*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

FEB 10 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DAVID WORKMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROY ROMER, Governor; ARISTEDES

ZAVARAS, Department of Corrections

Executive Director; BRAD ROCKWELL,

Department of Corrections Legal Access

Director; CATHIE DALTON, Legal Access

Program Employee; KATHLEEN BAXTER,

Legal Access Program Employee;

REGINALD SHOCKLEY, Legal Access

Program Employee, all in their official and

individual capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-1479

(D.C. No. 95-N-311)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
1The district court entered its order on September 24, 1996. Mr. Workman

filed a timely appeal. Subsequent proceedings in the appeal were delayed because

of an incorrect mailing address for Mr. Workman.

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unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

David Workman, a prisoner incarcerated at the Limon Correctional Facility

in Colorado, brought this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that

his constitutional rights were violated due to defendants’ refusal to photocopy a

legal document exceeding the thirteen-page limit then imposed by prison

regulations. The district court dismissed Mr. Workman’s appeal on three

grounds: 1) defendants’ actions did not impede Mr. Workman’s access to the

courts; 2) Mr. Workman’s complaint failed sufficiently to allege personal

participation on the part of the named defendants; and 3) an identical complaint

was previously dismissed by the district court barring Mr. Workman’s claims in

the instant action under the doctrine of res judicata. Mr. Workman subsequently

filed a notice of appeal and moved that he be allowed to proceed in forma

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §1915(b) and Fed. R. App. P. 24. The district court

denied the motion, finding that the appeal was not taken in good faith. Mr.

Workman now appeals the district court’s orders.1

On July 17, 1995, the district court dismissed an action filed by Mr.
2On appeal, Mr. Workman appears to raise claims not included in his

complaint before the district court. To the extent the appeal does raise new

issues, we do not consider them. See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(b); Valley Improvement

Ass’n, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Corp., 129 F.3d 1108, 1121 (10th

Cir. 1997). Mr. Workman may pursue these claims in a separate action should he

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Workman in which the complaint was identical to the one at issue here. See

Workman v. Romer, Civil Action No. 95 N 210 (D. Colo. Jul. 17, 1995). The

doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of all claims that were or could have

been advanced in a prior proceeding. See Nwosun v. General Mills Restaurants,

Inc., 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997). 

Res judicata requires the satisfaction of four elements: (1) the prior

suit must have ended with a judgment on the merits; (2) the parties

must have been identical or in privity; (3) the suit must be based on

the same cause of action; and (4) the plaintiff must have had a full

and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the prior suit.

Id.; see also Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 975

F.2d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 1992). All four criteria are met here where the parties

and issues are identical to those in the action previously dismissed on its merits,

and where there has been no showing that the parties did not have a full and fair

opportunity to litigate their claims. 

Because Mr. Workman’s appeal provides no basis on which the district

court’s res judicata determination should be reversed, and indeed fails even to

address the question, we hold that Mr. Workman’s appeal is frivolous or

malicious under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i).2 We therefore DENY him
choose to do so, bearing in mind the limitations imposed by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(g).

3Mr. Workman’s motion for appointed counsel on appeal is denied.

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permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) and

DISMISS the appeal.3

 Further, this dismissal counts as a “prior occasion” for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1915(g).

The mandate shall issue forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR

CHIEF JUDGE