SUMMARY

April 18, 2019

2019COA54

Nos. 17CA0044 & 17CA0677, Lorenzen v. Pinnacol Assurance

— Labor and Industry — Workers’ Compensation; Insurance; 

Torts — Bad Faith Breach of Insurance Contract; Evidence —

Testimony by Experts

In this bad faith breach of insurance contract case, plaintiff 

sued his employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, alleging that 

the insurer’s thirteen-day delay in authorizing surgery caused his 

permanent impairment.

The plaintiff’s proffered experts relied on a theory that 

prolonged nerve compression from a herniated disc leads to nerve 

damage and, therefore, surgery must be performed sooner rather 

than later. The district court disallowed the testimony. It 

concluded that the experts’ theory was not a scientifically reliable 

theory of medical causation and that the experts’ testimony would 

require the jury to speculate as to whether the delay caused the 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
plaintiff’s impairment. Then, because the plaintiff could not prove 

his claim without expert evidence, the district court entered 

judgment in favor of the insurer.

The division concludes that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in disallowing the expert testimony. First, the division 

determines that the plaintiff had the burden to prove that but for 

the thirteen-day delay, he would not have suffered a permanent 

impairment. Second, the division concludes that the experts’ theory 

of causation did not satisfy CRE 702, because the testimony did not 

reliably connect the premise that nerve compression should be 

alleviated by prompt surgery and the conclusion that it is more 

likely than not that the thirteen-day delay in undergoing surgery 

caused the plaintiff’s permanent impairment.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA54

Court of Appeals Nos. 17CA0044 & 17CA0677

City and County of Denver District Court No. 15CV32703

Honorable Michael A. Martinez, Judge

Richard Lorenzen,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Pinnacol Assurance,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS

Taubman and Rothenberg*, JJ., concur

Announced April 18, 2019

Bisset Law Firm, Jennifer E. Bisset, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Vaughan & DeMuro, David R. DeMuro, Richard K. Rediger, Denver, Colorado, 

for Defendant-Appellee

The Gold Law Firm, LLC, Michael J. Rosenberg, Greenwood Village, Colorado, 

for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. 

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2018.
1

¶ 1 In this bad faith breach of an insurance contract case, 

plaintiff, Richard Lorenzen, sued defendant, Pinnacol Assurance,

his employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, after Pinnacol 

initially denied his request for surgery to treat a work-related 

injury. Pinnacol’s denial resulted in a thirteen-day delay between 

the date of the request and the date Lorenzen underwent surgery. 

¶ 2 Before trial, Lorenzen disclosed four doctors as experts who 

intended to opine that the delay in approving the request caused 

Lorenzen to suffer permanent nerve damage. The experts relied on 

a theory that prolonged nerve compression from a herniated disc 

leads to nerve damage and, therefore, surgery must be performed 

sooner rather than later. As one of the doctors explained the 

theory, “timing matters.”

¶ 3 The district court concluded that the theory relied on by the 

doctors — for patients with a disc herniation causing neurological 

deficits, prompt surgery is preferable to delayed surgery to preserve 

nerve function — was not a scientifically reliable theory of medical 

causation and disallowed the expert testimony. Without his 

experts’ testimony, Lorenzen could not prove causation or damages, 
2

and so the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Pinnacol.1 

¶ 4 On appeal, Lorenzen contends that the district court erred in 

excluding his expert testimony. He maintains that the court 

imposed too stringent a causation standard and that, even under 

the standard applied by the court, he presented a reliable and 

relevant theory of causation that satisfies CRE 702. 

¶ 5 Lorenzen also contends that the district court erred in entering 

judgment for Pinnacol, as he retained a claim for noneconomic 

damages that did not require expert testimony.

¶ 6 We reject his contentions and therefore affirm. 

I. Background

A. Factual Background

 

1 Pinnacol filed a “Motion to Dismiss Complaint Based on Rulings 

on Expert Testimony” but failed to cite the governing procedural 

rule or applicable standard of proof. The district court construed 

the motion as a motion for summary judgment and reviewed it 

under C.R.C.P. 56, then entered an order granting the motion to 

dismiss. Like the district court, we construe Pinnacol’s motion as a 

motion for summary judgment, and we refer to the court’s order as 

an order granting summary judgment in favor of Pinnacol. 
3

¶ 7 On February 3, 2014, while Lorenzen was working as a 

groundskeeper for a country club, he injured his back and suffered 

a herniated disc with an extruded caudally migrated fragment.2 

Lorenzen’s employer reported the injury to Pinnacol the next day. 

¶ 8 Lorenzen was referred to Dr. Tracey Stefanon. She placed 

Lorenzen on work restriction, recommended over-the-counter antiinflammatories, ordered an MRI, and referred Lorenzen to an 

orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Douglas Beard. 

¶ 9 On February 6, Dr. Beard advised Lorenzen that he would 

likely need surgery, but, because Lorenzen wanted to avoid surgery 

if possible, Dr. Beard prescribed steroids with further monitoring. 

Lorenzen returned to Dr. Beard on February 10, still experiencing 

pain and foot weakness, and they decided that Lorenzen should 

have surgery as soon as possible. 

¶ 10 Lorenzen spoke with a claims adjuster on February 12 and 

discovered that Dr. Beard had not submitted a request for 

 

2 According to the deposition testimony of Drs. Beard and Biggs, a 

caudally migrated disc extrusion occurs when the outer part of the 

spinal disc ruptures, causing the inner material to push “completely 

outside” of the disc. In Lorenzen’s case, the material protruded 

downward, pressing on the nerve.
4

authorization of the surgery. He called Dr. Beard’s office with a 

reminder to submit the request to Pinnacol, and Dr. Beard faxed a 

request to Pinnacol marked “urgent.” According to Dr. Beard, an 

urgent request does not denote an emergency. 

¶ 11 On February 17, Pinnacol verbally advised Lorenzen that it 

would not authorize surgery, and the next day, it formally denied 

his request on the ground that Lorenzen’s injury was not work

related.

¶ 12 On February 20, Lorenzen, now proceeding under his private 

health insurance, consulted with Dr. William Biggs, an orthopedic 

surgeon, and Dr. Biggs performed the surgery on February 25. 

After the surgery, Lorenzen continued to experience right foot 

weakness due to permanent nerve impairment. 

¶ 13 On June 20, 2014, Pinnacol changed its position and 

determined that Lorenzen’s injury was work related. It reimbursed 

him for his medical costs and paid other workers’ compensation 

benefits.

B. Procedural History

¶ 14 Lorenzen filed this action against Pinnacol, asserting a claim 

for bad faith breach of an insurance contract. He alleged that “[a]s 
5

a result of the delay in receipt of surgical intervention, Lorenzen has 

permanent weakness and loss of control over his foot with loss of 

strength and stability, which affects his work, his activities of daily 

living and his hobbies . . . .”

¶ 15 In support of his claim, Lorenzen disclosed four medical 

experts (Drs. Stefanon, Beard, and Biggs, and Dr. Rebeka Martin) 

who intended to opine that the delay in authorizing surgical 

intervention for Lorenzen resulted in his permanent nerve damage.

¶ 16 Pinnacol filed a pretrial motion to exclude the experts’ 

testimony on the issue of medical causation, contending that their 

opinions were not scientifically reliable and were therefore 

inadmissible at trial. 

¶ 17 The district court held a hearing on the motion at which it 

reviewed the deposition testimony and heard argument from 

counsel. None of the doctors testified at the hearing. Thereafter, 

the district court made detailed findings and issued an order 

disallowing the doctors from testifying at trial that the thirteen-day 

delay caused by Pinnacol resulted in Lorenzen’s permanent 

impairment.
6

¶ 18 Pinnacol then moved for summary judgment, arguing that 

without the expert testimony, Lorenzen could not prove his bad 

faith claim. Lorenzen responded by filing a motion to reconsider the 

order prohibiting his experts’ testimony. He attached to his motion 

additional ex parte “deposition” testimony of Dr. Beard and an

affidavit by Dr. Martin. His motion for reconsideration continued to 

assert the theory that prompt surgical intervention is generally 

indicated for patients suffering from nerve compression, but it also 

raised a new theory of causation.3 

¶ 19 The district court denied Lorenzen’s motion for 

reconsideration, denied as moot Pinnacol’s motion to strike the 

 

3 We will not address the arguments raised for the first time in 

Lorenzen’s motion for reconsideration or consider the new evidence 

submitted with that motion. See Fox v. Alfini, 2018 CO 94, ¶ 37 

(neither district court nor appellate court is obliged to consider new 

arguments and evidence submitted in motions to reconsider); 

People v. Schaufele, 2014 CO 43, ¶ 49 (Boatright, J., concurring in 

the judgment) (“Motions for reconsideration are designed to correct 

erroneous court rulings; they are not designed to allow parties to 

present new legal arguments for the first time and then appeal their 

denial to” an appellate court.); McDonald v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, 

N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 85 (in reviewing grant of summary judgment, 

appellate court will not consider arguments and evidence that were 

not presented to the trial court in connection with the motion for 

summary judgment). 
7

doctors’ new testimony, and granted Pinnacol’s motion for summary 

judgment. 

II. Exclusion of Expert Evidence on Causation 

¶ 20 Lorenzen argues that the district court applied an overly 

stringent but-for causation test rather than a more lenient 

“substantial factor” test. But in any event, he says, his expert 

evidence satisfies a but-for test and, therefore, the district court 

erred in excluding the experts’ testimony. We disagree.

A. The Applicable Standard of Causation

¶ 21 The issue of the correct standard of causation is a legal one. 

Reigel v. SavaSeniorCare L.L.C., 292 P.3d 977, 985 (Colo. App. 

2011). Therefore, our review of that issue is de novo. Id. 

¶ 22 To prevail on a common law claim of bad faith breach of an 

insurance contract, the plaintiff must prove that the insurer acted 

unreasonably and that the insurer’s unreasonable conduct caused 

the plaintiff’s injury or damages. See Bankr. Estate of Morris v. 

COPIC Ins. Co., 192 P.3d 519, 523 (Colo. App. 2008). 

¶ 23 Damages for bad faith breach of an insurance contract are 

based on traditional tort principles. City of Westminster v. CentricJones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472, 484 (Colo. App. 2003). Under 
8

traditional tort principles, the plaintiff must show that the 

defendant’s conduct “proximately caused” the claimed injury. 

Reigel, 292 P.3d at 985; see also June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 

F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2009) (“In Colorado, as elsewhere, a 

party seeking recovery in tort must demonstrate that the 

defendant’s conduct caused the alleged injury.”).

¶ 24 Proximate cause has two components: causation in fact and 

legal causation. Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 436 (Colo. 

App. 2007). Legal causation — which refers to the scope or 

foreseeability of liability, see June, 577 F.3d at 1240 — is not at 

issue here; Lorenzen only challenges the test for causation in fact.

¶ 25 As to causation in fact, the test is “whether, but for the alleged 

[tortious conduct], the harm would not have occurred.” Reigel, 292 

P.3d at 985 (quoting N. Colo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm. on 

Anticompetitive Conduct, 914 P.2d 902, 908 (Colo. 1996)). 

Alternatively, the plaintiff can show factual causation by 

establishing that the defendant’s conduct was a “necessary 

component of a causal set that would have caused the injury.” Id.

at 987; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(1), (2) (Am. 

Law Inst. 1965). Thus, Lorenzen had to present evidence that, but 
9

for the thirteen-day delay between the request for authorization and 

the surgery, the permanent nerve damage would not have occurred,

or that the delay was a necessary component of a causal set that 

would have caused his impairment. 

¶ 26 Relying on Sharp v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado, 

710 P.2d 1153 (Colo. App. 1985), aff’d, 741 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1987), 

Lorenzen argues that he could instead establish causation under 

the “substantial factor” test by showing that Pinnacol’s conduct was 

a substantial factor in increasing the risk that he would have a less 

optimal surgical outcome. 

¶ 27 In Sharp, the division held that the jury could decide 

causation where the plaintiff presented expert testimony that the 

defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing the injury 

in that it “substantially increased plaintiff’s risk of the resulting 

harm or substantially diminished the chance of recovery.” 710 P.2d 

at 1155. On review, the supreme court did not reach the issue of 

whether the substantial factor theory was a cognizable, less 

stringent standard of causation because the court concluded that 

the plaintiff had met her burden to show but-for causation. Sharp, 

741 P.2d at 720.
10

¶ 28 However, as the Tenth Circuit explained in June, the 

“substantial factor” and but-for standards of causation are not 

alternatives; but-for causation is a prerequisite to establishing the 

substantial factor test. 577 F.3d at 1241. 

¶ 29 In explaining the substantial factor test, section 432 of the 

Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Sharp division did not 

consider, imposes a causation requirement at least as stringent as 

the but-for standard consistently applied by our supreme court:

(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the 

actor’s negligent conduct is not a substantial 

factor in bringing about harm to another if the 

harm would have been sustained even if the 

actor had not been negligent.

(2) If two forces are actively operating, one 

because of the actor’s negligence, the other not 

because of any misconduct on his part, and 

each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm 

to another, the actor’s negligence may be 

found to be a substantial factor in bringing it 

about.

Thus, “the allegedly negligent conduct of the defendant must 

satisfy” a but-for test “before it can even qualify as a substantial 

factor under the other Restatement sections.” Reigel, 292 P.3d at 

987. 
11

¶ 30 Regardless of Lorenzen’s theory of liability — that the thirteenday delay between the request for authorization and the surgery 

caused his impairment or increased his risk of permanent 

impairment or aggravated a preexisting condition — he had to show 

that (1) but for the delay, the injury (or the increased risk or the 

aggravation) would not have occurred; or (2) the delay was a 

necessary component of a causal set that would have caused the 

injury. Id. 

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding 

Lorenzen’s Expert Testimony Concerning Causation

¶ 31 Lorenzen next contends that, even if he had to prove but-for 

causation, he presented expert evidence that the thirteen-day delay 

in performing surgery caused his permanent impairment, and the 

district court erred in excluding the evidence under CRE 702. 

1. The Experts’ Testimony

a. Dr. Biggs

¶ 32 Dr. Biggs performed Lorenzen’s surgery. He testified at his 

deposition that five days of the two-week delay — from February 20, 

when he first saw Lorenzen, to February 25, when he performed the 

surgery — did not have “any detrimental effect [o]n the outcome.” 
12

¶ 33 When asked about his anticipated testimony concerning the 

effect of the delay in surgery on Lorenzen’s nerve damage, Dr. Biggs 

testified:

A: If you wait too long, you can end up with a 

permanent injury. Now, the waiting too long 

part is always the question mark. We don’t 

have good data to tell us what’s too long and 

what’s not. 

. . . .

Q: “[Your report says that you] will testify that 

it was not helpful to the patient to wait two 

weeks for surgery.” What will you say about 

that?

A: That’s a tough one. You know, that’s kind 

of the sooner the better sort of thing, but 

there’s no proof in the literature about that.

Q: “The wait from February 10, 2014, to 

February 25, 2014, was costly to the patient’s 

nerve function.” What would your testimony 

be about that?

A: It’s maybe in hindsight we can say that he’s 

had no nerve functional recovery or not much. 

But it’s hard to say that from – at the time of 

the injury.

Q: It’s also hard to attribute that to a two-week 

delay in surgery, isn’t it?

A: Yes.

. . . .
13

Q: And also, in his specific case, can you really 

say that having surgery two weeks earlier 

would have resulted in a better outcome?

. . . .

A: For him specifically, no, we can’t say that.

¶ 34 With respect to what he referred to as the “sooner is better” 

theory, Dr. Biggs recalled that he had seen articles that “supported 

doing surgery sooner rather than later with progressive neurologic 

injuries.” However, he acknowledged that he did not know of any 

“good studies” to support the theory and that the “sooner is better” 

theory “may be more our dogma.” 

¶ 35 When asked if “Lorenzen’s best chance of a recovery from this 

[injury] was early or shortly after his injury,” Dr. Biggs replied, “I’m 

not sure I can answer that. . . . I don’t know.” He explained that 

“there’s just no way of saying whether the nerve injury happened at 

the time of the injury or whether it happened during the first three 

weeks. The vast majority of people, if you leave the pressure on 

there for too long, it will continue to get worse and cause more of an 

issue.” Dr. Biggs was asked whether that had “happen[ed] for Mr. 

Lorenzen?” He replied, “I don’t know.”

b. Dr. Stefanon
14

¶ 36 Dr. Stefanon was Lorenzen’s initial treating doctor. She 

testified that the majority of people with herniated discs “tend to 

recover without surgery,” and that in most cases (even where 

patients showed symptoms similar to Lorenzen’s), it was reasonable 

to monitor a patient for four to six weeks prior to performing 

surgery.

¶ 37 Dr. Stefanon opined that “the longer the pressure is on the 

nerve, the increased risk for damage to the nerve,” but she agreed 

with Dr. Biggs that there is no “good data” on “what’s too long and 

what is not.” She testified that surgery “sooner is better” in a 

“progressive situation,” but she could not cite any peer-reviewed 

articles that would support that position. She looked for articles 

about the timing of surgery — “when nerve root damage was likely 

to occur” or whether “there was a neurological level that generally 

people were sent to surgery” — but she “did not find anything.” 

¶ 38 Like Dr. Biggs, she could not say one way or the other whether 

a three-week delay in undergoing surgery would have had any 

adverse effect on the outcome. When asked if she “believe[d] that 

some of the damage that Mr. Lorenzen currently faces could have 
15

been headed off with a more timely surgery,” she replied, “I would 

be speculating.”

c. Dr. Martin

¶ 39 Dr. Martin is a physiatrist who treated Lorenzen after his 

surgery. She testified that she had reviewed articles indicating that 

early surgical intervention was most helpful for “someone that has 

moderate weakness” after injury and that she would place Lorenzen 

in the “moderate” category. Thus, she opined that surgery 

performed sooner would have been better in Lorenzen’s case. 

¶ 40 At the same time, she agreed with Dr. Biggs that it was 

difficult to know whether the thirteen-day delay affected Lorenzen’s 

surgical outcome because any conclusion would be based on the 

“sooner the better” theory for which “there is no proof in the 

literature.” She also agreed that waiting too long for surgery could 

result in permanent nerve damage but that there was no good data 

to establish “what is too long and what is not.”

¶ 41 When asked whether Lorenzen would be “better today if 

surgery had been performed earlier,” she responded, “The hope 

would be that there would be more rapid and more complete

myotomal recovery, so that he would have more strength.” But she 
16

acknowledged that any prediction in that respect was “just an 

assumption,” and that she could not rule out that Lorenzen “would 

have had the same outcome if surgery had occurred earlier.” 

¶ 42 Dr. Martin summed up her causation theory in this way: “The 

best way to put it is time is nerve. The longer you wait, the more 

potential nerve damage and changes that can occur.”

d. Dr. Beard

¶ 43 Dr. Beard testified that Lorenzen’s nerve impairment could 

have been caused by (1) the delay in surgery; (2) an injury during 

the surgical procedure; or (3) the original disc herniation on 

February 3, 2014.

¶ 44 He agreed with Dr. Biggs that the five-day delay in scheduling 

the surgery (between February 20 and 25, 2014) would not have 

had any adverse effect on its outcome, but, for reasons he did not 

explain, he theorized that the two-day delay in submitting the 

request for authorization (between February 10 and 12, 2014) might 

have resulted in increased nerve damage. 

¶ 45 Dr. Beard stated that “had [Lorenzen] been able to receive 

surgical intervention in a more timely fashion, it is entirely possible 

that the earlier intervention might have led to less long-term 
17

damage,” though he admitted that it was also possible that the 

surgery “wouldn’t have done any good at all,” and that even if the 

surgery “had been performed on February 6, 2014,” it was possible 

that Lorenzen “could have ended up with the same outcome as he 

has now.”

¶ 46 According to Dr. Beard, “there is pretty good data out there” to 

support a “sooner is better” theory: “[T]here are many articles that 

talk about the shorter the duration of the palsy, the less likely there 

is to be permanent nerve deficit.” On the basis of those articles, he 

believed that “if surgery had been performed sooner, it would have 

been better than surgery performed later.” As he explained it:

There are some things which kind of 

inherently, common sensibly seem to make 

sense. And I would postulate that most of the 

doctors that are involved in this case, if they 

walked into a doctor’s office with as profound 

of a foot drop as Mr. Lorenzen had, they would 

want to have that piece of disc taken off their 

nerve root.

It is a reasonable thing to do. Because it is 

nonanatomic. There was clearly a change in 

the anatomy. And by changing that anatomy 

faster, we make it more likely that the nerve 

can recover. 

Now, if you want to say what is that timing 

down to the day and the moment, I can’t give it 
18

to you. I would agree that there is going to be 

a substantial error rate there. But common 

sense would lead us to believe that the faster 

we reverse the abnormal anatomy, the more 

likely it is that the nerve can have a chance to 

recover.

Are there going to be those that aren’t going to 

recover? Absolutely, I grant you that. Is Mr. 

Lorenzen one of those? We’ll never know. 

2. CRE 702

¶ 47 CRE 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It 

provides as follows: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 

to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 

thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”

¶ 48 To be admissible under Rule 702, scientific evidence, including 

medical evidence, must be both reliable and relevant. People v. 

Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 378 (Colo. 2007).

¶ 49 A trial court determines whether the testimony is reliable and 

relevant by considering whether (1) the scientific principles 

underlying the testimony are reasonably reliable; (2) the expert is 

qualified to opine on such matters; (3) the expert testimony will be 
19

helpful to the jury; and (4) the evidence satisfies CRE 403. Estate of 

Ford v. Eicher, 250 P.3d 262, 266 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 50 The court’s reliability inquiry should be broad in nature and 

consider the totality of the circumstances of the specific case. 

Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 378. The standard for admissibility is 

reliability, not certainty. Estate of Ford, 250 P.3d at 266. Thus, the 

proponent need not prove that the expert is indisputably correct. 

Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 378. Rather, reliability analysis under Rule 

702 hinges on whether the scientific principles the expert employed 

are grounded in the methods and procedures of science. Estate of 

Ford, 250 P.3d at 267. If so, the testimony meets the reliability 

requirement. 

¶ 51 A court may reject expert testimony that relies on bare 

assertions, subjective belief, or unsupported speculation. Id. The 

danger of speculative opinion testimony that has no sound scientific 

basis is that “what appears to be scientific testimony but is really 

not may carry more weight with the jury than it deserves.” Ramirez, 

155 P.3d at 379.

¶ 52 To determine relevancy under CRE 702, the court should 

consider whether the expert testimony would be useful to the fact 
20

finder. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001). Usefulness 

hinges on whether there is a logical relation between the proffered 

testimony and the factual issues involved in the case. Ramirez, 155 

P.3d at 379. In determining whether the testimony will be helpful 

to the fact finder, the court should consider, among other things, 

the elements of the particular claim and the scope and content of 

the opinion itself. Id.

3. The District Court’s Ruling and Standard of Review

¶ 53 The district court found that the “sooner is better” theory of 

causation was not “sufficiently grounded in reliable science,” had 

“no prior history of adoption or consideration or approval by other 

courts,” and had not been “subjected to sufficient peer review or 

study” to allow the court to assess the theory’s reliability. Thus, the 

expert evidence would require the jury to “speculate as to whether 

and to what extent the delay . . . caused the current presentation by 

Mr. Lorenzen.”

¶ 54 The district court concluded that the experts’ testimony would 

not be helpful to the jury in evaluating whether the thirteen-day 

delay between Lorenzen’s request for authorization of surgery and 

the surgery caused his impairment.
21

¶ 55 In civil cases, where the constitutional right to present a 

defense is not implicated, we review the district court’s decision to 

exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Core-Mark 

Midcontinent, Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 2012 COA 120, ¶ 29. We will not 

disturb the decision unless it is manifestly erroneous or based on 

an incorrect legal standard. Id. Even where a ruling excluding 

expert testimony is “outcome determinative” and the basis for a 

grant of summary judgment, our review is no less deferential. Gen. 

Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997). 

4. The Experts’ Theory of Causation Does Not Satisfy CRE 702’s 

Reliability and Relevancy Requirements

¶ 56 Lorenzen summarizes his experts’ theory of causation as 

follows: “Lorenzen’s treating physicians all agree that when nerve 

compression lasts too long[,] it can result in permanent neurological 

injury[;] therefore surgery must be performed sooner rather than 

later.” Thus, Lorenzen says, “[t]here is no basis to categorically 

reject as a matter of law, the indications for surgery, including the 

well-recognized principle in medicine that ‘sooner is better than 

later’ for treatment of acute disc herniations causing nerve 

compression.”
22

¶ 57 But Lorenzen has to prove that the thirteen-day delay in his 

case caused the “specific ailment of which [he] complain[s]”— nerve 

damage resulting in permanent impairment to his right foot. June, 

577 F.3d at 1245-46. 

¶ 58 As Dr. Beard explained, the “sooner is better than later” theory

amounts to a common sense and universal axiom that expedited 

treatment is preferable to delayed treatment, particularly in cases 

involving a disc herniation causing nerve compression. That axiom 

is undoubtedly sound, but it is not a theory of causation. See 

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(“[T]he notion of early treatment is well within common knowledge 

that would be obvious to the average juror, but [it] has nothing to 

do with causation.”). A general principle or axiom does not explain 

the cause of an injury in a particular case. Id. at 1300 (“[T]his ‘the 

earlier, the better’ theory adds nothing absent some testimony 

connecting the delay to the causation or aggravation of an injury.”). 

¶ 59 Tomlinson v. Collins, No. 2:09-cv-0125, 2010 WL 4317030 

(S.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2010) (unpublished report and 

recommendation), adopted, 2011 WL 478835 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 

2011) (unpublished opinion), is instructive. There, the plaintiff
23

injured his neck while he was an inmate in a state prison. Though 

he complained to various prison staff about his deteriorating 

condition, he did not receive treatment until his release, nearly 

seven months after the injury. By then, he was diagnosed with a 

displaced disc with compression and damage to the spinal cord. 

Surgery alleviated some of his symptoms but left him with 

numbness or pain in his hands, forearm, and neck. Id. at *1-3. 

¶ 60 Plaintiff offered two medical experts to establish causation. 

The first doctor testified that he believed “that prolonged neural 

compression is more likely to result in permanent defect than had 

the patient been diagnosed and treated sooner.” Id. at *6. The 

second doctor testified, similarly, that “the delay in surgery 

certainly could lead to residuals that may have been prevented by 

earlier surgical intervention.” Id.

¶ 61 The defendants moved to strike the experts’ testimony under 

Fed. R. Evid. 702, which is substantially similar to CRE 702. The 

district court granted the motion. Characterizing the experts’ 

theories as a variation of “the earlier, the better” theory rejected in 

McDowell, the court explained that the problem with this theory is 

that it does not go to causation:
24

The general proposition that prolonged neural 

compression is more likely to result in a 

permanent defect than had a patient been 

diagnosed and treated sooner says nothing 

about whether the delay in this specific 

plaintiff’s diagnosis and treatment actually 

caused his residual symptoms, and that — not 

the more general relationship between delays 

in treatment and the presence of preventable 

residual injury — is what is at issue here. A 

jury would not be entitled to find on the basis 

of these opinions that the delay in treating 

[plaintiff’s] medical condition actually caused 

him any harm.

Id. at *7. 

¶ 62 We agree with McDowell, Tomlinson, and the other courts that 

have evaluated the theory4 and have concluded that, on its own, a

 

4 See Estate of Anderson v. Strohman, Civ. A. No. GLR-13-3167, 

2016 WL 4013638, at *9 (D. Md. July 27, 2016) (excluding as 

unreliable the plaintiff’s expert’s theory of causation that “earlier 

treatment is preferable to later treatment”); Dishman v. Wise, Civ. A. 

No. 7:08-cv-45 (HL), 2009 WL 1938968, at *5 (M.D. Ga. July 7, 

2009) (a “mere guess” that earlier treatment would have improved 

plaintiff’s condition “simply fails the tests for expert opinion”

(quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1301 (11th Cir. 

2004))); Maudsley v. Pederson, 676 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Minn. Ct. App. 

2004) (“The conclusory statements that generally earlier treatment 

results in better outcomes” fail to explain “how and why” 

defendant’s delay in treatment caused plaintiff’s injury.). 

Two cases cited by Lorenzen — O’Neill v. Van Herpe, 956 F.2d 263 

(4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), and 
25

principle that early treatment is preferable to later treatment is not 

a viable theory of causation. 

¶ 63 That is not to say, as Lorenzen seems to suggest, that nothing 

short of expert testimony identifying the precise moment that 

Lorenzen’s nerve damage became irreparable is sufficient under 

Rule 702. Instead, what is necessary is evidence that would allow a 

jury to find that, but for the delay, Lorenzen would not have 

suffered the impairment. 

¶ 64 The line between impermissible speculation and reliable 

medical opinion is illustrated in Bentley v. Highlands Hospital Corp., 

Civ. No. 15-97-ART, 2016 WL 7446910 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 27, 2016), on 

which Lorenzen primarily relies. The plaintiff in that case arrived at 

the emergency room with symptoms suggesting a serious problem 

with her spinal cord, but the emergency room doctor misdiagnosed 

 

Prosser v. Nagaldinne, 927 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Mo. 2013) — do 

not address the reliability of the “sooner is better than later” theory. 

And, contrary to Lorenzen’s argument, the special concurrence in 

Adams v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 760 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 

2014) (per curiam), did not “back away from” McDowell, 392 F.3d 

1283. Adams involved expert testimony on the standard of care, 

not on causation, and the concurrence cited McDowell with 

approval. 
26

her and discharged her. Id. at *1. Her condition worsened, and by 

the time she arrived at a second hospital later the next day, she had 

lost motor control in both legs and was having trouble breathing. 

Id. After discovering inflammation on the plaintiff’s spinal cord, 

doctors at the second hospital treated her with intravenous 

steroids, which stopped the symptoms from progressing but did not 

reverse the loss of motor control. The plaintiff suffered permanent 

paralysis from the chest down. Id. 

¶ 65 She sued the first hospital and the emergency room doctor for 

negligently failing to diagnose and treat her emerging neurological 

condition. Id. at *2. Her experts, two doctors, opined that earlier 

administration of steroids could have prevented her paralysis. Id. 

The defendants moved to exclude the testimony as too speculative 

because, while administration of intravenous steroids was 

indisputably the proper treatment, there was no evidence, they 

said, that the injury would have been avoided if the drugs had been

administered earlier. Id. at *4. 

¶ 66 The district court distinguished the proposed expert testimony 

from the “generic medical testimony that ‘earlier treatment is 

better’” that has been routinely rejected by courts. Id. at *9. The 
27

district court acknowledged that evidence of the anti-inflammatory 

properties of steroids would have been insufficient to justify the 

doctors’ conclusions that steroids would have helped the plaintiff. 

Id. at *7. But the district court concluded that the doctors could 

testify more precisely — based on reliable medical principles, 

scientific literature, and their clinical experiences — that (1) if a 

patient has motor control or sensory function, the corresponding 

nerves have not yet been fully destroyed and there is more function 

left to preserve; (2) patients treated with intravenous steroids while 

they still have motor control and/or sensation overwhelmingly have

good or fair outcomes; (3) they examined the plaintiff and her 

medical records and observed that she still had motor control and 

sensation in her lower extremities when she left the first hospital; 

and (4) the record demonstrated that intravenous steroids did help 

the plaintiff, but they came too late to save much of her 

neurological function. Id. at *6-7.

¶ 67 As the court explained in Bentley, the doctors started with the 

general premise that steroids combat inflammation and they 

connected that premise to a conclusion through a series of 

principles and inferences based on their medical knowledge 
28

(informed by the scientific literature), their clinical experiences, and 

their review of the medical records. They observed that the plaintiff

had inflammation to her spinal cord; inflammation damages nerve 

tissue; steroids counteract the inflammatory process by inhibiting 

the production of white blood cells; if introduced early enough, 

steroids can accomplish that task before the immune system 

pushes the nerve cells beyond the point of repair; and “early 

enough” means while the patient still has motor control or sensory 

function, an indication the patient’s nerves are not yet destroyed. 

The doctors observed that the plaintiff still had motor control or 

sensory function when she left the first hospital, as evidenced by 

her ability to walk, and, therefore, the introduction of intravenous 

steroids at the first hospital would more likely than not have 

minimized the plaintiff’s paralysis. Based on these facts, the 

district court in Bentley ruled that the doctors had “good grounds” 

for reaching their conclusion regarding causation. Id. at *9. 

¶ 68 In contrast, Lorenzen’s expert testimony left significant gaps 

between his premise that nerve compression should be alleviated by 

prompt surgery and his conclusion that it is more likely than not 

the thirteen-day delay in undergoing surgery caused his permanent 
29

nerve damage. Unlike the doctors in Bentley, Lorenzen’s experts 

did not have “good grounds” to opine, with a reasonable degree of 

certainty, that surgery at any point before February 25, 2014, 

would have been “early enough” to prevent or minimize Lorenzen’s 

impairment. 

¶ 69 Dr. Biggs, the surgeon, admitted that “there’s no way of 

knowing if [Lorenzen’s] permanent nerve injury happened at the 

time of his injury or it happened at day 2 or day 6 or day 12 or day 

whatever it was, 14, 16, 18.” Thus, he could not say when surgery 

would have been “early enough” to make any difference at all, and

neither could any of the other doctors. 

¶ 70 Testimony does not assist the trier of fact unless there is a 

“justified scientific relationship” (a “fit”) between the opinion 

testimony and the facts of the case. McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1299. 

There is no “fit” where “a large analytical leap must be made 

between the facts and the opinion.” Id. 

¶ 71 The cited medical literature proffered by Lorenzen did not fill 

in the analytical gaps. The district court found that the proffered 

articles were “not factually consistent with the issues in this case” 
30

and did not support a conclusion that a thirteen-day delay in 

undergoing surgery was likely to cause irreparable nerve damage. 

¶ 72 Lorenzen directs us to two of the articles representative of 

those submitted to the district court: a 2014 article discussing the 

results of a study comparing surgical versus nonsurgical treatment 

for lumbar disc herniation (the SPORT study), Jon D. Lurie et al., 

Surgical Versus Nonoperative Treatment for Lumbar Disc Herniation, 

39 SPINE 3 (2014), and a 2002 article discussing the results of a 

study comparing recovery outcomes of patients who underwent 

surgery somewhere between a few weeks and several months after 

the initial injury (the Postacchini article), Franco Postacchini et al., 

Rediscovery of Motor Deficits After Microdiscectomy for Lumbar Disc 

Herniation, 84-B J. Bone & Joint Surgery 1040 (2002).

¶ 73 The SPORT study does not support any theory of causation 

relevant to this case. That patients who undergo surgery do better 

than those who receive nonsurgical treatment is not probative 

because Lorenzen underwent surgery. 

¶ 74 The Postacchini article is more on point. Of the patients in 

that study who exhibited severe deficits before surgery, those who 

underwent surgery most quickly — within one month of the initial 
31

injury — had a complete recovery, whereas most patients who 

underwent surgery after seventy days from the date of injury had 

an incomplete recovery of muscle strength. But Lorenzen 

underwent surgery within a month of his initial injury, so, 

according to the study, the timing of his surgery should have helped 

him. What Lorenzen needed to support his theory of causation was 

a study or article showing that surgery performed earlier than his 

surgery led to better outcomes in some group of patients. But he 

did not submit any such study.

¶ 75 We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district 

court’s determination that the cited articles did not render the 

experts’ testimony reliable. 

¶ 76 In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in disallowing the experts’ testimony because it would 

not have assisted the jury in determining whether Pinnacol’s delay 

in authorizing surgery caused Lorenzen’s permanent impairment.

III. Entry of Judgment for Pinnacol

¶ 77 Lorenzen concedes that, without his expert testimony, he 

cannot prove that Pinnacol’s delay in approving surgery caused his 

physical impairment or damages related to the impairment. Still, 
32

he contends that the district court erred in entering judgment for 

Pinnacol because he retained a separate claim for noneconomic 

damages based on the anxiety, stress, and inconvenience 

associated with Pinnacol’s initial denial of benefits. 

¶ 78 Pinnacol argues that Lorenzen pleaded a single claim for 

damages based on Pinnacol’s bad faith delay in authorizing surgery, 

and that the complaint did not provide notice of any other claim for 

noneconomic damages.

¶ 79 Although the district court did not address this issue, whether 

Lorenzen pleaded a claim for noneconomic damages unrelated to 

his physical injury is a question of law that we review de novo. See

Eliminator, Inc. v. 4700 Holly Corp., 681 P.2d 536, 539 (Colo. App. 

1984). Thus, a remand is unnecessary. 

¶ 80 The purpose of a complaint is to provide the defendant with 

“reasonable notice of the general nature of the matter presented.” 

DiChellis v. Peterson Chiropractic Clinic, 630 P.2d 103, 105 (Colo. 

App. 1981). If the complaint identifies the transaction that forms 

the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, it provides reasonable notice. 

Denny Constr., Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 170 P.3d 733, 736 

(Colo. App. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 199 P.3d 742 (Colo. 
33

2009). However, while the complaint need not list all examples of 

defendant’s misconduct, it must at least give the defendant 

sufficient notice of the basis of the claim so that the defendant can 

use the discovery rules to prevent any surprise at trial. See 

Southerland v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 794 P.2d 1102, 1105-06 (Colo. 

App. 1990).

¶ 81 Here, even construing Lorenzen’s complaint liberally and 

resolving all doubts in his favor, we cannot conclude that it 

contained a claim for noneconomic injuries unrelated to the 

physical impairment. Denny Constr., 170 P.3d at 736. 

¶ 82 The complaint alleged that, “[a]s a result of the delay in receipt 

of surgical intervention, Lorenzen has permanent weakness and 

loss of control over his foot with loss of strength and stability, which 

affects his work, his activities of daily living and his hobbies, 

including motorcycle trips with his wife and friends.” Lorenzen 

identified his “damages and losses” as “permanent physical 

impairment; disfigurement; unnecessary pain and suffering and 

emotional distress; unnecessary financial hardship; and the 

possibility of future economic losses” based on possible 

unemployment. The complaint did not allege that Lorenzen 
34

suffered stress, anxiety, or distress for some reason other than his 

physical impairment, including the uncertainty of reimbursement of 

benefits.

¶ 83 Nor did Lorenzen disclose any independent claim for 

noneconomic damages during discovery. At his deposition, 

Lorenzen explained that he had been injured by the denial of his 

claim in that “it put off the surgery. It put off any recovery [he] 

had.” He testified that Pinnacol’s handling of the claim was “wrong” 

and left him “very frustrat[ed]” and “angry.” 

¶ 84 Lorenzen intended to introduce evidence concerning the 

impact of his physical impairment on “the daily activities of life, 

including work and leisure activities.” Lorenzen’s wife submitted a 

statement discussing Lorenzen’s physical and emotional changes 

since his injury. She reported that he was unable to enjoy their 

walks, hikes, and runs; he stumbled frequently, even on flat 

ground; and his impairment made him angry, frustrated, and 

depressed. 

¶ 85 We conclude that Lorenzen pleaded a single claim for 

economic and noneconomic damages based on his physical 

impairment. And because he cannot prove that Pinnacol’s conduct 
35

caused his physical impairment, it follows that he also cannot prove 

that Pinnacol is responsible for the noneconomic damages resulting 

from his physical impairment. 

¶ 86 Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s dismissal of 

Lorenzen’s complaint and entry of judgment for Pinnacol. 

IV. Lorenzen’s Additional Contentions

¶ 87 In light of our disposition, we need not address Lorenzen’s 

challenges to the district court’s discovery ruling and its order 

imposing costs.

V. Conclusion

¶ 88 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE ROTHENBERG concur.