FILED

October 23, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

SEPTEMBER 1998 SESSION

KEITH A. GUY, )

) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9712-CC-00478

Appellant, )

) Madison County

V. )

) Honorable Franklin Murchison, Judge

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

)

Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

C. Michael Robbins John Knox Walkup

Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter

46 North Third Street, Suite 719

Memphis, TN 38103 Georgia Blythe Felner

Counsel for the State

George Morton Googe 425 Fifth Avenue North

District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Vanessa D. King James G. (Jerry) Woodall

Assistant Public Defender District Attorney General

227 West Baltimore Street

Jackson, TN 38301 Al Earls and

(at trial) Don Allen

Assistant District Attorneys General

P.O. Box 2825

Jackson, TN 38302

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

PAUL G. SUMMERS,

Judge
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O P I N I O N

The petitioner pled guilty to four counts of aggravated robbery, two

counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and four counts of conspiracy to commit

aggravated robbery. He received an effective thirty-year sentence for these crimes

pursuant to his plea bargain. The petitioner took no direct appeal from his convictions

or sentences but filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was the

result of ineffective assistance of counsel. After hearing the petitioner's testimony, the

hearing court below granted the state's motion to dismiss and denied relief. Upon our

review of the record, we affirm the court’s judgment.

In post-conviction relief proceedings the petitioner has the burden of

proving the allegations in his petition by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-

30-210(f) (1997). Furthermore, the factual findings of the trial court in hearings “are

conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against the judgment.” 

State v. Buford, 666 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).

In reviewing the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, this Court must determine whether the advice given or services

rendered by the attorney are within the range of competence demanded of attorneys

in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To prevail on

a claim of ineffective counsel, a petitioner “must show that counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that this performance

prejudiced the defense. There must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

error the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692, 694 (1984); Best v. State, 708 S.W.2d 421,
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422 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). To satisfy the requirement of prejudice in this case, the

petitioner would have had to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial. See Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Bankston v. State, 815 S.W.2d 213,

215 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

The court below found the petitioner's allegations of ineffective

assistance “just vague, indefinite, uncertain.” We agree. The petitioner testified that

his trial counsel “could have give[n] [me] a better job” but admitted that he had

confessed his crimes to the police and that he received the exact sentence to which

he agreed. The petitioner's allegations are without merit. The petitioner has failed to

carry his burden of proving that his lawyer was ineffective.

____________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
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CONCUR:

_____________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, Judge

_____________________________

JOE G. RILEY, Judge