NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0663n.06 F iled: Septem ber 6, 2007 Case No. 05- 2522 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. LA WREN CE SAL ES, als o kno wn as L awr e nc e Sal e s II I, also kn own as P ee We e, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEF ORE: G UY , BA TC HELD ER , a nd G ILM AN , C ir c uitJudg e s. ALICE M . BATCHEL DER, Circ uit Jud ge. De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt L awr e nc e Sa le s, a lso kn o wn as “P ee Wee ,” appe als his conviction relating to fire arms possession. Additionally , he appea ls the district court’s dete rmination that (1) proba ble ca use supported the sear ch wa rra nt issued fo r S a le s’ s r e sid e nc e , ( 2) the Go ve rnme nt did no t ne e d to re ve a l th e c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant u se d in this case a

nd (3) any prosec utorial misconduct did not trigg er a mistrial. Bec ause w e conc lude that sufficie nt evidence supports Sales’s conviction and that the di strict court did not err in its di sposition of Sales’s motions, we a ffirm the c onviction. We r emand, howeve r, with instructions to the district court to merg e Sales’s c onvictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). I. BACKG ROUND On J uly 9, 2003, a conf

idential informant (CI ) advised Romulus, Michig an, police of fice rs2

that he/she purchase d marijuana on J uly 7, 2003, from Sales. The CIpurcha sed the drug s at Sales’s

re sid e nc e in Romu lus , Mic hig an, and wh ile a t th e re sid e nc e , o bs e rv e d tw o s e mi- a uto matic a ssa

ult

wea pons and appr ox imately

10 other ha

ndg uns and long g uns. Also on J uly 9, the Romulus P olice Depa rtment direc ted the CIto contact Sales an d p u rc h as e m arijuana from him. The CI

then participated i n a co n t rol led buy and purc hased ma

rijuana f rom Sales, using Romulus P olice D e p art m e n tm o n e y. On J uly 10, 2003, Romulus P olice De part m ent officers a nd two Alcohol, Tobac co and Fire arms (“ ATF ”) a g ents executed a state sea rch w arr ant at Sales’s r esidenc e. Id. I n the upstairs northea st bedroom, offic ers located a disasse mbled .25 caliber firea rm, with a loade d mag azine, two banana clips containing assault rifle rounds, a varie ty of additional ammunition, a small razor blade,

and c oin -s ize d ziplo c k ba g g ie s. I n the same ro om, of fi c e rs fo un d a lar g e dig ita l sca le and $1 70 in cash. Downstairs, in a cabine t in the dining room, office rs found a loaded Smit h & Wesson .357 mag num revolver , sever al ty pes of a mmuniti on, including e ight .12 g aug e shotg un rounds, a c lear plastic bag of sus pecte d marijuana , two digital scales, ny lon gun holster s, a ce ll phone, and wa lkietalkies. Id. I n th e kit c he n a re a , o ff ic e rs fo un d a

n un loa de d .1 2 g a

ug e sh otgun

pr op pe d a g a ins t a

wa ll be hin d a do or ne xt to a sta ir we ll that le d ups ta ir s. Al so in the kit c he n, of fi c e rs fo un d a

bla c k p la sti c bagcontainingtwo banana clips, fully loaded with rifle rounds, and r ece ipts in S ales’s na me. In the ref rig erator, hidden in a c harc oal bag , police found a one g allon zipl ock bag containingsix smaller individual bag s of marijuana

. Id. The c abinet whe re office rs found the l oaded .357, the s mall digital scales, and a portion of the marijuana

was a bout fifteen f

eet a way from the refr ige rator containing the re st of the marijuana

.3

Additionally , police photog raphs of the kitchen a

rea indicated that the shotgun a nd plastic bag containingammunition were f airly close to the re frig erator. Id. The off icer s arr ested Sales a

nd transporte d him to the Rom ulus police station where office rs

re a d h im h is Miranda rig hts. Sales waived these rig hts and admitted that he owned the fire arms and the marijuana

found at his re sidence . Sales furthe r told the officers that he had sold marijuana out of his ho us e , that he ha d be e n sel lin g sin c e he wa s thir te e n y e ars old , an d that he ha d ma de a sa le to his brother only

two day s prior to his arr est. Sales also stated that he unde rstood it was illeg al for him to have the fire arms, but he ne verthe less had them for “home pr otection.” On J anuar y 5, 2005, in the First Superse ding I ndictment, the fe dera l gr and jury indicted Sales on six counts relating to possession of firearms and narc otics. Counts One, Two, and Thr ee c harg ed Sales with being a fe lon in possession of a firea rm, in violation of 18 U .S.C. § 922(g) (1) — the .357 caliber revolve r, the .12 g aug e shotg un, and the .25 caliber semi-automatic pist ol. I n Count Four, the g ra nd jur y c ha rg e d Sale s w ithpo sse ssi on of a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e wi th i nte nt t o d ist

ri bute , in vio latio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § 84 1( a )( 1) . Co un t F ive c ha rg e d Sa le s w ithpo sse ssi on of a fi re arm in fu rt he ra nc e of a dr ugtr a ff ic kin g c ri me , in

vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4( c )( 1) (A ), and Count S ix char g ed Sales with being a fe lon in possession of ammuniti on, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)( 1). On J une 9, 2005, a jur

y found Sales guilty

on all counts

. On Oc t o b er 1 8, 2005, Sales

rec eived a

sentenc e of 24 months’ imprisonment for Counts One through Four and Six to run

c on c ur re ntl y , a nd a c on secut ive mand a tor

y 60 -m on th s e nte nc e fo r C ount F ive . Sa le s ti me ly appea led. II. AN AL YSI S A. Se ar c h Wa r r ant4

Pr ior to t ri a l, S a le s mo ve d to su

ppres s the e vid e nc e se ize d w he n th e of fi c e rs se arc he d h is ho me , a rguin g tha

t no pr ob a ble c a us e su pp or te d the se arc h warr ant b e c a us e the un de rl yinga ff

ida vit l a c k e d i n d i c i a o f t h e v e r a c i t y

an d r e l i a b i l i t y o f th e C I. We r eview “‘a district c ourt’s fac tual finding s reg arding motions to suppress for clea r er ror

and its le g a l c on c lus ion s d

e n ovo . ’” United States v. Carter , 378 F.3d 584, 587 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). When the district court de nies the motion, we consider the evidenc e “‘in the light most favora

ble to the g overnme nt.’” Id. (q u o t i n g United St ates v. W ellman , 185 F.3d 651, 654- 55 (6th Cir. 1999)). The F ourth Amendment g uara ntees that “no wa

rra nts shall issue, but upon probable ca use, supported by

Oath or a ffirmation . . . .” U.S. C O N ST . amend. IV. “Probable cause arises if there a re ‘re asonable g rou n d s for be lief, supported by less than prima fa cie pr oof but more than me re suspicion.’” United States v. Coffee , 4 3 4 F. 3 d 8 8 7 , 8 9 2 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Be nn e tt , 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990) ). “[I ]n orde r for a judicial office r to issue a war rant, law enfor ceme nt officia ls must prese nt evidenc e from which the magistrate judg e ca n conclude from the totality o f th e c ir c u ms ta

n c e s , ‘ in c lu d in g th e “ v e r a c it y ” an d “ b a s is ” o f

kn o w le d g e o f

p e r s o ns

su pp lyinghe ars ay

inf or matio n, [that] th e re is a

fa ir pr ob a bil ity that c on tr a

ba nd or e vid e nc e of

a c ri me will be found in a

particula r plac e.’” United States v. W illiams , 224 F.3d 530, 532 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (q u o t i n g Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). A “[r]eview of the suf

ficienc y of the e vidence support ing pr obable c ause is limited to the information pre sented in the four corne rs of t h e af

fi d av i t
. ” Coffee , 4 34 F .3 d at 89 2. “ Whil e independe nt corr oboration of a confidential informant’s story is not a sine qua non to a finding of probable cause i n t h e ab s en ce of any indicia of the infor

mant’s re liability , courts insist that the5

aff idavit c ontain substantial independent police corr oboration.” United States v. Frazier , 423 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2005) (interna l citation omitt ed). So long as the issuin g j u d ge “c an conclude independe ntly

that the informant is re liable, an a ffidavit base d on t h e i nformant’ s tip will support a findingof proba

ble ca use.” Coffee , 434 F.3d at 893 (citation omitted). I n Coffee , a ca se fac tually simil ar to the prese nt case , we uphe ld the district court’s finding of proba ble ca use. Id. at 895. We aff

irmed the district cour

t’s conclusion “that, although the re w ere no statements in the af

fidavit about the reliability of the CI , Offic er Adams’[s] statements that he set up the c on tr oll e d b uy

and too k n e c e ssa

ry pr e c a uti on s b e fo re and

a ft e r t he or c he str a te d p ur c ha se adequately

corr oborate d the CI ’s information and, thus, provided suff icient proba

ble ca use for the issuance of the sear ch war rant.” Id. a t 89 4; see also United States v . Jack son , 470 F .3 d 299 , 3 08 (6 th Cir . 200 6) (O ff

ic e r’ s “ c or

ro bo ratio n o f e ve nts that oc c ur re d d ur ingthe c on tr oll e d b uy , a s se t f or th in the aff idavit, provide suffic ient probable cause to sustain issuance of the sear ch wa rra nt.”) Whil e Of fice r St. Andre’ s aff

idavit contains no fac ts supporting the CI ’s re liability , it does contain indepe ndent cor

roboration of th e C I ’s information. Off icer St. Andre saw the CIenter Sa le s’ s h ome a ft e r Sal e s invi te d the CI ov e r to p ur c ha se mari jua na . T he CI

we nt i nto Sa le s’ s h ome with Romul us p o l i ce d ep artment money and ca me out with a small bagof mater ial, which later tested positive for mar ijuana. See F razier , 423 F.3d at 532 (“The re must be ‘ a nexus betwee n the place to be sea

rche d and the e vidence to be soug ht.’”) ( citation omitted). The off icer s sear ched the CIand her

/his v eh i cl e fo r d rug s befor e and a fter the buy . Under Coffee and Jack son , O ff ic e r S t. Andre ’s cor

roboration of the CI ’s controlled buy provided sufficie nt pr obable c ause f or the issuanc e of the se arc h w arr ant. B. CI’s Identity6

Sa le s a lso so ug ht d isc los ur e of the CI ’s ide nti ty , a

rguin g that th e CI

pla y e d a n ac tiv e ro le in the cr iminal activity . Ba sed upon the prose cutor’s r epre sentations to the cour t that he did not intend to u s e an y

t h i n g that happene d betwee n the CIand Sales at trial, the district court denie d Sales’s

m o t i o nt o d i s c l o s e t h e C I’ s i d e n t i t y. We reviewa district cour t’s decision to deny

a motion t o disclose the identity of a confide ntial inf

ormant for a

buse of discr etion. Un ite d S tates v . M oo re , 954 F.2d 379, 381 ( 6th Cir. 1992). “Adistrict court abuse s its dis cre tion when it applies the incor rec t leg al standar d, misapplies the correc t leg al standar d, or re lies upon clea rly err oneous finding s of fa ct.” United States v. Pugh , 405 F.3d 390, 397 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (citation and inter nal punctuation omitted). The gove rnment has the privi leg e “to withhold from dis closure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to office rs cha rg ed with enf

orce ment of that law.” Ro v iaro v. United States , 3 53 U. S. 5 3, 59 (1 95 7) . H ow e ve r, to i nv ok e thi s p ri vil e g e “ the pu bli c int e re st i n protec ting the f

low of information t o t h e go v ernment” must outweigh “ the def endant’ s need f

or disclosure of inf

ormation in the prepa

ration of a

d ef ense.” United States v. Straughter , 950 F.2d 1223, 1232 (6th Cir. 1991). Sales must “show how disclosure of the informant would substantively assist his defense”

or “that disclosure is e ssential to a fa ir trial.” Mo or e , 954 F .2 d at 381

. Whe re the de fe nd ant’ s c la ims

are based on “ mere conjec ture or supposition about the possible rele vancy of the infor

mant’s testimony ,” suc h cl ai m s ar e insuffic ient to warr ant disclosure. Un ite d S tates v . S ha rp , 778 F.2d 1182, 1187 (6th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). We usua lly deny disclosure whe n the informer was not a par ticipant, and instead “ was a mere tipster or introduce r.” Id. at 1186 n.2. Sales argues di sclosure is essential here because the “CI would have e x plained def iciencie s7

in t imi ngtr ans a c tio ns and the times of eve nts that w e re a lle g e d in the a ff ida vit .” Sa le s’ s o nly

s u p p o rt f o r th is c o n te n ti o n was that he co uld have a possible alibi beca use he “ was not at the residenc e for the majority of the day and night in que stion.” Sales’s ar g ument fails under Sh ar p and Mo or e beca

use he only

speculates as to what disclosure might do; he ha s not established that dis c los ur e wo uld

have su bs tanti ve ly

a ssi ste d h is d e fe ns e or

th at di scl osur e wa s e sse nti a l to a fa ir tr ial

. Furt he r, the CI

in t his c a se wa s me re ly

a tip ste r, and

no t “ an a c tiv e pa

rt ic ipa nt i n th e e ve nts underlying the defe ndant’s potential liability .” Sh ar p , 778 F.2d at 1186 n.2. Sales was not cha rg ed for the e vents occur

ring during the controlled pur chase made by the CI , but rather

for the posse ssion of the drug s and fire arms the police located dur ing the sear ch of Sale s’s reside nce. Sales also ar g ues that the prosec utor place d the CI ’s “c laims” “be fore the jury without giving Sales a c hance to confront his ac cuser ,” in violation of the Six th Am en d m en t’s Confrontation Cla us e ; see U.S. CONST. amend VI . At trial, Off icer St. Andre testified c oncer ning the procur ement of the sea rch w arr ant for Sa les’s re sidence . Sales relies, in va in, on United States v. Cromer, 389 F. 3 d 6 6 2 (6th Cir. 2004). In Cromer , w e f o un d n o v io lati o no f

th e Si xth

A me n dment’s Confrontation Clause whe re the events or te stimony in que stion “ did not even put be fore the jury any statements made by

the CI .” Cromer, 389 F.3d at 676. Even if the of fice r’s testimony

reve aled the CI ’s statements to the jury , the “conf rontation rig ht w as not implicated bec ause the testimony was provided merely by

way of bac kg round.” Id. I n short, the “Confr ontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other

than establishing the t ruth of t he matter asser ted.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)). He re , a s Sa le s a dmi ts, “ the c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant d id n ot t e sti fy no r w e re [he r/

his ] statements expressly

used in the trial of Sale s.” Unde r Cromer , there was no v iolation of Sales’s8

Sixth A men dm ent r ig ht t o c on fr on t hi s a c c us e rs . T he dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in d e n yi n g S a l e s ’ s m o t i o nt o d i s c l o s e t h e C I’ s i d e n t i t y. C. Suf fi ciency of the Evidence 1. P os se ssi on o f a F ir e ar m in F ur th e r anc e of a D r ug Tr affic king Offen se Following his conviction, S ales moved for J udg ment of Ac quittal, pursuant to Fede ral Rules of C riminal Procedur al Rule 29(c), as to the charg es of possessing a f irea rm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking offe nse, see 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 4 (c ), an d p ossession of drug s with intent to di stribute. On appea l, Sales argues that insufficie nt evidence supported his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c ),

and the dis tr ic t c ourt

the re fo re e rr e d b y

de nyinghis mot ion

to a c qu it. “De cisions denying a

motio n fo r judgme nt of ac quittal are r eviewe d de novo to determine the suffic iency

of the e vidence .” United States v. Hartsel , 199 F.3d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 1999). Where defe ndants cha lleng e the suff iciency of the e vidence in a cr iminal trial, we inquire “‘whether , afte r viewing the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the prosec ution, any ra tio na l trie r of

fa c t c ou ld have f ound the essential e lements of the crime bey ond any rea sonable doubt.’” Un ite d S tates v . H ill , 142 F.3d 305, 311 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (quoting J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979))

. A person who, “ d

u r in g an d in r e lati o nto an y

. . . dr u g tr a f f ic k in g c r im e . . . f

o r w h ic hthe person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,” possesses a firea rm in further ance of that crime is guilty

of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) . Mere possession of a fir ear m on the premises wher e drugtransac tions take place will not by itself sustain a conviction under § 924(c)

. See U

nited States v. Mac key

, 265 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2001)

. “In order for the possession to be in furthe ranc e of a dr ug crime, the firea

rm must be strateg ically

located so that it is quickly and ea sily

available for use.” Un ite d S

tates v . S waf for d , 385 F.3d 1026, 1028 ( 6th. Cir. 2004) (quotingMack ey, 265 F.3d9

at 462). When a def

endant ha s a loade d firearm and plac es it in a strateg ic location whe re he can easily acc ess it to pr otect his drug s and drugbusiness, he possesses a firea rm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking offe nse. See , e.g. , Mack ey, 26 5 F.3d at 462-63 (whe re a n illega lly

possessed, loade d, short-bar rele d shotgun in the livi ng room of the c rac k house wa s easily acc essible to the def

endant and located near the scale s and razor blades, “a rea sonable jury could infer

that the purpose of

the firea rm was to p ro v i d e defe nse or de terre nce in f urthera nce of the drugtraff

icking for whic h defe ndant was arr ested” ), and Swa ffo rd , 385 F.3d at 1028 (“while the drug s were not found in the

same room a s the g un, t h e g ara g e whe re the y wer e found w as ea sily

acc essible from the be droom wh e re Swa ff

or d a nd the g un we re fo un d” ); see also United St ates v. Me ndizabal , 214 F. App’ x 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2006) (loade d firea rm locate d in a safe along side coc ai n e wa s positioned to provide protec tion for the coc aine)

. He re , t h e p o l i c e l o c a t e d a l o a d e d

. 3 5 7 m a g nu m i n a c a b i n e t t h a t a l s o c o n t a i n e d

tw o s ma ll digital scales, seve ral small plastic bag s filled with marijuana, se vera l gun holster s, and wa lkietalk ie s . T h e . 3 5 7 w a s a

p p r o xim a te ly 1 5 f

e e t f r o m th e b a g o f ma

r ij u an a th e o f

f ic e r s f o und in the ref rig erator in the ki tchen. The .12 g aug e shot g un, albeit unl oaded, w as in the kitchen ne ar a bagof ri fl e ammunit ion

and the re fr ig e rator c on ta ini ng mari jua na . On the se fa c ts, a

re a so na ble jur or c ou ld conclude , beyond a re asonable doubt, that Sales possessed these w eapons “ in further ance ” of a drug traff icking crime. 2. F elon in Possession of a F irear m Sales also alleg es i nsufficie nt evidenc e ex isted to convict him of beinga fe lon in possession of a f irea rm, specific ally the .25 caliber handgun, beca

use the gun was disassembled ( Count Three)

.10

Th e Go ve rnme nt c on te nd s th a t we ne e d n ot a dd re ss t his iss ue , a

nd sh ou ld i ns te a d r e mand

thi s c a se to the district court for the l imited purpose of merg ing the convictions and sente nces on Counts One, Two, Thre e, and Six, which relate to Sales’ s possession of firea rms and ammunition. The Gover

nment relies on Un ite d S

tates v . Th ro ne bu rg , 921 F.2d 654, 657 ( 6th Cir. 1990), wh ic h h e ld t

hat se pa rate ammunit ion

and g un c ounts are a

pp ro pr iate a t tria l, “a lth ou g h th e y wo uld merg e for purposes of se ntencing .” Unde r Thr on e bu rg , “while the g overnme nt ma y proce ed to trial on multipl e counts unde r § 922(g ) of possession of a fire arm a nd possession of ammunition, if the jury convicts on more tha

n one count, the c ounts are me rg ed” into a single conviction for the purposes of se ntencing

. United States v. Love , 19 97 U. S. Ap p. L EX I S 27 92 8, a t *1 8 (6 th Cir . O c t. 6, 1997). The Government conte nds that a newsentenc ing he aringwould not be re quired since Sales alre ady r e c e iv e d c o n c u r r e n t 2 4

- mo n th

s e n te n c e s o nth e s e f

o u r c o u n ts
. Wh e th e r

o r n o t s u f f ic ient

e vid e nc e su

pp or ts t he c on vic tio n a s to the .2 5 c a lib e r h and g un is i mmate ri a l si nc e the jur y a lso convicted Sale s of possessing the two other f irea rms, and Sales does not cha lleng e the suff iciency of the e vid e nc e a s to tho se fi re arm s. I n a ny e ve nt, up on

me rg ingthe § 9 22 (g ) c ounts , Sa le s w ou ld have on ly on e fe lon in p os se ssi on

c on vic tio n and se rv e on ly on e se nte nc e . We a g re e that th e c a se should be rema

nded so that the district cour t can e ffe ct such a

merg er. D. Mot ion f

or m istrial We r eview for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for mistrial. United States v. Y ang , 281 F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2002)

. We must first “determine whether a prose cutor’s r emar

ks were improper, a

nd then we de termine whe ther the impropr iety amounts t o reversible er ror.” United Sta te s v . Ca rro ll , 2 6 F .3 d 1 38 0, 13 85 (6 th C ir . 1 99 4) . “ Th e re are tw o ty pe s o f r e ve rs ibl e e rr or

in t his11

are a: improper r emar

ks that are flag rant amount to per se reve rsible error; i mproper remar ks that are not flag rant may

amount to reve rsible error in cer tain circ umstances.” United States v. Hargrov e , 416 F.3d 486, 493 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I n deter mining whe ther im p ro p er rema rks wer e fla g rant we consider f our fa ctors: “‘ (1) whether the re marks tende d to mislea d the jury or to pr ejudice the acc used; (2) whether they wer e isolated or extensive; (3) whe ther they wer e deliber ately

or ac cidentally

place d befor e the jury ; and (4) the stre ng th of the evide nce a g ainst the ac cused.’ ” Id. (c i t i n g Car oll , 26 F.3d at 1385). Howe ver,

even wh er e re m ar ks are not flag rant, the r emar ks may war rant re versa l where (1) the pr oof of defe ndant’s guilt was not overwhe lming, (2) defe nse objec ted to the conduc t, and (3) the district court fa iled to give a cur ative instruction. See H argrove , 416 F.3d at 493. On appe al, Sales cites two instance s of improper c omments made by the prosec utor, which he cla ims render ed his trial unfa ir. First, prior to trial Sales ag ree d to stipulate to his felon status (on the fe lon in possession c harg es), and the parties a g ree d that the g overnme nt could not introduce a ny evidenc e of

Sa le s ’ s p r e d ic a te f

e lo n ie s . I nth e p r o s e c u to r ’ s o p e n in g s tate me n t, h o w e v e r , h e s a id, “[Sales] has a .25 c aliber pistol afte r he w as arr ested for narc otics in 1991 or 1992.” Sales’s c ounsel immediately re q u es t ed a side bar a nd soug ht an immediate mistrial based on the prosec utor’s mention of the 1991 nar cotics ar rest. The district court cha stised the prosec utor for e ven mentioning any thing relating to Sale s’s predic ate f elonies, issued a c urative instruc tion to the jury , and denie d Sales’s motion for a mistrial. F ollowing his c onviction, Sale s rene wed his motion for a mistrial, and

a lte rn a tiv e ly

so ug ht a ne w tr ia l un de r F e de ra l Rul e s of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure Rul e 33 (a ), on the ba sisW i t h r es pec t t o t h i s c ommen t , Sa l es a r g u es t h at t h e pr os ec u t or v i ol at ed O l d C hi ef v. Uni t ed St at es , 519 1 U

. S. 17 2 (19 9 7 ). U nd er O l d C hi ef , i t i s unfairl y pre jud i cial f o r p ro sec uto rs t o i ntro d uc e e vid en ce o n a p rev i o us felo n y o ff

e n se w h e re d e fen d a n t o ff e re d to stip u la te to his fe lo n sta tus
. I d. at 1 7 4

. S ales cit es M yers v. Uni t ed St at es , 1 9 8 F.3d 61 5 , 61 8 (6t h C i r. 19 9 9 ), f o r t he p rop o si t i o n t hat , unde r O l d C hi ef , a di s t r i ct c ou r t a bu s es i t s di s cr et i on “when i t rej ect s a d ef

end ant ’ s o f

f er t o s t i p ul at e t o t he si m p l e exi st ence o f pri o r f el o ny co nvi ct i o ns. ” H o wever, nei t her O ld C h ie

f no r M ye rs a p p lies to the c a se a t ha n d . T h e p ro se c u to r n e v e r in tro d u c e d e v id e n c e o f S a le s’s p re d ic a te felo n ie s, no r d id the c o u rt re je c t S a le s’s o ff e r to stip u la te to his p rio r fe lo n y c o n v ic tio n s. T h is a rg u m e n t i s w itho u t m e rit. 12 of the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nt. 1 The sec ond instance is the pr osecutor’ s statement i n closing argument that “whe n Iattempted to ge t those notes befor e you he wouldn’t let me, he objected.” I n his case -in-chie f, the prose cutor ha d r e pe a te dly

so ug ht t o in

t r o d u c e the inv e sti g a tin g of

fi c e rs ’ n ote s f

ro m th e ir int e rr og a tio ns of

Sa le s, but the district court denie d ev ery attempt. When the prosec utor made this comment, Sales’s attorn ey immediately

objected. T he district cour t sustained the objection and r esponded to the prosec utor, “I

wouldn’t let y ou. I t had nothi ng to do with [S ales’s tria l counsel].” Sales did not seek a mistrial based on this comment, nor did he rai s e i t i n h i s post-trial motion for a mistrial or new tr ia l. Both stateme nts were improper, but we conclude that the s tatements were not flag rant, a nd there fore do not amount “to per se reve rsible er ror.” Hargrove , 416 F.3d at 493. The prose cutor’s

c omm e nts did

no t li ke ly mis le a d th e jur

y , th ou g h th e y

may have be e n s ome wh a t pr e

jud ic ia l to Sa le s. The c omments w ere isolated and made in the context of attorney statements, which the district court cautioned the jury

did not constitut e evidence. The prose cutor a ccide ntally place d the first statement be fo re the jur

y (h e wa s r e a din g fr om a

do cum ent an d n ot p ayinga s mu c h atte nti on a s h e sh ou ld have) ; in contrast, he c erta inly pl ace d the sec ond statement intentionally befor e the jury . The

e vid e nc e , ho we ve r, wa s ov e rwhe lmi ng : Th e se arc h of Sa le s’ s r e sid e nc e pr od

uc e d a larg e qu anti ty

o f m ar i j u an a , m a t e r i a l s u s e d f

o r m e a s u r i n g an d p a c k a g i n g t h e m ar i j u an a , an d

m u l t i p l e f

i r e ar m s . In13

addition, Sales admitted that he owned the m arijuana and the firea rms, and further stated that he wa s

c ur re ntl y a dr ugde a le r, and

ha d b e e n o ne fo r a

numbe r o f ye ars . F ina lly , we br ie fl y c on sid e r wh e the r, tho ug h no t fl a g ra nt, the c omm e nts wa

rrant r ever sa l. See H argrove , 416 F.3d at 493. Sales’s cla ims fare no better he re. The evidenc e ag ainst Sales was strong , and while his attorney did object to both comments, the district court quickly sustained the ob je c tio ns and

pr ov ide d c ur a tiv e ins tr

uc tio ns sp e c if

ic a lly a dd re ssi ngthe pro secu tor ’s c omm e nts
. The district cour

t did not abuse its discretion in d enying a mistrial based on the prose cutor’s imp ro pe r c omm e nts
. III . C ON CL USI ON F o r th e f o r e g o in g r e a s o n s , we aff irm Sa le s’ s c on vic tio ns , b ut r e m and this matter to the district court for

the limited a

nd purely minist eria l pur

pose of merg ing the convictions and sente nces of Sales’s § 922 c ounts. No new sente ncinghear ing is re quired.