J. S20016/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.N.R., 

A MINOR

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.R., FATHER : No. 3305 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree, September 29, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000835-2016,

CP-51-DP-0001108-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 19, 2017

A.R. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered September 29, 2016, 

in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petition of 

the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and 

involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor, dependent son, 

R.N.R. (“Child”), born in November of 2012, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 Father further appeals 

the order entered September 29, 2016, changing Child’s permanency goal to 

 

1 By separate decree entered the same date, the trial court also involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, B.N. (“Mother”), also 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother did not 

appeal, nor is she a party to the instant appeal.
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adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.2 After review, 

we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history, 

in part, as follows:

The family in this case has been known to DHS 

since March 17, 2015, when DHS received a report 

that Child had been taken to a hospital by Father. 

Father alleged that B.N. (“Mother”) abused and 

neglected Child. Father threatened to physically 

harm hospital staff if they did not treat Child. On 

March 19, DHS visited Father in the home of J.F., 

Child’s paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). The 

home was appropriate, and Grandmother told DHS 

that she supported Father and Child. On April 14, 

2015, Grandmother informed DHS that she had 

evicted Father and Child after Father had threatened 

her. DHS met with Father in a temporary residence, 

but he was unable to obtain stable housing through 

other services because he had been banned for 

threatening employees there. On May 14, 2015, the 

trial court adjudicated Child dependent, fully 

committed him to DHS custody and placed him in 

foster care. The case was then transferred to a 

Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) which 

developed a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) with objectives 

 

2

Father failed include any claim relating to the change of Child’s 

permanency goal in the statement of questions involved section of his brief, 

and failed to develop any argument related to this issue in his brief. Any 

challenge to this issue is therefore waived. See Krebs v. United Refining 

Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that, a 

failure to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion 

of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues); In re W.H., 

25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 

2011), quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“‘[W]here 

an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful 

fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”’).
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for Father. Over the course of 2015 and 2016, 

Father did not complete his objectives. . . .[3] 

Trial court opinion, 11/10/16 at 1.

The trial court held regular permanency review hearings in this matter. 

Throughout these reviews, the trial court maintained Child’s commitment 

and placement and permanency goal.

DHS filed petitions to terminate parental rights and for a goal change 

on September 13, 2016. The trial court held a combined termination/goal 

change hearing on September 29, 2016. In support thereof, DHS and the 

Child Advocate presented the testimony of the following: Andrea Freeman, 

CUA, NET, aftercare worker, former case manager; Nashanta Robinson, 

CUA, NET, case manager; Calea Moore, CUA, NET, case aid. In addition, 

there was an agreement to stipulate that CUA would testify as to the facts in 

the petition. (Notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 8.) DHS also offered Exhibits 

DHS 1-5, and the Child Advocate offered Exhibits CA 1-5, which were all 

admitted without objection. (Id. at 6-7, 12-13.) Father additionally 

testified on his own behalf. By decree entered September 29, 2016, the trial 

 

3

Father’s objectives included compliance with Northeast Treatment Centers 

(“NET”) services; enrollment in Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for 

employment and drug and alcohol therapy; attendance at the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (“CEU”); attendance at Behavioral Health Services (“BHS”); 

housing; visitation; completion of a parenting capacity evaluation; signature 

of consent forms; participation in a dual-diagnosis program; and provision of 

proof of employment and income. (Notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 26.) 

Testimony was also presented as to referrals for parenting, anger 

management, and domestic violence. Id. at 29.
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court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Father pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On August 25, 2016, 

Father, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal, along with 

a concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Father raises the following issue for our review: 

Whether the trial court terminated the Father’s 

parental rights in the absence of clear and convincing 

evidence that termination served the needs and 

welfare of the child?

Father’s brief at 2.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. 

“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, 

should not be reversed merely because the record 

would support a different result. Id. at 827. We 

have previously emphasized our deference to trial 

courts that often have first-hand observations of the 

parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, controls 

the termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis, as 

follows:

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We 

have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we 

need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, Father does not challenge the trial 

court’s finding of grounds for termination under Section 2511(a). We, 

therefore, analyze the court’s termination pursuant to Section 2511(b) only, 

which provides as follows: 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
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With regard to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as 

follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 

53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that 

the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” 

requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on 

the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed 

below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption 

of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing 

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted).
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Moreover, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) 

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster parent. 

. . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Instantly, in examining Section 2511(b) and determining whether 

termination of Father’s parental rights serves Child’s needs and welfare, the 

trial court reasoned as follows:

Father misses half his scheduled visits with Child. 

He claims he oversleeps. Father does not use the 

visits to build a relationship with Child. He does not 

interact with Child, but argues with and threatens 

CUA employees. Father is hostile and threatening to 

everyone he interacts with. His visits had to be 

moved to DHS because he fought with CUA. He 

fought with parents during visits. Father 

demonstrated no interest in reunification with Child. 

His main concern was ensuring Child was placed with 

one of his family members. Child is not bonded with 

Father, and calls Father by his first name only. 

When Father testified about his relationship with 

Child, the only positive example he could provide of 

their relationship was that Father had once bought 

Child expensive sneakers. Child would not suffer 
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irreparable harm if Father’s rights were terminated. 

Child is placed in a pre-adoptive foster home, and 

calls his foster mother “Mom.” He is very happy 

there and responds well to the foster mother. The 

foster mother takes Child to events with her family, 

and meets all of Child’s daily needs. The foster 

mother has made extraordinary efforts to provide 

Child a safe and stable home, choosing to give up 

other foster children in order to keep him. It is in 

Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental 

rights. Consequently, the court did not abuse its 

discretion when it found that it was clearly and 

convincingly established that there was no positive, 

beneficial parent-child bond with Father, and that 

termination of Father’s parental rights would not 

destroy an existing beneficial relationship.

Trial court opinion, 11/10/16 at 10-11 (citations to record omitted).

Father, however, argues that expert testimony was not offered 

regarding the bond between him and Child or the effect of the termination of 

his parental rights. (Father’s brief at 11.) Rather, only the testimony of one 

social worker, who had not recently observed visits between Father and 

Child, was presented. (Id.) Highlighting his own testimony, Father asserts 

that he, in fact, had a “close and caring” relationship with Child. (Id.) In 

further support of this, Father notes that the court took judicial notice that 

Child called Father “Dad” at recent visits. (Id. at 12.) Hence, Father 

maintains that “the trial court’s conclusion that that [sic] no positive 

beneficial bond existed between Father and Child, and that terminating 

Father’s parental rights would not be detrimental to Child is not supported 

by the evidence.” (Id. at 13.) We disagree.
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Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s 

needs and welfare favor termination of Father’s parental rights. Initially, we 

observe that Father’s compliance with his established objectives was 

reported as “minimal” or “none.” (Notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 41, 83.) 

Further, former CUA case manager, Andrea Freeman, indicated that Father 

did not appear interested in reunification. (Id. at 41.) Rather, “his main 

concern was his son being taken in by a family member.” (Id. at 42.) 

Likewise, the current CUA case manager at the time of the hearing, 

Nashanta Robinson, confirmed that Father indicated that, if Child were 

reunified with him, Child would be with his mother. (Id. at 82-82.)

Additionally, Father’s visitation with Child remained supervised and 

was changed from occurring at CUA to DHS with male supervision due to an 

altercation between Father and the case aid and another parent. (Id. at 34, 

101-102.) The CUA case aid who supervised Father’s visits with Child while 

still at CUA, Calea Moore, noted two instances where Father exhibited 

threatening behavior at visitation. (Id. at 101-02.) Ms. Moore also 

observed that Father was “aggressive” and “disrespectful” toward female 

caseworkers. (Id. at 102.) Ms. Freeman recounted that Father’s visits were 

not consistent, at one point 50 percent, noting he would oversleep or 
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forget.4 (Id. at 34-35.) Similarly, Ms. Robinson stated that Father missed 

4 of 14 visits since the last hearing.5 (Id. at 80.) As to the interaction 

between Father and Child during the visits, Ms. Moore observed that there 

was not a lot of interaction between Father and Child. (Id. at 103.) 

Ms. Moore stated that Father was instead distracted, contacting case 

managers or talking to other parents. (Id. at 102-103.) Father did not offer 

redirection or even acknowledge redirection was required. (Id. at 104.) In 

describing the visits, Father offered, “[W]e basically play, and I buy him 

stuff.” (Id. at 110.) All of the CUA workers testified that Child called Father 

by his first name. (Id. at 54-55, 86-87, 103.)

Moreover, and significantly, Child is in a pre-adoptive home. (Id. at 

43.) Child “responds well” to his foster mother, whom he calls “Mom.” (Id.

at 43, 53.) Ms. Freeman characterized the relationship as consisting of a 

mother-child bond. (Id. at 44.) In addition, as reported by Ms. Freeman, 

Child’s foster mother is “fully able to meet all of [Child’s] needs.” (Id. at 

54.) Ms. Robinson further corroborated the positive nature of the 

relationship, noting how Child’s foster mother provides redirection as well as 

educational stimulation. (Id. at 84.)

 

4 Ms. Freeman confirmed confrontational behavior, including inappropriate 

text messages, on the part of Father toward herself as well as other CUA 

caseworkers. (Id. at 52. See also Exhibit CA-4.) Father claimed these 

were not his text messages and suggested that a text-free application was 

used to insert his information. (Id. at 109-110.)

5

Father blamed missing these visits on Ms. Robinson. (Id. at 114-115.)
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As such, Ms. Freeman changed the Child’s goal to adoption and, 

referencing the lack of a father-son bond, opined there would be no 

irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated. (Id. at 42, 

44-45.) Likewise, Ms. Robinson confirmed Child’s goal was still adoption and 

suggested adoption would be in Child’s best interest. (Id. at 84.) Thus, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

termination of Father’s parental rights serves Child’s needs and welfare 

pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Accordingly, we affirm the decree of the trial court involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights and order changing Child’s permanency 

goal to adoption.

Decree affirmed. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/19/2017