*This memorandum opinion supplements Dynadeck Rotary Sys. v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-382. 

T.C. Memo. 2001-113

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

 DYNADECK ROTARY SYSTEMS, LTD., 

MARTIN LETTUNICH, TAX MATTERS PARTNER, Petitioner v. 

 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent*

Docket No. 1199-99. Filed May 10, 2001.

Martin N. Lettunich, pro se.

Paul K. Webb, for respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION

LARO, Judge: Martin Lettunich (petitioner), Tax Matters

Partner of Dynadeck Rotary Systems, Ltd. (the Partnership),

timely moves the Court to reconsider Dynadeck Rotary Sys. v.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-382. See Rule 161, Tax Court Rules

of Practice and Procedure. In Dynadeck Rotary Sys. v.

Commissioner, supra, the facts and holding of which are

incorporated herein by this reference, we sustained respondent’s

determination that the Partnership had no debt during 1991 and

1992 that would allow its partners to increase their bases in the

Partnership under section 752(a). In so doing, we rejected

petitioner’s argument that $400,000 owed to the Laurel Assets

Group (LAG), an unrelated investment group, was a Partnership

debt that increased each partner’s basis in the Partnership for

those years. Petitioner acknowledged that LAG transferred the

$400,000 directly to Dynadeck Rotary Systems Incorporated

(Corporation), a partner in the Partnership, and that the

underlying promissory note listed the Corporation as the obligor. 

Petitioner asserted that the Corporation received the $400,000 as

the Partnership’s agent. We stated:

The facts of this case do not establish that the

Partnership was ever liable to repay any of that [the

$400,000] amount. The sole evidence that we find in

the record as to a debtor/creditor relationship is the

promissory note which provides clearly that the

Corporation owed the money to LAG. The note says

nothing, nor is there evidence, to support petitioner’s

claim that the Corporation executed that note as the

Partnership’s agent or that the Partnership was liable

for the note’s repayment. Nor is there any evidence of

a written agreement identifying the Corporation as the

Partnership’s agent, or evidence that the Corporation

was held out as the partnership’s agent in dealings

with LAG or another third party. See Commissioner v.

Bollinger, 485 U.S. 343, 349-350 (1988). 
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Our conclusion is supported by the fact that the

Corporation’s role in the Partnership was to secure

funds for the Partnership and that the record is barren

as to any obligation or effort on the part of the

Partnership to secure its own funds. Nor do we find

that any of the Partnership’s partners, except the

Corporation, had such an obligation. In fact, each of

the partners appears to have contributed something

unique to the Partnership. In the case of Messrs.

Schadeck and Lettunich, for example, the former

contributed his rights in the underlying patent, and

the latter contributed his legal skills and his labor. 

The Corporation expected to, and did, generate and

contribute funds to the Partnership. [Id.]

Reconsideration under Rule 161, Tax Court Rules of Practice

and Procedure, serves the limited purpose of correcting manifest

errors of fact or law, or allows for the introduction of newly

discovered evidence that could not have been introduced in the

prior proceeding by the exercise of due diligence. See Estate of

Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 440, 441-442 (1998); Lucky

Stores, Inc., & Subs. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-70, affd.

153 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1998); Estate of Scanlan v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1996-414, affd. without published opinion 116 F.3d

1476 (5th Cir. 1997). The granting of a motion for

reconsideration rests within our discretion, and we usually do

not exercise our discretion absent a showing of unusual

circumstances or substantial error. See Estate of Quick v.

Commissioner, supra at 441-442; Lucky Stores, Inc., & Subs. v.

Commissioner, supra; Estate of Scanlan v. Commissioner, supra. 

Reconsideration is not the appropriate forum for rehashing
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1 Petitioner’s motion relies, in part, on a document that

petitioner attached to his posttrial brief. The document is

entitled “Declaration of Martin N. Lettunich” and contains Mr.

Lettunich’s assertions as to his understanding of the events

surrounding the $400,000 debt. We did not and do not consider

that document (or the assertions stated therein) as evidence. 

See Rule 143(b); see also Beecroft v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

(continued...)

previously rejected arguments or tendering new legal theories to

reach the end desired by the moving party. See CWT Farms, Inc.

v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1054, 1057 (1982), affd. 755 F.2d 790

(11th Cir. 1985); Stoody v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 643 (1977);

Estate of Trenchard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-232.

Petitioner's motion and related filings do not establish any

unusual circumstance or substantial error with respect to

Dynadeck Rotary Sys. v. Commissioner, supra. Thus, petitioner is

not within the general rules for reconsideration of a Memorandum

Opinion. Petitioner has also not persuaded us that the

Partnership’s case requires us to depart from these general

rules. In his trial brief, petitioner argued that the

Corporation received the $400,000 as the Partnership’s agent. 

For the reasons stated in Dynadeck Rotary Sys. v. Commissioner,

supra, we disagreed with that argument. Petitioner now asks us

to reconsider and accept that argument. We refuse to do so. 

Petitioner has not presented any persuasive reason why we should

reconsider or change Dynadeck Rotary Sys. v. Commissioner,

supra.

1 To the extent that petitioner had wanted either to
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1(...continued)

1997-23, and the cases cited therein.

strengthen his argument or to otherwise expand on it, he should

have done so before we released Dynadeck Rotary Sys. v.

Commissioner, supra. Petitioner did not do so.

Given the absence of a persuasive reason to depart from the

general rules for reconsideration mentioned above, we refuse to

reconsider Dynadeck Rotary Sys. v. Commissioner, supra. 

Accordingly,

An appropriate order will

be issued denying petitioner's

motion.