[Cite as State v. Denoyer, 2021-Ohio-886.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ALLEN COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-20-34 

 v. 

ANTHONY J. DENOYER, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. CR 2019 0435 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 22, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

William T. Cramer for Appellant 

 Jana E. Emerick for Appellee 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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SHAW, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Anthony Denoyer (“Denoyer”), brings this appeal 

from the August 11, 2020 judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court 

sentencing him to an aggregate indefinite prison term of a minimum of 32 years to 

a maximum of 36 years. On appeal, Denoyer argues that 3 of the 4 felonious assault 

charges to which he pled guilty should have merged for the purposes of sentencing, 

that the record did not support maximum prison terms on each of the felonious 

assault convictions, and that the record did not support consecutive sentences. 

Background

{¶2} Denoyer is the father of G.M., who was born in August of 2019. On 

October 29, 2019, police were contacted by St. Rita’s Medical Center with regard 

to G.M. having multiple skull fractures, a brain bleed, several fractured ribs, and a 

fractured femur. The injuries were life-threatening. An investigation established 

that G.M. was in Denoyer’s care when she was injured, and Denoyer later made 

admissions that he caused the injuries. 

{¶3} On December 12, 2019, Denoyer was indicted on four counts of 

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), all felonies of the second 

degree, and four counts of endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), 

all felonies of the second degree. Two of the felonious assault counts in the 

indictment, specifically counts 1 and 3, carried specifications pursuant to R.C. 
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2941.1426 alleging that the felonious assaults perpetrated by Denoyer against G.M. 

resulted in “permanent disabling harm,” and that G.M. was less than ten years old. 

G.M. was, in fact, less than three months old.1

 Denoyer originally pled not guilty 

to the charges. 

{¶4} On June 22, 2020, Denoyer entered into a written negotiated plea 

agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the four counts of felonious assault 

in the indictment. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the four endangering 

children charges, the two “permanent disabling harm” specifications attached to two 

of the felonious assault counts, and a separate pending criminal case against 

Denoyer that alleged Denoyer had committed, inter alia, grand theft of a motor 

vehicle.2

 

{¶5} A change-of-plea hearing was held wherein the plea agreement was 

recited to the trial court. At the time that the State recited the agreement to the trial 

court, the State emphasized that it would be arguing at sentencing, specifically 

contending that the felonious assault counts would not merge due to the disparate 

injuries to various parts of the infant’s body, due to some of the injuries being in 

different stages of healing, and due to Denoyer’s admission to five to seven acts of 

 

1

 Six of the eight counts—three felonious assaults and three endangering children—alleged that the incidents 

occurred on or about October 28, 2019. The remaining two counts—one felonious assault and one 

endangering children—alleged that the incidents occurred on or about October 22, 2019, through October 

28, 2019. 

2

 The record from the separate trial court case that was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement is not before 

us, thus we take this information from the written plea agreement and from statements made at the plea 

hearing. 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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violence against the child. After the plea agreement was recited, the trial court 

conducted a Crim.R. 11 hearing wherein Denoyer knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waived his rights and entered his pleas pursuant to the agreement. 

Sentencing was set for a later date. 

{¶6} Prior to the sentencing hearing the State filed a brief outlining its 

argument that the felonious assault counts should not merge. First, the State noted 

that Denoyer had given two interviews in this matter. During the first interview, 

when Denoyer was confronted with G.M.’s injuries, Denoyer claimed that he had 

“blackouts” and was told by others that he got violent during those episodes. He 

also claimed that he tripped with G.M. once and she hit her head on a table. Further, 

he stated that a month prior he picked G.M. up too hard and broke her rib, hearing 

it pop. In addition, he admitted to striking G.M. in the head on purpose, describing 

five episodes where he struck her to keep her awake. 

{¶7} In a second interview, Denoyer admitted to repeatedly abusing G.M. 

since her birth. He admitted to beating or assaulting G.M. five to seven times with 

the most recent being on October 28, 2019. He admitted to punching her, shaking 

her, and squeezing her so hard that he heard ribs pop. He also admitted to picking 

up G.M. by the leg when she was “fussing” causing the femur to fracture. Further, 

he admitted to punching G.M.’s head hard enough to make her head “soft.” (Doc. 

89). 
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{¶8} The State’s sentencing brief then detailed the medical evidence related 

to G.M. that would have been presented at trial as follows. 

Upon examination of GM, Dr. Jennifer T[.] of Nationwide 

Children’s Hospital in Columbus described various rib fractures

as acute (within seven days [of] presentation), and non acute or 

healing. Two of eighteen rib fractures were acute and occurred

within the seven day period of the 10-29-19 admission. The 

sixteen older rib fractures (symptomatic) cannot be more 

specifically dated but would have occurred in the ten week period 

from the date of birth (8-5-19) to seven days before the date of 

admission on 10-29-19, or 10-22-19. The older fractures were 

variously callused and in stages of healing, as evidenced on a CT 

scan. 

A chest CT scan was completed, and a reconstruction image 

was also completed. Nationwide doctors would opine that the 

fractures were consistent with the abdominal squeezing related to 

them, as admitted by the Defendant. The imaging is available 

through Children’s Health Information Management and can be 

enhanced to pinpoint fractures by radiologist Dr. Cody Y[.] 

Dr. T[.] noted two types of cranial injuries. One of the 

injuries was shearing, caused by shaking or violent 

acceleration/deceleration. (Note-Defendant has admitted shaking

victim on multiple occasions). The other multiple skull injuries 

described in the records are due to external trauma, as traumatic 

force applied to the outside of GM’s skull. This differentiation 

leads to the conclusion of two or more separate types of acts 

individually inflicting injury to GM’s skull. 

The femur injury is located near a growth plate, in a location 

Dr. T[.] attributes to ‘aggressive’ infliction of trauma unique to 

abuse of a child under one year of age and having occurred within 

seven days of observation. This resulted from pulling and 

twisting. 

One of [the] CT images of GM’s skull shows extensive 

fracturing. Another shows herniation (expulsion) of some brain
Case No. 1-20-34 

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tissue through the fracture site. Neuro-radiologist Jerome R[.] 

would at trial present enhanced imagery of the injuries, 

interpreting and articulating various CT views. Dr. T[.] agrees 

that the injuries were life threatening, and that GM’s breathing 

was destabilized.

(Doc. No. 89). 

{¶9} On August 10, 2020, a sentencing hearing was held. The State and 

defense counsel presented arguments related to merger. The trial court then 

indicated it had read the briefs on the matter and the pre-sentence investigation. 

Ultimately the trial court determined that the felonious assault counts did not merge 

for the purposes of sentencing. The trial court then sentenced Denoyer to maximum 

consecutive prison terms for an aggregate prison term of 32-36 years. A judgment 

entry memorializing Denoyer’s sentence was filed August 11, 2020. It is from this 

judgment that Denoyer appeals, asserting the following assignments of error for our 

review. 

Assignment of Error No. 1 

The trial court [violated] the Double Jeopardy clauses of the 

federal and state constitutions by failing to merge the first three 

counts of felonious assault under R.C. 2941.25. 

Assignment of Error No. 2 

By clear and convincing evidence the record does not support the 

imposition of maximum prison terms. 

Assignment of Error No. 3 

By clear and convincing evidence the record does not support 

consecutive sentences. 
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First Assignment of Error 

{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Denoyer argues that the trial court 

erred by failing to merge three of his felonious assault convictions for purposes of 

sentencing. More specifically, he contends that the indictment alleged that three of 

the felonious assaults occurred “on or about October 28, 2019” and thus they were 

part of the same course of conduct. 

Standard of Review 

{¶11} “ ‘Whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import is a question 

of law that this Court reviews de novo.’ ” State v. Jessen, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-

18-16, 2019-Ohio-907, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Frye, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-30, 

2018-Ohio-894; see generally State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-955. 

Relevant Authority 

{¶12} Revised Code 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, states: 

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 

indictment or information may contain counts for all such 

offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 

offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two 

or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately 

or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or 

information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the 

defendant may be convicted of all of them. 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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{¶13} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio held the following with regard to determining allied offenses: 

1. In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar 

import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate

three separate factors—the conduct, the animus, and the import.

2. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the 

meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct 

constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that 

results from each offense is separate and identifiable. 

3. Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports 

multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of 

the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of 

dissimilar import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were

committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses 

were committed with separate animus. 

The Supreme Court in Ruff explained: 

At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts 

of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct. 

The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will 

reveal whether the offenses have similar import. When a 

defendant’s conduct victimizes more than one person, the harm 

for each person is separate and distinct, and therefore, the 

defendant can be convicted of multiple counts. Also, a defendant’s 

conduct that constitutes two or more offenses against a single 

victim can support multiple convictions if the harm that results 

from each offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of

the other offense. We therefore hold that two or more offenses of 

dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) 

when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving 

separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is 

separate and identifiable. 

Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995 at ¶ 26. 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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Analysis 

{¶14} In this case, Denoyer argues that three of his convictions for felonious 

assault should have merged for the purposes of sentencing. For reference, 

Denoyer’s felonious assault convictions were in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), 

which reads, “No person shall knowingly * * * Cause serious physical harm to 

another or to another’s unborn[.]” 

{¶15} On appeal, Denoyer argues that there was no evidence that the 

felonious assaults against G.M. were committed separately. To support his claim, 

he cites the fact that the indictment for three of the felonious assault charges alleged 

the “same conduct against the same victim on the same date of October 28, 2019.” 

(Appt.’s Br. at 7). Denoyer argues that the prosecution did not present evidence 

indicating that separate acts occurred on the given “date” at the plea hearing or at 

the sentencing hearing, thus the trial court erred by failing to merge the three 

felonious assault convictions related to the acts “on” October 28, 2019. 

{¶16} At the outset, we note that the indictment alleged that three of the 

felonious assault charges to which Denoyer pled guilty occurred on or about

October 28, 2019. The prosecution later explained that given G.M.’s extremely 

young age, it was difficult to discern exactly when some of the injuries occurred. 

{¶17} Nevertheless, contrary to Denoyer’s argument, the prosecution 

presented multiple sentencing briefs detailing the disparate injuries to G.M., and 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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their origin according to medical evidence. The prosecution’s sentencing brief 

specifically separated the four felonious assaults into four different injury 

categories. The first felonious assault was related to “numerous blows to the head 

of GM by the Defendant on 10-28-19, resulting in multiple skull fractures.” (Doc. 

No. 88). The second felonious assault arose “from a shearing injury from shaking, 

or violent acceleration or deceleration to GM by the Defendant on or about 10-28-

19.” (Id.) The third felonious assault was related to a femur injury and two broken 

ribs inflicted by Denoyer during the period of October 22, 2019 to October 28, 2019. 

Finally, the fourth felonious assault was related to G.M. having sixteen broken ribs. 

{¶18} At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution reiterated the points from 

its written sentencing memoranda, adding that Denoyer had acknowledged at least 

five to seven different violent acts against the infant. Further, the prosecution 

emphasized that the distinct injuries were caused by separate acts that would have 

been identified through the medical testimony such as striking, squeezing, shaking, 

etc. 

{¶19} In State v. Ruff, supra, at ¶ 26, the Supreme Court of Ohio defined 

what “constitutes two or more offenses against a single victim,” by stating that there 

can be multiple convictions “if the harm that results from each offense is separate 

and identifiable from the harm of the other offense.” Here the record reflects 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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separate identifiable harm to G.M. coming from separate identifiable acts of 

Denoyer, i.e. striking, shaking, squeezing. 

{¶20} Moreover, even if some of these acts did occur on the same day, that 

does not make them allied as each act was distinct. Further, they were perpetrated 

against an infant less than three months old, so the knowing potential of serious 

physical harm would be in each identifiable act of striking, shaking, and squeezing. 

As we have held previously, separate assaults, even in close temporal proximity, 

can lead to separate convictions. See State v. Mejia, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-19-28, 

2020-Ohio-4883, ¶ 50-52. 

{¶21} Based on the record before us we cannot find that the trial court erred 

by finding that the felonious assault convictions did not merge for purposes of 

sentencing. Therefore, Denoyer’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

Second Assignment of Error

{¶22} In his second assignment of error, Denoyer argues that the record does 

not support the imposition of maximum 8-year prison terms for each of his felonious 

assault convictions. 

Standard of Review 

{¶23} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence 

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not 

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 

¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “ ‘which will produce in the mind of the 

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” 

Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of 

the syllabus. 

Relevant Authority 

{¶24} “ ‘The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the 

authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give 

its reasons for imposing maximum or more than [a] minimum sentence[ ].’ ” State 

v. Castle, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-16, 2016-Ohio-4974, ¶ 26, quoting State v. 

King, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2012-CA-25, 2013-Ohio-2021, ¶ 45; State v. White, 3d 

Dist. Marion No. 9-19-32, 2020-Ohio-717, ¶ 8. Nevertheless, when exercising its 

sentencing discretion, a trial court must consider the statutory policies that apply to 

every felony offense, including those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. 

State v. Kerns, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-18-05, 2018-Ohio-3838, ¶ 8, citing State v. 

Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38. 

{¶25} Revised Code 2929.11 provides that sentences for a felony shall be 

guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing: “to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the 

effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on 

state or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). In order to comply with 

those purposes and principles, R.C. 2929.12 instructs a trial court to consider 

various factors set forth in the statute relating to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism. R.C. 2929.12(A)-(E). 

Analysis 

{¶26} In this case, Denoyer was convicted of four counts of felonious assault 

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), all second degree felonies. Pursuant to R.C. 

2929.14(A)(2)(a), the prison term for a second degree felony “shall be an indefinite 

prison term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, 

five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant 

to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code[.]” Under R.C. 2929.144(B)(1), the 

maximum prison term for a qualifying felony of the second degree shall be equal to 

the “minimum term imposed * * * plus fifty per cent of that term.” Here, Denoyer 

was sentenced to serve four maximum, indefinite prison terms with a stated 

minimum of 8 years. The maximum was stated to be 12 years, though that only 

applies to one of the four counts. These prison terms are within the appropriate 

statutory range and they are compliant with the relevant statutes; therefore the 

maximum prison terms are presumptively valid. State v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca 

No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31. 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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{¶27} Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court referenced the 

requisite sentencing statutes, specifically indicating that it had balanced the 

seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. The trial court’s findings 

were incorporated into its judgment entry, further indicating it had considered R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12. Importantly, “[a] trial court’s statement that it considered the 

required statutory factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under 

the sentencing statutes.” Maggette, 2016-Ohio-5554, at ¶ 32, citing State v. Abrams, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103786, 2016-Ohio-4570, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio 

St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 18. Thus not only was the sentence in this case 

presumptively valid, the trial court also indicated that it considered the appropriate 

statutes. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that Denoyer demonstrated that 

his sentence was clearly and convincingly contrary to law. 

{¶28} Furthermore, to the extent that Denoyer seeks to have this Court 

modify his sentence, we emphasize that the Supreme Court of Ohio recently 

clarified an appellate court’s review a felony sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

State v. Jones, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 39.3

 The Supreme Court of 

Ohio determined that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) “clearly does not provide a basis for an 

 

3

 Because Jones was decided after the parties submitted their appellate briefs in this case, neither party has 

had the opportunity to address its applicability. However, Jones “does not change the law” but instead 

“clarifies existing law and precedents.” State v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2020 CA 0035, 2021-Ohio90, ¶ 81, fn. 2. Therefore, we elect to apply Jones to the instant case without the benefit of supplemental 

briefing. 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it concludes that the record does 

not support the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 because * * * R.C. 

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 are not among the statutes listed in the provision.” Id. at 

¶ 31. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that an appellate court may not 

modify or vacate a felony sentence based upon a finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s “findings” under R.C. 

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Id. at ¶ 42 (“Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an 

appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects 

compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”). 

{¶29} In Jones, the Supreme Court of Ohio also confirmed that R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not provide a mechanism for an appellate court to modify or 

vacate a felony sentence based upon a finding that the sentence is “contrary to law” 

because it clearly and convincingly is not supported by the record under R.C. 

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Id. at ¶ 32-39. “As a result of the Supreme Court’s 

holding in Jones, when reviewing felony sentences that are imposed solely after

considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, we shall no longer 

analyze whether those sentences are unsupported by the record. We simply must 

determine whether those sentences are contrary to law.” State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18. “A sentence is contrary to law when 
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it does not fall within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to 

consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 

and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” Id. citing State v. Brown, 2d 

Dist. No. 2016-CA-53, 2017-Ohio-8416, ¶ 74; see State v. D-Bey, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 109000, 2021-Ohio-60, ¶ 65. 

{¶30} In sum, the record demonstrates that the prison terms imposed by the 

trial court in this case are within the statutory range and that the trial court 

considered the requisite statutory factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when it 

fashioned Denoyer’s aggregate sentence. Thus, Denoyer cannot demonstrate that 

his sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law, and his sentence must 

therefore be affirmed. See State v. Burks, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-70, 2021-

Ohio-224, ¶ 9, (“Under Jones, this ends the inquiry regarding the individual 

sentences. Thus, there is no basis upon which to modify or vacate either individual 

sentence.”); see also, D-Bey, supra, ¶ 75, citing Jones at ¶ 39 (concluding that “this 

court cannot review D-Bey’s sentences to determine whether they are “excessive” 

or otherwise not “supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”). For 

all of these reasons, Denoyer’s second assignment of error is overruled. 
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Third Assignment of Error

{¶31} In his third assignment of error, Denoyer argues that the record does 

not support consecutive sentences in this matter.4

Relevant Authority 

{¶32} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), in order to impose consecutive 

sentences, a trial court must find on the record that consecutive sentences are 

“necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that 

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.” Accord State v. Grate, 

--- Ohio St.3d ---, 2020-Ohio-5584, ¶ 205. A trial court must then also find that at 

least one or more of the aggravating factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) through (c) 

are present. 

{¶33} In State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 37, the 

Supreme Court of Ohio held that a trial court must make the requisite statutory 

findings before imposing consecutive sentences “at the sentencing hearing and 

incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to state 

reasons to support its findings.” 

 

4

 The same standard of review from the second assignment of error applies here. 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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Analysis 

{¶34} In this case the trial court made all of the appropriate consecutive 

sentences findings at the sentencing hearing, and in its judgment entry. This was 

sufficient to comply with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s interpretation in Bonnell. 

{¶35} On appeal, Denoyer does not even attempt to argue that the trial court 

failed to make any of the appropriate findings; rather, he contends that the trial 

court’s consecutive sentence findings were unsupported by the record. Importantly, 

and contrary to Denoyer’s argument, a trial court has no obligation to state reasons 

to support its findings. Bonnell at ¶ 37. For this reason alone we could overrule 

Denoyer’s assignment of error. 

{¶36} Nevertheless, the trial court did state some reasons on the record as to 

why it was imposing consecutive sentences, indicating that this violence went on 

over a period of time, and that G.B. suffered serious physical harm, the extent of 

which may not even be determined for years to come. The trial court also cited that 

multiple acts occurred here, leading to separate identifiable harm. The litany of 

fractures and injuries to this child, less than three months old, cannot be overstated. 

While Denoyer may be remorseful now, and he may wish to have mental health 

treatment, that does not change his actions in this matter.5

 

5

 Denoyer claimed that he committed the acts while using “crystal meth.” 
Case No. 1-20-34 

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{¶37} Based on the record before us we cannot find that Denoyer has 

demonstrated that his consecutive sentences were clearly and convincingly contrary 

to law. Therefore, his third assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶38} For the foregoing reasons Denoyer’s assignments of error are 

overruled and the judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur. 

/jlr