# FILED April 8, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE WESTERN SECTION AT NASHVILLE

______________________________________________ THE OAK RIDGE BOYS, INC., Plaintiff-Appella

nt, Sumner Chancery No. 96C-212 Vs. C.A. No. 01A01-9708-CH-00401 STEVE H. SANDERS, ET AL, Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________________________________ __________________________ FROM THE SUMNER COUNT Y CHANCERY COURT THE HONORABLE TOM E. GRAY, JUDGE

John R. Phillips, Jr., Timothy R. Rector Phillips & Ingrum of G

allatin For Appellant John Knox Walkup, Attorney General and Reporter Ronald W. McNutt, A

ssistant Attorney G

eneral of Nashv

ille For Appellee

AFFIRMED Opinion filed:

W. FRANK CRAWFORD,

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR: ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE DAVID R. FARMER,

JUDGE This is an unemployment compensation case. Plaintiff, The Oak Ridg e Boys, Inc., appealsthe order of the trial court whi ch af firmed the decision of the Board of Review of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security to award benefits to Steve Sanders.2 The claimant, Steve Sanders, was employed as a singe r with the Oak Ridge

Boys, Inc. from A pril 1987 to N ovember 1995. For a number of years t

here had been a

dverse publicity surrounding a “feud” involving Mr. Sanders, his e x-wife, and his current wife. Newspapers chronicled

disputes over Mr. Sanders’ failure to paycourt ordered child support, his subsequent jail sentence, and “

a myriad of other

disputes with his

ex-wife.” Other members of the singing group expressed conc

ern over the neg

ative publicity an

d its effect on the group. At an October 1995 meeting the group told Mr. Sande rs that he had to ge

t control over the

increasing public

ity problem, and that if

it did not stop he would have to be replaced. Another meeting was had on this subject several

days later while o

n a tour bus during a

short concert tou

r. Mr. Sanders cla

ims that at this meeting he “agreed to be fired” to spare the group further embarrassment, but that he would fi nish the year end

concert tour bef

ore leaving the gr

oup. The group agr

eed that their discussions “would not leave the bus.” However, word of his “resignation”

leaked out to members of the road crew while on a tour of Texas. Disturbed by the rumors and the breach of the confidentiality a

greement,Mr. Sanders left the group in November 1995 d uring the middle of the concert tour. Mr. Sanders’s application for unemployment compensation was opposed by the group which asserte

d that Mr. Sanders w

as ineligible for u

nemployment compe

nsati on benefits becaus e he quit of his own volition without good cause conne cted with his work i

n violation of T.C.A. § 50-7-303(a)(1) and

that the act of leaving the group in the middle of a concert tour constituted work related misconduct within the meaning of T.C.A. § 50-7-303(a)(2). The Tenne ss ee Department of Employment Security (TDES) approved Mr. Sanders’s application for benefits finding that he “was discharged from most recent employment when he

was forced to leave

in lieu of discharge because of circumstances beyond his control,” and that “the record fails to establish work-related misconduct under T.C.A. § 50-7-303.” This agency decision was upheld by the Appeals Tribunal, the Board of Review, and the trial court. The Oak Ridge Boys, Inc. has appealed the judgment of the chancery court asserting that Mr. Sanders left his employment voluntarily without good cause. The appellant has apparently3

abandoned

its alternative argument that Mr. Sanders was discharged for work-related misconduct,and instead simply contends that Mr. Sanders was never discharged. The sole issue for our review is whether the chancellor err ed in affirmin

g the Board of Review’s award of unemployment compe

nsation benefits. The standard fo r judi cial review of a TDES Board of Review decision regarding unemployment bene

fits is set forth in T .C.A. § 50-7-304(i ) which provides i

n pertinent part: ( 2) The chancellor may affirm the decision of the bo ard or th e chancellor

may reverse, remand or modify the decision if the r ights of the petitioner h ave been prejud

iced because

th e administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (A) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (B) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (C) Made upon unlawful procedure; (D) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abu s e of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (E) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record. (3) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the cha ncell or shalltake into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the cha

ncellor shall

not substitute the chancellor’s ju dgment for that of the board of review as to the weigh t of th e evidence on ques

tions of fact. T.C.A. § 50-7-304(i)

(Supp. 1997). This Co

urt must apply

the same standard as the trial court in reviewing the tr

ial court’ s decision in an unemployment compensation case. Ford v. Traughber, 813 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tenn. App. 1991). Therefor e, in reviewing TDES’s findings of fact, we are constrained to a determination of whether there is subs tant ial and material evidence to support the findings. “Substantial and material evidence is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational conclusion and such as to furnish a reasonably

sound basis for the action under consideration.” Southern Ry. Co. V. State Bd. Of Equali zat ion , 682 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tenn. 1984) (citations and internal quotations omitted). If the record contains such evidence, we are limited to a review of the questions of law presented. Perryman v. Bible , 653 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tenn. App. 1983). An individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment compens ation benefits wher e the claimant “lef

t such claimant’s m

ost recent work voluntarily without good cause connected with su ch claimant’s work.” T.C.A. § 50-7-303(a)(1) (Supp. 1997). In Frogge v. Dave nport , 906 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. App. 1995), we noted that the term “good cause” is not def

ined in4

T.C.A. § 50-7-303, but found the following discussion from 81 C.J.S. Social Security and

Public Welfare § 226 (1977) to be he

lpful: In general, “good cause,” as used i n an unemployment compensation statute, means such a cause as justifies an employee’s volunt aril y leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the un employed; the quitti

ng must be for such a cause as would re

asonably motivate

in a si mil ar situation the averageable-bodied and qu alified worker to give up his or her employment

with i ts c ertain wage rewards in order to enter the ranks of the compensated unemployed. The terms “good cause” and “personal reasons” connote, as minimum requirements, real circumstances,

subst antial reasons , objective condit ions, palpable forces that operate to pr oduce correla

tive results; a

dequ ate excuses that

will bear the test

of reason; just grounds for action. The test is one of ordinary common sense and prudence. In order to constitute

good cause, the c

ircumst ances which compel the decision to leave employme nt must be real, not imaginary, substantial not trif ling, and reaso

nable, not whimsical; ther e must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous or co

mpelling circumsta

nces. In the instant ca se, a t the October 22, 1995 meeting, it was agreed by Sanders and the employer that Sanders would

work until the end o

f the year and the

n his employment would be terminatedby the employer. It was further

agreed that the t

erms of the agre

ement would remai

n private and confidential. However, on November 4, 1995, while on tour, it was discovered that information leaked about Sanders leaving the group, and at a meeting on that date the employer through its representati

ves d enied th e previous agre ement. The meetin

g reached a high

ly emotional pitch to the extent that Sanders felt unable to perform as an artist. Beca

use of these circumst ances, Sanders felt comp elled to leave the

tour recognizing

that he had no abili

t y t o control the actions of third parties over which he had no authority. Upon careful review of the record, we find that there is substantial and material evidence to support the Board of Review’s finding that Mr. Sanders “was disc harged from his most

recent employment

and forced to resign bec ause negative publicity about his domestic affairs was adverse to the group’s image.” We note that this was not the typical employe r- employee relationship. The members of the Oak Ridge Boys spen t a substanti al portion of the year traveling, performing, and l i ving togethe r. To perform night after night in that type of environm e ntrequires a special kind of camaraderie. Under the unusual facts of this case, we cannot say that Mr. Sanders vo

luntarily quit withou

t good cause. The

Board properly

exercised its discretion in accordance with law and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.5 The judgment of the cha ncery court affir

ming the Board of Re

view’s decision is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed against the appellant.

_________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S. CONCUR:

____________________________________ ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

____________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER,

JUDGE