NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ADAM C., KALYNN R., Appellants, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, 

K.R., D.C., S.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0071

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD529178 

 JS519408 

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa

By Suzanne Sanchez 

Counsel for Appellant Kalynn R.

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC., Peoria

By Edward D. Johnson

Counsel for Appellant Adam C.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety 

FILED 9-15-2022
ADAM C., KALYNN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

G A S S, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Mother and father appeal the superior court’s order 

terminating their parental rights to their children. Because mother

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to a trial, and 

because reasonable evidence supported the superior court’s best-interests 

determination as to father, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This court views the evidence and any reasonable inferences 

in the light most favorable to affirming the superior court’s decision. See 

Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 13 (App. 2002).

¶3 Mother and father are parents of two children, one born in 

2014 and one in 2016. Mother has another child born in 2009, who is not 

part of this proceeding. For many years, parents struggled with drug and 

alcohol addiction and domestic abuse. Maternal aunt and uncle learned

about parents driving with children while intoxicated and fighting in 

children’s presence—including an incident when mother stabbed father. As 

a result, maternal aunt and uncle filed two private dependency actions—

one in 2015 and one in 2017. In both, the Department of Child Safety (DCS)

took temporary custody of the children and provided parents with services. 

Ultimately, the superior court dismissed both dependency petitions. 

¶4 Even so, both parents continued abusing drugs, alcohol, and 

one another in children’s presence. Father admitted drinking significant 

amounts of alcohol every few nights and both parents used

methamphetamine. Between December 2018 and April 2019, police 

responded to four incidents of domestic abuse at parents’ home. During the 

last incident, father was intoxicated, yelled at the children, and slapped an 

armrest near one child who was crying and in the fetal position. 

¶5 In April 2019, maternal aunt and uncle again filed a private 

dependency petition, alleging abandonment, chronic substance abuse, and 

neglect as to both parents. Also in April 2019, DCS took custody of children 
ADAM C., KALYNN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

3

and placed them with maternal uncle and joined as co-petitioner in the

dependency petition. DCS referred both parents to substance-abuse 

assessment and treatment, urinalysis testing, parent-aide services, and 

supervised visitation. DCS also asked parents to enroll in domestic-violence 

counseling. 

¶6 Father consistently visited with the children, while mother 

occasionally missed scheduled visits. Both parents inconsistently drug 

tested and tested positive for alcohol and methamphetamine. Toward the 

end of 2019, mother briefly demonstrated sobriety while living at a 

residential treatment facility. During that time, she submitted clean 

urinalysis tests, participated in a substance-abuse assessment, and 

completed parent-aide services. But after leaving that facility in May 2020, 

she refused to participate in a recovery-maintenance program and stopped 

testing. Father also attended a 30-day residential sober living program. But 

other than that program, he missed many substance-abuse counseling 

sessions, and when he attended, he minimized his addiction issues and 

resisted treatment. Ultimately, father closed out unsuccessfully from his 

substance-abuse program.

¶7 By the end of 2019, parents ended their abusive relationship. 

Father also completed parent-aide services, but the parent aide said father 

“did not demonstrate behavior changes necessary to enhance [his 

parenting] capacities” because he cancelled skill sessions, did not attend a 

longer treatment program, and did not take accountability for his actions. 

Throughout most of the dependency, father continued to use alcohol and 

methamphetamine. 

¶8 In September 2019, the children’s guardian ad litem filed a 

termination petition alleging neglect, chronic substance abuse, and 

previous removal grounds. Though the superior court set a consolidated 

hearing on the dependency and termination petitions for April 2020, the 

superior court continued the hearing several times for various reasons. 

¶9 In October 2021, DCS filed substituted amended dependency 

and termination petitions in which DCS alleged chronic substance abuse 

and fifteen-month out-of-home placement grounds as to both parents. The 

superior court held a trial on both petitions in March 2022. At the hearing, 

mother pled no-contest to termination. Before she did so, the superior court 

conducted a colloquy with mother, including asking if she consulted with 

her attorney beforehand. Mother said she had. The superior court then 

advised mother she would waive certain rights by pleading no contest, 

including her rights to trial, to challenge DCS’s allegations and make them 
ADAM C., KALYNN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

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meet their burden of proof, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against 

her, to testify, and to call witnesses on her behalf. The court also told mother 

it would hear evidence from DCS even if she pled no contest. Mother said 

she understood those rights and still elected not to contest the petitions. The 

superior court, then, with mother and her counsel present, conducted an 

uncontested trial as to mother. Mother and her counsel did not observe the 

contested trial as to father. 

¶10 After the hearing, the superior court found DCS proved the 

children were dependent as to both parents and found DCS proved by clear 

and convincing evidence the chronic substance abuse and fifteen-month 

out-of-home placement grounds for both parents. The superior court also 

found by a preponderance of the evidence termination would be in 

children’s best interests. Accordingly, the superior court granted DCS’s

dependency and termination petitions. Mother and father timely appealed

from the termination order, but not the dependency finding. This court has 

jurisdiction under article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1, and 12-2101.A.1.

ANALYSIS

¶11 Mother argues she did not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waive her trial rights. Father argues the superior court erred in 

finding termination was in children’s best interests, and the superior court 

should have considered a permanent guardianship. We address each 

argument in turn.

I. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver

¶12 Though mother did not contest termination of her parental 

rights, she argues she did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

plead no-contest because the superior court did not advise her of her right 

to present documentary evidence. Mother shows no reversible error.

¶13 “Parents enjoy a fundamental liberty interest in the care, 

custody, and management of their children.” Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

251 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 8 (2021) (quotations omitted). A parent must make a 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the fundamental 

constitutional right to the custody and control of one’s child. See Ariz. R.P. 

Juv. Ct. 66(D)(1)(a) (June 30, 2022); State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21, 25 (1980) (“in 

any proceeding involving the surrender of Constitutional rights, it must 

appear from the record that the waiver was knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily made”). When a parent pleads no contest to termination of 

parental rights, the superior court must “[d]etermine whether the [parent] 
ADAM C., KALYNN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

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understands the rights being waived.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(D)(1)(b) (June 

30, 2022).1

¶14 This court reviews the interpretation of court rules de novo.

Ruben M. v. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 20 (App. 2012). Unless 

clearly erroneous, this court accepts factual findings if reasonable evidence 

and inferences supports them. A.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 246 Ariz. 402, 405, 

¶ 6 (App. 2019). If findings combine law and fact, this court reviews them 

de novo. White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa Cnty., 241 Ariz. 230, 248, 

¶ 62 (App. 2016).

¶15 Whether mother validly waived her right to trial is a mixed 

question of law and fact. Arizona statute requires the waiver be 

“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” given, but the facts determine 

whether the legal standard is met.

¶16 Here, mother’s counsel represented and consulted with her 

throughout the proceedings. See State v. Lerch, 107 Ariz. 529, 530 (1971) 

(representation by counsel weighs against involuntariness). Before the 

hearing, the superior court informed mother she had the right to a trial on 

the allegations in the termination petition, the right to challenge the 

allegations, the right to hold DCS to its burden of proof, the right to confront 

and cross-examine any witnesses against her, and the right to testify herself 

and to call witnesses on her behalf.When the superior court asked if mother 

understood those rights, she said, “Yes, Your Honor, I do.” The superior 

court also told mother she was waiving those trial rights by not contesting 

the allegations. Mother said she understood. 

¶17 Mother now argues the superior court failed to “affirmatively 

establish” mother was aware of her due process rights because it did not 

advise her of her right to “present documentary evidence.” To begin, even 

in the criminal setting, if the superior court informs a defendant of the right 

to trial, it need not chronicle every attendant trial right, including the right 

to present evidence. See State v. Miller, 110 Ariz. 304, 306 (1974). And the 

superior court advisement here went further than the Miller advisement 

because it advised mother of her rights to challenge the allegations at trial, 

1 Effective July 1, 2022, Rule 66(D)(1)(a) was repealed and replaced with 

Rule 353.e.2, which has slightly different language. We do not address Rule 

353.e.2’s new language.
ADAM C., KALYNN R. v. DCS, et al. 

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6

to confront and cross-examine witnesses brought against her, and to testify 

and call witnesses on her behalf. See id.

¶18 We note an issue for clarity though not raised in the opening 

brief. See Lawrence T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 246 Ariz. 260, 262, ¶ 7, n. 2 (App. 

2019). As part of the colloquy, the superior court said mother would waive 

her right to hold DCS to its burden of proof. In criminal pleas, the defendant 

must establish a factual basis for the plea. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.3(b). But, 

in juvenile cases, the State still bears the burden of proving the statutory 

basis for termination and the termination is in the child’s best interests. See

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(D)(1)(b) (June 30, 2022); Tina T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

236 Ariz. 295, 299, ¶ 16 (App. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Sandra R. 

v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224 (2020). The better practice when 

informing a parent of trial rights is to state DCS still must meet its burden 

of proof to support termination if the parent waives the right to trial. See

Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(D)(c) (June 30, 2022); see also Tina T., 236 Ariz. at 297–

99, ¶¶ 11–16 (App. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Sandra R. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224 (2020).

¶19 Even so, under the totality of the circumstances and facts of 

this case, the advisement adequately covered mother’s right to present 

evidence. Accordingly, the superior court did not err when it accepted 

mother’s waiver as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

II. Children’s Best Interests

¶20 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion when it 

found severance was in children’s best interests. He also argues the superior 

court should have considered a permanent-guardianship option. 

A. Totality of the Circumstances

¶21 The superior court must find by a preponderance of the 

evidence termination is in children’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 

Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). In doing so, the superior court “must consider 

the totality of circumstances” at the time of the trial, including whether the 

current placement is meeting children’s needs, children’s adoptability, the 

adoption plan, the parents’ efforts toward rehabilitation, and the bond 

between the biological parents and children. Alma S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018) (citation omitted); Dominique M. v. Dep’t 

of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98–99, ¶¶ 10–12 (App. 2016). Because the focus 

shifts from parents to children at the best-interests stage, the superior 

court’s primary focus is children’s “interest in stability and security.” Alma 

S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 12. Termination is in children’s best interests if 
ADAM C., KALYNN R. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

7

terminating the parent-child relationship will benefit the children or 

continuing the parent-child relationship will harm children. Maricopa Cnty. 

Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990).

¶22 Because the superior court “is in the best position to weigh 

the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and 

resolve disputed facts[,]” this court will affirm an order terminating 

parental rights if reasonable evidence supports the decision. Jordan C. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

¶23 DCS’s case worker testified about children’s placement with 

maternal uncle, saying the placement was adoptive, children were doing 

well there, and living with uncle would provide them permanency in a safe 

and stable environment. In contrast, father did not attend most of his drug 

testing, he minimized his addiction struggle, and he was still using alcohol 

and methamphetamine about three years after the dependency began—and 

almost seven years after DCS’s first involvement. Though father completed 

his parent-aide program, the parent aide worried father was not working 

to remedy his addiction or taking responsibility for his past behavior. 

¶24 Though father regularly attended visitations and had a bond 

with children, “[t]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship between 

a biological parent and a child . . . is not dispositive in addressing best 

interests.” Dominique M., 240 Ariz. at 98, ¶ 12. A parent-child bond is only 

one factor the superior court must consider under the totality of 

circumstances. See id. Here, the superior court said it considered the totality 

of the circumstances, including father’s “efforts toward reunification, the 

parent-child bond, and fitness to parent.” It also considered children’s 

kinship placement and ultimately found severance was in children’s best 

interests. Because reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s order 

finding termination would be in children’s best interests, the superior court 

did not err in terminating father’s parental rights. See Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 

93, ¶ 18.

B. Permanent Guardianship

¶25 Father relies on Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470 

(2022), to argue we should extend its permanent-guardianship ruling to the 

out-of-home placement ground. We decline to do so here. In Timothy B., our 

supreme court said the normal-home consideration in length-ofincarceration cases means the superior court “should consider the 

availability of a permanent guardian to provide a normal home life [during 
ADAM C., KALYNN R. v. DCS, et al. 

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the incarceration period] if another parent is unavailable.” 252 Ariz. at 477, 

¶ 27 (discussing termination under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4).

¶26 But here the superior court terminated father’s parental rights 

under the substance-abuse and fifteen-month out-of-home placement 

grounds. Unlike the length-of-incarceration ground in Timothy B., the 

normal-home language does not appear in the substance-abuse and out-ofhome placement grounds. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c) and § 8-533.B.3 with

§ 8-533.B.4; see also Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 320, 323, 

¶ 11 (App. 2017) (this court first looks “to the statute’s plain language as the 

best indicator of [legislative] intent[,]” and if the language is clear and 

unambiguous, this court “must give effect to that language without 

employing other rules of statutory construction”); Donald W. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 25 (App. 2019) (discussing the elements 

required to establish the out-of-home placement ground). 

¶27 Moreover, father did not raise the permanent-guardianship 

argument in the superior court or identify a potential permanent guardian 

for the superior court to consider. Accordingly, father waived the issue on 

appeal. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 177–79, 

¶¶ 10–18 (App. 2014).

CONCLUSION

¶28 We affirm.