RENDERED: NOVEMBER 12, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2019-CA-1117-ME

JONATHAN M. WARAWA APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE S. MARIE HELLARD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 12-CI-00658 

MICHELYNN D. WARAWA APPELLEE 

AND

NO. 2019-CA-1642-MR

JONATHAN M. WARAWA APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE S. MARIE HELLARD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 12-CI-00658 

MICHELYNN D. WARAWA APPELLEE 

AND
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NO. 2020-CA-0796-MR

JONATHAN M. WARAWA APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE S. MARIE HELLARD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 12-CI-00658 

MICHELYNN D. WARAWA APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, K. THOMPSON, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Jonathan M. Warawa (“Jonathan”) appeals the June 27, 

2019, October 3, 2019, March 25, 2020, and June 10, 2020 orders of the Shelby 

Circuit Court, Family Division. After careful review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The marriage of Jonathan and Michelynn D. Warawa (“Michelynn”) 

was dissolved by decree on October 17, 2013. Two minor children, a son and a 

daughter, were born of the marriage. This action has a lengthy and complicated 

history, including a prior appeal.

Following the entry of the decree of dissolution . . . , the 

issue of child custody remained unresolved for almost 
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four years. During that time, the parties were enmeshed 

in litigation regarding the care, custody and control of 

their children. Emergency protective orders were 

entered; dependency, neglect and abuse actions were 

filed; parenting schedules and plans were set forth; 

depositions were taken; psychological evaluations were 

performed; multiple custodial evaluations and updates 

were made; and there were multiple therapists and 

parenting coordinators involved. During that same time, 

Jonathan filed bar complaints against counsel and 

complaints against other professionals with their 

respective boards. In all, more than 200 pleadings and 

orders have been filed or entered.

Warawa v. Warawa, 587 S.W.3d 631, 632-33 (Ky. App. 2019). 

In 2013, by agreed order, the parties decided Jonathan would claim 

the children as dependents for tax purposes in even years and Michelynn would 

claim them in odd years. On October 9, 2017, the family court entered an order 

reciting an agreement reached by the parties regarding their children. The parties 

agreed to joint custody of the minor children. They also agreed each parent would 

be consulted prior to any appointment with the children’s pediatrician. The parties 

further agreed, during a child’s medical appointment, “[o]ne parent may be in 

person and the other, at minimum shall be present via telephone.” Record (“R.”) at 

650. The parties agreed to appointment of a parenting coordinator to assist them 

with issues regarding custody and parenting.

After additional litigation relating to the parties’ inability to agree on 

issues relating to the children’s medical treatment, the court entered an order 
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stating “[with] regard to medical treatment, if [a doctor] says a procedure is 

necessary, then it shall be performed; if the [treatment] is optional, absent the 

parents’ joint consent and agreement, the [treatment] shall not be performed.” R. 

at 1291. Litigation relating to the parties’ inability to agree about the children’s 

medical appointments and treatments continued thereafter. 

On September 11, 2019, Jonathan filed a motion to show cause 

alleging Michelynn violated the October 9, 2017 order by failing to call him while 

at the parties’ daughter’s appointment with Dr. Howell, an optometrist. On 

October 3, 2019, the family court denied Jonathan’s motion. The court found the 

parties agreed to schedule an appointment for the child with Dr. Howell. Based on 

this agreement, the family court found no violation of the October 9, 2017 order. 

The court subsequently denied Jonathan’s motion to reconsider the order. 

With regard to child support, in the October 9, 2017 order, the parties 

agreed to use the “Colorado formula” for calculating child support and temporary 

child support would be retroactive to August 3, 2017. A temporary agreed order 

for Jonathan to pay $659.00 was entered on December 5, 2017 and was made 

retroactive to the agreed upon date. After engaging in discovery relating primarily 

to Michelynn’s income, Jonathan filed a verified motion to modify child support 

on May 11, 2018, requesting gifts from Michelynn’s parents be included as her 

income for calculation of child support.
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After Jonathan filed his motion, the parties filed joint stipulations 

relating to child support. R. at 1102-07. They agreed Jonathan earns an annual 

salary of $115,607.78 as an employee of the University of Louisville. Id. at 1102.

He also pays health, dental, and vision insurance for the children in the amount of 

$144.00. Id. Michelynn earns $1,877.20 per month as an employee of the Council 

of Co-Owners of Glenview. Id. At some point in the last two years, Michelynn 

earned $17.00 per hour as an employee of Nabisco. Id.

The stipulations also include several statements regarding payments 

Michelynn’s parents make on her behalf including paying her mortgage, taxes, 

interest, and home insurance in the amount of $12,878.72 per year. Id. 

Michelynn’s parents also gave her $40,000.00 for the down payment on her home. 

Id. at 1105. Her parents pay her portion of the children’s private school tuition 

which amounted to $7,148.25 for the 2017-2018 school year and $7,200.00 for the 

2018-2019 school year. Id. They also pay the following monthly expenses for 

Michelynn: (a) internet and cable for $225.31; (b) yard maintenance for $79.50; 

(c) pest control for $30.00; (d) security system service for $18.00; (e) homeowners 

association (“HOA”) fees for $12.50; (f) HVAC maintenance for $11.72; and (g) 

cellphone service for $35.40. Id.

The parties also stipulated to fees related to the divorce paid by 

Michelynn’s parents. They paid her legal fees in the amount of $73,600.63 in 
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2016; $93,728.03 in 2017; and $26,950.10 in 2018. Id. at 1106. They also paid 

her portion of the parenting coordinator fees in the amounts of $7,481.25 in 2017 

and $3,663.50 in 2018. Id. Michelynn’s parents paid her portion of friend of the 

court fees in the amounts of $1,056.25 in 2016 and $1,876.25 in 2017. Id. They 

also paid fees for experts in the divorce action including: $350.00 to Dr. Cebe and 

$1,140.00 to Dr. Ebben in 2016; and $13,560.00 to Dr. Jenuwine and $300.00 to 

Dr. Ebben in 2017. Id. Michelynn’s parents also paid her therapy bills totaling 

$1,400.00 in 2017 and $1,355.00 in 2018. Id. Finally, they paid $902.00 in fees to 

the children’s therapist. Id. 

After filing the stipulations, the parties briefed the issue of child 

support modification. On June 27, 2019, the family court entered an order 

modifying Jonathan’s child support obligation to $510.00 per month.1 The court 

found Jonathan’s gross monthly income to be $9,634.00 and Michelynn’s gross 

monthly income to be $3,963.00 based on her wages of $1,877.20 and expenses 

paid by her parents on her behalf. 

Specifically, the court found Michelynn’s parents’ payment of her 

mortgage, interest, taxes, and insurance; as well as the children’s tuition, internet 

and cable service, security system service, pest control, yard maintenance, HOA

1 The June 27, 2019 order grants Michelynn’s motion to amend a May 30, 2019 order because 

the family court misstated the amount Michelynn’s parents pay for the children’s private school 

tuition in the first order. 
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fees, HVAC maintenance, and cell phone service qualified as income for 

calculation of child support. The court found these to be income to Michelynn 

because they were “reoccurring and regularly paid by her parents.” R. at 1217. 

The family court declined to include Michelynn’s parents’ payment of her legal 

fees, parenting coordinator fees, friend of the court fees, expert fees, and therapy 

bills as income to Michelynn. The court found “none of these expenses are routine 

or regular.” The court found the expenses varied from year to year and there was 

“no way to predict whether any of those expenses [would] reoccur.” Id. 

The parties’ parenting coordinator, Louis P. Winner, made three sets 

of recommendations on February 27, 2018; May 11, 2018; and February 8, 2019,

which informed the family court’s decision which is at issue in appeal number 

2020-CA-0796-MR.

2

 Jonathan filed objections to each set of recommendations.3 

The family court held a hearing on Jonathan’s objections to the recommendations.

In the resulting order, the family court, in relevant part, (1) declined to 

hold Michelynn in contempt for two instances in which Jonathan did not receive 

notice of the children’s medical appointments; (2) found Jonathan in contempt and 

2 Mr. Winner is the third parenting coordinator to be appointed in this case. 

3 The family court adopted the parenting coordinator’s first set of recommendations without a 

hearing on Jonathan’s objections. Jonathan appealed, and this Court reversed and remanded the 

matter to the family court, holding the court’s adoption of the parenting coordinator’s 

recommendations without a hearing was an improper delegation of the court’s final decisionmaking authority. Warawa, 587 S.W.3d at 636-37. 
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ordered him to reimburse Michelynn $9,064.00 because he claimed the children as 

dependents for tax purposes in 2017 in violation of the 2013 agreed order; (3) 

awarded Michelynn $1,760.00 in attorney fees due to Jonathan’s obstruction and 

unwillingness to follow the court’s order relating to taxes; (4) declined to hold 

Jonathan in contempt for failing to give Michelynn sixty days’ notice of a trip he 

took with the children outside the United States; (5) ordered Michelynn to hold the 

children’s passports; and (6) awarded Michelynn an additional $2,500.00 in 

attorney fees for Jonathan’s obstructive actions, filing of excessive pro se motions, 

and refusal to cooperate with the parenting coordinator. 

Both parties filed motions to alter, amend, or vacate the family court’s 

March 25, 2020 order. Jonathan’s motion was filed on April 24, 2020. Upon a 

motion by Michelynn, the family court struck Jonathan’s motion as untimely on 

June 10, 2020. The court also ruled on Michelynn’s motion on the same day. 

These appeals followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Our review of child support awards is governed by the abuse of 

discretion standard.” Holland v. Holland, 290 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Ky. App. 2009) 

(citation omitted). A family court abuses its discretion only where its decision is 

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id.

(citation omitted).
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Furthermore, “[w]hen a court exercises its contempt powers, it has 

nearly unlimited discretion.” Meyers v. Petrie, 233 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Ky. App. 

2007) (citation omitted). We will disturb a family court’s determination regarding 

contempt only where it has abused its discretion. Id. Similarly, a family court’s 

award of attorney fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Allison v. Allison, 246 

S.W.3d 898, 909 (Ky. App. 2008) (citation omitted). 

ANALYSIS

We will address each of Jonathan’s three appeals separately. 

However, before reaching the merits of Jonathan’s appeals, we must address

serious deficiencies in his briefs under CR4 76.12. An appellant’s argument must 

include “at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record 

showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what 

manner.” CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). Preservation statements ensure the reviewing Court 

“can be confident the issue was properly presented to the [family] court and 

therefore, is appropriate for our consideration.” Oakley v. Oakley, 391 S.W.3d 

377, 380 (Ky. App. 2012). Jonathan’s briefs are almost entirely devoid of 

preservation statements.5

4 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

5

Jonathan’s brief in 2019-CA-1117-ME contains preservation statements for his arguments.
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Furthermore, the civil rules mandate the appellant’s argument contain 

“ample . . . citations of authority pertinent to each issue of law[.]” CR 

76.12(4)(c)(v). “It is not our function as an appellate court to research and 

construct a party’s legal arguments. . . . We will not search the record to construct 

[Jonathan’s] argument for him, nor will we go on a fishing expedition to find 

support for his underdeveloped arguments.” Prescott v. Commonwealth, 572 

S.W.3d 913, 923 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted). In all three appeals, 

Jonathan’s arguments are largely without citation to relevant authority and are, 

instead, a series of conclusory statements. 

Although Jonathan is proceeding pro se, he is not exempt from the 

rules for appellate practice. “Because [Jonathan] is not an attorney, we cannot 

expect the elegance or sophistication of legal thought we should expect from 

members of our learned profession. . . . However, we have every reason to expect 

the briefs filed by pro se appellate advocates to demonstrate a good faith attempt to 

comport with CR 76.12[.]” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 697-98 (Ky. App. 

2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Where an appellant’s brief 

does not include preservation statements, we may (1) ignore the deficiency and 

proceed with our review on the merits; (2) strike the brief or the offending portions 

under CR 76.12(8)(a); or (3) review for manifest injustice. Ford v. 

Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Ky. 2021). Because Jonathan’s arguments 
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fail on their merits, we ignore the deficiencies and proceed with review of his 

claims. 

2019-CA-1117-ME

In 2019-CA-1117-ME, Jonathan raises the following arguments: (1) 

the family court erred by declining to include certain monetary gifts from 

Michelynn’s parents as income for purposes of child support calculation; (2) the 

court failed to impute Michelynn income previously agreed upon by the parties; 

and (3) the family court made the modification of child support retroactive to the 

incorrect date.

First, the family court did not abuse its discretion by declining to 

include some monetary gifts from her parents as Michelynn’s gross income for 

purposes of calculating child support. Jonathan asserts the family court should 

have included all gifts from Michelynn’s parents, including legal fees and other 

costs associated with this action, as gross income. The family court included sums 

which Michelynn’s parents gifted her monthly as income because they are 

regularly paid and reoccurring. These gifts include payment of Michelynn’s 

mortgage, taxes, interest, insurance, internet and cable service, lawncare service, 

pest control, security system service, HOA dues, cell phone service, and the 

children’s tuition. However, the family court declined to include payments of 
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Michelynn’s legal fees and other costs associated with this action because they are 

not routine, regular, or reoccurring. 

“Gross income” is defined for the purpose of child support calculation 

to include “income from any source,” including gifts. KRS6 403.212(2)(b). A 

family court may find a gift should not be included as income where it is 

nonrecurring. Layman v. Bohanon, 599 S.W.3d 423, 433 (Ky. 2020) (citing 

Stewart v. Burton, 108 S.W.3d 647, 648-49 (Ky. App. 2003)). Herein, the court 

did not abuse its discretion in finding only those gifts which are routine and 

reoccurring qualify as income for calculation of child support. 

Next, the family court did not err in declining to impute Michelynn 

wages at $17.00 per hour. Based on the stipulations of the parties, the court found, 

in addition to the gifts from her parents which qualified as income, Michelynn 

earns $1,877.20 per month as an employee of the Council of Co-Owners of 

Glenview. The parties also stipulated that, at some point during the prior two 

years, Michelynn was employed by Nabisco earning $17.00 per hour. 

For purposes of child support calculation, income “must be read as 

creating a presumption that future income will be on a par with the worker’s most 

recent experience.” Keplinger v. Keplinger, 839 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Ky. App. 1992) 

(citing KRS 403.212(2)(a)). The party who wishes the family court to use a 

6 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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different income level bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to support 

the request. Layman, 599 S.W.3d at 434 (citation omitted). Herein, Jonathan did 

not provide sufficient evidence proving Michelynn should have been imputed 

wages at $17.00 per hour rather than her most recent earnings of $1,877.20 per 

month. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion. 

Finally, the family court did not make the child support order 

retroactive to the incorrect date. Jonathan argues the modification to his child 

support obligation should have been made retroactive to August 3, 2017 based on a 

prior agreement by the parties. However, the parties agreed only that temporary 

child support would be retroactive to that date. On this basis, the family court 

made its December 5, 2017 temporary child support order retroactive to August 3, 

2017. Jonathan filed a subsequent motion to modify child support on May 11, 

2018. The order modifying Jonathan’s obligation which is the subject of this 

appeal was entered on June 27, 2019, and made retroactive to May 11, 2018.

A child support order “may be modified only as to installments 

accruing subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification[.]” KRS 

403.213(1); see also Giacalone v. Giacalone, 876 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Ky. App. 

1994). Therefore, the family court properly applied the statute when it made the 

modification to Jonathan’s child support obligation retroactive to May 11, 2018, 

the date on which he filed his motion. 
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2019-CA-1642-MR

In 2019-CA-1642-MR, Jonathan argues the court erred in denying his 

motion to show cause related to Michelynn’s failure to call him while at their 

daughter’s appointment with Dr. Howell without an evidentiary hearing. Jonathan 

asserts this was a matter of medical care, making it an issue of custody 

necessitating a hearing. Jonathan relies on the prior appeal in this action wherein 

this Court held issues of medical care are matters of custody. Warawa, 587 

S.W.3d at 636 (citing Keeton v. Keith, 511 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Ky. App. 2017)). 

Although issues relating to children’s medical care are matters of 

custody, the circumstances herein are easily distinguishable from those in the prior 

appeal. Therein, this Court reversed and remanded the family court’s decision 

because it delegated its decision-making authority to a parenting coordinator and 

adopted the recommendations of the coordinator without a hearing on Jonathan’s 

objections. Id. at 636-37. Here, the family court did not rely on the 

recommendation of the parenting coordinator but rather independently considered 

the evidence and ruled on Jonathan’s motion.7 

7 Although Jonathan insists he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion, the facts are 

undisputed. The parties agreed their daughter should see Dr. Howell. Jonathan had knowledge 

of the appointment but was unable to attend in person. Neither party called the other during the 

appointment. 
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2020-CA-0796-MR

In 2020-CA-0796-MR, Jonathan makes the following arguments: (1) 

the family court erred in striking his April 24, 2020 motion as untimely; (2) the 

family court erred in holding him in contempt for his violation of the parties’ 2013 

agreed order regarding taxes; (3) the family court violated federal tax law in 

ordering him to reimburse Michelynn for the refund she would have received had 

she claimed the children as dependents for tax purposes in 2017; (4) the family 

court should have held Michelynn in contempt for failing to provide Jonathan 

adequate notice of two of the children’s medical appointments; (5) the family court 

abused its discretion in awarding Michelynn attorney fees; and (6) the family court 

erred in ordering the children’s passports remain in Michelynn’s possession.

First, the family court acted appropriately by striking Jonathan’s 

motion to alter, amend, or vacate the March 25, 2020 order as untimely. Jonathan 

admits he was mistaken in believing he had thirty days to file his motion. “A 

motion to alter or amend a judgment, or to vacate a judgment and enter a new one, 

shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the final judgment.” CR 59.05. 

Jonathan served his motion on April 23, 2020. As Jonathan’s motion was clearly 

untimely under CR 59.05, we find no error.

Next, the family court did not err in finding Jonathan in contempt for 

violating the 2013 agreed order. “Any court or judge may punish any person guilty 
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of contempt for disobeying a judicial order entered under the authority of the 

Court.” Newsome v. Commonwealth, 35 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Ky. App. 2001) 

(footnote omitted). Furthermore, “a court not only has the right but also the duty to 

protect its authority and dignity against contemptuous conduct.” Meyers, 233 

S.W.3d at 216 (citation omitted). Jonathan admits to claiming the children on his

2017 taxes thereby violating the 2013 agreed order. In light of Jonathan’s 

obstructiveness and unwillingness to follow court orders, the family court acted 

well within its discretion by ordering him to pay $1,760.00 in attorney fees.

Relatedly, the family court did not violate federal tax law in ordering 

Jonathan to reimburse Michelynn for the amount she would have received as a 

refund had she been able to claim the children as dependents on her 2017 taxes. 

Jonathan primarily argues Michelynn should have completed Internal Revenue 

Service (“IRS”) Form 8332 to claim the children as dependents in 2017.8 

However, it is undisputed Jonathan claimed the children as dependents for tax 

purposes in 2017 in violation of the 2013 agreed order. Regardless of what 

documentation may have been required by the IRS to effectuate Michelynn’s claim 

of the children as dependents on her 2017 tax return, Jonathan violated the court’s 

8

Jonathan alleges Form 8332 was required because Michelynn did not have the children for at 

least fifty percent of their overnight care during 2017.
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order. In ordering Jonathan to reimburse Michelynn, the family court did not 

violate or in any way adjudicate federal tax law. 

Fourth, the family court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

hold Michelynn in contempt for failing to ensure Jonathan had notice of two 

instances in which the children received medical treatment. The October 9, 2017 

order requires each party to consult with the other when he or she seeks medical 

treatment for the children. A court’s discretion over the issue of contempt is nearly 

unlimited. Meyers, 233 S.W.3d at 215 (citation omitted). The family court 

declined to find contempt but warned “should Michelynn continue to schedule 

medical appointments for the children with no notice to [Jonathan] that such 

behavior would rise to the level of contempt.” R. at 16. This is not an abuse of the 

court’s broad discretion. 

Fifth, the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

Michelynn additional attorney fees in the amount if $2,500 because Jonathan’s 

“conduct in obstructing court orders, refusing to participate in good faith in the 

parent[ing] coordinator process (with 3 different PCs), his intimidation of the 

children’s therapist, and his incessant pro se motions are actions that caused 

[Michelynn] to incur additional cost.” R. at 1796. 

The court from time to time after considering the 

financial resources of both parties may order a party to 

pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of 

maintaining or defending any proceeding under this 
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chapter and for attorney’s fees, including sums for legal 

services rendered and costs incurred prior to the 

commencement of the proceeding or after entry of 

judgment.

KRS 403.220. Herein, the family court considered the financial resources of the 

parties and, considering Jonathan’s conduct, awarded Michelynn attorney fees. 

We find no abuse of discretion. 

Finally, the family court did not err in ordering the children’s 

passports remain in Michelynn’s possession. The family court “may make such 

other orders as are necessary to properly effectuate joint custody.” Squires v. 

Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Ky. 1993) (citation omitted). In addition to 

ordering Michelynn keep the children’s passports when not in use, the family court 

set out a number of other requirements to facilitate either party’s international 

travel with the children including requiring sixty days’ notice and provision of an 

itinerary to the other party, requiring Michelynn to provide the children’s passports 

within four days of receiving the itinerary, and mandating their return by Jonathan 

within four days of returning from a trip. R. at 2145. These orders are appropriate 

to effectuate the parties’ joint custody of the children. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the orders of the Shelby Circuit Court, Family 

Division are affirmed. 
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ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Jonathan M. Warawa, pro se

Shelbyville, Kentucky

BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:

Louis I. Waterman

Spencer J. Brooks

Lindsay I. Hardin

Prospect, Kentucky