Exhibit 4 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 1

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

Howard D. Maycon, Esq., SBN 183766 

COZEN O'CONNOR 

601 S. Figueroa Street 

Suite 3700 

Los Angeles, CA 9001 7 

Telephone: 213.892.7900 

hmaycon@cozen.com 

Shawn Caine, Esq., SBN 134987 

THE LAW OFFICES OF SHAWN E. CAINE 

1221 Camino Del Mar 

Del Mar, CA 92014 

Tel: (619) 838-1365 

scaine@cainelaw.com 

Mark Grotefeld, Esq. 

GROTEFELD, HOFFMANN, SCHLEITER, 

GORDON, OCHOA & EVINGER LLP 

Shepard Mountain Plaza 

6034 West Courtyard Drive, Suite 200 

Austin, TX 78730 

Tel: (737) 226-5310 

mgrotefeld@ghlaw-llp.com 

Craig S. Simon, Esq., SBN 78158 

BERGER KAHN, A LAW CORPORATION 

2 Park Plaza, Suite 650 

Irvine, CA 92614 

Phone: 474-1880 

Maura Walsh Ochoa, Esq., SBN 193799 

GROTEFELD, HOFFMANN, SCHLEITER, 

GORDON, OCHOA & EVINGER LLP 

700 Larkspur Landing Circle, Suite 280 

Larkspur, California 94939 

Tel: (415) 344-9670 

mochoa@ghlaw-llp.com 

Co-Lead Counsel for Subrogation Plaintiffs 

ELECTRONICALLY 

FILED 

Superior Court of California, 

County of San Francisco 

03/12/2018 

Clerk of the Court 

BY:JUDITH NUNEZ 

Deputy Clerk 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 

23 oordination Proceeding Special Title Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding 

No. 4955 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Rule 3.550) 

ALIFORNIA NORTH BAY FIRE 

ASES 

MASTER COMPLAINT - SUBROGATION 

PLAINTIFFS 

Judge: Honorable Curtis E.A. Karnow 

Department: 304 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

MASTER COMPLAINT- SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 2

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 I. 

4 II. 

5 III. 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 IV. 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................... 4 

THE PARTIES .................................................................................................................... 4 

A. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS ............................................................................. 4 

B. DEFENDANTS ...................................................................................................... 5 

C. DOE DEFENDANTS ............................................................................................. 8 

D. AGENCY & CONCERT OF ACTION .................................................................. 8 

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 9 

A. PG&E IS REQUIRED TO SAFELY DESIGN, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN 

ITS ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS .............................................................................. 9 

B. PG&E'S HISTORY OF SAFETY FAILURES .................................................... 11 

1. PG&E'S Long History of Safety Violations ............................................. 11 

2. The 1981 San Francisco Gas Explosion ................................................... 11 

3. The 1991 Santa Rosa Gas Explosion ........................................................ 11 

4. The 1994 Trauner Fire .............................................................................. 12 

5. The 1996 Mission Substation Electrical Fire ............................................ 12 

6. The 1999 Pendola Fire .............................................................................. 13 

7. The 2003 Mission District Substation Fire ............................................... 13 

8. The 2004 Sims Fire ................................................................................... 14 

9. The 2004 Freds Fire .................................................................................. 14 

10. The 2004 Power Fire ................................................................................. 14 

11. The 2005 San Francisco Electrical Explosion .......................................... 14 

12. The 2008 Rancho Cordova Explosion ...................................................... 14 

13. The 2008 Whiskey Fire ............................................................................. 15 

14. The 2009 San Francisco Electrical Explosion .......................................... 15 

MASTER COMPLAINT- SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 3

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

C. 

D. 

F. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

The 2010 San Bruno Explosion ................................................................ 15 

The 2011 Cupertino Explosion ................................................................. 16 

The 2014 Cann el Explosion ..................................................................... 17 

The 2015 San Francisco Transformer Explosion ...................................... 17 

The 2015 Butte Fire .................................................................................. 17 

PG&E's Conduct After the Butte Fires Reflect Its Conscious Disregard for 

Public Safety . ............................................................................................ 18 

THE NORTH BAY FIRES BROUGHT DEATH AND DESTRUCTION TO 

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA ................................................................................ 19 

THE IMPACT OF THE NORTH BAY FIRES ON THE WINE INDUSTRY. ... 22 

THE DEADLY AND DESTRUCTIVE NORTH BAY FIRES ........................... 26 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

The Atlas Fire ........................................................................................... 26 

The Cascade/LaPorte Fires ....................................................................... 27 

The Cherokee Fire ..................................................................................... 28 

The Honey Fire ......................................................................................... 29 

The Lobo Fire ........................................................................................... 29 

The Maacama or No Name Fire ................................................................ 30 

The McCourtney Fire ................................................................................ 30 

The Nuns Fire ........................................................................................... 30 

The Pocket Fire ......................................................................................... 33 

The Point Fire ........................................................................................... 33 

The Redwood Valley Fire ......................................................................... 34 

The Sullivan Fire .................................................................. 35 

The Sulphur Fire ....................................................................................... 35 

The Tubbs Fire .......................................................................................... 37 

The 37 Fire ................................................................................................ 37 

PG&E'S ACTS AND OMISSIONS CAUSED AND CONTRIBUTED TO 

CAUSING THE NORTH BAY FIRES ................................................................ 38 I+-----------------------------------

MASTER COMPLAINT- SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

ii 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 4

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 V. 

1. The 2013 Liberty Report Found that PG&E's Distribution System 

Presented "Significant Safety Issues" ....................................................... 38 

2. The 2013 Liberty Report Found that PG&E's Wires Were Highly 

Susceptible to Failure Due to Age ............................................................ 38 

3. PG&E Failed to Inspect, Maintain, Repair, and/or Replace Its Equipment 

................................................................................................................... 39 

4. PG&E Failed to Ensure Its Infrastructure Could Withstand Foreseeable 

Weather Conditions as Required by Law ................................................. 41 

5. PG&E's Unsafe Use ofReclosers ............................................................. 43 

6. PG&E's Reckless Adoption of the VMII Program Where It Paid Its 

Contractors to Cut Fewer Trees ................................................................ 44 

7. PG&E Failed to Fully Employ LiDAR to Identify Hazard Trees ............ 45 

8. PG&E Failed to Treat the Conditions of Its Aging Electrical Assets as an 

Enterprise-Level Risk ............................................................................... 47 

9. PG&E's "Run to Failure" Approach to Maintenance ............................... 48 

10. PG&E's Purchase of Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages ............ 49 

G. PG&E'S CORPORATE CULTURE IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE NORTH 

BAY FIRES .......................................................................................................... 50 

CAUSES OF ACTION ..................................................................................................... 52 

20 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE ........................................................................... 52 

21 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - WRONGFUL DEATH .......................................................... 55 

22 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - SURVIVAL ACTION .............................................................. 56 

23 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - INVERSE CONDEMNATION ............................................ 56 

24 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION - PUBLIC NUISANCE ................................................................ 58 

25 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION - PRIVATE NUISANCE ............................................................. 61 

26 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION - PREMISES LIABILITY ..................................................... 62 

27 EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION - TRESPASS ............................................................................. 62 

28 I+-----------------------------------

MASTER COMPLAINT- SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

iii 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 5

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION - PRIVATE ACTION UNDER PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE § 

2 2106 ................................................................................................................................... 63 

3 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION - VIOLATION OF HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 13007 ....... 65 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

VI. 

VII. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................... 66 

JURY DEMAND .............................................................................................................. 68 

MASTER COMPLAINT- SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

iv 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 6

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS bring this action for damages against Defendants 

2 PG&E CORPORATION, PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, and DOES 1 

3 through 100 (collectively, "DEFENDANTS") as follows: 

4 I. 

5 

INTRODUCTION1 

1. This case arises from PG&E CORPORATION and/or PACIFIC GAS & 

6 ELECTRIC COMPANY's (collectively, "PG&E") longstanding corporate culture of decision7 making that places profits over public safety. PG&E's well-documented disregard for safety 

8 regulations and risk management practices, along with their blind eye towards the use of 

9 effective maintenance and inspection practices for their facilities and equipment, lies at the root 

10 of the various factors which caused and/or contributed to causing the most destructive and deadly 

11 wildfires California has ever seen ( collectively, the "North Bay Fires"). 

12 2. On or around the night of Sunday, October 8, 2017, the North Bay Fires started 

13 when a system disturbance on the electrical grid constructed, owned, operated, managed, and/or 

14 maintained by PG&E caused transformers designed, constructed, owned, operated, managed, 

15 and/or maintained by PG&E to fail, fault, spark, and/or explode, causing energized power lines 

16 constructed, owned, operated, managed, and/or maintained by PG&E to bum and/or fall down. 

17 These downed lines sparked nearby vegetation, igniting fires simultaneously across multiple 

18 counties. Other fires caused electrical currents to flow through down guys owned, designed, 

19 operated, managed and/or maintained by PG&E, creating arcing at ground level in dry grass. 

20 The arcing from down guys at or around ground level sparked fires in and around vegetation. 

21 All of these events, and others, including but not limited to conductors, poles, insulators, 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 The Master Complaint filed on behalf oflndividual Plaintiffs contained 283 numbered 

paragraphs with 11 Causes of Action. Many of the Individual Plaintiffs are insured with one or more of 

the Subrogation Plaintiffs, and therefore Subrogation Plaintiffs "stand in the shoes" of their insureds 

under the law of subrogation. To make it easier on the Court, Subrogation Plaintiffs have mirrored the 

Master Complaint of the Individual Plaintiffs where possible. The Individual Plaintiffs' Master 

Complaint Second Cause of Action-Wrongful Death, Third Cause of Action-Survival Action, Seventh 

Cause of Action-Premises Liability, and Eleventh Cause of Action-Negligent Infliction of Emotional 

Distress have been omitted from this Master Complaint as not applying to the Subrogation Plaintiffs. 

Again, to make it more convenient for the Court, the Causes of Action alleged herein match by number 

the Causes of Action alleged by the Individual Plaintiffs. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

I 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 7

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 reclosers, and/or other electrical equipment constructed, owned, operated, managed, and/or 

2 maintained by PG&E that fell down, broke, failed, sparked, exploded, and/or came into contact 

3 with vegetation, caused and contributed to causing the North Bay Fires. Although the numerous 

4 fires constituting the North Bay Fires have different points or origin, they all share the same 

5 underlying causes and arose from PG&E's disregard of mandated safety practices and 

6 foreseeable hazardous risks associated with its infrastructure. 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

PG&E Equipment on October 9, 2017, in Fountaingrove, a Neighborhood Decimated by the Tubbs Fire 

3. Over the following days, the North Bay Fires spread rapidly and caused extensive 

22 damage throughout Northern California, including populated neighborhoods and sprawling 

23 vineyards. The North Bay Fires claimed the lives of at least 44 individuals, injured many others, 

24 burned over 245,000 acres, and destroyed over 14,700 homes. The following fires in Sonoma, 

25 Napa, Mendocino, Solano, Lake, Butte, Calaveras, Nevada, and Yuba Counties are collectively 

26 referred to as the North Bay Fires, including: the Adobe, Atlas, Cascade, Cherokee, Honey, 

27 

28 

2 http://www.mercurynews.com/2017 / 10/25/pge-missed-electricity-inspections-violated-safetyrules-in-bay-area-including-north-bay-audits/ (last accessed February 2, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

2 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 8

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 LaPorte, Lobo, Maacama, McCourtney, Norrbom, Nuns, Oakmont, Partrick, Pocket, Point, 

2 Pressley, Redwood Valley, Potter, Sulphur, Tubbs, Sullivan, and the 37 Fire. 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 4. 

Mccourtney 

Map of the North Bay Fires3 

As set forth in more detail in the following pages, based on multiple reports, 

19 audits, investigations, and/or interviews, it is clear that the North Bay Fires were an inevitable 

20 byproduct of PG&E's disregard of public safety. PG&E, although mandated to do so, failed to 

21 identify, inspect, manage, and/or control vegetation growth near its power lines and/or other 

22 electrical equipment. This created a foreseeable danger of trees and/or other vegetation coming 

23 into contact with PG&E's power lines and/or other electrical equipment and causing electrical 

24 problems. Further, PG&E failed to construct, manage, track, monitor, maintain, operate, 

25 replace, repair, and/or improve its power lines, poles, transformers, conductors, insulators, 

26 

27 3 Derived from Cal Fire map at http://www.fire.ca.gov/general/firemaps (last accessed February 

28 

12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

3 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 9

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 reclosers, and/or other electrical equipment m a safe manner, despite being aware that its 

2 infrastructure was aging, unsafe, likely to cause fires, and/or vulnerable to environmental 

3 conditions. 

4 5. PG&E knew about the significant risk of wildfires and other disasters from its 

5 ineffective vegetation management programs, unsafe equipment, and/or aging infrastructure for 

6 decades before the North Bay Fires began and, as described below, has been repeatedly fined 

7 and/or convicted of crimes for causing wildfires, explosions, and other disasters by failing to 

8 mitigate these risks. 

9 6. Wildfires, explosions, and other devastating events have resulted from PG&E's 

10 long history of choosing to divert funds from its public safety, vegetation management, and/or 

11 infrastructure maintenance programs to instead line its own corporate pockets. 

12 II. 

13 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

7. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

14 §§ 395(a) and 410.10 because Defendants, and/or each of them, reside in, are incorporated in, 

15 and/or do significant business in the County of San Francisco, State of California. The amount 

16 in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of this Court. 

17 8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 404.3 and 

18 California Rules of Court, Rule 3.540. The Honorable Curtis E.A. Karnow of the Superior Court 

19 of California, County of San Francisco was assigned as the Coordination Trial Judge for this 

20 action. 

21 III. THE PARTIES 

22 

23 

A. 

9. 

SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS 

SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS4 in this case were and are insurers authorized 

24 to carry on the business of insurance within the State of California as an insurance company. 

25 The insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS owned property that suffered damages by 

26 

27 

28 

4 The plural term "Subrogation Plaintiff�" is used for ease of reference. One insurance company 

could file an adoption form incorporating the terms of this Master Complaint, and the plural term applies 

equally to the single insurer. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

4 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 10

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 the North Bay Fires, including but not limited to the Adobe, Atlas, Cascade, Cherokee, Honey, 

2 LaPorte, Lobo, Maacama, McCourtney, Norrbom, Nuns, Oakmont, Partrick, Pocket, Point, 

3 Pressley, Redwood Valley, Potter, Sulphur, Tubbs, Sullivan, and/or 37 Fire. As a result of the 

4 North Bay Fires, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have paid and/or will pay money to their 

5 respective insured(s) under their policies of insurance for losses caused by the North Bay Fires. 

6 Such payments include, but are not limited to repair of real and personal property, replacement 

7 of real and personal property, additional living expenses, loss of use and business interruption. 

8 The money was paid to their insured(s) pursuant to various homeowners, automobile, 

9 business/commercial and property insurance policies. This action seeks recovery of amounts 

10 paid, and to be paid, by SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS to their insured(s). SUBROGATION 

11 PLAINTIFFS who are obligated to make payments or have made payments to their insured(s) 

12 are equitably subrogated to the rights of their insured(s), "stand in their shoes," and are entitled 

13 to bring this claim for payments made or to be made. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS 

14 investigated, adjusted and paid, and may in the future pay, said damage, injury and loss, 

15 consistent with its policies of insurance and its obligations under law, and said payments were 

16 not voluntary. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' damages are in a liquidated sum; the amount 

17 paid to their insureds. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' insureds have an existing, assignable 

18 cause of action against DEFENDANTS, which the insureds could have asserted for their own 

19 benefit had they not been compensated for their losses by SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS. As 

20 such, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have suffered damages caused by an act or omission of 

21 DEFENDANTS, and SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have equitable and/or legal subrogation 

22 rights against DEFENDANTS herein, to the extent of payments made. Justice requires that the 

23 loss be entirely shifted from SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS to DEFENDANTS, whose 

24 equitable position is inferior to that of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS. 

25 

26 

B. 

10. 

DEFENDANTS 

At all times herein mentioned Defendants PG&E CORPORATION and 

27 PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY were corporations authorized to do business and 

28 doing business in the State of California with their principal place of business in the County of 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

5 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 11

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 San Francisco, State of California. Defendant PG&E CORPORATION is an energy-based 

2 holding company headquartered in San Francisco. It is the parent company of Defendant 

3 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY. PG&E CORPORATION and PACIFIC 

4 GAS AND ELECTRIC COMP ANY provide public utility services, including the generation of 

5 electricity and the transmission and distribution of electricity and natural gas to millions of 

6 customers in Northern and Central California, including the residents of Butte, Calaveras, Lake, 

7 Mendocino, Napa, Nevada, Solano, Sonoma, and Yuba Counties. 

8 1 1. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS allege that PG&E CORPORATION and 

9 PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY are jointly and severally liable for each other's 

10 wrongful acts and/or omissions as hereafter alleged, in that: 

11 a. PG&E CORPORATION and PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY 

12 operate as a single business enterprise operating out of the same building 

13 located at 77 Beale St, San Francisco, California for the purpose of 

14 effectuating and carrying out PG&E CORPORATION's business and 

15 operations and/or for the benefit of PG&E CORPORATION; 

16 b. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION 

17 do not operate as completely separate entities, but rather, integrate their 

18 resources to achieve a common business purpose; 

19 c. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMP ANY is so organized and controlled, 

20 and its decisions, affairs and business so conducted as to make it an 

21 instrumentality, agent, conduit and/or adjunct of PG&E CORPORATION; 

22 d. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's income contribution results 

23 from its function, integration, centralization of management and economies of 

24 scale with PG&E CORPORATION; 

25 

26 

27 

28 

e. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's and PG&E 

CORPORATION's officers and management are intertwined and do not act 

completely independent of one another; 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

6 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 12

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

f. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's and PG&E 

CORPORATION's officers and managers act in the interest of PG&E 

CORPORATION as a single enterprise; 

g. PG&E CORPORATION has control and authority to choose and appoint 

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's board members as well as its 

other top officers and managers; 

h. Despite both being Electric Companies and Public Utilities, PACIFIC GAS 

& ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION do not compete 

with one another, but have been structured, organized, and businesses 

effectuated so as to create a synergistic, integrated single enterprise where 

various components operate in concert one with another; 

1. PG&E CORPORATION maintains unified administrative control over 

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY; 

J. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION 

are insured by the same carriers and provide uniform or similar pension, 

health, life and disability insurance plans for employees; 

k. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION 

have unified 401(k) Plans, pensions and investment plans, bonus programs, 

vacation policies and paid time off from work schedules and policies; 

1. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION 

invest these funds from their programs and plans by a consolidated and/or 

coordinated Benefits Committee controlled by PG&E CORPORATION and 

administered by common trustees and administrators; 

m. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION 

have unified personnel policies and practices and/or a consolidated personnel 

organization or structure; 

n. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION 

have unified accounting policies and practices dictated by PG&E 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

7 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 13

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

C. 

12. 

CORPORATION and/or common or integrated accounting organizations or 

personnel; 

o. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION 

are represented by common legal counsel; 

p. PG&E CORPORATION's officers, directors, and other management make 

policies and decisions to be effectuated by PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC 

COMPANY and/or otherwise play roles in providing directions and making 

decisions for PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY; 

q. PG&E CORPORATION's officers, directors, and other management direct 

certain financial decisions for PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY 

including the amount and nature of capital outlays; 

r. PG&E CORPORATION's written guidelines, policies, and procedures 

control PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, its employees, policies, 

and practices; 

s. PG&E CORPORATION files consolidated earnings statements factoring all 

revenue and losses from PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY as well 

as consolidated tax returns, including those seeking tax relief; and/or, without 

limitation; and 

t. PG&E CORPORATION generally directs and controls PACIFIC GAS & 

ELECTRIC COMPANY's relationship with, requests to, and responses to 

inquiries from, the Public Utilities Commission and uses such direction and 

control for the benefit of PG&E CORPORATION. 

DOE DEFENDANTS 

The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or 

25 otherwise of the Defendants DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, are unknown to SUBROGATION 

26 PLAINTIFFS who therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to Code of 

27 Civil Procedure § 474. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS further allege that each of said 

28 fictitious Defendants is in some manner responsible for the acts and occurrences hereinafter set 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

8 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 14

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 forth. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS will amend this Master Complaint to show their true 

2 names and capacities when the same are ascertained, as well as the manner in which each 

3 fictitious Defendant is responsible. 

4 

5 

D. 

13. 

AGENCY & CONCERT OF ACTION 

At all times herein mentioned herein, DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, 

6 hereinabove, were the agents, servants, employees, partners, aiders and abettors, co-conspirators, 

7 and/or joint venturers of each of the other DEFENDANTS named herein and were at all times 

8 operating and acting within the purpose and scope of said agency, service, employment, 

9 partnership, enterprise, conspiracy, and/or joint venture, and each DEFENDANT has ratified 

10 and approved the acts of each of the remaining DEFENDANTS. Each of the DEFENDANTS 

11 aided 

12 and abetted, encouraged, and rendered substantial assistance to the other DEFENDANTS in 

13 breaching their obligations to SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and the insured(s) of 

14 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS as alleged herein. In taking action to aid and abet and 

15 substantially assist the commission of these wrongful acts and other wrongdoings complained of, 

16 as alleged herein, each of the DEFENDANTS acted with an awareness of his/her/its primary 

17 wrongdoing and realized that his/her/its conduct would substantially assist the accomplishment 

18 of the wrongful conduct, wrongful goals, and wrongdoing. 

19 IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

A. PG&E IS REQUIRED TO SAFELY DESIGN, OPERATE, AND 

MAINTAIN ITS ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 

20 

21 

22 14. PG&E owns, installs, constructs, operates, and maintains overhead power lines, 

23 together with supporting poles and appurtenances throughout Northern and Central California for 

24 the purpose of transmitting and distributing electricity to the general public. These lines and 

25 equipment were located at and around the origin points for the North Bay Fires. 

26 15. Electrical infrastructure is inherently dangerous and hazardous, and PG&E 

27 recognizes it as such. The transmission and distribution of electricity requires PG&E to exercise 

28 an increased level of care in line with the increased risk of associated danger. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

9 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 15

of 74
confidential

confidential

16. At all times PG&E had and continues to have a duty to properly construct, 

2 inspect, repair, maintain, manage, and/or operate its power lines and/or other electrical 

3 equipment. PG&E also has a duty to keep vegetation properly trimmed and maintained to 

4 prevent foreseeable contact with its electrical equipment. 

5 17. In the construction, inspection, repair, maintenance, management, ownership, 

6 and/or operation of its power lines and other electrical equipment, PG&E had an obligation to 

7 comply with, inter alia: (a) Code of Civil Procedure§ 733; (b) Public Resource Code§§ 4292, 

8 4293, and 4435; ( c) Public Utilities Code § 451; and ( d) General Order Nos. 95 and 165. 

9 18. California's drought years increased the risk of wildfire and consequently 

10 heightened PG&E's duty of care in the prevention of wildfires. In January 20 1 4, Governor 

11 Edmund Gerald Brown, Jr. declared a state of emergency due to California's continued drought. 

12 In June 2014, pursuant to Resolution ESRB-4, the California Public Utilities Commission 

13 ("CPUC") directed PG&E and all investor-owned utilities to take remedial measures to reduce 

14 the likelihood of fires started by or threatening utility facilities. 5 In addition, the CPUC informed 

15 PG&E it could seek recovery of incremental costs associated with these remedial measures 

16 outside of the standard funding process, agreeing to provide additional funding on top of 

17 vegetation management funding already authorized to ensure remedial measures would not go 

18 unperformed due to lack of funding. 

19 19. In early 2017, the CPUC issued a Fact Sheet on "PG&E Vegetation Management 

20 Spending," directing PG&E to take increased efforts to reduce fire risk due to the drought 

21 emergency: "Although the Governor issued an Executive Order in April 2017 ending the 

22 Drought State of Emergency, the declaration directed state agencies 'to continue response 

23 activities that may be needed to manage the lingering drought impacts to people and wildlife.' 

24 The California Tree Mortality State of Emergency issued in October 2015 by Governor Brown 

25 regarding the bark beetle infestation and resulting tree mortality remains in effect. The CPUC 

26 

27 

28 

5 http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/GOOO/M096/K415/96415169 .pdf (last 

accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

10 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 16

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 has not rescinded ESRB-4, and work by the utilities to comply with it and the Tree Mortality 

2 Emergency continues."6 

3 20. PG&E knew or should have known that these statutory and regulatory standards 

4 are minimum standards. PG&E knew or should have known that it has: (a) a duty to identify 

5 vegetation that is dead, diseased, and/or dying, or that otherwise poses a foreseeable hazard to 

6 power lines and/or other electrical equipment; and (b) a duty manage the growth of vegetation 

7 near its power lines and equipment so as to prevent the foreseeable danger of contact between 

8 vegetation and power lines starting a fire. 

9 21. Further, PG&E has a duty to manage, maintain, repair, and/or replace its aging 

10 infrastructure to protect public safety. These objectives could and should have been 

11 accomplished in a number of ways, including, but not limited to, putting electrical equipment in 

12 wildfire-prone areas underground, increasing inspections, developing and implementing 

13 protocols to shut down electrical operations in emergency situations, modernizing infrastructure, 

14 and/or obtaining an independent audit of its risk management programs to ensure effectiveness. 

15 22. PG&E knew or should have known that failure to comply and conform to 

16 applicable standards and duties constituted negligence and would expose members of the general 

17 public to a risk of death, injury, and/or damage to their property. 

18 

19 

20 

B. 

23. 

PG&E'S HISTORY OF SAFETY FAILURES 

1. PG&E'S Long History of Safety Violations 

Over the past thirty-plus years, PG&E has been subject to numerous fines, 

21 penalties, and/or convictions as a result of its failure to abide by safety rules and regulations, 

22 including the following fines, penalties, and/or convictions. Despite these recurring 

23 punishments, PG&E refuses to modify its behavior, and has continued to conduct its business 

24 with a conscious disregard for the safety of the public, including the insured(s) of 

25 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS. 

26 

27 

28 

6 http://cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC _Public_ Website/Content/Safety/PGE%20Vegetation 

%20Management%20Spending.pdf (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

II 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 17

of 74
confidential

confidential

24. As detailed below, the North Bay Fires are among the many tragedies that have 

2 resulted from PG&E's enduring failure to protect the public from the dangers associated with its 

3 operations. PG&E power lines, transformers, conductors, poles, insulators, and/or other 

4 electrical equipment have repeatedly started wildfires due to PG&E's ongoing failure to create, 

5 manage, implement, and/or maintain effective vegetation management programs for the areas 

6 near and around its electrical equipment. Further, PG&E's deteriorating and carelessly 

7 maintained infrastructure has caused multiple disasters throughout California. 

8 2. The 1981 San Francisco Gas Explosion 

9 25. A PG&E gas main in downtown San Francisco exploded in 1981, forcing 30,000 

10 people to evacuate. It took workers nine hours to shut off the gas main's manual shut-off valves 

11 and stop the flow of gas that continued to feed the flames in the interim. 

12 

13 26. 

3. The 1991 Santa Rosa Gas Explosion 

Two people were killed and three others were injured when a PG&E gas line 

14 exploded in Santa Rosa in December 1 991. The pipeline was improperly marked, failing to give 

15 proper notice to contractors working in the area. A contractor hit the pipe with a backhoe, 

16 causing the pipe to leak and explode several months later. 

17 4. The 1994 Trauner Fire 

18 27. In 1994, PG&E's failure to maintain the vegetation surrounding its electrical 

19 equipment caused a devastating wildfire in Nevada County, California. This Fire, commonly 

20 known as the "Trauner Fire" or the "Rough and Ready Fire," burned approximately 500 acres in 

21 and around the town of Rough and Ready, destroyed 12 homes, and burned 22 structures, 

22 including a historic schoolhouse that was built in 1868. 

23 28. Investigators determined that the Trauner Fire began when a 21,000-volt power 

24 line brushed against a tree limb that PG&E was supposed to keep trimmed. Through random 

25 spot inspections, the investigators found several hundred safety violations in the area near the 

26 Trauner Fire. Approximately 200 of these violations involved contact between vegetation and 

27 one of PG&E's power lines. As a result, on or around June 19, 1997, PG&E was convicted of 

28 739 counts of criminal negligence and required to pay $24 million in penalties. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

12 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 18

of 74
confidential

confidential

29. After the trial, a 1998 CPUC report revealed that PG&E diverted $77 .6 million 

2 from its tree-trimming budget to other uses from 1987 to 1994. During that same time, PG&E 

3 under spent its authorized budgets for maintaining its systems by $495 million and instead, used 

4 this money to boost corporate profits. Despite this public outing, PG&E continued its corporate 

5 culture of putting profits before safety. 

6 5. The 1996 Mission Substation Electrical Fire 

7 30. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on November 27, 1996, a cable splice at PG&E's 

8 Mission Substation in San Francisco short-circuited, burning and melting the insulation around 

9 the splice. Smoke from the fire rose through a floor opening above the splice into a switch 

1 o cabinet. That smoke was so thick that it caused a flashover between phases of the bus bars 

11 connecting the overhead N bus to the switch. This caused insulation on the N bus to ignite and a 

12 circuit breaker to open, resulting in the loss of power to a group of PG&E customers. The 

13 substation was unmanned at the time and the fire was only discovered by chance by an employee 

14 who had stopped by the substation to use the restroom. 

15 6. The 1999 Pendola Fire 

16 31. A rotten pine, which the federal government detennined PG&E should have 

17 removed, fell on a power line, starting the Pendola Fire in 1999. It burned for 11 days and 

18 scorched 11,725 acres, mainly in the Tahoe and Plumas National Forests. PG&E paid a $14.75 

19 million settlement to the U.S. Forest Service in 2009. That year, the utility also reached a $22.7 

20 million settlement with the CPUC after regulators found PG&E had not spent money earmarked 

21 for tree trimming and removal toward those purposes. 

22 7. The 2003 Mission District Substation Fire 

23 32. In December 2003, a fire broke out at PG&E's Mission District Substation in San 

24 Francisco. Despite signs of trouble appearing at control centers, the fire burned for nearly two 

25 hours before PG&E operators showed up at the Substation, found it full of smoke, and finally 

26 called the fire department. The source of the fire was not located until five hours after it began. 

27 As a result, nearly one-third of San Francisco's residents and business owners lost power, with 

28 some waiting over 24 hours for their power to be restored. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

13 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 19

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

33. The CPUC report of the investigation, which was released in 2004, illustrated 

PG&E's careless approach to safety and apparent inability to learn from its past mistakes. An 

excerpt from the report describes the following: 

Soon after undertaking the investigation of the 2003 fire, CPSD [CPUC's 

Consumer Protection and Safety Division] discovered that another fire had 

occurred at Mission Substation in 1 996. CPSD's investigation team conducted a 

thorough analysis of both fires and found strikingly similar contributing factors 

and root causes. CPSD's team further determined that PG&E had not 

implemented the recommendations resulting from its own investigation of the 

1996 fire .... CPSD finds it quite troubling that PG&E did not implement its 

own recommendations from its own investigation of the 1996 fire. 7 

The findings related to the Mission Substation Fire should have been a wake-up call to PG&E to 

revamp its operating procedures to prevent future disasters. Instead, PG&E's focus remained on 

corporate profits, while safety was relegated to the backburner. 

8. The 2004 Sims Fire 

34. In July 2004, the Sims Fire burned over 4,000 acres of forest land in the Six 

14 Rivers and Trinity National Forests. A federal lawsuit alleged that PG&E failed to remove a 

15 decaying tree, which fell on a transmission line and ignited the blaze. 

16 

17 35. 

9. The 2004 Freds Fire 

The Freds Fire started in October 2004 near Kyburz, El Dorado County, 

18 California. A lawsuit filed by the United States Government claimed that employees of PG&E's 

19 contractor lost control of a large tree they were cutting down. It fe11 onto a PG&E power line 

20 and caused a fire that burned over 7,500 acres. PG&E and its contractors paid $29.5 million to 

21 settle the lawsuits over the Freds Fire and the Sims Fire. 

22 

23 36. 

10. The 2004 Power Fire 

In October 2004, the Power Fire burned approximately 17,000 acres on the 

24 Eldorado National Forest and on private timberlands. A federal lawsuit alleged that the Power 

25 Fire was ignited by a lit cigarette that was dropped by a PG&E tree trimming contractor. PG&E 

26 and its contractor paid the federal government $45 million to settle the lawsuit. 

27 

28 2018). 

http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publishedDocs/published/Report/40886.PDF (last accessed February 12, 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

14 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 20

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 37. 

11. The 2005 San Francisco Electrical Explosion 

In August 2005, a PG&E electrical transformer exploded in the San Francisco 

3 financial district at Kearny and Post Streets, severely burning a woman who had been walking 

4 by. A lawsuit by the injured woman settled for an undisclosed sum. 

5 

6 38. 

12. The 2008 Rancho Cordova Explosion 

In December 2008, a gas leak from a PG&E pipe caused an explosion in Rancho 

7 Cordova, California. This explosion left one person dead, injured several others, and caused 

8 over $260,000 in property damage. 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

39. A National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") investigation revealed that the 

leak was caused by incorrect repairs performed by PG&E in 2006, at which time PG&E 

installed a piece of pipe to patch up an earlier leak. The investigative report for the incident 

concluded that the walls of the new pipe were too thin, allowing gas to leak from the pipe, and 

that PG&E failed to timely send properly trained personnel to check out the leak, even though 

PG&E had been told several months earlier that its emergency plans fell below required 

standards. Specifically, the report noted the following: 

40. 

Contributing to the accident was the 2-hour 4 7-minute delay in the arrival 

at the job site of a Pacific Gas and Electric Company crew that was 

properly trained and equipped to identify and classify outdoor leaks and to 

begin response activities to ensure the safety of the residents and public. 8 

In November 20 10, the CPUC filed administrative charges against PG&E m 

20 connection with the Rancho Cordova explosion, alleging that PG&E was at fault for the blast 

21 and that PG&E should have discovered the improper repair job that caused the explosion, but 

22 failed to timely do so. As a result, the CPUC required PG&E to pay a $38 million fine. 

23 

24 4 1. 

13. The 2008 Whiskey Fire 

The June 2008 Whiskey Fire burned more than 5,000 acres of land in the 

25 Mendocino National Forest. The fire started when a gray pine tree that did not have the required 

26 

27 

8 http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/Final_ decision/146914-03.htm (last accessed February 12, 

28 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

15 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 21

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 clearance from a PG&E transmission line came into contact with the line. PG&E and its 

2 contractors agreed to pay $5.5 million to settle a federal lawsuit. 

3 

4 42. 

14. The 2009 San Francisco Electrical Explosion 

In June 2009, a PG&E underground electrical vault exploded in San Francisco's 

5 Tenderloin neighborhood, sending 30-foot flames and smoke into the air for two hours. This 

6 explosion left thousands of people without power. 

7 

8 43. 

15. The 2010 San Bruno Explosion 

On September 9, 2010, PG&E's continued disregard of public safety caused the 

9 death of eight people, injured 58 people, and destroyed an entire neighborhood in San Bruno, 

10 California when one of its gas pipelines exploded and burst into flames. Subsequent to the 

11 explosion, the NTSB issued a report that blamed the disaster on PG&E's poor management of 

12 its pipeline. In January 2011, federal investigators reported that the probable cause of the 

13 accident was: (i) PG&E's inadequate quality assurance and quality control during its Line 132 

14 pipeline relocation project, which allowed the installation of a substandard and poorly-welded 

15 pipe section; and (ii) PG&E's inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which failed 

16 to detect and remove the defective pipe section. 

17 44. As a result, PG&E was required to pay substantial fines for its massive safety 

18 violations. In April 2015, the CPUC slapped PG&E with a $1.6 billion fine for causing the 

19 explosion and diverting maintenance funds into stockholder dividends and executive bonuses. 

20 Further, in January 2017, a federal judge convicted PG&E of six felony charges and ordered it to 

21 pay $3 million in fines for causing the explosion. 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

45. Due to PG&E's corporate culture which repeatedly ignored public safety, the 

CPUC launched an investigation into the manner by which PG&E officers, directors, and/or 

managing agents establish safety policies and practices to prevent catastrophic events. At the 

beginning of the investigation, the CPUC President called out PG&E's ongoing safety 

violations: 

Despite major public attention, ongoing CPUC investigations (Oils) and 

rulemakings (OIRs) into PG&E's actions and operations, including the 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

16 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 22

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

investigations we voted on today, federal grand jury, and California Department 

of Justice investigation, continued safety lapses at PG&E continue to occur. 9 

16. The 2011 Cupertino Explosion 

46. After the San Bruno explosion, in September 2011, PG&E caused a gas 

5 explosion that partially engulfed a condominium in Cupertino, California. The explosion was 

6 the result of cracked Aldyl-A plastic pipe. 

7 47. Prior to the explosion, the manufacture of Aldyl-A, the NTSB, and the federal 

8 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration had all issued warnings about this type 

9 of plastic pipe that was prone to premature brittleness, cracking, and failure dating back to at 

10 least 2002. Despite these warnings and PG&E's knowledge of this risk, PG&E did nothing to 

11 prevent the explosion. Although some utilities around the United States had been replacing 

12 Aldyl-A pipes, PG&E did not have a replacement program to phase them out and adequately 

13 protect the public. 

14 

15 48. 

1 7. The 2014 Carmel Explosion 

In March 2014, a home in Carmel, California was destroyed due to a gas 

16 explosion caused by PG&E. Prior to the explosion, PG&E was attempting to replace a gas 

17 distribution line, but PG&E's legally inadequate records did not show that the steel pipe had a 

18 plastic insert. When crews dug into the steel pipe to perform the replacement, the unknown 

19 plastic insert was pierced, allowing gas to leak through the pipe and into the residence. 

20 49. The CPUC once again required PG&E to pay a massive fine because of their 

21 wrongdoing. In August 2016, the CPUC imposed a $25.6 million fine on PG&E. With a $10.85 

22 million citation previously paid by PG&E in 2015 for the explosion, PG&E was require to pay a 

23 total of over $36 million in penalties for its shoddy recordkeeping and disregard of public safety. 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

18. The 2015 San Francisco Transformer Explosion 

9 http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC _Public_ Website/Content/ About_ Us/ 

Organization/Commissioners/Michael _J. _ Picker/PresidentPickerCommentsonPGESafetyCultureandEnfor 

cementTheory.pdf (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

17 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 23

of 74
confidential

confidential

50. In September 2015, a PG&E underground transformer exploded in San 

2 Francisco's Bernal Heights neighborhood. This explosion injured two people, one of them 

3 critically. 

4 

5 5 1. 

19. The 2015 Butte Fire 

Tragedy struck yet again in September 2015, when PG&E's inadequate and 

6 ineffective vegetation management programs resulted in the Butte Fire in the Sierra foothills. 

7 The Butte Fire burned for 22 days across Amador and Calaveras Counties, killed two people, 

8 destroyed 921 homes and/or structures, and charred over 70,000 acres. 

9 52. Similar to the other disasters caused by PG&E's wrongdoing, the Butte Fire 

10 could have been prevented by PG&E. The Butte Fire was ignited by a gray pine tree that grew 

11 and came into contact with one of PG&E's power lines. PG&E knew that gray pines posed the 

12 highest risk of catastrophic wildfires, but failed to identify and/or remove the dangerous tree 

13 pursuant to its vegetation management practices. Instead, PG&E removed the two trees 

14 surrounding the gray pine at issue, which exposed the gray pine to sunlight and allowed it to 

15 quickly come into contact with PG&E's power line. Indeed, in PG&E's prepared testimony to 

16 the CPUC's Safety Model Assessment Proceeding, dated May 1, 2015, the company expressly 

17 stated that it was accepting the risk posted by outages in the range of 17 per 1,000 miles, less 

18 than 0.02 percent of trees in contact with its lines, and a small number of wildfires caused by 

19 PG&E equipment each year. As such, PG&E consciously chose not to mitigate those risks 

20 further, thereby exposing Plaintiffs to the risk of wildfire. 

21 53. Subsequent to the Butte Fire, in April 2017, the CPUC fined PG&E a total of 

22 $8.3 million for "failing to maintain its 12kV overhead conductors safely and properly" and 

23 failing to maintain a minimum distance between its power lines and vegetation. Cal Fire also 

24 sent PG&E a bill for $90 million to cover state firefighting costs. Despite these consequences, 

25 PG&E did not change, revise, or improve any of its vegetation management practices after the 

26 Butte Fire, paving the way for another massive wildfire. 

27 Ill 

28 /// 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

18 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 24

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 / / / 

2 Ill 

3 

4 

5 54. 

20. PG&E's Conduct After the Butte Fires Reflect Its Conscious 

Disregard for Public Safety. 

The Butte Fire was not an isolated incident, as shown by PG&E's long history of 

6 safety lapses that caused injury or death to many California residents, and destroyed or damaged 

7 their property. 

8 55. The North Bay Fires started approximately two years after the Butte Fire, where a 

9 44-foot tall, weak and spindly gray pine tree that should have been removed by PG&E struck a 

10 12,000-volt overhead power line that was owned and operated by PG&E. The resulting fire 

11 burned for 22 days, claimed the lives of two people, burned over 70,000 acres, and destroyed 921 

12 homes and/or structures. The fire also left tens of thousands of dead or dying trees and the risk 

13 of water pollution and erosion in its wake. Thousands of people were forced to evacuate their 

14 homes, and thousands were damaged in their person and property. 

15 56. PG&E's actions leading up to the Butte Fire illustrate its conscious disregard of 

16 public safety, as follows: 

17 • First, PG&E chose to not ensure that properly qualified and trained 

18 inspectors were being used by its contractors to identify hazard trees. 

19 • Second, PG&E chose not to verify that its quality assurance audits were 

20 properly conducted. 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

• Th ird, PG&E directed its inspection contractor to hire inspectors that they 

knew did not meet the minimum qualifications required by PG&E's own 

specifications. 

• Fourth, PG&E chose not to train inspectors on PG&E's hazardous tree 

rating system ("HTRS"). 

• Fifth, PG&E chose not to verify that its contractor trained inspectors on the 

HTRS. 

• Sixth, PG&E chose not to require inspectors to use the HTRS. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

19 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 25

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 57. 

• Seventh , PG&E knew that wildfires caused by contact between vegetation 

and its power lines posed the highest degree of risk to the public. 

• Eighth, PG&E knew that its vegetation management program failed to 

identify over 500,000 trees annually that were closer than the required 

distance away from its power lines. 

• Ninth, PG&E knew that its inspectors failed every year to identify tens of 

thousands of "facility protect trees" or "hazard trees" that were dead, diseased, 

and/or dying, or that otherwise posed a risk of contacting a power line. 

• Finally, PG&E did nothing to remove those trees, one of which was the 44-

foot tall, weak, and spindly gray pine tree that started the Butte Fire. 

In April 2017, the CPUC fined PG&E a total of $8.3 million because of the Butte 

12 Fire for "failing to maintain its 12kV overhead conductors safely and properly" and failing to 

13 maintain a minimum distance between its power lines and vegetation. Cal Fire also sent PG&E 

14 a bill for $90 million to cover state firefighting costs. 

15 58. After the Butte Fire, PG&E did not change, revise, or improve any of its 

16 vegetation management practices, and its managers, executives, and directors astoundingly and 

17 repeatedly testified at their depositions that none of PG&E's programs had failed to prevent the 

18 Butte Fire, and that none of PG&E's employees had done anything at all to contribute to the 

19 cause of the Butte Fire. This blind arrogance paved the way for the future disasters that came to 

20 pass with the ignition of the North Bay Fires in October 2017. 

21 

22 

23 

C. 

59. 

THE NORTH BAY FIRES BROUGHT DEATH AND DESTRUCTION TO 

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 

On Sunday, October 8, 2017, tragedy struck communities across Northern 

24 California when a series of fires began to spark and spread. These deadly fires quickly spread 

25 through neighborhoods and destroyed everything in their path, including residences, vegetation, 

26 structures, and businesses. 

27 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

20 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 26

of 74
confidential

confidential

60. The North Bay Fires are collectively the most destructive fires in California's 

2 history. In just a few weeks, the fires caused the deaths of at least 43 people, hospitalized over 

3 185 individuals, displaced about 100,000 people who were forced to leave their homes and 

4 search for safety, burned over 245,000 acres, and damaged or destroyed an estimated 14,700 

5 homes, 3,600 vehicles, and 728 businesses. 

6 61. PG&E caused and/or contributed to causing the North Bay Fires. As the North 

7 Bay Fires started to rage, emergency responders received many calls regarding electrical 

8 problems, transfonner explosions, transformer fires, arcing transformers, down power lines, 

9 arcing power lines, and/or flames in trees. 10 Witnesses observed, reported and described 

1 o downed power lines, exploding transformers, improper fuses, improper connections, improper 

11 clearances, aged and defective poles, and unrepaired poles in the areas in and around the North 

12 Bay Fires. 

13 62. Following the same negligent conduct that led to the Butte Fire, PG&E continued 

14 to adhere to the practices that served to increase the risk of wildfires leading up to the North Bay 

15 Fires: 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

• Reclosers in PG&E's system were set to avoid outages and not to avoid fires, 

even though fire conditions were known to be extreme. 

• PG&E failed to have a reasonable system in place to make sure its contractors 

were properly perfonning tree and/or vegetation inspections and removal, pole 

clearance, and pole inspections. 

• PG&E failed to take any steps to look for what it calls "Facility Protect 

Trees" (trees that pose a risk of falling into the line), even though it knew such 

trees were likely to exist after its contractors had performed their work. 

• PG&E failed to properly construct its power lines and thereafter failed to take 

reasonable steps to make sure the poles and lines were sufficiently strong to 

support lines and other equipment that were added by third parties. 

10 http://www.mercurynews.com/2017 /10/10/pge-power-lines-linked-to-wine-country-fires 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

21 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 27

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 63. 

• PG&E chose to not ensure that its contractors were properly trained in tree 

inspections and removal. 

• PG&E chose to not ensure that its contractors hired people who met PG&E's 

minimum qualifications. 

• PG&E chose to not participate in the training of its contractors. 

PG&E owes the public a non-delegable duty with regard to the operation of its 

7 power lines, which includes maintenance, inspection, repair, vegetation management, and/or all 

8 other obligations imposed by the Public Utilities Code and the CPUC, specifically including, but 

9 not limited to, General Orders Numbers 95 and 165. Even when PG&E chooses to hire 

10 contractors, its obligations remain non-delegable. PG&E's acts and omissions, as described 

11 herein, were a cause of the North Bay Fires and/or aggravated the spread of the fires and 

12 destruction left in their path. 

13 64. PG&E responded to the North Bay Fires by acknowledging that there were 

14 problems with its electrical equipment the night the North Bay Fires began. However, PG&E 

15 blamed its failing electrical equipment on winds combined with "millions of trees weakened by 

16 years of drought and recent renewed vegetation growth from winter storms."11 However, the 

17 fault lies with PG&E. Knowing the effects of the drought on vegetation near its power lines, 

18 PG&E had a duty to inspect and maintain that vegetation to minimize and avoid risk of fire, 

19 injury, death and harm to the public, but PG&E failed to do so. 

20 65. At all times relevant to this action, PG&E had specific knowledge that the 

21 greatest risk to the public from its operations was wildfire. PG&E knew that wildfire could 

22 result in death and injury to members of the public and could result in the destruction of 

23 structures and property. 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11 http://www.pgecurrents.com/2017 /10/ 1 1/pge-statement-on-north-bay-wildfires/ (last accessed 

February 1 2, 201 8). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

22 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 28

of 74
confidential

confidential

66. Despite such knowledge, PG&E chose to accept vegetation management that 

2 would result in 17 tree-related outages for each 1,000 miles of lines, despite knowing that such 

3 outages could result in wildfires that would cause injury, death, harm, and property destruction. 

4 67. PG&E has acknowledged and at all times relevant to this action knew that it was 

5 not adequately directing resources to its vegetation management program to reduce the risk of 

6 wildfire. PG&E cited its limited resources as the reason it chose to put the public in danger, 

7 while at the same time it was receiving approximately $1,400,000,000 in profits each year. 

8 PG&E's decision-making and practices resulted in numerous deaths, injuries, and damage to 

9 structures and property, just as PG&E knew it could when it implemented such choices and 

10 practices. 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

D. 

68. 

69. 

70. 

71. 

72. 

73. 

74. 

75. 

76. 

77. 

78. 

79. 

E. 

80. 

THE IMPACT OF THE NORTH BAY FIRES ON THE WINE INDUSTRY 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

!INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

THE DEADLY AND DESTRUCTIVE NORTH BAY FIRES 

1. The Atlas Fire 

The devastating Atlas Fire that tore through Napa and Solano Counties was one of 

27 California's most destructive wildfires. The Atlas Fire killed six people, burned approximately 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

23 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 29

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 51,600 acres, and damaged or destroyed at least 571 homes, wineries, and other structures in 

2 Napa and Solano counties. 

3 81. Thousands of residents were displaced and forced to flee in the dark hours before 

4 dawn when the fire grew and spread. Many left on only a moment's notice, fleeing from flames 

5 without their belongings, as their neighborhoods were consumed by smoke and fire. 

6 82. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Atlas Fire was at or near Atlas Peak Road, 

7 south of Lake Berryessa. Cal Fire also reported that the Atlas Fire started at or around 9:52 p.m. 

8 on Sunday, October 8, 2017.12 

9 83. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E power lines 

10 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or ar0tmd the time and place the Atlas Fire 

11 started. For example, in Napa County, a live oak tree and a live oak branch fell and struck two 

12 electricity distribution lines near the City of Napa. 

13 84. As described in PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171020-8589, at or 

14 around midnight on October 19, 2017, PG&E identified a broken tree limb and broken field15 phase primary insulator on the Pueblo 1104 PG&E facility at or near 4011 Atlas Peak Road, 

16 Napa, California. The incident report notes, "An approximately 25 foot tree limb fell from a 

17 White Oak that was rooted approximately 15 feet from the distribution conductors." This 

18 incident occurred the night the Atlas Fire began.13 

19 85. As described in PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171023-8596, on 

20 October 21, 2017, "PG&E identified a 19-inch diameter Oak tree, approximately 45 feet taU, 

21 that broke at the base and took down one phase of the Pueblo 1104 (12 kV) Circuit near 3683 

22 Atlas Peak Road. The butt of the Oak tree was completely burned and located 10 to 15 feet from 

23 the distribution conductors." 14 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1 866 (last accessed 

February 1 2, 2018). 

13 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

14 Ibid. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

24 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 30

of 74
confidential

confidential

86. Shortly after the fire, Cal Fire investigators were observed along Atlas Peak Road 

2 looking closely at a line of oak trees whose branches extended through overhead utility lines on 

3 the west side of the road, less than a quarter mile south of a sprawling ranch on the plateau of a 

4 Napa peak. A twisted, fallen wire lay on the ground, surrounded by stake flags. A broken oak 

5 branch precariously dangled overhead among the wires and other branches. 15 

6 

7 87. 

2. The Cascade/LaPorte Fires 

The Cascade and LaPorte Fires forced scores of individuals to evacuate in the 

8 dark hours before dawn as the fires grew and spread. Many left on only a moment's notice, 

9 fleeing from flames without their belongings, as their neighborhoods were consumed by smoke 

10 and fire. Collectively, the Cascade and LaPorte Fires killed approximately four people and 

11 destroyed over 450 structures and homes. 

12 88. The origin of the Cascade Fire was at or near 13916 Cascade Way, Browns 

13 Valley CA 95918. The Cascade Fire started at or around 11 :03 p.m. on Sunday, October 8, 

14 2017, and burned approximately 9,989 acres in Yuba County. 16 

15 89. Witnesses saw and/or reported trees hitting PG&E electrical lines and/or 

16 problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the Cascade Fire 

17 started. For example, in the half hour before the fire began, firefighters responded to at least two 

18 trees falling into power lines and power lines falling across the road. When emergency 

19 responders headed to the Cascade Fire, they warned each other of downed power lines to ensure 

20 firefighter safety. 17 

21 90. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the LaPorte Fire was at or near 167 Darby 

22 Road, Bangor, California. The LaPorte Fire started at or around 11 :03 p.m. on October 8, 2017, 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

15 http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/where-the-blazes-began-12294729.php (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

16 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1871 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

17 https://www.mercurynews.com/2017 /10/17 /yuba-countys-cascade-fire-bore-similar-hallmarksto-wine-country-fires/ (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

25 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 31

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 and burned approximately 6,151 acres in Butte County. 18 The Cascade and LaPorte Fires 

2 merged later that week. 

3 91. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

4 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the 

5 LaPorte Fire started. PG&E Electrical Safety Incident Report No. 171013-8569 shows that at or 

6 around 11 :20 p.m. on October 8, 2017, an oak tree limb broke and hit a nearby electrical wire at 

7 or near the area of origin. 19 

8 

9 92. 

3. The Cherokee Fire 

Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Cherokee Fire was at or near the 

10 intersection of Cherokee Road and Zonalea Lane in Oroville, California. Cal Fire also reported 

11 that the Cherokee Fire started on Sunday, October 8, 2017, at or around 9:45 p.m. The fire 

12 burned approximately 8,417 acres and destroyed 6 structures in Butte County. 20 

13 93. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

14 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the 

15 Cherokee Fire started. PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171010-8557 shows that at or 

16 around 9:45 p.m. on October 8, 2017, an incident caused a broken tree limb and wires down on 

17 the Clark Road 1102 PG&E facility at or near 3401 Cherokee Road, Oroville, California. The 

18 tree was rooted approximately 15 feet from PG&E distribution conductors at approximately the 

19 same location as the fire origin reported by Cal Fire. 21 

20 

21 94. 

4. The Honey Fire 

Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Honey Fire was at or near the intersection 

22 of Honey Run Road and Merlin Lane, southwest of Paradise, California. Cal Fire also reported 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

18 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1870 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

19 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

20 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1865 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

21 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

26 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 32

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 that the Honey Fire started on Monday, October 9, 2017, at or around 3:05 p.m. The fire burned 

2 approximately 150 acres in Butte County. 22 

3 95. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

4 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the Honey 

5 Fire started. Witnesses observed downed power lines, exploding transformers, improper fuses, 

6 improper connections, improper clearances, aged and defective poles, umepaired poles, problems 

7 with other electrical equipment, and/or down trees, tree limbs, and/or other vegetation in the area 

8 in and around the Honey Fire. 

9 

10 

11 96. 

5. The Lobo Fire 

Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Lobo Fire was at or near Lone Lobo Trail 

12 near Rough and Ready, California. Cal Fire also reports that the Lobo Fire started on early 

13 Monday, October 9, 2017, at or around 12:01 a.m. The fire burned approximately 821 acres in 

14 Nevada County.23 

15 97. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

16 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the Lobo 

17 Fire started. PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171012-8565 shows that at or around 

18 11 :20 p.m. on October 8, 2917, a ponderosa pine tree fell on the Narrows 2102 PG&E Circuit at 

19 or near 11218 Lone Lobo Trail, Nevada City, California. The tree was rooted approximately 50 

20 feet from PG&E distribution conductors at approximately the same location as the fire origin 

21 reported by Cal Fire. 24 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6. The Maacama or No Name Fire 

22 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1880 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

23 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1877 (last accessed 

February 1 2, 201 8). 

24 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

27 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 33

of 74
confidential

confidential

98. The "Maacama" or "No Name" Fire was first reported at approximately 10:01 

2 p.m. on Sunday, October 8, 2017, and originated near Maacama Lane and Chalk Hi11 Road in 

3 Healdsburg just east of Maacama Creek. 25 

4 99. The Maacama Fire forced two families to flee their homes shortly before they 

5 were destroyed by the fire, and burned approximately 50 acres, including sections of a vineyard. 

6 

7 

7. The Mccourtney Fire 

100. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the McCourtney Fire was at or near the 

8 intersection of McCourtney Road and Highway 20 in Grass Valley, California. Cal Fire also 

9 reported that the McCourtney Fire started on early Monday, October 9, 2017, at or around 12:00 

10 a.m. The fire burned approximately 76 acres in Nevada County and destroyed 13 structures. 26 

11 I 0 1. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

12 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the 

13 Mccourtney Fire started. PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171011-8563 shows that at 

14 or around 11 :00 p.m. on October 8, 2017, a broken ponderosa pine tree and wire were down on 

15 the Grass Valley 1103 PG&E Circuit near 11253 Orion Way, Grass Valley, California. The tree 

16 was rooted approximately 6 to 8 feet from PG&E distribution conductors and took down 3 

17 primary conductors at approximately the same location as the fire origin reported by Cal Fire. 27 

18 

19 

8. The Nuns Fire 

102. The Nuns Fire forced scores of individuals to evacuate in the dark hours before 

20 dawn as the fire grew and spread. Many left on only a moment's notice, fleeing from flames 

21 without their belongings, as their neighborhoods were consumed by smoke and fire. The Nuns 

22 Fire merged with the Adobe, Norrbom, Oakmont, Partrick, and Pressley Fires (collectively, the 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

25 Cal Fire did not give the "Maacama Fire" a name. It is also known to local residents as the "No 

Name Fire" due to its proximity to No Name Road. 

26 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1872 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

27 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

28 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 34

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 "Nuns Fire"). These fires claimed two lives and destroyed approximately 1527 structures and 

2 homes.28 

3 103. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Nuns Fire was at or near Highway 12 north 

4 of Glen Ellen, California. Cal Fire also reported that the Nuns Fire started on Sunday, October 8, 

5 2017, at or around 10:00 p.m. The fire burned approximately 56,556 acres in Napa and Sonoma 

6 Counties. 29 

7 104. Cal Fire also reported that the origin of the Partrick Fire, the first fire to merge 

8 with the Nuns Fire, was off Partrick Road west of Napa, California. The Partrick Fire started on 

9 Sunday, October 8, 2017, at or around 11 :48 p.m. and burned in Napa County. 30 

10 105. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

11 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the Nuns 

12 Fire started. At least ten of the calls reported electrical problems, transformer explosions, 

13 transformer fires, arcing transfonners, down power lines, arcing power lines, and/or flames in 

14 trees. Further, several calls reported problems with electrical equipment in the vicinity of the 

15 Nuns Fire, including a call at approximately 9:43 p.m. reporting trees and wires down and a call 

16 at approximately 10:40 p.m. reporting a blown transformer.31 

17 106. PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171010-8558 shows that at or around 

18 10:00 p.m. on October 8, 2017, a broken eucalyptus tree and wire was down on the Dunbar 1101 

19 PG&E facility at or near 8555 Sonoma Highway near Kenwood, California. The tree was 

20 rooted approximately 50 feet from PG&E fallen lines, and took down 3 primary conductors. 32 

21 Further, PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171016-8576 shows that at or around 1:00 

22 a.m. on October 9, 2017, an alder tree broke at the top and fell on an open wire at or near 1210 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

28 http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-northern-california-fires-structures (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

29 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1868 (last accessed 

February 1 2, 2018). 

30 http://cdfdata.firc.ca.gov/incidents/incidcnts _ details _info?incident_id= 1869 (last accessed 

February 1 2, 2018). 

31 http://www.mercurynews.com/201 7/10/1 0/pge-power-1 ines-linked-to-wine-country-fires (last 

accessed February 12, 2018). 

32 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 1 2, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

29 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 35

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 Nuns Canyon Road near Glen Ellen, California. The tree was rooted approximately 30 feet from 

2 PG&E overhead secondary distribution conductors. 33 The sites of these PG&E incidents are 

3 near or the same location as the two origin locations of Nuns Fire origin reported by Cal Fire. 

4 107. At or around the start time of the Nuns Fire, PG&E's website for electrical 

5 outages reported two outages at or very near the origin of the Nuns Fire. The first outage was 

6 reported at 10:31 p.m. on October 8, 2017, stating "found a broken power pole in the area." The 

7 second PG&E outage at or near the origin of the Nuns Fire was reported at 11 :50 p.m. on 

8 October 8, 2017, stating "found a broken power pole in the area. "34 

9 108. For the Partrick Fire, PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171020-8586 

10 shows that on or around October 8, 2017, an oak tree fell and took down one phase of the Pueblo 

11 2103 PG&E Circuit at or near 1721 Partrick Road near Napa, California. The tree was rooted 

12 approximately 44 feet from PG&E distribution conductors at or near the same location as the 

13 origin of the Partrick Fire reported by Cal Fire. 35 After the fire was extinguished, witnesses 

14 observed Cal Fire investigators looking at downed power lines near the suspected origin point of 

15 the Partrick Fire. 36 

16 109. Further, at or near the start time of the Partrick Fire, PG&E's website reported 

17 four separate outages at or very near the origin of the Partrick Fire. All four outages reflected the 

18 same outage cause: "found a broken power pole in the area." The date and time stamps were the 

19 same as well: 1 :47 a.m. on October 9, 2017. 37 

20 

21 

9. The Pocket Fire 

110. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Pocket Fire was at or near the intersection 

22 of Pocket Ranch Road and Ridge Ranch Road in Geyserville, California. Cal Fire also reported 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

33 Ibid. 

34 These quotes appeared on https://m.pge.com/?WT.pgeac=Home_ Outages#outages but are no 

longer available on that site. 

35 Ibid. 

36 http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/where-the-blazes-began-l 2294729.php (last accessed 

February 1 2, 201 8). 

37 These quotes appeared on https://m.pge.com/?WT.pgeac=Home_ Outages#outages but are no 

longer available on that site. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

30 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 36

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 that the Pocket Fire started on early Monday, October 9, 2017, at or around 3:30 a.m. The fire 

2 burned approximately 17,357 acres in Sonoma County. 38 

3 111. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

4 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the Pocket 

5 Fire started. PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171021-8592 shows that at or around 

6 3:30 a.m. on October 9, 2017, there was a broken oak tree limb and wire down on the Cloverdale 

7 1102 PG&E facility near the intersection of Ridge Ranch Road and Ridge Oaks Road near 

8 Geyserville, California. The tree was rooted approximately 15 feet from PG&E's lines at 

9 approximately the same location as the fire origin reported by Cal Fire. 39 

10 

11 

10. The Point Fire 

112. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Point Fire was at or near the intersection of 

12 Highway 26 and Higdon Road in West Point, California. Cal Fire also reported that the Point 

13 Fire started on early Monday, October 9, 2017, at or around 1: 10 a.m. The fire burned 

14 approximately 130 acres in Calaveras County.40 

15 113. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

16 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the Point 

17 Fire started. PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171009-8554 shows that at or around 

18 10:00 a.m. on October 9, 2017, there was a broken tree limb and wire down on the West Point 

19 1102 PG&E facility at or near 22894 Highway 26, West Point, California. The tree was rooted 

20 approximately 50 feet from PG&E's distribution conductors at approximately the same location 

21 as the fire origin reported by Cal Fire.41 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11. The Redwood Valley and Potter Fire 

38 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1883 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

39 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

40 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 187 5 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

41 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

31 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 37

of 74
confidential

confidential

114. Cal Fire reported that the ongm of the Redwood Valley Fire was north of 

2 Highway 20, west of Mendocino National Forest, and south of Black Bart, California, and that it 

3 started on October 8, 2017, at or around 11 :36 p.m. Cal Fire also reported that the origin of the 

4 Potter Fire was near Busch Lane in Pottery Valley. The fires merged into each other and became 

5 commonly referred to as the Redwood Valley Fire or Redwood Fire. Collectively the fires 

6 burned approximately 36,526 acres in Mendocino County, and destroyed or damaged around 588 

7 homes and structures. 42 The fires claimed the lives of 8 individuals, including a 14-year old 

8 b 43 oy. 

9 115. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

10 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the 

11 Redwood Valley Fire and Potter Fire started. PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 

12 171009-8553 shows that at or around 11:35 p.m. on October 8, 2017, there was a wire down and 

13 broken tree near structure 0/8 of the PG&E Potter Valley-Mendocino transmission line in Potter 

14 Valley, California. PG&E found a broken tree top near the downed conductor. The tree was 

15 rooted approximately 60 feet from PG&E's transmission line at approximately the same location 

16 as the fire origin reported by Cal Fire. 44 

17 116. It was difficult for firefighters to access the Redwood Valley Fire and Potter Fire 

18 because of downed power lines and trees. Local county officials reported that within 30 minutes 

19 of the fire dispatch coming in, Cal Fire dispatched every available Cal Fire unit except one, and 

20 local dispatchers fielded hundreds of calls reporting power outages and fires. 45 

21 

22 

12. The Sullivan Fire 

117. The Sullivan Fire was first reported at approximately 12: 17 a.m. on Monday, 

23 October 9, 2017, and originated near 4822 Sullivan Way in Santa Rosa, California. 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

42 http:// cdf data. fire. ca. gov /incidents/incidents_ details_ info ?incident_ id= 18 7 4 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

43 http://krcrtv.com/archive/remembering-the-victims-8-dead-from-redwood-valley-fire (last 

accessed February 12, 2018). 

44 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

45 http://www.ukiahdailyjournal.com/article/NP/20171109/NEWS/171109874 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

32 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 38

of 74
confidential

confidential

118. The Sullivan Fire forced families to flee the area in the middle of the night before 

2 it destroyed several homes on Sullivan Way. 

3 119. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated arcing activity or problems with 

4 PG&E electrical equipment at the same time and place the Sullivan Fire started. PG&E Electric 

5 Safety Incident Report No. 171015-8573 shows that fire damaged two structures "at or near 4818 

6 Sullivan Way" and upon arrival at the scene, PG&E "noticed a possible issue with the secondary 

7 conductor."46 

8 

9 

13. The Sulphur Fire 

120. Hundreds of residents were displaced and forced to evacuate in the dark hours 

10 before dawn as the Sulphur Fire grew and spread. In Clearlake Park, residents had to be picked 

11 up off their docks by boat patrols to escape the raging flames. 47 Other residents with homes on 

12 Gooseneck Point were trapped by the fire and had to flee by rowboat. Many other residents left 

13 on only a moment's notice, fleeing from flames without their belongings, as their entire 

14 neighborhoods were consumed by smoke and fire. 48 

15 121. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Sulphur Fire was off Highway 20 at 

16 Sulphur Bank Road, Clearlake Oaks, California. Cal Fire also reported that the Sulphur Fire 

17 started on Sunday, October 8, 2017, at or around 11 :59 p.m. The fire burned approximately 

18 2,207 acres in Lake County49 and destroyed approximately 162 homes, businesses, and 

19 outbuildings. 50 

20 122. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

21 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the 

22 Redwood Valley Fire started. PG&E Electric Safety Incident Report No. 171011-8562 shows 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

46 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed March 9, 2018). 

http://www. latimes. com/I ocal/ cal ifornia/la-north em-cal i fornia-fires-li ve-c 1 ear 1 ake-parknei gh borhood-hit-hard-by-1508100783-htmlstory.html (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

48 http://abc7news.com/exclusive-sulphur-fire-victims-tell-harrowing-tale-of-driving-throughf1ames/2553638 (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

49 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 187 6 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

50 https://yubanet.com/Fires/sulphur (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

33 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 39

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 that at or around 11 :55 p.m. on October 8, 2917, there were two broken poles on the Redbud 

2 1102 PG&E Circuit near the intersection of Pomo Road and Sulphur Bank Road near Clearlake, 

3 California. The top section of Fuse Cutout Pole 1447 had broken and fallen to the ground. In 

4 addition, a pole one span to the west was burned and fell to the ground. 51 The site of this PG&E 

5 incident is approximately the same location as the fire origin reported by Cal Fire, and that at 

6 least one of these poles was rotten and riddled with woodpecker holes. 

7 

8 

14. The Tubbs Fire 

123. The Tubbs Fire was the most destructive of the North Bay Fires. The fire 

9 destroyed approximately five percent of Santa Rosa's housing stock, burned over 36,807 acres 

10 across Sonoma and Napa Counties, and killed at least 22 individuals. 

11 124. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the Tubbs Fire was at or near the intersection 

12 of Highway 128 and Bennett Lane, Calistoga, California. Cal Fire also reported that the Tubbs 

13 Fire started on Sunday, October 8, 2017, at or around 9:45 p.m. 52 

14 125. Contemporaneous calls and reports indicated trees hitting PG&E electrical lines 

15 and/or problems with other electrical equipment at or around the same time and place the Tubbs 

16 Fire started. At least ten of the calls reported electrical problems, transfonner explosions, 

17 transfonner fires, arcing transformers, down power lines, arcing power lines, and/or flames in 

18 trees. Further, several calls reported problems with electrical equipment in the vicinity of the 

19 Tubbs Fire, including a call at approximately 9:24 p.m. reporting a PG&E transfonner 

20 explosion, a call at approximately 9:58 p.m. reporting down power lines, a call at approximately 

21 l 0: 14 p.m. reporting flames in trees, and a call at approximately 10:34 p.m. reporting falling 

22 power line wires. 53 

23 126. At or around the start time of the Tubbs Fire, PG&E's website for electrical 

24 outages reported two outages right next to each other at or very near the origin of the Tubbs Fire. 

25 

26 

27 

28 

51 http://cpuc.ca.gov/pgefireincidentreports (last accessed February 1 2, 201 8). 

52 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id=l 867 (last accessed 

February 1 2, 201 8). 

53 http://www.mercurynews.com/201 7/10/1 0/pge-power-lines-linked-to-wine-country-fires (last 

accessed February 1 2, 201 8). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

34 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 40

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 The causes of the PG&E outages read: "found damaged equipment on a power pole," and "fire 

2 in the area." The start time of both outages was exactly 8:51 p.m. on October 8, 2017 near the 

3 the reported start time of the Tubbs Fire. 54 

4 127. There were multiple power lines, power poles, and associated equipment in and 

5 around the reported area of Tubbs origin. After containment of the Tubbs Fire, there was caution 

6 tape around the PG&E power poles located at or near Highway 128 and Bennett Lane, where the 

7 outage reports originated. There were several trees dangerously close to power poles and 

8 electrical wires coming off the poles in the area of the Tubbs origin. There was also electric 

9 equipment on the ground that appeared to have come off the poles in the area of the Tubbs 

10 origin. 

11 

12 

1 5. The 37 Fire 

128. Cal Fire reported that the origin of the "37 Fire" was at or near the intersection of 

13 Highway 37 and Lakeville Highway near Sonoma, California. Cal Fire also reported that the 37 

14 Fire started on October 9, 2017, at or around 2:00 p.m., and burned approximately 1,660 acres in 

15 Sonoma County. 55 

16 129. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS are informed that witnesses observed downed 

17 power lines, exploding transformers, improper fuses, improper connections, improper clearances, 

18 aged and defective poles, unrepaired poles, problems with other electrical equipment, and/or 

19 down trees, tree limbs, and/or other vegetation in the area in and around the 37 Fire. 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F. PG&E'S ACTS AND OMISSIONS CAUSED AND CONTRIBUTED TO 

CAUSING THE NORTH BAY FIRES 

1. The 2013 Liberty Report Found that PG&E's Distribution System 

Presented "Significant Safety Issues" 

54 This quote appeared on https://m.pge.com/?WT.pgeac=Home_ Outages#outages but is no 

longer available on that site. 

55 http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents _ details _info?incident_id= 1882 (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

35 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 41

of 74
confidential

confidential

130. On May 6, 2013, a report was sent to the Safety and Enforcement Division of the 

2 CPUC from the Liberty Consulting Group who had been retained to conduct an independent 

3 review of capital and operations and maintenance expenditures proposed by PG&E (hereinafter 

4 the "2013 Liberty Report"). 56 The 2013 Liberty Report concluded that: "several aspects of the 

5 PG&E distribution system present significant safety issues." It also found: (a) "addressing risks 

6 associated with electrical distribution components has been overshadowed by electric 

7 transmission and gas facilities;" (b) "addressing aging infrastructure and adding SCAD A to the 

8 system comprise the major focuses of safety initiatives for the distribution system;" and (c) 

9 "current employee/contractor serious injury and fatality levels require significantly greater 

10 mitigation." 

11 

12 

13 

2. The 2013 Liberty Report Found that PG&E's Wires Were Highly 

Susceptible to Failure Due to Age 

131. One of the first key findings of the 2013 Liberty Report was that PG&E had a 

14 "large amount of small size obsolete conductor remaining on PG&E's system." PG&E has 

15 113,000 miles of conductors, and according to the report, over 60 percent of those conductors are 

16 highly susceptible to failure. The conductors are very small, and generally more susceptible to 

17 breaking than standard size conductors. As a conductor ages, it becomes even more susceptible 

18 to breaking. Weather conditions, such as winds and lightning strikes, will also wear a small 

19 conductor more than larger ones. For these reasons, "[t]his conductor was once popular, but is 

20 now recognized as obsolete, due to its small size." 

21 132. PG&E's failure to replace these undersized and obsolete conductors was a 

22 proximate cause of the North Bay Fires and the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS 

23 and SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' harm and damages arising therefrom. 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3. PG&E Failed to Inspect, Maintain, Repair, and/or Replace Its 

Equipment 

56 http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publisheddocs/efile/ g000/m065/k394/653942 l 0.pdf (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

36 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 42

of 74
confidential

confidential

133. PG&E failed to perform the necessary inspections, maintenance, repair, and/or 

2 replacement of its electrical equipment. 

3 134. A 2015 audit of PG&E's Sonoma Division revealed that there were over 3,500 

4 unfilled PG&E repair and maintenance requests in the area of the Tubbs Fire. 57 The volume of 

5 unfilled repair and maintenance requests reflects PG&E's reckless and conscious disregard for 

6 public safety in the North Bay Fire zones. 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

135. In a December 31, 2015, letter to PG&E regarding the audit, Fayi Daye, a 

supervising electric safety regulator with the CPUC, outlined the violations found in the review 

of records between 20 IO and 2015 and a spot check of PG&E electrical distribution equipment. 

She stated the following: 

PG&E's records indicated that from August 2010 to September 21, 2015, a total 

of 3,527 work orders were completed past their scheduled date of corrective 

action per PG&E's Electric Notification Prioritization Standards. Late work 

orders included overhead and underground facilities. 58 

136. The letter concluded that these delays violated CPUC General Order No. 128, 

15 Rule 17 .1, which sets forth the CPU C's design, construction, and maintenance rules for electrical 

16 systems. 

17 137. The audit also reviewed PG&E's maps for its electrical distribution lines and 

18 found that over 50 pieces of overhead equipment including pole mounted transformers and 

19 power lines has not been inspected every year as required by law. This was a violation of CPUC 

20 General Order No. 165, § 111-B, which sets forth standards for inspections. 59 

21 138. According to State Senator Jerry Hill, these findings are especially troubling 

22 because "they are getting the money for these, they are getting the funds to do the work in a 

23 timely manner. "60 Yet, PG&E takes the money but fails to correct the problems. 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

57 http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC _Public_ Website/Content/Safety/ 

Electric_ Safety_ and_ Reliability/Reports _and_ Audits/Electric _Facilities/EA2015-018.pdf (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

58 Ibid. 

59 Ibid. 60 https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/State-Audit-Shows-PGE-Had-Repair-Job-Backlog-inSonoma-Santa-Rosa-451996923 .html (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

37 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 43

of 74
confidential

confidential

139. Further, according to records maintained by Cal Fire, approximately 135 fires in 

2 Sonoma and Napa Counties were caused by electrical equipment from 2011 through 2015. 61 In 

3 2015, the last year of reported data, electrical power problems sparked the burning of 149,241 

4 acres across California more than twice the amount from any other cause. 62 

5 140. Since prior to 1996, PG&E has known or should have known that its choice of 

6 chemical treatments for its poles can also make its equipment unsafe. For example, PG&E uses 

7 and has used poles treated with pentachlorophenol in liquefied petroleum gas by the Cellon® 

8 process. Those poles tend to experience surface decay below ground regardless of the type of 

9 wood used for the poles. As a result, digging inspections are required for poles treated by these 

10 processes for all wood types. However, PG&E has failed to conduct the proper inspections. 

11 Further, when PG&E has been advised of necessary repairs to such poles, failed to repair the 

12 poles in a timely manner. 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

141. According to the 2017 CPUC Order Instituting Investigation into the Creation of a 

Shared Database or Statewide Census of Utility Poles and Conduit: 

Poorly maintained poles and attachments have caused substantial property 

damage and repeated loss of life in this State. For example, inadequate clearance 

between communication and power lines, perhaps in conjunction with a broken 

cable lashing wire, caused the Southern California Guejito Fire of 2007 which 

(together with the Witch Fire) burned 197,990 acres and caused two deaths. 

Three more deaths occurred in 2011 when an electrical conductor separated from 

a pole in high winds, causing a live wire to fall to the ground. At least five more 

people lost their lives in pole-related failures in 2012 and 2015. 

Unauthorized pole attachments are particularly problematic. A pole overloaded 

with unauthorized equipment collapsed during windy conditions and started the 

Malibu Canyon Fire of 2007, destroying and damaging luxury homes and burning 

over 4500 acres. Windstorms in 2011 knocked down a large number of poles in 

Southern California, many of which were later found to be weakened by termites, 

dry rot, and fungal decay. 

61 http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire _protection/fire _protection_ fire _info _redbooks (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

62 http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-utility-wildfires-20171017-story.html (last accessed 

February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

38 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 44

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

Communication and other wires are not infrequently found hanging onto roads or 

yards. Poles with excessive and/or unauthorized attachments can put utility 

workers at risk. Facilities deployed in the field may differ from what appears on 

paper or in a utility's database. 63 

142. In the June 29, 2017 CPUC press release for the investigation, CPUC President 

5 Michael Picker stated, "Plain old wooden poles, along with their cousins, the underground 

6 conduits, are work horses, carrying most of our power and telecommunications. They sometimes 

7 get crowded and fail, causing outages and fires because of all the equipment crammed onto 

8 them." Further, "Not knowing where all the poles are and who owns them, how loaded they are, 

9 how safe they are, and whether they can handle any additional infrastructure, is problematic to 

10 both the utilities and to the CPUC. Creating a database of utility poles could help owners track 

11 attachments on their poles and manage necessary maintenance and rearrangements, and can help 

12 the CPUC in our oversight role."64 

13 143. PG&E's failure to conduct proper and regular inspections of its wood utility 

14 poles and failure to replace them or make necessary repairs contributed to causing the North Bay 

15 Fires. 

16 

17 

18 

4. PG&E Failed to Ensure Its Infrastructure Could Withstand 

Foreseeable Weather Conditions as Required by Law 

144. Despite PG&E's public protestations to the contrary, Northern California did not 

19 experience uncommon weather patterns the night the North Bay Fires began. Readings at 

20 weather stations in the areas impacted by the North Bay Fires show that winds were at 

21 foreseeable levels when PG&E's electrical equipment began to fail. For example, on October 8, 

22 2017, a weather station in Santa Rosa in the vicinity of the Tubbs Fire recorded wind gusts of 

23 about 30 miles per hour at or around 9:29 p.m. About an hour later, the same station recorded 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

63 http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/GOOO/M l 90/K872/l 90872933.pdf (last 

accessed February 1 2, 2018). 

64 http://docs.cpuc.ca. gov /PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M 191 /K560/ 1915 60905 .pdf (last 

accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

39 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 45

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 wind gusts of 41 miles per hour. These wind speeds were surpassed in other recent storms in the 

2 area on a number of occasions. 

3 1 45. According to PG&E's 20 14 Annual Electric Distribution Reliability Report, sent 

4 to the CPUC on February 27, 201 5, weather conditions have accounted for many of the top ten 

5 PG&E electrical outages each year since at least 2004, putting the utility on notice that these 

6 weather conditions occur and that they can cause electrical problems. For example, four of the 

7 "ten largest 2004 outage events" for PG&E occurred in the Santa Rosa and Sonoma areas where 

8 winds were documented in the 35 to 65 mph range, much higher levels than those of October 8, 

9 20 1 7.

65 

10 146. PG&E's largest outage in 2009 was caused by a strong early season storm that 

11 affected the entire service area with many stations reporting wind gusts over 50 mph. National 

12 Weather Service records indicate this storm was the strongest October rain and wind event since 

13 1962. Therefore, PG&E had notice of the type of winds that occurred on October 8, 2017, the 

14 night the North Bay Fires began. 

15 1 47. PG&E's wood utility poles in the areas where the North Bay Fires began did not 

16 meet the wind load and safety factors required by General Order 95, Rule 48, under which wood 

17 utility poles must be replaced if they are not strong enough to withstand wind speeds of 92 mph. 

18 No weather station in the areas affected by the North Bay Fires recorded wind speeds at or above 

19 92 mph on the night of October 8, 20 1 7. 

20 148. PG&E's failure to replace old and deteriorated wood utility poles that did not 

21 meet the strength and safety requirements of General Order 95, Rule 48, and that could not 

22 withstand wind speeds of less than 92 mph contributed to the cause of the North Bay Fires. 

23 5. PG&E's Unsafe Use of Reclosers 

24 149. Another key finding of the 2013 Liberty Report was that on a daily basis and in 

25 36 percent of cases, PG&E cannot remotely de-energize a downed line and must send someone 

26 

27 

65 https://www.pge.com/inc1udes/docs/pdfs/myhome/outages/outage/re1iability/ 

28 AnnualElectricDistributionReliabilityReport.pdf (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

40 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 46

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 on-site to manually tum off the feed. An energized downed line is a hazard, and, according to 

2 the 2013 Liberty Report, this hazard has "contributed to a number of fatalities and injuries." 

3 150. PG&E has a long-standing practice of using reclosers throughout its system to 

4 automatically restart power after interruptions, even though it knows these devices may cause 

5 wildfires. Reclosers are circuit breakers equipped with a mechanism that can automatically 

6 "reclose" the breaker and reenergize a power line after it has been "opened" due to a fault. Many 

7 of PG&E's reclosers are set to reenergize the line up to three times after a fault. 

8 151. Reclosers are key tools to prevent power blackouts, but if a fault occurs from 

9 contact between a line and a tree or vegetation, reenergizing the line can ignite fires. This danger 

10 is so significant that other major utilities in California claim that they have reprogramed their 

11 electrical systems during fire seasons to ensure that reclosers do not automatically restart 

12 electrical currents after a service interruption. 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

152. PG&E knew that its reclosers posed a great risk of wildfire but has only taken 

slow and incomplete steps to eliminate that risk. The "Power Line Prevention Field Guide" 

("2008 Field Guide") makes the following prescient statement: 

The potential exists that power line caused fires will become conflagrations 

during the long, hot and dry fire season commonly experienced in California. The 

very same weather conditions that contribute to power line faults also lead and 

contribute to the rapid spread of wildfire. The most critical of these weather 

factors is high wind, which is commonly accompanied by high temperatures and 

low humidity. 

High, gusty winds may cause vegetation to sway into power lines, break off limbs 

or fall into power lines. High winds may also create vibrations in power lines that 

can lead to stress failures or cause loose connections to separate. Arcing usually 

accompanies such faults. Automatic Reclosers re-energizing the line into the 

fault may cause repeated arcing and increase the probability of igniting 

vegetation. [Emphasis added.] 66 

66 2008 Field Guide, p. 1 -5, http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/fire _ er/fpp _ engineering_ view?guide _id= 1 5. 

The 2008 Field Guide was developed as a mutual undertaking by Cal Fire, PG&E, Southern California 

Edison, San Diego Gas and Electric, and the other electric utilities of California. PG&E's name and logo 

is displayed prominently on the cover page. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

41 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 47

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 At a Congressional hearing in 2015, PG&E's Senior Vice President of Electrical Operations, 

2 Patrick Hogan, stated that PG&E had the ability to reprogram its reclosers during fire season to 

3 not restart power. Patrick Hogan admitted that shutting down power means "you take the 

4 reliability hit, but you gain the wildfire benefit."67 

5 153. Despite its knowledge of the dangers posed by reclosers reenergizing lines during 

6 fire season, PG&E only untimely and limited response has been to begin an experimental pilot 

7 program in 2017 to reprogram its reclosers that affected only a limited area of California. 

8 154. Before the Butte Fire in 2015, PG&E began a process of replacing all reclosers 

9 that can only be programmed or controlled on-site with reclosers that can be remotely 

1 o programmed and controlled. However, that process has been so slow and deliberate many of its 

11 reclosers must still be programmed or controlled only at the site where they are installed. 

12 155. On its own initiative, PG&E did not tum off a number of reclosers on 

13 transmission and distribution systems in the area of the North Bay Fires. Instead, PG&E left 

14 those reclosers active and did not tum them off until directed to do so by Cal Fire between 

15 October 12 and 15, 2017. 

16 156. PG&E's failure to tum off its reclosers during fire season and its failure to ensure 

17 all of its reclosers could be programmed and controlled remotely proximately caused the North 

18 Bay Fires and the injuries, deaths, harm and property destruction arising therefrom. 

19 

20 

21 

6. PG&E Knew That Its Down-Guy Design Was Flawed and Could 

Cause Ground Currents That Create Arcing and Spark Vegetation 

157. Electrical arcing is a process by which guy wires or "down-guys," when designed 

22 improperly and/or installed according to improper design, conduct ground current at ground level 

23 during high winds, igniting fires to nearby vegetation. Guy wires are the metal support cables 

24 that are used to tie electrical poles to the ground. PG&E utilizes an inverted "V" shape design 

25 without any separation or in-line insulators as an attempt to help its poles withstand high wind. 

26 However, in PG&E's sub-transmission design, PG&E does not separate the connection at the 

27 

28 

67 http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Power-line-restart-device-implicated-in-past12324764.php (last aecessed February 12, 2018). 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

42 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 48

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 pole by 12 inches, utilize any in-line insulator to prevent ground current from flowing, or utilize 

2 a shunt so when ground current exists it does not cause an electrical arc. In addition, if not 

3 properly maintained, the down-guys become loose. In high wind conditions, when the poles 

4 sway and ground currents exist, arcing occurs. With the combination of high winds, swaying 

5 poles, loose connections, two down-guys attached by a common bolt, and ground current, 

6 electrical arcing occurs, igniting local vegetation. 

7 158. It is believed that arcing from San Diego Gas & Electric wires was the cause of 

8 the 2007 San Diego "Witch Creek" Fires, in addition to the 2003 Cedar and Paradise Fires. 

9 159. The down-guy design utilized by PG&E is a violation of CPUC General Order 

10 Number 95. Industry experts have demonstrated to the CPUC and California utilities how the 

11 dangerous design causes arcing and fires for over a decade. They believe this design is 

12 unreasonably dangerous and that the fix is cheap and easy. CPUC General Order Number 95 

13 sets forth two possible solutions: either have a 12-inch separation on a pole; or add an in-line 

14 insulator. An additional solution is adding a shunt from the down-guy anchor to the down-guy 

15 itself. All three inexpensive solutions prevent electrical arcs at ground levels that ignite fires. 

16 

17 

18 

7. PG&E's Reckless Adoption of the VMII Program Where It Paid Its 

Contractors to Cut Fewer Trees 

160. PG&E's Vegetation Management Program performs two types of tree work: 

19 annual routine compliance tree work and reliability tree work. 

20 161. Annual routine compliance work focuses on maintaining regulatory distances 

21 between energized conductors and vegetation. "Reliability tree work" focuses on locations 

22 where there has been a history of vegetation-related outage problems based on three historical 

23 indexes: System Average Interruption Frequency Index ("SAIFI"), Customer Experiencing 

24 Multiple Interruption ("CEMI"), and System Average Interruption Duration Index ("SAIDI"). 

25 162. In 2006, PG&E's Vegetation Management Program adopted the "Vegetation 

26 Management Incentive Initiative" ("VMII"). The ostensible purpose of VMII was to reduce the 

27 annual routine compliance tree work and share the resulting cost savings with the contractors 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

43 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 49

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 whose compensation would be reduced by the loss of actual work. The actual purpose of VMII 

2 was to shift costs from annual routine compliance work to fund additional reliability work. 

3 163. For example, in 2011, PG&E set a goal to reduce routine "units" worked from 

4 1.18 million trees in 2011 to 1 million in 2012 in order to increase the amount of money 

5 available for reliability work by $20 mill ion. In 2012, PG&E set a goal to goal to reduce routine 

6 "units" worked by 25 percent in 2013 in order to increase the amount of money available for 

7 reliability work by $35 million. In 2013, PG&E only performed routine patrol inspections on 75 

8 percent of its distribution circuits, using the cost savings to increase its reliability patrols. In 

9 2014, PG&E set a goal to reduce routine units worked by 7.5 percent annually through 2016. 

10 164. Between 2006 and 20 1 3, PG&E actually reduced the number of routine trees 

11 worked from 1.7 million to 1.25 million in 2013, paid contractors $85 million, and increased 

12 reliability spending by $134 million. During that time, customer satisfaction as measured by 

13 SAIFI increased by 40 percent. 

14 165. Most of PG&E's annual routine compliance work is performed in rural areas in 

15 California, while most of PG&E's "reliability" work is perfonned in the more densely populated 

16 urban or semi-urban areas where outages will generate more complaints per square mile than in 

17 the rural counties served by PG&E. Although the actual vegetation management work 

18 performed in the annual routine compliance patrols and the reliability patrols is virtually the 

19 same, PG&E's only comprehensible rationale for differentiating the "two types of work" is that 

20 the "reliability" work is directed at reducing statistical measurements of customer dissatisfaction 

21 over outages and that goal can be better accomplished by concentrating on work in urban or 

22 semi-urban areas at the expense of work needed in rural areas. 

23 1 66. Under PG&E's bonus incentive program, reducing the number of customer 

24 complaints over outages leads to an increased likelihood of increases in executive and 

25 management bonuses. 

26 

27 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

44 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 50

of 74
confidential

confidential

167. PG&E's reckless implementation and continued application of VMII proximately 

2 caused the North Bay Fires and the injuries, deaths, harm and property destruction arising 

3 therefrom. 

4 

5 

8. PG&E Failed to Fully Employ LiDAR to Identify Hazard Trees 

168. LiDAR (an acronym for "Light Detection and Ranging") is a surveying method 

6 that measures distances to a target by illuminating that target with a pulsed laser light and 

7 measures the reflected pulses with a sensor. These light pulses, when combined with other data 

8 recorded by the system, orthoimagery, and hyperspectral data, can generate precise three9 dimensional images and information about the shape of the Earth and objects such as buildings 

10 or trees. 

11 169. When used in a vegetation management program for electric utilities, LiDAR 

12 scans and analyses can be used to identify trees that have the potential for contacting conductors, 

13 whether because of proximity to the conductors and/or because the trees are dead, diseased, or 

14 dying. Annual LiDAR scans and analyses of the electric system can also identify changes in the 

15 dead or diseased vegetation by comparing one year's data to the prior year's inventory of dead or 

16 diseased trees. When the analysis is conducted over a subset dataset, it can provide a statistical 

17 understanding in the percent change in vegetation identified as dead or diseased. 

18 170. PG&E's use of LiDAR is funded by its "Catastrophic Event Memorandum 

19 Account" ("CEMA"). If a catastrophic event is declared a state of emergency by the state or 

20 federal government, then utilities like PG&E can record costs caused by the event in this 

21 memorandum account. By recording these costs, the utilities can later ask for recovery of these 

22 costs from the CPUC. 

23 I 71. In 2014, PG&E began to use LiDAR to scan and analyze small sections of its 

24 electric transmission and distribution system. In 2015, PG&E employed a contractor who 

25 created spatially accurate alignment infonnation for approximately 10 percent of PG&E 

26 distribution lines using LiDAR and imagery. The contractor identified 2.2 million "Hazard 

27 Trees" in the LiDAR data having the potential to fail-in or encroach on distribution lines, 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

45 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 51

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 performed "dead and diseased analysis" on 1.6 million trees, and identified 23,000 trees as 

2 potentially dead or diseased. 

3 172. In 2015, for some unfortunate reason PG&E scheduled the LiDAR contractor's 

4 deliverables for October 2015 at the very tail end of California's fire season. The contractor's 

5 final product identified the 44 foot-tall gray pine that started the Butte Fire as a "Hazard Tree" 

6 that had the potential to fall into one of PG&E's distribution lines, but unfortunately PG&E 

7 received the information over a month after the Butte Fire started. 

8 173. In 2016 and 2017, PG&E again employed LiDAR technology to scan and 

9 analyze its electric transmission and distribution system, but only employed the technology in 

10 limited sections of that system, and again scheduled the deliverables at the tail end of the 

11 California wildfire season. 

12 174. PG&E's failure to fully employ LiDAR technology in the area of the North Bay 

13 Fires and its failure to timely schedule deliverables of LiDAR analyses proximately caused the 

14 North Bay Fires and the injuries, deaths, harm and property destruction arising therefrom. 

15 

16 

17 

9. PG&E Failed to Treat the Conditions of Its Aging Electrical Assets as 

an Enterprise-Level Risk 

175. Another recommendation of the 2013 Liberty Report was "the establishment of a 

18 formal asset management program in Electric Operations." According to the report, "aging 

19 infrastructure is best addressed by having a strategic asset management program in place. These 

20 types of programs, such as the PAS 55 program, force a detailed and thorough condition 

21 assessment survey of the major assets. These types of formal programs also take failure modes 

22 into consideration. Long term sustainable plans can then be prepared to address the asset 

23 conditions. A sustainable asset management will mitigate system safety risks from aging 

24 infrastructure, which constituted a major portion of the safety items in this GRC." 

25 176. The 2013 Liberty Report specifically recommended that "PG&E treat agmg 

26 infrastructure as an enterprise-level risk." 

27 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

46 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 52

of 74
confidential

confidential

177. PG&E's failure to treat its agmg infrastructure as an enterprise-level risk 

2 proximately caused the North Bay Fires and the injuries, deaths, harm and property destruction 

3 arising therefrom. 

4 

5 

10. PG&E's "Run to Failure" Approach to Maintenance 

178. PG&E's: failure to address the "significant safety hazards" identified by the 2013 

6 Liberty Report; replace obsolete and undersized conductors; halt its unsafe use of reclosers; 

7 adoption of the VMII program; failure to fully employ LiDAR to identify hazard trees; failure to 

8 treat the conditions of its aging infrastructure as an enterprise-level risk; failure to inspect, 

9 maintain, repair, and/or replace its aging equipment; failure to conduct an inventory of its 

10 electrical assets; and failure to ensure its infrastructure could withstand foreseeable weather 

11 conditions as required by law are all indicative of what has been called PG&E's "run to failure" 

12 approach to its infrastructure. 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

179. PG&E has a well-documented history of implementing this "run to failure" 

approach with its aging infrastructure, ignoring necessary maintenance and creating hazards to 

the public. According to a filing by Office of Ratepayer Advocates with the CPUC in May 2013: 

However, as we saw in Section V.F.3 above, the Overland Audit explains how 

PG&E systematically underfunded GT &S integrity management and 

maintenance operations for the years 2008 through 2010. PG&E engaged in a 

'run to failure' strategy whereby it deferred needed maintenance projects and 

changed the assessment method for several pipelines from ILI to the less 

informative ECDA approach all to increase its profits even further beyond its 

already generous authorized rate of return, which averaged 11.2% between 1996 

and 2010. 

Given PG&E's excessive profits over the period of the Overland Audit, there is 

no reason to believe that Overland's example regarding GT&S operations 

between 2008 and 2010 was unique. The IRP Report supplements the Overland 

Audit findings with additional examples of PG&E management's commitment to 

profits over safety. Thus, it is evident that while the example of GT &S 

underfunding between 2008 and 2010 might be extreme, it was not an isolated 

incident; rather, it represents the culmination of PG&E management's longstanding policy to squeeze every nickel it could from PG&E gas operations and 

maintenance, regardless of the long term 'run to failure' impacts. And PG&E has 

offered no evidence to the contrary. 68 

68 ftp://ftp2.cpuc.ca.gov/PG&E20150 l 30ResponseToA 13120l2Ruling/2013/03/ 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

47 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 53

of 74
confidential

confidential

180. PG&E's "run to failure" approach to maintenance proximately caused the North 

2 Bay Fires and the injuries, deaths, harm and property destruction arising therefrom. 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

181. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED). 

182. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED). 

183. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

184. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

G. PG&E'S CORPORATE CULTURE IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE 

NORTH BAY FIRES 

185. PG&E has a virtual monopoly in the provision of gas and electric services to the 

10 general public in almost all counties and cities across Northern and Central California. 69 

11 186. Over the past thirty-plus years, PG&E has been subject to numerous fines, 

12 penalties, and/or convictions as a result of its failure to abide by safety rules and regulations, 

13 including the fines, penalties, settlements, and convictions detailed above. Despite these 

14 recurring punishments, PG&E continues to display a shocking degree of arrogant complacency, 

15 refuses to modify its behavior, and continues to conduct its business with a conscious disregard 

16 for· the safety of the public, including the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS. 

17 187. Rather than spend the money it obtains from customers for infrastructure 

18 maintenance and safety, PG&E funnels this funding to boost its own corporate profits and 

19 compensation. This pattern and practice of favoring profits over having a solid and well20 maintained infrastructure that would be safe and dependable for years to come left PG&E 

21 vulnerable to an increased risk of a catastrophic event such as the North Bay Fires. 

22 188. For example, according to documents released by The Utility Reform Network 

23 ("TURN"), PG&E planned to replace a segment of the San Bruno pipeline in 2007 that it 

24 identified as one of the riskiest pipelines in PG&E's system. PG&E collected $5 million from 

25 its customers to complete the project by 2009, but instead deferred the project until it was too 

26 

27 

SB_GT&S_0039691.pdf (last accessed February 12, 2018). 

28 69 A few cities like Palo Alto and Sacramento provide their own gas and electric utility services. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

48 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 54

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 late and repurposed the money to other priorities. That same year, PG&E spent nearly $5 

2 million on bonuses for six of its top executives. 

3 189. Further, Geisha Williams, PG&E's CEO, is slated to receive at least $12.23 

4 million in bonuses over the next few years, depending on the future performance of the 

5 company. This is on top of her $1.085 million annual salary, which rose 3 percent from 2017 to 

6 2018.70 

7 190. Moreover, PG&E has implemented multiple programs that provide monetary 

8 incentives to its employees, agents, and/or contractors to not protect public safety. Prior to the 

9 Butte Fire, PG&E chose to provide a monetary incentive through the VMII program to its 

10 contractors to cut fewer trees, even though PG&E was required to have an inspection program in 

11 place that removed dangerous trees and reduced the risk of wildfires. Robert Urban, a regional 

12 officer for a PG&E contractor, stated that he had a concern that the bonus system incentivized 

13 his employees to not do their job, but PG&E chose to keep this program despite knowing this 

14 risk. 

15 191. Similarly, prior to the San Bruno explosion, PG&E had a program that provided 

16 financial incentives to employees to not report or fix gas leaks and keep repair costs down. This 

17 program resulted in the failure to detect a significant number of gas leaks, many of which were 

18 considered serious leaks. According to Richard Kuprewicz, an independent pipeline safety 

19 expert, PG&E's incentive system was "training and rewarding people to do the wrong thing," 

20 emblematic of "a seriously broken process," and "explains many of the systemic problems in this 

21 operation that contributed to the [San Bruno] tragedy."71 

22 192. As detailed above, the North Bay Fires are just one example of the many tragedies 

23 that have resulted from PG&E's enduring failure to protect the public from the dangers 

24 associated with its operations. PG&E power lines, transformers, conductors, poles, insulators, 

25 

26 

27 

28 

70 https ://www.sfchronicle.com/business/ articl e/PG-E-C EO-could-get-more-than-12-mil lion-in12714473 .ph p (last accessed March 6, 2018). 

http://www. sf gate. com/news/ artic I e/PG-E-incenti ve-system-b lamed-for-I eak-o versights2424430. php 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

49 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 55

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 and/or other electrical equipment have repeatedly started wildfires due to PG&E's ongomg 

2 failure to create, manage, implement, and/or maintain effective vegetation management 

3 programs for the areas near and around its electrical equipment. Further, PG&E's aging 

4 infrastructure has caused multiple disasters throughout California. 

5 193. As detailed more fully above, PG&E' s failures to reduce the risk of wildfire are 

6 serious and widespread, and contributed to causing the North Bay Fires. The reclosers in 

7 PG&E's system were set to avoid outages and not to avoid fires, even though fire conditions 

8 were known to be extreme. PG&E failed to have a reasonable system in place to make sure that 

9 its contractors were properly performing tree and/or vegetation inspections and removal, pole 

10 clearance, and pole inspections. PG&E failed to take any steps to look for what it calls Facility 

11 Protect Trees (trees which pose a risk of falling into the line), even though it knew such trees 

12 were likely to exist after its contractors had perfonned their work. PG&E failed to properly 

13 construct its power lines and thereafter failed to take reasonable steps to make sure the poles and 

14 lines were sufficiently strong to support lines and other equipment that were added by third 

15 parties. Finally, despite knowing that wildfires posed the greatest risk to the public from its 

16 electrical operations, PG&E chose to not ensure that its contractors were properly trained in tree 

17 inspections and removal, chose to not ensure that its contractors hired people who met PG&E's 

18 minimum qualifications, and chose to not participate in the training of its contractors. 

19 194. As the numbers of disasters caused by PG&E continue to mount, the number of 

20 "feel good" commercials it airs increases exponentially. Those "concerned neighbor" 

21 commercials cannot the true nature of PG&E's corporate culture of greed, indifference, dogged 

22 refusal to take responsibility for its actions, and persistent failure to institute obvious measures to 

23 protect the public. 

24 V. CAUSES OF ACTION 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 

NEGLIGENCE 

(Against All Defendants) 

25 

26 

27 195. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS incorporate and re-allege each of the 

28 paragraphs set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

50 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 56

of 74
confidential

confidential

196. The North Bay Fires were a direct and legal result of the negligence, carelessness, 

2 recklessness, and/or unlawfulness of DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them. DEFENDANTS, 

3 and/or each of them, breached their respective duties owed individually and/or collectively to the 

4 insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS by, 

5 including but not limited to: ( 1) failing to comply with the applicable statutory, regulatory, 

6 and/or professional standards of care; (2) failing to timely and properly maintain, manage, 

7 inspect, and/or monitor the subject power lines, electrical equipment, and/or adjacent vegetation; 

8 (3) failing to properly cut, trim, prune, and/or otherwise keep vegetation at a sufficient distance 

9 to avoid foreseeable contact with power lines; (4) failing to trim and/or prune vegetation so as to 

10 avoid creation of a safety hazard within close proximity of the subject power line; ( 5) failing to 

11 make the overhead lines safe under all the exigencies created by surrounding circumstances and 

12 conditions; (6) failing to conduct adequate, reasonably prompt, proper, effective, and/or frequent 

13 inspections of the electrical transmission lines, wires, and/or associated equipment; (7) failing to 

14 design, construct, monitor, and/or maintain high voltage electrical transmission, and/or 

15 distribution power lines in a manner that avoids the potential to ignite a fire during long, dry 

16 seasons by allowing vegetation to grow in an unsafe manner; (8) failing to install the equipment 

17 necessary and/or to inspect and repair the equipment installed, to prevent electrical transmission 

18 and distribution lines from improperly sagging, operating, and/or making contact with other 

19 metal wires placed on its poles and igniting fires; (9) failing to keep equipment in a safe 

20 condition and/or manage equipment to prevent fire at all times; (10) failing to de-energize power 

21 lines during fire prone conditions; ( 11) failing to de-energize power lines after the fire's ignition; 

22 and/or (12) failing to properly train and to supervise employees and agents responsible for 

23 maintenance and inspection of the distribution lines and/or vegetation areas nearby these lines. 

24 197. As a direct and legal result of DEFENDANTS' actions and omissions, the 

25 insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have 

26 suffered damage as alleged in Paragraph 9. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS who are obligated 

27 to make payments or have made payments to their insured(s) are equitably subrogated to the 

28 rights of their insured(s), "stand in their shoes," and are entitled to bring this claim for payments 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

51 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 57

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 made or to be made. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS investigated, adjusted and paid, and may 

2 in the future pay, said damage, injury and loss, consistent with its policies of insurance and its 

3 obligations under law, and said payments were not voluntary. SUBROGATION 

4 PLAINTIFFS' damages are in a liquidated sum; the amount paid to their insureds. 

5 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' insureds have an existing, assignable cause of action against 

6 DEFENDANTS, which the insureds could have asserted for their own benefit had they not been 

7 compensated for their losses by SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS. As such, SUBROGATION 

8 PLAINTIFFS have suffered damages caused by an act or omission of DEFENDANTS, and 

9 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have equitable and/or legal subrogation rights against 

10 DEFENDANTS herein, to the extent of the payments made. Justice requires that the loss be 

11 entirely shifted from SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS to DEFENDANTS, whose equitable 

12 position is inferior to that of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS. 

13 

14 

15 

198. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

199. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

200. As a further direct and legal result of DEFENDANTS' actions and/or omissions, 

16 and/or each of them, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION 

17 PLAINTIFFS have suffered a loss of income, loss of earning capacity, loss of profits, increased 

18 expenses due to displacement, and/or other consequential economic losses in an amount 

19 according to proof at trial. 

20 201. As a further direct and legal result of DEFENDANTS' actions and/or omissions, 

21 and/or each of them, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION 

22 PLAINTIFFS have suffered damage to real property, including the loss of vegetation, trees, and 

23 structures, the creation of hydrophobic soil conditions, and a loss of use, benefit, goodwill, 

24 diminution in value, and/or enjoyment of such property in an amount according to proof at trial. 

25 202. As a further direct and legal result of DEFENDANTS' actions and/or omissions, 

26 and/or each of them, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION 

27 PLAINTIFFS have suffered damage to and/or a loss of personal property, including but not 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

52 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 58

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 limited to items of peculiar value to the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and 

2 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS in an amount according to proof at trial. 

3 203. As a further direct and legal result of DEFENDANTS' actions and/or omissions, 

4 and/or each of them, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION 

5 PLAINTIFFS have incurred and will continue to incur expenses and other economic damages 

6 related to the damage to their property, including costs relating to storage, clean-up, disposal, 

7 repair, depreciation, and/or replacement of their property, and/or other related consequential 

8 damages in an amount according to proof at trial. 

9 204. PG&E has a virtual monopoly over the transmission and distribution of electrical 

10 power to the areas affected by the North Bay Fires and has individual contracts with all residents 

11 and businesses in those areas to whom it distributes that electrical power. The communities 

12 affected by the North Bay Fires are all dependent upon the safe transmission and distribution of 

13 that electrical power for continuous residential and commercial usage, and PG&E has 

14 contractual, statutory, and public duties to provide that electrical power in a manner that 

15 promotes those individual and public interests. 

16 205. The potential harms to the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and 

17 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS from wildfires such as the North Bay Fires were objectively 

18 foreseeable both in nature and in scope and were subjectively known to PG&E from its long and 

19 tragic history of causing such wildfires. 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

206. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

207. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

208. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 

(Against All Defendants) 

209. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

210. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

211. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

53 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 59

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

212. 

213. 

214. 

215. 

216. 

217. 

218. 

219. 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 

(Against All Defendants) 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

[INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

INVERSE CONDEMNATION 

(Against All Defendants) 

220. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS incorporate and re-allege each of the 

15 paragraphs set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 

16 221. On or around October 8 or 9, 2017, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' insureds 

17 were owners of real property and/or personal property and/or automobiles located within Butte, 

18 Calaveras, Lake, Mendocino, Napa, Nevada, Solano, Sonoma, and/or Yuba Counties in the area 

19 of the North Bay Fires. 

20 222. Prior to and on October 8 or 9, 2017, DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, 

21 installed, owned, operated, used, controlled, and/or maintained power lines and other electrical 

22 equipment for the public delivery of electricity, including power lines in and around the location 

23 of the North Bay Fires. 

24 223. On or around October 8 or 9, 2017, as a direct, necessary, and legal result of 

25 DEFENDANTS' design, installation, ownership, operation, use, control, management, and/or 

26 maintenance for a public use, the power lines and/or other electrical equipment came in contact 

27 with vegetation and/or broke, failed, fell down, sparked, and/or exploded, causing wildfires that 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

54 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 60

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 burned thousands of acres, including property owned or occupied by insured(s) of 

2 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS. The fires damaged and/or destroyed the insured(s) of 

3 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' real and/or personal property. 

4 224. The above described damage to the insured(s) of SUBROGATION 

5 PLAINTIFFS' property was legally and substantially caused by the actions of DEFENDANTS, 

6 and/or each of them, in their design, installation, ownership, operation, use, control, 

7 management, and/or maintenance of the power lines and other electrical equipment for a public 

8 use. PG&E is a privately owned public utility, which enjoys a state-protected monopoly or 

9 quasi-monopoly, derived from its exclusive franchise provided by the State of California and is 

10 more akin to a governmental entity than a purely private entity, and runs its utility affairs like a 

11 governmental entity. PG&E's monopoly is guaranteed and safeguarded by the California Public 

12 Utilities Commission, which possesses the power to refuse to issue certificates of public 

13 convenience and necessity to permit potential competition to enter the market. The policy 

14 justifications underlying inverse condemnation liability are that individual property owners 

15 should not have to contribute disproportionately to the risks from public improvements made to 

16 benefit the community as a whole. Under the rules and regulations set forth by the California 

17 Public Utilities Commission, amounts that DEFENDANTS must pay in inverse condemnation 

18 can be included in their rates and spread among the entire group of rate payers so long as they 

19 are otherwise acting as a reasonable and prudent manager of their electric distribution systems. 

20 225. The insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION 

21 PLAINTIFFS have not received adequate compensation for the damage to and/or destruction of 

22 their property, thus constituting a taking or damaging of the insured(s) of SUBROGATION 

23 PLAINTIFFS' property by DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, without just compensation. 

24 226. As a direct and legal result of the actions and/or omissions of the 

25 DEFENDANTS, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS suffered damages to their 

26 real and/or personal property and/or automobiles, including loss of use, business interruption, 

27 interference with access, and/or diminution in value and/or marketability, which amounts were 

28 paid by SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS in an amount according to proof at trial. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

55 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 61

of 74
confidential

confidential

227. As a direct and legal result of the actions and/or om1ss10ns of the 

2 DEFENDANTS, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have incurred and will continue to incur 

3 costs, disbursements, and/or expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, engineering, 

4 and/or other expert fees due to the conduct of the DEFENDANTS in amounts that cannot yet be 

5 ascertained, but which are recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1036. 

6 

7 

8 

9 

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

PUBLIC NUISANCE 

(Against All Defendants) 

228. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS incorporate and re-allege by this reference each 

10 of the paragraphs set forth as though fully set forth herein. 

11 229. The insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS own and/or occupy property 

12 at or near the site of the North Bay Fires which is the subject of this action. At all relevant times 

13 herein, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS had a right to occupy, enjoy, and/or 

14 use their property without interference by DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them. 

15 230. DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, owed a duty to the public, including the 

16 insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS herein, to 

17 conduct their business, in particular the maintenance and/or operation of power lines, power 

18 poles, and/or electrical equipment on power poles, and adjacent vegetation in proximity to their 

19 power lines in and around Butte, Calaveras, Lake, Mendocino, Napa, Nevada, Solano, Sonoma, 

20 and/or Yuba Counties in a manner that did not threaten harm or injury to the public welfare from 

21 operation of those power lines. 

22 231. DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, by acting and/or failing to act, as alleged 

23 hereinabove, created a conditions which was harmful to the health of the public, including these 

24 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and their insured(s), and which interfered with the 

25 comfortable occupancy, use, and/or enjoyment of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' insured(s) 

26 property. 

27 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

56 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 62

of 74
confidential

confidential

232. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS did not consent, expressly or impliedly, to the 

2 wrongful conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, in acting in the manner set forth 

3 above. 

4 233. The hazardous conditions that were created by and/or permitted to exist by 

5 DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, affected a substantial number of people within the general 

6 public, including the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS herein, and constituted a 

7 public nuisance under Civil Code§§ 3479 and 3480 and Public Resources Code§ 4171. Further, 

8 the ensuing uncontrolled wildfire constituted a public nuisance under Public Resources Code § 

9 4170. 

10 234. The damaging effects of DEFENDANTS' maintenance of a fire hazard and the 

11 ensuing uncontrolled wildfire are ongoing and affect the public at large. As a result of the fire's 

12 location, temperature, and/or duration, extensive areas of hydrophobic soils developed within the 

13 fire's perimeter. This further caused significant post fire runoff hazards to occur, including 

14 hillside erosion, debris flow hazards, sediment laden flow hazards, and hillside erosion. As a 

15 result, large quantities of ash and sediment will be deposited in perennial and ephemeral 

16 watercourses. 

17 235. As a direct and legal result of the conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or each of 

18 them, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS suffered harm that is different from the 

19 type of harm suffered by the general public. Specifically, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION 

20 PLAINTIFFS have lost the occupancy, possession, use, and/or enjoyment of their land, real 

21 and/or personal property and/or automobiles, including, but not limited to: (a) a reasonable and 

22 rational fear that the area is still dangerous; (b) a diminution in the fair market value of their 

23 property; (c) an impairment of the salability of their property; (d) soils that have become 

24 hydrophobic; (e) exposure to an array of toxic substances on their land; (f) the presence of 

25 "special waste" on their property that requires special management and disposal; and (g) a 

26 lingering smell of smoke, and/or constant soot, ash, and/or dust in the air. To the extent that 

27 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS insured such losses and made payment for such losses, 

28 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover such amounts from DEFENDANTS. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

57 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 63

of 74
confidential

confidential

236. As a further direct and legal result of the conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or each 

2 of them, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have suffered, and will continue to 

3 suffer, discomfort, anxiety, fear, worries, annoyance, and/or stress attendant to the interference 

4 with PLAINTIFFS' occupancy, possession, use and/or enjoyment of their property, as alleged 

5 above. To the extent that SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS insured such losses and made 

6 payment for such losses, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover such amounts 

7 from DEFENDANTS. 

8 237. A reasonable, ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or disturbed by the 

9 condition created by DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, and the resulting fire. 

10 238. The conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, is unreasonable and the 

11 senousness of the harm to the public, including the insured(s) of SUBROGATION 

12 PLAINTIFFS herein, outweighs the social utility of DEFENDANTS' conduct. 

13 239. The individual and/or collective conduct of DEFENDANTS set forth above, 

14 and/or each of them, resulting in the North Bay Fires is not an isolated incident, but is ongoing 

15 and/or a repeated course of conduct, and DEFENDANTS' prior conduct and/or failures have 

16 resulted in other fires and damage to the public. 

17 240. The unreasonable conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, is a direct 

18 and legal cause of the harm, injury, and/or damage to the public, including SUBROGATION 

19 PLAINTIFFS herein. To the extent that SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS insured such losses 

20 and made payment for such losses, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover such 

21 amounts from DEFENDANTS. 

22 241. DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, have individually and/or collectively, 

23 failed and refused to conduct proper inspections and to properly trim, prune, and/or cut 

24 vegetation in order to ensure the sole delivery of electricity to residents through the operation of 

25 power lines in the affected area, and DEFENDANTS' individual and/or collective failure to do 

26 so exposed every member of the public, residing in Butte, Calaveras, Lake, Mendocino, Napa, 

27 Nevada, Solano, Sonoma, and/or Yuba Counties, to a foreseeable danger of personal injury, 

28 death, and/or a loss of or destruction real and personal property. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

58 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 64

of 74
confidential

confidential

242. The conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, set forth above constitutes 

2 a public nuisance within the meaning of Civil Code §§ 3479 and 3480, Public Resources Code 

3 §§ 4104, 4170 and 4171, and Code of Civil Procedure § 731. Under Civil Code § 3493, the 

4 insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have 

5 standing to maintain an action for public nuisance because the nuisance is especially injurious to 

6 the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS because, as more specifically described 

7 above, it is injurious and/or offensive to the senses of the insured(s) of SUBROGATION 

8 PLAINTIFFS, unreasonably interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of their properties, 

9 and/or unlawfully obstructs the free use, in the customary manner, of the insured(s) of 

10 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' properties, and have suffered harm, injury, and damages. 

11 243. For these reasons, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS seek a permanent injunction 

12 enjoining DEFENDANTS, and each of them, from continued violation of: (a) General Order 

13 No. 95, Rules 31. 1-31.5, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.4, and 48-48.l; (b) General Order No. 165; (c) 

14 Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (d) Public Utilities Code § 451. 

15 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS also seek an order directing DEFENDANTS to abate the 

16 existing and continuing nuisance described above, and to the extent that SUBROGATION 

17 PLAINTIFFS insured such losses and made payment for such losses, SUBROGATION 

18 PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover such amounts from DEFENDANTS. 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

PRIVATE NUISANCE 

(Against All Defendants) 

244. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS incorporate and re-allege by this reference each 

of the paragraphs set forth as though fully set forth herein. 

245. DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, by their acts and/or omissions set forth 

above, directly and legally caused an obstruction to the free use of SUROGATION 

PLAINTIFFS' insured(s) property, an invasion the insured(s) of SUBROGATION 

PLAINTIFFS' right to use their property, and/or an interference with the enjoyment of the 

insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' property, resulting in the insured(s) of 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

59 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 65

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS suffering unreasonable harm and substantial actual damages 

2 constituting a nuisance pursuant to Civil Code§§ 3479 and 3481. 

3 246. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of 

4 DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS 

5 suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries and damages as set forth above, and to the extent 

6 that SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS insured such losses and made payment for such losses, 

7 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover such amounts from DEFENDANTS in 

8 an amount according to proof at trial. 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

247. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

(Against All Defendants) 

248. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

249. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

250. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

251. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

252. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

TRESPASS 

(Against All Defendants) 

253. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS incorporate and re-allege by this reference each 

of the paragraphs set forth as though fully set forth herein. 

254. At all times relevant herein, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS 

were the owners, tenants, and/or lawful occupants of property damaged by the North Bay Fires. 

255. DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, in wrongfully acting and/or failing to act 

in the manner set forth above, caused the North Bay Fires to ignite and/or spread out of control, 

causing hann, damage, and/or injury to the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

60 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 66

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 herein, resulting in a trespass upon the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS' property 

2 interests. 

3 256. The insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS did not grant permission for 

4 DEFENDANTS to wrongfully act in a manner so as to cause the North Bay Fires, and thereby 

5 produce fires which spread and wrongfully entered upon their property, resulting in the harm, 

6 injury, and/or damage alleged above. 

7 257. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or 

8 each of them, which led to the trespass, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS have 

9 suffered and will continue to suffer damages. To the extent that SUBROGATION 

10 PLAINTIFFS insured such losses and made payment for such losses, SUBROGATION 

11 PLAINTIFFS are entitled to recover such amounts from DEFENDANTS in an amount 

12 according to proof at trial. 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

258. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

259. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

260. !INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

261. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

262. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED] 

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

PRIVATE ACTION UNDER PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE § 2106 

(Against All Defendants) 

263. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS incorporate and re-allege each of the 

22 paragraphs set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 

23 264. Public Utilities Code§ 2106 creates a private right of action against "[a]ny public 

24 utility which does, causes to be done, or permits any act, matter, or thing prohibited or declared 

25 unlawful, or which omits to do any act, matter, or thing required to be done, either by the 

26 Constitution, any law of this State, or any order or decision of the commission .... " 

27 265. As a Public Utility, DEFENDANTS at all times herein had a duty to properly 

28 design, construct, operate, maintain, inspect, and manage its electrical infrastructure as well as 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

61 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 67

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 trim trees and vegetation m compliance with all relevant prov1s10ns of applicable orders, 

2 decisions, directions, rules or statutes, including, but not limited to, those stated in: (a) General 

3 Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-31.5, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.4, and 48-48.1; (b) General Order No. 

4 165; (c) Code of Civil Procedure § 733; (d) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; 

5 and ( e) Public Utilities Code § 451. 

6 266. The violation of a legislative enactment or administrative regulation which 

7 defines a minimum standard of conduct is unreasonable per se. 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

267. DEFENDANTS violated the above listed requirements, by: 

a. Failing to service, inspect or maintain electrical infrastructure, structures and 

vegetation affixed to and in close proximity to high voltage electrical lines; 

b. Failing to provide electrical supply systems of suitable design; 

c. Failing to construct and to maintain such systems for their intended use of safe 

transmission of electricity considering the known condition of the 

combination of the dry season and vegetation of the area, resulting in the 

property of the insureds of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS being 

susceptible to the ignition and spread of fire and the fire hazard and danger of 

electricity and electrical transmission and distribution; 

d. Failing to properly design, construct, operate, maintain, inspect and manage 

its electrical supply systems and the surrounding arid vegetation resulting in 

said vegetation igniting and accelerating the spread of the fire; 

e. Failing to properly safeguard against the ignition of fire during the course and 

scope of employee work on behalf of DEFENDANTS; and 

f. Failing to comply with the enumerated legislative enactments and 

administrative regulations. 

268. DEFENDANTS proximately and substantially caused the destruction, damage, 

26 and injury to the property of insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS by their violations 

27 of applicable orders, decisions, directions, rules or statutes, including, but not limited to, those 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

62 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 68

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 stated in: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 3 1.1-31.5, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.4, and 48-48.1; 

2 (b) General Order No. 165; (c) Code of Civil Procedure § 733; (d) Public Resources Code §§ 

3 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (e) Public Utilities Code § 4511. 

4 269. The insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS were and are within the class 

5 of persons for whose protection applicable orders, decisions, directions, rules or statutes were 

6 adopted, including, but not limited to, those stated in: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-

7 31.5, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.4, and 48-48.1; (b) General Order No. 165; (c) Code of Civil 

8 Procedure § 733; (d) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (e) Public Utilities 

9 Code § 451. 

10 270. As alleged herein according to proof, DEFENDANTS are liable to 

11 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS for all loss, damages and injury caused by and resulting from 

12 DEFENDANTS' violation of applicable orders, decisions, directions, rules or statutes were 

13 adopted, including, but not limited to, those stated in: (a) General Order No. 95, Rules 31.1-

14 31.5, 35, 38, 43, 43.2, 44.1-44.4, and 48-48.1; (b) General Order No. 165; (c) Code of Civil 

15 Procedure § 733; (d) Public Resources Code §§ 4292, 4293, and 4435; and (e) Public Utilities 

16 Code § 451. 

271. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

VIOLATION OF HEAL TH & SAFETY CODE § 13007 

(Against All Defendants) 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 272. SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS incorporate and re-allege each of the 

22 paragraphs set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 

23 273. By engaging in the acts and/or omissions alleged in this Master Complaint, 

24 DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, negligently, carelessly, recklessly, and/or in violation of 

25 law, set fire to and/or allowed fire to be set to the property of another in violation of Health & 

26 Safety Code § 13007. 

27 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

63 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 69

of 74
confidential

confidential

274. As a direct and legal result of DEFENDANTS' violation of Health & Safety 

2 Code § 13007, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS suffered recoverable damages to property 

3 under Health & Safety Code§ 13007.21 for amounts paid to its insured(s). 

4 275. As a further direct and legal result of the DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, 

5 violating Health & Safety Code § 13007, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS are entitled to 

6 reasonable attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021. 9. 

7 276. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or om1ss10ns of 

8 DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, the insured(s) of SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS and 

9 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries and damages as 

10 set forth above. 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

277. [INTENTIONALLY OMITTED]. 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

64 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 70

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WHEREFORE, SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS pray for judgment against 

DEFENDANTS and DOES 1 through 100, and each of them as follows: 

Dated: 

Dated: 

Dated: 

1. For monetary damages in an amount to be proven at trial, which exceeds the 

jurisdictional minimum of this Court; 

2. For prejudgment interest in accordance with California Civil Code §3287; 

3. For attorneys' fees and cost of suit to the extent allowed by California law, 

including California Code of Civil Procedure § 1036; 

4. On the claim for inverse condemnation, all amounts recoverable under the 

California Constitution including prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, litigation 

expenses, expenses for consultants and experts, and other just compensation; 

and 

5. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 

COZEN O'CONNOR 

3/12/18 By: 

The Law Offices of Shawn E. Caine 

3/12/18 By: 

SHAWN E. CAINE 

Lead Counsel for Subrogation Plaintiffs 

Grotefeld, Hoffmann, Schleiter, Gordon, Ochoa & 

3/12/18 By: 

ELD 

Subrogation Plaintiffs 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

65 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 71

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 

2 

Dated: 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 Dated: 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Berger Kahn, A Law Corporation 

3/1 2/18 

CRAIG S. SIMON 

Lead Counsel for Subrogation Plaintijf'I 

Grotefeld, Hoffmann, Schleiter, Gordon, Ochoa & 

2/1 By: __ � MA RA WALSH OCHOA 

Lead Counsel for Subrogation Plaintiffs 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

66 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 72

of 74
confidential

confidential

1 VII. JURY DEMAND 

2 SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS demand a trial by jury as to all claims in this action. 

3 

4 COZEN O'CONNOR 

5 

6 

Dated: -3/12/18 By: 7 D. MAYCON 

8 nselfor Subrogation Plaint(/].� 

9 

The Law Offices of Shawn E. Caine 

10 

11 Dated: 12/18 By: 

SHAWN E. CAINE 

12 Lead Counsel for Subrogation Plaintiffs 

13 

14 Grotefeld, Hoffmann, Schleiter, Gordon, Ochoa & 

15 

16 

Dated: 2/18 By: 

17 

18 

19 

Berger Kahn, A Law Corporation 

20 

21 Dated: -3/12/18 By: 

CRAIG S. SIMON 

22 Lead Counsel for Subrogation Plaintiffs 

23 

24 Grotefeld, Hoffmann, Schleiter, Gordon, Ochoa & 

25 

26 

Dated: 3/12/1 By: 

27 M WALSH OCHOA 

Lead Counsel for Subrogation Plaintiffs 

28 

MASTER COMPLAINT SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS; JCCP 4955 LEGAL\34788396\1 

67 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 73

of 74
confidential

confidential

PROOF OF SERVICE 

2 I, the undersigned, certify and declare as follows: 

3 I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to this action. My business address is 700 

Larkspur Landing Circle, Suite 280, Larkspur, CA 94939 which is located in the county where the 

4 mailing described below took place. 

5 On the date stated below, I caused to be served in the manner indicated the following 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

documents: 

MASTER COMPLAINT - SUBROGATION PLAINTIFFS 

on the parties involved addressed as follows: 

TO ALL PARTIES LISTED ON THE SERVICE LIST MAINTAINED BY CASEHOMEPAGE 

[] 

[] 

[] 

[J 

[X] 

By Personal Delivery: I caused each such envelope to be delivered by hand to the parties 

listed above on -----

By Mail: I caused each envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, to be placed in the United 

States mail at Larkspur, California. I am readily familiar with the business practice at my place 

of business for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States 

Postal Service. Correspondence so collected and processed is deposited with the United States 

Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. 

By Facsimile: By use of facsimile machine telephone number ( 415) 989-2802, I served a copy 

of the within document on the interested parties at the facsimile numbers listed. The 

transmission was reported as complete and without error. 

By Overnight Delivery: I caused each envelope, with delivery fees provided for, to be 

deposited in a box regularly maintained by UPS or Federal Express. I am readily familiar with 

the business practice at my place of business for collection and processing of correspondence 

for overnight delivery and know that in the ordinary course of my business practice the 

document(s) described above will be deposited in a box or other facility regularly maintained 

by UPS or Federal Express or delivered to an authorized courier or driver authorized by UPS or 

Federal Express to receive documents on the same date that is placed at my place of business 

for collection 

By Electronic Mail Transmission: By submitting a PDF format copy of such document via file 

transfer protocol (ftp) to CaseHomePage through the upload feature on March 12, 2018. The 

document(s) was transmitted by file transfer protocol (ftp) without error. Service will be deemed 

effective per the Electronic Service Agreement amongst the parties. 

23 I certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 

foregoing is true and correct. 

24 

25 EXECUTED ON March 12, 2018 

26 

27 

28 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2864-5 Filed: 07/03/19 Entered: 07/03/19 18:48:47 Page 74 PROOF OF SERVICE 

of 74