NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0509n.06

Nos. 21-3633/3661/4191/22-3025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRYAN ANTHONY REO (21-3633/4191); 

ANTHONY DOMENIC REO (21-3661); STEFANI 

ROSSI REO (22-3025),

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

MARTIN LINDSTEDT, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

OPINION

Before: BOGGS, KETHLEDGE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. In 2019, Martin Lindstedt published provocative and highly offensive 

material online, impugning three members of the Reo family: namely, Bryan Anthony Reo; 

Bryan’s father, Anthony Domenic Reo; and Bryan’s wife, Stefani Rossi Reo. Each family member

separately sued Lindstedt in the Court of Common Pleas for Lake County, Ohio, bringing statelaw claims for defamation and invasion of privacy through false light. Lindstedt, proceeding pro 

se, removed each case to federal court. There, each plaintiff moved for summary judgment solely 

on the ground that Lindstedt failed to timely respond to plaintiffs’ requests for admissions, which 

requested admissions of liability and damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). The district courts—

four in total—each granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The courts also collectively 
Nos. 21-3633/3661/4191/22-3025, Reo et al. v. Lindstedt

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awarded the Reo family $2,750,000 in damages, based largely on finding that Lindstedt failed to 

seek withdrawal of his admissions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). These appeals followed. 

Lindstedt argues that the district courts misapplied Rule 36(b) when they declined to permit 

him to withdraw his admissions; we review those decisions for an abuse of discretion. Kerry Steel, 

Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 154 (6th Cir. 1997). 

Rule 36(b) requires that a withdrawal be “on motion.” Yet a formal motion is not always 

required. United States v. Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d 285, 293 (6th Cir. 2009). That is because we 

are reluctant to assign “talismanic significance” to an attorney’s—or, as here, a pro se party’s—

failure to use the phrase “I move.” Kerry Steel, Inc., 106 F.3d at 154. Instead, a withdrawal “may 

be imputed from a party’s actions[.]” Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d at 293. We conclude here that 

Lindstedt’s actions in each of these cases—which include his insistence in various filings that he 

caused the plaintiffs no harm—should have been construed as motions to withdraw his admissions. 

The district courts in these cases entered judgments against a pro se litigant in excess of $2.7 

million based solely on Lindstedt’s failure to file a formal motion seeking withdrawal of his 

admissions. Meanwhile, withdrawal of the admissions would promote the presentation of the 

merits of the plaintiffs’ claims for damages and would impose no significant prejudice on the 

plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). To the contrary, one could infer that the plaintiffs used their 

requests for admissions less as a discovery device than as a shortcut to obtaining the judgments 

they obtained here. These judgments also raise a significant question as to whether a federal court 

sitting in diversity can award punitive damages under Ohio law based on Rule 36 admissions alone. 

See Whetstone v. Binner, 57 N.E.3d 1111, 1115 (Ohio 2016); Wayt v. DHSC, LLC, 122 N.E.3d 92 

(Ohio 2018). 
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We vacate the district courts’ judgments in each of these cases and remand them for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also deny as moot all other pending appellate 

motions and requests for relief. For the district courts’ sake and for ours, we strongly suggest that 

the lower courts consolidate these cases before a single judge on remand.