This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

Before 

KISOR, MIZER, and HARRELL

Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Roneshia L. REDMOND

Damage Controlman First Class Petty Officer (E-6), U.S. Navy

Appellant

No. 202300130

_________________________

Decided: 6 August 2024

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: 

Justin R. McEwen

Sentence adjudged 1 March 2023 by a special court-martial tried at U.S. 

Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece, consisting of a military 

judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E-5

and forfeiture of $1,000.00 pay per month for three months.

For Appellant:

Lieutenant Zoe R. Danielczyk, JAGC, USN

For Appellee: 

Lieutenant Michael A. Tuosto, JAGC, USN
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

2

_________________________

This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but 

may be cited as persuasive authority under 

NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

_________________________

PER CURIAM:

Appellant was convicted, contrary to her pleas, of one specification of willful 

disobedience of a petty officer in violation of Article 91, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).1 Appellant filed a timely appeal pursuant to Article 

66(b)(1)(A),2 asserting one assignment of error (AOE): whether the evidence is 

factually insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction of willful disobedience 

of a petty officer.3 We find no prejudicial error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

An ordinary shift for security personnel at Entry Control Point (ECP) India, 

U.S. Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece, became less so for a moment 

when Appellant pulled up in her car with two passengers in the early morning 

hours of 10 December 2022. 

When Appellant stopped behind the drop arm barrier at the ECP, Masterat-Arms Petty Officer Second Class (MA2) Victor4 approached Appellant from 

the guard shack, accepted Appellant’s identification card, and noticed Appellant to have an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and glossy eyes. Since Appellant 

sought entry through the ECP during the daily 0000–0500 command authorized sobriety checkpoint, MA2 Victor advised Appellant of the requirement to 

blow into an Alco-Blow alcohol detection device. Appellant had no interest in 

that and refused. Master-at-Arms Petty Officer First Class (MA1) Bravo, the 

watch commander who happened to be at the ECP for a post check, reiterated 

 

1 10 U.S.C. § 891.

2 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1)(A).

3 Appellant raised this issue pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 

(C.M.A. 1982).

4 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel, 

are pseudonyms.
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

3

the requirement to Appellant, and Appellant reiterated her refusal. Instead, 

she reversed her car away from the ECP against the orders of MA2 Victor and 

MA1 Bravo, dropped off her passengers, and drove away. A third Sailor at the 

ECP, Master-at-Arms Petty Officer Third Class (MA3) Foxtrot, observed part 

of the encounter from the guard shack, and the three testified about the minute-long run-in at Appellant’s court-martial for failing to obey a base order by 

refusing to submit to a breath analysis in violation of Article 92, UCMJ, and 

willfully disobeying MA2 Victor’s order to not drive away from the ECP in violation of Article 91, UCMJ.5

MA2 Victor testified in relevant part as follows:

Q: When [Appellant] pulled up, what, if anything, did you 

notice about her?

A: I can smell like alcohol on her breath. When I started 

talking to her, she was slurring her words a little bit, 

and her eyes were glossy. Other than that, she handed 

me her [identification card] like a normal person would 

have. 

Q: What did you do when she handed you her identification?

A: I told her that we were going to do the Alco-Blow. I explained it to her a little bit because I had to grab her ID 

to hand it to my cover sentry, and I was also looking at 

the passenger’s IDs as well. 

Q: So, you said that you told her about the Alco-Blow. 

What is it that you told her?

A: I explained to her the reason why I was taking the ID 

was because we had to write it down for inspection and 

that I had to perform an Alco-Blow on her.

. . . . 

Q: After you informed [Appellant] that you needed to perform an Alco-Blow test, what is it that she said to you?

 

5 The Government also charged Appellant with willfully disobeying an order of 

MA2 Victor to submit to a breath analysis, but the military judge dismissed the specification before trial. 
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

4

A: She was saying, “No, no, no. You don’t have to do that,” 

because I was handing the ID to [MA3 Foxtrot]. She 

said, “No. It’s okay.”

. . . . 

Q: [W]hat, if anything, did you explain to [Appellant] to 

get her to comply?

A: So, I turned back around, and I told her that it’s a command authorized breathalyzer or Alco-Blow, that everybody has to do it coming onto base in these hours, and 

I explained to her the process of a breathalyzer, that it 

had to be a steady blow into it, until it beeps. 

Q: How did [Appellant] respond to you after you explained 

that?

A: She was just basically saying, “No, I’m not doing that. 

I’m just here to drop these people off.”

. . . . 

Q: How did the interaction ultimately end with [Appellant]?

A: She told us that she was just going to reverse back, and 

we told her no, and then she continued on with the reversing back, and she basically did a U-turn right in 

front before India Post, and she turned around, dropped 

off the personnel that was in the car at the stop sign 

right there, leaving, and then she left. 

Q: Did anyone give her permission to reverse?

A: No. We told her that she wasn’t allowed to do that.

Q: What was your volume when you were communicating 

to [Appellant] about not reversing?

A: It was loud enough for her to hear. I did increase my 

volume because she was reversing and going further 

away, but it was--it was loud enough for her to hear. 

. . . . 

Q: [W]as there any obstruction to her reversing at that 

time?

A: There was another vehicle at the stop sign waiting to 

come through the gate.
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

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. . . . 

Q: After you told [Appellant] not to reverse, how did she 

react?

A: She just continued to reverse, and she said, “No, no, no. 

I’m not doing that.”6

MA2 Victor later narrated a video (sans audio) of the encounter introduced 

into evidence. She testified:

Q: So, what was it that [Appellant] was saying there as 

she pointed behind her and looked behind her?

A: She said, “I’m just going to reverse back right here.”

Q: And what was it that she--how did you respond?

A: We told her, no, she couldn’t do that.7

The Government then called MA1 Bravo. After recounting the conversation 

about the Alco-Blow, she testified:

Q: [H]ow did the interaction that night end?

A: So, after that happened, I said, “Okay. You don’t have 

to do it. Denying it is also your right, but I’m going to 

keep your ID, and I need to make notifications.”

Q: How did [Appellant] respond when you said that you

needed to make notifications?

A: She stated, “I’m good. Y’all can keep the ID. I’m leaving.”

Q: Had anyone given [Appellant] permission to reverse?

A: No. 

Q: Did anyone explain to [Appellant] that she could not reverse?

A: Yes. 

Q: What--who said something?

A: I said, “How are you leaving? There’s a vehicle behind 

you, and you can’t leave.”

 

6 R. at 190–94.

7 R. at 201.
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

6

Q: How did [Appellant] respond? 

A: She reversed. She--she started to reverse slowly, and 

[MA2 Victor] told her, “You can’t leave,” and then she 

just reversed. 

Q: After you told--after [MA2 Victor] told [Appellant] not 

to reverse, did [Appellant] make any response? 

A: I didn’t hear a response. 

Q: At any point do you recall [Appellant] stating, “This is 

me leaving”? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Could you describe in what context she said that? 

A: After--it was between when I told her and I--I told her 

she couldn’t leave and when [MA2 Victor] told her she 

couldn’t leave.8

MA3 Foxtrot rounded out the matter:

Q: So, you just mentioned that you heard [Appellant] say,

“This is me leaving now.” Did [MA2 Victor] give any order to [Appellant] about reversing?

A: She said, “Stop. You can’t do that.” And then her and 

[MA1 Bravo] as well, once [MA2 Victor] stopped talking, [MA1 Bravo] took more of the reigns [sic]. She was 

the higher ranking personnel, and, you know, she was 

kind of helping us out because we didn’t know what to 

do in a sense where someone just turned from India 

Gate back.9

The military judge acquitted Appellant of failing to obey the base order by 

refusing to submit to a breath analysis, and he convicted her of willfully disobeying MA2 Victor’s order to not drive away from the ECP. He entered special 

findings upon the Defense’s request, writing in relevant part:

On this is of [sic] order to not drive away from the ECP, the court 

relied on the following evidence: (1) [MA2 Victor] testimony that 

when the accused said she was backing up from the ECP, [MA1 

 

8 R. at 252–54.

9 R. at 346.
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

7

Bravo] said, “no you cannot do that.” This is circumstantial evidence establishing that the accused was on notice that she cannot leave the ECP; (2) [MA1 Bravo], [MA3 Foxtrot], and [MA2 

Victor’s] testimony that when the Accused began to reverse and 

stated that “this is me backing up”, [MA2 Victor] stated “no you 

can’t do that.” This is direct evidence that [MA2 Victor] ordered 

the accused to not back up and leave the ECP; (3) The testimony 

of [MA1 Bravo], [MA2 Victor], and [MA3 Foxtrot] that when the 

accused was backing up from India Gate, she was leaving the 

ECP; and, (4) The video evidence showing the accused backing 

up from the ECP.10

This “timely appeal from the judgment of a court-martial . . . that includes 

a finding of guilty” followed.11 Additional facts necessary to resolve the AOE 

are discussed below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Law

Article 66(d)(1)(B), Factual Sufficiency Review, provides:

(i) In an appeal of a finding of guilty . . . the Court may consider 

whether the finding is correct in fact upon request of the accused 

if the accused makes a specific showing of a deficiency in proof.

(ii) After an accused has made such a showing, the Court may 

weigh the evidence and determine controverted questions of fact 

subject to—

(I) appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw 

and heard the witnesses and other evidence; and

(II) appropriate deference to findings of fact entered into the 

record by the military judge.

(iii) If, as a result of the review conducted under clause (ii), the 

Court is clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against 

 

10 Appellate Ex. XVII at 2–3. 

11 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1)(A).
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

8

the weight of the evidence, the Court may dismiss, set aside, or 

modify the finding, or affirm a lesser finding.12

Accordingly, “to trigger factual sufficiency review under the present Article 

66(d)(1)(B), Congress requires two circumstances be present: (1) a request of 

the accused; and (2) a specific showing of a deficiency in proof.”13 To make a 

specific showing of a deficiency in proof, “an appellant must identify a weakness in the evidence admitted at trial to support an element (or more than one 

element) and explain why, on balance, the evidence (or lack thereof) admitted 

at trial contradicts a guilty finding.”14 Then, “this Court will weigh the evidence in a deferential manner to the result at trial. If we are clearly convinced 

that, when weighed, the evidence (including the testimony) does not support a 

conviction, we may set it aside.”15

B. Analysis

The Government charged Appellant as follows: 

In that Damage Controlman First Class Roneshia Redmond,

U.S. Navy, U.S. Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece, on 

active duty, having received a lawful order from [MA2 Victor], 

U.S. Navy, a petty officer, then known by the accused to be a 

petty officer, to not drive away from the Entry Control Point, an 

order which it was her duty to obey, did, at or near Souda Bay, 

Greece, on or about 10 December 2022, willfully disobey the 

same.16

The elements of this offense are:

(1) That Appellant was an enlisted member;

(2) That Appellant received a lawful order from MA2 Victor, a 

petty officer, to not drive away from the Entry Control Point;

(3) That Appellant then knew that MA2 Victor was a petty officer;

(4) That Appellant had a duty to obey the order; and

 

12 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B).

13 United States v. Harvey, 83 M.J. 685, 691 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2023), rev. 

granted, __ M.J. __, No. 23-0239/NA, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 13 (C.A.A.F. Jan. 10, 2024).

14 Id.

15 Id. at 693.

16 Charge Sheet.
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

9

(5) That, on or about 10 December 2022, at or near Souda Bay, 

Greece, Appellant willfully disobeyed the order.

Appellant focuses on the second element, arguing that the Government 

failed to prove that MA2 Victor actually issued an order to Appellant. She could 

not have disobeyed an order that was not given, the argument logically continues, attacking the fifth element by extension. So was that order given? The 

three Masters-at-Arms testified as much, the military judge found as much, 

and we give appropriate deference to such. 

Appellant identifies a handful of perceived weaknesses in the evidence admitted at trial. First, Appellant highlights points scored on cross-examination 

of MA2 Victor, particularly her concession that “her testimony on direct examination was not a ‘word for word’ account of what she told Appellant on the 

night in question.”17 This is apparently premised on the following exchange 

during cross-examination:

Q: You went through the video, and you remembered word 

for word what happened pretty specifically?

A: No, not word for word, but I do remember the basis of 

what I was trying to--or what I was telling her.

Q: So, the testimony you gave while the Prosecution 

played the video was not an exact word-for-word----

A: I can’t say if----

Q: ----of what happened?

A: I can’t say if it was word for word or not, sir. This did 

happen a while ago. So, I don’t want to say this is exactly what I said. But, based off what I said was the--

the basis of what I was telling her that night.

Q: So, in the beginning, we’ve talked about the importance 

of exactly what you said and did?

A: Yes.

Q: Your testimony today is that you’re not sure if that was 

word-for-word what she said while they were playing 

the video?

. . . .

 

17 Appellant’s Br. at 15–16.
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

10

A: I know what I said, but I can’t say it was word for word 

exactly the words I used that same night.

Q: You’re giving your best guess at what you said----

A: I wouldn’t--

Q: ----specifically word for word?

A: I wouldn’t say it was a guess. I do know what I said that 

night, but I don’t want to input words that I did say or 

input words I didn’t say, in case I get the word wrong.18

Suitable cross-examination there, but not enough to sway either the factfinder or us. MA2 Victor reasonably conceded the possibility of an imperfect 

memory of the precise words she uttered a few months before, but she maintained the thrust of it all—an order to not drive away from the ECP—which 

was corroborated by two witnesses within earshot. 

Appellant also makes much of MA2 Victor admitting on cross-examination 

that her pretrial statement that she stepped towards Appellant’s car as she 

ordered Appellant not to reverse was untrue. True, a video admitted into evidence evinces no step toward Appellant’s car as it reversed, but MA2 Victor’s 

immobility in that moment bears no load other than perhaps whether Appellant could hear—and thus willfully disobey—MA2 Victor’s order to not drive 

away from the ECP. To that point, MA2 Victor testified on direct-examination

and maintained on cross-examination that she increased the volume of her 

voice when issuing the order. She also testified that there were no interfering 

noises. MA3 Foxtrot agreed, testifying that MA2 Victor was “authoritative” 

and used a “raised voice.”19 And whatever hit to MA2 Victor’s credibility this 

impeachment caused was evidently not compelling in the view of the military 

judge, who heard and saw this and the other witnesses. We give appropriate 

deference to that, and we do not disagree. 

Appellant also highlights that MA1 Bravo’s detailed, close-in-time description of this incident in the desk journal, a record maintained by the Security 

Department, contains no reference to an order from MA2 Victor to Appellant 

not to drive away from the ECP. If this order had been given, argues Appellant, 

it would have been recorded in the desk journal. Log it or it didn’t happen is 

perhaps a helpful mantra for watch and duty standers, but it is unavailing 

here. To be sure, the absence of a written record of a matter may be probative 

 

18 R. at 219–20.

19 R. at 362. 
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

11

in some instances,20 but against the backdrop of the testimony of the three 

percipient witnesses, that absence here it is not fatal to the Government’s case.

Though Appellant satisfactorily raises specific deficiencies in proof, triggering our factual sufficiency review, we have weighed the evidence and are not 

clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence.21 

 

20 Cf. Mil. R. Evid. 803(7).

21 Though we, as Appellant, focus primarily herein on whether MA2 Victor issued 

an order to Appellant, we have assessed each element of the offense and the evidence 

thereof introduced at trial, and we conclude that the finding of guilty is both factually 

and legally sufficient. 
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Opinion of the Court

12

III. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we 

have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and 

that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred.22

However, we note that the Entry of Judgment is deficient in two respects. 

First, it does not adequately summarize each specification referred to trial as 

required by Rule for Courts-Martial 1111(b)(1)(A) and our published opinion 

in United States v. Wadaa.23 Second, it does not reflect the disposition of the 

charges referred to trial, but only that of the specifications. Although we find 

no prejudice, Appellant is entitled to have court-martial records that correctly 

reflect the content of his proceeding.24 In accordance with Rule for Courts-Martial 1111(c)(2), we modify the Entry of Judgment and direct that it be included 

in the record.

The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT:

MARK K. JAMISON

Clerk of Court

 

22 10 U.S.C. §§ 859, 866.

23 __ M.J. ___ No. 202300273, 2024 CCA LEXIS 148 at *6 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 

25, 2024).

24 United States v. Sutton, 81 M.J. 677 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2021); United States 

v. Crumpley, 49 M.J. 538, 539 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

UNITED STATES

v.

Roneshia L. REDMOND

Damage Controlman First Class 

Petty Officer (E-6) 

U.S. Navy

Accused

NMCCA NO. 202300130

ENTRY

OF 

JUDGMENT

As Modified on Appeal

6 August 2024

On 27 February–1 March 2023, the Accused was tried at U.S. Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece, by special court-martial consisting of a military judge sitting 

alone. Military Judge Justin R. McEwen presided.

FINDINGS

The following are the Accused’s pleas and the Court’s finding to all offenses the 

convening authority referred to trial: 

Charge I: Violation of Article 91, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 

10 U.S.C. § 891.

Plea: Not Guilty.

Finding: Guilty.

Specification 1: Willfully disobeying the lawful order of a petty officer 

to submit to a breath analysis on or about 10 

December 2022.

Plea: Not Guilty.

Finding: Dismissed without prejudice.

Specification 2: Willfully disobeying the lawful order of a petty officer 

to not drive away from the Entry Control Point on or 

about 10 December 2022.

Plea: Not Guilty.

Finding: Guilty.
United States v. Redmond, NMCCA No. 202300130

Modified Entry of Judgment

2

Charge II: Violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 

10 U.S.C. § 892.

Plea: Not Guilty.

Finding: Not Guilty.

Specification: Failure to obey other lawful order, 

NAVSUPPACTSOUDABAYINST 5560.2, by refusing to 

submit to a breath analysis on or about 10 December 

2022.

Plea: Not Guilty.

Finding: Not Guilty.

SENTENCE

On 1 March 2023, the military judge sentenced the Accused to the following: 

Reduction to pay grade E-5.

Forfeiture of $1,000 pay per month for three months. 

FOR THE COURT:

MARK K. JAMISON

Clerk of Court