alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### WOODROW CALAHAN, by His Next Friend, J. H. CALAHAN, v. TOM ROBERTS and Wife, ELIZABETH ROBERTS.

(Filed 20 November, 1935.)

Master and Servant F a — Where complaint alleges that defendants were not operating under Compensation Act, demurrer on ground that Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction is bad.

Where the complaint alleges that defendants employed more than eight employees, but that defendants were not operating under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a demurrer on the ground that it appeared upon the face of the complaint that the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission should be overruled, since plaintiff may offer evidence under the allegations of the complaint that the employers and employees had exempted themselves for the operation of the act under the provisions of sees. 8081 (1), (v), (x), notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 8081 (k).

Devin, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Phillips, J.,*at July Term, 1935, of Mitchell.

Reversed.

*Watson & Fonts and M. L. Wilson for plaintiff, appellant.*

*W. 0. Berry and Charles Hutchins for defendants, appellees.*

ScheNck, J.

In tbis action, instituted to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to bave been proximately caused by tbe negligence of tbe servant and agent of tbe defendants, tbe plaintiff alleged that tbe defendants employed from “nine to tbirty-five men as laborers in tbe operation” of tbeir sawmill, whereupon tbe defendants demurred to tbe jurisdiction of tbe court on tbe ground that it appeared from tbe face of tbe complaint that tbe ease was cognizable by tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission. Tbe court sustained tbe demurrer and plaintiff excepted and appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

Paragraph 6th of tbe complaint, in part, is as follows: “That as plaintiff is advised, informed, and now alleges, tbe defendants, at tbe time of tbe injuries complained of, and for more than six months prior thereto, were not operating under tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act. . . .”

Notwithstanding O. S., 8081 (k), provides that employers and employees shall be presumed to bave accepted tbe provisions of tbe North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, there are provisions in tbe act whereby employers, as well as employees, may except themselves from tbe operation thereof, O. S., 8081 (1), 8081 (v), 8081 (x), and other sections, and tbe presumption of acceptance may be rebutted by tbe proof *769of nonaeceptanee, and the plaintiff has laid the foundation for such proof by alleging that the “defendants . . . were not operating under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.” We think this allegation was sufficient to carry the case to the jury, and that his Honor erred in sustaining the demurrer.

Beversed.

Deviu, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Washington Banking Company (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2004, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Richard A. Shields, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company
      as of, and for, the periods presented in the Report.

This certification is being furnished solely to comply with the requirements of
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and shall not be incorporated by reference into any of
the Company's filings under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, or otherwise be deemed to be filed as part of the Report
or under such Acts.

/s/ Richard A. Shields, Jr.
----------------------------
Richard A. Shields, Jr.
Chief Financial Officer

November 12, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<CIK> 0000880052
<NAME> TOWNE FINANCIAL CORP/OH
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           2,310
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             205
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                   200
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     15,269
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          12,862
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            12,666
<LOANS>                                         66,817
<ALLOWANCE>                                        244
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 102,558
<DEPOSITS>                                      81,794
<SHORT-TERM>                                     5,356
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,066
<LONG-TERM>                                      6,704
<COMMON>                                           209
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,429
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 102,558
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  5,232
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                1,848
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   112
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 7,192
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               3,792
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,461
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            2,731
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       18
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                  14
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  2,359
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    566
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         566
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       365
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.70
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.66
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    2.99
<LOANS-NON>                                         26
<LOANS-PAST>                                       377
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   231
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        5
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  244
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               244
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit
23.3








CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT ENGINEERS





As
independent engineering consultants, Ryder Scott Company, LP hereby consents to
the use of our report entitled “Southwest Royalties, Inc., Estimated Future
Reserves and Income Attributable to Certain Leasehold and Royalty Interests, SEC
Parameters, as of December 31, 2009” dated January 26, 2010 and data
extracted therefrom (and all references to our Firm) included in or made a part
of this Form 10-K Annual Report to be filed on or about March 12, 2010 and
to the incorporation by reference of this Form 10-K Annual Report (including the
use of our report and references to our Firm herein) into that certain
Registration Statement on Form S-3 filed by Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, file number 333-116825, and those
certain Registration Statements on Form S-8 filed by Clayton Williams Energy,
Inc. with the Securities and Exchange Commission, file numbers 33-68320,
33-68316, 33-69688, and 33-92834 covering the Bonus Incentive Plan of Clayton
Williams Energy, Inc., Outside Directors Stock Option Plan of Clayton Williams
Energy, Inc., Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. 401(k) Plan & Trust, and the
Executive Incentive Stock Compensation Plan of Clayton Williams Energy, Inc.,
respectively.

















RYDER SCOTT COMPANY, LP


TBPE Firm Registration No.
F-1580





Houston,
Texas


March 12,
2010
#### STATE v. MERRITT ADKINS.

(Filed 21 December, 1927.)

Jury — Verdict—Influence—Motion to Set Aside Verdict — Courts — Motions — Discretion of Court — Appeal and Error — Review.

Communications made to tile jury by tlie officer in charge of them during their deliberation of the verdict in a criminal action, that defendant’s relatives had endeavored to obtain lodging in the same boardinghouse with them, will not be sufficient to set aside a verdict against him when the trial judge, in his investigation, finds upon the evidence on defendant’s motion, that the defendant had not been prejudiced, and refuses to set aside the verdict as a matter in his discretion.

CeimiNal action, before *Parker, J.,*at March Term, 1927, of Yancey.

The defendant was indicted for murder, but upon calling the case the solicitor announced that the State would not ask for a verdict of guilty in the first degree, but would ask for a conviction of murder in the second degree. The jury found tbe defendant guilty of manslaughter, and from the judgment imposing imprisonment in the State’s prison for a term of not less than five nor more than seven years the defendant appealed.

*Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.*

*Charles Hutchins, and Watson, Hudgins, Watson & Fouts for defendant.*

Brogden, J.

The record discloses that the only exceptions relied upon by the defendant related to the misconduct of the officer in charge of the jury, in communicating to the jury, while engaged in its deliberations, the fact that the defendant and his wife and daughter had applied for lodging to the boarding house or hotel at which the jury was quartered. After the verdict was rendered the trial judge very promptly and very properly cited the officer for contempt of court. The defendant lodged a motion to set aside the verdict because of the misconduct of the officer. The court examined the jurors, touching the incident, in order to ascertain if their verdict had been influenced by the communication. The record shows the following entry: “After a consideration of the foregoing testimony the court finds as a fact that the defendant’s rights were not prejudiced by the conduct of the officer and report to jury and the conduct of the jury.” Thereupon the court declined to set aside the verdict.

*750While the trial judge would have been fully justified in setting aside the verdict, this Court cannot do so for the reason that it is found as a fact that the rights of the defendant were not prejudiced by the alleged misconduct. “The finding of such fact by the presiding judge, who is far better acquainted with the surroundings than we can possibly be, is conclusive, and we cannot look into the affidavits, whether one or more, to reverse such finding.” *S. v. Crane,*110 N. C., 530. Undoubtedly the discretion committed to the trial judge is a sound, legal discretion and not to be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. However, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that the verdict had not been influenced or tainted by the misconduct of the officer. Therefore, the judgment of the court must stand.

No error.
Exhibit 10.9


 


Smart for Life, Inc.


990 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 503


Miami, FL 33132


 


November 29, 2022


 


Dr. Sasson E. Moulavi


1210 W 13th Street


Riviera Beach, FL 33404


 


Dr. Moulavi:


 


Reference is made to that
certain Six Percent (6%) Secured Subordinated Promissory Note in the principal amount of Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000) issued by
Smart for Life, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”) to you (the “Holder”) on July 1, 2021
(the “Original Note”). Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the
Note.


 


The Company and the Holder
previously agreed informally to extend the first payment under the Amortization Schedule and now desire to formally extend the note payments
by executing an Amended and Restated Note. The Amended and Restated Note, which includes a revised Amortization Schedule, is attached
hereto as Exhibit “A”.


 


In consideration for the execution
of the Amended and Restated Note, the Company hereby agrees to (i) issue to the Holder One Hundred Thousand (100,000) shares of its common
stock under the Company’s 2022 Equity Incentive Plan and (ii) pay to the Holder a fee of $50,000 in cash, which shall be paid upon
completion of the Company’s anticipated debt financing expected by December 31, 2022 (the “Amendment Fee”).


 


By signing below, the Holder
hereby consents and agrees to execute the Amended and Restated Note and agrees to the Amendment Fee as consideration therefore, as set
forth herein.


 


	 	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 	 
	 	 	Smart for Life, Inc.
	 	 	 
	 	 	By: 	/s/ A.J. Cervantes
	 	 	Name: 	 A.J. Cervantes
	 	 	Title: 	Executive Chairman
	 	 	
	AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED:
    	 	
	 	 	 
	/s/ Dr. Sasson E. Moulavi	 	 
	Dr. Sasson E. Moulavi
#### CHARLES F. CONNOR v. SAPROLITES, INC., et al.

(Filed 1 November, 1935.)

Appeal by plaintiff from *Sinclair, J.,*at September Term, 1934, of Lee.

Civil action to recover damages for an alleged negligent injury.

Plaintiff testified that he had been engaged in the mining business since 1916. He was removing ore from the Black Ankle Mine from a depth of 30 or 35 feet when injured.

The plaintiff offered in evidence the deposition of his associate, C. E. Barrentine, who testified, in part, as follows :

“O. F. Connor, by oral agreement, contracted with the Saprolites, Inc., through its superintendent and agent, E. L. Hedrick, that he would deliver 'on top of the ground at its mine in Montgomery County ore from under the ground at 50c. per ton, and that the said C. E. Connor was to use his own tools and equipment and have complete control of the matter, and the only thing that the Saprolites was to do was to pay 50c. *847per ton when delivered on top of the ground, and that the company was to be in no way responsible for any accident occurring in said work, or pay for anything toward getting out said ore.”

From judgment of nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, he appeals, assigning errors.

*K, R. Hoyle for plaintiff.*

*J. A. Spence and W. R. Williams for defendants.*

Pee Cttkiam.

The nonsuit was based upon plaintiff’s evidence of an independent employment, of his own knowledge and experience in the work, and of the fact that the shaft was only 30 or 35 feet deep. It is not perceived upon what ground the judgment should be disturbed. *Johnson v. Hosiery Co.,*199 N. C., 38, 153 S. E., 591; *Inman v. Refining Co.,*194 N. C., 566, 140 S. E., 289; *Greer v. Const. Co.,*190 N. C., 632, 130 S. E., 739.

.Affirmed.
#### S. M. UPCHURCH and PAUL H. ROBERTSON v. C. P. BUCKNER and Wife, PAULINE BUCKNER.

(Filed 14 January, 1955.)

Trial § 49—

A motion to set aside tlie verdict as being against tbe greater weight of the evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and when no abuse of discretion is shown, the court’s refusal to grant the motion is not reviewable.

Appeal by plaintiffs from *McKeithen, Special Judge,*May Term 1954 of OeANGE.

Civil action to recover a balance of $1,817.67 under an alleged contract for completion of a dwelling bouse for tbe defendants.

Tbe defendants filed answer denying that they owed plaintiffs anything, and set up a cross-action asking for the recovery of $1,500.00 allegedly due them from a loan made on tbe property, and also for tbe recovery of $1,500.00 damages for alleged defective workmanship and inferior materials used in tbe construction of tbe dwelling bouse by tbe plaintiffs.

Tbe plaintiffs and the defendants offered evidence in support of tbe allegations in their pleadings.

Tbe court submitted two issues to tbe jury: *One.*In what amount, if any, are tbe defendants indebted to tbe plaintiffs? And *Two.*In what amount, if any, are tbe plaintiffs indebted to tbe defendants ? Tbe jury answered tbe first issue nothing and tbe second issue $1,500.00. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict.

Plaintiffs appeal therefrom assigning error.

*L. J. Phipps for Plaintiffs, Appellants.*

*Bonner D. Sawyer for Defendants, Appellees.*

Per Curiam.

Plaintiffs have two assignments of error: *One,*to tbe court’s refusal to set tbe verdict aside as being against tbe greater weight of tbe evidence, and *Two,*to tbe signing of tbe judgment.

Tbe evidence was conflicting. Tbe motion by tbe plaintiffs to set aside tbe verdict as being against tbe greater weight of tbe evidence was one addressed to tbe sound discretion of tbe court, and no abuse of discretion being shown its refusal to grant tbe motion is not reviewable. *Billings v. Observer,*150 N.C. 540, 64 S.E. 435; *Hoke v. Whisnant,*174 N.C. 658, 94 S.E. 446; *Anderson v. Holland,*209 N.C. 746, 184 S.E. 511; *Coach Co. v. Motor Lines,*229 N.C. 650, 50 S.E. 2d 909; *Poniros v. Teer Co.,*236 N.C. 145, 72 S.E. 2d 9.

Appeal dismissed.
Case: 19-30088    Doc# 3513    Filed: 08/12/19    Entered: 08/12/19 14:30:00    Page 1 of1
#### STATE v. OSROW CUMMINGS.

(Filed 15 December, 1943.)

Appeal by defendant from *Nimo.chs,*J., at September Term, 1943, of Eobeson.

*Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Patton and Rhodes for the State.*

*F. D. Hackett for the defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

The defendant was convicted of an assault on a female, Lilly May Deese, and appealed to this Court, assigning error.

We have given careful attention to the exceptions presented on the appeal, and do not find any of sufficient merit to justify interference with the result of the trial. The exceptions, while carefully prepared and ably presented, involve no novel principles of law, and we have deemed it unnecessary to write an opinion.

We find

No error.
#### Eli D. Harrington, Respondent, v. The Village of Phœnix, Appellant.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by

Follett, J.
exv10w1






Exhibit 10.1




Indemnification Agreements



The following current directors and officers are parties to Indemnification Agreements with
K-Tron International, Inc. consistent in all material respects with the Form of
Indemnification Agreement which is filed as Exhibit 10.11 to our annual report on Form 10-K
for the year ended January 1, 2000 except for the director or officer who is a party
thereto and the date of execution:




Kevin C. Bowen

Edward B. Cloues, II

Norman Cohen

Robert A. Engel

Lukas Guenthardt

Edward T. Hurd

Richard J. Pinola

Robert E. Wisniewski
## The 2021 OASDI Trustees Report

Office of the Chief Actuary

Actuarial Publications

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Letter



 Exhibit 10.2 
 [Targacept Letterhead] 
 May 27, 2009 
 VIA EMAIL AND U.S. MAIL 
 Merck & Co., Inc. 
 Sumneytown Pike 
 West Point, Pennsylvania 19486 
 Attn: Larry Senour 
  

	 	Re:	 Discontinuation of Inversine®
by Targacept 


 Dear Mr. Senour: 
 Reference is made to the Asset Purchase and Trademark Assignment Agreement between Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”) and, as assignee of Layton Bioscience, Inc., Targacept, Inc.
(“Targacept”) dated March 19, 1998 (the “Agreement”). Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meanings given to them in the Agreement. 
 Merck understands that Targacept intends (1) that its product Inversine® (NDA #10-251) be identified in the FDA’s list of Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations as a discontinued drug product and (2) to
discontinue manufacture of Inversine®, in each case effective as of September 30, 2009 (together, the
“Discontinuation”). By the signature of their respective authorized representatives below: 
 A. Merck hereby:
(1) acknowledges and agrees that neither element of the Discontinuation nor any necessary or appropriate action or inaction arising from the Discontinuation shall constitute an Event of Default or otherwise constitute a breach or violation of
the Agreement; and (2) confirms that, as of the date of this letter, two (2) Royalty Payments remain to be paid under Section 2.3(a)(ii) of the Agreement, for the Payment Years running from May 1, 2008 through April 30, 2009
(“Payment Year 9”) and May 1, 2009 through April 30, 2010 (“Payment Year 10”), and that, upon payment in full by Targacept of the Royalty Payments with respect to Payment Year 9 and Payment Year 10,
Targacept shall have no further payment obligation to Merck under the Agreement; 
 B. Merck and Targacept hereby agree that, solely for
purposes of applying Section 2.3(a)(ii)(B) of the Agreement with respect to Payment Year 10 and for no other purpose, Net Sales shall equal the sum of (i) Net Sales for the portion of Payment Year 10 ending September 30, 2009 plus
(ii) the average monthly Net Sales for the twenty-four months ending April 30, 2009 multiplied by seven (7); and 
 C. Targacept
hereby agrees to pay the Royalty Payment with respect to Payment Year 10 prior to the end of 2009. 
 Please indicate your agreement with the
foregoing by signing one of the enclosed originals of this letter and returning it to my attention. 
 Sincerely,

 /s/ Jeffrey P. Brennan 
 Jeffrey P. Brennan 
 Vice President, Business and 
 Commercial Development 
 Acknowledged and
agreed: 
 Merck & Co., Inc. 

			
		
	By:	 	/s/ Robert A. McMahon
		 	 Name: Robert A. McMahon
 Title: President, US
Commercial Operations


 Date: Jun 2, 2009 
  

	cc:	Beth Fordham-Meier 

 Scott N. Cullison 
 Peter A. Zorn, Esq.