[Cite as State v. Houle, 2023-Ohio-4609.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

MARION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 9-23-31

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

LOGAN KEITH HOULE, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court

General Division

Trial Court No. 21-CR-204

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: December 18, 2023

APPEARANCES:

Kyle Phillips and Philip E. Pitzer for Appellant

Raymond Grogan for Appellee
Case No. 9-23-31

-2-

Waldick, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Logan Houle (“Houle”), brings this appeal from 

the April 6, 2023, judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court sentencing 

him to prison after a jury convicted him of Aggravated Robbery and Obstructing 

Official Business. On appeal, Houle argues that the trial court erred by denying his 

suppression motion, that the trial court erred by failing to provide jury instructions 

on excessive force, lawful resisting, and self-defense, that the trial court erred by 

excluding testimony from an expert witness, and that his convictions should have 

merged for purposes of sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} On May 19, 2021, Houle was indicted for Aggravated Robbery in 

violation of R.C. 2911.01(B), a first degree felony, and Obstructing Official 

Business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A)/(B), a fifth degree felony. It was alleged, 

inter alia, that Houle struggled and fought with three police officers while they were 

attempting to detain him during an investigation and that, during the struggle, Houle

attempted to remove a law enforcement officer’s firearm from the officer’s holster. 

Houle pled not guilty to the charges.

{¶3} On March 28, 2022, Houle filed a suppression motion arguing, inter 

alia, that his initial detainment was illegal and that his arrest was unreasonable and 
Case No. 9-23-31

-3-

illegal under the circumstances presented. A hearing was held on Houle’s 

suppression motion and the motion was ultimately overruled by the trial court.

{¶4} On February 7-9, 2023, Houle proceeded to a jury trial wherein he was 

convicted of both charges against him. On April 6, 2023, Houle was sentenced to 

serve an indefinite prison term of 9 to 13.5 years on the Aggravated Robbery charge 

and a concurrent 12 months in prison on the Obstructing Official Business charge. 

It is from this judgment that Houle appeals, asserting the following assignments of 

error for our review.

First Assignment of Error

The trial court erred in denying defendant-appellant’s motion to 

suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the excessive force 

employed upon Logan Houle during his illegal arrest.

Second Assignment of Error

The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to provide 

jury instructions on excessive force, lawful resisting, and selfdefense.

Third Assignment of Error

The trial court erred to the substantial prejudice of defendantappellant and abused its discretion in excluding testimony from 

appellant’s expert witness and prohibiting him from testifying at 

the jury trial.

Fourth Assignment of Error

[The] [t]rial court committed plain error in sentencing defendantappellant to concurrent sentences for both Aggravated Robbery 

and Obstructing Official Business as the counts should have 

merged.
Case No. 9-23-31

-4-

First Assignment of Error

{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Houle argues that the trial court erred 

by denying his suppression motion. Specifically, he contends that his initial 

detainment and his subsequent arrest were illegal and excessive under the 

circumstances. He also argues that the third-party individual’s call to dispatch did 

not support a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity on its own to 

justify a detainment.

Standard of Review

{¶6} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of 

law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a 

suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is 

in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id.; 

State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion 

to suppress,“an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they 

are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. 

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of 

law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently 

determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. 

McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
Case No. 9-23-31

-5-

Evidence Presented

{¶7} At the suppression hearing, the State presented the testimony of the 

three officers who responded to 623 Tyler Street on May 13, 2021, and a 911 

dispatcher. The body camera footage from all three responding officers was 

introduced into evidence. The defense presented the testimony of one witness who 

was classified as an expert in “General Law Enforcement and Arresting 

Procedures.” The trial court’s entry overruling Houle’s suppression motion 

contained detailed factual findings based on the evidence presented. Because the 

trial court’s findings are supported by competent credible evidence and the findings 

thoroughly detailed the evidence, we quote them in their entirety.

On or about May 13, 2021, officers from the Marion, Ohio Police 

Department were dispatched to 623 Tyler Street in reference to a male 

in an apartment with a knife threatening one to two females inside. 

The call to dispatch was made by an identified individual who had 

received a text message from one of the females inside. When dispatch 

called for officers, a “tone was dropped,” which is a signal to officers 

responding that the call was a high priority and had a high potential 

for danger based on the nature of the call.

Officer Jagger was the first to arrive on the scene. Upon arrival, 

there was nothing unusual and there was no noise coming from inside 

the apartment. Officer Jagger knocked on the door and a male 

answered the door. Officer Jagger mistakenly asked if his name was 

“Tyler,” to which the Defendant said “No.” He was identified as 

“Logan” (he was later identified as Logan Houle, the Defendant in the 

instant matter) and Officer Jagger asked him to step outside. Officer 

Jagger attempted to reach out to the Defendant and the Defendant 

retreated into the apartment. Two females were seen by Officer Jagger 

standing in the apartment, neither of which had any visible injury. The 

Defendant asked why he needed to step outside. Officer Jagger 

explained that there had been a phone call stating he had been in the 
Case No. 9-23-31

-6-

residence with a knife. The Defendant immediately escalated the 

situation by becoming verbally combative and yelling while clinching 

his fists. The Defendant then began making accusations that the two 

residents were lying. The Defendant began yelling “These bitches is 

lying.”

{¶8} Officer Jagger stated that he needed to step outside so she could 

check the Defendant for weapons for officer safety. The Defendant was 

aggressive from the outset and appeared defensive and agitated upon his 

initial interaction with Officer Jagger, however, after his initial retreat into 

the apartment and resistance to step outside, he cooperated in stepping 

outside of the apartment and acquiescing to a pat down search for weapons. 

A pat down for weapons was conducted outside of the apartment and nothing 

was found on [Houle’s] person.

About this time, less than one minute into the interaction between 

Officer Jagger and Defendant, Lt. Musser and Officer May arrived to 

assist on the call. The Defendant immediately asked “what are they 

doing, though?” referring to the other officers who arrived on scene. 

The Defendant was asked what was going on and he replied that 

nothing was going on, that everything was fine, and that he didn’t 

know what Officer Jagger was talking about in regards to someone 

with a knife. The Defendant stated he did not live at the residence and 

had been there a couple hours. Officer Jagger leaves the Defendant 

with Lt. Musser and proceeds to enter the residence with Officer May 

to secure the scene, make sure there was no one else inside, either with 

a knife or who was injured. At this point, officers were unsure who 

allegedly had a knife. A knife was located out on a counter in the 

kitchen area.

While Officers Jagger and May secured the apartment, the 

Defendant talked with Lt. Musser outside. The Defendant went to 

shake the hand of Lt. Musser. Lt. Musser calmly explained that he 

could not due to COVID restrictions. The Defendant backed away and 
Case No. 9-23-31

-7-

paced while he talked to Lt. Musser. The Defendant stated that one of 

the females was his girlfriend and called her “crazy” and tried to move 

in close to Lt. Musser. Lt. Musser asked him to step back. He stepped 

back to [sic] and continued to talk with Lt. Musser. The Defendant’s

behavior during his interaction with Lt. Musser fluctuated rapidly 

between trying to shake hands and smiling to being agitated and 

defensive, all while being unable to stand still and pacing.

The Defendant indicated that he had texts from his girlfriend 

inviting him [to the apartment]. He said his phone was inside but he 

did not want to show it to the officers. The Defendant then asked to 

go inside to get his phone. Before Lt. Musser responded, the 

Defendant swiftly turned to go into the apartment to retrieve his 

phone. Lt. Musser said “Hang on” and twice told him not to go in 

because he did not live there.

The Defendant approached the door. Officer May was in the 

doorway with the two residents also outside talking with Officer May.

The Defendant disregarded Lt. Musser’s instruction and 

moved to enter the residence. The Defendant moved towards Officer 

May and told him he “would be pissed” if the officers had his phone. 

Lt. Musser approached and repeated that the Defendant should not go 

in because he did not live there. The Defendant said something about 

his phone to the two females standing outside the doorway and 

pointed at them.

The Defendant continued to move in very close to Officer May. 

Officer May put his open hand out to stop the Defendant from entering 

the apartment. The Defendant tried to push past Officer May. Officer 

May directed the Defendant to back up.

Having disregarded multiple orders to not enter the residence 

and repeated instructions to stay back from the officers, Lt. Musser 

pulled out his handcuffs to detain the Defendant. The Defendant 

turned around, immediately pushed Lt. Musser, and attempted to flee. 

Lt. Musser testified that at that moment, he was detaining the 

Defendant so that they could finish their initial investigation. The 

Defendant pushed Lt. Musser and attempted to flee on foot less than 

three minutes after Officer Jagger’s initial contact and less than two 

minutes after Lt. Musser and Officer May’s arrival on scene.
Case No. 9-23-31

-8-

Nearly immediately after pushing away from Lt. Musser, 

Officer May was able to bring the Defendant to the ground. A struggle 

ensued with all three officers attempting to detain the Defendant. 

After one minute of struggling, one handcuff was finally able to be 

placed on the Defendant. The Defendant then pulled his arms free with 

one handcuff and reached and pulled on Officer May’s holstered gun. 

At this point, the struggle escalated. Officer May was able to reach 

one hand back and hit the Defendant’s hand from his gun. 

During the struggle, Officer Jagger attempted to secure the 

Defendant’s lower half by wrapping up his legs while Officer May 

admittedly had a hold around the Defendant’s neck and shoulder area. 

Officer May testified that, while he had a hold of the Defendant by 

the neck and shoulders, he was not applying pressure to the 

Defendant’s neck. It was not until the Defendant pulled on Officer 

May’s gun that he applied pressure to the Defendant’s windpipe 

briefly to gain compliance. This testimony is corroborated by the body 

cam videos. While the Defendant at one point states that he can’t 

breathe, it appears that this is right after being sprayed in the face with 

mace. During a nearly three minute struggle, the Defendant was tased 

multiple times and sprayed in the face with mace.

During the initial three minutes of the struggle, the Defendant 

repeatedly failed to comply with the officers’ instructions to stop 

resisting. The Defendant flailed, kicked, evasively moved his limbs, 

and did anything possible to not comply with the officer’s attempts to 

detain him, even after being tased, drive stunned, and maced.

The Defendant was told to put his hands behind his back. There 

was also a warning that the officers were going to tase the Defendant. 

The officer told him once the cuffs were on, the officer would let the 

Defendant back up. The Defendant then attempted to fight with the 

officers further.

This resistance led to the officers using the taser a number of 

times. Defendant offered Exhibit “F” which is a taser report showing 

the taser was deployed five times in the span of one minute. It was not 

possible to determine how many of those taser deployments actually

made contact with the Defendant given the struggle. The Defendant 

was also maced at least twice.
Case No. 9-23-31

-9-

As soon as Lt. Musser was able to secure the Defendant in 

handcuffs, Officer May got off the Defendant. The Defendant

appeared to stop resisting and was brought to his feet.

The Defendant then failed to comply with the officers orders 

while on his feet. The Defendant asked officers to “please stop” 

multiple times but was resisting and tensing up while doing so. He 

was taken to the ground again by Officer May. He was pinned there 

by Officer May and was given water to clear his eyes from the mace 

by the officers. Shortly thereafter, EMS arrived on the scene to give 

attention to the Defendant. The Defendant was ultimately walked to 

the stretcher to take the Defendant to the hospital.

The Defendant presented testimony from Ron Scheiderer, who 

was qualified, over the State’s objection, as an expert in “General Law 

Enforcement and Arresting Procedures.” Mr. Scheiderer opined that 

Lt. Musser did not have the authority to detain the Defendant. Mr. 

Sheiderer [sic] also opined that the Officers did not follow proper 

procedures by utilizing “chokeholds” and using profane language.

(Doc. No. 116).

Analysis

{¶9} Houle argued to the trial court that officers lacked authority to “arrest” 

him when he was first approached by Lt. Musser with handcuffs. The trial court 

denied his suppression motion and Houle now renews his argument on appeal. 

{¶10} Contrary to Houle’s argument, and as the trial court determined, Lt. 

Musser did not approach Houle initially with his handcuffs to “arrest” him; rather, 

Lt. Musser approached Houle to place him under an investigatory detention. A 

reasonable suspicion is all that is required for an investigative detention, which is 

less than the probable cause standard for arrest. State v. Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 
Case No. 9-23-31

-10-

363, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10. Thus any arguments related to Houle’s “arrest” are 

premature given that Houle was only being detained when he was approached by 

Lt. Musser.

{¶11} Here, Lt. Musser needed a reasonable suspicion to justify an 

investigative detention when he approached Houle with the handcuffs. Id.

Reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop “is dependent upon both the content 

of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 

496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). To determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion 

for an investigatory “Terry” stop or detention, the totality of the circumstances must 

be considered and viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police 

officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold. State v. Hawkins, 158 

Ohio St.3d 94, 2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 21. 

{¶12} In this case, at the time Lt. Musser attempted to detain Houle, an 

identified citizen informant had told police that he believed the mother of his 

children was in an apartment in Marion perhaps with another female being 

threatened by a man with a knife. Officers were dispatched to the apartment with a 

“tone” meaning that the situation could be dangerous. The first officer to arrive 

found Houle to be evasive and combative, including balling his fists. She also 

believed that Houle may have been “high” on some type of drug.

{¶13} Although Houle did allow himself to be patted down, once he was

outside the apartment he was continuously pacing and approaching the officers 
Case No. 9-23-31

-11-

while they were trying to investigate the matter. Houle then began talking about his 

cell phone and he indicated that he wanted to go get it, so he tried to go into the 

apartment where he had already stated he did not live, even though the doorway was 

blocked by an officer. Houle told the officers that they better not have his phone.

{¶14} Houle’s relatively erratic activity prompted Lt. Musser to pull out his 

handcuffs to detain Houle so the officers could speak with everyone present and 

learn what had occurred at the scene. Under the totality of the circumstances, this 

was sufficient at the time for Lt. Musser to pull out his handcuffs and attempt to 

briefly detain Houle so that the matter could be investigated. See State v. Everett, 

11th Dist. Lake No. 2018-L-142, 2019-Ohio-2397, ¶ 35 (“When a police officer 

makes a stop supported by reasonable suspicion, he is authorized to take such steps 

as reasonably necessary to protect his personal safety and to maintain the status quo 

during the course of the stop” such as handcuffing an individual even if he is not yet 

under arrest.) Therefore, Houle’s first argument is not well-taken.

{¶15} Houle next argues that the trial court erred by denying his suppression 

motion because he contends the third-party individual’s call to dispatch was not 

corroborated. However, Houle’s premise is flawed because officers at the scene 

specifically testified to the reasons beyond the call itself and why Houle was going 

to be detained. Lt. Musser specifically testified: 

he’s being evasive. You know, I have to ask the same question 

multiple times. He walked up in my space. He had a blank stare on his 

face, saying she’s crazy. The entire time, you know, he’s kind of 
Case No. 9-23-31

-12-

pacing around. And then he went into the – tried to go into the 

apartment, and I thought it was a good idea – we’re gonna detain him 

right now, sit him down, away from everything, so we can, you know, 

figure out what’s going on at the scene.

(Tr. at 81-82). We find that Houle’s detention was never based entirely on 

purportedly uncorroborated information from a citizen-caller.1 Therefore, this 

argument is not well-taken.

{¶16} Finally, Houle argues that he was illegally arrested. However, at the 

time he was arrested Houle had fled from an investigative detention, had repeatedly 

and physically resisted the officers, and had tried to remove an officer’s firearm 

from its holster. He committed violations of law directly in front of law enforcement 

and was properly subject to a lawful arrest. See State v. Pitts, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-220080, 2022-Ohio-4172, ¶ 16-17. Therefore we find no error here and Houle’s 

first assignment of error is overruled.

2

Second Assignment of Error

1 Notably, some points from the caller’s information were corroborated such as the number of people in the 

residence and that there was specifically 1 male and 1-2 females.

2 We note that while Houle argues that law enforcement used excessive force in arresting him by employing 

a “chokehold,” the only indication that any pressure was placed on Houle’s throat was the officer testifying 

that when Houle grabbed the firearm and pulled on it, he then began choking Houle because it became a 

deadly force situation.
Case No. 9-23-31

-13-

{¶17} In his second assignment of error, Houle argues that the trial court 

erred by failing to provide jury instructions on self-defense, excessive force, and 

lawful resisting.

Standard of Review

{¶18} We review a trial court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction 

under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Thompson, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-16-

10, 2017-Ohio-792, ¶ 11. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision 

was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 

217, 219 (1983).

Analysis

{¶19} Defense counsel requested jury instructions on self-defense, excessive 

force, and lawful resisting and these instructions were denied by the trial court. We 

will review each of the proposed instructions in turn.

{¶20} With regard to self-defense, the trial court determined, inter alia, that 

a self-defense instruction was not warranted here based on the evidence that Houle 

created the danger. After reviewing the evidence, we agree with the trial court. See 

State v. Crowe, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-19-12, 2019-Ohio-3986 (indicating the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying instruction on self-defense when 

evidence negated element of self-defense).3 Moreover, Houle did not present 

3 We also note that Houle did not provide notice of self-defense under Crim.R. 12.2.
Case No. 9-23-31

-14-

evidence that would tend to support an instruction for self-defense. See State v. 

Estelle, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-20-50, 2021-Ohio-2636, ¶ 18 (a defendant claiming 

self-defense has the burden of production), Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion 

with the trial court declining to instruct the jury on self-defense.

{¶21} With regard to his request for a jury instruction on “excessive force,” 

Houle proposed the following jury instruction: “‘EXCESSIVE FORCE’ ‘An arrest 

is not lawful, under Ohio law, if the arresting officer(s) used excessive force.’”

4

(Doc. No. 145). In denying the proposed instruction, the trial court again found that 

the evidence did not support the instruction and we can find no abuse of discretion 

with this finding. Three officers attempted to subdue Houle and despite the force 

used they still had trouble subduing him. Testimony indicated that the only time any 

“deadly” force was used was after Houle tried to pull an officer’s gun out of his 

holster. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion and Houle’s 

argument is not well-taken.

{¶22} Finally, Houle contended that a jury instruction on “lawful resisting” 

should have been provided to the jury. Specifically, Houle wanted the jury to be 

instructed that, “A person is privileged to resist an unlawful arrest.” However, as 

the trial court noted in denying this instruction, the arrest had already been 

determined to be lawful at the suppression hearing. We have similarly found that 

4 Houle cited White v. Ebie, 191 F.3d 454, 1999 WL 775914, as support for his proposed instruction.
Case No. 9-23-31

-15-

the arrest was lawful. Thus the instruction could only serve to confuse the jury, and 

we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination. For all these 

reasons, Houle’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Third Assignment of Error

{¶23} In his third assignment of error, Houle argues that the trial court erred 

by excluding testimony from his “expert” witness at the trial.

Standard of Review

{¶24} The admissibility of expert testimony is a matter committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court’s ruling will not be overturned 

absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Waldock, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-14-22, 

2015-Ohio-1079, ¶ 62, citing Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 42, 2006-Ohio3561, ¶ 9.

Analysis

{¶25} At the suppression hearing in this case, defense counsel presented the 

testimony of Ron Scheiderer. Over strenuous objection from the State, Scheiderer 

was classified as an expert in “General Law Enforcement and Arresting 

Procedures.” Scheiderer testified, inter alia, that he felt that the officers in this case 

did not use proper procedures by employing a chokehold on Houle and by using 

profane language during the incident. He also opined that the officers lacked 

authority to detain Houle at the scene. Defense counsel sought to introduce 

Scheiderer’s testimony again at trial, and the State again objected, indicating that 
Case No. 9-23-31

-16-

Scheiderer’s testimony would not be helpful to the jury given that Houle’s

detainment and arrest had been ruled lawful by the trial court at the suppression 

hearing.

{¶26} The trial court allowed defense counsel to proffer Scheiderer’s 

testimony and during his proffer Scheiderer testified, inter alia, that the altercation 

was unnecessary and escalated by the officers, that the chokehold was illegal, that 

Officer Jagger was belligerent and out of control because she used profanity and 

tased Houle, that the force used was excessive, that the charges were “stack[ed]” 

and “slinging mud on the wall and see what’s gonna stick.” (Tr. at 426). Scheiderer 

also testified that in his opinion it was not clear that Houle was attempting to remove 

the officer’s gun from the holster, and that Houle could not have removed it anyway 

because of the locking devices in the holster.

{¶27} After hearing the proffered testimony, the trial court refused to permit 

Scheiderer to testify before the jury ruling, in part, as follows:

A lot of the testimony was factual interpretations that I think would 

be jury questions and it’s his – not expert opinion. Some of those 

things were not expert opinions of his interpretation of certain facts. 

Some of what he said was speculative and inadmissible hearsay about 

a caller, about what Mr. Houle was thinking. So there were some 

things that would be inadmissible in that regard. I think at the 

suppression hearing he was deemed an expert in general law 

enforcement procedures and arresting procedures. My conclusion is 

that that issue has been decided. And I’ve decided that it was a lawful 

arrest, an investigatory detention that turned into a lawful arrest based 

on the suppression hearing. * * * So I think it would confuse the jury. 

So based on that testimony, I don’t think I’m gonna allow that 

testimony. So that’s the rule.
Case No. 9-23-31

-17-

(Tr. at 440-441).

{¶28} Houle now argues that the trial court erred and should have permitted 

Scheiderer’s testimony. However, we can find no abuse of the discretion in the trial 

court’s determination, particularly given that the lawfulness of the detention and 

arrest had been determined at the suppression hearing. 

{¶29} Moreover, Scheiderer was attempting to testify, in part, to ultimate 

issues in the case, which is generally inadmissible unless it is in an area of 

specialized knowledge. “[E]xpert opinion testimony as to the ultimate issue requires 

the application of expert knowledge not within the common knowledge of the jury.” 

State v. Beasley, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2022-L-040, 2023-Ohio-670, ¶ 56. Here there 

is no indication that Scheiderer was going to provide testimony that was not within 

any common knowledge of a jury or was not within the ability of the jury to 

understand.

5 We can find no abuse of discretion and find that the trial court properly

excluded Scheiderer’s testimony. Therefore, Houle’s third assignment of error is 

overruled.

Fourth Assignment of Error

5 Houle also argues that rather than excluding Scheiderer’s testimony altogether, the trial court should have 

permitted some testimony at least on the use of force, police training, and the use of chokeholds. However, 

we fail to see how this was relevant to the actual charges at issue given that the detainment and arrest were 

ruled lawful. We also note that the cases cited by Houle in his brief to attack the issues are either 

distinguishable or not relevant to our decision.
Case No. 9-23-31

-18-

{¶30} In his fourth assignment of error, Houle argues that the trial court erred 

by failing to merge his convictions for purposes of sentencing. However, Houle 

acknowledges that he did not argue allied offenses at the trial court level, thus the 

matter must be reviewed for plain error.

Standard of Review

{¶31} Generally we review whether offenses should merge for purposes of 

sentencing de novo. State v. Bailey, 171 Ohio St.3d 486, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 6.

However, where a defendant fails to preserve the issue for appeal, we review the 

matter for plain error. Id.

{¶32} Under the plain-error doctrine, intervention by a reviewing court is 

warranted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice. State v. Long, 

53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. To prevail under the plainerror doctrine, a defendant must establish that an error occurred, that the error was 

obvious, and that there is a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice, 

meaning that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Bailey at ¶ 8. The elements 

of the plain-error doctrine are conjunctive: all three must apply to justify an 

appellate court’s intervention. Id.

Relevant Authority

Revised Code 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, states: 

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 
Case No. 9-23-31

-19-

indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, 

but the defendant may be convicted of only one.

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses 

of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more 

offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a 

separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain 

counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of 

all of them.

{¶33} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio held the following with regard to determining allied offenses:

1. In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar 

import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three 

separate factors—the conduct, the animus, and the import.

2. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the 

meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes 

offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from 

each offense is separate and identifiable.

3. Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports 

multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of 

the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar 

import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed 

separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed 

with separate animus.

The Supreme Court in Ruff explained:

At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts of 

a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct. The 

evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal 

whether the offenses have similar import. When a defendant’s 

conduct victimizes more than one person, the harm for each person is 

separate and distinct, and therefore, the defendant can be convicted of 

multiple counts. Also, a defendant’s conduct that constitutes two or 

more offenses against a single victim can support multiple convictions 

if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable 
Case No. 9-23-31

-20-

from the harm of the other offense. We therefore hold that two or more 

offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 

2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses 

involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense 

is separate and identifiable.

Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995 at ¶ 26. 

Analysis

{¶34} Under the applicable legal authority, the offenses do not merge for 

purposes of sentencing in this case if, inter alia, the conduct was committed 

separately or there were separate victims for each of the offenses. Here, the 

Aggravated Robbery under R.C. 2911.01(B) was undertaken and completed when 

Houle grabbed the officer’s firearm and pulled on it. By contrast, the Obstructing 

Official Business occurred multiple times when Houle ran from the officers, 

wrestled with the officers, and fought against the officers. 

{¶35} In fact, Houle’s actions related to Obstructing Official Business 

caused physical harm to multiple officers, separate and distinct from the harm 

related to the Aggravated Robbery. Officer Jagger was injured, one officer was 

struck with some of the mace and another officer took a taser in the hand while 

attempting to subdue Houle. Thus there were multiple victims of Houle’s offenses.

See Ruff, supra.

{¶36} Given that the acts in question were committed separately and there 

were separate victims for each offense, we do not find that the trial court committed 
Case No. 9-23-31

-21-

plain error by declining to merge the convictions for purposes of sentencing. 

Therefore, Houle’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶37} Having found no error prejudicial to Houle in the particulars assigned 

and argued, his assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Marion 

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. AND ZIMMERMAN, J., concur

/eks