An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1141

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 6 May 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Henderson County

No. 10 CRS 53859

JERMAINE DEPRIE GLOVER

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 May 2013 by 

Judge Alan Z. Thornburg in Henderson County Superior Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper by Assistant Attorney General 

Mary Carla Hollis for the State.

Ryan McKaig for defendant-appellant.

STEELMAN, Judge.

Where the State presented sufficient evidence of 

defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the murder, the trial 

court did not err by denying his motions for dismissal.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2009 defendant and Misty Carter had been in a 

relationship for several months. They lived together but had not 
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been physically intimate for some time, and both were also 

seeing other people. Around this time defendant offered to sell 

a car to Jessica Levitt, an employee of a local Enmark gas 

station where defendant was a regular customer. In discussing 

the possible sale, defendant told Ms. Levitt that his 

relationship with Ms. Carter was unsatisfactory, that “she was 

cheating on him and it upset him,” and that “he was going to 

take care of the problem” and planned to “kick her out” of his 

trailer. 

In early October Ms. Carter learned that she was pregnant,

and planned to leave defendant to live with the baby’s father, a 

man named Dewayne Boyd. Ms. Carter spent the weekend of 16-18

October 2009 with her sister, Crystal Branson, and Mr. Boyd. On 

Friday, 16 October 2009, Ms. Carter was driving a Mitsubishi 

Eclipse that defendant had purchased for her. Ms. Branson 

noticed that the vehicle was “spotless” and that Ms. Carter had 

“new clothes, her hair freshly done, [and] her nails were 

freshly done,” all of which had been paid for by defendant.

After spending the weekend together, Ms. Carter left Ms. 

Branson’s house at around 1:00 p.m. on 18 October 2009.

In the early morning hours of 19 October 2009, Roger Burns, 

who lived next door to defendant and Ms. Carter, was awakened by 

the sounds of defendant and Ms. Carter arguing. He also heard 
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the voice of a third person. Mr. Burns heard defendant and Ms. 

Carter arguing for ten or fifteen minutes. He then heard Ms. 

Carter make a “hollering” sound, after which “it got quiet.” 

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Burns saw defendant backing his truck up 

to the deck of his trailer, and heard the truck drive away, 

accompanied by another vehicle that left from the place where 

Ms. Carter usually parked her car. When Mr. Burns saw 

defendant’s truck the next day, he noticed that it was wet with 

“water dripping off it,” although it had not rained the previous 

night. Law enforcement officers performed a forensic search of 

defendant’s truck several months later, but did not detect blood 

or other forensic evidence. 

Before dawn on 19 October 2009, Gerald Knaus was driving on 

the Blue Ridge Parkway towards Mt. Pisgah, when a pickup truck 

approached him from the opposite direction. The two vehicles 

slowed to about ten miles an hour to avoid colliding, and passed

within an arm’s length of each other. Mr. Knaus noticed the 

driver’s “unique” appearance, and after he saw a newspaper 

photograph of defendant, Mr. Knaus identified him as the driver 

of the truck. Mr. Knaus continued up the mountain for two or 

three miles, until he came upon the body of a woman lying on the 

side of the road. The body, which was nude except for a head 
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wrapping, had been set on fire and was still “smoldering.” The 

body was subsequently identified as Ms. Carter.

A short time later, SBI Special Agent Jim McClelland

arrived at the location where the body was found, and observed 

that her “head was wrapped in a burnt cloth in a burnt plastic 

bag.” The wrapping around her head contained a great deal of 

blood, and was composed of layers that included fabric, black 

plastic, and a cloth tie. Some of the wrappings were consistent 

with materials later found in defendant’s trailer. There was a 

strong odor of a petroleum-based product about the body, and 

subsequent testing indicated that gasoline had been used to set

the body on fire.

Later that morning, Ms. Carter’s 2000 Mitsubishi Eclipse 

was found at a Shell gas station not far from where the body was 

discovered. Surveillance video showed the vehicle entering the 

gas station in the early morning hours of 19 October 2009. 

Although her car had been “spotless” the day before, the 

floorboard was now covered with mud, leaves, and pine straw. The 

front passenger seat was pushed back and Agent McClelland 

observed a “large soaking reddish brown stain on the seat.” This 

was determined to be a bloodstain that matched Ms. Carter’s DNA 

profile. Items belonging to Ms. Carter, including her wallet and 

ATM cards, were found inside the car. 
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On the afternoon of 19 October 2009, defendant asked 

employees of the Enmark station for permission to dispose of 

trash in their dumpster. Although defendant was a regular 

customer there, he had never previously made such a request. The 

video surveillance camera captured him leaving a black trash bag 

in the dumpster. On 21 October 2009, SBI Assistant Special Agent 

Tom Ammons found a black plastic bag in the dumpster containing

items belonging to defendant and Ms. Carter, including mail 

addressed to each of them and a car title. 

The autopsy of Ms. Carter revealed that her death was 

caused by “a deep penetrating wound” to the left front of her 

head, “from the eye up into the scalp area” and “into the skull” 

resulting in fractures and brain injury. Although the murder

weapon was not identified, the pathologist who performed the 

autopsy determined that the wound had been inflicted by a “heavy 

instrument” with “at least a four-inch long sharp surface, such 

as an ax,” “a meat cleaver,” or another object that “would have 

that sort of shape and would be able to be wielded to form such 

a heavy wound that went right through the skull and caused all 

of those fractures.” 

After 19 October 2009, defendant returned rented furniture 

to the rental company, including a couch that was missing a 

cushion. Defendant claimed that a dog had “eaten” the cushion.
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In examining defendant’s trailer, Agent McClelland saw no dog 

beds, or “any other items related to a pet or a dog, water 

bowls, dog leashes, [or] food bowls[.]”Stains on the furniture 

returned by defendant, including stains that would have been 

under the missing cushion, contained blood that matched Ms. 

Carter’s DNA profile. Ms. Carter’s blood was also found on the 

floor and walls of defendant’s trailer.

Defendant had a prosthetic leg resulting from an amputation 

below his knee. Shaun Dolen, a prosthetist who had provided 

prosthetic care to defendant, recalled that prior to Ms. 

Carter’s death defendant was an “active amputee” and walked 

without a discernable limp. However, after Ms. Carter’s body was 

found, defendant was observed walking with a pronounced limp, 

and told Mr. Dolen that he “couldn’t have” killed Ms. Carter. 

This made Mr. Dolen uncomfortable, since he believed that 

defendant “would have had the ability to have done what he is 

charged with.” 

In 2009, Kelly Foster was a manager at American General 

Financial Services, which had provided financing for defendant’s 

purchase of two vehicles. In the fall of 2009, Ms. Foster spoke 

with defendant several times about his accounts. Prior to the 

death of Ms. Carter, defendant’s gait was normal, and Ms. Foster 

did not realize that he had a prosthesis. However, after Ms. 
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Carter’s body was discovered, defendant walked with a “very 

pronounced” limp. In addition, after Ms. Carter’s body was 

discovered, defendant “consistently would volunteer information” 

about the murder, despite Ms. Foster’s efforts to keep their 

discussions “on a professional level.” He told Ms. Foster that 

“there was no way that he could commit the murder” and that

“they [didn’t] have anything on him to show that he would have 

done that.” Defendant “brought up the subject that he had 

assisted Misty in trying to buy her a car” and “appeared to be 

angry that he had spent money on helping her buy a vehicle.” He 

told Ms. Foster “that he would not be able to do the things that 

they said that he could do, that he would not be able to lift a 

200-plus pound person and move her body,” while at the same time 

gesturing “as if he was picking something up and laying it on 

his shoulder, hoisting it up with a motion.” Defendant’s 

comments made Ms. Foster “very uncomfortable” and she informed 

local law enforcement officers about their conversations. 

Defendant was indicted for the first-degree murder of Ms. 

Carter on 9 August 2010. He was initially tried at the 26 

February 2013 Session of Criminal Superior Court for Henderson

County. However, the trial judge declared a mistrial when the 

jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Defendant was 

tried a second time before Judge Thornburg, beginning on 22 
-8-

April 2013. On 7 May 2013 the jury returned a verdict finding 

defendant guilty of second degree murder. The trial court 

sentenced defendant to a term of 157 months to 198 months

imprisonment. 

Defendant appeals. 

II. Denial of Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss

In the sole issue raised on appeal, defendant argues that 

the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss the 

charge against him for insufficiency of the evidence. We 

disagree.

A. Standard of Review

“Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for 

the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each 

essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense 

included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator 

of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied. If the 

evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture 

as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of 

the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion should be 

allowed.” State v. Mercer, 317 N.C. 87, 96, 343 S.E.2d 885, 890-

91 (1986) (citing State v. Roseman, 279 N.C. 573, 184 S.E. 2d 

289 (1971), and State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E. 2d 679 

(1967)) (other citations omitted). “Whether the evidence 
-9-

presented at trial is substantial evidence is a question of law 

for the court. ‘Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant 

evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a 

conclusion.’” State v. Miles, __ N.C. App. __, __, 730 S.E.2d 

816, 822 (2012) (citing State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 

296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982), and quoting State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 

294, 301, 560 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2002)) (other citation omitted), 

aff’d, 366 N.C. 503, 750 S.E.2d 833 (2013). In ruling on a 

motion for dismissal: 

The evidence is to be considered in the 

light most favorable to the State; the State 

is entitled to every reasonable intendment 

and every reasonable inference to be drawn 

therefrom; contradictions and discrepancies 

are for the jury to resolve and do not 

warrant dismissal; and all of the evidence 

actually admitted, whether competent or 

incompetent, which is favorable to the State 

is to be considered by the court in ruling 

on the motion. 

State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)

(citing State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. 236, 250 S.E. 2d 204 (1978))

(other citation omitted).

“The test of the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand 

the motion is the same whether the evidence is direct, 

circumstantial or both. ‘When the motion . . . calls into 

question the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the 

question for the Court is whether a reasonable inference of 
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defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. If so, it 

is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in 

combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant is actually guilty.’” Powell 299 N.C. at 99, 261 

S.E.2d at 117 (quoting State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358, 139 

S.E. 2d 661, 665 (1965) (other citations omitted). “It is 

immaterial that any individual piece of circumstantial evidence, 

taken alone, is insufficient to establish the identity of the 

perpetrator. If all the evidence, taken together and viewed in 

the light most favorable to the State, amounts to substantial 

evidence of each and every element of the offense and of 

defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense, a motion to 

dismiss is properly denied.” Mercer 317 N.C. at 98, 343 S.E.2d 

at 892 (citing State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599, 340 S.E. 2d 309 

(1986)) (other citation omitted). 

B. Analysis

First-degree murder is the “‘intentional and unlawful 

killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and 

deliberation.’ Murder in the second degree is the unlawful 

killing of a human being with malice but without premeditation 

and deliberation.” State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 463, 496 S.E.2d 

357, 363 (1998) (quoting State v. Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 517, 350 

S.E.2d 334, 337 (1986), and citing State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 731, 
-11-

735, 268 S.E.2d 201, 204 (1980)). Defendant does not dispute the 

sufficiency of the evidence that Ms. Carter was murdered, but 

challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence that he was the 

perpetrator. “Where, as here, defendant does not dispute that 

the victim died by virtue of a criminal act, asserting only that 

the evidence presented was insufficient to support a reasonable 

finding that defendant was the perpetrator of the offense, we 

review the evidence for ‘proof of motive, opportunity, 

capability and identity, all of which are merely different ways 

to show that a particular person committed a particular crime.’

. . . Whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to 

identify defendant as the perpetrator of the offense is not 

subject to ‘an easily quantifiable bright line test.’” Miles, __ 

N.C. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 822-23 (quoting State v. Bell, 65 N.C. 

App. 234, 238-39, 309 S.E.2d 464, 467-68 (1983)). There are

“numerous cases in which our courts have held that 

circumstantial evidence is adequate to support a conviction of 

murder.” State v. Curry, 203 N.C. App. 375, 396, 692 S.E.2d 129, 

144 (citing State v. Franklin, 327 N.C. 162, 172, 393 S.E.2d 

781, 787-88 (1990)), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 437, 702 

S.E.2d 496, (2010). In this case, after a careful review of all 

of the evidence, we hold that the State presented sufficient 
-12-

evidence to permit a reasonable juror to find that defendant 

killed Ms. Carter.

In State v. Brown, 350 N.C. 193, 202, 513 S.E.2d 57, 63 

(1999), our Supreme Court held:

It is well established that “in a criminal 

case . . . evidence is competent and 

relevant . . . if it reasonably allows the 

jury to draw an inference as to a disputed 

fact.” . . . [W]e hold that evidence of 

motive is always relevant and admissible 

where it tends to show that the defendant 

committed the alleged act.

(quoting State v. Jones, 336 N.C. 229, 243, 443 S.E.2d 48, 54 

(1994) (internal citation omitted)). In this case, evidence 

pertaining to motive included the following: 

1. In October 2009, defendant and Ms. Carter 

lived together but had not been physically 

intimate for some time. Ms. Carter was 

expecting the birth of a child fathered by 

Mr. Boyd, and planned to leave defendant.

2. When Ms. Carter spent the weekend of 17 

and 18 October 2009 with Mr. Boyd and Ms. 

Branson, she drove a car that defendant had 

recently bought her, and had new clothes,

fresh hair styling and a new manicure, all 

of which defendant had paid for. 

3. Defendant told Ms. Levitt that Ms. Carter 

“was cheating on him and it upset him” but 

that “he was going to take care of the 

problem” and planned to “kick her out” of 

his trailer. 

4. After the death of Ms. Carter, defendant 

talked to Ms. Foster and seemed angry about 

the fact that he had spent money to buy Ms. 

Carter a car.
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This evidence would allow a reasonable juror to infer that 

defendant had the motives of jealousy and anger for murdering

Ms. Carter. Defendant was angry because, although he lived with 

Ms. Carter and had spent money to buy her a car and other items, 

she was pregnant with another man’s child and planned to leave 

defendant. 

Regarding evidence of opportunity, we have held that “[i]n 

order for this Court to hold that the State has presented 

sufficient evidence of defendant’s opportunity to commit the 

crime in question, the State must have presented at trial 

evidence not only placing the defendant at the scene of the 

crime, but placing him there at the time the crime was 

committed.” State v. Hayden, 212 N.C. App. 482, 488, 711 S.E.2d 

492, 497 (citing State v. Pastuer, 205 N.C. App. 566, 572, 697 

S.E.2d 381, 386 (2010), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided 

court, 365 N.C. 287, 715 S.E.2d 850 (2011), and State v. Scott, 

296 N.C. 519, 522, 251 S.E.2d 414, 416-17 (1979)), disc. review 

denied, 365 N.C. 349, 717 S.E.2d 737 (2011). Evidence that is 

sufficient to permit a “reasonable juror [to] conclude that 

defendant was in the vicinity of . . . the scene of the crime at 

the time of death” “establish[es] defendant’s opportunity to 

commit the murder.” Miles at __, 730 S.E.2d 823. In this case, 

evidence that defendant was present at the scene of Ms. Carter’s 
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death and thus had the opportunity to kill her includes the 

following: 

1. During the early morning hours of 19 

October 2009, defendant’s next door neighbor 

heard defendant arguing loudly with Ms. 

Carter for ten or fifteen minutes, until Ms. 

Carter made a “hollering” sound, followed by 

silence. He then saw defendant back his 

truck up to the deck of his trailer, and 

heard defendant drive his truck away, along 

with another vehicle that left from the 

place where Ms. Carter usually parked her 

car. 

2. Ms. Carter’s blood was found on 

defendant’s sofa, floor, and wall.

3. Ms. Carter’s vehicle was discovered at a 

nearby gas station, where surveillance video 

showed that it had been driven and parked in 

a remote corner of the gas station parking 

lot within an hour or two of the time that

Mr. Burns recalled hearing the fight between 

defendant and Ms. Carter. 

4. Although Ms. Carter’s car was “spotless” 

the day before, when it was found in the 

parking lot there was mud, leaves, and pine 

straw on the floorboard. There was a “large 

soaking reddish brown stain” on the 

passenger seat, which was determined to be a 

bloodstain matching Ms. Carter’s DNA 

profile. 

5. The day after Ms. Carter’s death, 

defendant’s truck was wet, although it had 

not rained, and subsequent examination of 

the truck did not reveal the presence of 

blood. 

This evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror 

to find that (1) defendant and Ms. Carter were both at 
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defendant’s trailer during the early morning hours of 19 October 

2009; (2) during an argument, defendant struck and killed Ms. 

Carter; (3) after killing Ms. Carter, defendant transported her 

body in her car; and (4) defendant washed his truck to eliminate 

evidence of the murder. These inferences are supported by 

evidence that Ms. Carter was “hollering” and then abruptly 

became silent, by the presence of her blood at various places in 

the trailer, and by the condition of her car and the presence of 

her blood in the car’s interior. 

Although “evidence of either motive or opportunity alone is 

insufficient to carry a case to the jury. . . . [w]hen the 

question is whether evidence of both motive and opportunity will 

be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, . . . [the] answer 

appears to rest more upon the strength of the evidence of motive 

and opportunity, as well as other available evidence, rather 

than an easily quantifiable ‘bright line’ test.” Bell, 65 N.C. 

App. at 238-39, 309 S.E.2d at 467-68 (citations omitted 

(emphasis in original). In this case, the other available 

circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt was substantial,

and included the following:

1. Before dawn on the morning of 19 October

2009 Mr. Knaus was driving on the Blue Ridge 

Parkway towards Mt. Pisgah, when a truck 

approached him from the opposite direction. 

Both vehicles slowed to about ten m.p.h. and 

passed within an “arms’ length” of each 
-16-

other, allowing Mr. Knaus to see the driver 

clearly. Mr. Knaus identified defendant as 

the driver of this truck. 

2. About two or three miles from the 

location where defendant and Mr. Knaus 

passed each other, Mr. Knaus came upon a 

body by the side of the road. The body was 

wearing only a head wrap and had been set on 

fire so recently that it was still 

“smoldering.” This body was subsequently 

identified as Ms. Carter.

3. On 19 October 2009, defendant asked if he 

could dispose of trash at a local gas 

station near his house, and was videotaped 

leaving a black plastic bag in the gas 

station dumpster. Law enforcement officers 

later found a black bag in the dumpster that 

contained items belonging to defendant and 

Ms. Carter, including mail addressed to 

defendant and to Ms. Carter and a car title.

4. Following Ms. Carter’s death, defendant 

returned rental furniture to the rental 

company. A cushion was missing from a couch 

defendant returned, which he explained by 

saying that a dog had “eaten” the cushion, 

although his house contained no evidence of 

a dog or other pet. Forensic analysis 

revealed bloodstains originating from Ms. 

Carter at various locations in defendant’s 

trailer, as well as on the couch he 

returned, including the area that would have 

been beneath the missing cushion.

5. Defendant had a prosthetic leg resulting 

from an amputation below his knee. Prior to 

Ms. Carter’s murder, he was an “active 

amputee” and walked well enough that it was 

not apparent that he had a prosthesis. 

However, after Ms. Carter’s death, defendant 

began walking with a pronounced limp and 

making statements to others about his 

purported physical inability to have killed 

Ms. Carter. 
-17-

6. Defendant had several conversations with 

Kelly Foster. After Ms. Carter’s death, 

defendant “consistently would volunteer 

information” about the murder, despite Ms. 

Foster’s efforts to keep their discussion 

“on a professional level.” Defendant 

asserted that law enforcement officers 

lacked any proof of his involvement in the 

crime and that he was physically incapable 

of lifting Ms. Carter. Defendant’s 

persistent discussion of the murder made Ms. 

Foster so uncomfortable that she reported 

his comments to law enforcement officers. 

This evidence would permit the jury to make logical 

inferences that, in an effort to avoid prosecution for the 

murder of Ms. Carter, defendant (1) left Ms. Carter’s car in a 

parking lot; (2) drove to a remote area and left Ms. Carter’s

body by the side of the Blue Ridge Parkway after setting it on 

fire; (3) removed evidence that Ms. Carter had lived with him by 

throwing away items associated with her presence in his trailer;

(4) tried to eliminate evidence of the murder by discarding a 

bloodstained couch cushion and proffering an explanation for its 

absence that lacked credence; (5) adopted a limping gait to 

create the impression that his mobility and physical 

capabilities were limited, and (6) was so persistent in 

discussing Ms. Carter’s death with Ms. Foster that she felt it 

wise to inform law enforcement authorities. 

We hold that this evidence, in conjunction with the 

evidence of defendant’s motive and opportunity to kill Ms. 
-18-

Carter, was sufficient to submit the charges of first and second 

degree murder to the jury, and that the trial court did not err 

by denying defendant’s motions to dismiss.

In arguing for a contrary result, defendant does not deny 

the existence of this evidence. Instead, he attempts to minimize 

the importance of this evidence, raises challenges to the 

credibility of the witnesses, speculates on the possibility that 

someone other than defendant killed Ms. Carter, and directs our 

attention to various inconsistencies and discrepancies in the 

evidence. It is well-established that “contradictions and 

discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case - they are 

for the jury to resolve.” Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 67, 296 S.E.2d 

at 653.

We hold that the trial court did not err by denying 

defendant’s motions for dismissal. 

NO ERROR.

Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).