IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, :

: ID No. 1706000548

v. : In and For Kent County

: DARREN C. WEIFORD

, :

: Defendant. :

ORDER

Submitted: January 22, 2019 Decided: January 25 , 2019

Upon Defendant’s Motion for Correction of Sentence

- DENIED

On this 25th day of January, 2019, having considered Defendant Darren

Weiford’s (“Mr. Weiford’s”) motion for correction of sentence, it appears that:

1. The Court sentenced Mr. Weif ord to an aggregate unsus pended Level

V sentence of thi rty

- three years for Murder in the Second Degree, and Possession of
a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony

. Both charges involved Mr.

Weiford’s murder of Amber Bu ckler (“Ms. Buckler”) on June 1, 2017

. 2. He now moves the Court to correct his sentence pursuant to Superior

Court Criminal Rule 35 (c) because he alleges the Court lacked impartiality

. The

r ule he relies upon provides for co rrecting a sentence by motion when it “was
imposed as a result of arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” 1

3. M r. Weiford did not raise the issues at his sentencing that he now
challenges

. The Court notes that it concluded the sentencing by specifically inviting

counsel to rais e any additional matters

. D efense counsel declined to do so.

1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(c). This portion of the Rule addresses clerical errors. Nevertheless, Mr. Weiford’s motion fairly raises issues regarding an alleged violation of his due process rights and will be addressed by the Court.2

4. F or the first time , Mr. Weiford now asserts by motion that he did not

share with his attorney a pre

- sentenc ing letter that he sent to the Court requesting
leniency. A s a result , he alleges the Court violated his constitutional due process
rights becau se his letter to the Court was an ex parte communication

. N amely, he
alleges that the Court violated his “Delaware constitutional due process rights at his

allocution” by conside ring the letter because his attorney did not know that he had

written it. 2

5. Here, Mr. Weiford incorrectly characterizes his own letter as an ex

parte co mmunication that vio lated his right to due process. In order to generate a
right to relief from judgment on due process grounds , there must be “an ex parte conversation, which by definition deprives a defendant of the right to be heard . . .” 3

O nly when a defendant lacks notice of a comm unication from the State is he or she
deprived of the right to be properly heard on an issue

. 4 A defendant’s due process
rights may be violated when the State one

- sidedly interjects information in to the

process that the defendant is unaware of and therefore cannot address. Here, the

Defendant does not claim that the State pro vided information to the Court without
his knowledge. Rather, he complains that the Court reviewed and consid ered a letter
that he apparently chose not to share with his privately retained attorney

. 6. Prior to sentencing, the Court reviewed the presentence report , its

exhibits, and Mr. Weiford’s letter t hat was forwarded shortly after completion of the

presentence report. The Court was unaware that he chose not to disclose to his

2 The r igh t to allocution does not implicate constitutional issues. The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]ny failure of a trial court to adhere to the right of [allocution] is ‘an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional [and] not a fundamen tal defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice’ so as to constit ute a denial of a fair trial.” Shelton v. State , 744 A.2d 465, 495 (Del. 2000) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court further noted that neither the federal constitut ion n or the Delaware Constitution provide such a right. It is solely grounded upon Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(a)(1)(C). Id.

3 State v. Pruitt

, 805 A.2d 177, 181 (Del. 2002).

4 Carrigan v. State

, 2007 WL 3378657, at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 17, 2007)

.3

attorney that he sent a letter. Defen dants frequently write the Court prior to
sentencing in support of leniency and the Court considers such letters. Statements
in such letters fall within the right to allocution and are appropriatel y considered

. 5

This right to allocution involves the rig ht for the defendant to personally address the
Court, in addition to the separate right of counsel to individually address the Court. 6

7. Contrary to Mr. Weiford’ s position, it is not the role of the Court to
interject itself into the attorney

- client relati onship to regulate what information a

client share s w ith his attorney. Prior to receipt of this motion, the Court had every
expectation that Mr. Weiford had shared his letter with hi s counsel. Moreover,
counsel’s statements at the sentencing confirmed th e Court’s at

- the

- time
understanding. Namely, the opening sentences in his presentation closely tracked

the theme s in Mr. Weiford’s letter

. Counsel referenced Mr. Weiford’s statements
requesting leniency and that he be sentenced for a n offense less serious than Murder
in the Second Degree. He then characterized Mr. Weiford’s statements , that were

found both in the letter and made by him to the presentence officer, as “ an attempt
to gain attention

. ” At sentencing, the Court understood that counsel’s comments

address ed what Mr. Weiford raised both i n his presentence interview and in the letter

at issue

. 8. The Court presumes that a defendan t’s attorney spends adequate time

with his or her client to address such matters

. Defense counsel represented to the
Court at sentencing that he and Mr. Weiford met frequently prior to the sentencing

to discuss strategy. As a result, t he Court does not question counsel’s diligent
preparation for the sentencing. T he Court expects that a defendant and his attorney

would di scuss both the propriety and content of any such letter before a client sends

5 See Super

. Ct. Crim. R. 32(a)(1)(C) (providing that the defendant may personally make a statement to the Court prior to sentencing)

. 6 See Super

. Crim. R. 32(a)(1)(B) (providing that separately from the defendant’s right to address the Court, counsel for t he defendant must have an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant).4

it to t he Court

. The Court further should be able to reasonably expect that in final
preparation for sentencing a client would disclose to his attorney that he sent a letter

to the Court

. Mr. Weiford apparently chose not to. His own choice d oes not amount

to a Court violation of his due process rights.

9. D espite multiple mental health examinations, no mental health
professional opined that Mr . Weiford was in competent to fully cooperate with his

counsel when preparing for sentencing. In fact, a ll opinions confirmed that he was

competent. Mr. Weiford’s motion, in effect, seeks to place the burden on the Court
to interject itself into the attor ney

- client relationship to weigh the adequacy of a

client’s disclosures to his or her attorney. Prudence certainly weighs in favor of a

client sharing all such information. S eeking to place the after

- the

- fact bur den on the

Court to ensure s uch an exchang e is not appropriate.

10. With regard to Mr. Weiford’s allegations that the Court should
reassign the matter to another judge f or purposes of resentencing, he cites no
adequate basis for such action. The Court considered the undisputed facts that Mr.

Weif ord aimed at and shot his fiancé in the head at close range as she slept i n a hotel
bed, without warning. The Court found this to be excessively cruel. This murder

fo llowed his detailed posting on social media , o ne month earlier

, that amounted to a script for carrying out his plan. Although the State offered, and he accepted

, a Murder in the Second Degree plea, the circumstances could not have pointed more
strongly to that of an intentional killing. Furthermore, as discussed by the Court at

senten cing, although Mr. Weiford has mental health issues

, no psychiatrist or
psychologist that evaluated him provided a diagnosed mental infirmity that caused

his conduct

. 11. Despite counsel’s representation that Mr. Weiford did not share the

letter with him

, the Court nevertheless finds no prejudice. Namely, D efense

counsel’s statements at the sentencing reference d the s ame theme s Mr. Weiford5

recited in his letter. When commenting at sentencing, counsel addresse d
substantially simi lar matter s to those raised in Mr. Weiford’s letter includ ing (1)
blaming the mental health system and (2) counsel’s desire to find answers regarding
why Mr . Weiford killed Ms. Buck ler. Again, counsel’s sentencing comments
closely reflected the content of the letter as well as his cli ent’s interview comments.

On balance, a post facto review demonstrates no prejudice because the mitigating

theme s presented by counsel

, those stated by Mr. Weiford in hi s presentence
interview, and those stated by Mr. Weiford in his letter

, all closely aligned

. 12. Finally, the findings in the presentence report mirror those found by

the Court

. The Court accepted the presentence office r ’s recommendation regarding
aggravating factors that included (1) excessive cruelty, (2) undue depreciation of the

offense, and (3) a lack of remo rse. The Court also considered the sole mitigating

fac tor when issuing its sentence. Consequently, the Court’s sentence of Mr. We iford
to 30 years for an offense that carried a maximum stat utory penalty of life in prison
was appropriate

. NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Weiford’s motion for

correct ion of sentence is DENIED.

/s/Jeffrey J Clark Judge