FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In the Matter of: ANTOINETTE 

DUMONT,

Debtor,

No. 08-60002

BAP No. ANTOINETTE DUMONT,  SC-07-1155-BaMoD Appellant,

OPINION

v.

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,

Appellee. 

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Baum, Montali, and Dunn, Bankruptcy Judges

Argued and Submitted

May 5, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed September 15, 2009

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and

Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain;

Dissent by Judge Graber

13405
COUNSEL

Michael G. Doan, Doan Law Firm, Carlsbad, California,

argued the cause for appellant-debtor and filed briefs.

13408 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
Randall P. Mrocynski, Cooksey Toolen Gage Duffy & Woog,

Costa Mesa, California, argued the cause for the appellee and

submitted a brief.

Tara Twomey, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy

Attorneys, San Jose, California, submitted a brief on behalf of

amicus curiae National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy

Attorneys. With her on the brief was Cynthia Feathers.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention

and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 allows a consumer in

bankruptcy to retain personal property subject to a security

interest by continuing to make payments under his contract.

I

Antoinette Dumont purchased a car in 2003 from Ford

Motor Credit Company (“Ford”). The loan agreement contained a clause stating that Dumont would be in default if she

was involved in a bankruptcy proceeding, also known as an

“ipso facto” clause.1 Dumont filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy

protection in 2006, subsequent to the effective date of the

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act

of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. The

vehicle was listed on the bankruptcy petition as having a

value of $5,800. At the time, she owed $8,288 on it and was

making payments of $335.78 per month. In her Bankruptcy

1The contract read: “Default means . . . [y]ou start a proceeding in bankruptcy or one is started against you or your property.” It further states that

“[i]f you default, we may take (repossess) the vehicle from you if we do

so peacefully.” 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13409
Statement of Intentions, Dumont stated that she would retain

the car and continue to make monthly payments. 

Ford’s attorney e-mailed Dumont’s attorney, asking that

Dumont reaffirm the debt. Her attorney declined the offer. It

is not clear from the record what the terms of the proposed

reaffirmation were.

Ford filed a proof of claim, to which there was no objection; thus Ford’s claim was allowed. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).

Dumont received a discharge on August 15, 2006. After the

discharge, she continued making payments on the car loan.

Without advance notice, Ford repossessed her car on November 14, 2006.

Dumont successfully moved to reopen her bankruptcy case

and claimed that Ford had violated the discharge injunction

by repossessing her car. The bankruptcy court denied the

motion to find Ford in violation of the discharge injunction,

and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) unanimously

affirmed.

II

A

[1] When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, she is

required to state her intentions with regard to any property2

2

In this case, the property was owned by an individual debtor and was

used for personal rather than business purposes. The bankruptcy laws

often treat individuals differently from other entities which may file for

bankruptcy. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (applying only to “individual

debtor[s]”). We also note that the property in dispute here was personal

property, not real property. We accordingly have no need to determine

whether debtors may retain their real property via ride-through. See id.

§ 362(h)(1) (referring to “personal property of the estate”); In re Caraballo, 386 B.R. 398, 402 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008) (“Code § § 521(a)(6) and

362(h) abrogated the ride through option as it pertains to personal property. However, courts have concluded that the ability of a debtor to choose

the ride though option as it relates to real property was not abrogated by

BAPCPA.”). Our analysis may not necessarily hold where the debtor is

not an individual or where real property is involved. 

13410 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
which is subject to a security interest. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2).

Prior to BAPCPA, our circuit law allowed the debtor to

choose among four options. First, she could merely surrender

the collateral. Second, she could redeem such collateral—that

is, pay the creditor its present fair market value. See id. § 722.

The debtor could also reaffirm the debt on terms she and the

creditor agreed on. Reaffirmation allowed the debtor to keep

her collateral, but re-exposed her to personal liability should

she fail to make payments as promised. See id. § 524(c) (setting conditions for reaffirmations and exempting them from

the discharge injunction). The final option—recognized in

only some circuits—was the so-called “ride-through” or “pay

and drive.” Under this plan, the debtor continued to make

payments as if the bankruptcy had never occurred. The creditor was forbidden by the automatic stay (and later, by the discharge injunction) from repossessing the collateral unless the

buyer defaulted. If the buyer stopped making payments or

otherwise defaulted, then the creditor could reclaim its collateral but could not pursue a deficiency judgment against the

debtor.

Unsurprisingly, the ride-through system proved popular for

debtors. Debtors usually need a car3 to travel to and from

work, school, medical appointments, and other important

activities. Having just filed for bankruptcy, they understandably expect to experience difficulty securing financing for

another vehicle. Accordingly, they were often willing to continue payments on loans that were “underwater” (i.e., loans

for which the amount due exceeded the value of the collateral).

Some creditors embraced ride-through, even allowing the

debtor to keep making payments in circuits which did not recognize the option. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride3Ride-through was not limited to automobile loans. However, as the

name implies, ride-through was used most frequently to allow debtors to

hold on to an automobile. 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13411
Through Redux, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 474-81

(2005). On the other hand, creditors might believe that the

buyer was unlikely to follow through with the plan or that the

collateral might decrease in value faster than payments were

coming in. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479

(2004) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the increased risk

of non-payment by bankrupt debtors in the Chapter 13 “cramdown” context); id. at 502 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the

risk due to depreciation).4

B

[2] Prior to BAPCPA, we had held that ride-through was

available to debtors. McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker

(In re Parker), 139 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998). The Second,

Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits held likewise.5 Other circuits rejected ride-through.6

In Parker, we relied on the clear language of the statute,7

4The BAP expressed some confusion about Ford’s decision to repossess

given that Dumont was making payments. In re Dumont, 383 B.R. 481,

489 n.17 (BAP 9th Cir. 2008). We decline to speculate as to Ford’s motivations in this case; we only note that a decision to repossess might make

financial sense under certain sets of assumptions. 

5

See Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union (In re Price), 370 F.3d

362 (3d Cir. 2004); Capital Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In

re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997); Home Owners Funding Corp.

of Am. v. Belanger, 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed. Credit

Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989). 

6

See Bank of Boston v. Burr (In re Burr), 160 F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998);

Johnson v. Sun Fin. Co. (In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996);

Taylor v. Age Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir.

1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit

rejected a proposal similar to ride-through in General Motors Acceptance

Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1056-58 (6th Cir. 1983). However, that decision predated the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy

Code, which “include[d] the language that gave rise to the ride-through

dispute.” Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 171 n.8

(E.D.N.C. 2008). 

7At the time Parker was decided, the relevant statute, 11 U.S.C.

§ 521(2) read: 

13412 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
holding that the debtor was required only to file a statement

of intention under then-current section 521(2)(A). We read

the statute to require the debtor to declare an intent to redeem,

reaffirm, or surrender only “ ‘if applicable,’—that is, if the

debtor plan[ned] to choose any of the three options listed . . .

in the statute.” Parker, 139 F.3d at 673 (quoting then-current

11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A)). “The debtor’s other options

remain[ed] available, as unambiguously stated in [thencurrent] § 521(2)(C): “[N]othing in subparagraph[ ](A) . . .

shall alter the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to

such property under this title.” Id. (final two alterations in original).8

C

[3] BAPCPA wrought several changes in the Code which

[I]f an individual debtor’s schedule of assets and liabilities

includes consumer debts which are secured by property of the

estate[, the debtor shall] — 

(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition

under chapter 7 of this title or on or before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within such additional

time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes, the debtor

shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect

to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable,

specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the

debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends

to reaffirm debts secured by such property; 

(B) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent

under this section, or within such additional time as the court, for

cause, within such forty-five day period fixes, the debtor shall

perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified

by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; and 

(C) nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph

shall alter the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to such

property under this title[.] 

8Subparagraph (C) became known as the savings clause. 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13413
may be applicable to ride-through. First, it amended section

521(2), which is now section 521(a)(2). Most relevant for our

purposes, the savings clause in subparagraph (C) now reads:

“[N]othing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph

shall alter the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to

such property under this title, except as provided in section

362(h).” (emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), added by

BAPCPA, states that the automatic stay is terminated and the

“property shall no longer be property of the estate if the

debtor fails”

(A) to file timely any statement of intention required

. . . or to indicate in such statement that the debtor

will either surrender such personal property or retain

it and, if retaining such personal property, either

redeem [,reaffirm,] or assume such unexpired lease

pursuant to section 365(p)9 if the trustee does not do

so, as applicable; and 

(B) to take timely the action specified in such statement, . . . unless such statement specifies the debtor’s intention to reaffirm such debt on the original

contract terms and the creditor refuses to agree . . . .

A new section 521(a)(6) was added as well.10

A new section 521(d) provides that

9Section 365(p) addresses the assumption of unexpired leases. Added by

BAPCPA, it appears to have no relevance to this case. 

10It read, in part: “[The debtor shall] not retain possession of personal

property as to which a creditor has an allowed claim for the purchase price

secured in whole or in part by an interest in such personal property unless

the debtor [timely] either . . . [reaffirms] or . . . redeems such property

. . . .” Later, it continues: “If the debtor fails to so act . . ., the stay under

section 362(a) is terminated with respect to the . . . affected [property],

such property shall no longer be property of the estate, and the creditor

may take whatever action as to such property as is permitted by applicable

nonbankruptcy law.” Id. at § 521(a). 

13414 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
[i]f the debtor fails timely to take the action specified in [§ 521(a)(6) or § 362(h)(A) or (B)], with

respect to property . . . as to which a creditor holds

a security interest not otherwise voidable . . ., nothing in this title shall prevent or limit the operation of

a provision in the underlying lease or agreement that

has the effect of placing the debtor in default under

such lease or agreement by reason of the occurrence,

pendency, or existence of a proceeding under this

title or the insolvency of the debtor. Nothing in this

subsection shall be deemed to justify limiting such a

provision in any other circumstance.

D

BAPCPA has been criticized for its lack of clarity.11 We

agree that BAPCPA is hardly the very model of a well-drafted

statute. However, it is our task to interpret the laws as passed

by Congress without attempting to force them to cohere more

than their words allow. See Miller v. DaimlerChrysler Fin.

Servs. Ams., LLC (In re Miller), 570 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir.

2009) (“[P]erceived poor drafting [in BAPCPA] should not be

11See, e.g., In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006)

(stating with respect to ride-through: “Unfortunately, the BAPCPA

amendments do not provide a clear answer. The amendments are confusing, overlapping, and sometimes self-contradictory. They introduce new

and undefined terms that resemble, but are different from, established

terms that are well understood. Furthermore, the new provisions address

some situations that are unlikely to arise. Deciphering this puzzle is like

trying to solve a Rubik’s Cube that arrived with a manufacturer’s

defect.”); In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 706 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (“[I]t

appears unmistakable that Congress drafted, or allowed to be drafted by

others and then enacted, provisions with ‘loose’ and imprecise language.”); Keith Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA, Am. Bankr. Inst. J.,

Sept. 2005, at 1, 1 (“The list of drafting errors and incomprehensible provisions grows every day as bankruptcy professionals digest BAPCPA.

Especially the consumer parts, this legislation was not written or vetted by

the practitioners and scholars usually involved in bankruptcy legislative

efforts.”). 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13415
regarded as a license to invalidate plain-text readings in the

name of fixing a statute that some believe is broken.”).

In doing so, we are guided by traditional canons of statutory interpretation. We first note the principle “that a statute

ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be

prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,

void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31

(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts should

decline to render any “express exception . . . insignificant, if

not wholly superfluous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, according to the plain meaning rule, “where

the language of an enactment is clear [or, in modern parlance,

plain], and construction according to its terms does not lead

to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed

are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.” United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278

(1929). The scope and applicability of the absurdity exception

to the plain meaning rule is a subject of vigorous debate.12

We further note that, in general, legislative history is not an

able guide here. See, e.g., Parker, 139 F.3d at 673 (noting

that, in the ride-through context, “[t]he legislative history is of

little assistance”); Donald, 343 B.R. at 532-33 (noting the

sparse legislative history available for BAPCPA section 305).

Nor do the purposes of the bankruptcy code provide much

aid. Bankruptcy law serves two central but often conflicting

interests. As Dumont rightly notes, bankruptcy law aims to

protect the “honest but unfortunate debtor.” Local Loan Co v.

Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). On the other hand, since

ancient times, bankruptcy has also been seen as promoting

12See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L.

REV. 2387, 2486 (2003) (criticizing the absurdity doctrine as “entail[ing]

the exercise of judicial authority to displace the outcomes of the legislative

process”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,

103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 440-41 (1989) (defending the use of “more

aggressive” means “when conventional interpretation would produce

absurdity or gross injustice”). 

13416 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
creditor interests as well. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.

434, 447 (1973) (noting that discharge provisions developed

in England as a reward for a cooperating debtors); Thomas H.

Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV.

L. REV. 1393, 1395 n.5 (1985) (recognizing “[t]he comparative newness of the fresh-start policy in bankruptcy law”).

Because of the importance of secured lending to the nation’s

economy, secured creditors have been the subject of particular

congressional solicitude. This policy can be seen in other provisions of BAPCPA, including one change which clearly

reflects congressional concern for auto lenders.13

[4] Finally, we observe that congressional power over

bankruptcy affairs is limited by the constitutional requirement

that the bankruptcy laws be “uniform.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,

cl. 4. This principle was explained in Hanover National Bank

v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), which found constitutional

a provision of the Bankruptcy Code which set exemptions by

looking to state law. There, it held that “the system [was], in

the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United

States, when the trustee takes in each state whatever would

have been available to the creditor if the bankrupt law had not

been passed. The general operation of the law [was] uniform

although it [might] result in certain particulars differently in

different states.” Id. at 190. This is but an example of the principle that federal bankruptcy law generally leaves “the deter13Prior to BAPCPA, Chapter 13 debtors could “cramdown” car loans,

bifurcating them into a secured portion equal to the present value of the

automobile and an unsecured portion containing the remaining debt. “It

seems to be undisputed that Congress viewed this use of ‘cramdown’ as

abusive and unfair to car lenders and other lienholders, so it sought to”

give extra protection to these secured lenders. In re Dean, 537 F.3d 1315,

1318 (11th Cir. 2008). BAPCPA did not alter Chapter 13 debtors’ ability

to surrender the collateral or renegotiate a deal with the creditor, but

required them to make payments based on the full amount of the creditor’s

claim where the automobile had been purchased within 910 days of the

bankruptcy and met certain other requirements. See In re Jones, 530 F.3d

1284, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008). 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13417
mination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate

to state law.” Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979).

It would raise serious constitutional questions for us to conclude that Congress affirmatively intended to promote the

non-uniform system caused by the circuit split over ridethrough. The Supreme Court has counseled us to avoid such

conclusions “unless [the alternate] construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.

v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.

568, 575 (1988). Given the amendment of section 521(a)(2)

and the enactment of section 362(h), it is unlikely that Congress failed to foresee that BAPCPA would have a major

impact on ride-through. Accordingly, we assume that Congress intended to make ride-through available in all circuits,

or none. The direction and tenor of the changes, which place

new duties on debtors and create new sanctions for failure to

comply, suggest that Congress did not intend to increase

access to ride-through by passing BAPCPA.

III

A

We must therefore decide whether our decision in Parker

survived BAPCPA. The bankruptcy court held that it did not,

and that accordingly Dumont had no right to ride-through.

The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel unanimously

agreed, following the lead of every bankruptcy court to have

considered whether ride-through is still available to debtors,

at least those who did not seek reaffirmation. In re Dumont,

383 B.R. 481 (BAP 9th Cir. 2008).14

(Text continued on page 13420)

14The BAP cited the following bankruptcy court decisions as supporting

its conclusion: In re Bower, No. 07-60126-FRA7, 2007 WL 2163472

(Bankr. D. Or. July 26, 2007); In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D.

Ariz. 2007); In re Openshaw, No. 06C-24120, 2007 WL 2916294 (Bankr.

D. Utah Mar. 12, 2007); In re Ertha Rice, No. 06-10975, 2007 WL

781893 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar.12, 2007); In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211

13418 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Utah

2007); In re McFall, 356 B.R. 674 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); In re Ruona,

353 B.R. 688 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2006); In re Riggs, No. 06-60346, 2006 WL

2990218 (Bankr.W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2006); In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694

(Bankr. D. Idaho 2006); In re Anderson, 348 B.R. 652 (Bankr. D. Del.

2006); In re Norton, 347 B.R. 291 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Boring, 346 B.R. 178

(Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006); In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D. Kan.

2006); In re Craker, 337 B.R. 549 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). Several cases

after the BAP’s decision also have concluded that ride-through has been

eliminated where there was no attempt at reaffirmation. Fees v. Ford

Motor Credit Co., No. CV07-389-S-EFL, 2008 WL 4630668 (D. Idaho

Oct 17, 2008); In re Baine, 393 B.R. 561 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008); In re

Jones, 397 B.R. 775 (S.D. W. Va. 2008). 

Dumont notes that some courts have allowed ride-through after BAPCPA. However, in each of these cases, there was “substantial compliance

with § 521(a)(2), § 521(a)(6), and § 362(h).” Jones, 397 B.R. at 788 (citing In re Baker, 390 B.R. 524 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); In re Chim, 381 B.R.

191 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008); Moustafi, 371 B.R. at 434; Husain, 364 B.R.

at 211; Blakeley, 363 B.R. at 225); see also Hardiman, 398 B.R. at 161.

In each of these cases, the debtor submitted a reaffirmation agreement to

the bankruptcy court, which rejected the agreement as not in compliance

with 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) for reasons beyond the debtor’s control. See id.

§ 524(c)(6)(A)(ii) (requiring the court to declare the reaffirmation agreement in the best interests of the debtor before approving it if the debtor

is unrepresented); id. § 524(c)(3)(B) (requiring the attorney of a represented debtor to certify that the agreement “does not impose an undue

hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor” before it can be

approved). 

Here, it is undisputed that Dumont rejected an offer of reaffirmation.

We need not address what might have been had Dumont attempted to reaffirm only to be rebuffed by either Ford or the bankruptcy court. We are

aware that not addressing this scenario leaves the law of ride-through

unclear, creating uncertainty for many Chapter 7 debtors and creditors

alike. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual Non-Business Filings by

Chapter (2007-08), http://www.abiworld.org/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?

template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=56830 (last visited Aug.

25, 2009) (indicating that 96,678 Chapter 7 cases were filed in California

alone). However, it is a rule of long standing that federal courts may not

issue advisory opinions. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 352-

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13419
B

We start with section 521(a)(2). Dumont asserts that the

retention of “if applicable” in that section demonstrates the

continuing existence of ride-through. Because Congress

would have known that this court (and the Fourth Circuit)

relied on this phrase to establish ride-through, Dumont argues,

it would have eliminated the phrase had it intended to eliminate ride-through. This argument is not without some force.

Yet, were we to accept Dumont’s view, the amendments to

the savings clause and its reference to section 362(h)15 simply

have no effect. We cannot rely solely on Parker and write the

2005 amendments out of the Bankruptcy Code.

[5] A core underpinning of Parker—“that the only mandatory act is the filing of the statement of intention,” 139 F.3d

at 673—is inconsistent with the amendments, which clearly

provide that the debtor shall not only file a statement of intention but also follow through with his expressed intent. 11

U.S.C. § 362(h). Another pillar of its holding was that the

savings clause indicated “unambiguously” that section

521(a)(2) did not alter the debtor’s rights with regard to the

collateral. 139 F.3d at 673. With the addition of an exception

for section 362(h), this conclusion is not only obsolete but

actively contradicted. The inclusion of the exception strongly

implies that section 362(h) can, in fact, alter the debtor’s

rights with regard to the collateral.

60 (1911) (recounting the origins of the rule, which date back to 1792).

We note that, in an appropriate case dealing with this issue, scheduling

priority may be appropriate because of the significant impact of ridethrough on Chapter 7 bankruptcy practice. See 9th Cir. R. 27-12; 9th Cir.

Gen. Order 3.3(g). 

15“[N]othing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this [§ 521(a)(2)] shall

alter the debtor’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to such property under

this title, except as provided in section 362(h)[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(C)

(emphasis added). 

13420 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
[6] We now turn to that section to see if Dumont’s rights

were altered. As earlier noted, in this circuit the only duty

imposed by pre-BAPCPA law was to file the notice of intention. A specification of intent to redeem or reaffirm need only

have been communicated “if applicable”—that is, if the

debtor chose one of those options. Parker, 139 F.3d at 673.

Section 362(h)(1)(A) makes clear that the debtor now has two

duties with respect to the statement of intention. As before,

the debtor must “file timely any statement of intention

required under section 521(a)(2).” Id. But now, he must “indicate in such statement that” he will do one of four things: surrender, redeem, reaffirm, or assume an unexpired lease. Id. To

be specific, he must indicate “either” surrender “or” retention;

if he chooses the latter, he must indicate “either” redemption,

reaffirmation, “or” assumption. Id. “Either” means “[t]he one

or the other.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE 572 (4th ed. 2000). Although traditionally it has

referred to only two items, the standards of the English language have degenerated such that either is now acceptable

with more than two clauses. See id. at 572-73 (usage note).

However, the “either . . . or” disjunction has always meant

that one of the listed alternatives must be satisfied.16

[7] Thus, while Dumont filed a statement of intention, and

properly stated that she intended to retain the property, she

failed to indicate one of the three permissible means of doing

so. Accordingly, the automatic stay was terminated with

respect to her automobile. Furthermore, the automobile was

no longer the property of the estate.

We pause to note an exception to section 362(h). A debtor

who files an intent to reaffirm on the original contract terms

but is unable to complete such a reaffirmation due to the creditor’s refusal is not subject to the section.17 Ride-through is

16For instance, if a person states he will do either A or B, he has not

complied with his statement if he instead does C (even if A, B, and C are

in the same class of actions). 

17See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(B) (requiring the debtor “to take timely the

action specified in such statement, . . . unless such statement specifies the

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13421
functionally indistinguishable from reaffirmation on the original terms except for the lack of personal liability in the former. The careful carve-out of reaffirmation on the contract

terms—a return to the status quo ante bankruptcy—implies

that debtors who attempt to ride-through are subject to section

362(h). If ride-through existed, any lawyer who advised his

client to make a reaffirmation offer on the original contract

terms would be guilty of malpractice, and any bankruptcy

judge who approved such a reaffirmation from a pro se litigant would be seriously derelict in his duties. For why would

one ever choose reaffirmation on such terms and thus incur

the risk of personal liability when one could safely achieve

the same ends by ride-through? Yet Congress clearly contemplated that offers of reaffirmation on the original terms would

be made. If the debtor qualifies for the exception, then it

seems that the result would be the same as pre-BAPCPA ridethrough. Congress presumably would not have created an “exception” to provide access to an option all debtors had in the

first place. If all debtors had the right to elect ride-through in

the first instance, the exception would be wholly devoid of

content. The traditional rules of statutory construction counsel

against that result. This supports a conclusion that ridethrough is not available to all.

C

[8] The mere termination of the automatic stay, however,

was not enough to authorize Ford’s repossession. As Butner

teaches, the disposition of the debtor’s assets is generally left

to state law. 440 U.S. at 54-57. Nothing in the Code itself

authorized Ford to repossess Dumont’s automobile. The

removal of the automatic stay merely lifted one obstacle to its

doing so.

debtor’s intention to reaffirm such debt on the original contract terms and

the creditor refuses to agree.” (emphasis added)). 

13422 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
The parties’ contract, in conjunction with state law, determines when a debtor has defaulted on an automobile loan.

There is an important caveat, however: 11 U.S.C.

§ 365(e)(i)(B) generally renders unenforceable any contractual term which purports to create a default solely based on

the commencement of a bankruptcy case. Dumont’s loan contained an ipso facto clause, but unless section 365(e) is

trumped Ford cannot rely on the clause to justify its actions.

The bankruptcy court and the BAP found that section

521(d) provided just the trump Ford needed. Because Dumont

failed to take action required by section 362(h), “nothing in

[the Code] prevent[ed] or limit[ed] the operation of a provision in the underlying lease or agreement that has the effect

of placing the debtor in default under such lease or agreement

by reason of the occurrence, pendency, or existence of a proceeding under this title or the insolvency of the debtor.” Id.

§ 521(d).

Section 521(d) gives Ford no substantive right to take

action against the collateral. Where there is no ispo facto

clause in the contract, it does not allow Ford to pencil one in.

Steinhaus, 349 B.R. at 710. Rather it removes the last remaining impediment under federal bankruptcy law to enforcement

of an ipso facto clause that already exists.18

[9] Dumont asserts that while section 521(d) may place the

debtor in default, it “does not provide any recourse or other

action against the Debtor or Debtor’s property.” It “has the

effect of placing the debtor in default, nothing more. A debtor

is simply deemed to be in default.” Unfortunately for

18Although neither party discusses it in any detail, 11 U.S.C.

§ 541(c)(i)(B) also restricts ipso facto clauses, declaring that at the time

of filing the debtor’s property becomes property of the estate notwithstanding a contract provision “that effects or gives an option to effect a

forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor’s interest in property.” But section 362(h) had already divested Dumont’s automobile of its

previous status as property of the estate. 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13423
Dumont, the consequences of default are determined by the

contract and state law.19 Dumont’s default did not give Ford

a right to repossess her vehicle by itself, but section 521(d)

did give Ford the rights it possessed under the contract in the

event of default because of Dumont’s filing for bankruptcy.

Ford reserved the right to take the collateral back in case of

a default. Once Dumont failed to take the action required by

section 362(h), federal bankruptcy law no longer prevented

Ford from repossessing her car.

D

Dumont next claims that section 521(d) is inapplicable

because she was never engaged in a bankruptcy “proceeding”

20

but only a bankruptcy “case.”

21 This argument was not pres19Dumont argues that had Congress intended for a default to mean anything, it would have provided (as it did in section 521(a)(6)) that “the creditor may take whatever action as is permitted by applicable nonbankruptcy

law.” We reject this argument. When Congress has said something clearly

once in a statute, it need not do so again. Congress well knew what placing

a debtor in default meant and what actions it might authorize the creditor

to take (depending on the contract terms and state law). Furthermore, Congress also indicated its understanding of what would happen to debtors in

Dumont’s shoes when it passed the provision of section 362(h) which

divests the property from the estate. 

As an alternative, Dumont mentions the possibility of “recourse outside

the Debtor or her property.” As an example of such “recourse,” she asserts

that a default may lead to changes in the creditor’s financial statements or

might trigger a default swap agreement. But the clear purpose of the BAPCPA amendments is to compel certain action from the debtor, and sections

362(h) and 521(d) are spurs to compliance. 

20See 11 U.S.C. § 521(d) (providing that “nothing in [the Bankruptcy

Code] shall prevent or limit the operation of a provision [creating a default

under the contract] . . . by reason of the occurrence, pendency, or existence

of a proceeding under this title or the insolvency of the debtor” (emphasis

added)). 

21“In basic bankruptcy terminology, a bankruptcy proceeding is not the

same as a bankruptcy case. A proceeding is something that occurs within

an already existing bankruptcy case.” Donald, 343 B.R. at 538. 

13424 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
ented to the bankruptcy court. The BAP did not consider it,

although she did address it in the opening brief before the

BAP. We conclude, however, that Dumont’s argument falls

within one of the exceptions to the waiver doctrine. “When

the issue conceded or neglected in the trial court is purely one

of law and either does not affect or rely upon the factual

record developed by the parties . . . the court of appeals may

consent to consider it.” United States v. Patrin, 575 F.2d 708,

712 (9th Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted). The opposing

party must not be prejudiced before the court may consent. Id.

Satisfied that the question is purely one of law and that Ford

was not prejudiced by its absence below, we exercise our discretion to consider the question.22 In the years since BAPCPA

came into force, no court of appeals has had the opportunity

to pass on the viability of ride-through, and because of the

low amounts of money at stake it may be some time before

the issue here presents itself again to this court. Because the

parties have a strong interest in the resolution of this question

and because it was adequately briefed by both sides, we

decide it now.

[10] We agree with the Donald court that “the language of

§ 521(d) is broad enough to encompass the filing of a bankruptcy case.” Donald, 343 B.R. at 538. We acknowledge that

Congress has referred to “case[s] or proceeding[s]” elsewhere

in the Code. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 101(4)(A) (defining “bankruptcy assistance” subject to regulation elsewhere in the

Code). We also agree that the specialized meaning of the term

“proceeding” supports Dumont’s assertion. However, “proceeding” also has a more general definition which easily

encompasses the filing of a bankruptcy case. See AMERICAN

HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1398 (4th ed.

2000) (defining proceeding as a “course of action” or “a pro22We decline, however, Dumont’s invitation to interpret the term “proceeding” in her contract with Ford. The interpretation of ambiguous contracts may involve questions of fact as well as law. Fact-finding is not a

proper task for Dumont to ask of us. 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13425
cedure” or (in a legal context) “legal action” or “litigation”).

While Black’s Law Dictionary acknowledges the bankruptcyspecific meaning, the lead definition is “[t]he regular and

orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events

between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (8th ed. 1999).

Accordingly, the reference to a “proceeding” is ambiguous.

We turn to the traditional sources to clarify ambiguous legislative text. The familiar canon of construction, noscitur a

sociis, counsels us to determine the meaning of the term “proceeding” by reference to the alternate condition for default,

“insolvency.” Insolvency (i.e., in the sense of inability to pay

“debts as such debts become due,”) is generally required for

the initiation of a bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1).

And likewise debtors do not generally file for bankruptcy

unless they are insolvent. On the other hand, the filing of a

bankruptcy proceeding (say, seeking discharge of student loan

debt) has nothing to do with insolvency. It merely marks a

changed procedural posture in a case involving an already

insolvent debtor.23

[11] Reading “proceeding” as encompassing the filing of a

case makes sense of the statute. It would be bizarre if the right

to declare someone in default on her car loan depended on the

happenstance of a proceeding (in the technical sense) being

initiated for whatever reason in her case. Because there is no

plain meaning, we need not decide whether the absurdity

exception would apply here.24

23The relevant committee report also militates against Dumont’s position. It states: “If the debtor fails to timely undertake certain specified

actions . . . then nothing in the Bankruptcy Code shall prevent or limit the

operation of a provision in a lease or agreement that places the debtor in

default by reason of the debtor’s bankruptcy or insolvency.” H.R. Rep.

No. 109-31(I), pt. 2, at 71 (2005) (emphasis added). 

24We do note that Dumont’s preferred reading would have mischievous

results for other parts of the Code. For instance, she cites 11 U.S.C.

13426 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
[12] Finally, we consider how section 521(d) works

together with other sections of the Code. The section is

invoked by the debtor’s failure to do certain things he is

required to do, either under section 521(a)(6) or under section

362(h). Neither those sections of the Code nor the apparent

purpose of section 521(d) bear any relationship to the organization of litigation in a bankruptcy case. Accordingly, we

hold that the debtor’s filing of a Chapter 7 petition initiates a

“proceeding” for the purposes of section 521(d).

E

Dumont argues that a disclosure required to be made to

consumers who are contemplating reaffirmation demonstrates

that ride-through lives on. The relevant paragraph of the disclosure reads:

What if your creditor has a security interest or

lien? Your bankruptcy discharge does not eliminate

any lien on your property. A ‘lien’ is often referred

to as a security interest, deed of trust, mortgage or

security deed. Even if you do not reaffirm and your

personal liability on the debt is discharged, because

of the lien your creditor may still have the right to

take the security property if you do not pay the debt

or default on it. If the lien is on an item of personal

property that is exempt under your State’s law or

that the trustee has abandoned, you may be able to

§ 541(c) for the proposition that Congress knows the technical meaning of

the word “case.” Yet if Congress intended for “proceeding” and “case” to

have only their technical meanings, section 541(c) would not prevent the

action of ipso facto clauses which hinge on the institution of a “proceeding” rather than a “case.” Similar problems occur with section 365(e),

which is the source of the restriction on ipso facto clauses in executory

contracts. Although that section disables ipso facto clauses predicated on

the filing of a “case,” it does not bar the activation of clauses based on

“proceedings.” 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13427
redeem the item rather than reaffirm the debt. To

redeem, you make a single payment to the creditor

equal to the current value of the security property, as

agreed by the parties or determined by the court.

11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(3)(J)(i) (emphasis added).

[13] The language is certainly more opaque than one would

hope for a debtor disclosure. It is simply too vague to support

the weight Dumont would have us place upon it. Taken literally, the italicized sentence merely states the obvious: filing

for bankruptcy does not affect the creditor’s rights in the collateral, and the creditor can exercise its power of repossession

under the contract in case of non-payment or default. Allowing the creditor to exercise a clause placing the debtor in

default is not inconsistent with this truism. Furthermore, the

language “pay the debt” is ambiguous. It could, as Dumont

asserts, mean “continue to make monthly payments as under

the contract.”

25 But it could also mean “pay off the debt” (i.e.,

redeem it). This latter reading is supported by the very next

sentence, which offers redemption as the alternative to reaffirmation if the collateral is exempt under state law or has been

abandoned by the trustee. 

[14] Tellingly, nowhere in the disclosure is ride-through

presented as an option. Given that the disclosure describes

redemption as an alternative to reaffirmation, the absence of

a similar description of ride-through suggests that it is not

authorized in the presence of an ipso facto clause. Because the

intent of the disclosure is to force debtors to “[c]onsider the

decision to reaffirm carefully,” 11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(3)(J)(i),

we decline to read one ambiguous sentence as an endorsement

of ride-through where Congress provided explicit information

25This reading is uncontroversial where there is no ipso facto clause in

the contract. Accordingly, even if Dumont is correct about the interpretation of the disclosure, it could refer only to the default rule that bankruptcy

cannot lead to repossession. 

13428 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
about the statutorily authorized alternative to reaffirmation,

redemption.

F

Having decided that section 521(a)(2)(C), in conjunction

with section 362(h), disallows ride-through, we need not consider whether ride-through may also have been terminated

under the provisions of section 521(a)(6).26 We merely note

that the existence of section 521(a)(6) provides further evidence of Congress’s intent to eliminate—or at least to restrict

—ride-through.27

IV

[15] Dumont makes one remaining argument. She asserts

that her claim that the repossession was unlawful under state

law is a matter to be determined by the bankruptcy court. As

26We have chosen to resolve this case without resort to section

521(a)(6) because of the difficulties of construing the term “for the purchase price.” We express no opinion on the BAP’s conclusion that section

521(a)(6) independently eliminates ride-through in this case. Compare

Dumont, 383 B.R. at 488 (construing “purchase price” to mean “purchase

money security interest” because “[o]therwise the section would probably

be meaningless and have virtually no application because few automobile

lenders finance cars without some form of down payment, and any amount

of down payment would reduce the creditor’s claim to an amount less than

the purchase price”); Steinhaus, 349 B.R. at 706-07 (same result), with

Donald, 343 B.R. at 536 (“A plain meaning construction of the term

‘claim for the purchase price’ indicates a claim for the full purchase

price.“); id. at n.9 (observing that the legislative history is not the final

arbiter of the text’s meaning, particularly where the legislative history for

the same subsection is clearly incorrect on another point). 

27This is clearer in the legislative history than in the text itself; the former states that the new language “provide[s] that an individual who is a

chapter 7 debtor may not retain possession of personal property securing,

in whole or in part, a purchase money security interest unless the debtor,

within 45 days after the first meeting of creditors, enters into a reaffirmation agreement with the creditor, or redeems the property.” H.R. Rep. No.

109-31(I), pt. 2, at 70-71 (2005). 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13429
the BAP stated, “In the Ninth Circuit the test to determine

whether a civil proceeding is related to a bankruptcy case is

whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably

have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Dumont, 383 B.R. at 490 (internal quotation marks omitted). By the time of the repossession, the estate did not exist,

and there could have been no effects on the estate. 

Dumont also argues that there was supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim. However, she only asserted 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334 as bases for jurisdiction before the

bankruptcy court. Her assertion of a different jurisdictional

theory here is barred by the doctrine of waiver.28

V

[16] At least where the debtor has not attempted to reaffirm, our decision in Parker has been superceded by BAPCPA. Accordingly, Ford did not violate the discharge

injunction in repossessing Dumont’s vehicle. The bankruptcy

court rightly held that the propriety of Ford’s actions under

state law was not before it. 

AFFIRMED.

28We hasten to note that Dumont and debtors in her position are not

necessarily bereft of a remedy. “Both Dumont’s and Ford’s rights and

remedies under the[ir] [c]ontract are defined and brought into existence by

their [c]ontract and are now governed by state law.” Dumont, 383 B.R. at

490. While we tend to view Ford’s actions here as sharp practice, we

express no opinion as to whether they also violated any state or nonbankruptcy federal laws. 

13430 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
GRABER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

May a bankruptcy debtor “ride through” bankruptcy—

retaining possession of her motor vehicle, so long as she continues to make regular loan payments; or must the debtor

instead invoke one of the three options described in 11 U.S.C.

§ 521(a)(2)(A)? Because of confusing and contradictory statutory text, courts have struggled for decades to discern congressional intent on the answer to that simple question.

Indeed, before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”),

the circuit courts were split five to four. Five circuits—

including ours—had held that the ride-through option was

available to debtors, while four circuits had held that it was

not. See maj. op. at 13412 & nn. 5-6 (collecting cases). The

disagreement at the circuit court level represented only the tip

of the iceberg. In scores of cases, district courts, bankruptcy

appellate panels, and bankruptcy courts had weighed in on the

debate,1 as had commentators.2

1

See, e.g., Mayton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Mayton), 208 B.R.

61, 64 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (resolving the ride-through issue while noting the “marked disagreement among bankruptcy courts and district

courts”); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Lamirande, 199 B.R. 221, 223 (Bankr.

D. Mass. 1996) (noting that “[c]ourts across the country have split” on the

ride-through issue and, in the absence of binding precedent, adopting the

more persuasive position); In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302, 303-04 (Bankr.

E.D. Ark. 1992) (noting that “[n]umerous bankruptcy courts . . . have

ruled on this issue[ ] with little consistency in results” and, because

“[t]here is no controlling authority in this district,” adopting the “more

persuasive” position). 

2

See, e.g., 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 521.10 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry

J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev.) (advancing the Ninth Circuit’s view and

criticizing the opposing view’s reading of the statute); Scott B. Ehrlich,

The Fourth Option of Section 521(2)(A)—Reaffirmation Agreements and

the Chapter 7 Consumer Debtor, 53 Mercer L. Rev. 613, 700 (2002)

(asserting that the ride-through issue “affects billions of dollars in assets

and has great importance for both debtors and creditors”); Marianne B.

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13431
The dispute centered on the text of 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)

(2004), which BAPCPA redesignated as § 521(a)(2). Like

many courts and commentators, we held that the text of

§ 521(2) plainly authorized the ride-through option. McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 139 F.3d 668,

673 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Home Owners Funding Corp. of

Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir.

1992) (reaching the same conclusion); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 521.10 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,

15th ed. rev.) (same). Other courts held that the text of

§ 521(2) plainly directed the opposite conclusion: Debtors

must choose one of the three options listed in § 521(2)(A).3

See, e.g., Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3

F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1993).

Our analysis in In re Parker, like the analysis provided by

other courts and commentators, concerned two aspects of the

text of § 521(2): the phrase “if applicable” in § 521(2)(A) and

the text of § 521(2)(C). We reasoned in In re Parker:

The statute states that the debtor

Culhane & Michaela M. White, But Can She Keep the Car? Some

Thoughts on Collateral Retention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 7 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 471, 498 (2002) (arguing that “[b]oth debtors and

creditors would be better served by recognizing a debtor’s right to ridethrough on some collateral”); Lawrence Ponoroff, Surf’s Up, Dude: Riding Through Bankruptcy, 7 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 101, 101-02 (1997) (noting the “decided and disturbing lack of consensus” among courts and

discussing the National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s review of the

ride-through issue); Ned W. Waxman, Redemption or Reaffirmation: The

Debtor’s Exclusive Means of Retaining Possession of Collateral in Chapter 7, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 187, 187 (1994) (stating that the ride-through

issue is “[t]he most controversial consumer credit issue arising in [bankruptcy] cases”). 

3Other courts looked beyond the text, to policy considerations. See

Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union (In re Price), 370 F.3d 362,

367-68 (3d Cir. 2004) (summarizing cases). 

13432 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
shall file with the clerk a statement of his

intention with respect to the retention or

surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying that the property is claimed

as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem

such property, or that the debtor intends to

reaffirm debts secured by such property.

11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). Our interpretation of that language is that the only mandatory act is the filing of

the statement of intention, which the debtor “shall”

file. Then, “if applicable,”—that is, if the debtor

plans to choose any of the three options listed later

in the statute (claiming the property as exempt,

redeeming the property, or reaffirming the debt)—

the debtor must so specify in the statement of intention. The debtor’s other options remain available, as

unambiguously stated in § 521(2)(C): “[N]othing in

subparagraph[ ] (A) . . . shall alter the debtor’s or the

trustee’s rights with regard to such property under

this title.” We see no reason to reach beyond this

plain language.

139 F.3d at 673 (alterations in original) (paragraph break

omitted).

As explained by In re Belanger, “[t]he phrase ‘if applicable’ is redundant if . . . the options given to the debtor are

considered to be exclusive.” 962 F.2d at 348. And, of course,

courts should give effect, if possible, to every word in a statute. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). The

Fourth Circuit suggested simple alternative text that Congress

could have used if the options were exclusive, In re Belanger,

962 F.2d at 348—a suggestion that was repeated 12 years

later by the Third Circuit in In re Price, 370 F.3d at 371.

Against this backdrop, Congress enacted BAPCPA in 2005.

The majority begins with the “assum[ption] that Congress

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13433
intended to make ride-through available in all circuits, or

none.” Maj. op. at 13418. I am not convinced. The legislative

history is completely silent on the issue, with nary a reference

to the vigorous public debate by the courts and commentators.

In my view, the changes to the text indicate an intent to perpetuate the extant circuit split, not resolve it.

Most importantly, § 521(a)(2)(A) remains entirely

unchanged. The all-important “if applicable” phrase—the

very source of disagreement among circuit courts, district

courts, bankruptcy courts, and commentators—remains intact.

Congress not only declined to adopt the Fourth Circuit’s suggested text, it declined to make any change whatsoever.

I acknowledge, of course, that Congress did modify

§ 521(a)(2)(C) to include an exception for new § 362(h). But

my examination of that section suggests that, if anything,

Congress intended no change to the existing circuit split. The

new section requires, in relevant part, that the debtor must

indicate in such statement [of intention] that the

debtor will either surrender such personal property

or retain it and, if retaining such personal property,

either redeem such personal property pursuant to

section 722, enter into an agreement of the kind

specified in section 524(c) applicable to the debt

secured by such personal property, or assume such

unexpired lease pursuant to section 365(p) if the

trustee does not do so, as applicable[.]

11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1) (emphasis added). The text of § 362(h)

thus parallels the text of § 521(a)(2)(A) in that it requires the

debtor to follow one of three options “if applicable,”

§ 521(a)(2)(A), or “as applicable,” § 362(h)(1).4

4

I tend to agree with Ford that the phrase “as applicable”—if read in

isolation—more strongly suggests that one of the three options must be

selected. Given the context of the BAPCPA amendments, the long13434 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
When faced with confusing and contradictory amendments

to already confusing and contradictory statutory text,5 what

should we do? The majority reasonably starts from a presumption that Congress must have intended to resolve the circuit split and the more general principle that Congress

intended uniformity in the bankruptcy laws. As explained

above, though, I am not convinced that those presumptions

apply here. In the context of this case, I would fall back on

two different—and equally relevant—presumptions guiding

statutory interpretation.

First, as a general matter, “ ‘Congress is presumed to be

aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute

without change.’ ” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct.

2484, 2492 (2009) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,

580 (1978)). As noted above, the differing judicial interpretations were well known and were encapsulated in the five-four

circuit split. Yet Congress did not amend § 521(a)(2)(A) or

the critical phrase “if applicable,” even though courts and

commentators across the nation had provided different interpretations of that section. Additionally, although Congress

amended § 521(a)(2)(C) to include the new § 362(h), it carried forward the important qualifier “applicable.” “[A]bsent a

clear expression elsewhere in the Amendments of Congress’

intent to repeal some portion of that provision or to abrogate

[the circuit split],” Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2492 (emphasis

added), we should continue to read the statute as we did preBAPCPA. As I read the BAPCPA amendments, no such

“clear expression” emerges.

standing jurisprudence and commentary on the ride-through option, and

the interplay between § 521 and § 362, however, I decline to assign much

weight to the potential distinction between “if applicable” and “as applicable.” The phrase “as applicable” is not so rigid as to command that one

of the listed options must be followed. 

5The majority readily acknowledges the confusing nature of the amendments. Maj. op. at 13415 & n.11. 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13435
I pause to note that I do not disagree with the majority that

the general “direction and tenor of the changes . . . suggest

that Congress did not intend to increase access to ride-through

by passing BAPCPA.” Maj. op. at 13418. But the general “direction and tenor” of a statutory amendment is not the correct

inquiry. The correct inquiry is congressional intent with

respect to the specific issue. Furthermore, I readily agree that

“Congress did not intend to increase access to ride-through by

passing BAPCPA.” In my view, though, Congress decided to

do nothing—neither increasing nor decreasing access to ridethrough. Rather, Congress simply side-stepped the contentious ride-through issue, thus perpetuating the circuit split.

Second, specific to the Bankruptcy Code, the overarching

guiding principle of statutory interpretation, “again and again

emphasized by the courts,” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.

234, 244 (1934), strongly supports my view: “The principal

purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a fresh start to the

honest but unfortunate debtor,” Marrama v. Citizens Bank of

Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Here, Dumont filed for bankruptcy, stated her intent

to retain the car as a ride-through, and declined Ford’s request

to reaffirm the debt. Ford filed a claim with the bankruptcy

court but, so far as the record reveals, never objected to

Dumont’s statement of intent or her rejection of the offer of

reaffirmation. The bankruptcy case proceeded in the normal

course, and the bankruptcy court issued an order of discharge.

At all times—both during the bankruptcy proceedings and

after the discharge order—Dumont continued to make her

regularly scheduled loan payments to Ford. Months after the

discharge and without any notice to Dumont, Ford repossessed Dumont’s car. As can be imagined, Dumont claims

that the repossession of her only means of transportation,

without any notice whatsoever, caused her great difficulties.6

It is hard—if not impossible—to reconcile Ford’s actions with

6As courts have noted, a debtor’s personal automobile is often “vital”

to the debtor (and the estate) because, for example, the “automobile [is]

13436 DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT
the principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code: to give

Dumont a “fresh start.” In the absence of a clear congressional intent approving Ford’s actions, I would not read such an

intent into the statute.

In conclusion, I borrow text, equally applicable here, from

my colleagues in a recent bankruptcy appeal concerning a different perplexing provision: 

The “correct” answer to the question before us,

which the courts have been struggling with for years

—at the unnecessary cost of thousands of hours of

valuable judicial time—depends ultimately not upon

our interpretation of the statute, but upon what Congress wants the answer to be. We would hope, in this

regard, that we the judiciary would be relieved of

this Sisyphean adventure by legislation clearly

answering a straightforward policy question: [May

debtors invoke the “ride-through” option?]

Ransom v. MBNA, Am. Bank, N.A. (In re Ransom), No. 08-

15066, 2009 WL 2477609, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2009). In

contrast to the situation in In re Ransom, we have already

answered the question at hand. In re Parker, 370 F.3d at 371.

Because the BAPCPA amendments add only confusion, I

would not overrule In re Parker. 

used to commute to one’s workplace.” In re Price, 370 F.3d at 378 n.10.

Additionally, a debtor’s financial situation and access to financing for a

new vehicle during—or, as here, immediately following—bankruptcy is

generally limited, because she recently has filed for bankruptcy. Capital

Commc’ns Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43,

52 (2d Cir. 1997). 

DUMONT v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT 13437