Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 16A01-1412-CR-522| July 29, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrensburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Connie Kidd,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff,

July 29, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

16A01-1412-CR-522

Appeal from the Decatur Superior 

Court

The Honorable Matthew Bailey, 

Judge

Cause No. 16D01-1307-FD-462

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial, Connie Kidd was convicted of operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated as a Class D felony. She raises two issues for our review: (1) 
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whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Kidd’s blood test 

results; and (2) whether the abstract of judgment must be amended to clarify 

that Kidd acquired only one conviction in this case. We conclude the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Kidd’s blood test results. 

Therefore, we affirm her conviction for Class D felony operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated. However, we remand with instructions that the trial court amend 

Kidd’s abstract of judgment to clarify that only one conviction was entered 

against her. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 6, 2013, Officer David Henderson of the Decatur County Sheriff’s 

Department responded to a report of a possibly intoxicated person in a 

restaurant parking lot. Officer Henderson arrived at the restaurant and 

approached Kidd, who was sitting in the driver’s seat of her vehicle. Officer 

Henderson believed that Kidd was intoxicated and asked her to step out of the 

vehicle, but she stated that her vehicle was not running and that she did not 

wish to get out of the vehicle. The officer advised Kidd to contact a sober 

driver. Officer Henderson and two other officers left the parking lot but 

remained nearby. 

[3] Shortly after the officers left the parking lot, Kidd started her vehicle and 

attempted to drive away. The officers initiated a traffic stop. Kidd performed a 

field sobriety test—the horizontal gaze nystagmus test—during which she 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 16A01-1412-CR-522| July 29, 2015 Page 3 of 7

showed signs of intoxication. Kidd was advised of Indiana’s implied consent 

law, and she agreed to take a chemical test. 

[4] Kidd was transported to the Decatur County EMS building for a blood draw. 

After conducting the blood draw, the paramedic handed a vial of Kidd’s blood 

to Officer Henderson, who shook the vial for approximately one minute. The 

blood later tested positive for marijuana metabolites and a blood alcohol 

content of 0.17. 

[5] The State charged Kidd as follows: Count 1, operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor; Count 2, operating a vehicle with an 

alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor; Count 3, 

operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the body, a Class C 

misdemeanor; and Count 4, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class D 

felony.1 A jury found Kidd guilty of Counts 1, 2, and 3, and after Kidd 

stipulated to the existence of a prior conviction for operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated, the trial court found her guilty of Count 4. The trial court ordered 

the first three counts to be merged into Count 4, and entered a conviction on 

Count 4. Kidd was sentenced to a total of 540 days, which were to be split 

between imprisonment, community corrections, and supervised probation. 

Kidd now brings this appeal. 

 

1 Count 4 was charged as a Class D felony because Kidd had a prior conviction for operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated. See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3(a) (2013).
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Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of BAC Evidence

[6] Kidd contends that her blood test results were erroneously admitted at trial 

because Officer Henderson’s improper handling of the blood sample rendered 

the test results unreliable. A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence 

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Remy v. State, 17 N.E.3d 396, 399 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The court abuses its discretion when its decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the 

trial court has misinterpreted the law. Id. The court’s decision concerning the 

reliability of scientific evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Hagerman Construction, Inc. v. Copeland, 697 N.E.2d 948, 957 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1998), trans. denied. Relevant evidence is generally admissible at trial. 

Ind. Evidence Rule 402. However, relevant evidence may be excluded “if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting 

cumulative evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 403. 

[7] Blood test results are generally admissible so long as they comply with the rules 

of evidence. State v. Bisard, 973 N.E.2d 1229, 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing 

Ind. Code § 9-30-6-6(c)), trans. denied. Presumably, that is the case because 

“[b]lood samples are obtained and analyzed by medical professionals who are 

trained to produce reliable results.” Id. However, deviation from proper 

procedure concerning the blood draw and testing may warrant exclusion of 
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blood test results in some circumstances. See Hagerman Construction, 697 N.E.2d 

at 956-57 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence 

of blood test results where the failure to freeze the sample and add preservatives 

rendered the results unreliable). 

[8] Kidd argues that a breach in proper procedure calls into question the reliability 

of the test results in this case. After a blood sample is taken, it is ordinarily 

mixed with an anticoagulant, which is achieved by gently inverting the sample 

several times. Here, rather than a few gentle inversions of the vial, Officer 

Henderson shook Kidd’s blood sample for approximately one minute. It is 

Kidd’s position that this shaking may have caused hemolysis—the breaking 

down of red blood cells—which, in turn, could impact certain blood test results. 

Kidd presented evidence of such a possibility through a Mayo Clinic report. 

The State countered with testimony from its expert witness, who stated that 

improper inversion of the blood sample created only a small chance of 

hemolysis. On appeal, the State also points out that Kidd presented only 

evidence that hemolysis was possible and that it could have an effect on a blood 

test; Kidd did not present evidence that hemolysis actually occurred in this case 

or that hemolysis affected the blood alcohol test. 

[9] The trial court was presented with evidence from the State that Officer 

Henderson’s handling of Kidd’s blood sample, albeit improper, was not likely 

to cause hemolysis or impact the blood test results. It was within the trial 

court’s discretion to credit that testimony. Under the circumstances of this case 
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and considering the evidence before the trial court, we cannot say that the trial 

court abused its discretion by admitting the blood test results. 

II. Abstract of Judgment

[10] Next, Kidd complains of what she believes to be an ambiguity in the abstract of 

judgment. After Kidd was found guilty of the four counts against her, the trial 

court purported to merge the first three counts into Count 4 and enter a 

conviction only as to Count 4. Indeed, the trial court’s sentencing order is clear 

that only Count 4 was to be entered as a conviction: “for the purposes of 

sentencing, Counts One, Two, and Three merge into Count Four. The Court 

now enters judgment of conviction only as to Count Four . . . .” Appellant’s 

Appendix at 405. However, Kidd notes that the abstract of judgment lists the 

disposition of Counts 1, 2, and 3 as “Conviction Merged.” Id. at 414. 

Meanwhile, it lists the disposition of Count 4 as “Finding of Guilty.” Id. She 

expresses concern that someone reading the abstract of judgment might 

interpret it to mean that convictions were entered on all four counts and then 

merged. 

[11] We agree that it is possible to read the abstract of judgment as stating 

convictions were entered on all four of the counts against Kidd. Therefore, we 

remand with instructions that Kidd’s abstract of judgment be amended to 

clarify that Counts 1, 2, and 3 were not convictions.
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Conclusion

[12] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Kidd’s 

blood test results and thus affirm her conviction for Class D felony operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated. Due to an ambiguity in Kidd’s abstract of judgment, 

we remand with instructions that the judgment be amended to clarify that no 

judgment of conviction was entered on Counts 1, 2, and 3.

[13] Affirmed and remanded. 

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.