[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. McFarland, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3343.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-3343

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MCFARLAND, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. McFarland, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3343.] 

Criminal law—Complicity—Conspiracy—Aggravated murder—Sufficiency of the 

evidence—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 

(No. 2018-1116—Submitted December 10, 2019—Decided June 18, 2020.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 105570, 2018-Ohio-2067. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY, J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Eighth District Court of Appeals, 

we are asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 

convictions of the appellant, Sheila McFarland, on charges relating to the murder 

of Robert Williams. The Eighth District Court of Appeals held that there was 

sufficient evidence to support the convictions. We agree and therefore affirm the 

judgment of the appellate court. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} Robert Williams was gunned down in the hallway outside his 

apartment on November 14, 2015. McFarland did not pull the trigger and was not 

at the scene of the murder. The issue in this case is whether there was sufficient 

evidence produced at trial to support the jury’s verdicts that McFarland had 

conspired to murder Williams and had been complicit in the acts leading to his 

death. 

{¶ 3} There is no dispute as to why Williams was killed and who killed him. 

Williams was a drug dealer whose cooperation with police had led to the arrest and 

jailing of his supplier, Eddie “Mann” Brownlee. McFarland was Brownlee’s 

girlfriend, and she, too, had been arrested on drug charges due to Williams’s 

cooperation with police. Ryan Motley, an associate of Brownlee, killed Williams, 

with encouragement from Brownlee to, at the very least, harm Williams. This case 

is about McFarland’s involvement in the murder. 

The arrest of Brownlee and McFarland 

{¶ 4} Williams was 64 years old at the time of his death and was living in 

Euclid with his girlfriend, Korri Henderson, in the Indian Hills Senior Community 

Apartments. He also sold drugs there. After police caught Williams drug dealing 

in and around the Indian Hills complex, they searched his apartment and recovered 

crack cocaine. They arrested both Williams and Henderson; the pair then agreed 

to become confidential informants against their supplier, Brownlee. 

{¶ 5} Police used Williams to conduct three controlled drug buys from

Brownlee. In two of those buys, Brownlee handled the transaction with Williams. 

In the third, the purchase was made from McFarland. Police arrested Brownlee and 

McFarland directly after the third transaction. Both were taken to the Euclid Police 

Department; McFarland was released, but Brownlee was kept in jail. It was 

October 25, 2015. 

 
January Term, 2020 

3

Calls from jail 

{¶ 6} Brownlee and McFarland almost immediately suspected that it was

Williams who was responsible for their arrests. Brownlee called McFarland 

numerous times from jail; those calls were recorded, and portions were later played 

to the jury. Brownlee called his own cellphone, which McFarland possessed. On 

Brownlee’s first call to McFarland from jail, on October 25, 2015, McFarland 

suggested to Brownlee that it was Williams who had set him up, and Brownlee said 

that he was going to “get him.” Motley, the eventual triggerman, was with 

McFarland when Brownlee called, and he also talked to Brownlee on that call. 

Brownlee told Motley, “I need you to handle this. * * * Get Rob.” On that same 

call, Brownlee asked McFarland what had happened to his “hammer,” in other 

words, his gun. She reported that Motley had retrieved it from the hotel room that 

she and Brownlee had been staying in and had then given it to Brownlee’s brother, 

Chris. Motley testified that he got the gun back from Chris within two days of 

giving it to him and that that gun was the murder weapon. 

{¶ 7} On subsequent calls from jail, Brownlee, incensed about his 

predicament, discussed his suspicions about Williams and Henderson working with 

police and McFarland agreed. He told McFarland that he was going to “beat 

[Williams’s] ass,” that he was going to “get him,” and that Williams was not going 

to get away with what he had done. He asked McFarland whether Motley knew 

that Williams had been the informant. McFarland had talked to Motley about it, 

and McFarland reported to Brownlee that Motley said that Williams would “have 

to be handled.” McFarland reported that many of their associates thought it was 

Williams who had informed on Brownlee and that “something got to be done.” On 

another call, McFarland reported that she had talked to Williams and Henderson 

and they had denied setting up Brownlee, but McFarland said she knew the couple 

had been involved by the way they were acting. During a call just before Brownlee 
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was released, when the subject of Williams came up, McFarland urged Brownlee 

not to talk about it, saying, “You never know about this phone.” 

McFarland’s activities while Brownlee was jailed 

{¶ 8} McFarland maintained some contact with Williams and Henderson 

even after her arrest. On October 27, 2015, McFarland called Henderson from 

Brownlee’s cellphone and left two messages in which she accused Henderson and 

Williams of working with detectives and being snitches. But she also met with 

Williams and Henderson and got a ride from them to the county jail to add money 

to Brownlee’s commissary account. 

{¶ 9} With Brownlee in jail, McFarland sought help from Motley; she 

suggested that they sell drugs together to raise money to post Brownlee’s bond. 

McFarland saw Motley every day while Brownlee was in jail and together they 

raised money for Brownlee by selling drugs. 

{¶ 10} Motley later testified at McFarland’s trial; although he was the 

state’s witness, the state confronted him at points with prior testimony and with a 

previous written statement he had prepared about the events concerning Williams’s 

death. Motley testified that McFarland would vent to him about Brownlee being in 

jail. In discussions about the informants, McFarland told Motley that “they” needed 

to be “f[—-]ed up.” And she communicated with Motley about the gun that would 

become the murder weapon. 

Events after Brownlee’s release 

{¶ 11} On November 10, 2015, Brownlee was released from county jail. He 

and McFarland almost immediately went back to selling drugs together. On or 

around November 12, Brownlee and McFarland delivered crack to one of 

Brownlee’s customers, Dwayne Jackson. Jackson testified that McFarland told 

him, “Watch out for Rob, they’re snitching.” 

{¶ 12} Sometime between Brownlee’s release from jail on November 10 

and Williams’s murder on November 14, Brownlee and Motley met in a hotel room 
January Term, 2020 

5

in Willoughby and discussed what to do about Williams; McFarland was also in 

the hotel room. Motley testified that Brownlee told him to “go rough the dude up, 

beat him up” and that Brownlee offered to pay Motley’s accomplices. 

{¶ 13} Henderson testified at McFarland’s trial. She stated that the night 

before the murder, Williams received a threatening call from Brownlee saying that 

he was out of jail and would be coming for him and that Henderson and Williams 

were going to see their graves. According to Henderson, other threatening calls 

followed. A truck appeared at Williams’s apartment complex that evening, and 

four people got out and started staring up at Williams’s apartment window, where 

he was standing. Henderson called police to the apartment and filed a police report. 

After the police left, Henderson called a friend who also lived in the complex and 

she and Williams went there to stay until morning. 

{¶ 14} In the early hours of November 14, while at the friend’s apartment, 

Henderson got a call from McFarland. Henderson testified that the call came 

between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m., but telephone records revealed that no calls had come 

from Brownlee’s phone after 3:11 a.m. Henderson told McFarland they had been 

getting threatening calls, and McFarland laughed it off. When Henderson told 

McFarland that the calls had come from Brownlee, McFarland denied Brownlee 

had made the calls and claimed she had been with him all night. Henderson 

testified: 

When she called, she just asked, she was like, How you-all 

doing? And I was like, What you mean? I’m like, How do you 

think we're doing? We’ve been getting threatening calls all night. 

And she was like, What you mean? And I was like, Mann 

[Brownlee’s nickname] been calling Rob phone threatening us. And 

she was like saying what and whatever, and I was like talking about 

we going to die and he out of jail now, he coming to see us, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

whatever, whatever. And she was like, You sure that was Mann? 

And I said, Yeah, it was his phone. I said, It came from you-all 

phone. And she was like, He ain’t made no calls like that. But she 

was like, I’ve been with him the whole time. And I said, Well, they 

came from you-all phone unless somebody else had you-all phone.

{¶ 15} Henderson testified that McFarland said she had to end the call

because Brownlee was coming. After that call, Henderson and Williams returned 

to their own apartment. Henderson testified that they didn’t sleep much and at 

around 10:00 a.m., Williams went out to take a walk down the hallway. 

The shooting 

{¶ 16} Williams was shot as he walked down the hallway outside his 

apartment. Motley was the shooter. He had two other people with him, his brother 

Raymond and another acquaintance, Rahkee Young. All three snuck into the 

apartment complex and put on masks and gloves after they got inside. Motley 

testified that he had placed tape over the door peepholes of the apartments near 

Williams’s apartment (although DNA tests revealed his brother’s DNA on the tape) 

so that those neighbors could not see what was going on in the hallway. The three 

hid in the stairwell at the end of the hall behind a door. Surveillance video shows 

that when Williams left his apartment and was walking down the hallway, Motley 

and Young emerged from behind the door and approached Williams. Williams 

stopped and turned, and after a brief confrontation, Motley quickly fired one shot 

from close distance. The three then fled. Motley called Brownlee later that evening 

and told him, “It’s done.” 

{¶ 17} Motley testified that later that night or the next day, Brownlee met 

him and paid him with drugs that were worth around $4,000 and that the three 

assailants, Brownlee, and McFarland met at a hotel. 
January Term, 2020 

7

{¶ 18} Henderson was able to identify Motley from the apartment 

building’s surveillance footage. Henderson told a responding officer that she had 

been threatened by people she knew as Mann and Sheila and that she and Williams 

had been working with the narcotics department. 

Trial and appellate proceedings 

{¶ 19} Ryan Motley, Raymond Motley, Young, Brownlee, and McFarland 

were all indicted on ten counts, as follows: Count 1, aggravated murder under R.C. 

2903.01(A) (committed with prior calculation and design); Count 2, aggravated 

murder under R.C. 2903.01(B) (committed in the course of committing felonious 

assault); Count 3, conspiracy to commit aggravated murder or murder under R.C. 

2923.01(A)(1); Count 4, murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) (committed while 

committing aggravated burglary); Count 5, murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) 

(committed while committing felonious assault); Count 6, felonious assault under 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) (knowingly causing serious physical harm); Count 7, felonious 

assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) (committed with a deadly weapon); Count 8, 

aggravated burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) (inflicted physical harm on the 

victim); Count 9, aggravated burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) (committed with 

a deadly weapon); and Count 10, kidnapping under R.C. 2905.01(A)(3). All ten 

counts included a firearm specification. 

{¶ 20} McFarland’s case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of the state’s 

case, McFarland’s counsel moved for dismissal under Crim.R. 29, arguing that the 

state had failed to meet its burden to present sufficient evidence to establish the 

elements of the charges in the ten-count indictment. The trial judge denied the 

motion, and the jury found McFarland guilty on all ten counts. For purposes of 

sentencing, the trial court merged Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 (the aggravated-murder, 

murder, and felonious-assault counts), Counts 8 and 9 (the aggravated-burglary 

counts), and all the gun specifications. The trial court sentenced McFarland to life 

in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a concurrent 11 years on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Count 3, a concurrent 11 years on Count 8, and a concurrent 11 years on Count 10. 

The judge merged all the gun specifications and added three years to her sentence 

for the gun specification on Count 1, to be served prior to the life sentence, and a 

$20,000 fine on that count. 

{¶ 21} McFarland appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, and that 

court affirmed the convictions. In the appellate court, the state conceded that the 

kidnapping and aggravated murder convictions should have merged for sentencing. 

The court “remanded for resentencing for the sole purpose of merging the 

kidnapping count with the aggravated murder count and allowing the state to 

determine on which count to proceed to sentencing.” State v. McFarland, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 105570, 2018-Ohio-2067, ¶ 67. This court accepted one proposition 

of law for review: “A criminal defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when 

she is found guilty based on insufficient evidence.” 

LAW AND ANALYSIS 

{¶ 22} McFarland’s proposition of law is axiomatic—“a conviction based

on legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial of due process. Tibbs v. Florida 

(1982), 457 U.S. 31, 45, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2220, 72 L.Ed.2d 652, 663, citing Jackson 

v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.” State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Therefore, the 

question we face does not concern the effect of a conviction based upon insufficient 

evidence. Instead, we address a question appellate courts deal with regularly—

whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdicts in this case against 

this defendant. We conclude that the verdicts were based upon sufficient evidence. 

Sufficiency of the evidence 

{¶ 23} McFarland argues that the evidence presented by the state was 

insufficient to support a conviction on any of the crimes with which she was 

charged. “Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine 

whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as 
January Term, 2020 

9

a matter of law to support the jury verdict.” State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 

684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). Retrial is barred if a reversal is based upon a finding that 

the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction. “ ‘A verdict of not 

guilty, whether rendered by the jury or directed by the trial judge, absolutely shields 

the defendant from retrial. A reversal based on the insufficiency of the evidence 

has the same effect because it means that no rational factfinder could have voted to 

convict the defendant.’ ” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs at 41. 

{¶ 24} This court has set forth the standard appellate courts should employ 

in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction: 

An appellate court’s function when reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to 

examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such 

evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 

(1979), followed.) 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the 

syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in

State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). The trier of fact has the 

responsibility “fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, 

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson at 

319. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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{¶ 25} The trial court sentenced McFarland on four counts only—Count 1

(aggravated murder committed with prior calculation and design), Count 3 

(conspiracy to commit aggravated murder or murder), Count 8 (aggravated 

burglary while inflicting physical harm on the victim), and Count 10 (kidnapping), 

so we consider the sufficiency of the evidence on those convictions only.1 State v. 

Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 24 (“a ‘conviction’ 

consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty” [emphasis 

sic]); State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St.3d 405, 2018-Ohio-1903, 114 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 138 

(merger of kidnapping count with aggravated-robbery and aggravated-burglary 

counts moots sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim regarding kidnapping count). 

Complicity 

{¶ 26} The major consideration in determining the sufficiency of the 

evidence in this case is not whether the individual crimes were committed but 

whether the evidence of McFarland’s involvement in them was sufficient to find 

her guilty of the crimes. There is no suggestion that McFarland was present at the 

scene of the shooting. For the bulk of the charges, the central issue is whether the 

state proved that McFarland was complicit in the commission of the crimes. R.C. 

2923.03 is Ohio’s complicity statute. It states: 

(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required 

for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: 

(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; 

(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; 

 

1. Pursuant to the judgment of the court of appeals, after remand to the trial court McFarland will 

be sentenced on only three counts due to the merger of the kidnapping and aggravated murder 

convictions. At this point, we do not know whether the state will choose sentencing for aggravated 

murder or kidnapping, so we review all four convictions for sufficiency. 
January Term, 2020 

11 

(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation 

of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; 

(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the 

offense. 

{¶ 27} The statute does not define “aid or abet,” but this court has stated 

that to aid or abet is “ ‘[t]o assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to 

promote its accomplishment,’ ” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 243, 754 

N.E.2d 796 (2001), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 69 (7th Ed.Rev.1999). 

{¶ 28} R.C. 2923.03(F) provides that anyone who violates the complicity 

statute “shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender” and 

that an offender need not be charged under R.C. 2923.03, but instead may be 

charged with complicity in terms of the principal offense. Therefore, the state was 

not required to explicitly allege complicity. State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 

2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 32. McFarland was not charged with 

complicity under the statute but was charged with the principal offenses. 

{¶ 29} “To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting 

pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant 

supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal 

in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of 

the principal.” Johnson at syllabus. “ ‘Participation in criminal intent may be 

inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is 

committed.’ ” Id. at 245, quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34, 273 

N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist.1971). “The court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution and defer to the trier of fact on questions of credibility 

and the weight assigned to the evidence. State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 2010-

Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 146.” State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-

Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 132. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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{¶ 30} As explained in detail below, the evidence at trial was sufficient to 

prove that McFarland was complicit in the crimes associated with the killing of 

Williams. 

Aggravated murder

{¶ 31} In Count 1, McFarland was charged with aggravated murder 

pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(A). Under that statute, “[n]o person shall purposely, and 

with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another.” The element of prior 

calculation and design “require[s] a scheme designed to implement the calculated 

decision to kill.” State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 11, 381 N.E.2d 190 (1978). The 

evidence was sufficient to support a conviction based on McFarland’s participation 

and complicity in the scheme to kill Williams. 

{¶ 32} McFarland was at the center of the series of events that led to the 

killing of Williams. From the spark of the idea that revenge would be had against 

Williams and Henderson in Brownlee’s call from jail on October 25, to the 

telephone call she made to Henderson hours before the murder to assure Henderson 

that Brownlee was not threatening her and Williams, McFarland helped move the 

plan forward. 

{¶ 33} In one of the first calls from jail, McFarland and Brownlee identified 

Williams as a snitch and Brownlee said that he was going to “get him.” McFarland 

brought Motley in on the call. She made it clear that she had had prior 

conversations with Motley about the “hammer,” the gun that Motley would 

eventually use to shoot Williams. Motley testified that he had received a text from 

McFarland regarding “their” gun, meaning Brownlee and McFarland’s gun. 

{¶ 34} While Brownlee was in jail, McFarland worked with Motley to sell 

drugs to finance Brownlee’s bail. During her time with Motley, McFarland made 

clear to him that Williams and Henderson had to be dealt with. McFarland let the 

two know in a voicemail on October 27 that she considered them to be snitches. 

McFarland told Motley that they needed to be harmed. In another telephone call 
January Term, 2020 

13 

with Brownlee, McFarland made clear to him that she had talked to Motley about 

what to do about Williams and Henderson and that Williams would “have to be 

handled.” She had talked to other people about Williams and Henderson and told 

Brownlee that everybody knew about their role in McFarland’s and Brownlee’s 

arrests and that “something got to be done.” In a November 9 telephone call closer 

to Brownlee’s release from jail, she was more circumspect: after Brownlee said, “I 

could kick they ass,” McFarland responded that they should not talk about it on the 

phone. 

{¶ 35} Once Brownlee got out of jail, things moved quickly. McFarland

was in the hotel room when Motley and Brownlee agreed that Motley would harm 

Williams. Although Motley testified that the plan was only to “rough up” Williams, 

the presence and quick use of the gun are evidence that murder was the plan, as was 

Brownlee’s phone-call threat to Williams and Henderson that they were going to 

see their graves. The night before the murder, threatening phone calls—including 

the “see your graves” call—were made to Williams and four men arrived in the 

apartment parking lot in a truck and seemed to threaten Williams and Henderson. 

Williams and Henderson were frightened enough to stay with someone else in the 

apartment complex. In the early morning of November 14, hours before the 

murder, McFarland called Henderson and she attempted to assure her that it could 

not have been Brownlee making the calls, because she had been with him the entire 

night. A reasonable juror could determine from this evidence that McFarland was 

trying to minimize the imminent threat that Williams and Henderson faced. After 

the call, they did return to their own apartment. 

{¶ 36} Later that morning, a planned attack was executed. At some point, 

tape was placed over Williams’s neighbors’ peepholes. Three people lay in wait in 

a stairwell until Williams emerged from his apartment. As Williams walked down 

the hallway outside his apartment, Motley and Young approached from behind. 

After Williams stopped and turned, there was a brief altercation before Motley fired 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

the gun. Less than ten seconds after Motley emerged from the stairwell, Williams 

was shot. Motley testified that he called Brownlee and told him, “It’s done.” Not 

that the plan had spun out of control or that there had been an accident; he merely 

reported, “It’s done.” 

{¶ 37} When Motley and his associates met with Brownlee after the murder 

of Williams, McFarland was present again. In his testimony, Motley tried to 

diminish McFarland’s involvement, and when faced with prior testimony or prior 

written statements, he tried to back off from those that implicated McFarland. For 

instance, regarding McFarland’s statement that “they” needed to be “f[—-]ed up,” 

Motley explained at trial that he understood that “they” really meant Henderson 

only, but the state pointed out that Motley had written “they” in his earlier 

statement. Motley also testified that he had been in contact with McFarland about 

the location of one of Brownlee’s firearms; however, in his written statement, he 

had referred to it as one of “their” firearms. Motley eventually admitted in his trial 

testimony that he had received a text message from McFarland about “their” 

firearm. A juror could have easily interpreted parts of Motley’s testimony as trying 

to save McFarland from prosecution. The jury “may believe or disbelieve any 

witness or accept part of what a witness says and reject the rest. In reaching its 

verdict, the jury should consider the demeanor of the witness and the manner in 

which he testifies, his connection or relationship with the prosecution or the 

defendant, and his interest, if any, in the outcome.” State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 

67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). 

{¶ 38} The meetings before and after the murder, the use of Brownlee and 

McFarland’s gun, the lying in wait, the inclusion of Young and Raymond Motley 

as backup, the tape over peepholes, how quickly Motley fired the shot after 

emerging from the stairwell, and the phone call reporting, “It’s done,” all indicate 

prior calculation and design and that the assailants planned to cause the death of 

Williams. 
January Term, 2020 

15 

{¶ 39} “ ‘Participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, 

companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’ ” Johnson, 

93 Ohio St.3d at 245, 754 N.E.2d 796, quoting Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d at 34, 273 

N.E.2d 884. McFarland was a constant presence as Williams and Henderson were 

identified as targets and as it was decided that something had to be done. She 

discussed with Motley that Williams would “have to be handled” and incited him 

to harm the informants. She did not seek to have Motley return the murder weapon 

before the murder, advised Brownlee not to discuss Williams over the jail 

telephone, and was present at the planning meeting and the post-murder meeting. 

McFarland assisted in the plan by attempting to assuage Henderson’s fears that she 

faced imminent danger from Brownlee. Finally, the drug-selling business she 

engaged in with Brownlee produced the payout to Motley. 

{¶ 40} We determine that after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that the 

essential elements of aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(A) had been proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt—McFarland purposely and with prior calculation and 

design caused the death of Williams or aided or abetted those who did by 

facilitating the commission of aggravated murder or by actively promoting it. She 

supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, and incited Brownlee 

and Motley in the planning and commission of the crime. 

{¶ 41} A rational trier of fact could have also found McFarland guilty of 

aggravated murder through complicity by virtue of R.C. 2923.03(A)(1), by 

“solicit[ing] or procur[ing] another to commit the offense.” During her time selling 

drugs with Motley while Brownlee was in jail, she discussed with Motley the role 

of Henderson and Williams in Brownlee’s incarceration, and told him that “they” 

should be “f[—-]ed up.” She told Brownlee that she had discussed the matter with 

Motley and that Motley said that Williams would “have to be handled.” She never 

sought from Motley a return of the gun that she shared with Brownlee. She was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

present when the planning meeting occurred and was present for the postmortem 

meeting. A rational trier of fact could have found that through her complicity in 

soliciting Motley to commit aggravated murder, she was guilty of the purposeful 

killing of Williams with prior calculation and design. 

{¶ 42} A rational trier of fact also could have found McFarland guilty of 

being complicit in aggravated murder through R.C. 2923.03(A)(3), which 

references the conspiracy statute, considering a person complicit who conspires 

with another to commit an offense in violation of R.C. 2923.01. Since conspiracy 

is a separate count, we discuss it separately, below. 

Conspiracy

{¶ 43} McFarland was charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated 

murder or murder under R.C. 2923.01. The act of conspiring to commit a crime is 

a crime in and of itself; “it is no defense to a charge under this section that no 

offense that was the object of the conspiracy was committed.” R.C. 2923.01(E). 

The conspiracy statute provides: 

(A) No person, with purpose to commit or to promote or 

facilitate the commission of aggravated murder [or] murder, * * * 

shall do either of the following: 

(1) With another person or persons, plan or aid in planning 

the commission of any of the specified offenses; 

(2) Agree with another person or persons that one or more of 

them will engage in conduct that facilitates the commission of any 

of the specified offenses. 

(B) No person shall be convicted of conspiracy unless a 

substantial overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is alleged and 

proved to have been done by the accused or a person with whom the 

accused conspired, subsequent to the accused’s entrance into the 
January Term, 2020 

17 

conspiracy. For purposes of this section, an overt act is substantial 

when it is of a character that manifests a purpose on the part of the 

actor that the object of the conspiracy should be completed. 

{¶ 44} Having determined above that the evidence was sufficient to prove 

that McFarland aided in planning or agreed that Motley would murder Williams, 

satisfying R.C. 2923.01(A), the key portion of the statute for purposes of this part 

of our analysis is R.C. 2923.01(B), the requirement of a substantial overt act in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. “An indictment for conspiracy * * * must allege 

some specific, substantial, overt act performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 194, 724 N.E.2d 781 (2000), syllabus. 

{¶ 45} The state alleged three overt acts in the indictment supporting the 

conspiracy count: (1) solicitation of Motley for murder, (2) providing or assisting 

Motley in procuring the firearm, and (3) threatening Williams and/or Henderson 

via a telecommunications system. 

{¶ 46} As discussed above in regard to the first alleged overt act, a juror 

could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that McFarland solicited Motley 

to commit murder. McFarland was the conduit for information between Brownlee 

and Motley, but she also was often with Motley while Brownlee was in jail, and 

when she and Motley were discussing Henderson and Williams she told him that 

they needed to be harmed. McFarland told Brownlee in one jail call that she had 

spoken with Motley and that Motley said that Williams “had to be handled.” 

McFarland knew that Motley had the gun that belonged to her and Brownlee and 

texted Motley concerning its whereabouts. She was at the meeting in which the 

determination was made to harm Williams, and she was there when the assailants 

and Brownlee met after the killing. The fact that Brownlee solicited Motley for the 

murder does not mean that McFarland was not part of requesting and paying for 

Motley’s murder of Williams. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

{¶ 47} Regarding the second alleged overt act, there is sufficient evidence 

to demonstrate that McFarland provided or assisted Motley in procuring the gun. 

Motley referred to the murder weapon as “their” gun, meaning Brownlee and 

McFarland’s gun. McFarland knew that Motley had retrieved the gun from the 

hotel Brownlee and McFarland had been staying in when they were arrested. 

Motley left it with Brownlee’s brother, Chris, but retrieved it later. McFarland did 

not seek its return. There is no doubt that Brownlee and McFarland’s gun was the 

murder weapon. A rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the essential elements of the 

conspiracy had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, with the overt act being 

the provision of the gun to Motley. 

{¶ 48} The third alleged overt act was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

At trial, evidence was introduced of voicemail messages left by McFarland on 

Henderson’s phone after Brownlee’s arrest. On the voicemails, McFarland can be 

heard cursing at Henderson, telling her she knew what Williams and Henderson 

had done and using an accusatory tone. McFarland’s words were slurred, but the 

clear implication of the voicemails was that McFarland wanted to hold Williams 

and Henderson responsible for Brownlee’s incarceration. She called them snitches. 

Given what was said and the circumstances surrounding the calls, there would be 

no reason for the voicemails other than to threaten Henderson and Williams. A 

reasonable juror could find that the voicemails were threatening. The calls 

“manifest[] a purpose on the part of the actor that the object of the conspiracy 

should be completed,” R.C. 2923.01(B). The statute requires that the overt act 

occur after the accused entered into the conspiracy. The calls in question were 

placed in the early morning hours of October 27, 2015. A juror could conclude that 

the conspiracy was formed at the time of the October 25, 2015 jail call involving 

Brownlee, Motley, and McFarland, when they first identified Williams and 

Henderson as the people responsible for their arrests. 
January Term, 2020 

19 

{¶ 49} A rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the essential elements of the 

conspiracy had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, with the overt act being 

the provision of the threatening voicemails. 

The other charges 

{¶ 50} McFarland was convicted of aggravated burglary under R.C. 

2911.11(A)(1), which provides: 

(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass 

in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately 

occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person 

other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to 

commit in the structure or in the separately secured or separately 

occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense, if any of the 

following apply: 

(1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to inflict 

physical harm on another * * *. 

A trespass under R.C. 2911.21(A) occurs when a person, without privilege to do 

so, “[k]nowingly enter[s] or remain[s] on the premises of another.” It is no defense 

to a charge of trespass “that the land or premises involved was owned, controlled, 

or in custody of a public agency.” R.C. 2911.21(B). There was sufficient evidence 

that McFarland violated R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) through her complicity with the 

Motley brothers and Young. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of 

aggravated burglary had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt—specifically, that 

through stealth or deception, the three assailants entered Williams’s apartment 

building and put on masks and gloves in order to harm Williams and laid in wait 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

20 

for him to emerge from his apartment, and when Williams did emerge, Motley 

inflicted physical harm on Williams. McFarland was complicit in the endeavor and 

therefore can be prosecuted under the aggravated-robbery statute even though she 

was not in the apartment building when the murder occurred. 

{¶ 51} The remaining conviction was for kidnapping under R.C. 

2905.01(A)(3), which states that “[n]o person by force [or] threat * * * shall * * * 

restrain the liberty of [another] person” for the purpose of “inflict[ing] serious 

physical harm on the victim.” The jury had before it video surveillance footage 

from the hallway outside Williams’s apartment. The footage reveals Williams 

walking down the hallway and Motley and Young emerging from behind the 

stairwell door. Williams turns to see them walking toward him. He stops, and there 

is a confrontation before the shooting. A reasonable juror could have determined 

that Williams’s movements back toward his own apartment were restrained by 

either threat of force or use of force by Motley and Young, for the purpose of 

inflicting bodily harm upon Williams. Viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that McFarland was guilty of committing 

kidnapping due to her complicity with Motley and Young. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶ 52} Our duty in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence case is to determine 

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime 

had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. McFarland was a central figure in the 

killing of Robert Williams and a constant presence as Williams was targeted for 

revenge, as plans to kill him were made, and as the assailants met after his killing. 

She was in regular contact with Brownlee while he was in jail, reporting her 

suspicions about the role Williams and Henderson played in her and Brownlee’s 

arrests. She told Brownlee that Motley and others she had talked to thought 
January Term, 2020 

21 

something had to be done about Williams and Henderson. She was in frequent 

contact with Motley while Brownlee was in jail and knew that he had the gun she 

shared with Brownlee, which would become the murder weapon. When Brownlee 

got out of jail, she was present in the hotel room where the details of the plan against 

Williams were hatched. And hours before the murder, she called Henderson and 

attempted to mislead her about the imminent threat posed by Brownlee. After the 

deed was done, Brownlee paid off Motley in drugs that were the product of the 

criminal enterprise he participated in with McFarland, and McFarland was present 

again in the hotel room where all the participants in Williams’s murder gathered 

after-the-fact. 

{¶ 53} The record establishes that there was sufficient evidence on the four 

counts for which McFarland was sentenced—aggravated murder, conspiracy, 

aggravated burglary, and kidnapping—for a rational trier of fact to have determined 

that the elements of those crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

DEWINE, J., concurs. 

DORRIAN, J., concurs as to the convictions for aggravated murder, 

aggravated burglary, and kidnapping. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and FISCHER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 

DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined as to the conspiracy 

conviction by DORRIAN, J. 

JULIA L. DORRIAN, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

STEWART, J. 

_________________ 

DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 54} When the United States Supreme Court set forth the sufficiency-ofthe-evidence analysis requiring reviewing courts to view the evidence “in the light 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

22 

most favorable to the prosecution” when determining whether the evidence 

presented is legally sufficient to support the conviction, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), I do not believe the court 

meant a searchlight should be used to uphold a criminal conviction. Yet, despite 

the lead opinion’s attempt to find evidence to sustain appellant Sheila McFarland’s 

convictions, they have come up empty-handed. For the reasons that follow, I 

respectfully dissent. 

TRIAL EVIDENCE 

{¶ 55} The lead opinion acknowledges that McFarland was not present 

when Robert Williams was shot and killed as he exited his apartment on November 

14, 2015. It nevertheless maintains that there was sufficient evidence to support 

her convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and complicity in the associated 

crimes. To support affirming these convictions, the lead opinion relies on particular 

pieces of the state’s evidence while disregarding the uncontroverted testimony of 

the state’s key witness. As I explain below, I do not believe that the evidence 

establishes that McFarland had any participatory role in the crimes unquestionably 

perpetrated by Eddie Brownlee, Ryan Motley, and Motley’s accomplices. 

{¶ 56} I will start with the evidence that the lead opinion barely 

acknowledges: the trial testimony of Ryan Motley. As the lead opinion notes, 

Motley, known also by the nickname “Chop,” went to Williams’s apartment 

building with two confederates on the morning of November 14, 2015, and shot 

Williams in the hallway of his apartment complex. Motley was indicted on all the 

same charges that were brought against the other defendants, including McFarland. 

{¶ 57} Rather than face trial, however, Motley agreed on October 5, 2016, 

to plead guilty to amended Count 1, which reduced the charge of aggravated murder 

to murder, with the three-year gun specification for that charge retained, and Count 

3, which charged conspiracy to commit murder, with the three-year gun 

specification for that charge deleted; all remaining counts were dismissed. Further, 
January Term, 2020 

23 

Motley was immediately required to give a proffer statement in which he detailed 

what his testimony would be at the trials of Brownlee and McFarland. If Motley’s 

testimony was not truthful and was not consistent with other known facts, the state 

reserved the right to rescind the plea agreement and prosecute Motley on the 

offenses as charged. Motley thereafter entered guilty pleas as described and was 

sentenced to serve 18 years to life in prison. 

{¶ 58} Immediately after accepting Motley’s guilty pleas, the trial court 

asked Motley what happened on November 14, 2015. In open court, Motley 

admitted that he had approached Williams with his gun drawn and had shot 

Williams as Williams appeared to be reaching for the gun. Motley disclosed that 

Brownlee told him to “rough [Williams] up” because of Williams’s role in 

Brownlee’s then-recent arrest on drug charges. Motley acknowledged that he had 

initially obtained the gun from a hotel room that Brownlee had occupied, although 

Brownlee was not present at the time. 

{¶ 59} Motley stated in his proffer that McFarland did not play any role in 

Motley’s retrieval of “the hammer,” i.e., the gun. Motley stated that he did not talk 

to McFarland about roughing up Williams or getting the gun. Motley said he had 

no contact with McFarland prior to the commission of the November 14, 2015 

crimes. 

{¶ 60} Brownlee was convicted in October 2016 on all but Counts 1, 7, and 

9. When McFarland’s case came on for jury trial in February 2017, Motley was 

called as a state’s witness and admitted to his role in murdering Robert Williams. 

Motley testified that the day after Brownlee and McFarland’s October 25, 2015 

arrest on drug charges, he went without their knowledge to the Willoughby, Ohio, 

hotel that Brownlee had occupied in order to remove any drug-related evidence 

before the police discovered it, so as to protect Brownlee and McFarland from 

additional charges. Motley did not find any drugs but did find a gun under the 

mattress. Motley took the gun from the hotel and gave it to Brownlee’s brother, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

24 

but he retrieved it from him 48 hours later and thereafter kept it until the day of the 

murder. 

{¶ 61} Motley testified that following Brownlee’s release from jail on

November 10, 2015, and prior to the November 14, 2015 shooting, he and Brownlee 

met at the Willoughby hotel and Brownlee told him what he wanted him to do. 

Motley described the hotel room as being a suite that had a living area, a kitchen 

area, a bedroom, and a bathroom. Motley testified that McFarland was not in the 

area where the conversation between Brownlee and Motley occurred but instead 

was in a different part of the hotel room. 

{¶ 62} Motley testified that it was his decision to go to Williams’s 

apartment complex on the morning of November 14, 2015, with the gun. Later that 

day, Motley told Brownlee, “It’s done.” At some point on the evening of the murder 

or the next day, Motley met with Brownlee at the Willoughby hotel, while 

McFarland was in the hotel suite’s bedroom with the door closed. Brownlee gave 

Motley drugs valued at approximately $4,000 as an apparent reward. 

{¶ 63} Motley testified that he acted at only Brownlee’s direction. He 

testified that McFarland did not play any role in the plan to retaliate against 

Williams. And he testified that McFarland did not play any role in his obtaining 

possession of the gun that he used to kill Williams. 

{¶ 64} I note here that despite having expressly reserved the right to rescind 

Motley’s plea agreement if his testimony was not truthful or consistent with other 

known facts, the state of Ohio did not rescind the plea agreement after Motley 

provided his proffer statement and trial testimony. 

{¶ 65} Given that Motley’s testimony appears to exculpate McFarland from 

the charges brought against her in this case, the lead opinion looks to other evidence 

that supposedly establishes McFarland’s complicity and conspiratorial involvement 

in these crimes. But even that other evidence does not demonstrate McFarland’s 

participation in the charged crimes. 
January Term, 2020 

25 

{¶ 66} In particular, the lead opinion relies on portions of the October 25, 

2015 jail call from Brownlee to McFarland in which they discussed their belief that 

Williams was a snitch and Brownlee ranted that he was going to “get him.” That 

hardly establishes McFarland’s complicity or conspiratorial involvement in plans 

to commit murder. 

{¶ 67} The lead opinion says that during that same call, “McFarland 

brought Motley in on the call.” Lead opinion at ¶ 33. Specifically, the evidence 

reflects that McFarland received the call while she was with Motley as a passenger 

in his truck. After Brownlee learned that McFarland was with Motley, McFarland 

handed the phone to Motley, at which time Brownlee told Motley, “Chop, I need 

you to handle this.” Motley replied, “I already know.” Brownlee added, “Chop, 

get [Williams], get those mother fuckers.” When their private conversation was 

concluded, Motley handed the phone back to McFarland. There is no evidence that 

McFarland heard anything that Brownlee said to Motley. 

{¶ 68} Later in that same call, Brownlee asked McFarland about “the 

hammer.” McFarland told Brownlee that Motley had already retrieved the gun and 

had given it to Brownlee’s brother. From this evidence, the lead opinion says that 

McFarland “made it clear that she had had prior conversations with Motley” about 

the gun. Lead opinion at ¶ 33. So what? Does an inquiry concerning the 

whereabouts of a gun establish a conspiracy or complicity to commit murder? I 

would not have thought so before today’s decision. 

{¶ 69} Toward the end of that same call, Brownlee told McFarland: “Tell 

Chop when I get out I’m going to handle this.” Taken at face value, the implication 

was that no one should do anything until Brownlee was released from jail—at 

which time Brownlee, perhaps with Motley’s assistance, intended to handle the 

matter himself. That hardly inculpates McFarland in conspiracy or complicity to 

commit murder. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

26 

{¶ 70} The lead opinion gives undue if not talismanic significance to the 

fact that Motley, in the seven-page statement he wrote on October 16, 2015, 

referred to the gun as “their” gun. His trial testimony sought to correct that 

statement to reflect that the gun in fact was “his,” i.e., Brownlee’s, gun and not 

“their” gun. In any case, is the offhand use of a personal pronoun in an unsworn 

witness statement—with no showing of foundational knowledge to even make such 

a declaration—conclusive proof of conspiracy or complicity to commit murder? 

{¶ 71} The lead opinion says that while McFarland worked with Motley to 

sell drugs to finance Brownlee’s bail, “McFarland made clear to [Motley] that 

Williams and Henderson had to be dealt with.” Lead opinion at ¶ 34.2

 Regardless 

of whether McFarland was angry with Williams and Henderson, the lead opinion 

cannot point to any evidence indicating that she acted on that anger to cause harm 

to them. Motley flatly stated that he did not talk to McFarland about roughing up 

anyone and that she did not play any role in the planning of the events that occurred 

on November 14, 2015. 

{¶ 72} The lead opinion further relies on a jail call between Brownlee and 

McFarland in which McFarland said that Motley had said that Williams would 

“have to be handled.” Putting hearsay analysis aside, I fail to see how that statement 

could inculpate McFarland in conspiracy and complicity to commit murder. The 

evidence was that Motley was the one who said that they would “have to be 

handled” and that McFarland merely relayed what Motley said to Brownlee. Nor 

do I interpret McFarland’s passive submission to Brownlee’s voluble rantings as 

some form of silent incitement or encouragement to act. 

{¶ 73} Noting that “things moved quickly” once Brownlee was released 

from jail on November 10, 2015, the lead opinion says, “McFarland was in the hotel 

 

2. The lead opinion makes repeated references to McFarland’s involvement in drug dealings but 

neglects to acknowledge that McFarland was acquitted of all charges she faced in the drug 

trafficking case. See State v. McFarland, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-15-601477-B (May 22, 2017). 
January Term, 2020 

27 

room when Motley and Brownlee agreed that Motley would harm Williams.” Lead 

opinion at ¶ 35. But as noted previously, Motley testified that the hotel room was 

a suite with different areas and that McFarland was not in the area where Brownlee 

and Motley had their conversation. In any case, proximity is not necessarily equal 

to presence. 

{¶ 74} There was no evidence to suggest that McFarland had any 

knowledge of Brownlee’s November 13, 2015 calls to Williams stating that 

Brownlee was out of jail and would be coming for Williams and Henderson and 

that they were going to “see their graves.” Henderson testified that McFarland was 

not one of the four unidentified people who stood by their truck in the apartment’s 

parking lot looking up at Williams’ window as he started cussing them out. 

{¶ 75} Henderson testified that she received a telephone call from 

McFarland early on the morning of November 14, 2015, inquiring how they were 

doing. Henderson testified that McFarland had denied that Brownlee had made any 

threatening calls to Henderson and Williams but that McFarland had ended the call 

when she saw Brownlee approaching. There is no evidence that either Brownlee 

or Motley were aware of McFarland’s call to Henderson or that it had any effect on 

Motley’s actions. To infer that that phone call proves McFarland’s complicity in 

the murder scheme requires pure speculation and conjecture. I fail to see how this 

evidence substantiates McFarland’s supposed involvement when no other evidence 

establishes her participatory role in any plan. 

{¶ 76} As to the facts of the actual killing on November 14, 2015, the lead 

opinion does not identify any evidence that shows McFarland’s involvement in the 

crime. 

{¶ 77} With regard to what it calls the postmortem meeting at the 

Willoughby hotel, the lead opinion says “McFarland was present again,” lead 

opinion at ¶ 37; however, the lead opinion once again ignores Motley’s 

uncontroverted testimony that McFarland was in a different area—behind a closed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

28 

bedroom door—while Brownlee and Motley completed their business. Indeed, the 

lead opinion takes liberties with the record when it describes a meeting with all the 

confederates taking place after the murder. In truth, the testimony on this was 

ambiguous at best. What is not ambiguous, however, is that the state’s star witness 

once again exculpated McFarland. While Motley was being questioned about 

previous testimony elicited during a prior trial, the following exchange occurred: 

Q: All right. And do you remember testifying about the 

meeting where you met with Mr. Brownlee and Miss McFarland 

after the murder? 

A: Can you repeat the question? 

Q: Do you remember the meeting with Mr. Brownlee and 

Miss McFarland after the murder? 

A: Do I remember talking to them? 

Q: Well, do you remember that meeting, first of all? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And was Eddie Brownlee and Sheila McFarland both 

present? 

A: When I had the meeting? 

Q: Yes. 

A: See, that’s why I want you to be more specific, because 

you’re saying having a meeting, like me and everybody is in here 

right now, we’re talking, everybody can hear, it’s basically like 

we’re having a meeting. So basically I’m talking to you and I’m 

talking to everybody else in the courtroom. If she’s behind that door 

right there, I don’t know if she can hear me or not. So she’s not 

present to the meeting. 
January Term, 2020 

29 

Q: Well, how about this. Why don’t you tell me what you 

meant by this testimony: 

* * * 

Question: “Okay. And who was there when you met up with 

him now the second time after the hotel room?” 

Your answer was: “Who was with him?” 

Question: “Right. Who was with him.” 

Answer: “Sheila.” 

Question: “All right. Him and Sheila in tandem. And who 

was with you?” 

Answer: “The same two parties, Rahkee and my brother 

Raymond.” 

Okay, Is that all true or not? 

A: Yes. But you’re still missing what I’m trying to say. She

can be there, but listening to the conversation is different. 

Motley appears fixated on clarifying that McFarland was not present. No followup clarifying questions were asked about the meeting or, in particular, the presence 

of the other assailants. So regardless of what Motley said about the accomplices’ 

presence in prior testimony—for which we have no context or understanding of the 

line of questioning—his testimony in McFarland’s trial did not expressly say that 

they were present at a meeting after the murder. 

{¶ 78} The lead opinion says this was sufficient evidence to convict 

McFarland of aggravated murder based on her aiding or abetting another in 

committing the offense, R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), or soliciting or procuring another to 

commit the offense, R.C. 2923.03(A)(1). I cannot agree. 

{¶ 79} The lead opinion says McFarland “incited [Motley] to harm the 

informants.” Lead opinion at ¶ 39. How? I do not see how McFarland did anything 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

30 

to cause Williams’s murder, either by aiding or abetting or by soliciting or 

procuring. 

{¶ 80} The lead opinion says McFarland did not ask Motley to return the 

gun to her before the murder. Is that now proof of conspiracy and complicity to 

commit murder? 

{¶ 81} The lead opinion says McFarland discouraged the irate Brownlee 

from discussing Williams on the jail telephone. Is that also proof of conspiracy and 

complicity to commit murder? 

{¶ 82} Faced with Motley’s uncontroverted trial testimony that McFarland 

had no involvement whatsoever in the plan of retaliation that Brownlee directed 

Motley to execute against Williams, the lead opinion says that the jury could 

disbelieve his testimony and conclude that McFarland was involved. But under 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), superseded by 

constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio 

St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), an appellate court’s duty is to examine the 

evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would 

convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

at paragraph two of the syllabus. Today’s lead opinion turns Jenks on its head by 

determining whether the evidence if disbelieved, would convince the average mind 

of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶ 83} In my view, there must first be evidence to substantiate the elements 

of the offense before adverse inferences can be drawn from other evidence. Here, 

the evidence utterly failed to establish McFarland’s participatory role in the crimes 

committed against Williams. Indeed, as to the specific charge of conspiracy, the 

evidence failed to show any overt act by McFarland to promote or facilitate the 

commission of aggravated murder or murder. 

 
January Term, 2020 

31 

CONCLUSION 

{¶ 84} It is surprising to me that this court accepted discretionary 

jurisdiction in this case only to end up affirming McFarland’s conviction. This case 

presents no novel issue of law. We are not establishing new law or resolving 

conflicts in old law. Instead, the lead opinion acknowledges that the question here 

is one routinely addressed by appellate courts across the state. In that respect, this 

case is unremarkable. 

{¶ 85} At the same time, I do believe that the case presents an issue of great 

public interest that the lead opinion ignores. Contrary to the lead opinion’s 

assertion that “the question we face does not concern the effect of a conviction 

based upon insufficient evidence,” (emphasis sic) lead opinion at ¶ 22, I do not see 

how we can justly ignore the effect of such a conviction here—a sentence of life in 

prison without the possibility of parole. 

{¶ 86} This is a serious case involving the death of a man and the just 

punishment of those responsible for the crime. The significant issues presented 

concern the proper use of circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences 

that can be drawn from the testimony of witnesses in order to determine whether 

the evidence is legally sufficient to obtain a conviction such that its corresponding 

sentence is commensurate with the defendant’s criminal culpability for the crime. 

{¶ 87} The legitimacy of the administration of criminal justice is under 

scrutiny now perhaps more than ever. I believe that some of the biggest threats to 

the public’s confidence in the justice system are wrongful convictions, disparate 

treatment, and sentences that are inconsistent with criminal culpability. 

{¶ 88} McFarland, believing there was no compelling evidence that 

supported the state’s indictments, chose to exercise her constitutional right to trial. 

Despite a paucity of evidence, McFarland was convicted. By exercising her 

constitutional right to trial, McFarland turned down a plea agreement that could 

have resulted in a three-year prison sentence. While the jury was deliberating, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

32 

state again offered McFarland a plea deal, which she also turned down. In my 

experience, this is a highly unusual step for the state to take after a case has been 

submitted to the jury. After her convictions, she ended up with the most severe 

sentence short of the death penalty, while the individual who actually pulled the 

trigger and killed the victim in this case has the opportunity to be released in 18 

years. 

{¶ 89} At sentencing the trial court stated: 

And when there was a plea bargain offer just before trial, you rejected it. 

When there was a plea bargain offer when the jury was deliberating you 

rejected it because, apparently, your attorneys told me that you, quote, made 

your peace with God, closed quote. Well, now you have to make your peace 

with the state of Ohio. Okay? 

The court proceeded to sentence her to a life sentence without the possibility of 

parole. 

{¶ 90} Sheila McFarland chose to place her trust in the criminal justice 

system, and it failed her, allowing a conviction to stand based not on evidence but 

on innuendo, speculation, and conjecture. This court—provided with a final 

opportunity to remedy this injustice—perpetuates the failure. I dissent. 

DORRIAN, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion as to the conspiracy 

conviction. 

_________________ 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 

T. Van and Callista Plemel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Jeffrey M. 

Gamso and Paul Kuzmins, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 

_________________