J-S11026-18

2018 PA Super 163

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GEORGE G. BOND

Appellant No. 374 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed January 4, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0007801-2014

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 13, 2018

Appellant, George G. Bond, appeals from the January 4, 2017 judgment 

of sentence imposing an aggregate 271⁄2 to 55 years for involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), unlawful contact with a minor, aggravated 

indecent assault, and indecent assault.1 We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 

At trial it was established that on May 24, 2014, A.P. 

[“Child”], then age 10, her mother, S.P. [“Mother”] and [Mother’s] 

boyfriend, the [Appellant] George Bond, lived on the first floor 

apartment of premises 1260 South 60th Street, Philadelphia. 

While [Mother] was at work, [Child] told [Appellant] that she was 

hungry. [Child] sat on [Mother’s] bed. [Appellant] was lying on 

the same bed. While [Child] was searching for restaurants on her 

tablet, [Appellant] started to rub her and told her to pull down her 

____________________________________________

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(c), 6318(a)(1), 3125(a)(7), 3126(a)(7). 
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pants. She did. [Appellant] inserted his finger into her vagina, 

performed oral sex on her and then exposed his penis. 

Later that day, [Child] approached her great aunt, [“Great 

Aunt”], who lived in the upstairs apartment of the building. 

[Child] was too embarrassed to tell [Great Aunt] what happened. 

Instead, she wrote a note recounting the incident. She showed 

the note to [Great Aunt]. [Great Aunt] and [Child] informed 

[Mother] about the incident by telephone. [Mother] came home 

and summoned the police. 

[Child] was interviewed by [Michelle Kline], a forensic 

interview specialist with the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance. A 

video of the interview was played to the jury. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/17, at 2-3. 

On March 15, 2016, at the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant 

guilty of the aforementioned offenses. The trial court imposed sentence on 

January 4, 2017. On January 12, 2017, Appellant filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the sentence. The trial court denied that motion the same 

day. Appellant filed this timely appeal on January 19, 2017. His sole 

contention is that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to see a video of 

Child’s forensic interview (the “Interview Video”) with Philadelphia Children’s 

Alliance (“PCA”). Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. 

The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to the 

admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial 

court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed 

an error of law. Thus our standard of review is very narrow. To 

constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be 

erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining 

party. 
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Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 62 A.3d 379 (Pa. 2013). “Abuse of discretion is not merely an error 

of judgment, but rather where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or 

where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Commonwealth v. Aikens, 

990 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 4 A.3d 157 (Pa. 

2010). 

The trial court admitted the Interview Video as a prior consistent 

statement. It did so at the Commonwealth’s request after defense counsel 

cross-examined Child extensively with regard to the substance of the 

interview depicted in the video. Rule 613(c) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Evidence governs this issue: 

(c) Witness’s Prior Consistent Statement to 

Rehabilitate. Evidence of a witness’s prior consistent statement 

is admissible to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility if the opposing 

party is given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about 

the statement and the statement is offered to rebut an express or 

implied charge of:

(1) fabrication, bias, improper influence or motive, or faulty 

memory and the statement was made before that which has been 

charged existed or arose; or

(2) having made a prior inconsistent statement, which the 

witness has denied or explained, and the consistent statement 

supports the witness’s denial or explanation.

Pa.R.E. 613(c). 

This Court has addressed Rule 613 as follows: 
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[P]rior consistent statements may be admitted to 

corroborate or rehabilitate the testimony of a witness who has 

been impeached, expressly or impliedly, as having a faulty 

memory, or as having been induced to fabricate the testimony by 

improper motive or influence. Admission of prior consistent 

statements on such grounds is a matter left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, to be decided in light of the character 

and degree of impeachment. It is not necessary that the 

impeachment be direct; it may be implied, inferred, or insinuated 

either by cross-examination, presentation of conflicting evidence, 

or a combination of the two. 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 504 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal 

denied, 992 A.2d 885 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 

A.2d 498, 512 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1237 (Pa. 2005)). 

“[T]o be admissible to rebut a charge of improper motive, as is the case here, 

the prior consistent statement must have been made before the motive to lie 

existed.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 66 (Pa. 2012), cert. 

denied, 134 S. Ct. 178 (2013). A prior consistent statement, if admissible at 

all, is admissible only as rebuttal or rehabilitation but as not substantive 

evidence. Baker, 963 A.2d at 504. 

In Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 556 A.2d 370, 371 (Pa. 1989), a 

jury found the defendant guilty of raping and robbing two women. Upon his 

arrest, the defendant told police he was on his way home from his 

grandmother’s home and had committed no crime. Id. The defendant alleged 

counsel was ineffective for failing to offer the statement into evidence as a 

prior consistent statement after the prosecutor impeached the credibility of 

defendant and his grandmother. Id. 
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The Hutchinson Court explained that prior consistent statements 

ordinarily are inadmissible hearsay, but in rare cases, they are admissible to 

rehabilitate a witness against a claim of recent fabrication or corrupt motives. 

Id. at 372. The Hutchinson Court stated:

If one testifies that they did a certain thing at a given time, 

they may be challenged that they said something different before. 

Such is impeachment by a prior contradictory statement. 

Ordinarily, that one has always said the same thing is subsumed 

in their testimony and need not be buttressed by evidence of prior 

consistency, unless that consistency, by allegation of recent 

fabrication is challenged. When challenged, evidence of prior and 

continued consistency may be offered. Evidence of prior 

consistency, absent such challenge is not required and is 

essentially cumulative and repetitious. To regularly allow 

testimony of prior consistency may easily become a device to 

merely augment the credibility of witnesses by others. 

Hutchinson, 556 A.2d at 372. By the foregoing standards, the Hutchinson 

Court held the defendant’s statement inadmissible. The prosecution made no 

allegations of recent fabrication during trial, and “the statement in issue was 

made after [the defendant’s] arrest: clearly not a time when the effect of the 

statement could not have been foreseen.” Id. 

On the other hand, in Baker, this Court affirmed the admission of video 

of a child’s forensic interview because the defense insinuated that the 

prosecution and/or the victim’s mother induced the victim to fabricate the 

testimony. Baker, 963 A.2d at 505. The video predated the alleged 

inducement of fabricated testimony. Id. 

Appellant argues the trial court erred because this case involves no prior 

statements that predate Child’s motive to fabricate. He claims Child fabricated 
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her allegations from the beginning because she did not like living with Mother 

and Appellant and was upset about her separation from her natural father, 

who was incarcerated. Rule 613 permits prior consistent statements, 

Appellant argues, only when they predate the alleged “fabrication, bias, 

improper influence or motive, or faulty memory.” Pa.R.E. 613(c)(1). He is 

correct in this regard. Busanet, 54 A.3d at 66; see also, Commonwealth 

v. Montalvo, 986 A.2d 84, 96 (Pa. 2009) (holding a prior statement 

inadmissible where the defendant failed to establish the timing of the 

statement). 

Child’s accounts of the incident—in her note to Great Aunt, in her 

statement to a DHS caseworker, in the Interview Video, at the preliminary 

hearing, and at trial—varied slightly, with regard to whether Appellant 

penetrated2 her as well as various other details. Appellant claimed that Child’s 

allegations were fabricated from the beginning, and that the Interview Video

therefore served no rehabilitative purpose. The Interview Video, Appellant 

argues, was just one of a series of inconsistent accounts of the assault. 

The trial court cited Hunzer in support of its decision. There, the victim 

testified that the defendant assaulted her by “sticking his tongue and his finger 

in my private area.” Hunzer, 868 A.2d at 506. The Commonwealth, over the 

____________________________________________

2

 Penetration is an element of IDSI and aggravated indecent assault. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3101, 3123(c), 3125(a)(7). 
J-S11026-18

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defendant’s objection, elicited the victim’s prior consistent statements through 

the testimony of a caseworker. Id. at 511-12. The Hunzer Court wrote: 

Prior consistent statements may [...] be considered specially 

relevant when the witness’ status alone is such that his or her 

testimony may be called into question even in the absence of 

express impeachment. [...] [J]urors are likely to suspect that 

unimpeached testimony of child witnesses in general, and child 

victims of sexual assaults in particular, may be distorted by 

fantasy, exaggeration, suggestion, or decay of the original 

memory of the event. Prior consistent statements may therefore 

be admitted to corroborate even unimpeached testimony of child 

witnesses, at the trial court’s discretion, because such statements 

were made at a time when the memory was fresher and there was 

less opportunity for the child witness to be effected by the 

decaying impact of time and suggestion. 

Id. at 512 (quoting Commonwealth v. Willis, 552 A.2d 682, 691-92 (Pa. 

Super. 1988), appeal denied, 559 A.2d 527 (Pa. 1989)). 

The quoted passage seems at odds with the express language of Rule 

613, in that it is far more permissive of prior consistent statements, at least 

in the context of the sexual assault of a child. Willis, from which the Hunzer 

Court quoted, pre-dated the enactment of Rule 613 and the Tender Years Act, 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.13 The Hunzer defendant therefore argued that the trial 

court erred in relying on Willis rather than Rule 613. The Hunzer Court 

____________________________________________

3

 The Tender Years Act authorizes admission, subject to certain conditions, of 

hearsay statements by a child witness describing certain enumerated 

offenses, including sex offenses. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1. Statements 

admitted under this section are substantive evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Barnett, 50 A.3d 176, 187 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 772 

(Pa. 2013). The Commonwealth did not rely on the Tender Years Act in this 

case. 
J-S11026-18

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concluded that the Commonwealth used prior consistent statements “to rebut 

an inference of recent fabrication arising during cross-examination.” Id. at 

513. Thus, the Hunzer Court tracked the language of Rule 613, but it did not 

engage in a detailed analysis of the timing of the prior consistent statement. 

Instantly, the trial court quoted the portion of Hunzer in which that 

Court quoted extensively from Willis. We conclude the trial court erred, 

because its holding contravenes the express language of Rule 613, our 

Supreme Court’s analysis of Rule 613 in Hutchinson, and this Court’s analysis 

of Rule 613 in Baker.

4

 While the Interview Video antedated Child’s crossexamination at trial, it did not antedate the alleged motive to lie, which 

Appellant claims arose before she first complained of the assault. Put simply, 

Child’s statements in the Interview Video were not “made before” the alleged 

fabrication, as Rule 613(c)(1) expressly requires. Moreover, this case does 

not involve a lapse in memory, another basis for admitting a prior consistent 

____________________________________________

4 We are cognizant that a three-judge panel of this Court is not free to 

overrule the decision of a previous three-judge panel. Our result therefore 

does not affect the precedential value of Hunzer. As explained in the main 

text, the Hunzer Court found a prior consistent statement admissible because 

it rebutted an allegation of recent fabrication. Hunzer is therefore in harmony 

with Rule 613. Willis, however, is not. We conclude that the Hunzer Court’s 

reliance on Willis is dicta, and that Rule 613 and the Tender Years Act have 

superseded Willis. 
J-S11026-18

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statement under Rule 613(c)(1).5 Appellant relied on the inconsistencies in 

Child’s statements to support his claim that Child was lying. 

The Commonwealth argues that Appellant, in challenging Child’s 

credibility based on her varying accounts of the assault, has accused Child of 

fabricating her accounts “on an ongoing basis,” and that therefore the 

Commonwealth was entitled to introduce the Interview Video, which was 

largely consistent with Child’s most incriminating allegations. Given the 

governing precedents discussed above, we do not believe we can construe 

Rule 613(c)(1) so broadly. Under the Commonwealth’s analysis, a prosecutor

could, in any case where the defense probes a witness’s inconsistent accounts 

of a crime, rely on Rule 613(c)(1) to trumpet the most incriminating version 

regardless of whether it antedates the alleged “fabrication, bias, improper 

influence or motive, or faulty memory.” Rule 613(c)(1) does not authorize 

that approach. 

We also reject the Commonwealth’s argument that the trial court’s 

ruling is salvageable under Rule 613(c)(2), which permits admission of a prior 

consistent statement that supports the witness’s denial of, or explanation for,

____________________________________________

5

 Defense counsel questioned Child about whether she remembered making 

different versions of her statement to different people, but, as explained 

above, the defense theory was that the many variations in Child’s story were 

indicative of fabrication, not memory lapse. Cf. Commonwealth v. 

Swinson, 626 A.2d 627, 632-33 (Pa. Super. 1993) (a witness’s prior written 

statement to police was admissible where the witness’s trial testimony differed 

from the statement). 
J-S11026-18

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having made a prior inconsistent statement. Pa.R.E. 613(c)(2). The 

Commonwealth fails to cite any place in the record where Child denied having 

made a prior inconsistent statement or explained the inconsistencies in her 

testimony. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court 

erred in admitting the Interview Video under Rule 613(c). 

Next, we consider the Commonwealth’s argument that the trial court’s 

error was harmless. 

The doctrine of harmless error is a technique of appellate 

review designed to advance judicial economy by obviating the

necessity for a retrial where the appellate court is convinced that 

a trial error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Its purpose 

is premised on the well-settled proposition that [a] defendant is 

entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.

Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 182 (Pa. 2012) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Thornton, 431 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa. 1981)). 

On this point, we turn for guidance to Busanet. There, the defendant 

alleged his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial 

court’s admission of a witness’s prior consistent statement. Busanet, 54 A.3d 

at 65. The witness was the Commonwealth’s “key witness,” and he testified 

that he was with the defendant when the defendant fired a gun at the victim 

in retribution for a robbery. Id. Defense counsel examined the witness on 

his motive to obtain favorable treatment from the Commonwealth in his own 

case. Id. The Commonwealth introduced a prior consistent statement—the 

witness’s written statement that he gave to police 15 days after the crime 

occurred. Id. Trial counsel objected because the witness already had a 
J-S11026-18

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motive to lie at that point, but the trial court overruled the objection. Id. at 

66. Appellate counsel did not pursue the issue on direct appeal. 

The Supreme Court found no ineffective assistance of counsel because 

the defendant failed to establish prejudice: “Nevertheless, even assuming for 

purposes of argument that the trial court erred by admitting [the witness’s] 

prior statement under Pa.R.E. 613(e) [sic], we agree with the PCRA court that 

such a claim would not have entitled Appellant to relief on appeal[.]” Id. at 

67. Trial counsel “meticulously cross examined [the witness] with evidence 

of his motive to testify favorably for the Commonwealth[.]” Id. “Further, on 

re-cross examination of [the witness], trial counsel painstakingly pointed out 

to the jury that when [the witness] made the prior statement, he was 

concerned about being charged in connection with the shooting.” Id. The 

Supreme Court also noted other “overwhelming” evidence of the defendant’s 

guilt, including other witnesses, ballistics evidence, and the defendant’s own 

statements. Id. Thus, any error on the part of the trial court or counsel did 

not prejudice the defendant in Busanet. 

We find Busanet instructive. Instantly, defense counsel crossexamined Child extensively. Defense counsel brought out testimony that 

Appellant penetrated Child with his fingers and tongue. N.T. Trial, 3/11/16, 

at 98. In particular, defense counsel cross-examined Child with a transcript 

of the Interview Video:
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Q. So do you remember telling Ms. Kline that what happened 

was that it started with him rubbing on your butt with his hand 

over your pants? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And that then he went inside of your pants with his hand 

and touched your private part? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And put his fingers inside of your private part? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What you told Ms. Kline is that he did that while your pants 

were still on? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And that then after he did that, that that [sic] was when he 

pulled out his private part. 

Do you remember telling Ms. Kline that? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And do you remember telling Ms. Kline that after he pulled 

out his private part is when he pulled down your pants? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And that, after he pulled down your pants, the next thing 

that happened was that he put his tongue down there? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And then you told Ms. Kline that, after you got up and 

started to walk away out of the room, he called you back into the 

room? 

A. I don’t remember that. 

Q. You don’t remember saying that? 

A. No. 
J-S11026-18

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Q. Okay. All right. Well, you didn’t tell Ms. Kline that he called 

you back and kissed your private part again; right? 

A. No, I don’t remember. 

Q. And you told Ms. Kline – you did tell Ms. Kline that he tried 

to get you to touch his private part, right? 

A. I don’t remember. 

Q. And do you remember telling – do you remember Ms. Kline 

asking you – do you remember her asking you if he tried to make 

you or if he made you touch his private part? 

A. No. 

Q. Okay. Do you remember her asking you how many times 

he tried to make you touch his private part? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you remember telling her that he made you touch it 

twice? 

A. No. 

Q. Okay. Do you remember her asking you if you saw his 

private part? 

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And do you remember telling her that you couldn’t 

really see it because it was so fast? 

A. Yes. 

Q. All right. And you couldn’t tell her what it looked like? 

A. Yes. 

Q. All right. And you couldn’t tell her what it looked like at all? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Yes, you can tell us? 

A. No, no. I’m saying, yes, I couldn’t tell you. 
J-S11026-18

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Q. Thank you. But do you remember telling Ms. Kline that he 

took his private part out before he put his tongue on your private 

part, not after; right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And Ms. Kline was the first person who you told about him 

putting his fingers inside of your private part; correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. You didn’t tell [Great Aunt] about that part; right? 

A. No. 

[***]

Q. So you agree with me that it doesn’t say in the note that he 

put any part of his fingers or his hand inside of your private part; 

right? 

A Yes. 

Q. And you didn’t tell that to the police officer or to anybody at 

the hospital either; right? 

A. I don’t remember. 

Q. Okay. But do you agree that Ms. Kline was the first person 

you told that to; right?

A. Yes. 

Q. Alright. And when Ms. Kline was asking you about the part 

of this when he pulled out his private part, she also asked you if 

he did anything with his private part? 

Do you remember that? 

A. No. 

Q. Okay. Do you remember telling her that he sat there and 

didn’t do anything with it? 

A. No. 
J-S11026-18

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Id. at 108-113. In essence, defense counsel chose to cross-examine Child on 

all of the pertinent portions of the Interview Video transcript, and did so before 

the Commonwealth moved to play the Interview Video for the jury. The actual 

video itself was therefore cumulative and, in our view, harmless. See 

Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 182 (Pa. 2012) (concluding that 

erroneous admission of cumulative evidence was harmless), cert. denied, 

569 U.S. 972 (2013). 

In addition, the Commonwealth introduced a text message Appellant 

sent to Mother shortly after the assault. It said, “I’m so, so, so fucking sorry. 

I can’t breathe.” N.T. Trial, 3/14/2016, at 63. Mother also recorded two 

phone conversations she had with Appellant shortly after the assault, in which 

he made incriminating statements. Id. at 63-64. Appellant also asked Mother 

to lie to police and tell them he was teaching Child sex education. Id. at 69. 

Appellant, in his brief, does not explain how the Interview Video

prejudiced him. He notes that the jury asked for a replay of Appellant’s 

recorded statement and the Interview Video (the trial court directed the jurors 

to rely on their recollections of the video). The fact remains, however, that 

defense counsel introduced the incriminating facts from the Kline interview 

during cross-examination of Child. The jury’s request to see the Interview 

Video a second time does not change the fact that it was cumulative of 

evidence already in the record. 
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Ultimately, this case turned on Child’s credibility. Appellant cannot 

explain how the admission of the Video Interview, though erroneous, did 

anything to augment or bolster Child’s credibility, inasmuch as defense 

counsel cross-examined Child extensively on her interview with Michelle Kline. 

In addition, the jury heard Appellant’s own damaging statements. We believe 

the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Furthermore, we would conclude that the interview was admissible 

under Pa.R.E. 106:6 

If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded 

statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that 

time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded 

statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same 

time.

Comment: This rule is identical to F.R.E. 106. A similar 

principle is expressed in Pa.R.C.P. No. 4020(a)(4), which states:

“If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, any 

other party may require the offering party to introduce all of it 

which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may 

introduce any other parts.”

The purpose of Pa.R.E. 106 is to give the adverse party an 

opportunity to correct a misleading impression that may be 

created by the use of a part of a writing or recorded statement

that may be taken out of context. This rule gives the adverse 

party the opportunity to correct the misleading impression at the 

time that the evidence is introduced. The trial court has discretion 

to decide whether other parts, or other writings or recorded 

statements, ought in fairness to be considered 

contemporaneously with the proffered part.

____________________________________________

6

 The parties did not brief Rule 106, but this Court is free to affirm the trial 

court on any valid basis. Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 161 n.8 

(Pa. Super. 2011). 
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Pa.R.E. 106. Thus, where a party introduces a portion of a writing or recorded 

statement, Rule 106 permits the adverse party to introduce the remainder so 

that the fact finder can consider the evidence in context. Commonwealth v. 

Bryant, 57 A.3d 191, 195 (Pa. Super. 2012); Commonwealth v. Passmore, 

857 A.2d 697, 712 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 868 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 

2005). The burden is on the adverse party to explain the relevance of the 

remainder of the recording. Bryant, 57 A.3d at 196. 

As explained above, defense counsel cross-examined Child extensively 

about the interview before the Commonwealth moved to introduce the 

Interview Video. The prosecutor argued: 

And the fact that [defense] counsel, during her cross, 

explicitly went line by line towards what she’s transcribed that 

happened at the PCA video, more than anything, more than any 

other argument, that’s really what makes it important for the jury 

to view the video. She’s gone line by line. 

N.T. Trial, 3/11/16, at 137. This argument, though offered in support of 

admitting the Interview Video under Rule 613, supports its admission under 

Rule 106. Further, the prosecutor limited her request to the approximately 

thirteen minutes during which Child discussed the alleged assault. Id. at 138. 

Given the extent to which defense counsel relied on the Interview Video during 

her cross-examination of the victim, the prosecution was entitled to introduce 

Child’s entire account of the assault in order to provide full context. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/18