FILED

April 30, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

JOANNE DALLE MAYFIELD, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

) Davidson Circuit

) No. 95D-1525

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9611-CV-00501

JOHN DREW MAYFIELD, )

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur with the court’s opinion and with its finding that the evidence does

not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Ms. Mayfield did not

contribute substantially to the appreciation in the value of Mr. Mayfield’s separate

property, except for the Trimble Road house. I have prepared this separate

opinion to elaborate on the significance of this finding in the context of this case.

A spouse’s contributions to marital and separate property have a two-fold

significance. First, these contributions affect the classification of property as

marital or separate. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) (1996). Second,

they affect the equitable division of the property in the marital estate. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5). 

The finding that Ms. Mayfield did not contribute substantially to Mr.

Mayfield’s separate property effectively removes this property from the marital

estate with two exceptions. The first exception is the $50,000 increase in the

value of the Trimble Road house because the trial court specifically found that

Ms. Mayfield had contributed to the appreciation in the house’s value. The

second exception is the $26,104.57 increase in the value of Mr. Mayfield’s

individual retirement account because the appreciation in the value of this account

is marital property even without substantial contributions by Ms. Mayfield.

Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 830 (Tenn. 1996). The trial court did not
1This amount includes the $16,792.56 in marital property identified by the trial court and

the $50,000 “alimony in solido.” The trial court characterized the $50,000 “[a]s further property

division and in consideration of her contributions to the appreciation of the home place and her

efforts to make a home for Mr. Mayfield and raise the child.” 

-2-

include in the parties’ marital estate the increase in the value of the Trimble Road

house or Mr. Mayfield’s individual retirement account. Adding these two

valuable assets to the marital estate brings its value up to $109,689.67 rather than

$33,585.11 as found by the trial court. 

The only remaining question concerns whether Ms. Mayfield received an

equitable share of the marital property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) requires

an equitable rather than an equal division of marital property, Batson v. Batson,

769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), and does not require that each party

receive a share of each piece of marital property. Thompson v. Thompson, 797

S.W.2d 599, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). In dividing marital property the courts

consider the contributions of each spouse to the acquisition, preservation, and

appreciation of the marital or separate property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(c)(5). 

The trial court effectively awarded Ms. Mayfield $66,792.56 or 61% of the

parties’ marital estate.1 I find this distribution equitable in light of the

considerations in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). 

________________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE