United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 26, 2014*

Decided December 1, 2014

Before

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐2578

        Appeal from the

DAVID L. BENTON, SR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CLARK COUNTY JAIL and CLARK

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS’ OFFICE,

Defendants‐Appellees.

United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana,   

New Albany Division.

No. 4:14‐cv‐20‐TWP‐WGH

Tanya Walton Pratt,

Judge.

O R D E R

David Benton appeals from the dismissal of his civil‐rights suit alleging that the

Clark County Jail and Clark County Commissioners’ Office violated his Eighth

Amendment rights during his overnight detention by denying him medication and

subjecting him to unsanitary conditions. Because Benton’s claims are precluded by a

previous state‐court judgment against him, we affirm.

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14‐2578    Page 2

In Indiana state court, Benton sued Clark County Jail for civil‐rights violations

arising out of his detention on the night of December 17, 2012; he alleged that the jail did

not give him pain medication for his osteoporosis and forced him to stand barefoot on an

unsanitary floor. The state court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and

Benton did not pursue an appeal.

Benton then filed his federal suit, repeating his constitutional claims, attaching a

copy of his state‐court complaint, and adding the Clark County Commissioners’ Office

as a defendant. The district court screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and

dismissed it, concluding that the Commissioners’ Office was in privity with the jail and

that Benton’s claims against both parties were precluded by the prior state‐court

judgment. We note that the jail is a building and not a proper party, see Smith v. Knox

Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2012), but here the court appears to have treated the

complaint as a suit against the county and its officials.

The district court is correct that Benton’s claims are precluded. State‐court

judgments are afforded the same preclusive effect in federal court that they would have

under the law of the state that rendered judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Migra v. Warren

City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 937 (7th

Cir. 2013). In Indiana claim preclusion applies when (1) a court of competent jurisdiction

(2) rendered judgment on the merits; (3) the matter presently at issue was, or could, have

been addressed in the prior action; and (4) the prior case involved the parties to the

present suit or their privies. Geico Ins. Co. v. Graham, 14 N.E.3d 854, 858 (Ind. App. Ct.

2014); see also Jarrard v. CDI Telecomms., Inc., 408 F.3d 905, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying

Indiana law). Benton suggests that claim preclusion is inapplicable because he has added

the Commissioners’ Office as a party, but the office is in privity with the jail because

Benton’s allegations against the office stem from his treatment at the jail. See Becker v.

State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700–01 (Ind. 2013).

AFFIRMED.