alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-40495

Summary Calendar

CHARLIE RAY TAYLOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President,

United States, ET AL.

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Texas

(9:95-CV-375)

January 30, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Charlie Ray Taylor, Texas prisoner # 334319, appeals the

district court’s denial of his motion for relief from the district

court’s judgment. Because Taylor does not raise any arguments

concerning the district court’s dismissal of his complaint or the

district court’s denial of his motion, he has abandoned the only

issue before this court. S ee Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy

Sheriff Abner

, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, the2

district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Taylor’s

a ction for failure to comply with the court’s order to file an

a mended complaint and did not abuse its discretion in deny ing

Taylor’s motion for relief from the judgment. S ee Carimi v. Royal

Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc. , 959 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. 1992).

Taylor’s appeal i s without arguable merit and is thus frivolous.

See Howard v. King

, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983).

Therefore, Taylor’s appeal is DISMISSED. 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

The district court stated in its memorandum opinion that at

least two prior actions filed by Taylor have been dismissed as

frivolous, and Taylor does not challenge this statement. Because

on at least two occasions in addition to this frivolous appeal,

Taylor has brought an action or appeal in a United States court

that was dismissed as frivolous, Taylor is BARRED from proceeding

IFP under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See Adepegba

v. Hammons

, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Taylor

may not proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is

in prison unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical

injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

APPEAL DISMISSED; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) SANCTION IMPOSED.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 21, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-41420 Conference Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee v. REYNALDO HERNANDEZ-HERNANDEZ Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:06-CR-316-ALL Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The attorne

y appointed to represent Reynaldo Hernandez-Hernandez (Hernandez) has moved for leave towithdrawand has filed a briefin accordance with Anders v. Cali fornia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Hernandez filed a motion for appointment ofappellate counsel in the district court, which was transferred to this court. Our independent review of the record, counsel’s brief, and Hernandez’s motion discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly,No. 06-41420

2 counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel i s excused from further responsibilities herein, Hernandez’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR. R. 42.2.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-2034

MUZIO B. ROBERTO; MARY K. ROBERTO, Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus ROSALYN BELL, Circuit Court Judge, Montgomery County, Maryland; VINCENT FERRETTI, Circuit Court Judge, Montgomery County, Maryland; ANN HARRINGTON, Circuit Court Judge, Montgomery County, Maryland; PAUL WEINSTEIN, Circuit Court Judge, Montgomery County, Maryland;LOUISE SCRIVNER, Circuit Court Judge, Montgomery County, Maryland, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (CA-00-1438-AW) Submitted: February 21, 2002 Decided: March 4, 2002 Before WILKINS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Muzio B. Roberto, Mary K. Roberto, Appellants Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Muzio B. Roberto and Mary K. Roberto appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion to reconsider a prior order dismissing their civil action against several Maryland state courtjudges. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Roberto v. Bell , No. CA-00-1438- AW (D. Md. July 12, 2001). We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Henry W. Cromwell, as Administrator, etc., Respondent, v. Henry Hall, Appellant.

Judgment reversed, with costs.—

Brown, P. J.:

The notice of appeal, not containing any demand for a new trial, raised questions of law only, and it was the respondent’s duty, if there was any other evidence than that contained in the appeal book, to have caused such evidence to be inserted in the justice’s return. *(Halpin*v. *Phenix Insurance*Co., 116 N. Y. 165.) The justice’s return, however, states that it contains all the testimony given on the trial, and the question presented is whether there is any evidence to support the verdict. The testimony in the justice’s return does not show any indebtedness of tbe defendant to the plaintiff, and it is absolutely impossible on any view of the case to ascertain how the jury arrived at their verdict. The judgment is wholly unsupported by the testimony, and as we cannot, upon the record before us, indulge in any presumption in the respondent’s favor, it should be reversed.

Dykman and Pratt, JJ., concurred.
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EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. 1350)



In connection with the Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q of Wells Real Estate Fund I (the Registrant) for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), the undersigned, Leo F. Wells, III, Chief
Executive Officer of the corporate General Partner of the Registrant, and Douglas P. Williams, Chief Financial Officer of the corporate General Partner of the Registrant, hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(18 U.S.C. 1350), that, to the best of our knowledge and belief:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                          
|--------------------------
|/s/    LEO F. WELLS, III  
|Leo F. Wells, III         
|Chief Executive Officer   
|November 14, 2005         
|                          
|/s/    DOUGLAS P. WILLIAMS
|Douglas P. Williams       
|Chief Financial Officer   
|November 14, 2005
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EXHIBIT 10.13

                         PROMISSORY NOTE

$300,000.00                                      March 22,  2002


     FOR  VALUE  RECEIVED, Detwiler, Mitchell & Co.,  a  Delaware
corporation  ("Maker"), promises to pay to JAMES  H.  GRAVES,  an
individual  ("Holder"), at Boston, Massachusetts,  the  principal
sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($300,000.00) plus interest
thereon  at  a  rate of 10% per annum from the date hereof  until
paid on the terms set forth below.

Maturity  Date.  The unpaid balance of this Note and all  accrued
but unpaid interest shall be due and payable on May 22, 2003 (the
"Term").

Prepayment.   Maker  reserves  the right  to  prepay  the  unpaid
principal  balance  and  any accrued  interest,  or  any  portion
thereof, at any time without penalty.  Each such payment shall be
credited  first  to interest then accrued and  the  remainder  to
principal, and interest shall thereupon cease upon the  principal
so credited.

Security.  Holder  shall  have  a security  interest  in  certain
securities  listed  on Scheduled 1 (attached hereto)  until  such
time  as Maker fulfills its obligations under this Note or Holder
purchases  said securities pursuant to its option of Acceleration
(defined below),

Acceleration.   Holder, upon three (3) business  days  notice  to
Maker,  at  its  sole discretion for any reason  whatsoever,  may
purchase  the  Schedule 1 securities, said purchase resulting  in
the  cancellation of the obligation of Maker to pay the principle
and  accumulated interest of this Note. If Maker  had  previously
remitted  to  Holder any portion of the principle or  accumulated
interest  pursuant  to  the Prepayment  clause  above  then  upon
Acceleration Holder shall remit to Maker any such prepayment.  If
prior to expiration of said 3 business days this note is paid  in
full, Holder's Acceleration Option shall terminate.

No  Assignment.   Neither Maker nor Holder shall be  entitled  to
assign,  pledge,  transfer or otherwise convey  the  benefits  or
burdens  of  this Note without the prior written consent  of  the
other, except that any entity acquiring all or substantially  all
of  the assets or stock of Maker shall automatically acquire  the
burdens of this Note and Maker shall thereupon be released of its
obligations hereunder, all without Holder's consent.

DETWILER, MITCHELL & CO.           James H. Graves

a Delaware corporation

By: /s/ Stephen Z. Frank	By: /s/ James H. Graves
   -----------------------          ---------------------

DO  NOT DESTROY THIS ORIGINAL NOTE: When paid, this Note must  be
surrendered to Maker for cancellation and retention.

<PAGE>

                           SCHEDULE 1




Cierra Photonics                        100,000

Ion Optics                              100,000

Protedyne                                50,000

Media Point                              50,000



<PAGE>
sjdocs-7222689v133116_paltar.htm - Generated by SEC Publisher for SEC Filing



 


PROMISSORY NOTE


US$188,483.00                                                                                                                  
March 31, 2016


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, PALTAR
NATION LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (the “Borrower”), promises to pay to the
order of DAVID N. SIEGEL REVOCABLE TRUST 2009 (the “Lender”)
the principal sum of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND
EIGHTY-THREE DOLLARS (US$188,483.00) in
lawful currency of the United States (the “Principal Sum”), together
with interest thereon as herein provided.


The Principal Sum or such amount as shall
remain outstanding from time to time and shall bear interest, thereon,
calculated daily, at a rate of ten percent (10%) per annum as of the
issue dates stated in the attached Schedule “A”.  In the event of any partial
repayment made on the Principal Sum, such payments shall be applied firstly
towards accrued interest and then towards the Principal Sum.


The Principal Sum and all accrued and unpaid
interest at the rate aforesaid will become due and payable on March 31, 2017
(the “Term”).  Extension of time of payment of all or any part of the
amount owing hereunder at any time or times and failures of the Lender to
enforce any of their rights or remedies hereunder shall not release the
Borrower from its obligations hereunder or constitute a waiver of the rights of
the Lender to enforce any rights and remedies therein.


On default in payment of any sum due
hereunder for the Principal Sum or interest or after 15 days’ notice of Default
to the Borrower, the unpaid balance of the Principal Sum and all accrued
interest thereon shall at the option of the Lender forthwith become due and
payable.


This Promissory Note shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Delaware.


The undersigned will have the privilege of prepaying in whole or
in part the Principal Sum and accrued interest.


Presentment, protest, notice of protest and
notice of dishonour are
hereby waived.


 


DAVID N. SIEGEL REVOCABLE TRUST 2009 PALTAR
NATION LIMITED PARTNERSHIP


 


/s/
David N. Siegel,                                                 /s/
John R. Hislop                                            

DAVID N. SIEGEL, Trustee                                   JOHN R. HISLOP,
President


 








 

SCHEDULE “A”


 


	
  Issue Date

  	
  Principal Amount

  
	
  10/14/15

  	
  $6,000.00

  
	
  10/26/15

  	
  $1,332.00

  
	
  01/08/16

  	
  $20,000.00

  
	
  02/07/16

  	
  $71.00

  
	
  02/17/16

  	
  $50,000.00

  
	
  02/17/16

  	
  $20,000.00

  
	
  02/19/16

  	
  $2,530.00

  
	
  03/23/16

  	
  $3,550.00

  
	
  03/30/16

  	
  $85,000.00

  
	
  TOTAL

  	
  $188,483.00
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-2308
CLAUDE HOSCH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusBANDAG, INCORPORATED; GRANVILLE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT; CHEMICAL RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, Defendants - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. (CA-95-1083-5-BR) Submitted: December 11, 1997 Decided: December 24, 1997 Before HALL and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Claude Hosch, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Gray Styers, Jr., KILPATRICK STOCKTON, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Claude Hosch appeals the district court's order dismissing Defendants Granville County Superior Court and Chemical Residential Mortgage Company as frivolous, and granting summary judgment to Bandag on Hosch's state law claims for fraud, financial harassment,and clerical misprision. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Hosch v. Bandag , No. CA-95-1083-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5061 

To amend the Federal Credit Union Act to exclude extensions of credit 

made to veterans from the definition of a member business loan. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 10, 2014 

Mr. MILLER of Florida introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Credit Union Act to exclude extensions of credit made to veterans from the definition 

of a member business loan. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. MEMBER BUSINESS LOAN DEFINITION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 107A(c) of the Federal 

5 Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1757a(c)) is amended— 

6 (1) in paragraph (1)(B)— 

7 (A) in clause (iv), by striking ‘‘or’’ at the 

8 end; 

9 (B) in clause (v), by striking the period 

10 and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5061 IH

1 (C) by adding at the end the following: 

2 ‘‘(vi) made to a veteran;’’; 

3 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

4 end; 

5 (3) in paragraph (3), by striking the period and 

6 inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

7 (4) by adding at the end the following: 

8 ‘‘(4) the term ‘veteran’ has the meaning given 

9 such term under section 101 of title 38, United 

10 States Code.’’. 

11 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

12 subsection (a) shall take effect after the end of the 6- 

13 month period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

14 this Act. 

Æ 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of MidSouth Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”)
on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2008 (the “Report”), I, J. E.
Corrigan, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify
that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.





/s/ J.E.
Corrigan, Jr.


________________________


J. E.
Corrigan, Jr.


Chief
Financial Officer


August 7,
2008
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 24, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-10511

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

THOMAS REEDY; JANICE REEDY,

Defendants-Appellants.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC Nos. 4:00-CR-54-1-Y

 4:00-CR-54-2-Y

--------------------

Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Thomas and Janice Reedy appeal the sentences imposed

following remand to the district court for resentencing. The

Government argues that Janice Reedy’s notice of appeal was

untimely filed. Janice Reedy contends that the two appeals have

been consolidated and that the notice of appeal is timely because

it was filed within 10 days of the last entered judgment, which

is the judgment against Thomas Reedy. 
No. 03-10511

-2-

A timely notice of appeal is a mandatory precondition to the

exercise of appellate jurisdiction. United States v. Winn, 948

F.2d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 1991). Pursuant to FED. R. APP. P.

4(b)(1)(A)(i), the time for filing a notice of appeal runs from

“the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed.” 

Because Janice Reedy is appealing from the judgment entered

against her, her argument is without merit, and her notice of

appeal is untimely. 

A district court may grant a defendant an additional 30 days

in which to file a notice of appeal upon a showing of good cause

or excusable neglect. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(4). Because

Janice Reedy’s notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the

time for filing a timely notice of appeal, it should be construed

as a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal. See

United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1984). 

Accordingly, the appeals are held in abeyance, and Janice

Reedy’s case is REMANDED to the district court for a finding

under FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(4). Id. Upon making the finding, the

district court shall promptly return the case to this court for

dismissal or further proceedings, as may be appropriate. 

REMANDED; APPEALS HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING REMAND.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 6692** 

MICHAEL JEROME WILLIAMS , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. JOHN R. NEWHART, Sheriff; LT. SMITH; LT. WHITE , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk
. Rebecca Beach Smith , Chief District Judge. ( 2:12

- cv - 00150

- RBS

- TEM )

Submitted : June 14, 2012 Decided: June 20, 2012

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Michael Jerome Williams, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Michael Jerome Williams appeals the district court ’ s orde r denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (200 6 ) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. Williams v. Newhart , No. 2:12

- cv - 00150

- RBS

- TEM (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 20 12) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED