In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 16-1628 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JASON L. NICHOLS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 3:15-cr-00051-jdp-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 6, 2017 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Jason Nichols was charged with two 

counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g). Prior to trial, Mr. Nichols moved to suppress 

the evidence relating to the second count, and, following an 

evidentiary hearing, the district court denied his motion. He 

then pleaded guilty to count two, reserving his right to appeal 

the suppression issue. The Government moved to dismiss the 

first count and the court granted that motion. 
2 No. 16-1628 

In calculating the appropriate guidelines range, the district court denied Mr. Nichols credit for acceptance of responsibility and imposed an enhancement for obstruction of justice. It also concluded that he was not entitled to a reduction 

in his offense level on the ground that all the firearms and 

ammunition in his possession were used exclusively for 

sporting purposes. The court imposed a sentence of 27 

months’ imprisonment, at the low end of the applicable 

guidelines range. 

Mr. Nichols now challenges his conviction and sentence. 

He contends that his confession to law enforcement was involuntary and should have been suppressed by the district 

court. He further contends that, in calculating his sentencing 

guidelines range, the court should have given him credit for 

acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G § 3E1.1, and should 

not have imposed an enhancement for obstruction, id. § 3C1.1. 

Finally, he submits that his guidelines range should have been 

reduced because all of the contraband for which he was prosecuted was used for lawful sporting purposes. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(2). 

We affirm. The district court was faced with opposing versions of the circumstances of Mr. Nichols’s confession from 

Mr. Nichols himself and his probation officer; it made a credibility determination, which we have no cause to upset on appeal. In light of its determination that Mr. Nichols testified 

falsely in connection with his motion to suppress, the court 

committed no reversible error in applying the obstruction enhancement and denying credit for acceptance of responsibility. Finally, Mr. Nichols’s unsupported statements failed to 

carry his burden of demonstrating that the contraband involved in his case was used exclusively for lawful sporting 
No. 16-1628 3

purposes as would justify a reduction under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(2). 

I 

BACKGROUND 

A. 

On January 7, 2015, Mr. Nichols was involved in an altercation at his home that escalated when he threatened someone with a weapon. Responding officers of the Iowa County, 

Wisconsin Sheriff’s Department took him into custody. During the subsequent investigation of the altercation, Mr. Nichols consented to a search of his property. During the search, 

officers found a black case for a Taurus brand handgun with 

six .40 caliber rounds in it, as well as a stray round in a cabinet. 

In the same cabinet, officers discovered a Taurus PT 58 SS .380 

semi-automatic handgun with a fully loaded magazine along 

with other ammunition in a separate, zippered case. 

Mr. Nichols stated that he previously had sold a handgun 

without its case and that he had forgotten about the remaining handgun. 

At the time of the incident, Mr. Nichols was serving a 

three-year probation term for a prior federal felony mail fraud 

offense. When his probation officer, Kris Kiel, learned of 

Mr. Nichols’s arrest, she conducted a home visit. In the course 

of that visit, Mr. Nichols turned over to Officer Kiel a gallonsize container, half-full of various types of firearm ammunition as well as two or three shotgun shells, which he retrieved 

separately from a hunting vest. 
4 No. 16-1628 

B. 

In April 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Nichols on 

one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a 

felon and one count of possession of ammunition by a felon, 

both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Mr. Nichols initially 

pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence underlying the second count. He claimed that any statements 

and surrender of contraband that he had made to Officer Kiel 

were involuntary and based on false promises of leniency. 

A magistrate judge held a hearing on the motion. Officer 

Kiel testified that she had been a U.S. Probation Officer for 

twenty-three years. She described her review of the police report from the January 7 altercation, and the brief phone contacts she had with Mr. Nichols to set up the home visit on January 23. She noted that she had been concerned about the possibility that Mr. Nichols had a firearm on his property because 

the police report had noted the recovery of an empty handgun 

case. With respect to the visit itself, she described Mr. Nichols 

as calm and cooperative. She stated that she had inquired 

about the empty case and that he had told her that he sold the 

weapon without its case to a former girlfriend. 

According to Officer Kiel, this exchange led to a conversation “about contraband and what constituted contraband.”1

She explained that “guns, ammunition, drugs, anything like 

that would be considered contraband” and asked whether he 

had any.2 At that point, according to Officer Kiel, Mr. Nichols 

 

1 R.24 at 15. 

2 Id. 
No. 16-1628 5

led the way to the basement and gave Officer Kiel “a gallon-size half-full container of ammunition of various types.”3

Officer Kiel then inquired whether there was any other contraband in the house, and Mr. Nichols led Officer Kiel and her 

colleague back upstairs and took two or three shotgun shells 

out of a hunting vest and gave them to her. 

Officer Kiel affirmatively stated that neither in her previsit calls nor in the home visit itself did she ever make any 

promises of leniency to Mr. Nichols in exchange for his cooperation in turning over any contraband. She also did not 

threaten him with revocation of his probation for failure to 

answer questions or cooperate. She stated that it was the policy of the Probation Office to make no promises to defendants 

who are under supervision. Officer Kiel also stated that, in her 

many years as a Probation Officer, this occasion was only the 

second time that someone had turned over a weapon or ammunition to her. It was not her practice to request such a turnover; rather, she would inform those under her supervision of 

the prohibition on contraband, what it covered, and consequences for violation. She would reiterate this information on 

multiple occasions throughout probation. The court also 

asked several follow-up questions, and Officer Kiel noted that 

she had begun discussing these prohibitions with Mr. Nichols 

when he was in his pretrial phase for his prior offense. She 

knew him to be an avid hunter, and she knew of the presence 

of hunting equipment; once he was placed on probation following the conviction, she initiated and repeated the conversations about contraband. 

 

3 Id. 
6 No. 16-1628 

Mr. Nichols also testified at the hearing. He claimed that 

“[s]hortly after being placed on probation” he discussed firearms and ammunition with Officer Kiel.4 Specifically, according to Mr. Nichols, Officer Kiel had told him that “if [he] was 

to find any ammunition in the home” he should “give it to 

her.”5 In response, he claimed that he had “asked [Officer 

Kiel] if [he] would get in trouble and [Officer Kiel] said no.”6

He also claimed that in one of the phone calls to arrange the 

home visit in January 2015, Officer Kiel again had told him 

that he should hand over any ammunition to her for proper 

disposal, and again had promised that he would not “get in 

trouble” if he did so.7 Mr. Nichols further claimed that, in that 

phone conversation, he responded that, to his knowledge, 

there was no ammunition in the home but that he had some 

unpacked boxes in the basement and was not sure of their 

contents. He further testified that, on the day of the visit itself, 

Officer Kiel again instructed him to hand over to her any contraband, which he did. Mr. Nichols also testified about an 

email he had sent to his attorney in May, after having seen the 

charge related to the contraband recovered from him on January 23. In the email, he noted that he had been promised that 

handing over contraband would not result in adverse consequences for him. He also stated that, had he not received these 

promises, he would have disposed of the ammunition himself. 

 

4 Id. at 30. 

5 Id. 

6 Id. 

7 Id. at 31. 
No. 16-1628 7

Based on both Officer Kiel’s and Mr. Nichols’s testimony, 

the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, 

which characterized the motion hearing as essentially “a 

swearing contest.”8 The magistrate judge accepted Officer 

Kiel’s version of events and therefore recommended denial of 

Mr. Nichols’s motion to suppress. The report found that 

Mr. “Nichols had plenty of opportunities to dispose of firearms and ammunition on his own.”9 Moreover, he had been 

alerted on numerous occasions of the consequences of contraband prior to the January incidents and had never disclosed 

the presence of the handgun recovered in early January or the 

ammunition. Allegations that he forgot were incredible, given 

that he “had been able to remember, recover and brandish his 

handgun in a trice while drunk and angry.”10 The report also 

found it “[e]qually incredible” that Mr. Nichols had sought 

assurances about immunity prior to knowing that there was 

contraband in the basement, but did not seek to confirm it 

once he had allegedly located the ammunition in advance of 

the home visit.11 

Mr. Nichols objected to the report and recommendation of 

the magistrate judge. He first argued to the district court that 

the magistrate judge had relied on erroneous facts that were 

extraneous to the immediate matter at hand. He also contended that the magistrate judge erroneously had concluded 

that Mr. Nichols’s perception of a promise of immunity was 

 

8 R.31 at 1. 

9 Id. at 7. 

10 Id. at 8. 

11 Id. 
8 No. 16-1628 

not a determinative factor. Finally, he contended that the factual record did not support the recommendation. 

The district court overruled these objections and adopted 

the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Specifically, the district court found that the magistrate judge properly had considered the allegations surrounding the altercation on January 7, 2015 because “[t]he allegation that Nichols had possessed a firearm during an incident that le[d] to his arrest is 

obviously part of the factual background of this case.”12 As 

for Mr. Nichols’s “state of mind,” the district court concluded 

that “[t]he decisive fact is what Kiel said, and it does not matter at all what Nichols believed. If Kiel did not make the promise, then it does not matter whether Nichols somehow convinced himself that she had.”13 

After the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, 

Mr. Nichols pleaded guilty to Count 2 of the indictment, the 

count involving the ammunition recovered by Officer Kiel; in 

exchange, the Government agreed to dismiss Count 1, involving the January 7 incident. Mr. Nichols reserved the right to 

appeal on the motion. 

The presentence report recommended a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice 

and no reduction for acceptance of responsibility under 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Mr. Nichols objected not only to this recommendation, but also to the offense-level calculation. He contended that his offense level should be reduced to level 6 because the guns and ammunition that he possessed were used 

 

12 R.37 at 4. 

13 Id. at 5. 
No. 16-1628 9

solely for lawful sporting purposes pursuant to 

§ 2K2.1(b)(2).14 The district court overruled these objections. 

Specifically, the court determined that Mr. Nichols had obstructed justice because he willfully had made material false 

statements at the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, because of 

his obstruction of justice, he was not entitled to a reduction 

for acceptance of responsibility. Finally, the district court 

found that Mr. Nichols had not demonstrated that the guns 

and ammunition possessed were used solely for lawful sporting purposes pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(2). 

The court then determined that Mr. Nichols’s advisory 

guidelines range was 27 to 33 months and sentenced 

Mr. Nichols to 27 months’ imprisonment with 3 years of supervised release. The court also revoked Mr. Nichols’s probation and imposed 12 months’ imprisonment concurrent to the 

27-month sentence. Mr. Nichols timely appeals his conviction 

and sentence. 

II 

DISCUSSION 

Mr. Nichols’s appeal of his conviction rests on his claim 

that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. 

With respect to his sentence, he challenges both the imposition of the obstruction enhancement and the denial of credit 

for acceptance of responsibility. He also challenges the district 

 

14 That section provides, in pertinent part, “If the defendant ... possessed 

all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such 

firearms or ammunition, decrease the offense level determined above to 

level 6.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2). 
10 No. 16-1628 

court’s denial of the offense level reduction in U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(2); he continues to assert that all of the contraband 

recovered in relation to Count 2 was used for sporting purposes. We address each of these issues in turn. 

A. 

In a challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress, we 

review all factual determinations for clear error, and we review conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Villalpando, 

588 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, where the 

district court’s factual findings are supported by the record, 

we will not disturb them. United States v. Sands, 815 F.3d 1057, 

1061 (7th Cir. 2015). Credibility determinations receive special 

deference; we uphold them unless “completely without foundation” in the record. United States v. Freeman, 691 F.3d 893, 

899 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The parties agree, correctly, that a government agent’s 

“false promise of leniency may render a statement involuntary.” Villalpando, 588 F.3d at 1128. “An empty prosecutorial 

promise could prevent a suspect from making a rational 

choice by distorting the alternatives among which the person 

under interrogation is being asked to choose.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 As we previously noted, at the hearing on his motion to 

suppress, Mr. Nichols and his probation agent, Officer Kiel, 

gave testimony in direct conflict. Indeed, the magistrate judge 

called it “a swearing contest,”15 and the district court noted 

 

15 R.31 at 1. 
No. 16-1628 11

that it was “a straightforward credibility contest.”16 The district court found believable Officer Kiel’s version of the 

events: as a twenty-three-year veteran of the Probation Office, 

it is unlikely that Officer Kiel violated her office’s policy and 

made a promise of leniency (or immunity) to Mr. Nichols. 

Moreover, the context of Officer Kiel’s inquiry bolsters her 

version of events. As the magistrate judge noted: 

The court’s general take-away from Kiel’s version of events is that she and Nichols had had the 

“no-guns-or-ammo” conversation several times 

while Kiel was supervising Nichols, but Kiel 

never told Nichols that he would have to surrender this sort of contraband over to her or to law 

enforcement. In other words, Nichols had plenty 

of opportunities to dispose of firearms and ammunition on his own, without consequence. ... 

Nichols faced no Catch-22 here.[17]

Nothing in the record suggests that Officer Kiel’s version of 

events is “exceedingly improbable.” United States v. Vallar, 635 

F.3d 271, 283 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore accept the district court’s credibility determinations and accept its further findings of fact. 

Mr. Nichols also submits that, in finding him incredible, 

the district court erroneously relied on disputed factual material not in evidence in this case. Specifically, he notes that 

the district court relied in part on the fact that he had been 

told on several occasions prior to the January incidents that 

 

16 R.37 at 2. 

17 R.31 at 7–8. 
12 No. 16-1628 

he was prohibited from possessing firearms and ammunition 

as a condition of his probation. Although he claimed to have 

forgotten about the presence of firearms and ammunition in 

his home, the court noted that he was able to retrieve a firearm during the January 7 dispute and threaten someone with 

it, which indicated that he had made false statements about 

his possession of contraband prior to January 23. 

We need not decide whether the district court should 

have considered the statements about the January 7, 2015 incident and his weapon possession at that time. Even if 

Mr. Nichols did not retrieve a weapon on January 7 during 

an altercation, the fact remains that, prior to January 7, he 

had been warned about the consequences of firearm possession and never had sought to search his possessions and dispose of all firearms and ammunition on his own. The district 

court did not err in considering this warning as part of its 

overall assessment of credibility. 

Finally, the district court properly considered not only 

the plausibility of the two versions of events, but also the motivations of the witnesses. Considering all that evidence, the 

district court found Officer Kiel credible and accepted her 

version of events; we see no basis to disrupt those findings. 

Mr. Nichols also contends that the district court erred in 

determining that his belief that he could turn over the ammunition without negative consequences was irrelevant to the 

suppression motion. The district court took a different view. 

It found that the possibility that Mr. Nichols had a mistaken 

belief that he had been promised leniency or immunity for his 

conduct was not raised reasonably by the record. We agree. 

The evidence at the suppression hearing presented, as the district court characterized the situation, “a stark, binary contrast 
No. 16-1628 13

between two alternative versions of the facts: Nichols claims 

that Kiel expressly promised him immunity; Kiel denies ever 

saying such a thing. If Nichols is right that Kiel promised him 

immunity, then the statements to Kiel and the ammunition 

must be suppressed.”18 We are left with two alternatives: either Officer Kiel coerced Mr. Nichols by promising him that 

he would not get in trouble for turning over contraband to her 

or she did not. We already have credited the district court’s 

findings in this regard. 

In sum, the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress was based on a factual conclusion that there were no 

promises of immunity or leniency. That finding was based on 

credibility determinations made about witnesses at the suppression hearing. We see no basis to reverse the district 

court’s determination on the voluntariness of the admissions 

to Officer Kiel or on the physical evidence obtained as a result. 

B. 

The Sentencing Guidelines permit a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice 

[i]f (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the 

administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstruc-

 

18 R.37 at 5. 
14 No. 16-1628 

tive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or 

(B) a closely related offense[.] 

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We review the district court’s determination 

that a defendant satisfies the requirements of the obstruction 

of justice enhancement de novo, and its supporting factual 

findings for clear error. United States v. Jackson, 787 F.3d 1153, 

1159 (7th Cir. 2015). In applying the enhancement, the district 

court concluded that Mr. Nichols had testified falsely at the 

suppression hearing. 

Both parties agree that a finding that the defendant committed perjury is sufficient to justify the enhancement. See id.

“To apply the enhancement based on perjury, the district 

court should make a finding as to all the factual predicates 

necessary for a finding of perjury: false testimony, materiality, 

and willful intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

On this point, Mr. Nichols continues to assert factual error 

by the district court in refusing to credit his testimony, a position we already have rejected. In addition, Mr. Nichols invites the court’s attention to scattered comments by the magistrate judge and the district court which, taken together, 

could be read to suggest that he did not form the necessary 

intent for an obstruction enhancement. He likens his case to 

United States v. Parker, 716 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2013), in which 

we held that the obstruction enhancement was improper 

where the court had commented that the defendant “may 

even believe herself that she didn’t negotiate these checks,” 

which suggested an absence of willfulness. Id. at 1012 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we stated that the district court’s comments in Parker left us “unsure as to whether 
No. 16-1628 15

the court found that Parker’s denial of involvement in the 

scheme was willful.” Id. 

Mr. Nichols points us to what he perceives are parallel 

comments in his own record, specifically, the magistrate 

judge’s comment that he “‘would not speculate as to Nichols’[s] actual thought process’” and that “‘perhaps Nichols 

has convinced himself that Kiel really did offer him absolution in the abstract,’”19 and the district court’s comment that 

“there may be an arguable position” that Mr. Nichols did not 

make willingly false statements.20 Unlike in Parker, however, 

the record here is unambiguous regarding the district court’s 

ultimate conclusions on willfulness. That the district court 

asked the parties to argue willfulness shows its thorough and 

deliberate consideration of the issue. After hearing from both 

sides, it plainly found that the record supported a finding of 

willfulness. In short, Parker is inapposite where, as here, the 

district court heard argument and made explicit findings on 

the willful falsity of Mr. Nichols’s statements. The district 

court therefore did not err in applying the enhancement for 

obstruction of justice. 

Mr. Nichols also challenges the denial of the downward 

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3E1.1. The Guidelines permit a defendant to receive both the 

obstruction enhancement and credit for acceptance of responsibility only in “extraordinary cases” because conduct supporting the enhancement generally indicates that he has not 

accepted responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4; see also 

United States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2011); United 

 

19 Appellant’s Br. 26 (quoting R.31 at 9). 

20 R.59 at 6, see also id. at 8–9. 
16 No. 16-1628 

States v. Krasinski, 545 F.3d 546, 554 (7th Cir. 2008). The defendant “bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to a 

reduction.” United States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, 1266 (7th 

Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a defendant has accepted responsibility is a factual finding, which 

we review for clear error and accord great deference” to the 

sentencing judge. United States v. Pons, 795 F.3d 745, 747 (7th 

Cir. 2015). 

Mr. Nichols argues that he is entitled to an adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility for several reasons: he never denied possession of the contraband charged in Count 2; he entered a timely guilty plea following denial of his suppression 

motion; and he challenged only the voluntariness of his confessional statements and acts. He relies on decisions which 

hold that a defendant’s decision to raise a legal challenge to 

admitted facts or otherwise to challenge the admissibility of 

evidence do not automatically preclude the § 3E1.1 adjustment. See United States v. Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 230 (5th 

Cir. 2003); Purchess, 107 F.3d at 1267. 

The record does not support the view that the district 

court denied the adjustment because of Mr. Nichols’s legal 

challenges; instead, it based its denial on Mr. Nichols’s obstruction of justice by giving false testimony at the suppression hearing. The court’s findings about his untruthfulness 

are an adequate basis to support denying the adjustment. See, 

e.g., United States v. Yusuff, 96 F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(denying credit for acceptance where the defendant pleaded 

guilty and “admitt[ed] guilt” but obstructed justice by giving 

false testimony at a suppression hearing about the conduct of 

investigating officers). There is simply nothing in the record 
No. 16-1628 17

to indicate that this case presents the kind of extraordinary 

circumstances envisioned by the application notes. 

C. 

At sentencing, Mr. Nichols asserted that he was entitled to 

a reduction of his offense level down to level 6, under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(2), which applies “if the defendant ... possessed all 

ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes 

or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise 

unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition.” Application 

Note 6 suggests that relevant circumstances in this analysis 

include “the number and type of firearms, the amount and 

type of ammunition, the location and circumstances of possession and actual use, the nature of the defendant’s criminal 

history (e.g., prior convictions for offenses involving firearms), and the extent to which possession was restricted by 

local law.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2) cmt. n.6. A defendant bears 

the burden of proof on his eligibility for the sporting reduction. See United States v. Gresso, 24 F.3d 879, 880 (7th Cir. 1994). 

The parties agree that target shooting qualifies as a sporting purpose under the guideline. United States v. Lewitzke, 176 

F.3d 1022, 1028 (7th Cir. 1999). Mr. Nichols contends that the 

firearm and ammunition confiscated on January 7, 2015, as 

well as the ammunition provided to Officer Kiel during the 

home visit, were for sporting purposes. Mr. Nichols asserts 

that the district court erred in denying a reduction under the 

“sporting purpose” guideline by concluding that target practice was not a sporting activity. 
18 No. 16-1628 

In denying the applicability of the guideline, the court 

noted that it was “not limited to considering only the ammunition that was in the plastic bag that was turned over to Ms. 

Kiel” but also could consider the contraband retrieved during 

the January 7, 2015 incident, which included a “handgun and 

the ammunition for it.”21 The court continued that it would 

not allow the exception to swallow the rule and noted that 

“there’s virtually no weapon that you couldn't say wasn't 

used in a sporting way if you consider target practice to be a 

sporting activity.”22 Any suggestion that the court denied that 

target practice was a sporting activity as a blanket matter is 

belied by the district court’s written statement of reasons, 

which we review alongside the transcript. See United States v. 

Pape, 601 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Baker, 

445 F.3d 987, 991–92 (7th Cir. 2006). That statement does not 

reject target shooting as a sporting purpose, but instead discusses the number, type, and location of the contraband recovered in considering whether to apply the exception. This 

reasoning was proper under the application notes to § 2K2.1.

Most importantly, the only evidence in the record that all the 

contraband was used exclusively for sporting is Mr. Nichols’s 

own statement, which the district court did not credit. Mr. 

Nichols bore the burden on this issue, and he did not create a 

record that made a convincing case for the district court. The 

district court therefore did not err in denying the reduction 

under the sporting purposes guideline. 

 

 

21 R.59 at 12. 

22 Id.
No. 16-1628 19

Conclusion 

The district court’s factual finding at Mr. Nichols’s suppression hearing, based on its credibility assessments of 

Mr. Nichols and his Probation Officer, is not clearly erroneous, and therefore, the court did not err in finding that his 

confessional acts were voluntary. Furthermore, the false testimony that Mr. Nichols provided at his suppression hearing is 

an adequate basis for the court to have both imposed the enhancement for obstruction of justice and denied the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Finally, Mr. Nichols 

failed to carry his burden to show that all the contraband recovered in January 2015 was used exclusively for sporting 

purposes, where his only affirmative evidence was his own 

unsupported statements. We therefore affirm Mr. Nichols’s 

conviction and sentence. 

 AFFIRMED