Tinsel] asked him to lie to the police. Specifically, 

[Tinsel] asked Devin to tell police that [Devin’s] identification was 

stolen during a robbery that occurred a couple of years prior 

thereto in the area of G and Hilton Streets and that the person 

who robbed him used Devin’s identification to purchase the 

shotgun. Devin refused and [Tinsel] told him that he had to lie to 

the police because he ([Tinsel]) used the “joint,” i.e. the shotgun 

Devin had purchased, [and if Devin told them this,] the police 

would not come looking for him. [Tinsel] also told Devin that the 

gun had been left “in the lot.” Devin told [Tinsel] that he planned 

to tell the truth.

On July 1, 2015, Devin gave police a statement [alleging] that he 

purchased a shotgun for his brother. He also told police that 

[Tinsel] called him a few days prior thereto about the purchase of 

the shotgun and asked him to lie. He also gave police the names 

of several persons, including Sara[h] Reyes, [Tinsel’s] paramour. 

Devin told police that he believed that the shotgun was being 

stored at [] Reyes’ home.

[] Reyes, a long-time resident of the 700 block of Hilton Street in 

Philadelphia, came to know [Tinsel] because he ran one of two 

competing drug dealing operations on Hilton Street and came 

there every day to sell drugs. At some point she entered into an 

intimate relationship with him. During the relationship, [] Reyes 
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was introduced to [Tinsel’s] co-defendant [] Warren, who [Tinsel] 

said was his cousin.6

In June, 2015, the relationship between [] Reyes and [Tinsel] 

became strained because [Tinsel] and [] Reyes’ twenty-six-yearold daughter Charlene began “messing” around. On or about June 

20, 2015, Warren’s sister attempted to fight [] Reyes’ daughter 

Emily, because she believed that Emily had revealed that Charlene 

and [Tinsel] were in a relationship.

On June 22, 2015, at about 10:00 a.m., [] Reyes was outside 

when [Tinsel] arrived in his truck and parked on G Street. [Tinsel] 

walked to Hilton Street where he shook the hand of a male [] 

Reyes knew by the name “Gooch,” who was standing with a group 

of other males. A second male, specifically Basil Elliott, walked up 

and the group began berating [Tinsel] about [] having [] his 

cousin [(Warren)] beat up [] Reye[s’] daughter. The conversation 

soon turned violent as Gooch, Elliott, and another male named 

Reese began punching [Tinsel]. During the incident, [] Reyes saw 

Reese pull out a gun and hit [Tinsel] in the head[,] prompting [] 

Reyes to scream, “Stop.” The men stopped beating [Tinsel], who 

fled to his truck yelling, “I’ll be back[,]” before driving away. [] 

Reyes observed [Tinsel] bleeding from his head.

After [Tinsel] left, [] Reyes went home and told Charlene what [] 

happened to [Tinsel]. At about 1:30 p.m., Warren and another 

male came to her home and her daughter spoke to them out of [] 

Reyes’ earshot. At about 2:30 p.m., [] Reyes was in her kitchen 

when she heard three or four loud “booms” outside that sounded 

like firecrackers, prompting her to look out her front door. When 

she did so, she saw Warren carrying a shotgun. Warren looked at 

her and then ran toward G Street. [] Reyes also saw that a man 

she knew as “Fingers” was lying on the ground and was bleeding 

from his neck. She got some towels to stop the bleeding.

[] Reyes thereafter went outside and heard several persons 

talking about what [] happened. Police arrived shortly thereafter 

but [] Reyes did not speak to them that day. Subsequent thereto, 

Philadelphia Police Detective Kenneth Rossiter came to her home 

to interview her. During the interview, she told the detective 

about the problems she was having with [Tinsel] and identified a 

photograph of him[.] [Reyes] gave an incorrect description of 

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6 Tinsel and Warren are not biological cousins.
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Warren and did not give [the detective] Warren’s name because 

she was afraid for her family’s safety.

[Later,] Reyes went to a police station and told police that Warren, 

who she called “Cuz,” was the person she saw shooting on June 

22, 2015. She thereafter identified photographs of Warren that 

were in a photo array and photos developed from a video 

recording of the incident.

[] Alena Abramova, [Tinsel’s] fiancé[e], received a telephone call 

from [Tinsel] on June 22, 2015, during which [he] told her that he 

had been attacked. In a text, [] Abramova asked [Tinsel] to 

promise that he would not do anything “to get hurt more.” 

[Tinsel] responded with, “it’s already done.”

According to [] Abramova, [Tinsel] did not come home the night 

of the shooting or pick up his son[,] which was out of the ordinary. 

She further stated that [Tinsel] owned a shotgun, which he said 

was in his brother Devin’s name, and that she heard that he kept 

a shotgun in her home[.] [This same firearm] had been thrown

in an alley located at G Street and Allegheny Avenue.

During the evening on the day of the incident, [Tinsel also] sent 

[] Abramova a text telling her to get rid of everything in a cabinet 

situated over the refrigerator. When [] Abramova asked him when 

he would be home, [he] said, “Soon[,]” and “This shit got big.” 

Over the next few days, [] Abramova received more texts from 

[Tinsel] and spoke to him. During those contacts, he asked if she 

had seen anything “funny” around the house, discussed switching 

cars to evade the people who had attacked him, requested that 

she remove bullets from a suit jacket pocket and discard them, 

and delete all of his texts and phone logs. [Tinsel] also said that 

his brother Devin had spoken to police and had indicated that he 

was moving. [Tinsel] also stated, “do you think I was going to get 

jumped on the block and no one was going to do something about 

it?”

Over the course of the . . . weeks after the incident, [Tinsel] did 

not stay overnight at [] Abramova’s house, which was out of the 

ordinary. [He] turned himself in on July 7, 2015.

Detective James Dunlap of the Philadelphia Police Department’s 

Homicide Unit conducted a search of the records pertaining to 

[Tinsel’s] cell phone. The records reflected that [his] cell phone 

was within two square miles of the area where the shooting 

occurred [at the time of the incident]. Also, immediately following 
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the shooting, [Tinsel’s] cell phone travelled from Philadelphia to 

New York City. It returned to Philadelphia the following day, but 

not to the vicinity of [] Abramova’s residence or G and Hilton 

Streets, locations where the phone records indicated it spent the 

most amount of its time every day prior to the incident.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/17, at 2-7 (internal citations omitted).

In November of 2016, Tinsel filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence 

that alleged he was a drug dealer who “ran the block” where the shooting took 

place. The trial court denied this motion in part, allowing the Commonwealth 

to introduce evidence of Tinsel’s history as a drug dealer in the area; this 

testimony developed the Commonwealth’s theory of the case that the shooting 

on June 22 occurred as retaliation for Tinsel being beaten earlier that morning. 

Following trial, a jury convicted Tinsel of the above charges. After the 

recording of the verdict, the trial court additionally found Tinsel guilty of 

possession of a firearm. On January 27, 2017, Tinsel was sentenced to an 

aggregate term of incarceration of one-hundred five to two-hundred ten years. 

Following sentencing, Tinsel filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial 

court denied. Thereafter, Tinsel filed a timely notice of appeal and a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. On appeal, he presents the following 

issues for our consideration:

1. Was the evidence sufficient to support [Tinsel’s] convictions 

where the Commonwealth failed to establish [he] conspired 

with or otherwise abetted [c]o[-]defendant [Warren] in the 

shooting?

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion in allowing the 

Commonwealth to introduce[] evidence of [Tinsel’s] alleged 

criminal activity unrelated to the instant matter?
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Appellant’s Brief, at 2.

Tinsel first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction for conspiracy to commit murder,7 his convictions under a theory 

of accomplice liability,8 and his convictions where the Commonwealth “merely 

offered motive evidence.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9, 14, 17. 

Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is wellsettled:

The critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a criminal conviction . . . does not require a court to ask 

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it must determine 

simply whether the evidence believed by the fact-finder was 

sufficient to support the verdict . . . When reviewing the sufficiency 

of the evidence, [this Court] must determine whether the 

evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, are sufficient to establish all of the elements of the 

offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1235-37 (Pa. 2007) (internal 

citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “The Commonwealth’s burden may 

be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s 

guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder[,] unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn 

from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 38 A.3d 

846, 853 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

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7 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1).

8 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(b)(3).
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A person is guilty of conspiracy if “with the intent of promoting or 

facilitating its commission he . . . agrees with such other person . . . that they 

or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime 

or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1). 

Thus, to prove conspiracy to commit murder, the Commonwealth must 

demonstrate an agreement between individuals, a shared criminal intent, and 

an overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 784 (Pa. Super. 1998). The defendant need not 

commit the overt act himself; a co-conspirator may do so. Commonwealth 

v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002). Additionally, the 

Commonwealth must prove that “the defendant shared the criminal intent, 

i.e., that the [defendant] was an active participant in the criminal enterprise 

and that he had knowledge of the conspiratorial agreement.” Id. at 1016

(internal citations omitted). As explicit agreements in this context rarely arise, 

“proof of a criminal partnership is almost invariably extracted from the 

circumstances that attend its activities.” Johnson, supra at 785. 

Tinsel argues the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to 

sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy. Specifically, Tinsel argues that 

he himself did not commit any overt act, that the testimony establishing a 

connection between him and Warren was attenuated, and that the 

Commonwealth did not produce evidence of “any agreement, or even 

communication,” between him and Warren. Appellant’s Brief, at 12-13. 

Tinsel’s argument fails on several grounds. First, as stated, explicit 
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agreements are rarely found in such instances, and therefore conspiracy may 

be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Here, even if attenuated, the 

connection between Warren and Tinsel was demonstrated at trial. Even 

without evidence tying Warren to Tinsel’s drug dealing enterprise, Tinsel 

referred to Warren as his cousin, and Warren fired a shotgun belonging to 

Tinsel, in an area where Tinsel was mugged hours before. A reasonable jury 

could, and in fact did, conclude that the relationship between the two 

suggested an agreement with shared criminal intent. Stokes, supra. 

Further, it is well-established that actions by a co-conspirator taken while 

acting in furtherance of the conspiracy can be attributed to a defendant. 

Lambert, supra. Here, Warren’s actions on Hilton Street would constitute 

that overt act.

Next, Tinsel contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him on 

the theory of accomplice liability. An accomplice is someone who, “with the 

intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense aids or agrees 

or attempts to aid another person in planning or committing the crime.” 

Lambert, supra at 1024 (internal citations omitted). “The criminal intent 

necessary to establish accomplice liability is identical to the criminal intent 

necessary to establish conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 

245, 254 (Pa. Super. 2000). Because the evidence was sufficient to find Tinsel 

guilty of conspiracy, his argument regarding accomplice liability is meritless.

Tinsel next argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain all of his 

convictions “where the Commonwealth merely offered motive evidence.” 
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Appellant’s Brief, at 17. Tinsel essentially argues that, because other parties 

involved in the matter had motives of their own, his conviction cannot stand. 

The trial court deduced:

In addition[,] the evidence outlining [Tinsel’s] actions and 

admissions prior to and following the incident was more than 

sufficient to prove [Tinsel’s] guilt and participation in the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Not only did [he] make a threat after 

he was beaten, following that beating, he, inter alia: 1) admitted 

to his fiancé[e] that he could not let the incident pass and that “it”

had already happened; 2) asked his brother to lie about the 

purchase of the shotgun because it had been “used,”; 3) fled to 

New York; 4) altered his usual schedule; and 5) asked his fiancée 

to collect and discard bullets and other items. Given this evidence, 

it is clear that the Commonwealth presented enough 

circumstantial evidence in addition to the evidence of motive to 

prove [Tinsel’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/17, at 9. We agree. This argument is legally and 

factually unfounded and meritless. 

Lastly, Tinsel challenges the admission of testimony about his activities

as a drug dealer, because it was “unconnected to the proffered motive and 

crime for which [he] was standing trial.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18. The 

“[a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and 

will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708, 716 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

“For a ruling on evidence to constitute reversible error, it must have been 

harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party,” such that the trial court’s 

error could have effected the verdict in the case. Commonwealth v. Tyack, 

128 A.3d 254, 257 (Pa. Super. 2015). 
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Evidence of a person’s character is inadmissible to “prove that on a 

particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” 

Pa.R.E. 404(a). However, an exception for character evidence allows its 

admission in order to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 

404(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 

2009). This Court has held that “the trial court must decide first if the 

evidence is relevant and, if so, whether its probative value outweighs its 

prejudicial effect.” Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 

2006) (internal citations omitted). Evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) is 

not limited to prior convictions, but also extends to prior wrongs and acts. 

Commonwealth v. Lockcuff, 813 A.2d 857, 861 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

Particularly,

our courts will allow evidence of other crimes when it tends to 

establish the identity of the person charged with the commission 

of the crime or where it was part of the chain or sequence of 

events which formed the history of the case and formed part of 

the natural development of facts.

Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 635 (Pa. 1995).

The evidence in question was elicited to demonstrate Tinsel’s identity 

and motive. The record shows that Reyes knew Tinsel as a drug dealer on the 

block where the shooting occurred. The Commonwealth relied upon this 

evidence to establish its theory of the case that Tinsel “ran the block,” 
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maintained a presence in the area, and sought to control the area in order to 

run his drug dealing business. The trial court found: 

Thus, the admission of the evidence . . . was a necessary part of 

the story, as it provided context as to why [Tinsel] believed it 

necessary to retaliate after he was attacked, to add substance and 

meaning to why he was always on the block[], and to explain why 

he had his brother make a straw purchase of the shotgun for him.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/17, at 16. Further, the trial court concluded that 

the probative value of the evidence in assisting the jury to understand the full 

story of the incident outweighed its prejudicial effect. Id. We agree with this 

assessment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence of Tinsel’s identity as a drug dealer, which allowed the jury to infer 

that he had a motive to coordinate this shooting.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/27/18