## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 1157

_____________________________
W ILLIE F LOYD , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Thomas V. Dannheisser , Judge

.
November 20, 2018

W INSOR , J

. Willie Floyd is what state law calls a “habitual traffic offender.” See § 322.264, Fla. Stat. (2014). When an officer pulled him over for going nearly double the speed limit

, the officer discovered that Floyd’s license had been suspended or revoked

some fifteen times

— and that it was still revoked

. The State charged Floyd with violating s ection 322.34(5) , w hich provides that “[a]ny person whose driver license has been revoked pursuant
to [the habitual traffic offender statute] and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third deg ree.” He was convicted and sentenced to 33.5 months in prison.2 By its own terms, the statute applies only if a “driver license has been revoked,” id.

, and the Florida Supreme Court has confirmed that the statute does not apply to those who never had a lic ense in the first place

, State v. Miller , 227 So. 3d 562, 565 (Fla. 2017) (“ Having a driver license that has been revoked under the habitual traffic offender statute, section 322.264, Florida Statutes, is a necessary element of a section 322.34(5) offense. ”). Floyd’s sole argument on appeal is that he never had a “driver license” because he had only a “learner’s permit.” He argues concisely: “A learner’s permit is not a driver’s license .” Init. Br. at 7. If Floyd were correct on this point, he would prevail under Miller . But he is not correct.

Although Floyd (and perhaps others) refer colloquially to a “learner’s permit,” the Florida Legislature chose to classify what Floyd held as a “ learner’s driver license

. ” § 322.1615, Fla

. Stat. Moreover, t he Legislature defined “driver license” to mean “a certificate that, subject to all other requirements of law, authorizes an individual to drive a motor vehicle and denotes an operator’s license as defined in 49 U.S.C. s. 30301.” § 322.01(17) , Fla. Stat. ; see also 49 U

. S

. C . § 30301 ( “ ‘[M]o tor vehicle operator’s license ’ means a license issued by a State authorizing an individual to operate a motor vehicle on public streets, roads, or highways. ”). A “learner’s driver license” indeed authorize s a holder to dr ive a motor vehicle, albeit with certain restrictions. § 322.1615, Fla. Stat. (providing that “[a] person who holds a learner’s driver license may operate a vehicle” subject to certain restrictions ). The most notable restriction is that someone with a “lea rner’s driver license” may drive only when a licensed driver over 21 is riding up front. Id. Floyd correctly notes that the license “does not allow someone to drive a car by themselves,” Init. Br. at 7, but it does allow someone to drive a car. The statutory definition of “driver license” includes learner’s licenses like the one Floyd once held.

A FFIRMED

.
B.L. T HOMAS , C.J., and W ETHERELL , J., concur

.3 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion und er Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________ Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender

, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Amanda D. Stokes

, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.