alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
22-2318

Tavenner v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 4th 3 day of August, two thousand twenty-three.

4

5 PRESENT:

6 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,

8 MICHAEL H. PARK,

9 Circuit Judges.

10 _____________________________________

11

12 Deborah Tavenner,

13

14 Plaintiff-Appellant,

15

16 v.

17

18 International Business Machines Corporation, 22-2318

19

20 Defendant-Appellee.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN (Thomas Fowler, 

24 on the brief), Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., 

25 Boston, MA.

26

27 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: TRACI L. LOVITT, Jones Day (Anthony J. 

28 Dick, Jones Day, Washington, DC; Matthew 

29 W. Lampe, Erika D. Cagney, Jones Day, 

30 New York, NY; J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, 

31 Jones Day, Dallas, TX, on the brief), New 

32 York, NY.
2

1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

2 New York (Karas, J.).

3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

4 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and Plaintiff’s motion to unseal 

5 is DENIED. 

6 Plaintiff is a former employee of International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”), 

7 who sued to invalidate two provisions in the arbitration agreement she signed when she was 

8 terminated. On appeal, Plaintiff raises substantially the same issues as the plaintiffs in several 

related appeals. 9 1 We affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its 

10 decision, see Tavenner v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 21-CV-6345, 2022 WL 4449215 (S.D.N.Y. 

11 Sept. 23, 2022), and for the reasons stated in our opinion in the related appeal, In re IBM Arb.

12 Agreement Litig., No. 22-1728 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2023). 

13 We have considered all of Plaintiff’s arguments and find them to be without merit. For 

14 the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s motion to 

15 unseal is DENIED as moot.

16 FOR THE COURT: 

17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

18

1 See In re IBM Arb. Agreement Litig., No. 22-1728; Chandler v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 22-

1733; Lodi v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 22-1737.
#### STATE v. TOMMY FLOYD.

(Filed 3 November, 1954.)

Appeal by defendant from *Fountain, 8. J.,*June Term, 1954, of RANDOLPH.

Tommy Floyd, defendant, and Jody R. Floyd, Ms brother, were charged in one warrant with unlawful possession, transportation and possession for the purpose of sale of approximately 72 gallons of nontax-paid intoxicating liquor. Trial in Randolph County Recorder’s Court resulted in defendant’s conviction, and from judgment pronounced he appealed to Superior Court. There, after jury trial on original warrant, the verdict was “Guilty of possession and transportation of whiskey, as charged”; and judgment was pronounced thereon. Defendant excepted and appealed, and assigns errors.

*Attorney-General McMullan and A ssistant Attorney-General Lo.ve for the State.*

*Sam W. Miller for defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

Appellant failed to file his brief in this Court within the time required by Rule 28, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 233 N.C. 750-751. Thereupon, the Attorney-General nioved that the appeal be dismissed and the judgment affirmed. Even so, he concedes frankly that he has not been inconvenienced by appellant’s delay in filing his brief. But appellant’s brief when filed did not comply with other provisions of Rule 28, including the following: “Such brief shall contain, properly numbered, the several grounds of exception and assignment of error with reference to printed pages of transcript, and the authorities relied on classified under each assignment . . .” 221 N.C. 562-563.

No error appears on the face of the record proper. Moreover, careful consideration of appellant’s exceptive assignments of error fails to disclose prejudicial error; and the assignments are not such as to call for analysis and discussion. The issue was primarily one of fact, the jury’s verdict being adverse to defendant.

Should the Attorney-General’s motion be allowed ? It matters not, for in either event the judgment of the court below must be affirmed. It is so ordered.

Affirmed.
J

- A20037

- 16

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : JAMES PUORRO , : : Appellant : No. 1657 WDA 201 5 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 30, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP

- 02

- SA

- 0001328

- 2015 BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J. : FILED AUGUST 22, 2016 James Puorro (“Puorro”) appeals, pro se , from the judgment of sentence imposed fol lowing his conviction of two violations of the Pennsylvania Dog Law. See 3 P.S. §§ 459

- 305(a)(3); 459

- 502

- A(a)(1)(ii). We affirm. On April 23, 2015, Officer Craig Cummings (“Officer Cummings”) of the Springdale Township Police Department was dispatched to Greg Vansach’s (“Vansach”) home in Springdale Township. Vansach lives next door to Puorro. Vansach led Officer Cummings to his backyard, where his Pomeranian, Benny, was lying dead. Vansach told Officer Cummings that he witnessed one of Puorro’s dogs holding Benny in its mouth, and that the dog had killed Benny. Officer Cummings spoke with Puorro, who stated that one of Puorro’s dogs had escaped from his yard and killed Benny. Puorro wasJ

- A20037

- 16

- 2

-

subsequently cited for two violations of the Pennsylvania Dog Law: Unlawful Confinement and Control and Harboring a Dangerous Dog. Puorro challenged the citations, and appeared, pro se , for a summary appeal hearing before the Honorable Robert C. Gallo (“Judge Gallo”) on September 30, 2015. Judge Gallo found Puorr o guilty of both violations and imposed a $600 fine and additional costs. On October 22, 2015, Puorro filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Judge Gallo entered an Order directing Puorro to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of o n appeal. Puorro did not comply.
I t is well

- settled that a pro se appellant is not entitled to any advantage due to their lack of legal training, and must comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Commonwealth v. Adams , 882 A.2d 496, 497

- 98 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also id. at 498 (stating that “any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.”). Thus, because he failed to comply with the trial court’s Order directing him to file a concise statement, Puorro has waived his opportunity to have this Court consider his issues on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Commonwealth v. Lord , 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (stati ng that “issues have been considered waived where no 1925(b) statement was filed or where an issue was not included in a filed statement.”).J

- A20037

- 16

- 3

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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 8/22/2016
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 13, 2019

b 0910 

# Order

Clerk September 13 , 2019

158812

VERNON LENARD KATO, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 158812

COA: 344089 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant

- Appellee.

_____________________________________/

By order of May 22, 2019, the Department of Corrections was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the November 5, 2018 order of the Cour t of Appeals. On order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

C AVANAGH

, J

., ( co ncurring ).

I concur in the denial of leave to appeal for two reasons. First, plaintiff does not appear to have complied with the requirement in MCR 3.303(A)(2) that his action “be brought in the county in which the prisoner is detained,” but instead initiated his ac tion in the Court of Appeals. He may have done so having observed that MCR 7.203(C)(3) allows the Court of Appeals to “entertain an action” for habeas corpus. However, reading the two rules together, it appears the Court of Appeals may only “entertain” an action for habeas corpus if the action was first “brought” in the county in which the prisoner is detained

— presumably in circuit court. Second, even if the action for habeas corpus was correctly initiated, plaintiff’s argument relies on the factual pre dicate that he was presented with a certificate of discharge from parole. If that is true, plaintiff may well have been, and may yet be, entitled to relief. The Department of Corrections may not cancel a parole discharge “once the final order of discharg e has been entered and the certificate of discharge issued to the prisoner.” People v Holder , 483 Mich 168, 173 (2009). A discharge from parole is a “remission of the remaining portion of [a] sentence. . . . After delivery it cannot be

recalled.” In re Eddinger , 236 Mich 668, 670 (1926). Plaintiff has requested an evidentiary hearing to establish that he was presented with the certificate, but he has made no offer of proof as to how he would establish this fact at such a hearing.
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Dennis F. Dunne (admitted pro hac vice) 

Samuel A. Khalil (admitted pro hac vice) 

MILBANK LLP 

55 Hudson Yards 

New York, New York 10001-2163 

Telephone: (212) 530-5000 

Facsimile: (212) 530-5219 

and 

Gregory A. Bray (SBN 115367) 

Thomas R. Kreller (SBN 161922) 

MILBANK LLP 

2029 Century Park East, 33rd Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90067 

Telephone: (424) 386-4000 

Facsimile: (213) 629-5063 

Counsel for the Official Committee 

of Unsecured Creditors

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

In re: 

PG&E CORPORATION 

 - and - 

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC 

COMPANY,

Debtors.

Case No. 19-30088 (DM) 

Chapter 11 

(Lead Case) 

(Jointly Administered) 

STATEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL 

COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED 

CREDITORS IN RESPONSE TO THE 

COURT’S INQUIRY REGARDING 

POSSIBLE CONSENT TO THE 

ESTIMATION PROCEEDINGS 

Re: Docket No. 3091 

 Affects PG&E Corporation 

 Affects Pacific Gas and Electric 

Company 

 Affects both Debtors 

* All papers shall be filed in the Lead Case, 

No. 19-30088 (DM). 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3597 Filed: 08/19/19 Entered: 08/19/19 14:17:00 Page 1 of

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44553.00001

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Official Committee”) respectfully 

submits this statement in response to the Court’s comments at the August 14, 2019 hearing (the 

“Hearing”) with respect to of the Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C §§ 105(a) and 502(c) for 

the Establishment of Wildfire Claims Estimation Procedures (the “Estimation Motion”) [Docket 

No. 3091].1 

At the Hearing, the Court requested that the Official Committee poll the Debtors, the Ad 

Hoc Group of Subrogation Claim Holders and the Official Committee of Tort Claimants to 

determine whether those parties would agree to have all issues in dispute in the anticipated claims 

estimation process heard and decided by the Bankruptcy Court. The Official Committee has 

received responses from the parties and reports that there is not unanimous consent to the Court’s 

inquiry. 

Dated: August 19, 2019 

MILBANK LLP 

/s/Gregory A. Bray . 

DENNIS F. DUNNE 

SAMUEL A. KHALIL 

GREGORY A. BRAY 

THOMAS R. KRELLER 

Counsel for the Official Committee of 

Unsecured Creditors 

 

1

 Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the Wildfire Fund 

Motion. 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3597 Filed: 08/19/19 Entered: 08/19/19 14:17:00 Page 2 of

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Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David A. Flynn,
Chief Executive Officer of Fusion-io, Inc. (the Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to my knowledge:

1) the annual report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended June 30, 2011 (the Report) which this statement
accompanies fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |                        
|----------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: September 2, 2011 |  | /s/ DAVID A. FLYNN     
|                        |  | David A. Flynn         
|                        |  | Chief Executive Officer
Case: 19-30088    Doc# 3382    Filed: 08/06/19    Entered: 08/06/19 13:18:58    Page 1 of2

Case: 19-30088    Doc# 3382    Filed: 08/06/19    Entered: 08/06/19 13:18:58    Page 2 of2
Slip Op. 08-04

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

____________________________________ : SKF USA, INC, SKF FRANCE S.A., : and SARMA, :

: Plaintiffs, : : Before: WALLACH, Judge v. : Court No.: 03-00490

: UNITED STATES, :

: Defendant, :

: and :

: TIMKEN U.S. CORPORATION, :

: Defendant-Intervenor. :

___________________________________ :

JUDGMENT IN CONFORMITY WITH MANDATE

The United States Court of Appeals for th e Federal Circuit havi ng issued a mandate on 13 November 2007, in SKF USA, Inc. v. United States , Appeal No. 07-1039, vacating this court’s decision at Slip Op. 06-133 (September 1, 2006), it is hereby

ORDERED ADJUDGED AN D DECREED that the above entitled case be and hereby is DISMISSED as moot.

__/s/ Evan J. Wallach_________ Evan J. Wallach, Judge

Dated: January 14, 2008 New York, New York
#### STATE v. O. L. WERST.

(Filed 9 June, 1950.)

1. Criminal Law § 52a (2) —

Where the evidence for the prosecution is sufficient to make out a case, nonsuit on the ground that the defendant’s evidence tends to establish a defense is properly denied. G.S. 15-173.

2. Criminal Law § 81c (3) —

Any error in the exclusion of testimony is rendered harmless when the witness is later permitted to give the testimony.

3. Criminal Law § 81c (2) —

The charge will be read as a whole.

Appeal by defendant from *Glament, J.,*and a jury, at the January Term, 1950, of Eoesyth.

The defendant was charged with feloniously assaulting Hattie D. Cook with a deadly weapon, to wit, a pistol, with intent to kill, and inflicting upon her serious injury not resulting in death. G.S. 14-32. The State offered evidence tending to show that the accused angrily, intentionally, and unnecessarily discharged his 32-caliber pistol into a small group of inoffending persons, and thereby seriously wounded the prosecuting witness. The defendant presented evidence, indicating, however, that the prosecuting witness sustained her injury while the accused was reasonably endeavoring to prevent her and a multitude of companions from trespassing upon his premises. The jury acquitted the defendant of the felonious assault and battery charged in the indictment, but convicted him of a less degree of that crime, to wit, an assault with a deadly weapon. G.S. 15-169. Judgment was pronounced on the verdict, and the defendant appealed, assigning the refusal of the trial judge to dismiss the prosecution upon a compulsory nonsuit, the rejection of certain testimony of his witness, Yelma Smoot, and various portions of the charge as error.

*331
      *Attorney-General McMullan, Assistant Attorney-General Moody, and John B. Jordan, Jr., Member of Staff, for the State.*

*Whitman & Motsinger for defendant.*

EkyiN, J.

The testimony of the prosecution was sufficient to take the ease to the jury and to support the verdict for the State. *S. v. Cancelmo,*86 Or. 379, 168 P. 721. Consequently the court rightly refused to dismiss the action upon a compulsory nonsuit under G.S. 15-173. Whatever error the court below may have committed in temporarily excluding the evidence of the defendant’s witness, Yelma Smoot, as to the circumstances confronting the accused at the "time in controversy was rendered harmless when the same evidence was subsequently given by the same witness without objection on her further examination. *Eaves v. Coxe,*203 N.C. 173, 165 S.E. 345. When it is read as a whole, the charge is free from legal error. *Wyatt v. Coach Co.,*229 N.C. 340, 49 S.E. 2d 650.

For tbe reasons given, the trial and sentence are sustained.

No error.
#### Patrick J. Walsh, Respondent, v. John McAuliffe, Defendant, and Halstead Swan, Appellant.

Judgment of the Municipal Court,' affirmed, with costs. No opinion.

Jenks, P. J., Hirsehberg, Burr, Woodward and Rich, JJ., concurred.
#### BADGIE LEE SELLARS v. WILLIAM N. SELLARS.

(Filed 4 June, 1954.)

Divorce and Alimony § 12—

The court may allow plaintiff possession of the home owned by the parties as tenants by the entireties in fixing alimony *pendente lite*under G.S. 50-16.

Appeal by the defendant from *Sharp, Special Judge,*Special February Civil Term 1954 of Oeanoe.

Civil action instituted by plaintiff for alimony without divorce, and counsel fees under C-. S. N. G. 50-16, heard by consent on motion in the cause for alimony *pendente lile*and counsel fees.

The motion was heard on the complaint and affidavits of the plaintiff and the defendant. The court made detailed findings of fact, which are amply supported by competent evidence. These findings of fact are briefly summarized: On 12 December 1953 defendant feloniously assaulted the plaintiff, his wife, with a razor with intent to kill, inflicting upon her serious injuries across her breast and neck by which her health has been impaired; that he had previously assaulted and seriously injured plaintiff; that defendant is addicted to use of whiskey; that plaintiff cannot return to the home owned by them as tenants by the entirety without endangering her life, as long as defendant is in possession. That plaintiff lacks sufficient means to exist pending the trial of this action and to pay counsel fees. That the state of plaintiff’s health renders it in the best interest of the plaintiff, and necessary that alimony *pendente lite*to which she is entitled, be allotted to her in the home. That the defendant is an able-bodied man, and earning at least $37.00 a week after deductions and taxes. Whereupon, the court ordered that the defendant on or before 1 March 1954 pay to plaintiff $50.00; pay to her counsel on or before 1 May 1954 $100.00 as counsel fees; and on or before 27 February 1954 vacate the home owned by the parties at 504 Church Street, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, — -plaintiff’s alimony being allotted to her in the home pending the further orders of the court.

*476The defendant excepted to the judgment entered, and appealed.

*William 8. Stewart and Bonner D. Sawyer for Plaintiff, Appellee.*

*John T. Manning for Defendant, Appellant.*

Pee Cueiam.

The defendant makes no contention that the evidence fails to support the findings of fact. The argument of the defendant that the court erred in awarding to the plaintiff possession of the home owned by them as tenants by the entirety, has been answered adversely to such contention by this Court in *Wright v. Wright,*216 N.C. 693, 6 S.E. 2d 555, and upon the authority of that case the judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.
Order entered August 19, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas** No. 05 - 12 - 00455 - CV KIMBERLEY PETTIGREW, Appellant V. MEGAN REEVES & BRIAN A TROY, Appellee s On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Collin County, Texas Tr ial Court Cause No. 004 - 03642 - 2011 

### O RDER The Court has before it the request of Claudia Webb, official court reporter for the Collin County Court at Law No. 4, for an extension of time to prepare the reporter’s record in this case. The Court GRANTS the request and ORDERS that the reporter’s record be filed fourteen days from the date of this order

. /s/ ELIZABETH LANG

- MIERS JUSTICE
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

- 10890 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

ROMELIA FLORES, also known as Romy Flores, also known as Romy Duarte, also known as Tomelia Flores

,

Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 6:17

- CR

- 42

- 2

Before REAVLEY, OWEN

, and GRAVES , Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Romelia Flores has moved for leave

to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386
U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011).

Flores h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the

relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 24, 2019
Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 18-10890 Document: 00514970687 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/24/2019No. 18

- 10890

2 assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 18-10890 Document: 00514970687 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/24/2019
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BAKER 

&

HOSTETLER LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO, CA

Exhibit B

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3109-2 Filed: 07/19/19 Entered: 07/19/19 17:18:43 Page 1

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BAKER 

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HOSTETLER LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO, CA

EXPENSE SUMMARY

FOR THE PERIOD MAY 1, 2019 THROUGH MAY 31, 2019

EXPENSES AMOUNTS

Meals $ 48.06

Mileage Reimbursement $ 202.84

Miscellaneous $ 10.00

Transportation/Parking/Tolls $ 31.00

Total Expenses Requested: $ 291.90

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