alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5139 Reported in House (RH)]

                                                 Union Calendar No. 534
113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5139

                          [Report No. 113-703]

    To correct the boundaries of the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier 
                       Resources System Unit P16.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 17, 2014

    Mr. Clawson of Florida introduced the following bill; which was 
             referred to the Committee on Natural Resources

                           December 22, 2014

                     Additional sponsor: Mr. Moran

                           December 22, 2014

  Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 
       House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]
 [For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on July 
                               17, 2014]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To correct the boundaries of the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier 
                       Resources System Unit P16.

 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPLACEMENT OF JOHN H. CHAFEE COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES 
              SYSTEM MAP.

    (a) In General.--The map included in the set of maps entitled 
``Coastal Barrier Resources System'' referred to in section 4(a) of the 
Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 3503(a)) and relating to Unit 
P16 in Florida is hereby replaced by another map relating to the same 
unit entitled ``John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources System 
Corrected Unit P16'' and dated October 30, 2014.
    (b) Availability.--The Secretary of the Interior shall keep the 
replacement map referred to in subsection (a) on file and available for 
inspection in accordance with section 4(b) of the Coastal Barrier 
Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 3503(b)).
                                                 Union Calendar No. 534

113th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 5139

                          [Report No. 113-703]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

    To correct the boundaries of the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier 
                       Resources System Unit P16.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           December 22, 2014

  Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 
       House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
```
#### The John T. Noyo Manufacturing Company, Appellant, v. Charles Whitmore, Respondent.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

Opinion by

Haight, J.
[663 NE2d 911, 640 NYS2d 870]

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joy Wosu, Appellant.

Argued January 10, 1996;

decided February 8, 1996

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Kevin J. Bauer,*Buffalo, and *Joel L. Daniels*for appellant.

*Kevin M. Dillon, District Attorney*of Erie County, Buffalo *(Kimberly A. Phelan*and *John J. DeFranks*of counsel), for respondent.

*936OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Defendant’s convictions arose out of the rape and sexual abuse of twin seven-year-old girls, the daughters of a convicted codefendant. The indictment alleged that the criminal assaults occurred between November 1 and November 30, 1991. In an oral bill of particulars, the People later narrowed the time frame to the period "around Thanksgiving.” The evidence at trial showed that the memories of the child victims were keyed to a Thanksgiving-time turkey dinner at their father’s house.

During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for the "actual date” of the charged crimes. The jury sought clarification of whether the offense occurred "actually that Thanksgiving Day or is the charge for November 1 through November 30, 1991, as the verdict sheet reads.” The Trial Judge simply instructed the jurors that the date of the incident was a question of fact for their determination. The jury convicted defendant and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with two Justices dissenting. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to this Court.

We agree with the Appellate Division majority (213 AD2d 967, 968) that defendant’s trial counsel did not specifically and adequately preserve the appellate claims now made, to wit: (1) that the Trial Judge’s supplemental instruction should have informed the jury that the incident occurred on or near Thanksgiving Day, consistent with the proof at trial, and (2) that it was error to instruct the jury that the date of the incident was a question of fact for their determination. Because the issues are beyond this Court’s power to review in these circumstances and defendant’s remaining claims are without merit, we affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.

Order affirmed in a memorandum.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 13

- 14339 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 6:13

- cr - 00123

- RBD

- DAB

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee, versus EDWIN VIDAL TORRES, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

________________________ (May 4, 2015) Before JORDAN , ROSE NBAUM and JILL PRYOR , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Mark W. Ciaravella, appointed counsel for Edwin Vidal Torres in this direct criminal appeal , has moved to withdraw from further representation of the

Case: 13-14339 Date Filed: 05/04/2015 Page: 1 of 22 appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. Cal ifornia , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). In a pro se response to counsel’s motion to withdraw, Torres requests that counsel’s motion be denied or that new counsel be appointed to brief his appeal. Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED , Torres’s request for appointment of new counsel to brief his appeal is DENIED , and Torres’s convictions and sentence s are AFFIRMED

. Case: 13-14339 Date Filed: 05/04/2015 Page: 2 of 2
#### STATE v. VELTON FREEMAN.

(Filed 3 November, 1954.)

Appeal and Error § 16: Criminal Law § 74—

Where judgment is entered in an action tried at a term prior to the convening of the Supreme Court, the appeal must be taken to that term of the Supreme Court.

Appeal by defendant from *Rousseau, J.,*January Term 1954, MONTGOMERY.

Criminal prosecution upon a bill of indictment in which it is charged that the defendant did unlawfully possess, possess for the purpose of sale, and transport certain intoxicating liquors.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts “as charged in the bill of indictment.” The court pronounced judgment on the verdict and defendant appealed.

*Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Bruton for the State.*

*McLean ■& Stacy for the defendant.*

Per Curiam.

This criminal action was tried at the January 1954 Term of Montgomery County Superior Court prior to the convening of the 1954 Spring Term of this Court. It was the duty of the defendant to docket his appeal at that term. This he failed to do, and there was no petition for *certiorari.*Docketing for hearing at this term comes too late. Hence the appeal must be dismissed on authority of *Jones v. Jones,*232 N.C. 518, 61 S.E. 2d 335, and cases therein cited.

Since the exceptive assignments of error relied on by defendant are not of sufficient merit to require a new trial, the result in effect is the same.

Appeal dismissed.
Office of the Clerk 

United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California

If you have any questions, please contact me DW 

Edward Emmons, Clerk

United States Bankruptcy Court

DaWana Chambers, 'HSXW\&OHUN

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Edward J. EmmonsClerk of Court

450 Golden Gate Avenue 

Mail Box 36099

San Francisco, CA 94102

Phone: () -

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United States District Court 

Phillip Burton Federal Building 	

United States Courthouse

450 Golden Gate Avenue, 16WK Floor

San Francisco, CA 94102

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May 15, 2023

PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Case No. 19-30088-DM, Judge 

Dennis Montali

Appellant Designation of Contents For Inclusion in Record On Appeal and Statement of Issues on

Appeal filed on 5/12/2023, (dkt. #13728)

Order Granting Appellant Spiro Jannings' Motion for Leave to Expand Time filed on 5/15/2023,

(dkt. #13733)

/s/ DaWana Chambers

23-cv-01735-HSG

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 13734 Filed: 05/15/23 Entered: 05/15/23 14:25:15 Page 1

of 1
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 18

- 526 V

Filed: April 30, 2019

UNPUBLISHED

JESSICA MISKELL

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Special Processing Unit (SPU) ;
Rul ing on Entitlement; Concession; Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)

Gary Alan Krochmal, Law Offices of Gary A. Krochmal, PLLC

, Farmington Hills, MI ) , for
petitioner.

Adriana Ruth Teitel , U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

Dorsey

, Chief Special Master:

On April 10, 2018

, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa

- 10, et seq

. , 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration ( “ SIRVA ” ) following receipt of an influenza ( “ flu ” ) vaccine on October 4,

2015 . Petit ion at 1 . The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On April 29, 2019

, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

1 The undersigned intends to post this ruling on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website. This

means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, undersigned is required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in

accordance with the E

- Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services).

2 N ational Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755

.at 1. Specifically, respondent concludes that petitioner ’ s medical course is cons istent with a SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table Id. at 5 . Respondent further agrees that petitioner has satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the

Vaccine Act

. Id. at 6.

In view of respondent’s position and the evidence of record, the undersigned find s that petitioner is entitle d to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey
Nora Beth Dorsey
Chief Special Master
#### Cleveland Co-operative Stove Company et al. v. Peter Koch.

*Malicious Prosecution—Act of Agent—Liability of Principal—Scope of Employment.*

1. The duty or authority of an agent can not be extended by his under, standing of either.

2. An agent authorized to bring suits can not charge his principal with his own malicious acts in setting in motion the criminal procedure of the State, from any legitimate result of which the principal can receive no benefit, and if the agent’s intention is to derive to his principal a benefit from the abuse of the process, the principal is not thereby charged.

[Opinion filed January 16, 1891.]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County: the Hon. George Driggs, Judge, presiding.

*596Messrs. Edward Owings Towns and Smith, Helmer & Moulton, for appellants.

Messrs. Weigley, Bulkley & Gray, for appellee.

Gary, J.

This is an action for malicious prosecution against an Ohio corporation and a Cook county constable.

The corporation is charged with being responsible for the acts of Baldwin, their Chicago agent, who was joined as a defendant, but died before the trial. He was the'agent to conduct the business here, to sell goods, make contracts, and collect money due. There was testimony that Baldwin had once brought a suit on behalf of the company, but none that the company knew it, or had ever given him authority to bring suits. But if they had given such authority, he would not be thereby authorized to charge the corporation with his own malicious acts in setting in motion the criminal procedure of the State, from any legitimate result of which the corporation could derive no benefit.. And if his motive was to derive to the corporation a benefit from thé abuse of the process, the corporation is not thereby charged. The act was not within the scope of his agency. The case is not distinguishable from Springfield E. *&*T. Co. v. Green, 25 Ill. App. 106, on this point.

Wheeler, etc., Co. v. Boyce, 36 Kan. 350, relied upon by the appellee, is no authority for him. Baker, for whose act the company was there charged, had full authority from the company to prosecute replevin suits, and the arrest complained of was in Kansas a statutory incident in aid of the replevin suit.

The court instructed the jury, in substance, that if Baldwin was the agent in Chicago of the business of the corporation in Chicago, and that the prosecution was in the line of his duty, as he understood it, for the purpose of benefit to the corporation and not for any object personal to himself, the corporation was liable for his acts.

His duty or authority in fact was not extended by his understanding of either. Without noticing other matters, for this error the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.

*Reversed and remanded.*
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 106 (Thursday, June 3, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 31430]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-13371]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. AD10-11-000]


Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale 
Power Markets; Notice Establishing Date for Comments

May 27, 2010.
    On May 26, 2010, Commission staff convened a technical conference 
regarding frequency regulation in the organized wholesale power 
markets, as previously announced.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Notice of Technical Conference re Frequency Compensation in 
the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 75 FR 23,759, as supplemented 
by Supplemental Notice of Technical Conference re Frequency 
Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, issued April 
27, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Entities wishing to submit further, written comments regarding the 
matters discussed at the technical conference should submit their 
comments in this docket on or before June 16, 2010.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-13371 Filed 6-2-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5270 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5270

To promote the transportation of liquified natural gas from the United 
     States on United States flag vessels, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 30, 2014

  Mr. Garamendi (for himself and Mr. Hunter) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and 
                             Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To promote the transportation of liquified natural gas from the United 
     States on United States flag vessels, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Growing American Shipping Act of 
2014''.

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

    With respect to the trade and maritime transportation of natural 
gas produced in the United States, it is the purpose of this Act to--
            (1) enhance the national security and port safety of the 
        United States by encouraging to the maximum extent practicable 
        the transport of liquified natural gas on United States flag 
        vessels;
            (2) maintain the technological ability of the United States 
        shipbuilding industry to build and repair vessels for the Navy 
        and the Coast Guard by maintaining the critical industrial 
        infrastructure and skilled human workforce necessary to build 
        such vessels; and
            (3) ensure to the maximum extent practicable that all 
        maritime personnel operating vessels transporting liquified 
        natural gas to or from the United States are credentialed by 
        the Coast Guard and qualified to hold a transportation security 
        card.

SEC. 3. PROMOTION OF TRANSPORTATION OF LNG FROM THE UNITED STATES ON 
              UNITED STATES FLAG VESSELS.

    (a) Program.--Section 304(a) of the Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-241; 33 U.S.C. 1503 note) is 
amended by inserting ``and from'' before ``the United States''.
    (b) Amendment of Deepwater Port Act.--Section 4(i) of the Deepwater 
Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1503(i)) is amended by inserting before the 
period the following: ``or that will supply liquified natural gas to be 
exported on United States flag vessels''.
                                 <all>
```
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EXHIBIT C 

 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3914-3 Filed: 09/17/19 Entered: 09/17/19 14:50:59 Page 1

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EXPENSE SUMMARY FOR THE PERIOD 

JULY 1, 2019 THROUGH JULY 31, 2019 

Type of Expense Partner Amount 

Airfare Berman $ 899.05

Lodging Berman $ 786.26

Ground Transportation Berman $ 124.70

Total $1,810.01 

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 3914-3 Filed: 09/17/19 Entered: 09/17/19 14:50:59 Page 2

of 2
Order filed September 14, 2021 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-19-00145-CV

____________

REGIONAL SPECIALTY CLINIC, P.A., Appellant

V.

S.A RANDLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. AND SARNIE A. RANDLE, JR., 

Appellee

On Appeal from the 157th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2017-81941

ORDER

This court issued its opinion and judgment in this case on May 4, 2021. 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 49.1 provides for the filing of a motion for 

rehearing within fifteen days after a court of appeals’ judgment or order is 

rendered. Tex. R. App. Proc. 49.1. Appellant filed a motion for rehearing on June 

29, 2021, which was denied on August 3, 2031. Appellant filed a motion for en 

banc reconsideration on August 19, 2021, titled motion for hearing, and filed a 
2

properly titled motion for en banc reconsideration on August 23, 2021. Both

motions were filed more than 15 days after this court ruled on appellant’s motion 

for rehearing. 

“A court of appeals may extend the time for filing a motion for rehearing or 

en banc reconsideration if a party files a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b) no 

later than 15 days after the last date for filing the motion.” Tex. R. App. P. 49.8. A 

party seeking an extension of time in the court of appeals is required to file a 

motion specifically stating the facts that reasonably explain the need for an 

extension. Rios v. Calhoon, 889 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1994); see also Tex. R.

App. P. 10.5(b)(1)(C) (requiring motion to extend time to include facts relied on to 

reasonably explain the need for an extension). No motion for extension of time was 

filed in this case. 

The Texas Supreme Court has consistently treated minor procedural 

mistakes with leniency to preserve appellate rights. See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 

S.W.2d 615, 616-17 (Tex. 1997) (implying extension of time when a party perfects 

an appeal in good faith within the 15-day period for filing an extension). Thus, a

motion for extension of time can be implied when a motion for rehearing is filed 

within the 15-day period for filing a motion for extension of time if the appellant 

thereafter files a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b)(1) that contains a reasonable 

explanation to support the late filing. See Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 

647 (Tex. 2008); see also Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Ctr. Assoc., Ltd., 974 

S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (implying 

extension but requiring reasonable explanation). 
3

Accordingly, unless appellant files with the clerk of this court a motion that 

complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.5(b)(1) and provides a 

reasonable explanation for the late filing of the party’s motion for en banc 

reconsideration within seven days of the date of this order, the court will deny the 

motion for rehearing as untimely.

PER CURIAM

Panel Consists of Justices Wise, Jewell and Spain.