Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed October 12, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-1997

Lower Tribunal No. 13-16209

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Suresh Gidwani and Bina Gidwani,

Appellants,

vs.

Sherry Roberts and Alice Randolph,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Oscar 

Rodriguez-Fonts, Judge.

ALGO Firm and Harvey J. Sepler (Hollywood), for appellants.

Vincent F. Vaccarella, P.A., and John A. Moore and Zachary L. Auspitz 

(Ft. Lauderdale), for appellees.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and EMAS, and MILLER, JJ. 

FERNANDEZ, C.J.
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Defendants Suresh Gidwani and Bina Gidwani (“defendants”) appeal 

the trial court’s: 1) July 13, 2021 “Final Judgment on Damages Against 

Defendants”; 2) August 13, 2021 “Order on Defendants Suresh Gidwani and 

Bina Gidwani’s Motion for Rehearing of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Judgment”; 

and 3) September 21, 2021 “Order Denying Request for Relief from Final 

Judgment Contained in ‘Defendants Suresh Gidwani and Bina Gidwani’s 

Motion for Rehearing of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Judgment.’” Defendants’ 

argument that the award was excessive and unsupported by the evidence is 

not supported by the record on appeal, thus the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion. Furthermore, the Court accepts plaintiffs’ concession on the 

appellate attorneys’ fees error. Accordingly, the amount of attorneys’ fees 

awarded in the trial court’s “Final Judgment on Damages Against 

Defendants” is reduced from $266,476.25 to $247,463.75, and the case is 

remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an amended final 

judgment consistent with this Court’s decision, as well as for a recalculation 

of the prejudgment interest. The remainder of the award as it relates to costs 

in the amount of $18,258.28 is affirmed. In addition, we affirm the trial court’s 

August 13, 2021 order, as the trial court granted defendants the relief they 

requested in that motion by granting the rehearing. Regarding the 

September 21, 2021 “Order Denying Request for Relief from Final Judgment 
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Contained in ‘Defendants Suresh Gidwani and Bina Gidwani’s Motion for 

Rehearing of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Judgment’”, we reverse that order

consistent with our reversal of the final judgment on damages with respect 

to attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. In sum, we affirm in part, reverse 

in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The action below stems from a more than six-year dispute between 

two sets of Miami Beach condominium unit owners over who owned two 

parking spaces in the Decoplage Condominiums on Miami Beach, Florida. 

On May 6, 2013, Sherry Roberts and Alice Randolph (“plaintiffs”) filed a 

three-count complaint against Suresh Gidwani and Bina Gidwani

(“defendants”): Count 1 for declaratory judgment; Count II for a temporary

injunction; and Count III for damages regarding ownership of the two parking 

spaces. In Count I, plaintiffs asked the trial court to determine who owned 

the two parking spaces. Count II sought an order prohibiting defendants from 

using the spaces or renting them out to others. In Count III, plaintiffs sought 

damages related to the defendants’ prior use/renting of the parking spaces. 

In October 2015, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, which the 

trial court granted. Defendants appealed the final summary judgment as to 
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liability, as well as the final judgment awarding damages and attorneys’ fees 

entered in favor of plaintiffs. This Court reversed in Gidwani v. Roberts, 248 

So. 3d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), finding that genuine issues of material fact 

regarding who owned the subject parking spaces precluded summary 

judgment for plaintiffs. The case was thus remanded for trial. 

Subsequently, after a two-day bench trial was held in May 2019, the 

court entered Final Judgment for plaintiffs on June 2, 2019. Regarding Count 

I for declaratory judgment, the court found that the parking spaces were 

assigned appurtenant to plaintiffs’ unit and were included in the sale to 

plaintiffs at the time they purchased their unit at the Decoplage in 1998 and 

not to defendants when they purchased their unit in 2011. The trial court 

deemed Count II for injunction to be moot because the spaces were sold by 

the plaintiffs in 2016 during pendency of the litigation below. As to Count III 

for damages, plaintiffs sought to have defendants disgorge $6,700 

defendants had earned by renting the two parking spaces out to others 

during the time plaintiffs owned the parking spaces. The trial court found in 

favor of plaintiffs on Count III, but only awarded $1.00 in nominal damages 

to plaintiffs because it found that plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove 

damages, “as there was insufficient testimony adduced showing that 

Plaintiffs had or were going to rent the Spaces during the time that 
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Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their right to use the Spaces.” Finding that 

plaintiffs had prevailed on Count I, the trial court found plaintiffs were the 

prevailing parties and thus were entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s 

fees and costs, according to section 31.03 of the Decoplage’s Declaration of 

Condominium and section 718.303(1), Florida Statute (2019). The trial court 

reserved jurisdiction regarding the amount of fees and costs. Defendants 

moved for rehearing, which the trial court denied.

Defendants appealed the Final Judgment to this Court, contending that 

the trial court erred in entering declaratory judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, and 

in the alternative, that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs were 

entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. On August 5, 2020, this 

Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. Gidwani v. Roberts, 

306 So. 3d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). This Court also found plaintiffs were 

entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees. The case then returned to the trial court 

a second time to determine the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and 

costs.

Meanwhile, on December 10, 2019, plaintiffs had filed their “Motion to 

Determine Reasonable Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs,” seeking 

$266,476.25 in attorneys’ fees and $22,535.39 in costs. Plaintiffs filed 

supporting attorney affidavits, detailed contemporaneous time records, and 
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a fee expert affidavit detailing the expert’s lodestar analysis. Plaintiffs also 

filed “Plaintiffs’ Corrected Notice of Filing Supplemental Affidavit,” which was 

plaintiffs’ trial counsel’s supplemental affidavit regarding plaintiffs’ costs. 

Defendants filed their response and objections, contesting entitlement, 

arguing for a lower award of attorney’s fees and costs. They also attached a 

report by their fee expert, Debra L. Feit, which did not set forth a lodestar 

analysis. Evidentiary hearings before the trial court were held on three 

separate days: October 7, 2020; December 8, 2020; and February 1, 2021. 

The parties stipulated that the hourly rates being charged by plaintiffs’ 

lawyers were reasonable. 

On June 14, 2021, the trial court entered its eleven-page “Order on 

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Determine Reasonable Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and 

Costs” upon which its Final Judgment is based. First, the trial court did not 

undo the predecessor judge’s order finding plaintiffs were entitled to 

attorney’s fees, as defendants had requested. Next, in determining the 

reasonableness of the attorney’s fees, the trial court followed the lodestar 

approach as set out in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 

So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 1985). The trial court found that plaintiffs met their 

burden of presenting evidence via affidavits, contemporaneous time records, 

and expert report and testimony detailing the nature and extent of services 
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performed by their attorneys. The trial court stated that the burden then 

shifted to the defendants to point out with specificity which hours should be 

deducted. The court outlined in detail why defendants did not meet their 

burden and thus found that the rates and fees charged were reasonable. It

awarded the plaintiffs $266,476.25 in attorneys’ fees. In addition, the court 

awarded plaintiffs $18,258.28 in costs, also detailed in its order. Defendants 

moved for rehearing, and another evidentiary hearing was held before the 

trial court on August 23, 2021. On September 21, 2021, the trial court denied 

the motion for rehearing. Defendants now file this third appeal.

Defendants argue that 1) plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action, 

and there was no case or controversy before the trial court or this Court from 

which to impose fees and costs; 2) the amount of attorney’s fees and 

litigation costs assessed were excessive, disproportionate to the results 

obtained, and not sufficiently proved; and 3) because the attorney’s fee 

award was excessive and reflected unclaimed appellate attorneys’ fees and 

duplicative billing, it is unreasonable. Plaintiffs answer that the trial court 

never lost jurisdiction; the trial court’s order determining fees and costs is 

supported by substantial competent evidence; and defendants have not 

made any argument to reduce any of the costs award.
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“An appellate court reviews issues of jurisdiction under a de novo

standard of review.” Graves v. State, 331 So. 3d 210, 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2022). Furthermore, “[t]he standard of review for an award of attorney’s fees 

is abuse of discretion.” Bateman v. Serv. Ins. Co., 836 So. 2d 1109, 1111 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Judicial discretion is abused:

when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 

which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only 

where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the 

trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of 

the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the 

trial court abused its discretion.

Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980). Factual findings 

are reviewed to determine whether they are “supported by competent, 

substantial evidence,” and the “findings of fact come to the appellate court 

with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless they are 

clearly erroneous.” Haas Automation, Inc. v. Fox, 243 So. 3d 1017, 1023 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2018). 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Defendants first claim that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case 

when, during the pendency of the underlying case in the trial court, plaintiffs 

sold their rights to the subject parking spaces in March 2016. They claim that 

plaintiffs should not have been awarded attorneys’ fees for the period that 
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defendants contend the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the case. 

Plaintiffs counter that the trial court never lost jurisdiction over the case

because on August 5, 2020, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in 

its entirety. Gidwani, 306 So. 3d at 1054. Consequently, this Court has 

already implicitly determined in that opinion that the trial court had jurisdiction 

over the case. Thus, defendants’ argument on this issue is without merit.

II. Competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s order 

determining fees and costs

Defendants next contend that the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs 

assessed were excessive, disproportionate to the outcome, and not 

sufficiently proved. However, defendants have not shown how the trial court 

abused its discretion in determining the lodestar amount and determining 

fees and costs.

Adhering to Rowe, this Court in Universal Property & Casualty 

Insurance Company v. Deshpande, 314 So. 3d 416, 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), 

stated:

In determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded, a 

trial court is required to use the lodestar approach and consider 

the eight criteria set forth in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund 

v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). “Under Rowe, a trial court 

must first determine the lodestar amount, which is the number of 

attorney hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable 

hourly rate.” Joyce v. Federated Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 So. 3d 1122, 
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1126 (Fla. 2017) (citing Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150–51). “The trial 

court must set forth ‘specific findings’ as to its determination of 

the number of hours, the hourly rate, and any reduction or 

enhancement factors.” Id. (citing Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151). We 

review the trial court's evidentiary findings regarding the 

attorneys’ fee award for competent, substantial evidence. 

Pazmino v. Gonzalez, 273 So. 3d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2019).

Thus, the trial court must first determine the “lodestar” amount, which is the 

number of attorney hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable 

hourly rate. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150-51. In calculating the hourly rate, the 

trial court is to consider all eight Rowe factors “except the ‘time and labor 

required,’ the ‘novelty and difficulty of the question involved,’ the ‘results 

obtained,’ and ‘[w]hether the fee is fixed or contingent.’” Id. The trial court 

must set forth “specific findings” as to its determination of the number of 

hours reasonably expended, the hourly rate, and the appropriateness of any 

reduction or enhancement factors. Id. at 1151. “Once the court determines 

a lodestar figure, it may add or subtract from that fee based on a ‘contingency 

risk’ factor and the ‘results obtained.’” Id. “If the court decides to adjust the 

lodestar, it must state the grounds on which it justified the enhancement or 

reduction.” Id. “[T]he trial court has ‘broad discretion’ to award fees; on 

appeal, this court will reverse a fee award only if there has been an abuse of 

discretion.” Schmitz v. Schmitz, 891 So. 2d 1140, 1141-42 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2005).
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Here, the record reflects that the trial court adhered to Rowe. The trial 

court’s order awarding fees set forth specific findings as to time reasonably 

expended, the hourly rate (to which both parties stipulated as being 

reasonable), as well as the appropriateness of any other reduction or 

enhancement factors. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151. On page 2 of the trial 

court’s “Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Determine Reasonable Amount of 

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs,” the court cited Rowe and outlined the factors to 

be considered. The court noted that the first step in the lodestar analysis 

required the court to determine the number of hours reasonably expended 

in the litigation. Regarding hours reasonably expended, the trial court stated 

it “should first look to ‘accurate records kept by counsel,’ that detail ‘the 

dates, amount, and specific services provided.’” The trial court reviewed 

plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit, as well as plaintiffs’ counsels’ affidavits and 

records and contemporaneous detailed time sheets. The trial court further 

stated that he accepted plaintiffs’ fee expert, Michael Kurzman, as an expert 

and noted that Mr. Kurzman determined that the reasonable hours and fees 

expended was 782.37 hours, totaling $266,476.25 in fees, after applying 

certain deductions. He found this was a reasonable fee award for the six 

years of legal work and that the various hourly rates charged were lower than 

the reasonable hourly rates charged in South Florida. The trial court 
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accepted Mr. Kurzman’s deduction for credits or professional courtesy 

discounts of $9,900.00 and 1.8 hours at $385/hour because there was a May 

2018 entry related to an appeal. The trial court then found that plaintiffs “met 

their burden of presenting evidence by way of affidavits, contemporaneous 

time records, an expert report and testimony detailing the nature and extent 

of services performed by their attorneys.” The trial court stated that the 

burden then shifted to defendants “to point out with specificity which hours 

should be deducted.” 

Also, the trial court noted that the defendants argued that because 

plaintiffs sold the parking spaces for $52,500, then the reasonable attorneys’ 

fees could not exceed that amount. The defendants argued that reasonable 

attorneys’ fees would be 1/3 of $52,500 because they contended plaintiffs 

only prevailed under the declaratory judgment count. The court rejected this 

argument.

Here, the record does not reflect that Count I for declaratory judgment 

as to when the two parking spaces had been assigned involved an attempt 

to declare the value of the spaces. The record does not contain any evidence 

on the valuation of the two parking spaces. Accordingly, as plaintiffs contend, 

because there was no evidence or testimony presented as to the valuation 
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of the spaces, there is no support for defendants’ contention that the spaces 

were valued at $52,500. 

In addition, the amount at issue is only one factor to be considered. 

Plaintiffs’ expert, Mr. Kurzman, was asked on cross-examination if the 

amount of attorneys’ fees plaintiffs were seeking was reasonable if the value 

of the asset was only $52,500. He answered “Yes.” He further testified that:

[T]here is no case filed here in Florida that says the amount 

involved dictates the amount of the case. I have seen cases 

where an insurance claim was fighting over an MRI, which was 

like $1,000, and they ran up $300,000 in fees fighting over the 

entitlement to the MRI, and the Court said that was reasonable.

Mr. Kurzman also testified that in addition to the issue regarding who owned 

the parking spaces, also at issue was the parties’ exposure to an attorneys’ 

fees award. Thus, the record reflected that for the six years the case was 

litigated, plaintiffs’ attorneys reasonably expended 782.37 hours. The rate 

charged was reasonable, as it was below the average South Florida rate, 

and importantly, the parties stipulated to the hourly rate.

Furthermore, defendants’ expert, Ms. Keit, argued that it was 

unreasonable for anyone to spend more than $50,000 on attorneys’ fees in 

the underlying case, but she also conceded that defendants incurred much 

more than $50,000 in attorneys’ fees at the trial court level. During her 

testimony, Ms. Feit did not dispute that based on defendants’ own 
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interrogatory responses, defendants’ second trial law firm charged 

$43,023.50 for only five months of representation. Their third trial law firm 

charged $83,625.00 for six months of legal work. Ms. Feit testified that she 

charged $8,200.00 for her expert time alone. 

Here, the trial court found that 782.37 in legal hours was expended 

over the course of the six years. In Brake v. Murphy, 736 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1999), this Court found that the hours were excessive in a case where 

attorneys spent 2,219.50 hours over two years. In State Farm Fire & 

Casualty Company v. Palma, 524 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), 

the Fourth District Court of appeal affirmed a recovery of $253,500 in 

attorney’s fees for litigation to recover a $600 medical bill. Thus, we find that 

the trial court satisfied the mandatory requirements of Rowe, and defendants 

failed to show how the trial court abused its discretion. The “Order on 

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Determine Reasonable Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and 

Costs” and the evidentiary hearing transcripts reveal that, in determining 

reasonableness, the trial court considered applicable case law and 

competent expert testimony. Burton Family P’ship v. Luani Plaza, Inc., 276 

So. 3d 920, 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (holding that there was no abuse of 

discretion shown when the trial court’s award was based upon competent 

evidence and expert testimony). 
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III. Plaintiffs concede to a reduction for inadvertent inclusion of 

appellate attorneys’ fees invoice

Next, in their Answer Brief, plaintiffs concede that Invoice No. 48892 

reflecting $19,012.50 for fifty-four (54) hours of appellate work was 

inadvertently included in the invoices in support of plaintiffs’ motion for fees, 

and thus mistakenly included in the trial court’s lodestar analysis. Plaintiffs 

were only seeking attorneys’ fees for trial work. Thus, they concede that a 

reduction of $19,012.50 is to be taken from the $266,476.25 attorney’s fee 

award. Accordingly, the correct amount would be $247,463.75 based on 

728.37 hours (782.37 hours minus the fifty-four (54) appellate attorney 

hours).

IV. Credibility of witnesses

Regarding the credibility of the expert witnesses, “[t]he quality of that 

testimony and the weight to be assigned thereto were matters properly for 

consideration and determination by the trial court.” South Dade Farms, Inc. 

v. Atlantic Nat’l Bank, 222 So. 2d 275, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). At four 

hearings that took place before the trial court, the court weighed the 

credibility of the witnesses, and the court did not find Ms. Feit’s testimony to 

be as credible as that of Mr. Kurzman’s. In her cross-examination, Ms. Feit 
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was discredited when she admitted that she lied in her Report when she 

stated that she had been an associate in 2011 and 2012 for Tonja Haddad, 

PA firm. At the hearing, she testified she was not admitted into the Florida 

Bar until July 2013. Ms. Feit further admitted that she was currently the 

subject of two Florida Bar Complaints regarding her billing practices, one of 

which was before the grievance committee. And finally, Ms. Feit’s 117-page 

Report did not provide a lodestar analysis.

V. Defendants have not made any argument to reduce any costs 

awarded

As plaintiffs correctly contend, defendants have not made any 

argument for the reduction of costs in their Initial Brief or Reply Brief, thus 

the $18,258.28 in costs award is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The record on appeal establishes that the trial court’s “Order on 

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Determine Reasonable Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and 

Costs” was supported by competent, substantial evidence. Thus, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in entering Final Judgment for plaintiffs.

Defendants would like this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial 

court, but that is something this Court cannot do. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 
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13, 16 (Fla. 1976) (holding “[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court through re-evaluation of the 

testimony and evidence from the record on appeal before it.”). For these 

reasons and because plaintiffs have conceded error on the inclusion of the 

appellate attorneys’ fees invoice, we reverse the “Final Judgment on 

Damages Against Defendants” in part and remand to the trial court to reduce 

the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded from $266,476.25 to $247,463.75, 

which reflects the deduction of the fifty-four (54) hours of appellate attorneys’ 

fees plaintiffs conceded was erroneously included in the attorneys’ fees 

award. In addition, the trial court is to recalculate the prejudgment interest. 

We affirm the remainder of the award in the Final Judgment as it relates to 

costs. The trial court’s August 13, 2021 “Order on Defendants Suresh 

Gidwani and Bina Gidwani’s Motion for Rehearing of Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Final Judgment” is affirmed, as the trial court already granted defendants the 

relief they requested in that motion. We reverse in part the trial court’s 

September 21, 2021 order, insofar as the $266,476.25 attorneys’ fees figure 

and prejudgment interest needs to be reduced and recalculated, 

respectively, for the aforementioned reasons. The costs award is affirmed.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded with instructions.