11-3756 (L)

United States v. Cuti

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 August Term 2012

4 (Argued: October 25, 2012 Decided: June 26, 2013)

5 Docket Nos. 11-3756, 11-3831

6 ----------------------------------------x

7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

8 Appellee,

9 -- v. --

10 ANTHONY CUTI, WILLIAM TENNANT,

11 Defendants-Appellants.

12 -----------------------------------------x

13 B e f o r e : JACOBS, Chief Judge, WALKER, Circuit Judge, and 

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (retired).

*

14

15

16 Defendants-Appellants Anthony Cuti and William Tennant, former 

17 executives of the retail drugstore chain Duane Reade, appeal their

18 convictions for securities fraud in the District Court for the 

19 Southern District of New York (Batts, J.). Cuti and Tennant 

20 arranged fraudulent transactions to inflate Duane Reade’s reported 

21 earnings in SEC filings. Among the issues raised on appeal by Cuti 

22 is the admission of non-expert witness testimony as to what the 

23 accounting treatment of the transactions would have been absent the 

24 fraud. Tennant asserts primarily that the jury lacked sufficient 

25 evidence to convict him and that the district court had no basis to 

 

* The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (retired) 

of the United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation.
2

1 give a conscious avoidance instruction. We conclude that the 

2 district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the lay

3 witness testimony and that Tennant’s claims are without merit. 

4 Affirmed.

5 BRIAN C. BROOK, Clinton Brook & Peed

6 (Matthew J. Peed, Clinton Brook & 

7 Peed, and Brian D. Waller, Simon & 

8 Partners, LLP, on the brief), New 

9 York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant 

10 Anthony Cuti.

11

12 JOHN J. KENNEY (Laura B. Hoguet, 

13 Tai-Heng Cheng, Caitlin N. Bush, 

14 Damian R. Cavaleri, on the brief), 

15 Hoguet Newman Regal & Kenney, LLP, 

16 New York, NY, for Defendant17 Appellant William Tennant.

18

19 SARAH E. MCCALLUM (Rebecca Monck 

20 Ricigliano, Katherine Polk Failla, 

21 on the brief), Assistant United 

22 States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, 

23 United States Attorney for the 

24 Southern District of New York, New 

25 York, NY, for Appellee.

26

27 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:

28 Defendants-Appellants Anthony Cuti and William Tennant appeal 

29 from judgments of conviction following a jury trial in the District 

30 Court for the Southern District of New York (Deborah A. Batts, 

Judge).131 This opinion addresses Cuti’s claim that the district 

 

1 Cuti was convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 

One) and substantive offenses of securities fraud in violation of 

15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) & 78ff, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 

(Count 2), making false statements in two SEC filings in violation 

of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a) & 78ff, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2 (Counts 3 and 4), and making false statements in another SEC 

filing in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(d) & 78ff, 17 C.F.R.
3

1 court erred in admitting testimony from two lay witnesses as to 

2 what the accounting treatment of certain fraudulent transactions 

3 would have been absent the fraud, and Tennant’s claims that his 

4 conviction should be overturned for insufficient evidence to prove 

5 his knowledge of the fraud and that it was error for the district 

6 court to give a conscious avoidance jury instruction. We conclude

7 that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

8 the testimony of the non-expert witnesses and that Tennant’s claims

are without merit.

2

9 AFFIRMED.

10 BACKGROUND

11 Cuti was the former president, chief executive officer, and 

12 board chairman of Duane Reade, a retail drugstore chain in the New 

13 York City metropolitan area. Tennant was Duane Reade’s former 

14 chief financial officer or CFO and senior vice-president, who 

15 continued to consult for the company on real estate matters after 

16 his formal retirement.

17 The trial evidence, which we take as credited by the jury, 

18 showed that from 2000 to 2004, Cuti and Tennant (collectively, 

19 “defendants”) executed a number of schemes to inflate the company’s 

 

§§ 240.15d-1 & d-13 (Count 5). Tennant was acquitted on Count 1

and convicted on Count 2. The district court sentenced Cuti and 

Tennant principally to imprisonment for three years and time 

served, respectively, and imposed fines of $5 million on Cuti and 

$10,000 on Tennant.

2 The appellants’ other arguments on appeal are addressed in a 

summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion.
4

1 earnings in quarterly and annual financial statements filed with 

2 the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).

3 The principal scheme consisted of the fraudulent sale of real 

4 estate concessions and other rights that Duane Reade held in its 

5 storefront leases. When Duane Reade vacated a storefront with an 

6 unexpired lease, the right to the remainder of the lease term could 

7 have residual value and be sold back to the landlord or to a 

8 broker, especially when rental rates had risen. Cuti and Tennant, 

9 however, inflated earnings by fraudulently selling real estate 

10 concessions that were virtually worthless and surreptitiously 

11 repaying the purchasers through payments disguised as expenses.

12 Cuti and Tennant’s primary counterparty to the transactions in 

13 this scheme was the Winick Realty Group (“Winick Realty”), a

14 commercial real estate brokerage firm and its subsidiaries 

15 (collectively, the “WRG entities”). At trial, Cory Zelnik, a 

16 partner at Winick Realty, testified that in 2000, the WRG entities 

17 paid $806,000 for concessions in eight leases that Duane Reade had 

18 already sold, assigned away or planned to abandon and another 

19 $890,000 for options to buy out Duane Reade from three leases that 

20 were of minimal value to Winick Realty. The defendants repaid the 

21 WRG entities for these outlays using a sham consulting agreement 

22 and padded brokerage fees. The revenue immediately recognized from 

23 these transactions helped Duane Reade bridge a gap between its true 

24 earnings and analysts’ expectations for the fourth quarter of 2000. 
5

1 In subsequent quarters, the defendants continued to arrange other 

2 sham transactions to inflate company earnings and to repay the 

3 counterparties.

4 Because Duane Reade recognized such significant income from 

5 these activities, its external auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers 

6 (“PwC”), required the company to include in its financial 

7 statements filed with the SEC, a note stating that the company had 

8 no side agreements with or other obligations to the transaction 

9 counterparties. At trial, the government produced evidence of side 

10 agreements and demonstrated, through witness testimony and 

11 voluminous documentation, how the defendants executed and concealed 

12 their fraudulent conduct from the company’s internal accountants, 

13 PwC, the SEC, and the investing public. 

14 As part of its case, the government called Kevin Hallinan, the 

15 PwC partner who was Duane Reade’s lead outside auditor, and John 

16 Henry, Tennant’s successor as CFO and the company’s chief in-house 

17 accountant, to testify as to how they had accounted for the 

18 proceeds from the fraudulent transactions; how they would have 

19 accounted for the transactions had they been aware of the full 

20 facts; and how the material information that was withheld from them 

21 led to misstatements in the company’s financial statements.

22 The rules governing the accounting of real estate concession 

23 transactions, as Hallinan and Henry explained, are set forth under 

24 generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) including 
6

1 Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 13 and SEC Staff 

2 Accounting Bulletin No. 104. In order for revenue generated from 

3 such a transaction to be recognized immediately, (1) Duane Reade 

4 had to have negotiated with the counterparty at arms’ length, (2) 

5 the transaction must have had value, (3) to the extent the 

6 transaction relieved Duane Reade of its obligations under a lease 

7 agreement, the company could not be committed to enter into another 

8 lease with the same landlord, and (4) the transaction could not 

9 create any further obligations for Duane Reade to perform. If any 

10 of the foregoing criteria were not satisfied, immediate revenue 

11 recognition would have been inappropriate. Both the company’s 

12 internal accountants and outside auditors adhered to these rules in 

13 booking revenue from real estate concession transactions. At 

14 trial, the defendants did not dispute that these rules were

15 appropriately and consistently applied.

16 To demonstrate the impact of the defendants’ deception on the 

17 preparation and review of the company’s financial statements, the 

18 government presented Hallinan and Henry with information that Cuti 

19 and Tennant had withheld, such as side letters to the transactions, 

20 and asked how the withheld information would have affected their 

21 accounting. In each instance, Hallinan and Henry replied that if 

22 they had been aware of the withheld information, they would not 

23 have recognized the full amount of the transaction proceeds as 

24 immediate revenue. Defense counsel objected to the use of “what-
7

1 if-you-had-known” questions as eliciting inadmissible expert 

2 opinion testimony from fact witnesses.

3 In his defense, Tennant asserted that, like Hallinan and 

4 Henry, he too was deceived by Cuti’s fraudulent scheme and signed 

5 transaction documents without knowing that fraud was afoot so there

6 was insufficient evidence of his criminal intent to support a

7 conviction. He also objected to the district court’s inclusion of 

8 a conscious avoidance instruction in the jury charge, which he 

9 claimed was unwarranted and prejudicial.

10 These arguments are again raised on appeal and we consider 

11 them in turn.

12 DISCUSSION

13 I. Cuti’s claim as to the non-expert testimony

14 Cuti argues on appeal, as he did below, that the “what-if-you15 had-known” questions posed to Hallinan and Henry improperly 

16 elicited expert opinion testimony from non-expert witnesses. 

17 Because both Hallinan and Henry, while professional accountants, 

18 were not qualified as experts, Cuti insists that their testimony as 

19 lay witnesses was inadmissible.

20 We accord a district court’s evidentiary rulings deference, 

21 and reverse only for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

22 Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012). A district court has 

23 abused its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view 

24 of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or 
8

1 if its decision cannot be located within the range of permissible 

2 decisions. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008).

3 The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the admission of fact 

4 testimony so long as the witness has personal knowledge, see Fed. R. 

Evid. 602,35 while opinion testimony can be presented by either a lay

or expert witness, see Fed. R. Evid. 7014 & 702.56 The initial 

7 question is therefore whether the contested testimony should be 

8 characterized as fact or opinion. “[T]he distinction between 

9 statements of fact and opinion is, at best, one of degree.” Beech 

 

3 Rule 602 provides in relevant part: 

A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is 

introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness 

has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove 

personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own 

testimony.

4 Rule 701 states:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in 

the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) 

rationally based on the witness’s perception;(b) helpful to 

clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 

determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on 

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

within the scope of Rule 702.

5 Rule 702 states: 

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of 

an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier 

of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 

methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the 

principles and methods to the facts of the case.
9

1 Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988). We need not

2 adopt verbatim Judge Posner’s observation that “[a]ll knowledge is 

3 inferential, and the combined effect of [Federal] Rules [of 

4 Evidence] 602 and 701 is to recognize this epistemological verity 

5 but at the same time to prevent the piling of inference upon 

6 inference to the point where testimony ceases to be reliable” to 

7 acknowledge its essential truth. United States v. Giovannetti, 919 

8 F.2d 1223, 1226 (7th Cir. 1990).

9 In this case, the inference that Hallinan and Henry were asked 

10 to make in answering the hypothetical questions was limited by the 

11 factual foundation laid in earlier admitted testimony and exhibits, 

12 the factual nature of the hypotheticals, and the witnesses’

13 reasoning, which was based on undisputed accounting rules. These 

14 limitations left little room for the witnesses to engage in 

15 speculation and ensured that their testimony fell near the fact end 

16 of the fact-opinion spectrum.

17 Moreover, the witnesses, although not qualified as experts, 

18 were fact witnesses of a unique sort. Each was a certified and 

19 experienced accountant personally familiar with the accounting of 

20 the transactions at issue. The hypothetical questions utilized

21 facts that had been independently established in the record. If 

22 the facts as the witnesses had understood them were A and the true 

23 facts were B, it was not inappropriate to ascertain, from the very 

24 witnesses responsible for their accounting, whether B would have 
10

1 affected that accounting under the same, undisputed accounting 

2 rules. And, since the applicable accounting rules were explained 

3 in detail, the reasoning process that the witnesses employed in 

4 answering the hypotheticals was straightforward and transparent to 

5 the jurors, who could readily discern whether the responses given 

6 were reliable.

7 Cuti also contests whether the witnesses had sufficient 

8 personal knowledge, as required by Rule 602, to provide factual 

9 testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. This rule makes personal 

10 knowledge a foundational requirement for fact witness testimony and 

11 is premised on the common law belief that “a witness who testifies 

12 to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an 

13 opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact.” 

14 Fed. R. Evid. 602 advisory committee’s note.

15 However, personal knowledge of a fact “is not an absolute” to 

16 Rule 602’s foundational requirement, which “may consist of what the 

17 witness thinks he knows from personal perception.” Id. Similarly, 

18 a witness may testify to the fact of what he did not know and how, 

19 if he had known that independently established fact, it would have 

20 affected his conduct or behavior. As this case illustrates, “what21 if-you-had-known” questions that present withheld facts to a

22 witness are especially useful to elicit testimony about the impact 

23 of fraud. Although we have not addressed the issue squarely, other 

24 circuits have permitted the use of hypothetical questions to 
11

1 inquire into the effect of a fraud. See, e.g., United States v. 

2 Orr, 692 F.3d 1079, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. 

3 Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530, 549 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. 

4 Jennings, 487 F.3d 564, 582 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. 

5 Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. 

6 Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1975).

7 It also bears noting that there was nothing in the 

8 prosecution’s questions or in the answers they elicited that 

9 prevented the defense from challenging the factual accuracy of the 

10 disputed testimony. Indeed, Cuti pointed out at trial that at 

11 least one document Hallinan claimed not to have seen was actually 

12 recorded in a log of documents covered by PwC’s audit, and thus 

13 Cuti was able to argue that the auditor could not have been 

14 deceived about the accounting for that transaction. Cuti also 

15 questioned the materiality of the accounting distortions to the 

16 company’s overall financial statement by extracting an admission 

17 from Hallinan that the fair comparison for the proceeds generated 

18 from the real estate concession transactions was to the company’s 

19 pre-tax income and not to the considerably smaller after-tax net 

20 income figure.

21 While we hold that the challenged testimony was properly 

22 admitted as factual testimony, we alternatively hold that it is 

23 admissible as lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which 

24 permits a lay witness to give an opinion if it is limited to “one 
12

1 that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) 

2 helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 

3 determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, 

4 technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 

5 702.

6 Cuti argues that the hypothetical questions posed to the 

7 witnesses violated each subsection of Rule 701 because Hallinan and 

8 Henry were asked to comment on facts that they had not personally 

9 perceived; because their interpretation of evidence already 

10 admitted was not “helpful” to the jury; and because the witnesses 

11 used specialized expertise and were not properly qualified as 

12 experts in accordance with Rule 702.

13 Cuti’s Rule 701(a) objection is unpersuasive because, as 

14 discussed earlier, the witnesses were not testifying to the 

15 existence of facts, but simply acknowledging that knowledge of such 

16 facts, already admitted into evidence, would have caused them to 

17 alter their accounting treatment. Their testimony was plainly 

18 helpful to the jury within the meaning of Rule 701(b).

19 Cuti’s Rule 701(c) contention also fails but requires a bit 

20 more elaboration. The Advisory Committee’s Note on Rule 701 

21 instructs that “a witness’ testimony must be scrutinized under the 

22 rules regulating expert opinion to the extent that the witness is 

23 providing testimony based on scientific, technical, or other 

24 specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid.
13

1 701 advisory committee’s note, 2000 amend. Lay opinion under Rule 

2 701 must be limited to opinions that “result[] from a process of 

3 reasoning familiar in everyday life.” Id.

4 Cuti insists that if Hallinan and Henry’s answers to the 

5 hypotheticals are characterized as opinion, they are necessarily 

6 expert opinion and must satisfy the qualification requirements of 

7 Rule 702 because the testimony involved the technical and 

8 specialized knowledge of the accounting profession. At first blush, 

9 the accounting rules involved in the recognition of revenue from 

10 real estate concession transactions appear technical and unfamiliar 

11 to everyday life, but those rules or their interpretation were not 

12 in question in this case. The only issue was whether the withheld 

13 facts would have altered the rules’ application.

14 We held in Bank of China, N.Y. Branch v. NBM LLC that a 

15 witness’s specialized knowledge, or the fact that he was chosen to 

16 carry out an investigation because of this knowledge, does not 

17 render his testimony “expert” as long as the testimony was based on 

18 his “investigation and reflected his investigatory findings and 

19 conclusions, and was not rooted exclusively in his expertise.” 359 

20 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2004). However, if the testimony was “not a 

21 product of his investigation, but rather reflected [his] 

22 specialized knowledge [of the banking industry],” then it was 

23 impermissible expert testimony. Id. at 182.

24 A similar question arose in United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 
14

1 208 (2d Cir. 2007). There, an accountant with personal knowledge 

2 of a company’s books testified to the accounting impact of debt 

3 reclassifications, which the government had already established as 

4 fraudulent. We held that the accountant’s testimony was lay 

5 opinion because it did not address what the appropriate accounting 

6 technique should have been, but was instead simply offered to show 

7 what the amount of the debt would have been had the fraud not 

8 occurred. Id. at 225.

9 The testimony in this case was not “rooted exclusively [in the 

10 witness’s] expertise” and did not address the soundness of the 

11 accounting rules. When the issue for the fact-finder’s 

12 determination is reduced to impact -- whether a witness would have 

13 acted differently if he had been aware of additional information --

14 the witness so testifying is engaged in “a process of reasoning 

15 familiar in everyday life.” See Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory

16 committee’s note, 2000 amend. The testimony of Hallinan and Henry

17 in response to the hypothetical questions was therefore also 

18 admissible as lay opinion.

19 United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 216 (2d Cir. 2005), is 

20 not to the contrary. In that case, we held that an undercover law 

21 enforcement agent could not testify as lay opinion that, based on 

22 his knowledge gleaned from other drug interdiction cases, the 

23 defendant was a partner in the narcotics distribution conspiracy. 

24 Such testimony was inadmissible because the opinion was based on 
15

1 specialized experience that the agent had accumulated from other 

2 cases and involved a specialized reasoning process not readily 

3 understandable to the average juror. Nothing similar occurred 

4 here. These witnesses testified based only on their experiences 

5 with matters pertinent to this case, and their reasoning was 

6 evident to the jury.

7 Cuti also challenges the admission of the contested testimony 

8 as undermining the presumption of innocence by assuming his guilt. 

9 In support of this argument, Cuti highlights Second Circuit case 

10 law that forbids such questions in the cross-examination of defense 

11 character witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 110 F.3d 

12 948, 952 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 539 

13 (2d Cir. 1990).

14 This argument fails because the challenged questions here were 

15 not directed at character witnesses and made no assumption of guilt. 

16 Hallinan and Henry were asked, for the most part, narrow questions 

17 on direct examination designed to assess the impact of the

18 fraudulent omissions on their accounting treatment. The district 

19 court took pains to limit the hypotheticals to the impact of the 

20 withheld information and barred the witnesses from speaking to the 

21 wrongfulness of the defendants’ actions, leaving that analysis to 

22 the jury. And, as noted, Cuti had ample opportunity to challenge 

23 the factual accuracy of the disputed testimony.

24 Finally, Cuti argues that the manner in which the government 
16

1 presented the withheld information to the witnesses was flawed 

2 because some questions were open-ended, some were phrased in terms 

3 of opinion, and some were based on material not in the record. The 

4 district court reasonably required the government to reformulate 

5 its questions in some instances, but it did not always do so. We 

6 have examined the record and find any missteps in this regard to be 

7 minor relative to the witnesses’ entire testimony and harmless to 

8 the outcome of the trial. When a court, upon review of the entire 

9 record, “is sure that the [evidentiary] error did not influence the 

10 jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment 

11 should stand.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).

12 In sum, we hold that under these circumstances the contested 

13 testimony was admissible fact testimony that was relevant,

14 probative, and—for the most part—carefully controlled so as not to 

15 be unfairly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403 & 602. 

16 Alternatively, it was admissible as lay opinion testimony. See Fed. 

17 R. Evid. 701. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

18 admitting the challenged testimony.

19 II. Tennant’s claims

20 A. Sufficiency of evidence

21 Tennant argues that, even though he signed the various 

22 documents used to effectuate the fraudulent real estate concession 

23 transactions and return-trip payments disguised as commissions and 

24 consulting fees and engaged in other related activities, there was 
17

1 insufficient evidence that he knew or should have known that fraud 

2 was afoot to allow the case to go to the jury.

3 We review a claim of insufficient evidence de novo, United 

4 States v. Geibel, 369 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2004), but must uphold 

5 the jury verdict if “drawing all inferences in favor of the 

6 prosecution and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

7 the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

8 essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 

9 States v. Santos, 449 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks 

10 omitted). A defendant challenging a conviction on sufficiency 

11 grounds undertakes a “heavy burden.” United States v. Kozeny, 667 

12 F.3d 122, 139 (2d Cir. 2011). A judgment of acquittal can be 

13 entered “only if the evidence that the defendant committed the 

14 crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury 

15 could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 

16 Espaillet, 380 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir. 2004). In a close case, 

17 where “either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no 

18 reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, the court must let the jury 

19 decide the matter.” United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 137 (2d 

20 Cir. 2006)(quotation marks and alteration omitted).

21 In considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

22 guilty verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 

23 favorable to the Government. Id. at 136-37. To “avoid usurping 

24 the role of the jury,” United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 129
18

1 (2d. Cir. 1999), the Court must resolve all issues of credibility 

2 in favor of the jury’s verdict, Kozeny, 667 F.3d at 139. The Court 

3 must also “credit[] every inference that the jury might have drawn 

4 in favor of the government,” Temple, 447 F.3d at 136-37, because 

5 “the task of choosing among competing, permissible inferences is 

6 for the [jury], not for the reviewing court.” United States v. 

7 McDermott, 245 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2001).

8 Tennant argues that evidence of his knowledge of the fraud is 

9 insufficient because Zelnik could not definitively place him at a 

10 particular meeting where Cuti discussed this conspiracy with the 

11 principals of the WRG entities, who were in on the scheme. On that 

12 basis alone, Tennant reasons that his conviction was based on 

13 evidence that was “‘at least as consistent with innocence as with 

14 guilt,’” and must be reversed. (Tennant Brief at 45 (quoting United 

15 States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 372 (2d Cir. 1991)). This 

16 approach is flawed because not only must the evidence be viewed in 

17 the light most favorable to the government, Santos, 449 F.3d at 102, 

18 it must also be analyzed “in conjunction [with all of the evidence

19 and] not in isolation,” United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 104

20 (2d Cir. 2011). This is so because the sufficiency test “must be 

21 applied to the totality of the government’s case and not to each 

22 element, as each fact may gain color from others.” Guadagna, 183 

23 F.3d at 130.
19

1 We have little difficulty rejecting Tennant’s argument that 

2 the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he 

3 was aware of the fraudulent character of the transactions at issue. 

4 He either knew or had to know that the so-called real estate 

5 concession rights that Duane Reade was selling to the WRG entities 

6 in 2000 were valueless because he had personally signed or approved 

7 transactions that had rendered those very rights worthless in the 

8 first place or was otherwise privy to information that revealed 

9 their sham character. One conspicuous example of this is the lease 

10 remainder in the storefront at 19 Park Place, which Duane Reade 

11 sold, pursuant to a document that Tennant personally signed, for 

12 $12,500 back to the landlord of that property. The very next day, 

13 Tennant personally signed the $806,000 deal with the WRG entities

14 into which the same concessionary right was bundled for $75,000. 

15 The jury was entitled to infer guilty knowledge on the part of 

16 Tennant, the company’s former CFO and senior vice-president who was 

17 experienced in real estate matters, from his signing two contracts 

18 on back-to-back days to sell the same leasehold interest to two 

19 different buyers. Against this and similar evidence, his plea that 

20 other company personnel failed to tell him of the fraud could 

21 reasonably be rejected by the jury.

22 Moreover, Zelnik testified at trial that not only was Tennant 

23 aware that the concessions being sold were worthless, Tennant and

24 Cuti also determined the arbitrary values that the WRG entities 
20

1 would pay for them, and that it was Tennant who devised the 

2 vehicles used to make return payments to the WRG entities. The 

3 totality of the government’s evidence was more than sufficient for 

4 the jury to conclude that Tennant was aware of the fraud that he 

5 was helping to perpetrate.

6 B. Conscious avoidance charge

7 Tennant faults the district court for including a conscious 

8 avoidance charge in its instructions to the jury, which he says 

9 caused him prejudice and warrants reversal of his conviction. The 

10 district court instructed the jury that Tennant “knowingly” 

11 committed fraud if he was “actually aware he was making or causing 

12 a false statement to be made,” or if he “(a) was aware of a high 

13 probability that, because of the [real estate concession] 

14 transactions at issue, Duane Reade’s reported financial results 

15 were false or misleading but (b) that he deliberately and 

16 consciously avoided confirming these facts.” (Tr. 5004-05). The 

17 Court cautioned, however, that the “knowingly” element would not be 

18 satisfied if “Tennant actually believed that the transactions were 

19 legitimate and not improper.” (Tr. 5005).

20 Tennant takes no issue with the form of the conscious 

21 avoidance instruction, but rather argues that the charge should not 

22 have been given at all because there was an insufficient factual 

23 predicate to support it. This argument is without merit.
21

1 We review a claim of error in jury instructions de novo, 

2 reversing only where there was prejudicial error in the charge as a 

3 whole. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006). 

4 “A conscious-avoidance charge is appropriate when (a) the element 

5 of knowledge is in dispute, and (b) the evidence would permit a 

6 rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

7 defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute 

8 and consciously avoided confirming that fact.” Id. (quotation marks 

9 omitted); see also United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 277-78

10 (2d Cir. 2011). For example, in a securities fraud case, if a 

11 defendant attended meetings that were part of the charged scheme, 

12 yet argues that he lacked the requisite scienter because, for 

13 example, he “didn’t bother to read in full” the documents he signed, 

14 the charge is appropriate. Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 124-25.

15 The Government “need not choose between an ‘actual knowledge’ 

16 and a ‘conscious avoidance’ theory.” Ferguson, 676 F.3d at 278. 

17 To the contrary, in many cases, the evidence supporting each theory 

18 will be the same:

19 [T]he same evidence that will raise an inference that the 

20 defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal conduct 

21 ordinarily will also raise the inference that the 

22 defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of 

23 the existence of illegal conduct. Moreover, [conscious 

24 avoidance] may be established where a defendant’s 

25 involvement in the criminal offense may have been so 

26 overwhelmingly suspicious that the defendant’s failure to 

27 question the suspicious circumstances established the 

28 defendant’s purposeful contrivance to avoid guilty 

29 knowledge.
22

1 Kozeny, 667 F.3d at 133-34 (quotation marks omitted) (first 

2 alteration added).

3 District courts should pay heed, however, to circumstances in 

4 which a conscious avoidance charge may be inappropriate. This is 

5 so when the only evidence that alerts the defendant to the high 

6 probability of the criminal activity is direct evidence of the 

7 illegality such that the question for the jury is whether “the 

8 defendant had either actual knowledge or no knowledge at all of the 

9 facts in question.” United States v. Nektalov, 461 F.3d 309, 316 

10 (2d Cir. 2006)(quotation marks omitted). Similarly, if the 

11 defendant denies ever having access to the facts that the 

12 government claims should have alerted him to the fraud, the issue 

13 is not whether the facts he knew should have alerted him but 

14 whether he could even have known those facts. See, e.g., United 

15 States v. Adeniji, 31 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1994).

16 In this case, the district court did not err in giving the 

17 conscious avoidance charge. The government’s theory was that, 

18 because Tennant was immersed in sham concession agreements that he 

19 personally signed or approved, determined phony values for the 

20 contracts, figured out how to get money back to the WRG entities 

21 through overpayments and sham consulting services, and met with the 

22 principals of the WRG entities to these ends, Tennant had actual 

23 knowledge of the fraud.
23

1 In response, Tennant argued both that the evidence was lacking 

2 that he knew of the fraud and that the facts of which he was aware 

were insufficient to alert him to a high probability of fraud.63 

4 This purported lack of knowledge defense, despite Tennant’s deep 

5 involvement in the transactions that effectuated the fraud, all but 

6 invited the conscious avoidance charge. The same evidentiary facts 

7 that supported the government’s theory of actual knowledge also 

8 raised the inference that he was subjectively aware of a high 

9 probability of the existence of illegal conduct and thus properly 

10 served as the factual predicate for the conscious avoidance charge, 

11 Kozeny, 667 F.3d at 133-34. Finally, the government did not have 

12 to choose between an “actual knowledge” theory or a “conscious 

13 avoidance” theory, Ferguson, 676 F.3d at 278, and the district 

14 court did not err in giving both to the jury. Of course, it is 

15 plausible that the semi-retired Tennant, attending part-time to 

16 complex transactions, might have been sufficiently disengaged or 

17 trusting that in fact he lacked knowledge on any culpable level; 

18 but the jury was empowered to find otherwise, and did.

19

 

6 For example, Tennant’s able counsel argued in summation,

There is no evidence that [Tennant] knew anything 

about improper sales of leases or lease rights [to the 

WRG entities]. Then and now he believed them to be 

entirely proper, arm’s-length transactions.

(Tr. 4850).
24

1 CONCLUSION

2 For the above reasons, and for those set forth in the 

3 accompanying summary order, the judgments of conviction and 

4 sentence are AFFIRMED.