FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT MAY 2, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 04- 1184 2
D. C. Docket N o. 02-21758 -CV -PCH TU RRIE W EB B, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us W ORLDW IDE FLIGHT SERVICE, INC., D ef en dant- Appe llant, ART HU R A MBRU ST ER , D ef en dant.
Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida (M ay 2, 200 5) Be fo re D U BIN A , P RY O R and R O N E Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. DU BIN A, Circuit Judge:T h e d istrict court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity of citizenship and 1 am o un ti nc o n tr o v e r s y. Wor ldw ide a sse rt s that it a lso a pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f t he pla int if

f’ s mo tio n to 2 re o p en an d t he district cour t’s denial of its motion to dis miss. These asser tions, however, a

re su bs ume d b y

Wor ldw ide ’s po st- tr ia l mo tio ns . 2 Inthi s r ac ia lly

hos til e w ork e nvi ro nm en t a ct ion , br ough t un de r the F lor ida Ci vil Ri ght s A ct

( “ FC RA ”) , F la
. S ta t. § 76 0. 01 et se q. , the de fe ndant/ ap pe llant 1 W orldwide Flight Services, Inc. (“ W orldwide”), appeals the district court’ s denial of it s m ot io n fo r jud gm en t as a m at te r of law u nd er Ru le 50 (b ), Fed . R. Civ . P.,
re que st f or ane wtr ia l un de r Ru le 59, F ed
. R. Ci v. P
. , a nd p ar tia l de nia l of

it s
mo t i o n f o r r e mi t t i tu r . F o r

th e r e a s o n s th a tf

o l l o w , w e a f

f i rm. 2 I. BACK GROUND In Oc tober 2000 , the plaintiff/appellee T urrie W ebb (“ W ebb”), a black
m ale, com

m enced his em

ploym ent with W orldwide at the Miam i International A ir port ( “ MI A ”) a s ar am

p a ge nt. W eb b w as pr im ar ily r es pons ibl e fo r loa din g and unl oa din g lu gga ge and c ar go. W eb b’ s im m ed ia te sup er

vis or w as the r am

p/c ab in
m anager, Eilee n Motte, w ho in tu rn reported to A rt A m bruster. Betw een January 2001 a nd N ove m

be r or D ec em be r 2001 , A m

br ust er se rv ed a s th e m an ag er

of
se rv ic es a t M IAand r ep orte d to age ne ra l m an ag er a t the a ir port. A t the e nd o f 20 01 , W or ld wid e p ro m ot edAm brus te r to th e p os it io n o f ge ne ral m an ag er at MIA,3

wher e it em

ploy ed two genera l m anagers. A s a general m anager, Am bruster reported to the regional vice president, H arry Schw eitzer, in North Car olina. W eb b a lle ge s th at

be gin nin g inJanuary

200 1, a nd c ont inu ing f

or ap pr oxi m at el y

tw o y ears , A m

br ust er r ef er re d to him , on a

da ily ba sis , a s a

“ nig ge r, ” a “ m onke y , ” an d be ing “ fr om the tr ibe
. ” T he dis tr ic t c ourt i nit ia lly dism issed W ebb’ s claim

because he f

ailed to com

ply with the FC RA’ s procedural requirem ents und er F la. Stat. § 760.11. Subsequently , the district court perm itted W eb b to f

ile an am en de d c om

pla int , a nd r eo pe n th e ac tio n, a ft er W eb b ob ta ine d a

“ ri ght to sue ” le tte r fr om

the F lor ida

Co m m iss ionon H um anRe la tio ns (“ com m issio n”). W ebb’ s host ile work e nvironm ent claim proceeded to a j ury

trial in M ar ch200 4. T he j ur

y f ound in favor of W eb b and aw ar de d hi m

$30 0, 000 in
com pensatory dam ages and $100 ,000 in pun itive dam ages. The district court gr an te d W or ldw ide ’ s m oti on f or r em itt itur of

c om pe nsa tor y dam ag es , in part , and reduced the aw ard fr om

$300 ,000 to $10 0,000. T he district court denied W orldwide’ s rem aining p ost-trial m otion s and, af ter W ebb accepted the re m ittitur, entered j udgm ent in favor of W ebb and against W orldwide. W orldwide then pe rf ec te d th is a

ppe al
. II. D ISCU SSIONThe re maining issues a re: wh et her the evidenc e supports a c laim for hostile work 3 e nv ir onme nt, and , if

so , whe the r Wo rl dw ide is e nti tle d to th e a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e ann ounc e d in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); whether punitive damag es wer e proper ; whether compensatory damag es wer e proper ; a nd, whether a new trial i s wa rr anted. Be ca u s e we co n cl ude fr om the rec ord that there is no merit to any of these issues, w e af

firm the district court’s judg ment relative to these i ssues without further discussion. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1. 4 A lth oughW or ldw ide pr es en ts s ev er al iss ue s inthi s a ppe al , w e w ill onl y di sc us s wh et he r th e co ur t h as su bjec t m at te r juri sd ic ti on . The co ur t re vi ews 3
su bjec t m at te r juri sd ic ti on de no vo . Dunlap v. G & L H oldin g Group, Inc. , 381 F. 3d 1 285, 128 9 ( 11th C ir
. 200 4) ; U niv
. of Sout

h A lab am a v . A m . T

obac co Co

. , 168 F.3d 405 , 408 (11th Cir. 1999). Purs uant t o F la
. S ta t. § 76 0. 11, a n a ggr ie ve d pe rs on m ay c om m en ce ac ivi l
ac tio n inac ourt of

c om pe te nt j ur isd ic tio n on ly : “ Inthe e ve nt tha t the c om m iss ion determ ines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discrim inatory practice ha s o ccu rred in vi ol at io n o f th e Fl or id a Ci vi l Ri gh ts Act o f 19 92 ,” Fl a. St at . § 760. 11( 4) (a ), or

“ [i ] n th e ev en t tha t the c om m iss ionf ai ls t o c onc ili at e or

de te rm ine
w he the r the re is re as ona

ble c au se on any

c om pla int und er thi s se ct ionw ith in 1 80 day s of the filing of the com plaint, an aggrieved person m ay proceed under subs ection (4), as if the com m issio n determ ined that there wa s reasonable cause. ” Fl a. S ta t. § 76 0. 11( 8)
. S ec tio n 76 0. 11( 5) f urthe r pr ovi de s th at : “ T he
co m m en ce m en t of

suc h ac tio n sha ll div es t the c om m iss ionof

j ur isd ic tio n of

the
co m pla int
. ” (e m

pha sis a dde d)
. W or ldw ide a rg ue s th at pur suant t o se ct ion5

760. 11( 5) , onc e W eb b f

ile d hi s c ivi l a ct ion , the c om m iss ionw as div es te d of j ur isd ic tio n and, the re fo re , W eb b ne ed ed to fi le ane wc om

pla int w iththe
c o mm i s s i o n an dwa i tf

o r ad e t e rmi n a t i o n o f

c au s e o r th e e x p i r a t i o n o f

1 8 0 d a ys be fo re he c oul d f

ile thi s a ct ion
. W eb b’ s f

ai lur e to f ile ane wc om

pla int , W or ldw ide c ont en ds, is fata l t o th e co urt’ s su bj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a ddr es se d th is arg um en t ona t l ea st f our oc ca sio ns and
co rr ec tly c onc lud ed

that i t ha d su

bj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n be ca use the c om

m iss ion is onlydivested of its jurisdiction when a prop er c i v i l a c t i o n i s f

i l e d
. T h e t e rm,

“ com m encem ent of such action,” in section 760.11(5), re fers to a civil action that is t im el y f ile d “ af te r the da te of

de te rm inatio n of

r ea sona ble c au se by

the
com m issio n.” Section 760.11(5) does no t provide that a civil action th at is filed pr ior to a re as ona

ble c au se de te rm inatio n, or the e qui va le nt 1 80 d ay

f ili ng p er iod
se t f orth i n se ct ion760
. 11( 8) , div es ts the c om m iss ionof

j ur isd ic tio n. H er e, the
co m m iss iondid

not r equir e W eb b to f

ile ane wc om

pla int ; r athe r, it

iss ue d ar igh t t o s u e l et t erb as ed o n th e e x p i ra t i o n o f t h e 1 8 0 d ay p er i o dfr o m th e t i m e o f We b b ’s initial– and only

–com plaint. W orldwide does not cite a single case that required the dis tr ic t c ourt t o ig nor e the c om m iss ion ’ s r igh t t o su e le tte r, a nd the pla in langua ge of

se ct ion760
. 11 r ev ea ls tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in de te rm ini ng th atitha d s ub

ject m at te r juri sd ic ti on . Cf

. M aggi o v . F

lor ida D ep ’t

of La bor &The cases that W orldwide c ites to support its pos ition are distinguisha ble. In Sweene

y v. 4 Florida Power & Light Co. , 725 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d D CA 1998), the cour t dismi ssed the plaintiff’ s complaint as pre maturely

filed and de clined to abate t he action beca use, according to the court, “ the very act of filing the complaint serve d to divest the commission of jurisdiction t o proce ed.” Id. at 381 (quotation omitted). The c ourt in Sweene ycould not a

bate the action beca

use the plaintiff fa iled to properly

file the a ction; t h e s t at em en t that the filingof the a ction itself divested the c ourt of jurisdiction was mere l y dictum. See J ackson , 2005 WL713784 at *2 (statingthat “[i] n Sweene y , this Court di d not hold that a plaintiff like J ackson could not c ure the defe ct of a prematurely filed complaint”). I n Dixon v. Sprint-Florida, Inc

. , 787 So. 2d 968, 969 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) , the cour t held that the plaintiff did not circ umvent Fla. Stat. § 7 6 0
. 1 1 wh en she voluntarily dismiss ed her 6 E m plo ym en t Se cu rit

y , 200 5 W L 673 677, *2 ( Fl a. Marc h 24 , 200 5) ( “ T he F lor ida Ci vil Ri ght s A ct

is a re m ed ia l st at

ute that the L eg isl at

ur e ha s e xpr es sly

pr ovi de d is to b e ‘ lib er al ly

c onstru ed

to furthe r the ge ne ra l purp ose s’ of the A ct a nd the part ic ular pr ovi sio ns i nvol ve d. ”) ( ci tin g F la
. S ta t. § 76 0. 01( 3) ); W oodh am v . B lue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. , 82 9 S o. 2 d 8 91 , 89 7 (F la . 20 02 ) (s am e). In de ed , in a pr oc ed

ur al ly ide nti ca l c as e, the c ourt i n Ja ck son v. W orldw ide F

lig ht Services, Inc. , he ld tha t: H er e, the or igi na l pr em at ur e fi lin g w as not

be gun af te r the da te of

the re as ona ble c au se de te rm inatio n or a ft er the Co m m iss ion ’ s 18 0- day

pe ri od t o consider Jackson’s claim
. Ac cordingly , the original prem ature filing wa s n o t“ s u ch ac t i o n ” d i v es t i n g th e C o m m i s s i o n o f ju ri s d i ct i o n o v erJ ac k s o n ’s co m pla int
. I n othe r w or ds, be ca use the or igi na l pr em at

ur e cl ai m w as not pr op erl y be fo re t he co ur t, t he Co m m is si on was n ot di ve st edof ju ris di ct io n. T he Co m m iss ionw as not

div es te d of

j ur isd ic tio n un til Ja ck son re fi le d hi s co m pla int in ci rc uit c ourt w he n he pr ope rl y

c om m en ce d it a ft er the Jul y 3, 2003 issuance of the right-to-sue letter. 20 05 W L 71 37 84 , *2 (Fl a. 3d DCA Marc h 3 0, 2 00 5) . In t he pre se nt cas e, we conclude from

the rec ord that jurisdiction is prop er. 4prematurely filed complaint, filed a

subsequent complaint with the commi s s i on, and wa ited the require d 180 day s befor e fil i n gher a ction. In Dixon , the plaintiff filed he r subseque nt complaint with the commission after it informed he r that it deeme d her initial complaint withdrawn. Id. In th is case , Webb never

rec eived suc h a notice f

rom the commi ssion; ins tead, the c ommissi on provided him with a rig ht to sue letter after his civil ac tion was dismissed. Dixon does not stand for the pr op os iti on that a

pla int if f i s r e qu ir e d und e r F la . St at. § 76 0. 11 to f ile a su bs e qu e nt c omp la int

wi th the commission after the court dismisses his or her c ivil action. 7 A cc or din gly , w e af

fi rm the j udgm en t of

the dis tr ic t c ourt. AF FIRMED
.8