United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Argued April 22, 2008

Decided May 22, 2008

Before

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

Nos. 06‐3992 & 07‐1581

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JOEL VALENCIA & ADALBERTO

BETANCOURT,

Defendants‐Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

Nos. 04‐CR‐200‐04 & 04‐CR‐200‐01

Harry D. Leinenweber,

Judge.

O R D E R

Both Joel Valencia and Adalberto Betancourt pleaded guilty to conspiring to

possess cocaine with the intent to deliver.  The district court sentenced Valencia and

Betancourt to 210 and 144 months imprisonment, respectively.  In this consolidated

appeal, both defendants challenge the district court’s decision to deny their requests for

minor‐participant “role‐in‐the‐offense” reductions under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  Valencia also

contends that the court clearly erred in rejecting his request to reduce his sentence

below his guidelines range based on the conditions of confinement he endured at a state

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Nos. 06-3992 & 07-1581 Page 2

facility before he was sentenced.  Because the district court did not commit clear error in

not granting either defendant a role‐in‐the‐offense reduction, or in sentencing Valencia

within the guidelines, we affirm.

The facts are not in dispute.  Beginning (at the latest) in September 2003,

Valencia, Betancourt, and six others participated in a cocaine distribution ring.  The

leader would arrange for bulk shipments of cocaine to be delivered to a specific house

in Chicago, and other members of the ring sold it to customers in Chicago and other

nearby cities.  Neither Valencia nor Betancourt supervised these operations.  Valencia

was paid $1,000 weekly to guard the “stash” house, load and secure cocaine for later

delivery, and help transport the drugs.  On one occasion he helped deliver three

kilograms of cocaine to buyers.  Betancourt similarly helped guard and transport the

cocaine, once delivering several kilograms from Chicago to buyers in Detroit.  He also

installed a compartment in one of the delivery cars to hide the drugs.

After law enforcement officials caught on to the group’s activities, they recovered

roughly 330 kilograms of cocaine and several hundred‐thousand dollars from the

conspirators in February 2004; they also arrested Betancourt and Valencia.  Both

defendants pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C.

§ 846.  The statutory minimum for that count is 10 years imprisonment.  See id.; id.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).  

At sentencing Valencia urged the district court to reduce his offense level as

either a minimal or a minor participant in the conspiracy.  The court responded that

Valencia “had several different roles in the offense” and that he “helped transport and

unload cocaine on several occasions.”  The court acknowledged that Valencia was not a

supervisor or a manager, but concluded that he also did not serve in a minor or minimal

role.  Valencia’s offense level was calculated at 35, which, coupled with a criminal

history category III, resulted in a guidelines imprisonment range of 210‐262 months.

Valencia asked the court for “leniency” in determining his sentence on the ground that

he was not housed at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Chicago before

sentencing, but instead was subjected to “horrific conditions” elsewhere.  The district

court noted that Valencia received lenient sentences after his two prior drug

convictions, and that he became involved in this cocaine operation while still on

probation for those offenses.  Therefore, the court concluded that a sentence within the

guidelines range was appropriate.  Valencia was sentenced to 210 months.
Nos. 06-3992 & 07-1581 Page 3

Betancourt also asked for a minor‐participant reduction during his sentencing

hearing.  According to Betancourt, he worked “at the direction of others in multiple

roles.”  The district court agreed that Betancourt was “pretty much a complete mule in

this case,”  but because Betancourt materially assisted in the conspiracy, the court

declined to adjust his base offense level as a minor participant.  Betancourt had no

criminal history, so with a total offense level of 35, his guidelines imprisonment range

was between 168‐210 months.  Nevertheless, referring to his role as a “mule,” the

district court decided to “give [Betancourt] somewhat of a break,” and sentenced him to

144 months imprisonment.

On appeal Valencia and Betancourt contend that the district court erred in

declining to adjust their base offense levels as minor participants in the conspiracy.  The

sentencing guidelines shave two levels off a defendant’s offense level if the district

court determines that he was a minor participant in the offense.  See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  A

“minor participant” is one who “plays a part in committing the offense that makes him

substantially less culpable than the average participant.”  Id. cmt. n.3(A).  The district

court’s decision to deny a minor‐participant adjustment under § 3B1.2 is reviewed for

clear error, see United States v. Emerson, 501 F.3d 804, 815‐16 (7th Cir. 2007), and we

rarely reverse the denial of this adjustment, see United States v. Rodriguez‐Cardenas, 362

F.3d 958, 959‐60 (7th Cir. 2004).

Here, Valencia and Betancourt assert that, although they transported drugs, they

were less culpable than the other members of the conspiracy, and thus they should have

received the reduction.  Betancourt in particular seizes on the district court’s description

of his role as a “mule” and his resulting below‐guidelines sentence as proof that his role

was minor.  But even if Betancourt was “just” a courier, we have noted that “couriers

play an important role in any drug distribution scheme and therefore are not

automatically entitled to a mitigating role reduction.”  United States v. Hamzat, 217 F.3d

494, 498 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).  Because Betancourt was not only a courier

but also guarded and hid the cocaine, the district court did not clearly err in denying

him a reduction.  With regard to Valencia, he also transported drugs, guarded the stash

house, and secured the drugs for delivery.  The district court’s finding that his role was

not minor was also not clearly erroneous.  See United States v. Gallardo, 497 F.3d 727, 741

(7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that district court did not commit clear error in denying

adjustment where defendant’s involvement, though brief, was “essential to the

success and scope of the conspiracy.”).
Nos. 06-3992 & 07-1581 Page 4

Valencia also argues that the court erred in denying, sub silencio (as he puts it),

his request for a below‐guidelines sentence based on the “substantially harsher

punishment received in jail time during pre‐trial detention.”  As an initial matter,

though the court did not comment on this request, a sentencing judge is not required to

discuss every argument that a litigant makes.  See, e.g., United States v. Vitrano, 495 F.3d

387, 392 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Vaughn, 433 F.3d 917, 924 (7th Cir. 2006).  We can

infer that the judge considered all relevant factors when he has imposed a within‐

guidelines sentence, United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2005), which we

presume is reasonable.  See United States v. Allan, 513 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2008).

Valencia could rebut that presumption by showing that the district court failed to

consider one of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but “[h]arsh or unpleasant

conditions of pretrial confinement are not among the § 3553(a) factors.”  United States v.

Ramirez‐Gutierrez, 503 F.3d 643, 645‐46 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Martinez, No.

06‐4147, 2008 WL 817099, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2008).  Additionally, as we have noted,

“[i]t would complicate sentencing enormously to require that the length of every

sentence vary by the conditions of confinement.”  United States v. Spano, 476 F.3d 476,

479 (7th Cir. 2007).

Here, Valencia asserts that his time spent in a Wisconsin prison was harsher

because (1) family visits and calls from Wisconsin were less likely and shorter than

those at the MCC in Chicago, and (2) the quality of medical and dental care at the

Wisconsin facility was substandard.  These conditions are not so exceedingly harsh that

we could even consider disturbing the broad discretion that the Bureau of Prisons

enjoys in determining where to detain defendants.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); see also

Ramirez‐Gutierrez, 503 F.3d at 646 (“Absent truly egregious conditions, the pretrial

confinement of [the defendant] raises neither a meritorious nor a substantial issue for

sentencing purposes.”).

The judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.