NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________ No. 19-2079

__________ BRUCE A. KIBE, JR., Appellant

v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

__________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (District Court Civ il No. 2-18-cv-00228) District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose

Submitted Under Third Ci rcuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 1, 2019 BEFORE: HARDIMAN, PH IPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 16, 2019)

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OPINION *

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* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. Appellant Bruce Kibe, Jr., appeals from th e decision of the Dist rict Court granting summary judgment to the Commissioner of Soci al Security who denied Kibe’s claim for disability benefits. We review to dete rmine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 1 We will affirm. As the parties are familiar with the reco rd, we raise here only those facts that are essential to our decision. Kibe contends, first, that the ALJ erred at step three of the fivestep analysis by concluding that his impairme nts (learning disorder/borderline intellectual functioning, bipolar disorder and schizoaff ective disorder) did no t show the marked restrictions necessary to be “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing gainful activity” 2 consistent with the impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.05 (intellectual disorder). Kibe points to his verbal comp rehension IQ score of 70 and contends the ALJ erroneously relied on sp eculative inferences from the record to discredit it. Kibe also compla ins that the ALJ ignored the f act that, while in school, he was placed in specialized classes for learning disabled students. This placement, of itself, he says, was significant evidence of his impairment. Yet, the ALJ pointed to an array of evidence that unde rmined the IQ score as an accurate reflection of the severity of Kibe ’s impairment. Kibe did not produce any physician diagnoses of an intellectual di sability. Dr. David Ne wman diagnosed only

1 Rutherford v. Barnhart , 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005 ). “We have jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review final determinations by the Commissioner.” Id. 2 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a).3 borderline intellectual functioning. In additio n, Kibe showed adaptive ability by: tending to his own personal care; independently making and keeping his own medical appointments; showing an ability to read and write; and, exhibiting an ability to do gainful employment. Moreover, after acknowled ging that Kibe was in special education classes and had academic scores in a low to moderate range, the ALJ evaluated this evidence as insufficient to show low intellectual function. In short, the ALJ did not ignore or misinterpret crucial evidence releva nt to step three of the analysis, nor did the decision rely on mere speculation. The ALJ’ s decision that Kibe’s impairments did not show the marked restrictions necessary to meet a listed impairment is supported by substantial evidence. There is no basis here to remand. Kibe next contends that the ALJ di d not include his bo rderline intellectual functioning, as well as marked limitations in a number of areas, in the questions to the vocational expert at step five of the analys is. He maintains that this undermines the Residual Functional Capacity finding. Th e ALJ erred, he argues, by disregarding evidence of limitations in social interactions, as exhibite d in Kibe’s verbal and physical altercations with co-workers, and similar be havior with people outside of work. He contends this demonstrates a marked limita tion on his ability to work with others. Next Kibe says the ALJ brushed aside the opinion of his tr eating physician who opined that Kibe was completely disabled. He maintains that Dr. Joel Last’s observations and conclusions carried great weight because he was his tr eating physician. He also asserts that the ALJ relied in stead on “stale” evidence.4 There are a number of problems with his contentions. The ALJ has wide latitude to create hypothetical questions that incorpor ate a claimaint’s functional limitations. The ALJ also has ample discretion to weigh Ki be’s own opinions abou t his difficulties in work environments. With that said, noting th at Kibe had mental limitations and moderate difficulties in social functioni ng, the record shows that th e ALJ constructed hypotheticals accounting for superficial or minimal contact with the general public and co-workers. The hypotheticals also addre ssed a need for simple, repet itive tasks and precluded work with a fast pace or with production quotas. As for Dr. Last’s opinion, the ALJ did not disregard it. He accepted Last’s diagnosis of a schizoaffective disorder. But, as for his opinion on functional limitations and his general assessment that Kibe was completely disabled, the ALJ noted that the Doctor’s ow n record did not support his conclusions. The ALJ characterized Kibe’s medical treatmen t as conservative and largely successful in managing his impairments (for instance, dr opping from monthly appointments to threemonth appointments to monitor his medicati on), contradicting Dr. Last’s conclusions about Kibe’s marked limitations. This led th e ALJ to give less weight to Last’s opinion, eliminating any concerns about the date of the evidence th e ALJ relied upon. The ALJ’s hypotheticals reflected the en tire record; his analysis properly focused on assessing evidence of Kibe’s functiona l limitations. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.