### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 22
- 00196
- CV

John Muir , Appellant

v. The University of Texas at Austin , Appellee

FROM THE 250TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D
- 1
- GN
- 21
- 006371 , THE HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

John Muir appeals the trial court ’ s order gra nting a plea to t he jurisdiction filed by the U niversity of Texas at Austin (the University) and dismissing his suit brought under the
Texas Public Informati on A c t (PIA)

. See Tex. G ov ’ t C ode § 552.321 ( authorizing su it for writ
of mandamus to compel governmental body to make information available for public inspection )

. I n it s plea, the University asserted that it is protected from lawsu its by sovereign
immu nit y and that Muir had failed to sufficiently p lead a claim within the scope of the PIA ’ s waiver of i mmunity

. T he Universit y also asserted, in the alternative, tha t Muir ’ s suit had become

moot. Bec ause we conclude that the trial court erred in granting t he U niversity ’ s plea on either ground, w e will reve rse the trial court ’ s order and remand the case for f urther proceedings.

FA CTU AL AND PROCED URAL B ACKGROUND On July 2 , 2021 , Muir s ubmitted a request for public infor mation, later organized
into fi ve se par a t e requests , to the Marine Sc iences I nstitute in Port A r ansas, Texas , w hich is part2

of the University ’ s Co llege o f Natura l S ciences . In general, the requests sought documents
related to a proposed desalination plant in Nueces County, which is the subj ect o f a permit dispute pending in the State Offic e of Administrati ve Hearings (SOA H)

. 1 On September 15 , 2021 , t he University r e quested a decision fr om t he Office of the Attorney General as to whet her
it co uld wit hhold so me documents re sponsi ve to Muir ’ s requ e s ts on the ground that they are

ex cepted from disclosure under certain provisions of the PI A. See id . § 552 .301

.

O n Oc tober 25, 2021 , after he had not receiv ed any respo nsive documents , Muir f iled a petition for writ of man damus pursuant to Secti on 5 5 2 .321(a) of the PIA , s eeking

to comp el the University to disclos e the requested information. 2 See id

. § 55 2.321. On
Nov embe r 12, 2021, the A tto rney General issued its l e tter ru l i ng , conclud ing that the Univer sity
was entitled to wit hhold or red act ce r ta i n in f ormation but must disclose the remainder of the requested documen ts

. Muir subsequently amende d his petition to request that the trial court

con d uct an in ca m era r eview of the d ocume nts that the U n iversity claimed were e x cepted f rom di scl osure so t he co urt could “ make its own deter mination as to whether [th e University is ]
entit led to withhold an y of the requested publ ic doc uments purs uant t o the ex empt ion s they c laim apply. ” See id. § 552.32 21 ( “ In Camera I n spection of In formation ” )

.

1 Specificall y, the matter before SOAH c o ncer n s an application for a disch arge permit for the proposed desa lination plant filed b y the Port of Corpus Christi Authority o f Nue ces County

. Muir i s a n atto rney with th e law firm that re present s t he Port A uth ority in the SO AH proceedings

.

2 Muir als o b rought c laims against Universi ty employees Robert Davis and J ames Davis , ba sed on al l eged ul tra vires cond uct , and a claim ag ai nst the Universi ty for breach o f con tract. Prior to the tria l court ’ s ru ling on th e University ’ s p lea, Muir non

- s uite d these claims. Consequently, we will li mit our discussion of the underlying facts and procedura l hi story to the portion relevant to Mu ir ’ s PIA claim, the on ly claim that i s the subj ect of t his appeal.3 The U nivers ity f

ile d a plea to the jurisdiction , asserting that Muir had failed to plead a claim within the scope of the PIA ’ s waiver of sovereign immunity

. The Univer s ity
lat er amended its plea to contend that even i f the alleg ations in Mu i r ’ s pe tition w ere suffici ent

t o i n voke the court ’ s jurisdiction wh e n t he suit was filed , the controversy had be c o me moot
because the Uni versi t y had now volun tarily pr oduced all respon sive docum ents ot her than those
it was withh olding p ursuant to the a tt orney g eneral ’ s decision

. F o ll ow ing a hearing , the trial

c ourt granted the plea and dismis sed Muir ’ s action with prejudice , without s tati ng specific

grou nds fo r its ruling

.

ST ANDARD O F RE VIEW

Subject

- matter jurisdi ction i s esse ntial to the aut ho rity of a court to decide a case

. Blan d I nde p . Sch. Dist. v
. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547 , 55 4

- 55 (Tex. 2000)

. A plea to the jurisdict ion
is a dilatory p lea th at ch allen g es the t r ial court’ s s ubject

- matter jur i sdi ction without regar d to

w he t her t he asserted clai ms ha ve me rit. Harris County v. Syk es , 136 S. W .3d 635, 638 ( Tex

. 200 4 )

. W he th e r a trial court h as subject

- mat t er juri sdiction is a q uestion of la w, a nd we r eview a tri a l court’s ru ling on a pl ea to the jurisd ic tion de novo. Tex as Dep ’t of Parks & Wi ld lif e v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217 , 225 ( Tex. 20 04)

.

The bur d e n is on the plaint if f t o affirmat iv e ly demonstrate the tri al court’ s jurisdic tion. He ckma n v. Wi lliam s on Co u n t y , 369 S .W .3d 137, 1 50 (T ex. 20 1 2)

. In a plea to the jurisd iction , a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the pla in tiff ’ s pl e adings, the e xistence of jurisdiction al facts, or b oth. Alamo He ights In dep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark , 54 4 S. W.3d 75 5,
770 (Tex

. 2 018)

. W he n , as here , t he defend ant ’ s plea to the ju risd iction chal lenge s o nly the sufficiency of the plaintiff ’ s p lead i ngs, we det e rmi n e whether t he plaintiff has a lle ge d facts that4

a ff ir matively de monstr ate the c ourt’s juris di ction to he ar the cause
. M ir and a , 133 S .W.3 d a t 226

. In ma ki ng this asses smen t, we con strue the plai ntiff’ s plea di ngs libera lly, t aking all assert ions as

t ru e , and lo ok to the pl aintiff’s int ent

. Id

. If the p leadings do n ot c ontain suffic ient fact s to
affirmati ve ly dem onstr ate j ur isdiction but do n ot cont ain incurable defects in jurisdict ion , the
issue is on e of pleading sufficiency, and the plain tiff is ent i tled to a r easonable opportunity to amend its pleadings. Texas A & M U niv. Sys. v. Ko seoglu , 233 S.W.3d 835, 839 ( Tex. 200 7)

. On
the oth er hand , if the plaintiff ’ s pleadings a ffirmativ ely negate the exist ence of jurisdiction, the plea to the ju ris d i ction m a y be g ranted without providing the plaintiff an opportunit y t o amend

. Mira nda , 133 S.W.3 d at 226

.

The d octrine of s ove reign immunity generally b ars su its again st the State o r its agencies or sub division s , a bsent a clear and unambiguous wa iv er of immu ni ty by the Legislature.
Nazari v. State , 561 S.W.3d 495, 500 (Tex. 2018)

. Beca use im munit y from suit i mpli cate s a

court ’ s subje ct

- matter jurisdiction, it may be properly a s serted i n a pl ea to th e juri sdiction

. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. C o
. v. C ity of H ou st on , 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (T ex. 2016 )

. When a government defendant challenges jurisdiction o n the basis of immunity , the plain tiff must

a ffirmat i vely d emonstrat e the trial court ’ s subject

- matter ju risdiction by all eging a valid waiver
of i mm unit y. To wn o

f Shady Shores v

. S wanson , 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019)

.

DI SCUSSION
O n appeal, Muir cha llenge s each ground asserted by the University in support of
its plea to the juris diction , arguing that th e trial court erred in con cl uding that he f a ile d to pl ea d
facts est ablishing a valid w aiver of sovereign immunity or , alternatively, in concluding that h is5

claim for mandamus relief ha d be come moot. We will consider in turn the two potential ground s fo r the t rial court ’ s ruling

.

Waiv er of S overei

gn I mmun ity u nde r t

he PIA The Texas Legislature p romul gated the PIA with the expres s p u rpose of providing the public “ complete infor mation ab ou t the aff airs of government and the offic ial ac ts of public officials and employe es. ” Jackson v. State Offi ce of A dmin . H ea rin gs , 35 1 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 552.001 (a) )

. Under the PIA, u pon receiving a request
f or public i nf

ormation , a g o v ernmental b ody mu st “ p r omptly ” produce public infor mation fo r ins pectio n, duplic atio n , or both

. T ex
. Gov ’ t Code § 552.221 (a)

. This means that a governmental body must produce p ublic information “ as soon as possible under th e circu mstances , ” “ w ithin a
reasonab le time, w ithout dela y
. ” Id.

The PIA b r oadly defines “ p ublic i nforma t ion” as any infor mati on t hat , u nde r a
l aw or o rdinance or in co nnection with the transact ion of official b usiness , is collected , assembled, or m a intain ed by a governmen tal body or for such a body w hen it owns the
infor mat ion or has a right of access t o it. Id. § 552. 0 0 2

. The PIA exce p t s in f ormation from public disclosure , however, if it is “ c onsidered to be confidential by law, either consti tutional ,
sta tutory, or by j udicial decision

. ” Id. § 552.101 . In turn, t he PIA se ts forth numerous s tat utor y

ex ceptions to dis cl osu re , see id. § § 552.10 1

- .1 62 , “ e mbrac [ing] the under standing that the

pu blic ’ s right to know i s te mpered by the indi vidual a nd other int e r ests a t stake in disclo sing tha t
i nformation , ” Tex as Dep ’ t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. New spa pers , L.P. , 343 S .W.3d 112, 1 1 4 ( Te x. 2011)

. A g overnmental bo dy that wishes to withhold requested i nformatio n under an exception must request a determ inati on from the attor ney gen eral confirmi ng that the exception6

a pplies , unless the a t torney g ener a l has previ ously d eter mined that th e i nf orma tion fa l l s within

a claimed exception. Tex. Gov ’ t C ode § 552.3 01(a) ; see id. § § 552.101

- .162 ( “ In formation Excepted from Requ ired Disclosure ” ).

Section 552 .321 of the P IA “ waives sov erei gn immunity f or a requestor seeki ng a

w ri t o f manda mus t o com p el a governm e n tal body to mak e certain in formation a vailab le for public inspection u nder certain circ umstances. ” City of El P aso v. Abb ott , 444 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex . App.

— Austin 2014, pet. denied)

. Section 552.321 pr ovides :
A requ es tor or the attorn e y ge neral may f il e suit for a writ of mandamus comp elling a governmental body to make information available for public in spection if the governmental body [A ] refuses to re quest an at torney gen eral ’ s decision as pr ovided by Subcha pter G o r [ B] re fuses to s up pl y [ 1] publi c infor mation or [ 2] information th at the attorney ge neral has determined is public information that is not excepted from disclosure under Subchapter C.

Tex. Gov ’ t C ode § 552.32 1(a) (empha sis added )

. The parties agree t ha t t he jurisdictio n a l is s u e
presen te d in this case is whether Muir met his burden of affirmatively demonstrating subject

mat ter jurisdiction by alleging facts sufficient to s how th at the University wa s “ refus [i ng ] to

s upply public info rmation

. ” See Town of S ha d y Shores , 59 0 S .W. 3d at 5 50

. In support of its contention that Muir ’ s p leadings fail to allege facts sufficient to
demonstra te a claim within Section 55 2 .321(a ) ’ s wa iver o f immunity , the U niversity re li e s on an opinion from this Court, City o f E l Pa so , 4 44 S .W.3d at 3 2 4

. I n that c ase , which was a suit brought under Section 552.321(a) , we exam i ned wh ether the trial court erred in denying a plea

to t he juris diction based on immun ity whe re the gover n ment al de fe ndant , th e City of El Paso, presented evidence showing that i t “ h ad se arc he d ex tensiv e ly for responsive d ocuments, officially requested respon sive documents from the indi viduals named in the request, and then ultimately produced to [the Requ es tor] all the docu ments that it had b een able to locate and7

o btain

. ” Id

. a t 32 4

- 25

. I n analyzin g the i mp ort of the City ’ s jurisdictional evidence, we first
considered the use of the term “ refuse ” in the “ refus es to supply public information ” portion of
Sec ti on 552.321(a) and determined that “ under the plain lang uage of section 552. 321 ’ s waive r of sovereign i m munity , a requestor must show that the governmental body is ‘ unwilling ’ to supply
information

. ” Id. at 324

. Becau se the City ’ s jurisdictional evidenc e established that it wa s will ing to supply the requested in formation a n d , to the extent i t could , ha d actually done so, and
b ecause the petitioner failed to raise a fact issue on that point , we concluded that the trial co urt lacked subject

- matter jurisdic ti on over the reque stor ’ s mandamus claim and should have granted
the Cit y ’ s p l ea
. Id. a t 325 , 327

.

Here, t he University argues that based on our decision in City of El Pas o and,

more spe cifically, on our discussion of the m ea ning of the term “ refuses , ” Muir w as required t o plea d fac ts demonstrating that the University was u n will ing to supply the r equest ed information
in order to fall withi n the scope of Section 552.3 21 ’ s waiver of immunity

. The University asserts
that not o nl y did Muir fail t o meet this plead in g burden bu t that t he factual allegations in Muir ’ s pleading s af

f ir ma tively negate ju r is dict ion because they show that the University was actuall y willing to p roduce “ the adm ittedly public documents

. ” Based on our review of Mu ir ’ s pleadi ngs,

w e dis agree. In his pleadings, Mui r alleges that he initially received t wo l ett e rs from the
Unive rsity in which its Open Record s C oordin ator responded to the PIA r equest by inform ing
Muir that , upon rece i pt of the r equired d eposit, the Unive rsity “ estimate s it will take

a p prox i mately t en bu s i nes s da ys to produce all of the reques t ed i nformation ” in re sponse to one
of his r eque sts and forty

- five bu siness days t o produce all o f the req ue sted information in

r esponse to the re maining four r equest s. See Tex . Gov ’ t Code § 552.2 6 3 (providing that of fi cer8

for p ublic information may , unde r ce r tain circumstance s, “ require a deposit or b ond for payment
of anticipated cos ts for the prep aration o f a c o py of public inf o rmation ” ). As re quested, Muir
delive red the required de posits by ma i l on August 20, 2 021

.

Muir further alleges that the Univ e rsit y imposed at leas t two additional delays in
rel easing the public documents. On Septem be r 15 , 2021 , the University re quested an opinion
from t he O ffice of the At t orney General as to whet her so me documents responsi ve to Muir ’ s
requ ests could be withhel d on the ground they a re e xcept ed from disclosure under Subchapter C.
See id. § § 552.10 1 , . 107, .111 , .1235; see also Tex. Ed u c . Code § 51.914 (relating to con fidential
informati on )

. On Nov embe r 1 2, 2021, the A tto rney General issued its de cision , conclud i n g th at
the Univer sit y was entitled t o wi t hhold or red act ce rtain in formation but that it must disclose the
remainder of the requested documents

. Never theless, o n N ovember 1 7 , 2021, the d a te that th e University had stated it w ould re lease the non

- excepte d resp onsive d ocuments , the O pen Records
Coordinator notified Mui r t hat the Unive rsity would not release the documents until Janu ary 18,
2022

. As a result of these dela ys, w hich totaled more than 180 days as of the date Muir ’ s request

was first delivered, M uir ’ s petition alleg ed that “ this failure to release these admi ttedly public
documents demonstrates refusal by the Respondents under PIA § 552.321(a)

. ”

In sum, Muir ’ s fac tual alleg ations , taken as true and liberally construed , dem onstrate that he reque s t ed c er tain pu blic in f ormation from the Universit y and t hat instead of

co mply ing wit h the reques t , the Universi ty took actions that resulted in a failure to produc e the
info rmation for “ more t han 18 0 days (so fa r ) from [ his ] original r equest

. ” Amon g ot he r thi n gs, Muir ’ s petit ion alleged that the University stated on mul tiple occasions that it would produce responsive d ocuments on a date certain and then p ostponed production. In addition, the petition9

alleged that the University w ithheld som e publi c infor m a tion other wise r e spo n sive to Muir ’ s PI A

reques t on th e ground that the information is excepted from disclo sure
.

By seeki ng an a ttorney g eneral ’ s decisio n that it c ould decline to produce some of the requested material and then withholding some o f the m ate r ial based on that decision , the University was refusing to supply that portion of the public information. See Kalline n v. City of
Houston , 462 S.W.3d 25, 2 9 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam)

. Muir contends, and we agree, that these
und is puted alle gations

— that th e Un i versity has re peatedly d elayed the release of some publ ic
info rmation responsive to Muir ’ s PIA request a nd that it is continuing to withhold other public
info rmation on the ground that it is excepted from d i sclosure

— are sufficient to “ de monstrate a

re f usal by [ the U niversity] unde r P IA [Sec tion] 552.321(a). ” In addition , we disag ree with the
Univer sity ’ s su ggestion that the written statements made by the University affirmat ively committing to the produc tion of responsive , non
- excepted p u blic inform at i o n co ncl usively

e stablish tha t the University was willing to supply public inform ation and t hat it was not

“ refus [ing] to supply public infor mation

. ” Accor dingly, w e conclude tha t Muir has alleged facts
suffic ient to establish a valid waiver of immunit y u n der the PIA.

In reach ing this conclusion , we reject t he University ’ s as ser t i on th at Muir ’ s allegations

— that the Unive rsity withheld documents as being excepted from disclosure

— a re insufficient to demonstra te that i t is “ refus[ing] to supply p ublic infor m atio n
. ” The T exas
Su preme Court has held that a re questo r may b ri ng a suit for mandamus relief under Section 552.321(a)

— spe cifi cally, under its “ refuses to supply public infor mation ” provis i on

— when a

govern mental body w i th holds responsive informatio n and asks the Attor ney G en eral f or an opinion as to wh ether the with held inf orma tion i s except ed from d i sclosure under the PIA

. See Kalline n , 462 S.W.3d at 2 9

. Moreover , w h ile the reque stor m ay wa it to file its suit for10

mandamus to com pel the disclosure of th e req ues ted information unt il the Atto rney G ene ral
issues a decision , it is not r equired to do s o in o rder to invoke the trial court ’ s s ubject

- matter juri sdiction under Section 552. 321(a)

. Id. at 28

.

Nev ertheless, t he University asser ts th at Muir ’ s allega t io ns regardi ng the
Unive rsi ty ’ s wit hh olding of documents a re insufficient to demonstrate su bjec t

- matter jurisdiction because (1) he does not specifically allege that t h e withheld documents are “ public information ”

o r that they are “ not ex cept ed fr om dis c l o su r e , ” and (2) in effect , he is only ask ing the trial court

to “ double

- check[] to see if [the University] ma de any mistakes in the applying ” of the A ttorney
G eneral ’ s decision

.

We do not const r ue Muir ’ s pleadings as narrowly as the University urges
. Alt h ou gh Muir does not e xpli c itly allege th at the w ithheld documents are “ public information ”
and “ not except e d from disclosure , ” he does allege that his req uest s to the University con s titut e
req ue sts for p ublic informatio n
. A ssuming , as we must , that Muir ’ s al le gations are tr ue , an y documents responsive to his requests would necessarily cons titute “ public information, ”
i nclud ing any r esponsive documents that th e University claims ar e e x cepted from dis closure . In
addition , Muir ’ s petit ion as k s the trial cour t t o review any decision by the A tto rney General and

“ mak e its ow n determination as to whether [the University is] entitled t o withhold any of the requested public documents pur suant to the e xem ptions the y claim apply. ” 3 ( Emphasis added. )
Muir ’ s factual a l lega tions , li berally co nstrued and taken as true , show that the U nive rsity is

3 I n Kalline n v. City of Houston , t h e supreme cour t poin te d out that , in the past , it has reviewe d the correctness of a ttorney g eneral decisions in su i ts brought under Section 55 2. 332 (a) , 462 S.W.3d 25, 2 9 (Tex. 20 15) (per curi am) (ci ti ng Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox N ew spa pers , L.P. , 343 S. W.3d 112 , 11 3 (Tex. 2011) , a nd In re City of Georg etown , 53 S.W.3d 328, 329

- 36 (Tex. 2 001) )

. The court exp lained that “ [t]he req uirement that a governmental body seek a ruling fro m the A ttorney Ge neral when withholding reque sted inform ation is a che ck on the governmental body , not a remedy for t h e requ estor to exhaust

. ” I d. at 29

.11

withholding pub lic information that is otherwis e responsive to his PIA request s , which is
sufficient to demonst rate a waive r o f immunity under the “ refus es to supply public inf o r ma ti on ” provision in Se ct ion 5 52.321(a)

.

Beca use Muir sufficien tly pleaded facts affirmatively demonstrating a waiver of immunity under Section 552.321(a) o f the PIA, the trial cour t erred to the extent that it concluded
that Muir ’ s suit was barr ed by s o v ere ign immunity

.

Mo otness Next, we consider whether the trial court erred to the extent it grant ed the University ’ s plea to the jurisdiction based on its al ternative argument that the case had
become moot.
Courts lack subject

- matter jurisdiction to d ec id e m oot controversies. In re Guardianship of Fairley , 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022)

. The mootness doctrine is rooted in
the se paration

- o f

- powers doctri ne that p rohibi ts courts from rendering ad visory o pinions. Id. (citing Tex . Cons t. art. II. , § 1 )

. A cas e beco mes moot when a l iv e controversy no longer
exists o r the pa r tie s have no legally co gnizable interest in the outcome. City of Kr um v. Rice , 543 S .W.3 d 747, 749 (Te x. 201 7) (per curiam)

.

In its amended ple a, the Unive rs ity asserted tha t b etween De c ember 2021 a nd
Jan uary 2022, it vol un t arily produced 1 ,233 documents re sp onsiv e to Muir ’ s PIA requests. According to the University, these document s repre sent al l pub l ic information responsive to
Muir ’ s request ex cept those do cu me nts it conti nue s to wit h hold pursua nt to the Attorney
Genera l ’ s decision . The University argued that this volun tary production of documents

es tablishe s that the contr oversy ha s beco me moot

.12 A claim for mandamus relie f under Sec tion 5 52.321 becomes moo t when the

g overnme ntal b ody release s the requested infor mat ion that is the subject of the action. Ga tes v. Texas Dep ’ t of Fam. & Pr otective S ervs
. , No. 03

- 15

- 00631

- C V, 2016 WL 3521888, at * 5 ( T ex. App.

— Austin June 23, 2016, pet. denie d) (mem. op.) ( dis cussin g City o f El Paso , 44 4 S.W. 3d

at 32 4

- 325 ; Texas State Bd. of Vet erinary Med. Ex am ’ rs v. Giggleman , 408 S.W.3d 696 , 704 , 709 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2013, no pe t.) ) ; see also City of Georg etow n v. P utnam , 646 S.W.3d 61,
72 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2022, pet. denie d) ( “ Courts have uni formly h eld that a plaintiff ’ s claims
f o r both in

junctive and de claratory relief under the PIA are rendered moot upon the governmental body ’ s release of the r equested inf o rmation to the plaintiff. ” (co llecting ca ses)). I n other words, the go vernm ental body ’ s re le ase of all the requested inform atio n in its possession or

u nder its control “ obviate [s] any ju sticiable controversy” regarding the re questor ’ s entitlement to
mand a mus relief, re gardless of th e governmental body ’ s “ m otive s or delay in re fus ing to r elease
inf or mation [soon er ]. ” Gat es , 20 16 WL 3521888, at * 5

. As previously discus sed , Muir ’ s suit
for mandamus relief is ba sed in part o n the University ’ s continue d with h o lding of responsive
documents that it contends are excepted from disclosure under various s t atu tory exception s in the
PIA. Because there is no dispute tha t the University has not produced these respon sive
documents to Muir , a live controversy remains as to whether the doc uments are excepted from
disclosure and therefore may be p roperly withhel d

. We conclude that the trial co u rt erre d to the

ex tent it concluded that M uir ’ s suit for mandamus relief was moo t

.13 CONCLUSION
Because we conclude th at the tri a l court erred in granting the University ’ s plea to
th e jurisdiction , w e reve rse the o rder of the trial court and remand the ca se to that court for further proceedings.

_______________________________ ___________ J. Wo odfin J ones , Ju sti ce
B efore Just ice s Baker, Theofanis , a nd Jon es *
Reversed and R emanded
Filed: June 2 2 , 2023

* Befo r e J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting b y assig nment. See Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 74.003(b)

.