alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30554

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

BRIAN KEITH HEBERT,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:13-CR-315-7

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HO, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Brian Keith Hebert appeals the sentence imposed following the 

revocation of his supervised release. He contends that the ten-month term of 

imprisonment was substantively unreasonable because it was greater than 

necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. 

We typically review a revocation sentence to determine whether it is 

“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 13, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-30554 Document: 00515310213 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/13/2020
No. 19-30554

2

2011). A revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable where the district 

court did not account for a sentencing factor that should have received 

significant weight, gave significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, 

or made a clear error in judgment when balancing the sentencing factors. 

United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2013). Revocation 

sentences within the advisory guideline range are presumptively reasonable. 

See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Hebert fails to show that his sentence was unreasonable, much 

less plainly so. See Miller, 634 F.3d at 843; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 

602 F.3d 346, 361 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that we need not resolve which 

standard of review governs as the appellant’s argument failed under the 

standard more favorable to the appellant). The district court found that 

Hebert’s multiple positive drugs tests within the span of less than a year 

warranted a sentence near the bottom of the guideline range. Hebert fails to 

overcome the presumption that the sentence was reasonable. See Warren, 720 

F.3d at 332-33; Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d at 809. 

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 19-30554 Document: 00515310213 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/13/2020
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5142 Engrossed in House (EH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5142

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 113 West Jackson Street in Rich Square, North Carolina, as the 
          ``Chief Joseph E. White, Jr. Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CHIEF JOSEPH E. WHITE, JR. POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 113 West Jackson Street in Rich Square, North Carolina, 
shall be known and designated as the ``Chief Joseph E. White, Jr. Post 
Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Chief 
Joseph E. White, Jr. Post Office Building''.

            Passed the House of Representatives November 17, 2014.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
113th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 5142

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 113 West Jackson Street in Rich Square, North Carolina, as the 
          ``Chief Joseph E. White, Jr. Post Office Building''.
```
Exhibit 4.1




THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


2 HANSON PLACE, 12TH FLOOR, BROOKLYN,
N.Y. 11217


 


 


 


June 28, 2016


 


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


Smart Trust 247


 


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York
Mellon is acting as trustee for the series of Smart Trust set forth above (the “Trust”). We enclosed a list
of the Securities to be deposited in the Trust on the date hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our evaluation of such
Securities as of close of business on June 27, 2016, in accordance with the valuation method set forth in the Standard Terms and
Conditions of Trust and Trust Agreement. We consent to the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing the
evaluations of the Trust Securities in the Registration Statement (No. 333-211082) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
with respect to the registration of the sale of the Trust Units and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


 


Very truly yours,


 


/s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO                        


Gerardo Cipriano


Vice President
EXHIBIT 32(ii)
--------------

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Monroe Bancorp (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gordon M. Dyott,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
Company.




/s/ Gordon M. Dyott


Gordon M. Dyott
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
November 13, 2003


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350 and is not being filed for any other purpose.
#### Sarah Erambert, plaintiff in error, *vs.*James J. Scarborough, defendant in error.

A judgment rendered by the Judge of the Superior Court, without the verdict of a jury, in a civil case founded on contract, when an issuable defense is filed on oath, should be set aside.

Pleading. Practice. Judgment by Court. Before Judge Clark. Sumter Superior Court. April Term, 1871.

James J. Scarborough brought complaint against Sarah Erambert. The case being called and no response made by the defendant or her counsel, judgment was rendered by the Court for $150, with interest and costs. Subsequently a motion was made to vacate said judgment upon the ground that an issuable defense had been filed on oath to said suit, and that the judgment of the Court without a verdict of a jury was void. The motion was overruled and plaintiff in error excepted.

John R. Worrill, for plaintiff in error.

N. A. Smith; A. R. Brown, represented by B. P. Hollis, for defendant.

*399Montgomery, Judge.

Article *Y.*section 3 and paragraph 3 of the Constitution gives the Court authority to render judgment, without the verdict of a jury in all civil cases founded on contract, where an issuable defense is not filed on oath. Section 13 of the same article provides that the right of trial by jury, except where it is otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall remain inviolate. Before the Constitution, cases like the present in the Superior Court were tried by jury. That mode of trial must “remain inviolate/7 except where “an issuable defense is not filed on oath.77

Judgment reversed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6860

AARON M. BURNS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD CLARK, Department of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District Judge. (1:16-cv-01276-LO-TCB)

Submitted: November 21, 2017 Decided: November 27, 2017

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Aaron M. Burns, Appellant Pro Se. Eugene Paul Murphy, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Aaron M. Burns seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate 

of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, 

a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that 

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition 

states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Burns has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny a 

certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We deny as moot Burns’ motion to 

reconsider the order deferring action on his application for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains financial information extracted from NS Group, Inc.'s
condensed consolidated financial statements as of and for the three month period
ended January 1, 2000, included in the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such condensed consolidated
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000745026
<NAME> NS GROUP, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-26-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-01-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           1,601
<SECURITIES>                                    19,371
<RECEIVABLES>                                   41,727
<ALLOWANCES>                                       952
<INVENTORY>                                     65,194
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               152,440
<PP&E>                                         333,183
<DEPRECIATION>                                 192,974
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 353,346
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           64,068
<BONDS>                                         72,955
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       257,568
<OTHER-SE>                                    (49,847)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   353,346
<SALES>                                         86,626
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                86,626
<CGS>                                           90,912
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   90,912
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,138
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (12,897)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        37
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,934)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (12,934)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.60)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of MidSouth Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2010 (the “Report”), I, James R. McLemore, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ James R. McLemore


James R. McLemore


Chief Financial Officer


August 9, 2010
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#### WALTER S. PECK and others, Respondents, *v.*MICHAEL RICHARDSON and others, Appellants.

*Service of summons*— admission *of, as of prior day*— entry *ofjudgment upon*— *before expiration of twenty days from actual service*— not *fraudulent.*

The mere fact that a defendant admits the service of the summons upon him as of a day prior to the day of its actual service, and that a judgment is entered before twenty days from the actual service of the summons have elapsed, does not render such judgment fraudulent as against the creditors of the defendant.

*Troian*v. *Fagan*(48How., 240) not followed.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the trial of this action by the court without a jury.

The action was brought to set aside as fraudulent a judgment obtained by the defendants Richardson, Carpenter and Topping against the defendant Gilbert, on the ground that Gilbert had admitted service of the summons in the action in which the judgment was entered, as of a date prior to the day of actual service thereof.

*L. M. Conklin,*for the respondents.

*S. C. Keeler,*for the appellants.

*568
      *Per Curiam:*

There is no proof that the judgment of the defendants Richardson and others against Gilbert was fraudulent.

It was set aside solely on the ground, that Gilbert’s admission of service of the summons, was given as of a date prior to the day of the actual service; and that twenty days had not elapsed after the actual service, before the entry of judgment. This was not a matter of which the plaintiffs could complain. It was not a fraud upon them. It is not unlawful (except where so made by the United States bankrupt law) for a debtor to pay one creditor before he pays another.

The twenty days are allowed for the purpose, not of delaying the creditor, but of giving the debtor time to make a defense if he has one. If he has none, it would be strange for the law to forbid him to allow a judgment to be taken sooner. The plaintiffs may insist that their debtor’s property shall not be applied to any fraudulent debt. But they are not injured when it is applied to an honest debt by means of a judgment and an execution regular on the face.

We have examined the case of *Trolan*v. *Fagan*(48 How., 240), followed in the case of *Brown*v. *Marrigold*(50 id., 251), but we cannot agree with the views taken by the learned justice in that case. Even confessions of judgment, if they are made in good faith, may be amended when. they are imperfect, as against subsequent creditors. *(Mitchell*v. *Van*Buren, *21*N. Y., 300; *Ingram*v. *Robbins,*33 id., 409.) Here the plaintiffs seek to go behind the record, which is regular, to find not fraud, but alleged irregularity of practice. We think they have no such right.

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

Present — Leaened, P. J., Bootes and BoARDMAN,. JJ.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event.
#### Clifford E. Meade, Appellant, v. Benjamin Goldman, Respondent.

Motion for reargument denied, with ten dollars costs.

Present — Jenks, P. J., Thomas, Carr, Woodward and Rich, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Net Talk.com, Inc. a Florida corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Anastasios Kyriakides, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to my knowledge:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/s/Anastasios KyriakidesAnastasios KyriakidesChief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer)Date:  December 15, 2010
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4955 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4955

To amend the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States to extend 
 the tariff preference level on imports of certain cotton and man-made 
fiber, fabric, apparel, and made-up goods from Bahrain under the United 
                  States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 24, 2014

Mr. Southerland (for himself and Mr. Miller of Florida) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States to extend 
 the tariff preference level on imports of certain cotton and man-made 
fiber, fabric, apparel, and made-up goods from Bahrain under the United 
                  States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF TARIFF PREFERENCE LEVEL ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN 
              COTTON AND MAN-MADE FIBER, FABRIC, APPAREL, AND MADE-UP 
              GOODS FROM BAHRAIN UNDER THE UNITED STATES-BAHRAIN FREE 
              TRADE AGREEMENT.

    (a) In General.--U.S. Note 13 to subchapter XIV of chapter 99 of 
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended--
            (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (a), by striking 
        ``2015'' and inserting ``2025''; and
            (2) in the matter following paragraph (d), by striking 
        ``December 31, 2015'' and inserting ``December 31, 2025''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply with respect to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after January 1, 2016.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE v. MRS. JOHN TURPIN and FRANK SHERRILL.

(Filed 15 June, 1932.)

Criminal Law G e — Evidence of reputation of defendant’s garage for selling liquor held incompetent as hearsay evidence.

In a prosecution for violation of the prohibition laws evidence that the defendant’s garage had the reputation of selling liquor is incompetent as hearsay evidence.

Appeal by defendant, Mrs. John Turpin, from *Harding, J.,*at July-August Term, 1931, of SwaiN.

Criminal prosecution tried upon indictment charging the defendant, and another, with violations of the prohibition laws.

Lee Birchfield, a character witness for Mrs. Turpin, was asked on cross-examination the following question:

“Q. What is the reputation of the defendant’s home in regard to selling liquor? (Objection; overruled; exception.) A. That is the repu*12tation of that filling station, it bas been liquor. I don’t know I could buy whiskey there for sure, but I have got some reports on the filling-station.”

From an adverse verdict and judgment of six months in jail, the defendant appeals, assigning errors.

*Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Sea/well for the State.*

*I. 0. Crawford and Edwards & Leatherwood for defendant.*

Stacy, C. J.

The evidence respecting the reputation of defendant’s garage for selling liquor was hearsay and should have been excluded. *S. v. Springs,*184 N. C., 768, 114 S. E., 851; *S. v. Mills,*184 N. C., 694, 114 S. E., 314. The identical question was before the Court in the two cases just cited. Further discussion would only call for a repetition of what was said in these cases.

New trial.
##### 



Exhibit 31.2  CERTIFICATION
      a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to
the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of
the period covered by this quarterly report (the Evaluation Date); andc)
    
    presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;
  a)
    
    all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
identified for the registrants auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal controls; and
  August 15, 2005
 /s/ Karen L. HailChief Financial Officer