COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphr eys and Senior Judge Overton

YASHEKA DeHART MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0057-03-2 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 28, 2003 RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Theodore J. Markow, Judge (Robin M. Morgan; Davis & Morgan , P.A., on brief), for appellant. (Kate D. O'Leary; Patricia D. Barnett, Guardian ad litem for the infant child; Office of the City Attorney, on brief), for appellee.
Yasheka DeHart appeals a decision of the trial court terminating her pa rental rights to her son, age three, pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). On appeal, moth er contends the evidence was insufficient to support the termination. Upon review ing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is wi thout merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. S ee Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence established that in May 2000, DeHartgave birth to a son. DeHartwas fifteen years old, in the custody of the Richmond Department of Social Serv ices, and living in foster care. Shortly after

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1- 413, this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - the child's birth, DeHart's foster mother inform ed the Department that she could no longer care for DeHart and her child. The Department placed DeHart at Alpha Hous e, a residential program for pregnant teenagers and teenage mothers, where the Department offered DeHart anger management, individual and group counseling, and programs designed to teach independent living skills. Joy Marshall, the director of Alpha House, testified that on the day DeHart and the child were placed at Alpha House, the child was dre ssed in filthy clothing a nd had not been bathed. Marshall observed multiple dirty baby bottles about DeHart's room. During DeHart's stay at Alpha House, Marshall continued to have concerns regarding DeHart's ability to care for the child. One month after this placement, DeHart appeared at the Department, announced she would not return to Alpha House, and requested that the child be placed in the Department's custody. DeHart would not give a specific reason for refusing to return to Alpha House. The Department's initial foster care plan for the child had a goal of return home. The plan required DeHart to remain in her pl acement, attend school, maintain visitation, and participate in counseling. Between July 2000 and June 2001, DeHart had seven different placements, failed all of her school classes, fail ed to maintain visita tion with the child, and refused to cooperate with nece ssary psychological testing. The Department's second foster care planhad a goal of placem ent with relatives. Although the Department investig ated four relatives, one fa iled to respond to Department inquiries, one lost acceptable housi ng, one proved to be unrelated to DeHart, and the fourth said she was unable to care for DeHart and the child. Wilhemenia Cunningham became DeHart's fost er care worker in January 2002. Between that time and October 2002, DeHart had five di fferent foster care placements. Cunningham arranged for DeHart's placement at Unity Home, a residential facility for teenage mothers, where- 3 - she was offered anger management, behavior management, parenting classes, recreational services, and independent living services. De Hart's placement at Unity Home would have allowed her to be placed with her child; however, she left the facility af ter three days. DeHart later returned to the facility but was terminat ed from the program based on her behavior before the child could be placed there with her. Psychologist Caroline Campbell testified as an expert in child psychology and parental evaluations. After a clinical assessment and mental status ev aluation of DeHart, Campbell found her unable to properly parent and care for the child. She c oncluded DeHart was unable to comprehend the child's significant developmental delays and lacked the emotional maturity and stability necessary for consis tent, reliable parenting. The trial judge found that DeHart had failed to remedy the conditions which led to the child's foster care placement. See Code § 16.1-283( C). He ruled that the termination of DeHart's parental rights was in th e child's best interests. Analysis
I. In pertinent part, Code § 16.1- 283(C)(2) provides that "[t]he residual parental rights of a parent . . . of a child placed in foster care as a result of court commitment . . . may be terminated if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best in terests of the child" and that the following conditions exist: The parent or parents, wi thout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a re asonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the c onditions which led to or required continuation of the child's foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate e fforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agen cies to such end. Proof that the parent or parents, without good cause, have failed or been unable to make substantial progress towa rds elimination of the conditions which led to or required conti nuation of the child's foster care- 4 - placement in accordance with th eir obligations under and within the time limits or goals set forth in a foster care plan filed with the court or any other plan jointly designed and ag reed to by the parent or parents and a public or private social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agency shall constitute prima facie evidence of this condition. The court shall take into consideration the prior efforts of such agencies to rehabi litate the parent or parents prior to the placement of the child in foster care. Because "'[r]easonable and appropriate' efforts can only be judged with reference to the circumstances of a particular case," Fergus on v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 14 Va. App. 333, 338, 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992), we have held th at the trial judge "must determ ine what constitutes reasonable and appropriate efforts given the facts before the court." Id. at 338-39, 417 S.E.2d at 4. DeHart argues that the Depart ment failed to provide reasonable and appropriate services to assist her. The record reveals, however, the Department offered her extensive opportunities and services to enable her to remedy the condi tions which led to the child's placement. The Department placed DeHart in residential f acilities for teenaged mothers which offered counseling services, independen t living services, job readines s training, and an appropriate educational setting. DeHart refused to participat e in the offered services and did not cooperate with the Department. The tria l court found that the Department had fulfilled its duties under the statute. "The Department is not required 'to force it s services upon an unwilling or disinterested parent.'" Logan, 13 Va. App. at130, 409 S.E.2d at 463-64. We will not disturb this finding because the record indicates th at it was not plainly wrong or w ithout evidence to support it. Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986).
II. DeHart also asserts the tria l court erred by finding her failure to remedy the conditions leading to the child's foster car e placement was without good cause. DeHart acknowledges that her "oppositional behavior and difficulty in remaining in placements after her son's birth contributed to [the child's] initial placement and continuation in- 5 - foster care." She contends, however, that "h er immaturity and life experiences" provide good cause for her failure to remedy the conditions le ading to the child's foster care. Although she proposes "that time and maturity alone [may be ab le to] resolve the causes of [the child's] foster care placement," the child had already spent over tw o years in foster care at the time of the termination hearing. "While age of the parent or parents is doubtle ss an appropriate cons ideration in assessing 'good cause' in the context of C ode § 16.1-283(C), it is not a ci rcumstance which prevails over the best interests of the child." L ecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 312, 456 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1995). Furthermore, "[i]t is clear ly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming [her] responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990) (citation omitted). The record supports a finding that DeHart's inability to remedy the conditions that led to the child 's placement in foster care was without "good
cause."
III. DeHart further argues the trial court erred by finding the termination of her parental rights was in the child's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship existing between each parent and eachchild; the needs of the child or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests of the child or children. Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986).- 6 - The evidence established that DeHart pursued an unstable lifestyle, incompatible with the child's needs and reflective of an indifference to his interests. This conduct spanned the child's entire life, despite the best e fforts and substantial resources of the Department to assist and redirect DeHart in her behavi or and parenting skills. Addi tionally, the child suffers from developmental delays that DeHart is unable to discern. Guided by the child's best interests, the trial court found that the Department proved by "c lear and convincing evidence" that termination of DeHart's residual parental rights was the appropriate statutory remedy. Code § 16.1-283(C). The record supports this finding. Accordingly, we summar ily affirm the decision of the tr ial court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.