*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 16, 2010*

 Decided June 16, 2010

Before

 RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

 ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 09-3436

ALAN N. SCOTT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BRIAN R. JETT,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Terra Haute Division.

No. 2:09-cv-125-RLY-WGH

Richard L. Young,

Judge.

O R D E R

In three separate disciplinary actions, Alan Scott, a federal prisoner, was found

guilty of fighting, possessing contraband, attempting to obtain money for bribery and

gambling, and plotting to use code words on a telephone. (The last two charges were

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 09-3436 Page 2

brought in one proceeding.) In each case, a hearing officer punished Scott by stripping him

of good time and imposing other sanctions. After exhausting his administrative remedies,

Scott sought collateral review of all three proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In this appeal

from the denial of his petition, Scott renews the claims he made in his petition and also

challenges the district court’s denial of several discovery requests. We affirm the judgment.

For all three disciplinary cases, Scott claims that the evidence is too thin. The first

case arose from a 2001 allegation that Scott had “flicked” another inmate on the ear at least

three times before that inmate slapped him in return, after which guards separated the pair. 

Scott was found guilty of fighting, see 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, tbl. 3, Code 201, but he insists that

he never touched anyone or, alternatively, that “flicking” is horseplay, not fighting.

In evaluating Scott’s sufficiency challenges, we apply the “some evidence” standard. 

See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985); Johnson v. Finnan, 467 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir.

2006). An incident report written by a guard satisfies this standard. Bandy-Bey v. Crist, 578

F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2009); Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2001);

McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, the incident report and

witness interviews establish that intervention was necessary to separate the two inmates,

which supports a conclusion that the scuffle had escalated beyond horseplay. Thus, “some

evidence” supports the charge.

The second disciplinary action arose in 2004 when a search of Scott’s cell for “excess

property” turned up a compact disc containing tax-preparation software. The CD was

hidden in an envelope that had been altered to obscure its contours and hide it from less

rigorous searches. (Scott insists that the guards themselves doctored the envelope.) This

time Scott was found guilty of possessing an item he was not authorized to receive. See 28

C.F.R. § 541.13, tbl. 3, Code 305.

At the hearing Scott conceded that guards found the CD in his cell. And a mail-room

employee testified that staff always searched Scott’s incoming mail for computer media,

never issued such materials to him, and consistently returned computer media to the

sender. That evidence, together with the report of the doctored envelope, supports the

conclusion that Scott had taken steps to avoid the CD’s detection because he knew no one

had authorized him to receive it. Accordingly, “some evidence” supports this charge.

The third disciplinary action also took place in 2004. Scott was accused of scheming

to transfer money into the prison for a prohibited purpose, see 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, tbl. 3, Code

217A, and attempting to develop code words for use in discussing the prohibited money

transfers by telephone, see id., Code 297A. (The “A” next to each offense code designates

liability for an attempt or plan. See id. § 541.13(b).) According to the incident report, Scott
No. 09-3436 Page 3

wrote a letter asking an acquaintance outside the prison to channel $250 to another inmate

so that the pair could “buy [their] way into” a new cell and be made cell

mates—presumably by bribing someone at the prison. Scott added that future money

transfers could be used to bet on football games. His letter also provided code words to use

in telephone conversations about the transactions. According to the report, Scott admitted

his guilt when confronted with the letter.

The hearing officer reported that, at the disciplinary hearing, Scott still admitted

writing the letter but argued that the telephone charge was too “speculative” because he

never formalized a plan to talk on the telephone on a particular date. The hearing officer,

unpersuaded, found Scott guilty, but an administrative appeal won Scott a new hearing

because much of the material from the investigation into Scott’s recent financial transactions

had not reached the hearing officer. At a second hearing the presiding officer reviewed

additional evidence, including money orders sent by Scott’s outside accomplice to another

inmate and a memorandum from an investigator who spoke with postal inspectors in

Massachusetts about Scott’s correspondence. That memo explained how Scott and the other

inmate had used a Massachusetts resident as a go-between. The hearing officer sustained

the finding of guilt, and Scott’s contention that this collection of evidence is too thin to

satisfy the “some evidence” standard is frivolous.

Next, Scott contends that the district court wrongly denied his motions to compel the

warden to make admissions, answer interrogatories, and produce policy statements,

memoranda, and any contraband and letters referred to in the disciplinary actions. A

district court has discretion to grant limited discovery in habeas-corpus cases. Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). But if a petitioner fails to show “good cause,” i.e., that the

sought-after discovery would likely influence the outcome of his petition, the district court

commits no abuse of discretion in denying his request. Hubanks v. Frank, 392 F.3d 926, 933

(7th Cir. 2004). Here, none of the discovery Scott sought would have undermined the

sufficiency of the evidence in any of the disciplinary actions.

Finally, Scott argues that the deprivation of good time in the third disciplinary action

exceeded that allowed by applicable regulations. But that claim is not properly before us

because Scott never presented it to the district court in any meaningful way. See Johnson v.

Hulett, 574 F.3d 428, 429 (7th Cir. 2009); Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2009). 

The claim is not included in Scott’s § 2241 petition, and although he was given leave to

amend his petition, his amendment simply asserts in a sentence that too much good time

was taken away. Scott did not provide the district court with a factual predicate or explain

why he believes that the sanctions imposed were not authorized, so we cannot fault the

district court for not addressing the propriety of the sanctions. And though Scott devotes
No. 09-3436 Page 4

several pages of his brief to the subject and supplies factual detail that was not given to the

district court, we cannot resolve his contention in the first instance.

We have considered Scott’s remaining arguments and determined that they are

without merit and do not warrant further discussion.

AFFIRMED.