COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 23, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP1357-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF2456

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

QUINCY D. MOORE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Brash, C.J., Dugan and White, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2020AP1357-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Quincy D. Moore appeals his judgment of 

conviction for three drug charges and two felon in possession of a firearm charges 

with various penalty enhancers. He also appeals the trial court’s order denying his 

motion for postconviction relief without a hearing. Moore argues that an allegedly

biased juror served on the jury panel that convicted him and that the trial court 

erred when it allowed this juror to continue to serve and that his trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the allegedly biased juror. We 

disagree and, accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2018, Moore and a co-defendant were tried for 

multiple charges of drug possession, drug dealing, and felon in possession of a 

weapon. On the fourth day of trial, the court received a note from Juror No. 25 

that stated:

I feel it is my duty to report a comment made by a juror in 

the juror room on Wed AM (12/12). I found this comment 

to be very inappropriate, offensive, and may suggest that 

the juror is not fair and impartial. Comment made (as 

attempt at humor): “We’re in a hangin’ mood” [sic] 

Comment made by Juror #27. (cannot confirm juror 

number). No one replied to the comment.

¶3 The trial court discussed with the parties options on how to proceed, 

offering that the court could: “generally tell the jury not to make any comments 

about the case”; directly question the juror who submitted the note—Juror 

No. 25—but “that might make things a little more awkward for him going back 

into the jury room”; or directly question the juror named in the note—Juror 

No. 27. The court then asked “[w]hat suggestions do the attorneys have as to how 

I should handle this?” The State suggested a curative instruction and argued that 

the phrase was “ambiguous.” The attorney for Moore’s co-defendant disagreed 
No. 2020AP1357-CR

3

that the phrase was ambiguous, stating it only had “negative implications” for the 

defendants. He suggested the court poll the jurors individually. Moore’s trial 

counsel stated that she believed “this is a clearly inappropriate racially-charged 

comment”; “we have 12 remaining jurors” so the case “can go forward”; but “this 

person needs to be thrown off the jury.” Because the jurors were not wearing juror 

stickers with their numbers, the court and the attorneys were uncertain if Juror 

No. 25 could identify the person who allegedly made the statement.

¶4 The trial court noted that “we all know who Juror [No.] 27 is. In the 

event that Juror [No.] 25 got the right juror, maybe we bring in Juror [No.] 27.”

The court then called Juror No. 27 from the jury room and addressed him in the 

courtroom on the record:

[THE COURT:] I received a note from one of the 

other jurors that a juror—and they thought it was 

Juror 27—made a comment that upset that juror, indicating 

a comment that they believed was made as an attempt at 

humor in the jury room about the case, quote: We’re in a 

hanging mood .... Was that you? 

JUROR NO. 27: Pardon me? 

THE COURT: Did you say to the rest of the jury 

we’re in a hanging mood? 

JUROR NO. 27: No. 

THE COURT: No, that wasn’t you? 

JUROR NO. 27: No. 

THE COURT: Did you hear anybody else say that? 

JUROR NO. 27: No. 

THE COURT: No. All right.

None of the attorneys had any questions for Juror No. 27.
No. 2020AP1357-CR

4

¶5 After sending Juror No. 27 back to the jury room, the court stated 

“Juror No. 27 indicates he hasn’t made the comment. I am going to admonish all 

the jurors to please not make any comments, and we’ll take it from there.” When 

the jurors were again seated in the courtroom, the court explained it had received a 

note from one of the jurors:

The [] note from the juror concerned me. It 

indicated that the juror was concerned that another juror 

made a comment that appeared to be very inappropriate and 

might suggest that one of the jurors is not being fair and 

impartial. I’m not sure which juror made the potential 

comment. And this juror can’t—was unable to confirm the 

juror number of the person who made the comment, so all 

I’m going to ask all of you is be careful when you’re in the 

jury room not to say anything that indicates that you 

potentially prejudged the case. 

You haven’t heard all of the evidence. Keep an 

open mind, and don’t start talking about the case or 

deliberating until 12 of you are selected after the 

deliberations begin.

¶6 After the trial court gave the curative instruction to the jurors, the 

case proceeded and the jury returned guilty verdicts on five of the six charges 

Moore faced.1 In April 2019, the court imposed a twenty-six year sentence, 

evenly bifurcated between his term of initial confinement and extended 

supervision.

 

1

 Moore was found guilty of: (1) possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance, cocaine (>5-15 grams), using a dangerous weapon, as a second or subsequent offense, 

as a party to a crime; (2) possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, heroin (>3-10 

grams), using a dangerous weapon, as a second or subsequent offense, as a party to a crime; 

(3) possession of THC as a second or subsequent offense; and (4) two counts of possession of a 

firearm by a felon with the habitual criminality repeater penalty enhancers. Moore was acquitted 

on a charge of manufacture or delivery of controlled substance, heroin (<3 grams) as a second or 

subsequent offense for an alleged controlled buy by a police confidential informant.
No. 2020AP1357-CR

5

¶7 In March 2020, Moore moved for postconviction relief on the 

grounds of juror bias and ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied 

his motion without a hearing in August 2020. Moore appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶8 Moore argues that his right to an impartial jury was violated when 

the trial court failed to identify and remove the juror who allegedly said, “we’re in 

a hangin’ mood.” He argues that the trial court’s curative instruction was 

insufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the allegedly biased juror and that we 

should grant him a new trial. Additionally, he argues that trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to further investigate and seek to 

remove the allegedly biased juror. Moore seeks a Machner2 hearing to address 

trial counsel’s performance. 

¶9 We begin with Moore’s arguments that the trial court erred in 

allowing an allegedly biased juror to serve on the deliberating jury panel. A

defendant has a constitutional right to an unbiased jury. See State v. Brunette, 220 

Wis. 2d 431, 439, 583 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998); see also WIS. STAT. § 805.08

(2019-20).

3

 The “trial court has the discretion to remove a juror for cause during a 

trial proceeding.” State v. Gonzalez, 2008 WI App 142, ¶20, 314 Wis. 2d 129, 

758 N.W.2d 153. 

 

2

 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).

3

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2020AP1357-CR

6

¶10 Moore argues that a juror who said, “we’re in a hangin’ mood” is not 

impartial or “indifferent to the case,” and must be excused pursuant to WIS. STAT.

§ 805.08(1). Moore contends that the trial court could have taken more steps to 

identify the juror who made this statement by speaking directly to Juror No. 25 or 

by polling all of the jurors. Moore asserts that the allegedly biased juror 

participated in rendering the verdict and that the juror interviewed by the trial 

court, Juror No. 27, was “probably not even the one who made the comment.” 

However, he offers no substantiation from the record for these speculative 

comments. 

¶11 “It is presumed that a properly given admonitory instruction is 

followed” by the members of the jury. See State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 673, 

370 N.W.2d 240 (1985). “Where a trial court gives the jury a curative instruction, 

the appellate court may conclude that such instruction erased any possible 

prejudice, unless the record supports the conclusion that the jury disregarded the 

trial court’s admonition.” State v. Bembenek, 111 Wis. 2d 617, 634, 331 N.W.2d 

616 (Ct. App. 1983). Here, the trial court reminded the jurors to be careful of 

what they say in the jury room and to keep an open mind. Moore, however,

ignores the law on curative instructions, offering only a broad conclusion that “the 

so[-]called curative instruction did not cure anything” and was “grossly 

insufficient[.]” Further, Moore has not raised any facts from the record, but 

instead, only offers speculation, to show that the jurors did not follow the court’s 

instructions. Absent a showing in the record that the “hangin’ mood” comment 

affected the jury’s findings, we conclude that the trial court’s curative instruction 

“erased any possible prejudice” to Moore in these proceedings. See id. 

¶12 Next we turn to Moore’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Moore argues that trial counsel failed to investigate the identity of the juror who 
No. 2020AP1357-CR

7

made the comment. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was 

prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984). “Counsel’s conduct is constitutionally deficient if it falls below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶19, 264 

Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. To satisfy the prejudice inquiry, “[t]he defendant 

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A court need not address both aspects of 

the Strickland test if the defendant does not make a sufficient showing on either 

one. See State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 128, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990).

¶13 The State contends that Moore’s counsel vigorously argued that the 

juror who made the remark should be discharged. The record reflects that trial 

counsel immediately described the comment as “clearly inappropriate” and 

“racially-charged[.]” Trial counsel argued that the person who made the comment 

was not qualified to serve on the jury and “should be thrown off[.]” However, 

after the trial court offered various ways the court and parties could address the 

issue, it heard the attorneys input, and outlined how it would proceed, including 

issuance of a curative jury instruction. Moore’s counsel objected. In our analysis 

of the trial court’s response to the allegation of juror bias, we concluded that the 

court’s exercise of discretion was reasonable. “It is not deficient performance for 

counsel not to make a pointless objection.” State v. Cameron, 2016 WI App 54, 

¶27, 370 Wis. 2d 661, 885 N.W.2d 611. Therefore, trial counsel was not deficient 

for failing to continue to object. 
No. 2020AP1357-CR

8

¶14 Because we have established that trial counsel’s performance was 

not deficient, we need not analyze prejudice. See Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 128. 

Accordingly, Moore’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 

CONCLUSION

¶15 We conclude that Moore’s claims fail. Moore has not shown that the 

jury failed to follow the trial court’s curative instruction made in response to the 

allegation of jury bias. Therefore, if there was any error in the way the trial court 

addressed the alleged juror bias claim, any possible prejudice was cured by the 

court’s curative instruction. Additionally, Moore’s claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective similarly fails. Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to pursue a 

pointless objection after the court decided to offer a curative instruction. 

Therefore, we affirm Moore’s judgment of conviction and the trial court’s order 

denying his motion for postconviction relief.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.