IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-00569-COA RUTH DEDEAUX APPELLANT

v. COASTAL DEVELOPMENTS INC. APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CARTER O. BISE COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL JOSEPH YENTZEN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: W I LLIAM W . DREHER JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART - 09/03/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., TINDELL AND McCARTY, JJ. TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The Harrison C ounty Circuit Court, First Judicial District, awarded Ruth Dedeaux a judgm ent against Coastal Developm ents Inc. (Coastal) f o r $33,419.76 plus 8% a n nual interest and costs. Af

ter alm ost f

our y ears of accrued interest, Dedeaux’s judgm e nt against Coastal am ounted to $44,113.84. To satisf y the j u d g me n t , D e deaux obtained a writ of execution directing the sherif f to conduct a sale of f

our parcels of Coastal’s l and. Dedeaux purchased the f

our parcels at the sherif

f ’s sale f or $20,000. She l ater sold three of the parcels to third parties f

or $76,500. ¶2. C o a s t a l f

i l e d a com

plaint to set aside the convey ances. The Harr i s o n C o u n t yChancery Court, First J udicial D istrict, f ound that Dedeaux’s w inning b i d of $20,000 was unconscionably low com pared to the parcels’ f

air m arket value. The c h ancellor theref ore ordered Dedeaux to pay Coastal $ 32,386.16 a s reim bursem ent f

or the overage a m ount she received in selling t he three p arcels f or $76,500 and to convey the f ourth unsold parcel back

to Coastal. Dedeaux appeals the chancellor’s judgm ent on the grounds that (1) C oastal cam e bef ore the chancellor with unclean hands; (2) the j udgm ent was unsupported by Mississippi caselaw; (3) the judgm ent im properly awarded Coastal m ultiple inconsistent rem edies; and (4) the judgm ent im

properly punished Dedeaux. ¶3. Upon review, we af f irm the portion of t he chancellor’s judgm ent ordering Dedeaux

to convey the unsold parcel to C oastal and to r e im burse Coastal f

or any surplus resulting f rom the sales contracts. W e f ind, h o w e v e r, that the chancellor erred in calculating the reim bursem ent am ount that Dedeaux o wed Coastal. I n determ ining the parcels’ f air m arket value, the chancellor r elied only on the total sales price of $76,500 f or the three parcels that Dedeaux sold to thir d p a r t i es. The chancellor’s valuation f ailed to take into account, however, the $ 9,458.63 in expenses that Dedeaux paid during the real-estate closings. Af ter subtracting f

rom $ 76,500 both Dedeaux’s $9,458.63 in real-estate e x penses and her $44,113.84 prior judgm e nt against Coastal, we f ind that her surplus o nly am ounted to $22,927.53. W e theref

ore reverse the portion of the chancellor’s judgm e nt determ ining the reim bursem ent a m ount t hat Dedeaux owed Coastal and render a new m onetary judgm ent in Coastal’s f

avor f or $22,927.53.

2FACTS

¶4. O n D e c e m

b e r 15, 2011, the circuit court awarded D edeaux a judgm ent a gainst Coasta l f or $33,419.76 p lus 8% annual interest a nd costs. To satisf y t he judgm ent, Dedeaux sought

a sherif f ’s sale of f

our parcels of

real property owned by

Coastal. As the highest bidder at the October 9, 2015 sherif f ’s sale, Dedeaux obtained the f o ur parcels f

o r $20,000. Coastal claim ed, however, that Dedeaux’s winning bid am ount “was less than the f air m arket value of even any one of the f

our parcels sold, and by caselaw was so inadequate so as to shock the conscience of

the court.” ¶5. On October 23, 2015 , D e d e a u x c o n v e y e d o n e o f the parcels t o Lester Ray and Danielle Mae McKelvin ( the McKelvins) by warranty d eed. On the sam e day , the McKelvins entered into a purchase-m oney m ortga g e with Dedeaux f or $55,196.03, as evidenced by a d e ed of trust executed to Dedeaux. Dedeaux convey ed a second p arcel of lan d t o A u s t i n Alexander by warranty deed dated January 22, 2016, and a third p arcel to John Neidef f er by warranty deed dated March 16, 2016. The parties presented no ev i d e n c e t o show that Dedeaux ever sold the f

o urth parcel. ¶6. Coastal f

iled a com plaint against Dedeaux, the McKelvins, Alexander, and Neidef f er
to set aside the warranty d eeds. Accordin g t o C o a s t a l ’s com p laint, the f

act that the McKelvins entered into a p u r c hase-m oney m ortgage f or m ore than twice the w i nning bid

am ount f or a ll f our o f the parcels “clearly show[ ed] the inadequacy o f the original bid price and that

. . . Dedeaux knew i t was inadequate

. . . .” Coastal also took issue with D edeaux’s

3f

ailure to seek judicial conf i rm ation of the sherif

f ’s sale bef

o re she convey ed three of the parcels to third parties. Coastal theref ore asked the chancellor to perf orm an audit of the sale and to (1) set aside s om e or all of the deeds; (2) award C oastal a n y sales p roceeds over and

a b o v e D e deaux’s judgm ent am ount; or ( 3 ) declare that the j udgm ent against Coastal had been satisf i ed. ¶7. Dedeaux m oved f

or s um m ary judgm ent. The McKelvins, Alexander, and Neidef f er also collectively f

iled a m otion f

or sum m ary j udgm e n t. Coastal r esponded and f iled its own

sum m ary -judgm ent m o tion. Following a hearing, the c hancellor determ ined that $ 10,694.08 (or about f

our y e ars of interest) should be added to the prior j udgm ent the circuit court had awarded Dedeaux. W ith the accrued interest f actored in, Dedeaux’s total judgm e nt against Coastal n ow am o unted to $44,113.84. The chancellor denied the parties’ v arious sum m ary judgm ent m otions a f

ter f inding t h a t g e n u ine i ssues of m aterial f act r em ained due to the f ollowing: (1) no p arty had of f ered any coherent item ization o f undisputed f acts or tim e line of events; (2) the court had t o e n g a g e i n its own calculation as to the t otal am ount Coastal owed Dedeaux; (3) the parties had f ailed to provide sales prices on the parcels c o nvey ed to Alexander a n d N eidef

f er, which prevented a d eterm ination of the reasonableness of those sales; (4) a substantial dispute existed as to the f air m arket v alue of

the properties at issue; (5) a llegations existed as to whether the M c K e l v i ns, Alexander, and Neidef f e r were bona f

ide purchasers o f the l and f

or value without notice; and (6) no evidence had been provided as to Coastal’s location on the date of the sherif

f ’s sale.

4¶8. On March 2, 2017, the chancellor e ntered a f inal judgm ent to dism iss t he McKelvins, Alexander, and Neidef

f er f rom t he litigation. The chancellor noted that C oastal h ad m oved f or the dism issal and that the parties had advised the court of their agreem ent to the dism issal. As a result, the chancellor dism issed with prejudice Coastal’s claim s against t he McKelvins, Alexander, and Neidef

f er, which included any claim s related to the parcels convey ed to those parties. Coastal reserved all i t s c l a i ms against Dedeaux, which the chancellor heard on March 13, 2017. ¶9. Following the M a r c h 1 3 , 2017 hearing, the chancellor e ntered an o rder regarding Coastal’s rem aining claim s against Dedeaux. T he chancellor f o und that t he agreed j udgm ent
to dism iss the McKelvins, A lexander, Neidef f er, and any claim s t o the p arcels the y had purchased f

rom Dedeaux r endered m oot the issue of w hether t he f oreclosure sale should be

set a s ide. The chancellor f urther f ound, however, that issues rem ained as t o the parcels’ f air

m arket value, whether the judgm ent against Coastal had b e e n s atisf i ed, and w h ether Dedeaux had realized a prof

it bey ond what she was owed. ¶10. Dedeaux subm itted to t he chancellor t he af f idavit of M ichael Madden, a r eal-estate broker and i nvestor. Madden’s af f idavit d iscussed the 5.3-acre parcel of land that Dedeaux had sold to the M cKelvi n s . A ccording to Madden, i n August or Septem ber 2015, he had clients interested in purchasing the parcel f or $18,000 to $22,000. The ch a n c e llor f ound, however, that w hile Madden provided the am ount his clients w ould have been willing to pay f or t he 5.3-acre parcel, he never p rovided an estim a te as t o the parcel’s f a ir m arket value.

5The chancellor also noted that Coastal had s ubm itted an a f f idavit f rom M i l b u r n Mallette, who s tated that he sold the 5.3-acre parcel to two individuals f o r $ 1 2 0,000 and that the McKelvins h ad agreed to purchase the property f rom those individuals f

o r $140,000. Coastal provided the purported contract f or the sale a n d p u r chase of the property

. Although the docum ent was dated June 6 , 2013, and ref erenced t he McKelvins, the d ocum ent was neither signed nor notarized and f ailed to include a description of the subject property

. ¶11. W i th regard t o the other t hree parcels at issue, the chancellor f ound that D edeaux had subm itted an af

f idavit f rom Denise Fell, who valued two of the parcels at $7,500 each and the t hird parcel at $10,000. Fell m ade these valuations in A ugust or Septem ber 2015, which

was f our to six m onths b e f

ore t he convey a n ces t o Alexander and Neidef f e r. The chancellor f ound the parties had f

ailed to provide any inf

o rm ation o n the actual am o unts that Alexander and Neidef

f er had paid f

or their parcels. ¶12. The chancellor determ ined that the sale of the 5.3-acre parcel to the McKelvins “m ore than satisf

ied the outstanding judgm ent” against Coastal. The chancellor then stated:
It is theref

ore unclear t o this [ c ]ourt how R uth D edeaux was able to obtain a [ s]herif f ’ s [ d]eed to three additional parcels of

. . . [ Coastal’s] property to satisf y the D ecem

ber 15, 2011[ d]ecree of [ j]udgm ent the [ c ] ircuit [ c]ourt entered in her f

avor. In addition[ , ] this [ c ]ourt is unable to determ ine the f a i r m arket value of the 5.3[ -]acre p arcel f r o m t h e e v i d ence presented by the parties. If the [ c]ourt sim

ply averages M r. Madden’s $22,000 proposed s ale p rice with the $120,000 contract f

o r sale, the f

air m arket v alue is $71,000.00. Ruth Dedeaux sold the 5.3[ -]acre parcel to the McKelvins f or $55,196.03. The testim onial evidence and exhibits presented by both parties at the
6hearing on M arch 13, 2017, i s incom prehensible. The parties have f ailed to of f er proof s uf

f icient f or this [ c]ourt to establis h a f a i r m arket value f

or the properties i n question. The only f act that is clear to this [ c]ourt is that w ith the sale of the 5.3[ -]acre parcel, the d ebt owed by Coastal

. . . t o Ruth Dedeaux was satisf

i ed.

. . . The [ c]ourt m

u st d eterm i ne the f

a i r m arket v alue of the 5.3[ -]acre parcel, the

. . . [ parcel sold to Alexander, a n d t h e p a r c el sold to Neidef f er]; and

. . . [ o]nce the f

air m a rket value is determ ined, the [ c ]ourt m ust determ ine if Ruth Dedeaux received f unds over and above t he a m ount owed to her. ¶13. Af ter once again stating that t he sale of t h e 5

. 3

- a cre parcel to the McKelvins had satisf i ed Dedeaux’s judgm ent against C oastal, the chancellor o rdered Dedeaux t o convey the unsold parcel to Coastal within thirty day s. The c hancellor also ordered the parties to set a hearing date within sixty day s so he could determ ine the f air m arket value of the three parcels
convey ed to the McKelvins, Alexander, and Neidef f e r . I n addition, the chancellor ordered

e a c h party to provide (1) a v aluation of the three c onvey e d parcels a nd how that va l u a t i o n

was reached; (2) a ny related exhib i t s ; (3) a witness list; (4) “the sales price f o r each of the three parcels f

or any s ale that occurred within the p ast seven (7) y ears”; and (5) a c opy of the HUD, any sales contract related to each t r a n s a c t i on, and a copy of the tax assessor’s valuation of

the parcels f

or the past seven y e ars. ¶14. Dedeaux f

iled a m otion to reconsider or to am end the c h ancellor’s judgm ent. Af ter f inding t hat he had been u nable to adjudicate all the issues between the parties in his May 15, 2017 order, the chancellor f ound that the prior order f a iled to constitute a f

i n a l a ppealable judgm ent. As a result, the chancellor denied Dedeaux’s m otion as untim ely

. ¶15. Following a Septem ber 18, 2017 hearing on his request f or a dditional inf

orm ation, the

7chancellor entered his order on Novem b er 1, 2017. Based on the parties’ subm issions, the chancellor f

o u n d the f

o llowing: (1) in 2015, the tax assessor’s total valuation of the f our parcels am ounted to $79,706; (2) a certif ied residential appraiser had testif ied that at the t im e of the sherif

f ’s sale on October 9, 2015, the f air m arket value of the f our parcels was $85,100; (3) Dedeaux sold three o f the parcels to t he McKelvins, Alexander, and Neidef f er f or $76,500; (4) Dedeaux’s w inning bid of $20,000 am ounted to 25% of the 2 0 15 tax assessor’s valuation f

or all f o ur parcels, 24% of the a

p praised f air m arket value f

or the f our parcels, and 26% o f the total contract sales prices she received f or the t hree parcels she sold. Based on this i nf

orm a t i o n , t h e c hancellor concluded that, regardless of which of the three values he applied—the appraiser’s valuation, the contract sales p rices, o r the tax assessor’s valuations—Dedeaux’s winning bid am o unt of $20,000 was unconscionably low. ¶16. The chancellor adopted the actual contract sales prices o f the three parcels Dedeaux sold a s the f

air m arket value of those three parcels. Using th a t a mo u n t of $ 76,500, the chancellor subtracted $44,113.84 (the am o unt of the p rior judgm ent plus the 8% annual interest and costs) and $20,000 (the am o unt o f Dedeaux’s winning bid). B a s e d o n t hese calculations, the c hancellor c oncluded that “the overage am ount

. . . [ Dedeaux] realized by purchasing these three properties at the f oreclosure sale f

or an unconscionably low bid[ ] is $12,386.16.” Af

ter m a king these f

indings, the chancellor r eaf f irm ed his pr i o r ruling that required Dedeaux to convey the unsold parcel t o Coastal. The c hancellor also ordered Dedeaux to pay Coastal $12,386.16 “ as reim burse me n t o f the overage am ount

. . . [ she]

8realized as a result of her unconscionably

low bid.” ¶17. Coastal f

iled a m otion to c orrect the j udgm ent, and Dedeaux f i led a m otion to alter or

am end the j u d g ment. The chancellor denied Dedeaux’s m otion but f ound that Coastal

correct l y a r g ued t hat Dedeaux’s $20,000 bid was n ot paid t o any one and should not have been deducted fr o m t

h e o v e r a g e am ount Dedeaux realized. The chancellor theref ore changed his prior judgm ent t o ref

lect that Dedeaux owed C oastal $32,386.16. Aggrieved, Dedeaux appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶18. “W e will not disturb a chancellor’s f i ndings unless they are m anif estly wrong, clearly

erroneous, or apply the wrong legal s tandard. W e review questions o f law de novo.” Campbell Props. Inc. v. Cook , 258 So. 3d 273, 275 (¶9) (Miss. 2018) (citation om itted). DISCUSSION I. Unclean Hands ¶19. Dedeaux f

irst asserts t hat t he ch a n c e l l o r erroneously awarded Coastal an equitable

rem edy because Coastal cam e bef ore the chancellor with unclean hands. In his Novem ber 1, 2 017 order, the chancellor f ou n d t h a t C oastal had unclean h ands because its f our-y ear delay in p ay ing the prior m o netary judgm e nt f orced Dedeaux to pursue a f oreclosure sale. The chancellor a lso f

ound, however, that Dedeaux cam e bef ore him with unclean hands because she purchased Coastal’s f our land parcels with an unconscionably low bid. ¶20. “ The doctrine of unclean h ands provides that he who com e s into equity m ust come

9w i t h clean hands.” Vincent v. Rickman , 167 So. 3d 245, 249 (¶11) ( Miss. Ct. App. 201 5 )

(internal q u o t a t i o n m ark om itted). As our caselaw explains, “the c lean-hands doctrine prevents a com

p l a i n i n g p a rty f

rom o btaining equitable relief in c o urt when he i s guilty of willf ul m isconduct in t he transaction at issue.” Id. In the context o f d om estic-relations

m atters, however, w e have held that “th e e n t r y of a judgm ent f or arrearages cleanses the
pay or’s hands and allows the chancellor to review the m erits of the pay or’s request f

or . . . [ relief ].” Dixon v. Dixon , 238 So. 3d 1191, 1198 (¶25) ( M i s s. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation m ark om itted). ¶21. H e r e , t h e c h a n c e l lor f ound that the sale o f the 5.3-acre parcel t o the M c K e l v i n s essentially cleansed Coastal’s hands by satisf y i ng its past-due m onetary judgm e n t t o Dedeaux. Having s o f

ound, the chancellor was f ree to proceed to a review of the m erits of Coastal’s claim against D edeaux. W e t heref ore f ind no m erit to Dedeaux’s a rgum ent that the “clean-hands doctrine” continued to bar Coastal’s request f or equitable relief

. II. Rem aining Issues ¶22. Dedeaux’s three rem ai n i n g a s s i g n me n t s o f e r r o r c o n t e n d that t he chancellor’s judgm ent was unsupported b y l egal precede n t a nd awarded Coastal m ultiple inconsistent

rem edies while sim

ultaneously punishing Dedeaux. F or the sake o f brevity , we address these
argum ents together. ¶23. I n ordering Dedeaux to c onvey the unsold parcel back to Coastal and t o r e i mb u r s e Coastal f or the overage she r eceived f rom the sale of the three other parcels, the chancellor

1 0relied on Allied Steel Corp. v. Cooper , 607 So. 2 d 113 (M i s s . 1 9 9 2 ). In Allied Steel the

Mississippi Suprem e Court held that “absent any irregularity in the conduct o f a f oreclosure sale, i t m ay not b e set aside unless the sales price is so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the Court or to am ount to f raud.” Id. at 118 (internal quotation m a r k om i tted). “A legal determ ination of t he a dequacy of the purchase p rice is p redicated upon t he establishm ent of the f air m arket value of the property

. The determ ination of the f air m arket value is a question f or the trier of f

a ct.” Id. a t 118-19 (citations om itted). In determ ining the adequacy of a bid price, the Allied court f

u rther recognized that “[ a] survey of Mississippi cases concluded that the threshold of unconscionability [ f or a bid price] lies around f orty percent of f

air m arket value.” Id. at 120. ¶24. Here, the chancellor adopted as the f air m arket value t he total contract sales prices f or the t hree parcels that Dedeaux sold. Based on the overall sales price of $76 , 500, the chancellor concluded t hat Dedeaux’s bid of $20,000 a m ounted to 26% of t he parcels’ f air

m arket v alue. B ecause this f e ll w ell below the general l y a c c e pted threshold of 40%, the chancellor determ ined that Dedeaux’s bid price was unconscionable. See i d. As the trier of f act, the c h ancellor possessed the authority to determ ine the parcels’ f air m a rket value, and

we “will respect t he trial court’s f indings of f

a ct when th e y a re supported by r easonable evidence in the record a nd are not m anif estly wrong.” Hartman v. McInnis , 996 S o. 2d 704, 711 ( ¶23) (Miss. 2007) (citing Allied Steel , 607 So. 2d at 1 18-19). Neither p arty raises any

1 1dispute a s to the chancellor’s conclusion of the parcels’ f air m a rket value, 1 and upon review,

we f i nd that s u

bstantial c red i b le evidence supports the chancellor’s determ ination on this point. ¶25. Although the chancellor f ound Dedeaux’s b id p r i c e t o b e unconscionably low, he expressed reluctance to set aside the land sales to the McKelvins, A lexander, a n d Neidef f er be c a u s e doing so would “af f ect the property rights of innocent by standers t o the parties’ wrongdoing” and b ecause Coastal had agreed to dism iss those individuals f rom th e litigation. The chancellor did, however, reaf f irm his p rior ru l i ng f

o r Dedeaux to convey the unsold parcel o f land to Coastal, which he f ound still had t he ba s i c e f f e c t of setting aside the f oreclosure sale. S

e e Allied Steel , 607 So. 2d at 1 18 (holding t hat a f oreclosure sale m ay be set aside where “the sales p rice is so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the Court or

to am ount to f

raud”) (internal quotation m ark om itted). ¶26. The c hancellor also f ound that Dedeaux’s sale of the three properties f or $76,500 f

ully satisf i ed, and thereby ex t i n g u i shed, her p rior m onetary judgm ent plus interest a g ainst Coastal

1 In h er ap p e llate b rief

, D e d eau x states th e f

o llo w in g : [ D ed eau x ] read ily ad m its th at, acco rd in g to h er ap p raisal en t e r e d in to ev id en ce at th e f

i n al h earin g o n th is m atter o n M arch 1 3 , 2 0 1 7 [ ,]

. . . h er b id at t h e . . . s h erif

f ’ s s a l e d id n o t m eet th e 3 6 % to 4 0 % u n co n scio n ab ility stan d ard

. . . a s t h e $ 2 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 b id w a s a p p ro x im ately 2 4 % o f e ith e r th e $ 8 5 ,1 0 0

. 0 0 ap p raisal o r th e $ 8 5 ,0 0 0 f air m ark et v a l u e a s d eterm in ed b y th e ch an cery c o u rt. A c co rd in g l y , . . . [ D ed eau x ] d o es n o t d isp u te th e co u r t’s d eterm in atio n o f said f

air m ark et v alu e , ex clu s iv e o f

. . . [ th e u n s o ld p arcel] , as $ 7 6 ,5 0 0 .0 0

. . . . 1 2f

or $44,113.84. As a result, the chancellor next considered whether Dedeaux had received
any overage am o unt f

rom the l and sales t hat should be returned to Coastal. As t his Court has previously recognized, w here a f oreclosure s ale results in f unds over the am o unt owed on the l a n d a nd the f

oreclosure c osts, the judgm ent debtor is e ntitled to the surplus. Estate of
W alters v. Freeman , 904 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 0 04). See also Hinton

v. Rolison , 175 S o. 3 d 1281, 1285 (¶11) (Miss. 2 015); O’Neal v. Ketchum , 141 So. 3d 45, 51 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (Jam e s, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ¶27. Here, the f

o reclosure sale itself did not result in a surplus to D edeaux. The chancellor conclud e d , h o w e v er, that Dedeaux’s subsequent contracts to sell the three p roperties f or $76,500 n o t o n l y e xtinguished the judgm ent against Coastal but also resulted in a surplus.
In Central Financial S

e rvices Inc. v. Spears , 425 So. 2d 403, 403 (Miss. 1983), the Suprem e Court considered a sim ilar q uestion reg a r d ing “ whether a m ortgagee, who purchases the

m ortgaged prop e r t y a t a f oreclosure sale[ ,] m

ust account to the m ortgagor f or the surplus arising f rom a sale of the property by the m ortgagee w ithin t wo weeks f or two and one-half tim es the am ount b id by the m ortgagee at the f ore closure sale.” The Suprem e Court concluded that the b i d a m o unt was inadequate b ut that the inadequacy did not require overturning the f

oreclosure sal e . Id. at 405. Instead, the S uprem e Court held that the

m ortgagee was required to account to the m o rtgagor f or the surplus. Id. ¶28. In the present case, Dedeaux raises no dispute as to the chancellor’s f i ndings on the parcels’ f air m arket value. Based on this f act a nd t he holding of Central Financial Services ,

1 3we f

ind no e rror in the chancellor’s d eterm ination that D e d e aux was required to return to Coastal any overage resulting f rom the sale of the three properties. W e theref ore af f irm the portion of the chancellor’s judgm ent requiring Dedeaux to return t he unsold parcel to Coastal and t o reim

burse Coastal f

or any surplus resulting f

rom t he sale of the other three properties. ¶29. W e m

ust, however, r e v e r s e a n d r e n d e r t h e portion o f the chancellor’s judgm ent calculating the exact am ount of the reim bursem ent. In determ ining the am ount o f t he surplus that Dedeaux owed C oastal, the c hancellor looked only a t t h e t otal sales prices Dedeaux received f or the three sold parcels. Although D edeaux contracted to s ell the t hree parcels f or $76,500, the record r e f

l e c t s t h a t she also incurred $9,458.63 in related expenses (closing

costs and f

ees). Af ter deducting f

rom $76,500 these related expenses and Dedeaux’s prior judgm ent plus interest, w e f ind tha t the surplus am ounted to $ 22,927.53 r ather than the $32,386.16 t he c hancellor calculated. W e theref ore reverse the chancellor’s judgm ent as to the am ount of

Coastal’s m onetary

award and render a new judgm e n t in Coastal’s f avor f or $22,927.53. CONCLUSION ¶30. W e af

f irm the portion of the chancellor’s judgm e n t ordering Dedeaux to convey the unsold parcel of l and to Coastal and to reim burse Coastal f

or any surplus resulting f

rom the sales of the o ther three parcels. H owever, we reverse the am ount of the m onetary j udgm ent to Coastal and render a new m onetary judgm ent in Coastal’s f

avor f or $22,927.53. ¶31. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.

1 4BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,

WESTBROOKS, McDO N A L D , LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. W ILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

1 5