2016 UT App 103

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF S.L., W.T., AND P.T.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

R.T.,

Appellant

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20160133-CA

Filed May 19, 2016

Third District Juvenile Court, West Jordan Department

The Honorable Renee M. Jimenez

No. 1104100

Harini Venkatesan, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Carol L.C. Verdoia, Attorneys

for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and 

KATE A. TOOMEY.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 R.T. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights. We affirm.

¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to 

terminate a person’s parental rights,] ‘the result must be against 

the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with 

a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’” 

In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation omitted). We

“review the juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the 
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20160133-CA 2 2016 UT App 103

clearly erroneous standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 

P.3d 680. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when, in 

light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is against the 

clear weight of the evidence. See id. Further, we give the juvenile 

court a “wide latitude of discretion as to the judgments arrived 

at based upon not only the court’s opportunity to judge 

credibility firsthand, but also based on the juvenile court judges’ 

special training, experience and interest in this field.” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, “[w]hen a 

foundation for the court’s decision exists in the evidence, an

appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” 

In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.

¶3 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred in 

determining that there was sufficient evidence to support its 

conclusion that Mother was an unfit or incompetent parent.

However, the juvenile court found multiple other grounds for 

termination under Utah Code section 78A-6-607, including 

neglect, failure to remedy the circumstances leading to the 

children’s out-of-home placement, failure of parental 

adjustment, and that Mother made only token efforts to support 

the children and prevent neglect. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-

507(1)(b), (d), (e), (f) (LexisNexis 2012). Pursuant to section 78A6-507(1), the finding of any single ground is sufficient to warrant 

termination of parental rights. See id. § 78A-6-507(1) (providing 

that the court may terminate all parental rights if it finds any of 

the grounds listed); In re F.C., 2003 UT App 397, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d 790 

(noting any single ground is sufficient to terminate parental 

rights). Mother does not challenge any of these other grounds for 

termination. Accordingly, because other unchallenged grounds 

support the juvenile court’s decision to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights, there is no reason to review Mother’s claim 

concerning unfitness.

¶4 Mother next argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the juvenile court’s determination that it was in the best
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20160133-CA 3 2016 UT App 103

interests of the children to terminate her parental rights. We 

disagree. The children were removed from Mother’s care after 

the children were found wandering their neighborhood seeking 

ways to earn money so they could buy food and pay to get 

electricity reconnected to their home. After removal, DCFS 

began a trial home placement with Mother. Unfortunately, the 

children had to be removed once again after DCFS found that 

both the gas and electricity had again been turned off to their

home and because the sanitary conditions in the home had 

been rapidly deteriorating. After trial home placement was 

terminated, Mother was evicted from the home. As of the date of 

the termination hearing she had not yet obtained a permanent 

home or a stable source of income that would allow her to take 

care of the children. Mother also had failed to provide evidence 

that she had completed many other aspects of her service plan,

such as individual counseling, which would have allowed her to 

better deal with the issues that lead to the removal of the

children. On the other hand, the children were in a legal risk 

foster home with a couple that wished to adopt them. The 

children’s physical and emotional needs were being met and 

they were benefitting from the stability. Further, the juvenile 

court found that the children had made considerable changes for

the better in both their emotional and physical development.

Thus, because a foundation for the juvenile court’s 

determination exists in the record, we cannot conclude that the 

juvenile court’s decision that it was in the best interests of the 

children to terminate Mother’s parental rights was against the 

clear weight of the evidence.

¶5 Mother next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS made reasonable 

efforts to provide Mother with reunification services. After 

creation of the reunification plan, DCFS offered Mother amongst 

other things: (1) multiple assessments; (2) referrals for drugtesting, peer parenting, parenting classes, and therapy; (3) a 

referral to Workforce Services in order to allow Mother to 
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20160133-CA 4 2016 UT App 103

pursue employment opportunities; (4) support for arranging 

visitation with the children; and (5) bus passes that allowed 

Mother a means of transportation to her various obligations. 

Despite these efforts, Mother claims DCFS failed to adequately 

assist her in finding stable housing and employment or in

arranging family therapy. However, the juvenile court findings, 

which are supported by the record, indicate that adequate 

services were provided. For example, in regard to employment, 

Mother’s caseworker encouraged her to meet with the 

Department of Workforce Services to obtain an employment 

counselor, which Mother apparently did not do. Further, in 

regard to housing, at times Mother did not provide DCFS with 

updated information concerning her housing situation, for 

example, not informing DCFS that she had been evicted from her 

home or providing DCFS with her current address, thereby 

making it difficult for DCFS to assist Mother with her situation.

Mother did inquire about a potential grant to assist her in 

obtaining housing; however, the caseworker concluded that 

Mother did not or could not meet the qualifications for obtaining 

the grant. Accordingly, the record supports the juvenile court’s 

determination that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide 

Mother with reunification services.

¶6 Finally, Mother contends that she was unfairly prejudiced 

by the State’s failure to provide her with discovery in a timely 

manner and that the juvenile court erred in denying her 

motion to continue the trial. “The juvenile court has substantial 

discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a request for a 

continuance, and that discretion will not be disturbed unless that 

discretion has clearly been abused.” In re V.L., 2008 UT App 88, 

¶ 15, 182 P.3d 395. Mother received 246 pages of previously 

requested discovery on the day before trial was set to begin. As a 

result, Mother requested that the trial be continued in order to 

allow her to properly review the discovery. The juvenile court 

denied the motion. In so doing, the court noted that the trial was 

scheduled to take place over multiple days, thereby giving 
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20160133-CA 5 2016 UT App 103

Mother an opportunity to review the information before the 

second day of trial, which was to take place several days after 

the first day.

1 Further, the juvenile court ordered that, if needed,

it would allow Mother additional trial dates to address the 

evidence and recall any witness. The record does not reveal any 

request by Mother to exercise this opportunity. While we do not 

condone the timing of the State’s discovery disclosures, Mother 

has failed to demonstrate how the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in fashioning its remedy for the untimely discovery 

responses, or how she was prejudiced by the juvenile court’s 

decision when she failed to take advantage of that remedy.

¶7 Affirmed.

 

1. The State assured the court that it would not rely on any of the 

information during the first day of trial.