IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–1238

Filed April 8, 2016

Amended June 24, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

KEVIN DUANE FISHER II,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Stephen 

Gerard II, Judge.

A defendant challenges his guilty plea for failure to inform him of 

certain consequences of the plea. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE VACATED 

AND CASE REMANDED.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, 

Assistant Attorney General, Janet Lyness, County Attorney, and 

Elizabeth A. Beglin, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This case requires us to determine whether a defendant pleading 

guilty to a controlled-substance offense has a right to be informed 

beforehand that, as a result of the conviction, his driver’s license will be 

revoked for 180 days. We conclude that because revocation is automatic, 

immediate, punitive, and a part of the sentencing order, the defendant 

has a right to be informed of this consequence. We further conclude that 

the defendant has a right to be informed of fine surcharges. Accordingly, 

we vacate the defendant’s conviction and remand for further proceedings 

consistent herewith.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

According to the minutes of testimony, on April 11, 2013, Eric 

Seckel of the University of Iowa Police Department was performing a bar 

check in Iowa City. As he walked toward the back of the bar, he could 

smell the odor of marijuana. He made contact with Kevin Fisher and 

could smell a strong odor of burnt marijuana on his breath. When 

Fisher was asked if he had any marijuana on him, he handed Officer 

Seckel a cigarette box that contained a partially used joint. The joint 

contained marijuana.

On April 25, Fisher was charged with possession of a controlled 

substance first offense, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code 

sections 124.401(5) and 124.204(4)(m) (2013). Initially, Fisher pled not 

guilty and demanded a speedy trial. However, on June 17, the scheduled 

date of his pretrial conference, Fisher’s counsel submitted a written 

guilty plea signed by Fisher. Among other things, the plea set forth the 

maximum punishment—six months—and the basic range of fines—$315 

to $1875—for the offense. Additionally, it disclosed the constitutional 

rights that Fisher was waiving by pleading and not going to trial.
3

The actual plea agreement was handwritten into the signed form. 

It consisted of two days in jail, a $315 fine, substance abuse evaluation 

and treatment, and urinalysis within ten days.

In the plea form Fisher also acknowledged, in writing, as follows:

I have been advised of my right to challenge this plea 

of guilty by filing a Motion in Arrest of Judgment at least five 

(5) days prior to the date that the Court sets for sentencing 

and within forty-five (45) days after the Court accepts my 

plea.

Fisher’s counsel certified in the plea form that he had “carefully 

explained to the defendant the procedural steps of filing a Motion in 

Arrest of Judgment, the definition and grounds thereof and the time 

within which such Motion should be filed.”

On that same day of June 17, the district court entered a written 

order accepting the plea and entering judgment and sentence. The order 

stated that the defendant was advised of his right to file a motion in 

arrest of judgment pursuant to the provisions of Iowa Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 2.24(3) and that “[t]he Defendant waives the right to have time 

prior to sentencing, waives the right to be present for sentencing, and 

requests the Court proceed to immediate entry of judgment and 

sentencing.”

The ensuing judgment and sentence were consistent with the 

terms of the plea agreement. However, they also provided for several 

surcharges on top of the fine, including a thirty-five percent surcharge 

and a $125 law enforcement surcharge. Furthermore, the judgment and 

sentence stated that “[t]he Department of Transportation shall impose 

any suspensions or revocations of Defendant’s driver’s license or motor 

vehicle operating privilege as required by Iowa Code Chapter 321J, Iowa 

Code Section 901.5(10), or other applicable statute or rule.”
4

On July 18, Fisher filed a notice of appeal. The district court 

appointed appellate counsel on October 2. This counsel subsequently 

filed a motion for leave to withdraw under Iowa Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 6.1005 on November 15.1 We denied the motion because it 

failed to provide sufficient detail regarding the plea and sentencing 

proceedings. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1005(2)(a).2 Appellate counsel filed 

two more rule 6.1005 motions, both of which we denied for similar 

reasons. In our September 3, 2014 order denying appellate counsel’s 

third and final rule 6.1005 motion, we removed this counsel for his 

repeated failure to comply with rule 6.1005. The counsel who is 

handling the present appeal was appointed on October 3. 

Following briefing, we transferred the case to the court of appeals. 

On appeal, Fisher argued his written plea was defective because it failed

to disclose the statutory minimum sentence of two days in jail, the 

mandatory six months’ revocation of his driver’s license, and the 

surcharges that were later added to his fine. See Iowa Code 

§ 124.401(5); id. § 901.5(10); id. §§ 911.1–.3. In addition, Fisher urged 

the court to bypass any error preservation concerns despite his failure to 

file a motion in arrest of judgment because the plea did not adequately 

1Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1005 sets forth the procedures that “apply 

when court-appointed counsel moves to withdraw on the grounds that the appeal is 

frivolous.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.1005(1).

2Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1005(2)(a) provides in part,

If the appeal is from a guilty plea or sentence, the motion shall, at a 

minimum, address whether a factual basis existed for each and every 

element of the crime, whether the plea and sentencing proceedings 

substantially complied with the rules of criminal procedure, and whether 

the sentence was authorized by the Iowa Code, case law, or the rules of 

criminal procedure. The brief shall also contain citations to the record 

establishing each of the elements of the crime and establishing 

compliance with the rules of criminal procedure and the Iowa Code.

 
5

inform him that a failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment would 

foreclose his ability to challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal. 

Alternatively, Fisher argued that his counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance for failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment.

In a September 23, 2015 decision, the court of appeals concluded 

“there was substantial compliance with the requirement Fisher be 

informed of the necessity of filing a motion in arrest of judgment in order 

to challenge his guilty plea,” thus barring Fisher’s direct appeal. The 

court also determined that Fisher’s counsel was not ineffective for failing 

to challenge the alleged defects in the written plea. According to the 

court of appeals, Fisher “failed to show . . . he was unaware of the 

mandatory minimum sentence of two days in jail”; the surcharge did not 

“affect the range of Fisher’s punishment”; and, “[t]he suspension of 

Fisher’s driver’s license was also a collateral consequence of his guilty 

plea.” The court thus affirmed Fisher’s plea and sentence.

Fisher applied for further review. We granted his application.

II. Standard of Review.

We ordinarily review challenges to guilty pleas for correction of 

errors at law. State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Iowa 2013).

III. Analysis.

A. Error Preservation. We must first address whether Fisher can 

appeal his guilty plea despite not having filed a timely motion in arrest of 

judgment. Generally, “[a] defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy 

of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude 

the defendant’s right to assert such challenge on appeal.” Iowa R. Crim. 

P. 2.24(3)(a). However, this rule does not apply to defendants who were 

not advised 
6

during the plea proceedings, as required by rule 2.8(2)(d), 

that challenges to the plea must be made in a motion in 

arrest of judgment and that the failure to challenge the plea 

by filing the motion within the time provided prior to 

sentencing precludes a right to assert the challenge on appeal.

State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 2004) (emphasis added). 

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d) states,

The court shall inform the defendant that any challenges to 

a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea 

proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment 

and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude 

the right to assert them on appeal.

Substantial compliance with rule 2.8(2)(d) is mandatory and “[n]o 

defendant . . . should suffer the sanction of rule [2.24(3)(a)] unless the 

court has complied with rule [2.8(2)(d)] during the plea proceedings.” 

State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980).

Fisher pled guilty to a serious misdemeanor, and in such 

proceedings it is “unnecessary . . . for the trial court to actually engage in 

an in-court colloquy with a defendant so as to personally inform the 

defendant of the motion in arrest of judgment requirements.” Meron, 675 

N.W.2d at 541. Instead, a written waiver filed by the defendant can be 

sufficient. Id. A defendant’s written plea or waiver can foreclose an 

appeal when it complies with rule 2.8(2)(d). See State v. Barnes, 652 

N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 2002) (per curiam) (concluding that defendant 

failed to preserve error because he did not file a motion in arrest of 

judgment when his written plea clearly stated that a failure to file such a 

motion would bar any challenge to his plea on appeal). Yet regardless of 

whether the information is imparted through a colloquy or a written plea, 

the defendant must be made aware of the substance of rule 2.24(3)(a).

Fisher argues that the form he signed did not comply with this 

requirement. It set forth the right to challenge the plea by filing a motion 
7

in arrest of judgment and, on a separate page, provided that Fisher was 

waiving this right, but it did not indicate that all avenues for challenging 

the plea were being cut off or mention the word “appeal” at all. See State 

v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Iowa 2003) (“The right to appeal is waived 

only if such a waiver is an express element of the particular agreement 

made by that defendant.”); State v. Hinners, 471 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Iowa 

1991) (“[T]he waiver of the right to appeal should be voluntary, knowing, 

and intelligent. This presupposes the defendant knows about the right of 

appeal and intentionally relinquishes it.” (Citation omitted.)).

We have found sufficient compliance with the rule when the 

defendant was told that, if he requested immediate sentencing, his right 

to “question the legality of his plea of guilty” would be “gone.” State v. 

Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 692, 692 (Iowa 1981). And in State v. Oldham, 515 

N.W.2d 44, 46–47 (Iowa 1994), we found that a colloquy and a written 

application to withdraw the not-guilty plea—when considered together—

sufficed “to notify Oldham of the consequences of his failure to file the 

motion [in arrest of judgment].” There the colloquy advised the 

defendant that he had the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment “if 

[he] claim[ed] that these plea proceedings [were] illegal” but such a 

motion had to be filed “at least five days before the time set for 

sentencing.” Id. at 46. We viewed this advice alone as “equivocal with 

respect to the consequences of the defendant’s failure to file a motion in 

arrest of judgment.” Id. But the written application had added,

I understand that if I wish to attack the validity of the 

procedures involved in the taking of my guilty plea, I must 

do so by a motion in arrest of judgment filed with this court. 

I understand that such motion must be filed at least five 

days before sentencing and also within 45 days of the date 

my plea of guilty is accepted by the court.
8

Id. Oldham had read and signed the application and we decided that

when the application and colloquy were “considered together,” he “was 

adequately informed of the necessity of filing a motion in arrest of 

judgment” and his failure to do so precluded his challenge to his plea on 

appeal. Id. at 47.

“We employ a substantial compliance standard in determining 

whether a trial court has discharged its duty under rule 2.8(2)(d).” State 

v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 2006). In Straw we found

substantial compliance, noting,

The court’s statement plainly indicated that if Straw wanted 

to appeal or challenge the guilty plea, he had to file a motion 

in arrest of judgment. It also indicated this motion had to be 

filed not less than five days before sentencing. In whole, it 

conveyed the pertinent information and substantially 

complied with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d).

Id.

This case falls short of Taylor and Oldham and well short of Straw. 

Absent from Fisher’s form was any statement that by signing it or 

proceeding to immediate sentencing, Fisher was giving up his ability to 

contest the plea in the future, even if the conviction resulted in 

consequences (as we discuss below) that Fisher may not have been told 

about before pleading guilty. It is true that counsel for Fisher certified in 

the plea form that he had explained the procedure for filing a motion in 

arrest of judgment to the defendant. However, “[e]ven considering the 

assurances that counsel for [the defendant] explained the right to file a 

motion in arrest of judgment, this guarantee would be insufficient to 

satisfy the second requirement of rule 2.8(2)(d).” Meron, 675 N.W.2d at 

541.

On these facts, we cannot conclude that there was substantial 

compliance with the court’s duty to inform Fisher that a failure to file a 
9

timely motion in arrest of judgment would waive any challenge to his

guilty plea on appeal. Because Fisher’s written plea was deficient in this 

respect, he is not precluded from challenging his guilty plea on direct 

appeal.3

B. Is the Loss of a Driver’s License a Direct Consequence of 

Fisher’s Guilty Plea? Fisher argues his written guilty plea was invalid 

because he was not informed of three consequences of that plea: (1) the 

mandatory suspension of his driver’s license for six months, (2) the fine 

surcharges, and (3) the mandatory minimum sentence of two days in jail. 

Rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requires the court to 

address the defendant personally in open court and inform 

the defendant of, and determine that the defendant 

understands . . . [t]he mandatory minimum punishment, if 

any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the 

statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered.

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(2); see also id. r. 2.8(2)(b) (providing further 

that the court may “with the approval of the defendant, waive the above 

procedures in a plea of guilty to a serious or aggravated misdemeanor”).

As with rule 2.8(2)(d), we utilize a substantial compliance standard 

to determine whether a plea crosses the rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) threshold. See 

State v. White, 587 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 1998). Both parties agree for 

purposes of this appeal that Fisher needed to be informed of all direct 

consequences of the plea in the colloquy or in any written waiver thereof.

As we have said,

3Had the form substantially complied with rule 2.8(2)(d), Fisher would have to 

challenge his guilty plea under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel, which 

would require him, among other things, to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial.” Straw, 709 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 

52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 210 (1985)).

 
10

To the extent defendant alleges the sentencing court failed to 

inform him fully of the consequences of his plea, he 

implicates the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. To adhere to 

the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment a sentencing 

court must insure the defendant understands the direct 

consequences of the plea including the possible maximum 

sentence, as well as any mandatory minimum punishment. 

However, the court is not required to inform the defendant of 

all indirect and collateral consequences of a guilty plea.

State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam) (citations

omitted).

We begin with Fisher’s assertion that the failure to inform him of 

the temporary revocation of his license rendered his plea defective. Iowa 

Code section 901.5(10) requires the sentencing court to “order the 

department of transportation to revoke the defendant’s driver’s license or 

motor vehicle operating privilege for a period of one hundred eighty days” 

when pronouncing a sentence for certain specified offenses, including 

possession of a controlled substance under section 124.401. We must 

determine whether this mandatory license suspension is a direct or a 

collateral consequence of a guilty plea for possession of a controlled 

substance.

In affirming Fisher’s conviction and sentence, the court of appeals 

relied on our decision in Carney. There we determined that license 

revocation was “not a direct consequence of a guilty plea” to operating 

while intoxicated (OWI). Carney, 584 N.W.2d at 909. We distinguished

between direct and collateral consequences of a plea by approvingly 

quoting the following language: “The distinction between ‘direct’ and 

‘collateral’ consequences of a plea . . . turns on whether the result 

represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the 

range of defendant’s punishment.” Id. at 908 (quoting State v. Warner, 

229 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Iowa 1975)). We reasoned that the purpose of 
11

license revocation for those who had been convicted of OWI was “to 

protect the public by providing that drivers who have demonstrated a 

pattern of driving while intoxicated be removed from the highways.” Id. 

at 909 (quoting State v. Moore, 569 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 1997)). In 

addition, we had previously ruled that license revocation as a 

consequence of an OWI conviction was “not punishment for purposes of 

the double jeopardy clause.” Id.; see State v. Krebs, 562 N.W.2d 423, 

424–25 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam). Accordingly, we concluded that 

revoking the driver’s license of a person convicted of OWI was a collateral 

consequence because it was not intended as punishment. Carney, 584 

N.W.2d at 909.

However, unlike Carney, this case involves revocation of a driver’s 

license as a mandatory consequence of a drug possession conviction—not 

an OWI conviction. In this regard, we believe several pre-Carney 

decisions are relevant. In Hills v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 534 

N.W.2d 640, 640–41 (Iowa 1995), Hills was charged with possession of 

marijuana under Iowa Code section 124.401(3), and she pled guilty three 

months after her arrest. During the time between Hills’s arrest and her 

plea, Iowa Code section 321.209(8)—the former version of Iowa Code 

section 901.5(10)—went into effect. Id. at 641.4 After the department of 

4License revocation under the former Iowa Code section 321.209(8) was a 

separate administrative proceeding that took place after sentencing:

The department shall upon twenty days’ notice and without 

preliminary hearing revoke the license or operating privilege of an 

operator upon receiving a record of the operator’s conviction for any of 

the following offenses, when such conviction has become final:

. . . .

8. A controlled substance offense under section 124.401 . . . . 

Iowa Code § 321.209(8) (1995).

 
12

transportation revoked her license, Hills argued on judicial review that 

the revocation of her license amounted to a violation of the ex post facto 

clauses of the Federal and Iowa Constitutions. Id.

In that case, we concluded that license revocation was an ex post 

facto violation because the sanction was punitive in nature. Id. at 642. 

In reaching this conclusion, we examined the connection between the 

crime of possession of a controlled substance and the revocation of the 

offender’s drivers’ license—i.e., whether the license revocation amounted 

to a civil penalty or criminal punishment. Id. We noted that, unlike in 

the context of an OWI conviction, the aim of ensuring public safety on

the highways did not apply:

Persons who illegally possess drugs are of course subject to 

appropriate criminal punishment. But many such persons 

choose not to drive. When they do not, they do not affect 

highway safety. Any connection between drugs, driving, and 

public safety is at most indirect. The amended statute 

authorizing this license revocation was aimed essentially at 

enhancing punishment for controlled substance possession.

As such it was quasi-criminal and not civil in nature. Ex 

post facto principles therefore prohibit application of the 

amended statute.

Id.

After Hills, we decided Dressler v. Iowa Department of 

Transportation, 542 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1996). In that case, Dressler had 

pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance under Iowa Code 

section 124.401(3). Id. at 564. Shortly after his plea, the department of 

transportation commenced proceedings to revoke his driver’s license for 

six months pursuant to former Iowa Code section 321.209(8). Id. 

Challenging the latter action, Dressler argued that section 321.209(8) 

By contrast, Iowa Code section 901.5(10) (2013) provides that license revocation 

will be ordered by the court at the time of sentencing.

_______________________
13

was unconstitutional because it imposed a successive punishment for 

the same conduct in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. Id. at 565. We agreed with Dressler:

Our conclusion in Hills that section 321.209(8) 

enhances punishment of a controlled substance possession 

dispenses with the State’s assertion that this section is not a 

penal statute. Because section 321.209(8) twice punishes 

Dressler for the same offense—possession of a controlled 

substance—in a separate proceeding, we conclude it 

unconstitutionally contravenes Dressler’s double jeopardy 

guarantees.

Id.

Following the Hills and Dressler decisions, the general assembly 

amended the statute so it now provides that, as part of the criminal 

sentencing process, “the court shall order the department of 

transportation to revoke the defendant’s driver’s license or motor vehicle 

operating privilege for a period of one hundred eighty days . . . .” 1996 

Iowa Acts ch. 1218, § 68 (codified at Iowa Code § 901.5(10)(a)). This 

takes care of the double jeopardy problem but does not alter our prior 

view that revoking the driver’s license of a person convicted of a drug 

possession offense is a punitive rather than a regulatory consequence. 

As we previously said, “Any connection between drugs, driving, and 

public safety is at most indirect.” Hills, 534 N.W.2d at 642.

Because revocation of the driver’s license of a person convicted of a 

drug possession offense is mandatory, immediate, and part of the 

punishment for that offense, the court must inform the defendant of this 

consequence before accepting his or her plea. Here Fisher’s written plea 

did not advise him that a guilty plea would result in the suspension of 

his license. We therefore find that the plea was involuntary and Fisher’s 

conviction and sentence must be set aside. See also Barkley v. State, 

724 A.2d 558, 560–61 (Del. 1999) (holding that a revocation of driver’s 
14

license based on a conviction for cocaine possession was “an immediate, 

automatic and mandatory penalty” that must be disclosed to the 

defendant before the defendant pleads guilty); but see Rowell v. 

Commonwealth, 647 A.2d 696, 698 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (finding that 

a license suspension based on a drug possession conviction was merely a 

“civil consequence” as opposed to a “criminal punishment” and therefore 

the trial judge did not have a duty to inform the defendant of this 

consequence before accepting a guilty plea).

C. Are Fine Surcharges a Form of Punishment That Must Be 

Disclosed During Plea Proceedings? We turn now to Fisher’s assertion 

that the addition of surcharges to the fine for his conviction violated his 

right to be informed of the consequences of his guilty plea. The plea 

agreement stated that upon pleading guilty Fisher would be “fined at 

least $315.00 and up to $1,875.00.” Fisher received the $315 minimum 

fine, but several surcharges were tacked on:

1. A thirty-five percent criminal penalty surcharge,

2. A drug abuse resistance education surcharge of $10, and

3. A law enforcement initiative surcharge of $125.

See Iowa Code §§ 911.1–.3. With these surcharges, the fine actually 

totaled $560.25.

As noted above, rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requires the court to inform the 

defendant of the “mandatory minimum punishment” and the “maximum 

possible punishment” before accepting a guilty plea. These are 

considered direct consequences of the plea. See Saadiq v. State, 387 

N.W.2d 315, 324–25 (Iowa 1986). The State does not dispute that the 

fine itself is a form of punishment which must be disclosed. See State v. 

Brady, 442 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1989) (distinguishing fines and 
15

restitution).5 However, it analogizes surcharges to court costs, which are 

not considered a form of punishment and do not need to be disclosed in 

advance of the plea. See id. (holding that a failure to disclose mandatory 

payments that are compensatory rather than punitive did not vitiate a 

guilty plea).

We disagree with the State. According to the plain language of the 

statute, the surcharge of thirty-five percent is a mandatory “additional 

penalty.” Iowa Code § 911.1(1). Thus, it is punitive on its face. The 

DARE surcharge of ten dollars lacks the same label but is nonetheless

mandatory for controlled substance offenses. Id. § 911.2(1). The law 

enforcement initiative surcharge of one hundred twenty-five dollars is 

likewise mandatory for controlled substance offenses. Id. 911.3(1)(a).

All of these surcharges can be distinguished from other courtordered payments, such as restitution, court costs, and reimbursement 

for the cost of court-appointed counsel, which we regard as nonpunitive. 

See Brady, 442 N.W.2d at 59. The latter items are compensatory and 

“do[] not fit the generally understood definition of punishment.” Id. By 

contrast, the surcharges do not serve as compensation but are simply 

what their title indicates—a “surcharge” on the fine. For rule 2.8 

purposes, we see no meaningful difference between a fine and a built-in 

5Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 expressly requires disclosure of “any 

maximum possible penalty, including . . . fine” as part of the guilty plea colloquy. See 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H). Other states also require fines to be disclosed. See, e.g.,

Carter v. State, 812 So. 2d 391, 394–95 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (reversing guilty plea 

where the defendant was not advised of “all the mandatory fines that were due to be 

imposed upon entry of his guilty plea”); Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Minn. 

2002) (“[D]irect consequences are those which flow definitely, immediately, and 

automatically from the guilty plea—the maximum sentence and any fine to be imposed.” 

(quoting Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. 1998), abrogated in part on other 

grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480–81, 176 

L. Ed. 2d 284, 292–94 (2014))); People v. Harnett, 945 N.E.2d 439, 441–42 (N.Y. 2011) 

(“The direct consequences of a plea—those whose omission from a plea colloquy makes 

the plea per se invalid—are essentially the core components of a defendant’s sentence: a 

term of probation or imprisonment, a term of post-release supervision, a fine.”).

 
16

surcharge on a fine. As the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit has put it, “Labels don’t control. A fine is a fine even if 

called a fee . . . .” Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1133–34 (7th Cir. 

2014) (upholding the annual registration fee for the sex offender 

database because it was “intended to compensate the state for the 

expense of maintaining the sex offender registry”).

The State insisted at oral argument that surcharges cannot be 

characterized as punishment because the funds collected—or at least 

some of them—are used for “remedial” purposes, such as crime and drug 

abuse prevention. But the funds collected through regular fines

themselves are used for similarly beneficent purposes. They are 

deposited into the general fund which supports various state priorities 

including medical assistance and education. See Iowa Code § 602.1305; 

id. § 602.8108. This does not make them any less punitive.

As Fisher’s counsel pointed out during oral argument, the 

surcharges made it effectively impossible that Fisher could ever actually 

be fined $315, the mandatory minimum listed on the plea form. In fact, 

the actual dollar minimum was $560.25. We conclude that Fisher

should have been informed of the mandatory minimum and maximum 

possible fines, including surcharges.6

6Because we are vacating Fisher’s plea and sentence and remanding for further 

proceedings anyway based on failure to disclose the mandatory license suspension, we 

need not decide today whether failure to disclose the surcharges alone would have 

meant the plea did not substantially comply with rule 2.8(2)(b)(2). Regardless, we hold 

that actual compliance with rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requires disclosure of all applicable chapter 

911 surcharges.

Fisher also argues that his guilty plea was defective because he was not 

informed of the mandatory minimum of two days in jail. We note, however, that in his 

plea agreement, Fisher agreed to two days in jail.

 
17

IV. Conclusion.

For reasons stated above, we vacate the decision of the court of 

appeals and the judgment and sentence imposed by the district court. 

We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE 

REMANDED.