1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Exhibit B

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 1

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

Lawrence M. Rolnick (pro hac vice) 

lrolnick@rksllp.com 

Marc B. Kramer (pro hac vice) 

mkramer@rksllp.com 

Michael J. Hampson (pro hac vice) 

mhampson@rksllp.com 

Jeffrey A. Ritholtz (pro hac vice) 

jritholtz@rksllp.com 

Frank T.M. Catalina (pro hac vice) 

fcatalina@rksllp.com 

1251 Avenue of the Americas 

New York, NY 10020 

Telephone: (212) 597-2800 

Facsimile: (212) 597-2801 

THE LONG LAW FIRM, PLLC 

James A. Long CSB No. 326404 

8605 Santa Monica Blvd. 

PMB 48629 

West Hollywood, CA 90069 

(315) 991-8000 Telephone 

jlong@long.law 

Attorneys for the Movant Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

IN RE PG&E CORPORATION 

SECURITIES LITIGATION 

Case No. 5:18-cv-03509-EJD 

MOVANT PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY 

MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER 

SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE 

Hearing Information: 

Date: June 29, 2023 

Time: 9:00 a.m. (Pacific Time) 

Place: Courtroom 4 (5th Floor) 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 1 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 2

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 4

A. The Movants Seek Intervention for an Appropriate Purpose .............................................. 4

B. The Movants Satisfy All Requirements for Intervention Under Rule 24(a) ........................ 6

1. The Movants Have Significantly Protectable Interests ........................................... 6

2. The Movants’ Interests Will Be Impaired .............................................................. 7

3. The Movants’ Interests Are Not Adequately Represented ................................... 10

4. The Motion is Timely ........................................................................................... 11

C. In the Alternative, the Movants Should Be Granted Permissive Intervention ................... 15

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 15

 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 2 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 3

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ii 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page 

Cases

Allen v. Bedolla, 

787 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 12 

Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 

2020 WL 4501792 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) ............................................................................ 11 

B.G.N. Fremont Square Ltd. v. Chung, 

2011 WL 13129968 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2011)......................................................................... 11 

Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Insurance Co., 

966 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................................... 15 

Bergman v. Thelen LLP, 

2009 WL 1308019 (May 11, 2009) .......................................................................................... 11 

Brooks v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 

2015 WL 13390031 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) .......................................................................... 10 

Chavez v. PVH Corp., 

2014 WL 6617142 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) ......................................................................... 12 

Cicero v. Directv, Inc., 

2010 WL 11463634 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010) ............................................................................ 6 

Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Association, 

647 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................... 7 

Cody v. SoulCycle, Inc., 

2017 WL 8811114 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2017)........................................................................... 12 

Cohorst v. BRE Properties, Inc., 

2011 WL 3489781 (S.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) ............................................................................. 6 

Dixon v. Cost Plus, 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 3 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 4

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

iii 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

2012 WL 2499931 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) .......................................................................... 11 

Donnelly v. Glickman, 

159 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................. 4, 6 

Eacret v. Crunch, LLC, 

2021 WL 4722635 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021) ............................................................................ 8 

Eashoo v. Iovate Health Sciences U.S.A., Inc., 

2015 WL 12696036 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2015) .......................................................................... 9 

Fresno County v. Andrus, 

622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980) ...................................................................................................... 6 

Glass v. UBS Financial Services, Inc., 

2007 WL 474936 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2007) ............................................................................... 9 

Gomes v. Eventbrite, Inc., 

2020 WL 6381343 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2020) ......................................................................... 6, 8 

In Matter of McLarty Industries, Inc., 

2 B.R. 68 (N.D. Ga. Bankr. 1979) ............................................................................................ 10 

In re Lopez-Soto, 

764 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1985) ....................................................................................................... 10 

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 

131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 12 

National Wildlife Refuge Association v. Rural Utilities Service, 

2021 WL 2291084 (W.D. Wis. May 6, 2021) ............................................................................ 7 

O’Connell v. Smith, 

2014 WL 12773900 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2014) ........................................................................ 15 

Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 

587 F. 3d 947 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................... 11 

Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 

268 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................... 10 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 4 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 5

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

iv 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

Ubaldi v. SLM Corp., 

2014 WL 12639952 (N. D. Cal. June 13, 2014) ......................................................................... 6 

United States v. City of Los Angeles, 

288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................... 4 

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ................................................................................................................ 9, 10, 15 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 ................................................................................................................... passim 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 5 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 6

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

The Movant Plaintiffs1 submit this reply in further support of their motion to intervene in 

the above-captioned action (ECF No. 229, “Motion” or “Mot.”) for the purpose of opposing an 

impending motion by the Named Plaintiffs2 and Individual Defendants to lift the stay in this Action 

in connection with a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement. In the event 

the stay is lifted, it will allow this Action to go forward prior to resolution of the related bankruptcy 

claims process contrary to the prior orders of both this Court and the Bankruptcy Court. 

INTRODUCTION 

Up until now, PG&E, the Individual Defendants, the Bankruptcy Court, and this Court 

unanimously agreed that the most efficient way forward was to allow resolution of the claims 

administration process in the PG&E bankruptcy before proceeding with this Action. In what can 

only be characterized as a sea change, PG&E and the Individual Defendants now appear poised to 

reverse course and proceed with an uncontested motion for preliminary approval to send a notice 

of settlement to thousands of claimants who have filed proofs of claim in the Bankruptcy Court. 

To grant an uncontested motion for preliminary approval necessarily requires lifting the stay that 

this Court imposed on the Action pending resolution of the Bankruptcy Proceedings. 

The Motion seeks to allow the Movants to argue against lifting the stay to allow the 

Bankruptcy Court overseeing PG&E to consider the appropriateness of any settlement that releases 

the thousands of claims against PG&E that have been filed in the Bankruptcy Court and/or purports 

to use PG&E’s assets to settle both claims against non-debtors and of plaintiffs who have not filed 

bankruptcy claims before preliminary approval of that settlement is considered by this Court. The 

requested intervention is thus not intended to “disrupt” efforts to fairly resolve this Action, but 

rather to ensure that any settlement of this Action will respect the Movants’ rights as both putative 

1

 The Movant Plaintiffs are identified in Appendix A to the Motion. Capitalized terms not 

otherwise defined in this reply shall be given the same meanings ascribed to them in the Motion. 

2

 “Named Plaintiffs” include lead plaintiff PERA, as well as plaintiffs York County on Behalf of 

the County of York Retirement Fund, City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System, and 

Mid-Jersey Trucking Industry & Local No. 701 Pension Fund. 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 6 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 7

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

class members in this Action and claimants in the Bankruptcy Proceedings, including by 

respecting multiple orders of at least two courts directly relevant to those interests. Despite the 

doomsaying from the Named Plaintiffs and the about-faced Individual Defendants, even if granted, 

the Motion would afford the Movants nothing more than a timely opportunity to be heard on this 

important issue–something this Court may well provide to any unnamed class member. 

That there is any opposition at all to such a benign request to be heard gives away the game. 

The Named Plaintiffs and Individual Defendants clearly aim to jointly seek relief from the stay 

and preliminary approval authorizing the issuance of notice to thousands of claimants as quickly 

as possible, regardless of fairness or appropriateness, and without any resistance, including 

guidance from the Bankruptcy Court. They presumably fear that even a modicum of scrutiny of a 

proposed settlement by the Bankruptcy Court at this stage likely means failure because, among 

other reasons, they intend to use funds from PG&E’s estate to settle claims against non-debtors 

and claims of those who have not filed proofs of claim in accordance with the Bankruptcy Plan 

and repeated rulings of the Bankruptcy Court, using a case that has no claims against PG&E 

remaining. And though they deny, and even feign offense at, Movants’ claim of “coordination,” 

reaching a settlement in a class action and seeking preliminary approval by definition requires a 

coordinated effort. That both sides oppose the Motion is only further evidence of their joint tactics. 

The Movants are entitled to intervene to allow this Court the benefit of a genuinely 

adversarial process before deciding to lift the stay, reverse course, and preempt the ongoing efforts 

at claims resolution in progress in the Bankruptcy Proceedings. The Movants hold interests in 

both the Action (as putative class members against the Individual Defendants) and the bankruptcy 

(as claimants against PG&E). They therefore have reason to oppose lifting the stay and allowing 

notice of a class action settlement to be distributed to bankruptcy claimants not only on fairness 

grounds, but also to protect their bankruptcy interest. In fact, if the Named Plaintiffs and Individual 

Defendants were to represent that a proposed settlement would not involve a release of claims 

against PG&E (nor require withdrawing bankruptcy claims) or the use of PG&E’s funds, the 

Movants would withdraw the Motion. But no such assurance is forthcoming. 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 7 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 8

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

Instead, the Named Plaintiffs and Individual Defendants would have this Court invoke 

purportedly “well-established Ninth Circuit precedent” holding that a putative class member is not 

permitted to intervene for the sole purpose of opposing preliminary approval of a class settlement, 

and deny the Motion. Even if courts in this Circuit were unanimous in establishing such a rule (far 

from it), it would be inapposite here, where the Movants do not seek to object to preliminary 

approval of a proposed settlement in the first instance, but rather to oppose any effort to lift the 

Court-ordered stay of the Action before the parallel and overlapping Bankruptcy Proceedings have 

concluded. The opposing parties cannot point to any case with this nearly sui generis situation. 

Granting preliminary approval without allowing the Movants to be heard in the face of 

their bankruptcy interest would cause them prejudice. For one thing, it would allow notice to be 

sent out to thousands of putative class members who are claimants in the bankruptcy (including 

the Movants) and would be utterly confused about the implications of a settlement on their 

bankruptcy claims. Further, it would serve as a pretext for PG&E to continue evading its 

obligations under the Bankruptcy Court’s ADR Procedures—which specifically carve out the 

Named Plaintiffs, and which PG&E has largely ignored for over two years—and would thus 

inevitably delay resolution of the Movants’ claims until after the Court considers final approval 

and opt-out rights are exercised, as needed. In Gomes v. Eventbrite, this Court previously 

recognized that intervention by a putative class member is appropriate to seek a postponement of 

consideration of preliminary approval where to do so would benefit absent class members. That 

is virtually identical to the relief the Movants now request. There is no reason this Court need lift 

the stay, order preliminary approval and notice of settlement, or wait for final approval to 

determine (as it has twice already) that the Bankruptcy Proceedings should take precedence. 

Until weeks before the Movants filed their Motion, they had no reason to believe 

intervention would be necessary. The Individual Defendants and PG&E had argued in favor of 

this Court imposing a stay pending resolution of the Bankruptcy Proceedings. Circumstances 

changed when PG&E stated in October 2022 that it had secretly “paused” compliance with the 

ADR Procedures in a misguided effort to resolve this Action. And even following PG&E’s 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 8 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page 9

of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

startling admission, the Movants thought their interests would be preserved because PG&E had 

agreed to mediate their claims. It was only once that mediation failed that the Movants found 

themselves in a position of having to intervene to protect their interests, and they expediently filed 

the Motion less than one month later. The Motion is timely and should be granted. 

ARGUMENT 

Despite this Circuit’s “liberal policy in favor of intervention,” United States v. City of Los 

Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397–98 (9th Cir. 2002), the Named Plaintiffs and Individual Defendants 

oppose the Motion. See generally Individual Defendants’ Opposition to Movants’ Motion to 

Intervene (ECF No. 242, “Defs. Opp.”); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Movants’ Motion to Intervene 

(ECF No. 243, “Plfs. Opp.” and, together with Defs. Opp., “Oppositions”). They mischaracterize 

the purpose of the Motion, and then argue based on that faulty characterization that the Movants 

fail to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a) for intervention as of right, and that permissive 

intervention is not warranted. 

Their objections are baseless. The Movants plainly satisfy all elements of Rule 24(a): 

(i) they have a significantly protectable interest relating to the property that is the subject of the 

Action; (ii) disposition of the Action may impair or impede their ability to protect their interest; 

(iii) they are not adequately represented by the existing parties; and (iv) they timely moved. See 

Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998). Intervention should therefore be granted 

as of right, or, in the alternative, the Court should use its discretion to grant permissive intervention. 

A. The Movants Seek Intervention for an Appropriate Purpose 

As an initial matter, the Oppositions completely mischaracterize the Movants’ request as a 

motion “pertaining to dissatisfaction with a class action settlement.” Plfs. Opp. at 1; see also Defs. 

Opp. at 2 (arguing that “Movants’ stated justifications for intervention are not applicable to class 

action settlement opposition”) (emphasis added). But as both Oppositions recognize, there is no 

settlement that has yet been proposed with which the Movants could be dissatisfied. See Plfs. Opp. 

at 2 (describing the Motion as addressing “dissatisfaction with a potential settlement (emphasis in 

original)); Defs. Opp. at 9 (settlement is “hypothetical” and “may never come to fruition at all”). 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 9 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

10 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

Opposing a settlement is not the Movants’ main purpose. The Motion was clear about the 

Movants’ goals in moving to intervene: “The Movants now bring this motion to intervene for the 

purposes of protecting their rights in the Bankruptcy to complete the ADR procedures ordered by 

the Bankruptcy Court, and to ensure that no actions will be taken in this Court to undermine the 

claims process.” Mot. at 8. In other words, the Movants seek to oppose entry of preliminary 

approval because the Court already stayed the Action “pending resolution of the bankruptcy 

proceedings.” ECF No. 217 at 1. Therefore, before notice of a proposed settlement can be 

authorized for distribution to thousands of claimants in the Bankruptcy Proceedings, the Named 

Plaintiffs and Individual Defendants would need to make a motion to lift the stay. See id. at 2 

(“The parties may file a motion to reopen the case upon resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings, 

if appropriate.”).3

 The Movants, if granted permission to intervene, would oppose lifting the stay 

in the first instance—rather than granting preliminary approval—to allow claims resolution to play 

out in the Bankruptcy Proceedings and prevent undue confusion and delay that would ensue from 

granting preliminary approval and allowing the Named Plaintiffs to issue notices of settlement to 

thousands of claimants. See Mot. at 14-15. In so doing, the Movants would seek to protect their 

interests in receiving timely and adequate recoveries from defendants in both parallel 

proceedings—this Action and the bankruptcy.4

In fact, the Movants’ intervention request would be moot if the proposed settlement did not 

implicate PG&E’s bankruptcy estate, because it would have no impact on potential recoveries in 

the bankruptcy nor provide any basis for PG&E to pause the ADR Procedures. But all indications 

point to a proposed settlement that includes PG&E. The Individual Defendants have taken the 

3

 Neither Opposition contends that a motion to lift the stay would not be required. 

4

 The Named Plaintiffs puzzlingly allege that the Movants hid these intentions from the Court in 

their Motion. See Plfs. Opp. at 16. But the Movants stated explicitly their expectation that 

“PERA’s proposed settlement will undermine the Movants’ ability to recover in the Bankruptcy 

and potentially delay resolution of the Movants’ claims for years,” and sought relief narrowly 

targeted at that inevitability. Mot. at 15.

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 10 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

11 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

position that funds obtained from PG&E’s D&O insurers must be used to indemnify them in this 

Action, and explicitly quoted PG&E’s statement to the Bankruptcy Court that funds from a 

settlement with its D&O insurers would “cover at least a meaningful portion of a potential 

settlement of [Securities Claims].” Defs. Opp. at 5. PG&E, in the same vein, told the Bankruptcy 

Court that it has paused the ADR Procedures to negotiate a “more global resolution of the 

Securities Claims,” which ostensibly includes claims in this Action. Mot. at 8. And the Named 

Plaintiffs, for their part, have done nothing to assuage the Movants’ concerns that any proposed 

settlement would incorporate funding from, and a release of their claims against, PG&E. 

Accordingly, the Oppositions’ attempts to equate the Movants’ purpose in intervening with 

a typical objection to preliminary approval of a class settlement are disingenuous and should be 

disregarded. As is no doubt clear to this Court, which sua sponte stayed this Action in favor of 

the Bankruptcy Proceedings, there is nothing typical about this situation. The Court should 

consider all the practical implications of a decision to lift the stay and move forward with a 

claims-resolution process intended to disrupt and replace parallel proceedings in bankruptcy. See 

Ubaldi v. SLM Corp., 2014 WL 12639952, at *1 (N. D. Cal. June 13, 2014) (“[T]he Court should 

be ‘guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations’ and ‘should interpret the [Rule 

24(a)] requirements broadly in favor of intervention.’” (quoting Donnelly 159 F.3d at 409)). 

B. The Movants Satisfy All Requirements for Intervention Under Rule 24(a) 

1. The Movants Have Significantly Protectable Interests 

The Ninth Circuit views the “interest” test as “basically a threshold one, . . . because the 

criteria of practical harm to the applicant and the adequacy of representation by others are better 

suited to the task of limiting extension of the right to intervene.” Fresno Cty. v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 

436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980). As a result, putative class members like the Movants are held to have 

significantly protectable interests just “by virtue of being members of the class in the federal suit.” 

Gomes v. Eventbrite, Inc., 2020 WL 6381343, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2020) (Davila, J.) (citing 

Cicero v. Directv, Inc., 2010 WL 11463634, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010)); see also Cohorst v. 

BRE Props., Inc., 2011 WL 3489781, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (“[S]ince [the proposed 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 11 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

12 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

intervenor] is a class member there is no dispute that she has a significant protectable interest 

relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of this action.”). 

The Named Plaintiffs make only a half-hearted contention that the Movants’ interests are 

too tenuous to support intervention because they are based on a “speculative economic 

expectancy” in PG&E’s assets. Plfs. Opp. at 16-17. Their argument completely overlooks the 

Movants’ interests as putative class members in this Action, which are sufficient to satisfy the 

Rule 24(a) requirement. See id.; Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 

893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (“No specific legal or equitable interest need be established” under Rule 

24(a) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Notably, the Individual Defendants do not 

dispute that the Movants have significantly protectable interests. 

2. The Movants’ Interests Will Be Impaired 

The Movants’ (and other putative class members’) interests will be impaired in at least two 

ways if the Court were to lift the stay to grant preliminary approval of a class settlement. First, a 

proposed class settlement is likely to completely preempt the claims administration process that is 

currently underway in the Bankruptcy Court by releasing proofs of claim in the bankruptcy, or at 

least delaying their resolution under the Court-ordered ADR Procedures. Indeed, PG&E has 

already demonstrated that it will defer its obligations under the ADR Procedures while a settlement 

is being negotiated; it will certainly continue to put off negotiations of individual claims in the 

bankruptcy should a settlement be preliminarily approved. See Bankr. Dkt. No. 13122 at 10 

(PG&E “paused [ADR Procedures] after [it] began discussions regarding a more global resolution 

of the Securities Claims”). If preliminary approval of a class settlement is granted, the Movants 

will be forced to wait until at least a hearing on final approval of the settlement (and perhaps even 

appeals) before meaningfully reengaging in claim resolution. The Movants should be permitted 

to intervene to prevent that imposition to a speedy resolution of their claims. See, e.g., Nat’l 

Wildlife Refuge Ass’n v. Rural Utils. Serv., 2021 WL 2291084, at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 6, 2021) 

(granting intervention to oppose requested injunctions that would “prevent or at least delay” 

satisfaction of proposed intervenors’ interests (emphasis added)). 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 12 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

13 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

Second, granting preliminary approval would authorize the Named Plaintiffs to provide 

notice to putative class members regarding the settlement. As a significant portion of putative 

class members, including Movants, are also claimants in the PG&E bankruptcy, this notice would 

cause substantial and needless confusion, especially for those who filed their claims in the 

bankruptcy through claims administrators rather than counsel. Since PG&E’s bankruptcy, the 

Movants and other claimants have received multiple notices regarding their bankruptcy claims, 

and it has been their fair expectation that their securities claims would be resolved through the 

bankruptcy process, not via a collateral class settlement, particularly when class treatment has been 

twice rejected by the Bankruptcy Court. There is no reason to rush through preliminary approval, 

upend those expectations, and force through a notice before the Movants are heard on the 

appropriateness of these steps. See Gomes, 2020 WL 6381343, at *3 (allowing intervention prior 

to preliminary approval to avoid a scenario where “notice to the class will be sent without any 

mention of the [parallel action]”); Eacret v. Crunch, LLC, 2021 WL 4722635, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 26, 2021) (“[C]ounsel’s desire to rush this case forward in an effort to secure attorneys’ fees 

here is hardly a suitable justification for the confusion that would assuredly flow from putative 

class members receiving a notice of class action settlement in [a parallel action] at or near the same 

time as receiving Belaire-West notices in this case . . . .”). 

The Oppositions do not address either of these impairments directly. Instead, they grasp 

at straws to distinguish this Court’s decision in Gomes v. Eventbrite, where the Court granted an 

intervention motion prior to preliminary approval of a class settlement under practically the same 

circumstances because it benefitted the putative class to defer consideration of the settlement and 

the issuance of notices. See Mot. at 14-15. The Individual Defendants claim the Movants’ request 

is “broad[er]” than the intervenors’ request for a continuance in Gomes. Defs. Opp. at 11. But 

that is based on the misleading characterization of the Motion as a request “for the purpose of 

objecting to the settlement.” Id. They also suggest this case is different because a proposed 

settlement has not yet been filed, id. at 9, but they identify no supporting authority and fail to 

explain how that criticism can be reconciled with their argument elsewhere that the Motion is 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 13 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

14 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

untimely, see id. at 12-16. The Named Plaintiffs argue that the Movants’ reliance on Gomes is 

misplaced because (i) the Movants are not court appointed lead plaintiffs in a parallel action, (ii) do 

not ask for a “reasonable wait” for a decision on a dispositive motion, and (iii) do not allege that 

the Named Plaintiffs have stated the settlement is justified based on the potential outcome of the 

ADR Procedures. Plfs. Opp. at 19-20. They provide no analysis clarifying why any of those 

purported distinctions are relevant and instead issue a conclusory assertion that the Movants’ 

request “goes far beyond a limited 90-day continuance to inform class members of the status of 

certain claims.” Id. at 20. The Named Plaintiffs have no idea how long it will take for PG&E to 

resolve the bankruptcy claims, nor do they grapple with the fact that, unlike the case in Gomes, 

this Action is stayed, and thus the Movants’ request to intervene for the purpose of maintaining 

the status quo would be even less disruptive than the intervention request in Gomes. Moreover, 

even putting aside the opportunity to oppose preliminary approval, the Movants clearly have a 

right to be heard on lifting the stay, which will permanently change the order of proceedings that 

have been implemented by both this Court and the Bankruptcy Court. 

The Oppositions resort to targeting a strawman, citing a litany of cases from the Ninth 

Circuit in which intervention requests for the sole purpose of opposing a class settlement were 

denied on the grounds that Rule 23’s objection and opt-out rights adequately protected such 

interests and claiming that this is the Circuit’s “overwhelming[]” or even “unanimous” approach. 

Defs. Opp. at 9-10; Plfs. Opp. at 17-19. In reality, courts in this Circuit are split on whether Rule 

23 displaces the right of a putative class member to intervene solely to oppose class settlement. 

See Eashoo v. Iovate Health Sciences U.S.A., Inc., 2015 WL 12696036, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 

2015) (“Some district courts in this circuit have followed the reasoning expressed in Community 

Bank and implied by Diaz finding that a class member may intervene of right under Rule 

24(a)(2).”); Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 474936, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2007) 

(noting that Ninth Circuit’s Diaz decision suggests “members of a class, by their very nature, meet 

the first two requirements for intervention as of right[,]” including the impairment requirement); 

see also Mot. at 13. But even if this Court were to adopt the Oppositions’ proposed rule, it is 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 14 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

15 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

simply inapplicable here because the Movants do not seek solely to oppose a class settlement at 

this stage—they intend to oppose a motion to lift the stay, for which Rule 23 cannot serve as a 

replacement.5 In none of the cases cited in the Oppositions for this proposition was there a stay in 

place to accommodate resolution of a parallel proceeding that would be completely undermined 

by granting preliminary approval of a settlement. The Movants are entitled to protect their interest 

in the PG&E bankruptcy by opposing a motion to lift the stay.6

3. The Movants’ Interests Are Not Adequately Represented 

The Individual Defendants do not oppose the Motion on adequacy grounds. The Named 

Plaintiffs, however, spend multiple pages in opposition recounting the ways in which they purport 

to have adequately represented the putative class, both in this Action and the Bankruptcy 

Proceedings. Plfs. Opp. at 20-24. The Named Plaintiffs fail to address the relevant inquiries for 

purposes of intervention—whether they “will undoubtedly make all the intervenor’s arguments” 

and are “capable and willing to make such arguments[.]” Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 

268 F.3d 810, 822 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Clearly not. The Named Plaintiffs recognize 

the divergent interests they have with the Movants, admitting their claims are “specifically 

excluded” from the ADR Procedures, Plfs. Opp. at 3, and accusing the Movants of putting “their 

own individual economic interests above all other class members,” including the Named Plaintiffs, 

id. at 14 (emphasis in original). That adversity of interests overcomes any presumption of 

adequacy. See Brooks v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2015 WL 13390031, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 

3, 2015) (presumption of adequacy “may be overcome by . . . adversity of interest”); Dixon v. Cost 

5

 For the same reason, the Individual Defendants’ argument that the availability of final settlement 

approval undercuts the impairment prong fails. Defs. Opp. at 12. 

6

 Although it is an unusual circumstance, federal courts have granted intervention motions for the 

purpose of opposing the lifting of a stay. See, e.g., In re Lopez-Soto, 764 F.2d 23, 27-28 (1st Cir. 

1985); In Matter of McLarty Indus., Inc., 2 B.R. 68, 70 (N.D. Ga. Bankr. 1979). 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 15 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

16 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

Plus, 2012 WL 2499931, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (intervention permitted where 

intervenor’s interests “potentially diverge from [party’s] in two respects”). 

The suggestion that the Named Plaintiffs and Movants share an “ultimate objective” to 

maximize recovery for the putative class is misleading. Plfs. Opp. at 21. That might be true as to 

claims against the Individual Defendants, but not for a proposed settlement that will also release 

claims against PG&E in bankruptcy. Because it seems claims against PG&E will be involved in 

any settlement, it is incumbent on the Movants to protect their bankruptcy interest and ensure they 

are fully and expeditiously made whole by PG&E in the bankruptcy before its assets are depleted 

to pay for a settlement of claims against non-debtors or in favor of non-creditors/claimants. The 

existing parties do not share these interests because they (and their counsel) stand to benefit from 

settling this Action using PG&E’s funds at the expense of the individual bankruptcy claims. 

Unlike the cases on which the Named Plaintiffs rely, this is not a mere disagreement on preferred 

litigation tactics—it is an explicit conflict of interests. See Perry v. Proposition 8 Off. Proponents, 

587 F. 3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (intervenor and party had “identical interests”); Bergman v. 

Thelen LLP, 2009 WL 1308019, at *3 (May 11, 2009) (intervenors’ interests “are identical to that 

of the class”). The Movants should be permitted to intervene so that their conflicting position is 

heard before the stay is lifted and a settlement is preliminarily approved. See, e.g., Apartment 

Ass’n of Los Angeles Cty., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 2020 WL 4501792, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 

5, 2020) (intervention permitted when ultimate interests of parties “may directly conflict with 

Proposed Intervenors’ interests”); B.G.N. Fremont Sq. Ltd. v. Chung, 2011 WL 13129968, at *5 

(C.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2011) (granting intervention where defendants and proposed intervenor had 

“conflicting incentives . . . to apportion maximum potential liability” to different entities). 

4. The Motion is Timely 

The Oppositions argue to no avail that the Motion is untimely because: (i) the “matter” has 

been pending for years and is (according to them) near settlement; (ii) intervention would prevent 

or delay resolution of the Action; and (iii) the Movants did not intervene at an earlier date. Defs. 

Opp. at 12-16; Plfs. Opp. at 9-15. None of these allegations support denying intervention. 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 16 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

17 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

First, the Oppositions rely primarily on cases in which intervention was requested after

preliminary approval of a settlement had been granted and after notices were delivered, where the 

court and the putative class members had already expended substantial resources implementing 

the settlement. See Chavez v. PVH Corp., 2014 WL 6617142, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) 

(“Taking into consideration the Court’s engagement in the case” and finding that “[t]o allow 

intervention at this point would waste the significant resources the parties and the class have 

expended in reliance on the settlement agreement”); Cody v. SoulCycle, Inc., 2017 WL 8811114, 

at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2017) (denying intervention after “the parties reached a settlement, which 

th[e] Court preliminarily approved”); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 

F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We believe that the fact that the district court has substantively—

and substantially—engaged the issues in this case weighs heavily against allowing intervention”). 

That is not true here, where the Movants purposefully moved for intervention prior to the filing of 

a motion for preliminary approval, and while a stay of the Action is still in place. This is the ideal 

time for intervention because it would cause minimal disruption to the Court and the parties. 

Second, the Oppositions again ignore that the Motion is directed to maintaining the stay to 

allow the resolution of parallel Bankruptcy Proceedings rather than simply opposing an unfair 

settlement. This is not a situation “where Objectors’ concerns could largely be addressed through 

the normal objection process.” Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming 

district court’s denial of intervention motion after proposed intervenor was permitted to object at 

preliminary and final fairness hearings). The Oppositions wrongly suggest that the Bankruptcy 

Court has essentially blessed a settlement of this Action that would incorporate PG&E, and thus 

opposing a motion to lift the stay is merely an effort to hold “hostage” a potential settlement, 

causing prejudice to the parties and putative class members. See Defs. Opp. at 4-5; 13-14; Plfs. 

Opp. at 6-8, 14-15. While it is true that Judge Montali has not yet ruled against the possibility of 

a global resolution of securities claims against both PG&E and the Individual Defendants, he has 

said nothing about the form or ordering of such a resolution. Critically, Judge Montali adopted 

the ADR Procedures while rejecting a class resolution approach proposed by PERA because he 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 17 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

18 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

expected that individual claims resolution would more “quickly and inexpensively” allow the 

claimants to recover from the company. Bankr. Dkt. No. 13164-9 at 6:21-7:4; see also Defs. Opp. 

at 3 (“In declining to take a class approach, the Bankruptcy Court expressed a preference for ‘a 

well-established process . . . that facilitates consensual resolution.’” (citing Bankr. Dkt. No. 

13164-9 at 5:10-13) (emphasis added)). He certainly did not condone the use of a class settlement 

as a replacement for the ADR Procedures or an excuse to massively delay resolution of the 

individual claims. In fact, at a recent hearing, Judge Montali expressed the same concern voiced 

by the Movants—that PG&E’s assets will be used to try to settle the Action rather than the 

individual claims: “My point is, if the company spends money dealing with the class action, that’s 

money it could be spending dealing with [the Movants’] claims and . . . all the other [bankruptcy] 

securities claimants beyond the 699 you represent.” ECF No. 243-3 at 46:14-17.7

 

There is certainly nothing prejudicial about allowing the stay to remain in place and 

deferring consideration of preliminary approval until after the Bankruptcy Court has been afforded 

the opportunity to weigh in on any settlement that would deplete PG&E’s assets for the benefit of 

non-debtors and non-creditors and facilitate additional delay in moving the ADR Procedures 

forward.8 Indeed, this Court already recognized this as the proper procedure to follow by imposing 

7

 The March 7, 2023 hearing was on a motion by the Movants to enforce PG&E’s compliance with 

the ADR Procedures. Bankr. Dkt. No. 13492. Far from “den[ying]” that motion, Plfs. Opp. at 8, 

Judge Montali noted that the ADR Procedures had not progressed to the Bankruptcy Court’s 

satisfaction, which “compels the court to consider whether to alter the procedures in some way.” 

Bankr. Dkt. No. 13612 at 3. To that end, Judge Montali ordered PG&E to make offers to each of 

the Movants, and specifically asked PG&E to suggest modifications to the ADR Procedures to 

streamline the claims resolution process, including potentially fixing a “prompt deadline for 

[PG&E] to object to the [Movants’] claims[.]” Id. at 4. 

8

 The Named Plaintiffs criticize the Movants for seeking relief that “lies in the Bankruptcy Court, 

not this Court.” Plfs. Opp. at 3. But that is the Movants’ point—they should be permitted to 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 18 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

19 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

a stay of the Action pending resolution of the Bankruptcy Proceedings. ECF No. 217. In doing 

so, the Court took into consideration the same arguments by the Named Plaintiffs that they would 

be prejudiced by the stay because, among other reasons, the Bankruptcy Proceedings could take 

four to seven years to reach completion during which they would be left without recourse because 

they are carved out of the ADR Procedures. ECF No. 203 at 1. Even so, the Court held that the 

stay was “in the interest of efficiency and would avoid proceeding on a piecemeal basis.” ECF 

No. 217 at 2-3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Those holdings remain true. 

What is more, the Court agreed with the Individual Defendants (who now oppose the 

Motion), who argued vociferously in the context of the stay order that “it is consistent with 

PG&E’s interests to settle claims in the bankruptcy on terms that release all claims related to that 

claimant’s investments in PG&E, including the purported class claims against Defendants in this 

action[,]” and that a ruling against a stay “would merely constrain and interfere with Judge 

Montali’s efforts to effectuate the plan of reorganization of PG&E.” ECF No. 207 at 3-4 (emphasis 

added). The best the Individual Defendants can muster in response to this dramatic about-face is 

to try to explain away the Court’s stay ruling by noting it does not mention the ADR Procedures 

specifically. Defs. Opp. at 6. But that is nothing more than a smokescreen—the Court’s notice of 

intent to stay the proceedings was very clear about the role of the ADR Procedures in the decision: 

“Based upon the current status of the Chapter 11 Proceeding, the Court intends to stay this case 

pending completion of the claims procedure and ADR. . . . Lead Plaintiff and the non-debtor 

Defendants expect that the ongoing bankruptcy claim process will affect, among other things, the 

size and potential damage claims of the putative classes in this action.” ECF No. 198 at 2 

(emphasis added). Consistent with that view, the Movants’ proposed intervention is for the 

purpose of avoiding disruption and delay that would result from lifting the stay. That should 

outweigh any prejudice the parties would incur because of their purported negotiations involving 

a bankrupt entity that they knew was subject to, and neglecting, court-ordered ADR Procedures. 

intervene here to ensure that no settlement implicating PG&E is approved before they have an 

opportunity to argue these issues before Judge Montali. 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 19 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

20 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

Lastly, there is no basis to argue that the Movants should have intervened earlier. The 

primary interest at issue is the Movants’ bankruptcy interest, so prior knowledge of their interest 

in this Action is irrelevant. The Movants could only have known disposition of this matter might 

impact their bankruptcy interest once (i) PG&E stated generally in October 2022 that it had paused 

the ADR Procedures in favor of negotiating a potential settlement of this Action, and (ii) PG&E 

specifically broke off negotiations with the Movants concerning their bankruptcy claims, which 

occurred a few weeks before the Motion was filed. See Mot. at 10-12. 

C. In the Alternative, the Movants Should Be Granted Permissive Intervention 

The Movants should alternatively be granted permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). 

See Mot. at 17-18. For the reasons discussed above, the Oppositions’ objections to permissive 

intervention on the grounds of timeliness and prejudice are misplaced. In all analogous cases cited 

in the Oppositions, courts found permissive intervention unnecessary because the proposed 

intervenors were adequately protected by Rule 23. Defs. Opp. at 16-17; Plfs. Opp. at 24-25. That 

is clearly not the case for the Movants’ opposition to a motion to lift the stay and not at all true for 

this atypical situation involving a core bankruptcy and a separate action against collateral 

defendants. The Individual Defendants also misinterpret the “independent jurisdictional basis” 

requirement as applied to the Movants. The Movants do not seek to “become plaintiffs,” Defs. 

Opp. at 18, or “bring additional claims,” but rather to ask the Court to maintain a stay of 

proceedings, a “power it inherently has.” O’Connell v. Smith, 2014 WL 12773900, at *2 (C.D. 

Cal. Aug. 18, 2014). No independent jurisdictional basis is necessary for that purpose. Id.; 

Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992). Similarly, the Named 

Plaintiffs are incorrect to assume that the Movants are attempting to become lead plaintiffs in the 

Action or otherwise act on behalf of other absent class members. Plfs. Opp. at 15, 25. Permitting 

intervention would not undermine the PSLRA or any class action rule. 

 CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons discussed in the Motion, the Movants 

respectfully request that the Court grant their motion to intervene. 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 20 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

21 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 

ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS 

NEW YORK, NY 10020 

Dated: March 28, 2023 ROLNICK KRAMER SADIGHI LLP 

By: /s/ Lawrence M. Rolnick

 Lawrence M. Rolnick (pro hac vice) 

Marc B. Kramer (pro hac vice) 

Michael J. Hampson (pro hac vice) 

Jeffrey A. Ritholtz (pro hac vice) 

Frank T.M. Catalina (pro hac vice) 

THE LONG LAW FIRM, PLLC 

James A. Long CSB No. 326404 

Attorneys for the Movant Plaintiffs 

Case 5:18-cv-03509-EJD Document 244 Filed 03/28/23 Page 21 of 21

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13748-2 Filed: 05/17/23 Entered: 05/17/23 20:24:06 Page

22 of 22