Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-807 |June 18, 2015 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimmerly A. Klee

Greenwood, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Adrienne Tyler,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 18, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1411-CR-807

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Jose Salinas, Judge

The Honorable Shatrese Flowers, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause Number 49G14-

1305-FD-35608

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1411-CR-807 |June 18, 2015 Page 2 of 17

Case Summary

[1] During the late-evening or early-morning hours of May 30 and 31, 2013, 

Appellant-Defendant Adrienne Tyler became involved in an altercation with 

police after a passenger in her vehicle observed the passenger’s vehicle 

abandoned and damaged on the side of the road. During the altercation, Tyler 

yelled obscenities directed toward the officers, pushed an officer and slapped 

him on the face. She then continued to struggle with the officer after he 

attempted to place her under arrest.

[2] Tyler was subsequently charged with Class D felony possession of a controlled 

substance, Class D felony battery on an officer, Class D felony resisting law 

enforcement, and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. She pled guilty to 

the Class D felony possession of a controlled substance charge. A jury found 

her guilty of the remaining charges. Tyler was sentenced to an aggregate 365-

day sentence, with two days executed and the remainder suspended to 

probation.

[3] On appeal, Tyler challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her 

conviction for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. She also contends that 

the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to that charge. 

Concluding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Tyler’s conviction and that 

the claimed error in instructing the jury was harmless, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History
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[4] During the late-evening or early-morning hours of May 30 and 31, 2013, 

Lashanda Brownie, her cousin, and Tyler were “hanging out.” Tr. p. 224. At 

some point, Brownie loaned her cousin her vehicle so that he could go and 

purchase some drinks and cigarettes for the group. Brownie’s cousin never 

returned.

[5] At approximately 1:00 or 1:30 a.m. on May 31, 2013, Indianapolis 

Metropolitan Police Officer Alan Leinberger was driving his fully marked 

police cruiser northbound near 9th and Wallace Streets. While driving, Officer 

Leinberger observed a southbound vehicle that appeared to have a flat right 

passenger side tire, which looked as if it were about to fall off of the rim. 

Officer Leinberger also noticed that the vehicle appeared to have sustained 

some front end damage. Officer Leinberger turned around, initiated his 

overhead lights and siren, and attempted to stop the vehicle in order to find out 

what happened. The driver of the vehicle did not stop, but rather turned 

northbound on Wallace Street. 

[6] When the vehicle didn’t stop, Officer Leinberger requested backup. Lieutenant 

Thomas Black and Officers Beniam Kumbi and Joel Anderson responded to 

Officer Leinberger’s call for assistance. Officer Leinberger soon thereafter 

found the vehicle abandoned and parked along the side of Wallace Street. 

Officer Leinberger observed that the vehicle looked as though it had been 

involved in an accident. Because the vehicle was abandoned and parked in the 

line of traffic, Officer Leinberger intended to tow the vehicle. 
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[7] When her cousin failed to return, Brownie eventually asked Tyler to take her 

home. While on their way to Brownie’s residence, Brownie noticed her 

damaged vehicle abandoned and parked on the side of the road. Brownie 

approached the officers and asked “What’s going on? That’s my car.” Tr. pp. 

98-99. 

[8] After Brownie approached the officers, Officer Leinberger asked Brownie for 

identification in order to verify that she was indeed the owner of the vehicle. 

Brownie and Officer Leinberger walked back to the SUV that was being driven 

by Tyler and in which Brownie had been a passenger. As Brownie and Officer 

Leinberger continued their conversation and approached the SUV, Tyler started 

“getting loud,” yelling “Don’t tell nothing. We know what’s going on here. 

This is bullshit. Don’t say a f[******] word.” Tr. pp. 103-04. 

[9] Officer Leinberger instructed Tyler to “keep [her] voice down” telling her “[w]e 

don’t need to yell.” Tr. p. 104. Tyler ignored this instruction and kept yelling 

things to the effect of “We don’t need to say anything. Don’t say anything to 

them. Don’t give them shit. We know what’s going on.” Tr. p. 104. Tyler 

continued to yell even after both Lieutenant Black and Officer Kumbi repeated 

Officer Leinberger’s prior instruction to stop. In all, Tyler was instructed to 

stop yelling at least four or five times. She did not comply with any of these 

instructions. 

[10] Tyler eventually became involved in a physical altercation with Lieutenant 

Black, putting her hands on his chest and attempting to push him away. Tyler 
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also slapped Lieutenant Black in the face. Lieutenant Black indicated that he 

did not want to arrest Tyler, but felt he had no choice after she slapped him. 

Lieutenant Black then notified Tyler that she was under arrest. Tyler continued 

to struggle, “flailing her body and her arms.” Tr. p. 155. Tyler “kept moving 

around and pulling her arms and twisting her body” in an attempt to pull away 

from Lieutenant Black and Officer Kumbi. Tr. p. 199. 

[11] As a result of Tyler’s actions, Brownie’s focus shifted away from Officer 

Leinberger to Tyler. Brownie then became “very animated” and attempted to 

move towards the commotion that was being created by Tyler. Tr. p. 112. 

Although distracted by Tyler’s actions, Brownie eventually complied with 

Officer Leinberger’s instructions to “[j]ust stand still” and to “stay with [him].” 

Tr. p. 113.

[12] On May 31, 2013, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State”) charged 

Tyler with Class D felony possession of a controlled substance, Class D felony 

battery on an officer, Class D felony resisting law enforcement, and Class B 

misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Prior to the commencement of Tyler’s jury 

trial, which was held on September 22, 2014, Tyler pled guilty to the Class D 

felony possession of a controlled substance charge. Following the conclusion of 

the evidence, the jury found Tyler guilty of the remaining charges. On October 

27, 2014, the trial court conducting a sentencing hearing during which it 

merged the Class D felony battery on an officer charge with the Class D felony 

resisting law enforcement charge. The trial court sentenced Tyler pursuant to 
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alternate misdemeanor sentencing to an aggregate 365-day sentence, with two 

days executed and the remainder suspended to probation. This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision

[13] On appeal, Tyler contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her 

conviction for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Tyler also contends 

that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. We will address 

each contention in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[14] The offense of disorderly conduct is governed by Indiana Code section 35-45-1-

3, which provides in relevant part that: “(a) A person who recklessly, 

knowingly, or intentionally ... (2) makes unreasonable noise and continues to 

do so after being asked to stop ... commits disorderly conduct, a Class B 

misdemeanor.” “The constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute is 

determined on an as applied basis under Article 1, section 9 of the Indiana 

Constitution [(“Article 1, section 9”)].” Dallaly v. State, 916 N.E.2d 945, 951 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Article 1, section 9 provides that: “No law shall be 

passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting 

the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the 

abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible. 
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[15] In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for Class B 

misdemeanor disorderly conduct, Tyler argues that the speech at issue 

constituted protected free speech under the Indiana Constitution. 

In reviewing the constitutionality of [Indiana Code section] 35-45-1-3 

as applied to a defendant, we employ a two-step analysis. “First, we 

must determine whether state action has restricted a claimant’s 

expressive activity; second, if it has, we must decide whether the 

restricted activity constituted an ‘abuse’ of the right to speak.” 

Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, 584-585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing 

Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996)), trans. denied. 

Where a state action restricts a defendant’s expressive activity, only if 

the State correctly determines that a defendant has abused his right to 

speak may the statute be constitutionally applied. 

Dallaly, 916 N.E.2d at 952.

[16] “‘The first prong of this inquiry may be satisfied by a person’s conviction for 

making unreasonable noise based solely on his loud speaking during a police 

investigation.’” Id. (quoting Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App.

2000), trans. denied). Here, the record reveals that Tyler was arrested for 

disorderly conduct after she screamed and swore at the officers. Tyler has 

therefore established that the State restricted her expressive activity. See id. 

(providing that the recorded established that the State restricted Dallaly’s 

expressive activity where he was arrested for disorderly conduct after he 

screamed and swore at officers); Johnson v. State, 719 N.E.2d 445, 449 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1999) (holding that a person’s conviction for making unreasonable noise 

based on loud speaking during a police investigation constitutes state action 

restricting defendant’s expressive activity).
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Most cases turn on the second prong of the analysis. The Indiana 

Supreme Court recently reiterated “that the right of free speech 

protected in [Article 1, section 9] is expressly qualified by the phrase 

‘but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.’” 

J.D. v. State, 859 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind. 2007). In order to satisfy the 

second prong of the test, a defendant “must prove that ‘the State could 

not reasonably conclude that the restricted expression was an “abuse” 

of [his] right to speak, and therefore, the State could not properly 

proscribe the conduct, pursuant to its police power, via the disorderly 

conduct statute.’” Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 585 (quoting Johnson, 719 

N.E.2d at 449). Generally, whether the State correctly determined 

that a defendant’s expression constituted an abuse of the right to free 

speech is subjected to rationality review. Id. However, if the 

defendant demonstrates that the expressive activity precipitating the 

disorderly conduct conviction was political in nature, then the burden 

shifts to the State to demonstrate that it did not materially burden the 

claimant’s opportunity to engage in political expression. Id.; see also 

Anderson v. State, 881 N.E.2d 86, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). If the speech 

is determined to be ambiguous, “then the expression is not political, 

and we review the State’s restriction of the expression under standard 

rational review.” Anderson, 881 N.E.2d at 90.

“Expressive activity is political if its aim is to comment on government 

action, including criticism of an official acting under color of law.” 

Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 585. Where the expressive activity focuses on 

a private party’s conduct, including the conduct of the speaker himself, 

the expression is not political. Id. The nature of the expression is 

reviewed under an objective standard. Id. In instances where some of 

a defendant’s expressive activity is deemed political is coupled with 

other comments found not to be political expression, the “dual nature” 

of this expression may lead to the conclusion that the expression was 

ambiguous. Id. at 585-586.

Dallaly, 916 N.E.2d at 952.

[17] In the instant matter, Tyler and Brownie first encountered the investigating 

officers after Brownie noticed her damaged vehicle abandoned and parked on 

the side of the road. Brownie approached the officers and asked “What’s going 
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on? That’s my car.” Tr. pp. 98-99. After Brownie approached the officers, 

Officer Leinberger asked Brownie for identification in order to verify that she 

was indeed the owner of the vehicle. Brownie and Officer Leinberger walked 

back to the SUV that was being driven by Tyler and in which Brownie had been 

a passenger. As Brownie and Officer Leinberger continued their conversation 

and approached the SUV, Tyler started “getting loud,” yelling “Don’t tell 

nothing. We know what’s going on here. This is bullshit. Don’t say a 

f[******] word.” Tr. pp. 103-04. Officer Leinberger instructed Tyler to “keep 

[her] voice down” telling her “[w]e don’t need to yell.” Tr. p. 104. Tyler 

ignored this instruction and kept yelling things to the effect of “We don’t need 

to say anything. Don’t say anything to them. Don’t give them shit. We know 

what’s going on.” Tr. p. 104. Tyler continued to yell even after both 

Lieutenant Black and Officer Kumbi repeated Officer Leinberger’s prior 

instruction to stop. In all, Tyler was instructed to stop yelling at least four or 

five times. She did not comply with any of these instructions. As a result of 

Tyler’s actions, Brownie’s focus shifted away from Officer Leinberger to Tyler.

[18] The record before us on appeal demonstrates that the aim or focus of Tyler’s 

initial expressive activity was to criticize the actions of the police officers that 

occurred during the officers’ interaction with Tyler and Brownie. Further,

nothing in the record indicates that Tyler’s initial comments focused on any 

topic other than the state action which was taken against her and Brownie. We 

therefore conclude that Tyler’s expression therefore qualified as political 

expression. As such, the burden shifted to the State to demonstrate that it did 
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not materially burden Tyler’s opportunity to engage in political expression. See 

Dallaly, 916 N.E.2d at 953 (providing that the burden shifted to the State to 

demonstrate that it did not materially burden Dallaly’s opportunity to engage in 

political expression after Dallaly presented evidence demonstrating that the aim 

or focus of his initial expressive activity was to criticize the actions taken by 

police officers while effecting his arrest).

[19] The State may demonstrate that it did not materially burden the defendant’s 

opportunity to engage in political expression by producing evidence that the 

expression inflicted particularized harm analogous to tortious injury on readily 

identifiable private interests. Id. (internal quotations omitted). “‘When the 

expressions of one person cause harm to another in a way consistent with 

common law tort, an abuse under [Article 1, section 9] has occurred.’” Id. 

(quoting Madden v. State, 786 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. 

denied). “‘In order to demonstrate such particularized harm, the State must 

show that the expression caused actual discomfort to persons of ordinary 

sensibilities or that it interfered with an individual’s comfortable enjoyment of 

his privacy. Evidence of mere annoyance or inconvenience is not sufficient.’” 

Id. (quoting Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 585). 

[20] In J.D., the Indiana Supreme Court held that unlike in cases where the alleged 

harm resulting from a defendant’s exercise of their right to political expression 

did not rise above the level of a fleeting annoyance, the juvenile defendant 

abused her right to political expression when the expression, which consisted of 

persistent loud yelling, obstructed or interfered with the police by obscuring the 
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officer’s “attempts to speak and function as a law enforcement officer.” 859 

N.E.2d at 344. In reaching this holding, the Indiana Supreme Court found that 

because the speech in question obstructed and interfered with the police officer 

and was therefore not “relatively harmless,” the juvenile defendant’s otherwise 

political speech “clearly amounted to an abuse of the right to free speech and 

thus subjected her to accountability under [Article I, section 9].” Id. Similarly, 

in Dallaly, we concluded that because Dallaly’s speech interfered with the duties 

of the police officers at the scene, Dallaly abused his free speech rights under 

Article 1, section 9. 916 N.E.2d at 954. The Indiana Supreme Court’s holding 

in J.D. and our conclusion in Dallaly are in line with the previously stated belief 

that police officers conducting a legitimate investigation “must be able to 

perform their duties without unreasonable interruption.” Anderson v. State, 881 

N.E.2d 86, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 588).

[21] Here, the record provides that Tyler’s expressions interfered with Officer 

Leinberger’s legitimate attempt to verify that Brownie was the owner of the 

damaged vehicle that had been abandoned by Brownie’s cousin on the side of 

the road. As a result of Tyler’s actions, Brownie’s focus shifted from Officer 

Leinberger to Tyler and she was then unable to continue her conversation with 

Officer Leinberger. Thus, like in J.D. and Dallaly, the speech at issue, while 

political in nature, constituted an abuse of Tyler’s free speech rights under 

Article 1, section 9 because Tyler’s speech interfered with Officer Leinberger’s 

ability to conduct a legitimate investigation into who owned the abandoned and 
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damaged vehicle. Tyler, therefore, may be held accountable for her expressions 

under Article 1, section 9.

[22] Having concluded that Tyler’s expressions were not protected political speech, 

we now address whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her conviction for 

disorderly conduct. 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence 

and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s 

role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and 

weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a 

conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are 

confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most 

favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate courts affirm the 

conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of 

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not 

necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably 

be drawn from it to support the verdict. 

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and 

quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be 

reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence 

presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in original). 

Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess the 

credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002).

[23] In order to convict Tyler of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, the State 

was required to prove that Tyler recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally made 

an unreasonable noise and continued to do so after being asked to stop. Ind. 
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Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2). Based on the nature of Tyler’s outbursts, as detailed 

above, and the fact that she refused to stop yelling when instructed numerous 

times to do so by the responding officers, we conclude that the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain Tyler’s conviction for Class B misdemeanor disorderly 

conduct. Tyler’s claim to the contrary effectively amounts to a request for this 

court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 

435.

II. Jury Instructions

[24] Tyler also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury.

The trial court has broad discretion in the manner of instructing the 

jury and we review its decision thereon only for an abuse of that 

discretion. Stringer v. State, 853 N.E.2d 543, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

We review the refusal of a tendered instruction by examining whether 

the tendered instruction correctly states the law, whether there is 

evidence in the record to support giving the instruction, and whether 

the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other given 

instructions. Springer v. State, 798 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ind. 2003). Jury 

instructions are to be considered as a whole and in reference to each 

other. Stringer, 853 N.E.2d at 548. The ruling of the trial court will 

not be reversed unless the instructions, when taken as a whole, 

misstate the law or mislead the jury. Kelly v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1179, 

1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Before a defendant is entitled 

to a reversal, he must affirmatively show that the erroneous instruction 

prejudiced his substantial rights. Stringer, 853 N.E.2d at 548.

Snell v. State, 866 N.E.2d 392, 395-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[25] “The purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the 

facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case 
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clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Id. at 396 (citing Gravens v. 

State, 836 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied).

In instructing a jury, the trial court has a statutory duty to state to the 

jury all matters of law that are necessary for its information in giving 

its verdict. Ind. Code § 35-37-2-2(5); Dayhuff v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1100, 

1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied. Each party to an action is 

entitled to have the jury instructed on his particular theory of 

complaint or defense. Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2005) (quotations omitted). “As a general rule, a defendant in a 

criminal case is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of 

defense which has some foundation in the evidence.” Howard v. State,

755 N.E.2d 242, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). This is so even if the 

evidence supporting the defense is weak and inconsistent. Id.

However, the evidence must have some probative value to support the 

defense. Id.

Id.

[26] Tyler was convicted of disorderly conduct. Again, “[a] person commits 

disorderly conduct as a Class B misdemeanor when she recklessly, knowingly, 

or intentionally makes unreasonable noise and continues to do so after being 

asked to stop.” Id. (citing Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2)). “Article I, section 9 of 

the Indiana Constitution provides, ‘No law shall be passed, restraining the free 

interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or 

print, freely, on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right, every 

person shall be responsible.” Id.

[27] Prior to trial, Tyler submitted a jury instruction addressing the protected speech 

provision of Article 1, section 9. The proffered jury instruction read as follows:
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It is an issue in this case whether Ms. Tyler’s speech was protected by 

[Article 1, section 9] of the Indiana state constitution, which states 

that:

No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of 

thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, 

write, or print freely, on any subject whatever: but for the 

abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.

Indiana’s right to free speech imposes limits on prosecutions for 

Disorderly Conduct. If a person in engaged in “political” speech, he 

or she may not be convicted of Disorderly Conduct unless the State 

can show that the person caused actual discomfort to specific and 

identifiable private citizens or interfered with the comfortable 

enjoyment of privacy for specific and identifiable private citizens. 

Mere annoyance or inconvenience is not enough.

To determine whether this increased protection applies to Ms. Tyler, 

you must engage in the following two-step consideration.

First, you must decide whether State action in this case restricted Ms. 

Tyler’s opportunity to engage in expressive activity. “Expressive 

activity” has a broad meaning under the Indiana Constitution, and 

extends to any subject whatsoever and every conceivable mode of 

expression. State action restricts expressive activity when the [S]tate 

imposes a direct and significant burden on a person’s opportunity to 

speak his or her mind in whatever fashion he or she deems 

appropriate. Proof of an arrest for Disorderly Conduct involving loud 

speech is sufficient to find that State action restricted expressive 

activity.

Second, you must consider whether Ms. Tyler’s expression constituted 

an abuse of that right to speak. In order to decide this, you must first 

consider whether or not Ms. Tyler was engaged in political speech, 

which includes any criticism of the legality or appropriateness of police 

conduct towards another person. Political speech has more 

constitutional protection than non-political speech. If you find that 

Ms. Tyler engaged in political speech, then she abused her right to 

speak only if the State has convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt 

that she caused actual discomfort to specific and identifiable private 

citizens or interfered with the comfortable enjoyment of privacy for 

specific and identifiable private citizens. If you find that Ms. Tyler was 

not engaged in political speech, then she abused her right to speak if 
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the State has convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt that her 

behavior could rationally be considered “unreasonable noise.” 

If the State has not convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt 

that she abused her right to speak, you must find her “not guilty” of 

Disorderly Conduct.

Appellant’s App. p. 65. The trial court refused the tendered instruction, 

determining that Tyler’s speech at issue “wasn’t political speech.” Tr. p. 305. 

[28] Tyler argues on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing her tendered jury 

instruction. The State acknowledges on appeal that “it appears that the

instruction tendered by [Tyler] is a correct statement of the law as accepted by 

the Snell panel and other cases dealing with disorderly conduct.” Appellee’s Br. 

p. 13. The State further acknowledges that the substance of the tendered 

instruction was not covered by any other instruction. As such, our review on 

appeal is limited to whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving 

of Tyler’s tendered instruction. See Snell, 866 N.E.2d at 396; Stringer, 853 

N.E.2d at 548. In light of our discussion and conclusion above, we believe that 

there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the giving of Tyler’s 

tendered instruction addressing protected political speech. 

[29] Because the proffered instruction is a correct statement of the law that was not 

covered by any other instructions and the evidence supports the giving of the 

instruction, we conclude that the trial court erred in refusing the proffered 

instruction. “However, an error in the giving or refusing of an instruction is 

harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury 
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could not properly have found otherwise.” Snell, 866 N.E.2d at 399 (citing Dill 

v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001)).

[30] As we concluded above, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Tyler’s conviction 

for disorderly conduct. Thus, even if the jury had been properly instructed, the 

outcome would have undoubtedly been the same. Stated differently, although 

Tyler’s speech was political in nature, it nevertheless constituted an abuse of

Tyler’s free speech rights because it interfered with Officer Leinberger’s police 

duties. Accordingly, Tyler was not prejudiced by the trial court’s erroneous 

refusal of her tendered jury instruction.

Conclusion

[31] In sum, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Tyler’s conviction 

for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. We also conclude that while the 

trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury in relation to the 

disorderly conduct charge, the abuse of the trial court’s discretion was harmless. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

[32] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.