Filed 7/28/23 Alford v. County of Los Angeles CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JAY ALFORD, 

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B317180

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VS028361)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Olivia Rosales, Judge. Affirmed.

Jay Alford, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Peterson, Bradford, Burkwitz, Gregorio, Burkwitz & Su 

and Avi Burkwitz for Defendant and Respondent.

__________________________
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SUMMARY

Plaintiff Jay Alford filed a grievance after the Los Angeles 

County Department of Children and Family Services (county or 

department) placed his name on the Child Abuse Central Index. 

After a grievance hearing, the county decided no modification 

should be made to the previously substantiated allegations of 

child abuse by plaintiff, resulting in his name remaining on the 

Child Abuse Central Index. 

Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1094.5, seeking to overturn the decision 

to keep his name on the Child Abuse Central Index. The trial 

court initially granted summary judgment for the county on the 

ground the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. We 

found the statute of limitations did not bar the petition and 

reversed the judgment. (Alford v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 

51 Cal.App.5th 742.) When the case returned to the trial court, 

the court again denied plaintiff’s petition.

We affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Plaintiff and his former wife, who have an acrimonious 

relationship, shared custody of their 15-year-old son, J.A., who 

lived with plaintiff most of the time.

On March 18, 2014, J.A. called his mother, asking her to 

pick him up immediately because of plaintiff’s physical abuse the 

previous day. J.A. and his mother went to the Norwalk station of 

the county sheriff’s department. J.A. reported that plaintiff had 

gotten upset because J.A. had failed a test. J.A. told the deputy 

that plaintiff blindfolded him, punched him, kicked him and 

choked him. He said he fell to the floor and pleaded with 

plaintiff, “Just don’t kill me Dad.” When plaintiff left the 

residence on March 18, J.A. took the opportunity to flee and call 

his mother. The incident report states the reporting officer 
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(Deputy Redondo) observed bruising on J.A.’s chest, upper back 

and forearms, and the officer photographed the injuries. 

Officers went to plaintiff’s home, but he was not there. 

Plaintiff was arrested and booked when he went to the Norwalk 

station a few hours later to report his son was missing. Plaintiff

refused to make any statements regarding his son. 

On March 24, 2014, the department received a report on 

the incident from Deputy Redondo, alleging general neglect and 

physical abuse of J.A. by plaintiff. 

J.A. sought a temporary restraining order, and the court 

held a hearing on April 11, 2014. J.A.’s mother had also 

requested orders in the parents’ dissolution action, with a 

hearing scheduled for June 13, 2014. At the April 11 hearing, the 

court found the issues to be primarily about visitation and 

custody, and on its own motion reset the June 13 hearing for

April 29, 2014. The court granted plaintiff visitation on the 

weekend of April 18, ordering no physical discipline of J.A. 

Mother did not comply with the order. A safety plan the 

department finalized that same day (April 11) provided J.A. was 

to live with his mother and have no contact with plaintiff until 

the department’s investigation was completed. 

On April 30, 2014, J.A. signed a declaration describing the 

physical abuse and the related circumstances. His adult sister 

wrote an undated letter to support a permanent restraining order 

for J.A. against plaintiff, stating she too had experienced physical 

abuse inflicted by plaintiff. 

On May 21, 2014, after a hearing, the superior court issued 

a restraining order preventing plaintiff from contacting J.A. and 

requiring him to stay at least 100 yards away from J.A. for the 

next two years. 

Meanwhile, on March 28, 2014, child social worker (CSW) 

Callistus Amajoyi began an investigation for the department. 
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Among other things, he interviewed plaintiff (who stated J.A.’s 

mother was fabricating the allegations to get custody); mother; 

and J.A.’s adult sister (who told him plaintiff had anger problems 

and physically abused her for years until she moved in with her 

mother). On May 21, 2014, the department concluded the 

allegations of general neglect, physical abuse and emotional 

abuse were substantiated. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that his son went to the police 

station and made the statements to the police. Plaintiff also does 

not dispute that “[J.A.] had some scratches on him.” His position 

is that J.A. lied to the police “because of the mother” and lied to 

the social worker. 

The district attorney did not file criminal charges against 

plaintiff. The record does not reflect when that decision was 

made.

On June 19, 2014, plaintiff requested a grievance hearing, 

seeking review of the submission of his name to the Child Abuse 

Central Index, contending the alleged abuse did not occur. 

On July 3, 2014, the department told plaintiff his request 

could not be processed because the matter “is being adjudicated 

in Criminal Court,” but if the matter were dismissed by the court, 

plaintiff could then request a hearing. (A hearing “shall be 

denied when a court of competent jurisdiction has determined 

that suspected child abuse or neglect has occurred, or when the 

allegation of child abuse or neglect resulting in the referral to the

[Child Abuse Central Index] is pending before the court.” (Pen. 

Code, § 11169, subd. (e).))

Several months later, on November 13, 2014, plaintiff

raised the department’s denial of a hearing again in a phone 

conversation with Michael Watrobski, the author of the July 3, 

2014 denial letter. This was followed by correspondence in 

December 2014 between plaintiff and various supervisory
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personnel. The department told plaintiff that he should provide 

proof that the criminal charges were dropped, not filed or 

dismissed, upon receipt of which a grievance hearing would be 

held. Finally, in January 2015, the department secured 

information that the district attorney would not be filing a 

criminal charge. 

The grievance hearing occurred on August 25, 2015. 

Numerous exhibits offered by the parties were entered into 

evidence without objection, including Mr. Amajoyi’s investigative 

narrative; the sheriff’s incident report; affidavits from J.A., his 

mother and plaintiff; the restraining order; and other documents 

offered by plaintiff, all listed in the grievance officer’s decision. 

Mr. Amajoyi, the social worker who conducted the 

investigation and prepared the investigative report, did not 

appear at the hearing. (The Child Abuse Central Index grievance 

procedures in the record state that “[t]he county employee(s) who 

conducted the investigation that is the subject of the grievance 

hearing shall be present at the hearing if that person is employed 

by the county and is available to participate in the grievance 

hearing.” Instead, supervising CSW Veronica Jimenez testified 

about Mr. Amajoyi’s report. The record does not reflect why 

Mr. Amajoyi was unavailable. (Plaintiff asserts his 

unavailability “was the action of the Department when they 

terminated his employment.”))

At the hearing, plaintiff complained about his inability to 

question Mr. Amajoyi about inconsistencies in his report. These 

inconsistencies included statements about whether Mr. Amajoyi’s

visits to J.A.’s mother’s home were announced or unannounced; 

plaintiff’s assertion that Mr. Amajoyi stated he came to plaintiff’s 

home, while plaintiff said he did not; Mr. Amajoyi’s statement 

that J.A.’s mother gave him a copy of a restraining order filed in 

court on March 19, 2014 (when no order had yet been issued), 
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and the like. The grievance officer told plaintiff that both she 

and the witness (Veronica Jimenez) agreed, “there are 

inconsistencies. We cannot say that what happened happened 

because he’s [Mr. Amajoyi’s] not here. We’re gonna give you all of 

that, absolutely.” 

On October 2, 2015, the grievance review officer issued her 

decision, recommending “that there be no modification of the 

original substantiated allegations of physical and emotional 

abuse.” The director of the department adopted the decision on 

October 9, 2015. 

On February 17, 2016, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of 

administrative mandamus to compel the county to set aside its 

decision. As explained at the outset, after we held that the 

statute of limitations did not bar the claim, the trial court denied 

plaintiff’s petition on the merits.

Judgment was entered denying plaintiff’s petition on 

October 21, 2021. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. The Legal Principles

In a case involving the validity of an administrative 

decision, “[t]he inquiry . . . shall extend to the questions whether 

the [county] has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; 

whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any 

prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established 

if the [county] has not proceeded in the manner required by law, 

the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the 

findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) “Where it is claimed that the findings are 

not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is 

authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on 

the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court 
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determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of 

the evidence. . . .” (Id., subd. (c).) 

The parties do not dispute that in its review of the county’s

findings, the trial court was required to exercise its independent 

judgment on the evidence. In doing so, the trial court “must 

afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the 

administrative findings, and the party challenging the 

administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court 

that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the 

evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.) 

We review the trial court’s determination using the substantial 

evidence test. (Id. at p. 824.)

2. This Case

Plaintiff offers several arguments on appeal from the 

judgment denying his petition. None has merit.

a. The “excess of jurisdiction” claim

Plaintiff’s first contention is that the county acted in excess 

of jurisdiction because it did not provide a grievance hearing 

within 60 days of his initial request on June 19, 2014, as provided 

under the county’s policies. We disagree.

As we have already observed, a hearing must be denied if 

an allegation of child abuse is pending before a court. (Pen. Code, 

§ 11169, subd. (e).) The question whether a criminal case was 

pending was not resolved until January 2015. Moreover, even if 

that delay were the county’s responsibility, plaintiff did in fact 

receive a grievance hearing on August 25, 2015. (Plaintiff waived 

the time limits for that hearing.) And, as the trial court stated, 

plaintiff has not identified any prejudice to him resulting from 

the failure to hold the grievance hearing earlier.
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Plaintiff also contends the denial of his initial request for a 

hearing deprived him of a fair trial, causing his “inability to 

cross[-]examine and rebut the evidence.” For the reasons just 

discussed (and further discussed, post), this claim fails as well.

b. The bias claim

Plaintiff next contends the grievance officer was biased 

because her “boss” was Mr. Watrobski, who denied plaintiff’s 

June 19, 2014 request for a grievance hearing. (When plaintiff

questioned the grievance officer about the denial of his initial 

request for a hearing, the officer stated, “I’m thinking my boss 

probably looked at this, saw there was something pending, and 

asked you to provide some kind of evidence that said it wasn’t 

pending.”) The trial court found “there has been no sufficient 

argument or evidence presented to indicate that [the grievance 

officer] was biased again [plaintiff] in any way.” Our review of 

the record confirms that assessment.

c. The claim of denial of a fair trial

Plaintiff contends he was denied a fair trial because he 

could not confront and cross-examine the social worker, 

Mr. Amajoyi, about the discrepancies in his investigative report. 

The trial court agreed there were “many unexplained 

discrepancies and inconsistencies contained throughout the 

investigative record,” but found those inconsistencies “do not 

warrant a reversal of the County’s decision. The weight of the 

evidence supports the conclusion that [plaintiff] committed the 

actions addressed in [Penal Code provisions on child abuse and 

corporal punishment] against [J.A.]. Importantly, [J.A.] made 

multiple separate statements to different people stating that he 

was physically and emotionally abused by [plaintiff].” The court 

also cited the letter from plaintiff’s adult daughter (in connection 
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with the restraining order) “corroborating [J.A.’s] depiction of 

physical and emotional abuse in [plaintiff’s] home.” 

The trial court also pointed out, as to the fair trial issue, 

that at the grievance hearing, all of plaintiff’s evidentiary 

documents were considered; plaintiff testified; and he proffered 

testimony from his sister, his longtime roommate, and his 

fiancée. The trial court further found that Mr. Amajoyi’s 

investigative narrative was entered into evidence at the 

grievance hearing without objection, so that the county’s decision 

relied on admissible evidence notwithstanding Mr. Amajoyi’s 

inability to appear. 

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion plaintiff received 

a fair trial despite his inability to cross-examine Mr. Amajoyi 

about the discrepancies in his report. The discrepancies or 

inconsistencies are not relevant to the point at issue: whether 

plaintiff committed the abuse that J.A. reported to his mother, to 

Mr. Amajoyi, to another social worker in Riverside County, and 

to Deputy Redondo. Plaintiff contends J.A. is lying, but he offers 

no explanation for the bruises observed and photographed by the 

deputy at the sheriff’s station. As the grievance officer stated, 

“When asked how [J.A.] could have suffered those injuries, 

[plaintiff] stated that he did not know.” 

Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s statement that there 

was no showing the grievance officer refused to admit any of 

plaintiff’s documents into evidence. He claims he did make a 

showing, and that 10 pages of one of his exhibits is not in the 

administrative record. Plaintiff does not identify the contents of 

those pages or make any argument about their relevance, so this

claim fails.
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In a related argument, plaintiff contends Mr. Amajoyi’s 

report should not have been admitted in evidence because it is 

hearsay and, without cross-examination, was inherently 

unreliable. As stated earlier, plaintiff made no objection to 

admission of the report at the hearing. (See Clary v. City of 

Crescent City (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 274, 302 [“hearsay evidence 

is not per se inadmissible in administrative proceedings (see, 

e.g., Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (d)), and [the plaintiff] waived any 

objection to its use of such evidence by failing to object”]; Gov. 

Code, § 11513, subd. (c) [“The hearing need not be conducted 

according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses, 

except as hereinafter provided. Any relevant evidence shall be 

admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons 

are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, 

regardless of the existence of any common law or statutory rule 

which might make improper the admission of the evidence over 

objection in civil actions.”]; id., subd. (d) [“Hearsay evidence may 

be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other 

evidence but over timely objection shall not be sufficient in itself 

to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection 

in civil actions.”].)

Plaintiff contends he objected to the report at the hearing 

and before the hearing. His citations to the record for the claim 

he objected before the hearing do not in any way support his 

claim. He claims to have objected by virtue of his assertions at 

the hearing that no one could answer his questions about the 

discrepancies in the report. That does not suffice as an objection 

to admission of the report.

Further, the Amajoyi report was not the only evidence 

presented. Other evidence to which plaintiff did not object 
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included the police report, the two-year permanent restraining 

order, and J.A.’s affidavit describing the abuse. And, as already 

discussed, plaintiff identified no discrepancies in the Amajoyi 

report that are relevant to the fundamental issue, and so has 

shown no prejudice.

d. The weight of the evidence

Plaintiff argues the grievance officer’s findings were not 

supported by the weight of the evidence. The trial court 

concluded otherwise: “Notwithstanding [plaintiff’s] arguments to 

the contrary, the Court finds that the Grievance Officer’s 

Decision is supported by substantiated evidence of [plaintiff’s]

willful physical and emotional abuse. Specifically, [J.A.] 

disclosed specific acts of physical and emotional abuse by 

[plaintiff]; [the county] submitted documentary evidence of 

[J.A.’s] injuries to his torso, which were consistent with [J.A.’s] 

depiction of the injuries; and [plaintiff’s] minor son and adult 

daughter both disclosed that they had been victims of ongoing 

physical and emotional abuse at the hands of [plaintiff].” To this, 

plaintiff repeatedly claims only that the court “does not construe 

the information correctly.” The record, however, supports the 

trial court’s findings.

Plaintiff then contends the trial court did not have all the 

necessary evidence, and erred when it denied his request in 

March 2021 to augment the administrative record. We find no 

error.

In cases where the court exercises its independent 

judgment on the evidence, the court may admit evidence at the 

hearing on the writ, “[w]here the court finds that there is 

relevant evidence that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 

could not have been produced or that was improperly excluded at 
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the hearing before [the county].” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, 

subd. (e).)

Plaintiff asked to augment the record with 40 additional 

exhibits, including the audio recording and transcript of the 

grievance hearing. The trial court granted the request as to the 

audio recording and transcript, and denied it as to the other 

documents. (The transcript was already in the administrative 

record; the court later gave plaintiff leave to file a transcript of 

the audio recording on pleading paper.) As to the other 

documents, the court stated plaintiff “failed to show that the 

evidence could not have been produced in the exercise of 

reasonable diligence, or that it was improperly excluded at the 

administrative hearing.” 

On appeal, plaintiff identifies as evidence he could not have 

produced at the hearing only “the follow up question asked by 

Grievance Review Officer after the grievance hearing,” in the 

form of e-mails between plaintiff and the grievance officer. He 

does not tell us how these communications are relevant, or how 

their omission from the administrative record is in any way 

prejudicial to him. 

In short, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that the weight of the evidence showed plaintiff 

engaged in acts of physical and emotional abuse against J.A.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on 

appeal.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J.