The pa pers submitted in connec tion with Officer Woods’ moti on include: 1 Me mor and

um i n F ur the r S up po rt

of Mo tio n f or Judg me nt o n Pl a int if

f’ s Cl a ims Ag a ins t De fe nd ant Wo od s ( “ Woo ds Mo t.” ); Pla int if f’ s O pp os iti on

to D e fe nd ant N op a do n Wo od s’ Mo tio n f or Judg me nt a s a

Matte r o f L aw; Me mor and um i n Re ply

to t he Op po sit ion

of Pla int if f t o De fe nd ant Wo od s’ Mo tio n f or Judg me nt; Pla int if

f’ s N oti c e of

Sup ple me nta l Auth or iti e s in Fur ther Opposition to Defe ndants’ Motions for Judgment as a Matter of L aw; and D efe ndant No pa do n Wo od s’ Re sp on se to P la int if f’ s Su pp le me nta l Me mor and

um R e g ard ingWoo ds ’ Motion for J udg ment. The pa pers submitted in connec tion with the District of Columbi a’s motion include: Defe ndant District of Columbia’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of L aw (“D .C. Mot.”), and Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defe ndant District of Columbia’s Motion for J udg ment as a Matter of L aw ( “D.C. Opp.” ). UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) GL ORI A HAL COMB, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 02 -13 36 (P L F) ) NOPADON WOODS, e t al

. , ) ) De fe nd ants
. ) __________________________________________)
OPI NI ON This matter is befor e the Court on two sepa rate motions for judgme nt as a matter of law pur suant to Rule 50 of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, one filed by defe ndant Nopadon Woods and one f iled by defe ndant the District of Columbia. 1
I . BA CKGROUND Th is c a se ari se s o ut o f t

he arr e st a

nd de te nti on of pla int if f G lor ia Ha lc omb in October 2001. Ms. Halcomb ente red the District of Columbia’s Metrora il sy stem on October 30, 2001 at the Union Station entranc e. De fenda nt Nopadon Woods, a Washington Metropolitan2

Are a Tra nsit Authority

(“WMATA” ) police of

fice r, cla ims that Ms. Halcomb entere d without pa yinghe r f are . M s. Ha lc omb de nie s th at sh e e nte re d w ith out pa ying . In a ny e ve nt, Ms. Ha lc omb c on te nd s th at O ff ic e r Wo od s and

se ve ra l of

fi c e rs of the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia Me tr op oli tan Po lic e De pa rtme nt ( “ MPD ” ) a c te d unla wf ull y in a rr e sti nga nd de ta ini nghe r u

nti l the followingmorning . Acc ordingto Ms. Halcomb, the off icer s’ unlawf

ul actions deprive d her of he r c ivi l r ig hts and

c a us e d h e r t o s uf

fe r p hy sic a l in

jur y and se ve re e mot ion a l di str e ss. Ms. Halcomb filed suit on J uly 1, 2002, and the c ase w as tried be fore a jury over the c ours e of

tw o w e e ks in D e c e mbe r 2 00 7. At tr ia l, M s. Ha lc omb a sse rt e d f our c la ims a g a ins t Offic er Woods: (1) a c laim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (base d on the alleg ation that Offic er Woods vio late d h e r c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o b e fr e e fr om u nr e a so na ble se arc he s a

nd se izur e s) ; (2) a common law fa lse arr est claim; (3) a common law assa

ult and battery

claim; and (4) a common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. She also soug ht punitive damag es ag ainst Offic er Woods. In addition, Ms. Halcomb asser ted one c laim ag ainst the District of Columbi a: a c ommon law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on the actions of unidentified MPD off

icer s. At the conc lusion of the evidenc e, both def endants moved f

or judgme nt as a matter

of law pur suant to Rule 50(a) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e. The Court de fe rr e d r

uli ngon tho se mot ion s and

su bmi tte d th e c a se to t

he jur y in a c c or da

nc e wi th Rule 50(b). Af

ter the jury

was una ble to rea ch a ve rdict as to any of Ms. Halc omb’s claims, the Court de c lare d a

mis tr ia l. D e fe nd ants su

bs e qu e ntl y

re ne we d th e ir

mot ion s f

or jud g me nt a s a matter of la

w. Ms. Halcomb oppose d those motions and they are now ripe f

or adjudication.3 I I . ST AN DA RD After a jury trial, the Court may

g rant a motion for judgme nt as a matter of law under Rule 50 only

if it finds that “a re asonable jury would not have ha d a leg ally sufficie nt evidentiar y basis to find for the [non-moving ] party on that issue[.] ” F ED . R. C IV . P. 50(a)( 1). “In makingthat deter

mination, a court may

not assess the cr edibility of witnesses or

weig h the evidenc e.” H ay

man v. Nat’ l Acad. of

Science s, 23 F.3d 535, 537 (D .C. Cir. 1994). See also 9B W R I GH T & M I L L ER , F ED ER A L P R AC TI C E AND P ROCE D U RE : C I V I L 3 D , § 2524 at 270-85 (2008) (“W R I GH T & M I L L ER ” ). Mo re ov e r, the Court mus t c on sid e r t

he e vid e nc e in t

he light m os t favor able to the non- moving pa rty and dra w all re asonable infere nces in he r favor. See H endry v. Pe lla nd , 7 3 F .3 d 3 97 , 4 00 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) . Se e a lso Mc Gi ll v . M un oz, 20 3 F .3 d 8 43 , 8 45 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 0) (“ Judg me nt a s a matte r o f l aw i s a

pp ro pr iate on ly

if the e vid e nc e and

a ll r e a so na

ble inf e re nc e s th at c an b e dr awn the re fr om a

re so on e -s ide d th at r e a so na ble me n a nd wo me n c ou ld not have r eac hed a ve rdict in [the non-moving pa rty ’s] favor.” ) (inter

nal quotation marks and citation omitted); Pi tt v. District of Columbi a, 404 F . Supp. 2d 351, 353-54 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds , 4 91 F .3 d 4 94 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 7) (s ame ). Th at is no t to say , howeve r, that a me re sc intill a of e vidence will defeat a Rule 50 motion. “The question is not whether there is lit era lly

no evidenc e supportingthe par ty ag ainst whom the motion is di rec ted but whether

there is evidence upon which the jury might re asonably

find a ve rdict for

that party .” W R I GH T & M I LL ER § 2524 at 250-57.

Upon ca ref ul consideration of the evidenc e pre sented at trial, the parties’ paper s
an d th e r e l e v an tc a s e l aw , th e C o urtc o n c l u d e s th ata r e a s o n a b l e j ur y wou ld have ha d a

le g a lly sufficie nt basis on which to find for Ms. Ha lcomb on her c laims ag ainst Offic er Woods for4

violations of her c ivil rights, fa lse arr est, assault and battery , and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court also conc ludes that a re asonable jury could have found that Of fi c e r Wo od s w a s li a

ble fo r p un iti ve dama g e s. In c on tr a st, the Court c on c lud e s th at a
r e a s o n a b l e j ur y wou ld not

have ha d a

le g a lly su ff ic ie nt b a sis on

wh ic h to fi nd

fo r M s. Ha lc omb
on he r i nte nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia . O nly the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims requir e fur ther discussion.
I I I . I NT EN TI ON AL

I NF L I CTI ONOF EM OT I ON AL DI STRESS To establish liability

under D istrict of Columbia law for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: “(1) extreme and outra g eous conduc t on the part of the defe ndant which ( 2) either intentionally

or re cklessly

(3) c ause[d] t he plaintiff se vere emotional distress.” L arijani v. Ge org etown Univ., 791 A.2d 41, 44 ( D.C. 2002). See a lso Pi tt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d at 505- 06.

Th e fi rs t e le me nt o f t

he tor t is satis fi e d o nly

wh e n th e c on du c t at is su e is “ so outrag eous in cha

rac ter, a nd so ext reme in deg ree , as to g o beyond all possible bounds of dece ncy , and to be r eg arde d as atroc ious, and utterly intolerable in a

civiliz ed community .” Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D .C. 1998) (citation omitted). L iability “cle arly does not extend to mere insults, indi g nities, threats, annoyance s, petty oppressions, or other

trivialities.” R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F T O RT S § 46 cmt. d (1965) ( “RES TATEME NT ”). I n deter mining
w h e th e r s p e c i f i c a c t s r i s e t o th e e x tr e m e an d o u tr a g e o u s l e v e l , c o urt s ar e g u i d e d b y “(1) applicable contempora ry community

standards of

offe nsiveness and de cenc y , and (2) the specific context in which the conduct took place .” Kingv. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 668 (D.C. 1993).5 Th e se c on d e le me nt r e qu ir e s th at th e de fe nd ant i nf lic te d s e ve re e mot ion a l di str e ss in an intentional or re ckless manne r. See RE S TA TE ME NT § 4 6 c mt. i. I n s ome c a se s it

is “possible to infer the exis tence of . . . intent or re cklessness . . . f rom the ver

y outrag eousness of a defe ndant’s conduc t.” Sere v. Group Hospitalization, I nc., 443 A.2d 33, 37 ( D.C. 1982).

The third ele ment of the tort re quires that the plaintiff suf fer “seve re e motional distress.” To qua lify

as “se vere ,” the distress a sserted must be “ of so ac ute a nature that ha rmful phy sical conse quence s might be not unlikely to result.” Sere v. Group Hospitalization, I nc., 443 A.2d at 37 (quotingClark v. Associate d Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 65 ( D.C. Cir. 19 39 )) . Se e a lso Hu ds on

v. Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , 5 58 F .3 d 5 26 , 5 33 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 9) (l ia bil ity attache s only

if a plaintiff’ s emotional injury is “serious” a

nd “ver ifiable” ). Mer e “me ntal anguish” and “ stress” do not rise to the le vel of seve re e motional dist ress. Ross v. Dy nCorp, 362 F. Supp. 2d 344, 360 (D.D .C. 2005) (citingcase s). In addition, the distress asser ted may not be “e x ag g erated and unr easona ble” unde r the c ircumstance s, “unless it results from a pe culiar susceptibility

to such distress of which the actor has knowledg e.” RE S TA TE ME NT § 46 cmt. j. See also L ang er v. G eorg e Washing ton Univ., 498 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2007). A. Officer W

oods Offic er Woods is not entitl ed to judg ment as a matter of law on Ms. Halcomb’s int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss c la im b e c a us e a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld h ave fo un d in he r f avo r o n th is c la im. Ind e e d, the Court a g re e s w ithMs. Ha lc omb that a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld base suc h a findingon just one of her alleg ations ag ainst Offic er Woods: that is, that Office rOf fi c e r Wo od s argue s th at he is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw o n th is 2 claim bec ause “ Ms. Halcomb fa iled at trial to provide c redible te stimony or other e vidence , lay

or e xpe rt , th at th is s tate me nt .
. . c a us e d h e r t o e xpe ri e nc e ‘s e ve re e mot ion a l di str e ss. ’” Woo ds Mo t. at 13. B ut Ms. Halcomb was unde r no oblig ation to produce expert testimony or evide nce of treatment to demonstrate that the distress she suffe red w as “se vere .” See H oman v. Goyal, 711 A
. 2 d 8 1 2 , 8 2 1 ( D
. C. 1 9 9 8 ) ; s e e a ls o A d ams v . V e rte x, In c . , Ci v il A c ti o nN o . 0 4
- 1 0 2 6 , 2 0 0 7 WL 10 20 78 8, at *4 n. 7 ( D. D. C. M ar. 29 , 2 00 7) . N or is i t of any mom e nt, in t

he Rul e 50 c on te xt, whether Ms. Halcomb’s testimony was “ cre dible.” Woods Mot. at 13. See su pra at 3-4. 6 Woods t old her that “ now that I know wher e you live, Ioug ht to come out to y our house a nd put a bullet in y our hea d, havingme to g o throug h all this shit .” Tra nscript of Tr ial at 36 (De c. 11, 2007) (testimony

of Ms. Halc omb). I f Off icer Woods di d indeed make such a state ment, a jury could conc lude that it constituted ex treme a nd outrag eous beha

vior; that it was intended to inflict
e mot ion a l di str e ss; and

that Ms . H a lc omb su ff

e re d s e ve re e mot ion a l di str e ss a s a re su lt. 2
B. TheDi

str ic t of Colum bia Ms. Ha lc omb ba se s h e r i nte nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss c la im a g a ins t the District of Columbia on three events, a ll of which occ urre d afte r her arr est by Offic er Woods and bef ore she was re lease d from MPD custody the next morning. Ac cordingto Ms. Halcomb, the Di str ic t is lia

ble fo r t he int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss b e c a us e MPD of

fi c e rs : 1. Confined her

in a “strongroom” or c ell at D.C. Gene ral Hospital with a man dre ssed as a woman for

sever al hours, and took no corre ctive ac tion even af ter she inf

ormed them that the other pe rson in the ce ll was a man; 2. Ma de ina

pp ro pr iate , le wd

and se xua l r e mark s a

bo ut h e r a nd to her; a nd 3. Tr ans po rt e d h e r f

ro m an M PD f

a c ili ty to D .C. Ge ne ra l H os pit a l in an “intentionally

rec kless” manne r, D.C. Opp. at 2 – that is, by handcuf fingher, pla cingher on a

bench w ithout a seatbelt in the ba c k o f a n o ff ic ia l ve hic le , a

nd dr ivi ng“ ve ry , v e ry

fa st. ” Tr ans c ri pt of Tria l at 26 (De c. 11, 2007) ( testimony of Ms. Halc omb).The District a lso argues that, contra ry to Ms. Halcomb’s testimony , she wa s not 3 transporte d by

MPD office rs drivinga District of Columbia police ve hicle but by WMATA office rs drivinga WMATA vehicle . See D.C. Mot. at 5-6, 15-16. E ven thoug h the testimony of other witnesse s – including one called by Ms. Halcomb – supports this view, the Court ca nnot we ig h th e e vid e nc e and

make c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns on

a Rul e 50 mot ion

fo r j ud g me nt a s a matter of la

w. See su pr a at 3-4. 7 The District moves f

or judg ment as a matter of law on two primary

g rounds. First, the District a

rgues that Ms. Halc omb’s claim must fail beca use none of

her thre e alleg ations abut the manne r in which she w as deta ined by the MPD, even if tr

ue, desc ribe sufficie ntly

“extreme a

nd outrag eous” c onduct. See D.C. Mot. at 14-20. Second, the District 3 contends that Ms. Ha lcomb’s claim must fail bec ause she did not offer expert testimony establishing whether

or to what e x tent the seve re e motional harm she cla ims to have suffe red w as
cause d by the alleg ed ac tions of MPD officer s. Such expert testimony was re quired, in the District’s view, be cause even a ssuming that Ms. Halc omb suffer ed seve re e motional dist ress, that distress could have been c aused e ntirely or in part by

(1) spe cific tra

umatic eve nts that occurr ed prior to Ms. Halcomb’ s arr est and de tention, or (2) the alleg ed ac tions of Office r Woods. See id. at 12-14. Althoug h the Court does not ag ree entirely with the District’s re asoning , it does ag ree that the District is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. 1. Transpor

t to D.C. Genera l Hospital First, the Court re

jects Ms. Halc omb’s argument that a re asonable jury could have found in her f

avor ba sed on the a lleg ation that she wa s transported to D.C. Ge nera l Hospital by MPD of fi c e rs in a n e xtre me and

outr a g e ou s ma

nn e r. Se e D. C. O pp . at 3. Ms. Ha lc omb de sc ri be d h e r t

ri p in the ba c k o f a

po lic e ve hic le a s f

oll ow s:In h e r o pp os iti on to t he Di str ic t’ s mo tio n f

or jud g me nt a s a

matte r o f l aw, Ms. 4 Halcomb sug g ests that the vehicle was drive n so violently that she wa s thrown “into the vehic le’s metal floor a

nd walls.” D.C. Opp. at 3. Ms. Halcomb’s trial testimony , howeve r, does not support that sug g estion. Ms. Halcomb testified that she w as seated on one of two benche s on either side of

the bac k of the ve hicle, and that while she wa s transported she was “ thrown fr om le ft to r ig ht i n th e ba c k o f t

he va n. ” Tr ans c ri pt o f T ri a l at 26 (D e c . 1 1, 20 07 ). No wh e re do e s Ms
. Ha lc omb c la im that sh e fe ll t o th e fl oo r o f t he ve hic le , o r t

hat sh e wa s thro wn

a g a ins t it s w a lls
. 8 The be nch that I

was seated on was a

n iron benc h. Ihad no wa y of c on tr oll ing , you

kn ow , li ke , it

wa s n o w ay

tha t I wa s – that I c ou ld hold on and just maintain just a soli d seat ther e on that benc h. Th e y dr ov e ve ry , v e ry

fa st. Iwa s thro wn

a ll, y ou kn ow , ju st around f rom left to rig ht in the back of the van be cause my

hands we re c uf fe d b e hin d my

ba c k. An d I

ha d n ot a g ri p, I ’m jus t g ripping with the heel of

my shoes to try

to break my

fall, and I was just beingthrown ar ound in the back of the paddwa

yg on[.] Tr ans c ri pt o f T ri a l at 26 (D e c . 1 1, 20 07 ). Ev e n a ssumin g , a s th e Court mus t, t hat “ [t]he ve hic le in which Ms. Halcomb wa s transported c are ened at high spe eds makingjerkingand bumping motions,” D.C. Opp. at 3 (citations to rec ord omitted), Ms. Halcomb c annot re cover in tort based on this alleg ation. First, the dr iver’s c onduct, eve n as desc ribed by Ms. Halcomb in her t e s t i m o n y , w a s n o ts u f

f i c i e n t l y “ o u tr a g e o u s i nc h a

r a c t e r . ” H o m anv . G o y a l , 7 1 1 A
. 2 d at8 1 8
. It is d if fi c ult to i ma g ine that any

dr ive r, e ve n o ne int e nd ingto d ri ve a s sm oo thl y

a s p os sib le , c ou ld navig ate the stre ets of the District of Columbi a in a ve hicle that re sembles “a U-Ha ul truck” without making many

jerkingand bumpingmotions. Transcript of Tr ial at 25 (De c. 11, 2007) (testimony

of Ms. Halc omb). Second, Ms. Ha lcomb offe red no e vidence that the driver of the vehicle a cted with the r equisite intent to inflict severe emotional distress. And while a
rea sonable jury

may infer the intent element fr om the act itself if it is sufficie ntly outrag eous, see Sere v. G roup Hospitalization, I nc., 443 A.2d at 37; Ross v. Dy nCorp, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 359 n.8, this act simply

was not outrag eous enough to support such an infe renc e. 49 2. Inappropr iate, L ewd a nd Sex ual Remarks The Court also re

jects Ms. Halc omb’s argument that a re asonable jury could have found in her f

avor ba sed on the a lleg ation that cer tain unidentified MPD office rs made le wd and sexual remarks a

bout her a nd to her duringher de tention. Accor ding to Ms. Ha lcomb, as she wa s
escor ted to her c ell at D.C. Gene ral Hospital, “MPD off icer s made lew d jokes and vulg ar
re mark s at [he r] e xpe ns e . T he MPD of fi c e rs ma de state me nts su c h a s ‘ loo k at he r t its ,’ ‘I wo uld like to F that,’ a

nd ‘I wonder what her ass looks like under that c oat.’” D.C. Opp. at 3 (c itations to rec ord omitted). I f such r emar ks were made, they

wer e, to say

the least, “ inappropriate.” Transc ript of Trial at 27 (Dec . 11, 2007) (testimony of Ms. Halc omb). Neve rtheless, they wer e also flee ting a

nd unacc ompanied by

any other thre ateningor degradingconduct. Thus, they amount to no more than “ insults, i ndignities [or] petty oppressions” – that is, ac ts that are
cer tainly demea ning a nd unpleasa

nt but not actionable in tort. R E S TA TE ME NT § 46 cmt. d.
3. Detention at D.C. Ge nera l Hospital F ina lly , th e Court

re je c ts M s. Ha lc omb ’s argume nt t hat a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld have f ound in her fa

vor base d on her de tention in the “strongroom” at D.C. Gener al Hospital with a man dre ssed as a

woman. Ac cordingto the brief f iled on Ms. Halcomb’s be half: Duringthat time, she fea

red f or her phy sical saf

ety and wa s terrifie d she mig ht be ra

ped. The se fe ars we re so strongthat she urinate d on herse lf [rather than use the toilet in the cell], never sat down once throug h the entire ty

of her detention [because she wa s afr aid she would be assa

ulted or ra

ped if she did sit down,] and vomited. When Ms. Halcomb informe d the MPD office rs assig ned to the “strong room” that she w as in a c ell with a man, one of them responde d “you’re not at a hotel, you don’t g et your choic e of r ooms.” D. C. O pp . at 9 ( c itatio ns to r e c or d o mitte d) . M s. Ha lc omb c on te nd s th at a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld10

find that the off

icer ’s comment alone constitutes ext reme and outra g eous conduc t, beca use the office r abuse d his positi on of powe r by taunting Ms. Ha lcomb and re fusingto help her. See id. at 9- 10 . H e r p ri mary

argume nt, ho we ve r, is that “ the Di str ic t’ s me re de te nti on of Ms. Ha lc omb with a man would be suf

ficient to establish extreme and outr ag eous conduc t.” I d. at 10. The MPD offic er’ s remar k – “you’re not at a hotel, you don’t g et your choic e of rooms” – and his a

ppare nt failure to investig ate Ms. Ha lcomb’s complaint that she ha d been place d in a ce ll with a man could be c onstrued as ha rsh, insensitive and ce rtainly unprofe ssional. But it bea rs little resemblanc e to other police conduct that ha s been de emed e x treme, outra g eous and an a buse of a uthority . See, e.g ., Dre

jza v. Vacc aro, 650 A .2d 1308 (D.C. 1994) (of fice r be litte d a nd ha ra sse d p la int if

f whil e sh e wa s tr

yingto r e po rt

that sh e wa s r a

pe d) ; L e ine n v . Ci ty of Elg in, Civi l Action No. 98-8225, 2000 WL1154641 (N.D. I ll. 2000) (plaintiff subjec ted to an
unne c e ssa

ry str ip s e arc h) . Se e a lso R E S TA TE ME NT § 46 cmt. f. The Court c oncludes that the alleg ed re mark wa s, as a matter of law, “ inconsiderate and unkind,” K ing v. K idd, 640 A.2d at 6 6 8 (qu o t i n g R E S TA TE ME NT § 46 cmt. d) – not extreme and outra g eous. Cf. Kinber gv. Dist. of Columbi a, Civil Action No. 94-2516, 1998 WL10364, at *14 (D.D .C. J an. 5, 1998), aff’d , 161 F .3 d 4 4 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 8) (p oli c e of fi c e r d id n ot a c t outr a g e ou sly , e ve n a ssumin ghe us e d h ars h words and took plea sure in ar restingplaintiff). Nor c ould a re asonable jury have c oncluded that de taining Ms. Ha lcomb with a
man – eve n in the circ umstances de scribed by Ms. Halcomb at tria l – constitutes ex treme a nd outrag eous conduc t. As noted above , the Court’s eva luation of a de fenda nt’s conduct is to be g uided by “(1) applicable contempora ry community

standards of

offe nsiveness and de cenc y , and (2 ) t he sp e c if ic c on te xt in whic h th e c on du c t to ok pla c e .” Ki ngv. Ki dd , 6 40 A. 2d at 66 8. B othMs. Ha lc omb te sti fi e d th at th e man uri nate d in the c e ll’ s to ile t w hil e Ms. Ha lc omb 5 was pre sent in the ce ll. Had the ce ll not been desig ned such that a per son using the toilet wa s larg ely or entire ly

hidden from view , see D .C. Mot. at 9, or if Ms. Halcomb’s c ell mate had exposed his genitals to her when usingthe toilet, see inf ra at 12, the Court’s ana ly sis might be differ ent. 11 fac tors count ag ainst Ms. Halcomb. Requiringher to shar e a c ell with a man for sever al hours simply does not constitute a “ma jor outrag e” unde r conte mporary community

standards of offe nsiveness and de cenc y , even if that man is dressed a s a woman. RE S TA TE ME NT § 46 cmt. f. 5 Moreove r, eve n acc ordingto Ms. Halcomb, the man with whom she w as deta ined was not
a bu siv e , d ang e ro us or

e ve n a rgua bly thr e ate nin g . Ind e e d, it a

pp e ars tha

t he wa s q

uit e c or dia l. Q [by counsel for

the District]: And the person in the ce ll y ou believe w as, whe n y ou first saw the pe rson you believed that the pe rs on wa s a fe ma le , c or

re c t? A [b y Ms. Ha lc omb ]: We ll, y e s. She wa s w e a ri nga dr e ss, y e s. * * * Q: And the two of you had a ve ry brief c onversation; is n’t that c or re c t? A: She asked me what I

was in for

and whe re I

worke d. Q: And you responde d to her? A: Itold her that I

had bee n falsely

acc used of not pay

ing a far e, and I worke d for the Senate. * * * Q: And that was ba sically the extent of the conve rsation; isn’t that c or re c t? A: B a sic a lly , it

wa s, y e s. Q: An d th is w oma

n n e ve r a pp ro a c he d you

ina pp ro pr iate ly , c or

re c t?I f the MPD knew that Ms. Halcomb’s ce ll mate was a man, then it disreg arde d 6 MPD po lic ie s r e qu ir ingpr iso ne rs to b e se pa rate d b y se x. B ut c on du c t is no t ne c e ssa ri ly e xtre me and outr a g e ou s f

or purp os e s o f t

he tor t of int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss m e re ly beca use the c onduct violates off icial policies. See RE S TA TE ME NT § 46 cmt. d. Th e dis tr e ss a sse rt e d b y

a pla int if f n e e d n ot b e re a so na

ble and jus tif ie d if “ it 7 results from a

peculiar susceptibility

to such distress of which the actor has knowledg e.” R E S TA TE ME NT § 46 cmt. j. Ms. Halcomb claims that the MPD offic ers de taining he r “kne w that [she] was ‘pe culiarly

susceptible to emotional distress,’” D.C. Opp. at 10, but fails to explain (1) why and how she was pe culiarly susceptible to emotional distress, or (2) how the unidentified MPD office rs knew she was pe culiarly susceptible to emotional distress. See Cotton v. District of Columbia, 541 F. Supp. 2d 195, 206 n. 2 (D.D.C. 2008). 12 A: No , h e did

no t. Q: And when the person use d the toilet [ in the cell], y ou never saw the per son’s g enitals, did y ou? A: Ididn’t rea lly

see the m, or it, but Icould tell that there was one . Q: My question is, y ou never

saw the g enitals, did y ou? A: No , n ot pe r se , no. Tr ans c ri pt o f T ri a l at 98 -9 9 ( De c . 1 1, 20 07 ). Th e Court c on c lud e s th at th is i s si mpl y no t a c a se

“ in whic h th e re c itatio n o f t he fa c ts t o a

n ave ra g e me mbe r o f t

he c omm un ity wo uld
. . . le a d h im to exclaim, ‘Outrag eous!’ ” RE S TA TE ME NT § 46 cmt. d. 6

Finally , as noted a

bove, “the re is no liability wher e the plaintiff ha s suffer ed exagg erated and unr easona ble emotional distress.” RE S TA TE ME NT § 4 6 c mt. j. Ms. Ha lc omb 7 claims that beingdetained w ith this man ca used her to refuse to sit for fea

r of de adly

assault or rape , to urinate on he rself r ather than use the toilet, and to vomit. No rea sonable jury , upon hear ing Ms. Ha lcomb’s desc ription of her une ventful intera ctions with this m an, could r eg ard these pa rticular f ear s or re actions (or

their seve rity) as r easona ble and justified.This rule is subject to ce rtain exceptions: “(1) the disability first emer g ed 8 coincidenta lly

with or very

soon after

the [alleg ed] act, or ( 2) the disability was of a ty pe which by its very nature ref

lected its ca

use, or ( 3) the c ause of

the injury

related to matters of c ommon experience , knowledg e, or obse rvation of lay men.” B altimore v. B .F. Goodr ich Co., 545 A.2d at 1231. Neither

party sug g ests that any

of these e x ceptions ar e applica ble her e. 13 C. Necessity for Expe rt Testimony Th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

a lso is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw b e c a

us e Ms. Halcomb fa iled to present e x pert testimony demonstratingwhether

and to what e x tent the alleg ed ac ts of MPD office rs – as distinct from other fac tors – cause d her to suff er se vere
e mot ion a l ha

rm . F or re a so ns e xpla ine d b e low , O ff ic e r Wo od s is no t e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a
matte r o f l aw o n th is b a sis
.

Th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Court of Ap pe a ls h a s h e ld t

hat e xpe rt te sti mony

is
nece ssary to demonstrate a

causa l link between a

defe ndant’s ac t and a plaintiff’ s harm “in c ases p r e s e n ti n gme d ic a ll y

c o mp li c ate d

qu e s ti o n s d

u e to mu lt ip le an d

/o r p r e e xis ti n gc a

u s e s [. ]” Ba ltimore v. B.F . Goodrich Co., 545 A.2d 1228, 1231 ( D.C. 1988) (re quiring expert testimony as to c a us atio n whe re pla int if

f’ s d e pr e ssi on

and anxie ty wa s p ote nti a lly

tr a c e a ble to m any

so ur c e s, including the defe ndant’s conduc t, marital discord, a nd a discrimination lawsuit that the plaintiff had initiated bef

ore the acc ident). Expert testimony is nece ssary

in such ca ses “[t] o preve nt the jur y fr om e ng a g ingin s pe c ulatio n” a s to wh e the r a nd to what e xtent th e a lle g e dly un lawf ul a c ts at issue – as distinct from other potential fac tors – cause d plaintiff’s har m. I d. See Gr ay

L ine, Inc. v. Ke aton, 428 A.2d 360, 362 (D .C. 1981); Wi lhelm v. State Traf fic Safe ty Commi ssion, 185 A.2d 715, 719 (D.C. 1962). 8

In this case, the e motional dist ress Ms. Ha lcomb suffe red a fter he r ar rest and detention was, like the emotional distress in Ba ltimore, “multifactoria l and hig hly complicated.”Th e Court pr e c lud e d th e Di str ic t f

ro m intr od

uc inge vid e nc e of

thi s su it at tr ia l to 9 pr e ve nt u nf a ir pr e jud ic e to M s. Ho wa

rd . T he Court

did , h ow e ve r, pe rm it the Di str ic t to a sk Ms. Halcomb if she was suff

eringemotional distress as a r esult of prior e vents at the time of he r arr est and de tention. Accor ding to Ms. Ha lcomb, the discrimination suit and the eve nts giving rise to it inflicted upon her “ a deva stating loss of e njoy ment of life” and “substantial e motional pain and a

ng uish.” Tra

nscript of Tr ial at 111 (De c. 11, 2007).

14 Ba ltimore v. B.F . Goodrich Co., 545 A.2d at 1231. I t was multifactoria l beca use it was po te nti a lly

tr a c e a ble to at le a st thr e e dif

fe re nt s ourc e s: ( 1) the a lle g e d a c ts o f O ff ic e r Wo od s; (2 ) t he a lle g e d a c ts o f M PD o ff ic e rs ; and (3 ) a n e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min atio n s uit

that Ms
. Ha lc omb fi le d p ri or

to h e r a rr e st a nd de te nti on . I t w a s c omp lic ate d b e c a us e it m anif

e ste d it se lf 9 i na v ar i et y

o f w ay s , i n cl u d i n g: s p ec i fi c a n x i et i es ; i n s o m n i a; we i gh tl o s s ; un co n tro l l ab l e w ee p i n g; loss of relig ious faith; and social withdra wal. See T ransc ript of Trial at 54-55 (De c. 11, 2007) (testimony

of Ms. Halc omb). Be cause of the c omplex and multifactoria l nature of her e motional distress, Ms. Halcomb wa s require d to offer expert testimony

to ensure that the jury

was not left to speculate as to its cause or cause s. Ms. Halcomb did, in fac t, offer expert testimony

rele vant to this causation issue, and that testimony was suff icient to permit the jury

to conclude that Officer W oods’ acts bore some ca

usal relationship t o Ms. Halcomb’s distress. That testimony was not, howe ver, suf

ficient to per

mit the jury

to conclude, w ithout speculation, that the ac ts of MP D o ffi c e rs bore some c ausal re lationship to Ms . Halcomb’ s distress. At tr ia l, M s. Ha lc omb c a lle d a s a wi tne ss D r. Da

nny Mamod e se ne , a

sp e c ia lis t in internal medic ine. Dr. Ma modesene examined Ms. Halcomb soon afte r her ordea l. He testified that Ms . H a lc omb wa s su ff e ri ngfr om “ po sttra

uma tic ins omn ia

and anxie ty” wh e n h e fi rs t examined her. Tr anscr ipt of Trial at 83 (D ec. 12, 2007) . His testimony made c lear , howeve r, that this diagnosis wa s based on Ms. Ha lcomb’s desc ription of how she ha d been “ arr ested” and15

“assa ulted” duringan “e ncounter ” with a “ secur ity office r” at Union Station – t hat is, how she had bee n treated by Officer W oods , n ot t

he MPD . I d. at 81 -8 4, 98 -9 9. Thus , th e jur y ha d s ome ba sis fo r f

ind ingand

a sse ssi nga

c a us a l r e latio ns hip be tw e e n M s. Ha lc omb ’s e mot ion a l di str e ss and the a cts of Of

fice r Woods. I n contra st, Dr. Mamodese ne’s testimony failed to e stablish or
e ve n s ug g e st a

ny c a us a l r e latio ns hip be tw e e n M s. Ha lc omb ’s e mot ion a l di str e ss a nd the a c ts of MPD of fi c e rs . T he jur

y the re fo re c ou ld o nly

sp e c ulate a s to wh e the r a nd to what e xtent Ms
. Ha lc omb ’s dis tr e ss w a s tr a c e a ble to t he a c ts o f M PD o ff

ic e rs and /or a pr e e xistin gc a

us e – th at is , her discr imination sui t.

In r e sp on se to t

his la st p oint, M s. Ha lc omb argue s th at “ no e xpe rt te sti mony

is require d to succe ed on an e motional dist ress c laim.” D.C. Opp. at 7. Most of the c ases she cites in support of that proposition, however , are inapposite. Those c ases a ddress whe ther a plaintiff need pr ove the existenc e or se v e rit yof her alleg ed emotional injury

by expert testimony . They

do not addre ss whether

a plaintiff ne ed prove the causal link betwee n a def endant’ s action and he r alleg ed emotional injury

by expert testimony

when “ medically

complicated que stions [ about
causation] due to multiple and/or pree x isting ca uses” a rise. See A dams v. Ver

tex, I nc., 20 07 WL10 20 78 8 at *4 ; D avid v. Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , 4 36 F . Su

pp . 2 d 8 3, 91 n. 3 ( D. D. C. 2006); Sanders v. D istrict of Columbia, Ci vil Action No. 97-2938, 2002 WL655468, at *2 n.1 (D.D.C. Apr . 15, 2002); J eff erson v. Milvets Sy stem Technology , Inc., 986 F . Supp. 6, 8 n.1 (D.D.C. 1997). Ms. Ha lcomb does cite one case from the Southern D istrict of Texas for the proposition that ex pert testimony with respec t to causation is not nece ssary to preva il on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See D.C. Opp. at 8 (citing Salinas v. Rubin, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Tex. 2001), v ac ate d in pa rt , Salinas v. O’Ne ill, 286 F.3d 82716

(5th Cir. 2002)). That case is disti ng uishable, howe ver, be cause the issue of c ausation wa s not
near ly so complicated in that c ase a s it is i n this case. The court ther efor e found that there w as no need f or expert testimony

to establish a “suff

icient ca usal conne ction” betwe en def endant’ s conduct a nd plaintiff’s alleg ed emotional injury . Salinas v. Rubin, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (quotation marks a

nd citation omitted). F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Court c on c lud e s th at th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia

is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law, but that Off

icer Woods i s not. Two Orde rs consistent
w i thth i s O p i n i o ns h a l l i s s u e th i s s am e d ay.

SO ORDERED.
/s/_______________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: Apr il 28, 2009