United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 25, 2010

Decided May 25, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 08-3412

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GEORGE WATSON-EL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 04 CR 131-1

Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

Judge.

O R D E R

George Watson-El, a felon, pleaded guilty to selling cocaine to an informant and to

possessing three firearms (which he received in exchange for the cocaine). See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For both counts he was sentenced to 15 years’

imprisonment (the mandatory minimum for the gun count), with the terms to run

concurrently. Watson-El filed a notice of appeal, but his newly appointed counsel now

seek to withdraw because they cannot identify any nonfrivolous ground for appeal. See

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We confine our review to the potential issues

identified in counsel's facially adequate brief, see United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74

(7th Cir. 2002), and Watson-El’s response, see CIR. R. 51(b). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08-3412 Page 2

On the eve of trial Watson-El moved for substitute counsel because his appointed

lawyer had declined to move for dismissal on the ground of selective prosecution and had

not pursued discovery to Watson-El’s satisfaction. In refusing to provide a different

lawyer, the district court noted that it was counsel’s job to decide what arguments to make

but added that, at all events, a selective-prosecution challenge to the indictment would

have been denied. The court also confirmed that the government had turned over all

discoverable material. At that point Watson-El decided to plead guilty, though he reserved

the right to argue at sentencing that the drug involved was not crack and that his prior

convictions were not for violent felonies.

At sentencing Watson-El’s lawyer made an oral motion, at Watson-El’s request, for

substitute counsel. Watson-El then stated that he distrusted his lawyer, his lawyer would

not press the arguments Watson-El wanted, and he did not think they were communicating

effectively. In addition Watson-El made his own oral motion, without the support of

counsel, to withdraw his guilty pleas on the grounds of innocence and ineffective

assistance of counsel. The court denied both motions. The district court found that the

allegations about counsel were designed to derail the proceedings, and that there was no

basis to set aside the guilty pleas on the ground of innocence because Watson-El had

admitted under oath the factual basis for his crimes. The court then adopted the factual

findings in the presentence investigation report, including the probation officer’s

conclusion that the drug sold by Watson-El had been crack. At the hearing Watson-El

voiced no objection to this determination of drug type.

In their Anders brief, counsel have represented that Watson-El does not want his

guilty pleas set aside, yet he contradicts this assertion in his Rule 51(b) response. WatsonEl proposes to argue that it was error to deny him leave to withdraw his guilty pleas. We

would review that ruling for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Singleton, 588 F.3d 497,

500 (7th Cir. 2009), United States v. Loutos, 383 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2004), but it would be

frivolous to challenge the decision. Watson-El made no substantive argument in support of

his motion, and indeed he contradicted his claim of innocence by reaffirming that he

bartered drugs for guns. Even without this damning presentation, the district court was

free to hold Watson-El to the admissions he made when he pleaded guilty. See United States

v. Jones, 381 F.3d 615, 618-19 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Stewart, 198 F.3d 984, 987 (7th

Cir. 1999). And as for the assistance that Watson-El received from his former attorney,

Watson-El now says in his Rule 51(b) response that counsel never told him that by pleading

guilty he would give up his claims of selective prosecution and waive any appellate

challenge to the denial of a motion by counsel to have the indictment dismissed for

violating his right to a speedy trial. See United States v. Elizalde-Adame, 262 F.3d 637, 639

(7th Cir. 2001). But this purported omission was not the theory of ineffective assistance

that Watson-El presented to the district court, and so there is no support for it in the record. 

As is typically the situation, then, Watson-El should pursue a claim of ineffective
No. 08-3412 Page 3

assistance, if at all, in a collateral proceeding where the record can be fully developed. See

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003); United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543,

557-58 (7th Cir. 2005).

Watson-El also wants to challenge the denials of his motions for substitute counsel. 

But by pleading guilty he lost the ability to challenge the first motion. See United States v.

Foreman, 329 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Campbell, 324 F.3d 497, 499 (7th

Cir. 2003). And it would be frivolous to argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the

district court to deny the second motion after finding that Watson-El was motivated by a

desire to forestall the proceedings. A defendant’s vague claims of distrust are not a

suitable basis for removing one appointed lawyer in favor of another. See United States v.

Woodward, 291 F.3d 95, 108 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Pointer, 17 F.3d 1070, 1073 (7th

Cir. 1994).

Counsel and Watson-El devote the remainder of their submissions to potential

sentencing issues. First they examine whether Watson-El could argue that his prior

convictions in Illinois for robbery and attempted armed robbery are not violent felonies and

should not have counted toward the requisite three felonies under the Armed Career

Criminal Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). But counsel correctly conclude that this potential

issue is frivolous because robbery and attempted robbery under Illinois law are violent

felonies. Welch v. United States, — F.3d —, 2010 WL 1755062, at *1, *16 (7th Cir. May 4,

2010); United States v. Gregory, 591 F.3d 964, 967-68 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Woods,

233 F.3d 482, 485 n.4 (7th Cir. 2000).

Counsel also examine whether Watson-El could argue on appeal that his guidelines

range was miscalculated or that his overall prison sentence is unreasonable. But counsel

have not found any basis for arguing that the offense level or the criminal-history score are

incorrect. And a reasonableness argument would be frivolous because the district court

sentenced Watson-El to a total of 15 years, the mandatory minimum for the gun count, see

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and 30 months below the bottom of the guidelines range. United States

v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cooper, 461 F.3d 850, 856 (7th Cir.

2006).

Watson-El wants to challenge the district court’s finding that the drug he sold was

crack and not powder cocaine. However, the drug type was irrelevant because the 15-year,

mandatory minimum of the Armed Career Criminal Act determined the floor for

imprisonment, and that is the length of time that Watson-El received.

The motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED.