COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker and Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

WALTER LEE RAINES, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0835-95-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 MAY 7, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Timothy J. Hauler, Judge 

 D. Gregory Carr (Bowen & Bowen, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 In this criminal appeal, Walter Lee Raines contends that the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for petit 

larceny and vandalism. We hold that the evidence is sufficient 

and we affirm the defendant's convictions. 

 At trial, Belinda Castaneeda testified that she witnessed 

the defendant and another man break into a car parked at an 

apartment complex where Castaneeda's fiance resided and take the 

car's stereo. The defendant did not object to the admissibility 

of Castaneeda's identification of him as the thief, but he 

contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support 

the convictions because the identification was "unreliable." He 

argues that without a reliable identification the only other 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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evidence tending to connect him with the crime was the fact that 

his car was located near the apartments where the crimes were 

committed, which is insufficient to prove that he committed the 

crimes. 

 In determining the reliability of identification evidence, 

the reviewing court must consider 

 the opportunity of the witness to view the 

criminal at the time of the crime, the 

witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of 

the witness' prior description of the 

criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated 

by the witness at the confrontation, and the 

length of time between the crime and the 

confrontation. 

Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 331, 362 S.E.2d 650, 663 

(1987) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)), 

cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988). Although the defendant does 

not contest the admissibility of Castaneeda's identification, the 

factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers are also relevant in 

determining whether identification evidence is sufficient, 

standing alone or in combination with other evidence, to 

establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Smallwood v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 527, 530, 418 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1992) 

(applying the Neil v. Biggers analysis even though the accused 

did not appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress 

the identifications). 

 Here, Castaneeda testified that the parking lot where the 

crimes occurred was "well-lit" and that she viewed the suspects 

from a distance of thirty to thirty-five feet. She initially saw 
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the two men "walking through the parking lot" and continued to 

watch them as they broke into the car and took the stereo. 

Therefore, despite Castaneeda's admission on cross-examination 

that the light was not "shining directly" on the two men, the 

evidence indicates that she had an opportunity to view the 

perpetrators and focused her attention on them at all times 

during the commission of the crimes. 

 Most significantly, Castaneeda was unequivocal in her 

identification of the defendant. Cf. Smallwood, 14 Va. App. at 

532, 418 S.E.2d at 569 (holding that there were "significant 

inconsistencies between [the witness'] pre-trial description of 

[the accused] and her acknowledgment of his actual appearance at 

trial," and that her testimony at the preliminary hearing was 

less certain than it was at trial). Contrary to the defendant's 

assertion at oral argument, Castaneeda did not merely state that 

the defendant's profile was similar to that of one of the men who 

broke into the car. Defense counsel used the term "similar" in 

questioning Castaneeda, but the record is clear that Castaneeda 

positively identified the defendant and confirmed that there was 

"[n]o question in [her] mind" that he was one of the two men she 

saw break into the car. Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 

250, 421 S.E.2d 821, 839 (1992) ("Of the most significance on the 

subject of [the witness'] level of certainty . . . is the fact 

that her in-court identification of [the accused] was 

unequivocally positive"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1993). 
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 The fact that Castaneeda first confronted the defendant at a 

court proceeding prior to trial and admitted that she knew that 

he was standing where defendants normally stand does not taint 

her identification and render it unreliable. See Thomas v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 859, 434 S.E.2d 319, 324-25 (1993) 

(holding that the fact that the defendant was handcuffed during 

the showup and wearing "jail garb" at the preliminary hearing did 

not invalidate the identifications), aff'd en banc, 18 Va. App. 

454, 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994). Furthermore, the identification is 

not invalid merely because there is evidence that the initial 

confrontation occurred more than one month after the crimes were 

committed. "[T]he lapse of time alone is not sufficient to 

render an identification unreliable as a matter of law." 

Satcher, 244 Va. at 250, 421 S.E.2d at 839. 

 Finally, the fact that Castaneeda did not see a front view 

of the defendant's face, but identified him by his profile 

affects the weight to be accorded the identification rather than 

its reliability. The trial court is capable of "measur[ing] 

intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has 

some questionable feature. . . . The defect, if there be one, 

goes to weight and not to substance." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 

U.S. 98, 116-17 (1977). 

 In light of "the totality of circumstances in this case," we 

find that Castaneeda's in-court identification of the defendant 

was reliable. Satcher, 244 Va. at 250, 421 S.E.2d at 839. 
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Accordingly, Castaneeda's testimony that the defendant was one of 

the men who broke into the car, combined with the evidence that 

the defendant's vehicle was located less than one mile from the 

apartment complex where the crimes were committed, is sufficient 

to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Affirmed.