This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 ALICIA MONTOYA, as Personal 2 Representative of the Estate of 3 ADRIAN ARCHULETA, 4 Plaintiff-Appellant, 5

v. NO. A-1-CA-35178 6 WALGREEN CO., 7 Defendant-Appellee. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 9 Valerie A. Huling, District Judge 10 Fine Law Firm 11 Mark Fine 12 Albuquerque, NM 13 for Appellant 14 Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. 15 Jocelyn Drennan 16 Brenda Saiz 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellee 19 MEMORANDUM OPINION 202 VARGAS, Judge. 1
{1} Alicia Montoya (Plaintiff), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Adrian 2 Archuleta, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 3 Defendant Walgreen Co. (Walgreens). Plainti ff contends that there are genuine issues 4 of material fact regarding whether Walg reens’ negligence proximately caused Mr. 5 Archuleta’s death. We affirm. 6 BACKGROUND 7
{2} Adrian Archuleta began receiving opioids after suffering severe neck and back 8 injuries from a motor vehicle accident. Mr . Archuleta had a long history of accidental 9 prescription medication overdoses and, in March 2010, died of me thadone toxicity as 10 a result of an accidental overdose. Betw een January 9, 2009 and March 22, 2010, Mr. 11 Archuleta received prescriptions for large quantities of opioids (methadone and 12 oxycodone) and benzodiazepines (alprazolam, diazepam, lorazepam, and temazepam) 13 from ten different medical prescribers, filli ng those prescriptions at thirteen different 14 pharmacies, including seven Walgreens stores. 15
{3} On September 1, 2009, Dr. Barry Maron, one of Mr. Archuleta’s frequent 16 prescribers of opioids and benzodiazepines, included a handwritten note on Mr. 17 Archuleta’s prescription for blood pressure medication: “No further Rx’s until cleared 18 by psych[.] Medication abuse!” Despite receiving Dr. Maron’s warning note, 193 Walgreens filled seven additional prescrip tions for Mr. Archuleta totaling over 400 1 opioid and benzodiazepine pills, including six prescriptions from Dr. Maron that post2 date his note. In all, Dr. Maron wrote an additional twenty-six prescriptions for Mr. 3 Archuleta totaling more than 2,700 opioid and benzodiazepine pills in the 4 six-and-a-half months between the time of his warning note and Mr. Archuleta’s death 5 on March 23, 2010. Mr. Archuleta survivedan accidental prescription medication 6 overdose a month before his death and resumed filling opioid and benzodiazepine 7 prescriptions four days later. In total, Mr. Archuleta filled thirty-five prescriptions 8 totaling 3,315 opioid and benzodiazepine pills between the date of Dr. Maron’s note 9 and March 22, 2010, when he filled his last prescription. 10
{4} On March 23, 2010, one day after filli ng a ninety-count, thirty-day supply of 11 methadone prescribed by Dr. Maron at Ph armacy Plus, Mr. Archuleta succumbed to 12 a second accidental prescription medication overdose and died as a result of 13 respiratory depression, secondary to methadone toxicity. At the scene of Mr. 14 Archuleta’s death, only sixty-seven of the ninety methadone pills remained from the 15 prescription filled the day before. Postmortem toxicology revealed markedly elevated 16 levels of methadone as well as slightly el evated levels of alprazolam, bupropion, and 17 zolpidem. It is undisputed that Walgreen s did not sell Mr. Archuleta the actual pills 18 that resulted in his fatal overdose. The last prescription Mr. Archuleta filled at 194 Walgreens was for ninety methadone pills almost six weeks earlier on February 11, 1 2010. 2
{5} Plaintiff sued Walgreens on theories of negligence and negligence per se. 3 Plaintiff alleged that Walgreens acted negligently by selling large quantities of a 4 dangerous combination of drugs to Mr. Ar chuleta when it knew or should have known 5 that he was abusing the medications and the drugs posed a high risk of overdose to 6 him. Walgreens moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff could neither 7 prove that Walgreens breached any duty it owedMr. Archuleta nor that any of its acts 8 or omissions caused Mr. Archuleta’s death. In response, Plaintiff attached the 9 deposition of Dr. George Gl ass who opined that Walgreen s “abetted” Mr. Archuleta’s 10 addiction and his death from methadone toxicity was caused in part by Walgreens’ 11 failure to intervene to prevent further drug use. 12
{6} The district court granted Walgreens’ motion, noting that while matters of 13 causation are generally reserved for the jury , Plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue 14 of material fact that Walgreens’ actions or failures caused Mr. Archuleta’s death, 15 instead concluding that Mr. Archuleta’ s death was caused by taking twenty-three 16 methadone pills from a prescription that was not filled by Walgreens. 17 DISCUSSION 185 {7} On appeal, Plaintiff argues that a genuineissue of material fact exists as to 1 whether Walgreens’ alleged negligence, along with Mr. Archuleta’s consumption of 2 the twenty-three methadone pills, was the concurring proximate cause of Mr. 3 Archuleta’s death, or alternatively, that Walgreens’ alleged negligence deprived him 4 of a chance of recovery. Plaintiff contends that the district court erroneously weighed 5 the evidence and deprived the jury of its right to determine proximate cause when it 6 concluded that the singular cause of Mr. Archuleta’s death was his overdose from pills 7 taken from the Pharmacy Plus prescripti on filled the day before his death. Because 8 Plaintiff failed to produce evidence to support a logical inference that, had Walgreens 9 acted differently, Mr. Archuleta would not have died, we affirm the decision of the 10 district court. 11 Standard of Review 12
{8} We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Beggs v. City of 13 Portales , 2009-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 372, 210 P.3d 798. Summary judgment 14 is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions 15 on file, together with the affi davits, if any, show that th ere is no genuine issue as to 16 any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 17 law.” Rule 1-056(C) NMRA. If the movant es tablishes a prima f acie case that there 18 are no issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, “the 196 burden shifts to the non-movant to demons trate the existence of specific evidentiary 1 facts which would require trial on the merits.” Romero v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 2 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 713, 242 P.3d 280 (internal quotation marks and 3 citation omitted); Goodman v. Brock , 1972-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 8-9, 83 N.M. 789, 498 4 P.2d 676. This burden cannot be met with allegations or specu lation, but only with 5 admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine fact issue requiring trial. Rule 1-056(C), 6 (E); Schmidt v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. , 1987-NMCA-046, ¶ 5, 105 N.M. 681, 736 P.2d 7 135. Claimed disputed facts “cannot serv e as a basis for denying summary judgment” 8 if the evidence adduced is insufficient to support “reasonable inferences.” Romero , 9 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 10 (“An inference is not a supposition or a conjecture, but is a 10 logical deduction from facts proved and guess work is not a substitute therefor.” 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Summaryjudgment is proper “when 12 a defendant negates an essen tial element of the plaintiff’s case by demonstrating the 13 absence of an issue of fact regarding that element.” Mayfield Smithson Enters. v. 14 Com-Quip, Inc. , 1995-NMSC-034, ¶ 22, 120 N.M. 9, 896 P.2d 1156; see Goradia v. 15 Hahn Co. , 1991-NMSC-040, ¶ 18, 111 N.M. 779, 810 P.2d 798 (“A complete failure 16 of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily 17 renders all other facts immaterial.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 18 omitted)). 197 Causation 1
{9} To successfully prosecute a negligence claim, a plaintiff must not only show the 2 existence of a duty from the defendant to th e plaintiff and a breach of that duty, but 3 also that “the breach [was] a proximate cause and cause in fact of the plaintiff’s 4 damages.” Herrera v. Quality Pontiac , 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 5 181, abrogated on other grounds as recognized by In re Otero Cty. Hosp. Ass’n , 527 6 B.R. 719, 764 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2015). Followi ng the hearing on Walgreens’ motion 7 for summary judgment, the district court de termined that, while Walgreens owed Mr. 8 Archuleta a duty, “[t]he problem . . . is the causation issue.” Holding that Plaintiff 9 could not prove the element of causation, th e district court granted Walgreens’ motion 10 for summary judgment. On appeal, the parties have not raised the issue of duty or 11 breach. We therefore express no opinion as to whether the district court properly 12 found the existence of a duty owed by Walgreen s to Mr. Archuleta or whether an issue 13 of fact existed as to whether any su ch duty was breached. Instead, we limit our 14 analysis to the issue of causation. 15
{10} Plaintiff contends that the deposition te stimony of her expert witnesses creates 16 a genuine issue of material fact as to wh ether Walgreens’ negligent failure to detect 17 Mr. Archuleta’s elevated risk of overdose, negligent defiance of Dr. Maron’s warning, 18 and negligent failure to communicate withMr. Archuleta’s prescribers were the 198 concurring proximate causes of Mr. Archulet a’s death. Plaintiff’s experts, however, 1 fall short of concluding that Walgreens’ ac tions and failures to act were the causes in 2 fact of Mr. Archuleta’s death. 3
{11} In support of her claim, Plaintiff tendered an affidavit and deposition testimony 4 from Dr. William Simonson, Plaintiff’s expert pharmacologist. Dr. Simonson’s 5 testimony focused primarily on the standardof care for pharmacists. He provided an 6 affidavit in which he opined that “[i]t would have beenthe pharmacist’s responsibility 7 to communicate with the prescriber(s) and th e patient in an attempt to determine the 8 legitimacy and the therapeutic need for these medications.” Noting that it did not 9 appear any such communication was made , Dr. Simonson opined that “Walgreens 10 failed to meet the standard of practice for pharmacists for continuing to fill 11 prescriptions for Mr. Archuleta including prescriptions for controlled substances 12 apparently without first having Mr. Arc huleta being cleared by a psychiatrist as 13 specified by Dr. Maron.” As a result, Walgreens pharmacists “helped enable Mr. 14 Archuleta maintain an ongoing supply of c ontrolled substances which contributed to 15 the continuation of his addiction.” Dr. Si monson conceded, however, that he did not 16 have an opinion as to the cause of Mr. Arc huleta’s death. Nor did he offer an opinion 17 that connected Mr. Archuleta’ s death in any way to a particular prescription filled by 18 Walgreens. Instead, Dr. Simonson testif ied, “I’m not saying they caused or 199 contributed [to Mr. Archuleta’s death] . I’m saying they could have caused or 1 contributed, because, you know, we’re speculati ng in a lot of ways. Had they had all 2 of the information, communication I’m assu ming would have ensued regarding other 3 prescribers prescribing medications. And th en, at some point, Mr. Archuleta may not 4 have had all the. . . other drugs in addition to the methadone.” 5
{12} Plaintiff also provided deposition te stimony from Dr. George Glass, a 6 psychiatrist and addictionologist. Dr. Glass te stified that “the pattern of Dr. Maron’s 7 prescribing excessive amounts of medication . . . caused Mr. Archuleta’s death.” That 8 pattern, he explained, went on for almost two years and “would have been noticed by 9 a pharmacist. . . who looked at the records, and at that point somewhere in the process 10 they would have said: This guy is a drug addict, he’s working several doctors, if not 11 several pharmacies, and we need to notify people or cut him off.” Had that happened, 12 Dr. Glass opined, “Mr. Archuleta perh aps would have found another pharmacy, he 13 perhaps would have gone to a different doctor. He also may have done what they call 14 in the addiction recovery bus iness, hit bottom, where he was out of money and out of 15 supplies and suppliers and mi ght have had to go to treatment.” “So in essence, by 16 Walgreens continuing to fill the prescription without any question or any comment, 17 they abetted this man’s addiction. . . . [T]h ey enabled him to continue in his disease 18 until he died.” Notwithstanding his list of possible outcomes, and with no further 1910 explanation of his rationale, Dr. Glass opi ned that, had Walgreens refused to fill 1 additional prescriptions for Mr. Archuleta, he would still be alive. 2
{13} When considering the issue of causati on, we note that “[t]he general term 3 ‘proximate cause’ encompasses both causati on in fact and proximate causation as a 4 limitation place[d] on the tort-feasor’s responsibility.” Terrel v. Duke City Lumber 5 Co. , 1974-NMCA-041, ¶ 102, 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d 1021, aff’d in part, rev’d in part 6 sub. nom. Duke City Lumber Co. v. Terrel , 1975-NMSC-041, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 7 229. We focus our analysis on the first element of proximate cause, causation in fact. 8 To prove causation in fact, “it is essential to show that the tortious action produce[d] 9 the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.” Id. ¶ 103 10 (omission, alteration, internal quot ation marks, and citation omitted); see UJI 13-305 11 NMRA (providing that an act or omission is a “cause” of any in jury if it contributes 12 to bringing about the harm and if injurywould not have occurred without it). “To 13 establish liability, there must be a chain of causation initiated by some negligent act 14 or omission of the defendant, which in legal terms is the cause in fact or the ‘but for’ 15 cause of [the] plaintiff’s injury.” Chamberland v. Roswell Osteopathic Clinic, Inc. , 16 2001-NMCA-045, ¶ 18, 130 N.M. 532, 27 P.3d 1019. The cause in fact of an injury 17 is that without which the injury would not have occurred. It “need not be the last act, 18 or the nearest act to the injury,” but it must have actually aided in producing the 1911 injury, Kelly v. Montoya , 1970-NMCA-063, ¶ 28, 81 N.M . 591, 470 P.2d 563, and it 1 must be “reasonably connected as a significant link to the injury.” Talbott v. Roswell 2 Hosp. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-109, ¶ 34, 138 N.M. 189, 118 P.3d 194. Nonetheless, 3 “[w]here several factors may have caused [the harm], the plaintiff cannot recover 4 unless he proves that his injuries were sustained by a cause for which the defendant 5 is responsible.” N.M. State Highway Dep’t v. Van Dyke , 1977-NMSC-027, ¶ 9, 90 6 N.M. 357, 563 P.2d 1150. 7
{14} On summary judgment, “(1) all logical inferences are to be resolved in favor of 8 the non-moving party and (2) all inferences mu st be viewed in a light most favorable 9 to a trial on the merits.” Madrid v. Brinker Rest. Corp. , 2016-NMSC-003, ¶ 20, 363 10 P.3d 1197. As we previously noted, th e evidence adduced by a party opposing 11 summary judgment “must result in reasonable inferences.” Id. ¶ 18. (emphasis added) 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitte d). “An inference is not a supposition or 13 a conjecture, but is a logical deduction from facts proved and guess work is not a 14 substitute therefor.” Id. 15
{15} The parties do not dispute that Mr. Arc huleta died of methadone toxicity. Nor 16 do they dispute that the final methadone prescription filled by Mr. Archuleta the day 17 before his death was not filled by Walgreens, but was filled by another pharmacy. 18 Plaintiff argues, nonetheless, that the expert testimony of Dr. Simonson and Dr. Glass 1912 gives rise to a logical inference that Walgreens’ alleged failure to detect Mr. 1 Archuleta’s risk of overdose, its allege d defiance of Dr. Maron’s warning, and its 2 alleged failure to communicate with Mr. Archuleta’s prescribers was at least a 3 concurrent cause of Mr. Archuleta’s death. Dr. Simonson, however, conceded that he 4 did not have an opinion as to the cause of Mr. Archuleta’s death, admitting that he was 5 “speculating in a lot of ways.” His testimony, therefore, fails to support Plaintiff’s 6 claim that Walgreens was the cause infact of Mr. Archuleta’s death. 7
{16} With regard to Dr. Glass’s testimony, weinitially note that Dr. Glass testified 8 that it was Dr. Maron’s pattern of prescribing excessive amounts of medication that 9 caused Mr. Archuleta’s death. With regardto Walgreens, Dr. Glass testified that 10 Walgreens should have noticed Mr. Arcule ta’s drug addiction and refused to fill 11 further prescriptions. Dr. Glass opined th at, had Walgreens refused to fill Mr. 12 Archuleta’s prescriptions, “Mr. Archul eta perhaps would have found another 13 pharmacy, he perhaps would have gone to a different doctor . . . . [or h]e also may 14 have hit bottom . . . and he might have ha d to go to treatment.” This testimony falls 15 short of showing that, absent Walgreens’ failures, the injury to Mr. Archuleta would 16 not have occurred—that Walgreen s’ failures caused his death. See UJI 13-305. While 17 Dr. Glass notes that Walgreens’ alleged failures abetted Mr. Archuleta’s addiction, 18 enabling him to continue in his disease until he died, his testimony fails to create a 1913 genuine issue of material fact that, but for Walgreens’ negligence, Mr. Archuleta 1 would not have died. 2
{17} Pointing out that on summary judgment, all logical inferences must be resolved 3 in favor of the non-moving party, Plaintiff argues that a jury could reasonably infer 4 that, but for Walgreens’ failure to act, Mr . Archuleta would not have died. Plaintiff 5 contends that Walgreens was negligent by its failure to detect Mr. Archuleta’s 6 elevated risk of overdose, by its defiance of Dr. Maron’s warning, and by its failure 7 to communicate with prescribers. While conceding that he offered no opinion on a 8 pharmacist’s standard of care, Dr. Gla ss testified that Walgreens should have 9 intervened in Mr. Archuleta’s treatment. In tervention, he testif ied, could have been 10 by either contacting Mr. Archuleta’s physician, having a discussion with the patient, 11 or refusing to fill the prescription. Plaintiff, however, offers no testimony or other 12 evidence to support a conclusion that, had Walgreens intervened in Mr. Archuleta’s 13 treatment, as suggested by Dr. Glass, Mr. Archuleta would not have died, instead, 14 arguing that a jury can reasonably infer that had Walgreens intervened, Mr. Archuleta 15 would not have died. None of Dr. Glass’s proposed interventions, however, give rise 16 to a reasonable inference upon which Pl aintiff can rely to overcome summary 17 judgment. Mr. Archuleta was a drug addict who was filling prescriptions from 18 different doctors at different pharmacies. Hi s actions of visiting different doctors and 1914 filling prescriptions at different pharmacies indicate that he was aware that doctors 1 and pharmacists would not approve of his behavior. Absent more, a fact-finder cannot 2 logically deduce that had Walgreens intervened, Mr. Archuleta would have stopped 3 abusing drugs and would not have died. Any such conclusion is nothing more than 4 supposition or conjecture. See Madrid , 2016-NMSC-003, ¶ 18. “Where the facts are 5 not in dispute and the reasonable inferences from those facts are plain and consistent, 6 proximate cause becomes an issue of law.” Id. ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks and 7 citation omitted). Because Plaintiff failed to present any ev idence that would allow a 8 jury to logically deduce that Walgreens’ ac tions or failures to act were the cause in 9 fact of Mr. Archuleta’s death, the distri ct court properly granted summary judgment 10 to Walgreens. 11 Loss of Chance 12
{18} Finally, Plaintiff argues that Walgreens’ negligent acts diminished Mr. 13 Archuleta’s chance of surviving his drug addiction, and she is entitled to be 14 compensated for this loss of chance. Plaintiff’s loss of chance theory, however, suffers 15 from the same deficiencies as her other negligence theories, namely her inability to 16 show that a genuine issue of material factexists that Walgreens’ negligence was the 17 cause in fact of Mr. Archulet a’s reduced chance for survival. 1815 {19} As with a traditional negligence claim, to prove a loss of chance claim requires 1 that the plaintiff “show that [the d]efe ndant breached a duty of care owed to [the 2 decedent] and that [the deced ent’s] lost chance of surviv al . . . was likely caused by 3 that breach.” Baer v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 1999-NMCA-005, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 508, 4 972 P.2d 9. Causation evidence “must showto a reasonable degree of medical 5 probability that the defendant’s negligence caused the loss of the chance of a better 6 result.” Alberts v. Schultz , 1999-NMSC-015, ¶ 29, 126 N.M. 807, 975 P.2d 1279. 7 Under a loss of chance theory of recovery , Plaintiff must provide at least some 8 evidence that, without Walgreens’ neglig ence, Mr. Archuleta would have had a 9 measurably increased chance of survival. See Baer , 1999-NMCA-005, ¶ 20. “The 10 burden of proving reasonable medical probability rests with the plaintiff, and a causal 11 connection between the alleged act of malpractice and the plaintiff’s loss or damages 12 cannot be substantiated by arguments based upon conjecture, surmise, or speculation.” 13 Alberts , 1999-NMSC-015, ¶ 38. 14
{20} In this case, Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden. Dr. Simonson, as we 15 previously noted, expressed no opinion as to the cause of Mr. Archuleta’s death, 16 admitting that he was “speculating in a lo t of ways.” Plaintiff’s psychiatric and 17 addictionology expert, Dr. Glass, testifie d that had Walgreens appreciated Mr. 18 Archuleta’s drug addiction and refused to fill further prescriptions, it was possible Mr. 1916 Archuleta may have found other avenues to obtain these drugs, but he may also have 1 hit bottom and gone to treatment. While Dr. Glass notes that by Walgreens continuing 2 to fill Mr. Archuleta’s prescriptions without any question or any comment, it abetted 3 his addiction, enabling him to continue inhis disease until he died, his testimony fails 4 to establish that, but for Walgreens’ neglig ence, Mr. Archuleta would have had, to a 5 reasonable degree of medical probability, a measurably increased chance of survival. 6 See Baer , 1999-NMCA-005, ¶ 19. Though Dr. Gl ass describes several possible 7 outcomes had Walgreens acted differently, hefails to provide any information about 8 the likelihood of each such outcome, incl uding whether Mr. Archuleta’s chances of 9 survival would have measurably improved. Absent expert testimony, to a reasonable 10 degree of medical probability of the increas ed chance of survival, Plaintiff fails to 11 establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial that Walgreens caused Mr. Archuleta 12 harm and summary judgment was proper. 13 CONCLUSION 14
{21} We affirm. 15
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 18 WE CONCUR: 1917 1 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 2

3 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 4