97-069

 No. 97-069

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

IN RE MARRIAGE OF

JOSEPH R. NEVIN, II,

 Petitioner and Respondent,

 and

SUSAN A. NEVIN,

 Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Yellowstone

 The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Mark D. Parker; Parker Law Firm;

 Billings, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Gregory R. Todd; Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd;

 Billings, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: July 17, 1997

 Decided: September 22, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

 Joseph R. Nevin, after his divorce from Susan A. Nevin, obtained an order from

the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District in Yellowstone County which

required Susan to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for refusing to

allow Joseph to exercise visitation with their sons. After a hearing held in 

response to

the order, the court held Susan in contempt for failing to allow visitation and 

failing to

notify the court that custody and visitation were being disallowed. Susan purged the

contempt by reinstating visitation. Susan appeals from the District Court's contempt

order and its finding that Susan has serious emotional problems. We affirm in part 

and

reverse in part the judgment of the District Court.

 The following issues are raised on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it held Susan in contempt

for refusing to allow visitation?

 2. Did the District court err when it found that Susan is a hysterical, 

distressed

mother with serious emotional problems?

 3. Did the District Court err when it denied Susan's motion to modify custody?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On December 12, 1994, the petitioner, Joseph Nevin, filed an action in the 

District

Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District in Yellowstone County to dissolve his 

marriage

to his wife, Susan. The parties entered into a separation agreement which awarded

primary residential custody of the couple's two minor children to Susan and gave 

Joseph

reasonable rights of visitation. The final decree of dissolution, dated September 

18,

1995, incorporates the separation agreement. 

 After allegations of sexual abuse of the parties' older son, Gabe, were 

reported,

Susan took Gabe to a clinical psychologist who recommended that Susan temporarily

interrupt visitation between Joseph and his sons until the situation could be further

investigated. Susan did so in April 1996. Joseph responded by asking that Susan be 

held

in contempt.

 On October 15, 1996, Susan was ordered to show cause why she should not be

held in contempt for her refusal to allow visitation pursuant to the decree of 

dissolution

and separation agreement. Susan responded with a motion to modify custody in

accordance with the recommendations of the psychologist. The hearing on Joseph's

motion to hold Susan in contempt was held on December 24, 1996. The court concluded

that Susan was in contempt for "failing to notify the [c]ourt appropriately that 

custody and

visitation were being cut off." The court also found "Susan Nevin to be a 

hysterical,

distressed mother with serious emotional problems of her own." With regard to

modification of the custody arrangement, the court held that "the Decree that was 

filed

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as of September [19]95 shall remain in full force and effect." The court further 

held that

"Susan Nevin can be purged of the contempt provisions or contempt citations by

following the provisions of the Decree beginning Saturday, December 28th in lieu of 

the

Christmas holiday season and extending at least four days into January of 1997." The

court added that Susan's punishment would be purged if she complied with the 

provisions

for custody and visitation set forth in the decree of dissolution "from this day 

forward." 

 Susan complied with the judge's order and the children have had visitation with 

Joseph

since December 28, 1996. Susan appeals from the findings of the District Court.

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it held Susan in contempt for

refusing to allow visitation?

 We have held that although contempt orders are final and not reviewable on

appeal, except by writ of certiorari, an exception is created for contempt orders in 

family

law cases. See In re Marriage of Heath (1995), 272 Mont. 522, 527, 901 P.2d 590, 

593. 

We have also held that "[a] defeated party's compliance with the judgment renders his

appeal moot only where the compliance makes the granting of effective relief by the

appellate court impossible." Montana Nat'l Bank of Roundup v. State Dep't of Revenue

(1975), 167 Mont. 429, 432-33, 539 P.2d 722, 724.

 After the District Court held Susan in contempt on December 24, 1996, Susan

purged herself of contempt by permitting Joseph to visit his sons. Susan has 

continued

her compliance with the judge's order since it was entered. If Susan denies 

visitation in

the future, she is subject to no worse sanction because of the contempt order than 

she

would be for violating the original decree of dissolution. In Woolf v. Evans 

(1994), 264

Mont. 480, 483, 872 P.2d 777, 779, we held that "[c]ontempt of court is a 

discretionary

tool used to enforce compliance with a court's decisions. The power to inflict

punishment by contempt is necessary to preserve the dignity and authority of the 

court." 

Woolf, 264 Mont. at 483, 872 P.2d at 779, (citing In re Marriage of Jacobson (1987),

228 Mont. 458, 464, 743 P.2d 1025, 1028).

 In this case, the decision with which Susan must comply is first and foremost 

the

original decree of dissolution and the incorporated separation agreement. Pursuant 

to the

rule of law set forth in Woolf, a violation of the decree of dissolution subjects the

violating party to a contempt citation. Therefore, the possibility of future 

contempt is

present by the very nature of the decree of dissolution in this matter, regardless 

of the

existence of the District Court's later contempt order.

 As we stated in Bank of Roundup, when a party complies with a judgment to such

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an extent that effective relief by an appellate court is impossible, that party's 

appeal is

moot. See Bank of Roundup, 167 Mont. at 432-33, 539 P.2d at 724. Therefore, because

Susan complied with the District Court's contempt order by reinstating visitation, 

we are

not able to offer her any effective relief from that citation upon appeal. Nor are 

we able

to effectively relieve Susan's concern about that part of the contempt order which 

requires

that she comply with the provisions of the decree of dissolution "from this day 

forward"

or be held in contempt. The very existence of the original decree of dissolution 

subjects

her to this same potential sanction. Therefore, pursuant to the law as set forth in 

Bank

of Roundup, 167 Mont. at 432-33, 539 P.2d at 724, we conclude that the issue of 

Susan's

contempt is moot.

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District court err when it found that Susan is a hysterical, distressed

mother with serious emotional problems?

 The standard of review of a district court's findings and conclusions is whether

substantial evidence supports those findings and conclusions. See State v. Sheppard

(1995), 270 Mont. 122, 127, 890 P.2d 754, 757. Substantial evidence is the amount of

relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. See Swandal Ranch Co. v. Hunt (1996), 276 Mont. 229, 235, 915 P.2d

840, 844. In this case, other than the District Court's personal impressions, there 

was

no evidence to support the District Court's finding that Susan is a hysterical, 

distressed

mother with serious emotional problems. These sorts of findings, when made part of a

permanent record in a legal proceeding, necessarily require evidence in the form of a

qualified professional opinion. We therefore conclude that the District Court erred 

by

stating that finding on the record. Accordingly, we amend the District Court's 

findings

to strike the court's statement that Susan is "a hysterical, distressed mother with 

serious

emotional problems of her own."

 ISSUE 3

 Did the District Court err when it denied Susan's motion to modify custody?

 We review a district court's findings related to custody or visitation 

modification

to determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. See In re Marriage of 

Elser

(1995), 271 Mont. 265, 270, 895 P.2d 619, 622 (citing In re Marriage of Johnson

(1994), 266 Mont. 158, 166, 879 P.2d 689, 694). In Elser, we said that "[f]indings 

are

clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence, the court

misapprehends the effect of the evidence, or this Court's review of the record 

convinces

it that a mistake has been made." Elser, 271 Mont. at 270, 895 P.2d at 622. If the

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findings on which its decision are based are not clearly erroneous, this Court will 

reverse

a district court's decision regarding modification of custody or visitation only 

when an

abuse of discretion is demonstrated. See Elser, 271 Mont. at 270, 895 P.2d at 622 

(citing

In re Marriage of Hunt (1994), 264 Mont. 159, 164, 870 P.2d 720, 723).

 Since Susan presented no substantial evidence in support of modification, we

conclude that the District Court's finding regarding modification is not clearly 

erroneous

and that it did not abuse its discretion when it refused to modify the custody 

arrangement

between Susan and Joseph.

 The judgment of the District Court is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed 

in

part.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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