IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 18, 2000 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GREGORY LYNN REDDEN

 Appeal as of Right from the Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. I-298-77 Donald P. Harris, Judge

No. M2000-00761-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 29, 2000

The appellant, Gregory Lynn Redden, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to one

count of burglary, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III persistent

offender to eleven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court

further ordered the appellant to serve this sentence consecutively to the appellant’s unserved

sentences imposed in Greene County, Missouri, in the United States District Court in the Northern

District of Ohio, and in Robertson County, Tennessee. The appellant raises the following issue for

our review: whether the trial court erred in ordering the appellant to serve his sentence in this case

consecutively to his other sentences. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T. WOODALL, J.,

joined, ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, not participating.

C. Diane Crosier, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gregory Lynn Redden.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Russell S. Baldwin, Assistant Attorney General,

Jeff P. Burks and Mary Katherine Harvey, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee,

State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On December 4, 1997, the appellant, Gregory Lynn Redden, entered Regions Bank

in Franklin after business hours with the intent to take money. The appellant stole a total of $2. On

January 12, 2000, pursuant to a plea agreement, the appellant pled guilty in the Williamson County

Circuit Court to one count of burglary, a class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range III persistent

offender to eleven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The plea
-2-

agreement further provided that the trial court would determine whether the appellant would serve

this sentence concurrently or consecutively to the appellant’s other outstanding sentences. 

At the sentencing hearing, the appellant admitted that the pre-sentence report and the

State’s Notice of Enhancement correctly reflect his prior criminal convictions. The appellant

testified that he was first convicted in Ohio, as a juvenile, of burglary and auto theft. Subsequently,

as an adult, the appellant was convicted in Springfield, Missouri, in 1982, of possession of

marijuana, for which he was sentenced to two years of unsupervised probation. In 1982, while on

probation for the Missouri offense, the appellant committed first degree burglary in Norfolk,

Virginia. The appellant also admitted that he committed armed robbery in Pinellas, Florida, while

on probation for the Virginia offense. The appellant further testified that in 1986 he burglarized ten

to twelve banks in Northern Ohio, which resulted in a federal conviction. The appellant was

sentenced to fourteen years incarceration in Leavenworth for the federal offenses. The appellant also

conceded that in 1986 he was convicted of second degree burglary in Greene County, Misssouri.

The Missouri trial court ordered the appellant’s sentence for burglary to run consecutively to the

federal sentence. Additionally, the appellant was convicted in Greene County, Missouri, of escaping

from jail, and the Missouri court ordered that sentence to run concurrently with the Missouri burglary

sentence. On August 30, 1997, the appellant was released on parole to a halfway house. At the

sentencing hearing, the appellant admitted that he committed the instant offense, as well as the

burglaries in Robertson, Rutherford, and Bedford Counties, in early December, 1997, while on

parole for the federal offenses. Moreover, on June 11, 1998, the appellant was convicted of escaping

from jail in Davidson County, Tennessee.

Subsequent to the appellant’s testimony at the sentencinghearing, the trial court noted

that the appellant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted himself to criminal acts as

a major source of livelihood. Additionally, the trial court stated that, because the appellant’s history

reflected that the appellant consistently returned to criminal activity after release from custody, the

appellant should be confined in order to protect society from further criminal acts by the appellant.

The trial court also found that the appellant had committed the instant offense while on parole from

a previous felony conviction; therefore, the trial court noted that it was required to impose

consecutive sentencing for the instant offense. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the appellant to

serve the sentence imposed in this matter consecutively to the appellant’s unserved sentences in

Greene County, Missouri, in the United States District Court in the Northern District of Ohio, and

in Robertson County, Tennessee. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review:

whether the trial court erred in ordering the appellant to serve his sentence in this case consecutively

to his other outstanding sentences.

II. Analysis
1

The ap pellant only co ntests the conse cutive nature o f his sentences; he does not c ontest the length of his

sentence.

-3-

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by stating that it was required to order

that the appellant’s sentence for burglary be served consecutively to all his unserved sentences.1 This

court reviews the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence de novo. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-401(d)(1997). Moreover, if the record reveals that the trial court correctly took sentencing

principles and all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration, we will accord the trial court’s

determinations a presumption of correctness. Id.; State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn.

1991). Furthermore, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating to this court the impropriety

of his sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Commission Comments. 

In the course of our de novo review, this court will consider the following factors: (1)

the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the pre-sentence report; (3)

the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and

characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties

on enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statement by the defendant in his own behalf; and

(7) the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102,-103,-210 (1997). See

also Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168. Because the record reflects that the trial court did not consider the

sentencing principles when sentencing the appellant but instead proceeded directly to his

pronouncement of the appellant’s sentence, our review is de novo without a presumption of

correctness. 

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3) provides:

Where [an appellant] is convicted of multiple offenses from one trial

or where the [appellant] has additional sentences not yet fully served

as the result of the convictions in the same or other court and the law

requires consecutive sentences, the sentence shall be consecutive

whether the judgment explicitly so orders or not. This rule shall

apply:

(A) To a sentence for a felony committed while on parole for a

felony;

. . . . 

(D) Any other ground provided by law.

It is undisputed that the appellant was on parole for the federal offenses when he

committed the offense in this case. In fact, at the sentencing hearing the appellant admitted that he

was on parole for the federal offenses at the time of the instant offense, noting that the balance of

his sentence was approximately three years. Accordingly, the trial court correctly stated that it was

required to order the appellant’s current sentence to run consecutively to all the appellant’s other

sentences. State v. Buchanan, No. M1999-00980-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 226409, at *4 (Tenn.

Crim. App. at Nashville, February 29, 2000) perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.2000); see also State v.
-4-

Coggins, No.01C01-9310-CR-00360, 1994 WL 390445, at *8 n.5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville,

July 28, 1994).

Nevertheless, even if the trial court were not required to order the appellant’s current

sentence to run consecutively to the appellant’s other sentences, the appellant nonetheless meets the

criteria for permissive consecutive sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(1997) provides that

a trial court may impose consecutive sentencing if the appellant meets one of the criteria contained

therein. Moreover, if the trial court classifies the appellant as a dangerous offender, the court must

also find that the sentence reasonably relates to the severity of the appellant’s offenses and that

confinement is necessary to protect society from further criminal conduct by the appellant. See

State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 460-61 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn.

1995).

In the present case, the trial court concluded that the appellant’s livelihood came from

engaging in criminal behavior. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(1). The record reflects that the

appellant often engaged in criminal behavior, namely burglary and larceny, shortly after each release

from incarceration. See State v. Davis, W1999-02113-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 298746, at *6 (Tenn.

Crim. App. at Knoxville, March 15, 2000) perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2000). Additionally, the

appellant testified that he used money from at least one of the burglaries to pay rent and buy

Christmas presents. Moreover, because the trial court did not find that the appellant was a dangerous

offender, the trial court was not obligated to apply the Wilkerson factors. Lane, 3 S.W.3d at 460-61.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly ordered the appellant to serve the sentence for

the instant offense consecutively to his unserved sentences. 

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

___________________________________ 

NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE