alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### SOLOMON BARNETT, Respondent, *v.*MEYER BENJAMIN, Appellant.

*Money summons and complaint for tort*— variance *between*— when disregarded— *appeal*— order *of ae-rest.*

Appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate an order of arrest, and to strike out the allegations of fraud contained in the complaint served in this action.

The action was commenced on the 21st of March, 1876, by the service of a summons for money. On the twenty-second of March an order of arrest was granted upon affidavit, and on the twenty-sixth of April the complaint was served.

As regards the motion to set aside the complaint and strike out all the allegations of fraud therein contained, made on the ground that the summons was on contract and the complaint in tort, the court at General Term said: “ It has been claimed that the allegations inserted in the complaint alleging the commission of the fraud were irrelevant, and should have been stricken out because the notice contained in the summons stated that the judgment would be taken for the amount of the debt if the defendant failed to answer. To justify the service of a complaint in the form in which it has been made, it has been urged that the summons should have contained a notice that the plaintiff would *706apply to the court for relief if the defendant failed to answer. It is not necessary to decide whether this point has been well taken or not for the purpose of disposing of the present appeal; for, even if the defendant should be right in this position, he was not máte-rially injured in any one of his rights by the insertion of a different notice in the summons. If the plaintiff had taken judgment without applying for the relief proper in the case, then the defendant might have just reason to complain, if such an application should be held to be necessary. But by the mere service of a complaint, on which judgment could not regularly be taken without an application to the court, no substantial right of the defendant can be injured or affected, even if the summons stated that judgment in case of default would be taken for the debt, as a matter of course. For that reason no appeal can properly be taken from the order denying the motion, made to strike the allegation of fraud out of the complaint. *(McOoun*v. *W. Y. O. R. R.*Go., 50 N. Y., 176.)”

*John H. Ola/yton,*for the appellant. *N. A. Halbert,*for the respondent.

Opinion by

DaNIels, J.

Davis, P. J., and Beady. J., concurred.

Appeal dismissed as to so much of the order as denies motion to strike out the allegations of fraud from the complaint, and order affirmed so far as it denied motion to 'vacate order of arrest, with ten dollars costs, besides disbursements.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5276 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to treat bicycle sharing systems 

as mass transit facilities for purposes of the qualified transportation fringe. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 30, 2014 

Mr. CROWLEY (for himself and Mr. PAULSEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to treat bicycle 

sharing systems as mass transit facilities for purposes 

of the qualified transportation fringe. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Bike to Work Act of 

5 2014’’. 

6 SEC. 2. BICYCLE SHARING SYSTEMS TREATED AS MASS 

7 TRANSIT FACILITIES. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 132(f)(5) of the Internal 

9 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end 

10 the following new subparagraph: 


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•HR 5276 IH

1 ‘‘(G) BICYCLE SHARING SYSTEMS TREAT2 ED AS MASS TRANSIT FACILITIES.— 

3 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—A bicycle sharing 

4 system shall be treated as a mass transit 

5 facility for purposes of subparagraph 

6 (A)(i). 

7 ‘‘(ii) BICYCLE SHARING SYSTEM.— 

8 The term ‘bicycle sharing system’ means a 

9 public transportation system— 

10 ‘‘(I) consisting of a network of 

11 stations at which bicycles are made 

12 available to customers for commuting 

13 and short-term, point-to-point use 

14 within the network’s service area; and 

15 ‘‘(II) that is operated or author16 ized by a government agency or pub17 lic-private partnership.’’. 

18 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

19 this section shall apply to months beginning after the date 

20 of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


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#### Sylvester Cady, Respondent, v. Hiram W. Bradshaw, Appellant, Impleaded, etc.

Judgment affirmed.

Opinion by

Haight, J.
Entered on Docket 

February 06, 2019

EDWARD J. EMMONS, CLERK 

U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 344 Filed: 02/06/19 Entered: 02/06/19 16:29:27 Page 1 of 1
#### New York and Brooklyn Brewing Company, Appellant, v. Peter Angelo, Respondent.

Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs;

Present — Jenks, P. J., Thomas, Carr, Woodward and Rich, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 28, 2009 

l0921 

Order 

 

September 28, 2009 

138154(53) 

 

ATLANTIC XXXI, L.L.C., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 138154 

 COA: 278104 

Oakland CC: 2003-053566-CK 

ART MIDWEST L.P., ART MIDWEST, INC., 

AMERICAN REALTY INVESTORS, INC. and 

BASIC CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC., 

Defendants, 

and 

AMERICAN REALTY TRUST, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s April 28, 

2009 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
----

**EXHIBIT      32.2          **

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | */s/                Ronald H. Friesen*                           |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Ronald                H. Friesen                                 |
|   | Senior                Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |
|   | (principal                financial officer)                     |
|   | August                14, 2007                                   |

----
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications.

  Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1 (the "Trust"),
  Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C1

  I, Jeffrey A. Altabef,  a Vice President of Credit Suisse First Boston
  Mortgage Securities Corp., the depositor into the above-referenced Trust,
  certify that:

  1.I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K, and all reports Form 10-D
    required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on
    Form 10-K of the Trust (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

  2.Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
    whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
    to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
    light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

  3.Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
    information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
    covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

  4.Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required
    in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as
    disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have
    fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all
    material respects; and

  5.All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
    for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
    assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
    securities required to be included in this report in accordance with
    Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18
    have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise
    disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance
    described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form
    10-K.

    In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
    information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
    Capmark Finance Inc., Centerline Servicing Inc., Midland Loan Services,
    Inc. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

    Dated:   March 28, 2008


    /s/ Jeffrey A. Altabef
    Signature

    Vice President
    (Senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Randon Lee Foley, Appellant

No. 06

- 17

- 00037

- CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 77th District Court of Limestone County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No.

12657

- A ). Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed

for want of jurisdiction . Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We further order that the appellant, Randon Lee Foley, pay all costs of this appeal.

RENDERED APRIL 21, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
EX-4.3



 Exhibit 4.3 

OFFICER’S CERTIFICATE 

OF KINETIC CONCEPTS, INC. AND KCI USA, INC. 

June 22, 2016 
 The
undersigned officer of Kinetic Concepts, Inc., a Texas corporation (“KCI”), and KCI USA, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“KCI USA,” and together with KCI, the “Issuers”), pursuant to Section 13.4
of the Indenture, dated as of February 9, 2016 (the “Indenture”), by and among the Issuers, the guarantors party thereto (the “Guarantors”) and Wilmington Trust, National Association, as trustee and as
collateral agent, relating to the issuance and sale by the Issuers of $190,000,000 aggregate principal amount of the Issuers’ 7.875% First Lien Senior Secured Notes due 2021 (the “Notes”), does hereby certify, solely in his
capacity as an officer of each of the Issuers and not in any personal capacity, as follows (capitalized terms used but defined below have the respective meanings assigned to them in the Indenture): 

1. The undersigned has read the covenants and conditions of the Indenture with respect to the Notes and the definitions in the
Indenture relating thereto. 
 2. The undersigned has reviewed such documents and consulted with the appropriate individuals
and counsel as the undersigned has deemed necessary and appropriate to certify the statements herein. 
 3. In the opinion of
the undersigned, the undersigned has undertaken a sufficient review so as to enable him to make an informed opinion as to the accuracy of the statements made herein. 

4. In the opinion of the undersigned, all conditions precedent and covenants provided for in the Indenture and the Notes
relating to the establishment and original issuance, authentication and delivery of the Notes have been complied with. 
 5.
In the opinion of the undersigned, Section 2.1 of the Indenture has been complied with in the establishment of the terms of the Notes. 

6. The aggregate principal amount of the Notes to be authenticated and delivered pursuant to the Indenture is $190,000,000. The
Notes shall be issued on June 22, 2016 at an initial issue price of 105.250%, plus accrued interest from February 9, 2016, and shall be Restricted Notes and Additional Notes under the Indenture. Interest on the Notes shall accrue from
February 9, 2016. 
 [Signature page follows] 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Officer’s Certificate as of the date
first set forth above. 
  

					
	KINETIC CONCEPTS, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Caleb A. Moore

		 	Name:	 	Caleb A. Moore
		 	Title:	 	Vice President, Treasury and Investor Relations
	
	KCI USA, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Caleb A. Moore

		 	Name:	 	Caleb A. Moore
		 	Title:	 	Vice President, Treasurer and Investor Relations


 [Signature Page to Officer’s Certificate pursuant to the Indenture]
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5248 

To provide for United States participation in the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 29, 2014 

Ms. LEE of California (for herself, Mr. ENGEL, Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY

of New York, and Ms. SLAUGHTER) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To provide for United States participation in the InterParliamentary Union, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE INTER4 PARLIAMENTARY UNION. 

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

6 (1) The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 

7 founded in 1889, is the world organization of na8 tional parliaments comprising over 160 parliaments 

9 (including all the major allies of the United States) 


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•HR 5248 IH

1 and working closely with the regional parliamentary 

2 organizations on all continents. 

3 (2) The core mission of the IPU is the pro4 motion of parliamentary democracy, the elaboration 

5 of standards and criteria for democratic parliamen6 tary practice, the protection of human rights, the 

7 political empowerment of women, and greater trans8 parency and accountability at the global level, which 

9 are in line with United States interests and prior10 ities. 

11 (3) Congress was a founding member of the 

12 IPU, and played an active and prominent role for 

13 many decades. 

14 (4) The main concerns of Congress, including 

15 the scheduling of main Assembly and arrears, have 

16 been fully addressed by the IPU. 

17 (5) Through the activities of the IPU, the 

18 United States can usefully promote its core values of 

19 freedom, democracy, and human rights, and help 

20 build stronger parliaments around the world. 

21 (b) UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE INTER22 PARLIAMENTARY UNION.—Notwithstanding section 2503 

23 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 

24 1998 (division G of Public Law 105–277)— 

25 (1) the Secretary of State is authorized—— 


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•HR 5248 IH

1 (A) to facilitate the readmission and par2 ticipation of the United States in the Inter-Par3 liamentary Union; and 

4 (B) to pay expenses to meet the annual ob5 ligations of membership in the Inter-Parliamen6 tary Union, in accordance with the assessments 

7 determined by the Governing Council; and 

8 (2) the majority leader of the Senate, in con9 sultation with the minority leader of the Senate, and 

10 the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in con11 sultation with the minority leader of the House of 

12 Representatives, are authorized to designate Mem13 bers of Congress to serve as delegates to the Assem14 bly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. 

Æ 


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## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S

N O . A P
- 7 6 , 5 5 2

E X P A R T E T E R R A N C E R A Y S H U N C E P H U S , A p p l i c a n t

O N A P P L I C A T I O N F O R A W R I T O F H A B E A S C O R P U S C A U S E N O . 0 6 1 3 5 3 0 A I N T H E 2 9 7 J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T T H F R O M T A R R A N T C O U N T Y

P e r c u r i a m . O P I N I O N
P u rsuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proced u re , t h e cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte
Y o u n g , 4 1 8 S

. W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of two counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and sentenc ed to life imprisonment for eac h count, with an aff

irmative deadly wea

pon finding

. The Second Court of Appeals aff irmed his conviction. Cephus v. State , No. 02-01-251- CR (Tex. App. – For t Worth, Aug ust 22, 2002, pet. ref ’d). Applicant contends, inter alia , that his trial counsel rende red ineffe ctive assistance beca use2

counsel failed to a dvise Applicant that he had a rig ht to a jury deter mination of the deadly wea pon issue even though he elec ted to have the trial court assess his punishment. Applicant alleg es that had he known that he could submit the deadly wea pon issue to the j ury , he would have done so rathe r than allowing the trial cour t to made the dete rmination. After holding a habea s hear ing, the trial court has deter mined that trial coun s el wa s ineffe ctive in that counsel did not advi s e Applicant that he was entitled to a jury deter mination of the deadly wea

pon i s s u e, an d that such i neff ective repre sentation prejudice d Applicant. We find, there fore , that Applicant is entitled to a hear ing befor e a jury solely to decide the issue of punishment in Cause No. 0613530A f rom the 297th J udicial District Court of Tar rant County

.

Deliver ed: May

11, 2011 Do Not Publish
#### Samuel L. Chinman and Charles Puksansky, Respondents, v. Louis Liebross, etc., Appellant.

Judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed by default, with costs.

Burr, Thomas, Carr, Woodward and Rich, JJ., concurred.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 4402** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. JERMAL OLLIE CLEMONS , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Distri ct of South Carolina , at Anderson

. Henry F. Floyd , District Judge. ( 8:09

- cr - 00788

- HFF

- 1 )

Submitted : February 10, 2011 Decided: February 17, 2011

Before WILKINSON and DAVIS , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un publ ished per curiam opinion

. John Wesley Locklair, III, LOCKLAIR & LOCKLAIR, PC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not bind ing precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Jermal Ollie Clemons pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine base. The district court sentenced Clemons to 186 months in prison. On appeal, Clemons’ counsel ha s filed an Anders *

Clemo ns asserts that his attorney was ineffective for incorrectly predicting the applicable Guidelines range prior to Clemons’ guilty plea. However, ineffective assistance claims are more appropriately raised in a motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (W est Supp. 2010), unless counsel’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the record. See United States v. Richardson , 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). After review of the record, we find no conclusive evidence that counsel rendered ineffective assista nce, and we accordingly decline to consider these claims on direct appeal. brief, stating that there are no viable grounds for appeal, but questioning whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Although informed of his right to do so, Clemons has not filed a supplemental brief. We affirm.

In accordance with Anders , we have reviewed the remainder of the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for review. We therefore affirm Clemons’

* Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

.3 conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Clemons, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Clemons requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be fri volous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Clemons. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York *ex rel.*The Panama Railroad Company, Appellant, v. Commissioners of Taxes, etc., Respondent.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements on opinion of Beach, J., in court below.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael A. Mushow, :

Petitioner :

: No. 121 C.D. 2021

v. :

:

Doyle and Roth Manufacturing :

(Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board) :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of June, 2022, it is ORDERED that the abovecaptioned opinion filed April 12, 2022, shall be designated OPINION rather than 

MEMORANDUM OPINION, and it shall be reported.

 ________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
#### CHARLES C. LOCKWOOD, Respondent, *v.*ELIZABETH S. UNDERWOOD, Appellant.

*Aetion on note*— *what question admissible, to show that the plaintiff is not the owner.*

Appeal from a judgment in .favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee. The action was upon several promissory notes made by defendant, and delivered to Stephen N. Lockwood, and by him, July 2, 1875, transferred to William C. Lockwood, and by him, October 24, 1876, transferred to the plaintiff. The answer denied the ownership by plaintiff, and alleged that the notes were owned by S. N. Lockwood, and set up, also, off-sets to the notes and counter-claims against Stephen N. Lockwood.

Upon the trial Stephen N. was called by the plaintiff, and gave evidence as to his indorsement of his name upon the $500 note, and that he was the payee named in the note. The plaintiff then read the note in evidence, and the defendant, in the course of the cross-examination of Stephen' N., asked the witness if he had received anything, or consideration from any person, for the note. *593That question was objected to, and an answer to it excluded, and the defendant excepted. The defendant then offered to show by the witness “ that he had not received, up to the time the note was handed over ‘ to the plaintiff by William, any consideration therefor, and that the witness was at that time the lawful owner of the note.’ ” This was objected to by the plaintiff.

The court at General Term said : “ The referee rules out the question as to whether witness received any consideration for this note, on the ground that it is not a proper cross-examination ; and also that if the answer were in the affirmative it would be immaterial. There was an exception to this ruling by the defendant. Doubtless the offer to show an absence of any consideration for the transfer was for the purpose of sustaining the averment that the plaintiff was not the owner of the note, and that the witness was the owner. For such purpose we think the evidence was admissible. In *IIays*v. *Southc/ate*(18 Alb. Law Jour. [No. 16], 318), the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to prove a want of title on the part of the plaintiff to the note. (N. *O.,*10 Hun, 511, reversed.) The evidence in this case might have affected the status of the witness, and we think the offer was improperly excluded.”

*Farnell &*Burrell, for the appellant. *David*Millar, for the respondent.

Opinion by

Hardest, J.;

Talcott, P. J., and Smith, J., concurred.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered before another referee, with costs to abide event.