[Cite as State v. Good, 2021-Ohio-4560.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

AUGLAIZE COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-21-02 

 v. 

BRETT S. GOOD, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2017 CR 0001 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: December 27, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Rob C. Wiesenmayer, II for Appellant 

 Edwin A. Pierce & Reed D. Searcy for Appellee 
Case No. 2-21-02 

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MILLER, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Brett S. Good, appeals the February 19, 2021 

judgment of the Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas vacating his resentencing hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

Background 

{¶2} This case arises from a December 31, 2016 incident in which members 

of the Wapakoneta Police Department responded to a report of a female who was 

afraid to leave her residence for fear her husband, Good, would harm himself. At 

the scene, Good immediately entered a patrol vehicle and, despite not being placed 

under arrest, requested to be taken to the police department to be interviewed. 

During his interview with law enforcement, Good admitted to a number of sexuallymotivated crimes involving two minor children living in his household, which 

occurred over the course of more than one year. The victims were interviewed and 

corroborated Good’s admission. Following the interviews with the victims, Good 

was arrested. 

{¶3} On January 5, 2017, the Auglaize County Grand Jury indicted Good on 

41 counts: Counts One to Ten of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) with 

an allegation that the victim was less than ten years of age at the time of the offense, 

first-degree felonies; Counts Eleven to Sixteen of rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(b) with the allegation that the victim was less than 13 years of age at 
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the time of the offense, first-degree felonies; and Counts Seventeen to Forty One of 

rape with the allegation that the victim was compelled to submit by force or threat 

of force in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); first-degree felonies. (Doc. No. 1). On 

January 6, 2017, Good appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the counts 

of the indictment. 

{¶4} On July 5, 2017, Good appeared for a change-of-plea hearing. Under a 

negotiated plea agreement, Good withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered guilty 

pleas to Counts One, Eleven, and Seventeen. In exchange, the State asked for leave 

to nolle prosequi the remaining counts of the indictment. The trial court accepted 

Good’s guilty pleas, found him guilty of the offenses and granted the State’s motion 

to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment. 

{¶5} The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing where it imposed 

a jointly-recommended sentence. With respect to Count One, the trial court 

sentenced Good to a term of 25 years to life in prison. With respect to Count Eleven, 

the trial court sentenced Good to 25 years to life in prison. With respect to Count 

Seventeen, the trial court sentenced Good to a term of 11 years in prison. Pursuant 

to the parties’ recommendation, the trial court ordered the sentences to run 

concurrently for an aggregate sentence of 25 years to life in prison. On July 6, 2017, 

the trial court filed its judgment entry of conviction and sentence. 
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{¶6} On March 19, 2020, Good filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 

after sentencing pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Good alleged that his guilty pleas were 

invalid because they were not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 

Specifically, Good argued the 25 years to life in prison imposed for Counts One and 

Eleven were not authorized by law. On May 26, 2020, the State responded to 

Good’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after sentencing. On May 28, 2020, the 

trial court filed a judgment entry denying Good’s motion to withdraw his guilty 

pleas. However, the trial court set the matter for a resentencing hearing. 

{¶7} On June 16, 2020, Good filed a notice of appeal. On June 25, 2020, the 

trial court vacated Good’s resentencing hearing while his appeal was pending. On 

January 25, 2021, this Court dismissed Good’s appeal on the grounds that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the trial court’s order denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was not a final, appealable order. On 

February 19, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment entry vacating Good’s 

resentencing hearing and finding that a resentencing hearing was barred by State v. 

Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784. 

{¶8} On March 19, 2021, Good filed a notice of appeal. He raises four 

assignments of error for our consideration. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

The trial court’s actions of failing to comply with Criminal Rule 

11(C)(2)(a) requiring the defendant-appellant to understand the
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correct statutory maximum penalties in order for his pleas to be 

knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and thereafter in sentencing 

the defendant-appellant to statutorily excessive penalties which 

are void ab initio and resulted in manifest injustice to the 

defendant-appellant entitle him to withdraw his guilty pleas 

pursuant to Criminal Rule 32.1. 

Assignment of Error No. II 

The failure of defense counsel to adequately advise the defendantappellant about the correct maximum penalties as to Counts One 

(1) and Eleven (11) constituted denial of effective assistance of 

counsel rendering his pleas of guilty involuntary, and impaired

the knowing and voluntary nature of his pleas, requiring that the 

defendant-appellant be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Assignment of Error No. III 

The trial court [erred] in sentencing the defendant-appellant to 

concurrent sentences of twenty-five (25) years to possible life

imprisonment as to amended Counts One (1) and Eleven (11) 

acted contrary to law and exceeded the statutory requirements 

pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2971.03(B)(1)(b) resulting in a

sentence contrary to law. 

Assignment of Error No. IV 

The timeliness of defendant-appellant filing his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Criminal Rule 32.1 should 

not bar him from relief due to the trial court advising him that in 

following the joint sentencing recommendation that the 

defendant-appellant would waive all rights to appeal. Said waiver 

was not voluntary as it was based on errors by the trial court.

Discussion

{¶9} Appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. 
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Cartlidge, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-21-06, 2021-Ohio-3787, ¶ 8. An abuse of 

discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). 

{¶10} A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by Crim.R. 32.1,

which provides: 

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only 

before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court 

after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit 

the defendant to withdraw his or her plea. 

A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty or no-contest plea after sentencing bears 

the burden of demonstrating a “manifest injustice.” State v. James, 3d Dist. 

Hancock No. 5-19-30, 2020-Ohio-720, ¶ 11, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.3d 

261 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[A] postsentence withdrawal motion is 

allowable only in extraordinary cases.” Smith at 264. The Supreme Court of Ohio 

has defined the manifest injustice standard as a “clear or openly unjust act.” State 

ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208 (1998). “‘A defendant is not 

entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has 

been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the 

likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.’” State v. Kimpel, 3d Dist. 

Shelby No. 17-17-12, 2018-Ohio-2246, ¶ 16, quoting Brady v. United States, 397 

U.S. 742, 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1463 (1970). “‘A “manifest injustice” comprehends 

a fundamental flaw in the path of justice so extraordinary that the defendant could 
Case No. 2-21-02 

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not have sought redress from the resulting prejudice through another form of 

application reasonably available to him or her.’” State v. Brooks, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 23385, 2010-Ohio-1682, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Hartzell, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 17499, *2 (Aug. 20, 1999). 

{¶11} Good raises three principal arguments in support of his position that 

he suffered a manifest injustice and, therefore, the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea after the imposition of sentence. First, Good 

claims that he suffered a manifest injustice because the trial court failed to properly 

advise him of the correct maximum penalties prior to his change of plea. Second, 

Good argues that he suffered a manifest injustice because the trial court imposed a 

sentence that is contrary to law. Finally, Good contends that he suffered a manifest 

injustice because he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We address 

each of Good’s contentions in turn. 

{¶12} First, we consider Good’s argument regarding the trial court’s failure 

to correctly explain the maximum statutory penalties with respect to Counts One 

and Eleven. Good argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, in part, because the trial court 

conducted an inadequate plea colloquy. Specifically, Good contends the trial court 

violated Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) because he was incorrectly notified of the maximum 
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penalties he faced with respect to Counts One and Eleven, a defect which Good 

argues renders the enforcement of his plea unconstitutional. 

{¶13} Crim.R. 11, which outlines the procedures that trial courts must follow 

when accepting pleas, “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial 

court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his 

plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” State v. 

Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio 

St.2d 163, 168 (1975). “If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.” Id. at ¶ 10. Crim.R. 

11(C)(2), which applies specifically to a trial court’s acceptance of pleas in felony 

cases, provides as follows: 

(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or 

a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest 

without first addressing the defendant personally * * * and doing all 

of the following: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, 

with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 

penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible 

for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at 

the sentencing hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the 

court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and 

sentence. 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury 
Case No. 2-21-02 

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trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory 

process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to 

require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify 

against himself or herself. 

Crim.R. 11 “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to 

personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and 

determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” Dangler at ¶ 11, 

quoting State v. Stone at 168. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently reaffirmed 

that “our focus in reviewing pleas has not been on whether the trial judge has 

‘[incanted] the precise verbiage’ of the rule, State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92, 

364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977), but on whether the dialogue between the court and the 

defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his 

plea[.]” Dangler at ¶ 12, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio5200, ¶ 15-16. 

{¶14} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on 

appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trialcourt proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13, citing 

State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶ 14-15; Crim.R. 52. Generally, 

to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant would have to establish that “his plea would 

not have otherwise been made.” Dangler at ¶ 24. 
Case No. 2-21-02 

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{¶15} There are limited exceptions to the prejudice requirement in the 

criminal-plea context. “When a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights 

that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we presume that the plea 

was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is 

required.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 

¶ 31 and Veney at syllabus. The “constitutional” rights are set forth in Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c) above. See Dangler at ¶ 14. When a trial court fails to fully cover 

“nonconstitutional” rights in Crim.R. 11, “a defendant must affirmatively show 

prejudice to invalidate a plea.” Dangler at ¶ 14, citing Clark at ¶ 17. 

{¶16} The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized one other exception to the

prejudice requirement: “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of 

Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” (Emphasis 

sic.) Dangler at ¶ 15, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 

22. However, “[a]side from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to 

apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates 

that he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions 

of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). 

“The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id.

at ¶ 16, quoting Nero at 108. 
Case No. 2-21-02 

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{¶17} Good argues that the trial court’s Crim.R. 11 colloquy was defective 

because the trial court failed to properly advise him of the maximum penalties with 

respect to Counts One and Eleven. Good’s argument is without merit. 

{¶18} With respect to Count One, rape of a victim less than 10 years old, the 

trial court had the option of sentencing Good to (1) a term of life imprisonment 

without parole pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B) or (2) a minimum term of 15 years and 

a maximum term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole pursuant to R.C. 

2971.03(B)(1)(b). With respect to Count Eleven, rape of a victim less than 13 years 

old, the required sentence pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(a) was 10 years to life in 

prison with the possibility of parole. 

{¶19} At the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court informed Good that, with 

respect to Count One, it had the option of imposing a prison term of 25 years to life 

or a prison term of life without parole. (July 5, 2017 Tr. at 9-10). With respect to 

Count Eleven, the trial court advised Good that the charge carried a sentence of 25 

years to life with the possibility of parole. (Id. at 10). Thus, although the trial court 

incorrectly informed Good of the minimum sentences with respect to Counts One 

and Eleven, the trial court did correctly advise Good of the maximum penalties of 

life without parole and life with the possibility of parole, respectively. “Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a) requires the trial court to determine whether a defendant is entering his 

plea with an understanding of the maximum penalty involved; by its terms, Crim.R. 
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11(C)(2)(a) does not require the trial court to determine whether the defendant is 

aware of every lesser penalty that could be imposed.” State v. Liles, 3d Dist. Allen 

No. 1-18-69, 2019-Ohio-3029, ¶ 19. Under the relevant statutes, 15 years in prison 

and 10 years in prison was not the maximum penalty Good was facing. Moreover, 

the record indicates that the trial court did actually inform Good of the maximum 

penalties associated with Counts One and Eleven prior to accepting his guilty plea. 

(July 5, 2017 Tr. at 9-10). Further, at the change-of-plea hearing, Good 

acknowledged stated, “[I]t’s either life or life, so I’m going to take the lesser of the 

two evils.” (Id. at 16). Good’s statement indicates that not only was he aware of 

the maximum sentences available to him, but that he accepted the plea agreement 

for the purpose of avoiding the maximum penalty associated with Count One, life 

in prison without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to 

correctly apprise Good of the minimum sentence does not affect the sufficiency of 

the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy. See Liles at ¶ 19. 

{¶20} Even so, Good fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced from the 

trial court’s error. Rather than being sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, 

for Count One, Good received a term of 25 years to life in prison, with the possibility 

of parole. Thus, as Good’s sentence was less than the actual potential maximum and 

within the range stated by the trial court, Good did not suffer any prejudice. Liles

at ¶ 21; State v. Bailey, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2006-G-2734, 2007-Ohio-6160, ¶ 14-
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15 (finding no prejudice where the trial court imposed a sentence that was “less than 

the actual maximum potential sentence and within the limit of the maximum 

sentence as stated by the trial judge”). Furthermore, Good fails to argue that but for 

the trial court’s alleged error he would not have entered pleas of guilty. Indeed, if 

Good was willing to accept a plea with a 25-year-to-life sentence in 2017, it stands 

to reason that he would have accepted a 15-year-to-life or 10-year-to-life sentence 

if he had been correctly advised of the mandatory minimum sentences. 

Accordingly, we do not find that Good suffered a manifest injustice by the trial 

court’s misstatement of the mandatory minimum sentence. 

{¶21} Next, we consider Good’s argument that the trial court erred in

sentencing him with respect to Counts One and Eleven, and that the error resulted 

in Good suffering a manifest injustice. 

{¶22} As an initial matter, we acknowledge that Good’s sentence is contrary 

to law. As detailed above, with respect to Count One, the trial court had the option 

of sentencing Good to (1) a term of life imprisonment without parole pursuant to 

R.C. 2907.02(B) or (2) a minimum term of 15 years and a maximum term of life 

imprisonment pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b). With respect to Count Eleven, 

the required sentence pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(a) was 10 years to life in 

prison. With respect to Count Seventeen, forcible rape, the statutory range was 3 to 

11 years in prison pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B) and R.C. 2929.14(A). 
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{¶23} However, acting pursuant to the joint-sentence recommendation 

proffered by Good and the State, the trial court sentenced Good to 25 years to life 

in prison with respect to Count One, 25 years to life in prison with respect to Count 

Eleven, and 11 years in prison with respect to Count Seventeen. The trial court 

ordered the sentences to be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of 25 

years to life in prison, with the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the trial court 

erred with respect to the sentences imposed as to Counts One and Eleven. However, 

we do not find that the sentence is void or that Good suffered a manifest injustice as 

a result of the error. 

{¶24} Good argues that because the trial court’s sentence with respect to 

Counts One and Eleven is contrary to law, his conviction and sentence are void. 

Good is incorrect. “A judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court 

that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant.” State v. Henderson, 161 

Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 43. Even if a sentence imposed is not authorized 

by law, the sentence would only be voidable as long as the trial court possessed both 

subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Id. Here, Good’s argument is that his 

sentence is void because it was based on an error and is contrary to law. 

Accordingly, he does not allege, and we do not find, that the trial court lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction over him. Rather, we find that the sentences were merely 

voidable. See Henderson at ¶ 1 (“sentences based on an error * * * are voidable if 
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the court imposing the sentence has jurisdiction over the case and the defendant”). 

“The failure to timely –at the earliest available opportunity—assert an error in a 

voidable judgment, even if that error is constitutional in nature, amounts to the 

forfeiture of any objection.” State v Robey, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2021-CA-00010, 

2021-Ohio-3884, ¶ 25, citing Henderson. Accordingly, Good’s postsentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea, filed several years after conviction and sentence, 

is not the proper vehicle for Good to attack his sentence which was imposed by a 

court with proper subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Thus, although Good 

implores this court to vacate his sentence or remand his case for resentencing 

because it is contrary to law, such actions are outside of the scope of our review of 

the trial court’s denial of Good’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Rather, our review of Good’s assignments of error must focus on whether the 

sentencing error amounted to a manifest injustice such that the trial court erred by 

denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We hold that it does 

not. 

{¶25} First, as previously stated, a manifest injustice comprehends a flaw in 

the path of justice “so extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress 

from the resulting prejudice through another form of application reasonably 

available to him.” Brooks, 2010-Ohio-1682, ¶ 8. Here, Good failed to file a direct 

appeal, and thus failed to seek the redress available to correct the sentencing error 
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he now raises. Further, we note that Good still has the option of filing a motion for 

leave to file a delayed direct appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(A).1

 Accordingly, because 

Good has other means by which to correct his sentence, he does not show a manifest 

injustice. 

{¶26} Furthermore, our review of the record supports a finding that the 

sentencing error of which Good complains does not rise to the level of a manifest 

injustice. First, the trial court could have lawfully imposed a sentence of 25 years 

to life in prison by imposing the mandatory minimum sentences for Counts One and 

Eleven, 15 years to life and 10 years to life, respectively, and running those 

sentences consecutively to each other and concurrently to the sentence imposed for 

Count Seventeen. Accordingly, the trial court had the ability to sentence Good to 

25 years to life in prison. Moreover, the record indicates that the State’s willingness 

to run the sentences concurrently was based upon its understanding that Good would 

receive a sentence of 25 years in prison. Specifically, the State acknowledged that 

it recommended running Counts One and Eleven consecutively because it 

“believe[d] that twenty-five years to life is a justified sentence for [Good’s] crimes.” 

(July 5, 2017 Tr. at 29-30). Thus, Good bargained to receive a sentence of 25 years 

to life in prison, and he received the benefit of that bargain. Accordingly, we do not 

find that Good suffered a manifest injustice due to the trial court’s sentencing error. 

1

 Of course Good must still comply with the requirements of the Appellate Rules and must not delay filing 

such a motion. 
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{¶27} Finally, Good argues that he suffered a manifest injustice because he 

received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Good alleges that 

his trial counsel was ineffective by misinforming him of the correct maximum 

penalties for Counts One and Eleven, rendering his guilty pleas involuntary. Good 

argues that due to this incorrect legal advice, he was denied vital information upon 

which to make a decision regarding whether to go to trial, negotiate different terms 

during plea negotiations, or enter guilty pleas. Accordingly, Good contends that the 

trial court erred by denying his postsentence petition to withdraw his guilty plea. 

We disagree. 

{¶28} “In criminal proceedings, a defendant has the right to effective 

assistance of counsel under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.” State 

v. Evick, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2019-05-010, 2020-Ohio-3072, ¶ 45. “A claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may serve as a basis for seeking a postsentence withdraw of a guilty or no-contest plea under Crim.R. 32.1.” State v. 

James, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-19-30, 2020-Ohio-720, ¶ 14. “‘“When an alleged 

error underlying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the defendant must show (1) that his counsels’ performance was deficient 

and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pled guilty.”’” Id., quoting State v. Taveras, 12th Dist. Warren No. 

CA2016-06-054, 2017-Ohio-1496, ¶ 17, quoting, State v. Tapia-Cortes, 12th Dist. 
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Butler No. CA2016-02-031, 2016-Ohio-8101, ¶ 13. The party raising a claim of 

ineffective assistance has the burden of establish both elements to warrant relief. Id. 

{¶29} Good claims that his trial counsel incorrectly informed him of the 

maximum penalties associated with Counts One and Eleven. However, a review of 

the record indicates that Good’s trial counsel incorrectly informed him of the 

mandatory minimum sentences associated with Counts One and Eleven, but 

correctly informed him of the maximum sentences associated therewith. (July 5, 

2017 Tr. at 5-7). 

{¶30} Furthermore, given the totality of the circumstances, we do not find 

that the misinformation Good received from his trial counsel regarding the 

maximum penalties amounts to a manifest injustice. Although Good’s trial counsel 

was operating under the erroneous belief that the mandatory minimum sentences 

associated with Counts One and Eleven were 25 years to life in prison, the record 

indicates that the State and the trial court were also operating under the same 

mistaken understanding. Also, Good agreed to a sentence of 25 years to life in 

prison. It stands to reason that he would have pled guilty knowing the court would 

impose terms of 15 years to life and 10 years to life and could run those sentences 

consecutively for an aggregate total of 25 years to life imprisonment. 

{¶31} Additionally, Good’s trial counsel was successful in negotiating a plea 

that resulted in the trial court dismissing 38 of the 41 counts in the indictment. 
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Notably, all 38 dismissed charges were first-degree felonies, 9 of which carried 

potential penalties of life in prison without the possibility of parole. (Doc. No. 1). 

Furthermore, Good negotiated a plea that avoided the maximum sentence of life in 

prison without the possibility of parole. Therefore, the record supports the trial 

court’s determination that Good did not carry his burden in establishing both that 

his trial counsel was defective and that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 

pled guilty. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that Good failed to establish a manifest injustice on the basis 

of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel sufficient to warrant a postsentence 

withdrawal of his guilty plea. 

{¶32} Finally, in his fourth assignment of error, Good argues that his request 

to withdraw his guilty plea should not be required to comply with “any time 

constraints the law may require” because the trial court advised him at the changeof-plea hearing that he was waiving “all” his rights to appeal his sentence. We 

disagree. R.C. 2953.08(A) provides specific grounds for a defendant to appeal a 

sentence. State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 10. Under R.C. 

2953.08(D)(1), “[a] sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review 

under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended 

jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a 

sentencing judge.” “In discussing jointly recommended sentences, the Ohio 
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Supreme Court has recognized that ‘[t]he General Assembly intended a jointly 

agreed-upon sentence to be protected from review precisely because the parties 

agreed that the sentence is appropriate.’” State v. Morris, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-12-

17, 2013-Ohio-1736, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5, 2005-

Ohio-3095, ¶ 25. Here, although Good’s sentence was recommended jointly by the 

defendant and prosecution and imposed by the trial court, for the reasons detailed 

above, Good’s sentence is not authorized by law. However, the fact that Good’s 

sentence, which is voidable and not void, is contrary to law does not entitle him to 

disregard the applicable time constraints and procedure. As we previously detailed, 

Good had the recourse of filing a direct appeal to challenge his sentence. Although 

Good failed to timely file a direct appeal, we once again note that he still has the 

option of filing a motion for leave to file a delayed direct appeal. See App.R. 5(A). 

{¶33} Good’s assignments of error are overruled. 

Conclusion 

{¶34} For the foregoing reasons, Good’s assignments of error are overruled. 

Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned 

and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Auglaize County Court of Common 

Pleas. 

Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.