Stanley Rochkind v. Starlena Stevenson, No. 47, September Term, 2019. Opinion by 

Getty, J.

EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY—MARYLAND RULE 5-702—SUFFICIENT 

FACTUAL BASIS—FRYE-REED STANDARD—DAUBERT STANDARD

Over four decades ago, the Court of Appeals in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), adopted 

the “general acceptance” test—first espoused in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 

Cir. 1923)—for the admissibility of expert testimony based on new or novel scientific 

principles. In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States, in adopting a new “reliability” 

standard for admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts, endorsed a nonexclusive 

list of reliability factors. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 

(1993). In that case, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 702 

superseded Frye. The following year, the Court of Appeals adopted Maryland Rule 5-702, 

a rule modeled after FRE 702, which laid out the elements of admissible expert testimony. 

Maryland Rule 5-702, however, did not overrule Reed or Frye. Since 1994, the relationship 

between Frye-Reed and Maryland Rule 5-702 has complicated. 

The Court of Appeals adopted the Daubert reliability factors, overruling Frye and Reed. 

When interpreting Maryland Rule 5-702, Maryland courts, instead of merely looking to the 

general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, should consider, but are not 

limited to: (1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether a 

theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether a 

particular scientific technique has a known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and 

maintenance of standards and controls; (5) whether a theory or technique is generally 

accepted; (6) whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and 

directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they 

have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying; (7) whether the expert 

has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion; (8) 

whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations; (9) 

whether the expert is being as careful as he or she would be in his or her regular 

professional work outside his or her paid litigation consulting; and (10) whether the field 

of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion 

the expert would give.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 24-C-11-008722

Argued: February 7, 2020

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 47

September Term, 2019

STANLEY ROCHKIND

v.

STARLENA STEVENSON

McDonald,

Watts,

Hotten,

Getty,

Booth,

Biran,

Greene, Clayton Jr. (Senior Judge, 

Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Getty, J.

Watts, Hotten, and Greene, JJ., dissent.

Filed: August 28, 2020
Nearly a century ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia announced a new evidentiary standard by which the admissibility of expert 

testimony rooted in a novel scientific principle or discovery turned on the “general 

acceptance” of such evidence “in the particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United 

States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In the ensuing fifty years, “almost all of the 

courts in the country” that considered “the admissibility of scientific evidence” adopted the 

rationale set out in Frye, including this Court in 1978. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 382

(1978). Hence, after noting the majority of courts were in agreement that “‘general 

acceptance’ in the [relevant] scientific community ha[d] come to be the standard,” FryeReed was born in Maryland; as we put it, “before a scientific opinion will be received as 

evidence at trial, the basis of that opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as 

reliable within the expert’s” relevant scientific community. Id. at 381.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the 

Supreme Court of the United States upset the applecart of the admissibility of expert 

scientific testimony. There, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 

702 superseded Frye’s general acceptance test. In place of Frye, the Supreme Court 

provided a list of flexible factors to help courts determine the reliability of expert 

testimony. A supermajority of states followed the Supreme Court’s lead and replaced their 

respective Frye standards with Daubert. Maryland, however, did not.

In the forty years that followed Reed, Maryland experienced a jurisprudential drift:

the Frye-Reed standard announced in 1978 slowly morphed into a “Frye-Reed Plus” 

standard, implicitly and explicitly relying on and adopting several Daubert principles. For 
2

this reason, Appellant/Cross-Petitioner Stanley Rochkind now squarely poses this 

question: Should the Court adopt the standard for admitting expert testimony under 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.? This time, for reasons more fully 

explained below, we answer this question in the affirmative and choose to adopt Daubert

as the governing standard by which trial courts admit or exclude expert testimony.

BACKGROUND

A. Ms. Stevenson’s Lead Paint Exposure and Medical History.1

In 1991, a 10-month-old Starlena Stevenson and her mother, Charlena Montgomery,

moved to 3823 Fairview Avenue (“Fairview”), where they lived for 15 months. At the 

time, Fairview was owned in part by Mr. Rochkind. According to Ms. Montgomery, 

Fairview contained chipping and flaking paint on the windowsills, floors, and front porch. 

Blood lead level tests taken while Ms. Stevenson was a resident of Fairview revealed that 

she had a blood lead level of 13 to 14 micrograms per deciliter—a number that dropped to 

11 micrograms per deciliter just two months later when she was no longer a resident of that 

property.

Ms. Stevenson, now 29 years old, has a family history of learning disabilities and 

has faced numerous medical, psychological, and socioeconomic obstacles. She was born 

to a single teenage mother and has no relationship with her father. As a child, she was 

diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, commonly referred to as ADHD, 

 

1 For a comprehensive background to this case, refer to the Court’s opinion in Rochkind 

v. Stevenson, 454 Md. 277, 281–84 (2017) (“Stevenson I”).
3

and several major psychological disorders including oppositional defiance disorder, major 

depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and parent-child relationship disorder. Her 

psychological problems were so severe that in 2004 she engaged in self-mutilation and 

attempted suicide. 

Since graduating from high school in 2008, Ms. Stevenson has been sporadically 

employed, working as a patient transporter for the University of Maryland Medical System, 

a cashier for Royal Farms, and a babysitter. In each case, Ms. Stevenson struggled to stay 

employed due to her attentional deficits, hyperactivity, and impulsivity—symptoms which 

she claims resulted from her exposure to lead paint.

B. The First and Second Trials.

In December 2011, Ms. Stevenson filed suit against Mr. Rochkind in the Circuit 

Court for Baltimore City for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer 

Protection Act. In July 2012, lead testing conducted at Fairview detected lead-based paint 

on twenty-two interior surfaces and nine exterior surfaces. In preparation for the litigation, 

Cecilia Hall-Carrington, M.D., a pediatrician, filed a report concluding to “a reasonable 

degree of medical probability” that Ms. Stevenson was poisoned by lead at Fairview, and 

that “her lead poisoning is a significant contributing factor” to her neuropsychological 

problems, including her ADHD.

Before trial, Mr. Rochkind filed four motions in limine seeking to exclude Dr. HallCarrington’s testimony. He argued that she should not be permitted to testify that Fairview 

was a source of Ms. Stevenson’s lead exposure or that such exposure caused Ms. 

Stevenson’s “cognitive deficits,” including, specifically, ADHD. Mr. Rochkind requested 
4

a Frye-Reed hearing on each motion. The court denied his requests. After hearing 

arguments on the motions in limine, the court denied them as well. The jury returned a 

verdict in favor of Ms. Stevenson, awarding her $829,000 in economic damages and 

$534,000 in noneconomic damages. Mr. Rochkind filed a motion for a new trial, or, in the 

alternative, remittitur. The court granted his motion in part and ordered a new trial on the 

issue of damages alone.

The partial new trial began in October 2014. Before trial, Mr. Rochkind renewed 

his motions in limine to exclude Dr. Hall-Carrington’s ADHD testimony, which were again 

denied. The court declined to hold a Frye-Reed hearing, explaining that Dr. HallCarrington’s opinions are “not new science” or “new conclusions.” It admitted her 

testimony under Maryland Rule 5-702 because it found that she drew from “reliable 

sources.”

At trial, Dr. Hall-Carrington testified as to both general and specific ADHD 

causation. She explained that studies show that lead exposure can cause “attention 

problems[] or ADHD” generally. She also opined “within a reasonable degree of medical 

probability” that lead exposure caused Ms. Stevenson’s ADHD specifically. To support 

her testimony, Dr. Hall-Carrington relied on a publication from the Environmental 

Protection Agency reviewing the most recent studies on the effects of lead exposure in 

children, titled “Integrated Science Assessment for Lead” (the “EPA-ISA”).2 She testified 

 

2 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA/600/R–10/075F, Integrated Science Assessment for Lead 

(2013), https://www.epa.gov/isa/integrated-science-assessment-isa-lead (follow “PDF” 

hyperlink), archived at https://perma.cc/K28Z-F58P.
5

that the EPA-ISA concluded that there is a causal relationship between lead exposure and 

the symptoms of ADHD, such as attention decrements, impulsivity, and hyperactivity. Dr. 

Hall-Carrington also testified that “some years ago there was a concern with suicide in kids 

[taking] Adderall.” In closing argument, Ms. Stevenson’s counsel implied that Ms. 

Stevenson’s depression and hallucinations were side effects of her ADHD medications, 

including Adderall.

The jury awarded Ms. Stevenson $753,000 in economic damages and $700,000 in 

noneconomic damages. Due to the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, the court 

reduced the total judgment to $1,103,000. Mr. Rochkind filed a motion for a new trial, 

which the court denied.

On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held, among other things, that the circuit

court did not err in failing to hold a Frye-Reed hearing on Dr. Hall-Carrington’s general 

causation testimony because the studies she relied upon did not reach novel conclusions 

and “used methodologies that are generally accepted” in the scientific community. 

Rochkind v. Stevenson, 229 Md. App. 422, 464 (2016). The intermediate appellate court 

also held that the circuit court properly admitted Dr. Hall-Carrington’s specific causation 

testimony under Rule 5-702 because her opinion “was supported by an adequate factual 

basis and was sufficient to allow the jury to decide the causal connection, if any, between 

lead exposure and Ms. Stevenson’s ADHD.” Id. at 465. Mr. Rochkind appealed.

C. Stevenson I.

In his first appeal to this Court, Mr. Rochkind argued that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

testimony should have been excluded because it failed to meet the requirements of both 
6

Rule 5-702 and Frye-Reed. Rochkind v. Stevenson, 454 Md. 277, 285 (2017) (“Stevenson 

I”). The Court agreed. Applying a Rule 5-702 analysis, the Court held that “Dr. HallCarrington did not provide a sufficient factual foundation for why she thought the EPAISA supported her conclusion that lead exposure can cause ADHD.” Id. at 290. The Court 

concluded that because “Dr. Hall-Carrington did not cite to any other studies to support her 

opinion that lead exposure can cause ADHD,” she “cannot be permitted to testify that such 

a causal connection exists generally, or that lead exposure caused [Ms.] Stevenson’s 

ADHD specifically.” Id. at 293–94 (footnote omitted). In light of its Rule 5-702 

conclusion, the Court declined to address Mr. Rochkind’s argument that the circuit court 

should have held a Frye-Reed hearing on Dr. Hall-Carrington’s general causation 

testimony. Id. at 295. Because the Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion 

in permitting Dr. Hall-Carrington to opine on the effects of lead exposure based on the 

EPA-ISA, the Court remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial on the issue of 

damages. Id. at 295–96.

D. The Third and Fourth Trials.

Before the third trial, Mr. Rochkind filed a motion, once again attempting to exclude 

Dr. Hall-Carrington’s specific causation opinions. The circuit court denied the motion and 

request for a pre-trial Rule 5-702 and/or Frye-Reed hearing based on its reading of the 

opinion in Stevenson I. According to the circuit court, so long as Dr. Hall-Carrington did 

not actually use the word “ADHD,” she could opine that Ms. Stevenson’s attentional
7

deficits, hyperactivity, and impulsivity problems were caused by lead exposure.3 Despite 

the ruling, Dr. Hall-Carrington testified that lead exposure can cause “ADHD,” causing the 

circuit court to declare a mistrial.

Not to be deterred, in trial number four, Dr. Hall-Carrington testified that lead 

exposure caused Ms. Stevenson’s attentional deficits, hyperactivity, and impulsivity 

problems, once again relying solely on the epidemiological studies cited in the EPA-ISA. 

This time, however, Dr. Hall-Carrington did not mention “ADHD,” specifically. The jury 

awarded Ms. Stevenson $1 million in economic damages and $2 million in non-economic 

damages.

E. Post-Trial Motions and Appeal.

Mr. Rochkind filed a Motion for New Trial, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 

(“JNOV”), and Remittitur. The circuit court denied Mr. Rochkind’s motion for a new trial 

and JNOV but reduced damages pursuant to the statutory cap. Mr. Rochkind appealed to 

the Court of Special Appeals. While that appeal was pending, Ms. Stevenson filed a 

Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Mr. Rochkind filed a Cross-Petition. We granted both 

petitions to answer the following questions:

(1) Should the Court adopt the standard for admitting expert testimony under 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)? 

(2) Was [Ms. Stevenson’s] medical causation expert’s specific causation 

opinion admissible in this case under Rule 5-702, applying the standard set 

forth in Daubert?

 

3 Mr. Rochkind submitted additional briefing and a formal offer of proof to preserve the 

issue for appeal.
8

(3) Was it error for the trial court to allow [Ms. Stevenson’s] medical 

causation expert to testify that [Ms. Stevenson] has attentional and behavioral 

injuries without providing a reliable method for attributing those injuries to 

lead exposure when [Ms. Stevenson] had already been diagnosed with 

ADHD? 

(4) Was it error for the trial court to allow [Ms. Stevenson’s] medical expert 

to render specific causation opinions based on general epidemiological 

studies? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[T]he admissibility of expert testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of 

the trial court, and its action in admitting or excluding such testimony will seldom 

constitute ground for reversal.” Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 38–39 (2015). When the 

basis of an expert’s opinion is challenged pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-702, the review is 

abuse of discretion. Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 618 (2009). “Such a ruling, 

however, may be reversed on appeal if it is founded on an error of law or some serious 

mistake, or if the trial court clearly abused its discretion.” Sippio v. State, 350 Md. 633, 

648 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we will not 

affirm a decision within the discretion of the trial court if the judge acts in an “arbitrary or 

capricious manner” or “beyond the letter or reason of the law.” Garg v. Garg, 393 Md. 

225, 238 (2006) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Parties’ Contentions.

In Stevenson I, we held that it was error to allow Dr. Hall-Carrington to testify that 

lead exposure generally causes ADHD and therefore error to testify that lead exposure 

specifically caused Ms. Stevenson’s ADHD. 454 Md. at 293–96. On remand, the circuit
9

court ruled that Dr. Hall-Carrington was allowed to testify that Ms. Stevenson’s attentional

deficits, hyperactivity, and impulsivity—some of the symptoms of ADHD—were 

specifically caused by lead exposure as long as she did not use the term “ADHD.” The 

circuit court did not base its ruling on Rule 5-702 or Frye-Reed. It based its ruling solely 

on its reading of this Court’s opinion in Stevenson I.

As Appellant/Cross-Petitioner, Mr. Rochkind initially argues that the Court should 

adopt the Daubert standard, apply it to this case, and find that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s

specific causation opinion is inadmissible under Rule 5-702. Ms. Stevenson responds that 

the Court should not adopt Daubert but that even under Daubert, Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

specific causation opinion would be admissible. Understandably, Mr. Rochkind, in support 

of Daubert, and Ms. Stevenson, in opposition, each list a host of pros and cons to adopting 

Daubert. 

As Appellee/Petitioner, Ms. Stevenson argues that under current expert 

admissibility jurisprudence, it was not error for the circuit court to allow Dr. HallCarrington to testify that Ms. Stevenson has a physical brain injury attributable to lead 

exposure that manifested in symptoms of attentional deficits, hyperactivity and 

impulsivity. To support this position, Ms. Stevenson maintains that Dr. Hall-Carrington 

provided a reliable methodology consistent with Maryland tort law’s “substantial factor” 

causation standard. Ms. Stevenson lastly argues that the circuit court did not err in allowing 

specific causation opinions based on general epidemiological studies.

Mr. Rochkind responds that even under Frye-Reed, it was error for the circuit court 

to allow Dr. Hall-Carrington to testify that Ms. Stevenson’s attentional and behavioral 
10

problems were caused by lead exposure because (1) Ms. Stevenson had been clinically 

diagnosed with ADHD and (2) Dr. Hall-Carrington did not have a reliable methodology 

for attributing those problems to lead exposure as opposed to ADHD. Mr. Rochkind 

further asserts that it was error for Dr. Hall-Carrington to opine that lead exposure caused 

Ms. Stevenson’s attentional deficits, hyperactivity, and impulsivity problems based on a 

document that states it cannot be applied to individuals. In essence, these are the same 

arguments that Mr. Rochkind brought in Stevenson I, this time in the context of attentional 

deficits, hyperactivity, and impulsivity as opposed to “ADHD,” specifically.

In the lead up to the Daubert debate, we begin with the legal background.

B. Legal Background: Frye-Reed and Maryland Rule 5-702.

Maryland courts admit expert testimony through two channels—the Frye-Reed

standard and Maryland Rule 5-702. Nominally, the relationship between the channels is 

simple: to be admissible, expert testimony discussing novel scientific theories must meet 

both the minimum threshold Frye-Reed standard and the Rule 5-702 requirements, but 

expert testimony addressing non-novel scientific evidence must only meet the requirements 

of Rule 5-702. Often, however, the relationship between the tests is not so simple. For 

example, what test (or tests) applies when “the underlying data and methods for gathering 

this data are generally accepted in the scientific community but applied to support a novel 

theory[?]” Blackwell, 408 Md. at 596.

Despite decades of jurisprudence on the topic, the Frye-Reed standard—and its 

relationship to Maryland Rule 5-702—holds a confusing grip on Maryland bench and bar. 

What was originally set out in 1978 as a simple test for admissibility has become 
11

increasingly complex with the development of Daubert case law. We begin by chronicling 

the Frye-Reed “greatest hits.”

1. From Frye to Daubert.

In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), this Court, like most state appellate courts to 

consider the issue,4adopted the “general acceptance” test first espoused in Frye v. United 

States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923): for expert testimony predicated on a novel scientific 

principle or discovery to be admissible, the scientific principles or discoveries must be 

generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. For decades thereafter, Maryland 

appellate courts applied Frye-Reed only in novel scientific evidence cases. See, e.g., Kelley 

v. State, 288 Md. 298, 302 (1980) (polygraph); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 678–79

(1983) (hypnosis); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 336 Md. 145, 182–

83 (1994) (surface dust sampling in asbestos cases); Schultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145, 

150–57 (1995) (horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety tests); Keene Corp., Inc. v. Hall, 

96 Md. App. 644, 652–60 (1993) (polarized light microscopy in asbestos cases).

Meanwhile, seventy years after Frye, the Supreme Court of the United States 

adopted a new standard for admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts. In Daubert 

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court held that FRE 702 superseded 

Frye. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). At the time, FRE 702 provided that “a witness qualified as an 

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify . . . in the form 

of an opinion or otherwise” about “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

 

4 See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 382 (1978) (collecting cases).
12

[that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”

The Supreme Court read FRE 702 to mandate a threshold determination as to whether the 

“scientific testimony” at issue is “not only relevant, but reliable.” Id. at 589. On reliability, 

the Supreme Court provided a non-exclusive list of factors that may be pertinent: (1) 

“whether a theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether [it] has been 

subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error”; (4) 

“the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation”; and—

harkening back to Frye—(5) whether it is “general[ly] accepted” within the relevant 

scientific community. Id. at 593–94. The Daubert analysis, according to the Supreme 

Court, was more flexible than the “uncompromising [Frye] ‘general acceptance’ test” and 

gave trial courts greater discretion to admit scientific expert testimony that is relevant and 

founded on sound principles, even though novel or controversial. Id. at 596. 

Four years later, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Supreme Court scrutinized 

epidemiological studies regarding a cause of lung cancer. 522 U.S. 136, 145–46 (1997). 

The Joiner Court held that because none of the studies provided a causal link between the 

chlorine compound and lung cancer, “there is simply too great an analytical gap between 

the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. at 146. The studies therefore did not support the 

expert testimony in that case. Joiner and the “analytical gap” analysis, as discussed below, 

is now a critical piece of Maryland’s Frye-Reed analysis. To complete the “Daubert 
13

trilogy,”5the Supreme Court held in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, that “Daubert’s 

general holding . . . applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also 

to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.” 526 U.S. 137, 141 

(1999).6

A supermajority of jurisdictions have departed from Frye in favor of the flexible 

Daubert approach.7 Maryland stands strong amongst the minority jurisdictions that adhere 

to Frye or a modified Frye test.8 Maryland’s Frye-Reed standard, as it currently stands, is 

 

5 See, e.g., Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 753–56 (D.C. 2016) (describing—as 

others have before it—Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire, as the “Daubert Trilogy”).

6

In 2000, the FRE were amended (in response to Daubert and its progeny, see Fed. R. 

Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note) to include language requiring expert testimony to be 

based on “sufficient facts or data.” The FRE were restyled in 2011 without substantive 

changes. FRE 702 now reads:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 

the case.

7 See Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 178 n.3 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring) (listing 38 

jurisdictions that “have either explicitly adopted Daubert or held that its factors are 

persuasive in evaluating expert witness testimony”). One additional state, Florida, adopted 

Daubert by court order in 2019. In re: Amendments to Fla. Evidence Code, 278 So.3d 551

(Fla. 2019).

8 See id. at 179 n.4 (listing jurisdictions that apply a traditional or modified Frye analysis).
14

broader than it used to be. Some Maryland courts have suggested that Frye-Reed has 

“drift[ed]” toward Daubert in two ways: first, that courts have used Frye-Reed “not only 

to evaluate scientific methods, but also to assess scientific conclusions”; and second, that 

courts have applied Frye-Reed to established, as well as novel, scientific methods. Savage

v. State, 455 Md. 138, 180–81 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring); see Burks v. Allen, 238 Md. 

App. 418, 454–59 (2018); Sissoko v. State, 236 Md. App. 676, 708–09 (2018).

2. The First “Drift”: Scientific Conclusions.

This Court has modified the reach of Frye-Reed to include not only scientific 

methods, but also scientific conclusions. First indicated in Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 

(2002) (holding that an expert’s conclusion that SIDS deaths in a single family are 

genetically related was inadmissible even when based on a reliable statistical method—the 

“product rule”—because there was not general agreement in the medical community for 

such a conclusion), the Court expanded Frye-Reed in a trio of cases. Montgomery Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314 (2007) (“Chesson I”); Blackwell, 408 Md. at 575; 

Chesson v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 434 Md. 346 (2013) (“Chesson II”).

In Chesson I, the Court analyzed the admissibility of an expert medical opinion that 

exposure to mold causes “sick building syndrome.” 399 Md. at 317. Petitioners argued 

that the circuit court erred when it refused to hold a Frye-Reed hearing on the admissibility 

of the expert testimony. Respondents countered that expert opinions concerning the cause 

or origin of a person’s condition are not subject to Frye-Reed. In essence, because the 
15

methods of the expert were not novel, respondents believed that a Frye-Reed analysis was 

unnecessary. We disagreed, noting 

that in cases in which the proper choice of [scientific] techniques was 

dependent on an underlying scientific phenomenon or principle, a court must 

engage in Frye-Reed analysis to determine whether that phenomenon or 

principle is generally accepted in the scientific community and whether the 

proper scientific tests were used to reach the expert’s conclusions.

Id. at 329–30 (citing Wilson, 370 Md. at 203). We held that the expert, offering a novel 

medical conclusion based on underlying generally accepted medical principles, was 

therefore subject to a Frye-Reed hearing.

To reach that conclusion, we distinguished CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Miller, 159 

Md. App. 123 (2004) and Myers v. Celotex Corp., 88 Md. App. 442 (1991). In those cases, 

the Court of Special Appeals held that a Frye-Reed hearing was unnecessary to admit a 

medical expert opinion regarding the origin of a patient’s illness. See CSX, 159 Md. App. 

at 187 (etiology of arthritis); Myers, 88 Md. App. at 458–59 (asbestos causing cancer). The 

difference between those cases and Chesson I, we noted, was that CSX and Myers involved 

generally accepted medical conclusions based on generally accepted medical principles. 

Chesson I, 399 Md. at 331–32.

The “drift” continued in Blackwell, 408 Md. at 575, when we adopted the “analytical 

gap” concept discussed by the Supreme Court in Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. There, we 

conducted a Frye-Reed analysis of the supposed causal relationship between childhood 

vaccines and autism. The “essence” of the issue before us was whether the Frye-Reed test 

applied “to the analysis undertaken by an expert where the underlying data and methods 

for gathering this data are generally accepted in the scientific community but applied to 
16

support a novel theory” of medical causation. Blackwell, 408 Md. at 596. We drew from

federal Daubert decisions because we never “had occasion to scrutinize the analytical 

phase of a scientific process underlying a novel scientific opinion, where the underlying 

data may otherwise be generally accepted in the scientific community.” Id. at 604–05. 

Because generally accepted methodology “must be coupled with generally accepted 

analysis in order to avoid the pitfalls of an ‘analytical gap,’” we concluded that the medical 

expert opinion was not generally accepted in the scientific community notwithstanding a 

basis in generally accepted methods. Id. at 608–09.

We reaffirmed the “analytical gap” concept in Chesson II, noting that although 

“[g]eneral acceptance does not equate to unanimity of opinion within a scientific 

community . . . [a] trial judge [] cannot admit expert testimony based on scientific 

methodology without consideration of whether the analysis itself is flawed and posits an 

‘analytical gap.’” 434 Md. at 356–57 (quoting Blackwell, 408 Md. at 608). On appeal 

from the remand in Chesson I, we held that the “differential diagnosis”9 process—a 

 

9 See Chesson I, 434 Md. at 350 n.2 (“Differential diagnosis, a process critiqued in 

Blackwell[] to prove that thimersol caused autism, was characterized in that case as ‘a 

process of elimination, [and] defined as, “[t]he process of weighing the probability of one 

disease versus that of other diseases possibly accounting for a patient’s illness. The 

differential diagnosis of rhinitis (a runny nose) includes allergic rhinitis (hayfever), the 

abuse of nasal decongestants and, of course, the common cold.”’”).
17

generally accepted diagnostic method—the expert used to reach his causation conclusion, 

was a distortion of that methodology.

The “analytical gap” concept was on display recently in Savage, 455 Md. at 138. In 

that murder case, the defendant sought to bolster his theory of self-defense by expert 

testimony. The expert would have testified that prior traumatic brain injuries could have 

caused the defendant to perceive non-threatening actions as threatening. After a Frye-Reed 

hearing, the circuit court excluded the testimony. On appeal, we affirmed, holding that the 

expert’s “analysis did not bridge the ‘analytical gap’ between the data available to him and 

his ultimate conclusions.” Id. at 158.

We concluded that the expert’s 

ultimate opinions, that “under such conditions of chaos and stress” [the 

defendant] “would be more likely to perceive himself to be facing an 

imminent threat and have greater difficulty controlling his reactions[,]” and 

that “[defendant] views the world through an untrusting and suspicious 

perspective, and often is hyper-vigilant to possible threats[,]” are conclusory. 

* * *

[W]e are unable to conclude that [the expert] adequately “connected the dots” 

between the empirical foundation from his study of [defendant] and the 

[expert’s] ultimate opinions. We emphasize that, in passing on whether there 

exists an “analytical gap” between the data and the expert’s conclusions, we 

may take as given the general acceptance of the expert’s methods.

Id. at 164, 170.

Judge Sally D. Adkins, concurring in Savage, argued that the Court should adopt 

the Daubert standard because the “check for an ‘analytical gap’ has muddied our approach 

to expert testimony.” Id. at 186 (Adkins, J., concurring). In her view, Maryland Rule 5-
18

702 “serves as a sufficient bulwark for preventing shoddy scientific testimony.” We 

discuss Rule 5-702 in greater detail below.

3. The Second “Drift”: New and Old Methods.

In Reed, we adopted the Frye standard, stating that “if a new scientific technique’s 

validity is in controversy in the relevant scientific community, or if it is generally regarded 

as an experimental technique, then expert testimony based upon its validity cannot be 

admitted into evidence.” 283 Md. at 381 (emphasis added). In practice, however, 

Maryland courts have liberalized the standard, applying Frye-Reed “to testimony based on 

any scientific principle—new or old.” Savage, 455 Md. at 180 (Adkins, J., concurring).

For example, in Clemons v. State, we defined a Frye-Reed standard that “makes 

evidence emanating from a novel scientific process inadmissible absent a finding that the 

process is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.” 392 Md. 339, 344, 

365 (2006) (emphasis added). Despite purportedly limiting the standard to “novel 

scientific process[es],” we applied Frye-Reed to comparative bullet lead analysis10—a 

forty-year-old and widely used scientific process. We concluded that the timeworn process 

did not satisfy Frye-Reed “because several fundamental assumptions underlying the 

process are not generally accepted by the scientific community.” Id. at 372. Similarly, in 

State v. Baby, we held that expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome was subject 

to Frye-Reed despite acknowledging that the syndrome was first recognized in 1974. 404 

 

10 Comparative bullet lead analysis is “a three-step process that involves the comparison of 

the elemental composition of bullets in an effort to determine whether different bullets 

originated from the same vat of lead.” Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 347 (2006).
19

Md. 220, 271 (2008). “Thus, like Daubert, we have implicitly recognized that a trial 

judge’s gatekeeping function should not be limited to new scientific theories—old ‘junk 

science’ should be kept out of our courts as well.” Savage, 455 Md. at 180 (Adkins, J., 

concurring).

Still, “[d]espite our repeated assertions that Frye-Reed applies only to new scientific 

methods, we have never defined what constitutes a new or novel scientific method. We 

have never held that a scientific method is not subject to Frye-Reed because it is not new.” 

Id. at 181 n.5 (citations omitted) (citing Chesson I, 399 Md. at 327 (explaining that FryeReed requires a party to “establish first that any novel scientific method is reliable and 

accepted generally in the scientific community before the court will admit expert testimony 

based upon [it]” (citation omitted)); Clemons, 392 Md. at 363 (explaining that Reed

adopted a standard for the admission of “novel scientific techniques”); Wilson, 370 Md. at

201 (“[P]rior to the admission of expert testimony based on the application of new 

scientific techniques, it must be first established that the particular scientific method is 

itself reliable.” (citation omitted))). 

It is also well established that trial courts may take judicial notice when a scientific 

method is broadly and generally accepted. Chesson I, 399 Md. at 327; Wilson, 370 Md. at

201 (“Where the validity and reliability of a scientific technique is so broadly and generally 

accepted within the scientific community, as is the case of ballistic tests, blood tests, and 

the like, a trial court may take judicial notice of its reliability.” (citation omitted)). Given 

that “general acceptance” is the hallmark of Frye-Reed, our suggestion that trial courts take 

judicial notice of generally accepted methods implies that all scientific testimony is, in 
20

some sense, subject to Frye-Reed. In Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., for example, we stated that 

a Frye-Reed analysis is required “only when the proposed expert testimony involves a 

‘novel scientific method,’” yet we took judicial notice of the scientific method’s general 

acceptance:

We may take judicial notice from our own decisions that the scientific 

community accepts the proposition that exposure to asbestos may cause 

mesothelioma. That is not a novel scientific principle. More than 20 years 

ago . . . we flatly rejected the assertion that mesothelioma cannot be caused 

by exposure to chrysotile asbestos. Thus, [the expert’s] opinion that 

exposure to chrysotile asbestos in Ford brakes may cause mesothelioma also 

is not a novel scientific principle.

433 Md. 137, 149–50 (2013) (footnote omitted).

We acknowledge, as we have done on several occasions, that the modern Frye-Reed 

standard is not what it was when we adopted the test in 1978.

4. Maryland Rule 5-702.

Upon recommendation of the Rules Committee, this Court adopted Rule 5-702 in 

1994, a year after the Supreme Court issued the opinion in Daubert: 

Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 

the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that 

determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified 

as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the 

appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) 

whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.

In adopting our counterpart to FRE 702, we blessed a Committee Note that stated that Rule 

5-702 was not intended to overrule Reed or other cases adopting the Frye standard, and 

that “[t]he required scientific foundation for the admission of novel scientific techniques 
21

or principles is left to development through case law.” Comm. Note to Md. Rule 5-702; 

see Burral v. State, 352 Md. 707, 738 (1999). 

In Stevenson I, we closely examined the third prong of Rule 5-70211—sufficient 

factual basis. 454 Md. at 286. Judge Adkins, writing for the Court, noted that “sufficient 

factual basis” includes two sub-elements: (1) an adequate supply of data; and (2) a reliable 

methodology. Id. (citing Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 42–43 (2015); Exxon Mobil Corp. 

v. Ford, 433 Md. 426, 478 (2013)). Absent either element, the opinion is “mere speculation 

or conjecture.” Id. (quoting Exxon, 433 Md. at 478). Because we held that Dr. HallCarrington’s causation opinion lacked an adequate supply of data, we did not reach the 

reliable methodology element. We also declined to address the second question on 

certiorari—whether the circuit court should have held a Frye-Reed hearing—because our 

Rule 5-702 conclusion was dispositive. See Sissoko, 236 Md. App. at 713 (discussing 

Stevenson I and noting that “expert opinion testimony that does not satisfy the criteria for 

admissibility under Rule 5-702 is not admissible even if it satisfies the Frye-Reed general 

acceptance test”).

One month later, Judge Adkins issued her concurrence in Savage. On Rule 5-702, 

Judge Adkins pointed to Blackwell to describe the duplicity of applying Frye-Reed to Rule 

5-702:

In Blackwell’s Frye-Reed discussion, we acknowledged that 

“reliability . . . affect[s] whether a scientific theory is accepted in the field in 

which it is offered.” 408 Md. at 584, 971 A.2d 235. We turned to federal 

 

11 Like the present case, the first two prongs of the Rule 5-702 analysis—witness 

qualification and appropriateness—were not at issue in that appeal. 
22

case law to define the contours of this term because of Daubert’s emphasis 

on reliable expert testimony. Id. at 604–07, 971 A.2d 235, 260. We 

concluded that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible under Frye-Reed, in 

part, because his research was not “based upon sound methodology.” Id. at 

609, 971 A.2d 235, 260. Thus, our evaluation of whether a conclusion was 

generally accepted included inquiry as to whether the methodology used was 

reliable—one of the 5-702(3) subfactors. See Roy, 445 Md. at 42–43, 124 

A.3d 169. Accordingly, to determine the admissibility of expert testimony 

under our direction in Blackwell, a trial court may have to analyze the 

reliability of an expert’s methodology twice—once under Frye-Reed and 

again under Rule 5-702(3). Adopting the Daubert approach and confining 

our evaluation of scientific expert testimony to the requirements of Rule 5-

702 would eliminate this repetition.

Savage, 455 Md. at 184 (Adkins, J., concurring) (omissions and alterations in original). 

Thus, according to the concurrence, “[t]he evolution of our Frye-Reed doctrine to both 

maintain the general acceptance test and include a check for an “analytical gap” has 

muddied our approach to expert testimony.” Id. at 186. Judge Adkins suggested that the 

Court use its discretion under Rule 8-131(a)12 to adopt Daubert. In doing so, she 

distinguished Savage from the majority opinion in Stevenson I:

Acknowledging our implicit adoption of Daubert would not only be 

“desirable to guide the trial court” in this case but would also provide clarity 

to Maryland courts. See Md. Rule 8-131(a). Furthermore, unlike [Stevenson 

I], our most recent case addressing the admissibility of scientific expert 

testimony, we can only dispose of the case at hand by applying Frye-Reed. 

In [Stevenson I], we declined to address the parties’ arguments regarding 

Frye-Reed and instead held that the expert testimony was inadmissible under 

Rule 5-702 because the petitioner had appealed the trial court’s 

determination as to both standards. Here, Savage only challenges the 

exclusion of [the expert’s] testimony under Frye-Reed.

 

12

“Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears 

by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide 

such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and 

delay of another appeal.” Md. Rule 8-131(a).
23

Savage, 455 Md. at 175 n.1 (Adkins, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 

Most recently, in Sugarman v. Liles, another opinion authored by Judge Adkins, we 

revisited the same EPA-ISA papers at issue in Stevenson I and the present case. 460 Md. 

396 (2018). Unlike Stevenson I, we held that the EPA-ISA supplied a sufficient factual 

basis under Rule 5-702(3) for a pediatrician’s general causation opinion that elevated blood 

lead levels can cause deficits in auditory encoding and processing speed. In so holding, 

we discussed extrajurisdictional cases that address the “analytical gap” concept, including 

King v. Burlington North Santa Fe Railroad Co., 762 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 2009). In that case, 

the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed a trial court order excluding an expert’s opinion 

that exposure to diesel exhaust fumes had caused the plaintiff’s late husband to develop a 

blood cancer, because the expert relied upon epidemiological studies that did not “draw 

definitive conclusions on causation.” King, 762 N.W.2d at 48. 

In Sugarman, we cited King with approval, explaining that an expert may rely on 

scientific studies that do not make “definite conclusions of a causal relationship,” so long 

as they are “qualified to interpret and extrapolate from the relevant studies.” Sugarman, 

460 Md. at 427. Thus, the pediatrician expert witness was permitted to extrapolate from 

the EPA-ISA that exposure to lead can cause attention decrements to opine that it also 

could cause slower processing speed and auditory encoding deficits, which were “factors 

of attention.” Id. at 428.

Once again, we distinguished that case from Stevenson I:

There, the expert lacked “epidemiological studies—or other reliable 

evidence—demonstrating a causal link between lead exposure and ADHD” 

but nonetheless offered a causation opinion. A causal relationship between 
24

lead exposure and some symptoms of ADHD did not warrant testimony 

linking the two. The symptoms, we observed, were present in a “variety of 

other disorders and learning disabilities.” ADHD, however, has precise 

diagnostic criteria and requires ruling out other behavioral disorders. 

Further, the EPA-ISA emphasized other potential confounding factors that 

undermined Dr. Hall-Carrington’s opinion. The EPA-ISA could not support 

her opinion because the studies discussed therein “only reveal an association 

between lead exposure and ADHD.” Her opinion lacked an adequate factual 

basis because the source did not logically support her conclusion. 

Here, by contrast, the EPA-ISA identified a causal relationship 

between attention decrements and exposure to lead. Unlike in [Stevenson I], 

none of the experts opined that Liles has a diagnosable learning disability or 

behavioral disorder. [The pediatrician] explained lead’s impact on a 

developing brain, including the way it affects attention. She offered the 

opinion that Liles suffered from the kind of generalized attention deficits the 

EPA-ISA identified as being caused by lead exposure. Because [the 

pediatrician’s] opinion testimony does not suffer the same defects as were 

present in [Stevenson I], we hold that she had a sufficient factual basis to 

offer an opinion regarding general causation.

Id. at 428–29 (emphasis and citations omitted). The dissent in Sugarman disagreed, instead 

suggesting that “this case suffers a somewhat distinct, but nonetheless significant, 

analytical gap as was present in” Stevenson I. Id. at 450 (Getty, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part).

We have therefore held, under our Frye-Reed jurisprudence, that the EPA-ISA 

epidemiological studies can provide a sufficient factual basis to offer an expert opinion as 

to general causation of attention decrements. Regardless of whether we apply Daubert or 

the modern Frye-Reed standard, the question then becomes: is this specific causation case

a Stevenson I case, where the analytical gap was too vast, or a Sugarman case where the 

analytical gap was sufficiently bridged? We do not answer that question, but remand the 

case for a hearing on the subject applying the Daubert standard we adopt today.
25

C. We Adopt Daubert.

Maryland’s “jurisprudential drift” has led to a duplicative analytical process and 

“muddied” the waters of our approach to expert testimony. Savage, 455 Md. at 186, 187 

(Adkins, J., concurring). Instead of perpetuating a process wherein expert testimony must 

pass through Frye-Reed and Rule 5-702, we implement a single standard by which courts 

evaluate all expert testimony: Daubert. Courts, practitioners, and scholars alike have 

grappled with the advantages and disadvantages of the Daubert standard over the decades 

since the Supreme Court first articulated the factored test. Because our decision today is a 

substantial departure from our Frye-Reed jurisprudence, we explain the reasons that guide 

us. 

1. The Circuit Court Abused Its Discretion.

The circuit court did not contemplate any of the above legal considerations. Instead, 

the court relied solely on the opinion in Stevenson I. The determination in Stevenson I that 

Dr. Hall-Carrington could not testify that lead generally or specifically caused ADHD—

and the analysis thereto—led the circuit court to properly conclude that Dr. Hall-Carrington 

could testify that lead can cause attention decrements, hyperactivity, and impulsivity in the 

general population. But it does not follow, merely based on the Stevenson I opinion, that 

the EPA-ISA supports a finding that lead specifically caused Ms. Stevenson’s attention 

decrements, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. 

As a practical matter, the circuit court erred by refusing to hold a Rule 5-702 hearing 

at which Dr. Hall-Carrington could explain, and Mr. Rochkind could cross-examine, the 

specific causation methodology that is the subject of this appeal. Rather than conduct an 
26

evidentiary hearing to analyze the methodology employed by Dr. Hall-Carrington, the 

circuit court stated that based on its reading of the opinion in Stevenson I that Dr. HallCarrington could render the same opinions, as in Stevenson I, so long as she did not use the 

term “ADHD.” Mr. Rochkind objected, noting that (1) the Court never reached the specific 

causation issue in Stevenson I; and (2) Dr. Hall-Carrington had no methodology to render 

such an opinion. Mr. Rochkind thereafter filed additional briefing and an extensive written 

offer of proof in support of his objection. When the court denied the motion for a pretrial

hearing, Mr. Rochkind was compelled to challenge Dr. Hall-Carrington’s methodology in 

front of the jury. This placed Mr. Rochkind in exactly the situation a pretrial hearing is 

designed to prevent. See Blackwell, 408 Md. at 591, 594 n. 13 (describing pre-trial 

evidentiary hearing contemplated under Maryland law to challenge expert testimony and 

reasons therefor); Savage, 455 Md. at 170 (noting that experts should not be connecting 

the dots in front of jury).

The circuit court abused its discretion by not holding a Rule 5-702 hearing. Given 

that we are remanding the case so that the circuit court can conduct a hearing pursuant to 

Maryland Rule 5-702, as part of the remand, the circuit court should consider 

the Daubert standard adopted herein.
27

2. The “Right” Case.

Ms. Stevenson maintains that the instant case is not the “appropriate catalyst” for 

this Court to abandon the Frye-Reed standard in favor of the Daubert standard. We 

disagree.13

The standard by which expert testimony is evaluated is judicially determined by this 

Court. Within our purview, as charged by the Maryland Constitution, is our duty to “adopt 

rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure” in Maryland courts.14 With 

this duty, we have adopted Maryland Rule 5-702. When this Court effects a change to the 

common law, as it does today, the Maryland Rules undergo revision to reflect such change. 

We are not bound to the Rules when the need to alter common law arises. Indeed, the 1994 

 

13 Notwithstanding the fact that this Court granted certiorari to answer the very question of 

whether to adopt Daubert, the Dissent also argues that “[t]his case is plainly not the case

in which to entertain” adopting Daubert. Dissenting Slip Op. at 14. The Dissent relies on

an interaction between the circuit court and Mr. Rochkind’s counsel to conclude that 

“Rochkind’s counsel explicitly agreed with the circuit court that a Frye-Reed hearing was 

not appropriate under the[se] circumstances.” Id. After a full reading of the record, 

however, we are satisfied that up until that point, Mr. Rochkind sufficiently pursued a FryeReed hearing. Mr. Rochkind presented his Frye-Reed arguments several times over. Prior 

to the interaction quoted by the Dissent, Mr. Rochkind’s counsel filed a motion and argued 

several times at the motions hearing that a Frye-Reed hearing was needed. Only at a later 

hearing did counsel for Mr. Rochkind concede that a Rule 5-702 hearing would be 

sufficient. We therefore find unavailing the Dissent’s argument that the principles of FryeReed were not before the circuit court because “it was clear that [the] case was decided

under Maryland Rule 5-702, not under Frye-Reed.” Id. at 15. A “Frye-Reed hearing was 

not appropriate” only because the circuit said so, not for lack of preservation. See id. at 

14; see also Md. Rule 8-131(a).

14 Md. Const., Art. IV, Section 18(a) (“The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt 

rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of 

the appellate courts and in the other courts of this State, which shall have the force of law 

until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law.”).
28

Committee Note accompanying Rule 5-702 confirms as much: “[t]he required scientific 

foundation for the admission of novel scientific techniques or principles is left to 

development through case law.” The time has now come to plot a new course, overruling 

our Frye-Reed jurisprudence and finding Daubert factors persuasive, with regard to the 

analysis of expert testimony.

Surely, our decision today implicates the doctrine of stare decisis. “Latin for ‘to 

stand by things [that are] decided,’” stare decisis ordinarily requires that a court “follow 

earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Kazadi v. State, 

467 Md. 1, 27 (2020) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). However, the 

doctrine “is not an inexorable command.” Savage, 455 Md. at 186 (Adkins, J., concurring)

(quoting Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51, 65 (2016)). This Court has articulated two 

circumstances where a departure from the doctrine of stare decisis is permissible: “(1) 

when the prior decision is clearly wrong and contrary to established principles[;] or (2) 

when the precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conover, 450 Md. at 65). Over the last forty 

years, Maryland’s appellate courts have considerably modified the Frye-Reed standard. 

The Frye-Reed of 1978 is markedly different than the “Frye-Reed Plus” of 2020. With 

Daubert, and eventually Joiner and Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court disavowed the Frye

standard for the more flexible Daubert approach. A supermajority of our sister 
29

jurisdictions followed suit. Clearly, a significant change in the law has occurred, 

permitting us to depart from stare decisis and adopt the Daubert standard in this instance.

15

 

15 The Dissent and Ms. Stevenson argue that if Maryland is to adopt Daubert, the Rules

Committee, rather than this Court, should be the body to do so. Yet, we resist the call to

refer this matter to the Rules Committee for several reasons. As discussed above and noted

by the 1994 Committee Note to Rule 5-702, “[t]he required scientific foundation for the

admission of novel scientific techniques or principles is left to development through case

law.” Of course, at that time, the Rules Committee was referring to the FryeReed standard. Yet, in the same Committee Note, the Rules Committee explicitly

acknowledged Daubert, and made sure to indicate that Rule 5-702 is not intended to

overrule Frye-Reed. We glean from the Note that the Rules Committee

considered Daubert in 1994, but left it to this Court to change the standard applied to

scientific testimony.

Adopting Daubert is in line with our longstanding view that Maryland’s courts look to

federal cases when interpreting analogous federal rules. See Bartell v. Bartell, 278 Md. 12,

18 (1976). Rule 5-702 was adopted in 1994 to track FRE 702. See Hutton v. State, 339

Md. 480, 494 n.10 (1995); see also Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 523

n.13 (2000) (observing that Maryland’s “case law is consistent with the [2000]

amendments to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,” which expressly

adopted Daubert).

In part, the Dissent suggests that the Rules Committee is the more appropriate forum to

study the potential impact the Daubert standard will have on “African American people,

people of color, or people of limited financial means.” Dissenting Slip Op. at

18; see Andrew W. Jurs and Scott DeVito, A Tale of Two Dauberts: Discriminatory Effects

of Scientific Reliability Screening, 79 Ohio St. L.J. 1107, 1144 (2018). We do not reject

the seriousness of this contention. We do, however, note other scholarly research coming

to the opposite conclusion. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or

Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev. 471, 503

(2005) (“[A] state’s choice of scientific admissibility standard does not have a statistically

significant effect . . . [and] a state’s adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in

practice.”). This Court is well suited to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of

modifying our approach to any area of the law—as we often do. That this change

implicates our interpretation of the Maryland Rules does not necessitate a referral to the

Rules Committee.
30

3. Daubert: Generally Accepted by the Supermajority of Jurisdictions.

Judge Adkins’ concurring opinion in Savage blazed the trail for this Court’s 

adoption of the Daubert standard. Considering the breadth of scholarly arguments 

supporting and discounting the Daubert standard, and Maryland’s prolonged—albeit 

nominal at times—adherence to the Frye-Reed standard, we now explain our decision to 

join the supermajority of sister states and the federal courts on this issue.

We recognize that this Court’s jurisprudence has implicitly embraced portions of 

the Daubert standard in the Frye-Reed analysis without expressly stating that fact. See 

supra at 14–20. Recognizing our “drift,” we agree with Mr. Rochkind that retaining a 

Frye-Reed standard, yet encouraging trial courts to seek guidance from federal cases 

applying the Daubert standard, may generate some confusion.

The impetus behind our decision to adopt Daubert is our desire to refine the 

analytical focus when a court is faced with admitting or excluding expert testimony. This 

becomes especially important in modern society, which routinely confronts emerging 

technologies that challenge the efficacy of Frye. Frye centered on whether scientific 

principles or discoveries were generally accepted in a relevant scientific community. Yet,

using acceptance as the only measure of reliability presents a conundrum: a generally 

accepted methodology may produce “bad science” and be admitted, while a methodology 

not yet accepted may be excluded, even if it produces “good science.” See Motorola Inc. 

v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 756 (D.C. 2016). General acceptance remains an important 

consideration in the reliability analysis, but it cannot remain the sole consideration. See 

Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“While ‘[w]idespread 
31

acceptance can be an important factor’ in an assessment of reliability . . . after Daubert and 

Kumho [Tire], the inquiry does not necessarily end there. The lesson of the Supreme 

Court’s rejection of ‘general acceptance’ as the sole standard for expert testimony, in favor 

of the Daubert-Kumho reliability standard is that ‘widespread use’ or ‘general acceptance’ 

is an imperfect proxy for reliability.” (internal citation omitted)).

Daubert, by contrast, refocuses the attention away from acceptance of a given 

methodology—although that is not totally removed from the calculus—and centers on the 

reliability of the methodology used to reach a particular result. “The ability to focus on the 

reliability of principles and methods, and their application, is a decided advantage that will 

lead to better decision-making by juries and trial judges alike.” Motorola, 147 A.3d at 757.

In this regard, the analysis by the Honorable Paul W. Grimm in United States v. 

Horn is enlightening. There, Judge Grimm explained:

Under Daubert, the parties and the trial court are forced to reckon with the 

factors that really do determine whether the evidence is reliable, relevant 

and “fits” the case at issue. Focusing on the tests used to develop the 

evidence, the error rates involved, what the learned publications in the field 

have said when evaluating it critically, and then, finally, whether it has come 

be generally accepted, is a difficult task. But, if undertaken as intended, it 

does expose evidentiary weaknesses that otherwise would be overlooked if, 

following the dictates of Frye, all that is needed to admit the evidence is the 

testimony of one or more experts in the field that the evidence at issue derives 

from methods or procedures that have become generally accepted.

185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 553 (D. Md. 2002) (emphasis added). “The principle shortcoming of

Frye,” Judge Grimm continued, “was that it excused the court from even having to try to 

understand the evidence at issue.” Id. (citation omitted). Instead, a Frye court “only had

to assure itself that among the people involved in the field, the technique was acceptable
32

as reliable.” Id. (quoting 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal 

Evidence, § 702.05[1] (2d ed. 1997)). This rationale leads to a troubling result:

given the impact of the stare decisis doctrine, once a court, relying on Frye, 

had ruled that a doctrine or principle had attained general acceptance, it was

all to[o] easy for subsequent courts simply to follow suit. Before long, a 

body of case law could develop stating that a methodology had achieved 

general acceptance without there ever having been a contested, detailed 

examination of the underpinnings of that methodology.

Id.; see supra at 19 (discussing this phenomenon in Maryland).

Other courts applying a variant of Frye have observed different flaws. The D.C. 

Court of Appeals noted that Frye “is not a good gatekeeper for inductive sciences such as 

epidemiology or psychology.” Motorola, 147 A.3d at 756. The Supreme Court of Alaska, 

in adopting the Daubert standard, concluded that the Frye standard “is both unduly 

restrictive and unduly permissive.” State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999). The 

Frye standard “excludes scientifically reliable evidence which is not yet generally 

accepted, and admits scientifically unreliable evidence which although generally accepted, 

cannot meet rigorous scientific scrutiny.” Id. at 393–94. For this reason, we tend to agree 

with the Supreme Court of Connecticut: “an admissibility test for scientific evidence 

premised solely on its ‘general acceptance’ is conceptually flawed and therefore must be 

rejected.” State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 750 (Conn. 1997) (emphasis in original).

Our Frye-Reed jurisprudence gave trial courts a stated “end”—reliable 

methodology—without providing the “means” to achieve it. In Exxon, we observed that 

“[t]o constitute reliable methodology, ‘an expert opinion must provide a sound reasoning 

process for inducing its conclusion from the factual data’ and must have ‘an adequate 
33

theory or rational explanation of how the factual data led to the expert’s conclusion.’” 433 

Md. at 481 (citation omitted). The Daubert factors provide guidance on how to determine 

if scientific reasoning is, indeed, sound, or a scientific theory adequately justifies an 

expert’s conclusion.

Daubert is not beyond reproach. Ms. Stevenson levels several criticisms against 

Daubert, none of which we find sufficiently persuasive to perpetuate our Frye-Reed

jurisprudence. Still, we address Ms. Stevenson’s arguments against adopting Daubert and

use the opportunity to provide Maryland trial courts with additional guidance on how to 

implement this new-to-Maryland standard.

Ms. Stevenson contends that the Daubert standard enables judges to become 

“arbiters of scientific knowledge” and “usurp[] the role of juries.” She argues that the 

standard “sanction[s] judges to exclude from consideration opposing, yet legitimate 

opinions of experts, that . . . are for a jury to weigh credibility.” We do not foresee the 

same gloomy outlook. Under Daubert, judges are charged with gauging only the threshold 

reliability—not the ultimate validity—of a particular methodology or theory. Ms. 

Stevenson appears to believe that the inclusion of expert’s testimony will lead to the 

exclusion of another; however, this simply is not true. As we shall demonstrate, it is often 

helpful to turn to FRE 702 and the associated Advisory Committee Note to understand 

Daubert’s application. “When a trial court, applying [FRE 702], rules that an expert’s 

testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is 

unreliable. [FRE 702] is broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing 

principles or methods in the same field of expertise.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory 
34

Committee Note (emphasis added and citation omitted). Indeed, under this approach to 

expert testimony, juries will continue to weigh competing, but still reliable, testimony.

Ms. Stevenson relies in part on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring and dissenting 

opinion in Daubert to argue that adopting this standard requires judges to take on the role 

of amateur scientists. Like other courts that have considered this argument, however, we 

reject it in kind. “Under Daubert, trial judges are not required to make a determination of 

the ultimate scientific validity of any scientific propositions. Instead, they need only make 

a much more limited inquiry: whether sufficient indicia of legitimacy exist to support the 

conclusion that evidence derived from the principle may be profitably considered by a fact 

finder at trial.” Porter, 698 A.2d at 757; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 

Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added) (“[A] judge does not have 

to be trained in science to evaluate the reliability of a theory or technique.”). We are 

confident that trial judges are duly capable of undertaking the reliability analysis absent 

scientific training.

Ms. Stevenson further argues that Daubert’s abuse of discretion standard and 

inherent flexibility of the Daubert factors will lead to inconsistent results. We recognize, 

like the D.C. Court of Appeals, that with Daubert’s flexibility, “[s]ome inconsistency is 

inevitable.” Motorola, 147 A.3d at 756. The Supreme Court of Connecticut described 

“Daubert’s indefiniteness not as a flaw, but as a necessity” in concluding that “a test 

embodying a general, overarching approach to the threshold admissibility of scientific 

evidence . . . giv[es] trial courts a workable principle to follow.” Porter, 698 A.2d at 751–

52. We remain persuaded that a marginal amount of inconsistency is preferable given that 
35

this standard will “more accurately distinguish ‘good science’ from ‘bad science’ than 

Frye’s general acceptance test.” Savage, 455 Md. at 185 (Adkins, J., concurring) (quoting 

Motorola, 147 A.3d at 756).

As delayed as Maryland is in joining the supermajority of states and federal courts 

to adopt the Daubert standard, we do so now with the added benefit of hindsight. As one 

court remarked, Daubert’s application in the federal courts did not “work a sea change over 

federal evidence law.” United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less Situated in 

Leflore Cty., State of Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996). Nor are we convinced that 

adopting this standard in Maryland will upend Maryland evidence law. Instead, Maryland 

courts will be able to “draw from and contribute to the broad base of case law grappling 

with scientific testimony.” Savage, 455 Md. at 185 (Adkins, J., concurring). This will give 

our courts a decided advantage when faced with emerging technologies we cannot yet 

foresee.

Our adoption of Daubert will streamline the evaluation of scientific expert 

testimony under Rule 5-702. As Judge Adkins indicated in Savage, our discussion in 

Blackwell required trial courts “to analyze the reliability of an expert’s methodology

twice—once under Frye-Reed and again under Rule 5-702(3).” Savage, 455 Md. at 184 

(Adkins, J., concurring). Adopting Daubert eliminates the duplicative analysis and permits 

trial courts to evaluate all expert testimony—scientific or otherwise—under Rule 5-702.

4. Applying Daubert.

To complete our “jurisprudential drift”—once and for all—we set forth the Daubert

factors we find persuasive in interpreting Rule 5-702. They include, but are not limited to:
36

(1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested;

(2) whether a theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and 

publication;

(3) whether a particular scientific technique has a known or potential rate of 

error;

(4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and

(5) whether a theory or technique is generally accepted.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94 (cleaned up); Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee Note. 

In addition to these factors, courts have developed additional factors for determining 

whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable. These factors include:

(6) whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally 

and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the 

litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for 

purposes of testifying;

(7) whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted 

premise to an unfounded conclusion;

(8) whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative 

explanations;

(9) whether the expert is being as careful as he [or she] would be in his [or 

her] regular professional work outside his [or her] paid litigation consulting; 

and

(10) whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach 

reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give.

Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee Note (cleaned up).

The Supreme Court’s guidance in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire is critical to a 

trial court’s reliability analysis. Daubert made abundantly clear that the inquiry is “a 

flexible one.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. “The focus, of course, must be solely on 
37

principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595. Yet, 

Joiner clarified that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one 

another.” 522 U.S. at 146. A trial court must also consider the relationship between the 

methodology applied and conclusion reached. Indeed, “[t]rained experts commonly 

extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 

Evidence requires a [trial] court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing 

data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Id. “A court may conclude that there is simply 

too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id.

Kumho Tire, as noted above, extended Daubert’s application to all expert testimony. 

526 U.S. at 141 (“Daubert’s general holding . . . applies not only to testimony based on 

‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’

knowledge.”). Kumho Tire also made clear that

a trial court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that 

Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony’s 

reliability. But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is 

“flexible,” and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor 

exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a 

[trial] court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine 

reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination.

Id. at 141–42 (emphasis in original). Simply put, all of the Daubert factors are relevant to 

determining the reliability of expert testimony, yet no single factor is dispositive in the 

analysis. A trial court may apply some, all, or none of the factors depending on the 

particular expert testimony at issue. Savage, 455 Md. at 184 (Adkins, J., concurring) (“[A] 

a trial court is not required to consider any or all of the Daubert factors in making its 

reliability determination.”).
38

Applying Daubert factors to our interpretation of Rule 5-702 and eliminating FryeReed provides a simpler, more straightforward analysis of expert testimony. There is no 

longer a need to distinguish new or novel techniques or determine if testimony embraces a 

“scientific technique.” Just as this process provides a flexible structure for trial courts, so 

too does it guide appellate courts reviewing the admission or exclusion of expert testimony. 

Instead of maintaining two separate, and potentially outcome determinative, standards of 

review—de novo for Frye-Reed and abuse of discretion for Rule 5-702—all expert 

testimony is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.16 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143 

(“[T]he question of admissibility of expert testimony is . . . reviewable under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard.”).

5. Final Thoughts.

In light of our comments on applying Daubert, supra at 33–36, we offer a few 

thoughts for judges who will shoulder the implementation of this new-to-Maryland 

evidentiary standard. Much of the discussion above does not upend a trial court’s 

gatekeeping function. “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, 

and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 

 

16 Ms. Stevenson suggests that Frye-Reed’s de novo standard of review ensures consistency

because “[t]he science is either generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific 

community or it is not.” Yet, this misses the mark. Ms. Stevenson conflates consistency 

with complacency. To the extent that Frye-Reed rulings were consistent, it is due to the 

ability of a later court to take judicial notice of a methodology’s general acceptance. We 

reject this type of “consistency.” Instead, we task trial courts with analyzing the reliability 

of testimony posed to it, without the notion that because a court has accepted it before, it 

shall be accepted again.
39

attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. 596 (citation omitted). To 

the extent that our decision necessitates change in Maryland courts, we fully endorse Judge 

Grimm’s observations in Horn. The shift to Daubert

may mean, in a very real sense, that “everything old is new again” with 

respect to some scientific and technical evidentiary matters long considered

settled.

* * *

[J]udges, lawyers and expert witnesses will have to learn to be comfortable

refocusing their thinking about the building blocks of what truly makes 

evidence that is beyond the knowledge and experience of lay persons useful 

to them in resolving disputes. The beneficiaries of this new approach will be

the jurors that have to decide increasingly complex cases. Daubert, Kumho 

Tire, and now Rule 702 have given us our marching orders, and it is up to 

the participants in the litigation process to get in step.

Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 554–55. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the significant changes in the law concerning expert testimony, as 

established by Daubert and its progeny, we adopt the Daubert standard in Maryland

because we find those factors persuasive in interpreting Maryland Rule 5-702. Since 

Daubert is a new interpretation of Rule 5-702, our decision today “applies to this case and 

any other cases that are pending on direct appeal when this opinion is filed, where the 

relevant question has been preserved for appellate review.” Kazadi, 467 Md. at 47; 

Hackney v. State, 459 Md. 108, 119 (2018); State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 77 n.26 (2011). 

In this context, the “relevant question” is whether a trial court erred in admitting or 

excluding expert testimony under Maryland Rule 5-702 or Frye-Reed. Therefore, to apply
40

this new evidentiary standard, we remand this case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 

for further proceedings.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED.

CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT 

FOR PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND A 

NEW TRIAL CONSISTENT WITH THIS 

OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY

APPELLEE/PETITIONER.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 47

September Term, 2019

______________________________________

STANLEY ROCHKIND

v.

STARLENA STEVENSON

______________________________________

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Getty

Booth

Biran

Greene, Clayton, Jr., (Senior 

Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J., which Hotten 

and Greene, JJ., join.

______________________________________

Filed: August 28, 2020

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 24-C-11-008722

Argued: February 7, 2020
Respectfully, I dissent. I disagree with the adoption of the Daubertstandard, derived 

from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Maj. Slip 

Op. at 2, 39. I would hold that the issue of whether or not to move from the Frye-Reed

analysis and adopt the Daubert standard for the admissibility of expert testimony in 

Maryland is not a matter that the Court should decide in this case, i.e., this case is not the

proper one in which to make such a change. And, I disagree with the majority opinion that 

the case should be remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for application of the 

Daubert standard. See Maj. Slip Op. at 39. I would hold that the circuit court did not abuse

its discretion in admitting the testimony of Cecilia Hall-Carrington, M.D., and that the 

testimony satisfied the requirements of Maryland Rule 5-702, without the need to resort to 

the application of Frye-Reed or Daubert. The circuit court did not evaluate the 

admissibility of Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony under either Frye-Reed or Daubert, but

instead addressed the matter only under Maryland Rule 5-702. Adopting the Daubert

standard at this time for use in this case would change the analysis of the case on remand 

when nothing about the case warrants such a change and no change in existing law is 

necessary.

At the outset, it would be helpful to discuss the different standards pertaining to the 

admissibility of expert testimony. In general, Maryland Rule 5-702 governs the 

admissibility of expert testimony and provides:

Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 

the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that 

determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified 

as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the 
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appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) 

whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.

The third prong—sufficient factual basis—has been interpreted to include two sub-factors: 

an adequate supply of data and a reliable methodology with which to analyze the data. See

Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 42-43, 124 A.3d 169, 180 (2015).

In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), this Court adopted the standard 

set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Frye 

v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), setting forth a requirement for the 

admissibility of expert testimony that is based on a novel scientific method. Under the

standard known as the Frye-Reed analysis, a trial court must determine as a threshold 

matter whether a novel scientific method is generally accepted within the relevant scientific 

community before testimony based on that method can be admitted. See Reed, 283 Md. at 

381, 389, 391 A.2d at 368, 372; see also Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 433 Md. 137, 149-50, 

70 A.3d 328, 335 (2013) (“A Frye/Reed analysis is required, as a prerequisite to the 

application of Rule 5-702, only when the proposed expert testimony involves a ‘novel 

scientific method,’ in which event there must be some assurance that the novel method has 

gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.”). In such 

circumstances, the trial court conducts a Frye-Reed hearing, which is a “pretrial hearing at 

which the proponent of the scientific evidence must establish such general acceptance if 

the admissibility of the evidence is challenged.” Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180, 184 n.1, 

152 A.3d 712, 714 n.1 (2017).

By contrast, federal courts and a number of States utilize the Daubert approach, 
- 3 -

derived from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, for the 

admissibility of expert testimony on scientific matters. In Daubert, id. at 588, relying on 

the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Rule 

702 did not “establish[] ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.” 

At that time, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governing expert testimony provided: “If 

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 

opinion or otherwise.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. The Supreme Court held that Rule 702’s 

standards, not the general acceptance standard set forth in Frye, should be applied with 

respect to the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 

The Supreme Court explained that, before admitting expert testimony on scientific matters, 

a trial court must determine as a preliminary matter, “whether the reasoning or 

methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and [] whether that reasoning 

or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 592-93.

The Supreme Court provided “general observations” about how a trial court should 

assess the validity and reliability of scientific expert testimony, and set forth the following 

factors: (1) “whether a theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether 

the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known 

or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 

technique’s operation”; and (4) “general acceptance.” Id. at 593-94 (cleaned up). As to 

“general acceptance,” the Supreme Court pointed out that “[a] reliability assessment does 
- 4 -

not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific 

community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that 

community.” Id. at 594 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court explained that the approach it 

set forth under Rule 702 is “a flexible one” and “[t]he focus . . . must be solely on the 

principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 594-95.

The Supreme Court has since elaborated on the Daubert analysis. In General 

Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997), the Supreme Court rejected the contention 

that Daubert only permits a trial court to evaluate the methodology of studies and not an 

expert’s conclusions. The Supreme Court explained: “Trained experts commonly 

extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 

Evidence requires a [trial] court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing 

data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Id. The Supreme Court recognized that a trial 

court could “conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and 

the opinion proffered.” Id. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148-49 

(1999), the Supreme Court held that the “gatekeeping” standard and “general principles” 

of Daubert applied to all expert testimony governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 

meaning “scientific,” “technical,” and “other specialized” testimony. The Supreme Court 

also explained that the Daubert factors are “meant to be helpful, not definitive[,]” and 

“[i]ndeed, those factors do not all necessarily apply even in every instance in which the 

reliability of scientific testimony is challenged.” Id. at 151.

Over the past several years, there has been discussion in the legal community that

Maryland utilizes a standard that is a hybrid of Frye-Reed and Daubert, and speculation 
- 5 -

that Maryland has been moving from Frye-Reed to Daubert. In 2009, in Blackwell v. 

Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 591, 605, 971 A.2d 235, 245, 253 (2009), in reviewing Frye-Reed

jurisprudence, this Court stated that various federal courts had “had occasion to scrutinize 

the reliability of the analytical framework utilized by an expert in formulating a novel 

theory of science” and we observed “that they utilized the Daubert standard rather than 

Frye.” (Cleaned up). We noted that the concept of the “analytical gap” had developed 

beginning with Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, and that the “analytical gap” concept had been used 

by federal courts applying Daubert and by some State courts applying Frye. See Blackwell, 

408 Md. at 604-07, 971 A.2d at 253-54. After reviewing relevant case law, we concluded 

that “[g]enerally accepted methodology[ ] must be coupled with generally accepted 

analysis in order to avoid the pitfalls of an ‘analytical gap.’” Id. at 608, 971 A.2d at 255. 

In other words, this Court incorporated the concept of the “analytical gap” into Maryland’s 

Frye-Reed analysis.

In Rochkind v. Stevenson, 454 Md. 277, 295-96, 164 A.3d 254, 265 (2017)

(“Stevenson I”), when this case first came to the Court, we applied the “analytical gap” 

concept under Maryland Rule 5-702(3) and held that the expert’s (Dr. Hall-Carrington’s)

testimony lacked a sufficient factual basis, as required by the Rule, and that the circuit court 

abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Hall-Carrington to render an opinion that lead 

exposure can cause ADHD generally and that lead caused Stevenson’s ADHD specifically. 

In so holding, we explained that the circuit court had “failed to determine whether 

Stevenson’s proffered sources logically supported Dr. Hall-Carrington’s opinion that lead 

exposure can cause ADHD.” Id. at 295, 164 A.3d at 264. We applied the concept of the 
- 6 -

“analytical gap” and concluded that the circuit court clearly erred by “fail[ing] to check for 

an ‘analytical gap’ between the expert’s data and her conclusion.” Id. at 295, 164 A.3d at 

264. Notably, in Stevenson I, id. at 295, 164 A.3d at 265, because we concluded that Dr. 

Hall-Carrington’s ADHD causation testimony should have been excluded under Maryland 

Rule 5-702, we declined to reach the issue of whether the circuit court should have held a 

Frye-Reed hearing as to Dr. Hall-Carrington’s general causation testimony. 

A few weeks later, this Court issued its opinion in Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 

166 A.3d 183 (2017). In Savage, id. at 159, 166 A.3d at 195, we quoted approvingly from 

Giddens v. State, 148 Md. App. 407, 415-16, 812 A.2d 1075, 1080 (2002), cert. denied, 

374 Md. 83, 821 A.2d 370 (2003), in which the Court of Special Appeals explained:

Frye sets forth only a legal standard which governs the trial judge’s 

determination of a threshold issue. Testimony based on a technique which 

is found to have gained “general acceptance in the scientific community” 

may be admitted into evidence, but only if a trial judge also determines in the 

exercise of his discretion, as he must in all other instances of expert 

testimony, that the proposed testimony will be helpful to the jury, that the 

expert is properly qualified, etc. Obviously, however, if a technique does not 

meet the Frye standard, a trial judge will have no occasion to reach these 

further issues.

. . . 

It is also well settled, however, that if the relevant scientific community is in 

general agreement that a properly conducted scientific test will produce an 

accurate result, the Frye-Reed test does not operate to exclude conflicting 

expert opinions based upon such a test.

We explained that there was “no reason to depart from this standard in the appropriate case 

where it applies[,]” and that “[t]he issue is whether the expert bridged the ‘analytical gap’ 

between accepted science and his [or her] ultimate conclusions in a particular case.” 

Savage, 455 Md. at 160, 166 A.3d at 195-96. 
- 7 -

In a concurring opinion, the Honorable Sally D. Adkins stated that this Court should 

adopt the Daubert approach to the admissibility of scientific testimony. See id. at 174, 166 

A.3d at 204 (Adkins, J., concurring). Judge Adkins stated that, “[s]ince Daubert was 

decided, the majority of states have departed from the Frye standard in favor of the 

Supreme Court’s more flexible approach.” Id. at 178, 166 A.3d at 206 (Adkins, J., 

concurring) (cleaned up). Judge Adkins posited that our recent case law illustrated that the 

Court has modified its application of Frye-Reed and gradually moved toward the federal 

Daubert approach. Id. at 180, 166 A.3d at 208 (Adkins, J., concurring). 

Judge Adkins identified two ways in which she saw that the Court had adjusted the 

application of Frye-Reed. First, “we have liberally applied the Frye-Reed analysis to 

testimony based on any scientific principle—new or old[,]” thereby, “like Daubert, [] 

implicitly recogniz[ing] that a trial judge’s gatekeeping function should not be limited to 

new scientific theories—old ‘junk science’ should be kept out of our courts as well.” Id.

at 180, 166 A.3d at 208 (Adkins, J., concurring). According to Judge Adkins, we 

“suggested that all testimony based on scientific techniques is subject to Frye-Reed by 

encouraging trial courts to take judicial notice when a scientific method is well-established 

in the relevant community, rather than skipping Frye-Reed because the method is not 

novel.” Id. at 180, 166 A.3d at 208 (Adkins, J., concurring) (cleaned up). And, second, in 

Judge Adkins’s view, we had “modified the reach of Frye-Reed—inching closer to the 

federal Daubert standard—by using it not only to evaluate scientific methods, but also to 

assess scientific conclusions.” Id. at 181, 166 A.3d at 209 (Adkins, J., concurring). Judge 

Adkins stated that “[t]he federal courts’ adoption of Daubert, coupled with our own 
- 8 -

jurisprudential drift towards the Daubert standard, support departure from Frye-Reed.” Id.

at 187, 166 A.3d at 212 (Adkins, J., concurring). Thus, in deciding Savage, Judge Adkins 

would have “do[ne] away with Frye-Reed and h[e]ld that the Daubert factors used to 

interpret [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702 are persuasive in interpreting [Maryland] Rule 5-

702.” Id. at 186, 166 A.3d at 211 (Adkins, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).

In her concurring opinion, Judge Akins explained that Stevenson I was not the 

appropriate case in which to address a potential adoption of the Daubert standard. As 

quoted by the Majority, Judge Adkins stated:

Furthermore, unlike [Stevenson I], our most recent case addressing the 

admissibility of scientific expert testimony, we can only dispose of the case 

at hand by applying Frye-Reed. In [Stevenson I], we declined to address the 

parties’ arguments regarding Frye-Reed and instead held that the expert 

testimony was inadmissible under Rule 5-702 because the petitioner had 

appealed the trial court’s determination as to both standards. Here, Savage 

only challenges the exclusion of [the expert’s] testimony under Frye-Reed. 

Maj. Slip Op. at 22 (quoting Savage, 455 Md. at 175 n.1, 166 A.3d at 204 n.1 (Adkins, J., 

concurring)) (alterations in original).

The following year, in Sissoko v. State, 236 Md. App. 676, 707-08, 182 A.3d 874,

892, cert. denied, 460 Md. 1, 188 A.3d 917 (2018), the Court of Special Appeals discussed 

Judge Adkins’s concurring opinion, agreeing that Maryland jurisprudence was drifting 

toward the Daubert standard. The Court of Special Appeals stated that there had been a 

“drift toward applying Frye-Reed to scientific conclusions, not just techniques[,]” thereby 

expanding Frye-Reed. Id. at 708, 182 A.3d at 893.

To be sure, the evolution of case law applying and discussing Frye-Reed has led to 

discussion in the legal community that Maryland is moving away from Frye-Reed and 
- 9 -

toward Daubert. For example, in two articles published in The Daily Record, one after 

Stevenson I was issued and another after Savage was issued, Ronald D. Getchey, Esq., and 

Charles A. Danaher, Esq., who are attorneys on brief for Rochkind in this case, discuss 

whether there would be a change from Frye-Reed to Daubert in Maryland. See Ronald D. 

Getchey and Charles A. Danaher, “Stevenson v. Rochkind: Out of the Frye-ing pan,” The 

Daily Record, July 26, 2017; Ronald D. Getchey and Charles A. Danaher, “Why FryeReed appears to be on life support in Md.,” The Daily Record, Aug. 14, 2017. In two 

separate posts on the Maryland Appellate Blog,1 one after Savage was issued and another 

after Sissoko was issued, Derek Stikeleather, Esq., who is an attorney on brief for Rochkind 

in this case, speculated that Frye-Reed was coming to an end in Maryland. See Derek 

Stikeleather, “The End of Frye-Reed,” Maryland Appellate Blog, Oct. 5, 2017, available 

at https://mdappblog.com/2017/10/05/the-end-of-frye-reed/ [https://perma.cc/62YQK7BV]; Derek Stikeleather, “Update: The End of Frye-Reed Draws Closer,” Maryland 

Appellate Blog, May 1, 2018, available at https://mdappblog.com/2018/05/01/update-theend-of-frye-reed-draws-closer/ [https://perma.cc/YC5U-JQD2]. 

From my perspective, regardless of whether Maryland jurisprudence on Frye-Reed

has evolved over the years, there is no need to pick a side between Frye-Reed and Daubert, 

and certainly not in this case. Although Rochkind invites the Court to adopt the Daubert

standard, I would decline the invitation. This case is the result of several trials in which 

the circuit court did not conduct either a Maryland Rule 5-702 or Frye-Reed hearing. When 

 

1Maryland Appellate Blog is the blog of the Maryland State Bar Association’s 

Litigation Section. 
- 10 -

the case was previously before us, in Stevenson I, 454 Md. at 295-96, 164 A.3d at 265, we 

held that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony lacked a sufficient factual basis as required by 

Maryland Rule 5-702(3) and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial on 

damages, with specific instructions concerning the admissibility of Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

testimony on causation. On remand, at trial, the circuit court again admitted Dr. HallCarrington’s testimony. For this Court to now overhaul the standard by which expert 

testimony in Maryland is admitted at trial, i.e., the standard by which Dr Hall- Carrington’s 

testimony is to be evaluated, and remand the case again, after the circuit court admitted Dr. 

Hall-Carrington’s testimony in this case on remand after receiving specific instructions 

from this Court, would undermine the finality and predictability of the court system. The

unique procedural process of this case precludes the Court from adopting a new standard 

today to be applied in the case. Like Judge Adkins, I would conclude that this case differs 

from Savage in that in Savage “we [could] only dispose of the case at hand by applying

Frye-Reed[,]” Savage, 455 Md. at 175 n.1, 16 A.3d at 204 n.1 (Adkins, J., concurring), and 

here the admissibility of Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony was addressed under Maryland 

Rule 5-702, making this not a case in which this Court should entertain a discussion of 

adopting the Daubert standard let alone actually implementing such a change.

Although Rochkind relies on the District of Columbia’s adoption of Daubert in 

Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016), and Judge Adkins’s concurring 

opinion in Savage, 455 Md. 138, 166 A.3d 183, the procedural posture of this case is unlike 

the posture of both the Motorola and Savage cases, and different even from most cases 

adopting Daubert. Moreover, this Court was well aware of the District of Columbia’s 
- 11 -

adoption of the Daubert standard, in 2016, in Motorola when, in 2017, we declined to do 

the same in Savage. In Motorola, 147 A.3d at 752, the trial court held four weeks of 

evidentiary Frye hearings to determine the admissibility of the plaintiffs’ causation expert 

testimony. The trial court concluded that some of the expert testimony on causation would 

be admissible under Frye, but that “most, if not all” of the testimony would be excluded 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard. Id. The trial court certified 

the Daubert adoption question of law for interlocutory appeal. Id. And, the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals granted a motion for interlocutory review, and adopted Federal 

Rule of Evidence 702, i.e., Daubert. Id. at 758-59. Unlike Maryland, the District of 

Columbia does not have its own codified rules of evidence and, therefore, does not have 

its own version of Rule 702. This is different than the situation in Maryland, in which we 

have Maryland Rule 5-702, which provides for an analysis that is separate from Frye-Reed

and its progeny’s requisites for admission of expert testimony. Moreover, unlike the 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals case, this matter is not before us with a record of 

voluminous evidence weighing in favor of or against the differing standards for admission 

of expert evidence. In this case, the circuit court never considered or weighed admission 

of expert testimony under Frye-Reed or Daubert.

Likewise, unlike this case, in Savage, 455 Md. at 143-50, 166 A.3d at 186-90, the 

trial court held an extensive pre-trial evidentiary hearing and determined that the FryeReed standard had not been met. On review, this Court agreed and expressly concluded 

that there was no reason to abandon the Frye-Reed standard. In a concurring opinion, 

however, Judge Adkins wrote that she was “persuaded in part” by the Motorola decision
- 12 -

that this Court should adopt Daubert. Savage, 455 Md. at 185, 166 A.3d at 211 (Adkins, 

J., concurring). Judge Adkins’s discussion was obviously not the holding of this Court and 

necessarily addressed the circumstances of Savage, which as Judge Adkins acknowledged

involved a different posture from Stevenson I, and this case. 

In contrast to Motorola and Savage, we do not have extensive evidence gathered 

from a pre-trial Frye-Reed hearing. As we observed in Savage, 455 Md. at 160 n.6, 166 

A.3d at 196 n.6, in Stevenson I, 454 Md. 277, 164 A.3d 254, because we determined that 

the circuit court abused its discretion under Maryland Rule 5-702 in admitting the expert 

testimony, we did not address the issue of whether the trial court erred in not holding a 

Frye-Reed hearing. We now face a case even further attenuated from Stevenson I, because, 

on remand, again the circuit court did not hold a Frye-Reed hearing and instead acted 

pursuant to specific instructions from this Court pertaining to the admission of the expert 

testimony, and the instructions did not involve applying Frye-Reed let alone Daubert. I 

see no reason to revisit the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence under FryeReed where, here, like the first iteration of this case, disposition of the issues does not 

involve applying Frye-Reed or Daubert.

Maryland case law on the admission of expert testimony pertaining to scientific 

matters is understandably capable of adaptation and, in my view, as we concluded in 

Savage, 455 Md. at 160, 166 A.3d at 195, just three years ago, there is no need for a change. 

The only thing that has changed since the Majority’s holding and Judge Adkins’s 

concurrence in Savage is that there has been speculation in the legal community about a 

potential change from Frye-Reed to Daubert, and four members of the Court are now in 
- 13 -

favor of the change. In announcing the decision to adopt the Daubertstandard, the Majority 

simply states that “Rochkind now squarely poses th[e] question” and “we answer . . . in the 

affirmative[.]” Maj. Slip Op. at 2. Clearly, neither of the circumstances that would warrant 

a departure from the doctrine of stare decisis—a prior decision is clearly wrong and 

contrary to established principles or existing precedent has been superseded by significant 

changes in the law or facts—applies here. See Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51, 66, 146 

A.3d 433, 442 (2016); DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 64, 5 A.3d 45, 55-56 

(2010). Since the Majority’s holding in Savage, there has been no new case law from this 

Court indicating that our majority holding was wrong and there have been no further 

developments in the law since Savage leading Maryland case law any closer to adoption of 

the Daubert standard. Indeed, the Majority’s discussion of the principle of stare decisis

relies entirely on information that was available to Court at the time we issued Stevenson 

I and Savage. In an attempt to justify that the exceptions to the doctrine of stare decisis

are met, the Majority states only:

Over the last forty years, Maryland’s appellate courts have considerably 

modified the Frye-Reed standard. The Frye-Reed of 1978 is markedly 

different than the “Frye-Reed Plus” of 2020. With Daubert, and eventually 

Joiner and Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court disavowed the Frye standard for 

the more flexible Daubert approach. A supermajority of our sister 

jurisdictions followed suit. Clearly, a significant change in the law has 

occurred, permitting us to depart from stare decisis and adopt the Daubert 

standard in this instance.

Majority Slip. Op. at 28 (footnote omitted). The Majority does not claim that this Court’s 

prior adoption of the Frye-Reed standard was clearly wrong, or allege or even mention any 

developments subsequent to this Court’s decisions in Stevenson I and Savage that would 
- 14 -

warrant a departure from existing case law.

Equally as important, though, as Judge Adkins recognized in Savage, this case is

plainly not the case in which to entertain making a change from Frye-Reed to Daubert, as 

the issue of the admissibility of Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony has consistently been

decided under Maryland Rule 5-702, not under Frye-Reed. It is undisputed that, on 

remand, in admitting Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony, the circuit court did not conduct a 

Frye-Reed evidentiary hearing and the circuit court did not make any findings under FryeReed, such as whether a novel scientific method was involved and whether that method 

was generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Indeed, Rochkind’s 

counsel explicitly agreed with the circuit court that a Frye-Reed hearing was not 

appropriate under the circumstances and affirmatively stated that “the appropriate forum 

[was] a [Maryland Rule] 5-702 hearing.” The circuit court confirmed, asking: “[Y]ou’re 

not asking for the Frye-Reed because you believe that under these circumstances it’s a 5-

702, correct?” Rochkind’s counsel answered: “Correct.”2 In other words, in the circuit 

 

2This is the exchange that occurred between the circuit court and Rochkind’s 

counsel:

[CIRCUIT COURT:] So for those reasons, Defense Counsel was seeking a 

5-702, I’m sorry, seeking at this stage a Frye-Reed hearing. And counsel 

may not want to freely acknowledge it but, candidly speaking, you do --

you’re going to go with me on this one, that a Frye-Reed hearing is not 

appropriate under these circumstances. You’re going to give me that one, 

aren’t you?

[ROCHKIND’S COUNSEL]: I do think that the appropriate forum is a 5-

702 hearing.
- 15 -

court, it was clear that case was decided under Maryland Rule 5-702, not under Frye-Reed

and certainly not Daubert.

3

 

 

[CIRCUIT COURT]: See. This is why I like you. Honesty always helps. 

So again, so the issue for the Appellate Courts were to decide that you’re not 

asking for the Frye-Reed because you believe that under these circumstances 

it’s a 5-702, correct?

[ROCHKIND’S COUNSEL]: Correct.

3

In adopting the Daubert standard, the Majority attempts to rewrite history and 

minimize the consequence of Rochkind’s counsel’s agreement that neither a hearing under 

Frye-Reed nor Maryland Rule 5-702 was necessary. See Maj. Slip Op. at 26 n.13. It is 

beyond dispute that Rochkind’s counsel specifically agreed that a Frye-Reed hearing was 

not necessary. Even the Majority acknowledges this, i.e., that Rochkind’s counsel agreed 

that a Frye-Reed hearing was not necessary. Yet, the Majority takes the misguided path of 

finding significance in the circumstance that, prior to agreeing that a Frye-Reed hearing 

was not necessary, “Rochkind’s counsel filed a motion and argued several times at the 

motions hearing that a Frye-Reed hearing was needed” and only later made the concession. 

Maj. Slip Op. at 26 n.13. The Majority’s statement implies that Rochkind’s counsel’s 

concession is meaningless. Under the Majority’s theory, once a party takes a position in 

litigation, a court should not consider a concession even if it is made in open court on the 

record and there is no dispute that the concession has been made.

In a desperate attempt to counter a simple fact that is plain from the record, the 

Majority refuses to recognize that there was an agreement between the parties and the 

circuit court that no hearing was necessary. The Majority makes the unfortunate and 

inaccurate allegation that “[a] ‘Frye-Reed hearing was not appropriate’ only because the 

circuit said so[.]” Maj. Slip Op. at 26-27 n.13. The circuit court judge who presided in 

this case is an experienced trial judge with a sterling reputation. The Majority’s allegation 

ignores the record and the circumstance that, after having made the request for one, 

Rochkind’s counsel readily agreed not to pursue a Frye-Reed hearing. 

Similarly, the Majority’s suggestion that, because the Court granted certiorari, this 

case is the appropriate vehicle to announce a change to the Daubert standard is flawed. See

Maj. Slip Op. at 26 n.13. The grant of a petition for a writ of certiorari where the petition 

contains a particular question is not a guarantee that the Court will necessarily address the 

question, let alone that the Court will answer the question by making a sweeping change 

in the law. See, e.g., Duffy v. CBS Corp., 458 Md. 206, 217 & n.9, 182 A.3d 166, 172 & 

n.9 (2018) (This Court stated that because we answered the first of three questions 

presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari in the affirmative and held that the statute of 

repose did not apply in that case, we did “not address the remaining questions[,]” including 
- 16 -

Put plainly, it is obvious that the issue of the admissibility of Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

testimony, throughout the many trials in this case, has been considered only under 

Maryland Rule 5-702, that Rochkind expressly agreed that the matter should be considered 

under Maryland Rule 5-702 and that a Frye-Reed hearing was not appropriate under the 

 

whether the Court of Special Appeals’s decision violated a person’s “constitutional right 

to access the courts[.]”); State v. Weems, 429 Md. 329, 332, 55 A.3d 921, 925 (2012) (This 

Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari raising two questions, but did not address 

the second question because we affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment and 

answered the first question in the negative.); Prof’l Staff Nurses Ass’n v. Dimensions 

Health Corp., 346 Md. 132, 133-34, 138, 141-42, 695 A.2d 158, 158, 160, 162-63 (1997) 

(This Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari raising only a single constitutional 

issue—whether the National Labor Relations Act preempted the Maryland antistrikebreakers statute—but “conclude[d] that the constitutional issue should not have been 

reached” and affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment on a non-constitutional 

ground.); see also Stevenson I, 454 Md. at 284-85, 295, 164 A.3d at 258, 265 (This Court 

granted certiorari on two issues—whether the circuit court erred in admitting Dr. HallCarrington’s generally and specific ADHD causation testimony under Maryland Rule 5-

702 and whether the circuit court erred in failing to hold a Frye-Reed hearing on Dr. HallCarrington’s general ADHD causation testimony—and did not reach the issue concerning 

the Frye-Reed hearing given our resolution of the matter under Maryland Rule 5-702.). 

In addition, case law recognizes that the Court may dismiss a petition for a writ of 

certiorari for being improvidently granted. See, e.g., Sturdivant v. Md. Dep’t of Health 

and Mental Hygiene, 436 Md. 584, 589, 84 A.3d 83, 86 (2014) (“On occasion, this Court 

dismisses a case after briefing and argument on the ground that the petition for writ of 

certiorari was improvidently granted. In such cases the grant of the petition was a mistake, 

either because it becomes apparent later that there is truly no issue of public importance in 

the case or because there is such an issue, but it was not preserved below or the record in 

the case provides an inadequate basis for rendering useful guidance on that issue.”); see 

also McFarland v. Baltimore Cmty. Lending, Inc., 467 Md. 428, 429, 225 A.3d 83, 83 

(2020) (This Court dismissed a petition for a writ of certiorari as “having been 

improvidently granted.”). Also, Maryland Rule 8-604(d)(1) allows the Court to not affirm, 

reverse, or modify a judgment, but instead to remand so “that justice will be served[.]” In 

stating that this Court granted certiorari to answer the very question of whether to adopt 

Daubert, the Majority ignores these well-known appellate principles. Moreover, the 

Majority wrongly implies that the Court did not have the option of concluding that this was 

not an appropriate case in which to consider adopting the Daubert standard.
- 17 -

circumstances, and that no findings were made under Frye-Reed in the circuit court. Stated 

otherwise, under the circumstances of this case, the Court has no basis on which to 

conclude that the Frye-Reed analysis should be abandoned in favor of the Daubert analysis. 

This Court should refrain from deciding a matter not at issue in the circuit court and making 

a decision not warranted by the circumstances of the case. In my view, under no 

circumstance should we switch from Frye-Reed to Daubert, in a case in which no issue 

pertaining to either approach was decided by the circuit court—and the case is back before 

this Court after a remand that did not involve instructions from the Court pertaining to 

Frye-Reed or Daubert—simply because one party now seizes the opportunity to pose the 

question of whether this Court should adopt the Daubert standard. 

Even if the issue of whether to abandon the Frye-Reed standard and adopt the 

Daubert standard were squarely before the Court, i.e., the circuit court had made findings 

under Frye-Reed or one of the parties had argued the issue in the circuit court, from my 

perspective, adoption of the Daubert standard should not be done without information 

about the impact that adopting Daubert would have on African American people, people 

of color, and people of various socioeconomic status in Maryland. In a brief of amicus 

curiae filed in this case, the Maryland Association for Justice indicates that the Daubert

standard has resulted in some plaintiffs not being able to effectively present expert witness 

testimony. The Maryland Association for Justice points to studies by professors 

demonstrating that application of the Daubert standard “disproportionately and negatively 

affects claimants of color.” Andrew W. Jurs and Scott DeVito, A Tale of Two Dauberts: 

Discriminatory Effects of Scientific Reliability Screening, 79 Ohio St. L.J. 1107, 1144 
- 18 -

(2018). The professors’ analysis demonstrated that “Daubert [has] resulted in fewer claims 

by black claimants, and that once the claimants are out of the system, they stay out.” Id. at 

1144-45. This analysis concerning the impact of Daubert is extremely troubling. At a 

minimum, before any decision to adopt the Daubert standard, I would recommend that the

Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure undertake a study of the impact

of Daubert and make a determination as to whether adoption of Daubert in Maryland will 

negatively affect African American people, people of color, or people of limited financial 

means as potential litigants.

Wisely, the majority opinion does not “reject the seriousness of th[e] contention” 

that the “Rules Committee is the more appropriate forum to study the potential impact the 

Daubert standard” would have in Maryland. Maj. Slip Op. at 28-29 n.15. But, the 

Majority summarily disposes of the suggestion by alleging that other scholarly research 

has come to “the opposition conclusion.” See Maj. Slip Op. at 29 n.15. The Majority 

identifies only one such source, and by its’ own admission, there is disagreement as to the 

impact of the Daubert standard. Yet, the Majority is willing to implement that standard in 

our State without study. Unfortunately, rather than refer the matter to the Rules 

Committee, the Majority states that, “[t]his Court is well suited to weigh the advantages 

and disadvantages of modifying our approach to any area of the law—as we often do. That 

this change implicates our interpretation of the Maryland Rules does not necessitate a 

referral to the Rules Committee.” Maj. Slip Op. at 29 n.15. With this language, the 

Majority attempts to equate the change from the Frye-Reed standard to the adoption of the 

Daubert standard in Maryland to a mere interpretation of the Maryland Rules and not the
- 19 -

significant change—that reads into Maryland Rule 5-702 a new evidentiary standard that 

was not previously a part of the Rule—that it is. Other than including a quote in a 

parenthetical from a fifteen-year-old article—Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does 

Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev. 471 

(2005)—the Majority provides no information about the impact of Daubert, does no 

weighing about the effects of the switch, and gives no information on how litigants in 

Maryland will be impacted.4 The Majority appears to assert that the matter of Daubert’s 

 

4

Indeed, other than the parenthetical, the Majority provides no information about 

the article or its purpose, specifically, whether its purpose was to study the impact of 

Daubert on specific groups, or whether the article even mentions Maryland. The Majority

does not advise that the article, like other sources, likens Daubert to tort reform, stating:

In federal courts, where the decision is legally binding, Daubert has become 

a potent weapon of tort reform by causing judges to scrutinize scientific 

evidence more closely. Tort reform efforts often focus on medical 

malpractice, products liability, and toxic torts--all cases in which scientific 

evidence is likely to play a decisive or at least highly influential role. The 

resulting effects of Daubert have been decidedly pro-defendant. In the civil 

context, Daubert has empowered defendants to exclude certain types of 

scientific evidence, substantially improving their chances of obtaining 

summary judgment and thereby avoiding what are perceived to be 

unpredictable and often plaintiff-friendly juries.

Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific 

Admissibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev. 471, 472-73 (2005) (footnote omitted). After 

reaching this conclusion, the article purports to review the impact of Daubert in states by 

examining developments in specifically identified states that have and have not adopted 

the Daubert standard; Maryland is not among the states included in the article. Also, the 

article does not purport to study the effect of the Daubert standard on different communities 

within those states. As such, although the article purports to evaluate whether “doctrinal 

standards have any effect on scientific admissibility determinations” and reaches a general 

conclusion that it “found no evidence that Frye or Daubert makes a difference,” id. at 510-

11, in addition to being fifteen years old, the article reaches no conclusions whatsoever 

about the impact of the Daubert standard not having been adopted in Maryland or any 
- 20 -

 

potential impact of this Court adopting the standard now. The article also does not address 

the issue that the Maryland Association for Justice raises in its amicus brief concerning a 

potential disparate impact of Daubert on various communities in the State. 

In contrast, the more recent Andrew W. Jurs & Scott DeVito law review article 

addresses Daubert’s disproportionate impact on African American plaintiffs and claimants 

of color, stating:

We found that when the federal system adopted the stricter standard 

of Daubert in 1993, there was a disproportionate and negative impact on 

filings from African-American plaintiffs along with a corresponding rise in 

filings from white plaintiffs. Yet that is not all we found. In prior work, we 

found that when a state adopted Daubert after 1993, there was a “return to 

federal court” effect where filings rebound to pre-1993 patterns. Yet our 

analysis reveals that after state adoption of Daubert, there is no rebound for 

African-American plaintiffs; instead, the filing rates for black plaintiffs 

remain depressed.

Our research shows that, in response to Daubert, black plaintiffs were 

less likely to file in federal court, and once they were pushed out of the civil 

justice system, they remained out. In essence, the Daubert admissibility 

standard impacts filings exactly like a method of tort reform, but only for 

claimants of color.

Andrew W. Jurs & Scott DeVito, A Tale of Two Dauberts: Discriminatory Effects of 

Scientific Reliability Screening, 79 Ohio St. L.J. 1107, 1109-10 (2018) (footnotes omitted).

Another law review article indicates that Daubert and its progeny may have

“significant gender, race, and class implications,” stating:

[T]rial judges have used [Daubert and its progeny], despite Daubert’s 

announced intention to liberalize decisions on admitting scientific expert 

causation testimony, to erect conservative, and in some instances, virtually 

insurmountable barriers to plaintiffs’ ability to prove causation. These 

barriers stem from substantive legal decisions about causation law, rather 

than from scientific principles or case by case assessments of proffered 

testimony. Finally, the article analyzes some of the societal implications of 

these legal developments, including differential impact on social groups 

whose health problems have tended to be ignored or underexplored by the 

scientific research community[.]

* * *
- 21 -

 

There are also likely to be subtle, but significant gender, race, and 

class implications of the heightened requirements for proof of 

causation. Certain social groups have traditionally drawn greater research 

interest and research dollars. For example, medical problems of middle-aged 

white men have received a disproportionate amount of research attention, 

while the problems of women, the poor, and members of minority racial and 

ethnic groups have received less attention. Political groups or other 

organizations can also stimulate research attention to potential health 

problems--for example, the unions have played an important role in pushing 

for research into asbestos and other occupational exposures; veterans groups 

have continued to demand better Agent Orange and Gulf War Syndrome 

research. Until the relatively recent attention devoted by civil rights groups 

to toxic exposure issues in poor minority communities, and the activism of 

women’s groups around breast cancer research or [diethylstilbestrol] 

research, the advocacy groups that prodded regulatory agencies or the 

research community were more likely to represent largely male 

constituencies, such as industrial workers. For these reasons, the products, 

exposures, and diseases for which there is likely to be well-developed 

epidemiologic research will not be gender, race, or class-neutral. The 

societal groups most likely to be under-studied by the research community 

are often going to be the same groups whose health concerns have received 

less initial scrutiny from product or drug manufacturers. If the epidemiologic 

community has not produced enough research into some types of the 

exposures and risk factors facing women, minorities, and the poor, then these 

groups will be inherently disadvantaged when they try to use the tort system 

to redress their health problems and to stimulate more serious manufacturer 

and researcher attention to their concerns. The long-standing inequities of 

medical research can lead to differential race, gender, and class-based access 

to the tort system.

Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using 

Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 335, 

337-38, 373-74 (1999) (footnotes omitted).

Several sources state that Daubert has the effect of lowering costs for defendants 

and raising costs for plaintiffs. See Sandra F. Gavin, Managerial Justice in A Post-Daubert 

World: A Reliability Paradigm, 234 F.R.D. 196, 212 (2006) (“Th[e] shift to the pretrial 

arena significantly raises the costs and risks for plaintiffs while diminishing the costs and 

risks for defendants particularly when Daubert and summary judgment intersect.”); 

Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All over Again? Pretrial As Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 

DePaul L. Rev. 647, 669 (2011) (“The further nuance imparted by Daubert and its progeny 

is to reduce the cost to the defendant of deploying the summary judgment motion. Under 
- 22 -

impact in Maryland is resolved by one article from fifteen years ago that the Majority does 

not even contend provides any information about the impact of the implementation of 

Daubert in Maryland. The Majority provides no principled reason for declining to refer 

the matter to the Rules Committee.

To be sure, the Committee note to Maryland Rule 5-702 states that “[t]he required 

scientific foundation for the admission of novel scientific techniques or principles is left to 

development through case law.” (Citation omitted). The Committee note was included 

with Maryland Rule 5-702, which was adopted on December 15, 1993 and became 

effective on July 1, 1994, at the time when the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice 

and Procedure undertook to revise the Maryland Rules to be consistent with the Federal 

Rules. Daubert was issued on June 28, 1993, see Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, just months before 

the adoption of Maryland Rule 5-702. The adoption of Maryland Rule 5-702 and inclusion 

 

this line of cases, the defendant simply may insist that the plaintiff--the party with the 

ultimate burden of proof--show her evidentiary cards. A moving defendant need not 

affirmatively demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” (Footnote 

omitted.)); Sean Ryan, Backfire: Abandoning the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review 

for Daubert Rulings Shoots Trial Courts in the Foot, 47 U. Tol. L. Rev. 349, 368-69 (2016) 

(“A 2001 Institute for Civil Justice Study concluded that the extra burden of defending 

against Daubert motions had a chilling effect on plaintiffs. The unpredictability caused by 

a heightened standard of review of Daubert decisions on appeal will often increase those 

costs for plaintiffs.” (Footnote omitted.)); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, 

Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of 

Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 313 (2013) (“Daubert’s high threshold has 

been particularly burdensome-- financially, logistically, and sometimes both--for plaintiffs. 

This is because plaintiffs often must provide expert testimony or reports about a wide range 

of subjects-- for example, the relevant technology, pharmacology, the environmental 

impact of the defendant’s conduct, or the statistical and economic significance of certain 

phenomena or behaviors.”). Plainly, these articles demonstrate there is an imperative need 

to examine the impact of Daubert in Maryland before the wholesale adoption of the 

standard.
- 23 -

of the Committee note occurred before the timeframe in which any impact of the Daubert

standard on litigants would have been at issue, and the Committee note obviously predates 

by decades Jurs’s and DeVito’s article concerning studies showing the negative impact of 

Daubert on some groups. Although the Committee note to Maryland Rule 5-702 could be 

read to mean that this Court can adopt the Daubert standard through case law, in my view, 

given the weighty issues at stake, there is a need for study of the matter. In addition to the 

circumstance that this case is not the appropriate one for entertaining the change, before 

deciding whether to adopt the Daubert standard, this Court should have its impact 

investigated and the Court should attempt to understand the impact on the community. 

The circumstance that there may have been a drift from Frye-Reed to Daubert and 

that portions of the Daubert analysis may be already be in place in Maryland case law does 

not negate the need for a study of the impact of Daubert on litigants. It should not be said 

that because this Court may have already modified the Frye-Reed standard, we should not 

investigate any burden that the Daubert standard may impose on Maryland’s citizenry. The 

Court should want to ensure that equal access to the court system is provided to all and that 

case law is developed in a manner that is consistent with equal access. Information on the 

impact of the Daubert standard is information that the courts, the Bar, and the legal 

profession in general should be made aware of before this Court determines whether to 

take the action of adopting the Daubert standard for use in our State.

Lastly, in this case, I would hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony under Maryland Rule 5-702. This Court has 

repeatedly reiterated that “[t]he admissibility of expert testimony is a matter largely within 
- 24 -

the discretion of the trial court[; t]hus, we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude 

expert testimony only for an abuse of discretion.” Rochkind v. Stevenson, 454 Md. 277, 

285, 164 A.3d 254, 258-59 (2017) (cleaned up). In Blackwell, 408 Md. at 618, 971 A.2d 

at 261, this Court stated:

In the context of Rule 5-702, we have previously stated that, the admissibility 

of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will 

not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Put another way, it is 

well settled that the trial court’s determination regarding the qualification of 

experts may be reversed if it is founded on an error of law or some serious 

mistake, or if the trial court clearly abused its discretion and will seldom 

constitute a ground for reversal.

(Cleaned up).

Utilizing the principles expressed above, I would conclude that the circuit court did 

not abuse its discretion under Maryland Rule 5-702 in admitting Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

testimony and, specifically, the testimony that Stevenson has a physical brain injury 

attributable to lead exposure that has manifested in symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, 

impulsivity, and IQ loss. On remand, the circuit court specifically described the procedural 

history of the case and that the case had come back from the Court of Appeals with the 

Court having concluded that there was an insufficient link, i.e., a gap, between Dr. HallCarrington’s opinion that lead exposure caused ADHD and the data. The circuit court 

understood that the issue that was before the court was whether there was a sufficient 

factual basis to permit Dr. Hall-Carrington to testify that lead exposure caused attention 

deficits, hyperactivity, and cognitive development problems. As Rochkind’s counsel 

characterized it, Dr. Hall-Carrington’s proposed testimony involved the ability to render 

“specific causation opinions regarding attentional difficulty, things that may lead to or 
- 25 -

some of the symptoms of ADHD.” After framing the issue, the circuit court stated, among 

things, “[s]o there’s no objection to not having a hearing where there’s live testimony 

because all parties are satisfied that what is before the [c]ourt is [t]hat the [c]ourt needs to 

make a decision under 5-702-3.” The parties agreed that no hearing, Frye-Reed or 

otherwise, was necessary. After hearing extensive argument from the parties as to whether 

Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony would be admissible under Maryland Rule 5-702(3), 

which included references to Dr. Hall-Carrington’s prior trial testimony detailing the 

numerous sources of information she reviewed pertaining to Stevenson as well as her 

review of the EPA-ISA, and references to the requirements of the Rule, the circuit court 

ruled that it was satisfied that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s opinion would assist “the trier of fact 

. . . [and that] the trier of fact would be able to evaluate the reasoning underlying that 

opinion.” The circuit court ruled that it was “satisfied that the research does show that lead 

exposure can cause general attention deficits and hyperactivity[.]” In other words, the 

circuit court considered whether there was an analytical gap between Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

data and her opinion and ruled that the testimony satisfied Maryland Rule 5-702(3), as 

there was a sufficient factual basis to support the expert’s causation testimony.

The circuit court was correct. There was a sufficient factual basis to support Dr. 

Hall-Carrington’s testimony, as there was an adequate supply of data and she provided a 

reliable method for attributing Stevenson’s injuries to lead exposure.5 As to an adequate 

 

5

In the circuit court, Rochkind conceded that the only issue was whether Dr. HallCarrington had a sufficient factual basis for her opinions under Maryland Rule 5-702(3). 

In other words, Rochkind did not take issue with whether Dr. Hall-Carrington was qualified 
- 26 -

supply of data, Dr. Hall-Carrington testified that she reviewed and relied upon numerous 

records and documents concerning Stevenson to form the basis for her opinions, including, 

among other things,: birth records; records from the Pediatric Ambulatory Center early 

childcare clinic of the University of Maryland; records from the Greater Baltimore Medical 

Center clinic; records from Mercy Medical Center clinic; records from Kennedy Krieger 

Institute; Kennedy Krieger Institute’s social work records; a neuropsychological evaluation 

performed by Dr. Thomas Ley; blood-lead records from the Maryland Department of the 

Environment; records from Mount Washington Pediatric Hospital; a neuropsychological 

evaluation by Dr. William Collins; school records; the evaluation report and trial testimony 

of Dr. Robert Kraft; the evaluation report of Stevenson’s psychologist, Dr. Cynthia Munro; 

the report of Stevenson’s psychiatrist, Dr. Neil Blumberg; the 2014 trial testimony of 

Stevenson’s mother, Charlene Montgomery; and the November 2017 deposition of 

Stevenson. 

Dr. Hall-Carrington testified that she was familiar with and had read the portion 

related to lead contained in the Environmental Protection Agency’s 2013 publication, the 

EPA-ISA, which she described as “a review of all the research from around the world and 

it’s a peer reviewed articles, but it’s a review of all the research, scientific research that 

was available at the time. [The EPA] actually go[es] through hundreds of articles in 

forming [] opinions in this document.” Dr. Hall-Carrington testified that she was also 

familiar with the underlying studies that the Environmental Protection Agency cited to and 

 

as an expert under Maryland Rule 5-702(1) or the appropriateness of expert testimony on 

the particular subject under Maryland Rule 5-702(2). 
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relied on. Dr. Hall-Carrington testified that she reviewed EPA-ISA findings and there was 

documented a “causal relationship” between even low levels of lead exposure, of 2 to 8 

micrograms/deciliter (μg/dL), and “Cognitive Function Decrements” with learning, 

memory, and executive function. Dr. Hall-Carrington testified that EPA-ISA showed a 

“causal relationship” between externalizing behaviors such as attention, impulsivity, and 

hyperactivity and lead exposure in children with blood-lead levels between 7 and 14 μg/dL. 

Dr. Hall-Carrington also testified that the EPA-ISA concluded that there is a “likely causal 

relationship” between internalizing behaviors such as anxiety and depression and lead 

exposure in children with blood-lead levels “about 14” μg/dL. 

As to reliable methodology, Dr. Hall-Carrington’s opinions were not conclusory or 

ipse dixit, “because I said so,” opinions. Dr. Hall-Carrington’s thorough review of the 

numerous records related to Stevenson gave her specific and detailed information related 

to Stevenson’s medical history, including prior physical examinations and the results of 

clinical tests. It is not necessary that an expert witness conduct a physical examination of 

a person before being permitted to render an opinion. See Levitas v. Christian, 454 Md. 

233, 241, 253-54,164 A.3d 228, 233, 240-41 (2017) (In a lead paint case, this Court held 

that a trial court abused its discretion in excluding a plaintiff’s expert’s testimony on the 

ground that he had not examined the plaintiff, and had instead relied on a report from 

another doctor who had examined the plaintiff.); Sugarman v. Liles, 460 Md. 396, 403-05, 

410, 190 A.3d 344, 348-39, 352 (2018) (In a lead paint case, a pediatrician who was an 

expert for the plaintiff, as well as a pediatrician who was an expert for the defendant, did 

not examine the plaintiff, and instead relied on his medical records, the report of another 
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doctor who had examined the plaintiff, and other documents.). And, although we indicated 

in Sugarman, 460 Md. at 424, 190 A.3d at 360, that the EPA-ISA does not provide clinical 

criteria for determining whether an individual has been affected by lead, Dr. HallCarrington did not rely exclusively on the EPA-ISA in rendering her opinion as to 

causation concerning Stevenson. It is clear that Dr. Hall-Carrington based her opinion on 

numerous sources containing information specific to Stevenson. Dr. Hall-Carrington 

conducted a thorough review and analysis of, among other things, various medical records, 

neuropsychological evaluations, and other records related to Stevenson, and was capable 

of performing a differential analysis through that review. This analysis led Dr. HallCarrington to render an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability that lead 

exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing Stevenson’s brain impairments 

that manifested in an IQ loss of five to six points, a learning disability, and neurocognitive 

behavioral effects including hyperactivity, impulsivity, and attention decrements. It is 

clear that Dr. Hall-Carrington did not simply apply the conclusions of the EPA-ISA to 

Stevenson’s case without analysis of medical and other information pertaining to 

Stevenson, but instead relied upon a plethora of records and reports specifically related to 

Stevenson as well as her own training, experience, and expertise in treating children with 

lead poisoning, to render her opinion. In my view, Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony at trial 

more than satisfied the requirements of Maryland Rule 5-702(3), and specifically satisfied 

the Rule’s requirement that expert testimony be supported by a sufficient factual basis, 

including an adequate supply of data and a reliable methodology.

I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that the circuit court abused its discretion 
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in admitting Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony. See Maj. Slip Op. at 25-26. The Majority’s 

analysis on this point departs from the record and is wrong on this point in multiple ways. 

The Majority states that, in admitting Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony, the circuit court 

relied solely on Stevenson I and the Majority implies that the circuit court found that in 

Stevenson I this Court concluded that the EPA-ISA required a finding that lead specifically 

caused Stevenson’s injuries. See Maj. Slip Op. at 25. Contrary to the Majority’s 

assessment, the circuit court did not find based on Stevenson I that the EPA-ISA mandated

a finding that lead specifically caused Stevenson’s attention decrements, hyperactivity, and 

impulsivity. See Maj. Slip Op. at 25. Rather, the record reflects that the circuit court 

correctly understood that, in Stevenson I, 454 Md. at 293-96, 164 A.3d at 263-65, this 

Court held that there had been no check for an analytical gap between Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

data and her opinion that lead exposure can cause ADHD, and thus Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

testimony concerning ADHD was inadmissible. Contrary to the Majority’s assertion, the 

circuit court did not find that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony about attention deficits and 

hyperactivity would be automatically admissible based on this Court’s holding in 

Stevenson I. The record reflects that the circuit court understood that this Court did not 

direct that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony would be admissible on that point, but instead

that Stevenson was required to demonstrate a sufficient factual basis for Dr. HallCarrington’s opinion that exposure to lead was a substantial factor in causing Stevenson’s 

injuries, i.e., attention deficits and the like. The circuit court stated: “So this [c]ourt is here 

at this stage at this initial stage to determine whether or not the testimony of Dr. . . . HallCarrington will be appropriate.” Referring to this Court’s opinion in Stevenson I, the 
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circuit court stated that “[i]t says that you can’t use the word ‘ADHD’ which is a diagnosis, 

but it clearly shows that those symptoms that you referred to are caused by lead or that 

there are studies to show that it’s caused by lead.” The circuit court recognized, however,

that Stevenson was required to demonstrate that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony 

concerning attention deficits and hyperactivity was admissible under Maryland Rule 5-702. 

The circuit court stated: “I’m also clear that that case says that under the right 

circumstances there can be an opinion based on what has been presented to show that there 

are certain disorders and certain deficits.” Ultimately, as explained above, the circuit court 

concluded that the jury (trier of fact) would be able to evaluate the reasoning underlying 

Dr. Hall-Carrington’s opinion and that the circuit court was satisfied that the data (research) 

showed that lead exposure could cause attention deficits and hyperactivity. The record 

simply does not support a conclusion that the circuit court found Dr. Hall-Carrington’s 

testimony to be admissible “so long as she did not use the term ‘ADHD.’” Maj. Slip Op. 

at 25. 

Just as troubling, in reaching a decision that a remand is necessary, the Majority 

concludes that the circuit court erred in refusing to hold a Maryland Rule 5-702 hearing, at 

which Dr. Hall-Carrington could explain and Rochkind could cross-examine regarding 

specific causation methodology. See Maj. Slip Op. at 25. Once again, the Majority is 

incorrect. The record reveals that the parties agreed that the circuit court need not hold a 

Maryland Rule 5-702 hearing and that the parties agreed that the transcript of Dr. HallCarrington’s testimony from the trial that had occurred previously (the trial underlying 

Stevenson I), along with proffers by the attorneys, would be the agreed-upon manner to 
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proceed. As explained above, both parties agreed (i.e., Rochkind had conceded) that a 

Frye-Reed hearing was not the manner in which to proceed and that the issue was properly 

resolved under Rule 5-702. After that, the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: I wanted to make sure before I rule. All right. So with that, 

the [c]ourt did believe that it would be appropriate to either have a full 

hearing where the Defendants would be able to present the witnesses. The 

burden would be on the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would be able to offer Dr. 

Cecilia Hall-Carrington.

The parties have agreed based on conversations with the [c]ourt that 

the testimony of Cecilia Hall- Carrington which is before the Court that was 

in front of [a different circuit court j]udge [] will be similarly presented to 

this jury.

* * *

Again, so there’s no objection to not having a hearing where there’s live 

testimony because all parties are satisfied that what is before the [c]ourt is 

what the [c]ourt needs to make a decision under 5-702-3. Correct, Defense?

[ROCHKIND’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor, that’s correct.

THE COURT: And correct, Plaintiff?

[STEVENSON’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I will now hear from Plaintiff.

The Majority misunderstands what occurred in the circuit court. The circuit court 

initially denied Rochkind’s motion to exclude Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony in its 

entirety. The circuit court found that, under Stevenson I, Dr. Hall-Carrington could be 

permitted to testify under certain circumstances. The circuit court stated: “I’m also clear 

that that case says that under the right circumstances there can be an opinion based on what 

has been presented to show that there are certain disorders and certain deficits. And we 

may get to that at some point.” After this ruling, Rochkind filed a request to brief for a 
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Rule 5-702/Frye-Reed hearing, seeking to limit Dr. Hall-Carrington’s ability to testify 

under any circumstances about the symptoms of attention deficits and hyperactivity. The 

next day, as the circuit court addressed the additional filing, the parties agreed on the record 

(as explained above) that the matter should be resolved under Rule 5-702 (not Frye-Reed) 

and then agreed that a Rule 5-702 hearing was not necessary. The circuit court considered

argument from counsel, discussed the circumstances of the case, including this Court’s 

holding in Stevenson I, and found that there was no analytical gap between the data and 

Dr. Hall-Carrington’s opinion. It is impossible to conclude, as the Majority does, that the 

circuit court erred or abused its discretion by not holding a Rule 5-702 hearing when the 

record unequivocally demonstrates that the parties agreed that no hearing was necessary 

and the circuit court outlined in detail on the record that agreement.

Yet, after wrongfully concluding that the circuit court abused its discretion, the 

Majority remands for the circuit court to conduct a hearing pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-

702 (which the parties agreed was unnecessary); the Majority states that “the circuit court 

should consider the Daubert standard adopted herein.” Maj. Slip Op. at 26. It is clear that 

the remand to the circuit court to conduct a Maryland Rule 5-702 hearing is nothing more 

than the Majority’s way to shoehorn in justification for adopting the Daubert standard.

Apparently determined to implement Daubert in Maryland by any means necessary, the 

Majority is willing to disregard an on-the-record concession that the issue involving the 

admissibility of Dr. Hall-Carrington’s testimony was not to be resolved under Frye-Reed, 

an agreement by the parties that no hearing was necessary under Maryland Rule 5-702, and 

that neither of the exceptions to the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable, and the Majority
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is willing to refuse to refer the matter to the Rules Committee for study of how the decision 

will impact Marylanders when there are numerous scholarly sources indicating that the 

adoption of Daubert has far-reaching consequences. These are not the circumstances under 

which this Court should implement such a significant change in the use of Maryland Rule 

5-702 and such an important development in case law in our State.6

For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent.

Judge Hotten and Judge Greene have authorized me to state that they join in this 

opinion.

 

6Finally, the Majority states: “Since Daubert is a new interpretation of Rule 5-702, 

our decision today applies to this case and any other cases that are pending on direct appeal 

when this opinion is filed, where the relevant question has been preserved for appellate 

review.” Maj. Slip Op. at 39 (cleaned up). In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 

(1987), the Supreme Court held that not applying a newly announced constitutional rule to 

criminal cases pending on direct appeal is not consistent with basic principles of 

constitutional adjudication. In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Griffith, in some 

instances, this Court has given the application of new holdings to cases that were pending 

on appeal, where the new holding involved an issue of constitutional significance in 

criminal law. See, e.g., Hackney v. State, 459 Md. 108, 119, 184 A.3d 414, 421 (2018); 

State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 77 n.26, 18 A.3d 60, 85 n.26 (2011). Neither the holding 

in Griffith concerning the application of a newly announced constitutional rule nor the 

application of Griffith in Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 47, 223 A.3d 554, 581 (2020), and 

Daughtry would apply to a change of the evidentiary standard for use under Maryland Rule 

5-702. Here, the Majority’s holding should apply to this case and future trials; the 

Majority’s opinion should not be construed as giving rise to any grounds for relief in cases 

in which the trial occurred before the issuance of this opinion.