## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

Guzm an v. 7513 West Madison S treet, Inc. , 2013 IL App (1st) 122161

Appellate Court Caption MARCEL I NO GUZ MAN, BERTHA GUZ MAN and BEV ERL Y MYERS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. 7513 WES T MADI SON STREE T
, I NC., d/b/a Duffy ’s Tave rn, De fenda nt-Appellee

.

District & N o. First District, F ifth Division Docke t No. 1-12-2161

Filed Marc h 29, 2013

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) I n an action under the Dra mshop Act wher e the shop’s insurer i s insolvent and the I llinois I nsuranc e Guaranty Fund is defe nding, and
p laintiffs have rec overe d from their underinsure d motorist insurer, t h e intox icated person’ s automobile liability i nsurer or their g roup health insurer, and the jury ’s verdic t exceeds d ef en d ant’s maxi mum liability under the Act, the reduc tion for “other insurance ” rec overie s arising from section 546(a) of th e I llinois I nsuranc e Code should be made from defe ndant’s maximum dramshop liability to e ach pla intiff, not from the jury ’s damag e aw ard.

Dec ision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 09-L -15784; the Hon. Moira S. J ohnson, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Certified que stion answere d; cause rema nded.Counsel on

Appea l Kevin B . Apter, of L ipkin & Hig g ins, of Chicag o, for a ppellants.

Mary Be th O’B rien, of L indsay
, Rappaport & Postel, L L C, and Hug h C. Griff in, of Hall Prang le & Schoonveld, L L C, both of Chicag o, for appellee

.

Panel J USTI CE HOWSE delivered the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion. Presiding J ustice McB ride and J ustice Palmer concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 I n this c ase we consider a question cer tified by the trial court conce rning the obligation of the I llinois I nsuranc e Guar anty Fund when the Fund assumes the defe nse of a dramshop

case beca use the defe ndants’ insurer is decla red insolvent. We g rante d leave to appea l in this permissive interlocutory appea l pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 308 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010)). ¶ 2 The following question was ce rtified by the circ uit court:
“I n a ca se under

the Dra m Shop Act where the def endant dr am shop is being defe nded by the I llinois I nsuranc e Guar anty Fund afte r defe ndant’s dram shop liability insurer was decla red insolvent and the plaintiffs have alre ady made insurance rec overie s from their underinsure d motorist insurer and/or from the alleg ed intox icated person’ s auto liability insurer and/or from their g roup health insurer, and the jury returns a verdic t in excess of the Def endant’ s maxi mum liability under the Dram Shop Act, is the reduc tion for ‘other insurance ’ rec overie s set forth in Section 546(a) of the I llinois I nsuranc e Guar anty Fund Act applied ag ainst the Def endant’ s maxi mum dram shop liabil it y o f $ 5 8
, 6 52.333 to eac h Plaintiff? ” ¶ 3 For

the re asons that follow we answe r the que stion in t he af firmative.

¶ 4 BA CKGROUND ¶ 5 On J une 18, 2009 plaintif f M ar ce l i n o Gu zman was operating a motor vehicle with a
passeng er, his wife, Be rtha Guzman. They wer e struck by a vehicle driven by Nikki Klasser t. A third plaintiff, Be verly My ers, was a pedestria n who was injured as a result of the collision of the two automobiles. Plaintiffs alleg ed that at the time of the acc ident Klasser t neg lige ntly
operated her veh i cle, that Klasser t was intox icated and that she had been serve d alcoholic liquors by Duffy ’s Tave rn, the de fenda nt. ¶ 6 On J uly

20, 2009, the Guzman plaintiffs filed a ne g lige nce action aga inst Ms. Klassert in the circ uit court of Cook County seeking to rec over for the inju ri es t h ey alleg edly

-2-sustained in the collision. This case was subsequently settled by the pay ment of $40,000, the policy limit s of Klas s e r

t’ s a uto mo b il e liability insurer, Safew ay I nsuranc e Co. The settlement
pay ment was divided among the Guzmans and Be verly My ers. Marc elino Guzman rec eived $13,333.34. Be rtha Guzman and My ers eac h rec eived the sum of $13,333.33 from the settlement. ¶ 7 P l aintiffs rec overe d insurance proce eds from other solvent insurers as a result o f t h e in j u ri es they suffe red. Plaintiffs Marc elino Guzman and Be rtha Guzman eac h rec eived $36,666. 6 6 from their own underinsure d motorist cover ag e in addition to the Klasser t settlement. Plaintiff My ers rec eived $236,666.67 from her own automobile liability insurer and $87,529.78 fr om her g roup hea lth insurer. ¶ 8 On May 5, 2010, plaintiffs filed the instant action ag ainst defe ndant under the Dramshop Act (Ac t) (235 I L CS 5/6-21 (West 2008)), seeking damag es for their injuries. The Dramshop Act provides limit ed no-fa ult liability wher e a plaintiff can demonstrate that a patron was intox icated as a result of liquor provided by a bar and the plaintiff suffe red resulting injuries beca use of the patron’s intox ication. The Dramshop Act provides: “in no even t s h al l the judgme nt o r re co v ery for injury to the person or proper ty of any person exceed” the maxi mum rec o v er y allowed under the Act. 235 I L CS 5/6-21 (West 2008). The maxi mum amount rec overa

ble in a dra

mshop case ma

y incre ase or decr ease annually dependingon a formula provided in the Act which is ba sed on the consumer price index. The parties ag ree the maxi mum amount of damag es rec overa ble by the plaintiffs for their injuries in this case under the Dramshop Act is $58,652.33 per plaintiff. ¶ 9 At the time of the acc ident, defe ndant was insured under a liquor liability policy issued by Constit utional Casualty Company
, which had a $1 milli on policy limit

. On J anuar y 21, 2011, Constit utional Casualty Company was decla red insolvent and place d into liquidation by the I llinois Depa

rtment of I nsuranc e. The I llinois I nsuranc e Guar anty Fund (the Fund) has assumed responsibility for the obligations of Constit utional Casualty Compan y t o I l linois claimants and policy

holders, s u

b je c t to th e li mi ta

tions and conditions of the I llinois I nsuranc e Code (her einaf

ter Guar anty Fund Act) (215 I L CS 5/532 et seq. (West 2008)). Acc ording ly
, attorney s eng ag ed by the Fund assumed the defe nse of this case on behalf of the defe ndant. ¶ 10 T h e at t o rn ey s re t ai n ed by the Fund filed an aff irmative defe nse. As an af firmati v e defe nse, defe ndant alleg ed that the Dramsho p A c t s e t the maxi mum rec overy of eac h plaintiff in this case at $58,652.33, and, there fore
, $5 8 ,652.33 is the extent of the obligation of the Fund. Def

endant argues that under section 546(a) of the Guar anty Fund Act, the obligation of the Fund and the defe ndant’s liability to eac h of the plaintiffs is require d to be reduc ed in

an amount equal to eac h plaintiff’s rec overy from other insurance companies. There fore
, beca use Marc elino and Be rtha Guzman had eac h rec eived $50,000 from other insurance
, the Fund’ s obliga

tion and defenda

nt’s liability to them is reduc ed i n t he same amount and the maxi mum rec overy for eac h of the Guzman plaintiffs would be $8,652.33. Def endant arg ued Be verly My ers would not be enti t l ed t o any rec overy beca use her rec overy from other insurance exceede d the $58,652.33 obligation of the Fund unde r sec tion 546(a). ¶ 11 Section 546(a) provides:

“An insure d or claimant shall be require d first to exhaust all covera g e provide d by any

-3-other insurance policy
, reg ardle ss of whether or not such other i n s u rance policy was written by a member company , if the claim under such other policy arises from the same fac ts, injury
, or loss that g ave rise to the cover ed claim ag ainst t h e Fund. The Fund’ s obliga tion under Section 537.2 shall be reduc ed by the amount rec overe d or rec overa ble, whicheve r is g rea

ter, under such other insurance policy .*** To the extent that the Fund’ s obliga tion under Section 537.2 is r educe d by application of this Section, the liability of the person insured by the insolvent insurer’ s policy for the claim shall be reduc ed in the

same amount.” 215 I L CS 5/ 546(a) (West 2008). ¶ 12 Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike defe ndant’s aff irmative defe nse. The plaintiffs did not
contest th at t h e fu nds rec eived from Klasser t’s liability insurer, their own underinsure d policy and the amounts from group healt h i n s uranc e are subject to the reductions require d in section 546(a)

. Howeve r, the plaintiffs contest the manner in which the reduc tion should be applied. ¶ 13 The Dramshop Act allows a plainti ff to prese nt a damag e claim to a jur y for a damag e

awa rd with no instruction about the dama g e ca p of the Dr amshop Act:
“In ever y such action the jury shall deter mine the amount of damag es to be rec overe d witho u t re gar d to and with no specia l instructions as to the dollar limit s on rec overy imposed by

this S ection.” 235 I L CS 5/ 6-21 (West 2008). ¶ 14 Plaintiffs argue that a jur y s h o u l d b e al l o we d t o deter mine the full amount of their damag es and the re d u cti on for other insurance require d by section 546(a) should be made from the jury ’s damag e awa rd. Plaintiffs argue the statute should be interpre ted such that if the jury ’s damag e awa

rd, afte r the reduc tions require d by section 546(a) are made, exceeds the dramshop damag e limit s, the trial court c ould reduc e the a war d and ente r judg ment for the maxim um damag es allowe d by the Dra mshop Act. ¶ 15 On Ap ri l 3 0
, 2 0 1 2
, the trial court judge denied the plaintiffs’ motion to stri k e t h e aff irmative defe nse. On J u l y 16, 2012, the trial court cer tified the question prese nted for revie w. We g rante d leave to appea l.

¶ 16 ANAL YSI S ¶ 17 I n this case , we consider a cer t i fi ed q u es t i o n conce rning how the “other insurance ” reduc tion require d by section 546(a) of the Guar anty Fund Act impacts a dramsh o p cl aim

m ad e ag ainst a defe ndant wher e the defe nse has been assumed by the I llinois I nsuranc e Guar anty Fund due to the insolvency of the insurer . This case involves a ce rtified question

conce rning the interpre tation of a statute. There fore
, we are prese nted with a question of law and our standard of revie w is de novo

. Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.
, 227 I ll. 2d 45, 57- 58 (2007); Advincula v . United Blood Servic es , 176 I ll. 2d 1, 12 (1996). ¶ 18 “The car dinal rule of statutory constructi o n i s t o as ce rt ai n and g ive eff ect to the leg islature’s intent.” Moore v. Gree n , 219 I ll. 2d 470, 479 (2006). L ike any other exercise in statutory construction, the court’s analy sis beg ins with the specific languag e contained in the
statute beca

use t he wor ds used provide the best indication of leg islative intent. Hernande z

v. Kirksey
, 306 I ll. App. 3d 912, 914 (1999). “Where an enac tment is clea r and unambig uous,

we are not at liberty to depar t from the plain lang uag e and meaning of the statute by rea ding

-4-into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the leg islature did not express.” DeSme t v

.

County of Rock I

sland , 219 I ll. 2d 497, 510 (2006). ¶ 19 The Fund is a nonprofit entity cre ated to pr otect the policy holders of insolvent insurers and third parties who make claims under policies issued by insurers that become insolvent. Hasemann v. W

hite
, 177 I ll

. 2 d 4 1 4
, 416 (1997). The Fund’ s liability is subject to the limit ati o n t h at the s ubject claim must be a cover ed claim. 215 I L CS 5/534.3 (West 2008); Roth v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund , 366 I ll. App. 3d 787 (2006). ¶ 20 A claimant possessing a cover ed claim is require d to e x haust his r ights under any other policy of insurance which involves the same fac ts, injury or loss that g ave rise to the cover ed claim. 215 I L CS 5/546(a) (West 2008). The obligation of the Fund is reduc ed by the amounts

a claimant rec eives from other insurance

. Roth
, 366 I ll. App. 3d 787. There fore
, for pay ments

a plaintiff rec eives from his medical insurer or his own automobile insurer for the same fac ts, injury or l oss, a deduction must be made from the Fund’ s liability to the pl aintif f. Id

. This
court has repe atedly stated that the Fund is a fund of last resor t. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Farmland Mutual Insurance Co.
, 274 I ll. App. 3d 671, 674 (1995); Harrell v. Reliable Insurance Co. , 258 I ll. App. 3d 728, 731 (1994). ¶ 21 To consider the question prese nted to us, we first look to the statute. When the defe nse of a claim has been assumed by the I llinois I nsuranc e Guar anty Fund, section 546(a) require s

a re duction of the F und’s obligation by the sum a plaintiff re ceive s from anothe r insurer

. ¶ 22 Section 546(a) provides, in re levant par t: “The Fund’ s obliga tion under S ection 537.2 shall be reduce d by the amount recover ed

or rec overa

ble, whicheve r is g reater, under such other insurance policy .” 21 5 I L CS 5/546(a) ( West 2008). ¶ 23 Section 537.2 define s the obligation of the Fund and provides that the Fund is oblig ated to the extent of the cover ed cla ims: “The Fund shall be obliga ted to the extent of t h e cover ed claims exis ting prior to the entry of an Orde r of L iquidation ag ainst an insolvent company and arising within 30 day s afte r the e ntry

of such Or der ***.” 215 I L CS 5/ 537.2 (West 2008). ¶ 24 The de finition of a cove red c laim is also found in the statute:

“Covere d claim; unear

ned pre mium defined. (a) ‘Covere d claim’ means an unpaid claim for a los s arising out of an d wi t h i n the

cover ag e of an insurance policy to which this Article applies and which is in forc e at the time of the occur

renc e g iving ri s e to the unpaid claim *** made by a person insured under such policy or by a person suffe ring injury or damag e for which a person insured under suc h policy

is leg ally liable ***.” 215 I L CS 5/ 534.3 (West 2008). ¶ 25 Thus, a “cove red claim” is an unpaid claim made by a person suffe ring injury or damag e under a policy issued by a company that has been decla red insolvent for which a p er son insured under

such policy

is legally liable

. ¶ 26 The Dramshop Act provides: “[I ]n no event shall the judgme nt or rec overy for injury to the p erson or proper

ty of any person exceed” the maxi mum rec overy allowed under the Dramshop Act. 235 I L CS 5/6-21 (West 2008). The parties ag ree that the maxi mum rec overy

-5-allowed under the Dramshop Act in this case is $58,652.33 per person. There fore
, the

defe ndant is leg ally

liable to the pl aintiffs up to the m axim um rec overy possible under the Dram s hop Act, $58,652.33 per plaintiff. Id

. When we rea d the rele vant provisions of the Guar anty Fund Act toge ther with the Dramshop Act, we conclude the extent of the cover ed claims deter

mines the obliga tion of the Fund. Since defe ndant’s leg al liability is lim ited to $58,652.33 per person, the extent of the cover ed claims is $58,652.33 per person. There fore
, the Fund is obliga ted to the extent of the cover ed claims or $58,652.33 per person. 215 I L CS 5/537.2 (West 2008). ¶ 27 Acc ording ly
, under sectio n 5 46(a)
, the obl iga tion of t he Fund ($58,652.33 per person) is require d to be reduc ed by the rec overie s rec eived by plaintiffs from other insurance policies and the c ertified que stion is answered in the a ffirma tive. ¶ 28 Plaintiffs argue that the reduc tions for other insurance require d by section 546(a) should be made from the jury damag e awa rd, citing Kurth v. Amee

, Inc.
, 3 I ll. App. 3d 506 (1972). I n that case Watson, plaintiff, filed a complaint which alleg ed she was injured in an acc ident

cause d by Robert M eng e. The complaint alleg ed Menge was int ox icated at the t ime of t he

acc ident and the dramshop defe ndants had sold or furnished t h e al cohol that cause d his intox ication. Meng e was dismiss ed afte r plaintiff s i gn ed a covena nt not to sue Meng e in consideration of $24,000 rec eived from him. The dra mshop defe ndants subsequently filed

a motion to dismiss

. The trial court g rante d the motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiff is entitled to only one rec overy and that she had alre ady rec eived $24,000 for her neg lige nce claim, more tha

n the maxim um amount rec overa ble under the Dra mshop Act. Kurth
, 3 I ll. App. 3d at 508. ¶ 29 On appea l the court acknow ledg ed that plaintiffs may rec eive but one satisfac tion for one injury

. I f seve ral re medies and a ctions exi st, setoffs should be allowe d to preve nt a double

rec overy

. Id. at 510. Howeve r, the court stated this princ iple should not be administered in

a manner that preve nts plaintiff’s tota l re co v ery

. I n reve rsing the dismiss al order
, the appellate court co n s i d er ed the proper procedure to follow in a dramshop case to preve nt a double rec overy without prejudicing a plaintiff’s rig ht to a complete rec overy

. In such case s, the appellate court order ed that the total damag es should be assessed without ref ere nce to any amounts alre ady rec eived and the verdic t reduc ed by such amount. Id. The differ ence would be subjec t to the max imum li mits provided in the Dramshop Ac t. ¶ 30 Kurth does not support the plaintiffs’ position in this case

. The Kurth court de termined the proper proce dure to allow setoffs to preve nt a double rec overy in dramshop case s. Kurth did not interpre t h o w the reduc tions require d by section 546(a) are made in case s wher e d r a ms h o p d e f

e n d a n ts a r e r epre sented by the I llinois I nsuranc e Guar anty Fund. The leg islatu r e in section 546(a) clea

rly and unambig uously require s that the obligation of t h e Fu n d b e reduc ed by

the amount re cover ed fr om other insuranc e. ¶ 31 Other courts have interpre ted section 546(a) as we have. I n Tralmer v. Soztneps, Inc. , 283 I ll. App. 3d 677 (1996), the plaintiff was injured when the car she was driving collided with

an automobile driven by Pamela L oeb. Plaintiff Tralmer sued L oeb alleg ing that the collision

was due t o L o eb ’s neg lige nce and that L oeb was intox icated at the time of the collision. Tralmer , 283 I ll. 3d at 679.

-6-¶ 32 Tralmer also filed a dramshop case ag ainst defe ndants Hob Knob and Ver tigo, a lleg ing that they wer e liable under the Dramshop Ac t for serving liquor to L oeb. The defe ndants’ dramshop insurer was decla red insolvent and the I llinois Insuranc e Guar anty Fund beca me obliga ted to defe ndants Hob Knob and Ver tigo. Id. I n 1992, the limit of rec overy under the Dramshop Act for injuries w as $30,000. ¶ 33 Tralmer then settled her case ag ainst L oeb for $100,000, the liability limit under L oeb’s automobile insurance policy

. Hob Knob a n d V e r ti g o s u b s e q u e n tl y filed motions for summary judgme nt on the g rounds that under sectio n 5 4 6 ( a ), the maxi mum $30,000 that Tralmer could

rec over should be reduc ed by the $100,000 she had rec eived from L oeb under her insurance policy . I n 1992, section 546(a ) provided: “Any insured or claimant having a cover ed claim ag ainst the Fund shall be require d first
to exhaust his rig hts under any provision in any other insurance p o l i cy wh i ch may be applicable to the claim. Any amount pay able on a cover ed claim under this Article shall be reduc ed by the amount of such rec overy under s u ch i n s uranc e policy .” 215 I L CS 5/546(a) ( West 1992). ¶ 34 The trial court conclude d t h at b eca use plaintiff had rec overe d $100,000 from L oeb’s insurance policy
, and the dramshop maxi mum r ecove ry was $30,000, Tralmer could never obtain additional rec overy from the defe ndants. There fore
, t h e court enter ed summary judgme nt for the de fenda nts. Tralmer , 283 I ll. 3d at 679. ¶ 35 The appellate court observe d that Tralmer ’s neg lige nce claim ag ainst L oeb was based on

common law tort. The dramshop case Tralmer filed ag ainst Hob Knob and Ver tigo was a statutory cause of action. There fore
, the two case s did not constitute the “same claim” within the meaning of section 546(a)

. Acc ording ly
, the appellate cour t re v ersed the trial court beca use the provisions of section 546(a) did not require the $30,000 d ra m s h o p maxi mum

rec overy to be reduc ed by Tralmer ’s $100,000 settlement beca use it was not from the same claim. Id. at 681-82. ¶ 36 I n 1997, one y ear afte r the appellate court in Tralmer deter mined that a neg lige nce claim is not the same as a dramshop claim for purposes of section 546(a)
, the leg islature amende d section 546(a) and chang ed the wording of the statute, expanding its deduction require ments from instances of

the “same claim” to instanc es wher e a claim arises from the “same fac ts, injury or loss.” The sta tute now provides:
“An insure d or cla imant shall be requir ed first to exhaust all cover ag e provided by any other insurance policy
, reg ardle ss o f whether or not such other insurance policy was written by a member company , if the claim under such other policy arises from the same facts, injury, or loss that gave rise to the cove red claim against th e F u n d

. The Fund’ s obliga tion under Section 537.2 shall be reduc ed by the amount rec overe d or rec overa ble, whicheve r is g reater, under such other insurance policy .” (Emphasis added) 2 15 I L CS 5/546 (West 2010). ¶ 37 We presume the le g islature wa s awa re of Kurth when it amende d section 546(a ):
“Where statutes are enac ted af te r ju d ic ia l opinions are published, it must be presumed that the leg islature acte d with knowledg e of the preva iling case law.” People v. Hickm an , 163 I ll. 2d 250, 262 (1994).

-7-¶ 38 I n this case , the 1997 amendment to section 546(a) was enac ted afte r Tralmer was filed

in 1996. Acc ording ly
, we must presume that the leg islature knew that the Tralme r court interpre ted s ec tion 546(a) to require the reduction for other insurance cover ag e be applied
to reduc e the maxi mum dramshop liability and not a jury damag e awa rd. We observe that the leg islature did not chang e the Tralmer court ’s i n terpre tation that the “other insurance ” reduc tion require d by section 546(a) applied to reduc e the Fund’ s maxi mum obligation in dramshop case s. The 1997 amendment clar ifies that the reduc tion require d by section 546(a) applied “ if the claim under such other policy arises from the same facts, injury, or loss that
gave rise to the cove red claim against the Fund ,” reg ardle ss of the theory of

rec overy –whether neg lige nce or

dramshop. ¶ 39 There fore
, we presume in 1997, when the leg islature amende d the Act, it was awa re tha t I llinois courts int erpr eted section 546(a) to require d the “other insurance ” deduc tion apply
to reduc e the maxi mum dramshop awa rds. The leg islature expanded the applicability of the claim require ment without chang ing the Tralmer court’s method of apply ing section 546(a)
to dramshop damag e limit s, implicitl y app roving the manner in which the court applied section 546(a ). ¶ 40 Plaintiffs also arg ue that the $1 milli on policy limit is the Fu n d ’s o b l iga tion and the deduction require d in section 546(a) be made from the policy limit s. Howeve r, the Guar anty Fund Act in section 537.2 clea rly and unambig uously states that the Fund’ s obligation is the amount of the c overe d claims. I n this case, the e x tent of the c overe d claims is $58,652.33. ¶ 41 Moreove r, the statute makes it clea r that the Fund’ s obligation a nd the policy limit s are not sy nony mous terms and the oblig ation of the F und could be less than the policy limit s: “Any obliga tion of the Fund to d ef en d an i n sured shall cea se upon the Fund’ s pay ment or tender of an amount eq u al to the lesser of the Fund’ s cover ed claim obliga tion lim it or the applica ble policy limit .” 215 I L CS 5/ 537.2 (West 2008). ¶ 42 Plaintiff also arg ues that the Guar anty Fund Act has a $300,000 per- claimant limit ation and the Guar anty Fund Act limit ation should apply rathe r than the limit ation found in the Dramshop Act. The Guar anty Fund Act provides a limit on damag es reg ardle ss of the theory of recover

y

. I n contra st, the damage limit ation provided in the Dr am s hop Act is a specific limit ation of the statute under which p l ai n t i ff is seeking rec overy

. “[W ]here there are two statutory provisions, one of which is g ener al and desig ned to apply to case s g ener ally and the other is particula

r and rela tes to o n l y o n e subject, the particula r provision must preva il.” (I nterna l quota tion mar

ks omitted.) Hernon v. E.W

. Corrigan Construction Co.
, 149 I ll. 2d 190, 195 (1992). In this case, the damag e limitation of the Dramshop Ac t is specific to the statutory dramshop claim filed by the plaintiff and applies here instead of the g ener al damag e limit ation of the Gua

ranty Fund Ac t. ¶ 43 Finally
, the parties have also cited a Fifth District opinion, Rogers v. Ime ri
, 2013 I L App (5th) 110546. I n Rogers
, the Fifth District considere d the same issue in the cer tified question befor e us–how should the deduction for other insurance rec overie s be made wher e the Fund provides a defe nse for a dramshop defe ndant. I n its decision, t he Fifth District deter mined
t h at the deduction for other insurance rec overie s should be made from the jury dam age

awa rd, which is a dif

fer ent outcome f

rom our dec ision.

-8-¶ 44 We ag ree with the Fifth District’s finding in Rogers that the obligation of the Fund must

be reduc ed by rec overie s from other insurance policies. Howeve r, we rea ch a differ ent result beca use the Guar anty Fund Act has clea rly and unambig uously define d the obligation of the Fund as the extent of cover ed claims. In this case , the extent of cover ed claims is $58,652.33
per claimant. There fore
, the reduc tion require d for rec overie s from other insurance in section 546(a) is require d to be made f rom the $58,652.33 cove red c laim obligation in this case.

¶ 45 CONCL USI ON ¶ 46 We answer

the trial cour

t’s question in the aff

irmative and r emand.

¶ 47 Certified que stion answere d; cause rema nded.

-9-