* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### DEC 23 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. DOUGLAS O. RUEDLINGER,

Defendant-Appellant. No. 97-3357 (D.C. No. 97-CR-40012-01-RDR)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Defendant Douglas O. Ruedlinger appeals from an ord er of the district court granting the government’s motion to revoke de fendant’s release on bail pending trial. We affirm. In No. 97-40012, defendant was charged in a twenty- four-count indictment with conspiracy, interstate transportation of moneyobtained by fraud, money laundering, mail fraud, bankruptcy fraud, extortion and perjury. Trial in that case is scheduled to begin approximately one week after the completion of his co-defendant’s trial, which is scheduled to begin J anuary 20, 1988. In April 1997, defendant was found guilty of ten counts of m ail fraud, two counts of wire fraud, and one count of money laundering. (No. 96- 40045.) He is to be sentenced on that conviction January 16, 1998. Defendant was released on bail in No. 96-40045, sub ject to various conditions. The district court incorporated those conditions into the bail order in No. 97-40012. Defendant was found to have violatedthose release conditions in No. 96-40045. However, the court continued bail wi th the imposition of several additional conditions including one that he should “not transfer directly or indirectly personal or business funds, real or pers onal property, with a value in excess of $500, except with the express written con sent of the court.” Appellee’s Supp. App. A, p. 3.-3-

Subsequently, defendant received a refund on a car rental for approximately $900.00. He received verbal permission from his pr etrial services officer to deposit that check. He also received an income taxrefund of $1,311.53 which he also received verbal permission to deposit. Therea fter, defendant received a tax refund of $113,429.57. This check he divided into eleven cashiers checks and disbursed. After disbursement, he provided an acco unting to his pretrial services officer. Defendant also executed an agreement to s ell some of his property for $250,000.00. He did not notify anyone of that tran saction. The government then filed a petition to revoke defendant’s pretrial rel ease pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). The district court, held that the evidence was clea r and convincing that defendant had intentionally violated the terms of h is release and that it was unlikely he would abide by any conditions or combin ation of conditions of release. The court ordered defendant detained pend ing trial. Defendant appeals. “Appellate review of detention or release orders is plenary as to mixed questions of law and fact and independent, with due deference to the district court’s purely factual findings.” United States v. Stricklin , 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991). Defendant admits he did not have the express writte n consent of the court to disperse the funds. See Defendant’s Br. at 8. However, he contends he-4-

attempted to obtain that request and that he was ac ting in accordance with his previous acts which had not been found violative of his bail conditions. He asserts that he never received written permission t o deposit the first two checks, and, apparently, concludes that he was therefore re leased from the written consent provision. Defendant is wrong. The distinction be tween receiving oral permission to deposit checks and receiving no permi ssion to disburse money is obvious. The evidence is clear and convincing thatdefendant violated the conditions of his release. The district court also correctly found that it was unlikely defendant would abide by any additional conditions imposed. He had already violated his bail conditions once. The current hearing related to hi s violation of the conditions imposed as a consequence of his first violation. D efendant’s prior behavior provided ample evidence for the district court to c onclude that he would not comply with any conditions imposed. We find no error in the district court’s determinat ion that defendant violated the conditions of his release and that it was unlikely he would abide by any conditions or combination of conditions of rele ase. The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. ENTERED FOR THE COURT PER CURIAM