1

Filed 4/7/14 In re K.D. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re K.D., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A138531

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. OJ1201935)

Defendant K.D., a minor, appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order 

terminating her dependency status, declaring her a ward of the court, and placing her in 

an out-of-state facility pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1.1

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in several respects and that her 

constitutional and statutory rights were violated because a jurisdictional hearing on the 

section 602 wardship petition was held before a section 241.1 assessment was completed. 

We affirm. 

 

1

 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise specified.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested and taken to juvenile hall on July 27, 2012, after running 

away from her foster placement and stealing the foster parent’s phone and another child’s 

belongings. She was taken into protective custody after she was released from juvenile 

hall without a home to go to. Defendant’s paternal grandmother, who had been her care 

provider for 12 years, refused to take her back due to various behaviors including theft, 

running away, drug use and prostitution. On that same day, Alameda County Social 

Services filed a dependency petition pursuant to section 300 alleging defendant’s parents 

were unable to protect or provide for her support. Defendant was then 16 years old. Her 

father was incarcerated and mother’s whereabouts were unknown.

According to the jurisdiction/disposition report filed August 10, 2012, paternal 

grandmother reported defendant “had been doing well” until recently. However, at the 

beginning of the year, defendant ran away twice, for a week on each occasion. The 

second time, she “came back intoxicated with methamphetamines and ‘babbling.’ ” 

Grandmother enrolled defendant in the Thunder Road substance treatment program in 

March 2012, but she went AWOL from the program in May. Defendant acknowledged 

to the social worker she had been sexually exploited for a two-week period ending on 

July 24, 2012, when “her pimp left her in Stockton.” Defendant asserted prostitution 

“was only a temporary means to make money while she was AWOL.” She also

acknowledged she smoked marijuana every day and had used methamphetamines.

On August 13, 2012, the juvenile court found the dependency petition allegations 

true and declared defendant a dependent. The court ordered a planned permanent living 

arrangement with a foster parent, suitable group home, or residential facility. 

On August 21, the juvenile court granted the social worker’s application for a 

protective custody warrant after the foster parent reported defendant had absconded from 

her placement. The social worker filed another application for a protective custody 

warrant on September 25 after receiving a call from the caregiver that defendant did not 

return from a sleepover at a friend’s house. 
3

In a status review report filed on January 22, 2013, the social worker reported 

defendant had been held at Juvenile Hall in San Joaquin County since January 10, facing 

charges on loitering with intent to commit prostitution. The social worker noted 

defendant “has not been compliant with her case plan, in that she was AWOL and not 

attending school.” Also, the social worker reported there had been two incidents during 

the reporting period where defendant had been contacted by police for prostitution. The 

social worker expressed concern for defendant’s welfare “given the choices she has made 

regarding leaving placement and not attending school” and further opining “she places 

herself in grave danger [by] . . . participating in criminal activity that makes her very 

vulnerable to assault or worse.” 

On February 13, the San Francisco County District Attorney’s Office filed a 

wardship petition pursuant to section 602, subdivision (a), alleging defendant solicited 

and agreed to engage in prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision

(b), and resisted a peace officer, in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision 

(a)(1). The detention report prepared in connection with the wardship petition described 

the circumstances of the offense: At approximately 3:45 a.m. on February 13, 2013, a 

plain clothes San Francisco police officer assigned to the prostitution detail and operating 

an unmarked patrol car observed defendant standing at the intersection of 20th Street and 

Capp Street. Defendant waved at the officer as he approached. The officer pulled over 

and negotiated to have sex with defendant for $60, recording the transaction on a digital 

audio device. Defendant reached into the vehicle and attempted to touch the officer in 

the groin area. The officer grabbed defendant’s hand and told her she was going to be 

arrested. Defendant twisted her arm, broke free of the officer’s grasp and ran off. After 

the officer requested assistance, defendant was located west of 20th Street hiding 

between two parked cars. 

On February 14, defendant admitted as true the allegation of resisting a peace 

officer, and the prostitution allegation was dismissed. Thereafter, the San Francisco 

Juvenile Court transferred defendant’s section 602 matter to Alameda County for 
4

disposition. On February 20, the Alameda County Juvenile Court accepted the transfer 

and ordered defendant detained at juvenile hall until further order of the court.

On March 8, 2013, the Alameda County Social Services Agency Director and the 

Alameda County Chief Probation Officer filed a joint report pursuant to section 241.1 to 

assess and recommend whether defendant should be a declared a ward or remain a 

dependent of the court.2 The report noted defendant had been a dependent since August 

2012, after her grandmother could no longer care for her due to her out-of-control 

behavior. It stated: “This behavior included running away, theft, use of drugs, and 

prostitution. Since becoming a dependent, she has been chronically absent without 

approval for leave (AWOL) from placements. [Defendant] is pregnant and her child is 

due in August 2013. [Defendant] admitted to smoking cigarettes and marijuana daily. 

She also has used methamphetamines and ecstasy in the past. [¶] Both the undersigned 

and the Child Welfare Worker agree that it is in the minor’s best interest to be adjudged a 

ward of the Court. . . . [Defendant] could benefit from being placed at a program in a 

more remote location that would dissuade her from AWOLing. A Guidance Clinic 

evaluation would also be beneficial. . . . [T]he undersigned referred [defendant] to Bay 

Area Women Against Rape (BAWAR). Hopefully with their help, [defendant] can get 

the help she needs to change her life. It is important that she understands the potential 

harm that could come to her child should she continue on this destructive path.” 

On March 13, 2013, the juvenile court held a status determination hearing under 

section 241.1. The court dismissed defendant’s dependency and adjudged her a ward of 

court.

 

2

 Section 241.1 provides in part that “Whenever a minor appears to come within 

the description of both Section 300 and Section 601 or 602, the county probation 

department and the child welfare services department shall, pursuant to a jointly 

developed written protocol described in subdivision (b), initially determine which status 

will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society. The 

recommendations of both departments shall be presented to the juvenile court with the 

petition that is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is 

appropriate for the minor.” (§ 241.1, subd. (a).)
5

In a placement review filed on April 5, 2013, the probation officer reported 

defendant had terminated her pregnancy. The officer also reported defendant was 

interviewed and found appropriate for placement at the Mingus Mountain Academy in 

Arizona (Mingus Mountain), which “does well with the girls who are sexually exploited 

and who are AWOL risks.” The probation officer added, “The minor has a history from 

three different counties for prostitution and had run from numerous foster care 

placements. A remote facility would be best for [her].” On April 11, 2013, the juvenile 

court ordered defendant placed at the Mingus Mountain. On April 30, 2013, defendant

filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Legal Standards

The law governing minors with cases in both the dependency system and 

delinquency system was summarized in In re Joey G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 343 (Joey 

G.): “Under section 300, a child who is neglected or abused falls within the juvenile 

court’s protective jurisdiction as a ‘ “dependent child of the court.” ’ [Citation.] As a 

dependent, the juvenile court may remove the minor from the home, or place the minor in 

alternative care that meets his or her needs for custody, care and guidance. [Citation.]

Alternatively, the juvenile court may take jurisdiction over a minor as a ‘ “ward of the 

court” when the child is habitually disobedient or truant’ under section 601 or commits a 

crime under section 602. [Citation.] When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court, the 

minor is subject to more-restrictive placements because of his or her criminal conduct 

and the court may commit the minor to a juvenile home, ranch, camp, forestry camp, or 

juvenile hall. [Citation.] The Legislature has declared that a minor cannot 

simultaneously be both a dependent and a ward of the juvenile court.” (Id. at p. 347.)

“Section 241.1 sets forth the procedure for handling cases with dual jurisdiction in 

which a minor is both a dependent under section 300 and a ward under sections 601 or 

602. It requires the probation department and the welfare department to jointly develop a 

written protocol to determine which status will best serve the interests of the minor and 

the protection of society. Once completed, the report is presented to the juvenile court 
6

for a determination of the appropriate status for the minor. [Citation.] The joint 

assessment report must contain the joint recommendation of the probation and child 

welfare departments and also include (1) a description of the nature of the referral, (2) the 

age of the child, (3) the history of any physical, sexual or emotional abuse of the child, 

(4) the prior record of the child’s parents for abuse of this or any other child, (5) the prior 

record of the child for out-of-control or delinquent behavior, (6) the parents’ cooperation

with the child’s school, (7) the child’s functioning at school, (8) the nature of the child’s 

home environment, (9) the history of involvement of any agencies or professionals with 

the child and his or her family, (10) any services or community agencies that are 

available to assist the child and his or her family, (11) a statement by any counsel 

currently representing the child, and (12) a statement by any court-appointed special 

advocate (CASA) volunteer currently appointed for the child.” (Joey G., supra,

206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 347–348.)

A trial court’s determination under section 241.1, whether to retain section 300 

dependency status or declare section 601 or 602 wardship, is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. (Joey G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 346.) “To show abuse of discretion, 

the appellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 

capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Ibid.) 

Moreover, “ ‘ “[w]e must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the 

juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to 

support them.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1330.)

B. Analysis

Judged under the above standards, the juvenile court’s decision to terminate 

dependency and declare wardship did not constitute an abuse of discretion. On the 

contrary, the court’s decision was amply justified based on defendant’s admitted use of 

drugs on a daily basis, her documented involvement in street-corner prostitution, and her 

habitual abandonment of court-ordered foster home placements, all of which constituted 

both a danger to herself and created a potential public nuisance. 
7

Defendant nevertheless asserts the juvenile court’s decision should be reversed 

because the section 241.1 report did not meet statutory requirements and did not provide 

adequate information for the court to make a well-reasoned decision to treat the minor as 

a ward rather than a dependent. 

Defendant did not object in the juvenile court that the section 241.1 report was 

flawed and could not support an adjudication of wardship. Accordingly, any objection to 

the sufficiency of the section 241.1 report has been waived. (See, e.g., In re Crystal J.

(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411–412 [failure to object to the adequacy of assessment

mandated by section 366.21 at the 12-month review hearing waived the right to raise the 

issue on appeal].) In any case, the section 241.1 report addressed all matters mandated by 

the statute, namely, “consideration of the nature of the referral, the age of the minor, the 

prior record of the minor’s parents for child abuse, the prior record of the minor for outof-control or delinquent behavior, the parents’ cooperation with the minor’s school, the 

minor’s functioning at school, the nature of the minor’s home environment, and the 

records of other agencies that have been involved with the minor and his or her family.” 

(§ 241.1, subd. (b)(2).) 

Defendant contends the report failed to mention matters not specifically required 

under section 241.1 but listed in California Rules of Court, rule 5.512 (hereafter 

rule 5.512). In this regard, defendant asserts the section 241.1 report “completely failed 

to mention any services or community agencies that were available to assist [defendant] 

and her family.” This assertion is belied by the record. The section 241.1 report states, 

“[Defendant] could benefit from being placed at a program in a more remote location that 

would dissuade her from AWOLing. A Guidance Clinic evaluation could also be 

beneficial. On March 6, 2013, the undersigned referred [defendant] to Bay Area Women 

Against Rape.” Also, whereas defendant complains the section 241.1 report did not 

include a statement by her dependency counsel, as required under rule 5.512(d)(11), the 

court received a separate report from dependency counsel, and at the section 241.1 

hearing the court stated it read counsel’s report “very, very carefully . . . a couple times 

now.” Thus, any error in failing to include dependency counsel’s statement in the 
8

section 241.1 report was harmless because the trial court read counsel’s statement and 

considered it. (See In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 [holding that harmless error 

standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 applies in dependency matters].) 

Furthermore, in addition to the section 241.1 report and dependency counsel’s report, the 

juvenile court also reviewed the probation disposition report, the minute orders from 

prior hearings and other materials in the record. In sum, the juvenile court had ample 

information on which to base its decision to treat defendant as a ward rather than a 

dependent.

3

Defendant also challenges the juvenile court’s selection of wardship over

dependency on the grounds the same result—ensuring she would participate in treatment 

and not go AWOL—could have been accomplished by continuing her as a dependent. In 

support of this argument, defendant proffers a list of other secure, restrictive group homes 

outside the Bay Area but within California and asserts the trial court could have placed 

her at one of those facilities while maintaining her dependency status. In the same vein, 

she asserts the Agency “never placed the minor in a therapeutic treatment facility or a 

group home in a more remote in-state location.” Even if these assertions are true, they do 

not amount to a showing the juvenile court abused its discretion by declaring defendant a 

ward. (See Joey G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 346 [“To show abuse of discretion, the 

appellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 

capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”].) On the 

contrary, the trial court’s wardship determination was supported by substantial 

evidence—of defendant’s substance abuse, prostitution and her chronic abandonment of 

 

3

 Defendant’s reliance on Joey G., supra, and In re Marcus G. (1999) 

73 Cal.App.4th 1008 (Marcus G.), is misplaced. In those cases, unlike this one, reversal 

was warranted because the juvenile court was not presented with a joint assessment by 

the probation and welfare departments as required by section 241.1. (Marcus G., supra, 

73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014; Joey G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 349.)
9

all prior placements. (See In re Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 [juvenile 

court’s findings will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence].)4

Defendant also seeks reversal on the grounds her constitutional and statutory 

rights to due process were violated because the section 602 jurisdictional hearing was 

held prior to the section 241.1 assessment. On this point, defendant notes rule 5.512

provides that the “the hearing on the joint assessment report must occur . . . no later than 

15 courts days after the order of detention and before the jurisdictional hearing.” 

(Rule 5.512(e), italics added.) She asserts this rule was violated because in her case the 

section 241.1 assessment was not ordered “until the case was accepted on a transfer-in in 

Alameda County on February 20, 2013, six days after the San Francisco Juvenile Court 

found section 602 jurisdiction on February 14, 2013.” 

Not only did defendant fail to object to the section 602 hearing going forward 

before a section 241.1 assessment had been conducted pursuant to rule 5.512, she

affirmatively acquiesced in the section 602 proceeding, admitting to count 2 of the 

section 602 petition (misdemeanor resisting arrest) after waiving her constitutional rights 

and count 1 of the petition (misdemeanor solicitation to engage in an act of prostitution) 

was dismissed. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited the issue on appeal. (See, e.g., In re 

Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [citing cases in which appellate courts have 

applied the forfeiture doctrine “in dependency proceedings in a wide variety of contexts, 

including cases involving failures to obtain various reports required by statute”].) 

Even if the issue was not forfeited, the failure to comply with rule 5.512 is not of 

constitutional magnitude. “A procedural due process claim . . . requires a deprivation of 

 

4

 We summarily reject defendant’s “public policy” argument that she should have 

remained a dependent because she was a “commercially sexually exploited minor.” This 

wide-ranging argument, drawing upon the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. 

Code, § 11164 et seq.), the 2000 federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 18259 (providing that the County of Alameda, “contingent 

upon local funding, may establish a pilot project . . . to address the needs and effective 

treatment of commercially sexually exploited minors”) was not presented below. Nor 

does it change the fact the juvenile court’s determination of wardship under section 241.1 

was supported by substantial record evidence.
10

a constitutionally protected interest and a denial of adequate procedural protections. 

[Citations.] Although what procedural process is due in a given circumstance may vary, 

it ‘always requires a relatively level playing field, the “constitutional floor” of a “fair trial 

in a fair tribunal,” in other words, a fair hearing before a neutral or unbiased decisionmaker. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 

170 Cal.App.4th 229, 265–266.) Here, although the time of the hearing may not have 

comported with the guidelines set forth in rule 5.512, the court did conduct a 

section 241.1 assessment hearing, and carefully considered both the evidence submitted 

and the argument of counsel before reaching the ultimate determination of whether to 

terminate appellant’s status as a dependent. Moreover, on this record, there is no basis to 

conclude the juvenile court would have continued defendant as a dependent, rather than 

declaring her a ward, had the section 24.1 assessment hearing had been held prior to the 

section 602 jurisdictional hearing. The court would have received and based its decision 

on the same information, including defendant’s history of going AWOL from 

placements, engaging in prostitution while AWOL, daily drug use, as well as the 

underlying the section 602 petition involving solicitation of prostitution and resisting an 

officer. Thus, whether viewed as an error of state law or a due process violation,

defendant cannot show prejudice from any error in the timing of the section 241.1 

assessment hearing under either state or federal standards for harmless error. (See People 

v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837 [question is whether it is “reasonably probable that 

a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the 

error”]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“before a federal constitutional 

error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt”].)

Defendant also contends the disposition was erroneous because there was no “case 

plan” as required in section 706.6. Again, there was no objection to the lack of a case 

plan, nor was there any request for a continuance of the dispositional hearing for receipt 

of a case plan. Accordingly, any claim of error on that ground was forfeited. (See, e.g., 

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352–356; In re Christopher S. (1992) 
11

10 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1344 [procedural matters waived on appeal if not raised in trial 

court].) Even if it was not, there was no prejudice, as the information required in a case 

plan under section 706.6 was included in the section 241.1 report and the probation 

department’s investigation of other possible placements. Thus, the omission of a case 

plan was clearly harmless as it is not reasonably probable the court would have made a 

different finding had there been a formal case plan. (See People v. Watson, supra,

46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

Lastly, defendant contends the juvenile court erred by ordering an out-of-state 

placement, asserting there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that 

out-of-state placement was in the minor’s best interest and no equivalent in-state facility

was available. Pursuant to section 727.1, subdivision (b), before ordering an out-of-state 

placement the court must determine that in-state facilities or programs are “unavailable or 

inadequate to meet the needs of the minor.” We review a commitment decision “for 

abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court’s 

decision.” (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.)

In this case, after declaring wardship on March 13, 2013, the court held placement 

review hearings on March 28, April 11 and April 25, 2013, before finalizing its decision 

to place defendant at the Mingus Mountain Academy. Prior to placement, the court also 

referred her to the Guidance Clinic and received a report prepared by Leslie Marks, a 

Behavioral Health Care Clinician. Marks noted defendant was referred to the Guidance 

Clinic for a “psycho-diagnostic evaluation” covering a range of issues, such as whether 

defendant “has a substance-related disorder,” whether “family or peer dynamics 

contribute or cause her delinquent behavior,” and “[i]dentification of what type of setting 

would be most beneficial for [defendant].” (Italics added.) On the latter point, Marks 

concluded “the best setting for [defendant] is placement in a residential treatment 

program. [Defendant] has been continuously running away, placing herself in dangerous 

situations, and risks further being victimized and sexually exploited by others. 

[Defendant] poses a high flight risk. [Defendant] would benefit from a setting that has a 

therapeutic environment with sufficient safety and security so her underlying mental 
12

health problems are addressed. The residential setting needs to provide an opportunity 

for her to therapeutically work on issues of trauma, sexual exploitation, drug abuse, poor 

impulse control and her underlying feelings of loss and abandonment.” 

Moreover, the probation officer, in her placement review report filed on April 5, 

2013, opined Mingus Mountain would be the best program for defendant because it “does 

well with the girls who are sexually exploited and who are AWOL risks. The minor has a 

history from three different counties for prostitution and had run from numerous foster 

care placements. A remote facility would be best for [defendant].” The court found this 

a well-founded assessment, observing at the placement hearing on April 11, 2013, “So 

the fact that she is a flight risk is what’s playing into this decision in terms of what is the 

appropriate placement for her. And at this time what’s being looked at is Clarinda 

Academy as well as Mingus Mountain. So Thunder Road is not going to be an option at 

this point.” 

On April 12, 2013, the juvenile court signed an ex parte order approving 

defendant’s placement at the Mingus Mountain Academy which contained the following 

findings: “Mingus Mountain Academy is licensed by the state of Arizona and certified 

by the California Department of Social Services for the placement of minors. [Citation.]

[¶] In-State facilities or programs have been determined to be unavailable or inadequate 

to meet the needs of the minor. [Citation.] [¶] Equivalent facilities for the minor are not 

available in California and institutional care in Arizona is in the best interest of the minor 

and will not produce undue hardship. . . . [¶] The [Multidisciplinary Team (MDT)] 

assessed the matter and approves the out-of-home placement and plan of the minor with 

Mingus Mountain Academy, Arizona. [Citation.]”

5

In sum, the evidence showed defendant required a controlled and remote 

environment that would allow her to engage fully in the therapeutic programs necessary 

 

5

 Defendant’s request for judicial notice, filed on December 3, 2013, of the Foster 

Care Rates Group Home Facility of November 15, 2013, promulgated by the State of 

California, Department of Social Services, Children and Family Services Division is 

denied. We reject the suggestion the court abused its discretion because it did not assess 

every level 14 group home on the list before selecting out-of-state placement. 
13

to address her underlying mental health and drug abuse problems; that Mingus Mountain 

met those requirements; and that placement at Mingus Mountain would deter defendant 

from relapsing into the drug use and prostitution that resulted when she absconded from 

in-state placements, such as the Thunder Road drug treatment program. There was ample 

basis for concluding out-of-state placement was in the minor’s best interest.

Similarly, the record solidly supports the court’s determination there was no 

equivalent facility for appellant within the state. In this regard, the probation department 

explored placement at Grace Homes in Visalia and a placement in San Diego for 

pregnant women. However, after defendant terminated her pregnancy, probation 

determined that a remote placement would be more appropriate. In addition, the record 

shows that from July 26, 2012, to December 11, 2012, defendant was assigned to four 

different out-of-home placements and went AWOL from each of those placements. 

Moreover, defendant’s preferred placement at Thunder Road was unsuitable because she

went AWOL from that facility on each of her three prior placements there. Further, 

contrary to defendant’s assertion, the juvenile court did not err by failing to require the 

probation department to report more thoroughly on in-state programs it had considered 

and rejected, and to explain why the programs were rejected. Indeed, section 727.1, 

governing of out-of-state placements, contains no such requirement, and the juvenile 

court made all findings required under section 727.1. (See In re Oscar A. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 750, 757 (Oscar A.) [stating that juvenile court “need not determine all 

in-state facilities are unavailable [and] . . . mere existence of other facilities in California 

does not mean the court abused its discretion by ordering out-of-state placement”].) 

In sum, in light of defendant’s history, the need to separate her from negative 

influences, and the lack of available and adequate in-state facilities, the juvenile court 

acted well within its discretion in ordering defendant placed in an out-of-state facility.

(See Oscar A., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 758 [concluding that “[g]iven [the minor’s] 

behavioral issues, substance abuse, and multiple AWOL’s, an out-of-state facility would 

best serve his interests and the purpose of the juvenile court law to enable him to become 

a law-abiding and productive member of society”].) 
14

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s dispositional order declaring appellant a ward, dismissing her 

dependency and ordering out-of-state placement is affirmed.

_________________________

Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Dondero, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Becton, J.

 



 Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.