This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 LONNIE D. CLARK and 2 KARLA ROLEN CLARK, 3 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 4 v. No. 32,507 5 TERRY’S SERVICE CENTER, 6 Defendant, 7 and 8 AFFINITY ROAD AND TRAVEL 9 CLUB, INC., 10 Defendant-Appellant 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY 12 Albert Mitchell, District Judge 13 Lonnie D. Clark 14 Karla Rolen Clark 15 Brownfield, TX 16 Pro Se Appellants 17 Donald C. Schutte 18 Tucumcari, NM 19 for Appellant 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 212 FRY, Judge. 1 Plaintiffs-Appellants Lonnie D. Clark and Karla Rolen Clark (Plaintiffs) appeal 2 from an order granting summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Affinity Road and 3 Travel Club, Inc. (Affinity). We issu ed a notice of proposed summary disposition, 4 proposing to uphold the district court’s dete rmination. Plaintiffs have filed a 5 memorandum in opposition, which we haveduly considered. Because we remain 6 unpersuaded that the districtcourt erred, we affirm. 7 Our analysis relative to the merits is se t forth at length in the notice of proposed 8 summary disposition. We will confine the present discussion to the various points 9 raised in the memorandum in opposition. 10 First, Plaintiffs suggest that our reliance upon Espinosa v. United of Omaha Life 11 Ins. Co. , 2006-NMCA-075, ¶ 26, 139 N.M. 691, 137 P.3d 631, is misplaced, because 12 this is not an insurance dispute. [MIO 2] However, the pertinent portion of the 13 Espinosa decision deals with general principl es of contract law, which are equally 14 applicable outside the contex t of insurance litigation. See Rummel v. Lexington Ins. 15 Co. , 1997-NMSC-041, ¶ 18, 123 N.M. 752, 945 P. 2d 970 (“[I]nsurance contracts are 16 construed by the same principles which govern the interpretation of all contracts.” 17 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 183 Unambiguous contract language w ill be enforced as written. See Espinosa , 1 2006-NMCA-075, ¶ 26 (“When a contract or agreement is unambiguous, we interpret 2 the meaning of the document and the inte nt of the parties according to the clear 3 language of the document, and we enforce the contract or agreement as written.”); see 4 also Montoya v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 110 N.M. 128, 129, 793 P.2d 258, 259 (1990) 5 (“It is black letter law that, absent an ambiguity, a court is bound to interpret and 6 enforce a contract's clear language and cannot create a new agreement for the 7 parties.”). Accordingly, insofar as the appli cable terms of the contract at issue in this 8 case are clear and unambiguous, the district court did not err in enforcing them. 9 We further understand Plaintiffs to advance a new argument, contending that 10 the contract terms should not have been en forced because they were contained in a 11 document which altered previous terms, and because Pl aintiffs were unaware of this 12 material. [MIO 2-3] However, we have reviewed Plaintiffs’ response to Affinity’s 13 motion for summary judgment, and find no i ndication that Plaintiffs raised this 14 argument at that time. [RP 325-30, 342] At the hearing on the motion, when the 15 district court explained that it needed a copy of the contract and that it was Plaintiffs’ 16 burden to supply this, Plaintiffs indicated th at they lacked a copy and would therefore 17 “live with” the documents supplied by Affinity. [RP 364-65] Plaintiffs indicated that 18 Affinity sent new brochures on a yearly basi s, [RP 364] but later, Plaintiffs indicated 194 that they “didn’t see the brochure.” [RP 367] The district court reasonably interpreted 1 this statement as an indication that Plain tiffs had simply failed to read the brochure. 2 [RP 367] Under the circumstances, neither the factual nor the legal basis for Plaintiffs’ 3 lack-of-notice argument was clearly presented below. Moreover, no ruling on this 4 theory was requested or obtained. We th erefore conclude that Plaintiffs’ argument 5 was not adequately preserved. See generally Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Beagles 6 Chrysler-Plymouth , 83 N.M. 272, 273, 491 P.2d 160, 161 (1971) (“[A] matter not 7 brought to the attention of the [district] c ourt cannot be raised for the first time on 8 appeal.”); Agua Fria Save The Open Space Ass’n v. Rowe , 2011-NMCA-054, ¶ 27, 9 149 N.M. 812, 255 P.3d 390 (“To preserve a question for review, it must appear that 10 a ruling or decision by the district court was fairly invoked.” (alterations omitted) 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 12 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and in our notice of proposed 13 summary disposition, we remainunpersuaded that the distri ct court erred. The award 14 of summary judgment is therefore affirmed. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16

17 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 185 WE CONCUR: 1

2 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 3

4 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 5