This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1

CENTURY BANK, a New Mexico 2 banking corporation, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4 v. No. 31,939 5 ARTYARD LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 6 a New Mexico limited partnership, 7 DONALD H. WIVIOTT, MITCHEL M. 8 DAVENPORT, ANTHONY J. ALLEGRETTI, 9 DHW, LLC, a New Mexico limited liability 10 company, THE ARTYARD MASTER 11 CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION., INC., a 12 New Mexico corporation, and PARKSIDE 13 RESIDENTIAL CONDOMINIUM 14 ASSOCIATION, INC., a New Mexico 15 Corporation, 16 Defendants, 17
and 18 PRAXIS ARCHITECTS, INC., a New 19 Mexico corporation, 20 Defendant-Appellant. 21
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 22 Barbara Vigil, District Judge 232 Scheuer, Yost & Patterson, P.C. 1 Charlotte H. Heterington 2 Santa Fe, NM 3 for Appellee 4 Sommer, Sutin, Udall, Hardwick, & Hyatt, P.A. 5 Jack N. Hardwick 6 Santa Fe, NM 7 for Appellant 8
MEMORANDUM OPINION 9 VIGIL, Judge. 10 Defendant-Appellant Praxis Architects, Inc. (Praxis) has appealed from two 11 related orders: one awardi ng summary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee Century Bank 12 (Century), and the other awarding attorney fees and costs to Century. We issued a 13 notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to dismiss the appeal on grounds 14 that neither order is final. Century has filed a memorandum in opposition and Praxis 15 has filed a memorandum in support, whic h we have duly considered. Because we 16 remain unpersuaded that this matter is properly before us at this juncture, we dismiss 17 the appeal. 18 The right to appeal is generally restri cted to final judgments and decisions. See 19 NMSA 1978, § 39-3-2 (1966); Kelly Inn No. 102 v. Kapnison , 113 N.M. 231, 234-40, 20 824 P.2d 1033, 1036-42 (1992). Unde r the circumstances presented in this case, the 213 orders could only be final and appealable if they could be said to adjudicate all of the 1 issues as to any party. See generallyRule 1-054(B)(2) NMRA. 2 As we previously observed, neither of th e district court’s orders fully resolves 3 all of the issues as to Century, because Century’s claims against other defendants 4 remain pending. The orders similarly fail to dispose of Praxis’ cross-claims against 5 other defendants. Accordingl y, insofar as issues remainoutstanding relative to both 6 Century and Praxis, the orders cannot be re garded as final and appealable pursuant to 7 Rule 1-054(B)(2). Cf. Healthsource, Inc. v. X-Ray Assoc. of N.M. , 2005-NMCA-097, 8 ¶¶ 11-15, 138 N.M. 70, 116 P.3d 861 (observing th at appeal may only be taken if all 9 issues have been resolved by the orde r under consideration; where counterclaims 10 remain, immediate appeal is generally unavailable); Tarin’s, Inc. v. Tinley , 2000- 11 NMCA-048, ¶ 2, 129 N.M. 185, 3 P.3d 680 (h olding that a judgment containing no 12 mention of a counterclaim was not a final, appealable order). 13 In its memorandum in opposition Century argues that the orders should be 14 regarded as final, insofar as they resolv e all claims “as between Century and Praxis.” 15 [MIO 1, 3, 4] However, the fact that th e issues between these two parties may have 16 been resolved is insufficient. To satisfyRule 1-054(B)(2), an order must resolve every 17 issue as to one or more of th e parties. For the reasons prev iously stated, neither of the 18 district court’s orders meets this description. 194 Century further suggests that the district court’s orders should be regarded as 1 final insofar as “Praxis’ remaining cross-cl aims are severable and could be tried as a 2 separate unit.” [MIO 3] Inthis regard, Century observes that the district court’s 3 orders resolve all of Praxis’ claims relative to the mortgaged premises, leaving only 4 Praxis’ contractual claims pending. [MIO 4-5] However, the fact that the claims 5 currently pending are different in nature fro m the claim previouslyresolved, such that 6 severance might be a theoretical possibility , does not render the or ders final under any 7 rule or published authority of which we are aware. The authorities upon which 8 Century relies, addressing “difficult questions ” within the “twilight zone of finality,” 9 [MIO 4] are applicable to “marginal cases ” in which all substantive claims have been 10 resolved, leaving only collateral matters and/or ministerial acts outstanding. See 11 generally Executive Sports Club, Inc. v. First Plaza Trust , 1998-NMSC-008, ¶ 12 n.3, 12 125 N.M. 78, 957 P.2d 63 (observing that “mar ginal cases” describes a limited class). 13 This is not such a case. 14 Finally, we understand Century to argue thatthe orders are final, insofar as the 15 district court “exercised its discretion”by “declaring the finality of its judgment” 16 pursuant to Rule 1-054(B)(2). [MIO 4-5] However, Rule 1-054(B)(2) does not provide 17 for discretionary declarations of finality . We acknowledge that Rule 1-054(B)(1) 18 provides that a judgment that is final as to one or more claims but fewer than all 195 claims may become final, “upon an express determination that there is no just reason 1 for delay.” Id. However, neither of the orders atissue in this case incorporates such 2 language. 3 Accordingly, for the reasons statedabove and in the notice of proposed 4 summary disposition, we conclude that ne ither of the district court’s orders is 5 immediately reviewable. The appealis therefore summarily dismissed. 6
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

_______________________________ 8 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 9

WE CONCUR: 10

_________________________________ 11 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 12

_________________________________ 13 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 14