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DIEMER & WEI, LLP

Kathryn S. Diemer (#133977)

100 West San Fernando Street, Suite 555

San Jose, CA 95113

Telephone: 408-971-6270 

Facsimile: 408-971-6271

Email: kdiemer@diemerwei.com 

WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP

Matthew A. Feldman (pro hac vice)

Joseph G. Minias (pro hac vice)

Benjamin P. McCallen (pro hac vice)

Daniel I. Forman (pro hac vice)

787 Seventh Avenue

New York, NY 10019-6099

Telephone: (212) 728-8000

Facsimile: (212) 728-8111

Email: mfeldman@willkie.com

jminias@willkie.com

bmccallen@willkie.com

dforman@willkie.com

Counsel for Ad Hoc Group of Subrogation Claim Holders

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

In re:

PG&E CORPORATION,

-andPACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC 

COMPANY, 

Debtors.

☐ Affects PG&E Corporation

☐ Affects Pacific Gas and Electric 

Company

 Affects both Debtors

* All papers shall be filed in the lead 

case,

No. 19-30088 (DM)

Chapter 11 

Bankr. Case No. 19-30088 (DM)

(Jointly Administered)

OBJECTION OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF 

SUBROGATION CLAIM HOLDERS TO THE 

MOTION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF 

SENIOR UNSECURED NOTEHOLDERS FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND RELIEF FROM

ORDERS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF 

CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e) AND 60(b)

Date: January 21, 2020

Time: 10:00 a.m. (Pacific Time)

Place: United States Bankruptcy Court

 Courtroom 17, 16th Floor

 San Francisco, CA 94102

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

OBJECTION...........................................................................................................................................1

ARGUMENT..........................................................................................................................................3

I. There is no “newly discovered evidence” that justifies relief under FRCP 59 or 60.......3

II. Granting the Bondholders’ Motion Would Threaten Progress, Ensure Litigation 

and Jeopardize the Timeline for Confirming a Plan by June 30, 2020 ............................8

III. The Bondholders Present No Basis at All for Reconsidering the Subrogation RSA.....10

CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................................10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Allied Prof’ls Ins. Co. v. Anglesey, 

No. 14-cv-00665 (CBM/SH), 2015 WL 13449659 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015)...................3

Contempo Metal Furniture Co. of California v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 

661 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) ...............................................................................................6

Corex Corp. v. United States, 

638 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1981) ...............................................................................................4

Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 

505 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2007) ...............................................................................................4

Harvest v. Castro, 

531 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2008) ...........................................................................................4, 7

Hawaii Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 

363 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Haw. 2005).................................................................................6

Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp., 

921 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1990) ...............................................................................................3

Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 

452 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................................4

Meyer v. Lenox (In re Lenox), 

902 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1990) ...............................................................................................7

Phelps v. Alameida, 

569 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) .............................................................................................4

Saxena v. Abud (In re Nabilsi Yunes Abud), 

BAP No. CC-14-1444-KuPeTa, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2984 

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. Sep. 3, 2015)..............................................................................................4

Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 

5 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................3

Shoen v. Shoen, 

933 F. Supp. 871 (D. Ariz. 1996) ........................................................................................4

United States v. Washington, 

98 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) ...............................................................................................4

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The Ad Hoc Group of Subrogation Claim Holders (the “Ad Hoc Subrogation Group”) in 

the above-captioned chapter 11 cases of PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

(collectively, the “Debtors”), by its attorneys Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP and Diemer & Wei, 

LLP, hereby objects (the “Objection”) to the Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Unsecured 

Noteholders (the “Bondholders”) for Reconsideration and Relief from Orders Pursuant to Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) [Docket No. 5241] (the “Motion”).

1

In support of this 

Objection, the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group respectfully represents as follows:

OBJECTION

The standard for reconsideration of a Court order in the 9th Circuit is well-established and 

strict. It requires the presentation of newly-discovered evidence that was in existence at the time of 

the Court order but was not known by the Court, which otherwise would have affected the 

disposition of the issue. There is no such new evidence presented to the Court through this Motion. 

Instead, the Bondholders seek to portray their conscious, strategic decision to wait until after the 

Court approved the RSAs to announce their intention to amend their plan as “new evidence.” But 

the terms of the Bondholder plan, and the timing of their offers, were and have always been under 

their control. Thus, the Motion is nothing more than an attempted do-over, founded on post-hearing 

“developments” solely of their own making, impermissibly cloaked as a motion for reconsideration 

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. 

All of the evidence and arguments the Bondholders put forward in their Motion were

already presented to, and considered by, this Court in connection with its approval of the RSAs. 

The “lock up” provisions the Bondholders seek to unwind specifically were discussed at length in 

the briefing and oral argument at the December 17 hearing. Counsel for the settling parties 

explained why these provisions were a necessary part of reaching a deal with the Debtors and 

equity. The parties and Court understood at that time that the terms of the competing Bondholder 

plan could change in the future and that the lock up provisions nevertheless would require the RSA 

1 Capitalized terms used but not defined shall have the meanings ascribed in the Motion.

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parties to support the Debtors’ plan. In fact, the Bondholders explicitly stated that they may amend

their proposed plan depending on the Court’s decision with respect to the Subrogation RSA. See

Bondholders’ Joint Chapter 11 Plan at 10 n.1 [Docket No. 4257] (“The terms set forth in this Plan 

relating to the Subrogation RSA...are subject to change based on the Bankruptcy Court’s 

disposition of the Debtors’ motion to approve the Subrogation Claims RSA....”). Those parties 

agreed to the RSAs (and the Court approved them) because the trade-off was a part of a global 

resolution of all disputes between the Debtors and the only impaired classes in these cases, which 

would maximize claimant recoveries, eliminate wasteful litigation and fees, and move these cases 

on a straight line towards confirmation before A.B. 1054’s June 30, 2020 deadline. The 

Bondholders have come nowhere near meeting their burden of demonstrating that the Court’s 

December 19 orders approving the subrogation and individual wildfire victim RSAs should be 

disturbed. 

The thrust of the Bondholders’ argument is that dismantling the RSAs to remove one 

provision — the lock up provision, which is standard in plan support agreements — would 

purportedly increase competition. As an initial matter, that argument already was carefully 

considered by the Court after extensive briefing and argument on the RSAs, and was rejected. 

Moreover, that argument soft pedals the consequences of a reversal of the Court’s prior 

determination. Among other things, the Debtors would have the right to terminate the RSAs and 

restart estimation, which would now include the highly-contentious Tubbs fire (the Tubbs-related 

state court trial dates having been vacated), only adding to the length and complexity of any

estimation proceedings. Indeed, without the RSAs, these cases will be thrown back to the state they 

were in months ago, with all parties litigating all of the issues that were resolved by those 

settlements — except that there will be less time within which to resolve that revived litigation 

within the constraints of A.B. 1054. It is not “competition” the Bondholders offer the Court, it is 

chaos.

The Bondholders attempt to brush aside the disruption that would result if their Motion were

granted by arguing that Judge Donato already has decided to estimate wildfire claims at their RSA 

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settlement value and, in any event, that he has removed the matters from his calendar, so there is no 

real threat of estimation proceedings. These arguments fail for several reasons. First, the import of 

Judge Donato’s comments was presented and considered at the December 17 hearing. The Debtors 

and the Bondholders disagree about the course the estimation proceedings would take absent the

RSAs, but regardless of how Judge Donato ultimately rules, no Court can strip the Debtors of their 

right to demand estimation and to contend (based on, among other things, the language of the RSAs 

and Federal Rule of Evidence 408) that the settlement amounts set forth in the RSAs may not be 

considered for purposes of estimation. Second, if Judge Donato is unavailable to hear the

estimation proceeding promptly, as the Bondholders threaten, the consequence will not be

estimation without a trial — rather, it will be estimation too late to comply with A.B. 1054. (Judge 

Donato Dec. 17 Hr’g Tr. at 10:8-9) (“...I will not have you in by June 30th.”). The estimation 

proceedings and Tubbs trial schedules that were carefully crafted to comply with A.B. 1054 have 

already been lost due to those proceedings being removed from their respective calendars, which 

was done in reliance on the orders approving the RSAs. This was foreseeable and anticipated by all 

parties when the approval of the RSAs was before this Court in the first instance. The Bondholders 

should not be allowed to manipulate that fact in their favor.

The Debtors have achieved significant progress by settling the claims of the only two 

impaired creditor classes, putting them on track to meet the timetable established by A.B. 1054, and 

compensating the wildfire victims fairly. Those achievements should not be put at risk. The

Motion should be denied.

ARGUMENT

I. There is no “newly discovered evidence” that justifies relief under FRCP 59 or 60.

Bankruptcy courts may grant a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 

60—which are explicitly incorporated into the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure by 

Bankruptcy Rules 9023 and 9024, respectively—under limited circumstances, including if they are

presented with “newly discovered evidence.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 

(9th Cir. 1993). Motions for reconsideration on the basis of newly discovered evidence are 

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reviewed under the same standard whether they are made under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)(2). Jones 

v. Aero/Chem Corp., 921 F.2d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 1990); Allied Prof’ls Ins. Co. v. Anglesey, No. 14-

cv-00665 (CBM/SH), 2015 WL 13449659, at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015). Under both Rules, 

the newly discovered evidence must have been in existence at the time of the initial ruling – it 

cannot be evidence related to events that occur after the issue is decided. Corex Corp. v. United 

States, 638 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Cases construing ‘newly discovered evidence,’ either 

under 60(b)(2) or Rule 59, uniformly hold that evidence of events occurring after the trial is not 

newly discovered evidence within the meaning of the rules.”); see also Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. 

County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Furthermore, courts have discretion to grant a motion for reconsideration under Rule 

60(b)(6) when “any other reason justifies relief,” but only in extraordinary circumstances. The 

Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is to be used “sparingly” and that cases exhibiting 

the type of “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to justify this relief are “rare.” United States v. 

Washington, 98 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Shoen v. Shoen, 933 F. Supp. 871, 875-

876 (D. Ariz. 1996) (collecting cases for the proposition that Courts of Appeal disfavor Rule 60(b)

motions). 

Notably, a party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show there are extraordinary 

circumstances “beyond the movant’s control.” Saxena v. Abud (In re Nabilsi Yunes Abud), BAP 

No. CC-14-1444-KuPeTa, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2984, at*10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2015); Harvest 

v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008); Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 

1102-03 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has specifically stated that “Rule 60(b)(6) relief is less 

warranted when the final judgment being challenged has caused one or more of the parties to 

change his legal position in reliance on that judgment.” Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1138 

(9th Cir. 2009).

Here, the Bondholders do not come close to satisfying the test for relief on the basis of 

newly discovered evidence. First, their all-cash proposal was not in existence at the time the orders 

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were announced or entered, thus it has not been (and could not be) recently “discovered.” 2 In fact, 

the current circumstances are solely a matter of the Bondholders’ creation: the reason their offer 

was not previously known was because they waited to make it until after they knew the results of 

the RSA hearing.

3

 

The proposition upon which the Motion is premised — that the Bondholders did not know 

the TCC would have preferred an all-cash deal until the December 17 hearing — is simply not 

credible. Everyone was aware of the TCC’s preference for cash well before the hearing to approve 

the RSAs, as the TCC stated this preference repeatedly in the months leading up to the RSAs being 

signed and approved. In the TCC’s October 16 objection to the Subrogation RSA, they argued that 

the subrogation settlement should be rejected because it “pays $11 billion in cash to subrogation 

claimants while the Fire Victims’ trust is funded with stocks, bonds, or other non-cash alternatives.”

TCC Objection at 1:14-15 [Docket No. 4232]. Then again at the November 19 hearing, counsel for 

the TCC stated on the record that if the Subrogation RSA were disapproved the “case will resolve 

promptly” because under the terms of the settlement “[t]hey took the cash.” Nov. 19 Hr’g Tr. at 

12:17-23. 

There is also nothing “new” about the challenges to the lock up provisions that the 

Bondholders repeat in the Motion. The effect that the lock up provisions could have on future plan 

negotiations was at the forefront of the arguments over whether the Court should approve the RSAs, 

as reflected by comments to this Court by one of the lead counsel for the individual wildfire victims

in the Tubbs trial: 

2 The Bondholders have not in fact put forth any comprehensive proposal worthy of consideration — they have not (i) 

disclosed their plan financing or commitment letters; (ii) identified the revised treatment for subrogation claimants; or 

(iii) even filed a formal term sheet or an amended plan that incorporates their cash “proposal” to the individual wildfire 

victims — and the Bondholders have lost the only other party that supported their plan when the TCC settled with the 

Debtors.

3 The Ad Hoc Subrogation Group has served discovery requests on the Bondholders concerning the precise timing of 

when the Bondholders considered making their revised offer. The Ad Hoc Subrogation Group’s 30(b)(6) deposition of 

the Bondholders in connection with the Motion, scheduled for the afternoon of January 14, was adjourned following the 

adjournment of the proceedings then presently before the Court. The Ad Hoc Subrogation Group reserves its right to 

supplement the Objection following the continuation of the deposition and as new information comes to light, including 

at the hearing on the Motion.

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MR. PITRE: This deal was not going forward without a lock up . . . without that provision, 

we were going to trial on Tubbs . . . this was the best deal that could be cut, with a lock up. 

And there is no doubt in my mind over that. None....

THE COURT: You’re of the opinion that the alternative plan, which in many respects, has the 

same economic outcome, is still subject to these other kinds of concerns that motivates you. 

And you...believe that it’s the right outcome, and you will be recommending it to these 

hundreds and thousands of victims...?

MR. PITRE: I would be the first person to answer your question directly, yes.

THE COURT: ...again, this whole day isn’t about whether 13.5 should be 14.5 or 12.5, it’s 

about this lock up. As I say, there don’t appear to be any real challenges to the economics of 

this settlement, not even from the governor’s point of view.

MR. PITRE: You are correct. We understood the lock up....

Dec. 17 Hr’g Tr. at 243:4-247:17. The lock up provisions were also the primary focus of the 

opposition to the RSAs of the Bondholders and the UCC at the December 17 hearing. See Dec. 17 

Hr’g Tr. at 190:11-12, 191:8-10, 194:1-7, 202:8-11, 205:15-17, 280:2-6. Even the ability of the 

individual wildfire victims to evaluate an all-cash offer was already considered by the Court when 

the argument was raised by the Bondholders at the December 17 hearing. (Dec. 17 Hr’g Tr. at 

278:7-9) (MR. STAMER: “if the torts want more cash, our plan as it exists proposes more cash. 

But if they want more cash, it should be a competitive process.”). In sum, all of these issues were 

presented to the Court previously. Rearguing the same objection presented prior to the Court’s 

decision to approve the RSAs is insufficient grounds to grant a motion to reconsider. Hawaii 

Stevedores, Inc. v. HT & T Co., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1269 (D. Haw. 2005) (“Mere disagreement 

with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration . . .” and “. . . reconsideration may 

not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the 

challenged decision.”). In the present case the majority of the Bondholders’ arguments in support 

of reconsideration not only could have been argued in opposition to the original approval, they were 

in fact argued and rejected by the Court. 

Second, not only do the Bondholders fail to present anything “new,” the revised proposal

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also is not even “evidence.” The Bondholders tacitly acknowledge that they have no new evidence

by repeatedly characterizing the basis for the Motion as “new developments” rather than “new 

evidence.” But the law requires evidence that the Court could have heard previously, not new 

factual developments. For example, in Contempo Metal Furniture Co. of California v. East Texas 

Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), a furniture manufacturer sued a freight 

company for delivering damaged products. After plaintiff was awarded damages at trial, the 

defendant filed a motion for relief under Rule 59, arguing that, after trial, plaintiff had destroyed the 

subject goods, preventing defendant from selling them and mitigating damages. Id. at 767. The 

district court denied the motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal. The Ninth Circuit 

explained that for a Rule 59 motion to be granted, “the newly discovered evidence must be of facts 

existing at the time of trial.” Id. at 766. In other words, facts about new developments occurring 

after adjudication do not justify reconsideration.

Even the “developments” cited by the Bondholders fail to be concrete. All that the 

Bondholders have done is send a letter to Governor Newsom with an informal term sheet, which 

contains no detail on the treatment of the subrogation claims, and no detail on the management of 

the wildfire victim trust — which was a critical component of the TCC RSA. Indeed, as of the time 

of this Objection — six weeks after the TCC signed the RSA, one month after the RSA hearings,

over three weeks after the Bondholders publicized their new proposal to wildfire victims and their 

letter to the Governor with much fanfare, and two weeks after the Motion — the Bondholders still 

have not filed an amended plan. 

Finally, the Bondholders’ unilateral decision to change a provision of their plan does not 

constitute the “extraordinary circumstances” necessary for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(6) or 

Rule 59 — such changes have occurred multiple times throughout the course of these chapter 11 

cases with respect to both the Bondholders’ and Debtors’ proposed plans. The decision of whether

to offer individual wildfire victims an all-cash recovery prior to the hearing on the RSAs and then to 

make such an offer only after the hearing was completely within the Bondholders’ control and 

therefore not grounds for granting the Motion. Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d at 749 (holding that a 

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movant’s failure to take action at an earlier time could not constitute “circumstances beyond its 

control”). This is particularly true where other parties have taken action in reliance on the approval 

of the RSAs — e.g. staying the estimation proceedings and Tubbs trial — and it would be 

prejudicial to vacate those orders because it would risk non-compliance with the June 30 deadline.

Meyer v. Lenox (In re Lenox), 902 F.2d 737, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that bankruptcy courts 

“have the power to reconsider, modify or vacate their previous orders so long as no intervening 

rights have become vested in reliance on the orders”). At the end of the day, the Bondholders are 

seeking relief from their own tactical judgment (i.e. waiting until after the ruling on the RSAs to 

revise their proposal), which they now regret. Such relief is not the function of Rule 59 or 60.

II. Granting the Bondholders’ Motion Would Threaten Progress, Ensure Litigation and

Jeopardize the Timeline for Confirming a Plan by June 30, 2020

The underlying premise of the Motion is that granting the Motion will foster competition 

and ultimately benefit all claimholders. Competition should be directed towards a plan process —

not more strategic litigation. The Bondholders’ request that the Court vacate its order approving the 

Subrogation RSA so that the Bondholders can “negotiate” with the holders of subrogation claims is 

Kafkaesque. When the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group served discovery on the Bondholders with 

respect of their Motion, the Bondholders refused to produce documents reflecting, and indicated 

that their deponent would not testify regarding, how they intend to treat the Subrogation Group, 

despite the fact that they also seek to unwind the Subrogation RSA through their Motion. It is clear 

that the “competition” the Bondholders seek to foster is a standoff between a Debtor plan with the 

support of subrogation claimants and equity, and what they hope will be a Bondholder plan 

supported by the Bondholders and individual wildfire claimants — in other words, exactly the state 

of affairs that existed two months ago. 

While the approved RSAs offer a straight-line path to confirmation and compliance with 

A.B. 1054, reconsideration promises only to reverse the substantial progress made over the past few 

months. This will manifest itself most significantly in the litigation likely to be spawned by a 

granting of the Motion: 

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• Resumption of Estimation Litigation. If the Motion is granted, and the Debtors 

lose the critical, negotiated, “locked-in” global consensus, the Debtors and equity 

will proceed with renewed estimation proceedings, which significantly increases the 

risk of the Debtors’ insolvency. 

• The Debtors’ Inability to Satisfy the A.B. 1054 Deadline. The Bondholders 

concede that Judge Donato’s calendar may not be able to accommodate an 

estimation trial in the coming months. Thus, the granting of the Motion would 

significantly increase the likelihood that the Debtors would be unable to meet the 

June 30, 2020 deadline. This risk would be compounded by the fact that, now that 

the previously-scheduled trial dates for the Tubbs trial have been vacated in reliance 

on the order approving the TCC RSA, Tubbs-related estimation (including as to the 

issue of causation) would have to be folded into the District Court estimation 

proceeding. Failure to qualify to participate in the Wildfire Fund would destroy 

value for all parties. 

• Revival of Intercreditor Disputes. Granting the Motion could reopen otherwise 

resolved intercreditor disputes including the TCC’s “made whole” adversary 

proceeding against the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group. Reviving such litigation would 

serve no practical purpose, waste estate resources, risk irreparably driving the parties 

further apart from a global settlement, and increase the risk that no plan is confirmed 

by June 30, 2020.

The Bondholders may respond that certain of these issues will have to be addressed in 

connection with the prosecution of the Bondholders’ plan whether or not the Court reconsiders its 

approval of the RSAs. However, as long as the RSAs remain in effect, the Debtors plan is on track 

for confirmation, and the creditor body will have the opportunity to express which plan better 

addresses these issues through voting. Leaving the RSAs in place will maximize the likelihood that 

there will be one plan supported by the impaired creditor classes by June 30. Vacating the RSAs

risks derailing the Debtors’ plan, plunging the case into a litigation quagmire that jeopardizes the 

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possibility that any plan will be confirmable by June 30 — all for no good purpose. 

III. The Bondholders Present No Basis at All for Reconsidering the Subrogation RSA

The Bondholders present no justification (because none exists) for the Court to reconsider the

order approving the Subrogation RSA. The Bondholders admit as much in the Motion, noting that 

“the New AHC Plan does not at this time provide more favorable treatment to holders of 

subrogation claims,” and offer instead only vague, unsupported and speculative claims that “future 

developments may occur that make the AHC plan more favorable....” Motion at 11. But the Court 

already stated that the considerations for the lock up provisions in the Subrogation RSA are 

different than those for the TCC RSA. (Dec. 17 Hr’g Tr. at 182:14-25) (“If I...tell you I’ll approve 

it only if the lock up is out...and I’m focusing on this...RSA, not...the subro because to 

me...they’re much different.”). The Bondholders’ request that the Court reconsider the order 

approving the Subrogation RSA is nothing more than an afterthought and should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion should be denied. 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 5366 Filed: 01/14/20 Entered: 01/14/20 15:16:05 Page 13

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Dated: January 14, 2020

Counsel for Ad Hoc Group of Subrogation Claim Holders

WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP

/s/ Matthew A. Feldman

Matthew A. Feldman (pro hac vice)

Joseph G. Minias (pro hac vice)

Benjamin P. McCallen (pro hac vice)

Daniel I. Forman (pro hac vice)

787 Seventh Avenue

New York, NY 10019-6099

Telephone: (212) 728-8000

Facsimile: (212) 728-8111

Email: mfeldman@willkie.com

jminias@willkie.com

bmccallen@willkie.com

dforman@willkie.com

DIEMER & WEI, LLP

Kathryn S. Diemer (#133977)

100 West San Fernando Street, Suite 555

San Jose, CA 95113

Telephone: (408) 971-6270 

Facsimile: (408) 971-6271 

Email: kdiemer@diemerwei.com

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 5366 Filed: 01/14/20 Entered: 01/14/20 15:16:05 Page 14

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