### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 7, 200 4 S es sio n PETE H ONSA v . TOMBI GBE E TRANSPORT CO RP., ET AL 

### .

An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Hardin County No. 3462 C. Cr eed Mc Ginley, Judge

No. W2003-01048-SC- R3-CV - F iled Jul y 13, 2004

AND



### EDDIE GENE B ROWN V. TOMB IG BEE TRANSPORT CORP.

An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Hardin County No. 3433 C. Cr eed Mc Ginley, Judge

No. W2003-01050-SC- R3-CV - F iled Jul y 13, 2004

AND



### WI LLI AM B. STEVENS ON V. TRANSWAY, INC., ET AL 

### . An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Hardin County No. 3388 C. Cr eed Mc Ginley, Judge

No. W2003-01310-SC- R3-CV - F iled Jul y 13, 2004T h e a p p e llan t’s m id d le na m e is so m e tim e s sp e lled “G e a n ” in the re c o rd a n d is sp e lled “G e a n ” in the a p p e llan t’s 1 b rie f. W e a re un a b le to d e te rm ine the c o rr e c t sp e lli n g . -2- The issue raised in these thre e wor kers’ compensation cases, c onsolidated for a ppeal, is whe ther the defe ndant is the employ er of the pl aintiffs and thus responsible for pr oviding wor kers’ compensation insurancecover ag e for

them

. I n eac h case , the trial court gr anted the de fendant’s motion for summary judgme nt. We hold th at u n d er Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-106( 1)(A) , the de fe nd a nt i s n ot, a s a matte r of la w, the plaint if fs ’ e mpl oy e r so a s to su bje c t the de fe nd a nt t o li abil ity un de r the Wor

ke rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n L a w. Th e re fo re , w e a ff irm th e jud g me nts of

thetria l c ou rt

. Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 50-6-225(e ) Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Trial Court Affi rm ed
J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined. Ricky L . Boren and Robe rt N. Russ, J ackson, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, Pete Honsa

. Terry Ly nn Wood, C orinth, Missis sippi, for the Appe llant, Eddie Gene Br own. Curtis F. Hopper , Savannah, T ennesse e, for the Appellant, William B. Stevenson.
Amber A. Edwar ds and J

. Arthur Crews I I , J ackson, Tenne ssee, for the Appelle e, T o mbigbe e Transport Corp. Dianne Stamey

Dy cus, De puty

A tt o rn e y G e n e ral, Na shville, Tennessee , for the A ppellee, the Second I njury Fund. OP IN ION

Fa ctual and Proc edura l Ba ckg round On Aug ust 4, 2000, W illiam B. St evenson f ell from the ba ck of a

trailer, injuring his knee. On J anuary

11 , 2 0 0 1, Pete Honsa w as injured f ollowing a

collision with a car w hen he f ell to the g round while e x iting the truc k he wa s driving

. On Marc h 22, 2001, Eddie Ge ne B rown hurt his back 1 while attempting to close a door on a tra iler. All of the p laintiffs drove tr ucks for Tombigbe e Transport Corporation (“T ombigbe e”)

. After these a ccide nts, the pla

in ti f f s sought wor

kers’ compensation benefits from Tombig bee. Tombigbe e asserted that pursuant to T ennesse e Code Annotated section 50-6- 106(1)( A), it was not the employ er of

the plaintiffs. The trial court a g ree d and g rante d sum m ar yjudgme nt in favor of Tombigbe e in ea ch ca se. Th e plaint if

fs app e a le d, a ndthec a se s w e rec on so lid a te d f or arg ume nt b e fo rethi s Co urt.T rans way f i l ed a volunt ary pe t i t i o n for C hap t er 7 b ankruptcy o n A p ri l 2, 20 0 1 , s ho rt l y af t er t he i njury t o M r. 2 B r own . T r an s wa y wa s n ot cr ea t ed or ow n ed by T ombi g bee

. T h e pl ai n t i f f s a r e u n abl e t o r ec ov er w or k er s ’ c ompen s at i on b e n e fit s fro m T ra n sw a y b e c a u se T ra n sw a y is no w b a n k ru p t. -3- An a ly sis
We review an appeal from a g rant of summary judgme nt de novo, ac cording no presumption of cor rec tness to the trial court’ s disposit ion. See Edwa rds v. Hallsdale -Powell Util. Dist., 115 S.W .3d 461, 464 (Tenn. 2003) ; Godfre y v. Ruiz , 90 S.W .3d 6 9 2 , 6 9 5 (Tenn. 2002) . Tombigbe e relies upon Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-106( 1)(A) in support of its positi on that it is not the plaintiffs’ employ er. Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-106( 1)(A) provides in pertinent pa rt that “ no c omm on c arrie r by mot or ve hic le op e ratin g pu rs ua nt t o a c e rt if ic a te of pu bli c convenie nce and nece ssityshall be dee med the ‘employ er’ of a le ased- operator or owne r-ope rator of a motor vehicle or vehicles under a contra ct to suc h a common car rier.” Thereis no dispute that To mbi g be e is a

“ c omm on c arrie r b y

mot or ve hic le op e ratin g p urs uan t to a c e rt if ic a te of pu bli c convenie nce and nece ssity .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 5 0 -6 -1 0 6 (1)( A) (1999) . The pa rties dispute, howeve r, whe ther the pla intiffs were“lea sed-ope rator[s] . .

. of a motor vehicle or vehicles unde r a contra ct to” Tombig bee. I d. The pre sent ca ses involve statutory interpre tation and pre sent a c ommon q u es t i o n of law. Our review of questions of l aw is de novo. See Wallace v. State, 121 S.W .3d 652, 656 (Tenn. 2003)

. Ou r ro l e i n const ruing a statute is “‘ to asce rtain and g ive ef fec t to the leg islative intent without unduly restric ting or

expanding a

s t at u t e’ s co vera g e bey ond its int ended sc ope.’” Houg hton v. Ara mark Educ . Res., I nc., 90 S.W .3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) ). We determine leg islative intent “fr om the natura l and ordinary meaning of th e st atu to ry

la ng ua g e wi thi n th e c on te xt of thee nti restatut e wi tho ut any fo rc e d o r s ub tle construction that would extend or limit the statute’s mea ning.” State v. Flemming , 19 S.W .3d 195, 19 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . “ Whe n th e statut ory la ng ua g e is c le ar andun a mbi g uo us , w e app ly theplain lang uag e in its normal and acc epted use.” Boa rman v. J aynes, 109 S.W .3d 286, 291 (Tenn. 2003)

. A “lea sed-ope rator” for the purposes of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-106( 1)(A) is a “non-ow ner ope rating a vehic le pursuant to a lease a g ree ment.” L ong v. Stateline Sy s., I nc., 738 S.W .2d 622, 623 (Tenn. 1985) . I f the pla i n tiffs are“lea sed-ope rators . . . unde r a c ontrac t to” Tombigbe e, then Tombig bee is not the plaintiffs’ employ er. In s u p p ort of its position t hat the plaintiffs fall within this provision, Tombi g bee r elies upon a 1993 “ Service Ag ree ment ” between itself and Transway

Corporation (“ Transw ay ”). 2
I n the “Servic e Ag ree ment” executed by Tombigbe e and Transw ay on March 1 5 , 1 9 9 3, Transw ay ag ree d to provide driver s to Tombigbee . The a gre em ent s tates that the pe rsonnel T r a n s w a y s u p p l i e d t o T o mb i g e e “ s h a l l a ta l l t i m e s b e e m p l o ye e s o f T r a n s w a y o n l y. ” A d d i t i o n a l l y, the ag ree ment specific ally states that Transway

would pro v i d e wo rker s’ compensation insurance cover ag e for

the per sonnel it supplied to Tombi g bee.-4-

By its terms , h o w e v e r , th eMarc h 1993 ag ree ment betwee n Transw ay and Tombig bee e x pired at the end of thirty day s. Tombigbe e asse rts that it operate d under an implied lease a g ree ment when it c ontinued to a

bide by the terms of the “Servic e Ag ree ment” bey ond the stated thirty -day term. The plaint if fs dis a g re e , a

rg uin g that no c on tr a c t e xiste d be tw e e n To mbi g be e a nd Tr a ns way a t th e tim e they wer e injured and thus TennesseeCode Annotated section 50-6-106( 1)(A) is inapplicable. T he plaintiffs point to the p ro v i s i on in the 1993 ag ree ment that states that “[n]o chang e, alter ation, modification, or addition to this Agr eeme nt shall be eff ective un le ss in writing a nd properly executed by the parties here to” to bolster their arg ument that no valid contra ct exis ted betwe en T o m bigbe e and Transway

once the ag ree ment’s thirty -day term expired.
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 50-6-106(1)( A) requires that lease d-oper ators be “under a c on tr a c t” to a

c omm on c arrie r f

or thec omm on c arrie r t o b e e xemp t f ro m th e Wor

ke rs ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n La w . T h e s t a t u t e , h o w e v e r , d o e s n o ts p e c i f y w h a tt yp e o f

c o n tr a c tm u s te x i s t

. In p ar t i cu l ar , t h e s t at u t e d o es n o ts t at e t h at t h e co n tra ct m u s t b e wr i t t en . W e co n cl u d e th att h e l an gu age of Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 5 0- 6- 10 6( 1) (A ) s imp ly re qu ires a

c on tr a c tua l r e latio ns hip betwee n the lessor a nd the lessee

. We have held that if the same se rvice s continue to be re ndere d following the expiration of a contr act f

or a de finite term and no new agreeme nt is executed, it is presumed a new contrac t has been cre ated having the same te rms and conditions as the origina l. See Delzell v. Pope, 294 S.W .2d 690, 694 (Tenn. 1956) . Tombigbe e cle arly had an ong oing c ontrac tual relationship wit h Transw ay afte r the e x piration of t he March 1993 “Service A g ree ment.” Tombig bee c ontinued to pay Transw ay f o r th e s e r v ic e s o f

it s d r ivers, an d T r a n s w a y c o n ti n u e d to p r o v id e d r iv e r s to T o mb ig b e e . We conclude that this relationship is sufficie nt to satisfy the re quirement of a

contra ct in Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-106( 1)(A)

. This result is consistent with the express leg islative intent that common car

riers be remove d from conside ration as the statutory employ er of

lease d-oper ators. See L ong , 738 S.W .2d at 623-24. The plaint i ff s also arg ue that it would be unfair to allow Tombigbe e to deny its status as employ er when Tombigbe e admittedly supervised the plaintiffs’ wor k and contr olled the means and methods by

which they

car ried out t heir duties. Howe ver, c ontrol is not relevant in dete rmining whether a truc king c ompany i s an employ er a s defined by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 50-6-106( 1)(A) . A per son who is “a lea sed-ope rator . . . under a contra ct to . . . a common ca rrier ” is n ot an e mpl oy e e of the c omm on c arrie r pu rs ua nt to the plain la ng ua g e of thestatut e . Se e Josli n v. Mich. Mut. I ns. Co., 742 S.W .2d 263, 265 (Tenn. 1987) . This status is notaff ecte d by the e mpl oy e r’ s c on tr ol o r rig ht t o c on tr ol the plaint if fs

. One plaintiff, H onsa, also conte nds that he should be a ble to rec over w orker s’ compensation benef its from Tombi gb ee p u rs u an t to our decision in Perkins v. Enterprise Truc k Lines, I nc., 896 S.W. 2d12 3 ( Te nn . 19 95 ). Th e plaint if f, Pe rkins , w a s in

jur e d a ndso ug ht b e ne fi ts f ro m E nte rp ri se Truck Lines, I nc. (“ Enterprise”). Per kins, 896 S.W .2d at 124. Enterprise contende d that Perkins was a l e a s e d

- o p e r a t o r

u n d e r T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 1 0 6 ( 1 ) ( A )

. F o l l o w i n g t h e i n j u r y, howeve r, Enter

prise paid Perkins’ m edica l bills and som e weekly disability benef its. W e af

firmed-5-

the trial court’s finding that Enterprise had e lected to pr ovide Perkins with worker s’ compensation insurancecover ag e despite his lea sed-ope rator status and held that Enterprise was r equire d to pay worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits to Perkins. I d. at 125-27. Honsa urge s this Court to hold that Tombigbe e is require d to provide wor kers’ compensation in s u ranc e covera g e to h im , ju s t a s E n te rp r is e w a s r e q u ir e d to p r o v id e c o v e r a g e to Pe rk in s . We decline to so hold. Perkins is distinguishable f rom the pre sent ca ses. Unlike Enter prise, Tombig bee did not voluntarilyelec t to provide worke rs’ c ompensation insuranc e cove rag e. Tombig bee ne ver ag ree d to provide worke rs’ compensation to lease d-oper ators, and it paid no wor kers’ compensation benef its to any of the plaintiffs until it was order ed to do so. Finally , emphasiz ing the lang uag e “unde r a contra ct,” the plaintiffs arg ue that Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-106( 1)(A) is me an t to apply only in situations i n which a c ommon car rier le ases both a vehicle and an operator from the same entity in a single document. The truc ks driven by the plaintiffs we re le ased by Tombigbe e fr om Penske Tru ck L easing , L .P. W e find no support for the pla intiffs’ nar row interpr etation of this statutory lang uag e. This contention is without me ri t. Conclusion
F or thea fo re me nti on e d r e a so ns , w e a ff irm th e tr ial c ou rt ’s g rant o f s umm ary jud g me nt i n favo r of To mb i ge e i n e a ch cas e. C os ts of t hi s ap peal are t ax ed t o t he ap pel lan ts – W il li am B. Stevenson, Pete Honsa, and Eddie Ge ne Br own – and their sureties, for

which execution may

issue i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE