No. 85-422 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL 

HEALTH OF D. B. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Richland, 

The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Larry D. Mansch, Glendive, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Phillip N. Carter, Deputy County Attorney, Sidney, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Oct. 25, 1985 

Decided: November 27, 1985 

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Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Respondent D.R. appeals from a commitment order entered 

in the Seventh Judicial District Court, County of Richland. 

We affirm the order. 

On June 14, 1985, the Richland County Deputy Attorney, 

at the request of D.B. 's mother, filed a petition seeking to 

commit D.B. The petition alleged four grounds for 

commitment: 

A. That on June 12, 1985, at approximately 1:30 

a.m., the respondent woke his mother, [J.B.] , and 

accused her of cutting up his pork chops. 

B. That on June 12, 1.985, at approximately 2:00 

o'clock a.m., the respondent went to his sister's 

house and demanded that that [sic] she return his 

car to him. The car he was demanding belongs to 

his sister and her husband. 

C. That on June 12, 1985, at approximately 3:00 

o'clock p.m., the respondent was found in the Gary 

Schlenz residence in Glen.dive, Montana. The 

respond.ent was unknown to the Schlenz family and 

had no authority to be there. 

D. On June 10, 1985, the respondent told Officer 

Marvin Johnson of the Richland County Sheriff's 

Department that the respondent was not really there 

and later he could be beamed to different places 

and that Brooke Shields was older than she claimed. 

Probable cause was found to support the petition. 

Thereafter, Larry Mansch was appointed to represent D.B. as 

his legal counsel. Peter J. Bruno was appointed as the 

Professional Person to examine D.B. 

D.B. requested a trial by jury. It was held June 25, 

1985. At the trial, D.B.'s mother, his sister and Peter 

Bruno, a psychologist, testified that they believed D.B. to 

be seriously mentally ill and that the least restrictive 

placement alternative would be Warm Springs State Hospital. 

D.B. testified in his own behalf. Thereafter, the jury 

unanimously determined D .B. to be seriously mentally i.11, 

pursuant to S 53-21-102(14), MCA. A dispositional hearing 

was held immediately, following which the trial judge 
committed D.B. to Warm Springs State Hospital for "a period 

of time not to exceed ninety (90) days, as is necessary to 

adequately treat the respondent." 

D.B. raises two issues on appeal: 

1. Did the District Court err in allowing the jury to 

hear evidence regarding violent behavior on the part of D.B. 

when that behavior took place several years previous to this 

petition and when those incidents were not set forth as 

allegations in the petition? 

2. Did the State fa.il to meet its burden of proof as 

found in 53-21-126(2), MCA? 

We find no error in the admittance of evidence of D.B. 's 

past violent behavior. Rule 402, M.R.Evid., allows the 

admittance of relevant evidence. "Relevant evidence means 

evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 

action more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence." Rule 401, M.R.Evid. 

Section 53-21-126(2), MCA, states in part: 

Imminent threat of self-inflicted injury or injury 

to others shall be evidenced by overt acts, 

sufficiently recent in time as to be material and 

relevant as to the respondent's present condition. 

D.B.'s past behavior is both material and relevant to his 

present condition in that it shows the progression of D.B.'s 

illness. It provides the jury with a history of his 

problems, his family's efforts to work with him and his 

potential with proper treatment. The past events are 

unquestionably linked to D.B.'s present condition and could 

make a determination of "seriously mentally ill" more 

probable. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge 

in choosing to allow the jury to hear that evidence. 

Secondly, we find that the State met its burden of proof 

as set forth in S 53-21-126(2), MCA. 
(2) The standard of proof in any hearing held 

pursuant to this section is proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt with respect to any physical facts 

or evidence and clear and convincing evidence as to 

all other matters, except that mental disorders 

shall be evidenced to a reasonable medical 

certainty. 

In order to commit D .B. , the jury had to find that the 

evidence proved D.B. to be seriously mentally ill, 

S 53-21-127 (2), MCA, that is "suffering from a mental 

disorder which has resulted in self-inflicted injury or 

injury to others or the imminent threat thereof or which has 

deprived the person afflicted of the ability to protect his 

life or health." Section 53-21-102 (14), MCA. This section 

requires that respondent be a present threat to others or 

presently unable to protect his life or health. In the 

Matter of R.T. (1983), 665 P.2d 789, 790, 40 St.Rep. 1025, 

There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's 

determination that D.B. is seriously mentally ill. Not only 

has he exhibited violent behavior in the past, his sister 

testified that she felt threatened by him on the morning of 

June 11, 1985, when he entered her home demanding the keys to 

her car. Further, D.B. was found in a stranger's home that 

same day. Fortunately, the woman responded calmly and no one 

was hurt. However, the result could have been far more 

tragic had she panicked. Finally, Peter Bruno, D.B.'s 

court-appointed psychologist, testified that he believed D.B. 

to be seriously mentally ill; that he lacked the ability to 

care for himself, specifically in that he refuses to take his 

medication; and that he poses a threat to others. 

This evidence, if believed, supports the verdict. 
We concur: 

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Chief Justice