Filed 6/24/14; pub. order 7/22/14 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

LILAS MOUA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
PITTULLO, HOWINGTON, BARKER, ABERNATHY, LLP et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B251787
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC471183)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Joseph R. Kalin, Judge. Affirmed.

OsbornLaw, Richard G. Osborn and Blair J. Berkley for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Nemececk & Cole, Jonathan B. Cole, Cl audia L. Stone, and Mark Schaeffer for Defendants and Respondents.2 Lilas Moua (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pittu llo, Howington, Barker, Abernathy, LLP; P. Timothy Pittullo (Pittullo) a nd Jonathon A. Zitney (Zitney) (collectively respondents) on appellant’s claim against respondents for legal malpractice. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellant was born and educated in the Un ited States. She bega n living with Alex Ng (Ng) in 1998. Appella nt and Ng participated in a traditional Hmong marriage ceremony in February 2000. 1 Ng paid a dowry, and they lived together as husband and wife. Ng signed numerous fo rmal documents and filed tax returns indicating he was married. The couple had two children togethe r. Appellant believed she was married to Ng. Ng informed appellant that he would take care of any papers or documents that were needed with respect to the marriage. However, no marri age license was ever obtained. On April 9, 2009, appellant retained respondents to assist her in obtaining a property settlement and child support from Ng . On April 23, 2009, respondents filed a petition for dissolution of marriag e in the matter captioned Moua v. Ng , San Bernardino County Superior Court case No. FAMRS 901291 (“family law case”). Pittullo represented to appellant that there was a 50 percent chance that th e family court would find her to be Ng’s putative spouse. 2 Pittullo further represen ted to appellant that she could win $1.5 to $2 million if the family court determ ined that she was Ng’s putative spouse. Pittullo also advised appellant that if she did not prevail on her putative spouse

1 “The Hmong are an Asian ethnic group from the mountainous regions of China, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.” (<http://e n.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hmong_people>.)

2 “‘Under the equitable putative spouse doct rine, a person’s reasonable, good faith belief that his or her marriage is valid entitle s that person to the benefits of marriage, even if the marriage is not, in fact, valid.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 973, 980.)3 claim, she could file a civil action pursuant to Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 ( Marvin ), along with a paternity action. 3 In August 2009, appellant instructed respondents to st op work because she and Ng were negotiating a settlement. In A ugust and September 2009, respondents communicated with appellant regarding the stat us of the settlement negotiations. In late August 2009, appellant inform ed respondents that she and Ng had reached a settlement, which included a one-time paym ent of $550,000. Ng late r offered to enter into a stipulated judgment in the family law case pr oviding, in part, that Ng would pay the sum of $550,000 to appellant. In a letter dated October 30, 2009, Zitn ey informed appellant that there were significant risks involved with trying the putativ e spouse issue, and informed her that if she were to lose that issue, sh e could walk away with nothing. In a letter dated April 27, 2010, Pittullo wrote to appe llant informing her of his “strong” recommendation that she accept Ng’s settlement offer of $550,000. Pittullo wrote: “Considering that you have a 50% chance of losing and walking away from $500,000, we have recommended that you ac cept the offer. However, the final decision is yours to make.” Appellant did not accept Ng’s offer. On May 6, 2010, appellant advised respondents to stop work ing on the settlement be cause she was not interested in settling. On May 14, 2010, Pittullo sent appellant a letter indicating that because appellant expressly agreed to a judgment in court, an d the court asked that such a judgment be drafted and presented, respondents were s till drafting the agreem ent pursuant to the
court’s directive. Pittullo indicated that the court may have “significant issues” with appellant’s decision to renege on the agreement.

3 In Marvin , the California Supreme Court held that unmarried adults who live together are free under general principles of c ontract law to make agreements concerning their property and earnings.4 On May 28, 2010, Ng’s attorney, Howa rd D. Pilch, faxed respondents the negotiated attachment to judgment signed by Ng. It provided, in part, for payments totaling $605,000. On June 1, 2010, appellant emailed resp ondents with a request to postpone all court dates on her case. On June 2, 2010 , respondents sent appellant a copy of the attachment to judgme nt for her review. On June 4, 2010, appellant retained Stolar & Associates (Stolar) to represent her in the family law case. On June 7, 2010, Pittullo received a lette r from Evan Bardo of Stolar indicating that appellant had retain ed Stolar and enclos ing a substitution of attorney signed by appellant. The same day, Zitney sent an ema il to appellant’s new
counsel with the attachment to judgment signed by Ng. On June 10, 2010, Pittullo sent Stolar the signed substitution of attorney, which was filed w ith the court that day. Appellant did not enter a settlement agre ement while represen ted by respondents. On June 18, 2010, Steven L. Finston of Stolar wrote ap pellant a letter advising her to accept the $605,000 settlement offer. Finston indicated hi s opinion that appellant’s chances of winning the putative spouse issue were “far lower” than 50/50. Appellant did not accept the offer. Instead she offered to settle for $750,000. Ng declined. 4 Ultimately, Ng’s motion to dismiss the family law case was granted on the ground that appellant was not a putative spouse, a nd appellant received nothing from Ng.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellant filed the present legal malp ractice lawsuit against respondents and Stolar, among others, on October 7, 2011. Appellant’s fourth amended complaint was filed October 15, 2012. It alleged one ca use of action against respondents for legal malpractice. On November 5, 2012, respondents file d their motion for summa ry judgment. In it, they argued that there was no proximate causal connection between the alleged breach

4 Appellant’s counsel insisted at oral argument that it was Ng who made the $750,000 offer. On the contra ry, the record reveals that it was appellant who made the offer, which Ng declined.5 and appellant’s injury due to the fact th at appellant’s case was taken over by new attorneys prior to the conc lusion of the matter. Further, respondents argued that appellant’s claim was barred by the one-year st atute of limitations found in Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.6. The motion was heard on August 15, 2 013, and the matter was taken under submission. On August 20, 2013, the trial cour t issued an order granting the motion. The court explained its conclusion that “[t]here are no triable issues of material fact to show any causation of alleged damages caused by [respondents’] conduct. [Respondents] recommended that [appellant] accept the settle ment offers.” Judgment in favor of respondents was entered on September 13, 2013. On October 2, 2013, appellant filed her notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
The standard of review for an order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is de novo. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 ( Aguilar ).) The trial court’s stated reasons for granting summary relief are not binding on the reviewing court, which reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. ( Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878.) A party moving for summary judgment “bea rs the burden of persuasion that there
is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ( Aguilar, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would a llow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the mo tion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” ( Ibid. , fn. omitted.) “A defenda nt bears the burden of persuasion that ‘one or more elements of’ th e ‘cause of action’ in question ‘cannot be established,’ or that ‘there is a comple te defense’ thereto. [Citation.]” ( Ibid. ) Generally, “the party moving for summa ry judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of prod uction, he causes a shift, and the opposing6 party is then subjected to a burden of pr oduction of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a tr iable issue of material fact. . . . A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the positi on of the party in question. [Citation.]” ( Aguilar, supra , 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851, fn. omitted.) II. Elements of legal malpractice cause of action “In a legal malpractice action arising from a civil proceeding, the elements are (1) the duty of the attorney to us e such skill, prudence, and d iligence as members of his or her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2 ) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate
causal connection between the breach and th e resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney ’s negligence. [Citations.]” ( Coscia v. McKenna &
Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1199.) Significa ntly, “‘[i]f the a llegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action in tort. [Citation.] . . .’ [Citation.]” ( Baltins v. James (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202.) 5 In the present matter, appellant argues that respondents’ representation that there was a 50 percent chance that th e family court would find her to be the putative spouse of Ng caused her to decline Ng’s settlement of fers of $550,000 and $605,000. Appellant asserts that she was damaged when the family law matter was dismissed and she recovered nothing.

5 Reasonable reliance is not an element of th e tort of legal malpractice, therefore we decline to address in detail appellant’s discu ssion of this concept. However, we note that appellant attempts to argue that it is never po ssible to conclude that a plaintiff’s reliance on a representation was unreasonable without stepping into the role of the trier of fact and weighing the evidence. This position is inco rrect. Appellant cite s only one case, which is not controlling authority: Hoyt Props. v. Producti on Res. Group, L.L.C. (Minn. 2007) 736 N.W.2d 313, 321. Appellant completely ignores the substantial body of California law on the topic of reasonable reliance. In Ca lifornia, the question of “whether a party’s reliance was justified may be decided as a ma tter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion based on the facts. [Citation.]” ( Guido v. Koopman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 837, 843; see also Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38, 54 [“‘If the conduct of the plaintiff in the light of his own intelligence and information was manifestly unreasonable, . . . he will be denied a recovery’”].)7 III. Respondents’ burden: the nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact In their motion for summary judgment, respondents argued that there was no triable issue of material fact as to proxim ate causation. “[T]he question of proximate
cause . . . becomes one of law where the f acts are uncontroverted and only one deduction or inference may reasonably be drawn therefrom. [Citations.]” ( Whinery v. Southern
Pac. Co. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 126, 128.) Respondents point out that they recommended to appellant that she settle the case, advised her that there was significant risk in trying her case, and warned her that she could walk away with nothing if she lost the putative spouse issue. Respondents negotiated a stipulated judgment providing th at Ng would pay appe llant $605,000, which Ng signed. Respondents urged appellant to accept the settlement. Shortly thereafter, appellant retained new counsel, who also recommended that appellant accept the $605,000 offer. In spite of both counsels’ recommendations, appellant rejected the settlement. Based on these undisputed facts, respondents take the position that it was appellant’s own actions, in reje cting her attorneys’ advice, wh ich was the direct cause of her damage. In addition, respondents argue that appe llant’s retention of subsequent counsel (Stolar), who independen tly advised appellant about Ng’s offer of $605,000, broke the causal chain between respondents and appe llant. In support of this argument, respondents cite severa l cases. The first, Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46 ( Steketee ), involved a plaintiff who claimed that the defendant law firm and two of its members negligently failed to file an action for medical malpractice on plaintiff’s behalf within the limitations period. ( Id. at p. 50.) However, the attorneyclient relationship between plaintiff and defe ndants was terminated in January 1979, and the plaintiff’s cause of action for medical malpractice did not expire until September 1979. ( Id. at p. 57.) The Supreme Court conclude d, “An attorney can not be held liable for failing to file an action prior to the expira tion of the statute of limitations if he ceased to represent the client and was replaced by other counsel before the statute ran on the client’s action. [Citations.]” ( Ibid. ; see also Stuart v. Superior Court (1992) 148 Cal.App.4th 124, 127 [attorney “entitled to summary judgment because he was not the attorney of record for [plaintiff] at the time hi s former client is alleged to have lost the right to pursue the personal injury action”].) Similarly, respondents argue, an attorney
cannot be held liable for a client ’s failure to accept a settleme nt when the attorney ceases to represent the client and is replaced by ot her counsel while the se ttlement offer is still

open. Respondents al so rely upon Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154 ( Filbin ). Filbin is a “settle and sue” case, “which i nvolves a former client suing after litigation has been settled. Depending on whet her the disgruntled client was the plaintiff
or the defendant in the antecede nt lawsuit, the basis of the cl aim is that the settlement was
less than it should have been, or more than it had to be , by reason of the negligence of the party’s attorney.” ( Id. at p. 157.) In Filbin , the trial court awarded former clients more than half a million dollars for malpractice by th eir former attorney. The Court of Appeal reversed, “concluding that as a matter of la w there [was] no causal connection between the attorney’s assertedly negl igent acts and omissions and the amount the clients received when they settled.” ( Ibid. )
The matter involved an em inent domain proceeding in itiated by San Luis Obispo County against the Filb ins. An appraiser hired by F itzgerald, the Filb ins’s attorney, appraised the property at $4,535,000. However, Mr. Filbin, a former real estate broker, believed the property was worth betw een $12 million and $15 million. ( Filbin, supra
, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 159.) Fitzgerald advi sed the Filbins that they were required to
make a final settlement offer under the mandato ry settlement provisions found in Code of
Civil Procedure section 1250.410. He also in formed them that the law generally requires that the property owner make a settlement demand in a figure less than the appraisal opinion. ( Id. at pp. 159-160.) This statement was in correct, as no authority requires such a reduced demand. ( Id. at p. 168.) However, the Court of Appeal pointed out that “attorney breach es of the standard of care are not per se actionable. [Citations.]” ( Filbin, supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169-170.) The court concluded that “nothing Fitzgerald did, or did not do, up to the time9 he departed as the Filbins’ co unsel caused the Filb ins to do anything to their detriment.” ( Id . at p. 170.) Indeed, the trial court noted, the Filbins refused to follow his advice and
refused to lower their demand to the amount stated by the appraiser. ( Ibid .) Thereafter, they acquired new counsel, and it was with that new attorney’s impartial advice that they proceeded. The court conclude d, “Their decision to settle was theirs and theirs alone, made with the assistance of new counsel, with no input fro m Fitzgerald. The consequences of that decision are likewise theirs alone.” ( Id. at p. 171.) Similarly, respondents argue, appellant re fused to follow their advice and accept Ng’s settlement offer. Thereafter, appellant acquired new counsel, and it was with her new counsel’s impartial advice that she procee ded. Appellant’s ultimate decision not to settle, in spite of her attorneys’ advice that she do so, was hers alone, and the consequences of that deci sion are likewise hers alone. 6 We find that the cases cited by respondents support their position that there is no
triable issue of material fact as to causati on. Appellant disregarde d respondents’ advice to accept the initial settlement offer from Ng. Appellant reta ined new counsel while Ng’s offer of $605,000 was still pendi ng. Appellant’s new counsel also strongly encouraged her to accept the settlement. It was her own deci sion, against the advice of her attorneys,
to decline. No causal connec tion exists between any allege d malpractice and appellant’s
loss as a matter of law.

6 Appellant attempts to distinguish Filbin on the ground that it was a “settle and sue” case. Here, appellant argues, there wa s no settlement. Appellant is suing because she declined Ng’s settl ement offers to her substantial de triment. We find this factual distinction to be insignificant under the circ umstances. Appellant is complaining of essentially the same thing: she got less than what she could have. Appellant also attempts to distinguish Filbin because the Filbins rejected Fitzgerald’s advice. Appellant insi sts: “Obviously, after the Filbins rejected Fitzgerald’s advice and hired new counsel, there could be no reliance on F itzgerald or causation.” However, the facts here show that appellant did exactly the same th ing: she rejected respondents’ advice to accept Ng’s settlement offer, then hired new counsel. Following appellant’s own logic, there can be no reliance or causation under these facts.10 IV. Appellant has failed to sh ow the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to proximate cause Because respondents have met their burde n of production, ther e is a shift, and appellant is subjected to a burden of pr oduction of her own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a tria ble issue of material fact as to the element of causation. ( Aguilar, supra , 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.) As set forth below, we find that appellant
has failed to meet this burden. Appellant states that, in reliance on re spondents’ negligent representation that there was a 50 percent chance th e family court would find her to be Ng’s pu tative spouse and award her $1.5 to $2 m illion, she declined to accep t Ng’s settlement offers. Appellant insists that if respondents had advi sed her that there was less than a 50 percent
chance that she would be decl ared Ng’s putative spouse, sh e would have accepted Ng’s settlement offers. In other words, appellant claims, but for responde nts’ negligence, she would have obtained a greater reward. 7 Appellant argues that the trial court faile d to credit her declar ation, which states “In reliance on [respondents’] representation th at there was a 50-percent chance that the family court would find me to be Ng’s putative spouse and award me $1.5 to $2.0 million, I declined to sign the Attachment to Judgment (Fam ily Law) that Ng signed on May 28, 2010, that provided for a payment of $605,000 to me.” Appellant argues that it is axiomatic that a trial court may not wei gh the evidence on summary judgment, thus it was improper for the trial court to reje ct this evidence in her declaration. Appellant’s insistence that she relied on respondents’ representation that she had a 50 percent chance of winning is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to legal causation. “[A]n issue of fact is not raised by ‘cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory assertions.’ [Citation.]” ( Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190,

7 Appellant’s reliance on Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App. 4th 170 regarding the concept of but-for causation is misplaced. Charnay addresses the sufficiency of legal malpractice allegations on demurrer. Here , the question is whether appellant can establish causation as a matter of law on the undisputed facts of this case.11 196.) A 50 percent chance is just that: you might win, you might lo se. Respondents did not encourage appellant to gamble on this 50/ 50 chance. On the contrary, the undisputed facts show that respondents strongly enco uraged appellant to accept Ng’s settlement offer. Appellant does not deny that responde nts encouraged her to accept the settlement. The undisputed evidence shows that she simply ignored this advice. Appellant was not relying on her attorneys’ advice in rejecting the settlement, as her attorneys’ advice was to accept the settlement. Appella nt’s conclusory assertion to the contrary does not create
a triable issue of fact. 8 Appellant also disputes respondents’ position that her replacem ent of respondents
with new counsel broke the chain of causation, based on language in Cline v. Watkins (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 174 ( Cline ). Cline was a legal malpractice case which stemmed from a divorce proceeding. Watkins, Cline’s former attorney, filed a divorce action on January 21, 1969, claiming several items as community property . Cline’s former husband stated that he was receiving $376.15 per month in “Air Force retirement pay.” However, Cline’s community in terest in the retirement pa y was not asserted in the dissolution action. ( Id. at p. 177.) On May 13, 1969, a substitution of a ttorney was filed re lieving Watkins of representation of Cline. A week later, an attorney named Scott was substituted as counsel. ( Cline, supra , 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 177.) Wh en Cline filed a malpractice action against both attorneys for their failure to assert her community property interest in the retirement money, Watkins demurred on the gr ound that there was no causal connection

8 Appellant cites law suggesting that it is improper for a court to resolve issues of credibility on summary judgment. ( AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1065 [“A court ge nerally cannot resolve questions about a declarant’s credibility in a summary judgment proceeding”] .) In determining that appellant’s declaration does not create a triabl e issue of material fact, we need not make any credibility determinations nor weigh any evidence. Instead, we are making a judgment regarding legal proximate caus ation based on undisp uted evidence. Appellant’s alleged reliance on a single stat ement that gave her only a 50 percent chance of winning was not the legal cause of her failu re to obtain a settlement. The legal cause of her failure to obtain a settlement was her ow n decision to reject two separate attorneys’ recommendations that she accept the settlement.12 between his negligence and Cline’s damage because he was relieved before judgment was entered and subsequent coun sel could have cured the error.
The trial court sustained Watkins’ demu rrer, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The question addressed was “whether the negligen ce of Scott disclosed by the file in the
dissolution action to have occurre d after that of Watson is a superseding cause which as a
matter of law excuses the latter from liability. [Citation.]” ( Cline, supra , 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 178.) Thus, both attorneys were alleged to have committed the same negligence: failing to secure Cline’s community property interest in her former husband’s retirement fund. The question was whether the second a ttorney’s negligence superseded Watkins’ negligence. Finding the question to be one of foreseeability, the Court of Appeal
determined that a factual issue existed. Appellant has not raised an issue here regarding superseding negligence. She specifically asserts that it was respondents who put her chances of winning at 50/50; appellant’s subsequent counse l put her chances “far lower.” Nor do respondents argue that the negligence of Stolar was a supersed ing cause of appellant’s damage. Instead, respondents argue that Stola r, operating independently and w ithin the standard of care, advised appellant that her chances of winn ing the putative spouse issue were not good and encouraged her to take Ng’s settlement . In other words, subsequent counsel did attempt to prevent any harm that may have been cause d by respondents’ alleged
overestimation of success on the putative spouse issue. Appe llant chose to ignore this good advice. It was that choice which was the proximate cause of her damage. Because we are not addressing an issu e of superseding negligence, Cline , and the lengthy foreseeability discussion th erein, are inapplicable. 9

9 The Restatement Second of Torts section 452, discussed in Cline , is captioned “Third Person’s Failure to Prevent Harm.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 452.) The restatement is plainly inapplicable to the facts before us. It covers a situation in which “after the original actor has been negligent and so ha s created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, a third person has th e opportunity, by taking affirmative action, to avert the threatened harm. This imp lies that if such action were taken, it would prevent the negligence of the original act or from causing the harm whic h has in fact resulted.”13 In sum, appellant has failed to show the ex istence of a triable issue of material fact
as to causation under the undi sputed facts of this case.
V. Statute of limitations issue Respondents have raised a second ground for summary judgment. They argue that the malpractice action against them is barred by the one-year statute of limitations found
in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The parties raise various conflicting arguments about when exactly appellant ’s cause of action accrued. Because we have determined that appellant cannot show the existence of a triable issue of material fact regarding the element of proximate cause, we decline to address the statute of limitations issue. ( Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 845, fn. 5 [“appellate courts will not ad dress issues whose resolution is unnecessary to disposition of the appeal”].)
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Responde nts are awarded their costs of appeal.

_______ _______________ ______, J. CHAVEZ We concur:

_____________ _____________, P. J. BOREN

___________________ _______, J.* FERNS

(Rest.2d Torts, § 452, Com. a.) Again, neither party here is suggesting that Stolar failed to prevent appellant’s harm. The undisputed facts show that Stolar -- like respondents -- made every effort to prevent harm to appella nt by encouraging her to take the settlement.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chie f Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.14 Filed 7/22/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

LILAS MOUA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
PITTULLO, HOWINGTON, BARKER, ABERNATHY, LLP et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B251787
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC471183)

ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:*

The opinion in the above entitled matter f iled on June 24, 2014, was not certified for publication.

For good cause it now appears that the opi nion should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

*BOREN, P. J., CHAVEZ, J., FERNS, J.†
† Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.