lARK WHITE 

ittorney General 

The Attorney General of Texas 

July 27, 1979 

Honorable W. B. Anderson 

Lamar County Auditor 

Lamar County Courthouse 

Paris, Texas 

Opinion No. MW-34 

Re: Authority of a county to pay 

a former county judge for services 

rendered in acquiring right-of-way 

for the ‘county. 

Dear Mr. Anderson: 

You have requested our opinion regarding the authority of a county to 

pay a former county judge for services rendered in acquiring right-of-ways 

for the county. The county attorney has issued an opinion in thii matter 

with which you disagree. We have asked that you provide us with the dates 

of the various transactions, and our opinion is based on the narrative you 

have provided. 

You state that, on December 28, 1978, prior to the expiration of his 

term, the county~judge of Lamar. County made an informal agreement with 

each other member of the commissioners court. Under the terms of the 

contract, the county judge would act as the agent for the county in squiring 

parcels of land for a highway project. On January 8,1979, after the county 

judge had left office, the commissioners court officially considered the 

matter, but left it unresolved. On January 22,1979, the commissioners court 

assigned all further duties in regard to obtaining rxht-of-way to the county 

attorney’s office. Subsequently, the former county judge submitted his 

claim for $l,SllO.OO for services rendered from January l-26. On April 9, 

1979, the commissioners court, on the basis of the December 28 contract, 

authorized a payment of $800.00 to the former judge. You ask a number of 

questions regarding the validity of these actions. 

Article 2340, V.T.C.S., requires that, upon entering the duties of 

office, a county judge and each member of the commissioners court 

take a written oath that he will not be directly or 

indirectly interested in any contract with, q claim 

against, the county in which he resides. . . . 

It has long been firmly established in this state that a contract between a 

public official and the public body of which he is a member is contrary to 

P- 101 
* Honorable W. E. Anderson - Page Two (NN-341 

public policy and therefore void, if the official has any personal pecuniary interest in the 

contract. Bexar County v. Wentworth, 378 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 

1964, writ refed n.r.e.); Starr County v. Guerra, 297 S.W.%d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. - San 

Antonio 1956, no writ); Meyers v. Walker, 276 S.W. 305 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1925, 

no writ). This office has said that the purpose of article 2340 is “to eliminate any conflicts 

of interest between the county and those who manage its fiscal affairs.” Attorney 

General Opinion No. II*24 (19751. See Attorney General Opinions M-R40 (1972); WW-1406 

(1962). Even compelling circumstances are not sufficient to render such a contract lawful. 

Attorney General Opinions H-734, H-695 (1975). Since, under the circumstances you have 

described, the contract was entered into while the individual still occupied the office of 

county judge, we must conclude that it was void ab. initio. Such a contract may not be 

subsequently ratified, Limestone County v. Knox, 234 S.W. 131 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 

1921, no writ), and thus,’ the $800.00 payment by the commissioners court on April 9,1979, 

on the basis of that contract, was invalid. 

SUMMARY 

Under the circumstances described, a commissioners court may not 

authorize payment to a former county judge for services rendered 

under a contract with the county entered into while the judge still 

occupied his office. 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

TED L. HARTLEY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Rick Gilpin 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

C. Robert Heath, Chairman 

David B. Brocks 

Walter Davis 

Susan Garrison 

Rick Gilpin 

William G Reid 

Bruce Youngblood 

p. 102