IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-1511

Filed September 14, 2016

DARLENE JANSSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

MERRY LANES, INC. and 

FIRSTCOMP INSURANCE,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Osceola County, Nancy L. 

Whittenburg, Judge.

An employee appeals the district court’s ruling on judicial review upholding 

the workers’ compensation commissioner’s determination that she was entitled 

benefits for a “scheduled” injury rather than industrial disability benefits. 

AFFIRMED.

Willis J. Hamilton of Hamilton Law Firm, P.C., Storm Lake, for appellant.

Sasha L. Monthei and Kent Smith of Scheldrup Blades, Cedar Rapids, for 

appellees.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
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DANILSON, Chief Judge.

An employee appeals the district court’s ruling on judicial review upholding 

the workers’ compensation commissioner’s determination that she was entitled 

benefits for a “scheduled” injury under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(o) rather than 

industrial disability benefits under section 85.34(2)(u) (2009). Because 

substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s findings and its application of 

law to the facts is not wholly unjustifiable, we affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Darlene Janssen sustained an injury to her hamstring when she slipped 

and did the splits on October 30, 2010, while working as a bartender for the 

employer, Merry Lanes, Inc. Janssen filed a petition for workers’ compensation 

benefits with the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. The employer 

and its insurer denied Janssen sustained an injury to her body as a whole, and 

instead maintained her injury was limited to her leg, a scheduled injury.

An arbitration hearing was held before a deputy commissioner, who 

issued a ruling on February 3, 2014, finding Janssen sustained an injury to her 

body as a whole and was permanently and totally disabled. On interagency 

appeal, the acting commissioner determined Janssen had failed to prove she 

sustained a whole-body injury and that the evidence demonstrated Janssen’s 

injury was limited to her left lower extremity. The commissioner ruled Janssen 

was entitled to 72.6 weeks of permanent-partial-disability benefits and no penalty 

benefits.

Janssen sought judicial review in the district court, which affirmed the 

commissioner. Janssen now appeals. 
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II. Standard of Review.

The district court considering a petition for judicial review acts in an 

appellate capacity and may reverse or modify an agency’s decision if the 

agency’s decision is erroneous under a section of the Iowa Administrative 

Procedure Act and a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced. Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10) (2013).

When dealing with the issue of whether substantial evidence 

supports the agency’s findings, the district court and the appellate 

court can only grant relief to a party from the agency’s decision if a 

determination of fact by the agency “is not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed 

as a whole.”

Gits Mfg. Co. v. Frank, 855 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(f)). “Substantial evidence supports an agency’s decision even if 

the interpretation of the evidence may be open to a fair difference of opinion.” Id.

“Just because the interpretation of the evidence is open to a fair difference of 

opinion does not mean the [agency’s] decision is not supported by substantial 

evidence. An appellate court should not consider evidence insubstantial merely 

because the court may draw different conclusions from the record.” Arndt v. City 

of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa 2007) (citations omitted). When we 

review a district court decision that reviewed an agency action, our task is to 

determine if we would reach the same result as the district court in applying the 

Act. Gits, 855 N.W.2d at 197. If we reach the same result, we affirm; if not, we 

reverse. Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2014).
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III. Discussion.

We reject Janssen’s claim that the issue before us is a matter of 

erroneous statutory interpretation. Janssen contends that the “essence” of prior 

decisions by the appellate court is “that the nerves and veins are system wide 

and extend beyond a scheduled member and are not listed as scheduled 

members and are therefore compensated industrially.” She relies upon this 

court’s rulings in Collins v. Department of Human Services, 529 N.W.2d 627 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1995), and First Fleet Corp. v. Hannam, No. 14-1254, 2015 WL 

4158941 (Iowa Ct. App. July 9, 2015). Janssen mischaracterizes the case

holdings. 

The question presented in both cases was whether the agency’s factual 

findings were supported by substantial evidence. See Collins, 529 N.W.2d at 

628-29; Hannam, 2015 WL 4158941, at *4. In Collins, we found substantial 

evidence supported the commissioner’s finding that the employee’s depression 

was related to her work-related injury and was compensable by determining the 

employee’s industrial disability. 529 N.W.2d at 629. Having “already found 

Collins is entitled to compensation for industrial disability,” we did not address the 

issue of whether her diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy1 was a second 

injury compensable by industrial disability. Id. at 629-30. In Hannam we ruled, 

“The commissioner’s determination that Hannam suffered nervous system injury 

compensable as an unscheduled disability is supported by substantial evidence, 

and the district court erred in ruling otherwise.” 2015 WL 4158941, at *4. 

 

1

“Reflex sympathetic dystrophy is a dysfunction of the sympathetic nervous system.” 

Collins, 529 N.W.2d at 629. 
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Here, however, the commissioner concluded Janssen had suffered a 

scheduled-member injury. As an appellate court, our task “is not to determine 

whether the evidence supports a different finding; rather, our task is to determine 

whether” there is substantial evidence supporting the findings the commissioner 

“actually made.” Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 845

(Iowa 2011). The question presented then is whether there is substantial 

evidence to support the commissioner’s finding that Janssen suffered a 

scheduled-member injury. There is. 

On January 20, 2011, Dr. Gary Miller performed an electrophysiologic

(EMG) study which was described as abnormal. Dr. Miller’s report indicates the 

EMG showed “irritation of the sciatic nerve in the area of the biceps femoris 

muscles consistent with injury and irritation localized in that area” and that 

“[t]here is no clear evidence of lumbosacral radiculopathy.” On April 25, 2011, 

Dr. James Case performed a new EMG, which revealed a “severe partial sciatic 

neuropathy to the sciatic branch supplying the right lower extremity lateral 

hamstring groups.” Dr. Case also found no indication the injury extended beyond 

the leg. Citing these expert opinions, the commissioner determined:

In the present case, claimant’s injury is confined to the leg. 

There is no question claimant suffered a right proximal hamstring 

tear causing damage to the sciatic nerve. The sciatic nerve injury 

was limited to the section of the lateral upper hamstring. Objective 

testimony showed the sciatic nerve injury did not extend into the 

low back. 

There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the agency’s finding 

that Janssen’s injury does not extend beyond her right lower extremity. And the 

commissioner’s conclusion that the injury is compensable as a scheduled-
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member injury is not “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” See Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(m).

Having found no merit to Janssen’s contention that the agency erred in 

concluding she suffered a scheduled-member injury, we need not address her 

claim she should have been awarded penalty benefits based on that purported 

error. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.