J-S71038-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

DANNY JERALD ALDERMAN 

 Appellant No. 830 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-56-CR-0000642-2014 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2016 

 Danny Jerald Alderman appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on April 30, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset 

County. On January 16, 2015, a jury convicted Alderman of driving under 

the influence (“DUI”).1 That same day, the trial court, sitting without a jury, 

convicted him of driving on roadways laned for traffic and careless driving.2 

The court sentenced Alderman to a term of 12 months to five years in a 

state correctional facility with respect to the Section 3802(c) DUI offense.3 

On appeal, Alderman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a 

____________________________________________ 

1

 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). 

2

 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3309(1) and 3714(a). 

3

 The court imposed statutory fines and costs for the remaining offenses. 
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thorough review of the submissions by the parties, the certified record, and 

relevant law, we affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows: 

The Commonwealth’s first witness, Carol Fochtman, testified on 

direct examination that on April 26, 2014, she was driving on her 

way home from work and encountered a vehicle in front of her 

driving very slowly at approximately 10 to 15 miles an hour in a 

35 miles per hour zone. She stated that the vehicle “swerved off 

to the right on the berm just a little bit ... it happened again, like 

a couple seconds later it went off on the berm again to the 

right.” She also testified “... I said it out loud to myself, I said, 

‘Oh, my God, he’s going to hit that pole.’ And it was like a 

couple of seconds later, I heard a crack and he hit the pole.” 

Ms. Fochtman stated that she got out of her car and went over 

to the driver who was out of the car and standing up. She 

stated “I said, ‘Are you okay? He said, “Yes.” Ms. Fochtman 

was then asked “What else did he say to you?” She answered 

that he said “Please don’t call the cops.” She also testified that 

she did not see him drink anything. In addition, she was able to 

point to [Alderman] as the man she saw at the scene. 

The Commonwealth also called Mary Devroy, another 

driver who came upon the scene and stopped. She testified as 

follows: 

Driving out Route 160 towards Windber, we seen a car 

that was off the road that hit a telephone pole. We pulled 

off to the right. As I was walking across the road calling 

911 to report an accident, [Alderman] was sitting on the 

ground, went over to make sure he was okay, and I could 

smell the alcohol. And I said: “were you drinking?” and 

he did admit, yes, that he was drinking.[] 

She also testified that she made the call to 911 at 5:54 

P.M. and that she saw an open beer can in [Alderman]’s car. 

Further, she stated that she smelled the alcohol on [Alderman] 

before he climbed back into his car. In addition she said that 

[Alderman] said “Please don’t call the police ... I am going to go 

to jail.” She testified that the State Police Trooper arrived at 

6:20 and she left the scene at 6:21. 
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Trooper Eric Bowser testified regarding his investigation of 

the accident. He stated that he was dispatched at 6:00 P.M. and 

arrived at the scene about 20 to 25 minutes after the accident 

had occurred. He stated that he viewed the damage to the car 

and the pole and that an ambulance was preparing to transport 

the operator to the hospital. He gathered s[o]me additional 

evidence, talked to Ms. Devroy, prepared a diagram of the 

scene, travelled to Windber Hospital and spoke to [Alderman] 

there, noting “a very strong odor of alcohol emanating from ... 

Mr. Alderman.” The Trooper also testified that [Alderman]’s 

“eyes were glassy and bloodshot ... he had slurred speech; he 

was sleepy and groggy as well as crying...” [Alderman] also 

stated that he had three or four beers in the morning. After 

[Alderman] also failed a field sobriety test, identified as a 

horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Trooper Bowser placed him 

under arrest for driving under the influence at approximately 

6:56 P.M. At 7:08 P.M. a blood sample was drawn by hospital 

personnel for testing at the request of the Trooper. In addition, 

Trooper Bowser testified that he had found one beer can in 

[Alderman]’s vehicle at the scene. 

Finally, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

Karen Turcato, an employee in the laboratory at Windber 

Hospital where [Alderman] was taken for treatment. She 

testified concerning her role in the taking and chemical testing of 

a sample of [Alderman]’s blood on the evening in question. She 

reviewed the procedure she employed and the test result which 

showed a blood alcohol of .243%. The test results were 

admitted as Commonwealth’s Exhibit “A” without objection. She 

verified that the time of the blood draw at 7:08 P.M. on April 26, 

2014. After the Commonwealth rested, we denied a Defense 

motion for Judgment of Acquittal. 

 [Alderman] presented testimony from his mother and also 

took the stand. Sherri Miller testified that [Alderman] had spent 

the night at her home and spent time with his daughter there. 

She said that [Alderman] wanted to take the child fishing but the 

child wouldn’t go unless her grandfather went along. She stated 

that he left the house and was upset regarding the failed fishing 

outing. In addition she stated that [Alderman] had nothing 

alcoholic to drink at her home. On cross examination she stated 

that [Alderman] was gone 30-45 minutes before she received a 

call from him regarding his accident. 
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 [Alderman] testified regarding his plans to take his 

daughter fishing on his day off and the issue that arose which 

frustrated those plans. He stated that he began to feel 

“overwhelmed” by the circumstances and wanted to avoid 

getting frustrated in the child’s presence and chose to leave the 

house. He stated that he drove to a gas station, got gas in his 

vehicle, purchased some cigarettes, sat in his vehicle and 

smoked a cigarette and left the area. He explained that the 

vehicle was experiencing some problems with the alignment and 

the vehicle was “pulling” to the right. He stated that as he 

pulled out, his phone slid off the seat, he picked it up and was 

looking at [it] when the vehicle “just pulled off the road. I 

wasn’t paying attention and it hit the pole.” 

 He stated that he had not been drinking at home, was not 

drinking at the gas station, and had no alcohol in his system 

when he hit the pole. He testified that there was alcohol in the 

car “some beer in the back seat ... I had a fifth of Jim Beam 

under the passenger seat.” He also testified that he “opened the 

beer – or I washed my mouth, spit it out and drank the beer. I 

opened the fifth and figured I would drink as much of it as I can 

until the police got there.” 

 On cross-examination, [Alderman] was asked 

 “So you’re willing – you were willing to say anything to 

get home at that time?” 

That inquiry produced the following exchange: 

“A. After I realized I wasn’t going to jail that day, I mean 

yeah. I had alcohol on my breath. I – I can’t deny it. I 

was looking for what is the most plausible explanation – 

Q. Kind of like you’re doing today. You’re looking for the 

most plausible explanation – 

A. That is your opinion. I can’t argue with you. 

Q. So you didn’t – you lied to the officer when you said 

you had three or four drinks that morning? 

A. Yeah.[”] 
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Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/2015, at 2-6 (record citations omitted). 

 As noted above, a one-day jury was held on January 16, 2015. The 

jury convicted Alderman of DUI, a first-degree misdemeanor. Following the 

jury trial, the trial court convicted him of the summary offenses of driving on 

roadways laned for traffic and careless driving. As noted above, on April 30, 

2015, the court sentenced Alderman to a term of 12 months to five years in 

a state correctional facility with respect to the Section 3802(c) DUI offense. 

Following the sentencing hearing, by separate order, the court granted 

Alderman’s oral motion to dismiss his appointed counsel and to proceed to 

represent himself on appeal. 

 On May 6, 2015, Alderman filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a 

reduction in the maximum date of his incarceration. However, on May 22, 

2015, before argument could be scheduled regarding the motion, Alderman 

filed a notice of appeal. On June 2, 2015, the trial court entered an order, 

denying his post-sentence motion. On June 3, 2015, the trial court ordered 

Alderman to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Alderman filed a concise statement on June 

17, 2015. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on 

July 2, 2015. 
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 In Alderman’s sole argument,4 he claims there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction for DUI under Section 3802(c). 

Specifically, he states expert testimony was required to validate the blood 

alcohol content (“BAC”) testing because a supernatant example was used as 

the test sample of his results and therefore, evidence of a conversion factor 

to calculate the whole blood alcohol content of the original whole blood 

sample from the non-whole blood result was necessary. Alderman’s Brief at 

9-13. Moreover, he states that while the Commonwealth may have 

mentioned “conversion” while questioning Karen Turcato, the Windber 

Medical Center laboratory employee, it did not present any evidence of the 

conversion process. Id. at 11. He asserts: 

This makes the result of the test legally insufficient to support a 

conviction for [Section] 3802(c), Merely stating this is the whole 

blood conversion, without explanation or conversion factors 

used, is tantamount to simply stating that someone is an expert, 

but not showing you their credentials. 

Id. In support of his argument, he relies on Commonwealth v. Haight, 50 

A.3d 137 (Pa. Super. 2012), and Commonwealth v. Karns, 50 A.3d 158 

(Pa. Super. 2012). 

Our standard of review is well-settled: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

____________________________________________ 

4

 We note that while Alderman lists two issues in his statement of questions 

involved, he addresses them together in his argument. 
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evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, 

the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence. 

Commonwealth v. LaBenne, 21 A.3d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2011), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856–57 (Pa. Super. 

2010). 

 However, before we may address the merits of this issue, we must 

determine whether Alderman properly preserved the claim. In his concise 

statement, as ordered by the court to file, Alderman identified the following 

issues he wished to raise on appeal: 

1) Whether there was sufficient evidence presented to the Jury 

for them to return a verdict that [Alderman] was driving with a 

BAC of .16 or higher? 

2) Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

presented to uphold a verdict that [Alderman] was at the time of 

the operation of the vehicle , operating a vehicle with a BAC[] of 

.16% or higher? 

Concise Statement of Matters Complained on Appeal, 6/17/2015, at 2. 
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The trial court found Alderman’s issues on appeal could be waived, 

determining his concise statement failed to specify any specific errors the 

court made during trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/2015, at 6. The trial 

court stated, “We view these statements as the type of ‘boilerplate’ 

responses which may not require a response under Rule 1925.” Id. 

Nevertheless, the court did address the sufficiency and weight claims 

generally but did not specifically analyze the sufficiency of expert evidence 

regarding the conversion process for the BAC results. See id. at 2-8. 

Rule 1925 requires an appellant “concisely identify each ruling or error 

that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all 

pertinent issues[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “When a court has to guess 

what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful 

review.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 969 A.2d 1236, 1239 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (failure to adequately identify issues “impede[s]” trial court “in its 

preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues.”). 

Ordinarily, a defendant waives a sufficiency claim where he fails to 

indicate with specificity which element of a crime the Commonwealth failed 

to prove. See Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (“In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity 

the element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence 

was insufficient.”). 
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The trial court convicted Alderman of DUI, highest rate of alcohol, 

under the following statute: 

§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 

substance 

... 

(c) Highest rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a 

vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that 

the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 

0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual has driven, 

operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of 

the vehicle. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). 

Based on the lack of specificity regarding what element of the crime 

the Commonwealth failed to establish, we are compelled to conclude 

Alderman waived his claim by filing a deficient concise statement.5

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

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5

 Moreover, the test results were admitted without objection. See N.T., 

1/16/2015, at 47. Additionally, prior to sentencing, Alderman’s counsel 

made an oral motion for arrest of judgment, relying on Commonwealth v. 

Kostra, 502 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Super. 1985), and stating that Kostra

discusses “blood alcohol conte[n]t, lay testimony and expert testimony. We 

believe there was no expert testimony presented and that that would 

disqualify essentially the Jury’s lay opinion of what his blood alcohol could 

have been or would have been at the time.” N.T., 4/30/2015, at 4-5. The 

court denied the motion without prejudice to raise on appeal. However, as 

evidenced above, Alderman did not set forth the sufficiency argument with 

any specificity as required by the appellate rules.
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 2/9/2016