PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1

MARCUS, SANTORO & KOZAK, P.C., ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 062357 JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 November 2, 2007 

HUNG-LIN WU, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

A. Joseph Canada, Jr., Judge 

Marcus, Santoro & Kozak, P.C. (MSK) and Kaufman & Canoles 

(K&C) (collectively “the Firms”) appeal from the judgment of the 

circuit court of the City of Virginia Beach which found both 

parties liable upon a garnishment summons for the payment of 

funds held in their respective trust accounts from a judgment 

debtor who was their client. The circuit court determined that 

the lien of a writ of fieri facias under Code § 8.01-501 

required the Firms to cease disbursing funds from their trust 

accounts in satisfaction of accrued legal fees and related costs 

and to pay those funds to a judgment creditor effective with the 

issuance of the writ of fieri facias. For the reasons set forth 

below, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

On May 12, 2005, Hung-Lin Wu and the Wu Trust (collectively 

“Wu”) obtained two judgments in a Florida state court, one 

 1

 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 

August 16, 2007. 
2

against Stanley F.C. Tseng and another against several business 

entities affiliated with Tseng (collectively “Tseng”).2 Wu 

domesticated the judgments in the Circuit Court of the City of 

Virginia Beach on August 16, 2005. 

Tseng retained MSK to represent him personally, and K&C to 

represent his affiliated business entities, with regard to 

various proceedings initiated by Wu in an attempt to collect on 

the judgments in both Virginia and Florida. Tseng entered into 

a written representation agreement with each law firm which 

provided that he would deposit a sum certain into a trust 

account maintained by the law firm as a “retainer.” The written 

agreement with K&C provided “This retainer will be applied 

toward services heretofore and hereafter rendered and out-ofpocket costs,” but gave no further explanation as to the basis 

for withdrawals from the trust account. The written agreement 

with MSK did not specifically address the disbursement of funds. 

As agreed, Tseng deposited $155,000 into K&C’s trust account and 

$125,000 into MSK’s trust account. K&C made the first 

disbursement from its trust account for payment of its fees and 

costs on August 26, 2005. MSK made the first disbursement from 

its trust account for fees and costs on August 19, 2005. 

 2

 The judgment against Tseng was for $8,459,789 and the 

judgment against the business entities was for $11,279,836. 
3

In an attempt to collect on the judgments, Wu requested 

that the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach deliver a 

writ of fieri facias against Tseng to the Sheriff of Virginia 

Beach pursuant to Code § 8.01-466.3 The writ was delivered to 

the sheriff on October 7, 2005. In its June 14, 2006 letter 

opinion, incorporated into the final order, the circuit court 

found that K&C and MSK were served with a notice of the lien of 

fieri facias on October 7, 2005. The Firms made no assignment 

of error to that finding. Tseng was not served with the notice 

of lien. 

On October 14, 2005, the circuit court issued a garnishment 

summons against each law firm. Each garnishment summons 

contained a new writ of fieri facias and provided another notice 

of the lien of fieri facias. Tseng was served with the MSK 

garnishment summons on October 21, 2005 and MSK was served with 

that garnishment summons on October 24, 2005. K&C and Tseng 

were served with the K&C garnishment summons on November 14, 

2005. The Firms had continued to disburse funds from their 

respective trust accounts during the period between the date of 

the issuance of the writ of fieri facias and service of notice 

on the Firms, October 7, 2005, and the dates of service of the 

respective garnishment summonses. 

 3

 A writ of fieri facias commands “the officer . . . to make 

the money therein mentioned out of the goods and chattels of the 
4

On November 18, 2005, the return date on the garnishment 

summonses, the Firms filed separate motions to dismiss the 

garnishments. In addition, each law firm delivered to the 

circuit court a check payable to Wu in an amount equal to the 

balance of its trust account as of the date that law firm and 

Tseng had been served the applicable garnishment summons. K&C 

paid $48,600.13, the remaining balance in its account as of 

November 14, 2005 when K&C and Tseng were served the garnishment 

summons. MSK paid $19,574.53, the remaining balance in its 

account as of October 24, 2005, the date by which both it and 

Tseng had been served with the garnishment summons. 

In the motions for summary judgment the Firms contended 

that they had remitted all the funds to which Tseng was 

entitled. At a hearing and in memoranda filed in the circuit 

court, Wu contended that the law firms should have remitted 

amounts equal to the account balances on October 7, 2005, the 

date the writ of fieri facias was delivered to the sheriff, and 

therefore that the sums remitted were deficient. Citing Code 

§ 8.01-501 for the proposition that the issuance of the writ of 

fieri facias on October 7 perfected a lien on the funds in the 

trust accounts, Wu contended that the Firms were obliged to 

cease disbursing funds from their respective trust accounts on 

 

person against whom the judgment is.” Code § 8.01-474. 
5

that date and were liable to him for any funds disbursed after 

that date. 

The Firms did not contest in the circuit court that Wu 

could proceed by garnishment, but argued the garnishment process 

he used was ineffective as a matter of law to reach any funds 

prior to the actual date of service of the garnishment summons. 

The Firms asserted that they were “person[s] making a payment to 

the judgment debtor” under Code § 8.01-502, and as such, the 

liens created under Code § 8.01-501 were ineffective against 

them without the statutory conditions precedent being met. That 

statutory condition precedent under Code § 8.01-502 included 

service of a notice of lien on both the Firms as garnishees and 

the judgment debtor, Tseng. For that reason, the Firms 

contended they were entitled to disburse funds from the trust 

accounts until the date on which both they and Tseng were served 

with the garnishment summonses. 

In its letter opinion, the circuit court ruled that the 

Firms were liable to Wu for the balances remaining in the 

respective trust accounts as of October 7, 2005, because: 

“According to [Code] § 8.01-501, the lien of fieri facias was 

effective on the date it was delivered to the sheriff, which the 

parties agree was October 7, 2005, unless the § 8.01-502 

provision applies.” The circuit court rejected the Firms’ 

argument that they were “person[s] making a payment to the 
6

judgment debtor” under Code § 8.01-502 when they disbursed funds 

from the trust accounts. The circuit court opined that funds 

held in the trust accounts represented payment in advance for 

legal fees not yet incurred and that the balances in the trust 

accounts at any particular time remained Tseng’s property. The 

circuit court found that although the Firms would be obligated 

to refund to Tseng any portion of an advanced legal fee that had 

not been earned when the representation terminated, a “potential 

future obligation” to pay Tseng did not qualify the law firms as 

“person[s] making a payment to the judgment debtor.” 

Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that the lien under the 

writ of fieri facias on the funds in the trust accounts was 

effective on October 7 despite the lack of service of a notice 

of lien on Tseng until a later date. 

Pursuant to its letter opinion, the circuit court entered 

an order denying the Firms’ motions for summary judgment. The 

circuit court ordered that K&C pay to Wu $67,903.24, which 

represented the amount K&C disbursed from its trust account 

between October 7, 2005 and November 14, 2005, the date by which 

service of the K&C garnishment summons was made on both K&C and 

Tseng. The circuit court also ordered that MSK pay to Wu 

$27,661.76, which represented the amount MSK disbursed from its 

trust account between October 7, 2005, and October 24, 2005, the 
7

date by which the MSK garnishment summons had been served on MSK 

and Tseng. We awarded the Firms this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

The issues raised in this appeal solely involve issues of 

law, which we review de novo. Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 

363, 634 S.E.2d 754, 759 (2006); Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 

410, 559 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2002). 

The Firms make six assignments of error to the judgment of 

the circuit court which can be condensed to four arguments: (1) 

The circuit court erred in ruling that the funds in the Firms’ 

trust accounts were property owned by Tseng instead of a 

contract obligation by the Firms to pay Tseng any unearned funds 

upon the termination of representation; (2) The circuit court 

erred in holding the lien of the writ of fieri facias “directly 

reached the trust accounts” instead of the Firms’ contractual 

obligation to Tseng; (3) The circuit court erred in its 

application of Code § 8.01-502 by finding that the Firms were 

not “persons making a payment to the judgment debtor”, and (4) 

the circuit court “erred in holding that the execution lien” of 

the writ of fieri facias under Code § 8.01-501 “was perfected 

and fully effective” as to the Firms upon delivery of the writ 

to the sheriff without “service of the notice of that lien upon 

anyone.” We address each argument in turn. 

A. Tseng’s Interest in the Trust Accounts 
8

The Firms argue that Tseng’s interest in the trust 

accounts, into which he deposited his funds under the retainer 

agreements, was only a bare contract right. They contend Tseng 

had no property right or ownership interest in the trust account 

funds.4

 Instead, the Firms argue that they and “Tseng were in a 

debtor-creditor relationship” essentially in the same capacity 

as a commercial bank and a depositor. The Firms posit they only 

had a “legally enforceable contractual obligation . . . to repay 

Tseng the unearned and unused retainer deposits.” Thus, the 

Firms contend the circuit court’s finding that the funds in the 

trust account “remain the property of the client” is in error. 

Our jurisprudence clearly supports the conclusion reached 

by the circuit court. An attorney who receives funds from a 

client for the future payment of legal fees for services not yet 

rendered holds those funds in trust. The funds are the corpus 

of a trust of which the attorney is the trustee and the client 

the beneficiary. In re Equip. Servs., 290 F.3d 739, 746 (4th 

Cir. 2002) (citing Indian Motocycle Assocs. v. Massachusetts 

Housing Fin. Agency, 66 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (1st Cir. 1995)) 

(“the relationship is a trust arrangement in which the attorney 

holds the retainer for the client” and “the retainer so held, 

 4

 The Firms did not contend the trust status (and Tseng’s 

equitable ownership interest) in the funds in the trust accounts 

ended before the lien of fieri facias attached on October 7, 
9

less any fees charged against it, constitutes the property of 

the client”). Although not a case involving an attorney’s trust 

account, we explained such a general fiduciary relationship, and 

distinguished it from a debtor/creditor relationship, in 

Broaddus v. Gresham, 181 Va. 725, 26 S.E.2d 33 (1943). 

The question frequently arises as to whether the 

relation created is a trust or a debt. With respect 

to this distinction, in Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1, 

section 12.1, p. 86, the author says: “A trust 

involves a duty to deal as fiduciary with some 

specific property for the benefit of another. A debt 

involves a merely personal obligation to make payment 

of a sum of money to another. A creditor as such has 

merely a personal claim against the debtor. He can 

enforce his claim by judicial proceedings to reach the 

debtor’s property and subject it to the satisfaction 

of his claim, but until he does so he has no legal or 

equitable interest in the property of his debtor. *** 

On the other hand, the beneficiary of a trust has an 

equitable interest in the trust property. The 

beneficiary of a trust has something more than a mere 

chose in action, something more than the merely 

personal claim which a creditor has against the 

debtor. He is equitable owner of the trust property. 

If the trustee transfers the trust property to a 

person who is not a bona fide purchaser, or if the 

trustee becomes insolvent, the beneficiary is still 

entitled to the property . . . .” 

Id. at 731-32, 26 S.E.2d at 35-36. 

The Firms were in a fiduciary relationship to Tseng, 

holding his property (the funds he tendered to the Firms) as the 

corpus of a trust of which Tseng was the beneficiary. Nothing 

in either representation agreement evidences any other type of 

 

2005, by virtue of any contractual agreement between the 

parties. 
10

relationship. The Firms were thus under a fiduciary duty to, 

among other things, return the funds in the fiduciary trust 

account to Tseng upon his request. This obligation, fiduciary 

in nature, did not convert the parties’ relationship to that of 

debtor and creditor as to the trust funds although Tseng could 

have sought many of the same remedies as a creditor had the 

Firms failed to discharge their fiduciary duty. We reiterated 

this point in Broaddus: 

The fact that the trustee may be indebted to the 

beneficiary in a fixed and definite amount which is 

due and payable immediately and which may be recovered 

by the beneficiary in an action at law, is not, as 

contended by the appellant, determinative of the 

existing relation. If the trustee is under a duty to 

pay money immediately and unconditionally to the 

beneficiary, the beneficiary can maintain an action at 

law against the trustee to enforce payment. This does 

not mean, however, that a trustee who is under an 

immediate and unconditional duty to pay to the 

beneficiary money held in trust has ceased to be a 

trustee and has become a debtor. 

Id. at 732-33, 26 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting Restatement of 

Torts §§ 198-199) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We specifically applied these principles in the context of 

trust accounts held by an attorney in Virginia State Bar v. 

Goggin, 260 Va. 31, 530 S.E.2d 415 (2000), and plainly held the 

client had an ownership interest as a trust beneficiary, not a 

mere creditor: 

Clients’ funds deposited in an attorney’s trust 

account are funds held in trust. As such, the claim 

of such clients for return of funds is more than 
11

merely a personal claim against the attorney for the 

payment of the sum of money on deposit. The clients 

retain an equitable or beneficial ownership interest 

in the funds. The deposit of one client’s funds in an 

account with funds of other clients does not destroy 

the beneficial interest of the clients in the funds so 

deposited. Thus, the clients are entitled to those 

funds to the extent their equitable ownership 

interests can be traced. 

Goggin, 260 Va. at 33, 530 S.E.2d at 416-17 (citing 

Broaddus, 181 Va. at 731-32, 26 S.E.2d at 35-36); accord

Iowa Supreme Court Bd. Of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. 

Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2003) (Advance payment 

for future services “represent[s] money that still belongs 

to the client after it is paid to an attorney and must be 

deposited in a client trust account.”); In re Lochow, 469 

N.W.2d 91, 98 (Minn. 1991) (“[A]dvance payments for future 

services are client funds until earned. . . . Furthermore, 

attorney fees for payment of services to be performed in 

the future must be placed in a trust account and removed 

only by giving the client notice in writing of the time, 

amount, and purpose of the withdrawal, together with a 

complete accounting thereof.”). 

The Firms’ analogy to a lawyer’s trust account and the 

relationship between a bank and its depositor is untenable. 

While a depositor is only a creditor of the bank as to his 

account in the depository bank, Bennet v. First & Merchants 

Nat’l Bank, 233 Va. 355, 360, 355 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1987) 
12

(citing Bernardini v. Central Nat’l Bank, 223 Va. 519, 521, 290 

S.E.2d 863, 864 (1982)), that contractual indebtedness is 

qualitatively and legally distinct from that of the client whose 

own funds are being held by his attorney. A depositor in a bank 

retains no ownership interest in the funds deposited, but 

becomes a general creditor of the bank. Should the bank become 

insolvent, the depositor is a mere creditor with all others. 

See First Nat’l Bank v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 163 Va. 

162, 169, 175 S.E. 775, 777 (1934) (a depositor “has no claim 

upon the assets of the bank superior to that of the bank’s 

general creditors”). 

Should a lawyer’s client, having tendered funds into the 

lawyer’s trust account, file a petition in bankruptcy, the funds 

in the trust account at the time of filing are assets of the 

client’s bankruptcy estate because of the client’s ownership 

interest. E.g., In re U.S.A. Diversified Prods., Inc., 196 B.R. 

801, 807 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (“[T]he funds in [firm’s] trust 

account became the property of the bankruptcy estate upon the 

filing of the petition.”); see also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 

329.04[1][e] & n.22 (Lawrence P. King et al., eds. 15th ed. 

2007) (supplying cases). Conversely, if the attorney holding a 

client’s funds files a petition in bankruptcy, the client’s 

funds in the trust account are not part of the attorney’s estate 

in bankruptcy. Those funds remain the separate property of the 
13

client because it is the client who has equitable ownership, not 

the attorney. 

We hold that Tseng had an equitable ownership of the funds 

held by the Firms in trust and was not simply a contractual 

creditor of the Firms as they contend. The circuit court thus 

did not err in its holding that the trust account funds were 

Tseng’s property. 

B. Scope of the Garnishment Summons 

Garnishment is the process by which a judgment creditor may 

enforce the lien of his writ of fieri facias against any debt or 

property due his judgment debtor that is held by a third party, 

the garnishee. Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va. 516, 520, 84 S.E.2d 

419, 421 (1954); Code § 8.01-511. The creditor can assert no 

greater rights against the garnishee than the judgment debtor, 

himself, possesses. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro 

International, Inc., 259 Va. 759, 768, 529 S.E.2d 80, 85 (2000). 

“A garnishment summons does not create a lien itself, but, 

instead, is ‘a means of enforcing the lien of an execution 

placed in the hands of an officer to be levied.’ ” Id. at 768-

69, 529 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting Knight v. The Peoples Nat’l Bank 

of Lynchburg, 182 Va. 380, 392, 29 S.E.2d 364, 370 (1944)). 

Under Virginia law, a garnishment proceeding is a 

separate proceeding in which the judgment creditor 

enforces the "lien of his execution" against property 

or contractual rights of the judgment debtor which are 

in the hands of a third person, the garnishee. The 
14

summons issued in a garnishment proceeding "warns" the 

garnishee not to pay the judgment debtor’s money to 

the judgment debtor, with the sanction that if the 

garnishee were to do so, it would become personally 

liable for the amount paid. 

United States ex rel. Global Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Harkins 

Builders, Inc., 45 F.3d 830, 833 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Lynch, 

196 Va. at 520, 84 S.E.2d at 421) (internal citations omitted). 

The Firms contend the circuit court erred by permitting 

Wu’s garnishment to, in effect, reach the respective trust 

accounts for any amounts disbursed after the writ of fieri 

facias was issued to the sheriff and served upon them, but 

before there was service upon Tseng. In part, the Firms argue 

their position is correct because a garnishment could only reach 

their contractual indebtedness to Tseng and they held no 

property Tseng owned. We have just rejected that argument 

because Tseng had equitable ownership of the funds deposited in 

the trust accounts and possessed more than a mere contract 

right. 

The Firms also appear to argue that a garnishment can only 

reach a debt the garnishee owes a judgment debtor, but no other 

property interest of that judgment debtor that the garnishee may 

hold. The Firms misapprehend the law of garnishment. 

 Our precedent reflects that a garnishment reaches any 

intangible property interest of a debtor and that property 

interest is not constricted to a narrow category of a debtor-
15

creditor obligation. We succinctly explained the scope of 

garnishment in Lynch. 

If it appear upon proof or upon confession of the 

garnishee that he owes the judgment debtor any debt or 

property, the court “may give judgment against him 

. . . .” The court cannot, [however], enter any order 

or judgment against the garnishee unless he is found 

either to be indebted to the judgment debtor, or to 

have possession of property of such debtor for which 

debt or property the judgment debtor himself could 

maintain an action at law. 

196 Va. at 520, 84 S.E.2d at 422 (citing Levine’s Loan Office, 

Inc. v. Starke, 140 Va. 712, 125 S.E. 683 (1924); Freitas v. 

Griffith, 112 Va. 343, 71 S.E. 531 (1911)) (emphasis added). 

Thus, it is the debtor’s intangible property interest that 

the garnishee may hold, not just an indebtedness from the 

garnishee, that is properly subject to garnishment. Network 

Solutions, Inc., 259 Va. at 768, 529 S.E.2d at 85. The Firms, 

as garnishees, held the intangible equitable property interest 

of Tseng in their trust accounts and were under a fiduciary duty 

not only to hold that interest but return the property to Tseng 

when the trust obligation ends. As such, Tseng’s property 

interest in the trust accounts could be attached in garnishment 

by Wu as “the judgment creditor [who] enforces the ‘lien of his 

execution’ against property . . . of the judgment debtor [Tseng] 

in the hands of a third person, the garnishee,” the Firms. 
16

Harkins Builders, 45 F.3d at 833 (quoting Lynch, 196 Va. at 520, 

84 S.E.2d at 421).5

C. Person Making a Payment to the Judgment Debtor 

 The Firms contend that even if their prior arguments are 

incorrect, and Wu’s garnishment summons can reach the trust 

account interests owned by Tseng, the circuit court nonetheless 

erred because the requirements of Code § 8.01-502 were not met. 

The Firms argue this is so because they were persons “making a 

payment to the judgment debtor” within the meaning of Code 

§ 8.01-502 and thus entitled to require strict compliance with 

the statute’s requirements, including service of the notice of 

lien upon Tseng, before the lien of the writ of fieri facias was 

effective. 

 We have not previously considered who is “a person making a 

payment to the judgment debtor” under Code § 8.01-502. However, 

if a party falls within that category, the Firms are correct 

that no liability under the writ of fieri facias attaches as to 

them until the notice requirements of the statute have been met. 

“Garnishment, like other lien enforcement remedies authorizing 

 5

 The Firms cite Code § 8.01-512.3 on brief as being 

inconsistent with the circuit court’s judgment by virtue of 

language in the statutory form that the garnishee withhold funds 

from “the date of service of this summons on you.” This 

argument was not made in the circuit court and will not be 

considered under Rule 5:25. Further, other than citing the 

statute, the Firms do not make any further analysis in their 
17

seizure of property, is a creature of statute unknown to the 

common law, and hence the provisions of the statute must be 

strictly satisfied.” Network Solutions, Inc., 259 Va. at 768, 

529 S.E.2d at 85 (citing Long v. Ryan, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 718, 

724 (1878); Mantz v. Hendley, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 308, 315 

(1808)). 

 If Tseng were a plumber and provided plumbing services to 

the Firms, then their payment to Tseng for those services would 

clearly be a Code § 8.01-502 “payment to the judgment debtor.” 

In that case, the lien of fieri facias would not cause a 

liability on the part of the Firms for making the plumbing 

payment to Tseng until he had been properly served with notice 

of the lien. However, the Firms’ claim of a statutory payment 

in this case is far more attenuated, if not illusory, than the 

foregoing example. 

 Without citation to any authority, the Firms contend that 

they made a “constructive payment” to Tseng each time the Firms 

withdrew money from the trust accounts to pay their legal fees 

and costs.6

 Based on their view that any obligation on their 

part to Tseng was purely a contractual indebtedness to him, the 

Firms argue that each time they paid themselves from the trust 

 

brief and as such, the argument would also be waived under Rule 

5:17(c)(4). 

6

 The record is silent as to whether Tseng consented to or 

knew about any particular withdrawals. 
18

accounts they were “simultaneously discharging their own 

obligation to pay Tseng the identical sum from the retainer 

deposits.” 

 This legal fiction was the basis for the Code § 8.01-502 

defense the Firms argued to the circuit court. 

In effect, what has happened, Your Honor, is the law 

firms did the work, the obligation to pay us was 

incurred. Rather than give the money back to Mr. 

Tseng so that he could then pay us, what happened was 

in the nature of a setoff, and that is a payment. 

[O]ur obligation to Mr. Tseng for what he deposited 

with us was reduced pro tanto by the amount that he 

was obligated to pay us for our services, or reimburse 

us for the expenses we had incurred in the course of 

that representation . . . . And by discharging the 

obligation that we had to Mr. Tseng, we made a payment 

to him. 

We disagree with the Firms. 

 There is no hint in Code § 8.01-502 that any artifice or 

legal fiction is contemplated by the plain language of the 

statute. The words of the statute mean what they say and we may 

not read into a statute a meaning contrary to its clear 

language. Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 74, 155 S.E.2d 351, 356 

(1967) (when construing “simple, clear and unambiguous language 

. . . we read it to mean what it says.”); Chase v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547-48, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 

(2003) (“[T]he intention of the legislature . . . must be 

gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction 

would involve a manifest absurdity.”). The service requirements 
19

of Code § 8.01-502 apply only where the garnishee actually makes 

a payment to the judgment debtor. 

 Simply put, the Firms never made a payment to Tseng; they 

paid themselves. When the Firms withdrew Tseng’s property from 

the trust accounts, they made no payment to Tseng, Wu’s judgment 

debtor. Instead, the Firms put Tseng’s money into their pockets 

or the pockets of their nominees, but never Tseng. 

Consequently, the Firms are not “person[s] making a payment to 

the judgment debtor” within the intendment of Code § 8.01-502 

and the notice requirements of that statute cannot be claimed by 

them. Therefore, the failure to make service upon Tseng under 

that statute has no effect on the Firms’ liability to Wu under 

the garnishments. 

D. Effective date of the Fieri Facias Lien 

 The Firms’ final assignment of error is that the circuit 

court erred in holding the Code § 8.01-501 lien could attach to 

the funds in the trust accounts “without regard to service of 

the notice of lien upon anyone.” The circuit court actually 

ruled in its opinion letter that: “According to Code § 8.01-

501, the lien of fieri facias was effective on the date it was 

delivered to the sheriff, which the parties agree was October 7, 

2005.” The court then cited the statute, which provides: 

“Every writ of fieri facias shall . . . be a lien from the time 

it is delivered to a sheriff . . . on all the personal estate of 
20

or to which the judgment debtor is . . . possessed or entitled.” 

Code § 8.01-501 (emphasis added). The Firms’ only argument to 

the circuit court was that the lien was not effective as to them 

because of the failure to serve the notice of lien under Code 

§ 8.01-502. Otherwise, the Firms conceded the effective 

attachment of the fieri facias lien before the circuit court. 

[A]lthough the lien became effective – was created I 

guess is a better way to put it, statewide territorial 

lien on intangible property was created when that writ 

of execution was placed in the hands of the Virginia 

Beach sheriff on October 7th, it was not binding upon, 

it was not effective against the two law firms until 

all the procedures set forth in [Code §] 8.01-502 were 

met. 

 Having failed in their argument under Code § 8.01-502, as 

just addressed above, the Firms made no other argument in the 

circuit court that related to any notice defect in the 

garnishment.7

 Moreover, the Firms’ argument that there was no 

service of notice of the fieri facias lien is contrary to the 

law of this case. As noted previously, the circuit court found 

as a fact that the Firms had been served on October 7, 2005, the 

same date the fieri facias writ was delivered to the sheriff and 

the Firms assigned no error to that finding. Whether failure to 

have made service on the Firms upon the day of the delivery of 

 7

 No issue was raised below regarding any other defect in 

the notice of the lien of fieri facias, such as a claim of lack 

of due process, or that the Firms had a lien interest of their 

own under Code § 54.1-3932 or otherwise. 
21

the writ to the sheriff would have affected the lien under Code 

§ 8.01-501 is not an issue before the court in this case. 

 Accordingly, as the provisions of Code § 8.01-502 did not 

apply to the Firms, the circuit court did not err in finding the 

lien of the writ of fieri facias became effective against the 

Firms as of October 7, 2005. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 

judgment of the circuit court. 

Affirmed.