ORIGINAt INTHE SUPREME COURT OFTHE STATE OF MONTANA OP 20-0201 ROBERT MAFFIT, and the MONTANA INDEPENDENT LIVING PROJECT, Petitioners, v. MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY, HONORABLE KATHY SEELEY, Presiding Judge, Respondent.
FfiLED APR

1 4 2020 Bowen Greenwood Therk of Supreme Coun State of rviontarl,, ORDER Robert Maffit (Maffit) and the Montana Independent Living Project (MILP) seek
a writ of supervisory control overthe First Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark County Cause No. CDV-2016-484. They ask this Court toexercise discretionary jurisdiction

to reversethe District Court's November 2019 order denying the Petitioners' rnotion for partial surnmary judgment
onMILP'sclairn against the City of Helena and disrnissing MILP asa partytothe action. Maffit and MILP initially filed
adiscrirnination claim with the Montana Human Rights Bureau alleging that the City had discriminated against them when
it reorganized
the City bus system. Although they withdrew their initial complaint, Maffit and MILP filed another HRB complaint alleging that the City retaliated against thern in violation
of the Montana Hurnan Rights Act (Title 49, Chapter 2, MCA), and the Governmental Code of Fair Practices (Title 49, Chapter
3, MCA), when
it changed the priorities for funding for capital transportation projects, allegedly disfavoring MILPin response
totheir prior action. The District Court agreed with the Human Rights Bureau that MILP did nothave legal standing tofile aretaliation complaint against the City and disrnissed MILP asa plaintiff. Maffit's04/14/2020Case Number: OP 20-0201individual claims for retaliation, violation
of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and defarnation rernain pending. MILP and Maffit claim that supervisory control
is appropriate because whether MILP has standing
toassert

aretaliation claim
is anissue of law. They arguethat the District Court is proceeding under

arnistake of law that forecloses MILP's participation

in the case, prejudicing
the Petitioners
by having to goforward with trial onMaffit's claims alone, without "a necessary party," when appeal of the court's ruling dismissing MILP
is inevitable. Because

afinal order in this casewill notbe reached until Maffit's claim is adjudicated,
the Petitioners arguethat the Court should accept jurisdiction

toreview MILP'

sclaim now. Supervisory control
is an extraordinary remedy that is sometimes justified when urgencyor emergencyfactors make the normal appeal process inadequate, the caseinvolves purely legal questions, and oneorrnoreof the three following circumstances exist: the other courtis proceeding under

amistake of law and is causing

a gross injustice, constitutional issues of state-wide importance
areinvolved,
orthe other court has granted
ordenied

a motion for substitution

of a judge in acriminal case.M.R. App.P. 14(3). When appeal provides
an adequate remedy
toreview

atrial court's alleged rnistake of law, supervisory control

is not appropriate. And "[i]n the absence of extraordinary
and compelling circumstances beyond simply requiring

a partyto proceed
to trial," we generally decline
to review by supervisory control anorder denying summary judgment. State exrel. Kosena

v. District Court, 172 Mont. 21, 22-23, 560 P.2d 522, 523 (1977). AsMILP observes, the District Court's dismissal
of oneof the two plaintiffs means that there is nofinal judgment for purposesof direct appeal. That does not necessarily mean, though, that MILP has no adequate remedy.
If the Petitioners have appropriate grounds, they may proceed with
amotion under M.R.Civ. P. 54(b) before the District Court. That Rule contemplates that, where anorder adjudicates fewer than all claims involving
all parties, the trial court should review the casefirst and certify its interlocutory order asfinal for purposes of appeal only if "the court expressly determines that there is no just reasonfor delay." M.R. Civ. P. 54(b). Petitioners
do not indicate that they have requested such relief. Nor 2have they demonstrated
the urgency required
to leap-frog the ordinary appeal process. Petitioners arguethat other entities areaffected by the HRB's refusal to allow institutional retaliation claims and that, in this case,"there
is a scheduling order with deadlines rapidly approaching." Petitioners waited nearly five months
toseek extraordinary review of the District Court's order. They mayseek extensions

in the trial court of any scheduling deadlines. In surn, having reviewed the petition and exhibits, weconclude that Maffit and MILP have not satisfied the M.R. App. 14(3) criteria for invoking this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction

toreview the District Court's interlocutory ruling. ITIS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition for aWrit of Supervisory Control

is DENIED and DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed
to provide notice of this Order toall counsel of record in the First Judicial District Court's Cause No. CDV-2016-484
and tothe Honorable Kathy Seeley, presiding District Court Judge. DATED this day of April, 2020.

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