### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 11, 200 6

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CH AR LES H ALL

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 04-00119, 20 Ar thur T. Benn ett , Judge

No. W2005-01338-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Augu st 11, 2006

The de fenda nt, Charles Ha ll, was convicte d by a Shel b y C o u n t y j u ry

of two counts of a g g ravated robbery . For

these off enses, the de fenda nt was sentenc ed as a repe at violent offe nder to c onsecutive
sentenc es of life imprisonment without t he possibilityof par ole. On appe al, he arg ues t hat: (1) the
tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in c on so lid a tin g the ind ic tme nts fo r t ri a l; ( 2) the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in se nte nc ing him

un de r the Re pe a t Vi ole nt Of fe nd e r Ac t; (3 ) the e vid e nc e wa s ins uf fi c ie nt to s up po rt

his c on vic tio ns ; and (4) the trial court err ed in or dering consec utive sentenc ing. Following our revie w of the re cord

a ndthe pa rt ie s’ brie fs , w e re ve rs e the jud g me nts of the tr ia l c ou rt a ndre ma ndfo r t wo se pa

rate tr ia ls.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

J.C. M C L IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Robert Wils on J ones (Of Counsel ), S helby

CountyChief Public Defe nder; Tony N. B rayton (on

app e a l) a ndTi mothy

Al be rs a nd Willi a m Rob ili o (at tria l) , A ssi sta nt P ub lic De fe nd e rs , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f

or the app e lla nt, Cha

rl e s H a ll.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Wil lis , A ss ist a nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Ge n er al ; and Stacy McEndre e, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

BACK GR OUND

Th e de fe nd a nt, Cha

rl e s H a ll, wa s c ha

rg e d w ith tw o c ou nts of a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

in indictment 04-00119 and two c ounts of a g g ravated robbe ry

in indictment 04-00120. The lower court consolidated the indictments for trial over the defe ndant’s object i o n

. T h e testi mony from the consolidated trial is set out below.-2-

J anice Gordon testified that she was wor king a s a t el l er at Br ighton B ank on F ebrua ry 20, 2003. She arrived at wor

k at 7:30 that morning but stay ed in her car beca use the ba nk did not open until 8:00. As she was sitti ng in her car, a m an approac hed with a g un and told her to “ g ive him the ke y s. ” Ms. Go rd on tol d th e ma n th a t sh e didno t ha ve a ny ke y s to the ba nk

bu t sh e did ha ve c ar k e y s. Ms. Gordon re called that the man was w earing a “pumpkin colore d, bubble jacke t” with the hood up and a stra

p covering t h e l o we r part of his fa ce. T he man he ld a silver automatic pistol in one hand, and he ld a surg ical g love in his other hand.

Ms. Gordon test i fi ed t h at the man for ced he r out of her car and ar ound into the passeng er
se a t. S he e xpla ine d th a t a sec on d man g ot i nto the ba c k s e a t of he r c ar, bu t sh e pa id h im l itt le attention beca

use the fir st man had the g un. She followed the g unman’s orde rs to hand over her c ar key s, money , and j ew el ry , i ncluding her dia mond cluster ring and eng ag ement ring . Using the surg ical g love to hold the key s, the man starte d the ca r, but w hen he did, she jumped out of the ca r and ra n awa y . After

the men lef

t the bank par

king lot in her

car , Ms. G ordon went into the bank and called the police. About thirty minutes later, the police found her car parke d near

the bank with her

wa lle t a nda

tw e nty do lla r b ill in the fr on t se a t.

Ms. Go rd on te sti fi e d th a t on Mar c h 12, 20 03 , Ser g e a nt B e ll br ou g ht a ph oto g ra ph ic arr a y to her at the bank to see if she re cog nized the man who robbe d her. She e x plained that she used a piec e
o f p ap e r to c r o p th e p ic tu r e s to g e t a b e tt e r lo o k a t th e in d iv id u a l’ s e y e s a n d nose ar ea be fore ide n t i f y i n g t h e d e f

e n d a n t a s t h e r o b b e r

. S h e a l s o i d e n t i f i e d t h e d e f

e n d a n t a s t h e ro bb e r a t a prelim in ar y h e ar in g a n d a g a in a t tria l. M s

. G o r d o n te s ti f ie d th a t s h e w a s p o s it iv e of he r identification because she had re ceive d extensive training in the ide ntification of robbe rs throug h her employ ment at the bank, and she had previously looked at a photog raphic arr ay from anothe r robbe ry in which she ha d been involved. Ms. Gor don testified that af ter the pr eliminary hearing she rec eived

a ca ll from the owner

of a pa wn shop, Scot Keller, a sking he r to come look a t some jewelry . The je we lr y turne d o ut t o b e he r s tol e n e ng a g e me nt anddiamon d c lus te r ring s.

On cr oss-examination, Ms. Gordon r elated that the robber was ve ry rude, thre atening , and

us e d vulg ar la ng ua g e . M s. Go rd on state d th a t sh e didno t no tic e a ny sp e c ia l ma

rking s o r a

sc ar i n the robbe r’s e y e.

Offic er Milton Gonzalez testified that he locate d Ms. Gordon’s c ar on the road be hind the bank. Offic er Gonzalez notice d a twenty dollar bill, a wallet, a nd an umbre lla in the front seat of the

c ar

. O f f i c e r C h a m P a yn e t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h e w o rk e d i n t h e c r i m e r e s p o n s e u n i t t h e d a y o f t h e r o b b e r y. Offic er Payn e e xp la in e d th a t h e p h o to g r ap h e d a n d p r o c e s s e d th e v e h ic le a n d it s c o n te n ts

. He

c oll e c te d a

tw e nty do lla r b ill a ndtoo k it to the pr op e rt y ro om, bu t he did no t fin d a ny fi ng e rp ri nts

.
Sherron Jeffe rson testified that she w as working alone at the Wonder Br ead Store on Fe bruary 23, 2003. Whil e she was restocking the s helves in the back, she heard someone enter the store. When she turne d around, a silver handgun was pointed at her fac e. She obser ved that the man holding the g un was we aring a mustard- y ellow, “or ang e like, bubble jac ket” with the c ollar pulled-3-

up, a blac k skull c ap, and hospital g loves. Howe ver, she was only able to see the robbe r’s e y es and

no se du e to h is c ov e ri ng s.

Ms. Jef fe rs on te sti fi e d th a t th e ro bb e r t oldhe r t o lo c k th e do or , turn the sig n o ff , a ndg ive him the money

out of the reg ister. He a lso told her to give him the money from her purse. The robber then took her to the ba ck of the store and de manded that she get t h e VCR surveillance ta pe. The

ro bb e r g ot u ps e t wh e n the tape g ot stu c k. He pu lle d the VC R fr om the wa ll a nd ste pp e d on it u nti l the tape e je c te d. Th e ro bb e r the n p ut h e r in the ba thr oo m a ndtol d h e r n ot t o le a ve fo r f if te e n to twenty minutes or he would hurt her. Ms. J eff erson stay ed in t he bathr oom for over fiftee n minutes befor e running next door to t he fire station at which time the police w ere called.

Ms. J eff erson testified that Serg eant B ell showed he r a photog raphic arr ay a couple of we eks afte r the robbe ry . Whil e looking at the photog raphs, Ms. Jeffer son cover ed portions of the individual’s fac es “to see the ey es.” A fter looking at all the picture s, M s

. J ef fe rs o n identified the defe ndant as the ma n who robbe d her. Ms. Jeffe rson also identified the defe ndant as the robber at a preliminary hearing and aga in at trial. She expressed that she w as “positive” and “ce rtain” of her identification.

On cr oss-examination, Ms. J eff erson a dmitted that a neig hborhood boy was in the store at t h e t i m e o f

t h e r o b b e r y

. M s

. J e f

f e r s o n d e s c r i b e d t h e r o b b e r a s c a l m , d e m a n d i n g , a n d p o l i t e

. In response to questions, Ms. J eff erson a nswere d that she did not notice any marking s or sca

rs in the robber ’s ey es. On re- direc t examination, Ms. J eff erson e labora ted that the neig hborhood boy was with her in the bathroom afte r the robber left, but she did not mention him beca use the boy ’s mother did not want him involved. Ms. J eff erson a lso cl ar i fi ed t h at the robbe r wa s not polit e but instead demanding . She reiter ated that she was c erta in the defe ndant was the man who robbe d her.

Offic er Sherman Bonds testified t hat he responde d to the robbe ry at the Wonder B rea d Store. Offic er B onds stated that he wa s unable to lift any fing erprints fr om the VCR. Serg eant William Woodard testified that he w as assig ned to the Wonder Br ead c ase until a Crime Stoppers tip linked it t o th e B ri g hto n B a nk

c a se . A c c or din g to S e rg e a nt Wo od ard , a n a no ny mo us tip c a me in tha t a Charles Ha ll of a ce rtain ag e, sex, and ra ce wa s responsible for a couple of crimes. Serg eant Woo da rdthe n e xpla ine d that he re c e ive d a no the r c a ll fr om the tip ste r, thi s ti me g ivi ng mor e de ta ils about the def

endant being responsible for the r obberie s. Ba sed on the tipster’s information, Serg eant Woo dard se arc he d p a wn sh op s in She lby Cou nty fo r i te ms p a wn e d b y

the de fe nd a nt. Du ri ng his

sear ch, he rec e ive d w or d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d p a wn e d je we lr y a t K e lle r’ s Pa wn Sho p in Mis sis sip pi.

Offic er J

. B. Bell testified that he investigated the B rig hton Ba nk robbery case and the Wonder Br ead Store case

. Offic er Bell testi fied that based on the C rime S toppers ti p, he located a photograp h o f t he def

endant a nd cre ated a

six -per son photogr aphic a rra y that he took to the two victims, Ms. Gordon and Ms. J eff erson. Ac cording to Office r B ell, Ms. Gordo n s ai d s h e wa s “positively sure that [t he defe ndant] wa s the person [who robbe d her].” L ikewise, Ms

. J ef fe rson identified the de fenda nt as the robbe r.-4-

On cr oss-examination, Office r B ell testified t hat he initially thought the B rig hton Ba nk and Won de r B re a d St or e c a se s might be re la te d b e c a us e a sil ve r h a nd g un wa s u se d in bo th r ob be ri e s. Offic er B ell elabor ated that during that particula r m o n t h there had bee n a lot of robbe ries, but the Br i g hton Ba nk and Wonder B rea d Store robberies wer e the only robberies that involved a silver h a n d g u n

. H o w e v e r , O f

f i c e r B e l l a d m i t t e d t h a ta

s i l v e r h a n d g u n w a s n o ta n u n u s u a l f i r e ar m

. L a s t l y, Offic er B ell looked into the defe ndant’s ey es and noticed that his le ft ey e looked off- set and big g er than the rig ht ey e. H e al s o noticed that the de fenda nt’s left ey e had a small scar in it. Howe ver, Offic er B ell expressed his opinion that these particula rities could be e asily

overlooke d.

Scot Keller testified t hat t he defenda nt had pawned it ems at hi s pawn shop six ty to six ty -five times. Mr. Keller pulled his r ecor ds and noted that the defe ndant pawne d a diamond marquis ring on Fe bruary

26, 2003 and a dia mond cluster ring on Marc h 8, 2003. Mr. Keller testified that he wa s
c on ta c te d b y

the po lic e a nda sk e d to ho ld the t wo r ing s, wh ic h M s. Go rd on la te r c la ime d a s h e rs

. Mr. Keller

also rec alled that sometime afte r Ms. G ordon claimed the jewelry , he rec eived a call fr om the def endant inquiring whether

Mr. Keller still had the two ring s. On cross- examination, Mr. Keller testified that the def

endant wa s a go o d cu s tomer and nothing he had pa wned be fore had bee n reported as stolen.

R o b e r tL i v e l y t e s t i f

i e d f o r t h e d e f e n s e

. M r

. L i v e l y e x p l a i n e d t h a t h e r a n a s e c u r i t y c o m p a n y, Courtesy Consultants, and he had e mploy ed the defe ndant “on and off for two, to three, ma y be four y e ars .” Mr . Live ly

br ou g ht t he de fe nd a nt’ s ti me sh e e t f or the pe ri odof th e tw o rob beri e s to tr ia l. The time shee t indicated that the de fenda nt was assig ned to an a partment c ompl ex , an d that he worke d 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. on Fe bruary 20, 2003 and 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on Februa ry 23rd. Mr . Live ly

a dmi tte d tha t the de fe nd a nt wa s re sp on sib le fo r fi lli ng in the tim e sh e e t a ndthat ne xt to Fe bruary 20th a “minus t hree ” wa s noted in another handwriting , meaning the def endant missed approximately

three radio c hecks or

was not on the prope rty

for thre e hours. On c ross-examination, Mr. L ively admitted that he could not ve rify that the defe ndant worke d every minute of his reporte d ho ur s a ndon ly

we nt b y the tim e sh e e t.

Th e la st d e fe ns e wi tne ss t o te sti fy wa s G e or g ia

John so n, the de fe nd a nt’ s c ou sin . M s. John so n te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a s a da rk sp ot i n o ne of

his e y e s.
The state put on r ebuttal proof in the form of testimony from I nvestig ator Ge org e Dunlap. I nv e sti g a tor

Du nla p te sti fi e d th a t he tr ie d to c on ta c t so me on e wi th Cou rt esy Con su lta nts a t le a st twice, but he ne ver r ece ived a r esponse.
Following the trial, the jury returne d a ver dict of g uiltyas cha rg ed in indictment 04-00119 to two counts o f aggr av at ed robbe ry , which the tria l court merg ed into one ag g ravated robbe ry conviction. The jury also found the de fenda nt guilty of ag g ravated robbe ry

and the lesse r-include d offe nse of

robbery as cha rg ed in indictment 04-00120, which the trial court mer g ed into one ag g ravated robbery conviction. The trial court sentenc ed the defe ndant as a re peat violent off ender to two consec utive life sentenc es without the possibili ty of par ole.-5- AN AL YSI S

The de fenda nt raises four issues on appea l: (1) whether the trial court e rre d in consolidating the i n d i ct m ents for tria l; (2) whethe r the trial c ourt err ed in sentenc ing him as a repe at violent offe nder; (3) whether

the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whe ther the tria l
court e rre d in ordering consec utive sentenc ing.

A. Consolid ation

The de fenda nt first arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in consolidating indictments 04-00119 and 04-00120 f

or trial despite his objec tion. Prior to trial, the trial court gr anted the state’s motion to consolidate the two indictments ag ainst the defendant pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedur e 8(b) . Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedur e 8(b) provides that two or more offe nses may be “c onsolidated pursuant to Rule 13 if the off enses c onstitut e parts of a c ommon scheme or pla n
or if the y are of the sa me or

sim ila r c ha ra c te r. ” Rul e 13 all ows th e tr ial c ou rt a n o pti on to

c on so lid a te the of

fe ns e s if the of fe ns e s c ou ld hav e been jo ine d in a sin g le ind ic tme nt p ur su a nt t o Rule 8 or seve r the off

enses if the p ro s ec u t i o n o r def ense c ould have obtaine d a seve ranc e under Rule 14. The def

endant oppose d the s tate’s moti on pursuant to Rule 14(b)( 1), which provides that “the de fen d an t s h al l h av e a right to a se vera nce of the offe nses unless the off enses a re pa rt of a common scheme or plan a nd the evidenc e of one would be admissible upon the trial of the others.”

The fir st prong of the two-pr ong inquiry in Rule 14(b)( 1) require s a showing of a c ommon scheme or plan. To e stablish a common scheme or plan, the tria l court must find that (1) the of fense s
are of distinctive desig n or sig nature crimes; (2) the evidence demonstrates a la rg er c ontinuing plan

or conspirac y ; or (3) the offe nses are part of the same c riminal transac tion. Sta te v . M oo re , 6 S.W .3d 235, 240 (Tenn. 1999) . The distinctive desig n or sig nature cate g ory encompa sses offe nses where the modus operandi is so sim ila r, a nd the of

fe ns e s o c c ur

wi thi n s uc h a

re la tiv e ly c los e pr oximi ty

in
t i m e and location that the same pe rson proba bly committed both offense s. S ta t e v

. M o r ris , 788 S.W .2d 820, 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) . Whil e the of fense s need not be identical in eve ry respe ct, Bu nc h v . S tat e , 605 S.W .2d 227, 2 3 1 (T enn. 1980), the “methods used in committing the offe nses must have such unusua l particularities that rea sonable men can conclude that it would not likely be employ ed by

differ ent per sons.” Mo ore , 6 S.W .3d at 240. “[ S] imply beca use the de fenda nt may have c ommitt ed a se ries of c rimes d o es n o t mean that they are part of a

common scheme or plan.” State v. De nton , 149 S.W .3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2004) (citations and internal quotations omitt ed).

Th e se c on d p ro ng of

Rul e 14 (b )( 1) re qu ir e s a sh ow ing that the e vid e nc e of on e of fe ns e wo uld be admissible in the trial of the ot her. To comply with the requirements i n the s econd prong , the trial court must conclude that (1) the e vidence of ea ch off ense is r eleva nt to some materia l issue in the trial of the other offe nse under Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 404(b)( 2); and (2) the probative value of the e vidence of the other offe nse i s not outweig hed by the prejudicial conseque nces of admission under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) (4). State v. Hoy t , 928 S.W .2d 935, 944 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), ov e rru le d o n o the r g ro un ds by Sp ic e r v . S tat e , 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 8
, 4 4 7 n

. 1 2 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 )

. In-6-

Te nn e sse e , e vid e nc e of

oth e r o ff e ns e s ma y be a dmi ssi ble to sh ow (1 ) mot ive ; (2 ) int e nt; (3 ) g uil ty knowledg e; (4) iden t i ty

of the de fenda nt; (5) abse nce of mistake or ac cident; or (6) a common scheme or plan for commission of t wo or more crimes so relate d to eac h other that proof of one te nds to establish the other. Id.

Dec isions reg arding the joinder a nd sever ance of off enses a re ma tters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Spic er , 12 S.W .3d at 442. On appea l, this court will not interfe re with the exercise of that discretion unless it a ppear s from the fac e of the re cord that the defe ndant

was prejudice d by the trial court’ s ruling. State v. W iseman
, 643 S.W .2d 354, 362 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 82 )

. M o r e o v e r , “ b e c a u s e t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n o f w h e t h e r t o c o n s o l i d a t e o ff e ns e s is de te rm ine d f

ro m th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at th e he ari ng , a pp e llate c ou rt s sh ou ld u su a lly on ly loo k to that evidenc e, along with the trial court’ s findings of fac t and conc lu s i o n s o f l aw , to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by improperly

joining the of

fense s.” Spicer , 12 S.W .3d at 445.

I n this case, the trial court c onducted a pretria l hearing on m o t i o n s for c onsolidation and suppression, during which, Serg eant B ell, Ms. Gordon, and Ms. Jeffe rson testified. Afte r hea ring this testim ony

and the a rg uments from both parties r eg arding consolidation, the trial court review ed the app lic able la w a ndstate d:

As to Rule 14(b) . . . if two or mor e offenses ha ve bee n joined, or

c on so lid a te d f

or a tr ia l, p ur suant to Ru le 8( b) , th e de fe nd a nt s ha ll h a ve the ri g ht t o
sever [ance] of the off

enses, unless the of

fense [s] [are] part of a common scheme, pla n a ndthe e vid e nc e of

on e wo uldbe a dmi ssi ble up on the tr ia l of the oth e rs

.
Of c ou rs e , th a t g oe s to the c omm on sc he me , o r p la n to sh ow , r e a lly , it bo ils out to identity , that this is t he same person that c ommitt ed the other crime.

And in this case . .

. it appea rs that something striking he re makes it unique. And that is, surg ical g loves. That’s something that y ou don’t see. T hat’s about the only thing. The coat doe sn’t car ry much weig ht. I t car

ries some we ight, be cause of the way he wor e it

. B ut the fa c t th a t it wa s a c oat of that ty pe , y ou c a n’ t say , w e ll he’s a bout the only

one that’s g ot a coat of that ty pe. No, that wouldn’ t happen. Probably a l o t o f folks g ot a coat like that and it didn’t happen in the same are a, any way . Somebody

in that a rea may have ha d, may

be not somebody , may

be seve ral people ha d a coat like that.

Now, but what r eally

cause s this to be very

unique, surg ical g loves. May be I re me mbe r s o m e c a s e , m a y b e y e ar s a g o , s o m e b o d y

h a d a s u r g i c a l g l o v e , b u tit wasn’t a two indictment situation. But, appare ntly he mig ht not have had the g loves on in one incident, but he had them in his hand, so that’s t he same as having them on. He ha d them with him for whateve r re ason he ha d surg ical g loves. May be that’s f or ke e pin g him

fr om m akin g fi ng e rp ri nts so me wh e re if he ha d to tou c h s ome thi ng . B ut,-7-

I think that that [si c] makes it very unique, to show identity , common scheme , or plan to whateve r he wanted to have these surg ical, rubbe r g loves out there. N ot to keep y our hands wa

rm, ce rtainly , in Febr

uary , in the winter time. B ut, I t h i nk that that [si c] makes it unique.

. . . .
. . . Now, I

don’t know whe ther it was this de fenda nt, or not, but the person that was identified as having these surg ical g loves on both incidents. And the coat -- when y ou take that, with the coat, same kind of c oat, it rea lly does tell in making the

c oa t mo re imp orta nt.

. . . .
So the Court feels that t h er e may be her e that they

can use that appea

ranc e and will rule that they

can put that on at t h i s t i m e t o show that the plan of the defe ndant’s, as w ell as the a ttempt to show identit y

.

. . . .
The Cour t is going to allow the state to g o ahea d based on this situation, I think, because it’s a unique situation that’s involved i n this case c oncerning the wh ole c omm on sc he me , pla n of this de fe nd a nt, the way he c ro pp e d h is f

a c e in b oth incidence s. The g un being the same. The gl o v es , s o m ethi ng ’s that very unique, ha vin g ru bb e r g lov es, or ho sp ital g lov e s o n a ndha vin g the m w ith him in b oth instances. And the n one time he ha d them on and one time he had them in his ha nd.

So the Court’s going to allow her to put on -- of cour se, eve n that, they ’re separ ate a nd distinct in dictments and the state ha s to prove ea ch and e very ind ic tme nt, a s to e a c h o f the se c a se s. An d th e jury loo ks a t th e e vid e nc e a s to bo th of these c as es and ma

ke a de cision as to whether the state ha s proven it, as to ea ch of these inc idence s.
That is the way

that the Court will rule on that matter. . . .

Upon re view, we conclude that the trial court e rre d in consolidating the two indictments for trial based on the offenses being part of a common scheme or pl an. I n our view, the offe nses her e
are no t so fa c tua lly

un iqu e or

dis tin c tiv e a s to c on sti tut e a sig natur e . L oo kin g a t the re c or d, so me sim ila ri tie s e xist b e tw e e n th e tw o off e ns e s. Th e se inc lud e the fa c t th a t th e pe rp e tr a tor wo re so me shade of y el low-ora ng e bubble jac ket with the collar pulled up over his mouth, had on a he ad

covering pulled down over his fore head, and carried a s ilver handgun. There was also testim ony that the per petra tor held a c lear

surg ical g love in one hand during the Brighton B ank robbe ry and wor e off- y ellow surg ical g loves during the Wonder B rea d Store robbery

. Howeve r, these similarities ar e-8-

g eneric, n o t unique. To re iterate , the test for f inding sig nature crimes is “not whe ther ther e wa s evidenc e that a def

endant c ommitt ed both crimes, but whether the re w as a unique method us e d in committing the crimes.” Denton , 149 S.W .3d at 14 (c itations and internal quotations omitted).

We al s o n o t e that numerous fac tual differ ence s exi st betwee n the two robbe ries. F or ins tan ce, th e re c or d r e fl e c ts tha t th e of fe ns e s o c c ur

re d th re e da y s a

pa rt , th e of fe ns e s o c c ur

re d in differ ent are as of Memphis – approximately ten miles apart, a nd the offe nses occ urre d at diffe rent tim e s o f t h e d a y

. T h e r e c o r d f u r t h e r r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e B r i g h t o n B a n k r o b b e r u s e d t he ho od of his jacke t to cover his head; where as, t he W onder Bre ad S tore robber wore a skull ca p. The B rig hton Ba nk robbery

was in esse nce a

car -jac king and was c ommitt ed by two individuals; wherea s, the Wonder Br ead Store robbery was perpetrated by only one indi vidual. The Brig hton Ba nk robber was
more a g g r e s s iv e a n d v u lg ar th a n th e Wo n d e r B r e a d St o r e r o b b e r

. A g a in
, to b e p ar t of a common scheme or pl an , t h e o ffe nses “must be so similar in mo du s o pe ra nd i and occ ur within such a

re l at i v el y clos e proximi ty of time and location to each other that there can be littl e doubt that the offe nses wer e committed by the same pe rson(s).” S ta te v

. P e a c o ck
, 6 3 8 S.W .2d 837, 840 (Tenn. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 8 2 )

. I n s u m, th e tw o r o b b e r ie s d o n o t e v id e n c e u n iq u e c ir c u ms tan c e s a n d in clude many differ ence s. There fore , we a re una ble to s ay t h at a dist inct or unique modus oper andi was used. Ac cording ly , we c onclude the lowe r court abused its di scre tion in consolidating the indictments for trial over

the def endant’ s objection.

We further

note that while the tria l c ourt did c onduct a series of discussions outside the jury ’s prese nce r eg arding whether the evidenc e of one offense would be admissi ble i n the trial of the othe r of fe ns e , th e c ou rt

fa ile d to sp e c if

ic a lly a na ly ze the iss ue un de r R ule 40 4( b) . T he tr ia l c ou rt a lso fa ile d to fi nd on the re c or d w he the r the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e vid e nc e of

the oth e r o ff

e ns e outweig hed the pr ejudicial conse quence s of admission.

Having determined that the trial court erre d in consolidating the indictments f or trial, we now
mus t e va luate the re c or d to det e rm ine if thi s er ro r ap pe ars to h a ve a ff

ir ma tiv e ly

a ff e c te d th e ou tc ome of the trial. Te nn. R. Crim. P . 52(a) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). I n looking at the evidenc e pre sented at trial, we note that i n addition to Ms. Gordon’s testimony there was some other evidenc e indicative of the de fenda nt’s g uilt in reg ards to the B rig hton Ba nk robbery . Specifica lly , the def endant pa wned the two ring s stolen from Ms. Gordon within day s of the robbe ries.

On t h e other ha nd, the pre dominant evidence linking the de fenda nt to the Wonder Br ead Store robbery

was Ms. Jeffer son’s testimony . No fing erprint or other for ensic e vidence linked the de fe nd a nt t o e ith e r o f the se c ri me s. Th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d a t tria l, w hil e probab ly su ff ic ie nt t o
con vi ct, could h ard ly

be de sc ri be d a s overwhelming

. D u e to th is la c k o f e v id e n c e , w e ar e hard pr e sse d to ig no re the imp a c t th e joi nin g of the wi tne sses ’ t e sti mon y ha d o n th e jury ’s ve rd ic t;

e sp e c ia lly , in lig ht o f the fa c t th e jury , a ft e r h e ari ng Ms . Gor do n’ s te sti mon y , mo re than li ke ly believed t he def

endant ha d a prope nsityto commit the second robbe ry . For these re asons, we conclude that trial court’ s err or wa s not harmless. There fore
, we hold that the judg ments of the trial court must be re verse d and the c ase r emande d for se parate trials.T he exc ept i ons ar e d elay c au sed by ( 1) t he defendan t , ( 2) a comp et enc y ex ami nat i on, ( 3) a comp et enc y 1

h ea r i n g , ( 4) a n a dj u di ca t i on of i n compe t en cy for t r i al
, ( 5) a c on t i n u an ce du e t o t h e def en dan t ’ s ph y s i ca l i n ca pac i t y for t ri al
, or (6) an i nt erl o cut o ry ap p eal

. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 2 0 (i )( 1 )( A )- (F).

W e no t e t hat t he d efend ant d i d rai se t hat he was not bro ught t o t ri al wi t hi n 18 0 da y s b o t h pri o r t o t ri al and 2

in h is m o tio n fo r n e w tria l. H o w e v e r, o u r re v ie w o f t h e re c o rd re v e a ls tha t his first ch a llen g e to the a lleg e d un tim e ly

n o tice o f his sta tus a s a re p e a t vio le n t o ff e n d e r w a s o n a p p e a l.

-9- Be cause of the possibilityof further a ppellate r eview, w e will addre ss the d efe ndant’s

rema ining thre e issues.

B. R e pe at Vi ole nt Offen de rSt at us

The de fenda nt arg ues that he should no t have be en sente nced unde r the Repe at Violent Offe nder A ct bec ause he was not notifie d of his status as a re peat violent off ender within forty -five da y s of arr a ig nme nt. Un de r the Re pe a t Vi olent Offen der A ct, defe nd ant s con vi cte d of cert a in violent cr i m es who have a re cord of specifie d prior convic tions qualify for a n automatic sente nce of life without par ole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-1 2 0

. A ch arge as a r epeat violent offende r
mus t b e b r o u g h t t o tr i a l w i t h i n 1 8 0 d a y s o f t h e arr a i g n m e n t w i t h c e r t a i n e xc e p t i o n s. Id. § 1 40 -3 5- 12 0( i) (1 ). Mo re ov e r, the state is r e qu ir e d to file wi th th e cou rt a ndde fe ns e c ou ns e l a
state me nt tha t the de fe nd a nt is a re pe a t vio le nt of fe nd e r w ith in f

orty -f ive da y s o f the arr a ig nme nt. Id. § 40-35-120( i)(2). The t ri al court shall gr ant the def endant a continuance if the notice is not timely filed so that the def

endant ha s forty -five day s betwee n the date of notice and the trial. Id. The de f e n d a n t is n o t e n ti tl e d to r e le a s e f r o m c u s to d y o r d is mi s s a l o f th e c h ar g e s if th e s tate d o e s not comply with the notice provisions. Id. § 40-35-120( i)(3).

I n th is c a se , w e ini tia lly

no te that th e de fe nd a nt h a s w a ived th is issue fo r f a ili ng to r a ise it p ri o r t o t ri al
, i n a mo t i o n fo r ne w tri al
, o r d u ri n g t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) ; 2 State v. Thompson , 36 S.W .3d 102, 108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)

. Howeve r, even if not waived, the defe ndant is not entitled to relief. The rec ord reveals that the defendant was indicted on J anuary 8, 2004 and arra igne d on J anuary 14, 2004. The prose cutor filed a notice of r epeat violent offende r status on Ma

rc h 1 5, 20 04 . H ow e ve r, the no tic e wa s not pla c e d in th e de fe nd a nt’ s c ou rt fi le du e to wh a t m u s t h a v e b e e n a c l e r i c a l o v e r s i g h t i n t h e c o u r t c l e rk ’ s o f f i c e

. T h e tr i a l c o u r tc orre c te d th is

err or by entering an order to c orre ct the re cord on F ebrua ry 8, 2006. See T e n n

. R. Crim

. P. 3 6

. We

re vie we d th e nu me ro us tr a ns c ri pts in this c a se a nd fo un d no me nti on of a failu re by the state to f ile notice of re peat violent off ender status. Accor dingly , in light of the tria l court’s orde r cor rec ting the

re c or d, we c on c lud e the state ’s no tic e of re pe a t vio le nt of fe nd e r s ta tus wa s f

ile d a pp ro xima te ly

sixty day s after the def endant’ s arr aig nment.

The re medy

under the statute for untimely notice is t o g rant a

continuance so that the defe ndant has forty -five day s betwee n rec eipt of notice a nd trial. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35- 120(i)(2) . Her e, eve n with the delay ed notice, the defe ndant s till had forty -five day s notice bef ore his tr ia l be g a n o n N ov e mbe r 2 , 2 00 4. Th is c ou rt ha s p re vio us ly

de te rm ine d th a t th e de fe nd a nt m us t-10-

show he or she was prejudice d due to the untimely notice. State v. Thompson
, 36 S.W .3d 102, 115- 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) . I t is our view that the defendant ha s not shown he was pr ejudiced by the untimely notice g iven he had ample time be tween rec eipt of the notice and the trial. Ther efor e, the def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

C. Suf fi ciency

The de fenda nt ne x t c halleng es the suff iciency of the c onvicting e vidence . Our re view beg ins with the well-e stablished rule that onc e a jury finds a def

end an t g uilty , his or her pr esumption of innocenc e is remove d and re place d with a pre sumption of guilt. S ta te v

. E v a ns , 8 3 8 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992) . There fore , on appea l, the convicted defe ndant has the burden of de monstrating to this court why

t h e ev i dence will not support the jury ’s ver dict. Sta te v . Ca rru the rs , 35 S.W .3d 51 6, 55 7- 58 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). To meet this burden, the de fe nd a nt mus t e sta

bli sh that no “r a tio na l trie r of fa c t” c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c rime bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U.S

. 30 7, 31 9 (19 79 ); State v. Evans , 108 S.W .3d 231, 236 (Tenn. 2003) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3 (e) . I n contra st, the jury ’s ver dict approve d by

the trial judg e acc redits the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in f avor of the
state. Sta te v . H

ar ris , 8 39 S.W. 2d54 , 7 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . T he state is enti tl e d to the str on g e st leg itimate v ie w o f

th e e v id e n c e a n d a ll r e a s o n ab le in f e r e n c e s w h ic h may

b e d r a w n f

r o m th at evidenc e. Car ru the rs , 3 5 S. W.3 d a t 55 8; Tug gle , 639 S.W .2d at 914. Questions conc erning the

cre dibi l i t y o f t h e witnesses, c onflicts in trial testimony , the weig ht and value to be g iven the

e vid e nc e , a nda ll f

a c tua l is su e s r a ise d by the e vid e nc e are re so lve d b y the tr ie r o f f

a c t a ndno t th is
court. State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997) . We do not at t em p t t o re- weig h or

r e

- e v a lu a te th e e v idence

. St ate v . R e id , 9 1 S. W.3 d 2 47 , 2 77 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Bland , 958 S.W .2d at 65 9. L ike wi se , we do no t r e pla c e the jury ’s inf e re nc e s d ra wn fr om the c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e wi th our own infe renc es. See State v. Elkins , 1 02 S.W. 3d58 1, 58 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Re id
, 91 S.W .3d at 277.

Ag g rav a te d r o b b e r y

is d e f in e d a s r o b b e r y

“ [a ]c c o mp li s h e d w ith a

d e a d ly w e ap o n o r

by dis play of a ny art ic le us e d o r f

a sh ion e d to lea d th e vi ctim to r e a so na bly be lie ve it t o b e a

de a dly

wea pon.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402( a)( 1). Robbery is defined a s “the intentional or knowing theft of pr operty

from the pe rson of a nother by violence or

putting the pe rson in fear. ” Id. § 39-13-401( a). The identity of the de fenda nt as the per son who committed the offe nse for which he is on trial is an elem en t o f t he off ense a nd a question of f

act f or the jury

. State v. W

illiams , 623 S.W .2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) . A victim’s identification of the de fenda nt as the one w ho committed the o ff

en s e i s sufficie nt to establish identity

. State v. Strickland , 885 S.W .2d 85, 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.

I n th is c a se , b othvic tim s id e ntifie d th e def e nd a nt a s th e ro bb e r a ft e r l oo kin g a t a ph oto g ra p h i c l i n e u p , a tt h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s p r e l i m i n ar y

h e ar i n g , a n d a ttr i a l

. M o r e o v e r , b o t h v i c tim s testified t hat t hey wer e able to clea rly see the defe ndant when he robbed them. Ms. Gordon testified that the defendant was initially two fee t awa y from her. Ms. J eff erson testified that she stood “fa ce to fac e” w ith the defe ndant, no more tha n an arm’s leng th away

.-11-

Additionally , the evidenc e at tria l established that the def endant pa wned the two rings stolen from Ms. Gordon w ithin day s of the robbe ries. Also, the de fenda nt cross-e x amined Ms. J eff erson about a little boy

being prese nt in the store during the robbery

. Howeve r, on re- direc t examination Ms. J eff erson testified that she had not told the police or the prosec utor about the little boy ’s pr e se nc e . A c c or din g ly , in lig ht o f the d efen dan t’ s bu rd e n o f p ro of on app e a l, w e c on c lud e that, while not overw helming, the evidenc e wa s sufficient f or a rational t rier of fac t to find the defe ndant g uilty

.

D. Co nse c ut ive Se nt e nc ing

The de fenda nt lastlyarg ues that the trial c o u rt er red in orde ring his sentence s be ser ved

consec utively . Spe ci fi ca l l y , he conte nds the trial court misapplied the “extensive criminal re cord

c a te g o r y

. ” T h is c o u r t’ s r e v ie w o f a c h a ll e n g e d s e n te n c e is a

d e n o v o r e v ie w o f

th e r e c o r d with a pr e su mpt ion that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns are c or re c t. Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ). Th is presumption of cor

rec tness is conditioned upon the af firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial
court considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances. State v. Pe ttus , 98 6 S. W.2 d 5 40 , 5 43 -4 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . H ow e ve r, if the re c or d s ho ws that th e tr ial cou rt f a ile d to consider the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umsta n ce s, then revie w of the challeng ed sentenc e is purely de novo without the pre sumption of corre ctness. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). On appea l, the party challeng ing the sentenc e imposed by the trial court ha s the burden of establishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d), Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments.

I n co n d u ct i n g our de novo r eview of a sente nce, this court must consider (a) the evidenc e ad d u ce d at t ri al an d t h e se n t en ce h ea ri n g; (b ) t h e pr e- s en t en ce re p o rt ; (c ) t h e p ri n ci p l es o f s en t en ci n g; (d) the a rg uments of counse l as to sentencing alternatives; ( e) the nature and char acte ristics of the of f e n s e ; ( f ) th e e n h a n c e me n t a n d mi ti g a ti n g f a c to r s ; a n d ( g ) th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s p o te n ti a l o r la c k of potential for r ehabilitation or treatment. Id. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b).

I nitially , we note that if a def endant is convic ted of more than one criminal offense , a trial court may impose consec utive sentenc ing upon a determination by a preponderance of the evide nce that on e or mor e of the c ri te ri a se t fo rth in Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b ) e xists

. Be low is the statutory

criteria the trial c ourt found re levant to this case:

(1) The defe ndant is a prof essional criminal who has knowi n g ly devoted suc h defe ndant’s life to c riminal acts as a major sourc e of livelihood;

(2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive;

A A A A
(6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation[ .]-12-

Id. § 40-35-115( b). The sta tutory criteria set fo rt h in Tennesse e Code Annota ted sec tion 40-35-115( b) ar e stated in the a lternative; ther efor e, only one nee d exis t to s u p port the ap p ro p ri at en es s o f c o n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g.

I n ordering the consec utive sentenc es, the trial c ourt conc luded:

He [has] offenses in seve ral states at least two other state s where he committed violent offense s, and in Tenne ssee numer ous violent offense s. . . .

. . . .

. . . [H] e’s got a horre ndous rec ord here. Horre ndous rec ord[.] [I ]t ’s one of the worst I ’ve se en in the violent categ ory , y ou know, ag g ravated robbe ries in seve ral states and numer ous case s ag g ravated robbe ry

. So he made a ca ree r of that of

doing those things. . . .

. . . [H] e’s c ommitt ed these offe nses and his h o rr i b l e record f or violent

o f f e n s e s a n d to ta l d is r e g ar d f o r th e la w o v e r th e y e ar s , e a c h ti me h e g e ts out, he

c omm its so me mor e vio le nt o ff e ns e s.

. . . .

He is a pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l w ho ha s d e vo te d h ims e lf to c ri min a l a c ts a s a major sourc e of livelihood. He has to, to have committed that ma ny offe nses. The lit tle wo rk he did wa s p art -t ime c omp are d to his fu ll- tim e job of ro bb ing fo lks . So the Cou rt fi nd s th a t he is a

pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l a ndhis of fe ns e s, his re c or d is

e xten siv e , a nd , o f c ou rs e , h e wa s se nte nc e d to a n o ff e ns e wh ile on pa

role so tho se matters indicate that consec utive sentenc es ar e app ro p ri ate, a nd the Court will run them consec utive. . . .

To beg in, the defe ndant only challeng es application of fac tor two, that his rec ord of c riminal

a c tiv ity is e xten siv e . T he re fo re , w e wi ll a dd re ss his arg ume nt be fo re a na ly zing the ov e ra ll v a lid ity of conse cutive sente ncing in this case. The defe ndant ar g ues that the t ri al court erre d in ordering

consec utive sentenc ing ba sed upon hi s past extensive criminal record. The defe ndant ar g ues that the “extensive crimin a l re c o r d c ateg ory ” set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(2) is n ot a pp lic able to h is s itu a tio n b e c a us e thi s c a te g ory re fe rs to a

c on sid e ratio n o f the e xten siv e ne ss of a n off e nd e r ’ s p r e s e n tc o n v i c t i o n s , n o tp a s tc r i m i n a l r e c o r d

. T h e d e f e n d a n t ar g u e s t h a th i s p a st criminal re cord f

ormed the ba sis for a se ntence based upon a persistent off

ender status but did not form the ba sis for conse cutive sente ncing . The de fenda nt cites the Sentenc ing Comm i s sion Comments to Tennessee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115 and Gr ay v . S tat e , 538 S.W .2d 391 (Tenn. 1976) , as support for his arg ument.-13-

We note the def

endant’ s contention has pre viously been addre ssed bythis court in State v. Palmer , 10 S.W .3d 638 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) . I n Palmer , we he ld that the “extensive criminal

re c or d c a te g ory ” a

pp lie d to of

fe nd e rs wi th an e xten siv e his tory of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns an d

a c t i v i t i e s, not just t o offe nders with extensive prese nt convictions. Id. at 648-49. The Palmer c ou rt ba se d it s holding on sta re de c isi s , rec og nizi ng that for e ight y ear s the courts had interpre ted sec tion 40-35- 115(b)( 2) to ref

er to both a de fenda nt’s prior re cord a nd prese nt convictions. Id. Ac c or din g ly , th is issue is without m erit.

Turning now to t h e appropriateness of consec utive sentenc ing, w e note the trial court wa s incorre ct in apply ing f

actor six (6) be cause the def

endant was on parole , not probation, when he committed the offe nses in question. This court has previously determined that the terms “pr obation” and “parole” are not sy nony mous for purpose s of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115. See State v. Robert Sanford Barnes
, No. W 2003-02967-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 331376, at *13 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, F eb. 1 1
, 2 0 0 5 ). Despite the trial court’ s misapplication of fac tor six , the other fa ctors cited by

the trial court provide ample justifica tion for conse cutive sente ncing

. First, the de fenda nt’s rec ord shows that he is a profe ssional c riminal. Acc ording to the presentenc e report, the defe ndant’s criminal behavior beg an when he wa s six teen y ear s old. Si nce that time, the defe ndant has a cquire d eig ht armed r obbery convictions in Tenn essee, two ag g ravated

ro bb e ry wi th a fi re arm c on vic tio ns inA rk a ns a s, a ro bb e ry c on vic tio n in Ar

ka ns a s, a nda

ro bb e ry wi th

a deadly wea

pon conviction in Mississippi. The pre- sentenc e report a lso r evea ls tha t the defe ndant’s only employ ment history

was with the security company , Courtesy Consultants, which the company

owner testified was “on and off.” The trial court de termined that the de fenda nt’s full-time job was “robbing folks,” and the rec ord supports that determination.

Second, the de fenda nt ha s an extensive recor d of criminal activity . As mentioned ea rlier, the defe ndant has a t least eleve n convictions for armed r obbery , as we ll as a plethora of more minor offe nses. Her e, the tria l court dete rmined the defe ndant’s rec ord to be “hor rendous.” Our re view of the re cord supports that determination.

I n his brief, the de fenda nt also mentions another c o n s ecutive se ntencing fac tor: “[t] he defe ndant is a dange rous offender whose behavior indi cate s littl e or no r eg ard f or human life, a nd no hesitation about committing a c rime in which the risk to human life is hig h.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b)(4) . We note the trial court did not base its decision on this factor; there fore , we do not find it nece ssary to addre ss whether the factor would apply to this defendant e specia lly in light of our a fore mentioned conc lusions.

CO NC LU SION

F oll ow ing ou r r e vie w, we re ve rs e the jud g me nts of the tr ia l c ou rt

a ndre ma ndfo r s e pa

rate trials based on the err oneous consolidation of the two indictments

. Ad d i t i o nally , due to the possibili ty

of further a

ppellate r eview, w e also c onclude that the de fenda nt is not entit led to relief on his sufficienc y

and sente ncing issues.-14- ___________________________________
J .C. McL I N, J UDGE