In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1224 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JEREMY GLISPIE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 1:18-cr-10002-JES-JEH-1 — James E. Shadid, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 2019 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. On January 23, 2018, the Government filed a single-count indictment against Jeremy Glispie 

for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g). Mr. Glispie entered a plea of guilty, but reserved the right to challenge his anticipated designation as 

an armed career criminal based on his prior convictions for 

residential burglary under Illinois law. Following our guidance, the district court concluded that residential burglary in 
2 No. 19-1224 

Illinois is no broader than “generic burglary” and that it 

therefore qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Consequently, it sentenced Mr. Glispie as an armed career 

criminal and imposed a sentence of 180 months. 

Before this court, Mr. Glispie renews his objection to his 

designation as an armed career criminal based on his convictions for residential burglary under Illinois law. Acknowledging that our decision in Dawkins v. United States, 809 F.3d 

953 (7th Cir. 2016), is controlling, he urges us to revisit that 

decision. According to Mr. Glispie, Dawkins did not explore 

all of the relevant aspects of Illinois burglary. Had we fully 

considered the question, he submits, we would have reached 

the conclusion that residential burglary in Illinois covers a 

broader swath of conduct than generic burglary for purposes 

of the ACCA and, therefore, cannot be used as a predicate 

offense for purposes of the ACCA. 

After considering the briefs and hearing oral argument, 

we conclude that Mr. Glispie has raised an important issue 

that has not been considered fully: whether the limited-authority doctrine applies to the Illinois residential burglary statute. As we will explain, if the limited-authority 

doctrine applies to residential burglary, then a conviction for 

Illinois residential burglary is broader than generic burglary 

and cannot qualify as an aggravated felony for purposes of 

the ACCA. If, however, the limited-authority doctrine does 

not apply to Illinois residential burglary, then a conviction 

under that statute is no broader than generic burglary and 

qualifies as an aggravated felony. Because the Supreme 

Court of Illinois has not made this determination, and because the question is likely to arise frequently and to affect 
No. 19-1224 3

the administration of justice in both the state and federal 

courts, we respectfully seek the assistance of the Supreme 

Court of Illinois by certifying this controlling question of 

law.1

 

I. 

Whether Mr. Glispie’s convictions qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA requires us to look at the elements of 

generic burglary under the ACCA as well as the elements of 

residential burglary under Illinois law. We turn first to the 

ACCA, then to Illinois law, and finally to our cases that have 

addressed the intersection of the two. 

A. Generic Burglary under the ACCA 

The ACCA “increases the sentences of certain federal defendants who have three prior convictions ‘for a violent felony.’” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013) 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). For purposes of the ACCA, a 

violent felony is 1) a crime that “has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 

the person of another” or 2) “burglary, arson, ... extortion, 

[or] involves the use of explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).2

 

1 Because our decision calls into question our decision in Dawkins v. 

United States, 809 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016), we have circulated it to all 

judges in active service in accordance with Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge 

in active service requested to hear this case en banc. 

2 Prior to Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), if a defendant’s 

conviction was not one of the enumerated offenses, it still might have 

qualified as a violent felony if it “involve[d] conduct that present[ed] a 

serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. 

(continued ... ) 
4 No. 19-1224 

To determine whether a past conviction qualifies as one of 

the enumerated offenses, courts employ the categorical approach: 

They compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with 

the elements of the “generic” crime—i.e., the 

offense as commonly understood. The prior 

conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate only 

if the statute’s elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense. 

Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. 

The Supreme Court has addressed the definition of generic burglary under the ACCA on several occasions. In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990), the Court held, 

for the first time, that burglary as set forth in § 924(e)(2)(B) 

meant “‘burglary’ [in] the generic sense in which the term is 

now used in the criminal codes of most States.” The Court 

further explained that, “[a]lthough the exact formulations 

vary, the generic, contemporary meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Id. The Court then 

turned to “the problem of applying this conclusion to cases 

in which the state statute under which a defendant is convicted varies from the generic definition of ‘burglary.’” Id. at 

599. It concluded that “the only plausible interpretation of 

 

( ... continued) 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). However, Johnson held that this “residual” clause of 

§ 924(e)(2)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 
No. 19-1224 5

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is that, like the rest of the enhancement 

statute, it generally requires the trial court to look only to the 

fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior 

offense.” Id. at 602. If the statutory definition of the prior 

crime of conviction is narrower than generic burglary, or has 

“minor variations in terminology,” id. at 599, it qualifies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) as a violent felony. If the definition in 

the state statute is broader than generic burglary, for instance, “by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful, or by including places, such as automobiles and 

vending machines, other than buildings,” a conviction under 

that statute would not qualify as a predicate under the 

ACCA. Id. This process of comparing the elements of the generic crime to those set forth in the state statute of conviction 

has come to be known as the “categorical approach.” 

The Court also spoke directly to the requirements of generic burglary in Descamps. The precise issue before the 

Court in Descamps focused on what legal authorities and 

record documents may be used to determine whether an offense qualifies as one of the enumerated generic offenses 

under the ACCA. Specifically, the Court addressed whether 

a sentencing court may “decide, based on information about 

a case’s underlying facts, that the defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate even though the elements of the crime fail to satisfy our categorical test.” 

Descamps, 570 U.S. at 258. In Descamps, the Government had 

asked the district court to impose an enhanced sentence under the ACCA based in part on the defendant’s conviction 
6 No. 19-1224 

for burglary under California law.3

 The law “provides that a 

‘person who enters’ certain locations ‘with intent to commit 

grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.’” 

Id. at 258–59. The Court noted that the “statute does not require the entry to have been unlawful in the way most burglary laws do. Whereas burglary statutes generally demand 

breaking and entering or similar conduct, California’s does 

not: It covers, for example, a shoplifter who enters a store, 

like any customer, during normal business hours.” Id. at 259. 

“In sweeping so widely,” the Court continued, “the state law 

goes beyond the normal, ‘generic’ definition of burglary.” Id. 

At the trial level, Descamps had argued that this “asymmetry of offense elements precluded his conviction ... from 

serving as an ACCA predicate, whether or not his own burglary involved an unlawful entry that could have satisfied 

the requirements of the generic crime.” Id. The district court, 

however, had disagreed. Looking beyond the statutory elements of the offense to Descamps’s actual conduct, the district court concluded that Descamps’s conduct satisfied the 

generic definition of burglary for purposes of the ACCA. 

The Supreme Court, however, held that the district court 

had erred in deviating from the categorical approach. The 

Court explained that the “modified categorical approach” 

employed by the district court “helps implement the categorical approach when a defendant [has been] convicted of 

violating a divisible statute.” Id. at 263. If the statute is not 

divisible—does not “comprise[] multiple, alternative ver-

 

3 The law at issue was section 459 of the California Penal Code Annotated. 
No. 19-1224 7

sions of the crime”—the modified categorical approach 

simply does not apply. Id. at 262–64. The Court therefore 

concluded that, in Descamps’s case, the modified approach 

had no role to play because “[t]he dispute here does not concern any list of alternative elements. Rather,” the Court continued, 

it involves a simple discrepancy between generic burglary and the crime established in 

§ 459. The former requires an unlawful entry 

along the lines of breaking and entering. The 

latter does not, and indeed covers simple shoplifting ... . In Taylor’s words, then, § 459 “define[s] burglary more broadly” than the generic 

offense. And because that is true—because California, to get a conviction, need not prove that 

Descamps broke and entered—a § 459 violation cannot serve as an ACCA predicate. 

Whether Descamps did break and enter makes 

no difference. And likewise, whether he ever 

admitted to breaking and entering is irrelevant. 

... We know Descamps’ crime of conviction, 

and it does not correspond to the relevant generic offense. Under our prior decisions, the 

inquiry is over. 

Id. at 264–65 (citations and parallel citations omitted); see also 

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016) (observing that, in Descamps, it had “found that a California 

statute swept more broadly than generic burglary because it 

criminalized entering a location (even if lawfully) with the 

intent to steal, and thus encompassed mere shoplifting”). 
8 No. 19-1224 

Following Descamps, the Court twice has addressed the 

elements of generic burglary. In United States v. Stitt, 139 

S. Ct. 399 (2018), the Court considered “whether the statutory term ‘burglary’ includes burglary of a structure or vehicle 

that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight 

accommodation.” Id. at 403–04. The Court held that it does. 

The Court noted that it had been “clear in Taylor that Congress intended the definition of ‘burglary’ to reflect ‘the generic sense in which the term [was] used in the criminal 

codes of most States’ at the time the Act was passed.” Id. at 

406 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598). At that time, “a majority 

of state burglary statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used for lodging—either explicitly or by defining 

‘building’ or ‘structure’ to include those vehicles.” Id. Additionally, Congress 

viewed burglary as an inherently dangerous 

crime because burglary “creates the possibility 

of a violent confrontation between the offender 

and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to investigate.” An offender 

who breaks into a mobile home, an RV, a 

camping tent, a vehicle, or another structure 

that is adapted for or customarily used for 

lodging runs a similar or greater risk of violent 

confrontation. 

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588). The 

second case, Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019), 

decided just last term, addressed “[t]he exceedingly narrow 

question” 
No. 19-1224 9

whether remaining-in burglary[4]

 (i) occurs only if a person has the intent to commit a crime 

at the exact moment when he or she first unlawfully remains in a building or structure, or (ii) 

more broadly, occurs when a person forms the 

intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in a building or structure. 

Id. at 1875. The Court concluded it was the latter. Moving 

from general to specific, the Court “sum[med] up” its holding accordingly: 

The Armed Career Criminal Act does not define the term “burglary.” In Taylor, the Court 

explained that “Congress did not wish to specify an exact formulation that an offense must 

meet in order to count as ‘burglary’ for enhancement purposes.” And the Court recog-

 

4 In Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019), the Court explained 

the origin of “remaining-in” burglary. “At common law,” it noted, “burglary was confined to unlawful breaking and entering a dwelling at 

night with the intent to commit a felony. But by the time Congress 

passed ... the current version of § 924(e) in 1986, state burglary statutes 

had long since departed from the common-law formulation.” Id. at 1876–

77. By that time, States not only had “cast[] off relics like the requirement 

that there be a breaking, or that the unlawful entry occur at night,” but a 

majority of States also “prohibited unlawfully ‘remaining in’ a building 

or structure with intent to commit a crime. Those remaining-in statutes 

closed a loophole in some States’ laws by extending burglary to cover 

situations where a person enters a structure lawfully but stays unlawfully—for example, by remaining in a store after closing time without permission to do so.” Id. at 1877; see also infra note 12 (discussing interpretation of “remaining-in” burglary under Illinois law). 
10 No. 19-1224 

nized that the definitions of burglary “vary” 

among the States. The Taylor Court therefore 

interpreted the generic term “burglary” in 

§ 924(e) in light of: the ordinary understanding 

of burglary as of 1986; the States’ laws at that 

time; Congress’ recognition of the dangers of 

burglary; and Congress’ stated objective of imposing increased punishment on armed career 

criminals who had committed prior burglaries. 

Looking at those sources, the Taylor Court interpreted generic burglary under § 924(e) to 

encompass remaining-in burglary. Looking at 

those same sources, we interpret remaining-in 

burglary under § 924(e) to occur when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at 

any time while unlawfully present in a building or structure. 

Id. at 1879 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 598). 

Drawing from these cases, generic burglary requires “at 

least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged 

entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, 

with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. 

“[O]ther structure[s]” include a vehicle “that has been 

adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.” Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 403–04. Regardless of the type of 

structure, however, the entry itself must be unlawful; an intent to later commit a crime or theft, without more, does not 
No. 19-1224 11

meet this requirement. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264–65; Mathis, 

136 S. Ct. at 2248–49.5

B. Illinois Residential Burglary 

The next step in the categorical approach requires us to 

determine the elements of residential burglary under Illinois 

law. Mr. Glispie asserts that, unlike generic burglary, Illinois 

residential burglary “does not require an unlawful or unauthorized entry, separate and apart from an entry or remaining with intent to commit a crime.”6

 To determine the scope 

of the Illinois residential burglary statute, we look to the 

language of the statute as it has been interpreted by the Illinois courts. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (stating that the “threshold inquiry” whether listed items in a 

criminal statute are “elements or means” had been settled by 

a decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, and, “[w]hen a ruling 

of that kind exists, a sentencing judge need only follow what 

 

5 See also United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 2014) (observing that, if North Carolina’s law prohibiting “breaking or entering” 

“cover[ed] any entry into the building with the intent to commit a crime, 

even when a person enters with the building owner’s consent,” then this 

might “disqualify it as a predicate offense because ‘generic burglary’s 

unlawful-entry element excludes any case in which a person enters 

premises open to the public, no matter his intent’” (quoting Descamps v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 254, 275 (2013)); United States v. Hiser, 532 F. App’x 

648, 648 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the defendant’s two prior convictions for burglary under Nevada law did not qualify as generic burglaries because “Nevada’s burglary statute is facially broader than the generic definition of burglary because it ‘does not require the entry to have 

been unlawful in the way most burglary laws do’” (quoting Descamps, 

570 U.S. at 259)). 

6 Appellant’s Br. 16. 
12 No. 19-1224 

it says”); Smith v. United States, 877 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 

2017) (relying on a decision of the Illinois Appellate Court to 

conclude that the definition of dwelling under the Illinois 

residential burglary statute excludes vehicles other than occupied trailers and therefore is not broader than generic 

burglary).7

 

 

7 We note that, in Descamps, 570 U.S. at 275, the Court “reserve[d] the 

question whether, in determining a crime’s elements, a sentencing court 

should take account not only of the relevant statute’s text, but of judicial 

rulings interpreting it.” However, the Supreme Court has relied explicitly on statutory interpretations by state supreme courts in applying the 

categorical and modified categorical approaches. See Mathis v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 

138 (2010) (stating that the Court was “bound by the Florida Supreme 

Court’s interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements” of Florida battery in assessing whether a conviction under that 

statute “meets the definition of ‘violent felony’ in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)”). Additionally, it has been the regular practice of this 

court, as well as other Courts of Appeals, to rely on state courts’ interpretations of statutes in addressing questions of the breadth of state law. See, 

e.g., Smith v. United States, 877 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2017); United States 

v. Aparicio-Soria, 740 F.3d 152, 154 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“To the extent that the statutory definition of the prior offense has been interpreted 

by the state’s highest court, that interpretation constrains our analysis of 

the elements of state law.” (citing Johnson, 559 U.S. at 138)); United States 

v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “[a] state 

court’s interpretation of a statute is binding in determining whether the 

elements of generic burglary are present” and adhering to a decision of 

the Supreme Court of South Dakota defining the elements of burglary 

under the state statute).
No. 19-1224 13

The Illinois residential burglary statute8

 provides, in relevant part: 

A person commits residential burglary when 

he or she knowingly and without authority enters or knowingly and without authority remains within the dwelling place of another, or 

any part thereof, with the intent to commit 

therein a felony or theft. This offense includes 

the offense of burglary as defined in Section 

19-1. 

720 ILCS 5/19-3(a). Mr. Glispie admits that, “[o]n its face, the 

statute appears to require not only that the State prove that a 

defendant had intent to commit a crime at the time of entry, 

but also that the entry be ‘without authority.’”9 Nevertheless, 

he contends that Illinois courts have “effectively ... collapsed” the “without authority” element with the “intent to 

commit a crime” element with the result that “the State need 

not prove unlawful presence apart from proof of the defendant’s intent.”10 This interpretation has its origins in People v. 

Weaver, 243 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ill. 1968). 

In Weaver, the defendant had entered a laundromat with 

the intent to steal coins from the vending machines inside. 

 

8 Mr. Glispie acknowledges that this was the language of the residential 

burglary statute at all times relevant to his underlying convictions. See

Appellant’s Br. 13. 

9 Id.

10 Id. at 18 (emphasis removed) (quoting People v. Rudd, 970 N.E.2d 580, 

583 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)). 
14 No. 19-1224 

He was charged and convicted under the Illinois burglary 

statute.11 On appeal, he argued that, because the laundromat 

was open to the public at the time in question, “he could 

have entered as a business invitee,” and, therefore, his entry 

“in the store [wa]s as consistent with his innocence as with 

his guilt.” Weaver, 243 N.E.2d at 248. The Supreme Court of 

Illinois rejected this argument: 

While a common-law breaking is no longer an 

essential element of the crime of burglary, the 

statute requires an entry which is both without 

authority and with intent to commit a felony or 

theft. A criminal intent formulated after a lawful entry will not satisfy the statute. But authority to enter a business building, or other 

building open to the public, extends only to 

those who enter with a purpose consistent with 

the reason the building is open. An entry with 

intent to commit a theft cannot be said to be 

within the authority granted patrons of a laundromat. 

Id. (citations omitted). Weaver thus established that one who 

enters a public building with the intent to commit a crime 

 

11 The Illinois burglary statute provides, in relevant part: “A person 

commits burglary when without authority he or she knowingly enters or 

without authority remains within a building, housetrailer, watercraft, 

aircraft, motor vehicle, railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to 

commit therein a felony or theft. This offense shall not include the offenses set out in Section 4-102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.” 720 ILCS 

5/19-1(a).
No. 19-1224 15

automatically satisfies the unlawful entry requirement of the 

Illinois burglary statute. 

Since Weaver, the Supreme Court of Illinois and Appellate Court of Illinois consistently have applied this principle—the limited-authority doctrine—to burglary of public 

establishments.12 See People v. Blair, 288 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ill. 

 

12 The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, has held that the limited-authority doctrine does not apply to burglary by remaining. See People v. Bradford, 50 N.E.3d 1112 (Ill. 2016). In Bradford, the defendant had 

been convicted of burglary under 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) for “knowingly and 

without authority remain[ing] within the building of Walmart, with the 

intent to commit therein a felony or a theft.’” Id. at 1113–14 (alterations in 

original). Before the Supreme Court of Illinois, he argued that he had not 

satisfied the elements of the crime because 

he never exceeded the scope of his physical authority to 

be in the Walmart. He contend[ed] that burglary by remaining is not intended to apply to ordinary shoplifting. 

Rather, it refers to situations in which a person lawfully 

enters a place of business, but, in order to commit a theft 

or felony: (1) hides and waits for the building to close; 

(2) enters an unauthorized area within the building; or 

(3) continues to remain on the premises after being 

asked to leave. Since defendant lawfully entered the 

Walmart during regular business hours, shoplifted merchandise within public areas of the store, and left while 

the store was still open, defendant argues that he committed retail theft, ... rather than burglary ... . 

Id. at 1117. On the authority of People v. Weaver, 243 N.E.2d 245 (Ill. 1968), 

however, the State maintained “that an individual who engages in a ‘discrete act of remaining’ within a store with the intent to commit a theft is 

guilty of burglary by remaining.” Bradford, 50 N.E.3d at 1117. The state 

supreme court, however, rejected this contention. The court explained 

that “it [wa]s not clear what evidence would be sufficient to establish 

(continued ... ) 
16 No. 19-1224 

1972) (quoting Weaver, 243 N.E.2d at 248, for the proposition 

that “authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to those who enter with 

a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open”); 

see also People v. Rudd, 970 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (explaining that, “in the context of a building open to the public, ... the permission to enter does not extend to people who 

enter for purposes that are inconsistent with the purpose for 

which the building is open to the public,” and, therefore, 

 

( ... continued) 

that a defendant ‘remains’ within a public place in order to commit a 

theft.” Id. at 1118. Extending the doctrine to “remaining-in” burglary also 

would “arbitrarily distinguish[] between a defendant who shoplifts one 

item in a store and leaves immediately afterwards and a defendant who 

shoplifts more than one item or lingers inside a store before leaving.” Id. 

Consequently, the court concluded that “burglary by remaining includes 

situations in which an individual enters a public building lawfully, but, 

in order to commit a theft or felony, (1) hides and waits for the building 

to close, (2) enters unauthorized areas within the building, or (3) continues to remain on the premises after his authority is explicitly revoked.” 

Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). 

After Bradford, one state appellate court interpreted that decision to 

eliminate the limited-authority doctrine for unlawful-entry burglary as 

well as remaining-in burglary, “effectively overrul[ing]” Weaver and its 

progeny. See People v. Johnson, 94 N.E.3d 289, 294 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). 

However, in People v. Johnson, No. 123318, 2019 WL 3559640, at *11 (Ill. 

Aug. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate 

court’s decision and reaffirmed Weaver. See infra pp. 16–17 (discussing 

the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Johnson). In Johnson, 2019 

WL 3559640, at *5, the Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly noted that 

“none of the concerns expressed in Bradford apply to burglary involving 

an unauthorized entry based on the intent to commit retail theft.” See also 

infra pp.16–17. 
No. 19-1224 17

“the State need not prove unlawful presence apart from 

proof of the defendant’s intent”); People v. Smith, 637 N.E.2d 

1128, 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (observing that “under Illinois 

law a burglary can occur during business hours in a building 

open to the public” and that such convictions must rest upon 

evidence “sufficient to show an intent to commit a felony or 

theft at the time of entry onto the premises of the business 

establishment”), remanded on other grounds, 643 N.E.2d 198 

(Ill. 1994). Most recently, in People v. Johnson, No. 123318, 

2019 WL 3559640 (Ill. Aug. 1, 2019), the Supreme Court of 

Illinois reaffirmed Weaver; it stated: 

Weaver construed the current burglary statute 

over 50 years ago (and 7 years after it was enacted) as granting a patron of a building open 

to the public only limited authority to enter the 

establishment for a “purpose consistent with 

the reason the building is open.” Weaver, 243 

N.E.2d [at 248]. And “[a]n entry with intent to 

commit a theft cannot be said to be within the 

authority granted patrons.” Id. The appellate 

court has consistently, and quite correctly, applied this holding to open retail shops. And 

while the General Assembly has amended the 

burglary statute a number of times in the 

half-century since Weaver was decided, it has 

never acted to reverse Weaver and its progeny’s 

interpretation of the statute. When the legislature does not address by way of amendment a 

judicial construction of a statute by this court, 

it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation and such a con-
18 No. 19-1224 

struction becomes as much a part of the statute 

as if plainly written into it. 

Johnson, 2019 WL 3559640, at *7 (citations and parallel citations omitted). 

The Supreme Court of Illinois also has held that the limited-authority doctrine applies to the Illinois home-invasion 

statute, which, like the residential burglary statute, has as an 

element that the defendant “without authority ... knowingly 

enter[] the dwelling place of another.” 720 ILCS 5/19-6. Specifically, in People v. Bush, 623 N.E.2d 1361, 1364 (Ill. 1993), 

the Supreme Court of Illinois stated: 

In [People v. ]Peeples, [616 N.E.2d 294 (Ill. 1993),] 

this court stated that when a defendant comes 

to a private residence and is invited in by the 

occupant, the authorization to enter is limited 

and that criminal actions exceed this limited 

authority. No individual who is granted access 

to a dwelling can be said to be an authorized 

entrant if he intends to commit criminal acts 

therein, because, if such intentions had been 

communicated to the owner at the time of entry, it would have resulted in the individual’s 

being barred from the premises ab initio. Thus, 

the determination of whether an entry is unauthorized depends upon whether the defendant 

possessed the intent to perform a criminal act 

therein at the time entry was granted. If, as in 

Peeples, the defendant gains access to the victim’s residence through trickery and deceit and 

with the intent to commit criminal acts, his entry is unauthorized and the consent given viti-
No. 19-1224 19

ated because the true purpose for the entry exceeded the limited authorization granted. 

Conversely, where the defendant enters with 

an innocent intent, his entry is authorized, and 

criminal actions thereafter engaged in by the 

defendant do not change the status of the entry. 

Bush, 623 N.E.2d at 1364 (citations omitted). 

Although the Supreme Court of Illinois has applied this 

doctrine consistently to entry of public buildings under the 

burglary statute and to entry of dwellings under the 

home-invasion statute, it never has addressed whether the 

doctrine applies to entry of dwellings under the residential

burglary statute, the statute under which Mr. Glispie was 

convicted. The issue was raised in People v. Wilson, 614 

N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. 1993), but the Supreme Court of Illinois neither reached nor resolved the issue, see id. at 1231. 

The majority of Illinois Appellate Courts,13 however, have 

extended this doctrine to the residential burglary statute. See, 

e.g., People v. Walker, 547 N.E.2d 1036, 1038–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1989) (noting that the defendants were permitted into the 

victim’s home for a specific purpose, but that the evidence 

“established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Caruth 

 

13 The Government argues that decisions from the Supreme Court of Illinois are the only authoritative source for determining the meaning of a 

state statute. See Gov’t’s Br. 17. Although it is true that only state supreme court cases bind this court, state appellate court decisions nevertheless provide significant guidance. Indeed, in Smith, 877 F.3d at 723, 

we relied on an Illinois Appellate Court opinion to determine the “dwelling” requirement of the Illinois residential burglary statute. 
20 No. 19-1224 

brothers entered with the intent to commit a robbery and 

that such entry was unauthorized”); People v. Fisher, 404 

N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (applying doctrine to 

burglary of an apartment); see also, e.g., People v. Hodge, No. 

5-11-0082, 2012 WL 7070081, at *4 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 3, 2012) 

(unpublished) (“[A]ssuming arguendo that the State did not 

meet its burden of proof regarding the defendant’s authority 

to enter the home, this court nevertheless agrees with the 

State that the defendant would have forfeited such authority 

under the ‘limited authority’ doctrine” because the defendant “had intent to perform a criminal act at the time entry 

was granted.”).14 

Despite these authorities, the Government maintains that 

there is little indication that the Supreme Court of Illinois 

 

14 Mr. Glispie notes that the second district appellate court is the lone 

holdout for requiring “separate proof of unauthorized entry, apart from 

a contemporaneous intent to commit a theft or felony.” Reply Br. 13. He 

submits, however, that given that appellate court’s decision in People v. 

Dillavou, 958 N.E.2d 1118, 1121–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), it “appears to have 

fallen in line with its sister districts.” Reply Br. 13. In Dillavou, however, 

the defendant was not convicted of residential burglary based on entering without authority; “[r]ather, defendant was convicted under the second part of the residential burglary statute”: “‘knowingly and without 

authority remain[ing] within’” the victim’s home. 958 N.E.2d at 1121 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). Thus, Dillavou did not address the 

critical issue—whether the first prong of the burglary statute requires 

“separate proof of unauthorized entry, apart from a contemporaneous 

intent to commit a theft or felony.” Indeed, in Dillavou, the court did not 

even reach the question whether “the limited-authority doctrine applies 

to defendants charged with residential burglary by remaining without 

authority.” Id. at 1123. Dillavou, therefore, does not convince us that the 

second district appellate court has altered its course. 
No. 19-1224 21

would agree with the appellate courts that the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary. First, 

it notes that the Supreme Court of Illinois “expressly declined to consider” the issue in Wilson, 614 N.E.2d at 1231.15

The Government, however, has not come forward with any 

authority suggesting that the court’s action in Wilson—

postponing resolution of an issue until it is necessary for 

disposition of a case before it—is evidence that the Supreme 

Court of Illinois would be unwilling, in the appropriate case, 

to extend the limited-authority doctrine to residential burglary. Second, the Government contends that the state supreme court’s discussion in Johnson “emphasized that its rationale and holding were restricted to the commercial context.”16 This is not surprising, however, because Johnson involved a conviction for burglary of a department store. The 

court had neither the opportunity, nor any reason, to speak 

in broader terms. Third, the Government submits that there 

are “essential differences between commercial establishments and residences, in relation to the presence of other 

persons, [that] militate against any assumption that the state 

supreme court would apply the limited-authority doctrine to 

residential burglary.”17 This argument would have more 

force if the Supreme Court of Illinois had not applied the 

doctrine to the home-invasion statute. As the Supreme Court 

of Illinois already has extended the doctrine to home invasion, however, it is unlikely that it would be persuaded by a 

 

15 Gov’t’s Br. 14. 

16 Id. at 27. 

17 Id. at 28. 
22 No. 19-1224 

commercial-residential distinction. Moreover, in Bush, the 

Supreme Court of Illinois relied in part on People v. Hudson, 

448 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983), for the proposition that 

the “interpretation of language ‘without authority’ in [the] 

home invasion statute should be consistent with [the] meaning given [the] same language in [the] burglary statute.” 

Bush, 623 N.E.2d at 1364. By extension, the “without authority” language in the residential burglary statute18 should be 

given the same meaning as that of the burglary and 

home-invasion statutes.19 

 

18 See supra p.12 (setting forth the language of the residential burglary 

statute). 

19 The Government also argues that extending the limited-authority doctrine to residential burglary would render subsection (a-5) of that statute 

superfluous. See Gov’t’s Br. 30. Subsection (a-5), added to the statute in 

2010, provides that “[a] person commits residential burglary when he or 

she falsely represents himself or herself ... for purpose of gaining entry 

to the dwelling place of another, with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft or to facilitate the commission therein of a felony or theft by another.” 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a-5) (emphasis added). The Government maintains 

that “[a]pplying the limited-authority doctrine to residential burglary, 

and thus permitting courts to infer unauthorized entry or remaining 

merely from the burglar’s intent, would essentially eliminate the separate element of unauthorized entry or remaining from cases under subsection (a), rendering subsection (a-5) unnecessary.” Gov’t’s Br. 30–31. If 

the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary, there may 

be some overlap between subsections (a) and (a-5); nevertheless subsection (a-5) still would encompass situations that subsection (a) would not. 

An individual violates subsection (a-5) when his entry of a dwelling is 

either with “intent to commit therein a felony or theft,” or “with the intent ... to facilitate the commission therein of a felony or theft by another.” Subsection (a-5) therefore encompasses individuals who have no 

(continued ... ) 
No. 19-1224 23

Thus, the weight of Illinois cases, as well as principles of 

statutory interpretation, suggest that the limited-authority 

doctrine applies to residential burglary, just as it does to 

burglary and to home invasion. If that is the case, and proof 

of “intent to commit ... a felony or theft” also satisfies the 

element of entering “without authority,” then Illinois residential burglary is broader than generic burglary under the 

ACCA20 and cannot be used as a predicate offense for an increased sentence under the ACCA. 

II. 

Given the frequency with which this issue arises, the 

possible impact of its resolution on Illinois citizens, and the 

importance of this issue in the application of the ACCA in 

this circuit, we believe the appropriate course of action is to 

certify this controlling issue of law to the Supreme Court of 

Illinois. The principle impediment to our pursuing this 

course is our prior decision of Dawkins v. United States, 809 

F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016), which addressed the scope of entering “without authority” under the Illinois burglary statutes. 

The Government maintains that Dawkins controls the issue 

before us and should not be reconsidered. Mr. Glispie maintains that, in light of both the strong evidence that Illinois 

recognizes the limited-authority doctrine and our failure to 

consider that doctrine in Dawkins, we must revisit that decision. 

 

( ... continued) 

intent to commit a crime themselves, but are “casing” the dwelling for 

another individual. 

20 See supra p.10. 
24 No. 19-1224 

In Dawkins, the petitioner had pleaded guilty to armed 

robbery and had been sentenced as a career offender under 

the ACCA on the basis of his prior carjacking and Illinois 

burglary convictions. Following his sentence, he sought 

permission to file a successive habeas petition on the basis of 

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held 

that the ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally 

vague.

21 Dawkins maintained that burglary under Illinois 

law was broader than generic burglary; specifically, he submitted that Illinois required only an “entry without authority” which was broader than the “unlawful entry” required 

for generic burglary. Dawkins, 809 F.3d at 955. Because his 

Illinois burglary conviction was not encompassed by one of 

the specifically enumerated offenses in the ACCA, Dawkins 

continued, the now unconstitutional “residual clause” had to 

serve as the basis for designating his burglary as a violent 

felony under the ACCA. He therefore contended that he was 

sentenced under an unconstitutional statute and should 

have been granted permission to pursue habeas relief on that 

basis. 

A divided panel of our court denied relief.22 The majority 

held that Dawkins’s petition did not implicate Johnson because Illinois burglary was not broader than generic burglary under the ACCA. The majority held that the elements of 

residential burglary under Illinois law were indistinguishable from the generic understanding of burglary: “Illinois 

 

21 See supra note 2. 

22 Dawkins’s petition was submitted to the panel on the briefs, without 

the benefit of oral argument. 
No. 19-1224 25

courts, like federal courts, use terms like unlawfully, unauthorized, without consent and without authority interchangeably[.]” Id. (collecting cases). Because Illinois burglary 

and generic burglary are materially indistinguishable, the 

sentencing court did not need to resort to the residual clause 

of the ACCA “to determine that Dawkins’ prior conviction 

for burglary was a conviction for a crime of violence, for it 

was a conviction for ‘burglary’ as defined by the Supreme 

Court in the Taylor decision.” Id. at 956. 

The dissent believed, however, that the majority decision 

failed to undertake the elemental analysis required by the 

categorical approach. The dissent explained that Descamps 

required that, for a state burglary conviction to qualify as 

generic burglary, it must require “the ‘element of breaking 

and entering or similar unlawful conduct.’” Id. at 957 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (quoting Descamps, 570 U.S. at 276). In 

light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps, the dissent perceived “two significant problems” in Dawkins’s application for collateral relief that needed to be “examined by 

the district court in more detail.” Id. First, it was unclear 

which Illinois burglary statute formed the basis for Dawkins’s conviction—the burglary statute or the residential 

burglary statute. Second, neither statute had as an element 

“breaking and entering,” id., and, indeed, the Supreme 

Court of Illinois had held that “a common-law breaking is no 

longer an essential element of the crime of burglary,” id. at 

958 (quoting Weaver, 243 N.E.2d at 248). In light of the language used in Descamps, the dissent believed that it was nec-
26 No. 19-1224 

essary to reassess our prior assumption that Illinois burglary 

qualified as generic burglary under the ACCA.23

We agree with Mr. Glispie that our reasoning in Dawkins

does not reflect the elemental analysis required by the categorical approach. Our consideration of the scope of the un-

 

23 Smith, 877 F.3d 720, also addressed the issue whether a residential 

burglary in Illinois qualified as generic burglary for purposes of the 

ACCA. In Smith, the district courts had read Dawkins “as conclusively 

establishing that residential burglary in Illinois satisfies Taylor.” Id. at 

722. We concluded otherwise: “[T]he only question addressed in Dawkins

was whether residential burglary in Illinois includes the element of 

breaking and entering; we answered yes.” Id. We went on to consider 

whether the Illinois offense includes as an element “entering a ‘building 

or other structure’” as required by Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. The defendants 

had argued that, because Illinois residential burglary requires entry of a 

“dwelling place of another,” and dwelling place is defined as “a house, 

apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters,” the Illinois 

statute is broader than the generic offense. Smith, 877 F.3d at 722–23 

(quoting 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) and 720 ILCS 5/2-6(b), respectively). We rejected that argument. We explained that Taylor “set out to create a federal 

common-law definition of ‘burglary’” and therefore “counsel[ed] against 

reading its definition as if it were a statute.” Id. at 723. In Taylor, we continued, the Court was attempting to get to a common understanding of 

burglary. By the time Taylor was handed down, most states had amended their burglary statutes to cover trailers and mobile homes. We 

thought “it unlikely that the Justices set out in Taylor to adopt a definition of generic burglary that is satisfied by no more than a handful of 

states—if by any.” Id. at 724. We concluded that “[p]eople live in trailers, 

which are ‘structures’ as a matter of ordinary usage. Trailers used as 

dwellings are covered by the Illinois residential-burglary statute. The 

crime in 720 ILCS 5/19-3 therefore is ‘burglary’ under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Defendants were properly sentenced as armed career criminals.” Id. at 

725. Smith, therefore, did not rely, or build directly, upon our holding in 

Dawkins. 
No. 19-1224 27

authorized entry requirement began and ended with the observation that “Illinois courts, like federal courts, use terms 

like unlawfully, unauthorized, without consent, and without 

authority interchangeably[.]” Dawkins, 809 F.3d at 955. This 

would be persuasive reasoning if the cases on which we 

rested our analysis actually had considered the underlying 

meanings of those terms. The bulk of the cases, however, 

contained no such analysis; indeed, most compared other 

elements of generic and statutory burglary or focused on a 

different issue altogether. See, e.g., United States v. 

Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 822–23 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding 

that, given the lack of case law interpreting the South Carolina burglary statute, it was not plain error for the court to 

consider the statute divisible, and, applying the modified 

categorical approach, the district court did not err in concluding that the burglary conviction involved entry into the 

victim’s residence); United States v. Constantine, 674 F.3d 985, 

990 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting defendant’s argument that 

“burglary” under the ACCA should be limited to residential 

burglary), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Bonilla, 687 

F.3d 188, 192–93 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that, where defendant had conceded that “all of the Taylor elements—unlawful 

entry, of a building or other structure, and the requisite intent to commit a felony”—were satisfied, the fact that, under 

Texas law, the intent to commit a felony could be formulated 

before or after the unlawful entry did not take it outside of 

generic burglary). 

The two cases on which we relied in Dawkins and that 

did address the scope of “unauthorized” and “unlawful” entries raise serious questions about the validity of our analytical approach in Dawkins and suggest that we need to consid-
28 No. 19-1224 

er carefully Mr. Glispie’s submission. In United States v. 

Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001), the defendant had argued that a prior conviction for burglary under South Dakota law did not qualify as generic burglary because the statute 

“omits any reference to the required entry being unlawful or 

unprivileged.” Id. at 1196. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged 

that there was “no mention of the lawfulness of the entry” in 

the text of the statute and that it therefore appeared that the 

statute fell outside the generic definition of burglary. Id. It 

noted, however, that the Supreme Court of South Dakota 

had interpreted the statute to include “the element of ‘unlawful or unauthorized entry,’” separate from the element of 

intent, which brought it within the generic definition. Id.

Similarly, in United States v. Lujan, 9 F.3d 890 (10th Cir. 1993), 

the defendant had argued that an “unauthorized entry” required for his New Mexico burglary conviction could “mean 

anything and d[id] not necessarily rise to the level of unlawful or unprivileged entry” required for generic burglary. Id. 

at 892. The Tenth Circuit noted that, in Taylor, the Court had 

relied on the Model Penal Code definition of burglary, 

which reads: “A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a 

building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime 

therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or 

the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under New Mexico law, however, a 

person was not guilty of burglary if he merely “enter[ed] a 

store open to the public with intent to ... commit larceny.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus,” the court 

concluded, “‘unauthorized entry’ as used in the New Mexico 

burglary statute and in Mr. Lujan’s indictment necessarily 
No. 19-1224 29

ha[d] the same meaning as ‘unlawful or unprivileged entry’ 

in Taylor[.]” Id. 

In sum, when issues concerning the scope of “unlawful 

or unprivileged entry” were raised in these cases, the courts 

critically assessed the scope of the relevant state law before 

determining that the generic element was satisfied. Dawkins

does not contain the rigorous elemental analysis found in 

these two cases. We are confident, moreover, that had we 

undertaken that same critical analysis in Dawkins as our sister circuits did in Tighe and Lujan, we would have ended up 

where we are today: facing the critical question whether, 

under Illinois law, the limited-authority doctrine applies to 

residential burglary, effectively collapsing the “unauthorized entry” and “intent to commit ... a felony” requirements, 

and taking it outside of the definition of generic burglary. 

As we have noted, we believe that Illinois case law, as 

well as its principles of statutory interpretation, generally 

point to the conclusion that the Supreme Court of Illinois 

would apply the limited-authority doctrine to the residential 

burglary statute. However, Illinois appellate courts have not 

been unanimous in their extension of this doctrine to residential burglary,24 and application of the doctrine may affect 

the interpretation of other sections of the Illinois residentialburglary and home-invasion statutes.25 “Certification of a 

controlling issue of state law to the highest court of the state 

is one method of reducing the possibility of error” in trying 

to predict what course the state supreme court might choose. 

 

24 See supra note 14. 

25 See supra note 19. 
30 No. 19-1224 

See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 

2002). 

Circuit Rule 52 provides that 

[w]hen the rules of the highest court of a state 

provide for certification to that court by a federal court of questions arising under the laws 

of that state which will control the outcome of 

a case pending in the federal court, this court, 

sua sponte or on motion of a party, may certify 

such a question to the state court in accordance 

with the rules of that court, and may stay the 

case in this court to await the state court’s decision of the question certified. 

Certification to the Supreme Court of Illinois is proper when 

“there are involved in any proceeding before [the Seventh 

Circuit] questions as to the law of this State, which may be 

determinative of the said cause, and there are no controlling 

precedents in the decisions of this court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 20(a). 

Here, the question whether the limited-authority doctrine 

applies to residential burglary will determine whether the 

district court erred in sentencing Mr. Glispie as a career offender. No controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of 

Illinois answers this question. We therefore respectfully ask 

the Supreme Court of Illinois to answer the question whether, and if so under what circumstances, the limited-authority 

doctrine applies to its residential burglary statute, 720 ILCS 

5/19-3. 

The Clerk of this Court will transmit the briefs and appendices in this case, together with this opinion, to the Supreme Court of Illinois. On the request of that Court, the 
No. 19-1224 31

Clerk will transmit all or any part of the record as that Court 

so desires. 

QUESTION CERTIFIED