United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

INDACON, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

FACEBOOK, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1129

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Texas in No. 5:10-cv-00966-OLG, 

Judge Orlando L. Garcia.

______________________ 

Decided: June 6, 2016

______________________ 

PRATIK A. SHAH, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, 

LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by ZE-WEN JULIUS CHEN, EMILY CURTIS 

JOHNSON, JAMES EDWARD TYSSE.

THOMAS G. HUNGAR, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BLAIR A. SILVER, LUCAS C. TOWNSEND;

HEIDI LYN KEEFE, MARK R. WEINSTEIN, Cooley LLP, Palo 

Alto, CA; MICHAEL GRAHAM RHODES, San Francisco, CA. 

______________________ 
2 INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 

Before NEWMAN, REYNA, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge. 

Following the district court’s claim construction order, 

Indacon, Inc. and Facebook, Inc. stipulated to noninfringement, and the district court entered final judgment 

in favor of Facebook. Indacon appeals, disputing the 

district court’s construction of several claim terms. Because the district court correctly construed the claim 

terms “alias,” “custom link,” “custom linking relationship,” and “link term,” we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Indacon owns U.S. Patent No. 6,834,276, which is 

directed to a system and method for searching, indexing, 

perusing, and manipulating files in a database, particularly through the insertion of automatically generated 

hyperlinks. ’276 patent col. 3 ll. 50–54, col. 4 ll. 56–58,

col. 5 ll. 34–47. Exemplary claim 1 recites: 

1. A data acquisition and perusal system, comprising:

a database selection module that enables selection 

of a plurality of files for inclusion into at least one 

selectable database;

a link module that enables custom links to be defined between selected terms of selected files of 

the at least one database;

wherein the link module enables association of 

any link term with any of the plurality of files in 

the at least one selectable database; and

wherein the link module enables at least one alias

term to be defined for the any link term to enable 

a link to be established between the at least one 

alias term and the any of the plurality of files; 
INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 3

a database index generator module that enables 

generation of a searchable index of the data contained in the at least one selectable database, including the custom links, the generator module 

enabling only valid custom links to be added to the 

searchable index; and

a search module that enables a search of the 

searchable index to be performed according to a 

search criterions. 

Id. col. 34 l. 56 – col. 35 l. 9 (emphases added). 

Indacon filed a patent infringement suit against 

Facebook, alleging that the software architecture for 

Facebook’s social network infringes claims 1–4 and 8–11

of the ’276 patent. The district court construed several 

claim terms in the ’276 patent. Following claim construction, the parties stipulated to noninfringement, and the 

district court entered final judgment in Facebook’s favor. 

On appeal, Indacon disputes the district court’s construction of four claim terms: “alias,” “custom link,” “custom 

linking relationship,” and “link term.” We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

“The ultimate construction of the claim is a legal 

question and, therefore, is reviewed de novo.” Info-Hold, 

Inc. v. Applied Media Techs. Corp., 783 F.3d 1262, 1265 

(Fed. Cir. 2015). While subsidiary factual findings regarding extrinsic evidence are reviewed for clear error, we 

review claim construction based solely upon intrinsic 

evidence de novo. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 

135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). Because the district court 

considered only intrinsic evidence in construing the 

disputed claim terms, our review here is de novo.

“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the 

claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is 

the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” 
4 INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 

Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The prosecution history of a patent is also part of the intrinsic evidence and “can often inform the meaning of the claim 

language by demonstrating how the inventor understood 

the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution.” Id. at 1317. 

I. Alias

Several of the claims require a link to be established 

between an “alias” or “alias term” and a plurality of files. 

The district court construed the claim term “alias” as a 

“textual expression that the user can define to serve as an 

alternative name or label.” Indacon, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.

(Claim Constr. Order), No. 5:10-cv-966-OLG, 

Dkt. No. 111, at 22 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2013) (emphasis 

added). Indacon acknowledges that “alias” and “alias 

term” are used interchangeably in the ’276 patent. Indacon argues that this term encompasses a “textual or 

graphical hyperlink,” and not just “textual expression.” 

Appellant Br. 19. Thus, Indacon essentially raises two 

disputes with the district court’s construction: (1) whether 

“alias” encompasses graphical expression as well as 

textual expression, and (2) whether an “alias” is a hyperlink.

We agree with the district court that “alias” and “alias 

term” are limited to textual expression. The district court 

first construed “term” as “textual expression, such as 

words,” finding an express definition of “term” in the 

specification as “words, numbers, spaces, etc.” Claim 

Constr. Order at 17–18 (citing ’276 patent col. 12 l. 55). 

Then, finding that the specification described an alias as a 

term, the district court looked to this construction of 

“term” to determine that “alias” is similarly limited to 

textual expression. 
INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 5

Indacon argues that the district court erred by basing 

its construction of “alias” on its construction of “term.” 

Indacon has not appealed the district court’s construction 

of “term,” but instead argues that “alias” is not dependent 

on the meaning of “term.” We agree with the district 

court’s approach and conclusion regarding the construction of “alias.” The ’276 patent defines “term” by referring 

to forms of textual expression (“words, numbers, spaces, 

etc.”). See id. As the district court explained, the use of 

“etc.” in this definition implies additional, but similar 

forms of expression and does not reasonably encompass 

graphical expression. Indacon also recognizes that exemplary claim 1 is not directed to just an “alias,” but actually 

requires an “alias term.” Thus, Indacon’s argument that 

the construction of “term” is irrelevant to the construction 

of “alias” is unconvincing.

Further, nothing in the specification suggests that 

“alias” encompasses graphical expression. Instead, the 

specification consistently describes an alias as a term, 

which, as explained above, is limited to textual expression. The “Summary of the Invention” introduces the 

concept of an “alias,” explaining: “The link module may 

further enable at least one alias term to be defined for any 

selected link term to enable a link to be established 

between each alias term and any of the files in the database.” ’276 patent col. 5 ll. 64–67 (emphases added). 

Similarly, all examples of an “alias” in the specification 

consist of textual expression. See id. col. 11 ll. 34–36 

(“For example, the user may define the terms ‘grape’, 

‘tomato’, ‘raspberry’, etc., as aliases of a link term ‘vine 

fruit’.”) (emphases added); id. col. 24 ll. 46–48 (“For example, a user may want to use aliases or synonyms so 

that ‘equine’ is also linked when ‘horse’ is the primary 

pattern.”) (emphasis added). The prosecution history also 

fails to support an interpretation of an “alias” encompassing graphical expression.
6 INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 

Indacon uses the specification’s reference to file formats that may contain graphical elements as support for 

its view that an “alias” can be graphical. See, e.g., id.

col. 10 ll. 15–17, col. 22 l. 59 (referencing HTML and RTF 

files). But nothing in the specification ties these file 

types, or their potentially graphical elements, to an 

“alias.” To the contrary, with respect to RTF files, the 

specification teaches “discard[ing] all image byte sequences without affecting the absolute position determination 

of visible characters in words.” Id. col. 22 ll. 63–65. We 

find no support in the intrinsic evidence for Indacon’s 

assertion that the claimed alias can be graphical. 

We also agree with the district court that an “alias” is 

not a hyperlink, contrary to Indacon’s assertions. The 

specification explains that “[t]he link module may further 

enable at least one alias term to be defined for any selected link term to enable a link to be established between 

each alias term and any of the files in the database.” Id.

col. 5 ll. 64–67. As such, a link can be established to 

connect an “alias” or other link term to files in the database, but the alias is not itself the link. Thus, we adopt 

the district court’s construction of “alias” as a “textual 

expression that the user can define to serve as an alternative name or label.”

II. Custom Link, Custom Linking Relationship, 

and Link Term

The district court construed “custom link” as “a link 

the user can define using a chosen term that allows each 

instance of the term in the plurality of files to be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, 

without modifying the original database files”; “custom 

linking relationship” as “a linking relationship the user 

can define using a chosen term that allows each instance

of the term in the plurality of files to be identified and 

displayed as a link to a file chosen by the user, without 

modifying the original database files”; and “link term” as
INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 7

“a term chosen by a user that can be displayed as a link to 

a file specified by the user whenever the user encounters 

the term in the plurality of files.” Claim Constr. Order at 

26–27 (emphases added). Indacon raises a single issue 

with respect to the constructions of “custom link,” “custom 

linking relationship,” and “link term” (collectively, “the 

link claim terms”), and does not make any distinct arguments for these individual claim terms. 

Specifically, Indacon objects to the district court’s constructions of the link claim terms to the extent they 

exclude creation of a link for less than all instances of a 

defined term, disputing the district court’s construction

that allows each instance of the defined term to be identified and displayed as a link. We disagree and adopt the 

district court’s constructions of the link claim terms as 

being limited to allowing each instance of a link term to 

be identified and displayed as a link.

Facebook argues that the link claim terms have no

accepted meaning in the art. We agree with Facebook 

that these terms have no plain or established meaning to 

one of ordinary skill in the art. As such, they ordinarily 

cannot be construed broader than the disclosure in the 

specification. Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite 

Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent 

such an accepted meaning [in the art], we construe a 

claim term only as broadly as provided for by the patent 

itself.”). The specification explains that “[t]he link module 

enables association of any selected link term with any of 

the plurality of files in the selectable database.” ’276 

patent col. 5 ll. 62–64 (emphasis added). The specification 

repeatedly demonstrates that all link terms are capable of 

being identified and displayed as a link. See, e.g., id.

col. 11 ll. 29–32 (“[W]hen a link term is encountered in a 

file or document, the link term is indicated or otherwise 

highlighted so that the user can select the indicated link 

term to jump to the linked file.”) (emphases added); id. 

col. 30 ll. 22–26 (“A user can instruct the database index 
8 INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 

generator to insert custom links by entering a custom link 

word in a New Custom Link Word edit box and then 

entering a path and name of a file or document to which 

all such words should link in the File to Link To edit 

box.”) (emphasis added); id. col. 30 ll. 34–37 (“[W]henever

a user encounters the custom link word in any document

displayed in the document view window, except the corresponding file to link to file, it is set off from surrounding 

text.”) (emphases added). Thus, we agree with the district 

court that, consistent with the teachings of the specification, the link claim terms are properly construed as 

allowing each instance of a defined term to be identified 

and displayed as a link. 

 The prosecution history provides additional support 

for the district court’s constructions of the link claim 

terms. In distinguishing prior art, the patentees stated: 

Applicants’ invention provides a user with a linking control panel in which the user can designate 

a specific file to be linked with every instance of a 

specified word (and any associated alias terms) in 

the database. After the index is generated, the 

program displays every instance of that custom 

term (and its alias terms, if any) as a hyperlink to 

the designated file. . . . These innovations distinguish Applicants’ invention from [the prior art].

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 1182–83 (emphases added). The 

patentees then summarized the differences between 

“Applicants’ Invention” and the prior art, explaining that 

their invention “[e]nables user[s] to associate all instances

of a specified word with a specific file.” J.A. 1186 (emphasis added). 

Facebook argues that these statements in the prosecution history, consistent with the specification, provide 

further evidence that the patentees understood the invention as limited to allowing each instance of a defined term 

to be identified and displayed as a link. But, to the extent 
INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 9

these claim terms might otherwise have a broader meaning in the art, Facebook argues in the alternative that the 

prosecution history evidences a clear and unmistakable

disclaimer of claim scope. We agree that the patentees’ 

description of their invention during prosecution as 

allowing every instance or all instances of designated 

terms to be linked to a file bolsters the district court’s 

constructions. Because the link claim terms lack a plain 

or ordinary meaning in the art, and because the specification suggests limiting the scope of these claim terms to 

allowing each instance of a defined term to be identified 

and displayed as a link, we need not determine whether 

the patentees’ statements during prosecution rise to the 

level of clear and unmistakable disclaimer.

In response, Indacon argues that because the references to “every instance” in the prosecution history were

not the “critical contrast that applicants were trying to 

make over the cited reference,” these statements cannot 

form the basis for disavowal. Appellant Reply Br. 12 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As 

explained above, we need not find disclaimer where the 

specification does not permit a broader interpretation of 

these claim terms and the terms otherwise lack an ordinary meaning in the art. Moreover, “the interested public 

has the right to rely on the inventor’s statements made 

during prosecution, without attempting to decipher 

whether the examiner relied on them, or how much 

weight they were given.” Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco 

P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, the 

patentees repeatedly described their invention both in the 

specification and the prosecution history as allowing 

“every instance” or “all instances” of a defined term to be 

identified and displayed as a link. J.A. 1182–83, 1186. 

Under these circumstances, the district court did not err 

in limiting the link claim terms as such.

Finally, Indacon argues that claim differentiation precludes the district court’s constructions of the link claim 
10 INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 

terms because certain claims recite linking instances

while other claims recite linking all instances of the link 

terms. Specifically, Indacon points, on the one hand, to 

claims 2 and 9, which recite “wherein the link module is 

operable to link instances of the one or more text strings 

in the selected files” (claim 2) and “wherein the step of 

defining the linking relationships includes . . . linking 

instances of the one or more text strings in the selected 

files” (claim 9). ’276 patent col. 35 ll. 20–21, col. 37 ll. 29–

32 (emphases added). In contrast, Indacon points to 

claims 14 and 15, which both recite “automatically generating links between all instances of the link term within 

the plurality of selected source files and the designated 

file.” Id. col. 38 ll. 65–67, col. 40 ll. 1–3 (emphasis added). 

Importantly, however, all of claims 2, 9, 14, and 15 are 

independent claims, and we have declined to apply the 

doctrine of claim differentiation where, as here, the claims 

are not otherwise identical in scope. See World Class 

Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp., 769 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 

(Fed. Cir. 2014); Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, 

LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Further, 

“[a]lthough claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, 

it cannot enlarge the meaning of a claim beyond that 

which is supported by the patent documents, or relieve 

any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution 

history.” Fenner, 778 F.3d at 1327. 

Thus, we adopt the district court’s constructions of the 

link claim terms. “Custom link” is properly construed as 

“a link the user can define using a chosen term that 

allows each instance of the term in the plurality of files to 

be identified and displayed as a link to a file chosen by 

the user, without modifying the original database files”; 

“custom linking relationship” is properly construed as “a 

linking relationship the user can define using a chosen 

term that allows each instance of the term in the plurality 

of files to be identified and displayed as a link to a file 

chosen by the user, without modifying the original data-
INDACON, INC. v. FACEBOOK, INC. 11

base files”; and “link term” is properly construed as “a 

term chosen by a user that can be displayed as a link to a 

file specified by the user whenever the user encounters 

the term in the plurality of files.”

CONCLUSION

We find no error in the district court’s constructions of 

“alias,” “custom link,” “custom linking relationship,” and 

“link term.” As such, we affirm the judgment of noninfringement.

AFFIRMED