1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHARLES TURPIN, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 17-2453 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 9, 20 : DARNELL RAY, et al. , : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING IN P ART AND D ENYING IN P ART D EFENDANTS R OWLEY , S TRANGE , AND THE D ISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA ’ S M OTION TO D ISMISS ; D ECLINING TO E XERCISE J URISDICTION O VER R EMAINING S TATE L AW C LAIMS I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Charles Turpin brings suit against Metropolitan Polic e Department Officers Anthony Rowley and Sharon Strange, t he District of Columbia, an d landlord Darnell Ray. Mr. Turpin asserts individual and m unicipal liability claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Rowley and Strange and the Distri ct of Columbia for violations of his Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable se izures. He has also brought comm on law claims for trespass, false arrest, wrongful evicti on, and malicious prosecution agai nst Officers Rowley and Strange, and the common law claim of ma licious prosecution against the D istrict of Columbia. He further asserts individual common law cla ims against Darnell Ray for wr ongful eviction, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. For the forthcoming reasons, the Cou rt grants Officers Rowley and Strange’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims of illegal entry, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Furthermore, the Cour t grants the District of Colu mbia’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 municipal liability claim. F inally, the Court declines t o exercise supplemen tal jurisdiction2 over Mr. Turpin’s remaining state law claims. Thus, the common law claims of false arrest, trespass, wrongful eviction, and m alicious prosecution against Officers Rowley and Strange; of malicious prosecution against the District of Columbia; and of wrongful eviction, false arrest, and malicious prosecution against Darnell Ray will be remanded to the D.C. Superior Court.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1 Charles Turpin is a District of Columbia resident who, prior to commencement of this action, had been a long-time tenant of Darnell Ray’s. Am. Compl . ¶¶ 8–9, ECF No. 5. Mr. Turpin and his partner, Ms. Mil es, had lived in an apartment re nted from Mr. Ray for at least 10
years. Id. ¶ 8. Ms. Miles’s name was on the lease. Id. ¶ 9. Following Ms. Miles’s death in 2016, Mr. Ray indicated to Mr. Turpin t hat he wished t o sell the apar tment and asked Mr. Turpin to vacate the premises. Id. ¶ 14. In July 2016, Mr. Ray initiate d a landlord-tenant case a gainst Mr. Turpin seeking repossession of the apartment. Id. ¶ 15. The lawsuit resulted in a judgment of possession against Mr. Turpi n, and on October 13, 2016, the cou rt issued a Writ of Restitution authorizing Mr. Turpin’s eviction. Id. ¶ 15–16. The Writ was set to expire seventy-five days from issuance. Id. ¶ 16. In the District of Columbia, e victions are carried out by the U .S. Marshals Service. See D.C. Code § 13-302 (“[T]he United S tates Marshal for the Distri ct of Columbia . . . shall serve the process of . . . the Superior C ourt of the District of Colu mbia.”); D.C. Super. Ct. Land. & Ten. R. 16 (detailing process by whi ch U.S. Marshal execute wri ts of restitution); Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss. (“Pl. ’s Opp’n”) Ex. 1, ECF No. 11-1; see also Mendes v. Johnson , 389 A.2d 781, 786–87 (D.C. 1978) (holding evi ctions may only be exe cuted by appropriate legal

1 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts the plaintiff ’s factual allegations as true. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).3 process not landlord self-help); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6-A, § 20 0.11 (“Members of the [police] force shall not serve civil process; nor shall they render assi stance in civil cases.”). Acting pursuant to this rule, Mr. Ray pa id the required eviction fee t o the Marshals Service. Am. Compl. ¶ 17. During the seventy-five-d ay period in which the Writ of R estitution was active, Mr. Turpin continued to occupy the residence and was never officially remo ved by the Marshals. See id. ¶ 19. On December 27, 2016, the Writ of Restitution for Mr. Turpi n’s eviction expired without the Marshals Service taking any act ion to execute the eviction. Id. ¶ 18. At some point between when the court issued the Writ of Restitution and when it expir ed, Mr. Ray changed the locks of the apartment, barring Mr. Turpin from entry. Id. ¶ 19. As a result of the changed locks, Mr. Turpin, who at that time still o ccupied the apartment, forced e ntry into the unit by breaking through the rear door. Id. ¶ 20. Following Mr. Turpin’s re-entry into the apartment he received no communication from Mr. Ray until Mr. Ray called polic e officers to the premises on December 29, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 21– 23. On first dispatch, the officers that arrived at the scene d id not enter the apartment and ultimately declined to intervene in what they deemed a civil ma tter between a landlord and

tenant. Id. ¶ 22. Later that day, Mr. Ray a gain called the police, and dif ferent officers, Officers Rowley and Strange, were dispatched to the premises. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. After speaking with Mr. Ray, who informed them of the evi ction proceedings, the officer s “indicated to Mr. Turpin that he had been evicted” and needed to come out of the apartment. Id. ¶ 26. During that conversation Mr. Turpin admitted that he had forced entry into the apartment and acknowledged that while eviction proceedings ha d been entered against him, t he Marshals Service had yet to remove him from the apartment. Id. ¶ 25. Mr. Turpin maintained tha t the Writ of Restitution against him had expired and that he had a right to remain in th e apartment. See id . Following this4 conversation, Officers Rowley a nd Strange entered the apartment , arrested Mr. Turpin, and forcibly removed him from the premises. Id. ¶¶ 26–30. Following his arrest, Mr. Turpi n was charged with destruction o f property and resisting arrest and was prosecuted fully. Id. ¶ 29. Mr. Turpin’s trial took place on July 9, 2017, and the next day, he was acquitted on all counts. Id. ¶ 31. On October 6, 2017, Mr. Turpin commenced this action in D.C. Superior Cour t, which the District of Colum bia then removed to federal court.
See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Mr . Turpin has brought individual and municipal liability claims for Fourth Amendment violations pursuant to § 1983 again st Officer Rowley, Officer Strange, and the Distr ict of Columbia, as well as common law to rt claims against Officer Rowley, Officer Strange, the Dist rict of Columbia, and Mr. Ray. See generally Am. Compl. Before the Court today are moti ons to dismiss from Officers Row ley and Strange, the District of Columbia, and Mr. Ray. Each moti on is now ripe for decision.
III. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Proce dure require that a complaint c ontain a “short and plain statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair not ice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curium). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff’s ultimate likelihood of success on the merits, but rather whether a plain tiff has properly stated a claim. See
Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A court cons idering a motion to dis miss presumes the complaint’s factual allegations are true and must construe them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).5 While it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elemen ts of a prima facie case in the complaint, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Assuming all factual allegations are true, a plainti ff’s right to relief must rise a bove “the speculative level.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555–56 (2007) (citations omitted). A court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, see Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, nor presume the veracity of legal conclusion s couched as factual allegations. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory sta tements” will therefore not withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678.
IV. ANALYSIS Officers Rowley and Strange cont end that Mr. Turpin has failed to state a claim for violations of his Fourth Amendme nt rights, and that even if he has stated valid claims, the officers are entitled to dismi ssal on the constitutional claims on qualified immunity grounds. Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 6–12, ECF No. 9. Officers Rowley and Strange further assert that they are entitled to common law privilege for the additional false arrest and trespass claims, and t hat Mr. Turpin has failed to s tate claims for wrongful eviction and malicious prosecution. Id. at 12–14. The District of Columbi a contends that Mr. Turpin ha s failed to both adequately plead a “deliberate indifference” mun icipal liability claim under § 1983, as well as state a claim fo r common law malicious prosecu tion. Id. at 15–18. Finally, Mr. Ray argues that Mr. Turpin has fa iled to state proper claims fo r wrongful eviction, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. See generally Def. Ray’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Def. Ray’s Mem.”), ECF No. 20-1. The Court will address each argument in t urn.6 A. § 1983 Claims Against Officers Rowley and Strange Mr. Turpin has brought § 1983 claims against Officers Rowl ey and Strange, alleging they violated his Fourth Amendment r ights against warrantless entry and unreasonable seizure when they (1) entered his apartment without a search warrant or the occurrence of exigent circumstances; (2) arrested hi m without a corresponding arrest warrant or probable cause; and (3) initiated criminal proceedings against him with “full knowl edge” of the illegality of the arrest. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–57. Offi cers Rowley and Strange conten d, given Mr. Turpin’s unresolved tenancy status and hi s admission that he had partici pated in the destruction of property on the premises, that: (1) no predicate constitutional violations occurred because Mr. Turpin had no expectation of priv acy in the home and probable c ause existed for his arrest; and (2) even if a violation occurred, the officers are nonetheless entitled to qualif ied immunity because the violations were not “clearly established” under the circumstances. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 243–44 (2009); see Defs.’ Mem. at 6–12. The Supreme Court has identifie d a clear mandate for courts to resolve qualified immunity questions at the earliest possible stage of litigation , leading this Court to assess Officers Rowley and Strange’s e ntitlement to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss phase.
Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231. While this Court recognizes a r ecent reluctance among other cou rts in this Circuit to make qualified i mmunity determinations prior to trial, the facts before the Court coupled with the case law regard ing both Mr. Turpin’s expectati on of privacy in the apartment in question and probable cause surr ounding his arrest allow for a qualified immunity assessment at this stage. See Jiggetts v. Cipullo , 285 F. Supp. 3d 156, 172 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing circuit trend).7 1. § 1983 Illegal Entry Claim Mr. Turpin alleges that Officer s Rowley and Strange violated hi s Fourth Amendment rights by illegally ent ering his apartment without a warrant or exigent circumstances. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–42. Officers Rowley a nd Strange assert that Mr. Tu rpin has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the a partment at the time that would have entitled him to Fourth Amendment pr otection in the first place, but that even if he had, the officers are nonetheless entitled to qualified i mmunity for the ir actions. Defs.’ Mem. at 8

. The Court finds that clearly estab lished law did not prohibit Offic ers Rowley and Strange’s conduct under the circumstances, and tha t therefore, qualified immunity protects their actions, even if possibly mistaken. See Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236. Accordingly, Off icers Rowley and Strange’s motion to dismiss the illegal entry claim is granted on qualifi ed immunity grounds. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a claim against a defendant who, acting under color of state 2 or local law, deprived him or he r of the “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2018). The doctrine of qualified immunity i n turn protects government offi cials from liability for corresponding civil damages insofa r as their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constituti onal rights of whic h a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine exists to strike a bal ance between holding public officials righteously accoun table for irresponsible acts , and shielding public officials from

2 The District of Columbia is c onsidered a “state” for purposes of a § 1983 claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“[E]very person w ho, under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation . . . of any State or Territor y or the District of Columbia, subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any right s, privileges , or immuniti es secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”); see also Boyd v. District of Columbia , 526 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48 n.3 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[F]or the purposes of § 198 3, the District of Columbia is treated as a state.”).8 any harassment or distraction that may inhibit th eir ability to reasonably perform their duties.
Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231. To determine whether a defendant is entitled to q ualified immun ity, courts undertake a two-pronged analysis, assessing “(1 ) whether the facts alleged show that the government official’s conduct violated a ‘ constitutional right, and (2) wh ether that right was clearly established at the tim e of the incident.” Jiggetts , 285 F. Supp. 3d at 171 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A “clearly established” right is one of “settled law” with a clear foundation in existing precedent. District of Columbia v. Wesby , 138 S. Ct. 577, 581 (citing Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)); see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (noting principle must be “dictated by controlling authority [o r by] . . . robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” (quoting Wilson v. Layne , 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999))). Given the unique factual circumstances of each cas e, a qualified immunity determ ination hinges largely on an official’s conduct in the parti cular factual circumstances and protects against reasonable mistakes of law, fact, or mixed questions of law and fact. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231, 236; see Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985) (finding tha t only those actions tha t are “clearly proscribed” by the law are unprotected by qualified immunity). Under the first prong of the quali fied immunity analysis, in or der to determine whether Mr. Turpin’s Fourth Amendment ri ghts were violated, the Court w ould need to determine whether, given the District of C olumbia’s prohibition against s elf-help evictions, a tenant regains or retains a possessory right ( and thus a Fourth Amendment expe ctation of privacy) to the premises once a Writ of Restitution has expired, but no evictio n has formally been executed. See
Mendes , 389 A.2d at 786–87 (holding evicti ons must be executed by app ropriate legal process);9 see also Pl.’s Opp’n. Ex. 1 (outlining Metr opolitan Police Department ( “MPD”) policy against intervention in landlord and tenant disputes). The Fourth Amendment protects t he “right of the people to be se cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980). Absent exigent circumstances, warr antless entry into a home is patently unreasonable, even if probable cause is found to exist

. Id. at 590. That being said, Fourth Amendment protections onl y apply when the plaintiff enjo ys a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises in questi on and when that expectation o f privacy is one that “society [is] willing to recognize . . . as reasonable.” Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (alternation in original). Wh ile a strong body of case law both within this Circuit and others has attempted to address the issue of the expectation of privacy in landlord-tenant r elationships, the unique scenario at hand ha s yet to be addressed. See United States v. Curlin , 638 F.3d 562, 565– 66 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that prev iously evicted tenant enjo ys no expectation of privacy in home); United States v. Struckman , 603 F.3d 731, 747 (9th Cir. 2010) (no ting that trespassers may not claim Fourth Amendment protections); United States v. Gale , 136 F.3d 192, 195–96 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that te nant lacked expectation of pri vacy in apartment occupied illegally); United States v. Ratcliffe , No. 93-3096, 1994 WL 245598, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 1994) (finding that expectation of privacy does not extend to t enant whose continued presence was maintained through threats and coercion); Hill v. G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. , 859 A.2d 1055, 1057 (D.C. 2004) (noting that tenant loses possessory rig hts once judgment of possession is entered against him). However, given the second prong of the qualified immunity analy sis, the Court need not reach a determination on the constitutionality of the actions i n question to rule on Officers10 Rowley and Strange’s motion. See Pearson , 555 U.S. at 241 (noting flexibility of two-step inquiry and cautioning against d eciding constitutionality quest ions unless unavoidable); see also Raub v. Campbell , 785 F.3d 876, 884 (4th Cir. 2012) (ru ling on whether violatio n was clearly established law without reaching constitutionality of particula r scenario); Buchanan v. Maine , 469 F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) (avoi ding Fourth Amendment qu estion where injury was “highly idiosyncratic and heav ily dependent on the facts”). In Mr. Turpin’s case, then, the applicability of qualified immun ity turns on whether the facts as pleaded establish that Officers Rowley and Strange’s conduct wa s clearly prohi bited under circu mstances before them. Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citing Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). The court concludes that they do not. In order for Officers Rowley a nd Strange’s motion to succeed on qualified immunity grounds, the facts available to t he officers must have indicate d that the consenting party (Mr. Ray) had legitimate authority over the premises and that entry into the home under the circumstances would not be a “cl early establishe d” violation of Mr. Turpin’s constitutional rights—in other words, that Mr . Turpin no longer enjoyed a Four th Amendment expectation of privacy in the home. Saucier , 533 U.S. at 202; see Illinois v. Rodriquez , 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). While the constitutionality of the officers’ conduct in the par ticular scenario has yet to be “clearly established,” case law suggests that Mr. Turpin did no t enjoy an expect ation of privacy in the residence—supporting the o fficer’s actions, rather than putting them on notice of their potential illegality. Cf. Buchanan, 469 F.3d at 169 (finding qualified i mmunity when “there is no case directly on point, [but] case law tended to support office r’s actions, not put them on notice [of violation]”). The parties do not dispute the fact that Mr. Turpin was previously a long-term tenant of Mr. Ray’s and that a j udgment against Mr. Turpin had been entered in Landlord and11 Tenant Court resulting in the i ssuance of a Writ of Restitution . Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–16. Furthermore, the officers were informed by both parties that Mr . Turpin had broken back into the home. Id. ¶¶ 20, 24–25. Had Mr. Turpin not broke n into the residence, or had a judgment not yet been entered regarding his eviction proceedings, this Court mig ht have reached a different conclusion. However, even taking all of his factual allegations as true, Mr. Turpin was admittedly occupying the residence through forced entry, when h e knew a Writ of Restitution was outstanding against him. Id. ¶ 25. Based on the unsettled legal status of a Fourth Amendment expec tation of privacy in this particular scenario and with a n eye to Circuit case law, the Co urt finds that the officers’ entry into the home upon permission of Mr . Ray was not a clearly esta blished constitu tional violation. See Ratcliffe , 1994 WL 245598, at *2 (findi ng in regard to landlord self-hel p laws that “[w]hether one has legitimate e xpectation of privacy in a given place . . . does not necessarily turn on nuances of local property law”). Accordingly, the Court grants Officers Rowley and Strange’s motion to dismiss the illegal entry claim on qualifie d immunity grounds.
2. § 1983 False Arrest Claim Mr. Turpin also alleges that Offi cers Rowley and Strange violat ed his Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a war rantless arrest without probab le cause. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43–51. Officers Rowley and Strange asse rt that no predicate Fourth Ame ndment violation occurred, and that even if it had, they are enti tled to qualified immunity fo r their reasonable, if possibly mistaken, belief that probable cau se existed for the arrest in question. Defs.’ Mem. at 8. While this Circuit has held tha t the issue of probable cause in a false arrest case is a mixed question of law and fact tha t should ordinarily be left t o the jury, see Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs. , 755 F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the Supreme Court’s recen t ruling in District of12 Columbia v. Wesby , 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018), weighs in f avor of a ruling on qualifi ed immunity at this stage. See Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 591 (noting officer s are entitled to immunity e ven if they “reasonably but mistakenly” conc lude that probable cause was pr esent). A warrantless arrest is consiste nt with the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable cause. Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). Therefore, a warrantless arrest without probable cause is a “cle arly established” constitutiona l violation. Polk v. District of
Columbia , 121 F. Supp. 2d 56, 69 (D.D.C. 2000). Probable cause exists i f under the totality of the circumstances, a prudent pe rson would have concluded that t here was a probability that a suspect committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio , 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see Kaley v. United States , 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1103 (2014) (noting proba ble cause is not “high ba r”). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified imm unity, the facts pleaded mus t establish that an arrest without probable cause occurred. Saucier , 533 U.S. at 207–08. The officers in Mr. Turpin’s case were informed by both Mr. Ray and Mr. Turpin that Mr. Turpin had broken a door to ent er the residence and that an eviction judgment had been entered against him. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24–25. For that reason, Offi cers Rowley and Strange claim that they acted under a belief a nd with evidence that a crime h ad occurred

. Defs.’ Mem at 8. Furthermore, Officers Rowley a nd Strange contend that they were acting pursuant to D.C. Code § 22-303, which prohibits the dest ruction of others’ property, which they believed Mr. Turpin had violated when he broke the door. Id. Even viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Turpin, the facts alleged in the complaint indicate that a police offic er just arriving on the scene would likely have concluded that a cr ime may have occurred, and thus that the requisite probable cause existed for an arrest. Beck, 379 U.S. at 91.13 That being said, as with the ill egal entry claim, it is not nec essary for the Court to reach a determination on the constitutionality of the specific action h ere. See Pearson , 555 U.S. at 241 (relaxing the two-step qualified immunity inquiry). Under the m odified test established in
Pearson v. Callahan , Officers Rowley and Strange may still claim qualified immunit y as long as the alleged violation w as not clearly established at the time. Brown v. Fogle , 819 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2011). To survive a mo tion to dismiss, Mr. Turpin must therefore allege facts sufficient to show that Officers Rowley and Strange violated a clearly established constitutional right, or that they were on notice of the illegality of their a ctions. See White v. Pauly , 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (stressing the need to identify a “case where a n officer acting under similar circumstances . . . violated t he Fourth Amendment”); see also Boatwright v. Jacks , 239 F. Supp. 3d 229, 233 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[P]lainti ff must allege facts that plausibly establish the . . . defendants knew or should have known that the action . . . woul d violate plaintiff’s rights.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Patterson v. United States , 999 F. Supp. 2d 300, 312 (D.D.C. 2013) (same). For warra ntless arrests in particular , the Court has noted that a “body of relevant case law” is necessary to establish the “answer” wi th regard to probable cause. Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citing Brosseau v. Haugen , 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).
In Wesby , the Court grante d qualified immunity to officers who arrested partygoers based on an inference that the arrestee s did not have permission to u se a vacant home. 138 S. Ct. at 586–88. The Court found that the con duct of the partygoers, cou pled with the run-down state of the residence and the suppose d landlord’s reaction upon speakin g to the police, combined to create probable cause that a crime had occurred, even if the po lice were ultimately mistaken. Id. at 591. The Court noted that whil e a reasonable officer in thos e circumstances could have concluded probable cause was pres ent, given that there was no c ontrolling case finding that14 probable cause in the fact ual circumstances did not exist, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity even if ultimately no probable cause was found. Id. at 590–94 (requiring “high degree of specificity” in relevant cas e law to alert officer of clearl y established violation). As noted, the officers in Mr. Tur pin’s case were informed by bo th parties that Mr. Turpin had broken a door to enter the res idence and were made aware th at an eviction judgment had been entered against him. Am . Compl. ¶¶ 24–25. Thus, Officers R owley and Strange claim that they acted under a belief that a crime had occurred. See id. Furthermore, Mr. Turpin has identified no controlling case law in which a Fourth Amendment violation has been found in similar circumstances. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. Based on the fact s alleged by Mr. Turpin and given the protection qualified imm unity affords to officers’ re asonable mistakes in judgment, Officers Rowley and Strange’s qua lified immunity claim succeeds here as well—especially in light of the Supreme Cour t’s recent decision in Wesby

. See Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 590–91 (noting that lower court’s failure to i dentify “a single precedent—much less controlling case or . . . consensus of cases” prohibit ing officers’ conduct weighed heavi ly in favor of granting qualified immunity); Butz v. Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (protecting r easonable mistakes in judgment). Given that no Circuit case law clearly “answer[s]” the question of probable cause under these particular circumstances , the Court finds that Officers R owley and Strange’s arrest of Mr. Turpin was not a clearly estab lished constitutional violation. Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 591. Accordingly, the Court grants t he motion to dismiss the false a rrest claim on qualified immunity grounds as well.15 3. § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claim Mr. Turpin also alleges that Offi cers Rowley and Strange initia ted criminal proceedings against him which resulted in a deprivation of his liberty cons tituting an unreasonable “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51–57. Officer s Rowley and Strange assert that no predicate cons titutional violation occurred to s ustain the claim, but that even if it had, they are again entitled to qua lified immunity for their ac tions. Defs.’ Mem. at 7. The Court finds that even if Mr. Turpin ha d alleged facts sufficient to s how that the initiation of criminal proceedings against him resulted i n a Fourth Amendment “seizure ,” the unsettled nature of the law surrounding what constitutes a “seizure” in the District of Columbia for the purposes of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim , coupled with the Court’s pr ior determination that Officers Rowley and Strange are entitled to qualified imm unity for the f alse arrest claim, necessitates a finding that Officers Rowley and S trange are entitled to qualif ied immunity in regard to the malicious prosecution claim as we ll. Accordingly Officers Rowle y and Strange’s motion to dismiss the final constituti onal claim is granted on qualified immunity grounds. 3 As noted previously, to determine whether Officers Rowley and S trange are entitled to qualified immunity the Court must assess (1) whether a predicat e constitutional violation occurred and (2) whether that vi olation was “clearly establishe d” at the time of the incident in question such that the official s were on notice that their cond uct was prohibited. Jiggetts , 285 F.

3 Aside from a cursory mention of qu alified immunity in relation to Mr. Turpin’s constitutional claims generall y, Defendants offer little additi onal basis on which they rest their motion to dismiss the malicious pr osecution claim, largely basi ng their claims on the notion that “if probable cause [for the ar rest] exists . . . a claim for ma licious prosecution cannot be maintained.” Defs.’ Mem. at 7 (citing Pitt v. District of Columbia , 491 F.3d 494, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). However, given the impor tance of addressing qualified i mmunity claims at the earliest possible stage of litigation, the Court will nonetheless engage in a qualified immunity analysis regarding Mr. Turpin’s constitutional final claim. See Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231.16 Supp. 3d at 171. In regard to Mr. Turpin’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the qualified immunity analysis depends on whe ther Officers Rowley and Strang e’s conduct in part icipating in or continuing criminal proceedings against him was clearly proh ibited under the circumstances. 4 Wesby , 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citing Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). Unlike a false arrest claim, the “critical event” triggering li ability for malicious prosecution is the filing of a criminal charge. Dellums v. Powell , 566 F.2d 216, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 389–90 (2007) (distinguishing malicious prosecu tion as “entirely distinct” from false arrest, because it “remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by w rongful institution of legal process”) (citing W. Page Keeton et al. , Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 119, at 885–86 (5th ed. 1984)). Therefore, malicious prosecution is a “clearly estab lished” constitutional violationactionable under § 1983 to the extent that criminal proceedings instituted again st the plainti ff cause the plaintiff to be “seized” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Pitt , 491 F.3d at 511; see also Britton v. Maloney , 196 F.3d 24, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1999) (disc ussing differences between common law malicious prosecution and § 1983 malicious prosecution). To support a § 1 983 malicious prosecution claim then, a plaintiff must plead fact s establishing (1) that the de fendant institute d or continued a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) that the proceed ings terminated in favor of the plaintiff; and (3) that a predicate constitutional violation oc curred as a result of the proceedings.
See Mehari v. District of Columbia , 268 F. Supp. 3d 73, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Gregory

4 There is little informati on on the record, or on the D.C. Supe rior Court docket, regarding the nature of Officers Rowley and Strange’s involveme nt in the actual legal proceedings themselves and Mr. Turpin does not allege involveme nt past the initial arrest. See See Superior Ct. Docket, U.S. v. C harles Turpin, Case No. 2016 CMD 021218; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–31. Defendants, however, have chos en not to challenge the fa cial deficiencies of the claim and therefore the Court will not address them.17 v. City of Louisville , 444 F.3d 725, 748 (6th Cir. 2006) ( finding § 1983 malicious p rosecution when the “gravamen of the compl aint is continue d detention with out probable cause”); Castellano v. Fragozo , 352 F.3d 939, 953–54 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding malic ious prosecution when “initiation of c riminal charges . . . set[s] i n force events that run afoul of explicit constitutional protection[s]”); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia , 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that malicious pros ecution actionable under § 19 83 if there is deprivation of liberty “accompanyi ng the prosecution”). Mr. Turpin has seemingly failed to plead facts establishing a p redicate constitutional violation occurred i n the first place. In Pitt , the plaintiff was detaine d post-arrest for ten days in a halfway house against his will and thus was “seized” in violati on of the Fourth Amendment. 491 F.3d at 510. Additionally, in Thorp v. District of Columbia , the plaintiff was subjected to “burdensome” and “humiliating” pr etrial conditions that the cou rt deemed an illegal “seizure” in violation of the Four th Amendment. 142 F. Supp. 3d 132, 145–46 (D.D.C. 2015). In contrast, Mr. Turpin alleges no such seizure. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–31. The court in Spiller v. District of
Columbia found that the plain tiff’s allegations that he was “deprived o f liberty” coupled with the mere fact that he was arreste d and had to appear in court, were insufficient to satisfy the “modest” showing of restriction of liberty necessary for his ma licious prosecution claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 302 F. Supp. 3d 240, 248 (D.D.C. 2 008). Here too, Mr. Turpin simply alleges that he was subj ected to “unnecessary and illega l detention” as a result of his arrest, but fails to allege a ny restriction on his liberty comp arable to the violations in Pitt or18 Thorp , or in fact any restriction on his liberty stemming from the p rosecution itsel f. Am. Compl. ¶ 50. 5 As noted previously in regard to M r. Turpin’s other constitutio nal claims, the court need not reach a determination on the constitutionality of Officers Rowley and Strange’s actions to rule on their motion when the law surrounding the alleged viola tion was not “clearly established” at the time of the events in question. See Pearson , 555 U.S. at 240–41. Here, as with the illegal entry and false arrest claims, the Court finds that it was not clearly established. While the right to be free from malicious prosecu tion is a constitutionally cogniz able claim under the Fourth Amendment, see Pitt , 491 F.3d at 511, that is “not enough” for a claim to survive dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. Brosseau , 543 U.S. at 198–99 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also Johnson v. Moseley , 790 F.3d 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[T]o avoid . . . qualified immunity . . . pl aintiff was required to plead facts making out a violation of a

5 While the facial deficiencies of the complaint indicate that M r. Turpin failed to plead the predicate constitutional vi olation necessary to survive a m otion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it bears mentioning tha t the Superior Court docket rev eals that Mr. Turpin was subjected to drug testing while his case wa s pending, and was required to attend eleven court hearings prior to his trial, requirements whic h seemingly rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure. See Superior Ct. Docket, U.S. v. C harles Turpin, Case No. 2016 CMD 021218; see also Thorp v. District of Columbia , 142 F. Supp. 3d at 145–46 (recognizing pretrial conditions as potential Fourth Amendment seizure). Because the D.C. Superior Cou rt docket is a public document, th e Court may take judicial notice of such documents without conver ting Defendants’ motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Lewis v. Parker , 67 F. Supp. 3d 189, 195 n.6 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp. , 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). However, even if the Court were to exercise its discretion to g rant Mr. Turpin leave to amend his complaint to include t he restrictions revealed in the Superior Court docket, the unsettled nature of both the law surrounding the probable cause for the underlying arrest and the law surrounding the bounds of a § 1983 malicious prosecution cl aim indicate that even a properly pleaded predicate viol ation in this case would not ult imately survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualif ied immunity grounds.19 constitutional right clearly est ablished in a particularized se nse.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The violated right must be clearly defined “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau , 543 U.S. at 198 (citations omitted). In terms of a malicious prosecu tion claim, the Supreme Court as well as circuit courts around the country have struggled t o define what exactly consti tutes an unreasonable “seizure” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Spiller , 302 F. Supp. 3d at 245–48 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing unsettled case law); see, e.g. , Wallace , 549 U.S. at 390 n.2 (declin ing to define the “contours” of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim); Evans v. Ball , 168 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that re quired pretrial information disclosure sufficiently restricted plaintiff’s liberty); Murphy v. Lynn , 118 F.3d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding t hat periodic court appearances restricted plaintiff’s liberty); Kingsland v. City of Miami , 382 F.3d 1220, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that manda tory interstate court appea rances not sufficient deprivation of liberty); Karam v. City of Burbank , 352 F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that restriction on out-of-st ate travel not was sufficient deprivati on of liberty); Britton , 196 F.3d at 28 (finding that mere burden of facing c harges, absent arrest or d etention, was not sufficient deprivation of liberty ). The few cases in this Circuit that hav e directly addressed the issue make clear that a plaintiff must plea d some sort of post-arraignment “seizure” to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, but the conditions that sati sfy this “seizure” remain r elatively undefined. See Mehari , 268 F. Supp. 3d at 81–82 (analyzing circuit law , upholding defe ndants’ claim that plaintiff must allege “that he was held in cus tody subsequent to the initiatio n of the criminal prosecution against him” to state a claim for § 1983 malicious prosecution) ; Spiller , 302 F. Supp. 3d at 248 (noting that while only “minima l restriction” on plaintiff’s li berty is required, mere allegations20 that plaintiff was “deprived of liberty” were insufficient to s how Fourth Amendment seizure when plaintiff was released di rectly following arraignment). Given this Court’s determinati on that no clearly established la w prohibited Officers Rowley and Strange’s conduct in r elation to the ar rest itself, the similarly unsettled law within this Circuit and others regardi ng what may or may not constitut e the minimum requirements of a “seizure” for purposes of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim cr eates a situation in which n o clear case law existed to have placed Officers Rowley and Stran ge on notice that their actions in participating in the initial a rrest may eventually subject them to liability for whatever pretrial conditions were imposed on Mr. Turpin following the filing of f ormal charges. In light of the scarcity of cases addressing t he “contours” of § 1983 malicious prosecution claims directly, Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390 n.2, and the fact that Mr. Turpin’s complaint s imply does not indicate that any impermissible “seizur e” occurred as a result of the ch arges filed against him, the Court dismisses the final § 1983 cla im of malicious prosecution on qu alified immunity grounds as well. 6
B. § 1983 Claim Against the District of Columbia Mr. Turpin’s final constitutiona l claim alleges a right to reli ef from the District of Columbia on a theory of municipa l liability based on a “failure to properly train, investigate and discipline MPD officers with respect to warrantless entries.” A m. Compl. ¶¶ 87–88. Mr. Turpin

6 Cases addressing qualified i mmunity in relation to § 1983 mali cious prosecution claims often involve disputed questions of fact that warrant further d iscovery and make dismissal at this stage of litigati on inappropriate. See, e.g. , Jiggetts , 285 F. Supp. 3d at 172 (declining to rule on malicious prosecution claim at motion to dismiss phase given di sputed questions of fact surrounding plaintiff’s underlyi ng arrest). In this case howeve r, neither party has chosen to raise material factual questions regar ding Mr. Turpin’s underlying ar rest or his subsequent prosecution, allowing the Court to reach a determination based on qualified immunity at this stage. See generally Am. Compl.; Pl.’s Opp’n; D efs.’ Mem.; Defs.’ Reply.21 alleges that District of Columbi a policymakers have been made a ware of a pattern of ongoing constitutional violations stemm ing from a lack of police traini ng regarding warrantless entries and acted with deliberate indiffe rence to the need to correct t he problem. Id. ¶¶ 84–87. Following the District’s motion to dismiss , Mr. Turpin withdrew his munic ipal claim and reserved his “right to reinstate” subject to discove ry. Pl.’s Opp’n at 24. Defendan ts now claim that not only does Mr. Turpin fail to adequately p lead the pattern of abuses requi red to sustain a deliberate indifference claim against a municipality, but that his subsequ ent withdrawal of the claim necessitates dismissal with prej udice. Defs.’ Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 2, ECF No. 13. Defenda nts’ arguments regarding Mr. T urpin’s withdrawal of the claim are correct and thus the claim is dismissed, but, as expl ained below, the Court dismisses the claim without prejudice. Local Civil Rule 7(b) provides that if a memorandum in oppositi on to a motion “is not filed within the prescribed time , the Court may treat the motio n as conceded.” Local Civ. R. 7(b). While it is “well understood in thi s Circuit that when a plaint iff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a

court may treat those argumen ts that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded” under Local Rule 7(b), the decision whether t o treat a motion as conceded i s highly discretionary. Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Glob. Ministries , 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Barnes v. District of Columbia , 42 F. Supp. 3d 111, 116 (D.D.C. 2014). Furthermore, dismissal wit h prejudice is the exception, rather than the rule. Rudder v.
Williams , 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Dismissal with prejudice is the exception, not the rule, in federal practice because it ‘operates as a rejection o f the plaintiff’s claims on the merits and [ultimately] precludes further litigation of them.’”) (alte ration in origin al) (quoting Belizan v.22 Hershon , 434 F.3d 579, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C. , 819 F.3d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (deemi ng dismissal with prejudic e an “onerous bar to preclude [plaintiff] from ever having his claims heard”). Following the District’s motion t o dismiss, Mr. Turpin withdrew his municipal claim and reserved his “right to reinstat e” subject to discovery. Pl.’s O pp’n at 24. Defendants ask that the court treat Mr. Turpin’s respons e to Defendants’ motion to dism iss as a concession and dismiss the municipality claim with pr ejudice. Defs.’ Reply at 2. As ex plained above, Mr. Turpin’s withdrawal of his claim consti tutes a failure to even cursorily refute the District’s challenges to his allegations and therefore, Def endants’ motion to dismiss th e municipal liability claim is conceded. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 24; cf. Wash. All. of Tech. Worke rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 892 F.3d 332, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (expl aining that Rule 7(b) “ is not a tool to subvert the FRCP 12(b)(6) inquiry simply because the court finds the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, although pressed, underwhelm ing”). However, this Court sees no reason to dismiss the claim with prejudice at this juncture. See Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“If the underlying facts or circumstan ces relied upon by a plaintiff ma y be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity t o test his claim on the me rits.”). Accordingly, the Court grants the District’s motion t o dismiss the § 1983 municipal cl aim, but the claim is dismissed without prejudice.
C. The Remaining State Law Claims Mr. Turpin has also brought D.C. c ommon law claims against Offi cers Rowley and Strange for wrongful eviction, tre spass, false arrest, and mali cious prosecution; against the District of Columbia for malic ious prosecution; and against Dar nell Ray for wrongful eviction, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. See generally Am. Compl. While this Court originally23 exercised supplemental jurisdic tion over the state law claims a t issue because they formed part of “the same case or controversy” a s Mr. Turpin’s federal claims, given that the Court has concluded that Mr. Turpin’s c onstitutional claims will not surv ive Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court consequently lacks independent subject-matte r jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the common law claims are remand ed to the D.C. Superior Court. Federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state claims that form the same “case or controversy” as federal cl aims over which they have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018). Courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over such c laims if the district court has “dismissed all claims over which i t has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(3). Courts determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after federal claims have been dismissed must consider “judici al economy, convenience, fairnes s, and comity.” Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’t. , 409 F.3d 414, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ( citation omitted); Pollard v. District of
Columbia , 191 F. Supp. 3d 58, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d , 698 F. App’x 616 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (“[F]airne ss . . . point[s] in favor of allo wing Plaintiffs to pursue their claims . . . in state court.”); see Turner v. Corrs. Corp. of Am. , 56 F. Supp. 3d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2014) (upholding court’s decision to decl ine supplementa l jurisdictio n given early stage of case in federal court and finding that r emand to state court did not pr ejudice plaintiff who originally filed in state court and “prefers that forum”). While the decis ion is left to each court’s discretion,

see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966), when all federal claims are eliminated before trial, the “ba lance of factors” weighs toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). As such, the D.C. Circuit has id entified a clear preference for courts to exercise their discretion to remand state claims back to Dis trict of Columbia courts once all federal questions have “left24 the building.” Kyle v. Bedlion , 177 F. Supp. 3d 380, 400 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 775 F.3d 409, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). In Mr. Turpin’s case, these fact ors weigh against the exercise of jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims. The f ederal claims over which the C ourt exercised federal question jurisdiction are dismissed and t he remaining claims are based e ntirely in District of Columbia law. Furthermore, discovery in this case has not yet begun, and the case has not progressed in federal court past Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Additionally , because Mr. Turpin originally filed his case in D.C. Superior C ourt, he will not be prejudice d by a return to his preferred forum.
See Turner , 56 F. Supp. 3d at 37; cf

. Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP , 595 F.3d 370, 378–79 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the court appropriately r etained jurisdiction over state claims when federal “time and res ources” were already invested) ; Hargraves v. District of
Columbia , 134 F. Supp. 3d 68, 89–90 (D.D.C. 2015) (same). Extensive fed eral judicial resources have not been expended on this case yet, and as a D.C. resident , Mr. Turpin will not be inconvenienced or disadvantage d by pursuing his case in Superio r Court. Because no clear unfairness will result from a d ecision not to exercise suppleme ntal jurisdiction over Mr. Turpin’s remaining claims, the common law claims against Officers Rowley and Strange, the District of Columbia, and Mr. Ray are remanded to D.C. Superior Court where Mr. Turpin may continue to prosecute his local causes of action under D.C. law. 7 See Floyd v. PNC Mortg. , 216 F. Supp. 3d 63, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that w hen case was originally removed from state court, remand was “fairer course” tha n dismissal without prejudice).

7 Officers Rowley and Strange asse rt that they are entitled to c ommon law privilege in relation to Mr. Turpin’s common l aw claims against them. Defs.’ Mem. at 3. Mr. Ray asserts Mr. Turpin fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in relation to a ll of the claims against him. Def. Ray’s Mem. a t 2–5. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims in this case, it does not reach either issue.25 V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the C ourt grants Officers Rowley and Strange’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims of illegal entry, false arrest, and m alicious prosecution. The Court additionally grants the Distric t of Columbia’s motion to dismis s the § 1983 munici pal liability claim. As to the remaining claim s, the Court remands the case t o the D.C. Superior Court for adjudication of the state law cla ims against Officers Rowley an d Strange for trespass, illegal entry, false arrest, and wrongful e viction; again st the Distric t of Columbia for malicious prosecution; and against Darnell Ray for wrongful eviction, fal se arrest, and malicious prosecution. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion i s separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: July 12, 2018 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge