* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that th i s

opinion s h ould not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

July 25, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 04-50100

_______________________

ALLEN JAMES NEW; TRUMAINE NEW,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO; ET AL,

Defendants,

PHILIP WANG, Individually,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

SA-00-CV-1481-RF

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge: *

Allen New and his son Trumaine (hereinafter the “News”)

sued San Antonio Police Off icer Philip Wang, among other

defendants, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for his alleged

use of excessive force during an arrest. A jury found in favor of

Officer Wang on all counts and issues including his defense of

qualified immunity. Following the entry of judgment for Officer2

Wang, the News moved for and were grant ed a new trial on the

grounds that the admission of evidence related to Allen New’s

cocaine possession was erroneous and tainted the jury’s verdict.

Officer Wang contends on appeal that his having to stand trial

again amounts to the improper denial of his immunity.

We must dismiss this appeal. The district court’s grant

of a new trial is an interlocutory order, not a final judgment as

p rescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and Wang’s immunity does n ot in

this instance afford an exception to the final judgment rule.

I. BACKGROUND

The material facts underlying this § 1983 suit were hotly

disputed. On March 7, 1999, Allen New and his son Trumaine went

fishing with David Castano at Pecan Valley Park in San Antonio.

Because Trumaine was thirsty, Castano drove Allen (sitting in the

front passenger side of the Honda Civic) and Trumaine (sitting in

the back seat) to a nearby convenience store. As they left the

convenience store, Castano became disturbed that Officer Wang was

traveling immediately behind them. Castano asserted that he turned

into a random driveway, 570 Morning View Drive, which Officer Wang

identified as a known crack house. When Officer Wang thought he

saw Castano making a quick drug transaction, Wang stopped and

questioned the suspects. Castano’s name, run through the computer,

turned up on two outstanding warrants.1 Charges against Allen New for possession of a controlled substance,

assaulting a police officer, and resisting arrest were all dismissed without

prosecution.

3

As Officer Wang was attempting to handcuff Ca stano, he

noticed Allen New digging in his back pants pocket. Officer Wang

ordered Allen New to place his hands on the dashboard. Initially,

Allen New complied with the request, but, as soon as Officer Wang’s

attention was refocused on handcuffing Castano, Allen began digging

in his back pocke t again. Officer Wang commanded Allen a second

and third time to place his hands on the dashboard, but Allen

disregarded him. Convinced that Allen’s actions placed him at risk

of death or serious bodily injury, Wang jumped into the front seat

of the vehicle and forceful ly attempted to restrain Allen.

Trumaine then joined in the struggle between Officer Wang and his

father. Responding to Wang’s emergency call, a fellow police

officer arrived to a ssist in subduing the News. Allen New is

approximately five feet, ten inches tall, and was visibly impaired

and had heart problems. His son Trumaine was then thirteen years

old and five feet, two inches tall at the time of the arrest.

Allen and Trumaine characterize the events as an

unprovoked beating that left Allen with a swollen eye and broken

nose and Trumaine with compacted teeth. Officer Wang, for his

part, searched the vehicle after the melee and fo und a rock of

crack cocaine in the seat where Allen New had been digging in his

back pocket. 14 The News sued Officer Wang individually and in his

official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pendent state law for

violating their right to be free from the use of excessive force.

After discovery, Officer Wa ng moved unsuccessfully for summary

judgment on qualified immunity; genuinely d isputed issues of

material fact rendered summary disposition inappropriate.

At trial, the district court admitted evidence of Allen

N ew’s alleged possession of the crack cocaine, its admission

preceded by a lengthy limiting instruction as to the weight the

jury could afford the evidence. The court understood that the

nugget of crack cocaine powerfully supported Of ficer Wang’s

contention that Allen New was reaching for something in his back

pocket

— albeit not a w eapon of any sort — even as the same

evidence separately prejudiced Allen, not only by casting doubt on

his veracity but by injecting an extraneous derogatory issue. The

jury returned a unanimous verdict that Officer Wang had not

violated the News’ constitutional right s to be free from

unreasonable search and seizure and from excessive force, and the

jury found facts that entitled Wang to qualified immunity on all

counts.

Nev ertheless, following the entry of judgment on the

verdict, the district court granted the News’ motion for new trial

based on proceedings so “corrupted by the manner in which the Court

handled the admission of the cocaine possession as to taint the

jury’s verdict.” The district court further commented:5

The manner of t he admission, and not necessarily the

admission itself, is grounds for a new trial because the

evidence was not properly addressed before trial and the

limiting instruction offered to the jury was gi ven in

haste with little clarity and precision. As admitted and

instructed, the evidence’s prejudice far outweighed its

probative value . The evidence of drug possession is

potentially relevant to th e issues properly before the

jury, including probable cause and the Officer’s

subjective perception of the events.

Officer Wang has appealed. He argues that the district

court should not have disturbed the jury’s verdict because the

limiting instruction was not erroneous.

II. JURISDICTION

Before reaching the merits, this court m ust consider

whether we have appellate jurisdiction. Kelly v. Moore , 376 F.3d

481, 483 (5th Cir. 2004). An order granting a new trial is

generally not appealable because such an order is interlocutory and

not a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id.

As an exception to the prohibition on in t erlocutory

appeals, this court has jurisdiction to review denials of qualified

immunity asserted by gover nment officers where the trial court’s

determination turns on a matter of law. See Mitchell v. Forsyth

,

472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815-16 (1985); Feagley v.

Waddill

, 868 F.2d 1437, 1439 (5th Cir.1989). Officer Wang contends

that the district court’s grant of a new trial negates the

qualified immunity to which the jury found him entitled. This

effective denial of qualified immunity should, he asserts, provide

a jurisdictional foundation for his challenge to the new trial2 Corbell I was a provisional jurisdictional determination made by a

motions panel which is not binding on the oral argument panel to which the case

is submitted or on a later panel of this court. N orthshore Development, Inc. v.

Lee

, 835 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1988); F ischer v. United States

, 759 F.2d 461,

463 (5th Cir. 1985); E .E.O.C. v. Neches Butane Prods. Co.

, 704 F.2d 144 (5th

Cir. 1983).

6 order. Officer Wang relies on a motions panel decision, S tevens v.

Corbell

, 798 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1986) (“ Corbell I ”), as support for

the proposition that appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory

appeal exists here.

Although Corb ell I tends to support Officer Wang’s

invocation of jurisdiction in this case, it does not control. In

Corbell I

, the jury found that unreasonable force had not been used

by the defendant state policemen in subduing the plaintiff. The

district court ordered a new trial on the ground that it had erred

in inst ructing the jury on the issue of intent. This court’s

motions panel held that the district court’s grant of a new trial

implica ted the issue of the officers’ entitlement to qualified

immunity. Id. 2

The subsequent oral argument panel declined to reconsider

the jurisdictional determination made earlier by the motions panel.

See Stevens v. Corbell

, 832 F.2d 884, 887 (5th Cir.1987) (“ Corbell

II ”). Nevertheless, C orbell II ultimately affirmed the district

court’s order granting Stevens a new trial because, as a matter of

law

, the district court had erroneously instructed the jury on the

issue of the officer’s intent. Id. at 891.7 Appealability in Corbell I turns on the court’s holding

that, as in Mitchell

, the intertwining of jury instr uctions and

qualified immunity with the grant of a new trial could be reviewed

as a matter of law. C orbell II emphasized that the court was

reviewing only the legal sufficiency of the instructions. In this

case, by contrast, the new trial grant depended on the court’s

evidentiary ruling, a matter that can at most be reviewed for abuse

of discretion by this court. A discretionary call is not a pure

matter of law. Consequently, Wang’s appeal does not fit within the

Mitchel l paradigm permitting us to review interlocutory legal

issues where qualified immunity is at stake. On this narrow basis,

the appeal must be DISMISSED

.