IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

DELBERT HAROLD BENSON,

Appellant.

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No. 35000-2-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PENNELL, J. — Delbert Benson appeals his perjury conviction. We affirm.

FACTS

Delbert Benson agreed to work as a confidential informant and facilitate a 

controlled drug buy on October 30, 2012. Prior to the controlled buy, Mr. Benson 

met with two police officers. The officers searched Mr. Benson’s person and pickup

truck and provided him $200 in buy funds. Mr. Benson was also outfitted with an 

audio transmitting and recording device. The device enabled the officers to listen to 

Mr. Benson’s conversations in real time and also to record the conversations for future 

use.

After being wired and prepped for the controlled buy, officers followed Mr. 

Benson to the residence of John Gant. Mr. Benson went inside the residence and met 

with Mr. Gant for approximately 40 minutes. During the meeting, officers could hear 

FILED

OCTOBER 30, 2018

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

2

Mr. Benson negotiating a purchase for $150. The conversation included drug 

terminology such as a “ball,” an “eight ball” and a “teen.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 36, 38. 

After finishing his meeting with Mr. Gant, the police followed Mr. Benson back to the 

police station.

Once at the station, officers performed additional searches of Mr. Benson and his 

pickup. They recovered $50 in buy funds and a plastic container containing 

methamphetamine. During a recorded debriefing, Mr. Benson said that he had gone to 

Mr. Gant’s house and given him $150. Mr. Benson was asked if Mr. Gant had 

methamphetamine.

1 He responded, “yes.” CP at 59. Mr. Benson explained Mr. Gant 

weighed the methamphetamine and took the $150 in exchange for the drug.

As a result of Mr. Benson’s controlled buy, the State charged Mr. Gant with 

controlled substance violations. Mr. Benson was called to testify at trial. During his 

testimony, Mr. Benson denied Mr. Gant had ever supplied him with methamphetamine. 

Mr. Benson claimed that the methamphetamine turned over to police belonged to him 

and had come from a tool box located in the bed of his pickup. Mr. Benson also testified 

that he had kept the $150 that he was supposed to have given to Mr. Gant. According to 

 

1 The officers referred to methamphetamine as “it” during the recorded debriefing. 

CP at 59. The context of the interview makes clear that the “it” being referenced is the 

methamphetamine turned over by Mr. Benson to the officers.
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

3

Mr. Benson, he instead placed the $150 in his wallet. Mr. Gant was acquitted of the 

controlled substance charge.

Two years after Mr. Gant’s acquittal, the State charged Mr. Benson with first 

degree perjury. The information alleged Mr. Benson gave materially false testimony 

when he stated he did not purchase any drugs from John Gant on October 30, 2012. 

The exact statements that formed the basis of the charge were identified in a bill of 

particulars.

2

 

2 The statements identified in the bill of particulars were as follows: 

Q.: Are you going to tell the jury who you got the Meth from?

A.: It was mine.

Q.: It was yours?

A.: The only reason I took the money from [the police] was to get the 

money.

Q.: Ok. So where did you have it?

A.: In my tool box in my pickup.

. . . .

Q.: Did Mr. Gant give you any Methamphetamine while you were in the 

apartment?

A.: No. I, I –

Q.: Did he give you any Methamphetamine at any time?

A.: No. 

. . . .

Q.: You made a comment about Mr. Gant “not being the guy.” What do you 

mean by that?

A.: When we were at the house, Mr. Gant never gave me anything. That’s 

all I meant by that. Mr. Gant never gave me any drugs at all, ever.

CP at 7-8.
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

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Mr. Benson’s case proceeded to trial. The State presented testimony from the

two officers who had handled Mr. Benson’s cooperation. The officers described their 

surveillance activities and interactions with Mr. Benson. According to the officers’ 

testimony, they would have searched any tool box located in Mr. Benson’s truck as well 

as Mr. Benson’s wallet. Yet during the pre-buy search, the officers did not discover any 

methamphetamine. Nor did the officers ever see Mr. Benson retrieve anything from the 

bed of his pickup during the course of their surveillance. During the post-buy search, 

Mr. Benson was not discovered to have $150 on his person. In addition to the officers’ 

testimony, the State introduced the entire wire recording of Mr. Benson’s undercover 

activity, along with Mr. Benson’s post-buy recorded statement to police. The entire 

statement was played for the jury, as were portions of the undercover recording.

At several points during the trial, the prosecutor explained that Mr. Benson had 

perjured himself by claiming that the drugs turned over to police were his.3

 Defense 

counsel reiterated this clarification and pointed out the various false statements attributed 

to Mr. Benson that were not the subject of the perjury charge.

 

3 During opening statements, the prosecutor stated, “And when you have heard 

everything and [are] deliberating about this case you are left with two choices: Did [Mr. 

Benson] lie on the stand regarding whose drugs this was, or was it really his?” 1 Report 

of Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 31, 2016) at 117. During closing argument, the prosecutor

stated Mr. Benson was “contesting the perjury charge saying that the dope was his.” 3 RP 

(Nov. 2, 2016) at 379.
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

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The prosecutor concluded his rebuttal argument with the following statement, to 

which the defense objected:

[PROSECUTOR]: You know, one might, you know, people like 

analogies. It’s always kind of difficult to come up with one that makes 

sense. If this were a trial about whether or not a boat existed, was made, 

and the plaintiff was alleging this is a boat, this would be a case where the 

defense is telling you, well, we’re not sure because we don’t know if it has 

one mast or two masts, maybe even three masts, when all you have to 

decide is, is it a boat, and will it float? And the State submits to you that 

you know, after you have, now that you have heard everything—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I apologize. I have to object. 

I think counsel is trivializing the term—

THE COURT: Overrule. Again, ladies and gentleman what the 

lawyers say isn’t evidence. It’s not the law. You will get the evidence from 

what you heard and get the law from my instructions. 

Go ahead. This is argument.

[PROSECUTOR]: After you have seen, gone through the evidence, 

the transcript, the wires, that you are left with no reasonable doubt but that 

Mr. Benson committed the crime of Perjury back in June 2013. Thank you.

3 Report of Proceedings (Nov. 2, 2016) at 413-14.

The jury was given a standard pattern instruction that direct and circumstantial 

evidence carry equal weight and value (instruction 5).4

 The jury was also given an

instruction specific to the heightened evidentiary requirements for perjury (instruction 7). 

See, e.g., State v. Singh, 167 Wn. App. 971, 976, 275 P.3d 1156 (2012) (explaining the 

requirement). Instruction 7 provided:

 

4 CP at 171; 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY 

INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 5.01, at 181 (4th ed. 2016).
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

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To convict the defendant of the crime of Perjury in the First Degree, 

there must be either positive testimony of at least two credible witnesses 

that directly contradicts the defendant’s statement made under oath or there 

must be one such direct witness along with independent direct or 

circumstantial evidence of supporting circumstances that clearly overcomes 

the oath of the defendant and the legal presumption of defendant’s 

innocence.

CP at 173. The to-convict instruction (instruction 11) listed the elements of first 

degreeperjury but did not contain any reference to the heightened evidentiary requirement 

described in instruction 7. Mr. Benson was found guilty of first degree perjury. 

He appeals.

ANALYSIS

Sufficiency of the evidence

In a sufficiency challenge, our inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 

(1992). All reasonable inferences are drawn in the State’s favor, and the evidence is 

interpreted most strongly against the defendant. Id. This court does not reweigh the 

evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 

216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

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A person is guilty of first degree perjury if, in any official proceeding, he or she 

makes a materially false statement, which he or she knows to be false, under an oath 

required or authorized by law. RCW 9A.72.020(1). The evidentiary requirements for 

a perjury conviction are more stringent than all other crimes, except treason. State v. 

Arquette, 178 Wn. App. 273, 282, 314 P.3d 426 (2013). Sufficient evidence for a perjury 

conviction requires

“the direct testimony of at least one credible witness, and that testimony to 

be sufficient must be positive and directly contradictory of the defendant’s 

oath; in addition to such testimony, there must be either another such 

witness or corroborating circumstances established by independent 

evidence, and of such a character as clearly to turn the scale and overcome 

the oath of the defendant and the legal presumption of his innocence. 

Otherwise the defendant must be acquitted.”

State v. Rutledge, 37 Wash. 523, 528, 79 P. 1123 (1905) (quoting People v. Rodley, 131 

Cal. 240, 261, 63 P. 351 (1900)). This direct testimony must come “from someone in a 

position to know of his or her own experience that the facts sworn to by defendant are 

false.” Nessman v. Sumpter, 27 Wn. App. 18, 24, 615 P.2d 522 (1980).

Mr. Benson claims the State’s evidence was insufficient to meet the heightened 

evidentiary requirements for perjury. We disagree. The State presented testimony from 

law enforcement officers that Mr. Benson did not have any methamphetamine on his 

person or in his vehicle prior to the meeting with Mr. Gant. This directly contradicted 
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

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Mr. Benson’s testimony that the methamphetamine had come from a tool box located on 

his truck bed. The officers’ testimony regarding the origins of the methamphetamine was 

corroborated by the audio recording of Mr. Benson’s interactions with Mr. Gant, during 

which the men discussed drug terminology and a $150 purchase. It was also corroborated 

by the statements made by Mr. Benson during his recorded debriefing. The State’s 

corroborating evidence was inconsistent with Mr. Benson’s claim of innocence. There 

was, therefore, sufficient evidence to justify the jury’s guilty verdict.

To-convict jury instruction

Mr. Benson claims that the court’s to-convict instruction was flawed in two ways:

(1) the instruction did not inform the jury of the heightened evidentiary requirements

applicable to perjury, and (2) the instruction did not specify which false statement formed 

the basis of the State’s charge. We reject both challenges.

Essential elements

Jury instructions are reviewed de novo. State v. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d 295, 300, 

325 P.3d 135 (2014); State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 656, 904 P.2d 245 (1995). Taken 

together, the instructions must inform the jury that the State bears the burden of proving 

every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d at 306; Pirtle, 

127 Wn.2d at 656. Because the to-convict instruction is the “ ‘yardstick by which the jury 
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

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measures the evidence,’” it must contain all of the essential elements of the charged 

crime. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d at 306 (quoting State v. Sibert, 168 Wn.2d 306, 311, 230 

P.3d 142 (2010)). Other instructions cannot be used to supplement a defective to-convict 

instruction. Id.

Mr. Benson criticizes the court’s to-convict instruction because it did not recite 

the heightened evidentiary requirements applicable to perjury. This argument fails 

because a crime’s evidentiary standard is different from its elements. Elements are 

“‘[t]he constituent parts of a crime—[usually] consisting of the actus reus, mens rea, 

and causation.’” State v. Peterson, 168 Wn.2d 763, 772, 230 P.3d 588 (2010) (alteration 

in original) (quoting State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 754, 202 P.3d 937 (2009)). An 

evidentiary standard merely governs how the elements of a crime must be proved. It 

was unnecessary for the trial court’s to-convict instruction to provide an explanation 

of evidentiary standards. Instead, it was sufficient for the standards to be set forth in 

a separate instruction, as was done here. Mr. Benson’s challenge therefore fails.

Specification of the charged offense

The court’s to-convict instruction alleged “[t]hat on or about the 26th day of June, 

2013, the defendant made a false statement.” CP at 177. For the first time on appeal, 

Mr. Benson raises the concern that the jury may have convicted him for making a false 
No. 35000-2-III

State v. Benson

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statement different from the statements identified in the State’s charging document and 

bill of particulars.

We find no reversible error. Any vagueness in the court’s instruction was 

sufficiently addressed by the clarification presented by both counsel for the State 

and defense counsel. See State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 409, 756 P.2d 105 (1988) 

(no multiple acts problem when the State tells “the jury which act to rely on in its 

deliberations”). Further instruction from the court was therefore unnecessary.

Prosecutorial misconduct

Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Lindsay, 180 Wn.2d 423, 430, 326 P.3d 125 (2014). A defendant bears the 

burden of showing that the prosecutor’s comments are both improper and prejudicial. Id. 

Allegedly improper arguments by the prosecutor must be reviewed in the context of the 

total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the 

instructions given. State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 85-86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994).

Mr. Benson claims the prosecutor’s boat analogy misstated the burden of proof and

denigrated the defense. We disagree. Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s analogy simply 

pointed out that the jury should focus on the false statement that formed the basis of the 

crime charged (the boat), not details regarding other false statements or wrongdoing (the 
No. 35000-2-III 

State v. Benson 

various masts of the boat). While the prosecutor's analogy may not have been perfect, 

it did not undermine the fairness of Mr. Benson's trial. The trial court appropriately 

overruled Mr. Benson's objection to the prosecutor's argument. 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 5 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Lawrence-Berrey, CJ. 

5 Because we find no error, we need not address Mr. Benson's argument that his 

conviction should be reversed on the basis of cumulative error. 

11