alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE v. DELOS AVERN HILL, JR.

(Filed 14 January, 1955.)

Bigamy and Bigamous Cohabitation § 3: Criminal Law § 39c—

In a prosecution for -bigamous cohabitation, the wife is competent to testify against her husband to prove the fact of marriage, but she is not competent to give testimony as to the absence of a divorce, and the admission of her testimony in regard thereto is prejudicial. G-.S. 8-57.

Appeal by defendant from *Fountain, Special J.,*March-April 1954 Criminal Term of Durham.

Criminal prosecution on bill of indictment charging bigamous cohabitation, under G.S. 14-183. Defendant pleaded Not Guilty.

The State offered as its witness the alleged first wife of defendant. She was permitted to testify, over objections by defendant, not only that she and defendant were married in Danville, Virginia, on 4 August, 1947, *410but to tbe place and duration of their cohabitation pursuant thereto, and also that since their marriage there had been no divorce proceedings commenced by her, and that she had never heard of any divorce action her husband had started and had not been served with papers in any such divorce action.

The jury returned a verdict of Guilty as charged. Thereupon, the court pronounced judgment, from which defendant appeals, assigning as error the admission of the testimony stated above.

*Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Love for the State.*

*Spears ■& Spears for defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

G.S. 8-57, since the 1951 amendment, provides expressly that a wife is a competent witness against her husband in a criminal prosecution for bigamous cohabitation under G.S. 14-183 “to prove the fact of marriage.” Here the wife’s testimony goes beyond the prescribed limit. This is conceded by the Attorney-General.

In *S. v. Setzer,*226 N.C. 216, 37 S.E. 2d 513, this Court, conceding, without deciding, that G.S. 8-57, before the 1951 amendment, made the wife a competent witness “to prove the fact of marriage” in a prosecution for bigamous cohabitation as well as in a prosecution for bigamy, construed the statute as meaning (1) that she was a competent witness only to facts tending to show that she and defendant had been legally married, and (2) that her testimony beyond this limit, *e.g.,*as to absence of divorce proceedings wherein she was plaintiff or defendant, was incompetent. It is noteworthy that the 1951 amendment (Oh. 296, Session Laws of 1951) of G.S. 8-57 did not in any way enlarge the meaning of the phrase, “to prove the fact of marriage,” as construed in the *Seizer case.*

Should G.S. 8-57 be amended so as to facilitate prosecutions for bigamy and bigamous cohabitation by making the wife a competent witness against her husband to prove (1) that she and defendant had been legally married, and (2) that they are now legally married, *i.e.,*facts within her knowledge tending to show the absence of divorce proceedings wherein she was plaintiff or defendant *%*This is a question for consideration by the General Assembly.

Under G.S. 8-57, as construed in the *Seizer case,*incompetent evidence, prejudicial to defendant, was admitted, necessitating a

New trial.
EXHIBIT 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Lightlake Therapeutics Inc. (the “Company") for the year ended July 31, 2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Seijin Ki, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Date: October 29, 2012





By: /s/ Seijin Ki


Seijin Ki


Chief Financial Officer











This certification accompanies each Report pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of ss.18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### WILLIAM BRUMSEY v. CLYDE MATHIAS and GLADYS MATHIAS.

(Filed 3 January, 1940.)

Automobiles § 19—

In an action by a guest in an automobile against tbe driver to recover for injuries sustained in an accident occurring in tbe State of Virginia, judgment for plaintiff is error when tbe jury finds that the defendant was not guilty of gross negligence, since such finding is necessary to a recovery by a guest under the laws of that state.

Appeal by defendants from *Carr, J.,*at March Term, 1939, of Currituck:.

Reversed.

The issues submitted to the jury and their answers thereto were as follows:

“1. Was the plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendants, as alleged in the complaint? Ans.: ‘Yes.’

“2. Was the negligence of the defendants gross negligence? Ans.: ‘No.’

*744“3. Did the plaintiff contribute to his injury by his own negligence, as alleged in the answer? Ans.: ‘No.’

“4. What damages, if any, is -the plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendants? Ans.: ‘$500.00.’ ”

The court below rendered judgment on the verdict against the defendants for $500.00. The defendants made numerous exceptions and appealed to the Supreme Court.

*A. H. Scales, Chester R. Morris, M. B. Simpson, and R. Clarence Dozier, for plaintiff.*

*J. Henry LeRoy for defendants.*

Per Curiam.

The injury to plaintiff occurred in the State of Virginia. The evidence indicates that plaintiff was a guest. Under the law of Virginia a guest cannot recover except for gross negligence.

From a careful reading and re-reading of the record and briefs, we cannot say that the conduct of defendants amounted to gross negligence. *Farfour v. Fahad,*214 N. C., 281.

The judgment is

Reversed.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

ANTHONY VICTOR LEROSE, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-4864

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

___________________________________)

Opinion filed April 5, 2019.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee 

County; Deno Economou, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and 

Julius J. Aulisio, Assistant Public Defender, 

Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Jonathan S. Tannen, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

LaROSE, C.J., and KHOUZAM and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
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REQUEST TO BE REMOVED FROM ECF NOTIFICATIONS

1

MARY ELLMANN TANG (SBN 154340)

PATRICIA H. LYON (SBN 126761)

KEVIN E. FUSCH (SBN 255877) 

FRENCH LYON TANG

A Professional Corporation

1550 Parkside Drive, Suite 250

Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Telephone: (925) 678-1876

Attorneys for Creditor,

CRISTINA MENDOZA

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

In Re:

PG&E CORPORATION 

 -andPACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC 

COMPANY

 Debtors.

______________________________/

Case No. 19-30088 (DM) and 19-30089

Chapter 11

(Jointly Administered) 

REQUEST TO BE REMOVED FROM 

ECF NOTIFICATIONS

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND ALL INTERESTED PARTIES: 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002 and 9007, the undersigned 

attorney hereby requests to be removed from the Court’s Courtesy Notification of Electronic 

Filing in these jointly administered cases. 

Dated: May 23, 2023

FRENCH LYON TANG

A Professional Corporation

By: /s/Mary Ellmann Tang

MARY ELLMANN TANG

Attorneys for CRISTINA MENDOZA

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13765 Filed: 05/23/23 Entered: 05/23/23 12:19:24 Page 1

of 2
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REQUEST TO BE REMOVED FROM ECF NOTIFICATIONS

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of May, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of 

such filing to all those entitled hereto. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is 

true and correct. 

Executed this 23rd day of May, 2023, at Walnut Creek, California.

/s/Nicole Fears

NICOLE FEARS

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13765 Filed: 05/23/23 Entered: 05/23/23 12:19:24 Page 2

of 2
#### Stephen Main, Appellant, v. John Spink, Respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Opinion by

Corlett, J.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-17-00437-CV

RICARDO VAIZ AND MARIA F. VAIZ

v.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, AURORA BANK, LEHMAN 

BROTHERS BANK FSB, AND NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC

On Appeal from the

138th District Court of Cameron County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2013-DCL-2466-B

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are adjudged 

against appellants.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

March 7, 2019
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert White, Appellant.

[772 NYS2d 601]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Latella, J.), rendered January 31, 2002, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), assault in the first degree, and assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s claim that certain comments made by the prosecutor during summation and the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct constituted reversible error is largely unpreserved for appellate review since the defendant made only general objections, did not request curative instructions when the objections were sustained, and did not timely move for a mistrial *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Smith,*298 AD2d 607 [2002]; *People v Bruen,*136 AD2d 648, 649 [1988]). In any event, most of the challenged remarks were proper because they constituted either fair comment upon the evidence or a fair response to the defense summation *(see People v Ivory,*307 AD2d 1000, 1001 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 643 [2003]; *People v Clark,*132 AD2d 704, 705 [1987]; *People v Colon,*122 AD2d 151 [1986]). With respect to the remaining challenged remarks, the trial court’s immediate admonitions served to ameliorate any prejudicial effect that may have resulted *(see People v Galloway,*54 NY2d 396, 399 [1981]; *People v Armonte,*287 AD2d 645, 646 [2001]). Moreover, the challenged remarks, both individually and cumulatively, constituted harmless error in light of the *512overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt *(see People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230, 241 [1975]; *People v Ivory, supra; People v Garrett,*219 AD2d 670 [1995]). Smith, J.P., Goldstein, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.
EX-10.1






Exhibit 10.1




August 2, 2009




Hicks Acquisition Company I, Inc.

100 Crescent Court, Suite 1200

Dallas, TX 75201

Attention: Joseph B. Armes




We are writing to set forth an amendment to the Underwriting Agreement between and among Hicks
Acquisition Company I, Inc. (the “Company”) and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. as Representative for
the Several Underwriters, dated September 27, 2007 (the “Underwriting Agreement”). Capitalized
terms used herein that are not otherwise defined have the meanings ascribed to them in the
Underwriting Agreement.



The Underwriters agree that in the event that the Deferred Discount becomes payable such Deferred
Discount will be in an aggregate amount equal to $5,500,000 (hereby being reduced from the
$17,388,000 that would otherwise be payable (the “New Deferred Discount Amount”). Each of the
undersigned represent and warrant that they are parties entitled to such fee and thereby the
parties authorized to agree to the afore-mentioned discount. The Underwriters are making the
foregoing amendment in consideration of efforts that are being expended by the Company in pursuing
a Business Combination and acknowledge that the Company is pursuing the structuring of such
Business Combination in reliance on this letter. This letter sets forth the entire agreement with
respect to the discount and may only be amended by a writing signed by the Company and the
Underwriters.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	Very truly yours,





CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Jason Cunningham
 	 
	 	Name:  	Jason Cunningham 	 
	 	Title:  	Managing Director 	 
	 
	 	LAZARD CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/
David G. McMillan, Jr. 	 
	 	Name:  	David
G. McMillan, Jr. 	 
	 	Title:  	Managing Director 	 
	 
	 	LADENBURG THALMANN & CO. INC.

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Peter H. Blum
 	 
	 	Name:  	Peter H. Blum 	 
	 	Title:  	Vice Chairman 	 
	 




 









 




Accepted and agreed to as of
the date set forth above:


Hicks Acquisition Company I, Inc.


By:        /s/ Joseph B. Armes                    
Name:   Joseph B. Armes
Title:     President & CEO
Presidential Documents

65015

Federal Register

Vol. 60, No. 241

Friday, December 15, 1995

Title 3—

The President

Proclamation 6858 of December 13, 1995

Wright Brothers Day, 1995

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Ninety-two years ago, Orville Wright manned the first sustained and controlled, machine-powered flight in an airplane he designed and built with

his brother Wilbur. This extraordinary journey, though only 12 seconds

long, was the first great achievement of a partnership that revolutionized

aviation and made remarkable contributions to aerodynamics, mechanical

engineering, and practical flight techniques. The Wright brothers’ pioneering

efforts remain enduring examples of American ingenuity and perseverance.

Today, the United States aviation industry helps to drive our economy

and provides business and recreational opportunities to our citizens that

were unthinkable just a century ago. Our reliance on air transit grows

each year, challenging the aviation community and the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) to meet new safety and operational demands.

Our air transportation system, already the safest and most efficient in the

world, continues to improve. In fact, efforts are underway to craft reforms

that enhance the efficiency of the FAA so that America’s leadership in

air transportation, begun with the Wright brothers’ historic flight on December

17, 1903, can continue well into the next century.

The Congress, by a joint resolution approved December 17, 1963 (77 Stat.

402; 36 U.S.C. 169), has designated December 17 of each year as ‘‘Wright

Brothers Day’’ and has authorized and requested the President to issue

annually a proclamation inviting the people of the United States to observe

that day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States

of America, do hereby proclaim December 17, 1995, as Wright Brothers

Day.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirteenth day

of December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-five,

and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred

[FR Doc. 95–30726

Filed 12–14–95; 8:45 am]

Billing code 3195–01–P

and twentieth.

œ–
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#### Pauline Karsokas *vs.*Universal Motor Sales Co. Stephen Karsokas *vs.*Same.

Suffolk.

November 3, 1931.

November 3, 1931.

Present: Rugg, C.J., Pierce, Wait, Sanderson, & Field, JJ.

*Negligence,*Contributory, In use of way.

Upon the evidence at the trial of an action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian, while crossing a street, by reason of negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant, the question, whether the plaintiff should have allowed the motor vehicle to pass in front of him or whether he might reasonably undertake to pass in front of it, was for the jury; and it could not properly have been ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

Two actions of tort, the first action for personal injuries and the second action by the husband of .the plain*155tiff in the first action for consequential damages. Writs dated February 9, 1928, and February 1, 1929, respectively.

The actions were tried in the Superior Court before *Donahue,*J. The judge denied a motion by the defendant in each action that a verdict be ordered in its favor. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in the first action in the sum of $7,500, and for the plaintiff in the second action in the sum of $500. The defendant alleged exceptions.

*C. F. Albert, (B. J. Walsh*with him,) for the defendant.

*A. J. Berkwitz,*for the plaintiffs, was not called on.

By the Court.

The action by the female plaintiff is in tort to recover compensation for personal injuries alleged to have been caused to her by the negligence of a servant of the defendant operating its motor vehicle in the course of his employment. The only question argued by the defendant is that this plaintiff is barred from recovery because of her own contributory negligence. The evidence on this point need not be narrated in detail. The plaintiff was injured while as a pedestrian she was crossing a street in Boston. Whether she ought to have stopped in order to let the defendant’s motor vehicle pass in front of her or whether she had a right in the exercise of reasonable judgment for her own safety to undertake to pass in front of the approaching truck, G. L. c. 90, § 14, as amended, was a question of fact and could not be ruled as matter of law. The case at bar falls within the authority of cases like *Gauthier*v. *Quick,*250 Mass. 258, *Newman*v. *Hill,*250 Mass. 578, and *Hutchinson*v. *H. E. Shaw Co.*273 Mass. 51.

Because the female plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury, the case of her husband was also rightly submitted to the jury.

*Exceptions overruled.*
#### James M. Kater vs. Commonwealth.

December 21, 1995.

*Supreme Judicial*Court,

Superintendence of inferior courts.

*Practice, Criminal,*Interlocutory appeal.

James M. Kater (defendant) has been convicted by two different juries of kidnapping and murder in the first degree; this court has reversed the convictions on both occasions. A third trial ended in a mistrial. The Commonwealth is preparing to try the defendant a fourth time. To that end, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to admit evidence of prior bad acts. The trial judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion.

In August, 1995, the defendant filed in the county court a petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3 (1994 ed.). A single justice denied the petition. The defendant appealed. The Commonwealth has moved to dismiss *1009the appeal. The Commonwealth’s motion is allowed. Whatever relief the defendant may be entitled to may be sought in the normal course of appeal.

*Joseph F. Krowski,*for the defendant, submitted a brief.

*Appeal dismissed.*
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5765 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5765

     To amend the Native American Programs Act of 1974 to provide 
 flexibility and reauthorization to ensure the survival and continuing 
                 vitality of Native American languages.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 20, 2014

Mr. Ben Ray Lujan of New Mexico (for himself, Mr. Young of Alaska, Ms. 
   McCollum, Mr. Moran, Mr. Grijalva, and Mr. Honda) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and 
                             the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To amend the Native American Programs Act of 1974 to provide 
 flexibility and reauthorization to ensure the survival and continuing 
                 vitality of Native American languages.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Native American Languages 
Reauthorization Act of 2014''.

SEC. 2. NATIVE AMERICAN LANGUAGES GRANT PROGRAM.

    Section 803C of the Native American Programs Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 
2991b-3) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)(7)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``10'' and 
                inserting ``5''; and
                    (B) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``15'' and 
                inserting ``10''; and
            (2) in subsection (e)(2)--
                    (A) by striking ``or 3-year basis'' and inserting 
                ``3-year, 4-year, or 5-year basis''; and
                    (B) by inserting ``, 4-year, or 5-year'' after ``on 
                a 3-year''.

SEC. 3. REAUTHORIZATION OF NATIVE AMERICAN LANGUAGES PROGRAM.

    Section 816(e) of the Native American Programs Act of 1974 (42 
U.S.C. 2992d(e)) is amended by striking ``2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 
2012'' and inserting ``2015 through 2019''.
                                 <all>
```
|   | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |   | /s/ Patricia Niu    |   |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Patricia Niu                       |   |
|   |   | Chief Financial Officer            |   |
Exhibit 21.1

KKR Financial Holdings LLC
List of Subsidiaries

Company

Jurisdiction of Incorporation or FormationKKR TRS Holdings, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKKR Financial Holdings, Inc.

DelawareKKR Financial Holdings II, LLC

DelawareKKR Financial Holdings III, LLC

DelawareKKR Financial Holdings IV, LLC

DelawareKKR Financial CLO Holdings, LLC

DelawareKKR Financial CLO 2005-1, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKKR Financial CDO 2005-1, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKKR Financial CLO 2006-1, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKKR Financial CLO 2007-1, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKKR Financial CLO 2007-A, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKKR Financial CLO 2009-1, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKKR Financial Holdings, Ltd.

Cayman IslandsKFH PE Holdings I LLC

DelawareKFH PE Holdings II LLC

DelawareKFN PEI V, LLC

DelawareKFN PEI VII, LLC

DelawareKFN PEI IX, LLC

DelawareKFN PEI XI, LLC

DelawareKKR Financial Capital Trust I

DelawareKKR Financial Capital Trust II

DelawareKKR Financial Capital Trust III

DelawareKKR Financial Capital Trust IV

DelawareKKR Financial Capital Trust V

DelawareKKR Financial Capital Trust VI

Delaware


---



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