IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

JOHN R. FRANCE,

Petitioner,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA,

Respondent,

GILA COUNTY,

Respondent Employer,

ARIZONA COUNTIES INSURANCE POOL,

Respondent Carrier.

No. CV-20-0068-PR

Filed March 2, 2021

Special Action from the Industrial Commission of Arizona

The Honorable Michelle Bodi, Administrative Law Judge

No. ICA 20171-990349

Carrier Claim No. WC17000001316

AWARD SET ASIDE

Opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One

248 Ariz. 349 (App. 2020)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

Matt Fendon (argued), Matt Fendon Law Group, Phoenix; Toby Zimbalist, 

Attorney at Law, Phoenix, Attorneys for John R. France
France v. IGA/Gila County

Opinion of the Court

2

Lori L. Voepel (argued), Eileen Dennis GilBride, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, 

PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Respondent Employer and Respondent 

Carrier

Kristin M. Mackin, William J. Sims III, Sims Mackin LTD, Phoenix, 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Municipal Risk Retention Pool

Robert E. Wisniewski, Law Offices of Robert E. Wisniewski, Phoenix, 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers’ Injury Law & Advocacy Group

________________

JUSTICE GOULD authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES 

BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, and MONTGOMERY joined.

_______________

JUSTICE GOULD, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Under A.R.S. § 23-1043.01(B), employees may receive 

compensation for mental injuries if “some unexpected, unusual or 

extraordinary stress related to [their] employment . . . was a substantial 

contributing cause of the mental injury, illness or condition.” We hold that 

under this statute, a work-related mental injury is compensable if the 

specific event causing the injury was objectively “unexpected, unusual or 

extraordinary.” We further hold that under this objective standard, an 

injury-causing event must be examined from the standpoint of a reasonable 

employee with the same or similar job duties and training as the claimant, 

as opposed to the claimant’s subjective reaction to the event.

¶2 Here, deputy John France developed post-traumatic stress 

disorder (“PTSD”) after he shot and killed a man who threatened him with 

a shotgun during a welfare check (the “Shooting Incident”). In denying 

France’s claim for benefits, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) for the 

Industrial Commission of Arizona (“ICA”) erred by limiting her analysis to 

whether France’s job duties encompassed the possibility of using lethal 

force in the line of duty and failing to consider whether the Shooting 

Incident itself was “unexpected, unusual or extraordinary.” Thus, for the 
France v. IGA/Gila County

Opinion of the Court

3

reasons discussed below, we set aside the ICA’s decision and award 

denying benefits.1

I.

¶3 On June 18, 2017, France, a Gila County deputy sheriff, and 

another deputy were dispatched to a residence to perform a welfare check 

regarding a man threatening to kill himself with a shotgun. France had 

“engaged with the subject two nights before and during that encounter the 

subject had threatened to kill officers.” When the deputies arrived at the 

home, they positioned themselves on either side of a security gate at the 

base of a stairway leading to a doorway on the second floor. France then 

saw a man burst through the doorway, scream in rage, and run down the 

stairs carrying a shotgun. The man advanced towards France, pointing a 

shotgun two to three feet away from his chest and face. Knowing that his 

light-weight vest would not stop a shotgun blast at point-blank range, 

France feared he would be killed. The deputies told the man to drop his 

weapon, but he ignored them.

¶4 Because the man was positioned between the deputies, 

neither one could shoot without putting the other at risk. As the man 

advanced towards France, he backed around the corner of the building 

until he was “pinned” in an area with no further room to retreat. At that 

point, however, the deputies were no longer in each other’s respective line 

of fire, and they shot the man several times. The man fell to the ground 

near France, who watched him die.

¶5 France started having “psychological problems” the next day. 

He never returned to work and retired a few months later. France was later 

diagnosed with PTSD and filed a workers’ compensation claim. However, 

his employer, Gila County, and its insurer, Arizona Counties Insurance 

Pool (collectively, “Gila County”), denied his claim on the grounds his 

PTSD purportedly did not arise from “some unexpected, unusual or 

extraordinary stress related” to his employment. France filed a request for 

a hearing with the ICA.

1 We do not address France’s argument that A.R.S. § 23-1043.01(B) is 

unconstitutional as applied to claimants “who work in high-stress 

occupations” such as law enforcement. Neither the ALJ nor the court of 

appeals considered this argument, and we did not accept it for review. 

Further, because we set aside the ICA’s decision and award, we need not 

address this argument.
France v. IGA/Gila County

Opinion of the Court

4

¶6 An ALJ held a two-day evidentiary hearing, where medical 

experts for both sides agreed that France suffered from PTSD caused by the 

Shooting Incident. Thus, the only contested issue was whether the stress 

he experienced during the Shooting Incident was “unusual, unexpected or 

extraordinary” thereby making his injury compensable under § 23-

1043.01(B).

¶7 Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision denying 

France’s claim. The ALJ concluded that based on France’s training and job 

duties, the Shooting Incident was not unusual, unexpected, or 

extraordinary. Specifically, the ALJ stated that “the stress of if or when to 

employ deadly force is a usual, expected, and ordinary part of a Gila 

County deputies’ [sic] duties,” and therefore “[t]here is nothing in the 

[Shooting Incident] that sets [it] apart from the normal duties of a Gila 

County deputy.” The ALJ further stated that because “Gila County 

deputies are trained to face these types of dangerous situations . . . as being 

a regular part of their duties,” the Shooting Incident was not “unusual, 

unexpected, or extraordinary for a Gila County deputy to encounter . . . on 

the job.”

¶8 France requested review of the decision, which was 

confirmed by the ALJ. Thereafter, the ICA entered a decision and an award 

denying France’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

¶9 France appealed, and the court of appeals set aside the ICA’s 

decision and award. France v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 248 Ariz. 369, 374 ¶ 17 

(App. 2020). The court reasoned that the ALJ, in focusing her analysis on 

France’s “training and job duties,” erroneously based the determination 

“upon the nature of the event, rather than the nature of the stress.” Id. at 373 

¶ 13 (emphasis added). Further, the court held that the phrase 

“unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress” in § 23-1043.01(B), should be 

construed as meaning “that the injury-inducing stress, imposed upon the 

claimant by virtue of his employment was sufficiently significant and 

noteworthy to differentiate it from the non-compensable, general stress 

caused by the work regimen.” France, 248 Ariz. at 371 ¶ 2.

¶10 Because this case involves an issue of statewide importance 

and statutory construction, we granted review.
France v. IGA/Gila County

Opinion of the Court

5

II.

¶11 Gila County argues that in applying § 23-1043.01(B), Arizona 

courts have examined whether an employee’s work-related stress is 

reasonable as compared to the stress experienced by “his fellow 

employees” with the same job duties. But here, Gila County argues, the 

court of appeals applied a standard based solely on France’s subjective, 

personal reaction to the Shooting Incident. France disagrees, claiming that

the court of appeals correctly held that his PTSD was compensable because 

the Shooting Incident itself was objectively “unexpected, unusual or 

extraordinary.”

¶12 Thus, here, we clarify the standard that applies to 

determining whether a mental injury arises from “some unexpected, 

unusual or extraordinary stress related to employment.”

A.

¶13 We review de novo questions of statutory construction. 

Cundiff v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 217 Ariz. 358, 360 ¶ 8 n.2 (2008). 

“We interpret the words of a statute using their ordinary meanings,” Carrow 

Co. v. Lusby, 167 Ariz. 18, 20 (1990), and avoid construing a statute in a

manner that leads to an absurd result. State v. Zeitner, 246 Ariz. 161, 168 

¶ 26 (2019).

¶14 The legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme of laws 

providing compensation for workers injured in the course of their 

employment. Grammatico v. Indus. Comm’n, 211 Ariz. 67, 70 ¶ 13 (2005); 

Twin City Fire Ins. v. Leija, 244 Ariz. 493, 495 ¶ 11 (2018). In 1980, the 

legislature enacted § 23-1043.01(B) to include compensation for workrelated mental injuries. To prove a compensable injury under § 23-

1043.01(B), a claimant must show that: (1) the work-related stress “was a 

substantial contributing cause of the mental injury” and (2) the stress was 

“unexpected, unusual or extraordinary.” Findley v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 

135 Ariz. 273, 276 (App. 1983); see Owens v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 129 Ariz. 

79, 82 (App. 1981) (stating a “claimant bears the burden of establishing all 

material elements” of a mental injury claim); see also Lapare v. Indus. Comm’n 

of Ariz., 154 Ariz. 318, 321 (App. 1987) (stating that, prior to the enactment 

of § 23-1043.01(B), cases involving “mental stress resulting in mental illness 

[were] required to be unexpected, unusual, or extraordinary in order to be 

compensable as an industrial injury”).
France v. IGA/Gila County

Opinion of the Court

6

B.

¶15 Here, it is undisputed that the Shooting Incident caused 

France’s PTSD. Therefore, the sole issue before us is whether his injury was 

caused by some unexpected, unusual, or extraordinary work-related stress.

¶16 There are two general categories of cases addressing this 

issue. One category involves mental injuries caused by a gradual build-up 

of work-related stress. See Arizona Workers’ Compensation Handbook § 5.4.2.2, 

at 5-11 (Ray J. Davis et al. eds., 1992 &Supp. 2015) (discussing mental injury 

cases where “the injury producing event is gradual in onset . . . develop[ing] 

as a result of a gradual buildup of work-related stress”). In such cases, an 

employee’s mental injuries are generally non-compensable because “there 

is neither an articulable work-related event nor an increase in stressful 

activity,” but rather “the resulting disability is caused by ‘gradual 

emotional stress’ related” to the common stresses and strains of the work 

regimen. Archer v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 127 Ariz. 199, 204 (App. 1980); see

Verdugo v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 114 Ariz. 477, 478–79 (App. 1977) (holding 

that a mental injury “is not compensable if it is brought about by the general 

building of emotional stress from the usual, ordinary, and [expected] 

incidents of the workmen’s employment”); Lapare, 154 Ariz. at 320 (to same 

effect); see also 4 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’

Compensation Law § 56.04(2), at 56-24 through 56-25 (2020) (compiling cases 

involving gradual stress causing work-related mental injuries).

¶17 Thus, for example, in Muse v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., the court 

denied a bus driver’s claim where the mental injury built up over a period 

of time and was caused by his “tension and stress derived from the 

responsibilities of driving” a bus. 27 Ariz. App. 312, 313–14 (1976). The 

court concluded that the bus driver’s injury was caused by “nothing other 

than the usual, ordinary and expected incidents of his job as a bus driver.” 

Id. at 314. Similarly, in Shope v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., the court held that 

an employee’s claim was not compensable where the injury was caused by 

his increasing difficulty in getting “the cooperation of the other foremen,” 

and his lack of authority to satisfy “numerous complaints from customers.” 

17 Ariz. App. 23, 23, 25 (1972). Under these circumstances, the court 

concluded that there was “no unexpected injury-causing event,” and that 

“[t]he conflicts which [the employee] experienced were part of the usual, 

ordinary and expected incidents of his employment.” Id. at 25; see Verdugo, 

114 Ariz. at 479 (holding that an applicant’s “psychiatric disability was 

related to his employment only in the sense that the demands of his work 
France v. IGA/Gila County

Opinion of the Court

7

were too much of him; that he had been promoted to a position of 

responsibility beyond his capacity; that his physical symptoms were 

essentially psychosomatic reactions to such stresses”); but see Fireman’s 

Fund Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 119 Ariz. 51, 53–55 (1978) (holding 

that an employee sustained a compensable mental injury caused by the 

gradual build-up of stress due to a dramatically increased workload and 

responsibilities).

¶18 Another category of cases involves a single work-related 

event that is “sudden and unanticipated.” Arizona Workers’ Compensation 

Handbook § 5.4.2.2, at 5-11. Courts have generally held that such claims are 

compensable. Archer, 127 Ariz. at 204; see Brock v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 15 

Ariz. App. 95, 96–97 (1971) (holding that claimant, who aggravated a preexisting mental condition when he “ran over and killed a woman while 

operating a water-truck in the course of his employment,” suffered a 

compensable injury because the subject incident was an “unexpected 

injury-causing event”); see also 4 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law

§ 56.04(1), at 56-15 through 56-23 (compiling cases involving a specific 

work-related event causing mental injuries).

C.

¶19 Courts apply an objective, reasonable person standard in 

determining whether the stress placed on an employee by a work-related 

incident is unexpected, unusual, or extraordinary. See Barnes v. Indus. 

Comm’n of Ariz., 156 Ariz. 179, 183 (App. 1988); Pima Cmty. Coll. v. Indus. 

Comm’n of Ariz., 137 Ariz. 137, 140 (App. 1983). This standard requires 

courts to examine “the stressfulness of work-related events” from the 

standpoint of a “hypothetical ‘reasonable person’” with the same or similar 

job duties as the claimant. Barnes, 156 Ariz. at 184. Additionally, the inquiry 

focuses on the stress imposed on the worker rather than how the worker 

experienced it. See Findley, 135 Ariz. at 276 (stating that the compensability 

of mental injury claims under § 23-1043.01(B) focuses on whether “the 

stress placed upon” an employee was “unexpected, unusual or 

extraordinary”); Archer, 127 Ariz. at 203, 205 (stating the “the test for 

determining the measure of emotional stress is not a subjective one (i.e., 

how the employee reacts to the job), but an objective one (i.e., do the duties 
France v. IGA/Gila County

Opinion of the Court

8

imposed by the job subject the claimant to greater stress than his fellow 

employees?)”). 2

III.

¶20 Here, a specific event—the Shooting Incident—caused 

France’s mental injury. Nevertheless, the ALJ failed to analyze whether the 

Shooting Incident imposed stress on France that was unexpected, unusual, 

or extraordinary. Supra ¶ 7. Instead, the ALJ focused solely on the nature 

and scope of France’s job duties. Thus, the ALJ erred by failing to apply the 

standard required by § 23-1043.01(B).

¶21 It is axiomatic that law enforcement officers are trained to 

respond to welfare checks, and that during such calls there is a possibility 

they might encounter a violent situation. But here, the specific workrelated event that caused France’s injury was the attack on France and his 

subsequent shooting and killing of the gunman. The record in this case 

shows that this type of encounter by a law enforcement officer is 

exceedingly rare. For example, France testified that in his thirty-six years 

as a law enforcement officer, he was involved in two gunfights, including 

the subject incident, and only this incident involved killing a subject. 

Likewise, at the ICA hearing, several law enforcement officers with many 

years of service testified that, while they are trained and prepared to use 

lethal force in the line of duty, they had never been involved in a gunfight. 

And although the estimates varied, the evidence showed that officerinvolved shootings in Gila County were extremely rare, with fewer than ten 

such incidents occurring over the past forty years. In short, the Shooting 

Incident is not the type of incident that is part of a law enforcement officer’s 

daily routine, nor is it expected that a deputy will face such a dramatic 

brush with death in responding to a welfare check.

¶22 We therefore reject Gila County’s argument that to bring a 

compensable mental injury claim under § 23-1043.01(B), a claimant must

prove that the injury-causing event was outside the scope of his assigned 

job duties. To construe the statute in this manner ignores the central inquiry

2 As the court of appeals noted, although Archer addressed whether workrelated stress was unexpected, unusual, or extraordinary in the context of 

heart-related injuries, “which now, by statute, need not arise from any 

particular type of stress,” “[t]he discussion and conclusions in Archer

remain sound as applied to mental injuries . . . .” See France, 248 Ariz. at 373 

¶ 12 n.4. 
France v. IGA/Gila County

Opinion of the Court

9

of § 23-1043.01(B): whether the work-related event itself imposed stress on 

the employee that was “unexpected, unusual or extraordinary.” Indeed, 

based on Gila County’s construction of § 23-1043.01(B), a deputy who 

suffers mental injuries caused by a gunfight, regardless of the 

circumstances, could never receive compensation because such an incident 

might possibly occur in the line of duty.

¶23 We emphasize that our holding today is limited to mental 

injuries arising from a specific work-related incident and does not 

encompass gradual injuries resulting from ordinary stresses and strains of 

the work regimen. However, unlike gradual injuries, when a work-related 

event is (like the Shooting Incident here) objectively unexpected, unusual,

or extraordinary, it is more likely to produce objectively unexpected, 

unusual, or extraordinary stress, and, therefore, give rise to a compensable 

injury. Supra ¶ 18.

¶24 Finally, we note that not all mental injuries caused by violent

encounters experienced by law enforcement officers in the line of duty are 

compensable. As a preliminary matter, an officer must first establish that 

his work-related stress was a substantial contributing cause of his mental 

injury. Unlike the present case, many claims may not satisfy this initial 

hurdle. Additionally, a court must examine the stressfulness of any such 

incident from the standpoint of a “reasonable person” with the same or 

similar job duties as the claimant, e.g., another law enforcement officer.

Thus, applying this standard, officers may be involved in many encounters 

in the line of duty that produce expected, common, and ordinary stress.

CONCLUSION

¶25 For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the court of 

appeals’ opinion and set aside the ICA’s decision and award denying 

France’s workers’ compensation benefits.