RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1658-19T2

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Y.O.-E.,

Defendant-Appellant, 

and

R.E.,

Defendant.

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF JC.E., 

a minor.

__________________________

Argued November 18, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Whipple, Rose, and Firko.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 16, 2020
2

A-1658-19T2

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket 

No. FG-20-0013-19.

Clara S. Licata, Designated Counsel, argued the cause 

for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Clara S. Licata, on the briefs).

Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Jane C. Schuster, of counsel; Julie B. 

Colonna, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Louise M. Cho, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis

Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Louise 

M. Cho, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Y.O.-E. (Yolanda) appeals from a December 16, 2019 

judgment of guardianship terminating her parental rights to her biological child, 

JC.E. (Jonathan).

1

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in finding the Division

of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) had met its burden by clear and 

convincing evidence for each Title-30 prong. Defendant asserts the Division 

1 For the sake of anonymity and ease of reference, we utilize the pseudonyms 

from defendant's brief to protect the parties and the child. See R. 1:38-3(d)(13). 
3

A-1658-19T2

neglected its duties to her while she herself was in Division custody. 

Additionally, defendant contends that the Division should have provided further 

support for her during her time trying to improve her situation so she could 

parent Jonathan.

Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:

POINT I.

NO DEFERENCE IS OWED TO TRIAL COURT 

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS OR FACT FINDINGS 

UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE THAT IS 

SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE AND THAT IS 

ALSO CLEAR AND CONVINCING.

POINT II. 

[DIVISION]'S FAILURE TO ASSIST [YOLANDA]

IN BECOMING DOCUMENTED WHILE AN 

UNDOCUMENTED CHILD IN [DIVISION]'S 

CUSTODY IN THE 1990'S AND EARLY 2000'S, 

WHICH LED TO INSTABILITY IN HER MENTAL 

HEALTH TREATMENT, EMPLOYMENT, AND 

RESIDENCE, SHOULD BAR [DIVISION] AND A 

COURT FROM RELYING ON SUCH 

CIRCUMSTANCES TO TERMINATE HER 

PARENTAL RIGHTS TO [JONATHAN]. (Not Raised 

Below).

POINT III. 

[DIVISION] DID NOT PROVE THAT 

[JONATHAN]'S SAFETY HAS BEEN OR WILL BE 

ENDANGERED BY CONTINUING THE 

PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP WHEN THERE WAS 

NO PROOF THAT [JONATHAN] HAS BEEN 

HARMED OR EXPOSED TO RISK OF HARM IN 
4

A-1658-19T2

THE THREE MONTHS HE WAS IN [YOLANDA]'S 

CARE.

POINT IV.

[DIVISION] DID NOT PROVE BY CLEAR AND 

CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT [YOLANDA]

WAS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ELIMINATE 

THE ALLEGED RISK OF HARM TO [JONATHAN], 

OR THAT THE DELAY IN PERMANENT 

PLACEMENT WOULD ADD TO THE HARM WHEN 

[YOLANDA]'S EFFORTS TO WORK, AND TO 

ATTEND THERAPY, MEDICATION 

MANAGEMENT AND VISITATION WERE 

THWARTED BY TRANSPORTATION AND 

SCHEDULING CONFLICTS [DIVISION] REFUSED 

TO ADDRESS AND WHEN HER IMMIGRATION 

STATUS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO PAY FOR 

SERVICES.

POINT V. 

[DIVISION] DID NOT PROVE THAT IT MADE 

REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SERVICES 

TO REMEDIATE THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO 

[JONATHAN]'S REMOVAL FROM [YOLANDA]'S 

HOME WHEN IT FAILED TO ASSIST HER WITH 

THE FINANCIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND 

SCHEDULING PROBLEMS THAT INTERFERED 

WITH CONSISTENT ATTENDANCE AT 

THERAPY.

POINT VI. 

EXPERT OPINION THAT SEVERING 

[JONATHAN]'S BOND WITH HIS FOSTER 

PARENTS WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS 

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM AND 

THAT HE HAS A NEED FOR PERMANENCY IS 

INSUFFICIENT WHEN [YOLANDA] HAS NEVER 

HAD THE ABILITY TO TIMELY COMPLY WITH 
5

A-1658-19T2

[DIVISION]'S REQUIREMENTS AND WHEN 

[DIVISION] AND THE COURT HAVE USED HER 

IMMIGRATION STATUS AGAINST HER.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm primarily for the reasons 

expressed in the thorough written opinion of Judge Marc R. Brown issued with 

the judgment, wherein he found the Division had established by clear and 

convincing evidence all four prongs of the best-interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a), which, in the best interest of the child, permits termination of parental 

rights. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999). 

Our review of the judge's decision is limited. We defer to his expertise as 

a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998), and we are 

bound by his factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient,

credible, evidence, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 

279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. 

Div. 1993)).

Defendant came to this country at a young age as an undocumented 

immigrant, was abused by her extended and immediate family, and was 

ultimately placed in Division custody. Defendant suffers from severe mental 

illness and has struggled to maintain employment, housing and treatment. 

Defendant contends that because the Division failed to assist her in achieving
6

A-1658-19T2

documented immigration status while she was in its custody, she has been

continuously unable to secure housing, and she was recently held in an 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facility. Defendant 

asserts the Division's failure to seek documented status precluded her from using 

the "social safety net" to seek medical and financial assistance. Moreover, the 

Division's failure to seek documented status for her, resulting in her being in 

ICE custody, further removed her from Jonathan's life.

Our review of the record reveals a more complicated picture, which 

includes defendant's history of substance abuse, criminal behavior and 

domestically violent relationships and includes the fact that defendant no longer 

has custody of her five other children. After a thirteen-day guardianship trial 

was held with three expert witnesses, two Division employees, and defendant's 

immigration attorney, the court found defendant's mental health issues 

permeated her life to the point that she was not a fit parent. She was not

compliant with therapy or pharmacological treatment. Defendant had not shown 

she could be self-sufficient, was prone to returning to abusive relationships, 

struggled to manage her mental health and sacrificed the opportunity to see 

Jonathan because of criminal activity, immigration detention and psychological 

episodes.
7

A-1658-19T2

Focusing on the third and fourth prongs, the court found that the Division 

had made reasonable efforts to provide care, and Jonathan was in the best 

alternative placement possible — with resource parents who wanted to adopt 

him. Accordingly, the judge held that even though evidence was presented from 

both sides, Jonathan saw his resource parents as his psychological parents; he 

would not suffer harm from terminating defendant's rights to him, but rather, he 

would suffer harm from terminating his relationship with his resource parents. 

This appeal followed.

With leave granted to supplement the record, defendant has added for our 

consideration that she has been released from ICE detention, now has 

authorization to work, and can more readily access the help she needs through 

government assistance. She is also currently living in an apartment. This 

development certainly evidences a commendable change in circumstance, and 

defendant contends that such a shift militates against the trial court's foundation 

for terminating her rights. We disagree.

While the court understandably had to discuss, and consider, the issues 

that may arise from defendant being in ICE detention, unable to access 

employment, housing and medical assistance, we do not consider this change of 

circumstances determinative. The trial judge was careful to discuss defendant's 
8

A-1658-19T2

problematic conditions before detention and regardless of detention. As 

unfortunate and troubling as defendant's life experience has been, it is not in 

Jonathan's best interest to delay permanency while his mother's condition 

remains fluid.

Affirmed.