J-S55006-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

KAHHIM ODOM, 

 Appellant No. 1737 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 22, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002652-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and OTT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2014 

 Kahhim Odom appeals from the judgment of sentence of life 

imprisonment that was imposed by the trial court after a jury convicted him 

of first degree murder, conspiracy, carrying an unlicensed firearm, carrying a 

firearm in public in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime. 

We affirm. 

 Appellant and his co-defendant, Benderick Sterns, were convicted 

based upon the testimony of three eyewitnesses to the November 27, 2011 

shooting death of Rymeek Horton. Additionally, Sterns admitted to killing 

Mr. Horton to Stephon Brandon. Appellant also admitted to being involved 

in killing Mr. Horton to Mr. Brandon as well as Paula Sharp. The trial court 

aptly delineated the evidence adduced at trial: 

 
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On November 27, 2011, the night Rymeek Horton (“the 

decedent") was killed, he, Amir Jones ("Amir"), Amir's brother 

Omar Jones ("Omar"), and Ramil Andrews were hanging out, 

smoking marijuana in front of Amir's and Omar's grandmother's 

house on Malcom Street, a few houses down from Frazier Street 

in Philadelphia. Amir testified that they shared one bag of 

marijuana, and then Omar and the decedent decided to go down 

Frazier Street, in the direction away from Whitby Avenue, to get 

some more. The decedent turned back and began to walk back 

toward his aunt and uncle's house on Malcom Street to tell his 

uncle to leave the door unlocked. 

Amir and Omar then saw two men start running down 

Frazier Street, from the direction of Whitby Avenue, firing guns 

at the decedent. One of them was wearing a gray hoodie, the 

other had on a dark hoodie. Amir and Omar both identified the 

man in the dark hoodie as [Appellant] and the man in the gray 

hoodie as [Appellant’s] co-defendant, Sterns. Sterns’ gun 

jammed, but he cleared the jam and continued shooting. Omar 

ran, heard the decedent scream “Ouch,” turned around, and saw 

the decedent lying on the ground. 

When the first shots rang out, Vance Bradley ("Bradley") 

was in his house at 5628 Malcom Street. Bradley heard four 

shots and then a pause, and then he went to look out his door. 

He saw the decedent lying just in front of his house, about three 

feet from the sidewalk, in the street. 

Bradley testified that he saw [Appellant] and Sterns walk 

toward the decedent—[Appellant] was wearing a dark hoodie, 

and Sterns was wearing a gray hoodie, but Bradley could see 

both their faces. Both men had guns. Sterns stood over the 

decedent, [Appellant] just a few feet behind him, and [Sterns] 

fired four more shots at the decedent's head. Bradley then saw 

both [Appellant] and Sterns run back up Frazier Street toward 

Whitby Avenue. 

Prior to the shots being fired, Jeffrey Taylor (“Taylor”) 

arrived at home and parked his car between Malcom Street and 

Whitby Avenue on Frazier Street. As he walked down Frazier 

Street and then down Whitby Avenue, he saw two men get out 

of a white Chevrolet Impala parked on Whitby Avenue near 

Frazier Street. One wore a gray hoodie, the other wore a dark 

hoodie. The two men walked toward the intersection of Malcom 
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and Frazier Streets. Taylor continued walking home, but then 

heard gunshots from the direction of that intersection. He 

looked back toward the sound of the gunshots and saw the same 

two men running back, guns in hand, and getting back in the 

car, which then drove off. 

The night after the shooting, Stephon “Buddha” Brandon

(“Brandon”) and [Appellant] were at Paula Sharp’s house. 

Brandon expressed concern that people in the neighborhood 

would think he had killed the decedent, as the two men had had 

an argument over drug sales. [Appellant] responded to

Brandon’s concern by saying, “You don’t know what is going on. 

Me and that [racial slur] had a shootout and things got real.” 

N.T. 4/11/2013 at 52-53. [Appellant] became upset and then 

left Sharp’s house. The next day, [Appellant] was again at 

Sharp’s house. Sharp asked [Appellant] about what happened 

to the decedent, and [Appellant] told her that “him and his boys 

went to take care of it.” [Id.] at 55. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/13, at 2-4 (footnotes and extraneous citations to 

record omitted). The Commonwealth established that the victim died from 

multiple gunshot wounds, including three to the head. 

 This appeal followed imposition of the above-described sentence. 

Appellant raises two arguments on appeal: 

A. Whether Appellant is entitled to an arrest of judgment as to 

each charge, because the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient for a finder of fact to render a guilty verdict beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

B. Whether the Court erred in denying Appellant's request for a 

mistrial, due to the Commonwealth's Brady violation. 

Appellant’s brief at 6. 

 We first recite our standard of review regarding the sufficiency of the 

evidence. 
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The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of 

the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial 

in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying 

the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the 

facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need 

not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts

regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or 

none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a

sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution 

the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 

 Appellant first challenges his convictions for first-degree murder and 

conspiracy. “There are three elements of first-degree murder: (1) a human 

being was unlawfully killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; 

and (3) the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.” 

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318, 323 (Pa. 2013) (18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2502(a)). Herein, Appellant assails the evidence supporting the jury’s 

finding that he possessed the specific intent to kill Mr. Horton. The 

Commonwealth’s evidence was that Appellant possessed a gun and, along 
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with Sterns, repeatedly shot at the fleeing victim, who was struck in the 

back and neck by the bullets. A jury can properly conclude that the 

defendant had the specific intent to kill when he runs after a fleeing victim 

and repeatedly shoots him. Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 

737 (Pa.Super. 2004). Additionally, Appellant stood and watched his cohort 

shoot the victim in the head three times after the victim was immobilized 

from the other bullet wounds. Hence, we conclude that the evidence was 

sufficient to establish that Appellant had the specific intent to kill the victim. 

Appellant also maintains that he was not guilty of conspiracy. The 

crime of conspiracy is set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a):

A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons 

to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating 

its commission he: 

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that 

they or one or more of them will engage in conduct 

which constitutes such crime or an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime; or 

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an 

attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. 

Under this provision, the Commonwealth must prove that “1) the 

defendant entered into an agreement with another to commit or aid in the 

commission of a crime; 2) he shared the criminal intent with that other 

person; and 3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of the 

conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Nypaver, 69 A.3d 708, 715 (Pa.Super. 

2013) (citation omitted). We utilize four factors “in deciding if a conspiracy 
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existed. Those factors are: ‘(1) an association between alleged conspirators; 

(2) knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of 

the crime; and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the 

conspiracy.’” Id. at 715 (partially quoting Commonwealth v. Feliciano,

67 A.3d 19, 25 (Pa.Super. 2013)(en banc)). 

Ignoring the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, Appellant 

maintains that he was hiding behind a car when the victim was killed and 

was merely a bystander who witnessed Sterns kill Mr. Horton. However, the 

evidence adduced by the Commonwealth established the following. 

Appellant and Sterns associated with each other by arriving at the scene of 

the crime together, jointly shooting at the victim, and then fleeing after he 

was dead. Appellant admitted to Ms. Sharp and Mr. Brandon that he 

participated in the killing of the victim. Hence, the evidence was sufficient to 

support the conviction of conspiracy since all four factors necessary to 

establish a conspiracy were present herein. 

Appellant also challenges his firearms convictions.1

 He was adjudged 

guilty under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a), firearms not to be carried without a 

____________________________________________ 

1

 We note that the trial court opined that the two firearms convictions were 

infirm since the Commonwealth failed to establish the barrel length of 

Appellant’s gun. Trial Court Opinion, 12/6/13, at 9; see 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102 

(defining “firearm” for purposes of the Uniform Firearms Act and outlining 

that the barrel length of pistols, revolvers, shotguns, and rifles may not 

exceed a certain number of inches to be a firearm for purposes of that Act). 

However, in this appeal, Appellant does not challenge either of his firearms 

convictions on this basis. It is well-established that this Court is prohibited 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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license, which states, with exceptions inapplicable herein, that “any person 

who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm 

concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place 

of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license under this chapter 

commits a felony of the third degree.” Appellant’s challenge to his offense is 

that no one established that he concealed his gun and that there was no 

proof the firearm was operable. 

However, Mr. Taylor stated that he saw two men, one wearing a grey 

hoodie and the other wearing a dark hoodie, arrive near the site of the 

shooting in a car. Mr. Taylor continued that they exited the car, that he 

heard gunshots, and that the same two men then re-entered the car. Other 

witnesses established that Appellant was wearing a dark hoodie and that 

Sterns was wearing a grey hoodie. The Commonwealth is entitled to all the 

inferences created by the evidence and Mr. Taylor’s testimony established 

that Appellant, who was carrying his weapon, arrived at the crime scene 

inside a vehicle, and then Appellant re-entered that car after the shooting. 

Since Appellant carried an unlicensed firearm “in any vehicle,” the evidence 

was sufficient to support this crime. 

Appellant’s operability position is also leveled in connection with his 

challenge to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108, carrying firearms on public streets or public 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

from raising a contention sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 

875 (Pa. 2009). Hence, we are barred from overturning the firearms 

convictions herein on a ground not raised by the Appellant. 
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property in Philadelphia, which outlines that, “[n]o person shall carry a 

firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time upon the public streets or upon any 

public property in a city of the first class unless” he is licensed or exempt 

from licensing. 

We conclude that the evidence establishes that Appellant’s gun was 

functional. Specifically, Omar Jones testified that he saw Appellant firing his 

firearm. Additionally, Appellant admitted to Mr. Brandon that he had a 

shootout with the victim. Appellant claims that his gun jammed, but the 

evidence established that he fired the weapon four times before it ceased to 

fire. N.T. Trial, 4/12/13, at 100. Hence, it was operable. We therefore 

reject Appellant’s challenges to his convictions under the Uniform Firearms 

Act. 

Appellant’s next position is that the trial court improperly failed to 

grant him a mistrial, which was requested based upon a purported violation 

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

[A] trial court may grant a mistrial only where the incident upon 

which the motion is based is of such a nature that its 

unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by 

preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict. . 

. . In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial, 

our standard is abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 728 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted). 
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 In this case, Appellant presented Dominique Evans who provided an 

alibi defense and reported that Appellant was in his company when the 

shooting occurred. Appellant’s Brady argument involves the fact that a 

detective interviewed Evans and Evans told the detective that Appellant was 

with him during the timeframe of the shooting. Appellant’s claim is that the 

Commonwealth violated Brady when it did not tell him about Evans’ report 

to the detective. It is established that the reason behind Brady is to require 

the prosecution to provide to the defendant exculpatory evidence in the sole 

control of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294 

(Pa. 2002). Accordingly, “no Brady violation occurs if the evidence in 

question is available to the defense from non-governmental sources . . . or if 

the defendant knew, or with reasonable diligence could have known, of such 

evidence[.]” Id. at 305; Accord Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 

276 (Pa. 2011) (“There is no Brady violation when the appellant knew or, 

with reasonable diligence, could have uncovered the evidence in question, or 

when the evidence was available to the defense from non-governmental 

sources.”). 

 In this case, Appellant knew about Evans because he presented him as 

a witness. Appellant also suggests that the fact that Evans told police about 

the alibi would have aided Appellant’s defense. However, Evans was aware 

of the interview and could have told Appellant about it. There simply was no 

Brady violation herein. Finding Appellant’s assertions meritless, we affirm. 
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 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/16/2014