2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-19-2013

Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 12-2208

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 PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-2208

___________

MICHAEL GWYNN; 

BRENDON RYAN, 

 Appellants

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; CHARLES RAMSEY; 

PATRICK KELLY; MELVIN SINGLETON; 

SALVATORE FEDE; FRANK PALOMBO

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 11-cv-01128)

District Judge: Honorable Robert E. Kelly

___________

Argued April 16, 2013

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: June 19, 2013)
2

Brian M. Puricelli [ARGUED]

Law Offices of Brian Puricelli

691 Washington Crossing Road

Newtown, PA 18940-0000

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants

Kelly S. Diffily

Jane L. Istvan [ARGUED]

Shant H. Zakarian

City of Philadelphia

Law Department

17th Floor

1515 Arch Street

One Parkway

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

City of Philadelphia Police Officers Michael Gwynn 

and Brendon Ryan appeal a summary judgment entered in 

favor of several of their fellow officers and the City. 

Appellants asserted constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, statutory claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 

and various state law claims. For the reasons that follow, we 

will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
3

I

As this appeal comes to us following summary 

judgment, we review the facts in the light most favorable to 

Appellants. See Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 

181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013).

A

On December 15, 2009, while on duty, Appellants 

stopped and frisked men they believed were engaged in an

illegal drug transaction. One of the men they frisked, 

Keyshawn Artis, accused Appellants of stealing money from 

him. Appellants denied the accusation, and told Artis to 

―move along.‖

When Appellants returned to headquarters, a superior 

officer, Sergeant Salvatore Fede, ordered them into his office. 

After informing Appellants that a complaint about their 

behavior had been made to the Internal Affairs Bureau, 

Sergeant Fede took Appellants to Captain Melvin Singleton’s 

office. Appellants did not feel free to leave because they had 

been ―ordered to be in the captain’s office.‖ App. 285. After 

waiting fifteen to twenty minutes, Appellants and Sergeant 

Fede were joined by Captain Singleton, then-Sergeant Patrick 

Kelly, and Lieutenant Frank Palumbo.

Appellants were instructed to stay in Captain 

Singleton’s office until officers from the Internal Affairs 

Bureau arrived. While Appellants waited, Captain Singleton 

offered them water and told them that they could watch 

television, but instructed them not to use their cell phones. 

Appellants then were questioned about their interaction with 

Artis, including whether they had taken money from him. In 
4

that regard, Appellants were asked to remove their jackets 

and Gwynn was asked to remove his outer vest. Appellants 

also were told to pull out their pockets, pull up their pant legs 

and pull down their socks, and open their wallets. Finally, 

Appellants were told that cooperation would be in their ―best 

interest‖ insofar as it could demonstrate to Internal Affairs 

that they did not have Artis’s money when they returned from 

their patrol. During the hour or so they spent in Captain 

Singleton’s office while awaiting the arrival of Internal 

Affairs officers, Appellants did as they were told because the 

orders came from their ―superiors and supervisors,‖ and they 

feared ―discipline and possible loss of employment‖ if they 

disobeyed. App. 241.

Upon their arrival at Captain Singleton’s office, two 

Internal Affairs officers questioned Appellants for about 

fifteen to twenty minutes and then left briefly to talk to Artis, 

the complainant. Appellants were told to stay put until the 

Internal Affairs officers returned after speaking with Artis. 

As Appellants waited, Gwynn asked for permission to call his 

wife to arrange for her to pick up their son, and then-Sergeant 

Kelly granted permission. The Internal Affairs officers 

returned, stated that they believed Artis, and told Appellants 

that they were not needed for anything further that day. 

Appellants left Captain Singleton’s office around 8:15 p.m. 

and when they opened their lockers that evening, it appeared 

as though they had been searched.

B

In February 2011, Appellants sued Captain Singleton, 

Lieutenant Kelly, Sergeant Fede, and Lieutenant Palumbo 

along with the City and its Police Commissioner, Charles 

Ramsey. Since Appellants’ claims arose under federal and 
5

state law, the District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.

Appellants served requests for admission in June 2011 

that went unanswered until the beginning of August 2011, 

after the 30-day deadline prescribed by the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Because 

Appellants’ requests for admission were deemed admitted by 

operation of Rule 36, Appellees filed a motion in the District 

Court on September 9, 2011, to withdraw those admissions. 

The District Court granted that motion, gave Appellees ten 

additional days to respond, and extended the discovery period 

for 60 days.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment 

and the District Court granted the motion of Appellees. 

Gwynn and Ryan filed this timely appeal, which we have 

jurisdiction to hear pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II

Gwynn and Ryan first argue that the District Court 

abused its discretion when it allowed Appellees to withdraw 

their admissions. Had those admissions remained 

undisturbed, Appellants argue, their summary judgment 

motion would have been granted. Because the District Court 

did not err when it allowed Appellees to withdraw their 

admissions, we reject Appellants’ first argument.

Rule 36(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

provides that a request for admission is deemed admitted if a 

party does not respond within 30 days. Nevertheless, courts 

may permit withdrawal of the admission if: (1) doing so 

―would promote the presentation of the merits of the action‖; 
6

and (2) ―the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the 

requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the 

merits.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Courts may consider other 

factors as well, such as whether the moving party can show 

good cause for the delay, see Conlon v. United States, 474 

F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 2007), but they are not required to do 

so, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).

Here, the District Court’s discretionary decision to 

permit Appellees to withdraw the admissions was consistent 

with both requirements of Rule 36(b). Upholding the 

admissions would have significantly interfered with 

Appellees’ ability to present the merits of their case, and 

Appellants have failed to identify any prejudice they suffered 

as a result of the withdrawal. In their brief, Appellants state 

that counsel ―detrimentally relied‖ upon the admissions as 

indicated at pages 6–8 of their opposition to the motion in the 

District Court. There, Appellants argued that counsel had not 

moved to compel discovery of certain documents in reliance 

on the admissions—a concern that was adequately addressed 

by the extension of the discovery deadline. Appellants 

further argued that counsel had ―developed a litigation 

strategy that placed reliance on the conclusive facts deemed 

from the Admissions.‖ Dkt. No. 9 at 8. ―The prejudice 

contemplated by Rule 36(b),‖ however ―is not simply that the 

party who obtained the admission now has to convince the 

jury of its truth. Something more is required.‖ Bergemann v. 

United States, 820 F.2d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 1987).

In sum, because the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion when it withdrew Appellees’ deemed admissions, it 

did not err when it denied Appellants’ motion for summary 

judgment, which was premised upon the efficacy of those 

admissions.
7

III

Appellants next argue that the District Court erred 

when it entered summary judgment against them on their 

constitutional claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well 

as their claims for false imprisonment and violations of the 

Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

333.101 et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 201 et seq.

1

 We exercise plenary review over summary 

judgments, Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 

(3d Cir. 2010), and will affirm if ―the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,‖ Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a).

A

Appellants’ constitutional arguments are founded upon 

the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, as applied to the States through the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Gwynn and Ryan 

claim they were unreasonably seized when they were ordered 

to wait in Captain Singleton’s office until the Internal Affairs 

officers arrived, and that they were unreasonably searched 

when their superiors asked them to turn out their pockets, take 

off outer layers of clothing, and reveal the contents of their 

socks and wallets. Although it is not entirely clear from their 

brief, Appellants seem also to contend that Appellees 

conducted an unreasonable search of their lockers. Viewing 

 

1 Appellants also asserted a First Amendment claim for 

retaliation in their complaint, but they do not now challenge 

its dismissal.
8

the record in the light most favorable to Appellants, the 

District Court did not err when it granted summary judgment 

because Appellants failed to establish either that they were 

seized or that they were subjected to an unreasonable search.

1

A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment only 

when ―his freedom of movement is restrained‖ either ―by 

means of physical force or a show of authority.‖ United 

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (explaining 

that ―[o]nly when such restraint is imposed is there any 

foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards‖). 

Police officers, no less than civilians, are protected by the 

Fourth Amendment, and, in some circumstances, they may be 

seized as the result of an order given by another officer. See 

Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622, 637 (7th Cir. 

2002) (recognizing ―the well-settled rule that men and women 

do not surrender their freedoms when joining the police 

force‖); see also Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 196 (2d 

Cir. 2001) (explaining that when police officers are seized in 

the context of a criminal investigation, probable cause is 

required).

This does not mean, however, that every order a police 

officer feels compelled to obey amounts to a seizure. Public 

employees, like their counterparts in the private sector, often 

must comply with orders issued by supervisors, and may 

suffer work-related consequences if they disobey. See INS v. 

Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (―Ordinarily, when people 

are at work their freedom to move about has been 

meaningfully restricted . . . by the workers’ voluntary 

obligations to their employers.‖). This is especially true for 

police officers, who are part of a ―paramilitary organization 
9

that must maintain the highest degree of discipline, 

confidentiality, efficiency, and espirit [sic] de corps among its 

officers, who are the first line of defense against lawlessness.‖ 

Driebel, 298 F.3d at 638–39. Officers are trained to obey 

orders from their superiors and may be subject to discipline if 

they fail to do so. Id. at 639. Characterizing work-related 

demands as seizures whenever an officer feels compelled to 

obey them would not further any interest protected by the 

Fourth Amendment, and it would significantly interfere with 

the effective management of police forces. See Mendenhall, 

446 U.S. at 553–54 (explaining that the purpose of the Fourth 

Amendment is ―to prevent arbitrary and oppressive 

interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and 

personal security of individuals‖ (quoting United States v. 

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976))); O’Connor v. 

Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (acknowledging ―the 

common-sense realization that government offices could not 

function if every employment decision became a 

constitutional matter‖ (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 

138, 143 (1983))).

To determine whether a police officer has been seized 

for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, our sister courts of 

appeals have recognized that the distinction between 

situations in which the police department issues orders ―in its 

capacity as an employer‖ and those in which it acts ―as the 

law enforcement arm of the state.‖ Pennington v. Metro. 

Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 511 F.3d 647, 652 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Driebel, 298 F.3d at 637); see also 

Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007). An

officer is not seized ―simply because he believes that he 

[would] lose his job‖ or suffer other work-related 

consequences if he were to leave the police station or fail to 
10

report to a designated area. Pennington, 511 F.3d at 652. 

Rather, an officer is seized if a reasonable person in his 

position would believe that he were not actually free to 

disobey the command—that is, if he feared he would be 

detained if he attempted to leave. Id. We agree with the 

Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 

that the distinction between police conduct qua employer and 

police conduct qua law enforcement agent is a valid one.

For example, in Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, an 

officer who was subject to an internal investigation was 

ordered to ―stand by‖ at the police station until he received 

further instructions. 298 F.3d at 629. While waiting at the 

garage, he was neither told that he was the subject of a 

criminal investigation nor was he read his Miranda rights. Id. 

at 643. He received overtime pay for the assignment and 

retained possession of his police-issued equipment while 

waiting. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that this was not a 

seizure, explaining that the officer ―must have been aware 

that no officer was permitted to use force or any show of 

authority to prevent him from departing the garage if he so 

chose.‖ Id. 

Driebel also addressed the claims of another officer 

under investigation, who was ordered to report to Internal 

Affairs headquarters for questioning. While there, he was 

advised that he was under criminal investigation and read his 

Miranda rights, and he was not permitted to use the restroom 

unaccompanied. Id. at 648. Police policy required, however, 

that officers be told their rights any time they were 

questioned, even as part of an internal investigation. Id. The 

Internal Affairs officers also had a legitimate reason for 

supervising his trips to the restroom, namely, to ensure that he 

was not communicating with others about the investigation. 
11

Id. In addition, the officer was not told that he was suspected 

of any particular crime; he was not addressed in a threatening 

manner; he retained his police-issued equipment; and he was 

compensated for his time at the headquarters. Id. Although 

noting that this second incident was a more borderline case, 

the Seventh Circuit also determined that this was not a 

seizure. Id. at 648–49.

The Sixth Circuit applied the same analysis in 

Pennington v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and 

Davidson County. There, while in a bar, off-duty police 

officer Pennington was involved in an altercation in which he 

identified himself as a police officer. 511 F.3d at 648. 

Officers in his department were required to comply with 

department policy whenever they invoked their authority as 

police officers, and that policy forbade intoxication. Id. at 

649. Another officer who arrived at the scene asked 

Pennington to return to the station for a breathalyzer test as 

part of an internal investigation. Pennington was neither 

handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the police car nor 

read his Miranda rights, and he was allowed to return home 

before completing a report. Id. He did not believe that he 

would be forcibly detained if he attempted to leave; rather he 

claimed he was ―compelled by the threat of job loss‖ to 

comply. Id. at 652. The Sixth Circuit explained that ―[a] 

reasonable off-duty officer in Pennington’s position would 

not have feared seizure or detention if he had refused to take 

the breathalyzer test.‖ Id. Accordingly, Pennington had not 

been seized. Id.

Likewise, in Aguilera v. Baca, the Ninth Circuit held 

that officers who were ordered to stay after work to speak to 

Internal Affairs officers had not been seized. 510 F.3d at 

1169. The court emphasized that the department’s treatment
12

of the officers differed from its treatment of detained criminal 

suspects. Id. at 1170. For example, the officers waited in 

unlocked rooms with intermittent supervision and no request 

to leave was denied. The officers also remained in possession 

of their police-issued equipment. In addition, they were 

asked if they wanted food or drink; they were free to use the 

restroom unattended and free to leave after the interview; and 

they were paid overtime. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained 

that to characterize their treatment as a seizure ―would equate 

to a pronouncement that a law enforcement agency cannot, 

even under . . . the agency’s general policies to preserve 

public confidence and the integrity of its personnel in the 

discharge of their public safety responsibilities, order its 

employees to cooperate in an investigation of possible officer 

misconduct by standing by at their duty station after the end 

of their watch.‖ Id. at 1171; see also Fournier v. Reardon, 

160 F.3d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1998) (plaintiff was not ―seized‖ 

when he submitted to being handcuffed as part of a basic 

training academy course, even though objecting to such 

treatment may have had negative consequences for his 

continued employment).

The facts in Driebel, Pennington, and Aguilera stand 

in contrast to those presented to the Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit in Cerrone v. Brown. There, the officer was 

stopped by the investigative team, who ―asked whether he 

was carrying a weapon, allegedly placed him in the felony 

position, placed him in the back of an unmarked police car 

(where he was guarded), transported him to a hotel room, 

read him his Miranda rights, and informed him that he was 

the target of a criminal investigation.‖ Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 

198 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The 

police officers conceded that their actions amounted to a 
13

seizure, so the court did not reach the issue. Nevertheless, 

these are the kinds of circumstances that would make an 

officer feel he was not free to leave—not by virtue of being 

an employee of the police department, but as a citizen who 

was being detained. See Driebel, 298 F.3d at 649 (explaining 

that a jury could find that a seizure occurred when an officer 

grabbed another officer, turned him around, and directed him 

toward the squad car).

We recognize that whether a police officer would 

reasonably have perceived his superior officer to be issuing 

orders as his supervisor or as a law enforcement agent during 

the course of an investigation will not always be clear. Here, 

however, the evidence demonstrated that, to the extent 

Appellants felt compelled to obey their superior officers’ 

commands, that compulsion was borne out of their 

employment relationship. There was no suggestion that 

Appellants were under criminal investigation; they were 

asked to wait in Captain Singleton’s office so they could 

speak with Internal Affairs agents. Additionally, the 

circumstances surrounding the investigation were not 

particularly coercive. Although Appellants were not able to 

use the phone while waiting for Captain Singleton to return, 

they were offered drinks, they were asked if they wanted to 

watch television, and they retained all of their police-issued 

equipment. Moreover, Appellants admitted in their affidavits 

and deposition testimony that they followed the orders of 

their superior officers because they were concerned that they 

would suffer work-related consequences if they did not do so. 

For these reasons, we hold there was no Fourth Amendment 

seizure of Gwynn and Ryan.
14

2

Appellants also argue that their superior officers 

conducted an unreasonable search when they asked 

Appellants to reveal whether they had money in their pockets, 

vests, or socks and when they went through Appellants’ 

lockers without probable cause or a warrant. Although the 

Fourth Amendment protects government employees against 

unreasonable searches by their employers, O’Connor, 480 

U.S. at 715, work-related searches of a government 

employee’s person or property often fall into the ―special 

government needs‖ exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 

warrant and probable cause requirements. We find that to be 

the case here as well.2

When an ―intrusion serves special government needs, 

beyond the normal need for law enforcement,‖ the 

government must show that its search was reasonable. 

Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 373–74 (3d Cir. 

1998) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 

489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989)). In O’Connor v. Ortega, the 

Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion that a non-criminal 

investigative search will be reasonable if, at its inception, 

―there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search 

will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-

 

2

 Contrary to Appellants’ suggestion in their Rule 28j 

letter, the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 

133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), has no bearing on this analysis. At 

issue in McNeely was whether the natural metabolization of 

alcohol in the bloodstream is necessarily an exigent 

circumstance justifying a warrantless search. Id. at 1556. 

That decision does not address the special needs doctrine.
15

related misconduct,‖ 480 U.S. at 726, and ―the measures 

adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search 

and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the 

misconduct,‖ id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 

342 (1985)) (alterations omitted); see also City of Ontario, 

Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).3 The Supreme 

Court explained that this lower standard is appropriate for 

work-related investigations because ―[p]ublic employers have 

an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an 

effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies 

inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, 

mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its 

employees.‖ O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724. It emphasized that, 

―in many cases, public employees are entrusted with 

tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their 

misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the 

public interest can be severe.‖ Id.

The need for oversight and corrective action is 

particularly acute in police departments. This is because 

officers ―exercis[e] the most awesome and dangerous power 

that a democratic state possesses with respect to its 

residents—the power to use lawful force to arrest and detain 

 

3

Justice Scalia, concurring in O’Connor, stated that he 

would hold that ―government searches to retrieve workrelated materials or to investigate violations of workplace 

rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and 

normal in the private-employer context—do not violate the 

Fourth Amendment.‖ 480 U.S. at 732; see also Quon, 130 S. 

Ct. at 2628. The search here was an investigation of 

violations of workplace rules, and, as such, would meet this 

alternative standard as well.
16

them.‖ Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.J., Local 318 v. 

Washington Twp., 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) 

(emphasizing the need for ―public confidence, respect and 

approbation‖ with respect to police officers); see also 

Aguilera, 510 F.3d at 1168 (explaining that society has an 

―important interest in ensuring the highest integrity by those 

entrusted with discharging the duties of a peace officer‖);

Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989) (―The 

public and government have strong interests in ferreting out 

misconduct by police officers.‖).

As noted herein, the investigation into Appellants’ 

conduct was work related; it was not a criminal investigation. 

Their superior officers had reasonable grounds to investigate 

misconduct in view of the formal complaint Artis made to 

Internal Affairs. Indeed, Ryan acknowledged that he 

understood why his superiors would need to investigate 

Artis’s claim. Further, the search was not excessively 

intrusive given the nature of the alleged misconduct. 

Appellants’ superior officers examined their outer clothing, 

wallets, pockets, socks, and the cuffs of their pants to see if 

they had a large amount of money on them, and checked their 

lockers for the same purpose. The search was reasonably 

related to its purpose—that is, ensuring that Appellants did 

not possess Artis’s money—and it was not overly intrusive. 

Cf. Copeland v. Phila. Police Dep’t, 840 F.2d 1139, 1143–44 

(3d Cir. 1988) (compulsory urinalysis, based on reasonable 

suspicion that officer had engaged in drug use, was not a 

violation of the Fourth Amendment). Because the search was 

not unreasonable, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment.4

 

4 Appellants further challenge the dismissal of two 

other related claims. First, they argue that the District Court 
17

B

Appellants also claim they were not credited for 

working overtime on the day of the Internal Affairs interview, 

in violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act and the 

Fair Labor Standards Act. Appellees presented evidence, in 

the form of an affidavit from Lieutenant Palumbo and the 

police department’s daily attendance report, that Appellants 

were, in fact, paid. Appellants failed to produce any evidence 

to rebut that evidence.

On appeal, Appellants challenge the adequacy of 

Appellees’ evidence of payment. They claim that the 

affidavit from Lieutenant Palumbo was not based on personal 

 

erred in dismissing their false imprisonment claim. To 

establish false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law, 

Appellants were required to show that: (1) they had been 

detained; and (2) the detention was unlawful. Renk v. City of 

Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994). Appellants 

contend that they were unlawfully detained when they were 

unreasonably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

As discussed above, there was no seizure, and thus, there was 

no unlawful detention. See James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 

700 F.3d 675, 682–83 (3d Cir. 2012). Second, Appellants 

contend the District Court erred in dismissing their claim 

under ―the Due Process Clause and the 14th Amendment, 

which protects liberty interests.‖ Gwynn Br. at 23. 

Appellants merely allude to this claim in their briefing, where 

they incorrectly contend that ―the district court failed to even 

mention the claim.‖ Gwynn Br. at 23–24; but see Gwynn v. 

City of Phila., 866 F. Supp. 2d 473, 488 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 

Appellants have failed to raise any substantive challenge to 

the dismissal of this claim.
18

knowledge and the daily attendance report was not properly 

authenticated. This argument disregards the applicable 

burden of proof, however. Appellants, as the plaintiffs, were 

required to present some evidence showing that they were not 

credited for working overtime. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens 

Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–87 (1946), superseded by 

statute on other grounds as stated in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 

U.S. 21, 41 (2005). They identified no such evidence in their 

response to the motion for summary judgment—not even in 

the form of affidavits, stating under oath that they had not 

been paid. Indeed, Gwynn stated in his deposition that he did 

not know whether he had been paid overtime for December 

15, 2009. Thus, the District Court did not err when it granted 

summary judgment on this claim.

* * *

Police officers serve a critical function in any civilized 

society. The power they wield and the responsibilities they 

assume require them to act beyond reproach. When a citizen 

lodges a credible complaint of police misconduct, it is 

imperative that it is investigated, both to protect the citizen 

who may be wronged and the officers who may be falsely 

accused. When police administrators undertake employmentrelated detentions such as the one experienced by Officers 

Gwynn and Ryan, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure. 

And because the searches of Gwynn and Ryan were 

reasonable, we will affirm the summary judgment of the 

District Court.