### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 1, 200 6

MA RK TOML IN v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Dyer County No. C04-117 LeeMoore , Judge

No. W2005-02043-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Dece m ber 5, 2006

The Petitioner, Mar

k Tomlin, pled guilty

to one count of poss ession of under 0.5 g rams of c ocaine with intent to sell. The Petiti oner pe titioned for post-conviction re lief cla iming that he had re ceive d the ineff ective assistance of

counsel. The post-conviction court dismi ssed the post-convic tion petition, and we a ffirm that judg ment. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., and D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., joined.

J ason R. Creasy , Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Mark T omlin.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; B e njamin A. B a ll, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C. Phi llip Bivens, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F acts Pursuant to a plea ag ree ment, the Petitioner pled g uiltyto possession of under 0.5 g rams of
cocaine with intent to sell and was sentenc ed to three y ear s of confinement, consecutive t o a twelve y ea r s en t en ce t h at h e w as s er v i n g. At the g uiltyplea he aring on May 25, 2004, the District At t o rney offe red the following fac tual basis for the Petitioner’ s g uiltyplea: the police department was informe d that the Petitioner was in a motel room with an unknow n quantity of drug s. The police went to the motel and found the manag er swe eping outside the room. The police asked the manag er if the Petitioner was stayingM r. K el l y and M r. D avi s were ass o ci at es. M r. K el l y represent ed t he P et i t i o ner fo r s o m e p eri o d of t i m e and 1

w a s c o n tinu ing to re p re se n t him up to this la st c h a rg e , at w h ic h p o int M r. D a v is to o k o v e r.

A pp ar ent l y , al l par t i es ha ve r ef er r ed t o t he cha r ge out of wh i ch t hi s ca s e a r i s es as t he “ mo t el ch ar ge” i n or der 2

to d isting u ish it fro m the two un re la te d c h a rg e s fo r w h ic h the P e tit io n e r w a s in c o u rt, re p re se n te d b y M r. K e lly.
-2- in the room and the ma nag er r eplied, “Y es.” The n, without being a sked, t h e m an age r opened the do or fo r the po lic e . T he po lic e we nt in a nd sa w the Pe tit ion e r. Th e y a sk e d h im i f h e ha d a ny

dr ug s, and the Petitioner responde d, “No.” The District Attorney then stated that the police asked the Petitioner if they

could sea rch the room, and he told them they could. The police sear ched the room with “no results.” They

then aske d the Petitioner if they could sea rch him, and he said they

could. The police then found the dr ug s and some ca sh.
At the post-conviction hea ri n g, t h e Petitioner testified that he was in the bathroom of the mot e l r oo m w he n h e he ardkn oc kin g , the n a ke y op e ne d th e do or , a ndthe po lic e c a me int o th e ro om. He sa id that the police did no t fi n d anything during the ir sear ch of the room and then the police of fi c e rs pu t th e ir

ha nd s in to h is p oc ke ts. He c la ime d he did no t g ive the m pe rm iss ionto s e arc h h is person. He testified that he told this to hi s at t o rn ey , Steve Davis, a nd his previous attorney on u n r e late d c h ar g e s , Ch ar le s K e ll y

. T h e Pe ti ti o n e r a ls o s tate d h e d id n o t a s k M r

. D a v is to file a 1 motion to s uppress, but he e x pecte d them to do what was ne cessa ry for his def

ense. Following the sea

rch, it is undisputed the Petitioner was arr ested, and the dr ug s were sent off for testing as t o the amount. On F ebrua ry 3, 2004, the Petitioner was in cour t on two unrelate d char g es, re prese nted by

Mr. Kelly

. Be fore and at that he aring , Mr. Kelly and the District Attorne y discussed the “ motel c harg e.” The District Attorney testified at the post-convic tion hearing that he 2 felt there was no ne ed for

the Petitioner to have a

misdemeanor dr

ug char g e on his rec ord with what he wa s then fac ing on the two unrelated cha rg es, so, he told Mr. Ke lly that if the lab re sults returned “misdemea nor amounts,” he would not seek a n indictment. Mr. Kelly did not disput e this.

Th e Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he be lie ve d that he wo uld be ple a din g to a ll the c ha rg e s a g a ins t him , in c lud ing the “ mot e l c ha rg e .” Th e n, on F e br

ua ry 3, 20 04 , the Pe tit ion e r ac tua lly ple d g uil ty to the two unre lated cha

rg es, and w hen the lab r esults came ba ck with fe lony amounts, the Petitioner was indi cte d o n th e “ mo te l c h ar g e

. ” A t th a t p o in t, M r

. D a v is to o k o v e r th e r e p r e s e n tati o n o f

the Petitioner.

The Petitioner’s c l ai m for the ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel stems from Mr. Da vis’s repr esentation. The Petitioner claims that Mr. Davis should ha ve made a motion to enforce the plea ag ree me n t f

r o m F e b r u a r y 3 , 2 0 0 4 , which the Petitioner be lieves should have e ncompassed the “motel
c ha rg e .” Ad dit ion a lly , the Pe tit ion e r c la ims that Mr

. Da vis sh ou ld ha ve ma de a mot ion to s up pr e ss the evidenc e seized fr om the motel because it was the pr oduct of a n illega l searc h, conducte d without his pe rm iss ion a ndwi tho ut a wa rr a nt.

At the pos t-conviction hearing , Mr. Davis stated t hat he be lieved the door to the room was op e n e d w ith p e r mi s s io n a n d th at th e r e w a s n o f o r c e d e n try

. H e a ls o s tate d th a t h e b e li e v e d what-3-

occur red w as a Te rry

frisk, which turne d up the co ca i n e an d m arijuana in question. He stated he believed the sear ch wa s leg al. Mr. Da vis also te stified that he could not r eca ll if the Petiti oner a sked him to file a motion to suppress, but that if the Petiti oner ha d asked him he w ould have f iled one.

As to the Fe bruary

3, 2004, plea a g ree ment, Mr. Davis stated t hat he thoug ht every thing wa s g oing to be pled tog ether , and he w as surprise d when Mr. K elly told him the “motel c harg e” w as not included. He stated that he ta lked with the District Attorney , and the District Attorney told him that the “motel cha

rg e” w as only

to b e d ropped if the lab re sults returned misdemeanor amounts. Mr. Davis also testified that the Petitioner w as surprise d to hear t h e “m otel char g e” w as not included. Mr. Davis stated that he believe d the Petitioner was s u rp ri s ed b eca use he and Mr. Kelly

told the Petitioner the cha

rg e wa s to be included.

F ind ing the Pe tit ion e r r e c e ive d th e e ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l a nd

the Pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty plea wa s not constituti onally defe ctive, the post-c onviction court dismissed the petition.

II. Ana lys is

On app e a l, the Pe tit ion e r c la ims that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d whe n it

dis mis se d h is pe ti ti o n f o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f b e c a u s e h e w a s d e n ie d th e e f f e c ti v e a s s is tan c e o f counsel. He
asserts that counsel was ine ffe ctive in fa iling to file a motion to suppress and f ailing to f ile a motion to enforc e the plea

ag ree ment. The Petitioner cla ims that because he did not rec eive the eff ective assistance of counse l, his guil ty plea, e ntere d on May

25, 2004, was not knowing , voluntary , and int e lli g e nt. Th e Sta te c ou nte rs that th e Pe tit ion e r’ s p e tit ionis w ith ou t me ri t.

I n order to obta in post-c onviction r elief, a petitioner must show that his or her c onviction or sentenc e is void or voi dable be cause of the a bridg ment of a c onstitut ional rig ht. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 1 0 3 (2003). The petitioner bea rs the burde n of proving fac tual alleg ations in the petition for post-c onviction relief by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 1 0(f) (2003). Upon re vi ew , t h i s Court will not re-weig h or re -eva luate the e vidence below; all questions
conce rning the cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven their testimony and the fa c tua l is su e s r a ise d b y

the e vid e nc e are t o b e re so lve d b y the tr ia l ju dg e , n ot the app e llate c ou rt s. Momon v. St ate, 18 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn. 1999); Henley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578-79 (Te nn. 19 97 ). A p os t- c on vic tio n court’s f a c tua l f ind ing s a re su bje c t to a

de no vo re vie w b y

thi s Co urt; howeve r, we must accor d thes e factual finding s a pre sumption of corre ctness, which c an be
overc o m e onlywhen a

preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is contra ry to the post-conviction court’s fac tual finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 456-57 (Te nn. 2001). A post-c onviction court’s conclusions of law are subject to a p u re l y de novo re view by

this Court, wit h no presumption of
corr ectne ss. I d. at 457.

Th e ri g ht o f a

c ri min a lly

a c c us e d to re pr e se ntatio n is g ua rante e d b y

bo th the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constituti on and article I , section 9, of the T ennesse e Constituti on. State v. Whit e, 114 S.W .3d 469, 475 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) ; Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The following two-prong test directs a court’s-4-

e va luatio n o f a

c la im f or ine ff e c tiv e ne ss:

F ir st, the [pe tit ion e r] m us t sh ow that c ou ns e l’ s p e rf orma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt . T his require s showing that counsel made err ors so serious that counsel was not fu nc tio nin g a s th e “ c ou ns e l” g ua rante e d th e [pe tit ion e r] b y the Six th Ame nd me nt. Second, the [petitioner] m u s t show that the def icient per formanc e pre

judiced the defe nse. This require s showing that counsel’s e rror s were so serious as to deprive the [petit ioner] of a fair t rial, a trial whose re sult is reliable. Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it ca nnot be said that the convic tion or death sente nce r esulted fr om a bre akdown in the a dversa ry proce ss that rende rs the re sult unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Melson, 772 S.W .2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989)

.
I n revie wing a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, this Court m ust determine whe ther the advice g iven or services rende red by the attorne y

are within the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorney s in c riminal case s. Ba x ter, 523 S.W .2d at 936. To prevail on a cla i m o f i n ef fe ct ive assistance of counse l, a petiti oner must show that “counse l’s repr esentation fell below an objective standard of

rea sonablene ss.” House v. State, 44 S.W .3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (1984))

. Wh en ev al u at i n g an i n ef

fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el cl ai m , t h e r ev i ew i n g co u rt s h o u l d j u d ge the attorne y ’s per formanc e within the context of the case as a w hole, taking into account a ll releva nt circ umstances. Strickland , 46 6 U .S. a t 69 0; S ta te v. Mit c he ll, 75 3 S. W.2 d 1 48 , 1 49 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p

. 1 9 8 8 ). T h e r ev i ew i n g co u rt m u s tev al u at e t h e q u es t i o n ab l e c o n d u ct fr o mt h e a t t o rn ey 's perspe ctive at the time. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690; Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)

. I n doing so, the revie wing court must be hig hly defe rential a nd “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide rang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 462. Fina lly , we note that a d ef en d an t i n a criminal case is not entitled to perf ect repr esentation, only constitutionally adequate re prese ntation. Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). I n o the r w or ds , “ in c on sid e ri ng c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, ‘we addre ss not what is prudent or a ppropriate , but only

what is constitutionallycompelled.’ ” Bur g er v. K emp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984) ). Counsel should not be deemed to ha ve bee n ineffe ctive mer ely beca use a diff

ere nt proce dure or

strateg y might have produce d a diffe rent re sult. Wil liams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The fac t that a particula r strateg y or tactic failed or h u rt t he defe nse does not, standing alone, e stablish unreasona ble re prese ntation. House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (c i t i n g Go ad v

. S t at e, 9 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d 3 6 3 , 3 6 9 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ))

. Ho we v er , d ef er en ce t o m at t er s o f s tra t egy and tac tical choice s applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon a dequate prepa ration. House, 44 S.W.3d at 515.

I f t he petiti oner shows that counsel’s repre sentation fell below a rea sonable standa

rd, then the pe tition e r mu st sa tis fy the pr e jud ic e pr on g of

the Stric klandte st b y

de mon str a tin g “ the re is a-5-

rea sonable proba

bilit y t h at , b ut for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding woul d h av e b ee n d iffer ent.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W .3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002)

. To sa tis fy the re qu ir e me nt of prejudic e , a pe tit ion e r mus t sh ow a re a so na ble pro ba bil ity that, b ut f

or c ou ns e l’ s u nr e a so na

ble e rr or , th e fa c t f

ind e r w ou ld h a ve ha d r e a so na ble doubt r eg arding the petitioner’s g uilt. Strickland, 46 6 U.S. a t 695. Th is r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity

mus t be “suf ficient to undermine confide nce in the out come.” I d. at 694; Har ris v. State, 875 S.W .2d 662, 66 5 (T e nn . 199 4) . Wh e n a pe tit ion e r c la ims ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l in re la tio n to a

g uil ty plea, the pe titioner must prove that counsel perf ormed defic iently and, “but for c ounsel’s er rors, he
wo uld no t hav e ple a de d g uil ty a nd wo uldha ve ins ist e d o n g oin g to t ri a l.” Hi ll v . L oc kh art , 4 74 U. S. 52, 59 (1985).
Ag ain, in the case before us, the Petiti oner c laims that Counsel was ineffe ctive bec ause he failed to file two motions, a motion to suppress and a motion to enforc e the plea ag ree ment. The Pe tit ion e r a lso c la ims that be c a us e he didno t r e c e ive the e ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, h is g uil ty pl ea , en t ered on May

25, 2004, was not knowing , voluntary , and intellige nt. The post-convic tion court found the Petitioner did not car ry his bur den of pr oof bec ause he did not present any evidenc e as to whethe r the motion to suppress would have been suc cessf ul. As to the motion to enforce the plea ag ree ment, the Petitioner offe red no evidenc e that there was in f act any ag ree ment betwee n the Di stric t A tto rn e y

a ndhis c ou ns e l th a t w ou ld a bs olu te ly includ e th e “ mot e l c ha

rg e .” I ns te a d, it appea rs there was a m i scommunication betwe en the Petitioner a nd Mr. Kelly , which led the Petitio n er t o believe that the “motel cha rg e” w as included in the F ebrua ry 3, 2004, g uiltyplea. Be cause there was no plea ag ree ment that ab s o l u t ely included the “ motel char g e,” it wa s not
unrea son ab le f

o r M r

. D a v is to n o t f

il e a mo ti o n to e n f

o r c e a p le a a g r e e me n t. T h e r e w a s n o plea
a g re e me nt that app lie d to the “ mot e l cha rg e .” Th e re wa s mer e ly a dis c us sio n tha t if the la b r e su lts
came back w ith mis demea nor amounts of drug s, the District Attorney would not pur sue the “ motel
c ha rg e .” Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.
Next, the Petitioner claims that a motion to suppress should have be en filed c oncerning the money and drug s found on the Petitioner’s p er s o n wh en he w as sea rche d in the motel room. The Petitioner claims that he re peate dly told Mr. Davis that he be l i eved the sear ch wa s illega l. The Petitioner does not claim that he a sked Mr. Davis to f ile the motion, and Mr. Davis a g ree s that he
wa s n ot a sk e d to do so

I f the Petitioner had r ejec ted the plea a g ree ment for the “ motel char g e,” he fac ed the po ssi bil ity

of tw e lve to t we nty

y e ars in p ri so n. Un de r the ple a a g reement , th e P e tit ion e r w a s to
rec eive a sentenc e of three y ear s. Mr. Davis ac ted within the rang e of c ompetence when he advised the Pe tit ion e r to ple a d g uil ty a nd re c e ive a thr e e -y e ar s e nte nc e un de r the ple a a g re e me nt anda vo id g oing f orwa rd. We ag ree with the post-conviction cour t that the P etitioner has not met his burden of proving Mr. Davis wa s objectively unrea sonable a nd not functioning as counse l as g uaranteed by the U.S. and Te nnessee Constit utions.

E ven if Counsel wa s objectively unrea sonable in not making a motion to suppress, the Petitioner has fa iled to prove he was pre judiced. When a petitioner claims ineffe ctive assistanc e ofW e al so no t e t hat t he D i st ri ct A t t o rney specif i cal l y st at ed at t he gui l t y p l ea heari ng on M ay 2 5 , 20 0 4 , “ [T he 3
po l i ce] advi s ed M r

. T om l i n a s t o t he r eas on t hey wer e pr es ent and i f he had any d r ug s o r o f

an y dru g a ct i vi t y

. H e s t at ed

no , Y o ur H o no r. T hey asked f o r perm i ss i o n to search and he rep l i ed that they c o ul d

. T hey searched t he roo m wi t h no

res ul t s, Y o ur H o no r. T hey t hen asked M r. T o m l i n i f t hey co ul d search hi s p ers o n, he agreed

. ” In hi s gui l t y plea coll o q uy
w i t h t h e t r i a l c ou r t j u dg e , t h e j u dg e a s k e d, “ Ar e t h e f a c t s a s M r

. B i v e n s h a s s u mma r i z e d t h e m, a r e t h os e f a c t s c or r e c t ?” T h e P e tit io n e r re sp o n d e d , “Y e s, sir.”
-6- counsel in re lation to a g uilty plea, the petitioner must prove that counsel pe rformed def iciently and,

“ bu t f or c ou ns e l’ s e rr or s, he wo uldno t ha ve ple a de d g uil ty a ndwo uldha ve ins ist e d on go ing to trial.” Hill v. L ockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Be cause the Petitioner did not present a ny evidenc e which would indicate that a motion to suppress would be succe ssful other than his own testimony that he believe d that the sea rch w as illeg al, the post-convic tion court had no ba sis to find that the Petitioner was pre

judiced by

the lack of

a motion to suppress

. Ge n er al ly , “[w]hen a petitioner 3

c on te nd s th a t tria l c ou ns e l f a ile d to dis c ov e r, int e rv ie w, or pres ent witne sse s in su pp ort of his defe nse, these w itnesses should be pre sented by the petitioner at the evidentiary hearing.” Bla ck v. Sta te , 7 94 S.W. 2d 75 2, 75 7 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 0)

. We ma y no t sp e c ulate on wh a t be ne fi t th e se witnesses mig ht have of

fer ed to the petitioner’ s case , and we may not gue ss as t o what evidence fu rthe r i nv e sti g a tio n may ha ve un c ov e re d. I d. a t 75 7- 58 . A c c or din g ly , th e Pe tit ion e r h a s fa ile d to demonstrate pr ejudice in this reg ard. The Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.
The post-c onviction court found that the Petitioner did not prove by clea r and c onvincing
e vid e nc e that Co un se l w a s o bje c tiv e ly un re a so na

ble or that he wa s pr e

jud ic e d by

Cou ns e l’ s c on du c t. We co nc lud e t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s n o tp r e p o n d e r a t e t o t h e c o n tr ar y

. W e a l s o a g r e e w i t h t h e po stconviction court’s application of the law. Counsel’s act i ons fell within the “wide r ang e of
rea sonable prof

essional assistance .” B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 462.

I f the Petitioner wa s denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel on or befor e his g uiltyplea, it might be ar g ued that he did n o t en t er t he g uiltyplea a ccor ding to the sta ndards se t out by the United States Supreme Court. Ac cording to Boy kin v. Alabama, our

chief conce rns when de aling with a g uiltyplea a

re e nsuring that the plea is enter ed int o in a knowing, intellige nt, and voluntary way

. 3 9 5 U. S

. 2 3 8 , 242-44 (1969) . The Te nnessee Supreme Court has spe cified the following fac tors to consider whe n determining whe ther a g uiltyplea wa s proper ly

enter ed:

the re lative intellige nce of the def endant; the deg ree of his f amiliarity with criminal proce eding s; whether he was rep resented by competent c ounsel and ha d the opportunity

to confe r with counsel a

bout the options available to him; the extent of advice from c o unsel and the c ourt conc erning the cha rg es ag ainst him; and the
re a so ns fo r h is d e c isi on to p le a d g ui lt y , in c lud ing de sir e to avo id a g re a te r p e na lty that mi g ht r e su lt f

ro m ju ry tr ia l.

Powers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting B lankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) ).-7-

I n ap p l y i n g t h e f

a c t o r s l i s t e d ab o v e , w e a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r e n t e re d h is plea in a know ing, voluntary , and intellige nt way . Fr om the testimony , it appear s that the Petitioner is able to rea d and write, he has be en involved with the criminal sy stem bef ore, and he wa s re pr e se nte d b y

c omp e te nt c ou ns e l, a s o utl ine d a bo ve . T he Pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d th a t he dis c us se d w ith his a tto rn e y

the iss ue of

a c c e pti ng the ple a a g re e me nt a ndre c e ivi ng thr e e y e ars ins te a d o f g oin g to tr ia l a ndri sk ing re c e ivi ng tw e lve to t we nty y e ars . T he la w is c le ar that “ a n o the rw ise va lidg uil ty plea doe s not be come voluntary mere ly beca use it is induced by

the def endant’ s desire to limit the possible maxi mum penalty to less than t hat authoriz ed if there is a jury trial.” Newsom v. State, 995 S.W

. 2 d 1 2 9 , 1 3 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . Thus, we c onclude that the e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the ruling by the post-conviction court; the Petiti oner ha s not met his burden.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing r easoning and authorities, we af firm t he judg ment of the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.

________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE