In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 03-1036

CLYDE AMMONS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ARAMARK UNIFORM SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 C 4073—John W. Darrah, Judge.

____________

ARGUED DECEMBER 5, 2003—DECIDED MAY 21, 2004

____________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and MANION and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Clyde Ammons sued his former

employer, Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (“Aramark”), for

terminating his employment in violation of the Americans

with the Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (the

“ADA”). At the close of discovery the District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division) granted summary judgment in favor of Aramark. Ammons appeals from
2 No. 03-1036

that decision. He also challenges the district court’s decision

to strike testimony offered by Ammons’ expert as well as

several of Ammons’ responses to Aramark’s statement of

undisputed facts in support of its motion for summary

judgment. We affirm.

I.

Aramark (or its predecessor) employed Ammons for almost forty years. Most recently, Ammons was employed at

Aramark’s Chicago, Illinois, laundry facility as a boiler

engineer and lead mechanic. On August 15, 1997, Ammons

injured his right knee on the job. Following the injury, he

sought treatment from Dr. Mitchell Krieger, an orthopedic

surgeon who, in October 1997, performed surgery on

Ammons’ knee.

Ammons returned to work on November 17, 1997.

Ammons was assigned to light duty and was restricted in

the amount of climbing he could do, the amount of time he

could spend on his knees, bending, squatting, climbing

stairs, lifting, and use of a ladder. Despite his light duty assignment, Ammons voluntarily withdrew from work less

than a month later and took a medical leave of absence.

On February 14, 1998, Ammons again returned to work in

a light duty capacity. Approximately one month later,

Ammons voluntarily took a second leave of absence. After

that, Ammons did not return to work at Aramark.

On April 9, 1998, based on a functional capacity evaluation, Dr. Krieger concluded that Ammons had reached the

point of maximum medical improvement, i.e., Ammons’

condition was permanent. Dr. Krieger also concluded that

Ammons could not return to his normal duties at Aramark

and that he was limited to a light-medium level of work
No. 03-1036 3

with the following restrictions: minimal kneeling (no longer

than five minutes at a time); a limited period of “static

standing” (no longer than eight minutes at a time); a

maximum of one hour of “dynamic standing”; limited

climbing; and restricted walking on a “pain-level basis.” Dr.

Krieger also concluded that Ammons could not resume a

heavy level of work activity. Such a level would include

occasional lifting of 100 pounds, frequent lifting of 35

pounds or less, and constant lifting of 15 pounds.

In September 1998, in conjunction with a worker’s compensation claim for the same injury, Ammons met with

Susan Entenberg, a vocational rehabilitation counselor.

After meeting with Ammons and reviewing his job responsibilities and medical records, Entenberg concluded in a

report dated October 6, 1998 that Ammons’ work at

Aramark required heavy exertion and that Dr. Krieger’s restrictions amounted to a “sedentary restriction.” Entenberg

also concluded that Ammons was not capable of returning

to his position as it was generally performed but also recommended that Aramark could make accommodations for

Ammons’ condition.

In January 1999, Ammons, who was still on medical leave,

asked to return to work. To explore this possibility, Jeff

Schwingler, the general manager of the Chicago plant, and

Barrington McPherson, a co-worker of Ammons and

a union steward, met with Ammons on January 21, 1999, to

discuss possible accommodations that might permit

Ammons to return to work. Neither Ammons’ attorney nor

Entenberg were present at this meeting. At the meeting,

Schwingler asked Ammons to identify specific tasks he was

capable of performing. Ammons stated that he could operate the plant’s boiler with some assistance, repair the

plant’s sewing machines, and provide general troubleshooting assistance. In the weeks following the meeting,
4 No. 03-1036

1 There is some confusion in the pleadings, the briefs of the

parties, and the opinion of the district court as to the timing of

this letter and a second meeting on or after March 10, 1999 to discuss accommodations for Ammons. As best we can tell from the

record, Ur sent his letter to Ammons on March 9, 1999. This letter

had not been received by Ammons when he requested, in writing, on March 10, 1999, a second meeting with Schwingler to

discuss returning to work. At this second meeting Ammons

repeated the request he made in January, namely, that he be able

to return to Aramark with responsibility for operating the boiler

room, repairing and maintaining the sewing machines, and serving as a maintenance troubleshooter. Apparently, Schwingler

either rejected Ammons’ suggestions or told him he would take

them under consideration. In any event, the confusion surrounding these events is immaterial.

Schwingler discussed Ammons’ case with Alexander Ur,

Aramark’s Director of Employment Practices, and the

Chicago facility’s maintenance manager Pasquale Malfeo.

In a letter to Ammons dated March 9, 1999,1

 Ur rejected

Ammons’ request to return to work to perform the duties

Ammons had set forth in his meeting with Schwingler

and McPherson. In making this decision Ur relied on

Entenberg’s report, Dr. Krieger’s assessment of Ammons’

physical restrictions, and Ur’s own discussions with Malfeo

and Schwingler. Ur informed Ammons that the duties

Ammons proposed were too limited given the amount of

work he could not do, and thus did not amount to a reasonable accommodation of Ammons’ condition. Although

Ur saw no problem with allowing Ammons to have assistance in completing his boiler room duties, these duties took

only 3.5 to 4 hours per day. There was little else that

Ammons was capable of doing the remainder of his workday. Because Ammons could not perform the maintenance

and repair duties that generally took up the rest of the
No. 03-1036 5

workday, he would not, in Ur’s view, be completing the

essential functions of the job. Ur rejected Ammons’ suggestion that Ammons could maintain and repair the plant’s

sewing machines. The plant had only a few sewing machines and these did not need repair frequently enough to

require an employee dedicated to that task. Finally,

Aramark had no need for a general troubleshooter. The

company expected its maintenance staff to perform maintenance and repair functions; it did not need (and could not

afford) an employee who could identify problems but could

not actually repair equipment himself.

In late March 1999, Ammons met with Schwingler, other

Aramark managers, and representatives of Ammons’ union.

At that meeting, Joe Dayton, Aramark’s director of labor

and employee relationships, informed Ammons that the

collective bargaining agreement governing Ammons’

employment stated that an employee would be terminated

if he was absent due to illness or injury from work for more

than 18 months. Aramark had placed Ammons on medical

leave as of May 8, 1998, approximately two months after

Ammons had last worked at Aramark in a light duty capacity. On November 8, 1999, 18 months after having been

placed on medical leave, Ammons was terminated from his

position with Aramark.

In June 2001, Ammons filed this lawsuit alleging that his

termination by Aramark violated his rights under the ADA.

The parties then engaged in a significant discovery process.

As part of this discovery process, Ammons put forth

Entenberg as a proposed expert witness. Although in her

1998 report Entenberg concluded that Ammons was not

capable of returning to his past work, she has apparently

since that time reached a different conclusion. After conducting a tour of the plant and interviewing Malfeo and
6 No. 03-1036

2 The facts surrounding Entenberg’s report will be discussed in

depth below.

McPherson, Entenberg concluded in a report and deposition

that Ammons could perform “the vast majority” of his job

functions.2

At the close of discovery, both parties filed motions for

summary judgment. Aramark argued that Ammons was not

a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA.

Ammons argued that Aramark had not engaged in the

interactive dialogue with Ammons necessary to satisfy

Aramark’s duty to explore whether a reasonable accommodation could be made for Ammons’ disability.

Aramark also made two motions important here. First,

Aramark moved to strike Entenberg’s proposed expert

testimony because, Aramark argued, it was unreliable and

lacked proper foundation. Second, Aramark moved to strike

approximately 100 of Ammons’ responses to Aramark’s

proposed statement of undisputed facts submitted in

conjunction with the cross-motions for summary judgment.

Aramark argued that Ammons failed to comply with the

Northern District of Illinois’s local rule concerning the

preparation of statements of undisputed facts.

The district court granted both motions. Specifically, the

district court held that Entenberg’s conclusion that Ammons

was capable of performing the vast majority of his duties “is

only unsupported speculation” and was thus unreliable.

The district court also concluded that the 100 or so of

Ammons’ responses to Aramark’s proposed statement of

undisputed facts identified by Aramark should be stricken

for violations of the district court’s Local Rule 56.1.

The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of Aramark. The district court concluded that Ammons

could not perform the essential functions of his job with or
No. 03-1036 7

without reasonable accommodations. The district court

further held that Aramark had engaged in an interactive

process as required by the ADA but that, even if it had not,

the undisputed facts showed that there were no reasonable

accommodations that would have allowed Ammons to

complete the essential functions of his job. This appeal

followed.

II.

Ammons raises four issues on appeal. First, Ammons

argues that the district court erred in striking Entenberg’s

testimony. Second, Ammons argues that his responses to

Aramark’s statement of uncontested facts substantially

complied with the Northern District of Illinois rule concerning such responses and therefore the district court erred in

striking them. Third, Ammons argues that the district court

erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Aramark.

Finally, Ammons argues that Aramark did not fulfill its

duty to engage in an interactive process to determine

whether reasonable accommodations were possible and

thus, Ammons was entitled to summary judgment on that

basis. We address each argument in turn.

A. Entenberg’s Testimony

As we explained above, Entenberg concluded in October

1998 that Ammons was “not capable of returning to his past

work.” Entenberg based this conclusion on a review of

Ammons’ medical records and an interview with Ammons.

Entenberg described the restrictions placed on Ammons as

sedentary while his duties at Aramark required heavy

exertion.

Entenberg was later retained by Ammons as an expert in

this case. She concluded in a letter to Ammons’ counsel
8 No. 03-1036

3 Entenberg met with McPherson while on her tour of the

Chicago plant and also spoke with him separately. At her deposition Entenberg stated that she remembered nothing of what

she and McPherson discussed in their separate meeting. We treat

as important, therefore, only her meeting with McPherson during

the tour.

dated May 10, 2002, that “Ammons’ restrictions did not

preclude him from performing the majority of the work

duties.” Entenberg based her revised conclusion primarily

on a tour of the Chicago facility and meetings she held with

Malfeo and McPherson.3

 Entenberg did not interview

Ammons a second time, nor did she review the deposition

testimony of McPherson and Malfeo. During his deposition,

Malfeo stated that Ammons could be expected to repair and

maintain several pieces of machinery and equipment

identified to him by Aramark’s counsel. 

Entenberg indicated in her deposition that the tour of the

facility took approximately three hours, including the time

she spoke with McPherson, and that she also spoke with

Malfeo by phone for approximately an hour. Entenberg also

admitted at this deposition that she did not observe any

repairs being conducted while she toured the plant and that

she did not see all of the equipment and machinery

Ammons could be called on to maintain or repair.

Entenberg was also asked whether she had any opinion

as to whether Ammons could repair and maintain several

specific pieces of equipment, including the equipment

Malfeo had testified that Ammons was expected to repair

and maintain. Entenberg admitted that she was not familiar

with several pieces of equipment and could offer no opinion

as to whether Ammons was capable of making the necessary repairs.
No. 03-1036 9

The district court, relying on the Supreme Court’s seminal

cases concerning the admission of expert testimony, Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and this

court’s subsequent cases, held that Entenberg’s proposed

expert report—that Ammons could perform the vast

majority of his duties—was not reliable. In so holding, the

district court noted that “Entenberg admits that she did not

observe any repairs being conducted while on the tour and

that she did not observe all of the equipment and machinery

that Ammons could be called on to maintain or repair.” The

district court also noted that Entenberg had failed to review

Malfeo and McPherson’s depositions and had not reinterviewed Ammons. The district court also held that

Entenberg’s report was speculative: “In light of her inability

to form an opinion concerning [several pieces of equipment

and machinery, Entenberg’s] conclusion that Ammons

could perform the ‘vast majority’ of his job functions is not

based on any specific methodology applied to the facts but

is only unsupported speculation.”

This court’s review of a district court’s decision concerning expert witnesses has two parts. First, this court must

determine “whether the district court properly followed the

framework set forth in Daubert.” United States v. Brumley,

217 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2000). This framework requires

the district court to determine whether (1) the proposed

witness “would testify to valid scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge and (2) his testimony will assist the

trier of fact.” NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co., 227 F.3d

776, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702; Kumho,

526 U.S. at 147-149; Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581,

586 (7th Cir. 2000)). The first prong of this framework

evaluates the reliability of the testimony. A court is expected

to reject “any subjective belief or speculation.” Chapman v.

Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Porter
10 No. 03-1036

4 Ammons is in error when he argues that we should review de

novo the district court’s decision that Entenberg’s testimony was

not reliable. As we explained above, we review de novo only

whether the district court properly applied the framework of

Daubert. Brumley, 217 F.3d at 911. We review a district court’s

actual determination that a proposed expert’s testimony is

unreliable (or for that matter, reliable) only for an abuse of

discretion. Masters v. Hesston Corp., 291 F.3d 985, 991 (7th Cir.

2002) (citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)); see

also Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.

v. Whitehall Labs. Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1993)). The

second prong evaluates the testimony’s relevance. Whether

a district court has properly followed the Daubert framework is subject to de novo review. Brumley, 217 F.3d at 911.

The district court in this case properly applied the Daubert

framework: The district court identified the relevant

analysis and focused its inquiry on whether Entenberg’s

testimony was reliable. Because the district court followed

the Daubert framework, we must next “review the district

court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony only

for an abuse of discretion.” Id. (emphasis added).4

 In

determining whether evidence is reliable, “the district judge

must determine whether the expert is qualified in the

relevant field and whether the methodology underlying the

expert’s conclusions is reliable.” Zelinski v. Columbia 300,

Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 2003).

There is no question concerning Entenberg’s qualifications. Nor is there any question that Entenberg’s proposed

testimony—that Ammons is capable of performing his

job—would be relevant. The only question, therefore, is

whether Entenberg’s proposed testimony is reliable.

Like the district court, we conclude that Entenberg’s

testimony was speculative. Entenberg offered her opinion,

that Ammons was capable of performing the vast majority
No. 03-1036 11

of his job duties, while acknowledging that she could offer

no opinion as to whether Ammons could repair several

pieces of machinery earlier identified in a deposition of the

plant’s former maintenance manager as machinery Ammons

would have to repair as part of his job. Not only had

Entenberg not reviewed this deposition testimony, she

acknowledged she was unfamiliar with the machinery and

did not see them being repaired during her tour. Without

being able to offer any opinion as to whether Ammons was

capable of repairing these pieces of machinery, Entenberg’s

opinion was nothing more than speculation.

B. Ammons’ Responses to Aramark’s Statement of Undisputed

Facts

The second issue on appeal concerns the Northern District

of Illinois Local Rule 56.1(a). This rule requires a party

moving for summary judgment to include with that motion

“a statement of material facts as to which the moving party

contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the

moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.D. Ill. R.

56.1(a). This statement must be organized by numbered

paragraphs. Id. The party opposing the motion must

respond to this statement of facts with:

(A) a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving

party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the

record, and other supporting materials relied upon, and

(B) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs,

of any additional facts that require the denial of summary

judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of

the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.

N. D. Ill. R. 56.1(b). The rule also provides that “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving
12 No. 03-1036

party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by

the statement of the opposing party.” Id.

Aramark moved to strike nearly half of Ammons’ 200

responses to Aramark’s statement of facts. The district court

granted the motion, finding that Ammons’ responses were

defective for an assortment of reasons. First, the district

court found that a large number (approximately 80) of

Ammons’ denials of factual statements by Aramark failed

to cite facts supporting the denial or impermissibly added

new, unrelated facts. Second, the district court found that

four of Ammons’ responses failed to cite any part of the

record in support of the denial. Third, the district court

found that two responses were improper because the

responses cited an entire deposition transcript rather than

specific page references. Finally, the district court determined that six of the responses were improper because

Ammons failed to admit or deny Aramark’s allegations.

This court reviews the decision of a district court concerning compliance with local rules, such as Rule 56.1, for an

abuse of discretion. Borcky v. Maytag Corp., 248 F.3d 691, 697

(7th Cir. 2001). We have also repeatedly held that a district

court is entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1.

Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524,

527 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Given their importance, we have

consistently and repeatedly upheld a district court’s discretion to require strict compliance with its local rules governing summary judgment.”); Waldridge v. American Hoechst

Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).

Thus, as an initial matter, Ammons’ argument that the

district court erred in striking his responses because he

substantially complied with Rule 56.1 is inapt. Substantial

compliance is not strict compliance.

Having reviewed the responses at issue, we do not believe

the district court abused its discretion when it struck the
No. 03-1036 13

responses. Rule 56.1 envisions a separate statement of

additional facts. In this case, several of Ammons’ responses

to Aramark’s allegations admit to the allegation but then

add other additional facts. These facts should have been

included in a separate statement. They were not, and the

district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the

responses. 

In addition, where a non-moving party denies a factual

allegation by the party moving for summary judgment, that

denial must include a specific reference to the affidavit or

other part of the record that supports such a denial. Citations to an entire transcript of a deposition or to a lengthy

exhibit are not specific and are, accordingly, inappropriate.

A court should not be expected to review a lengthy record

for facts that a party could have easily identified with

greater particularity. See Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 922 (“[D]istrict

courts are not obliged in our adversary system to scour the

record looking for factual disputes and may adopt local

rules reasonably designed to streamline the resolution of

summary judgment motions.”); Herman v. City of Chicago,

870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989) (“A district court need not

scour the record to make the case of a party who does

nothing.”). Two of Ammons’ responses cited only to a 30-

page exhibit and did not provide a specific page reference.

Other responses simply denied an allegation and provided

no citation whatsoever. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in striking these responses. 

Finally, several of Ammons’ responses do not include a

statement to the effect that Ammons agrees with or denies

Aramark’s allegations. Instead, for these responses Ammons

merely states that the allegations are irrelevant. They may

be. This does not excuse, however, the non-moving party

from at least indicating that it agrees with or denies the

allegation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

striking these responses.
14 No. 03-1036

C. Aramark’s Motion For Summary Judgment

We next consider whether Aramark was entitled to summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only

where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”

Fritcher v. Health Care Service Corp., 301 F.3d 811, 815 (7th

Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986)). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo

and view all facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in

Ammons’ favor.

The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability of such

individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines a

“qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual

with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42

U.S.C. § 12111(8). To determine whether a disabled person

is qualified, this court considers whether he can perform the

essential functions of his job at the time the employer makes

the allegedly discriminatory employment decision. Ross v.

Indiana State Teacher’s Ass’n Ins. Trust, 159 F.3d 1001, 1013

(7th Cir. 1998).

Both parties agree that Ammons is disabled within the

meaning of the ADA. The only question is whether

Ammons could perform the essential functions of his job

with or without reasonable accommodations. The factors to

take into consideration when determining “whether a job

duty constitutes an essential function include [the employee’s] job description, [the] employer’s opinion, [the]

amount of time spent performing the function, [the] consequences for not requiring the individual to perform the

duty, and past and current work experiences.” Emerson v.

Northern States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 512-13 (7th Cir.

2001).
No. 03-1036 15

The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that the

essential functions of Ammons’ job included the repair and

maintenance of all the equipment and machinery in the

plant. Approximately one-half of his day was typically

spent tending to the plant’s boiler. The other half of the day

involved maintenance and repair. Although, of course,

Ammons could not always predict what machinery and

equipment he could be called on to repair on a given day,

the job required heavy exertion and included frequent

standing, climbing, walking, kneeling, and lifting in excess

of 50 pounds three to five times a week. 

Moreover, the plant’s three boiler engineers worked on a

staggered schedule and were responsible for covering a 20-

hour day. Thus, there were times when an engineer would

be the only person at the plant with the responsibility to

repair machinery and equipment including machinery and

equipment that, if inoperable, could shut down the entire

plant. To reach these particularly crucial pieces of machinery, a maintenance engineer might find it necessary to climb

and lift equipment that weighed as much as 50 to 100

pounds.

In light of Ammons’ injuries and Dr. Krieger’s subsequent

restrictions, which, as indicated above, included limitations

on standing, kneeling, walking, and climbing, we agree with

the district court that Ammons was unable to perform the

essential functions of his job without reasonable accommodations. The essential functions of Ammons’ job included

duties and exertion greatly exceeding the restrictions that

Ammons’ own physician placed on him.

Further, we do not believe that the duties Ammons

suggests he could perform amount to reasonable accommodations. Ammons’ suggested accommodations would

amount to a significant change in the essential functions of

his job. Although tending to the boiler with assistance and
16 No. 03-1036

repairing the plant’s sewing machines are reasonable accommodations for Ammons’ disability, these tasks would

account for only approximately half of Ammons’ workday.

Cf., DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 270 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir.

2001) (accommodations for a full-time employee are expected to permit the employee to work full-time). The only

other accommodation Ammons offered, serving as a

maintenance troubleshooter, would amount to an entirely

new position—one that Aramark did not previously

maintain and had no plans on creating. It is not, therefore,

an accommodation that would permit Ammons to perform

the essential functions of his job; instead it would change

the essential functions of his job. As we have previously

held, “[a]n employer is not obligated to change the essential

functions of a job to accommodate an employee.” Emerson,

256 F.3d at 514; Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499

(7th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n employer [is not] obligated to create

a ‘new’ position for the disabled employee.”). Therefore,

Ammons could not perform the essential functions of his job

even with reasonable accommodations. Accordingly,

Aramark was entitled to summary judgment in its favor.

D. The Interactive Process

Ammons’ final argument is that Aramark failed to engage

in the required interactive process to discuss reasonable

accommodations for his disability. Emerson, 256 F.3d at 515

(“[T]he ADA requires employers to engage in an interactive

process with disabled employees needing accommodation

so that together they can identify the employee’s needs and

discuss accommodation options.”). Ammons’ primary

contention is that Aramark failed to agree to an interactive

process because it did not consent to a meeting that included Ammons’ counsel and Entenberg.
No. 03-1036 17

The duty to engage in an interactive process does not

mandate a meeting with an employee’s attorney and vocational counselor. Aramark satisfied its duty to discuss reasonable accommodations with Ammons through its face-toface meeting with Ammons in January 1999. As recounted

above, Ammons met on January 21, 1999, with Schwingler

and McPherson (a co-worker and union steward). At this

meeting Ammons was given an opportunity to set forth the

duties he could perform. Ammons was also told to keep the

company informed if he thought of other ways in which he

could be accommodated. Following this meeting, Ur

discussed, in more than one conversation, Ammons’ request

with Schwingler and Malfeo, who, as Ammons’ supervisor,

was knowledgeable of the duties Ammons could be called

on to undertake. Ur also reviewed Entenberg’s 1998 evaluation of Ammons. It was based on this evaluation, his

conversations with Schwingler and Malfeo, and Ammons’

own statements concerning what he could do, that Ur

decided that there were no reasonable accommodations for

Ammons. This satisfied Aramark’s responsibility with

respect to an interactive process.

We find no support, and Ammons has offered none, for

the conclusion that an interactive process must include an

employee’s counsel or other persons including a rehabilitation counselor. Although there may be cases where an

attorney or a vocational expert would be of considerable assistance in the interactive process, there is no requirement

that an attorney and/or vocational expert need to participate. The ADA envisions no more than “a flexible, interactive process by which the employer and employee determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation.” Rehling

v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000). Such an

interactive process occurred here.
18 No. 03-1036

III.

The district court did not err in striking Entenberg’s

testimony and Ammons’ responses to Aramark’s statement

of material facts. Further, the district court properly concluded that Aramark was entitled to summary judgment.

The undisputed facts establish that Ammons was incapable

of performing the essential functions of his job with or

without reasonable accommodations. Finally, we conclude

that Aramark engaged in the required interactive process.

For these, and the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—5-21-04