alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Wells Fargo Logo] **Wells Fargo Bank, NA****Document Custody**1015 - 10th Ave SE Minneapolis, MN 55014**ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE SERVICING CRITERIA**Corporate Trust Services division of Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (the "Company") is responsible for assessing compliance with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.  The Company has determined that the servicing criteria are applicable in regards to the servicing platform as of and for the period as follows: Platform: Publicly-issued (i.e., transaction level reporting required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) residential mortgage-backed securities and commercial mortgage-backed securities issued on or after January 1, 2006 for which the company provides document custody services, excluding any publicly issued transactions issued by any government sponsored entity (the "Platform"). Applicable Servicing Criteria: The servicing criteria set fo rth in Item 1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(4)(i) and 1122(d)(4)(ii), in regard to the activities performed by the Company with respect to the Platform (the "Applicable Servicing Criteria"). Management of the Company has determined that all other servicing criteria set forth in item 1122(d) are not applicable to the Platform. Period: As of and for the twelve months ended December 31, 2007 (the "Period").With respect to the Platform and the Period, the Company provides the following assessment of compliance with respect to the Applicable Servicing Criteria: 1.The Company is responsible for assessing its compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria. 2.The Company has  assessed compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria. In performing this assessment, the Company used the criteria set forth by the Securities and Exchange Commission in paragraph (d) of Item 1122 of Regulation AB. 3.Based on such assessment, as of and for the Period, the Company has complied, in all material respects with the Applicable Servicing Criteria. KPMG LLP, a registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report with respect to the Company's assessment of compliance as of and for the Period. **WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION**By: /s/ Shari Gillund****Its: Senior Vice President Dated: February 29, 2008
#### Ellen O'Connor, Respondent, v. The Sea Side and Brooklyn Bridge Railroad Company and Others, Appellants.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion.

All concur.
#### In the Matter of the Application of Horace Pettit for Admission to the Bar.

Application granted.

Present — Jenks, P. J., Thomas, Carr, Woodward and Rich, JJ.
#### H. A. COLLINS and Wife, PARALEE COLLINS, and RUTH C. BROOKSHIRE, Petitioners, v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY *&*PUBLIC WORKS COMMISSION.

(Filed 22 September, 1954.)

Trial § 39—

Even though the amount of the verdict may prompt the surmise that it was a quotient verdict, this alone is insufficient to compel the conclusion, as a matter of law, that it was in fact a quotient verdict.

*628Appeal by respondent from *Pless, J.,*March Term 1954, BuNcombe. No error.

Special proceeding for the recovery of compensation for the land of petitioners appropriated by respondent for highway purposes.

In the proceeding before the clerk, the commissioners assessed the damages, the clerk signed judgment on the report of the commissioners, and respondent appealed.

In the court below the jury fixed the damages sustained by petitioners at $1,666.67. From judgment on the verdict respondent appealed.

*Bon 0. 7oung for petitioner appellees.*

*B. Brookes Peters and McLean, Elmore & Martin for respondent appellant.*

Per Curiam.

Bespondent’s exceptive assignments of error fail to raise any question of law of sufficient moment to require discussion. Upon the rendition of the verdict the respondent did not request the court to poll the jury. While the amount of the verdict may prompt the surmise that it was a quotient verdict, it alone is insufficient to compel the conclusion, as a matter of law, that it was in fact a quotient verdict.

As no prejudicial error is made to appear, the verdict and judgment will not be disturbed.

No error.
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28 Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153-0119

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 

Stephen Karotkin (pro hac vice) 

(stephen.karotkin@weil.com) 

Ray C. Schrock, P.C. (pro hac vice) 

(ray.schrock@weil.com) 

Jessica Liou (pro hac vice) 

(jessica.liou@weil.com) 

Matthew Goren (pro hac vice) 

(matthew.goren@weil.com) 

New York, NY 10153-0119 

Tel: (212) 310-8000 

Fax: (212) 310-8007 

KELLER & BENVENUTTI LLP 

Tobias S. Keller (#151445) 

(tkeller@kellerbenvenutti.com) 

Jane Kim (#298192) 

(jkim@kellerbenvenutti.com) 

650 California Street, Suite 1900 

San Francisco, CA 94108 

Tel: (415) 496-6723 

Fax: (415) 636-9251 

Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors in Possession 

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

In re:

PG&E CORPORATION, 

 - and - 

Bankruptcy Case No. 19-30088 (DM) 

Chapter 11 

(Lead Case) 

(Jointly Administered) 

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 

BETWEEN DEBTORS AND 

CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS 

COMMISSION EXTENDING TIME TO 

RESPOND TO LEASE ASSUMPTION 

MOTION 

 

Re: Dkt. No. 3726 

[No Hearing Requested] 

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC 

COMPANY, 

 Debtors. 

 Affects PG&E Corporation 

 Affects Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

Affects both Debtors 

* All papers shall be filed in the lead case, 

No. 19-30088 (DM) 

 

Signed and Filed: September 9, 2019

________________________________________

DENNIS MONTALI

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Entered on Docket 

September 09, 2019

EDWARD J. EMMONS, CLERK 

U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3850 Filed: 09/09/19 Entered: 09/09/19 16:53:54 Page 1 of

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 Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153-0119

The Court having considered the Stipulation Between Debtors and California State Lands 

Commission Extending Time to Respond to Lease Assumption Motion (“Stipulation”), entered 

into by PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, as debtors and debtors in 

possession (collectively, the “Debtors”), on the one hand, and the California State Lands 

Commission (the “Commission”), on the other hand, filed on September 9, 2019; and, pursuant 

to such stipulation and agreement of the Parties, and good cause appearing, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. The time for the Commission to file and serve any response or opposition 

to the Lease Assumption Motion (as defined in the Stipulation) is extended through 4:00 p.m. 

(Pacific Time) on September 13, 2019. 

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 

Dated: September 9, 2019

XAVIER BECERRA 

Attorney General of California 

MARGARITA PADILLA 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General 

 

/s/ Paul J. Pascuzzi

STEVEN H. FELDERSTEIN

PAUL J. PASCUZZI 

FELDERSTEIN FITZGERALD 

WILLOUGHBY PASCUZZI & RIOS LLP 

Attorneys for California State Lands Commission

**END OF ORDER** 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3850 Filed: 09/09/19 Entered: 09/09/19 16:53:54 Page 2 of

2
Exhibit 31(ii)
                                --------------


                                CERTIFICATIONS
                                --------------

I, Steve Bailey, certify that:


      1.    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form
            10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this
            report on Form 10-K of Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OC11 (the
            "Exchange Act periodic reports");

      2.    Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as
            a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
            omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
            made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
            were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
            this report;

      3.    Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and
            other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the
            period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act
            periodic reports;

      4.    I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
            servicer(s) and based on my knowledge and the compliance review(s)
            conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement(s)
            required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and
            except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the
            servicer(s) have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing
            agreement(s) in all material respects; and

      5.    All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
            criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation
            reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
            asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in
            accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules
            13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report,
            except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material
            instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been
            disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

      In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
      information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: The
      Bank of New York, as Trustee.

Date: March 27, 2007


      /s/ Steve Bailey
      -----------------------
      Steve Bailey
      Senior Managing Director, Loan Administration
#### W. H. FRANCISCO v. PINE CLIFFE CAMP AND COUNTRY CLUB and W. B. WADSWORTH v. PINE CLIFFE CAMP AND COUNTRY CLUB.

(Filed 5 October, 1927.)

Judgments — Liens—Mechanics’ Liens — Appeal and Error — Statutes.

Where a laborer on a building being constructed has failed in his action to establish a lien on the building, and Judgment is entered creating only a Judgment lien from which he has not appealed, the lien of - the Judgment takes effect from the time of its rendition, and does not relate back to the time of the filing of the lien in the clerk’s office under the provisions of our statute relating to mechanics’ liens so as to give it priority out of the proceeds of the sale of the property to the liens of other Judgments theretofore entered.

Appeals by *W.*H. Erancisco from *Granmer, J.,*at June Term, 1927, of CRAVEN.

Controversy among judgment creditors relative to tbe proper distribution of proceeds arising from sale of defendant’s land under execution. Tbe question presented is tbe right to priority of satisfaction out of said funds.

From tbe order entered *W.*H. Francisco appeals, assigning error.

*Guión & Guión and L>. H. Willis for plaintiffs:*

*Whitehurst & Barden for appellees.*

Stacy, C. J.

These appeals present but a single question. It is tbis: When notice of claim is filed in tbe clerk’s office by a laborer, mechanic or material-furnisher, and judgment subsequently rendered in an action by such laborer, mechanic or material-furnisher against tbe owner of tbe building for tbe amount of bis claim, but in which tbe plaintiff’s right to a statutory lien as a laborer, mechanic, or material-furnisher, is specifically denied, does tbe lien of said judgment take effect from tbe date of its entry, or would such lien relate back *to the*date upon which tbe laborer, mechanic, or material-furnisher filed notice of bis claim in tbe clerk’s office?

*321Tbe question, answers itself. His Honor correctly beld tbat as "W. H. Francisco failed to obtain a judgment on bis claim of lien as a laborer, mecbanic, or material-furnisber, and did not appeal from tbe order awarding bim judgment as a general creditor only, tbe lien of tbe judgment entered in bis favor took effect from tbe date of its entry, 31 January, 1927, and not from tbe date of tbe filing of claim in tbe clerk’s office, 30 July, 1926, wbicb be failed to prosecute to a successful conclusion, and tbat said judment was not entitled to share in tbe distribution of tbe proceeds, derived from tbe sale of defendant’s land under execution, over other judgments, docketed prior to 31 January, 1927.

Affirmed.
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 12
- 00348
- CV
IN THE INTEREST OF S .N. AND A.N., CHILDR EN ,

From the 74th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2011
- 1171
- 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Armando Nevarez’s parental rights to his two children, S.N and A.N. A jury found that Nevarez’s parental rights should be terminated, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. We affirm.
Neva rez’s appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting that he has diligently reviewed the appellate record and that, in his opinion, the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The procedures in Anders are applicable to
appe als from judgments terminating the parent

- child relationship. In re E.L.Y ., 69 S.W.3d 838, 842 (T ex. App.
─ Waco 2002, no pet.).I n the Interest of S.N. and A.N. Page 2

In compliance with High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [PanelOp.] 1978), counsel has discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he provided Nevarez with a copy of the Anders brief and informed Nevarez of his right to obtain a copy of the appellate record. Coun sel has also advised Nevarez of his right to file a pro se brief or response. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at
510 n.3. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and Nevarez has not filed a
pro se response. S ee In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In reviewing an Anders appeal, we must, "after a full examination of all the proceedings, ... decide whether the case is wholly frivolous." See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. at; accord Staffo rd v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 509

- 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). An appeal is "wholly frivolous" or "without merit" when it "lacks any basis in law or fact." McCoy v. Court of Appeals , 486 U.S. 429, 439 n. 10 (1988). After a review of the entire
record in th is appeal, we determine the appeal to be wholly frivolous. See Bledsoe v.
State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 826

- 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we affi rm the trial court's judgment. Counsel's request that he be allowed to withdraw from representation of Nevarez is granted. Additionally, counsel must send Nevarez a copy of the opinion and notify him of his right to file a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. See In re
K.D. , 127 S.W.3d 66, 68 n.3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).I n the Interest of S.N. and A.N. Page 3 AL SCOGGINS Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed; motion granted Opinion delivered and filed November 29, 2012 [CV06]
#### David O’Neill and Others, Appellants. In the Matter of Addison D. O’Neill, Executor of Agnes L. Jones, Deceased, Respondent.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion.
#### Clark S. Bennett, Appellant, v. Edmund R. Bell and another executors of Calvin H. Bell, deceased, Respondents.

— Order affirmed, without costs. *Held,*that as the order does not appear to have prejudiced the appelh nt, it is not necessary to pass upon the question as to the power 'of the court to amend the verdict.
#### John A. Knox, Appellant, v. William M. Chandler, Respondent.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.

Dykman, J.:

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff entered upon the verdict of a jury after a trial at the Circuit. The action was for malicious prosecution. As the testimony was substantially uncontradicted, or at least such that but one conclusion could be fairly reached upon the question, the trial judge determined that there was not probable cause for the prosecution, and left the question of damages to the jury. There was no error committed upon the trial and the judgment must be affirmed, with costs.

Brown, P. J., and Pratt, J., concurred.
#### Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Bankers and Merchants' Insurance Company.

Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs. Opinion

*Per Curiam*
Case: 19-30088    Doc# 3413-2    Filed: 08/07/19    Entered: 08/07/19 13:21:40    Page 1of 2

Case: 19-30088    Doc# 3413-2    Filed: 08/07/19    Entered: 08/07/19 13:21:40    Page 2of 2
Exhibit 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

In connection with the periodic report of Glowpoint, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Christopher A. Zigmont, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for
purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that
to the best of my knowledge:

      1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.

This Certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, "filed" with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

Date: August 16, 2004


/s/ Christopher A. Zigmont
----------------------------------
Christopher A. Zigmont
Chief Financial Officer


53
#### Joseph S. Johnson v. F. H. Noble.

*Practice—Dismissal of Suit—Appearance.*

1. A plaintiff has until ten days oefore the second term after service in which to file his declaration.

*2.*A defendant is not in court till he has been served with process, or has appeared; appearance is a substitute for service.

3. A plaintiff has the same time after notice of appearance in which to file his declaration, as after service, unless the defendant applies for a special rule on him to file it at a particular time.

[Opinion filed November 11, 1890.]

In error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elliott Anthony, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. Willett & Johnson, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Edward Maher, for defendant in error.

Moran, P. J.

Plaintiff in error filed a praecipe in assumpsit against the defendant in error on November 27, 1889. A summons was issued, but was never served or returned into *315court. On April 16, 1890, defendant "appeared by attorney, and on April 19th, on motion of said defendant’s attorney, the suit was dismissed for want of a declaration. This was error. The plaintiff has until ten days before the second term *after*service to file his declaration. Herring v. Quimby, 31 Ill. 153.

“The object of the statute is to hasten proceedings, and not allow a plaintiff to keep a defendant attending in court from term to term, without apprising him of the nature of the complaint against him.” Downey v. Smith, 13 Ill. 671.

A defendant is not in court till he has been served with process, or has appeared. Appearance is a substitute for service, and the same result must follow when the court gets jurisdiction of the defendant by appearance, as when it is obtained by service.

Hence, a plaintiff has the same time after notice of appearance to file his declaration as he has after service, unless, indeed, the defendant applies to the court for a special rule on him to file it at a particular time.

The judgment of dismissal must be reversed and the case remanded to the Superior Court.

*JReversed and*remanded.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             495
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,239
<ALLOWANCES>                                       700
<INVENTORY>                                      3,589
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                21,153
<PP&E>                                          17,952
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  45,731
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,219
<BONDS>                                              0
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<COMMON>                                        10,836
<OTHER-SE>                                       (145)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    45,731
<SALES>                                         19,916
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                19,916
<CGS>                                           16,380
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   16,380
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,519
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 514
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    503
<INCOME-TAX>                                       230
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                273
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .06
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</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-6460

GUY LANCASTER RICHMOND, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus WARDEN SIZER, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, District Judge. (CA-97-3933-WMN) Submitted: August 27, 1998 Decided: September 17, 1998 Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Guy Lancaster Richmond, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint without prejudice for failure toexhaust administrative remedies. The district court properly required exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West Supp. 1998). Because Appellant did not demonstrate to the district court that he had exhausted administrative remedies or that such remedies were not available, the court’s dismissal of the action, without prejudice, was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-16-00351-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.A. AND C.A., CHILDREN

From the County Court at Law No. 1

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 14-002766-CV-CCL1

ORDER

Appellant’s Emergency Motion for Relief is denied.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Order issued and filed July 26, 2017

Do not publish