J-S32045-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARKESE MARTIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1761 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 29, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0007160-2015, 

CP-51-CR-0009778-2015, CP-51-CR-0009779-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARKESE MARTIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1921 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 29, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0007160-2015, 

CP-51-CR-0009778-2015, CP-51-CR-0009779-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARKESE MARTIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1922 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 29, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0007160-2015, 
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CP-51-CR-0009778-2015, CP-51-CR-0009779-2015

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 17, 2021

Markese Martin appeals from the judgment of sentence imposing two 

consecutive life sentences, inter alia, following a bench trial where the court 

found him guilty of first and second degree murder and related crimes. On 

appeal, Martin claims that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to two 

consecutive life sentences instead of making them concurrent. Upon review, 

we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

On February 24, 2015, Martin was arrested and charged with numerous 

offenses, which stemmed from a robbery and a series of shootings that 

occurred on the afternoon of September 23, 2014, and the early hours of the 

next day. The trial court detailed the circumstances surrounding these 

charges in its opinion. Summarily, Megan Jones and her boyfriend, Randall 

Falon, set up a drug deal for percocets with Ronald McMillan. Once the deal 

was in progress, Falon’s friends, Martin, Kord Rozier, and Antonio Holcum, aka 

Bunk, were to rob McMillian. 

As planned, Jones went to meet McMillian, with Falon’s cohorts following 

behind, unbeknownst to McMillian. Jones met with McMillian and his cohorts, 

Christopher Ross and Kenneth Woods. During the deal, Martin approached, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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pulled out a gun, and ordered that the drugs be turned over. A fight ensued 

between Rozier and Woods, but stopped when shots were fired. McMillian and 

Ross fled the scene. Martin then came over to Rozier and Woods, and shot 

Woods in the chest. Martin and the remaining conspirators fled the scene with 

the pills. Rozier asked Martin why he shot him; Martin said “I had to.” 

Shortly after the shooting, McMillian and Ross were stopped by police. 

They told the police about the drug deal and shooting. McMillian identified 

Martin as the shooter from a photographic lineup.

Later that day, Martin told his girlfriend, Charde Denmark, about the 

robbery, and that he shot someone, but did not know if he killed him. 

Denmark saw on the news that Woods died, and told Martin.

After the shooting, Rozier met up with his girlfriend, Jasmine Williams, 

who was eight months pregnant, and told her what happened. Realizing that 

he dropped his hat at the scene, Rozier became concerned that the police 

would identify him from the hat and connect him to the robbery. 

Consequently, Rozier concocted a plan to turn himself in, but lie about what 

happened. Rozier told the others about his plan, but they protested. 

Nevertheless, Rozier called Williams’ uncle, Joseph Mears, who was a 

Philadelphia Police sergeant, and planned to meet him at the homicide unit. 

Before going however, Rozier called Martin and told him he was turning 

himself in. Martin objected, and suggested that they meet. 

Around midnight on September 24, Rozier and Williams left to see 

Mears, but first they met up with Martin. Martin got in the back seat of their 
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car, and pulled out a gun. Rozier and Martin started fighting over the gun, 

and several shots were fired, one hitting Rozier in the arm. Rozier told 

Williams to run. Rozier also tried to run, but Martin shot him multiple times. 

Rozier fell to the ground and played dead. Martin then chased Williams, and 

shot her in the head. 

After the police arrived, Rozier and Williams were taken to the hospital. 

Williams and her baby were pronounced dead later that night. Rozier 

survived, but sustained serious bodily injuries. Rozier identified Martin as the 

shooter of Woods and Williams.

Following these incidents, Martin fled to Atlanta with the help of 

Denmark. Almost six months later, Martin was arrested and charged with 

numerous offenses. 

At his bench trial,1 Rozier, Jones, Denmark, and Sergeant Mears, among 

others, testified. The trial court found Martin guilty of first degree murder, 

second degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy-second degree murder, 

robbery-infliction of serious bodily injury, two counts of intimidation of 

witnesses/victims refrain from reporting/informing, three counts of possession 

of instrument of crime, and various firearm offenses.2 On January 29, 2018, 

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1

In exchange for having a bench trial, the Commonwealth agreed not to 

pursue the death penalty on the first degree murder charge.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 2502(b), 901(a), 903(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), 

4952(a)(1), 907(a), 6106(a)(1) and 6108.
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the court sentenced Martin to consecutive life terms of imprisonment for the 

first and second degree murder convictions, and concurrent terms of 

incarceration, of varying lengths, for his other convictions.3 Martin filed a 

post-sentence motion, which was denied by operation of law.

Martin filed this timely appeal. The trial court and Martin complied with 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. 

This Court sua sponte consolidated Martin’s appeals. Additionally, it was 

noted that Martin’s notice of appeal listed three trial court docket numbers. 

This Court issued an order directing Martin to show cause why his appeals 

should not be quashed in light of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 

977 (Pa. 2018). Martin responded, stating that he filed a separate notice of 

appeal at each docket number. This Court subsequently discharged the rule 

and referred the issue to the merits panel. 

On appeal, Martin raises three issues for our consideration, which we

have reordered for ease of disposition:

1. Should these consolidated appeals be quashed for failure to 

comply with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 

2018)?

2. Did not the trial court err in denying appellant's motion for a 

new trial, as the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

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3 The trial court originally gave Martin a concurrent life sentence for his 

conspiracy conviction. However, during the course of this appeal, the trial 

court realized that this was an illegal sentence under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(c), 

and therefore has suggested that this court remand the case after resolution 

of the other issues to resentence Martin for this conviction. Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/2/19, at 1. As we agree that this portion of his sentence was illegal, 

we remand solely for resentencing on this count. 
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where the evidence of record was inherently unreliable and did 

not establish that appellant was the shooter in either incident, 

such that the conclusion of appellant's guilt was based purely on 

speculation and conjecture, in violation of appellant's 

constitutional rights under the state and federal constitutions?

3. Did not the trial court err as a matter of law, abuse its discretion 

and violate general sentencing principles by imposing a manifestly 

excessive and unreasonable sentence of consecutive life 

sentences of incarceration, where appellant was 25 years old at 

the time of the offenses and suffered from a catastrophic youth

riddled with life-threatening medical ailments and overwhelming 

abuse and neglect, and was not the sentence in excess of what 

was necessary to address the gravity of the offense, the protection 

of the community and appellant's rehabilitative needs?

Martin’s Brief at 4.

Before addressing Martin’s substantive issues, we must first determine 

whether this appeal is properly before us. Walker requires that “when a 

single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket, 

separate notices of appeal must be filed. The failure to do so will result in 

quashal of the appeal.” Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341). 

Recently, this Court, sitting en banc, clarified the intent of this directive and 

held that where separate notices of appeal are filed at each docket, even 

though they contain multiple docket numbers, the inclusion of multiple docket 

numbers on each notice of appeal does not invalidate the notice of appeal. 

See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(en banc). Rather, Walker only requires that a defendant file a separate 

notice of appeal for each lower court docket being challenged. Id. 

Here, initially, this Court received only one notice of appeal from the 

lower court, including all three docket numbers challenged by Martin. It was 
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subsequently discovered that Martin had filed separate notices with all three 

dockets listed at the other two dockets, but the clerk had not forwarded them 

to this Court. 

We conclude that Martin satisfied Walker. Martin filed a separate notice 

at each lower court docket which he intended to challenge. This is evidenced 

by the separate docket entries and different time clock stamps on each notice. 

That each of Martin’s notices listed more than one docket number is of no 

consequence per Johnson. Consequently, we need not quash this appeal, 

and may consider Martin’s other issues.

In his second issue, Martin argues that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. According to Martin, the testimony and evidence did 

not establish that Martin, although present at the crime scenes, had a gun or 

that he was the shooter in either incident; instead Martin claims that Holcum 

was the shooter. Martin’s Brief at 27, 29. In support of his claims, Martin 

first argues that the Commonwealth witnesses’ testimony was unreliable and 

incredible. They all had some sort of relationship with Holcum, and therefore 

had motive to lie and protect him. Id. Additionally, they participated in the 

crimes and had a self-serving interest in testifying. Id. at 27. Second, the 

identification description given by the two eyewitnesses to the first shooting, 

did not match that of Martin. Third, a different gun was used during each 

incident. Finally, the video footage of the second shooting did not show the 

actual shooting; someone else could have done it. Id. at 29. Martin therefore 
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claims the trial Court erred in finding that the verdict was not against weight 

of evidence and in denying his motion for a new trial.4 Id. 

When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, our standard 

of review is as follows:

The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie 

in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support. 

Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the 

trial court has acted within the limits of its discretion. 

* * *

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of 

the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. 

* * *

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review 

applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim 

is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054–55 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s 

decision will not be disturbed. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 515 A.2d 

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4 We note that Martin’s third and fourth arguments do not relate to the weight 

of the evidence, but rather the sufficiency of the evidence. Martin did not 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, and therefore we do not 

address these arguments.
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865, 869 (Pa. 1986). An abuse of discretion “is not merely an error in 

judgment. Rather, it involves bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, manifest 

unreasonableness or a misapplication of the law.” Commonwealth v. West, 

937 A.2d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2007). By contrast, a proper exercise of 

discretion “conforms to the law and is based on the facts of record.” Id. 

Initially, we observe that, typically, a weight claim is filed after a jury 

trial in the hope that the trial court judge who, like the jury, had an opportunity 

to hear the evidence and observe the demeanor of the witnesses, “will 

conclude that the verdict was so contrary to what it heard and observed that 

it will deem the jury's verdict such a miscarriage of justice and trigger the 

court's time-honored and inherent power to take corrective action.” Criswell 

v. King, 834 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. 2003). Here, however, a non-jury trial was 

held. Although weight of the evidence claims have been addressed in nonjury cases, there is a logical inconsistency in asking a trial judge to conclude 

that his non-jury decision shocked his own conscience. Notwithstanding this, 

we consider whether the trial court's decision was against the weight of the 

evidence.

Not surprisingly, the trial court concluded that its non-jury verdict was 

not against the weight of the evidence. In reaching its decision, the trial court 

thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented to support Martin’s convictions.

Critical to this decision was determination of the witnesses’ credibility. 

In reaching its conclusion, the trial court thoughtfully considered the credibility 

of the witnesses, and explained its rationale for finding the Commonwealth’s 
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witnesses credible. The court found that the testimony was substantially 

consistent among them; their individual testimony also was substantially 

consistent with their statements to police. Notably, the testimony of the 

witnesses whom Martin did not challenge corroborated the testimony of those 

whom he did. Furthermore, the court explained why, despite the witness’

initial untruthfulness or withholding of information, criminal record, motive or 

interest in lessening his or her own sentence, the court nonetheless found 

these witnesses’ testimony credible. Based on its review, the court concluded 

that these witnesses, especially Rozier, credibly testified that Martin was the 

shooter in both incidents. “[T]he finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 

A.3d 759, 767 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 

852, 856–57 (Pa. Super. 2010). The trial court summarized its analysis as 

follows:

Rozier, McMillan, and Jones all identified [Martin] as the shooter 

of Kenneth Woods. [Martin] admitted as much to Denmark, who 

also testified that [Martin] left her house around the time of the 

second shooting. She also testified about [Martin’s] subsequent 

flight to Atlanta. Sergeant Mears' testimony corroborated Rozier's

account of the aftermath of the robbery-shooting and his plan to 

turn himself in under false pretenses. Rozier identified [Martin]

as the one who shot him and Williams in the second shooting and 

also identified [Martin] as being in his car [at] the gas station . . .

He further testified as to his call with Martin letting him know of 

the plan to turn himself in.
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Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/19, at 29. The trial court therefore found that Martin 

shot both Woods and Williams. 

Based upon our review of the record, and the trial court’s rationale for 

denying Martin’s motion, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that its verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. 

Lastly, Martin challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence for

his first and second degree murder convictions. This Court has explained that, 

to reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we must conduct a 

four-part analysis to determine: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [a]ppellant 

preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant's brief includes a 

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of 

appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence [in 

accordance with 2119(f)]; and (4) whether the concise statement 

raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate 

under the sentencing code. . . . [I]f the appeal satisfies each of 

these four requirements, we will then proceed to decide the 

substantive merits of the case.

Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1042–43 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013)). 

Here, Martin satisfied the first three requirements under Colon. 

Accordingly, we must determine whether Martin has raised a substantial 

question for our review. An appellant raises a “substantial question” when he 

“sets forth a plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the 

[S]entencing [C]ode or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing 
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process.” Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (citation omitted).

In his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), Martin acknowledges that the trial court was 

required to impose life sentences for his murder convictions, but argues that 

it abused its discretion by imposing those life sentences consecutively instead 

of concurrently. Specifically, in rendering this sentence, Martin claims that 

the trial court failed to consider his catastrophic and debilitating background 

and his rehabilitative needs in light of those circumstances. Consequently, 

Martin claims his sentence was manifestly excessive and unreasonable and 

should be vacated. Martin’s Brief at 23-24. 

Regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences and whether a 

substantial question has been raised, this Court has held:

A court's exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence

concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a

substantial question. Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 

581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010)[.] Rather, the imposition of 

consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will present a

substantial question in only “the most extreme circumstances, 

such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, 

considering the nature of the crimes and the length of 

imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 

372 (Pa. Super. 2012)[(en banc)].

[An appellant] may raise a substantial question where he receives 

consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges if the case 

involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines 

would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence; 

however, a bald claim of excessiveness due to the consecutive 

nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial question.
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Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338-39 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quotations and citations omitted). 

Furthermore, “ordinarily, a claim that the sentencing court failed to 

consider or accord proper weight to a specific sentencing factor does not raise 

a substantial question.” Id. (emphasis in original). However, this Court has 

held that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that 

the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en 

banc). 

In Caldwell, we noted that “prior decisions from this Court involving 

whether a substantial question has been raised by claims that the sentencing 

court ‘failed to consider’ or ‘failed to adequately consider’ sentencing factors 

[have] been less than a model of clarity and consistency.” Id. at 769-70

(quoting Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. 

2014)). We explained further that, although the lack of consideration of 

rehabilitative needs has often not triggered our review, “an excessive 

sentence claim – in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to 

consider mitigating factors – raises a substantial question.” Id. at 769-770

(quoting Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

and Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005)).

Consequently, when we view Martin’s challenge to the imposition of 

consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, together with his claim that the 

court failed to consider certain mitigating factors or his rehabilitative needs, 
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we conclude that he presents a substantial question. Therefore, we will 

consider the merits of his sentencing claim.

Our standard of review of a sentencing claim is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

In reviewing Martin’s excessive sentencing claim, we first note that the 

trial court had the benefit of a pre-sentence report. “[W]here the trial court 

is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is aware 

of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the 

court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” 

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(citation omitted). 

Additionally, the trial court had a mitigation report. The trial court 

specifically noted on the record that it reviewed this report after the trial, and 

reread it the day before sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, Martin’s 

counsel highlighted for the trial court some of the pertinent factors from the 

report, particularly noting that Martin suffered from a serious medical 

condition, was terribly neglected, and was emotionally and physically abused, 

essentially from conception. Counsel further emphasized Martin’s actual age, 
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25, at the time of his crimes and suggested that, given the medical, societal, 

cultural, and environmental circumstances of his life, his mental age was lower

than his actual age, despite Martin’s refusal to undergo a mental health 

evaluation. 

From our review of the sentencing transcript, it is evident that, contrary 

to Martin’s claim, the trial court sincerely considered the contents of the 

reports and the circumstances of Martin’s life in fashioning its sentence. The 

court stated: 

Having read everything I read regarding your life and the 

circumstances that led you to this, I think to the extent that people 

failed you in your life, I don’t think anybody can deny that. And I 

think the people on this side—and I’m indicating the . . . the family 

of the baby and Ms. Williams and Mr. Woods—I think they regret

it the most, right? They wish that you had been taken care of and 

loved and provided for, at a minimum, and then we wouldn’t be 

here. . . . I’m struggling with how to fashion a sentence that takes 

into account those things, yet acknowledges the lives of three 

people who were taken from this from this earth, especially that 

baby and her mother, who really—these people . . . had no dog in 

the fight . . . . All over something that happened where you look 

at these facts and it’s like, it didn’t have to happen in the first 

instance.

N.T., 1/29/18, at 27-28.

It is also evident that the trial court considered Martin’s rehabilitative 

needs. The court specifically acknowledged that one of the goals of sentencing 

is rehabilitation. Id. at 30. Martin’s counsel addressed his potential for 

rehabilitation. The mitigation report was extensive, signifying the need for 

rehabilitation. Indeed, the court noted that Martin could work to rehabilitate 

himself and be a positive member of his community if he so chose and did the 
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things that counsel argued he could. N.T., 1/29/18, at 33. Nonetheless, the 

court found that the circumstances of this case weighed in favor of retribution, 

another purpose of sentencing, and, thus, warranted consecutive life 

sentences. Id. On appeal, “[w]e cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and 

impose our judgment in place of the sentencing court.” Commonwealth v. 

Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

We have long held that a sentencing court has broad discretion 

regarding whether a defendant serves sentences consecutively or 

concurrently. Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 

2014). Here, the trial court viewed the murders as separate incidents thereby 

warranting separate life sentences. N.T., 1/29/18, at 31. Martin is not 

entitled to a volume discount for his crimes. See Commonwealth v. Hoag, 

665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995). Moreover, the court specifically 

noted that it did not sentence Martin based on the death of Williams’ unborn 

child since that case had been nolle prossed. However, the fact that Williams 

was pregnant at the time that Martin shot her in the head as she ran away 

remained a fact of the case, and the court could not simply ignore it when 

determining Martin’s sentence. N.T., 1/29/18, at 29. Notably, the court 

imposed concurrent sentences on his other charges, attempting to balance all 

the circumstances of this case. Id. at 31-32.

Based upon our review of this case and the sentencing transcript, we 

conclude that, contrary to Martin’s allegations, it is evident that the trial court 

considered all of the sentencing factors, including the mitigating 
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circumstances of Martin’s life and his rehabilitative needs. The court 

thoroughly and thoughtfully deliberated on the sentence to impose against 

Martin for his first and second degree murder convictions. We do not find that 

the trial court committed a manifest abuse of discretion in rendering Martin’s 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed in all respects, except as to conspiracy 

to commit murder, which is vacated. Case is remanded for resentencing on 

the conspiracy conviction. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/17/2021