18-2447 Rogers v. Borkowsky 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12 th day of March, two thousand nineteen. PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ Patricia Rogers, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. 18-2447 Mitchell T. Borkowsky, Carolyn Mazzu Genovesi , Defendants-Appellees .

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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Patricia Rogers, pro se, Reading, PA. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Andrew W. Amend, David Lawrence III, Assistant Solicitors General, for Letitia A. James, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY.2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States Di strict Court for the Eastern District of New York (Matsumoto, J. ).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the distri ct court entered on August 1, 2018, is AFFIRMED

. Appellant Patricia Rogers, proceeding pro se, sued the chief and assistant counsel to the New York State Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District (“Grievance Committee”) for wrongs under the Federal Tort Claims Act and fo r violations of her constitutional rights. She alleged that the Grievance Committee wrongfully dec lined to investigate a grievance that she filed against her former attorney. The District Cour t dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedur al history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as needed to explain our decision to affirm.
On de novo review of the District Court’s dismissal, Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust
Co. , 757 F.3d 79, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2014), we identify no error. To ha ve standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) she has an injury in fact, (2) th ere is a causal connection between the injury and conduct of which she complains, and (3) “it [is] ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that [her] injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citation omitted). Injury in fact c onsists of “an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and part icularized and actual or imminent , not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (citation omitted). The requirement sets “a3 low threshold, . . . which helps to ensure that the plaintiff has a personal stak e in the outcome of the controversy.” John v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. , 858 F.3d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 2017). We have consistently held that “a private citizen generally lacks standing ‘to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he hims elf is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.’” United States v. Grundhoefer , 916 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D. , 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). This prin ciple precludes an individual from challenging an attorney disciplinary committee’s decision not to discipline his or her former attorney. In re Attorney Disciplinary Appeal , 650 F.3d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 2011). Just as crime victims “have not suffered an Article III direct injury” from a prosecuto r’s decision not to pursue criminal charges against their assailants, Grundhoefer , 916 F.2d at 791 (emphasis added), a person who files a grievance with an attorney disciplinary committee suffers no direct injury from that committee’s decision not to pursue discipline. In re Attorney Disciplinary Appeal , 650 F.3d at 204; see also Doyle v. Okla. Bar Ass’n , 998 F.2d 1559, 1566–67 (10th Ci r. 1993) (affirming dismissal for lack of standing beca use grievant could not assert a ny cognizable legal interest in disciplinary commissi on’s decision). Rogers alleged that the Grievance Committee violated her constitutional rights by declining to investigate her grievance against her former attorney. But under the precedent cited above, she has not alleged an interest in the Grievance Committee’s proceedings sufficient to satisfy Article III standing. See In re Attorney Disciplinary Appeal , 650 F.3d at 204; Doyle , 998 F.2d at 1566–
67.4 We have reviewed Rogers’s remaining arguments and conclude that they have no merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judg ment of the District Court is AFFIRMED

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FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court