NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0675n.06 No. 06-6444 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

WILLIE GENE JENK

INS, P etitioner -Appellant,

v. THOMAS DAILEY, WARDEN, Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) O n App eal from the United St at e s D ist r ic t C our t fo r th e We st e r n Di st r ic t o f K e nt uc ky

Be for e : BA TC HELD ER , C hie f Judg e ; a nd BOG G S and C OOK , C ir c uitJudg e s BOGG S, Circuit Judge. Willi e Ge ne Jenk ins a pp e a ls f ro m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his pe tit ion fo r a wr it of ha be a s c or pu s. Jenk ins a rgue s th a t hi s c on vic tio n und e r K e ntu c ky ’s c ri min a lsy ndication statute violated his due proce ss r ight not to be convicted of a cr ime “except upon proof bey ond a rea sonable doubt of ever y fac t ne cessa

ry to c onstitut e the c rime with which he is charg ed,” In re W ins hip , 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Jenkins ar g ues that proof bey ond a re asonable doubt was i mp o s s i b l e a s a

m a t t e r o f l a w b e c a u s e , u n d e r

K e n tu c ky’ s c o d i f

i c a t i o n o f t h e R u l e o f C o n s i s t e n c y, he could not be c onvicted of c riminal sy ndication if hi s co-de fenda nts have been acquitted or have been disc harg ed under

circ umstances a

mounting to an acquittal. We affir m the district court’s de nial of the pe tition. INo. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

- 2 - I n 1998, J enkins was indicted by a Jeffer son County

Gra nd J ury on o n e co u n t of cr iminal sy ndication under

Ky . Rev. Stat. § 506.120, o n e co u n t o f being a persistent fe lony

offe nder, a

nd numerous counts of c riminal possession of a for g ed instrument and thef t by dece ption. Four c odefe ndants wer e indicted along with Jenkins on one count of criminal sy ndication eac h, and var ious

c ounts of c ri min a l po sse ssi on of fo rg e d ins tr ume nts , the ft by

de c e pti on , a

nd oth e r r e la te d o ff

e ns e s. Pr ior to Je nk ins ’s tr ia l, a ll fo ur

c o- de fe nd a nts e nte re d in to p le a a g re e me nts wi th t

he Com monwe a lth of Ke ntucky : eac h pleade d g uilty to various counts of theft by dece ption and/or criminal possession of a f org ed instrument in exchang e for the Commonwealth’s re comm endation of a five-y ear sentenc e, to be probate d. The Com monwealth conditioned its sentence r ecommendation on each c ode fe nd ant’ s c oo perati on in the pr os e c uti on of oth e r c o- de fe nd a nts . T he Com monwe a ltha lso dismiss ed the c riminal-sy ndication cha

rg e ag ainst all of J enkins’s co- defe ndants. I n Marc h 2001, J enkins was trie d and convic ted by a jury in J eff erson Circuit Court (“ trial

co u rt ”) of six teen c ounts of criminal possession of a f org ed instrument, eig ht counts of theft by dece ption over $300, one c ount of being a per s i s t en t felony offe nder, a

nd one count of

criminal sy nd ic a tio n. Af

te r h is c on vic tio n, Jenk ins a c c e pte d a p le a a g re e me nt w a ivi ngthe se nte nc ingph a se in exchang e for

the C ommonwealth’s re commendation of a total thirty -y ear

sentenc e. The plea ag ree ment specifie d that all sentenc es we re to run c oncurr ently , and tha t the total sentenc e

re c omm e nd e d r e su lte d f

ro m the c ri min a l- sy

nd ic a tio n co nv ic tio n, wh ic h carr ie d a sen te nc e of tw e ntyNo. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

Eac h count of c riminal possession of a forg ed ins trument and theft by dece ption over $300 1 car ried a five-y ear sentenc e, enha

nced by the PFO- Istatus to twenty y ear s p er co u n t
. T h us, the rec ommended t h i rt y -y ear sentenc e wa s ten y ear s longe r than it would ostensibly be without the criminal-sy

ndication count. - 3 - y e ars and wa s e nh a nc e d by Jenk ins ’s Pe rs ist e nt F e lon Of fe nd e r (“ PF O- I ” ) status to th ir ty y e a rs . 1 The judg ment of convic tion, entere d on May 11, 2001, was c onsistent with the plea ag ree ment. Jenk ins mov e d f

or po st- c on vic tio n re lie f be fo re the tr ia l c ourt purs ua nt t o K y . RC r 1 1. 42 in May 2002, seekingto vacate his sentence on three g rounds. He argu ed t h at his sentence was disproportionately

long c ompare d to those of his co-de fenda nts, t h at he rece ived ineff ective

a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l, a nd that his ple a wa s no t int e lli g e ntl y a nd vo lun tari ly ma de . A publ ic advocat e, s ubsequently

appointed to re prese nt J enkins, filed a supple ment to J enkins’s orig inal motion, seeking relief

pursuant to Ky

. R. Civ. P . 60.02 (e) and (f ), base d on the alleg ed seve rity of J enki n s ’s sentenc e. The trial court de nied J enkins’s Ky . RCr 11.42 moti on, and held that he was barr ed fr om seeking relief under K y . R. Civ. P . 60.02. J enkins appe aled to the Court of A ppeals for the C ommonwealth of Kentucky

. Acc ording to that c ourt, J enkins argued, int e r a lia , that the t rial court misint erpr eted his ar g ument with respec t to th e d is p r o p o rti o n a te le n g th o f th e s e n te n c e an d

th e le g a li ty

o f h is c o n v ic ti o n o f

c r im in al sy ndication. The c ourt of appeals stated that upon a revie w of the tria l rec ord, it “fa il[ s] t o see w here the trial cour

t misi nterpre ted J enkins’ a rg ument,” but did not decline to addr ess the ar g ument J enkins claimed to have made be fore the trial cour t: that the con viction for cr iminal sy ndication was improper be cause the Commonwealth did not sustain its burden of showing that five or more pe rsons collaborated t o promote or e ng ag e in the commission of the cr ime. Specifica lly , J enkins argued thatNo. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

J enkins also ar g ued that his c ounsel was inef fec tive for f

ailing to move f

or a dire cted ve rdict 2 when the Commonwealth failed to “prove that the re quired e lements of cr iminal sy ndication wer e in place.” - 4 - “ther e ca nnot be a c onviction of ‘C ri minal Sy ndication’ whe n he wa s in fact the only defe ndant convicted in the prese nt case .” The Kentuck y Court of Appea ls affirme d the trial cour t, and the Supreme Court of Ke ntucky subsequently

denied discr etionary

revie w. Jenk ins fi le d a pe tit ion fo r a wr it of ha be a s cor pu s in fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt . In r e le va nt p a rt , J enkins argued that, first, “ it was improper f or the trial court to allow prosecution of Petitioner for

cr i m i n al s y

n d i ca t i o n wh en f

o u r ( 4 ) o f t h e f

i v e( 5 ) i n v o l v ed , h adt h ei r c ri m i n al s y n d i ca t i o n ch ar ge dismiss ed prior to Petitioner being found g uilty ,” sec ond, “it is prere quisite that all five(5) or more pe rs on s c ha

rg e d with c ri min a l sy

nd ic a tio n be c on vic te d or at a min imum still be le g a lly c ha rg e d w ith criminal sy

ndication bef

ore one or any can be convicted” of it, and thi rd, J enkins was “ not proved to be found guilty

bey ond a re asonable doubt beca use the Commonwealth fa iled to present e vidence that [any ] other than Petitioner was alleg ed to be par t of criminal sy

ndication, bec ause Petitioner wa s the only acc used to be found g uilty ” of the crime. The dist rict court treated the thre e ar g uments as p r e s e n ti n g e s s e n ti a ll y

o n e c la im , th a t Je n k in s ’ s “ c o n v ic ti o n w a s u n la w f u l u n d e r K e n tu c ky

la w .” 2 The district cour

t denied the petition on September 25, 2006. J enkins appe aled, a nd we g rante d a

cer tificate of appea lability

solely on the issue of whether “ther e was insufficient evidenc e to support his conviction for c riminal sy ndication bec ause he was the only person found g uilty of the off ense.” II ANo. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

- 5 - The district cour

t’s decision to deny

habea s corpus re lief is revie wed de novo

. Tucker v

. Palmer , 5 41 F .3 d 6 52 , 6 56 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) . U nd e r t he An tit e rr ori sm and

Ef fe c tiv e De a th P e na lty Act of 1996 (“AED PA”), a writ of habeas corpus shall not be gra nted unless a pe titioner shows that the state’s a djudication of the c laim “(1) r esulted in a de cision that was c ontrary to, or involved an

unrea sonable a

pplication of, cle arly

established Fe dera l la

w, as dete rmined by

the Supreme Court of t he United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was ba sed on an unr easona ble deter mination of the fa cts in light of the e vidence prese nted in the State court proce eding .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A state-c ourt dec ision is contrary to c lear ly established fede ral law if “the state court applies a rule that

c on tr a dic ts the g ov e rn ing law” a s se t fo rt h by the Sup re me Court , o r “ if the state c ourt

c on fr on ts a set of fa cts that are materia lly indisti ng uishable f

ro m a dec ision of th[ e] [ Supreme] Court and

never theless arrives at a

[di ffe rent] result.” W

illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). “ A state -c ourt

de c isi on is an un re a so na

ble a pp lic a tio n of cl e a rl y e sta

bli sh e d fe de ra l la

w i f i t c or re c tly identifies the g overningleg al rule but applies it unrea sonably to the fac ts of a par

ticular prisone r’s

case .” Tucker , 5 41 F .3 d at 65 6 ( qu otatio n ma rk s and c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Mo re ov e r, “ [a]v oid ingthe se pitfalls does not require [a state court’s] citation of [S upreme Court] case s – indeed, it does not eve n require awa

rene ss of our ca ses, so long as neither the re asoning nor the re s u l t o f the state-c ourt decision contra dicts them.” Early v. Pac ker , 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). B J enkins claims that the Kentuc ky courts unre asonably

applied the e stablished principle of fe de ra l la w that a state c ourt may no t c on vic t a de fe nd a nt “ e xce pt up on pr oo f be y on d a re a so na ble doubt of every fac t nece ssary to constitute the crime which he is charg ed,” In re W ins hip , 3 97 U. S.No. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

- 6 - 358, 364 (1970). Proof be y ond a re asonable doubt was impossible as a m att er of law, Jenkins argues, bec ause a

defe ndant may

not be convic ted of “ a cr ime requiringthe par ticipation of more than one indivi dual – such as criminal sy ndication – if the other

participa nts have be en ac quitted or have be en discha

rg ed under

circ umstances amounting to an a cquittal.” Appe llant’s Br . at 12. The Kentucky law that alleg edly made proof bey ond a reasonable doubt leg ally impossibl e is that state’s codification of the common-law Rule of Consist ency . The codified Kentucky rule states that “[a] defe ndant ca

nnot be convicte d of conspira cy if all of his co-c onspirators h av e b ee n acquitted or discharged under c ircumstances am ounting to an acquittal .” Ky

. R ev . Stat. Ann. § 506.070(3) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Jenkin s a sse rt s th a t th e a lle g e dly un c on dit ion a l di smi ssa l of the c ri min a lsy ndication cha

rg e in ea ch of his c o-def

endant’ s plea ag ree ments constituted a “discha rg e[] under circ umstances amounting to an a cquittal.” Thus, he c oncludes, unde r Ke ntucky ’s Rule of Consist ency , the charg e of c riminal sy ndication ag ainst him was leg ally insufficient, a

nd should not have be en submitted to the jury

. “Unde r the W

ins hip de c isi on , it is cl e a r that a stat e pr iso ne r wh o a lle g e s th a t th e e vid e nc e in support of his state convic tion cannot be f airly char acte rized as sufficie nt to have led a rational trier of fa ct to find g uilt beyond a rea sonable doubt ha s stated a f eder al constitutional claim.” Jack son v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979). The d i s t ri ct cour t determined, how ever , that J enkins’s ins uf fi c ie nc y -o f- e vid e nc e c la im a mou nte d to a n a sse rt ion that “ the c ourt s o f K e ntu c ky imp ro pe rl y applied or inter

prete d Ky . Rev. Stat. 506.120(3),” and that “[a] feder al cour t cannot issue a w rit of habea s corpus on the ba sis of a per ceived error of state law.” Jenk ins v. Dailey , 2 00 6 U .S. Di st. L EXI S 73477, at *3 (W.D. Ky . Sept. 22, 2006) (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted).No. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

- 7 - A challen g e to th e s u f

f ic ie n c y o f e v id e n c e f

o r a s tate c o n v ic ti o n n e c e s s a r il y in v o lve s examining state lawto some ext ent. As the Supreme Court expl ained in Jack son , in considering

su c h c la ims , “ the re le va

nt qu e sti on is wh e the r, a ft e r vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t f a vo ra ble to t he pr os e c uti on , a

ny ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e es se nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Jack son , 4 43 U. S. at 31 9. Th is sta nd a rd “ mus t be a

pp lie d w ithe xplic it ref ere nce to the substantive e lements of the c riminal offe nse as defined by state law .” Jack son , 443 U.S. at 32 4 n.16 (empha sis added). H oweve r, if the of fense is not clearly

define d by

state law or interpre ted by

state cour ts, a n attempt to inter

pret state law by a fede ral court risks “intru[ding] upon the power of the States to def

ine cr iminal offense s,” ibi d

. See Sherrill v. Nicholson , 545 F. Supp. 573, 575 (W.D. Ky . 1982) (“ I t is ordinarily not the province of [ a federa l court] to interpret c riminal statut e s; h ow e ve r, wh e n a statut e is cl e a r on its fa c e , inte rp re ta tio n by the hig he st c ourt of the state is unnece ssary .”) Th us , i n e a c h o f t h e c a s e s w h e r e f e d e r a l c o u rt s r e v i e w e d a s t a t e c o n v i c t i o n a lle g e d to contra dict the fe dera l law of W ins hip and Jack

son i n h ab ea s p roce eding s, the inquiry into the sufficie n c y o f e v id e n c e r e qu ir e d n o in te r p r e tati o n o f s tate la

w : th e e le me n ts o f th e o f f e n se of

con v i ct i on wer e cle ar, or prior dec isions by

highe st state courts author itatively resolved a

ny

a mb igu it y . I n Jack

son , the Su

pr e me Court

c on sid e re d th e su ff

ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e to s up po rt

a finding of “spe cific intent,” which wa s indisputably an ele ment of first-de g ree murder unde r Vi rg ini a law. 44 3 U.S. a t 324- 25

. Mo re ov e r, the ru le of law a pp lic a ble to t he pe tit ion e r’ s c la im i n J a c k s on

– t h at s p ec i fic intent “ma y be for med at the moment of the commission of the unlawful act,” and nee d not be harbored for any particula r l eng th of t ime – was “well settled” a nd aff irmedNo. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

- 8 - by Virg inia’s high es t co u rt
. Ib id

. (c i t i n g Com mo nwe alt h v . B ro wn , 90 Va. 671, 673 ( Va. 1894) ). Se e als o D ix on v . M

oo re , 318 F. App’ x 316, 321-22 (6th Cir. 2008) (r eviewingan insufficienc y -of- evidenc e cla im with reg ard to an element of felony murder, where it “is undisputed that, u nd e r Oh io law, pr oximate c a us a tio n is a n e sse nti a l e le me nt of fe lony mur de r, ” “ [n]e ith e r p a rt

y disag ree s with this conclusion,” and a “ state cour t’s interpre tation of stat e l aw ” b ound the fe dera l

c ourt ); Tucker v . Palmer , 54 1 F .3 d 65 2, 65 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 8) ; Brown v. Palmer , 441 F.3d 347, 351 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) ; Ho

ps on v . F olt z , 818 F.2d 866, 1987 U.S. App. L EXI S 6596, at *4 (6th Cir. May 20, 1987) (table ) (

per curiam ); Sh e rri ll , 545 F. Supp. at 575. B y c on tr a st, wh e n a

ha be a s p e tit ion

is p re dic a te d u

po n ju st o ne of

se ve ra l pla

us ibl e interpre tations of underlying state l aw, feder al courts have declined to revie w s tate convic tions on insufficienc y -of–e vidence g rounds. The Seven t h C i rcuit’s reasoning in Curtis v. Mongtome ry is ins tr uc tiv e . 5 52 F .3 d 5 78 (7 th C ir . 2 00 9)

. Th e ha be a s pet iti on e r in tha t ca se c la ime d th a t th e state of I llinois did not prove eve ry element of

“ag g ravated stalking ” beyond a reasonable doubt: under I llinois law, “a g g ravated stalking ” re quired showing that an acc used “plac es another person unde r

surv e ill anc e ,” wh ic h w a s d e fi ne d to mea n “r e ma ini ng pr e se nt out sid e ” the vic tim ’s ho me , s c ho ol, or vehic le. Id. at 581. The pe titioner claimed that “ the State’s evide nce e stablished that he wa s

arr ested as he was approaching [victim’] s car , and thus, that he c ould not possibl y have ‘ remained ’ outside of it” for a

ny appre ciable pe riod of time. Ib id

. (empha sis added)

. The state appellate court disag ree d and upheld his convic tion, noting that the question of whether the “brie f period Curtis was

near [vi ctim’s] car . . . constituted surve illance” was a question for the jury

. Id . at 582 (interna l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) . T he Se ve nth Cir c uit he ld t hat th e peti tio ne r w a s “ imp e rm iss ibl yNo. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

Ev e n f a c e d w itha

state law that ha s b e e n a uth or itativ e ly

int e rp re te d b y

a state ’s hig he st 3 court, the Supre me Court has at times bee n reluc tant to base its dispositi on of a ha beas c laim on that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h e n t h e s t a t e c o u rt d i d n o ts p e c i f

y w h e t h e r i t s a u t h o r i t a t i v e c o n s t r

u c t i o n h a d

a l w a ys been the law or was a new interpre tation of the law. Fi or e v . W hit e , 528 U.S. 23, 24-25 (1999) . The petitioner in Fi or e soug ht to have his state convic tion set a s i d e o n t h e b as is of a law that the Pennsy lvania Supreme Court has i nterpre ted i n a manner favorable to his claim after his conviction beca me final. The Supreme Court dec l i n ed t o rule on the me rits of Fiore ’s habe as petition and inv ok e d th e state ’s c e rt if

ic a tio n pro c e dure , expla ini ng that “ pr e vio us ly , Pe nn sylva nia ’s low e r c ourt s ha d b e e n d ivi de d in

the ir inte rp re ta tio n, ” a nd it r e ma ine d unc le a r “ wh e the r t he Pe nn sylva

nia Sup re me Court ’s [ne w] co ns tr uc tio n of the statut e . . . sta te d th e c or re c t un de rs tand ingof

the statut e at the time Fior e’s c onviction beca me final, or w hether

it chang ed the inter

pretation then applicable.” Id . at 28-29. - 9 - a tte mpt ingto use a pe tit ion fo r a wr it of ha be a s cor pu s to pre ss his pr e fe rr e d inte rp re ta tio n of I lli no is law” a s to the me a nin g of “ re ma ini ngpr e se nt, ” a nd that his cla im wa s non e the mor e c og niza ble in fede ral c ourt if “r eca st[ ] . . . as [ a] challeng e[] to a st ate court’s application of Jack son .” Id . at 582. I t is evident that fede ral courts cannot entertain a collater al attack on a st ate conviction that

re qu ir e s a

fo ra y int o ambi g uo us or un se ttl e d a re a s o f s ta te law. An d K e ntu c ky ’s c ri min a l- 3 sy ndication statute ca

nnot be fairly char acte rized as unambig uous or settled. I n particula r, Jenkins’s argument relies on thre e cr ucial – and c ontentious – interpretations of Kentucky law. F ir st, Jenk ins a sse rt s tha t “c on sp ir a c y ” is a re qu ir e d e le me nt o f c ri min a l sy nd ic a tio n, bu t th is is fa r fr om c le a r fr om the pla in te xt o f t he statut e . T he statut e make s “ any of the fo llo wi ng ” a c ri me wh e n don e “ wi th the purp os e to es ta bli sh or ma int a in a cr imi na l sy nd ic a te or to fa c ili ta te a ny of its activities”: (a) Organize or participate in organizing a c ri min a l sy

nd ic a te or a ny of its a c tiv iti e s; (b) Provide mate rial aid to a c ri min a l sy

nd ic a te or a ny of its a c tiv iti e s, wh e the r suc h aid is in t he fo rm of mon e y or oth e r p ro pe rt

y , o r c re dit ;No. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

Under Ke n tucky

law, “[a] person havingthe intention of promoting or fac ilitating the 4 comm is s io n o f

a c r im e is g u il ty

o f c r im in a l c o n s p ir a c y

w h e n h e : ( a ) A g r e e s w it

h o n e ( 1 ) o r

more persons that at least one (1) of them will eng ag e in conduct constituting that crime or an attempt or solicitation to commi t such a c rime; or (b) Ag ree s to aid one or more persons in the planningor commission of t hat crime or an attempt or sol icitation to commit such a crime.” K y . Rev. Stat. Ann. § 506.040. - 10 - (c) Ma nage

, s up e rv ise

, o r d ire c t any of the a ctivities of a criminal sy ndicate, at any level of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y; (d) Kno win gl

y fur nis h leg al, ac counting , or other ma nag eria l service s to a criminal sy ndicate; (e) Commi t, or conspire or attempt to commit, or act as an acc omplice i n the commission of, any of fe ns e of a ty pe in w hic h a

c ri min a l sy

nd ic a te e ng a g e s o n a

c on tin uin g ba sis ; (f) Commi t, or conspire or attempt to commit or act a s an ac complice in the commissi on of, any offe nse of violenc e; or (g ) C ommit, or conspire or attempt to commit , or ac t as an a ccomplice in the commission of bribery

. . . . § 5 06 .1 20 (1 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . Onl y thr e e of the se ve n cr imi na l ac tiv iti e s th a t c on sti tut e the of fe ns e expli citly mention conspirac y ; and even there , a conspiracy is a requirement only as an a lternative t o commission of the act (i.e . “commit, or c o n s p ir e ” )

. T h e f ir s t f o u r p r e d ic a te a c ts , e mp hasized above, do not r equire a conspira cy on their fa ce. Nor c an it be said that the de finition of “cr iminal sy ndicate” unambig uously

makes conspirac y

an esse ntia l el em en t of the off ense. A“‘c riminal sy

ndicate’ means five (5) or more persons c ollaborating to promote or eng ag e in any o f t h e fo l lowing on a continuing ba sis.”

“ Col la bo ratio n, ” wh ic h is no t de fi ne d in the statut e , ma

y me a n “ c on sp ir a c y .” Ho we ve r, it may we ll 4

m ea ns o m et h i n g el s e, ev en i f o n l y fo r t h e r ea s o n t h at t h e d ra ft er s ch o s e t o em p l o y “c o l l ab o ra t i n g”No. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

For example, one pra ctice ma nual desc ribes a c riminal sy ndicate a s “a c riminal network of 5 some sort, more loosely c onnecte d than ‘conspiracy ,’ but conne cted none theless.” 1-7 Georg e G. Seelig , Kentucky Criminal L aw and Procedur e § 7-6 (empha sis added). See also Commonwealth v. Phillips , 655 S.W .2d 6, 9 (Ky

. 1983) (“The collaboration in the statute means simply collaborating in the scheme , and it is not necessa ry for the Commonwea lth t o s h o w t h at ea ch par ticipant collaborating in the sc heme c o l l ab o rated with or even w as aw are of the c ollaboration of the othe r participa nts.”). J enkins relies on a Kentucky Supreme Court ca se, Br e we r v . Co mm on we alt h , 206 S.W .3d 6 313, 320 (Ky . 2006), to support his c ontention that conspirac y is an eleme nt of criminal sy ndication. Appellant’s Rep. B r. at 9. In Brewer , t h e cour t held that a stateme nt admitted at trial was a n exception f

r o m th e h e a r s a y r

u le b e c a u s e it w a s ma d e b y a c o - c o n s p ir a to r a n d th e a p p e ll a n t was convicted of

criminal sy

ndication, “whic h require s a conspiracy of five or more pe rsons.” Ib id

. We ar e n o t p e r s u a d e d tha t the B r ew er court mea

nt to identify

the essential e lements of the of fense of criminal sy

ndication. I n that case , a co n s pirac y was in fa ct prove n bey ond a re asonable doubt; at most, thi s sugg ests that conspirac y is one manner

of collaborating for the pur poses of c riminal sy ndication, and wa s the manner of collabor ation proven by the Commonwealth in that case

. Ib id

.

- 11 - rathe r than “ conspiring .” J enkins does not identify , nor ca n we l o ca t e, any

state dec isions that 5

c l e ar l y i d e n t i f

y all the e sse nti a l ele me nts of the c ri min a l- sy

nd ic a tio n o ff

e ns e . I nd e e d, § 5 06 .1 20 is 6 de sc r i b e d a s s o “ s i g n i f

i c a n t l y [d i f

f e r e n t ] f r o m R I C O t h a t t h e e xt e n s i v e c a s e l a w o n t h a t st a tut e provides ver

y littl e g uidance on what constitutes ‘e ng ag ing in or g anized crime’ in Kentucky ,” and, beca use only “[a] few dec isions have bee n rende red on the statute, . . . much re mains to be resolve d befor e the c overa g e of this offe nse is clea r.” 1- 7 Geor ge G. S ee l i g, Kentucky Criminal L aw a

nd Procedur e § 7-6. Mor eover , even if conspirac y wer e required to prove the exis tence of a criminal sy ndicate, a plain re ad i n g of the statute sug g ests that a def endant may

be convic ted of c riminal sy ndication when he formed no c onspiratorial re lationship with an y one – if, for example, he provided “material aid” or “ service s” to a sy ndicate, of

which he is not par

t. See § 506.120(1)( b), (d).No. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

- 12 - Second, Jenkins arg ues that Ke ntucky ’s codifie d Rule of Consistency , Ky . Rev. Code. Ann. § 5 06 .0 70 (3 ), a

pp lie s to a ll c ri me s o f w hic h c on sp ir a c y is an e sse nti a l e le me nt. Th is p ro po sit ion is not obvious from a plain re ading of the provision, which states that “[a] defendant c annot be convicted of c onspiracy i f all of his co-conspirator s have be en ac quitted or dischar g ed under circ umstances amounting to an a cquittal.” J enkins argues t hat t he legislative hist ory of § 506.070(3) “shows plainly ” that it applies to “a ny cr i me if conspira cy

is an essential e lement of that c rime.” Ap pe lla nt’ s Re p. B r. a t 7. Jenk ins ’s a c c ount of the le g isl a tiv e his tor y be hin d the statut e may

we ll be cor rec t. Nonethel es s , this is not the cour t before which that ar g ument oug ht to be made, a nd J enkins points us to no authoritative decision by a Kentucky court a dopting the inter

pretation of the Rule of Consistency

that he urg es. See Fiorev . W hit e , 5 28 U. S. 2 3, 28 -2 9 ( 19 99 ); Estelle v. Mc Gu ire , 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). J enkins’s third asser

tion is no m ore se ttled under Ke ntucky law than the first t wo. J enkins

ar g u e s th a t h is c o - d e f

e n d a n ts ’ p le a

a g r e e me n ts d is mi s s e d

th e c r im in a l- s y

n d ic a ti o n c h a r g e s u n d er circ umstances amounting to ac quittal because none of the co- defe ndants pleade d g uilty to a lesser included offe nse, none “suff ere d any penalty , none has a sy ndication or re lated cha

rg e on her rec ord,

and no ne ri sk

fa c ingtho se c ha

rges aga in. ” Ap pe lla

nt’ s B r. a t 13 . Ins of

a r a s K e ntu c ky ’s hig he st court c onfronted this issue, its resolution is not favora ble to J enkins’s cla im. I n Commonwealth v. Sego , the Kentuc ky

Supreme Court held that § 506.070(3) does not war rant a direc ted ver dict of not g uilty on a conspira cy

char g e whe n a co- defe ndant pleads out of the conspirac y char g e. 872 S.W .2d 441, 444 (Ky . 1994). That c ourt held that “me rely beca use a c odefe ndant co u l d not be furthe rNo. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

- 13 - prosec uted for c onspiracy did not mean t hat t here was not a conspiracy betwee n . . . [defendant a nd co-de fenda

nt] war ranting an instruction on conspira cy . . . . W e do not believe the leg islature intended the r efe renc e to ‘a cquittal ’ u n d er KR S 506.070(3) to mean a neg otiated plea w here the

co-c onspirator testifies at trial to participation in the conspira cy . I t is a more consistent interpre tation to believe that se ction (3) wa s adopted mer ely to preve nt inconsistent verdicts.” Ib id

. J en k i n s ar gu es t h at t h e “ i m m u n i t y fr o m p ro s ec u t i o n ” a n d

a p l ea t o a l es s er -i n cl u d edch ar ge in the pl ea ag ree ment in Sego are distinguishable from the unconditional dismissal and an alleg ed immunit y from re-prose cution g rante d to J enkins’s co- defe ndants. “[A] sweeping rule pre cluding application of K

RS 506.070(3) in all plea-ba rg ain situations would not take into account the va rious t yp e s o f a g r e e m e n t s t h a tm i g h tb e r e a c h e d , ” J e n k i n s a r g u e s . A p p e l l a n t ’ s B r . a t 1 5

. B e t h a t a s i tm a y, no fede ral c onstitut ional law would be violate d by a state’ s adoption of such a n interpre tation of the Rule of Consistency

– in view of the fac t that a state is not constitutionally require d to adopt such a rule at all. See Ha rri

s v . R iv e ra , 454 U.S. 339, 34 6 (1 9 8 1 ) (h o l d i n g that “[i] nconsistency in a verdic t is not a sufficient re ason for setting it a side” in a fede ral habea s corpus proce eding ). Whether

and ho w K e ntu c ky

a pp lies a ru le tha t a ff or ds c ri min a l de fe nd a nts pr ote c tio ns be y on d w hat is constitutionally

require d is the province of state law. Ev e n if Jenk ins ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f K e ntu c ky law we re the mos t com pe lli ng of the po ssi ble

a lte rn a tiv e s, the state c ourt ’s fa ilure to c ome to t he same c on c lus ion

is at mo st a

n e rr on e ou s sy

nth e sis of state law . A fa ilure to apply , or even identify , a state rule of consistency does not contradic t the g overninglaw of Jack

son and W

ins hip

. Se e Sm ith v . S

owd e rs , 848 F.2d 735, 738-39 (6th Cir. 1988)No. 06-6444

J enkins v. Dailey

- 14 - (holding that “a c laim of a fe dera l constituti onal violation that is based on an alleg ed misapplication of a state -a do pte d s ing le larc e ny ru le c a nn ot be su sta ine d, ” be c a us e “ [t]he a do pti on

of a sin g le larc eny doctrine is strictly

a matter of st ate law,” and “the application of that doctrine , or the re fusal to apply it to a given set of facts is a matter to be resolved by state courts” (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted)). We conclude that, as did the petitioner in Cur tis , Jen kin s is “ imp e rm iss ibl y a tte mpt ing to u se a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus to press his pre fer red inter pretation of [s tate] law,” 552 F .3d at 582, notwithstanding the attempt to r eca st it as a challeng e to a state cour t’s application of W

ins hip and Jack son . III Fo r th e r e a s o n s s tate d a

b o v e , w e A F F I RM th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f th e writ of habe as corpus.