alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.3 (b)


 




AGREEMENT TO AMEND/EXTEND CONTRACT


THIS FORM HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES AND THE PARTIES SHOULD CONSULT LEGAL, TAX AND OTHER COUNSEL BEFORE SIGNING










September 3, 2014







RE: Contract dated August 24, 2014 between Nutritional High, (Buyer), whether one or more, and Lawrenceville Greenhouse Inc, (Seller), whether one or more, relating to the sale of the following described real estate in Lawrence County, State of Illinois known as: Lawrenceville Greenhouse and Florist (2415 State Street; Lawrenceville, IL 62439).







Buyer and Seller hereby agree to amend the aforesaid contract as follows:







1. The date for  closing and delivery of deed is changed to N/A, 20 __


2. The date for furnishing commitment for title insurance policy or abstract of title is changed to N/A, 20 __


3. The date for delivering possession of Property is changed to N/A, 20 __


4. The date for approval of new loan is changed to N/A. 20 __


5. Other dates  set forth in said contract shall be changed as follows:




Other Provisions, item 2: Application Date extended from 09/15/14 to 09/22/14.



6. Additional amendments:


N/A







All other terms and conditions of said contract shall remain the same.







DATED this the 3rd day of September, 2014















__/"Signed"/ Dan Scherer___________               ________________







Seller                                                                                                  Buyer







__/"Signed"/ Holly Scherer___________               ________________
<PAGE>
 
                                  Exhibit 11

                    Intercell Corporation and Subsidiaries
                       Computation of Net Loss Per Share

<TABLE> 
<CAPTION> 
                                                   Three months ended June 30,      Nine months ended June 30,
                                                     1998            1997             1998              1997
                                                ------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                                             <C>              <C>                <C>              <C>
Loss from continuing operations                  ($604,000)      ($2,012,000)       ($3,547,000)     ($5,695,000)
Deemed preferred stock dividend relating to                                                       
   in-the-money conversion terms                   (15,000)         (306,000)           (45,000)      (1,023,000)
Accrual dividends preferred stock                  (37,000)                             (74,000)  
Accretion on preferred stock                       (29,000)         (118,000)           (93,000)        (413,000)
                                                ------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss from continuing operations applicable to     (685,000)       (2,436,000)        (3,759,000)      (7,131,000)
 common shareholders
 
Discontinued operations
  Loss from discontinued operations               (825,000)         (446,000)        (3,414,000)        (144,000)
  Gain on sale of subsidiaries                     544,000                              244,000
                                                ------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss from discontinued operations                 (281,000)         (446,000)        (3,170,000)        (144,000)
 
Net loss applicable to common stockholders       ($966,000)      ($2,882,000)       ($6,929,000)     ($7,275,000)
                                                ==================================================================
 
Weighted average number
of common shares outstanding                    35,848,917        18,710,850         31,291,413       17,169,353
 
Net loss per common share:
   Loss from continuing operations                  ($0.02)           ($0.13)            ($0.12)          ($0.41)
   Loss from discontinued operations                ($0.01)           ($0.02)            ($0.10)          ($0.01)
                                                 ------------------------------------------------------------------
Net loss per applicable to common stockholders      ($0.03)           ($0.15)            ($0.22)          ($0.42)
                                                 ==================================================================
</TABLE> 
 
Diluted loss per share is not presented as the effect of the potential
conversion of preferred stock to common stock and the exercise of outstanding
warrants and options would decrease loss per share.

              See notes to the consolidated financial statements.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-1800

HUO YING LIEN, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals. 

Submitted: January 7, 2009 Decided: January 22, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Huo Ying Lien, Petitioner Pro Se. Javier Balasquide, DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Arlington, Virginia; Brianne Whelan Cohen, 

Trial Attorney, Carol Federighi, Senior Litigation Counsel, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; George 

William Maugans, III, Special Assistant United States Attorney, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

 Huo Ying Lien, a native and citizen of China, 

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (Board) dismissing her appeal from the Immigration 

Judge’s decision dismissing her applications for relief from 

removal. We have reviewed the administrative record and Lien’s 

claims and find no error in the agency decisions. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.10 (2008). We accordingly deny the petition for review 

for the reasons stated by the Board. See In Re: Lien (B.I.A. 

June 24, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
#### In the Matter of the Application of Michele Sollecito, Petitioner, against Paul Moss, License Commissioner of the City of New York, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Bronx County,

November 17, 1936.

*John B. McPennett,*for the petitioner.

*Paul A. Windels, Corporation Counsel [David I. Shivitz*of counsel], for the defendant.

McLaughlin (Charles B.), J.

On May 6, 1936, the petitioner herein was duly licensed to sell ice at retail by the license commissioner of the city of New York. Thereafter, on July 3, 1936, a hearing was held before the commissioner of licenses on charges made against the petitioner. As a result of this hearing the petitioner’s license was revoked on July 6, 1936. Upon application made by petitioner a rehearing was granted. This rehearing took place before the commissioner on September 8, 17 and 18, 1936. Petitioner still continued unsuccessful and as a result of the rehearing his license remains revoked. On October 16, 1936, petitioner obtained an order of certiorari to review the decision and action of the commissioner of licenses in the premises. The defendant now *169moves to vacate this order on the ground that the petitioner has mistaken his remedy.

Before certiorari can be granted, the act of the municipal officer sought to be reviewed must be plainly judicial in character. *(Matter of Mt. Morris Square,*2 Hill, 14.) Official acts which are legislative, executive, administrative or ministerial in their character are not subject to review by certiorari. *(People ex rel. Copcutt*v. *Board of Health,*140 N. Y. 1.) We know of no provision of law, nor are we referred to any by petitioner, which confers power to perform a judicial act upon the commissioner of licenses. The holding of a hearing and the swearing and examination of witnesses did not, in the matter before us, constitute the determination of the commissioner of licenses a judicial act. *(People ex rel. Keating*v. *Bingham,*138 App. Div. 736; appeal dismissed, 200 N. Y. 511.) Before a writ or order of certiorari can be obtained it must be shown that the judicial proceedings sought to be reviewed were provided for by statute. The writ or order will not issue where the hearing had was granted for some reason other than that it was made mandatory by statute. *(Copcutt*v. *Board of Health, supra; Keating*v. *Bingham, supra.)*The hearing and rehearing granted by the commissioner of licenses in this case were, therefore, not judicial acts subject to review by certiorari within the purview of the decided cases.

The motion to vacate the order of certiorari heretofore issued in this proceeding is granted.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 108 (Monday, June 7, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 32230]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-13667]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2010-0002]


Meetings; Sunshine Act

Date: Week of June 7, 2010.

Place: Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland.

Status: Public and closed.

Additional Items To Be Considered: Wednesday, June 9, 2010
1:25 p.m. Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (Tentative).
    a. Review of Final Rule Package, Export and Import of Nuclear 
Equipment and Material; Updates and Clarifications (10 CFR part 110, 
RIN 3150-AI16) (Tentative).

    This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address--http://www.nrc.gov.
    The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the Internet 
at: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/policy-making/schedule.html.
* * * * *
    The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with 
disabilities where appropriate. If you need a reasonable accommodation 
to participate in these public meetings, or need this meeting notice or 
the transcript or other information from the public meetings in another 
format (e.g. braille, large print), please notify Angela Bolduc, Chief, 
Employee/Labor Relations and Work Life Branch, at 301-492-2230, TDD: 
301-415-2100, or by e-mail at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#40212e27252c216e222f2c243523002e32236e272f36"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c8a9a6afada4a9e6aaa7a4acbdab88a6baabe6afa7be">[email protected]</span></a>. Determinations on 
requests for reasonable accommodation will be made on a case-by-case 
basis.
    This notice is distributed electronically to subscribers. If you no 
longer wish to receive it, or would like to be added to the 
distribution, please contact the Office of the Secretary, Washington, 
DC 20555, (301)-415-1969, or send an e-mail to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#721613001e171c175c05001b151a06321c00115c151d04"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="e68287948a838883c891948f818e92a6889485c8818990">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: June 2, 2010.
Rochelle C. Bavol,
Policy Coordinator, Office of the Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-13667 Filed 6-3-10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### A. E. GIBSON, Employee, v. KEY MOTOR COMPANY, Employer, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier.

(Filed 5 November, 1958.)

Appeal by defendants from *Frizelle, J.,*at April, 1958 Term of New Hanover.

*White Aycock, and Harvey Marcus for defendants, appellates.*

*Addison Hewlett, Jr. and Lonnie B. Williams for plaintiff, appellee.*

Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court affirming an award made by the Industrial Commission in a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The award is based upon findings that the claimant, who was employed by the defendant Motor Company as an automobile salesman, sustained a disabling injury to his back while attempting to push a used car to start the motor preparatory to demonstrating the car to prospective customers.

A study -of the record discloses that the crucial findings of fact, all challenged by exceptions taken by the defendants, are supported by competent evidence. The defendants’ other exceptions, relating mainly to evidentiary and procedural matters, have been examined and found to be without substantial merit. The record is free of prejudicial error. The judgment is

Affirmed.
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. Section 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of Advanced BioMedical Technologies Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended October 31, 2009, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “report”), I, Wang
Hui, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:




(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)           The
information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and
r




Dated
      this 13th
      day of February, 2009./s/
      Wang HuiWang
      Hui, Director and Chief Executive
Officer
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICTOR MANUEL GUARDADORODRIGUEZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 11-71907

Agency No. A097-361-112

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 18, 2013** 

Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 

Victor Manuel Guardado-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Mexico,

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying

his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of

counsel and changed circumstances in Mexico. We have jurisdiction under

FILED

JUN 20 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-71907

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to

reopen, Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011), and we deny the

petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guardado-Rodriguez’s

motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed five months after the

BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed

within 90 days of final order), and Guardado-Rodriguez failed to show the due

diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646

F.3d at 680-81 (petitioner “[a]pparently . . . took no affirmative steps to

investigate” whether prior counsel adequately prepared claim); Singh v. Gonzales,

491 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir 2007) (no evidence in record of any actions taken,

after becoming suspicious of the fraud, until meeting with present counsel). Nor

did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Guardado-Rodriguez’s motion to

reopen as untimely, where Guardado-Rodriguez failed to establish material

evidence of changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory

exception to the time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will 
3 11-71907

be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by

affidavits or other evidentiary material.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DARRYL C. CARTER
, ) ) Plaintiff, ) )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2 3

- 2314 (UNA) ) JAMES COMER
, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on p laintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF

No. 2), his pro se civil complaint (ECF No. 1), and motion for CM/ECF password (ECF No. 3)

. The application will be granted, the case will be dismissed for l ack of subject matter jurisdiction
, and the motion for CM/ECF password will be denied as moot

. Under Article III of the Constitution, “ p laintiffs must establish that they have standing to

sue.” Comm . on Judiciary of U .S. House of Representatives v. McGahn , 968 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C.

Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). A party has standing if he has “ (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2)
that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 763 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992))

. Darryl Carter brings this action against the Chair of the House Committee on Oversight

and Accountabilit y. Compl. ¶ ¶ 2 , 4

. Carter claims that the Chair has “a duty . . . to direct the
review . . . operations of government activities at all levels ,” id . ¶ 5 and to collect and investigate
“tips” from the general public, such as the 27 tips Carter has submitted, id . ¶ ¶ 6, 12

. Even assuming that Carter has suffered or is suffering an injury

— “emotional duress”
stemming from the “tyranny of the federal government via its WOKE politics and DEEP STATE2 social revolution radicalism ,” compl. ¶14

— he has not sufficiently explained why that injury is

particular to him. “[I] t is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all

members of the public.” Ex parte Levitt , 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937) (per curiam). His injury must

be “particularized”

— it “ must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way .” S pokeo, Inc.

v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) . The fact that he is upset about federal government action is
not enough.
Compounding the jurisdictional problem, Carter has not established that his requested
relief would redress his injury. Carter asks for essentially a declaration from this Court that the
Chair of the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability must “direct review of serious
government misconduct.” Compl. ¶17. But it is not clear that his concerns even qualify as “serious
government misconduct .” Not is it clear that a single committee of a single chamber of Congress’

review of that misconduct would result in the dismantling of the federal government’s “ WOKE
politics and DEEP STATE social revolution radicalism.”

An Order will be issued separately.

DATE: March 17, 2024 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL

- TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 19a0604n.06
No. 19

- 1093
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. SEAN LAMONTE LINDSAY, aka Sean Lamonte Goodman , Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

B efore : GIBBONS, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH , Circuit Judges

. KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge

. Sean Lindsay argues that he received a substantively unreasonable sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. We reject his argument s and affirm.
In 2011 , Lindsay ple d guilty to bank robbery

. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)

. The district court
sentenced him to 77 months in prison followed by 2 years of supervised release. He was released from prison i n October 2017

. After that, Lindsay worked several full

- time jobs, but quit each one to avoid paying child support. As a resu lt, he also failed to pay the restitution required by the terms
of his supervised release. N ine months after his release , Lindsay tested positive for cocaine , which
led t he district court to order him to reside six month s at a halfway house as part of his release.
S even weeks into that six

- month term, Lindsay absconded from the halfway house

— again a violation of the terms of his release

. His g uidelines range for that violation was 21

- to

- 27 months ,No. 19

- 1093 , United States v. Lindsay

- 2

-

but the statutory maximum for his violation was 24 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

. The
district court sentenced Lindsay to 24 months

. We review the reasonableness of Lindsay’s
sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 578 ( 6th Cir. 2007)

. Where, as here, the district court impose d a within

- Guidelines sentence, “a presumption of reasonableness applies[.]” United States v. Mosley , 635 F.3d 859, 865 (6th Cir. 2011). Lindsay argues that the district court’s sentence was exce ssive because, he says, his
abscondence was his first violation of supervised release

. But the abscondence was Lindsay’s
third violation

—h e had violated the terms of his release by fail ing to pay restitution and by test ing positive for cocaine. Thus , the district court did not abuse its discretion

. Lindsay also says the district court failed to credit the fact that he had secured employment
while on release. But the district court cited Lindsay’s job

— albeit after selec ting Lindsay’s

sentence

— as a “bright spot” amid a criminal record that left Lindsay “i n custody or on community supervision almost constantly since 1993.” R. 56, PageID 308. So that criticism is without merit
as well.
The district court’s sentence is a ffirmed.
#### Catherine Areson, Appellant, v The Long Island Railroad Company, Respondent.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event. Opinion by

Barnard, P. J.;

Dykman, J., dissenting.
#### Thomas Halpin, Respondent, v. Insurance Company of North America, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. Opinion by

Barnard, P. J.
#### John McVey, Respondent, v. Security Mutual Life Insurance Company, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

All concurred, except Smith, P. J., dissenting.