1

Filed 5/6/16 P. v. Ramirez CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE , Plaintiff and Respondent
,
v. SAMUEL RAMIREZ , Defendant and Appellant

. A1 4 3 981
( Contra C o sta County Super. Ct. No. 5

- 132103

- 3 )

Samuel Ramirez was convicted by a jury of 26 counts of committing a forcible lewd act on a child under the age of 14. The offenses involved a single victim, Ramirez’s step daughter, Jane Doe. He was sentenced to state prison for 156 years and ordered to

pay Doe $900,000 in noneconomic restitution. On appeal, Ramirez contends : (1) the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of uncharged sexual offenses pursuant to Evidence Code sectio ns 1101 and 1108; 1 (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain expert testimony; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of hearsay; ( 4) the cumulative impact of alleged errors requires reversal; and ( 5) the trial court’s restitution award constitutes an abuse of
discretion. W e affirm

.

I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Ramirez was charged by information with 26 counts of committing a forcible lewd

act on Doe, a child under 14 ( Pen. Code
, § 28 8 , subd. ( b ) (1)). The 26 offenses were

1 Undesignated statu tory references are to the Evidence Code.2

alleged to have occurred in Rodeo between Decembe r 1, 1993 , and December 31, 1994

. It was further alleged that the statute of limitations was extended and Ramirez was ineligible for probation because the offenses invol ved substantial sexual conduct ( Pen. Code, § § 803, subd. (f), 12 03.066, subd. (a)(8)).
Prosecution ’s Case
Doe ’s Testimony
Doe was 30 years old at the time of trial. Although Ramirez was technically her stepfather, Doe considered Ramirez her father. She had known him since she was two years old , when he and her mother, Sandra, moved in together

. 2 Doe’s family also
included her three siblings, Benjamin , Cruz, and Cas andra ( respectively ages 35, 22, and
21 at the time of trial ), as well as two stepsiblings. The family lived i n Los Angeles until 1991. When Doe was about eight years old, they moved to Mill Valley into a three bedroom duplex , where the molestations began. During the time they lived in Mill Valley, Ramirez entered Doe’s bed room a couple of
times a week or every couple of days
, in the middle of the night, pulled her covers down, removed her pants and underwear, and touched her buttocks and vagina. “It was always
the same.” The family moved again sometime between April 1993 and Ap ril 1994, when Doe
was nine or 10 years old , to a four

- bedroom house in Rodeo. In Rodeo, the molestations
continued. I n addition to fondling her, sucking on her nipples, and kissing her
, Ramirez began t o orally copulate Doe and lick her anus

. Although D oe could not remember the
number of incidents, t he molestations were frequent

— occurring approximately several
times a week

. The acts generally followed a consistent pattern. 3 Doe began wearing

2 Ramirez and Sandra did not marr y until Doe was an adult, in approximately 2008 . They divorced sever al years later.

3 On one memorable occasion in Rodeo, Ramirez had been drinking at the neighbors’ house and came home momentarily in the late afternoon to retrieve a forgotten item. On encountering Doe at home alone, he ripped off her shirt, hugged and French kissed her, and kissed her chest.3

multiple layers of clothing to bed , trying to hold up her pants before Ramirez forced them down, and crossing her legs in an attempt to protect herself. Ramirez said “please” and
“come o n” and she could not stop him. Generally, Doe would just “lay there lifelessly,” sometimes crying.
T h e family moved to a three

- bedroom house in Vallejo. The molestations
remained similar but became less frequent

—happening approximately every other week.
When Doe was about 11, t he family moved yet again to a residence at San Quentin,
where Ramirez worked as an electrician. The abuse in San Quentin occurr ed less frequently than in Vallejo. Doe started saying “no.” Ramirez s topped orally copulating Doe, b ut he continued to touch her vagina and buttocks. He began wa k ing her up in the morning by massaging her feet, touching her vagina, and applying lotion. When Doe would say “no, ” Ramirez responded, “I’m not hurting you.” On one occasion, she woke up and Ramirez was trying to rub his exposed penis with her hand. That was the last t ime
Ramirez tried to t ouch her. When Doe was 16, the family moved to Jamestown. She moved out a year later and lived with her boyfriend in Sonora.
Ramirez never verbally threatened Doe and never used physical violence during
the molestations

. She just la id there, not unders tanding what was happening. However, Doe felt trapped, scared, humiliated, and confused whenever Ramirez molested her. Although Ramirez never spank ed her during any of the molestations, this d iscipline was part of the fear Doe experienced. 4 She feared t hat, if she resisted or “said anything,” she would be spanked. Doe felt trapped because Ramirez was in control and “what he said
went.” While the molestations were occurring, Ramirez never told her it was a secret or not to tell anyone. Nonetheless, s he did not tell anyone because she felt scared and
humiliated. Doe waited a very long time to tell her mother because she did not want to destroy what appeared to be a happy marriage. Havi ng a daughter herself gave Do e the strength to come forward.

4 When Doe misbehaved, Ramirez discipline d her by spank ing her bare bottom with his hand.4

In approximately 2008, when Doe w as about 25 years old , she asked Ramirez why
he molested her. He said he had “a sickness.” Around 2012
, when Doe was approximately 28 or 29, she learned that Sandra and Ramirez were separating

. Around the same time, Doe tol d Sandra and her older brother
, Benjamin
, that Ramirez had
molested her. At a family meeting to discuss Sandra and Ramirez’s separation, Ramirez admitted molesting Doe . Doe reported the abuse to police in March 2013

. Sibling s’ Testimony Doe’s younger brother, Cruz, attended the 2012 family m eeting and heard
Ramirez admit he molest ed Doe. After that meeting, Ramirez wrote Cruz a letter, in which he referred to “the revelation of my past with your sister.” Doe’s yo unger sister,
Cas andra, also attended the 2012 family meeting. She heard Ramirez say, “I molested your sister, [ Doe].” Police Investigation Sergeant Deborah Moss , of the Tuolumne County Sheriff’s Office , testified that Doe reported the abuse on March 26, 2013

. Doe said the abuse began in Mi ll Valley
when she was around seven years old and in the fourth grade. In fifth g rade they moved
to Rodeo. Doe told Moss that, while in Rodeo, Ramirez came into her room every night or every other night and touched her vagina, kissed her lips and bre asts , and orally copulated her.
Moss arran ged a pretext call between Doe, Cas andra, and Ramirez , which was played for the jury . Ramirez admitted the molestations, which he said began in Rodeo
when Doe was seven or eight . He attributed the molestations to a “sickness

. ”
Police Interview of Ramirez On April 17, 2013, Moss and Detective Kenny Hutton interviewed Ramirez.
Ramirez admitted that he molested Doe. He denied ever orally copulating Doe , and he did not remember molesting her as frequently as twice a w eek. However, Ramirez
conceded that if Doe claimed that many molestations he would not disagree. He remembered four episodes in the Rodeo house, only two of which involved touching Doe’s vagina. He also denied any molestations occurred in Mill Valle y. But Ramirez5

remember ed six to 10 incidents at the Sa n Quentin residence when he had Doe
masturbate him. At the end o f his statement to poli ce, Ramirez wrote a letter to Doe in which he admitted, among other things, rubbing her vagina, breasts, and buttock s, and using her h and to masturbate him. Police Interview of Doe On April 29, 2013 , Hutton took a more extensive interview of Doe. In its case

- in

chief, the prosecution introduced an abbreviated video and transcript of the April 201 3
i nterview. In this abbreviated version, Doe told Hutton the molestations began in Mill Valley. At that time, Ramirez would come into Doe’s bedroom about once a week, or every other night, pull her pajamas down and “touch [ed]” and “ finger [ed] ” her. In Rodeo, Ramirez contin ued molesting her every other day and began performing oral sex.
He would also try to kiss her and get her to touch him. Although Ramirez never threatened her or used violence, she thought she would get in trouble if she did not cooperate. Ramirez expos ed his penis “sometimes.” Expert Witness ’s Testimony Sergeant Antonio Benavides, an investigator with the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Off

ice, testified as an expert in delayed disclosure, evolving disclosure, victim behavior, and the profile o f sexual abusers. Benavides testified that some victims of sexual abuse will delay disclosure because of confusion, fear, shame, guilt, and self

- blame. Also, if the abuser is someone who has control or power over the
victim , it may take longer for the victim to come forward.
Defense Case Ramirez was the only defense witness. He testified that when he met Sandra in 1987, s he already had two children

— B enjamin and Doe. He and Sandra began living together about a year after they met , had a child togethe r in 1991 , and finally married in
2005.
Ramirez drank heavily throughout Doe’s childhood

. For example, on a typical weeknight, he drank four or five beers and a similar number of mixed drinks

. He quit6

drinking in October 2004. Ramirez admitted spank ing Doe, although he probably spanked her less than 10 times total

. Ramirez denied ever molesting Doe

. H e ha d consensual sex with her when she
was 16. While Sandra, Benjamin, and the younger siblings move d th e family’s belongings to the ir new home in Jamestown , Ramirez and Doe stayed an extra day to paint the San Quentin home

. Ramirez went to bed around 9 :00 p.m., after consuming
about nine beers and half a fifth of vodka

. He awoke to find Doe holding his penis. He grabbed her hand and asked , “W hat are you doing?” After Ramirez tried to push her hand away, s he said, “ No. Don’t stop me. I wanted this and I know you want it too

. ” 5
Ramirez stopped resisting and had intercourse wit h Doe

. In 2010, Doe told Ramirez that she wanted to talk with him about what happened. She said that what they had done was weighing on her, and she felt the need to disclose it.
Ramirez offered to talk with Sandra i mmediately, but they agreed it would crush her. Ramirez offered to take responsibility and sug gested he could tell Sandra he molested Doe. Doe approved of that approach. Ramirez decided that admitting to molestation would help Doe “come to terms with this.”
In October 2012 , the family, including Doe, met to discuss the division of marital

assets. At t he meeting, Doe asked Ramirez , “Don’t you have something to say to the family?” Ramirez “could tell just what she wanted me to say, ” so h e said, “I molested your sister.” Doe said that if Ramirez signed certain papers and made sure Sandra never
had to wo rk again, she would not pursue the matter. Ramirez later signed an asset agreement , in which he “[gave] up virtually everything.” In his letter to Cruz, Ramirez ’s reference to “my past with your sister” was a reference to the 1999 incident when Doe
was 1 6, “but of cour se nobody knew that.” During the pretext call, Ramirez felt he was unable to defend himself. He felt that telling the truth would be worse. He therefore made up t he idea that he had a “sickness ”

5 Rami rez said Doe had entered his bedroom not fully dressed o n four or five previous occasions

.7

and hoped “[ Doe and Casandra ] would accept [this] so that [they] could move on.” When the police interviewed him, Ramirez decided to continue lying . Since the family
had already alienated him, he did not think his predicament could get worse. H e also lied to police to protect Sandra and Doe and to provide Doe with closure . He was not concerned that he was admitting crimes because the police had assured him that his case
was less serious. Ramirez fabricated details or took a non sexual situation and sexualized
it. The letter he wrote to Doe at t he end of the interview incorpora ted things suggested by
Hutton.
Rebuttal In rebuttal, the prosecutor played the complete recording of Doe’s April 201 3
i nterview , which was largely consistent with her testimony at trial

. Verdict and Sentence
Ramirez was convicted of all 26 counts and all special allegations were found true. He was sentenced to state prison for a total term of 156 years. The trial court also
order ed Ramirez to pay $900,000 in restitution to Doe for pain and suffering. Ramirez
f iled a timely notice of appeal.
II. D ISCUSSION Ramirez contends: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged
sexual offense s pursuant to section s 1101 and 1108 ; (2 ) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Benavides’s expert testimony ; ( 3 ) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of Doe’s out

- of

- court statements to police ; (4 ) the cumulative impact of the alleged errors requires reversal ; and (5) the trial court’s
restitution award constitutes an abuse of discretion

. None of Ramirez ’s arguments has
merit

. A. Admission of Evidence of Uncharged Sexual Offenses Over Ramirez’s section 352 objection, the trial court admitted, under sections 1101 and 1108, evidence of uncharged sexual offenses against Doe in addition to8

evidence of the 26 charged molestations (which occurred in Rodeo during 1993

– 1994). 6
Ramirez insists this was an abuse of discretion an d deprived him of a fair trial. “Evidence of prior criminal acts is ordinarily inadmissible to show a defen dant’s disposition to commit such acts. (

. . . § 1101.) However, the Legislature has created exceptions to this rule in cases involving sexual offenses (

. . . § 1108) and domestic violence (.

. . § 1109).” ( People v. Reyes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 246, 251.)
Section 1108 “allows evidence of the defendant’s uncharged sex crimes to be introduced in a sex offense prosecution to demonstrate the defendant’s disposition to commit such crimes.” ( People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1009.) “Under .

. . section 352, the trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time.” ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124.)
A tri al court’s exercise of its discretion under section 352 “ ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice .’ ” ( Rodrigues
, at pp. 1124

– 1125; accord, People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1295.) “[A] court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value or even expressly state that it has done so, if the record as a whole shows the court was aware of and performed its balancing functions under

. . . secti on 352.” ( People v. Taylor (2001)
26 Cal.4th 1155, 1169.)

6 S ection 1108, subdivision (a), provides: “ In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of

a nother sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” S ection 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outw eighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”9

1. Background In pretrial motions, the prosecution moved to admit evidence of Ramirez’s uncharged sexual offenses involving Doe, pursuant to section 1108. Ramirez opposed the motion, arguing the evidence was unduly prejudicial. The trial court a greed with the prosecutor that the uncharged acts were admissible und er sections 352, 1101, and 1108

. The court explained its ruling as follows: “[I]t seems to me the history between them
would be relev ant to [the force] issue with a child start ing at age seven years old. [¶] I have considered 352 and the obvious prejudice from that long history of alleged abuse, but I think the probative value is very substantial and out weighs the prejudicial effect.”
2. Analysis Ramirez contends that the probative value of Doe’s testimony regarding uncharged offenses was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and that “[t]he hundreds of additional uncharged acts .

. . should have been excluded under

. . . section 352.” We disagree.
Section 1108 reflects a legislative determination that “ ‘evidence of uncharged sexual offenses is so uniquely probative in sex crimes prosecutions it is presumed admissible without regard to the limitations of

. . . section 1101.’ ” ( Peopl e v. Britt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 500, 505

– 506, italics omitted; People v. Yovanov (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 392, 405.) “Under section 1108, courts .

. . retain broad discretion to exclude disposition evidence if its prejudicial effect, including the impact t hat learning about defendant’s other sex offenses makes on the jury, outweighs its probative value.” ( People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 919.) In weighing prejudice against probative value under section 352, “five factors stand out as particularly significant in [ a ]

. . . section 1108 case. These factors are (1) whether the propensity evidence has probative value, e.g., whether the uncharged conduct is similar enough to the charged behavior to tend to show the defendant did in
fact commit the charged offense; (2) whether the propensity evidence is stronger and more inflammatory than evidence of the defendant’s charged acts; (3) whether the uncharged conduct is remote or stale; (4) whether the propensity evidence is likely to10

confuse or distract the jurors from their main inquiry, e.g., whether the jury might be tempted to punish the defendant for his uncharged, unpunished conduct; and (5) whether admission of the propensity evidence will require an undue consumption of time. [Citation.] A tria l court balances this first factor, i.e., the propensity evidence’s probative value, against the evidence’s prejudicial and time

- consuming effects, as measured by the second through fifth factors.” ( People v. Nguyen (201 0) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1117.)

“ [ T]he probative value of ‘other crimes’ evidence is increased by the relative similarity between the charged and uncharged offenses, the close proximity in time of the offenses, and the independent sources of evidence (the victims) in each offense. [Citati on.] .

. . [T]he prejudicial impact of the evidence is reduced if the uncharged
offenses resulted in actual convictions and a prison term, ensuring that the jury would not be tempted to convict the defendant simply to punish him for the other offenses, and that the jury’s attention would not be diverted by having to make a separate determination whether defendant committed the other offenses.” ( People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) In assessing prejudice, we must remember that “[t]he prejudice which
exclusion of evidence under

. . . section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence. ‘[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to t he defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is “prejudicial.” The “prejudice” referred to in

. . . section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very l ittle effect on the issues.’ ” ( People v.
Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.) Applyin g these f

a ctors here, we conclude Doe’s testimony had significant probative value and was not “cumulativ e,” as Ramirez suggests. The uncharged conduct was extremely simil ar to the charged conduct and was part of a recurrent pattern of abuse, wherein the incidents occurred very close in time. Doe’s testimony regarding the early
molestations
, which began when she was about e ight, was also relevant to place the charged offen ses in context . Specifically, her testimony about these early offenses, if11

true, tend s to explain why Doe felt forced to submit to the sexual ac tivity in the charged
offenses.
E vidence of Ramirez’s uncharged acts was no more inflammatory than Doe’s testimony regarding the charged offen ses, so any additional prejudicial effect was minimal. (See People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 725

– 726 [“[w] hatever emotional bias might have been invoked against [the defendant] at trial, would have been
full y invoked by the multitude of horrific crimes actually charged

. . . [, and] additional evidence suggesting he may have done more of the same [to the same victim], would not significantly change the jury’s perception of him”].) Doe was only about seven or eight years old when the uncharged offenses began. However, we cannot say that these early acts were qualitatively different or any more inflammatory than the facts underlying the charged crimes, which also involved oral copulation. We cannot agree with Ramirez that the number of uncharged offenses was unduly prejudicial standin g alone. As Ramirez concedes, the charged acts were also numerous.
Ramirez also contends the evidence should have been excluded because the uncharged acts were “remote, unpunis hed, and unverified by a third victim or witness.” We agree with the People that there was essentially no gap between the charged and uncharged offenses. E ven if we look only at the first or last uncharged offenses, they occurred within a few years of th e charged offenses, which is not remote. (See People v.
Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 992 [upholding admission of uncharged sexual assault occurring 34 years before charged sexual offense].) The probative value of this testimony may not be height ened because Doe was the victim in all of the offenses. W e also agree that there was some risk that the jury would be tempted to convict Ramirez of the charged offenses, regardless of guilt, to assure that he would be punished for the uncharged offenses. (See People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 59; People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 427.) However, the trial court weighed these factors, none of which are dispositive. ( Merriman , at p. 59.) Most importantly , because of the similarity of all the ac ts and Ramirez’s uniform
defense that none of the acts occurred , it is highly unlikely the jury would return a guilty12

verdict based upon the uncharged misconduct rather than the charged offenses. If the jury was not inclined to believe Doe’s testimony reg arding the charged acts, it is highly unlikely that hearing her testimony about uncharged acts would have changed the jury’s assessment. ( People v. Ennis, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 734.) The risk of prejudice

was also significantly reduced by the cour t’s instruction to the jury , pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1191, that the evidence of uncharged sexual offense s “ is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty .

. . . The People must still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt

. ” 7 Juries are presumed to follow the instructions given. ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 919, disapproved on other grounds by People
v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405,458

– 459.) In light of all of the above circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the probative value of the uncharged acts testimony was not outweighed by its risk of undue prejudice. Because the trial court properly admitted the evidence under section 1108, we do not consider whether, as Ra mirez suggests, the trial

7 Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1191 , the jury was instructed : “ The People presented evidence that the defendant committed th e crimes of Forcible Lewd Act upon a Child or Lewd Act upon a Child under 14 that were not charged in this case. These crimes are defined for you in these instructions. [¶] You may consider th is evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the uncharged offense s. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fac t is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true. [¶] If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must disregard this evidence entirely. [¶] If you decide that the defendant commi tted the unch arged offense s, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit
, an d did com mit Forcible Lewd Act upon a Child as charged in Counts 1 through 26, or Lewd Act upon a Child under 14, which is a lesser charge as to each count . If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged offense s, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of Forcible Lewd Act upon a Child or Lewd Act upon a Child under 14 . The People must still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. ”13

court abused its discretion in also admitting the evidence under section 1101. ( People v. Story, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1295; People v. Britt, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.)
B. Admission of Expert Testimony Next, Ramirez contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Benavides’s expert testimony related to c hild s exual a buse accommodation s yndrome (CSAAS) . Specifically, he maintains Benavides implicitly vouched for Doe’s credibility by opining on the signific ance of facts too closely mirroring her testimony

. We dis agree. “As a general rule expert opinion testimony is limited to an opinion that is ‘[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion .

. . would assist the tri er of fact.’ (

. . . § 801, subd. (a).) Because admissibility of expert opinion is a question of degree, and a jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter under the statutory rule, exclusion is only necessary where the opinion would add nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of information. ( People v. McAlpin (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299

– 1300.) For example, courts have repeatedly recognized the appropriate use of expert testimony when an alleged victim’s actions during or following
a crime se em to contradict the victim’s claims in cases of alleged molestation or abuse. (See People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 293 [expert testimony addressing battered

woman ’ s syndrome]; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744 [expert testimony con cerning [ CSAAS ] ].) ‘A trial court’s decision as to whether a particular subject is a proper one for expert opinion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’ ” ( People v. Dejourney (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1110.) “The general rule is that an expert may n ot give an opinion whether a witness is telling the truth, for the determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond common experience that the expert’s opinion would assist the trier of fact; in other words, the jury generally is as well e quipped as the expert to discern whether a witness is being truthful.” ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 82.) Although expert testimony on the common reactions of a child molestation victim is not admissible to prove a charged sex crime actually occurred, “ ‘CSAAS testimony “is admissible to rehabilitate [the molestation victim’s] credibility when the defendant suggests that the14

child’s conduct after the incident

— e.g., a delay in reporting

— is inconsistent with his or her testimony claimin g molestation.” ’ ” ( People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231, 245; accord, People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394 ( Bowker ) .)
The Bowker court outlined limitations on the admission of CSAAS evidence. First, the evidence “must be targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’ suggested by the evidence,” such as the significance of delayed reporting. ( Bowker, supra , 203 Cal.App.3d at p p. 393

– 394.) Second, “the jury must be instructed simply and directly that the expert’s testimony is not int ended and should not be used to determine whether
the vict im’s molestation claim is true.

. . . The evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not
inconsistent with having been m olested.” ( Id. at p. 394 , some italics added.)
1. Background In advance of trial, Ramirez filed a motion to exclude testimony from the prosecution’s proposed expert psychologist, Dr. Anthony Urquiza. Ramirez argued Urquiza’s proposed testimony on CSAAS was irrelevant and not accepted in the scientific community. Ramirez also argued that, if the expert were to testify, opinions regarding Doe’s credibility should be excluded. The prosecutor responded that the admission of CSAAS expert testimony is approved in sexual assault cases. The prosecutor specifically noted the evidence’s relevance to this case, saying, “[t] here [are] delayed disclosures, there are [victim] behaviors, and there was grooming, and there was dissuasion and there was force, all of which ari se and are described in CSAAS.”
The trial court explain ed it would need to hear the cross

- examination of Doe because “whether there are myths to be dispelled will depend on what she says.” However, the court also said, “I do understand there ’s at minimum the issue of delayed disclosure for many years here, so I think it’s likely that I will admit [the expert’s] testimony. [¶ ] .

. . [ ¶] I can’t in advance give specific rulings as to what questions are admissible and what questions are not. [¶] I would generally keep his testimony to the valid purposes of type of expert testimony to dispel myths .

. . .”15

After Doe testified, howev er, the prosecution gave notice that the testimony of
Benavides would be offered instead to provide “information rel ated to the late disclosure and evolving disclosure, victim behavior, general sexual assault investigation .

. . and [to] very, very, very narrowly have him testify .

. . that there is no profile of the sexual assault perpetrator .

. . .” Ramirez’s trial counsel submitted on the admissibility of delay ed disclosure expert testimony, b ut he also made clear that he believed the testimony s hould be limited so that “no hypotheticals would be proposed and no specifics about this

. . . case would be discussed. ”
The trial court conclude d the evidence was admissible and explained: “I do think

. . . people do have misimpressions about child sexual assault victims and how they are likely to behave and the significance of a delayed or evolving disclosure. So I think it is helpful to the jury to have the general expertise about the experience in this field. .

. . [¶ ]

. . . [ ¶] I will impose the limitations that are required by the case law; that is, there should be no hypotheticals mirroring the facts of this case and no elicitation of an opinion on the question whether the victim in this case was, in fact, a victim of child sexual assault. [¶] I will provide [a] limiting instruction to the jury on the nature of this testimony

. . . .” Benavides was qualified as an e xpert in delayed disclosure, evolving disclosure, victim behavior, and the profile of sexual abusers. At the conclusion of his voir dire of Benavides, Ramirez’s trial counsel said, “I’ll just restate my earlier objection from the in
limines and submit.” Ramirez ’s continuing objection to Benavides’s testimony is only to particular instances of his testimony. Specifically, Ramirez challenges Benavides’s response to the following inquiry from the prosecutor : “Have you had any cases specifically where there ’s .

. . a familial relationship or a father/child

- type relationship?” Benavides responded , “Yes. [¶ ] .

. . [ ¶] [S]uspects have described just using the power that they have .

. . as a father or as the .

. . patriarch of the house. [¶] They’ve also
descri bed using fear or using gifts or .

. . generally just trying to keep the victim on their good side to prevent them fr om disclosing. ”
Benavides also testified regarding delayed disclosures : “[F]or example when you
have a .

. . father/daughter type of relationship or a close familiar relationship .

. . you16

may have a reluctance to report because of a fear that that person that they love, that they care about, or that has raised them .

. . may go to jail or may be in trouble or they may not see them agai n. [¶] And that person may have reinforced that behavior by telling

. . . the victim that’s what’s going to happen, or the victim if they’re sophisticated enough can make that inference on their own.” The prosecutor also asked Benavides about widely

held stereotypes about child molesters and whether they were accurate. Benavides responded, “In my experience, I can say that I’ve probably had out of the hundreds of cases that I have investigated ten at the most cases where .

. . the suspect was unknown to

t he victim. The rest of those cases are all a victim who knows their perpetrator. [¶] .

. . [¶] I would say probably two thirds to three quarters [are direct parental authority cases].”
Benavides also explained why a victim may not be able to distinguish repeated
instances of abuse. “[A]s we do things over and over again, for example, even innocuous things like

. . . getting gas, if those things

. . . happen over and over again, they sort of
become indisti nguishable one from the other. [¶] And this behavi or also sort of gets indistinguishable.

. . . I

. . . might only be able to pull out landmark events in their memory, for example, the first time, the last time, or a time when something was different, particularly violent, something changed

. . . .”
2. A nalysis
Ramirez contends that Benavides ’s testimony was improperly tailor ed to reflect the facts of this case, making it appear that Doe was telling the truth. Contrary to the People’s assertion that Ramirez forfeited t his argument, we conclude he adequately preserved it. (See People v. Perez , supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 245, fn. 5.) In any event,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony

. “Supreme Court precedent requires that expert testimony related to [CSAAS] b e narrowly confined, subject to a proper foundational showing that such evidence is necessary to rebut popular misconceptions which would challenge the victim’s credibility. After the testimony has been received, the jury must be admonished so that it
und erstands the limited purpose for admitting such evidence.” ( Bowker , supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p p

. 387

– 388 .)17

In Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, a psychologist testified “at great length” on CSAAS and explained in detail each of the fiv e stages of the sy ndrome theory . ( Id. at p. 389.) When asked why a child would doubt that an adult believed the child’s claim
, the expert respond ed as a hypothetical child: “ ‘ “If they believe me, why are they taking me away from my mom? If they believe me

. . . , why are they bringing me in [this courtroom]? How many times do I have to say it? I told the lady at the hospital, the policeman, I told the detective, I told the guy downtown in the suit, and they took me into this big courtroom.” ’ ” ( Id. at pp. 389

– 390.)
The Bowker court stressed : “It is one thing to say that child abuse victims often exhibit a certain characteristic or that a particular behavior is not inconsistent with a child having been molested. It is quite another to conclude that where a ch ild meets certain criteria, we can predict with a reasonable degree of certainty that he or she has been abused. The former may be appropriate in some circumstances; the latter

— given the

curren t state of scientific knowledge

— clearly is not.” ( Bowker, sup ra, 203 Cal.App.3d at
p. 393.) The Bowker court concluded that the psychologist’s testimony exceeded the permissible bounds of CSAAS evidence , as it “was replete with comments designed to elicit sympathy for child abuse victims and solicitations that chil dren should be believed.” ( Id. at p. 394. ) “[T]he picture painted by [the psychologist also] happened to be of the two children in the case,” in that his comment, “ ‘ Why are they taking me away from my mom? ’ ” directly mirrored the fact that complaining witnesses had been
removed from parental home as a result of sex abuse investigation. ( Ibid. ) Most troubling was that, “by delineating each stage of the CSAAS theory, [the expert] constructed a ‘scientific’ framework into which the jury could pigeonhole, the facts of the case. Thus, even though [the psychologist] was precluded from using CSAAS as a predictor of child abuse, the jury was free to superimpose these children on the same theory and conclude abuse had occurred.” ( Id. at p. 395.) Here, the expert testimony did not go beyond that found permissible in Bowker

. Ramirez cross

- examined D oe regarding the timing of her reports to police as well as the timing and details of specific molestations , which tended to challenge her credibility.18

Benavides’s testimony helped explain why Doe’s delay in reporting the alleged abuse, as well as her inability to pin down specific instances, was not inconsistent with her claim that she was so abused. Benavides couched his testimony in terms of victims as a class, he did not refer to Doe specifically. Benavides’s testimony regarding the lack of any profile for a “typical” child molester was also admissible. (See People v. McAlpin, supra,
53 Cal.3d at p. 130 2 [without expert testimony “many jurors would tend to rely .

. . on the widespread public image of the child molester as an old man in shabby clothes who loiters in playgrounds or schoolyards and lures unsuspecting children into sexual contact by off ering them candy or money”] ; id. at pp. 1302

– 1304 .)
The trial court also properly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193: “You have heard testimony from Inspector Benavides regarding dispelling common misconception of the behavior of sexual assault victims. [¶] Inspector Benavides’ s testimony about th e behavior of sexual assault victims is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him. [¶] You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not Doe’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of
someone who h ad been molested and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.” (Italics added.) We must presume the jury followed this instruction. ( People v.
Pinholster

, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 919. ) Accordingly, it is extremely unlikely Benavides’s testimony was used improperly to find Doe had been molest ed

. The court did not abus e its discretion in admitting Benavides’s challenged expert testimony

. 8

8 Our conclusion is not altered by Ramirez’s reliance on People v. Roscoe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1093 , in which a psychologist opined that the complaining witness

“ ‘was diagnosed as a victim of child molest.’ ” ( Id. at pp. 1098, 1095.) The Roscoe court hel d “the expert testimony authorized .

. . to permit rehabilitation of a complainant’s credibility is limited to discussion of victims as a class, supported by references to literature and experience (such as an expert normally relies upon) and does not exte nd to discussion and diagnosis of the witness in the case at hand.” ( Id. at p. 1100 , fn. omitted .) In reaching that conclusion, the court observed: “Thus, for example, a victim whose credibility is attacked for initially denying that he had been moleste d could be rehabilitated by expert testimony that such denials are more likely than not in molestation cases. The testimony would not be that this particular child was a victim of19

C

. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Next, Ramirez maintains his trial counsel provided ineffective assista nce by failing to object to admission of Doe’s prior statements to police. Specifically, he
contends Doe’s recorded police interview and earlier statements to Moss were hea rsay. “In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defenda nt bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient because it ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [¶]

. . . under prevailing professional norms.’ [Citations.] Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that ‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.’ [Citation.] If the record ‘sheds no light on why counsel a cted or failed to act in the manner challenged,’ an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citations.] If a defendant meets the burden of establishing that counsel’s performance was deficient, he or she also must show that counsel’s deficiencies resulted in prejudice, that is, a ‘reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional er rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” ( People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 745

– 746; People v. Lopez (2008)
42 Cal.4th 960, 966.) We conclude that Ramirez’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to
admiss ion of the recorded April 2013 i nterview with Hutton or Doe’s March 2013 statements to Moss. First, even if we assume th at an objection c ould have properly been sustained, “ ‘failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.’ ” ( People v.
C arrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 985.) “Generally, failure to object is a matter of trial tactics as to which we will not exercise judicial hindsight. [Citation.] ‘When a defendant

molestation, causing him to react in a certain way, but rather that as a cl ass victims of molestation typically make poor witnesses, and are reluctant to disclose or discuss the sordid episodes. ” ( Id. at p. 1099.) Benavides’s testimony was in the latter vein.20

makes an ineffectiveness claim on appeal, the appellate court must look to see if the record contains any explanation for the challenged aspects of representation. If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation” [citation], the contention must be rejected.’ [Citation.] A reviewing court will not second

- guess trial counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions.” ( People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 520.) “ ‘ “Reviewing courts will reverse convictions on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission.” ’ ” ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal. 4th 1005, 1052.) Here, Ramirez’s trial counsel was not asked to explain why he did not object. We agree with the People that Ramirez’s trial counsel may very well have acted with a tactical purpose when he failed to object

— i .e., he believed admission of Doe’s sta tement s to police would be helpful to the defense to the extent her prior statements revealed
inconsistencies with her trial testimony. In his cross

- examination of Doe, Ramirez asked
about the substance of her prior statements to police, in an apparent at tempt to highlight
such inconsistencies. 9 Ramirez also referred to the asserted inconsistencies in his closing

9 Specifically, the record reflects the following exchange between Doe and Ramirez’s trial counsel: “Q. Now, when you were originally talking with .

. . Deputy Moss, the first time that you had a conversation with the police, you disclosed to Deputy Moss that it was in [Ramirez’s brother’s] house where the abuse actually started; is that true? A. No. Q.

. . . So what your testimony is is that the abuse happened not at [Ramirez’s brother’s] house but somewhere else? A. Yes. Q. And do you recall telling Deputy Moss that it happened in Mill Valley when you were sleeping on a pullout couch? A. No. No. [¶ ] .

. . [ ¶] Q. Now, you’ve described the frequency of abuse at the Mill Valley house as I think something in the neighborhood of a couple times a week. A. Yes.21

argument. Of course, Ramirez is correct t hat Doe’s statements to police were potentially damaging to Ramirez because they were largely consiste nt with her trial testimony

. “Competent counsel often are confronted with tactical choices that have cons as well as pros; a fortiori, they are permitted, indeed required, to make them.” ( People v. Kelly,

supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 522.) This is not a case where there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s failure to object. The pretrial discussion between counsel and the court regarding section 356 further supports the presumption Ramirez’s trial counsel
took a calculated ris k that, if he chose to elicit the substance of any recorded statement,
the prosecution could move to admit the entire recording. 10 Ramirez has not rebutted the presumption his trial counsel elected not to object for a valid tactical reason. Furthermore, a n objection would not have been meritorious. Ramirez maintains his counsel should have objected when, to counter his cross

- examination of Doe, the prosecution offered excerpts (and eventually the entire recording) from Doe’s April 2013
i nterview, as well as Moss’s testimony descr ibing Doe’s statements in March 2013.

“ ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter

Q. Okay. Do you remember describing the abuse to the deputies when you had interviews with them as happening more frequently than that? A. Well, it happened all the time, .

. . I can’t say exactly how many times a week it happened but it happened a lot. [¶ ] .

. . [ ¶] Q. And do you recall telling Deputy Hutton that when y ou would put on clothes that you wore sometimes up to ten pairs of pants? A. Yes. [¶] Well, I mean ten pairs of pants? [¶] Well, maybe it was over exaggerated. But maybe like four. [¶ ] .

. . [ ¶] Q. And .

. . do you recall telling Deputy Moss and Deputy Hu tton that you were kind of exhausted all the time? A. Yes. Absolutely.”

10 Section 356 provides, in relevant part: “Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquir ed into by an adverse party;

. . . and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence

. ”22

stated.” (§ 1200, su bd. (a).) Unless an exception applies, “hearsay evidence is inadmissible.” (§ 1200, subd. (b).) Here, although Doe’s statements to police were made out of court and were offered for their truth, section 356 acts as an applicable exception to the hearsay rule. (See People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 239 [“[o ]nce defendant had introduced a portion of [a witness’s] interview with [the police officer] into evidence, the prosecution was entitled to introduce the remainder of [the witness’s]
interview to place in context the isolated statements of [the witness] related by [the officer] on direct examination by the defense”]; People v. Parrish (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 263, 269.) The purpose of section 356 is “to prevent the use of selected aspects of a

co nversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a misleading impression on the subjects addressed.” ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 156.) “ ‘In applying .

. . section 356 the courts do not draw narrow lines around the exact subject of in quiry. “In the event a statement admitted in evidence constitutes part of a conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled to have placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the declarant in the course of such conversation or corre spondence, provided the other statements have some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission

o r declaration in evidence. ” ’ ” ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959 , italics
omitted .) Because Ramirez’s trial counsel elicited some of the substa nce of Doe’s statements regarding the molestations to both Moss and Hutton during cross

- examination, the entirety of her conversations with those officers was admissible. Ramirez provides no argument regarding section 356 and has not shown his trial couns el’s performance was
deficient. In any event, even if trial counsel’s failure to object fell below the objective standard of reasonableness, it was not prejudicial. Doe’s police interview statements were largely repetitive of her testimony at trial. Thus, by virtue of trial counsel’s failure to object, the jury was not exposed to significantly new or different incriminating evidence. Furthermore, the case against Ramirez was overwhelming : Doe’s testimony was corroborated by Ramirez’s repeated pretri al admissions

— i n a family meeting, a23

pretext call, a police interview, and an apology letter

. Ramirez’s defense

— that he repeatedly admitted serious criminal conduct to spare Sandra’s feelings and help Doe
“come to t erms” with their consensual sex

— i s inher ently improbable. It is not reasonably probable Ramirez would have achieved a more favorable result but for trial counsel’s failure to object. ( People v. Carrasco, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 986; People v. Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 966.)
D. Cumulative Error
Ramirez also argues that the cumulative effect of the asserted errors requires
reversal of the judgment. We have rejected all of Ramirez’s arguments on the merits. Ramirez was entitled to a trial “in which his guilt or innocence was fairly adjudic ated.” ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 84 4.) He received such a trial.
E. Restitution Order Finally, Ramirez maintains the $900,000 restitution award was an abuse of discretion because it was impermissibly based, in part, on loss caused by uncharged
offenses

. “A victim’s restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.” ( People
v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 500.) “With one exception, restitution orders are limited to the victim’s economic damages.” ( People v. Smith (201 1) 198 Cal.App.4th 415, 431 ( Smith ).) The exception is found in Penal Code, section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F), which authorizes a trial court to award restitution in “a dollar amount that is
sufficient to fully reimburse the victim [for] .

. . : [¶ ] .

. . [ ¶] Noneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for felony violations of [Penal Code

s ection ] 288.” (Italics added.) “[W]e review the trial court’s restitutio n order for abuse
of discretion .” ( People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663.) At sentencing, the prosecution requested a res titution award of $13 million

— $1 million for each month o f abuse in the charged period

— to compensate Doe for pain and suffering. Ramirez opposed the request as excessive. In awarding Doe $900,000 for
noneconomic loss , the trial court explained : “ Jane Doe was the victim in all 26 counts of forcible lewd act upon a child in violation of Penal Code Section 288(b)(1) on which [Ramirez] was convicted. Jane Doe was molested by [Ramirez], her m other’s boyfriend24

and the only father figure in her life, frequently and repeatedly from the age of approximately eight or nine years old until she was fifteen years old . Jane Doe felt trapped, terrified each night for the bulk of her childhood that [Rami rez] would come into her bedroom in the middle of the night to molest her again. [¶ ] .

. . [ ¶] Although it is impossible to know the extent to which [Ramirez’s] abuse of Jane Doe has impacted the remainder of her life, no one can reasonably contest that [R amirez’s] long

- term and extensive molestation of Jane Doe caused her immeasurable psychological harm. Jane Doe has suffered the effects of the defendant’s abuse for her entire life, and will continue to suffer for the remainder of her life. Based upon Ja ne Doe’s testimony at trial, and upon the exhibits and authorities submitted by the People, the Court concludes that an award of $900,000 for emotional distress, past and future, is appropriate.” (Italics added.)

“ ‘When there is a factual and rational b asis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.’ ” ( People v. Mearns, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 499.) “Unlike restitution for economic loss, however, loss for noneconomic loss is subjectively quantified.” ( Smith , supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 436.) We will affirm such a restitution award “that does not, at first blush, shock the conscience or suggest passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.” ( Ibid .)
In Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 415, the defendant was co nvicted of molesting his stepdaughter from the time she was eight years old until she turned 15. ( Id. at
p p

. 419 , 42 0

– 424 .) Evidence of uncharged offenses against the complaining witness was
also presented. ( Id. at pp. 421

– 422.) The court awarded $750,000 in noneconomic
restitution to the victim, noting that the defendant’s acts against his stepdaughter actually

o ccurred over a 15

- year period

— between age eight to age 23. The court multiplied tha t 15 years by $50,000 per year, thus arriving at $750,000. ( Id. at p p . 420 , 433 .) On appeal from the restitution order , the defendant maintained the amount
awarded was an abuse of discretion , in part because it was based on the victim’s suffering “during years after the crimes were committed.” ( Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at25

p. 435; id. at p p

. 420 .) The Smith court referenced the civil jury instruction for noneconomic loss, a nd adopted the standard for reviewing such damage awards

. 11 ( Smith, at p. 436 .) The court conclude d $750,000 in noneconomic damages for years of sexual abuse did not shock the conscience or suggest passion, prejudice or corruption. ( Ibid. ) In reaching that conclusion, the Smith court cited Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified
School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1033, 1059

– 1061, in which a jury award of $1.5 million in noneconomic damages was affirmed for a single act of molestation

. ( Smith, at pp. 436

– 437.) The Smith court was also untroubled by the trial court’s reference to y ears beyond th os e in which the charged offenses occurred . “As would a jury, the court was searching for some way to quantify [the victim’s] pain and suffering. And there is no credible argument, especially on the facts of this case, that [the victim’s]

p sychological harm ended when she was 15 years old. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion.” ( Id. at p. 437. ) Here, as in Smith, the trial court may have referred to the entire history of Ramirez’s offenses against Doe

. However, contrary to Ramirez’s assertion, we see no evidence that the trial court ordered him to pay any sum of restitution for loss attributable solely to uncharged conduct. It was reasonable for the trial court , who observed Doe’s demeanor, to conclude that her pain and suffering did not end in 1994 and will continue indefinitely. The trial court ’s award does not shock the conscience or suggest passion, prejudice or corruption

. 12
III. D ISPOSITION The judgment and restitution order are affirmed

.

11 CACI No . 3905A provides in relevant part: “ No fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of these noneconomic damages. You must use your judgment to decide a reasonable amount based on the evidence and your common sense. ”

12 Ramirez misplaces his reliance on People v. Woods (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1045, People v. Lai (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1227, and People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164 , as none of these cases involve an award of noneconomic damages for pain and suffering under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F)

.26 _________________________ BRUINIERS, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ JONES, P. J.

_________________________ SIMONS, J.