United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 23-20430 

____________ 

Kennard Law P.C., 

Appellant, 

versus

United Airlines, Incorporated, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:21-CV-1301 

______________________________ 

Before Clement, Graves, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

After granting summary judgment for the defendant employer in an 

employment discrimination lawsuit, the district court sanctioned the plaintiff 

employee’s lead attorney and the attorney’s law firm, Kennard Law P.C. 

(“Kennard Law”). Kennard Law appeals the order imposing sanctions. We 

VACATE and REMAND. 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

August 8, 2024 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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No. 23-20430 

2 

I 

Kim Thomas (“Thomas”), an employee of United Airlines 

(“United”), was scheduled to work on July 20, 2019. She reserved a flight 

from Houston to Detroit on July 20 using her employee travel pass privileges 

but was unsuccessful in trading her full shift for that day with a coworker. 

Thomas asserted that she decided not to travel after she fell ill while waiting 

for her flight and briefly visited the emergency room at HCA Houston 

Northwest Hospital (“HCA”). She then called United’s sick line to apply 

her Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) intermittent leave, which 

allowed her to take leave once a week, to the remainder of her shift. She had, 

however, already exhausted her leave allotment for that week. Because she 

neglected to show up for her shift and called in sick several hours after her 

shift had ended, United opened an investigation. 

Thomas faxed emergency room discharge papers to United, but 

United could not authenticate the July 20 visit. United contacted employees 

at HCA, who reported that Thomas was not seen at the hospital on July 20 

and that the hospital had no record of her admittance to the emergency room 

on that date. United concluded that Thomas (1) falsely declared that she 

went to the HCA emergency room on July 20, (2) submitted a falsified 

document to support her purported hospital visit, and (3) refused to 

cooperate during the investigation. United ultimately fired her. 

After being issued a notice of right to sue from the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission in early 2021, Thomas sued United in federal court 

under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act for discrimination 

and retaliation based on her race and disability. During discovery, United 

obtained Thomas’s medical records, which reflected that the discharge 

papers Thomas had submitted for the purported July 20 visit had the same 

account number as an overnight hospital visit she made on August 13, 2019. 

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The record indicates that HCA generates account numbers that are unique 

to each patient visit. Despite this evidence, Thomas continued to insist 

throughout the litigation, including under oath during her deposition, that 

she visited HCA on July 20. 

United moved for summary judgment on all claims. In the district 

court’s order granting summary judgment, it highlighted “convincing 

evidence” that Thomas had lied about her emergency room visit on July 20 

and submitted falsified medical documentation to United. It also found that 

Kennard Law “amplif[ied]” Thomas’s wrongdoing by bringing “to bear the 

courts and system of justice that wrongfully targeted United in this action.” 

The district court identified five statements in Kennard Law’s briefing in 

which it “vouched for a perjurious version of the facts” and concluded that 

basing arguments on “perjured testimony and forged documents . . . is 

contrary to the commands of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 11(b)(3) & 

(4).” The district court then instructed United that it could, “if desired, 

bring a motion under Rule 11(c) for sanctions against the Kennard Law Firm 

for the entirety of its legal fees and expenses expended in this litigation[.]”

Ellen Sprovach (“Sprovach”) was Thomas’s lead attorney, but Kennard 

Law contends she resigned from Kennard Law before the district court 

granted United’s motion for summary judgment.1

 

_____________________ 

1

 Kennard Law relies on Sprovach’s resignation to argue that the firm was not 

responsible for what the district court described as “the additive and amplifying conduct 

of [Thomas’s] counsel.” Kennard Law insists that Sprovach was the lead attorney on the 

case and would have been the one to verify Thomas’s version of events and certify them to 

the court. According to Kennard Law, the firm’s liability was negligible at most, and it 

could not have been expected to meaningfully respond to the motion for sanctions. The 

docket sheet indicates that Kennard Law did not withdraw from its representation of 

Thomas and continued to receive notice of filings after Sprovach’s departure, however. 

An advisory filed by Sprovach suggests that the firm retained access to her company email 

address to which the notices of filings were also sent. 

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United subsequently filed a motion for sanctions on April 12, 2023. 

On June 16, the district court granted United’s motion for sanctions and 

jointly sanctioned Kennard Law and Sprovach in the amount of $52,287.72. 

After neither Kennard Law nor Sprovach responded to the motion for two 

months, the district court treated their failure to respond as a 

“representation of no opposition” per the court’s local rules. The district 

court concluded that United’s “substantial and persuasive” evidence that 

Thomas had not visited HCA on July 20 warranted imposing sanctions 

against Kennard Law under Rule 11. The district court found that Kennard 

Law violated Rule 11 by “conced[ing] that it initiated and maintained this 

lawsuit without any good-faith basis” because Kennard Law amended the 

complaint without reasonable investigation and with minimal evidentiary 

support. Additionally, it noted that Kennard Law “submitted factual 

contentions in briefing that lacked minimal evidentiary support” and “made 

denials of factual contentions that could in no way be warranted on the 

available evidence.” 

Kennard Law moved for reconsideration on June 29, 2023, asking the 

district court to reconsider, reverse, and vacate the order of sanctions 

because Kennard Law did not have a clear record to which it could respond. 

The district court found that a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(b) or Rule 

60(b) was not the proper vehicle to rehash issues raised before the entry of 

judgment. Concluding that Kennard Law’s motion did not cite any change in 

controlling law, present new evidence, or argue relief was necessary to 

correct a manifest error of law or fact, the district court denied the motion to 

reconsider. Kennard Law filed this appeal. 

II 

As a preliminary matter, it is important for us to “examine the basis 

of our own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary.” United States v. Cronan, 937 

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5 

F.2d 163, 164 (5th Cir. 1991). A notice of appeal must include certain 

information (e.g., name of the appealing party), see Fed. R. App. P.

3(c)(1)—otherwise, our subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, McCardell v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 794 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2015). The notice 

of appeal here is confusing, as the appealing party appears to be Thomas, but 

it also states that Kennard Law is appealing a state court judgment. This 

notwithstanding, we find “‘objectively clear’ from the notice” of appeal that 

Kennard Law is appealing the district court’s sanctions order to this Court. 

Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 508 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. App. 

P. 3(c) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment); see, e.g., Garcia v. 

Wash, 20 F.3d 608, 610 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 

III 

“We review the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 for abuse of 

discretion.” Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1995); see also

Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 802–03 (5th Cir. 2003). A 

district court abuses its discretion when it bases its Rule 11 ruling on “an 

erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” 

Elliott, 64 F.3d at 215 (citing FDIC v. Calhoun, 34 F.3d 1291, 1297 (5th Cir. 

1994)). “This court can affirm the district court on any ground supported by 

the record.” Ozmun v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C., 2022 WL 881755, at 

*6 (5th Cir. Mar. 24, 2022) (per curiam) (alterations adopted) (quoting 

United States v. Mazkouri, 945 F.3d 293, 307 (5th Cir. 2019)) (applying the 

principle in the context of imposition of sanctions). 

IV 

Kennard Law argues that the district court erred by granting United’s 

motion for sanctions despite United’s failure to comply with Rule 11’s safe 

harbor provisions. In the alternative, Kennard Law contends that the district 

court’s failure to enforce Rule 11’s safe harbor provisions evinces its intent 

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6 

to sanction Kennard Law sua sponte, and because the district court also 

neglected to follow the procedural requirements of Rule 11(c)(3) for sua 

sponte sanction orders, the judgment should be reversed on that basis as well.2

 

A 

Kennard Law objects to United’s failure to comply with the safe 

harbor provisions of Rule 11. 

When a party moves for sanctions, Rule 11’s safe harbor provisions 

dictate that the motion must be served in compliance with Rule 5 and “must 

not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, 

defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 

21 days after service or within another time the court sets.” Uptown Grill, 

L.L.C. v. Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc., 46 F.4th 374, 388 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)). These provisions cannot be waived by 

the party against whom sanctions are sought. See Elliott, 64 F.3d at 216. 

United concedes, as is evident from the record, that it and the district 

court did not comply with Rule 11’s safe harbor provisions in seeking Rule 11 

sanctions. Rule 11’s safe harbor provisions require a party seeking sanctions 

to serve the motion on the opposing party and then wait 21 days before filing 

the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Kennard Law clearly was not 

afforded 21 days to withdraw any papers that violated Rule 11 because only 

13 days separated the district court’s order, which granted summary 

judgment and invited United to file a motion for sanctions, and United’s 

_____________________ 

2

 Kennard Law also maintains that 1) the district court’s conclusion that Kennard 

Law engaged in sanctionable conduct was erroneous because Sprovach was lead counsel 

and 2) the district court improperly awarded attorneys’ fees and costs sua sponte. Because 

we reverse based on Kennard Law’s procedural challenges to the order imposing sanctions, 

we need not address these additional objections. See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kasler 

Corp., 906 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1990). 

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sanctions motion. To the extent the sanction order relied on United’s motion 

for sanctions, it was improperly entered despite United’s failure to comply 

with the safe harbor provisions. 

B 

 Kennard Law argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

granting Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte without following applicable procedural 

requirements.

 A court may impose sanctions sua sponte under Rule 11. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11(c)(3). The safe harbor provisions do not apply to a district court’s 

sua sponte imposition of sanctions. See id. 11(c)(2). For that reason, we have 

previously assumed that a district court intended to “impose[] . . . sanctions 

on its own initiative” solely because one party had “filed a motion seeking 

sanctions, [but] their motion failed to follow the safe harbor procedures of 

Rule 11.” Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2009). 

But a district court still must follow certain procedural mandates 

before issuing an order imposing sanctions sua sponte. Rule 11(c)(3) provides 

that “[o]n its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show 

cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not violated” Rule 

11. See Jenkins v. Methodist Hosps. of Dall., Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 264 (5th Cir. 

2007) (“If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 

determines Rule 11 sanctions may be warranted, it may sua sponte issue a 

show-cause order specifying the offending conduct and, following a response, 

may impose sanctions.”). “We have held that a district court imposing sua 

sponte sanctions abuses its discretion by disregarding Rule 11’s procedural 

requirements that it issue a show cause order and describe the specific 

offensive conduct.” Brunig, 560 F.3d at 297 (citing Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 

F.3d 710, 722 (5th Cir. 1999)). 

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A show-cause order under Rule 11(c)(3) need not be its own separate 

order. See id. at 297 n.18. We have previously deemed an order adequate to 

satisfy Rule 11(c)(3) where it was included in a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation and simply directed the party against whom sanctions were 

sought, “[i]f [he] chooses[,] to show cause why sanctions may not be 

warranted in this case.” Id. at 297. On the other hand, a final order 

“grant[ing] the appellees their costs as either indemnification or sanctions” 

did not provide sufficient notice to comply with the rule. Goldin, 166 F.3d at 

714, 722. 

Here again, the district court did not comply with these procedural 

requirements. It did not issue an order for Kennard Law to show cause why 

sanctions should not be imposed, and nothing in any of its related orders 

satisfies Rule 11(c)(3)’s mandates. The district court expressly invited 

United to file a motion for sanctions “if desired,” but it did not suggest that 

it would raise the issue sua sponte if United declined to do so. The district 

court’s failure to issue a show-cause order as required by Rule 11(c)(3) 

constitutes an abuse of discretion. Brunig, 560 F.3d at 297. 

V 

 United maintains that the order imposing sanctions should be 

affirmed because the record supports a finding of bad faith such that the 

district court could have relied on its inherent power to impose sanctions.

Federal courts enjoy an inherent power to manage their own affairs to 

achieve the orderly disposition of cases. In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 558–59 

(5th Cir. 2016) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). 

This power includes the ability to discipline attorneys. Id. at 559. “[A] court 

should invoke its inherent power to award attorney’s fees only when it finds 

that fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has 

been defiled.” FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 590 (5th Cir. 2008) 

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, “a specific 

finding that the [sanctioned party] acted in bad faith” is a prerequisite for 

imposing sanctions pursuant to a court’s inherent power. Crowe v. Smith, 151 

F.3d 217, 236 (5th Cir. 1998). We have reversed the imposition of sanctions 

where “the district court merely made general complaints about the 

sanctioned party.” Goldin, 166 F.3d at 722 (citing Elliott, 64 F.3d at 217). 

 Bad faith exists when a party knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous 

argument or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an 

opponent. Portillo v. Cunningham, 872 F.3d 728, 740 n.29 (5th Cir. 2017); see 

also Gate Guard Servs., L.P. v. Perez, 792 F.3d 554, 561 n.4 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(“Bad faith implies that a litigant intentionally took a position he subjectively 

knew was unfounded.”). When invoking its inherent power to sanction 

parties or their attorneys, the court must comply with the mandates of due 

process in determining whether bad faith exists. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. 

And “the threshold for the use of inherent power sanctions is high.” Elliott, 

64 F.3d at 217 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Because “this court can affirm the district court on any ground 

supported by the record,” we may consider United’s inherent-power 

argument despite the fact that it was not raised before the district court. 

Ozmun, 2022 WL 881755, at *6. Ultimately, however, it does not save the 

district court’s order imposing sanctions. 

United’s motion for sanctions did not rely on the district court’s 

inherent power at all. The district court’s sanctions order likewise did not 

refer to its own inherent authority to discipline parties and attorneys. 

Kennard Law had no notice that the district court might rely on its inherent 

power to impose sanctions and no opportunity to respond to the district 

court’s purported bad faith finding. The procedure here therefore did not 

comport with principles of due process. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. 

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Moreover, the district court did not make a “specific finding” of bad faith. 

See Gipson v. Weatherford Coll., 2023 WL 7314355, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 

2023) (per curiam) (“The district court’s order imposing monetary 

sanctions on defense counsel contains no mention of ‘bad faith,’ let alone a 

‘specific finding.’”). Instead, it simply listed several arguably false 

statements Kennard Law made, which is insufficient to show bad faith. 

Goldin, 166 F.3d at 722 (reversing imposition of sanctions where district 

court merely listed frustrating conduct by party). 

 And even if the district court had complied with these procedural 

safeguards, nothing in the final order imposing sanctions amounts to a finding 

of bad faith on the part of Kennard Law. The district court stated simply that 

Kennard Law “could not merely accept as true and trustworthy allegations 

such as those made by Thomas and on that basis present them to a federal 

court.” The district court concluded that Kennard Law “failed to undertake 

any such reasonable inquiry into the allegations made by its client.” These 

failures to act reasonably do not suggest that “fraud has been practiced 

upon” the court “or that the very temple of justice has been defiled.” 

Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d at 590. The district court’s findings do not reflect any 

intentionally or recklessly fraudulent conduct. Accordingly, the order 

imposing sanctions does not satisfy the “high” threshold for invoking a 

district court’s inherent power to sanction attorneys and parties. Elliott, 64 

F.3d at 217. 

* * * 

VACATED and REMANDED. 

 

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