Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Statement of STEVENS, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

ROBERT F. CALDWELL AND PETE RONALD 

MARTINEZ v. NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, 

DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTIONS DIVISION 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–10671. Decided October 10, 2006 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

 Statement of JUSTICE STEVENS respecting the denial of 

the petition for writ of certiorari. 

The limitations period in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a “person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” 

to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus within one 

year of “the date on which the judgment became final 

. . . .” 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A). This case raises the 

question whether a Texas order of “deferred adjudication 

probation” is a “judgment” under the statute. In essence, 

a deferred adjudication probation order places a defendant 

on probation while postponing any adjudication of guilt. 

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, §5 (Vernon 

2006 Supp. Pamphlet). If the defendant successfully 

completes the terms of his probation, the charges against 

him are dismissed, §5(c); if he violates those terms, he is 

found guilty and sentenced, §5(b). See generally Taylor v. 

State, 131 S. W. 3d 497, 499–500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

Often, a defendant’s case is finally resolved many years 

after the entry of the order of deferred adjudication. 
2 CALDWELL v. QUARTERMAN 

Statement of STEVENS, J. 

That is precisely what happened here. Petitioners 

Robert Caldwell and Pete Martinez pleaded guilty and

were placed on deferred adjudication probation. Both 

subsequently violated the terms of their probation, had 

their probation revoked, were adjudicated guilty pursuant 

to their earlier pleas, and were given lengthy prison sentences. Promptly after the entry of orders revoking their

probation, petitioners applied for federal writs of habeas 

corpus. The Court of Appeals held that their applications 

were time barred because they were filed more than one

year after the entry of orders deferring adjudication. The 

heart of the Fifth Circuit’s holding is that these earlier

orders were final judgments under AEDPA.

However, as Judge DeMoss noted in his dissent, there

“are two absolute essentials to a final judgment in a criminal case”—first, a determination of guilt or innocence, and 

second, the imposition of a sentence. Caldwell v. Dretke, 

429 F. 3d 521, 531 (CA5 2005). Neither occurred prior to 

the revocation of petitioners’ probation. Indeed, reconciling the majority’s conclusion with AEDPA’s text is particularly difficult because Texas law provides that a “judgment 

is the written declaration of the court signed by the trial

judge and entered of record showing the conviction or 

acquittal of the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., 

Art. 42.01, §1 (Vernon 2006 Supp. Pamphlet) (emphasis 

added). An order of deferred adjudication probation is not

a conviction, and it is therefore not a “judgment” under 

Texas law. See Davis v. State, 968 S. W. 2d 368, 371 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1998). Under a literal reading of the federal

statute, such an order cannot be a “judgment of a State 

court” within the strict terms of §2244(d)(1)(A).

Despite this conflict between the Court of Appeals decision and the plain text of AEDPA, our decision to deny 

certiorari is supported by at least two valid considerations. 

First, if a court is convinced that a nonliteral reading of a 

statute is more faithful to the actual intent of the enacting 
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Statement of STEVENS, J. 

Congress, that reading should normally be preferred. See, 

e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U. S. ___ (2006); Koons Buick 

Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50 (2004); see also 

Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 361–362, and n. 1 

(2005) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 

Co., 534 U. S. 438, 472 (2002) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

In this case, the Fifth Circuit had a justifiable basis for 

concluding that a nonliteral reading is consistent with

Congress’ intent to “‘curb the abuse of the statutory writ 

of habeas corpus’” and “‘address problems of unnecessary

delay.’” See 429 F. 3d, at 528 (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep.

No. 104–518, p. 111 (1996)). Second, the Court of Appeals

expressly limited its holding to “instances where a petitioner” brings an untimely challenge to “substantive issues

relating to an original order of deferred adjudication probation.” 429 F. 3d, at 530, n. 24. It did not foreclose 

timely challenges to such orders, nor did it foreclose timely

challenges to the sentencing aspects of the revocation 

proceedings. The Fifth Circuit also did nothing to upset 

the practice of deferred adjudication probation itself,

which confers considerable benefits upon defendants who

do not violate the terms of their probation.* This narrow 

holding is unlikely to produce injustice. Accordingly, the 

denial of certiorari is appropriate. 

—————— 

*See Davis v. State, 986 S. W. 2d 368, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“A

defendant who has been discharged from deferred adjudication [probation] is immediately eligible to serve on a jury, to vote, and to be recommended for probation by a jury after a finding of guilty at a subsequent trial” (footnotes omitted)); Ex parte Laday, 594 S. W. 2d 102, 104 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“The whole point of [the deferred adjudication

probation] statute is to avoid having to formally adjudicate the defendant’s guilt unless and until he demonstrates that he cannot abide by 

the terms of probation set by the court. If the defendant successfully

completes his probation, his offense is essentially expunged”).