NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

MUHAMMED TARIQ CAMRAN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50404 

D.C. No. 

3:17-cr-00817-CAB-2 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2018**

Pasadena, California

Before: IKUTA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and McNAMEE,

*** District 

Judge.

Muhammed Tariq Camran appeals the district court’s order denying his 

motion to suppress evidence stemming from a vehicle stop on the basis that the 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Stephen M. McNamee, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 30 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-50404 

border patrol agent lacked reasonable suspicion to direct the stop. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, and we affirm.

The district court did not err in denying Camran’s motion to suppress 

because the totality of the circumstances made it reasonable for Agent Massie to 

suspect that the vehicle occupants were engaged in criminal activity. See United 

States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an 

officer on a roving border patrol may conduct a brief investigatory stop if she has 

“a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of 

criminal activity.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also United 

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (explaining that a reviewing court looks 

to the “totality of the circumstances” to see whether the officer had a 

“particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity (internal 

quotations and citations omitted)).

First, the vehicle appeared in the late hours of the evening at an intersection 

which was experiencing a high level of alien smuggling traffic. Second, the 

intersection was located in a rural and sparsely populated area two and a half miles 

from the United States-Mexico border (which was only partially fenced in this 

area), and close to a known alien pick-up point. Third, Agent Massie was 

intimately familiar with the area’s residents, vehicles, and traffic patterns, and did 

not recognize the vehicle as a local vehicle, and noticed it was atypical for the area 
3 17-50404 

because it was brand new. Fourth, the vehicle was a rental, and Agent Massie knew 

that rental vehicles were often used by alien and drug smugglers. Fifth, the vehicle 

passed through the intersection and headed toward the border (and the pick-up 

point), and then returned in an amount of time sufficient in Agent Massie’s

estimation to pick up aliens and turn around. Finally, when Agent Massie 

attempted to catch up to the vehicle on Interstate 8, the vehicle increased its speed, 

as if trying to evade capture.

Consistent with the totality of the circumstances test, the district court 

viewed Agent Massie’s observations in the aggregate, and gave due weight to the 

inferences that Agent Massie drew from those observations prior to ruling that the 

stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Reviewing de novo the district court’s 

determination that reasonable suspicion existed, and the findings of fact for clear 

error, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion to 

suppress. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

AFFIRMED.