alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5237 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5237

  To direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to allow aliens having 
  status as an E-2 nonimmigrant by reason of a change of nonimmigrant 
classification made in the United States to re-enter the United States 
           after a trip abroad without obtaining a new visa.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 29, 2014

 Mr. Coffman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to allow aliens having 
  status as an E-2 nonimmigrant by reason of a change of nonimmigrant 
classification made in the United States to re-enter the United States 
           after a trip abroad without obtaining a new visa.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as--
            (1) the ``Investors Need Clear Laws with Uniform Direction 
        for E-2 Status Holders Act''; or
            (2) the ``INCLUDE Act''.

SEC. 2. UNLIMITED RE-ENTRIES FOR CERTAIN TREATY INVESTORS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such 
steps as may be necessary to ensure that--
            (1) an alien described in subsection (b) may re-enter the 
        United States after a trip abroad without having to request or 
        obtain a new visa; and
            (2) there is no limit on the number of such re-entries 
        during the period in which the alien lawfully holds status 
        under section 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii)).
    (b) Aliens Described.--An alien described in this subsection is an 
alien having lawful status under section 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii)) by reason 
of a change of nonimmigrant classification made in the United States 
under section 248 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1258).
    (c) Travel Documents.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
commence issuance of travel documents determined appropriate by the 
Secretary to carry out this section, such as re-entry permits, advance 
parole travel documents, or any other travel documents deemed 
appropriate by the Secretary for this purpose.
                                 <all>
```
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Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 

425 Lexington Ave 

New York, NY 10017

Exhibit C 

Customary and Comparable Compensation Disclosures 

Category of 

Timekeeper 

BLENDED HOURLY RATE 

Billed by timekeepers in all 

domestic offices, excluding 

bankruptcy 

Billed in this Application 

Partners $1,309.00 $1,313.00 

Counsel $1,071.00 $1,054.00 

Associate $731.00 $749.92 

Paraprofessionals $282.00 $379.87 

All timekeepers 

aggregated $805.00 $952.53 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3157-3 Filed: 07/23/19 Entered: 07/23/19 16:36:20 Page 1

of 1
June 1 1 , 2013



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals
MUHAMMAD AMIR QURAS HI , Appellant

NO. 14

- 12

- 00858

- CV V.

ISMAT JABEEN , Appellee

_____________ ___________________ This cause, an appeal from the final decree of divorce , signed June 19, 2012, was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find no error in the judgment. We order the judgment of the court below AFFIRMED

. We order appellant, Muhammad Amir Qurashi, to pay all costs incurred in this appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7828

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DARRENCE TERMAINE COVINGTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:07-cr-00125-FL-1; 5:09-cv-00565-FL)

Submitted: February 25, 2016 Decided: March 2, 2016

Before SHEDD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Darrence Termaine Covington, Appellant Pro Se. Ethan A. Ontjes, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Seth Morgan Wood, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Darrence Termaine Covington seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. 

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge 

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief 

on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating 

that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate 

both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that 

the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Covington has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Jack Grynberg d/b/a Grynberg Petroleum Company v. 

Teledrift Company d/b/a Spidle Turbeco

Appellate case number: 01-13-00512-CV

Trial court case number: 2011-16376

Trial court: 80th District Court of Harris County

The trial court clerk filed the clerk’s record for this appeal on July 9, 2013. The 

court reporter filed the reporter’s record on February 18, 2014. Accordingly, we order

appellant to file appellant’s brief within 60 days of the date of this order. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.6(a). Appellee’s brief, if any, will be due within 30 days after the date 

appellant’s brief is filed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(b).

Further, we carry the issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 

with the case and order the parties to address the issue in their briefs.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Sherry Radack

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: February 27, 2014
#### CLARK HALL, Administrator of the Estate of LEE HALL, v. KENTUCKY-VIRGINIA STONE COMPANY and PAUL McCURRY, LON LAMBERT, and ERNEST GALLOWAY.

(Filed 13 October, 1937.)

Removal of Causes § 4a — Complaint held to state joint cause, and petition for removal was properly denied.

A complaint alleging that plaintiff’s intestate was riding in a truck which was being negligently driven at an unlawful speed, and that the truck collided with another truck which was negligently and unlawfully parked on the highway, resulting in the death of intestate, and that the accident was the result of the concurrent negligence of tile drivers, *is held*to state a cause of action for joint negligence, and petition of the nonresident defendants to remove to the Federal Court was properly denied, the cause of action as stated in the complaint being determinative on the question of separable controversy.

Appeal by petitioners from *Alley, J.,*at June Special Term, 1937, of Yaitcey.

Affirmed.

This was a petition for removal to the United States District Court by the defendants Kentucky-Yirginia Stone Company and Lon Lambert on the ground of diversity of citizenship and separable controversy. From judgment denying the removal, petitioners appealed to this Court.

*255
      *Charles Hutchins and E. L. Briggs for plaintiff, appellee.*

*Jones & Ward and J. M. Horner, Jr., for defendants, appellants.*

Pee Cueiam.

The complaint alleges that the death of the plaintiff’s intestate was caused by the joint negligence of the defendants in the operation of two trucks on the public highway. The plaintiff and the defendants Ernest Galloway, Paul McCurry, and Lon Lambert, according to the allegations of the complaint, are residents of North Carolina, and the defendant Kentucky-Yirginia Stone Company is a nonresident corporation.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff’s intestate received fatal injuries as a result of a collision of the truck in which he was riding, which was owned by Galloway and driven by McCurry, with a truck owned by the Kentucky-Yirginia Stone Company and driven by Lon Lambert; that these two trucks collided as a result of “the mutual and concurrent negligence of the defendants, and each of them,” in that Galloway’s truck was being operated on the public highway at a negligent and unlawful speed, and the Stone Company’s truck was negligently and unlawfully parked upon said highway.

Upon a petition for removal to the Federal Court on the ground of diversity of citizenship and separable controversy, the plaintiff is entitled to have his cause of action considered as stated in the complaint. It is obvious that the complaint under consideration alleges a cause of action based upon the joint and concurrent negligence of both resident and nonresident tort-feasors. This case is governed by *Rucker v. Snider Bros.,*210 N. C., 777, and the petition for removal was properly denied.

Affirmed.
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EXHIBIT C 

 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3877-3 Filed: 09/11/19 Entered: 09/11/19 11:42:25 Page 1

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EXPENSE SUMMARY FOR THE PERIOD 

FEBRUARY 1, 2019 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2019 

Type of Expense Partner Amount 

Airfare Berman 758.60

Lodging Berman 457.74

Ground Transportation Berman 183.95

Total 1400.29 

 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3877-3 Filed: 09/11/19 Entered: 09/11/19 11:42:25 Page 2

of 2
#### H. R. GARRIS v. J. K. YOUNG and YOUNG MERCANTILE COMPANY, a Corporation.

(Filed 5 October, 1927.)

Damages — Arrest—Pleadings—Demurrer.

No cause of action is alleged in tie complaint upon allegations that defendant who was on his appearance bond to appear at court upon appeal from a misdemeanor, misinformed the plaintiff that the cost of the prosecution had been paid and he was discharged, and in consequence of this erroneous statement he had been taken on a capias and incarcerated, thereby sustaining the damages in suit.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Qranmer, J.,*at March Term, 1927, of Pitt.

Affirmed.

*8. J. Ev&rett for plaintiff.*

*Skinner, Cooper & Whedbee and Albion Dumb for defendant.*

Per CuriaM.

The substantial allegations of the complaint are that on 1 November, 1924, the plaintiff was employed by *J. K.*Young, manager of the Young Mercantile Company, to advertise the company in the town of Greenville, and while so engaged he was arrested for violating an ordinance of the town. The manager then requested him to appear before the proper court and, if convicted, to appeal to the Superior Court in term. In the mayor’s court he was convicted and appealed, the defendant Young signing his appearance bond as surety. Thereafter the plaintiff inquired of Young as to the disposition of the case, and was told that the cost had been paid and that the plaintiff had been discharged, and was not required to attend the court. He alleged that he did not attend and that his absence was the result of Young’s failure to pay the cost; that he was arrested under an order of the Superior Court on account of delinquent costs and imprisoned all night and a part of the nest day, and then brought into court and held in *341custody, and tbat in consequence of tbe wrongful acts of tbe defendants be bad been damaged in tbe sum of $5,000. Tbe defendants demurred *ore tenus;*tbe demurrer was sustained, tbe action dismissed, and tbe plaintiff appealed.

Tbe plaintiff knew tbat be bad given a bond for bis appearance in tbe Superior Court, and be is presumed to bave known tbat in case of default be would be subject to arrest under a capias. It bas been said, “Wben a man bas a ease in court tbe best thing be can do is to attend to it; if be neglects to do so be cannot complain.” *Pepper v. Clegg,*132 N. C., 312. Tbe plaintiff should bave observed this injunction and not relied upon tbe statement of Young under tbe circumstances alleged in tbe complaint. We bave discovered no sufficient ground upon which to base a recovery.

Affirmed.