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On appeal, appellant first argues that the district court erred 

in finding that appellant's mental illness and psychotropic medications did 

not constitute good cause. We disagree. Appellant raised this same claim 

in a prior post-conviction habeas petition in an attempt to overcome the 

procedural bars, and this court concluded that "[a]ny alleged incompetence 

was not good cause to excuse the almost ten-year delay in the filing of this 

petition." Taylor v. State, Docket No. 50602 (Order of Affirmance, April 

18, 2008) (citing Phelps v. Dir., Nev. Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 

764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988)). Thus, this claim is barred by the doctrine of 

the law of the case. Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 

(1975). Appellant acknowledges that this claim was previously raised but 

contends that it should be revisited because he only recently obtained the 

prison medical records that allowed him to support the claim with more 

detailed and specific allegations. The doctrine of the law of the case, 

however, cannot be avoided by a "more detailed and precisely focused 

argument." Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Further, even if appellant could 

overcome the doctrine of the law of the case because of substantially new 

or different evidence discovered, see Hsu v. Cnty. of Clark, 123 Nev. 625, 

630, 173 P.3d 724, 729 (2007), he failed to raise this claim within a 

reasonable time of obtaining the medical records, cf. Hathaway, 119 Nev. 

at 254-55, 71 P.3d at 507-08. Appellant obtained the medical records in 

2008 when he was appointed counsel in federal court, but he waited 

approximately three years to file the instant petition. To the extent that 

appellant attempts to argue that the delay was due to his pursuit of relief 

in federal court and that he filed the instant petition within a reasonable 

time after the federal court determined that his claims were unexhausted, 

he has failed to demonstrate good cause. See Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 

236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989). Therefore, we conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying this claim. 

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Second, appellant argues that official interference provided 

good cause to excuse the untimeliness of his petition. He asserts that he 

was prevented from filing a timely petition because the prison placed him 

in a mental health unit and mental health seclusion on numerous 

occasions from 1997 to 2002 and on at least four occasions from 2003 to 

2008. He also contends that the prison failed to properly treat his mental 

illness from 1997 until 2008, the year that he filed a petition for habeas 

relief in federal court. Appellant does not explain why he could not have 

raised this claim of official interference in his earlier post-conviction 

petitions. Further, even assuming that these allegations support official 

interference, appellant waited approximately three years before filing the 

instant post-conviction petition in state court and fails to demonstrate that 

this three-year delay was reasonable. Cf. Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 254-55, 

71 P.3d at 507-08. His pursuit of relief in federal court does not constitute 

good cause. See Colley, 105 Nev. at 236, 773 P.2d at 1230. Therefore, we 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Third, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 132 

S. Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant argues that he had good cause because he 

was not appointed counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings. We 

conclude that this argument lacks merit. The appointment of counsel was 

discretionary in the first post-conviction proceedings, see NRS 34.750(1), 

and appellant has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or provide 

an explanation for why he could not have raised this claim earlier. 

Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to 

Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel, 

Nev. , P.3 d (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014). Thus, the 

failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez 

would not provide good cause for this untimely petition. 

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Finally, appellant argues that the district court erred in 

finding that the State would be prejudiced by consideration of the petition. 

He asserts that he would be the party prejudiced by the passage of time 

because it is his burden to prove his claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. We conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 

district court abused its discretion in finding that the petition was barred 

by the doctrine of laches because he did not overcome the presumption of 

prejudice to the State. See NRS 34.800(2). Thus, because the petition was 

untimely and appellant failed to demonstrate good cause or overcome the 

presumption of prejudice, the district court did not err in denying the 

petition. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Hardesty 

CHERRY, J., concurring: 

Although I would extend the equitable rule recognized in 

Martinez to this case because appellant was convicted of murder and is 

facing a severe sentence, see Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. , P.3d 

(Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014) (Cherry, J., dissenting), I concur in 

the judgment on appeal in this case because the State pleaded laches 

under NRS 34.800(2) and appellant failed to rebut the presumption of 

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prejudice to the State. 

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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