Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT, PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SONIA LONG GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

FRANCES BARROW

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

R.C. RICHMOND, III

Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

SONIA LONG, et al. )

)

Appellants-Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) No. 09A05-1308-CT-434

)

HEARTLAND RESIDENTIAL SERVICES, )

INC., et al. )

)

Appellees-Defendants. )

APPEAL FROM THE CASS SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Lynn Murray, Special Judge

Cause No. 09D01-1204-CT-15 
2

December 30, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PYLE, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Sonia Long (“Long”), pro se, on behalf of herself and her ward, Timothy Urmston 

(“Urmston”) filed an amended complaint against Heartland Residential Services, Inc. 

(“Heartland”) and various agencies of the State of Indiana (collectively, “the State”) to 

challenge the amount of funding the State provided under its Medicaid waiver program. 

After Long requested the trial court to dismiss her amended complaint without prejudice, 

the trial court dismissed her complaint with prejudice under Indiana Trial Rule 41(A)(2). 

Because, on appeal, Long makes no cogent argument showing that the trial court’s order 

was erroneous, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Additionally, we deny Heartland’s 

and the State’s request for appellate attorney fees.

We affirm.

ISSUES

1. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Long and Urmston’s

amended complaint with prejudice.

2. Whether Heartland and the State are entitled to appellate attorney fees. 
3

FACTS

In April 2000, the Cass Superior Court appointed Long and her husband1as coguardians of Urmston, who was born in 1944 and is not related to Long. Long lives in St. 

Joseph County, while Urmstrom lives in Cass County. Urmstrom lives in a house owned 

by Long and pays rent to Long. Urmstrom has developmental disabilities and receives 

support services under the Medicaid waiver program that is administered by the State. 

In February 2011, Long met with Heartland about providing support services for 

Urmston. Heartland then contracted with the State to provide in-home supportive 

services to Urmston through the Medicaid waiver program. The State determined how 

many hours of service that Heartland could provide to Urmston and set out that amount in 

a Notice of Action (“NOA”). The State authorized funding to Heartland to provide 

services to Urmston for sixteen hours per day for five days per week. However, for 

multiple months in 2011, Heartland was able to provide 24/7 service to Urmston when he 

was at home because Heartland was able to get a budget modification request (“BMR”) 

approved by the State. At some point, the State no longer approved the BMR for 

Urmston, leaving him with the original service authorization set out in his NOA. Long 

provided care to Urmston for the hours not funded by the program.

On March 5, 2012, Heartland sent Long a letter (“60-day Notice Letter”),

2

notifying her that it would no longer provide Medicaid services to Urmston on May 7, 

2012. Specifically, the letter from Heartland’s vice president provided:

 

1 Long’s husband was not included on any of the pleadings below and is not a party on appeal. 

2 Such a notice letter was required by the Medicaid waiver program so that a client had time to find 

another service provider. 
4

I am writing to inform you that Heartland . . . will no longer be able to 

provide services to . . . Tim as of May 7, 2012, midnight. Additionally, 

please be informed that Heartland will not be providing any hours of 

services other than those that are authorized under Tim’s NOA beginning 

March 12, 2012 at midnight.

Because you have stated that you have no intention of providing any care 

for Tim during the time when Heartland staff is not present, and further, 

because you have deliberately refused additional services that Tim needs 

and is entitled to under a Medicaid PA, this Notice is being provided to 

Adult Protective Services and various other government authorities so that 

emergency actions may be taken to keep Tim safe when Heartland is not in 

the home.

This was not an easy decision for Heartland to make, as our staff has come 

to truly enjoy Tim’s company and takes great pride in providing him with 

the services he deserves. Unfortunately, your behavior has made it 

impossible for Heartland to continue services. Specifically:

1. You have consistently and intentionally interfered with 

Heartland’s staff and their duties, including requiring each staff 

member to give you a special “report” at 10:00 p.m. each night, 

which includes what he ate and various other non-essential 

details. If you do not receive this report you call the police to the 

home;

2. You require staff members to “watch” the garage so that no one 

will break in;

3. You have refused to allow additional medically-based services 

for Tim under an approved PA; and,

4. You have behaved in an entirely inappropriate manner toward 

Heartland management, raising your voice at them, hanging up 

on them and threatening to sue them.

Simply put, you have created an overall atmosphere in which our staff can 

not function optimally and is harmful to Tim. You are also regularly 

abusing the 911 system, which is entirely and wholly unacceptable.

 
5

Heartland will do everything in its power to ensure a smooth transition for 

Tim to his new provider, and will work hard to make certain that he 

continues to receive the very best services we can provide until that time. 

Should you have any questions about this matter, please contact me 

directly. You should be aware that I have instructed staff members not to 

discuss this particular matter with you. Instead their focus will be on care 

for Tim, and I encourage you to do the same. 

(Appellee’s App. 39-40) (emphasis in original). 

On April 23, 2012, Long filed, pro se, the following pleadings with the trial court: 

(1) a complaint against Heartland on her behalf; (2) a complaint against Heartland on 

Urmston’s behalf as his guardian; and (3) a motion for a temporary restraining order. 

Although she did not name them as parties, Long served copies of these pleadings to the 

Attorney General and the Cass County Prosecutor.3 

In Long’s complaint, she alleged the following claims against Heartland: Count I, 

breach of an oral contract; Count II, “intentional misrepresentation[;]” Count III, breach 

of duty, malicious conduct, and bad faith; Count IV, attempted malicious prosecution, 

harassment, libel, slander, and defamation of character; Count V, assault; Count VI, 

denial of her civil rights and violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution.4 (Appellee’s App. 10) (upper case lettering altered to lower case). Under 

each count, Long sought damages from Heartland and the State (including BDDS and 

 

3 Additionally, Long sent a notice of tort claim and a summons to the Attorney General’s Office. In her 

tort claim notice, Long alleged claims of “[h]arassment, discrimination, malicious conduct, [b]ad [f]aith, 

negligence[,] [b]reach of HIPPA, and other issues” against the Bureau of Developmental Disability 

Services (“BDDS”) and Adult Protective Services (“APS”) and asserted that the date of loss for the claim 

was “ongoing loss since 10-2008[.]” (Appellee’s App. 196). 

4 Long argued that Heartland forced her to care for Urmston during the hours that were not covered by 

funding from the State and that such actions “constituted the action of slavery by Heartland.” (Appellee’s 

App. 18). 
6

APS) “(if/when, these entities are added to this Complaint).” (Appellee’s App. 7, 11, 13, 

15, 16, 18-19).

In the complaint on behalf of Urmston, Long alleged the following claims: Count 

I, “breach of duty to a vulnerable individual[;]” Count II, “bad faith in the services 

provided[;]” Count III, “intentional neglect and abuse of a vulnerable individual[;]” and 

Count IV, denial of Urmston’s civil rights.5 (Appellee’s App. 22, 26, 28) (upper case 

lettering altered to lower case). 

In Long’s motion for a temporary restraining order, she sought three things: (1) to 

“no longer be forced to care for her ward, Mr. Timothy Urmston[;]” (2) to have Heartland 

pay her “at the Indiana State rate of $19.52 per hour for her care-giving services[;]” and 

(3) to prohibit Heartland from discontinuing services for Urmston on May 7, 2012 or to 

have the State provide funding for twenty-four hour a day services with a different 

provider. (Appellee’s App. 57-58). 

On May 1, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on Long’s motion for a temporary 

restraining order. During this hearing, the parties discussed that the State should be 

involved in this case because Long was making claims that could more appropriately be

addressed by the State. After witnesses from Heartland6testified that it would not and 

could not stop providing services to Urmston until another service provider was found, 

the trial court denied Long’s motion. 

 

5 Long alleged that the State had violated Urmston’s civil rights “by not providing sufficient funding” and 

that Heartland violated his rights when it sent Long the 60-day Notice Letter to notify her that it would no 

longer be Urmston’s Medicaid waiver service provider. (Appellee’s App. 30). 

6 The trial court heard testimony from the executive director and the owner/president of Heartland. 
7

On May 22, 2012, the Attorney General’s Office, on behalf of the Attorney 

General and the Cass County Prosecutor, filed a Notice of Non-Involvement, indicating 

that they were not parties and would not be filing any responsive pleadings. 

On June 15, 2012, Heartland filed a motion to dismiss. Specifically, Heartland 

sought to dismiss the action under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(7) for failure to join parties 

needed for just adjudication under Trial Rule 19, and it sought to dismiss counts II 

through VI of Long’s complaint and counts I and IV of Urmston’s complaint pursuant to 

Trial Rule 12(B)(6). 

On July 25, 2012, Long sent a letter to the trial judge and filed separate motions 

requesting to add the Cass County Chief Deputy Prosecutor (“Deputy Prosecutor”), two 

employees from BDDS, and one employee of APS as defendants in the case (collectively, 

“the State employees”). 

On August 10, 2012, the Attorney General’s Office filed, on behalf of the Deputy 

Prosecutor and the State employees, a response in opposition to Long’s request to add 

them as defendants. The State asserted that joinder of these parties would be futile 

because Long had failed to state a claim against them, she had failed to comply with the 

Indiana Tort Claims Act, and because the State employees had immunity. 

In late August 2012, the trial judge recused from the case, and a special judge was 

selected in late September 2012. Later, on November 26, 2012, Long filed a second 

motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking to “protect the health and safety of Mr. 

Urmston and to stop the physical and financial drain which has occurred for the Long 

family due to the requirement that Sonia Long care for Mr. Urmston a minimum of thirty-
8

six (36) hours per week.” (Appellee’s App. 127). Thereafter, Heartland filed a response 

in opposition to Long’s motion and requested attorney fees, pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 

34-52-1-1(b), for the costs incurred in responding to the motion.

On December 14, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on Heartland’s motion to 

dismiss and on Long’s second motion for a temporary restraining order. Subsequently, 

the trial court determined that BDDS and APS were “necessary parties” and ordered 

Long to join these parties as defendants within thirty days. When ruling on Heartland’s 

motion to dismiss, the trial court ordered that Counts II, III, and IV (to the extent that 

they purported to assert claims for malicious prosecution, slander, and harassment) as 

well as Counts V and VI of Long’s complaint were dismissed and that Counts I and IV of 

Urmston’s complaint were dismissed. (App. 10; Appellee’s App, 144). The trial court 

also denied Long’s second request for a temporary restraining order and reserved its 

ruling on Heartland’s request for attorney fees. 

On January 7, 2013, Long sent the trial court a letter requesting a consultation, and 

the trial court denied her request. Then, on January 10, 2013, Long filed an amended 

complaint on behalf of herself and Urmston, and she added BDDS and APS as 

defendants.

7

 In her amended complaint, she alleged, among other things, that Heartland 

breached its oral contract with her and its contractual agreement with the State and that 

Heartland had breached its duty to Long and Urmston and acted with bad faith and 

malicious conduct. Long also alleged that specific employees of the various State 

agencies had breached their duty to her and to Urmston. Long sought compensatory 

 

7 Long also added Liberty of Indiana and Indiana Professional Management Group as defendants.
9

damages, punitive damages, “Hedonic” damages, loss of consortium damages, and costs. 

(Appellee’s App. 164). 

In January 2013, Long sent the Attorney General several tort claims notices on 

behalf of herself and Urmston. These notices contained various dates of loss and 

contained various complaints against State agency employees, including complaints of 

breach of duty, improper supervision, failure to file for a new BMR, and failure to follow

agency rules. 

On March 1, 2013, the State filed a motion for summary judgment and argued, 

among other things, that it was entitled to summary judgment because Long had failed to 

properly or timely file a tort claim notice and because she had never served the Attorney 

General with a summons or copies of the amended complaint. Additionally, the State 

argued that Long’s claims were barred by the Indiana Tort Claims Act and the statute of 

limitations and that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Approximately two weeks later, on March 19, 2013, Long filed a motion to 

dismiss her complaints without prejudice. Thereafter, Heartland filed an objection to a 

dismissal without prejudice and requested a hearing on Long’s motion. It also argued 

that the trial court should dismiss Long’s case with prejudice, and it moved for attorney 

fees in the event that the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice.

On May 16, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on Long’s motion to dismiss and 

on Heartland’s motion for attorney fees. At the beginning of the hearing, Long told the 

trial court that she wanted to withdraw her motion to dismiss and that she was prepared to 

argue against the State’s summary judgment motion. The attorneys for Heartland and the 
10

State then voiced their concern that Long could have given prior notification that she 

wanted to withdraw her motion. They also expressed the inconvenience of preparing for 

Long’s motion and traveling the distance to the trial court when that could have been 

avoided by her providing notification. Heartland then stated that it would request 

attorney fees for the cost of preparation for and travel to the hearing if the trial court 

granted Long’s motion to withdraw her motion to dismiss. After the trial court discussed 

“common courtesy” and acknowledged that Heartland’s request for attorney fees was 

“well taken[,]” Long stated that she did not want to withdraw her motion and confirmed 

that she wanted to proceed with the hearing on her motion to dismiss. (Tr. 70)

In regard to her motion to dismiss, Long told the trial court that she had “requested 

the Federal Government to do an investigation to Medicaid issues in the State of Indiana” 

and stated that she should be able to dismiss her complaints without prejudice and later 

refile after she “g[o]t all the information that [she] need[ed]” and after she was able to get 

an attorney. (Tr. 72). 

On May 20, 2013, the trial court, issued an order in which it dismissed Long’s 

complaint with prejudice. The trial court’s order provides, in relevant part:

3. . . . For the most part the plaintiffs’ claims are unintelligible and 

appear to ask the court to determine the amount and nature of services to be 

provided by the State agencies or Heartland to Urmston.

* * * * *

6. Indiana Trial Rule 41(A) provides than an action shall not be 

dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon 

such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. This rule conveys 

upon the trial judge authority to exercise his or her discretion and impose 

conditions on a dismissal. Highland Realty, Inc. v. Indianapolis Airport 

Authority, 563 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 1990). This discretion may be exercised 
11

to assure that a dismissal does not prejudice or unfairly inconvenience the 

defendants. Id.

7. The plaintiffs’ claims are largely undecipherable. Most of plaintiffs’

claims against Heartland were dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which this court could grant relief. As correctly stated in the State’s 

memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs’

claims against the State defendants are not cognizable.

8. Although plaintiff Long is representing herself in this action, and 

purports to also be representing her ward Urmston, in doing so she must be 

held to the same standard as trained legal counsel. Receveur v. Buss, 919 

N.E.2d 1235, 1238 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Pro se litigants are held to the 

same standards as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural 

rules. Ballaban v. Bloomington Jewish Cmty, Inc., 982 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2013).

9. In defending plaintiffs’ claims in this action, Heartland has incurred 

legal fees of more than $18,000.00, and the State Attorney General’s office 

has incurred substantial time and effort to-date. Said defendants would be 

prejudiced and unfairly inconvenienced if the plaintiffs were allowed to 

walk away and wait for a better day to refile their suit.

10. Based upon the foregoing, the court finds and orders that as a proper 

term and condition of granting the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss this action, 

said dismissal should be with prejudice against the refiling thereof. As 

such, the defendant Heartland’s motion for an award of attorney fees as 

well as the State’s motion for summary judgment are deemed moot.

(App. 19-20). 

On June 18, 2013, Long filed a “Motion for Corrections to Court for Change from 

Order of Dismissal with Prejudice to Order of Dismissal without Prejudice[,]” which the 

trial court treated as a motion to correct error and set for a hearing. (App. 24) (upper case 

lettering altered to lower case). Thereafter, Heartland and the State both filed a response 

in opposition to Long’s motion, and Heartland requested attorney fees for its costs 

incurred in responding to Long’s motion to correct error. 
12

On July 15, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on Long’s motion and Heartland’s 

attorney fee request. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying Long’s motion to 

correct error, which provided, in relevant part:

3. Long’s motion to correct [error] is a lengthy recitation of claims 

asserted in her original complaint and of new claims against the defendants 

based upon events that occurred after the hearing in May 2013.

4. Neither Long’s motion nor her responses to the defendants’

statement in opposition . . . address the pertinent issue as to whether the 

court erred by dismissing her claims with prejudice.

5. Long’s motion to correct error should be denied, for the reasons 

cited in its order of May 20, 2013 and the statements in opposition filed by 

the defendants on July 15, 2013. It was within the proper discretion of this 

court to find and order that the plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed with 

prejudice so that the defendants were not prejudiced or unfairly 

inconvenienced.

(App. 100). Additionally, after determining that Long’s motion to correct error was 

“frivolous, unreasonable, and/or groundless[,]” the trial court awarded attorney fees of 

$750.00 to Heartland pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 34-52-1-1 for Heartland’s fees in 

responding to Long’s motion. 

DECISION

Long appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her case with prejudice, and 

Heartland and the State request that we grant them appellate attorney fees. We will 

address each argument in turn.

1. Dismissal with Prejudice

Initially, we note that Long appeals pro se. As our Indiana Supreme Court has 

explained, a litigant “has every right to represent himself in legal proceedings, but a pro 
13

se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent 

leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 

259, 266 (Ind. 2014). 

Here, Long appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing her case with prejudice 

under Indiana Trial Rule 41(A)(2) and the subsequent denial of her motion to correct 

error. Although Long’s appeal stems from the order dismissing her case with prejudice, 

she makes no argument—let alone any cogent argument—explaining how or why the 

trial court’s order dismissing her claims with prejudice was erroneous. Instead, she 

appears to rehash claims raised in her amended complaint, and she asserts various 

challenges to procedural events that occurred during this underlying case, such as 

whether trial court staff erred with regard to how and where to file her complaint. We, 

however, are a Court of intermediate review, and we cannot review any newly raised 

claims. Because Long presents no cogent argument nor any citation to authority to show 

that the trial court’s order was erroneous, she has waived review of this order on appeal. 

See, e.g., Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 264 (holding that the pro se appellant’s claim was 

waived because he failed to support it with cogent argument or citation to relevant 

authority). See also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).8

2. Appellate Attorney Fees

 

8

In her Reply Brief, Long generally asserts that “the trial court was incorrect in its dismissal of Long’s 

amended complaint with prejudice.” (Long’s Reply Br. 3). To the extent that she provides an argument 

to support this general assertion, it is waived because she raises it for the first time in her reply brief. See 

Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005) (“The law is well settled that 

grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant’s initial brief and if addressed for the first time in 

the reply brief, they are waived.”). 
14

Heartland and the State (“the Appellees”) ask this Court to grant them appellate 

attorney fees under Appellate Rule 66(E). 

Under Appellate Rule 66(E), we are authorized to “assess damages [including 

attorney fees] if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith.” 

A decision to assess any appellate damages or attorney fees is “in [our] Court’s 

discretion.” App. R. 66(E). While Appellate Rule 66(E) allows us to award damages on 

appeal, “[w]e must use extreme restraint when exercising this power because of the

potential chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal.” Kroger Co. v. WC 

Associates, LLC, 967 N.E.2d 29, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “A strong 

showing is required to justify an award of appellate damages, and the sanction is not

imposed to punish mere lack of merit, but something more egregious.” Id.

While we agree with Appellees that Long’s appellate brief was not the model of 

clarity and did not completely adhere to the Appellate Rules, the Appellees have not 

shown that this appeal is “something more egregious” that requires the imposition of 

appellate attorney fees. Thus, we decline the Appellees’ request to award appellate 

attorney fees under Appellate Rule 66(E).9 

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur. 

 

9 We also disagree with the Appellees’ assertion that they should receive appellate attorney fees under 

Indiana Code § 34-52-1-1.