2018 UT App 141

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF N.M.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

E.M.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20170142-CA

Filed July 19, 2018

Fourth District Juvenile Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Brent H. Bartholomew

No. 1113723

Neil D. Skousen, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES KATE A. TOOMEY and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 In this appeal, we are asked to address whether the 

juvenile court properly terminated E.M.’s (Father) parental 

rights to N.M. (Child). For the reasons explained below, we 

affirm.
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20170142-CA 2 2018 UT App 141

BACKGROUND

Child’s Removal and the Initial Permanency Proceedings

¶2 In an April 2015 shelter proceeding, the juvenile court 

determined that Child’s removal from Father and Child’s mother 

(Mother) was necessary and in Child’s best interest due to both 

parents’ incarceration. The court thereafter adjudicated Child 

neglected as to both Father and Mother, and it placed Child in 

the custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). 

DCFS created a family plan for both Father and Mother and

recommended reunification as the primary permanency goal, 

with Child’s adoption as the concurrent goal. The court accepted 

the proposed plan as well as the stated goals and ordered DCFS 

to make “reasonable effort to finalize the permanency goal.” In 

November 2015, given Father’s and Mother’s respective lack of 

progress, the court granted temporary custody and guardianship 

of Child to his maternal grandparents (Maternal Grandparents), 

subject to DCFS supervision. Child remained with Maternal 

Grandparents from then on.

¶3 The court thereafter terminated reunification services for 

both parents and, accordingly, in a September 2016 permanency 

hearing, changed the permanency goal to adoption, with the 

concurrent goal of permanent custody and guardianship with 

Maternal Grandparents. The court also determined that Child’s 

best interest required a petition for termination of parental rights 

to be filed, and it ordered that such a petition be filed, and a 

pretrial hearing held, within forty-five days.1

 

1. The Utah Code provides that “[i]f the final plan for the minor 

is to proceed toward termination of parental rights, the petition 

for termination of parental rights shall be filed, and a pretrial 

held, within 45 calendar days after the permanency hearing.”

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314(9) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017).
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20170142-CA 3 2018 UT App 141

¶4 Following the permanency order, the State filed a petition 

for termination of parental rights (the TPR) as to both parents. In 

it, the State recited the case history, which included the fact that 

both parents had “serious” substance abuse problems and that 

neither parent had remedied the circumstances that led to 

Child’s out-of-home placement. The State asserted that it would 

be in Child’s best interest for Father’s and Mother’s parental 

rights to be terminated, that Child was in need of permanency, 

and that Child needed to be available for adoption to achieve 

that permanence. The court ordered the parents to participate in 

mediation and set the TPR for a pretrial hearing on November 

16, 2016.

The November 2016 Pretrial Hearing

¶5 At the pretrial hearing, rather than proceeding with the 

TPR, the State moved to change the temporary custody in 

Maternal Grandparents to permanent custody and guardianship 

and to dismiss the TPR. The State declared that “there are some 

burdens of proof . . . that would be very difficult to be able to 

carry forward” and that its request “would be in the child’s best 

interest.”

¶6 In response, the court noted that adoption was the 

permanency goal in the case, and it heard from those present 

regarding the State’s request to grant permanent custody and 

guardianship to Maternal Grandparents. The State, the Guardian 

ad Litem, and the parents agreed that permanent custody and 

guardianship would be in Child’s best interest. Maternal 

Grandparents stated that their desire was to adopt Child.

¶7 After hearing from those present, the court expressed 

concern that granting the State’s request to “set the goal at 

permanent custody and guardianship” would only delay the 

proceedings and increase the uncertainty in Child’s life. The 

court then stated:
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20170142-CA 4 2018 UT App 141

[I]n this particular case I’m not ready to name 

permanent custody and guardianship as the 

permanency goal. We have a young child here of 

tender age and young age, and I appreciate 

everything that’s been said in this matter, but it’s 

the Court’s decision what the permanency goal 

should be. It very well may end up being 

permanent custody and guardianship, but I don’t 

have the evidence before me and I feel like I need 

to hear that evidence.

¶8 Mother objected, stating that the court did have evidence 

and knew “almost everything” about the case. The State also 

objected, asserting that it did not think it could “carry the 

burden of proof” if it went to trial on the TPR. In response, the 

court stated,

[T]he Court set the permanency goal of adoption, 

and we’ll hear the evidence that’s involved. 

Whether you think the burden is there or not, 

that’s the job for the Court to decide; and very well 

it may not be, and I’ll make a decision for 

permanent custody and guardianship, but there 

isn’t a stipulation in this matter. The grandparents 

have voiced their concerns and I want to hear the 

evidence.

¶9 The court therefore denied the State’s request to dismiss 

the TPR and order permanent custody and guardianship in 

Maternal Grandparents, and it set the case for a termination trial 

in January 2017.

The Pretrial Motions

¶10 Before the termination trial began, both the State and the 

parents filed additional documents with the court. First, the State 

filed a notice to withdraw the TPR. Next, Father and Mother 

filed a joint rule 60(b) motion, asking the court to set aside its 
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20170142-CA 5 2018 UT App 141

November 16 order denying the State’s oral request to dismiss 

the TPR. Father and Mother argued that the court should set 

aside its order because the State conceded that it could not meet 

its burden of proof at trial. The parents contended that the State, 

not the court, decides which cases to file, litigate, and prosecute. 

The parents also argued that requiring the State to proceed with 

the termination trial effectively forced it to violate rule 3.1 of the 

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a 

lawyer “shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 

controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact 

for doing so.”

¶11 In the alternative, the parents argued that the court 

should treat the State’s November 16 oral motion to dismiss the 

TPR as a rule 41 notice of dismissal under the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The parents claimed that, because the parties 

stipulated to the dismissal of the TPR, the court lost jurisdiction 

over the petition while still retaining jurisdiction to enter an 

order of permanent custody and guardianship in line with the 

court’s concurrent goal. The parents also noted that Maternal 

Grandparents would be free to file their own termination 

petition.

¶12 On January 17, 2017, the court denied the parents’ 

rule 60(b) motion and struck the State’s notice of withdrawal.

The Termination Trial

¶13 The case proceeded to the termination trial. On the second 

day of trial, Mother advised the court that she wished to 

relinquish her parental rights to Child to allow Maternal 

Grandparents to adopt Child. The court took Mother’s voluntary 

relinquishment under advisement. The State thereafter clarified 

that, given Mother’s voluntary relinquishment, it had “no 

misgivings about going forward with and putting on whatever 

evidence was necessary to establish [Father’s] unfitness.” The 

State explained that, although it had asserted in the November 
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20170142-CA 6 2018 UT App 141

2016 hearing that it did not have enough evidence to proceed 

with a termination trial, its reservation applied only to the 

evidence with respect to Mother, not to Father. The State 

asserted that it had “never questioned the evidence with respect 

to [Father],” that Father had “never done anything” to establish 

his fitness as a parent, and that he accordingly was unfit. The 

State ultimately contended that it was in Child’s best interest for 

the court to grant the TPR with respect to Father.

¶14 In February 2017, the court entered a termination order, 

terminating both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as to 

Child. The court accepted Mother’s voluntary relinquishment of 

her parental rights. As to Father, the court determined that he 

was an unfit parent and that it would be in Child’s best interest 

to terminate Father’s parental rights. In doing so, the court noted 

that, while having Child “in a permanent custody and 

guardianship arrangement may be convenient for Father, . . . it is 

not in [Child’s] best interest.” The court observed that Child 

instead needed “the certainty and benefits that come with being 

adopted.” Accordingly, the court determined that it was “strictly 

and absolutely necessary to terminate parental rights so 

Maternal Grandparents can adopt [Child],” and it ordered Child 

to remain in Maternal Grandparents’ custody until he was 

adopted.

¶15 Father appeals the juvenile court’s denial of his rule 60(b) 

motion and the court’s termination of his parental rights as to 

Child.

ANALYSIS

I. Failure to Accept the Parties’ Stipulation about the 

Permanency Goal

¶16 Father first argues that the juvenile court erred “in 

applying the law by failing to accept [the parties’] stipulation”

that it would be in Child’s best interest to change the 
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20170142-CA 7 2018 UT App 141

permanency goal from adoption to permanent custody and 

guardianship with Maternal Grandparents. In particular, Father 

claims that the juvenile court was “bound by the parties’ 

stipulation” and that the court erred in disregarding it.

¶17 Father’s request that the juvenile court honor the parties’ 

stipulation appeared in his joint rule 60(b) motion for relief from 

the court’s November 2016 oral ruling, which the court denied 

and later incorporated into the termination order. We generally 

review both a court’s denial of a rule 60(b) motion and a refusal 

to accept an alleged stipulation for an abuse of discretion. See

generally Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ¶ 7, 104 P.3d 1198 

(reviewing a denial of a rule 60(b) motion); Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 

UT App 392, ¶ 6, 197 P.3d 117 (reviewing a district court’s 

refusal to accept a stipulation). And here, we conclude that the 

court did not exceed its discretion when it declined to adopt the 

proffered stipulation. Father’s overall argument—that the 

juvenile court was bound by the parties’ stipulation—is at odds 

both with precedent establishing a juvenile court’s inherent 

discretion to disregard stipulations that intrude upon its core 

responsibilities and with the overarching purpose of juvenile 

courts in protecting a child’s best interest throughout child 

welfare and permanency proceedings.

¶18 The Utah Supreme Court has explained that, while “the 

law favors the settlement of disputes” through agreements 

between parties, there are circumstances in which it is 

appropriate for a court to disregard such agreements and 

stipulations. See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ¶¶ 20–21, 137 P.3d 809. 

Put plainly, a court may disregard stipulations that 

“compromise the core responsibilities of the court.” See id. ¶ 21. 

For example, a court may, pursuant to its fact-finding 

responsibility, disregard agreements regarding certain facts and 

instead “compel the parties to present evidence for the court to 

weigh and evaluate.” Id. ¶ 20; In re D.A.J., 2015 UT App 74, ¶ 6, 

347 P.3d 430 (per curiam) (same). A court also must “exercise 

greater care when delegating judicial functions” in cases “where 
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20170142-CA 8 2018 UT App 141

considerations of public policy or fundamental constitutional 

rights permeate a case.” See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ¶ 26. Child 

welfare and adoption cases are such cases. See id.; see also Utah 

Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5) (LexisNexis 2012) (outlining the 

purposes of the juvenile courts); In re M.H., 2014 UT 26, ¶ 44, 347 

P.3d 368 (Nehring, J., concurring in the result) (explaining that 

when the Juvenile Court Act was enacted its purpose was to “act 

in the interest of Children in various kinds of troubled 

circumstances because of the public interest in their welfare” 

(quotation simplified)).

¶19 To that end, juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction 

over proceedings involving abused, neglected, or dependent 

children within the statutory definitions, including termination 

proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(1)(b), (f) (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2017); see also In re D.A.J., 2015 UT App 74, ¶ 5. And one of 

the juvenile court’s main purposes and responsibilities in these 

types of proceedings is to “act in the best interests of the minor 

in all cases.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5)(g) (2012). Indeed, 

the Juvenile Court Act provides that the court overseeing 

permanency proceedings “shall . . . consider the welfare and best 

interest of the child of paramount importance” in rendering its 

permanency determinations. See id. § 78A-6-503(12) (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2017); see also id. § 78A-6-506(3) (2012); In re M.H., 2014 UT 

26, ¶ 44 (explaining that the “best interests of the children 

remains the guiding principle in juvenile court proceedings 

today” and that “the purpose of the juvenile courts [is] to strive 

to act in the best interests of the children in all cases” (quotations

simplified)); In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶¶ 10, 24, 26, 257 P.3d 

1062 (affirming that “in every [termination of parental rights] 

case, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance in 

determining whether the child-parent relationship should be 

permanently severed”).

¶20 In this regard, our supreme court has explained that 

the court overseeing these types of proceedings retains the 

“final authority over the determination of [a child’s] best 
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20170142-CA 9 2018 UT App 141

interests.” See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ¶¶ 28, 37. This core 

authority to determine a child’s best interest cannot be stipulated 

away by the parties. See id. ¶¶ 21–28, 37; see also R.B. v. L.B., 2014 

UT App 270, ¶¶ 14–17, 339 P.3d 137 (“[P]arties cannot stipulate 

away the district court’s statutory responsibility to conduct a 

best-interest analysis.”); see generally Utah Code Ann. 

§§ 78A-6-503(12), -506(3) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2017) 

(providing that the court determines whether termination is 

appropriate in light of “the welfare and best interest of the 

child,” which is “of paramount importance” (emphasis added)).

¶21 For example, in In re adoption of J.M., 2005 UT App 157, 

135 P.3d 902 (per curiam), although the father delegated his 

parental powers through a signed statement to his own parents, 

the juvenile court instead awarded temporary guardianship to 

the maternal grandparents. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. On appeal, the paternal 

grandparents argued that “the delegation of parental powers 

trumps the juvenile court’s power to determine guardianship of 

the child.” Id. ¶ 2. This court disagreed, noting that “[n]o 

provision in the Utah Code regulating the juvenile court limits 

the juvenile court’s authority when a delegation of parental 

power has been signed.” Id. ¶¶ 2–3. And we observed that “[t]o 

hold otherwise would allow any parent in danger of having their 

parental rights terminated a means of divesting the juvenile 

court of its power to protect the best interests of children”—an 

untenable proposition, given the juvenile court’s ultimate 

authority to determine what is or is not in a child’s best interest. 

See id.

¶22 Similarly, in In re D.A.J., a private party filed a petition to 

terminate the mother’s parental rights and, in the course of the 

proceedings, the mother and the private party entered into a 

stipulation “that addressed many issues related to the custody 

and care” of the child. 2015 UT App 74, ¶ 2. When the juvenile 

court dismissed the termination petition after determining that 

grounds for termination were not established and termination 

was not in the child’s best interest, the private party appealed, 
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20170142-CA 10 2018 UT App 141

arguing that the stipulation “established that [the child] was 

dependent” and, notwithstanding the dismissal of the 

termination petition, the juvenile court should grant the private 

party custody and guardianship of the child. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. We

rejected those arguments, concluding that the juvenile court was 

not bound by the stipulation at issue. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. We determined 

that, regardless of the stipulation, the juvenile court had not 

adjudicated the child as dependent and that parties cannot 

stipulate to a juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction, such as 

through an agreement about a child’s alleged dependency. Id. 

¶ 6. We also reiterated that the court retained discretion to 

disregard “an agreement regarding certain facts” and could 

instead compel the parties to present evidence on the issue. Id.

¶23 Here, the stipulation upon which Father relies 

represented the parties’ determination that, rather than 

terminate Father’s parental rights and proceed with the primary 

permanency goal of adoption, it would be in Child’s best interest 

to place Child in the permanent custody and guardianship of 

Maternal Grandparents. Nevertheless, because that stipulation 

was necessarily predicated upon a determination by the parties 

regarding what was in Child’s best interest, the court was not 

bound by it or obligated to accept it. See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, 

¶¶ 21–28, 37. As we have explained above, one of the juvenile 

court’s core responsibilities is protecting and making 

determinations regarding a child’s best interest. Thus, the 

juvenile court, not the parties, retains the final authority to 

determine, once reunification services to both parents are 

terminated, what permanency goal—permanent custody and 

guardianship or adoption—would be in a child’s best interest. 

See id.; see generally Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314 (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2017) (authorizing a court to determine a final plan in the 

child’s best interest in circumstances where, among other things, 

reunification services were not successful). The court here acted

well within its discretion and its authority, as overseer of the 

permanency proceedings and final arbiter of Child’s best 

interest, to reject the parties’ proffered stipulation and instead 
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20170142-CA 11 2018 UT App 141

continue with the termination proceedings to hear the available 

evidence before making its final permanency determinations.2

Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in

terminating Father’s parental rights.

3

 

2. Father contends that the juvenile court erred when it rejected 

the parties’ stipulation based on Maternal Grandparents’ stated 

desire to adopt Child, because Maternal Grandparents, although

involved on a practical level with the proceedings, were 

nevertheless nonparties to the case. We reject the premise 

underlying this contention. While the court noted Maternal 

Grandparents’ disagreement with the stipulation, our review of 

the November 2016 hearing persuades us that the court did not 

reject the stipulation in deference to Maternal Grandparents’ 

wishes. Rather, the record demonstrates that the court’s decision 

was driven by its determination that it did not “have the 

evidence” at that time to change the permanency goal from 

adoption to permanent custody and guardianship. We therefore 

do not address this contention further.

3. Father also argues that the court erred in rejecting the 

stipulation because the scope of the juvenile court’s authority to 

determine a permanency goal in light of a child’s best interest is 

necessarily usurped by the ethical rules prohibiting an attorney 

from pursuing a frivolous proceeding and by the separation of 

powers between the State, as a representative of the executive 

department with authority to decide which cases to prosecute, 

and the court. We reject both contentions. Father has not 

demonstrated that rule 3.1 of the Utah Rules of Professional 

Conduct “usurps” the juvenile court’s authority to proceed with 

termination proceedings, particularly in light of the juvenile 

court’s unique purpose and authority to protect a child by 

making permanency orders in light of the child’s best interest. 

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5) (LexisNexis 2012); id. 

§ 78A-6-314(4), (9) (Supp. 2017). Similarly, Father has failed to 

(continued...)
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20170142-CA 12 2018 UT App 141

II. Failure to Dismiss the TPR

¶24 Father also argues that the juvenile court erred by 

declining to treat the State’s motion to change the permanency 

goal and dismiss the TPR as a voluntary dismissal under rule 41 

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a dismissal he claims ought 

to have resulted in the juvenile court’s loss of jurisdiction over 

the TPR. In particular, he claims that the court erred because the 

State’s “oral request was proper” under rule 41.

¶25 Father asked the juvenile court in his joint rule 60(b) 

motion to treat the State’s oral motion to change the permanency 

goal and dismiss the TPR as a rule 41 voluntary dismissal. We 

generally review for an abuse of discretion the court’s refusal to 

grant relief on this basis. Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ¶ 7, 104 P.3d 

1198 (“We will generally reverse a [lower] court’s denial of a rule 

60(b) motion only where the court has exceeded its discretion.”). 

However, even if the juvenile court exceeded its discretion in 

failing to grant the relief Father requested, Father is entitled to 

relief on appeal only if he can also demonstrate that he was 

harmed by the alleged error. See In re P.D., 2013 UT App 162, 

¶ 11, 306 P.3d 817 (“On appeal, the appellant has the burden of 

demonstrating an error was prejudicial—that there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 

proceedings.” (quotation simplified)). We conclude that Father’s 

rule 41 challenge fails because, as we explain below, he has not 

shown that he was harmed by the alleged error.

¶26 Rule 41 provides in relevant part that a plaintiff may 

voluntarily “dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . 

a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves an answer 

 

(...continued)

demonstrate that, notwithstanding the juvenile court’s unique 

purpose and authority, requiring the case to proceed with 

termination hearings violated the separation of powers doctrine.
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20170142-CA 13 2018 UT App 141

or a motion for summary judgment; or . . . a stipulation of 

dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” Utah R. Civ. 

P. 41(a)(1)(A). A valid voluntary dismissal under this rule 

renders the proceedings a “nullity,” because “no case in 

controversy exists any longer and, hence, the court . . . lack[s] 

jurisdiction to proceed any further with the action.” Thiele v. 

Anderson, 1999 UT App 56, ¶ 24, 975 P.2d 481 (quotations

simplified). Father claims that the court erred in failing to 

dismiss the TPR because the State’s request, memorialized by its 

later notice of withdrawal, constituted a rule 41 notice of 

dismissal made before the parents had answered the TPR.

¶27 Even assuming for purposes of argument that the court 

ought to have construed the State’s request as a rule 41 dismissal 

and that it was error not to do so, Father has not demonstrated 

that the juvenile court’s alleged error was harmful. See In re J.B., 

2002 UT App 268, ¶¶ 8–12, 53 P.3d 968 (affirming the 

termination of a father’s parental rights where, even though the 

juvenile court erred in relying upon findings from a prior 

termination proceeding in which the father did not participate to 

terminate the mother’s rights, the error was not harmful). “The 

pivotal question is whether the error resulted in prejudice 

sufficient to warrant reversal of the termination order. An error 

is prejudicial only if a review of the record persuades the 

appellate court that without the error there was a reasonable 

likelihood of a more favorable result for the [appellant].” In re C.Y., 

765 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quotation simplified); see 

also Albrecht v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 64, ¶¶ 31–32, 44 P.3d 838 

(declining to reach the merits of an allegedly improper rule 41 

dismissal where the alleged error was harmless in light of the 

record and the other proceedings in the case). Father contends, 

in conclusory fashion, that had the TPR been dismissed, the State 

would not have been forced “to pursue termination against 

him,” and the court would have instead “properly mov[ed] 

towards its concurrent goal of permanent custody and 

guardianship as stipulated to by the parties.”
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20170142-CA 14 2018 UT App 141

¶28 But Father has not shown that, if the TPR had been 

dismissed, the court would have “mov[ed] towards its 

concurrent goal of permanent custody and guardianship.” As we 

have explained, the court was not required to simply accept on 

motion that permanent custody and guardianship would have 

been in Child’s best interest, and Father has not shown that, had 

the TPR been dismissed, the court necessarily would have 

abandoned its primary permanency goal of adoption. To the 

contrary, in the November 2016 hearing, the juvenile court 

expressed its discomfort with proceeding with the concurrent 

goal precisely because it did not believe it had the evidence yet 

that it was in Child’s best interest to do so. See generally In re 

M.H., 2014 UT 26, ¶ 44, 347 P.3d 368 (Nehring, J., concurring in 

the result) (explaining that the “best interests of the children 

remains the guiding principle in juvenile court proceedings 

today” and that “the purpose of the juvenile courts [is] to strive 

to act in the best interests of the children in all cases” (quotations

simplified)). Nor has Father provided any authority to support 

the proposition that in circumstances in which a termination 

petition is dismissed a juvenile court is required to abandon the 

primary permanency goal and instead proceed under the 

concurrent goal. See Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 11–13, 

391 P.3d 196 (suggesting that an appellant will not carry his 

burden of persuasion on appeal if the appellant fails to “cite the 

legal authority on which [his] argument is based and then 

provide reasoned analysis of how that authority should apply in 

the particular case”); see generally Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-

312(10)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017) (providing that the 

juvenile court “may amend a minor’s primary permanency plan 

before the establishment of a final permanency plan,” but that 

“[t]he court is not limited to the terms of the concurrent 

permanency plan in the event that the primary permanency plan 

is abandoned”).

¶29 In this regard, Father has provided little basis for his 

prediction about how the case would have proceeded. Even had 

the TPR been dismissed, the court retained jurisdiction over 
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20170142-CA 15 2018 UT App 141

Child by virtue of Child’s adjudication as neglected, see generally

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(1)(b) (Supp. 2017) (providing that 

the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over a neglected 

child), and its September 2016 decisions—terminating 

reunification services, setting adoption as the final permanency 

goal, and ordering that a petition for termination of both 

parents’ rights be filed—still stood. Father has not shown, for 

example, that in these circumstances it was reasonably likely that 

another interested party—such as Maternal Grandparents or the 

Guardian ad Litem—would have failed to file a termination 

petition pursuant to the court’s permanency order, had the

State’s petition been dismissed. See generally id. § 78A-6-504(1) 

(2012) (providing that “[a]ny interested party, including a foster 

parent, may file a petition for termination of the parent-child 

relationship with regard to a child”). And, regardless of whether 

the TPR was dismissed under rule 41, given the termination of 

reunification services, the court still would have had to decide 

whether adoption or permanent custody and guardianship was 

the proper permanent plan for Child. See id. § 78A-6-314(4) 

(Supp. 2017). To make that decision, the court would have had to 

consider the evidence relevant to that question, just as it had 

pursuant to its decision to terminate Father’s parental rights. 

Father therefore has not demonstrated that, given the posture of 

the case, even if the TPR had been dismissed, the case was 

reasonably likely to have proceeded differently, resulting in a 

different and more favorable outcome for him. See In re J.B., 2002 

UT App 268, ¶¶ 8–12.

¶30 Accordingly, Father has not shown he is entitled to relief 

on appeal. On this basis, we reject his rule 41 challenge to the 

termination of his parental rights.

CONCLUSION

¶31 We reject Father’s argument that the juvenile court erred 

by failing to accept the parties’ stipulation regarding Child’s best 
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20170142-CA 16 2018 UT App 141

interest. We also reject Father’s challenge to the juvenile court’s 

refusal to dismiss the TPR on the basis of rule 41 of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the termination 

of Father’s parental rights as to Child.