DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BROWARD OUTPATIENT MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, BETH ISRAEL 

OUTPATIENT SURGICAL CENTER, LLC d/b/a BROWARD 

OUTPATIENT SURGICAL CENTER, PALM COAST ANESTHESIA 

GROUP, LLC, and CENTRAL SPINE AND ORTHOPEDIC CENTERS,

LLC d/b/a INTRAOPERATIVE MONITORING ASSOCIATES AND 

CENTRAL SPINE AND ORTHOPEDICS CENTER, LLC,

Appellants,

v.

FENSTERSHEIB LAW GROUP, P.A., f/k/a THE LAW OFFICES OF 

ROBERT J. FENSTERSHEIB & ASSOCIATES, P.A., et al.,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-3404

[November 25, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Sandra Perlman, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE-19-009436

(04).

Bruce S. Rogow and Tara A. Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort 

Lauderdale, and Mitchell E. Moore, Pompano Beach, for appellants.

Scott A. Mager and Gary S. Gaffney of Mager Paruas, LLC, Hollywood, 

for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

Broward Outpatient Medical Center, LLC, Beth Israel Outpatient 

Surgical Center, LLC d/b/a Broward Outpatient Surgical Center, Palm 

Coast Anesthesia Group, LLC1, and Central Spine and Orthopedic 

Centers, LLC d/b/a Intraoperative Monitoring Associates and Central 

Spine and Orthopedics Center, LLC (collectively “the Medical Providers”) 

appeal the trial court’s order distributing interpleaded funds to Appellee, 

1 Palm Coast Anesthesia Group, LLC was not listed in the order on interpleader 

but was a listed claimant in the petition for interpleader and is a party to this 

appeal. Neither the Medical Providers nor the Law Firm mentions this 

discrepancy on appeal.
2

Fenstersheib Law Group, P.A. (“the Law Firm”). We hold that the trial 

court erred by distributing the interpleaded funds before determining the 

amount owed to each claimant and the priority of each claim to the funds.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

By way of background, while represented by the Law Firm in a personal 

injury case, Chevelle Legami (“the Plaintiff”) sought medical treatment 

from the Medical Providers. In order to secure payment for such 

treatment, the Plaintiff and the Law Firm gave the Medical Providers letters 

of protection. The letters of protection stated:

[T]he attorney for the above [Plaintiff] (patient), does hereby 

agree to . . . withhold such sums from any settlement or 

judgment as may be necessary to adequately protect the above 

listed health care providers and to promptly pay such sums 

to them upon receipt of payment of any settlement or 

judgment without demand.

Ultimately, the Plaintiff’s case settled. However, the Law Firm 

determined that after it deducted its contingency fee from the proceeds of 

the settlement, there remained insufficient funds to pay the outstanding 

bills from the Medical Providers and others. Therefore, the Law Firm filed 

a petition for interpleader in which it identified the Medical Providers and 

the Plaintiff as claimants.2 In the petition, the Law Firm sought 

authorization from the court to pay itself its contingency fee from the 

settlement funds before the court determined the amounts owed to the 

other claimants and the priority of each claim to the settlement funds. In 

response to the petition, the Medical Providers asserted affirmative 

defenses against the Law Firm and crossclaims against the Plaintiff, in 

which they alleged that the letters of protection gave them priority to be 

paid in full.

The matter proceeded to a hearing in which the Medical Providers relied 

on Stuart M. Berger, RPT, P.A. v. Silverstein, Silverstein & Silverstein, P.A., 

727 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), for the proposition that letters of 

protection grant medical providers priority over an attorney’s claim to 

settlement funds. The Medical Providers also argued, however, that the 

hearing was “premature” because their liens were disputed by the Plaintiff.

Following the hearing, the trial court entered its order authorizing the Law 

2 The Law Firm also named other claimants in the interpleader action. The 

Medical Providers do not contest the distribution of interpleaded funds to those 

claimants. Accordingly, the relief granted to those claimants is not under review.
3

Firm to take its contingency fee. The trial court deferred ruling on the 

Medical Providers’ claims, reasoning: 

[The Plaintiff] challenges these [M]edical [P]roviders’ 

entitlement to amounts they claim from the interpleaded 

funds; thus, these claims must be litigated at law to determine 

whether the [M]edical [P]roviders are entitled to any of the 

interpleaded funds and, if so, the amount to which each is 

entitled. Notably, these [M]edical [P]roviders also have 

remedies at law they could pursue. Under these 

circumstances, it would be premature for this Court to make 

any determination as to the [M]edical [P]roviders’ priority to 

the interpleaded funds unless and until there has been a 

determination on the [M]edical [P]roviders’ entitlement to any 

interpleaded funds. If litigation of the medical claims ends 

with judgments (or settlements are reached) in amounts less 

than the remaining interpleaded funds, there may be no need 

to make such a priority determination. Conversely, if the 

litigation ends with judgments or settlement amounts in 

excess of the remaining interpleaded funds, the Court may 

then need to consider what, if any, equitable or other 

determinations are appropriate. This Court will address these 

issues—if and when it becomes necessary—at the appropriate 

time, but will not issue an advisory opinion on such issues at 

this time.

This appeal follows.

“The very purpose of a suit in interpleader is to prevent the prosecution 

of other suits against the complainant in interpleader and to require those 

claiming the fund in the hands of the interpleader to litigate their 

differences between themselves.” Drummond Title Co. v. Weinroth, 77 So. 

2d 606, 610 (Fla. 1955) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. 

Co., 3 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. 1941)). Thus, once the trial court determines 

that an interpleader action has been properly brought, “the court should 

dispose of the entire controversy in a way that is binding on all the parties 

without requiring further litigation of any nature.” Azelton v. Finch, 390 

So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (quoting 18A Fla. Jur. Interpleader

§ 18).

By distributing to the Law Firm its full contingency fee while conflicting 

claims to the funds remained pending between the Law Firm, the Plaintiff, 

and the Medical Providers, the trial court disregarded the very purpose of 

an interpleader action. See Drummond Title Co., 77 So. 2d at 610; Azelton, 
4

390 So. 2d at 120. To avoid the need for further litigation, a trial court 

must first determine what each party is owed, then decide the priority of 

payment if the funds are insufficient to pay each liquidated claim, and 

then order the distribution of the funds. See Drummond Title Co., 77 So. 

2d at 610; Azelton, 390 So. 2d at 120–21 (“[A]fter the court decides the 

preliminary question of whether interpleader is appropriate, the court then 

proceeds to determine the issues made between the parties laying claim to 

the funds held by the party seeking the order of interpleader.”).

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the portion of the order on 

interpleader distributing to the Law Firm the amount of its contingency 

fee, and remand for the trial court to proceed in a manner consistent with 

this opinion.3

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CIKLIN and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

3 To the extent that the Medical Providers ask for this Court to give instructions 

to the trial court declaring that their claims are superior to the Law Firm’s fee, it 

would be premature to do so because the trial court never decided the matter of 

priority.