2017 UT App 11

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

LANDIN DEE MOOSMAN,

Appellant.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20150588-CA

Filed January 12, 2017

Third District Court, West Jordan Department

The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck

No. 151400319

Joanna E. Landau and Daniel M. Torrence, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Jeanne B. Inouye, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Memorandum Decision, in 

which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and STEPHEN L. ROTH

concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Landin Dee Moosman pleaded guilty to violating a 

protective order, resulting in his third conviction for that offense.

While Moosman requested “another chance to go back on 

probation,” the district court imposed a term of imprisonment 

and revoked Moosman’s probation for his prior offenses. 

Moosman appeals, asserting that the district court’s sentencing 

decision was inherently unfair and based on irrelevant and 

unreliable information. We affirm.

¶2 In 2013 a woman (Mother) obtained a protective order 

against Moosman, with whom she shares a child. The protective 
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20150588-CA 2 2017 UT App 11

order contained a condition, to which Moosman and Mother

stipulated, that they would not communicate except for text 

messages regarding their child. Moosman violated that 

provision several times by sending text messages to Mother 

about subjects other than their child. In 2014 Moosman twice 

pleaded guilty to violating a protective order, both third degree 

felonies. The two resulting sentences were suspended in favor of 

probation. In 2015, while on probation for those offenses, 

Moosman again sent text messages to Mother regarding subjects 

other than their child. Moosman subsequently pleaded guilty to 

violating a protective order, again a third degree felony.

¶3 At sentencing the district court revoked Moosman’s 

probation for his two prior offenses and imposed both 

previously suspended sentences, which were for indeterminate 

prison terms not to exceed five years. For the latest offense, 

Moosman was likewise sentenced to prison for an indeterminate

term not to exceed five years. All three sentences were to run 

concurrently. On appeal, Moosman asserts that the district court 

abused its discretion by imposing “a prison sentence over 

probation.”1

¶4 “We have traditionally afforded trial courts wide latitude 

and discretion in sentencing, recognizing that they are best 

situated to weigh the many intangibles of character, personality 

and attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling.” State 

v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 58, 191 P.3d 17 (citations and internal 

 

1. Moosman does not distinguish between the district court’s 

imposition of a prison term for the latest offense, and the court’s 

revocation of probation and imposition of the previously 

suspended sentences. We need not address those differences in 

posture because Moosman’s arguments otherwise fail on appeal. 

Thus, we follow Moosman’s lead and treat all three sentences 

similarly. 
State v. Moosman

20150588-CA 3 2017 UT App 11

quotation marks omitted). A trial court’s sentencing decision 

generally “will not be overturned unless it exceeds statutory or 

constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally 

relevant factors, or the actions of the judge were so inherently 

unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶ 59 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

¶5 Moosman first challenges the district court’s sentencing 

decision as inherently unfair and disproportionate to the 

allegedly “benign” conduct that gave rise to his three 

convictions. The offenses involved what Moosman deems 

relatively minor infractions. The latest violation was perhaps the 

most innocuous, and Moosman asserts he should have again 

been placed on probation. Moosman also points to other 

considerations that were before the district court and allegedly

weighed in favor of probation.

¶6 At sentencing the district court expressed concern over 

the difficulty of the situation, in which there was “no [really] 

good answer for anyone.” While Moosman presented the court 

with an explanation to downplay each violation—asserting that 

it “was a mistake” or that it “wasn’t a threat”—Moosman’s 

repeated violations of the protective order had put him before 

the court “time and time and time again.” Thus, following the 

recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) as

provided in its presentence report, the court imposed a term of 

imprisonment. 

¶7 “A defendant is not entitled to probation, but rather the 

trial court is empowered to place the defendant on probation if it 

thinks that will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible 

with the public interest.” State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, 

¶ 23, 82 P.3d 1167 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Although the district court could have taken a 

different approach and again placed Moosman on probation, the 

court’s sentencing decision was neither inherently unfair nor 
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20150588-CA 4 2017 UT App 11

disproportionate to the underlying conduct and thus did not 

constitute an abuse of discretion. Cf. State v. Wimberly, 2013 UT 

App 160, ¶¶ 20–22, 305 P.3d 1072 (concluding that the district 

court acted within its broad discretion in sentencing the 

defendant to prison rather than suspending the sentence and 

placing him on probation).

¶8 Moosman also asserts that the district court abused its 

discretion by relying on irrelevant and unreliable information. 

During sentencing the court referred to a “dynamic[,] . . . pretty 

well known in the literature and in experience,” which suggests 

that Moosman is “indeed a danger to” Mother. The court stated, 

without further elaboration, that “there is a great deal of 

literature about the simple fact of not letting go, [and] continued 

efforts at control, however innocuous [that] may seem,” it is 

nonetheless “dangerous.”

¶9 “The due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah 

Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably 

reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in 

fixing a sentence.” State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). 

“When there is evidence in the record showing a sentencing 

judge’s reliance on specific information, we will not consider it 

improper for a judge to rely on such information if the evidence 

in question had indicia of reliability and was relevant in 

sentencing.” State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 36, 282 P.3d 985 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). It is the defendant’s 

burden to “demonstrate that the information [relied upon] was 

unreliable or irrelevant.” Id.

¶10 In context, the district court’s statement was that a 

defendant’s ongoing attempts to control a former intimate 

partner are indicative that the defendant remains a danger to 

her. While Moosman assails the district court’s reference to 

“literature” and “experience,” he does not assert that the

principle referenced by the district court was generally 
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20150588-CA 5 2017 UT App 11

unreliable. We therefore do not conclude that it was. See id.

(placing on the defendant the burden of showing unreliability).

¶11 Moosman does claim that, as applied to him, the principle 

relied on by the district court was irrelevant and unreliable 

because he was not dangerous. In support, Moosman reiterates 

the arguments he made with regard to the asserted unfairness of 

the district court’s sentencing decision—that, for example, his 

offenses involved nonviolent, nonthreatening, and relatively 

benign conduct. But the premise of the district court’s reasoning 

was that interactions with and attempts to control a former 

intimate partner may appear benign and yet still indicate an 

ongoing threat. Moosman has not presented any argument in

response to that principle.

¶12 Given Moosman’s repeated violations of the protective 

order and AP&P’s recommendation of imprisonment, we cannot 

conclude that “no reasonable person would take the view 

adopted by the trial court,” which was that, under the 

circumstances, imprisonment rather than probation was the 

appropriate sentence. See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, 

¶ 14, 82 P.3d 1167 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation 

marks omitted). For these reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.