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[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5293 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5293

To address non-compliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations 
       under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 30, 2014

    Mr. Rogers of Alabama (for himself, Mr. Forbes, and Mr. Turner) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
 Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services 
 and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To address non-compliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations 
       under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Consequences for Russia's Arms 
Control Violations Act of 2014''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) A public report in the New York Times on January 29, 
        2014, revealed that the Russian Federation is no longer in 
        compliance with the Treaty Between the United States of America 
        and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
        of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 
        commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
        (INF) Treaty, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and 
        entered into force June 1, 1988.
            (2) On April 29, 2014, Acting Assistant Secretary of State 
        for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Anita E. Friedt 
        stated in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
        the House of Representatives that, ``[w]e have concerns about 
        Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. We have raised them 
        with Russia and are pressing for clear answers in an effort to 
        resolve our concerns because of the importance of the INF 
        Treaty to Euro-Atlantic security. We've briefed our NATO allies 
        on our concerns and will continue to coordinate with them on 
        this and other matters that affect our common security. We have 
        been keeping Congress informed on this matter through briefings 
        with relevant congressional committees and will continue to do 
        so. We will continue to work with Russia to resolve our 
        concerns, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster a more 
        stable, resilient, transparent security relationship. We're not 
        going to drop the issue until our concerns have been 
        addressed.''.
            (3) On March 5, 2014, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
        Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Ms. Elaine Bunn 
        said to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, ``[W]e 
        are concerned about Russian activity that appears to be 
        inconsistent with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 
        We've raised the issue with Russia. They provided an answer 
        that was not satisfactory to us, and we will, we told them that 
        the issue is not closed, and we will continue to raise this.''.
            (4) On April 2, 2014, the Commander, U.S. European Command, 
        and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Breedlove, stated 
        that, ``A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is 
        introduced into the greater European land mass is absolutely a 
        tool that will have to be dealt with . . . I would not judge 
        how the alliance will choose to react, but I would say they 
        will have to consider what to do about it . . . It can't go 
        unanswered.''.
            (5) The Russian Federation succeeded to the INF Treaty 
        obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a 
        declaration issued at Biskek, Kyrgyzstan, in October 1992.
            (6) The flight test or deployment of any INF-banned weapon 
        delivery vehicle by the Russian Federation constitutes a 
        militarily significant violation of the INF Treaty.
            (7) The INF Treaty has unlimited duration, but, under the 
        terms of the Treaty, inspections and continuous monitoring of 
        Russian missile production under the Treaty ceased on June 1, 
        2001, thus the Treaty no longer offers any verification to 
        detect any militarily significant violations.
            (8) A major problem exists with respect to the application 
        of the INF Treaty to any new ballistic or cruise missile that 
        is flight tested or otherwise flown once at a range not 
        prohibited by the Treaty (that is a range less than 500 
        kilometers or more than 5,500 kilometers) but will be flown at 
        a range that is banned by the Treaty (at a range that is 
        between 500 and 5,500 kilometers) as a weapon delivery vehicle.
            (9) President Obama has not made use of any INF Treaty-
        provided means to address Russian noncompliance with the 
        Treaty, to include convening a meeting of the Treaty's Special 
        Verification Commission under Article XIII of the Treaty.
            (10) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate noted 
        in its 1988 report on the INF Treaty that, ``In the event 
        Soviet actions appear to contradict their obligations under the 
        treaty, Congress should be kept fully informed. Any 
        questionable activity should be fully discussed in the Special 
        Verification Commission. If the Soviet Union has not, after a 
        sufficient period of time, satisfied United States concerns or 
        ceased the activity in question, and if the Soviet activity is 
        deemed to be militarily significant, the President should 
        propose implementation of an appropriate and proportionate 
        response.''.
            (11) The Administration has not made any serious or 
        credible effort, over several years, to respond to violations 
        by the Russian Federation of its obligations under the INF 
        Treaty.
            (12) The INF Treaty is no longer effectively verifiable.
            (13) The Russian Federation's actions, as detailed in the 
        January 29, 2014, report of the New York Times have defeated 
        the object and purpose of the INF Treaty.
            (14) Continued noncompliance by the Russian Federation with 
        its obligations under the INF Treaty and continued United 
        States adherence to the INF Treaty, in light of failure to 
        respond in a timely manner to Russian noncompliance, places the 
        supreme interests of the United States and its allies in the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in jeopardy.
            (15) The Russian Federation has violated its obligations 
        under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and 
        has rendered null the effect and assurances of the NATO-Russia 
        Founding Act of 1997.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Russian Federation, through its flight testing of 
        both a ballistic missile intended for intermediate-range 
        targets as well its flight testing of a ground-launched cruise 
        missile prohibited by the INF Treaty has acted contrary to the 
        object and purpose of a central purpose of the Treaty and is 
        therefore in material breach of its obligations under the 
        Treaty; and
            (2) the President, after consultation with United States 
        allies directly affected by such Russian Federation ballistic 
        missiles or cruise missiles, should take such actions as the 
        President determines to be necessary to deny the Russian 
        Federation any militarily significant advantage resulting from 
        its noncompliance with the INF Treaty.

SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, OR ACTIVITIES OF 
              THE U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION.

    No funds made available to the Department of State may be used to 
carry out programs, projects, or activities of the U.S.-Russia 
Bilateral Presidential Commission until the President certifies to the 
appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation as of 
the date of the certification has or has not flight tested a ballistic 
missile at strategic range in a configuration (booster stages, post-
boost vehicle, or reentry vehicles) that is unlike a configuration that 
is used for remaining tests of the system at ranges that are prohibited 
under the INF Treaty.

SEC. 5. PROGRAM TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOP GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE 
              AND GROUND-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES.

    (a) Program Required.--The President shall establish and carry out 
a program to research and develop ground-launched cruise missile and 
ground-launched ballistic missile capabilities, including by 
modification of exiting United States military capabilities, with a 
range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
    (b) Study and Report.--
            (1) Study.--The President shall conduct a study for 
        potential sites of the cruise missile and ballistic missile 
        capabilities specified in subsection (a). In conducting the 
        study, the President shall consider selecting sites on United 
        States overseas military bases and sites offered by United 
        States allies.
            (2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the 
        results of the study.
    (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement to establish 
and carry out the program under subsection (a) if, on or before October 
1, 2014, the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that--
            (1) the Russian Federation is in compliance with all of its 
        obligations under the INF Treaty; and
            (2) the Russian Federation has verifiably and completely 
        eliminated any military system that it has developed, flight 
        tested, and deployed in violation of the INF Treaty.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the President $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2015 to 
carry out the program under subsection (a).

SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE RESPONSES TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S 
              VIOLATION OF INF TREATY.

    The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Aegis Ashore sites 
in Romania and Poland are deployed, consistent with the timelines 
established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review of 2010, with an 
operational capability to defend against short-, medium-, and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched by 
the Russian Federation.

SEC. 7. SANCTIONS.

    (a) In General.--If, on or before the date that is 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this section, the President does not 
certify to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian 
Federation is not developing or deploying any military system that 
violates or circumvents the INF Treaty, the President shall impose the 
sanctions described in subsection (b).
    (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions referred to in subsection 
(a) are the following:
            (1) The President shall suspend any cooperation with the 
        Russian Federation related to any aspect of the United States 
        program for national, theater, or regional missile defense, 
        including any provision of any data generated by the United 
        States in any test of any missile defense technology.
            (2) The President shall deny any license pursuant to 
        section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077 
        b.) for the export of any nuclear material, equipment, or 
        technology to the Russian Federation.
            (3) The President shall terminate the United States of the 
        Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 
        America and the Government of the Russian Federation for 
        Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 
        entered into force January 12, 2011, in accordance with the 
        provisions of Article 20(1) of that Agreement.
            (4) The President shall not award any United States 
        Government contract to a private or public entity in the 
        Russian Federation.
    (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement to impose 
sanctions under this section beginning on or after the date on which 
the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 
that the Russian Federation has provided to the United States the 
following:
            (1) A list of all intermediate-range and shorter-range 
        missiles, as such terms are defined in the INF Treaty, as well 
        as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment 
        that are not intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles 
        listed under Article III of the Treaty as existing types and 
        which have been designed, developed, flight tested or deployed 
        by the Russian Federation since June 1, 2001.
            (2) A list of all deployment bases for any intermediate-
        range and shorter-range missiles, as such terms are defined in 
        the INF Treaty, including in particular, any base for any road-
        mobile, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that are 
        not bases at which such missiles were located on June 1, 2001.
            (3) A list of all flight tests carried out by the Russian 
        Federation for any new type of ground-launched ballistic or 
        cruise missile which has been flight tested at one or more 
        times below a range of 500 kilometers or above 5,500 
        kilometers.
            (4) A list of all production facilities used for the design 
        and development of any ballistic or cruise missile that is 
        prohibited under the INF Treaty.
            (5) A description of the reasons that the Government of the 
        Russian Federation has provided for undertaking the design, 
        development, and deployment of any ballistic or cruise missile 
        that is prohibited under the INF Treaty.

SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
                and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
                and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
            (2) INF treaty or treaty.--The term ``INF Treaty'' or 
        ``Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States of 
        America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
        Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
        Missiles, commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range 
        Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed at Washington December 8, 
        1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.
                                 <all>
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