alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 21

- 51044 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,**

Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus
**Robert Harvison Graham,**

Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 1:09

- CR

- 144

- 1

Before **King, Higginson,**  and **Willett,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** * Robert Harvison Graham, federal prisoner #03228

- 079, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by unreasonably focusing on harmful parts of his record while ignoring mitigating factors ( such as his post

conviction rehabilitation, his prison disciplinary record, and the need to avoid

* This opinion is no t designated for publication. See **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 12, 2022 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 21-51044 Document: 00516574689 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/12/2022No. 21

- 51044

2 unwarranted sentencing disparities following the amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) under the First Step Act of 2018 )

. We review the district court’s denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion

. United States v. Cooper , 996 F.3d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2021)

. Even if the sentencing disparities and other factors that Graham points to constitute “extraord inary reasons” favoring release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), Graham “still must convince the district judge to exercise discretion to grant the motion after considering the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Shkambi , 993 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 20 21)

. The district court concluded that Graham failed to show that the § 3553(a) factors support an early release. That finding was not an abuse of discretion. On the contrary, the district court’s decision focused on specific fac t s from Graham’s criminal history , including the escalating violence that Graham employed with each successive offense. Graham “ may disagree with how the district court balanced the § 3553(a) factors, [but] that is not a sufficient ground for reversal

. ” United States v. Chambliss , 948 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 2020)

. **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 21-51044 Document: 00516574689 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/12/2022
|   | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Cellcom Israel Ltd.. |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | /s/ Nir Sztern          |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   | Name: Nir Sztern        |   |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |   |

|   | /s/ Shlomi Fruhling     |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   | Name: Shlomi Fruhling   |   |
|   | Chief Financial Officer |   |

----
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 106 (Thursday, June 3, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 31464]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-13293]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[LLORS00100 63500000 DQ0000 LXSS036H0000; HAG10-0275]


Notice of Public Meeting, Salem District Resource Advisory 
Committee Meeting

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of Public Meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) and the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA), the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Salem 
District Resource Advisory Committee (RAC) will meet as indicated 
below.

DATES: June 17, 2010, 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Salem, OR; June 18, 2010, 
8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., Salem, OR.

ADDRESSES: Salem District Office, 1717 Fabry Road SE., Salem, OR 97306

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Program information, meeting records, 
and a roster of committee members may be obtained from Richard 
Hatfield, BLM Salem District Designated Official, 1717 Fabry Road, 
Salem, OR 97306--(503) 375-5682. The meeting agenda will be posted at: 
http://www.blm.gov/or/districts/salem/rac.
    Should you require reasonable accommodation, please contact the BLM 
Salem District--(503) 375-5682 as soon as possible.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Resource Advisory Committee will 
consider proposed projects for Title II funding under Section 205 of 
the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self Determination Act of 2000 
(Pub. L. 110-343) that focus on maintaining or restoring water quality, 
land health, forest ecosystems, and infrastructure.

Aaron G. Horton,
District Manager.
[FR Doc. 2010-13293 Filed 6-2-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-33-P
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 302(a) CERTIFICATION**

 

I,Lisa K. Peterson,****certify that:

 

1.             I havereviewed this quarterly**report on Form 10-Q of CarrekerCorporation;

 

2.             Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.             Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a)             Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b)            Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

c)             Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting;

 

5.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a)             Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

b)            Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 

 
| Date:  |  June 9, 2004      |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   |
|   |
| By:    | /s/ Lisa K.  Peterson   |   |
|   | Lisa  K. Peterson       |
|   | Chief Financial Officer |
|        |                         |        |  |  |

 

1

----
#### Theodore H. Vatterlein v. Demas Barnes, Assignee.

—Motion to charge assignee personally with costs denied, with ten dollars costs. Opinion by

Dykman, J.
Case: 19-30088    Doc# 4068    Filed: 10/02/19    Entered: 10/02/19 09:17:04    Page 1 of2

Case: 19-30088    Doc# 4068    Filed: 10/02/19    Entered: 10/02/19 09:17:04    Page 2 of2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       2,614,550
<SECURITIES>                                    50,874
<RECEIVABLES>                                  719,044
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,721,297
<PP&E>                                      66,552,392
<DEPRECIATION>                              15,114,841
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              59,006,244
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,227,437
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,102,576
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                59,006,244
<SALES>                                     12,370,471
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,524,865
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             8,098,962
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,541,724
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,026,183
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,026,183
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,026,183
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     5.80
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     5.80
        

</TABLE>
#### Frances E. Muller, Respondent, v. Willard G. Wilcox, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.—

Fursman, J.:

In September, 1890, the plaintiff’s husband owed a debt of sixty dollars to the defendant. The defendant thereupon wrote her proposing to take her goods and store them for her, and asked her to give him an order for them “ so no other creditors could touch them.” She agreed to this by a letter in these terms: UI Hereby authorize *622you to take, remove and keep *A*th6 goods, ilsame being in payment or your account made for supplies while living in your village.” This was August 20, 1890. On September first the plaintiff wrote: “Igive yoct order to hold said goods in your possession belonging to me until such time as I can take care of them.” It is clear that up to this time the plaintiff: had not thought of pledging her goods foi payment of her husband-’s, debt, nor to do anything more than to pro* tect her right in them against her husband's creditors. She owed no debt, either to the plaintiff or any one On the same day she wrote to the defendant that she appreciated I his kindness, and expressed her belief that he would “do right” by her. There was evidently a very friendly relation between these parties, and no one carefully reading the evidence can fail to see that this woman < confided fully in the honesty and friendship of the defendant. She seemed to believe that her goods might be taken to satisfy her husband’s debts, and, fostering this belief, the defendant, on the 2d of September, 1890, wrote her: “ I enclose a -writing which please sign and return to me. When I have this I can hold the goods together in face of due process of law any party may attempt. * * * Of course, this writing takes the goods absolute, but it is not my wish to hold them. I hope and trust that the time will come when all these goods will be wanted and used as heretofore.” The defendant knew that the plaintiff was not responsible for her husband’s debt to him, nor for any other debt of his. It was a scheme to collect from her her husband’s debt by representing to her that her property would, be safer from her husband’s creditors in his hands than in hers, and, relying upon his representations and friendship, she placed them there. After-wards the defendant sold them, “ in such a way, he could get them together again ” if plaintiff would pay her husband’s debt to him, with interest, and his charges for storing the goods. The referee finds the value of the goods sold to pay a debt of $60, which the plaintiff did not owe, to be $331.88. The evidence in the case is practically without contradiction, and justifies the conclusion of the referee that the defendant obtained possion of the goods by fraud. The question in the case is wholly one of fact, and the referee having found for the plaintiff upon sufficient evidence the judgment should not be disturbed.

Putnam and Herrick, JJ., concurred.
**Exhibit 99.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION1350, AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connectionwith the Annual Report of Carreker Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q forthe quarterly period ending April 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Terry L. Gage, ChiefFinancial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuantto § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)          TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/    TERRY  L. GAGE |   |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|
| Terry L. Gage, Chief  Financial Officer   |
|                                      |
|                                      |
| Dated:   June  12, 2003    |

 

----
#### JULIAN C. NIXON v. W. J. MORSE.

(Filed 14 September, 1927.)

Partnership — Actions—Accounting—Adjustment.

One partner cannot maintain an action against his copartner for an indebtedness growing out of the' relationship of partnership, unless there has been a settlement between them of the partnership business or some sufficient accounting or adjustment by which to determine their respective liability.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Daniels, J.,*at March Term, 1927, of Ctjr-RiTucic.

No error.

Action to recover upon notes executed by defendant, payable to tbe order of Richardson-Nixon Company, and upon an account for advancements made by said company to defendant. At tbe date of said notes and advancements, tbe Richardson-Nixon Company was a partnership, engaged in business in tbe city of Norfolk, Ya.

Plaintiff alleges tbat be is tbe owner of said notes by endorsement, and of said account by assignment made to him by said company, upon its dissolution.

Defendant alleges tbat be and plaintiff were partners under the firm name and style of Richardson-Nixon Company; tbat tbe notes and *226account sued upon are part of the assets of said partnership, and that the affairs of said partnership have not been adjusted or settled. He alleges that said partnership is indebted to him, and sets up said indebtedness as a counterclaim against plaintiff.

Plaintiff, in his reply, denies that defendant was at any time a member of the firm doing business as Richardson-Nixon Company; he also denies that said partnership is indebted in any sum to defendant.

The issues were answered by the jury as follows:

1. Were plaintiff and defendant partners in the Richardson-Nixon Company, as alleged in the answer? Answer: Yes.

2. Is the defendant indebted to plaintiff as alleged in the complaint, and if so, in what amount? Answer: No.

3. Is plaintiff indebted to defendant as alleged in the answer, and if so, in what amount? Answer: No.

From judgment upon the verdict, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

*McMullan & LcRoy for plaintiff.*

*Ehringhaus & Hall for defendant.*

Peb Cubiam.

Plaintiff’s assignments of error upon his appeal to this Court cannot be sustained.

The jury has found that plaintiff and defendant were partners under the firm name and style of Richardson-Nixon Company. The notes sued upon, executed by defendant, were payable to the order of the partnership; the advancements were made by the partnership to defendant. Both the notes and the account for advancements are assets of the partnership. Neither plaintiff nor defendant can maintain an action against the other for the recovery of partnership assets. There has been no settlement of the partnership business. The claims of plaintiff and defendant, growing out of their dealings with the partnership, have not been adjusted. There has been no accounting between the partnership and its members, in order to determine their respective rights in and to the partnership assets.

The judgment is affirmed. There is

No error.
A96A1028.

#### HARPER v. THE STATE.

(474 SE2d 288)

Judge Harold R. Banke.

Antonio Harper was convicted of armed robbery and aggravated assault. On appeal, Harper challenges the trial court’s limitation on the scope of voir dire. *Held:*

Harper claims that the trial court abused its discretion in its conduct of voir dire because his trial counsel was not permitted to pose nine questions to prospective jurors. We disagree. Limitation placed on counsel in questioning during voir dire under OCGA § 15-12-133 lies largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and *394appellate courts should not interfere with the court’s exercise of that discretion unless it has been manifestly abused. *White v. State,*230 Ga. 327, 337 (5) (196 SE2d 849) (1973); *Thomas v. State,*217 Ga. App. 720, 721 (2) (458 SE2d 897) (1995).

Decided August 2, 1996.

*Donald W. Rogers,*for appellant.

*Fredric D. Bright, District Attorney, Stephen A. Bradley, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellee.

It is not within the purview of voir dire to inquire into technical legal questions, such as those ultimately involving the presumption of innocence, issues which are more properly the subject of a legal charge by the trial court. *Henderson v. State,*173 Ga. App. 302, 303 (1) (326 SE2d 246) (1985). For this reason, the trial court properly excluded counsel’s questions about the presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof on the allegations in the indictment, and the comparative guilt of Harper relative to other persons. Counsel’s questions about the State’s evidentiary burden and proof beyond a reasonable doubt were also properly disallowed. *Anderson v. State,*169 Ga. App. 729, 731 (2) (314 SE2d 735) (1984).

Generally, juror examination should be confined to questions designed to elicit the possible prejudice of jurors against the accused or juror bias or interest in the outcome. See *Mills v. State,*137 Ga. App. 305, 306 (2) (223 SE2d 498) (1976). In this case, counsel’s other technical questions of a legal nature about an indictment as evidence of guilt, the function of grand jury proceedings, and the role of jurors as factfinders were all subjects for instruction by the court and were not proper subjects for voir dire questioning. Id.

The trial court also properly excluded counsel’s question about magazine subscription preferences. See *Henderson v. State,*251 Ga. 398, 401 (306 SE2d 645) (1983). Finally, counsel’s inquiry into whether jurors would ascribe more credibility to a police officer’s testimony was impermissible. *Lewis v. State,*186 Ga. App. 349, 352 (3) (a) (367 SE2d 123) (1988).

Harper failed to present any evidence that the trial court “manifestly abused” its discretion in limiting the scope of voir dire. Harper’s counsel was not prevented from determining whether any jurors were biased or partial but was restricted only from asking improper questions. See *Thomas,*217 Ga. App. at 721 (2).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Birdsong, P. J, and Blackburn, J, concur.*
Exhibit
      32.2




**CERTIFICATION**




I,
      Edwin
      F. Heinen, Chief Financial Officer of Glowpoint, Inc., a
      Delaware corporation (the "Company"), do hereby certify, in accordance with
      18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as created pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that:




1)  The accompanying
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the six and three months ended
      June 30, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section
      13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
      amended; and




2)  The information
      contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and results of operations of the Company .




Date:
      June 6, 2007




/s/
                Edwin F. HeinenEdwin
                F. Heinen
              Chief
                Financial Officer




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 (“Section 906”), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or
      otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the
      electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been
      provided to Glowpoint, Inc. and will be retained by Glowpoint, Inc. and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request
EXHIBIT A

Transmittal Letter

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4633-1 Filed: 11/08/19 Entered: 11/08/19 17:04:46 Page 1

of 2
Lincoln Advisors Limited 

500 West Madison Street

Suite 3900 

Chicago, Illinois 60661 www.lincolninternational.com

November 8, 2019 

Ms. Karen Lockhart 

Chair, Official Committee of Tort Claimants 

Pacific Gas and Electric Co. and PG&E Corp 

Klockhart1492@gmail.com

Re: In re: PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company – Case No. 19-30088 

Dear Karen: 

Enclosed please find our firm’s first interim fee application in the above-captioned cases, along with 

its exhibits and supporting certification. The Bankruptcy Court’s Guidelines for Compensation and 

Expense Reimbursement of Professionals and Trustees provides that a debtor-in-possession, a 

trustee, or an official committee must exercise reasonable business judgement in monitoring the fees 

and expenses of the estates’ professionals. I invite you to discuss with me any objections, concerns 

or questions that you may have with the firm’s fee request. The Office of the United States Trustee 

will also accept your comments. The Court will consider timely-filed objections by any party in interest 

at the time of hearing, which will take place at a time to be announced shortly. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ Brent C. Williams 

Brent C. Williams 

Managing Director 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4633-1 Filed: 11/08/19 Entered: 11/08/19 17:04:46 Page 2

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