Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

BRIAN E. WOOD, BY AND THROUGH 

HIS NEXT FRIENDS, LARRY E. WOOD 

AND LAVONNE W. WOOD 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 970727 January 9, 1998 

HENRY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 

David V. Williams, Judge 

 I. 

 The primary issue we consider in this appeal is whether a 

public school division, which expelled a student who violated the 

school division's code of student conduct, violated that 

student's due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.1

 II. 

 In March 1996, Brian Edmond Wood, then a 10th-grade student 

at Bassett High School in Henry County, went on a schoolsponsored field trip with his class to the Henry County Jail. In 

response to a sheriff deputy's inquiry whether any students had 

weapons in their possession, Brian gave the deputy a pocketknife. 

 The deputy gave the pocketknife to a school chaperon, and when 

Brian returned to school, the chaperon took him to the assistant 

principal's office. Curtis Shelton, an assistant principal, 

asked Brian "what happened" and told him to "write a brief 

statement on a sheet of paper." Brian gave a written statement 

 

 1 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution states in relevant part that no state shall 

"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 

due process of law." 
that he did not intend to take the pocketknife to school, that he 

placed the knife in his pants pocket the night before the field 

trip, and that he forgot that the knife was in his pants pocket 

until the deputy asked if any students had any weapons. 

 After hearing Brian's version of the incident, Shelton 

suspended Brian from school for 10 days for violating the Henry 

County Public School Code of Student Conduct which prohibits 

students from possessing knives at school-sponsored events. 

Shelton contacted Brian's mother, by telephone, and informed her 

of the incident and the suspension. 

 On March 4, 1996, Robert C. Vogler, director of pupil 

personnel for the Henry County Public Schools, sent a notice to 

Brian's parents, Larry E. and LaVonne W. Wood, informing them 

that the Bassett High School administration had recommended that 

Brian appear before the committee for the control of school 

discipline "to determine if there [was] sufficient cause to 

recommend to the Superintendent that Brian be excluded from 

attending Henry County Public Schools." The notice advised 

Brian's parents of a hearing date and location and cited the 

appropriate policies in the code of student conduct. 

 Brian, his parents, and their attorney appeared at a hearing 

before the committee and presented evidence to the committee. 

The Woods' attorney participated in this hearing. 

 The committee decided to recommend to the Henry County 

Public School Board that Brian be expelled from school. Brian 

remained on suspension pending official action by the School 

Board. The committee informed Brian and his parents of its 
decision and advised them that they had a right to appeal the 

committee's recommendation to J. David Martin, Superintendent of 

the Henry County Public Schools. 

 Brian appealed the recommendation of expulsion to the 

superintendent. During that appeal, Brian was asked to discuss 

the events surrounding his possession of the pocketknife, and his 

parents were asked if they had anything they would like to say. 

Brian's parents, as well as his attorney, made statements to the 

superintendent. By letter dated March 22, 1996, the 

superintendent informed the Woods that "[i]t appeared from the 

affidavits and testimony that the incident of possession of a 

weapon on a field trip from Bassett High School did constitute 

sufficient cause for action beyond the disciplinary options used 

by the school. It is accordingly decided that the recommendation 

of an expulsion be made to the full [S]chool [B]oard and that 

Brian remain suspended from the Henry County Public Schools 

pending official action by the [S]chool [B]oard." The 

superintendent also informed the Woods that Brian had a right to 

a hearing before the School Board and that they could be 

represented by an attorney. The superintendent also notified the 

Woods of the date, time, and location of the hearing. 

 The School Board conducted an evidentiary hearing to 

consider the superintendent's recommendation. The superintendent 

presented evidence, and the Woods' attorney cross-examined him. 

Mr. Wood testified at the hearing, and the Woods' lawyer argued 

on behalf of Brian. The School Board considered the evidence and 

argument of the Woods' attorney, and found that Brian had 
violated the school division's policy which prohibits students 

from possessing knives at school-sponsored events as well as Code 

§§ 22.1-277.01, 18.2-308, and -308.1 which prohibit students from 

possessing firearms or weapons on school property. The School 

Board, among other things, voted to expel Brian.2

 III. 

 Brian, by and through his next friends, Larry and LaVonne 

Wood, filed a petition pursuant to Code § 22.1-873 against the 

Henry County Public Schools. Brian alleged that the Henry County 

Public Schools had violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 

process when he was suspended and subsequently expelled from the 

 

 2 The School Board's decision states: "[T]he Board 

accept[ed] the recommendation of the Superintendent that the 

student be expelled for 365 days provided that the student 

may return for the [19]96-[19]97 school year if he remains of 

good behavior and provided further that, number one; the 

student be provided homebound instruction for the remainder 

of this school year and number two; that if the student is of 

good behavior and does not violate the Code of Student 

[C]onduct for the remainder of the 365 day period, that this 

action of the [School] Board and the original suspension be 

expunged from the student's record, and number three; that if 

the student violates the Code of Student Conduct during the 

365 day period, he will be expelled for the remainder of the 

original 365 day period." 

 3 Code § 22.1-87 states: "Any parent, custodian, or legal 

guardian of a pupil attending the public schools in a school 

division who is aggrieved by an action of the school board 

may, within thirty days after such action, petition the 

circuit court having jurisdiction in the school division to 

review the action of the school board. Such review shall 

proceed upon the petition, the minutes of the meeting at 

which the school board's action was taken, the orders, if 

any, of the school board, an attested copy of the transcript, 

if any, of any hearing before the school board, and any other 

evidence found relevant to the issues on appeal by the court. 

 The action of the school board shall be sustained unless the 

school board exceeded its authority, acted arbitrarily or 

capriciously, or abused its discretion." 
Henry County Public Schools. The school division filed an answer 

denying that it had violated Brian's due process rights. The 

trial court considered evidence, legal memoranda, and argument of 

counsel and, on August 5, 1996, entered a judgment which set 

aside Brian's expulsion because the School Board had erroneously 

decided that a pocketknife was a firearm within the intendment of 

Code §§ 22.1-277.01, 18.2-308(A), and -308.1. The trial court 

did not disturb the School Board's finding that Brian had 

violated the Code of Student Conduct which prohibits students 

from bringing knives to school-sponsored events. 

 The court remanded the proceeding to the School Board for 

reconsideration of punishment. The School Board convened to 

reconsider Brian's punishment without notice to Brian or his 

parents and decided that it would not change Brian's punishment. 

 The trial court entered a final judgment, Brian appeals, and the 

school division assigns cross-error. 

 IV. 

 A. 

 Brian argues that the school division deprived him of his 

due process rights on numerous occasions.4

 First, Brian contends 

that he was deprived of his due process rights when the assistant 

principal initially suspended him. Next, Brian claims that his 

due process rights were violated because, he says, he was not 

 

 4 Code §§ 22.1-277 and 22.1-277.01 confer certain 

statutory rights upon a student subject to expulsion or 

suspension by a school board. Brian does not contend, 

however, that the school division contravened his statutory 

rights. 
given sufficient notice of the hearing before the disciplinary 

committee. Brian also asserts that his appeal from the decision 

of the disciplinary committee to the superintendent of schools 

did not comport with due process. We find no merit in these 

contentions. 

 The Commonwealth has conferred upon school boards, which are 

created pursuant to art. VIII, § 7, of the Constitution of 

Virginia, broad authority to prescribe and enforce standards of 

conduct in schools. This authority, however, must be exercised 

consistently with constitutional safeguards. 

 The United States Supreme Court articulated the principles 

that we must apply in this appeal in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 

574 (1974). There, the Court stated that a 

 "State is constrained to recognize a student's 

legitimate entitlement to a public education as a 

property interest which is protected by the Due Process 

Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct 

without adherence to the minimum procedures required by 

that Clause." 

Thus, a student charged with misconduct may not be suspended from 

a public school without the minimum procedures required by the 

due process clause. Explaining the requirements of due process, 

the Supreme Court noted: 

 "'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is 

the opportunity to be heard,' Grannis v. Ordean, 234 

U.S. 385, 394 (1914), a right that 'has little reality 

or worth unless one is informed that the matter is 

pending and can choose for himself whether to . . . 

contest.' . . . At the very minimum, therefore, 

students facing suspension and the consequent 

interference with a protected property interest must be 

given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of 

hearing. 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are 

entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy 

that right they must first be notified.'" Id. at 579 

(citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court also held in Goss that 

 "[s]tudents facing temporary suspension have interests 

qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause, 

and due process requires, in connection with a 

suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be 

given oral or written notice of the charges against him 

and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence 

the authorities have and an opportunity to present his 

side of the story. The Clause requires at least these 

rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken 

findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from 

school." Id. at 581. 

 Applying these principles, we hold that the Henry County 

Public School division did not abridge Brian's due process 

rights. The assistant principal, who initially suspended Brian, 

gave him an opportunity to explain his version of the facts, and 

Brian was informed of "what he is accused of doing and . . . the 

basis of the accusation." Id. at 582. 

 The committee for the control of school discipline also 

afforded Brian due process. That committee forwarded a notice to 

Brian's parents that he committed a "severe breach of the conduct 

code at Bassett High School" and referred to a policy which 

states that a student shall not possess, handle, or transmit a 

knife while at school or during an off-site school-sponsored 

activity. Without question, Brian, his parents, and their 

attorney knew the reasons Brian had been suspended and that the 

committee was conducting a hearing to determine whether Brian 

should be expelled. Additionally, as we have already mentioned, 

Brian, his parents, and their attorney participated during the 

hearing before the committee. 

 The superintendent did not abridge Brian's due process 
rights. The Woods requested an appeal to the superintendent "due 

to a weapons violation." The Woods were informed of the date and 

time for this appeal, and Brian, his parents, and their attorney 

were given an opportunity to make whatever statements they deemed 

appropriate. 

 B. 

 Brian argues that even if the school division accorded him 

his procedural due process rights, the school division should not 

be permitted to promulgate policies that require suspension or 

expulsion of students who possess knives on school property. We 

find no merit in this contention. Neither the school division's 

policies nor the Federal Gun-Free School Act with which Code 

§ 22.1-277.01(A) complies, divests the School Board of its 

authority to impose a punishment less severe than expulsion. 

Moreover, a school division is permitted to suspend or expel a 

student for possession of a dangerous weapon on school property 

or at school-sponsored events provided that the school division 

does not abridge a student's constitutional or statutory rights. 

See Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Oxford, 625 F.2d 660, 664-

65 (5th Cir. 1980); Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 

N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997). In this instance, Brian fails to 

identify any statutory or constitutional right that the Henry 

County Public School division has purportedly violated. 

 C. 

 As we have already stated, the trial court set aside the 

School Board's initial decision to expel Brian and remanded the 

proceeding, by an order dated August 5, 1996, to the School Board 
because the School Board erroneously concluded that Brian's knife 

was a firearm under Code §§ 22.1-277.01, 18.2-308.1, and -308(A). 

 Brian argues that the school division violated his due process 

rights because, upon remand, the School Board failed to give him 

notice and an opportunity to be present at the hearing. 

 After the trial court remanded this proceeding, the School 

Board decided it would expel Brian, and the trial court entered a 

final judgment which dismissed the proceeding. Brian's counsel 

objected to this final judgment "for the reason stated on the 

order dated August 5, 1996," which was the order that remanded 

the matter to the School Board. Brian's objections to the August 

5, 1996 order did not, and could not, contain an objection on the 

basis that he was not given adequate notice of the School Board's 

hearing on remand because the date of that hearing had not yet 

been fixed. Brian did not make any objection in the record to 

the School Board's failure to give him notice of the second 

hearing. Accordingly, this argument is procedurally barred. 

Rule 5:25.5

 V. 

 As previously noted, the School Board concluded at Brian's 

 

 5 Brian raises the following arguments that we do not 

consider because he failed to raise them in the trial court, 

Rule 5:25: Brian was denied due process because Shelton was 

a member of the committee for the control of school 

discipline; the School Board was required to provide Brian a 

more expeditious review of his suspension and subsequent 

expulsion; Brian was excluded from the educational process 

because he did not receive any homebound instruction until 

after the School Board's hearing, more than 30 days after his 

initial hearing; and the trial court lacked the authority to 

remand this case to the School Board. 
first hearing that he had violated, among other things, Code 

§ 22.1-277.01, which prohibits a student from possessing a 

firearm on school property. The trial court held that the School 

Board misapplied Code § 22.1-277.01, and the school division 

assigns cross-error to this determination. Essentially, the 

school division asserts that a "pocketknife" is a "firearm" 

within the meaning of Code §§ 22.1-277.01, 18.2-308, and -308.1. 

 We disagree. 

 Code § 22.1-277.01(A) states in part: 

 "In compliance with the federal Improving 

America's Schools Act of 1994 (Part F -- "Gun-Free 

Schools Act of 1994"), a school board shall expel from 

school attendance for a period of not less than one 

year any student whom such school board has determined, 

. . . to have brought a firearm onto school property or 

to a school-sponsored activity as prohibited by § 18.2-

308.1 . . . ." 

Code § 18.2-308.1 states in part: 

 "If any person has in his possession any . . . 

weapon . . . designated in subsection A of § 18.2-308 

upon (i) the property of any public . . . elementary, 

middle or high school, including buildings and grounds, 

(ii) that portion of any property open to the public 

used for school-sponsored functions or extracurricular 

activities while such functions or activities are 

taking place, or (iii) any school bus owned or operated 

by any such school, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 

misdemeanor." 

Code § 18.2-308(A) defines the word "weapon" to include, inter

alia, "any dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife 

. . . or . . . any weapon of like kind." 

 Contrary to the school division's assertion, the 

pocketknife that Brian had in his possession does not 

constitute a firearm within the meaning of these 

statutes. We stated in Martin v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 
298, 301-02, 295 S.E.2d 890, 892-93 (1982): "Under the 

rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of 

persons or things is enumerated in a statute and 

general words follow, the general words are to be 

restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the 

less general, particular words. East Coast Freight 

Lines v. City of Richmond, 194 Va. 517, 525, 74 S.E.2d 

283, 288 (1953); Rockingham Bureau v. Harrisonburg, 171 

Va. 339, 344, 198 S.E. 908, 911 (1938). Likewise, 

according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated 

words) when general and specific words are grouped, the 

general words are limited by the specific and will be 

construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 

those things identified by the specific words. 

Commonwealth v. United Airlines, 219 Va. 374, 389, 248 

S.E.2d 124, 132-33 (1978); Hensley v. City of Norfolk, 

216 Va. 369, 374, n.5, 218 S.E.2d 735, 740, n.5 

(1975)." 

Applying these principles, we hold that Brian's pocketknife is 

not a firearm because a pocketknife is neither a dirk, bowie 

knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, nor a weapon of like 

kind.6

 

 6 A "dirk" is defined as "a long straight-bladed dagger 

formerly carried [especially] by the Scottish Highlanders[,] 

2. a short sword formerly worn by British junior naval 

officers." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 642 

(1981). A "bowie knife" is defined as "a large hunting knife 

adapted [especially] for knife-fighting and common in western 

frontier regions and having a guarded handle and a strong 

single-edge blade typically 10 to 15 inches long with its 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed. 

 

back straight for most of its length and then curving 

concavely and sometimes in a sharpened edge to the point." 

Id. at 262. A "switchblade knife" is defined as "a 

pocketknife having the blade spring-operated so that pressure 

on a release catch causes it to fly open." Id. at 2314. A 

"ballistic knife" is defined as "any knife with a detachable 

blade that is propelled by a spring-operated mechanism." 

Code § 18.2-308(N).