J-S03024-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RONALD SCOTT STEPHENS

Appellant No. 1066 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 10, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000235-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2016

Ronald Scott Stephens appeals the judgment of sentence imposed on 

March 10, 2015, in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, made 

final by the denial of post-sentence motions on April 7, 2015. The trial court 

sentenced Stephens to a term of four to 10 years’ imprisonment, following 

his non-jury conviction on charges of robbery (fear of bodily injury), robbery 

(taking property from another by force), theft by unlawful taking or 

disposition, receiving stolen property, terroristic threats, and simple assault.1 

On appeal, he challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Based 

on the following, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iv), 3701(a)(1)(v), 3921(a), 3925(a), 

2706(a)(1), and 2701(a)(3), respectively.
J-S03024-16

- 2 -

The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history as follows:

At around 9:30 p.m. on December 27, 2013, [Stephens] 

entered a Wendy’s restaurant on Cheltenham Avenue in 

Cheltenham, Montgomery County and approached an employee 

at the register. He leaned in and said “Baby girl, this is a 

robbery. Give me the money in the register.” While [Stephens] 

said this, he held one hand in his pocket and pointed it in the 

direction of the counter. After the employee told [Stephens] she 

was unable to open the register, [Stephens] began to take his 

hand out of his pocket and instructed the employee that she 

better figure out how, at which point the employee opened the 

register and gave [Stephens] the money. [Stephens] took the 

money and left the restaurant. Based on a description of the 

assailant, police apprehended [Stephens] about two or three 

blocks from the restaurant. 

The matter proceeded to a bench trial and the undersigned 

found [Stephens] guilty robbery-fear of bodily injury, one count 

[of] robbery-taking property from another by force, theft by 

unlawful taking or disposition, receiving stolen property, 

terroristic threats and simple assault. The court sentenced 

[Stephens] to four to 10 years in prison on the charge of 

robbery-fear of bodily injury. The remaining charges merged for 

purposes of sentencing.

[Stephens] filed a post-sentence motion. He asserted the 

charges of robbery, terroristic threats and simple assault were 

against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. He also 

claimed this court failed to place sufficient reasons on the record 

to support a sentence outside the standard range.

The court denied the post-sentence motion in an order 

dated April 7, 2015.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/2015, at unnumbered 1-2 (record citations and 

footnotes omitted). This timely appeal followed.2

____________________________________________

2

 On April 24, 2015, the trial court ordered Stephens to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S03024-16

- 3 -

In his sole issue on appeal, Stephens challenges the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence, alleging the court did not set forth any specific 

reasons on the record to justify an aggravated range sentence. Stephens’ 

Brief at 12. Specifically, he states the judge “did not explain why this 

particular offense is more severe than the normal type of this crime,” and 

moreover, the judge 

wholly failed to consider that this robbery case was in fact less 

severe than many robbery cases, in that [Stephens] did not 

possess a weapon of any kind, did not directly threaten to 

commit any act of violence, did not commit any act of violence 

and, in fact, never even touched anyone or anything 

inappropriately until he was handed the money. 

Id. at 15.3

The standard of review for a claim challenging the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing is well-established:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

judge, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest 

abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not shown merely 

by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Stephens filed a concise statement on May 7, 2015. The trial court issued 

an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on June 15, 2015.

3

 Stephens also claims the judge considered an incorrect fact, that the 

victim-witness was scared to testify at trial, in his decision. We note 

Stephens addresses this issue for the first time on appeal and failed to raise 

it at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. Therefore, this issue is 

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Nevertheless, we note that during 

sentencing, defense counsel indicated the victim was not a cooperative 

witness, “the DA had to get a witness warrant and go pick her up and bring 

her in” and she was “[n]ot the kind of victim, you know, that was running 

into court.” N.T., 3/10/2015, at 11-12. 
J-S03024-16

- 4 -

by reference to the record, that then sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly 

unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 980 A.2d 607 (Pa. 2009). 

“A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a 

claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 518 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (citation omitted). To reach the merits of a discretionary 

issue, this Court must determine: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant 

preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a 

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of 

appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and 

(4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question 

that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-330 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013).

Here, Stephens filed a post-sentence motion challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence, as well as a timely direct appeal. 

Moreover, his brief includes the requisite statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f), setting forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. See

Stephens’ Brief at 11. Therefore, we may proceed to determine whether 

Stephens has set forth a substantial question that his sentence is 
J-S03024-16

- 5 -

inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. See Commonwealth v. Titus, 

816 A.2d 251, 255 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

A substantial question exists when an appellant sets forth “a colorable 

argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms 

underlying the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 

1128, 1133 (Pa Super. 2009) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 

161 (Pa. 2009). As noted above, Stephens asserts that the court sentenced 

him in the aggravated range and failed to state its reasons for doing so on 

the record. This Court has previously held that such a claim raises a 

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 829 A.2d 334, 338 

(Pa. Super. 2003); Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa. 

Super. 2008), appeal denied, 13 A.3d 474 (Pa. 2010). This Court has also 

determined that a substantial question is raised where, as Stephens also 

alleges, the court imposed a sentence in the aggravated range without 

adequately considering mitigating circumstances. See Commonwealth v. 

Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).

We note that when imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must 

consider “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates 

to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Moreover,

“a court is required to consider the particular circumstances of 

the offense and the character of the defendant.” 
J-S03024-16

- 6 -

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2002), 

appeal denied, 582 Pa. 671, 868 A.2d 1198 (2005), cert. denied,

545 U.S. 1148, 125 S.Ct. 2984, 162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005). “In 

particular, the court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal 

record, his age, personal characteristics and his potential for 

rehabilitation.” Id. Where the sentencing court had the benefit 

of a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), we can assume the 

sentencing court “was aware of relevant information regarding 

the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations 

along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 101-02, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988). See also 

Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 368 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (stating if sentencing court has benefit of PSI, law expects 

court was aware of relevant information regarding defendant’s 

character and weighed those considerations along with any 

mitigating factors). 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Furthermore, 

[a] sentencing court may consider any legal factor in 

determining that a sentence in the aggravated range should be 

imposed. In addition, the sentencing judge’s statement of 

reasons on the record must reflect this consideration, and the 

sentencing judge’s decision regarding the aggravation of a 

sentence will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 204 Pa.Code § 303.13(c) 

(providing that when imposing sentence in aggravated range sentencing 

court, “shall state [its] reasons on the record[.]”). 

“[A]n appellate court may not disturb a sentence that is within the 

sentencing guidelines unless it determines that the sentence is ‘clearly 
J-S03024-16

- 7 -

unreasonable.’” Bowen, 975 A.2d at 1126 n.5, quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c).4

A sentence may be found unreasonable if it fails to 

properly account for [the] four statutory factors [listed in Section 

9781]. A sentence may also be found unreasonable if the 

“sentence was imposed without express or implicit consideration 

by the sentencing court of the general standards applicable to 

sentencing.” These general standards mandate that a 

sentencing court impose a sentence “consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to 

the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9721(b).

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 191 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal 

denied, 980 A.2d 607 (Pa. 2009).

Here, the trial court had the benefit of a presentence investigation 

report,5and therefore, we will presume it was “aware of all appropriate 

____________________________________________

4

 In making a reasonableness determination, a court should consider four 

factors:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 

and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(1)-(4).

5

 Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/2015, at unnumbered 9.
J-S03024-16

- 8 -

sentencing factors and considerations.” Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 

A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

Moreover, the standard sentencing guideline range for Stephens’ 

robbery conviction was 35 to 45 months. N.T., 3/10/2015, at 9. The court 

sentenced him to four to 10 years’ imprisonment, three months above the 

top end of the standard range. Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/2015, at 

unnumbered 8. At the time of sentencing, Stephens was 56 years old, this 

was his ninth robbery conviction, and he was a repeat felony offender 

(“RFEL”). N.T., 3/10/2015, at 8-9, 14. Additionally, he was on parole when 

he committed the present offense. Id. at 13. 

Furthermore, the trial court had the opportunity to observe Stephens’ 

behavior at both his trial and sentencing hearing, and to hear his allocution 

at sentencing. Stephens apologized for his actions, submitted several 

supportive letters from members of the community, and admitted that he 

had alcohol and drug issues which he has battled his whole life. Id. at 2-8. 

Lastly, at the March 10, 2015, sentencing hearing, the trial court 

placed its reasons for the sentence it imposed on the record:

[C]learly, you are not just a robber, you are prolific. I 

mean, this is your ninth conviction for robbery. That is 

unbelievable.

...

In the present case, I have considered your age, the 

information about yourself that you have presented to me. And 

it is very impressive and informative. And I have also

considered the evidence and the circumstances of the offense.
J-S03024-16

- 9 -

The fact of the matter is I was the trial judge in this 

matter. It was a bench trial. So I feel very familiar with this 

case. And I watched the videotape, saw it all, heard what this 

young lady had to say, the victim. She thought it was a gun. 

No question in her mind. 

...

So as I say, the facts of the offense have been established 

by the verdict. So you are admitting to that.

And after considering those factors, I find that there is an

undue risk that during the period of any type of probation or 

partial confinement you will commit another crime. I don’t think 

you would disagree with that otherwise.

...

Clearly, a lesser sentence than I am about to give you 

would depreciate the seriousness of your crime. I, therefore, 

find that total confinement is proper.

...

If it wasn’t mentioned, you are an RFEL defendant. And 

that if I have to weigh protecting society versus your 

rehabilitative needs, I think this is the route that I am mandated 

by my own conscience to go with.

N.T., 3/10/2015, at 14, 16-19.

Based on the above, our review of Stephens’ sentence, pursuant to 

Section 9781 of the Sentencing Code, leads us to conclude that the court 

imposed a reasonable and appropriate sentence. It is evident from the 

court’s on-the-record statement that it considered all the requisite factors, 

including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the recommended 

guideline range, the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and 
J-S03024-16

- 10 -

Stephens’ rehabilitative needs, when fashioning his sentence. Moreover, 

contrary to Stephens’ argument, it is clear from the court’s statement that it 

did set forth specific reasons on the record to justify an aggravated range 

sentence and did consider the mitigating circumstances surrounding the 

incident. Accordingly, we conclude the court properly exercised its discretion 

in sentencing Stephens in the aggravated range of the Sentencing 

Guidelines. Therefore, Stephens’ sole issue on appeal does not merit relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/2016