UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4601

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE WAYNE REESE,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-4611

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LANCE TERRELL REESE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:15-cr-00032-LO-1; 1:15-cr-00032-LO-2)

Submitted: August 15, 2016 Decided: September 12, 2016

Before KING and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.
2

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dontae Lamont Bugg, BUGG LAW FIRM, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia; 

Geremy Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Kevin R. Brehm, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellants. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Michael E. 

Rich, Christopher Catizone, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

After a jury trial, Lawrence Reese (“Lawrence”) and Lance 

Reese (“Lance”) were convicted of various charges relating to 

the arson of Lawrence’s business. Lawrence and Lance were

convicted of conspiracy to commit arson and arson, violations of 

18 U.S.C. § 844(n), (i) (2012), respectively. Lawrence also was 

convicted of arson to commit mail fraud, a violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 844(h) (2012); arson to commit wire fraud, a § 844(h)

violation; mail fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012);

and wire fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 

On appeal, Lance challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his convictions. Next, Lawrence and Lance assert 

that the district court erred by refusing to grant a new trial 

based on certain comments made by the district court. Finally, 

Lawrence challenges the district court’s imposition of 

consecutive rather than concurrent sentences. We affirm. 

I.

Lance asserts that the district court erred by denying his 

motion for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). 

We review the court’s denial de novo, United States v. Fuertes, 

805 F.3d 485, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 

1220 (2016), and view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Government to determine whether the guilty verdict is 

supported by substantial evidence. United States v. Bailey, 819 
4

F.3d 92, 95 (4th Cir. 2016). “In determining whether there is 

substantial evidence to support a verdict, we defer to the 

jury’s determinations of credibility and resolutions of 

conflicts in the evidence, as they are within the sole province 

of the jury and are not susceptible to judicial review.” United 

States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Lance contests the Government’s proof of his participation 

in the conspiracy on the ground that the only evidence was the 

testimony of a convicted coconspirator. We have held, however, 

“that the testimony of a co-defendant standing alone and 

uncorroborated is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United 

States v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382, 386 (4th Cir. 1998); United 

States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1190 & n.10 (4th Cir. 1997). 

After viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most 

favorable to the Government, we conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence to prove Lance’s involvement in the 

underlying conspiracy and aiding and abetting the arson. See

United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 149 (4th Cir. 2016) 

(stating elements of conspiracy), petition for cert. filed, __ 

U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. June 23, 2016) (No. 16-5017); United States v. 

White, 771 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating elements of 

arson), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1573 (2015); United States v. 

Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 389 n.6 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating elements 
5

of aiding and abetting). Thus, the district court did not err 

in denying Lance’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

II.

The Reeses challenge the district court’s denial of the 

motion for a new trial based on certain comments made by the 

district court during trial. Generally, “we review the district 

court’s denial of a [Fed. R. Crim. P. 33] motion for a new trial 

for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Parker, 790 F.3d 

550, 558 (4th Cir. 2015). When a party fails to object during 

trial, however, our review is for plain error.1 United States v. 

Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 222 (4th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other 

grounds by United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 

2015); United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 672 (4th Cir. 

2001). Under either standard, Lawrence and Lance are entitled 

to no relief.

The Reeses contend that the district court improperly 

commented on the coconspirator’s testimony. See United States 

 1 To overturn the Reeses’ convictions under plain error 

review, we must find (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) 

that affects substantial rights. Molina-Martinez v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016). Even if all three 

conditions are met, it is within our discretion whether to 

remedy the error, and we will refrain from intervening unless 

“the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 
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v. Martinovich, 810 F.3d 232, 239 (4th Cir. 2016) (providing 

standard). Here, the district court’s intervention “simply 

fulfill[ed] its obligation to clarify confused factual issues or 

misunderstandings [and] to correct inadequacies of examination 

or cross-examination.” United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 

1273 (4th Cir. 1995). In addition, the district court gave 

numerous instructions to the jury reminding the jury that it was 

their recollection of the evidence that controlled. See

Martinovich, 810 F.3d at 241. We therefore conclude that the 

court’s isolated statement did not unfairly prejudice either 

Lance or Lawrence so as to deprive either of a fair trial. See

United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336 (4th Cir. 2008).

Next, the Reeses challenge the district court’s comments 

during Lance’s counsel’s closing argument and during the 

Government’s closing rebuttal argument. Our review of the 

record leads us to conclude that the district court did not err 

in denying the motion for a new trial on these grounds. The 

court instructed the jury that it was the Government’s burden to 

prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that it was the jury’s 

recollection of the evidence that controlled. See Martinovich, 
7

810 F.3d at 241. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of 

the motion for a new trial was not erroneous.2

III.

Finally, Lawrence challenges his sentence. Our precedent 

forecloses his argument that his sentences for arson and 

conspiracy should be imposed concurrently with his sentences for 

arson to commit mail and arson to commit wire fraud. See United 

States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 281, 293 n.6 (4th Cir. 2008); see 

also 18 U.S.C. § 844(h). Thus, the district court appropriately 

sentenced Lawrence to a total of 15 years’ of imprisonment. 

IV.

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

 2 To the extent Lance and Lawrence also argue that the 

cumulative effect of the court’s comments deprived them of a 

fair trial, we reject this claim as well.