1

Se e Cru mp ton v . S

tate , No. 05-06-01673 -C R slip op. at 8-9 (Tex.App.–Dallas, deliver ed Aug ust 31, 2007) (not desig nated f or publication) ( “[T] he j u ry i n this case c ould not have found a pp e lla nt guil ty of c ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide , a s in c lud e d wi thi n the mans la ug hte r i nd ic tme nt, w it h o u t a ls o e xp r e s s ly

d e c id in g s h e u s e d

h e r mo to r v e h ic le , a d e a d ly

w e a p o n . [F o o tn o te o mi tt e d ]. The re fer ence to the indictment in both the application para g raph a nd in the verdic t form is sufficient to constitute an express finding by the j ury a deadly wea

pon was used during the commission of the 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS
NO. P D-1634-07

LINDSEY ALYN CRUMP TON, App ellant

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS ON AP P ELLA NT ’S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE F IF TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS

DA LLA S CO UN TY H ERV EY , J. , fil e d a c onc ur r ing opi nio n in whic h K E AS L E R and C OCH RAN , JJ., jo ine d. CO NC UR RI NG OP I NI ON The c ourt of appe als decide d that the jury ’s application-para g raph f indings a nd the ver dict form constituted an express deadly -we apon finding under this Court’s decision in LaF le ur v . S tate , 106 S.W .3d 91 (Tex.Cr.App. 2003). Iag ree . 1Crumpton--2

offe nse and, thus, suff

icient to support a dea dly wea pon finding in the judgme nt.”). 2 In LaFleur , the m urder indictment alleg ed that the defendant c ommitt ed the of fense with “a deadly wea pon, to-wit: a fire arm” and t h e application par ag raph on the lesser- included off ense of manslaug hter required a finding that the defendant used “a de adly wea pon: to-wit, a fire arm.” See LaFleur , 106 S.W .3d at 92-93, 99. The c harg ed manslaug hter-of fense indictment, in releva nt part, allege d that appellant

rec klessly cause d the complainant’ s death “ by driving her motor ve hicle, a deadly wea pon” into the

c omp la ina

nt’ s v e hic le . T he c on te ste d is su e a t tr ia l w a s w he the r a pp e lla nt dr ov e he r mot or

ve hic le

rec klessly or neg lige ntly . In the jury -cha rg e application para g raph on the lesser -included of fense of

c ri min a lly

neg li gent homic ide , th e jur y wa s in str

uc te d to fi nd

a pp e lla nt guil ty of “ c ri min a lly neg lige nt homicide as included in the indictment” if it found that appellant c aused the complainant’s de a th by c ri min a l ne g lig e nc e . I n its ve rd ic t fo rm , the jur y fo un d a pp e lla nt “ g uil ty of cr imi na lly neg lige nt homicide, as included in the indictment.” Al tho ug h the jur

y -c ha rg e a pp lic a tio n pa

ra g ra ph on the le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of c ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt ho mi cid e di d no t pr e c ise ly tr a c k th e langua g e of

the ind ic tme nt, a s w a s th e c a se in LaFleur , I believe that the rea soning of LaFleur still applies to this case. In this case, the r efe renc e 2 i nth e ap p l i ca t i o np ar agr ap ht o t h e i n d i ct m en t wi th i t s “i n cl u d edi nth e i n d i ct m en t ” l an gu age b ri n gs this case within LaFleur , beca use this wa s the equivalent of instructing the jury to f in dap p ell ant g uilty of cr iminally

neg lige nt homicide if

it found that appellant ne g lige ntly cause d the complainant’s de ath “by

driving her motor ve hicle, a de adly wea po n ” into the complainant’s vehic le. See LaFleur , 106 S.W .3d at 99 (“ I n this case , the combination of: 1) the indictment which a lleg ed ‘a de adly wea pon: to wit, a firea

rm’; 2) the jury

char g e applica

tion parag raph of

the lesser -included offe nse of mansla

ug hter that required a finding , beyond a re asonable doubt, that the appellant use dCrumpton--3

3 257 S.W .3d 712 (Tex.Cr.App. 2008). 4 Any prior dec isions by

this Court requiring a contr ary decision, as discussed in Presiding Judg e Ke lle r’ s d iss e nt, sh ou ld b e ov e rr ule d as b e inginc on sis te nt w ithour m or e re c e nt d e c isi on s in Blount and LaFleur

. Se e Awa de lk ar ie m v . S tate , 974 S.W .2d 721, 725 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998) (“ When older pre cede nt conflicts with a newer decision that is found t o be more soundly rea soned, we may resolve the inconsistency in favor of

the more soundly

rea soned dec ision.”). ‘a de adly wea pon: to-wit, a fire arm’; a

nd 3) the jury ’s verdict, that appellant was g uilty of t he lesser

included off

ense of manslaug hter, c ontained an e x press finding that appellant used a f irea rm, which is a dea dly

wea pon pe r se , to cause the complainant’ s death.” ). I believe that an examination of the manslaug hter indictment, the a pplication para g raph on the le sse r c ha

rg e of c ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide , a

nd the ve rd ic t f

or m in dic a te s th a t th e jur

y c ou ld not have f ound appellant guilty

of cr iminally

neg lige nt homicide wi th o ut a lso e x pressly decidingthat she drove her “ motor vehicle, a deadly wea pon.” S ee L a F l eur , 106 S.W .3d at 98 (purpose of

e ns ur ingan “ e xpre ss f

ind ing ” of a de a dly we a

po n is sati sf

ie d by loo kin g to the e xplic it r e qu ir e me nts of the a pp lic a tio n p ara g ra

ph , th e ind ic tme nt a

nd the ve rd ic t for

m) . Any oth e r d e c isi on

wo uld e xalt “for m over substanc e to no discer nible jurisprudential purpose .” See LaFleur , 106 S.W .3d at 98. In a dd ition , I agree wi th t he Court ’s op ini on

that th e re a so nin g of

thi s Co ur t’ s d e c isi on

in Blou nt v . S

tate supports a decision that “a verdic t of g uilt in a homicide case may be an a ffirmative 3 finding that a dea dly

wea pon was used, sinc e ca

using de ath by

an ac t (as distinguished f rom an omission) necessa

rily require s t h e use of a dea dly wea pon.” SeeMa

j. o p. a t 2. Withthe se comments, I join the Court’s opinion de ciding that the jury made an express finding that appellant used a de adly

wea pon. 4 H e r v e y , J.Crumpton--4

Filed: De cembe r 9, 2009 Pub lis h