2003 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-30-2003

Executive Bd Transp v. Transp Workers Union

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 02-4574

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PRECEDENTIAL

Filed July 30, 2003

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 02-4574

THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF TRANSPORT WORKERS

UNION OF PHILADELPHIA, LOCAL 234, THOMAS CASEY;

JOSEPH COCCIO; BRIAN POLLITT; KARL TURNER;

ROBERT O’CONNOR; ABE TISDALE; WILLIE BECKTON;

CHARLES CLANCY; ROBERT D’ALFONSO, and MEMBERS

OF TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF PHILADELPHIA,

LOCAL 234

v.

TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO;

NELLIE (JEAN) ALEXANDER, Individually and as

President of Transport Workers Union Local 234

TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,

Appellant

No. 03-1165

THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF TRANSPORT WORKERS

UNION OF PHILADELPHIA, LOCAL 234; THOMAS CASEY;

JOSEPH COCCIO; BRIAN POLLITT; KARL TURNER;

ROBERT R. O’CONNOR; ABE TISDALE; WILLIE

BECKTON; CHARLES CLANCY; ROBERT D’ALFONSO, and

MEMBERS OF TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF

PHILADELPHIA, LOCAL 234

v.
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO;

NELLIE (JEAN) ALEXANDER, Individually and as

President of Transport Workers Union Local 234

NELLIE (JEAN) ALEXANDER,

Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 02-cv-06633)

District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson

Argued May 21, 2003

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and

NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 30, 2003)

Joseph J. Vitale (Argued)

Cohen, Weiss & Simon

New York, NY 10036

Gail Lopez-Henriquez

William H. Haller

Freedman & Lorry

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Attorneys for Appellant

Transport Workers Union of

America

Joshua P. Rubinsky

Brodie & Rubinsky

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Attorney for Appellant

Nellie (Jean) Alexander

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Howard J. Kaufman (Argued)

Bruce Bodner

Kaufman, Coren & Ress

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal presents us with the latest episode in an

ongoing power struggle between the majority of the

executive board of a union local on one side and its

International and the president of the local on the other.

The union is the Transport Workers Union (“TWU”); the

local at issue is TWU Local 234 (“Local”); the Local’s

president is Jean Alexander. 

The particular issue presented by this intra-union battle

is whether the District Court erred in issuing a preliminary

injunction against the TWU and Alexander after concluding

that the TWU had interpreted its own Constitution in a

patently unreasonable manner.

I.

BACKGROUND

A glimpse into the history of the TWU and Local 234

provides the necessary background to appreciate the issue

currently before us. In 2001, the District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a preliminary

injunction to enforce a trusteeship imposed by the TWU on

the Local after a Subcommittee of the TWU’s International

Executive Council (“IEC”) concluded that the Executive

Board of Local 234 was guilty of charges leveled by the

TWU against members of the Local’s Executive Board.

Transp. Workers Union of Philadelphia, Local 234 v. Transp.

Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 131 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D.

Pa. 2001). The Board was found, inter alia, to have

pressured two elected officers to resign their positions,

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threatened 12 officers with removal for engaging in free

speech, failed to submit timely per capita payments to the

TWU, and engaged in in-fighting and factionalism to the

detriment of the Local’s operations. Id. at 662 n.6. The

trusteeship ended the following year on July 19, 2002 when

new officers were elected to the Board. 

In the July 2002 election, the Local’s membership elected

14 persons to fill all positions on the Board. Five of the

persons elected — the President, the Executive Vice

President, and three Board members — were from the

“Alexander Slate” while the remaining nine persons elected

— the three Vice Presidents, the Recording Secretary, the

Secretary Treasurer and four Board members — were from

the “Jeffrey Brooks Unity Team,” an opposing slate. Thus,

the election resulted in a Board split among two different

slates, a first such situation in the history of Local 234.

Previously, one of the competing electoral slates had won

all seats on the Board. 

Less than a week after the 2002 election, the newly

elected Board convened for its first meeting with all

members present and the Local’s new President, Jean

Alexander, presiding. The Board passed three motions

appointing a professional accountant, retaining a law firm

as legal counsel to the Local, and hiring five union

members as full time staff. Board members voted along

party lines, passing the motions by a vote of nine to five

with Alexander and her slate members voting in the

minority. Alexander ruled those motions out of order. 

Thereafter, Alexander wrote a letter to TWU’s President,

Sonny Hall, challenging the constitutionality of the motions

passed by the Board and requesting his interpretation, as

the International President, of the scope of Alexander’s

powers as the President of Local 234 under the TWU

Constitution. In her letter to Hall, Alexander claimed that

she had “the power, to the exclusion of the Executive

Board, to designate the Local’s attorneys, accountants and

appointed Business Agents” based on “the implied powers

given to the President” by Article XVI, § 1 of the TWU

Constitution. App. at 98. Alexander further relied on the

“settled past practice and policy” of Local 234 by which,

according to her, “the President alone designates the

4
attorneys, accountants and appointed Business Agents who

serve the Local.” App. at 99. In response, President Hall

rendered an interpretation of the above constitutional

provisions that upheld Alexander’s position. 

The nine members of the Board who originally voted in

favor of the motions (“Board”) filed a two count complaint in

the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

against the TWU and President Alexander (“Union”).1 The

complaint was accompanied by a motion for a preliminary

injunction. On appeal, we are solely concerned with count

one of the complaint, which asserts a claim under § 301 of

the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.

§ 185 et seq., alleging that the TWU and Alexander

breached the TWU Constitution by unlawfully shifting

decision-making authority in Local 234 from the Board to

the President. After filing the complaint, the Board, as

permitted by the TWU Constitution, appealed President

Hall’s interpretation of the TWU Constitution to the IEC.

The IEC affirmed Hall’s interpretation but clarified that the

Board could review and disapprove certain decisions made

by the Local President according to a “reasonableness”

standard. App. at 102. The parties had agreed to withhold

action on the motion for a preliminary injunction pending

the result of the internal union appeal. Once the IEC

rendered its decision, the Board filed a renewed motion. 

The District Court granted the Board’s motion for a

preliminary injunction, enjoining the TWU from giving force

or effect to President Hall’s interpretation of presidential

powers; ordered the TWU and Alexander to give full force

and effect to the motions passed at the Board’s July 25,

2002 meeting; and enjoined Alexander from filing

disciplinary charges against members of the Board because

of the motions passed at the July 25, 2002 meeting.

Executive Bd. of Transp. Workers Union of Philadelphia,

Local 234 v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 236 F.

Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Pa. 2002). In so doing, the District

Court acknowledged the substantial deference afforded to

1. We denominate Appellants as the “Union” because they are the parties

representing the view of the parent, the TWU, and the Appellees as the

“Board” because they represent the majority of the Local’s Board. 

5
union officials in interpreting a union’s Constitution. Id. at

487. It correctly noted that a party bringing a § 301 LMRA

claim bears the burden of demonstrating to the court that

the union’s interpretation of its own governing documents

was “patently unreasonable.” Id. Bearing this deference in

mind, the District Court nonetheless concluded that “giving

deference to [the Union’s] interpretation would condone

verbal violence against the plain meaning of the union’s

Constitution.” Id. at 493-94. The Union timely appealed. 

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(a)(1). The District Court’s

determination in granting the preliminary injunction will be

reversed only if it abused its discretion, committed an

obvious error in applying the law, or made a serious

mistake in considering the proof. Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853

F.2d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1988). Although the scope of our

review is limited, “ ‘any determination that is a prerequisite

to the issuance of an injunction . . . is reviewed according

to the standard applicable to that particular

determination.’ ” Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d

148, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Thus, we

exercise plenary review over the District Court’s

conclusions of law and its application of the law to the

facts. Id. at 151. 

In issuing the preliminary injunction, a district court

must consider the following: 

(a) did the movant [here the Board] make a strong

showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits? (b) did

the movant show that, without such relief, it would be

irreparably injured? (c) would the grant or denial of a

preliminary injunction substantially have harmed other

parties interested in, or affected by, the proceedings?

(d) where lies the public interest? 

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Loretangeli, 853 F.2d at 193 (citation omitted). The District

Court considered all four factors, concluding that they

pointed towards injunctive relief for the Board. Executive

Bd., 236 F. Supp. 2d at 494-97. Before us, the Union

focuses on the first factor, namely whether the Board made

a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits. 

Central to this appeal is the deference that courts accord

to a union’s interpretation of its own Constitution. With

common ground eluding the parties as to most issues, they

nonetheless agree that courts typically defer to a union’s

interpretation of its own Constitution and will not override

that interpretation unless it is “patently unreasonable.”

Although this court has never explicitly defined “patently

unreasonable,” the standard is undeniably a high one as

“ ‘[c]ourts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that

of union officials in the interpretation of the union’s

constitution, and will interfere only where the official’s

interpretation is not fair or reasonable.’ ” Local 334, United

Ass’n of Journeymen v. United Ass’n of Journeymen, 669

F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted); see also

Stelling v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d 1379, 1389

n.10 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The proper inquiry has been

described as ‘whether there was arguable authority for the

officer’s act from the officer’s viewpoint at the time, not

from a court’s more sophisticated hindsight.’ ”) (citation

omitted). Furthermore, we have noted that an interpretation

that conflicts with the “stark and unambiguous” language

of the Constitution or reads out of the Constitution

important provisions is a “patently unreasonable

interpretation” of a union Constitution. Loretangeli, 853

F.2d at 194-95. Bearing the considerable deference that we,

as a court, owe to TWU’s interpretation of its own

Constitution, we turn now to the parties’ conflicting

constitutional interpretations. 

B. The TWU Constitution 

1. The Union’s Challenge

Article XVI, § 1 of the TWU Constitution, “Duties of Local

Officers,” which is at the heart of this appeal, reads as

follows: 

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The President shall preside at all meetings of the Local

Union, the Local Executive Board and Joint Executive

Committee. He/she shall sign all orders on [sic] the

Financial Secretary-Treasurer authorized by the Local

Executive Board and shall countersign all checks

issued by the Financial Secretary-Treasurer against the

accounts of the Local Union on authorization of the

Local Executive Board. He/she shall enforce the

provisions of this Constitution. He/she shall appoint

all committees not otherwise provided for. He/she shall

perform such other duties as the Local Union, or the

Local Executive Board may assign to him/her; and

except as to powers and duties specifically

conferred on him/her by the Constitution, he/she

shall adhere to all decisions and directions of, and

be subject to, the Local Executive Board. He/she

shall be, ex officio, a delegate to Convention of the

International Union and of all organizations to which

the Local is affiliated. He/she shall be responsible for

the proper conduct of the affairs of the Local Union,

and the compliance by his/her fellow officers with their

obligations under the International Constitution and

the Local by-laws. He/she shall be chairman of the

Local’s Committee on Political Education. 

TWU Const. art. XVI, § 1 (emphasis added). 

In granting the preliminary injunction, the District Court

held that the Board was likely to prevail on the merits of its

claim and that the interpretation of President Alexander

and the TWU was patently unreasonable. Executive Bd.,

236 F. Supp. 2d at 494-96. Although the District Court

considered the interpretations of Local President Alexander,

TWU President Hall, and the IEC, it referred to the latter

two interpretations as “articulations and not the actual

decision.” Id. at 494. According to the District Court, it

“interprets the sequence of events as the IEC affirming

President Hall, who affirmed the power of Local President

Alexander to have the rights which Local President

Alexander claimed in her letter of July 25, 2002.” Id.

This is an accurate sequence of events. It is important to

understand whose interpretation represents the

interpretation of the Union because, although there is

8
essential agreement between President Alexander, President

Hall and the IEC, there are differences in their

interpretations. The TWU Constitution explicitly gives the

International President, here Sonny Hall, the power to

“interpret the meaning and application of the provisions” of

the Constitution. TWU Const. art. V, § 1. The same

constitutional provision thereafter provides that “[a]ny such

interpretation or application may be appealed by any

member or by any Local Union adversely affected to the

[IEC].” TWU Const. art. V, § 1. 

The Board followed the internal appeal provided by the

Constitution, appealing President Hall’s interpretation to

the IEC. Because the IEC served as the final step in the

internal union appeals process, we consider its

interpretation of the Constitution to be that of the Union

and thus we review it — over and above the interpretations

rendered by Hall and Alexander — under the patently

unreasonable standard. However, the IEC interpretation

must be understood in context. 

In response to President Alexander’s constitutional

inquiry, Hall rendered the following interpretation in his

July 26, 2002 letter to Alexander: 

Article XVI, Section 1, places on the Local President the

responsibility “for the proper conduct of the affairs of

the Local Union.” It is inconceivable to me that a Local

President could even begin to carry out this

responsibility without the power to select staff and

professionals whom the President felt he/she could

trust to provide the necessary assistance in a reliable

manner. The responsibility for “the proper conduct of

the affairs of the Local Union” is thus inextricably

bound up with the power to hire and fire staff

professionals. The Executive Board of Local cannot

usurp the power in question without invading a

responsibility specifically assigned by the Constitution

to the Local President. Any attempt by an Executive

Board, on its own and contrary to the wishes to [sic]

the President, to exercise the power to hire and fire

thus violates the T.W.U. Constitution. 

This interpretation of the Constitution is consistent

with the past practice at T.W.U. Locals. 

9
App. at 100. 

The IEC, in turn, affirmed President Hall’s interpretation

with the caveat that although the Local President had the

power to hire and fire staff and retain professional help, the

Board retained the power to reject particular decisions

provided that its justification is deemed to be “reasonable.”

App. at 102. The IEC rendered its decision in a letter to the

Local’s Recording Secretary, Thomas R. Casey, dated

October 30, 2002. Although the crux of this rather lengthy

letter is the IEC’s affirmation with the “reasonableness”

qualification, its relevant passages are the following: 

Prior to consideration of the matter by the entire [IEC],

President Hall told the [IEC] that his interpretation

should not be taken to stand for more than what it

explicitly stated, namely, that the decisions to hire and

fire staff, and to retain outside professional help, must

originate with the President, and that the Executive

Board had no right to usurp this Presidential authority

by initiating decisions on who to hire and who to retain

without reference to the decisions made by the

President. He said that this interpretation should not

be taken to mean that the Executive Board had no role

whatever in reviewing these kinds of decisions by the

President, or that in appropriate cases the Executive

Board could not be justified in voting to disapprove, for

instance, a particular arrangement reached between

the President and an outside lawyer or accountant,

provided its justification for the rejection was

reasonable. 

. . . . 

. . . [A] motion was made to affirm the Constitutional

interpretation made by President Hall in his letter of

July 26. . . . The motion was passed. 

App. at 102. 

Thus, the narrow question before us on appeal is whether

the IEC’s constitutional interpretation — with its

reasonableness standard — is patently unreasonable. Of

course, we recognize that underlying this narrow legal

question is the broader power struggle pervading the

10
current appeal. As counsel for the Board rhetorically asked:

“The whole issue here is who ultimately makes the

decisions? Who ultimately has the power and authority?”

Tr. of Oral Argument, May 21, 2003, at 38. 

2. Constitutional Provisions

There are two somewhat conflicting provisions in Article

XVI, § 1 that give rise to the battling constitutional

interpretations before us. The first provision, appropriately

referred to as the “adherence clause” by the parties, reads

as follows: “except as to powers and duties specifically

conferred on him/her by the Constitution, [the President]

shall adhere to all decisions and directions of, and be

subject to, the Local Executive Board.” TWU Const. art.

XVI, § 1. The Board relies on this provision. The Union, for

its part, relies on the so-called “responsibility clause” that

states: “[the President] shall be responsible for the proper

conduct of the affairs of the Local Union. . . .” TWU Const.

art. XVI, § 1. 

The District Court found no ambiguity in the words of the

Constitution but instead concluded that the “intent and

plain meaning” of the Constitution is to “give overriding

authority and control to the [Board].” Executive Bd., 236 F.

Supp. 2d at 494. In so concluding, the District Court stated

that “[t]he plain language of the Constitution mandates that

the Local President ‘shall adhere to all decisions and

directions of, and be subject to, the Local Executive Board.’ ”

Id. (alteration in original). According to the District Court,

“[t]his clear, unambiguous language does not in any way

lend itself to President Hall’s interpretation. . . .” Id.

Furthermore, the District Court rejected the reasonableness

standard proffered by the IEC, noting that it could find no

basis for such a standard in the TWU Constitution. Id. at

495. 

In attacking the District Court’s opinion, the Union

primarily calls on the considerable judicial deference that is

to be afforded to its constitutional interpretation. It further

argues that there is “no dispute” that the Constitution fails

to expressly give either the Local President or Board

absolute power to retain counsel, hire accountants, or

employ staff for the Local and argues that, in light of this

11
ambiguity, it is not patently unreasonable to conclude that

the initial decision in these areas must originate with the

Local President which the Board may review and even

reject, as long as its rejection is reasonable. The Union

takes the position that ultimately the IEC would be the

body that would determine whether the Board’s rejection

was reasonable. 

The Union faults the District Court for selectively quoting

from the TWU Constitution, considering only the adherence

clause to the exclusion of the responsibility clause. It

argues that if the District Court had properly considered all

rather than only certain constitutional passages, it could

not have concluded that the Union’s interpretation “would

condone verbal violence against the plain meaning of the

union’s Constitution.” Executive Bd., 236 F. Supp. 2d at

493-94. The Union argues that in concluding that the

Constitution unambiguously empowers the Board to make

such decisions, the District Court severed the qualifying

portion of the adherence clause, which states: “except as to

the powers and duties specifically conferred on [the

President] by the Constitution. . . .” TWU Const. art. XVI,

§ 1. It notes that altogether missing from the District

Court’s analysis is any reference to the responsibility clause

which states that “[the President] shall be responsible for

the proper conduct of the affairs of the Local union.” TWU

Const. art. XVI, § 1. According to the Union, if the District

Court had taken into account these two provisions, it could

not have concluded that the Constitution empowers the

Board to make unilateral decisions regarding staff and

professionals. 

Predictably, the Board argues just the opposite, urging us

to affirm the District Court. Acknowledging that courts

typically defer to a union’s interpretation of its own

Constitution — here the IEC’s interpretation — the Board

argues that in this instance, the Union’s interpretation is

patently unreasonable as it conflicts with the clear and

unambiguous language in the Constitution, ignores the

plain terms of the Constitution, and reads important

provisions out of the Constitution.2 It further notes that the

2. We note that the Board refers to President Hall’s interpretation as the

one at issue but, as explained above, we consider the interpretation of

the IEC to be the Union’s interpretation. 

12
TWU interpretations — of both Hall and the IEC — fail to

mention the adherence clause. As for the responsibility

clause, the Board argues that the District Court did, in fact,

consider it, as evidenced by the Court’s statement that

“[t]he Local President is authorized to act similarly to most

executives, that is, to carry out the decisions of a Board of

Directors, or, in this case, the Local Executive Board.”

Executive Bd., 236 F. Supp. 2d at 494. Unquestionably, this

is a skewed reading of the District Court’s opinion as

nowhere in the Court’s analysis can we find reference to the

responsibility clause. The crux of the parties’ contentions is

that each claims that the other has read out an important

constitutional provision. 

C. Disposition 

This court has previously rejected an approach by which

only certain provisions of a union’s Constitution are

considered. We noted that when a union’s interpretation of

its Constitution reads out an “important protective

provision,” it may be found to be patently unreasonable.

Loretangeli, 853 F.2d at 195. In Loretangeli, Plaintiffs, who

were members of Local 194 of the New Jersey Turnpike

Employees’ Union, challenged the payment of rebates of per

capita dues to two other union locals made by the parent

organization, the Federation. Id. at 187. The district court

dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint and denied their motion for

a preliminary injunction, finding the Federation’s action to

be authorized by its reasonable interpretation of the union’s

Constitution. Id.

On appeal, we concluded that the district court had

misconstrued the proof presented and erred as a matter of

law because the Federation’s interpretation conflicted with

the stark and unambiguous language of the Constitution

which barred rebates to any local union not accorded to all

of the other locals. Id. at 194. Because the Federation’s

interpretation read out of the Constitution an important

provision, id. at 195, we reversed the dismissal of the

complaint and remanded for further consideration of the

Plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction. Id.

This case is different. First, there is no stark and

unambiguous language clearly supporting either party’s

13
contentions. If there were, resolution would be much easier.

Second, both parties read out provisions from the

Constitution, thereby precluding either of them from

effectively relying on Loretangeli for doctrinal support. It is

true, as the Board claims, that neither President Hall nor

the IEC refers to the adherence clause, focusing instead on

the responsibility clause in rendering their interpretations.

It is also true, as the Union notes, that the District Court

and the Board have ignored the responsibility clause. So,

both sides are correct in their contentions that the other

has failed to account for all of the provisions of the

Constitution. 

The difficulty is that a reading of all of the applicable

provisions shows that there is no unambiguous grant of

power to either party. Consequently, we are constrained to

accept the Union’s interpretation, not because it is

compelled by the language but only because of the

considerable deference we owe to it. In so concluding, we do

not suggest that the IEC’s interpretation is better than the

Board’s, but we merely hold that it is not patently

unreasonable.3 Furthermore, the Board’s reference to

Article XII, § 2 does nothing to help its cause. Contrary to

the Board’s contentions, nothing in that section explicitly

bestows the Board with the exclusive power to originate

hiring decisions.4

3. The Board also argues that the “reasonableness” component of the

IEC’s interpretation is, in and of itself, invalid as it cannot be found in

the text of the Constitution. It nonetheless concedes that the IEC has the

authority to interpret the Constitution. The Board’s positions are in

tension. If the IEC has the power to interpret the Constitution, it also

has the power to apply a reasonableness standard with which the Board

must comply in reviewing President Alexander’s selections. As the IEC is

empowered to “interpret” and not simply “read” the Constitution, its

interpretation supplemented by a reasonableness standard, is not

patently unreasonable. 

4. That section reads: 

Subject to the provisions of the International Constitution and the

by-laws of the Local Union and to all delegations of authority and

assignment of responsibility to the Local Officers and to the Local

Executive Board as provided in the International Constitution and

Local by-laws, the supreme authority in the Local Union shall be the

14
On a final note, the Union buttresses its position by

arguing that its interpretation is consistent with past

practices of the Local. Specifically, it argues that

historically Local Presidents have exercised the power to

originate employment decisions. While it is true that we

may consider past practices of the Union, see Loretangeli,

853 F.2d at 195, because the Local had heretofore never

elected a split board, we will refrain from making the apples

to oranges comparison urged by the Union. 

III.

CONCLUSION

While the unfortunate political animosity pervading this

intra-union battle is deep, the legal issue before us is

narrow, namely whether the Union’s interpretation of the

TWU Constitution is patently unreasonable to warrant the

preliminary injunction issued by the District Court. Given

the deference we afford to unions in interpreting their own

Constitutions, we conclude that although not compelled by

the language, the Union’s constitutional interpretation is

not patently unreasonable. Thus, we will remand to the

District Court with instructions to dissolve the preliminary

injunction.5 The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

membership of the Local Union, acting through duly called regular

meetings of the Local Union or through duly called regular meetings

of the respective sections or divisions of the Local meeting

separately, as the Local by-laws may provide. Between such

meetings, the Local Executive Board shall have the power and

authority to administer the affairs of the Local Union. 

TWU Const. art. XII, § 2. 

5. The Union argues that the District Court’s attention to the

fundamental inquiry before it was “diverted” by the Court’s reliance on

democratic policy considerations. Br. of Union at 19. Although we agree

with the District Court as to the emphasis that labor policy places on the

need for union democracy, that does not help resolve the issue in this

case as all of the contending parties were elected by the membership. 

15
A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

16