Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed January 6, 2004

Division No. 94-1

IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN

(LEWINSKY FEE APPLICATION)

Division for the Purpose of

Appointing Independent Counsels

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, As Amended

–————

Before: SENTELLE, Presiding, FAY and REAVLEY, Senior

Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

It is ORDERED by the Court, sua sponte, that the opinion

filed herein on December 30, 2003, be and it hereby is,

amended as follows:

Page 4, line 24, substitute ‘‘half of the’’ for ‘‘a majority of.’’

PER CURIAM

 For the Court:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

 By:

 Marilyn R. Sargent

 Chief Deputy Clerk
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

–—————

Filed December 30, 2003

Division No. 94-1

IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN

(LEWINSKY FEE APPLICATION)

–—————

Division for the Purpose of

Appointing Independent Counsels

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, As Amended

–—————

Before: SENTELLE, Presiding, FAY and REAVLEY, Senior

Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

This matter coming to be heard and being heard before the

Special Division of the Court upon the application of Monica

Lewinsky for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs

pursuant to section 593(f) of the Ethics in Government Act of

1978, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq. (2000), and it

appearing to the court for the reasons set forth more fully in

the opinion filed contemporaneously herewith that the petition is not well taken, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the petition of Monica Lewinsky for attorneys’ fees that she incurred
2

during the investigation by Independent Counsel be denied.

PER CURIAM

 For the Court:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

 By:

 Marilyn R. Sargent

 Chief Deputy Clerk
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

–————

Filed December 30, 2003

Division No. 94-1

IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN

(LEWINSKY FEE APPLICATION)

–————

Division for the Purpose of

Appointing Independent Counsels

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, As Amended

–————

Before: SENTELLE, Presiding, FAY and REAVLEY, Senior

Circuit Judges.

ON APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Opinion of the Special Court filed Per Curiam.

Per curiam: Monica Lewinsky petitions this court under

§ 593(f) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 591–599 (2000) (the Act), for reimbursement of attorney

fees that she incurred during and as a result of an investigation conducted by the Independent Counsel (IC). Because

we conclude that Lewinsky has not carried her burden of

showing that the fees would not have been incurred but for

the requirements of the Act, we deny the petition.

I. Background

On January 16, 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno applied

for and this court granted an order extending the jurisdiction

of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr ‘‘to investigate TTT

whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, ob-
2

structed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated

federal law TTT in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses,

attorneys, or others concerning the civil case Jones v. Clinton.’’ The Jones v. Clinton case referenced in Attorney

General Reno’s application and the court’s order was a civil

suit filed by Paula Jones against then-President William J.

Clinton. Jones alleged that during Clinton’s term as Governor of Arkansas and while Jones was a state employee, he

had solicited sex from her, that she had declined, and that as

a result, her state employment had been adversely affected,

in violation of her federal civil rights as well as other rights.

Prior to trial, Jones’s attorneys sought to discover whether

there were other government employees with whom President Clinton had conducted sexual relationships or from

whom he had solicited sexual favors. In December 1997,

Jones’s attorneys subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky, the fee petitioner here, directing her to appear the next month to testify

and to produce certain items, including gifts from President

Clinton. As the investigation ultimately revealed, Lewinsky,

an intern and later employee in the White House, had been

having a sexual relationship with President Clinton since

about 1995. They had agreed, however, that they would deny

the relationship if ever asked about it. In response to the

subpoena, Lewinsky in early January 1998 executed an affidavit falsely denying any sexual relationship with the President.

Shortly thereafter, Lewinsky accepted a job in the private

sector which she was able to obtain with the assistance of a

friend to the President, Washington attorney Vernon Jordan.

See In re Madison Guar. Sav. and Loan (Jordan Fee Application), 344 F.3d 1250, 1252 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 2003) (per

curiam).

Attorneys for Jones also subpoenaed Linda Tripp, a friend

of Lewinsky’s. On January 12, 1998, Tripp contacted the

Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) and advised that office

that Lewinsky had told her that she was preparing to file a

false affidavit, had and stated her intent to lie if deposed, and

had urged Tripp to lie in her own deposition. Unbeknownst

to Lewinsky, Tripp had taped conversations between herself

and Lewinsky which corroborated the information she presented to the IC. On January 13, 1998, the OIC consensually
3

monitored a conversation between Tripp and Lewinsky during which Lewinsky offered Tripp a one-half interest in a

condominium if Tripp would join her in perjury in the Jones

case. The OIC presented this information to the Attorney

General.

On January 16, 1998, the Attorney General notified this

court that she had commenced a preliminary investigation

into whether Lewinsky or others had committed violations of

federal criminal law. As a result of that preliminary investigation, she requested an expansion of the jurisdiction of then

Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr to investigate further

and determine whether prosecution was warranted. Referring to the consensually monitored conversation between

Tripp and Lewinsky of January 13, 1998, the Attorney General specifically stated to the court ‘‘I have also determined that

the taped conversation establishes that further investigation

of this matter is warranted.’’

On January 17, 1998, Clinton was deposed in the Jones

case. United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright of

the District of Arkansas had traveled from Little Rock to

Washington, D.C. to preside over the deposition. Despite the

Court’s orders requiring discovery regarding state or federal

employees with whom he had conducted or from whom he had

solicited sexual relations, President Clinton during the deposition ‘‘by clear and convincing evidence TTT responded to

plaintiff’s questions by giving false, misleading and evasive

answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process.’’

Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1127 (E.D. Ark. 1999).

In the meantime, on January 16, 1998, the OIC had confronted Lewinsky with evidence of her crimes and attempted

to obtain her cooperation in exchange for immunity. Represented, at that time, by attorney William Ginsburg, whom her

father had retained in California, Lewinsky rejected the

immunity offer.

The investigation continued. Among other evidence, the

IC obtained a box of gifts given by Clinton to Lewinsky

during the course of their sexual relationship. After receiving the subpoena, Lewinsky had turned the gifts over to

Betty Curry, Clinton’s personal secretary, who had secreted

the gifts in further obstruction of the Jones litigation.
4

Although Lewinsky had rejected the proffered immunity on

January 16, 1998, Lewinsky’s attorneys, William Ginsburg

and Nathaniel Spates, first attempted to negotiate an immunity agreement then spent months attempting to enforce in

court an immunity agreement that they claimed had been

struck. The District Court for the District of Columbia, thenChief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson presiding, rejected

that claim. See In re Sealed Case, 144 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal on jurisdictional

grounds). Shortly thereafter, Lewinsky dismissed attorney

Ginsburg, retained Plato Cacheris of Washington, D.C. as her

lead counsel and also added attorney Jacob Stein. Within

two months Lewinsky’s new attorneys were able to negotiate

full transactional immunity for Lewinsky in exchange for her

agreement to cooperate with the investigation. They entered

into an agreement on July 28, 1998. Lewinsky prays fees for

legal services rendered both before and after the entry of the

immunity agreement.

As a result of the evidence of perjury, subornation of

perjury, and obstruction of justice, the House of Representatives voted to impeach President Clinton on December 19,

1998. On February 12, 1999, following trial on two articles of

impeachment, the Senate voted on whether to remove Clinton

from office. Although half of the Senators voted for

removal, the vote fell short of the two-thirds’ concurrence

necessary for conviction of President Clinton.

The IC concluded that the basic allegations against President Clinton were substantiated and that sufficient evidence

existed to prosecute him. Final Report of Independent

Counsel at 19–20, 23, 28–29, 32–34, 41–43. However, rather

than seeking an indictment of the President, the IC entered

into an agreement with Clinton whereunder the departing

President admitted his responsibility, accepted professional

discipline from the Arkansas Bar, and agreed not to apply for

any counsel fees in relation to this investigation. Under an

agreement with the Arkansas Bar, Clinton agreed that he

‘‘would accept a five year suspension, pay[ ] a $25,000 fine (as

legal fees for the [Arkansas Committee on Professional Conduct’s] outside counsel) and formally acknowledg[e] a viola-
5

tion of one of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct.’’

Letter from David E. Kendall, private counsel to President

Clinton, to Robert W. Ray, Independent Counsel (Jan. 19,

2001) (quoted in Final Report of Independent Counsel at 19).

Pursuant to the agreements with the IC and the Arkansas

Bar, Clinton admitted:

A. That he knowingly gave evasive and misleading answers in violation of Judge Wright’s discovery orders,

concerning his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, in an

attempt to conceal from plaintiff Jones’s lawyers the true

facts about his improper relationship, which had ended

almost a year earlier.

B. That by knowingly giving evasive and misleading

answers, in violation of Judge Wright’s discovery order,

he engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in that his discovery responses interfered with the conduct of the Jones case by causing the

court and counsel for the parties to expend unnecessary

time, effort, and resources, setting a poor example for

other litigants, and causing the court to issue a thirty-two

page Order civilly sanctioning Mr. Clinton.

Based upon Clinton’s admissions, the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled that he had committed professional misconduct

and ‘‘engag[ed] in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice.’’ Agreed Order of Discipline at 3–4, Neal v.

Clinton, No. Civ. 2000–5677, 2001 WL 34355768 (Cir. Ct. of

Pulaski Co., Ark. Jan. 19, 2001).

Lewinsky now petitions the court for attorneys’ fees in the

amount of $1,165,390.97 that she states she incurred during

the IC’s investigation of this matter.

II. Analysis

A. The Requirements of the Act

Unique in the criminal law structure of the United States,

the Ethics in Government Act provides for reimbursement of

attorneys’ fees expended by subjects in defense against an
6

investigation under the Act. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.

§ 593(f)(1) states:

Upon the request of an individual who is the subject of

an investigation conducted by an independent counsel

pursuant to this chapter, the division of the court may, if

no indictment is brought against such individual pursuant

to that investigation, award reimbursement for those

reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by that individual

during that investigation which would not have been

incurred but for the requirements of this chapter.

Because the Act ‘‘constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity it is to be strictly construed.’’ In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d

428, 438 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1991) (per curiam). Under the

Act, therefore, we can only order reimbursement for attorney

fees when we determine that: (1) the subject of the IC

investigation, (2) incurred the fees during the investigation,

and (3) would not have incurred them ‘‘but for’’ the requirements of the Act. See, e.g., In re Pierce (Kisner Fee Application), 178 F.3d 1356, 1358 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per

curiam). In addition to these three elements, the fee applicant must also establish that the fees are reasonable. See,

e.g., In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1201–03 (D.C. Cir., Spec.

Div., 1990) (per curiam). In light of our disposition of the

pending application on the basis of the elements already

listed, we will not herein reach the question of reasonableness.

B. The Subject Requirement

While the whole of Lewinsky’s fees will be disallowed for

failure to meet the ‘‘but for’’ requirement of the Act, we

would not reach that question if she did not qualify under the

subject requirement for at least a portion of those fees. As

we have noted frequently in the past, the Act does not define

‘‘subject,’’ but our precedents establish that for purposes of

the fee reimbursement provision a subject of an IC’s investigation is a person

whose conduct is within the scope of the independent

counsel’s investigation and TTT who knew at the time of
7

incurring the fees sought in the petition that his conduct

was within that scope in such a fashion that the independent counsel might reasonably be expected to point the

finger of accusation at him.

In re North (Applications of Shields and Gruner), 53 F.3d

1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1995) (per curiam) (citations

and internal punctuation omitted). Both the IC and the

Attorney General, for whose comments on the Lewinsky

application we are grateful, agree that Lewinsky was a subject for a part of the time for which she claims fees. That

portion of the time begins with our grant of jurisdiction on

January 16, 1998, and extends through July 28, 1998, the date

on which the OIC granted her transactional immunity.

Although she claims that she was a subject and entitled to

reimbursement until February 12, 1999, the date on which

President Clinton was acquitted in the impeachment trial, we

disagree. After the grant of transactional immunity, it was

no longer reasonable to expect that the IC might point the

finger of accusation at her. As we have previously stated, ‘‘as

a general proposition TTT an immunized witness will no longer

be a ‘subject.’ ’’ In re North (Dutton Fee Application), 11

F.3d 1075, 1079 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1993) (per curiam).

Lewinsky contends that her case falls outside this ‘‘general

proposition.’’ In support of her argument, she relies on our

decision in In re North (Cave Fee Application), 57 F.3d 1117

(D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1995) (per curiam), which held that the

fee petitioner therein retained ‘‘subject’’ status even after

being granted use immunity because such immunity did not

protect him from being prosecuted as a result of information

independently derived from other witnesses, id. at 1120.

Lewinsky claims that she too did not lose her subject status

after being granted transactional immunity, arguing that ‘‘she

remained a subject because her immunity was conditional and

she remained under continuous threat of prosecution.’’ In

support of this argument, Lewinsky asserts that regardless of

her immunity, she could still be prosecuted for giving false

testimony or for speaking publicly about the case. She

further claims that the IC threatened to withdraw her immu-
8

nity if she did not cooperate with the impeachment proceedings of the House of Representatives. According to Lewinsky, her immunity agreement was ‘‘far more demanding,

being conditioned on a set of unusual requirements, and

contained far more dire consequences for Ms. Lewinsky than

the immunity agreement in Cave.’’ She sums up her argument here by claiming that for her ‘‘there remained a realistic

possibility that she could become a defendant even after the

grant of immunity.’’ We disagree.

The petitioner in Cave had obtained only a grant of use

immunity pursuant to the Federal Use Immunity Statute, 18

U.S.C. § 6002. Such a grant ‘‘confers immunity only against

the use of testimony compelled under the immunizing order;

‘it does not confer transactional immunity under which

the witness could not be prosecuted at all for the transactions

about which he testifies.’ ’’ Id. at 1120 (quoting Dutton, 11

F.3d at 1078–79). The OIC in this case granted Lewinsky

transactional immunity which prevented the OIC from prosecuting her so long as she abided by the terms of her immunity agreement. Therefore, as of the time she signed the

agreement, her status was that of witness, not potential

defendant. In Dutton, we held that even the grant of use

immunity is generally sufficient to remove the reasonable

likelihood of prosecution. On the special facts of the Cave

application we held that a reasonable possibility of prosecution remained even in the face of the use immunity. In the

case of transactional immunity it is highly unlikely, if not

impossible, that the recipient, such as Lewinsky, would ever

be prosecuted absent some act totally within her own control

in breach of the immunity agreement.

Therefore, only the earlier portion of Lewinsky’s fees are

considered for reimbursement. However, for reasons set

forth infra, even those fees do not survive analysis under the

‘‘but for’’ test.

C. The ‘‘But For’’ Test.

As stated, we can award only ‘‘those reasonable attorneys’

fees incurred by [a subject of the investigation] during that

investigation which would not have been incurred but for the
9

requirements of’’ the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 593(f)(1). Lewinsky

argues that in cases such as In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam), and Dutton, supra, we have

awarded fees where we have found that a professional or

politically appointed prosecutor would not have pursued allegations similar to those investigated by an IC, and that her

case falls within that category. She asserts that perjury

allegations such as those against her would not have been

pursued by the Department of Justice had they not been

‘‘part of a broader inquiry of the President of the United

States’’ and at best ‘‘would have generated a cursory or

summary nonpublic investigation by the Department of Justice.’’ In other words, she asserts that her claim for fees

meets the ‘‘but for’’ test because there would have been no

investigation of her conduct had it not involved the President.

The IC in her evaluation of Lewinsky’s fee petition first

takes issue with Lewinsky’s claim that the DOJ does not

investigate perjury and obstruction of justice, stating that in

fact ‘‘the Department routinely prosecutes perjury and obstruction cases and is willing to do so for perjury in civil cases

and even when those cases settle.’’ But the IC argues that in

any event it is of no consequence in the ‘‘but for’’ discourse

how rare a certain type of prosecution is ‘‘if it is shown, as it

has been here, that that type of offense would be and has

been prosecuted by the Department of Justice if and when it

occurred.’’

The IC further argues that Lewinsky’s claim that the

investigation of her was overly thorough and intrusive does

not satisfy her burden of showing that the requirements of

the Act caused her to incur attorneys’ fees. Lewinsky’s

reliance on In re Nofziger is misplaced, according to the IC,

because the court in that case concluded that the fee reimbursement provision of the Act was intended for instances in

which covered officials were investigated ‘‘for criminal offenses for which ordinary citizens would not have been investigated or prosecuted,’’ 925 F.2d at 444, whereas here the

criminal offense investigated was perjury for which ordinary

citizens are routinely investigated and prosecuted.
10

Additionally, the IC argues that Lewinsky’s comparison of

her situation to that of an ‘‘ordinary citizen’’ is not appropriate. The IC cites In re Babbitt (Babbitt Fee Application),

290 F.3d 386, 391 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 2002) (per curiam), in

which the court stated that Babbitt, the Secretary of the

Interior, could not compare the investigation of himself to an

investigation of an ordinary citizen; rather, the comparison

would have to be to an investigation of a cabinet officer. The

IC notes that the allegations here concerned plans by the

President of the United States to commit perjury as well as

his involvement in a scheme to provide Lewinsky with a job in

exchange for false testimony, and that ‘‘[i]t is in the context of

the broader allegations of obstruction at the highest levels of

government that Lewinsky’s situation must be analyzed.’’

Finally, the IC notes that at the very beginning of the

investigation of her the IC offered Lewinsky transactional

immunity in exchange for her cooperation. She refused and

in the next six months accumulated more than $800,000 in

attorneys’ fees, after which she successfully negotiated an

immunity agreement with the IC. The IC argues that in this

regard Lewinsky ‘‘cannot show that any requirement of the

Act forced these choices upon her.’’

The DOJ in its evaluation also contradicts Lewinsky’s

argument here by citing numerous cases that it asserts

demonstrate that the DOJ frequently investigates and prosecutes the crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice in civil

cases. And the DOJ points out the seriousness of the perjury

allegations involving both President Clinton and Lewinsky.

Relying on In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d at 443–44, the DOJ states

that Lewinsky invokes the wrong legal standard for the ‘‘but

for’’ test: it is not, as she claims, whether there would have

been no investigation of her if her misconduct did not involve

the President, but rather whether there would have been a

similar investigation ‘‘if there had been no Independent Counsel statute but all other circumstances were the same.’’ (Emphasis by the DOJ.) After reiterating the allegations of

perjury and subornation of perjury that were leveled against

Lewinsky and President Clinton, the DOJ asserts that in the

absence of the Act it would have conducted a similar investi-
11

gation and therefore Lewinsky has not satisfied the ‘‘but for’’

requirement because she ‘‘has failed to meet her burden of

demonstrating that there would have been no investigation of

this matter in the absence of the Independent Counsel Act.’’

We agree with the OIC and the DOJ. Lewinsky asserts

that her claim for fees meets the ‘‘but for’’ test because there

would have been no investigation of her allegedly criminal

conduct had it not involved the President. In making that

argument, she applies the wrong legal standard. The language she draws from our prior decisions concerning the

possibility of investigation of ‘‘private citizens’’ describe specific applications of the statutory requirement. That statutory requirement is that the legal fees ‘‘would not have been

incurred by a similarly-situated subject investigated in the

absence of the Act.’’ In re Pierce (Kisner Fee Application),

178 F.3d at 1359. In other words, her burden is to prove that

she would not have incurred these fees if there had been no

IC statute but all other circumstances were the same. See In

re Nofziger, 925 F.2d at 443–44.

Here, the underlying allegations were that Lewinsky lied

under oath in a pending lawsuit against the President of the

United States; that she was planning to lie again and had

encouraged others to lie; that she had spoken to the President and an associate of the President about the matter; and,

at least implicitly, that the President and his associate may

themselves have been involved in the wrongdoing. See, e.g.,

Final Report at 14–15; Referral Order of January 16, 1998;

Application to Expand the Jurisdiction of the IC 1–2 (January

16, 1998). As noted, the Independent Counsel ultimately

concluded that the basic allegations were substantiated and

that sufficient evidence existed to prosecute the President.

Final Report at 19–20, 23, 28–29, 32–34, 41–43. Lewinsky has

failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that there would

have been no comparable investigation of this matter in the

absence of the Act.

At most, Lewinsky has established that the investigation

would not have occurred had her fellow subject been someone

other than the President of the United States, not that the
12

investigation would have never begun or been aborted early

in the absence of the Act. We doubt whether she has

established even that; but even if she had, it would not be

sufficient. As we stated in Kisner, ‘‘[her] difficulties were

occasioned by [her] being suspected of having done mischief

in high company, not by the identity of the authority investigating the allegation of mischief.’’ 178 F.3d at 1361.

We have considered and rejected this same claim not only

on parallel facts, as in Kisner, and numerous other cases, but

on the very investigation before us in this petition. In

Jordan Fee Application, Vernon Jordan, an associate of

former President Clinton, made the same argument that

Lewinsky now presents. As we stated in Jordan, when the

Attorney General made the referral, and when the OIC

conducted the investigation generating the fees, each ‘‘had

credible, indeed compelling, evidence that Monica Lewinsky

had committed perjury and was attempting to suborn perjury

of others. This was accompanied by other evidence that the

President of the United States had committed perjury and

had suborned or attempted to suborn others.’’ 344 F.3d at

1255. Like the petitioner in Jordan, Lewinsky ‘‘offers no

reason why any prosecutor in the absence of the Act would

not have investigated these serious allegations of criminal

wrongdoing as thoroughly as did the Independent Counsel.’’

Id. As in Jordan and cases cited therein,

we cannot hold that the Attorney General and other

investigative authorities would not have pursued allegations of corruption as deep and widespread as those

revealed by the Independent Counsel’s investigation had

there been no such Act.

Id. (quoting In re Pierce (Olivas Fee Application), 178 F.3d

1350, 1355 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per curiam)).

In short, the question is: would evidence of criminal wrongdoing by an incumbent President and accomplices of that

President have escaped an investigation of similar scope in

the absence of the Ethics in Government Act? History
13

teaches us that the answer is no. The most recent parallel

investigation of an incumbent sitting president before the

enactment of the Ethics in Government Act arose from the

Watergate scandal during the administration of President

Richard Nixon. The thoroughness of that investigation is

legend. We have no reason to believe that the Department of

Justice, the Congress, and other civil authorities would have

been any less diligent in the Clinton administration of the

1990’s than in the Nixon administration of the 1970’s. As in

Jordan, Lewinsky’s petition flounders on the ‘‘but for’’ requirement and we can award no counsel fees.

We note in passing that in Jordan, Clinton, and other fee

application decisions, we have awarded fees for time spent by

counsel reviewing the Independent Counsel’s Final Report.

See Jordan at 1255; In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan

(Clinton Fee Application), 334 F.3d 1119, 1128 (D.C. Cir.,

Spec. Div., 2003) (per curiam). Lewinsky has made no claim

for any such fees and we therefore make no similar award.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the petition is denied.