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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

W.A.-T., : No. 1514 MDA 2019

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 26, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No. CP-67-CR-0000528-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 12, 2020

W.A.-T. appeals the August 26, 2019 judgment of sentence, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of York County, after a jury convicted him of 

aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and corruption of minors.1 The

trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of three

to six years, followed by five years’ probation. We affirm.

As gleaned from the record, the relevant facts are as follows: At the 

time of the sexual assaults, the victim, age ten, was living with her mother, 

appellant (victim’s stepfather), and her younger brothers. (Notes of 

testimony, 5/14/19 at 124, 158.) The victim testified to several incidents 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(a)(7), 3126(a)(7), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively. 

Appellant was found not guilty of rape and two counts of involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse, person less than 13 years of age, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c) 

and 3123(b), respectively.
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where she was inappropriately touched by appellant when her mother was 

away from the home. (Id. at 125-134.) The victim did not immediately tell 

anyone because she thought she would not be believed and she was afraid 

her brothers would be taken away. (Id. at 134, 135.) On July 3, 2017, 

two days after the most recent incident, the victim told her stepmother. (Id.

at 158, 159.) On the same date, the victim’s stepmother and her father took 

her to York Hospital. (Id. at 166.)

On July 19, 2017, the victim’s stepmother and father took her to the 

Children’s Advocacy Center for a follow-up examination and interview. (Id.

at 169, 196.) There, the victim’s father made a statement to the sexual 

assault forensic examination (“SAFE”) nurse that “[the victim’s] lying is out of 

hand, like talking to a wall.” (Id. at 196.)

Appellant sought to introduce father’s statement to the SAFE nurse as 

an exception to the hearsay rule, statement made for medical diagnosis or 

treatment, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803(4)(B). (Notes of testimony, 5/14/19 at 

195-202.) The trial court ruled that the exception did not apply. (Id. at 202.)

Following his conviction and imposition of sentence, appellant did not 

file post-sentence motions. Rather, appellant timely appealed. On 

September 17, 2019, the trial court ordered appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant timely complied. Thereafter, the trial court filed its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
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The sole issue raised by appellant is as follows:

Whether the [] trial court erred in not permitting 

[appellant’s] counsel to admit into evidence 

statements made by the alleged victim’s father to the 

SAFE nurse that the alleged victim’s lying was “ out of 

hand[,”] said statements being made in gathering 

information for purpose(s) of the medical examination 

pursuant to Rule 803(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Evidence[?]

Appellant’s brief at 4 (full capitalization and bolding omitted).

In reviewing evidentiary rulings:

The admission of evidence is committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling 

regarding the admission of evidence will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects 

manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly 

erroneous. 

Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 397 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement that 

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; 

and (2) a party offers into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted 

in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible except as 

provided by [the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence], by other rules prescribed 

by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.” Pa.R.E. 802. In order for 

a hearsay statement to be admissible, the statement must fall within an 

exception to the hearsay rule. See Pa.R.E. 803-805.
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One of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is the medical diagnosis or 

treatment exception. Pa.R.E. 803(4). A statement is not excluded by the 

hearsay rule if it:

(A) is made for--and is reasonably pertinent to--

medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation 

of treatment; and

(B) describes medical history, past or present 

symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception 

or general character of the cause or external 

source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent 

to treatment, or diagnosis in contemplation of 

treatment.

Pa.R.E. 803(4).

“[T]here are essentially two requirements for a statement to come 

within this exception. First, the declarant must make the statement for the 

purpose of receiving medical treatment, and second, the statement must be 

necessary and proper for diagnosis and treatment.” Commonwealth v. 

D.J.A., 800 A.2d 965, 976 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 857 A.2d 677 

(Pa. 2004) (citation omitted).

Here, appellant baldly asserts that even though the victim’s father was 

not receiving medical treatment, his statement to the SAFE nurse is admissible 

because “the patient’s veracity or lack thereof would be relevant for medical 

personnel to arrive at a proper diagnosis and treatment.” (Appellant’s brief 

at 13.) Appellant fails to support this claim with legal authority. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring citation to authorities to support argument). 

“When an appellant cites no authority supporting an argument, this Court is 
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inclined to believe there is none.” Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez,

111 A.3d 775, 781 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 123 A.3d 331 (Pa.

2015). Appellant waives this claim on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 

50 A.3d 732, 748 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 601 (Pa. 2013) 

(reiterating failure to cite to relevant legal authority to support argument 

results in waiver).

Notwithstanding waiver, we note that the statement was not made by 

the victim when she was a patient, but by her father. It was not reasonably 

pertinent to, nor does it describe, the victim’s “medical history, past or present 

symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the 

cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment, 

or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment.” Pa.R.E. 803(4)(B). As a result, 

the exception to hearsay set forth in Pa.R.E. 803(4) was inapplicable. 

Moreover, the credibility of the victim was within the sole province of the jury. 

See Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 600-601 (Pa.Super. 2018).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion and, therefore, properly 

excluded the statement made by the victim’s father to the SAFE nurse.

Judgment of sentenced affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/12/2020