alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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Morrison & Foerster LLP 

425 Market Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105

EXHIBIT A 

COMPENSATION BY PROFESSIONAL FOR THE 

PERIOD FROM AUGUST 1, 2019 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 2019 

Name of 

Professional Person 

Department, Date of 

First Admission or

Years in Position 

Hourly 

Billing 

Rate 

Total 

Billed 

Hours 

Total 

Compensation 

Partners and Of Counsel 

Hill, Joshua Dep’t: Litigation

Admission: 2002 

 $905.25 37.30 $33,765.98 

Wong, Christine Y. Dep’t: Litigation

Admission: 2001 

 $828.75 81.40 $67,460.50 

Associates and Attorneys 

Annobil, Yacoba Elsie Dep’t: Litigation

Admission: 2015 

 $590.75 7.50 $4,430.66 

Barr, Sarah Elizabeth Dep’t: Litigation

Admission: 2017 

 $467.50 52.20 $24,403.50 

Floyd, Amani Solange Dep’t: Litigation

Admission: 2014 

 $590.75 29.20 $17,250.04 

Kissner, Andrew Dep’t: Business 

Restructuring & 

Insolvency 

Admission: 2017 

 $531.25 5.70 $3,028.16 

Nicholson, Julie A. Dep’t: Litigation

Admission: 2012 

 $680.00 48.40 $32,912.00 

Paralegals and Non-Legal Staff 

Im, Amanda Dep’t: Litigation

Title: Paralegal 

Years in Position: 2 

 $310.25 1.40 $434.35 

Middleman, Caitlin K. Dep’t: Litigation

Title: Senior Paralegal 

Years in Position: 8.5 

 $314.50 10.50 $3,302.25 

Total Incurred: 273.6 $186,987.44 

Less Client Accommodation for Time Entry Review 

(100% of Fees Incurred): 

n/a $(2,337.52) 

Less Additional Client Discount Per Agreement: n/a $(36,627.48)

Total Requested: 273.6 $148,022.44 

 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4598-1 Filed: 11/07/19 Entered: 11/07/19 14:21:05 Page 1

of 2
 

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Morrison & Foerster LLP 

425 Market Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105

Total Partners, Of Counsel, Associates and Paraprofessionals 

PROFESSIONALS BLENDED 

RATES 

TOTAL 

HOURS 

BILLED 

TOTAL 

COMPENSATION 

Partners and Counsel $852.79 118.7 $101,226.48 

Associates and Attorneys $573.59 143 $82,024.36 

Total Incurred by All Attorneys: $700.23 261.7 $183,250.84 

Less Client Accommodation for 

Time Entry Review (100% of Fees 

Incurred): 

n/a n/a $(2,337.52) 

Less Additional Client Discount 

Per Agreement: 

n/a n/a $(36,627.48) 

Blended Attorney Rate: $551.34 261.7 $144,285.84 

Paraprofessionals and Non-Legal 

Staff 

$314.00 11.9 $3,736.60 

Total Requested: $541.01 273.6 $148,022.44 

 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4598-1 Filed: 11/07/19 Entered: 11/07/19 14:21:05 Page 2

of 2
Exhibit 31.2
 
 CERTIFICATION
 
 I, Brian Lenz, certify that:
 
 1.
I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of VioQuest Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the Registrant);2.
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
The Registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)) and 15d-15(e)) for Registrant and have:(a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(c)
Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrants internal control over financial reporting; and5.
The Registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrants auditors and the audit committee of the Registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a)
All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting. 
 Date: August 16, 2004
/s/ Brian LenzBrian Lenz
Interim Chief Financial Officer
#### Charlotte Manning, Respondent, v. Reis Circuit Company, Appellant.

Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs.
#### YALE & TOWNE MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. J. RAY McDERMOTT COMPANY, Inc., Appellee.

No. 21659.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 21, 1965.

Harmon F. Roy, Lafayette, La., for appellants.

John A. Bernard, Lafayette, La., for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge, WHITAKER,* Senior Judge, and JONES, Circuit Judge.

*

 Of the Court of Claims, sitting by designation.

JONES, Circuit Judge:

Andrew Y. Romero was an employee of the appellee, J. Ray McDermott Company, Inc., at its manufacturing plant in St. Mary Parish, Louisiana. While so employed, and in the course of his employment, he sustained an injury as the result of an accident for which he received workmen’s compensation from the employer or its compensation insurance carrier. The injury occurred while the employee, Romero, was using a hoist manufactured by the appellant, Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company. He brought an action against Yale & Towne and its insurer asserting that it was negligent in designing and manufacturing the hoist and that the injury sustained was the result of its negligence. Yale & Towne filed a third party complaint against the employer, McDermott, alleging that it was negligent in failing to provide Romero with a safe place to work, failing to furnish safety devices and to instruct Romero in using and requiring him to use such safety devices, which negligent acts and omissions were claimed by Yale & Towne to have caused Romero’s injuries. McDermott, the third party defendant, filed a motion to dismiss the third party complaint. The motion was granted and a judgment dismissing the third party complaint was entered. From that judgment this appeal has been taken.

The basis for Federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship. The law by which the case must be decided is that of Louisiana. At the time the appeal was argued and submitted, there was no decision of this Court or of a Louisiana appellate court which could be regarded as conclusive upon the legal issue raised, although the well reasoned opinion of Judge Dawkins in Auld v. Globe Indemnity Co., D.C.W.D.La.1963, 220 F.Supp. 96, was most persuasive. It was fol*372lowed by the district court in this case. The principles stated in the Auld decision and applied by the district court in this case have now found expression in a recent opinion of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Sanderson v. Binnings Construction Co., 172 So.2d 721, decided March 18, 1965. The appellant urges that the Sanderson case has been impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So.2d 122, decided March 29, 1965. We are of the opinion that the latter case is not in point as to the issue in the case before us. We are also of the opinion that the Sanderson case is in point and requires an affirmance of the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

CLINTON HITNER,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 479 MAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 13th day of December, 2017

, the Petition for Allowance of

Appeal is DENIED

.
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    October 4

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Case: 19-30088    Doc# 4125    Filed: 10/04/19    Entered: 10/04/19 12:22:40    Page 6 of6
GLOBE SPECIALTY METALS, INC.
CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Globe Specialty Metals, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the registrant);2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a.
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;b.
    
    [paragraph omitted in accordance with Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(a)];c.
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by
this report based on such evaluation; andd.
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal controls over
financial reporting that occurred during the most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially effected or is reasonably likely to materially effect, the
registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of registrants board of directors:
 a.
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; andb.
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
 Date: October 5, 2009
    By:

/s/
Alan KestenbaumAlan KestenbaumExecutive Chairman(Principal Executive Officer)
#### Edward J. Kelsey and others, Respondents, v. James Sargeant and others, Appellants.

Order granting additional allowance affirmed, without costs.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

MIDSOUTH BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES                               EXHIBIT 11
COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE  (Unaudited)
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND 1997 AND
  FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997



				    First Quarter    First Quarter    Year-to-Date
				     March 31,        March 31,       December 31,
BASIC                                   1998             1997             1997
				    _____________    _____________    ____________
<S>                                 <C>               <C>              <C>
Earnings:
    Income applicable to common 
     stock                             $514,988         $341,615       $1,600,217
				    ===========       ==========       ==========
Shares:
    Weighted average number of
      common shares outstanding       1,587,674        1,543,731        1,554,968
				    ===========       ==========       ==========
									      
Earnings per common share:                                                    
    Income applicable to common 
     stock                                $0.32            $0.22            $1.03
				    ===========       ==========       ==========


DILUTED

Earnings:
    Net income                         $552,508         $381,422       $1,754,692
				    ===========       ==========       ==========

Weighted average number of
    common shares outstanding         1,587,674        1,543,731        1,554,968

    Assuming exercise of 
      options, reduced by the 
      number of shares which 
      could have been purchased 
      with the proceeds from
      exercise of such options 
      at the average issue price         51,526                -           16,491

    Assuming conversion of 
      preferred stock at a 
      conversion rate of 
      1 to 1.999 shares                 317,873          343,140          332,546
				    ___________       __________       __________
    Weighted average number of 
      common shares outstanding, 
      as adjusted                     1,957,073        1,886,871        1,904,005
				    ===========       ==========       ==========

Fully diluted earnings per common 
  shares                                  $0.28            $0.20            $0.92
				    ===========       ==========       ==========

</TALBE>


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5344 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5344

  To prohibit the purchase, ownership, or possession of enhanced body 
                  armor by civilians, with exceptions.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 31, 2014

Mr. Honda (for himself, Ms. Kelly of Illinois, Mr. Hastings of Florida, 
and Mr. Pascrell) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                     the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To prohibit the purchase, ownership, or possession of enhanced body 
                  armor by civilians, with exceptions.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Responsible Body Armor Possession 
Act''.

SEC. 2. BAN ON PURCHASE, OWNERSHIP, OR POSSESSION OF ENHANCED BODY 
              ARMOR BY CIVILIANS; EXCEPTIONS.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 932. Ban on purchase, ownership, or possession of enhanced body 
              armor by civilians
    ``(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall be unlawful 
for a person to purchase, own, or possess enhanced body armor.
    ``(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to--
            ``(1) a purchase, ownership, or possession by or under the 
        authority of--
                    ``(A) the United States or any department or agency 
                of the United States; or
                    ``(B) a State, or a department, agency, or 
                political subdivision of a State; or
            ``(2) enhanced body armor that was lawfully possessed by 
        any person at any time before the date this section takes 
        effect.''.
    (b) Enhanced Body Armor Defined.--Section 921(a) of such title is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(36) The term `enhanced body armor' means body armor, including a 
helmet or shield, the ballistic resistance of which meets or exceeds 
the ballistic performance of Type III armor, determined using National 
Institute of Justice Standard-0101.06.''.
    (c) Penalties.--Section 924(a) of such title is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(8) Whoever knowingly violates section 932 shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM INTERCELL
CORPORATION'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 1998 AND  FOR THE SIX
MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         285,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  586,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    458,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,331,000
<PP&E>                                         956,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 322,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,745,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,190,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  3,587,000
<COMMON>                                    21,312,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (26,887,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,745,000
<SALES>                                      1,168,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,168,000
<CGS>                                        1,471,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,593,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             371,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,896,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (5,267,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                               (565,000)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (5,832,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.20)
        

</TABLE>
#### Otto W. HEIDER, Sr., and Irene E. Lawrence, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 19334.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

June 15, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 5, 1965.

*696William E. Dougherty, H. Myron Gleason, Portland, Or., for appellants.

Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Joseph M. Howard, Norman Sepenuk, Jack M. Cotton, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Sidney I. Lezak, U. S. Atty., Charles H. Habernigg, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for appellee.

Before MERRILL and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, District Judge.

MERRILL, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal from conviction of tax evasion appellants’ general position is that the District Court failed to exercise that care and restraint which is necessary if it is to escape the pitfalls inherent in the net-worth method of establishing guilt of this crime. Holland v. U. S., 348 U.S. 121, 129, *75*S.Ct. 127, 99 L. Ed. 150 (1954). We cannot agree. The case was tried to the court without jury and the court, in a written opinion, has carefully considered the disputed aspects of the case.1 Before us appellants renew many of the contentions made below which were dealt with by the District Court. Upon all of these we agree with the District Court for the reasons set forth in its opinion.

Appellants’ principal contention is that the evidence establishes the facts to be contrary to the factual determinations of the District Court as incorporated in its written opinion. Specifically, appellants refer to the facts respecting their intent to defraud, the opening net-worth statements, the River Bend garage inventory, prepaid insurance, the “cash hoard,” the Sheridan Church loan, and certain loans receivable. In general, appellants attack the sufficiency of proof respecting appellant Lawrence. In all of these respects we conclude from the record that the findings are not clearly erroneous.

Appellants also contend that the court erred in failing to give due consideration to an asserted failure of proof by the United States in certain other respects. We find no merit in these contentions. As to the establishing of “middle balances” as of December 31, 1953, there is evidence that these balances were based upon the same sources of information as were opening (December 31, 1952), and closing (December 31, 1954), balances which appellants had stipulated were correct. As to static real estate and certain personal chattels, it appears that the balances of these assets remained constant throughout the period, and that if inaccuracies existed they would offset themselves and eliminate prejudice.

We find no basis whatsoever for appellants’ remaining contentions that the court prejudged the question of intent and shifted the burden of proof to appellants ; that there was undue delay in presenting charges to the Grand Jury and in bringing appellants to trial; that they were not provided with an adequate and timely bill of particulars.

Judgment affirmed.

1

. The District Court opinion appears sub nom., United States v. Heider, 231 F.Supp. 223 (D. Or.1964).