NO. 95-105 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 

1995 

STATE OF MONTANA 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

-vRONALD EVANS, 

Defendant/Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Silver bow, 

The Honorable James E. Purcell, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Jeffrey T. Rem, Montana Defender Project, 

Univeristy of Montana, School of Law, Missoula, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Crew Coughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, 

Montana; Robert McCarthy, Silver Bow County 

Attorney, Brad Newman, Deputy Silver Bow County 

Attorney, Butte, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: May 11, 1995 

Decided: July 13, 1995 
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from a designation as dangerous offender by 

the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County. We remand 

so the court can articulate its reasons for entering this 

designation. 

The following issues are dispositive of the case: 

I. Did the District Court err in relying upon the evidence 

found in the case record for its designation of dangerous offender? 

II. Did the District Court err in failing to articulate its 

reasons for designating Evans a dangerous offender? 

On August 30, 1994, a vehicle driven by Ronald Evans (Evans) 

veered into the on-coming lane and collided head on with another 

vehicle driven by Sonnie Holm (Helm). Helm and another adult 

passenger were seriously injured. The passenger's five month old 

baby sustained serious head injuries and eventually died as a 

consequence of the accident. 

Evans, whose blood alcohol was .164 an hour after the 

accident, was charged with one count of negligent vehicular 

homicide, a felony and two counts of negligent vehicular assault, 

a misdemeanor. Evans initially pled not guilty, but later changed 

his plea to guilty pursuant to an agreement with the State. 

Evans was freed on bond, but following a disturbance in a 

vacant lot in Butte, Evans was charged with disorderly conduct and 

his bond was revoked. He was remanded to the county jail. 

On November 21, 1994, the District Court sentenced Evans to 

ten years on the negligent homicide count and six months on each 

2 
count of negligent vehicular assault, all time to run concurrently. 

Evans was also ordered to pay $1,000 fine and $10,000 restitution. 

Evans was remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections 

with a recommendation that he be placed at the Montana State 

Prison. The court also designated Evans a dangerous offender for 

purposes of parole eligibility. 

Evans filed his appeal on January 12, 1995, appealing his 

dangerous offender designation. 

I. 

Did the District Court err in relying upon the evidence found 

in the case record for its designation of dangerous offender? 

Appellant argues that the record does not contain sufficient 

evidence that he is a dangerous offender. The State disagrees. 

Under § 46-18-404, MCA, 'I an 

designated a dangerous offender, if, 

individual may be 

in the discretion of 

the sentencing court, he is determined to represent a 

substantial danger to other persons or society; however, 

more than a mere recital of the statutory language is 

required. . .'I [citations omitted.1 Our review of the 

record here indicates that the District Court failed to 

articulate its reasons for the dangerous offender 

designation. . . 

Where the record below reveals substantial evidence 

to support a sentencing court's determination that an 

offender is dangerous, this Court has remanded the cause 

to the district judge for findings to support such a 

conclusion. 

State v. Belmarez (1991), 248 Mont. 378, 381, 812 P.2d 341, 342-43. 

The record here indicates that Evans has a dismal and 

extensive juvenile criminal record. At the time of sentencing 

Evans was 18 years of age and had already been involved in a 

negligent vehicular homicide. The felony occurred because Evans 

3 
was intoxicated while driving and swerved into the oncoming lane of 

traffic. 

Further, the record indicates that while out of jail on bail 

bond during the vehicular homicide proceedings, he was again 

arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. The court 

indicated that Evans was "incorrigible" and the record bears this 

out. Further, the record also reflects that he has not sought help 

with his drinking problem, but continues to drink without 

considering the consequences of his actions. Nor does he show 

remorse for the lives that he negatively impacts. These facts are 

contained in the record and the court should have noted them, all 

or in part, for its determination that he represented a danger to 

society. 

We hold that the record contains substantial evidence from 

which the District Court could have drawn support for its dangerous 

offender designation. 

II. 

Did the District Court err in failing to articulate its 

reasons for designating Evans a dangerous offender? 

Evans argues on appeal that the court did not articulate the 

reasons that it found him to be a dangerous offender. According to 

Evans, the court had to specifically state why it found him to be 

a danger to society and could not just mimic the wording of § 46- 

18-404(l) (b), MCA. 

The State argues that the court's statements were adequate 

according to the statute and our case law. 

4 
Section 46-18-404(l), MCA, states in pertinent part: 

(1) . . . ET1 he sentencing court shall designate an 

offender a nondangerous offender for purposes of 

eligibility for parole under part 2 of chapter 23 if: 

(a) during the 5 years preceding the commission of the 

offense for which the offender is being sentenced, the 

offender was neither convicted of nor incarcerated for an 

offense committed in this state or any other jurisdiction 

for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess 

of 1 year could have been imposed; and 

(b) the court has determined, based on any presentence 

report and the evidence presented at the trial and the 

sentencing hearing, that the offender does not represent 

a substantial danger to other persons or society. 

This statute governs the designation of both nondangerous and 

dangerous offenders. State v. Wing (1994), 264 Mont. 215, 870 P.2d 

1368. 

In making a dangerous designation, the court should consider 

the defendant's persistence in criminal conduct, the defendant's 

failure with earlier discipline to deter or reform him and whether 

the defendant is a substantial danger to others or society. State 

v. Nichols (1986), 222 Mont. 71, 720 P.2d 1157. Also to be 

considered is the vicious nature of the crime engaged in. 

Belmarez, 248 Mont. at 382, 812 P.2d at 343. 

In making the dangerous offender designation, the district 

courts must articulate their reasons for imposing a dangerous 

designation; a mere recital of the statutory language will not be 

sufficient because we cannot review the court's discretion based 

upon a mere repetition of the statutory directives. Belmarez, 248 

Mont. at 381, 812 P.2d at 343. When a court fails to state its 

specific reasons and substantial evidence exists for such a 

finding, we will remand the case in order that the court follow the 

5 
proper procedure. Belmarez, 248 Mont. at 381, 812 P.2d at 343. 

Here, the court made the following conclusions in its 

judgment: 

That Defendant Ronald Evans is a dangerous offender 

and is currently a threat to society and confinement in 

the Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge, Montana is 

necessary and appropriate for the protection of society 

and particularly the rehabilitation of the Defendant. 

That the Defendant Ronald Evans has been sentenced 

to Montana State Prison after this Court has fully 

considered the gravity of the offenses, the punishment 

permitted by law, the deterrent effect on others, the 

protection of society while the Defendant is 

incarcerated, and the possibilities, or lack thereof, of 

rehabilitation of this Defendant and the Pre-Sentence 

Report. The Court has also considered the Motive of the 

Defendant in committing the crime, his lack of 

cooperation with officials and mitigating circumstances. 

The age of the Defendant and the Defendant's prior 

criminal record, including his juvenile record, were also 

taken into consideration along with the Defendant's 

lifestyle and his lack of significant goals or work 

history. 

This is merely repetition of the elements as stated in statutory 

directives and case law. It is not sufficient. 

The State argues that this case is analogous to State v. 

Buckman (1989), 236 Mont. 37, 768 P.2d 1361. There, the court gave 

the following reasons for making the dangerous offender 

designation: 

The defendant, since he was 18 years old, has been 

involved with the criminal law. In 1979, he was given a 

three (3) year deferred sentence for auto theft. In 

1980, he was convicted, by a jury, of Aggravated Assault 

and Aggravated Kidnapping, felonies, and was given two 

ten (10) year terms which ran concurrently and was 

designated a Dangerous offender. He was released from 

the Montana State Prison in February, 1987 and committed 

the crime of Deceptive Practices, a felony, by stealing 

and using stolen credit cards. 

The defendant has demonstrated no evidence or effort 

to rehabilitate himself and is addicted to alcohol and 

6 
drugs. His incarceration is necessary for long term inpatient treatment for alcohol and drugs and for the 

protection of the public. 

Buckman, 236 Mont. at 40-41, 768 P.2d at 1363. The Buckman court 

gave specific facts taken from the record of the case as reasons 

for making its decision. Buckman is not analogous to the case at 

hand. 

While the court here made its decision "pursuant to Findings 

and Conclusions set forth above" such is not sufficient reasoning 

for our review. 

Remanded for further proceedings cons 

We Concur: