# FILED
October 23, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON SEPTEMBER 1998 SESSION

KEITH A. GUY, ) ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9712-CC-00478 Appellant, ) ) Madison County V. ) ) Honorable Frank lin Murchison, Jud ge STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)

FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: C. Michael Robbins John Knox Walkup Attorney at Law Attorney General & Repor ter 46 North Third Street, Suite 719 Memphis, TN 38103 Georgia Blythe Felner Counsel for the State George Morton Goo ge 425 Fifth Avenue North District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Vanessa D. King James G. (Jerry) Woodall Assistant Public Defender District Attorney General 227 West Baltimore Street Jackson, TN 38301 Al Earls and (at trial) Don Allen Assistant District A

ttorneys General P.O. Box 2825 Jackson, TN 38302

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMM ERS, Judge2 O P I N I O N
The pet itioner p led guilty t o four co unts of a ggravated r obbery, t wo counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and four count s of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. He received an effectiv e thirty-year sentence for these crimes pursuant to his plea bargai n. The petitioner took no direc t appeal from his convicti ons or sentences but filed for post-c onviction relief, alleg ing that his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistanc e of counsel. After hearing the pe titioner's testimony, the hearing court below granted the state's motion to dismiss and denied relief. U pon our review of the record,we affirm the court’s judg ment.

In post-conviction rel ief proceedings the petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations in his petition by clear and convincing

evidence. T.C.A. § 40- 30-210(f) (1997). Furthermore, the factual f indings of the trial court in hearings “are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against the judgm ent.” State v. Buford , 666 S.W.2d 473, 47 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).

In reviewing the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this C ourt must determine whether the advice given or services rendere d by the at torney are within the range of c ompete nce dema nded of attorne ys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose , 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To prevail on a claim of ineffective counsel, a petitioner “must show th at counsel’s representatio n fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that this performance prejudiced the defense. There must be a rea sonable probability that but for counsel’s error the result of the proc eeding would have been d ifferent. Stricklan d v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692, 694 (198 4); Best v. State , 708 S.W.2d 421,3

422 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). To satisfy the requirement of prej udice in this case, the petitioner would have

had to demonstrate a reasonable pr obability that, but for counsel’s errors, he w

ould not have pled guilt y and would have ins isted on going to trial. See Hill v. Lockart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Bankston v. State , 815 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

The cour t below fo und the p etitione r's allega tions of ineffe ctive assistance “just vag ue, indefinite, uncertain.” We agree. The peti tioner testified that his trial counsel “cou ld have give[n] [me] a better job” but admitted that he had confessed his crimes to the police and that he received the exact sente nce to which he agreed. The petitioner's allegations are without merit. The petitioner has failed to carry his burden of prov ing that his lawy

er was ineffective.

____________________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Ju dge4

CONCUR:

_____________________________ DAVID H. W ELLES, Judge

_____________________________ JOE G. RILEY, Judge