[Cite as In re M.J.M., 2019-Ohio-4799.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

IN RE: M.J.M. : 

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Appellate Case No. 28396 

Trial Court Case No. 2016-3599 

(Appeal from Common Pleas Court – 

Juvenile Division) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 22nd day of November, 2019. 

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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by LISA M. LIGHT, Atty. Reg. No. 0097348, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422

 Attorney for Appellee, Montgomery County Children Services 

 

ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Atty. Reg. No. 0067714, P.O. Box 340214, Beavercreek, 

Ohio 45434 

 Attorney for Appellant, Father 

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WELBAUM, P.J. 
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{¶ 1} Petitioner-appellant, the father of M.J.M. (“Father”), appeals from the 

judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, denying 

his motion to terminate or modify his child support obligation. In support of his appeal, 

Father asserts that pursuant to R.C. 3119.22 and R.C. 3119.23, his child support 

obligation should have been reduced to $0 due to monthly Social Security benefits 

received by M.J.M. and funds that M.J.M. will receive from her guardianship when she 

turns 18 years old. For the reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial court 

denying Father’s motion to terminate or modify child support will be affirmed. 

Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 2} M.J.M., the minor child at issue in this appeal, was born in March 2002. 

Father and M.J.M.’s mother (“Mother”) were married at the time of M.J.M.’s birth, but 

divorced in December 2009. After the divorce, Mother became M.J.M.’s primary 

custodian and Father was awarded standard visitation time. 

{¶ 3} As M.J.M. grew older, she would often refuse to go to Father’s house when 

it became his time to exercise visitation. In February 2015, M.J.M. alleged that Father 

had sexually abused her. Law enforcement in Clermont County, Ohio, investigated the 

allegations made by M.J.M., but ultimately did not file any charges against Father. In 

July 2015, Mother sent M.J.M. to live with her maternal grandfather (“Maternal 

Grandfather”). This move was the result of an unresolved conflict between Mother’s 

boyfriend and M.J.M. Father had not seen M.J.M. since May 2014 and had not spoken 

to her since April 2015. 
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{¶ 4} On October 6, 2015, Mother died as a result of suicide. Following Mother’s 

passing, M.J.M. continued to reside with Maternal Grandfather. On August 12, 2016, a 

juvenile court magistrate issued a decision finding that M.J.M. was a dependent child and 

awarded temporary custody of M.J.M. to her maternal aunt (“Maternal Aunt”), as Maternal 

Grandfather had difficulty caring for M.J.M. due to her special mental and physical needs. 

In the decision, the magistrate also ordered Father not to have visitation with M.J.M. until 

recommended by the child’s therapist. Father filed objections to the magistrate’s 

decision, which were overruled by the juvenile court. After the juvenile court adopted the 

magistrate’s decision, Father appealed. On May 25, 2018, this court affirmed the 

judgment of the juvenile court in In re M.M., 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 27722 and 27724, 

2018-Ohio-2034. 

{¶ 5} On September 8, 2017, while the appeal in In re M.M. was pending, Father 

filed a motion to terminate or modify his child support obligation. Shortly thereafter, on 

October 31, 2017, Montgomery County Children Services (“MCCS”) filed a motion for 

legal custody of M.J.M. to be granted to Maternal Aunt. A hearing on both motions was 

held before a juvenile court magistrate on July 9, 2018. During this hearing, Father 

testified that he did not oppose MCCS’s legal custody motion and had no objection to 

Maternal Aunt being granted legal custody of M.J.M. Therefore, the main issue to be 

determined at the hearing concerned whether Father’s child support obligation should be 

terminated or modified. 

{¶ 6} In his motion to terminate or modify child support, Father argued that his 

current monthly child support obligation of $434.50 should be terminated as a result of 

M.J.M. receiving Social Security benefits and guardianship funds. At the hearing on the 
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motion, Maternal Aunt testified that M.J.M. receives a Social Security benefit in the 

amount of $834 per month due to Mother’s death. Of that amount, Maternal Aunt 

testified that $265 is used to pay for storage lockers containing Mother’s belongings that 

were awarded to M.J.M. through the probate court. According to Maternal Aunt, M.J.M. 

would like to keep those belongings to help furnish her own home in the future. Maternal 

Aunt also testified that $325 of the Social Security benefits is paid to Maternal Grandfather 

for M.J.M.’s cell phone bill and fees, and for M.J.M.’s allowance, which is a little over $100 

a month. 

{¶ 7} In addition to the Social Security benefits, Maternal Aunt testified that 

Mother’s home had been sold and the proceeds of the sale were put into a guardianship 

for M.J.M. Maternal Grandfather testified that he receives $1,634 in Worker’s 

Compensation benefits for Mother’s death twice a month, which he deposits into M.J.M.’s 

guardianship. Maternal Aunt and Maternal Grandfather both testified that the 

guardianship money is not available to M.J.M. until she turns 18 years old, unless the 

probate court approves the release of funds for a specific use. Maternal Grandfather 

testified that he has petitioned the probate court for funds to purchase a car for M.J.M. 

{¶ 8} Father testified that, as of the date of the hearing, he had been employed at 

USF Holland in West Chester, Ohio, for three weeks. Prior to that, Father testified that 

he had worked for Ryder Integrated until December 8, 2017. Father testified that his 

hourly wage was $18.48 with a guaranteed 40 hours of work per week. Based on that 

information, the magistrate calculated Father’s annual salary as $38,438.40. Father 

testified that he was married with no other minor children. Father also testified that his 

wife was employed. 
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{¶ 9} On August 7, 2018, the juvenile court magistrate issued a decision granting 

legal custody of M.J.M. to Maternal Aunt and denying Father’s motion to terminate or 

modify child support. Ten days later, on August 17, 2018, Father filed objections to the 

magistrate’s decision denying his motion to terminate or modify child support. Father 

also filed supplemental objections on February 15, 2019. However, on April 19, 2019, 

the juvenile court issued a judgment overruling Father’s objections and adopting the 

magistrate’s decision denying Father’s motion to terminate or modify child support. 

Father now appeals from that judgment, raising a single assignment of error for review. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶ 10} Under his sole assignment of error, Father claims that the trial court erred 

in denying his motion to terminate or modify his child support obligation. In support of 

this claim, Father asserts that pursuant to R.C. 3119.22 and R.C. 3119.23, his monthly 

child support obligation of $434.50 should have been reduced to $0 due to the Social 

Security benefits received by M.J.M. and the funds that M.J.M. will receive from her 

guardianship when she turns 18 years old. Father also asserts that his child support 

arrearage should have been reduced based on Social Security back pay allegedly 

awarded to M.J.M. We find no merit to either of Father’s claims. 

{¶ 11} A trial court’s ruling on a motion to modify child support is reviewed on 

appeal for an abuse of discretion. Burks v. Burks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28349, 

2019-Ohio-4292, ¶ 8, citing Matlock v. Matlock, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28278, 2019-

Ohio-2131, ¶ 12. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is 

“unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place 
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Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 

(1990). “[M]ost instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply 

unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” Id. “A 

decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that 

decision.” Id.

{¶ 12} Pursuant to R.C. 3119.22, the trial court “may order an amount of child 

support that deviates from the amount of child support that would otherwise result from 

the use of the basic child support schedule and the applicable worksheet if, after 

considering the factors and criteria set forth in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, the 

court determines that the amount calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule 

and the applicable worksheet would be unjust or inappropriate and therefore not be in the 

best interest of the child.” Again, we apply an abuse-of-discretion review to a trial court’s 

decision whether to deviate from child support owed under the applicable worksheet. 

Burks at ¶ 9, citing Hamby v. Hamby, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26506, 2015-Ohio-1042, 

¶ 16. 

{¶ 13} In this case, Father argues that four of the factors listed under R.C. 3119.23 

justify a deviation from the $434.50 support obligation calculated under the child support 

computation worksheet. Specifically, Father argues that the factors listed in R.C. 

3119.23 (F), (P), (K), and (Q) support finding that his child support obligation should have 

been reduced to $0. Those factors are as follows: 

(F) The obligee’s income, if the obligee’s annual income is equal to or less 

than one hundred per cent of the federal poverty level; 

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(K) The standard of living and circumstances of each parent and the 

standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage continued 

or had the parents been married; 

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(P) Extraordinary child care costs required for the child or children that 

exceed the maximum state-wide average cost estimate as described in 

division (P)(1)(d) of section 3119.05 of the Revised Code, including 

extraordinary costs associated with caring for a child or children with 

specialized physical, psychological, or educational needs; [and] 

* * * 

(Q) Any other relevant factor. 

R.C. 3119.23(F),(K),(P) and (Q). 

{¶ 14} In discussing the aforementioned factors, Father fails to explain how they 

apply to the instant case and we likewise fail to see how they are applicable. For 

example, factor (F) pertains to the obligee’s income—the obligee in this case being 

Maternal Aunt, a non-parent, whose income is not factored into the child support 

calculation. See Child Support Computation Worksheet attached to Magistrate’s 

Decision (Aug. 7, 2018), p. 7. See also R.C. 3119.07(C) (“If neither parent of a child who 

is the subject of a child support order is the residential parent and legal custodian of the 

child and the child resides with a third party who is the legal custodian of the child, the 

court shall issue a child support order requiring each parent to pay that parent’s child 

support obligation pursuant to the child support order.”) (Emphasis added.) Therefore, 

because Maternal Aunt’s income is not part of the child support calculation, factor (F) 
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simply did not apply here. 

{¶ 15} Factor (K), concerning Father and Mother’s standard of living, is also 

inapplicable, as Mother is deceased and there was no evidence of any standard of living 

concerns raised in the trial court. With regard to factor (P), concerning “extraordinary 

child care costs,” the record indicates that M.J.M. has been receiving trauma counseling 

since 2016 and also receives treatment from other medical providers for multiple mental 

and physical conditions. Assuming that the costs for those services are extraordinary 

costs for purposes of factor (P), we fail to see how that factor supports Father’s claim that 

his child support obligation should be reduced to $0, as those costs would require Father 

to pay additional child support to Maternal Aunt so that M.J.M. could continue to receive 

those services. 

{¶ 16} As for factor (Q), which instructs the trial court to consider “any other 

relevant factor,” Father provides no relevant factor other than that M.J.M. receives 

monthly Social Security benefits. Father argues that pursuant to Williams v. Williams, 

88 Ohio St.3d 441, 727 N.E.2d 895 (2000), his child support obligation should be offset 

by M.J.M.’s Social Security benefits. Father also argues that pursuant to Rice v. Rice, 

177 Ohio App.3d 476, 2008-Ohio-3518, 895 N.E.2d 198 (5th Dist.), he is entitled to have 

his child support arrearage offset by Social Security back pay. However, both Williams

and Rice are distinguishable from the present case. 

{¶ 17} Unlike the present case, the obligor fathers in Williams and Rice became 

physically disabled and received Social Security benefits as a result of their disabilities. 

Because the fathers’ children in those cases also received derivative Social Security 

income for the fathers’ disabilities, the fathers moved to have their child support 
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obligations and/or arrearages reduced by the amount of Social Security disability benefits 

received by their children. The courts in Williams and Rice found it appropriate to credit 

the fathers’ child support obligations/arrearages with the Social Security disability benefits 

received by their children. Williams at syllabus; Rice at ¶ 7-10. Williams specifically 

noted that “where the disabled parent has no other source of income due to his or her 

disability, the receipt of Social Security payments actually ensures that their child support 

obligation will be satisfied,” and that “Social Security payments are tantamount to 

earnings by the disabled parent.” Williams at 444. 

{¶ 18} The present case is distinguishable from Williams and Rice because Father 

is not the source of the social security benefits being received by M.J.M. Rather, M.J.M. 

is receiving the social security benefits as a result of Mother’s death. Therefore, the 

benefits are in no way attributable to Father and not tantamount to Father’s earnings. 

{¶ 19} In In re Mudrak, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 94-B-32, 1997 WL 28557 (Jan. 22, 

1997), the Seventh District Court of Appeals held that, because the father in that case 

was not the parent whose disability occasioned the Social Security benefits awarded to 

his child, the Social Security benefits could not be credited against the father’s child 

support obligation. Id. at *5 (holding that “social security derivative payments received 

on behalf of a minor child as a result of a parent’s disability should be credited toward that 

parent’s support obligation”). (Emphasis sic.) Like the instant case, the child in Mudrak 

received Social Security benefits as a result of her mother’s death and the father 

attempted to have those benefits credited against his child support obligation. The 

Mudrak court likened such credit as a windfall to the father and stated that: 

If, as [father] argues, he is given a dollar for dollar credit, he would pay no 
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child support and would thus receive a windfall. To illustrate this, consider 

what the situation would be if this were an ordinary case where [mother] 

survived and had no income. [Father’s] $17,680.00 annual salary would 

yield an annual child support obligation of $3,425.00 or, taking it one step 

further, if [mother] had survived and she had annual income equal to the 

social security benefits currently being received[,] * * * $4,044.00, [father’s] 

annual child support obligation would be $3,321.00 per year. It is 

inconceivable then that [father] should receive a windfall from the death of 

the child’s mother and pay no support whatsoever. Further, [father] has 

failed to establish through the record how a dollar for dollar credit for child 

support benefits received by [the child], against his child support obligation, 

would serve the best interest of the child. [Father’s] argument for a dollar 

for dollar credit is rejected. 

Id. at *3. 

{¶ 20} Similarly, in Paton v. Paton, 91 Ohio St.3d 94, 742 N.E.2d 619 (2001), the 

Supreme Court of Ohio held that Social Security disability benefits awarded to a child due 

to the child’s disability did not constitute a financial resource that justified deviating from 

the basic child support schedule. Id. at syllabus. In so holding, the Supreme Court 

stressed that “[p]arents, to the extent that they are able, have an obligation to support 

their minor children. In situations where a child is eligible to receive [Social Security 

Income], these benefits are intended to supplement the parents’ support obligation, not 

to reduce it.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 97. 

{¶ 21} Based on the foregoing, we find that M.J.M.’s receipt of monthly Social 
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Security benefits resulting from Mother's death did not warrant reducing Father’s child 

support obligation or arrearage. Except for referencing M.J.M.’s guardianship funds, 

which M.J.M. cannot access until she turns 18 years old, Father provided no other basis 

on which to terminate or reduce his child support obligation. Therefore, because Father 

otherwise failed to establish that his monthly child support obligation of $434.50 was 

unjust or inappropriate and not in M.J.M.’s best interest, it was not an abuse of discretion 

for the trial court to deny Father’s motion to terminate or modify his child support 

obligation. 

{¶ 22} Father’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 23} Having overruled Father’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed. 

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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Lisa M. Light 

Robert Alan Brenner 

Michael Booher 

Christopher Deal 

Theodore Valley 

Lori Byrd 

Hon. Helen Wallace