UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4925

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

MARCUS DIXON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, 

District Judge. (3:08-cr-00032-1) 

Submitted: March 30, 2009 Decided: April 17, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Lex A. Coleman, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF 

THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, 

R. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, 

West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Marcus Dixon pled guilty to possession of fifty grams 

or more of crack cocaine. The district court determined that 

Dixon was accountable for 246 grams of crack cocaine, and that 

his advisory guideline range was 151 to 188 months imprisonment. 

The district court determined that Dixon’s criminal history 

category overstated the seriousness of his past criminal 

activity, and departed downward and imposed a 140-month 

sentence. Dixon appeals, arguing that the district court erred 

by converting the $20,000 in cash which was found secreted in a 

loveseat in Dixon’s bedroom to its crack cocaine equivalent. He 

also argues that the sentence imposed violated his substantive 

due process rights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 First, we find no clear error in the district court’s 

determination that the currency found hidden in the loveseat was 

attributable to Dixon’s drug trafficking activities. United 

States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 614 (4th Cir. 1994) (providing 

standard). The $20,000 was packaged in a manner similar to that 

used by persons in the drug trade, it was hidden inside 

furniture, and it was implausible, given their income, that 

Dixon and his wife could save up that substantial sum “from 

their limited income with the expenses any normal family would 

have.” While the district court did convert to crack the amount 

that Dixon’s mother testified was given to Dixon from family 

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members, as the district court noted, even if this sum was not 

included in the amount converted to crack, Dixon’s offense level 

would remain the same. From our review of the evidence, we do 

not find any clear error by the district court in converting the 

currency found in Dixon’s home to its cocaine base equivalent. 

See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1, cmt. 

n.12 (2007); United States v. Sampson, 140 F.3d 585, 592 (4th 

Cir. 1998). 

 Second, Dixon claims that the sentencing disparity 

between powder cocaine and crack offenses violates due process. 

We find no such violation, either in the statute, or in the 

application of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. 

Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases). 

 Accordingly, we affirm Dixon’s sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED