An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1227

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 20 May 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Union County

Nos. 09 CRS 55490-94, 55496-98,

LISA STARNES MORGAN 55500-01

Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 14 June 2013 by 

Judge Christopher W. Bragg in Superior Court, Union County. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 April 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Karissa J. Davan, for the State.

Mary McCullers Reece for Defendant-Appellant. 

McGEE, Judge.

Lisa Starnes Morgan (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments

entered upon revocation of her probation. Defendant pleaded

guilty to ten counts of obtaining a controlled substance by 

fraud on 17 February 2011. Defendant received suspended 

sentences of five to six months each, all of which were to run 

consecutively, and was placed on supervised probation for 

thirty-six months. 
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Defendant’s probation officer filed violation reports in 

each of the ten cases on 31 January 2013. The reports alleged 

that Defendant violated her probation by: (1) being in arrears 

of the monetary conditions of her probation; and (2) committing 

multiple new criminal offenses.

A probation revocation hearing was held on 14 June 2013 and 

Defendant admitted to being in willful violation of her 

probation. The trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and 

activated her suspended sentences.

Defendant timely filed written notice of appeal; however, 

the notice of appeal was not served upon the State and failed to 

properly identify the court to which the appeal was being taken. 

Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari on 6 November 

2013 seeking review of the judgments entered, because her notice 

of appeal did not comply with Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules 

of Appellate Procedure. In our discretion, we grant Defendant’s 

petition for writ of certiorari and review her arguments.

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

revoking her probation because the trial court was under the 

misapprehension of law that “each violation is, in and of 

itself, a sufficient basis upon which [a] court should revoke 
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probation and activate the suspended sentence.” We are not 

persuaded.

As an initial matter, we note that Defendant committed some 

of her alleged probation violations prior to the 1 December 2011 

effective date of the Justice Reinvestment Act (“JRA”), and some 

were committed after the effective date of the JRA. See State 

v. Hunnicutt, __ N.C. App. ___, ___, 740 S.E.2d 906, 911 (2013) 

(citing 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 192, sec. 4.(d); 2011 N.C. Sess. 

Laws 412, sec. 2.5). Under the JRA, only certain violations of 

probation are sufficient to revoke a defendant’s probation, 

including when a defendant commits a new offense. N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 15A–1344(a) (2013). This provision differs from the 

prior law in this state under which “[a]ny violation of a valid 

condition of probation [wa]s sufficient to revoke [a] 

defendant’s probation.” State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 521, 

353 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1987). Because some of Defendant’s alleged 

violations occurred prior to the effective date of the JRA and

some occurred after the effective date, we must apply both the 

JRA and prior law. 

The trial court found Defendant had violated her probation 

as alleged in the probation violation reports. Defendant argues

the trial court erroneously applied the pre-JRA doctrine that 
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any violation of probation is sufficient to justify revocation. 

Id. at 521, 353 S.E.2d at 253. However, Defendant’s conviction 

of a new criminal offense was a substantial factor in the trial 

court’s decision to revoke her probation as shown by the trial 

court admonishing Defendant:

THE COURT: Ms. Morgan, you were put on 

probation for ten counts, okay, of basically 

obtaining property -- obtaining controlled 

substance by fraud. And then in January of 

this year, you get another conviction for 

attempting to obtain controlled substance by 

fraud, which is basically the same thing 

that you're on probation for. All right. I 

can’t ignore that. You’re on probation, and 

you do the same thing again while you’re on 

probation.

Under both the JRA and prior law, committing a criminal offense 

while on probation is a ground upon which a defendant’s 

probation can be revoked. Consequently, it is immaterial 

whether we analyze Defendant’s violations of her probation under 

the JRA or prior law. There is no indication that the trial 

court acted under a misapprehension of law. Accordingly, we 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

revoking Defendant’s probation.

Affirmed.

Judges ELMORE and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).