The Honor able James G. Carr , Senior United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District * of Ohio, sitting by

desig nation. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0155n.06 No. 09-5973 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
J ERRY STAMPER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly

situated, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. CAMPBEL LCOUNTY, KENTUCKY, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

Be fore : BOG GS and COOK, Circuit Judges; CARR, District J udg e. * COOK, Circuit J udg e. Jerry Stamper’s dispute with Campbell County (County) ar ises from its suspension of his telephone privileg es at t he Campbell County Detention Center

(De tention Ce nte r) fi ve da

y s p ri or to h is p le a

he ari ng . St amper bro ught a § 1 98 3 a c tio n, se e kin g c la ss
cer tification and a lleg ing that the C ounty ’s policy of punishing ja il inmates for rules violations by denying them telephone privileg es violated his Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel. The district cour t g rante d summary

judgme nt to the C ounty . Stamper now a ppeals, c laiming that ( 1) the district cour t
err ed by failingto rec og nize that the policy completely

denied him ac cess to counse l during a cr iticalNo. 09-5973

Stamper v. Campbe ll Cnt y.

- 2 - p e r io d , an d

( 2 ) th e Co un ty

la c k e d a c o mp e ll in g r e a s o n f

o r r e mo v in g h is te le p h o n e p r iv il e g e s . We aff irm.
I.
Th e inc ide nt t

hat le d to the te le ph on e su sp e ns ion a t is su e be g an whe n St ampe r a nd his cellmates ig nored a serg eant’ s instruction to remove hang ing towe ls and clothing that obstructed he r ability to see inside. De puty

jailers then se arc hed the c ell and located items of contra band including piece s of metal, shank pe ns, and a br oken ra z or handle . The sea rch, more over, r evea led that the i n m at e s h a d

p a p e r e d o v e r an a r e a w h e r e t h e y

h a d r e m o v e d c o n c r e t e , c r e a t i n g a

s e c ur i ty r i s k
. In response , the Detention Center suspended tele phone use f or the c ell up to and includingthe day of Stamper’s plea hear ing. Prior to this suspension, Stamper’s court-a ppointed attorney

visited him at the Dete ntion Center at lea st three times, spoke to him on the phone approximately three times, and
rec eived a

letter fr om Stamper reg ardingthe neg otiation of a plea agre ement. Stamper a g ain met with his attorney

the day of his plea he aring ; he pleade d g uilty t o t h re e counts a nd a four th was dismiss ed. Stamper c oncede s his satisfaction with the plea a g ree ment.
II.
This court re views a district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt de novo, af

firmingif, vie wi nga ll of the e vid e nc e in favo r of the no nmo vin g pa rt y , no g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f a c t e xists
.No. 09-5973

Stamper v. Campbe ll Cnt y.

- 3 - Bishop v. Children’s Ctr. for Dev elopmen t a l Enrichment , 618 F.3d 533, 536 ( 6th Cir. 2010); Ve re e c k ev . H ur on Va lle

ySc h. Di st. , 609 F.3d 392, 399 ( 6th Cir. 2010).

A.
Ordinar ily , a def

endant a lleg ing ineffe ctive counse l must show prejudice to pre vail under the familiar Strickland standard. See M itchell v. Mason , 3 2 5 F
. 3 d 7 3 2 , 7 4 0 ( 6 thCi r . 2 0 0 3 )
. We presume pr ejudice, how ever , when “‘circ umstances [ exis t] that are so likely to prejudice the ac cused that the cost of litigating their eff ect in a particula

r case is unjusti fied.’” W

right v. Van Patten , 552 U. S
. 1 2 0 , 1 2 4 (2 0 0 8 ) ( al t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . Cron ic , 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)) . Such circ umstances include “the complete denial of counsel during a critica l sta g e of the criminal proc eeding .” Peters v . Chandler , 292 F. App’ x 453, 464 (6th Cir. 2008) (interna l quotation marks and c itations omi tted). Stamper urg es us to construe the day s prior to a p l ea hear ing a s a cr itical stag e and to f ind that the County

completely

denied him counse l dur ing this pe riod. Specifica lly , Stamper ar g ues for a brig ht-line rule guara

nteeingpretria l detainee s the abili ty to call their attorney s fre ely duringthe ten-da y period prior

to any hear ing or

trial. “In order

to as s es s i f a g iven portion of a c riminal proce edingis a critica l stag e, we must ask how likely it is t hat sig nificant c onsequenc es mig ht have resulted f rom the abse nce of

counsel at the stag e of the criminal proc eeding .” Van v. J ones , 475 F.3d 29 2, 31 3 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 7) . T o q

ua lif y , “ [t]he re mus t be a

re a so na ble lik e lih oo d th a t [su

bs tanti a l] prejudice [t o the defe ndant’s rig hts] will a rise fr om complete abse nce of counsel.” Id
. “[M] any

ofNo. 09-5973

Stamper v. Campbe ll Cnt y.

- 4 - the stag es found to be cr i t i ca l ar e thos e in which a n opportunity

may be irre trievea

bly lost, or materia l may

come out that may

be incur ably

damag ing.” Id . at 314–15. Stamper cites no a

uthority for de signating a

cer tain number of da

y s prior to a

plea he aring as themselves c ritical. In s t ea d , S t am p er misguidedly relies on Gede rs v. United States , a c a se in which the Court deeme d a sevente en-hour overnig ht tr ial rec ess that divided the def endant’ s direct te sti mony fr om h is c ro ss- e xami natio n a c ri tic a l st a g e . 4 25 U. S. 8 0, 91 (1 97 6) ; se e als o Cron ic , 466 U. S. at 65 9 n .2 5. B ut Ge de rs ’s re a so nin g dis tin g uis he s mid-trial denial of c ounsel from Stamper’ s de nia l:
Such rec esses a

re of ten times of intensive work, with ta ctical decisions to be made and strate g ies to be re viewed. T he l aw y er ma y need to obtain f

rom his client information made rele vant by the day ’s testimony , or he may need to pur sue inquiry along lines not fully

explored ear lier. At the ve ry least, the ove rnig ht rec ess during trial g ives the def

endant a chanc e to discuss with counsel the signific ance of the da y ’s events.
425 U.S. at 88. Unlike the ong oing pr ocee dings de scribed in Ge de rs , pre- hear ing da y s do not require chang ed strate g y

in light of ne w testimony or the ne ed to dis cu s s the day ’s eve nts. St amper has descr ibed neither

an “oppor

tunity [t hat] m ay b e i rre trievably lost” during this li mited pre-he aring period, see Van , 4 75 F .3 d at 31 4– 15 , n or a re a so na ble lik e lih oo d th a t su

bs tanti a l pr e

jud ic e wi ll b e fa ll him due to the absence of counsel duringthis ti me, see id. at 313. The da y s prior to a plea

hear ing thus do not qualify

as a c ritical stag e. See U nited States v. He al , N o. CR 0 2- 09 -H -C CL , CV 06-02-H- CCL , 2006 WL 2033955, at *2 (D. Mont. J uly 18, 2006) (f

inding that the pe riod betwe enNo. 09-5973

Stamper v. Campbe ll Cnt y.

Be cause Stamper’s c laim fails on the merits, we need not a ddress whether he satisfied the 1 Mo ne ll policy -or- custom require ment. Se e Mo ne ll v . N.Y.C. De p’ t of S oc . S e rv s. , 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). - 5 - arrai gn m ent and a

plea de adline did not constitute a cr itical stag e bec ause it lac ked “tr ial-like confr ontation” (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Stampe r f ind s b etter

fo oti ngwi th h is a

rgume nt t hat th e e nti re pr e tr ia l pe ri od qu a lif ie s a s a critica l stag e. S

e e M i t c he ll , 325 F.3d at 742. But to no ava il: our inquiry cente rs on the pre trial period as a whole, see id. , and Stamper did not suffe r a c omplete denial of counsel duringthis period. His confineme nt in the Detention Center be g an ar ound October of 2004; he e ntere d his guilty plea in May of 2005. Duringthe i n t er veningmonths, S tamper points to only five da y s during which County policy arguably denied him counse l. Duringthe re mainder of his pretrial de tention, Stamper availed himself of

his right to telephone , write, a nd consult in-person with his attorney ; he did not
su ff e r a c omp le te de nia l of

c ouns e l. 1
B. Stamper additionally argues that, absent a compelling justification, a ny interfe renc e with the ri g ht t o c ouns e l vi olate s th e Sixth A me ndme nt. “ ‘[W]he n a n in sti tut ion a l r e str ic tio n inf ri ng e s a specific constitutional gua rante e, . . . the pr actice must be evaluated in the light of the ce ntral objective of prison administration, safe g uarding instit utional security .’” United States v. Mic higan , 9 4 0 F. 2 d 1 4 3 , 1 5 3

– 5 4 (6 thC i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Be ll v . W olf ish , 441 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1979)) . EvenNo. 09-5973

Stamper v. Campbe ll Cnt y.

- 6 - if the telephone suspension violated the Six th Amendment, “maintaining inst itutional secur ity and prese rvinginternal orde r and discipline a re e ssential g oals that may require limit ation or re trac tion of the re tained constitutional rig hts of both convicted pr isoners and pr etrial de tainees.” Be ll , 4 41 U.S. at 546. “Prison administrators .
. . should be ac corde d wide-r ang ing de fer ence in the adoption and execution of policies a nd prac tices that in their judgme nt a re neede d to pr eser

ve interna l order and discipline and t o m ai n tain instit utional security .” Id . at 547. Stamper c laims that no such
nece s s it y e xis te d h e r e , an d d e s c r ib e s th e s u s p e n s io na s b a s e d o n“ a d ir ty b o w l a n d s o me to w e ls.” Stamper’s de scription elides the vo la ti les it u a ti o n the serg eant c onfronted, w ith inmates shouting and ignor ing he r orde rs. The e nsuing se arc h of the c ell reve aled a co n ce al ed h o l e in the wall and dang erous contra

band—violations that the serg eant and the Campbell County J ailer a g ree d aff

ecte d the safe ty and sec urity

of the jail. Gra

nting the Detention C enter administrators due defer ence , we find that Stamper fa ils to establish a Si x th Amendment violation. Se e id
. I I I
. For the above rea sons, we af firm the judg ment of the district cour t.