NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0050n.06 No. 08-2437
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. WI LLIA M ELIA S KHA M I, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE EASTE RN DISTRICT OF M ICHIGAN

BEF OR E: NO RRIS, CL AY , a nd SU TTON , C ir c uitJudg e s. CLA Y, Ci rc uit Jud ge. Def endant, William Eli as Khami, appeals fr om his felon-inpossession of a fir ear

m conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )( 1 ) resulti ng from a c onditional g uilty plea that r eser

ved his rig ht to appeal two issues t o this Court. Defenda nt first appea ls the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of the sea rch of his home, claiming that the under ly ing
se arc h w arr ant w a s d e fe c tiv e and that th e se arc h a

nd se izur e was in violatio n o f h is F ourt h Amendment rig hts. I n addition, Def endant appeals the denial of a motion to di smiss hi s indictment ba se d on a c ha lle ng e to the c on sti tut ion a lity of 18 U. S.C. § 92 2( g )( 1) in lig ht of r ecent Sup re me Court prec edent inter

pretingthe Second Ame ndment. For the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de rs de nyingbo th m oti on s.No. 08-2437

2 BACK GR OUND Two sepa rate law enf

orce ment ecsta sy

investigations were ong oing in August 2007 when both investigations focused on lawenfor ceme nt’s suspicions reg ard ing a ctivities taking pla ce at Def endant’ s home at 19 168 Hava na Stree t, Detroit, Michig an. The investigation headed by I mmigration and Customs Enforc ement (I CE) did not result in law en fo rce ment seekinga sea rch
wa rr ant, bu t th e g ov e rnme nt a lle g e d in its th e or y of the c ri min a l c a se , w hic h is no t be fo re thi s Co ur t, that an ecsta sy transac tion oc curr ed at the 19168 Hava na Street location among Roni Shaba a nd four others. The investigation that led to the sear ch of D efe ndant’s home wa s led by CHI EF, a combined ta sk fo rc e of state , lo c a l, a

nd fe de ra l la w e nf or c e me nt. The CHI EF inve stigation beg an surveilling t wo co-defe ndants, Kenzill S tanciel a nd Carlos Wil lis, on August 28, 2007. CHI EF inve stigators ob s er v ed S tanciel a nd Wil lis meet with codefe ndant Mario Ha

rre ll at a B P station where the thr ee a pp ea re d t o engag e in a suspicious transac tion in which items wer e transfe rre d from Stanciel’s and Willis’ vehicles to Har rell’s ve hicle. Wil lis and Stanciel wer e t h en o b s erved following Har rell in tandem in their ve hicles. Will is and Stanciel wer e late r ap p re h ended dur ing tr aff ic stops, and appr ox imately 9,500 ecsta sy

pills were
rec ove r e d f r o m S tanciel’ s vehicle. Willis t hen told investigators that the brown pa per ba g transfe rre d to Harr ell contained money utiliz ed to purc hase the ecsta sy rec overe d during the traf fic stop. Acc ording to Wi llis, t he ac tual drug transac tion took place nea r 19168 Havana Stre et, but not at that loc a tio n. Willi s to ld C HI EF inv e sti g ato rs that he saw “ an A ra b ma le ” g e t in to H arr e ll’ s c ar at a house nea r 19168 Havana Stre et and that he
o b s erv edHa rr el l h an d

t h e b ag co n t ai n i n g t h e m o n ey t o [ an Ar ab m al e] i nex ch an ge for a brown pa

per ba g which Willi s had pre viously s ee n i n [ t h e Arab male]’sNo. 08-2437

3 possession. Accor ding to Willis , the brown pa per ba g was g iven to Stanciel and when a rre sted shortly

there afte r, it was found in his possession, containing the 9,500 p i l l s o f E c s t a s y. (Appe llee’s B r. 4). Willis identified a photo of Defenda nt as t he Ar ab male he linked to this drug transac tion. It was dete rmined af ter indictment that De fenda nt was not the Ara

b male in question, but that Roni S haba w as. Will is al s o i d enti fied, fr om a photo, Def endant’ s residenc e as ne ar the location wher e the dr

ug transac tion occurr ed involving the Ara b male. CH I EF inv e sti g a tor s w e re un a ble to fo llo w the c ar dr ive n b y Ha rr e ll, bu t th e y

we re a ble to trac e the c ar to Ha

rre ll and o b t ai n h i s addre ss: 19329 Ri opelle Stree t, Detroit, Michig an. The office rs obs erve d Har

rell at that addre ss and followed him to Def endant’ s residenc e. They

observe d Har rell and an individual matchingDef endant’ s descr iption having a meeting . CHI EF inve stigators did a uti lit ie s c he c k to re ve a l th a t 19 16 8 H a va na Str e e t w a s th e re sid e nc e of Willi a m E lia s K

hami
and the n p e rf or me d a Se c re tary of State se arc h to ob ta in the ph oto of De fe nd ant. Th e of

fi c e rs a lso lear ned that Def

endant had two prior drugfelony convictions, including one for methamphetamine d el i v ery an d m an u fa ct u ri n g. Duringthe interrog ation of Will is, which involved two office rs (one from CHI EF, one from DEA) que stioning him on separ ate oc casions on Aug ust 28, 2007, Wil lis also descr ibed in detail the house where t h e actual drug transac tion beg an with the Ar ab male g etting into Ha rre ll’s vehicle. That house wa s not the same house a s Defe ndant’s re sidence , which Willi s identified as ne ar the place wher e the Ara

b male – whom Wil lis identified from a photog raph a s Defe ndant – was pic ked up to participate in the transac tion.No. 08-2437

4 T h e fa ct s that Def

endant a lleg es we re le ft out of the supporting aff idavit for the se arc h
wa rr ant a re summa ri zed in h is b ri e f a s f

oll ow s: Wil lis describes the house as South of 7 Mile Road; Mr. K hami’s house is North of 7 M ile Roa d. Willi s d e sc ri be s th e ho us e a s a “ tw o- fa mil y fl a t” ; Mr . K

hami’ s h ome is a single -fa

mily dwelling
. Wil lis de scribes the house as being “beig e bric k”; Mr. Khami’s house ha s white aluminum siding on it. Wil lis de scribes the house a s being located “ near

the cor ner” ; Mr. Khami’s house is in the middle of his block (Appe llant’s Br . at 16, punctuation modified). Def endant wa s indicted on September 13, 2 0 0 7 (super seded by a cor rec ted indictment on Janu ary 31 , 2 00 8) on thr e e c ounts in an ind ic tme nt that inc lud e d othe r de fe nd ants and fo ur c ounts total: Count I : conspirac y to possess with intent to d istribute more than 9,500 pills of 3, 4
m e t h y l e n e d i o x y

m e t h a mp h e t a m i n e ( “ E c s t a s y ” ) i nv i o l a t i o no f 2 1 U
. S
. C
. § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; C o u n tIII : distribution of the s ame in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1); C ount I V: being a fe lon in possession of a firea rm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). Counts Iand I I Iwer e dismissed as to Def endant
on Marc h 1 2, 20 08 on

mot ion of the g ov e rnme nt. Def endant f iled two motions, bot

h o f wh ic h wer e denie d, that challeng ed the r emaining count of the indictment (Count I V). On D ece mber 11, 2007, De fenda nt filed a mot i o n t o s u p p ress the evidenc e ( i n particula

r the fir ear

m) rec overe d in the sear ch of his home, a rg uing that the sear ch
wa rr ant w a s w ith out pr ob a

ble c a us e and that th e a ff

ida vit su pp orti ng it l e ft

ou t mate ri a l f

a c ts intentionally

to misl ead the mag istrate. A hearing on this motion was held on J anuar y 24, 2008, and the motion was denied on Ma y 12, 2008 afte r suppl emental br iefing . On J anuar y 16, 2008, Def endant f iled a motion to dism iss Count I V of the indictment arguing that the statute under w hichNo. 08-2437

5 he wa s in dic te d is an unc on sti tut ion a l in fr ing e me nt o f h is Se c on d A me ndme nt r ig ht t o b e ar a rm s. The district cour

t denied this motion on March 10, 2008. Def endant pled guilty

to Co u nt I V of the indictment on June 3, 2008 with the benef it of a
c on dit ion a l pl e a

a g re e me nt t

hat pr e se rv e d h is r ig ht t o a pp e a l th e de nia l of

bo th m oti on s and

a lso noting the then pending Supreme Court dec ision in Di str ic t of Colum bia v . H

e lle r, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct . 2783 (2008). The district court sentenced Defe ndant t o 51 months’ incar cer ation with three y e ars of su

pe rv ise d re le a se to f

oll owon Oc tob e r 2 4, 20 08 . D e fe nd ant t he n ti me ly

a pp e a le d to thi s Court
. DI SCU SSIO N I. DE F EN DA NT ’S M OTI ON TO SU P P RE SS A. Stand ard of Review This Court reviews the de nial of a motion to suppr ess using a standard of revie w in which fac tual finding s of t he dis trict court are reviewe d for c lear err or and que stions of law are revie wed de novo
. Un ite d Sta te

s v . B lai r, 52 4 F. 3d

74 0, 74 7 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 8) ; United States v. He rndon , 393 F.3d 665, 667 ( 6th Cir. 2005). “When a district court ha s denied a motion to s uppress, we consider the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the g overnme nt.” United St ates v. Long, 464 F.3d 569, 5 7 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g United St ates v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc) ). The district court’s de nial of a Franks hear ing is re viewe d u n d er t h e same standa rd of r eview a s the motion to s uppress. United States v. Mastromatteo , 538 F.3d 535, 545 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 ( 6th Cir. 2001)).No. 08-2437

6 B. The Di st r ic t C our t D id N otEr r in D e nyi ng t he M ot ion to Suppr e ss Def endant make s three a

rg uments in support of his appea l: 1) that the sea rch w arr ant was not supported by

probable cause on its face ; 2) that the af fidavit su pporting the sea rch w arr ant was intentionally

misleading in its materia l omission of facts which, if include d, would have de feated the finding of proba

ble ca use by the mag istrate; and 3) that the offic ers a re not e ntitled to the ex ception to t he e xclu sio na

ry ru le fo r g oo d f

a ithre lia nc e on a fa c ia lly va lid

wa rr ant. On the fi rs t tw o th e or ie s, the district court did not err in denying the motion to s uppress e vidence from t h e s ea rch of Def endant’ s home. The third theor y , the g ood faith exception, need not be addre ssed g iven the dispositi on of the other

two. Def endant’ s motion t o suppress base d on his first argument that the sea rch w arr ant was not
su pp or te d b y pr ob a ble c a us e on its fa c e is unava ili ng : To deter mine whether probable cause for a sear ch ex ists, a judge issuing a wa rra nt must “make a

prac ti cal, c ommon-sense de cision whether , g iven all the cir cumstance s set forth in t he af

fidavit befor e him, including the ‘ver acity ’ and ‘ basis of knowledg e’ of per sons supply ing he arsa y information, there is a fair probabilit y that contra band or evide nce of a crime w ill be found in a par ticular plac e.” T he duty

of a r eviewing court is simply

to ensure that the mag istrate had a “substantial ba sis” for c oncluding that probable cause exis ted. Un ite d S tat es v . G un te r, 5 5 1 F. 3 d

4 7 2 , 4 7 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Il lin ois v . G ate s, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239 (1 9 83)). Onc e the mag istrate has de termined that proba ble ca use supports the issuing of
a se arc h w arr ant, tha

t de te rm inatio n is c on c lus ive un le ss t he e vid e nc e on th e re c or d c omp e ls a differ ent conc lusion or it can be shown that the mag istrate act ed ar bitrarily
. See U nited States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 ( 6th Cir. 2000).No. 08-2437

7 A sear ch war

rant aff idavit must contain sufficie nt a lleg ations to suppor t t h e magistrate ’s f i n d i n g t h a tt h e r e i s a

n e x u s b e t w e e nt h e l o c a t i o nt o b e s e ar c h e d an d p r o b a b l e c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 749-50 (6th Cir. 2005) ; U nite d S tates v . Ca rp e nte r, 360 F .3 d 5 91 , 5 94 -9 5 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc ). Th e a ff ida vit ne e d not sh owsu ff

ic ie nt a lle g a tio ns to support a findingthat criminal a ct i v i t y is actually

occur ring at that location, but must include alleg ations sufficient to show a link between pr obable c riminal activity and that spec ific lo cation. United States v. J

ones , 159 F.3d 969, 974- 75 (6th Cir. 1998). The sear ch war

rant aff idavit in this c ase, w hich was f airly leng thy , consisted of the f ollowing alleg ations. First, t he C HI EF investigator alleg ed that in his leng thy experience in law enf orce ment
and in d ru g inv e sti g a tio ns , the art ic le s so ug ht i n th e se arc h w arr ant a re the kin d o f e vid e nc e us ua lly
re c ov e re d fr om hom e s o f p e op le wh o a re su sp e c te d o f i nv olv e me nt i n d ru g tr a ff ic kin g . T he a ff

ida vit then details the CHI EF sur veillance of three vehicles believed to be involved in narc otics traff icking wh ic h le d to the re c ov e ry of 9, 50 0 e c sta sy pil ls in a tr a ff ic sto p of tw o of the ve hic le s. Th e a ff ida vit then discusses using the license plate number of vehicle #3 to de termine the r eg istered a ddress, a nd law enf orce ment office rs then g oing to that a ddress a nd observingthe black ma le pre viously seen participating in the thre e-ve hicle tra nsaction. That m ale was followed to 19168 Hava na Stree t where he met with an Ar ab male who had come fr o m i n side the home. The n the af fidavit discusses information obtained f

rom Wil lis, one of the defe ndants arr ested in the tra ffic stop of the first two vehicles w hich desc ribes the dr ug transac tion that oc curr ed at an unknown house, and then a lleg es that Wil lis identified Defe ndant as the Ara b male involved in that tr ansac tion and identified 19168 Hava na Stree t from photog raphs a s near the location of the drug transac tion. The aff idavit concludesNo. 08-2437

8 with alleg ations that Defe ndant lists 19168 Havana Stre et as his addr ess on his driver’ s license a nd that D e fe nd ant h a s tw o p ri or dr ugc on vic tio ns . The a lleg ations in the aff

idavit supporting the se arc h war rant were suf

ficient to support an independe nt determination by the mag istrate that ther e wa s probable c ause to sea rch t h e home. There was e vidence from a na med informant identify

ing D efe ndant from a

photogr aph as involved in the transac tion. The independe nt observations of the CHI EF inve stigators also implicated Def endant’ s involvement and cr eate d a nexus t o the house be cause those offic ers sa w the drive r of the third vehicle (Ha

rre ll) g o to Defe n d an t ’s hous e and me et with him shortly afte r the drug tr ans a c tio n. Whil e that surv e ill anc e a lon e wo uld pr ob a bly no t be su ffici e nt t o e sta

bli shpr ob a

ble
c a us e sin c e the re is n o a lle g a tio n th a t D e fe nd ant r e c e ive d a ny g oo ds fr om H arr e ll i n th a t me e tin g so
a s to c re a te su sp ic ion re g ard ing his inv olv e me nt in t he e c sta sy ri ng , it do e s le nd c re dib ili ty

to Wi lli s’ ide nti fi c a tio n o f D e fe nd ant a s th e Ar a b ma le inv olv e d. Con sid e ri ngthe tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s, this evidence was sufficie nt to e stablish a nexus between c riminal activity and De fenda

nt’s home. Once that deter

mination wa s m ade, the mag istrate could r ely upon the expertise of the of fice r
swea ring the af

fi d av i t , as s uming the of

fice r could attest to sufficient experienc e in these kinds of criminal investig ations, to draw r easona ble infer ence s as to what ty pes of e vidence m i g ht be
rec overe d in the home. S ee Un i t ed S t a t es v. W

illiams, 5 4 4 F. 3 d

6 8 3 , 6 8 7 (2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Caicedo , 85 F.3d 1184, 1192- 93 (6th Cir. 1996)). Def endant also argues that the off icer was intentionally

misleading by

leaving out material fac ts that would have de feated proba ble ca use, and so the district c ourt err ed in not g rantinga Franks hear ing. I

n order to be entitled t o a Franks he ari ngto e sta bli shmate ri a l f

a c tua l om iss ion s f

ro m aNo. 08-2437

9 wa rr ant, a de fenda

nt must show that his case is the “ v e ry r ar e c a s e w h e r e t h e d e f e n d an tma ke s a str on g pr e lim in a

r y s ho wi ngthat th e a ff

iant with an i ntention to mislead excluded critica l information from the a ffidavit, and the omission i s critical to the f inding of probable cause .” Ma

ys v. City of Dayton, 13 4 F .3 d 8 09 , 8 16 (6 th C ir . 1 99 8) (e mph a sis in or ig ina l)
. Th is C ir c uit ha s r e pe a te dly

he ld that the standar d for obtaininga Franks hear ing is higher for a claim of mate rial omission than for an allege dly false affir

mative s tatement. United States v. Fowler , 535 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (c i t i n g United States v. Graham , 275 F.3d 490, 506 ( 6th Cir. 2001), Un ite d Sta te s v . S awy e rs , 127 F. App’ x 1 7 4 , 1 8 3 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 5 ) )
. T h is h ig h e r b ar is in r e c o g n it io no f

th e f a c t t h a t c r im inal investigations are u s u all y fast-pa ced a

nd have ma

ny source s of information that may not all be
rec og nized as equally

important to the office rs involved, and so this Circuit has held that this highe r bar pr events “ endless rounds of Franks hear ings” based on “endless c onjecture about investig ative le a ds , f ra g me nts of

inf or matio n, or

oth e r m a tte r t

hat mi g ht, if

inc lud e d, have re do un de d to defe ndant’s bene fit.” Un ite d S tates v . M

ar tin , 920 F.2d 393, 398 ( 6th C ir. 1990). This hig her sta nd ard ha s n ot b e e n me t by

De fe nd ant’ s a lle g a tio ns . Def endant’ s alleg ations of intentional misleading of the mag istrate ar e si mp ly to o conclusory to constitute the substantial showing r equire d by this Ci rcuit. His rele vant allegations amount to an
a sse rt ion tha t th e se arc h warr ant wa s the re su lt of ov e rze a lou s lawe nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs e ng a g e d in interlockinginvestigations and that t h er e we re f acts known to the swe aringoffice r that we re int e nti on a lly

no t in c lud e d. B ut t

he re i s no e vid e nc e tha

t th e tw o inve sti g a tio ns we re wo rk ingin tand e m, n or

is the re e vid e nc e to sup po rt the a lle g a tio n that the inf or matio n w a s in te nti on a lly

le ft ou t. Def endant a lso relies hea

vily on the fa ct that W illis ’ credibility was not specific ally alleg ed in t heNo. 08-2437

10 war rant a nd that it was later de termined that Def endant was incorre ctly identified by Wil lis and was
n o t t h e Ar ab male involved in the e cstasy ring . But De fenda

nt provides no evidenc e that law enfor ceme nt knew Willi s to be un reliable or that law e nforc ement doubted, or even should have doubted at the time, the vera city of Wil lis’ ide ntification of Def endant from the ph o t o graph. Def endant a lso does not provide any evidenc e that t h e fact there w ere two simult aneous investigations led to an int entional misleading of the mag istrate. The ref ore, D efe ndant has not met his bur den of proof by making a substantial show ing that the fac ts omitted fr om the aff idavit were done so with an intention to misl ead
. Fur ther, e ven if this Court reviews t h e wa rr ant wit h the alleg edly materia l fac ts that were omitted, the inclusion of those fac ts w ould not tend to de feat probable c ause. The aff idavit alrea dy
no te s th a t th e ho us e inv olv e d in the dr ugtr ans a c tio n w a s an un k no wn h ou se and

that Will is s imp ly ind ic a te d th a t 19 16 8 H a va na Str e e t w a s near that house. There fore , the additional desc riptions of the house whe re the drugtransac tion occurr ed would not def eat the theo ry o f p ro b able cause f or
sear ching Def

endant’ s house, which was that Defenda nt met with Harre ll (the driver of the third ca

r) shortly afte r the drug transac tion that led to the rec overy of 9,500 ecsta sy pills, t hat 19168 Hava

na Street is Def

endant’ s residenc e, that Willi s identified De fe ndant as the A rab ma le involved in the tr ans a c tio n, and

that in the e xpe ri e nc e of

the sw e ari ng of

fi c e rs , c e rt a in ty

pe s of e vid e nc e are lik e ly to be found in the home of those linked to drug traffi ck i ng , espec ially when the me eting betwee n Har rell and D efe ndant took place at Def endant’ s home. Be cause the war

rant wa s supported b y

p r o b a b le c a use and D efe ndant had not made the prope r showing to warr ant a Franks hear ing, there is no ne ed to re ach the issue of whe ther the of fice rs ar eNo. 08-2437

11 entitled to the g ood faith exception of United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Gunter , 551 F.3d at 4 8 2 (c i t i n g United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265, 271 (6th Cir. 2002) (g ood faith exception not applicable when c ourt finds war rant wa s based on pr obable c ause) ). Th e dis tr ic t court did no t er r in de nying De fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss b e c a

us e the a ff ida vit was suff icient to establish probable cause . The district co u rt al s o d i d not err in de nying a Franks hear ing be cause Def

endant did not make the nece ssary showing of an intent to mislead to support
a Fran k s hear ing a

nd even w ith the omitt ed fa cts the wa rra nt stil l supported proba

ble ca use. II. DE F EN D A N T ’ S M O T I O N T O D I S M I S S C O U N T I V O F T H E I N D I C T M E N T B A S ED ON THE AL LEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALIT Y OF 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)( 1). A. Stand ard of Review Def endant moved to dismiss Count I V of the indictment based on the alleg ed unconstitutionalit y

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1)
. The dist rict court’s denial of a motion to di smiss an ind i ct m en t is reviewe d de novo by this Court. Un ite d S

tates v . A li, 557 F.3d 715, 720 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Ther efor e, the district cour t’s finding s of fact and conc lusions of law are fully revie wable. The district cour

t’s ruling on the constitutio n ality of a f eder al statute is also revie wed de novo
. Un ite d S tat es v . R os e , 522 F.3d 710, 716 ( 6th Cir. 2008). B. The Di st r ic t C our t D id N otEr r in D e nyi ng t he M ot ion to Di sm iss Co untIV The Supreme Court’s rec ent dec ision in District of Columbia v. Heller in te r p r e te d the Second Amendment to g uara

ntee a n individual right to bear arms in some circ umstances. 128 S.Ct. at 2797- 98. Def endant a rg ues that t his decision supports his challeng e to the consti tutionality of § 922(g )(1) , which this Court has previously held to be constitutional along with severa l other re lated provisions regulating posse ssion of firea rms. See U

nited States v. Napier , 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir. 2000)No. 08-2437

12 (collec ting pr e- He lle r case s fr om vari ou s cir c uit s uph old ingthe c on sti tut ion a lity of § 9 22 (g )) ; see als o United States v. W

aller, 218 F.3d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that it is well-settled that § 922(g )(1) does not violate the Sec ond Amendment). Se ve ra l c ir c uit s, inc lud ing the Sixth Cir c uit , have be e n pr e se nte d wi th s imi lar c ha lle ng e s to the constitutionality

of § 922(g )(1) in light of Heller
. I n eac h case , our sister Circuits have found that the pronounc ement in Heller that “nothing in [ the] opi n i o n s h o u l d be take n to cast doubt on longsta nding pr ohibitions on the possession of fire arms by felons” is suff

icient to dis p o s e of the
c la im that § 92 2( g )( 1) is un c on sti tut ion a l. 12 8 S. Ct. a t 28 16 -1 7; see United States v. Stuck ey , 317 F . App ’x 48 , 5 0 ( 2d

Cir . 2 00 9) ; United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x
. 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ande rson , 5 59 F .3 d 3 48 , 3 52 (5 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; United States v. Irish, 2 8 5 F
. A p p ’ x. 32 6, 32 7 ( 8th

Cir . 2 00 8) ; Un ite d S

tates v . S mi th , 3 29 F . App ’x 109, 11 0- 11 (9 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; United States v. Mc Cane , 57 3 F .3 d 10 37 , 10 47 (1 0th Cir . 2 00 9) ; Un ite d Stat es v. B att le , 2009 WL 3065103, *1 -2 (1 1th

Cir . 2 00 9) . O ur

Cir c uit ’s pr ior

de c isi on on the c on sti tut ion a lity

of § 92 2( g )( 1) po st-Heller
a lso qu ote s th e dic ta

fr om Heller and the n r e vie ws the c a se s in wh ic h th is C ir c uit

ha d p re vio us ly

he ld § 922(g )(1) to be constitutional. United States v. Frazier , 314 F. App’ x 801, 807 (6th Cir. 2008).No. 08-2437

Th e Se ve nth

Circu it re c e ntl y

pu bli sh e d a de c isi on re g ard ing§ 9 22 (g )( 9) , w hic h r e str ic ts 1 firea rm owner ship f

o r people who ha

ve bee n convicted of

a domestic violenc e misdemea nor, indicating that simple reliance on the languag e in Heller about long -standing g un cont rol statutes would not be sufficient to justify the continued c onstitut ionality of that statute. U.S. v. Skie n, 587 F.3d 803 ( 7th Cir. 2009) (re manding for the district c ourt to consider w hether the statu t e passes intermediate scrutiny

and for the g overnme n t to argue that position). Howeve r, since Heller is dir e c tly on po int in thi s ca se , whe re a s the ra tio na le of § 9 22 (g )( 9) is n ot s pe c if ic a lly re fe re nc e d, it is more fully

dispositi ve of this issue. 13 Only two Circuits have published opinions on this specific issue since Heller
. Th e Te nth 1 Circuit majority

opin i on simply

relies on the dic ta in Heller and cites the only

other published decision, which is fr om the Fifth Circuit. McCane , 573 F .3 d at 104 7. Ho we ve r, the c on c ur re nc e in the Tenth Circuit ca se expresses some c oncer n that this dictum conflicts with the underly ing the ory of He lle r that longsta

nding f irea rm restric tions are not in conflict with the Sec ond Amendment since felon fir ear

m restrictions may

not be long standing and also ex p re s s es concern that this di ctum
ne e dle ssl y

c on str a ins the de ve lop me nt o f S e c ond Ame ndme nt d oc tr ine , b ut t he c on c ur re nc e sti ll
re c og nize s th a t Heller seems to f orec lose the possibili ty that § 922(g )(1) is unc onstitut ional. Id. at 1047-50 (Ty

mkovich, J . concur

ring ). The F ifth Circui t d ec i s i on simply quotes the dictum from Heller to dispose of the constitutional challeng e to § 922(g )(1)
. Anderson , 559 F.3d at 352.

“ [Th is C ourt

ha s] no te d th a t [we ] ar e ob lig a te d to fol low Sup re me Court dic ta , p art ic ula

rl y wh e n th e re is n o s ub st ant ial r e a so n f or dis re g ard ingit, su c h a s a g e or su bs e qu e nt s tate me nts undermining its rationale.” United States v. Marlow, 278 F.3d 581, 588 n.7 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (citing G a y lo r v . U n ite d S ta tes , 7 4 F. 3 d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (“ this court considers itself bound by Sup re me Court dic ta a lmo st a s fi rm ly a s b y the Court ' s o utr ig ht h old ing s, pa rt ic ula rl y wh e n th e dic ta is r e c e nt an d not e nf

e e ble d b y late r s tate me nts ” ); accord M cCoy v . Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13,No. 08-2437

14 19 (1 st Cir .1 99 1) (“ fe de ra l a pp e llate c ourt s are bo un d b y the Sup re me Cou

rt ' s c on sid e re d d ic ta almost as firmly

as by the Court' s outright holding s . . . ”)) . The dicta in Heller car ries sig nificant
we ig ht in our a

na ly sis , e sp e c ia lly

sin c e De fe nd ant a

pp e ars to b e ra isi nga

fa c ia l c ha lle ng e to t

his statut e , w hic h w ou ld r e qu ir e the De fenda nt t o a rgue that th e fe lon -i n- po sse ssi on statut e is unconstitutional a s applied to a ll f elons cover ed by the statute. See U nited States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (in a fac ial challeng e, “the challeng er must establish that no set of
c ir c ums tanc e s e xists un de r w hic h th e Ac t w ou ld b e va lid .” ). Ev e n a n a s a pp lie d ch a lle ng e wo uld be difficult for Def

endant to mount since he was on elec tronic tether at the time of the sear ch and had two prior dr

ug felony convictions, which sug g ests that Def endant likely

is within the categ ory of felons to whom the rationale in Heller would clea

rly apply , and ther efor e for

whom Congr ess ca

n
c on sti tut ion a lly

re str ic t th e po sse ssi on

of fi re arm s. Since Heller

indi ca t es t h at its holdi ng does not bring into question the constituti onality of § 9 22 (g )( 1) , a

nd thi s Co ur t ha s n ot b e e n p re se nte d wi th any c on vin c ing argume nt t hat it s d ic ta

sh ou ld
no t be ve ry

pe rs ua siv e in t

his c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr in d e nyingDefendant’s mot ion to dismiss Count I V. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons se t forth in this opini on, we AF F IRM the district court’s de nial of the mot ion

to s up pr e ss a

nd the mot ion

to d ism iss c ount IV o f t

he ind ic tme nt.