EXHIBIT D

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ALJ/SPT/SL5/ek4 Date of Issuance 12/6/2017

Decision 17-11-033 November 30, 2017

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Application of San Diego Gas & Electric 

Company (U902E) for Authorization to 

Recover Costs Related to the 2007 

Southern California Wildfires Recorded in 

the Wildfire Expense Memorandum 

Account (WEMA).

Application 15-09-010

DECISION DENYING APPLICATION

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Table of Contents

Title Page

-iDECISION DENYING APPLICATION........................................................................ 1

Summary ........................................................................................................................... 2

1. Factual Background......................................................................................... 2

2. Procedural Background.................................................................................. 3

3. Legal Standards Applied................................................................................ 9

4. Discussion and Analysis............................................................................... 11

4.1. Witch Fire ............................................................................................... 11

4.1.1. Witch Fire Background ........................................................... 11

4.1.2. SDG&E’s Position on its Operation and Management of its 

Facilities Prior to the Witch Fire ............................................ 15

4.1.3 ORA’s Position on SDG&E’s Operation and 

Management of its Facilities Prior to the Witch Fire ......... 21

4.1.4. Intervenors’ Position on SDG&E’s Operation and 

Management of its Facilities Prior to the Witch Fire .......... 24

4.1.5. Reasonableness Review: SDG&E’s Operation and 

Management of its Facilities Prior to the Witch Fire ......... 27

4.2. Guejito Fire ............................................................................................. 29

4.2.1. Guejito Fire Background......................................................... 29

4.2.2. SDG&E’s Position on its Operation and Management 

of its Facilities Prior to the Guejito Fire ............................... 31

4.2.3. ORA’s Position on SDG&E’s Operation and Management 

of its Facilities Prior to the Guejito Fire ................................ 33

4.2.4. Reasonableness Review: SDG&E’s Operation and 

Management of its Facilities Prior to the Guejito Fire....... 35

4.3. Rice Fire .................................................................................................. 36

4.3.1. Rice Fire Background .............................................................. 36

4.3.2. Legal Requirements................................................................. 37

4.3.3. Issues and Party Positions ...................................................... 38

4.3.3.1. FF1090’s Inspection and Trimming Schedule .......... 38

4.3.3.2. FF1090’s latent defect and the issue of Reliability 

Trees ................................................................................. 40

4.3.4. Discussion ................................................................................. 41

4.3.4.1. SDG&E’s Tree Inspection and Trimming Schedule.. 42

4.3.4.2. FF1090’s Latent Defect and the Issue of Reliability 

Trees ................................................................................. 47

4.4. Commission Precedent......................................................................... 49

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Table of Contents

Title Page

ii

4.5. Wind and Weather Conditions in October 2007.............................. 55

4.6. Reconsideration of Threshold Issues.................................................. 61

5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 61

6. Intervenor Compensation ............................................................................ 64

7. Comments on Proposed Decision ............................................................... 64

8. Assignment of Proceeding ........................................................................... 65

Findings of Fact .............................................................................................................. 65

Conclusions of Law........................................................................................................ 69

ORDER .......................................................................................................................... 72

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DECISION DENYING APPLICATION

Summary

This decision finds that San Diego Gas & Electric Company did not 

reasonably manage and operate its facilities prior to the 2007 Southern California 

Wildfires and therefore denies the utility’s request to recover costs recorded in its 

Wildfire Expense Memorandum Account. Because we deny this application on 

its merits, the issue preliminarily scoped for phase two of this proceeding is 

moot. 

This proceeding is closed. 

1. Factual Background

Beginning on October 21, 2007, a fire storm ripped through portions of 

Southern California. This fire storm, which was comprised of more than a dozen 

fires, spread over portions of Orange, San Diego, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, 

Ventura, Santa Barbara, and Riverside counties. These wildfires caused 

extensive damage to properties in the region, widespread evacuations, and 

fatalities.1 Investigative reports issued in the aftermath of the 2007 wildfires by 

the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) and the 

Commission’s Consumer Protection and Safety Division (CPSD) (now the Safety 

and Enforcement Division), attributed the ignition of three of these wildfires to 

San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) facilities. These three fires, the 

Witch, Guejito and Rice wildfires (2007 Wildfires), are the subject of the instant 

proceeding. 

On September 25, 2015, SDG&E filed Application (A.) 15-09-010 seeking 

Commission approval to recover $379 million recorded in its Wildfire Expense 

 

1 Application (A.) 15-09-010 at 2.

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Memorandum Account (WEMA). The WEMA is an account established per 

Resolution E-4311, to track costs associated with the Witch, Guejito, and Rice 

wildfires. The $379 million represents a portion of the total $2.4 billion in costs 

and legal fees incurred by SDG&E to resolve third-party damage claims arising 

from the Witch, Guejito and Rice Wildfires.2 When translated into typical 

residential rates, the WEMA costs would lead to an increase of $1.67 per month 

when amortized over six years. 

2. Procedural Background 

The 2007 Wildfires were the subject of two prior proceedings before the 

Commission. Investigation (I.) 08-11-0073 concluded with Decision 

(D.) 10-04-047, which approved a settlement agreement between the 

Commission’s CPSD and SDG&E. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, 

SDG&E paid penalties ($14.75 million) but did not admit to any safety violation 

or role in the cause of the 2007 wildfires.4 Subsequently, SDG&E, alongside 

Southern California Gas Company and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, filed

A.09-08-020 to seek authority to establish a Wildfire Expense Balancing Account 

(WEBA) to record future recovery costs associated with the 2007 Wildfires. 

D.12-12-029 ultimately denied the utilities’ request to open the WEBA.

5 

 

2 A.15-09-010 at 1. Portions of the $2.4 billion were recovered from liability insurance coverage 

($1.1 billion) and settlement payments from third parties (Cox Communications and three contractors 

totaling $824 million). Other portions of the costs were allocated to Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission jurisdictional rates. In addition, SDG&E proposes to voluntarily contribute $42 million. 

(Id. at 7.) 

3 Investigation on the Commission’s own Motion into the Operations and Practices of SDG&E 

Regarding the Utility Facilities linked to the Witch and Rice Fires in 2007. 

4 D.10-04-047 at 5.

5 Ordering Paragraph 1 of D.12-12-029. 

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D.12-12-029 additionally ordered the memorandum accounts (WEMA), 

authorized by Commission Resolution E-4311, to remain open pending a 

reasonableness review6 in an appropriate proceeding.7 Following this order, 

SDG&E filed A.15-09-010 on September 25, 2015. 

Between October 23 and October 30, 2015, protests were timely filed 

and served by San Diego Consumers’ Action Network (SDCAN), the Utility 

Consumers’ Action Network (UCAN), The Utility Reform Network, Center for 

Accessible Technology (TURN/CforAT), Protect Our Communities Foundation 

(POC), Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA), and Mussey Grade Road Alliance 

(MGRA). TURN/CforAT argued that the proceeding should be phased, with the 

first phase addressing whether SDG&E had prudently managed its facilities and 

operations and the second phase addressing the reasonableness of the and timing 

of the amounts requested.8 Under this proposal, Phase 2 would only be reached 

if it was determined that SDG&E had prudently managed its facilities. 

Ruth Henricks (Henricks) filed and served a Motion for Party Status on 

October 2, 2015 that was subsequently granted. 

 

6 There is usually a significant distinction between a balancing account and a memorandum 

account as used by the Commission. Both accounts are typically employed to ensure the 

accurate recovery of the actual cost of a regulatory program. The goal is to avoid the risk of 

over- or under-recovery in retail rates of reasonably incurred program costs. Balancing 

accounts have an associated expectation of recovery. They have been pre-authorized by the 

Commission, and it is the amounts -- and not the creation of the accounts themselves -- that the 

Commission reviews for reasonableness. Memorandum accounts, in contrast, are accounts in 

which the utilities record amounts for tracking purposes. While the utilities may later ask for 

recovery of the amounts in those accounts, recovery is not guaranteed. See D.03-06-013 at 4-5.

7 Ordering Paragraph 2 of D.12-12-029.

8 TURN/CforAT Protest at 4.

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In its November 9, 2015 reply, SDG&E opposed phasing A.15-09-010 and 

the protestors’ request to incorporate the record from the prior proceedings as 

part of the record for the instant proceeding. Additionally, SDG&E stated that 

the reasonableness standard should only be applied to: (1) its decision to pursue

the settlement of the claims stemming from the 2007 Wildfires litigation; (2) the 

process SDG&E employed in settling the claims; and (3) its efforts in reducing 

the costs.9 

On February 19, 2016, a Joint Proposed Schedule was served by MGRA, 

ORA, POC, Henricks, SDCAN, TURN, and UCAN (collectively, the Joint 

Intervenors). The Joint Proposed Schedule requested that A.15-09-010 be 

litigated in phases as proposed by TURN/CforAT, and that parties be provided 

with the opportunity to brief certain threshold legal and policy issues in relation 

to the appropriateness of the rate recovery.

The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) convened a prehearing 

conference on February 22, 2016. Subsequently the assigned Commissioner 

issued a Scoping Memorandum and Ruling (Scoping Ruling) on April 11, 2016. 

The Scoping Ruling implemented a two-phase approach for this 

proceeding with a separate reasonableness review for each phase. Phase 1 was 

to address whether any threshold legal issues raised by the Joint Intervenors 

should be a bar to the application and prudent operation of the facilities. 

Specifically, Phase 1 was scoped as:

 

9 SDG&E Reply at 3; Scoping Ruling at 3.

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(1) Whether any of the Threshold Issues10 serves as a bar to 

recovery; and

(2) Whether SDG&E’s operation, engineering and 

management the facilities alleged to have been involved in 

the ignition of the fires was reasonable and prudent. Each 

of the three fires should be addressed separately.11

The Scoping Ruling stated that prior Commission decisions indicate that a 

reasonableness standard should entail a review of the prudency of SDG&E’s 

actions leading up to the fire. The Scoping Ruling specifically referenced 

D.14-06-007 in which the Commission held that for costs to be found reasonable, 

the utility must prove that they were: 

prudently incurred by competent management exercising 

the best practices of the era, and using well-trained, 

well-informed and conscientious employees who are 

performing their jobs properly...[T]he Commission can and 

must disallow those costs: that is unjust and unreasonable 

costs must not be recovered in rates from ratepayers.12

The Scoping Ruling further stated that this standard is consistent with the 

Commission’s obligation under Pub. Util. Code § 451 to ensure that resulting 

rates will be just and reasonable and that service is provided in a safe manner. 

Opening briefs on Threshold Issues were filed by SDG&E, ORA and 

UCAN on May 11, 2016. On May 26, 2016, Reply briefs were filed by SDG&E 

 

10 The Threshold Issues are: Whether rate recovery would create a moral hazards . . . the fairness of 

imposing rate increases on San Diego customers, particularly those who were already victims of the 

fires..., and whether SDG&E has already been compensated for such risks in its rates and whether it 

warrants special recovery outside of the normal general rate case process...: (Scoping Ruling at 6 citing 

the Joint Intervenors Joint Proposed Schedule).

11 Scoping Ruling at 6.

12 Scoping Ruling at 6 citing D.14-06-007 at 31. 

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and UCAN. The assigned ALJ reviewed the arguments posed by the intervening 

parties to dismiss the application on the basis of the Threshold Issues as a motion 

for summary judgment. On August 11, 2016, the assigned ALJ issued a ruling 

against the intervening parties and confirming the procedural schedule set forth 

in the Scoping Ruling. The August 11, 2016 ruling allowed for the 

re-consideration of the arguments in the briefs after the development of an 

evidentiary record.13

If the proceeding was not dismissed during the first phase, the second of 

A.15-0-010 would have the Commission consider whether SDG&E’s actions and 

decision making in connection with settling of legal claims and costs in relation 

to the wildfires were reasonable.14 

In October 2016, this proceeding was reassigned to ALJ S. Pat Tsen and 

ALJ Pro Tem Sasha Goldberg. Following this reassignment, ORA filed a motion 

for change of venue, which was ultimately denied.15 In accordance with the 

procedural schedule set by the Scoping Ruling, the newly assigned ALJs and 

Commissioner scheduled and held two Public Participation Hearings (PPHs) in 

Escondido, California, on January 9, 2017.16 Over 200 residents of San Diego 

County attended the PPHs, as well as several local news outlets. 

 

13 Ruling Confirming Procedural Schedule Following Briefs on the Threshold Issues, 

August 11, 2016 at 4.

14 Id. at 5. 

15 Administrative Law Judges’ Ruling Denying the Office of Ratepayer Advocates’ Motion to 

Change Venue (December 21, 2016).

16 Administrative Law Judges’ Ruling Setting Public Participation Hearings 

(November 11, 2016). 

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Evidentiary Hearings for Phase 1 of this proceeding were held at the 

Commission’s San Francisco hearing rooms the week of January 23, 2017. In 

response to requests from SDG&E and ORA, the assigned ALJs issued a ruling 

on February 10, 2017 modifying the post-hearing briefing schedule for Phase 1. 

In addition to modifying due date(s) for briefs, this ruling directed parties to 

obtain confirmation that the Cal Fire investigative reports on the 2007 Wildfires 

were in fact final and/or closed.17

On March 17, 2017, ORA served an affidavit from the Unit Chief for Cal 

Fire’s MVU Unit affirming that Cal Fire considers the investigative reports into 

the 2007 Wildfires final, with no plans to re-open or supplement any of these 

investigations.

18 Opening briefs for Phase 1 were filed and served on 

March 24, 2017 by SDG&E, ORA, SDCAN, UCAN, POC, and Henricks. Reply 

briefs were filed and served on April 14, 2017 by SDG&E, ORA, MRGA, UCAN, 

and SDCAN. The record for Phase 1 of this proceeding was submitted19 for 

Commission consideration on July 6, 2017 after Henricks filed a motion to accept 

the late filing of Henricks’ Opening Brief.

On August 22, 2017 a proposed decision (PD) denying SDG&E’s recovery 

in this proceeding was served on the service list to A.15-09-010. Opening 

comments on the PD were filed on September 11, 2017, along with motions by 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and Southern California Edison 

Company (SCE) for party status. The filing of motions by PG&E and SCE at this 

 

17 Ruling Administrative Law Judges’ Ruling Modifying Procedural Schedule and Requiring 

Supplemental Information at 4. 

18 ORA Response regarding Cal Fire Affidavit (March 17, 2017).

19 Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 13.14(a).

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late juncture triggered responses from the intervenors and ORA in this 

proceeding. After evaluating the motions and responses, the assigned ALJs 

granted PG&E and SCE limited party status20 on September 26, 2017. This 

limited party status gave PG&E and SCE the opportunity to comment on the 

legal issue of inverse condemnation. PG&E and SCE filed joint comments on the 

issue of inverse condemnation on October 4, 2017. SDG&E, ORA, POC, UCAN 

and MGRA filed replies to the joint comments on October 11, 2017.

In addition to the comment period for inverse condemnation, on 

September 18, 2017, the assigned ALJs noticed an All Party Meeting. The All 

Party Meeting, held by Commissioner Liane Randolph, took place in Chula 

Vista, California, immediately after the conclusion of the September 28, 2017 

Commission Meeting. The All Party meeting provided parties with the 

opportunity to address the Commission. Participants in the All Party Meeting 

included SDG&E, PG&E, SCE, ORA, MGRA, POC, SDCAN, Henricks, and 

UCAN. 

Due to the scheduling of the All Party Meeting, and building in time for 

replies to PG&E and SCE’s comments on inverse condemnation, the statutory 

deadline for this proceeding was extended by D.17-09-038 to April 11, 2018. 

3. Legal Standards Applied

The appropriate standard in a ratesetting matter is preponderance of the 

evidence.21 As the Applicant, SDG&E bears the burden of proof. Preponderance 

of the evidence usually is defined “in terms of probability of truth, e.g., ‘such 

 

20 See A.15-09-010 E-mail Ruling Granting Limited Party Status to Southern California Edison 

Company; A.15-09-010 E-mail Ruling Granting Limited Party Status to PG&E.

21 D.16-12-063 at 9, citing D.12-12-030 at 44. 

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evidence, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and 

the greater probability of truth’.”22 In short, SDG&E must present more evidence 

that supports the requested result than would support an alternative outcome. 

The Commission’s standard for reasonableness reviews, reaffirmed in a 

series of decisions, is as follows: 

The term reasonable and prudent means that at a particular 

time any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in by a 

utility follows the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of 

the facts known or which should have been known at the time 

the decision was made. The act or decision is expected by the 

utility to accomplish the desired result at the lowest 

reasonable cost consistent with good utility practices. Good 

utility practices are based upon cost effectiveness, safety and 

expedition.23

We have analyzed SDG&E’s management and operation of its facilities 

prior to the ignition of the Witch, Guejito and Rice Wildfires within the rubric of 

the Commission’s prudent manager standard. In comments to the proposed 

decision, SDG&E contends that the Commission is imposing a perfection 

standard. That is not the case. Our decision today analyzes the Witch, Guejito, 

and Rice fires separately, taking into account extensive records submitted by the 

parties, industry practice in 2007, and contemporaneous information available to 

SDG&E at the time of the separate ignitions. Each analysis is fact specific and

has been reached after careful consideration of the record. Contrary to SDG&E’s 

assertion, holding utilities accountable under the reasonable and prudent 

manager standard in no way imposes a standard of perfection. The Commission 

 

22 D.12-12-030 at 42, aff’d D.15-07-044 at 28-30. 

23 24 CPUC 2d 476, 486. 

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was prepared in this case, as it will in the future, to find SDG&E’s conduct is

reasonable and prudent, if the facts warrant such a conclusion.

4. Discussion and Analysis 

In this section, the Commission analyzes the Witch, Guejito, and Rice fires 

separately and determines SDG&E’s prudency in managing its facilities. As the 

Applicant seeking recovery, SDG&E must affirmatively satisfy the Commission 

that it acted prudently. We weigh evidence presented by SDG&E that it acted 

prudently, against evidence presented by the intervenors that SDG&E did not act 

prudently. In each analysis, we find SDG&E to have failed its burden of proof to 

show by a preponderance of the evidence, that it complied with the 

Commission’s prudent manager standard. 

4.1. Witch Fire 

4.1.1. Witch Fire Background 

The Witch Fire, which later merged with the Guejito Fire, was the second 

largest fire to occur in San Diego County in 2007.24 The SDG&E facility involved 

in the ignition of the Witch Fire was Tie Line (TL) 637.25 TL 637 is a 69 kilovolt 

(kV) transmission line that connects the Santa Ysabel and Creelman substations.

26

TL 637 is approximately 14 miles long and runs along a remote backcountry 

section of San Diego County.27 

Although there were no eyewitnesses to the ignition of the fire, the Cal Fire

investigator determined that a fault on TL 637 between poles Z416675 and 

 

24 ORA-01 at 6.

25 SDGE-11-A at 2. 

26 Id. 

27 Id. at 3

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Z416676 on October 21, 2007 led to arcing of the lines, which dispersed hot 

particles to land in the grassy field below the powerlines.28 These particles were 

determined to have ignited the Witch Fire which was then spread by wind.29 

There was a Red Flag Warning30 in place at 4:45 a.m., prior to the Witch Fire’s 

ignition on October 21, 2007.31 

The following chart depicts a timeline of the events occurring the day of 

the Witch Fire ignition: 

Timeline of Events on October 21, 2007 on TL 63732

Time Description of Event

8:53 a.m. Fault 1 occurred on TL 637 

9:05 a.m. and 9:08 a.m. The Transmission System Operator dispatched Electric 

Troubleshooters to either end of TL 637(Santa Ysabel and 

Creelman substations) to gather additional information about 

the 8:53 a.m. fault 

9:30 a.m. SDG&E’s Grid Operations were responding to the Harris Fire 

which burned in southern San Diego County near the vicinity 

of SDG&E’s 500 kV transmission line, the Southwest Powerlink

10:00 a.m. Electric Troubleshooters reported back to the Transmission 

System Operator at Grid Operations

The Troubleshooters found that the protection devices at each end of the line operated and opened 

the circuit breakers, which remained opened for ten seconds, and then reclosed the line, because 

the faults had cleared within the ten seconds The Troubleshooters learned that the faults were 

 

28 Id. at 3; ORA-01 at 6 to 7. 

29 SGDE-11-A at 3-4, citing Cal Fire Report (Witch) at 2, 14, and 19. 

30 ORA-01 at 45: The National Weather Service issues a Red Flag Warning “to call attention to 

limited weather conditions of particular importance that may result in extreme burning 

conditions. It is issued when it is an on-going event or the fire weather forecaster has a high 

degree of confidence that Red Flag criteria will occur within 24 hours of issuance.” (Citing the 

National Weather Service Glossary, Red Flag Warnings.)

31 ORA-02-A.

32 SDGE-11-A at 6-7, referencing Appendices 3 and 4 (Appendix 3 is the Operations Shift 

Supervisor Daily Log from October 21, 2007), (Appendix 4 is the Electric Switching Order for 

TL 637 on October 21, 2007). 

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Time Description of Event

temporary because they had cleared within 10 seconds, and so the flow of electricity was 

restored.

33

11:22 a.m. Fault 2 occurred on TL 637 

11:42 a.m. Cal Fire requests Grid Operations to de-energize the Southwest 

Powerlink to allow air drops of fire retardant in the area. 

12:01 p.m. Electric Troubleshooters dispatched to the Santa Ysabel and 

Creelman substations 

12:15 p.m. SDG&E’s Grid Operations opened the Southwest Powerlink as 

a Forced Outage 

12:19 p.m. Electric Troubleshooter reported back to Grid Operations from 

the Santa Ysabel substation that the circuit breakers had again 

operated and had reclosed. 

12:23 p.m. Fault 3 occurred on TL 637, while the Troubleshooters were at 

the Santa Ysabel and Creelman substations. 

Under SDG&E’s Transmission Monitoring & Control Procedure 1100, when a line faults and 

immediately recloses and the cause for the trip is unknown, the line should be patrolled by either 

a vehicle or aerially, via a helicopter.

12:29 p.m. Witch Fire observed by Air Tanker Pilot (according to the 

Cal Fire Report)

12:33 p.m. Patrolman was sent to patrol TL 637 

12:39 p.m. Patrolman informed the Grid Operations Transmission System 

Operator that he would go out to patrol TL 637 in person 

rather than by air. 

12:56 p.m. Electric Troubleshooter reported back to Grid Operations from 

the Creelman substation that the circuit breakers had again 

operated and had reclosed.

1:10 p.m. Grid Operations became aware of the Witch Fire 

1:14 p.m. SDG&E’s Transmission Construction and Maintenance 

Manager rerouted a Construction Supervisor to Santa Ysabel 

1:59 p.m. SDG&E’s Transmission Construction and Maintenance 

Manager requested that Grid Operations disable automatic 

reclosing on TL 637

2:01 p.m. Grid Operations Transmission System Operator turned-off 

automatic reclosing at the Santa Ysabel substation 

2:05 p.m. Grid Operations Transmission System Operator requested a 

 

33 SDGE-11-A at 7. 

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Time Description of Event

Troubleshooter be dispatched to the Creelman substation to 

turn-off automatic reclosing. 

3:00 p.m. An SDG&E Construction Supervisor with SDG&E’s 

Transmission Construction and Maintenance Manager met a 

Cal Fire crew at the Santa Ysabel substation

3:25 p.m. Fault 4 occurred on TL 637, automatically reclosed at the 

Creelman substation 

3:27 p.m. TL 637 became de-energized by the Grid Operations 

Transmission System Operator 

A series of four faults occurred on TL 637 on October 21, 2007: the first 

fault at 8:53 a.m.; the second fault at 11:22 a.m.; the third fault at 12:23 p.m.; and 

the fourth fault at 3:25 p.m.34 Cal Fire concluded that the Witch Fire ignited after 

the third fault occurred on TL 637 at 12:23 p.m. on October 21, 2007 because an 

Air Tanker Pilot first observed the fire at 12:29 p.m.35 SDG&E Grid Operations 

became aware of the Witch Fire at 1:10 p.m., and de-energized TL 637 after the 

fourth fault at 3:27 p.m.36

Ultimately, the Witch Fire led to the destruction of 1,141 homes, 509 

outbuildings, and 239 vehicles.37 Once combined with the Guejito Fire, the Witch 

Fire burned a total of 197,990 acres.38 The combination of the Witch and Guejito 

Fires led to two fatalities and injured 40 firefighters.39

 

34 SDGE-11-A at 6 to7.

35 SDGE-11-A at 6 to 7.

36 SDGE-11-A at 6 to 7.

37 ORA-01 at 7, citing Cal Fire Report (Witch) at 2.

38 Id. 

39 Id. 

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4.1.2. SDG&E’s Position on its Operation and 

Management of its Facilities Prior to the Witch Fire 

SDG&E maintains that its operation and management of its facilities 

linked to the Witch Fire prior to October 21, 2007 were reasonable.40 SDG&E 

supports its position by claiming: (1) SDG&E’s response to the faults along 

TL 637 was reasonable given the information available at the time of the faults;

(2) SDG&E’s recloser policy was reasonable and prudent; and (3) the Witch Fire 

was not foreseeable.41

SDG&E’s Response to Faults along TL 637 

SDG&E maintains that the facts surrounding the Witch Fire do not show 

that SDG&E acted unreasonably or imprudently in its response to the four faults 

occurring along TL 637 on October 21, 2007.42 SDG&E does not dispute the fact 

that its facilities were directly involved in the ignition of the Witch Fire, SDG&E 

put forth Mr. Ali Yari (Mr. Yari), SDG&E’s Director of Electric Grid Operations, 

to testify as to SDG&E’s reasonable and prudent monitoring of the faults along 

TL 637.43 

First, SDG&E contends that its actions and response to the faults occurring 

along TL 637 were reasonable given the information it had available in real time 

on October 21, 2007.

44 Mr. Yari testified that in 2007, SDG&E did not have the 

capability to determine in real-time the exact location of the faults occurring 

 

40 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 30. 

41 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 30 to 31. 

42 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 37. 

43 SDGE-11-A at 1. 

44 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 37.

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along the 14-mile stretch of TL 637.45 SDG&E maintains that the relay equipment 

at the substation stores voltage and current information, and not specific fault 

locations.46 Mr. Yari testified that it would have taken at least one hour to get the 

protection engineer in a position to dial into the relay, plus about 30 additional 

minutes to download and process the information.47 SDG&E asserts that this

need for engineering intervention to analyze the data stored in the relay showed

that SDG&E acted prudently in responding to the faults on TL 637.48 SDG&E 

contends its response to the faults along TL 637 was reasonable because its 

interpretation of the data stored in the relay along TL 637 was both analytical 

and appropriate, given the standards in 2007.49

Second, SDG&E maintains its Grid Operations’ response time to inspect 

TL 637 was reasonable given the threat to the Southwest Powerlink on 

October 21, 2007.50 In his direct testimony, Mr. Yari explains how the threat of 

the Harris Fire to the Southwest Powerlink impacted SDG&E’s monitoring of TL 

637. Mr. Yari notes, the threat to the Southwest Powerlink “was a major event 

consuming SDG&E resources – including the attention of Grid Operations 

personnel and the resources available to conduct patrols....SDG&E was 

particularly concerned about the outage of this major transmission line since it 

was essential to grid stability across Southern California....SDG&E was also 

 

45 Id.

46 Id. at 41. 

47 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 43. 

48 Id. at 42. 

49 Id. 

50 Id. at 37, SDGE-11-A at 1-13. 

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taking seriously the faults on TL 637 but there was no indication of any kind of 

emergency...since faults are not particularly unusual on a windy day...”51

SDG&E maintains that even though its Grid Operations de-energized the 

Southwest Powerlink at 12:15 p.m., Grid Operations was appropriately 

monitoring the faults along TL 637.

52 SDG&E argues that its dispatch of 

troubleshooters to investigate the faults on TL 637 was all that was required to be 

reasonable.

53

Third, SDG&E argues that, because it had not previously experienced fires 

related to transmission lines coming into contact with one another, SDG&E’s 

level of concern about the faults along TL 637 was appropriate.

54 Through 

Mr. Yari, SDG&E stressed that conductor-to-conductor activity is “relatively 

rare” and on windy days a fault is not unusual given the potential for debris to 

come into contact with a conductor.55 Because of this “relatively rare” activity, 

SDG&E asserts it was reasonable not to suspect that hot particles were being 

emitted from the activity along TL 637.56

As such, SDG&E maintains that its monitoring of the faults on TL 637 was 

reasonable and prudent. 

SDG&E’s Recloser Policy 

 

51 SDGE-11-A at 9. 

52 Id.

53 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 37 to 38. 

54 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 38, citing SDGE-11-A at 15-16. 

55 Id. and SDGE-11-A at 8.

56 SDGE-11-A 8 to 9. 

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SDG&E asserts its recloser policy57 in effect on October 21, 2007 as both 

reasonable and prudent.58 SDG&E maintains ORA fails to show how SDG&E’s 

awareness of the 2001 Power Line Fire Prevention Field Guide (2001 Field Guide) 

put SDG&E on notice of the risks of its recloser policy prior to October 2007. 

SDG&E notes the 2001 Field Guides’ excerpt, “automatic reclosers re-energizing 

the line into the fault may cause repeated arcing and increase the probability of 

igniting vegetation,” does not show SDG&E’s imprudence in utilizing its recloser 

policy in response to the faults along TL 637.59 SDG&E asserts that even if it 

were possible to turn off TL 637’s automatic reclosers after the second fault, such 

an action would not have avoided the Witch Fire’s ignition.60 Moreover, Mr. Yari 

testified that disabling automatic reclosers after the second fault would have 

been imprudent “given the important of keeping [TL 637] in service to serve the 

 

57 SDG&E Recloser Policy: Similar to all electric utilities across the country, SDG&E uses 

protection devices on all of its transmission lines to ensure that the electric system detects and 

responds to fault activity and isolates the faulted line. Those protection devices measure 

currents and voltages and detect any abnormal system conditions or faults, on the associated 

lines. If a transmission system line faults, the protective relays operate to open the circuit 

breakers (de-energizing the line), and the circuit breakers remain open for ten seconds before 

the reclosers attempt to reclose them. If the circuit breakers do not reclose successfully, which 

would indicate that the fault has not cleared after 10 seconds, the recloser “locks out” and 

prevents further automatic reclose attempts. If the circuit breakers reclose successfully, the 

circuit is restored. As an additional protection, even if the circuit breakers reclose successfully 

after 10 seconds, the recloser will lockout if the lines faults again within 120 second of the initial 

fault. If no additional faults occur within that 120-second period, the recloser resets. ORA-18 

at 2, citing Geier Testimony Excerpts (I.08-11-006).

58 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 49.

59 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 49 to 50. 

60 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 50. 

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backcountry during a very windy day” and that the recloser policy was industry 

practice.61

Foreseeability of Witch Fire 

SDG&E maintains that the facts surrounding the Witch Fire do not show 

that SDG&E acted unreasonably or imprudently based on what SDG&E knew at 

the time.62 More specifically, SDG&E argues that Henricks, MGRA, UCAN and 

POC fail to show how the Witch Fire was foreseeable.63

First, SDG&E put forth Mr. David Geier (Mr. Geier) to testify as to 

SDG&E’s fire preparedness in 2007.64 Mr. Geier, SDG&E’s Vice President of 

Electric Transmission and System Engineering, discussed the 2003 Wildfires65 in 

his direct testimony and the steps SDG&E took in the aftermath of the 2003 

Wildfires to reduce the risk of wildfires in its service territory.66 Mr. Geier 

explained how post-2003 SDG&E focused on improving the integrity and 

reliability of the utility’s transmission and distribution systems, especially in the 

areas subject to the extreme Santa Ana winds.67 Through Mr. Geier, SDG&E 

showed that it created a full-time fire coordinator position to provide training to 

its employees on fire risk, in addition to creating a database to track fire causes 

 

61 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 51, citing Reporter’s Transcript Volume 3 at 384. 

62 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 30 to 31. 

63 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 30. 

64 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 31.

65 SDGE-05 at 15, 2003 Wildfires: In San Diego County alone, the 2003 Wildfires burned over 

400,000 acres, destroyed more than 2,400 homes, and caused extensive damage to SDG&E 

facilities. 

66 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 31. 

67 SDGE-05 at 16. 

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and patterns.

68 Despite the newly created fire coordinator position and database, 

SDG&E maintains that there was no information available that could have been 

used to predict the Witch Fire ignition.

69

Second, SDG&E maintains that there has not been a credible showing that 

there has ever been a comparable event to the 2007 Wildfires.

70 SDG&E contends 

that while the 2003 Wildfires were significant, the 2007 Wildfires happened 

under different circumstances.

71 Specifically, SDG&E contends that the 

2007 Wildfires involved over a dozen major fires igniting over a short period of 

time, including ignitions to powerlines, which was not the case in 2003.72 

Accordingly, SDG&E maintains there was no way to have foreseen what 

occurred in October 2007 based on historical data.

73

Third, SDG&E contends that the Witch Fire was not foreseeable because

SDG&E designed, engineered, maintained and inspected TL 637 in compliance 

with the Commission’s industry standards.74 General Order (GO) 95 requires 

that all infrastructure be designed, constructed, rebuilt and maintained to 

account for known local conditions.75 And while MGRA and other intervenors 

have raised SDG&E’s compliance with GO 95 in regards to the foreseeability of 

the Witch Fire, SDG&E maintains those arguments fail to discredit SDG&E’s 

 

68 SDGE-05 at 16. 

69 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 32 citing SDGE-12 at 25. 

70 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 32. 

71 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 32. 

72 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 32. 

73 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 33. 

74 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 33. 

75 MGRA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 8.

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showings of compliance and prudence.76 Specifically, SDG&E asserts MGRA

fails to show how rebuilding TL 637 to a higher wind loading standard would 

have prevented the Witch Fire.77

As such, SDG&E maintains that its operation and management of TL 637 

was reasonable. 

4.1.3 ORA’s Position on SDG&E’s Operation and 

Management of its Facilities Prior to the 

Witch Fire

ORA maintains that SDG&E has not shown by a preponderance of the 

evidence that SDG&E’s operation and management of its facilities prior to the 

ignition of the Witch Fire were reasonable.

78 ORA argues that SDG&E’s response 

to the faults occurring on TL 637 was unreasonable.

79 Within this argument, 

ORA contends: (1) the timing of SDG&E’s response to the faults along TL 637 

was not appropriate; and (2) SDG&E did not effectively use fault location 

information available at the relays in response to the faults.80 ORA additionally 

argues that SDG&E’s recloser policy in effect on October 21, 2007 imprudently 

increased fire risk.81

 

76 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 33. 

77 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 33.

78 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 13. 

79 Id. 

80 Id. 

81 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 28. 

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SDG&E’s Response to Faults along TL 637 

ORA contends that SDG&E has not shown it acted prudently in connection 

to the ignition of the Witch Fire.82 ORA maintains SDG&E’s failure to use fault 

location information effectively demonstrates that the utility failed to act 

reasonably regarding the faults along TL 637.

83 

First, ORA maintains that SDG&E should have responded sooner to 

investigate the faults occurring on TL 637 on the morning of October 21, 2007.

84 

ORA points to SDG&E’s dispatch of troubleshooters in support of this argument:

“the dispatch time for the second trip was almost four times as long as for the 

first trip that occurred less than three hours before. Multiple line trips of TL 637 

in a single day should have been a concern to the utility, especially since this was 

a rare event that had occurred only 9 times in the previous 24 years.”85 ORA 

argues that SDG&E’s response time was slow, noting that over 6 hours passed 

from the time of the initial fault on TL 637 to its de-energization.86 ORA argues 

that SDG&E should have had the resources in place to communicate the need for 

patrol; and that SDG&E’s failure to have resources available constituted 

imprudent management.

87 ORA maintains that this imprudent management 

lead to the ignition and spread of the Witch Fire.88 

 

82 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 13. 

83 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 13.

84 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 10. 

85 Id. citing ORA-03 at 1-3 (TL 637 Fault History). 

86 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 11.

87 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 12. 

88 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 34. 

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Second, ORA maintains that SDG&E did not effectively use the fault 

location information it had available to respond to the faults along TL 637.89 

ORA contends that SDG&E could have obtained the location of faults in time to 

be in a better position to respond to the faults on TL 637.90 Specifically, ORA 

refers to the following fault time and location information obtained through 

discovery to rebut SDG&E’s argument that it could not analyze the data stored in 

the relay without engineering intervention.91

Fault Time Fault Location

8:53 a.m. 2.73 miles / 2.74 miles

11:22 a.m. 2.73 miles / 2.75 miles

12:23 p.m. 2.79 miles /2.76 miles

3:25 p.m. 2.82 miles / 2.84 miles

ORA notes that SDG&E did not retrieve the above mileage data until 

October 22, 2007, a day after the ignition of the Witch Fire.92 Additionally, ORA 

highlights the testimony of Mr. Yari, that had SDG&E looked at the mileage data, 

it would have been in a better position to respond to the faults.93 In sum, ORA 

asserts it was imprudent of SDG&E to not effectively use data that was available 

at the relays in responding to the faults. Moreover, ORA contends that had 

 

89 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 13. 

90 Id. at 17.

91 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 13. 

92 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 13 to 16, referencing ORA-19. 

93 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 17, citing Reporter’s Transcript Volume 3 at 349.

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SDG&E used the fault location data on October 21, 2007, rather than the day after 

ignition, it would have assisted SDG&E in having a quicker response time.94

SDG&E’s Recloser Policy

ORA maintains SDG&E’s recloser policy in effect during the faults along 

TL 637 imprudently increased fire risk.95 Under cross-examination by ORA,

Mr. Geier acknowledged and essentially agreed with the 2001 Field Guide’s 

assertion, “Automatic reclosers reenergizing the line into the fault may cause 

repeated arcing and increase the probability of igniting vegetation.”96 ORA 

contends this assertion put SDG&E on notice of the risks posed by automatic 

reclosers to ignite vegetation, as early as 2001.97 ORA asserts that these risks and 

the fact that there was a Red Flag Warning in place on October 21, 2007, and that 

there were an unusual number of trips shows that SDG&E was imprudent when 

it did not anticipate that its facilities posed a fire risk on October 21, 2007.98

As such, ORA maintains the record established SDG&E did not act 

prudently on October 21, 2007.

4.1.4. Intervenors’ Position on SDG&E’s Operation

and Management of its Facilities Prior to

the Witch Fire 

Many of the intervenors to this proceeding contend that SDG&E fails to 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that SDG&E’s operation and 

 

94 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 17. 

95 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 28. 

96 Hearing Reporter’s Transcript Volume 2 at 197; ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 29, citing 

ORA-20. 

97 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 32. 

98 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 15. 

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management of its facilities prior to the ignition of the Witch Fire were 

reasonable.99 Henricks, MGRA, UCAN and POC assert that the fact that SDG&E 

had prior experience with catastrophic fires, renders SDG&E imprudent when 

SDG&E failed to adequately address the faults on TL 637.100

Foreseeability of Witch Fire

Henricks, MGRA, UCAN and POC maintain that the facts show SDG&E 

did not operate its facilities reasonably prior to the ignition of the Witch Fire.

101 

Henricks asserts that SDG&E was familiar with the 2003 Wildfires, and 

thus was on notice that a fire could spread to the extent to which the Witch Fire 

spread.

102 Henricks highlights the testimony of SDG&E’s witness Lee Schavrien 

(Mr. Schavrien) to show that SDG&E had knowledge of the catastrophic events 

linked to 2003 Wildfires.

103 Henricks maintains that SDG&E’s knowledge of the 

400,000 acres burned, 16 lives lost, and 2400 homes destroyed by the 2003 

Wildfires put SDG&E on notice that such an event could occur again.104 As such, 

Henricks maintains SDG&E did not act reasonably because the 2007 Wildfires 

were foreseeable.

105

 

99 Henricks Phase 1 Opening Brief at 5.

100 Henricks Phase 1 Opening Brief at 4; MGRA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 13 to 15. 

101 See generally Henricks Phase 1 Opening Brief. 

102 Henricks Phase 1 Opening Brief at 4.

103 Henricks Phase 1 Opening Brief at 4, referencing Reporter’s Transcript Volume 2 at 264 

to 271.

104 Henricks Phase 1 Opening Brief at 5, referencing Reporter’s Transcript Volume 2 at 264

to 271.

105 Henricks Phase 1 Opening Brief at 5. 

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MRGA argues that SDG&E fails to show it acted reasonably in its 

operation and management of TL 637.106 MGRA contends that SDG&E fails to 

establish it had no reason to suspect the faults occurring along TL 637 were the 

result of unusual conductor to conductor contact.107 More specifically, MGRA 

contends that had SDG&E applied SDG&E’s prior knowledge of load standards 

and the Santa Ana wind conditions differently, the Witch Fire could have been 

prevented, or at the very least foreseen.

108

UCAN and POC maintain that SDG&E failed to act reasonably prior to the 

Witch Fire’s ignition because fires were foreseeable given the history in SDG&E’s 

service territory.109 Although UCAN’s arguments as to wind and weather 

conditions are addressed in more detail in Section 4.4 of this decision (Wind and 

Weather Conditions in October 2007), UCAN’s assertions touch on how SDG&E 

failed to act reasonably in regards to the Witch Fire.110 UCAN contends that the 

Santa Ana wind conditions were a foreseeable, known local condition and 

SDG&E should have been prepared for the possibility that its electrical 

equipment might spark wildfires during a Santa Ana windstorm.111 And 

although UCAN does not dispute the fact that SDG&E’s facilities were not linked 

to the 2003 Wildfires, UCAN does contend that the events surrounding the 

2003 Wildfires put SDG&E on notice of the fire potential years prior to the 

 

106 MGRA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 13.

107 MGRA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 15 to 16.

108 MGRA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 16. 

109 UCAN Phase 1 Opening Brief at 3; POC Phase 1 Opening Brief at 3.

110 UCAN Phase 1 Opening Brief at 3.

111 UCAN Phase 1 Opening Brief at 3.

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ignition of the 2007 Wildfires.112 As such, UCAN maintains that SDG&E cannot 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its management and operation of 

its facilities prior to the ignition of the Witch Fire were reasonable.113

4.1.5. Reasonableness Review: SDG&E’s Operation

and Management of its Facilities Prior to 

the Witch Fire 

In evaluating SDG&E’s operation and management of its facilities in 

connection with the Witch Fire, the Commission must determine whether 

SDG&E employed reasonable judgement in its operation and management of its 

facilities in the period leading up to the ignition of the Witch Fire. 

SDG&E’s response to the faults along TL 637 was unreasonable when 

viewed in light of the record of this proceeding. The threat of the Harris Fire to 

the Southwest Powerlink, does not excuse SDG&E’s failure to monitor the faults 

on TL 637. The fact that there are other wind related wildfires in the area should 

put a prudent manager on notice to anticipate wind related events to its facilities. 

Also, in the 24 year history of FL 637, there were only nine days with multiple

faults. While compliance with industry practice is relevant to our reasonableness 

review, SDG&E must also show it acted reasonably in light of the circumstances 

at the time. The Red Flag Warning indicating high wind conditions, other fires 

in the vicinity, the request by Cal Fire to de-energize another transmission line, 

and three faults over a period of 3.5 hours, all alerted SDG&E to the potential for 

fires and should have caused SDG&E to act more proactively on 

 

112 UCAN Phase 1 Opening Brief at 3.

113 UCAN Phase 1 Reply Brief at 5. 

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October 21, 2007.

114 Mr. Yari testified it would take 1.5 hours for a protective 

engineer and computer to calculate the exact location of the fault(s) on TL 637. 

Had SDG&E de-energized TL 637 or sent a protective engineer out to either end 

of TL 637 before the third fault occurred, it may have prevented the third fault 

from igniting the Witch Fire at 12:23 p.m. Moreover, it would have been more 

reasonable for SDG&E to send a protective engineer to calculate the fault mileage 

information on the date the faults occurred and the fire ignited. 

While SDG&E’s recloser policy was industry practice, it knew as early as 

2001 that automatic reclosers energizing into the fault may cause arcing and 

increase fire risk. SDG&E fails to show how it was reasonable for its Grid 

Operations to take 6.5 hours to de-energize TL 637 after the initial 8:53 a.m. fault.

This 6.5 hour lapse does not show that SDG&E was engaged in reasonable utility 

practice. It would have been more reasonable to force an outage before the 

Witch Fire ignited at 12:23 p.m. However, the fact that SDG&E did not 

de-energize TL 637 until 3:27 p.m., does not show how SDG&E acted reasonably 

in its decision to not de-energize the line immediately at 1:10 p.m. Even though 

SDG&E management was aware of the 2001 Field Guide’s assertion that 

automatic reclosers increase the risk to ignite vegetation, SDG&E still failed to 

take more proactive steps to prevent the Witch Fire’s ignition. 

There were multiple events happening on October 21, 2007 which show 

SDG&E was unreasonable not to foresee the Witch Fire or to assert now that that 

it was not foreseeable. The Red Flag Warning in effect on October 21 2007 

coupled with the 9:30 a.m. ignition of the Harris Fire put SDG&E on notice that 

 

114 ORA-01 at 10:13-15; ORA-03 at 1-3.

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wind and weather could cause the ignition of another fire in its territory on 

October 21, 2007. The four faults on a line that did not have a history of 

faults combined with SDG&E’s knowledge of the destruction caused by the 

2003 Wildfires, including the Cedar Fire, contradicts the argument that the Witch 

Fire was unforeseeable. 

As such, SDG&E fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

acted prudently in its operation and management of its facilities linked to the 

ignition of the Witch Fire. 

4.2. Guejito Fire 

4.2.1. Guejito Fire Background 

The Guejito Fire was first reported by Cal Fire at 01:00 on October 22, 2007 

near the City of Escondido, in San Diego County.115 The SDG&E facility involved 

in the ignition of the Guejito Fire was a 12 kV overhead conductor. CPSD and 

Cal Fire attributed the ignition of the Guejito Fire to a Cox Communications 

(Cox) lashing wire coming into contact with an SDG&E 12 kV overhead 

conductor, between SDG&E poles P196387 and P196394.116 The SDG&E 

conductors were located above the Cox lines.117

GO 95, within the California State Rules for Overhead Electric Line 

Construction, sets the basic minimum allowable clearance of wires from other 

wires at crossings.118 Rule 38 of GO 95 specifies a minimum clearance of 

 

115 ORA-01 at 17.

116 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 34, citing ORA-05 at 926. 

117 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 34, citing ORA-50. 

118 General Order 95 at Table 2. 

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6 feet with a maximum reduction of ten percent under wind conditions.119 On 

November 2, 2007 an SDG&E engineering contractor, Nolte Associates, Inc. 

performed an engineering survey on the facilities linked to the Guejito Fire’s 

ignition.

120 The Nolte Survey documented a 3.3-foot clearance between the 

SDG&E conductors and Cox lines prior to any repair work being completed after 

the ignition of the Guejito Fire.121 

The Cox facilities involved in the Guejito Fire were installed in August of 

2001.122 SDG&E purports that it is not known when the 3.3-foot clearance 

violation occurred, as there were no pre-fire surveys completed on the facilities 

in question.123 At hearings however, SDG&E presented Mr. Greg Walters, a 

former manager of SDG&E’s Compliance Management Group and Joint Facilities 

Department, to testify that it was his belief that the Cox facilities involved in the 

Guejito Fire were not in compliance with GO 95, Rule 38, Table 2 at the time of 

installation.124 

In its opening brief, ORA notes that CPSD found SDG&E to be in violation 

of the following statutory provisions at the time it conducted its post-fire survey 

of the SDG&E facilities involved in the Guejito Fire:

 Public Utilities Code Section 451 (“Failing to 

detect/repair a broken lashing wire and/or failing to 

maintain required clearances.”);

 

119 Id. 

120 Id. 

121 Id. at 18-19.

122 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 18. 

123 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 59. 

124 A.15-09-010 at 15; Reporter’s Transcript Volume 5 at 793.

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 GO 95, Rule 31.1 (“Failing to detect/repair a broken 

lashing wire and/or failing to maintain required 

clearances, in consideration of the given local conditions 

such as the well-known Santa Ana winds.”); and

 GO 95, Rule 38 (“As supported by the Nolte Survey, the 

clearances between Cox’s and SDG&E’s facilities were 

noncompliant before/during and after the Guejito [F]ire 

ignition, which occurred during conditions that did not 

justify the noncompliance.”)

125

SDG&E’s expert, Mr. Darren Weim (Mr. Weim), testified that detailed 

inspections prior to the Guejito Fire were conducted on June 22, 2007 (for Pole 

P196394) and April 8, 2005 (for Pole P196394).126 Mr. Weim noted, “[o]ther than 

missing or damaged high voltage or warning signs (which were repaired), no 

[other] conditions were noted in these inspections.”127

As referenced above, the Guejito Fire, which later combined with the 

Witch Fire, burned a total of 197,990 acres before being contained.128 Once 

combined, the Guejito and Witch Fires led to two fatalities and 40 injured 

firefighters.129

4.2.2. SDG&E’s Position on its Operation and 

Management of its Facilities Prior to 

the Guejito Fire 

SDG&E does not dispute that GO 95 required a 6-foot clearance; however,

SDG&E maintains that its operation and management of its facilities involved in 

 

125 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 25; citing ORA-05 at 1238:3-4. 

126 SDGE-06 at 11.

127 SDGE-06 at 11. 

128 ORA-01 at 7.

129 ORA-01 at 18. 

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the Guejito Fire prior to October 22, 2007 were reasonable.130 SDG&E argues that 

it appropriately inspected the facilities linked to the ignition Guejito Fire.131

Furthermore, SDG&E contends ORA fails to show how a compliant clearance 

between the Cox line and the SDG&E overhead conductors could have 

prevented the ignition of the Guejito Fire.132

GO 95 Clearance Requirements and SDG&E’s Inspections

At hearings, SDG&E presented Mr. Darren Weim (Mr. Weim), SDG&E’s 

Manager of Northeast Construction & Operations, to discuss the utility’s design, 

construction, and maintenance standards that were in place prior to 2007.

133 

While SDG&E does not dispute GO 95’s 6-foot clearance requirement, 

Mr. Weim’s testimony was used to show the programmatic approach SDG&E 

takes in its inspection and maintenance of its facilities.

134 Mr. Weim testified

regarding SDG&E’s Corrective Maintenance Program. He elaborated on two of 

the inspections carried-out under SDG&E’s Corrective Maintenance Program.135 

A “patrol inspection” involves visual inspections, designed to identify obvious 

structural problems and hazards.136 A “detailed inspection” requires trained

employees to perform thorough checks on distribution poles and all attachment 

facilities to identify GO 95 clearance violations.137 Mr. Weim noted that the most 

 

130 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 59-60. 

131 Id. 

132 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 3.

133 A.15-09-010 at 15. 

134 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 60. 

135 SDGE-06 at 4. 

136 SDGE-06 at 4 to 5. 

137 SDGE-06 at 5. 

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recent patrol inspection was completed on August 30, 2007, with no hazards 

identified.138 The most recent detailed overhead inspections were conducted on 

June 22, 2007 and April 8, 2005, but did not uncover design or construction issues 

with respect to poles P196387 and P196394.139 

SDG&E maintains that “if the 3.3 foot clearance pre-dated SDG&E’s 

inspections, and those inspections did not uncover the problem, those facts 

merely show that SDG&E was not perfect.”140 SDG&E maintains that the 

Commission’s prudence standard “is not a ‘perfection’ standard: it is a standard 

of care that demonstrates all actions were well planned, properly supervised and 

all necessary records retained.”141 Furthermore, SDG&E maintains that ORA 

failed to show that the 3.3-foot clearance contributed to the Guejito Fire’s 

ignition.

142

As such, SDG&E maintains that its management and control of its facilities 

prior to the ignition of the Guejito Fire were reasonable. 

4.2.3. ORA’s Position on SDG&E’s Operation

and Management of its Facilities Prior to

the Guejito Fire 

ORA maintains that SDG&E has failed to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that SDG&E’s operation and management of its facilities linked to the 

 

138 SDGE-06 at 10. 

139 SDGE-06 at 11. 

140 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 60.

141 Id. citing D.14-06-007 at 36. 

142 SDG&E Phase 1 Reply Brief at 63. 

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Guejito Fire were reasonable.

143 ORA cites to the facts surrounding the ignition 

of the Guejito Fire as well as the applicable clearance requirements per GO 95. 

GO 95 Clearance Requirements and SDG&E’s Inspections

ORA argues that SDG&E’s failure to comply with GO 95 renders the 

utility’s operation and management of its facilities imprudent.144 ORA contends 

that the lack of records documenting when the 3.3-foot clearance violation 

occurred does not mean that SDG&E met the prudent manager standard.

145 ORA 

maintains that the fact that Mr. Walters testified, under oath, that the clearance 

violation occurred at the time of the 2001 Cox line installation is evidence of

imprudent utility management.146 Additionally, ORA contends that the 

longstanding clearance violation was a safety risk, rendering SDG&E 

imprudent.147 Bolstering this argument, ORA highlights the specific statutory 

violations CPSD found during its post-fire investigation of the facilities linked to 

the Guejito Fire.148 ORA contends that CPSD’s finding that SDG&E failed to 

maintain its facilities in compliance with Public Utilities Code § 451, GO 95 

Rule 31.1, and GO 95 Rule 38 , shows SDG&E was imprudent in managing its 

facilities linked to the Guejito Fire.149 

 

143 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 18. 

144 Id. 

145 Id. 

146 Id. citing Reporter’s Transcript Volume 5 at 792.

147 Id. at 24. 

148 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 24. 

149 ORA Phase 1 Opening Brief at 24.

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As such, ORA maintains that SDG&E’s operation and management of its

facilities prior to the ignition of the Guejito Fire were not reasonable.150

4.2.4. Reasonableness Review: SDG&E’s Operation

and Management of its Facilities Prior to 

the Guejito Fire 

In evaluating SDG&E’s operation and management of its facilities in 

connection to the Guejito Fire, the Commission must determine whether SDG&E 

employed reasonable judgment in its operation and management of its facilities 

in the period leading up to the ignition of the Guejito Fire. 

The record shows that SDG&E utilized its Corrective Maintenance 

Program to perform patrol and detailed (overhead) inspections of P196387 and 

P196394 prior to the Guejito Fire ignition. SDG&E asserts its failure to identify 

the 3.3-foot clearance violation merely shows the utility was not perfect; we 

disagree. SDG&E’s use of patrol and overhead inspection protocols may be 

reasonable. The repeated failure of these patrols to identify the clearance 

violation is not reasonable. While SDG&E’s testimony highlights its Corrective 

Maintenance Program, the existence of the Corrective Maintenance Program is 

not sufficient to establish that SDG&E fulfilled its duty to be a reasonable and 

prudent manager. At the same time, the lack of inspection records indicates a 

failure to act prudently. The fact that the Cox line was installed in 2001, six years 

before the fire, and that no inspection records affirmatively reference compliance 

with GO 95 clearance requirements is problematic. Moreover, we find the 

six-year gap in inspection records (from 2001 to 2007) to be indicative of 

imprudent management. SDG&E asserts that to find its failure imprudent would 

 

150 ORA Phase 1 Reply Brief at 30. 

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be to interpret the prudence standard as a perfection standard. We disagree. 

Documentation of compliance with objective clearance standards at some point 

during the many years the Cox line was installed is not equivalent to perfection.

As such, SDG&E fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

acted prudently in its operation and management of its facilities prior to the 

ignition of the Guejito Fire. 

4.3. Rice Fire 

4.3.1. Rice Fire Background 

The Rice Fire ignited on October 22, 2007 in Fallbrook, California.151 The 

Cal Fire Investigation Report into the Rice Fire concluded that the cause of the 

fire was a downed powerline.

152 CPSD determined that a limb from sycamore 

Tree FF1090 (FF1090) broke and fell onto SDG&E 12 kV overhead conductors on 

October 22, 2007, which in turn caused the conductors to break and fall to the 

ground.153

In comments to the proposed decision, SDG&E alleges that the weight of 

the evidence shows it could not have prevented the Rice Fire, because it had no 

way to know of a defect in the broken tree branch that fell onto the conductors. 

SDG&E reiterates its claim that the broken branch was not marked for trimming 

and would not have been removed.154 We revise our discussion below to address 

these comments with further support from the evidentiary record of this 

proceeding. The Commission finds that SDG&E failed to trim FF1090 on a timely

 

151 SDGE-08 at 2. 

152 ORA-01 at 22. 

153 SDGE-08 at 2. 

154 See SDG&E’s Comment 

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basis and failed to keep adequate records for FF1090. SDG&E failed to show that 

it was prudent in its management of FF1090, or that it could not have identified

the defective branch with proper management. We find the evidence 

inconclusive as to the growth direction and the growth pattern of the broken 

branch. 

4.3.2. Legal Requirements

The Commission’s GO 95, Rule 35 sets the general clearance requirements 

for vegetation around powerlines.155 Rule 35 requires that where dead, rotten or 

diseased trees or dead, rotten, or diseased portions of otherwise healthy trees 

overhang or lean toward power conductors, those trees or portions are to be 

removed. In 2007, GO 95 required a radial clearance of 18 inches, and Public 

Resources Code Section 4293156 required a radial clearance of 4 feet, between 

 

155 SDGE-08 at 2. 

156 Public Resources Code § 4293: Except as otherwise provided in Sections 4294 to 4296, 

inclusive, any person that owns, controls, operates, or maintains any electrical transmission or 

distribution line upon any mountainous land, or in forest-covered land, brush-covered land, or 

grass-covered land shall, during such times and in such areas as are determined to be necessary 

by the director or the agency which has primary responsibility for the fire protection of such 

areas, maintain a clearance of the respective distances which are specified in this section in all 

directions between all vegetation and all conductors which are carrying electric current: (a) For 

any line which is operating at 2,400 or more volts, but less than 72,000 volts, four feet; (b) For 

any line which is operating at 72,000 or more volts, but less than 110,000 volts, six feet; (c) For 

any line which is operating at 110,000 or more volts, 10 feet. In every case, such distance shall 

be sufficiently great to furnish the required clearance at any position of the wire, or conductor 

when the adjacent air temperature is 120 degrees Fahrenheit, or less. Dead trees, old decadent 

or rotten trees, trees weakened by decay or disease and trees or portions thereof that are leaning 

toward the line which may contact the line from the side or may fall on the line shall be felled, 

cut, or trimmed so as to remove such hazard. The director or the agency which has primary 

responsibility for the fire protection of such areas may permit exceptions from the requirements 

of this section which are based upon the specific circumstances involved. (Amended by Stats. 

1976, Ch. 1300.)

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vegetation and 12 kV conductors.157 To comply with both Commission rules and 

State law, SDG&E designed and implemented its Vegetation and Management 

Program (VMP ) and Tree Pre-inspection procedures.158 In this decision, we 

review the VMP that was in place on October 22, 2007. SDG&E’s VMP manual 

describes SDG&E’s Tree Pre-inspection procedures in detail. The document 

provides an overview of the VMP, inventory criteria for vegetation, instructions 

to the Vegetation Management System, factors affecting reliability, procedure to 

escalate issues, updating inventory of vegetation, tree growth rates and the 

Vegetation Management Areas (VMAs). The manual is comprehensive and 

indicates that SDG&E had a robust VMP in 2007. 

4.3.3. Issues and Party Positions

Although no party disputes that the Rice Fire started when a broken limb 

from FF0190 fell onto SDG&E’s conductors, parties dispute whether SDG&E 

prudently marked, inspected and trimmed FF1090 pursuant to its VMP. Parties 

focused their litigation efforts on the tree inspections, trimming schedule and 

activities related to the clearance requirements. ORA and SDG&E also 

introduced testimony and evidence regarding Reliability Trees and FF1090’s 

latent defect.

4.3.3.1. FF1090’s Inspection and 

Trimming Schedule

FF1090 is a fast growing sycamore tree inventoried by the VMP in its 

Vegetation Management System (VMS) in 1999. The VMS is a software 

application designed by SDG&E to record tree data within a dynamic inventory 

 

157 SDGE-08 at 16.

158 SDG&E-08, Appendix 3.

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of vegetation having the potential to grow into or fall into SDG&E electric power 

lines and facilities.159 SDG&E pre-inspectors update information contained 

within certain fields in the database based on their evaluation of the tree. One of 

the fields in the VMS database is called “Months to next trim”, and the inspector 

can choose 0-3, 3-6, 6-9 months, etc. from the drop down menu. SDG&E’s VMS 

considers the tab “0-3 months” as setting a timeline that begins during the 

subsequent trim cycle, which in this case meant between September to 

November 2007. 

The record shows that FF1090 was inspected on July 18, 2007 and the 

SDG&E inspector chose the 0-3 months tab to remove direct overhang. On 

October 22, 2007, three months later, when the Rice Fire ignited, FF1090 had not 

been trimmed. ORA and SDG&E heavily litigated the issues of when FF1090 

should have been trimmed, whether FF1090 exhibited a clearance violation, and 

whether the trim would have prevented the branch from falling onto the 

conductors.

ORA argues that FF1090 should have been trimmed before 

October 18, 2007, three months from the July 18, 2007 pre-inspection. ORA 

believes that failure to trim FF1090 led directly to the branch breaking off and 

falling on the conductors. SDG&E states that the “Months to next trim” tab

should be used to estimate how many months will elapse before the tree grows 

out of compliance. According to SDG&E, a selection of 0-3 months would mean 

that the tree should be trimmed in the upcoming trim cycle, which in this case, 

would have been between September and November of 2007. 160 SDG&E further 

 

159 Ibid at 8.

160 See SDG&E-13 Prepared Rebuttal Testimony of Don Akau at 10-11.

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alleges that the broken off branch was growing away from the power lines, and 

as such would not necessarily have been subject to trimming. 

4.3.3.2. FF1090’s latent defect and the 

issue of Reliability Trees

The parties did not focus on some other aspects of the VMP manual that 

are nevertheless important in determining whether SDG&E acted prudently 

prior to the fire. Don Akau, SDG&E’s Vegetation Management Program 

Manager, testified about the hidden defect he observed in the broken branch 

after the fire. Mr. Akau referred to “staining” at the point where the fallen 

branch broke from the main trunk161 and proposed that the staining could be an 

indicator of “included bark”, or “internal structural stressing and cracking in the 

branch union” which in his opinion contributed to the failure of the limb in the 

winds.162

Throughout this proceeding, SDG&E claimed that the included bark was 

hidden, and could not have been discovered by its personnel during their 

inspections. According to SDG&E’s VMP manual, a Reliability Tree is “Any 

Tree, located inside or outside the utility right-of-way, that has a reasonably 

good potential for interrupting service to an overhead circuit (excluding 

secondary) with the current routine cycle.”163 When a pre-inspector identifies a 

Reliability Tree, it is mandatorily marked in the VMS as a Reliability Tree and for 

trimming.164 A Reliability Tree exhibits one or more factors listed in the VMP 

 

161 SDG&E-08 at 19 and SDG&E-13 at 8.

162 Ibid.

163 SDG&E-08, Appendix 3 at 7.

164 Ibid. at 30.

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manual, and per SDG&E’s inspection procedures, must be marked, pruned and 

inspected to ensure grid reliability. FF1090 was not marked as a Reliability Tree 

before the Rice Fire. 

4.3.4. Discussion 

In evaluating SDG&E’s operation and management of its facilities in 

connection with the Rice Fire, the Commission must determine whether SDG&E 

employed reasonable judgment in its operation and management of its facilities 

in the period leading up to the ignition of the Rice Fire. The general purpose of 

routine pre-inspections is to identify vegetation for pruning and removal that 

will not maintain required clearance for a full cycle (fourteen months). As part of 

the inspection process, the pre-inspector is also tasked to identify and mark 

Reliability Trees. A Reliability Tree is “Any Tree, located inside or outside the 

utility right of way, that has a reasonably good potential for interrupting service 

to an overhead circuit within the current routine cycle.” According to the VMP 

manual, “a majority of tree related outages that occur in the utility right-of-way 

are the result of tree or limb failure, not tree growth.”165 When a Reliability Tree 

is identified the pre-inspector shall [emphasis added] check both the reliability 

and trimming required box in the tree tab.166 

As part of its VMP, SDG&E relies on its inspectors to select the appropriate 

fields in the VMS and to identify potential Reliability Trees. It is essential for 

 

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.

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SDG&E personnel and contractors to be well trained in the procedures of the 

VMP so that they accurately select the drop down menus in the VMS.167 

Based on an exhaustive review of the record and informed primarily by 

SDG&E’s own VMP manual, the Commission finds SDG&E acted imprudently 

in its management of FF1090. First, we find SDG&E to have deviated from its 

usual timeline in trimming FF1090. Secondly, SDG&E’s pre-inspector mistook 

the ‘months to next trim’ menu to mean that a selection of 0-3 months means that 

an actual trimming would take place within 0-3 months of the pre-inspection. 

The contractor’s misunderstanding of the VMS led him to incorrectly select a 

menu item that delayed the trimming beyond three months from the inspection 

date. Thirdly, SDG&E did not identify FF1090 as a “Reliability Tree” even 

though FF1090 seems to have exhibited at least two characteristics on the “Tree 

Hazard Checklist.”168 Each of these elements of the record is discussed below. In 

each of these instances, SDG&E failed to demonstrate that it employed

reasonable judgment in its operation and management of its facilities in the 

period leading up to the ignition of the Rice Fire.

4.3.4.1. SDG&E’s Tree Inspection and 

Trimming Schedule

The record shows that at the time of the Rice Fire’s ignition, SDG&E had a 

VMP in place whereby FF1090 was inspected and trimmed. A summary of all 

available pre-inspections and subsequent trim dates recorded in the VMS Tree 

Information Sheet up to the Rice Fire are shown in the table below:

 

167 The Vegetation Management System (VMS) is a database which tracks all of the inventoried 

vegetation within SDG&E’s territory. The VMS has various drop down menus which allow an 

inspector to identify issues with a tree and recommend the proper course of action. 

168 Ibid.

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Tree FF1090 Inspection and Prune dates

Tree FF1090 Inspection Date Prune date

05/07/1999 05/01/2000

01/25/2001 No trim record

01/02/2002 04/29/2002

01/13/2003 05/07/2003

11/11/2003 02/17/2004

11/17/2004 02/11/2005

07/12/2005 No trim record

07/19/2006 No trim record

07/18/2007

(10/15/2007)*

(10/19/2007)* 10/22/2007

* SDG&E states that Davey Tree Surgery Company and SDG&E personnel

performed follow up inspections on October 15, 2007 and October 19, 2007 

respectively, and that FF1090 was in compliance with clearance requirements on 

those two visits. However, these additional inspection dates are not shown in 

the tree information sheet submitted by SDG&E. SDG&E asserts the 

October 15, 2007 inspection by a data request response submitted by Davey.169

The Tree Information Sheet identifies FF1090 as a fast growing sycamore 

tree with a growth rate of between four to six feet every year. FF1090 was 

inventoried on May 7, 1999 and pruned on May 1, 2000. It was inspected again 

on January 25, 2001 and January 2, 2002. Having not been trimmed for 20 

months, the January 2, 2002 inspection documents FF1090 as having between 

1.5 to 4 foot clearance to the conductors and SDG&E pruned FF1090 on 

 

169 See SDGE-08, Appendix 7.

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April 29, 2002.170 In 2002, SDG&E had notice that, because of FF 1090’s growth 

rate, not trimming the tree annually resulted in FF1090 being out of clearance 

compliance. Subsequent to the 2002 violation, FF1090 was inspected and pruned 

annually until the inspection on July 12, 2005. FF1090 was not trimmed after 

July 12, 2005, nor was it trimmed after the inspection on July 19, 2006. By the 

July 18, 2007 inspection, FF1090 had not been trimmed for over 29 months.171 

There were only two instances in FF1090’s inventoried history in which it 

was not trimmed on an annual basis. The first instance in which SDG&E failed 

to trim FF1090 annually was in 2002, when the tree was recorded as being within 

4 feet of conductors. The Rice Fire marks the end of the second time period 

during which SDG&E fell out of the annual trimming schedule. At the time of 

the Rice Fire ignition, SDG&E had not trimmed FF1090 for 29 months. The fact 

that SDG&E deviated from its own standard time table, and allowed more than 

two years to elapse without pruning this fast-growing tree, shows that SDG&E 

was not reasonable or prudent in its management of FF1090. 

ORA and SDG&E focus their arguments on the definition of 0-3 months 

and whether it meant that FF1090 should have been trimmed by 

October 18, 2007. The Commission reviews all available data as a whole. 

SDG&E’s inspector described his reasoning in selecting 0-3 months: “And I 

listed from zero months to three months as when it should be trimmed. I chose 

that option on the drop-down menu.” “[I]t had strong growth towards the lines, 

 

170 SDGE-08 at Appendix 6. SDG&E argues that ORA failed to prove FF1090 was out of 

compliance, we note that it is SDG&E who carries the burden of proof to show it was acting 

prudently and reasonably, not the other way around. 

171 Ibid.

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and I felt it would encroach in the 4 foot distance from the primary line in the 

facilities within three months.”172 

In light of this testimony, SDG&E’s claim that “0-3 months” did not set a 

deadline for trimming is unpersuasive. SDG&E’s contract requires Davey to 

train its pre-inspectors on many topics in the VMP manual and to use the VMS. 

But, in this instance, the pre-inspector did not have a clear understanding of the 

drop down menu functions in the VMS. The inspector’s misunderstanding of 

SDG&E’s tree trimming program underscores the need for proper training. If the 

contractor made a mistake due to insufficient or improper training, SDG&E is 

still responsible for acts, omissions, or failures of its agents under PUC 

Section 2109. 173 

In comments on the proposed decision, SDG&E further asserted that the 

broken off branch grew away from the powerline, and was not marked for 

trimming. SDG&E did not carry its burden to show that the broken branch grew 

away from the powerline. Rather, the growth direction of the broken branch is 

inconclusive from the record. Testimony from Mr. Akau states that the branch 

was positioned toward the northeast, growing away from the powerline;174

testimony from Mr. Ronald Hay states that the broken branch grew to the south, 

toward the utility lines;175 and testimony from Mr. David Kracha states that

 

172 ORA-44, Transcript excerpts of the March 25, 2008 Examination Under Oath of Mark 

Clemens.

173 California Public Utilities Code section 2109: “In construing and enforcing the provisions of 

this part relating to penalties, the act, omission, or failure of any officer, agent, or employee of 

any public utility, acting within the scope of his official duties or employment, shall in every 

case be the act, omission, or failure of such public utility.”

174 See SDG&E-08 at 18.

175 See ORA-40, Transcript excerpts of May 28, 2008 examination under oath of Ronald Hay.

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broken limb grew completely vertically and did not grow toward or away from 

the powerlines.176 

Next, assuming that the broken branch grew away from the powerline, a 

second evidentiary issue emerges. SDG&E presented multiple witnesses stating 

that the broken branch was part of co-dominant leader growth- with two 

similar-sized branches growing from the same union point. SDG&E has argued 

throughout this proceeding that due to the co-dominant nature of these 

branches, the breaking of one necessitated the removal of the other. After 

observing the broken branch on October 22, 2007, before Cal Fire could inspect 

the ignition site, SDG&E’s Chris Thompson ordered the removal of the 

remaining leader branch, and reduction of FF1090’s entire canopy to prevent 

additional failures.177 SDG&E justifies the reduction of the entire canopy of 

FF1090 by stating it was necessary to prevent further failures. Applying the 

same rationale, the evidence indicates that that trimming of FF1090’s overhang 

would have required balanced trimming throughout the canopy. Thus, even if 

the broken branch did not have clearance problems, a prudent manager 

trimming on a regular schedule likely would have trimmed FF1090 to balance 

the other branches that did have clearance issues. 

According to SDG&E, two additional inspections of FF1090 took place on 

October 15, 2007 and October 19, 2007, and those inspections found FF1090 to be 

in compliance with clearance requirements.178 The October 19, 2007 inspection 

 

176 See ORA-41, Transcript excerpts of May, 28, 2008 Examination under oath of David Kracha.

177 See SDG&E-13, Appendix 4 at 4.

178 We note the October 15, 2007 inspection is not recorded on SDG&E’s own Tree Information 

Sheet, but reported by Davey as part of a data response in SDG&E-08, appendix 7.

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was conducted by SDG&E personnel, but also is not shown in the Tree 

Information sheet. 

4.3.4.2. FF1090’s Latent Defect and the 

Issue of Reliability Trees

In addition to FF1090’s inspection and trim history, the Commission also 

considers whether SDG&E has met the burden of showing that it could not have 

identified the defect in FF1090. The Commission’s analysis of the record and the 

VMP concludes that SDG&E has not met its burden: There is insufficient 

evidence to show that acting responsibly SDG&E could not have identified the 

defect in FF1090. The broken branch with included bark exhibited at least two 

factors which could warrant FF1090 being marked as a Reliability Tree. 

To begin, Section 5 of SDG&E’s VMP manual discusses Reliability Trees. 

The five-page section defines Reliability Trees and provides a Hazard Tree 

Checklist for evaluating trees for reliability and six sample photos.179 Two 

checklist items are relevant to FF1090: 1) “are there multiple vertical branches 

originating from one point that may indicate weak attachment?” and 2) “are 

there narrow-angled branch crotches that may indicate included bark?180”

Section 5 of SDG&E’s VMP manual is consistent with General Order 95, 

Rule 35, which requires that diseased and rotten portions of otherwise healthy 

trees growing toward or hanging over powerlines be removed. 

SDG&E presents evidence of the included bark and the limb’s growth 

direction through Mr. Akau’s testimony, a hand drawn diagram by Mr. Akau, 

and testimony from Ronald Matranga and Chris Thompson, SDG&E arborists 

 

179 Ibid.

180 SDG&E-08, Appendix 3 at 30.

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who visited the Rice Fire site after the fire. According to SDG&E, the broken 

limb which caused the ignition contained hidden ‘included bark’, which could 

not be observed during routine inspections. In his direct and rebuttal testimony, 

Mr. Akau referred to the presence of “staining” at the point where the fallen 

branch broke from the main trunk.181 Mr. Akau proposes that the staining could 

be an indicator of “included bark”, or “internal structural stressing and cracking 

in the branch union” which in his opinion contributed to the failure of the limb in 

the winds.182

The record, however, does not clearly support that SDG&E did not have 

advance notice of the structural defect. 

Mr. Akau testified regarding SDG&E’s Vegetation Management Program 

and presented inspection protocol for “Reliability Trees,” and stated that no 

structural defects were noted by SDG&E’s contractors during the July 18, 2017 

inspection 183 SDG&E’s Chris Thompson testified in I.08-11-006 that the cause of 

the included bark was co-dominant leader branches in FF1090.184 Mr. Thompson 

states in his testimony that FF1090’s included bark occurred “when two separate 

leaders start growing together and pushing against each other as they grow in 

diameter.”185 Further corroboration of FF1090’s growth pattern can be found in 

the transcribed testimony of Ronald Hay, which described the broken branch as 

 

181 SDG&E-08 at 19 and SDG&E-13at 8.

182 Ibid.

183 SDGE-13 at 9, citing “Direct Testimony of Ronald Matranga” in I.08-11-006, June 6, 2009 

at 3-5.

184 SDG&E-13, Appendix 4 at 4.

185 Ibid.

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part of “a healthy clutter[spelling per transcript] of branches that grew straight 

up.”186

While as discussed above, SDG&E personnel provided conflicting 

testimony on the growth direction of the broken branch, in contrast SDG&E 

personnel have been consistent in their recollection of the growth pattern of the 

broken limb. 

The testimony indicates that the broken branch was part of at least two 

vertical branches, possibly more, growing closely together. This testimony 

indicates that the tree appeared to have some physical characteristics that would 

have warranted further attention. Based on the testimony of SDG&E’s 

personnel, SDG&E has not met its burden of showing that it could not have 

identified the defect in FF1090. 

4.4. Commission Precedent 

The Commission has a long history of cases that apply the reasonable and 

prudent manager standard to after-the-fact reviews of costs incurred by utilities. 

In each case, the facts showed that the costs the Commission denied were 

directly attributable to clear and identifiable utility failures or errors. 

 

186 See ORA-40, Transcript excerpts of May 28, 2008 Examination under oath of Ronald Hay

at 23.

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Mohave

The facts of I.86-04-002 have similarities to the facts of the instant 

proceeding. On June 9, 1985, a weld in a high-pressure steam pipe at the Mohave

Coal Plant (Mohave) ruptured, blasting steam hotter than 1,000 degrees 

Fahrenheit through an employee breakroom and Mohave’s control room.187 As a 

result, six people were killed and ten others were severely injured.

188 The steam

caused extensive damage to the control room, as well as other portions of the 

plant.189 The Commission ultimately concluded that Southern California Edison 

Company (SCE) acted unreasonably in failing to implement an inspection 

program to ensure that the portion of the piping system that ultimately failed 

was maintained in a safe condition.190 In reaching its decision, the Commission 

offered, “[e]vidence of accepted industry practices will often be relevant to a 

reasonableness inquiry, but compliance with such practices will not relieve the 

utility of [its] burden of showing that its conduct was reasonable.”191

Furthermore, the Commission noted “guidelines are only advisory in nature and 

do not relieve the utility of its burden to show that its actions were reasonable.” 

I.86-04-002 concluded with D.94-03-048, which held it was not reasonable to pass 

costs resulting from the accident to SCE’s ratepayers. 

Similar to Mohave, where SCE’s facilities were directly involved killing 

six people and injuring ten others, SDG&E’s facilities were directly involved in 

 

187 D.94-03-048 at 2.

188 D.94-03-048 at 2. 

189 D.94-03-048 at 2. 

190 D.94-03-048 at 2.

191 D.94-03-048 at 37, citing D.88-03-036 at 527.

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the ignition and subsequent destruction caused by the 2007 Wildfires. Although 

SDG&E had industry recognized policies and programs in place (recloser policy, 

Corrective Maintenance Program, and Vegetation Management Program) prior 

to October 2007, such practices do not relieve SDG&E of its burden to show that 

its actions were reasonable. As discussed above, SDG&E fails to show its actions 

were reasonable when SDG&E allowed 4 faults to occur on TL 637 over a period 

of 6.5 hours; SDG&E failed to uncover the 3.3 feet clearance violation for 6 years 

after utilizing its Corrective Maintenance Program’s patrol and detailed 

inspections; and SDG&E did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

properly monitored and trimmed FF1090 before the ignition of the Rice Fire. 

SDG&E did not train its contractors to properly mark the VMS and has not 

shown it could not have identified a defective limb. SDG&E is responsible for its 

contractor’s failure to appropriately mark the VMS and ensure that Tree FF1090 

was trimmed on a timely basis. The Commission is also concerned with records 

suggesting that FF1090 may have been a Reliability Tree warranting immediate 

attention.

Helms 

In A.82-04-12 and I.82-01-01 (Helms), the Commission reviewed whether 

the costs incurred by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) in building the 

Helms Project192 prior to the Lost Canyon pipe failure constituted reasonable and 

 

192 D.85910 defines the Helms Project as: The Helms Pumped Storage Project is a combination 

pumped storage and conventional hydroelectric project. The project allowed for the utilization 

of the water power resources of the North Fork Kings River and Helms Creek. The project 

completes development of the available head between Courtright Lake, maximum water 

surface elevation 8,184 feet, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Pine Flat Reservoir, 

maximum water surface elevation 952 feet. The maximum head developed by the project 

between Courtright Lake and Lake Wishon is 1,744 feet. The power potential will be developed 

Footnote continued on next page

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prudent utility expenditures.193 On September 29, 1982, the Lost Canyon pipe 

crossing failed during testing of the Helms Project.194 In April 1983, PG&E filed 

an amendment to A.82-04-12 asking the Commission: (1) to place $738.5 million 

cost for the Helms Project incurred before the Lost Canyon pipe failure into rate 

base; and (2) to defer any review of the additional reconstruction cost until PG&E 

resolved all litigation arising from the Lost Canyon pipe failure.195 In reaching its 

conclusion, the Commission found PG&E failed to appreciate the risks associated 

with the construction of the Helms Project, and that PG&E also failed “to take 

seriously the repeated safety citations and work shutdowns issued and ordered 

by the State Department of Occupational Safety and Health.”196 Ultimately, the 

Commission found PG&E failed to perform at the appropriate standard of 

performance, rendering PG&E imprudent.197 D.85-08-102 specified that 

ratepayers would not be required to indemnify PG&E for losses arising from the 

Lost Canyon pipe failure.198

Similar to Helms, where the Commission found PG&E failed to take into 

account the risks associated with building the Helms Project, SDG&E failed to 

take into account the risks associated with its automatic recloser policy. As ORA 

 

by constructing a conduit consisting of two tunnels, a short pipe section and a penstock 

between Courtright Lake and an underground powerhouse. Total length of the conduit, which 

is entirely underground except for the 140-foot pipe section, is 20,408 feet. The trailrace tunnel 

connects the underground powerhouse with Lake Wishon. 

193 D.85-08-102 at 6 to 7. 

194 D.85-08-102 at 5.

195 D.85-08-102 at 5 to 6. 

196 D.85-08-102 at Findings of Fact 6 and 10.

197 D.85-08-102 at Conclusions of Law 5 and 6.

198 D.85-08-102 at Conclusion of Law 9. 

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showed, SDG&E had knowledge of the 2001 Field Guide’s caution that automatic 

reclosers increase the risk of igniting vegetation. As such, it was imprudent of 

SDG&E to not take into account the risk factors associated with re-energizing 

TL 637 after three faults occurred within a span of 3.5 hours. 

SONGS

D.84-09-120 addressed the reasonableness of SCE’s cost of power 

purchased to replace power lost because of the diesel generator fire at

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 1.199 On July 14, 1981, a

fire caused by a small oil leak in a section of piping attached to a diesel engine 

caused two emergency diesel generators at SONGS 1 to be out from July 17, 1981 

to August 16, 1981.200 Although a small oil leak had been reported near the 

piping in question, maintenance personnel could not find the source of the leak, 

even with the diesel shutdown.201 Unfortunately, during the next monthly 

scheduled load-test, the unidentifiable leak caused oil to spray out and ignite a 

fire.202 The coordinated effort between SONGS 1 control room operators and the 

fire personnel limited the fire to only 7 minutes, thereby reducing damage to the 

diesel generator.

203 In reviewing SCE’s conduct, the Commission applied its 

reasonableness standard, and found that the replacement energy costs associated 

 

199 D.84-09-120 at 2. 

200 D.84-09-120 at 72. 

201 D.84-09-120 at 73 to 74. 

202 D.84-09-120 at 74 to 75.

203 D.84-09-120 at 74 to 75. 

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with the SONGS I diesel generator fire were incurred on account of SCE’s 

unreasonableness and were therefore unrecoverable.204

Similar to SONGS, where the Commission found costs incurred for 

replacement energy costs were unrecoverable due to the unreasonableness of 

SCE’s actions, the costs of the 2007 Wildfires were incurred due to unreasonable 

management by SDG&E. Even though SCE limited the diesel fire to 7 minutes, 

thereby substantially reducing the fire’s damage, the Commission still found 

SCE’s actions leading up to the diesel fire to be unreasonable. Similarly, it was 

imprudent of SDG&E to allow a fourth fault to occur on TL 637 more than two

hours after SDG&E’s Grid Operations became aware of the Witch Fire. Similar to 

SONGS, where maintenance personnel could not locate the oil leak, SDG&E’s 

Corrective Maintenance Program failed to identify the almost 3-feet clearance 

violation between SDG&E’s overhead conductors and the below-installed 

Cox Communication Line. While SONGS involved the prompt deployment of 

maintenance personnel to address its oil leak, SDG&E was unable to locate and 

address the clearance issue for almost six years, even after personnel completed 

inspections on April 8, 2005, June 22, 2007 and August 30, 2007. 

Applying the above case analysis to the facts of the instant proceeding, it is 

reasonable for the Commission to find SDG&E’s actions leading up to the 

2007 Wildfires imprudent. Moreover, it is reasonable for the Commission to 

deny those costs which were incurred by SDG&E to resolve third-party damage 

claims arising from the Witch, Guejito and Rice Wildfires.

 

204 D.84-09-120 at Conclusion of Law 2. 

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4.5. Wind and Weather Conditions in 

October 2007

Per the Scoping Ruling, the Commission has analyzed SDG&E’s operation 

and management of its facilities prior to the ignition of the 2007 Wildfires by 

each fire. Regardless of the varying facts surrounding the Witch, Guejito and 

Rice wildfire ignitions, a common issue amongst the three fires exists. While no 

party disputes the fact that the Santa Ana winds are a known local condition in 

San Diego County, dispute remains as to whether the winds credited with the 

ignition and spread of the 2007 Wildfires were unprecedented.

205 If the wind and 

weather patterns present in October of 2007 were not unprecedented, then a 

prudent manager would have used the weather information to reasonably 

manage and operate its facilities. 

The parties to this proceeding have put forth extensive arguments and 

expert witness testimony on the issue of the wind and weather conditions in 

October 2007. While both SDG&E and UCAN presented highly recognized wind 

and weather experts, the opinions encompass a variety of the methodologies to 

estimate the peak wind speeds during the ignition of each of the 2007 Wildfires. 

While reviewing the experts’ showings, we have applied the following principle: 

[I]n administrative proceedings before an agency composed of 

trained specialists and before expert examiners or hearing 

officers, the burden of evaluating the weight and probity of 

testimony and evidence covering technical subject matter is 

primarily that of sifting and evaluating the evidence based 

upon the agency's expertise. Expert opinion does not bind the 

 

205 ORA-01 at 36; SDGE-05 at 3. 

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Commission. The Commission may form its own conclusions 

without the aid of expert opinions.206

SDG&E’s Experts’ Showings

SDG&E put forth Mr. Steve Vanderburg (Mr. Vanderburg) and 

Dr. Jon Peterka (Dr. Peterka) to show that the October 2007 weather conditions 

were unprecedented. 

Mr. Vanderburg, a Senior Meteorologist with SDG&E, testified that the 

2007 Wildfires occurred during the most severe weather event in San Diego 

County since 1984.207 Mr. Vanderburg presented a statistical analysis comparing 

wind gusts from the Julian Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS) and the 

West Santa Ysabel weather station to show that the wind gust speeds would 

have been 92 miles per hour (mph) during the peak of October 2007 weather 

season.208 Mr. Vanderburg utilized data from the West Santa Ysabel weather 

station because it was the closest source to the Witch Fire ignition point.

209 In 

briefs, SDG&E stressed that even though the West Santa Ysabel weather station 

did not exist in 2007, “Mr. Vanderburg was still able to determine what the wind 

gust speeds would have been at the West Santa Ysabel weather station during 

the peak of the late October 2007 wind event.”210 

Dr. Peterka, a Professional Engineer and Professor Emeritus in Fluid 

Mechanics and Wind Engineering at the Department of Civil Engineering at 

 

206 D.90642, 2 CPUC2d 89, 102 (1979), citing Market Street Railway v. Railroad Commission, 

324 U.S. 548, 560-561 (1945). See City of Los Angeles v. Public Utilities Commission, 7 Cal. 3d 

331, 351 [*34] (1972).

207 SDGE-09 at 2. 

208 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 91 to 92. 

209 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 91. 

210 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 91 to 92. 

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Colorado State University, testified as to the mean wind speeds at the time and 

location of the ignition of each of the 2007 Wildfires.

211 Dr. Peterka used a 

two-pronged approach, WRF (Weather Researching and Forecasting) Modeling

and a model of the local terrain, to compute peak wind gusts speeds of: 78 to 87 

miles per hour (mph) for the Witch fire ignition; 59 to 68 mph for the Guejito fire 

ignition; and 70 to 75 mph for the Rice fire ignition.212 In his direct testimony, 

Dr. Peterka elaborated on his methodology. Essentially, Dr. Peterka explained

that he validated his WRF results with 2007 observed data from the Automated 

Surface Observing System (ASOS) located at the Ramona Airport.213 Dr. Peterka 

stated, “the largest 3-second gust measured at the Ramona Airport during 

[October 2007] was 55 mph. Based on the ESDU procedure used to estimate the 

3-second gust from the WRF simulations, the gusts are predicted to be between 

60 and 76 mph, or 9 to 38 percent higher than the actual measurements. The 

validation exercise is dependent on the overall match between ASOS and WRF 

wind speeds and directions....as well as the comparison of peak gusts. This 

validation supports my methodologies.”214 Dr. Peterka explained that he believed 

the RAWS and ASOS data were obtained from stations that were improperly 

sited. Dr. Peterka asserts that the improper siting resulted in recorded wind 

 

211 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 98.

212 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 98, citing SDGE-10 at 1 and Appendix 1. 

213 Reporter’s Transcript Volume 5 at 735 to 740. 

214 SDGE-10 at 12. 

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speeds that are too low.215 For this reason, Dr. Peterka discarded the 2007 RAWS 

and ASOS and came up with a result that is 9 to 38 percent higher.216

In addition to providing analyses of the wind and weather events 

surrounding the ignition of the 2007 Wildfires, SDG&E’s experts highlighted the 

utility’s involvement in developing the Santa Ana Wildfire Threat Index 

(SAWTI).217 SDG&E notes, “to develop the SAWTI, SDG&E and UCLA worked 

to configure the WRF model by calibrating it against actual observations of 

temperatures, winds, and dew points collected from SDG&E weather stations 

during Santa Ana wind events.”218 SDG&E highlights that the SAWTI allows an 

individual to understand the fire potential by comparing it to past and present 

conditions.219 As such, SDG&E’s experts utilized the SAWTI in testifying that the 

wind and weather conditions in San Diego County in 2007 had the largest fire 

potential since 1984.220 Because of this, SDG&E maintains that it had no way to 

know how the strong winds in October 2007 would affect SDG&E’s service 

territory and fire danger.221

UCAN’s Experts’ Showings 

UCAN put forth Dr. Janice Coen (Dr. Coen) and Dr. Alexander Gershunov 

(Dr. Gershunov) to rebut the claims made by SDG&E’s weather experts. 

Dr. Coen, a Project Scientist with the National Center for Atmospheric Research 

 

215 UCAN Phase 1 Opening Brief at 9. 

216 Reporter’s Transcript Volume 5 at 739. 

217 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 94. 

218 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 94. 

219 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 95.

220 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 95. 

221 SDG&E Phase 1 Opening Brief at 95.

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in Colorado, and Dr. Gershunov, from University of San Diego in the Climate, 

Atmospheric Science and Physical Oceanography Division at the Scripps 

Institute of Oceanography, assert that SDG&E’s experts’ analysis is flawed.222 

Dr. Gershunov testified regarding his methodologies in calculating the 

wind gust speeds for each of the 2007 Wildfires, and how his findings show that

the 2007 Wildfires cannot be attributed to an unprecedented weather event.

223

Dr. Gershunov’s estimates for the Witch fire ignition were 43.1 mph, 56.7 mph at 

the time of the Guejito Fire’s ignition, and 34.4 mph at the time of the Rice Fire’s 

ignition.224 UCAN argues that “when looking at these numbers from both 

SDG&E’s wind expert and UCAN’s wind expert, the differences seem huge. 

However, as Dr. Gershunov testified, the difference is that [Dr. Gershunov] used 

the recorded data from 2007 to validate and bias correct his model results and 

that SDG&E did not.”225 Dr. Gershunov utilized data recorded by the RAWS and 

ASOS stations in calculating his wind speed estimates.

226 As noted by 

Dr. Gershunov, “not only was there a stronger wind event on record [in 

San Diego County], but there were 3 other wind events that were within 

10-percent of the wind speeds of the 2007 Santa Ana event that occurred in the 

last 30 years.”227 Furthermore, UCAN notes that SDG&E’s use of the SAWTI to 

 

222 UCAN Phase 1 Opening Brief at 8, 18; UCAN Phase 1 Reply Brief at 8.

223 UCAN Phase 1 Reply Brief at 9.

224 UCAN Phase 1 Reply Brief at 9. 

225 UCAN Phase 1 Reply Brief at 9. 

226 UCAN Phase 1 Reply Brief at 9. 

227 UCAN Phase 1 Opening Brief at 19, citing Reporter’s Transcript at 1004 to 1005. 

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advance its theory that the 2007 Wildfires’ ignition and spread were beyond the 

utility’s control is not supported by SDG&E’s experts’ theories.228

Analysis of Parties’ Experts

The presentation of UCAN’s and SDG&E’s expert witnesses added 

tremendous value to the record of this proceeding. SDG&E’s attempt to explain 

why the contemporaneous data collected from San Diego County’s RAWS and 

ASOS should be discarded were not persuasive. We find the wind estimates of 

Dr. Gershunov to be more reflective of the actual wind and weather conditions 

during the ignitions of the Witch, Guejito and Rice Wildfires in October 2007.

We find Dr. Gershunov’s utilization of the actual recorded weather data from 

2007 to validate his wind speed estimates to be more reliable than Dr. Peterka’s 

methodologies. Furthermore, the Commission is not persuaded by SDG&E’s use

of the SAWTI to try to establish that the wind and weather conditions in 

San Diego County in October 2007 created the largest wildfire threat since 1984

because of more refined testimony provided by the other parties. 

Because we find the methodologies that UCAN’s experts utilized in 

developing its testimony to be more consistent with the actual weather and wind 

conditions in San Diego County in October 2007, the Commission does not find 

that the 2007 Wildfires were spread under unprecedented wind and weather 

conditions. SDG&E fails to show how the wind and weather conditions 

impacted its operation and management of its facilities involved in the 2007 

Wildfires. 

 

228 UCAN Phase 1 Opening Brief at 19. 

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4.6. Reconsideration of Threshold Issues

While the August 11, 2016 ruling rejected the Joint Intervenors’ briefs 

requesting the dismissal of this application based on the aforementioned

Threshold Issues, the ruling did allow for the re-consideration of the Threshold 

Issues after the development of the evidentiary record. Since the August 11, 2016 

ruling, there have been no additional testimonies or briefs submitted referencing 

the Threshold Issues. With this decision, the Commission denies A.15-09-010 

based on SDG&E’s imprudent management of its facilities. As such, the 

Threshold Issues should be denied as moot.

5. Conclusion

Almost 10 years have passed since the Witch, Guejito, and Rice Wildfires 

ripped through San Diego County in October 2007. The parties to this 

proceeding have produced a voluminous record on which the Commission must 

base its decision. And although ORA and UCAN were not present at Grid 

Operations on October 21, 2007, or at the August 30, 2007 patrol inspection of 

P196394 and P196387, or privy to the implementation of SDG&E’s Vegetation 

Management Program, ORA, UCAN, MGRA and Henricks have presented 

evidence which paints a clearer picture of SDG&E’s utility management prior to 

the ignition of the 2007 Wildfires. 

As to the Witch Fire, the Commission is not persuaded that SDG&E 

utilized good utility practice when it allowed three faults to occur within a span 

of 3.5 hours, on a line with a history of 9 multiple fault days in a 24-year period. 

Multiple faults on TL 637 on a single day during a Red Flag Warning should 

have been of more concern to SDG&E than the threat of the Harris Fire to the 

Southwest Powerlink. Additionally, while SDG&E’s recloser policy was 

industry practice, it was unreasonable for SDG&E to allow 6.5 hours to elapse

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between the initial fault at 8:53 a.m. on TL 637 and the de-energizing of TL 637 at 

3:27 p.m.

As to the Guejito Fire, SDG&E cannot just point to its Corrective 

Maintenance Program to show it fulfilled its duty to be a reasonable and prudent 

manager. SDG&E did not utilize good utility practice when it failed to discover 

the 3.3-foot clearance violation after conducting what it purported to be thorough 

patrol and visual inspections prior to October 22, 2007. And although the record 

shows SDG&E completed inspections prior to the Guejito Fire ignition, it is 

unreasonable for six years to have elapsed without finding or addressing the 

clearance violation between the SDG&E overhead conductor and the Cox line. 

As for the Rice Fire, SDG&E fails to explain why it ignored its own 

contractor’s recommendation to trim FF1090 within 0 to 3 months of Davey’s 

July 2007 inspection. Furthermore, SDG&E’s utilization of its Vegetation 

Management Program does not absolve SDG&E of its responsibility to act 

reasonably in light of specific information. Because SDG&E had labeled FF1090 

as a fast grower, SDG&E should have trimmed FF1090 before October 22, 2007. 

Finally, even if we were to find SDG&E’s operations reasonable under the 

circumstances, SDG&E cannot use the wind and weather conditions of October 

2007 to mitigate SDG&E’s failure to operate as reasonable and prudent manager. 

SDG&E’s witnesses fail to accurately present the wind and weather conditions in 

October 2007. Moreover, SDG&E does not prove that the Witch, Guejito and 

Rice Wildfire were due to unforeseeable circumstances beyond SDG&E’s control. 

Because SDG&E has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that its management and operation of its facilities prior to the ignition of the

Witch, Guejito and Rice wildfires were reasonable, we find SDG&E’s 

management and control of its facilities prior to the 2007 Wildfires imprudent. 

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California law, Commission practice and precedent all essentially require 

that before ratepayers bear any costs incurred by the utility, those costs must be 

just and reasonable. Because we find SDG&E’s management and control of its 

facilities prior to the ignition of the Witch, Guejito and Rice Wildfires 

unreasonable, such costs incurred by the utility in settling third-party damage 

claims are unjust and unreasonable. As such, those costs must not be recovered 

through ratepayers. SDG&E’s request to recover $379 million recorded in its 

WEMA must be denied. 

With the denial of SDG&E’s application, there is no reason for SDG&E’s 

Wildfire Expense Memorandum Account to remain open to recover: (a) wildfire 

claims, including any deductibles, co-insurance and other incremental insurance 

expense paid by SDG&E that are not authorized as part of SDG&E’s General 

Rate Case or any other proceeding; and (b) incremental outside legal costs 

incurred by SDG&E in the defense of wildfire claims.229 After the adoption of 

this decision, it is appropriate for SDG&E to file a Tier 1 Advice Letter with the 

Commission’s Energy Division to implement the denial of $379 million from its 

WEMA and to close the account.

Since SDG&E’s application is denied based on its unreasonable 

management and control of its facilities, there is no need to re-consider the 

Threshold Issues identified in the Scoping Ruling. The Threshold Issues should 

be denied as moot.

 

229 A.15-09-010 at Attachment B. 

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6. Intervenor Compensation 

Per Public Utilities Code Section 1804(c), following the issuance of a final 

order or decision by the Commission in the hearing or proceeding, a customer 

who, or eligible local government entity that, has been found, pursuant to 

§ 1804 (b), to be eligible for an award of compensation may file within 60 days a 

request for an award. 

7. Comments on Proposed Decision

The PD of the ALJs in the matter was mailed to the parties in accordance 

with Pub. Util. Code § 311 and comments were allowed under Rule 14.3 of the 

Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. Opening Comments to the PD 

were filed on September 11, 2017 by SDG&E, ORA, POC, MGRA, and Henricks. 

Reply Comments were filed by SDG&E, Henricks, MGRA, POC, and UCAN on 

September 15, 2017. This Decision has been revised where appropriate to 

address relevant comments. 

A second round of comments pertaining to the issue of Inverse 

Condemnation was filed according to the procedural schedule set via e-mail 

ruling on September 29, 2017. 

SDG&E, PG&E and SCE all argue that the PD commits legal error by 

failing to address Inverse Condemnation. Further, they argue that under Inverse 

Condemnation principles, SDG&E would be strictly liable for the costs sought in 

its application. Thus, they argue that the Commission must approve rate 

recovery of the costs SDG&E requests here regardless of prudency. SDG&E 

argue that reasonableness review of the WEMA application should be based 

exclusively on whether the settlement amounts paid by SDG&E were reasonable. 

We disagree.

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First, Inverse Condemnation principles are not relevant to a Commission 

reasonableness review under the prudent manager standard. Thus, Inverse 

Condemnation was not a material issue in Phase 1 and did not merit a dedicated 

discussion. Notably, even SDG&E withdrew its testimony concerning Inverse 

Condemnation for purposes of Phase 1. 

Second, according to SDG&E’s application, the Superior Court only went 

so far as to rule that the plaintiff homeowners could plead Inverse 

Condemnation claims in their civil actions against SDG&E. We are not aware of 

any Superior Court determination that SDG&E was in fact strictly liable for the 

costs requested in its application. Even if SDG&E were strictly liable, we see 

nothing in the cited case law that would supersede this Commission’s exclusive 

jurisdiction over cost recovery/cost allocation issues involving Commission 

regulated utilities. 

In response to comments, the section of the decision describing the Rice 

Fire has been modified to provide more of the details of the facts and legal 

analysis on which the decision is based. Corresponding findings of fact and 

conclusions of law have been revised to reflect this.

8. Assignment of Proceeding

Liane M. Randolph is the assigned Commissioner and ALJ S. Pat Tsen and 

ALJ Pro Tem Sasha Goldberg are the presiding officers to this proceeding.

Findings of Fact

1. Intervening parties argued that Threshold Issues on fairness and moral 

hazard should bar SDG&E from recovering its costs recorded in the WEMA

before a reasonableness review.

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2. The assigned ALJ rejected early dismissal of the application based on the 

Threshold Issues but allowed re-consideration of the Threshold issues after the 

development of an evidentiary record. 

3. Parties have served no additional testimony or briefs on the Threshold 

Issues. 

4. The Witch Fire, which later merged with the Guejito Fire, was the second 

largest fire to occur in San Diego County in 2007. 

5. The SDG&E facility involved in the ignition of the Witch Fire was TL 637. 

6. TL 637 is a 69 kV line that connects the Santa Ysabel and Creelman 

substations. 

7. Cal Fire determined that a fault on TL 637 between poles Z416675 and 

Z416676 on October 21, 2007 led to arcing of the lines, which dispersed hot 

particles to land in the grassy filed below the powerlines. 

8. A Red Flag Warning was in place at 4:45 a.m. on October 21, 2007. 

9. The first fault on TL 637 occurred at 8:53 a.m. on October 21, 2007.

10. The second fault on TL 637 occurred at 11: 22 a.m. on October 21, 2007.

11. The third fault on TL 637 occurred at 12:23 p.m. on October 21, 2007. 

12. The Witch Fire ignited at 12:23 p.m., after the third fault on TL 637. 

13. SDG&E’s Grid Operations became aware of the Witch Fire at 1:10 p.m. on 

October 21, 2007. 

14. The fourth fault on TL 637 occurred at 3:25 p.m. on October 21, 2007. 

15. SDG&E’s recloser policy was industry practice. 

16. On October 21, 2007, it took 6.5 hours for Grid Operations to de-energize 

TL 637. 

17. SDG&E did not calculate the fault location information data stored in the 

relay until October 22, 2007.

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18. It would take a protective engineer 1.5 hours to calculate the exact location 

of the faults on TL 637. 

19. SDG&E was aware of the 2001 Power Line Fire Prevention Field Guide, 

which put SDG&E on notice that automatic reclosers re-energizing the line 

increases the probability of igniting vegetation. 

20. The Guejito Fire ignited on October 22, 2007 near Escondido, California. 

21. The SDG&E facility involved in the ignition of the Guejito Fire was a 12 kV 

overhead conductor. 

22. CPSD and Cal Fire attributed the ignition of the Guejito Fire to a 

Cox Communications lashing wire coming into contact with an SDG&E 12 kV 

overhead conductor, between poles P196387 and P196394. 

23. Rule 38 of GO 95 sets a minimum clearance of 6 feet for wires from other 

wires at crossings. 

24. The November 2, 2007 survey completed by the SDG&E contractor, Nolte 

Associates, Inc. documented a 3.3-foot clearance between the SDG&E conductors 

and the Cox Communications line prior to any repair being completed after the 

ignition of the Guejito Fire. 

25. At the time of the Guejito Fire ignition, SDG&E had in place its Corrective 

Maintenance Program to conduct patrol and detailed inspections on its facilities. 

26. SDG&E completed a patrol inspection on P196387 and P196394 on 

August 30, 2007 and a detailed inspection on June 22, 2007 and April 8, 2005, but 

did not uncover the 3.3-foot clearance violation. 

27. The Cox Communications Facilities were installed in August 2001.

28. SDG&E presented evidence that it is not known when the clearance 

violation between the Cox Communications line and the SDG&E overhead 

conductors first occurred. 

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29. The Rice Fire ignited on October 22, 2007 in Fallbrook, California. 

30. CPSD determined that a limb from sycamore Tree FF1090 broke and fell 

onto SDG&E 12 kV overhead conductors causing a powerline to fall to ignite the 

ground below. 

31. To track and monitor vegetation around powerline facilities and comply 

with General Order 95 and Public Resources Code Section 4293, SDG&E 

designed and implemented a Vegetation Management Program and 

Tree-Pre-inspection procedures that were in place at the time of the ignition of 

the Rice Fire.

32. The Tree Information Sheet for Tree FF1090 listed it as a “fast grower” prior 

to and at the time of the ignition of the Rice Fire, with between 4 and 6 feet of 

growth per year.

33. The Tree Information Sheet for Tree FF1090 shows that it was trimmed 

approximately every 12 months except for two occasions: 1) After being 

trimmed on May 1, 2000, it was next trimmed on April 29, 2002 and 2) after being 

trimmed on February 11, 2005, it was not trimmed again until the day of the Rice 

Fire on October 22, 2007.

34. A January 2, 2002 inspection recorded Tree FF1090 with a 1.5 to 4 foot 

clearance from the conductors and subsequently trimmed on April 29, 2002.

35. A July 18, 2007 inspection of Tree FF1090 advised SDG&E of a direct 

overhang and marked it for trimming within zero to three months.

36. SDG&E’s Vegetation Management System considers the tab ‘zero to three 

months’ to begin during the subsequent trim cycle, which in this case meant 

between September to November, 2007.

37. SDG&E’s inspector marked the zero to three months tab in the Vegetation 

Management System to indicate that the tree needed to be trimmed before the 

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end of three months due to strong growth toward the powerline, which ends on 

October 18, 2007. 

38. SDG&E’s inspector mistook the meaning of the zero to three months tab, 

and did not follow the instructions for SDG&E’s Vegetation Management 

Program.

39. SDG&E’s Vegetation Management Program had an inspection protocol for 

“Reliability Trees.”

40. Reliability Trees are trees which pose a threat to the safe and reliable 

delivery of electricity that have the potential to fail completely or drop limbs 

onto powerlines.

41. Trees marked as Reliability Trees are mandatorily marked for trimming 

and heightened inspections.

42. The broken branch of FF1090 was part of at least two vertical branches, 

possibly more, growing closely together.

43. SDG&E’s testimony indicates that FF1090’s broken branch matched the 

description of two checklist items in the Hazard Tree Checklist.

44. FF1090 was not marked as a Reliability Tree before the Rice Fire.

45. SDG&E failed to trim Tree FF1090 for a 29-month period prior to the 

ignition of the Rice Fire. 

46. Dr. Gershunov’s estimates of the peak wind gusts speeds for the 

2007 Wildfires are more compelling than Dr. Peterka’s because he relied on 

contemporaneous wind and weather data recorded during October 2007 to 

validate his estimates.

Conclusions of Law

1. For costs to be found reasonable, the utility must prove that they were 

prudently incurred by competent management exercising the best practices of 

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the era, and using well-trained, well-informed and conscientious employees who 

perform their jobs properly. 

2. As required by Public Utilities Code Section 451 all rates and charges 

collected by a public utility must be “just and reasonable.” 

3. The burden of proof is on SDG&E to demonstrate that it is entitled to the 

relief sought in this proceeding, including affirmatively establishing the 

reasonableness of all aspects of the application. 

4. The standard of proof that SDG&E must meet is that of a preponderance of 

evidence, which means the evidence presented by SDG&E must be more 

convincing and have a greater probability of truth when weighed against 

opposing evidence. 

5. SDG&E’s operation and management of its facilities prior to the ignition of 

the 2007 Wildfires is subject to a reasonableness review. 

6. The reasonableness review entails a review on the prudency of SDG&E’s

actions leading up to the ignition of the 2007 Wildfires. 

7. Evidence of accepted industry practices is relevant to a reasonableness 

inquiry, but compliance with such practices is not dispositive. 

8. Evidence of following accepted industry practices does not relieve SDG&E 

of the burden of showing that its conduct was reasonable. 

9. SDG&E fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its operation 

and management of its facilities prior the ignition of the Witch Fire were 

reasonable. 

10. The combination of the Red Flag Warning in place on October 21, 2007, 

three faults on a line over a period of 3.5 hours after having only 9 multiple fault 

days in that same line’s 24-year history, should have caused SDG&E to act more 

aggressively. 

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11. The threat of the Harris Fire to the Southwest Powerlink does not excuse

SDG&E’s failure to monitor the faults on TL 637. 

12. The 2003 Wildfires put SDG&E on notice of the potential for wildfires in its 

service territory. 

13. SDG&E fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its operation 

and management of its facilities prior to the ignition of the Guejito Fire were

reasonable. 

14. It was imprudent of SDG&E to not discover the clearance violation 

between its overhead conductor and the Cox Communication line for 6 years. 

15. SDG&E failed to maintain its facilities in compliance with GO 95 Rule 38 

clearance requirements prior to the ignition of the Guejito Fire. 

16. SDG&E failed to prudently inspect its facilities prior to the ignition Guejito 

Fire. 

17. General Order 95, Rule 35 requires that where dead, rotten or diseased 

trees or dead, rotten or diseased portions of otherwise healthy trees overhang or 

lean toward power conductors, those trees or portions are to be removed.

18. Public Resources Code Section 4293 requires radial clearance of 4 feet 

between vegetation and 12 kV conductors.

19. SDG&E failed to properly train its tree pre-inspectors, causing the 

inspector to incorrectly mark fields in its Vegetation Management System.

20. SDG&E failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it could not 

identify the defective limb in Tree FF1090.

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21. SDG&E fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its operation 

and management of its facilities prior to the ignition of the Rice Fire were

reasonable.

22. SDG&E failed to prudently manage the facilities connected with the 

2007 Wildfires. 

23. Because we find Dr. Gershunov’s analysis of the wind gust speeds at the 

time of the ignition of each of the 2007 Wildfires more compelling, the 

2007 Wildfires were not spread under extraordinary circumstances.

24. SDG&E has not justified recovering from ratepayers costs incurred to 

resolve third-party damage claims arising from the Witch, Guejito and Rice 

Wildfires. 

25. SDG&E’s requested relief should be denied. 

26. SDG&E should file a Tier 1 Advice Letter with the Commission’s Energy 

Division to implement the provisions of this decision. 

27. The Threshold Issues identified in the Scoping Memorandum should be 

denied as moot.

28. This decision should be effective today.

29. Application 15-09-010 should be denied. 

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The application by San Diego Gas and Electric Company for Authorization 

to Recover Costs Related to the 2007 Southern California Wildfires Recorded in 

the Wildfire Expense Memorandum Account is denied. 

2. The Threshold Issues as identified in the Scoping Memorandum are denied 

as moot. 

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3. Within 30 days of the effective date of this decision, San Diego Gas and 

Electric Company shall file a Tier 1 Advice Letter to implement the denial of 

(a) wildfire claims, including any deductibles, co-insurance and other 

incremental insurance expense paid by SDG&E that are not authorized as part of 

SDG&E’s General Rate Case or any other proceeding; and (b) incremental 

outside legal costs incurred by SDG&E in the defense of wildfire claims from its 

Wildfire Expense Memorandum Account as ordered in this decision, and to close 

the account.

4. All pending motions in Application 15-09-010 are hereby denied. 

5. Application 15-09-010 is closed.

This order is effective today.

Dated November 30, 2017, at San Francisco California.

 MICHAEL PICKER

 President

 CARLA J. PETERMAN

 LIANE M. RANDOLPH

 MARTHA GUZMAN ACEVES

 CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN

 Commissioners

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