UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4622

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ARTEMAS TYRELL ROBERTS, a/k/a Artimus Tyrell Roberts,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00173-NCT-1)

Submitted: February 17, 2012 Decided: February 24, 2012

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark E. Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Artemas Tyrell Roberts appeals his 294-month sentence 

and convictions following a guilty plea to possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006), and possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006). On appeal, Roberts argues that 

the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress 

evidence following an alleged illegal search of his residence. 

Roberts has also filed a motion to remand the case for 

resentencing in light of the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) of 

2010. We affirm Roberts’s convictions and deny his motion to 

remand.

Following the denial of a motion to suppress, we 

review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its 

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Foster, 634 

F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). A factual finding is clearly 

erroneous if this court “on the entire evidence is left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 

United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting our review, 

we give particular deference “to a district court’s credibility 

determinations, for it is the role of the district court to 

observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial 
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motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 

232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “Because the district court denied the motion to 

suppress, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the government.” United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 364 

(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

On appeal, Roberts does not challenge the district 

court’s finding that exigent circumstances justified the 

officers’ entry into his residence to conduct a protective 

sweep. Instead, Roberts asserts for the first time that the 

officers impermissibly entered the “curtilage” surrounding his

residence when they approached the rear door, rather than the 

front door, to conduct their “knock and talk,” thereby violating 

the Fourth Amendment. Because Roberts failed to raise this 

argument in his motion to suppress before the district court, 

our review is for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Plain 

error occurs when: (1) there was an error; (2) the error is 

plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the 

error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Wilkinson, 

137 F.3d 214, 223 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). 

The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 

searches extends to the curtilage of a home. Oliver v. United 
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States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 

279, 287 (4th Cir. 2001). However, “just as private citizens 

may approach a home, absent contrary instructions from the 

owner, to knock on a door, so may the police approach without 

probable cause, a warrant, or exigency.” Pendleton, 249 F.3d at 

289. Officers may enter an individual’s backyard without a 

warrant “when they have a legitimate law enforcement purpose for 

doing so.” Alvarez v. Montgomery Cnty., 147 F.3d 354, 358 (4th 

Cir. 1998). Once on a private individual’s property, however, 

the officers may not “exceed their legitimate purpose for being 

there.” Id.

In this case, the officers had a legitimate reason to 

approach Roberts’s townhouse — to apprehend a wanted fugitive 

believed to be residing there. Based upon their previous 

observations during the course of surveillance, the officers saw

that all guests approached and entered the townhouse through the 

rear entrance. As the rear patio connected to an adjoining 

parking lot along a paved sidewalk, it would be reasonable for 

members of the public to approach the townhouse through the rear 

entryway as well. Moreover, although a dog was chained in the 

backyard, the patio was not fenced and contained no signs 

forbidding trespassers. Accordingly, the officers reasonably 

approached the rear door to conduct a “knock and talk.” 
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Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Roberts’s 

motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result. 

In his motion to remand, Roberts asserts that the case 

should be remanded for resentencing in light of the FSA. The 

FSA increased the threshold quantities of cocaine base needed to 

trigger certain mandatory minimum sentences under 21 U.S.C.A. 

§ 841(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011). This court has not yet ruled 

on whether the FSA is retroactively applicable to a defendant, 

like Roberts, who committed the offense prior to August 3, 2010, 

the effective date of the FSA, but was sentenced after that 

date. See United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 248 n.5 (4th 

Cir. 2011) (reserving judgment on “whether the FSA could be 

found to apply to defendants whose offenses were committed 

before August 3, 2010, but who have not yet been sentenced”).

However, the district court determined Roberts’s 

advisory Guidelines range based upon his status as a career 

offender, not his drug quantities. Although 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(B) imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of five 

years’ imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute 

12.8 grams of cocaine base, Roberts’s status as a career 

offender governed his subsequent advisory Guidelines range of 

262 to 327 months’ imprisonment pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(c)(3) (2010). Accordingly, any change 

in the minimum mandatory sentence for possession with intent to 
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distribute 12.8 grams of cocaine base would not affect Roberts’s 

sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment 

and deny Roberts’s motion to remand. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED