COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

TAMMY MAE FRAZIER 

v. Record No. 0418-93-2 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AUGUST 29, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge 

 Anthony G. Spencer (Eric D. White; Morchower, Luxton & 

 Whaley, on briefs), for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney General (James 

 S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Tammy Mae Frazier (defendant) was convicted in the trial court 

on twenty-three counts of grand larceny and one count of misuse of 

public funds and sentenced on November 18, 1992, to two years for 

each larceny offense and four years for misuse of public funds, a 

total of fifty years imprisonment. The court suspended forty-seven 

years of these sentences on several conditions, including 

restitution of $27,000 to the Circuit Court of Hanover County and 

$23,000 to the victim of the offenses and supervised probation for 

an unspecified term. The court further ordered that defendant pay 

court costs of $1,611.50. 

 On November 25, 1992, the Commonwealth moved the trial court 

to order the "judgment" for restitution and court costs docketed in 

the "Judgement [sic] Book of Hanover County." Following an ore

tenus hearing on January 27, 1993, the court granted the motion 

with respect to the restitution and "[o]rdered, as provided in 

. . . Code § 8.01-446, and . . . § 19.2-305.2(B), that restitution 

. . . be docketed in the Judgment Book of the Hanover Circuit 
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Court." 

 On appeal, defendant contends that docketing of the 

restitution as a "judgment against a person has serious adverse 

consequences for that person" which "changed the terms and 

conditions of the restitution obligation specified in the 

sentencing order" in violation of Rule 1:1.1

 Defendant also 

complains that the disputed order was not docketed "without delay" 

in accordance with Code § 8.01-446. Finding no error, we affirm 

the disputed order. 

 In imposing sentence for a criminal offense, trial courts are 

vested with "'wide latitude' and much 'discretion in matters of 

suspension and probation . . . to provide a remedial tool . . . in 

the rehabilitation'" of offenders. Deal v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. 

App. 157, 160, 421 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1992) (citations omitted). The 

court may "suspend the sentence in whole or part," "suspend [its] 

imposition," and "in addition . . . place the accused on 

probation," subject to specified "conditions." Code § 19.2-303. 

"Among such conditions, restitution for 'damages or loss' caused by 

the offense" is a well established sentencing component, intended 

to benefit both offender and victim. Deal, 15 Va. App. at 160, 421 

S.E.2d at 899; see Code §§ 19.2-303, -305, -305.1, -305.2. 

Sentencing statutes must be liberally construed, Deal, 15 Va. App. 

 

 1Rule 1:1 states, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll final 

judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, 

shall remain under the control of the trial court and subject to be 

modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date 

of entry, and no longer." 
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at 160, 421 S.E.2d at 899, and those "dealing with restitution 

. . . 'should be read, construed and applied together'" to promote 

their intended purposes. Alger v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 252, 

256, 450 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1994) (citation omitted). 

 Code § 19.2-305.1(A) provides, inter alia, that "no person 

convicted of a crime, . . . which resulted in property . . . loss, 

shall be placed on probation or have his sentence suspended unless 

such person shall make at least partial restitution for such . . . 

loss." The "amount [of restitution] to be repaid by the defendant 

and the terms and conditions thereof" shall be determined by the 

court "[a]t the time of sentencing" and specified in the "judgment 

order." Code § 19.2-305.1(C); see Russnak v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. 

App. 317, 321-22, 392 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1990). 

 "An order of restitution may be docketed as provided in 

§ 8.01-446 when so ordered by the court or upon written request of 

the victim and may be enforced by a victim named in the order to 

receive the restitution in the same manner as a judgment in a civil 

action." Code § 19.2-305.2(B). Code § 8.01-446 prescribes, in 

pertinent part, that "[t]he clerk of each court of every circuit 

. . . shall docket without delay, any judgment for money rendered 

in his court" in a "judgment docket" book established and 

maintained for that purpose. (Emphasis added). 

 Defendant urges that we view an order of restitution pursuant 

to Code § 19.2-305.1 apart from a related, dependent order under 

Code § 19.2-305.2(B), which provides for docketing and enforcement 

of the award. When considered in this perspective, she argues that 
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the later order adding enforcement remedies to the original 

restitution order modified the sentence by enhancing the 

punishment. However, this construction would subvert the salutary 

purposes of rehabilitation for defendant and recovery for the 

victim. Clearly, collection through enforcement is inherent in an 

order of restitution for the right to have any remedy, and, to that 

end, Code §§ 19.2-305.1, -305.2(B), and 8.01-4462

 must be read and 

considered together. See Alger, 19 Va. App. at 256, 450 S.E.2d at 

767. Thus, any additional burden on defendant attendant to 

enforcement was obviously contemplated by the legislature when it 

enacted these companion statutes. 

 Defendant also complains that the docketing order failed to 

comply with Code § 8.01-446, which requires that judgments "shall 

[be] docket[ed] without delay." However, defendant misunderstands 

the statutory scheme. Code § 19.2-305.2 authorizes the trial court 

to order the restitution order "docketed as provided in § 8.01-446 

. . . in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action." Code 

§ 19.2-305.2. Code § 8.01-446 directs the clerk of each circuit 

court to "docket, without delay, any judgment for money rendered in 

his court" in a "judgment docket" book "maintained for that 

purpose." Thus, the promptness directed by Code § 8.01-446 does 

not relate to entry of the docketing order by the court, but, 

rather, to the clerk's responsibility to comply. 

 

 2Code § 8.01-446 was amended during the 1995 session of the 

General Assembly to expressly address an "order of restitution 

docketed pursuant to Code § 19.2-305.2." 
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 Because the record here does not reflect the time that the 

clerk actually docketed the restitution order, we are unable to 

review compliance with Code § 8.01-446. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 

16 Va. App. 630, 635, 432 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1993). 

 Finally, defendant argues that court costs were also 

improperly subject of the docketing order. However, a review of 

the order discloses no mention of court costs and, therefore, this 

is not an issue before the Court. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the docketing order of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.
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BENTON, J., concurring. 

 The narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial 

judge had jurisdiction to enter an order allowing the docketing of 

a judgment for restitution. The record establishes that when the 

trial judge entered an order permitting docketing of the final 

order pursuant to Code § 19.2-305.2(B), more than twenty-one days 

had elapsed after entry of the final order. I would hold that Rule 

1:1 did not bar entry of the order docketing the judgment. 

 "After the expiration of 21 days from the entry of a judgment, 

the court rendering the judgment loses jurisdiction of the case, 

and, absent a perfected appeal, the judgment is final and 

conclusive." Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 

(1987). Notwithstanding that general rule, the Supreme Court has 

recently held that "Rule 1:1 does not preclude the entry of an 

order . . . [that] does not alter the substantive provisions of [a] 

final judgment" and that merely aids in the execution of the final 

judgment. Davidson v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 168, 171, 432 S.E.2d 

178, 179-80 (1993). Even though a final order has been entered, a 

judge of the court rendering that judgment "'may still enter such 

decrees and orders as may be necessary to carry the decree into 

execution.'" Leggett v. Caudill, 247 Va. 130, 133, 439 S.E.2d 350, 

351 (1994) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 142 Va. 244, 250, 128 S.E. 524, 526 

(1925)). The order that is at issue in this case was not a 

modification of a substantive provision of the final order; it 

merely aided execution of the final order. Accordingly, I concur 
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in the judgment affirming the order of the trial judge.