IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gary H. Powell, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1418 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: April 20, 2018

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: February 1, 2019

Gary H. Powell (Claimant) petitions, pro se, for review of an order of 

the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), mailed

August 15, 2017, which affirmed an Unemployment Compensation Referee’s 

(Referee) decision, denying Claimant unemployment compensation benefits under 

Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 For the reasons 

set forth below, we affirm. 

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§ 802(b). Section 402(b) of the Law provides, in part, that a claimant shall be ineligible for 

compensation for any week in which the claimant’s unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving 

work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. “[W]hether a claimant had cause of a 

necessitous and compelling nature for leaving work is a question of law subject to this Court’s 

review.” Wasko v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 488 A.2d 388, 389 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). 
2

Claimant applied for unemployment compensation benefits after he 

voluntarily resigned his position with Joe Krentzman & Son Inc. (Employer) on 

September 24, 2013. The Altoona UC Service Center (Service Center) found 

Claimant ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, pertaining to 

voluntary termination without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. 

Claimant appealed, claiming that he had necessitous and compelling cause to quit 

because he was assaulted at work. 

During the course of several hearings before various referees, Claimant 

testified and presented the testimony of Dave Parks, Wesley Wagner, and Scott 

Brown, all of whom were employed by Employer at the time of the incident that led 

to Claimant’s separation. Employer presented the testimony of Employer’s 

President, Michael Krentzman (President), and Employer’s Chief Financial Officer, 

Dale Watkins (CFO). For ease of presentation, we summarize the relevant testimony 

of the witnesses with a focus on the alleged assault.2 

Claimant testified that during his employment with Employer, his direct 

supervisor was Employer’s Operational Manager, David Krentzman.

3

(R.R. at R-15 

to R-16.) On the day in question, Claimant had just finished a job for the Operational 

Manager when the President asked him to take over supervision of the metals 

department that day. (R.R. at 15a.) There was a lot going on that day. (Id.) A 

machine was down, and Claimant still had his normal duties in addition to the metals 

room. (Id. at R-16.) The President questioned Claimant as to whether Claimant 

could perform the tasks, and Claimant told him about other tasks he needed to 

 

2 At the outset, we note that Claimant’s numbering of pages of the Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) is somewhat inconsistent and haphazard and does not fully comply with Pa. R.A.P. 2173. 

3 The Operational Manager was also a Co-President of Employer and the brother of the 

President. 
3

perform. (Id. at 16a, 67a.) The President said that he would take care of the other 

tasks and instructed Claimant to do the tasks assigned by the President. (Id.

at 16a, 68a.) Claimant asked the President how Claimant was supposed to handle 

some of the things, but the President did not have an answer and just told Claimant 

that he needed these things to be done. (Id. at 16a.) Claimant then started to talk 

about his job performance, and the President responded by saying that Claimant had 

poor job performance and demeaned him in front of 5 or 6 people and eliminated his 

authority. (Id. at 16a, 68a.) Claimant then told the President that he was going to 

see Steven Krentzman, Employer’s owner and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), to 

get things straightened out. (Id. at R-17, 68a, 69a, R-70.) Claimant believed the

CEO could tell him how and what to do. (Id. at R-17.) When he went to see the 

CEO, the President went around Claimant, blocked Claimant’s path, and put his 

hand on Claimant. (Id. at R-17, 68a.) Claimant stopped in his tracks and told the 

President not to touch him. (Id.) Claimant then turned, walked back to the other 

employees, and told them to call 9-1-1. (Id.) No one would assist him, so he left so 

as not to escalate matters further. (Id. at 17a, 68a, R-69.) Before leaving, he clocked 

out at 9:14 a.m., having clocked in at 7:00 a.m. (Id. at R-69.) Claimant testified that 

after he left work, he went to the State Police to file assault and harassment charges 

against the President. (Id. at R-69.) Claimant did not call the CEO or anyone within 

Employer’s management. (Id. at 70a.) 

Claimant testified that later that evening, he had a conversation with 

Mr. Brown, who told him that if Claimant showed up on the premises, Employer 

would call the police. (Id.) Mr. Brown also told Claimant that Claimant was fired. 

Claimant did not follow up because he expected Employer to send him a letter, but 

Employer never sent anything. (Id.) 
4

Mr. Parks testified that the CEO told Mr. Parks at some point that 

Employer would not be bringing Claimant back. (Id. at 74a-75a.) 

Mr. Wagner testified that on the day in question, he observed the 

President “with his hand out stopping [Claimant’s] right of travel.” (Id. at R-76.) 

Mr. Wagner stated that the President was standing with his back toward Mr. Wagner 

and his hand stuck in Claimant’s chest, but Mr. Wagner also stated that he could not 

see if the President touched Claimant’s chest. (Id.) The two “were hollering[, but 

Mr. Wagner] didn’t stick around to hear what they were talking about.” (Id. at 76a.) 

Mr. Wagner “kind of giggled about it because maybe they were having [a] squabble. 

[He] didn’t think anything about it.” (Id.) Mr. Wagner is no longer employed by 

Employer. (Id.) 

Mr. Brown testified that on the day of the incident, when Mr. Brown 

was clocking out, one of Employer’s security guards informed Mr. Brown that 

Claimant was fired and if he showed up on the property security personnel were

supposed to call the State Police. (Id. at 12a.) When Mr. Brown got home, he called 

Claimant to tell him what he had been told. (Id.) 

The President testified that on the day of the incident, the Operational 

Manager was not at work. (Id. at R-23.) Normally, the Operational Manager would 

direct operations in the metals room. (Id. at R-24.) Mr. Parks was the supervisor of 

the metals room, but he left work sick that day and put Claimant in charge of the 

metals room. (Id.) When the President went to the metals room, he could not find 

Claimant. (Id.) There was a lot going on in production that day, and the President 

was concerned that Claimant was not in the metals room. (Id. at 24a.) Claimant 

emerged from the break room a few minutes later. (Id.) The President wanted to 

make sure that Claimant was on site and knew what his responsibilities were that 
5

day—i.e., that the metals room was Claimant’s only responsibility that day. (Id.

at 24a, R-25.) Claimant responded to the President’s inquiry as to whether the 

President could “count on” him by stating that he was the only one on whom the 

President could count. (Id. at 25a, 78a.) The President responded by letting 

Claimant know that there are a lot of people on whom the President could count and 

commented on his attitude and work performance. (Id. at R-26, 78a.) 

Approximately six other employees were in the area, but they were not close to 

Claimant and the President. (Id. at 26a.) Claimant then ranted that he works for the 

CEO, not the President. (Id. at 78a.) Claimant further stated that Claimant could do 

whatever he wants and was going to go talk to the CEO. (Id. at R-79.) The President 

followed Claimant and told him that they could all sit down to talk during Claimant’s 

break at 10:00 a.m. (Id.) Claimant then went into the main part of the warehouse, 

claimed that the President assaulted him, and asked someone to call 9-1-1 or give 

him a cell phone. (Id.) The other employees laughed. (Id.) Then Claimant left 

without punching out. (Id.) The President instructed another employee to punch 

Claimant’s time card, which he did. (Id. at R-79, 79a.) Claimant never returned. 

(Id.) The President stated that he never touched Claimant, raised his hand, made any 

kind of arm motion, put his hand out to restrain or stop Claimant, or moved his hands 

out in a gesture. (Id.) 

The President further testified that following Claimant’s departure, the 

President wrote a memorandum memorializing the incident. (Id.) Thereafter, a State 

Police trooper came to the facility and spoke with the President and another 

employee about the incident. (Id. at 80a.) The President told the trooper what had 

happened, and the trooper expressed his belief that nothing was going to happen. 

(Id.) The President then prepared a memorandum regarding this meeting with the 
6

trooper. (Id.) The President made no effort to contact Claimant, and Claimant never 

contacted him. (Id. at R-81.)

The CFO testified that Employer took the position that Claimant “quit 

his job [and] walked off with no notice.” (Id. at R-44 to R-45.) Employer considered 

Claimant to be absent without leave and wrote “AWOL” on his time card. (Id.

at 31a, R-32, R-85.) As a result, the CFO instructed security guards on 

September 24, 2013, not to admit Claimant if he appeared on the premises after work 

hours and to instruct Claimant that Claimant should report during regular work 

hours. (Id. at R-46, R-52, R-85.) He did so because it is Employer’s policy not to 

give former employees access to the plant except during regular business hours. (Id.

at R-49.) The CFO also instructed security guards to advise Claimant to see the 

Operational Manager, President, or CEO before resuming duties. (Id. at 31a, R-32.) 

He did so because it was possible, given Claimant’s volatile attitude, he would return 

to work. (Id.) According to the CFO, the situation was fluid and Claimant had 

worked for Employer for a long time, so it was possible that Claimant could have 

come back. (Id. at R-32.) The day of the incident, the CFO did not tell security that 

Claimant was fired and could not come back to work. (Id.) 

Based upon the above testimony, the Board affirmed a decision of 

Referee Hess, thereby denying benefits pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Law. In 

so doing, the Board issued the following findings of fact: 

1. Joe Krentzman & Son, Inc., employed the claimant 

beginning April 1993, finally as a maintenance 

director.

2. The employer’s operations manager was the 

claimant’s direct supervisor.

3. Although the employer’s president did not 

ordinarily participate in the daily floor management 
7

of the employer’s facility, he had authority to direct 

employees if circumstances required.

4. On September 24, 2013, the claimant’s supervisor 

left early and the operations manager was absent, so 

the president approached the claimant and directed 

him to manage the ferrous metals department for the 

day and notified him of several tasks that needed to 

be completed that day.

5. The president asked if he could count on the

claimant, who responded that “he was the only 

person [the employer] can count on.”

6. The president acknowledged that he could count on 

many employees and noted that he could not always 

count on the claimant because of his recently 

declining performance.

7. Although other workers were visible in the area, 

they were too far away and the facility was too loud 

for them to hear the president’s comments.

8. The claimant proclaimed that he did not work for 

the president or the operations manager, but only for 

the employer’s owner and proceeded to walk to the 

owner’s office.

9. The president followed the claimant and told him 

that he could talk to the owner, but not until his 

10:00 a.m. break because the department needed to 

be managed until then.

10. The president did not touch the claimant during this 

exchange.

11. The claimant publicly accused the president of 

assault, but his co[-]workers did not take him 

seriously or assist him.

12. The claimant left the facility without clocking out 

and drove to a Pennsylvania State Police barracks to 

file a complaint of assault and harassment by the 

president.

13. The president instructed the scale master to clock 

out the claimant at 9:22 a.m. and immediately 

drafted an e-mail to other managers detailing the 

incident, expressing that he believed the claimant 
8

had resigned, and recommending his resignation 

should be accepted. 

14. A state trooper visited the facility and investigated 

the claimant’s complaint, but the president was not 

charged with any offense.

15. The employer’s chief financial officer told security 

staff that, if the claimant returned to the facility, he 

should be instructed to return during regular 

business hours to meet with senior management 

before resuming his duties.

16. The claimant did not return to work or contact the 

employer.

(Board’s Decision at 2-3.) 

The Board first considered whether Claimant voluntarily quit his 

employment or whether Employer terminated Claimant’s employment. In support 

of Claimant’s contention that Employer terminated his employment, Claimant relied 

upon a statement of Mr. Brown that one of Employer’s security guards told Mr. 

Brown that Employer discharged Claimant, Claimant was no longer permitted on 

Employer’s property, and Employer would contact the State Police if Claimant were 

on the property. The Board observed that the CFO testified he told security staff 

that, if Claimant returned to the facility, Claimant should be instructed to return 

during regular business hours to meet with senior management before resuming his 

duties. The Board considered the testimony of the two witnesses and acknowledged

that the CFO’s statement had been orally transmitted through several individuals 

before it reached Claimant. The Board determined, regardless of the hearsay 

objection, that Mr. Brown’s testimony did not establish that Employer terminated 

Claimant’s employment. The Board reasoned: 

Because the guard did not testify, the Board does not have 

his perspective of what the CFO told him or whether what 

he told the co-worker was what the CFO told him or 

combined with rumor or speculation. Likewise, the 
9

co-worker’s testimony could be clouded by 

misunderstanding or misremembering or separately 

impacted by rumor or speculation. Considering the 

respective reliability of these statements, the Board credits 

the CFO that the guard was not told that the claimant was 

discharged. 

Because the guard’s statement went beyond the scope of 

the CFO’s instruction, the Board concludes that it does not 

fit into the [hearsay] admission exception. Even if it did, 

however, being competent evidence does not make it 

credible, and the Board would discredit it for the reasons 

given above. Consequently, there is no competent, 

credible evidence that the claimant was told he was 

discharged.

(Id. at 3-4.)

The Board next considered whether Claimant established cause of a 

necessitous and compelling nature to quit and concluded he did not. In so doing, the 

Board analyzed Claimant’s intention and reasoned:

The claimant did not clock out and left the employer’s 

facility. This, alone, does not evidence intention to quit, 

especially considering that the claimant testified he 

intended to return to work the next day. However, the 

claimant did not return to work. The claimant gave 

conflicting reasons for his failure to return: he was fired 

and he did not want to be arrested. Because both of these 

situations have been discredited, neither justifies the 

claimant’s actions. Regardless, neither situation would 

prevent the claimant from calling the owner and speaking 

with him, as he stated he intended to do on 

September 24, 2013. The claimant claimed he did not call 

the owner because he did not want to make the situation 

worse, but did not explain how it could have been worse, 

considering that he allegedly believed he had been 

discharged. Therefore, the Board concludes that the 

claimant quit.

. . . .
10

The claimant, likewise, has not credibly established that 

the president pushed him or physically threatened him. 

Even the claimant’s witness could not corroborate that the 

president touched the claimant. The claimant’s 

co[-]workers appeared to not take his accusation seriously, 

nor did the State Police. Conversely, the president 

credibly testified he did not touch the claimant. Therefore, 

the Board cannot conclude that the alleged contact was a 

necessitous and compelling reason to quit.

(Id. at 4.) 

On appeal,

4 Claimant, no longer represented by counsel, argues he was 

denied due process. Claimant also argues that substantial evidence does not exist to 

support the Board’s findings and that the Board erred in concluding that Claimant 

voluntarily quit his employment. 

With regard to his due process challenge, Claimant argues that he was 

entitled to due process in the form of a fair hearing by a neutral fact finder. The 

essential elements of due process in an administrative proceeding are notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. Groch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 

472 A.2d 286, 287-88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984); Wojciechowski v. Unemployment Comp. 

Bd. of Review, 407 A.2d 142, 143 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). Claimant appears to argue 

that he did not receive due process because the various referees work together and

for the Board. Claimant cites Lyness v. State Board of Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204

(Pa. 1992), in support of his argument. 

We disagree that the Board denied Claimant due process of law as a 

result of the referees’ relationships with each other and the Board. The referees’ and 

Board’s functions are set forth in Section 203 of the Law, as amended, 43 P.S. § 763. 

 

4 This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. 

§ 704.
11

Section 203(e) of the Law provides, in part: “It shall be the duty of a referee, under 

the supervision, direction and administrative control of the [B]oard, to hear and 

decide disputes in accordance with the provisions of this act and to conduct such 

other and further hearings in connection with the foregoing as may be required by 

the Board.” Pursuant to Section 203(c) of the Law, “[t]he [B]oard shall be a 

departmental administrative board, and shall have all the powers and perform all the 

duties generally vested in, and imposed upon, departmental administrative boards 

and commissions by The Administrative Code [of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, 

P.L. 177, as amended, 71 P.S. §§ 51-732].” The Board has the duty “to hear appeals 

arising from claims for compensation, adopt, amend or rescind such rules of 

procedure, undertake such investigations, and take such action required for the 

hearing and disposition of appeals as it deems necessary and consistent with [the 

Law].” Section 203(d) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 763(d). Although the referees are under 

the Board’s supervision, direction and administrative control, the referees 

independently issue their decisions, and the Board reviews the referees’ decisions

only when appealed to the Board. 

We disagree with Claimant that this framework for the review of 

unemployment compensation claims violates due process under the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s decision in Lyness. Lyness prohibits the commingling of 

prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions, based on the notion that the same 

individual should not be empowered or have the responsibility to act as both 

prosecutor and judge. Lyness, 605 A.2d 1208-11. In other words, Lyness stands for 

the proposition that an agency violates due process when the same individual 

responsible for making a decision to prosecute also sits in judgment of the charges 

and imposes sanctions based on the charges. Id. Lyness clearly does not apply to 
12

the situation at hand. First, neither the referees nor the Board functioned as 

prosecutors, and no prosecution or disciplinary action occurred. Second, even if we 

were to ignore the lack of any sort of prosecutorial function, no member of the Board 

had any involvement in the decision-making regarding the merits of Claimant’s 

claim at any stage prior to the appeal to the Board. Rather, the UC Service Center 

made an initial determination as to Claimant’s entitlement to unemployment 

compensation, and the referees then conducted hearings in order to issue a 

determination. On appeal to the Board, the Board reviewed Referee Hess’s decision

and made its own independent determination. Given that the Board is not involved 

in the UC Service Center’s or referees’ decision-making process, the concerns 

underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyness are not present in this matter.5 

 Claimant also argues that he was denied due process because he wanted 

his witness, Mr. Brown, to testify in person, but Claimant’s attorney arranged for 

Mr. Brown to testify by telephone against Claimant’s wishes.

6

 Claimant appears to 

imply that, had Mr. Brown testified in person before Referee Kauffman, the 

credibility determinations would have been different. At the outset, we note that, 

although represented by counsel at the hearing, Claimant did not object or express 

 

5 To the extent that Claimant implies that a referee or the Board acted with bias, Claimant 

does not develop any argument regarding bias, and the Court perceives no bias in the referees’ or 

Board’s decisions. 

6 Claimant also argues that he was denied due process because he did not receive a copy of 

the cover sheet or page 1 of the transcript. Claimant does acknowledge having been provided the 

sound recordings of the transcript, and he does not indicate how the Board’s alleged failure to 

provide him with the first page of the transcript harmed his ability to proceed with this appeal. 

Furthermore, the Board, in its brief, notes that it, too, had not received page 1 of the transcript in 

the record it reviewed. Since then, however, it acquired page 1 and had attached it to its brief as 

Appendix “B.” Page 1 of the transcript does not contain any witness testimony or address any 

matter relevant to this appeal. For that reason, to the extent that any error occurred, we conclude 

that the error was harmless. 
13

any concern to the referee at the time the referee received Mr. Brown’s testimony 

via telephone. Furthermore, Claimant was in no way disadvantaged by having Mr. 

Brown’s testimony received by telephone. As noted by the Board, here, the Board 

made the credibility determinations and acted as the fact finder. The Board, in 

determining credibility and finding facts, reviewed only transcripts of the testimony. 

It did not directly observe any witness’s testimony. Thus, there is simply no basis 

to support a contention that the Board denied Claimant due process in any way. 

Next, Claimant argues that substantial evidence does not exist to 

support the Board’s finding of fact number 10—i.e., that the President did not touch 

Claimant during their exchange. Essentially, Claimant takes issue with the Board’s 

credibility determinations. Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence 

upon which a reasonable mind could base a conclusion. Johnson v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Review, 502 A.2d 738, 740 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). In determining 

whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings, this Court must 

examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that 

party the benefit of any inferences that can logically and reasonably be drawn from 

the evidence. Id. A determination as to whether substantial evidence exists to 

support a finding of fact can only be made upon examination of the record as a 

whole. Taylor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 378 A.2d 829, 831 

(Pa. 1977). The Board’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal only so long as 

the record taken as a whole contains substantial evidence to support them. Penflex, 

Inc. v. Bryson, 485 A.2d 359, 365 (Pa. 1984). “The fact that [a party] may have 

produced witnesses who gave a different version of the events, or that [the party] 

might view the testimony differently than the Board is not grounds for reversal if 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings.” Tapco, Inc. v. Unemployment 
14

Comp. Bd. of Review, 650 A.2d 1106, 1108-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Similarly, even 

if evidence exists in the record that could support a contrary conclusion, it does not 

follow that the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. Johnson 

v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 504 A.2d 989, 990 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). 

It is well settled that in unemployment compensation cases, the Board 

is the ultimate fact finder and is, therefore, entitled to make its own determinations 

as to witness credibility and evidentiary weight. Peak v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. 

of Review, 501 A.2d 1383, 1385 (Pa. 1985). In making credibility determinations, 

the Board “may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, in whole or in 

part.” Greif v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 450 A.2d 229, 230 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1982). The appellate court’s duty is to examine the testimony in the light 

most favorable to the party in whose favor the Board has found, giving that party the 

benefit of all inferences that can logically and reasonably be drawn from the 

testimony. Taylor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 378 A.2d 829, 831 

(Pa. 1977). 

Here, Claimant and the President provided similar testimony regarding 

the incident at issue, with the exception of whether the President touched Claimant 

during their verbal exchange. In concluding that Claimant lacked cause of a 

necessitous and compelling nature to voluntarily quit his employment, the Board 

specifically found that Claimant did not credibly establish that the President pushed 

him or physically threatened him. The Board noted that even Claimant’s witness, 

Mr. Wagner, could not corroborate that the President touched Claimant, and other 

employees and the State Police appeared not to take Claimant’s accusation seriously. 

Simply put, the Board found the President’s testimony credible and did not find 

credible Claimant’s testimony regarding physical contact between Claimant and the 
15

President. Such a credibility determination lies within the purview of the Board, and 

this Court will not disturb it on appeal. 

Finally, Claimant argues that the Board erred in concluding that 

Claimant voluntarily quit his employment. Claimant, in making this argument, 

points to evidence he contends establishes that Employer terminated his 

employment. Claimant specifically points to the effective date of the cancellation 

of his insurance and his understanding that Employer’s security guard was told to 

arrest Claimant if he came back to the property. 

With regard to the effective date of the cancellation of his insurance, 

Claimant argues that the fact that Employer canceled his insurance coverage is 

evidence that Employer knew that Employer fired him. The Board did not find the 

cancellation of Claimant’s insurance to be relevant to the issue of whether Claimant 

voluntarily quit his employment and did not make any findings regarding Claimant’s 

insurance. We cannot conclude the Board erred in determining that the cancellation 

of insurance had any relevance to whether Claimant quit or was fired. Regardless 

of whether Claimant quit or was fired, Employer would have taken steps to cancel 

Claimant’s insurance coverage. Thus, Employer’s cancellation of Claimant’s 

insurance does not establish the circumstances of Claimant’s separation. 

As to Claimant’s contention that the fact that Employer would have him 

arrested if he returned to the property is evidence that Employer fired him, the Board 

found the CFO’s testimony credible that the CFO only instructed Employer’s

security guards that, in the event Claimant appeared at the property after regular 

business hours, they should advise Claimant to return to the property during regular 

business hours. Thus, the CFO’s instructions to Employer’s security guards also 

does not establish the circumstances of Claimant’s separation. 
16

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Board. 

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gary H. Powell, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1418 C.D. 2017

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1

st day of February, 2019, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is AFFIRMED. 

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge