NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 210518-U

Order filed November 18, 2022

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE )

OF ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

 Complainant-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

IRONHUSTLER EXCAVATING, INC., an ) 

Illinois corporation, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

and ) 

 ) 

RIVER CITY CONSTRUCTION, LLC, an ) 

Illinois limited liability company, and ) 

VENOVICH CONSTRUCTION CO., an ) 

Illinois corporation, ) 

 ) 

Respondents. )

Petition for Administrative Review

Appeal No. 3-21-0518 

Case No. PCB-2020-16 

____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Daugherity and Peterson concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Administrative agency did not err in finding respondent liable for violating 

environmental regulations and in imposing an $80,000 penalty.
2 

¶ 2 Respondent IronHustler Excavating, Inc. (IronHustler) was cited by the Illinois Pollution 

Control Board (Board) for unlawfully dumping construction and demolition debris at an 

unpermitted site. The Board granted summary judgment to the State, as represented by the attorney 

general, in an action instituted by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) against 

IronHustler, River City Construction, LLC (River City) and Venovich Construction Company. 

The Board found that IronHustler and River City violated various provisions of the Illinois 

Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2018)), determined penalties were 

warranted, and assessed a penalty of $80,000 against IronHustler and $35,000 against River City. 

IronHustler appealed the order and opinion of the Board with a direct appeal to this court. River 

City failed to timely seek review in this court and this court denied its motion to file a late petition 

for review. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Respondent IronHustler was hired as a subcontractor by respondent general contractor 

River City to handle demolition, removal and disposal of portions of a high school in Delevan, 

Illinois, at which River City was constructing a new wing. IronHustler transported 208 semi-truck 

loads of debris from the high school project to the Tazewell County Landfill between June 28, 

2017, and July 21, 2017. It also transported 24 loads to a farm owned by Venovich Construction

Company. On July 13, 2017, in response to an anonymous tip regarding unlawful dumping, Jason 

Thorp, an investigator with the IEPA, inspected the farm site. Venovich, the owner of Venovich 

Construction Company, held a permit for clean construction and demolition debris in order to 

prevent erosion along the riverbank abutting the property. However, according to Venovich, 

IronHustler dumped the debris without his knowledge or permission. Venovich was contacted by 

the IEPA about the dumped materials, and in turn, contacted IronHustler and demanded the debris 
3 

be removed. The following day, IronHustler discovered by looking at its trucking timesheets that 

24 loads of construction debris were taken to the farm site, not the landfill. IronHustler arranged 

for removal of the debris and its proper disposal at the landfill. On July 17, 2017, IronHustler 

transported 29 loads of debris from the farm to the landfill.

¶ 5 IronHustler thereafter terminated the employees who had arranged for the open dumping 

at the farm. IronHustler implemented additional policies to prevent future diversions for unlawful 

dumping. IronHustler also implemented a service agreement for nonhazardous waste that 

committed third parties with whom it dealt to reject acceptance of construction debris in violation 

of the Act. To further rectify the situation, IronHustler paid for the transport from the farm and 

disposal at the landfill of five more loads than it dumped, paid for the double transport from the 

job site to the farm and then to the landfill of the original 24 loads and bore the cost of terminating 

its employees and implementing additional remedial actions.

¶ 6 IronHustler, River City and Venovich Construction Company each received a violation 

notice from the IEPA on August 21, 2017. The notice informed the parties that they should 

(1) cease all open dumping at the farm site, (2) remove all unlawfully dumped materials from the 

site, and (3) submit copies of receipts indicating proper disposal of the construction debris. 

Venovich reached a settlement with the IEPA and is not a party to this appeal. IronHustler 

responded in writing to the IEPA’s recommendations, informing the agency that it had complied 

with the recommendations two months earlier. IronHustler proposed a compliance commitment 

agreement, which the IEPA rejected because of the nature and seriousness of the violations which 

remained a subject of disagreement between the IEPA and the respondents. The IEPA issued a 

letter on December 27, 2017, to IronHustler indicating the IEPA inspected the farm site again in 

November 2017 and determined the site was returned to compliance.
4 

¶ 7 On September 16, 2019, the State filed a seven-count complaint with the Board against 

IronHustler, River City and Venovich Construction Company on behalf of IEPA. Count I alleged 

open dumping (415 ILCS 5/21(a) (West 2018)); count II alleged open dumping resulting in litter 

(id. § 21(p)(1)); count III alleged open dumping resulting in waste in standing or flowing waters 

(id. § 21(p)(4)); count IV alleged open dumping of demolition debris (id. § 21(p)(7)(i)); count V 

alleged developing and operating a landfill without a permit (35 Ill. Adm. Code 812.101(a) (2018); 

415 ILCS 5/21(d)(1) (West 2018)); count VI alleged developing and operating a landfill in 

violation of board regulations (415 ILCS 5/21(d)(2) (West 2018)); and count VII alleged waste 

disposal at an improper site (id. § 21(e)). The complaint sought various monetary penalties based 

on the alleged violations.

¶ 8 The State moved for summary judgment in March 2021 and IronHustler filed a crossmotion for summary judgment in May 2021. On October 7, 2021, the Board granted summary 

judgment to the State, denied IronHustler’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and assessed 

penalties of $80,000 against IronHustler and $35,000 against River City. IronHustler timely filed 

its petition. River City filed a late petition for review, which this court denied. River City filed a 

brief and argued its position in IronHustler’s appeal. The State moved to strike River City’s brief,

which this court initially denied but thereafter granted after vacating the denial order. People v. 

IronHustler, No. 3-21-0518 (Sept. 15, 2022) (unpublished dispositional order). River City is not a 

party to this appeal.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 IronHustler argues that summary judgment was improperly granted to the State, which it 

maintains failed to establish it violated the Act. According to IronHustler, the State did not prove 

it dumped waste at the farm site. IronHustler also argues that the Board erred in imposing a 
5 

monetary penalty. It asserts the penalty was not appropriate where the penalty was imposed for 

past violations, IronHustler acted at all times in good faith, the penalty was not warranted under 

the applicable statutory factors, and the amount of the penalty imposed was inappropriate. Finally,

IronHustler argues that River City was improperly penalized for IronHustler’s actions about which

River City was unaware. 

¶ 11 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 

file, along with any affidavits, show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018). When parties file

cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that no genuine issue of material fact exists and 

that the issue is a question of law. Prairie Rivers Network v. Pollution Control Board, 2016 IL

App (1st) 150971, ¶ 24. This court reviews an administrative agency’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Id. ¶ 23. On review, this court gives deference to the administrative determination and

will only set aside a penalty “if it is clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” City of Morris 

v. Community Landfill Co., 2011 IL App (3d) 090847, ¶ 42. 

¶ 12 To determine whether to impose a penalty and its amount, the Board looks to the factors in

section 33(c) of the Act and all the attendant facts and circumstances that bear on the conduct that

is the subject of the complaint. Modine Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 193 Ill. 

App. 3d 643, 648 (1990). The severity of the penalty should bear some relationship to the

seriousness of the conduct or infraction. Id. at 649. In determining whether to impose a penalty 

and its amount, good faith or lack of it is a pertinent consideration. Id. 

¶ 13 A. IEPA Burden to Establish that “Waste” was Dumped 

¶ 14 To begin, IronHustler submits that the IEPA failed to demonstrate that the dumped 

materials were “[g]eneral construction or demolition debris” or “[w]aste” as defined in the Act. 
6 

See 415 ILCS 5/3.160(a), 3.535 (West 2018). Accordingly, it maintains, the State failed to carry 

its burden that it violated the Act, challenging the affidavit of Thorp, the IEPA inspector, which 

stated that general construction or demolition debris was present at the farm site. IronHustler 

submits that anything it dumped was permissible clean construction and demolition debris. 

“ ‘General construction or demolition debris’ means non-hazardous, uncontaminated 

materials resulting from the construction, remodeling, repair, and demolition of *** 

structures, *** limited to the following: bricks, concrete, and other masonry materials;

soil; rock; wood, including non-hazardous painted, treated, and coated wood and wood 

products; wall coverings; plaster; drywall; plumbing fixtures; non-asbestos insulation; 

roofing shingles and other roof coverings; reclaimed or other asphalt pavement; glass; 

plastics that are not sealed in a manner that conceals waste; electrical wiring and 

components containing no hazardous substances; and corrugated cardboard, piping or

metals incidental to any of those materials ***.” 415 ILCS 5/3.160(a) (West 2018).

Section 3.535 defines “ ‘Waste’ ” as:

“any garbage *** or other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or 

contained gaseous material resulting from industrial [and] commercial *** operations, 

and from community activities ***.” Id. ¶ 3.535. 

¶ 15 Thorp’s affidavit was introduced by the IEPA in support of its claim of unlawful dumping. 

He visited both the dump site at the farm and the high school project site on July 17, 2017. Thorp 

averred that the demolition debris he discovered at the farm contained “electrical wire, metal 

radiators, wood, rebar, wire conduit, metal sheeting, metal angle iron, painted brick, plywood, 

metal studs, metal pipe, painted concrete, slag, and ceramic tile.” He further attested that he 

reinspected the dump site on November 16, 2017, that the construction debris had been removed, 
7 

and that IronHustler submitted receipts showing it properly disposed of the debris at a landfill on 

July 17, 2017. The IEPA submitted photographs taken by Thorp at both the farm and the high 

school demolition/construction project. The farm photographs depicted the dumped construction 

debris and Thorp described the type of debris shown in the photos as attested in his affidavit. 

Photographs from the high school site showed construction debris similar to that found at the farm. 

Photographs of both sites showed excavators bearing IronHustler markings. In its answers to 

interrogatories, IronHustler stated that the operator of the excavator seen at the farm was its 

employee and that the excavator had been transported to the farm by another of its employees.

¶ 16 Other than IronHustler’s denials, it did not offer any proof to rebut the IEPA’s evidence of 

open dumping of waste. Its inspector documented the debris with photographs, which aligned with 

his attestations that the materials dumped at the farm consisted of construction and demolition 

debris and constituted waste. We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the 

debris deposited at the farm site was waste and that the IEPA did not carry its burden to establish 

violations of the Act.

¶ 17 B. Assessment of Penalty

¶ 18 IronHustler disputes the propriety of the monetary penalty assessed against it, arguing that 

it should not be penalized for past violations, that imposition of the penalty violates the factors set 

forth in section 33(c) of the Act, and that River City should not be monetarily penalized because 

it played no role in the open dumping. 

¶ 19 1. Past Violations

¶ 20 IronHustler argues that it was improperly assessed penalties for “wholly past” violations 

of the Act, which it readily corrected, and demonstrated that it exercised good faith in complying 

with the Act. It observes that the dumping took place on July 7, 2017; it was notified about it on 
8 

July 13, 2017; removed the debris on July 17, 2017; and the site was reinspected and found in 

compliance on November 16, 2017. The IEPA did not pursue its action against it until September 

16, 2019, when the State filed a complaint on its behalf. According to IronHustler, the penalties 

cannot serve to enforce the Act but merely punishes it and discourages others from acting in good 

faith to remedy Act violations.

¶ 21 There is no bar to the imposition of penalties for past violations of the Act. See Modine 

Manufacturing Co, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 648 (“we decline to hold categorically that penalties may 

not be imposed for wholly past violations”). In Modine, the appellant challenged the $10,000 

penalty imposed against him for violating the Act, arguing the penalty was not necessary to aid in 

the Act’s enforcement. Id. at 647. The reviewing court rejected the appellant’s argument that

because the violation had ceased before the complaint against it was filed, the monetary penalty 

would not aid in enforcing the Act. Id. at 648. However, the court found under the applicable 

statutory factors that a maximum penalty was not warranted and reduced the penalty to $1000. Id. 

at 650. The appellant in Modine worked for several years with the IEPA to rectify its violations of 

the Act, cooperated fully with the agency, and expended substantial funds to correct the problem. 

Id. In contrast, although IronHustler quickly cleaned up the illegal dump site at the farm and 

transported the debris to a landfill prior to the complaint being filed, the efforts were by compulsion 

and without good faith. IronHustler’s compliance with the Act took place only when it got caught 

dumping illegally. The fact that IronHustler’s excavator was at the farm site and more than 20 

loads of debris were dumped there indicate that the illegal dumping was not small scale and the 

result of the normal operations of business, as in Modine. 

¶ 22 The cases on which IronHustler relies for the proposition that past violations should not be 

penalized are distinguished. In CPC International, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 24 Ill. 
9 

App. 3d 203, 208 (1974), the reviewing court found the $15,000 penalty arbitrary and excessive 

where the violations were not deliberate and the violator quickly corrected the problem. In 

Southern Illinois Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 60 Ill. 2d 204, 209 (1975), the court 

found monetary penalties were not warranted under the Act, as the violations had ended long 

before the IEPA brought its enforcement actions and there were significant mitigating 

circumstances. In Park Crematory, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 264 Ill. App. 3d 498, 506 

(1994), the reviewing court found the monetary penalty punitive in that it “in no way aid[ed] in 

the enforcement of the Act,” noting the violator misunderstood the permit requirements, 

cooperated promptly with the IEPA, and corrected the violations prior to the complaint.

¶ 23 In City of Moline v. Pollution Control Board, 133 Ill. App. 3d 431, 434 (1985), this court 

reversed the monetary penalty imposed on Moline for its violations of the Act, finding that the 

monetary penalty was purely punitive. Moline worked extensively with the IEPA to resolve the 

problems, took its own initiatives to further abate the problems and ultimately operated in 

compliance. Id. at 432-33. This court reasoned a monetary penalty was inappropriate for two 

significant reasons. Id. at 434. First, it considered the IEPA’s complaint unnecessary, as Moline

had been working with the IEPA to resolve the issues. Id. Secondly, it noted that the burden of the 

penalty would be borne by the taxpayers, who were already saddled with the increased costs 

associated with Moline’s measures to comply with the Act. Id.

¶ 24 In contrast, here, the dumping was deliberate, IronHustler’s employees were aware of the 

dumping, there were no long-term attempts or cooperation with the IEPA to correct violations, 

there were no mitigating circumstances, and IronHustler only cleaned up the dump site after the 

open dumping was discovered. Furthermore, in the cases presented by IronHustler, the violations 

that had been remedied were long-term violations, not a single illegal dumping. The monetary 
10 

penalties were rejected because they did nothing to enforce the Act, whereas here, the penalty 

serves, in part, to force future compliance. While IronHustler cleaned up the dump site in quick 

fashion, the penalty was imposed because the dumping took place in the first place. 

¶ 25 2. Assessment of Penalty

¶ 26 IronHustler argues that the PCB erred when it imposed an $80,000 penalty. According to 

IronHustler, the section 33(c) factors do not support imposition of a penalty.

¶ 27 To determine whether to impose a penalty, the PCB is guided by the considerations set 

forth in section 33(c) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/33(c) (West 2018)). Southern Illinois Asphalt Co., 

60 Ill. 2d at 207-08. Section 33(c) provides as follows:

“(c) In making its orders and determinations, the Board shall take into consideration 

all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the reasonableness of the emissions, 

discharges, or deposits involved, including, but not limited to: 

 (i) the character and degree of injury to, or interference with the protection of 

the health, general welfare and physical property of the people;

 (ii) the social and economic value of the pollution source;

 (iii) the suitability or unsuitability of the pollution source to the area in which it 

is located, including the question of priority of location in the area involved;

 (iv) the technical practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing or 

eliminating the emissions, discharges or deposits resulting from such pollution 

source; and

 (v) any subsequent compliance.” 415 ILCS 5/33(c)(i)-(v) (West 2018).

¶ 28 As to the first factor, IronHustler submits that the debris it dumped was solid waste and 

presumably less harmful than if it had dumped liquid waste. While the fact the waste was solid 
11 

allowed an easier clean up, it does not diminish that IronHustler engaged in unlawful open 

dumping of construction and demolition debris along the banks of and in a river. The dumped 

waste included electrical wire, metal radiators, wood, rebar, wire conduit, metal sheeting, metal 

angle iron, painted brick, plywood, metal studs, metal pipe, painted concrete, slag, and ceramic 

tile. IronHustler maintains the waste only remained for a short period of time and did not leave 

behind any contamination; however, the mere dumping of these items interfered with or threatened 

the general welfare and health of the people. See Toyal America, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control 

Board, 2012 IL App (3d) 100585, ¶ 40 (finding violation where unlawful emission “caused, 

allowed, or threatened air pollution”) (citing 415 ILCS 5/9(a) (West 2018)). 

¶ 29 The second factor weighs in favor of penalizing IronHustler, as found by the Board. The 

construction of a new high school wing has social and economic value to the public but the 

dumping of debris from the construction project does not.

¶ 30 The third factor, the suitability of the pollution source, also weighs in favor of a penalty. 

The debris was dumped along and in the Mackinaw River. The dump site was not a permitted 

landfill. IronHustler argues that the dumping was orchestrated by rogue employees; however, this 

fact does not relieve IronHustler of responsibility. See Gonzalez v. Pollution Control Board, 2011 

IL App (1st) 093021, ¶ 33 (standard is whether the violator “has the capability of control over the 

pollution”). Nor do its claims of proactive efforts to ensure future compliance as this violation is 

not the first for IronHustler, termination of rogue employees notwithstanding.

¶ 31 The fourth factor is whether reducing or eliminating the pollution was technically 

practicable and economically reasonable. All IronHustler needed to do was transport the waste to 

the landfill as it did with the other loads from the high school project. The landfill was permitted 
12 

and dumping the debris there was both practicable and reasonable. This factor weighs in favor of 

a penalty.

¶ 32 The fifth and final factor is any subsequent compliance. The Board found this factor 

favored IronHustler and the record supports the finding.

¶ 33 We conclude that the Board did not err in finding on these undisputed facts that IronHustler 

violated the Act, that summary judgment was proper, and that a penalty was warranted. The 

majority of the section 33(c) factors support the PCB’s finding that penalties were appropriate.

¶ 34 3. Amount of Penalty

¶ 35 The next inquiry is the amount of the penalty, as determined by the section 42(h) factors

(415 ILCS 5/42(h) (West 2018)). IronHustler challenges the monetary penalty of $80,000 and the 

penalty against River City of $35,000, arguing the PCB’s “general analysis” of the factors was 

insufficient and a proper analysis would conclude that the amount of the penalties assessed was 

unwarranted. 

¶ 36 Section 42(h) provides:

“(h) In determining the appropriate civil penalty to be imposed***, the Board is 

authorized to consider any matters of record in mitigation or aggravation of penalty, 

including, but not limited to, the following factors:

 (1) the duration and gravity of the violation;

 (2) the presence or absence of due diligence on the part of the respondent in 

attempting to comply with requirements of this Act and regulations thereunder or 

to secure relief therefrom as provided by the Act; 
13 

 (3) any economic benefits accrued by the respondent because of delay in 

compliance with requirements, in which case the economic benefits shall be 

determined by the lowest cost alternative for achieving compliance;

 (4) the amount of monetary penalty which will serve to deter further violations 

by the respondent and to otherwise aid in enhancing voluntary compliance with this 

Act by the respondent and other persons similarly subject to the Act;

 (5) the number, proximity in time, and gravity of previously adjudicated 

violations of this Act by the respondent;

 (6) whether the respondent voluntarily self-disclosed, ***non-compliance to the 

Agency; 

 (7) whether the respondent has agreed to undertake a ‘supplemental 

environmental project’, which means an environmentally beneficial project that a 

respondent agrees to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action brought 

under this Act, but which the respondent is not otherwise legally required to 

perform; and

 (8) whether the respondent has successfully completed a Compliance 

Commitment Agreement under subsection (a) of Section 31 of this Act to remedy 

the violations that are the subject of the complaint.” 415 ILCS 5/42(h)(1)-(8) (West 

2018). 

¶ 37 The first factor, the duration and gravity of the violation, was found to be neutral by the 

Board. It noted that the open dumping was discovered by the IEPA inspector on July 13, 2017, 

and the material was “promptly” removed on July 17, 2017. When the dump site was inspected 

again on November 16, 2017, the debris had been removed. According to the Board, the limited 
14 

duration of the open dumping was counterbalanced by the gravity of the violation. This factor 

serves to aggravate the penalty amount.

¶ 38 The next factor is IronHustler’s due diligence in complying with the Act and its regulations. 

IronHustler acted with diligence in removing the debris and bringing the site into compliance with 

the Act. The Board’s finding that this factor favored IronHustler is supported by the record. This 

factor is mitigating.

¶ 39 Whether there were any economic benefits to IronHustler as a result of its compliance delay 

is the third factor. The Board considered this factor neutral, noting that IronHustler paid to clean 

the farm site and dump the debris at a permitted site and that the State did not provide information 

that IronHustler enjoyed any economic benefits from its noncompliance.

¶ 40 The next factor to be considered is the amount of penalty which will serve to deter further 

violations and enhance voluntary compliance. The Board found this factor significant, calculating 

the amount of the penalty to “serve to deter future violations” by IronHustler and others. 

Assessment of a substantial monetary penalty would serve to urge potential violators like 

IronHustler to comply with the Act initially, rather than after violating it. See Wasteland, Inc. v.

Illinois Pollution Control Board, 118 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1055 (1983) (penalty to deter “those who 

blatantly disregard applicable rules and regulations [and] others who might consider cutting 

corners at the expense of the environment”). This is an aggravating factor.

¶ 41 Whether there were previously adjudicated violations is the next factor and it weighs 

against IronHustler as found by the Board. It had prior adjudicated violations and penalties: in 

2013, a $10,000 penalty for open dumping at a nonpermitted site, and in 2019, a $3000 penalty for 

open dumping resulting in litter and the deposit of construction debris. This factor aggravates the 

penalty as to IronHustler.
15 

¶ 42 The next factor, whether the respondent voluntarily self-disclosed, also aggravates the 

penalty, as the Board found. IronHustler did not self-disclose, and contrary to its claims that it was 

unaware of the violation until notified by the IEPA, the debris was transported to and dumped at 

the site by IronHustler employees using IronHustler equipment.

¶ 43 Finally, the Board stated that the record contained no evidence regarding the seventh and 

eighth factors, whether IronHustler agreed to a supplemental environmental project or completed 

a compliance commitment agreement, and apparently found these factors neutral.

¶ 44 We find the undisputed material facts support the Board’s analysis of the section 42(h) 

factors and agree that imposition of an $80,000 penalty was appropriate under the applicable 

factors.

¶ 45 4. River City’s Liability

¶ 46 Finally, IronHustler maintains that the penalty against River City was in error because 

River City did not “cause or allow” a violation of the Act. As discussed above, River City failed 

to timely appeal the Board’s decision and IronHustler lacks standing to present an argument on 

River City’s behalf.

¶ 47 Standing “requires only some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest.” Greer v. 

Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492 (1988). To satisfy the standing 

requirement, a party must establish that its injury is distinct and palpable, can fairly be traced to 

the actions of the defendant, and the grant of requested relief is “substantially likely” to prevent or 

redress the party’s claimed injury. Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1993). “A party must 

assert its own legal rights and interests, rather than assert a claim for relief based upon the rights 

of third parties.” Powell v. Dean Foods Co., 2012 IL 111714, ¶ 36. 
16 

¶ 48 As we determined in granting the State’s motion to strike River City’s brief, we lack 

jurisdiction to review the Board’s findings and penalty against it. River City failed to timely file 

its petition for review of the Board’s decision and IronHustler’s petition for review referenced only 

the finding and penalty against River City. See IronHustler, No. 3-21-0518. We also reject 

IronHustler’s assertion that it has standing because its contract with River City obligates it to River 

City for any claims arising from IronHustler’s work. Thus, IronHustler asserts, any penalty 

imposed against River City is IronHustler’s responsibility to pay, and thus, it has a valid economic 

interest in River City’s penalty and has standing to challenge it. Despite IronHustler’s contractual 

obligation, it cannot seek relief based on River City’s rights.

¶ 49 In summary, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact that IronHustler violated 

the Act by unlawfully dumping waste at an unpermitted site. The Board did not err in granting 

summary judgment in favor of the State and denying IronHustler’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment. 

¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 51 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Pollution Control Board is affirmed. 

¶ 52 Affirmed.