Exhibit 7

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398940 - 1 - 

ALJ/TIM/jt2 Date of Issuance 9/18/2009

 

Decision 09-09-030 September 10, 2009

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Application of San Diego Gas & Electric 

Company for Review of its Proactive 

De-Energization Measures and Approval 

of Proposed Tariff Revisions (U902E). 

Application 08-12-021 

(Filed December 22, 2008) 

DECISION DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY’S APPLICATION TO 

SHUT OFF POWER DURING PERIODS OF HIGH FIRE DANGER 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 Title Page

DECISION DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY’S APPLICATION TO 

SHUT OFF POWER DURING PERIODS OF HIGH FIRE DANGER.......................2

1. Summary of Decision ................................................................................................2

2. Summary of SDG&E’s Application.........................................................................2

3. Procedural Background and Chronology ..............................................................3

4. Summary of Parties’ Positions .................................................................................7

5. Commission Jurisdiction and Standard of Review...............................................7

6. Summary of SDG&E’s Community Fire Safety Program ....................................9

6.1. Hardening of Facilities...................................................................................9

6.2. Power Line Re-Closers .................................................................................10

6.3. Inspection of Overhead Power Lines.........................................................11

6.4. Vegetation Management..............................................................................12

6.5. Staging Personnel..........................................................................................12

6.6. Emergency Power Shut-Off Plan................................................................12

6.6.1. Power Shut-Off Criteria .............................................................12

6.6.2. Re-Energization of Power Lines ...............................................15

6.6.3. Power Shut-Off Areas.................................................................15

6.6.4. Number of Affected People and Customers...........................16

6.6.5. Customer Education ...................................................................18

6.6.6. Customer Notice of Power Shut-Off Events ...........................20

6.6.7. Mitigation of Adverse Impacts on Customers........................21

6.6.8. Cost of the Power Shut-Off Plan...............................................23

7. Review of SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan ...........................................................24

7.1. Position of the Parties...................................................................................24

7.1.1. SDG&E..........................................................................................24

7.1.2. Opposition Parties.......................................................................30

7.1.3. SCE ................................................................................................40

7.2. Discussion ......................................................................................................41

7.2.1. Impact on the Number of Wildfires .........................................42

7.2.2. Historical Data on Power-Line Fires ........................................48

7.2.3. Shutting Off Power During Major Wildfires ..........................50

7.2.4. SCE’s Power Shut-Off Program ................................................54

7.2.5. Costs and Benefits .......................................................................55

7.2.6. Conclusion....................................................................................57

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) 

 Title Page

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8. Electric Tariff Rule 14 ..............................................................................................63

8.1. Position of the Parties...................................................................................64

8.1.1. SDG&E..........................................................................................64

8.1.2. SCE ................................................................................................64

8.1.3. The Opposition Parties...............................................................65

8.2. Discussion ......................................................................................................65

9. Proceeding Category and Need for Hearings .....................................................66

10. Comments on the Alternate Proposed Decision .................................................66

11. Assignment of the Proceeding ...............................................................................67

Findings of Fact...............................................................................................................67

Conclusions of Law ........................................................................................................69

ORDER .............................................................................................................................70

Appendix A: Map of the 2009 Power Shut-Off Areas 

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DECISION DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY’S APPLICATION TO 

SHUT OFF POWER DURING PERIODS OF HIGH FIRE DANGER 

1. Summary of Decision 

This decision denies, without prejudice, San Diego Gas & Electric 

Company’s (SDG&E) application to shut off power to certain areas when 

hazardous fire conditions are present. SDG&E has not met its burden to 

demonstrate that the benefits of shutting off power outweigh the significant 

costs, burdens, and risks that would be imposed on customers and communities 

in the areas where power is shut off. 

Today’s decision directs SDG&E to make a good faith effort to develop a 

comprehensive fire prevention program in collaboration with all stakeholders. 

Parties are encouraged to use the Commission’s Alternative Dispute Resolution 

process for this purpose. The agreed-upon fire prevention program must be 

based on a cost-benefit analysis that demonstrates (1) the program will result in a 

net reduction in wildfire ignitions, and (2) the benefits of the program outweigh 

any costs, burdens, or risks the program imposes on customers and communities. 

2. Summary of SDG&E’s Application 

In Application (A.) 08-12-021, SDG&E asks the Commission to review its 

Emergency Power Shut-Off Plan (referred to hereafter as “the Power Shut-Off 

Plan”).1

 Under its Power Shut-Off Plan, SDG&E will turn off electricity to certain 

 

1 We interpret SDG&E’s request for Commission review of its Power Shut-Off Plan as 

a request for Commission authorization to implement the Power Shut-Off Plan. 

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regions during periods of high fire danger in order to prevent its overhead 

power lines from igniting potentially catastrophic wildfires. SDG&E intends to 

implement its Power Shut-Off Plan in time for the 2009 autumn fire season in 

Southern California. 

SDG&E anticipates that providers of essential services, such as police 

departments and hospitals, may need to increase their use of electricity in the 

hours leading up to an announced power shut-off event in order to prepare for 

the event. SDG&E requests that electric usage by these customers during the 

period immediately preceding a shut-off event be exempted from (1) the 

determination of peak demand changes, (2) critical peak pricing, and (3) the 

demand response program. 

Finally, SDG&E requests authority to revise Electric Tariff Rule 14. The 

existing Tariff Rule 14 states that SDG&E is not liable to its customers for an 

interruption in service “caused by inevitable accident, act of God, fire, strikes, 

riots, war or any other cause not within its control.” SDG&E seeks to revise 

Tariff Rule 14 to explicitly state that SDG&E will not be liable for any costs or 

adverse impacts that customers experience due to the Power Shut-Off Plan. 

3. Procedural Background and Chronology 

SDG&E filed A.08-12-021 on December 22, 2008. Notice of A.08-12-021 

appeared in the Daily Calendar on December 30, 2008. SDG&E served copies of 

A.08-12-021 on the San Diego Office of Emergency Services; the San Diego 

County Red Cross; and all State Legislators and members of Congress who 

represent any part of SDG&E’s service territory. SDG&E also mailed a notice of 

A.08-12-021 to (1) all cities and counties in SDG&E’s service territory, and (2) all 

customers in areas subject to the Power Shut-Off Plan. In addition, SDG&E 

published notice of A.08-12-021 in newspapers of general circulation. 

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The following parties filed protests to A.08-12-021: Pacific Bell Telephone 

Company d/b/a/ AT&T California and affiliated entities (together, “AT&T”);2

the California Cable and Telecommunications Association (CCTA); CTIA-The 

Wireless Association (CTIA); the Commission’s Consumer Protection and Safety 

Division (CPSD); the Commission’s Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA); and 

a consortium of six municipal water districts (together, “the Water Districts”).3

 

SDG&E filed a reply on February 9, 2009. 

A prehearing conference (PHC) was held on February 10, 2009. The 

following parties filed PHC statements: AT&T; CCTA; CoxCom, Inc., and Cox 

California Telecom, L.L.C. (together, “Cox”); CPSD and DRA (together, 

“CPSD/DRA”); CTIA; Disability Rights Advocates (DisabRA); the Mussey Grade 

Road Alliance (the Alliance); the San Diego County Superintendent of Schools 

(“the School Districts”); SDG&E; Southern California Edison Company (SCE); 

Time Warner Cable Inc. (Time Warner); Utility Consumers Action Network 

(UCAN); and the Water Districts. An Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling and 

Scoping Memo was issued on February 26, 2009, pursuant to Rule 7.3 of the 

Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rule). 

 

2

 The entities filing the AT&T protest were Pacific Bell Telephone Company 

(U-1001-C); AT&T Communications of California, Inc. (U-5002-C); TCG 

San Francisco (U-5454-C); TCG Los Angeles, Inc. (U-5462-C); TCG San Diego 

(U-5389-C); AT&T Mobility LLC; New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC (U-3060-C); 

Cagal Cellular Communications Corporation (U-3021-C); Santa Barbara Cellular 

Systems, Ltd. (U-3015-C); and Visalia Cellular Telephone Company (U-3014-C) 

d/b/a AT&T Mobility LLC. 

3

 The Water Districts are Valley Center Municipal Water District, Ramona Municipal 

Water District, Padre Dam Municipal Water District, Rainbow Municipal Water 

District, Fallbrook Public Utilities District, and Yuima Municipal Water District. 

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There were no evidentiary hearings. The formal record was developed 

primarily though the direct written testimony submitted by SDG&E with its 

Application,4

 informational filings submitted by SDG&E, and written comments 

submitted by all the parties. The factual assertions in these documents were 

verified in accordance with Rule 1.11. The following table shows the chronology 

of the informational filings and written comments. 

Date 2009 Document Party Filing Document 

March 13 Informational Filing SDG&E 

March 27 Opening Comments 

AT&T; the Alliance; CCTA and 

Time Warner (together, CCTA); 

CPSD/DRA; Cox; CTIA; 

DisabRA; SDG&E; SCE; the 

School Districts; the Water 

Districts; and UCAN 

April 3 Informational Filing SDG&E 

April 10 Reply Comments 

AT&T; the Alliance; CCTA; 

CPSD/DRA; Cox; the California 

Farm Bureau (CFB); DisabRA; 

SDG&E; SCE; the School Districts; 

the Water Districts; and UCAN 

April 10 Informational Filing SDG&E 

April 17 Reply to Informational Filing 

on April 10 

DisabRA; and jointly by the 

School Districts and the 

Water Districts 

 

4

 SDG&E provided the direct written testimony of the following witnesses with their 

subject topics in parentheses: David L. Geier (Policy); Sohrab A. Yari (Engineering 

and Operations); Joe Velasquez (Customer Issues); and Greg Lawless (Special Needs 

and Low-Income customer Issues). 

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Date 2009 Document Party Filing Document 

May 12 

Comments re: Portable Backup 

Generators to Pump Water for 

Fire Fighting Purposes 

SDG&E and CPSD/DRA 

May 19 Reply to Comments Filed 

on May 12 SDG&E and DisabRA 

May 26 Additional Comments re: 

Portable Backup Generators 

The Alliance, CPSD/DRA, 

and SDG&E 

June 10 Further Comments re: Portable 

Backup Generators SDG&E and the Water Districts 

June 30 

Comments re: (1) Use of 

San Diego County’s Reverse 911 

System, and (2) County Oversight 

of Portable Backup Generators 

The Alliance, SDG&E, and 

the Water Districts 

July 2 Reply to the Comments Filed on 

June 30, 2009 

DisabRA; SDG&E; and jointly by 

CCTA, Cox and CTIA 

Two public participation hearings (PPHs) were held in San Diego County. 

One was held in Alpine on April 7, 2009, and the second in Valley Center on 

April 8, 2009. Both PPHs were held in areas subject to the Power Shut-Off Plan. 

In addition, a public workshop was held in Valley Center on April 8, 2009, to 

obtain input from local governmental agencies regarding the impact of the 

Power Shut-Off Plan on public health, safety, and welfare. Workshop 

participants included the San Diego County Sheriff Department, the San Diego 

County Office of Emergency Services, the San Diego County Air Pollution 

Control District, the School Districts, and the Water Districts. 

There was considerable public participation in this proceeding. More than 

100 members of the public, elected representatives, government officials, and 

representatives of community organizations spoke at the PPHs and public 

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workshop, and there were many letters and email sent to the Commission. The 

public’s input was carefully considered in crafting today’s decision. 

4. Summary of Parties’ Positions 

All the intervening parties except SCE oppose SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off 

Plan. Most of the comments received from the public also oppose the Plan. 

Those who oppose the Plan believe it will do little to prevent wildfires while 

increasing the risk of wildfires from other sources. They also contend that 

shutting off power will impose burdens on SDG&E’s customers that outweigh 

any likely benefit. 

Those who support SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan believe that shutting off 

power when fire risks are high is a reasonable precaution against the possibility 

of catastrophic wildfires being ignited by power lines. 

5. Commission Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 

SDG&E’s Application to shut off power under specified circumstances in 

order to eliminate the risk of power-line fires is subject to Pub. Util. Code § 4515

which states, in relevant part, as follows: 

Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, 

efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, 

equipment, and facilities ... as are necessary to promote the 

safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, 

employees, and the public. 

SDG&E has a duty under § 451 to provide electric service in a way that 

protects the safety of its customers, employees, and the public at large. The 

 

5

 All statutory references are to the Public Utilities Code unless otherwise indicated. 

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central issue in this proceeding is whether SDG&E should be relieved of its duty 

when, as SDG&E asserts, there is a heightened risk that its power lines could 

ignite a catastrophic wildfire. 

The California Constitution6

 and the Public Utilities Code7 provide the 

Commission with broad jurisdiction on matters regarding the safety of electric 

utility facilities and operations, including authority to promulgate regulations 

regarding the safety of overhead power lines.8

 Electric utilities are required by 

§ 702 to “obey and comply” with such requirements. 

The provision of electricity to the public carries some risk. Every year, 

people are injured and killed by contact with power lines, and numerous fires 

are started when foreign objects (e.g., balloons and tree branches) contact power 

lines. Despite the risks, electric utilities have a duty to provide electricity to the 

public because, as stated in § 330(g), “electric service is of utmost importance to 

the safety, health, and welfare of the state's citizenry and economy.” To 

minimize the risks, the Commission has promulgated safety regulations 

governing electric utility operations and facilities.9

 In addition, electric utilities 

may suspend service when necessary to protect public safety. For example, if a 

vehicle crashes into a utility pole, the electric utility may shut off the power line 

until the accident is cleared and pole is repaired. 

 

6

 Cal. Constitution, Article XII, §§ 3 and 6. 

7

 Pub. Util. Code §§ 216, 701, and 768. 

8

 Pub. Util. Code §§ 8037 and 8056. See also Pub. Util. Code §§ 761, 768, and 770. 

9

 See, for example, General Orders 95 and 128. 

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SDG&E’s Application to shut off power under certain conditions in order 

to prevent wildfires places two fundamental goals in conflict: the need for 

continuous electric service versus the need for public safety. While there are 

always trade offs, today’s decision endeavors to achieve both goals using our 

judgment, experience, and expertise in regulating electric utilities. 

6. Summary of SDG&E’s Community Fire Safety Program 

Santa Ana winds occur annually in Southern California during the fall and 

early winter. These strong, dry, offshore winds have led to some of California’s 

largest and most damaging fires. Over the past decade, wildfires fanned by 

Santa Ana winds have burned hundreds of thousands of acres in San Diego 

County, caused billions of dollars of damage, and killed numerous people. In 

October 2003 and 2007, wildfires driven by Santa Ana winds spiraled out of 

control to become devastating firestorms. 

SDG&E is currently implementing a multi-pronged program to reduce the 

likelihood of strong winds causing power-line fires. The major elements of the 

program, which SDG&E calls the Community Fire Safety Program, are 

summarized below. SDG&E represents that it developed its Community Fire 

Safety Program after consulting with local governments, public safety agencies, 

the Red Cross, various community groups, and other stakeholders. 

6.1. Hardening of Facilities 

SDG&E uses the term “hardening of facilities” to describe physical 

improvements to its overhead electric transmission and distribution system in 

areas that are prone to wildfires. SDG&E states the hardened facilities will be 

better able to withstand Santa Ana winds, which should lessen the risk of 

keeping power on during windy conditions. The hardened facilities will also be 

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more resistant to damage from wildfires, potentially reducing the time needed to 

restore power after a fire.

The steps SDG&E is taking to harden its overhead power lines include the 

replacement of wood poles with steel poles, use of heavier wire conductors, 

increased spacing between conductors, and expanded use of conductor spacers. 

The hardened facilities are designed to withstand wind gusts of 85 miles per 

hour (mph). SDG&E is also implementing limited conversion of overhead power 

lines to underground lines in order to make the electric service provided to some 

essential public service infrastructure, such as selected water utility pump 

stations, less susceptible to outages from Santa Ana winds and wildfires. 

Because placing facilities underground is quite expensive, this form of hardening 

will be implemented sparingly. 

The hardening of facilities will have little effect on SDG&E’s Power 

Shut-Off Plan. Areas served by hardened above-ground facilities will remain 

subject to the Plan, even though such facilities will be better able to withstand 

high winds and fires. Only the few areas that are served by newly 

undergrounded facilities will be removed from the Power Shut-Off Plan. 

6.2. Power Line Re-Closers 

Many of SDG&E’s power lines have switches known as “re-closers” that 

automatically de-energize circuits if unusually high electric currents are detected, 

and then automatically restore power. Under the Community Fire Safety 

Program, SDG&E will modify the operation of re-closers for overhead power 

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lines in the areas of high fire risk. When an Elevated Fire Condition10 is present, 

SDG&E will adjust the operation of re-closers to allow either one or two 

re-energization attempts, depending on the location. If a circuit fails to re-close 

following the specified one or two attempts, the re-closer will be turned off 

remotely until the line is inspected and the re-closer is manually reset. Re-closers 

that cannot be monitored remotely will be turned off.11

SDG&E will turn off re-closers when a Red Flag Warning is declared by 

the National Weather Service for high winds and/or low humidity. When an 

outage occurs due to the operation of a re-closer, there will be a visual patrol of 

the line to ensure that it is safe to restore power. Although inspecting the line 

will increase the duration of the outage, SDG&E believes this step is warranted 

by the heightened fire risk conditions, especially since high-wind conditions 

increase the likelihood of damage to overhead facilities.12

6.3. Inspection of Overhead Power Lines 

As part of its Community Fire Safety Program, SDG&E has implemented 

expanded inspections of overhead power lines and associated facilities in areas 

of high fire risk. The expanded inspections exceed current regulatory 

requirements.

 

10 SDG&E defines an “Elevated Fire Condition” as occurring when live vegetation fuel 

moisture is 75% or less as measured by the California Department of Forestry and 

Fire (Cal Fire). 

11 The planned operation of re-closers is described in Exhibit SDG&E-2, p. 11. Turning 

off re-closers prevents automatic attempts to re-energize the line. 

12 SDG&E is considering the use of a new technology that sends a low-energy pulse 

through faulted power lines to determine if it is safe to re-energize. These devices 

might reduce restoration time. 

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6.4. Vegetation Management 

SDG&E maintains clearance for approximately 72,000 trees located near 

overhead power lines in areas of high fire risk. SDG&E is working with local 

governments, public safety agencies, the Commission, and the legislature to 

modify laws and regulations to allow for increased vegetation management. 

6.5. Staging Personnel 

As part of its Community Fire Safety Program, SDG&E will stage 

personnel in or near Power Shut-Off Areas 13 when an Elevated Fire Condition is 

present or a Red Flag Warning for high winds and/or low humidity is 

declared.14 The purpose of staging personnel is to improve response times. 

6.6. Emergency Power Shut-Off Plan 

The final element of SDG&E’s Community Fire Safety Program is the 

Power Shut-Off Plan. The purpose of this Plan is to de-energize overhead power 

lines when certain criteria are met in order to eliminate power lines as an ignition 

source when fire risks are high. SDG&E intends to implement its Plan on 

September 1, 2009. Power shut-off events will most likely occur during the 

September – December fire season in Southern California, but power will be shut 

off whenever the criteria are met. 

6.6.1. Power Shut-Off Criteria 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan calls for power to be shut off in certain 

areas when all five of the following criteria are met in those areas. 

 

13 The term “Power Shut-Off Areas” is defined later in today’s decision. 

14 The planned staging of personnel is summarized in Exhibit SDG&E-2, p. 13. 

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Criterion 1: Live Fuel Moisture. The less moisture in living plants, the 

higher the fire risk. SDG&E intends to use a live fuel moisture level of 75% or 

less as one of the five criteria for initiating a power shut-off event.15 SDG&E will 

obtain measurements of live fuel moisture from Cal Fire and the United States 

(U.S.) Forest Service. 

Criterion 2: Non-Living Fuel Moisture. The less moisture in dead 

vegetation, the higher the fire risk. SDG&E intends to use a non-living fuel 

moisture level of 10% or less as the second criterion for initiating a power 

shut-off event.16 Measurements of this criterion are made hourly at Remote 

Automatic Weather Stations (RAWS) operated by Cal Fire, the U.S. Forrest 

Service, and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management. 

Criterion 3: Relative Humidity. The risk of wildfires is inversely 

proportional to the amount of moisture in the air, also known as relative 

humidity.17 The lower the relative humidity, the higher the fire risk. SDG&E 

intends to use a relative humidity of 20% or less as the third criterion for 

initiating a power shut-off event. Measurements of relative humidity are readily 

available from RAWS. 

Criterion 4: Red Flag Warning. The risk of wildfires increases when there 

is low humidity, high winds, and/or dry lightning. The National Weather 

 

15 Live fuel moisture is the amount of moisture, expressed as a percentage of weight, in 

a living fuel sample compared to that sample when oven dry. 

16 Non-living fuel moisture is the amount of moisture in a non-living wood dowel 

expressed as a percent of the dry weight of that wood. 

17 Relative humidity is the ratio of actual moisture in a given volume of air at a given 

temperature compared to the total amount of moisture that volume of air could hold. 

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Service declares a “Red Flag Warning,” its highest fire alert, when any of the 

following conditions are forecasted: 

• Relative Humidity is 10% or less (for a duration of 10 hours or 

more) with no associated wind criteria. 

• Relative Humidity is 15% or less, with sustained winds of 

25 mph or more and/or frequent gusts of 35 mph or more (for 

duration of 6 hours or more). 

• Dry lightning that is not accompanied by enough precipitation 

to significantly wet fuels that are critically dry.

SDG&E plans to use Red Flag Warnings for low humidity and/or high 

winds, but not dry lightning, as the fourth criterion for initiating a power 

shut-off event. 

Criterion 5: High Winds. High winds are a significant fire hazard for 

power lines. High winds can topple utility poles, detach power lines, blow 

flammable debris onto power lines, and cause trees to fall onto power lines. 

Power-line fires that occur during high winds spread faster and are more 

difficult to extinguish. 

SDG&E intends to use wind speed as the final criterion for initiating a 

power shut-off event. The criterion is sustained winds of 35 mph, or gusts of 

55 mph accompanied by sustained winds of 30 mph.18 These wind speeds are at 

10 meters above ground level, which corresponds to the top of utility poles. 

However, the actual measurements of wind speeds will be made by the RAWS at 

 

18 Wind speeds are measured at RAWS and are reported once per hour. The reported 

sustained wind speed is the average wind speed during the ten-minute interval prior 

to the hourly report. The reported maximum gust speed is the maximum wind 

speed recorded for any six-second interval since the prior hourly report. 

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six meters above ground level. SDG&E estimates that wind speeds at 6 meters 

are 15% less than wind speeds at 10 meters. The wind-speed criterion at 

6 meters, where the actual measurements will be made, is sustained winds of 

30 mph, or gusts of 48 mph accompanied by sustained winds of 25 mph. 

6.6.2. Re-Energization of Power Lines 

After SDG&E shuts off power, SDG&E will not re-energize until sustained 

winds drop to 25 mph or less for two hours and the affected power lines have 

been visually inspected to ensure that it is safe to re-energize. SDG&E will 

monitor weather data to determine when inspections can begin. 

If requested by an outside agency, SDG&E will re-energize prior to 

sustained winds staying at 25 mph or less for two hours, but only after SDG&E 

has deemed it safe to re-energize. SDG&E anticipates the process of 

re-energizing its lines, including inspections, could take up to two hours. 

6.6.3. Power Shut-Off Areas 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan applies to all circuits with overhead 

facilities that pass through regions designated by SDG&E as “Highest Risk Fire 

Areas.” In general, these are areas with a high fuel load and strong winds. The 

geographic areas served by the circuits that are included in the Power Shut-Off 

Plan are called “Potential De-Energization Areas” (referred to hereafter as 

“Power Shut-Off Areas”). The Power Shut-Off Areas extend beyond the Highest 

Risk Fire Areas because circuits do not stop at the boundaries of these regions. 

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There are 17 Power Shut-Off Areas. Each Area is associated with its own 

RAWS that is located in or near the Area, for a total of 17 RAWS.19 Appendix A 

of today’s decision contains a map that shows the 17 Power Shut-Off Areas and 

the 17 RAWS. There is some overlap of Power Shut-Off Areas. Thus, individual 

customers may be in two or more Power Shut-Off Areas. 

SDG&E will be able to turn off power in each Power Shut-Off Area 

individually.20 SDG&E believes it is extremely unlikely there will be a need to 

shut off power to all 17 Areas simultaneously. Should the need to shut off power 

occur, SDG&E believes it will be limited to only a few Areas, which will 

minimize the number of people affected by an outage. 

6.6.4. Number of Affected People and Customers 

SDG&E estimates there are 59,130 electric customers (meters) and 129,976 

people living in the Power Shut-Off Areas, or about 4% of the total electric 

customers and population served by SDG&E. In addition, there are 

approximately 160 SCE customers served by SDG&E "fringe area circuits” who 

may be subject to SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. SDG&E and SCE are taking 

steps to ensure inter-utility coordination on this matter. 

 

19 The RAWS monitor and automatically report three of the five criteria used by 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. The two criteria that are not monitored by the RAWS 

are (1) the Red Flag Warnings declared by the National Weather Service, and (2) live 

fuel moisture, which is provided periodically by Cal Fire and the U.S. Forrest Service. 

20 There is some overlap between Power Shut-Off Areas. Consequently, shutting off 

power in one Area could affect another Area to the extent the two Areas overlap. 

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The following table shows the estimated number of customers (meters) 

and people (residents) subject to the Power Shut-Off Plan in 2009, broken down 

by the 17 Power Shut-Off Areas. 

Number of Meters and Residents in Power Shut-Off Areas 

Area by 

RAWS Name 

Total 

Meters 

Residential

Meters 

Commercial

Meters 

Industrial

Meters Residents 

Alpine 18,566 15,615 2,943 8 42,205 

Ammo Dump 1,736 1,139 597 0 3,289 

Bell Canyon 68 7 56 5 81 

Cameron 4,231 3,363 865 3 7,908 

Camp Elliott 2,882 2,565 317 0 8,199 

Descano 8,436 6,806 1,624 6 17,089 

Goose Valley 18,027 15,136 2,885 5 45,580 

Julian 3,294 2,393 901 0 4,001 

Mount Laguna 286 226 60 0 391 

Oak Grove 640 394 246 0 1,272 

Palomar 1,310 885 424 1 1,126 

Pine Hills 2,387 1,659 728 0 3,706 

Potrero 2,471 1,890 581 0 5,423 

Ranchita 1,116 747 369 0 1,802 

San Miguel 2,298 1,977 321 0 6,119 

Talega 19 0 17 2 19 

Valley Center 13,886 10,815 3,062 9 29,932 

Total 1 81,653 1 65,617 15,996 39 178,142 1

 Note 1: Due to overlapping Areas, the sum of the meters in individual Areas 

(81,653) is greater than the total meters (59,130), and the sum of the residents in 

individual Areas (178,142) is greater than the total residents (129,976). 

SDG&E has identified approximately 902 Medical Baseline customers in 

the Power Shut-Off Areas. Of these, 590 require life support equipment. There 

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are also approximately 5,700 customers in the Power Shut-Off Areas who 

participate in the California Alternative Rates for Energy (CARE) program. 

Some customers will be removed from the Power Shut-Off Plan in 2009 

due to a project that is currently underway to place certain overhead power lines 

underground. When the project is complete, it will remove approximately 2,300 

customers from the Power Shut-Off Plan, including 14 water pumping stations, 

leaving 56,830 customers affected by the Plan. 

SDG&E estimates that the duration of power shut-off events will range 

from 12 to 72 hours, and that the average number of residents affected by each 

event will be 18,600. This estimate of residents excludes approximately 160 SCE 

customers (meters) subject to SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. 

6.6.5. Customer Education 

SDG&E believes it is important for customers to understand the Power 

Shut-Off Plan so they can prepare for power shut-off events before they occur. 

To this end, SDG&E has mailed information packets to all customers in the 

Power Shut-Off Areas. The package included a cover letter, program fact sheet, 

list of frequently asked questions, map of the impacted areas, a guide for 

developing an emergency plan, an unplanned outage fact sheet, a portable 

generator fact sheet, and a customer contact form. SDG&E will continue to mail 

a package annually to customers in Power Shut-Off Areas that contains the 

previously identified information. 

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SDG&E will survey its Special Needs Customers21 to ascertain each 

customer’s readiness for a power shut-off event and any transportation needs 

they may have. Special Needs Customers with mobility restrictions who cannot 

remain in their homes without electricity (as identified through customer 

surveys) will be provided round trip transportation to appropriate facilities. 

Similarly, customers with special needs for diet, medication, and medical 

equipment will be provided round trip transportation to acute care facilities or 

hospitals in accordance with their needs and insurance restrictions. All 

transportation will be at SDG&E’s expense. 

SDG&E has made significant outreach efforts to Essential Customers, i.e., 

customers who provide services that are essential to public health, safety, and 

welfare. SDG&E defines Essential Customers as including the following: 

A. Fire, police, and prison facilities. 

B. Lighting for streets, highways, and other public areas. 

C. National defense agencies. 

D. Hospitals and convalescent homes. 

E. Public, private, and municipal utilities that provide services 

that are essential for public health and safety (i.e., electric, 

gas, water, communication, and sewage disposal utilities). 

F. Public transportation. 

G. Radio and broadcasting stations that transmit emergency 

information. 

 

21 SDG&E defines Special Needs Customers as those who participate in the Medical 

Baseline Allowance and/or Life Support programs. 

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H. Residential customers who use medical life support 

equipment. 

I. Schools K-12.22

Essential Customers are not exempt from the Power Shut-Off Plan. Due to 

the nature of their loads, most Essential Customers are prepared to operate 

during outages. For example, hospitals and skilled nursing facilities have 

back-up generation to support critical load for 12 to 72 hours. 

SDG&E has contacted all Essential Customers in the Power Shut-Off Areas 

to discuss the Power Shut-Off Plan. SDG&E will continue to contact all Essential 

Customers prior to each fire season to help them plan for power shut-off events. 

6.6.6. Customer Notice of Power Shut-Off Events 

SDG&E will attempt to provide all customers with two notices when a 

power shut-off event appears likely. The first notice will occur at approximately 

four to six hours prior to the forecasted shut-off event. SDG&E will use its 

outbound dialer system to send telephone alerts to affected customers. The 

outbound dialing system can make more than 20,000 calls per hour, including 

calls to communications devices commonly used by persons with hearing, 

speech, and/or vision disabilities. The first notice will indicate that high fire risk 

conditions are forecast to occur, that SDG&E may shut off power, and that 

customers should prepare for a power shut-off event. 

 

22 SDG&E treatment of schools as Essential Customers is limited to customer education 

and notice. SDG&E does not treat schools as Essential Customers with respect to 

SDG&E’s proposed tariff provisions for demand normalization, critical peak pricing, 

and demand response. 

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The second notice will occur two to three hours prior to the forecasted 

shut-off event. This second notice will have a more urgent tone about the need 

to prepare for the expected shut-off event. If the forecast changes and SDG&E 

determines that a power shut-off event is no longer likely, SDG&E will use its 

outbound dialer system to notify customers. 

Essential Customers will be notified at the same times as other customers, 

but through phone calls and e-mails consistent with the individual customer 

preferences. SDG&E will also alert the Red Cross and 2-1-1 when a shut-off 

event is forecasted. 

It is possible that the first forecast that SDG&E receives indicates a shut-off 

event could occur in three hours or less. In this situation, only one notice will be 

provided. In the unlikely event that a shut-off event occurs with no warning, 

SDG&E will notify customers as soon as practicable. Customers with 

functioning land lines or registered cell phones will receive a call. 

6.6.7. Mitigation of Adverse Impacts on Customers 

SDG&E acknowledges that shutting off power imposes hardships on 

customers, particularly low income customers and customers with medical 

needs. SDG&E will implement a variety of measures to mitigate the hardships, 

such as providing advance warning of an impending shut-off event whenever 

possible so customers can prepare; providing $250 debit cards to customers 

participating in the CARE and/or Medical Baseline programs; opening shelters 

in the areas where power is shut off; and transporting customers who depend on 

life support equipment to appropriate medical facilities when a shut-off event is 

declared. SDG&E does not request additional funding in rates for these 

mitigation efforts in 2009. 

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SDG&E will contact all impacted Special Needs Customers in person or by 

telephone to discuss their emergency readiness and medical transportation needs 

in the case of a power shut-off event. Because Special Needs Customers are 

recertified bi-annually, SDG&E will use this opportunity to again discuss their 

emergency readiness and medical transportation needs. Once the power shut-off 

event is over and the Special Needs Customers are back home, there will be an 

in-person visit by an SDG&E employee to deliver assistance, followed by a 

live-person phone call to discuss the service level and overall experience. 

SDG&E also recognizes that shutting off power will prevent the Water 

Districts from using many of their electric-powered pumps, which could disrupt 

the supply of water used to fight fires. To mitigate this adverse impact, SDG&E 

will procure a pool of six portable backup generators (four 400 kW and two 

750 kW) that can be dispatched to the Water Districts during power shut-off 

events. The six portable generators are intended to support 20 critical pump 

stations with loads of 100 kW or greater. SDG&E will install and own the wiring 

and permanent electric transfer safety switches at these 20 facilities. The total 

estimated cost of the six generators and wiring is $3.9 million.23

If more than six generators are needed to provide water for fire-fighting 

purposes, SDG&E will re-energize any part of its system if ordered to do so by 

 

23 At the all-party meeting held on July 6, 2009, SDG&E stated that it would procure a 

pool of 31 portable generators. Six would be for the Water Districts, ten for 

evacuation centers, and 15 for schools. SDG&E also proposed to pre-wire 110 sites to 

accept the portable generators. Ten of these sites would be evacuation centers, 20 

sites would be critical pump stations, and the remainder would be schools. SDG&E 

did not state who will ultimately pay for the generators and wiring. (Reporter’s 

Transcript, pp. 39-40.) 

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the incident commander. For example, if all six generators have been deployed 

to Water District facilities and additional Water District pump stations need to be 

brought on line at locations that remain de-energized, SDG&E could re-energize 

the circuit(s) serving the pump stations after conducting a safety inspection. 

SDG&E is willing to own and maintain a pool of six generators for a 

two-year period. SDG&E believes that two years is enough time for the Water 

Districts to procure and install emergency back-up generation they should have 

for any of a number of emergency situations. 

SDG&E does not intend to procure a pool of portable generators or install 

wiring for critical pump stations with a load of less than 100 kW. SDG&E 

believes that back-up generators for loads of less than 100 kW should be the 

responsibility of the individual Water Districts. 

6.6.8. Cost of the Power Shut-Off Plan 

SDG&E states that the costs for its Power Shut-Off Plan will depend on the 

frequency and scope of shut-off events. Assuming two events per year, the 

annual costs will be in the range of $7 - $11 million. Startup costs will be in the 

range of $14 - $24 million.24 These estimates do not include any costs that result 

from Commission requirements that are adopted in this proceeding. SDG&E 

does not seek ratepayer funding for costs incurred in 2009.25 

 

24 At the all-party meeting held on July 6, 2009, SDG&E stated that its startup costs 

would be in the range of $24 - $36 million. (Reporter’s Transcript, pp. 39 – 40.) 

25 SDG&E does not state if or when it will request ratepayer funding of costs incurred 

in 2010 and future years. 

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The above costs for the Power Shut-Off Plan are incremental to normal 

operating and maintenance costs and do not include other expenses for SDG&E’s 

Community Fire Safety Program such as system hardening. 

7. Review of SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan 

7.1. Position of the Parties 

7.1.1. SDG&E 

SDG&E asserts that its Power Shut-Off Plan is needed to address the 

serious fire danger that occurs when strong Santa Ana winds blow across 

SDG&E’s service territory. The severity of the danger is demonstrated by the 

firestorms of October 2003 and October 2007. In October 2007, Santa Ana winds 

reportedly caused SDG&E’s overhead power lines to ignite the Witch Fire, the 

Guejito Fire, and the Rice Fire.26 The Witch Fire and Guejito Fire combined into a 

single wildfire that burned 197,990 acres and 1,624 buildings (including 440 

homes), and killed two people. The Rice Fire burned 9,000 acres and 

248 buildings (including 240 homes). There were no deaths. SDG&E is 

concerned that failure to shut off power during severe conditions could lead to 

firestorms like those in 2003 and 2007. 

SDG&E used historical data to “backcast” the number of times it would 

have shut off power had its Power Shut-Off Plan been in effect in prior years. 

The following table lists the backcast of shut-off events, with an “event” defined 

 

26 The Commission is currently investigating the Witch Fire and Guejito Fire in 

Investigation (I.) 08-11-006 and the Rice Fire in I.08-11-007. Today’s decision does not 

prejudge any issues being addressed in those Investigations. 

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as any calendar day in which power would have been shut off. A single calendar 

day in which power is shut off at multiple locations is counted as one event. 

Backcast of Power Shut-Off Events During Red Flag Warnings 

Event Date/ Vegetation Fuel Moisture

Time RAWS Non-Living Living 

Relative 

Humidity

Sustained Wind or 

Gusts @ 6 Meters 

Duration 

(Hours) 

# Meters/ 

# of People 

 < 10% < 75% < 20% 

At 6 meters

• Sustain > 30 mph, 

or

• Sustain > 25 mph 

+ gusts > 48 mph 

 

Event 1 

2/9/02 

@ 1500 

Cameron Note 1 71% 12% Sustain 26 mph 

Gusts 48 mph 24 hours 4,231/ 

10,587 

2/9/02 

@ 2230 

Descanso 4% 71% 11% Sustain 27 mph 

Gusts 59 mph 18 hours 8,436/ 

21,299 

Event 2 

2/10/02 

@ 0050 Alpine 5% 71% 7% Sustain 28 mph 

Gusts 52 mph 13 hours 18,566/ 

48,078 

2/10/02 

@ 0410 

Potrero Note 1 71% 10% Sustain 26 mph 

Gusts 53 mph 12 hours 2,471/ 

6,043 

Event 3 

2/25/02 

@ 1720 

Ammo 

Dump 10% 58% 10% Sustain 37 mph 

Gusts 37 mph 3 hours 1,736/ 

3,889 

Event 4 

1/5/03 

@ 2320 

Ammo 

Dump 6% 74% 12% Sustain 33 mph 

Gusts 45 mph 11 hours 1,736/ 

3,889 

Event 5 

1/6/03 

@ 0130 

Bell 

Canyon 7% 74% 7% Sustain 38 mph 

Gusts 62 mph 7 hours 68/ 

81 

1/6/03 

@ 0220 Talega 0% 74% 8% Sustain 36 mph 

Gusts 39 mph 7 hours 19/ 

19 

Event 6 

1/7/03 

@ 1220 

Bell 

Canyon 7% 74% 20% Sustain 38 mph 

Gusts 65 mph 3 hours 68/ 

81 

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Backcast of Power Shut-Off Events During Red Flag Warnings 

Event Date/ Vegetation Fuel Moisture

Time RAWS Non-Living Living 

Relative 

Humidity

Sustained Wind or 

Gusts @ 6 Meters 

Duration 

(Hours) 

# Meters/ 

# of People 

 < 10% < 75% < 20% 

At 6 meters

• Sustain > 30 mph, 

or

• Sustain > 25 mph 

+ gusts > 48 mph 

 

Event 7 

10/26/03 

@ 1230 

Descanso Note 1 64% 4% Sustain 27 mph 

Gusts 56 mph 6 hours 8,436/ 

21,299 

Event 8 

12/16/04 

@ 1820 

Ammo 

Dump 4% 66% 18% Sustain 34 mph 

Gusts 39 mph 13 hours 1,736/ 

3,889 

12/16/04 

@ 1500 

Cameron 6% 66% 18% Sustain 26 mph 

Gusts 50 mph 3 hours 4,231/ 

10,587 

Event 9 

12/24/04 

@ 0900 

Cameron 7% 66% 4% Sustain 28 mph 

Gusts 49 mph 5 hours 4,231/ 

10,587 

Event 10 

2/8/06 

@ 0630 

Bell 

Canyon 2% 72% 4% Sustain 29 mph 

Gusts 48 mph 17 hours 68/ 

81 

Event 11 

11/30/06 

@ 0520 

Ammo 

Dump 9% 58% 8% Sustain 31 mph 

Gusts 37 mph 3 hours 1,736/ 

3,889 

Event 12 

10/21/07 

@ 2222 

Ammo 

Dump 9% 66% 7% Sustain 30 mph 

Gusts 35 mph 38 hours 1,736/ 

3,889 

10/21/07 

@ 2303 

Cameron 0% 66% 9% Sustain 28 mph 

Gusts 51 mph 18 hours 4,231/ 

10,587 

10/21/07 

@ 1933 

Descanso 3% 66% 10% Sustain 26 mph 

Gusts 52 mph 28 hours 8,436/ 

21,299 

10/21/07 

@ 2058 

Goose 

Valley 8% 66% 8% Sustain 29 mph 

Gusts 50 mph 13 hours 18,027/ 

46,634 

10/21/07 

@ 1214 

Potrero 0% 66% 8% Sustain 27 mph 

Gusts 51 mph 49 hours 2,471/ 

6,043 

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Backcast of Power Shut-Off Events During Red Flag Warnings 

Event Date/ Vegetation Fuel Moisture

Time RAWS Non-Living Living 

Relative 

Humidity

Sustained Wind or 

Gusts @ 6 Meters 

Duration 

(Hours) 

# Meters/ 

# of People 

 < 10% < 75% < 20% 

At 6 meters

• Sustain > 30 mph, 

or

• Sustain > 25 mph 

+ gusts > 48 mph 

 

Event 13 

10/22/07 

@ 0653 Alpine 4% 66% 9% Sustain 27 mph 

Gusts 51 mph 5 hours 18,566/ 

48,078 

10/22/07 

@ 0014 Julian 6% 66% 15% Sustain 29 mph 

Gusts 57 mph 30 hours 3,294/ 

7,817 

10/22/07 

@ 0313 

Valley 

Center 6% 66% 0% Sustain 26 mph 

Gusts 50 mph 10 hours 13,886/ 

34,326 

Event 14 

10/14/08 

@ 0403 

Cameron 0% 73% 13% Sustain 30 mph 

Gusts 40 mph 7 hours 4,231/ 

10,587 

Note 1: Data for the "Non-living Fuel Moisture" was not available at the RAWS at that time. 

However, nearby RAWS reported data that met the criterion. 

SDG&E’s backcast shows that power shut-off events would have occurred 

14 times in the last eight years. The duration of the backcast events ranges from 

3 hours to 49 hours, with an average of 13 hours.27 Duration includes the time 

that power is shut off due to exceeding the shut-off criteria plus the time 

required for the inspection and restoration process. The number of customers 

(meters) affected by each backcast event ranges from 68 to 35,746, with an 

average of 9,475 customers. The number of residents (people) affected by each 

 

27 The average duration of 13 hours is the resident-weighted average. 

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event ranges from 100 to 90,221, with an average of 23,826 residents. SDG&E 

believes this information shows that an average shut-off event will be far less 

disruptive to the public than the devastating firestorms that could occur if power 

is not shut off. 

SDG&E identified 167 fires from August 2003 through early 2009 that in 

some way relate to its power lines. Most fires were insignificant. Of the 167 

incidents, 13 are associated with high winds. SDG&E provided the following 

information for each of the 13 wind-related power-line fires: (a) date the fire 

started; (b) location; (c) size in acres; (d) injuries and/or property damage, if 

known; (e) how the fire was ignited; (f) why the fire is associated with high 

winds; and (g) whether shutting off power might have prevented the fire. 

The information for (a) – (f) is provided in the following table. For (f), 

SDG&E does not know the exact wind speed at the time of the fire. The rationale 

for labeling a fire as wind related comes from incident reports for each fire. With 

respect to (g) regarding whether the Power Shut-Off Plan might have prevented 

the fire, SDG&E does not know for 10 of the fires because of a lack of data. In 

three cases (Fire Event Nos. 2, 11, and 13 in the following table), SDG&E is 

confident that all five criteria of its Power Shut-Off Plan were met. 

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Historical Data for Wind-Related Power-Line Fires 

Fire 

Event 

Date 

Started Location 

Size in 

Acres 

Injuries & 

Property Damage Wind-Related Cause of Fire 

1 12/16/04 Wynola 5 None noted Power line down from heavy winds 

2 12/16/04 Descanso 1 None noted Power line down from heavy winds 

3 12/17/04 Ramona 1 None noted Power line down from heavy winds 

4 2/19/05 Fallbrook 1 None noted 

Tree branch into power line from 

high winds 

5 2/7/06 

Laguna 

Niguel 1 None noted 

Tree branch into power line from 

high winds 

6 6/27/06 Fallbrook 1 None noted 

Tree branch into power line from 

high winds 

7 10/27/06 

Boulder 

Creek 2 None noted Power line down from heavy winds 

8 11/30/06 San Ysabel 130 

Damage to bridge; 

loss of pasture land

Power line down. High winds of 

40 mph w/gusts to 60 mph 

9 12/27/06 

Camp 

Pendleton 3 None noted Power line down from heavy winds

10 3/3/07 Jamul 0.1 None noted 

Tree branch into power line from 

high winds 

11 10/21/07 

Guejito, 

San Pasqual 197,990*

Extensive damage 

& injuries*

Alleged contact w/conductor. 

High winds observed in area. 

12 10/21/07 

Witch, 

Ramona 197,990*

Extensive damage 

& injuries*

Alleged arcing between power 

lines. Santa Ana winds in area. 

13 10/22/07 

Rice, 

Rainbow 9,472 

Extensive damage 

& injuries 

Alleged tree branch into power line 

from high winds

* Witch and Guejito acreage, injuries, and damage are aggregated. 

SDG&E cautions that while past experience is instructive, future power 

shut-off events and power-line fires may not follow historical patterns. SDG&E 

anticipates there will be fewer power-line fires in the future due to its 

Community Fire Safety Program and Power Shut-Off Plan. 

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SDG&E believes that the parties who oppose its Power Shut-Off Plan 

overestimate the risk of fires being ignited by candles, barbeques, portable 

generators, and other sources when SDG&E shuts off power. To illustrate the 

small risk of fires from other sources, SDG&E cited statistical information 

maintained by the State Fire Marshal that shows during the five-year period of 

2003 – 2007 there were 55,636 equipment-related fires in all of California, of 

which 71 were ignited by generators and 243 by grills, hibachis, and barbeques. 

7.1.2. Opposition Parties 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan is opposed by the Alliance, AT&T, CCTA, 

CFB, Cox, CPSD, CTIA, DRA, DisabRA, the School Districts, the Water Districts, 

and UCAN (collectively, the “Opposition Parties”). They contend that SDG&E’s 

Power Shut-Off Plan will eliminate one ignition source but create many others. 

This is because customers without electricity will use other means for lighting 

and cooking, such as candles, lanterns, fireplaces, barbecues, and camp stoves. 

In addition, some customers may resort to providing their own power with 

portable generators that are not maintained and/or operated properly. AT&T 

notes that the U. S. Fire Administration has issued a warning about the fire 

hazard posed by generators. 28 

The Opposition Parties assert that SDG&E has presented no evidence that 

its Power Shut-Off Plan will reduce the overall risk of wildfires. Rather, 

SDG&E’s Plan reduces one risk but increases others. The risk that is reduced is 

the one for which SDG&E might be held liable - fires caused by its power lines. 

The risks that are increased are those for which SDG&E would not be held liable. 

 

28 www.usfa.dhs.gov/citizens/all_citizens/co/generator.shtm. 

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The Opposing Parties note that SDG&E has identified 13 power-line fires 

since 2003 that are linked to high-wind events, but only three of these fires would 

have been prevented had its Power Shut-Off Plan been in effect at the time. The 

Opposing Parties question the benefit of shutting off power 13 times to prevent 

three fires. CCTA opines that the three fires could have been prevented by better 

maintenance, making SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan unnecessary. 

The Alliance and CPSD contend that SDG&E has selected a wind-speed 

criterion that is too low, which will cause needless power shut-off events. They 

state that SDG&E is required by General Order 95 to design, construct, and 

maintain power lines that can withstand wind speeds well in excess of SDG&E’s 

wind-speed criterion. 

Finally, the Opposing Parties believe that the Power Shut-Off Plan will 

impose many significant costs, burdens, and risks on customers and 

communities in the areas where power is shut off. They argue that SDG&E has 

not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the claimed benefits of its Power 

Shut-Off Plan versus the many adverse impacts. These adverse impacts are 

summarized below. 

Disruption of Communications Networks. Communications providers 

rely on commercial power to provide landline telephone service, cable TV, 

internet, and wireless telephone service. Network facilities located in the Power 

Shut-Off Areas can function when commercial power is shut off by using onsite 

backup batteries and generators, but service could start to fail for many 

customers after 4 - 12 hours as batteries are exhausted and generator fuel is 

consumed. To keep networks functioning, the exhausted batteries would need to 

be replaced with fresh batteries or portable generators, and the generators would 

need to be refueled. This could become a herculean task during a widespread 

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and prolonged power shut-off event, as there are hundreds of sites in the Power 

Shut-Off Areas where backup power would be needed to keep communications 

networks functioning.29 Communications providers are concerned that if backup 

generators are not installed or refueled in time due to distance, terrain, traffic, 

blocked roads, or other obstacles, customers could lose communications services, 

including copper-based landline service, cable TV service, internet service, 

and/or wireless service. 

Communications providers estimate they will incur significant costs to 

respond to power shut-off events. The actual costs will vary depending on how 

widespread the shut off is, how long it lasts, and other factors. They will also 

lose an unknown amount of revenue if service is disrupted. 

Loss of Communications at Customer Premises. Even if communications 

networks continue to function during a power shut-off event, the loss of power 

at customers’ premises could cause many customers to lose access to 

communications services. For example, AT&T provided information that shows 

approximately 37% of households use only cordless phones for their landline 

service. Cordless phones rely on commercial power at customers’ premises and 

are not usually sold with back-up batteries. As a result, thousands of households 

could be without landline service during a power shut-off event. Some of these 

households may have cell phones, but they might not be able to recharge cell 

phone batteries when power is shut off. 

 

29 AT&T alone has hundreds of remote terminals in the Power Shut-Off Areas where 

calls carried by its landline network are aggregated and disaggregated. These 

remote terminals collectively serve tens of thousands of lines, and have an industry 

standard of about eight hours of battery backup. 

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Customers who subscribe to cable voice services receive a modem with 

battery back-up for up to eight hours. Voice service will be lost after eight hours. 

Many residents rely on broadband internet for “over-the-top” phone 

service (e.g., Vonage, Skype, and MagicJack). However, desktop computers will 

not function without power, and laptop computers will be unable to access the 

internet because the Wi-Fi modems that connect laptops to the internet will be 

without power. Only those customers who subscribe to wireless data services 

will be able to access the internet with a laptop, but only if the wireless networks 

are functioning and only for as long as laptop batteries hold out. 

Large communications customers such as government agencies, financial 

institutions, and hospitals are often served by on-site equipment rooms with 

battery backup for short outages. These equipment rooms usually cannot 

accommodate portable generators. SDG&E estimates there are about 10,930 

commercial customers in the shut-off area. Extended outages could force many 

commercial customers to curtail or halt their operations. 

Public Safety Impacts of Degraded Communications. The loss of 

communications caused by a power shut-off event would adversely affect public 

health, safety, and welfare. These adverse impacts include: 

• The loss of communications would occur during periods of 

high fire risk. Residents may not be able to call 911 to report 

fires. The delayed reporting of fires could allow fires to escape 

initial attack and spiral out of control. 

• Residents may not be able to call 911 to report crimes, medical 

emergencies, and vehicle accidents. The delayed response to 

emergencies of all types poses a serious risk to lives and public 

safety in general. 

• First responders may not be able to communicate with each 

other or the public via cell phones. The inability of first 

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responders to communicate effectively could impede 

coordinated and timely responses to emergencies. 

• Residents may not be able to receive emergency information 

such as evacuation notices disseminated through reverse 911. 

• Health monitoring services and security services that rely on 

telecommunications may not function. Many seniors and 

persons with disabilities may not be able to use their “lifeline” 

emergency button when power is shut off. 

Loss of News and Information. Government agencies depend on 

television and the internet to disseminate emergency information. During the 

2003 and 2007 firestorms, television and internet media provided around-theclock coverage of events and disseminated emergency information to residents 

throughout the area. SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan could cut off this important 

source of emergency information, since most televisions and computers will not 

work without external power. 

Customers with Disabilities. Shutting off power for an extended period 

would impose a number of hardships on people with disabilities. First, many 

people with disabilities depend on electric-powered devices. If power is shut off, 

people who use electric wheelchairs will find their mobility limited once the 

batteries run down. People with hearing or vision disabilities who rely on 

specialized communications equipment will not be able to communicate with the 

outside world.30 People who take medications that must remain refrigerated 

may be forced to leave their homes in order to find a location with refrigeration 

 

30 DRA reports that most of the equipment provided by the Deaf and Disabled 

Telecommunications Program needs external power to operate. 

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facilities. Similarly, people with medical conditions that require them to 

maintain their environment at a certain temperature may have to evacuate 

because the loss of power makes temperature control impossible. 

Second, SDG&E estimates there are 902 Medical Baseline Customers in the 

Power Shut-Off Areas, including 590 customers who rely on life support 

equipment. Many of these individuals will have to evacuate if there is an 

extended outage. Because these people have serious medical conditions, any 

evacuation creates some risk. 

SDG&E plans to offer free transportation to medically fragile customers if 

a power shut-off event is called. However, any care provided at the hospital or 

other medical facility would be the customers’ responsibility. This will result in 

hefty medical bills for the customers or their insurance providers. 

Third, people with disabilities rely on communications services to stay in 

contact with caregivers and other essential resources. If an outage occurs, many 

people with disabilities will need additional assistance. Any breakdown in 

communications places people with disabilities at risk of having health and 

medical needs go unmet. 

Finally, disabled people are disproportionately low-income and can ill 

afford the costs of purchasing provisions for power shut-off events, such as 

landline phones, flashlights, coolers, spare batteries, and backup generators. 

Consequently, SDG&E’s Plan will force many customers with disabilities to 

evacuate their homes and incur the costs and inconvenience that such evacuation 

entails. Even if some disabled persons could afford a generator, they may not be 

able to operate it due to mobility or vision impairments. 

Adverse Impact on Schools. There are 65 public elementary schools, 

middle schools, and high schools in the Power Shut-Off Areas that serve 

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approximately 19,867 students. None of these schools has backup power. All the 

affected schools use phone systems that need external power to operate. 

During a power shut-off event, the schools affected by the event will be 

without internet, television, and phone service, which creates health and safety 

issues on three fronts. First, if a student is seriously hurt during an outage, the 

school may not be able to contact emergency services in a timely manner. 

Second, if there is an emergency outside of the school, such as a major wildfire, 

the school may not receive timely warning, thereby compromising the school’s 

ability to protect children and staff. Third, schools without power may not be 

able to meet health and safety requirements, such as providing water from wells, 

lighting, and air conditioning. The School Districts estimate that it would cost 

several million dollars to prepare for power shut-off events. 

The School Districts are very concerned about the loss of Average Daily 

Attendance (ADA) funding from the State, which is the main source of funds for 

the School Districts. If a lengthy power shut-off event occurs, schools may have 

to cancel school days, causing a loss of ADA funds. The Education Code 

provides for waivers of ADA requirements if an emergency is established to the 

satisfaction of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. The School 

Districts are worried that a power shut-off event might not be deemed an 

emergency, resulting in a loss of ADA funds. 

Adverse Impact on Water Supply. The Water Districts have 39 “critical 

pump stations” in the Power Shut-Off Areas that do not have backup power. 

These pump stations provide water to tens of thousands of customers and for fire 

fighting purposes. If SDG&E shuts off power, the supply of water in the areas 

served by the affected critical pump stations will be limited to whatever is on 

hand in tanks and small reservoirs. If a fire breaks out, the heavy demand for 

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water to fight the fire could exhaust the available supply within hours. The lack 

of water to fight fires could be disastrous, as the fires would be occurring during 

periods of high fire danger (i.e., when winds are high, humidity is low, and 

vegetation is dry). 

The Water Districts estimate that it would cost $8 million to install backup 

generators and associated wiring at the 39 critical pump stations. They also state 

that SDG&E’s proposal to procure a pool of six portable generators for use by the 

Water Districts during power shut-off events is insufficient. SDG&E’s backcast 

shows that during the October 2007 firestorm, SDG&E would have shut off 

power to more than 30 critical pump stations simultaneously. 

Adverse Impact on Sewage Service. Several of the Water Districts 

provide sewer service. In order to avoid spills or unlawful discharges, the Water 

Districts will need to rent generators during power shut-off events to keep sewer 

facilities operating. 

Costs to Prepare for a Power Shut-Off Event. Customers could incur 

significant costs to prepare for a power shut-off event. Such costs could include 

the purchase of landline phones; flashlights and portable radios; extra batteries 

for flashlights, radios, laptop computers, and communications devices; coolers to 

store perishable foods and medications; candles, camp stoves, and lanterns; and 

backup generators and fuel. 

Costs Incurred During a Power Shut-Off Event. Many customers could 

incur significant costs due to a power shut-off event. Such costs could include 

the rental of portable generators; lost business revenues; lodging and restaurant 

costs for residents who leave the area while power is shut off; loss of refrigerated 

foods and medicines; and general loss of public convenience. 

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Impacts on Low Income Customers. Low income customers might not be 

able to afford the loss of refrigerated foods and medications, or to take actions to 

mitigate the impacts of shut-off events, such as evacuating to a hotel, eating at 

restaurants, or buying batteries, coolers, and generators. 

Portable Generators. Customers without power may use portable 

generators to provide electricity for their appliances and lights. The use of 

portable generators poses a fire risk for the reasons described previously, but 

that is not the only hazard. UCAN states that owners of portable generators may 

need to store 20 gallons of fuel on site in order to power a generator through a 

shut-off event lasting 72 hours. If a wildfire passes through the property, the fuel 

could explode with deadly consequences for residents and fire crews. 

In addition, some residents may connect their generators to the electrical 

wiring of their homes. If “do-it-yourselfers” do not disconnect their electrical 

panels from the utility system, the generators would energize utility lines, 

thereby nullifying SDG&E’s intent to reduce ignitions from power lines. This 

would also pose a danger to utility employees because power lines would be 

“hot” when the workers do not expect it. 

Finally, generators emit dangerous levels of carbon monoxide (CO). 

UCAN cites a study that shows portable generators were implicated in 96% of 

poisonings from CO following hurricanes Charley and Jeanne in Florida in 2004. 

Loss of Traffic Lights and Street Lights. Traffic lights and street lights 

depend on commercial power. The loss of traffic lights and street lights during 

power shut-off events would increase the risk of vehicle accidents, particularly at 

night. Crash victims may not be able to summon help if the wireless network 

has ceased functioning. The loss of traffic lights could also delay the arrival of 

first responders to the scene of the accident or other emergency. If a general 

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evacuation is declared due to an approaching wildfire, the lack of traffic signals 

and street lights could slow the evacuation and place many lives at risk. 

Hampering Evacuations. Shutting off power could hamper evacuation 

efforts because customers might not receive timely notices to evacuate for the 

reasons stated previously. In addition, elderly and disabled persons may not be 

able to open their garage doors without electric garage door openers, trapping 

them in their homes. Evacuations from homes at night will be slower and more 

difficult without lights. Loss of power to traffic lights and street lights may 

impede and disrupt evacuations. Loss of power to fueling stations might trap 

evacuees without sufficient fuel in their vehicles. 

The October 2007 firestorm demonstrates that concerns about evacuating 

during a power shut-off event are warranted. On October 21, 2007, the Witch 

Fire started at 12:35 p.m. near the community of Ramona. If the Power Shut-Off 

Plan had been in effect, SDG&E would have shut-off power to Ramona at 

8:58 p.m. Sixteen minutes later, at 9:14 p.m., residents of Ramona received 

reverse 911 calls to evacuate.31 Fortunately, power was on, and residents were 

able to receive reverse 911 calls and to evacuate at night with the aid of lights in 

their homes and on the streets. 

Diversion of Public Safety Personnel. Shutting off power would divert 

police and sheriff personnel from their primary missions. For example, officers 

would need to direct traffic at intersections where traffic lights no longer 

function until temporary stop signs could be set up. Police and fire department 

 

31 Reporter’s Transcript of the all party meeting held on July 6, 2009, p. 47. 

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personnel might have to drive longer distances to find gas stations with working 

pumps to refuel emergency vehicles. 

Police and sheriff personnel would be diverted at a time when many 

burglar alarms and security lights would not function, providing increased 

opportunity for criminal activity. 

Loss of Economic Activity. Many businesses could not operate without 

commercial power. For example, some retail businesses could not function 

without scanners at checkout stands, gas stations could not pump fuel, and many 

restaurants could not cook. Employees who rely on computers could not work. 

Setting the Stage for Catastrophic Wildfires. The simultaneous 

occurrence of the all of the above circumstances under high fire risk conditions 

(e.g., loss of communications, lack of water, disruption of traffic, disabled and 

elderly residents trapped in their homes, etc.) would increase the potential for 

catastrophic wildfires. 

7.1.3. SCE 

SCE is the only party that supports SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. SCE 

opines that shutting off power is better than running the risk of igniting 

catastrophic fires like those that occurred in October 2003 and October 2007. 

SCE does not currently have a power shut-off plan in effect. However, in 

2003 SCE implemented a temporary program to shut off power to rural areas 

where the Governor had declared a state of emergency due to the fire risk posed 

by the large number of dead trees killed by bark beetles. The purpose of SCE’s 

power shut-off program was to protect against the possibility of strong winds 

causing dead trees to fall onto its power lines and igniting a wildfire. The region 

affected by SCE’s program had 34,500 customers (meters), and was dividend into 

11 areas where power could be shut off independently from each other. 

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SCE implemented its power shut-off program in 2003 on its own initiative 

and obtained Commission authorization sometime later. SCE terminated the 

program in August 2005, after the dead and diseased trees had been cleared from 

the region. During the time SCE’s power shut-off program was in effect, SCE 

shut off power one time. The shut-off occurred on October 26-27, 2003, in the 

Idyllwild area. It affected approximately 4,000 customers and lasted 26 hours. 

When SCE inspected its power lines prior to re-energization, it found six 

locations where trees had fallen onto the lines. SCE views its program as a 

success because it prevented what could have been a catastrophic wildfire. 

7.2. Discussion 

We will approve SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan only if we are convinced 

that the need to shut off power to protect public safety takes precedence over the 

vital necessity of keeping power on. There is a strong presumption that power 

should stay on. As the California Legislature recognized in § 330(g), “[r]eliable 

electric service is of utmost importance to the safety, health, and welfare of the 

state’s citizenry and economy.” 

There are two threshold issues we must consider in deciding whether to 

approve SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. The first issue is whether shutting off 

power results in a net reduction in wildfire ignitions during hazardous fire 

conditions. The second issue is whether the benefits of SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off 

Plan outweigh the adverse impacts. If SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan fails either 

test, then SDG&E’s Application for Commission approval of its Plan should be 

denied. SDG&E has the burden of demonstrating that its Power Shut-Off Plan 

passes both tests. 

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7.2.1. Impact on the Number of Wildfires 

We begin our analysis of SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan by assessing 

whether it will reduce the number of wildfires during periods of high fire 

danger. There is no doubt that shutting off power eliminates the risk of power 

lines igniting fires. However, the Opposition Parties have demonstrated that 

shutting off power increases the risk of fires starting from sources other than 

power lines. This is because people who do not have power in their homes will 

light candles or lanterns when the sun goes down; will use barbeques and camp 

stoves to cook food, especially when faced with the loss of costly groceries in a 

freezer or refrigerator that is not receiving power;32 and will use fireplaces for 

heat, light, and cooking. All of these actions create new ignition sources. In 

addition, some customers may use portable generators to power their appliances 

and homes. AT&T cites the following warning from the U. S. Fire 

Administration regarding the fire hazard posed by generators: 

Before refueling the generator, turn it off and let it cool. Fuel 

spilled on hot engine parts could ignite.33

UCAN notes that sparks from vehicles are responsible for 11.6% of fires.34 

Shutting off power could increase the number of miles driven by forcing people 

in the areas where power is shut off to drive long distances to find restaurants 

 

32 Customers with gas stoves and ovens will still be able to cook but many of these 

customers will have to use matches to light the cooking fire. The use of matches 

increases the risk of fire because explosive levels of gas could accumulate if 

customers cannot light the stove or oven by the second or third try. 

33 www.usfa.dhs.gov/citizens/all_citizens/co/generator.shtm. 

34 UCAN Comments filed March 27, 2009, p. 5. 

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and retail stores where power is on so they can eat and buy groceries, batteries, 

gasoline, and other necessities. The increased driving would exacerbate the risk 

of vehicle-ignited fires. 

The risk of customers igniting fires increases as the number of affected 

customers increases and the length of the outage increases. SDG&E’s backcast 

shows that SDG&E would have shut off power on October 22, 2007, to 35,746 

meters serving 90,221 residents. The meter-weighted average duration of the 

shut-off would have been 23.8 hours, or about one full day. We believe it is 

likely that if SDG&E ever shuts off power to 90,211 residents for one full day, the 

residents would collectively light tens of thousands of candles, lanterns, camp 

stoves, barbeques, and fireplaces, and turn on numerous portable generators. 

This would present a significant risk of wildfire ignitions that could equal or 

exceed the risk of ignitions from power lines.35

The Alliance provided information that shows power-line fires constitute 

about 3% of all wildfires and only 1% of significant wildfires (i.e., fires greater 

than 100 acres) in Southern California.36 Thus, wildfires that are not started by 

power lines constitute 97% to 99% of all wildfires. Anything that increases the 

number of fires caused by sources other than power lines, even by a small 

fraction, is a greater threat to public safety than the threat from power-line fires. 

 

35 Fires started by any of these ignition sources could spread to nearby wildlands, 

especially in Santa Ana wind conditions. 

36 The Alliance’s Comments filed March 27, 2009, p. 10, and Appendix A, pp. 14, 16, 

and 23. See also the Water Districts’ Comments filed April 19, 2009, p. 3. 

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SDG&E provided no evidence or analysis that shows its Power Shut-Off 

Plan will result in a net reduction in wildfire ignitions during periods of high fire 

danger. SDG&E suggests that the threat of wildfire ignitions from sources other 

than power lines will be reduced by its customer education efforts, which will 

help customers to prepare for power shut-off events. We agree this will help to 

some extent. Nevertheless, a significant and irreducible risk will remain. When 

SDG&E shuts off power, customers will have to use alternative means to light 

their homes at night, cook their food, and power their appliances, all of which 

increases the risk of wildfire ignitions. 

SDG&E downplays the threat of wildfire ignitions from other sources by 

citing information from the State Fire Marshal that shows during a recent 

five-year period there were 55,636 equipment-related fires in all of California, of 

which 71 were caused by generators; 253 were caused by grills, hibachis, 

barbeques, and charcoal lighters; and 347 were caused by fireplaces and 

chimneys.37 SDG&E believes its education campaign will reduce what it views 

as an already meager threat of wildfires from generators and other sources. 

We see portable generators, grills, hibachis, barbeques, and fireplaces 

(referred to hereafter as “other fire sources” or “other sources”) as a much more 

serious fire risk than SDG&E. The information that SDG&E obtained from the 

State Fire Marshal shows there were 671 fires caused by generators, grills, 

 

37 SDG&E Comments filed June 30, 2009, p. 7, Fn. 3, citing a report titled “Fires by 

Equipment Involved in Ignition, 2003-2007” prepared by the State Fire Marshall at 

http://osfm.fire.ca.gov/cairs/pdf/firesbyeqinignition2003_07.pdf. SDG&E’s motion 

to take official notice of this information pursuant to Rule 13.9 and Evidence Code 

§§ 452(c) and 452(h) was granted by the assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in 

a ruling issue on August 6, 2009. 

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hibachis, barbeques, fireplaces, charcoal lighters, and chimneys compared to 343 

power-line fires.38 The reported number of fires from other sources does not

reflect the impact of SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan because the Plan has never 

been put into effect. For example, we would expect there would normally be 

very few generator fires in SDG&E’s service territory because there would be 

little need for SDG&E’s customers to use portable generators on a day-to-day 

basis. However, if a power shut-off event occurs, then every affected customer 

with a portable generator would have a need to use it. The number of people 

using generators during a shut-off event may be significant, as SDG&E stated 

that “a large number of people in the backcountry have portable generators.”39 

The upshot is that the risk of fires from other sources would be multiplied 

manyfold during a power shut-off event, perhaps surpassing the risk of windrelated power-line fires that the Power Shut-Off Plan is intended to address.40

In its comments on the proposed decision, SDG&E asserts that the data 

from the State Fire Marshall shows that shutting off power will prevent many 

types of fires besides power-line fires. For instance, the data shows that during 

the five-year period of 2003-2007, thousands of fires were caused by electrical 

appliances, wiring, transformers, and motors. During a power shut-off event, 

 

38 It is important to keep in mind that the 671 fires from other sources and the 343 

power-line fires are categorized as equipment-related fires. There is no information 

on how many of these fires resulted in wildfires. 

39 Reporter’s Transcript of the all party meeting held on July 6, 2009, p. 73. 

40 As noted previously in today’s decision, wind is not a factor in most fires associated 

with SDG&E’s power lines. This suggests that wind was not a factor in causing most 

of the 343 power-line fires reported by the State Fire Marshall. 

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none of these ignition sources would be capable of starting a fire, including: 

soldering equipment (91 fires), power tools (138 fires), clothes dryers (1,058 fires), 

dishwashers (84 fires), microwave ovens (167 fires), toasters and toaster ovens 

(83 fires), electrical wiring (562 fires), electric distribution/power transfer 

equipment (155 fires), extension cords (76 fires), and fans (378 fires). 

We agree that shutting off power will eliminate many sources of ignition 

while the power is shut off. However, it is unclear to what extent, if any, there 

will be a net reduction in the number ignitions. The timing of many activities 

that require electric power — such as using dishwashers, clothes dryers, and 

power tools — will simply be shifted to when power is on. Furthermore, it is 

likely that when customers receive notice of a forecasted power shut-off event, 

there will be a spike in the use of electric devices and appliances as customers 

rush to prepare for the shut-off event (e.g., charging batteries and cell phones) 

and complete activities that require power (e.g., cooking meals and washing 

dishes and clothes) before power is shut off.41 These activities will increase the 

number of ignition sources immediately prior to a shut off event.42 If a fire were 

 

41 SDG&E anticipates that Essential Customers will increase their use of electricity to 

prepare for a noticed shut-off event. (Exhibit SDG&E-3, pp. JSV-17 – 19.) We believe 

that many other customers will likewise need to increase their use of electricity to 

prepare for a shut-off event. 

42 It is possible that customers may use their appliances less efficiently in an effort to 

prepare for a power shut off event that will likely last 12 to 72 hours (e.g., wash less 

than a full load of clothes). The inefficient use of appliances could result in greater 

use of appliances immediately before and after a power shut-off event and thereby 

increase the number of appliance-related ignitions. Customer might also overload 

their appliances in order to get as much done as possible before a shut-off event 

Footnote continued on next page

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to ignite, it would occur at a time when the overall fire hazard is increasing 

(i.e., when humidity is dropping and winds are becoming stronger). 

SDG&E also argues in its comments on the proposed decision that its 

Power Shut-Off Plan will not significantly increase the risk of generator-related 

fires. SDG&E states there are more than 5,000 outages per year on its system, 

and that its Plan will cause only one to two additional outages annually. 

We are not persuaded by SDG&E’s argument. The 5,000 outages that 

occur annually are not comparable, on average, to outages that will occur under 

the Power Shut-Off Plan. Outages under the Power Shut-Off Plan will last far 

longer than the typical outage. During the 10-year period of 1999-2008, the 

average minutes of sustained outages per SDG&E customer was 101.62 minutes 

per year, or less than two hours.43 In contrast, outages under the Power Shut-Off 

Plan will last 12 to 72 hours. 

Given the relatively short duration of the vast majority of the 50,000 

outages that have occurred over the last decade, it is likely that many customers 

with generators may choose to wait out a typical outage based on their 

experience that it will last only a few hours at most, rather than going through 

the inconvenience of pulling their generators from storage, fueling them, turning 

 

(e.g., washing more than a full load of clothes), which could increase the risk of 

appliances sparking a fire. 

43 See ALJ Ruling dated August 5, 2009, taking official notice of the System Average 

interruption Duration Index pursuant to Rule 13.9 of the Commission’s Rules of 

Practice and Procedure and California Evidence Code §§ 452(c) and 452(h). The 

10-year annual average of minutes of sustained outages per SDG&E customer 

includes the widespread and prolonged outages that occurred due to firestorms in 

October 2003 and October 2007. (Response of SDG&E Response to Water and School 

District Joint Motion for Offical Notice filed July 20, 2009, p. 6, Fn. 5.) 

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them on, connecting appliances, and then returning the generators to storage 

when the outage ends. 

On the other hand, when SDG&E notifies customers of a forecasted outage 

under its Power Shut-Off Plan, customers will know in advance that the outage 

could last up to 72 hours because of SDG&E’s previous customer education 

efforts.44 These circumstances lead us to conclude that outages under the Power 

Shut-Off Plan will (1) spur much greater use of generators than typical outages, 

and (2) significantly increase the risk of generator-related fires. 

For the previous reasons, we find that SDG&E has not met its burden to 

demonstrate that its Power Shut-Off Plan will reduce the overall number of 

wildfires occurring during hazardous fire conditions. Based on the available 

information, we conclude that it is more likely than not that SDG&E’s Plan will 

increase the risk of wildfire ignitions during hazardous fire conditions. 

7.2.2. Historical Data on Power-Line Fires 

We next review the available historical data on wind-related fires ignited 

by SDG&E’s power lines for insight on weighing the costs and benefits of 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. SDG&E reports that its power lines have been 

involved in 13 wind-related fires since August 2003. Ten of these fires were 

 

44 SDG&E’s customer education for its Power Shut-Off Plan includes workshops and 

advice for the safe installation, connection, and operation of generators, which 

indicates that SDG&E anticipates widespread use of generators during outages 

under its Power Shut-Off Plan. (Exhibit SDG&E-3, page JSV-16 and Attachment A.) 

Customers in power Shut-Off Areas may also be more likely to purchase generators 

in the future to prepare for the possibility of lengthy outages under the SDG&E’s 

Power Shut-Off Plan. The increased number of generators increases the risk of 

generator-related fires during outages under the Power Shut-Off Plan as well as 

during any of the other 5,000 outages that occur annually. 

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minor, burning a total of 145 acres. There were no injuries. Only one of the ten 

fires caused property damage, which was limited to the loss of pasture land and 

unspecified damage to a bridge. 

The remaining three wind-related fires involving SDG&E’s power lines 

occurred during the October 2007 firestorm. These were the Guejito, Rice, and 

Witch Fires. All three were major wildfires. We are currently investigating the 

causes of these fires in I.08-11-007 and I.08-11-006. 

SDG&E’s backcast of power shut-off events purports to show that if 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan had been in effect in prior years, it would have 

prevented three of the 13 wind-related fires involving SDG&E’s power lines. The 

three fires that would have been prevented are listed in the following table: 

The Descanso Fire in the above table was a minor, 1-acre fire. The Guejito 

and Rice Fires were major wildfires, the causes of which are currently being 

investigated in I.08-11-007 and I.08-11-006, respectively. Until the investigations 

Fires That SDG&E Believes Would have 

Been Prevented By Its Power Shut-Off Plan 

Date Location Acres 

12/16/04 Descanso 1 

10/21/07 Guejito 197,990*

10/22/07 Rice 9,472 

* Note: Includes the area burned in both 

the Guejito and Witch Fires. 

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are complete, we cannot say whether SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan would have 

prevented these two fires.45 

It is important to recognize that SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan would not 

have prevented the Witch Fire, which was allegedly ignited by SDG&E’s power 

lines on October 21, 2007.46 After it was ignited, the Witch Fire moved west and 

merged with the Guejito Fire on October 22, 2009.47 The Witch Fire moved into 

the Guejito area at the exact time that SDG&E would have shut off power to the 

Guejito area under its Power Shut-Off Plan. This demonstrates that major 

wildfires can occur in areas where power is shut off. As discussed in more detail 

below, shutting off power in areas where major wildfires are burning creates 

significant risks to public safety. 

7.2.3. Shutting Off Power During Major Wildfires 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan does nothing to prevent wildfires started 

by sources other than power lines, which constitute about 97% of all wildfires 

and 99% of significant wildfires (i.e., fires greater than 100 acres) in Southern 

California. The Cedar Fire in San Diego County during the October 2003 

 

45 SDG&E acknowledges that the “role power lines played in [the Witch, Guejito and 

Rice Fires] has not been determined with certainty.” (Joint Comments filed by the 

School Districts and the Water Districts on April 17, 2009, p. 4, quoting an SDG&E 

data response provided to DisabRA.) 

46 The cause of the Witch Fire is currently being investigated in I.08-11-006. 

47 See Cal Fire’s report “California Fire Siege 2007, An Overview” at 

http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire_protection/downloads/siege/2007/Overview_Complet

eFinal.pdf, p. 84. The School Districts and Water Districts’ joint motion to take official 

notice of the report pursuant to Rule 13.9 and Evidence Code § 452(h) was granted by 

the assigned ALJ in a ruling issue on August 5, 2009. 

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firestorm demonstrates the serious threat from wildfires ignited by sources other 

than power lines. The Cedar Fire is the largest fire in California’s recorded 

history. It started when a lost hunter lit a signal fire, and it eventually burned 

280,275 acres, destroyed more than 2,200 structures, and killed 14 people.48

As discussed previously, the Witch Fire demonstrates that major wildfires 

can occur in an area at the same time that SDG&E would shut off power to the 

area under its Power Shut-Off Plan. Shutting off power increases the public 

safety risk of wildfires, including the 99% of significant wildfires that are not 

started by power lines. The heightened risks include: 

• Shutting off power could disrupt landline and wireless telephone 

service. SDG&E recognizes this, and warns its customers that 

they may lose phone service during a power shut-off event.49 

Without phone service, customers may not be able to report fires, 

which could delay the initial attack by firefighters and thereby 

increase the chance of wildfires growing to catastrophic size. 

Such fires would be occurring at the exact time when there is the 

greatest potential for the rapid spread of wildfires (i.e., when 

winds are strong, humidity is low, and vegetation is dry). 

• Customers without power may not be able to use their 

telephones, televisions, radios, and computers. Thus, those who 

work or live in an area where power is shut off will lose their 

primary means to learn of approaching fires, evacuation notices, 

and other critical information. A report on the October 2007 

firestorm that was jointly prepared by Cal Fire, the U.S. Forest 

Service, and the San Diego County Office of Emergency Services 

 

48 Cal Fire’s report “California Fire Siege 2003, The Story” at 

(http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire_protection/downloads/2003FireStoryInternet.pdf, 

pp. 72-73.) We take official notice of Cal Fire’s report pursuant to Rule 13.9. 

49 Exhibit SDG&E-3, Appendix A, Fact Sheet. 

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highlighted the vital importance of communications during 

evacuations and other emergencies. The Report stated: “A vital 

component in any evacuation or emergency situation is 

communication. During the October fire siege, the Reverse 911 

system was employed on a large scale, and was key to reaching 

thousands of citizens. Previous evacuation communications, 

such as those employed in the 2003 fire siege, depended on 

residents watching the news, listening to radio broadcasts or 

waiting for a personal visit from law enforcement officials giving 

evacuation orders. The Reverse 911 system contacted nearly 

200,000 citizens with recorded phone messages relevant to their 

communities.”50 

• People with disabilities rely disproportionately on 

communications devices that need to be plugged into a power 

outlet to operate, such as TTYs and computers, making them 

vulnerable to being cut off from communications with the 

outside world during a power shut-off event. Shutting off power 

would place such people at risk of not receiving a notice to 

evacuate due to an oncoming wildfire. In addition, people with 

disabilities are more likely to need assistance in evacuating. The 

inability to receive evacuation notices or to call for assistance 

could have deadly consequences.51

• Electric garage door openers will not work when power is shut 

off. If wildfire forces an evacuation, customers who are elderly 

or have disabilities may not be able to open their garage doors 

manually, potentially trapping them in their homes. Trapped 

customers may not be able to call for help if telephone service is 

disrupted. 

 

50 See “California Fire Siege 2007: An Overview,” at p. 86. The School Districts and 

Water Districts’ joint motion to take official notice of the report pursuant to Rule 13.9 

was granted by the assigned ALJ in a ruling issue on August 5, 2009. 

51 DisabRA’s comments on the Proposed Decision of Commissioner Simon, p. 12. 

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• Loss of power to traffic signals and street lights may cause traffic 

accidents and impede evacuations, particularly at night. 

• The Water Districts have 39 electric-powered pump stations in 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Areas that are critical to maintaining 

the supply of water, but which have no backup power.52 If 

power is shut off to any of these 39 pump stations while a 

wildfire is burning, the supply of stored water in the area served 

by the pump station could be exhausted within hours, leaving no 

water to fight fires. In order to satisfy the immense demand for 

water during a major wildfire, the Water Districts must pump 

around the clock.53

SDG&E did not provide any evidence or analysis that shows the benefits 

from the reduction in the number of power-line fires made possible by its Power 

Shut-Off Plan exceeds the increase in public-safety risk from wildfires that 

threaten communities in areas where power is shut off. 

SDG&E intends to mitigate the risk of shutting off power to critical pump 

stations by forming a pool of six large portable generators for use by the Water 

Districts during power shut-off events. We agree with the Water Districts that 

six generators are not enough. During the October 2007 firestorm, SDG&E 

would have shut off power to more than 30 critical pump stations 

simultaneously.54

 

52 Water Districts Comments filed on June 10, 2009, pp. 1-2. The 39 pump stations 

without backup power excludes pump stations that will be removed from the Power 

Shut-Off Areas during 2009 after the conversion of certain overhead power lines to 

underground lines pursuant to SDG&E Advice Letter 2075-E. (Ibid.) 

53 Water Districts Comments filed on May 19, 2009, p. 13. 

54 Water Districts Comments filed on June 10, 2009, p. 1 and Appendix A. 

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SDG&E states that it will restore power to any area threatened by a 

wildfire if ordered to do so by a public-safety agency. However, restoring power 

to communities already threatened by a wildfire does not mitigate the risk that 

while power is shut off, residents may not be able to report fires. This could 

delay the initial attack by firefighters and thereby increase the chance of large 

scale wildfires. SDG&E also states that it may take as long as two hours to 

restore power once it is ordered to do so.55 During that interval, lives and 

property would be at increased risk from fast-moving wildfires driven by strong 

Santa Ana winds. 

7.2.4. SCE’s Power Shut-Off Program 

The only precedent for SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan is a temporary 

program that SCE implemented in 2003. The fact that SCE instituted a shut-off 

program does not mean that SDG&E should be allowed to do the same. 

SCE’s shut-off program was instituted in response to emergency 

conditions that arose from the tremendous number of trees that had been killed 

by bark beetles. On March 7, 2003, the Governor issued an emergency 

proclamation that, among other things, directed utilities to clear dead and 

diseased trees near power lines due to the fire hazard. SCE was concerned that 

until the trees were removed, high winds could cause dead and diseased trees to 

fall onto its power lines and ignite wildfires. After the dead and diseased trees 

were removed, SCE ended its power shut-off program in 2005. 

The lesson we draw from SCE’s power shut-off program is that it may be 

appropriate to implement a power shut-off program when emergency conditions 

 

55 SDG&E Comments filed July 2, 2009, p. 2. 

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are present, but the program should end when the emergency is over. SDG&E’s 

Power Shut-Off Plan is not limited to emergency conditions, but applies to 

situations that occur annually (e.g., sustained winds of 35 mph). SDG&E is 

required by General Order 95 to design, construct, and maintain its power-line 

facilities to operate safely under these regularly occurring conditions.56 

7.2.5. Costs and Benefits 

The Opposition Parties have identified many significant costs, burdens, 

and risks that shutting off power imposes on customers and communities in the 

areas where power is shut off. These adverse impacts were summarized 

previously and are not repeated here.57 SDG&E has proposed several measures 

to mitigate the adverse impacts, including the opening of shelters; offering free 

medical transport; providing $250 debit cards to customers participating in the 

CARE and Medical Baseline Programs; and procuring a pool of six large portable 

generators for use by the Water Districts. SDG&E does not seek ratepayer 

funding for mitigation costs incurred in 2009. 

We commend SDG&E for its willingness to undertake extensive and costly 

mitigation measures. However, SDG&E provided no evidence or analysis that 

shows the benefits of its Power Shut-Off Program, as mitigated, outweigh the 

many significant adverse impacts on customers and communities. Given this 

fundamental lack of information, we cannot find that the Power Shut-Off Plan is 

in the public interest. 

 

56 CPSD/DRA Comments filed May 26, 2009, pp. 9-11. There is no dispute that SDG&E 

may shut off power when high winds exceed General Order 95 design standards. 

57 See the previous summary in today’s decision of the Opposition Parties’ position on 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. 

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SDG&E contends that shutting off power is better than risking the chance 

of more firestorms like those that devastated San Diego County in October 2003 

and October 2007. SDG&E states that unless decisive action is taken, it is only a 

matter of time before the next catastrophic firestorm. 

We agree that every reasonable action should be taken to avoid firestorms. 

However, SDG&E has not demonstrated that shutting off power is likely to 

decrease the number of wildfires. Nor did SDG&E cite a single fire during the 

October 2003 firestorm that was ignited by its power lines. Thus, shutting of 

power would have done nothing to prevent the October 2003 firestorm. 

On the other hand, SDG&E’s power lines have been implicated in three of 

the many fires that collectively comprise the October 2007 firestorm. These were 

the Guejito, Rice, and Witch Fires.58 We are currently investigating these fires in 

I.08-11-007 and I.08-11-006. Until the investigations are complete, we decline to 

speculate on the causes of these fires. At this point in time, there is no basis to 

conclude that SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan is an appropriate response to the 

October 2007 firestorm.59 

SDG&E asserts that its Power Shut-Off Plan is not based on costs and 

benefits. Rather, it is meant to protect public safety. SDG&E observes that 

 

58 SDG&E states that its Power Shut-Off Plan would have prevented the Guejito and Rice 

Fires, but not the Witch Fire. 

59 SDG&E acknowledges that the “role power lines played in [the October 2007 fires] has 

not been determined with certainty.” (Joint Comments filed by the School Districts 

and the Water Districts on April 17, 2009, at p. 4, quoting an SDG&E data response to 

DisabRA.) 

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several Public Utilities Code sections require SDG&E to operate its system in a 

safe manner. (§§ 330, 399, 451, 761, 762, 768, and 770). 

We agree that the Public Utilities Code ranks public safety as a top 

priority. We further agree that a safe electric system is one which is operated to 

prevent fires. However, operating a safe system also includes the reliable 

provision of electricity. Without power, numerous unsafe conditions can occur. 

Traffic signals do not work, life support systems do not work, water pumps do 

not work, and communication systems do not work. As the California 

Legislature recognized in § 330(g), “[r]eliable electric service is of utmost 

importance to the safety, health, and welfare of the state’s citizenry and 

economy.” In short, there is a strong presumption that power should remain on 

for public safety reasons. 

7.2.6. Conclusion 

SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan would impose significant costs, burdens, 

and risks on the customers and communities in the areas where power is shut 

off. In light of these hardships, SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan should be 

adopted only if SDG&E demonstrates that its Plan will improve public safety. 

While the Power Shut-Off Plan will eliminate power lines as a source of ignition 

during hazardous fire conditions, it will create many new sources of ignition and 

exacerbate the risk to public safety from fires that occur in areas where power is 

shut off. SDG&E provided no evidence or analysis that shows its Plan will 

improve public safety overall. Based on our review of the record, we believe it is 

more likely than not that SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan would, on balance, 

negatively affect public health, safety, and welfare. 

We conclude for the previous reasons that SDG&E’s Application should be 

denied without prejudice. Because SDG&E’s Application is denied, there is no 

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need to decide if the shut-off criteria proposed by SDG&E are reasonable or to 

address ancillary issues raised in SDG&E’s application pertaining to demand 

normalization, critical peak pricing, and demand response. 

Although today’s decision rejects SDG&E’s proposed Power Shut-Off Plan, 

we recognize that SDG&E’s power lines pose an ongoing fire hazard.60 We 

commend SDG&E for its concern for fire safety and its extensive efforts to 

implement measures to protect the public, both in this proceeding and with its 

broader Community Fire Safety Program. We encourage SDG&E to continue its 

efforts, particularly with respect to its inspections of overhead power lines, 

hardening its facilities in fire-prone areas, and sound vegetation management. 

In an effort to ensure steady progress in reducing the fire hazard of 

overhead power lines, we will direct SDG&E to make a good faith effort to 

develop a comprehensive fire-prevention program in collaboration with all 

stakeholders.61 Parties may use the Commission’s Alternative Dispute 

Resolution (ADR) process for this purpose. If ADR is selected, SDG&E and the 

parties should agree on the type of Commission ADR process they would like to 

use and then contact the Commission’s ADR coordinator for assistance. 

Information about the Commission’s ADR program, the types of ADR available, 

 

60 SDG&E and the Commission have implemented numerous measures to reduce the 

fire hazard to an acceptable level, including (i) the elements of SDG&E’s Community 

Fire Safety Program other than its Power Shut-Off Plan, and (ii) the Commission’s 

General Order 95. 

61 SDG&E should invite the following stakeholders to participate in the collaborative 

process: the parties to A.08-12-021, the San Diego County Office of Emergency 

Services, Cal Fire, the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, and major healthcare 

providers. Other stakeholders may participate as well. 

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and how to request ADR is available at the Commission’s website at 

http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/adr/. 

The agreed-upon fire-prevention program must be based on a cost-benefit 

analysis that demonstrates (A) the program will likely result in a net reduction in 

wildfire ignitions, and (B) the benefits of the program outweigh any costs, 

burdens, or risks the program imposes on customers and communities. The costbenefit model proposed by the Alliance may provide a reasonable conceptual 

framework. SDG&E shall confer with the other stakeholders, including the 

parties to A.08-12-021, for the purpose of reaching a consensus on (1) the design 

and conduct of the cost-benefit study, and (2) the development and submittal of 

a joint fire-prevention program. 

The cost-benefit study shall assess whether re-closer devices62 and/or 

measures to harden SDG&E’s system can be used instead of the drastic step of 

shutting off power. If not, the study should assess if it is cost effective to spend 

money on re-closer devices and hardening if power will be shut off anyway. 

If the cost-benefit study finds the public-safety benefits of shutting off 

power outweigh the many attendant costs, burdens, and risks, the study should 

include a careful assessment of the criteria that should be used to trigger a 

shut-off event, particularly wind speed. There are many complex engineering 

 

62 At the all-party meeting held on July 6, 2009, SDG&E stated for the first time that the 

re-closer policy it is implementing as part of its Community Fire Safety Program 

would have prevented the Witch Fire in October 2007 had the re-closer policy been in 

effect at that time. (Reporter’s Transcript, p. 68.) The new re-closer policy is separate 

from SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. SDG&E did not address whether its new 

re-closer policy would be just as effective at preventing wildfires as its Power 

Shut-Off Plan, but with considerably fewer impacts on customers and communities. 

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factors and public safety considerations that need to be thoroughly evaluated in 

determining the wind-speed criteria.63 Similarly, Cal Fire states that several of 

the criteria proposed by SDG&E in the instant proceeding (i.e., non-living fuel 

moisture, relative humidity, and wind speed) place unwarranted confidence in 

the accuracy and reliability of the RAWS system. The cost-benefit study needs to 

assess to what extent it is appropriate to rely on RAWS data for determining 

when to shut off power. In addition, the cost-benefit study should consider what 

mitigation measures should be implemented to eliminate or reduce the inevitable 

adverse impacts caused by shutting off power. Particular attention should be 

placed on mitigating the adverse impacts on people with disabilities, providers 

of essential services, and schools. 

Finally, the cost-benefit study should endeavor to identify and assess 

environmental impacts, if any, of agreed-upon fire-prevention measures. 

At the conclusion of the collaborative process, SDG&E may file an 

application for approval of the jointly developed fire-prevention program. The 

application should include (1) a copy of the previously described cost-benefit 

study; (2) detailed plans and timelines for mitigating any adverse impacts on 

customers and communities; and (3) a proponent’s environmental assessment, if 

appropriate. If the collaborative process does not result in a consensus proposal, 

SDG&E may file an application containing its own proposed fire-prevention 

program. SDG&E’s proposed fire-prevention program shall be based upon the 

 

63 CPSD and the Alliance have identified several potential deficiencies in the windspeed criteria that SDG&E proposed in A.08-12-021. These deficiencies are 

summarized in the Alliance’s Comments on the Proposed Decision, pp. 6-8. 

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previously described cost-benefit study and its application shall include the 

previously identified documents and information. If SDG&E chooses to not file 

an application, it shall file and serve a notice of its decision on the service list for 

A.08-12-021. The notice shall include an explanation for SDG&E’s decision. 

Our denial of SDG&E’s application does not affect SDG&E’s authority 

under § 451 and § 399.2(a) to shut off power in emergency situations when 

necessary to protect public safety. These laws state, in relevant part, as follows: 

§ 451: Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such 

adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, 

instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities...as are necessary 

to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its 

patrons, employees, and the public. 

399.2 (a)(1): It is the policy of this state, and the intent of the 

Legislature, to reaffirm that each electrical corporation shall 

continue to operate its electric distribution grid in its service 

territory and shall do so in a safe, reliable, efficient, and 

cost-effective manner. 

399.2 (a)(2): In furtherance of this policy, it is the intent of the 

Legislature that each electrical corporation shall continue to be 

responsible for operating its own electric distribution grid 

including, but not limited to, owning, controlling, operating, 

managing, maintaining, planning, engineering, designing, and 

constructing its own electric distribution grid, emergency 

response and restoration, service connections, service turnons 

and turnoffs, and service inquiries relating to the operation of 

its electric distribution grid, subject to the commission's 

authority. 

SDG&E’s statutory obligation to operate its system safely requires SDG&E 

to shut off its system if doing so is necessary to protect public safety. For 

example, there is no dispute that SDG&E may need to shut off power in order to 

protect public safety if Santa Ana winds exceed the design limits for SDG&E’s 

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system and threaten to topple power lines onto tinder dry brush.64 Any decision 

by SDG&E to shut off power under its existing statutory authority may be 

reviewed by the Commission pursuant to its broad jurisdiction over matters 

regarding the safety of public utility operations and facilities. The Commission 

may decide at that time whether SDG&E’s decision to shut off power was 

reasonable and qualifies for an exemption from liability under Tariff Rule 14. 

Our denial of the SDG&E’s Application does not signal any diminishment 

in our resolve to protect Californians from the wildfire-related risks of overhead 

power lines. We take very seriously our obligation to protect public safety on 

matters within the scope of our jurisdiction. There is perhaps no better example 

of our commitment to protecting the public than General Order 95. This General 

Order is over 500 pages long and contains comprehensive guidelines for the 

design, construction, and maintenance of overhead electric lines. These 

guidelines are specifically intended to provide the public with a high level of 

protection from the hazards associated with overhead power lines, including 

fire-related risks. 

The paramount importance we place on public safety can be seen by our 

current investigations of the October 2007 wildfires. (I.08-11-007 and I.08-11-006) 

The ultimate objective of these investigations is to identify the root causes of the 

wildfires so that corrective actions can be taken to prevent future wildfires. We 

also have an ongoing rulemaking proceeding (Rulemaking 08-11-005) to consider 

 

64 There is disagreement between SDG&E on the one hand, and CPSD, DRA, and the 

Alliance on the other hand, regarding how the wind-loading standards for power 

line facilities set forth in General Order 95 should be interpreted in terms of setting a 

threshold for shutting off power. Today’s decision does not resolve this dispute. 

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new regulations to reduce the fire hazards associated with utility operations and 

facilities. On August 20, 2009, we issued our first decision in Rulemaking 

(R.) 08-11-005 adopting such regulations.65 Additional regulations to reduce fire 

hazards will be considered in R.08-11-005 in the near future. 

We commend SDG&E for its concern for fire safety and its extensive 

efforts to implement measures to protect the public, both in this proceeding and 

with its broader Community Fire Safety Program. We encourage SDG&E to 

continue its efforts, particularly with respect to its inspections of overhead power 

lines, hardening its facilities in fire-prone areas, and sound vegetation 

management. 

8. Electric Tariff Rule 14 

 SDG&E’s Electric Tariff Rule 14 requires SDG&E to exercise “reasonable 

diligence and care to furnish and deliver a continuous and sufficient supply of 

electric energy to the customer, and to avoid any shortage or interruption of 

delivery of same.”66 Tariff Rule 14 also states that SDG&E will not be held liable 

for an interruption in service “caused by inevitable accident, act of God, fire, 

strikes, riots, war or any other cause not within its control.” 

SDG&E requests authority to amend Tariff Rule 14 to include the 

statement that SDG&E may shut off power “without liability to Customers” 

 

65 See D.09-08-029. Among other things, D.09-08-029 requires utilities to take the 

following actions in extreme and very high fire treat zones in Southern California: 

(i) increase the frequency of patrols of overhead facilities in order to identify and 

correct potential fire hazards; and (ii) increase the minimum clearance between 

overhead power lines and vegetation at the time of trim. 

66 Tariff Rule 14, Section A. 

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when in “SDG&E’s sole opinion such interruption is necessary for . . . [an] 

[e]mergency affecting or likely to affect SDG&E’s distribution system.”67 The 

text of SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Tariff Rule 14 mirrors PG&E’s current 

Tariff Rule 14. 

SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Tariff Rule 14 are not contingent on 

Commission approval of SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan. Rather, SDG&E sees 

these as separate matters. 

8.1. Position of the Parties 

8.1.1. SDG&E 

SDG&E avers that its proposed revisions to Tariff Rule 14 will help 

customers understand that power may be shut off unexpectedly in order to 

protect public safety. SDG&E also asserts that customers are currently 

responsible for any losses they might occur when power is shut off for safety 

reasons, and that the proposed revisions to Tariff Rule 14 will not change that. 

SDG&E maintains that PG&E’s current Tariff Rule 14 is an appropriate 

template for revising SDG&E’s Tariff Rule l4 even though PG&E’s Tariff was not 

adopted as a part of a fire-safety program. Rather, it was approved in 1997 as 

part of the Commission’s direct access program. SDG&E submits that PG&E’s 

Tariff Rule 14 is not limited to situations involving direct access; it covers safety 

and interruption of service in a general sense. 

8.1.2. SCE 

SCE supports SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Tariff Rule 14. 

 

67 Exhibit SDG&E-3, Appendix C. 

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8.1.3. The Opposition Parties 

The Opposition Parties assert that SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Tariff 

Rule 14 will unfairly shift all costs and liabilities for power shut-off events to the 

customers and communities in the areas where power is shut off. 

The Opposition Parties dismiss SDG&E’s assertion that PG&E’s Tariff 

Rule 14 is an appropriate template for revising SDG&E’s Tariff Rule 14. They 

state that PG&E’s Tariff Rule 14 was implemented as part of the direct access 

program, not a fire-safety program. 

8.2. Discussion 

It appears that the main purpose of SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Tariff 

Rule 14 is to allow SDG&E to shut off power in a manner consistent with its 

Power Shut-Off Plan, without liability to its customers or others. Because today’s 

decision denies SDG&E’s request for authority to implement its Power Shut-Off 

Plan, we decline to authorize the proposed changes to SDG&E’s Tariff Rule 14. 

Our denial of SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Tariff Rule 14 means we do not 

have to decide whether the proposed tariff language would permit SDG&E to 

shut off power under the circumstances described in its Power Shut-Off Plan. 

SDG&E argues that the proposed revisions will help its customers 

understand that SDG&E may need to shut off power unexpectedly in order to 

protect public safety. SDG&E does not explain why revising Tariff Rule 14 will 

achieve this objective, particularly if few customers ever read Tariff Rule 14. We 

believe that most customers already expect that SDG&E will shut off power 

when necessary to protect public safety, thereby making SDG&E’s proposed 

revisions to Tariff Rule 14 superfluous. 

SDG&E also argues that it should be allowed to revise its Tariff Rule 14 to 

mirror PG&E’s Tariff Rule 14. We disagree. As noted by several parties, the 

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revisions to PG&E’s tariff were made in a different context. PG&E’s Tariff 

Rule 14 stems from D.97-10-087, which concerned the interruption of energy 

supplied by energy marketers to direct access customers. Thus, the revisions to 

PG&E's Tariff Rule 14 were wholly unrelated to the main purpose of SDG&E's 

proposed revisions to its Tariff Rule 14. Nor does SDG&E explain why a tariff 

filed by PG&E more than a decade ago to implement direct access is appropriate 

today given all the ensuing changes to direct access. 

9. Proceeding Category and Need for Hearings 

In Resolution ALJ 176-3228, dated January 29, 2009, the Commission 

preliminarily categorized this proceeding as ratesetting and preliminarily 

determined that hearings were needed. The Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling 

and Scoping Memo (Scoping Memo) dated February 26, 2009, affirmed these 

preliminary determinations, but left open the possibility that hearings would not 

be held by requiring parties to file motions for evidentiary hearings by April 10, 

2009. The evidentiary hearings, if held, were set to begin on April 30, 2009. 

There were no motions for evidentiary hearings. After consulting with the 

assigned Commissioner, the assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a 

ruling on April 15, 2009, that canceled the previously scheduled evidentiary 

hearings. 

Rule 7.5 requires that the Commission to approve a change to the 

preliminary determination on the need for hearings. Today’s decision affirms 

that evidentiary hearings are not needed in this proceeding. 

10. Comments on the Alternate Proposed Decision 

The proposed decision of the assigned Commissioner and the alternate 

proposed decision of the ALJ in this matter was mailed to the parties in 

accordance with Pub. Util. Code § 311, and comments were allowed pursuant to 

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Rule 14.3. Comments were filed on August 31, 2009, by Cal Fire, a coalition of 

communications providers,68 CPSD, DisabRA, DRA, the Alliance, the County of 

San Diego, SDG&E, the School Districts, the Water Districts, and UCAN. Reply 

comments were filed on September 8, 2009, by Cal Fire, a coalition of 

communications providers, CPSD, DisabRA, DRA, the Alliance, and the County 

of San Diego, SDG&E, the School Districts, and the Water Districts. These 

comments and reply comments are reflected, as appropriate, in today’s decision. 

11. Assignment of the Proceeding 

Timothy Alan Simon is the assigned Commissioner for A.08-12-021 and 

Timothy Kenney is the assigned ALJ. 

Findings of Fact 

1. The purpose of SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan is to prevent the ignition of 

wildfires by shutting off power lines during hazardous fire conditions. 

2. Although shutting off power eliminates the risk of power lines igniting 

fires, it also increases the number of potential ignition sources as people use 

alternate means for cooking, lighting, and power, such as candles, lanterns, 

fireplaces, barbeques, hibachis, camp stoves, and portable generators. 

3. Wildfires that occur in areas where power is shut off are a much greater 

threat to public safety than wildfires that occur where power is on. 

4. SDG&E’s Power Shut-Off Plan imposes significant costs, burdens, and 

risks on customers and communities in areas where power is shut off. 

 

68 The coalition of communications providers consist of CCTA, AT&T and affiliates, 

CoxCom, Inc., Cox California Telcom, L.L.C., dba Cox Communications, CTIA-The 

Wireless Association, and Time Warner Cable. 

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5. SDG&E did not demonstrate that its Power Shut-Off Plan will result in an 

overall reduction in the number of wildfires, or that the public safety benefits of 

its Plan exceed the significant costs, burdens, and risks that are imposed on 

customers and communities in areas where power is shut off. 

6. SDG&E’s power lines pose an ongoing fire hazard. SDG&E and the 

Commission have implemented numerous measures to reduce the fire hazard to 

an acceptable level, including (i) the elements of SDG&E’s Community Fire 

Safety Program other than its Power Shut-Off plan, and (ii) the Commission’s 

General Order 95. 

7. The purpose of the Commission’s ADR program is to facilitate informal 

resolution of disputes in order to improve decision making, conserve 

Commission resources, and to identify parties’ fundamental interests. 

8. One purpose of SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Tariff Rule 14 is to allow 

SDG&E to shut off power in a manner consistent with its Power Shut-Off Plan. 

9. SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Tariff Rule 14 will do little to help its 

customers understand that power may be shut off unexpectedly in order to 

protect public safety because most customers will never read the Tariff. 

10. Most customers already expect that SDG&E will shut off power when 

necessary to protect public safety, thereby making SDG&E’s proposed revisions 

to Tariff Rule 14 superfluous. 

11. There is no evidence that PG&E’s Tariff Rule 14 was filed to implement a 

power shut-off program like the one proposed by SDG&E. 

12. In Resolution ALJ 176-3228, dated January 29, 2009, the Commission 

preliminarily determined that there was a need for evidentiary hearings in this 

proceeding. The preliminary determination on the need for hearings was 

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affirmed in the Scoping Memo, but the Scoping Memo also directed parties to file 

motions for evidentiary hearings. 

13. There were no motions for evidentiary hearings. 

Conclusions of Law 

1. A.08-12-021 should be denied without prejudice because SDG&E has not 

met its burden to demonstrate that (i) its Power Shut-Off Plan will decrease the 

number of wildfires, and (ii) the benefits of its Power Shut-Off Plan outweigh the 

significant costs, burdens, and risks imposed on customers and communities in 

the areas where power is shut off under the Plan. 

2. SDG&E should make a good faith effort to develop a comprehensive 

fire-prevention program in collaboration with other stakeholders, including the 

parties to A.08-12-021, that is based on a thorough and detailed cost-benefit 

analysis that addresses the matters identified in the body of today’s decision. 

3. SDG&E has authority under §§ 451 and 399.2(a) to shut off power in 

emergency situations when necessary to protect public safety. Any decision by 

SDG&E to shut off power may be reviewed by the Commission pursuant to its 

broad jurisdiction regarding the safety of public utility operations and facilities. 

4. Because today’s decision does not authorize SDG&E to implement its 

Power Shut-Off Plan, there is no need to (i) adopt SDG&E’s proposed revisions 

to Tariff Rule 14, or (ii) decide if the proposed revisions would permit SDG&E to 

shut off power under the circumstances described in its Power Shut-Off Plan. 

5. PG&E’s Tariff Rule 14 was filed to implement direct access and, therefore, 

does not constitute a reasonable precedent for revising SDG&E’s Tariff Rule 14 

for the purpose of implementing a power shut-off program. 

6. SDG&E’s proposed revisions to Electric Tariff Rule 14 should be denied. 

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7. There is no need for evidentiary hearings in this proceeding. This changed 

determination on the need for hearings should be approved by the Commission 

in accordance with Rule 7.5 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and 

Procedure. 

8. The following Order should be effective immediately. 

ORDER 

IT IS ORDERED that: 

1. San Diego Gas & Electric Company’s Application (A.) 08-12-021 is denied 

without prejudice. Any future application filed by San Diego Gas & Electric 

Company to implement a power shut-off program shall include a cost-benefit 

study that addresses the matters identified in the body of today’s decision. 

2. Within 30 days from the effective date of today’s decision, San Diego Gas 

& Electric Company shall initiate a collaborative process with other stakeholders, 

including the parties to A.08-12-021, for the purpose of reaching a consensus on 

(i) the design and conduct of the cost-benefit study indentified in the previous 

ordering paragraph, and (ii) the development and submittal of a joint 

fire-prevention program. San Diego Gas & Electric Company and the parties 

may use the Commission’s Alternative Dispute Resolution program for this 

purpose. If Alternative Dispute Resolution is selected, San Diego Gas & Electric 

Company and the parties shall attempt to agree on the type of Commission 

Alternative Dispute Resolution process they would like to use and then contact 

the Commission’s Alternative Dispute Resolution coordinator for assistance. 

3. At the conclusion of the collaborative process described in the previous 

ordering paragraph, San Diego Gas & Electric Company may file an application 

for approval of the jointly developed fire-prevention program. The application 

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shall include (i) a copy of the cost-benefit study that is described in the body of 

today’s decision; (ii) detailed plans and timelines for mitigating any adverse 

impacts on customers and communities; and (iii) a proponent’s environmental 

assessment, if appropriate. If the collaborative process does not result in a 

consensus proposal, San Diego Gas & Electric Company may file an application 

containing its own proposed fire-prevention program. San Diego Gas & Electric 

Company’s proposal shall be based on the previously identified cost-benefit 

study and its application shall include the previously identified documents and 

information. If San Diego Gas & Electric Company chooses to not file an 

application, it shall file and serve a notice of its decision on the service list for 

A.08-12-021. The notice shall include an explanation for San Diego Gas & Electric 

Company’s decision. 

4. There is no need for evidentiary hearings in this proceeding. 

5. A.08-12-021 is closed. 

This Order is effective today. 

Dated September 10, 2009, at San Francisco, California. 

MICHAEL R. PEEVEY 

 President 

DIAN M. GRUENEICH 

JOHN A. BOHN 

RACHELLE B. CHONG 

 Commissioners 

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I reserve the right to file a concurrence. 

 

/s/ RACHELLE B. CHONG 

 Commissioner 

I will file a dissent. 

/s/ TIMOTHY ALAN SIMON 

 Commissioner 

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(END OF APPENDIX A) 

A - 1 

Appendix A: Map of the 2009 Power Shut-Off Areas 

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