alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5185 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 10, 2014 

Received 

AN ACT 

To reauthorize the Young Women’s Breast Health Education 

and Awareness Requires Learning Young Act of 2009. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 5185 RDS 

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘EARLY Act Reauthor3 ization of 2014’’. 

4 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE YOUNG WOMEN’S 

5 BREAST HEALTH EDUCATION AND AWARE6 NESS REQUIRES LEARNING YOUNG ACT OF 

7 2009. 

8 Section 399NN(h) of the Public Health Service Act 

9 (42 U.S.C. 280m(h)) is amended by striking ‘‘$9,000,000 

10 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014’’ and in11 serting ‘‘$4,900,000 for each of fiscal years 2015 through 

12 2019’’. 

13 SEC. 3. GAO REPORT ON HHS ACTIVITIES TO PROVIDE 

14 BREAST CANCER EDUCATION. 

15 Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment 

16 of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States 

17 shall submit to the appropriate committees of the Con18 gress a report— 

19 (1) listing and detailing the activities of the De20 partment of Health and Human Services that pro21 vide or support breast cancer education described in 

22 subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 399NN of 

23 the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 280m); 

24 and 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 5185 RDS 

1 (2) identifying any such activities that are du2 plicative with each other or with other Federal 

3 breast cancer education efforts. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 9, 

2014. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Mary B. Bancroft, Respondent, v. The City of Newburg, Appellant.

— Judgment and order denying new trial affirmed, with costs. Opinion by

Pratt, J.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### June 23, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 135638 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 135638 COA: 278523 Wayne CC: 02-011705-01 JORGE ANTONIO IBARRA-PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 14, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

s0616 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 23, 2008

Clerk
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Thomas C. Mitchell (CA State Bar No. 124438) 

ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 

405 Howard Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105 

Telephone: (415) 773-5732 

Email: tcmitchell@orrick.com 

Debra L. Felder (admitted pro hac vice) 

ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 

1152 15th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20005 

Telephone: (202) 339-8567 

Email: dfelder@orrick.com 

Counsel for EDF Renewables, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

In re: 

PG&E CORPORATION, 

- and - 

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC 

COMPANY, 

Debtors.

 Affects PG&E Corporation 

 X Affects Pacific Gas and Electric 

 Company 

 Affects both Debtors 

*All papers shall be filed in the Lead Case, 

 No. 19-30088-DM.

Bankruptcy Case 

Case No. 19-30088 (DM) 

Chapter 11 

(Lead Case) 

(Jointly Administered) 

JOINDER OF EDF RENEWABLES, INC. TO 

NEXTERA ENERGY, INC.’S AND 

CONSOLIDATED EDISON DEVELOPMENT, 

INC.’S MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM THE 

AUTOMATIC STAY TO PARTCIPATE IN 

APPEAL OF FERC ORDERS 

Related Dkt Nos. 2400 and 2403 

Date: June 26, 2019 

Time: 9:30 a.m. (PDT) 

Place: United States Bankruptcy Court 

 Courtroom 17, 16th Floor 

 San Francisco, CA 94102

 Objection Deadline: June 21, 2019 

4:00 pm (PDT)

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2450 Filed: 06/07/19 Entered: 06/07/19 12:57:14 Page 1 of

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Certain affiliates of EDF Renewables, Inc. (“EDF”) are counterparties to 

FERC-jurisdictional power purchase agreements with the above-captioned Debtors and EDF is an 

intervenor in the (i) FERC proceeding styled NextEra Energy, Inc., et al. v. Pacific Gas & Electric 

Company, Docket No. EL19-35-000 and (ii) adversary proceeding pending in this Court styled 

PG&E Corporation, et al. v. FERC, et al., Adv. Pro. No. 19-03003 (DM). 

EDF hereby supports and joins in the Motion for Limited Relief from Stay to Participate in 

Appellate Proceedings with Respect to FERC Orders, filed by NextEra Energy, Inc. and NextEra 

Energy Partners, L.P. (Dkt. No. 2400) and the Motion of Consolidated Edison for Relief from the 

Automatic Stay to Intervene and Participate in Appeal of FERC Orders (Dkt. No. 2403) 

(collectively, the “Motions”). 

EDF reserves all rights to be heard before the Court in connection with the Motions. 

DATED: June 7, 2019 

ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP

/s/ Thomas C. Mitchell

Thomas C. Mitchell (CA State Bar No. 124438)

405 Howard Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

Telephone: (415) 773-5732 

Facsimile: (415) 773-5759 

Email: tcmitchell@orrick.com

and 

Debra L. Felder (admitted pro hac vice) 

1152 15th Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20005 

Telephone: (202) 339-8567 

Facsimile: (202) 339-8500 

Email: dfelder@orrick.com

Counsel for EDF Renewables, Inc.

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 2450 Filed: 06/07/19 Entered: 06/07/19 12:57:14 Page 2 of

2
Order entered April 25, 2016

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 16
- 00342
- CV
MICHAEL O ’ BRIEN PICKENS, Appellant

V. JACK M. THOMAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Co urt Cause No. DC
- 14
- 06104



### O RDER The Court has been notified that a petition for bankruptcy has been filed in United States Bankruptcy Court concerning appellant. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, further action in this cause is automatically stayed. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 8.2. Accordingly, for administrative purposes, this cause is ABATED and will be treated as a closed case. It may be reinstated on prompt motion by any party showing that the stay has been lifted and specifying what further action, if any, is required from this Court. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 8.3.
/s/ ELIZABETH LANG

- MIERS JUSTICE
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

March 14, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135642 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

MARIA C. ABAY, Personal Representative of the 

ESTATE of MIRA E. ABAY, Deceased, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135642 

 COA: 281924 

Oakland CC: 06-075016-CK 

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, 

Defendant, 

and 

JAMES E. TRENT and KELLY ROSE BROOKS, 

 Defendants/Cross-Defendants, 

and 

DAIMLERCHRYSLER INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/ 

Cross-Plaintiff/Third-Party 

Plaintiff/Appellee, 

v 

AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE 

COMPANY d/b/a AAA OF MICHIGAN, 

 Cross-Defendant/Third-Party 

 Defendant/Appellant, 

and 

ALVIN JEROME TAYLOR, 

 Cross-Defendant/Third-Party 

 Defendant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Chief Justice, a stipulation signed by counsel for the parties 

agreeing to the dismissal of this application for leave to appeal is considered, and the 

application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs. 

p0311 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

March 14, 2008 

 Clerk
**Exhibit 34.2**

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm 

The Board ofDirectors 

U.S. Bank National Association 

We have examined management’s assertion, included in the accompanying Report on Compliance with Applicable Servicing Criteria Pursuant to Item 1122 of Regulation AB under the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, that U.S. Bank National Association (the Company) complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB for the Corporate Trust Asset-Backed Securitiesplatform (the Platform) as of December 31, 2009, and for the period from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009, except for servicing criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(4)(i)-(ii) and 1122(d)(4)(iv)-(xiv), which the Company hasdetermined are not applicable to the activities performed by them with respect to the servicing Platform covered by this report. Management is responsible for the Company’s compliance with those servicing criteria. Our responsibility is toexpress an opinion on management’s assertion about the Company’s compliance with the servicing criteria based on our examination. 

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, as adopted by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly,included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of lessthan all of the individual asset-backed transactions and securities that comprise the Platform, testing of less than all of the servicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company processed those selected transactionsand performed those selected activities in compliance with the servicing criteria. Furthermore, our procedures were limited to the selected transactions and servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Ourprocedures were not designed to determine whether errors may have occurred either prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report forthe selected transactions or any other transactions. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’s compliance with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management’s assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned servicing criteria as ofDecember 31, 2009, and for the period from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009, for the Corporate Trust Asset-Backed Securities platform is fairly stated, in all material respects. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

March 2, 2010
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

MIDSOUTH BANCORP, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES                               EXHIBIT 11
COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE  (Unaudited)
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 AND 1999 AND
FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 1999


				    First Quarter    First Quarter    Year-to-Date
				     March 31,        March 31,       December 31,
BASIC                                   2000             1999             1999
				    _____________    _____________    ____________
<S>                                 <C>              <C>              <C>
Earnings:
    Income applicable to common
    stock                              $510,209         $563,467       $2,518,622
				    ============     ============     ============
Shares:
    Weighted average number of
      common shares outstanding       2,470,551        2,439,256        2,441,461
				    ============     ============     ============

Earnings per common share:
    Income applicable to common
    stock                                 $0.21            $0.23            $1.03
				    ============     ============     ============


DILUTED

Earnings:
    Net income                         $548,268         $596,850       $2,650,204
				    ============     ============     ============


Weighted average number of
    common shares outstanding         2,470,551        2,439,256        2,441,461

    Assuming exercise of options,
    reduced by the number of
    shares which could have
    been purchased with the
    proceeds from exercise of
    such options at the
    average issue price                  36,951           56,604           51,616

    Assuming conversion of
    preferred stock at a
    conversion rate of 1
    to 2.998 shares                     457,153          469,343          463,185
				    ____________     ____________     ____________

    Weighted average number of
    common shares outstanding,
    as adjusted                       2,964,655        2,965,203        2,956,262
				    ============     ============     ============


Fully diluted earnings per common
  share                                   $0.18            $0.20            $0.90
				    ============     ============     ============

</TABLE>
Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13034 Filed: 10/03/22 Entered: 10/03/22 10:51:47 Page 1

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#### T. M. MARSH, Executor of ESKER CANTER, v. DURHAM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

(Filed 20 August, 1930.)

Insurance K a — Knowledge of agent of physical condition of applicant is imputed to insurer.

Knowledge of the agent writing a policy of life insurance of the physical condition of the applicant is imputed to the insurer and the insurer may not avoid the policy upon the ground of false representations in regard thereto.

Civil actioN, before *Sink, Special Judge,*at January Special Term, 1930, of Surry.

The plaintiff instituted an action for tbe recovery of $710, which he alleged was due to the estate of his intestate by virtue of a policy of life insurance issued by the defendant.

The following issues were submitted to the jury:

1. “Did the insured falsely and fraudulently represent that he was in good health and had not been afflicted as alleged in the answer ?”

2. “Did the defendant, with knowledge of insured’s condition and such affliction issue and deliver the policy sued oh ?”

3. “What amount, if any, is defendant indebted to plaintiff?”

The jury answered the first issue “No,” the second issue “Yes,” and the third issue “$770, with interest.”

The defendant offered evidence that plaintiff’s intestate had undergone an operation in which one of his kidneys had been removed several years prior to the application for the policy of insurance sued on. The application stated that plaintiff’s intestate had never been attended by a physician. The plaintiff, however, offered testimony to the effect that the agent of defendant who took the application, knew of the physical condition of plaintiff’s intestate at the time the application was signed. The agent testified that he talked with the superintendent about writing the policy because he had heard that the health of the insured was not good and that the superintendent had instructed him to write the policy if he knew of no physical defects.

From judgment for plaintiff defendant appealed.

*Folger & Folger for plaintiff.*

*E. Q. Bmens. for defendant.*

Per Curiam.

The knowledge of an insurance agent, who procures an application for insurance, that at the time the applicant is in ill health, is imputed to the company, and such knowledge will prevent the company from avoiding the contract on the ground of false warranty. *Short v. Insurance Co.,*194 N. C., 649, 140 S. E., 302; *Insurance Co., v.*
      *342
      *Grady,*185 N. C., 348, 111 S. E., 289. Therefore, evidence as to the knowledge of the agent writing the application, as to the physical condition of applicant was competent. The pertinent principle of law was thus declared in *Follette v. Accident Asso.,*107 N. C., 240, 12 S. E., 370: “Actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s defective hearing on the part of the agent was constructive notice of it to his principal, and, hence, the latter is deemed to have waived the objection that the deafness of the former was a bodily infirmity, notwithstanding the fact that it was provided in the policy that the agents of the company should have no power to waive its conditions.”

Hence the answer of the jury to the second issue entitles the plaintiff to recover.

No error.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-6187

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus EMMANUEL UZUEGBUNAM, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CR-96-43, CA-98-517) Submitted: May 25, 1999 Decided: June 2, 1999 Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Emmanuel Uzuegbunam, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Gerald McBride, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Emmanuel Uzuegbunam seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’sopinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Uzuegbunam , Nos. CR96-43; CA-98-517 (E.D. Va. Feb. 1, 1999). We deny Appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

January 5, 2024 SC-2023-0847 Ex parte M.P. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: M.P. v. DeKalb County Department of Human Resources) (DeKalb Juvenile Court: JU-20.282.02; Civil Appeals: CL-2023-0183).

CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT WHEREAS, the petition for writ of certiorari in the above referenced cause has been duly submitted and considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama and the judgment indicated below was entered in this cause on January 5, 2024: Writ Denied. No Opinion. Shaw, J. -- Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court's judgment in this cause is certified on this date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or agreed upon by the parties, the costs of this cause are hereby taxed as provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P.

I, Megan B. Rhodebeck, certify that this is the record of the judgment of the Court, witness my hand and seal.

Clerk, Supreme Court of Alabama
EXHIBIT 32.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with the  Annual  Report of  Titanium  Metals  Corporation  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-K for the period  ending  December 31, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Annual Report"),
we, J. Landis  Martin,  Chairman  of the Board,  President  and Chief  Executive
Officer of the  Company,  and Bruce P.  Inglis,  Vice  President  - Finance  and
Corporate Controller of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   the Annual  Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section
          13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company




March 4, 2004


/s/ J. Landis Martin
---------------------------------
J. Landis Martin
Chairman of the Board, President
   and Chief Executive Officer

/s/ Bruce P. Inglis
--------------------------------------------------
Bruce P. Inglis
Vice President - Finance and Corporate Controller




Note:The  certification  the registrant  furnishes in this exhibit is not deemed
     "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,
     as  amended,  or  otherwise  subject to the  liabilities  of that  Section.
     Registration  Statements or other  documents  filed with the Securities and
     Exchange Commission shall not incorporate this exhibit by reference, except
     as otherwise expressly stated in such filing.
#### William C. Rowland, Appellant, v. John Alden and others, Respondents.

Order affirmed on authority of *Matthews*v. *Tufts*(87 N. Y., 568).
#### Edward J. Judd, Impleaded, etc., v. Levi F. Cralle.

*Negotiable Instrument—Note—Execution—Limitations.*

In an action upon a promissory note, defendant contending that he did not make, or authorize the making thereof, this court holds he having failed to deny the execution, by affidavit, that he is barred from this defense even though the action was brought before a justice.

*150[Opinion filed June 30, 1890.]

Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Kirk Hawes, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. Walker *&*Judd, for appellant.

Messrs. Keator & Thompson, for appellee.

Garnett, J.

This action was begun before a justice of the peace, and from his judgment in favor of the plaintiff an appeal was taken to the Superior Court, where the case was tried by the court without a jury; judgment was again rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

The suit was on a promissory note, to which there appeared the signature of Judd & Hill. Appellant contends that he did not make or authorize the making thereof. Having failed to deny the execution by affidavit he is barred from this defense even where the action was brought before a justice. Griswold v. Trustees of Peoria University, 26 Ill. 41; Zuel v. Bowen, 78 Ill. 234; Hudson v. Dickinson, 12 Ill. 407; Evans v. Fisher, 5 Gilm. 569; Foy v. Blackstone, 31 Ill. 538.

Being estopped to deny the execution of the note, there is no place in the case for the statute of limitations, as the plaintiff is not obliged to rely upon the original consideration as a cause of action.

The judgment is affirmed. *Judgment affirmed.*
EXHIBIT
23.3





Consent
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm








Vanguard
Natural Resources, LLC


Houston,
Texas





We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form
S-8 (No. 333-152448, effective July 22, 2008) of Vanguard Natural Resources, LLC
of our report dated April 20, 2007, related to the consolidated financial
statements of Vanguard Natural Gas, LLC (formerly Nami Holding Company, LLC) as
of and for the year ended December 31, 2006, which appears in the Annual Report
on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008.











/s/ UHY
LLP


Houston,
Texas





February
4, 2010
#### Fleming S. Phillips, Appellant, v. The Germania Mills, Respondent.

Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Opinion by

Van Brunt, P. J.