### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs O

ctober 18, 2000 Sessi

on
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GREGORY LYNN REDDEN
Appeal as of Right from the Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. I-298-77 Donald P. Harris, Judge

No. M2000-00761-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 29, 2000

The appellant, Greg

ory Ly nn Redden, pled g

uilty in the Willi

amson County Ci

rcuit C ourt to one count of burglary, a class D felony . The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III persistent offender to eleven years incarcer ation in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court further ordered the appellan t to serve this sentence consecutively to the appellant’s unserved sentences imposed in

Greene County, Missouri, in the United States District Court in the Northern District of Ohio, andin Robertson County, Tennessee. The appellant raises the following issue for
our review: whether

the trial court er

red in ordering theappellant to serv e his sentence in t

his case consecutively

to his other sentences. Upon review of the record and theparties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of th

e trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Circuit Cour

t is Affirmed.

N ORMA M C G EE O GLE , J., de livered the op inion of the court, in which T HOMAS T. W OODALL , J., joined, R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER , not parti cipating. C. Diane Crosier, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gregory Lynn Redden.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Rep

orter, Russell S. B aldwin, Assistant A ttorney Ge

neral, Jeff P. Burks and Mary

Katherine Harv

ey, Assistan

t District Attorney

s General, for th

e appelle e , State of Tennessee.
OPINION I. Factual Backgr

ound On December 4, 199

7, the appellant,

Gregory Ly

nn Redden, entered Regions Bank in Franklin after

business hours with

the intent to

take money. The appellant stole a total of $2. On January 12, 2000, pursuant to a plea agreement, the

appellant pled g

uilty in the Willi

amson County Circuit Court to one count

of burglary, a cla ss D felony, and was sentenc ed as a Range III persistent off ender to eleven years incarceration in the Tennessee D epartment of Correction. The ple a-2-

agreement

further provided

that the trial cour

t would determine whether the appellant would serve this sentence concurrently or consecutively to the appellant’s other outstanding sentences.

At the sentencing hearing, the appellant admitted that the pre-sentence report and the State’s Notice of Enhancement correctly reflect his prior c riminal convictions. The appellant testified that he was first convicted in Ohio, as a juvenile

, of burglary

and auto the ft. Sub seq uen tly,
as an adult, the appellant was convicted in Springfield, Missouri, in 1982, o f possession of marijuana, for which he was sentenced to two years of unsupervised p

robation. In 1 982, while

on probat ion forthe Missouri offense, the appellant committed first degree burglary in Norfolk, Virginia. The appellant als o admitted that he co

mmitted armed robb

ery in Pinell

as, Florida, while
on probation for the Virginia offense. The appellant further testified that in 1986 he burglarized ten to twelve banks in Northe rn Ohio, which resulted in a federal conviction. The appellant was sentenced to fourteen years

incarceration in Leavenworth for the federal offen

ses. The appella

nt also conceded that in 1986 he was convicted of sec ond degree bur

glary in G

reene County

, Misssouri. The Mi sso uri trial court ordered the appellant’s sentence for burglary to run consecutively to the federal sentence. Additionally, the appellant was convicted in Greene County, Missouri, of escaping from jail, and the Missouri court ordered that sentence to run concurrently with the Missouri burg lary sentence. On August 30, 1997 , the appellant wa s released on pa

role toa hal fway h ouse. At the sentencing hearing, the a ppellant admitted t

hat he committ

ed the insta

nt offense, as well as the burglaries in Robertson, Rutherford, and Bedford Co

unties, in early December, 1997, while on parole for the federal offenses. Moreover, on June 11, 1998, the appellant was convicted of escaping from jail in Davidson County, Tennessee.

Subsequent

to the appellant’s testimony at the s entencing hearing, the tria l court noted that the appellant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted himself to criminal acts as
a major source of livelihood. Additionally, the trial court stated that, because the appellant’s history reflected that the appellant consistently returned to criminal activity after release from custody , the appellant should be confined in order to protect society from further criminal acts by

the appellant. The trial court also found that the appellant had committed the instant offense while on parole from
a previous felon y convictio n; therefore, th

e trial court note

d that it was requir

ed to impose consecutive sentencing for the instant offense. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the app

ellant to
serve the sen ten ce i mpo sed in t his mat ter con secu tiv ely t o the appellant’s unserved senten

ces in GreeneCounty, Missouri, in the United States District Court in the Northern District of Ohio, and in Robertson County, Tennessee. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for

our review: whether the trial court erred in ordering the appellant to serve his sentence in thi

s case consecut

ively to his other outstan

ding sentences

. II. Analysis1 The ap pellant only co ntests the conse cutive nature o f his sentences; he does not c ontest the length of his

sentence. -3-

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by stating that it was required to order that the appellant’s sentence for bu rglary be served consecu

tively to all h

is unserved sente

nces. 1 This court reviews the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence de novo. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d)(1997). Moreover, if the record reveals that the trial court correctly took sente ncing principles and all

relevant facts and circumstances into consideration, we will accord the trial court’s dete rminations a presumption of correctness. Id. ; State v. Ashby , 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). Furthermore, th

e appellant bear

s the burden of de

monstrating to this

court the impropr

iety of his sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Commission Comments.

In the course of our de novo review, this court will consider the following factors: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the pre-sentence report; (3) the principles o

f sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any state ment by the defendant in his own behalf; and (7) the potential for r

ehabilitation or tr

eatment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102,-103,-210 (1997). See also Ashby , 823 S.W.2d at 168. Because the record reflects that the trial court did not consider the sentencing principles when sentencing the appellant but instead pro ceeded directly to h is pronoun cementof t he appellant’s sentence, our review is de novo without a presumption of correctness. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c )(3) provides: Where [an appellant] is convicted of multiple offenses from one trial
or where the [appellant] has additional sentences not yet fully se rved
as the result

of the convictions in the same or other court and the law requires consecutive sentences, the sentence s ha ll be consecutive whether the judgment expli

c itly so order

s or not. This rule sh

all app ly: (A) To a sentenc e for a felony committed while on parole for a fel ony;

. . . . (D) Any other ground provided by law.

It is undisputed that the appellant was on parole for the federal of fen ses when he committed the offense in

this case. In fact, at the sentencing hearing the appellant admitted that he
was on parole for the federal offenses at the time of the in stant offense, noting that the balance of his sentence was approximately three y ears. Accordingly, the trial court correctly stated that it was required to order the appe

llant’s current sen tence to run consecutively to all the appellant’s other sentences. State v. Buchanan , No. M1999-00980-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 2264 09, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, February 29, 2000) perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn.2000); see also State v.-4-

Coggins , No.01C01-9310-CR-00360, 1994 WL 390445, at *8 n.5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 28, 1994).
Nevertheless, even if the trial court were not required to order the appellant’s current sentence to run consecutive ly to the appellant’s o

ther sentences,

the appellant none

theless meets the cri teria for permi ssive consecutive sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(1997) provides that
a trial court may

impose consecutiv

e sentencing if

the appellant meets one of the criteria contained therein. Moreover, if

the trial court classifies the appellant as a da ngerous offen

der, the court mus

t also find that the sentence reasonably relates to the severi ty of the ap pellant’s offenses and that confinement

is necessary to protect society f rom fur ther criminal conduct by the appellant. See Statev. Lane , 3 S.W.3d 456, 460-61 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Wilkerson , 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995).

In the present case, the trial court concluded that the appellant’s livelihood came from engaging in criminal behavior. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(1). The recordreflects that the appellant often engaged

in c rim ina l be hav ior , na mel y bur glar y and lar ceny, shortly afte r each release from incarceration. See State v. Davis , W1999-02113-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 298746, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, March 15, 2000) perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2000). Additionally, the appellant testified that he used m oney from at least one of the burglaries to pay rent and buy Christmas presents. Moreover, because the trial court did not find that the appellant was a dangerous offender, the trial court was not obligated to apply the Wilkerson factors. Lane , 3 S.W.3d at 460-61. Acco rdi ngly, we conclude that the trial court properly ordered the appe llant to serve the sentence for the instant offense consecutively to his unserved sentences.
III. Conclusion Based upon the f

oregoing, we

affirm the judg

ment of the trial c

ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE