J-A15026-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ROBERT E. SWEIGART AS 

SHAREHOLDER OF WILLIAM SWEIGART 

& SONS SANITATION SERVICE, INC., 

ROBERT E. SWEIGART AND SUSAN 

DESIMONE, COEXECUTORS OF THE 

ESTATE OF WILLIAM SWEIGART

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

VIOLET F. SWEIGART, A/K/A VIOLET 

RUTH SWEIGART, A/K/A VIOLET 

SWEIGART, VIOLET SWEIGART, 

WILLIAM K. SWEIGART, WILLIAM 

SWEIGART & SONS SANITATION 

SERVICE, INC., AND BILL SWEIGART 

WASTE WATER INC.

Appellee No. 2371 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 11, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Civil Division at No(s): 07-981

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MAY 14, 2015

Appellants, Robert E. Sweigart and Susan Desimone, appeal from the 

August 11, 2014 judgment entered in their favor and against Appellees, 

Violet F. Sweigart, William K. Sweigart, William Sweigart & Sons Sanitation 

Service, Inc., and Bill Sweigart Waste Water, Inc., in the amount of 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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$149,777.00. After careful review, we remand for the preparation of a 

supplemental trial court opinion.

Briefly, the parties proceeded to a four-day bench trial, which 

culminated in a bench verdict on March 24, 2014. On April 2, 2014, 

Appellees filed a timely post-trial motion. On April 3, 2014, Appellants filed 

a timely post-trial motion. On April 23, 2014, Appellants filed a notice of 

appeal to this Court, which was docketed at 1310 EDA 2014. The trial court 

denied Appellees’ post-trial motion without prejudice for want of subject 

matter jurisdiction on April 29, 2014, without disposing of Appellant’s posttrial motion. On May 21, 2014, Appellants filed a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b), after the trial court ordered them to do so. On May 29, 

2014, this Court entered an order quashing Appellant’s appeal as premature. 

Superior Court Order, 1310 EDA 2014, 5/29/14, at 1. On August 11, 2014, 

Appellants entered a praecipe for judgment in the trial court, as Appellants’ 

post-trial motion was denied by operation of law. See generally Pa.R.C.P. 

227.1(1)(b). 

On August 12, 2014, Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. The 

trial court did not order Appellants to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. On 

January 20, 2015, the trial court filed an opinion, finding that Appellants had 

waived all their issues on appeal due to a non-compliant Rule 1925(b) 
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statement. Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/15, at 2. Thereafter, the trial court set 

forth its rationale for its analysis of the case on its merits, as follows.

[I]n a bench trial, it is within the trial court’s 

discretion to determine the credibility of witnesses 

and to render decisions based on the weight of the 

credible evidence. The trial court judge as the finder 

of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the 

evidence. The trial court judge as the finder of fact 

is free to reject or accept any testimony of a witness.

When examining a decision after a non-jury 

trial, the reviewing [c]ourt’s scope of review is 

limited. Findings of a trial judge in a non-jury case 

must be given the same weight and effect on appeal 

as a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent an error of law or abuse of discretion. The 

reviewing [c]ourt will reverse only if the findings are 

predicated on an error of law or are unsupported by 

competent evidence in the record. In reviewing a 

trial judge’s findings, evidence is to be viewed in a 

light most favorable to the prevailing party. All 

evidence and inferences favorable to the victorious 

party are to be considered true and unfavorable 

inferences are to be rejected.

In the instant case[,] the trial court heard four 

days of testimony and found, based on the credible 

evidence presented, that [Appellants] failed to meet 

their burden of proof on all of their claims except for 

their claims that [Appellants’] decedent was owed 

sums for his share of the Sweigart & Sons business 

and for additional shareholder distributions from 

2001 through 2004. The trial court found, based on 

[Appellants’] evidence and the [a]ccounting 

[m]aster’s [r]eport, that [Appellees] were, in fact, 

liable to [Appellants] in the total amount of 

$149,777.00, plus costs.

Id. at 2-3.

On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review.
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I. Did the [trial court] err in not finding that 

[Appellants] proved [a] confidential 

relationship as a matter of law and the 

opportunity for [Appellees] to take advantage 

of that relationship as to all claims made by 

William Sweigart with credible evidence 

sufficient to shift the burden of proof to 

[Appellees] where the evidence supporting the 

claim is uncontested, non-testimonial and 

conclusively established[?]

II. Did the [trial court] err in not finding that 

[Appellees], by electing to rest their case after 

[Appellants’] case in chief, and not offering any 

testimony or exhibits, failed to meet their 

burden of proving by clear and convincing 

evidence, that all dealings involving the parties 

were indeed fair, conscientious, beyond the 

reach of suspicion and that [Appellees] used 

scrupulous fairness and good faith in dealing 

with [Appellants’] decedent, William Sweigart 

and refrained from using their position to 

William Sweigart’s detriment and to their own 

advantage[?]

III. Did the [trial court] err in not imposing a 

constructive trust on those certain investment 

accounts in the name of Violet Sweigart at 

Wells Fargo bank and wherever else the 

subject funds may be traced if necessary, 

where [Appellants] substantially identified the 

assets sought to be reconveyed, [Appellees] 

would be unjustly enriched if permitted to 

retain the subject property and where the 

supporting evidence is uncontested, nontestimonial and conclusively established[?]

IV. Did the [trial court] err in holding that 

Appellant[s] attempted to overwhelm the 

[trial] court by filing a voluminous 1925(b) 

statement where the order appealed from 

listed no reasons for the relief not granted, the 

issues listed by counsel were raised before and

during the trial and not specifically decided and 
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where counsel could not discern the reasons 

for the decision from reading the [trial court]’s 

order[?]

Appellants’ Brief at 4-5.

We first reject Appellees’ argument that the instant appeal should be 

quashed as premature. Appellees’ Brief at 31-34. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure 227.4 permits a party to file a praecipe for entry of judgment 

after 120 days have elapsed from the time post-trial motions were filed, as 

they are treated as denied by operation of law. Pa.R.C.P. 227.4(1)(b). In 

this case, Appellees post-trial motions were filed on April 2, 2014, as a 

result, the 120-day period lapsed on August 1, 2014. Although Appellees 

are correct that Appellants’ first appeal at 1310 EDA 2014 was interlocutory 

and premature, that appeal did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to 

address the post-trial motions it had before it for decision. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1701(b)(6) (noting that the trial court may “[p]roceed further in any matter 

in which a non-appealable interlocutory order has been entered, 

notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal ... of the order[]”). Based on 

these considerations, Appellants instant appeal is not subject to quashal as 

premature.

We next address Appellants’ fourth issue, as well as Appellees’ and the 

trial court’s argument that Appellants have waived all issues by filing a nonconcise Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellees’ Brief at 34-37. The trial court 

concluded, and Appellees argue, that Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) statement 
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was “anything but concise, [it was] eleven pages contain[ing] twenty-six 

paragraphs of rambling, repetitive and overly lengthy compilation of issues.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/15, at 2. However, the Rule 1925(b) statement in 

question was filed in response to the trial court’s order, which was itself 

triggered by the premature notice of appeal at 1310 EDA 2014. See, e.g., 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (stating, “[i]f the judge entering the order giving rise to 

the notice of appeal ... desires clarification of the errors complained of on 

appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to file of record 

in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise statement of the errors 

complained of on appeal[]”) (emphasis added). When Appellants filed the 

instant notice of appeal, they were not ordered to file a new Rule 1925(b) 

statement and did not file one. As the triggering event for a second Rule 

1925(b) statement was the second notice of appeal, Appellants cannot be 

penalized for not filing a compliant Rule 1925(b) statement when they were 

not ordered to file a statement at all. By logical extension, Appellants 

cannot be subject to waiver based on the Rule 1925(b) statement filed in 

connection with an appeal that this Court has already quashed as 

premature. The trial court could have ordered Appellants to file a new Rule 

1925(b) statement, but it did not. Based on these considerations, we 

conclude Appellants’ issues are not subject to waiver.

Finally, we note Rule 1925(a) states “the judge ... [to] file of record at 

least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other 
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errors complained of, or ... specify in writing the place in the record where 

such reasons may be found.” Id. at 1925(a). This Court has held “the trial 

court opinion is a necessary component of appellate review, providing the 

reviewing court with a reasoned basis for the lower court’s decisions and 

enabling it to engage in a thorough consideration of the issues raised by an 

appellant.” Commonwealth v. Burwell, 42 A.3d 1077, 1082 (Pa. Super. 

2012).1 Here, we note the trial court’s opinion did not specifically examine 

any of the issues raised by Appellants on appeal because the trial court 

believed all issues were waived on appeal due to Appellants’ lengthy Rule 

1925(b) statement.

Given the state of the record, we conclude the best course of action is 

to remand the record to the trial court for the preparation of a supplemental 

opinion. The trial court shall author an opinion, stating its findings of fact 

and legal analysis, limited to the remaining three issues Appellants have 

raised in their brief on appeal, as reproduced above. Once the record is 

returned to this Court, the Prothonotary shall list this case before the next 

available oral argument panel.

____________________________________________

1 We note “[s]ince the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to criminal and 

civil cases alike, the principles enunciated in criminal cases construing those 

rules are equally applicable in civil cases.” Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 

141, 148 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2006), citing Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 

400 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005).
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Case remanded. Panel jurisdiction relinquished. Superior Court 

jurisdiction retained. Case stricken from argument list.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/14/2015