alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Harry Katz, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

July 9, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Harry Katz, pro se,*and *Philip L. Weinstein*and *Mark C. Cogan*for Harry Katz, appellant. *Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney (Phyllis A. Monroe*and *Beth J. Thomas*of counsel), for respondent.

*858OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction rendered August 7, 1985 affirmed.

We find that a corporation may be the subject and victim of aggravated harassment in the second degree under Penal Law § 240.30. That statute provides in relevant part:

"A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he:

"1. Communicates, or causes a communication to be initiated by mechanical or electronic means or otherwise, with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone * * * in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or

"2. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose; of legitimate communication”.

The prosecution established, beyond a reasonable doubt, a course of conduct consisting of a barrage of threatening telephone calls by defendant to corporate officers of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, made at all hours of the day and night at their homes and offices, intended to influence the corporation’s decision-making process as regards employment within its beneficiary agencies, in which defendant demanded that a certain employee be fired on pain of a campaign by defendant to impair the Federation’s ability to carry out its charitable function. Defendant’s words and actions exceeded the bounds of legitimate communication and constituted harassment, or so a jury could reasonably find. A corporation may be the object of extortionate or coercive threats *(People v Lamm,*292 NY 224; *United States v Lewis,*797 F2d 358), and in the situation where repeated telephone threats are directed to corporate officers in their official capacities concerning corporate affairs, it is fair to conclude that the corporation itself has been disrupted or harassed. Hence, it is appropriate that a corporation, as well as an individual, be construed as a "person” within the intendment of the statute (Penal Law § 10.00 [7]).

As to defendant’s argument that he was not tried upon a proper accusatory instrument, it is evident from the trial minutes that defendant’s counsel made a knowing election to proceed to a determination on the merits and ratified the procedure adopted by the court for conversion of the com*859plaint to an information *(see, People v Connor,*63 NY2d 11).

Defendant’s appellate argument that the statute is void for vagueness was not raised below and is, in any event, unavailing *(People v Smith,*89 Misc 2d 789; *cf., People v Dupont,*107 AD2d 247).

Hughes, P. J., Riccobono and Ostrau, JJ., concur.
Description of Mosaic Management Incentive Program



 Exhibit 10.iii.d. 
 Pursuant to the Management Incentive Plan (“MIP”) of The Mosaic Company (the “Company”), key managers of the Company and its subsidiaries, including executive officers, are eligible for annual cash
incentive compensation based upon the attainment of business performance goals that are pre-established by the Board of Directors of the Company, upon the recommendation of the Compensation Committee or a subcommittee of outside directors.
Attainment of the performance measures determines the amount of the incentive payment for executive officers and all or a portion of the amount of the incentive payment for other participants. Threshold, target and maximum payout levels are set
based upon the extent to which the specified performance measures are attained. Target annual incentive awards for executive officers range from 50% to 110% of base salary for the fiscal year ending May 31, 2010. The Corporate performance
measures for the fiscal year ending May 31, 2010 are (i) consolidated operating earnings (“operating earnings”) and (ii) average consolidated working capital (“average working capital”), weighted 80% on the
operating earnings measure and 20% on the average working capital measure. The Corporate performance measures apply to all executive officers, except that the performance measures for the executive officer who is the leader of the Company’s
Potash business unit is based 60% on consolidated operating earnings and average consolidated working capital and 40% on operating earnings and average working capital of the Potash business unit. The plan has a minimum level for both the operating
earnings measure and the average working capital measure at which payments begin. In addition, the plan has a separate threshold for the operating earnings measure below which no payout will be made under the average working capital measure. The
maximum payout percent for both the operating earnings measure and the average working capital measure is 200% of the target annual incentive award.
#### STATE v. NATHANIEL FOY.

(Filed 2 February, 1951.)

Criminal Law § 81c (4) —

Where but one sentence is imposed upon a verdict of guilty as to both counts in an indictment, alleged error relating to one count only cannot entitle defendant to a new trial when no error is found as to the other *229count, and the sentence imposed is within the limits prescribed for such offense.

Appeal by defendant from *Clement, J.,*February Term, 1950, of Forsyth.

Criminal action tried upon an indictment charging the defendant with a conspiracy to sell intoxicating liquor and with the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor.

The jury returned the following verdict: “Guilty of conspiracy to sell intoxicating liquors as charged in the bill of indictment, and guilty of selling unlawful liquors as charged in the bill of indictment.”

The court did not enter separate judgments on the respective counts for the purpose of punishment, but entered one judgment on the verdict, committing the defendant to the county jail for 18 months, to be assigned to work under the supervision of the State Highway and Public Works Commission.

Defendant appeals, assigning error.

*Attorney-General McMullan, Assistant Attorney-General Bruton, and John B. Jordan, Jr., Member of Staff, for the State.*

*Higgins & McMichael for defendant.*

PeR Curiam.

The defendant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to sustain his motion for judgment as of nonsuit. We concur in the ruling below as to both counts in the bill of indictment.

The defendant also challenges the validity of the verdict on the second count, on the ground that the jury found him “guilty of selling ‘unlawful liquors’ as charged in the bill of indictment,” instead of finding him guilty of selling “intoxicating liquors” as charged in the bill of indictment. We consider the exception without merit; but, if it were otherwise, the judgment should be upheld on this record.

The exception to the failure of the court below to sustain the defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit is the sole exception in the record bearing on the first count, and that exception having been disposed of adversely to the defendant, and the sentence imposed being within the limit prescribed by statute for such offense, the judgment will be upheld. *S. v. Graham,*224 N.C. 347, 30 S.E. 2d 151, and cited cases. Therefore the judgment entered below is

Affirmed.
First Department,

February Term, 1893.

#### Isaac H. Bailey, as Assignee, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daniel Drew Chamberlain and others, Respondents and Appellants.

Judgment, so far as it dismissed the complaint, affirmed, without costs. Opinion by

Van Brunt, P. J.
Exhibit 35.3

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (Item 1123)

Homecomings Financial, LLC

RALI Series 2007-QA1 Trust (the Issuing Entity)

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Homecomings Financial, LLC, as servicer (the Servicer) pursuant to the applicable servicing agreement, does hereby certify that:

1. A review of the Servicers activities during the period from and including January 30, 2007 through and including September 24, 2007 and of the
Servicers performance under the applicable servicing agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such
review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable servicing agreement in all material respects throughout such period.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 24th day of March 2008.



|       |  |                     
|------ |  | --------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
|Name:  |  | Anthony N. Renzi    
|Title: |  | Managing Director
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DAVID M. REEDER, ESQ. (California State Bar No. 133150)

REEDER LAW CORPORATION

1801 CENTURY PARK EAST, 16TH FLOOR

LOS ANGELES, CA 90067

PHONE: (310) 774-4060

FAX: (310) 295-2290

EMAIL: david@reederlaw.com

Attorneys for The City of American Canyon

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

In re: 

PG&E CORPORATION,

And

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC

COMPANY,

Debtors.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 19-30088-DM

[Chapter 11]

(Lead Case Jointly Administered)

REQUEST FOR REMOVAL FROM

COURT E-MAIL LIST AND MAILING

MATRIX

[X] Affects PG&E Corporation

[ ] Affects Pacific Gas Electric Company

[ ] Affects Both

*All papers shall be filed in the Lead Case

No. 19-30088

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT, CASE ADMINISTRATORS AND ALL PARTIES IN

INTEREST:

David M. Reeder hereby requests the following name and e-mail addresses be removed from 

the Court's ECF e-mail list and the mailing matrix in the above referenced case:

David M. Reeder, Esq.

Reeder Law Corporation

1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90067

Email: David@Reederlaw.com; Secretary@Reederlaw.com

Dated: April 12, 2023 REEDER LAW CORPORATION

/s/ DAVID M. REEDER

DAVID M. REEDER

Attorney for The City of American Canyon

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13667 Filed: 04/12/23 Entered: 04/12/23 20:30:20 Page 1

of 1
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SCOTT H. MCNUTT (CSBN 104696) 

324 Warren Road 

San Mateo, California 94402 

Telephone: (415) 760-5601 

Email: shm@ml-sf.com 

Counsel to the Fee Examiner 

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

In re 

PG&E CORPORATION, 

- and - 

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC 

COMPANY, 

Debtors. 

☐ Affects PG&E Corporation 

☐ Affects Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

☒ Affects both Debtors 

* All papers shall be filed in the Lead Case, 

No. 19-30088 (DM) 

 Bankruptcy Case 

No. 19-30088 (DM) 

(Lead Case) 

(Jointly Administered) 

Chapter 11 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3899 Filed: 09/16/19 Entered: 09/16/19 17:03:48 Page 1 of

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 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 

employed in the County of San Mateo, State of California. My business address is 324 Warren 

Road, San Mateo, CA 94402. 

On September 16, 2019, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as

EX PARTE APPLICATION OF FEE EXAMINER TO SET STATUS CONFERENCE 

SCHEDULING HEARINGS ON FEE APPLICATIONS AND RELATED ISSUES 

on the interested parties in this action as follows: 

TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING 

(NEF): Pursuant to controlling General Orders and LBR, the foregoing document will be served 

by the court via NEF and hyperlink to the document. All registered ECF participants shall receive 

the NEF transmission at the email addresses on record with the court. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 

foregoing is true and correct and that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this 

Court at whose direction the service was made. 

Executed on September 16, 2019, at San Mateo, California. 

 /s/ Scott H. McNutt 

 Scott H. McNutt

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3899 Filed: 09/16/19 Entered: 09/16/19 17:03:48 Page 2 of

2
Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4181 Filed: 10/10/19 Entered: 10/10/19 15:03:06 Page 1 of

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Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4181 Filed: 10/10/19 Entered: 10/10/19 15:03:06 Page 2 of

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Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4181 Filed: 10/10/19 Entered: 10/10/19 15:03:06 Page 3 of

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- 1 -

ORDER GRANTING DAVID M. FELDMAN’S APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION OF 

ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Gibson, Dunn & 

Crutcher LLP

DAVID M. FELDMAN, NY SBN 2633881

 dfeldman@gibsondunn.com

 (pro hac vice application pending)

MATTHEW K. KELSEY, NY SBN 4250296

 mkelsey@gibsondunn.com

 (pro hac vice application pending)

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193

Telephone: 212.351.4000

Facsimile: 212.351.4035

MICHAEL S. NEUMEISTER, SBN 274220

 mneumeister@gibsondunn.com

MICHELLE CHOI, SBN 313557

 mchoi@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

333 South Grand Avenue

Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197

Telephone: 213.229.7000

Facsimile: 213.229.7520

Attorneys for the Ad Hoc Committee of

Holders of Trade Claims

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

In re:

PG&E CORPORATION 

-andPACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY,

 Debtors.

 Affects PG&E Corporation

 Affects Pacific Gas and Electric Company

 Affects both Debtors

*All papers shall be filed in the Lead Case, No. 

19-30088 (DM).

Bankruptcy Case No. 19-30088 (DM)

Chapter 11

(Lead Case)

(Jointly Administered)

ORDER GRANTING DAVID M. 

FELDMAN’S APPLICATION FOR 

ADMISSION OF ATTORNEY PRO HAC 

VICE

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4181 Filed: 10/10/19 Entered: 10/10/19 15:03:06 Page 4 of

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- 2 -

ORDER GRANTING DAVID M. FELDMAN’S APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION OF 

ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Gibson, Dunn & 

Crutcher LLP

DAVID M. FELDMAN, whose business address and telephone number is 

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193

Telephone: 212.351.4000

and who is an active member in good standing of the bar of NEW YORK having applied in the aboveentitled action for admission to practice in the Northern District of California on a pro hac vice basis, 

representing the AD HOC COMMITTEE OF HOLDERS OF TRADE CLAIMS,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the application is granted, subject to the terms and 

conditions of Civil L.R. 11-3. All papers filed by the attorney must indicate appearance pro hac vice. 

Service of papers upon and communication with co-counsel designated in the application will 

constitute notice to the represented party. All future filings in this action are subject to the Bankruptcy 

Local Rules and Electronic Case Filing Procedures adopted by the United States Bankruptcy Court for 

the Northern District of California.

**END OF ORDER**

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4181 Filed: 10/10/19 Entered: 10/10/19 15:03:06 Page 5 of

5
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00217-CR

The STATE of Texas,

Appellant

v.

Kyle Tyrone WARNERAppellee

Kyle Tyrone WARNER,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 15, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 390617

The Honorable Michael La Hood, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 17, 2013

MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; APPEAL DISMISSED

Appellant, the State of Texas, filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The motion is granted, 

and this appeal is dismissed.1

 See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a). 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH

1 During the pendency of this appeal, appellee Kyle Tyrone Warner filed a motion to remand this matter to the trial 

court to allow the trial court to advise this court what portion of a DVD was viewed by the trial court in making its 

determinations in this case. We ordered the motion carried with the appeal. Given the State’s motion to dismiss, we 

withdraw our order carrying the motion with the appeal and DENY the motion as moot.
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

S E C O N D D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

CHIEF JUSTICE

 BONNIE SUDDERTH

JUSTICES

 SUE WALKER

 BILL MEIER

 LEE GABRIEL

 ELIZABETH KERR

 MARK T. PITTMAN

 J. WADE BIRDWELL

TIM CURRY CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER

401 W. BELKNAP, SUITE 9000

FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76196-0211

TEL: (817) 884-1900

FAX: (817) 884-1932

www.txcourts.gov/2ndcoa

CLERK 

 DEBRA SPISAK

CHIEF STAFF ATTORNEY

 LISA M. WEST

GENERAL COUNSEL

 CLARISSA HODGES

May 24, 2018

Michael White

#02158436

Gist Unit

3295 FM 3514

Beaumont, TX 77705

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 02-17-00305-CR

02-17-00306-CR

02-17-00307-CR

Trial Court Case Number: 1464400D

1470552D

1470991D

Style: Michael White

v.

The State of Texas

Dear Mr. White:

Your court-appointed attorney, J. Warren St. John, filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel on appeal and a brief supporting that motion in the above

cause. In these documents, your attorney has certified that, in his opinion, any

appeal of your conviction would be wholly frivolous and without merit. 

Your attorney has provided this court with a copy of a letter that was sent

to you on May 24, 2018. In that letter, your attorney states that copies of the

motion and brief have been delivered to you. Your attorney also states in the

letter that a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record has been

provided to you should you wish to review it for the purpose of filing a pro se

response to the Anders brief in which you point out any alleged errors that you

feel were committed in your trial.

FILE COPY
02-17-00305-CR

May 24, 2018

Page 2

If you wish to examine the record and file a pro se response, please sign

and date the motion for pro se access to the appellate record that your attorney

provided you and send it to the Second Court of Appeals within fourteen (14)

days of the date of this letter. The address for the Second Court of Appeals is

401 W. Belknap, Suite 9000, Fort Worth, Texas 76196. After you have been

provided access to the appellate record, the court will then set a due date for

your pro se response to be filed.

If you do not file a motion for pro se access to the appellate record within

fourteen (14) days of the date of this letter, this court will assume that you do

not wish to file a pro se response to the Anders brief and that you have nothing to

add to the brief filed by your attorney.

Respectfully yours,

DEBRA SPISAK, CLERK

By: Shoshanna Cordova, Deputy Clerk

cc: J. Warren St. John

2020 Burnett Plaza

801 Cherry St., Unit No. 5

Fort Worth, TX 76102

Joseph W. Spence

Assistant District Attorney

401 W. Belknap Street

Fort Worth, TX 76196

Criminal District Clerk, Tarrant County

Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center

401 W. Belknap, 3rd Floor

Fort Worth, TX 76196-0402

FILE COPY
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0604n.06

No. 19-1093

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SEAN LAMONTE LINDSAY, aka Sean Lamonte 

Goodman,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: GIBBONS, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Sean Lindsay argues that he received a substantively 

unreasonable sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. We reject his arguments

and affirm.

In 2011, Lindsay pled guilty to bank robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The district court 

sentenced him to 77 months in prison followed by 2 years of supervised release. He was released 

from prison in October 2017. After that, Lindsay worked several full-time jobs, but quit each one

to avoid paying child support. As a result, he also failed to pay the restitution required by the terms 

of his supervised release. Nine months after his release, Lindsay tested positive for cocaine, which 

led the district court to order him to reside six months at a halfway house as part of his release. 

Seven weeks into that six-month term, Lindsay absconded from the halfway house—again a 

violation of the terms of his release. His guidelines range for that violation was 21-to-27 months,
No. 19-1093, United States v. Lindsay

-2-

but the statutory maximum for his violation was 24 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The 

district court sentenced Lindsay to 24 months. We review the reasonableness of Lindsay’s

sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Where, as here, the district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence, “a presumption of 

reasonableness applies[.]” United States v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 859, 865 (6th Cir. 2011).

Lindsay argues that the district court’s sentence was excessive because, he says, his 

abscondence was his first violation of supervised release. But the abscondence was Lindsay’s 

third violation—he had violated the terms of his release by failing to pay restitution and by testing

positive for cocaine. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion. 

Lindsay also says the district court failed to credit the fact that he had secured employment 

while on release. But the district court cited Lindsay’s job—albeit after selecting Lindsay’s 

sentence—as a “bright spot” amid a criminal record that left Lindsay “in custody or on community 

supervision almost constantly since 1993.” R. 56, PageID 308. So that criticism is without merit 

as well. 

The district court’s sentence is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>    5


<CAPTION>

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                  MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                            445,000
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                           0
<ALLOWANCES>                            0
<INVENTORY>                             0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  455,000
<PP&E>                                  0
<DEPRECIATION>                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    976,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           4,773,000
<BONDS>                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                     2,971,000
<COMMON>                       23,461,000
<OTHER-SE>                    (30,229,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      976,000
<SALES>                                 0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        0
<CGS>                                   0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  189,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 25,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   663,000
<INCOME-TAX>                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               663,000
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                      663,000
<EPS-BASIC>                        0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                        0.00




</TABLE>
Order entered July 8, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00348-CV

VISTA BANK, Appellant

V.

NELEZER, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-02535

ORDER

Before the Court is appellee’s July 6, 2021 motion for an extension of time 

to file its brief on the merits. We GRANT the motion and extend the time to July 

27, 2021.

/s/ KEN MOLBERG

JUSTICE