Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 5 , 2021.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 19

- 00792

- CV

JASON DEYO , Appellant

V.
CHAD DWAYNE BRADSHAW AND KENNETH RANDAL L

HUFSTETLER , Appellee s
On Appeal from the 239th Distr i ct Court Brazoria C o u nty, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 103573

- CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION Following an enfo rcement proceeding relating to a child

- suppor t order, appellant Jason Deyo file d this lawsuit asserting claims of false imprisonment and gross negligence a gain st two judges pr e sidin g over the enforcement proceedings , ap pellees C had Dwayne Bradshaw and Kenneth Ran dal l Hufstetler. Deyo and the jud ge s filed c ompeting motions for summary judgment

. Among other arguments , the judges asserted that ju dicial immunity barred Deyo ’ s suit

. T he trial court2

granted the jud ges ’ motion. We affirm.
I
. B ACKGROUND During the rele v ant time period, Judge Hufstetler was the district judge for the 300 th District Court ; Judge Bradshaw was the associate judge for that same
court. In 2009, as part of a s ui t affecting the parent

- child r elationship, the 300 t h District Court signed a final order requi ring Deyo , among other things, to pay child

s upport to his ex

- wife. In 2017, Deyo ’ s ex

- wife filed a motion in the 300t h District Court to en force the child

- su p p or t o rder, followed by an amended m ot ion t o enfo rce the order . After a h earin g on the amended order before Associate Judge Bra dshaw , Judge Bradshaw rendered o rder s holding Deyo in contempt for violating the chi l d

- support order and committ ing Deyo to jail f or 180 d ays f

or each of 17 violation s , with the periods of con fin ement to run concurrently . The da y after
t he hearing, Judge Hufstetler s igned an order memorializing Associate Judge Bradshaw ’ s orders

. Deyo filed a petition for a writ o f hab eas cor pu s, whi c h Judge Hu fstetler granted, releasing Deyo after less than a m onth of confinement

. I I
. A NAL YSIS
A. Subject

- matt er j urisd iction We first address our subject

- matter jurisdiction , specif ically whether the trial
court ’s order granting t he ju dges ’ s ummary

- jud g me nt motion was a final, appealable judgmen t

. See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape , 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (appe llate court is “ obligated to review sua sponte issues affecting jurisdic tion ” even if not raised b y parties). A judgment is fi nal “ if it dispos e s of all pending parties and claims in the record.” Lehmann v. Har

– Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (T ex. 2001). In Lehmann , the supreme court instruct ed that, “ in cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be r ender ed, a judg ment is sued3

witho u t a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes o f all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it sta tes with unmistakable clarity that it i s a f inal judgm en t a s to all cla i ms and all parties. ” Id. at 192

– 93

. If the judgm e nt is n ot “ unmistakably cl ear , ”
t o determine wheth e r a judgment dispose s of all pending claims and parties, it may be necessary for the appellate court to look to the record in the cas e. Id

. at 205

– 06

.

“ [A] n o rder that all parties appear to have treat ed as final m ay be final despite some vagueness in the order itself, whi le an order that some party should not reasonably have rega rd ed as fina l may not be final despite language that might indicate otherwise.” I

d. at 206. Deyo ’ s petition names three defendants: J udge Hufstetler, Associate Judge Bradshaw, and the State of Texas. The trial cour t ’ s order on d ef endants ’ motio n f

or summary judgme nt , h ow ever, only addresses claims against the judges :

After considering De fendants District Court Judge K. Randall Hufstetle r and Associate Judge Chad D. Bradshaw ’ s Motion for Summary Judgment, the pleading s, the response, the reply, and the other evidenc e on fil e, t he Court GRANTS the Motion for Summa ry Judgment. Accordingly , t he Court orders Plaintiff Jason Deyo to take noth ing on his claims against Defendants District Court Judge K. Randall Hufstetler and Associate Judge Chad D. Bra dshaw.
A judgment tha t doe s not d ispose of unserved parties still may be final for
purposes o f a

ppeal when (1) the judgment expressly dispo ses of some, but not all defendants, (2) the only remai ning defendants have not been serv ed or answered, and (3) noth ing in the record ind icate s that plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved de f

en dants, such that the case “stands as if the re had been a discontinuance” as to the unserved defend ants. Youngstown She et & Tube Co. v. Penn , 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962); see M.O . Den tal Lab , 139 S.W.3d at 6 754

(holding that decision in Penn s urvives L eh mann )

. Here, Associate Judge Brad shaw a nd Jud ge Hufstetler were ser ved , app eared, and a nswered. Ou r revi ew of the record does not reve al any e ff orts by Deyo to se rv e the State of Texas , and the re is no app earance or ans wer by t he State

. Accordingly, we t ur n to whether the record indicates th a t Deyo “ ever expected to obtain service ” on the State. See Penn , 363 S.W.2d at 232

. The record contains no request for a citation for the S tate. In deed, in h is li sting of the pa rties , while Deyo lists a ddress es where th e two judges may be served , he does not do so for the State of T exas:

Defendant, THE STATE OF TEXAS is sued for Plaintiff [ ’ ] s personal injuries caused by th e gross and negligent acts or omis sio ns of its em ployee s. Those employees were acting within the s co pe of their office or employment under circum stances where THE STATE OF TEXAS, if a priv ate person, would be liable to Plaintiff in accordance with Texas Ci vil Pra ctice & Remedies Code § 41. 005 (b )( 1 ).
T h is langu age, which d oes not include any informatio n a bout where or how the State of Texas migh t be serv ed, indicates th at Deyo did not intend to serve the State

. Cf. Fair Oaks Hous. Partners, LP v. Hernandez , 616 S.W.3d 602, 606

– 07 (Tex. App.

— Hou sto n [14th D ist .] 202 0 , no pet. h. ) (plaintiff ’s listing of d ef endant ’s address as “unknown ” in original and am ended petition s indicated that plaintiff did not inten d to serve that defendant). In addition, in hi s own motio n fo r summary judgment, while Deyo li sts the S tat e of T exas a s a party, he also states,

“ On Ju l y 23rd defendants filed an Answer that contained a ‘ General Denial ’ along with numerous Unmeritorious claims and untenable affirmative defenses. ” Only the judges had f

iled answer s , indicating tha t D eyo did n ot view t he State of Te xas as a separate party t o b e ser ved. F urther , we note that Deyo appealed th e trial
court ’ s ju dg ment without arguing , either in the trial court o r this court, that the5

judgment was not fi nal because it did not dispose of cla ims ag ain s t th e St ate of Texas. W e conclude nothing in th e r ecord indicates that Deyo ever expected to obtai n service on the State of Texas . A ccordingly , the trial court ’ s order granting the judges ’ summary

-

judgment mot ion , which disposes of all claims aga inst the jud ges, is final and appealable. See Penn , 363 S

. W. 2d at 232

. B
. Notice of summary

-

judgment hearin g In issue 1, Deyo arg ues that he did not receive sufficient notice of the heari ng on the judges ’ summary

- judgm ent motion be cause the not ice of h ea ring

was fil ed on August 5 , 2019 at 3:12 p

. m

. , set ting the he aring for August 26 , 20 19 at 9:00 a

. m . Deyo comp lains that he did not recei ve the required 21

- days notice ; instead, the hear ing was “six (6) hours and 12 minut es early and thus has not met the 21 day require ment found under Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).” See Te x . R. Civ. P. 166a( c ).
Rule 4 states , in relevan t part, the following rega rding the computati on of time under the Rules of Civil Procedure: In computing any pe riod of time prescribed or allowed by these rul es, by ord er of court, or by any applicable sta t ut e, the day of the act, event, or default after w hich the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a S aturday, Sun day, or le gal holiday, in which event the perio d r uns until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or lega l holiday.
Tex . R. Civ. P. 4. In Lewis v. Blake , the supreme court applied Rule 4 to service of hearing on a Rule 166a ( c ) summary

- ju d gment mot ion : Rule 4 could not be plainer: it a pp lies to any period of time prescribed by the rul es of procedure, and Rule 166a is one of those rules. Applying Rule 4 to Rule 166a(c), the day of service is no t to be included in computing the m inimum 21

– da y notice f or he aring, and the day of hearing is

. T hus, hearing on a motion for summary6

judgment ma y be set as early as the 2 1st day after the motion is served, or the 24th day if the motion is served by mail. 876 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1994) . I n th i s case , notice of hearing on the judges ’
summary

- judgme n t motion was filed on August 5 settin g the hearing for Aug ust 26, which was the 21st day after the motion was filed

. See id. We conclude that Deyo has not s hown ser vice of the notice of hearing w a s untimely.
We overrul e issue 1.
C
. Ju dicial im munity
In i s su es 2 through 10, Deyo makes vario us arguments as to w hy the judge s
are not immun e from suit under the doctrine of ju dicial imm unity

. Deyo focuses on his allega tion that, although he was in car ce rated follow ing the he aring on the amended motion for en forc e me nt, he was not “ personally served ” with notice o f the hear ing as required by Family Code section 157.062(c). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.062(c). 1 H e also claims he was not served with the motion for enfo rcem ent itsel f. Deyo argues that , in light of these p ro cedural deficiencies , the judges denied him proc edural due process

— Associate J udge Bradshaw, by proceeding with the hearing and rendering order s following the hearing , and Judge Hufste tler, by signing th e written or der follo wing the hearing . Deyo conten d s his cla ims are support ed by the fact that Judge Hufstetler later granted his habeas

- corpus petition

1 Section 157.062(c) provides : Notice of hearing on a motion for enforcement of a final order providing for chil d support or possession of or access t o a child, a ny provi sion of a final order rendered against a party who has a lr eady appeared in a s uit under this title, or any provisio n of a temporary order shall be given to the respondent by personal service of a co py of the motion and notice not later than the 1 0t h day be fore the date of the h earing. For purposes of this subse ct ion, “temporary orde r” includes a temporary restraining o rder, standing order, injunction, and any other temporary order rendered by a court

. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.062 (c).7

and released h i m from prison . Deyo also complains tha t the lack of personal service of the he aring n otice dep riv ed the tr i a l c ourt of personal jurisdicti o n over him. Judges acting in their of ficial judicial capacity have immunity from liability and suit for judicial acts performed within the scope of their jur isdiction. See Dallas C nty

. v. Ha lsey , 87 S. W.3d 552, 55 4 (Tex. 2002). This immunity extends t o

ac t io ns that are done “ in error, malicio usly, and even in excess of t he judge ’ s authority. ” Twilligear v. Carrell , 148 S.W.3d 502, 50 4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, p et. denied) (citing Stum p v. S parkman , 435 U.S. 34 9, 356

– 57 (1978) ). Ju dicial immun i t y is overcome only for acti ons that a re: (1) nonju dicial, i .e., not taken in the judge ’ s official capacity , or (2) taken in the complete absence of al l juris diction. Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 11

– 12 (1991) ; Twil ligear , 148 S.W.3d at 50 4

. We first determ i ne whether the judges ’ actions were “ ju dicial. ” Whether an act is judicial for this purpose is determined by the nature of the a ct, i.e., whether it is a fun ction normally performed by a ju dge, a s cont rasted from other ad ministrative, legislative, or exec u ti ve acts that simply happen to be do ne by judges. Twilligear , 148 S.W.3d at 504

– 05 . Judicial acts include those per formed by judges in adju dicati ng, or othe rwise exercising the ir judicial author ity ov er, proceedi ngs pend ing in their courts. Id

. at 505

. C o nv ersely, nonjudicial acts include ot her tasks, even though essential to the functioning of courts and re quired by law to be per formed by a judge, such as: ( 1) selecting jurors for a county ’ s

cou rts; ( 2) promulgat ing and enforcing a code of conduct for at t or neys; and (3) making personnel deci sions regarding court employees and officers. I d

. H e r e, the judges ’ actions

—holding a hearing and ruling on a motion

— are8

quin tessential judicial actions. 2 See id

. a t 50 4

– 05

. Wh ile Deyo may disagree w ith the j udges ’ dec i si ons, these are n onetheles s judicial acts , even if there were erro rs of procedural due process relating to serv ice of the enforcement motion and notice of h earing

. See Stump , 435 U.S. at 359 (re jectin g argument t hat acti ons were nonjudicial due to j udge ’ s “ failure to comply with element ary principles of procedural due process ” and expl aining that “ [a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for his jud icial acts even if his exercise of aut hority is flawed b y the

co mmission of grave procedural error s ” ).
W e next examine whether the judge s ’ actions we re “ taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction. ” In determining whether an act was “ clearly outside ” a j udge ’ s jurisdiction for judicial

- immun ity p urposes, the focus i s not on whether the judge ’ s specif

ic act w as proper or improper, but on whether the judge had the subject

- matter jurisdiction necessary to perform an act of that kind in the case. 3 Bradt v. We st , 892 S.W.2d 56, 6 8 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [1s t Dist.] 19 9 4, writ denied)

. This case concerns enforc ement of a 2009 child

- support order by t he 300 th Dis trict Court , the court over which J ud ge Hufstetler and Assoc iate Judge Bradshaw presi ded during the relev ant time perio d. A trial court h as inhe rent judicial authority to enfor ce its orders and decrees , K atz v. B ianchi , 848 S.W.2d 372, 374 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (collecting cases ) , and statutory authority to enforce its temporary or fi nal child

- support order s in su its affec ting the parent

- child relationsh ip

. See T ex. Fam. Code An n. § 15 7

. 00 1( a), (c),

2 T he facto rs we cons ider in determining wh ether a judge ’ s act is “judi cial” ar e whether (1) the ac t complained of is one normally performed by a judge, (2) the act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct su ch as the judge ’ s chambers, (3) the co ntroversy ce ntered
a round a case pending b efore the judge, and (4) the act a ro se out of an exchang e with the judge in the judge ’ s judicial capacity. Bradt v. West , 892 S.W.2d 56, 67 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)

.

3 Accordingly, Deyo ’ s arguments c oncerning personal jur i sdiction are not relevant to this
ana lysis.9

(d). M oreover, the trial court had statutory authority to hold Deyo in contempt for violations of the child

- s upport order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.001 (b) ( “ The court may enfo r ce by contempt any provision of a temporary or final order. ” ) . We

co nclude the judges ’ act ions we re not “ taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction. ”

Because the actions complained o f were ju dicial actions and were not taken in the complete absence of s ubject

- matter jurisdiction , we c onclude the trial court
prop er ly r en dered s ummar y jud g me nt in fa vor of the ju d ges on judicial

- immun ity grounds. We overrule Deyo ’s issue s 2 through 10. We do not address issues 11 and 12, as these i ssues conc ern alt ernate ar gum ents tha t would n ot affor d Dey o an y relie f given our conc lu sion t he judges were entit led to ju dicial immunity

. Tex. R. App. P. 47 .1.
I II
. C ONC LUSION
We affirm the tr ial court ’ s j udgm ent as challenged on ap peal

.

/s/ C harle s A. Spain Just ice

Panel co nsis ts of Jus t i ces B ou rliot , Zimmerer , an d Spain

.