[Cite as Professionals Guild of Ohio v. Lucas Cty. Corr. Facility, 2019-Ohio-2522.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Professionals Guild of Ohio, : 

 

 Appellant-Appellant, : No. 17AP-885 

 (C.P.C. No. 17CV-6612)

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Lucas County Correctional Treatment : 

Facility Governing Board et al., 

 : 

 Appellees-Appellees. 

 : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 25, 2019 

 

On brief: James E. Melle, for appellant. Argued: James E. 

Melle. 

On brief: Julia R. Bates and Elaine B. Szuch, for Lucas 

County Correctional Treatment Facility Governing Board. 

Argued: Elaine B. Szuch. 

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Michael D. Allen, 

for State Employment Relations Board. Argued: Tracy M. 

Nave. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by appellant, Professionals Guild of Ohio, from a judgment 

of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas affirming a directive of appellee, State 

Employment Relations Board ("SERB"), which granted a motion filed by appellee, Lucas 

County Correctional Treatment Facility Governing Board (hereafter "Lucas County" or 

"the board"), to dismiss appellant's notice to negotiate. 
No. 17AP-885 2 

{¶ 2} The following background facts, essentially not in dispute, are drawn 

primarily from the trial court's decision and entry filed December 14, 2017. From 1999 

until 2007, appellant and the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas (hereafter "the 

common pleas court") had a "voluntary relationship" with regard to correction officers 

employed by the common pleas court's community based correctional facility ("CBCF"). 

(Dec. 14, 2017 Decision & Entry at 2.) On October 12, 2006, the Ohio General Assembly 

enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 162 ("H.B. 162"), which "made a county, instead of a court of 

common pleas, eligible to establish a CBCF." (Dec. 14, 2017 Decision & Entry at 2.) H.B. 

162 also "eliminated judicial corrections boards and gave the functions previously held by 

them, including employment matters, to the new facility governing boards." (Dec. 14, 

2017 Decision & Entry at 2.) Lucas County "established such a governing board" to 

assume responsibility for the CBCF. (Dec. 14, 2017 Decision & Entry at 2.) 

{¶ 3} With the enactment of H.B. 162, the General Assembly amended R.C. 

4117.01(C) to provide in part: 

"Public employee" means any person holding a position by 

appointment or employment in the service of a public 

employer, * * * except: 

* * * 

(18) Employees of community-based correctional facilities 

and district community-based correctional facilities created 

under sections 2301.51 to 2301.58 of the Revised Code who 

are not subject to a collective bargaining agreement on June 1, 

2005. 

{¶ 4} The 2006 legislation included an uncodified provision, Section 4 of H.B. 

162, which stated as follows: 

The amendment of section 4117.01 of the Revised Code by this 

act preserves the nonexempt collective bargaining status of 

employees of community-based correctional facilities and 

programs and district community-based correctional facilities 

and programs who are covered by a collective bargaining 

agreement existing on June 1, 2005. These employees shall 

maintain their non-exempt status beyond the termination 

date of the existing collective bargaining agreement. All 

employees of community-based correctional facilities and 

programs and district community-based correctional facilities 

and programs who are not covered by a collective bargaining 
No. 17AP-885 3 

agreement on June 1, 2005, shall be exempt from collective 

bargaining rights under Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code. 

{¶ 5} At the time of the enactment of H.B. 162, Lucas County apparently "had the 

only CBCF" covered by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). (Dec. 14, 2017 

Decision & Entry at 2.) Prior to the enactment of H.B. 162 and the corresponding 

amendment to R.C. 4117.01(C), the common pleas court and appellant "treated 

corrections officers employed by [the board] as being excluded from the definition of 

'public employees' under the exception for court employees" codified in R.C. 

4117.01(C)(18). (Dec. 14, 2017 Decision & Entry at 2.) 

{¶ 6} With the enactment of H.B. 162 and R.C. 4117.01(C)(18), appellant filed a 

request for recognition with SERB. At that time, SERB "found that the employees were 

'public employees' under [R.C.] 4117.01(C)(18) as amended, since the parties had been 

subject to a collective bargaining agreement on June 1, 2005." (Dec. 14, 2017 Decision & 

Entry at 3.) Accordingly, SERB "ordered a Direction to Election." (Dec. 14, 2017 Decision 

& Entry at 3.) On November 28, 2008, appellant was certified as the exclusive 

representative of corrections officers employed by the board. Appellant and the board 

"have continued to be parties to a collective bargaining agreement ever since," and "[t]he 

most recent agreement expired on June 30, 2017." (Dec. 14, 2017 Decision & Entry at 3.) 

{¶ 7} On June 30, 2015, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 64 

("H.B. 64"), which amended R.C. 4117.01(C) to provide as follows: 

"Public employee" means any person holding a position by 

appointment or employment in the service of a public 

employer, * * * except: 

(17) Employees of community-based correctional facilities and 

district community-based correctional facilities created under 

sections 2301.51 to 2301.58 of the Revised Code. 

{¶ 8} On March 27, 2017, appellant filed with SERB a notice to negotiate with the 

board regarding employees of the Lucas County Correctional Treatment Facility ("Lucas 

County CTF"). On May 26, 2017, the board filed a motion to dismiss appellant's notice to 

negotiate. On July 25, 2017, SERB issued a directive granting the board's motion to 

dismiss appellant's notice to negotiate. The directive by SERB stated in part: 
No. 17AP-885 4 

In this case, a ruling for the Union would run contra to the 

plain language of an unambiguous statute and would also 

ignore clear legislative intent to remove the grandfather clause 

from § 4117.01 (C)(17). Uncodified law is, by nature, limited in 

scope and duration. While some uncodified laws are 

longstanding and govern with great power (e.g., the 

uncodified law that provides for deemed certified bargaining 

units), [Section 4]'s weight of authority appears to be greatly 

diminished by the clear meaning of the statute on point and 

the legislative intent to exempt all CBCF employees from 

collective bargaining rights. 

{¶ 9} SERB further held it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to determine 

the issue of the constitutionality of H.B. 64. Appellant filed an appeal with the trial court 

from SERB's directive, pursuant to R.C. 119.12 and 4117.02(P), and the parties 

subsequently submitted briefs to the court. On December 14, 2017, the trial court filed a 

decision and entry affirming SERB's directive based on the court's determination that 

SERB correctly found R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) "was controlling." (Dec. 14, 2017 Decision & 

Entry at 8.) The trial court further rejected appellant's contention that the amendment to 

R.C. 4117.01(C) in H.B. 64 violated the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 10} On appeal, appellant sets forth the following four assignments of error for 

this court's review: 

I. The Common Pleas Court erred in affirming the directive of 

the State Employment Relations Board because it was not 

supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and 

was not in accordance with law. 

II. The Common Pleas Court erred to the prejudice of 

Appellant in finding and concluding that the amendment to 

R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) in Am.Sub.H.B. 64 and Section 4 of 

Am.Sub.H.B. No. 162 were in conflict and the conflict was 

irreconcilable. 

III. The Common Pleas Court erred in finding that the 

amendment to R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 64 did 

not violate the One Subject Rule in Article II, Section 15(D) of 

the Ohio Constitution. 

IV. The Common Pleas Court erred to the prejudice of 

Appellant in failing to find and order that Appellant's Motion 

to Compel Bargaining according to the obligations in O.R.C. 

Chapter 4117 be granted. 
No. 17AP-885 5 

{¶ 11} Appellant's assignments of error are interrelated and will be considered 

together. Under these assignments of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in: 

(1) affirming the directive of SERB because it was not supported by reliable, probative and 

substantial evidence and was not in accordance with law, (2) concluding that Section 4 of 

H.B. 162 and the amendment to R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) made by H.B. 64 were in 

irreconcilable conflict, (3) finding that the amendment to R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) did not 

violate the one-subject rule in Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution, and (4) 

failing to grant appellant's motion to compel bargaining in accordance with R.C. Chapter 

4117. 

{¶ 12} A trial court, in considering an appeal under R.C. 119.12, "reviews an 

administrative order to determine whether it is supported by reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence and is in accordance with law." Benevolent Emps. v. State Emp. 

Relations Bd., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-377, 2012-Ohio-5905, ¶ 28. In reviewing a trial court's 

determination that "the board's order was supported by reliable, probative and 

substantial evidence, this court's role is limited to determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion." Id. at ¶ 29. However, regarding the issue of "whether the board's 

order was in accordance with law, this court exercises plenary review." Id. In this respect, 

"[a] question of statutory construction presents an issue of law that we determine de novo 

on appeal." Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 134 Ohio St.3d 296, 2012-

Ohio-5366, ¶ 12, citing Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, ¶ 8, citing 

State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 13} In general, "[t]he goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give 

effect to the General Assembly's intent." Toledo v. Corr. Comm. of Northwest Ohio, 6th 

Dist. No. L-16-1155, 2017-Ohio-9149, ¶ 22. In determining such intent, "courts first look 

to the statutory language and the purpose to be accomplished," and "[w]hen a statute's 

meaning is clear and unambiguous, courts apply the statute as written." Id. Thus, "[i]n 

such a situation, courts have no basis for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation, as 

an unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted." Id. If, on the other hand, "a 

statute is ambiguous, ' "courts seek to interpret the statutory provision in a manner that 

most readily furthers the legislative purpose as reflected in the wording used in the 
No. 17AP-885 6 

legislation." ' " Id., quoting State v. Black, 142 Ohio St.3d 332, 2015-Ohio-513, ¶ 38, 

quoting State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508 (1996). 

{¶ 14} The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that courts are to "accord due 

deference to SERB's interpretation of R.C. Chapter 4117. Otherwise, there would be no 

purpose in creating a specialized administrative agency, such as SERB, to make 

determinations." Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 40 

Ohio St.3d 257, 260 (1988). 

{¶ 15} In challenging the trial court's affirmance of SERB's order, appellant argues 

the trial court erred in "seemingly" ruling that the amended version of R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) 

was irreconcilable with the former version of R.C. 4117.01(C). (Appellant's Brief at 14.) 

According to appellant, the trial court's analysis should have been based on a comparison 

of the language of amended R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) with the language of Section 4 of H.B. 162. 

In response, SERB and the board argue the clear statutory language of R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) 

excludes from the definition of "public employee" any employees of CBCFs. 

{¶ 16} As set forth under the facts, in 2006, the legislature, through the enactment 

of H.B. 162, amended R.C. 4117.01(C)(18) to define "[p]ublic employee" to mean, in part, 

"any person holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public 

employer * * * except * * * [e]mployees of community-based correctional facilities and 

district community-based correctional facilities created under sections 2301.51 to 2301.58 

of the Revised Code who are not subject to a collective bargaining agreement on June 1, 

2005." (Emphasis added.) In 2015, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 64, which 

amended R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) to define public employee to mean, in part, "any person 

holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer * * * 

except * * * [e]mployees of community-based correctional facilities and district 

community-based correctional facilities created under sections 2301.51 to 2301.58 of the 

Revised Code." Thus, by the enactment of H.B. 64, the above italicized language (i.e., 

"who are not subject to a collective bargaining agreement on June 1, 2005") was deleted 

from R.C. 4117.01(C). 

{¶ 17} On review, we agree with the board and SERB that the language of R.C. 

4117.01(C)(17) is plain and unambiguous. By its terms, the statute excludes employees of 

CBCFs from the definition of public employee for purposes of collective bargaining in the 
No. 17AP-885 7 

public sector. Further, as noted by SERB, interpreting current R.C. 4117.01(C) as not 

applying to appellant's members because they were a party to a collective bargaining 

agreement on June 1, 2005 would require adding words to the statute that no longer exist. 

{¶ 18} It is presumed the legislature was aware of the existing law when it 

amended R.C. 4117.01(C). See, e.g., Harris v. J.A. Schultz & Son, 6th Dist. No. WD-86-81 

(July 17, 1987) ("the legislature is presumed to be aware of existing statutes and to know 

the status of the law relating to the subjects with which it is dealing"); Lytle v. Baldinger, 

84 Ohio St. 1, 8 (1911) (presumption exists "that every amendment of a statute is made to 

effect some purpose"). A similar presumption arises when the legislature amends a 

statute by deleting language from the prior version. See State ex rel. Kelly v. Judges of 

Cleveland Municipal Court, 1 Ohio App.2d 558, 563 (8th Dist.1965) (amendment of 

statute deleting language raised presumption that legislature "intended to change the 

effect and operation of the law to the extent of the change in the language of the statute"). 

Here, it is presumed the legislature, by deleting the words "who are not subject to a 

collective bargaining agreement on June 1, 2005," intended to change the existing law 

such that the omitted provision was no longer effective. 

{¶ 19} As indicated, in support of its position, appellant relies on a provision in the 

uncodified law (i.e., Section 4 of H.B. 162), which explained that the amendment to R.C. 

4117.01 (effective October 12, 2006) "preserves the nonexempt collective bargaining 

status of employees of community-based correctional facilities * * * who are covered by a 

collective bargaining agreement existing on June 1, 2005." According to appellant, H.B. 

64, which amended R.C. 4117.01(C) in 2015, did not repeal, amend or change uncodified 

Section 4. 

{¶ 20} Under Ohio law, "uncodified law is '[l]aw of a special nature that has a 

limited duration or operation and is not assigned a permanent Ohio Revised Code section 

number.' " Maynard v. Eaton Corp., 119 Ohio St.3d 443, 2008-Ohio-4542, ¶ 7, quoting A 

Guidebook for Ohio Legislators, 145 (1oth Ed.2007-08). Because uncodified law " 'is not a 

law of a general and permanent nature, it does not appear in the statutes in codified form.' 

" Id. Uncodified law is "occasionally called a temporary law." Id. Further, "[w]hile 

uncodified law is 'part of the law of Ohio,' it should not be used to displace statutory 
No. 17AP-885 8 

language where the meaning of the statute is clear." First Natl. Bank of Pennsylvania v. 

Jones, 11th Dist. No. 2013-T-0083, 2014-Ohio-746, ¶ 22. 

{¶ 21} As noted, while Section 4 provided explanation regarding the amendment in 

H.B. 162 of R.C. 4117.01 (i.e., that employees subject to a CBA existing on June 1, 2005 

"shall maintain their non-exempt status beyond the termination date of the existing 

collective bargaining agreement"), we do not find persuasive appellant's argument that 

this uncodified provision remains operative in light of the plain language of R.C. 

4117.01(C)(17), as amended in H.B. 64. Rather, because the language of R.C. 

4117.01(C)(17) is unambiguous, we decline to look to uncodified Section 4 to alter that 

meaning. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in affirming the directive of SERB on the 

basis that the language of R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) "was controlling." 

{¶ 22} We note, as an aside, while this court's affirmance of SERB's interpretation 

of R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) necessarily resolves the dispositive issue of whether Lucas County 

(as a public employer) is mandatorily required to collectively bargain with employees of a 

CBCF, nothing in our decision should be construed as addressing (and/or foreclosing) the 

right of the parties to voluntarily agree to collectively bargain in the future.1

{¶ 23} Appellant further contends the amendment to R.C. 4117.01(C)(17) in an 

appropriations bill (H.B. 64) is violative of the single-subject rule of Article II, Section 

15(D) of the Ohio Constitution. According to appellant, the amendment has nothing to do 

with expending funds and was buried among numerous unrelated provisions, thereby 

displaying the hallmarks of logrolling. In support, appellant relies in part on State ex rel. 

Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Assn. Local 11 v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 104 Ohio St.3d 122, 

2004-Ohio-6363, ¶ 36 (holding that amendment to R.C. 3318.31, excluding certain 

employees from collective bargaining process, violated one-subject rule where there was 

disunity between challenged provision and budget-related items of bill). 

{¶ 24} In response, the board contends there is a direct link between the 

amendment at issue and the budgetary process; specifically, the board maintains the 

Lucas County CTF is unique, being the only CBCF in the state that could be subject to the 

change in the statute (i.e., the only CBCF subject to a CBA on June 1, 2005). The board 

 

1 As previously noted under the facts, appellant and Lucas County (formerly the common pleas court) 

initiated a "voluntary relationship" with respect to corrections officers employed by the CBCF beginning in 

1999, and appellant and Lucas County have continued to be parties to a CBA since that time. 
No. 17AP-885 9 

notes that the overall budget allocation for CBCFs statewide is set by the state legislature, 

and earmarked funds are then allocated to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction which, in its sole discretion, determines the dollar amounts to be appropriated 

to each of the CBCF programs. According to the board, because the Lucas County CTF 

budget is dependent on the state budget, in accordance with R.C. 2301.56, legislation 

relating to employee conditions, wages, operations and other pertinent matters regarding 

employees of the Lucas County CTF necessarily impacts the state budget as a whole and, 

therefore, the amendment was correctly included in an appropriations bill. 

{¶ 25} In its response to appellant's constitutional challenge, SERB argues there is 

no disunity within H.B. 64, and the legislature had a legitimate reason for combining 

provisions that affect R.C. Chapter 4117 and collective bargaining in the legislation. SERB 

notes the amendment to R.C. 4117.01(C) was not the only revision in the legislation 

affecting R.C. Chapter 4117 or collective bargaining rights; specifically, SERB observes, 

H.B. 64 also amended R.C. 4117.10(A), clarifying which laws prevail over conflicting 

provisions of agreements between employee organizations and public employers, and the 

bill added R.C. 3319.113, a provision affecting collective bargaining rights of public school 

employees. 

{¶ 26} Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution, states in part: "No bill 

shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." The 

Supreme Court of Ohio as held that the purpose of the one-subject rule "is to prevent 

logrolling, which occurs when legislators combine disharmonious proposals in a single bill 

to ensure passage of proposals that might not have won acceptance on their own." State 

ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, ¶ 15, 

citing State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste, 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 142-43 (1984). 

{¶ 27} Although the Supreme Court has "described the one-subject rule as 

mandatory," it has noted that its role in enforcement of the rule "remains limited." Id. at 

¶ 16. Further, "[t]he one-subject rule does not prohibit a plurality of topics, only a 

disunity of subjects." Id. at ¶ 17. Thus, "[t]he mere fact that a bill embraces more than 

one topic is not fatal as long as a common purpose or relationship exists between the 

topics." Id. The Supreme Court has made clear it will "invalidate statutes as violating the 

one-subject rule only when they contain 'a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation.' " 
No. 17AP-885 10 

Id., quoting Dix at 145. Accordingly, "[o]nly when there is no practical, rational or 

legitimate reason for combining provisions in one act will we find a one-subject-rule 

violation." Id. The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[a]pplication of the one-subject 

rule is more difficult when the challenged provision is part of an appropriations bill." Id. 

at ¶ 18. In this respect, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[b]iennial appropriations 

bills, which fund the state's programs and departments, necessarily address wide-ranging 

topics and bring unique challenges for judicial review." Id. 

{¶ 28} In the present case, the trial court addressed the constitutional issue and 

found no manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of the one-subject rule, nor evidence of 

logrolling. On review, we find no error with that determination. 

{¶ 29} In general, we agree with the board that the issue of whether Lucas County 

is subject to mandatory collective bargaining (and attendant matters pertaining to 

employee wages, hours, working conditions, etc.) implicates budgetary and appropriation 

processes, thereby impacting the overall Lucas County CTF budget. In this respect, 

county budgeting processes "are necessarily affected by overall state appropriations." 

Cuyahoga Cty. Veterans Servs. Comm. v. State, 159 Ohio App.3d 276, 2004-Ohio-6124, 

¶ 14 (10th Dist.). We therefore find the amendment at issue to be sufficiently related to 

funding and the budgeting process so as to justify inclusion in an appropriations bill. 

{¶ 30} We also find no blatant disunity of topics, and conclude there is a legitimate 

basis for combining provisions affecting R.C. Chapter 4117 and collective bargaining rights 

in the bill. As noted by SERB, H.B. 64 not only amended R.C. 4117.01(C)(17), but 

included amendments to R.C. 4117.10 (delineating the relationship between provisions of 

a CBA and applicable state and local laws). In addition, the bill contained other 

provisions related to collective bargaining, including R.C. 4113.81 (prohibiting the state 

from engaging in collective bargaining with individuals excluded from coverage under 

R.C. Chapter 4117 and the National Labor Relations Act), as well as R.C. 3319.113(F) 

(which included language providing that "[n]otwithstanding any provision to the contrary 

in [R.C.] Chapter 4117," requirements for school counselor evaluations "prevail over any 

conflicting provision of a collective bargaining agreement entered into on or after 

September 29, 2015"). 
No. 17AP-885 11 

{¶ 31} Under Ohio law, "when an enactment of the General Assembly is 

challenged, the challenger must overcome a strong presumption of constitutionality." 

State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 161 

(1967). Here, we agree with the trial court that the amendment to R.C. 4117.01(C) in H.B. 

64 does not constitute a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of the one-subject rule. 

Thus, the trial court did not err in rejecting appellant's constitutional challenge under 

Article II, Section 15(D), of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 32} Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in affirming the directive 

of SERB granting the board's motion to dismiss appellant's notice to negotiate. 

Accordingly, appellant's four assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

SADLER and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

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