CLD
- 060 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 0 7

- 4307

___________ SALIH HALL**; KENNETH M. SMITH*; LLOYD DIXON, III, Appellants

v. GOVERN O R RUTH ANN MINNER; JOSEPH BEAU BIDEN,

ATTO RNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE; JAMES T. VAUGHN, President Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware; CARL C. DANBERG, C OMMISSIONER OF THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; RENATA HENRY, Director of the Delaware Division of Substan ce Abuse and Mental Health * Dismissed pursuant to Clerk's Order of 11/19/09. ** Dismissed pursuant to Clerk's Order of 12/01/10.

____________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil N o. 0 7

- cv
- 0 0392 ) District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 9, 2010
B efore: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH , Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: January 5, 2011 )2 _________ OPINION OF THE COURT

_________ PER CURIAM

. Lloyd Dixon , III, a Delaware inmate , commenced this suit along with two other inmates by filin g a pro se complaint in the District Court for the District of Delaware purporting to seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Title II of the Americans w ith
Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

. Although t he complaint sets forth numerous allegations , we briefly summarize the allegations that are relevant to our disposition of this appeal.
Dixon was convicted in 1994 o f firs t

- degree burglary ; based on his history of prior felony convictions , he was sentenced as a n “ habitual offender” to life imprisonment. See
Di xon v. State , 673 A.2d 1220, 1223 (Del. 1996)

. Under Delaware law , a life sentence is required for “[a]ny person who has been 2 times convicted of a felony ... and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony [.] ” 11 Del. Code § 4214(b). The Delaware Supreme Court has “held that the legislature intended to reserve the habitual offender penalties for those individuals who were not rehabilitated after the specified number of separate encounters with the criminal justice system and a correspondin g number of chances to reform.” Buckingham v. State , 482 A.2d 327, 330 (Del. 1984).
Dixon contends in th is suit that the predicate felony convictions that formed the
basis for his habitual

- offender s entence were the result of conduct that he engaged in

w hile suffering from chemical dependenc y or drug addiction. He alleges that the state3 officials named here as defendants failed , allegedly due to a discriminatory animus, to
afford opportunit ies for Dixon to receive drug treatment following his earlier con victions

. In doing so, Dixon claims, defendants failed to afford him a “ chance to reform ” so that he
could avoid be coming an habitual offender.
Dixon asserts that his chemical dependency is a dis ease and “ disability ” under the
ADA , and that his disease went untreated despite the State having received federal funds to provide treatment

. Claiming that defendants were “deliberate ly indifferent” to his
need for treatment so that he could avoid future felony convictions , Dixon asked the
District Court , inte r alia , to declar e h is habitual

- offender s entence unconstitutional “because [he was] never provided the requisite number of treatment opportunities before being declared incorrigible under habitual offender pro ceedings.” Complaint at ¶ 35.
Dixon also sou ght class certification on behalf of other inmates similarly situated

. The District Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). In a subsequent order, the Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A( b)(2) for failure to state a claim upo n which relief can be granted, and determined that any amendment to the complaint would be futile. Dixon and his fellow plaintiffs timely filed this appeal. 1

1 Plaintiffs Salih Hall and Kenneth M. Smith initially joined in the appeal. Smith later voluntarily withdrew, and Hall was dismissed from the appeal after he was denied leave to proceed IFP and failed to pay the filing fee. Dixon, the lone remaining appellant, is proceeding IFP on appeal . Our review is limited to Dixon’s claims.4 This Court has appellate jurisd iction under 28 U.S.C. § 1 291. We exercise plenary
review over a district court’s sua sponte dismiss al of an IFP complaint for failure to state
a claim. Allah v. Seiverling , 22 9 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
The District Court rejected Dixon ’s Title II claim s for a vari ety of reasons, but we need only address one of those reasons
-- the statute of limitations

-- because it plainly
dictates dismissal. A district court has authority t o dismiss a complaint sua sponte under § 1915(e) where, as here, the statute of limitations defe nse is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the factual record is required. See, e.g. , Fogle v.
Pierson , 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006). “[T] he statute of limitations applicable to
claims under Title II of the ADA

... is the s tatute of limitations for personal injury
actions in the state in which the trial court sits. ” Disabled in Action v. SEPTA , 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008)

. The state at issue here, Delaware, has a two

- year limitations period

. See 10 Del. Code § 8119. “[A] federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis
for the claim. ” Disabled in Action , 539 F.3d at 209 ( quotation marks omitted )

. Dixon was sentenced as an h abitual offender in 1994. He filed this suit thirteen years later, on June 16, 2007. Dixon is plainly time barred as to any claim that he might

assert under Title II based on an alleged failure to afford treatment for his drug addiction

-- treatment whic h , according to the complaint , should have been provided in the years prior to Dixon’s 1994 sentencing as an habi tual offender

. It is clear that a ny a mendment5 to the complaint to correct this defect would be futile

. S ee Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 29 3 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)

. I nsofar as Dixon’s pro se complaint c an be read liberally to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such as a claim of deliberate indifference to a past serious medical need for drug treatment, see Complaint at ¶ 31, the same two

- yea r statute of limitations period applies

. S ee McDowell v. Del aware State Police , 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 1996)

. Our review of the complaint reveals no basis for any claim under § 1983 that can be said to have accrued within two years prior t o Dixon’s filing of this suit on June 16, 2007. Finally, we agree with the District Court that Dixon ’s request to have his sentence
declar ed unconstitutional improperly crosse s the line into a request for habeas corpus
relief . As this Court has explaine d , “ whenever the challenge ultimately attacks the ‘ core of habeas ’

-- the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence

-- a challenge, however denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition. ” Leamer v. Fauver , 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002)

. Title II and § 1983 do not provide a means for Dixon to overturn his presumptively valid criminal sentence. In sum, and a fter a review of the entire record, we conclude that Dixon’s claims

were properly dismissed

. B ecause his appeal lacks arguable legal merit , s ee Neitzke v.
Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) , we will dismiss it under § 1915(e)(2)(B) (i)

. Dixon’ s motion for summary action is denied.