J-S66001-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.V., A 

MINOR A/K/A Z.S.V.

APPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3659 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Orders October 4, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000552-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0001269-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2018

Appellant, D.S. (“Mother”), appeals from the orders entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which reaffirmed the court’s prior 

decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to her minor child, Z.V. a/k/a 

Z.S.V. (“Child”) (born November 2008), and the court’s prior order changing 

Child’s permanency goal to adoption. We affirm. 

A prior opinion of this Court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case as follows:

On May 10, 2015, [the Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”)] obtained an order of protective custody (“OPC”) 

regarding Child based on reports that Mother repeatedly hit 

Child with different implements. Following a shelter care 

hearing, the trial court granted DHS legal and physical 

custody over Child. Child was initially placed with Child’s 

maternal grandmother.

On May 15, 2015, DHS filed a dependency petition regarding 

Child. DHS asserted aggravated circumstances, namely, 
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the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to 

Child’s sibling. On May 27, 2015, the trial court adjudicated 

Child dependent and set a permanent placement plan of 

“return to guardian.” The court referred Mother to the 

Clinical Evaluation Unit for a drug screen and a dual 

diagnosis assessment. 

On July 29, 2015, following a permanency review hearing, 

the trial court entered an order indicating Mother did not 

meet the criteria for substance abuse intervention. The 

court referred Mother to Behavioral Health Systems for a 

consultation or evaluation and directed the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) to refer Mother to anger 

management counseling. The court directed that Child be 

placed in foster kinship care with Child’s maternal aunt.

On December 16, 2015, the trial court convened a 

permanency review hearing. At the beginning of the 

hearing, DHS’s counsel indicated that a ruling on DHS’s 

allegations of aggravated circumstances had been deferred. 

DHS entered copies of a September 29, 2004 order 

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child’s 

sibling into the record. DHS’s counsel requested that DHS 

make no reasonable efforts toward reunification. Following 

arguments by Mother’s counsel, the court directed that “no 

reasonable efforts are needed.” 

DHS presented additional testimony from Child’s CUA case 

manager, who indicated that visitation had been suspended 

based on the recommendation of Child’s therapist. Mother’s 

counsel objected suggesting that DHS did not present 

evidence of a grave threat to Child. In response, DHS 

presented the case manager’s testimony that Child reported 

(1) her sibling sexually abused her when Child and sibling 

were in Mother’s care, (2) Mother and Child’s sibling taught 

Child sexual behaviors, and (3) Child placed a firearm 

against her own head because her Mother told Child she was 

“bad.” DHS’s counsel indicated that child protective services 

reports were made in September, and the matter was “being 

investigated.” Moreover, DHS’s counsel averred, “I believe 

[the reports] have been substantiated.” The court 

determined that visitation with Mother constituted a grave 

threat to Child and ordered visitation be permanently 

suspended unless it occurred in a therapeutic setting.
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Following the December 16, 2015 hearing, the trial court 

entered a permanency review order memorializing its 

suspension of visitation. However, the court did not change 

the permanent placement plan of reunification. 

Additionally, the court directed that CUA refer Mother for a 

parenting capacity evaluation and that Mother continue with 

therapy. The court scheduled a permanency review hearing 

for March 2016.

The trial court also entered a separate aggravated 

circumstances order finding the existence of aggravated 

circumstances and directing the cessation of efforts “to 

preserve the family and reunify [Child and Mother].” In that 

order, the court directed that a hearing be held within thirty 

days. 

A hearing was not held within thirty days of the trial court’s 

aggravated circumstances order, and the matter proceeded 

to a permanency review hearing held on March 16, 2016, 

before a new presiding judge. During the witness’s 

testimony, the court interceded and the following exchange 

occurred:

THE COURT: So let me just say this. Given that on 

December 16, 2015[, the prior judge] made the 

finding, no efforts are to be made to preserve the 

family, reunify [Child] with [Mother] we don’t have to 

go through objectives on [Mother] and where she is 

and everything like that because that’s the court 

order. So there was no appeal taken of that 

December 16th order and therefore that stands. So I 

don’t need any objectives put on the record as to 

[Mother] because the [c]ourt has already made a 

finding that there are to be no efforts to reunify.

[Mother’s counsel]: Your Honor, just one 

clarification note. Your Honor is in agreement that 

[M]other can still make her own efforts, isn’t that 

correct?

THE COURT: I don’t know what that looks like 

because right now she doesn’t have visits because 

they’ve been suspended at the recommendation of the 
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therapist. And [the CUA case manager] just testified 

that that is still the recommendation of the therapist, 

no contact, no visits.

[Mother’s counsel]: But, Your Honor, there’s much 

more thorough recommendations in the report, that I 

think you were just handed, from [the Children’s Crisis 

Treatment Center (“CCTC”)].

THE COURT: Okay.

[Mother’s counsel]: You know, in terms of 

reasonable efforts even if the department has no 

affirmative obligation the parent’s rights are not 

terminated yet and she has the right to make her own 

efforts.

THE COURT: Well considering that the order was 

made that there are no efforts to be made as to 

reunification, reunification is no longer the 

permanency goal. The permanency goal for [Child] 

now goes to either adoption or [permanent legal 

custody (“PLC”)].

[Mother's counsel]: Your Honor, that goal was not 

changed and we didn’t have a goal change hearing for 

that.

THE COURT: Well I’m changing the goal because 

essentially it was already done at the last court date. 

If [Mother] doesn’t have to work on objectives and the 

[c]ourt has already said very clearly on December 16th

that no efforts are to be made to preserve the family 

and reunify [Child] with [Mother], then essentially 

there is no reunification goal. The goal is adoption or 

PLC, whichever is appropriate in this case. And it 

really would be adoption because of the age of the 

child. So with that in mind—that decision was made 

before I got here.

[Mother's counsel]: So you[’re] ordering that the 

goal is changed to adoption today?

THE COURT: The goal has—even though [the prior 
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judge] did not make the goal change. Given his order, 

reunification is not a viable option. So therefore today 

I’m making the order that the goal is now adoption for 

[Child] based on his previous ruling. He took 

testimony. He made that decision and so therefore, 

based on that, we don’t have to get into objectives or 

anything like that. The goal is adoption.

[Mother’s counsel]: Your Honor, please note my 

objection.

Following the March 16, 2016 hearing, the trial court 

entered [a] permanency review order. The order indicated 

that the permanent placement goal was “return to parent or 

guardian” and added a concurrent placement plan of 

adoption. The court further directed:

THE DHS GOAL IS CHANGED TO ADOPTION. THE 

CURRENT COURT GOAL IS REUNIFICATION UNTIL 

PETITIONS ARE FILED. A meeting among the parties 

is to occur within 30 days to discuss the appropriate 

goal. Reunification has been ruled [out] as to 

[Mother] as a viable goal.

Mother timely appealed from the March 16, 2016 order....

In Interest of Z.V., 158 A.3d 665, 666-68 (Pa.Super. 2018) (internal 

footnotes and citations to record omitted).

While Mother’s appeal from the March 16, 2016 order was pending, on 

June 16, 2016, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to 

Child at Docket No. AP-0000552-2016, and a petition to change Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption at Docket No. DP-0001269-2015. Additionally, 

on October 18, 2016, the court entered against Mother a stay-away order 

prohibiting Mother from contacting Child’s foster mother, Mother’s aunt, based 

upon reports Mother had repeatedly harassed Child’s foster mother over the 
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phone. 

On January 4, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on DHS’

termination and goal change petitions, during which the court heard testimony 

from Child’s CCTC therapist, Child’s CUA case manager, Mother, and Child’s 

foster mother. 

Child’s therapist, on behalf of DHS, testified and explained she had been 

Child’s trauma focus therapist since July 2015, after a social worker referred 

Child to therapy in light of reports Mother had physically abused Child. In 

September 2015, Child disclosed to her foster mother and a caseworker that 

her older brother sexually assaulted her numerous times when both children 

were in Mother’s care. Also in September 2015, Child’s therapist 

recommended suspension of Mother’s supervised visits with Child because:

Mother had encouraged Child to make false allegations of mistreatment by 

foster mother and told Child not to follow her foster mother’s directions; Child 

feared Mother would hit her if she did not follow Mother’s instructions; and 

Child exhibited increased behavioral problems following Mother’s visits. In 

meetings with the case manager, Mother failed to acknowledge she caused 

Child trauma, disbelieved Child had been sexually abused, and described Child 

as a liar and a manipulator. Since February 2016, Mother failed to attend any

caregiver sessions with Child’s therapist and had attended less than three 

throughout Child’s treatment. When Child’s therapist began counseling with 

Child, Child exhibited several trauma symptoms, including, inter alia: trouble 
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sleeping, nightmares, nighttime enuresis, dishonesty, physical aggression, 

inability to focus, and suicidal ideation. Child’s therapist diagnosed Child with 

post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity 

disorder (“ADHD”). As of January 2017, Child had progressed with therapy 

and the severity of her symptoms had diminished, but Child’s therapist 

maintained the recommendation that Mother should not visit with Child. 

Child’s therapist explained Child needs a stable and consistent caregiver, 

which role the therapist opined Mother was unable to fulfill. Child’s therapist 

also indicated Child has a good relationship with her foster mother; foster 

mother supports Child’s recovery and Child loves foster mother. (See N.T. 

Termination/Goal Change Hearing, 1/4/17, at 20-37). 

A CUA case manager, who became involved with Child’s case in July 

2016, also testified on behalf of DHS. The CUA case manager reiterated that 

during visitation, Mother coached Child to make false allegations against 

Child’s foster mother, and Child’s behavior deteriorated after Mother’s visits. 

CUA developed for Mother single case plan (“SCP”) objectives, which included, 

inter alia: undergoing anger management counseling; completing part two of 

a parenting capacity evaluation; and participating in mental health treatment, 

including complying with a mental health medication management program. 

Mother failed to provide CUA with documentation of her anger management 

treatment and mental health treatment. Mental health treatment reports CUA 

obtained from Mother’s provider indicated Mother had attended one treatment 
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session each in June and October 2016, but she had not attended sessions 

between June and October 2016, or after October 2016. While Child was in 

foster mother’s care, Mother had made threatening phone calls and sent 

threatening text messages to foster mother. Additionally, at a meeting about 

Child’s placement, Mother commented she wanted to punch the case 

manager’s supervisor. The CUA case manager had observed Child with her 

foster mother, to whom Child had bonded. Child and her foster mother have 

a good, caring relationship, and Child looks to her foster mother for daily 

support, parental guidance, and love. The CUA case manager opined 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child is in Child’s best interest, 

because: Mother failed to complete her SCP objectives; Child is fearful of 

Mother; and Child has improved overall since she has been in the care of foster 

mother. The case manager added she believed Child would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights to Child were terminated. (Id. at 

48-65). 

Additionally, Mother testified on her own behalf. Mother explained she 

had last received mental health treatment from her original provider in 

October 2016, when the counseling center had dismissed her from treatment

because it lacked resources. Mother added she had missed several therapy

appointments due to other medical issues and because her therapist had 

repeatedly cancelled sessions. Mother claimed she had received mental health 

treatment from two different therapists since October 2016. Mother said her 
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original counseling center reinstated her treatment earlier on the day of the 

termination hearing, and she attended a counseling session that same day. 

Mother conceded she used corporal punishment to discipline Child, which 

included hitting Child with a belt. Mother stated she originally sought social 

services assistance to learn to better parent Child and discipline Child without 

beating her. Mother also acknowledged two of her other children have been

in the care of Child’s foster mother. (Id. at 83-107). 

Child’s foster mother, who is Child’s maternal great-aunt, also testified. 

Foster mother has known Child since she was born, and at the time of the 

January 4th hearing, Child had been in foster mother’s care for nearly two 

years. Foster mother also had in her care two of Child’s older siblings. While 

Child was in foster mother’s care, Mother had repeatedly threatened and 

harassed foster mother over the phone. In one instance, Mother sent foster 

mother approximately forty-one text messages at 2:00 a.m. accusing foster 

mother and others of abusing Child. Foster mother and Mother had a good 

relationship in the past; their relationship deteriorated only after foster mother 

began to care for Child. On the day of the January 4th hearing, Mother and 

foster mother communicated, and foster mother indicated she had a 

“breakthrough” with Mother during their discussion. Foster mother requested 

the court to lift the stay-away order against Mother to allow foster mother and 

Mother attempt to reestablish a relationship in the interest of promoting a 

healthy relationship between Child and Mother. (Id. at 114-123). On January 
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4, 2017, the court entered a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

Child and an order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption. That same 

day, the court lifted the stay-away order against Mother. 

With respect to Mother’s pending appeal, on January 24, 2017, in an 

unpublished memorandum (republished on March 23, 2017), this Court 

vacated the trial court’s March 16, 2016 goal change order and remanded for 

a permanency review hearing. See In Interest of Z.V., supra. 

Meanwhile, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s

January 4, 2017 termination decree on February 3, 2017, which was docketed 

at No. 522 EDA 2017. On February 23, 2017, Mother filed in this Court an 

“Application for Remand,” requesting this Court to vacate the trial court’s 

January 4, 2017 decree and remand for a permanency review hearing 

consistent with this Court’s January 24, 2017 appellate directive. On March 

31, 2017, this Court entered the following order in response to Mother’s 

request for a remand:

The above-captioned appeal is hereby REMANDED to the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, and the 

common pleas court is permitted to vacate its January 4, 

2017 order in light of this Court’s decision in Superior Court 

Docket No. 1211 EDA 2016.

Jurisdiction is RELINQUISHED.

(Order, filed March 31, 2017) (emphasis added). In other words, this Court 

allowed the trial court to hold a permanency review hearing on remand as 

directed and gave the court the discretion to vacate the January 4, 2017 
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termination decree if the court determined the evidence so required. With 

this Order, the appeal at No. 522 EDA 2017 ended. 

On remand, the trial court conducted the permanency review hearing,

as directed, on October 4, 2017. Before the court heard testimony, Mother 

made an oral motion for recusal, which the court denied. During the hearing, 

the court limited the parties to presenting only that evidence which they could 

have offered at the initial permanency review hearing on March 16, 2016. The 

court heard the testimony of a CUA caseworker, on behalf of DHS, and Mother. 

At the remand hearing, the CUA caseworker testified she had been 

involved with Child’s case since May 2015. A letter from Child’s trauma 

therapist dated March 15, 2016, in CUA’s records indicated the therapist had 

recommended continued suspension of Mother’s visits with Child, because 

Mother had inappropriate contact with Child during the visits and Child’s 

behavior worsened after visits. The March 15th letter also indicated Child’s 

therapist would consider recommending Mother’s visits with Child to resume,

but only after Mother had made progress in her own therapy and 

acknowledged her role in causing Child’s trauma. CUA had requested Mother 

to participate in caregiver sessions at CCTC, but nothing in CUA’s records 

indicated Mother had attended any caregiver sessions. Further, as of March 

2016, Mother had not completed her SCP objectives. (See N.T. Permanency 

Review Hearing, 10/4/17, at 5-12). 

Mother also testified at the remand hearing. Mother stated she had 
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participated in anger management, mental health treatment, and parenting 

classes through March 2016. Specifically, Mother said that, by March 2016, 

she had received mental health treatment and anger management counseling

for approximately a year. Mother testified she signed necessary releases on 

Child’s behalf and attempted to communicate with Child’s therapist. Mother 

added she had participated in caregiver sessions, but stopped when the 

therapist said she did not need to see Mother again. By March 2016, Mother 

claimed she had completed part one of the parenting capacity evaluation, but 

she had not completed part two. Mother said she acknowledged in therapy

that she had lost her temper with Child, was wrong to do so, and wished to 

correct her behavior to reunite with Child. Mother provided to the court a

medication management report, but Mother had no documentation of her 

ongoing participation in mental health treatment. (Id. at 14-42).

Following the permanency review hearing on remand, on October 4, 

2017, the court entered identical orders at both docket numbers to let stand 

its prior January 4, 2017 termination decree and goal change order. On 

November 3, 2017, Mother timely filed at both docket numbers notices of 

appeal and contemporaneous statements of errors complained of on appeal 

per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE 

SUPERIOR COURT’S ORDER OF MARCH 31, 2017?

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE 
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SUPERIOR COURT’S REMAND DECISION OF JANUARY 24, 

2017 BY...CONDUCT[ING] ONLY A “SNAPSHOT” HEARING 

AND NOT A FULL PERMANENCY REVIEW HEARING UNDER 

THE [PENNSYLVANIA] JUVENILE ACT, 42 PA.C.S.A. § 6301, 

ET SEQ.?

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT[’S] OCTOBER 4, 2017 ORDERS 

LETTING STAND ITS JANUARY 4, 2017 PRIOR ORDERS

CHANGING...CHILD’S PERMANENCY GOAL TO ADOPTION 

AND TERMINATING [MOTHER]’S PARENTAL RIGHTS DENY 

MOTHER AND CHILD DUE PROCESS?

(Mother’s Brief at 4-5).1 

In her issues combined, Mother argues the trial court failed to comply 

with this Court’s March 31, 2017 remand order, when the court chose not to 

vacate its January 4, 2017 termination decree before holding the permanency 

review hearing on remand. Mother insists the trial court incorrectly 

interpreted this Court’s decision when it limited the parties at the remand 

hearing to presenting only the evidence they could have introduced at the 

____________________________________________

1 Mother includes in her statement of questions presented numerous 

subheadings, which she failed to support with discussion in the argument 

section of her brief. For example, Mother’s brief contains no argument on the 

following claims: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold the October 4, 

2017 hearing without first vacating its January 4, 2017 order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights, because more than 30 days had elapsed since 

January 4, 2017 order; (2) the October 4, 2017 hearing did not constitute a 

permanency review hearing under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351; and (3) the trial court 

determined Mother was merely a witness for purposes of the October 4, 2017

hearing, because the court had previously terminated Mother’s parental rights 

to Child. Accordingly, we give these claims no consideration. See Butler v. 

Illes 747 A.2d 943 (Pa.Super. 2000) (providing where appellant fails to raise 

or develop her issues on appeal properly, or where her brief is wholly 

inadequate to present specific issues for review, this Court can decline to 

address appellant’s claims on merits); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 
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original March 16, 2016 permanency review hearing (“snapshot hearing”). 

Specifically, Mother avers the trial court barred Mother from presenting at the 

remand hearing more recent and contemporary information to refute 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child. Mother also contends the 

court improperly admitted hearsay evidence that did not meet the business 

records exception to the hearsay rule. 

Moreover, Mother complains the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied Mother’s recusal motion. Likewise, Mother asserts the evidence in this 

case was insufficient to support the court’s decision to let stand its prior 

January 4, 2017 decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child and its 

prior order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption. Mother concludes 

this Court should vacate the trial court’s orders and remand for further 

proceedings. We disagree. 

As a preliminary matter, to preserve a claim of error for appellate 

review, a party must make a specific objection to the alleged error before the 

trial court in a timely fashion and at the appropriate stage of the proceedings; 

failure to raise an objection results in waiver of the underlying issue on appeal. 

In re J.A., 107 A.3d 799, 820 (Pa.Super. 2015). See also Cominsky v. 

Donovan, 846 A.2d 1256, 1262 (Pa.Super. 2004) (stating: “[T]o preserve an 

evidentiary objection, a party must make a timely and specific objection to 

the admission or the exclusion of the evidence”). “Issues not raised in the 

[trial] court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” 
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Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

Further, appellate briefs must conform in all material respects to the 

briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See also Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (addressing 

specific requirements of each subsection of brief on appeal). Regarding the 

argument section of an appellate brief, Rule 2119(a) provides: 

Rule 2119. Argument

(a) General rule.—The argument shall be divided into 

as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall 

have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type 

distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, 

followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are 

deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Importantly, where an appellant fails to raise or develop 

her issues on appeal properly, or where her brief is wholly inadequate to 

present specific issues for review, this Court can decline to address the 

appellant’s claims on the merits. Butler, supra. See also Lackner v. 

Glosser, 892 A.2d 21 (Pa.Super. 2006) (explaining arguments must adhere 

to rules of appellate procedure and arguments which are not appropriately 

developed are waived; arguments not appropriately developed include those 

where party has failed to cite authority to support contention); Estate of 

Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating appellant must 

support each question raised by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority; 

absent reasoned discussion of relevant law in appellate brief, appellant 

hampers this Court’s review and risks waiver). 
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Additionally, an appellant’s failure to cite to the record and relevant 

supporting authority constitutes waiver:

An appellate brief must provide citations to the record and 

to any relevant supporting authority. The court will not 

become the counsel for an appellant and will not, therefore, 

consider issues which are not fully developed in [her] brief. 

Failing to provide...citation to the record represents serious 

deviations from the briefing requirements of the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Because such an omission impedes on 

our ability to address the issue on appeal, an issue that is 

not properly briefed in this manner is considered waived.

Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) 

(providing: “If reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion 

or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set 

forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference 

to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears...”). 

Instantly, Mother raises her hearsay claim for the first time on appeal. 

See Cominsky, supra. Further, in her brief, Mother fails to identify the 

purportedly inadmissible hearsay the trial court allegedly admitted and does 

not cite to the record to support her assertion. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). 

Therefore, Mother’s hearsay challenge is waived. See Gould, supra; 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Additionally, Mother fails to cite to relevant authority to 

support her recusal claim; the sole case Mother relies upon does not discuss 

recusal. Instead, the case addresses the admission of prior convictions 

evidence in a criminal case. Thus, Mother’s recusal claim is also waived. See
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Lackner, supra; Gould, supra. 

Regarding Mother’s remaining complaints, ordinarily, “where a case is 

remanded to resolve a limited issue, only matters related to the issue on 

remand may be appealed.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 789 A.2d 252, 253 

(Pa.Super. 2001). Nevertheless, there are instances where an appellate court

can address claims unrelated to the issue on remand. See Commonwealth 

v. Chamberlain, 612 Pa. 107, 30 A.3d 381 (2011), certiorari denied, 566 

U.S. 986, 132 S.Ct. 2377, 182 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2012) (explaining Supreme 

Court remanded case to trial court, recognizing that remand proceedings could 

provide basis for appellant to seek relief; following remand, Supreme Court 

considered additional claims from appellant). In light of the importance of the 

rights involved, the complex procedural history of this case, and in all fairness 

to Mother, we will address her complaints raised on appeal with respect to the 

goal change and termination of her parental rights. 

On appeal, goal change decisions are subject to an abuse of discretion 

standard of review. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

In order to conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion, we must determine that the court’s 

judgment was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the 

court did not apply the law, or that the court’s action 

was “a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,” 

as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial 

court’s findings of fact that have support in the record. 

The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with 

the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the 

witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. 

In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. 
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When the trial court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we will affirm, “even if 

the record could also support an opposite result.” 

Id. at 822-23 (internal citations omitted).

The Juvenile Act controls the disposition of dependent children. In re 

R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1217 (Pa.Super. 2008). Section 6351 provides in 

relevant part:

§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child

* * *

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency 

hearing.—At each permanency hearing, a court shall 

determine all of the following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and

appropriateness of the placement. 

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent 

of compliance with the permanency plan 

developed for the child. 

(3) The extent of progress made toward 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated 

the original placement. 

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the 

current placement goal for the child. 

(5) The likely date by which the placement 

goal for the child might be achieved. 

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to 

finalize the permanency plan in effect. 

(6) Whether the child is safe. 

* * *
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(9) If the child has been in placement for at 

least 15 of the last 22 months or the court has 

determined that aggravated circumstances exist 

and that reasonable efforts to prevent or 

eliminate the need to remove the child from the 

child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family need not be 

made or continue to be made, whether the 

county agency has filed or sought to join a 

petition to terminate parental rights and to 

identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified 

family to adopt the child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative 

best suited to the physical, mental and 

moral welfare of the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a 

compelling reason for determining that filing 

a petition to terminate parental rights would 

not serve the needs and welfare of the child; 

or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided 

with necessary services to achieve the safe 

return to the child’s parent, guardian or 

custodian within the time frames set forth in 

the permanency plan. 

* * *

(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the 

determinations made under subsection (f) and all 

relevant evidence presented at the hearing, the court 

shall determine one of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be returned to 

the child’s parent, guardian or custodian in cases 

where the return of the child is best suited to the 

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral 

welfare of the child. 

(2) If and when the child will be placed for 

adoption, and the county agency will file for 
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termination of parental rights in cases where 

return to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian 

is not best suited to the safety, protection and 

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. 

(3) If and when the child will be placed with a 

legal custodian in cases where the return to the 

child’s parent, guardian or custodian or being 

placed for adoption is not best suited to the 

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral 

welfare of the child. 

(4) If and when the child will be placed with a 

fit and willing relative in cases where return to 

the child’s parent, guardian or custodian, being 

placed for adoption or being placed with a legal 

custodian is not best suited to the safety, 

protection and physical, mental and moral 

welfare of the child. 

* * *

(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent 

that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at 

risk, including evidence of the use of alcohol or a 

controlled substance that places the health, safety or 

welfare of the child at risk, shall be presented to the 

court by the county agency or any other party at any 

disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the 

conduct was the basis for the determination of 

dependency. 

(g) Court order.—On the basis of the 

determination made under subsection (f.1), the court 

shall order the continuation, modification or 

termination of placement or other disposition which is 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, 

mental and moral welfare of the child. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), (f.1), (f.2), (g). 

“When the child welfare agency has made reasonable efforts to return a 

[dependent] child to [the child’s] biological parent, but those efforts have 
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failed, then the agency must redirect its efforts towards placing the child in an 

adoptive home.” In re N.C., supra at 823 (citing In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 

967, 973 (Pa.Super. 2004)). 

Although the agency has the burden to show a goal change 

would serve the child’s best interests, “[s]afety, 

permanency, and well-being of the child must take 

precedence over all other considerations” under Section 

6351. In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009), 

appeal denied, 601 Pa. 702, 973 A.2d 1007 (2009) 

(emphasis in original); In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978 

(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 782, 959 A.2d 320

(2008). “[T]he parent’s rights are secondary” in a goal 

change proceeding. In re D.P., supra. 

Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal 

change to adoption might be appropriate, even when a 

parent substantially complies with a reunification plan. In 

re N.C., supra at 826-27. Where a parent’s “skills, 

including her judgment with regard to the emotional wellbeing of her children, remain problematic[,]” a goal change 

to adoption might be appropriate, regardless of the parent’s 

compliance with a permanency plan. Id. at 825. The 

agency is not required to offer services indefinitely, where a 

parent is unable to properly apply the instruction provided. 

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 2002). See 

also In re S.B., supra at 981 (giving priority to child’s 

safety and stability, despite parent’s substantial compliance 

with permanency plan); In re A.P., 728 A.2d 375, 379 

(Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 693, 743 A.2d 912 

(1999) (holding where, despite willingness, parent cannot 

meet “irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the 

needs of the child must prevail over the rights of the 

parent”). Thus, even where the parent makes earnest 

efforts, the “court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 347 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 

648, 12 A.3d 372 (2010) (some internal citations and quotation marks 
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omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the 

following principles: 

In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our 

standard of review is limited to determining whether the 

order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence, 

and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to 

the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.” 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972 

A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)). 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. ... We must employ 

a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order 

to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence. 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) 

(internal citations omitted). 

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder 

of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of 

witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be 

resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is 

on the party seeking termination to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for 

doing so. 

In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super. 

2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony 

that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable 

the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re 

J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may 

uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for 

the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 
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(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are 

supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite 

result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 

2004). 

In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 

1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 

(2008)). 

DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental 

rights to Child on the following grounds:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused 

or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will 

not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 
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period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). “Parental rights may be 

involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is 

satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In 

re Z.P., supra at 1117. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 
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if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of...her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under 

the standard of best interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 

Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:

To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence 

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the 

filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled 

intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or 

failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if 

the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties. 

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, 

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the 

parent’s explanation for...her conduct; (2) the postabandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) 

consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights 

on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination 

petition:

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations 
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offered by the parent facing termination of...her parental 

rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of 

the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination. 

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 

797 A.2d 326 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” 

Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 

636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced 

that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner for involuntary 

termination must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998). 

“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires that: 

(1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2) 

the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child continue to 
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exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118. 

“[T]o terminate parental rights pursuant to [Section] 2511(a)(8), the 

following factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed 

from parental care for [twelve] months or more from the date of removal; (2) 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 

(Pa.Super. 2003). 

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination 

will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The 

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying 

close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.” 

Id. Significantly:

In this context, the court must take into account whether a 

bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. 

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, 

Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
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“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and have...her rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 

1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 

child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental 

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance. 

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association 

with the child. 

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a 

place of importance in the child’s life. 

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with 

good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of...her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A

parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with his or her physical and 

emotional needs. 

In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic 
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constitutional right to the custody and rearing of...her child is converted, upon 

the failure to fulfill...her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper 

parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, 

safe environment.” Id. at 856. 

Notably, neither Section 2511(a) nor Section 2511(b) requires a court 

to consider at the termination stage, whether an agency provided a parent 

with reasonable efforts aimed at reunifying the parent with her children prior 

to the agency petitioning for termination of parental rights. In re D.C.D., 629 

Pa. 325, 342, 105 A.3d 662, 672 (2014). An agency’s failure to provide 

reasonable efforts to a parent does not prohibit the court from granting a 

petition to terminate parental rights under Section 2511. Id. at 346, 105 A.3d 

at 675. 

Instantly, the plain language of this Court’s March 31, 2017 order belies 

Mother’s claim that the trial court erred when it declined to vacate the court’s

prior January 4, 2017 termination decree before conducting the October 4, 

2017 remand hearing. This Court’s order provided the trial court with the 

discretion to vacate its prior orders but did not direct the trial court to do so. 

The procedural posture of this case at the time of this Court’s March 31, 2017

order was an appeal from the goal change/termination order/decree of 

January 4, 2017. With its March 31, 2017 order, this Court intended to abstain 

from ruling on that appeal until after the trial court had conducted the 

permanency review hearing previously ordered on remand and to give the trial 
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court the option at that time to vacate its January 4, 2017 termination decree 

if the court found the evidence warranted vacation. Therefore, the trial court 

had the opportunity to rule again on termination. Upon remand, the trial court 

simply declined to vacate its prior termination decree. See In re Z.P., supra; 

In re N.C., supra. Thus, Mother’s claim of error in this regard fails. 

Additionally, Mother’s assertion the trial court improperly limited the 

parties, at the October 4, 2017 permanency review hearing on remand, to 

presenting only evidence the parties could have introduced at the original 

permanency review hearing on March 16, 2016, also fails. The court’s decision 

to restrict the evidence at the remand hearing put the parties in the same

respective positions they had occupied at the time of the original permanency 

review hearing. Thus, the trial court did not err when it limited the parties’ 

evidence at the October 4, 2017 permanency review hearing. See In re Z.P., 

supra; In re N.C., supra. Therefore, Mother’s “snapshot” evidentiary claim 

fails. 

With respect to Mother’s termination of parental rights and goal change

claims, at the conclusion of the January 4, 2017 hearing, the court addressed 

its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child and let stand its 

previous goal change order, in part, as follows:

[W]e sit here at nineteen months and we have [a child] who 

is fortunate to have landed in a place with someone familiar 

because she’s there with [foster mother]. And then I come 

to find out that [Child] has two older siblings and it sounds

like maybe one of the older siblings has a child now. And 

so [foster mother] is taking care of a one-year-old.
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But really today needs to be about [Child] and really what’s 

in [Child]’s best interests. It’s an unfortunate chain of 

circumstances that have led us to this point. I don’t think 

that anybody disputes that [Mother] initially sought help.... 

And that is commendable and indeed a strength.

However, during that time there was an incident that rose 

to a level that that worker or workers had to report that 

incident. That’s their responsibility as mandated reporters. 

And even with that report that did not have to be the end of 

it because once this matter was brought to court [Mother] 

had every opportunity to cooperate and comply with those 

[SCP] objectives. But one of the recurring themes that I 

have heard and even today when [Mother] provided 

testimony is that I really don’t think that [Mother] has 

complete insight in the gravity of her actions when it comes 

to a life of a child.... 

To talk about how [Mother] exhorted discipline, to have a 

child cry after being physically spanked, to be hit with a belt 

for a minute, as an adult that would be offensive. But when 

you think of a [child] being exacted that type of punishment. 

The way it resonates in a [child] is much different from an 

adult. And what’s clear is [Child] still lives in the shadows 

of what she’s seen or what she experienced in terms of 

abuse. 

Now we talked a lot about physical abuse, but the testimony 

is does she suffer from medical neglect? Does she suffer 

from sexual abuse of various persons? And at the end of 

the day today [this] has to be about [Child].

What I have heard in terms of [Mother] gives me concern 

and I don’t think that [Mother] has done what she needed 

to do to ensure the return of her child. And what we see is 

a recurring theme of [Mother] threatening people through 

text messages, through comments, ...those inappropriate 

actions keep on surfacing. 

So [Mother] is not where she needs to be to deal with [Child] 

who has a traumatic history. Who has special needs that 

have to be dealt with. And I think that was clear through 

[Child’s trauma therapist]’s testimony.
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I find the testimony of the therapist..., [the CUA case 

manager] who[’s] here today as a social worker, and [foster 

mother] extremely credible. And I kind of feel that [Mother] 

lacks insight as to her actions that happen[ed] then and 

even as today through her testimony.

So with that in mind, with clear and convincing evidence this 

[c]ourt will involuntarily terminate the rights of [Mother] as 

to [Child].

The [c]ourt is making this ruling based on [23 Pa.C.S.A. §§] 

2511[(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8),] and 2511[(b)], 

considerations have been taken in. I do believe that [DHS] 

has met their burden of proof.

I believe that it is absolutely in the best interest of [Child] 

at this time for [Mother]’s parental rights to be terminated. 

I believe that [Child] will not suffer any irreparable harm 

because she has looked to [foster mother] to meet her day 

to day needs for over a year and a half. I believe that the 

fact that there were aggravated circumstances in this case 

found by [a previous judge] and the fact...that he made the 

order that reasonable efforts do not have to be made to 

reunify [Mother]. ... When I assumed the case that is the 

disposition that was before the [c]ourt. And the [c]ourt 

believes that that was appropriate in light of the totality of 

the information taken in today.

I do believe that at this time that this matter should be 

transferred to [the] Adoption Unit for further handling.

(N.T. Termination/Goal Change Hearing, 1/4/17, at 136-139). Additionally, 

the court provided the following rationale, in relevant part, at the conclusion 

of the October 4, 2017 remand hearing:

... The [SCP] objectives as I understand them [as of March 

2016] w[ere] mental health anger management, 

med[ication] management, [Mother]’s cooperation with 

CUA and the parenting capacity evaluation and supervised 

visits at that time had been suspended. 
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In terms of [M]other’s level of compliance, in terms of 

mental health, even given the opportunity, [M]other has not 

provided treatment plans or progress reports that would 

have been a part of the permanency testimony [as of March 

2016]. I do have this note of [February 24], 2017, and it’s 

very general saying that she was attending treatment, 

[M]other, since [August 7], 2015. It does not indicate how 

frequently she was to attend treatment, it does not say how 

consistent she was with her treatment. It doesn’t say what 

they were addressing in the context of her treatment, it’s 

essentially not a treatment plan.

There is no indication that they were specially working on 

anger management and to that extent I agree with [the 

child advocate], given the circumstances that brought this 

case into care where you have a mother that is setting forth 

by her own admission, spanking, beating a child, I think that 

anger management would have definitely be[en] one of the 

primary concerns. I have no indication that [Mother] was 

actively engaged in anger management services [as of 

March 16,] 2016. So, at this point in time, [M]other’s level 

was I would say at best minimally compliant. 

Finally, there’s the issue of the CCTC treatment record or 

the letter dated [March 15], 2016. 

[The March 15th letter] clearly says at the end that CCTC is 

recommending that visits between [Child] and [Mother] 

continue to be suspended until [Mother] makes progress in 

her own therapy, and until [Mother] is able to acknowledge 

her role in [Child]’s trauma history, we’re sitting here today, 

that still hasn’t been established. 

* * *

On [March 16, 2016], we have no documentation to say that 

[Mother] was actively engaged in treatment that could be 

submitted to [Child’s trauma therapist] for reconsideration. 

We don’t have—actually I have in this [March 15, 2016] 

report, quite the contrary that [Mother] is indicating she 

believes that [Child] is coached by [her foster mother], that 

she believes that [Child] is a liar and a manipulator and 

[Mother] takes very little ownership of anything that she 

may have done that contributed to this matter coming forth.
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So I do not believe [as of March 16, 2016,] that [Mother] 

had successfully or substantially addressed her goals so that 

we can even consider reunification at that time. ... 

... [A]nd I submit to the parties here that based on the 

evidence that was provided at the time of the involuntary 

termination of parental rights [hearing] for [Child], that the 

[c]ourt did not err in its ruling. That [M]other has not been 

compliant, and that therefore the order will stand as to the 

[in]voluntary termination. ... 

(N.T. Permanency Review Hearing, 10/4/17, at 54-57). The record in this 

case tells a tragic story of continued neglect, abuse, and corruption of a small 

child while in the care of a parent found to be a grave threat to the child. The 

evidence showed that Mother’s continued presence in Child’s life is both 

harmful and hostile to Child’s welfare. Child fears Mother and looks to foster 

mother for daily support, parental guidance, and love. Thus, the record 

supports the court’s orders confirming its prior decree terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to Child and the prior order changing Child’s permanency goal 

to adoption. See In re Z.P., supra; In re N.C., supra. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/18/18