THE LONG-RANGE DEMOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS

FOR THE 2017 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

July 13, 2017
Demography, Page 2

PRINCIPAL DEMOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS 

OVERVIEW

SECTIONS

1 FERTILITY

2 MORTALITY

3 IMMIGRATION 
Demography, Page 3

Overview

Each year the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and 

Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds provides an annual report to the Congress on the financial 

and actuarial status of the OASDI program. The Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) produces 

projections of future cost and income based on three separate sets of long-range (75-year) 

assumptions for key demographic variables. The intermediate (alternative II) set of assumptions 

represents the Trustees’ best estimate for future experience, while the low cost (alternative I) and 

high cost (alternative III) sets of assumptions are more and less favorable, respectively, from the 

perspective of program cost as a percent of taxable payroll. In addition, the intermediate 

assumptions serve as the central tendency for the stochastic projections presented in the OASDI 

Trustees Report. This memorandum presents the demographic assumptions used in the 2017

annual report of the Board of Trustees (the “Trustees Report”).

The basic demographic assumptions are:

 The total fertility rate, along with the single year of age fertility rates,

 The annual rates of reduction in central death rates by broad age group (0 – 14, 15 – 49, 

50 – 64, 65 – 84, and 85+) and by cause of death (cardiovascular, cancer, violence, 

respiratory, and all other), and

 Immigration levels (legal new arrivals, legal exits, adjustments of status, and other-thanlegal entrants) and other-than-legal rates of exit.

For the 2017 Trustees Report, there were no changes to these basic assumptions from those used 

in the 2016 Trustees Report. The following table shows the basic ultimate assumptions or 

summary measures for the basic assumptions.

New data and transitioning to demographic ultimate values with fertility, mortality, and 

immigration result in an increase (improvement) of the OASDI actuarial balance of about 0.01

percent of taxable payroll. In addition, changes to historical data, including updates to recent 

other-than-legal (OTL) populations, result in a decrease (worsening) of the OASDI actuarial 

balance of about 0.04 percent of taxable payroll. Thus, the total demographic changes result in a

decrease (worsening) of the OASDI actuarial balance of about 0.03 percent of payroll.
Demography, Page 4

Key Demographic Assumptions and Summary Measures for the Long-Range (75-year) Projection Period

2016 Trustees Report and 2017 Trustees Report

2016 Trustees Report 

Alternative

2017 Trustees Report 

Alternative

2017 Trustees Report Less 

2016 Trustees Report

I II III I II III I II III

Ultimate total fertility rate 

(children per woman) 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0

Average annual percentage 

reduction in total age-sex-adjusted 

death rates for the 75-year 

projection period

0.42 0.78 1.16 0.42 0.77 1.16 0.00 -0.01 0.00

Average annual net legal 

immigration (in thousands) for the 

75-year projection period

1,008 795 602 1,008 795 602 0 0 0

Average annual net other-thanlegal immigration (in thousands)

for the 75-year projection period

621 496 359 615 491 359 -6 -5 0

The remainder of this paper provides details regarding the historical values and future values for 

each of the demographic assumptions, and the basis for the assumptions.
Fertility, Page 1

1. FERTILITY

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2017 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

1.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

1.2 HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE........................................................................................................ 2

1.3 ASSUMED FUTURE FERTILITY RATES...................................................................................... 3

TABLE 1.1: PAST AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES FOR THE UNITED STATES..................................................6

TABLE 1.2: HISTORICAL TOTAL FERTILITY RATES, BY COUNTRY..................................................................................7

CHART 1.1: HISTORICAL TOTAL FERTILITY RATES FOR THE UNITED STATES ................................................................8

CHART 1.2: CENTRAL BIRTH RATES FOR FIVE YEAR AGE GROUPS: HISTORICAL AND ALTERNATIVE II PROJECTION ...9

CHART 1.3: HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES............................................................................10

CHART 1.4: HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES BY BIRTH COHORT .............................................11

CHART 1.5: PAST AND FUTURE EXPECTED BIRTHS PER WOMAN BASED ON THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY 

GROWTH (NSFG)..................................................................................................................................................12
Fertility, Page 2

1.1 Summary

The ultimate total fertility rates (TFRs) in the 2017 Trustees Report are 2.2, 2.0, and 1.8 children 

per woman for the respective low-cost, intermediate, and high-cost alternatives. The ultimate 

TFRs are the same as those used in the 2016 Trustees Report. Final birth data for 2015 from the 

National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) resulted in a TFR of 1.84.

The sharp drop in the TFR from a level of 2.12 in 2007 to a level of 2.00 for 2009 and 1.85 for 

2013 is most likely largely due to the effects of the economic recession. In 2014, the TFR 

increased slightly to 1.86 but decreased again in 2015 to 1.84. However, the Trustees assume

that the TFR will still increase to pre-recession levels before returning to the ultimate level of 

2.0. The consistency of reported birth expectations around 2.3 by women of childbearing age 

through the period of reduced economic activity suggests that much of the recent drop in births is 

a deferral, rather than a decrease, in fertility rates. Thus, for the intermediate alternative, the 

Trustees assume an increasing TFR from 2016 through 2023 to a level slightly above the 

ultimate TFR, consistent with the projected recovery from the recession. After 2023, the 

Trustees assume the TFR decreases linearly, reaching the ultimate TFR of 2.0 in 2027. 

Compared to the assumed intermediate path of the TFR in the 2016 Trustees Report, this path is 

lower through 2022. For 2023 and later, the path is the same as the path used in the 2016 

Trustees Report. This change in the path of the TFR results in a decrease in the long-range 

actuarial balance, under the intermediate alternative, of about 0.01 percent of taxable payroll.

In addition to the overall level of the TFR, the distribution of birth rates by age of mother has 

implications for the size of the population. As in the prior Trustees Report, the Trustees assume

a continuation of the historical trend toward lower birth rates for women below age 20 and 

higher birth rates for women above age 30 through the ultimate years. This continued trend 

results in a somewhat smaller and slightly older population in the future than if the future relative 

distribution of birth rates by age of mother were unchanged. 

1.2 Historical Experience

Past total fertility rates (TFRs) in the United States are shown in table 1.1 and chart 1.1. The 

TFR for a given year is defined as the average number of children that would be born to a 

woman throughout her lifetime if she were to survive the entire childbearing period and were to 

experience, at each age of her life, the birth rate1observed in that year. During the period 1917 

through 1924, the TFR was more than 3.0 children per woman. From 1924 through 1933, the 

TFR declined from 3.1 to 2.2 children per woman, and then remained level at 2.1 to 2.2 children 

per woman through 1940. After 1940, the TFR once again began to rise, reaching a peak of 3.7 

in 1957 and stayed above 2.8 for the “baby boom” years of 1946 through 1965. This period of 

high fertility was followed by a period of declining fertility. The TFR reached a historical low of 

1.7 in 1976. Beginning in 1977, the TFR remained fairly stable at 1.8 children per woman until 

1987, when it started to increase, reaching 2.1 in 1990. Between 1990 and the start of the Great 

Recession, the TFR remained fairly stable, fluctuating between 2.0 and 2.1. The TFR decreased 

from 2.12 in 2007 to 1.85 in 2013. The 1.86 TFR for 2014 represents the first time the TFR has 

 

1

The ratio of: (1) the number of live births to mothers of a specified age, to (2) the midyear female population of that age.
Fertility, Page 3

increased from the prior year since 2007. However, the TFR decreased again in 2015 to 1.84. It 

is important to note that, despite the recession, birth expectations of women have not dropped 

below 2.20, as noted in the next section.

The increase in the TFR after 1976 was primarily due to increases in birth rates among women in 

their 30s. After dropping dramatically between 1960 and 1976, birth rates for women in their 

20s remained quite stable between 1976 and 2007 (see chart 1.2). Because much of the decline 

in birth rates for women in their 20s was understood to represent a desire to defer births until 

women were in their 30s, the gradual increases in birth rates for women in their 30s for 10 to 15 

years after 1976 were expected. However, birth rates for women in their 30s continued a rising 

trend through 2007, partially due to advancements in infertility treatments.

1.3 Assumed Future Fertility Rates

The Trustees do not expect the TFR to return to the high levels experienced during the baby 

boom. Several changes in our society have occurred during the past 50 years that have 

contributed to reducing birth rates. Some of these changes are:

 increased availability and use of birth control methods,

 increased female participation in the labor force,

 increased postponement of marriage and childbearing among young women,

 increased prevalence of divorce,

 decreased death rates among children (requiring fewer births for a desired family size), 

and

 increased percentage of women choosing to remain childless.

The Trustees do not expect a significant reversal of these changes. In addition, a sharp decline in 

the TFR to the low levels experienced by certain other industrialized countries is unlikely due to 

economic, demographic, and cultural differences between the U.S. and those countries. 

The Trustees assume an ultimate TFR of 2.0 for alternative II. The 2007 and 2011 Technical 

Panels both suggested keeping the ultimate alternative II TFR assumption at 2.0. However, the 

2015 Technical Panel suggested an ultimate alternative II TFR assumption of 1.9. The 

Congressional Budget Office adopted the 2015 Technical Panel’s recommended TFR assumption 

of 1.9 in their 2016 projections.2 The 2014 National Population Projections released by Census 

also have a slightly lower TFR path. In those projections, Census assumptions resulted in a TFR 

in 2014 of 1.87. Then, Census’ TFR stays almost constant throughout their projection through 

2060.3

As shown in chart 1.2, there is a continuation of the historical trend for, generally, increasing 

birth rates for women over age 30, and decreasing rates for women below age 20 through the 

ultimate year, with age-specific rates remaining constant thereafter. This changing distribution 

of fertility rates by age of woman has significant effects on population size, but these effects 

essentially stabilize once the age distribution of fertility rates stabilizes. 

 

2 See https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580-LTBO-2.pdf

3 See http://www.census.gov/population/projections/files/methodology/methodstatement14.pdf
Fertility, Page 4

Examining data from other countries is useful in selecting a range of ultimate assumptions for 

the low-cost and high-cost alternatives. Historical TFRs during the period 1980-2013 that were 

reported to the United Nations are shown for 24 countries in table 1.2. The TFRs for the most 

recent year shown in the table range from 2.3 in India to 1.3 in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 

However, if India is excluded from the comparison, the highest TFR is 2.1 for Mexico followed 

by 2.0 for France, Ireland, and New Zealand. Although the TFR in the industrialized countries 

has been observed at levels as low as the 1.2 to 1.5 range, the cultural and economic climate in 

the U.S. makes it highly unlikely that our TFR will go to the level of 1.7 achieved in 1976 for 

any sustained period. Thus, the Trustees assume an ultimate TFR for the high-cost scenario of 

1.8 children per woman. Using the range of past experience for the United States and other 

countries as a guide, the Trustees assume an ultimate TFR for the low-cost scenario of 2.2 

children per woman.

For the intermediate alternative, the Trustees assume the ultimate TFR is reached in the 4th year 

from the post-recession peak TFR year of 2023. For the low-cost alternative, the Trustees 

assume the ultimate TFR is reached in 2024 and for the high-cost alternative, the Trustees 

assume the ultimate TFR is reached in 2032. These ultimate years are unchanged from those 

used in the 2016 Trustees Report.

For the intermediate assumptions, the Trustees assume the TFR:

 Increases over the period from 2016 through 2023, consistent with the economic 

recovery;

 Reaches 2.05 in 2023, which is approximately the average TFR from 2000 through 2005;

and

 Decreases linearly after 2023, reaching the ultimate TFR of 2.0 in 2027.

For the low-cost and high-cost alternatives, the Trustees assume the paths of the TFRs gradually 

grade away from the intermediate alternative path until 2023 and then linearly grade to the 

ultimate TFRs in 2024 and 2032, respectively. Chart 1.3 shows the historical path of the TFR 

starting in 1917 and the projected paths of the TFRs for all three alternatives.

Examining the TFR by birth cohort is also a useful tool in evaluating an ultimate assumption. As 

shown in chart 1.4, the cohort TFRs vary much less than the annual TFRs shown in chart 1.3. 

Chart 1.4 also shows that the cohort TFR has been near or greater than 2.0 for all cohorts who 

have finished their childbearing years. The most recent cohorts that just completed their 

childbearing years show an upward trend in their TFRs. The intermediate path continues that 

trend before eventually coming back down to the ultimate assumption of 2.0.

As mentioned above, reported birth expectations for women of childbearing age provide a 

measure to help assess trends in birth rates. The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) 

conducts the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) to gather information about men and 

women aged 15-44.

4

 Prior to the 2002-20055survey, the NCHS only asked married women 

about birth expectations. However, for the 2002-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015 surveys, the 

NCHS asked all women about past and future expected births. As shown in chart 1.5, past and 

 

4 Persons are aged 15-44 at the time of the sampling but may have their 45th birthday by the interview date.

5 NCHS refers to the data collected from 2002 through 2005 as “Cycle 6” as shown at: 

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/nsfg_questionnaires.htm.
Fertility, Page 5

future expected births in all four survey waves is well above 2.0. Based on this, the Trustees 

conclude that the dip in birth rates since the start of the recession in 2007 is largely a temporary 

deferral of births. Many of the births postponed during the period of low economic activity may 

be realized in the next several years, consistent with the continued economic recovery that is 

projected. Perhaps more importantly, the consistency of birth expectations well above 2.0

strongly suggests that the current reduction in the total fertility rate will not be permanent.
Fertility, Page 6

Table 1.1: Past and Projected Total Fertility Rates for the United States

Calendar Year 2017 Trustees Report 2016 Trustees Report

1920 3.263 3.263

1930 2.533 2.533

1940 2.229 2.229

1950 3.028 3.028

1960 3.606 3.606

1965 2.882 2.882

1970 2.432 2.432

1975 1.770 1.770

1980 1.820 1.820

1985 1.835 1.835

1990 2.069 2.069

1991 2.057 2.057

1992 2.043 2.043

1993 2.018 2.018

1994 2.002 2.002

1995 1.981 1.981

1996 1.980 1.980

1997 1.974 1.974

1998 2.002 2.002

1999 2.008 2.008

2000 2.054 2.054

2001 2.032 2.032

2002 2.025 2.025

2003 2.055 2.055

2004 2.059 2.059

2005 2.062 2.062

2006 2.112 2.112

2007 2.123 2.123

2008 2.074 2.074

2009 2.002 2.002

2010 1.925 1.925

2011 1.889 1.889

2012 1.874 1.874

2013 1.850 1.849

2014 1.860 1.862

2015 1.841 1.871 1

Alternative I:

2016 1.886 1.929

2020 2.066 2.091

2024+ 2.200 2.200

Alternative II:

2016 1.870 1.898

2020 1.982 1.998

2025 2.025 2.025

2027+ 2.000 2.000

Alternative III:

2016 1.853 1.868

2020 1.899 1.906

2025 1.891 1.887

2030 1.826 1.825

2032+ 1.800 1.800

1

 Estimated Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Fertility, Page 7

Table 1.2: Historical Total Fertility Rates, by Country

1980 - 2013

Country 1980 1985 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Most Recent TFR

Australia 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9

Austria 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 — 1.4

Belgium 1.7 1.6 1.6 — — — — — — 1.8 — — 1.8 1.8 — — 1.8

Canada 1

1.7 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 — 1.6

China 2.2 2.2 2.3 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1.8

Denmark 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 — 1.7

Finland 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 — 1.8

France 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 — 2.0 2.0 2.0 — 2.0

Germany 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 — 1.4 1.4 — — 1.4

Greece 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 — 1.3

India 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3

Ireland 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 — 2.0

Italy 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 — 1.4

Japan 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4

Mexico 3.1 3.3 3.7 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 — — — — — 2.1

Netherlands 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 — 1.7

New Zealand 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0

Norway 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 — 1.9

Portugal 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 — 1.3

Spain 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 — 1.3

Sweden 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 — 1.9

Switzerland 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 — 1.5 — 1.5

United Kingdom 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 — — 1.9 1.9 — 1.9

United States 2

1.8 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9

1

 Estimates for Canada from Statistics Canada website for 2010-2012

2

 Estimates for the U.S. from NCHS NVSR 64-12

Source: United Nations Demographic Yearbook Historical Supplement 1948-1997

 United Nations Demographic Yearbook Fertility Supplement 1980-1999

 United Nations Demographic Yearbooks 2000 - 2014

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Fertility, Page 8

Chart 1.1: Historical Total Fertility Rates for the United States

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Total Fertility Rate

Calendar Year

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Fertility, Page 9

Chart 1.2: Central Birth Rates for Five Year Age Groups: Historical and Alternative II Projection

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 Central Birth Rate

Calendar Year

25-29

30-34 20-24

35-39

14-19

40-44 45-49

Historical

Alternative II 

Projection

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Fertility, Page 10

Chart 1.3: Historical and Projected Total Fertility Rates

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 Total Fertility Rate

Calendar Year

Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Historical 

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Fertility, Page 11

Chart 1.4: Historical and Projected Total Fertility Rates by Birth Cohort

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 Total Fertility Rate

Year of Birth

Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Historical 

Mix of Historical and 

Projected Data

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Fertility, Page 12

Chart 1.5: Past and Future Expected Births per Woman Based on the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-45 All Ages Children Per Woman

Age Group

2002-2005 NSFG 2006-2010 NSFG 2011-2015 NSFG

Note: The portion of the bar below the horizontal break for each age group shows the average births realized up to that age, while the full 

height of each bar indicates the average of total births expected at that age.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Mortality, Page 1

2. MORTALITY

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2017 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

2.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

2.2 CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING A MORTALITY PROJECTION METHOD............................... 2

2.3 CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING MORTALITY ASSUMPTIONS BY AGE AND CAUSE OF 

DEATH............................................................................................................................................. 4

2.4 PAST EXPERIENCE BY CAUSE OF DEATH................................................................................. 7

2.5 ASSUMED FUTURE RATES OF REDUCTION IN MORTALITY BY CAUSE OF DEATH ................. 7

2.6 PROJECTED FUTURE RATES OF REDUCTION BASED ON ASSUMPTIONS BY AGE, SEX, AND 

CAUSE OF DEATH ........................................................................................................................... 9

2.7 TRUSTEES’ ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS HISTORICAL TRENDS AND OTHER ASSUMPTIONS ........ 10

2.8 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS TECHNICAL PANELS AND OTHER PROJECTIONS . 12

TABLE 2.1: HISTORICAL AND ASSUMED RATES OF REDUCTION IN MORTALITY...........................................................14

TABLE 2.2: AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN AGE-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES: FOR THE 

2017 TRUSTEES REPORT .......................................................................................................................................17

TABLE 2.3: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF REDUCTION IN CENTRAL DEATH RATES BY AGE GROUP, SEX, AND 

CAUSE...................................................................................................................................................................19

TABLE 2.4: AGE-SEX-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES ..........................................................................................20

CHART 2.1: HISTORICAL UNITED STATES AGE-SEX-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES FROM 1900-2014................21

CHART 2.2: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MALE AND FEMALE ANNUAL PERCENT REDUCTION IN AGE-ADJUSTED 

DEATH RATES FOR POPULATION 65+....................................................................................................................22
Mortality, Page 2

2.1 Summary

For the 2017 Trustees Report, the ultimate annual rates of mortality reduction by age and cause 

of death are the same as those used in the 2016 Trustees Report. The assumed ultimate rates of 

reduction apply fully for years after 2040 in the projection. For years between the most recent 

observed data and the full implementation of the ultimate rates of reduction after 2040, there is a

transition from recently observed trends by age, sex, and cause to the ultimate assumed rates of 

reduction. 

Projections for this report reflect final NCHS data for 2014, final Medicare data for 2013, and 

preliminary Medicare data for 2014. These new data show continued mortality reductions that 

are generally smaller than those projected in last year's report by age, sex, and cause. These 

additional data result in higher death rates at the start of the long-range projection period than 

expected a year ago, as well as higher death rates throughout the projection period.

Incorporating these new data results in an increase (improvement) in the long-range actuarial 

balance, under the intermediate set of assumptions, of about 0.04 percent of taxable payroll.

The low-cost and high-cost alternative ultimate rates of improvement by age and cause are set as 

percentages of the intermediate alternative assumed rates and, as such, are not displayed 

separately in the tables. Male and female ultimate rates of improvement by age and cause are set 

equal to each other, but are displayed separately because historical rates of change, projected 

rates of change through the transition years, and rates of change for all causes combined 

throughout the projection period vary by sex.

2.2 Considerations in Selecting a Mortality Projection Method

Projections of mortality improvement are subject to uncertainty that is possibly greater than any 

other variable used in the Trustees’ assumptions. Some demographers argue that life expectancy 

is potentially limitless and that rates of mortality reduction will match or exceed historical trends 

indefinitely into the future. Others believe that biological limitations make mortality 

improvement more difficult to achieve in the future and, combined with behavioral factors and 

economic considerations, future rates of reduction will be more modest than in the past.

Because the method for projecting future mortality is critical in determining the results, we begin

with a comparison of four approaches that are currently in use by demographers. These 

approaches can provide very different results, and make very different use of the available data. 

Some relatively simple approaches have been popular for illustrating trends in longevity but do

not address the full complexities of changing conditions over time. We believe that any

projection of mortality used to model the size and age structure of the population, which is the 

foundation for analyzing the actuarial status of programs like Social Security and Medicare, 

should explicitly consider the past and expected future conditions that affect rates of 

improvement.

Perhaps the simplest approach to projecting future mortality is to extrapolate past trends in life 

expectancy. Some have presumed that the rate of increase in life expectancy at birth will be 

linear for the indefinite future. Oeppen and Vaupel in 2002 contended that a trend for the “best 
Mortality, Page 3

nation” would continue to rise linearly and that the U.S. would catch up to that trend. Further 

analysis by Ron Lee, and more recently by Jacques Villan and France Meslé, has shown that this

historical trend has not been linear but has been decelerating in recent years. In addition, 

experience for the U.S. and for other countries has demonstrated that there are clear differences 

in the populations among developed nations that have made differences in mortality persist. 

Finally, life expectancy at birth is most highly affected by changes in death rates at young ages, 

particularly at infancy. Even if mortality reduction trends by age were to continue unchanged 

into the future, increase in life expectancy at any age would slow. For assessing the actuarial 

status of Social Security and Medicare, extrapolation of life expectancy is not useful, because it 

does not address the age structure of mortality rates or of the population.

A second approach extrapolates death rates on a cohort basis. Shifts in death rates from one 

cohort to the next have been observed particularly in the U.K., and to a lesser extent in the U.S. 

However, extrapolating such shifts across ages within a cohort requires careful analysis. If a 

cohort shows lower death rates up to a given age due to better health, then the improvement may 

be expected to persist to higher ages. However, if the shift is primarily due to interventions that 

have lowered death rates for individuals with compromised physiology, then death rates for the 

cohort at older ages might actually be worse than the prior cohort. In addition, advances that are

for one cohort may reflect a level shift in mortality and not a trend of improvement that will

continue for succeeding cohorts.

A third, more commonly used approach extrapolates past rates of reduction in mortality, by age

and sex, indefinitely into the future. Lee and Carter are the most notable proponents of this 

approach. They developed a model for fitting a trend to a selected historical period that is then 

applied for projected future improvement, effectively assuming that future conditions for overall 

reduction by age and sex will match the conditions over the past. Key to this approach is the 

selection of the “appropriate” historical period. For many years, Lee and Carter suggested using 

the period starting with 1900. More recently, they suggested a period starting with 1950, which 

results in somewhat faster projected rates of mortality improvement. If a longer period were 

used (starting with 1800, for example), then the rates of reduction would be substantially less. 

Relative to all of human history, the twentieth century, and particularly the latter half of the 

twentieth century, was a time of exceptionally rapid mortality decline. The Lee and Carter 

extrapolation method presumes no deceleration in the future rate of reduction in mortality, and

also presumes no change in the relative rate of decline across ages in the historical period. In 

2016, Ron Lee produced projections of death rates through 2090 using national data by age and 

sex for the period 1950 through 2011. These death rates result in the same overall 75-year 

actuarial balance for the Social Security program as the death rates used in the 2015 Trustees 

Report. See Actuarial Note 158 at https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/pdf_notes/note158.pdf. 

The fourth approach for projecting mortality involves more comprehensive use of available data 

and flexibility for considering how future conditions are expected to differ from the past. This 

approach takes advantage of historical mortality data by cause of death, age, and sex, which is 

available on a relatively complete basis for the U.S. starting in 1979. Biologists and many 

demographers have long recognized the value of modeling mortality by cause. Ken Manton was 

a pioneer in evaluating effects of eliminating death by a given cause. Others, like Jay Olshansky,

have emphasized the strides made in mortality for some causes and the failure to improve for 
Mortality, Page 4

other causes. Our model has, for decades, reflected past trends in mortality by cause, taking into 

account future expected changes based on input from researchers at the National Institutes of 

Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and others. More recently, medical

researchers and clinicians at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) independently assessed prospects 

for mortality improvement by cause and age. The JHU study has been extremely useful in 

evaluating and benchmarking the Trustees’ assumptions. Of course, developing assumptions for 

future rates of mortality reduction by cause and age requires judgment about the expectation of 

future conditions relative to the past. Consideration of past changes in the rates of mortality 

reduction for individual causes, along with expert opinion, provides a rich basis for such 

judgment. Perhaps most importantly, this approach provides a clear disclosure of specific 

assumptions used for improvement by age and cause of death. This can then be explicitly 

compared to the historical experience in considerable detail.

It is important to note that the 2015 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, appointed by 

the independent Social Security Advisory Board, endorsed the use of mortality assumptions by 

cause group. See page 19 of their report at 

http://www.ssab.gov/Portals/0/Technical%20Panel/2015_TPAM_Final_Report.pdf?ver=2015-

09-24-113145-693.

2.3 Considerations in Selecting Mortality Assumptions by Age and Cause of Death

Simple extrapolation of the average trends experienced for any past period to project long-term 

future trends should only be considered when there is a basis for assuming that future conditions 

will on average replicate past conditions. This approach may have merit for processes where 

there is no reason to believe there are natural limits, such as for labor productivity of workers,

where technology has no apparent limit. Human mortality, on the other hand, is limited by our 

biology. The maximum verified age of survival for a human is age 122, and shows no signs of 

extending significantly. Biological researchers suggest that extension of the maximum lifespan

would require fundamental alteration of the aging process. This may be possible, but there is no 

clear evidence that it will be achieved in the future. 

In addition, reductions in mortality have come in a very irregular pattern over time, closely 

reflecting changes in the economy, access to medical care, and behavior of the population. 

Therefore, in developing assumptions for future mortality improvement by age and cause, it is 

crucial to study the differing historical rates of decline for various periods and the conditions that 

contributed to these variations. Only after considering how future conditions will differ from the 

past can we speculate about future mortality improvement.

The remainder of this section describes many of the overarching factors that have influenced 

mortality improvement during the past century and will affect it in the future. Section 2.5 goes 

into greater detail regarding the Trustees assumptions for rates of improvement for each cause of 

death.

A number of extremely important developments have contributed to the generally rapid overall 

rate of mortality improvement during the past century. These developments include:
Mortality, Page 5

• Access to primary medical care for the general population (in particular, the access due 

to Medicare and Medicaid health coverage for the elderly, disabled, and poor),

• Discovery of and general availability of antibiotics and immunizations, 

• Clean water supply and waste removal, and 

• The rapid rate of growth in the general standard of living. 

Each of these developments is expected to make a substantially smaller contribution to annual 

rates of mortality improvement in the future. 

Future reductions in mortality will depend upon such factors as: 

• The development and application of new diagnostic, surgical, and life-sustaining 

techniques,

• The rate of future increase in health spending and the efficiency of that spending relative 

to mortality improvement,

• The presence of environmental pollutants, 

• Changes in amount and type of physical activity, 

• Improvements in nutrition, 

• The incidence of violence and suicide, 

• The isolation and treatment of causes of disease, 

• The emergence of new forms of disease, 

• The evolution of existing forms of disease, 

• Improvements in prenatal care, 

• The prevalence of obesity,

• The prevalence of cigarette smoking, 

• The misuse of drugs (including alcohol), 

• The extent to which people assume responsibility for their own health, 

• Education regarding health, and 

• Changes in our perception of the value of life. 

In reviewing the above list, future progress for some factors seems questionable when recent 

statistics are considered. Recent National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) releases have 

reported a substantial increase in the prevalence of obesity and diabetes, decreased 

environmental air quality, and an increase in negative side effects from invasive surgical 

procedures. On the other hand, there is good basis for speculation that there will continue to be 

substantial breakthroughs in advancing medical technology and treatment in the future. The 

extent to which such new technologies will have purely positive effects (like improved 

sanitation) versus mixed effects (as in the case of chemotherapy) will determine their potential 

for improving mortality. A fundamental consideration, however, is the ability and willingness of 

our society to pay for the development of new treatments and technologies, and to provide these 

to the population as a whole. 

The expansion of national expenditures for health services, research, and development over the 

last 60 years has been remarkable. Total national health expenditures have risen from 4 percent 

of GDP in 1952 to nearly 18 percent of GDP by 2009. This expansion has both enhanced health 

care for those who already had access and extended access to tens of millions through Medicare, 

Medicaid, and more recently, the Affordable Care Act. However, national health expenditures 
Mortality, Page 6

cannot continue to expand at this pace in the future. In fact, the Medicare Trustees Report 

projects a dramatic slowdown in the rate of increase in per-enrollee Medicare spending in the 

future, even as the average number of enrollees will be increasing. Even with improved 

efficiency and targeting of medical care in the future, a deceleration in spending per enrollee of 

this magnitude will tend to slow the rate of reduction in mortality.

Much has been made of the reduction in smoking in the U.S. over the past 30 years, particularly 

for males. However, there is a looming concern over other behavioral factors. Reduced physical 

activity and consumption of excess calories has led to the rising epidemic of obesity. In the 

future, assuming the prevalence of obesity stabilizes, an increasing portion of the adult and aged 

population will have been obese for long durations. The effects of prolonged obesity will clearly 

have negative cumulative effects for diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancer in the future. 

Education and income are factors that are correlated with mortality differences in the population. 

More education and higher income are associated with lower mortality. It is not entirely clear 

whether this correlation is largely due to the benefits of higher income and education, or to the 

“selection” of more advantaged (and thus healthier) individuals in gaining access to the best 

education and job opportunities. To the extent that the former factor is important, then 

increasing education and income for the population as a whole may provide some further 

benefits, but substantially less than in the past, given that further increases in education are likely 

to slow. 

Future progress in treatment of currently predominant diseases is contingent on the availability 

of funding, research outcomes, society’s views on moral issues, and education about lifestyle 

choices that affect one’s health. Quality of life and average years of healthy living have 

improved on a continual basis. Much progress has been made in the predominant causes of 

death (cardiovascular and respiratory disease) over the past several decades. These medical 

advances have caused the predominant causes of death to become less dominant, so that other 

causes, which have had slower rates of improvement or have only recently emerged, are 

becoming more predominant. For the still-predominant causes of death where significant

progress has been made, further progress may be more difficult. In contrast, causes that have 

been less addressed may receive more research attention in the future. Therefore, many causes 

of death that have recently had rapid rates of reduction may have slower rates in the future. 

Causes that have had slower rates of improvement in the past may have more rapid rates of 

improvement in the future.

Finally, we must consider that improvements in mortality and extension of longevity through the 

last century were relatively unconstrained by limitations of senescence and gradual deterioration 

of body systems, as we had not yet reached the apparent practical limit to life span. While we do 

not subscribe to the notion that there is a fixed limit for human longevity, it is true that average 

human lifespan has improved much more than the maximum observed lifespan. This suggests 

that even with continued technological advances, the inherent limitations of the physical body 

and the mind to endure successfully past about 110 years will gradually result in a decelerating 

force of mortality improvement. 
Mortality, Page 7

2.4 Past Experience by Cause of Death

In the past, the reduction of mortality rates has varied greatly by cause of death. In assessing 

experience and future possible improvement in mortality, it is important to understand the 

varying trends in mortality by cause of death. For the relatively recent period 1979-2014, we 

analyzed average annual reductions in central death rates by age group and sex for five basic 

categories of cause of death: four major groups of cause of death, and a residual group (Other) 

that contains all other causes (see table 2.3). (Note that in the past, we analyzed death rates by 

more than five categories and the Trustees have developed assumptions for the same. For 

example, in the 1990's there were 10 different categories. See Actuarial Study 112 at 

https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/pdf_studies/study112.pdf.) We have focused on the period 

1979-2014 because NCHS has provided death rates by cause on a consistent basis since 1979, 

allowing for consistent groupings of death rates by selected cause groups. 

For all ages combined, the largest rate of reduction over the period 1979-2014 was in the 

category of Cardiovascular Disease, which has been about 2.7 percent for males and about 2.4 

percent for females. The rate of reduction for Cancer has been about 1.0 percent per year for 

males and about 0.5 percent per year for females. The category of Violence, which includes 

accidents, averaged about 0.6 percent reduction for males, but an increase in mortality of about 

0.2 percent for females. The Respiratory Disease category averaged about 0.4 percent 

reduction for males and about a 1.5 percent increase for females. The Other Causes category

averaged increases in mortality of about 0.8 and 1.6 percent per year for males and females, 

respectively. 

2.5 Assumed Future Rates of Reduction in Mortality by Cause of Death

The ultimate average annual percentage reductions by age group and cause of death that are 

assumed for the intermediate alternative of the 2017 Trustees Report are presented in table 2.3, 

along with the intermediate assumptions from the 2016 Trustees Report, and the average rates 

experienced during the periods 1979-2014 and 2004-2014. The ultimate rates of improvement 

by age, sex, and cause for the low-cost and high-cost alternatives are developed as a ratio to the 

intermediate alternative, with low-cost being 1/2 of the intermediate rates of improvement and 

the high-cost being 5/3 of the intermediate rates. 

As seen in table 2.3, the rate of reduction in mortality due to cardiovascular disease and

respiratory disease has slowed generally in the last 10 data years (2004-2014) for ages under 65. 

The Trustees believe that ultimate rates of decline for these causes under age 65 will generally be 

higher than for the last 10 years, but somewhat lower than the rapid pace since 1979. For ages 

65 and over, reductions in death rates from cardiovascular disease and respiratory disease have 

increased generally in the last 10 years, consistent with a partial continuation of the gains at 

younger ages in the previous 10 years. For the ultimate rates of reduction, the Trustees expect 

more modest improvement at ages 65 and over for these causes as the gains from reduced 

smoking and interventions for heart disease will slow, while effects from obesity will increase. 

Reductions in death rates due to cancer for those over 65 have improved significantly in the last 

10 data years (2004-2014). As indicated by researchers at NCHS, cancer is actually many 
Mortality, Page 8

different diseases and each will be addressed gradually. Progress has been made for lung cancer 

in large part due to reduced smoking. Progress has been made in other areas such as breast 

cancer and prostate cancer due to increased awareness and medical treatments. However, 

progress for other cancers has been slower. In addition, there are indications that treatment for a 

first cancer may result in greater susceptibility to a second cancer at a later time. On balance, 

however, the Trustees expect that the ultimate average rate of reduction in death due to cancer 

will match or exceed the rate of reduction experienced from 1979 to 2014. 

Death rates from violence have actually increased substantially in the last 10 years for ages over 

50. The Trustees believe that this trend will not continue. However, because this category 

includes suicide, it is not clear that the rate of decline will be substantial at higher ages. 

Analyzing death rates from all other causes is always a challenge, because this category 

incorporates new causes that are identified over time. In addition, this broad group now includes 

neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s disease. Death rates for this category have risen 

substantially since 1979. Progress in reducing death rates in this category will be extremely

challenging in the future, even as the proportion of all deaths from this group increases. Even 

with decelerating spending on health research and services relative to GDP for the future, it is 

reasonable to assume that spending will be redirected from the largest causes of death in the past 

(cardiovascular disease and respiratory disease) to other causes (neurological and emerging 

diseases). Thus, the Trustees expect that some progress, even if modest, will be achieved for this 

category. 

Advice from the medical research community (including CDC, NCHS, and others) has been 

received on a largely informal basis and has been an essential component in guiding the 

Trustees’ assumptions for reductions in mortality by cause. Recently, we have explored insights 

from a Johns Hopkins University (JHU) study, which enlisted medical researchers and clinicians 

to develop expectations for reductions in death rates over about the next 30 years (2009-2040). 

This specific input has been highly instructive in corroborating assumptions for the medium-term

and long-term reductions in death rates by cause. This work was recently published in the North 

American Actuarial Journal, Volume 20, Issue 3 (see https://www.soa.org/naaj/). Note that the 

JHU expectations included an assumption that declines for causes not specifically considered by 

their experts would occur at about one-half the rate for all other causes combined, somewhat 

similar to the assumed assumptions for the “Other” category. 

There are three directly comparable categories of cause of death between the JHU experts and 

the Trustees. As an example, we focus on these three categories at ages 85+. For cardiovascular 

disease, the JHU experts project an average annual rate of decline from 2009-2040 of 0.5 percent 

for females and 0.6 percent for males. The Trustees’ ultimate assumption for cardiovascular 

disease is 1.2 percent. For cancer, the JHU experts project an average annual rate of decline 

from 2009-2040 of 0.4 percent for females and 0.6 percent for males. The Trustees’ ultimate 

assumption for cancer is 0.5 percent. For respiratory disease, the JHU experts project an average 

annual rate of decline from 2009-2040 of 0.1 percent for females and 0.4 percent for males. The 

Trustees’ ultimate assumption for respiratory disease is 0.2 percent. Note in particular the 

similarity of expectations for the respiratory disease and cancer categories between the JHU 

experts and those assumed for the 2017 Trustees Report. 
Mortality, Page 9

2.6 Projected Future Rates of Reduction based on Assumptions by Age, Sex, and Cause of Death

The averaging period for determining starting levels of annual mortality reduction is 10 years. 

Average annual reductions observed for the period 2004-2014 are calculated by age group, sex, 

and cause. These average annual reductions are set to be the starting levels. The rates of 

improvement begin grading to the ultimate rates immediately after the last year of data. The 

reductions in mortality are assumed to change rapidly from the starting levels1of average annual 

reductions to the assumed ultimate rates of reduction for years 2041 and later. Under the lowcost and high-cost scenarios, the starting levels of average annual reduction are assumed to be 50 

percent and 150 percent,2respectively, of the starting levels for the intermediate assumptions.

Instead of using the measured mortality rates for the last single year of data (calendar year 2014) 

as the starting point of the mortality projections, we use mortality rates calculated to be 

consistent with the trend inherent in the last 12 years of available data. The last 12 years of data 

are 2003-2014. This approach reduces the impact of wide fluctuations that tend to occur in 

annual data on the starting levels used for the mortality projection. 

It is also useful to compare the resulting reductions in death rates for all causes combined to past 

trends. This analysis allows for a further look at the reasonableness of the projections that result 

from the cause-specific assumptions. In addition, we are able to compare the Trustees’

assumptions with those of demographers who prefer to extrapolate past trends without specific 

consideration of the underlying causes of death. 

Table 2.4 provides age-sex-adjusted mortality rates for historical years and projected years, 

based on the assumed future rates of reduction by cause group. For the 2017 Trustees Report, 

the base year for the mortality projections is 2014. The age-sex-adjusted mortality rates 

presented in table 2.4 use the 2010 Census resident population as the standard population for the 

age-sex adjustment. 

Because reductions in mortality have differed widely by age in the past, the ultimate reductions 

in death rates vary by age group. Historically, reductions have been very rapid at the youngest 

ages. However, reductions at the highest ages, ages 85 and over, have been very slow. For 

many years, the Trustees’ assumptions have reflected the belief that neither of these extremes 

will persist indefinitely into the future. The Trustees’ assumptions have reflected slower 

improvement at the youngest ages than evidenced since 1900, and faster improvement at the 

highest ages (85 and over) than experienced historically. While this “compression” of rates of 

mortality improvement is in conflict with a literal interpretation of the Lee and Carter method, it 

was nevertheless endorsed explicitly by the 1999 Technical Panel, where Ron Lee was the 

principal demographer on the panel.

 

1

If the starting level of annual reductions for a particular cause age-sex group is negative, then 75 percent of that 

starting level is assumed for the intermediate alternative.

2

If the starting level of annual reductions for a particular cause age-sex group is negative, then 100 percent of that 

starting level is assumed for the low-cost alternative and 50 percent is assumed for the high-cost alternative.
Mortality, Page 10

Table 2.2 shows historical rates of improvement and the projected rates of improvement based 

on assumed rates of reduction by cause, by alternative for the 2017 Trustees Report, summarized 

by age group and sex. For the intermediate alternative, projected rates of improvement for ages 

under 50 are generally lower than those experienced over the period 1900-2014, consistent with 

the Trustees’ expectation of continued generally slower improvement in the future for these age 

groups. For males age 50 and older, the average projected rates of improvement for years after 

2014 are slightly higher than those experienced since 1900. The projected rates of improvement 

for women age 50 and older are slightly lower than those assumed for men and generally lower 

than the rates experienced by this group of women over the period 1900-2014. This is consistent 

with the Trustees’ long-held belief that average rates of mortality improvement for women, 

which had been faster than for men until around 1980, would ultimately converge with male 

improvement rates. Evidence that improvement for females will not always be faster than for 

males is apparent in data for years since 1980. The rate of improvement in mortality for women 

age 65 and older averaged only 0.50 percent per year during the period 1979-2014. This amount 

was a little less than half the average rate of improvement for aged men during this period (1.11 

percent). 

Table 2.2 also shows that, for all ages combined, the projected rate of improvement under the 

intermediate alternative for the period 2041-2091 is 0.74 percent per year for men and 0.69 

percent per year for women. The ultimate rates of improvement in the 2016 Trustees Report 

were also 0.74 and 0.69 percent per year for males and females, respectively.

A comparison of the basis for past improvement in mortality with the expected basis for future 

improvement suggests that future improvement is likely to continue, but at a generally slower 

rate than experienced during the extraordinary 1900-2014 period for ages under 65. Based on 

analysis of experience by cause of death, and expected future conditions affecting mortality 

improvement, it seems reasonable to expect the rate of mortality improvement for the age group 

65 and older for the next 75 years to be slightly slower compared to that experienced during 

1900-2014 (0.81 percent as shown in table 2.2). The Trustees believe the average annual rate of 

decline of 0.69 percent (as shown in table 2.2) over the period 2014-2091 for the intermediate 

assumption is reasonable in this context.

2.7 Trustees’ Assumptions versus Historical Trends and Other Assumptions 

Table 2.1 shows average rates of reduction in mortality for three broad age groups over two 

historical periods. In addition, the table includes the following ultimate rates of reductions (the 

rate of reduction in mortality averaged over the last 50 years of the 75-year long-range period): 

 Those assumed for the intermediate ultimate assumptions for various Trustees reports 

(choosing those reports that included changes in the ultimate assumptions or in the 

methodology), 

 Those recommended by various Technical Panels, and 

 Those resulting from a survey taken at a Society of Actuaries (SOA) seminar. 

Rates of improvement shown on the first page of table 2.1 reflect age-sex adjustment to the 

distribution of the 1990 U.S. population; those on the second page use the distribution of the 
Mortality, Page 11

2000 U.S. population; and those on the third page use the distribution of the 2010 U.S. 

population. As seen by comparing the rates on the first and second pages in table 2.1 under the 

intermediate assumptions of the 2002 and the 2004 Trustees Reports (for which ultimate rates of 

improvement were the same), the difference in using the different populations for age-sex 

adjusting makes little difference in the ultimate average rates by the broad age groups. This 

conclusion is further supported by comparing the rates from the 2013 Trustees Report using two 

different populations for age-sex adjusting, as shown on the second and third pages in table 2.1. 

For presentations other than table 2.1 of this memorandum, rates of improvement are presented 

with age-sex adjustment to the distribution of the 2010 U.S. population.

Table 2.1 provides the assumed ultimate average annual percent reductions in mortality for the 

intermediate assumptions of the 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2016 

Trustees Reports, along with those assumed for the 2017 Trustees Report. The 1999 and 2000 

Trustees Reports are included because ultimate annual percent reductions were increased 

substantially in the 2000 Trustees Report. The 2002 Trustees Report is included because 

changes in methodology were made that resulted in increased ultimate annual percent reductions. 

The 2004 Trustees Report is included to provide comparability in the results using a different 

population for the purpose of age-sex adjustment. The 2008 and 2009 Trustees Reports are 

included because ultimate annual percent reductions were revised. The 2011 Trustees Report is 

included because changes in methodology were made that put more emphasis on the recent 

historical data. The 2013 Trustees Report values are shown on both the second and third pages 

of the table to compare results using different populations for age-sex adjustment. 

Also included in table 2.1 are the assumed ultimate annual percent reductions in mortality 

recommended by the 1994-96, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015 Technical Panels and the 

median response from actuaries, demographers, biologists, and economists who participated in 

the 1997 Society of Actuaries Seminar. Focusing on mortality for ages 65 and over, it should be 

noted that since 2000, the Trustees’ intermediate assumptions have provided for an ultimate rate 

of reduction that is somewhat less than the average experienced since 1900. A description of the 

recommendations of recent technical panels is presented later in this report. 

Comparisons of historical and assumed rates of improvement are included in table 2.2. All rates 

of improvement shown in this table reflect age-sex adjustment3to the distribution of the 2010 

United States population. For the age group 65 and over (where mortality is concentrated), the 

rate of improvement experienced during 1900-2014 averaged 0.81 percent. In the most recent 

two sub-periods, there has been both a period of fast improvement (1.78 percent per year for 

1999 through 2009) and a period of slow improvement (0.61 percent per year for 2009 through 

2014). In fact, mortality at ages 65 and over generally improved at about 0.61 percent per year, 

or less, during 1900-2014 with the exception of three notable periods. The first was for the 

World War II period and subsequent years, 1936-1954. During this time frame, dramatic 

advances in the standard of living were achieved due to expanded medical practice including the 

introduction of antibiotics. The second period was from 1968-1982, during which additional 

 

3

 The age-sex-adjusted death rate is the crude rate that would occur in the enumerated total population as of April 1, 

2010, if that population were to experience the death rates by age and sex observed in, or projected for, the selected 

year.
Mortality, Page 12

dramatic advancements in medicine were made and access to medical services was greatly 

expanded through Medicare and Medicaid for the old, frail, and disadvantaged, those who 

account for the vast majority of deaths in the population. During the third period, 1999-2009, 

advances in medicines and surgical treatments led to rapid improvements. Cancer and 

cardiovascular patients especially benefitted from these advancements.

Chart 2.1 displays the annual age-sex-adjusted central death rates experienced since 1900. An 

examination of these rates reveals a sequence of distinct periods of mortality reduction. Table 

2.2 provides average annual rates of reduction4for these periods. During the period 1900-1936, 

annual mortality reduction averaged about 0.7 percent for males and 0.8 percent for females. 

During the following period, 1936-1954, there was more rapid reduction (with the help of 

antibiotics and other medical advances), averaging 1.5 percent per year for males and 2.3 percent 

per year for females. The period 1954-1968 saw a much slower reduction of 0.7 percent per year 

for females and an increase of 0.3 percent per year for males. From 1968 through 1982, the rate 

of reduction in mortality surged (with the help of Medicare and Medicaid), averaging 1.8 percent 

for males and 2.1 percent for females, annually. From 1982 to 1999, moderately slow reduction 

in mortality returned, averaging 0.9 percent per year for males and 0.4 percent per year for 

females. From 1999 to 2009, another more rapid period occurred, averaging 1.8 percent per year 

for males and 1.4 percent per year for females, annually. The latest period, 2009-2014, has 

mortality reduction slowing with average mortality improvement of 0.6 percent per year for 

males and 0.4 percent per year for females.

For the first four periods mentioned above, spanning 1900 through 1982, the average annual rate 

of improvement for males was less than that for females. For the last three periods, spanning 

1982 through 2014, the opposite was true, i.e., the average annual rate of improvement for 

females was less than that for males. Chart 2.2 shows differences between male and female 

annual rates of mortality improvement for the age group 65 and older for each year of the period 

1969 through 2014. Differences are shown for rates based on Medicare data. Even with normal 

year-to-year variation, improvement was generally greater for females until about 1980, as had 

been the case since the beginning of the past century. However, female improvement was 

generally less than or equal to that for males beginning about 1980.

2.8 Recommendations of the Previous Technical Panels and Other Projections

The 2015 Technical Panel appointed by the Social Security Advisory Board recommended 

substantially larger rates of decline than those assumed under the 2015 Trustees Report. Their 

recommendation was for an assumption of an overall average 1.00 percent annual reduction in

the age-sex-adjusted death rate for the ultimate period (2040 to 2089), compared to the 0.71 

percent overall average rate of decline for the 2015 Trustees Report. However, they supported 

having an age gradient (i.e., having the rates of improvement at younger ages be greater than 

rates of improvement at the older ages) and using cause-specific assumptions. Their 1.00 percent 

annual reduction recommendation was based on the average rate of reduction in the total 

 

4 Average annual reductions were calculated as the complement of the exponential of the slope of the least-square 

line through the logarithms of the central death rates. The rates for the period 1900-2014 are a weighted average of 

the rates shown for the seven distinct periods of change.
Mortality, Page 13

population (all ages and causes combined) observed for the period since 1950. However, the 

mortality data through 2014 have continued to improve much less than was assumed for the 2015 

and 2016 Trustees Reports. Based on recent slow rates of mortality improvement, the 

chairperson of the panel stated that she was glad that the Trustees did not follow the panel’s 

recommendation for faster overall mortality reduction (see

http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/social-securitys-financial-outlook-the-2016-update-in-perspective/).

The 2011 Technical Panel recommended an increase in life expectancy at birth that was 

consistent with generally larger rates of mortality reduction than those assumed under the 2011 

Trustees Report. Their recommendation was for reductions in mortality at the same rate for all 

ages that would result in a life expectancy at birth of 88.7 in 2085. This is consistent with having 

an annual 1.26 percent reduction in death rates for all ages and both sexes. This is a large 

increase over the recommendation of the 2007 Technical Panel.

The 2007 Technical Panel recommended generally larger rates of decline than those assumed 

under the 2007 Trustees Report. Their recommendation was for an assumption of 1.0 percent 

annual reduction in death rates for all ages and both sexes. Their recommendation was based on 

the average rate of reduction in the total population (all ages combined) observed for the period 

1953-2003.

We feel that the approach of the 2007 and 2011 Technical Panels fails to take into account 

significant deviations in the rates of reduction by age groups as evidenced by the data shown in 

tables 2.2 and 2.3. The rates of reduction at younger ages have been much larger than the rates 

experienced at older ages. While we agree that differences by age will diminish in the future, we 

do not believe they will vanish. 

The Congressional Budget Office assumes mortality rates will decrease by 0.985percent per year

in their 2016 Long-Term Budget Outlook. However, unlike in their prior reports, they now 

assume an age gradient in the decline of mortality. Specifically, they assume each five-year age 

group will continue to decline at the average rate that it declined from 1950 through 2012. This 

results in a life expectancy at birth of 87.3 years in 2090.6 Comparing with Census, the assumed 

mortality rates in the 2014 National Population Projections result in a life expectancy at birth of 

85.6 in 2060.7

 

5 From unpublished correspondence

6 See https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580-LTBO-2.pdf

7 See Table 17 at http://www.census.gov/population/projections/data/national/2014/summarytables.html
Mortality, Page 14

Table 2.1: Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality1

1999 1994-96 October-97 1999 2000 2002 2003

1900-2000 1982-2000

Trustees 

Alternative 22

Technical 

Panel3

SOA 

Seminar4

Technical 

Panel5

Trustees 

Alternative 26

Trustees 

Alternative 27

 Technical 

Panel8

0 - 14 3.30 2.74 1.20 3.30 0.95 2.20 1.35 1.55 2.33

15 - 64 1.44 1.15 0.57 1.40 0.75 1.12 0.75 0.78 1.11

65 & Over 0.73 0.49 0.50 0.75 0.60 0.98 0.65 0.70 0.92

1Rates of reduction are the average of male and female annual rates of decline in age-adjusted central death rates. The rates for the period 1900-2000 are a weighted

 average of rates for five separate distinct periods of change.

2The 1999 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2023-2073.

3The 1994-96 Technical Panel (appointed by the Advisory Council) recommended assuming reduction at the average rate experienced during the century.

4The Society of Actuaries Seminar included 60 actuaries, demographers, economists, and other experts on Social Security financing. 

 Values shown are the median responses of the participants.

5The 1999 Technical Panel (appointed by the Advisory Board) recommended that ultimate rate of reduction in mortality be increased at all ages

 (over the 1999 TR assumptions) by enough to increase the projected life expectancy at birth for 2070 by 3.7 years (to the level assumed for the high-cost alternative).

6The 2000 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2024-2074. Ultimate rates of mortality reduction increased.

7The 2002 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2026-2076. Changes to projection methodology increased rates of mortality reduction.

8The 2003 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2027-2077.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017

Assumed ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

(Using the 1990 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)
Mortality, Page 15

 

Table 2.1 (Continued): Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality1

2004 2007 2008 2009 2011 2011 2013

1900-2009 1982-2009

Trustees 

Alternative 22

 Technical 

Panel3

Trustees 

Alternative 24

Trustees 

Alternative 25

Trustees 

Alternative 26

 Technical 

Panel7

Trustees 

Alternative 28

0 - 14 3.15 2.34 1.55 1.00 1.57 1.55 1.56 1.26 1.57

15 - 64 1.38 1.25 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.26 0.98

65 & Over 0.79 0.77 0.69 1.00 0.65 0.71 0.66 1.26 0.64

1Rates of reduction are the average of male and female annual rates of decline in age-adjusted central death rates. The rates for the period 1900-2009 are a weighted

 average of rates for five separate distinct periods of change.

2The 2004 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2028-2078.

3The 2007 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2031-2081.

4The 2008 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2032-2082.

5The 2009 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2033-2083.

6The 2011 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2035-2085.

7The 2011 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2035-2085.

8The 2013 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2037-2087.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

(Using the 2000 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)

Ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates
Mortality, Page 16

Table 2.1 (Continued): Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality1

2013 2015 2016 2017

1900-2014 1982-2014

Trustees 

Alternative 22

 Technical 

Panel3

Trustees 

Alternative 24

Trustees 

Alternative 25

0 - 14 3.07 2.26 1.57 2.44 1.56 1.56

15 - 64 1.25 1.20 1.00 1.47 1.01 1.01

65 & Over 0.81 0.86 0.63 0.86 0.62 0.62

1Rates of reduction are the average of male and female annual rates of decline in age-adjusted central death rates. The rates for the period 1900-2013 are a weighted

 average of rates for five separate distinct periods of change.

2The 2013 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2037-2087.

3The 2015 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2039-2089.

4The 2016 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2040-2090.

5The 2017 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2041-2091.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017

(Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

Ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates
Mortality, Page 17

Table 2.2: Average Annual Percent Reductions in Age-Adjusted Central Death Rates: for the 2017 Trustees Report 1

Sex Age 1900-1936 1936-1954 1954-1968 1968-1982 1982-1999 1999-2009 2009-2014 1900-2014 2014-2041 2014-2091 2041-2091

Male 0-14 2.91 4.79 1.65 4.33 2.91 1.29 1.90 3.05 1.66 1.59 1.54

15-49 1.46 3.01 -0.25 2.21 0.65 0.80 0.79 1.38 1.00 0.92 0.88

50-64 0.42 0.96 -0.13 2.28 1.92 1.15 -0.14 0.93 1.18 1.11 1.07

65-84 0.20 1.16 -0.11 1.46 1.25 2.45 1.00 0.86 1.04 0.87 0.77

85+ 0.22 1.21 -0.89 1.56 -0.29 1.53 0.34 0.45 0.61 0.54 0.51

65+ 0.21 1.17 -0.37 1.50 0.70 2.08 0.73 0.71 0.85 0.72 0.65

Total 0.67 1.49 -0.25 1.78 0.94 1.80 0.60 0.96 0.93 0.81 0.74

Female 0-14 3.14 5.06 1.72 4.15 2.63 1.12 1.91 3.09 1.67 1.61 1.58

15-49 1.53 4.68 0.28 2.91 0.59 0.26 0.49 1.76 0.99 0.96 0.94

50-64 0.71 2.57 0.76 1.72 1.09 1.46 -0.21 1.22 1.16 1.10 1.06

65-84 0.35 2.05 1.06 2.03 0.47 1.72 0.82 1.07 0.93 0.79 0.72

85+ 0.23 1.21 0.13 2.06 -0.14 1.13 0.11 0.62 0.56 0.51 0.48

65+ 0.31 1.74 0.69 2.04 0.22 1.46 0.50 0.89 0.76 0.66 0.60

Total 0.79 2.31 0.70 2.11 0.43 1.38 0.41 1.17 0.84 0.74 0.69

Total 0-14 3.01 4.90 1.68 4.26 2.79 1.22 1.91 3.07 1.67 1.60 1.56

15-49 1.49 3.69 -0.06 2.44 0.63 0.61 0.68 1.53 0.99 0.93 0.90

50-64 0.55 1.62 0.19 2.08 1.61 1.27 -0.16 1.05 1.17 1.10 1.07

65-84 0.28 1.60 0.42 1.72 0.92 2.11 0.91 0.97 0.99 0.83 0.74

85+ 0.23 1.21 -0.22 1.86 -0.18 1.30 0.20 0.56 0.58 0.52 0.49

65+ 0.26 1.46 0.19 1.77 0.51 1.78 0.61 0.81 0.80 0.69 0.62

Total 0.73 1.88 0.22 1.95 0.75 1.59 0.50 1.07 0.89 0.78 0.72

1Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age adjusting

Historical Period (last year of final data is 2014) Intermediate Alternative

July 13, 2017

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary
Mortality, Page 18

Table 2.2 (Continued): Average Annual Percent Reductions in Age-Adjusted Central Death 

Rates: for the 2017 Trustees Report 1

Sex Age 2014-2041 2014-2091 2041-2091 2014-2041 2014-2091 2041-2091

Male 0-14 0.84 0.80 0.78 2.72 2.58 2.51

15-49 0.51 0.47 0.45 1.61 1.48 1.41

50-64 0.57 0.58 0.59 1.92 1.70 1.58

65-84 0.54 0.48 0.45 1.62 1.26 1.07

85+ 0.27 0.28 0.28 1.01 0.84 0.75

65+ 0.42 0.39 0.37 1.35 1.07 0.92

Total 0.46 0.43 0.42 1.48 1.21 1.06

Female 0-14 0.84 0.81 0.80 2.74 2.63 2.58

15-49 0.49 0.49 0.49 1.62 1.55 1.50

50-64 0.57 0.57 0.58 1.89 1.70 1.60

65-84 0.48 0.44 0.42 1.45 1.16 1.00

85+ 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.94 0.79 0.71

65+ 0.36 0.35 0.35 1.21 0.98 0.85

Total 0.41 0.40 0.39 1.36 1.12 0.99

Total 0-14 0.84 0.81 0.79 2.72 2.60 2.54

15-49 0.50 0.48 0.47 1.61 1.50 1.44

50-64 0.57 0.58 0.58 1.91 1.70 1.59

65-84 0.51 0.46 0.44 1.54 1.21 1.04

85+ 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.97 0.81 0.72

65+ 0.39 0.37 0.36 1.28 1.02 0.88

Total 0.44 0.42 0.41 1.43 1.17 1.03

1Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age adjusting

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017

Low-Cost Alternative High-Cost Alternative
Mortality, Page 19

Table 2.3: Average Annual Rates of Reduction in Central 

Death Rates by Age Group, Sex, and Cause 

2016 TR 2017 TR 2016 TR 2017 TR 

1979 to 2014 2004 to 2014 2040 to 2090 2041 to 2091 1979 to 2014 2004 to 2014 2040 to 2090 2041 to 2091

Under Age 15

Cardiovascular Disease 2.73 2.19 2.3 2.3 2.64 2.52 2.3 2.3

Cancer 2.33 1.57 1.5 1.5 1.94 1.67 1.5 1.5

Violence 2.82 2.37 1.0 1.0 2.37 2.92 1.0 1.0

Respiratory Disease 2.55 1.12 2.0 2.0 2.54 0.69 2.0 2.0

Other 2.32 2.42 1.7 1.7 2.20 2.13 1.7 1.7

Resulting Total ** 2.44 2.33 1.54 1.54 2.24 2.20 1.58 1.58

Ages 15 - 49

Cardiovascular Disease 1.97 1.73 1.5 1.5 1.20 1.49 1.5 1.5

Cancer 1.88 2.25 1.5 1.5 1.67 1.80 1.5 1.5

Violence 0.80 0.93 0.7 0.7 0.01 -0.06 0.7 0.7

Respiratory Disease 0.78 -0.04 0.5 0.5 -0.25 -0.95 0.5 0.5

Other 0.63 2.68 0.8 0.8 -0.34 1.07 0.8 0.8

Resulting Total ** 1.16 1.58 0.88 0.88 0.58 0.89 0.95 0.94

Ages 50 - 64

Cardiovascular Disease 3.01 1.67 2.2 2.2 2.61 1.89 2.2 2.2

Cancer 1.64 1.47 1.5 1.5 1.40 1.61 1.5 1.5

Violence 0.00 -2.12 0.5 0.5 -0.68 -3.07 0.5 0.5

Respiratory Disease 1.03 -0.35 0.7 0.7 -0.48 -0.75 0.7 0.7

Other -0.45 -0.57 0.6 0.6 -0.47 -0.43 0.6 0.6

Resulting Total ** 1.60 0.59 1.07 1.07 1.13 0.69 1.07 1.06

Ages 65 - 84

Cardiovascular Disease 3.24 3.29 2.2 2.2 2.91 3.59 2.2 2.2

Cancer 0.93 1.95 0.9 0.9 0.04 1.35 0.9 0.9

Violence 0.56 -0.16 0.5 0.5 -0.11 -0.36 0.5 0.5

Respiratory Disease 0.68 1.43 0.3 0.3 -1.85 0.43 0.3 0.3

Other -0.77 -0.55 0.3 0.3 -1.48 -0.61 0.3 0.3

Resulting Total ** 1.59 1.73 0.77 0.77 0.78 1.40 0.72 0.72

Ages 85 and older

Cardiovascular Disease 1.74 2.77 1.2 1.2 1.92 3.18 1.2 1.2

Cancer -0.18 1.16 0.5 0.5 -0.47 0.48 0.5 0.5

Violence -0.65 -0.70 0.3 0.3 -1.24 -1.91 0.3 0.3

Respiratory Disease -0.45 1.78 0.2 0.2 -1.64 1.08 0.2 0.2

Other -2.28 -1.85 0.2 0.2 -3.14 -2.02 0.2 0.2

Resulting Total ** 0.32 1.04 0.51 0.51 0.12 0.83 0.48 0.48

Total

Cardiovascular Disease 2.65 2.77 2.40 3.15

Cancer 0.97 1.70 0.51 1.32

Violence 0.55 0.02 -0.16 -0.84

Respiratory Disease 0.36 1.34 -1.50 0.47

Other -0.83 -0.61 -1.56 -0.93

Resulting Total ** 1.23 1.32 0.74 0.74 0.64 1.07 0.69 0.69

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Female

Male Female

Alternative II* Alternative II*

Male

Female

Historical Historical

Female

Male

* Alternative 1 is 1/2 times Alternative 2; Alternative 3 is 5/3 times Alternative 2.

July 13, 2017

Male Female

Male Female

Male

**Resulting total represents average annual percent reduction in age-adjusted death rates for the last 50 years of the 75-year projection period.
Mortality, Page 20

Table 2.4: Age-Sex-Adjusted Central Death Rates

(per 100,000 population)

Year 2016TR 2017TR

1900 2,684.3 2,684.3

1910 2,495.9 2,495.9

1920 2,304.5 2,304.5

1930 2,094.9 2,094.9

1940 1,919.8 1,919.8

1945 1,716.6 1,716.6

1950 1,561.9 1,561.9

1955 1,453.8 1,453.8

1960 1,454.3 1,454.3

1965 1,428.8 1,428.8

1970 1,340.0 1,340.0

1975 1,204.8 1,204.8

1980 1,136.9 1,136.9

1985 1,081.0 1,081.0

1990 1,021.3 1,021.3

1991 1,007.7 1,007.7

1992 992.7 992.7

1993 1,016.4 1,016.4

1994 1,004.1 1,004.1

1995 1,001.5 1,001.5

1996 987.8 987.8

1997 971.9 971.9

1998 963.8 963.8

1999 970.6 970.6

2000 960.7 960.7

2001 951.1 951.1

2002 947.0 947.0

2003 933.4 933.4

2004 898.9 898.9

2005 901.3 901.3

2006 876.1 876.1

2007 856.8 856.8

2008 857.0 857.0

2009 827.1 827.1

2010 821.3 821.3

2011 819.3 819.3

2012 811.9 811.9

2013 812.2 811.9

2014 790.4 1 805.4

2015 781.4 1 787.9 1

2016 773.0 1 779.8 1

2016TR 2017TR 2016TR 2017TR

2020 777.4 779.0 742.8 750.2 706.0 719.4

2025 760.5 762.6 709.5 716.9 655.1 667.6

2030 743.8 745.9 679.1 686.1 610.9 622.2

2040 711.7 713.8 624.5 630.8 536.5 545.7

2050 681.7 683.6 576.8 582.3 476.0 483.7

2060 653.6 655.4 534.8 539.7 426.3 432.7

2070 627.3 629.1 497.6 502.0 384.7 390.2

2080 602.7 604.4 464.6 468.6 349.6 354.3

2090 579.7 581.2 435.1 438.7 319.6 323.7

2100 558.0 559.5 408.7 411.9 293.7 297.4

1

 Estimated, Intermediate Alternative Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III

July 13, 2017

2016TR 2017TR
Mortality, Page 21

Chart 2.1: Historical United States Age-Sex-Adjusted Central Death Rates from 1900-2014

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Annual Deaths per 100,000

Year

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Mortality, Page 22

Chart 2.2: Difference Between Male and Female Annual Percent Reduction in Age-Adjusted 

Death Rates for Population 65+ 

(based on Medicare data)

-2.0%

-1.5%

-1.0%

-0.5%

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Difference in Rates (%)

Year

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Immigration, Page 1

3. IMMIGRATION

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2017 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

3.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

3.2 LEGAL IMMIGRATION .............................................................................................................. 3

3.3 LEGAL EMIGRATION ................................................................................................................ 4

3.4 NET LEGAL IMMIGRATION ...................................................................................................... 5

3.5 OTHER IMMIGRATION .............................................................................................................. 5

3.6 RECOMMENDATIONS OF PREVIOUS TECHNICAL PANELS AND OTHER PROJECTIONS........... 7

TABLE 3.1: ANNUAL IMMIGRATION ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY AREA POPULATION..............................9

TABLE 3.2: LEGAL IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES: FISCAL YEARS 1966-1991 ...............................10

TABLE 3.3: LEGAL IMMIGRATION LIMITS FOR FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING 1995 ..........................................................11

TABLE 3.4: LEGAL IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES: FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING 1985 .....................12
Immigration, Page 2

3.1 Summary

For the 2017 Trustees Report, there are no changes to the ultimate immigration assumptions 

from those used in the 2016 Trustees Report. Table 3.1 displays the annual immigration levels

assumed for the 2017 Trustees Report as well as those assumed in the 2016 Trustees Report. 

Historical data updates result in a decrease (worsening) in the long-range OASDI actuarial 

balance of about 0.01 percent of taxable payroll.

Historically, the annual number of legal immigrants (persons becoming legal permanent 

residents) has risen substantially, averaging around 1.1 million persons per year since 2005. 

Based on this experience and the belief that the number of future legal immigrants in the 

category of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens will be close to current levels, the Trustees 

intermediate ultimate assumption is 1.06 million new legal permanent residents per year for the 

2017 Trustees Report. There was no change to the assumption that legal emigration out of the 

Social Security area will be 25 percent of the number of legal immigrants, or 265,000 per year,

ultimately. 

For other-than-legal (“other”) immigration, there were no changes to the immigration model

introduced for the 2014 Trustees Report, and no changes to the updated exit rates used in the 

2016 Trustees Report. The model projects the annual other immigration flows by splitting them 

into three main components: (1) the other immigrants entering the Social Security area each year, 

(2) those who leave the stock of other immigrants and move outside the Social Security area, and

(3) the other immigrants that adjust status to become legal permanent residents, thereby leaving 

other immigrant status. The net other immigration is equal to the gross level of other 

immigration, less other emigration out of the Social Security area, and less those who adjust 

status to become legal permanent residents.

The model continues to project these annual other immigrant flows and further separates the 

other immigrants into three specific categories: (1) those who have temporary legal status 

(“nonimmigrant”), (2) those who never had legal status (“never-authorized”), and (3) those who 

originally entered legally as a nonimmigrant but overstayed their visa (“visa-overstayers”). 

Using this model of other immigration, the level of net other immigration, under the intermediate 

alternative, is assumed to be about 764,000 persons for 2017, 717,000 persons for 2020, 462,000 

persons for 2050, and 432,000 persons for 2090. The average level of net other immigration 

during the 75-year projection period is approximately 491,000 persons per year. The following

table presents the projected net numbers of immigrants for the intermediate alternative. 
Immigration, Page 3

Annual Net Immigration: Alternative II Levels for the 

2017 Trustees Report

Year Legal Other Total

2017 795,000 764,000 1,559,000

2020 795,000 717,000 1,512,000

2030 795,000 537,000 1,332,000

2040 795,000 487,000 1,282,000

2050 795,000 462,000 1,257,000

2060 795,000 448,000 1,243,000

2070 795,000 439,000 1,234,000

2080 795,000 434,000 1,229,000

2090 795,000 432,000 1,227,000

 Notes: Totals do not necessarily equal the sums of rounded components.

 Levels rounded to the nearest 1,000.

3.2 Legal Immigration

The term legal immigration refers to the number of persons granted authorization to live and 

work in the United States on a permanent basis. These individuals are referred to as legal 

permanent residents (LPRs). Many individuals are admitted to the country legally but on a 

temporary basis. These individuals are included as other immigrants and are discussed in the 

following sections of this paper.

Legal immigration has been a very important element in the growth of the United States 

population. For the period 1870 through 1930, the population averaged about 13 percent foreign 

born. The Census Bureau estimates that the percentage of the civilian non-institutionalized 

population that is foreign born declined to a low of about 5 percent in the 1970 Census, rose to 

about 8 percent in the 1990 Census, and was estimated to be approximately 13.5 percent in the 

2015 American Community Survey.

Data on the number of legal immigrants admitted to the U.S., which include U.S. possessions 

and territories and Armed Service posts abroad, are obtained from the Office of Immigration 

Statistics (OIS), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Legal 

immigration averaged nearly one million per year for the period 1904 through 1914. Legal 

immigration decreased greatly during World War I and following the adoption of quotas based 

on national origin in 1921. The economic depression in the 1930's caused an additional, but 

temporary, decrease that resulted in more emigration than immigration. Annual legal 

immigration increased after World War II to around 200,000 to 300,000 persons and stayed at 

that level through the 1950's and into the 1960's. With the Immigration Act of 1965 and other 

related changes, annual legal immigration increased to about 400,000 and remained fairly stable 

until 1977. Between 1977 and 1990, legal immigration (excluding aliens admitted under the 

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA]) averaged approximately 580,000 per 

year. This increase was due to the increase in the numbers of relatives admitted and to the large 

numbers of refugees and political asylees admitted during this period. Table 3.2 lists legal U.S. 

immigration for fiscal years 1966 through 1991, reflecting the immigration categories established 

in the 1965 Act. 
Immigration, Page 4

The Immigration Act of 1990, which took effect in fiscal year 1992, restructured the immigration 

categories and substantially increased the number of immigrants that may legally enter the 

United States each year. For fiscal years 1995 and later, the 1990 law specified an annual limit 

that could range between 421,000 and 675,000 for certain categories of immigrants. These 

categories and their limits include those admitted based on: family-sponsored preference 

(226,000 to 480,000), employment-based preference (140,000) and diversity (55,000). Other 

categories of immigrants, such as refugees, are subject to separate limits. The Real ID Act of 

2005 eliminated the numerical limit on asylees and no numerical limitation exists for immediate 

relatives of U.S. citizens. For each of the numerically limited categories, the limits may be 

adjusted annually based on unused amounts from prior years or other categories. Table 3.3 

displays these unadjusted limits and the adjusted limits for each fiscal year from 1995 through 

2014.

The annual level of total legal immigration and the levels by category can vary considerably 

from year to year as shown in table 3.4. For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, annual immigration was 

about 650,000, the lowest level since the 1990 Act went into effect. This drop is attributed to a 

backlog in the process caused mainly by the longer time required to process the affidavit of 

support and the shifting of responsibilities from the Department of State to the Department of 

Homeland Security. Legal immigration was 841,000 in 2000 and over 1,000,000 in 2001 and 

2002. These levels in 2000 – 2002 were also significantly above the low levels in 1998 and 1999, 

mainly due to the efforts to reduce the backlog of pending immigration applications. In 2003, 

legal immigration declined to a level of 704,000 due to a slowdown in processing because of 

increased security checks. Since then, the level increased dramatically and peaked at a level of 

1,266,000 persons in 2006 before declining about 17 percent to 1,052,000 in 2007. However, the 

decline in 2007 is attributed to an unanticipated spike in naturalization applications that 

temporarily shifted resources away from processing immigration applications. In 2008, the level 

increased slightly from the 2007 level, to 1,107,000. In 2009, there was another slight increase, 

to 1,131,000. From 2010 through 2013, total legal immigration declined from 1,043,000 in 2010 

to 991,000 in 2013. Total legal immigration increased to 1,017,000 in 2014. For the 

intermediate assumptions, the Trustees assume that the future legal immigration levels will 

average approximately 1.06 million persons per year.

It is possible that future global economic conditions assumed under the high-cost alternative 

and/or less favorable attitudes toward immigration could result in generally lower immigration. 

Therefore, the Trustees assume an ultimate level of 860,000 legal immigrants per year for the 

high-cost (low-immigration) alternative. On the other hand, the possibility of a significant 

increase in the number of immediate relatives admitted and the uncertainty of the number of 

asylees permits the possibility of annual immigration substantially higher than 1,060,000 persons 

per year. Therefore, the ultimate level for the low-cost (high-immigration) alternative is

1,260,000 persons per year.

3.3 Legal Emigration

Statistics on emigration are sparse and most analysis is based largely on estimates. Research 

done by the Census Bureau, the OIS, and other experts suggests that annual emigration may 
Immigration, Page 5

generally be in the range of 20-40 percent of annual legal immigration. Expected emigration 

from the Social Security area should be less than emigration from the United States, especially at 

the older ages. This is primarily because most individuals who leave the United States having 

achieved fully insured status are still eligible to receive OASDI benefits and thus are still 

considered to be in the Social Security area population. For the 2016 Trustees Report, the 

assumed ratio of emigration to immigration was 20, 25, and 30 percent for the low-cost, 

intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. The same ratios of emigration to 

immigration are assumed for the 2017 Trustees Report.

3.4 Net Legal Immigration

Combining the levels of legal immigration with the ratios for legal emigration yields ultimate 

levels of net legal immigration of 1,008,000, 795,000, and 602,000 per year for the low-cost, 

intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. 

3.5 Other Immigration

The term “other immigration” refers to persons entering the United States in a manner other than 

lawfully admitted for permanent residence. This population consists of three components: 

1) Nonimmigrants who are defined as foreign nationals that enter the U.S. with 

authorization to stay for a temporary period of time and for a specific purpose such as 

students and exchange visitors, temporary workers, and diplomats and other 

representatives. 

2) Those who are unauthorized on entry and were never previously legally authorized to be

residing in the United States (“never-authorized”).

3) Those who at one point had temporary legal authorization to be residing in the United 

States but have overstayed their visas (“visa-overstayers”).

The stock of the other immigrant population is included in the starting year population level for 

our projections, in accordance with the official policy of the Census Bureau to enumerate all 

persons residing in the U.S., as well as to provide a basis for estimating the total labor force in 

the United States and total births in the Social Security area. 

During the 1990s there was rapid growth in the size of the other immigrant population. In a joint 

project, the OIS and the Census Bureau examined the size of the unauthorized immigrant 

population between October 1988 and October 1992. In 1988 there were over 4 million 

unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States. Not counting those who would be 

subsequently legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), it is 

estimated that there were 2.2 million unauthorized immigrants in the population as of October 

1988. At the time of the 1990 Census, 2.6 million persons were estimated to be unauthorized, 

again excluding those who would subsequently be legalized under the IRCA. (The total 

unauthorized population in 1990 was, roughly, 5.3 million.) Subsequent estimates suggest an 

increase to 3.4 million for October 1992 and approximately 5.0 million for October 1996. The 
Immigration, Page 6

rapid rise in the other immigrant population between 1990 and 1996 reflected the continued 

inflow of other immigrants combined with a decreased number leaving this status, due to the 

reduced stock of other immigrants that resulted from the IRCA.

The 2000 Census gave evidence that other immigration since 1990 had been consistently 

underestimated. In producing intercensal estimates of the U.S. population between the 1990 and 

2000 Census, the Census Bureau estimated the average level of annual net other immigration to

be approximately 550,000. For 2000, DHS estimated a total other stock of 9.9 million. Based on 

DHS estimates, the total stock was 12.2 million in 2005, then increased to a peak of 14.1 million 

in 2008, and then decreased to 13.3 million by 2012. Using DHS methods, we estimate that the 

January 2015 other stock was 13.0 million.

The other immigration model makes explicit estimates of the following categories:

 The annual numbers of new-arrival other immigrants who enter as never-authorized and 

who enter legally as nonimmigrants;

 The annual number of non-immigrants who become visa-overstayers;

 The annual numbers of other emigrants (those leaving the Social Security area) who were

never-authorized, nonimmigrants, or visa-overstayers; and

 The annual numbers of adjustments of status who were never-authorized, nonimmigrants,

or visa-overstayers.

For the 2017 Trustees Report, the Trustees assume no change to the ultimate number of new 

other immigrants per year. The Trustees assume an ultimate level of 1,350,000 per year under 

the intermediate projections. Due to the projected economic recovery, the Trustees assume a 

slow increase in the number of new other immigrants from current levels to 1,550,000 in 2018 

and 2019 before gradually decreasing to the ultimate level of 1,350,000 in 2022. It is possible 

that the ultimate level will be higher than 1,350,000 in the future, as other immigrants already in 

the U.S. may help family members or additional other immigrants enter the country and the 

demand for other immigrant labor in the economy may increase. Thus, the Trustees assume an

ultimate level of 1,650,000 per year under the low-cost (high-immigration) scenario. Due to the 

possibility of an increased willingness of the government to pursue deportation of unauthorized 

immigrants or withhold services from them and to crack down on those who employ them, the 

Trustees assume an ultimate level of 1,050,000 under the high-cost (low-immigration) scenario. 

We estimate the average annual other emigration level (departures from the Social Security area) 

during 2008 through 2010 to be around 471,000. Although we estimate the annual other 

emigration level in 2016 to be around 198,000, we believe this number will rise throughout the 

projection period. As the stock of the other immigrant population rises, more emigration is 

likely to occur. Thus, we estimate the other emigration as a function of the population at risk. 

We developed rates of emigration by age and sex for the never-authorized, the nonimmigrants,

and the overstayers based on the number of exits from each of these categories estimated to have 

occurred during the period 2008 through 2011. Ideally, these rates would be developed by age, 

sex, and duration of stay in the country. Unfortunately, at this time, data are too sparse to 

develop accurate estimates of the current stock by duration of stay. However, as in the 2016 TR, 

the Trustees assume continuing higher rates of emigration for recent entrants.
Immigration, Page 7

Applying the method described above results in increasing levels of other emigration1throughout 

the projection period. Under the intermediate alternative, the gross emigration rate (number of 

other emigrants divided by the midyear other population) is about 1.6 percent at the start of the 

projection period, increasing to a maximum of about 1.7 percent in 2022, but declining to about 

1.3 percent at the end of the 75-year projection period. 

Another component of the immigration model takes into account the following two ways 

immigrants attain legal permanent resident status:

1) New-arrival LPRs are persons who file an application to become an LPR with the 

Department of State while living outside of the United States and become an LPR upon 

entry.

2) Adjustments of Status2are persons who are already living in the United States as 

temporary workers, students, or unauthorized immigrants and apply and receive an 

adjustment of status to an LPR. 

Historically, the adjustment of status category has been a substantial portion of all new LPRs. In 

the past, approximately 50 percent of all new LPRs were people that had already been in the 

country as a temporary worker, foreign student, or unauthorized immigrant and who filed an 

application for adjustment to LPR status. However, the recent trend shows this percentage 

decreasing to under 50 percent. Thus, the Trustees assume a little over 40 percent of future 

individuals becoming LPRs will be adjustments of status from the other immigrant population.

3.6 Recommendations of Previous Technical Panels and Other Projections

The total net levels of immigration recommended by the 2003, 2007, and 2011 Technical Panels 

appointed by the Social Security Advisory Board are higher than the levels assumed for the 2017

Trustees Report. However, the levels recommended by the 2015 Technical Panel are generally 

similar to the levels assumed for the 2017 Trustees Report. For the intermediate assumptions, 

the 2003 Technical Panel recommended a continuing annual growth rate in the total net 

immigration equal to approximately 1/2 the annual growth rate in the total population through 

the next 75 years. Under this specification, total net immigration would have been projected to 

reach 1.5 million by 2065, with continuing increases thereafter.3 

 

1 As the population begins to mature, we expect to see higher numbers of other immigrants in the population and 

thus higher levels of emigration, particularly at the ages 35 and over. The current other immigrant population is 

centered very heavily at the younger ages. We believe this concentration at the younger ages is due to (1) the 

relatively high levels of other immigration that began in the late 1990’s (entering at relatively young ages) and (2) 

the effects of the IRCA legislation in the late 1980’s (which removed largely older individuals with required 

substantial durations of residence in the country). These reasons result in a population of other immigrants that is 

relatively young of age and low in duration of stay in the country. 

2 The Department of Homeland Security also considers refugees and asylees to be adjustments of status, but for the 

purposes of our model, we treat these categories as new arrivals.

3 All results displayed in this section are based on that current year’s Trustees Report model. For example, the result 

using the 2003 Technical Panel recommendation is based on the 2003 Trustees Report model.
Immigration, Page 8

The 2007 Technical Panel recommended setting the total net immigration equal to 1.35 million 

for 2007, with increases of 1.0 percent per year for the first 25 years of the projection period and 

increases of 0.5 percent per year thereafter. This would have resulted in a net immigration flow 

of nearly 2.2 million by the end of the projection period.

The 2011 Technical Panel recommended setting the total net immigration equal to 0.32 percent 

of the total population for all years after 2025. This would have resulted in a net immigration 

flow of nearly 1.63 million by the end of the projection period.

The 2015 Technical Panel recommended setting the total net immigration to equal the average 

between that assumed in the 2015 Trustees Report and that projected by the Census Bureau, 

while maintaining the proportion of net legal and net other the same as assumed in the 2015 

Trustees Report. This would have resulted in a net immigration flow of nearly 1.32 million by 

the end of the projection period.

This increase in the level of total net immigration recommended by the panels prior to the 2015 

panel reflects a number of factors. One factor is that each panel includes the assumption of 

continuing changes in immigration law to allow more immigrants as the population increases. 

Historically, the Trustees, as well as other Federal Government entities, have assumed that future 

immigration will be consistent with current law and that changes based on potential future 

legislation should not be reflected until enactment. Reflecting the possibility of future changes 

in immigration law is not unreasonable if there is a conviction that such changes are truly 

expected to occur and this change in the basis for projecting is fully disclosed. On the other 

hand, presuming such changes could result in the peculiar situation where the Trustees would 

need to change assumptions in the future because immigration law had not been modified. On 

balance, the Trustees retained the practice of reflecting changes in the immigration law only 

upon enactment. Another factor is the potential number of immigrants entering the U.S. The 

Trustees recognized that birth rates have dropped in several countries that supply significant 

numbers of immigrants to the U.S. Most of those countries, particularly Mexico, have seen drops 

in birth rates since 1990 and will likely average less emigration in the future.

In their 2016 projections, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects net immigration of 

1.4 million people in 2026 and 1.5 million people in 2046.4 Comparing with Census, the middle 

series of the 2014 National Population Projections results in net immigration of 1.4 million 

people in 2040.5 The Trustees assumptions for the intermediate alternative of the 2017 Trustees 

Report result in net immigration of 1.4 million people in 2026 and 1.3 million people in 2040.

 

4 See https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580-LTBO-2.pdf

5 See http://www.census.gov/population/projections/files/methodology/methodstatement14.pdf
Immigration, Page 9

Table 3.1: Annual Immigration Assumptions1for the Social Security Area Population

(All values rounded to the nearest 1,000 immigrants)

Alternative Year Gross Legal Net Legal Gross Other Net Other Alternative Year Gross Legal Net Legal Gross Other Net Other

Low Cost: 2017 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,750,000 955,000 Low Cost: 2017 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,750,000 957,000

2020 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,750,000 896,000 2020 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,750,000 896,000

2030 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 691,000 2030 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 688,000

2040 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 620,000 2040 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 617,000

2050 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 581,000 2050 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 578,000

2060 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 557,000 2060 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 556,000

2070 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 544,000 2070 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 543,000

2080 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 538,000 2080 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 536,000

2090 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 535,000 2090 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 534,000

Intermediate: 2017 1,060,000 795,000 1,450,000 758,000 Intermediate: 2017 1,060,000 795,000 1,450,000 764,000

2020 1,060,000 795,000 1,450,000 713,000 2020 1,060,000 795,000 1,450,000 717,000

2030 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 537,000 2030 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 537,000

2040 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 489,000 2040 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 487,000

2050 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 464,000 2050 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 462,000

2060 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 449,000 2060 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 448,000

2070 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 440,000 2070 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 439,000

2080 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 435,000 2080 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 434,000

2090 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 433,000 2090 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 432,000

High Cost: 2017 860,000 602,000 850,000 272,000 High Cost: 2017 860,000 602,000 850,000 278,000

2020 860,000 602,000 850,000 269,000 2020 860,000 602,000 850,000 274,000

2030 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 418,000 2030 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 419,000

2040 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 382,000 2040 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 381,000

2050 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 361,000 2050 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 360,000

2060 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 349,000 2060 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 348,000

2070 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 341,000 2070 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 340,000

2080 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 336,000 2080 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 336,000

2090 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 334,000 2090 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 333,000

1

 This table contains basic assumptions along with key summary values that are derived from basic assumptions. Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Values Used for 2016 Trustees Report Values Used for 2017 Trustees Report

July 13, 2017
Immigration, Page 10

Table 3.2: Legal Immigrants Admitted to the United States: Fiscal Years 1966-1991

(in thousands)

Reflecting Categories Established in the 1965 Immigration Act

Fiscal 

Year IRCA1

Total non 

IRCA

Numerically 

Limited 2

Western 

Hemisphere 3

Immediate Relatives 

of Citizens

Refugees & 

Asylees

Other Specially 

Legislated Immigrants 4

1966 — 323 126 148 39 4 6

1967 — 362 153 125 47 30 7

1968 — 454 156 154 44 95 6

1969 — 359 291 — 60 1 7

1970 — 373 287 — 79 — 7

1971 — 370 281 — 81 — 8

1972 — 385 284 — 86 — 15

1973 — 400 283 — 101 — 16

1974 — 395 274 — 105 — 16

1975 — 386 282 — 92 — 13

1976 — 399 285 — 102 — 12

1976 — 104 73 — 28 — 3

1977 — 462 277 — 106 68 12

1978 — 601 341 — 126 122 12

1979 — 460 279 — 138 32 11

1980 — 531 289 — 158 76 8

1981 — 597 330 — 152 107 7

1982 — 594 260 — 168 157 9

1983 — 560 269 — 178 103 10

1984 — 544 262 — 183 92 7

1985 — 570 264 — 204 95 6

1986 — 602 267 — 223 104 7

1987 — 602 271 — 219 92 20

1988 — 643 264 — 219 82 78

1989 479 612 280 — 218 84 30

1990 880 656 298 — 232 97 29

1991 1,123 704 294 — 237 139 34

1

 This category includes those aliens admitted under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

2

 Legal limits on immigration visas were 170,000 per fiscal year before 1969, 290,000 per fiscal year for 1969 through 1979, 

 280,000 for fiscal year 1980, and 270,000 for fiscal years 1981 and later. Includes additional visas starting 1989.

3

 Natives of Western Hemisphere countries, their children and spouses, Act of October 3, 1965. This category became

 numerically limited to 120,000 starting fiscal year 1969.

4

 This category consists mainly of children born abroad to alien residents, ministers and their families, beginning 1971,

 spouses of U.S. citizens who entered as fiances and their children, and beginning 1988 Amerasians, special

 Cuban / Haitian entrants, and aliens in the U.S. since 1972.

Source: Annual Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017
Immigration, Page 11

Table 3.3: Legal Immigration Limits for Fiscal Years Beginning 1995

Family Sponsored 

Preference

Immediate 

Relatives of 

U.S. Citizens

Employment 

Based Diversity Refugees Asylees

226,000 to 480,000 1 Not Limited 140,000 2 55,000 3 Set Annually Not Limited 4

1995 253,721 Not Limited 146,503 55,000 111,000 10,000

1996 311,819 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 90,000 10,000

1997 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 78,000 10,000

1998 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 83,000 10,000

1999 226,000 Not Limited 160,906 55,000 91,000 10,000

2000 294,601 Not Limited 142,299 55,000 90,000 10,000

2001 226,000 Not Limited 192,074 55,000 80,000 10,000

2002 226,000 Not Limited 142,632 55,000 70,000 10,000

2003 226,000 Not Limited 171,532 55,000 70,000 10,000

2004 226,000 Not Limited 204,422 55,000 70,000 10,000

2005 226,000 Not Limited 148,449 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2006 226,000 Not Limited 143,949 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2007 226,000 Not Limited 147,148 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2008 226,000 Not Limited 162,704 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2009 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2010 226,000 Not Limited 150,657 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2011 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2012 226,000 Not Limited 144,951 55,000 76,000 Not Limited

2013 226,000 Not Limited 158,466 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2014 226,000 Not Limited 150,241 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

1 The family preference limit is given as a range because it is equal to the larger of: 226,000 or 480,000 minus 

 the previous year's immediate relatives of U.S. citizens minus certain other small categories of children minus

 certain categories of aliens paroled into the U.S. in the second preceding fiscal year plus unused

 employment preferences from the previous year.

2 The employment-based preference can be higher than 140,000 if certain other preferences go unused in the

 previous year.

3

 The Diversity category includes those immigrating through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central

 American Relief Act (NACARA).

4

 The REAL ID Act of 2005 eliminated the numerical limit for Asylees.

Sources:

1. Family sponsored, Employment based, and Diversity: Table A1 of 

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/LPR%20Flow%20Report%202014_508.pdf

2. Immediate Relatives: all "not limited" unless legislation changes

3. Refugees: Table 1 of

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees %26 Asylees Flow Report 2014_508.pdf

4. Asylees: Historical years: text on page 6 of 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003Yearbook.pdf

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Unadjusted 

Limit

Limit 

For 

Fiscal 

Year

July 13, 2017
Immigration, Page 12

Table 3.4: Legal Immigrants Admitted to the United States: Fiscal Years Beginning 1985

(in thousands)

Reflecting Revised Categories in the 1990 Immigration Act, Subject to limitation under the Overall Flexible Cap

Fiscal Year IRCA1

Total non 

IRCA2

Family 

Sponsored

Employment 

Based

Immediate 

Relatives

Refugees & 

Asylees Diversity

Other Specially 

Legislated Immigrants

1985 — 570 213 53 204 95 — 4

1986 — 602 213 57 223 104 — 4

1987 — 602 212 58 219 92 3 19

1988 — 643 201 59 219 82 6 76

1989 479 612 217 58 218 84 7 28

1990 880 656 215 58 232 97 29 25

1991 1,123 704 216 60 237 139 22 30

1992 163 811 213 116 235 117 89 40

1993 24 880 227 147 255 127 89 35

1994 6 798 212 123 250 121 75 17

1995 4 716 238 85 220 115 48 10

1996 — 916 294 117 300 128 58 17

1997 — 798 213 90 321 112 49 12

1998 — 653 191 77 283 52 45 4

1999 — 645 217 57 258 43 48 24

2000 — 841 235 107 346 63 51 39

2001 — 1,059 232 179 440 108 42 59

2002 — 1,059 187 174 484 126 43 46

2003 — 704 159 82 331 45 46 41

2004 — 958 214 155 418 71 50 49

2005 — 1,122 213 247 436 143 46 37

2006 — 1,266 222 159 580 216 44 44

2007 — 1,052 195 162 495 136 42 23

2008 — 1,107 228 165 488 166 42 18

2009 — 1,131 212 141 536 177 48 17

2010 — 1,043 215 148 476 136 50 17

2011 — 1,062 235 139 453 168 50 16

2012 — 1,032 202 144 479 151 40 16

2013 — 991 210 161 439 120 46 14

2014 — 1,017 229 152 416 134 53 32

1

 This category includes those aliens admitted under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

2

 Comprehensive immigration legislation increased total immigration under an overall flexible cap of 675,000 immigrants

 beginning in fiscal year 1995, preceded by a 700,000 level during fiscal years 1992 through 1994. 

Source: Table 6 of Annual Reports of the Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

July 13, 2017