NO. 07-04-0430-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D DECEMBER 14, 2005

______________________________ TERRY KEITH HAMMOND, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLE E

_________________________________ FROM THE 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF WHEE LER COUNTY; NO. 4010; HONORAB LE JOHN T . FORBIS, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
MEMORAND UM OPINION Appel la ntTerry Keith Hammond challenges a theft conviction for w hich he was placed on commun ity super vision f or five ye ars and ajudgment revoking communit y supervision. Presenting five points of error, he maintains (1) thetheft conviction cannot be upheld where ownership of the property was disputed; (2) the mot ion to quash the2

indictmentshould have been granted; (3) the court erroneously allowed amendment of the i ndictmen t; (4) his m otion for instructe d verdict

should have bee n granted ; a nd (5 )
co mmunity

supervision was illegally revoked be cause there was no proof he violated a term of commun ity

supervision. We have no jurisdiction to consider points o ne through four and affirm the judgment revoking appellant’s community supervision.
On June 4, 2004, appel lant was conv icted of theft and placed on commun ity supervision. No motio n for new tr ia l or notice of appeal was filed chal lenging the conviction. Three weeks later, on June 25, the State filed a motion to revokecommunit y supervision alleging appellant had vi olated the following condition: [d]efendantshal l cease a nd desist any remarks made verbally or in writing againstthe Dist rict Judg e, the Dist rict Attorney’s Office or employees, the ShamrockEconomic Development Corporat ion, it’ s [sic] bo ard members and /or employees and any Attorney involved in a ny civil actions involving Shamrock Economic

Develop ment Corp oration.
Atthe hearing on the State’s motion, appellant plead not true to the vio lation and following presentation of evidence, on July 12, 2004, the trial co u rt found appellant had violated the condition and revo ked commu nity supe rvision. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on August 4, 2004, expressing an intent to “file his motion for new trial, and fully appeal from all phases of his conviction, overturn of his Motion for Probation, denial of his Writ of Ha beas Cor pus, deni al of his Motions to Quash a nd from al l other o rders . . . .”1 The time in which to f ile th e notice of appeal expired on Su nday, July 4, 2004.

Under rule 4.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appel late Procedure, the deadline was extended to Monday, July 5. 3 A defendant must file a written notice of appea l with the trial court clerk within 30 days after the da te sentence is imposed. Te x. R. App. P . 25.2(c) & 26.2(a)(1). The Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for a 15-day ex tension in which to file the notice of a ppeal if it is accompanied by a motion for extension of time in compliance with Rule 10.5(b)(2 ). See Tex. R. A pp. P. 26 .3. Appellant’s sentence for the t heft conviction was imposed on June 4, 2004. The deadline for perfecting an appeal was Monday, July 5, or 15 days thereafter if accompanied bya motion for extension of time. 1 Appellant’s n o tice filed on August 4, 2004, does not invoke our

jurisdic tion to consider points o f error on e through four whi ch are directed at the original theft con viction. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.Cr .App. 1998). See also Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999). However, the notice is timely for consideration of point five, by which appellant challenges the revocation of July 23, 2004

. Background
ShamrockEconomic Development Corporation (EDC) gu arante ed a note for ShamrockBroadcast ing to purchase KRMN radio station from James Turvaville. As a resultof the note, the EDC had a lie n on the bui lding an d the rad io statio n’s equi pment.2 Appellant arg ues, [f]inally the probation revocation occured [sic] without any

evidence except David Rushing, a protagonist, proported [sic] to have been manipulating 4 David Rushing served as direc tor of theEDC. Without the EDC’s approval, appellant was broughtin by Shamrock Broa dcasting t o manage the radio station. The working arrang eme ntwas for a ppellan t to manag e the stat ion and the EDC to handl e accoun ts payable and rece ivable. Appell ant was t he only person w ith a key to the po st o ffice box where bills and checks were mailed. An escrowaccount was opened to deposit revenues from advertisers.
Sometimein 2002, Rushing discovered that recordsreflecte d some businesses had notpaid for advertising. After contacting the businesses, they provided copies of checks to Rushing reflecti ng appel lant’s w ife had cashed so me and others had been deposited in appellant’s personal account. Some checks had the payee line altered to show payment to Monster FM.com., an entity ma intained by appel lant. Appellant

was evicted from the building housing the radio station. Suit was filed againstShamrock Broadcasting to foreclose on the note and a ci vil suit was also filed against appellant. Both suits were pending at the time of the underlying trial. Having previously concluded that appellant’s first four contentions are not before us,
we address point of error five , by whic h appell ant chal lenges t he judgme nt rev oking his community

supervision. Appell ant’s en tire argument on this point consists of one sentence withoutcitation to any l egal aut hority or reference s to the record. 2 In his reply brief, the onlyan Internet computer co ntr aption which he alleged showed uncomplimentary remarks

againsthimself and allegedly Judge Forbisand it was not shown that appellant put anything on the me ssage bo ard and a ppellan t denied having done so.” 5 support for point five, without citation to legal authorit y , is a statement that the State’s evidence “consisted of ramblings by Barney and the opinions and suppositionsby Rushing

. . . .” Althoug h Rule 38.1(h) of the Texas Rules of Appe llate Procedure requires that argumentbe supported by citations to authorities and record references, in the interest of justice we will review the evidence presented at the revocation hearing.
When reviewing a judgment revoking community supervision, the sol e question is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex.Cr. App. 1984); Ja ckson v. S tate, 645S.W.2d 30 3, 305 (T ex.Cr.Ap p. 1983). In a revocation proceeding the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the p robationer

violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion t o revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, th e trial court abus es its di scretion in revoki ng commun ity supervision. Cardona , 665 S.W.2d at 494. In determining the s ufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2 d 419, 42 1 (Tex.C r.App. 197 9).
The State al leged th at appel lant vio lated pa ra graph 19 of the conditions of community supervision. Paragraph 19 provides:6

[d]e fendant s hall cease and desist any remarks made verbally or in writing againstthe District Judge, the District Attorney’s Office or em ployees, the ShamrockEconomic Development Corporat ion, it’ s [sic] bo ard members and /or employees and any Attorney involved in a ny civil actions involving Shamrock Economic

Develop ment Corp oration. Following imposition of

community supervision, the State presented evidence that
on June 21 and June 22 several postings referencing community personalities in violation of paragraph 19 appeared on the message board of appellant’s website. A ccording to the evidence, the domain name of MonsterFM.com was purchased by appellan t, and he was the registered owner. Appellant, as administrator or webmaster, controlled the con tent of the messa ge board

. In his defense, appellant testified he transferred control of the message boar d on May 29, in anticipation of the conditions of community supervision. He also testified that approxi mately a dozen pe rsons thro ughout th e country had the password to gain access to the message board and denied posting the questionable informati on. However, based
on the preponderance of the evidence standard, the trial court found the postings originated from an administrator

in Shamrock and not

distant points in the country. He further found that the contentof

the messa ges poste d was “pe culiarly within the know ledge of ” appell ant. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable the trial court’s ruling, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revokin g app ellant’s community supervision. Appellant’s fifth point of error is overruled.7

Having concluded we have n o j urisdiction over the original theft conviction and judgment of June 4, 2004, we affirm the judgment of July 23, 2004, revoking Ter ry Kei th Hammond’s community supervision.
Don H. Reavis Justice Do not publish.