IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

CHARLES W. STENZ, DECEASED,

Petitioner Employee,

ELIZABETH STENZ, WIDOW,

Petitioner,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA,

Respondent,

CITY OF TUCSON,

Respondent Employer,

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES,

Respondent Insurer.

No. CV-14-0298-PR

Filed July 20, 2015

Appeal from the Industrial Commission of Arizona

The Honorable Gary M. Israel, Administrative Law Judge

No. 20051100192

AWARD SET ASIDE

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two

236 Ariz. 104, 336 P.3d 737 (App. 2014)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

M. Ted Moeller (argued), Tucson, and Andrew J. Petersen, Tucson, 

Attorneys for City of Tucson and Pinnacle Risk Management Services

J. Patrick Butler (argued), Tretschok, McNamara & Miller, P.C., Tucson, 

Attorneys for Elizabeth Stenz, widow of Charles W. Stenz 

James B. Stabler, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae CopperPoint Mutual 

Insurance Company
STENZ V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

2

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE

CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER and JUSTICES BERCH and TIMMER joined, 

and BRUTINEL concurred.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Although Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act does not 

mandate the payment of interest on benefits not timely paid, this Court has 

held that the general interest statute, A.R.S. § 44-1201, applies to workers’ 

compensation awards. Today we hold that death benefits under A.R.S. 

§ 23-1046 are liquidated, and interest on them accrues from the time a 

carrier receives notice that a survivor has filed a claim with the Industrial 

Commission pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1061(A).

I. 

¶2 In 2005, Charles Stenz suffered an on-the-job injury for which 

he filed a claim with his employer’s insurance carrier, Pinnacle Risk 

Management. Pinnacle accepted the claim and paid the benefits. In 2009, 

Stenz died. Alleging that his death resulted partly from the 2005 injury, 

Stenz’s widow filed a claim for death benefits under A.R.S. § 23-1061(A). 

The claim was filed with the Industrial Commission on September 21, 2009. 

Pinnacle received notice of the claim on October 21, 2009.

¶3 One week later, Pinnacle denied the claim. An 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upheld the denial, but the court of 

appeals set aside that award. After a new hearing, the ALJ issued an award 

granting death benefits. In 2013, nearly four years after Mrs. Stenz filed her 

claim, the ALJ entered a final order affirming the award. Pinnacle paid the 

benefits dating back to Stenz’s death, but did not pay interest on the unpaid 

benefits.

¶4 Mrs. Stenz requested a hearing pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-

1061(J), alleging that she was owed interest on unpaid death benefits from 

the time the claim was originally filed until the award was ultimately paid. 

The ALJ ruled that no interest was owed on the death benefit before the 

award became final in 2013. The court of appeals set this ruling aside, 

concluding that the claim was liquidated as of the date Pinnacle received 

notice of it. Stenz v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 Ariz. 104, 336 P.3d 737 (App. 2014).
STENZ V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

3

II.

¶5 This Court has applied Arizona’s general interest statute, 

A.R.S. § 44-1201, to claims arising under the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

Tisdel v. Indus. Comm’n, 156 Ariz. 211, 212, 751 P.2d 527, 528 (1988). We later 

clarified that interest begins to accrue when “(1) there is a legal 

‘indebtedness . . . or other obligation’ to pay benefits and (2) when the carrier 

has ‘notice of [this] obligation to pay.’” DKI Corp./Sylvan Pools v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 173 Ariz. 535, 537, 845 P.2d 461, 463 (1993) (quoting Tisdel, 156 Ariz. 

at 213, 751 P.2d at 529). Here we consider whether a “legal indebtedness . . .

or other obligation” first arises when a carrier receives notice of a claimant’s

petition for death benefits under A.R.S. § 23-1046 or instead when an ALJ 

orders that such benefits be paid.

¶6 Tisdel and DKI provide guiding principles but do not answer 

the question. In Tisdel, the insurance carrier accepted a claim for benefits in 

1971 but did not pay that claim for nearly fourteen years. 156 Ariz. at 212, 

751 P.2d at 528. The legal indebtedness indisputably existed in 1971, and 

we held that interest accrued on that indebtedness throughout the nearly 

fourteen-year period of inactivity. Id. In DKI, by contrast, the claimant filed 

a petition to re-open a claim under A.R.S. § 23-1061(H). 173 Ariz. at 537, 

845 P.2d at 463. There we held that a petition to re-open did not trigger 

indebtedness sufficient to accrue interest. Id. at 539, 845 P.2d at 536.

¶7 In DKI, we applied the “liquidated-unliquidated” test to 

determine whether a “legal indebtedness . . . or other obligation” exists so 

that interest begins to accrue. Id. at 538, 845 P.2d at 464. “A claim is 

liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it 

possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon 

opinion or discretion.” La Paz County v. Yuma County, 153 Ariz. 162, 168, 

735 P.2d 772, 778 (1987). If the amount of benefits to be paid is liquidated 

and the carrier has notice of the liquidated obligation, then the Industrial 

Commission should award interest. DKI, 173 Ariz. at 539, 845 P.2d at 465.

¶8 In DKI, this Court said that the claim in Tisdel was liquidated 

because it was for “scheduled benefits . . . susceptible to mathematical 

computation and applied to the statutory payment schedule.” 173 Ariz. at 

538, 845 P.2d at 464. But in DKI, there was “no indication that the amount 

of benefits could have been accurately determined when the initial award 

was entered.” Id. Because of this uncertainty, “by definition, the ALJ did 
STENZ V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

4

not find that [the claimant] was entitled to any benefits until the date of the 

initial award.” Id. at 537, 845 P.2d at 463.

¶9 A claim for death benefits, like the claim at issue in Tisdel, is 

subject to a fixed payment schedule. A.R.S. § 23-1046(A)(2). Pinnacle 

received notice of this claim in October 2009. The amount to be paid did

not depend on an ALJ’s later award. A legal obligation to pay may exist 

before, or even in the absence of, a court order commanding such payment. 

See Desert Mountain Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 225 Ariz. 

194, 201 ¶ 17, 236 P.3d 421, 428 (App. 2010). We agree with the special 

concurrence in the court of appeals that “a court may enforce a legal 

obligation, [but] no court action is required to create a legal obligation.” 

Stenz, 236 Ariz. at 111 ¶ 27, 336 P.3d at 744 (Howard, J., specially 

concurring).

¶10 Under Arizona’s workers’ compensation scheme, the 

obligation to pay is created by A.R.S. § 23-1061(G), which commands that 

“the insurance carrier or self-insuring employer shall process and pay 

compensation and provide medical, surgical and hospital benefits, without 

the necessity for the making of an award or determination by the 

commission.” Because the obligation to pay was created by statute and was 

for a liquidated amount prescribed by the statute’s schedule, Pinnacle had 

notice of the obligation upon its receipt of Mrs. Stenz’s claim in October

2009. Interest began to accrue on that date. (As noted in the concurring 

opinion, ¶ 17, no party has urged us to depart from DKI’s holding that 

interest only begins to accrue when the carrier receives notice of the claim.) 

¶11 Pinnacle argues that mechanisms already exist to prevent 

carriers from withholding benefits in bad faith, pointing both to statutory 

provisions such as A.R.S. § 23-930 (civil penalties for unfair or bad faith 

claim processing) and tort law, see, e.g., Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 

274, 872 P.2d 668, 678 (1994) (holding that A.R.S. § 23-930 does not displace 

common-law tort actions for bad faith processing of claims). But these 

arguments misconstrue the purpose of awarding interest for liquidated 

claims for benefits. Although allowing interest may induce insurance 

companies to act more quickly, the primary purpose is to protect a 

claimant’s right to be made whole after an injury.

¶12 This Court has previously recognized the “economic fact” 

that any money damage award is worth less the later a claimant receives it. 
STENZ V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

5

Tisdel, 156 Ariz. at 214, 751 P.2d at 530. A party who is deprived of the use 

of money has suffered an economic loss and the party who retains the use 

of money is unjustly enriched. La Paz, 153 Ariz. at 168, 735 P.2d at 778. 

Interest is the remedy for this deprivation.

¶13 Recovery of interest in these circumstances furthers the 

purpose of Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act, “to dispense, so far as 

possible, with litigation between employer and employee and to place upon 

industry the burden of compensation for injuries caused by the 

employment.” Pressley v. Indus. Comm’n, 73 Ariz. 22, 28, 236 P.2d 1011, 1015 

(1951). A contrary ruling would deprive a claimant of the full value of the 

benefit owed while undesirably encouraging insurance carriers to protract

litigation to delay paying benefits for as long as possible.

III.

¶14 We hold that a claim for death benefits filed pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 23-1046 is a liquidated claim and interest is owed on the claim from 

the date on which the carrier receives notice of the claim. Accordingly, we 

vacate the opinion of the court of appeals and set aside the ALJ’s award 

denying Mrs. Stenz relief.
STENZ V. ICA, ET AL.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, CONCURRING

6

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, concurring: 

¶15 Although I otherwise agree with the majority’s analysis, I 

write separately because I think interest on the death-benefits claim 

should accrue from the date of death rather than the date the carrier 

receives notice of the claim. The majority correctly cites DKI Corp./Sylvan 

Pools v. Industrial Commission, 173 Ariz. 535, 537, 845 P.2d 461, 463 (1993), 

for the proposition that interest on a workers’ compensation claim does 

not begin to accrue until the carrier receives notice of the claim. Id. DKI 

relies on an earlier case, Tisdel, for the proposition that the carrier must 

have notice of a claim before interest begins to accrue. See DKI, 173 Ariz. 

at 537, 845 P.2d at 463 (quoting Tisdel v. Indus. Comm’n, 156 Ariz. 211, 213, 

751 P.2d 527, 529 (1988)). 

¶16 But neither DKI nor Tisdel explain why interest should not 

begin to run until the carrier has notice of the claim. When we adopted 

the liquidated/unliquidated test, we stated only that “[a] claim is 

liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it 

possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon 

opinion or discretion.” La Paz County v. Yuma County, 153 Ariz. 162, 168, 

735 P.2d 772, 778 (1987) (quoting Ariz. Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. O’Malley 

Lumber Co., 14 Ariz. App. 486, 496, 484 P.2d 639, 649 (1971)). As the 

majority points out, A.R.S. § 23-1061(G) creates “the obligation to pay 

[death benefits],” and these benefits are immediately calculable at death. 

Supra, ¶ 10. Because this legal obligation to pay a liquidated sum exists 

prior to any action to enforce payment, interest should begin to accrue 

from that date, just as in any other area of the law where prejudgment 

interest is available. See, e.g., La Paz County, 153 Ariz. at 168, 735 P.2d at 

778; Rossi v. Hammons, 34 Ariz. 95, 104, 268 P. 181, 184 (1928) (“[W]hen 

allowed as damages, interest runs from the date when the right to recover 

a sum certain is vested in the plaintiff.” (internal citation omitted)). This is 

consistent with the purpose of awarding interest, which “protects a 

claimant’s right to be made whole after an injury.” Supra, ¶ 11. To hold 

otherwise wrongfully deprives claimants use and enjoyment of their 

money without compensation, even if the time between death and notice 

is relatively short. See La Paz County, 153 Ariz. at 168, 735 P.2d at 778.

¶17 Although I think this is the better technical approach, neither 

party urged this position before this Court. Because we have not had the 

benefit of briefing and argument by counsel, and recognizing that the 
STENZ V. ICA, ET AL.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, CONCURRING

7

monetary difference would be relatively small in this case, I concur in the 

opinion of the Court.