08/24/2017 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

June 27, 2017 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER DAVIS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 107367 Bobby R. McGee, Judge

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No. E2016-02132-CCA-R3-CD

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Upon the request of the Department of Safety, the State filed a petition to declare William 

Christopher Davis, the Defendant, a “habitual offender” pursuant to Motor Vehicle 

Habitual Offenders Act (“the MVHO Act”). The trial court dismissed the petition after 

concluding that the MVHO Act was ambiguous regarding when the State had a duty to 

file a petition. On appeal, the State argues that it has an appeal as of right under 

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) from the dismissal of its petition and that the 

trial court erred in dismissing its petition on the grounds that the MVHO Act was 

ambiguous and penal in nature. The Defendant argues that the State does not have an 

appeal as of right from the dismissal of its petition and that the trial court correctly 

dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the facts of this case and applicable 

case law, we conclude that the State does not have an appeal as of right from the 

dismissal of a motor vehicle habitual offender petition, and thus we dismiss the State’s 

appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. KELLY 

THOMAS, JR., and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant 

Attorney General; Charme Allen, District Attorney General; and Gregory Eshbaugh, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

James R. Owen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, William Christopher Davis.
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OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On February 1, 2016, the Department of Safety requested that the District 

Attorney’s Office of the Sixth Judicial District petition to have the Defendant declared a 

“habitual offender” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-603(2) of the 

MVHO Act. On February 25, 2016, the District Attorney’s Office filed the petition

claiming that the Defendant had been convicted of DUI in Knox County on December 

30, 2015, driving on a revoked license in Williamson County on October 2, 2012, and 

DUI in Williamson County on February 22, 2012. The Defendant filed a motion to 

dismiss the petition on September 8, 2016. The motion alleged that on February 10, 

2016, after the Defendant pled guilty to the DUI charge in Knox County, he requested a 

restricted license order and that the State did not object. On February 17, 2016, he 

installed an interlock device in his vehicle, obtained SR22 insurance, paid a sixty-seven 

dollar ($67.00) fee to the State, and was issued a restricted license. The motion alleged

that:

When the [Defendant] pled guilty in docket [#]1136345 on 

December 30, 2015, the [S]tate had notice that the [D]efendant had the 

three triggering convictions that the [S]tate subsequently relied upon in the 

petition to declare the [D]efendant a habitual motor vehicle offender. At 

that time, the [S]tate chose not to comply with the requirements of 

Tennessee Code Annotated [section] 55-10-618 (b) and did not file or give 

the [D]efendant notice of a habitual motor vehicle offender petition. The 

[S]tate did not file the petition to declare the [Defendant] a habitual motor 

vehicle offender until February 25, 2016, two months after the date of his 

plea.

On September 29, 2016, the trial court heard the parties’ arguments concerning the 

State’s petition. The trial court admitted the Department of Safety’s Habitual Offender 

MVR [motor vehicle report], which was dated February 1, 2016, into evidence. The trial 

court stated the following:

[I]t does appear that there may be an ambiguity in the law as to just what 

procedure should be followed when the Attorney General knows that the 

prosecution is bringing – at that time, is going to be the triggering 

conviction for the statute and intends to use it as the trigger and to seek 

revocations of the license. And even though it’s not technically a criminal 

matter, it still is penal in nature. And I think the Court would have to 

resolve the ambiguity in favor of the [D]efendant.
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Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the State’s petition. The State filed its notice of 

appeal on October 17, 2016.

II. Analysis

The State argues that it has an appeal as of right from the dismissal of its petition 

under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) because the substantive effect of the 

trial court’s dismissal order “results in dismissing a complaint as set forth in Rule 

3(c)(1).” The Defendant contends that the State does not have an appeal as of right under 

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 to appeal the dismissal of its petition. 

State’s Appeal as of Right

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 3(c) states the following:

Availability of Appeal as of Right by the State in Criminal Actions. 

In criminal actions an appeal as of right by the state lies only from an order 

or judgment entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the 

Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals: (1) the substantive effect of 

which results in dismissing an indictment, information, or complaint; (2) 

setting aside a verdict of guilty and entering a judgment of acquittal; (3) 

arresting judgment; (4) granting or refusing to revoke probation; or (5) 

remanding a child to the juvenile court. The state may also appeal as of 

right from a final judgment in a habeas corpus, extradition, or postconviction proceeding, from an order or judgment entered pursuant to Rule 

36 or Rule 36.1, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, and from a final 

order on a request for expunction.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c). The Advisory Commission Comment for this subsection states, in 

pertinent part, that:

The only limitation placed upon the right of appeal by the state in criminal 

actions is that it may not appeal upon a judgment of acquittal. In addition, 

notions of double jeopardy place constitutional restrictions on the 

availability of appeals by the state. See[,] e.g., United States v. Martin 

Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). This subdivision specifies 

situations, within constitutional limits, in which it seems desirable to 

recognize the state’s right of appeal. In addition, the rule provides that 

appeals as of right lie only in those circumstances specified in the 

subdivision.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c), Advisory Comm. Cmt. 
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In its reply brief, the State points to numerous cases in which this court has 

reviewed appeals by the State of dismissals of habitual motor vehicle offender (HMVO)

petitions. See State v. Gross, 673 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984); State v. 

James E. Thompson, No. 02C01-9706-CC-00213, 1998 WL 281939, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. June 2, 1998); State v. Earl Stanley Williams, No. E2001-01675-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 

WL 489124, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2002), no perm. app. filed; State v. Daniel 

Henley, No. W2001-02962-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31259483, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

Aug. 27, 2002), no perm. app. filed; State v. Daniel Cleveland and Matthew Harville, No. 

W2004-02892-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1707975, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2005), 

no perm. app. filed. The State asserts that this court should consider its appeal based on 

the precedent set by these prior cases. However, these cases do not specifically analyze 

whether the State had an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 

3(c) from the dismissal of an HMVO petition. Thus, we note that this is an issue of first 

impression for this court.

In determining whether the State had a direct appeal as of right from an 

expungement order, our supreme court stated the following:

[I]t is clear that Rule 3(c) grants the State the authority to appeal as of right 

only in a limited number of circumstances. The plain language of the rule 

enumerates the six instances in which the State may appeal as of right and 

states that they are the “only” instances that give the State such a right. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c). Moreover, by listing the specific circumstances that 

give the State the right of appeal under Rule 3(c), the rule “excludes other 

[circumstances] that are not mentioned.”

State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting State v. Peele, 58 S.W.3d 701, 

704 (Tenn. 2001)) (second alteration in original), superseded on other grounds by Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-32-101. Additionally, our supreme court noted that Tennessee Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 3 became effective after the statute permitting expungement of 

public records became effective and that “[w]hen interpreting statutes, [the supreme 

court] notes that ‘the Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of its prior enactments 

and to know the state of the law at the time it passes legislation.’” Id. at 400-401 

(quoting Wilson v. Johnson County, 879 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1994)). The Tennessee 

Supreme Court concluded that the Tennessee General Assembly “specifically chose to 

allow neither the State nor a criminal defendant an appeal as of right under Rule 3 from 

an unfavorable ruling concerning an expungement order.” Id. at 401.

Despite this court’s prior consideration of State appeals from the denial of HMVO

petitions, we conclude that the State does not have an appeal as of right under Tennessee 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) to appeal the dismissal of an HMVO petition. See State 
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v. Cody Matthew Headrick, No. E2008-02598-CCA-MR3-CD, 2009 WL 4505440, at *6-

8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 12, 2010) (concluding 

that the State did not have a Rule 3 appeal from the trial court’s order granting pretrial 

diversion even though the court had previously considered such appeals). The State 

argues that its appeal as of right in this case falls under Tennessee Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 3(c)(1), which includes an appeal from an order or judgment entered by a trial 

court “the substantive effect of which results in dismissing an indictment, information, or 

complaint[.]” However, a plain language reading of subsection 3(c)(1) leads us to 

conclude that an appeal from the dismissal of a HMVO petition does not fall under Rule 

3(c)(1). The substantive effect of the trial court’s order dismissing the State’s petition did 

not result in the dismissing of an indictment, information, or complaint. The State’s 

petition would clearly not be categorized as an indictment or information. Tennessee 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 defines an affidavit of complaint as “a statement alleging 

that a person has committed an offense[]” that must “allege the essential facts 

constituting the offense charged.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 3(c). Here, the State’s petition did 

not allege that the Defendant committed an offense; instead, it sought to declare the 

Defendant’s status as an HMVO. An appeal from the dismissal of an HMVO petition is 

not specifically enumerated in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c); thus, under 

Adler, 92 S.W.3d at 400, the State does not have an appeal as of right from the trial 

court’s order in this case. Therefore, based on the supreme court’s precedent in Adler

and our plain language reading of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), the State 

does not have an appeal as of right from the dismissal of its petition.

Additionally, the MVHO Act does not provide a method of appeal for the State. In 

section 55-10-614(a) of the MVHO Act, the Tennessee General Assembly specifically 

provided that “[t]he defendant may appeal to the court of criminal appeals any final 

action or judgment entered under this part, in the same manner and form as appeals in 

criminal matters are heard.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-614(a) (emphasis added). The 

MVHO Act did not include a similar provision providing an appeal by the State. “[W]hen 

interpreting statutes, [the supreme court] has routinely followed the Latin maxim of 

expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning ‘the expression of one thing implies the 

exclusion of all things not mentioned.’” Adler, 92 S.W.3d at 400 (quoting Limbaugh v.

Coffee Medical Center, 59 S.W.3d 73, 84 (Tenn. 2001)). By expressing a method of 

appeal for the defendant, the statute implies an exclusion of an appeal by the State.

We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the MVHO Act is penal in 

nature. See Goats v. State, 364 S.W.2d 889, 891 (1963) (The “revocation [of a license to 

operate a motor vehicle upon the highways] is not a penalty), see also State v. Conley, 

639 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1982) (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399-401 

(1938)) (“the revocation of all driving privileges of one declared to be an habitual 

offender under the motor vehicle habitual offender act ‘is nothing more than deprivation 

of a privilege, is ‘remedial in nature’ and is not intended to have the effect of imposing 
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‘punishment’ in order to vindicate public justice.”). We also disagree that the act is 

ambiguous. See State v. Sammy L. Golden, No. 02C01-9611-CR-00393, 1997 WL 

564261, at *2 n.1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 1997) (noting that section 55-10-618(a) 

“simply provide[s] an alternative procedure; the State may still pursue this classification 

of the offender in a separate proceeding[]”), no perm. app. filed. However, because we 

have concluded that the State does not have an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 3(c) from the dismissal of a petition to declare a defendant an 

HMVO, we dismiss the State’s appeal.

III. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, the State’s appeal is dismissed.

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ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE