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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

In re: 

PG&E CORPORATION, 

- and -

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, 

Debtors. 

☐ Affects PG&E Corporation

☐ Affects Pacific Gas and

Electric Company 

☒ Affects both Debtors

* All papers shall be filed in

the Lead Case, No. 19-30088 (DM).

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Bankruptcy Case 

No. 19-30088-DM 

Chapter 11 

Jointly Administered 

Date: December 11, 2019 

Time: 10:00 AM 

Place: Courtroom 17 

450 Golden Gate Ave. 

16th Floor

 San Francisco, CA 

MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING POSTPETITION INTEREST 

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 11, 2019, the court heard oral argument on the 

discrete legal issue of the applicable postpetition interest to 

be paid to four classes of allowed unsecured and unimpaired 

claims, under any chapter 11 reorganization plan for solvent 

debtors PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

(“Debtors”). The Debtors, joined by certain Shareholders, argue 

that creditors in all four classes should receive interest 

Entered on Docket 

December 30, 2019

EDWARD J. EMMONS, CLERK 

U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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calculated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (the “Federal 

Interest Rate”) in effect as of the petition date (January 29, 

2019) these chapter 11 cases. That rate for these jointly 

administered cases is 2.59 percent. Debtors contend that use of 

the Federal Interest Rate is consistent with In re Cardelucci, 

285 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Cardelucci”), which holds that 

unsecured creditors in a solvent case should receive 

postpetition interest calculated at the Federal Interest Rate. 

Several parties, including the Official Committee of 

Unsecured Creditors, the Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Unsecured 

Noteholders, the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of Trade Claims and 

others (collectively “Unsecured Creditors”) oppose the motion. 

They urge application of various rates, generally determined by 

applicable contracts between the Debtors and the respective 

claimants, judgment rates or some other rate. 

For the following reasons, the court concludes that the 

Debtors are correct, that Cardelucci controls and that the 

Federal Interest Rate applies to any Plan. 

II. APPLICABLE LAW 

Statutory construction of the Bankruptcy Code1 is “a 

holistic endeavor” requiring consideration of the entire 

statutory scheme. United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of 

Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 

98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988), cited by In re BCE West, L.P., 319 F.3d 

1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section 

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 

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In Timbers, the Supreme Court utilized this holistic 

approach to analyze five seemingly unconnected provisions of 

Title 11 in determining that oversecured creditors are entitled 

to receive postpetition interest. Applying a similar holistic 

approach, this court has looked to the structure of the 

Bankruptcy Code and the purposes behind its many parts to 

conclude while unsecured creditors are entitled to postpetition 

interest in a solvent estate, the Bankruptcy Code requires 

application of the Federal Interest Rate to those claims and 

that such an application does not impair these claims. Even if 

Cardelucci were not binding, the court would reach the same 

conclusion. 

Chapter 5, subchapter I (“Creditors and Claims”) of the 

Bankruptcy Code sets forth the guiding principles for filing and 

allowance of claims or interests, administrative expenses, 

determination of secured status and other provisions not 

important to the current analysis. In contrast, the court must 

apply the critical provisions of chapter 11, subchapter II (“The 

Plan”). Section 1123(a) states what a plan “shall” do or 

include. Section 1123(b) states what a plan “may” do or 

include. As a definitional matter, section 1124 explains that a 

class of claims or interest is impaired unless the plan leaves 

certain legal, equitable and contractual rights unaltered (§ 

1124(1)), or cures, restates, or compensates the rights of class 

or interest members (§ 1124(2)(A)-(E)). 

The structure of the Bankruptcy Code and the applicability 

of these definitional and empowering sections, therefore, 

dictate rights that are fixed as of the petition date and what 

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rules apply after that. Nothing suggests that, absent specific 

rules, provisions dealing with prepetition entitlements carry 

over postpetition. For example, section 502(b)(2) clearly 

provides that a claim for “unmatured interest”2 may not be 

allowed. An exception to the rule is found in section 506(b) 

that permits accrued interest to be allowed as long as the 

security is “greater than the amount of such claim.” 

The Unsecured Creditors’ argument that somehow the 

definitions and remedies found in section 1124 override the 

plain impact of section 502(b)(2) is simply not persuasive and 

would require the court to ignore not only the plain words of 

the statute but also the holistic notion of treating them as 

part of a combined comprehensive instrument of definitions, 

applicability and implementation. Section 1124(1) describes 

what claims are unimpaired and section 1124(2) describes what is 

necessary for a plan to “unimpair” impaired claims. In 

contrast, chapter 5 (“Creditors and Claims”) dictates how claims 

and interests are dealt with in the substantive chapters: 7, 11, 

12 and 13. The subparts of section 502(b) list nine specific 

rules for affecting allowed claims. 

An example not directly related to this case proves the 

point. Section 502(b)(4) disallows the claim of an insider or 

an attorney to the extent it exceeds the reasonable value of the 

services. Unsecured Creditors could not persuade the court or 

even make a convincing argument that somehow an insider or an 

attorney whose asserted claim exceeds a reasonable value could 

 

2 No one has suggested that “unmatured interest” means 

anything other than “postpetition interest.” 

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take refuge in section 1124((1)’s definitional provision and 

escape the clear intention of Congress to limit unreasonable 

claims for services in the same manner it has limited 

postpetition unsecured claims for unmatured interest. For the 

same reason, underlying non-bankruptcy law must give way to 

contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Travelers Cas. & 

Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 444 

(2007) (quoting Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 

15, 20 (2000). 

With that background, the court turns to the applicability 

of Cardelucci and its clear message. 

III. THIS COURT’S RESPONSIBILITY UNDER STARE DECISIS

This court is bound by the Ninth Circuit’s Cardelucci 

decision unless it can be distinguished or overruled: 

Courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts 

under the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine 

derives from the maxim of the common law, “Stare 

decisis et non quieta movere,” which literally means, 

“Let stand what is decided, and do not disturb what is 

settled.” See 1B Jeremy C. Moore et al., Moore's 

Federal Practice ¶ 0.402[1] (2d ed. 1992). Moore's 

treatise describes the rule as follows: 

The rule, as developed in the English law, 

is that a decision on an issue of law 

embodied in a final judgment is binding on 

the court that decided it and such other 

courts as owe obedience to its decisions, in 

all future cases. Id. 

Under this principle a decision of a circuit court of 

appeal is binding on all lower courts in the circuit, 

including district courts and bankruptcy courts 

(absent a contrary United States Supreme Court 

decision). Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 

(9th Cir. 1987). 

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This is true even if there is a split of opinion 

between the controlling circuit and another circuit 

court of appeals, and the lower court believes that 

the controlling circuit court is in error. Zuniga, 

812 F.2d at 450; Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 

930, 933 (9th Cir. 1981)[.] 

In re Globe Illumination Co., 149 B.R. 614, 617 (Bankr. C.D. 

Cal. 1993) (multiple internal citations omitted). 

Cardelucci is a published panel opinion by the Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It is binding on this court. 

State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. GP West, Inc., 2016 WL 

3189187, 90 F. Supp.3d 1003, 1018 (D. Haw. 2016) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). See Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 

736, 747 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e are bound by a prior three-judge 

panel's published opinions, ....”) (citing Miller v. Gammie, 335 

F.3d 889, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 

IV. THE HOLDING OF CARDELUCCI

In Cardelucci, the Ninth Circuit framed the issue before it 

as follows: 

This appeal presents the narrow but important 

issue of whether such post-petition interest is 

to be calculated using the (federal judgment 

rate) or is determined by the parties’ contract 

or state law. 

Cardelucci, 285 F.3d at 1231. 

The Ninth Circuit held that in chapter 11 cases involving 

solvent debtors, unsecured creditors are entitled to 

postpetition interest at the federal judgment rate, not at not 

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at contractual or state statutory rates. Id. at 1234. In so 

holding, the Ninth Circuit observed that application of the 

lower federal judgment rate did not violate an unsecured 

creditor’s substantive due process rights (id. at 1236) and that 

utilization of federal judgment rate for all claims was 

rationally related to legitimate interests in efficiency, 

fairness, predictability, and uniformity within bankruptcy 

system. Id. 

While the court pinpointed a “narrow but important 

issue,” it did not narrow the application of its holding, 

which must be applied broadly given the structure of the 

Bankruptcy Code and the clear and plain meaning of its 

applicable provisions, as noted above. 

In Cardelucci, the debtor and his opponents, holders of a 

state court judgment, set aside various differences and thereby 

permitted confirmation to proceed subject to a reservation of 

rights concerning the applicable postpetition interest rate.3 

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the reference by Congress to 

“the legal rate” in section 726(a)(5) was intentional, in that 

 

3 While the opinion is silent on the specifics of that 

debtor’s plan, the opponents’ claim was impaired for reasons not 

relevant to this analysis. In the present case the Unsecured 

Creditors’ claims are unimpaired. The Unsecured Creditors put 

the cart before the horse when they contend that the application 

of the “fair and equitable” test of section 1129(b) determines 

that their claims are impaired under section 1124. 

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Congress had rejected proposed language of “interest on claims 

allowed.” Cardelucci, 285 F.3d at 1234. The court also 

emphasized that a single, easily determined rate for all 

postpetition interest ensures equitable treatment of creditors.4 

Although Cardelucci was a chapter 11 case, the reference to 

section 726(a)(5) was critical. Without that reference, the 

court would be compelled by section 502(b)(2) to allow claims 

“except to the extent that . . . (2) such claim is for unmatured 

interest.”5 There is no specific provision in chapter 11 that 

allows any interest on unsecured claims.6 Without that 

reference, Unsecured Creditors would be left with no allowed 

postpetition interest. 

The rule in the seventeen years since Cardelucci is clear: 

unsecured creditors of a solvent debtor will be paid the Federal 

Interest Rate whether their prepetition contracts call for 

higher or lower rates, or applicable state law judgment rates 

 

4 In this case, given the vast array of creditors’ claims, the 

equal application of such uniform policy is all the more 

compelling. 

5 The exception found in section 506(b) for secured claims has 

no bearing here. 

6 The court rejects the argument by the Ad Hoc Committee of 

Holders of Trade Claims that section 103(b) precludes 

consideration of section 726(a)(5). Cardelucci merely compared 

the chapter 7 outcome (apply the Federal Interest Rate) as part 

of the “best interest” test of Section 1129(a)(9) to compare 

whether creditors do better in chapter 7 or chapter 11.

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are higher, or there are no other applicable rates to consider. 

Nor is that rule limited to impaired claims. Cardelucci is 

unequivocal and articulates several reasons for broad 

application of its holding despite the recognition of the narrow 

issue presented: 

1. The use of the term “legal rate” indicates the Congress 

intended the single source to be statutory because of the 

common use of the term when the Bankruptcy Code was 

enacted. 

2. Using the federal rate promotes uniformity within federal 

law. 

3. The analogous post-judgment interest entitlement 

compensates for being deprived of compensation for the 

loss of time between ascertainment of damages and 

payment. 

4. Application of a single, easily determined rate ensures 

equitable treatment of creditors. 

5. With a uniform rate, no single creditor will be eligible 

for a disproportionate share of the remaining assets. 

Cardelucci, 285 F.3d at 1235-1236. 

The Unsecured Creditors refer to the opinion’s “parting 

note” to support their cause. The actual conclusion rejects a 

substantive due process argument that has not been developed 

here for good reasons. To this court, the “parting note” that 

dooms their cause is in the penultimate paragraph, and bears 

repeating: 

The Court recognizes that these two interests, 

fairness among creditors and administrative 

efficiency, may be of limited relevance in certain 

bankruptcy proceedings. Where there are only a few 

unsecured creditors seeking post-petition interest and 

there are sufficient assets to pay all claims for all 

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interest (sic), there will be no concerns regarding 

equity among creditors or practicality. In those 

instances, a debtor may receive a windfall from the 

application of a lower federal interest rate to an 

award of post-petition interest. Nonetheless ‘interest 

at the legal rate’ is a statutory term with a 

definitive meaning that cannot shift depending on the 

interests invoked by the specific factual 

circumstances before the court. See In re Thompson, 16 

F.3d 576, 581 (4th Cir. 1994). 

Cardelucci, 285 F.3d at 1236. 

Unsecured Creditors’ reliance on older cases invoking the 

“absolute priority” rule in defense of postpetition interest at 

the contract rate are unavailing. Consolidated Rock Products 

Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941), was decided under the 

former Bankruptcy Act and is of questionable viability now that 

the Bankruptcy Code includes sections 726(a)(5) and 502(b)(2). 

Similarly, Debentureholders Protective Committee of Continential 

Inv. Corp. v. Continental Inv. Corp., 679 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 

1982), was decided under Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act 

and thus offers no guidance here. 

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in L&J Anaheim Associates v. 

Kawasaki Leasing International, Inc. (In re L&J Anaheim 

Associates), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993) does not change the 

outcome. L&J Anaheim was decided only a few months after 

Cardelucci and did not cite it, as it addressed an altogether 

different issue. 

 In L&J Anaheim, a secured creditor filed a chapter 11 plan 

that was opposed by the debtor. In order to achieve the 

statutory requirement for at least one impaired class, the 

creditor, Kawasaki, proposed changing its own state law remedies 

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following debtor’s breach. It eliminated its right to exercise 

various remedies under the California Uniform Commercial Code, 

replacing those entitlements under its proposed plan with a 

requirement that its collateral and a related lawsuit be sold at 

public auction under procedures mandated by the Bankruptcy Code. 

 In determining that Kawasaki’s rights were altered, and 

thus its claim was impaired, the court stated: 

At first blush the idea that an improvement in ones’ 

position as a creditor might constitute ‘impairment’ 

seems nonsensical.” 

L & J Anaheim, 995 F.2d at 942. 

 The court examined the term of art adopted by Congress to 

replace language in the prior Bankruptcy Act and concluded that 

section 1124 created certainty in determining whether or not a 

creditor was impaired. Once again, section 1124 is 

definitional, describing improvement in the context of the plan 

presented as impairment. The court had no occasion to address 

whether, for an impaired class, postpetition interest was even 

relevant. 

 Of importance here is that the plan’s own language altered 

Kawasaki’s rights; in the present case, the Bankruptcy Code, and 

not the Plan, is what causes Unsecured Creditors to have their 

postpetition interest limited to the Federal Judgment Rate. The 

Plan is not the culprit. 

 A few months after Cardelucci, the Ninth Circuit decided 

Platinum Capital, Inc. v. Sylmar Plaza, L.P. (In re Sylmar 

Plaza, L.P., 314 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). There, the court 

addressed whether or not a plan proponent had proposed the plan 

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in good faith under section 1129(a)(3) when its sole purpose was 

to enable the debtors to cure and reinstate an obligation. At 

that time, Great W. Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber and 

Supply, Inc. (In re Entz-White Lumber and Supply, Inc.), 850 

F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988), was good law. Under Entz-White, plan 

proponents were permitted to cure defaults under former section 

1124(3), leaving the objecting creditor not impaired under 

section 1124. Perhaps predicting the crucial distinction 

between what a plan does and what the Bankruptcy Code does, the 

Sylmar Plaza court rejected the argument that a plan lacks good 

faith when it permits owners of a solvent debtor to avoid paying 

postpetition interest at the default interest rate. The fact 

that a creditor’s contractual rights are adversely affected does 

not by itself warrant a bad faith finding. Quoting the 

bankruptcy court in In re PPI Enters. (US), Inc., 228 B.R. 339 

(Bankr. D. Del. 1998), the court stated: 

In enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress made a 

determination that an eligible debtor should have the 

opportunity to avail itself of a number of Code 

provisions which adversely altered creditors’ 

contractual and non bankruptcy rights . . . . 

The fact that a debtor proposes a plan which it avails 

itself of an applicable Code provision does not 

constitute evidence of bad faith. 

Sylmar Plaza, 314 F.3d at 1075 (citations omitted). 

Cases cited by the Sylmar Plaza creditor to support a per 

se rule were distinguishable in that neither adopted or approved 

such a rule and, moreover, “. . . because none involved an 

objection to a plan by an unimpaired creditor.” Id.

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 At oral argument counsel for one of the Unsecured Creditors 

argued that Cardelucci has been superseded by In re New 

Investments, Inc., 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016). That argument 

is unavailing. The New Investments decision concludes that the 

1994 amendments to section 1124 abrogated the holding of EntzWhite that default interest rates could be eliminated by curing 

defaults under a plan. The decision does not even mention 

postpetition interest or Cardelucci and does not deal with 

unimpaired claims under section 1124(1) and thus is of no 

bearing on the issue presented or the outcome here. 

V. IMPAIRED OR UNIMPAIRED CLAIMS ARE TREATED ALIKE 

Unsecured Creditors attempt in vain to escape Cardelucci’s

impact by arguing that, unlike the impaired claim there, their 

claims will be unimpaired under a plan. The court rejects 

Unsecured Creditors’ argument. 

First, Cardelucci, in answering the narrow question, drew 

no distinction as to whether the rule it announced was confined 

only to impaired claims. The clear and unequivocal analysis 

based on section 726(b)(5) is obvious: it applies to all 

unsecured and undersecured claims in a surplus estate. 

Second, no plan compels the payment of the Federal Interest 

Rate. Rather, the Bankruptcy Code does. A similar analysis was 

applied very recently by the Fifth Circuit in In re Ultra 

Petroleum Corporation, ___ F.3d ___, 2019 WL 6318074 (November 

26, 2019). There, the court contrasted the treatment of 

creditors’ claims outside of bankruptcy and whether the plan 

itself was a source of limitation on their legal, equitable and 

contractual rights, or rather the Bankruptcy Code. The court 

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looked to the language of section 1124(1), defining not impaired 

when the plan “. . . leaves unaltered [the claimant’s] legal, 

equitable and contractual rights.” The court ruled that a claim 

is impaired only if the plan itself does the altering, not what 

the Bankruptcy Code does. 

Ultra Petroleum agreed with the only other court of appeals 

decision to draw the distinction between what a plan might do 

and what the Bankruptcy Code does do. In Solow v. PPI 

Enterprises (U.S.) Inc. (In re PPI Enterprises (U.S.) Inc.), 324 

F.3d.197 (3d Cir. 2003) the court upheld confirmation of a plan 

notwithstanding a limitation on an objecting landlord’s 

statutorily capped damages under section 502(b)(6). It held that 

where section 502(b)(6) alters a creditor’s non-bankruptcy 

claim, there is no alteration of the claimant’s “legal, 

equitable and contractual rights” for purposes of impairment 

under section 1124(1). Id. at 203. 

The PPI Enterprises court agreed with the bankruptcy 

court’s analysis in In re American Solar King Corp., 90 B.R. 808 

(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) where the bankruptcy court made the 

following very thoughtful observation: 

A closer inspection of the language employed in 

[s]ection 1124(1) reveals ‘impairment by statute to be 

an oxymoron.’ Impairment results from what the plan 

does, not what the statute does. A plan which ‘leaves 

unaltered’ the legal rights of a claimant is one which 

by definition, does not impair the creditor. A plan 

which leaves a claimant subject to other applicable 

provisions of Bankruptcy Code does no more to alter a 

claimant’s legal rights than does a plan which leaves 

a claimant vulnerable to a given state’s usury laws or 

to federal environmental laws. The Bankruptcy Code 

itself is a statute which, like other statutes, helps 

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to define the legal rights of person’s, just as surely 

as it limits contractual rights. Any alteration of 

legal rights is a consequence not of the plan but of 

the bankruptcy filing itself. 

American Solar, 90 B.R. at 819-20. 

The Ultra Petroleum court noted that decisions from 

bankruptcy courts across the country have reached the same 

conclusion, agreeing that impairment results from what a plan 

does, not from what a statute does. Its conclusion reinforces 

the point: 

We agree with PPI, every reported decision identified 

by either party, and Collier’s treatise. Where a plan 

refuses to pay funds disallowed by the Code, the Code 

- not the Plan – is doing the impairing. 

Ultra Petroleum, 2019 WL 6318074 at *5. 

Like the creditors in Ultra Petroleum, the Unsecured 

Creditors’ complaint is with Congress and the Bankruptcy Code, 

not the drafters of a Plan. The Bankruptcy Code, not the Plan, 

limits them to the Federal Interest Rate.7 The cases cited by 

Unsecured Creditors do not apply here, as the rights in those 

cases were impaired by the plan and not by operation of law. See 

Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia), 787 F.2d 1352, 1363 

(9th Cir. 1986) (shareholder voting rights altered by plan); In 

re Rexford Properties, LLC, 558 B.R. 352, 368 (Bankr. C.D. Cal 

2016) (creditor’s rights regarding ongoing business altered by 

plan). 

There is no point in discussing section 1124(2), as that 

subsection is not relevant to the treatment of the four not 

 

7 For the same reason, creditors who hold contractual claims 

calling for interest lower than 2.59% will fare better under the 

Plan. 

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impaired classes. Were Debtors to have proposed a treatment of 

the Unsecured Creditors’ claims that cured, reinstated, or 

reversed any acceleration, then the analysis might be helpful. 

But because section 1124(1) is the operative section here, that 

ends the discussion. 

Because the Plan leaves the Unsecured Creditors’ claims not 

impaired, there is also no need to dwell on whether or not “fair 

and equitable” principles apply. They do not. Unimpaired 

Creditors, when treated as dictated by the Bankruptcy Code, are 

not impaired by the Plan. They are conclusively presumed to 

have accepted the Plan. Section 1126(f). Section 1129(b) is 

not available to them.8

VI. CONCLUSION 

As a trial court in the Ninth Circuit, this court is bound 

to follow Cardelucci unless, as a matter of principled 

reasoning, it can be distinguished. No such grounds exist. The 

1994 amendments to section 1124 predated Cardelucci. Thus, 

whether or not Cardelucci addressed the issue is not the point. 

Its rule is the law of this circuit until altered either by an 

en banc panel, the United States Supreme Court, legislation or 

some other controlling change in the law. 

Even were Cardelucci not controlling, this court would 

follow the lead of PPI and Ultra Petroleum (and the lower court 

decisions cited by Ultra Petroleum), and reject the contention 

 

8 For this reason, the court rejects as incorrect the 

bankruptcy court’s reliance In re Energy Future Holdings, 540 

B.R. 109 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) on “equitable principles” to 

permit unsecured creditors in a solvent case to recover a 

contract rate or such other rate as it deemed appropriate. 

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of Objecting Creditors that imposition of the Federal Interest 

Rate impairs them. It is the Bankruptcy Code itself, not any 

plan provision, that imposes that rate.9

The court is not concurrently entering an order consistent 

with this Memorandum Decision as was the case with its recent 

decision in the Inverse Condemnation action (Dkt. No. 4895). 

Because of the close relationship between the postpetition 

interest question and the issues presented in the forthcoming 

Make-Whole dispute, orders disposing of them both at the same 

time seems appropriate and efficient. Whether either or both 

questions should be certified for direct appeal or to treated as 

final for purposes of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054, can be visited 

later. 

***END OF MEMORANDUM DECISION*** 

 

 

9 Ultra Petroleum remanded the case to the bankruptcy court 

to decide the appropriate Make-Whole amounts, the appropriate 

postpetition interest rate, and the applicability of the 

solvent-debtor exception. If the three judges on the Fifth 

Circuit panel had been members of the Ninth Circuit, there is no 

doubt they would have been bound by Cardelucci, thus limiting 

the remand to the Make-Whole issue. 

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