[Cite as Danison v. Blinco, 2019-Ohio-2767.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

CRAWFORD COUNTY 

 

CARL J. DANISON, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 3-18-19 

 v. 

MATTHEW BLINCO, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 18CV0226 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: July 8, 2019 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Robert C. Aldridge for Appellant 

 G. Scott McBride for Appellee 
Case No. 3-18-19 

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PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Respondent-appellant, Matthew Blinco (“Blinco”), appeals the 

November 14, 2018 judgment of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas 

granting a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO”) to petitioner-appellee, Carl J. 

Danison (“Danison”) on behalf of his minor child, R.D. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm. 

{¶2} On September 25, 2018, Danison filed a petition for an ex parte CSPO 

under R.C. 2903.214. (Doc. No. 1). The trial court granted Danison’s ex parte 

petition on September 26, 2018. (Doc. No. 3). Both parties appeared with counsel 

at the full hearing on November 6, 2018. (Doc. No. 10). On November 14, 2018, 

the magistrate granted a three-year CSPO against Blinco. (Id.). The order was 

adopted by the trial court on the same day. (Id.). Blinco did not file objections to 

the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision granting the CSPO. 

{¶3} On December 6, 2018, Blinco filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 11). 

He raises three assignments of error. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

The trial court erred in considering hearsay evidence in granting 

Petitioner’s Petition for a Civil Stalking Protection Order. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

The trial court erred in granting Petitioner’s Petition for a Civil 

Stalking Order because the evidence offered did not meet the 

requirements of Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.214. 
Case No. 3-18-19 

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Assignment of Error No. III 

The trial court erred in failing to make any findings of fact to 

support its decision to issue the Civil Stalking Protection Order. 

{¶4} In his assignments of error, Blinco argues that the trial court erred by 

granting Danison’s petition for a CSPO. Specifically, Blinco argues that the trial 

court considered inadmissible hearsay statements when granting Danison’s petition 

for a CSPO. (Appellant’s Brief at 6-7). Blinco also asserts that Danison failed to 

present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Blinco engaged in a “pattern of 

conduct” which “knowingly” caused R.D. to believe he would cause “physical 

harm” or “mental distress” to her. (Id. at 7-10). (See R.C. 2903.211(A)(1); R.C. 

2903.214). Blinco also contends that the trial court did not make any findings of 

fact in support of its decision to grant Danison’s petition for a CSPO. (Appellant’s 

Brief at 11). 

{¶5} Notwithstanding Blinco’s arguments, we must first determine whether 

this court has jurisdiction to reach the merits of Blinco’s assigned errors. 

{¶6} Danison argues that Blinco’s failure to file objections to the trial court’s 

adoption of the magistrate’s decision granting Danison’s petition for a CSPO in 

accordance with Civ.R. 65.1(G) divests this court of jurisdiction to entertain 

Blinco’s appeal as it is not a final, appealable order. 
Case No. 3-18-19 

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{¶7} Civ.R. 65.1 governs proceedings under R.C. 2903.214. Civ.R. 65.1(A). 

Under Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i), “[a] party may file written objections to a court’s 

adoption, modification, or rejection of a magistrate’s denial or granting of a 

protection order after a full hearing, or any terms of such an order, within fourteen 

days of the court’s filing of the order.” Civ.R. 65.1(G) provides as follows: 

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule, an order entered by 

the court under division (F)(3)(c) or division (F)(3)(e) of this rule is a 

final, appealable order. However, a party must timely file objections 

to such an order under division (F)(3)(d) of this rule prior to filing an 

appeal, and the timely filing of such objections shall stay the running 

of the time for appeal until the filing of the court’s ruling on the 

objections. 

The plain language of Civ.R. 65.1(G) specifically defines an order entered under 

Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c) as a final, appealable order. M.W. v. D.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 105758, 2018-Ohio-392, ¶ 7. Thus, this court has jurisdiction over Blinco’s 

appeal. See id. (noting that “[t]he failure to comply with Civ.R. 65.1(G) * * * is not 

jurisdictional”); Saqr v. Naji, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160850, 2017-Ohio-8142, ¶ 

19. But see K.R. v. T.B., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-302, 2017-Ohio-8647, ¶ 6 

(dismissing the appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G) due to the appellant’s failure to 

file objections to the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision granting the 
Case No. 3-18-19 

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CSPO); J.S. v. D.E., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0032, 2017-Ohio-7507, ¶ 21-

22 (dismissing the Respondent’s appeal and finding that under Civ.R. 65.1(G), 

“[w]ithout a timely-filed objection, Appellant is not permitted to appeal the trial 

court’s adoption of the magistrate’s granting of the protection order”); K.U. v. M.S., 

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0165, 2017-Ohio-8029, ¶ 18 (“Without any 

objection filed, pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G), this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this 

appeal.”). 

{¶8} However, we also acknowledge that the requirement to file written 

objections to the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision is mandatory. 

Civ.R. 65.1(G); M.W. at ¶ 7. See Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d). Therefore, parties wishing 

to object to the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision must timely file 

objections with the trial court as failure to do so waives their arguments regarding 

the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision. See J.Y. v. J.Y., 9th Dist. 

Medina No. 17CA0037-M, 2018-Ohio-3522, ¶ 5 (noting that “the fact that the * * 

* civil protection order indicated that it was a final appealable order did not excuse 

[Respondent] from complying with the procedural requirements of Civ.R. 65.1” and 

declining to address the merits of the assignment of error). Here, Blinco failed to 

timely file an objection to the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision. 

{¶9} Thus, Blinco did not preserve his arguments for appeal.1

 

 

1

 The trial court in the case at hand used Sup.R. Form 10.03-F for its judgment entry. (See Doc. No. 10). 

The form used by the trial court is the most recent version currently available and was amended on March 1, 
Case No. 3-18-19 

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{¶10} Accordingly, we decline to address the merits of Blinco’s assignments 

of error. Blinco’s assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶11} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 Judgment Affirmed 

SHAW and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur. 

/jlr 

 

2014. See Sup.R. Form 10.03-F. We note, with concern, that Sup.R. Form 10.03-F does not include a 

conspicuous warning of the consequences of failure to object to an order entered under Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c) 

or Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(e) within fourteen days. We acknowledge that Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(b) expressly states that 

“[a] magistrate’s denial or granting of a protection order after full hearing under this division does not 

constitute a magistrate’s order or a magistrate’s decision under Civ.R. 53(D)(2) or (3) and is not subject to 

the requirements of those rules.” Thus, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii), which provides that “[a] magistrate’s decision 

shall indicate conspicuously that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual 

finding or legal conclusion * * * unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or 

legal conclusion,” does not apply to the case at hand, which was an order entered under Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c). 

While we will follow Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(b), we nevertheless find it troublingly inconsistent that the trial court 

is required to give the parties a conspicuous warning of the consequences of failure to object to orders entered 

under Civ.R. 53(D)(2) or (3), but not under Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c) or Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(e), particularly due to 

the weighty consequences to the parties, who often proceed pro se, of a decision issued under Civ.R. 

65.1(F)(3)(c) or Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(e).