UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ R. KIRK MCDONALD, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; CITIBANK N.A.; CHASE FUNDING MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATE 2002-4, Defendants - Appellees. No. 15-1168 (D.C. No. 1:12-cv-02749-MSK-MEH) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , HOLMES , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Appellant R. Kirk McDonald, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of 10 of his 13 claims against the defendants under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and its grant of summary judgment in their favor on his remaining claims. Exer cising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 31, 2016 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. Background Mr. McDonald defaulted on his home loan, and defendant Citibank initiated foreclosure proceedings in Colorado state cour t. After a hearing, the court issued an order authorizing sale of the property. The day before the sale, Mr. McDonald initiated this action, filing both a comp laint and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. His efforts to enjo in the sale were unsuccessful, but the case proceeded. His amende d complaint purports to asse rt 13 claims, all of which relate to the foreclosure, which predated the amended complaint. Claim one is for “conversion.” R., Vol. 1 at 237. Mr. McDonald alleges that the defendants prevented him from negotiati ng a foreclosure deferment and therefore the foreclosure resulted in conversion of his property. Claims two through five are for “fr[ au]d upon the court,” “conspiracy to defraud,” “civil conspiracy,” and “attemp ting to influence a public servant.” Id. at 238-41. The gist of the al legations underlying these clai ms is that the defendants’ failure to provide information about the not e holder before and during the foreclosure hearing caused him to lose his home. Claim six is for “willfu l & wanton negligence.” Id. at 241. Mr. McDonald alleges that he relied on material fals e information provided by the defendants and that he was damage d by their conduct. Claim seven is for “ unjust enrichment.” Id. at 242. Mr. McDonald does not set forth the elements of the offense but reiterates the allegati on that the defendants illegally acquired his home through the foreclosure.3 Claims eight and nine are for “breach of contract” and “unconscionability.” Id. at 242-44. The underlyi ng allegations are variati ons on the same theme. Mr. McDonald asserts that the defendant s’ conduct breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing a nd was substantively and pr ocedurally unconscionable. Claims 10 and 11 are based on alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). Mr. McDonald a lleges that defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank failed to respond to his request for a new loan and that th e defendants did not respond to his requests for in formation about his loan. Claim 12 is based on an al leged violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-38-805 (a foreclosure-deferment statut e since repealed). Mr. Mc Donald asserts that the defendants prevented him from obtaining th e deferment to which he was entitled and the foreclosure was therefore improper. Claim 13 is based on an al leged violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-40-103 (a statute requiring a servicer of a loan to re spond to a written reque st from the debtor for information about the loan ) because the defendants alle gedly failed to respond to Mr. McDonald’s written re quests for information. The complaint requests reli ef in the form of “[a] ctual and consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial” as well as attorney fees and costs. Id. at 246. The district court granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that it did not have subject -matter jurisdiction over claims one through nine, and 12. Because those claims sought to invalidate the state-c ourt foreclosure, the court4 reasoned, they were barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits lower federal courts from revi ewing state-court judgments. See generally Campbell v. City of Spencer , 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012). Later, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, c oncluding that Mr. McDonald had failed to establish even a prima facie claim with respect to hi s remaining claims. II. Analysis We review de novo dismissals for la ck of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1281. We also review de no vo grants of summary judgment. See Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc. , 812 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 2015). Because Mr. McDonald is proceeding pro se, we afford his filings a lib eral construction, but we do not act as his advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. McDonald devotes much of his brie fing to issues that we do not address because they are not pertinen t to this appeal. We do a ddress his argument that the district court misapplied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the state-court foreclosure proceedings. We are not persuaded. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars claims “compl aining of injuries caused by state-court judgments.” Campbell , 682 F.3d at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a party who loses in state court may not bring a case seeking review and rejection of the st ate-court judgment in federal court. See In re Miller , 666 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012). With respect to claims one through nine, and 12, the district court ruled that that is precisely what Mr. McDonald seeks in this case. For these claims, Mr. McDona ld fails to allege any injury that is5 separate from the state-court-authori zed foreclosure. He argues only that RookerFeldman is inapplicable because the order aut horizing sale was not a final judgment. But Rooker-Feldman does apply to the fo reclosure judgment. See Dillard v. Bank of New York , 476 F. App’x 690, 692 n.3 (10th Cir. 2012). To the extent that Mr. McDonald may have attempted to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judg ment on claims 10, 11, and 13, he has not adequately presented any argument that wo uld warrant our considerati on. No such argument is even listed in his statement of the issues. “[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inad equately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.” Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). “Scattered statements in the a ppellant’s brief are not enough to preserve an issue for appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). III. Conclusion The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. McDonald’s motion to submit a supplemental brief is granted. His motion to pr oceed in forma pauperis is denied. See Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C. , 497 F.3d 1077, 10 79 (10th Cir. 2007) (denying motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis for failure “to show the existence of a reasoned, nonfri volous argument on the law and facts in support of the6 issues raised on appeal”).

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge