Filed 2/25/13 P. v. Chambers CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

JOANNA CHAMBERS,

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 G046095

 (Super. Ct. No. 07HF0829)

 O P I N I O N 

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lance 

Jensen, Judge. Affirmed. 

Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and 

A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

Appellant Joanna Chambers was accused of embezzling money from and, 

as the prosecutor alleged in closing argument, “cooking the books” of a construction 

company she worked for. She was convicted by jury of one count of grand theft and 67 

counts of violating Penal Code section 471, which makes it a crime to make a fraudulent 

entry in any book of records.1 She contends the trial court did not properly instruct the 

jury on the elements of section 471, but we disagree and affirm the judgment. 

FACTS 

Appellant worked for the Bogart Construction Company from 1994 to 

2004. During that time, she held a number of different positions with the company, 

including bookkeeper and office manager. She was heavily involved in the day-to-day 

operations of the company and had ready access to its digital financial records. She also 

had access to the signature stamp of company president Brad Bogart. 

In June 2004, the company controller Kim Krick noticed there was a check 

missing from the company‟s check registry. Krick contacted the bank and learned the 

check was written to appellant in the amount of $2,450 and cashed by her on June 7, 

2004. In the wake of this discovery, Krick audited the company‟s financial records and 

discovered numerous discrepancies in the company‟s bank accounts. She also discovered 

that several canceled checks were missing from the filing cabinet where such checks 

were kept when they came back from the bank. 

Krick obtained copies of the missing checks from the bank and noticed they 

were made out to appellant and either cashed by her or deposited into her personal bank 

account. However, the company‟s check ledger did not list appellant as the payee of the 

missing checks. Rather, the ledger listed other employees or company vendors as the 

payee. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3

The check ledger was the heart of the prosecution‟s case. The prosecution 

argued appellant falsified the ledger entries and destroyed the canceled checks when they 

came back from the bank so no one would know she was taking the money. 

Appellant did not testify at trial. However, in closing argument, her 

attorney claimed the money appellant took was rightfully hers. Defense counsel also 

pointed out lots of people had access to the company books, including its president Brad 

Bogart. Counsel theorized Bogart knew all about the subject checks and was content 

with appellant using them for salary advances or loans. However, after Krick‟s audit 

revealed questionable discrepancies in the company‟s books, Bogart turned on appellant 

to protect himself and accused her of embezzlement. 

In the end, the jury convicted appellant of one count of grand theft and 67 

counts of forgery under section 471. It also found the loss from the theft was over 

$100,000, there was property damage exceeding $150,000 and appellant‟s fraudulent 

conduct involved the taking of more than $100,000. After dismissing four of the forgery 

counts due to pleading error, the court sentenced appellant to six years in prison. 

I

Appellant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that section 

471 applies only to the forgery of a public book of records. We disagree. 

Section 471 provides, “Every person who, with intent to defraud another, 

makes, forges, or alters any entry in any book of records, or any instrument purporting to 

be any record or return specified in Section 470, is guilty of forgery.” Recently, in 

People v. Dunbar (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 114, we held that section 471 applies to the 

forgery of both public and private books of record. Appellant makes no attempt to 

distinguish Dunbar. He simply reasserts all of the very same arguments we found 

unpersuasive in that case. For the reasons explained in Dunbar, we reject appellant‟s 

interpretation of section 471. The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury the 

statute applies only to the forgery of a public book of records. 
4

II

Appellant also faults the trial court for failing to instruct the jury that 

section 471 requires the making of a false entry into a book of records. Since it is not 

reasonably likely the jury failed to find that appellant‟s alleged entries were false, we 

uphold its verdict. 

On review, jury instructions “„should be interpreted, if possible, so as to 

support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such 

interpretation.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111-1112.) 

In determining whether instructional error has occurred, we consider the record as a 

whole, including the specific language challenged and the arguments of counsel. (People 

v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36-37; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1191.) 

Unless there is a reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood the challenged instruction 

in a manner that violated defendant‟s rights, we must uphold the court‟s charge to the 

jury. (Ibid.; People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 720.) 

In this case, the trial court instructed the jury in language that tracks the 

wording of section 471. In relevant part, the court stated that to prove appellant was 

guilty of violating section 471, the People had to prove she “made, forged or altered an 

entry in a book of records” and that she did so “with the specific intent to defraud 

another.” Since the statute does not expressly require the alleged entry to be false, we are 

hard pressed to fault the trial court for failing to include this requirement in its 

instructions to the jury. (People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1014 [the language 

of a statute is generally an appropriate basis for instructing the jury on its elements].) 

In any event, given the way the case played out, it is not reasonably likely 

appellant was convicted of making entries that were not false. The evidence plainly 

showed the company‟s check ledger was made to appear as though the subject checks 

were used for legitimate business expenses, when in fact they were issued to appellant. 
5

There may have been an issue as to who made the fraudulent entries in the ledger, but 

there was no dispute that the ledger was falsified. 

Moreover, during closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized over and 

over again that this case was about appellant‟s actions in making false entries in the 

company books with the intent to defraud. Even though the falsity of the entries was not 

disputed, the prosecutor took pains to explain that appellant‟s actions in falsifying the 

company records were the means by which she was able to get away with her scheme for 

so long. The falsification of the records was a key aspect of the prosecution‟s case and 

one that could not have been lost on the jury given everything they were told. 

For all these reasons, we uphold the trial court‟s charge to the jury. It is not 

reasonably likely that the jury construed the trial court‟s instructions in a manner that 

violated appellant‟s rights by convicting her of making entries in the company books that 

were not false. We therefore uphold her convictions for violating section 471. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FYBEL, J.

THOMPSON, J.