UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

WAYNE HANDLEY BARCLAY, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

JASON BRYANT, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

Nos. 17-6242 & 18-6045 

(D.C. No. 5:15-CV-01369-M) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

In these companioned cases, Wayne Handley Barclay, proceeding pro se, seeks 

certificates of appealability (COA) to appeal from the district court’s denial of his 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition and its denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from 

judgment. Construing Barclay’s pro se filings liberally, Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 

927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008), we deny a COA in each appeal and dismiss the matters. 

BACKGROUND 

Barclay was convicted in Oklahoma state court of two counts of rape by 

instrumentation and one count of lewd acts with a child under sixteen. The victim in all 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 23, 2018

Chris Wolpert 

Chief Deputy Clerk
2 

three counts was his step-grandaughter “K.K.,” who was between five and nine years old 

when the conduct occurred. Barclay was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment on each 

of the rape convictions, one of which was suspended, and to six years’ imprisonment for 

the lewd-acts conviction, the sentences to run consecutively. His convictions and 

sentenced were affirmed on direct appeal. Barclay was represented by counsel at trial 

and on direct appeal, but he filed an application for post-conviction relief pro se. After 

appointing counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing on ineffectiveness of appellate 

counsel, the state trial court denied the application. Barclay appealed that denial pro se to 

the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), which affirmed. Barclay then sought 

habeas relief in federal court, again representing himself. A magistrate judge issued a 

report and recommendation that the petition be denied. The district court adopted the 

recommendation over Barclay’s objections, denied relief, and denied a COA. The court 

also denied Barclay’s Rule 60(b) motion, in which he asked the court to address de novo 

an argument he made in his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and 

denied a COA to appeal that ruling. 

DISCUSSION 

A. No. 17-6242 

To appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition, Barclay must first 

obtain a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a state prisoner appealing denial 

of § 2254 application to obtain a COA); We will issue a COA “only if the applicant has 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). 
3 

In his application for a COA to appeal the district court’s denial of his habeas 

petition, Barclay nominally seeks a COA on three issues. The first two are substantive. 

In the first, he asks us to consider whether the introduction at trial of a recording of a 

“controlled call” that was placed without a warrant, allegedly in violation of federal and 

Oklahoma wiretap statutes, violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1

 

Second, he seeks review of whether trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective 

assistance by (1) failing to investigate or argue that use of the controlled call violated the 

federal wiretap act, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20; or (2) failing to seek a hearing on the application of Oklahoma’s 

rape-shield statute to testimony trial counsel elicited from K.K. regarding whether she 

lied to a friend that she was pregnant, a topic on which the trial court disallowed any 

further evidence. Appended to his second issue is an argument that the trial court’s 

refusal to permit trial counsel to continue questioning K.K. about the alleged pregnancy 

lie violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. 

 1

 The controlled call was scripted by a police detective, placed to Barclay by K.K., 

and recorded. During the approximately seven-minute call, K.K., who was then fourteen 

years old, told Barclay she had been lately troubled by the times Barclay had touched her. 

Although Barclay asked K.K. why she was lying and never expressly admitted to any 

sexual misconduct, he made some circumstantially incriminating comments, including 

that he thought it was over with; that K.K. could get him into a lot of trouble; that he was 

sorry; and that nothing ever really happened except for “the messing around part,” State 

v. Barclay, No. CF-2009-1426 (Dist. Ct. of Cleveland Cty., Okla.), Court’s Ex. 1, Control 

Call at 6:35 to 6:40 (state court record filed in hard copy with this court). He also asked 

K.K. whether she was recording the call, whether anyone was present with her, and 

(repeatedly) whether the matter was going any further, extracting a promise from K.K. 

that it would not. 
4 

Barclay never presented these constitutional issues in his habeas petition, 

supporting brief, or reply brief. In his objections to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, he did argue that admission of the controlled call violated his Fourth, 

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it was obtained without a warrant. But 

that argument came too late to avoid waiver of appellate review. See Marshall v. Chater, 

75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.”). Because Barclay never 

properly presented issues one and two to the district court, he has waived appellate 

review of them. We therefore deny a COA on those issues. See United States v. Viera, 

674 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (denying COA on issues not presented to district 

court in § 2254 petition by “adher[ing] to our general rule against considering issues for 

the first time on appeal”). 

In apparent acknowledgement of this procedural impediment, the third “issue” 

Barclay seeks a COA on is couched as a request that we overlook any waiver concerning 

issues one and two because he had limited access to legal research materials and received 

poor advice from jailhouse lawyers when he prepared his application for post-conviction 

relief2

 and habeas petition. See No. 17-6242, Appl. for COA at 14–16; id. at 15 

(“Petitioner submits that [he] does not want a mixed petition to lose presentation of issues 

not completely argued in the original petition that justices like yourself will see readily. 

 2

 It appears Barclay never presented any of the claims he now seeks a COA on in 

either his direct appeal, his application for post-conviction relief, or his appeal from the 

denial of that application. 
5 

Petitioner seeks further forum to argue debatable issues, but guidance as to issues not 

waived by [one of the jailhouse lawyers].”). But Barclay did not present these 

contentions to the district court, and he has not explained that failure. We therefore deem 

his third “issue” waived and deny his request for a COA. See Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 

1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (refusing to consider a § 2254 petitioner’s contention that the 

State of Oklahoma unconstitutionally impeded his ability to timely file his habeas petition 

by denying access to legal materials, because petitioner had not raised the issue in the 

district court in response to state’s motion to dismiss). 

B. No. 18-6045

In No. 18-6045, Barclay seeks a COA to appeal the district court’s denial of his 

Rule 60(b) motion. In that motion, he asked the court to address de novo the new 

argument he made in his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation—that 

conducting the controlled call without a warrant violated federal and Oklahoma wiretap 

statutes, so its introduction at trial violated his constitutional rights. The district court 

denied the motion, finding that Barclay had not established any basis for granting relief 

under Rule 60(b), such as a change in the law, new evidence, manifest injustice, and 

misapprehension of the facts, the law, or Barclay’s position, and that it had thoroughly 

reviewed de novo “all relevant pleadings” before entering judgment on the petition. 

R.,Vol. 2 at 191. 

The district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion was a final order disposing of 

the merits of a motion that arose from the denial of a § 2254 petition. We therefore 

conclude that Barclay must obtain a COA to appeal that order. See Harbison v. Bell, 
6 

556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009) (explaining that COA requirement of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(A) “governs final orders that dispose of the merits of a habeas corpus 

proceeding”); Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a 

§ 2254 petitioner must obtain a COA “to appeal from the denial of a true Rule 60(b) 

motion in the district court”3

); accord United States v. Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134, 1142 

(9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that in keeping with Harbison, “a COA is required to appeal 

the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment arising out of the denial of a 

[28 U.S.C. §] 2255 motion”). 

To make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” needed to 

obtain a COA, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), Barclay must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists 

could debate whether (or for that matter, agree that) the petition”—here, the Rule 60(b) 

motion—“should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Taking into consideration that our review of the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is 

for abuse of discretion, Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 

2000), we conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s resolution 

 3

 Barclay’s Rule 60(b) motion was a “true” one, and not a second or successive 

habeas petition, because it alleged “a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas 

proceeding.” Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215–16. The alleged defect was the failure to 

review de novo an argument Barclay advanced in his objections to the magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation, and success on the motion did not depend “on a 

determination that the court had incorrectly ruled on the merits in the habeas proceeding,” 

In re Pickard, 681 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012). 
7 

of the Rule 60(b) motion. Nor is the issue presented in that motion—whether the district 

court should have reviewed the warrantless controlled-call issue de novo—deserving of 

further proceedings. In addition to canvassing and rejecting other possible bases for 

Rule 60(b) relief, the district court made clear that, contrary to Barclay’s argument, it had 

in fact engaged in de novo review of his objections before adopting the recommendation, 

denying the petition, and entering judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

Barclay’s applications for a COA are denied, and these matters are dismissed. 

Barclay’s Motion for Limited Remand, in which he asks for a remand so that the district 

court can have the opportunity to grant his Rule 60(b) motion, is denied as moot because 

the district court has since denied the Rule 60(b) motion. 

Entered for the Court 

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge