IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-0815

Filed May 11, 2022

GINA LYNCH,

Petitioner-Appellee,

vs.

ISRAEL MORENO,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica Zrinyi 

Ackley, Judge.

A father appeals a decree establishing legal custody, physical care, 

visitation, and child support. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 

Jordan D. Grube of Hope Law Firm & Associates, P.C., West Des Moines, 

for appellant.

Dustin Baker of Henkels & Baker, PC, Dubuque, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

During their off and on relationship, Gina Lynch and Israel Moreno had a 

child together. When their relationship ended for good, Moreno embarked on a 

campaign to prove Lynch had sexually abused their daughter. He made reports 

to the Iowa Department of Human Services, law enforcement, medical providers, 

and government officials, none of whom found any merit to his allegations. 

Against this backdrop, the district court granted Lynch’s request for sole 

legal custody and physical care of the child with supervised visitation for Moreno. 

On appeal,1 Moreno claims the court erred by (1) not allowing him to introduce 

certain evidence; (2) not allowing him to cross-examine Lynch; (3) awarding Lynch 

sole legal custody and physical care; (4) placing onerous conditions on his 

visitation, failing to award him more visitation, and impermissibly delegating its 

powers to expand visitation; and (5) awarding Lynch attorney fees. We affirm as 

modified.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The parties met in 2016 through an online dating site. They were never 

married but had a child together in June 2017. Lynch and Moreno lived together 

in Lynch’s house in northeast Iowa until Moreno moved to Colorado for work when 

the child was about ten months old. He came back to Iowa twice for visits before 

moving back in late July 2018. Once he was back in Iowa, Moreno bounced 

between sleeping on Lynch’s couch and a friend’s couch until sometime in 2019, 

when Lynch told him to get the rest of his things out of her home. Shortly after

 

1 Lynch waived her opportunity to file a brief in this appeal. See Iowa R. App. 

P. 6.903(3). 
3

that, Moreno lodged allegations with the Iowa Department of Human Services 

against Lynch. Nothing came of these allegations.

In early February 2020, Lynch filed a petition to establish custody, physical 

care, visitation, and support. She testified that she could no longer handle Moreno 

showing up unexpectedly at her house or hunting her down in the community and 

causing a scene. Around the same time Lynch filed her petition, Moreno reported 

to law enforcement that he was concerned the child had suffered sexual abuse

while in Lynch’s care. A police officer testified that because Moreno could not

provide any specific allegations, he told Moreno to take the child to a doctor. The 

officer never heard anything else from Moreno. Moreno proceeded to have the 

child undergo multiple sexual assault examinations by medical professionals, 

telling them Lynch or her mother had sexually abused the child. 

Moreno also got the department involved, and a forensic interview of the 

child was conducted. The medical professionals who completed the examinations 

found no signs of sexual abuse, and the department issued two unfounded 

assessment reports.2 For one of the assessments, Moreno provided the 

department worker with several videos of him questioning the child about sexual 

abuse. The worker noted in her report that Moreno prompted the child during 

questioning and asked leading questions. During the investigation, Moreno’s 

initially vague concerns of sexual abuse crystallized into vivid and specific 

allegations of sexual abuse that Moreno said he either witnessed Lynch commit or 

 

2 A third unfounded assessment was issued on Moreno’s report that Lynch’s home 

was unsafe because she threw “a piece of lathe that had 50 little nails sticking out 

of it . . . in the front yard near the sidewalk” and that Lynch had “elbowed and 

slapped her daughter.”
4

that the two-year-old child told him about. And he claimed the maternal 

grandmother, who watched the child during the day, was drugging her so that she 

could sexually abuse her. To support these claims, he sent dozens of pictures to 

the department, many of which simply showed Lynch and the maternal 

grandmother holding the child like any caretaker would. He also told the protective 

worker that “he knows what a sex offender is” because he was convicted of “4th 

degree sexual assault” when he was a teenager. The last assessment ended with 

a finding that Moreno “has an unusual preoccupation with [a] sexualized theme, 

regarding the care his daughter receives by others. He is also quick to reject 

reasonable explanations and medically professional opinions, regarding the care 

of his daughter.”

Like the district court, we decline to repeat the explicit details of Moreno’s 

sexual abuse allegations in this decision. None were credible.3 Moreno also 

contacted high-ranking government officials about his cause. He even had the 

child urinate in a cup in a public restroom so he could have the urine tested to 

support his suspicions of sexual abuse. In his testimony at trial, Moreno stuck with

his belief that the child was being sexually abused at the hands of Lynch or those 

 

3 For instance, Moreno claimed that before he left for Colorado, he witnessed 

Lynch molesting the child. He said this happened while Lynch was changing the 

child’s diaper, and he was watching through a crack in the door. But when a 

department worker visited the home and tried to look through the crack, she could 

not see into the room where the diaper changing station would have been. 

Moreno said that on another occasion, the child used sign language for a 

sexually explicit act. Moreno claimed that Lynch or her mother taught the child this 

sign because Lynch’s father is deaf. But upon investigation, the department 

worker learned that the family has never used sign language to communicate with 

Lynch’s father, who has seventy percent of his hearing after a cochlear implant 

seven years ago. The only sign language the child knows, according to Lynch and 

her mother, is the sign for “more.”
5

close to her, despite multiple medical professionals and department workers 

finding the opposite.

The child regressed in her development as a result of Moreno’s obsession 

with alleged sexual abuse, reverting to “baby talk” and having trouble pottytraining. At a well-child visit in August 2020, the child’s primary physician referred 

the child to a therapist to ensure her experiences did not cause any emotional or 

physical trauma. Before making that referral, the physician noted that she and her

colleagues have been contacted by patient’s father regarding 

concerns for sexual abuse . . . either by the mother or maternal 

grandmother. He has taken her to multiple ERs and had sexual 

assault examinations done on this girl. Everything has been normal. 

There has been no signs of sexual assault on examination.

Lynch explored many possible therapists. Moreno shot down most of them 

because, as far as we can tell, they were selected by Lynch. His communication 

with one counselor ended with an email from the counselor stating that she was 

feeling “harassed” and would pursue legal action if contacted again. 

Moreno’s testimony contained several themes. One of the main ones was 

that Lynch was trying to exclude him from the child’s life. Yet he agreed on crossexamination that Lynch allowed him to live with her and the child after he returned 

from Colorado, she gave him consistent visitation after he moved out, and she 

complied with the visitation provisions of the temporary-matters order. He even 

agreed she helped him make up visits he missed. Some of the hundreds of text 

messages between the parties that Moreno submitted as evidence did show that 

Lynch was restricting unfettered visits. But those messages largely occurred in 

the window between the start of Moreno’s sexual-abuse campaign and the entry 

of the temporary-matters order. 
6

The text messages also show Lynch tried to facilitate supervised visits, but 

Moreno was resistant to anything but unlimited access to the child. He obsessively 

texted Lynch, demanding to know where she and the child were. If he didn’t

receive an immediate response, he would begin hounding her family members. 

Lynch’s sister-in-law described his contact as follows: “Instead of sending one text 

message, he sends 22 of them in five minutes, and it is, ‘Why are you ignoring 

me? Why are you not talking to me? Where is Gina?’” Moreno would go to 

Lynch’s house, or her family members’ houses, demanding to see his child. 

Lynch’s sister-in-law said that he once sat outside of her house trying to take 

pictures of them as they were having a family dinner. She described his behavior 

as scary and odd.

Soon after answering Lynch’s petition, Moreno moved for a hearing on 

temporary matters, requesting physical care of the child. In August 2020, the court 

awarded the parties temporary joint legal custody with temporary physical care to 

Lynch. Moreno’s minimum visitation on a temporary basis was to include every 

other weekend from Thursday evening to Sunday evening and every Tuesday 

evening for two and one-half hours. Moreno recorded many of these interactions, 

submitting some of them as evidence at the trial in February 2021.

Moreno represented himself at trial, offering a confusing array of exhibits

with a bizarre numbering system. In his pretrial brief, Moreno requested sole legal 

custody and physical care of the child. He proposed that Lynch be allowed

visitation with the child “52 days of the year with holidays to be at [Moreno’s] sole 

discretion,” which he implied was generous. Following trial, and based on the 
7

record made before it, the district court suspended Moreno’s visitation under the 

temporary-matters order.

In its ensuing decree, the court placed the parties’ child in Lynch’s sole legal 

custody and physical care. The court did not provide Moreno with any visitation 

due to its belief that he needed “therapy and psychiatric intervention to address his 

obsession with sexual conduct.” In the event Moreno “undergoes extensive 

psychiatric therapy and can establish he is being medicated for whatever diagnosis 

results,” the court authorized Lynch “to permit visitation under any conditions she 

deems necessary to keep her daughter safe.” Because of the disparity in the 

parties’ incomes, the court awarded Lynch $2500 in attorney fees.

Moreno obtained counsel and filed a motion for a new trial or to reconsider, 

enlarge, or amend. As to his motion for a new trial, Moreno complained that he 

was not allowed to cross-examine Lynch and the court impermissibly delegated 

judicial authority on the issues of custody and visitation. For his motion to 

reconsider, enlarge, or amend, Moreno requested that his visitation be at least 

equal to what he had under the temporary-matters order or a graduated visitation 

schedule with concrete parameters for visitation not subject to Lynch’s discretion. 

At the hearing on the motion, Moreno proposed that the court “allow for the child’s 

therapist . . . to create a reunification plan which affords [him] visitation time with 

the child as the therapist deems appropriate.” Lynch objected to returning to 

visitation as laid out in the temporary-matters order but was “receptive to 

developing a parenting plan through the therapist” and allowing for video and 

supervised visits.
8

The district court denied Moreno’s motion for a new trial but found a 

“progression for visitation” would be appropriate. To accomplish that goal, the

court started with virtual visits until July 2021, at which point Moreno could move 

to supervised visitation on alternating Saturdays provided he complied with certain 

conditions. After nine months, visitation could progress to unsupervised and be 

expanded to include alternating weekends and holidays, depending on the child’s 

progress, Moreno’s conduct, and the counselor’s recommendation. The ruling 

provided for other potential expansions when the child reached school age. 

Moreno appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review child-custody cases under Iowa Code chapter 600B (2020) de 

novo. See McKee v. Dicus, 785 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010); see also

Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). Despite 

our de novo review, we give strong consideration to the district court’s fact findings, 

including any credibility findings. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594; see also Iowa

R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). In child-custody cases, the first and foremost consideration

is the child’s best interest. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(o); Phillips v. DavisSpurling, 541 N.W.2d 846, 847 (Iowa 1995).

III. Analysis

A. Admission of Evidence4

Moreno argues the court impermissibly prevented him from introducing 

certain evidence, specifically (1) “an audio recording between him and a medical 

 

4 Our review of Moreno’s evidentiary claims was hampered by an extremely 

confusing record on exhibits. While Moreno’s pretrial brief did have a vague list of 
9

provider for the parties’ minor child,” (2) “exhibits which showed that [he] did not 

need to register on the sex offender registry,” and (3) “bills and statements . . . to 

support his argument that he does regularly attend therapy and his therapist has 

no concerns.”

1. Audio recording

At trial, Moreno offered an audio recording he took of a nurse during a 

medical appointment with the child. The court did not admit the exhibit because 

Moreno recorded the nurse without her knowledge. Lynch’s counsel added the 

exhibit was not listed as an exhibit before trial. Moreno did not ask the court to

receive it as an offer of proof. On appeal, Moreno argues that the recording would 

have provided the court with “a more robust picture of what would have been in 

the best interests of the minor child”; “corroborated his testimony that although the 

medical examination did not prove any abuse, the examination also did not 

 

categorized evidence he wished to offer, none of which related to evidence he 

argues was inappropriately excluded, Moreno never filed a formal exhibit list. The 

court refused to admit many exhibits that were not itemized on an exhibit list, 

explaining:

[T]here’s a difference as to what happens in a case with exhibits. 

First of all, most of everything that a party offers during . . . an equity 

trial, I take. The rules say that I give a different weight, but when you 

don’t include it as an exhibit, [opposing counsel] is not notified of that, 

you’re violating the rules of civil procedure, and I don’t take those 

things.

Opposing counsel, and the court, gave him the benefit of the doubt and allowed 

into evidence a plethora of exhibits that Moreno electronically filed, thus giving 

some notice of their potential use. But, apparently, Moreno showed up to trial with 

hundreds of additional exhibits on paper and compact discs. Our ruling on this 

appeal was stalled for a significant time due to the poor maintenance of the record 

and its resulting status when it was transmitted to this court, which required our 

direction for correction. 
10

disprove any abuse”; and “shown that [he] was only complying with law 

enforcement and medical professionals’ recommendations for his concerns.”

We agree that evidence in an equity proceeding should generally be 

received subject to objections. Hughes A. Bagley, Inc. v. Bagley, 463 N.W.2d 423, 

426 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). But because the exhibit is not before us, we have no 

way of knowing whether it would have been helpful or harmful to Moreno’s case, 

and “[w]e cannot predicate error upon speculation.” In re Est. of Hansen, 264 

N.W.2d 746, 747–48 (Iowa 1978) (citation omitted). Because no request was 

made that the exhibit be received as an offer of proof, error was not preserved. 

See In re Marriage of Wersinger, 577 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) 

(“[W]ithout an offer of proof, there is nothing for us to review.”). 

If the exhibit had been admitted, we have authority on appeal—even from 

an equitable proceeding—to disregard the exhibit as inadmissible hearsay, which 

it clearly was. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hansen, No. 18-2212, 2019 WL 

3714946, at *2 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug 7, 2019); In re Marriage of Williams, 449 

N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). In any event, based on our review of the 

remaining evidence, we cannot conclude admission of the exhibit for the purposes 

that Moreno claims it was important would have affected the overarching custody 

decision. See Hansen, 264 N.W.2d at 748. With no prejudice to Moreno, we affirm 

on this point. See Hansen Lind Meyer, Inc. v. Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.C., No. 

00-0808, 2002 WL 31307230, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002) (“The decision 

to . . . exclude evidence . . . will not be disturbed on appeal absent . . . prejudice 

[to] the complaining party.”). 
11

2. Sex offender registry

Turning to the exhibits concerning whether Moreno had to register as a sex 

offender,5those he referenced and included in the appendix do not appear to have 

even been discussed or offered at trial at all.6 So Moreno’s complaint that “the 

court did not allow for the admission of exhibits which showed that [he] did not 

need to register on the sex offender registry” lacks merit and does not entitle him 

to any relief on appeal. 

3. Therapy records

As to Moreno’s therapy records, he offered as evidence exhibit “8BA,” which 

he explained was an email from his therapist. The court responded, “So I see you 

have 8B . . . from A through J.” Then Moreno explained exhibit 8BA was only 

correspondence with the therapist, and the remainder (8BB–8BJ) were invoices. 

The court questioned whether Lynch’s counsel objected to the admission of exhibit 

8BA, counsel responded in the negative, and the court admitted the exhibit. The 

 

5 During Moreno’s cross-examination, Moreno asserted that despite a prior 

conviction for a sex offense, he did not have to register as a sex offender. 

6 We note Moreno’s brief often cites “proposed exhibits,” which he also included in 

the appendix. As an appellate practice pointer, the record that makes its way to 

us does not include proposed exhibits that are never marked as admitted by the 

district court in the judicial interface. Practitioners should refrain from citing items 

that were not admitted and including them in the appendix, as they were not made 

a part of the district court record and are therefore not part of the record on appeal. 

See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.801 (“Only the original documents and exhibits filed in the 

district court case from which the appeal is taken, the transcript of proceedings, if 

any, and a certified copy of the related docket and court calendar entries prepared 

by the clerk of the district court constitute the record on appeal.”), 6.905(1)(b) 

(indicating contents of appendix are limited to parts of the district court record); In 

re Marriage of Keith, 513 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“[C]ounsel has 

referred to matters apparently not a part of the record of this appeal. We admonish 

counsel to refrain from such violations of the rules of appellate procedure. We are 

limited to the record before us and any matters outside the record on appeal are 

disregarded.”). 
12

invoices, which were separately marked exhibits, were never offered as evidence. 

Following our order directing the correction of issues with exhibits, the court 

confirmed in its new exhibit maintenance order that exhibit 8BA was offered, 

received, and considered. It was therefore made part of the record on appeal. To 

the extent Moreno complains the email from his therapist was not admitted, 

Moreno is incorrect. He is not entitled to relief on the claim the court did not admit 

the invoices, as they were never offered as evidence. 

B. Cross-Examination

Next, Moreno argues the “court erred in not allowing [him] to cross examine” 

Lynch. In denying this claim, the court noted in its ruling on Moreno’s motion for 

new trial that Moreno managed the presentation of his case and he essentially did 

so inefficiently.

7

 As a result, the court found his claim lacked merit. 

 

7 Most of the trial was dedicated to Moreno’s six witnesses—in comparison to 

Lynch serving as the sole witness on her own behalf—and sorting out the 

confusion about Moreno’s numerous unorganized exhibits—in comparison to 

Lynch’s few organized exhibits. The record discloses that before trial, Moreno 

agreed only one day was needed for the trial. Trial began at roughly 9:45 a.m. 

Following about ten minutes of sorting out Moreno’s non-compliance with 

pandemic-related protocol, Moreno was allowed to take his first three witnesses 

out of order. Their testimony took about forty minutes, very little of which included 

cross-examination by Lynch. Then Lynch was directly examined, which took about 

an hour leading up to the lunch break. After lunch ended at 12:30 p.m., two more 

of Moreno’s witness were called out of order, and their testimony ran to about 

1:50 p.m., again with very little cross-examination by Lynch. Then Moreno began 

his direct examination of himself, which lasted roughly ninety minutes. At the end 

of his direct examination, Moreno questioned the court, “I get to question Ms. 

Lynch, right?” The court stated it would proceed with Lynch’s cross-examination 

of Moreno since he was already on the stand. Moreno then continued to directly 

examine himself and offer a flurry of exhibits, which lasted another forty minutes, 

bringing the clock to 4:03 p.m. Lynch’s cross-examination of Moreno lasted 

roughly twenty-five minutes, concluding at 4:28 p.m., at which point the court 

ended the trial.
13

Cross-examination is of course an important right to a litigant and an 

effective aid to the factfinder in securing justice. Pickerell v. Griffith, 29 N.W.2d 

588, 595 (Iowa 1947). While the extent of cross-examination is within the 

discretion of the trial court, it “is a right to be jealously guarded.” Id. Outright 

refusal to allow cross-examination “is a denial of an absolute right, and has been 

generally held to be sufficient ground for reversal,” id. (citation omitted), so long as 

prejudice resulted, Avery v. Harms Implement Co., 270 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 

1978); see also In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). 

“Only after a party has been afforded an opportunity for full and fair crossexamination may the trial court limit its scope.” Avery, 270 N.W.2d at 650.

But, as the supreme court has explained, “cross-examination is limited to 

matters testified to in chief.” Jack v. P & A Farms, Ltd., 822 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Iowa 

2012) (quoting Avery, 270 N.W.2d at 650). Moreno complains he “could not refute 

any allegations that [Lynch] made in her testimony,” and he “was not afforded an 

opportunity to confront [Lynch] with her lack of attention to his concerns and her 

failure to communicate and co-parent.” However, Lynch’s testimony was limited 

to her background; the child’s birth and the parties’ relationship; the reasons she 

sought a custody decree; her involvement in the department’s investigations; the 

parties’ efforts at securing a therapist for the child; and visitation under the 

temporary-matters order, which Lynch opined has “been working.” She also 

testified the child loves Moreno and enjoys spending time with him. While she 

provided some foundation for the department’s investigative reports, those reports 

were admitted as evidence without objection from Moreno. And Lynch specifically 
14

agreed the parties could not effectively communicate and co-parent with one 

another—a central theme of Moreno’s case. 

“A party is not denied a fair trial by the denial of the opportunity to crossexamine a witness who does not give any testimony” on issues the party wants to 

delve into on cross-examination. See id.; accord 7 Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa 

Practice Series: Evidence § 5.611:3 (Nov. 2021 update). Because Lynch did not 

testify about the issues Moreno complains about on appeal, we find Moreno was 

not denied an affirmative right to cross-examine her. Along the same lines, we find 

that no prejudice resulted from the court’s failure to allow Moreno to cross-examine 

Lynch given the other evidence in the record. 

In support of his theme that the parties could not communicate with one 

another, Moreno submitted hundreds of text messages between the parties, along 

with dozens of videos. He also testified about this subject himself after Lynch’s 

testimony concluded, along with his concerns about sexual abuse and her 

response to those concerns. Moreno’s sexual-abuse concerns were thoroughly 

vetted by the department and found uncredible in the reports Moreno stipulated 

could come into evidence. Moreno’s lack of organization resulting from his 

decision to proceed without counsel led to a large chunk of the trial being 

squandered. His cross-examination of Lynch about the issues he raises on appeal 

would have been further “unnecessary time consumption” and repetitive of other 

evidence. See Doré, § 5.611:2. We affirm the district court on this point. 

C. Legal Custody and Physical Care

Moreno next claims the court erred in placing the child in Lynch’s sole legal 

custody. The factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.41 apply to custody 
15

determinations in proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 600B. See Iowa Code 

§ 600B.40(2). Custody decisions turn on the child’s best interests and should 

“assure the child the opportunity for the maximum continuing physical and 

emotional contact with both parents” and “encourage parents to share the rights 

and responsibilities of raising the child unless direct physical harm or significant 

emotional harm to the child . . . is likely to result from such contact with one parent.” 

Id. § 598.41(1)(a). From these principles, we have said the “legislature and 

judiciary of this State have adopted a strong policy in favor of joint custody from 

which courts should deviate only under the most compelling circumstances.” In re 

Marriage of Winnike, 497 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Those 

compelling circumstances are present here. 

We have no concerns for Lynch’s suitability as a custodian for the child. 

See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(a). But as for Moreno, we agree with the district court 

that “the child has digressed in her development while in” his limited care. Though

Moreno complains no expert testimony was offered about the child’s regression, 

an expert was not needed for the court to read the writing on the wall. Moreno’s 

pattern of conduct—namely continuing his obsessive campaign about sexual 

abuse of the child at the hands of Lynch despite repeated and consistent findings 

to the contrary—shows he is willing to put his own desires over the child’s best 

interests. Thus, we have serious concerns for Moreno’s suitability as a custodian.

As to the child’s psychological and emotional needs and development, see 

id. § 598.41(3)(b), it is undisputed that the child loves Moreno and enjoys spending 

time with him. That said, the child is young and used to Lynch serving as her 

primary custodian. See id. § 598.41(3)(d). Because the child will have visitation 
16

with Moreno, albeit under certain conditions, we cannot conclude she will suffer 

psychologically or emotionally due to lack of contact or attention from Moreno. The 

opposite instead appears to be true. Like the district court found, Moreno “created 

a hostile environment focused on his misguided obsession with sexual assault,”

which harmed the child. See Knotek v. Mellin, No. 19-16000, 2020 WL 5229429, 

at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2020) (finding “continuous unfounded abuse reports 

operates a significant emotional harm to these children”). 

It is also undisputed that the parties’ ability to communicate with each other 

about the child’s needs is strained. See id. § 598.41(3)(c). This is largely due to

Moreno’s sexual-abuse campaign against Lynch. But even after his sordid 

allegations, Lynch mostly responded to him courteously and refrained from 

disparaging him. See In re Marriage of Jacobson, 2018 WL 1633512, at *4 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018) (affirming decision placing a child in the father’s physical 

care where despite the mother’s “outrageous conduct,” the father remained 

courteous). It also does not help that Moreno appears to lack the understanding 

that Lynch, who works full time, can’t respond to each of Moreno’s incessant text 

messages mere moments after he sends them. Even setting up basic routine 

matters about the child’s physical and mental health has been a constant tug of 

war. While tension alone is not sufficient to deny joint legal custody, the parties’ 

inability to communicate and cooperate rises above the “usual acrimony that 

accompanies” parental separation. See In re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d 

705, 715 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). The parties appear to recognize 

this considering that neither asked for joint legal custody. See Iowa Code 

§ 598.41(3)(g). 
17

We also have concerns about the viability of a joint custody relationship in 

light of Moreno’s inability to support Lynch’s relationship with the child. See id.

§ 598.41(3)(e). It is true that Lynch restricted the frequency of Moreno’s visitation

early on in the proceedings. But she did so only after she learned the details of 

what Moreno put the child through to try to support his claims of abuse—the 

multiple and unnecessary invasive physical examinations by medical 

professionals, the surreptitious collecting of the child’s urine in a public bathroom, 

and Moreno’s incessant questioning and recording of the child. Before then, she 

allowed Moreno regular and unsupervised contact with their daughter. And once 

the temporary order was entered, she substantially complied with its visitation 

provisions. Moreno, on the other hand, has continued to try to undermine the 

relationship between Lynch and the child by attempting to identify Lynch as a 

sexual abuser. See Winnike, 497 N.W.2d at 174 (discussing significance of false 

sexual abuse allegations made by mother in making custody determination); see 

also Knotek, 2020 WL 5229429, at *8; In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 524 N.W.2d 

212, 215–16 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). His conduct “is serious and should not be 

tolerated.” Knotek, 2020 WL 522949, at *8. 

The foregoing clearly and convincingly shows “that joint custody is 

unreasonable and not in the best interest of the child to the extent that the legal 

custodial relationship between the child and a parent should be severed.” Iowa 

Code § 598.41(2)(b). So, on our review, “[w]e agree with the district court that this 

is one of the rare cases where sole legal custody is appropriate and in the best 

interests of the child[].” Gensley, 777 N.W.2d at 717. We accordingly affirm the 
18

award of sole legal custody. As a result, we need not address the court’s award 

of physical care to Lynch. See id. at n.7; see also Iowa Code § 598.41(5)(a). 

Moreno relatedly requests that we “expand the sole legal custody provision 

to include that he is permitted access to the child’s medical, educational, and 

health records.” The decree did not specifically restrict him from having such 

access. To the extent it may be interpreted as doing so, we modify the decree to 

allow Moreno legal access to the child’s “medical, educational and law 

enforcement records.” See Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(e).

D. Visitation

Turning to Moreno’s visitation with the child, he first complains the decree 

impermissibly delegated discretion over visitation to Lynch. Assuming without 

deciding that it did, the district court revisited its visitation determination in its ruling 

on Moreno’s motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend. So we start from there. 

The court’s ultimate decision on visitation provided for graduated visitation. 

To begin, following entry of the final ruling in mid-May 2021, Moreno was 

authorized virtual contact with the child four days each week for fifteen minutes. 

Beginning in July, and contingent upon Moreno providing his therapist with the 

department’s investigative reports and the decree and participating in therapy, his 

visitation would increase to include supervised contact every other Saturday from 

10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Visits would progress to unsupervised after nine months 

and expand to include every other Saturday and Sunday, conditioned upon the 

child’s counselor’s recommendation and Moreno’s monthly participation in 

therapy. When the child reaches school age, visits can occur in Moreno’s home 
19

state of Wisconsin. The decree also authorized Lynch to expand visitation as she 

sees Moreno progress.

Moreno argues this visitation plan placed “onerous conditions” on his 

parenting time. But while he notes the court required him to provide his therapist 

with the department’s investigative assessments and the court’s decree, Moreno

makes no claim this was inappropriate. He goes on to complain “[t]he trial court 

then permitted [Lynch] to have power over increasing visitation as she felt 

appropriate,” based on his attendance at counseling. The problem with this claim 

is that pretty much every decree involving the custody of children permissibly 

allows the physical-care parent to increase visitation over the minimum ordered by 

the court. Here, in its expanded ruling, the district court did not order that any

visitation be at the discretion of Lynch, which would be reversible error. See, e.g., 

Thompson v. Fowler, No. 17-0284, 2017 WL 6513973, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Dec. 20, 2017). It instead provided graduated minimums and authorized Lynch to 

exceed those minimums, which is commonplace.

Next, Moreno complains the court gave him no in-person contact with the 

child until July 2021. Yet he offers no suggestion on what relief we can provide 

him now. That small window of time where he was only allowed virtual visits has 

come and gone and is now moot. Cf. Calcutt v. Calcutt, 320 S.E.2d 55, 59 (S.C. 

Ct. App. 1984) (finding challenge to six-month waiting period before visitation could 

begin moot because the period had expired and no controversy remained).

Moreno next disputes the plan for him to progress to unsupervised visits 

and the amount of time he is allowed. But sometimes, like here, conditions on 

visitation are justified. See In re Marriage of Rykhoek, 525 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. 
20

App. 1994); see also Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(i). “Additionally, a parent may agree 

to a condition on his or her visitation . . . .” Rykhoek, 525 N.W.2d at 5. 

At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, Moreno argued that if the court 

declined to immediately reinstate the temporary-visitation schedule (the denial of 

which we agree was appropriate), the court should instead implement “a graduated 

visitation schedule with the minor child through reunification efforts” that would

“allow for the child’s therapist . . . to create a reunification plan which affords Mr. 

Moreno visitation time with the child as the therapist deems appropriate,” all aimed 

at creating “a visitation schedule that would gradually get the parties back to the 

every-other-weekend schedule that they exercised prior to this trial.” That is 

essentially what the court did, so Moreno has no cause to complain now. See,

e.g., Jasper v. State, 477 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Iowa 1991) (noting a litigant “cannot 

deliberately act so as to invite error and then object because the court has 

accepted the invitation”); Odegard v. Gregerson, 12 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Iowa 1944); 

In re Marriage of Carter, No. 18-2157, 2019 WL 3714935, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Aug. 7, 2019); In re Marriage of Koster, No. 16-1583, 2017 WL 6040575, at *7 

(Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017). This also defeats Moreno’s claim that the court 

“made an impermissible delegation of power to the therapist.” Cf. In re Marriage 

of Schmidt, No. 13-0675, 2014 WL 2432549, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2014). 

Moreno specifically agreed the therapist should weigh in on the matter, so he 

cannot complain now that the court imposed this condition.

While we do find some of the triggering events for Moreno’s increased 

visitation to be arbitrary—like the nine-month waiting period—that period has 

already passed. At this point, Moreno should be exercising unsupervised visitation 
21

on alternating weekends provided that “the child is progressing, there are no issues 

with [Moreno’s] conduct, and the counselor makes a recommendation for 

expansion of the visitation.” Either party may make application to the district court 

to enforce this provision of its ruling, which we find appropriate under the 

circumstances presented here. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Strong, No. 07-1085, 

2008 WL 509071, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2008) (finding the

“therapeutic/supervised visitation provisions and subsequent reporting to the court 

before additional visitation determinations are made to be appropriate”). 

Lastly, Moreno raises various complaints about the alleged lack of 

specificity in the district court’s orders on logistics for virtual visits, exchange 

location, and visitation supervisors. We find the district court’s orders about the 

former two issues sufficiently specific to guide the parties. As to supervisors, we 

have no idea about the current status of visitation or arrangements the parties may 

have put in place while this appeal has been pending. And Moreno does not 

provide us with any specific request for relief on this point. We decline to formulate 

one for him. If the selection of appropriate visitation supervisors remains an issue, 

Moreno may pursue resolution of the issue in the district court. 

E. Attorney Fees

Moreno finally argues the district court abused its discretion by awarding 

Lynch trial attorney fees. The court may award attorney fees to a prevailing party 

in a proceeding under Iowa Code chapter 600B. Iowa Code § 600B.26. We review 

such an award for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 

N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006). “An award of attorney’s fees is based on the parties’ 
22

respective needs and ability to pay.” In re Marriage of O’Rourke, 547 N.W.2d 864, 

867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

Moreno traversed most of the proceedings and all of trial without counsel, 

throughout which his disorganization and inefficiency increased Lynch’s attorney 

fees. As Lynch explained in her testimony, Moreno “filed over . . . hundreds and 

hundreds of exhibits, and my attorney had to take the time to go through all of 

them, um, or most of them, or what he could get through. . . . I’m getting billed for 

that.” The district court determined Lynch’s annual income to be $27,000 and 

Moreno’s to be $70,000. On our review, we find the district court’s award to be in 

line with Lynch’s need and Moreno’s ability to pay and affirm.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm on all of the evidentiary issues raised by Moreno. We also affirm 

the district court’s decision to place the child in Lynch’s sole legal custody and 

physical care. To the extent that the decree restricted Moreno from accessing 

certain records of the child’s, we modify the decree to allow Moreno legal access 

to the child’s medical, educational, and law enforcement records. We affirm the 

visitation plan ordered by the district court and the award of attorney fees in favor 

of Lynch. Costs on appeal are taxed to Moreno. 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.