2022 IL App (1st) 211195-U 

No. 1-21-1195 

Filed June 9, 2022

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the

URSZULA DABROWSKA, ) Circuit Court of

 ) Cook County. 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) No. 17 D 8885

and ) 

 ) 

JACEK DABROWSKI, ) Honorable 

 ) David E. Haracz, 

 Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding

JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We lack jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s denial of respondent’s petition for 

 relief from judgment. 

¶ 2 Jacek Dabrowski appeals from an order denying his petition for relief from judgment filed 

pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)). The 

petition sought to vacate the maintenance requirement of a judgment of dissolution of marriage. 

The circuit court denied the petition following an evidentiary hearing. However, neither a notice 
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of appeal nor a postjudgment motion were filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. 

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

1

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Jacek and Urszula were married in Poland in 1996.2 On October 31, 2017, the circuit court 

entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporated a marital settlement agreement 

(MSA) signed by both parties. A term of the MSA required that Jacek pay Urszula maintenance 

of $1600 per month until either of them die or until Urszula remarries or cohabitates with another 

person. The MSA also called for Jacek to pay child support for each of their two teenage children 

until the later of reaching age 18 or graduating from high school. Urszula was represented by 

counsel while Jacek acted pro se in these proceedings. 

¶ 5 In January 2019, Jacek filed, through counsel, a “Petition to Partially Vacate Judgement 

Entered October 31, 2017.” In the petition, Jacek claimed that he has limited understanding of 

English, that he did not understand that the lawyer who prepared the MSA he signed was 

representing only Urszula’s interests, and that the terms of the MSA were not explained to him. 

He understood he had some obligation to make payments, but believed it was temporary and only 

related to child support. He claimed that he never agreed to pay maintenance and was not aware 

of the obligation until he sought counsel in the later part of 2018. Jacek went on to claim that 

Urszula exploited his limited understanding of English to conceal the maintenance obligation, that 

the $1600 per month amount is onerous for him, and the term is unconscionable. For relief, the 

petition requested, inter alia, that the provisions relating to maintenance in the judgment of 

dissolution be vacated. It further requested that the court either permanently bar maintenance or 

1

In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this 

appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. 2

We use the parties first names for clarity. 
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conduct a hearing to determine a fair maintenance amount. Jacek cited section 2-1401 as the legal 

basis to file his petition. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016). Urszula filed a timely answer denying 

Jacek’s allegations. In November 2019, Jacek filed an amended petition captioned “Amended 

Petition to Partially Vacate Judgment Entered October 31, 2017 and Modify Allocation.” The 

amended petition contained the same allegations and requests for relief as the initial petition. It

added, as an alternative to the other requested relief, that the court modify his maintenance 

obligation. 

¶ 6 The matter eventually proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. Following that hearing, the 

circuit court entered a written order on March 4, 2021, denying Jacek’s petition. The order 

contained the following findings of the court:

“A. A Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage (“Judgment”) which incorporated a 

 Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) was entered on October 31, 2017. The 

 Judgment and MSA was signed and initialed by both parties;

B. On January 22, 2019, [Jacek] filed a Petition to Partially Vacate Judgement (sic) 

 Entered October 31, 2017 addressing mainly the maintenance provisions of the 

 judgment. The Petition did not contain an affidavit from [Jacek];

C. On November 7, 2019, [Jacek] filed an Amended Petition to Partially Vacate 

 Judgement (sic) Entered October 31, 2017 and Modify Allocation addressing the 

 maintenance provisions of the judgment. The Petition did not contain an affidavit 

 from [Jacek];

D. After the Judgment was entered, [Jacek] complied with the terms of the MSA by 

 paying approximately 11 months of maintenance. Three months after unilaterally 

 terminating his maintenance, [Jacek] filed his Petition to Vacate;
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E. [Jacek’s] testimony was not wholly credible. [Jacek] failed to show diligence 

 in presenting his claim or in filing his 2-1401 petition[.]” 

¶ 7 The case was continued to March 12 for a status conference on other pending matters. On 

March 16, 2021, the court entered an order stating that, after a hearing on March 12, the court 

found that Jacek’s amended petition filed in November 2019 was “not properly filed to be 

considered as a Motion to Modify Maintenance.” The order further stated that Jacek remained 

obligated to make maintenance payments as provided in the MSA. 

¶ 8 On April 15, 2021, Jacek filed a motion to reconsider the court’s March 16 order or, in the 

alternative, to modify maintenance. The motion argued that Jacek’s initial petition did, contrary to 

the court’s March 4 finding, contain his affidavit. It went on to argue that the maintenance 

provisions were improper for various reasons. Lastly, the motion noted the alternative request to 

modify maintenance in the amended petition. Jacek asked the court to consider his earlier filed 

petitions as motions to modify maintenance, since he had requested modification of his 

maintenance obligation in those filings. Urszula filed a response opposing Jacek’s motion to 

reconsider. 

¶ 9 In an order entered June 30, 2021, the court denied Jacek’s motion to reconsider. The court 

also expressly denied Jacek’s request to consider his amended petition to vacate judgment as a 

motion to modify maintenance. However, the court granted Jacek leave to file a motion to modify 

maintenance, and, on July 16, 2021, Jacek filed such a motion. 

¶ 10 On July 30, 2021, Jacek filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s order denying his 

motion to reconsider denial of his section 2-1401 petition to vacate judgment.3

3

The notice of appeal and the amended notice of appeal filed Nov. 23, 2021, indicate that Jacek is 

appealing an order dated “7/30/2021.” The circuit court did not enter any orders on July 30, 2021. Rather, 

that is the date Jacek filed his initial notice of appeal. We assume this was a typographical error and June 
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¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Urszula argues that Jacek’s notice of appeal was untimely and, as such, did not invoke this 

court’s jurisdiction.4 We have an independent duty to consider our own jurisdiction. People v. Hill, 

2021 IL App (1st) 131973-B, ¶ 14. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is both mandatory and 

jurisdictional. Joseph v. Evergreen Motors, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 180360, ¶ 19. “Unless there is 

a properly filed notice of appeal, a reviewing court has no jurisdiction over the appeal and is

obliged to dismiss it.” People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008). 

¶ 13 The matter that Jacek ultimately seeks to appeal is the denial of his petition filed pursuant 

to Section 2-1401. Section 2-1401 allows a litigant to petition for relief from a final judgment after 

30 days from its entry. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2016). Section 2-1401 is ordinarily used to 

bring facts to the attention of the trial court that, if known at the time of judgment, would have 

precluded its entry. Paul v. Gerald Adelman & Assoc., Ltd., 223 Ill. 2d 85, 94 (2006). A petition 

brought under section 2-1401 must set forth allegations supporting the existence of a meritorious 

claim or defense; due diligence in presenting the claim or defense to the circuit court in the original 

action; and due diligence in filing the petition. Id. To prevail, a petitioner must establish these 

elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 95.

¶ 14 A section 2-1401 petition, however, is a separate action, independent from the original 

action. Warren County Soil & Water Conservation District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31. A 

final order disposing of a section 2-1401 petition is appealable without any special finding by the 

trial court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). A timely filed motion to reconsider the court’s 

ruling on a section 2-1401 petition extends the time to file a notice of appeal to 30 days after the 

30, 2021, was intended. The substantive description of the order Jacek seeks to appeal clearly points to the 

court’s order of June 30, 2021. 4

The appellant’s reply brief was due on March 29, 2022. Neither a reply brief nor request for 

extension were filed in this court. The case was submitted for decision on April 13, 2022. 
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entry of the order disposing of the motion to reconsider. Harris Bank, N.A. v. Harris, 2015 IL App 

(1st) 133017, ¶¶ 42-46 (finding that a motion to reconsider the denial of a section 2-1401 petition 

is a motion directed against the judgment, which tolls the time to file a notice of appeal under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1)). 

¶ 15 The motion to reconsider the trial court’s denial of Jacek’s section 2-1401 petition, 

however, was not timely filed. The court entered an order denying the petition on March 4, 2021.

That was a final judgment. To challenge the judgment, Jacek needed to either file a notice of appeal 

or a motion to reconsider within 30 days from March 4. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017); 

735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2016). The motion to reconsider, here, was filed on April 15, 2021, 

more than 30 days later. 

¶ 16 Jacek’s motion to reconsider referred to the court’s March 16 order, but, in substance, 

addressed the matters decided on March 4. The March 16 order did not rule on his section 2-1401 

petition. As we noted, that ruling occurred on March 4. The March 16 order merely stated that 

Jacek’s petition did not constitute a motion to modify maintenance. It is unclear from the record 

before us what prompted the court to state this in its order. Jacek had not filed any written pleading 

between the March 4 order and the March 12 hearing referenced in the March 16 order. No 

transcript, bystander’s report, or agreed statement of facts has been supplied for us to ascertain 

what transpired. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). In any event, the March 16 order did not

extend the time to file a notice of appeal such that Jacek’s April 15 motion to reconsider or his 

July 30 notice of appeal were timely. The March 16 order was not a judgment on the section 2-1401 

petition, the March 4 order was. At most, the March 16 order may have constituted the denial of 

an oral motion to reconsider raised in the March 12 hearing. If so, then Jacek’s time to file a notice 

of appeal would have concluded on April 16, 2021. Yet, even under that scenario, he could not file 
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another motion to reconsider. People v. Miraglia, 323 Ill. App. 3d 199, 205-06 (2001). Thus, the 

circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear Jacek’s April 15 motion to reconsider. See Won v. Grant 

Park 2, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 122523, ¶ 20 (“the trial court loses jurisdiction after 30 days from 

the time the final judgment is entered when either (1) a posttrial motion directed against the 

judgment is not filed, (2) 30 days pass from the time the trial court disposes of a timely filed 

posttrial motion, or (3) a notice of appeal is timely filed.”).

¶ 17 We recognize that, under some circumstances, parties can revest the circuit court with 

jurisdiction to hear an untimely motion. See People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 114459, ¶ 25. However, 

those circumstances were not present here. Revestment requires that both parties “assert positions 

that make the proceedings inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment and support the setting 

aside of at least part of that judgment.” Id. Nothing in the record suggests that Urszula asserted a 

position inconsistent with the prior judgment and sought for any part of that judgment to be set 

aside. Rather, the opposite is apparent.

¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 19 For these reasons, we find that we lack jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.

¶ 20 Appeal dismissed.