2024 IL App (1st) 182727-U

No. 1-18-2727 

Order filed July 15, 2024 

First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RONALD BATTLE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 03 CR 13668

Honorable 

Allen F. Murphy, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Hyman and C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The private attorney who represented defendant at the hearing on the State’s motion 

to dismiss his supplemental postconviction petition was not required to comply 

with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), because defendant’s initial 

postconviction counsel already had. Pursuant to People v. Addison, 2023 IL 

127119, we remand the cause for additional postconviction proceedings. 

¶ 2 In 2007 and 2008, defendant Ronald Battle filed pro se petitions for relief pursuant to the 

Post-Conviction Heating Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006, 2008)), and the Code 

of Civil Procedure (725 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)). The petitions were docketed and 
No. 1-18-2727 

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consolidated, and postconviction counsel was appointed. Postconviction counsel filed a 

supplemental petition, which was ultimately dismissed on the State’s motion. On appeal, defendant 

argued (1) the case should be remanded for further proceedings when the private attorney who 

represented him at the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss filed a facially invalid certificate 

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), and (2) he was denied the reasonable 

assistance of postconviction counsel when none of his postconviction attorneys amended his pro 

se filings to overcome procedural bars. We affirmed. See People v. Battle, 2021 IL App (1st) 

182727-U. 

¶ 3 Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal. Our supreme court denied defendant’s

petition, but ordered us to vacate our judgment and consider the effect of its decision in People v. 

Addison, 2023 IL 127119, on the issue of whether defendant received reasonable assistance from 

postconviction counsel. See People v. Battle, No. 127782 (Sept. 27, 2023) (supervisory order). We 

allowed the parties to file supplemental briefing responding to the supervisory order. For the 

following reasons, we reverse the dismissal of the supplemental postconviction petition and 

remand the cause for further proceedings pursuant to the Act. 

¶ 4 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and armed robbery 

arising from the May 29, 2003, shooting death of James Johns in a jewelry store. We relate only 

the facts relevant to the instant appeal.

¶ 5 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that his inculpatory statement 

was coerced when detectives threatened to charge defendant’s family members, claimed to have 

arrested his mother and girlfriend, and showed him documents memorializing “the alleged arrests.” 
No. 1-18-2727 

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¶ 6 At the hearing on the motion, Calumet City police officer Donald Joswiak and detective 

Kevin Rapacz denied telling defendant that his family members would be charged if he did not 

make a statement, making any “material misrepresentations” to him, or using psychological or 

physical coercion in order to obtain a statement. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 7 Defendant also filed a motion in limine to present testimony from his mother, Yvonne Key, 

and girlfriend, Catrina Hines, that his cousin, Donnell Coleman, admitted committing the offenses. 

¶ 8 At the hearing on the motion, trial counsel represented to the trial court that Key and Hines 

would testify that on the one-year anniversary of the shooting, Coleman began to cry, and stated 

that he was responsible for the murder and felt “bad about it.” Hines would further state that 

Coleman said his girlfriend was pregnant at the time of the shooting and he needed money. Trial 

counsel acknowledged that Coleman, who had been interviewed by the State and the defense, 

denied committing the offenses, but argued that Coleman would not admit to the offenses and that 

defendant was entitled to present a defense. 

¶ 9 The trial court denied the motion, finding that the out-of-court statement was not made 

under circumstances that provided a “considerable assurance of reliability.”1

 

¶ 10 At defendant’s jury trial, Irene Sanchez testified that, when she arrived at the jewelry store 

on May 29, 2003, defendant, rather than Johns, was behind the counter. Defendant exited the store 

carrying a garbage bag that subsequently broke, causing jewelry and boxes to fall to the ground.

Defendant retrieved some items and fled. Sanchez later gave police a description of defendant and 

1 The court later clarified that, “the statement made by the mother was unreliable, not the 

statement made by the declarant.”
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his vehicle, and a computer sketch was created. On June 5, 2003, Sanchez identified defendant in 

a lineup.

¶ 11 Additional evidence established that Johns was discovered on the floor of store with a 

gunshot wound to the head. 

¶ 12 Tommy Lee Johnson testified that on June 4, 2003, defendant visited his home and asked 

him to “get rid” of some jewelry, and that he sold several pieces and gave defendant the money. 

¶ 13 Following defendant’s arrest, he made a videotaped statement, stating, that he went to the 

jewelry store to rob it because he owed money to a drug dealer. Defendant looked at rings and then 

drew a firearm and told Johns not to move. When Johns reached under a shelf, defendant shot him. 

Defendant filled a garbage bag with jewelry. As he left the store, he passed a woman. Later, he 

gave Johnson rings to sell on his behalf. He denied being threatened or coerced into making the 

statement. 

¶ 14 Before the State rested, the parties stipulated that six phone calls were made to defendant’s 

home on May 29, 2003, between 8:49 a.m. and 11:21 a.m. Three phone calls lasted zero seconds 

and three phone calls lasted more than zero seconds. A zero-second call meant no one answered

the phone. 

¶ 15 Outside the presence of the jury, the parties argued as to the admissibility of Coleman’s 

alleged statement to Key and Hines. Coleman’s attorney, who was present, told the court that his 

client would deny making any statement admitting involvement. Trial counsel then argued that 

Coleman’s statement was admissible pursuant to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), 

and was crucial to defendant’s theory of the case. 
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¶ 16 The State responded that Coleman’s proposed testimony would allow the defense to “get 

it out there that [Coleman] supposedly confessed to this murder,” and that Key’s and Hines’s 

testimony on this issue—which the court already found unreliable—would confuse the jury. The 

trial court then placed Coleman under oath and requested an offer of proof as to his potential 

testimony. 

¶ 17 Coleman testified that he did not remember the evening of May 14, 2004, and denied telling 

Key and Hines that he committed “the murder.” The trial court found that Coleman’s testimony 

would serve “no purpose,” and therefore barred it. 

¶ 18 Defendant testified that on the morning of May 29, 2003, he was at home on the phone 

with his friend Amelia Jones when Coleman arrived and asked to borrow defendant’s vehicle.2

After Coleman left, defendant spoke to Jones again and had a brief call with Key. When Coleman 

returned with a white garbage bag filled with jewelry, defendant assumed the jewelry was stolen. 

Defendant only gave the videotaped statement because the police threatened to arrest his family 

members. Defendant denied shooting Johns and, to defendant’s “knowledge,” Coleman shot Johns. 

Defendant identified photographs of Coleman at trial.

¶ 19 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and armed robbery and that, during 

the commission of these offenses, defendant personally discharged a firearm. After a hearing, the 

trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 75 years for first degree murder and 20 

years for armed robbery. 

¶ 20 On direct appeal, we modified defendant’s sentences to run concurrently. See People v. 

Battle, 378 Ill. App. 3d 817 (2008). Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal. Our supreme 

2 In the transcript, defendant identified Amelia’s family name as both Jones and Johnson. 
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court denied the petition for leave to appeal, but issued a supervisory order directing us to vacate 

our judgment and reconsider the case in light of People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (2009). See People 

v. Battle, No. 106105 (May 28, 2009) (supervisory order). We thereafter affirmed defendant’s 

conviction for murder and vacated his conviction for armed robbery. See People v Battle, 393 Ill. 

App. 3d 302 (2009).

¶ 21 While his direct appeal was pending, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition

alleging, relevant here, that he was prevented from presenting a defense and identifying the “ ‘true 

offender.’ ” The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, 

we granted the parties’ agreed motion for summary disposition and directed the petition be 

docketed for further proceedings under the Act. People v. Battle, No. 1-07-1264 (May 22, 2009) 

(dispositional order).

¶ 22 On January 2, 2008, defendant filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under section 

2-1401, alleging in pertinent part, that Coleman was the true offender, and that on February 21, 

2004, Coleman confessed to defendant’s mother and stated he “felt sorry” that defendant was 

incarcerated because of Coleman’s actions. 

¶ 23 On August 11, 2008, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition raising numerous 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel including, relevant here, that 

defendant was denied effective assistance on direct appeal by appellate counsel’s failure to 

challenge trial counsel’s effectiveness. 

¶ 24 Attached to the petition were the affidavits of defendant and Key. Defendant averred that 

he had unsuccessfully tried to obtain documents, phone records, and police reports from trial 

counsel to support his claims. Key averred, relevant here, that in February 2004, her nephew cried 
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and told her that it was his fault that defendant was “locked up” and that she was not permitted to 

mention her nephew’s name at trial.3

 

¶ 25 On October 29, 2008, the circuit court docketed defendant’s pro se petitions for 

postconviction and postjudgment relief and appointed counsel. On June 9, 2009, the State read this 

court’s order directing the clerk to docket the 2007 pro se postconviction petition into the record. 

¶ 26 On January 15, 2016, postconviction counsel filed a supplemental postconviction petition

and a certificate pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). In the certificate, 

counsel stated that he consulted with defendant by mail, phone, and in person to ascertain 

defendant’s contentions, obtained and read the trial transcripts, and prepared a supplemental 

postconviction petition which “augment[ed] the concerns already expressed” in defendant’s pro 

se petition. 

¶ 27 The supplemental petition alleged, in pertinent part, that defendant’s conviction resulted 

from a denial of due process when he was identified through a “result oriented process” designed 

to ensure that he was identified as the offender when in fact the sketch generated from Sanchez’s 

interview resembled Coleman rather than defendant and defendant’s statement was “at odds” with 

the physical evidence. The petition next alleged that the trial court denied defendant the 

opportunity to present a defense when it barred evidence that Coleman “confessed” and raised a 

free-standing claim of actual innocence based upon Coleman’s confession to Key and Hines. The 

petition next argued that defendant was denied the effective assistance when trial counsel failed to 

3 While Key’s affidavit did not identify her nephew by name, we assume that the nephew in 

question is Coleman, as Kay averred, in one of the affidavits attached to the supplemental postconviction 

petition, that Coleman was her sister’s son. 
No. 1-18-2727 

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challenge Sanchez’s pretrial identification of defendant as suggestive, and appellate counsel failed 

to challenge the suggestive identification on direct appeal.

¶ 28 Attached to the petition were police reports, a sketch generated from Sanchez’s description, 

and three affidavits from Key. 

¶ 29 Key averred, in pertinent part, that Coleman told her he knew that defendant did not commit 

“the robbery and murder.” Specifically, a month after defendant was arrested, Key was in a vehicle 

with Hines and Coleman when Coleman stated that he knew it would “not be like [defendant] to 

do something like that.” When she asked Coleman how he knew defendant did not commit the 

offense, Coleman said he was sorry. When Key told trial counsel about the conversation, he said 

he would have someone talk to Coleman. 

¶ 30 The State filed a motion to dismiss alleging, relevant here, that the legal and factual 

arguments surrounding Coleman’s alleged confession were “litigated to death” during pretrial and 

trial proceedings, were contained in the record, and should have been raised on direct appeal. 

¶ 31 Defendant filed a response which asserted, relevant there, that the claim that the trial court 

erred when it did not allow defendant to present evidence that Coleman stated that he committed 

the offense was not waived, because it could not have been raised on direct appeal. The response 

noted that the record on direct appeal did not contain a photograph of Coleman, whereas the record 

in the postconviction proceeding did. Therefore, because the photograph was not contained in the 

record on direct appeal, appellate counsel “did not have the opportunity” to argue that the sketch 

prepared after Sanchez was interviewed resembled Coleman. In other words, absent this 

photograph, one of Chambersfactors, whether an out-of-court statement was corroborated by other 
No. 1-18-2727 

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evidence, was not met on direct appeal, and therefore the argument could not have been raised.

4

The response reiterated that the trial court’s failure to permit testimony from Key, Hines, and 

Coleman denied defendant due process.

¶ 32 Postconviction counsel passed away on January 31, 2017, and substitute postconviction 

counsel was assigned. On March 17, 2017, substitute postconviction counsel acknowledged that 

the case was set for argument and asked the court to approve certain discovery. The State objected 

because a motion to dismiss and response had already been filed. The State further stated that 

discovery had been tendered and a Rule 651(c) certificate had been filed. The circuit court ordered 

substitute postconviction counsel to brief the discovery issue. 

¶ 33 At a subsequent hearing, substitute postconviction counsel told the court that defendant 

instructed her to withdraw the discovery issue, review the transcript, and set the case for argument. 

She further stated she would file a Rule 651(c) certificate after reviewing the transcript. 

¶ 34 On April 20, 2018, private postconviction counsel entered her appearance and substitute

postconviction counsel was granted leave to withdraw. 

¶ 35 On July 20, 2018, private postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate stating that 

she consulted with defendant by phone, mail, electronic means, or in person to ascertain his 

constitutional deprivations, and examined the trial proceedings. Private postconviction counsel 

acknowledged that she was defendant’s third postconviction attorney and that defendant instructed 

her to respond to the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the supplemental postconviction petition 

filed by initial postconviction counsel. The court then heard arguments on the motion to dismiss.

4 In his opening brief before this court, defendant notes that this assertion was actually incorrect, 

as defendant identified photographs of Coleman at trial.
No. 1-18-2727 

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¶ 36 On September 21, 2018, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The court 

noted, relevant here, that defendant raised a claim of actual innocence based upon defendant’s 

assertion that Coleman was the “actual killer.” The court characterized the claim as “like” a claim 

that defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and found the claim refuted by 

the record when defendant was identified by Sanchez and gave an inculpatory statement, 

Additionally, “[t]his matter could have been raised on appeal.” The court then addressed 

defendant’s claim that appellate counsel “should have raised these issues in his original appeal” 

and determined that defendant did not establish that the failure to do so was objectively 

unreasonable. 

¶ 37 Before this court, defendant does not challenge the dismissal of his petition on the merits. 

Rather, he contends that remand is warranted because private postconviction counsel failed to 

comply with the requirements of Rule 651(c), and he was denied the reasonable assistance of 

postconviction counsel. Defendant has therefore forfeited for review any substantive claim 

challenging the dismissal of the petition on the merits. People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 49.

¶ 38 On appeal, defendant first contends that the cause must be remanded for further 

proceedings under the Act because the Rule 651(c) certificate filed by private postconviction 

counsel was facially invalid. Defendant argues that private postconviction counsel’s certificate did 

not state that she made any amendments to defendant’s pro se petition necessary for an adequate 

presentation of his contentions of constitutional deprivation as required by the rule. 

¶ 39 Our supreme court has held there is “no constitutional right to counsel, effective or 

otherwise,” in postconviction proceedings. People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30. Rather, the 

right to counsel recognized by the Act is a matter of legislative grace. Id. A defendant in a 
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postconviction proceeding is only entitled to the level of assistance required by the Act. Id. This 

“required quantum of assistance has been judicially deemed to be a ‘reasonable level,’ a standard 

that is significantly lower than the one mandated at trial by our state and federal constitutions.” Id. 

(quoting People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472 (2006)). 

¶ 40 Pursuant to Rule 651(c), postconviction counsel must make a showing that: counsel 

consulted with the defendant either in person or by phone, mail, or electronic means to ascertain 

the defendant’s alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; examined the record of the trial 

proceedings; and made any necessary amendments to the pro se petition for an adequate 

presentation of the defendant’s contentions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Counsel may 

make this showing by filing a certificate with the court. Id. The filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate 

gives rise to a rebuttal presumption that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance. 

People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 19. Compliance with the rule “ensure[s] that counsel 

shapes the petitioner’s claims into proper legal form and presents those claims to the court.” People 

v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 43-44 (2007). We review an attorney’s compliance with Rule 651(c) de 

novo. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 17.

¶ 41 In the case at bar, defendant does not dispute that his initial postconviction counsel filed a 

Rule 651(c) certificate or that private postconviction counsel was his third postconviction attorney. 

Rather, he argues that private postconviction counsel was herself required to comply with Rule 

651(c)’s requirements and that her failure to do so requires remand for further proceedings under 

the Act. We disagree.

¶ 42 In People v. Smith, 2022 IL 126940, the defendant appealed the second-stage dismissal of 

his postconviction petition. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. The defendant sought remand for additional proceedings 
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under the Act because the attorney who represented him at the hearing on the State’s motion to 

dismiss was not the same attorney who filed a Rule 651(c) certificate. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6, 8-9. 

¶ 43 There, the defendant’s pro se postconviction petition was docketed and initial 

postconviction counsel was appointed. Id. ¶ 6. Initial postconviction counsel thereafter filed a Rule 

651(c) certificate representing that she complied with the rule and that a supplemental petition was 

unnecessary for the presentation of the defendant’s claims. Id. The State filed a motion to dismiss, 

and initial postconviction counsel filed a response. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Initial postconviction counsel was 

then replaced by second postconviction counsel, who represented the defendant at the hearing on 

the State’s motion to dismiss. Id. ¶ 8. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss and the 

defendant appealed. Id. Thus, the issue before our supreme court was whether every attorney who 

represented a defendant at the second stage of proceedings under the Act must demonstrate 

compliance with Rule 651(c), even when prior counsel had filed a valid Rule 651(c) certificate. 

Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 44 The court determined that, because of initial postconviction counsel’s “presumptively 

reasonable representation and compliance with Rule 651(c),” all that remained for second

postconviction counsel to do was orally argue at the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss. Id. 

¶ 30. In other words, initial postconviction counsel already determined whether any amendment to 

the pro se filings were necessary to shape the defendant’s “complaints” into the proper legal form. 

Id. ¶ 32. As such, second postconviction counsel did not undertake to represent the defendant on 

the pro se petition that he filed, and “was not required to independently demonstrate compliance 

with Rule 651(c).” Id. ¶¶ 32, 38. Rather, all that remained for second postconviction counsel was 

to argue against the State’s motion to dismiss. Id. ¶ 38.
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¶ 45 Therefore, pursuant to Smith, by virtue of initial postconviction counsel filing a Rule 651(c) 

certificate, a rebuttable presumption arose that defendant received reasonable assistance of 

postconviction counsel. See id. ¶¶ 28-29. Here, initial postconviction counsel certified that he 

complied with the duties specified in Rule 651(c). Accordingly, private postconviction counsel, 

who represented defendant at the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, “was not required to 

independently demonstrate compliance with Rule 651(c).” Id. ¶ 38. 

¶ 46 Defendant next contends that he was denied reasonable assistance of postconviction 

counsel. First, he contends that none of his postconviction attorneys amended his pro se filings to 

allege that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel where appellate counsel failed 

to raise a Chambers claim on direct appeal. Second, he contends that his postconviction attorneys 

did not reshape his claim that he was denied due process by police coercion into a constitutional 

claim that he was denied effective assistance by trial counsel’s failure to present Key’s testimony 

to corroborate this claim. 

¶ 47 Defendant argues that all three postconviction attorneys had the same duty to amend his 

pro se filings. We disagree. Here, initial postconviction counsel was defendant’s attorney at the 

time that defendant’s pro se claims “needed to be shaped into proper legal form.” Id. ¶ 19. 

Moreover, initial postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and a supplemental 

petition. Thus, the question is whether initial postconviction counsel rendered reasonable 

assistance when amending the pro se filings. See Id. ¶ 38 (“if postconviction counsel performs 

unreasonably—even after a presumption has arisen that there has been compliance with Rule 

651(c)—postconviction petitioners are not foreclosed from pursuing a claim that counsel failed to 

provide a reasonable standard of representation”).
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¶ 48 “[T]he purpose of Rule 651(c) is to ensure that counsel shapes the [defendant’s] claims 

into proper legal form and presents those claims to the court.” Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 43-44. Counsel 

creates a rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance by filing a Rule 651(c) certificate. 

Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21. A defendant bears the burden to rebut that presumption by showing 

postconviction counsel did not substantially comply with the requirements of the rule, i.e., by 

demonstrating counsel did not make all necessary amendments to the pro se petition, including 

amendments necessary to overcome applicable procedural bars. Id. As discussed, we review 

counsel’s compliance with Rule 651(c) de novo. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 17.

¶ 49 Here, defendant contends that initial postconviction counsel violated Rule 651(c) by failing 

to amend his pro se filings to present his claims in appropriate legal form. Specifically, defendant 

alleges that initial postconviction counsel failed to allege ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel on direct appeal for failure to raise a Chambers claim in order to overcome forfeiture. He

notes that the claim was of record when Coleman’s alleged confession was the subject of a motion 

in limine and included in a posttrial motion. 

¶ 50 When a defendant asserts claims in a postconviction proceeding “that could have been 

raised on direct appeal, he can avoid the procedural bar of forfeiture by casting his claims as 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal.” Addison, 

2023 IL 127119, ¶ 23.

¶ 51 Addison is instructive. In that case, our supreme court found the defendant received 

unreasonable assistance when postconviction counsel did not amend the defendant’s pro se

postconviction petition to include allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id.
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¶¶ 23-25. There, the defendant’s pro se petition raised 15 issues and asserted that appellate counsel 

failed to raise 14 of them on direct appeal. Id. ¶ 23. 

¶ 52 The court noted that the petition showed that the defendant understood the “need” to frame 

these issues as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in order to overcome the “procedural bar 

of forfeiture.” Id. Yet, while postconviction counsel filed an amended petition raising five issues, 

all of which could have been raised on direct appeal, the amended petition “did not assert any 

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and nowhere alleged any way in which 

appellate counsel was ineffective.” Id. ¶ 24. The State filed a motion to dismiss arguing, relevant 

here, that the defendant’s claims were forfeited because they could have been raised on direct 

appeal. Id. ¶ 25. Despite the State’s written and oral arguments that the defendant’s claims were 

procedurally barred because they were not raised on direct appeal, postconviction counsel did not 

thereafter amend the petition to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and “never once 

countered the State’s assertion that [postconviction counsel] had failed to allege ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel.” Id.

¶ 53 Our supreme court was therefore “faced with the unusual situation in which postconviction 

counsel, in one significant sense, made the pro se petition worse by amending it.” Id. ¶¶ 24-25 

(noting that postconviction counsel “eliminated the necessary allegations [regarding ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel] that defendant had included in the pro se petition” (emphasis in 

original)). The court explained that although postconviction counsel determined that five claims 

were worth pursuing, “counsel failed to shape the claims into the proper form.” Id. ¶ 26. The court 

therefore found that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance and remanded the 
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matter for compliance with Rule 651(c). Id. ¶ 33. The court did not consider whether the claims 

raised in the petition had merit. Id. 

¶ 54 The court specifically rejected the State’s argument that remand was not required because 

the circuit court dismissed the petition on the merits rather than finding that the claims were 

forfeited. Id. ¶ 39. The court explained that it was “simply not possible to tell from this record that

forfeiture” and the failure to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel “played no part” in 

the circuit court’s decision to dismiss. Id. ¶ 40. Moreover, the court noted that its previous decision 

in People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999), on a “more fundamental level,” stood for the 

proposition that “it would not be appropriate to affirm the dismissal of [a postconviction] petition 

when counsel had not shaped the claims into the proper form.” Id. ¶ 41.

¶ 55 Similarly, here, we find that, based on this record, defendant has rebutted the presumption 

of reasonable assistance created by initial postconviction counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate. Id.

¶ 21. 

¶ 56 In the case at bar, the supplemental postconviction petition alleged that the trial court 

denied defendant the opportunity to present a defense when it barred evidence that Coleman 

“confessed” and raised a free-standing claim of actual innocence based upon Coleman’s alleged 

confession. However, despite the fact that these claims were based on the trial record and could 

have been raised on direct appeal, initial postconviction counsel did not include a claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise them on direct appeal. See id. ¶ 23 

(when raising postconviction claims that could have been raised in direct appeal, a defendant “can 

avoid the procedural bar of forfeiture by casting his claims as ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal”). 
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¶ 57 Thereafter, in response to the State’s argument in its motion to dismiss that these claims 

should have been raised on direct appeal, initial postconviction counsel did not seek leave to add 

a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to the supplemental postconviction petition. 

Rather, initial postconviction counsel concluded that these claims could not have been raised on 

direct appeal because the record did not contain a photograph of Coleman. However, initial 

postconviction counsel’s assertion that the record on direct appeal did not contain a photograph of 

Coleman was incorrect, as defendant identified photographs of Coleman at trial. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 

651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) (postconviction counsel must, inter alia, examine the record of the trial 

proceedings). Consequently, these claims could have been raised on direct appeal as the State 

contended, yet initial postconviction counsel did not seek leave to amend the supplemental petition 

to include a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise them on direct 

appeal. See Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 26 (“We fail to see how it can be reasonable assistance of 

counsel for an attorney to identify claims worth pursuing but then fail to shape them into proper 

form.”). Accordingly, based on this record, defendant has overcome the rebuttable presumption, 

created by the filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate, that initial postconviction counsel provided 

reasonable assistance. Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 58 Finally, we note that, based upon the reasoning of Addison, we need not consider whether

defendant’s claims had merit. See id. ¶¶ 33-42. As our supreme court explained, when 

postconviction counsel fails to comply with Rule 651(c), “our case law dictates that the cause 

should be remanded without a consideration of whether the petition’s claims have merit.” Id. ¶ 33. 

This is because “on a more fundamental level,” it would be inappropriate to evaluate the merits of 
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a defendant’s claims when postconviction “counsel had not shaped the claims into the proper 

form.” Id. ¶ 41. 

¶ 59 Accordingly, because initial postconviction counsel failed to fulfill his duties under Rule 

651(c), we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the supplemental petition and remand this cause

to the circuit court for the appointment of new postconviction counsel, so that defendant has the 

opportunity to replead his postconviction petition with the benefit of reasonable assistance of 

counsel. See id. ¶¶ 41, 44; see also People v. Schlosser, 2017 IL App (1st) 150355, ¶ 36 

(postconviction counsel’s failure to provide a reasonable level of assistance requires appointment 

of new counsel on remand). Based on our disposition, we do not reach defendant’s other contention 

of unreasonable assistance. 

¶ 60 Reversed; remanded.