1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006)

Statement of S TEVENS , J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
ROB ERT F. CAL DWEL L AND P E TE R O NALD MARTIN E Z v. NAT H ANIEL QUARTE R MA N, DIREC TOR , TEXAS DEPAR T ME NT OF CRIMINALJUSTICE, COR R E C TIONAL INSTITUTI O NS DIVISION
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATE S COU R T OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIR C UIT
No. 05–1 06 71. D e c i ded O c t ober10, 200 6 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Statement of J USTICE S TEVE NS respecting th e denial of the petition for writ of certiorari. The limitat ions peri od in the Antiterrorism and Effec

tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a “pe r son incustody pursuant to the ju dgment of a State court” to file an ap plication for a writ of h abeas corpus within one year of “the date on which the judgment b e came final

. . . .” 28 U. S. C. §2 244(d)(1)(A). This case raises the question whether a T e xas order of “deferredadjudicatio n probation” is a “judgme n t” underthe statute. In ess e nce, a deferred adjudication probat ion order places a defendant on probation while postponing any adjudica tion of guil t. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, §5 (Vernon 2006 Supp. Pamphlet). If the defendant successfully completes the terms of his probation, the charges against him are dismissed, §5(c ); if he violates those terms, he is found guilty and sentenced, §5(b). See gener a llyTaylor v. Sta t e , 131 S. W. 3d 497, 499–500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Often, adefendant’s case is finally resolved many years after the entry of the or der of deferred adjudic a tion.2 CALDWELL v. QUARTERMAN

Statement of S TEVENS , J. That is precisely what happened here. Petitioners Robert Caldwell and Pete Martinez pleaded guilty an d were placed on defer r ed adjudication probation. Bot h subsequentl yviolated the terms of their probation, ha d their probation revoked, were adjudicated gu ilty pursua nt to their earlier pleas, and were g i ven lengthy prison sen

tences. Promptly afterthe entry of orders revoking their probation, petitioners applie d for federal writs of habeas corpus. Th e Court of Appeals held that their applications were time barred beca use they were filed more than one year after t h e entry of orders deferring adjud i cation. The heart of the Fifth Circuit’s holding is that these earlier orders were final judgments under AEDPA. However, a s Judge DeMoss no ted in his dissent, there “are two ab solute essentials to a final judgment in a crim i

nal case”—first, a determination of guilt or innocence, an d second, the imposition of a sentence. Caldwell v . Dretke , 429 F. 3d 5 21, 531 (CA5 2005). Neither occurred prior to the revocat i on of petitioners’probation. Indeed, reconcil

ing the majority’s concl u sion with AED PA’s text is parti c u larly difficult because Texas law provides that a “judgmen t is the writt en declaration of the court signed by the tria l judge and entered of record s h ow ing t h e convic t i on or acquittal of the d e fend ant .” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.01, §1 (Vernon 2006 Su pp. Pamphl et) (emphasis added). An order of deferred adjudication probation is not a conviction, and it is therefore not a “judgment” under Texas law. See Davis v . State , 968 S. W. 2d 368, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Under a liter a lreading of the federal statute, such an order cannot be a “judgmen t of a State court” within the strict terms of §2244(d)(1)(A)

. Despite this conflict between the Court of Ap peals deci

sion and the plain te xt of AEDPA, our de cision to de ny certiorari is supported by at le ast two valid co nsiderations. First, if a court is convinced that a nonliteralreading of a statute is more faithful to the actual intent of t h e enacting3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006)

Statement of S TEVENS , J. Congress, that reading should nor m ally be preferred. See, e.g. , Woodfordv. Ngo , 548 U. S. ___ (2006); Koons Buick Pontiac GM C, Inc. v. Nigh , 543 U. S. 50 (2 004); see al so Doddv. United States , 545 U. S. 353, 361– 362, and n. 1 (2005) (S TE VENS , J., di ssenting); Barnhartv. Sigmon Coal Co. , 534 U. S. 438, 472 (2002) (S TEVEN S , J., dissenting). In this cas e , the FifthCircuit ha d a jus t ifiable basis for concluding that a nonliteral read ing is cons istent with Congress’ intent to “ ‘curb the abuse of the s t atutory writ of habeas c o rpus’ ” and “ ‘address problems of unnecessary delay.’ ” Se e 429 F. 3d, at 528 (q uoting H. R. Conf. Rep

. No. 104–51 8, p. 111 (1 996)). Second, the Court of Appeals expressly limited its holding to “instances where a peti

tioner” brings an untimely challenge to “substantive issues relating to an original order of def e rred adjud i cation pro

bation.” 429 F. 3d, at 530, n. 24. It did not foreclos e timely challenges to such orde rs, nor did it foreclose timely challenges to the sentencing aspects of the revocation proceedings. The Fift h Circuit also did noth ing to upset the practic e of defer r ed adjudi cation probation itself, which confe r s considerable benefit s upon defendants who do not violate the terms of their probation.* This narro w holding is unlikely to produce injustice. Accordingly, th e denial of certiorari is appropriate.

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* See Davis v . State , 986 S. W. 2d 36 8, 37 0 (Tex . Cr im. App. 19 98) (“A defendant who has been discharged from deferred adjudication [proba

tion ] is im me diatelye lig ibl e to ser v e on a ju r y , to v o te , an d to be r e c ommen d ed forpr obationby a ju r yaftera fin d in gof g u il tyat a su bse

quent trial” (f ootnotes omitted)); Ex parte Laday , 594 S. W. 2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“Th e whole po intof [t he deferre d a d j u dicat i on pr obation ] s t a t u t e is to av oi d h av i n gto for mallyadju dic ate th e defen

da nt ’s guiltu n les s a n d unt il he demons t r a t e s t h athe c a nnotab i de by the terms of p r obation se t by the co urt. I f the defendant successfully completes his probation, his offense is esse ntially expunged”).