United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 22-20289 

Walied Shater, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Shell Oil Company, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:20-CV-1465 

Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Walied Shater claims he was denied a promotion by his former 

employer Shell Oil Company (“Shell”) due to his race and national origin in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Shell 

counters that it gave the promotion to Wayne Hunt, a white person of British 

*

 Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

November 28, 2022 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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No. 22-20289 

2 

national origin, because Hunt was more qualified. The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Shell. Shater appealed. 

We review the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. 

Garcia v. Orta, 47 F.4th 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is 

appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). At this stage, we “view all evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” 

Menzia v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 47 F.4th 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(quotation omitted). In this case, the nonmoving party is Shater. 

 We evaluate Title VII claims based on circumstantial evidence under 

the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792 (1973). See Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 

997 (5th Cir. 2022). The plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of 

discrimination. Id. at 997–98. Then the burden of production shifts to the 

employer to provide an alternative, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action. Id. at 999. If the employer satisfies its burden, the 

plaintiff must raise a fact issue that proves the proffered reason is pretextual. 

Ibid. The employee carries the burden of persuasion throughout the entire 

analysis. Ibid. 

 The parties agree that Shater presented a prima facie case of 

discrimination. And Shater concedes that Shell satisfied its burden of 

presenting an alternative, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action—namely, that Hunt was a better fit for the role. 

 But the parties disagree over the third prong: whether this proffered 

reason was pretextual. To support a denial of summary judgment on the 

ground that it was pretextual, Shater must raise a fact issue showing either 

(1) Shell’s explanation was “false or unworthy of credence,” or (2) Shater 

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was “clearly better qualified than the person selected for the position.” 

Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 

2007) (quotation omitted). We agree with the district court that Shater’s 

claim does not survive summary judgment under either standard. 

First, Shater does not raise a fact issue supporting the demonstration 

that Shell’s reasons for its adverse employment action were “false or 

unworthy of credence.” Burrell, 482 F.3d at 412 (quotation omitted). Shell 

provided testimonial evidence from two interview panelists, indicating the 

interview process was fair and objective. They testified that Shater was one 

of three finalists for the promotion. Shell assembled a three-person panel to 

interview the finalists, consistent with its normal process. The panel asked 

each candidate the same questions about leadership experiences and style. 

The panel assessed applicants based on specific criteria: (1) leadership and 

managerial experience, (2) experience and understanding of security issues 

in Latin America, and (3) connection to U.S. security agencies. It found the 

first two factors favored Hunt; the third favored Shater. The panel then 

carefully considered the qualifications of both candidates and ultimately 

concluded that Hunt was the best fit. 

Shater does not provide any compelling evidence that the panel’s 

reasons were false or not credible. He primarily claims that one panel member 

preselected Hunt. But he has no direct evidence. In fact, that same panel 

member encouraged Shater to apply for the position. Shater also provided 

evidence that one panel member said the panel had not made its promotion 

decision when it had. But that panel member explained the discrepancy by 

testifying that he could not announce the decision at the time for completely 

non-discriminatory reasons. Thus, Shater’s arguments are speculative and 

conclusory at best. And even if he could show Hunt was preselected for the 

position, Shater conceded that preselection alone does not establish pretext 

unless the preselection was motivated by discriminatory animus. And there 

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is no evidence of discriminatory animus. Thus, Shater cannot meet this 

prong. 

Second, Shater has not raised a fact issue to show he was “clearly 

better qualified than” Hunt. Burrell, 482 F.3d at 412. A showing that “two 

candidates are similarly qualified does not establish pretext.” Price v. Fed. 

Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). Rather, the “losing 

candidate’s qualifications must leap from the record and cry to all who would 

listen that he was vastly—or even clearly—more qualified.” Ibid. (quotation 

omitted). The qualifications must be “so widely disparate that no reasonable 

employer would have made the same decision.” Martinez v. Tex. Workforce 

Comm’n—C.R. Div., 775 F.3d 685, 687 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). 

Otherwise, “any differences in qualifications are generally not probative 

evidence of discrimination.” Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 923 

(5th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

While Shater had extensive international security experience in the 

private and public sector, he did not have the same experience in the Latin 

American region as Hunt. Since the position specifically involved work in 

Latin America, the panel could conclude that Hunt’s language skills and 

familiarity with the region gave him a competitive advantage. The panel 

acknowledged that Shater had a greater ability to obtain security clearances 

than Hunt based on his work with the secret service. But this fact alone does 

not demonstrate that Shater was “vastly—or even clearly—more qualified.” 

Price, 283 F.3d at 723. Since he cannot meet this burden, he cannot show 

pretext. 

Finally, Shater’s contention that the district court’s ruling is 

inconsistent with summary judgment rules is without merit. Shater’s 

speculative allegations did not create a genuine dispute as to material fact. 

AFFIRMED. 

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