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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50733

In the Matter of John Doe I, A Child 

Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.

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Filed: July 27, 2023

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH & WELFARE, 

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE (2023-17),

Respondent-Appellant.

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THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate. 

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed. 

Anthony R. Geddes, Ada County Public Defender; Joshua D. Mills, Deputy Public 

Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica L. Partridge, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Chief Judge 

Jane Doe (2023-17) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe is the mother of the minor child involved in this action. The child was born in 2021. 

Following the removal of the child’s two older siblings due to Doe’s significant history of 

untreated substance abuse, the child was removed from Doe’s care a day after his birth because 

Doe was incarcerated at the time. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare was awarded legal 
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custody of the child. The child was subsequently placed into the care of his maternal grandfather,

and the magistrate court approved a case plan for Doe.

Thereafter, the magistrate court held periodic review hearings to monitor Doe’s progress 

on her case plan. Doe was temporarily released from incarceration in 2022 but failed to make 

meaningful progress on her case plan during this period of release. Ultimately, Doe’s probation 

in her criminal case was revoked, but the court retained jurisdiction. The Department subsequently

filed a petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights. After finding by clear and convincing evidence 

that Doe neglected the child and that termination is in the child’s best interests, the magistrate court 

terminated Doe’s parental rights.1 Doe appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences 

in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. 

Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater 

quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143 

Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood 

to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe 

v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must 

be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.

III.

ANALYSIS

Doe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the magistrate court’s finding 

that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interests. The Department responds 

1 The magistrate court also terminated father’s parental rights. However, that decision is not 

at issue in this appeal.
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that substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s termination decision. We

affirm the termination of Doe’s parental rights. 

A. Statutory Basis for Termination 

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 

child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 

343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the 

Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family 

life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due 

process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 

386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States 

Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that 

decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 

(1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 

P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652. Idaho Code Section 16-2005 

permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in 

the child’s best interests and any one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; 

(b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive 

parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period that 

will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated 

and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an 

independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117. 

In this case, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights because she neglected 

the child. Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-

1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child 

is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary 

for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other 

custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed 

to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act case and the Department 

has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and 
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reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has 

been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department. I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). 

The magistrate court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Doe neglected the child. 

The child was in foster care for sixteen of the past twenty-two months and reunification had not 

been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month. Doe also failed to comply with her 

court-ordered case plan. Specifically, Doe failed to complete substance abuse treatment, did not 

participate in all requested drug testing, did not secure safe and stable housing, did not obtain 

employment, and failed to attend the child’s medical appointments when Doe was out of custody. 

The magistrate court acknowledged Doe’s incarceration but determined that, in the six months 

prior to her incarceration, she made no meaningful progress on her case plan. The magistrate court 

further found that Doe’s decisions were the primary cause of her incarceration, resulting in her 

unavailability to comply with her case plan. Doe’s overall instability prevented her “from being 

able to consistently meet [the child’s] basic needs.”

On appeal, Doe has not challenged these findings and, thus, we will not presume they are 

erroneous. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 164 Idaho 883, 892, 436 P.3d 1232, 1241 

(2019). These findings provide substantial and competent evidence for the magistrate court’s 

conclusion that Doe neglected the child under I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a).

B. Best Interests of the Child

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next 

determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. 

Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When 

determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the 

parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the 

unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the 

child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s 

efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe 

(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare 

v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests 

of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t 

of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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As noted, the magistrate court determined that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the 

child’s best interests. Doe had at least one open child protection case since October 2020. Since 

then, Doe failed to work two separate court-ordered case plans and had her parental rights to the 

child’s two older siblings terminated. The magistrate court found that, in the previous thirty 

months, “little has changed in [Doe’s] life circumstances.” The magistrate court stated that Doe 

had been unable to conquer her battle with addiction, “resulting in multiple incarcerations and 

general instability in all spheres of [her life].” While the magistrate court recognized Doe’s 

expressed desire to achieve sobriety, it found no indication that her actions would match her words 

in the foreseeable future. Further, the magistrate court found that the child was “thriving in his 

home, showing a healthy attachment to his grandfather and a strong bond with his siblings.” The 

magistrate court ultimately held that termination of Doe’s parental rights and subsequent adoption 

by the grandfather would “promote continuity, stability and consistency for [the child]” and would 

“afford [the child] the opportunity to be raised in a home that meets his basic needs.”

On appeal, Doe challenges the magistrate court’s basis for finding that termination of her 

parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Specifically, Doe alleges that the magistrate 

court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the progress she made while on her rider in 

her criminal case. Doe argues that the magistrate court lacked substantial and competent evidence 

to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best interests to terminate 

Doe’s parental rights. 

Doe’s argument on appeal seeks to have this Court reweigh the evidence presented at trial. 

This Court’s review, however, is limited to whether substantial and competent evidence supports 

the magistrate court’s decision. See, e.g., Doe, 148 Idaho at 245-46, 220 P.3d at 1064-65 (noting 

review is whether substantial and competent evidence supports decision). This Court will not 

reweigh the evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2017-5), 162 Idaho 400, 407, 397 

P.3d 1159, 1166 (Ct. App. 2017). The magistrate court’s findings of facts are supported by 

substantial and competent evidence and supports its holding, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that it is in the best interests of the child for Doe’s parental rights to be terminated. As such, Doe 

has failed to show that the magistrate court erred in finding that terminating her parental rights is 

in the child’s best interests. 
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Substantial, competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s determination that Doe 

neglected the child and that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. 

Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. 

Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.

Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.