United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 30, 2019*

Decided June 3, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐3655

MARY L. CORNER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

   

v.

R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, Secretary of

Labor,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 17 C 8134

Thomas M. Durkin,

Judge.

O R D E R

Mary Corner lost her bid for president of the American Postal Workers Union

(Local 7140) in 2017. She attributes her defeat to problems with the election: in her view,

the chapter had permitted ineligible candidates to run for office and improperly

notified voters of the election through the form of an “obsolete” newsletter, in violation

of the Labor‐Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 481. But the

United States Department of Labor ruled out irregularities that could have affected the

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐3655    Page 2

election’s result and declined to take further action. In a statement of reasons explaining

its decision not to sue, the Department addressed Corner’s three concerns. It first stated

that the purportedly ineligible candidates had paid their dues in the year before the

election so they were eligible to run for office. Second, the Act permitted chapters to

notify their members of an election via newsletter, regardless of whether the newsletter

had regular distribution. Finally, the incumbent candidate received no endorsement by

virtue of contributing an article to the newsletter because the article discussed general

chapter business, not the campaign itself.

Corner then filed this action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A), seeking to compel the Department to file suit in an effort to overturn the

election. Ruling that the Department’s statement adequately explained its decision not

to sue, the court discerned no grounds for compelling the Department to sue to

invalidate the election. And because Corner pointed to nothing within the statement of

reasons suggesting that the Department’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, neither

Corner nor the district court was entitled to further investigate the Department’s

findings. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department.

On appeal, Corner’s only possible avenue for relief is to point to something

within the statement of reasons showing that the Department’s decision not to sue was

“so irrational” that it renders “the decision arbitrary and capricious.” Dunlop

v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572–73 (1975); Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2003).

An explanation that “rests on conclusory statements” may meet this threshold. Ellis,

336 F.3d at 122. But we defer to the statement of reasons if it “sets forth the essential

facts” that led to the decision not to sue. Id.; Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 571.

Corner’s brief fails to identify any conclusory statements that could render the

Department’s explanation inadequate, nor do we see any. First, the Department

concluded based on the tax statements of the purportedly ineligible candidates that the

union had withheld the candidates’ dues in the year before the election, so they were

“member[s] in good standing” eligible to run for office. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e); see also Chao

v. Local 743, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, 467 F.3d 1014, 1015 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006). Next, the

Department explained that the Act allows unions to notify members of elections via

newsletter, and regular distribution is not required. 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.99–100. Finally, the

Department concluded that the incumbent’s newsletter article did not amount to

improper union‐funded campaign material or disparate candidate treatment because

the article’s timing, tone, and content did not endorse the incumbent. We will not

substitute our judgment for that of the Department. See Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 572–73.   
No. 18‐3655    Page 3

Corner next argues that the district court erred in failing to examine the factual

bases for the Department’s conclusions. But that would be appropriate only if we found

the Department’s explanations lacking. Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 572–73; Ellis, 336 F.3d

at 126. Because the Department’s statement of reasons is adequate, the district court

appropriately limited its review to that document.

Last, Corner asserts that the Department should have evaluated her complaint

under Title I of the Labor‐Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411,

the section governing pre‐election complaints. But she filed her complaints with the

Department after the election, and ʺTitle IV plainly bars Title I relief when an individual

union member challenges the validity of an election that has already been completed.”

Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 541 (1984);

see also 29 U.S.C. § 483 (“The remedy provided by this subchapter for challenging an

election already conducted shall be exclusive.”).

We end with a warning. This is the third time Corner has challenged her union’s

local‐officer elections based on the assertion that Jackie Engelhart, another candidate, is

ineligible to run. See Porch‐Clark v. Engelhart, 547 Fed. App’x 782 (7th Cir. 2013); Corner

v. Harris, 519 Fed. App’x 942 (7th Cir. 2013). Any future filings that reprise this

argument without distinguishing the circumstances underlying her previous dismissals

will subject Corner to possible sanctions.

AFFIRMED