18-2447 

Rogers v. Borkowsky 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 12th day of March, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT D. SACK, 

REENA RAGGI, 

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

Patricia Rogers, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 18-2447 

Mitchell T. Borkowsky, Carolyn Mazzu 

Genovesi,

Defendants-Appellees. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Patricia Rogers, pro se, Reading, PA. 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Andrew W. Amend, David Lawrence III, 

Assistant Solicitors General, for Letitia A. 

James, Attorney General of the State of New 

York, New York, NY. 
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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York (Matsumoto, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court entered on August 1, 2018, is AFFIRMED. 

 Appellant Patricia Rogers, proceeding pro se, sued the chief and assistant counsel to the 

New York State Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District (“Grievance Committee”) for 

wrongs under the Federal Tort Claims Act and for violations of her constitutional rights. She 

alleged that the Grievance Committee wrongfully declined to investigate a grievance that she filed 

against her former attorney. The District Court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only 

as needed to explain our decision to affirm. 

 On de novo review of the District Court’s dismissal, Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 

Co., 757 F.3d 79, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2014), we identify no error. To have standing, a plaintiff must 

show that (1) she has an injury in fact, (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and 

conduct of which she complains, and (3) “it [is] ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that 

[her] injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560–61 (1992) (citation omitted). Injury in fact consists of “an invasion of a legally protected 

interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (citation omitted). The requirement sets “a 
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low threshold, . . . which helps to ensure that the plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the 

controversy.” John v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 858 F.3d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 2017). 

 We have consistently held that “a private citizen generally lacks standing ‘to contest the 

policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with 

prosecution.’” United States v. Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Linda 

R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). This principle precludes an individual from 

challenging an attorney disciplinary committee’s decision not to discipline his or her former 

attorney. In re Attorney Disciplinary Appeal, 650 F.3d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 2011). Just as crime 

victims “have not suffered an Article III direct injury” from a prosecutor’s decision not to pursue 

criminal charges against their assailants, Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d at 791 (emphasis added), a person 

who files a grievance with an attorney disciplinary committee suffers no direct injury from that 

committee’s decision not to pursue discipline. In re Attorney Disciplinary Appeal, 650 F.3d at 

204; see also Doyle v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566–67 (10th Cir. 1993) (affirming 

dismissal for lack of standing because grievant could not assert any cognizable legal interest in 

disciplinary commission’s decision). 

 Rogers alleged that the Grievance Committee violated her constitutional rights by declining 

to investigate her grievance against her former attorney. But under the precedent cited above, she 

has not alleged an interest in the Grievance Committee’s proceedings sufficient to satisfy Article 

III standing. See In re Attorney Disciplinary Appeal, 650 F.3d at 204; Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1566–

67. 
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 We have reviewed Rogers’s remaining arguments and conclude that they have no merit. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court