FILED

January 5, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

NOVEMBER 1997 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9703-CR-00119

Appellee, * SHELBY COUNTY

VS. * Hon. Chris Craft, Judge

GERALD L. WEBSTER, * (Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender)

Appellant. *

For Appellant: For Appellee:

Thomas M. Veteto John Knox Walkup

Attorney Attorney General and Reporter

100 North Main Street, Suite 1922 

Memphis, TN 38103 Kenneth W. Rucker 

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Justice Division

Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor

425 Fifth Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Dan Byer

Assistant District Attorney General

201 Poplar Avenue, Third Floor

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:__________________________

AFFIRMED

GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
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OPINION

The defendant, Gerald L. Webster, was found to be a motor vehicle

habitual offender. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2)(a). The trial court barred the

defendant from operating a motor vehicle in the State of Tennessee. In this appeal

of right, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in its determination. 

We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On July 26, 1995, the state filed a petition asking that the defendant be

declared a motor vehicle habitual offender. At trial, the defendant stipulated the

evidence relied upon by the state:

(1) an October 18, 1989, conviction for driving under the

influence in the General Sessions Court of Shelby

County for an offense occurring February 15, 1989; 

(2) an October 12, 1992, conviction for driving under the

influence in the Criminal Court of Shelby County for an

offense occurring January 21, 1991; and

(3) a May 4, 1995, conviction for reckless driving in the

Criminal Court of Shelby County for an offense occurring

July 23, 1994. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401 and 55-10-205. 

The Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act defines a habitual offender

as follows:

Any person who, during a three-year period, is convicted

in a Tennessee court or courts of three (3) or more of the

following offenses; any person who, during a five-year

period, is convicted in a Tennessee court or courts of

three (3) or more of the following offenses; or any person

who, during a ten-year period, is convicted in a

Tennessee court or courts of five (5) or more of the

following offenses; provided, that if the five- or ten-year

period is used, one (1) of such offenses occurred after

July 1, 1991:

 (viii) Violation of § 55-10-401, prohibiting intoxicated or
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drugged persons from driving; 

* * *

 (xi) Violation of § 55-10-205, relative to reckless

driving.... 

* * *

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2) (Supp. 1996). 

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 55-10-604 controls as to the

computation of convictions within the prescribed time period:

(c) For the purposes of making the computation of

convictions, the date of entry of conviction in the court of

original jurisdiction shall control, except that offenses

committed during the applicable period with regard to

which convictions are imposed shall also be counted,

even though such convictions are not actually entered on

the records of the courts imposing them within the

applicable period.

(d) The start of the applicable period is the date of entry

of conviction in the court of original jurisdiction of the first

offense to be counted. 

The defendant claims that he does not qualify as a habitual offender

because the time between the earliest conviction date of October 18, 1989, and the

last conviction date, entered May 5, 1995, exceeds five years. In addition, he claims

that the sanctions within the statute should not apply because the first offense

occurred on February 15, 1989, and the last offense occurred on July 23, 1994,

more than five years apart. 

By using the computational guidelines provided in the statute, the trial

court determined that the five-year time period began on October 18, 1989, the date

of the initial conviction, and encompassed July 23, 1994, the date the last offense

was committed; the time between the first conviction and commission of last offense
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spanned an interval of only four years and nine months. Therefore, the trial court

found in favor of the state. 

The defendant claims in this appeal that the computation guidelines

conflict with the definition of habitual offender which is limited to "any person who,

during a five-year period, is convicted ... of three (3) or more" of the qualifying

offenses. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2)(A). The defendant complains that these

statutory sections create an ambiguity which should be given its most restrictive

interpretation. 

In matters of statutory construction the role of this court is to ascertain

and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 121,

124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). A basic principle of due process is that an enactment

whose prohibitions are not sufficiently defined is void for vagueness. State v.

Lakatos, 900 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Generally, the language of

a penal statute must be clear and concise to give adequate warning so that

individuals might avoid the forbidden conduct. State v. Boyd, 925 S.W.2d 237, 242-

43 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Yet, legislative enactments must be interpreted in their

natural and ordinary sense without a forced construction to either limit or expand

their meaning. State v. Thomas, 635 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tenn. 1982). Courts must

construe statutes as a whole and in conjunction with their surrounding parts; the

interpretation should be consistent with their legislative purpose. State v. Turner,

913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995). The meaning of a statute is to be determined

not from specific words in a single sentence or section but from the act in its entirety

in light of the general purpose of the legislation; any interpretations should express

the intent and purpose of the legislation. Loftin v. Langsdon, 813 S.W.2d 475, 478-

79 (Tenn. App. 1991); National Gas Distrib., Inc. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tenn.
5

1991). 

It is well established that a specific provision relating to a particular

subject controls and takes precedent over a general provision applicable to a

multitude of subjects. State v. Black, 897 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tenn. 1995). "The

special provision [is] 'deemed an exception, and the general provision [is] construed

to operate on all the subjects therein except the particular one which is the subject

of the special provision.'" State ex rel. v. Safley, 112 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tenn. 1938)

(quoting Board of Park Comm'rs v. City of Nashville, 185 S.W. 694, 698 (Tenn.

1916)). 

In our view, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-604 is the more specific statute. 

While Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603 generally addresses the three, five, and tenyear periods qualifying those subject to the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act,

the statute directing the method by which that time is specifically computed must

control. The natural and ordinary meaning of the language of Tenn. Code Ann. §

55-10-604(c) requires the time interval to begin on the date of the first qualifying

conviction; by the terms of the specific statute, any offenses committed within a

period of five years thereafter, even if no conviction takes place until later, are

included.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

________________________________

Gary R. Wade, Judge 
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CONCUR:

_____________________________

David G. Hayes, Judge

_____________________________

Joe G. Riley, Judge