EXHIBIT G

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 1

of 32
1 FRANK M. PITRE (SBN 100077) 

fpitre@cpmlegal.com 2 ALISON E. CORDOVA (SBN 284942) 

3 acordova@cpmlegal.com 

JOHN P. THYKEN (SBN 286598) 

4 jthy~~n@cpmlegal.com 

COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP 

5 San Francisco Airport Office Center 

840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200 

6 Burlingame, CA 94010 

7 Telephone: (650) 697-6000 Facsimile: (650) 697-0577 

8 RICHARD L. HARRIMAN (SBN 66124) 

Harrimanlawl@sbcglobal.net 

9 LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD L. HARRIMAN 

1078 Via Verona Dr. 

l O Chico, CA 95973 

F 

I 

L 

St1perior Court of Cnhfom1a F 

County of Butte I 

L 

l l Telephone: (530) 343-1386 Facsimile: (530) 343-1155 E 

12/10/2018 E 

12 Counsel for Plaintiffs 

13 [ Additional co .. counsel listed on the signature page] 

14 

D \J-K•m~eQJC ci4.rk ~ D 

f3 y ~ OP.put y 

f-.'nrfrnni,.1/!v 1--ll H) 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHE'n', PITRE & 

McCAR"ll-IY, LLP 

LILA WILLIAMS, an individual; and 

LOUISE HOWELL, an individual; 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, 

a California corporation; 

PG&E CORPORATION, a California 

corporation; and 

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive; 

Defendants. 

COMPLAINT 

Case No. 18CV03993 

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND 

DECLARATORY RELIEF: 

1. NEGLIGENCE 

2. INVERSE CONDEMNATION 

3. PUBLIC NUISANCE 

4. PRIVATE NUISANCE 

S. PREMISES LIABILITY 

6. TRESPASS 

7. VIOLATION OF PUBLIC 

UTILITIES CODE § 2106 

8. VIOLATION OF HEALTH & 

SAFETY CODE § 13007 

9. VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & 

PROF. CODE§ 17500 

10. INJUNCTION UNDER CAL. 

BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 17535 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 2

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

IO 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHcrr, PITRE & 

McCARTIIY, U.P 

I. 

II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 

BACKGRO'UN"D .................................................................................................................. 2 

A. THE START ........................................................................................................... 2 

B. THE PLIGHT OF PLAINTIFFS WILLIAMS & HOWELL ................................. 3 

C. AWARENESS OF THE FORESEEABLE RISK AND CONSEQUENCE OF 

FAILING TO MANAGE THE WILDFIRE RISK ................................................. 4 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE .......................................................................................... 6 

PARTIES .............................................................................................................................. 6 

A. PLAINTIFFS .......................................................................................................... 6 

B. DEFENDANTS ..... ~ ................................................................................................ 6 

C. DOE DEFENDANTS ............................................................................................. 9 

D. AGENCY & CONCERT OF ACTION .................................................................. 9 

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................ 10 

A. PG&E'S EQUIPMENT SPARKED THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE AND 

DEADLY FIRE IN CALIFORNIA HISTORY .................................................... IO 

B. PG&E CONSIDERED PREEMPTIVELY SHUTTING OFF POWER TO 

MANY NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AREAS DUE TO EXTREME FIRE 

DANGER .............................................................................................................. 13 

C. PG&E KNEW ITS INFRASTRUCTURE WAS AGING AND 

UN"RELIABLE ..................................................................................................... 16 

i. PG&E's Wires ":Nere Found Highly Susceptible to Failure Due to Age .. 17 

ii. Many of PG&E' s Wires Do Not Remotely De-Energize When Down 

and In a Hazardous S"tate .................................................................... ~ ...... 17 

iii. The CPUC Announced that Aging Power Poles Are Causing 

Significant Safety Hazards That Must Be Addressed ............................... 18 

iv. PG&E Was Not Tracking the Condition oflts Electrical Assets, 

Despite Its Aging Infrastructure ................................................................ 19 

COMPLAINT 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 3

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETI, PlmE & 

McCARTHY, LLP 

D. 

E. 

F. 

G. 

. H. 

v. PG&E Knew that Its Down-Guy Design Was Flawed and Could 

Cause Ground Currents That Create Arcing and Spark Vegetation ......... 20 

PG&E RECKLESSLY ADOPTED IS VMII PROGRAM WHERE IT PAID 

CONTRACTORS TO CUT FEWER TREES ...................................................... 21 

PG&E FAILED TO FULLY EMPLOY LiDAR TO IDENTIFY HAZARD 

TREES ............................ ~ ..................................................................................... 22 

PG&E KNEW ITS ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WAS UNSAFE .................... 23 

PG&E'S "RUN TO FAILURE" APPROACH TO MAINTENANCE ................ 24 

PG&E'S LONG HISTORY OF SAFETY VIOLATIONS .................................. 25 

1. The 1981 San Francisco Gas Explosion ....................................... 25 

2. The 1991 Santa Rosa Gas Explosion ............................................ 26 

3. The 1994 Trauner Fire .................................................................. 26 

4. The 1996 Mission Substation Electrical Fire ................................ 26 

5. The 1999 Pendola Fire .................................................................. 27 

6. The 2003 Mission District Substation Fire ................................... 27 

7. The 2004 Sims Fire ....................................................................... 28 

8. The 2004 Freds Fire ...................................................................... 28 

9. The 2004 Power Fire ..................................................................... 28 

10. The 2005 San Francisco Electrical Explosion .............................. 28 

11. The 2008 Rancho Cordova Explosion .......................................... 28 

12. The 2008 Whiskey Fire ................................................................. 29 

13. The 2009 San Francisco Electrical Explosion .............................. 29 

14. The 2010 San Bruno Explosion .................................................... 29 

15. The 2011 Cupertino Explosion ..................................................... 30 

16. The 2014 Carmel Explosion .................................... ·.· ................... 31 

17. The 2015 San Francisco Transformer Explosion .......................... 31 

18. The 2015 Butte Fire ...................................................................... 31 

COMPLAINT ii 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 4

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETI, PITRE & 

McCARTHY, LLP 

VI. 

VII. 

19. The 2017 North Bay Fires ............................................................. 32 

I. THE CORPORA TE CULTURE AT PG&E THAT PUTS PROFITS BEFORE 

SAFETY ............................................................................................................... 33 

i. PG&E Has Repeatedly And Continuously Diverted Safety Funds .......... 34 

ii. PG&E Continually And Habitually Flaunts CPUC Regulations And 

Investigations ............................................................................................ 3 5 

J. PG&E IS REQUIRED TO SAFELY DESIGN, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN 

ITS ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND THE SURROUNDING VEGETATION. 37 

PLAINTIFFS' LOSSES ..................................................................................................... 39 

CAUSES OF ACTION ...................................................................................................... 41 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................................................................... 41 

NEGLIGENCE 

(Against All Defendants) 

~ECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................... ~ ............................... 44 

INVERSE CONDEMNATION 

(Against All Defendants) 

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION .......................................................................................... 45 

PUBLIC NUISANCE 

(Against All Defendants) 

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 47 

PRIVATE NUISANCE 

(Against All Defendants) 

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................................................................... 48 

PREMISES LIABILITY 

(Against All Defendants) 

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION .......................................................................................... 49 

TRESPASS 

(Against All Defendants) 

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION .................................................................................... 50 

VIOLATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE§ 2106 

(Against All Defendants) 

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION ....................................................................................... 51 

VIOLATION OF HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 13007 

(Against All Defendants) 

COMPLAINT iii 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 5

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHE1T, PITilE & 

McCARTHY, I.LP 

VIII. 

IX. 

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION .......................................................................................... 52 

VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. &PROF. CODE§ 17500 

(Against All Defendants) 

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ......................................................................................... 58 

INJUNCTION UNDER CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 17535 

(Against All Defendants) 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................................................................................... 59 

JURY DEMAND .................................................................................................................. 62 

COMPLAINT iv 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 6

of 32
1 PLAINTIFFS bring this action for damages against Defendants PG&E 

2 CORPORATION, PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, and DOES 1 through 20 

3 (collectively, "DEFENDANTS") as follows: 

4 

5 

I. INTRODUCTION 

1. This case arises from PG&E CORPORATION and/or PACIFIC GAS & 

6 ELECTRIC COMPANY's (collectively, "PG&E") repeated and willful disregard for public 

7 safety in failing to manage the risks associated with the operation of their facilities and equipment 

8 2. PG&E's abdication of responsibility for assessing the effectiveness of their risk 

9 management practices to prevent catastrophic wildfires is exacerbated by the fact that those 

10 charged with managing wildfire risks choose to ignore the lessons learned from the Butte and 

11 North Bay Wildfires. These events exposed serious problems with the efficacy of the practices 

12 PG&E relies upon to prevent wildfires. As described by one senior officer of PG&E charged 

13 with assessing PG&E's overall Risk Management Program prior to the San Bruno explosion in 

14 2010, "PG&E lacks a well defined documented risk policy/standard at the enterprise level. One 

15 that explains PG&E's overall risk assessment methodology,· defines the lines of business roles 

16 and responsibility; specifies the requirements for performing and documenting risks; links risk 

17 assessments to controls, self-assessment, reviews and audits; and specifies the requirements for 

18 metrics to track the risks. " 

19 3. Given the calamities experienced by the victims of the Butte Fire in Calaveras 

20 County in 2015, the North Bay Fires in 2017 and the recent Camp Fire, it is clear that PG&E's 

21 dysfunctional risk assessment methodologies have not improved. PG&E has spent millions of 

22 dollars on media advertising, instead of investing to upgrade infrastructure and revamp their 

23 vegetation management practices, demonstrating that PG&E places its reputation above public 

24 safety. PG&E refuses to authorize audits of its wildfire risk management practices by independent 

25 consultants to provide objective assessments of whether their policies are effective. Rather, 

26 PG&E conducts self-audits of its practices which fail to accurately evaluate the safety risks posed 

27 to the public. As a result, PG&E promotes a false and misleading picture of their ability to safely 

28 supply its customer base, and the public, with a safe supply of electricity. 

LAW OFFICES COMPLAINT 

COTCHE'n', PITRE & 

McCARTI-IY, Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 7 LLP 

of 32
1 4. This callous and despicable disregard for the safety of California communities is 

2 underscored by PG&E's diversion of necessary safety related expenditures into funding corporate 

3 bonuses, .. boosting shareholder profits, and/or fueling advertising campaigns -- while ignoring the 

4 serious and irreparable nature of the public safety threat posed by its aging infrastructure and 

5 ineffective vegetation management practices. As a result, the people of the State of California 

6 have paid for corporate greed with the lives of their loved ones, their homes, and their most 

7 cherished belongings. This action seeks not only the recovery of damages on behalf of Plaintiffs 

8 herein, but also seeks to: (1) stop PG&E officers and directors from spending the company's 

9 monopolistic profits and ratepayer assessments on advertising to promote a false and misleading 

10 picture of safety surrounding their operations; and (2) recoup all monies spent by PG&E for 

11 advertising to promote their false image of safety since September 9, 2010. 

12 II. BACKGROUND 

13 

14 

A. 

5. 

THE START 

On the morning of November 8, 2018, a fire began in Butte County which would 

15 eventually ravage the town of Paradise and several other communities (hereinafter "Camp Fire"). 

16 The first reported sighting of a fire that morning was near Pulga Road and Camp Creek Road, 

17 northeast of the Town of Paradise. The discovery of the fire coincided with a reported malfunction 

18 in one of PG&E's transmission lines just minutes earlier, the Caribou-Palenno 1 lSkV 

19 Transmission Line, which is more than fifty (50) years old. Approximately thirty minutes after the 

20 first malfunction, a second power outage was reported by PG&E in its power lines near Concow, 

21 just east of Paradise. 

22 6. Fanned by high winds, the fire spread at an estimated rate of a football field every 

23 second. By around 8 a.m., the fire had reached Paradise, a scenic forest community nestled in the 

24 Sierra foothills with a population of 26,000, many of them seniors, retirees, and families seeking 

25 to escape the high cost of living found in other California cities. 

26 7. Many residents had little, to no, warning of the approaching blaze and were forced 

27 into bottlenecks of traffic in a desperate attempt to escape on the few small roads out of town. 

28 Vehicles waited in bumper-to-bumper traffic hoping to outpace the flaines as the enveloping 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHEIT, PITRE & 

McCARTIIY, I.LP 

COMPLAINT 2 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 8

of 32
1 smoke turned the mid-day sky to night. By the end of the day, the Camp Fire had destroyed nearly 

2 all of Paradise and surrounding communities, and inflicted horrific death and destruction. 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

B. 

8. 

Devastation of the Camp Fire 1 

THE PLIGHT OF PLAINTIFFS WILLIAMS & HOWELL 

Plaintiffs, 93-year-old LILA WILLIAMS and her daughter, 67-year-old LOUISE 

17 HOWELL, were two of those desperately trying to escape the inferno which enveloped. 

18 9. LOUISE barely escaped her Concow property as the fire closed in around her. With 

19 her dog and cat nowhere in sight, she had no choice but to leave without them. LOUISE then 

20 found herself stuck in a row of cars unable to cross Concow Creek on the one road out of town. 

21 The fire began melting the stopped cars, forcing LOUISE and others trapped by the flames to 

22 leave their vehicles and seek shelter in Lake Concow. After fire crews were able to clear debris 

23 from the road, LOUISE joined a convoy of cars following behind a fire truck, passing through 

24 flaming forests as the fire truck batted away burning tree limbs. Throughout this ordeal, LOUISE 

25 was unable to reach her 93-year-old mother in Magalia and was tormented by the fear that her 

26 mother could not get out in time. 

27 

28 

LA \V/ OFPICES 

COTCI IETJ', PITRE & 

MCCt\RTI-IY, LLP 

1 https://www.firehouse.com/operations-training/wildJand/news/21031685/at-least-five-peopledead-cam -wildfire- aradise-chico-ca-firefi hters 

COMPLAINT 3 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 9

of 32
1 10. LILA was returning from a doctor's appointment with her granddaughter on the 

2 morning of No~ember 8 when embers from the Camp Fire began falling on their car. Fearful that 

3 she would not have enough gas to escape the fire, she stopped at a gas station, but left without 

4 refueling due to the long lines ~f vehicles. She tried another gas station, only to have the power 

5 shut off just as she reached the pump. Fortunately, LILA was finally able to abandon her vehicle 

6 at her granddaughter's home in Magalia and evacuate in her granddaughter's truck. They then 

7 joined the clogged roads heading towards to Chico. Terrified of being overrun by the flames in the· 

8 slow-moving traffic, LILA made the harrowing decision of turning around and heading deeper 

9 into the mountains in an attempt to escape. LILA and her family managed to survive, but their 

10 homes, property, and community were destroyed. 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

C. AWARENESS OF THE FORESEEABLE RISK AND CONSEQUENCE OF 

FAILING TO MANAGE THE WILDFIRE RISK 

11. In the days leading up to the Camp Fire, weather forecasts predicted high winds 

and low humidity which, coupled with dry vegetation, presented an extreme risk of fire danger. 

This prompted the National Weather S~rvice to issue a Red Flag Warning for Butte County. Aware 

of these risks, PG&E began notifying customers on November 6 that it may be proactively shutting 

off power in certain affected Northern California counties in order to reduce the foreseeable and 

18 probable risk of their equipment igniting a wildfire. Despite these warnings, PG&E ultimately 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHE1T, PITilE & 

McCARTHY, LLP 

decided not to shut off power on November 8. 

12. Prior to this event, PG&E was well aware of the catastrophic consequences of 

failing to de-energize powerlines during conditions of high fire danger and red-flag warnings. 

Little more than a year has passed since the North Bay Counties mourned the losses of the North 

Bay Fires, which took 44 lives, and only three years have gone by since the Butte Fire destroyed 

over 70,000 acres in Calaveras County. PG&E was even aware of the risk high winds posed to 

the specific transmission lines near Pulga as five steel support towers were toppled during a 2012 

storm. But in the face of this predictable risk, PG&E decided not to. take the simple and easy fail 

safe step of flipping the switch and shutting off power to the circuits in areas of extreme wildfire 

danger so that its overhead electrical equipment, which has proven to be a likely source of wildfires 

COMPLAINT 4 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 10

of 32
1 and potentially the most prevalent cause of fires in California, would not serve as the spark to yet 

2 another deadly and destructive wildfire. 

3 13. The Camp Fire was an inevitable byproduct of PG&E's willful and conscious 

4 disregard of public safety. PG&E, although mandated to do so, failed to identify, inspect, manage, 

5 and/or control vegetation growth near its power lines and/or other electrical equipment. This 

6 created a clear and present danger of trees and/or other vegetation coming into contact with 

7 PG&E's power lines and/or other electrical equipment and causing electrical problems. Further, 

8 PG&E failed to construct, manage, track, monitor, maintain, replace, repair, and/or improve its 

9 transmission and distribution lines, appurtenant equipment, poles, transformers, conductors, 

10 insulators, ''jwnper" cables, reclosers, and/or other electrical equipment, despite being aware that 

11 its infrastructure was unsafe, aging, and/or vulnerable to environmental conditions. PG&E's risk 

12 mitigation systems were knowingly ineffective in assessing deficiencies in its wildfire safety 

13 programs, vegetation management programs, maintenance and inspection programs. Moreover, 

14 PG&E's officers, employees, and/or agents abdicated their responsibility of oversight, auditing 

15 and/or evaluation of mitigation measures used to prevent against the risk of wildfires caused by 

16 operation of its equipment. 

17 14. PG&E's officers, employees, and/or agents continually and repeatedly add insult 

18 to injury by using misleading and/or untrue advertising related to PG&E's mitigation measures, 

19 including maintenance and inspection of electrical equipment and facilities, as well as vegetation 

20 management, used to prevent the risk of wildfires caused by the operation of its equipment, which 

21 foreseeably and unreasonably misled PLAINTIFFS and the residents of Paradise and California, 

22 generally, related to the risk of catastrophic wildfires caused by PG&E's equipment. Not to 

23 mention, PG&E's misleading and untrue media posts during the Camp Fire, which indicated that 

24 while a wildfire was probable, it had not occurred yet. This was over an hour after the fire had 

25 started, homes had been destroyed, and people were fleeing for their lives. This misleading media 

26 contributed to and/or caused a false sense of security for PLAINTIFFS and/or residents of 

27 Paradise, generally, who were deprived of adequate and/or proper advance warning, then left with 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHEIT, PITRE & 

McCARTHY, LLP 

COMPLAINT s 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 11

of 32
1 no other option but to make a desperate attempt to escape while the fire was descending upon 

2 them. 

3 III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

4 15. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Code of Civil 

5 395(a) because, at all times relevant, Defendants and each of them have resided in, been 

6 incorporated in, or done significant business in the State of California so as to render the exercise 

7 of jwisdiction over Defendants and each of them, by California Courts consistent with traditional 

8 notions of fair play and substantial justice. The amount in controversy exceeds the jwisdictional 

9 minimum of this Court. 

10 16. Venue is proper in this County because substantially all of the events, acts, 

11 omissions, and/or transactions complained of herein occurred in/or originated from Butte County, 

12 State of California. 

13 IV. PARTIES 

14 

15 

A. PLAINTIFFS 

17. Plaintiffs LILA WILLIAMS and LOUISE HOWELL (collectively, 

16 "PLAINTIFFS") are a mother and daughter who lost personal property and their respective homes 

17 on land they owned at 6758 lshi Drive in Magalia, California and 3488 Hoffman Road in Concow, 

18 California. All of the damages alleged herein occurred in and around Butte County and arose from 

19 the Camp Fire, as set forth in more detail below. 

20 

21 

B. DEFENDANTS 

18. At all times herein mentioned Defendants PG&E CORPORATION and 

22 PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY (collectively, "PG&E") were corporations 

23 authorized to do business and doing business, in the State of California, with their principal place 

24 of business in the County of San Francisco, California. Defendant PG&E CORPORATION is 

25 an energy-based holding company headquartered in San Francisco. It is the parent company of 

26 Defendant PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY. PG&E CORPORATION and 

27 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY provide customers with public utility services, 

28 

LAWOFFICES 

CarcHETI, PITRE & 

McCARIBY,LLP 

COMPLAINT 6 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 12

of 32
1 and services relating to the generation of energy, transmission of electricity and natural gas, 

2 generation of electricity, and the distribution of energy. 

3 19. PLAINTIFFS allege that PG&E CORPORATION and PACIFIC GAS & 

4 ELECTRIC COMP ANY are jointly and severally liable for each other's wrongful acts and/or 

5 omissions as hereafter alleged, in that: 

6 a. PG&E CORPORATION and PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY operate 

7 as a single business enterprise operating out of the same building located at 77 Beale 

8 St, San Francisco, California for the purpose of effectuating and carrying out PG&E 

9 CORPORATION's business and operations and/or for the benefit of PG&E 

10 CORPORATION; 

11 b. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMP ANY and PG&E CORPORATION do not 

12 operate as completely separate entities, but rather, integrate their resources to achieve 

13 a common business purpose; 

14 c. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMP ANY is so organized and controlled, and its 

15 decisions, affairs and business so conducted as to make it a mere instrumentality, agent, 

16 conduit and/or adjunct of PG&E CORPORATION; 

17 d. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's income contribution results from its 

18 function, integration, centralization of management and economies of scale with 

19 PG&E CORPORATION; 

20 . e. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's and PG&E CORPORATION's 

21 officers and management are intertwined and do not act completely independent of one 

22 another; 

23 f. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's and PG&E CORPORATION's 

24 officers and managers act in the interest of PG&E CORPORATION as a single 

25 enterprise; 

26 g. PG&E CORPORATION has control and authority to choose and appoint PACIFIC 

27 GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's board members as well as its other top officers 

28 and managers; 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETI, PITRE & 

·MCCAR11-IY,U.P 

COMPLAINT 7 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 13

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETI', PITIIB & 

MCCARTHY, l.LP 

h. Despite both being Electric Companies and Public Utilities, PACIFIC GAS & 

ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION do not compete with one 

another, but have been structured, organized, and businesses effectuated so as to create 

a synergistic, integrated single enterprise where various components operate in concert 

one with another; 

i. PG&E CORPORATION maintains unified administrative control over PACIFIC 

GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY; 

j. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION are 

insured by the same carriers and provide uniform or similar pension, health, life and 

disability insurance plans for employees; 

k. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION have 

unified 401 (k) Plans, pensions and investment plans, bonus programs, vacation policies 

and paid time off from work schedules and policies; 

1. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION invest 

these funds from their programs and plans by a consolidated and/or coordinated 

Benefits Committee controlled by PG&E CORPORATION and administered by 

common trustees and administrators; 

m. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION have 

unified personnel policies and practices and/or a consolidated personnel organization 

or structure; 

n. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION have 

unified accounting policies and practices dictated by PG&E CORPORATION and/or 

common or integrated accounting organizations or personnel; 

o. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION are 

represented by common legal counsel; 

p. PG&E CORPORA TIO N's officers, directors, and other management make policies 

and decisions to be effectuated by PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMP ANY and/or 

COMPLAINT 8 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 14

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

otherwise play roles in providing directions and making decisions for PACIFIC GAS 

& ELECTRIC COMPANY; 

q. PG&E CORPORATION's officers, directors, and other management direct certain 

financial decisions for PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY including the 

amount and nature of capital outlays; 

r. PG&E CORPORATION's written guidelines, policies, and procedures control 

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMP ANY, its employees, policies, and practices; 

s. PG&E CORPORATION files consolidated earnings statements factoring all revenue 

and losses from PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMP ANY as well as consolidated 

tax returns, including those seeking tax relief; and/or, without limitation; and 

t. PG&E CORPORATION generally directs and controls PACIFIC GAS & 

ELECTRIC COMPANY's relationship with, requests to, and responses to inquiries 

from, the Public Utilities Commission and uses such direction and control for the 

benefit of PG&E CORPORATION. 

C. DOE DEFENDANTS 

20. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or 

17 otherwise of the Defendants DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, are unknown to PLAINTIFFS who 

18 therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 

19 474. PLAINTIFFS further allege that each of said fictitious Defendants is in some manner 

20 responsible for the acts and occurrences hereinafter set forth. PLAINTIFFS will amend this 

21 Complaint to show their true names and capacities when the same are ascertained, as well as the 

22 maimer in which each fictitious Defendant is responsible. 

23 

24 

D. AGENCY & CONCERT OF ACTION 

21. At all times herein mentioned herein, DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, 

25 hereinabove, were the agents, servants, employees, partners, aiders and abettors, co-conspirators, 

26 and/or joint venturers of each of the other DEFENDANTS named herein and were at all times 

27 operating and acting within the purpose and scope of said agency, service, employment, 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETf, PITRE & 

McCAR.'n-IY, LLP 

COMPLAINT 9 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 15

of 32
1 partnership, enterprise, conspiracy, and/or joint venture, and each DEFENDANT has ratified and 

2 approved the acts of each of the remaining DEFENDANTS. Each of the DEFENDANTS aided 

3 and abetted, encouraged, and rendered substantial assistance to the other DEFENDANTS in 

4 breaching their obligations to PLAINTIFFS as alleged herein. In trucing action to aid and abet 

5 and substantially assist the commission of these wrongful acts and other wrongdoings complained 

6 of, as alleged herein, each of the DEFENDANTS acted with an awareness of his/her/its primary 

7 wrongdoing and realized that his/her/its conduct would substantially assist the accomplishment of 

8 the wrongful conduct, wrongful goals, and wrongdoing. 

9 V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

10 

11 

12 

A. 

22. 

PG&E'S EQUIPMENT SPARKED THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE AND 

DEADLY FIRE IN CALIFORNIA HISTORY 

On November 7, 2018, PG&E emailed a customer who owns property near the 

13 location where the Camp Fire is suspected of originating. The PG&E e-mail notified the customer 

14 that crews would need to access the PG&E equipment on her land ]?ecause PG&E was "having 

15 problems with sparks. "2 

16 23. The following morning at 6:15 a.m., PG&E reported a power outage on its 

17 "Caribou-Palenno l 15kV Transmission line" in the same area. Just eighteen minutes later, at 6:33 

18 a.m., the Camp Fire was first reported. 

19 24. Later that day, PG&E conducted an aerial patrol of the area and observed 9amage 

20 to the transmission tower on the same Caribou-Palenno 115k V Transmission line, approximately 

21 one mile north-east of the town of Pulga, "in the area of the Camp Fire."3 Five of the transmission 

22 towers in this exact area suffered damage by winds in a 2012 storm and required replacement. 

23 The project took years longer than planned and was not completed until 2016.4 It is not presently 

24 known whether the tower damaged on November 8, 2018 was one of those replaced just two years 

25 earlier or if it experienced the same failure mechanism as the towers damaged in the 2012 storm. 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETf, PITRE & 

McCARTHY, LLP 

2 https://sacramento.cbsloca).com/2018/11 /12/pge-sparks-power-lines-camp-fire/ 

3 Id. 

4 https://www .mercurynews.com/2018/ 11 / 19/pge-transmission-line-eyed-in .. camp .. fire-hadcolla sed-durin -2012-storm/ 

COMPLAINT 10 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 16

of 32
25. Dispatch repo11s initially described the Camp Fire as a vegetation fire "under the 

2 high tension power lines" near the Feather River and Poe Dam. Firefighters arrived at the scene 

3 around 6:43 a.m. and confirmed that the fire was in fact located "underneath the transmission 

4 lines." 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 26. 

The Black Arrow Follows the Path of PG&E Transmission Lines with the 

Black Circle Depicting the Suspected Arca of Origin of the Camp Fire 5 

The first firefighter on the scene immediately realized the danger presented by the 

20 fire. He reported to dispatch that "this has got the potential for a major incident" and requested an 

21 additional 15 engines, four bulldozers, two water tenders, four strike teams and hand crews. He 

22 further recommended the evacuation of the nearby town of Pulga and requested air support.6 

23 Sh011ly after arriving at the scene, another firefighter estimated the growing fire to be about 10 

24 acres with a "really good wind on it."7 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAWOFFICI~S 

COTCI !ETI', PITRE & 

1\.[CCARTI IY, J .I ,p 

5 https://www.kqed.org/news/ I 1705306/pge-transm ission-1 ine-may-be-tied-to-disastrous-buttecounty-fire 6 Id. 

7 Id. 

COMPLAINT 11 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 17

of 32
27. At 6:45 AM on November 8, 20 I 8, while the fire near Pulga was already burning, 

2 PG&E reported a separate malfunction with a 12kV Big Bend 1101 distribution line in the nearby 

3 community of Concow. Cal Fire has reported that the Concow location is a potential "second 

4 origin" for the Camp Fire. 8 

5 28. Aided by high winds, the fire spread quickly and soon endangered populated areas. 

6 By the night of November 8, an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the nearby town of Paradise was 

7 destroyed.9 Residents of the town had only a matter of moments to gather their families and attempt 

8 to escape the blaze. Many could not escape and tragically perished. 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 29. 

Satellite View of Camp Fire, November 8, 2018'° 

The Camp Fire was not 100% contained until November 25 and not until it 

23 consumed more than 153,000 acres, and destroyed nearly 14,000 homes and more than 4,800 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LA \Y/OI•'IiJCES 

CoTCI llffl', Prnm & 

MCCART! IY, LLP 

8 https://www.kqed.org/news/ 11707191 /second-pge-outage-reported-around-ignition-of-deadlycamp-fire 9 https://weather.com/news/news/2018-1 1-09-northern-california-wildfire-camp-fire-paradise 

10 htt s://earthobservator .nasa. ov/ima es/144225/cam -fire-ra )es-in-califomia 

COMPLAINT 12 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 18

of 32
additional structures. 11 The official search for those that died in the blaze was concluded on 

2 November 29, with 88 confirmed dead and nearly 200 still listed as missing. 12 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

L,\ \XI ( WFI CES 

CurCI IITI', PITRE & 

i\lCC\RTI IY, 1.1,P 

B. 

30. 

Camp Fire 

Tl!Und;y rrhby Sunday Momuy 

Spread of the Camp Fire November 8111 -12 111 13 

PG&E CONSIDERED PREEMPTIVELY SHUTTING OFF POWER TO 

MANY NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AREAS DUE TO EXTREME FIRE 

DANGER 

PG&E was aware in advance of the Camp Fire of the extreme fire danger presented 

by weather conditions on November 8. Two days earlier, on November 6, PG&E activated its 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) "due to forecasted weather conditions with increasing fire 

risk." 14 

31. PG&E then began notifying customers that it might be shutting down power in 

certain Northern California counties on November 8 due to forecasted high winds and low 

humidity. 

say/ 

11 https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/ l l /25/deadly-camp-fire-now- I 00-percent-contained-ftre-officials12 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11 /29/us/victims-cal i forn ia-fires-missing.html 

13 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/11/us/california-fires-tracker.html 

14 PG&E's November 27, 2018 Resolution ESRB-8 Com liance Re 011 to CPUC. 

COMPLAINT 13 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 19

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 32. 

POTENTIAL OUTAGE PREPARATION PG&E urges customers 

to prepare for possible proactive power shutoff ( 1118) and 

extended outages 1n portions of the following counties. Lake. 

Napa. Sonoma Butte, Plumas. Yuba Sierra. Placer & Nevada 

Learn more and prepare 

r I.I· 

PG&E followed up with 17 additional warnings over the next two days advising 

7 that it was going to shut off power on the morning of November 8. PG&E's warnings referenced 

8 forecasts of sustained winds of 20 to 30 miles per hour, with gusts of 40 to 50 mph overnight 

9 Wednesday into Thursday and lasting until late afternoon. 15 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

33. At 7:56 a.m. on the morning of November 8 - over an hour after the Camp Fire had 

already started - PG&E was still reporting that it may be shutting off power due to the "potential 

extreme fire danger": 

34. 

ADVISORY FOR THURSDAY (11/8): Due to 

evolving weather & potential extreme fire 

danger, PG&E may proactively shutoff power 

for safety to some customers in parts of 

(counties): Lake, Napa, Butte, Plumas, Yuba, 

Sierra, Placer and Nevada. Learn more: 

PG&E's November 8 Tweet 16 

Despite these warnings, its own assessment of the potential for extreme fire danger, 

20 and the fact that the Camp Fire was actively burning, PG&E callously sent a tweet - more than 

21 six hours after the Camp Fire started burning - defending its decision not to shut down power 

22 in Butte County that morning. 

23 Ill 

24 Ill 

25 Ill 

26 

27 

28 

LA\'\IOJ,'Jo'JCES 

emu 1ETr, PrmE & 

l\lCC\RTI IY, LLP 

15 https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/ 11/09/pge-power-lines-may-have-sparked-deadly-buttecounty-wildfire-according-to-radio-transmissions/ 

16 Id. 

COMPLAINT 14 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 20

of 32
2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 35. 

PG&E has determined that 11 will nol proceed with plans today 

for a Public Safety Power Shutoff in portions of 8 Northern CA 

counties as weather conditions did not warrant tl11s safety 

measure We want to thank our customA.rs for their 

understa11ding 

PG&E's purported justification for not preemptively shutting off power was that 

12 weather conditions did not wanant the power shutoff; however, this ran contrary to PG&E's own 

13 stated criteria for conducting preemptive power shutoffs. 

14 36. PG&E represented to the public that they did an evaluation and developed factors 

15 to assess when a shutdown of power was warranted. They call this preemptive shutdown a "Public 

I 6 Safety Power Shutoff' or "PSPS." According to PG&E, no single factor is determinative in 

17 PG&E's decision to initiate a PSPS. On the morning the Camp Fire ignited, every one of PG&E's 

18 factors supported the cutting of power. 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

L\ \VOFFICl·:S 

COTCIIETI', PrrnE & 

I\lcC,\RTI IY, I .I .J> 

Factors 

• "Extreme" fire danger threat level, as 

classified by the National Fire Danger 

Ratin S stem 

• A Red Flag Warning declared by the 

National Weather Service 

• Low humidity levels, generally 20 percent 

and below 

COMPLAINT 

Actual Conditions 

• 11/7/18: National Weather Service issued 

a strong wind advisory, which will "create 

critical fire weather dan er" 

• National Weather Service issued a Red 

Fla Warnin on 11/7/18 

• On 11 /8/18 relative humidity ranged from 

a low of 11 to a high of 23, for an average 

of 16 ercent. 

15 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 21

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

• Sustained winds above approx. 25 mph 

· and wind gusts in excess ofapprox. 45 

mph 

• Site~specific conditions such as 

temperature, terrain and local climate 

• Critically dry vegetation that could serve 

as fuel for a wildfire 

• . On-the-ground, real-time observations 

from PG&E field crew 

• Sustained winds of 32 mph and gusts up · 

to 52 mph at 4AM on the morning of the 

firel7 

• Temperature 48°F at 6:00am; Hilly 

terrain; Hot summer Mediterranean 

climate 

• Extended dry fall weather and periods of 

~ north ,.winds causing low moisture 

content in live and dry fuels 

• Un.known 

37. PG&E claims that its PSPS plan only applies to power lines that are 70kV or lower, 

9 meaning that higher voltage lines are not preemptively de-energized. This is different from other 

10 power utilities, such as San Diego Gas & Electric, which include long-distance transmission lines 

11 in its de-energization protocol. 18 Had PG&E included the 115kV transmission line that 

12 malfunctioned near Pulga in its de-energization protocol and implemented the preemptive 

13 shutdown as indicated by its PSPS criteria, then the ignition of the Camp Fire would have been 

14 prevented. 

15 38. In contrast to the 115kV transmission line, PG&E admits that the 12kV line near 

16 Concow -the location of the potential "second origin" for the Camp Fire - was one of the circuits 

17 which "would have been de-energized'' in the event of a PG&E preemptive power shutoff. 19 This 

18 line would never have malfunctioned - potentially igniting or exacerbating the spread of the Camp 

19 Fire - had PG&E heeded its own warnings and protocols, and preemptively de-energized this 

20 line. 

21 

22 

23 

24 

. 25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETI, PITRE & 

McCAR11-IY, LLP 

c. PG&E KNEW ITS INFRASTRUCTURE WAS AGING AND UNRELIABLE 

39. On May 6, 2013, a report was sent to the Safety and Enforcement Division of the 

CPUC from the Liberty Consulting Group who had been retained to conduct an independent 

review of capital and operations and maintenance expenditures proposed by PG&E (hereinafter 

17 https:/ /www .mercurynews.com/2018/11 / 17 /why-didnt-pge-shut-down-power-in-advance-ofdeadly-camp-fire-heres-the-data/ 

18 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-28/pg-e-chose-not-to-cut-power-as-windsraged-before-deadliest-fire 

19 Id. 

COMPLAINT 16 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 22

of 32
1 the "2013 Liberty Report").20 The 2013 Liberty Report concluded that: "several aspects of the 

2 PG&E distribution system present significant safety issues." It also found: ( a) "addressing risks 

3 associated with electrical distribution components has been overshadowed by electric transmission 

4 and gas facilities;" and (b) "addressing aging infrastructure and adding SCADA to the system 

5 comprise the major focuses of safety initiatives for the distribution system". 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

1

i. PG&E's Wires Were Found Highly Susceptible to Failure Due to Age 

40. One of the first key findings of the 2013 Liberty Report was that PG&E had a 

"large amount of small size obsolete conductor remaining on PG&E's system." PG&E has 

113,000 miles of conductors (a.k.a. wires), and according to the report, over 60 percent of those 

conductors are highly susceptible to failure. The conductors are very small, and generally more 

susceptible to breaking than standard size conductors. As the conductor ages, it becomes even 

more susce~tible to breaking. Weather conditions, such as winds and lightning strikes, will also 

wear a small conductor more than larger ones. For these reasons, "[t]his conductor was once 

popular, but is now recognized as obsolete, due to its small size." 

ii. 

41. 

Many of PG&E's Wires Do Not Remotely De-Energize When Down 

and In a Hazardous State 

A second key finding of the 2013 Liberty Report was that upon review of 

18 PG&E's documents, on a daily basis and in 36 percent of cases, PG&E cannot remotely de19 energize a downed line and must send someone on-scene to manually turn off the feed. During 

20 that time, the downed line is a hazard, and according to the 2013 Liberty Report, this hazard has 

21 "contributed to a number of fatalities and injuries." 

22 42. PG&E has a long-standing practice of using reclosers throughout its system to 

23 automatically restart power after interruptions, even though it knows these devices may cause 

24 wildfires. Reclosers are circuit breakers equipped with a mechanism that can automatically 

25 "reclose" the breaker and reenergize a power line after it has been "opened" due to a fault. Many 

26 of PG&E's reclosers are set to reenergize the line up to three times after a fault. 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHE'IT, PITRE & 

McCARTI-IY, LLP 

17 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 23

of 32
1 43. Reclosers are key tools to prevent power blackouts, but if a fault occurs from 

2 contact between a line and a tree or vegetation, reenergizing the line can ignite fires. This danger 

3 is so significant that the other two major utilities in California, San Diego Gas & Electric Company 

4 and Southern California Edison, have reprogramed their electrical systems during fire seasons to 

5 ensure that reclosers do not automatically restart electrical currents after a service interruption. 

6 44. PG&E knew that its reclosers posed a great risk of wildfire but has only taken slow 

7 and incomplete steps to eliminate that risk. At a Congressional hearing in 2015, PG&E's Senior 

8 Vice President of Electrical Operations, Patrick Hogan, stated that PG&E had the ability to 

9 reprogram its reclosers during fire season to not restart power. Patrick Hogan claimed that shutting 

10 down power means "you take the reliability hit, but you gain the wildfire benefit. "21 

11 45. In contrast to San Diego Gas & Electric Company and Southern California Edison 

12 having disabled all of their reclosers from reenergizing lines during fire season, and despite its 

13 own knowledge of the dangers posed by reclosers, PG&E began an experimental pilot program in 

14 2017 to reprogram its reclosers that only affected a limited area of California. 

15 46. Even before the Butte Fire in 2015, PG&E began a process of replacing all 

16 reclosers that can only be programmed or controlled on-site with reclosers that can be remotely 

17 programmed and controlled. However, that process has been so slow and deliberate many of its 

18 reclosers must still be programmed or controlled only at the site where they are installed. 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAWOFFICES 

COTCHBTf, PITRE & 

McCAR'll-lY, LLP 

iii. The CPUC Announced that Aging Power Poles Are Causing Significant 

Safety Hazards That Must Be Addressed 

47. According to the 2017 CPUC Order Instituting Investigation Into the Creation of a 

Shared Database or Statewide Census of Utility Poles and Conduit: 

Poorly maintained poles and attachments have caused substantial property 

damage and repeated loss of life in this State. For example, inadequate 

clearance between communication and power lines, perhaps in conjunction 

with a broken cable lashing wire, caused the Southern California Guejito 

Fire of 2007 which (together with the Witch Fire) burned 197,990 acres and 

caused two deaths. Three more deaths occurred in 2011 when an electrical 

21 http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Power-line-restart-device-implicated-in-past12324764. h last accessed Februa 12, 2018 . 

COMPLAINT 18 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 24

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 48. 

conductor separated from a pole in high winds, causing a live wire to fall to 

the ground. At least five more people lost their lives in pole-related failures 

in 2012 and 2015. 

Unauthorized pole attachments are particularly problematic. A pole 

overloaded with unauthorized equipment collapsed during windy 

conditions and started the Malibu Canyon Fire of 2007, destroying and 

damaging luxury homes and burning over 4500 acres. Windstorms in 2011 

knocked down a large number of poles in Southern California, many of 

which were later found to be weakened by tennites, dry rot, and fungal 

decay. 

Communication and other wires are not infrequently found hanging onto 

roads or yards. Poles with excessive and/or unauthorized attachments can 

put utility workers at risk. Facilities deployed in the field may differ from 

what appears on paper or in a utility's database. 22 

In the June 29, 2017 CPUC press release for the Order, the CPUC President 

12 Michael Picker stated, "Plain old wooden poles, along with their cousins, the underground 

13 conduits, are work horses, carrying most of our power and telecommunications. They sometimes 

14 get crowded and fail, causing outages and fires because of all the equipment crammed onto them." 

15 Further, "[n]ot knowing where all the poles are and who owns them, how loaded they are, how 

l 6 safe they are, and whether they can handle any additional infrastructure, is problematic to both the 

17 utilities and to the CPUC. Creating a database of utility poles could help owners track attachments 

18 on their poles and manage necessary maintenan~e and rearrangements, and can help the CPUC in 

our oversight role. "23 

19 

20 

21 

22 49. 

iv. PG&E Was Not Tracking the Condition of Its Electrical Assets, Despite 

Its Aging Infrastructure 

Another recommendation of the 2013 Liberty Report was ''the establishment of a 

23 formal asset management program in Electric Operations." According to the report, "aging 

24 infrastructure is best addressed by having a strategic asset management program in place. These 

25 types of programs, such as the PAS 55 program, force a detailed and thorough condition 

26 assessment survey of the major ·assets. These types of formal programs also take failure modes 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

CorcHETT, PITRE & 

McCARTI-IY, LLP 

22 http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/GOOO/M I 90/K.872/190872933 .PDF. 

23 h ://docs.c uc.ca. ov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/MI91/K560/191560905.PDF. 

COMPLAINT 19 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 25

of 32
1 into consideration. Long term sustainable plans can then be prepared to address the asset 

2 conditions. A sustainable asset management will mitigate system safety risks from aging 

3 infrastructure, which constituted a major portion of the safety items in this GRC." 

4 50. The 2013 Liberty Report was so concerned about the state of PG&E's aging 

5 infrastructure that it advised: "[wle also recommend that PG&E treat aging infrastructure as 

6 an enterprise-level risk." 

7 

8 

9 51. 

v. PG&E Knew that Its Down-Guy Design Was Flawed and Could Cause 

Ground Currents That Create Arcing and Spark Vegetation 

Electrical arcing is a process by which guy wires or "down-guys," when designed 

1 o improperly and/or installed according to improper design, conduct ground current at ground level 

11 during high winds, igniting fires to nearby vegetation. Guy wires are the metal support cables that 

12 are used to tie electrical poles to the ground. PG&E utilizes an inverted "V" shape design without 

13 any separation or in-line insulators as an attempt to help its poles withstand high wind. However, 

14 in PG&E's sub-transmission design, PG&E does not separate the connection at the pole by 12 

15 inches, utilize any in-line insulator to prevent ground current from flowing, or utilize a shunt so 

16 when ground current exists it does not cause an electrical arc. In addition, if not properly 

17 maintained, the down-guys become loose. In high wind conditions, when the poles sway and 

18 ground currents exist, arcing occurs. With the combination of high winds, swaying poles, loose 

19 connections, two down-guys attached by a common bolt, and ground current, electrical arcing 

20 occurs, igniting local vegetation. 

21 52. It is believed that arcing from San Diego Gas & Electric wires was the cause of the 

22 2007 San Diego "Witch Creek" Fires, in addition to the 2003 Cedar and Paradise Fires. 

23 53. The down-guy design utilized by PG&E is a violation of CPUC General Order 

24 Number 95. Industry experts have demonstrated to the CPUC and California utilities how the 

25 dangerous design causes arcing and fires for over a decade. They believe this design is 

26 unreasonably dangerous and that the fix is cheap and easy. CPUC General Order Number 95 ·sets 

27 forth two possible solutions: either have a 12-inch separation on a pole; or add an in-line insulator. 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETf, PITRE & 

McCARTIIY, LLP 

COMPLAINT 20 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 26

of 32
1 An additional solution is adding a shunt from the down-guy anchor to the down-guy itself. All 

2 three inexpensive solutions prevent electrical arcs at ground levels that ignite fires. 

3 

4 

5 

D. 

54. 

PG&E RECKLESSLY ADOPTED IS VMII PROGRAM WHERE IT PAID 

CONTRACTORS TO CUT FEWER TREES 

PG&E's Vegetation Management Program perfonns two types of tree work: 

6 annual routine compliance tree work and reliability tree work. 

7 55. Annual routine compliance work focuses on maintaining regulatory distances 

8 between energized conductors and vegetation. Reliability tree work" focuses on locations where 

9 there has been a history of vegetation-related outage problems based on three historical indexes: 

10 System Average Interruption Frequency Index ("SAIFI"), Customer Experiencing Multiple 

11 Interruption ("CEMI"), and System Average Interruption Duration Index ("SAIDI"); 

12 56. In 2006, PG&E's Vegetation Management Program adopted the "Vegetation 

13 Management Incentive Initiative" ("VMII"). The ostensible purpose of VMII was to reduce the 

14 annual routine compliance tree work and share the resulting cost savings with ~e contractors 

15 whose compensation would be reduced by the loss of actual work. The actual purpose of VMII 

16 was to shift costs from annual routine compliance work to fund additional reliability work. 

17 57. For example, in 2011, PG&E set a goal to reduce routine "units" worked from 1.18 

18 million trees in 2011 to 1 million in 2012 in order to increase the amount of money available for 

19 reliability work by $20 million. In 2012, PG&E set a goal to goal to reduce routine "units" worked 

20 by 25 percent in 2013 in order to increase the amount of money available for reliability work by 

21 $35 million. In 2013, PG&E only perfonned routine patrol inspections on 75 percent of its 

22 distribution circuits, using the cost savings to increase its reliability patrols. In 2014, PG&E set a 

23 goal to reduce routine units worked by 7.5 percent annually through 2016. 

24 58. Between 2006 and 2013, PG&E actually reduced the number of routine trees 

25 worked from 1.7 million to 1.25 million in 2013, paid contractors $85 million, and increased 

26 reliability spending by $134 million. During that time, customer satisfaction as measured by 

27 SAIFI increased by 40 percent. 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHEIT, PITRE & 

McCARTHY, LLJ> 

COMPLAINT 21 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 27

of 32
1 59. Most of PG&E's annual routine compliance work is performed in rural areas in 

2 California, while most of PG&E's "reliability" work is p-erformed in the more densely populated 

3 urban or semi-urban areas where outages will generate more complaints per square mile than in 

4 the rural counties served by PG&E. Although the actual vegetation management work performed 

5 · in the annual routine compliance patrols and the reliability patrols is virtually the same, PG&E's 

6 only comprehensible rationale for differentiating the "two types of work" is that the "reliability" 

7 work is directed at reducing statistical measurements of customer dissatisfaction over outages and 

8 that goal can be better accomplished by concentrating on work in urban or semi-urban areas at the 

9 expense of work needed in rural areas. 

10 60. Under PG&E's bonus incentive program, reducing the number of customer 

11 complaints over outages leads to an increased likelihood ofincreases in executive and management 

12 bonuses. 

13 

14 

15 

E. 

61. 

PG&E FAILED TO FULLY EMPLOY LiDAR TO IDENTIFY HAZARD 

TREES 

LiDAR (an acronym for "Light Detection and Ranging11} is a surveying method 

I 6 that measures distances to a target by illuminating that target with a pulsed laser light and measures 

17 the reflected pulses with a sensor. These light pulses, when combined with other data recorded by 

18 the system, orthoimagery, and hyperspectral data, can generate precise three-dimensional images 

19 and information about the shape of the Earth and objects such as buildings or trees. 

20 62. When used in a vegetation management program for electric utilities, LiDAR scans 

21 and analyses can be used to identify trees that have the potential for contacting conductors, whether 

22 because of proximity to the conductors or are dead, diseased, or dying. Annual LiDAR scans and 

23 analyzes the electric system the change in the dead or diseased vegetation by comparing one year's 

24 data to the prior year's inventory of dead or diseased trees. When the analysis is conducted over a 

25 subset dataset, it can provide a statistical understanding in the percent change in vegetation 

26 identified as dead or diseased. 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETJ', PITRE & 

MCCAR'lllY, LLP 

63. PG&E's use of LiDAR is funded by its "Catastrophic Event Memorandum 

Account" ("CEMA"). If a catastrophic event is declared a state of emergency by the state or 

COMPLAINT 22 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 28

of 32
1 federal government, then utilities like PG&E can record costs caused by the event in this 

2 memorandwn accoW1t. By recording these costs, the utilities can later ask for recovery of these 

3 costs from the CPUC. 

4 64. In 2014, PG&E began to use LiDAR to scan and analyze small sections of its 

5 electric transmission and distribution system. In 2015, PG&E employed a contractor who created 

6 spatially accurate alignment information for approximately 10 percent of PG&E distribution lines 

7 using LiDAR and imagery. The contractor identified 2.2 million "Hazard Trees" in the LiDAR 

8 data having the potential to fail-in or encroach on distribution lines, performed "dead and diseased 

9 analysis" on 1.6 million trees, and identified 23,000 trees as potentially dead or diseased. 

10 65. In 2015, for some unfortunate reason PG&E scheduled the LiDAR contractor's 

11 deliverables for October 2015 at the very tail end of California's fire season. The contractor's 

12 final product identified the 44 foot-tall gray pine that started the Butte Fire as a "Hazard Tree" that 

13 had the potential to fall into one of PG&E's distribution lines, but unfortW1ately PG&E received 

14 the information over a month after the Butte Fire started. 

15 66. In 2016 and 2017, PG&E again employed LiDAR technology to scan and analyze 

16 its electric transmission and distribution system, but only employed the technology in limited 

17 sections of that system, and again scheduled the deliverables at the tail end of the California 

18 wildfire season. 

19 

20 

F. 

67. 

PG&E KNEW ITS ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WAS UNSAFE 

PG&E has a long-standing practice of using reclosers throughout its system to 

21 automatically restart power after interruptions, even though it knows these devices may cause 

22 wildfires. Reclosers send pulses of electricity through power lines whenever an interruption occurs 

23 on lines equipped with the devices. According to experts, if power lines ·are in contact with trees 

24 or vegetation, these pulses of electricity can start fires. For this reason, other utilities have changed 

25 their operations to protect the public. 

26 68. The dangers posed by reclosers are so significant that the other two major utilities 

27 in California, San Diego Gas & Electric Company and Southern California Edison, have 

28 reprogramed their electrical systems during fire seasons to ensure that reclosers do not 

LAW OFFICES COMPLAINT 23 

COTCHETI, PITRE & 

McCARTHY, Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 29 Ll .. P 

of 32
1 automatically restart electrical currents after a service interruption. In contrast, PG&E began an 

2 experimental pilot program in 2017 in limited parts of California to reprogram its reclosures. 

3 69. PG&E knew that its reclosures posed a great risk of wildfire. At a Congressional 

4 hearing in 2015, PG&E's Senior Vice President of Electrical Operations, Patrick Hogan, stated 

5 that PG&E had the ability to reprogram its reclosures during fire season to not restart power. 

6 Patrick Hogan claimed that shutting down power means "you take the reliability hit, but you gain 

7 the wildfire benefit."24 PLAINTIFFS believe that despite this knowledge and ability, PG&E 

8 never reprogramed all of its reclosures to prevent wildfires. 

9 70. In addition, since prior to 1996, PG&E has known or should have known that its 

10 choice of chemical treatments for its poles can also make its equipment unsafe. For example, 

11 PG&E uses and has used poles treated with pentachlorophenol in liquefied petroleum gas by the 

12 Cellon® process. Those poles tend to experience surface decay below ground regardless of the 

13 type of wood used for the poles. As a result, digging inspections are required for poles treated by 

14 these processes for all wood types. However, PLAINTIFFS believe that PG&E has failed to 

15 conduct the proper inspections and further, when PG&E has been advised of necessary repairs to 

16 such poles, PG&E failed to repair the poles in a timely manner. These failures are a breach of 

17 PG&E obligations to the public and have been a cause of fires. 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETr, PITRE & 

McCARTHY, !LP 

G. PG&E'S "RUN TO FAILURE" APPROACH TO MAINTENANCE 

71. PG&E has a well-documented history of implementing a "run to failure" approach 

with its aging infrastructure, whereby it ignores necessary maintenance in order to line its own 

pockets with excessive profits. According to a filing by the CPUC in May 2013: 

However, as we saw in Section V .F .3 above, the Overland Audit explains 

how PG&E systematically underfunded GT &S integrity management and 

maintenance operations for the years 2008 through 2010. PG&E engaged 

in a "run to failure" strategy whereby it deferred needed maintenance 

proiects and changed the assessment method for several pipelines from ILI 

to the less informative ECDA approach - all to increase its profits even 

further beyond its already generous authorized rate of return, which 

averaged 11.2% between 1996 and 2010. 

24 http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article!Power-line-restart-device-implicated-in-past12324764. h . 

COMPLAINT 24 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 30

of 32
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

H. 

72. 

Given PG&E's excessive profits over the period of the Overland Audit, 

there is no reason to believe that Overland's example regarding GT&S 

operations between 2008 and 2010 was unique. The IRP Report 

supplements1 the Overland Audit findings with additional examples of 

PG&E management's commitment to profits over safety. Thus, it is 

· evident that while the example of GT &S underfunding between 2008 

and 2010 might be extreme, it was not an isolated incident; rather, it 

represents the culmination . of PG&E management's long standing 

policy to squeeze every nickel it could from PG&E gas operations and 

maintenance, regardless of the long term "run to failure" impacts. And 

PG&E has offered no evidence to the contrarv.25 

PG&E'S LONG HISTORY OF SAFETY VIOLATIONS 

Over the past thirty-plus years, PG&E has been subject to numerous fines, 

10 penalties, and/or convictions as a result of its failure to abide by safety rules and regulations, 

11 including the following fines, penalties, and/or convictions. Despite these recurring punishments, 

12 PG&E refuses to modify its behavior, and has continued to conduct its business with a conscious 

13 disregard for the safety of the public, including PLAINTIFFS. 

14 73. As detailed below, the Camp Fire is just one example of the many tragedies that 

15 have resulted from PG&E's enduring failure to protect the public from the dangers associated 

16 with its operations. PG&E power lines, transformers, conductors, poles, insulators, and/or other 

17 electrical equipment have repeatedly started wildfires due to PG&E's ongoing failure to create, 

18 manage, implement, and/or maintain effective vegetation management programs for the areas near 

19 and around its electrical equipment. ·Further, PG&E's aging infrastructure has caused multiple 

20 disasters throughout California. 

21 1. The 1981 San Francisco Gas Explosion 

22 74. A PG&E gas main in downtown San Francisco exploded in 1981, forcing 30,000 

23 people to evacuate. It took workers nine hours to shut off the gas main's manual shut-off valves 

24 and stop the flow of gas that continued to feed the flames in the interim. 

25 II I 

26 . II I 

27 

28 

LAWOFFICES. 

COTCHETI, PITRE & 

McCARTIIY, LLP 

25 ftp://ftp2.cpuc.ca.gov/PG&E20 I SO l 30ResponseToA 13I2012Ruling/2013/03/SB _ GT &S _ 

0039691. df. 

COMPLAINT 25 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 31

of 32
1 

2 75. 

2. The 1991 Santa Rosa Gas Explosion 

Two people were killed and three others were injured when a PG&E gas line 

3 exploded in Santa Rosa in December 1991. The pipeline was improperly marked, failing to give 

4 proper notice to contractors working in the area. A contractor hit the pipe with a backhoe, causing 

5 the pipe to leak and explode several months later. 

6 

7 76. 

3. The 1994 Trauner Fire 

In 1994, PG&E's failure to maintain the vegetation surrounding its electrical 

8 equipment caused a devastating wildfire in Nevada County, California. This Fire, commonly 

9 known as the "Trauner Fire'' or the "Rough and Ready Fire," burned approximately 500 acres in 

10 and around the town of Rough and Ready, destroyed 12 homes, and burned 22 structures, including 

11 a historic schoolho·use that was built in 1868. 

12 77. Investigators detennined that the Trauner Fire began when a 21,000-volt power line 

13 brushed against a tree limb that PG&E was supposed to keep trimmed. Through random spot 

14 inspections, the investigators found several hundred safety violations in the area near the Trauner 

15 Fire. Approximately 200 of these violations involved contact between vegetation and one of 

16 PG&E's power lines. As a result, on or around June 19, 1997, PG&E was convicted of 739 

17 counts of criminal negligence and required to pay $24 million in penalties. 

18 78. After the trial, a 1998 CPUC report revealed that PG&E diverted $77.6 million 

19 from its tree-trimming budget to other uses from 1987 to 1994. During that same time, PG&E 

20 under spent its authorized budgets for maintaining its systems by $495 million and instead, used 

21 this money to boost corporate profits. Despite this public outing, PG&E continued its corporate 

22 culture of putting profits before safety. 

23 4. The 1996 Mission Substation Electrical Fire 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LAW OFFICES 

COTCHETf, PITRE & 

McCARTI-IY, LLP 

79. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on November 27, 1996, a cable splice at PG&E's 

Mission Substation in San Francisco short-circuited, burning and melting the insulation around the 

splice. Smoke from the fire rose through a floor opening above the splice into a switch cabinet. 

That smoke was so thick that it caused a flashover between phases of the bus bars connecting the 

overhead N bus to the switch. This caused insulation on the N bus to ignite and a circuit breaker 

COMPLAINT 26 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3436-7 Filed: 08/07/19 Entered: 08/07/19 16:13:52 Page 32

of 32