NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ALFRED B. CHARLES,

Petitioner,

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent.

______________________ 

2012-3196

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. NY0353110263-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: April 8, 2013 

______________________ 

ALFRED B. CHARLES, of South Ozone Park, New York, 

pro se. 

CALVIN M. MORROW, Attorney, Office of the General 

Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington, 

DC, for respondent. With him on the brief were BRYAN G.

POLISUK, General Counsel, and KEISHA DAWN BELL, 

Deputy General Counsel

______________________ 
2 ALFRED CHARLES v. MSPB

Before MOORE, CLEVENGER, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Alfred B. Charles appeals from a final order of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) dismissing his 

claim as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

Charles v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. NY0353110263-I-1 

(M.S.P.B. July 5, 2012) (Final Order). For the reasons 

discussed below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mr. Charles was employed as an electronic technician 

at the U.S. Postal Service (Agency). In January 2008, he 

filed a claim for an on-the-job back injury with the Office 

of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) and stopped 

reporting for work. About a month later, the Agency 

offered Mr. Charles a modified assignment, but he refused. The OWCP later found that the modified assignment was suitable. 

On March 10, 2008, the OWCP denied the injury 

claim because Mr. Charles failed to establish that his 

employment had caused his medical condition. On March 

24, 2008, Mr. Charles returned to work unannounced and 

was asked to leave the workplace. Mr. Charles then filed 

another claim with the OWCP for an injury that allegedly 

occurred on March 24. The OWCP denied that claim, and 

the Agency removed Mr. Charles effective August 15, 

2008 for providing inaccurate information on his March 

2008 OWCP claim. 

In October 2009, Mr. Charles requested restoration as 

a partially recovered employee, but the Agency declined to 

restore him. Mr. Charles appealed this decision to the 

Board. The Administrative Judge (AJ) dismissed the 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Charles v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., No. NY0353100036-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 10, 2009) 

(Restoration Decision). The AJ held that Mr. Charles 

failed to make a nonfrivolous claim for restoration be-
 ALFRED CHARLES v. MSPB 3

cause he had been removed for cause. Id. at 7. The AJ 

noted that the “documentation provided by the [A]gency 

demonstrates that he was removed for making a false 

claim to the OWCP.” Id. Thus, the AJ concluded that Mr. 

Charles was not eligible to be restored because he had 

been removed for filing a false claim. That decision 

became final when the Board denied Mr. Charles’s petition for review. Charles v. U.S. Postal Serv., 114 M.S.P.R. 

81 (2010) (Table). In parallel, the AJ reviewed Mr. 

Charles’s appeal of his removal and dismissed that claim 

for lack of jurisdiction as well. Charles v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., NY075210037-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 18, 2009) (Removal Decision). Mr. Charles did not appeal either decision.

In March 2011, the OWCP reversed its own determination regarding Mr. Charles’s January 2008 back injury 

claim, finding that it was work-related. The OWCP did 

not opine on the March 2008 claim. Mr. Charles then 

filed a third appeal, claiming that “I got injured on the job 

which was accepted by OWCP” and that “the Postal 

Service failed to restore me.” J.A. 47. He also alleged 

that “I did not commit fraud nor intended to commit fraud 

on any of my injury claims.” Id. at 48. 

The AJ dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Charles v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. NY0353110263-I-1 

(M.S.P.B. Sept. 14, 2011) (Initial Decision). The AJ 

explained that the Board had already resolved Mr. 

Charles’s challenge to the Agency’s refusal to restore him 

in the Restoration Decision. Id. at 8. The AJ held that 

the OWCP’s acceptance of Mr. Charles’s January 2008

injury claim did not undermine the Restoration Decision

because the Agency’s determination that the March 2008

claim was false remained unaffected. Id. at 9. The AJ 

therefore concluded that Mr. Charles was collaterally 

estopped from relitigating his claim. Id. at 10. The full 

Board affirmed, adopting the AJ’s reasoning and noting 

further that “there is no new, previously unavailable, 

evidence” to support Mr. Charles’s contention that the AJ 
4 ALFRED CHARLES v. MSPB

made an “error in law or regulation that affects this 

outcome.” Final Order at 4–5. 

Mr. Charles appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the question of whether the Board 

has jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal. Johnston v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 518 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

Nevertheless, we are bound by the Board’s underlying 

fact findings “unless those findings are not supported by 

substantial evidence.” Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 

F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Mr. Charles argues that the Board failed to take into 

account his January 2008 traumatic injury, which was 

“directly related” to the alleged injury during his return to 

work on March 24, 2008. Pet. Br. 1. He also contends 

that the Agency did not offer him accommodation for the 

January 2008 injury because the modified assignment 

was “so unreasonable that it amounted to arbitrary and 

capricious denial of restoration.” Id. Mr. Charles contends that the OWCP’s reversal of its position on the 

January 2008 injury calls into question its determination 

that the Agency’s modified assignment offer was suitable.

Mr. Charles also argues that the OWCP did not find 

that he tendered a fraudulent claim for the March 24 

injury. He contends that the Restoration Decision affirming removal for cause was “grossly unfair.” Id. at 2. Mr. 

Charles explains that, after his appearance at work on 

March 24, he meant to make a claim for a recurrence of 

the January 2008 injury, but the Agency mistakenly gave 

him a form for reporting new traumatic injuries. Mr. 

Charles contends that the determination that his March 

2008 claim was false cannot stand because he never 

intended to assert that he had a new traumatic injury. 

Furthermore, Mr. Charles argues that the recurrence of 
 ALFRED CHARLES v. MSPB 5

his back problems on March 24 occurred during the 

performance of his duties, which undermines the Agency’s 

basis for removing him for making a false claim of a workrelated injury. He contends that the true reason that that 

the Agency terminated him was his refusal to accept the 

modified assignment. Mr. Charles argues that he refused 

the assignment in good faith because it was “unsuitable” 

due to his “physical limitation.” Reply Br. 6. 

The government counters that the Board correctly 

found that the Restoration Decision resolved the same 

issues that are presented in this appeal: (1) whether the 

agency arbitrarily denied Mr. Charles an appropriate 

assignment prior to his removal and (2) whether the 

agency removed him for a cause unrelated to a compensable injury. The government argues that the OWCP’s 

changed evaluation of Mr. Charles’s January 2008 injury 

is irrelevant because it does not affect the resolution of 

either of these issues. The government contends that 

jurisdiction in this case and in the Restoration Decision

turns on whether that Mr. Charles was removed for 

cause, and that the Board had already answered that 

question in the affirmative in the Restoration Decision. 

The government argues Mr. Charles is therefore precluded by collateral estoppel from relitigating the question of 

whether he made a nonfrivolous restoration claim. 

We agree with the government that Mr. Charles’s 

claim is barred. “Like other tribunals, the Board may 

apply collateral estoppel where: (i) the issue previously 

adjudicated is identical with that now presented, (ii) that 

issue was actually litigated in the prior case, (iii) the 

previous determination of that issue was necessary to the 

end-decision then made, and (iv) the party precluded was 

fully represented in the prior action.” Morgan v. Dep’t of 

Energy, 424 F.3d 1271, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The AJ 

in the Restoration Decision determined that Mr. Charles 

was separated from work not because of a compensable 

injury, but because he was removed for cause. Restora-
6 ALFRED CHARLES v. MSPB

tion Decision at 7. That factual issue was actually litigated and was necessary to resolving that case. Although 

the AJ also examined whether the Agency’s February 

2008 modified assignment offer was reasonable, id., that 

issue could not have provided an alternative basis for the 

decision. The purpose of Mr. Charles’s legal challenge 

was to force the Agency to take him back, not to request a 

different assignment. Mr. Charles presses that challenge 

again in this case, but it was already resolved in the 

Restoration Decision. Lastly, it is undisputed that Mr. 

Charles was a party to the prior action. 

The fact that the OWCP recharacterized Mr. Charles’s 

January 2008 injury as work-related does nothing to 

disturb the preclusive effect of the Restoration Decision. 

In that decision, the Board determined that Mr. Charles 

was removed for cause because of a false claim arising 

from the March 2008 injury, not the January 2008 injury. 

Thus, in the decision now on appeal, the Board did not err 

when it concluded that Mr. Charles was collaterally 

estopped from relitigating his arguments for restoration. 

We have considered Mr. Charles’s other arguments 

and find them to be without merit. Because the Board 

correctly held that Mr. Charles’s appeal is barred by 

collateral estoppel, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.