Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Mitchem, 2019 IL App (1st) 162257

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

MARCELLUS MITCHEM, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Fifth Division 

No. 1-16-2257

Filed October 11, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 14-CR-1080-02; 

the Hon. Brian K. Flaherty, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed

Counsel on

Appeal

Stephen L. Richards, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

John E. Nowak, and Noah Montague, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of 

counsel), for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion.

Justices Rochford and Delort concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, the defendant, Marcellus Mitchem, was convicted of aggravated 

kidnapping and aggravated vehicular hijacking and sentenced to concurrent terms of 32 years’ 

imprisonment. He now appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt, the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a

severance, and the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of other crimes. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 We set forth the facts necessary to provide background for the defendant’s several claims 

of error. Additional facts will be included as needed in later sections of this opinion.

¶ 3 The defendant and codefendant, Vernal Odom, were charged by indictment with, inter alia, 

aggravated vehicular hijacking and aggravated kidnapping of Antwain Avery. Both charges 

were predicated on the defendant being armed with a firearm during the commission of the 

offenses.

¶ 4 Prior to trial, the defendant moved to sever his trial on the basis that he and the codefendant 

had antagonistic defenses. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant and the 

codefendant were both asserting an alibi defense and that the defendant failed to show how 

these defenses were antagonistic. After hearing arguments, the circuit court denied the 

defendant’s motion for a severance.

¶ 5 The State also filed a motion in limine, seeking to admit evidence of the defendant’s prior 

crimes for the purposes of proving identification, intent, motive, and lack of mistake. 

Specifically, the State sought to introduce evidence of an incident, which occurred 

approximately three months prior to the events giving rise to the charged offenses, where the 

defendant and the codefendant invited Avery out to lunch and then led him to a vacant 

apartment where they held him for ransom at gunpoint. The defendant objected, arguing that 

the prior incident was not factually similar to the instant offenses, the State was not required 

to prove motive, and the identity of the perpetrators of the instant offenses was not at issue. 

The circuit court granted the State’s motion and admitted the other crimes evidence for the 

purposes of proving intent, motive, knowledge, and identification.

¶ 6 At trial, Avery testified that, on November 8, 2013, he arrived at his apartment complex in 

a Chevrolet Malibu. After he parked in his usual spot, a white sports utility vehicle (SUV) with 

three occupants pulled directly behind him, blocking his exit. Two men exited the SUV and 

approached him. Both of the men were armed with a gun and wore a mask and gloves. The 

men told him to get out of the car and attempted to open his driver side door. He locked his 

door and then fled out of the passenger door. The smaller of the two masked men pursued him 

and tackled him in the courtyard of the apartment building. The man then hit him with a hard 

object in the back of the head and he blacked out. 

¶ 7 When Avery came to, the two masked men were attempting to place him, feet first, into 

their SUV. He struggled to free himself, and the two offenders dropped him. He then saw the 

third perpetrator, the driver of the SUV, whom he identified as the codefendant. Avery once 

again attempted to flee, but both of the masked offenders dragged him back to the SUV. The 

men returned him to the SUV and threatened to kill him. The two men again tried to force him 

into the SUV. During the struggle, Avery removed the mask off of one of the perpetrators, 
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whom he identified as the defendant. According to Avery, he had known both the defendant 

and codefendant for over 20 years and considered them to be his “brother[s].” 

¶ 8 Avery continued to struggle with the defendant and the other masked man. He freed himself 

and attempted to flee but was quickly caught and returned to the SUV. Once there, he heard 

the codefendant say, “Hurry up. Let’s get the fuck out of here. Just shoot him.” The defendant, 

standing approximately a foot away from him, then pointed a silver, automatic “pistol” at his 

head and said, “I’m going to kill him.” Avery testified that the other perpetrator was armed 

with a black automatic pistol. Avery fled, and this time no one gave chase. As he fled, Avery 

turned to see the defendant entering his vehicle and driving away. 

¶ 9 Avery further testified to a prior incident, during which the defendant and the codefendant 

held him for ransom. According to Avery, in late August or early September 2013, the 

defendant and the codefendant invited him to lunch. He arrived at the restaurant in a separate 

car from the defendant and the codefendant. Once there, the three men drove together to an 

apartment building. They went inside and entered what Avery described as a “vacant looking” 

apartment. After he spoke with the defendant and the codefendant for a few minutes, the two 

men displayed guns, bound him, and directed him to call his fiancée, Camille Colbert. The 

defendant told him that he would be shot if he did not follow their directions. Avery was 

instructed to tell Colbert to “give up” everything that he had in their apartment, including cash, 

jewelry, and the title to a Chevrolet Impala. Avery, who sold drugs, had a bag that contained 

$100,000 in cash in his apartment. He was then instructed to tell Colbert to leave the bag of 

money at a nearby restaurant. After the phone call, the codefendant left the apartment. When 

the codefendant returned, he had with him the duffle bag of cash from Avery’s apartment. 

Avery watched the defendant and the codefendant divide the cash from the duffle bag and then 

the two discussed whether to kill him or let him go. Eventually, they decided to let him go. 

Avery did not report the incident to the police due to the illegal source of the money. He 

eventually told the state’s attorney’s office about the incident in October 2015.

¶ 10 Colbert, Avery’s fiancée, testified that, on November 8, 2013, she looked out from her 

apartment balcony and saw three men “tussling” outside. One of the men yelled out for help, 

and she realized that it was Avery. Colbert ran inside and called the police. When she returned 

to observe the scene, Avery and the other men were standing near a white SUV that was 

blocking Avery’s car. Colbert recognized the defendant as one of the men standing near Avery. 

She also recognized the codefendant as the driver of the white SUV and heard him say “Pop 

his ass. Shoot his ass.” Colbert saw the white SUV and Avery’s car drive away. When Avery 

eventually returned to the apartment, his clothes were “ripped off.” Colbert testified that she 

had known the defendant and the codefendant for 18 years.

¶ 11 The State published the audio recording of Colbert’s 9-1-1 phone call to the jury. During 

the call, Colbert says that she cannot identify the perpetrators. Later in the call, she identified 

both the defendant and the codefendant as two of the perpetrators.

¶ 12 Colbert also testified to the prior incident where Avery was held for ransom. According to 

Colbert, Avery called her that day and told her that he needed her to do something and would 

call her back shortly. Around this time, Colbert looked outside her apartment window and saw 

the codefendant walk past. Shortly thereafter, Avery called her back and told her to retrieve a 

bag hidden in the closet, some jewelry, and the title to her car. He then instructed her to place 

the bag in the dumpster of a nearby restaurant. Colbert complied but was unable to find the 

title to her car. She then went to the restaurant, but the dumpster was too visible to the public. 
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Another individual spoke to her from Avery’s phone and directed her to drop the bag at another 

location, which she did.

¶ 13 The State next presented the testimony of Calumet City detective Randall.1 Prior to his 

testimony, the circuit court instructed the jury as follows: “A statement made by one defendant 

may not be considered by you against any other defendant.” Detective Randall testified that he 

interviewed the codefendant on November 13, 2013. According to Detective Randall, the 

codefendant denied any involvement in the offense or that he knew either the defendant or 

Avery.

¶ 14 The State presented the testimony of Chicago police officers Michelle Murphy, Robert 

McHale, and David Fietko. The officers testified to three separate traffic stops that took place 

in 2013, during which the codefendant was the driver of the vehicle that was pulled over and 

the defendant was the passenger. 

¶ 15 The circuit court granted the State’s motion to introduce its exhibits into evidence, after 

which the State rested.

¶ 16 The defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the circuit court denied. Neither the 

defendant nor the codefendant testified on their own behalf.

¶ 17 During closing arguments, both the defendant and the codefendant argued that Avery and 

Colbert had fabricated the event. In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued the following:

“And so the defendants have indicated that this is a concocted story. There was no 

kidnapping. There was nothing that happened here. But it isn’t—and [the codefendant] 

of course in his statement claims he doesn’t even know [the defendant]. *** And that’s 

a lie. We know because they were caught riding together. They are like Bert and Ernie.”

¶ 18 The jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated vehicular 

hijacking. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 32 years’ imprisonment, which included a 

15-year enhancement based on the use of a firearm. This appeal followed.

¶ 19 On appeal, the defendant argues the following: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of 

either aggravated kidnapping or aggravated vehicular hijacking beyond a reasonable doubt, 

(2) the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a severance, and (3) the 

circuit court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant’s other crimes.

¶ 20 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our function is not to retry 

the defendant. People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70. Rather, we must determine whether, 

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. This 

means that we must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution. 

People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). Reversal is justified only where the 

evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive as to justify a reasonable doubt as 

to the defendant’s guilt. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011).

¶ 21 The defendant raises three arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. First, he 

argues that the State failed to prove that he was armed with a firearm during the commission 

of the offenses. Second, he contends that the State failed to prove that there was asportation 

and secret confinement of Avery and therefore failed to prove him guilty of aggravated 

1

Detective Randall’s first name is not contained in the record.
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kidnapping. Lastly, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove aggravated vehicular 

hijacking because the evidence was insufficient to show that he took Avery’s car from his 

immediate person or presence. We address each argument in turn. 

¶ 22 To prove the defendant guilty of the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated vehicular 

hijacking counts as charged, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 

he possessed a firearm during their commission. See 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6) (West 2012) 

(aggravated kidnapping); 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2012) (aggravated vehicular 

hijacking). Section 2-7.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/2-7.5 (West 2012)) 

provides that the term “firearm” has the meaning ascribed to it by section 1.1 of the Firearm 

Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2012)), namely, “any device, *** 

which is designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion 

of gas or escape of gas,” but excluding items such as a “paint ball gun,” a “B-B gun,” or a 

“pneumatic gun.”

¶ 23 The defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed a 

firearm within the meaning of the Code where Avery provided insufficient detail regarding the 

object he saw the defendant holding. We disagree.

¶ 24 Initially, we note that “courts have consistently held that eyewitness testimony that the 

offender possessed a firearm, combined with circumstances under which the witness was able 

to view the weapon, is sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that the weapon was actually 

a firearm.” People v. Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141448, ¶ 15. As such, the State is not 

required to present a firearm in order for the trier of fact to find that the defendant possessed 

one. See Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶¶ 76-77.

¶ 25 Here, Avery testified to several details about the firearm that he saw the defendant holding, 

including the fact that it was a silver, automatic pistol. Furthermore, there is circumstantial 

evidence that suggests that the item the defendant was holding was a firearm within the 

meaning of the Code. During the incident, Avery heard the codefendant say, “Just shoot him,” 

to which the defendant responded by pointing the gun at his head and saying, “I’m going to 

kill him.” Colbert also testified that she heard the codefendant tell the other perpetrator to 

“shoot” Avery. Id. (finding the evidence sufficient to prove the defendant was armed with a 

firearm where witnesses testified that the defendant was armed with a “black automatic” gun, 

an “actual firearm,” and a “9 millimeter pistol”). Given this record, we cannot say that the 

evidence was so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive as to justify a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant was armed with a firearm within the meaning of the Code.

¶ 26 The defendant next argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated 

kidnapping. The offense of kidnapping may be committed in one of three ways: 

(1) confinement of the victim, (2) asportation of the victim, or (3) inducement of the victim. 

People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 225 (2009). The indictment charged the defendant 

with kidnapping under an asportation theory, alleging he “knowingly by force or threat of 

imminent force carried Antwain Avery from one place to another with intent secretly to confine 

Antwain Avery against his will *** while armed with a firearm.” See 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6) 

(West 2012). 

¶ 27 Here, Avery testified that the defendant and an unknown individual, both of whom were 

armed with firearms and wearing masks and gloves, attempted to remove him from his car. He 

fled, and the defendant chased him, tackled him, and struck him over the head with a hard 

object. Avery awoke, after briefly losing consciousness, to find that the defendant and the other 
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perpetrator were attempting to place him, feet first, inside their SUV. Illinois courts have “most 

commonly” found secret confinement when the victim is enclosed in “a house or a car.” People 

v. Sykes, 161 Ill. App. 3d 623, 628 (1987). Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant used force and transported Avery with the intention of secretly confining 

him in his SUV.

¶ 28 Lastly, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated 

vehicular hijacking. To prove the defendant guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking, the State 

was required to establish that the defendant “knowingly took a motor vehicle, from the person 

or the immediate presence of [Avery], by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use 

of force” while armed with a firearm. See 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2012). The defendant 

maintains that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he took Avery’s car from his 

immediate person or presence. Specifically, the defendant contends that the evidence 

established that Avery had fled and was an unknown distance away when he turned around 

and saw the defendant driving away with his vehicle. Therefore, the defendant did not take the 

vehicle from Avery’s person or immediate presence. We disagree.

¶ 29 The evidence established that, after Avery parked his car, a white SUV pulled up behind 

him, blocking his exit. The defendant and another perpetrator, both armed and wearing masks, 

exited the SUV and told him to get out of his car. One of the perpetrators attempted to open 

the driver side door and Avery quickly locked it. Avery then fled out of the passenger door, 

but the defendant tackled him and carried him back to the SUV. After multiple failed attempts 

to flee, Avery finally succeeded, and as he ran, he saw the defendant drive his car away. 

¶ 30 The defendant relies primarily on People v. Cooksey, 309 Ill. App. 3d 839 (1999), to 

support his argument. In Cooksey, the victim had just exited a mall when she was accosted by 

the defendant. Cooksey, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 842. She tried to run but the defendant caught up 

with her, stuck “something” in her back, and demanded her car keys. Id. The victim gave her 

keys to the defendant and ran into the mall. Id. A short time later, she returned to the parking 

lot and her vehicle was gone. Id. The defendant was convicted of vehicular hijacking and 

argued on appeal that the State failed to prove that the victim was in the “immediate presence” 

of the vehicle when it was taken. Id. at 846. We found that the driver or passenger must be in 

the “immediate vicinity of the car” at the time it is taken to constitute “immediate presence.” 

Id. at 847-48. We concluded that the State failed to prove the defendant guilty of vehicular 

hijacking because the undisputed evidence established that at no time did the victim approach 

her vehicle, she was 25 feet away from it when the defendant first jumped her, and she fled 

away from the vehicle, not toward it. Id. at 848.

¶ 31 Unlike in Cooksey, at the time the hijacking began in the instant case, Avery was inside of 

his vehicle and, therefore, it was within his immediate presence. Moreover, although the record 

is silent with regard to how far Avery was when the defendant ultimately drove off with his 

car, it was not unreasonable for the trier of fact to infer that he was within 25 feet given the 

circumstances. Lastly, the defendant and the codefendant had demanded the title to Avery’s 

Impala as ransom during their previous kidnapping of him, which supports the inference that 

it was their intention from the start to take the car. Put simply, the instant facts align with the 

specific ill that the legislature intended to address when it enacted the vehicular hijacking 

statute. See id. at 847 (“[I]t is clear that the vehicular hijacking statute was enacted to combat 

the ‘tragedies *** of car hijacking where someone armed or unarmed attacks a car, and *** 
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snatches the driver out ***.’ ” (quoting 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Apr. 15, 

1993, at 281 (statements of Senator Hawkinson))). As such, we conclude that a reasonable jury 

could find that this evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant took Avery’s car from his person or immediate presence.

¶ 32 The defendant next contends that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion for a severance.

¶ 33 A defendant does not have an automatic right to be tried separately from a codefendant 

merely because they were charged in the same indictment for crimes arising from the same 

circumstances. People v. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d 80, 92 (1985). The long-established general rule in 

Illinois is that defendants who are jointly indicted are to be jointly tried unless fairness requires 

a separate trial to avoid prejudice to one of the defendants. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 92. Prejudice 

occurs under the following circumstances: (1) when statements made by a codefendant 

implicating the defendant are admitted at trial, but the defendant is unable to cross-examine 

the codefendant because he does not testify, or (2) when the codefendants’ defenses are so 

antagonistic that, when tried jointly, one codefendant cannot receive a fair trial. People v. 

Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d 324, 345 (1986); Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 93. The defendant argues the first 

scenario existed here because the State admitted a statement made by the codefendant and he 

did not testify at trial.

¶ 34 To begin, we note that, although the defendant raised this issue in his posttrial motion, he 

did not raise this particular issue in either his motion for a severance prior to trial or in a 

contemporaneous objection. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988) (objection both 

at trial and in a posttrial motion is required to preserve an issue for appeal). He nevertheless 

argues that this court should consider the matter pursuant to the plain-error doctrine. We 

disagree. 

¶ 35 A reviewing court considers unpreserved error under plain-error review when either of the 

following circumstances is present: (1) the evidence at trial was so closely balanced that the 

guilty verdict may have resulted from the error or (2) the error was so serious that it deprived 

the defendant of a fair trial. People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 489 (2009). Absent an error, 

there can be no plain error under either prong. Id.

¶ 36 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968), the United States Supreme Court 

held that the admission of a codefendant’s statement inculpating the defendant during a joint 

jury trial violates the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. See also U.S. Const., 

amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him ***.”). Our supreme court has likewise held that “with limited 

exceptions, defendants should not be prejudiced by the admission of incriminating 

extrajudicial statements of nontestifying codefendants.” People v. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d 400, 415 

(1988). Therefore, our first duty is to determine whether the codefendants statement 

incriminated the defendant in the charged offenses. We conclude that it did not.

¶ 37 The record shows that, prior to Detective Randall’s testimony, the circuit court instructed 

the jury that any statement made by the codefendant could not be used against the defendant. 

Detective Randall went on to testify that, during his interview with the codefendant, he denied 

knowing the defendant or Avery. Simply put, this statement does not incriminate the defendant 

in the charged offenses in any manner, either explicitly or implicitly. Nor did the State use the 

statement to argue that it implicated the defendant. Rather, during its rebuttal, the State used 

the codefendant’s statement exclusively against the codefendant to argue that he was 
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untruthful. The prosecutor said the following: “And [the codefendant] in his statement claims 

he doesn’t even know [the defendant]. *** And that’s a lie. We know because they were caught 

riding together. They are like Bert and Ernie.” To the extent that the State used the 

codefendant’s statement during trial, the record shows that it was only used to discredit the 

codefendant as untrustworthy. As such, its admission did not violate the defendant’s rights 

under the confrontation clause and, as the circuit court committed no error, there can be no 

plain error. People v. McGee, 398 Ill. App. 3d 789, 794 (2010).

¶ 38 The defendant’s final contention is that the circuit court abused its discretion when it 

admitted evidence of the defendant’s other crimes. Specifically, the defendant argues that the 

circuit court abused its discretion in allowing evidence that he and the codefendant had 

previously kidnapped Avery and held him for ransom because it was admitted to show he had 

a propensity to commit crimes.

¶ 39 The State responds by arguing that the evidence was not used to show propensity but rather 

to prove identity, intent, and motive. We agree with the State.

¶ 40 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is not admissible to prove a criminal 

defendant’s criminal propensity. Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Evidence of other 

crimes, however, is admissible for any other purpose, “such as proof of motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Ill. R. Evid. 

404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). In addition, the offering of other-crimes evidence may be admissible 

when it “ ‘constitutes a continuing narrative of the circumstances attending the entire 

transaction.’ ” People v. Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d 948, 958 (2007) (quoting People v. Carter,

362 Ill. App. 3d 1180, 1189 (2005)). However, even when such evidence is offered for a 

permissible purpose and not solely for propensity, such evidence will not be admitted if its 

prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative value. People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 

115171, ¶ 11. A circuit court’s decision to admit other-crimes evidence is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 125.

¶ 41 In this case, the record shows that the circuit court granted the State’s motion in limine, 

allowing the State to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior kidnapping of Avery for the 

purpose of showing identity, intent, and motive. We find that the prior kidnapping of Avery 

was highly relevant to establish the motive of the defendant in targeting Avery. According to 

Avery, he had known the defendant and the codefendant for over 20 years. Without the prior 

kidnapping incident, the trier of fact might be left to wonder what would motivate two men, 

whom Avery considered his “brothers,” to kidnap him and hijack his car. As the evidence of 

the prior kidnapping established, the defendant and the codefendant successfully held Avery

for ransom just a few months prior to the charged offenses. Thus, the other-crimes evidence 

was highly relevant to establishing that the defendant’s and the codefendant’s motive, from the 

beginning, was to once again kidnap Avery and hold him for ransom. Additionally, the prior 

kidnapping also established that the defendant and the codefendant specifically targeted 

Avery’s Chevrolet Malibu, as they had previously demanded the title to Colbert’s car as part 

of the ransom, which again speaks to their motive in carrying out the charged offenses. In short, 

the evidence of the defendant’s other crimes was highly probative of his motive for both the 

kidnapping and hijacking. See People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 59 (1999) (holding that evidence 

of the defendant’s continued hostility and animosity toward his ex-wife and her new boyfriend 

was admissible to prove the defendant had motive to murder them). Because we cannot say, as 

a matter of law, that the probative value of the other-crimes evidence was substantially 
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission 

of the evidence of the defendant’s prior kidnapping of Avery.

¶ 42 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 43 Affirmed.