Filed 3/29/23 In re J.T. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). Th is opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re J

. T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
J

. T. , Defendant and Appellant. D0 80820

(Super. Ct. No. J243738 )

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert
J. Trentacosta , Judge. A ffirmed in part , reversed in part , and remanded with
directi ons

. Elisabeth R. Cannon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley a nd Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2

At a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court f ound J.T. ( a minor ) guilty of possessing a concealable firearm (Pen

. Code , § 29610 , 1 count

one ) ; possessi ng a firearm in violation of a probation condition ( § 29815 , count
two ) ; carr ying a loaded and unregistered weapon concealed within a vehicle he directed or controlled ( § 25400, sub d s. (a)(1) & (c)(6) , count three ) ; carrying

a concealed weapon in a vehicle ( § 25400, su b d

. (a)(3) , count four ) ; possess ing live ammunition ( § 29650 , count five ) ; and receiv ing stolen property worth over $950 ( § 496, sub d

. (a) , count six ). At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court committed J.T. to Urban Camp for 130 days. J.T. appeal s his conviction on all counts for lack of substantial
evidence. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the convictions on all counts except count three.
J.T. further contends that the juvenile court failed to ( i ) specify
whether the wobbler cou nts were felonies or misdemeanors , as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 ; ( ii ) specif y hi s maximum term of confinement , as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 ; and (iii) credit him for time spent in custody , as required by section 2900.5, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code

. The People properly concede the first two
issues , and we agree that J.T.’s custody credit s w ere erroneously omitted from the disposition order

. Accordingly, we affirm in part , reverse in part , and r emand with
directions

.

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.3 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Incident Around 7:30 a.m. on May 23, 2022, J ason H. left his parents’ house in Mira Mesa, San Diego to go to work. By then, h is father had already left the
house

. His mother left for work later around 8:20 a.m. When Jason returned
home around 5:15 p.m. , he felt something was amiss. T he window screen in
his bedroom was removed

. His parents’ master bedroom was “ransacked.” The family discovered that $14,000 in cash was missing from the ho me , as well as designer purses worth about $30,000, a Nintendo Switch, a white computer tower , earrings, and two iPhone X’s

. At approximately 11:55 a.m. that day, the police made a traffic stop on a white Hyundai Sonata (a four

- door sedan) with rear bump er damage in a shopping center on Euclid Avenue in San Diego

. The car had an expired registration and was possibly connected with “ some other crimes.” The police identified four occupants in the car

— an adult driver, adult front passenger,
and two rear pa ssenger s who were minors , including J.T

. The car was registered to the driver. J.T. was sitting in the rear seat behind the

passenger

. A detective could see clothing scattered inside of the vehicle and

“ a lot of stuff

” stacked up in the passenger compar tment. Another detective stated there “wasn’t a lot of room” inside the car. Between J.T. and the other

rear passenger was “ large plastic box ” of stuff

. Because the rear bumper damage on the Hyundai matched the description of another car reportedly inv olved in a series of burglaries under investigati o n, the detectives removed all the occupants from the vehicle and
conducted a search. They found a loaded Glock 30 handgun , a Nintendo Switch, and two cellphones in the pouch of the passenger seat directly in front of J.T. A round of nine

- millimeter ammunition was located in the glove4

box. And a second loaded handgun, a nine

- millimeter Taurus, was found under the driver’s seat. After the guns were found, the detectives arrested
the occupants of the car an d conducted an inventory search of the car. In the large plastic box on the rear passenger seat, the detectives found designer purses and family photo s not depicting any of the car’s occupants

. They also found c heckbooks and identification cards not bel onging to any of the car’s occupants and a red bag

. A white computer tower and MacBook were found i n the trunk

. A patdown of J.T. revealed he had $1,700 in cash on his person

. Later that evening , Jason and his parents went to the police station
and ide ntified items recovered from the Hyundai as their missing property, including the white computer tower, Nintendo Switch, purses , and other belongings. They did not know any of the occupants in the Hyundai and did not give them permission to have any of th eir belongings.
B. The Juvenile Proceeding s In May 2022, the San Diego County District Attorney ’s Office filed a wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) charging J.T. with counts one to five

. The following mont h,
the d istrict a ttorney amended the petition to add count six

. At the adjudication hearing in July 2022, the court made the following findings . J.T. was in the Hyundai which matched another vehicle reportedly involved in a series of residential burglar ies. He was found sitting in the back seat behind the front passenger. J.T. and the occupant beside him “were essentially crammed into the back seat with a plastic tub full of stolen property between them.” J.T. was “essentially sitting with his hip and perhaps his arms literally in a mother lo a d of stolen items

. ” “[I]n addition to the items that were stolen there was cash in a sum of about $14,000” stolen5

from Jason’s home

. J.T. “was found to have $1,700 on his person.” The photographs show ed that th e pouch contained a handgun, ski goggles that were bent toward J.T., and the stolen Nintendo Switch. In the court’s view, one of the photographs showed “the butt of the handgun” “pretty clear [ly] given the tight fit of the pouch as well as the other items that are stuffed in
there that

— and the minor’s proximity to those items and the fact that the
minor would be

— if he looks down at all, these things are going to be visible to
him. [¶] It is, again, I think proven beyond a reasonable doubt that these
item s must have been known.” The court then concluded there was no “reasonable explanation [J.T.] did not know of the presence of this handgun, which was in close proximity to his body.” At the time of the incident, J.T. was on probation with the condition t hat he “must not possess a dangerous or deadly weapon” and “shall not knowingly have any firearm in his/her possession until attaining the age of 30.” The juvenile court thus made true findings on all counts , and found that J.T. violated his probation by possessing the handgun

. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered J.T. committed to Urban Camp for 130 days.

DISCUSSION

I. J.T. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s true findings on all counts. We conc lude that substantial evidence supports the true findings on all c harges except count three

. A. Standard of Review Our review of the minor’s substantial evidence claim is governed by the same standard applicable to adult criminal cases. ( In re V.V. (20 11) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) We must determine whether, viewing the evidence in6

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Ibid .) We presume in support of the judgment every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. ( Ibid .) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defe ndant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. ( Ibid .) Our role on appeal is a limited one. If the circ umstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, our opinion that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. ( People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 924, fn. 2.)
B. Analysis of Counts One, Two, Four, Five
, and Six As to counts one, two, four, five , and six, J.T. contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish his possession of the firearm, ammunition, or stolen property. He maintains that the evidence, at mo st, merely demonstrates his physical proximity to them. We disagree. Section s 29610 , subdivision (a), and 29650 (counts one and five )

p rohibit a minor from possessing a handgun and live ammunition, respectively

. Section 29815, subdivision (a), (count two ) crim inalizes the

possess ion of firearm by any person restricted from doing so as a condition of probation

. Section 25400, subdivision (a)( 3 ), (count four ) makes it a crime to

carry a concealed firearm in a vehicle. Section 496 (count six ) prohibits a person from know ingly possess stolen property. ( § 496; In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728 ( Anthony J. )

. )7

P ossess ion of a weapon or stolen property may be actual or
constructive

. ( People v. Peña (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083 ( Peña ) ; Anthony J. , supra , 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 728 .) “ A defendant has actual possession when the weapon [or stolen property] is in his immediate possession or control. He has constructive possession when the weapon [or stolen property] , while not in his actua l possession, is nonetheless under his dominion and control, either directly or through others.” ( Peña , at pp. 1083

– 1084; see Anthony J. , at p. 728. ) “Implicit in the crime of possession of a
firearm [and stolen property] is that a person is aware both t hat the item [s] [are] in his or her possession and that it is a firearm” and the property is
stolen. ( People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 958 ; People v. Myles (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 423, 428 ( Myles ) .) Possession may be shared with
others and proved circumstantially

. ( People v. Neese (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 235, 245.)
M ere proximity to a weapon or stolen property , standing alone, is not sufficient evidence of possession

. ( People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417 ( Sifuentes ) ; Anthony J. , supra , 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 728

. ) However, “the necessary additional circumstances may, in some fact contexts,
be rather slight

. ” ( People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 225 , italics
added

. ) Here, t he evidence establishes more than mere pr oximity.
The burglary at Jason’s home in Mira Mesa occurred sometime within three and a half hours immediately before the Hyundai was stopped in
another San Diego neighborhood because it matched the description of a vehicle used in a series of burglaries

. J.T. w as in the car filled with stolen
items and an unusual amount cash ($1,700) on his person consistent with the items and cash that were reported stolen at Jason’s home

. Based on the photograph, the butt of the loaded handgun in the pouch was pointing8

outwar d toward J.T. along with the ski goggles, which w ere partially sticking out from the pouch and bent toward J.T. These items (and others) were
visible to and immediately accessible by J.T., who was sitting right behind the pouch. (Se e People v. Miranda (2 011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 410 [ “Possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which
is immediately accessible to the joint dominion and control of the accused and
another ” ( italics added ) ] .) The $1,700 cash on J.T.’s person further sup ported a reasonable inference that he possessed or jointly possessed the items and cash taken in the burglary of Jason’s home, including the stolen Nintendo Switch stuffed into the seat pocket directly in front of him along with the firearm

. Viewing the evidence in its totality , t he juvenile court could reasonably infer that J.T. had dominion and control over the loaded handgun and stolen property

. ( See , e.g., People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 214 [ finding evidence sufficient to establish construct ive possession of narcotics because bag s of tablets were found beneath the driver’s seat and a tablet was found on the floor in front of the seat occupied by the defendant ] .) Construing the evidence in light most favorable to the judgment, we cannot say t hat there was no reasonable basis to support the juvenile court’s findings as to counts one, two, four, five, and six . (See People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142 [“ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ”].) To support his position, J.T. relies on four cases in which the appellate

courts found the evidence insufficient to establish possession. “ W hen we
de cide issues of sufficiency of evidence, comparison with other cases is of limited utility, since each case necessarily depends on its own facts.” ( People9

v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516 ( Thomas ) .) The facts of the cases cited by J.T. bear little rese mblance to this case. (See Sifuentes , supra , 195 Cal.App.4th at p p

. 1414 , 1418

– 1419 [finding insufficient evidence that defendant possessed gun found under mattress near fellow gang member and rejecting unsupported theory that “all gang members had the ri ght to control communal gang guns”]; In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778

– 779 [holding that Facebook messages and photos did not establish defendant’s possession of gun found in car he did not occupy]; Myles , supra , 50 Cal.App.3d at p p

. 428

– 429 [findi ng insufficient evidence that passenger of vehicle possessed stolen televisions found in truck]; People v. Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 335

– 336 [finding insufficient evidence that front passenger of vehicle possessed stolen chainsaw located in rear se at ]

. )
J.T. also cites to several cases in which there was sufficient evidence to establish possession of a gun or stolen property. ( See People v. Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 132 [finding sufficient evidence the defendant possessed the pistol and ammu nition in a backpack not proven to be his ] ; People v. Harrison (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 115, 118

– 119 [ finding sufficient evidence the defendant possessed firearm, even though another person testified he owned it , because
the defendant “failed to stop immediatel y after seeing the red light, though the curbing was free of parked cars,” and expressed “disconsolate disgust”
when the police officer found the gun] ; People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75, 82

– 83 [finding sufficient evidence the defendant received a c heckbook belonging to another person because it was located in his car behind the driver’s sun visor] .) These cases finding sufficient evidence do not undermine our conclusion that the evidence of actual or constructive possession is
likewise sufficient o n the record presented here

. C

. Analysis of Count Three10

J.T. next argues that there is insufficient evidence the Hyund ai was under his control or direction to support the count three conviction for
violati ng section 25400, subdivision (a)(1). We agree. “Section 25400 [ , subdivision] (a)(1) makes it a crime for one to carry ‘concealed within any vehicle that is under the person’s control or direction any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.’ Conviction under th e statute requires proof that the ‘defendant carried within a vehicle a firearm capable of being concealed on the person,’ the ‘defendant knew the firearm was in the vehicle,’ the ‘firearm was substantially concealed,’ and the ‘vehicle was under the defend ant’s control or direction.’ ” ( People v. Aguilar (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.)
As J.T. maintains, the juvenile court did not explain how it concluded
that he controlled or directed the Hyundai

. At the time of the traffic stop, t he Hyundai was re gistered to and operated by the adult driver

— not J.T. who

was simply a rear passenger. ( S ee People v. Davis (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 33, 36 [concluding the car was under the defendant’s control and direction
because he owned it ].) There is no evidence that J.T. himself ever drove the

car or exercised any control or direction over the adult driver ’s operation of
the car

. The People nonetheless contend that under People v. Gant (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 420, 424, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer J.T. had joint control or direction of the vehicle with the dri ver because of “their joint enterprise of burgling a home.” We are unconvinced

. In that case, the two defendants were seated together as the driver and front passenger in a stolen

car with r ecently stolen property . ( Id. at pp. 42 4

– 425.) Based on the totality of circumstances, the Gant court concluded it was reasonable to infer the two defendants had joint possession of the stolen car. ( Ibid. ) By contrast, J.T.11

was a minor sitting in the r ear seat of a car that was not stolen and was registered to and operated by the adult driver

. Even assuming that J.T. and the driver jointly participated in the burglary (which J.T. was not charged with), we see no evidentiary support for a finding that t hey had joint control
and direction o ver the adult driver’s car. II. The parties agree, as do we, that the juvenile court failed to expressly
declare during the adjudication hearing whether wobbler counts one, two, three, and six were misdemeanors or fe lonies , as required by Welfare and
Institutions Code section 702. 2 “The remedy for a juvenile court’s failure to designate felony or misdemeanor treatment of an offense is a remand for the purpose of making that determination.” ( In re Jacob M. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 58, 65.) We also agree with the parties that the juvenile court failed to specify a maximum period of confinement as required by Welfare and Institutions
Code section 726

. 3 Both the disposition order and the transcript of the disposition he aring are silent on J.T.’s maximum period of confinement.

2 Section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions Code , in relevant part, provides: “If the minor is found to have committed a n offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.” (Italics added.) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702.)

3 Under section 726 , subdivision (d)(1) , when a court orders a removal of a minor from his or her parents’ or guardians’ custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 , “the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the m iddle term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)(1), i talics added.)12

Finally, J.T. contends the disposition order fails to credit him for his time in custody

. We agree. The juvenile court has a duty to credit J.T. for his
time in custody pursuant to section 2900 .5, subdivision ( d ). 4

4 Section 2900.5, subdivision ( d ) , states: “It is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to this section. T he total number of days to be credited shall be contained in the abstract of judgment

. . . . ” (§ 2900.5, subd. (d).)13 DISPOSITION

The adjudication order is reversed as to count three and otherwise affirmed

. The case is remanded with directions for the juvenile court to ( i) state on the record its determination of the felony or misdemeano r status of counts one, two, and six ; (ii) specify on the record the maximum custody

term ; (iii) recalculate the appropriate custody credits ; and (iv) amend the disposition order accordingly

. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed

.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.