Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A04-1508-CR-1110 | April 28, 2016 Page 1 of 11

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Lisa Diane Manning

Manning Law Office

Danville, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Paula J. Beller

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Corey T. Weaver,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

32A04-1508-CR-1110

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court 

The Honorable Rhett M. Stuard, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D02-1410-CM-1002

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Corey Weaver (“Weaver”) was convicted in the Hendricks Superior Court for 

refusing to identify himself to a law enforcement official, as required pursuant 

to Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3.5. Weaver appeals and argues that his 

conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence.
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[2] We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At 9:31 p.m. on October 1, 2014, Hendricks County Sheriff’s Deputy Samuel 

Chandler (“Deputy Chandler”) initiated a traffic stop of Weaver’s vehicle on 

U.S. Highway 40 because Weaver had an inoperable plate light. Weaver pulled 

over into an Arby’s parking lot where Deputy Chandler approached him.1

Appellant’s App. p. 12.

[4] Deputy Chandler asked Weaver if he knew that his plate light did not work, 

and Weaver told the officer that he was not aware that the light was inoperable.

Deputy Chandler then asked if Weaver had his license and registration. Weaver 

said he did not know. Tr. p. 11. Weaver started to look for his registration but 

was unable to find it. 

[5] Weaver eventually told the officer that he previously had an Indiana license but 

that he did not have it or any other form of identification with him. Id. at 55-56. 

Weaver told Deputy Chandler that he was not aware that he was required to 

carry identification while driving. Id. at 56. 

[6] After failing to produce any identification, the following conversation ensued:

DEPUTY CHANDLER: Okay, where do you live at, bud?

 

1 At trial, Deputy Chandler testified that the stop occurred at 10:15 p.m. in a McDonald’s parking lot. Tr. p. 

11. However, the video recording of the traffic stop establishes the time and location as noted above.
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COREY, WEAVER: Uh, Indianapolis. 

DEPUTY CHANDLER: You live in Indy—what’s your actual 

physical mailing address?

COREY WEAVER: Uh, am I being charged with something?

DEPUTY CHANDLER: No, I’m trying to figure out who you 

are. You don’t have any identification. 

Id. This was the only time that Deputy Chandler specifically asked for Weaver’s 

address. 

[7] After explaining that Weaver was required to provide the requested 

information, Deputy Chandler again asked Weaver for his name. Id at 57.

Weaver stated that his name was “Mr. Weaver.” Id. at 11. After Deputy 

Chandler asked for his first name, Weaver stated that he did not have a 

particular name. Id. at 57. Deputy Chandler asked the same question many 

ways. Id. at 58 (“What are they calling you? . . . [D]oes your mom call you Mr. 

Weaver?”). Eventually, Weaver stated that his mother calls him Corey. Id. at

59. 

[8] Weaver also failed to provide his birthdate when asked. Id. at 60. Weaver stated 

that he was “a little uncomfortable” providing his birthdate. Id. Approximately 

eight minutes after he stopped Weaver, Deputy Chandler ordered Weaver to 

put his hands on the back of his head and step out of the vehicle. Id. at 60-61; 

Ex. Vol. State’s Ex. 1. Deputy Chandler placed Weaver in handcuffs and stated 
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that he was detaining Weaver until he could identify him. Id. at 61. Deputy 

Chandler told Weaver several times that he was legally required to provide 

identification and warned him that he would have to go to jail if he failed to 

comply. See, e.g., id. at 62. 

[9] Sixteen minutes after the traffic stop began, Weaver told Deputy Chandler his 

birthdate. Id. at 67. After Deputy Chandler confirmed the information Weaver 

provided, he determined that Weaver’s driver’s license had been suspended. 

The deputy then impounded Weaver’s vehicle but allowed Weaver to leave of 

his own accord.

[10] On October 3, 2014, Weaver was charged with Class A misdemeanor driving 

while suspended and Class C misdemeanor failure to identify.2 A bench trial 

was held on March 31, 2015, and was continued on July 10, 2015. Weaver 

represented himself at trial and was convicted as charged. 

[11] Weaver was ordered to serve four days for the driving while suspended 

conviction but was given credit for four days served. The trial court also ordered 

him to pay a $100 fine. For the refusal to identify conviction, he was only 

 

2 The State also alleged that Weaver committed the following infractions: “No Operators License in 

Possession,” “Certification of Registration; Possession Required,” and “Improper or No Tail or Plate Light.” 

Tr. p. 88; Appellant’s App. at 1. The trial court concluded that Weaver committed the infractions as alleged 

and ordered him to pay a $100 fine for each infraction. Appellant’s App. p. 46.
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ordered to pay a second $100 fine. Weaver now appeals, claiming that the State 

produced insufficient evidence to support his refusal to identify conviction.

3

Standard of Review

[12] When a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the 

evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 

124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 

(Ind. 2005)), trans denied. Rather, we recognize the exclusive province of the 

trier of fact to weigh any conflicting evidence and we consider only the 

probative evidence supporting the conviction and the reasonable inferences to 

be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is not substantial evidence of probative value 

from which a reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion that the 

defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, then the 

judgment will be disturbed. Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2008). 

Discussion and Decision 

[13] To convict Weaver of Class C misdemeanor failure to identify, the State was 

required to prove that Weaver “knowingly or intentionally refuse[d] to provide . 

. . [his] name, address, and date of birth.” Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3.5(1); see also 

Appellant’s App. p. 11. Weaver argues that Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3.5 

 

3 We held oral argument in this case at Cathedral High School in Indianapolis, Indiana, on March 11, 2016. 

We extend our gratitude to the faculty, students, and staff of the school for their gracious hospitality, and we 

commend counsel for the quality of the advocacy.
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does not impose a timeliness requirement and that he eventually gave his date 

of birth to the officer.

[14] First, we observe that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State.

Milam v. State, 14 N.E.3d 879, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Luhrsen v. State, 

864 N.E.2d 452, 455–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). However, we do not construe 

statutes so strictly that our interpretation defeats the legislature’s expressed 

intent. Id.

[15] Indeed, our court must ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Chambliss v. 

State, 746 N.E.2d 73, 78 (Ind. 2001) (citing Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 501 

(Ind. 1999)). “The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the 

statute itself, and all words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning 

unless otherwise indicated by statute.” Id. (quoting Bartlett, 711 N.E.2d at 501). 

We presume that the legislature intended that the statutory application would 

not yield “an unjust or absurd result.” Milam, 14 N.E.3d at 882.

[16] Weaver argues that our court may not require an individual to provide the 

requested information to the officer within a certain amount of time because 

Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3.5 does not impose a time requirement. We 

agree, but only to a point, a point that was not reached in the facts before us.

[17] We may reasonably conclude that the General Assembly intended that a person

would identify him or herself promptly when a law enforcement officer requests 
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such identification. Failing to require a person to promptly provide the 

statutorily required identification information would contravene public policy. 

If a person could indefinitely delay giving identification information to the 

requesting officer, it would make the officer’s job needlessly difficult, and 

possibly endanger officers and drivers involved in roadside traffic stops. 

[18] However, after reviewing the conversation between Weaver and Deputy 

Chandler, it is evident that Weaver did not refuse to give his address when 

asked. Instead of replying that he would not provide his address, or evading 

Deputy Chandler on the issue, Weaver asked a question: “Uh, am I being 

charged with something?” Tr. p. 56. 

[19] Weaver’s question was a normal and legitimate question; it was certainly not an

express denial of information. Weaver then asked why he was required to 

identify himself if he was not being charged with a crime. Deputy Chandler

explained that Weaver was required to provide the information by law, but 

Deputy Chandler did not return to the topic of Weaver’s address at any other 

time during the traffic stop. 

[20] Weaver’s general behavior during the stop was ridiculous. Deputy Chandler 

properly ended Weaver’s evasiveness eight minutes into the stop, ordering him 

out of the vehicle, and handcuffing him until he could identify him. See Tr. pp. 

23; Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1.
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[21] Even then, Weaver’s evasiveness did not abate. It took Deputy Chandler 

another eight minutes before he had Weaver’s date of birth. Importantly, with 

those two (and one-half) pieces (Weaver having stated that he lived in 

Indianapolis) of the three pieces of information called for by the statute, Deputy 

Chandler was able to ascertain that Weaver was driving while suspended (a 

Class A misdemeanor), had a permit to carry a handgun, and had no 

outstanding warrants.4

[22] Deputy Chandler impounded Weaver’s vehicle and cited Weaver for the Class 

A misdemeanor driving while suspended but allowed Weaver to leave the stop 

thereafter. Despite being the personal recipient of Weaver’s evasiveness, 

Deputy Chandler did not arrest Weaver for his behavior. He did, however, 

allege probable cause to charge Weaver with Class C misdemeanor failure to 

identify, and two days later, the charge was added.

[23] Even with all of this in mind, and as reprehensibly as Weaver behaved, under 

the specific and limited facts and circumstances before us, we do not consider 

Weaver’s question in response to being asked for his address to constitute 

refusal. Indeed, his legitimate question as to whether he was being arrested

approaches constitutional magnitude under the statute. Because Weaver did not 

 

4 We assume that Weaver would have been arrested if he had any outstanding warrants.
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refuse to provide his address, the State did not meet its burden of proving that 

Weaver refused to provide his name, address, and date of birth. See I.C. § 34-28-

5-3.5(1). We therefore reverse Weaver’s conviction for Class C misdemeanor 

failure to identify.

[24] Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Kirsch, J., concurs. 

Altice, J., dissents with opinion. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A04-1508-CR-1110 | April 28, 2016 Page 10 of 11

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Corey T. Weaver,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No. 

32A04-1508-CR-1110

Altice, Judge, dissenting.

[25] Our standard of review requires us to affirm Weaver’s conviction “unless no 

reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. State, No. 48S02-1509-CR-554, slip op. at 4 (Ind. 

March 2, 2016). In my opinion, the trial court reasonably determined that the 

evidence in this case sufficiently established each element of the offense. 

Therefore, I must dissent.

[26] As determined by the majority, I.C. § 34-28-5-3.5 should be interpreted to 

require an individual stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation to identify 

him or herself promptly when a law enforcement officer requests identifying 

information under the statute. There was nothing prompt about Weaver’s 

provision of the requested information. Time and again, Deputy Chandler

patiently explained that he needed to identify Weaver and that Weaver was 
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legally required to provide the requested information. After Weaver was unable 

to provide his driver’s license, Deputy Chandler asked for his address and then 

for his name. Weaver avoided answering the question regarding his address and 

then became overtly evasive regarding his name, requiring another two minutes 

of questioning before providing his first and last name. Even if this was not 

enough to establish the offense of failure to identify, his subsequent refusals to 

provide his birthdate surely were sufficient. 

[27] After the cumbersome task of determining Weaver’s name, Deputy Chandler 

requested Weaver’s birthdate. Weaver did not provide the information. At that 

point, Deputy Chandler removed Weaver from the vehicle, handcuffed him, 

and “placed him in custody for refusing to identify himself.” Transcript at 12. 

Over the next eight minutes, Deputy Chandler asked Weaver at least four more 

times for his birthdate and each direct request was met with a refusal to answer. 

Deputy Chandler then indicated that he was taking Weaver to jail so that he 

could be identified. Weaver finally provided his birthdate approximately sixteen 

minutes after the stop began. By this point, a reasonable trier of fact could 

conclude, as did the trial court, that Weaver had already committed the offense 

of failure to identify. Accordingly, I would affirm Weaver’s conviction.