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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38799

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PATRICK ANTHONY MORRISSEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 316

Filed: January 9, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and sentence, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LANSING, Judge

 After a jury trial, Morrissey was found guilty of conspiracy to commit arson, Idaho 

Code §§ 18-802(4), 18-1701, and arson in the first degree, I.C. § 18-802(4). The jury also found 

that Morrissey was a persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514. As to each offense, the district court 

imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years determinate. These sentences ran 

concurrently with each other but consecutively with sentences in other cases. On appeal, 

Morrissey argues that the district court erred by failing to order a mental health evaluation and by 

imposing an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of conviction. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Because Morrissey asserts sentencing errors and not trial errors, our recitation of the facts 

focuses on post-trial issues. Immediately after the jury returned its verdict and was dismissed, 

the court issued an order that a presentence investigation report be prepared. At that time, the 
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court asked Morrissey’s counsel if he would like to request any additional evaluations. Counsel 

indicated that he was not requesting any additional evaluations. 

At the sentencing hearing, neither party disputed the contents of the presentence 

investigation report (PSI). The report generally showed that Morrissey had significant indicators 

of mental illness. Morrissey reported a troubled childhood: he suffered oxygen deprivation at 

birth, a parent physically abused him, and he behaved poorly in school. He and others indicated 

he had been diagnosed with numerous conditions: a seizure disorder, attention-deficit 

hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, oppositional-defiant 

disorder, an unspecified mood disorder, conduct disorder, damage to the limbic region of his 

brain, and substance dependence. For these conditions, he had been treated with numerous 

psychotropic medications and had self-medicated by abusing alcohol, marijuana, LSD, cocaine, 

opium, psilocybin mushrooms, methamphetamine, and prescription opiates. 

In addition to Morrissey’s reports, the PSI contained a psychiatric discharge summary 

that was prepared approximately four years before the sentencing hearing. In that document, 

Morrissey was diagnosed with conduct disorder and an unspecified mood disorder. The 

discharge summary indicated that Morrissey was not well-suited for care in the community and 

would best be served by treatment in a penal institution because “he cannot voluntarily cooperate 

with care.” An earlier report, also in the PSI, diagnosed Morrissey with disruptive behavior 

disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, mixed seizure disorder, and a mixed 

developmental disorder. 

At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Morrissey should be imprisoned on 

several grounds. These included Morrissey’s relatively long criminal record including three 

prior adult felonies by the age of twenty-two. He had been given opportunities for treatment in 

the community and on a rider, but neither had proven effective at reducing Morrissey’s criminal 

conduct. 

During the sentencing hearing, the court discussed the reasoning that undergirded its 

sentencing decision. First, it made clear that it had “very carefully read this presentence 

investigation.” Then, it discussed the distinction between the view of Morrissey held by his 

friends and family and his course of criminal conduct:

I have gone back and I’ve looked at the history of these other cases and I’m not 

sure what it is that causes your conduct, but it’s clear that it’s been there for years. 

There is an element of kind of a Jekyll and Hyde element going on in your life. If 
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I listen to the people that know you like your mother, the mother of your child and 

your friends and so forth, they think that Patrick Morrissey is just a fine, young 

man and has had a tough life and deserves a break and so forth and so forth. If I 

look at the history of this case in terms of your conduct with the legal system, 

you’re the Hyde because you’ve had nothing but problems in schooling, problems 

in the juvenile system.

Thereafter, the court explained that it gave significant credence to Morrissey’s mental 

health evaluations:

I’ve looked at this case from the standpoint of is there something in 

Patrick Morrissey’s life that would be causing him to do these things? In other 

words, are there mental problems? I’m aware that you have a history in that area. 

I’ve looked very carefully at the evaluations of Dr. Heidenreich that was done a 

couple of years ago and the Canyon View reports and so forth. Frankly, I was 

astounded to see in Dr. Heidenreich’s report the statement that the prosecutor 

quoted, that if you have further problems in life you need to go to a penal 

institution. I don’t know that I’ve ever seen that out of a psychiatrist. It tells me 

something about your character that I think really does influence my decision 

today.

Finally, the court summarized the difficult nature of its decision, “I don’t understand, at 

this juncture, what is driving Patrick Morrissey.” On the one hand, the court considered the 

possibility that Morrissey was merely “a young man who has just not felt the impact, if you will, 

of punishment and thinks that you can get away with anything.” Alternatively, the court 

considered the potential impact of the mental health reports. Those indicated that Morrissey had 

an antisocial personality disorder and would be likely to ignore “anything anybody says, 

including the parole board [and] this court.” If that were true, the court said, it was inclined to 

impose a longer sentence to protect society. After explaining its sentencing rationale, the court 

imposed unified sentences of fifteen years, with five years determinate.

On appeal, Morrissey argues that the district court erred by failing to order a mental 

health evaluation for purposes of sentencing and that his sentence is excessive.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Order Mental Health Evaluation

Morrissey bases his first claim of error upon Idaho Code § 19-2522(1), which provides 

that “if there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor 
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at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or 

licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant.” 

Morrissey’s claim of a violation of this statute has been waived because it was invited. 

He not only did not request a mental health evaluation, his counsel specifically declined when 

asked if any additional evaluations were desired. We have previously held that when the 

sentencing court asks counsel if an evaluation is needed and counsel indicates it is not, any error 

in failing to provide that evaluation is invited error. State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106, 114 n.4, 266 

P.3d 1211, 1219 n.4 (Ct. App. 2011). “Invited errors are not reversible.” Thomson v. Olsen, 147 

Idaho 99, 106, 205 P.3d 1235, 1242 (2009) (quoting State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 

P.2d 456, 460 (1985)). That is true even if the claimed error would otherwise constitute 

fundamental error. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011). 

Therefore, we will not further address the issue.

B. Sentence

Morrissey also claims that the trial court erred by imposing an excessively harsh 

sentence. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and 

the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established 

and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 

1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

III.

CONCLUSION

Morrissey’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte order a mental health 

evaluation fails; to the extent any error occurred, it was invited error. He also failed to show that 

the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessively harsh sentence. Therefore, the 

judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed. 

Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.