16-3015 

Tao v. Sessions 

BIA 

Laforest, IJ 

A087 601 002

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

23rd 4 day of February, two thousand eighteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 REENA RAGGI,

8 DENNY CHIN, 

9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 LI TAO, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 16-3015 

17 NAC 

18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Mike P. Gao, Flushing, NY. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

26 Attorney General; Nancy E. Friedman, 

27 Senior Litigation Counsel; Sharon M. 

28 Clay, Trial Attorney, Office of 

29 Immigration Litigation, United 

30 States Department of Justice, 

31 Washington, DC. 
2

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Li Tao, a native and citizen of the People’s 

6 Republic of China, seeks review of an August 9, 2016, decision 

7 of the BIA affirming an April 20, 2015, decision of an 

8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Tao’s application for asylum, 

9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

10 Torture (“CAT”). In re Li Tao, No. A087 601 002 (B.I.A. Aug. 

11 9, 2016), aff’g No. A087 601 002 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City April 

12 20, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

13 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

15 IJ’s and BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 

16 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 

17 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

18 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Su Chun Hu v. Holder, 

19 579 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2009). 

20 Because Tao alleged only a fear of future persecution on 

21 account of her membership in the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) 

22 in the United States, she had the burden to show a well-founded 

23 fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that 
3

1 is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 

2 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

3 see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Y.C. 

4 v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum 

5 claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possibility of 

6 future persecution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “An 

7 asylum applicant can show a well-founded fear of future 

8 persecution in two ways: (1) by demonstrating that he or she 

9 ‘would be singled out individually for persecution’ if 

10 returned, or (2) by proving the existence of a ‘pattern or 

11 practice in [the] . . . country of nationality . . . of 

12 persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the 

13 applicant’ and establishing his or her ‘own inclusion in, and 

14 identification with, such group.’” Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332 

15 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)). 

16 First, we conclude that the agency did not err in 

17 determining that Tao failed to demonstrate an objectively 

18 reasonable possibility that she would be singled out 

19 individually for persecution. “[A]n alien must make some 

20 showing that authorities in his or her country of nationality 

21 are either aware of his or her activities or likely to become 

22 aware of his or her activities.” Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332 

23 (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
4

1 Tao argues that online publication of her four pro-democracy 

2 articles and photographs of protests she attended established 

3 the Chinese government’s likely awareness of her U.S. political 

4 activities, particularly in light of her own testimony and 

5 testimony from a witness that that the government would discover 

6 her activities. Although the agency found Tao and her witness 

7 credible, that only satisfied the subjective prong of the test. 

8 The agency then reasonably concluded that Tao’s fear of 

9 persecution was speculative because it was unlikely that the 

10 Chinese government would discover her four articles and protest 

11 photographs. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 

12 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that in “absence of solid support in 

13 the record” a fear of persecution is not objectively reasonable 

14 and is “speculative at best.”); Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334, 336-37 

15 (finding insufficient grounds for awareness based on either 

16 publication of one article or applicant’s member page, name, 

17 and photograph on CDP’s website). 

18 Second, we conclude that the agency did not err in 

19 determining that Tao failed to establish a pattern or practice 

20 of persecution of similarly-situated individuals—namely, 

21 low-level CDP members who joined the CDP in the United States. 

22 To establish a pattern or practice of persecution of a 

23 particular group, an applicant must demonstrate that the harm 
5

1 to that group is “systemic or pervasive.” In re A-M-, 23 I. 

2 & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005); see Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 

3 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2007). Although Tao and her witness 

4 identified a few arrests of low-level CDP members who had been 

5 active in the United States, the agency reasonably concluded 

6 that the isolated incidents did not amount to a pattern or 

7 practice. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3 110, 111-12 (2d Cir. 

8 2009) (finding no error in agency’s denial of pattern or 

9 practice claim where persecution was “sporadic” and 

10 “localized”). 

11 Further, as the agency reasoned, the country conditions 

12 evidence reflects that high-profile CDP leaders and recruiters 

13 have been persecuted for their pro-democracy activities in

14 China, but does not identify persecution of low-level CDP 

15 members, like Tao, whose activities occurred only in the United 

16 States. The agency therefore did not err in concluding that 

17 Tao failed to show a pattern or practice of persecution of 

18 similarly-situated individuals. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334-35 

19 (affirming agency’s denial of pattern or practice claim by 

20 low-level Chinese Alliance for Democracy member where evidence 

21 showed persecution of prominent leaders of pro-democracy 

22 movements outside of China and political dissidents within 

23 China). As the agency concluded, Tao failed to demonstrate an 
6

1 objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See id. Thus, 

2 the agency did not err in denying asylum or in concluding that 

3 Tao necessarily failed to meet the higher burdens for 

4 withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder, 

5 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010). 

6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

7 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

8 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

9 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

10 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

11 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

12 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

13 34.1(b). 

14 FOR THE COURT: 

15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk