## NO. 12

- 22

- 00193 -CV

I N THE COUR T OF APPEALS

TW ELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TY LER, TEXAS

IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF VASSIL

V. T CHOKOEV, AN INCAPACITATED

P

ERSON §
§
§ APP EAL FROM THE

COUNTY COURT AT LAW

CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION William K. Wilder appeals the trial court’s order imposing monetary sanctions against him. He also appeals the denial of his motion for sanctions. He presents six issues on appe al.
We affirm.

B ACKGROUND
T his is an appeal from an order granting sanctions in a guardianship proc eeding. Mu ch of the underlying facts are unknown and not contained in the a ppellate record. 1 However, the
record does indicate that during the guardianship proceeding, Wilder represented the ward, Dr. Vassil V. Tchokoev. It appears Vassil’s sons, Vastan and Nichol as (the Applicants) , applied for
the guardianship. In accordance with the Texas Estates Code, the Applicants requested an independent medical examination (IME) of Vassil’s competency. The record indicates that there were some issues finding a doctor covered by Vassil’s insurance

. Once the examination was conducted, it appeared that Vassil’s wife , Olga, participate d in the examination. In addition, the
examination notes referenced a more “physical” examination instead of a mental or psycho logical exa mination. Therefore, the Applicants requested an additional IME

. At the hearing, the Applicants provided the trial court with the name of a d octor in Dallas that had

1 Wilder makes a number of factual allegations in his brief; how eve r, the majority of those “facts” are not contained in the appellate r ecor d.2 agreed to perform the examination. The Applicants also agreed to provide or arrange
tra nsportation for Vassil to and from the appointment. The trial court granted the motion on February 22, 2022 and gave the parties thirty days to conduct the IME. The examination was scheduled for March 3. That morning, Wilder advised Olga not to permit V assil to go to the exam. He claimed the exam must be done by a psychiatrist or psychologist while the current doctor was a neurologist. Therefore, he refused to allow Vassil to attend. Vassil later died on March 20, under allegedly suspicious circumstances. The Applicants filed a motion for sanctions against Wilder, alleging that his conduct on March 3, and throughout the guardianship, was un scrupulous. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion; however, it allowed the Applican ts to amend the motion to include the amount of attorney’ s fees owed. Wilder filed his own motion for sanctions alleging that the Applicants made false accusations against him and failed to post the bond required under the Texas Estates Code. The
trial court denied the motion. After the trial court closed the guar dianship, the sanctions orders became final. This appeal followed.

S ANCTIONS
I n his fir st three issues, Wilder asserts the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions against him. In issues one and two, Wilder contends that the trial court r equired that
Vassil be examined by a psychiatrist and not a neurologist; therefore, Wilder’s advice to not undergo the examination did not warrant sanctions. In his third issue, Wilder argues that he

c ould not be sanctioned until after the date set forth in the trial court’s order. 2 In his fourth and fifth issues, Wilder states that his motio n for sanctions should have been granted. Specifically, he urges that the bond required by the Texas Estates Cod e was never posted and the Applicants should be accordingly sanctioned.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court ’ s imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Cire v. Cummings , 134 S.W.3d 835, 383

- 39 (Tex. 2004). A court abuses its d iscretion w hen it acts arbitrarily or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine

2 Wilder does not dispute the amount of the sanctions ordere d.3 Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex . 1985). Although we view conflicting evidence favorably to the court ’ s decision, we are not bound by a trial cou rt ’ s fact findings or conclusions
of law and mus t, instead, review the entire record independently to determine whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Products, LLC , 601 S.W.3d 704, 717 (Tex. 2020)

. A decision la cking factu al support is arbitrary and unreasonable and mus t be set
aside. Id

. Applicants’ Motion for Sanctions At the hearing on the motion for sanction s, Vastan testified that a nurse approached him
about Vassil ’s HIPAA form. The release included two p eople: Olga and “Dr. Wilder.” The
nurse said that Wilder r epresented himself as a medical doctor. Vastan told her to remove both
individuals and add him , his brother, and his wife, Megan. On cross

- examination, Wilder pointed
out that his wife has a Ph.D. and goes b y “doctor.”
Vastan further testified that on ano ther occasion, he contacted the Tyler Police Department because he “was concerned about foul pl ay due to the serious bump and laceration [on] top of [his] father’s head that was not there on Tuesda y morning t hat [he] can remember.” The officers gave him a case number, took photographs, and collected some other evidence. They also gave Vastan a num ber to call when Vassil passed away. During their investigation, Tyler Police learned that several me dical recor ds had been deleted . Vastan stated:

They informed my brother and I that the records appeared to have been deleted, that they were told by the Hospice staff that they no longer had any records or the HIPAA forms on Olga or Bill [Wilder]

.

Vastan testified that he received a new case number and that the officers believed a different crime may have been committed. 3 During a second hearing on the mo tion, it was discussed that Wilder f iled a response to
the motion for sanctions in which he clarified t hat he nev e r represented Olga. However,
Vastan’s attorne y urged that he was unaware that Olga was acting pro se during the pendency of

3 Vastan prepared an affidavit for the first hearing to support the motion for sanctions. He did not test ify f ro m the affida vit. Rather, he used it “ for recollection. ” As noted ab ove, th is Co urt was not provided a complete clerk ’ s record because W ild er only requ ested certain documents be contained i n it. As a result, in reviewing the reporter ’ s record, this Cou rt asked the clerk ’ s record be suppl emented to contain the affidavit re feren ced in Vastan ’ s testimony. Wilder filed an objection t o the affid avit. It does not appear that he objected to the affidavit in the trial court. And it appears the trial court ma y h ave consid ered the affidavit in granting the motion for sanctions. As a result , we overrule Wilder ’ s objection.4 the guardianship. According to Vastan, Wilder was ad vising Olga as if he was her attorney regarding the examination sch eduled for March 3. A ccording to Vastan’s attorney:

. . . the question is we never communicated to Dr. Tchokoev, Vassil; he was in bed. That was the te stimony. Wilder only communicated to Olga, who I thought was his client. I could have communicated with her, anyb o dy else could have. She refused access to him, and that was the moment that we felt that the order had been disobeyed completely in taking him to the independent medical evaluatio n had been realized, but it was Mr. Wilder who directed him not to get out o f bed through somebody he did not represent. It gets confusing.

. . . So when we show up on the morning of March 3rd after all of this argument , after all of this presentation to t ake the man to go see a doctor and this man fights it, he directs to go see i t, to not see it vociferously to this tangential one

- off person I didn ’ t know he didn ’ t represent where I could ’ ve talked to her directly myse lf. He directly interfered in the intent of your order, psychologist or psychologist (sic) aside.

Now, I ’ d be wil l ing to argue the psychologist/psychologist (sic) question I thought we already had. We were in chambers when we did this and you signed an ord er. I think that somebody that ’ s been practicing law 51 years, who has a duty to a client who is obviou sly incapa c itated in some capacity, you would think would have a responsibility to see that a medical doctor looked at him, no matter what, and if they h ad a problem with the results that came back the day later

-- the second day later, whenever they came back, he c o uld ’ ve came [sic] here before you and said, “ I object. Let ’ s seal them. Protective order. Quash them. In camera. ” 51 years of experience, but he had a responsibility to know what mental health and physical condition his client was in, and my cli ents paid f or that opportunity as neutrally and by golly as gracefully as they could.

. . .
I ’ m mad, but I didn ’ t come here to embarrass or impugn Mr. Wi lder. I respect his 51 years of practice, but enough is enough. He used every ounce

-- every bit of his skills to evade, dodge, weave, obfuscate. Got a phrase for it; it ’ s called officious intermeddling. It ’ s production of wor k just for generation of costs , and we ’ re kindly asking that the Court award these costs expressly related to misconduct after March 3rd and pa i d to Vastan and Nicholas Tchokoev.

Wilder argued that Applicants were complying with the court order because the doctor was not a psychiatris t or psychologist. He also argued that he had until March 24th to comply with the order. However, bec ause Vassi l died prior to that date, he argued he did not violate the order. Generally, a trial court has “inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct d uring the course of litigation that interferes with the administration of justice or the preservation o f the

cour t ’ s dignity and integrity.” Phillips & Akers, P.C. v. Cornwell
, 927 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App. Houston [1 st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (citing Onwuteaka v. Gill
, 908 S .W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Metzger v. Sebek
, 892 S.W.2d 20, 51 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 199 4, writ de n ied) ) . Such powers, however, are limited. “The trial court ’ s5 inherent power to sanction exists only to the extent necessary to deter, alleviat e, and counteract bad faith abuse of the judicial process, such as significant interference with core j udicial
fu n ctions

. . . of Texas courts.” Id

. at 280 (citing On w uteaka
, 908 S.W.2d at 280).
P arties must generally obey even an invalid order until it is overturned on appeal. Bachynsky v. State
, 747 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1988), aff ’ d in part a nd rev ’ d i n part on other grounds, 770 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1989). A party ’ s failure to comply with a court
order could res ult in the party being held in con tempt or in other sanctions being imposed. See
Koslow ’ s v. Mackie
, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990) (dis cussing va r ious sanctions for failure to comply with court orders); Ex parte Johns
, 807 S.W.2d 768 , 770 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1991, no writ) (contempt); see also T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 60 (dismissal of appeal for failure to comply with
order of appellate court).
Bas ed on the r ecord before us, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Wilder instructed his client, Vass il, via Olga, to not comply with the t rial court’s order compelling an IME. Even if the trial court intended for Vassil to be examined by a psychologi s t as Wilder argues, the record indicates that the trial court granted the motion for an IME after the

pa rties agreed to a specific doctor. Th e fact that the doctor is a neurologist does not negate the trial court’s order or the parties’ agreeme nt. In ad d ition, there is no evidence in the record that
Wilder intended to comply with the trial court’s order wi thin the time frame allotted

. Because the record contains evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that Wilder
failed t o comply w i th a court order , we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Applican ts’ motion for sanctions. See Koslow’ s , 796 S.W.2d at 704 ; see also
Downer , 701 S.W.2d at 241

. We overrule Wilder’s first, second, and thir d issues.
W ilder’s Motion for Sanctions
Wilder also filed a motion for sanctions alleging the Applicants failed to post bond for the temporary restraini ng order as required. On March 18, 2022 , the trial court held an emergency hearing on the Applicants ’ request f or temporary guardianship and heard their request for a temporary rest raining order , which it granted. That order enjoined Olga from accessin g, withdrawing, transferring, removing, transmitting, or otherwise engaging in financial transactions o n behalf o f Vassil. The trial court further ordered that “within five (5) business days, the Movants must execute and file with the
clerk a bond in the amount of $50,000.00 to the adverse party in accordance with Rule 684 of the6 Texas Rules of Civil Proce dure.” Wi l der conten ds the bond was never provided, and therefore, the trial court erred in not granting sanctions against the Applicants. However, he acknowledged that there is money in the registry of the court

. Thus, h e contends Applicants failed to follow the
form of th e bond. The entirety of Wilder’s argument for both issues four and five are found in his “summary of the argument” section of his brief :

Appellees failed to post a bond for their temporary restraining order as clearly required by la w, and sa n c tions shoul d be ordered against them and/or their attorneys.

. . . The conduct of Appellees and/or their attorneys which amounted to extreme annoyance, harassment and unprofessional conduct of Appellant and his Client justified an order of sanc tions aga i n st Appellee s and/or their attorneys to include an award of attorneys fees and costs of court to Appellant.

Wilder cites no authority for hi s arguments and no factual basis or explanation. Instead, he merged all six of his issues together , fo cusing on f acts support ing the first three issues. Rule
38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedur e mandates that an appellant ’ s brief must 1) state concisely all issues or points presented for review and 2) contain a clear and concise argument
for the contentio n s made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.1(e), (h). The failure to brief, or to adequately brie f, an issue by an appellant effects a waiver of that issue on appeal. General Servs. Comm ’ n v. Little

- T ex Insulat i on Co., Inc. , 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 n.1 (Tex. 2001). We have liberally construed Wilder’s brief in order to give
effect to his arguments. See T E X

. R. A PP

. P. 38.9. But it is not our duty to review the record, research the law, and fashion a legal argument f o r an app ellant when he has failed to do so. Zhang v. Capital Plastic & Bags, Inc. , 587 S.W.3d 82, 90 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet . denied). Wilder’s brief do es not contain a clear and concise argument and contain s no citations to au thority or the reco rd

. In addition, he did not argue his fifth issue before the trial

court. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1. Accordingly, we hold he ha s waived a ny alleged error with respect
to issues four and five

. In his sixth issue, Wilder urges the Applicants be charge d the costs of this appeal, including attorney ’ s fees. We decided that the trial court did not err. Because Wilder ’ s sixth7 issue is premised u pon the trial court ’ s alleged error in its judg ment, Wi lder ’ s sixth issue is mo o t. Accordingly, we overrule Wild er ’ s sixth issue.

D ISPOSITION Having overruled Wilder’s first, sec ond, and t h ird issues , concluded that issues four and
five are waive d, and overruled his sixth issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

B RIAN H OYLE Justice
Opinion d eli vered November 17 , 2022. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and N eeley, J.8 

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

NOVEMBER 17 , 2022

NO. 12

- 22

- 00193

- CV

IN THE GUARDIANSHI P O F VASSIL V. TCHOKOEV, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON

Appeal from the County Cou rt at Law
of Chero kee County , Texas (Tr.Ct.No. G00030 )

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinio n o f this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore OR DERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED t h at the judgment of
the cou rt below b e in all things affirmed and that all costs of this appeal are hereby ad judged against the Appellant, WILLIAM K. W ILD ER , and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance

. Brian Hoyle , Jus t ice

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J ., and Neeley, J.9