NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DAVID SEGAL, 

Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, an Agency, 

Appellee.

No. 1 CA-UB 22-0358 

Appeal from the A.D.E.S. Appeals Board

No. U-1790328-001-B

The Honorable Marjorie Nanian, Administrative Law Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED

COUNSEL

Yuzhuo Li, Attorney at Law, Mesa

By Yuzhuo Li

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 2-13-2024
SEGAL v. ADES

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Appellant David Segal challenges a determination made by 

the Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) Appeals Board

(“Board”) that he was ineligible for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance 

(“PUA”) and would thus be required to repay the amounts he had received.

Because ADES later waived his repayment obligation, he is no longer 

aggrieved by the Board’s decision. We therefore dismiss the appeal for lack 

of jurisdiction. 

¶2 Between March 2020 and May 2021, Segal applied for and 

received PUA benefits. However, in notices provided to Segal between July 

2021 and November 2021, ADES determined he was not eligible for PUA 

benefits and classified them as overpayments, requiring him “to refund the 

money” to ADES. Segal appealed these determinations, and as pertinent 

here, they were affirmed by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in January 

2022. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and Segal filed his timely 

application for appeal to this court in September 2022. 

¶3 In June 2023, ADES sent four notices to Segal stating that he 

would “not need to repay these benefits because these payments were 

issued incorrectly through no fault of your own, and repayment would be 

contrary to equity and good conscience. . . . The remaining overpayment 

balance and your repayment obligation have been waived in full.” Two 

months later, Segal filed four applications for appeal, acknowledging the 

waiver notices and asking the Board to apply them but arguably still 

challenging his PUA eligibility. In October 2023, this court issued orders 

denying each of those applications for appeal. Meanwhile, in January 2023, 

this court granted Segal’s application for appeal in this case challenging the 

eligibility determination, appointed pro bono counsel to represent him, and 

ordered briefing, which was completed by September 2023.

¶4 We have an independent duty to determine our appellate 

jurisdiction, Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 464, 465 (App. 

1997), which is “defined, and limited, by the Legislature,” Brumett v. MGA 
SEGAL v. ADES

Decision of the Court

3

Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 426, ¶ 4 (App. 2016). See also Ariz. 

Const. art. 6, § 9 (“The jurisdiction, powers, duties and composition of any 

intermediate appellate court shall be as provided by law.”). 

¶5 As Segal notes in his opening brief, this court’s jurisdiction to 

review the Board’s rulings arises from A.R.S. § 41-1993(B), which states that 

a “party aggrieved by a decision of the appeals board may file an application 

for appeal to the court of appeals.” (Emphasis added.) And as 

demonstrated by the unique procedural circumstances of this case, whether 

a party is aggrieved may be affected by events that occur after filing of the 

application for appeal. 

¶6 “To qualify as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate 

to deny the party some personal or property right or to impose a substantial 

burden on the party.” Jewel C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 347, 349, ¶ 3 

(App. 2018) (quoting Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. B-9385, 138 Ariz. 291, 293

(1983)). Originally, Segal was aggrieved by the Board’s decision because it 

found him ineligible for PUA and determined he needed to repay those 

funds. However, given ADES’s subsequent decision to waive the 

overpayments, Segal has been relieved of that obligation and no longer 

faces imposition of a substantial burden or denial of a property right. Nor 

does he argue that the administrative decision regarding eligibility would 

impose collateral consequences. See Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 618, ¶ 9 

(App. 2012) (discussing the “collateral consequences exception” to 

mootness). Thus, whether the Board erred in finding him ineligible for 

those funds is moot, which also means dismissal of the appeal is 

appropriate. Id. at 617, ¶ 5 (noting that an appeal will be dismissed as moot 

“when our action as a reviewing court will have no effect on the parties”). 

¶7 Although the record is not clear as to the precise amount of 

PUA funds Segal received, he has not been harmed given that ADES 

waived his repayment obligations “in full.” Because Segal is no longer 

aggrieved by the Board’s determination that he was not eligible for PUA 

benefits, we dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Chambers v. 

United Farm Workers Org. Comm., AFL-CIO, 25 Ariz. App. 104, 107 (1975) 

(“Dismissal is required for lack of an aggrieved party.”).