CLD-125 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 20-3590

___________

TRENTON JOHN TOMPKINS,

Appellant

v.

LAUREN LEIGH HACKETT, Public Defender

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(W.D. Pa. Civil No. 2-20-cv-01141)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Maureen P. Kelly

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 18, 2021

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 5, 2021)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Trenton John Tompkins, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the 

reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

In September 2017, Tompkins was arrested on several charges. Defendant Lauren 

Hackett, a Mercer County Assistant Public Defender, was appointed to represent 

Tompkins. Hackett informed Tompkins that prosecutors had agreed to drop the pending 

charges against him if he passed a polygraph test. Tompkins alleged that one month before 

the polygraph test, in late September 2017, he was placed in medical isolation, assaulted 

by correctional officers, and forcibly drugged. While he was being held in medical 

isolation, in late October 2017, Tompkins’ family retained private counsel for him. The 

Mercer County Public Defender’s Office subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel, which was granted. Tompkins alleged that neither Hackett nor his private counsel 

attended the polygraph examination in early November, and that his private counsel did 

not know about it.

Tompkins claimed that the initial charges against him were not withdrawn after the 

examination, and that the statements he made during the examination allowed prosecutors

to add additional charges against him. His private counsel subsequently filed an omnibus 

pre-trial motion challenging the examination, but the hearing on the motion was repeatedly 

delayed. Tompkins claimed that his counsel negotiated a plea agreement for him in 

February 2019 but that delays from rescheduling the hearing added more than a year to his 

sentence. Tompkins subsequently wrote to Hackett to request the terms of her agreement

with prosecutors about the polygraph examination. Tompkins claimed that another public 
3

defender wrote back to say that Hackett would communicate only with Tompkins’ 

appointed counsel in his pending post-conviction proceedings. Tompkins maintained that 

Hackett schemed with prosecutors to lengthen his term of incarceration.

In July 2020, Tompkins filed a complaint in the District Court alleging civil rights 

claims against Hackett pursuant to § 1983; he later amended his complaint. Hackett moved 

to dismiss Tompkins’ amended complaint. After Tompkins filed a response, the District 

Court granted Hackett’s motion and dismissed Tompkins’ complaint with prejudice and 

without leave to amend.1

 He timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 

plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Tompkins’ complaint. See Fowler v. 

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). Dismissal is appropriate “if, 

accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack facial 

plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). We may 

summarily affirm a district court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the 

appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 

(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

The District Court properly dismissed Tompkins’ claims against Hackett. Public 

defenders do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when they “perform[] 

1

 The judgment was issued by a Magistrate Judge, proceeding with the parties’ consent 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
4

a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk 

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Tompkins alleged that Hackett negotiated 

with prosecutors on his behalf to drop the charges against him if he passed a polygraph 

examination and that her representation of him ended shortly thereafter when he retained 

private counsel. He did not claim that Hackett knew of his alleged mistreatment in prison 

or withheld information from his private counsel, who was already representing Tompkins 

at the time of the polygraph examination. Tompkins’ allegations of conspiracy with 

prosecutors are conclusory; he provided no factual allegations to support them beyond his 

own speculation. Thus, Tompkins cannot establish that his public defender acted outside 

of her traditional capacity as his counsel for the limited time that she represented him.2

 

Tompkins has not clarified or added to his allegations in subsequent filings in the District 

Court or on appeal. Under these circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion in concluding that it would be futile to grant Tompkins leave to amend his 

complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

2

 Because we affirm the District Court’s decision on this basis, we need not address the 

District Court’s alternative grounds for dismissal.