IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-10521

OLIVER “BUCK” REVELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HART G.W. LIDOV, an individual; BOARD O F TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, a foreign corporation (Columbia

University); CO LUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM, an agency

and/or Department of Columbia University in the City of New York,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

December 31, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Oliver “Buck” Revell sued Hart G.W. Lidov and Columbia

University for defamation arising out of Lidov’s authorship of an

article that he posted on an internet bulletin board hosted by

Columbia. The district court dismissed Revell’s claims for lack of

personal jurisdiction over both Lidov and Columbia. We affirm.

I

Hart G.W. Lidov, an Assistant Professor of Pathology and

Neurology a t the Harvard Medical School and Children’s Hospital,

wrote a lengthy article on the subject of the terrorist bombing of2

Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.

The article alleges that a broad politically motivated conspiracy

among senior members of the Reagan Administration lay behind their

wilful failure to stop the bombing despite clear advance warnings.

Further, Lidov charged that the governm ent proceeded to cover up

its receipt of advance warning and repeatedly misled the public

about the facts. Specifically, the article singles out Oliver

“Buck” Revell, then Associate Deputy Di rector of the FBI, for

severe criticism, accusing him of complicity in the conspiracy and

cover-up. The article further charges that Revell, knowing about

the imminent terrorist attack, made certain his son, previously

booked on Pan Am 103, took a different flight. At the time he

wrote the article, Lidov had never been to Texas, except possibly

to change planes, or conducted business there, and was apparently

unaware that Revell then resided in Texas.

Lidov has also never been a student or faculty member of

Columbia University, but he posted his article on a website

maintained by its School of Journalism. In a bulletin board

section of the website, users could post their own works and read

the works of others. As a result, the article could be viewed by

members of the public over the internet.

Revell, a resident of Texas, sued the Board of Trustees of

Columbia University, whose principal offices are in New York City,

and Lidov, who is a Massachusetts resident, in the Northern

District of Texas. Revell claimed damage to his professional1 Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA De CV

, 92 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1996).

2 Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V.

, 213 F.3d 841, 8 54 (5th Cir.

2000).

3 Alpi n e View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB

, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir.

2000).

4 Stuart v. Spademan , 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).

3 reputation in Texas and emoti onal distress arising out of the

alleged defamation of the defendants, and sought several million

dollars in damages. Both defendants moved to dismiss for lack of

personal juri sdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(2). The district court granted the defendants’ motions, and

Revell now appeals.

II

A

Our question is w hether the district court could properly

exercise per sonal jurisdiction over Hart Lidov and Columbia

University, an issue of law we review de novo

. 1 The plaintiff

bears the burden of est ablishing jurisdiction, but need only

present pr ima facie evidence. 2 We must accept the plaintiff’s

“uncontroverted allegations, and re solve in [his] favor all

conflicts between the facts contain ed in the parties’ affidavits

and other documentation.” 3 In considering a motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction a district court may consider

“affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any

combination of the recognized methods of discovery.” 45 Latshaw v. Johnston , 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999).

6 Electrosource, Inc. v. Horizon Battery Techs.

, Ltd

., 176 F.3d 867, 871

(5th Cir. 1999).

7 Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC

, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Int’l

Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

8 Wilson v. Belin , 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994).

9 Mink , 190 F.3d at 336.

4 A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise

personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if (1) the long-arm

statute of the forum state creates personal jurisdiction over the

defendant; an d (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is

consistent with the due process guarantees of the Unite d States

Constitution. 5 Because Texas’s long-arm statute reaches to the

constitutional limits, 6 we ask, therefor e, if exercising personal

jurisdiction over Lidov and Columbia would offend due process.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a

court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign de fendant

when (1) “that defendant has purpos efully availed himself of the

benefits and protections of the for um state by establishing

‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of

juri s diction over that defendant does not offend ‘traditional

notions of fair play an d substantial justice.’” 7 Sufficient

minimum contacts will give rise t o either specific or general

juri sdiction. 8 “General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s

contacts with the forum state are unrelated to the cause of action

but are ‘continuous and systematic.’” 9 Specific jurisdiction10 Lewis v. Fresne , 252 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

11 The district court did not address Revell’s general jurisdiction

argument. It was made and we reach the issue. S ingleton v. Wulff

, 428 U.S. 106,

121 (1976).

12 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

13 Mink , 190 F.3d at 336.

14 Zippo , 952 F. Supp. at 1124.

5 arises when the defendant’s contacts with the forum “arise from, or

are directly related to, the cause of action.” 10

B

Answering the question of personal jurisdiction in this case

brings these settled and familiar formulations to a new mode of

communication across state lines. Revell first urges that the

district court may as sert general jurisdiction over Columbia

because its website pro vides internet users the opportunity to

subscribe to the Columbia Journalism Review , purchase advertising

on the web site or in the journal, and submit electronic

applications for admission. 11

This ci rcuit has drawn upon the approach of Z ippo

Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 12 in d etermining whether

the operation of an internet site can support the minimum contacts

necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 13 Zippo used

a “sliding scale” to measure an internet site’s connections to a

forum state. 14 A “passive” website, one that merely allows the

owner to post information on the internet, is at one end of the15 Id.

16 Id

.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp.

, 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir.

1999); see also Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc ., 223 F.3d 1082,

1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[E]ngaging in commerce with residents of the forum state

is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence

within the state’s borders.”).

6 scale. 15 It will not be sufficient to establish personal

jurisdiction. 16 At the other end are sites whose owners engage in

repeated online con tacts with forum residents over the internet,

and in these cases personal jurisdiction m ay be proper. 1 7 In

between are those sites with some interactive elements, through

which a site allows for bilateral i nformation exchange with its

visitors. Here, we find more familiar terrain, requiring that we

examine the extent of the interactivity and nature of the forum

contacts. 18

While we deployed this sliding scale in Mink v. AAAA

Development LLC

, it is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction

inquiry, because even repeated contacts with forum residents by a

foreign defendant may not constit ute the requisite substantial,

continuous and systematic contacts required for a finding of

general jurisdiction—in other words, while it may be doing business

with Texas, it is not doing business in Texas. 19

Irrespective of the sliding scale , the question of general

jurisdiction is not difficult here. Though the maintenance of a20 See Wilson v. Belin

, 20 F.3d 644, 650-51 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding no

personal jurisdiction over individual defamation defendants where the defendants

did not conduct regular business in Texas and did not make a substantial part of

their business decisions in Texas).

21 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952).

22 Id. at 447-48.

23 Id.

24 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002).

7 website is, in a sense, a continuous presence everywhere in the

world, the cited contacts of Columbia with Texas are not in any way

“substantial.” 20

Columbia’s co ntacts with Texas are in stark contrast to the

facts of the Supreme Court’s seminal case on general jurisdiction,

Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co

. 21 In P e rkins , a

Philippine corporatio n temporarily relocated to Ohio. 2 2 The

corporation’s president reside d in Ohio, the records of the

corporation were kept in Ohio, director’s me etings were held in

Ohio, accounts were held in Ohio banks, and all key business

decisions were made there. 23 Columbia’s internet presence in Texas

quite obviously falls far short of this standard.

Our conclusion also comports with the recent decision in Bird

v. Parsons

, 24 where the Sixth Circuit found Ohio courts lacked

general jurisdiction over a non-resident business that registered

domain names despite the fact that: (1) the defendant maintained a

website open for commerce with Ohio residents and (2) over 4000

Ohio residents had in fact registered domain names with the25 Id. at 873-74.

26 More precisely, there were 17 subscriptions by Texas residents in 2000

and 18 for the first two issues in 2001. R. at 305.

27 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.

, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (W.D. Pa.

1997) (noting that the plaintiff conceded that only specific jurisdiction was at

issue in the case).

28 See Indianapo l is Colts v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship

, 34

F.3d 410, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1994).

8 defendant. 25 By contrast, Columbia, since it began keeping records,

never received more than twenty internet subscriptions to the

Columbia Journalism Review from Texas residents. 26

C

Turning to the issue of specific jurisdiction, the question is

whether Revell has made out his prima facie case with respect to

the defendants’ contacts with Texas. Zippo ’ s scale does more work

with specific jurisdiction—the context in which it was originally

conceived. 27

Revell urges that, given the uniqueness of defamation claims

and their inherent ability to inflict injury in far-flung

juris dictions, we should abandon the imagery of Z ippo

. It is a

bold but ultimately unpersuasive argument. Defamation has its

unique features, but shares relevant characteristics with various

business to rts. 2 8 Nor is the Z ippo scale, as has been suggested,29 465 U.S. 783 (1984).

30 We need not decide today w hether or not a “ Z ippo -passive” site could

still give rise to personal jurisdiction under Calder

, and reserve this difficult

question for another time.

31 Lewis v. Fresne , 252 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2001).

32 Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC , 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999).

33 Id. at 337.

9 in tension with the “effects” test of Calder v. Jone s 29 for

intentional torts, 30 which we address in Part II.D.

For specific jurisdiction we look only to the contact out of

which the cause of action arises 31 —in this case the maintenance of

the internet bulletin board. Since this defamation action does not

arise out of the solicitation of subscriptions or applications by

Columbia, those portions of the website need not be considered.

The district court concluded that the bulletin board was

“Zippo -passive” and therefore could not create specific

jurisdiction. The defendants insist that Columbia’s bulletin board

is indistinguishable from the website in Mink

. In that case, we

found the website would not support a finding of minimum contacts

because it only solicited customers, provided a toll-free number to

call, and an e-mail address. 32 It did not allow visitors to place

orders online. 33 But in this case, any user of the internet can

post material to the bulletin board. This means that individuals

send information to be posted, and receive information that others

have posted. In Mink and Z ippo

, a visitor was limited to34 See, e.g.

, Barrett v. Catacombs Press

, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 728 (E.D. Pa.

1999) (finding interactive internet newsgroups where defendant posted messages

in common cyberspace accessible to all but ult imately holding personal

jurisdiction could not be obtained).

35 Calder , 465 U.S. at 784-85.

36 Id. at 789.

37 Id. at 788-89 (emphasis added).

10 expressing an interest in a commercial product. Here the visitor

may participate in an open forum hosted by the website. 3 4

Columbia’s bulletin board is thus interactive, and we must evaluate

the extent of this interactivity as well as Revell’s arguments with

respect to Calder

.

D

1

In Calder , an editor and a writer for the National Enquirer

,

both reside nts of Florida, were sued in California for libel

arising out of an article published in the Enquirer about Shirley

Jones, an actress. 35 The Supreme Court upheld the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over the two de fendants because they had

“expressly aimed” their conduct towards California. 36

The allegedly libelous story concerned the California

activities of a Californ ia resident. It impugned the

professionalism of an entertainer whose television career

was centered in California. The article was drawn from

California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms

both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to

her professional reputation, was suffered in California.

In sum, California is the focal point both of the story

and of the harm suffered. 3738 Id. at 789-90 (“And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be

felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the

National Enquirer has its largest circulation.”).

39 Panda Brandyw ine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co. , 253 F.3d 865, 869

(5th Cir. 2001).

11 The Court also relied upon the f act that the E nquirer had its

largest circulation–over 600,000 copies–in California, indicating

tha t the defendants knew the harm of their allegedly tortious

activity would be felt there. 38

2

Revell urges that, measured by the “effects” test of Calder

,

he has presented his prima facie case for the defendants’ minimum

contacts with Texas. At the outset we emphasize that the

“effects” test is but one facet of the ordinary minimum contacts

analysis, to be consider ed as part of the full range of the

defendant’s contacts with the forum. 39

We find several distinctions between this case and

Calder— insurmountable hurdles to the exercise of personal

jurisdiction by Texas courts. First, the article written by Lidov

about Revell contains no reference to Texas, nor does it refer to

the Texas activitie s of Revell, and it was not directed at Texas

readers as distinguished from readers in other states. Texas was

not the focal point of the article or the harm suffered, unlike

Calder

, in which the article contained descriptions of the

California activities of the plaintiff, drew upon California40 Calder

, 465 U.S. at 788; see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.

, 465

U .S. 770, 777 (1984) (noting that the harm of a libelous publicat ion is felt

where it is distributed).

41 See Panda Brandywine

, 253 F.3d at 870 (“If we were to accept Appellants’

arguments, a nonresident defendant would be subject to jurisdiction in Texas for

an intentional tort simply because the plaintiff’s complaint alleged injury in

Texas to Texas residents regardless of the defendant’s contacts ....”); Southmark

Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc. , 851 F.2d 763, 772-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting

application of Calder and descri bing the plaintiff’s decision to maintain its

principal place of business in the forum state as “a mere fortuity” that could

not support personal jurisdiction). B ut see Jan m ark, Inc. v. Reidy

, 132 F.3d

1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding personal jurisdiction over a California

business proper under Calder on the basis that the defendant’s alleged

threatening of one of the plaintiff’s customers in New Jersey injured the

plaintiff, an Illinois business, in Illinois); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG

, 155 F.3d 254, 263-65 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing circuit split between Janmark

and views of t he First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits and

adopting the majority view). We do not suggest that the analysis for defamation

claims under Calder should differ from that utilized in our other cases , but

merely provide further explication because this case is factually more similar

to Calder

.

42 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).

43 238 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001).

44

– F.3d –, No. 01-2340, 2002 WL 31780988, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2002).

12 sources, and found its largest audience in California. 4 0 This

conclusion fits well with our decisions in other intentional tort

cases where the plaint iff relied upon C alder. I n those cases we

stated that the plaintiff’s residence in the forum, and suffering

of harm there, will not alone support jurisdiction under Calder

. 41

We also find instructive the defamation decisio ns of the Sixth,

Third, and Fourth Circuits in Reynolds v. International Amateur

Athletic Federation

, 42 Remick v. Manfredy

, 43 and Young v. New Haven

Advocate

, 44 respectively.

In Reynolds a London-based association published a press

release regarding the plaintiff’s disqualification from45 23 F.3d at 1112.

46 Id. at 1119-20.

47 Id. at 1120. The court also cited two distinctions arguably not present

in this case: that the plaintiff’s professional reputation was not centered in

Ohio, and that the defendant did not itself publish or circulate the report in

Ohio. Id. However, the defendant in Reynolds clearly knew that the plaintiff

was an Ohio resident, unlike Lidov. See Part II.D.3.

48 The Tenth Circuit has suggested that this is not a requirement of

Calder

. In B urt v. Board of Regents of University of Nebras ka , 757 F.2d 242

(10th Cir. 1985), vacated as moot

, Connolly v. Burt , 475 U.S. 1063 (1986), the

court upheld the application of Calder to support personal jurisdiction in

Colorado wh ere a University of Nebraska doctor had written unflattering and

allegedly defamatory letters about the plaintiff in respo nse to requests from

Colorado hospitals, despite the fact that the content of the letters focused on

the plaintiff’s activities in Nebraska, not Colorado. Id . at 244-45. We find

more persuasive the view of Judge Seth, who remarked, in dissent, that this

represented “but half a Calder ,” which requires both the harm to be felt in the

forum and that the forum be the focal point of the publication. Id. at 245-47

(Seth, J., dissenting).

13 international track competition for two years following his failure

of a drug test. 45 The plaintiff, an Ohio resident, claimed that the

alleged defamation had cost him endorsement contracts in Ohio and

cited Calder in support of his argument that personal jurisdiction

over the defendant in Ohio was proper. 46 The court found

Calder inapposite because, inter alia

, the a llegedly defamatory

press release dealt with the plaintiff’s activities in Monaco, not

Ohio; the source of the report was a urine sample taken in Monaco

and analyzed in Paris; and the “focal point” of the release was not

Ohio. 47 We agree with the R eynolds court that t he sources relied

upon and activities described in an a llegedly defamatory

publication should in some way connect with the forum if Calder is

to be invoked. 48 Lidov’s article, insofar as it relates to Revell,

deals exclusively with his actions as Associate Deputy Director of49 Remick , 238 F.3d at 257-58.

50 Id.

51 Id. at 257.

52 Id. at 259.

14 the FBI—just as the offending press release in Reynolds dealt only

with a failed drug test in Monaco. It signifies that there is no

reference to Texas in the article or any reliance on Texas sources.

These facts weigh heavily against finding the requisite minimum

contacts in this case.

In Remick the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania lawyer, sued several

individuals for defamation arising out of two letters sent to the

plaintiff in Pennsylvania containing oblique charges of

incompetence and accusations that the plaintiff was eng aged in

extortion of the defendants. 49 The letters concerned the

termination of the plaintiff’s representation of o ne of the

defendants, a professional boxer. 50 One of the two letters was read

by individuals other than the plaintiff whe n it was faxed to the

plaintiff’s Philadelphia office. 51 The court held, however, that

since there was nothing in the letter to indic ate that it was

targeted at Pennsylvania residents other than the plaintiff,

personal jurisdiction could not be obtai n ed under Calder

. 52

Furthermore, the court noted that allegations that the charges in

the letter had been distributed throughout the “boxing community”53 Id. ; see also ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc.

, 126 F.3d 617, 625

(4th Cir. 1997) (finding Calder inapplicable where allegedly tortious business

activity was focused “more generally on customers located throughout the United

States and Canada without focusing on and targeting South Carolina”); Pavlovich

v. Superior Court

, 29 Cal. 4th 26 2, 265-66 (2002) (rejecting the personal

jurisdiction of California courts in a t rade secret infringement case over a

Texan who posted the offending computer code on a website).

54

– F.3d –, No. 01-2340, 2002 WL 31780988, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2002).

55 Id.

56 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).

15 were insufficient, because there was no assertion that Pennsylvania

had a “unique relationship with t he boxing industry, as

d istinguished from the relationship in Calder between Californ i a

and the motion picture industry, with which th e C alder plaintiff

was associated.” 53

Similarly, in Young v. New Haven Advocate

, 54 two newspapers in

Connecticut posted on the internet articles about the housing of

Connecticut prisoners in Virginia that allegedly defamed a Virginia

prison warden. The Fourth Circuit held that Virginia could not

exercise personal jurisdiction over the Connecticut defendants

because “they did not manifest an intent to aim their websites or

the posted articles at a Virginia audience.” 55 Following its

decision in ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants

, 56 it

reasoned that “application of Calder in the Internet context

requires proof that the out-of-state defendant’s Internet activity57 Young , 2002 WL 31780988, at *5 (citing ALS , 293 F.3d at 714).

58 Id

.

59 Calder v. Jones , 465 U.S. 783, 785 n.2 (1984).

16 is expressly directed at or directed to the forum s tate.” 5 7 It

observed that more than simply making the news article accessible

to Virginians by defendants’ posting of the article on their

internet sites was needed for assertion of jurisdiction: “The

newspapers must, through the Internet postings, manifest an intent

to target and focus on Virginia readers.” 58

As with Remick and Young

, the post to the bulletin board here

w as presumably directed at the entire world, or perhaps just

concerned U.S. citizens. But certainly it was not directed

specifically at Texas, which has no especial relationship to the

Pan Am 103 incident. Furthermore, here there is nothing to compare

to the targeting of California readers represented by approximately

600,000 copies of the Enquirer the Calder defendants knew would be

distributed in California, the Enquirer ’s largest market. 59

3

As these cases ap tly demonstrate, one cannot purposefully

avail oneself of “some forum somepla ce”; rather, as the Supreme60 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).

61 Further evidence that the Calder defendants knew that the harm of their

conduct would be felt in California came from their knowledge that the

Enquirer

enjoyed its largest circulation there. Id. at 789.

62 Calder

, 465 U.S. at 790 (“An individual injured in California need not

g o to Florida to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florid a

, knowingly cause the injury in California .” (emphasis added)).

63 S ee, e.g.

, Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc

., 223 F.3d

1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Calder requires that “the defendant is

alleged t o have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the

defendant knows to b e a resident of the forum state ” (emphasis added)); IMO

Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG , 155 F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he plaintiff

must show that the defendant knew that the plaintiff would suffer the brunt of

the harm cause d by the tortious conduct i n the forum

, and point to specific

activity indicating that the defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at

the forum .” (emphasis added)).

17 Court has stated, due proce ss requires that “the defendant’s

conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” 6 0 Lidov’s

affidavit, uncontroverted by the record, states that h e did not

even know that Revell was a resident of Texas when he posted his

article. Knowledge of the particular forum in which a potential

plaintiff will bear the brunt of the harm forms an essential part

of the Calder test. 61 The defendant must be chargeable with

knowledge of the forum at which his conduct is directed in order to

reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum, as

Calder itself 62 and numerous cases from other cir cuits applying

Calder confirm. 63 Demanding knowledge of a particular forum to

which conduct is directed, in defamation cases, is not altogether18

distinct from the requirement that the forum be the focal point of

the tortious activity because satisfaction of the latter will

ofttimes provide sufficient evi dence of the former.

Lidov must have known that the harm of the article would hit

home wherever Revell resided. But that is the case with virtually

any defamation. A more direct aim is required than we have here.

In short, this was not about Texas. If the article had a

geographic focus it was Washington, D.C.

III

Our ultimate inquiry is rooted in the limits imposed on states

by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is

fairness judged by the reasonableness of Texas exercising its power

over residents of Massachusetts and New York. This inquiry into

fairness captur es the reasonableness of hauling a defendant from

his home state before the court of a sister state; in the main a

pragmatic account of reasonable expectations

– if you are going to

pick a fight in Texas, it is reasonable to expect that it be

settled there. It is not fairness calibrated by the likelihood of

success on the merits or relative fault. Rather, we look to the

geographic focus of the article, not the bite of the defamation,

the blackness of the calumny, or who provoked the fight.

Revell also ma kes various evidentiary objections to the

affidavits introduced by the defendants to support their motions to64 Coury v. Prot , 85 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1996).

65 Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB

, 205 F.3d 208, 221 (5th Cir.

2000) (affirming denial of discovery that “could not have added any significant

facts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

19 dismiss. We conclude that all of these lack merit, and the

district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting them. 64

Alternatively, Revell asks that we remand for further discovery,

but given the uncontroverted facts of the operation of Columbia’s

website, and lack of purposeful availment, we must decline to do

so. 65

IV

In sum, Revell has faile d to make out a p rima facie case of

personal jurisdiction over either defendant. General jurisdiction

cannot be obtained over Columbia. Considering both the “effects”

test of Calder and the low-level of interactivity of the internet

bulletin board, we find the contacts w ith Texas insufficient to

establish the juri sdiction of its courts, and hence the federal

district court in Texas, ov er Columbia and Lidov. We AFFIRM the

dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction as to both defendants.

AFFIRMED.