Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2013-376

APRIL TERM, 2014

Ronald Wood } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Rutland Unit,

 v. } Family Division

}

}

Suzen Wood } DOCKET NO. 296-7-07 Rddm

Trial Judge: Cortland Corsones

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Mother appeals from the trial court’s order granting father’s motion to enforce the 

parties’ final divorce order. At issue is a clause concerning the allocation of tax exemptions for 

the parties’ minor children. Mother argues that the court erred in reaching its decision. We 

affirm.

The parties were divorced in April 2009. They have three children, Jessica, born in May 

1993; Marissa, born in April 1998; and Joshua, born in June 2001. Father and mother agreed to 

share legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities for all three children. With respect to 

tax returns, the final order provided:

Beginning with [the] 2009 tax year, the children will be alternately 

claimed on both parents’ income tax returns with the following 

schedule:

[Mother] will claim Joshua and Marissa in 2009

[Father] will claim Jessica in 2009

[Mother] will claim Jessica in 2010, [father] will claim Joshua and 

Marissa

This pattern will follow until Jessica is either 18 or no longer 

eligible as a dependent, at which time each parent will claim 1 

child. 

In June 2013, father filed a motion to enforce, asserting that mother had improperly 

claimed Marissa as a dependent in 2010. Mother opposed the motion. 
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Following a hearing, the court granted father’s request for relief. It found as follows. In 

2009, as dictated by the final divorce order, mother claimed Joshua and Marissa as dependents 

and father claimed Jessica. In 2010, father was scheduled to claim Joshua and Marissa and 

mother was scheduled to claim Jessica. At that time, Jessica was a seventeen-year-old high 

school student. Jessica had worked during 2010 and determined that she would receive a much 

larger tax refund if father did not claim her as a dependent. 

In January 2011, Jessica and mother told father that Jessica wanted to take herself as an 

exemption. Mother said that she therefore wanted to claim either Joshua or Marissa as a 

dependent on her own tax return. Father responded that he would follow the court order, that is, 

he would be claiming Joshua and Marissa. When father attempted to e-file his tax return, 

however, it was rejected because mother had already filed her tax return and claimed Marissa. 

Father spoke with someone at the IRS and filed a paper copy of his tax return, attaching a copy 

of the divorce order. In his return, father claimed Joshua and Marissa as dependents and 

received a refund. He later received a letter from the IRS stating that he owed $2,069.20 in 

taxes, penalties, and interest, because he had claimed Marissa. 

In opposing father’s motion to enforce, mother asserted that she was entitled to claim 

either Marissa or Joshua under the terms of the final divorce order. According to mother, Jessica

was “no longer eligible” to be claimed as a dependent because Jessica wanted to take an 

exemption for herself. The court rejected this argument and determined that mother could have 

claimed Jessica as a dependent in 2010. See 26 U.S.C. § 152(a), (c)(1)-(3) (as relevant here, 

defining “dependent” as child of taxpayer under age 19 who has same principal place of abode as 

taxpayer for more than one-half of taxable year, and who has not provided over one-half of his or 

her own support for calendar year in which taxable year of taxpayer begins); id. § 152(e) (setting 

forth special rule for divorced parents, and providing that if child receives over one-half of 

child’s support during calendar year from child’s parents, who are divorced, and child is in 

custody of one or both of parents for more than one-half of calendar year, such child shall be 

treated as qualifying child or qualifying relative of noncustodial parent for calendar year if 

custodial parent signs written declaration that custodial parent will not claim child as a dependent 

and noncustodial parent attaches declaration to his or her tax return).

In reaching its conclusion, the court credited father’s testimony that Jessica lived 

primarily with parents between January 2010 and August 2010, and primarily with father 

between September 2010 and December 2010. The court found that parents provided for the 

majority of Jessica’s living expenses in 2010. The court noted that father continued to pay child 

support to mother for all of 2010. In fact, according to mother’s affidavit, father paid mother 

$6,167.76 in child support for 2010. The court rejected as not credible mother’s contention that 

Jessica had not lived with parents for the majority of 2010 and that Jessica had primarily 

supported herself. The court observed that Jessica had earned just under $7,000 in 2010. 

The court therefore found that in 2010, Jessica was still a dependent of the parties and 

that the parties were “eligible” to claim her as a dependent on their tax returns as contemplated 

by the terms of their stipulation. The only reason she became “ineligible,” the court continued,

was because mother and Jessica determined, without father’s consent, that Jessica would claim 

herself as a dependent on her return, even though she was still residing in her parents’ homes and 

they were providing for most of her support. Thus, based on the facts recited above and the plain 
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language of the divorce order, the court concluded that father was entitled to claim both Joshua 

and Marissa as dependents on his 2010 tax returns. The court ordered mother to fill out an IRS 

tax form to this effect. Mother appealed.

Mother first suggests that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render its decision. 

According to mother, the assessment of Jessica’s “eligibility” to be claimed as a dependent 

directly implicates questions of substantive federal tax law, a matter outside the court’s authority. 

Mother also complains that the court’s decision will implicate the validity of her tax return and 

the tax return that Jessica filed. 

These arguments are without merit. The court here interpreted and enforced the parties’ 

stipulated final divorce agreement, and it plainly had jurisdiction to do so. See Lamell Lumber 

Corp. v. Newstress Int’l, Inc., 2007 VT 83, ¶ 6, 182 Vt. 282, (“ ‘Subject matter jurisdiction’ 

refers to the power of a court to hear and determine a general class or category of cases.”); 4 

V.S.A. § 31 (explaining that civil division has exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions, with 

exceptions not relevant here); V.R.F.P. 4 (post-judgment motions in divorce cases must be filed 

in superior court). Mother does not contest the court’s authority to allocate federal tax 

exemptions in a final divorce order. Gazo v. Gazo, 166 Vt. 434, 448 (1997). Case law provided 

by mother expressly recognizes that where “a violation of a state court order wrongly deprives 

the intended beneficiary of a federal tax advantage, the state court unquestionably retains 

authority to remedy that violation.” Armstrong v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, ___ F.3d ___, 

2014 WL 961033, at *5 (8th Cir. 2014). As the court found, mother violated the final divorce 

order here, which deprived father of his ability to claim Marissa as a dependent. The fact that the 

court’s decision has implications for the validity of mother’s tax return in no way deprives the 

court of jurisdiction over this case. 

Assuming the court had jurisdiction over the motion to enforce, mother asserts that the 

court erred in finding that she could have claimed Jessica as a dependent in 2010. According to 

mother, the court should not have credited father’s testimony as to Jessica’s living situation in 

2010. Mother also offers her own calculations as to the level of parental support that she 

believes Jessica received in 2010. 

On review, we will uphold the court’s factual findings unless there is no credible 

evidence to support them; the court’s conclusion will stand where supported by its findings. 

DeSantis v. Pegues, 2011 VT 114, ¶ 26, 190 Vt. 457. 

At the outset, we note that mother asserted below only that Jessica was “ineligible” 

because Jessica wanted to file her own tax return and claim herself. The term “eligible” was not 

defined in the parties’ stipulation and the court did not err in construing this term to turn on 

whether parents were eligible to claim Jessica as a dependent, not whether Jessica was “eligible” 

to claim herself as a dependent. Applying this construction, it follows that Jessica’s desire for a 

larger tax refund did not render the seventeen-year-old “ineligible” to be claimed as a dependent 

under the law. If mother had questions about her own ability to claim Jessica as a dependent, she 

could have inquired with the IRS. But no such question ever arose because mother’s decision 

was based solely on the ground identified above. In any event, the court’s finding that Jessica 

remained “eligible” to be claimed as a dependent is supported by the record. Father testified that 

Jessica lived with parents between January and August 2010, and then lived primarily with father 
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between September and December 2010. Parents provided housing for Jessica, and father also 

paid child support in 2010. Jessica earned only $7000 in 2010. All of this evidence supports the 

court’s findings that Jessica lived with parents during 2010 and parents provided for most of her 

living expenses. These findings in turn support the court’s conclusion that mother could have 

claimed Jessica as a dependent and that she violated the final divorce order by claiming Marissa. 

While mother advances her own calculations about support provided to Jessica (which do not 

appear to have been introduced below) and believes that her position was more persuasive than 

father’s, the court concluded otherwise. We will not disturb the court’s credibility assessment or 

its assessment of the weight of the evidence on appeal. Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 252

(1986) (“It is the province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and weigh 

the persuasive effect of the evidence.”). We find no error in the court’s decision. 

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice