IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 40PA13

FILED 20 DECEMBER 2013

IN THE MATTER OF: L.M.T., A.M.T.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous, 

unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2012), 

reversing orders entered on 19 October 2010 and 5 March 2012, both by Judge 

Edward A. Pone in District Court, Cumberland County, and remanding for additional 

findings of fact. Heard in the Supreme Court on 4 September 2013.

Christopher L. Carr and Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee for Cumberland County 

Department of Social Services, and Beth A. Hall, Attorney Advocate for the 

Guardian ad Litem, petitioner-appellants.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellee-mother.

Annick Lenoir-Peek, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Office of Parent 

Representation, amicus curiae. 

NEWBY, Justice. 

In this case we consider the statutory requirement that a trial court make 

certain findings of fact in matters involving the legal separation of a parent and child. 

Though a trial court is required to make written findings of fact in a permanency

planning order that consider the factors in section 7B-507 of our General Statutes, 

these findings need not recite the statutory language verbatim. When reviewing the 

sufficiency of such orders, an appellate court should consider whether the trial court’s 

findings of fact address the substance of the statutory requirements. Further, even 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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if the permanency planning order is deficient standing alone, the appellate court 

should review that order in conjunction with the trial court’s termination of parental 

rights order to determine whether the statutory requirements are met. In some 

instances, a deficiency in one may be cured by the other. In this case, because both 

the permanency planning order and the termination of parental rights order comply 

with the statutory mandate, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Mother appealed after the trial court entered two orders that (1) 

ceased reunification efforts between respondent and her children, L.M.T. and A.M.T., 

(“cease reunification order”) and (2) terminated respondent’s parental rights

(“termination order”). At the Court of Appeals respondent argued that the trial 

court’s cease reunification order failed to satisfy section 7B-507, which requires trial 

courts to “make[ ] written findings of fact that” further reunification efforts would be 

“futile” or “inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe,

permanent home.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2011). The Court of Appeals 

acknowledged that in the cease reunification order the trial court “made numerous 

and detailed findings addressing respondent’s troubled case history.” In re L.M.T., 

___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, No. COA12-743, 2012 WL 6595388, at *2 (Dec. 18, 

2012) (unpublished). Moreover, the Court of Appeals found “sufficient evidence in 

the record to support the required findings.” Id. at *3. Nonetheless, the Court of 

Appeals determined that the cease reunification order contained “no finding explicitly 

linking those facts with any of the factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507, including 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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the futility of further reunification efforts or that further efforts would be inconsistent 

with the juveniles’ health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home.” Id. at *2. 

Based on these perceived deficiencies in the cease reunification order, and without 

considering the termination of parental rights order, the Court of Appeals reversed 

both orders and remanded for additional findings. Id. at *3. 

We allowed discretionary review to consider the requirement that a trial court 

make certain findings of fact under subsection 7B-507(b) of our Juvenile Code. In re 

L.M.T., ___ N.C. ___, 738 S.E.2d 359 (2013). The purpose of the Juvenile Code is, in 

part, to “provide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their 

homes and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the 

unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents” and to 

ensure “that the best interests of the juvenile are of paramount consideration by the 

court.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(4), (5) (2011). The General Assembly further stated that 

“when it is not in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned home, the juvenile will be 

placed in a safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of time.” Id. § 7B100(5). The Juvenile Code strikes a balance between the constitutional rights of a 

parent and the best interests of a child, id. § 7B-100(3) (2011) (stating that a purpose 

of the Juvenile Code is “[t]o provide for services for the protection of juveniles by 

means that respect both the right to family autonomy and the juveniles’ needs for 

safety, continuity, and permanence”), and provides a protective framework when a 

juvenile is “alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent,” id. § 7B-300 (2011). See 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 553, 614 S.E.2d 489, 498 (2005) (“Parents’ fundamental 

right to control their children at some point gives way to the state’s interest in the 

welfare of the child. In Subchapter I of our Juvenile Code, the General Assembly has 

established procedures to safeguard parental rights while simultaneously providing 

for the removal of children and even the termination of parental rights.”). 

To advance the Juvenile Code’s dual purpose of protecting parental rights and 

promoting the best interests of the child, subsection 7B-507(b) requires that trial 

courts make written findings of fact in orders that place “a juvenile in the custody or 

placement responsibility of a county department of social services.” N.C.G.S. § 7B507(b) (2011). Relevant to the case at hand, that statute mandates:

[T]he court may direct that reasonable efforts to eliminate the 

need for placement of the juvenile shall not be required or shall 

cease if the court makes written findings of fact that:

(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or would be 

inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and 

need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable 

period of time[.]

Id. Strict adherence to this statute ensures that the trial court fulfills the aspirations 

of the Juvenile Code by allowing our appellate courts to conduct a thorough review of 

the order. While trial courts are advised that use of the actual statutory language 

would be the best practice, the statute does not demand a verbatim recitation of its 

language as was required by the Court of Appeals in this case. Put differently, the 

order must make clear that the trial court considered the evidence in light of whether 

reunification “would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.” The 

trial court’s written findings must address the statute’s concerns, but need not quote 

its exact language. On the other hand, use of the precise statutory language will not 

remedy a lack of supporting evidence for the trial court’s order. 

Our review of the cease reunification order in this case “is limited to whether 

there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings [of fact] and whether 

the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re P.O., 207 N.C. App. 35, 41, 698 

S.E.2d 525, 530 (2010) (citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C. App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 

235, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 192 (2002)). The trial court’s findings 

of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. Id. (citing 

In re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003)). 

At the permanency planning review hearing, the trial court considered

extensive evidence from multiple witnesses, including respondent, about

respondent’s continued drug abuse, which she admitted occurred in the presence of 

her children; her lack of employment, attempted suicide, and confessed deception of 

the court; her involvement in domestic violence with her husband; and other repeated 

instances of behavior inconsistent with the best interests of the juveniles. That

evidence supported the following findings of fact contained in the cease reunification 

order:

The Respondent Mother has now disclosed that she has a 

substance abuse problem, primarily related to prescription drugs. 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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[Respondent Mother’s drug use became] increasingly worse . . . 

while she was in the process of seeking reunification with the 

juveniles. 

There have been instances of domestic violence between the 

Respondent Mother and her now husband . . . . At least one of 

those incidents involved [respondent’s] use of a knife. . . .

The environment of the Respondent Mother’s home is not 

conducive to raising children. In fact, the environment that the 

Respondent Mother and her husband have created is injurious. 

That while the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad Litem

and everyone else involved was working toward the reunification 

process, the Respondent Mother was sinking deeper and deeper 

into an abyss of domestic violence and drug abuse all the while 

covering it up and refusing to acknowledge the fact of its existence 

in order that the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad Litem 

and others surrounding her could assist her and help the 

juveniles. The deception of the Court during this process is bad 

enough, but the Respondent Mother has completely let her 

children down. 

The Respondent Mother and her husband are facing eviction and 

have received a notice to vacate their housing. . . .

[The juveniles] are in need of permanence and deserve a fresh 

start.

The Court determines that in the best interest of the juveniles, 

the permanent plan should now be changed to that of placement 

with other Court approved caretakers with a concurrent plan of 

adoption. 

Return of the juveniles to the custody of the Respondents would 

be contrary to the welfare and best interest of the juveniles.

While these findings of fact do not quote the precise language of subsection 7B507(b), the order embraces the substance of the statutory provisions requiring 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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findings of fact that further reunification efforts “would be futile” or “would be 

inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home 

within a reasonable period of time.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1). As an example, the 

trial court’s finding that “the environment that the Respondent Mother and her 

husband have created is injurious” indicates that further reunification efforts would 

be “inconsistent” with the juveniles’ “health” and “safety.” Id. Likewise, the trial 

court’s findings of fact related to respondent’s drug abuse, participation in domestic 

violence, deception of the court, and repeated failures at creating an acceptable and 

safe living environment certainly suggest that reunification efforts “would be futile.” 

Id. Moreover, these findings clearly support the trial court’s conclusions that 

“[r]eturn of the juveniles . . . is contrary to the welfare and best interest of the 

juveniles,” “[t]hat in the best interest of the juveniles, legal and physical custody 

should remain with the Cumberland County Department of Social Services,” and 

“[t]hat the Cumberland County Department of Social Services should be relieved of 

reunification and visitation efforts with the Respondents.” 

Even if the cease reunification order standing alone had been insufficient, that 

would not end the appellate court’s inquiry. Parents may seek appellate review of 

cease reunification orders only in limited circumstances. In this case, respondent 

appealed under subsection 7B-1001(a)(5)(a), which provides that 

a. The Court of Appeals shall review [an] order [entered 

under section 7B-507] to cease reunification together with 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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an appeal of the termination of parental rights order if all 

of the following apply:

1. A motion or petition to terminate the parent’s 

rights is heard and granted.

2. The order terminating parental rights is 

appealed in a proper and timely manner.

3. The order to cease reunification is identified as 

an issue in the record on appeal of the 

termination of parental rights.

Id. § 7B-1001(a)(5) (2011). In other words, if a termination of parental rights order 

is entered, the appeal of the cease reunification order is combined with the appeal of 

the termination order. 

Despite the General Assembly’s plain language that we are to “review the order 

to cease reunification together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights 

order,” id. (emphasis added), respondent urges the Court to consider each order by 

itself. Had the General Assembly intended to so limit our scope of review, it could 

have clearly drawn such a distinction. Rather, the legislature unambiguously 

instructed our appellate courts to review both orders “together.” The word “together” 

is defined to include “at one time,” “with each other,” and “considered as a whole.” 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2404 (1967). Accordingly, we read this

statute to mean that we are to look to both orders “with each other,” id., to determine 

whether the trial court has made sufficient findings of fact. Because we consider both 

orders “together,” incomplete findings of fact in the cease reunification order may be 

cured by findings of fact in the termination order. This application of the statute is 

consistent with the “paramount” aim of the Juvenile Code to provide for “the best 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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interests of the juvenile” within a “reasonable amount of time.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(5);

see also Act of Aug. 23, 2005, ch. 398, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455 (captioned “An Act 

to Amend the Juvenile Code to Expedite Outcomes for Children and Families 

Involved in Welfare Cases and Appeals and to Limit the Appointment of Guardians 

ad Litem for Parents in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings.”); cf. In re 

M.I.W., 365 N.C. 374, 381, 722 S.E.2d 469, 474 (2012) (“Our holding [ensures that the 

best interest of the juvenile are of paramount consideration] by minimizing 

procedural delay that interferes with addressing the needs of the child when that 

delay is unnecessary to protect the rights of parents.”).

Though the issue was not addressed by the Court of Appeals, to provide finality 

in this case we now shift our attention to the sufficiency of the termination of parental 

rights order. In regards to this order, at the Court of Appeals respondent challenged 

only the trial court’s conclusion of law that terminating her parental rights would be 

in the best interests of her children.

“Once the trial court has found a ground for termination, the court then 

considers the best interests of the child in making its decision on whether to 

terminate parental rights.” In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146, 669 S.E.2d 55, 59 

(2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368, 677 S.E.2d 455 (2009). When making a

decision on a child’s best interests, section 7B-1110 requires the trial court to 

consider:

(1) The age of the juvenile.
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the 

accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the 

proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other 

permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 (2011). “We review this decision on an abuse of discretion 

standard, and will reverse a court’s decision only where it is ‘manifestly unsupported 

by reason.’ ” In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. at 146, 669 S.E.2d at 59 (citation omitted); see 

also In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984) (“[T]he court’s 

decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary.”).

At the termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court again took

extensive evidence regarding domestic violence, lack of necessary medical care for the 

juveniles, respondent’s admitted drug abuse and related criminal activity, her neglect 

of the juveniles while they were visiting her, specifically that they were not “fed” or 

“bathed,” her failure to obtain a job and pay child support, and her struggles with 

mental illness. The court heard further testimony that respondent had made little 

progress toward changing the circumstances that initially led to the removal of her 

children and that another family was interested in permanently adopting them. The 

trial court made the following findings of fact:

That the Respondent Mother and [her husband] have 

demonstrated a pattern of failing to provide appropriate care for 

the juveniles and the Court finds that it is probable that this 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

-11-

neglect would be repeated if custody of the juveniles was returned 

to the Respondent Mother.

That the Respondent Mother’s situation has not improved, and 

based on the evidence presented on this date, the juveniles would 

be subjected to irreparable harm if the juveniles were returned to 

the home of the Respondents. 

Since [the Department of Social Services was relieved of 

reunification and visitation efforts], the Respondent Mother has 

not made efforts to communicate with the juveniles by sending 

any cards, gifts, or letters to the juveniles. 

The Respondent Mother has willfully failed to pay any amount 

towards the costs of care for the juveniles. The Respondent 

Mother is physically and financially able to do so. 

The Respondents have demonstrated a pattern of failing to 

provide appropriate care for the juveniles. It is highly probable 

that neglect would be repeated if custody of the juveniles was 

returned to either of the Respondents. The Respondents have 

neglected the welfare of the juveniles for several years. This 

behavior is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.

Additionally, the court concluded that “based on the tender age of the juveniles, the 

likelihood of adoption for each of the juveniles is great,” that there is a “minimal bond” 

between respondent and her children, and that the juveniles “have begun to adjust” 

to their “potential adoptive home.” Given the totality of the evidence and the trial 

court’s extensive order, the court clearly considered the factors in section 7B-1110. 

Viewing the trial court’s decision through the lens of the abuse of discretion standard, 

we cannot say that its determination was manifestly unsupported by reason, and we 

must thus defer to the trial court’s judgment “that it is in the best interest of these 
In re L.M.T.

Opinion of the Court

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juveniles for the purpose of obtaining safety, permanence, and stability that the 

parental rights of the Respondents . . . be terminated.” 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s orders ceasing reunification and 

terminating respondent’s parental rights were each sufficient standing alone and 

should have been affirmed. The Court of Appeals erred both in its analysis of the 

cease reunification order and in its determination that the cease reunification order

was deficient without considering that order in light of the findings of fact in the 

termination order. Ending a parent-child relationship is a decision the court must 

weigh carefully, mindful of constitutional protections and statutory safeguards. 

Those safeguards, however, are to be applied practically so that the best interests of 

the child—the polar star in controversies over child neglect and custody—are the 

paramount concern. The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed 

thereby reinstating the trial court’s orders. 

REVERSED.

Justice BEASLEY concurring. 

I concur in the majority’s holding that the trial court’s findings of fact are 

sufficient under N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1) to support its conclusion that reunification 

efforts should cease in respondent’s case. I disagree, however, with the majority’s 

further statement that any hypothetical deficiencies in the permanency planning 

order’s findings could be “cured” by examining that order in conjunction with the 
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

-13-

order terminating respondent’s parental rights.1 Accordingly, I write separately to 

express my concerns.

The majority correctly observes that this case asks us to “consider the statutory 

requirement that a trial court make certain findings of fact in matters involving the 

legal separation of a parent and child.” This inquiry is controlled by N.C.G.S. § 7B507(b), which specifies that orders relieving county departments of social services of 

further reunification efforts must include findings of fact addressing, among other 

considerations, whether “[s]uch efforts clearly would be futile or would be

inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home 

within a reasonable period of time.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2013). The majority 

concludes—and I agree—that the trial court’s findings in this case, while not couched 

in the “precise language” of N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1), are sufficient to “embrace the 

substance of the statute.”

In its order, the trial court found as fact:

3. The Court readopts the findings from the previous orders

entered in this matter, and the Court further finds that 

those were the findings that existed at the time that those 

particular orders were entered.

4. The juveniles were adjudicated dependent on January 5, 

2010. They have remained in the continual care of the 

 

1 The majority refers to the trial court’s 19 October 2010 order as a “cease reunification 

order.” Because reunification efforts are only one aspect of the review that district courts 

undertake in conducting permanency planning hearings, I refer to the order as a 

“permanency planning order.”
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

-14-

Cumberland County Department of Social Services since 

on or about August 31, 2009, as a result of a Non Secure 

Custody Order filed subsequent to the filing of the Petition. 

The Petition was filed on July 29, 2009.

5. It is not possible for the juveniles to return to the custody 

of the Respondents in as much as the conditions which led 

to the removal of the juveniles from the home as well as the 

accruing conditions have not been alleviated.

6. Since the previous hearing, it has been determined that 

the Respondent Mother has been very much less than 

candid with the Court, the Cumberland County 

Department of Social Services as well as all others involved 

in this case.

7. The Respondent Mother has now disclosed that she has 

a substance abuse problem, primarily related to 

prescription drugs. Her testimony today indicates that she 

began abusing the drugs in November, 2009. The abuse 

has become increasingly worse. The Court notes that this 

occurred while she was in the process of seeking 

reunification with the juveniles. She failed to disclose this 

to the Court or the Cumberland County Department of 

Social Services. In fact, at a previous hearing where the 

Cumberland County Department of Social Services had 

significant concerns about missing prescription 

medication, the Respondent Mother came into court and, 

in fact, lied under oath. She attributed the missing 

medication into [sic] a mix-up at the pharmacy. She 

indicated that the pills were not actually missing but that 

she had taken the pills back to the pharmacy and there was 

some problem with the pharmacy records. She admitted 

today that that statement was not true and that she and a 

friend had abused the prescription drugs. In fact, she did 

this while the juveniles were within her care.

. . . .

9. There have been incidents of domestic violence between 

the Respondent Mother and her now husband Mr. 
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

-15-

Dickerson. At least one of those incidents involved the use 

of a knife by the Respondent Mother directed toward her 

husband. Additionally, the Respondent Mother’s husband 

has a problem with illegal drugs and prescription drugs. 

Each of them are facing serious felony charges. The 

Respondent Mother is currently facing charges of Felony 

Trafficking Opium or Heroin and Felony Obtaining a 

Controlled Substance by Fraud or Forgery. This incident 

surrounds allegations of forgery of a prescription. They 

could both face a significant period of incarceration. 

Additionally, the Respondent Mother is facing charges of 

Driving While Impaired. The offense date for that is 

August 20, 2010. She took a significant number of Zanex, 

and her testimony today is that she has little or no 

recollection after taking the pills.

10. The Respondent Mother’s husband’s chain of command 

has had significant difficulties with the substance abuse 

and domestic violence between the Respondent Mother and 

the Respondent Mother’s husband. They have had to 

respond to several different incidents. Witnesses present 

in court today have responded to several of the domestic 

violence incidents as well as other incidents involving 

illegal drugs and controlled substances. The Respondent 

Mother’s husband has been placed on buddy-watch on at 

least four (4) different occasions within the past couple of 

months. Buddy-watch is placed in effect when an 

individual has suicidal or homicidal ideations. Both the 

Respondent Mother and her husband have had suicidal 

attempts. Mr. Dickerson has been taken to the 6th floor at 

Womack Army Hospital which is the unit that deals with 

behavioral and emotional and mental health issues as well 

as substance abuse issues. He has gone there on at least 

one (1) occasion within the past sixty (60) days. The 

environment of the Respondent Mother’s home is not 

conducive to raising children. In fact, the environment 

that the Respondent Mother and her husband have created 

is injurious.

11. Of significant concern to this Court is the fact that these 

juveniles were formerly placed with relatives and had to be 
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

-16-

removed following significant incidents and a toxic 

relationship between the Respondent Mother and her 

relatives. The Court has previously ruled out relative 

involvement as a result of that and has closed that chapter 

in these juveniles’ lives while we made a sincere and 

significant effort to reunify the Respondent Mother with 

her children. That while the Court, the Department, the 

Guardian ad Litem and everyone else involved was 

working toward the reunification process, the Respondent 

Mother was sinking deeper and deeper into an abyss of 

domestic violence and drug abuse all the while covering it 

up and refusing to acknowledge the fact of its existence in 

order that the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad 

Litem and others surrounding her could assist her and help 

the juveniles. The deception of the Court during this 

process is bad enough, but the Respondent Mother has 

completely let her children down.

12. The Respondent Mother and her husband are facing 

eviction and have received a notice to vacate their housing 

by October 11, 2010. Mr. Dickerson has obtained a new 

residence at 709 Wellons Avenue in Spring Lake, North 

Carolina. The Respondent Mother is not listed as a tenant 

on the lease, and their relationship at this time is unclear. 

Mr. Dickerson is in the process of being chaptered out of 

the military. That is likely to occur within a very short 

period of time. The Respondent Mother is unemployed.

. . . .

15. The juveniles have been in care since August 31, 2009. 

They are in need of permanence and deserve a fresh start. 

The juveniles are doing well in the current foster care 

placements. There are no suitable relatives, based on the 

information that has previously been provided to the 

Court, and relative placement is not appropriate for these 

juveniles.

. . . .
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

-17-

17. The previous permanent plan was reunification with 

the Respondent Mother. The Court previously approved of 

this plan and finds that the Cumberland County 

Department of Social Services has been making reasonable 

efforts, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-507 and 7B907, to implement that permanent plan of care. Those 

efforts include, but are not limited to, conducting Child and 

Family Team Meetings, developing an appropriate Out-ofHome Family Services Case Plan, making necessary 

referrals, coordinating with the Respondent Mother to 

complete the psychological evaluation and parenting 

assessment, and ensuring that the needs of the juveniles 

were being met. The Court determines that in the best

interest of the juveniles, the permanent plan should now 

be changed to that of placement with other Court approved 

caretakers with a concurrent plan of adoption. The Court 

further determines that the Cumberland County 

Department of Social Services should be relieved of 

reunification and visitation efforts with the Respondents.

18. Return of the juveniles to the custody of the 

Respondents would be contrary to the welfare and best 

interest of the juveniles.

Based on these findings, the trial court concluded:

2. Return of the juveniles to the Respondents is contrary to 

the welfare and best interest of the juveniles.

3. That the Cumberland County Department of Social 

Services should be relieved of reunification and visitation 

efforts with the Respondents.

. . . .

5. That in the best interest of the juveniles, legal and 

physical custody should remain with the Cumberland 

County Department of Social Services for placement in 

foster care, with suitable relatives or with other Court 

approved caretakers, pending further orders of the Court.
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

-18-

The trial court’s adoption of the findings contained in its previous orders is 

critical, I believe, because it shows that the trial court was aware of the developments 

in this case, from the events leading to the juveniles entering Cumberland County 

DSS custody in August 2009 to the events precipitating the court’s decision to cease 

reunification efforts in October 2010. The court’s finding that the conditions which 

led to the juveniles’ removal from respondent’s custody had not been alleviated and, 

in fact, had worsened implicitly recognizes that continuing reunification efforts would 

be futile. Such a conclusion is further supported by the trial court’s findings 

regarding respondent’s increasing abuse of prescription drugs, her “sinking” into an 

“abyss of domestic violence,” her consistent deception of the trial court, and her 

inability to obtain and maintain a safe home for the juveniles. The court’s findings 

further recognize that it would be inconsistent with the juveniles’ health and safety 

to work toward reunifying respondent with the juveniles—indeed, the court found 

that the living environment created by respondent is “injurious” and “not conducive 

to raising children.” Moreover, in the trial court’s finding of fact 17, the court reviews 

its “previous permanent plan,” recites the “reasonable efforts” made by the 

Cumberland County Department of Social Services, and determines that the 

Department “should be relieved of reunification . . . efforts with the Respondents,” 

indicating that the trial court properly considered the relevant factors set out in 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1).
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

-19-

Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the trial court’s findings of fact in 

its permanency planning order “address the substance of the statutory requirements” 

under N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1). See In re T.R.M., 208 N.C. App. 160, 164, 702 S.E.2d 

108, 111 (2010) (determining that the trial court’s findings supported its “conclusion 

that further reunification efforts were not required” despite none of the findings using 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1) phraseology); In re D.J.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 238, 615 S.E.2d 

26, 32 (2005) (concluding that the trial court’s finding that “return of the children 

would be contrary to their best interests,” coupled with a recitation of “DSS attempts 

to assist the mother, were sufficient to support cessation of reunification efforts).

Nonetheless, despite having concluded that the trial court’s permanency 

planning order is sufficient “standing alone,” the majority then discusses whether the 

order also might have been sufficient if read together with the trial court’s 

termination order. This discussion is both unnecessary and inappropriate. It is 

unnecessary because we have already held that the trial court’s “written findings of 

fact in [its] permanency planning order [establish] that [it] consider[ed] the factors in 

section 7B-507 of our General Statutes.” We have thus answered the question before 

us; we should not engage in any further analysis that is not necessary to dispose of 

this case.

The majority’s discussion is, moreover, inappropriate in light of the wellestablished principle that “[i]t is no part of the function of the courts, in the exercise 
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

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of the judicial power vested in them by the Constitution, to give advisory opinions, or 

to answer moot questions, or to maintain a legal bureau for those who may chance to 

be interested, for the time being, in the pursuit of some academic matter.” Poore v. 

Poore, 201 N.C. 791, 792, 161 S.E. 532, 533 (1931) (citations omitted). Critically, we 

have held that the permanency planning order in this case adequately stands on its 

own under N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-507 and 7B-907. Thus any further discussion of whether 

a hypothetically deficient order could be salvaged by looking at a subsequent 

termination order is purely advisory in nature. Because the facts of this case do not 

compel this Court to answer this question, we should refrain from doing so. See 

Boswell v. Boswell, 241 N.C. 515, 518-19, 85 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1955) (“This Court 

declares the law as it relates to the facts of the particular case under consideration. 

A decision may be considered authority only within the framework of such facts. 

Dissimilarity as to a material fact may call for application of a different principle of 

law. Hence, the Court will not give advisory opinions or decide abstract questions.” 

(citations omitted)).

Beyond issues of judicial restraint and abstract questions, I further disagree 

with the majority’s merging of permanency planning and termination orders for 

purposes of appellate review. Underlying my disagreement is the fact that 

permanency planning hearings are fundamentally different in nature than 

proceedings to terminate parental rights. We have recognized that
In re L.M.T.

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[t]he permanency planning process in Article 9 [of 

Chapter 7B] is meant to bring about a definitive placement 

plan for the abused, neglected, or dependent child. Within 

twelve months of its initial custody order removing a child 

from his parent, the court must conduct a permanency 

planning hearing to “develop a plan to achieve a safe, 

permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable 

period of time.” [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-907(a). The permanent 

plan may include, inter alia, returning the child to his 

parent, legal guardianship, or adoption. See N.C.G.S. § 7B907. The court enters a written order memorializing the 

permanent plan and continuing or modifying custodial 

arrangements accordingly. Id. § 7B-907(c). Even the 

“permanent plan” is not immutable, however. Follow-up 

hearings every six months enable the court to review 

progress and, if necessary, formulate a new permanent 

plan. N.C.G.S. § 7B-907(a).

In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 546, 614 S.E.2d 489, 494 (2005), superseded by statute on 

other grounds, Act of Aug. 23, 2005, ch. 398, sec. 12, N.C. Sess. Laws 1455, 1460-61, 

as recognized in In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 592, 636 S.E.2d 787, 791 (2006).2

“The essential requirement[ ] at . . . the review hearing[ ] is that sufficient 

evidence be presented to the trial court so that it can determine what is in the best 

interest of the child.” In re Shue, 311 N.C. 586, 597, 319 S.E.2d 567, 574 (1984). In 

light of this objective, neither the parent nor the county department of social services 

bears the burden of proof in permanency planning hearings, and the trial court’s 

 

2 The General Assembly has recently merged the provisions regarding custody review 

hearings, N.C.G.S. § 7B-906, and permanency planning hearings, N.C.G.S. § 7B-907, into one 

provision: N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1 (2013). See Act of June 13, 2013, ch. 129, secs. 25, 26, 2013 

Sess. Laws __, __ (effective October 1, 2013). As the proceedings in this matter occurred 

before the amendment’s 1 October 2013 effective date, N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1 does not apply.
In re L.M.T.

Beasley, J., concurring

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findings of fact need only be supported by sufficient competent evidence. Id. at 597, 

319 S.E.2d at 574.

In contrast to the fluidity and reviewability built into Article 9 decisions, “the 

dissolution of parental rights under Article 11 is decisive. Termination orders 

‘completely and permanently terminate[ ] all rights and obligations of the parent to 

the juvenile and the juvenile to the parent arising from the parental relationship.’ ” 

In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. at 548, 614 S.E.2d at 494 (alteration in original) (quoting 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1112). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that grounds for 

termination exist and, given the gravity of such decisions, the trial court’s findings of 

fact must be “based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B–1109(f)

(2013). Given these important differences in the purposes of and procedures involved 

in the two types of proceedings, I do not believe that a trial court’s findings in a 

termination order may substitute for or supplement the factual determinations 

necessary to support a decision to cease reunification efforts.

The majority concludes that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(5) authorizes our appellate 

courts to consider both orders “together” so that any “incomplete findings of fact in 

the cease reunification order may be cured by findings of fact in the termination 

order.” In support of this conclusion, the majority cites the General Assembly’s 2005 

amendments to the Juvenile Code’s framework for appealing juvenile cases, entitled 

“An Act to Amend the Juvenile Code to Expedite Outcomes for Children and Families 
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Involved in Welfare Cases and Appeals and to Limit the Appointment of Guardians 

Ad Litem for Parents in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings.” See Ch. 398, 

2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455. The majority, however, ignores the fact that the 2005 

amendments were enacted by the legislature to supersede our decision in In re 

R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 614 S.E.2d 489, in which we held that the entry of an order 

terminating parental rights during the pendency of an appeal from a permanency 

planning order renders the pending appeal moot. Id. at 553, 614 S.E.2d at 498. The 

majority’s holding that a permanency planning order containing insufficient findings 

may be “cured” by substituting the findings from a subsequent termination order is 

simply a retooling of the holding in R.T.W., one that was rejected by our General 

Assembly.

Subsection 7B-1001(a) enumerates the “juvenile matters [that] may be 

appealed,” providing in pertinent part:

The Court of Appeals shall review the order to cease 

reunification together with an appeal of the termination of 

parental rights order if all of the following apply:

1. A motion or petition to terminate the parent’s 

rights is heard and granted.

2. The order terminating parental rights is appealed 

in a proper and timely manner.

3. The order to cease reunification is identified as an 

issue in the record on appeal of the termination of 

parental rights.
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(5)(a) (2013). The majority reads this provision as establishing 

that “the legislature unambiguously instructed our appellate courts to review both 

orders “ ‘together[.]’ ” But this is not what the statute says. Rather, the statute 

authorizes our appellate courts to “review the order to cease reunification together 

with an appeal of the termination of parental rights order.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, the statute merely dictates the timing of 

when an underlying permanency planning order may be reviewed, which is “with an 

appeal of the termination of parental rights order.”3

Had the legislature intended to authorize the rehabilitation of a defective 

permanency planning order by borrowing from a subsequent termination order, it 

“clearly” would have done so. Rather than saying that an order ceasing reunification 

efforts may be “review[ed] . . . together with an appeal of the termination of parental 

rights order,” id. (emphasis added), the General Assembly would have said that such 

an order may be “review[ed] . . . together with the order terminating parental rights.”

Reflecting on the practical results of the majority’s holding further suggests 

that the majority has misconstrued the statute. Under the majority’s rationale, 

despite the legislature’s mandate that we “review the order to cease reunification 

together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights order,” id., we need not 

 

3 N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001 also permits a parent “to appeal the order [ceasing reunification 

efforts] if no termination of parental rights petition or motion is filed within 180 days of the 

order.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(5)(b) (2013).
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actually conduct a review of such an order because even the most deficient or defective 

order ceasing reunification efforts can be ignored so long as we conclude that the 

termination order contains findings that, when considered post hoc, justify the 

cessation of reunification efforts. But this outcome is effectively what we held in 

R.T.W. and what the General Assembly overrode in enacting the 2005 amendments 

to the Juvenile Code. The majority simply reads out of the statute the deliberately 

imposed requirement that orders ceasing reunification efforts “shall” be subject to 

review and reinstates the holding from R.T.W. But see Town of Pine Knoll Shores v. 

Evans, 331 N.C. 361, 366, 416 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1992) (“[W]ords of a statute are not to be 

deemed useless or redundant and amendments are presumed not to be without 

purpose.” (citations omitted)). This decision is for the General Assembly to make, not 

this Court.

Simply put, I believe that the General Assembly intended our appellate courts 

to review permanency planning orders separately and independently from 

termination orders. I find nothing in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(5) suggesting that a 

termination order may effectively render a flawed permanency planning order moot. 

Indeed, there is no point to explicitly providing parents with a right to review 

decisions to cease reunification efforts only to have that review obviated by allowing 

courts to leapfrog the permanency planning order and review the termination order 

in its place.
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This conclusion is further supported by examining the provisions in the 

Juvenile Code detailing the process required to “preserve” such decisions for review. 

Subsection 7B-507(c) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]t any hearing at which the 

court orders that reunification efforts shall cease, the affected parent, guardian, or 

custodian may give notice to preserve the right to appeal that order in accordance 

with G.S. 7B-1001.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(c) (2013). This notice of preservation is 

required to be “given in writing by a proper party as defined in G.S. 7B-1002 and shall 

be made within 30 days after entry and service of the order in accordance with G.S. 

1A-1, Rule 58.” Id. § 7B-1001(b) (2013). Section 7B-1001(a)(5) further provides that 

review is proper only if the parents’ “rights to appeal [were] properly preserved” 

under N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(c). Id. § 7B-1001(a)(5).

The majority’s holding frustrates parents’ efforts to preserve their challenges 

to decisions ceasing reunification efforts. If parents fail to comply with any step of 

the preservation process, they have waived appellate review. See In re S.C.R., 198 

N.C. App. 525, 531, 679 S.E.2d 905, 908-09 (concluding that a father waived appellate 

review of an order ceasing reunification efforts by failing to give notice within 

statutory time frame), appeal dismissed, 363 N.C. 654, 686 S.E.2d 676 (2009). Even 

if parents do preserve their right to appeal, under the majority’s reasoning, a 

reviewing court is nonetheless not required to address any deficiencies in the 

permanency planning order’s findings of fact and conclusions of law so long as the 

ultimate order terminating the parents’ rights can be read as justifying the trial 
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court’s earlier decision. The General Assembly, I believe, did not set out a specific 

process for preserving the right to challenge decisions ceasing reunification efforts, 

only to have that right frustrated by a mode of review that does not require 

independent scrutiny of that very order.

The majority concludes that the trial court’s findings of fact support its 

conclusion of law that reunification efforts should cease in this case. This holding is 

all that is necessary to dispose of this case.