alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5246 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5246

    To require the United States attorney to bring the matter of an 
individual's contempt of Congress before a grand jury not later than 30 
 days after receiving a certification from the Speaker of the House of 
 Representatives or the President of the Senate that the individual is 
                              in contempt.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 29, 2014

  Mr. Jordan introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To require the United States attorney to bring the matter of an 
individual's contempt of Congress before a grand jury not later than 30 
 days after receiving a certification from the Speaker of the House of 
 Representatives or the President of the Senate that the individual is 
                              in contempt.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEADLINE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEY TO BRING CONTEMPT OF 
              CONGRESS ACTION BEFORE A GRAND JURY.

    (a) 30-Day Deadline.--Section 104 of the Revised Statutes (2 U.S.C. 
194) is amended by striking ``for its action.'' and inserting ``for its 
action not later than 30 days after receiving the certification of the 
statement of facts.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to statements of facts which are certified to a 
United States attorney under section 104 of the Revised Statutes on or 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP

767 Fifth Avenue

New York, NY 10153-0119

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WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP

Stephen Karotkin (pro hac vice)

(stephen.karotkin@weil.com)

Ray C. Schrock, P.C. (pro hac vice)

(ray.schrock@weil.com)

Jessica Liou (pro hac vice)

(jessica.liou@weil.com) 

767 Fifth Avenue

New York, NY 10153-0119

Tel: 212 310 8000

Fax: 212 310 8007

KELLER & BENVENUTTI LLP

Tobias S. Keller (#151445)

(tkeller@kellerbenvenutti.com)

Jane Kim (#298192)

(jkim@kellerbenvenutti.com)

650 California Street, Suite 1900

San Francisco, CA 94108

Tel: 415 496 6723

Fax: 650 636 9251

Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors in Possession

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP

Paul H. Zumbro (pro hac vice)

(pzumbro@cravath.com)

Kevin J. Orsini (pro hac vice)

(korsini@cravath.com)

Omid H. Nasab (pro hac vice)

(onasab@cravath.com)

825 Eighth Avenue

New York, NY 10019

Tel: 212 474 1000

Fax: 212 474 3700

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

In re:

PG&E CORPORATION,

 - and -

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC

COMPANY,

Bankruptcy Case No. 19-30088 (DM)

Chapter 11

(Lead Case) (Jointly Administered)

ORDER PURSUANT TO L.B.R. 9013-1(c) 

AUTHORIZING OVERSIZE BRIEFING FOR

DEBTORS’ OMNIBUS REPLY IN FURTHER 

SUPPORT OF THE DEBTORS’ MOTION 

PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) AND 

502(c) FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 

WILDFIRE CLAIMS ESTIMATION 

PROCEDURES

Related Document: Dkt. No. 3091

[No Hearing Requested]

Debtors.

 Affects PG&E Corporation 

 Affects Pacific Gas and Electric 

Company 

 Affects both Debtors

* All papers shall be filed in the Lead 

Case, No. 19-30088 (DM). 

Signed and Filed: August 9, 2019

________________________________________

DENNIS MONTALI

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

Entered on Docket 

August 12, 2019

EDWARD J. EMMONS, CLERK 

U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3511 Filed: 08/09/19 Entered: 08/12/19 13:31:02 Page 1 of

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The Court, having reviewed the Ex Parte Application for Order Authorizing Oversize 

Briefing Pursuant to L.B.R. 9013-1(c) for Omnibus Reply in Further Support of the Debtors’ Motion 

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 502(c) for the Establishment of Wildfire Claims Estimation 

Procedures (the “Application”), filed on August 9, 2019; and after due deliberation and sufficient 

cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Application is granted, as provided herein.

2. The Debtors are authorized to file and serve an Estimation Motion Omnibus

Reply (as defined in the Application), in excess of 15 pages, but not to exceed 25 pages (exclusive 

of any schedules or exhibits thereto and/or any declarations filed in connection therewith).

** END OF ORDER **

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3511 Filed: 08/09/19 Entered: 08/12/19 13:31:02 Page 2 of

2
EXHIBIT
23.1
 
 Consent
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
 
 
 Vanguard
Natural Resources, LLC
 Houston,
Texas
 
 We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form
S-8 (No. 333-152448, effective July 22, 2008) of Vanguard Natural Resources, LLC
of our reports dated March 10, 2009, relating to the consolidated financial
statements, and the effectiveness of Vanguard Natural Resources, LLC’s internal
control over financial reporting, which appear in the Annual Report on Form 10-K
for the year ended December 31, 2008.
 
 
 
 /s/ BDO
Seidman, LLP
 Houston,
Texas
 
 February
4, 2010
EXHIBIT 31.1

               CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(D)/15D-14(D)
                    UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

I, Anthony N. Renzi, certify that:

1. I have  reviewed  this  report  on Form  10-K and all  reports  on Form  10-D
   required to be filed in respect of the period  covered by this report on Form
   10-K of RALI Series 2007-QO1 Trust (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

2. Based on my knowledge,  the Exchange Act periodic reports,  taken as a whole,
   do not contain  any untrue  statement  of a material  fact or omit to state a
   material  fact  necessary  to make  the  statements  made,  in  light  of the
   circumstances  under which such  statements  were made, not  misleading  with
   respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based  on  my  knowledge,  all  of  the  distribution,  servicing  and  other
   information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by
   this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities  performed by the servicers and
   based on my knowledge and the compliance  reviews  conducted in preparing the
   servicer  compliance  statements  required in this report  under Item 1123 of
   Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic  reports,
   the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements
   in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance  with  servicing  criteria for
   asset-backed  securities and their related  attestation reports on assessment
   of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to
   be included in this report in accordance  with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
   Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
   report,  except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances
   of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report
   on Form 10-K.

In giving the  certifications  above,  I have  reasonably  relied on information
provided  to me by the  following  unaffiliated  parties:  Deutsche  Bank  Trust
Company Americas.

Date:  March 24, 2008


By:     /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
Name:   Anthony N. Renzi
Title:  Managing Director
(senior officer in charge of the servicing function)
[661 NE2d 1380, 638 NYS2d 598]

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jane Campbell, Appellant.

Decided December 5, 1995

*856APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Rosali Vasquez,*New York City, and *Daniel L. Greenberg*for appellant.

*Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney*of New York County, New York City *(Carol A. Remer-Smith*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Police Officer Basilio Casado testified that on May 31, 1991, Albert Tyson, an employee of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) informed him and other police personnel at the 28th precinct that unauthorized persons were within an apartment located in an HPD building that was supposed to be vacant. The police went to the apartment, told several people, including defendant, that they were under arrest for trespassing and searched them in the hallway of the building. The police found seven vials of cocaine in defendant’s pocket. Defendant, after being charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, moved to suppress the cocaine and certain statements *857made by her in the immediate aftermath of the arrest. The suppression court denied her motion. Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant.

The determination of probable cause made by the Appellate Division involves a mixed question of law and fact which, there being support for its conclusion in the record, is beyond this Court’s further review (see, *People v Diaz,*81 NY2d 106, 108; *People v Bigelow,*66 NY2d 417, 420; *People v Harrison,*57 NY2d 470, 477-478).

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order affirmed in a memorandum.
**EXHIBIT        32.2**

|   | 1. | The                  Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)                  or                  15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;                  and |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The                  information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in                  all                  material respects, the financial condition and results of operations                  of                  the Company. |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:                November 5,                2008  |   | /s/ Jana                Whitlock                                                                                      |
|------------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                            |   | Jana Whitlock, President,                CEO, CFO                and Director (Principal Financial                Officer) |

----
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Ex parte Thomas Aven Cole

Appellate case number: 01-15-00107-CR

Trial court case number: 2005582

Trial court: County Criminal Court at Law No. 10 of Harris County

The clerk’s record has been filed in this appeal. We have not yet received a court 

reporter’s record. It is unknown whether the reporter’s record has been requested by Appellant. 

The clerk’s record is lacking any filings by the State of Texas in response to the briefing of 

appellant on his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Likewise, nothing in the current record 

explains the underlying extradition proceedings, what the charges against appellant are, or 

where.

Therefore, the Court REQUESTS briefing from the parties. The brief of Appellant is 

due on or before February 23, 2015. The response of the State is due within 14 days of the date 

appellant’s brief is filed.

We note that if appellant has requested the reporter’s record, it is due to be filed by 

February 13, 2015, which is 15 days from the date the Notice of Appeal was filed. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 31.1 The court reporter is ORDERED to either file the record by February 13, 2015, or 

inform us by that date if the record has not been requested or paid for by appellant, if he is not 

indigent.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: February 6, 2015
No. 17,898.

#### Edward Clifford Heald, etc. *v. A.*M. Ramsey, et al., as State Board of Land Commissioners.

(304 P. [2d] 900)

Decided December 17, 1956.

Mr. E. Clifford Heald, Mr. Leon Ginsberg, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, Mr. Frank E. Hickey, Deputy, Mrs. Patricia H. Maloy, Assistant, and Mr. Samuel R. Freeman, Assistant, for defendants in error.

*395
      *En Banc.*

Per Curiam.

Judgment affirmed without written opinion.
#### George E. Beardsley v. Willis G. Pope.

Motion for leave to go to the Oourt of Appeals denied, with ten dollars costs.
SEP 2 6 2022 

BPQWN 

CLE F 4iCu iv 

D UTY 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

No. 84820 

MED 

SHAWN TOSH HARTZELL, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

1U, Q-17 A 

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction. Tenth judicial 

District Court, Churchill County; Thomas L. Stockard, Judge. 

Deputy Attorney General Jaimie Stilz has filed a notice of 

appearance as counsel for respondent. The clerk of this court shall add Ms. 

Stilz as counsel of record for respondent. 

Preliminary review of this appeal revealed a potential 

jurisdictional defect. The district court entered the judgment of conviction 

on April 7, 2022. Thus, appellant's notice of appeal was due to be filed in 

the district court by May 9, 2022. See NRAP 4(b)(1)(A) (providing that a 

notice of appeal must generally "be filed with the district court clerk within 

30 days after the entry of the judgment or order being appealed"). However, 

the notice of appeal was not filed in the district court until June 2, 2022, 24 

days after expiration of the 30-day appeal period. 

Appellant dated his notice of appeal May 5, 2022. Pursuant to 

NRAP 4(d), if appellant delivered his notice of appeal to a prison official for 

mailing on or before May 9, 2022, and utilized the notice-of-appeal log or 

other system designed for legal mail, his notice of appeal would be deemed 

timely filed. Because this court could not determine from the documents 

before it whether the notice of appeal should be deemed timely, this court 

z oc:16 
ordered the attorney general to obtain and transmit to the clerk of this court 

certified copies of the notice of appeal log maintained at the prison 

indicating the actual date upon which appellant delivered to a prison official 

his notice of appeal. 

The attorney general has now provided this court with a 

response and an affidavit from the law librarian and custodian of records at 

Lovelock Correctional Center. These documents indicate Lovelock 

Correctional Center did not maintain a notice of appeal log froin July 2021 

through July 2022, but did maintain an "other system designed for legal 

mail," namely a brass slip log and outgoing mail log during that time period. 

However, there were no entries by appellant on those logs from May 2022 

to June 2, 2022. Accordingly, the June 2, 2022, date controls and appellant's 

notice of appeal was untimely filed, thus this court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider this appeal. See Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 352, 871 P.2d 944, 

946 (1994) ("[A]n untimely notice of appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this 

court."). We therefore 

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 

, J. 

Silver 

pìu J. 

Cadish Pickering 

SUPREME COURT 

OE 

NEVADA 

Pia7A 

cc: Hon. Thomas L. Stockard, District Judge 

Shawn Tosh Hartzell 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Churchill County District Attorney/Fallon 

Churchill County Clerk 

2
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Compas Medical, P.C., as Assignee of Nelson Cory, Appellant, <br><br>against<br><br>Citiwide Auto Leasing, Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell of counsel), for appellant.Palmieri, Castiglione &amp; Nightingale (Michael S. Nightingale of counsel), for respondent.</p><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), entered January 21, 2016. The order granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the claims at issue had been untimely submitted (<i>see</i> 11 NYCRR 65-1.1). </p><p>For the reasons stated in <i>Greenway Med. Supply Corp., as Assignee of Acosta Hector v Citiwide Auto Leasing</i> (___ Misc 3d ____, 2018 NY Slip Op _____ [appeal No. 2016-741 K C], decided herewith), the order is affirmed.</p><p>PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.</p><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: November 09, 2018<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
Case: 19-30088    Doc# 3352    Filed: 08/01/19    Entered: 08/01/19 11:52:05    Page 1 of3

Case: 19-30088    Doc# 3352    Filed: 08/01/19    Entered: 08/01/19 11:52:05    Page 2 of3

Case: 19-30088    Doc# 3352    Filed: 08/01/19    Entered: 08/01/19 11:52:05    Page 3 of3
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5257 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a deduction relating 

to the compensation of the lesser earning spouse. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 30, 2014 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS (for herself, Mrs. CAPITO, Mrs. WAGNER, Mrs. 

ELLMERS, Mrs. BACHMANN, Mr. VALADAO, Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois, and Mr. FITZPATRICK) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 

a deduction relating to the compensation of the lesser 

earning spouse. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Empowering Families 

5 at Home and at Work Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEDUCTION FOR LESSER EARNING SPOUSE. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Part VII of subchapter A of chap8 ter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5257 IH

1 by redesignating section 224 as section 225 and by insert2 ing after section 223 the following new section: 

3 ‘‘SEC. 224. SECOND EARNER DEDUCTION. 

4 ‘‘(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.—In the case of a 

5 taxpayer who files a joint return for the taxable year, there 

6 shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 20 

7 percent of the total compensation of the lesser earning 

8 spouse. 

9 ‘‘(b) LIMITATIONS.— 

10 ‘‘(1) COMPENSATION TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.— 

11 The amount of compensation taken into account 

12 under subsection (a) for the taxable year shall not 

13 exceed $60,000. 

14 ‘‘(2) LIMITATION BASED ON INCOME.—The 

15 amount allowed as a deduction under subsection (a) 

16 shall be zero if the adjusted gross income of the tax17 payer for the taxable year exceeds $110,000. 

18 ‘‘(c) COMPENSATION.—For purposes of this section, 

19 the term ‘compensation’ means the sum of— 

20 ‘‘(1) wages (as defined in section 3121), and 

21 ‘‘(2) self-employment income (as defined in sec22 tion 1402).’’. 

23 (b) DEDUCTION ALLOWED ABOVE-THE-LINE.—Sub24 section (a) of section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code of 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 5257 IH

1 1986 is amended by inserting after paragraph (21) the 

2 following new paragraph: 

3 ‘‘(22) SECOND EARNER DEDUCTION.—The de4 duction allowed by section 224.’’. 

5 (c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

6 for part VII of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal 

7 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking the item 

8 relating to section 224 and by inserting the following new 

9 items: 

‘‘Sec. 224. Second earner deduction. 

‘‘Sec. 225. Cross reference.’’. 

10 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

11 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

12 December 31, 2014. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-1723
KAMIL A. MESAYS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus DAVID H. HUGEL, ADMINISTRATOR MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (CA04-1570-RDB) Submitted: September 17, 2004 Decided: October 18, 2004 Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Kamil A. Mesays, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Kamil A. Mesays appeals the district court’s order dismissing his complaint without prejudice. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Mesays v. Hugel , No. CA-04-1570-RDB (D. Md. May 28, 2004). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED