FILED

July 30, 1999

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JULY SESSION, 1999

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9810-CR-00412 

)

Appellee, )

) DAVIDSON COUNTY

V. ) 

)

) HON. CHERYL BLACKBURN, 

MAURICE E. BOYD, ) JUDGE

)

Appellant. ) (AGGRAVATED BURGLARY)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JENNIFER LYNN THOMPSON PAUL G. SUMMERS 

715 Crescent Road Attorney General & Reporter

Nashville, TN 37205

CLINTON J. MORGAN

Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37243

VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III

District Attorney General

GRADY MOORE 

Assistant District Attorney General

Washington Square, Suite 500

222 2nd Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37201-1649

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

From the trial court’s order revoking the Defendant’s sentence in the

comm unity corrections program, the Defendant appeals as of right. In his sole issue,

the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by finding that he had violated

conditions of his placement in the community corrections program. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The rather sparse record reflects that Defendant pled guilty to the

offense of aggravated burglary on March 19, 1998. He received a sentence of six

(6) years, to be served in the community corrections program by initially being

incarcerated day-for-day for one (1) full year, followed by five (5) years outside of

incarceration in comm unity corrections supervision. With m andatory pretrial credits

available, Defendant was eligible to be released from incarceration on June 8, 1998.

His release in the community was more akin to an extended field trip

than permanent release from incarceration. On July 2, 1998, a violation report was

filed by his supervising officer alleging a violation of a rule of community corrections,

to-wit: Defendant had not properly reported to his supervising officer, having last

reported on June 10, 1998, two (2) days after his release from incarceration. A

hearing was held and the trial court, with the agreement of the Defendant and the

State, placed him back on release in the community corrections program but

increased the length of the sentence to seven (7) years. This was done on August

5, 1998.
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Fifteen (15) days later, another violation report was made by the

Defendant’s supervising officer. The Defendant, as of August 20, 1998, had not

contacted his supervising officer since being placed back into the community

corrections program on August 5, 1998. On August 9, 1998, Defendant was

arrested in relation to a domestic assault upon his girlfriend. 

The Defendant stated that he had been in jail since August 9, 1998, and

could not contact his community corrections supervisor because the office would not

accept a collect call from the jail. He admitted that he did not send a letter to the

supervisor or make any other efforts, other than one attempted phone call, to notify

his supervising officer that he had been arrested and was in jail.

In his brief, the Defendant takes the position that since he had not been

convicted of assault and because his girlfriend’s parents had “pressured her” to

testify against him at a preliminary hearing, that the trial court erred in finding a

violation of his community corrections conditions by committing a crime. What the

Defendant overlooks is that notwithstanding the status of the assault charge, the trial

court found in its ruling that the Defendant did not report as required to his

community corrections supervisor.

The same principles that apply to a probation revocation hearing are

applicable to a community corrections revocation hearing. State v. Harkins, 811

S.W.2d 79, 83 (Tenn. 1991). The proof of a violation of community corrections

requirem ents is sufficient if it allows the trial court to make a conscientious and

intelligent judgment. The standard of review on appeal is whether the trial court

abused its discretion. Only if there is no substantial evidence in the record to
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support the trial court’s conclusion that a violation has occurred, can there be a

finding on appeal of an abuse of discretion. Id. at 82. The proof of the violation must

be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Wall, 909 S.W .2d 8, 9

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). These standards were met by the proof.

Upon consideration of the entire record and the applicable law, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, Judge

___________________________________

NORMA McGEE OGLE, Judge