1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-15-00499-CV

____________________

IN RE COMMITMENT OF CURTIS ALLEN ARNOLD

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 15-05-05169-CV

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State of Texas filed a petition to commit Curtis Allen Arnold (Arnold) 

as a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-

.151 (West 2010 & Supp. 2015) (SVP statute). On October 14, 2015, a jury found 

that Arnold is a sexually violent predator, and the trial court rendered a final 

judgment and an order of civil commitment. Arnold filed a motion for new trial. 

The court denied the motion for new trial. Arnold filed a notice of appeal. In two 

issues, Arnold challenges the constitutionality of the SVP statute, as amended, and 
2

the denial of his motion for directed verdict. We affirm the trial court’s judgment 

and order of civil commitment.

Evidence at Trial

Responses to Requests for Admissions

The State read into the record Arnold’s responses to Requests for 

Admissions. Arnold admitted that he was born in July of 1969, that on or about 

April 8, 1999, he was convicted in Liberty County of aggravated sexual assault of 

a child, who was younger than fourteen, and that he was convicted of indecency 

with a child, in a separate cause number in Liberty County. Arnold admitted that 

he received an eighteen-year sentence for each Liberty County offense, and he is 

currently incarcerated for the Liberty County offenses. Arnold also admitted that in 

May of 1999, he was convicted of indecency with a child in Walker County, 

Texas, in February of 1999, he was convicted of indecency with a child in 

Montgomery County, Texas, and in February of 1999, he was also convicted of 

aggravated sexual assault of a child in Montgomery County. 

Arnold admitted that he engaged in sexual contact with E.N., a five-year-old

child, and that he engaged in sexual contact with W.T., a thirteen-year-old child. 

He admitted that he knew it was wrong to sexually offend against the children, but 
3

he did it anyway. Arnold also admitted that he is a sex offender, and that he 

believes he has zero risk of reoffending. 

The trial court took judicial notice that the offense of indecency with a child 

by sexual contact falls under section 21.11(A)(2) of the Texas Penal Code and that 

aggravated sexual assault falls under section 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code, and 

both are sexually violent offenses as defined by the SVP statute.1

Testimony of Arnold

The State called Arnold as its first witness at trial. Arnold agreed that he has 

five convictions for sex offenses, and that his discharge date for his offenses will

be in February of 2017. One of Arnold’s victims, W.T., was the child of one of 

Arnold’s friends. Arnold testified about the two occasions when Arnold took W.T. 

camping. At the time Arnold offended against W.T., Arnold was twenty-seven

years old and, according to the records, W.T. was twelve years old, although 

Arnold testified that he thought W.T. was “like 14[.]” The camping was part of an 

event for a group called Society for Creative Anachronism, where the participants

reenact events from the Middle Ages and dress in costumes like “kings and [] 

queens and knights and lords and ladies.” Arnold testified that he and W.T. stayed 

 

1 At the close of the State’s evidence, the trial court entered a directed 

verdict finding Arnold to be a repeat sexually violent offender. Arnold did not 

object and does not challenge this finding on appeal.
4

in the same tent. According to Arnold, Arnold was a “massage therapist[,]” and 

“massaged” W.T.’s legs because W.T. complained of pain in his legs. Arnold 

denied pulling W.T.’s shorts down, denied telling W.T. to relax, denied trying to 

remove W.T.’s shorts, and denied intentionally touching W.T.’s sex organ. Arnold 

admitted, however, that he pleaded guilty to indecency with a child by contact and 

to intentionally and knowingly touching W.T.’s sex organ with sexual desire. 

Arnold also admitted that he offended against W.T. on another camping trip that 

occurred in Montgomery County, Texas. 

Arnold also admitted that on the Montgomery County camping trip, Arnold 

sexually offended against another child, E.N., and that he was convicted of the

offense against E.N. Arnold was convicted for two aggravated assaults against 

E.N., who was only five years old at the time. Arnold was also charged for 

touching E.N.’s sex organ in Liberty County. Arnold denied committing the 

conduct for which he was convicted with respect to the aggravated sexual assault 

charges.

Arnold testified that he gave a statement to the Cleveland Police and signed 

the statement about the offense against W.T., but Arnold claimed that he touched 

W.T.’s sex organ not for his own sexual gratification but because he “thought it

was what [W.T.] wanted.” Arnold also agreed that in the statement he gave to 
5

police about the offense against E.N., Arnold stated: “I drove [E.N.] to my house. 

While on the way, I had my hand on [E.N.]’s [sex organ]. I know that [E.N.] is five 

years old[.]” Arnold also signed a written stipulation in connection with the 

Montgomery County aggravated sexual assault. 

Arnold testified that he was currently enrolled in a sex offender treatment 

program. The program is a nine-month program which is part of his parole 

stipulation, and it is something he never inquired about before, and he has never 

had any other sex offender treatment. The first part of the program is classroom 

instruction, and the second part is group therapy. Arnold agreed he never told his 

therapist about anything other than two of his offenses, because he says the other 

offenses have now “fallen off” of his record. Arnold denied that he has been 

resistant to feedback from his treatment. Arnold believes it is safe for him to be 

around children because of the treatment he has had and due to his belief in God. 

When asked about his risk of reoffending, Arnold testified that he would not put 

himself in situations where he would be alone with a child, like going to the mall, 

babysitting, or getting involved with women who have children. Arnold also stated 

that he does not believe that he has a “deviant sexual attraction to children[,]” and 

that he has never had such an attraction. 
6

On examination by Arnold’s attorney, Arnold agreed that he deserved every 

day he has spent in jail or prison, that he had severely hurt his victims, destroyed 

their trust, caused shame, and that what he has done could lead his victims to 

depression and destroy their lives. Arnold admits that in one of his statements to 

the authorities he said touching his victims was a “joke” and that one of the victims 

“wanted [Arnold]” to offend the victim, but he testified that was in the late 

nineties. According to Arnold, at the time of the commitment trial, he did not find 

sexually abusing children to be sexually exciting, and he did not have sexual 

fantasies involving children. Arnold also explained that he has had support while in 

prison from his family and from Rabbi Pratt, his “spiritual mentor.” Arnold 

believes he has changed and he is not the same person that he was when he 

offended against his victims. Arnold testified that while in prison he has not been 

charged with any other crime, and he has received no disciplinary write ups. 

However, on further examination by the State, Arnold admitted he has 

received nine disciplinary violations for violating prison rules while incarcerated. 

He received a violation for creating a disturbance, which was a “major case[,]” for 

refusing to obey orders, and for possession of contraband (which he says was for 

possessing stamps). He did not recall that he has also been written up for refusing 
7

to go to his cell. Arnold also testified that he does not believe he has ever been a 

pedophile. 

Testimony of Dr. Gaines

The State’s expert witness was Dr. Sheri Gaines, a medical doctor with a 

specialty in psychiatry. Dr. Gaines is board-certified in psychiatry and in child and 

adolescent psychiatry. She currently works at a residential treatment center that 

provides services to patients, and she also treats patients in an outpatient setting. 

As a forensic psychiatrist for the past twenty-five years, Dr. Gaines testifies in 

legal proceedings and performs evaluations for the court system. Approximately 

thirty percent of her practice involves forensic psychiatry, and the other seventy 

percent involves seeing patients, treating patients, and supervising other clinicians. 

Dr. Gaines explained to the jury that she uses a “standard methodology” that 

is used by experts in Texas who conduct behavioral abnormality evaluations. Her 

opinion was based on her knowledge of literature, facts, and details that she 

gathered from interviewing Arnold and from reviewing all the collateral 

information. Dr. Gaines also relied upon her education, training, and clinical 

judgment. Before interviewing Arnold, Dr. Gaines reviewed Arnold’s records,

which included a report from a psychologist hired by the multidisciplinary team, 

Arnold’s indictments and penitentiary packets, and some information regarding the 
8

facts and details of his offenses. She also reviewed actuarial instruments from a 

psychologist about Arnold. According to Dr. Gaines, her meeting or interview of 

Arnold lasted about three hours. After meeting with Arnold, she received 

additional records including Arnold’s deposition in this case, additional records 

regarding the offenses, as well as prison records and sex offender treatment 

records, all of which she reviewed and relied upon. Dr. Gaines explained that some 

of the records she reviewed were official records such as police reports and prison 

records, and that the older information is important to her in identifying risk factors 

that are published in the literature and in looking for a pattern of behavior. 

According to Dr. Gaines, “the psychiatric literature indicates that past behavior is a 

good predictor of future behavior especially when that past behavior is repetitive.” 

Dr. Gaines testified that her evaluation of Arnold was done in accordance 

with her training as a psychiatrist, and within accepted standards in the field of 

psychiatry. Based upon her education, training, experience and methodology, she 

formed an opinion based on a reasonable degree of certainty that Arnold currently

suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a 

predatory act of sexual violence. 

Dr. Gaines diagnosed Arnold with pedophilic disorder and major depressive 

disorder. Gaines testified that pedophilia is a chronic condition, but it can lessen 
9

with time and treatment. Dr. Gaines diagnosed Arnold with a pedophilic disorder 

because: his first offenses against a prepubescent child occurred around September 

of 1996 and then continued according to the last conviction around October of 

1997, one victim was four or five years old, and another twelve or thirteen, and the 

convictions and sexual offenses meet the criteria as defined in the DSM.

2

Dr. Gaines explained that she considered the factual details of Arnold’s 

offenses. Dr. Gaines recalled that Arnold had seven charges that resulted in five 

convictions, and she considered all of the information. During her interview of 

Arnold, Arnold denied engaging in some of the sexual acts that were otherwise 

documented in records of his offense against E.N., but he admitted fondling the 

child and to having the child perform a sexual act that Arnold later denied in his 

deposition. Dr. Gaines found it significant that Arnold gave different versions of 

what happened at different times; this “is significant because it’s evidence of the 

risk factor of not taking full responsibility” and of “the risk factor of minimizing 

what he has done.” Dr. Gaines also considered the records from Arnold’s sex 

offender treatment program, which indicated that Arnold is “resistant to feedback 

that he gets from peers[,]” and although Arnold has made some progress in 

treatment, he still has “a lot more to work on.” In Dr. Gaines’s opinion, although 

 

2 Dr. Gaines explained that the “DSM” is the Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual.
10

Arnold “echoed” a lot of terminology, Arnold does not understand why he sexually 

offended, which is also significant. And, while one progress note indicated Arnold 

admitted he had a sexual attraction to his victims, other notes indicated he does not 

admit such attraction. Dr. Gaines considered this as present-day evidence that 

Arnold has a sexual deviancy. 

Dr. Gaines identified risk factors for Arnold reoffending that include

Arnold’s deviant sexual behavior, offending against prepubescent boys, the range 

of the victims’ ages from four to thirteen, the multiple types of sexual acts, the 

grooming of his victims, offending in public places, the lack of age-appropriate 

romantic relationships, and the lack of accepting responsibility and minimization. 

Dr. Gaines also identified some positive factors for Arnold, which include that he

is in sex offender treatment, his faith, and the education he has obtained in prison. 

Arnold also scored very low on the PCL-R actuarial as to psychopathic traits. 

Testimony of Rabbi James Pratt

James Pratt is a Messianic Jewish Rabbi, a Jewish believer in Jesus Christ, 

who has a congregation and also volunteers in the prison system.3 Rabbi Pratt 

 

3 Arnold notified the State after the deadline in the scheduling order that he 

wanted to call Rabbi James Pratt as a witness on behalf of Arnold. In a pretrial 

hearing, the trial court ruled that the defense had shown “good cause” for the late 

designation, but the court concluded at the pretrial hearing that his testimony was 

not relevant. During the trial, the State conceded it had not objected based on 
11

mentored Arnold from 2005 until 2013, while Arnold was incarcerated. The Rabbi 

admitted that he did not know the details of Arnold’s criminal offenses, but the 

Rabbi testified he knew Arnold “has an offense, a sexual offense with children.”

The Rabbi testified about his work in the prison with Arnold and the support 

system that faith provides, and he explained that he would not be testifying if “I 

wasn’t convinced that [Arnold] was a new man in Christ, that he is remorseful for 

his mistake and that he would never do that again. I couldn’t sit here and testify on 

his behalf if I had any doubt in my mind that he would repeat that crime.” Rabbi 

Pratt also agreed he is not a licensed psychiatrist, counselor, or sex offender 

provider. According to Rabbi Pratt, Arnold has admitted to and repented of being 

sexually attracted to prepubescent boys, and the Rabbi believes Arnold is sincere. 

Constitutional Challenge

In his first issue, Arnold argues that the SVP statute “as amended by Senate 

Bill 746 is facially unconstitutional because it requires all persons adjudicated as 

sexually violent predators to live in oppressive confinement with no evidence they 

cannot be treated in an outpatient model first, and as amended fails the ‘intenteffects test’ utilized by the Texas Supreme Court in In re Commitment of Fisher, 

 

relevancy, and Dr. Gaines testified about the protective factor of Arnold’s faith. 

The trial court then ruled that Rabbi Pratt would be allowed to testify but limited 

his testimony. The Rabbi was not allowed to testify as an expert on the specific 

risk of reoffending as a sexual offender. 
12

164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005).” Arnold contends that the findings of a trial court 

judge as to another civilly committed person, Alonzo May, equally apply to 

Arnold, and Arnold argues that “at least five out of six of the ‘intents-effects’ test 

factors as analyzed in Fisher have been rendered moot by SB 746.” 

Effective June 17, 2015, Senate Bill 746 amended Chapter 841 of the Texas 

Health and Safety Code in several respects. See Act of May 21, 2015, 84th Leg., 

R.S., ch. 845, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2701, 2701-12. The Legislature created a 

new state agency, the Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO), with the 

responsibility for treatment and supervision of sexually violent predators.4Id. § 3 

(current version at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.007 (West Supp. 2015)). 

The Legislature required the TCCO to develop a tiered program of supervision and 

treatment that provides a seamless transition from a total confinement facility to 

less restrictive housing and supervision and eventual release from civil 

commitment, based on the person’s behavior and progress in treatment. Id. § 16

(current version at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.0831 (West Supp. 

2015)). Under the statute as amended, the TCCO transfers a committed person to 

 

4

See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 420A.002 (West Supp. 2015). Throughout this

opinion we refer to the Texas Civil Commitment Office by its acronym, “TCCO.” 

We refer to its predecessor agency, the Office of Violent Sex Offender 

Management, as “OVSOM.” In some places in this opinion, we refer to Chapter 

841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code as “the SVP statute.”
13

less restrictive housing and supervision if the transfer is in the best interests of the 

person and conditions can be imposed that adequately protect the community, and 

a committed person may petition the court for a transfer to less restrictive housing 

and supervision. Id. (current version at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 

§ 841.0834 (West Supp. 2015)). The enacting language of SB 746 provides:

If a civil commitment requirement imposed under Chapter 841, Health 

and Safety Code, before the effective date of this Act differs from any 

of the civil commitment requirements listed in Section 841.082, 

Health and Safety Code, as amended by this Act, the applicable court 

with jurisdiction over the committed person shall, after notice and 

hearing, modify the requirement imposed as applicable to conform to 

that section.

Id. § 40(b).

The statutory amendments about which Arnold complains became effective 

on June 17, 2015, and Arnold’s trial began on October 12, 2015. The appellate 

record indicates that Arnold did not raise the issue of the constitutionality of the 

amended SVP statute before or during trial, and he failed to raise the issue in his 

motion for new trial. Generally, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the 

complaining party must present the complaint to the trial court by timely request, 

objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). 

We apply the preservation rule to constitutional challenges. See In re L.M.I., 

119 S.W.3d 707, 710-11 (Tex. 2003) (parent failed to preserve his due process 
14

challenge); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 222 (Tex. 2002) (party 

failed to raise constitutional argument that trial court’s ruling violated open-courts 

provision in response to summary judgment motion and thus did not preserve it for 

appeal); Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993) (party waived due 

process and equal protection challenges by failing to raise them in trial court);

Lowe v. Jefferson Dental Clinics, No. 05-11-00902-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 

3796, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 14, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellant

failed to preserve her challenge to the constitutionality of Chapter 74 by failing to 

raise the complaint in the trial court); In re J.R.N., No. 09-08-00029-CV, 2010 

Tex. App. LEXIS 2280, at **8-9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 1, 2010, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (“The law is well settled that even constitutional errors may be waived 

by failure to raise the issues at trial.”). Arnold did not raise his constitutional 

arguments in the trial court. Therefore, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate 

review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. We overrule Arnold’s first issue.5

 

5 Nevertheless, even if Arnold had preserved his constitutional challenge, we 

would still overrule his first issue. This court recently examined the 

constitutionality of the SVP statute, as amended, in In re Commitment of May, No. 

09-15-00513-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8058 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 

2016, no pet. h.). In May, we reversed the trial court and concluded that the statute 

is constitutional, and we specifically examined and applied the factors as outlined 

in Fisher. Id. For the same reasons discussed in May, we conclude the statute 

remains civil and we reject Arnold’s constitutional challenge.
15

Motion for Directed Verdict

In his second issue, Arnold argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for directed verdict because he claims that the State’s expert, Dr. Sheri 

Gaines, “could not provide scientific support for her methodology used in this 

case, and could not provide scientific support of her opinion that Appellant’s 

actions 16 years ago constitute a behavioral abnormality today.” Arnold did not 

raise a challenge to Dr. Gaines’s testimony either before or during her testimony. 

However, at the close of the trial, after the State and Defense rested, Arnold moved 

for a directed verdict wherein he argued as follows:

[Respondent’s Attorney]: Your Honor, at this time, the Respondent 

moves for a directed verdict on the grounds that the State has failed to 

offer any proof that Mr. Arnold suffers from a behavioral abnormality. 

Evidence is legally insufficient to support a verdict whether the 

evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair minded people to 

reach a verdict. The State has presented no evidence or insufficient 

evidence to show that Mr. Arnold suffers from a behavioral 

abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of 

sexual violence today. The State’s expert was unable to close the 

analytical gap between Mr. Arnold’s last offense and his sexual 

behavior today. There is no evidence that even if Mr. Arnold is 

sexually deviant that Mr. Arnold is likely to act on that tendency 

which is required for the State to prove. 

The State’s expert opinion is based upon an unstructured 

clinical judgment as she gave no basis for support of her methodology 

or the research she relied upon in giving her opinion in this case. She 

never cited to any specific articles regarding her risk factors for an 

example. She scored no actuarial instruments and, even though she 

said she reviewed these instruments, she also testified that she has no 
16

training and/or experience in scoring these instruments, thus, her 

ability to review this instrument is questionable at best.

Unstructured clinical judgment is a process involving no 

specific guidelines but relies on the individual clinician’s evaluation 

having regard to the clinician’s experience and qualifications. Thus, 

her testimony is wholly conclusory, speculative and unreliable.

The trial court overruled the motion for directed verdict. 

We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict under a legal 

sufficiency standard. In re Commitment of Hatchell, 343 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.). We view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the verdict to determine if a rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, the elements required for commitment under the SVP statute. In re 

Commitment of Nicholson, No. 09-13-00498-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 10179, at 

**9-10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 11, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). “It is the 

factfinder’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the 

evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id.

The State argues that Arnold failed to make timely objections to Dr. 

Gaines’s testimony and that he waived the complaints in his motion for directed 

verdict. When a party intends to challenge the reliability of an expert’s 

methodology, a timely objection must be made in the trial court. Maritime 

Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998); In re Commitment of 
17

Barbee, 192 S.W.3d 835, 843 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, no pet.); see also Tex. 

R. App. P. 33.1; Tex. R. Evid. 103. An objection to reliability is timely if it is made 

before trial, or when the evidence is offered. Maritime Overseas, 971 S.W.2d at 

409. An objection raised after the evidence is offered is not timely. See In re 

Commitment of Dodson, 434 S.W.3d 742, 749-50 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, 

pet. denied) (finding an objection raised the day following the testimony was 

untimely). Additionally, an objection raised after the deadline set in a docket 

control order is also untimely. In re Commitment of Conley, No. 09-10-00383-CV, 

2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7877, at **12-13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 29, 2011, 

no pet.) (mem. op.).

The docket control order in this case set the deadline for challenges to expert 

testimony as September 16, 2015. Arnold did not object to the testimony of Dr. 

Gaines, or to the reliability or methodology used by Dr. Gaines, until after the 

deadline in the docket control order and after both parties had rested and closed at 

trial. Appellant does not address this deficiency in his appellate brief. However, 

Appellant contends that while “[c]hallenges that raise questions regarding the

scientific reliability of [the] expert’s methodology used to examine a set of facts 

must be raised before trial or when the evidence [is] offered[,][] challenges to an 

expert’s conclusory, speculative, or ipse dix[i]t opinion may be raised for the first 
18

time on appeal (or in Appellant’s case, the motion for directed verdict and the

motion for new trial).” 

On appeal, Arnold challenges Gaines’s testimony as conclusory, nonprobative, speculative, and legally insufficient. He contends that there is an 

analytical gap between the facts and the expert’s conclusions, the expert’s opinions 

are lacking in methodology and authoritative support, and, therefore, unreliable. 

Arnold also argues that Gaines misapplied the actuarial tests. Nevertheless, in his 

Reply Brief, Arnold states that he “does not challenge the scientific reliability of 

Dr. Gaines’ methodology . . .” but rather that Dr. Gaines’s “failure to provide 

specific articles or research to support her opinion is what Appellant challenges on 

appeal[.]” 

Arnold’s complaints regarding Gaines’s use of or misapplication of actuarial 

tests and her alleged failure to provide authoritative support for her opinions 

concern the foundational data used or relied on by the expert in reaching her

opinions. See In re Commitment of Sprague, No. 09-10-00228-CV, 2011 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 4503, at **28-29 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 16, 2011, no pet.) (mem. 

op.). Similarly, a complaint that an analytical gap exists in an expert’s testimony or 

a complaint that the expert’s testimony is not based on the facts of the case is a 

challenge to the methodology used by the expert. In re Commitment of Robertson, 
19

No. 09-09-00307-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7421, at **28-29, 31 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Sept. 9, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Arnold’s objections to Gaines’s 

testimony were untimely. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Under these 

circumstances, Arnold’s challenges to the expert’s testimony as outlined in the 

motion for directed verdict were not timely preserved for appellate review. See

Dodson, 434 S.W.3d at 749-50; City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 

816-17 (Tex. 2009); see also Sprague, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4503, at *29; 

Robertson, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7421, at *29; Barbee, 192 S.W.3d at 843.

To the extent Arnold challenges Gaines’s opinions as legally insufficient, we 

also disagree. Gaines’s opinions were based upon established methodology and 

techniques in her profession. See Dodson, 434 S.W.3d at 750 (quoting In re 

Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 206 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. 

denied)). Dr. Gaines is a board-certified psychiatrist. The methodology she 

employed in this case is the same methodology that she learned during her formal

education and training, and it is the methodology used by other professionals 

conducting behavioral abnormality evaluations. Like the expert in Dodson, Dr. 

Gaines conducted a face-to-face interview with Arnold. She also reviewed and 

relied upon records typically used by other professionals conducting this type of 

evaluation. Dr. Gaines diagnosed Arnold with pedophilic disorder and major 
20

depressive disorder. She identified risk factors Arnold possesses, as well as 

positive factors. She testified about the risk factors and explained what they are 

based upon. She also explained to the jury that her opinion is based on her 

education, training, clinical judgment, knowledge of the literature, the details 

obtained from Arnold and his records, and her review of all of the collateral 

information. In Dr. Gaines’s expert opinion, Arnold suffers from a behavioral 

abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. 

Dr. Gaines explained in detail the facts and evidence she found relevant in forming 

her opinions and the role those facts played in her evaluation. Her testimony was 

not so speculative or conclusory as to be completely lacking in probative value. 

See In re Commitment of Moss, No. 09-12-00599-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 

1612, at **6-7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 13, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 

Conley, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7877, at *13; Sprague, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 

4503, at **29-30; see also Barbee, 192 S.W.3d at 843.

“The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

to be given their testimony.” In re Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881, 887 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). The jury may resolve conflicts and 

contradictions in the evidence by believing all, part, or none of the witnesses’

testimony. Id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we 
21

conclude that a rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

Arnold is a sexually violent predator, and the evidence is legally sufficient to 

support the jury’s finding. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.062(a); see 

also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002); Mullens, 92 S.W.3d at 885; In re 

Commitment of Burnett, No. 09-09-00009-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 9930 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Dec. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). Weighing all of the 

evidence, we also conclude the verdict does not reflect a risk of injustice that 

compels ordering a new trial. See Day, 342 S.W.3d at 213. We overrule both issues 

and we affirm the trial court’s judgment and order of civil commitment.

AFFIRMED.

_________________________

 LEANNE JOHNSON

 Justice

Submitted on July 14, 2016

Opinion Delivered August 25, 2016

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger, and Johnson, JJ.