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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD WARNER and JOHANNA RICHARDSON,

Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellants, UNPUBLISHED October 21, 2014

v No. 316613 Marquette Circuit Court SUZANNE S. SCHLAF, I ndividually and as Trustee of the SUZANNE S. SCHLAF TRUST, LC No. 12-050910-CZ

Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellee.

SUZANNE S. SCHLAF,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 316616 Marquette Circuit Court ANNA WARNER, LAURA MERCIER, HENRY JOHNSON, CARL JOHNSON, CHRISTINE (KITTY) CHRISTENSEN, MILFORD JOHNSON, and EILEEN JOHNSON,

Defendants,

and

RICHARD WARNER and JOHANNA RICHARDSON, LC No. 06-044020-CH

Appellants.

Before: M URPHY
, C.J., and S AWYER and M. J. K ELLY , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.
On December 12, 2006, a default judgment was entered granting Suzanne Schlaf fee simple title to a vacant piece of land in Ishpemi ng, Michigan. On November 13, 2012, Richard-2- Warner and Johanna Richardson filed a complaint requesting that the lower court set aside the default judgment, and that it grant sanctions and attorney fees under MCR 2.114. The two cases were consolidated and ultimately, the lower court set aside the default judgment as it pertained to
Warner and Richardson but not as it pertained to defendants in the quiet title action. It denied the request for sanctions and atto rney fees. Warner and Richardson now appeal by right. We
affirm.

This case involves a 160-acre pa rcel of undeveloped property. For purposes of this case, the chain of title originates wi th Christ and Ellen Johnson, th e great-grandparents of Warner, Richardson and Schlaf. At death, Ellen Johnson pa ssed equal 1/8th shares of the property to her living children, one of whom was Inga Goldsby, w ho passed her 1/8th inte rest to her daughter, Lyla Schultz, who in turn quit-claimed the inte rest to her daughter, Sc hlaf. Another initial recipient was Anna Warner, the grandmother of appellants Warner and Richardson. Their father’s estate was never probated so it is unclear whether his interest passed to them or to Hazel Warner, his widow. Rae Elliot, who held anothe r 1/8th interest, quit-claimed it to Schlaf in 1997, and Evelyn Caven, another inte rest holder, quit-claimed her interest to Schlaf in 1998.

In 2006, Schlaf initiated a qui et title action, alle gedly believing that she was the last living person with an interest in the property. She named Ellen Johnson’s heirs and all of their unknown heirs, spouses, devisees an d assignees as defendants. Schl af averred 1) that she could not locate known addresses for any of the releva nt defendants; 2) that she had searched the Marquette County Records and found no informati on concerning the status or identity of any named or unnamed defendants; and 3) that she had been in sole possession of the property since 1976 and that no defendant had attemp ted to pay the property’s taxes. Schlaf sought a fee simple title free and clear of any claim by the defendant s. On October 6, 2006, the lower court ordered defendants to answer and required that a notice of the suit be published in the Marquette Mining Journal. On December 12, 2006, the lower court gr anted Schlaf a default judgment quieting title to the property.

On November 13, 2012, Warner and Richards on filed a complaint claiming that Schlaf had perpetrated a fraud on the lo wer court by making false statem ents in the 2006 quiet title action. They asserted that Schlaf falsely claimed that she was the only person with an interest in the property and that she had no way of contacti ng any of the defendants. In support of their claim, they provided letters th at they had received from Sc hlaf and her husband in 1987 and 1988. The letters were addressed to family members and provided updates on the property, notified of timber harvests for the payment of property taxes, informed of excess timber harvest revenue, and requested that younger generations of the family begin participating in the property’s maintenance. In addition, Warner claimed that Schlaf’s husband called him in 2005 to confirm his mailing address. Warner and Rich ardson argued that this proved that Schlaf knew of their interest in the propert y. Therefore, Warner and Rich ardson requested that the lower court set aside the default judgment and sanction Schlaf under MCR 2.114 for filing a false and frivolous claim. Moreover, during the proceedings they provided a quit claim deed that they had received from Hazel Warner on March 5, 2013.

The lower court found that it did not have personal ju risdiction over Warner and Richardson at the time it issued the default judgme nt because they were not properly notified of-3- the 2006 quiet title action. As a result, it set aside the de fault judgment under MCR 2.116(C)(3) to the extent it foreclosed any interest they mi ght have in the property. The court also stated:

Now, I’m setting this aside not on the basis of fraud on the court. . . . I don’t find from the undisputed facts that Suzanne Schlaf in any way committed a fraud on
the court. . . . She and her husband were in fact the caretakers of the property, had in fact paid property taxes on it, or had taken care of seeing the timber was cut, did attempt to provide dist ribution to other interested parties, did exercise diligence in looking at the chain of title in the Register of Deeds office, did exercise diligence in determining whether or not there was any probate, and concluded, wrongly I think, in my judgmen t, that [Warner and Richardson] had no interest in the property. And they brought this quiet title ac tion not to seek any great personal gain, but to try to get some – get the title clarified to this property. And I just cannot conclude from thes e undisputed facts that there was any wrongful or fraudulen t intent here.

As a result, the lower court denied the request for sanctions, granting only nominal statutory costs. Finally, the lower court de nied the request to set aside the default judgment as it pertained to the defendants in the 2006 quiet title action be cause the remaining defendants were not before the court asking for relief.

I. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Warner and Richardson argue that the lower court erred in denying their request to set aside the 2006 default judgment as it applies to the remaining defendants. We disagree. Warner and Richardson lack standing to request relief from the default judgme nt on behalf of the remaining defendants. “To have standing, a party must have a legally protected interest that is in jeopardy of being adversely affected.” Barclae v Zarb , 300 Mich App 455, 483; 834 NW2d 100 (2013). The interest must be based on a plaintiff’ s own legal rights, and not on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Id. Here, the only legally protected inte rests of Warner and Richardson are their own potential shares in the property. While they may be affected by the division of the property amongst other family members, they do not have standing to bring a claim based on the rights of the remaining defendants. “A real party in interest is one who is vested with a right of action in a given claim, although the benefi cial interest may be with another.” MOSES Inc v
SEMCOG , 270 Mich App 401, 415; 716 NW2d 278 (2006). Warner and Richardson simply cannot base their claim on property rights owned by the remaining defendants. See Walgreen Co v Macomb Twp , 280 Mich App 58, 66; 760 NW2d 594 (2008). If any of the remaining
defendants wish to have the defa ult judgment set aside, they themselves must come before the
lower court.

II. SANCTIONS

Warner and Richardson also argue that the lo wer court erred in deny ing their request for sanctions. Again, we disagree. This Court review s a lower court’s finding that an action is not
frivolous for clear error. Kitchen v Kitchen , 465 Mich 654, 661-662; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). “A-4- decision is clearly erroneous where, although ther e is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
is left with a definite and firm convi ction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

Under MCR 2.114(E), a party to an action ma y be sanctioned for submitting a claim not grounded in fact or warranted by existing la w. Similarly, under MCR 2.114(F), a court may sanction a party for pleading a frivolous clai m or defense. “The purpose of imposing sanctions . . . is to deter parties and attorney s from filing documents or asserting claims and defenses that have not been sufficiently investigated and researched or that are intended to serve an improper purpose.” BJ’s & Sons Const Co, Inc v Van Sickle , 266 Mich App 400, 405; 700 NW2d 432 (2005).

It is undisputed that Schlaf and her husband have served as the sole caretakers of the property for nearly 40 years. Similarly, it is undisputed that Schlaf searched the Marquette County Register of Deeds and found no other record ed interest in the property. As a result, it
was reasonable for Schlaf to conclude that sh e was the sole owner of the property after she acquired quit claim deeds from the only other apparent, living owners, Rae Elliot and Evelyn Caven. Similarly, it was reasonabl e for Schlaf to conclude that Warner and Richardson had no interest in the property because their father’s es tate could have passed to his second wife and not to his children. The letters were nearly 30 ye ars old and only evidenced that Schlaf knew that Warner and Richardson were part of the extend ed family. If Schlaf genuinely and reasonably believed that they had no owne rship interest in the propert y, then she likewise reasonably believed that they did not need to be named as defendants in th e 2006 quiet title action and were
thus not entitled to notice.

Schlaf may have wrongly concluded that she was the only living pers on with an interest in the property. However, Warner and Rich ardson have failed to establish that Schlaf intentionally made false or misleading statements , or otherwise acted with an improper purpose. As a result, the lower court did not e rr in denying the request for sanctions.

Affirmed.

/s/ William B. Murphy /s/ David H. Sawyer /s/ Michael J. Kelly