DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

RECOVERY RACING, LLC d/b/a MASERATI OF FORT LAUDERDALE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND 

MOTOR VEHICLES, MASERATI NORTH AMERICA, INC., and RICK 

CASE WESTON, LLC d/b/a RICK CASE MASERATI,

Appellees.

No. 4D15-0650

[June 1, 2016]

Appeal from the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings; 

L.T. Case Nos. DMV 14-1016 and DOAH 14-2700. 

Raoul G. Cantero, David P. Draigh, and Ryan A. Ulloa of White & Case 

LLP, Miami, for appellant.

Susan V. Warner and Andy Bertron of Nelson Mullins Riley & 

Scarborough, LLP, Jacksonville and Tallahassee, and Robert D. Cultice of 

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, for 

appellee, Maserati North America, Inc.

Robert E. Sickles and John P. Gaset of Broad and Cassel, Tampa, for 

appellee Rick Case Weston, LLC d/b/a Rick Case Maserati.

A. Edward Quinton, III and Kenneth L. Paretti of Quinton & Paretti, 

P.A., Miami, for Amicus Curiae South Florida Automobile Dealers 

Association in support of Recovery Racing, LLC d/b/a Maserati of Fort 

Lauderdale.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

Recovery Racing, LLC appeals an administrative order in which the 

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (the “Department”) 

determined that Recovery Racing lacked standing to protest Rick Case 

Weston, LLC, d/b/a Rick Case Maserati’s (the “Proposed Dealership”) 

proposal to establish a new Maserati dealership. We affirm.
2

Legislative Framework

Before delving into the specifics of this case, it is necessary to 

understand the legislative framework governing the licensing of 

automotive dealerships in the State of Florida. The relevant statutes are 

set forth in Chapter 320 of the Florida Statutes, the provisions of which 

the Department is charged with administering and enforcing. § 320.011, 

Fla. Stat. (2014). 

In section 320.605, the Florida Legislature manifested an intent “to 

protect the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state by 

regulating the licensing of motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers, 

maintaining competition, providing consumer protection and fair trade 

and providing minorities with opportunities for full participation as motor 

vehicle dealers.” § 320.605, Fla. Stat. (2014). To that end, it enacted 

section 320.642, which outlines the procedures for obtaining a license to 

relocate an existing dealership or establish a new dealership in an existing

market. § 320.642, Fla. Stat. (2014). Under section 320.642, the potential

licensee must notify the Department of its intent to establish an additional 

dealership and the Department must then, in turn, publish a notice in the 

Florida Administrative Register. § 320.642(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). At that 

point, an existing dealership may protest the proposed dealership so long 

as the existing dealership has standing. § 320.642(2)-(3). 

In counties with a population exceeding 300,000 people (such as 

Broward County), “[a]n existing franchised motor vehicle dealer or dealers 

shall have standing to protest a proposed additional or relocated motor 

vehicle dealer when the existing motor vehicle dealer or dealers have a 

franchise agreement for the same line-make vehicle to be sold or serviced 

by the proposed additional or relocated motor vehicle dealer” and is either: 

1) located within 12.5 miles of the location of the proposed dealership, or

2) “can establish that during any 12-month period of the 36-month period 

preceding the filing of the licensee’s application for the proposed 

dealership, such dealer or its predecessor made 25 percent of its retail 

sales of new motor vehicles to persons whose registered household 

addresses were located within a radius of 12.5 miles of the location of the 

proposed additional or relocated motor vehicle dealer.” § 320.642(3)(b)1.-

2., Fla. Stat. (2014). Relevant to this appeal is the second method of 

establishing standing, which will be referred to as the “25% Test.”

Factual Background

Recovery Racing is a franchised Maserati dealer which sells cars from 

its location in Broward County, Florida. In 2014, the Department 
3

published a notice that the Proposed Dealership intended to establish a 

new Maserati dealership about seventeen miles away from Recovery 

Racing’s dealership. Recovery Racing filed a “Petition or Complaint 

Protesting the Establishment of Additional Dealership” with the 

Department of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”), alleging that it had 

standing under the 25% Test and that Maserati was “receiving adequate 

representation for the Maserati line-make in the community or territory of 

the proposed additional dealership site by existing franchised same-line 

dealers who register sales and leases in the community or territory.” 

Thereafter, the Proposed Dealership and Maserati North America, Inc. 

(“Maserati”) filed a joint motion requesting a hearing on the limited issue 

of Recovery Racing’s standing. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

granted the motion and also ruled that Recovery Racing bore the burden 

of establishing its standing. 

At the standing hearing, Recovery Racing presented the testimony of an 

economist, Edward Stockton, who opined that Recovery Racing met the 

criteria for standing under the 25% Test. In arriving at this determination, 

Mr. Stockton began with all of Recovery Racing’s sales for the applicable 

36-month period excluding wholesale sales, used vehicle sales, and sales 

of aftermarket parts not associated with new vehicles. He then removed 

any sales where the “beneficiary” of the transaction was a business (e.g.,

a company car). Based on the foregoing, Mr. Stockton opined that the 

remainder was the total amount of Recovery Racing’s “retail sales of new 

motor vehicles.” 

To determine which of Recovery Racing’s “retail sales of new motor 

vehicles” were made to persons with “registered household addresses” 

within 12.5 miles of the Proposed Dealership, Mr. Stockton looked at 

Recovery Racing’s sales files to find the primary home address of the 

“ultimate beneficiary” of the sale. He looked to the sales files as opposed 

to vehicle registration information because many of Recovery Racing’s

clients have multiple homes or use purchasing agents and, therefore, their 

primary home address may be different than where the car is registered

with the Department. 

After extracting the sales which met his definition of “retail sales of new 

motor vehicles to registered household addresses” within 12.5 miles of the 

proposed dealership, Mr. Stockton grouped the sales into “standing 

periods.” Mr. Stockton described the “standing periods” as any 12-month 

period—beginning on any day of a particular month and ending on the 

same day of the month 12-months later—within the 36-month period 

preceding the Proposed Dealership’s license application. 
4

Based on the afore-outlined methodology, Mr. Stockton concluded that 

Recovery Racing had standing under the 25% Test during five “standing 

periods.” None of the “standing periods” during which Mr. Stockton 

determined Recovery Racing had standing began on the first of a month.

The Proposed Dealership and Maserati argued that the manner in 

which Mr. Stockton interpreted the 25% Test called for manipulated data 

and a skewed reading of the governing statute. They maintained that 

under a plain language application of the 25% Test, Recovery Racing could 

not establish that it had standing. In support of this position, the 

Proposed Dealership and Maserati presented testimony from their own 

expert, Sharif Farhat. Mr. Farhat opined that the highest percentage of 

Recovery Racing’s “retail sales to registered household addresses” within 

12.5 miles of the Proposed Dealership during any possible 12-month 

period within the 36-months preceding the Proposed Dealership’s 

application was 14.2%. In arriving at this conclusion, Mr. Farhat utilized 

the following definitions when compiling the data to plug into the 25% 

Test: 

• “retail sales” meant sales to natural persons and to businesses 

that buy fewer than ten vehicles in a year.

• “registered household addresses” meant the address of where the 

vehicle sold by Recovery Racing was registered with the 

Department.

• “12-month period” meant a period beginning on the first of the 

month and ending on the last day of the calendar month.

The ALJ entered a recommended order concluding that Recovery 

Racing did not have standing to protest the Proposed Dealership because 

it could not satisfy the 25% Test. In so doing, the ALJ rejected Mr.

Stockton’s definition of the term “registered household addresses” as the 

primary home address of the ultimate beneficiary of the sale and instead 

found that “registered household addresses” as used in the statute meant 

the address where the purchased vehicle was registered with the 

Department. The ALJ also rejected Mr. Stockton’s interpretation of the 

term “retail sales” as “suspect in that it requires investigation into whether 

a business is a ‘beneficiary’ or an ‘instrument’ – again, information that is 

highly subjective and easily manipulated.” Finally, the ALJ rejected Mr. 

Stockton’s “rolling” definition of “12-month period,” reasoning that Rule 

15C-7.004(9) of the Florida Administrative Code provides that the 36-

month lookback period is calculated based on the last day of the calendar 
5

month prior to the date of publication of the notice of intent to open a new 

dealership. Thus, the ALJ reasoned the 12-month period must also be 

based on whole calendar months. The Department issued a final order 

adopting the recommended order in its entirety. This appeal follows.

Analysis 

We begin our analysis by noting the well-established principle of law 

that “administrative agencies are afforded wide discretion in interpreting 

statutes which they administer. An agency’s statutory construction is 

entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned on appeal, unless 

clearly erroneous.” Braman Cadillac, Inc. v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & 

Motor Vehicles, 584 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Recovery Racing takes issue with the Department’s interpretation of the 

25% Test as set forth in section 320.642, arguing that it erroneously 

placed the burden of proving standing on Recovery Racing and construed 

the data points contained in the 25% Test contrary to the statute’s plain 

language. We disagree.

With respect to standing, Recovery Racing analogizes this case to a civil 

proceeding where a defendant who seeks to avoid a judgment by raising 

the plaintiff’s standing as an affirmative defense bears the burden of 

proving lack of standing by a preponderance of the evidence. Cong. Park 

Office Condos II, LLC v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 105 So. 3d 602, 

607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (lack of standing is an affirmative defense which 

must be raised by the defendant). As such, it maintains that the Proposed 

Dealership and Maserati bore the burden of proving that Recovery Racing

lacked standing. We reject Recovery Racing’s argument because section 

320.642(3)(b)2. provides that an existing dealer has standing to protest a

proposed dealership under the 25% Test if it “can establish that” it meets 

the criteria. § 320.642(3)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2014). This plain language 

places the burden squarely on the existing dealer to show its standing.1 

See id.; see also Braman Cadillac, Inc., 584 So. 2d at 1050 (affirming 

because the existing dealer “cannot meet [the standing] requirements” of 

section 320.642(3)(b)”).

 

1 Indeed, in the administrative context, the burden is typically on the 

petitioner/intervenor to establish it has standing at the outset. See AmeriSteel 

Corp. v. Clark, 691 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1997); Accardi v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 

824 So. 2d 992, 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also Palm Beach Cty. Envtl. Coal. 

v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 14 So. 3d 1076, 1077-78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (chapter 

120 requires a petitioner to establish that it has standing in order to initiate an

administrative proceeding).
6

Turning to the Department’s interpretation of the data points used to 

calculate standing under the 25% Test, we first address its interpretation 

of the term “registered household addresses.” The Department interpreted 

the term to mean the addresses where the purchased vehicles are

registered with the Department. Recovery Racing argues that this was an 

erroneous interpretation. We disagree, as any other interpretation would 

ignore the implications of the word “registered” as used in the context of 

Chapter 320.

When interpreting statutes, we are required to give effect “‘to every 

word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a 

statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.’” Am. Home 

Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 366 (Fla. 2005) 

(quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003)). 

“Further, ‘a basic rule of statutory construction provides that the 

Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should 

avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.’” Id.

(quoting State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. 2002)). “[R]elated 

statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, 

and . . . ‘[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory 

provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one 

another.’” Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 

891, 898 (Fla. 2002) (citation omitted) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key 

Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).

Chapter 320, entitled “Motor Vehicle Licenses,” governs not only the 

relationships between automotive manufacturers, distributors, and 

dealers, but also governs the registration of motor vehicles within the state. 

Indeed, Chapter 320 contains multiple sections discussing vehicle 

registration procedures and requirements. See, e.g., §§ 320.02, 320.03, 

320.031, 320.04, 320.05, 320.06, 320.0605, 320.071, 320.0715, Fla. Stat. 

(2014). One such section requires that when registering a vehicle, the 

applicant must provide “the street address of the owner’s permanent 

residence or the address of his or her permanent place of business.” 

320.02(2)(a). In light of these considerations, the term “registered home 

addresses” clearly refers to the addresses where the vehicles are registered 

with the Department. Interpreting the phrase any other way would ignore 

the implications of section 320.642’s location within Chapter 320. See 

Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 200 (Fla. 2007)

(interpreting a term contained in a statute by reading the section “in pari 

materia with related provisions” of the chapter in which it was located). 

Accordingly, the Department did not err in its interpretation of the term 

“registered household addresses” as used in section 320.642(3)(b)2.
7

Our holding concerning the definition of the term “registered household 

addresses” is dispositive to this case. As Mr. Farhat testified and the ALJ 

noted, Recovery Racing cannot establish that it has standing under the

25% Test utilizing Mr. Stockton’s proposed definitions of “retail sales” and 

“12-month period” so long as “registered household addresses” means the 

addresses where the vehicles sold by Recovery Racing are registered with 

the Department. Therefore, we affirm without addressing the merits of the 

Department’s interpretation of the terms “retail sales” and “12-month 

period.”

Affirmed.

LEVINE, J., and HANZMAN, MICHAEL A., Associate Judge, concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.