# FILED

February 19, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk MARCIA WUBBENA STAFFORD, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9804-CV-00174 v. ) ) Warren Circui

t JAMES ARTHUR STAFFORD, ) No. 9108 ) Defendant/Appel

lant. )

)

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WARREN COUNTY

AT McMINNVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE CHARLES D. HASTON, JUDGE

BERNARD K. SMITH P. O. Box 490 McMinnville, Tenn

essee 37111 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

J. HILTON CONGER 200 South Third Street Smithville, T

ennessee 37166 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE-2- 

# OPINION

The only issue presented for appellate review

in this divorce actio

n is whether or not the m

arital property

was equitably d

ivided.

Marsha Wubbena Stafford

and James Arthur Stafford were marr

ied on June 23, 1990 and separated in WarrenCounty, Tennessee on Apri l 9, 1997. There were no children b orn of the marr

iage. On April 17 , 1997, wife sued f or divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and husband, on August 4, 1997, answered and co un ter-complained for divorce on inappropriate marital conduct grounds.

Ata hearing on Octobe r 14, 1997 , the trial judge sustain ed the complaint

of the wife and gra

nted her a divor

c e on grounds of inappropr iate maritalconduct. The court referred to the Special Master the question of

marital property and its disposition. This hearing befo re th e Special Master was also held on October 14,

1997 with pertinent f

indings as follows: Atthe conclusion of the proof, the Special master finds that plaintiff brought into the ma

rriage the sum of appro

ximately $200,000.00

(two-hundred thousand dollars), the defendant less than $20,000.00

(twenty-thousand dollars). The parties converted the individual property into marital pr

operty by purchasinga house and real estate. The parties' residence burned an d the c ontents of the hom e were replace

d with insurance proceeds . W hile plaintiff was away on a trip , defendant withdrew $84,000. 00 (eighty-four thousand dollars) cash, moved e

verything thatwas moveable , and gave a "fake" bill of sal

e for the farm equip

ment to a neighbor in an attempt to co nceal thes e asset [si c] which c ould not be moved. Defenda

n t will admit fi

ling no income tax

returns for the ti me of th e marri age bu t clai ms inco me between $1.00 (one dollar) and $1,0 00,000. 00 (one-million d ollars) but took the 5th as to the exact am ount. Defendant

indica tes that he has spent the $84,000.00 ( eighty-four thou sand do lla rs) gambling and on bad business deal s. Defenda nt ind icates that he has none of the

funds left. Plaintiff is left with a partially completed house , no insurance proceeds and a sub stant ial mortgage.It is the finding of the Special Master that an equitable divi sion of the parties' assett [sic] w

ould be to give the plain

ti ff the house, real estate, per

sonal property,

automobiles,

farm equipment and cabinet equipme

nt tha t defendant rem oved to-3- Mississippi, she would be responsib le for the mor

tgage . I n addition a judgment in

the amount of $42,000.0 0 (forty-two thousand dollars) should

be rendered agains

t defendant. While ajudgment m

ay be discha rgeabl e in ban kruptc y, the U. S. Attorney may

be interested in defendant's tax sta tus.

The trial judge c oncurred in the findi ngs of the Special Ma

ster and husband appealed.

The proof in the case am

ply supports

the actions of the Special Master and the trial judge as to the disposition of pro perty. At the

time of the marriage, wife owned various asset

s with an aggregate value

of $202,743.16. Husband had assets at the time of t

he marriage v

alued at $18,367.00.

During the marriage wife

u sed her sep arate property for the benef it of both parties, p roviding the down payment for an unimproved farm and providing the mone y for building thei

r home. This home bur

ned on or about January

1, 1997 with insuranc

e paying approximately

$95,000.00 for the ho

me and later $67,749.53 for contents. Both parties agree that the sepa rate pre-marital property hasbeen transmuted, and that all resulting property is marital. See e.g. Batson v. B atson , 769 S.W.2d 849, 585 (Tenn.App.1988).

With the reconstruction of the maritalh ome unfinished, husband in March of 1997 disappeared after withdrawing $84,000.00 fro m the savings of the parties, taking all three of t he parties' vehicl

es together with his cabinet making tools and effecting a fraudulent transfer of farm equipment to a neighbor, Jam es Owens. He lost most of the money in gambling transactions at casinos in Tunica, Mississippi. Husband's testimony is revealing. Q. And where is the f arm equipm

ent? A. It's at Jim Owens' house. Q. Andwe've -- we had a bil l of sale around here t hatwe could introduce, but that was not a true bill of sale; is that correct? A. No, sir, Jim

told me he needed something to get her off his back because she

was calling and aggr

avating him and his wife to death.And I made the bill of sale out

and took it to him. I

told him if it com

e to court, tell the

truth. Q. Okay. And tha

t's what you'r

e here to do, too? A. Yes, sir.-4- Q. When was the last time you filed an income tax return? A. Due to t he grounds of my counsel's ad vice, I refuse to answer that question. It may incriminate m e. Q. Didyou file an i

nc ome tax return

during the course of this marriage? A. Due to my counsel's advi[s]e, I refuse to answer that question on the grounds it may incriminate me. Q. Didyou earnany funds during th e course of this marriage? A. Yes, sir, but I h

ave no idea how m

uch. Q. You have no idea how much? A. No, sir. Q. It could be as little as a dollar. A. Correct. Q. Or as much as a million? A. Correct. Q. When you left here, you took every

thin g wi th you, all of y

our tools? A. Yes, sir.

This court has held: [13] A trial court's divis

ion of marital property is

to be guided by the f

actors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c). However , an equitable property division is not necessarily

an equal one. It i s not ac hieved by a mechanical application

of the statutory factors, but rather by considering and weighing the mos

t relevant factor

s in light of the unique facts of the case. [14] Tenn.Code

Ann. § 36-4 -1 21(c)(1) permits trial courts to consider the duration of the marriage. In cases involving a marriage o f relatively sho rt duration, it is appropriate

to divide the

property in a way that, as nearly as possible, plac e s the parties in the sa me position they

would have been i n had th e marriage never taken place. In re Marria ge of McInnis , 62 Or.App. 524 , 661 P.2d 942, 943 (1983). [15] When relatively short marriages are i n volved, each spouse's cont

r ibutions to the accum

ulation of assets during the marriage

is an important factor. In re Marriage of Peru , 56 Or.Ap p. 300, 641 P.2d 646, 647 (1982). When a marriage is short, the signifi

cance and value

of a spouse's non-monetary

contr ibut ions is di minis hed, a nd cla ims by one spouse to anotherspouse's separate property are minimal at best. In re Marriage

of Wallace, 315 N.W.2d 827, 830-31 (Iowa Ct.App.1981).
Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn.App.1988).-5- The marriage at

bar, one of only

seven years dur

ation, falls in the

same category as does the mar

riage in Batson . The husband br ought a comparative pittance to the marital estate. Under the decree of the tri

al court he receiv

ed, in property divi sion , $42, 000.0 0 of th e money f rom ma rital asse ts that he had squan dered at the gambling tables; which is more than twice his marital contribution. Wife received everything else . This division " . . . as nearly as possible, places the parties in the sam e position they wo

uld have been in had the marriage never taken place." Ba tson v. Batson , 769 S.W.2d 849 , 859 (Tenn.App.1988).

The evidence certainly does not preponderate against the marital property disposition made by the trial court and the judgme

nt willtherefore be affirmed.

Such being the only issue raised on appeal it r

emains but to t

a x the costs against the husba

nd, James Ar

thur Stafford.

The judgment of

the trial court is affirmed

and the case is rem

anded for collection of costs.

_____ _______________________ _____ _ WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

CONCUR:

__________________________________ ___ BEN H. CANTRELL, P

RES. JUDGE, M.S.

__________________________________ ___ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE