PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CHERYL S. CONNER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 98-2055

SCHRADER-BRIDGEPORT

INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Danville.

Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.

(CA-96-38-D)

Argued: January 25, 2000

Decided: September 13, 2000

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and

John T. COPENHAVER, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

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Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Copenhaver joined.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Barbara Rubin Hudson, Evanston, Illinois, for Appellant.

Arthur Bruce Sternberg, PEDERSEN & HOUPT, Chicago, Illinois,

for Appellee.

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OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Cheryl Conner appeals the district court's adverse judgment on her

Title VII hostile work environment claim. The lower court vacated a

jury verdict in favor of Ms. Conner and granted judgment as a matter

of law and a conditional new trial to her former employer, SchraderBridgeport International ("SBI"). We now reverse the district court's

judgment and remand for reinstatement of the jury's verdict.

I.

Ms. Conner originally raised three claims against SBI in her civil

action filed on July 1, 1996 in the Western District of Virginia. She

claimed SBI: (1) discharged her on account of her gender, in violation

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ; (2) subjected her to a hostile

work environment, also in violation of Title VII; 1 and (3) willfully

violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Prior to trial, the district court dismissed the claim of discriminatory discharge. After a

five-day trial in late November and early December 1997, the jury

found in Ms. Conner's favor on both the hostile work environment

and equal pay claims. On her hostile environment claim, the jury

awarded Ms. Conner $20,000 in compensatory damages and granted

punitive damages against SBI in the sum of $500,000. On the Equal

Pay Act claim, the jury found the employer's violation "willful," and

it awarded Ms. Conner $1,700 in compensatory damages. Upon considering post-trial motions, the district court, on April 30, 1998,

entered judgment on the jury's verdict against SBI for $1,700 on the

equal pay claim, plus an additional $1,700 in liquidated damages for

willfulness. The district court, however, granted SBI's motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the hostile work environment claim,

and it awarded SBI a conditional new trial pursuant to Rule 50 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court alternatively

granted a reduction in damages and a remittitur of an unspecified

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1 A "hostile work environment" is also often referred to as an "abusive

work environment." See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57, 66 (1986).

 2
amount, unless Ms. Conner elects a new trial. Ms. Conner appeals the

judgment in favor of SBI on the hostile work environment claim.

II.

A.

When reviewing a district court's entry of judgment as a matter of

law, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Brown v. CSX Transp., Inc., 18 F.3d 245, 248

(4th Cir. 1994). We accordingly recite the facts presented in support

of Ms. Conner's hostile environment claim in that light.

B.

SBI manufactures high-performance valving for automotive systems, and it includes Ford, General Motors, Toyota, and Honda

among its customers. SBI's corporate headquarters is in Illinois, and

it has several manufacturing plants in the United States (Virginia,

North Carolina, California, New York, and Oklahoma) as well as in

Ireland, Italy, India, Brazil, and Mexico. Its annual gross sales from

1993 to 1995 were about $75 million, with sales to approximately six

thousand customers worldwide.

Ms. Conner began work in 1984 as a temporary unskilled factory

worker at the manufacturing plant in SBI's Piedmont Manufacturing

Division in Altavista, Virginia. By 1992, she was working as a permanent employee in SBI's "cap and core room," assembling the stems

on car and truck tires. J.A. 93.

In 1993, SBI moved a production process to its Altavista plant that

used complex specialty equipment -- Acme-Gridley multi-spindle

machines.2 SBI created its Department 710 for this new production

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2 The record establishes that each Acme-Gridley machine was approximately 20 feet in length. Machine operators fed metal bars twelve to

fourteen feet long and weighing as much as 70 pounds into the machine.

After the machine processed the metal bars into parts, the finished parts

dropped from the machine into a pan; the Acme-Gridley machine opera-

 3
work at Altavista, and it advertised for skilled machine operators.

After Ms. Conner passed an initial screening examination, she was

permitted to enroll in a special training class for such operators at a

local community college. Upon completing the class, Ms. Conner and

twenty others took a mandatory hands-on examination. This examination tested each student's ability to diagnose and correct malfunctioning machines within a limited time period. Ms. Conner and one of her

co-workers tied for the highest score on this exam.

In support of her claim of a hostile work environment with respect

to women, Ms. Conner presented evidence of the following categories

of conduct by her supervisors and other authorized personnel: (1) disparate, lesser training; (2) unauthorized disciplinary action against

her; (3) extra burden in her job assignments; (4) disparate floor mopping duty; (5) verbal disparagement; (6) forced display of bloody

pants; (7) failure to investigate her disparate treatment allegations; (8)

lower pay rate; (9) timing her breaks with a stopwatch; and (10) termination threat as a response to her discrimination complaint.

1. Disparate, Lesser Training of Ms. Conner 

In May 1993, SBI hired Ms. Conner and a number of men (who

had also completed the community college course) for the position of

"craftsman (skilled)" to operate the multi-spindle machines in Department 710. J.A. 1002. Men who did not have prior experience operating the Acme-Gridley machines were first temporarily placed in

SBI's Department 767, where they received an additional six months

of one-on-one, hands-on training, and were taught how to properly

load metal bars into the machines. These men were then transferred

to Department 710, where they began operating the machines. Like

these men, Ms. Conner had no prior experience operating the Acme-

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tor then carried the full pan of oil-covered parts to a degreaser. Full pans

of parts weighed up to 100 pounds.

The atmosphere around these machines was dense with the oil required

to run them smoothly. Machine operators regularly were required to submerge their arms in oil; vaporized oil from the machine would fall and

settle, covering the machine operators' clothes, hair, and skin, as well as

the floor around the machine.

 4
Gridley machines, other than the training acquired in the community

college class. SBI, however, did not place Ms. Conner into Department 767, but placed her directly into Department 710. Thus, she did

not receive the additional six months of training provided to the male

machine operators initially placed in Department 767.3

George Schaefer, SBI's foreman and supervisor in Department

710, was responsible for pay raises, promotions, discipline, and terminations within the Department. On numerous occasions during the

period when Ms. Conner was employed in Department 710, Schaefer

stated explicitly that, in his view, women did not belong in the workplace at all. However, Schaefer testified at trial that he believed Ms.

Conner had "excellent mechanical ability," and estimated that of the

ten persons SBI hired from the community college training program,

Ms. Conner was "probably number three from the top." J.A. 677.

In May 1993, Ms. Conner was assigned to work on the second shift

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3 When SBI hired additional machine operators in 1994, the men hired

were again initially assigned to Department 767 for several months

before being transferred into Department 710. As with Ms. Conner's

placement in the previous year, SBI also placed Debra Rorer, another

female hired into Department 710, directly into that Department without

interim training in Department 767. In fact, the supervisor, George

Schaefer, did not allow Ms. Rorer to operate Acme-Gridley machines for

six months after she was hired as a machine operator in August 1994.

When Ms. Rorer complained, Schaefer attempted to transfer her to a

different department where women performed assembly work. However,

Ms. Rorer insisted that she should be trained to operate the AcmeGridley machines, and the personnel manager, Mr. Keller, intervened on

her behalf. Keller required Schaefer to permit Ms. Rorer to continue to

work in Department 710, as she had been hired to do. Ms. Rorer was

then assigned to operate the Acme-Gridley machines, and she worked on

the same shift as Ms. Conner prior to Ms. Conner's termination.

A third female operator hired in Department 710, Stacey Haskins, also

received no training. Schaefer showed Ms. Haskins how to turn on her

machine and told her that the next day she would run the machine by herself. Hence, the men who worked in Department 710 received additional

training that was not provided to any of the women who performed the

same work.

 5
(3:30 p.m. to 2:00 a.m., including mandatory overtime) in Department

710. J.A. 188. However, an auto accident the following month hospitalized her and caused an eight-week medically excused work

absence. Upon her return, she did not receive the regular training in

machine operations that the men hired with her were receiving. For

example, when a machine malfunctioned, supervisor Bruce Boyd

would explain and demonstrate to the male operators how to fix the

machine, and he permitted the male machine operators to assist him.

If Ms. Conner's machine malfunctioned, however, Boyd simply fixed

it without showing or explaining what he did, "rolled his eyes" at her,

and refused Ms. Conner's requests to participate and to learn how to

fix the machines.4 J.A. 104. Ms. Conner specifically asked Mr. Schaefer to see that she was provided with comparable training. However,

he dismissed her request by responding that she had a high rate of

absenteeism. J.A. 660. Mr. Schaefer took no action to improve Ms.

Conner's training in machine operating techniques.

Boyd also instructed the male machine operators, on an ad hoc

basis, on special procedures essential to operation of the AcmeGridley machines. For example, some machines processed round

metal bars, whereas others processed hexagonal bars. The round bars

would fall into place when the machine operators beat them in to the

machines. In contrast, beating on the hexagonal bars achieved nothing, as those bars had to be turned gently by hand until they slipped

into place. Significantly, Ms. Conner received absolutely no instruction or assistance on how to load the hexagonal bars. When she tried

to beat them into place, Boyd and Schaefer mocked her and laughed

at her failure. In fact, they also encouraged other male employees to

laugh at her.5 At home at night, Ms. Conner cried and soaked her blistered hands, acquired from her attempts to force the hexagonal bars

into the machines. When she asked her brother, fellow employee Jay

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4 Likewise, when co-worker Stacey Haskins's machine malfunctioned,

Boyd fixed it without showing her what he did. When Ms. Haskins asked

Boyd how he fixed the machine, he responded, "Never mind, just run it

now."

5 The men also laughed at Ms. Rorer in 1995 when she began working

on the Acme-Gridley machines, as she tried to beat hexagonal bars into

place before learning how to properly load them. Ms. Conner then taught

Ms. Rorer how to load the hexagonal bars.

 6
Shelton, to show her how to load the hexagonal bars, he came to work

early on his own time and did so. Ms. Conner was thereafter able to

load the bars successfully.6

However, supervisor Boyd and Mr. Schaefer both accused Ms.

Conner of having her brother do her work for her, and they transferred her away from Mr. Shelton to work on the first shift (7:00 a.m.

to 3:00 p.m.). J.A. 109, 274. Even then, Mr. Shelton continued to

donate his personal time to training his sister in machine set-ups7 and

tool settings. Such set-ups and tool settings were difficult but necessary skills for a machine operator, in order to prevent a machine malfunction from disrupting production. When it became apparent to Ms.

Conner's supervisors that she was not relying on her brother to do her

work, and that she actually preferred working on the first shift, she

was transferred back to the second shift.

2. Unauthorized Disciplinary Action Against Ms. Conner

In the Fall of 1993, SBI granted Ms. Conner general permission to

leave work early when there were no tasks for her to perform, consistent with its policy of permitting employees to volunteer to leave

when there was a lack of work. Then, in November 1993, because

Ms. Conner had been leaving work early, Mr. Schaefer denied her a

regular pay increase to $9.08 per hour, instead assigning her a lower

$8.55 per hour pay rate.

Significantly, alterations in an employee's pay rate on the basis of

asserted attendance problems were not authorized by SBI's disciplin-

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6 Mr. Shelton was also an Acme-Gridley machine operator on the second shift and had received training in Department 767. He witnessed the

Department 710 employees making fun of Ms. Conner when she tried to

load the machines with hexagonal bars, and he observed that no one

would assist her.

7 When a machine operator changes a machine's settings in order for

the machine to produce a different part, the operator performs a "set-up."

This process involves changing the machine's tooling, and adjusting each

tool according to blueprint specifications. Machine operators who performed set-ups were ranked at a higher grade, and thus received higher

pay rates.

 7
ary policy. SBI's "Work and Safety Rules" provide only that an

employee who engages in prohibited practices (including repeated tardiness or absenteeism, and leaving work during scheduled work hours

without authorization) "shall be subject to discharge, suspension, or

a written or oral reprimand as appropriate." J.A. 973. Ms. Conner had

never been disciplined in her SBI employment for any reason during

the prior nine years. J.A. 115.

3. Extra Burden in Ms. Conner's Job Assignments

Because the Acme-Gridley machines were idiosyncratic-- each

required its own particular techniques in order for it to perform well

-- new machine operators were typically assigned to a specific

machine and first learned how to keep that particular machine operating. An inexperienced machine operator would then advance to learning machine set-up and unplanned tool-setting only after having

gained basic operating skills on a single machine. As a result of

single-machine training, the machine operator's efficiency and productivity were greater. Contrary to this usual practice, however, Mr.

Schaefer repeatedly moved Ms. Conner from one machine to another.

This caused her to spend a much greater proportion of her time on

machine set-up and unplanned tool setting rather than on production,

as compared to her male co-workers. For the period from October

1994 through April 1995, Ms. Conner spent 139.3 hours on machine

set-up and unplanned tool setting.8 J.A. 993. By comparison, male

Acme-Gridley machine operators in Department 710 spent only 82.5,

48.3, 40.9, 15.5, 12.2, and 12.1 hours on these activities during the

same time period. Id.

Ms. Conner was also assigned to operate Acme-Gridley machines

that were producing dissimilar products and thus had dissimilar tool

settings. These assignments differed from those of male machine

operators, who operated machines that were producing similar products. Not unexpectedly, the machine operators that produced similar

products obtained greater efficiency and productivity, resulting from

the uniformity of their work and the ability to directly transfer knowledge gained from one machine's functioning to other machines per-

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8 Likewise, Ms. Haskins spent 131.3 hours on these tasks during the

same period.

 8
forming the same tasks. Ms. Conner's disparate assignments

prevented her from obtaining an equivalent efficiency and productivity.

Male machine operators were also assigned to operate machines

that were located in a more convenient manner, side by side, again

promoting greater efficiency and productivity. By contrast, Ms. Conner was assigned to operate machines that were physically separate

from one another, so that she would have to leave one machine unattended if she had operating problems on a distant machine. Being

unable to simultaneously watch her machines had adverse practical

consequences. For example, when an Acme-Gridley machine broke a

drill bit and Ms. Conner could not see the machine from across the

factory, it "wiped out all the tooling before I could even know it --

know it wasn't producing work . . . it took probably three to four

hours to get it set back up and running."9 J.A. 135. Ms. Conner's

assignments to machines that were far apart from each other further

affected her efficiency and productivity. The extra complexity of Ms.

Conner's duties also caused her to experience heightened job-related

stress.

4. Disparate Floor Mopping Duty

If Ms. Conner asked for assistance, or if her machine malfunctioned, Mr. Schaefer regularly stated to her, "You can mop the floor.

That's something you can do. You -- You should already know how

to mop the floor." J.A. 113. Even when her machine was functioning

properly, if a male operator's machine failed, Schaefer would reassign

the male operator to Ms. Conner's functioning machine and would

order Ms. Conner to mop the Department's entire floor, on both sides

of all the machines. On those occasions, Ms. Conner lost the credit

that she would have received for producing parts with her machine.

While Ms. Conner manually mopped the floor of the Altavista

plant using a large mop and a bucket for squeezing the mopped oil

and water into, her co-workers would shout at her,"Cheryl, mop the

floor. Mop the floor, Cheryl. At least you could do that." J.A. 138-39.

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9 Mr. Schaefer also required one of the other female operators, Ms.

Rorer, to operate machines that were physically separated.

 9
These events occurred regularly, approximately fifteen times per

month. On the other hand, male operators mopped the floors around

their own machines, but were not required to mop the entire floor

unless it was at the end of the day. In these instances they received

overtime pay for doing so, and unlike Ms. Conner (who was required

to use a hand mop and bucket), the male operators rode a cleaning

machine with a large "squeegee" on the bottom of it to mop the floor.10

J.A. 163.

Schaefer justified his decisions in this regard by stating to Ms.

Conner, "Why would I take a qualified machine operator and have

them mop the floor and you run a [multi-spindle] machine?" J.A. 293.

Conversely, the male machine operators were not ridiculed when they

performed mopping tasks. Ms. Conner's mopping assignments

resulted in her being less productive than the male operators and

caused her to suffer substantial stress.

5. Verbal Disparagement of Ms. Conner

When Ms. Conner became frustrated in dealing with a malfunctioning machine, Mr. Schaefer would ask her, within the hearing of other

employees, "Are you on the rag today? Didn't you get any last night?"

J.A. 134. This occurred approximately ten to twenty times per month.11

J.A. 239. By contrast, when male machine operator Noel Farrell

became angry due to balky machinery, he was neither ridiculed nor

disciplined when he left his shift early without permission, merely

announcing, "I'm leaving . . . I'm sick of this. I'm frustrated." Id.

Ms. Conner suffered from daily headaches and nausea resulting

from the humiliation she experienced at work. She was unable to take

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10 Of significance, Mr. Schaefer also required the other female coworkers, Ms. Rorer and Ms. Haskins, to mop the entire floor during their

regular work shifts, which prevented them from operating their machines

during that time. Ms. Rorer mopped the entire floor approximately three

times per week.

11 Schaefer also made similar derogatory remarks to Ms. Haskins, such

as "Are you on the rag?," on three occasions when she was not smiling

or in a good mood. J.A. 326-27. Ms. Haskins would cry later at home

from the degradation of Schaefer's remarks.

 10
the medication prescribed for her symptoms, though, because its label

warned her not to work around heavy equipment while taking it. Ms.

Conner hated going to work because of the humiliation that she experienced there. However, because Ms. Conner was the sole support for

her young son, she was unable to resign, and she lived in constant fear

of losing her job at SBI.

6. Forced Display of Bloody Pants

In January 1994, Ms. Conner was briefly hospitalized due to uterine hemorrhaging. She experienced several unexpected episodes of

uterine bleeding during the remainder of her employment at SBI, until

her May 1995 termination. If the bleeding was heavy, she became

faint, which was dangerous if she was near the active machinery. To

stop the bleeding, Ms. Conner had to remain immobile in bed for a

period of time. Approximately ten of these bleeding incidents

occurred at work, between January 1994 and May 1995.

Each time a hemorrhaging episode occurred at work, she wrapped

a rag around her waist to cover her bloodied pants, went to Schaefer's

office, and asked for permission to go home. Ms. Conner was acutely

embarrassed by the visible bloodstains on her pants. In such situations, Schaefer told Ms. Conner, "You show me that you're bleeding,

and I'll let you go." J.A. 137. Significantly, Schaefer never referred

Ms. Conner to SBI's on-site nurse for a medical verification of her

problem. Ms. Conner's co-workers could see her unwrap the rags

from her waist to display her bloodied pants to Schaefer in his open

office, which also had a large glass window facing the factory work

area.

7. Failure to Investigate Disparate Treatment Complaints

Beginning in January 1994, Ms. Conner complained on numerous

occasions to the plant's personnel manager, Mr. Keller, concerning

her improper treatment by Mr. Schaefer. SBI's "Anti-Harassment Policy" required investigation of employee complaints "thoroughly and

promptly to the fullest extent practicable." J.A. 1067. During 1994,

Ms. Conner spoke to Mr. Keller on three separate occasions about the

unreasonable differential treatment to which she was subjected by her

supervisors in the workplace. Indeed, she asked Mr. Keller to observe

 11
her supervisors' treatment of the employees in Department 710 and

to investigate further.

Despite these complaints, Keller failed to either observe how Ms.

Conner was treated or review her daily labor activity sheets. These

activity sheets demonstrated that Ms. Conner spent far more time on

machine set-ups and unplanned tool settings than the male machine

operators. Instead, Keller simply spoke to Ms. Conner's supervisors,

Schaefer and Boyd, about her. Mr. Keller concluded from those conversations that Ms. Conner was not treated differently from other

employees. Although Keller had assured Ms. Conner that he would

contact her after investigating her complaints, he failed to follow

through.

8. Lower Pay Rate for Ms. Conner

In March 1994, Mr. Schaefer evaluated Ms. Conner's attendance

and production quantity as "satisfactory." According to Boyd, Ms.

Conner had no performance or aptitude problems in her job, and she

was among the top employees of the Altavista plant with respect to

her ability to keep the Acme-Gridley machines functioning. Mr. Keller agreed that there was never any problem with Ms. Conner's quality and quantity of production, her attitude, or her safety record at

work.

However, in March 1994, Ms. Conner was advised that she would

not receive a pay raise comparable to that received by male operators

who were less experienced and less skilled than she was, because of

her absences from work. She asked Mr. Schaefer to explain why she

was not classified in the set-up pay grade. To qualify for the higher

pay grade, a machine operator must have learned how to set up her

machine. Ms. Conner regularly performed set-ups for male machine

operators who could not perform their own set-ups, but the men

received the higher set-up pay rates. Indeed, she sometimes came into

the plant on Sunday (a regular day off) to perform set-ups for male

machine operators. Mr. Schaefer responded that she would do what

she was told to do -- without question -- or she could leave. During

the period from October 1994 through April 1995, SBI paid a number

of male machine operators -- who were hired after Ms. Conner --

$10.47 per hour to perform the skilled tasks of machine set-ups and

 12
unplanned tool setting. These men performed these skilled tasks less

frequently than Ms. Conner did, but Ms. Conner was paid a rate of

only $9.44 per hour -- over a dollar per hour less than the male coworkers.12

On September 9, 1994, Ms. Conner overslept her 7:00 a.m. starting

time, and at 7:25 a.m. she called the plant to inform them that she

would be at work as soon as possible. When she arrived, Mr. Keller

counseled her about her "intolerable" and"unacceptable" performance, and he included a written warning to her, based on thirty-six

absences and eight tardies for the year. Of those absences, twenty

were medically excused accompanied by a doctor's note, and five

were vacation days.13 Later, in November 1994, Schaefer evaluated

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12 Ms. Haskins and Ms. Rorer were also paid less than the male

machine operators who performed the same specialized work, and their

pay progression ceased shortly after their employment began. Ms.

Haskins achieved a pay rate of $8.53 per hour, and Ms. Rorer attained

an $8.08 per hour rate.

Ms. Conner advised her supervisor that her lower pay rate was unfair,

especially considering that a male co-worker, Noel Farrell, was regularly

tardy and left work early without permission, and that he did so without

being disciplined. Shortly afterwards, Farrell received a written warning

that documented two incidents of tardiness, and advised him that another

unexcused tardiness would result in a three-day suspension. (Farrell's

attendance record at the Altavista plant does not show either of the two

tardy arrivals referenced in his supervisor's written warning.)

When Ms. Conner missed two days of work in August 1994 due to an

unexpected death in her family, she was placed on suspension for two

days without pay because of an unexcused absence. She complained to

Mr. Schaefer that her suspension was unfair, in light of Farrell's regular

unexcused absences that were not disciplined. Five days later, Farrell

was suspended for one day without pay when he arrived two hours late

without an excuse.

13 At trial, Schaefer incorrectly characterized Ms. Conner's attendance

record as "by far the worst" and "still probably one to two times greater

than the next person in the [D]epartment," even excluding her medically

necessary absences.

Ms. Conner had 36 unexcused absences during her SBI employment.

In comparison, male operators Richard Harvey and Jay Shelton had 36

 13
Ms. Conner's attendance and production quantity as"satisfactory,"

the same as on her previous evaluations, and noted that her "attendance and attitude . . . has much improved." J.A. 979.

9. Timing Ms. Conner's Breaks with A Stopwatch

In late 1994, Mr. Boyd followed Ms. Conner about the plant with

a stopwatch, timing her while she was in the ladies room and when

she was on breaks. He engaged in timing Ms. Conner's breaks for

approximately a month and a half. By contrast, Boyd did not time

male machine operators.

On January 3, 1995, Mr. Schaefer evaluated Ms. Conner's performance as "barely meets requirements" for production quantity and

stated that she was "slightly neglectful" in attendance. He concluded

that Ms. Conner needed to improve her "attendance, production and

performance." However, there was no consideration given to the disproportionate amount of time that Ms. Conner had been assigned to

machine set-ups and unplanned tool setting, or the time that she spent

mopping the Department's entire floor area.

Then, in early January 1995, SBI disciplined Ms. Conner for

returning eight minutes late from a timed break that began when she

entered the ladies room to wash off machine oil. 14 In contrast, breaks

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and 44 absences, respectively, for the same time period (May 1993

through May 1995). Shelton was never disciplined based on his

absences, and according to the plant manager, Martin Giudice, Shelton's

absences were about average, not excessive. Similarly, SBI's records

show that Noel Farrell had 27 absences and 28 tardies from December

1993 (when he began working at the plant) to May 1995. See supra note

12 (SBI's records overstated Farrell's actual work attendance).

14 In comparison, Mr. Schaefer failed to discipline male machine operator Richard Harvey when, on January 13, 1995, Harvey pulled out his

knife and started to sharpen it while Mr. Schaefer spoke to him about

inappropriate actions the previous day -- when Harvey threw a knocker

rod at work that could have injured others, and when he purposely broke

a machinery part. In response to Harvey's knife-sharpening activity,

Schaefer told Harvey that he was scaring Schaefer. According to Schaefer, "it was clear he was trying to intimidate me."

 14
by the male machine operators did not begin until after they had completed cleaning machine oil off of themselves and had exited the restroom. Male machine operators also frequently extended their breaks

for an extra ten minutes, without any reprimands for doing so. In fact,

Ms. Conner often operated the machines of her co-workers during the

time that they overstayed their breaks.

10. Termination Threat as Response to Discrimination Complaint

On January 18, 1995, Ms. Conner requested a meeting with the

Piedmont Manufacturing Division's president and plant manager,

Martin Giudice, concerning differences between the employment conditions for her and those of her male co-workers. Mr. Giudice prepared for the meeting by reviewing Ms. Conner's record; he decided

that in the meeting, he would express to her his disapproval of her

attendance record.

This meeting took place on January 23, 1995, with Ms. Conner,

Mr. Giudice, and Mr. Keller in attendance. According to Ms. Conner,

during the meeting Mr. Giudice dismissed her complaints by directing

her to do what her supervisor told her to do, and further directing her

not to worry about what male machine operators in the Department

were doing. Ms. Conner responded that, in her view, Giudice's

response constituted sexual discrimination. Giudice then slammed his

fist down on his desk, stood up, and screamed at her that "if this ever

comes out of your mouth again, you will be fired right here on the

spot right now." J.A. 155. Ms. Conner sat mute and crying for the

remainder of the meeting, and then exited. Stacey Haskins, who happened to be in the hallway outside Giudice's office at the time, saw

that Ms. Conner was upset and crying as she left the meeting.

At trial, SBI presented evidence that Mr. Keller wrote a memorandum describing the January 1995 meeting, which vaguely characterized Ms. Conner as having complained of unfairly being selected by

her supervisors for monitoring and discipline. Significantly, this

memorandum did not note any response to Ms. Conner's complaint.

Keller's memorandum states that Mr. Giudice informed Ms. Conner

that her attendance was "unacceptable," and that if she failed to

change her behavior her employment would be terminated. Keller

failed to record any mention of sexual discrimination. Both Giudice

 15
and Keller signed the memorandum, which was placed in Ms. Conner's employment record. Ms. Conner was not informed of the memorandum's existence and did not review it at any time while she was

employed at SBI.15

C.

On May 30, 1995, SBI terminated Ms. Conner's employment, stating that her excessive absences were its reason. Mr. Keller testified

that he calculated that approximately 34% of Ms. Conner's 1994

absences occurred on a Monday, and that in his experience, such a

higher than usual absence rate is often associated more with weekend

activities rather than illness. Keller had not, however, performed the

same calculation for any other machine operators, and when he did

so at trial, he acknowledged that male operators Harvey and Shelton

had approximately 59% and 82% of their absences, respectively, on

work days associated with weekends. See also supra note 13.

III.

A.

We review de novo a district court's grant of judgment as a matter

of law. See Brown, 18 F.3d at 248. A motion for judgment as a matter

of law after a verdict is returned is properly granted only if "there is

no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for

that party with respect to that issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. We view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine "whether a reasonable trier of fact could draw only one conclusion from the evidence." Brown, 18 F.3d at 248 (citation omitted); see

also Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 437 (4th Cir.

2000). If, giving the non-movant the benefit of every legitimate inference in her favor, there was evidence upon which the jury could reasonably return a verdict for her, we must reverse the judgment below.

_________________________________________________________________

15 Four days after Ms. Conner's meeting with Giudice, on January 27,

1995, Mr. Giudice called Ms. Haskins into his office. He asked her if she

had been sexually harassed during her employment, and he emphasized

that he had an open-door policy to talk with employees on any issue

whatsoever.

 16
See Mays v. Pioneer Lumber Corp., 502 F.2d 106, 107 (4th Cir.

1974).

A sexual harassment claim due to a hostile or abusive work environment requires proof of: (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based

on the plaintiff's sex; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and to create an abusive

work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer. See

Spicer v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Corrections , 66 F.3d 705,

709-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,

510 U.S. 17 (1993)).

The parties do not dispute the first and fourth prongs, i.e., that Ms.

Conner experienced unwelcome conduct that was imputable to the

employer through the actions of Mr. Schaefer and Mr. Giudice. As to

the second prong, that such conduct was based on Ms. Conner's gender, we agree with the district court's rejection of SBI's argument that

Ms. Conner's sexual harassment claim must fail because she did not

establish conduct of a "sexual nature."16 On appeal, SBI does not dispute the district court's ruling on this issue.

The issue here therefore relates only to the third prong of a hostile

environment claim. Under Harris, the Supreme Court determined that

"[t]he conduct in question must be judged by both an objective and

a subjective standard: [t]he conduct must be severe or pervasive

enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find

hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively regard that environment as abusive." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.

Harris directs that we must look at all the circumstances to determine whether a work environment is hostile or abusive, including: (1)

_________________________________________________________________

16 Actionable discrimination includes conduct "because of" the victim's

gender, which is broader than conduct of a "sexual nature." See Oncale

v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-81 (1998). The district court correctly concluded that here, sufficient evidence supported a

finding that Ms. Conner's gender was the cause of complained-of conduct such as the comments, "Are you on the rag?" and "Didn't you get

any last night?" as well as the requirement that the female operators mop

the floor more frequently than the male operators.

 17
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3)

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with

the plaintiff's work performance; and (5) what psychological harm, if

any, resulted. See id. at 23; Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d

234, 242 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Ms. Conner

asserts error in the district court's determination that no "actionable"

harassment occurred during the applicable period"[b]ecause none of

the conduct complained of by Conner rises to the level required to be

compensable under Title VII." J.A. 1098.

B.

In its post-trial decision, the district court identified nine separate

categories or types of conduct evidenced at trial. These categories are

as follows:

(1) male employees mocked Ms. Conner when her

machine malfunctioned;

(2) her supervisor asked her, "Didn't you get any last

night?" and "Are you on the rag?";

(3) she and the other women were forced to mop the floor

when their machines broke down and were told in a

condescending manner that "at least [they] could mop

the floor";

(4) she was singled out for discipline relating to her

absences;

(5) Schaffer made her remove the rags that she used to

cover her bloodstained pants;

(6) she was timed with a stopwatch when she went to the

bathroom;

(7) she was assigned to machines at opposite ends of the

factory, requiring her to run back and forth;

 18
(8) she was given less training than male machine operators; and

(9) in response to her complaints of unfair disparate treatment, Giudice threatened to fire her if she ever mentioned the words "sexual harassment."

J.A. 1095-96. However, the district court erred when it analyzed these

categories of Ms. Conner's evidence in a disaggregated fashion, contrary to Harris's "totality of the circumstances" test. The court concluded that the "only allegations that are even remotely close to

meeting the severe and pervasive threshold are the comments, `Are

you on the rag?' and `Didn't you get any last night?'" and the court

analyzed those comments independently of the "totality" of the situation. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-

82 (1998) ("The real social impact of workplace behavior often

depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed."); Williams

v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 562-63 (6th Cir. 1999) (evidence of sexually related remarks, foul language, and mean and inequitable treatment by co-workers gave rise to a jury question, because

impact of separate successive incidents may accumulate to create hostile environment); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 660 (6th

Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (improper to consider each offensive

event in isolation, "as the very meaning of `environment' is `[t]he surrounding conditions, influences or forces which influence or modify").

The district court characterized "[t]he mocking, the mopping, the

singling out for discipline, the timing with the stopwatch, the machine

assignments, the disparate training and the threats by Giudice" as

merely evidence "revealing the work environment to be `unpleasant

and sometimes cruel.'" It then dismissed each of these types of conduct as "at most bothersome incidents." J.A. 1097 (citation omitted).

In this regard, in addition to improperly disaggregating the incidents

from the whole, the district court adopted the view that these incidents

were not discriminatory, and thus erred by failing to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Ms. Conner. Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prod., Inc., No. 99-536, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 12, 2000)

 19
(court misapplied standard of review under Rule 50 by disregarding

evidence that supported plaintiff's prima facie case and undermined

the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation).

C.

As a preliminary matter, in its post-trial memorandum order granting judgment as a matter of law, the district court erred in determining

that certain evidence presented by Ms. Conner was"irrelevant and

prejudicial." We construe the court's post-trial determination to be a

reversal of its decision during trial that the evidence was admissible;

the district court is fully empowered to reverse its evidentiary rulings

post-trial and to reconsider that evidence's effect on the trial. See

Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (2000). However,

upon review, we must conclude that the district court properly admitted the evidence during trial, and that its post-trial decision reversing

its prior evidentiary rulings was erroneous. General Elec. Co. v.

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997) (abuse of discretion standard of

review for district court's evidentiary rulings).

1.

With respect to the comments the district court credited as potentially severe or pervasive ("Are you on the rag?" and "Didn't you get

any last night?"), after the jury returned its verdict, the court found

that the evidence that Department 710 was an unpleasant place to

work was "irrelevant and prejudicial." J.A. 1103-04. The court concluded that such comments were simply insufficient to constitute

harassment, in light of the "rugged environment" of physically

demanding work that usually caused the machine operators to be covered in oil. J.A. 1096. The court indicated that"[t]hose of us who

work in refined office jobs where socially imposed speech codes predominate must not lose sight of the fact that Title VII was not meant

to transform the rough into the sublime." Id. However, Ms. Conner

does not take issue with the physically demanding, rough, and oily

workplace (indeed, the evidence demonstrates that she performed the

demanding work well) -- instead, she alleges that she was not comparably treated because of her gender.

We are unable to discern an "inhospitable environment" exception

to Title VII's mandate that employers may not discriminate based on

 20
employees' gender as to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment." See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-35

(1977) (Title VII's bar to gender-based discrimination with respect to

female applicant for "contact" prison guard job in a maximumsecurity male prison was not surmounted merely by"peculiarly inhospitable [environment] for human beings of whatever sex" subject to

regular "violence and disorganization"); Williams, 187 F.3d at 564

("women working in the [male-dominated] trades do not deserve less

protection from the law than women working in a courthouse"), cf.

Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing the

idea that a prevailing workplace culture can excuse discriminatory

actions, as "[t]here is no assumption-of-risk defense to charges of

work place discrimination") (citing Oncale , 523 U.S. at 81-82). The

objective prong of the Harris test instead requires the jury to assess

the events in the context of the workplace, as is appropriate.

Additionally, SBI simply does not assert that Department 710's

physical environment permits different treatment of its employees

based on their gender. See United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114,

1117-18 (4th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (employer has burden to

prove that gender-based distinction is "reasonably necessary to the

normal operation of that particular business"); see also Dothard, 433

U.S. at 334 (Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification exception

is "extremely narrow").

Whether Ms. Conner experienced unlawful discrimination -- even

in SBI's "rough" environment -- must be determined based on "the

simple test of whether the evidence shows `treatment of a person in

a manner which but for that person's sex would be different.'" City

of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart , 435 U.S. 702,

711 (1978). The jury must therefore evaluate the employer's treatment of Ms. Conner in light of the work environment at the Altavista

plant, which was, as the district court found, "an unpleasant place to

work" where none of the employees were treated"tenderly." J.A.

1103. Cf. Reeves, slip op. at 16 (reasonable jury could find unlawful

discrimination even where supervisor also harassed other employees).

The factual development concerning SBI's work atmosphere was

therefore entirely appropriate and necessary, and was properly admitted into evidence at trial by the district court. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

It was, arguably, the most probative and relevant evidence with

 21
respect to Ms. Conner's claim, and we are simply unpersuaded by the

district court's post-verdict view in this regard.

2.

Further, the district court found it "not surprising that Shaeffer [sic]

sought verification" of Ms. Conner's uterine hemorrhaging condition

by insisting that she display her bloodied pants to him rather than to

a nurse, in light of her poor attendance record. J.A. 1097. After the

jury returned its verdict against SBI, the district court also expressed

"serious concerns about the impact of the testimony relating to the

bloody pants incidents," based on its view that Ms. Conner's counsel

"chose to repeatedly elicit details" about this "irrelevant and prejudicial evidence." J.A. 1103-04. However, we again disagree, conclude

that this evidence was highly relevant and probative, and find the district court's post-verdict ruling to be erroneous.

First, the court admitted evidence of the uterine hemorrhaging and

SBI's conduct relating to it, and thus had assessed its probative value

during the jury trial. See infra § III.D. During trial, the district court

properly determined that this evidence's probative value was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R.

Evid. 403. Because the evidence had been properly admitted and was

before the jury, counsel's argument in reliance on it was also entirely

proper.17

Second, the record simply fails to support the district court's

impression of any overemphasis of this evidence-- of approximately

1000 pages of transcript, Ms. Conner's testimony on the subject is

barely thirty lines. Likewise, Ms. Haskins's corroborating testimony

is fewer than fifteen lines. And, of thirty-seven pages of counsel's

closing argument, fewer than twenty-three lines refer to the subject.

Under these circumstances, we must conclude that there was no unfair

_________________________________________________________________

17 If there had been some basis to restrict the use of this evidence --

and none is evident -- the court was empowered to give limiting instructions to prevent the jury from drawing improper inferences from it. The

district court gave no such limiting instructions, consistent with its determination that the evidence was relevant and admissible.

 22
prejudice to SBI resulting from references to this highly relevant evidence relating to the bloody pants.

D.

In addition, the district court committed two distinct errors of law

by failing to apply the Harris test to determine whether the unwelcome conduct was "severe or pervasive," and by failing to properly

assess the evidence in its totality. Application of the Harris test to this

evidentiary record, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, leads

us to conclude that sufficient evidence exists for the trier of fact to

find an actionable hostile work environment in the Altavista plant.

We review the Harris factors in turn:

1. Frequency of the Unwelcome Conduct

We find ample evidence before the jury to support a conclusion of

both frequent and unwelcome conduct. More specifically, the evidence established:

(a) Ms. Conner was required to mop the entire floor several times each week, while her supervisors led her coworkers in ridiculing, belittling, and mocking her. See

supra § II.B.4. Unlike the male machine operators, she

was not allowed time to clean the heavy layer of

machine oil off of herself before her breaks began. See

supra § II.B.9. She was followed and timed with a

stopwatch during her breaks for approximately six

weeks. Id.

(b) On a regular basis, her work assignments were not

comparable to those of the male operators, as demonstrated by the contrast between the number of hours

Ms. Conner spent on the advanced tasks of unplanned

tool setting and machine set-up, as compared to the

male operators. See supra § II.B.3.

(c) When the men learned the advanced tool setting and

machine set-up skills, they were promoted to a higher

 23
pay grade, unlike Ms. Conner. See supra§ II.B.8.

SBI's failure to pay Ms. Conner comparably affected

her daily from November 1993 until her termination in

May 1995, and was particularly egregious because: (i)

she was one of the most capable employees in the

Department (according to Boyd and Schaefer); and (ii)

she even came to the plant on her non-work days to

perform advanced tasks for men who were incapable of

performing them and were themselves paid at the

higher rate. Id.

(d) Schaefer repeatedly and inappropriately asked Ms.

Conner if she was "on the rag." See supra § II.B.5.

(e) Schaefer repeatedly and inappropriately asked Ms.

Conner if she "got any last night." See supra § II.B.5.

(f) Approximately ten different times, Ms. Conner was

not permitted to leave the factory floor until, each

time, she showed her supervisor the blood from her

uterine hemorrhaging. See supra § II.B.6.

The frequency and regularity of the unwelcome conduct established by the evidence here is similar to that underlying our decision

in Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir.

1995). In Amirmokri, a supervisor and co-workers referred to the

plaintiff by derogatory nicknames almost daily, just as Schaefer often

used gender-based taunts to ridicule Ms. Conner. See Amirmokri, 60

F.3d at 1131. Like the plaintiff in Amirmokri , Ms. Conner experienced frequent humiliation because she was given work assignments

that were more difficult than those of her co-workers. Id. The regularity of the unwelcome conduct here is entirely different from the few,

scattered remarks that we determined were merely"offensive" in

Hartsell v. Duplex Products, Inc., 123 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting four instances of others' gender-based derogatory office commentary). Further, unlike the plaintiff in Hartsell, who herself uttered

numerous vulgarities in the workplace, Ms. Conner was the regular

target of the unwelcome conduct rather than a willing participant in

such conduct. See Hartsell, 123 F.3d at 773. There was therefore

 24
ample evidence before the jury establishing that Ms. Conner experienced frequent and unwelcome gender-based hostile conduct.

2. Severity of the Unwelcome Conduct

The second Harris factor, the severity of the unwelcome conduct,

taken as a whole, is also firmly established on this evidentiary record.

For example:

(a) Ms. Conner was denied the necessary training to perform her job. See supra § II.B.1. She was thereafter

inequitably assigned to perform more difficult tasks.

See supra § II.B.3; see also Amirmokri , 60 F.3d at

1131 (supervisor tried to embarrass plaintiff by giving

him impossible tasks and by stating in front of his coworkers that plaintiff did not know what he was

doing). She nonetheless performed skilled tasks, sometimes assisting men who did not have those necessary

skills, and she did so at a lower rate of pay. See supra

§ II.B.8. Also, she was selectively disciplined for her

absences. See supra § II.B.2. When she sought remedy

for these disparities, her concerns were repeatedly

ignored by the responsible authorities. See supra

§ II.B.7; see also, e.g., Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 573 (8th Cir. 1997) (managers' failure to respond to complaints added to hostile environment).

(b) Ms. Conner was required to expose her uterine blood

to Mr. Schaefer, and to do so within view of her coworkers. See supra § II.B.6. This unnecessary and

deeply invasive mandate is certainly "severe" by any

definition. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210,

1214 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that privacy justified

the district court's order that prevented male prison

guards from viewing female inmates during the early

morning, when "one may find her night clothes and

bedding visibly soiled from an unexpected menstrual

flow [which she] wish[ed] to clean up"), cited with

 25
approval in Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119-20

(4th Cir. 1981).

(c) Schaefer publicly asked Ms. Conner if she was"on the

rag," and in this manner, he dismissed the legitimacy

of her frustrations by personal gender-based remarks.

See supra § II.B.5. His remarks are unlike the generalized and plaintiff-invited references to gender stereotypes in Hartsell. See Hartsell, 123 F.3d at 772 (office

comments that females would "cry like a baby," and

suggestions that women be a "mini van driving

mommy," or "like a good wife" were not severe in a

context where the plaintiff herself referenced masturbation and used profanity to refer to her supervisor).

Schaefer's references to Ms. Conner's menstruation

amplified the severity of his requirement that Ms. Conner actually expose her gynecological blood to him.

(d) Schaefer publicly asked her "didn't she get any last

night?," another personalized offensive utterance. See

supra § II.B.5; see also, e.g. , Spicer, 66 F.3d at 707

(abusive environment established by two days of a few

co-workers' remarks such as "This is nipple check

day," and "Which one is bigger?").

(e) The regular mocking of Ms. Conner while she mopped

the floor is also of consequence for our view of the

totality of the circumstances. See supra§ II.B.4; see

also Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1131 (supervisor and coworkers abused Iranian plaintiff almost daily by calling

him a "camel jockey," "the local terrorist," and "the

Emir of Waldorf").

The more serious incidents enumerated here were complemented

by numerous additional occurrences that, in isolation, may have

seemed less problematic, but which actually served to exacerbate the

severity of the situation. Reviewed and considered cumulatively, the

unwelcome conduct here was clearly of sufficient severity to support

the jury's verdict against SBI.

 26
3. Nature of the Unwelcome Conduct

We next turn to the third Harris factor: whether the evidence demonstrates unwelcome conduct that was physically threatening or

humiliating, or that instead merely constituted offensive utterances.

Some examples of such unwelcome conduct found in the evidentiary

record are the following:

(a) Ms. Conner, one of the higher-performing machine

operators at the plant, was paid less than male machine

operators who did not possess equivalent skills, and

who sought her assistance on their machines. See supra

§ II.B.8. This difference in compensation, unrelated to

her job performance, was humiliating and offensive.

(b) Ms. Conner experienced a single powerful incident of

gender-based intimidation, when in her meeting with

Giudice, he slammed his clenched fist on his desk and

screamed that he would fire her on the spot if she ever

mentioned sexual discrimination again. See supra

§ II.B.10; see also Smith, 202 F.3d at 242 (discriminatory intimidation, as well as ridicule and insult, can

contribute to an alteration of the conditions of the victim's employment to create an abusive working environment).

(c) Schaefer's questions of "Are you on the rag?" and

"Didn't you get any last night?" constitute, in context

and by their frequency, personally humiliating public

ridicule. See supra § II.B.5. Such gender-based ridicule

was amplified by Schaefer's leadership in mocking

Ms. Conner while she complied with his orders that

she perform the stereotypically female task of mopping, which men in the same job class were not

required to perform. See supra § II.B.4.

(d) In order to obtain permission to leave the work floor

in response to a medical and safety need, Ms. Conner

repeatedly had to display her gynecological bleeding to

Schaefer, who also frequently and quite publicly

 27
humiliated her by asking, "Are you on the rag?" See

supra §§ II.B.5, II.B.6. While the district court reasoned that "[t]here was no evidence that Schaefer made

the plaintiff show her blood-stained pants for any reason other than to verify the presence of a medical problem," this suggestion is logically flawed. First, because

Schaefer flatly denied Ms. Conner's version of these

incidents, there is no affirmative evidence of any medical purpose underlying his disavowed conduct. Second, Schaefer's visual inspection could not provide

any verification of a medical problem, because blood

on a woman's pants can also indicate normal body functions.18 Cf. Dorland's Medical Dictionary 1013 (28th

ed. 1994) (menstruation is a normal discharge of blood

from the uterus). A senseless mandate from a supervisor that an employee expose symptoms of a deeply private reproductive system dysfunction is simply

humiliating, especially when, as here, that mandated

display must occur within eyesight of other employees.

We conclude that the unwelcome conduct established by this

record was sufficiently humiliating and physically threatening to support the jury's verdict.

4. Unreasonable Interference with Work Performance

The fourth Harris factor requires us to determine whether the evidence shows that the frequent and unwelcome conduct unreasonably

interfered with Ms. Conner's work performance.

Under the evidence, SBI failed to provide the usual training to Ms.

_________________________________________________________________

18 The district court indicated that "[g]iven Conner's poor attendance

record, it is not surprising that Shaeffer [sic] sought verification of this

condition." We are unpersuaded by this argument, in light of Schaefer's

blanket denial of having engaged in the conduct, and in light of the

undisputed evidence that SBI's medical verification policy required

employees to provide a note from a health care professional. There simply was no evidence suggesting that SBI physically inspected its employees to verify their asserted medical needs.

 28
Conner, see supra § II.B.1, by not initially assigning her to Department 767 with the new male machine operators, and also by denying

her ad hoc lessons and practice on a day-to-day basis throughout her

employment. These omissions undermined her ability to perform

despite her excellent aptitude for the tasks. As a result, Ms. Conner

alone bore the responsibility for acquiring the necessary job skills,

unlike her counterparts, the male machine operators.

Ms. Conner's specific job assignments (unlike those of her male

counterparts), see supra §§ II.B.3, II.B.4, also interfered with her performance -- she operated physically separated machines; those

machines produced dissimilar parts, which slowed her operation time

by precluding a rapid transfer of knowledge between machines. She

was often reassigned to tool setting and set-ups rather than permitted

to operate her machines as they were producing parts. She also regularly had to mop the entire floor during the time that the men were

able to produce parts.

We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the

jury to find that the disparate and adverse treatment of Ms. Conner in

Department 710 unreasonably interfered with her work performance,

due to her gender, during the course of her SBI employment.

5. Psychological Harm

We must also consider, pursuant to Harris, whether there was evidence, from the plaintiff's subjective perception of the hostile work

environment, i.e., that psychological harm resulted therefrom.

On this record, Ms. Conner experienced regular, profound humiliation because of her gender, unlike the male machine operators. The

disparate duties assigned to her, and the failure to provide her with

needed training prior to the task assignments, placed her in a significantly higher-stress workplace than experienced by the male machine

operators. She suffered pain from the blistered hands that resulted

from her efforts to force the hexagonal bars into the machines,

because her supervisors failed to show her how to properly load the

bars.

 29
Ms. Conner suffered daily headaches and nausea from the humiliation, and as a result, a doctor prescribed medication for her. The

workplace disparities caused her to have constant fear that she would

lose her job, adding even more stress. When she met with the plant

manager, Mr. Giudice, to inform him of these disparities, he screamed

at her and threatened to terminate her "on the spot," causing her to

immediately start crying. She cried throughout the rest of that meeting. J.A. 155.

We find sufficient evidence before the jury to support Ms. Conner's subjective perception of Department 710 as a hostile and abusive environment towards women. The evidence supports the jury's

finding that this environment resulted in psychological harm to her.

6. Summary

Applying the Harris factors to this record, viewed in the totality of

the circumstances, there is ample support for the jury finding of

severe or pervasive conduct sufficient to constitute a hostile work

environment. Indeed, in our view, the conduct evidenced here is

extreme. Our conclusion is buttressed by the legal principle that

whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create

a hostile work environment is "quintessentially a question of fact" for

the jury, Smith, 202 F.3d at 243 (citing Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d

524, 530 (4th Cir. 1994)), as is the issue of the plaintiff's credibility.

The fact that two female machine operators later hired into the

Department, Ms. Rorer and Ms. Haskins, experienced the same types

of unwelcome conduct is also highly supportive of the jury's determination of a gender-based hostile work environment. See Harris v. L

& L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1997) (identical course

of harassment experienced by two female employees indicated it was

not an isolated phenomenon); Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 19

F.3d 533, 538 (10th Cir. 1994) (because critical inquiry in hostile

environment claim is the environment, sexual harassment incidents

directed at other employees can prove plaintiff's claim).

We accordingly conclude that there is sufficient evidence in this

record to support the jury's finding of a hostile work environment.19

_________________________________________________________________

19 SBI raises three additional arguments, as follows:

First, SBI contends that the harassment claim impermissibly exceeds

 30
IV.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court's grant of a

conditional new trial. See Atlas Food Sys. and Serv., Inc. v. Crane

Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1996). A new trial is

warranted when (1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the verdict is based upon evidence which is false; or (3) the

verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. In considering a new

trial motion, the district court may weigh the evidence and consider

the credibility of the witnesses. Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transport Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1980).

A.

As explained previously, the district court erred when it failed to

apply the appropriate legal standard to evaluate whether the evidence

was sufficient to establish existence of a hostile work environment.

_________________________________________________________________

the scope of Ms. Conner's EEOC charge that alleged that she was "harassed and subjected to different terms and conditions of employment . . .

and in general was treated differently than the males." J.A. 1014. We

find that her claims in her judicial complaint are reasonably related to her

EEOC charge. See Smith, 202 F.3d at 246 (citation omitted).

Second, SBI asserts that Ms. Conner's sexual harassment claim is limited to the 180-day period preceding her EEOC claim because incidents

outside the statutory window are time-barred unless they can be related

to a continuing violation. SBI contends that no continuing violation

occurred. We agree with the district court's rejection of this argument,

as the continuing conduct was plainly evidenced during the relevant

period.

Third, SBI maintains that Ms. Conner failed to file her charge with the

appropriate state agency. Ms. Conner moved to supplement the record on

appeal with a copy of the EEOC's letter transmitting Ms. Conner's

charge to the Virginia Council on Human Rights ("VCHR") pursuant to

the agencies' worksharing agreement. We grant the motion and conclude

that Ms. Conner properly filed her charge with the VCHR. See Puryear

v. County of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2000); see also J.A.

278-79 (evidence of charge filed with EEOC and its issuance of right-tosue letter).

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See supra § III.A. And a material legal error by definition constitutes

an abuse of discretion. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100

(1996). We therefore must reverse the district court's grant of the conditional new trial. Cf. Weisgram, 120 S. Ct. at 1015 (if court of

appeals concludes that the loser on appeal has had full and fair opportunity to present the case, including arguments for a new trial, appellate court may appropriately instruct district court to enter judgment).

B.

Further, the district court based its grant of a conditional new trial

on its weighing of the evidence, concluding that the verdict was a

product of the jury's "passion, whim, and emotion." The court viewed

Ms. Conner's testimony about the frequency of Mr. Schaefer's comments and about the meeting with Mr. Giudice as not credible, incorrectly determined that irrelevant and prejudicial evidence affected the

jury's verdict, see supra § III.C., and found that the damages award

was too large. See J.A. 1100-07.

1.

Our review of the record convinces us that the extensive corroborating evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it,

support Ms. Conner's testimony on the two minor points that the district court apparently disbelieved. See Abasiekong v. City of Shelby,

744 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir. 1984) (trial judge should not substitute

his own judgment of facts and witness credibility, particularly where

the subject matter of the trial is easily comprehended by a lay jury).20

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20 We are also unpersuaded by the district court's reasons for discounting two points in Ms. Conner's testimony. First, as to Ms. Conner's trial

testimony on the frequency that Schaefer remarked,"Didn't you get any

last night?" or "Are you on the rag?," she testified that Schaefer made

these remarks approximately ten to twenty times per month. This testimony is not necessarily inconsistent with her deposition testimony,

which SBI was permitted to fully utilize for impeachment purposes.

Second, the district court apparently disbelieved Ms. Conner's testimony about her meeting with Giudice. Giudice and Keller testified that

sexual harassment was not mentioned in the meeting. The district court

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In any event, minor inconsistencies cannot justify such an intrusion

into the jury's purview. This jury verdict was simply not against the

clear weight of the evidence; a jury could reasonably find, under the

totality of circumstances, that Ms. Conner was subjected to an abusive

work environment based on gender. See Abasiekong , 744 F.2d at

1059; cf. Boczar v. Manatee Hosp. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d

1514, 1519 (11th Cir. 1993) (reversing conditional new trial grant and

remanding for reinstatement of the verdict in light of simple issue

presented that was sharply disputed, and evidence permitted reasonable jury inference supporting plaintiff's claim).

2.

As we have already determined, the district court's view that the

jury heard irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial evidence is incorrect

under Harris. See supra § III.C. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion in ruling that the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.21 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 961 F.2d 1190,1197

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found Giudice and Keller more credible because they"testified in conformity with a contemporaneously drafted memorandum." The court also

viewed as "almost impossible to believe" Ms. Conner's testimony about

the meeting, based on Ms. Haskins' "very credible" testimony that four

days later, Giudice initiated a meeting with her to ascertain that she did

not feel sexually harassed. The district court did not view as probative

that Ms. Haskins saw Ms. Conner leave her meeting with Giudice in

tears. However, the jury evidently accepted another reasonable interpretation: (1) the memorandum -- allegedly contemporaneous, but which

was not shown to Ms. Conner until after litigation began -- was constructed in anticipation of possible litigation; (2) Giudice's unusual meeting with Ms. Haskins (Ms. Conner's co-worker) four days after his

meeting with Ms. Conner, appears to have been in reaction to Ms. Conner's discrimination claim to him; and (3) Ms. Conner left her meeting

with Giudice in tears because he threatened her with termination if she

mentioned sexual discrimination again. Intrusion into the jury's province

-- the determination of credibility -- is simply not warranted on this evidence. Cf. Reeves, slip op. at 18 (reinstating jury verdict of workplace

discrimination that was sufficiently supported by the evidence, rather

than reconsidering new trial motion after reversing grant of summary

judgment).

21 That the jury carefully considered the evidence before it, and based

its award thereon, is further indicated by the jury's award of less dam-

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(5th Cir. 1992) (district court abused its discretion by granting conditional new trial based on prejudice from evidence that was relevant,

admitted, and only briefly referenced by counsel); Douglass v. Eaton

Corp., 956 F.2d 1339, 1344 (6th Cir. 1992) (district court abused its

discretion by concluding evidence of workplace disparities was irrelevant, based on the court's interpretation of the employer's differential

treatment of employees), abrogated on other grounds by Weisgram,

120 S. Ct. at 1019.

3.

Whether the jury's award was excessive is a question of law, which

we review de novo. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518

U.S. 415, 435-36 & n.18 (1996). We find that a compensatory damages award of $20,000 is entirely reasonable -- and not excessive --

for discrimination that the jury reasonably could find that Ms. Conner

experienced. Cf. Kimzey, 107 F.3d at 570 ($35,000 compensatory

damages for sexual harassment); Hearn v. General Elec. Co., 927 F.

Supp. 1486, 1500-01 (M.D. Ala. 1996) ($50,000 and $20,000 in compensatory damages for plaintiffs' mental anguish from suffering gender discrimination); Reinhold v. Commonwealth of Va., No. 96CV82,

1996 WL 1061854, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 31, 1996) (jury verdict summary) ($85,000 compensatory damages for sexual harassment),

vacated and remanded in light of new Supreme Court decisions, 151

F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998).

4.

A punitive damages award is appropriate where the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with

malice or with reckless indifference to the [plaintiff's] federally protected rights." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). The standard required to qual-

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ages than requested on Ms. Conner's Equal Pay Act claim. The jury's

award corresponded to her claimed lost wages limited to the statutory

period for allowable recovery under Title VII. Although the Equal Pay

Act actually permits a longer recovery period than does Title VII, the

jury's damages award demonstrates its thoughtful and rational deliberation of the matters with which it was charged.

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ify for a punitive damages award, the "reprehensible character of the

conduct[,] is not generally considered apart from the requisite state of

mind," and employers need not "engage in conduct with some independent, `egregious' quality before being subject to a punitive

award." Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2124,

2126 (1999).22 Under this Kolstad standard, the evidence presented

here was sufficient to support the jury's award of punitive damages.

However, the amount of the award was by law excessive and we must

remand for factual development. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Title VII

plaintiff's total compensatory and punitive damages award may not

exceed $300,000).23

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's award of

judgment as a matter of law to SBI, and we also reverse its award to

SBI of a conditional new trial. We remand this case to the district

court for the jury's verdict to be reinstated, and for such further proceedings as may be warranted.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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22 The district court's opinion relied on a standard that was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court's Kolstad decision.

23 The parties disagree as to the applicable damages maximum under 42

U.S.C. § 1981a. The issue relating to determination of this damages maximum has not yet been addressed by the district court.

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