[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-11813

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 7:15-cr-00003-HL-TQL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 versus

EDWARD MINCEY, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

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(August 21, 2017)

Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Edward Mincey appeals his convictions for possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

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841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D). On appeal, Mincey argues that the district court erred 

by denying his motion to suppress the controlled substances found in his rental 

vehicle during a traffic stop. After thorough review, we affirm.

We review the grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence as a mixed 

question of law and fact. United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 

2003). The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and the 

application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. “The facts are construed in favor of 

the party that prevailed below,” which in this case is the government. Id.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of 

the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 

2001). A decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 

when an officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred. 

United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir. 1999). A traffic stop must 

last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. United States 

v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999). “Ordinarily, when a citation or 

warning has been issued and all record checks have been completed and come back 

clean, the legitimate investigative purpose of the traffic stop is fulfilled . . . .” 

United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004). 

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An officer may prolong a traffic stop beyond its legitimate purpose only in 

the limited circumstances where there is “articulable suspicion illegal activity has 

occurred or is occurring,” or if the driver consents. Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1220. 

Articulable suspicion must be drawn from specific facts, and rational inferences 

therefrom, measured under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the 

officer’s knowledge. United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 

1990). A Fourth Amendment violation occurs when police conduct a dog sniff and 

uncover contraband while an individual is unlawfully detained, e.g., “during an 

unreasonably prolonged traffic stop.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 

(2005). But see Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (declining to impose 

exclusionary remedy under the circumstances of the case). Thus, while the 

duration of an initial traffic stop may be reasonable, any continued detention is 

illegal absent reasonable suspicion. Perkins, 348 F.3d at 971.

In weighing factors for reasonable suspicion, we look to the “totality of the 

circumstances.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). We are not 

entitled to give “no weight” to certain factors merely because they may have an 

innocent explanation. Id. at 274. An officer can detain a motorist for a brief 

investigation when the officer, through his training and experience, can point to 

specific factors that lead him to suspect other legal wrongdoing, but cannot rely on 

a mere “hunch.” Id. at 273-74. The standard we apply “falls considerably short of 

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satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 274. 

Reasonable suspicion may exist even if each fact alone is susceptible of innocent 

explanation. United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 

2009). 

In this case, Mincey does not challenge the initial traffic stop; he challenges 

only the duration of the stop, and we can find no constitutional error in its duration. 

From the moment Deputy Bruce initiated the traffic stop, Mincey acted in ways 

that distinguished himself from the average traveler. For example, upon pulling to 

the side of the road, Mincey stopped his vehicle for a brief second, and then -- for 

reasons not clearly related to safety concerns -- proceeded to move again before 

coming to a complete stop. When Deputy Bruce approached the vehicle and 

ordered Mincey to exit, Mincey moved his hand towards the gearshift, refused to 

exit the vehicle, and asked on at least two occasions what “cause” Bruce had to 

order him out. Mincey remained in the car against Bruce’s orders, and did not exit 

until Bruce notified him of the consequences of his failure to comply. After finally 

exiting the vehicle, Mincey was visibly nervous, so nervous that Bruce could see 

his carotid artery and heart pulsating. Mincey’s responses to Bruce’s questioning 

did not allay any of the concerns Bruce was noticing; to the contrary, as the stop 

progressed, Bruce learned that Mincey was traveling in a direction inconsistent 

with his destination, that Mincey could not correctly describe the terms of the 

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rental car agreement, and that the price paid for the rental was $2,300, even though 

Mincey admitted he was unemployed. Last, but not least, Mincey curiously 

answered Bruce’s question regarding whether he had large amounts of U.S. 

currency in his vehicle by stating that he was not a drug dealer. Moreover, the 

record indicates that Deputy Bruce is an officer with a significant amount of 

training and experience in narcotics investigations. 

When viewed under the totality of the circumstances standard, and in the 

light most favorable to the government, the record supports Deputy Bruce’s 

reasonable suspicion that Mincey was involved in criminal activity. As a result, 

the continued detention of Mincey was not unconstitutional because Deputy Bruce 

had reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Mincey beyond the initial purpose 

of the traffic stop, and the evidence found as a result of Deputy Bruce’s additional 

investigation was admissible. The district court did not err in denying Mincey’s 

motion to suppress evidence. 

AFFIRMED.

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