J-S21020-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RYAN STANFORD LEE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2819 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 17, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0006593-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 06, 2019

Ryan Stanford Lee (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his open guilty plea to third-degree murder and criminal 

conspiracy.1 Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) seeks to withdraw from 

representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we 

grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence.

The trial court recited the pertinent facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, on the evening of 

March 18, 2011, Appellant was driving his sister’s gray, four-door 

1997 Chevrolet Malibu with tinted windows through the streets of 

Norristown with his friend, Omar Massenburg, riding as the front 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 903(a)(1).
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seat passenger and Steven Jackson as a rear seat passenger when 

they observed the Victim, seventeen-year-old D’Ravious Dawkins 

(“Victim” or “Dawkins”) walking home from his girlfriend’s house 

along Noble Street near West Oak Street in Norristown Borough, 

Montgomery County. (Affidavit of Probable Cause, filed 7/6/16). 

Massenburg exited the Malibu and approached young Mr. Dawkins 

with the intent of robbing him. (Id.). A witness walking his dog

in that area later described the encounter to police. He saw the 

two men struggling and heard the younger man ask “why are you 

doing this to me?” (Id. at 2-3). The witness heard a “pop” and 

observed the young man fall to the ground. (Id. at 3). Seconds 

later he observed a four-door sedan pull away on Oak Street 

driving “really fast.” (Id.). Another witness who heard the 

gunshot described a light gray vehicle parked on West Oak Street 

at Noble Street pulling away from the area “pretty fast.” (Id. at 

2).

At approximately 10:08 p.m., Norristown Borough Police 

Officers responded to the intersection of Noble Street and West 

Oak Street and found the Victim unconscious in the roadway. (Id. 

at 1). At 10:28 p.m., doctors at Montgomery Hospital pronounced 

Dawkins dead. (Id.). Dr. Paul Hoyer, a forensic pathologist, 

performed an autopsy on Mr. Dawkins on March 19, 2011. Dr. 

Hoyer recovered a projectile from the body and opined that Mr. 

Dawkins died from a single gunshot wound to his neck area. (Id.).

Dr. Hoyer ruled the manner of death a homicide. (Id.).

* * *

Following years of diligent police work by the Norristown 

Borough Police Department and Montgomery County Detective 

Bureau, Massenburg was arrested on March 16, 2016, and 

Appellant on July 15, 2016, for the murder of D’Ravious Dawkins.

The court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress 

recorded conversations on March 6, 2017, and heard argument on 

numerous pretrial motions on April 3, 2017.

After granting Appellant’s request for a continuance, the court 

scheduled Appellant’s trial to begin on Monday, April 17, 2017. 

Following a four-day trial before the undersigned, a jury convicted 

Appellant’s co-conspirator Massenburg of second-degree murder 

and other offenses on Friday, April 14, 2017. On the day Appellant 

was to select a jury, Counsel informed the court that Appellant 
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wished to enter open pleas of guilty to the charges of third-degree 

murder and criminal conspiracy to commit third-degree murder.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/18, at 1-4 (footnotes omitted).

On April 17, 2017, Appellant pled guilty to the aforementioned crimes. 

On May 8 and 15, 2017, Appellant mailed the trial court two letters expressing 

his desire to withdraw his guilty plea, in which he alleged that he entered his 

plea under duress and that he did not receive enough time to contemplate his 

options. On June 7, 2017, the trial court held a hearing regarding Appellant’s 

desire to withdraw his guilty plea. Ultimately, on July 17, 2017, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea. On August 17, 2017, 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 171⁄2 to 35 years 

of incarceration.

Appellant did not file post-sentence motions. On September 5, 2017, 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Both the trial court and Appellant have 

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

On appeal, Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and brief pursuant 

to Anders and Santiago. There are particular mandates that counsel seeking 

to withdraw pursuant to Anders must follow. These mandates and the 

significant protection they provide to an Anders appellant arise because a 

criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a direct appeal and to counsel 

on that appeal. Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 

2007). We have summarized these requirements as follows:
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Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file 

a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the 

record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel 

must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might 

arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary 

for the effective appellate presentation thereof.

Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition 

and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to 

retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points 

worthy of this Court’s attention.

If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of 

Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and remand 

the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing counsel 

either to comply with Anders or file an advocate’s brief on 

Appellant’s behalf).

Id. (citations omitted).

Additionally, there are requirements as to precisely what an Anders 

brief must contain:

[T]he Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s 

petition to withdraw ... must: (1) provide a summary of the 

procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer 

to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports 

the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the 

appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have 

led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. When faced with a purported Anders brief, we 

may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first deciding 

whether counsel has properly requested permission to withdraw. 

Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). If counsel has met these obligations, “it then becomes the 
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responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal 

is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354 n.5.

Instantly, we conclude that Counsel has complied with the requirements 

outlined above. Counsel has filed a petition with this Court stating that after 

reviewing the record, he finds this appeal to be wholly frivolous. Petition to 

Withdraw as Counsel, 12/24/18, ¶ 10. In conformance with Santiago, 

Counsel’s brief includes summaries of the facts and procedural history of the 

case and discusses the only issue he believes might arguably support 

Appellant’s appeal. See Anders Brief at 5-18. Counsel’s brief sets forth his 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous and includes citation to relevant 

authority. See id. at 15-18. Finally, Counsel has filed with this Court the 

letter that he sent to Appellant, which enclosed Counsel’s petition and Anders 

brief and advised Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or with private 

counsel and to raise any additional issues that he deems worthy of this Court’s 

consideration. We therefore turn to the merits of Appellant’s case.

The single issue presented by Counsel in the Anders brief is whether 

the trial court erred when it denied his request to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Appellant asserts that in his letters to the trial court in which he requested the 

withdrawal of his guilty plea, he provided the court with an explanation of 

events indicative of his innocence and alleges that he was under duress when 
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he made the plea because he did not have sufficient time to consider his 

options and discuss them with Counsel.

Preliminarily, we recognize that at “any time before the imposition of 

sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of the 

defendant, or direct sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo 

contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty.” Pa.R.Crim.P 591(A). 

“The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests within 

the trial court’s discretion, and we will not disturb the court’s decision on such 

motion unless the court abused that discretion.” Commonwealth v. Gordy, 

73 A.3d 620, 624 (Pa. Super. 2013).

With respect to pre-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea, our 

Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 

2015), explained:

[T]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; trial 

courts have discretion in determining whether a withdrawal 

request will be granted; such discretion is to be administered 

liberally in favor of the accused; and any demonstration by a 

defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, 

unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the 

Commonwealth. The perfunctory fashion in which these principles 

were applied . . . lent the impression that this Court had required 

acceptance of a bare assertion of innocence as a fair-and-just 

reason.

* * *

[T]he proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal 

motion is whether the accused has made some colorable 

demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting 

withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice. The 

policy of liberality remains extant but has its limits, consistent with 
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the affordance of a degree of discretion to the common pleas 

courts.

Id. at 1291-92.

Here, the trial court detailed its decision to deny Appellant’s presentence request to withdraw his guilty plea as follows:

Instantly, as fairly described by his counsel, Appellant provided 

an “outline of the facts” (N.T. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 

6/7/17 at 5) by stating “maybe I was there to pick someone up 

and they was taking to[o] long so the passenger went to tell the 

person to hurry up an[d] on the[ir] way to the door they cross 

paths with Dawkins an[d] decided to freelance a[d] [sic] rob him.”

(Commonwealth Exhibit A, at 1). Appellant had the opportunity 

to expand on this outline of the facts with testimony at the hearing 

on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but [chose] not to do 

so. He offered no supporting evidence. Even in his May 2017 

letters to the court suggesting a claim of innocence, Appellant 

admitted at a minimum that he was driving that night and present 

at the scene of the murder.

In contrast, the Commonwealth offered evidence from several 

sources, including Appellant’s own words, in support of Appellant’s 

guilt. In short, Appellant’s claim is belied by the record, both that 

presented at the hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty plea as 

well as the factual basis adopted by Appellant at his guilty plea 

hearing on April 17, 2017, the day he was to begin trial on charges 

including first- and second-degree murder. While Appellant did 

not have to prove his innocence at the hearing on his motion to 

withdraw the guilty plea as Appellant’s counsel pointed out and 

this court acknowledges, his claim of innocence is simply not 

plausible.

It is also apparent from Appellant’s May 2017 letters that the 

reason behind the request to withdraw was Appellant’s fear of the 

possible sentence that the court could impose and his inability to 

challenge that sentence after pleading guilty. However, his 

counsel made it clear on the record at Appellant’s plea colloquy 

that Appellant understood the possible sentences he could receive 

as a result of entering the guilty plea. . . . These do not constitute 

valid reasons for allowing withdrawal of a knowing, intelligent and 

voluntarily entered plea.
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The court also questioned Appellant during his guilty plea 

colloquy about the time Appellant had to consider his options, that 

he had the opportunity to discuss his decision with friends and 

family and enough time to ask questions of and discuss the 

decision with his Counsel. Appellant replied that he had indeed 

discussed his option with others and had enough time to ask 

questions of Counsel. Thus, Appellant’s sworn testimony during 

his April 2017 guilty plea colloquy contradicts the words in his May 

2017 letters.

Lastly, this court considered the prejudice to the prosecution 

should Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea be granted 

and determined that it would be substantial. As explained by ADA

Heron, the majority of the Commonwealth witnesses were 

cooperating witnesses whose cases had been left open while 

awaiting the trials of Appellant and co-conspirator Massenburg. 

Once Appellant had entered his plea, those witnesses went before 

Judge Carpenter for sentencing. After Judge Carpenter heard 

about their cooperation in the Massenburg trial, including their 

testimony, and the fact that Appellant had entered a guilty plea, 

he sentenced two of the main cooperating witnesses to time 

served. Assuming that these witnesses would even be willing to 

testify now, which is doubtful, the Commonwealth argued that 

their credibility would be diminished from the level that it was 

before their sentencing. In other words, if the request to withdraw 

were granted, the Commonwealth would not be in the same 

position pre-trial that it would have been had Appellant proceeded 

with trial on April 17, 2017, instead of entering a guilty plea.

The Commonwealth also argued that convincing the witnesses 

to come back into court and testify, those cooperating as well as 

the resident witnesses who live in Norristown, would be more 

difficult because of the intimidation factor. Appellant’s argument 

that he was unaware of and disavowed the intimidation of 

witnesses that occurred during his co-conspirator’s trial misses 

the mark. This court has documented cases of witness 

intimidation, including the case presided over by the undersigned

in Appellant’s conviction by a jury in April of 2015. See

Commonwealth v. Ryan Stanford Lee, Montgomery County 

Docket No. CR-7659-2014, aff’d Commonwealth v. Lee No. 

3803 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super. Filed July 3, 2018) (unpublished 

memorandum). In that case, Appellant was convicted of shooting 

at an individual who testified before a Grand Jury. The inability to 
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secure witness testimony because of this intimidation is 

substantially prejudicial to the Commonwealth.

Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, a review 

of the entire record as well as the applicable law, including all of 

the factors this court is required to consider, the court determined 

that Appellant had failed to offer a “fair and just” reason to justify 

granting the request to withdraw his guilty plea. Further, the 

court determined that substantial prejudice would inure to the 

Commonwealth should Appellant’s request to withdraw his plea be 

granted. Therefore, this court has properly exercised its 

discretion, and [this] issue merits no relief.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/18, at 20-23.

Based on our review of the certified record, including the transcripts of 

Appellant’s guilty plea colloquy and the hearing on Appellant’s request to 

withdraw his plea, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Appellant’s request to withdraw his plea. Appellant asserts two 

arguments in support of his claim that the trial court erred in precluding him 

from withdrawing his plea: (1) that he offered a plausible explanation of his 

innocence, and (2) that he was under duress when he pled guilty because of 

having insufficient time to weight his options. There is, however, no record 

support for either argument.

Appellant offered no evidence at the hearing on his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea to support his claim of innocence, and instead relied solely on 

the letters he had mailed to the trial court. With regard to Appellant’s claim 

that he made his guilty plea under duress, the transcript of his guilty plea 

colloquy reveals that Appellant answered in the affirmative when the trial court 

asked him if he had ample time and opportunity to discuss his decision to 
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plead with family, friends, and Counsel. N.T., 4/17/17, at 20-21. As the trial 

court accurately recognized, “[a] defendant is bound by the statements made 

during the plea colloquy, and a defendant may not later offer reasons for 

withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Moreover, it is apparent from our reading of Appellant’s letters to the 

trial court that Appellant sought the withdrawal of his guilty plea, in part, 

because of his concern with the potential length of his sentence. See Pro Se

Correspondence, 5/18/17. This Court has repeatedly stated that the “desire 

to avoid a more lengthy prison term is not grounds for withdrawing [a] plea.” 

Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 41 (Pa. 2017).

Based on these considerations, along with the issues outlined by the 

trial court regarding the Commonwealth’s witnesses, we conclude that 

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that permitting withdrawal of his plea 

would promote fairness and justice or that it would not substantially prejudice 

the Commonwealth. See Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1291-92.

Finally, after conducting our own independent review of the record, we 

have determined that there are no issues of merit and agree with Counsel’s 

assessment that Appellant’s direct appeal is frivolous. We thus find this appeal 

to be wholly frivolous and permit Counsel to withdraw.

Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/6/19