# FILED

January 5, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON NOVEMBER 1997 SESSION
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9703-CR-00119 Appellee, * SHELBY COU NTY VS. * Hon. Chris Craft, Judge GERALD L. WEBSTER, * (Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender) Appellant. *

For Appellant : For Appellee : Thomas M. Veteto John Knox Walkup Attorne y Attorney General and Repor ter 100 North Main Street, Suit e 1922 Memphis, TN 38103 Kenneth W. Rucker Assistant Attorney Gener al Criminal Justice Div

ision Cordell Hull Buildi ng, Second Floor 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Dan Byer Assistant District A

ttorney General 201 Poplar Avenue, Third Fl oor Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:__________________________

AFFIRMED

GARY R. WADE, JUDGE2 OPINION The defendant, Gerald L. W ebster, was found to be a motor vehicle habitual offender. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2)(a). The trial cour t barred the defendant from operating a motor vehi cle in the State of Tennessee. In thi s appeal of right, the defendant claims that the trial court erred i n its determination.

We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial c ourt.
On July 26, 1995, the state fil ed a petition asking that th e defendant be declared a motor vehicle habitual offender. At trial, the defendant stipulated the evidence relied upon by the state: (1) an October 18, 1989, conv iction for driving under the influence in the General Sessi ons Court of Shelby County for an offense occurring February 15, 1989; (2) an October 12, 1992, conv iction for driving under the influence in the Criminal C ourt of Shelby County for an offense occurring January 2 1, 1991; and (3) a May 4, 1995, conv iction for reckless dri

ving in the Criminal Court of Shelby County for an offense occurring July 23, 1994. SeeTenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401 and 55-10- 205.

The Motor Vehicle Habitual O ffenders Act defines a habitual offender as follows: Any person who, durin g a three-year peri od, is convicted

in a Tennessee court or courts of three (3) or more of the following offenses; any per son who, during a fiv

e-year period, is convicted i n a Tennessee court or courts of three (3) or more of the follow ing offenses; or any person who, during a ten-y

ear period, is convic

ted in a Tennessee court or courts of fiv e (5) or more of the following offenses; provi ded, that if the five- or ten-y ear period is used, one (1) of suc h offenses occurred after July 1, 1991: (viii) Viol ation of § 55-10-401, prohibiting intoxicated or3 drugged persons from driv ing; * * * (xi) Violation of § 55-10-205, relative to reckless driving.... * * * Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2) (S upp. 1996).

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 55-10- 604 controls as to the computation of convictions w ithin the prescribed time period: (c) For the purposes of maki ng the computation of convictions, the date of entr y of conviction in the c

ourt of original jurisdic

tion shall control, ex

cept that offenses committed during the applicab le period with regard to which convictions

are imposed shall also be c ounted, even though such convi ctions are not actually entered on the records of the courts imposi ng them within the applicable period. (d) The start of the applicable period is the date of en try of conviction in the court of original jurisdiction of the first offense to be counted.
The defendant claims that he does not qual ify as a habitual offender because the time between the ear liest conviction date of October 18, 1989, and the last convi ction date, e ntered May 5, 1995, exc

eeds five y

ears. In add ition, he cl aims that the sanctions within the statute should not apply because the first offense occurred on February 15 , 1989, and the last offense occurred on July 23, 1994, more than five years apart

.

By using the computational guidelines provided in the statute, the trial court determined that the five- year time period began on October 18, 1989, the date of the initial conviction, and encompassed July 23, 1994, the date the last offense was committed; the time between the first conviction and commission o f last offense4 spanned an interval of only four years and nine months. Theref ore, the trial court found in favor of the state.

The defendant claims in this appeal that the computation guidelines conflict with the definiti on of habitual offender which is l imited to "any person w ho, during a five-year

period, is convicted ... of three (3) or more" of the q ualifying offenses. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10 -603(2)(A). The defendant complains that th ese statuto ry section s create a n ambigui ty which sho uld be give n its most restricti ve interpretation.

In matters of statutory construction the role of this court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the l egislature. State v. Williams , 623 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). A bas ic principle of due process is that an enactment whose prohibitions are not sufficiently defined is v oid for vagueness. State v. Lakatos , 900 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Generally, the language of a penal statute must be clear and concise to give adeq uate warning so that individuals might av

oid the forbidden conduct. State v. B oyd , 925 S.W.2d 237, 242- 43 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Yet, legislative enactments must be interprete d in their natural and ordinary sens e without a forced construc tion to either limit or e

xpand their meaning. State v. Thomas , 635 S.W.2d 114, 11 6 (Tenn. 1982). Courts must construe statutes as a wh ole and in conjunction wi th their surrounding par ts; the interpretation should be cons istent with their l egislative purpose. State v. Turner , 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995). The meaning of a statute is to be determined not from specific words in a single sentence or section but from the act in its enti rety in light of the general purpose of the legislation; any interpretations should express the intent and purpose of the legi slation. Loftin v. Langsdon , 813 S.W.2d 475, 478- 79 (Tenn. App. 1991); National Gas Distrib. , Inc. v. State , 804 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tenn.5 1991).

It is well establi shed that a specific provi sion relating to a parti cular subject controls and takes precedent over a general provision applicable

to a multitude of subjects. State v. Black , 897 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tenn. 1995). "The special provision [is] 'deemed an exception, and the general provision [is ] construed to operate on all the subjects therein except the particular one which is the subject of the special provision. '" State ex rel. v. Safley, 112 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tenn. 1938) (quoting Board of Park Comm'rs v. City of Nashville , 185 S.W. 694, 698 (Tenn. 1916)).
In our view, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-604 is the more spec ific statute. While Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603 generally addresses the three, five, and tenyear periods qualify

ing those subject to the M otor Vehicle Habitual Offenders A ct, the statute directing the method by which that time is specifically computed must control. The natural and ordi nary meaning of the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-604(c) require

s the time interval to beg in on the date of the first qualifying conviction; by the ter

ms of the specific statute, any offenses committed within a period of five years thereafter, even if no conviction takes place until later, are included.
Accordingly, the j udgment is affirmed.

________________________________ Gary R. Wade, Judge6 CONCUR:

_____________________________ David G. Hayes, Judge

_____________________________ Joe G. Riley, Judge