18-105 United States v. LaPorte

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT



### SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AN D THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILE D WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN EL ECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SU MMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seco nd Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthou se, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 15 th day of October, two thousand nineteen.

PRESENT: P IERRE N. L EVAL , S USAN L. C ARNEY , Circuit Judges
, T IMOTHY C. S TANCEU , Judge

. *

_____________ _______________ _____________
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Appellee
,
v. No. 18-105

S TACEY J. L A P ORTE , J R .,

Defendant - Appellant
,
M ACKENZIE J. B AILEY , Defendant

. †

* Chief Judge Timothy C. Stanceu, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

† The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as above.2 _____________ _______________ _____________ FOR APPELLANT: James P. Egan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY.

FOR APPELLEE: Lisa M. Fletcher & Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Grant C. Jaquith, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for th e Northern District of New York (Hurd, J. ).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREO F, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on January 10, 2018, is
AFFIRMED

. Stacey LaPorte appeals from a judgment of the District Court entered after a jury convicted him of two counts of conspiracy to sexually exploit a chil d in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), three counts of sexual exploita tion of a child (or children) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and one count of receiving ch ild pornography in viol ation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). The District Court sentence d him primarily to 95 years’ imprisonment.

The evidence at trial included a statement and Miranda waiver signed by LaPorte on May 17, 2016 (the “Statement” and “Waiver”). In the statement, LaPorte admitted to conduct involving abuse of a minor that was not part of the federal charges against him. Before trial, LaPorte moved unsuccessfully to suppress the Statement and for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he involuntarily gave the Statement and Waiver. On appeal, LaPorte argues that the District Court abused its discretion by not ho lding an evidentiary hearing on the motion. We assume the parties’ familiarity wi th the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, to wh ich we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to
affirm.3 We review a district court’s denial of a de fendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing on motions to suppress for abuse of discretion. United States v. Finley , 245 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2001). The cour t must hold an evidentiary hearing, we have ruled, if “the moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact goin g to the [issue] are in question.” United States v. Pena , 961 F.2d 333, 339 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omi tted). To compel a hearing, the movant’s allegations must be “neither vague, nor obscure, nor unspecific.” United States v. Mathurin
, 148 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1998).
Before a criminal defendant’s statemen t may be admitted into evidence, the government must establish the voluntariness of the statement and of any waiver of rights. As we have said elsewhere, “[t]he prosecuti on has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a suspect waived his Miranda rights, and that his confession is truly the product of free choice.” United States v. Anderson , 929 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1991). To be effective, a waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights must be both knowing and voluntary. United States v. Plugh , 648 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011).
In the Second Circuit, an analysis of a statement’s vo luntariness “requires an inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the law enforcement officials’ conduct to ascertain
whether it overcame the accused’s will to resi st and brought about a confession that was not freely self-determined.” Campaneria v. Reid , 891 F.2d 1014 , 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1989). The district court should consider the totality of the circumstances, assessing such factors as “the accused’s age, his lack of education or low intelligence, th e failure to give Miranda warnings, the length of detention, the nature of the interrogation, and any use of physical punishment.” Campaneria , 891 F.2d at 1020; see also Mathurin , 148 F.3d at 69 (An assertion of involuntariness “could be based on any of a nu mber of factual premises such as coercion,
lack of Miranda warnings, or lack of competence.”).

LaPorte cites three circumstances described in his affidavit in support of the motion to suppress, which he argues demonstrate that the Statement and Waiver were not “freely self-determined,” in the Campaneria formulation. First, LaPorte alleged that “[b]efore I was picked up by the police, I had been drinki ng alcohol and smoking marijuana.” App’x 44.4 This allegation goes to LaPorte’s competence to give a voluntary statement. Second, LaPorte alleged that the investigator made threats, including that when LaPorte “asked what would happen if I asked for a lawyer[, the investigator ] said he would make sure he brought a ‘shit ton’ more charges against me.” Id. These allegations go to the nature of the interrogation. Third, LaPorte alleged that “[b]efore I was ev er read my Miranda warnings the investigator started questioning me. . . . He talked to me for at least tw enty minutes before he ever read me my rights.” Id. LaPorte continued, “After I spoke to th e investigator for a little while, he read me my Miranda warnings and then handcuffed me to a chair.” Id. These allegations go to a potential failure by the investigator to give timely Miranda warnings. The District Court reviewed these allegati ons and carefully discussed them before issuing the order denying the motion to suppress. We agree with the District Court that the allegations of intoxication were sufficiently va gue so as not to merit a hearing. LaPorte did not allege in his affidavit that he was incapaci tated when he gave the st atement, only that he had been drinking and smoking marijuana at so me point earlier. That is insufficient to require a hearing. The mere fa ct of having had alcohol and marijuana is insufficient to require a hearing where LaPorte did not allege that he was impaired.
Although the District Court did not discuss the alleged threats in any detail, we also
conclude that the District Court did not abuse it s discretion in deciding that these allegations did not require a hearing. LaPorte did not al lege that he was forced to “choose between having an attorney present during questioning . . . or cooperating with the government,”
Anderson , 929 F.2d at 100 (internal citati on omitted), as he argues on appeal.
Finally, we agree with the Di strict Court that LaPorte failed to assert that he gave any incriminating statements before being read Mirandawarnings. Nor did he assert that the prewarning questions were improper questions about potentially incriminating matters, as opposed to name, address, and general pedigree information.
In circumstances such as these, holding a hearing is preferable to avoid doubt in resolving any lingering credibility issues. Nevert heless, we cannot say that, on these facts, the
District Court abused its discretion by not conducting a hearing here.5 * * *
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entere d on January 10, 2018, is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court