If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

NEW PRODUCTS CORPORATION,

Plaintiff/Counter DefendantAppellant,

UNPUBLISHED

December 19, 2019

v No. 344211

Berrien Circuit Court

HARBOR SHORES BHBT LAND 

DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

LC No. 11-000280-CH

Defendant/Counter Plaintiff/ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

HARBOR SHORES GOLF COURSE, LLC,

Defendant/Counter PlaintiffAppellee,

and

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, 

CORNERSTONE COMMUNITY ASSET FUND, 

INC., CITY OF BENTON HARBOR, BENTON 

CHARTER TOWNSHIP, and HORIZON BANK,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

MICHIGAN MAGNET FUND E, LLC, 

HORIZON BANCORP, and PNC BANK,

Defendants,

and
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LARRY ALLEN HEALD and HEIDI HEALD,

Third-Party Defendants.

Before: METER, P.J., and O’BRIEN and TUKEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this action to quiet title, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order quieting title 

in defendants’ favor under multiple theories. We affirm, albeit only on narrower grounds than 

the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

This action concerns a strip of land that now comprises the 18th hole of the Harbor 

Shores Golf Course—a Jack Nicklaus Signature championship golf course at which the Senior 

Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour Championship Tournament is held biannually. The 

disputed parcel sits along the relocated Paw Paw River to the north. To the south, the disputed 

parcel is bordered by a parcel upon which plaintiff operates a large factory producing automobile 

and machine parts; there is no dispute that plaintiff holds title to this southernmost parcel. In its 

natural state, the disputed parcel consisted mostly of marsh land, suitable mainly for riveradjacent recreation or as a floodplain. With the approval of the National Parks Service and other 

governmental entities, the wetland has now been filled to create land suitable for golfing.

Ownership of the disputed parcel can be traced back to a parent parcel owned in 1950 by 

Elwood and Evelyn McDorman. Since then, however, ownership of the disputed parcel has been 

less than clear. As described by this Court in an opinion resolving an interlocutory appeal:1

In 1950, Elwood and Evelyn McDorman owned a 250-foot-wide parcel of 

land running south from Higman Park Road to the then existing channel of the 

Paw Paw River, which served as the boundary between the city of Benton Harbor 

(Benton Harbor) and Benton Charter Township (the Township). At around that 

time, engineers relocated the river approximately 500 feet north. To facilitate the 

relocation, Benton Harbor purchased a right of way over the McDormans’ land 

for the new channel and transferred to them a 250-foot-wide parcel located to the 

south of their existing parcel. After that transfer, the McDormans owned a 250-

foot-wide strip of land extending from Higman Park Road in the north to Klock 

Road in the south. The parcel in dispute] is that part of the McDormans’ land that 

 1 This Court held that plaintiff’s claims to quiet title, for a permanent injunction against trespass, 

and declaratory relief were to be decided by the trial court, not a jury. New Products Corp v 

Harbor Shores BHBT Land Dev, LLC, 308 Mich App 638; 866 NW2d 850 (2014).
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was located in the Township before the relocation of the river, but which is now 

south of the relocated river.

New Products owns and operates a manufacturing facility in Benton 

Harbor along Klock Road. In 1955, New Products acquired the parcel that 

Benton Harbor transferred to the McDormans as part of the project to relocate the 

river along with the disputed parcel. [The parcel was first transferred from the 

McDormans to John Crow and Barbara Crow, who conveyed the property to 

plaintiffs by quitclaim deed in 1955.] Benton Harbor taxed both parcels and New 

Products paid the taxes. However, the Township continued to tax the disputed 

parcel . . . and listed the taxpayer of record as Frank Hoffman. [New Products 

Corp v Harbor Shores BHBT Land Dev, LLC, 308 Mich App 638, 641-642; 866 

NW2d 850 (2014).]

At the time, Frank Hoffman was the owner of the parcel of land situated north of the Paw Paw 

River, which was previously owned by the McDormans. The McDormans transferred this 

northernmost parcel to Glenlord Realty in 1961 via a deed that stated that land south of the 

relocated Paw Paw River was not included in the sale, as it was otherwise previously conveyed. 

Glenlord Realty subsequently transferred the northernmost parcel to Frank Hoffman, whom the 

township taxed both for the northernmost parcel and the disputed parcel. The Township did not 

assess taxes against plaintiff for the disputed parcel. In 1968, plaintiff recorded its deed to the 

southernmost parcel and the disputed parcel. Then:

In 1970, the Township foreclosed against Hoffman’s property for unpaid 

taxes. The state acquired the property, but transferred it back to Hoffman in 1973

[via redemption deed]. Larry and Heidi Heald acquired the property from 

Hoffman and his co-owners in 1991. Harbor Shores Development then purchased 

the disputed parcel . . . from the Healds in 2007. As part of a large development 

project, Harbor Shores Development conveyed a portion of the disputed parcel to 

Benton Harbor and a portion to defendant Harbor Shores Golf Course, LLC 

(Harbor Shores Golf). [New Products Corp, 308 Mich App at 642.]

When the Healds purchased the property in 1991, their realtor contacted plaintiff’s thenpresident, Stanley Miller, to clarify ownership of the now-disputed parcel, indicating that the 

Hoffmans had paid taxes on the parcel for 38 years, although, “unknown to them, it was not 

legally theirs.” There is no indication in the record that Miller ever took any action with regard 

to this correspondence. Then, in 2005 Chicago Title investigated the chain of title regarding the 

disputed parcel and was unable to determine who, in fact, owned the property.

Sometime in 2006 or 2007, plaintiff’s now-president, Cheryl Miller, became aware of the 

Harbor Shores defendants plans for using the disputed parcel for part of its golf course and 

surrounding residential improvements. In 2007, Miller2 retained a land-surveying firm to survey 

 2 Hereinafter, references to “Miller” in this opinion refer to Cheryl Miller, not Stanly Miller.
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plaintiff’s property, which resulted in the firm posting “no-trespassing” signs on the disputed 

parcel. Also in 2007, Miller contacted the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 

regarding the Harbor Shores defendants’ application for a permit to fill wetlands and floodplains 

on the disputed parcel, indicating that the defendants were not the rightful owners of the 

property.

Sometime in 2008, Miller witnessed plans for the proposed development in the Herald 

Palladium, which indicated that a golf-course hole would be placed on the disputed parcel. In 

March 2008, she contacted a trustee of Harbor Shores requesting a final version of the plans. In 

April 2008, Harbor Shores’s counsel sent Miller a letter arguing that plaintiff’s assertion of 

ownership over the disputed parcel was incorrect, stating:

While I have not had an opportunity to review the vesting deed by which New 

Products took title to its portion of the property in question, the tax description of 

that property on file with Berrien County purports to run to the center of the Paw 

Paw River. If the New Products property in fact extended to the center of the Paw 

Paw River as it exists today, then New Products would own a great deal more 

property than it originally acquired, the Heald’s [sic] would not have owned the 

property they sold Harbor Shores, and the conclusions set forth in New Products’ 

letter would be correct. But, of course, this cannot be, and there is an explanation.

The bed of the Paw Paw River was physically moved some years ago from 

its former location to a place considerably north of that. Moving a monument that 

demarks a property boundary does not, of course, actually extend the property’s 

area. Instead, one seeking to ascertain the actual boundaries of the property must 

reestablish the original location of the boundary. A river, like a tree, a pile of 

stones, or a concrete post, is nothing more than a monument. When the river was 

moved north, the boundary of the New Products property did not follow it. 

Instead, that boundary remained the same, and its location can be ascertained 

through proper surveying techniques.

Plaintiff responded to the letter through its own legal counsel, who emphasized that plaintiff’s 

deed referenced the Paw Paw River “as relocated” and indicated that any future encroachment on 

the disputed parcel would be considered a trespass. In turn, Harbor Shores’s counsel sent 

plaintiff a final letter dated July 1, 2008, stating that, if plaintiff held an interest in the disputed 

parcel, it was divested of any title to the property by its failure to pay property taxes. Harbor 

Shores’s counsel attached to the letter a copy of the 1973 redemption deed and reiterated Harbor 

Shores’s position that the boundary of plaintiff’s property was south of the original river channel. 

Harbor Shores’s counsel invited further communication with plaintiff, stating, “To the extent it 

would be helpful, I would be pleased to discuss this matter with you by telephone or in person.” 

Plaintiff’s counsel did not respond to this last letter.

For her part, Miller attended a meeting with Harbor Shores representatives in September 

2008 at which the parties discussed potential conflicts between the disputed parcel’s use as a golf 

course and plaintiff’s factory operation. Before the meeting, Miller had sent Harbor Shores’s 

counsel a letter indicating that there was no record of any tax delinquency or property sale 

pertaining to plaintiff; at the meeting, however, ownership of the disputed parcel was not 
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discussed. Follow-up correspondence indicates that Miller was concerned about flood 

protection, given that plaintiff had erected flood-control berms on or near the disputed parcel. 

Again, ownership was not discussed.

In late September 2008, plaintiff began filling wetlands on the disputed property in 

preparation for its construction of the 18th hole of the proposed golf course. About that time, 

Miller urged plaintiff’s counsel to file a lawsuit preventing the construction of the golf course.

Plaintiff’s counsel agreed that a lawsuit and a preliminary injunction were necessary to protect 

plaintiff’s interests, but never filed a complaint. Other communications indicate that plaintiff 

and its counsel were disputing attorney fees at the time.

Harbor Shores opened the golf course in 2010. The Senior PGA Championship 

Tournament was scheduled to be held at Harbor Shores in even-numbered years through 2024. 

The course is a Jack Nicklaus Signature championship golf course and the 18th hole sits on the 

disputed parcel. The remaining 17 holes sit on contiguous property, part of which made up the 

original northernmost McDorman parcel. Also completed in tandem with the golf course were 

several residential developments; in total, the mixed use development encompasses 530 acres. 

Additionally, part of the disputed parcel was deeded to the City of Benton Harbor in exchange 

for the city’s agreement to repurpose a city park within the development for the golf course. 

Construction on the disputed parcel ultimately required 34,000 yards of dirt, or 1,200 truckloads. 

The 18th hole was seeded in 2009 and opened for play in August 2010. As it currently stands, 

there is no land available for an alternative 18th-hole location; although an alternative location 

existed as late as September 2010, residential housing has been constructed there. Testimony 

indicated that alterations to the 18th hole would require the approval of Jack Nicklaus’s design 

firm and would likely result in the loss of the course’s status as a championship course.

Plaintiff did not file its complaint until September 2011, asserting inter alia a claim for 

quiet title. Harbor Shores defendants filed a counterclaim for quiet title under MCL 600.2932 

and the marketable record title act. The trial court found inter alia that plaintiff was subject to 

tax foreclosure for failing to pay property tax to the township on the disputed parcel. The trial 

court also found that the Crows’ nonpayment of property tax caused the county to foreclose on 

the disputed parcel, eventually leading to the state’s conveyance of the disputed parcel to 

Hoffman via the redemption deed. Regarding equity, the trial court found that plaintiff’s delay 

in asserting its legal rights to ownership of the disputed parcel until after the completion of the

18th hole and the opening of the golf course barred plaintiff from asserting title to the disputed 

property under the doctrines of laches, unclear hands, and “waiver and estoppel.” The trial court 

also concluded that the Harbor Shores defendants were entitled to title under the marketable 

record title act. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. TAX FORECLOSURE AND REDEMPTION

We first address plaintiff’s challenges to the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff was 

divested of title by the tax events of 1971 to 1973. We review the trial court’s factual findings for 

clear error, City of Novi v Robert Adell Children’s Funded Trust, 473 Mich 242, 249; 701 NW2d 
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144 (2005), and its legal conclusions de novo, In re Treasurer of Wayne Co for Foreclosure, 478 

Mich 1, 6; 732 NW2d 458 (2007).

Plaintiff raises several arguments on appeal challenging the trial court’s factual findings 

and conclusions. As an initial matter, we note that the trial court’s conclusion that the Crows’ 

nonpayment of property tax on the disputed parcel caused the county to foreclose on the property 

is not supported by the record. There is no evidence that the township taxed the Crows for the 

disputed parcel or that the Crows failed to pay any property tax; rather, the record shows that the

township taxed the disputed parcel to Hoffman, whose nonpayment led to the foreclosure 

proceedings and whose subsequent payment of the delinquency led to the redemption deed. The 

trial court mistakenly concluded that the Crows nonpayment caused the county to foreclose on 

the disputed parcel and eventually issue a redemption deed to Hoffman. Not only is this finding 

inaccurate, the trial court also provided no authority for the proposition that a non-owner can 

oust the owner of real property and obtain title for himself by paying the owner’s tax 

delinquency.

Moreover, while we will not address all of plaintiff’s arguments regarding the trial 

court’s tax proceedings findings, perhaps the most significant of plaintiff’s arguments concerning 

the property tax history is that plaintiff was never given notice of the tax proceedings. “[D]ue 

process requires the government to provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 

opportunity to present their objections.” In re Treasurer of Wayne, 478 Mich at 9. There is no 

evidence that the township gave plaintiff notice of its tax assessments or the foreclosure 

proceeding, or that plaintiff received actual notice. Additionally, even if we were to consider the 

redemption deed to Hoffman akin to a tax sale, plaintiffs never received notice of the sale. See 

1970 CL 211.140 (requiring notice to be given to the last grantee in the regular chain of title

before property may be transferred via tax sale).

Is short, the trial court’s analysis of the tax proceedings between 1971 and 1973 was 

inaccurate factually and incomplete legally. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred 

by quieting title in the defendants’ favor on the basis of the tax proceedings.

B. EQUITY

Although we conclude that the trial court’s tax-proceeding conclusions were erroneous, 

we nonetheless affirm the trial court’s rulings in equity. The statute that authorizes an action to 

quiet title, MCL 600.2932, provides that “[a]ctions under this section are equitable in nature.” 

MCL 600.2932(5). Thus, “[a] suit to quiet title or remove a cloud on a title is one in equity.” 

McFerren v B & B Inv Group, 253 Mich App 517, 522; 655 NW2d 779 (2002). We “review de

novo a trial court’s decision whether to apply equitable doctrines,” Home-Owners Ins Co v 

Perkins, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2019) (Docket No. 344926); slip op at 4, but 

review the trial court’s factual findings supporting its decision for clear error, McFerren, 253 

Mich App at 522. Although we closely scrutinize the trial court’s factual findings in an equity 

case, we are cognizant of the trial court’s special opportunity to view the evidence in the first 

instance. In re Conant Estate, 130 Mich App 493, 498-499; 343 NW2d 593 (1983).
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The trial court concluded that the defendants were entitled to judgment in equity under 

the doctrines of laches, unclean hands, and estoppel. “Estoppel by laches is the failure to do 

something which should be done under the circumstances or the failure to claim or enforce a 

right at the proper time.” Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Null, 304 Mich App 508, 537-538; 847 NW2d 

657 (2014). “A party guilty of laches is estopped from asserting a right it could have and should 

have asserted earlier.” Perkins, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op at 8-9 (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). “To successfully assert laches as an affirmative defense, a defendant 

must demonstrate prejudice occasioned by the delay.” Wells Fargo Bank, 304 Mich App at 538. 

The doctrine of laches may bar a claim even where the action is brought within the applicable 

limitations period. Rowry v Univ of Mich, 441 Mich 1, 11; 490 NW2d 305 (1992).

The unclean-hands doctrine is “a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court 

of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks 

relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the [opposing party].” Rose v Nat’l 

Auction Group, 466 Mich 453, 463; 646 NW2d 455 (2002) (internal citation and block notation

omitted). Any willful act that transgresses equitable standards of conduct is sufficient to allow a 

court to deny a party equitable relief. Stachnik v Winkel, 394 Mich 375, 386; 230 NW2d 529 

(1975).

Equitable estoppel occurs when “(1) a party by representation, admissions, or silence, 

intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe facts; (2) the other party justifiably 

relies and acts on this belief; and (3) the other party will be prejudiced if the first party is 

permitted to deny the existence of the facts.” Twp of Williamstown v Sandalwood Ranch, LLC, 

325 Mich App 541, 553; 927 NW2d 262, 270 (2018) (internal citation and block notation 

omitted). “Equitable estoppel is not an independent cause of action, but instead a doctrine that 

may assist a party by precluding the opposing party from asserting or denying the existence of a 

particular fact.” Conagra, Inc v Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich App 109, 140-141; 602 NW2d 

390 (1999). In the context of property rights, “estoppel may be invoked as an equitable defense 

where the plaintiff has observed the defendant dealing with his property in a manner inconsistent 

with his rights and makes no objection, while the defendant changes his position in reliance on

the plaintiff’s silence.” Thiel v Goyings, ___ Mich ___, ___ n 37; ___ NW2d ___ (2019) 

(Docket No. 156708), slip op at 13 (VIVIANO, J., concurring), quoting 42 Am Jur Proof of Facts 

3d 463, 482, § 10 (discussing estoppel in the context of a breach of covenant).

In this case, plaintiff knew about the defendants’ plan to build a golf-course hole on the 

disputed property by at least March 2008. Plaintiff initially asserted its title to the disputed 

property; by the end of September, however, the defendants had made clear that they would not 

recognize plaintiff’s title, asserting instead that the tax proceedings granted title to their 

predecessors in interest. The defendants invited plaintiff to discuss the issue further, but plaintiff 

did not avail itself of this opportunity. Despite having at least one meeting and other further 

communications with the defendants, plaintiff did not again raise the ownership issue.

The Harbor Shores defendants started filling wetlands on the disputed property in late 

September 2008. Plaintiff’s president, Miller, recognized that this action was inconsistent with 

plaintiff’s claim to title, but, despite Millers concerns, she did not further discuss the ownership 

issue with the defendants and plaintiff’s counsel did not file a complaint or seek an injunction. 

Rather, plaintiff waited until 2011—after the golf course had been completed and had opened to 
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the public—to file its complaint and seek an injunction. Plaintiff lodged no complaint while 

1,200 truckloads filled the disputed parcel with 34,000 yards of dirt; while construction crews 

installed drainage, graded, and seeded the parcel; and while the Harbor Shores defendants

undertook other construction projects in places that the 18th hole could have been placed. 

Plaintiffs waited for months while the grass grew on the 18th hole and only took action after the 

public started golfing on it.

The record reveals that open lines of communication existed between plaintiff and the 

relevant defendants. In fact, after explaining its position regarding its title to the disputed 

property, Harbor Shores’s attorney invited additional discussion on the issue. Having received 

no further objections on the title issue, despite communication on other issues, the defendants 

reasonably believed that plaintiff’s objection to their claim of title had ceased. Indeed, this belief 

could only have been enhanced by plaintiff’s silence on the issue throughout the entirety of the 

construction of the 18th hole. On this record, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff’s silence 

on the title issue inequitably induced the defendants’ belief that the issue was resolved and that 

the Harbor Shores defendants justifiably relied on this belief to complete its development on the 

disputed parcel and related property.

3

We also agree with the trial court that the defendants were sufficiently prejudiced by 

plaintiff’s delay to estop plaintiff from reviving its objection to defendants’ title claim in the 

quiet-title action. By the time the case came before the trial court, the golf course had already 

been completed and opened to the public. The Harbor Shores defendants had already 

constructed residential housing or other buildings in places where the 18th hole could have been 

placed; moreover, they had deeded a mitigation parcel on the disputed property to the City of 

Benton Harbor in exchange for the city’s agreement to redevelop a city park and there was no 

other suitable land left to be used as this mitigation parcel. Theoretically, at the time of trial, the 

18th hole could have been shortened from a par-4 to a par-3 hole which would not encroach on 

the disputed parcel; however, doing so would require the approval of Jack Nicklaus’s firm, of 

which there was no guarantee. Moreover, shortening the hole would jeopardize the course’s

designation as a Jack Nicklaus Signature course and would likely mean that the course would no 

longer be considered a championship golf course. Losing its status as a championship course 

likely would mean that the course could no longer host the Senior PGA Championship 

Tournament, despite plans to hold the tournament there biannually through 2024. In turn, loss of 

these statuses jeopardized Harbor Shores Golf Course’s customer base, particularly those 

customers attracted to the course because of its status as a Jack Nicklaus Signature championship 

 3 To the extent that plaintiff blames its delay on its counsel, we note that plaintiff could have 

ended its relationship with its counsel and hired alternative counsel. In any event, any error on 

counsel’s part may be remedied monetarily through a malpractice action. Similarly, plaintiff 

blames the delay on its preoccupation with the bankruptcy of one of its most important clients, 

General Motors. That an unrelated legal entity filed for bankruptcy, however, does not absolve 

plaintiff of its duty as a landowner to assert its ownership interests. Plaintiff was aware of the 

development and there is no indication in the record that General Motor’s bankruptcy precluded 

plaintiff in any way from asserting its legal rights.
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golf course associated with the PGA. Even harder to quantify would be the economic impact of 

the loss of the Senior PGA championship and the course’s championship designation on the 

residential portions of the development.

In short, we agree with the trial court that, under the doctrines of laches, unclean hands, 

and estoppel, plaintiff should be estopped from reviving its objection to defendants’ title to the 

disputed parcel. Plaintiff, however, raises two arguments on appeal challenging the application 

of the doctrine of laches to the instant dispute, which require further discussion. Neither 

argument is meritorious.

First, plaintiff argues that the defendants cannot rely on laches because a remedy exists 

under MCR 3.411(F). MCR 3.411 governs procedure in civil actions to determine interests in 

land under MCL 600.2932 and MCR 3.411(F) provides a procedure in which the non-prevailing 

party may present a claim for the value of buildings erected and improvements made on the 

disputed property:

(1) Within 28 days after the finding of title, a party may file a claim 

against the party found to have title to the premises for the amount that the present 

value of the premises has been increased by the erection of buildings or the 

making of improvements by the party making the claim or those through whom 

he or she claims.

(2) The court shall hear evidence as to the value of the buildings erected 

and the improvements made on the premises, and the value the premises would 

have if they had not been improved or built upon. The court shall determine the 

amount the premises would be worth at the time of the claim had the premises not 

been improved, and the amount the value of the premises was increased at the 

time of the claim by the buildings erected and improvements made.

(3) The party claiming the value of the improvements may not recover 

their value if they were made in bad faith.

While it is true that MCR 3.411(F) would grant certain of the defendants the right to 

recover for the physical improvements made to the disputed property—e.g., the installation of 

drainage and the filling, grading, and seeding of the property—such a remedy would be wholly 

inadequate in this case. Indeed, as already shown, the bulk of the Harbor Shores defendants’

losses from an adverse title ruling would not be in the form of lost construction costs, but rather 

by the loss of an opportunity to erect the 18th hole in a different location to retain the golf 

course’s status as a Jack Nicklaus Signature championship golf course. Without repeating the 

above analysis, the record shows that plaintiff’s delay in filing its suit artificially increased the 

risks associated with the property action, such that an adverse property ruling would have drastic, 

seemingly permanent economic consequences for the development as a whole, which could not 

be remedied by a monetary award equal to the increased value of the disputed parcel itself. 

Accordingly, we conclude that MCR 3.411(F) poses no impediment to the trial court’s laches 

ruling, because the remedy provided by MCR 3.411(F) is inadequate to cure the prejudice 

defendants suffered by plaintiff’s delay in filing its suit.
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Similarly, plaintiff argues that the doctrine of laches has no application where a title is 

validly recorded. In support of this position, plaintiff cites Angeloff v Smith, 254 Mich 99, 101; 

235 NW 823 (1931), for its proposition that: “Where the right is not an executory one but is a 

vested legal title, the doctrine of laches has little, if any, application. 21 CJ p 215. This is 

particularly true where the title is of record for the world to see.” Having reviewed this case, 

which involved a divorcee’s challenge to the sale of joint property after divorce, see id. at 100-

101, we cannot conclude that Angeloff establishes such a broad prohibition. Rather, despite this 

seemingly expansive language, the Angeloff court actually engaged in a traditional laches 

analysis: noting that the equities ran in the plaintiff’s favor because she did not engage in any

undue delay and the purchasers bought the property with notice of her title. Id. at 101-102. Our 

Supreme Court concluded, “The case is not accompanied by elements of estoppel, and plaintiff 

cannot, under the circumstances, be held guilty of laches.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added).

This is not the type of analysis establishing an absolute rule prohibiting laches from 

defeating a recorded property interest; at most, Angeloff stands for the proposition that only in 

rare cases will laches defeat a recorded property interest. See Zlydasdyk v Lucas, 29 Mich App 

584, 587-588; 185 NW2d 838 (1971) (reversing the trial court’s ruling rejecting the defendant’s 

argument that the doctrine of laches could not apply where the plaintiff held record title to land). 

If it is indeed a rare case in which laches will defeat a recorded property interest, we believe that 

the drastic consequences attendant to plaintiff’s delay in this case establishes the exception to the 

general proposition. In any event, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff was estopped from 

challenging the defendants’ title under the doctrines of unclean hands and estoppel and we are 

unable to find any challenge to those theories in Angeloff.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that defendants were entitled to judgment 

in equity under the doctrines of laches, unclean hands, and estoppel.

C. MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT

Finally, although we technically need not address this case further, given our affirmance 

of the trial court’s equity rulings, we will briefly address the trial court’s conclusion that the 

Harbor Shores defendants held title to the disputed parcel under the marketable record title act, 

MCL 565.101 et seq.

MCL 565.101(1) provides:

Any person, that has the legal capacity to own land in this state, that has 

an unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for 20 years for mineral 

interests and 40 years for other interests, is at the end of the applicable period 

considered to have a marketable record title to that interest, subject only to claims 

to that interest and defects of title as are not extinguished or barred by application 

of this act and subject also to any interests and defects as are inherent in the 

provisions and limitations contained in the muniments of which the chain of 

record title is formed and that are recorded within 2 years after the effective date 

of the amendatory act that added section 2(2)1 or during the 20-year period for 

mineral interests and the 40-year period for other interests. However, a person is 
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not considered to have a marketable record title by reason of this act if the land in 

which the interest exists is in the hostile possession of another.

At the time relevant, MCL 565.102 provided4:

A person is considered to have an unbroken chain of title to an interest in 

land as provided in section 1 when the official public records disclose either of the 

following:

(a) A conveyance or other title transaction not less than 20 years in the 

past for mineral interests and 40 years for other interests, which conveyance or 

other title transaction purports to create the interest in that person, with nothing 

appearing of record purporting to divest that person of the purported interest.

(b) A conveyance or other title transaction not less than 20 years in the 

past for mineral interests and 40 years for other interests, which conveyance or 

other title transaction purports to create the interest in some other person and 

other conveyances or title transactions of record by which the purported interest 

has become vested in the person first referred to in this section, with nothing 

appearing of record purporting to divest the person first referred to in this section 

of the purported interest.

The 1971 tax deed was recorded on August 6, 1971. Although the tax deed and 

subsequent redemption deeds were defective for the reasons described earlier, they nonetheless 

“purport[] to create the interest” in the state. MCL 565.102(1)(b). The redemption deed 

“purports” to pass this interest to Hoffman. Plaintiff emphasizes that the tax deed was nullified 

by the redemption deed, and that the redemption deed did nothing more than restore the status 

quo before the tax foreclosure, but the key word in the statute is “purports.” The pertinent 

inquiry is not whether the recorded instruments were based entirely on valid transactions, but 

whether they purported to declare a conveyance of record. Consequently, the recorded tax deed 

 4 MCL 565.102 was amended by 2018 PA 572, effective March 29, 2019, to add Subsection 2, 

which provides:

For purposes of this section, except as to mineral interests, a conveyance 

or other title transaction in the chain of title purports to divest an interest in the 

property only if it creates the divestment or if it specifically refers by liber and 

page or other county-assigned unique identifying number to a previously recorded 

conveyance or other title transaction that created the divestment.

Because Subsection (2) did not become effective until after plaintiff filed this lawsuit, it is not 

applicable. If it applied, however, plaintiff would prevail because none of the title transactions 

created plaintiff’s divestment in the disputed parcel or referred by liber and page to a transaction 

that created a divestment.
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began a 40-year chain of unbroken record title as of the date plaintiff filed its complaint in 

September 2011. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by concluding that the defendants were 

entitled to judgment under the marketable record title act.

Affirmed.

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Jonathan Tukel