In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-22-00014-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 396th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1540587D

Before Bassel, Womack, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker

MARHINOTA KEJUAN FORD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Marhinota Kejuan Ford pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and 

was placed on six years of deferred-adjudication community supervision. The written 

plea admonishments informed him that, if he violated any condition of his 

community supervision, he would be entitled to an adjudication hearing, after which 

the trial court could adjudicate him guilty and assess his punishment “anywhere within 

the range provided by law.” Further, the admonishments informed Ford that his 

charged offense was a first-degree felony which carried a penalty range of 5 to 99 

years or life in prison and up to a $10,000 fine. Both Ford and his attorney signed the 

plea admonishments and Ford acknowledged with his signature that he fully 

understood the written admonishments and that he was aware of the consequences of 

his plea.1 

While Ford was on community supervision, the State filed a petition to proceed 

to adjudication alleging that he had violated its terms. At the revocation hearing on

the State’s petition, Ford pleaded true to the allegations. The trial court, without 

admonishing Ford regarding the relevant range of punishment or consequences of 

pleading true, adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to fifteen years’ confinement. 

Ford filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by operation of law. 

1Ford concedes that he was properly admonished when he pleaded guilty. 
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Ford raises one point on appeal: that the trial court erred when it failed to 

admonish him at the revocation hearing as to the range of punishment for the 

underlying offense and the consequences of pleading true to the allegations in the 

State’s petition. Specifically, he contends that this failure violated both his due 

process rights as announced by the Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama and

Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See 395 U.S. 238, 242,

89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711 (1969); Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 26.13(a).

We overrule Ford’s point. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made it 

abundantly clear that Article 26.13 does not require trial courts to admonish 

probationers as to the consequences of a plea to a motion to revoke or adjudicate

guilt. See Gutierrez v. State, 108 S.W. 3d 304, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding in 

revocation context that trial courts are not required to admonish defendants pursuant 

to Article 26.13); Harris v. State, 505 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (“We 

hold that admonishments provided for in Article 26.13 . . . do not apply in revocation 

of probation proceedings.”). Relatedly, discussing Boykin, the Court of Criminal 

Appeals recognized that due process does not require a trial court to make Article 

26.13 admonishments. Aguirre-Mata v. State, 125 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2003) (“Boykin clearly did not hold that due process requires the equivalent of the 

Article 26.13(a) admonishments or an admonishment on the range of punishment.”). 

Thus, neither due process nor Article 26.13 required the trial court to admonish

Ford about the range of punishment or the consequences of pleading true at the 
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revocation hearing. And Ford does not point us to a statute or precedent that places 

upon a trial court such a duty. For these reasons, we overrule his sole point on appeal 

and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: December 22, 2022