IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GNC Community :

Federal Credit Union, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1063 C.D. 2018

: Submitted: February 14, 2018

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: March 4, 2019

GNC Community Federal Credit Union (Employer) petitions for 

review from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review 

(Board), which determined that Tracy Taylor (Claimant) was not ineligible for 

unemployment compensation (UC) benefits under Section 402(e) of the 

Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1(relating to willful misconduct). 

Employer contends that the Board’s determination that Claimant established good 

cause to justify her willful misconduct is erroneous and not supported by substantial 

evidence. Additionally, Employer asserts that the Board violated Employer’s due 

process rights and failed to follow requisite procedures. Discerning no error, we 

affirm. 

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§802(e). 
2

Claimant worked for Employer as a full-time receptionist from May 

2014 until her last day of work on January 26, 2018. After her separation from 

employment, Claimant applied for UC benefits, which a local service center granted. 

Employer appealed, and a referee held a hearing. 

At the hearing, the referee received evidence and heard testimony from 

Claimant and two witnesses for Employer: Dianna Cecchini, Employer’s CEO 

(CEO) and Renae Colaizzi, Employer’s Branch Manager (Branch Manager).

2

 The 

referee found that Claimant committed willful misconduct by refusing to perform 

her assigned job functions. Thus, the referee determined that Claimant was 

ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. Claimant appealed. 

Based on the record created at the referee’s hearing, the Board found 

the following facts. Employer maintains an employee conduct policy, which states, 

in relevant part, that unacceptable job performance includes insubordination or 

failing to follow manager directions. Claimant was aware of Employer’s policy. 

Board Opinion, 7/17/18, Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 2-3. 

In May 2014, Employer hired Claimant to be a receptionist for its main 

bank located in downtown New Castle (main branch). In August 2014, Employer 

opened a branch bank in Neshannock, approximately three miles from the main 

branch (satellite branch). At that time, Employer instructed Claimant to work at both 

bank branches on a daily basis. Claimant began her day at the main branch, took 

lunch, and then traveled to and worked at the satellite branch, where she finished her 

day. F.F. Nos. 4-5. 

In February 2016, Claimant met with CEO regarding her work hours. 

CEO informed Claimant that Employer pays her for 40 hours per week; however, 

 

2 Claimant and Employer were both represented by counsel.
3

Claimant’s time records showed that she was working less than 40 hours. CEO 

directed Claimant to take a 45-minute lunch instead of a one-hour lunch to make up

the difference. During the meeting, Claimant requested reimbursement for the 

mileage she accrued traveling between the bank branches. CEO agreed to pay her 

the current IRS mileage rate on a monthly basis. Claimant again approached CEO 

about compensation for mileage and, in May 2017, she was informed that Employer 

would reimburse her the mileage, but never did. F.F. Nos. 6-8.

In December 2017, Claimant began having transportation issues. She 

requested the promised reimbursement for mileage and to stay at the main branch 

during the winter. On January 2, 2018, Claimant did not go to the satellite branch. 

Claimant received permission from the CEO to remain at the main branch due to a 

staffing shortage. Two days later, Claimant took her lunch at 3:09 p.m. due to a busy 

workday. Upon informing CEO, CEO directed Claimant not to travel to the satellite 

branch that day. F.F. Nos. 9-11.

On January 5, 2018, CEO initiated a meeting with Claimant regarding 

traveling between the two branches and voiced an issue with Claimant frequently 

taking a late lunch, which allowed for only a minimal amount of time at the satellite 

branch. Claimant informed CEO that the tires on her vehicle were bad and her other 

vehicle was having electrical issues. Claimant requested to remain at the main 

branch during the winter. CEO stated she would get back to her on the issue, 

reiterated that Claimant must continue to travel between offices daily, and directed 

her to take a lunch by 1:30 p.m. F.F. Nos. 12-13. 

On January 11, 2018, Claimant, following Employer’s written 

procedural policy, filed a written complaint with the President of Employer’s Board 

of Directors regarding not receiving reimbursement for mileage. Later that month, 
4

Claimant met with the President, and they discussed multiple options for resolving 

Claimant’s concerns about traveling between the offices. Claimant asked to remain 

at either branch for the entire workday, rather than partial days, citing transportation 

issues. Claimant stated it was difficult to find a ride in the middle of the day to take 

her to the satellite branch. President indicated that all options would be considered;

however, he informed Claimant that the decision was ultimately up to CEO. 

F.F. Nos. 14-15.

On January 26, 2018, CEO met with Claimant. CEO presented 

Claimant with a four-page job description for Claimant’s position and directed her

to sign it. The job description included a provision for daily travel between branches, 

without mileage reimbursement. Employer indicated that Claimant was paid for 40 

hours of work when she frequently worked less than 40 hours and that this difference 

was approximately the same amount that Claimant would be paid for mileage and, 

as such, Employer would consider that her compensation for traveling between the 

bank branches. Claimant refused to sign the job description, and CEO discharged 

Claimant for insubordination in violation of Employer’s policies. F.F. Nos. 16-18.

The Board concluded that Employer has a right to make reasonable 

changes to an employee’s job duties. Commuting three miles a day between 

branches on a daily basis is a reasonable job change. Claimant performed her new 

job duties beginning in August 2014 until January 26, 2018, when she refused to 

sign an updated job description that included the duty to commute between branches. 

The Board determined that Claimant’s refusal to accept the requirement of 

commuting without mileage reimbursement constituted an act of insubordination. 

However, the Board concluded that Claimant demonstrated good cause 

for her refusal. Employer had agreed to reimburse her monthly for mileage, but 
5

never did. Claimant followed Employer’s policy by filing a complaint with the 

President of Employer’s Board of Directors. Although multiple solutions were

proffered, in the end, CEO chose not to make any accommodations and instead 

revised Claimant’s job duties to require daily commute between branches without 

mileage reimbursement. The Board determined that Claimant acted reasonably

under the circumstances by acting within the process outlined for resolving 

complaints and had good cause for refusing to accept CEO’s offer for settlement of 

her complaint. Thus, the Board reversed the referee’s determination and granted 

benefits to Claimant. Employer’s petition for review to this Court followed.3

On appeal, Employer argues that: the Board’s findings are not 

supported by substantial evidence; the Board erred by failing to affirm the referee’s 

decision; and the Board denied it due process. 

Willful Misconduct

First, Employer argues that the Board’s findings are not supported by 

substantial evidence. Claimant was aware, and had agreed to, the travel 

requirements of the job, yet refused to travel. Claimant had no issue with the travel 

assignment and compensation arrangement for three years. There was never a 

 

3 Our review of the Board’s decision is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether an error of law was committed or whether necessary findings of fact were 

supported by substantial evidence. Wise v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 111 

A.3d 1256, 1261 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). In addition, we review for capricious disregard of 

competent evidence “in every case in which such question is properly before the court.” Leon E. 

Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478, 487 (Pa. 

2002). “A capricious disregard of evidence occurs where the fact finder willfully and deliberately 

disregards competent and relevant evidence that one of ordinary intelligence could not possibly 

have avoided in reaching a result.” Wise, 111 A.3d at 1262. “[W]here there is substantial evidence 

to support the agency’s factual findings and those findings support the legal conclusions, “it should 

remain a rare instance in which an appellate court would disturb an adjudication based upon 

capricious disregard.” Id. (quoting Wintermyer, 812 A.2d at 487 n.14).
6

promise to reimburse Claimant for mileage. Instead, Claimant was paid for 

additional, unworked hours as compensation for the mileage it took to drive to the 

satellite branch. In addition, Claimant committed other acts of insubordination, 

including taking lengthy lunch breaks and failing to appear at the satellite branch in 

a timely manner. According to Employer, the Board ignored this evidence. 

Claimant did not prove just cause for her actions. 

Section 402(e) of the Law provides, “[a]n employe shall be ineligible 

for compensation for any week . . . [i]n which his unemployment is due to [her] 

discharge . . . from work for willful misconduct connected with his work . . . .” 

43 P.S. §802(e). “[W]illful misconduct is defined by the courts as: (1) wanton and 

willful disregard of an employer’s interests; (2) deliberate violation of rules; (3) 

disregard of the standards of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect from 

an employee; or, (4) negligence showing an intentional disregard of the employer’s 

interests or the employee’s duties and obligations.” Johns v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 87 A.3d 1006, 1009 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 

97 A.3d 746 (Pa. 2014) (citing Grieb v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 827 A.2d 422 (Pa. 2002)).

The employer bears the initial burden of proving a claimant engaged in 

willful misconduct. Johns, 87 A.3d at 1009. When asserting a discharge based on 

a violation of a work rule, an employer must establish the existence of the rule, the 

reasonableness of the rule, the claimant’s knowledge of the rule, and its violation. 

Id. (citing Ductmate Industries, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 949 A.2d 338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)). 

Policy 5070 of Employer’s Employee Handbook governs employee 

conduct and provides that “insubordination or failing to follow manager directions”
7

constitutes unacceptable conduct subject to corrective action. Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) at 118a. In addition, this Court has defined insubordination as:

A willful disregard of an employer’s instructions, esp. 

behavior that gives the employer cause to terminate a 

worker’s employment . . . [or] an act of disobedience to 

proper authority; esp., a refusal to obey an order that a 

superior officer is authorized to give” and an 

unwillingness “to submit to authority . . . disobedience of 

orders, infraction of rules, or a generally disaffected 

attitude toward authority.

Scott v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 105 A.3d 839, 846 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2014), appeal denied, 125 A.3d 779 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted). 

Once an employer meets its burden of proving willful misconduct, the 

burden shifts to the employee to prove good cause for her actions. Johns, 87 A.3d 

at 1010. An employee establishes good cause where her actions are justified or 

reasonable under the circumstances. Docherty v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, 898 A.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). A determination of 

“willful misconduct requires a consideration of ‘all of the circumstances, including 

the reasons for the [claimant’s] noncompliance with the employer’s directives.’” Id.

(quoting Navickas v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 787 A.2d 284, 

288 (Pa. 2001)). 

Further, in UC cases, the Board is the ultimate fact-finder and is 

empowered to resolve all issues of witness credibility, conflicting evidence and 

evidentiary weight. Wise, 111 A.3d at 1261-62 (citing Ductmate, 949 A.2d at 342). 

It is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence that would support findings 

other than those made by the Board; the proper inquiry is whether substantial

evidence supports the findings actually made. Id. at 1262. Substantial evidence is 
8

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. A reviewing court must examine “the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party, and give that party the benefit of all inferences that 

can be logically and reasonably drawn from the testimony.” Id. 

Employer challenges statements made by the Board in its discussion 

that “CEO chose not to accept any offered solution,” that “CEO met with [Claimant] 

and reneged on the promise to pay for the mileage,” and that Claimant “was provided 

with different reasons for why she was not going to be paid the mileage and, in good 

faith, she filed a written complaint.” See Petitioner’s Brief at 7, 9 (quoting Board 

Opinion at 4). According to Employer, Claimant was compensated for mileage. 

Employer paid Claimant an additional 15 minutes each day to reimburse her for her 

travel time between the two offices. R.R. at 25a, 28a. This quarterly-hour payment 

amounted to more money than mileage reimbursement for a one-way three-mile trip. 

R.R. at 25a-28a, 45a. Employer contends this evidence was ignored. 

Contrary to Employer’s assertions, this evidence was not disregarded, 

but considered. See F.F. No. 17. However, the Board made numerous findings that 

Claimant and Employer discussed mileage reimbursement on several occasions, and 

Employer agreed to reimburse Claimant for mileage, but never did, despite multiple 

requests for payment. See F.F. Nos. 6-9, 13, 14. 

The Board’s findings are supported by Claimant’s testimony, and, to 

some extent, CEO’s own testimony. CEO testified that, as early as February of 2016, 

Claimant requested mileage. R.R. at 28a. Claimant testified that Employer agreed 

to reimburse her for mileage on a monthly basis. R.R. at 44a, 49a, 60a. Claimant 

made several requests to be reimbursed, but was never paid for the mileage. R.R. at 
9

49a, 57a, 61a. CEO acknowledged that she and Claimant had several conversations 

about mileage. R.R. at 63a. 

Although Employer asserts that compensation Claimant received for 40 

hours a week while working for some fraction of time less than 40 hours a week was 

higher than what Claimant would receive in mileage (Petitioner’s Brief at 9), that 

assertion is not supported by sufficient evidence to reach that conclusion. Moreover, 

CEO testified that Employer never reviewed such a cost analysis with Claimant. 

R.R. at 25a. Claimant testified she was not compensated for 15 minutes to drive to 

the satellite branch. R.R. at 57a.

Insofar as Employer cites to other instances of insubordination, such as 

lengthy lunch breaks and failure to appear at the satellite branch in a timely manner 

or at all, CEO testified that she terminated Claimant because she refused to travel to 

the satellite branch, not because she was tardy or exceeded her lunch break. R.R. at 

33a-34a. Notwithstanding, Claimant testified that the instances cited by Employer 

were authorized or excused by CEO or Branch Manager. For instance, CEO testified 

that, on December 28, 2017, Claimant was gone for several hours midday without 

her knowledge. R.R. at 29a. However, Claimant testified that she had taken her son 

to a doctor’s appointment during the day and had advised her Branch Manager of 

this appointment. R.R. at 46a. CEO testified that Claimant did not arrive at the 

satellite branch on January 2, 2018. R.R. at 30a. According to Claimant’s testimony,

CEO allowed her to remain at the main branch that day because the main branch was 

short a teller. F.F. No. 10; R.R. at 52a. CEO testified that, on January 4, 2018, 

Claimant arrived late at the satellite branch. R.R. at 30a. Claimant testified that she 

did not travel to the satellite branch that day because, by the late hour at which she 

took lunch, she would have spent only a short time at the satellite branch and CEO 
10

excused her from travel that day. F.F. No. 11; R.R. at 53a. CEO also acknowledged

that she allowed Claimant to remain at the main branch during inclement weather. 

R.R. at 29a. 

Further, Claimant testified that she did not have a set time for lunch,

and she was not told to take her lunch by 1:30 p.m. until the meeting with CEO on 

January 5, 2018. R.R. at 45a, 53a, 56a. Claimant testified that the main branch was 

much busier than the satellite branch, which caused her to take a late lunch break or 

no lunch at all some days. R.R. at 56a. Claimant testified that at no point did she 

stay at the main branch and not travel to the satellite branch without the approval of 

the CEO. R.R. at 51a. 

Claimant, in accordance with Employer’s policy, filed a written 

complaint regarding her travel between the two branches and mileage 

reimbursement, among other issues, and met with the President of Employer’s Board 

of Directors. F.F. No. 14; R.R. at 40a-43a. Although the options of working full 

days in each of the two locations and providing mileage reimbursement were 

proffered during the meeting, the ultimate decision was CEO’s. F.F. No. 15; R.R. 

at 44a, 63a. CEO presented Claimant with an updated job description that required 

Claimant to travel daily between the offices with no reimbursement for mileage. F.F. 

No. 16; R.R. at 50a-51a. Claimant refused to sign the job description and was 

discharged for insubordination. F.F. No. 18; R.R. at 51a. 

Upon review, the Board’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence. That Employer may have provided “a different version of the events, or 

. . . might view the testimony differently than the Board, is not grounds for reversal 

if substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings.” Tapco, Inc. v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 650 A.2d 1106, 1108-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). The
11

Board’s findings support the determination that Claimant acted reasonably in 

following Employer’s procedure for addressing work issues and had good cause for 

refusing to accept CEO’s offer to resolve her complaint. 

Referee’s Decision

Next, Employer argues that the Board erred by failing to affirm the 

referee’s decision. Employer takes issue with the fact that the referee examined the 

same evidence and found in Employer’s favor. The Board did not indicate any 

alleged errors made by the referee. 

In this regard, Employer misapprehends the Board’s role and our 

standard of review in UC matters. The Board is the ultimate finder of fact and is not 

bound by the referee’s findings and conclusions. Peak v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 501 A.2d 1383, 1385 (Pa. 1985). It is the Board’s 

“exclusive power to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide witness 

credibility and the weight to be accorded the evidence.” Wise, 111 A.3d at 1261-62. 

Further, we review the Board’s decision, not the referee’s, for errors of law and 

evidentiary support. Id. at 1261 n.5. This argument is without merit. 

Due Process

Next, Employer claims that the Board denied Employer basic due 

process during the pendency of its appeal. First, the Board did not provide Employer 

notice of the allowance of appeal, despite two inquiries. Pursuant to the Department 

of Labor and Industry’s regulations, if appeals are allowed by the Board, notice must 

be given to all interested parties. 34 Pa. Code §101.104(c). Second, Employer 
12

contends that the Board failed to provide Employer with an opportunity to file a 

brief, while expressly granting Claimant the right to do the same. 

“It is well settled that the essential elements of due process in an 

administrative proceeding are notice and an opportunity to be heard.” McFadden v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 806 A.2d 955, 958 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2002). In the context of a proceeding before the Board, these elements encompass 

the right to notice as well as the right to request oral argument and to file a brief. Id. 

To that end, the Board’s regulations provide that “[t]he Board may 

allow or disallow any application for a further appeal without hearing, solely on the 

basis of the application and the record.” 34 Pa. Code §101.104(a). If allowed, the 

Board “assumes jurisdiction of the appeal” and mails notification “to the last known 

post office address of each interested party.” 34 Pa. Code §101.104(c). 

Further, “any of the interested parties may file a written request for oral 

or written argument.” 34 Pa. Code §101.104(e). “Such request will be granted as 

of course.” Mileski v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 379 A.2d 

643, 644 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977); see 34 Pa. Code §101.104(e) (“the normal time 

allowed for submitting written argument shall be 7 days from the date of the 

request”). Each party shall be afforded the opportunity to reply to the arguments and 

contentions of the other parties. 34 Pa. Code §101.104(e).

Here, the record contains Claimant’s petition for appeal to the Board 

and the cover sheet showing it was mailed to Employer’s counsel. R.R. 183a-85a, 

187a. Employer does not deny receiving this notice, but complains that it did not 

receive any “correspondence” from the Board indicating whether the Board allowed 

or disallowed Claimant’s appeal. Petitioner’s Brief at 14-15. However, the lower 
13

portion of the petition for appeal indicates that the Board accepted the appeal and 

assigned an appeal number. R.R. at 184a. Consequently, no further notice was due.

As for Employer’s claim that the Board deprived Employer of an 

opportunity to file a brief, Claimant’s counsel requested permission to file a brief on 

her behalf and then filed one. R.R. at 182a. Employer acknowledged that it received 

a copy of Claimant’s brief. R.R. at 200a. Although the regulations permitted 

Employer to file its own brief, Employer did not seek the Board’s permission to do 

so. Instead, Employer requested the Board to disregard Claimant’s brief because the 

“previously established record is adequate to meet the Board’s fact finding 

responsibilities and the parties were given ample opportunity to present their 

testimony and evidence at the Referee hearing.” R.R. at 189a, 200a. Consequently, 

Employer waived its opportunity to respond by brief. Upon review, Employer’s due 

process arguments lack merit. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GNC Community :

Federal Credit Union, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1063 C.D. 2018

: 

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4

th day of March, 2019, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated July 17, 2018, is 

AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge