Filed 1/5/21 In re M.G. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re M.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 D077804

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Super. Ct. No. J520073)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Carolyn M. Caietti, Judge. Affirmed. 

Jacques Alexander Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

J.G. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights, 

contending the juvenile court erred when it concluded the beneficial parentchild relationship exception to adoption did not apply. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)1 Mother further challenges the denial of her 

motion pursuant to section 388 to return her son to her, or to order family 

maintenance services and reunification services, based on a change in 

circumstances. We conclude the court did not err, and therefore affirm the 

court’s orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2019, the San Diego County Health and Human Services 

Agency (Agency) filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (e), alleging 

that in May 2019, then two-month old M.G. suffered severe physical abuse

inflicted by I.G. (Father) and possibly another person. Specifically, the child 

suffered 13 arm and rib fractures in different stages of healing (suggesting 

multiple instances of abuse), an eye hemorrhage, multiple parallel linear 

bruises on his abdomen, and a liver laceration. The petition alleged that a 

child abuse medical expert opined that M.G. had sustained those injuries on 

at least three separate occasions. Although Mother and Father took M.G. to 

the hospital in June, Mother admitted they had not sought medical attention 

for his injuries during the past month.

In its detention report, the Agency stated that Mother told it that she 

and Father were M.G.’s primary caregivers and that she took him to the 

hospital because she observed blood on his eye and he was crying more than 

usual. Mother stated she did not understand how M.G. got hurt. Father 

stated M.G. could have been injured accidentally when he rolled on top of the 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

child while they were sleeping or when M.G. fell out of bed. However, three 

days later, Father admitted to law enforcement officers that he smacked M.G. 

on the back of the head with his open hand; punched the child on his stomach 

with a closed fist; squeezed the child; and shook him. Father’s admission of 

smacking, punching, squeezing, and shaking M.G. did not account for all of 

the child’s injuries. At M.G.’s detention hearing, the court found that the 

Agency had made a prima facie showing in support of its petition and 

detained M.G. out of the home in foster care.

In its jurisdiction and disposition report, the Agency stated that Mother 

was having difficulty understanding how Father had injured M.G. She did 

not believe Father was responsible for injuring M.G., and instead believed 

the maternal grandmother may have injured M.G. when she had cared for 

him for short periods. Mother had supervised visits with M.G. and acted 

appropriately toward him during visits. Citing section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(5) and (6),2 the Agency recommended that the court not order 

reunification services for Mother and Father because of the severity of 

injuries inflicted on M.G. The Agency also was concerned that the parents 

2 Section 361.5, subdivision (b), provides an exception to the requirement 

that reunification services be provided to parents when a child is removed 

from their custody. The exception applies when the court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence “(5) [t]hat the child was brought within the jurisdiction 

of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that 

parent or guardian[;]” or “(6)(A) [t]hat the child has been adjudicated a 

dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of . . . the 

infliction of severe physical harm to the child . . . by a parent or guardian . . . , 

and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to 

pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.” 

Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)(C), provides: “A finding of the infliction of 

severe physical harm, for the purposes of this subdivision, may be based on, 

but is not limited to, deliberate and serious injury inflicted to or on a child’s 

body . . . by an act or omission of the parent or guardian . . . .” 
4

had delayed seeking medical treatment despite seeing visible signs of injury.3 

They only took the child to the hospital after the paternal grandfather 

insisted they do so. In an addendum report, the Agency stated that Mother 

had completed a parenting class and was continuing her participation in 

child abuse classes. Although Mother stated she was learning to recognize 

the red flags for child abuse and had considered ending her relationship with 

Father, she admitted she loved Father and it would be difficult for her to 

move on. During her visits with M.G., she would take a teddy bear which 

played Father’s voice for the child. At the October 2019 contested jurisdiction 

hearing, the court made true findings on the petition’s allegations.

In its October 2019 disposition report, the Agency reported that Mother 

continued to claim she had not noticed M.G. cry in pain and denied that 

Father could have hurt the child. Mother stated she remained in a 

relationship with Father. Father recanted the statements he made to law 

enforcement officers and blamed the maternal grandmother for M.G.’s 

injuries. At the October contested disposition hearing, the court heard 

testimony from the psychologist who performed a psychological evaluation on 

Father. The psychologist explained that Father was abused during his 

childhood, he did not acknowledge full responsibility for causing M.G.’s 

injuries, and he remained uniquely dangerous to his own children due to 

“replaying” the trauma from his own childhood—meaning he would inflict 

abuse on his children. After learning that Father admitted to law 

enforcement that he punched, smacked, squeezed, and shook M.G., the 

3 A medical expert explained some injuries would have been so painful 

that M.G. would have screamed in pain inconsolably while being dressed and 

moved around. This led the Agency to question Mother’s ability to protect 

M.G. because she should have known of the child’s pain and injuries while 

bathing and changing him. 
5

psychologist agreed Father was trying to make himself “look good” to the 

psychologist by only admitting to squeezing the child too hard. Mother was 

present during this testimony. 

The court also heard testimony that Mother had completed her 

parenting class program, she had finished nine child abuse classes, and she 

had supervised visits with M.G. three times per week. The social worker 

acknowledged there were no concerns regarding Mother’s care of M.G. during 

the supervised visits. Although Mother was empathetic regarding M.G.’s 

well-being, the social worker testified that Mother was not empathetic about 

the abuse that M.G. suffered, she never seemed sad about it, and she 

minimized the abuse. Mother did not believe Father committed the abuse, 

she could not understand how the injuries occurred, and she took no 

responsibility. In closing arguments, the Agency’s counsel emphasized that 

M.G.’s injuries were not caused by Father accidentally rolling over the child 

during sleep. Instead, counsel argued “that father beating a two-month-old 

was the problem. But by now, the mother should really know this, too. Her 

comments show she still doesn’t believe he did the things he admitted to, 

despite overwhelming evidence that the abuse occurred and really only two 

people out there could have done this.” Counsel further argued that Mother 

lacked insight and therefore could not be protective of M.G. 

At the conclusion of the contested disposition hearing, the court 

declared M.G. a dependent of the court, ordered him placed in a confidential 

foster home, denied reunification services to Mother and Father pursuant to 

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and (6), and ordered that Mother be allowed 

reasonable supervised visitation with M.G. The court also set a 

section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan for M.G. The court noted it 

was faced with a case where an infant sustained “severe injuries that were 
6

inflicted on multiple days under circumstances where the child would have 

obviously been in pain, where he had visible injuries, and where there was 

blood on his pacifier, where he was not taken to the hospital that uncovered 

those injuries until the paternal grandfather insisted.” 

In its February 2020 section 366.26 report, the Agency recommended 

that the court terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights and select 

adoption as M.G.’s permanent plan. The Agency believed that M.G. was 

generally and specifically adoptable and reported that his current foster 

caregivers wanted to adopt him. It reported that M.G. was doing well in his 

foster home. Mother had filed for divorce from Father and was no longer 

living with him. Mother was unable to explain the injuries that resulted in 

M.G.’s juvenile dependency. Mother consistently visited M.G. and the 

visitation logs prepared by the visitation monitor indicated she demonstrated 

a parental role during those supervised visits.4 Despite positive interactions 

during these one-hour visits, the Agency concluded that the relationship that 

M.G. had with Mother did not rise to the level of a parent-child relationship. 

M.G., then 10 months old, had spent about seven months of his life outside of 

Mother’s care. M.G. relied on his current caregivers to meet his physical and 

emotional needs and they were his primary parental figures. At supervised 

4 There were eight visitation logs from December 3, 2019 to January 24, 

2020. The visitation logs are preprinted forms with an entry titled 

“Demonstrates Parental Role.” The visitation monitor can complete this 

section to show the parent “did well” or “needs help with” demonstrating a 

parental role. The monitor completed each of the logs indicating Mother did 

well during her supervised visits by providing all items needed for the visit;

bringing a backpack with baby food, diapers, and snacks; changing the child’s 

diaper; helping the child practice walking; preparing snacks for the child; and 

feeding the child. Each of these logs reflected a one-hour visit, but Mother 

also had some visits that were one and a half hours.
7

visits with Mother, M.G. did not show any distress on initial contact with, or 

separation from, Mother.

In its April 2020 addendum report, the Agency continued to recommend 

that the parental rights of Mother and Father be terminated and a 

permanent plan of adoption be selected for M.G. Mother stated that although 

she worked for the same company as Father, she had not had any contact 

with him. At that time, some of Mother’s visits were virtual visits with M.G. 

(presumably because of the COVID-19 crisis). It was also reported that, 

during visits supervised by the caregiver, M.G. does not become distressed 

when Mother leaves, and he tends to crawl toward the caregiver when he is 

with Mother. The Agency reported that M.G. continues to rely on caregivers 

to meet his physical and emotional needs, and they provide him with a stable 

and safe environment. 

In June 2020, Mother filed a section 388 petition to modify the court’s 

October 2019 order. Mother requested that the court modify its prior order 

by returning M.G. to her care and ordering family maintenance services, or 

by ordering reunification services for her and expanding her visitation rights 

to unsupervised and/or overnight visits. She alleged there had been a change

in circumstances since the prior order and that her requested order was in 

M.G.’s best interest. Regarding changed circumstances, Mother alleged that 

she was no longer in a relationship or living with Father and had filed for a 

divorce. She alleged she had attended 25 sessions of a child abuse group 

class and could not continue to attend that class due to her work schedule, 

but was now attending a different child abuse class.5 Mother alleged she had 

5 Mother explained during the hearing on her petition that she only 

attended two or three of these classes and stopped during the COVID-19 

pandemic. 
8

obtained full-time employment and taken other steps to become fully 

independent. Regarding M.G.’s best interest, Mother alleged she and M.G. 

had a clear bond and she had consistently visited him.

The Agency opposed Mother’s section 388 petition. It believed that 

Mother’s circumstances were changing, but had not yet changed. The Agency 

stated that Mother had not yet completed a child abuse program. She had 

not yet fully addressed empathy in her child abuse classes. Although Mother 

told the Agency that she had begun individual therapy the prior month, she 

could not identify the therapist by name. She had a new job after losing two 

prior jobs and lived with the maternal grandfather. During an in-person 

supervised visit, M.G. began to cry when Mother carried him and was 

inconsolable. At the end of the visit, M.G. let go of Mother’s hand when he 

saw his caregiver and ran to the caregiver. Mother continued to wear her 

wedding ring, explaining she just liked to wear it. Mother stated she paid 

her cell phone bill and no longer shared a bank account with Father. 

Although she continued to work, Mother stated that she found it difficult to 

support herself and was unable to pay for continued child abuse classes. 

Mother stated she was only half-way ready to have M.G. back in her care.

In August 2020, after finding Mother had made a prima facie showing 

in support of her section 388 petition, the court held a combined hearing on 

her section 388 petition and the section 366.26 permanency planning issues. 

In addition to the Agency’s reports, Mother’s section 388 petition, and other 

documents admitted in evidence, the court also heard testimony from Rosa 

Pamatz, an Agency social worker; Mother; Valerie Padra-Najera, Mother’s 

child abuse class therapist; and Wendy, M.G.’s caregiver.6 

6 Relevant portions of the witnesses’ testimony is discussed post. 
9

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Mother’s section 388 

petition, finding that she had not shown changed circumstances or that her 

requested order was in M.G.’s best interest. Regarding the section 366.26 

issues, the court found that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception 

did not apply, terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, and selected 

adoption as M.G.’s permanent plan.

Mother timely appealed, challenging the court’s orders denying her 

section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights.

DISCUSSION

I

Section 388 Petition for Modification

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her 

section 388 petition for modification because the evidence showed there had 

been a substantial change in circumstances since the October 2019 

disposition order bypassing reunification services and it was in M.G.’s best 

interest to continue his relationship with her. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

A parent may petition the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside 

a prior order on the grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.7 The 

7 Section 388, subdivision (a), provides: “Any parent or other person 

having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile 

court . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, 

petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a 

dependent child of the juvenile court or in which a guardianship was ordered 

pursuant to Section 360 for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any 

order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court. 

The petition . . . shall set forth in concise language any change of 

circumstance or new evidence that is alleged to require the change of order or 

termination of jurisdiction.” 
10

burden of proof is on the moving party to show both a change of 

circumstances and that the proposed modification is in the child’s best 

interests. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.); In re 

G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157 (G.B.); In re A.A. (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612 (A.A.); In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47

(Casey D.).) Typically, the parent must demonstrate changed circumstances 

by a preponderance of the evidence, but where reunification services were 

bypassed under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), as here, the burden of proof 

is clear and convincing evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a); California Rules of Court, 

rule 5.570(e)(7); see G.B., supra, at pp. 1157-1158.)

The moving party must show changed, not merely changing, 

circumstances. (Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) “A petition which 

alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the 

selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has 

repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some 

future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best 

interests. [Citation.] ‘ “[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become 

adequate.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Furthermore, “[w]hen a juvenile court bypasses reunification services 

due to a finding that a child suffered ‘severe physical abuse’ [citation], the 

focus of the dependency proceedings turns to the child’s need for permanence 

and stability instead of family reunification.” (G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1157.) Accordingly, “at any hearing to consider a section 388 petition 

requesting reunification services[,] . . . a juvenile court may modify an order 

denying reunification services only if there is clear and convincing evidence 

that the services would be in the child’s best interests, and only if it makes 

the same findings that would have been required to offer services at the 
11

disposition hearing instead of bypassing services. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) 

Namely, “[o]nce severe abuse has been found, a court is ‘prohibited from 

granting reunification services “unless it finds that, based on competent 

testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse . . . or that failure to 

try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely 

and positively attached to that parent.” ’ ” (Ibid.)8 

The determination whether to grant or deny a section 388 petition “is 

addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will 

not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. 

[Citations.]” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416 (Jasmon O.); see 

also In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 920 (Y.M.).) On appeal, a 

reviewing court will not disturb a discretionary decision by the juvenile court 

unless the determination is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. 

(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318; In re Marcelo B. (2012) 

209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642.) The appellant has the burden on appeal to 

affirmatively show that the juvenile court abused its discretion. (A.A., supra,

203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.)

B. Analysis

Mother argues she met her burden of establishing changed 

circumstances justifying a modification of the court’s order bypassing her for 

reunification services. Mother cites evidence that since the court’s October 

8 Mother states the multi-factor test from In re Kimberly F. (1997) 

56 Cal.App.4th 519 is “[o]ne standard approach in assessing the best interest 

prong of section 388.” But Kimberly F. did not involve a situation where, as 

here, reunification services were bypassed, shifting the focus of the 

proceedings to the child’s interests in permanency and stability. (In re J.C.

(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526-527 (J.C.).) Even if we were to consider the 

listed factors from Kimberly F., we would not be persuaded to reach a 

contrary conclusion. 
12

2019 order, she engaged in child abuse classes, was employed fulltime, and 

was gaining independence by filing for divorce from Father. Mother also 

argues she met her burden of proving modification of the order was in M.G.,’s 

best interest. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion. 

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s 

section 388 petition because she failed to show changed circumstances. There 

is substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that Mother showed, at 

most, changing circumstances and not changed circumstances. As discussed 

above, M.G. suffered severe physical abuse, including 13 arm and rib 

fractures, an eye hemorrhage, multiple parallel linear bruises on his 

abdomen, and a liver laceration. The fractures were in different stages of 

healing—indicating there were multiple separate instances of physical 

abuse—and were so serious the child would have been in excruciating pain

and his suffering would be apparent. The bypass of services for Mother thus 

was grounded on the fact that she knew or should have known of the abuse

yet delayed in obtaining medical treatment. Mother alleged she had 

participated in child abuse classes for six months of the 12-month course, and 

she testified about what she learned from the parenting course and child 

abuse program. Mother further alleged that she attended all visits with the 

child, which were positive. But Mother had already completed a parenting 

program prior to the disposition hearing, and she had completed 

approximately nine child abuse classes. Completing additional child abuse 

classes, and her re-enrollment in a similar program, does not constitute a 

change of circumstances, especially when this case involves severe physical 

abuse of an infant and Mother has failed to complete the program (including 
13

crucial aspects of the program addressing insight and empathy).9 Similarly, 

Mother’s supervised visits with M.G., in which she acted appropriately 

toward him and brought appropriate supplies like snacks and diapers, did 

not constitute changed circumstances as she already had similar visits with 

M.G. before reunification services were bypassed. As the juvenile court 

noted, “nothing changed” in regard to the visitation. 

Furthermore, the juvenile court was concerned that Mother knew or 

should have known about the abuse, she did not take measures to protect 

M.G., and she lacked insight in failing to obtain medical treatment despite 

his visible signs of injury. Although Mother acknowledged M.G. had been 

hurt, she had not used the word “abuse” in describing his injuries. There was 

little evidence that Mother had taken responsibility for her actions or failures 

to act that contributed to the dependency. The court expressed concern that 

Mother believed Father’s claims that the injuries could have been sustained 

by accident, stating “that doesn’t seem credible, it doesn’t seem logical.” 

Despite the fact that Mother heard extensive testimony regarding Father’s 

extreme physical abuse during the course of the dependency action, at the 

section 388 hearing, Mother did not recall significant details regarding 

Father’s admissions of deliberate abuse. The court could reasonably conclude 

that Mother remained in denial and, without a clear explanation of what 

occurred and the source of the child’s injuries, “there is no reason to believe 

9 Mother attended only the first half of the child abuse course and had 

not attended the second half that would have focused on insight and 

empathy—which, according to Padra-Najera (Mother’s child abuse class 

therapist), are essential for a parent to protect a child from the type of abuse 

inflicted on M.G. Although Mother’s participation in the first half of the 

classes had been above expectation, Padra-Najera testified that she had not 

seen Mother in six months and did not know her current state of mind. 
14

further services will prevent her from inflicting or ignoring the infliction of 

similar injuries in the future.” (In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 

1077-1078.) There was substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion 

that Mother had not gained sufficient insight and empathy, and Mother has 

not met her burden of establishing that services were likely to prevent 

reabuse. (G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.) The court could 

reasonably infer that Mother had shown she was in the process of changing 

her ability to protect M.G., but had not yet shown she had changed her 

circumstances and was now able to protect him. 

Mother’s contention that she was gaining independence, by filing for 

divorce from Father, and obtaining employment, similarly does not establish 

the trial court erred in denying her section 388 petition. Mother had not yet 

finalized her divorce from Father. She continued to wear her wedding ring,

maintained a family photograph on her cell phone that included Father, and 

had contact with him (including dinner) merely four months before filing her 

section 388 petition. This evidence supported an inference by the court that 

Mother had not yet ended her emotional connection with the man who had 

abused M.G. and posed a risk to him of future abuse. And although Mother 

alleged in her section 388 petition that she was prepared to become M.G.’s 

permanent caregiver, Mother told the Agency she was only half-way ready to 

become M.G.’s caregiver. Because Mother had recently obtained a new job 

after losing two prior jobs and was living with the maternal grandfather, the 

court could reasonably infer that she had not yet established a stable job or 

stable home in order to provide M.G. with the stability he needed.10 

10 Mother testified that she was not prepared to have M.G. in her care 

and had yet to look into arranging daycare for M.G. if he were returned to her 

care and she continued to work.
15

Even if Mother had demonstrated a substantial change in 

circumstances, she has not shown it would be in M.G.’s best interest to 

provide reunification services or return him to Mother’s custody. As 

discussed above, because the court bypassed reunification services for Mother 

and Father, the focus shifted to M.G.’s need for permanency and stability, not 

family reunification. (G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157 [trial court is 

required not to order reunification services unless it finds that services were 

likely to prevent reabuse or “failure to try reunification will be detrimental to 

the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent”].) 

At the section 388 hearing, there was substantial evidence showing 

that M.G.’s best interest was in pursuing the permanency and stability that 

adoption could provide him rather than in continuing a relationship with 

Mother—whether through returning him to her care or offering her 

reunification services and more liberal visitation. Pamatz, the Agency’s 

social worker, testified that it was not in M.G.’s best interest to return to 

Mother’s care. Mother had not yet explained or understood how M.G. could 

have sustained the severe injuries he suffered on multiple occasions or why 

she did not observe, and seek treatment for, his injuries earlier. 

Mother also failed to establish M.G. was “closely and positively 

attached” to her as required to modify the prior order bypassing reunification 

services. Mother points to her testimony to show the child was bonded with 

her and the visits went well. However, there was also evidence that the child 

showed no distress when separated from Mother and, at some visits, he 

became very distressed after the caregiver walked away and the caregiver 

had to redirect M.G. to go with Mother. The child sought comfort with the 

caregiver, and was thriving in his current placement with caregivers who 

were providing him with a stable home. The foster parents were addressing 
16

all of M.G.’s physical and emotional needs, and M.G. had shown significant 

improvement in their care. Of particular note, the foster parents were in 

child-parent psychotherapy with the child and were helping this very young 

child deal with his diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder from the trauma 

he suffered. 

The Agency opined that it was in M.G.’s best interest that the court 

terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and select adoption as his 

permanent plan. M.G. was only two months old when he came to the 

Agency’s attention and had spent most of his life out of Mother’s care. M.G. 

looked to his foster parents as parental figures, and relied on them for safety 

and stability. In light of the evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that Mother’s requested order was not in M.G.’s best interest. 

(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1157; A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612; Casey D., supra, 

70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47; Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 415-416; Y.M., 

supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.) 

II

Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception

Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it terminated her 

parental rights, asserting she established the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception to adoption applied. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We 

disagree with this assertion as well.

A. Applicable Law

“The section 366.26 hearing is a critical late stage in a dependency 

proceeding. The child has been under juvenile court jurisdiction for an 

extended period following the dispositional order, and the court has held one 

or more review hearings to consider a return to parental custody. (See 
17

§ 366.21.) At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from family 

reunification and toward the selection and implementation of a permanent 

plan for the child. [Citation.] . . . If adoption is likely, the court is required to 

terminate parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding 

that termination would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.26(c)(1); In re 

Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53[ ] [(Celine R.)].)” (In re S.B. (2009) 

46 Cal.4th 529, 532, fn. omitted.)

Mother invokes the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to 

adoption, which applies if “termination would be detrimental to the child” 

because the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the 

child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”11 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In making the determination of whether the 

beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies, the juvenile court 

“balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in 

a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging a new family 

would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive 

the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child 

would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the 

natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 

239 Cal.App.4th 389, 397 (Anthony B.).) To establish the exception, a parent 

“must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact’ [citation], an 

emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits 

pleasant. [Citation.] Rather, the parent[ ] must show that they occupy ‘a 

11 Mother does not rely on any other exception. Although Mother has 

another child (a 10-year-old daughter) from a different father than M.G., she 

told the Agency that she had lost custody of her other child in a family court 

proceeding and there is no evidence that M.G. has a relationship with this 

sibling. 
18

parental role’ in the child’s life. [Citation.]” (In re Andrea R. (1999) 

75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.) Such “a relationship characteristically aris[es] 

from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.” 

(Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) “It is not enough to show that the 

parent and child have a friendly and loving relationship.” (J.C., supra,

226 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) Moreover, “[b]ecause a section 366.26 hearing 

occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet 

the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the 

parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive 

placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.) 

“We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual 

issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of 

discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling 

reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child.” 

(Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.)12 Under the substantial 

evidence standard of review, we consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the court’s order, draw all reasonable inferences in support of the 

court’s findings, and disregard all contrary evidence. (S.B., supra,

164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 297-298; Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) 

Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, we determine whether the 

juvenile court’s decision exceeded the bounds of reason, and, in so doing, we 

do not substitute our view for that of the juvenile court. (Stephanie M., 

supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.)

12 The standard of review that applies to the beneficial parental 

relationship exception to adoption is currently pending before the California 

Supreme Court. (In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, 106, review 

granted July 24, 2019, S255839.) Pending further guidance, we apply the 

standard described herein.
19

B. Analysis

Mother claims she visited consistently with M.G., her relationship with

the child was parental in nature, and it would be detrimental to M.G. to sever 

that relationship. At a minimum, she claims, the juvenile court should have 

ordered legal guardianship for the child rather than adoption. 

It is undisputed that Mother maintained regular contact and visitation 

with M.G. and therefore met the first prong of the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) [“parents have maintained 

regular visitation and contact with the child”].) Thus, the issue before us is 

whether Mother met her burden with regard to the second prong—whether 

she had a beneficial parental relationship with M.G. that “is sufficiently 

strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination.” (In re 

Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 613.) 

The record shows that Mother had a positive and loving relationship 

with M.G., and the child appeared to enjoy his visits with Mother. 

Nevertheless, the court could reasonably find that Mother’s relationship with 

M.G. was not parental in nature but rather, more akin to a friendly visitor.

For the majority of M.G.’s life, the child did not live with Mother or rely on 

her to meet his daily needs. He was only two months old when he was 

removed from his parents’ custody and looked to his foster parents to meet 

his physical and emotional needs. Although Mother continued to have 

contact with M.G. during the dependency proceeding, she never progressed to 

unmonitored visitation. Under such circumstances, where the parent has not 

had custody of the child throughout the dependency proceedings and has not 

advanced beyond supervised visitation, the parent-child bond is difficult to 

establish. (Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) The court reasonably 

found that the relationship formed during their limited supervised visitation 
20

was not a parental relationship that warranted delaying M.G.’s adoption, but 

rather one of a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative. (In re Angel B.

(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 

1418-1419.) Although Mother cites evidence or inferences therefrom that 

would have supported a contrary finding, we are required to disregard these 

contrary findings under the applicable substantial evidence standard of 

review.13 

Even assuming that Mother demonstrated a beneficial parental 

relationship with M.G., she has not shown such a relationship “outweigh[ed] 

the well-being [M.G.] would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive 

parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575; § 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Pamatz testified that based on M.G.’s young age, good 

health, and temperament, there was a very high likelihood that he would be 

adopted, and his foster parents were fully committed to adopting him. 

During the social worker’s observation of about eight visits between Mother 

and M.G., he did not show any distress at the end of his visits with Mother. 

By contrast to his easy separation from Mother, he was distressed when 

separating from his foster parent and attempted to return to her rather than 

Mother, requiring redirection. And as noted, Mother never progressed 

13 Mother emphasizes that the visitation logs reflect she demonstrated a 

parental role. (See fn. 4 ante [describing visitation logs].) But the juvenile 

court also heard testimony that Mother did not fulfill a parental role within 

the meaning of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. 

Pamatz testified that M.G. looked toward his caregivers, and not Mother, for 

his physical and emotional needs for food, care, comfort, affection, safety, and 

stability. Furthermore, Pamatz testified that Mother’s relationship with 

M.G. was not parental in nature, but instead that of a friendly visitor. 

“ ‘ “When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, 

the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the 

trial court.” ’ ” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)
21

beyond supervised visitation. The court thus could conclude that M.G.’s 

primary attachment was to his foster parent, not Mother, and that any 

relationship with Mother was not outweighed by the security of a permanent 

placement. (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 622-623 [“While the 

weekly two-hour visits between K.P. and his mother may have been pleasant 

for both parties, there was no evidence in the record (beyond [mother’s] stated 

belief) that termination of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental 

to K.P. or that the relationship conferred benefits to K.P. more significant 

than the permanency and stability offered by adoption”].) 

Furthermore, Mother’s failure to fully acknowledge and accept 

responsibility for M.G.’s severe physical abuse, combined with the instability 

in her living situation and work history, weighed against maintaining M.G.’s 

relationship with her. The court could reasonably conclude that Mother 

failed to demonstrate that she could provide M.G. with the stability he 

needed, as well as protection from child abuse, and that adoption could 

instead provide him with that stability and protection. Under these 

circumstances, severance of M.G.’s relationship with Mother would not 

deprive him of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that he 

would be “greatly harmed.” (Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 394-

395.) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would have no detrimental impact on 

the child. (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531; Anthony B., supra, 

239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395; Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.) 

Mother also contends a permanent plan of legal guardianship would 

have been more appropriate for M.G. Under section 366.26, however, the 

statutory preference is to terminate parental rights and order the child 

placed for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) “The Legislature has thus 
22

determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice. ‘Adoption is the 

Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] 

emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’ [Citation.] 

‘Guardianship, while a more stable placement than foster care, is not 

irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the 

Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.’ ” (Celine R., supra,

31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) We are not persuaded by Mother’s argument that the 

preference for adoption is overcome simply because she has visited with the 

child and she believes he would receive some benefit from having an ongoing 

relationship with her. 

In sum, we conclude Mother has not met her burden of showing that 

the juvenile court erred in finding that the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception did not apply to preclude termination of her parental 

rights.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

GUERRERO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.