[Cite as Varga v. Drees Co., 2014-Ohio-643.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

PAUL VARGA, et al. 

 Appellees 

 v. 

THE DREES COMPANY 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 13CA010385 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 12CV178725 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: February 24, 2014 

 

CARR, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, The Drees Co., appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of 

Common Pleas denying its motion to stay pending arbitration. This Court reverses and remands. 

I. 

{¶2} In 2010, Paul and Rebecca Varga entered into a contract with The Drees Co., 

d/b/a Drees Homes, for the construction of a new residence in Avon, Ohio. On December 7, 

2012, the Vargas filed a complaint against Drees alleging negligence, breach of implied warranty 

of suitability, breach of contract, and failure to comply with local building codes. On January 

22, 2013, Drees filed both an answer to the complaint, and a motion to stay pending arbitration. 

The Vargas filed a brief in opposition to the motion, and Drees replied thereto. Subsequently, 

the trial court issued a journal entry summarily denying the motion for a stay. 

{¶3} Drees filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Drees raises one assignment of 

error. 
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II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO STAY PENDING ARBITRATION. 

{¶4} In its assignment of error, Drees argues that the trial court erred in denying its 

motion for a stay pending arbitration. This Court agrees. 

{¶5} In support of its assignment of error, Drees argues that because all of the Vargas’ 

claims arise directly from the construction agreement, they fall within the arbitration agreement 

set forth in the parties’ agreement. In response, the Vargas assert that the trial court properly 

denied the motion to stay because its claims for negligence, breach of implied warranty of 

suitability, and failure to comply with local building codes did not arise out of the parties’ 

agreement, and that those claims could be maintained separately from the agreement. 

{¶6} The question of whether an arbitration provision is applicable presents a matter of 

contract interpretation. Thus, “[t]he arbitrability of a claim is a question of law, and we review 

the arbitrability of a claim de novo.” Murray v. David Moore Builders, Inc., 177 Ohio App.3d 

62, 2008-Ohio-2960, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting McManus v. Eicher, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2003-CA30, 2003-Ohio-6669, ¶ 11. 

{¶7} R.C. 2711.01(A) states: 

A provision in any written contract * * * to settle by arbitration a controversy that 

subsequently arises out of the contract, or out of the refusal to perform the whole 

or any part of the contract, or any agreement in writing between two or more 

persons to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time 

of the agreement to submit, or arising after the agreement to submit, from a 

relationship then existing between them or that they simultaneously create, shall 

be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in 

equity for the revocation of any contract. 
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{¶8} “As a matter of public policy, Ohio law strongly favors arbitration as a means to 

settle disputes.” Bozich v. Kozusko, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009604, 2009-Ohio-6908, ¶ 8, 

citing Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 711-712 (1992). Where the parties to a 

contract have agreed to an arbitration clause, courts generally view that clause as the parties’ 

agreement to settle any contractual disputes that fall within the scope of the clause by arbitration, 

as opposed to litigation. Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 471 (1998). 

Consequently, “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the subject arbitration clause is 

not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute[,]” the trial court should stay 

the proceedings. Neubrander v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 308, 311 (9th 

Dist.1992). In determining whether a dispute falls within an arbitration provision, “[d]oubts 

should be resolved in favor of coverage.” Academy of Medicine of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, 

Inc., 108 Ohio St.3d 185, 2006-Ohio-657, ¶ 14. Accordingly, if a dispute even arguably falls 

within the arbitration provision, the trial court must stay proceedings until the arbitration has 

been completed. Featherstone v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 9th Dist. Wayne No. 

04CA0037, 2004-Ohio-5953, ¶ 5. 

{¶9} When a court is called to determine whether a dispute falls within an arbitration 

provision, it must “ask if an action could be maintained without reference to the contract or 

relationship at issue.” Academy of Medicine of Cincinnati, at ¶ 24. However, “[a]rbitration is not 

limited to claims alleging a breach of contract, and creative pleading of claims as something 

other than contractual cannot overcome a broad arbitration provision.” Id. at ¶ 19. 

{¶10} Drees attached a portion of the construction and purchase agreement to the motion 

to stay pending arbitration. Paragraph 18 of the agreement reads as follows: 

18. Arbitration and Disputes. * * * Any controversy, claim or other matter arising 

out of or relating to this agreement, or breach thereof, shall be resolved in 
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accordance with the residential construction arbitration rules of the American 

Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator 

may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The parties agree that the 

seller shall have the right to add its subcontractors and/or suppliers as parties to 

the arbitration. The parties further agree that the arbitration hearing shall be 

conducted either at the subject residence or the offices of the arbitrator, as 

determined by the arbitrator. The seller shall have the right, but not the 

obligation, to enter the residence at reasonable times prior to the arbitration 

hearing for purposes of conducting inspections and tests of the residence. 

Notwithstanding the above, arbitration shall not be required in connection with 

any controversy or claim in which the dollar amount in dispute does not exceed 

the jurisdictional limit of any small claims court having jurisdiction over the 

parties. In such event, either party shall have the right to resolve such controversy 

or claim by filing an action in such small claims court. Claims in excess of such 

jurisdictional limit shall be subject to arbitration as provided in this Paragraph 18. 

All such controversies, claims or other matters regarding construction shall be 

resolved (whether through arbitration or small claims court) in accordance with 

the Drees Company’s Limited Warranty Booklet which establishes the standard 

by which the seller’s performance in connection with construction matters shall 

be governed. * * *. 

{¶11} The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that “[a]n arbitration clause that 

contains the phrase ‘any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to the agreement’ is 

considered ‘the paradigm of a broad clause.’” Academy of Medicine of Cincinnati, at ¶ 18, 

quoting Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys. Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir.1995). Here, the 

arbitration provision must be considered a broad clause as it aims to cover any dispute arising 

from the parties’ business relationship and does not contain language which limits its scope, 

other than the small claims stipulation which is not at issue in this case. 

{¶12} A review of the complaint reveals that all of the Vargas’ claims stemmed from 

their central allegation that they retained Drees to build a home, and that Drees failed to properly 

install the sidewalk and driveway pursuant to their agreement. As noted above, “unless it may be 

said with positive assurance that the subject arbitration clause is not susceptible to an 

interpretation that covers the asserted dispute[,]” the trial court should stay the proceedings. 

Neubrander, 81 Ohio App.3d at 311. While the Vargas did, in fact, couch certain claims in 
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terms of negligence, breach of implied warrant of suitability, and failure to comply with local 

building codes, all of these claims stemmed from Drees’ performance of a contractual obligation, 

namely the construction of the Vargas’ home. Thus, as all of the Vargas’ claims are “arising out 

of or relating to” the construction agreement, they fall within the scope of the broad arbitration 

provision contained in their agreement. It follows that the trial court erred in denying Drees’ 

motion for a stay pending arbitration. 

{¶13} The assignment of error is sustained. 

III. 

{¶14} The Drees Co.’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed, 

and cause remanded. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 
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 Costs taxed to Appellees. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 

MOORE, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

VICTORIA D. BARTO, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

JOHN H. WEST, Attorney at Law, for Appellees.