EXHIBIT "3"

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. This Court has jurisdiction over 

Defendant’s violations of the California Labor Code because the amount in controversy 

exceeds this Court’s jurisdictional minimum.

VENUE

2. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to California Code of Civil 

Procedure §§ 395(a) and 395.5, as at least some of the acts and omissions complained of herein 

occurred in the County of Monterey. Defendants own and maintain offices, transact business, 

have agents and employees within the County of San Francisco, and Defendants are within this 

jurisdiction of this Court for purposes of service of process.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff is an individual over the age of eighteen (18). At all relevant times 

herein, Plaintiff was and currently is a California resident. During the four years immediately 

preceding the filing of the Complaint in this action and within the statute of limitations periods 

applicable to each cause of action pled herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a nonexempt employee. Plaintiff was and is a victim of Defendants’ policies and practices 

complained of herein, lost money and/or property, and has been deprived of the right 

guaranteed by Labor Code §§ 201-203, and 227.3.

4. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that during the four 

(3) years preceding the filing of the Complaint and continuing to the present, Defendants did 

and continue to do business by operating a natural gas and electric utility, and employed 

Plaintiff and other similarly situated non-exempt employees within the State of California and 

the County of Monterey, and therefore, were and are doing business in the State of California 

and the County of Monterey. 

5. Plaintiff does not know the true names or capacities, whether individual, partner, 

or corporate, of the defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, and for that 

reason, said defendants are sued under such fictitious names, and Plaintiff will seek leave from 

this Court to amend this Complaint when such true names and capacities are discovered. 

Plaintiff is informed, and believes, and based thereon alleges, that each of said fictitious 

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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defendants, whether individual, partners, or corporate, were responsible in some manner for the 

acts and omissions alleged herein, and proximately caused Plaintiff and the Class as defined in 

Paragraph 16 to be subject to the unlawful employment practices, wrongs, injuries and damages 

complained of herein.

6. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that at all times 

mentioned herein, Defendants were and are the employers of Plaintiff all members of the Class.

7. At all times mentioned herein, each of said Defendants participated in the doing 

of the acts hereinafter alleged to have been done by the named Defendants; and furthermore, 

the Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants, and employees of each and every 

one of the other Defendants, as well as the agents of all Defendants, and at all time herein 

mentioned were acting within the course and scope of said agency and employment. 

Defendants, and each of them, approved of, condoned, and/or otherwise ratified each and every 

one of the acts or omissions complained of herein.

8. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants, and each of them, were members of 

and engaged in a joint venture, partnership, and common enterprise, and acting within the 

course and scope of and in pursuance of said joint venture, partnership, and common enterprise. 

Further, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants were joint employers for all purposes of Plaintiff 

and all members of the Class.

GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

9. On or about June 30, 20106, Defendants hired Plaintiff. Over the years, Plaintiff 

was promoted and ultimately became a salaried supervisor. As a salaried supervisor, 

Defendants paid Plaintiff a base salary plus overtime. In addition, Defendants provided 

Plaintiff paid vacations pursuant to Defendants’ paid vacation policy.

10. On March 25, 2019, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment for an 

alleged violation of Defendants’ company policies. Plaintiff’s termination of employment by 

Defendants was involuntary. At the time of his termination, Defendants paid Plaintiff once per 

month. 

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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11. At the time of his termination of employment, Plaintiff had accrued 123 hours of 

vested vacation pay at the rate of $72.05/hour in the total amount of $8,862.15. 

12. California Labor Code Section 227.3 provides “whenever . . . employer policy 

provides for paid vacations, and an employee is terminated without having taken off his vested 

vacation time, all vested vacation shall be paid to him as wages at his final rate in accordance 

with such . . . employer policy respecting eligibility or time served; provided, however, that an . 

. . employer policy shall not provide for forfeiture of vested vacation time upon termination.” 

Under California law, earned vacation time is considered wages, and vacation is earned, or 

vests, as labor is performed. Vacation pay accrues as it is earned, and cannot be forfeited, 

regardless of the reason for termination. Saustez v. Plastic Dress Up (1982) 31 Cal.3d 774. 

13. California Labor Code Section 201(a) provides: “If an employer discharges an 

employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable 

immediately.” 

14. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff’s vested vacation time immediately upon 

Plaintiff’s date of termination (i.e., March 24, 2019). Rather, Defendants created a payroll 

check issued to Plaintiff in the gross amount of $11, 023.65, which included Plaintiff’s vested 

vacation pay in the amount of $8,862.15. The “Check Date” is “3/29/2019”. However, 

Defendants failed to deliver said payroll check to Plaintiff until April 4, 2019, which was the 

following pay period. 

15. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay all earned and vested vacation pay upon 

Plaintiff’s involuntary termination of employment, Defendant failed to pay all final wages 

owed to Plaintiff in a timely manner. 

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

16. Class Allegations: Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the 

following Class pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure §382: All of Defendants’ former

salaried employees in California who were paid once per month and who had earned and vested 

vacation pay at the time of their separation of employment and whose during the three years 

immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint. 

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17. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all 

members would not be feasible or practicable. The membership of the Class is unknown to 

Plaintiff at this time; however, it is estimated that the members of the Class is greater than 500 

individuals. The identity of such membership is readily ascertainable via inspection of 

Defendants’ employment records.

18. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate/Well Defined 

Community of Interest: There are common questions of law and fact as to Plaintiff and all 

other similarly situated employees, which predominate over questions affecting only individual 

members. Those questions include without limitation: 

a. Whether Defendants’ policies/practices for the timing and amount of payment of 

final wages to members of the Class at the time of their separation of employment 

were lawful.

b. Whether Defendants systematically failed to pay accrued and vested vacation pay to 

members of the Class immediately at time of discharge.

c. Whether Defendants systematically failed to pay accrued and vested vacation pay to 

members of the Class within 72 hours of resignation.

19. Predominance of Common Questions. Common questions of law and fact 

predominate over questions that affect only individual members of the Class. The common 

questions of law set forth above are numerous and substantial and stem from Defendants’ 

policies and/or practices applicable to each individual class member. As such, the common 

questions predominate over individual questions concerning each individual class member’s 

showing as to their eligibility for recovery or as to the amount of their damages. 

20. Typicality. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class because 

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt employee in California during the 

statute(s) of limitations period applicable to each cause of action pled in the Complaint. As 

alleged herein, Plaintiff, like the members of the Class, was not paid proper overtime wages, 

was not provided all required meal periods, was not authorized and permitted to take all 

required rest periods, did not receive meal and rest period premium wages when she was not 

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provided compliant meal or rest periods, was not provided complete and accurate wage 

statements, and did not receive all final wages owed to her upon her termination of employment 

from Defendants. 

21. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff is prepared to take all necessary steps 

to represent fairly and adequately the interests of the members of the Class. Moreover, 

Plaintiff’s attorneys are ready, willing and able to represent the members of the Class and 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s attorneys have litigated numerous wage-and-hour class actions in state and 

federal courts and are committed to vigorously prosecuting the action on behalf of the members 

of the Class. 

22. Superiority. The California Labor Code is broadly remedial in nature and 

serves an important public interest in establishing minimum working conditions and standards 

in California. These laws and labor standards protect the average working employee from 

exploitation by employers who have the responsibility to follow the laws and who may seek to 

take advantage of superior economic and bargaining power in setting onerous terms and 

conditions of employment. The nature of this action and the format of laws available to 

Plaintiff and members of the Class make the class action format an efficient and appropriate 

procedure to redress the violations alleged herein. If each employee were required to file an 

individual lawsuit, Defendants would gain an unconscionable advantage since they would be 

able to exploit and overwhelm the limited resources of each individual plaintiff with their 

vastly superior economic and legal resources. Moreover, requiring each individual member of 

the Class to pursue an individual remedy would discourage the assertion of lawful claims by 

employees who would be disinclined to file an action against their former or current employer 

for real and justifiable fear of retaliation and damage to their careers. Further, the prosecution 

of separate actions by the individual class members, even if possible, would create a substantial 

risk of inconsistent or varying verdicts or adjudications with respect to the individual class 

members against Defendants; and which would establish potentially incompatible standards of 

conduct for Defendants; and/or legal determinations with respect to individual class members 

which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other class members not 

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parties to adjudications or which would substantially impair or impede the ability of the class 

members to protect their interests. Further, the claims of the individual members of the Class

are not sufficiently large to warrant vigorous individual prosecution considering all the 

concomitant costs and expenses attending thereto. As such, the Class identified in paragraph 

16 are maintainable as a Class under the Code of Civil Procedure § 382. 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

WAITING TIME PENALTIES

(Against All Defendants)

23. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs.

24. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Labor Code §§ 201-203, which 

require an employer to pay all wages immediately at the time of separation of employment in 

the event the employer fires the employee or the employee provides at least 72 hours of notice 

of their intent to quit. In the event the employee provides less than 72 hours of notice of their 

intent to quit, the employee’s final wages become due and payable not later than 72 hours of 

the employee’s last date of employment.

25. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that Defendant 

failed to pay timely Plaintiff and the members of the Class all final wages due to them at their 

separation from employment, including earned and vested vacation pay. 

26. Further, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that as a 

matter of policy/practice, Defendants continue to fail to pay Plaintiff and the members of the 

Class all earned wages at the end of employment in a timely manner. 

27. Defendants’ failure to pay final wages was willful within the meaning of Labor 

Code § 203. Defendants’ willful failure to pay timely Plaintiff and the members of the Waiting 

Time Class their earned wages upon separation from employment results in a continued 

payment of wages for up to thirty days from the time the wages were due. 

28. Therefore, Plaintiff and the members of the Waiting Time Class are entitled to 

compensation pursuant to Labor Code § 203. 

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PRAYER 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment herself and for all others on whose behalf 

this suit is brought against Defendants, as follows: 

1. An order certifying the proposed Class; 

2. An order appointing Plaintiff as representative of the Class; 

3. An order appointing Counsel for Plaintiff as Counsel for the Class; 

4. Declaratory judgment that Defendants’ practices alleged herein are unlawful; 

5. Upon the First Cause of Action, for statutory waiting penalties pursuant to Labor 

Code § 203; 

6. Prejudgment interest.

7. On all causes of action for attorneys’ fees and costs; and 

8. For such other and further relief the Court deems just and proper. 

DATE: June 17, 2019 OSTERGAR LAW GROUP, P.C.

By: _____________________________________

JOHN E. LATTIN

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DAVE ALONZO

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

 Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial with respect to all issues triable by jury. 

DATE: June 17, 2019 OSTERGAR LAW GROUP, P.C.

By: _____________________________________

JOHN E. LATTIN

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DAVE ALONZO

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