# In the 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 19-1491

S ARAH 

# M. S TEFFEK



# , et al.

, Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v.

C LIENT 

# S ERVICES



# , I NC


# ., et al.

, Defendants-Appellees

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 1:18-cv-00160-WCG — William C. Griesbach

, Judge

.



# ____________________

A RGUED 

# D ECEMBER 

# 11, 2019

— D ECIDED 

# J ANUARY 

# 21, 2020

____________________

Before F LAUM 

# , H AMILTON 

# , and B ARRETT



# , Circuit Judges

.

H AMILTON



# , Circuit Judge . The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., requires the collector of a

consumer debt to send the consumer-debtor a wri tt en notice containing, among other informat ion, “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” § 1692g(a)(2). Plainti ff s Sarah

Ste ff ek and Jill Vandenwyngaard received form notices from
defendant Client Services, Inc. su bject to this requirement. On each, a header stated only “RE: CHASE BANK USA, N.A.”

# 2 No. 19-1491

with an account number, and the le tt ers continued: “Theabove account has been placed with our organization for collections.” The le tt ers did not say whether Chase Bank still owned the accounts in question or instead had sold the debts to another entity. Ste ff ek and Vandenwyngaard sued Client Services for violating § 1692g(a)(2), arguing that these le tt ers failed to identify clearly the current holder of the debt.

The district court certi fi ed a plainti ff class of Wisconsindebtors who received substantially identical notices from Client Services. The court then found that undisputed facts showed that Chase Bank was actually the current creditor and granted summary judgment to Client Services. Ste ff

ek v. Client
Servs., Inc. , No. 1:18-cv-00160-WCG, 2019 WL 1126079, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2019). The actu al identity of the current creditor, however, does not control the result. Regardless of
who then owned the debts, the question under the statute is

whether the le tt ers identi fi ed the then-current creditor clearly enough that an unsophisticate d consumer could identify it without guesswork. See Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace,

LLP , 825 F.3d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 2 016). Undisputed facts show

that the notices here failed that test. We therefore reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in the plainti ff s’ favor as to liability.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts needed to decide this case are few and undisputed. Ste ff ek and Vandenwyngaard received form dunning

le tt ers, also called debt validation notices, from Client Services. The parties agree that Cl ient Services is a “debt collector,” that the named plainti ff s are “consumers,” and that the

le tt ers were “communications” in connection with a tt empts to

# No. 19-1491 3

collect “debts,” as each of those terms is de fi ned in the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2)–(3), (5)–(6).

The le tt er Ste ff ek received was identical to the others except for di ff ering account numbers and balances. It began

with a header that read:

RE: CHASE BANK USA, N.A.

ACCOUNT NUMBER: XXXXXXXXXXXX3802
BALANCE DUE: $8,936.43 REFERENCE NUMBER: [redacted]3872

The body of the le tt er then read:

The above account has been placed with our organization for collections.

Unless you notify our o ffi ce within thirty (30) days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof,

this o ffi ce will assume this de bt is valid. If you notify this o ffi ce in writing within thirty (30) days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof,

this o ffi ce will obtain veri fi cation of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or veri fi cation. If you request

of this o ffi ce in writing within thirty (30) days after receiving this notice, this o ffi ce will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if di ff erent from the current creditor.

We look forward to working with you in resolving this ma tt er.

# 4 No. 19-1491

The le tt er further speci fi ed that payment should be made to Client Services. The only addresses contained in the le tt er were the P.O. box and street addresses of Client Services in Missouri. Finally, a po stscript stated: “THIS

COMMUNICATION IS FROM A DEBT COLLECTOR. THIS

IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT. ANY

INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.” A slightly redacted copy of the le tt er Ste ff ek received is a tt ached as an appendix to this opinion.

The parties agreed on a stipul ation to all facts necessaryfor cross-motions for summary judgment. Client Services reneged on its stipulation, however, by submi tt ing some additional evidence, as we discuss in the concluding portion of this opinion. After addressing that procedural complication,the district court granted summary judgment to Client Services. Ste ff

ek

, 2019 WL 1126079, at *5. Finding that the le tt ers “contained” the name of Chase Bank and no other creditor,

the court decided that the le tt ers satis fi ed § 1692g(a)(2) as a

ma tt er of law. Id. at *4. The plainti ff s have appealed. 1



# II. Failure to Identify the Current Creditor

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act protects consumers through a series of disclosure requirements, beginning with the initial notice subject to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The required information includes the amount of the debt; the name of the

1 

# The district court also granted summary judgment on any claimsarising under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, the Act’s general prohibition on false, deceptive, or misleading representations. Steffek , 2019 WL 1126079, at *5. The complaint alleged violations of § 1692e, but plaintiffs did not make any argument opposing summary judgmenton those claims. Any claims under § 1692e are forfeited.

# No. 19-1491 5

creditor; a statement that unless the debtor disputes the validity of the debt within 30 days, it will be assumed to be valid;

a statement that if the debtor di sputes the debt in writing, the

collector will mail the consumer veri fi cation of the debt or a copy of the judgment; and a statement that, upon wri tt en request within 30 days, the debt collector will provide the name and address of the original creditor if di ff erent from the current creditor. § 1692g(a).

We and other circuits have long interpreted § 1692g to require that the mandatory disclosures be made so that they would be clearly understood by unsophisticated debtors.“The statute does not say in so many words that the disclosures required by it must be made in a nonconfusing manner. But the courts, our own included, have held, plausibly enough, that it is implicit that the debt collector may not defeat the statute’s purpose by ma king the required disclosures in a form or within a context in which they are unlikely to beunderstood by the unsophisticated debtors who are the particular objects of the statute’s solicitude.” Bartle tt v. Heibl , 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997), citing Avila v. Rubin , 84 F.3d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1996) (to be valid, a debt validation notice “must

be e ff ective, and it cannot be cleverly couched in such a way as to eviscerate its message”); Terran v. Kaplan , 109 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1997) (debt validation notice may not include

super fl uous language that “overshadows” the required disclosures); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S ., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (“It is not enough for a debt co llection agency simply to include the proper debt validation notice in a mailing to a consumer—Congress intended that such notice be clearly conveyed.”); Graziano v. Harrison , 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991) (§ 1692g was violated by contradictory message: “statutory notice must not only explicate a debtor’s rights; it must do so

# 6 No. 19-1491

e ff ectively”); Miller v. Payco–General American Credits, Inc ., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991) (“a de bt collector does not comply with § 1692g merely by inclusio n of the required debt validation notice; the notice Congre ss required must be conveyed

e ff ectively to the debtor” (quotation omi tt ed)).

This implied requirement of clarity extends to identi fi cation of the current creditor under § 1692g(a)(2). The mere presence of the correct name in the notice somewhere does

not su ffi ce. See Smith v. Simm Assocs., Inc ., 926 F.3d 377, 381 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that § 1692g(a)(2) “requires a debt collector to present information about the creditor and thedebt in the manner the unsophisticated consumer can understand”); Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP , 825 F.3d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When § 1692g (a) requires that a communication include certain information, compliance demands more than simply including that information in some unintelligible form.”). Across all the Act’s protections, we evaluate acommunication “through the objective lens of an unsophisticated consumer who, while ‘uninformed, naïve, or trusting,’ possesses at least ‘reasonable intelligence, and is capable of making basic logical deductions and inferences.’” Smith , 926 F.3d at 380 (claim under § 1692g(a)(2)), quoting Pe tt it v. Retrieval Masters Cred itor Bureau, Inc ., 211 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000) (claim under § 1692e).

Turning to the notice at issue in this case, the problem for

Client Services is that the form le tt er simply did not identify

Chase Bank as the creditor to whom the debts were then owed. The heading said “RE: CHASE BANK,” followed by an account number, which communicated only that the le tt er somehow related to the listed Chase Bank account. The body

of the le tt er then explained that this “account has been placed

# No. 19-1491 7

with our organization for collect ions,” referring to Client Services. Farther down, the le tt er said that the recipient could

write to Client Services to fi nd out if the original creditor was

di ff erent from the current creditor. This la tt er sentence raised the possibility that the debt co uld have been resold, but the

le tt er did not clarify who actually owned the debt. The le tt er did not communicate clearly on whose behalf Client Services was trying to collect the debt. The le tt er did say, however, that the recipient should pay Client Services rather than anyoneelse, which a recipient could reasonably understand as implying that Client Services it self was then the creditor.

As it turns out, the evidence available on summary judgment indicated that Chase Bank still owned the accounts for the two lead plainti ff s, Ste ff ek and Vandenwyngaard. But this

fact—extrinsic to the le tt er itself—does not insulate Client Services from the claim that it violated § 1692g(a)(2), which required it to identify the current creditor clearly, without leaving the ma tt er to guesswork. In Smith , the le tt er identi fi ed an entity as the “original credito r” and named no other potential
creditor, which we concluded left no doubt as to who thenowned the debt. 926 F.3d at 380–81. Similarly, our recent decision in Dennis approved a le tt er that expressly identi fi ed both the “original creditor” and the “current creditor” in

those terms. See Dennis v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc. , — F.3d —, No. 19-1654, 2019 WL 7288044 at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 30, 2019).

This case is controlled by Janetos , however, not Smith or
Dennis

. The notice in Janetos said that the account had been“transferred from Asset Acceptance, LLC, to Fulton, Friedman & Gullace, LLP.” 825 F.3d at 321. The debt collector, Fulton, argued that this “transferred” phrase made clear that Asset Acceptance owned the debt and that Fulton was only

# 8 No. 19-1491

collecting it. Id. We disagreed: “standing alone the fact that

the form le tt er included the words ‘Asset Acceptance, LLC’ did not establish compliance with § 1692g(a)(2).” Id. The le tt er left recipients “to guess who currently owned the debts in question.” Id. at 323. Because this facial lack of clarity left nofactual dispute, we reversed summary judgment for the defendants and directed summary judgment for the plainti ff s. Id. at 326.

Client Services’s arguments to distinguish Janetos are not persuasive. First, it urges that unsophisticated consumers

would understand the di ff erence between “transferred,” used by the collector in Janetos , and “placed,” used here. With respect, that supposed di ff erence is not clear to the members ofthis panel, let alone to unsophisticated consumers. Client Services has not shown that “transferred” and “placed” have distinct meanings regarding ownershi p of a debt that are universally understood even in the debt-collection business itself. And even if consistent trade usage of those verbs had been shown, that would not show compliance with § 1692g(a)(2),which requires clear communication to unsophisticated consumers.

Second, Client Services cites several district court decisions that have approved similar le tt ers on the theory that they gave account numbers for the debts and thus identi fi ed the creditors. E.g., Howard v. Client Services, Inc ., No. 0:17-cv62425-UU, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 42827, at *17 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2018) (noting “the account in formation in the header” and granting summary judgment to C lient Services). The district

court here also mentioned that practice favorably. Ste ff

ek

, 2019 WL 1126079, at *4. We agree that listing an account number may help a consumer identify the origins of the debt in

# No. 19-1491 9

question (especially if it is an old account). The problem under § 1692g(a)(2) is that an original account number, just like “RE:CHASE BANK,” says nothing about who owns the debt today. 2



# Third, Client Services points out that it identi fi ed itself on

the le tt er as “A DEBT COLLECTOR.” This disclosure appears

in the so-called “mini- Miranda ” warning at the end of the letter as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). Client Services arguesthat this mandatory postscript alerted consumers that it collects debts for others rather than buying them itself. By process of elimination, goes the arg ument, Chase Bank is the only creditor named in the notice, so that any recipient would

2 

# Client Services cites additional di strict court decisions that ruled for debt collectors even though the notice s identified only accounts, not the

current creditors. See Ocampo v. Client Services, Inc ., No. 18-cv-4326 (BMC), 2019 WL 2881422 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2019); Stehly v. Client Services, Inc ., No. 2:18-cv-5103 (DRH)(ARL), 2019 WL 2646664 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2019); Philips v. Central Fin. Control , No. 2:17-cv-02011-RDP, 2018 WL 3743221 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2018); Taylor v. MRS BPO, LLC , No. 2:17-cv-01733 (ARR)(RER), 2017 WL 2861785 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017); Santibanez v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc ., No. 6:16-cv-00081, 2017 WL 126111 (D. Or. Jan. 12, 2017);
Demonte v. Client Services, Inc. , No. 14-cv-14511, 2015 WL 12556159 (S.D. Fla. July 29, 2015); see also Campagna v. Client Services, Inc. , No. 18-cv-3039, 2019 WL 6498171 (Dec. 3, 2019) (claim under § 1692e). The plaintiffs, on the other hand, point to several decisions that have reached the opposite

result. See Datiz v. Int’l Recovery Assocs., Inc ., No. 2:15-cv-03549(ADS)(AKT), 2018 WL 3751920 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4561461 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018); McGinty v. Prof’l Claims Bureau, Inc ., No. 15-cv-4356 (SJF)(ARL), 2016 WL 6069180 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2016); Lee v. Forster & Garbus LLP , 926 F. Supp. 2d 482 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C ., 374 F. Supp. 2d 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). We do not need to dissect and distinguish these rulings in detail; we respectfully disagree with any reasoning inconsistent with this opinion’s application of § 1692g(a)(2).

# 10 No. 19-1491

understand that Chase Bank must be the current owner of the debt. But we considered and rejected this exact syllogism in
Janetos :
[D]efendants argue that the le tt er made clear

that Fulton is a law fi rm and a debt collector. True enough, but neither point leads to a “basic logical deduction” that Fulton must have beencollecting the referenced debts on Asset Acceptance’s behalf or that Asset Acceptance remained the current owner of the debts.

825 F.3d at 321–22, quoting Pe tt it , 211 F.3d at 1060. What Client Services invokes is not logic but guesswork. Again, Janetos

controls this case.

Finally, the district court correctly observed that § 1692g(a)(2) does not mandate the use of speci fi c terms such

as “creditor” or “owner of the debt.” Ste ff

ek

, 2019 WL 1126079, at *4. We made the same point in Smith : “the FDCPA does not require use of any speci fi c terminology to identify the creditor.” 926 F.3d at 381. That point do es not help Client Services here. The Act does not prescribe speci fi c words, but it does require the debt collector to identify clearly “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2).

Debt collectors are free to use words other than these chosenby Congress if the words will communicate the required information to unsophisticated consumers. The plainti ff s are entitled to summary judgment as to liability here because this

le tt er did not clear that hurdle.

III. Evidentiary Dispute

Because Client Services is liable for violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) no ma tt er who actually owned the debts, we

# No. 19-1491 11

need not decide whether the district court was correct to treat that issue as undisputed at summary judgment. See Ste ff

ek

, 2019 WL 1126079, at *2. Nevertheless, the evidentiary and procedural controversy over the parties’ factual stipulation in

this case raises issues that re cur in summary judgment practice, so it is prudent to address the controversy.

At the fi rst scheduling conference in the district court in
March 2018, Client Services re ported that it was not “100% sure” that Chase Bank still held the named plainti ff s’ debts. (That initial uncertainty in the litigation tends to con fi rm the point that the dunning le tt ers violated § 1692g(a)(2).) The plainti ff s then sought details about the relationship between Client Services and the as-yet -unknown owner of the debts through requests for production. Client Services objected to the requests and responded with only fi ve pages of internal account notes, two pages for Ste ff ek and three for Vandenwyngaard. 3



# Discovery negotiations brok e down, and on August 22, 2018, the plainti ff s fi led a motion to compel with the district court. Two days later, however, the parties seemed to resolve their disputes through a joint st ipulation to what they agreed were “the only facts that shall be used by the Parties in support of, or in opposition to, a fi nding of liability by way of any dispositive motion fi led by the Parties or at trial.” In other words, the parties stipulated to ten facts that they thought suffi cient to decide the case and ag reed to halt all discovery except on the issue of damages. The stipulation provided that

3 

# The plaintiffs did not use one of their permitted interrogatories under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 to ask the identity of the current

creditor.

# 12 No. 19-1491

Chase Bank “was the original cr editor of the debts” but pointedly omi tt ed the identity of the current creditor. The court approved this arrangement by order dated September 11, 2018.

The parties fi led cross-motions for summary judgment on October 5, 2018. The plainti ff s’ accompanying statement of facts, required by local rule, merely reiterated the ten stipulated facts. But Client Services reneged on the stipulation: its statement of facts went beyond the stipulation to claim that Chase Bank was not only the original but also the current creditor. In support of this assertion, Client Services a tt ached an

a ffi davit from Edward Li tt le, its chief information o ffi cer, as well as the fi ve pages of account notes disclosed earlier. In their opposition brief, the plainti ff s protested that the court should enforce the terms of the stipulation and disregard

these new materials. 4



# The district court held a conference on March 11, 2019 to address the procedural dispute and to se tt le the identity of the

current creditor. Client Services insisted that Chase Bank was “absolutely” the current creditor; the plainti ff s maintained

that the court should restrict itse lf to the stipul ated facts. The

court concluded that the eviden ce showed that Chase Bank

was the current creditor and granted summary judgment for Client Services the next day. Ste ff

ek

, 2019 WL 1126079, at *2,

*5.

On appeal, the plainti ff s have raised several objections. They point out that a ffi ant Li tt le had not been identi fi ed as a

4 

# Client Services asserts on appeal that its clear violation of its courtapproved stipulation was not deliberate but resulted from an “internal miscommunication,” without any additional detail or explanation. See Appellee’s Br. at 12 n.1.

# No. 19-1491 13

knowledgeable witness in Client Services’ initial disclosures or supplements. Plainti ff s also contend that the Li tt le a ffi davit did not properly authenticate the Ste ff ek and Vandenwyngaard account notes. More generally, plainti ff s object to the

district court’s decision to allow Client Services to breach without consequence the court-approved stipulation for the summary judgment motions. We address these points in turn.

First, a motion for summary judgment supported by an affi davit from a witness not previously disclosed in the case ordinarily will cause problems that Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) and (e)(1) and case management plans are intended to prevent. Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) requires early identi fi cation of “each individuallikely to have discoverable information—along with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Rule 26(e)(1) imposes a duty on a disclosing party to supplement its disclos ures if they turn out to be incomplete or incorrect, at least if the new information has not already been made known to other parties. Finally, Rule 37(c)(1) directs judges to exclude evidence left out of required disclosures absent some extenuating circumstance. We are notsuggesting that a party can never move for summary judgment based on an a ffi davit from a previously undisclosed witness. When that happens, though , judges need to be ready to address the problems the tactic creates for opposing parties so as to prevent surprise and unfair prejudice. E.g., Baemmert v.
Credit One Bank, N.A ., 271 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (declining to consider declaration submi tt ed at summary judgment from a previously undisclosed witness).

Second, because the plainti ff s objected to the notes, the district court should have considered them only if it

# 14 No. 19-1491

concluded that they would be admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (authorizing objections that material cited to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment “cannotbe presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence”); Baines v. Walgreen Co ., 863 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Evidence o ff ered at summary judgment must be admissible
to the same extent as at trial, at least if the opposing party objects, except that testimony ca n be presented in the form of

a ffi davits or transcripts of sworn testimony rather than in person.”). Documents must be authenticated by an a ffi davit that lays a proper foundation for their admissibility, even at the summary judgment stage. See Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc ., 786 F.3d 559, 578 (7th Cir. 2015) (a ffi rming district court’s decision to disregard a document unaccompanied by an a ffi davit establishing that it met the busi ness records hearsay exception).

The Li tt le a ffi davit presented a borderline case under thisstandard. It contained scant information concerning the provenance of the account notes to support their admissibility under Rule of Evidence 803(6).

At the same time, we recognize the practicalities of the adversary system. Parties often submit documents on summary judgment without authenticating them with a ffi davits thorough enough to overcome all potential objections:

When that happens—when one side fails to cross all evidentiary t’s and dot all procedural i’s—it is also not unusual for opposing lawyers to choose to overlook available evidentiary or other procedural objections. Lawyers should know their cases. Courts are entitled to rely on lawyers to decide which potential objections are worth raising and which are not. This is

# No. 19-1491 15

especially so when many such defects in summary judgment evidence could be cured quickly with a supplemental a ffi davit or two.

Neither the rules of evidence nor the rules of civil procedure require lawyers or judges to raise all available evidentiary objections.

Cehovic-Dixneuf v. Wong , 895 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2018) (affi rming summary judgment where objection to moving party’s evidence was raised fi rst on appeal); see also Elghanmi v. Franklin College , No. IP 99-879-C H/G, 2000 WL 1707934, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 2, 2000) (not ing that counsel often do not include full authentication or obje ct to its absence where there is no real dispute about authenticity of document). When an objection is raised, nothing stops the trial court from allowing

the o ff ering party to supplement the record to cure the defect. But the court may not simply ignore an objection to evidence the court will rely upon for its decision.

Third, and on the other hand, the district court retained discretion to consider facts beyond the parties’ stipulation. True, “once made, a stipulation is binding unless relief from the stipulation is necessary to prevent a ‘manifest injustice’ or the stipulation was entered in to through inadvertence or

based on an erroneous view of the facts or law.” Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co ., 870 F.2d 1198, 1206 (7th Cir. 1989); see

also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez , 561 U.S. 661, 677 (2010) (“[T]he parties will not be permi tt ed to deny the truth of the facts stated, ... or to suggest, on appeal, that the facts were other than as stipulated or th at any material fact was omitted.”), quoting 83 C.J.S., Stipulat ions § 93 (2000). At the same
time, however, “the district court has ‘broad discretion’ to decide whether to hold a party to its stipulations.” Graefenhain

,

# 16 No. 19-1491

870 F.2d at 1206; see also United States v. Nobles , 422 U.S. 225,235 n.9 (1975) (citing district court’s “inherent power to control evidentiary ma tt ers”). Although we disagree with the district court on the relevance of the disputed information and
the ultimate merits, we are not convinced that the court

abused its broad discretion here in deciding to relieve Client Services of its obligations under the stipulation, at least in the absence of unfair prejudice, which we do not see.

The district court’s power to consider evidence it deemed relevant or even decisive did not leave the plainti ff s without options. When Client Services breached the stipulation by offering evidence that Chase Bank still owned the debts in question, plainti ff s could have sought appropriate relief from thedistrict court to prevent unfair prejudice. One obvious remedy would have been a delay under Rule 56(d) to conduct additional discovery. See Smith v. OSF HealthCare System , 933 F.3d 859, 865–71 (7th Cir. 2019) (reversing denial of Rule 56(d) motion). Plainti ff s’ failure to do so supports the district court’s conclusion that no actual disp ute existed as to the ownership of the debt. Nevertheless, as explained above, the identity of

the current creditor does not determine the outcome of this

case.

The defendants’ debt validation notices violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) as a ma tt er of law by failing to disclose clearlythe identity of the current creditor. The judgment of the district court is therefore REVERSED. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

# APPENDIX3451HarrySTrumanBlvd.SaintCharles,MO63301·4047RE:CHASEBANKUSA,N.A.ACCOUNTNUMBER:XXXXXXXXXXXX3802BALANCEDUE:$8,936-43REFERENCEOfficeHours<CentralTime).Monday-Thu(sday:8am-8pmF1iday:7am-5pmSaturday:7am-11amSunday:ClosedPHONE:877·288-9903DATE:2/2212017Theaboveaccounthasbeenplacedwithourorganlzatlonforcollections.Unlessyounotifyourofficewithinthirty(30}daysafterreceivingthisnolicethatyoudisputethevalidityorthisdebtoranyportionthereof,thisofficewillassumelhisdebtisvalid.Ifyounotifythisofficeinwritingwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceivingthisnoticethatyoudisputethevalidityofthisdebtoranyportionthereof,tt1lsofficewillobtainverificationorthedebtorobtainacopyofaJudgmentandmai1youacopyofsucl1Judgmentorverification.Ifyourequestofthisofficeinwritingwithinthirty(30}daysafterreceivingthisnotice,thisofficewillprovideyouwllhthenameandaddressortheoriginalcreoitor,irdifferentfromthecurrentcredltor_Welookrorwardtoworkingwithyouinresolvingthismatter.MikeCraftsTHISCOMMUNICATIONISFROMADEBTCOLLECTORTHISISANATIEMPTTOCOLLECTADEBT.ANYINFORMATIONOBTAINEDWILLBEUSEDFORTHATPURPOSE.FORlMPORTANTRIGHTSANDPRlVILEGESWHICHMIGHTAPPLYTOYOURSTATEOFRESIDENCE,PLEASESEEBELOWORREVERSESIDE(IFFAXEDTHENFOLLOWINGPAGE).SendyoLffpaymentintheenclosedenvelopeusingtheremittancecouponbelow.llilPay-by-Phone:1-877-552-5905Donotsendcorrespondencetothisaddress.POBox1586SaintPeters,MO63376'•111111111111'Il'lilI1l1l1111I1l11hhl111111I1•111l1llll1l111lISARAHMSTEFFEKaOnfine:www.csiconsumetcenter.com0jIfyouareunablelopayLhebalanceinrun,contaclourj°fficeat877-288-9903forpaymentoptions,whichmayAlabeavailabletoyou.lilHil'lli---8-7_2______ChecksPayableTo:ClientServices.Inc.CLIENTSERVICES,INC.3451HARRYS.TRUMANBLVDST.CHARLESMO63301-4047II'I1I1''I1II1t•I•I'·•111•••,1..I1•••1.1.1·I'I1I1III'I·I1I'11••'IICALIFORNIAThestateRosenthalFairDebiCollectionPracticesActandthefederalFairDebtCollectionPracticesActrequirethat,exceptunderunusualcircumstances,collectorsmaynotcontactyoubefore8:00a.m.orafter9:00p.m.Theymaynotharassyoubyusingthreatsofviolenceorarrestorbyusingobscenelanguage.Collectorsmaynotusefalseormisleadingstatementsorcallyoualworkiftheyknoworhavereasontoknowthatyoumaynotreceivepersonalcallsatwork.Forthemostpart.collectorsmaynottellanotherperson.otherthanyourauomeyorspouse,aboutyourdebt.Collectorsmaycontactanotherpersontoconfinnyourlocationorenforceajudgment.Formorelnfonnationaboutdebtcollectionactivities,youmaycontacttheFe<!eralTradeCommissional1-877-FTC·HELPorwww.flc.gov.Nonprofitcreditcounselingservicesmaybeavailableinthearea.COLORADOFORINFORMATIONABOUTTHECOLORADOFAIRDEBTCOLLECTIONPRACTICESACT.SEEWWW.COAG.GOV/CAR.Aconsumerhastherigl1ttorequestinwritingthatadebtcollectororcollectionagencyceasefurthercommunicationwiththeconsumer.Awrittenrequesttoceasecommunicationwillnotprohibitthedebtcollectororcollectionagencyfromtakinganyotherattlonauthorizedbylawtocollectthedebt.TheaddressaneltelephonenumberforClientServices,tnc.'slocalColoradoofficeis:TheExecutive Building,Attn:Stokes&Wolf,P.C.asagentforClientServices,Inc.,1776S.JacksonSt.,Suite900Denver,CO80210(TEL:(303)753-0945).KANSASAninvestigativeconsumerreport,whichincludesInformationastoyourcharacter.generalreputation,personalcharacteristicsandmodeofliving,hasbeenrequeste<I.YouhavetherighttorequestadditionalInformation,whichincludesthenatureandsoopeoftheinvestigation.MASSACHUSETTSNOTICEOFIMPORTANTRIGHTS:Youhavetherightlomakeawrittenororalrequestthattelephonecallsregardingyourdebtnotbemadetoyouatyourplaceoremployment.Anysuchoralrequestwillbevalidforonlytendaysunlessyouprovidewrittenconfirmationoftherequestpostmarkedordeliveredwithinsevendaysofsuchrequest.Youmayterminatethisrequestbywritinglothedebtcollector.MINNESOTAThiscolleclionagencyislicensedbytheMinnesotaDepai1menlofCommeme.NEWYORKInaccordancewiththeFairDebtCollectionPracticesAct,15U.S.C.§1692etseq.,debtcollectorsareprohibitedfromengagingInabusive,deceptive,andunfairdebtcollectionefforts,Includingbutnotlimitedto·theuseorthreatofviolence,theuseofobsceneorprofanelanguage,andrepealedphonecallsmadewiththeintenttoannoy,abuse,orharass.Ifacreditorordebtcollectorreceivesamoneyjudgmentagainstyouincourt,stateandfederallawsmaypreventthefollowingtypesofincomefrombeingtakentopaythedebt:supplementalsecttlityincome(SSI),socialsecurity,publicassistance(welfare),spousalsupportincludingmaintenance(alimony)orchildsupport,unemploymentbenefits,disabilitybenefits,workers'compensationbenefils..publicorprivatepensions,veterans'benefits,federalstudentloans,fe<leralstudentgrants,federalworkstudyfunds,andninetypercentofyourwagesorsalaryeame<Iinthelastsixtydays.NEWYORKCITYNewYorkCityDepartmentorConsumerAffairsLicenseNumber:1306512NORTHCAROLINANorthCarolinaPermII\lumber:100705TENNESSEEThiscollectionagencyIslicensedbytheCollectionserviceBoardortheDepartmentofCommerceandInsurance.