UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

R. KIRK MCDONALD, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; 

CITIBANK N.A.; CHASE FUNDING 

MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET BACKED 

CERTIFICATE 2002-4, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1168 

(D.C. No. 1:12-cv-02749-MSK-MEH) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before HARTZ, HOLMES, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Appellant R. Kirk McDonald, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

dismissal of 10 of his 13 claims against the defendants under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and its grant of summary judgment in their favor on 

his remaining claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, we affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 31, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I. Background 

 Mr. McDonald defaulted on his home loan, and defendant Citibank initiated 

foreclosure proceedings in Colorado state court. After a hearing, the court issued an 

order authorizing sale of the property. The day before the sale, Mr. McDonald 

initiated this action, filing both a complaint and an emergency motion for a 

temporary restraining order. His efforts to enjoin the sale were unsuccessful, but the 

case proceeded. His amended complaint purports to assert 13 claims, all of which 

relate to the foreclosure, which predated the amended complaint. 

Claim one is for “conversion.” R., Vol. 1 at 237. Mr. McDonald alleges that 

the defendants prevented him from negotiating a foreclosure deferment and therefore 

the foreclosure resulted in conversion of his property. 

Claims two through five are for “fr[au]d upon the court,” “conspiracy to 

defraud,” “civil conspiracy,” and “attempting to influence a public servant.” Id. at 

238-41. The gist of the allegations underlying these claims is that the defendants’ 

failure to provide information about the note holder before and during the foreclosure 

hearing caused him to lose his home. 

Claim six is for “willful & wanton negligence.” Id. at 241. Mr. McDonald 

alleges that he relied on material false information provided by the defendants and 

that he was damaged by their conduct. 

Claim seven is for “unjust enrichment.” Id. at 242. Mr. McDonald does not 

set forth the elements of the offense but reiterates the allegation that the defendants 

illegally acquired his home through the foreclosure. 
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Claims eight and nine are for “breach of contract” and “unconscionability.” 

Id. at 242-44. The underlying allegations are variations on the same theme. 

Mr. McDonald asserts that the defendants’ conduct breached the covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing and was substantively and procedurally unconscionable. 

Claims 10 and 11 are based on alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement 

Procedures Act (RESPA). Mr. McDonald alleges that defendant J.P. Morgan Chase 

Bank failed to respond to his request for a new loan and that the defendants did not 

respond to his requests for information about his loan. 

Claim 12 is based on an alleged violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-38-805 (a 

foreclosure-deferment statute since repealed). Mr. McDonald asserts that the 

defendants prevented him from obtaining the deferment to which he was entitled and 

the foreclosure was therefore improper. 

Claim 13 is based on an alleged violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-40-103 (a 

statute requiring a servicer of a loan to respond to a written request from the debtor 

for information about the loan) because the defendants allegedly failed to respond to 

Mr. McDonald’s written requests for information. 

The complaint requests relief in the form of “[a]ctual and consequential 

damages in an amount to be proven at trial” as well as attorney fees and costs. 

Id. at 246. 

 The district court granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding 

that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims one through nine, and 12. 

Because those claims sought to invalidate the state-court foreclosure, the court 
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reasoned, they were barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits 

lower federal courts from reviewing state-court judgments. See generally Campbell 

v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012). Later, the court granted the 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Mr. McDonald had failed 

to establish even a prima facie claim with respect to his remaining claims. 

II. Analysis 

 We review de novo dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. 

at 1281. We also review de novo grants of summary judgment. See Birch v. Polaris 

Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 2015). Because Mr. McDonald is 

proceeding pro se, we afford his filings a liberal construction, but we do not act as his 

advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). 

 Mr. McDonald devotes much of his briefing to issues that we do not address 

because they are not pertinent to this appeal. We do address his argument that the 

district court misapplied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the state-court foreclosure 

proceedings. We are not persuaded. 

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars claims “complaining of injuries caused by 

state-court judgments.” Campbell, 682 F.3d at 1283 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In other words, a party who loses in state court may not bring a case 

seeking review and rejection of the state-court judgment in federal court. See In re 

Miller, 666 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012). With respect to claims one through 

nine, and 12, the district court ruled that that is precisely what Mr. McDonald seeks 

in this case. For these claims, Mr. McDonald fails to allege any injury that is 
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separate from the state-court-authorized foreclosure. He argues only that RookerFeldman is inapplicable because the order authorizing sale was not a final judgment. 

But Rooker-Feldman does apply to the foreclosure judgment. See Dillard v. Bank of 

New York, 476 F. App’x 690, 692 n.3 (10th Cir. 2012). 

 To the extent that Mr. McDonald may have attempted to appeal the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment on claims 10, 11, and 13, he has not adequately 

presented any argument that would warrant our consideration. No such argument is 

even listed in his statement of the issues. “[W]e routinely have declined to consider 

arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s 

opening brief.” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). 

“Scattered statements in the appellant’s brief are not enough to preserve an issue for 

appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. Conclusion 

 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. McDonald’s motion to 

submit a supplemental brief is granted. His motion to proceed in forma pauperis is 

denied. See Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir. 

2007) (denying motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis for failure “to show the 

existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the 
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issues raised on appeal”). 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge