[Cite as State v. Good , 2021-Ohio-4560.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT AUGLAIZE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-21-02

v. BRETT S. GOOD, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2017 CR 0001 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: December 27, 2021

APPEARANCES: 

### Rob C. Wiesenmayer, II for Appellant



### Edwin A. Pierce & Reed D. Searcy for AppelleeCase No. 2-21-02

-2- MILLER, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Brett S. Good, appeals the February 19, 20 21 judgment of the Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas vacating his resentencing hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Background {¶2} This case arises from a December 31, 2016 incident in which mem bers of the Wapakoneta Police Department responded to a report of a female who was afraid to leave her residence for fear her husband, Good, would harm himself. At the scene, Good immediately entered a patrol vehicle and, despi te not being placed under arrest, requested to be taken to the police department to be interviewed. During his interview with law enforcement, Good admitted to a n umber of sexuallymotivated crimes involving two minor children living in his hou sehold, which occurred over the course of more than one year. The victims we re interviewed and corroborated Good’s admission. Following the interviews with t he victims, Good

was arrested. {¶3} On January 5, 2017, the Auglaize County Grand Jury indicted Goo d on 41 counts: Counts One to Ten of rape in violation of R.C. 2907 .02(A)(1)(b) with an allegation that the victim was less than ten years of age at the time of the offense, first-degree felonies; Counts Eleven to Sixteen of rape in viol ation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) with the allegation that the victim was less t han 13 years of age atCase No. 2-21-02

-3- the time of the offense, first-degree felonies; and Counts Seve nteen to Forty One of rape with the allegation that the victim was compelled to submi t by force or threat of force in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); first-degree felon ies. (Doc. No. 1). On January 6, 2017, Good appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the counts

of the indictment. {¶4} On July 5, 2017, Good appeared for a change-of-plea hearing. U nder a negotiated plea agreement, Good withdrew his pleas of not guilt y and entered guilty pleas to Counts One, Eleven, and Seventeen. In exchange, the S tate asked for leave to nolle prosequi the remaining counts of the indictment. The trial court accepted Good’s guilty pleas, found him guilty of the offenses and grant ed the State’s motion to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment. {¶5} The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing where it im posed a jointly-recommended sentence. With respect to Count One, the trial court sentenced Good to a term of 25 years to life in prison. With r espect to Count Eleven, the trial court sentenced Good to 25 years to life in prison. With respect to Count Seventeen, the trial court sentenced Good to a term of 11 years in prison. Pursuant to the parties’ recommendation, the trial court ordered the sen tences to run concurrently for an aggregate sentence of 25 years to life in p rison. On July 6, 2017, the trial court filed its judgment entry of conviction and sent ence.Case No. 2-21-02

-4- {¶6} On March 19, 2020, Good filed a motion to withdraw his guilty p leas after sentencing pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Good alleged that h is guilty pleas were invalid because they were not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Specifically, Good argued the 25 years to life in prison impose d for Counts One and Eleven were not authorized by law. On May 26, 2020, the State responded to Good’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after sentencing. O n May 28, 2020, the trial court filed a judgment entry denying Good’s motion to wit hdraw his guilty pleas. However, the trial court set the matter for a resentenc ing hearing. {¶7} On June 16, 2020, Good filed a notice of appeal. On June 25, 2 020, the trial court vacated Good’s resentencing hearing while his appea l was pending. On January 25, 2021, this Court dismissed Good’s appeal on the gro unds that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the trial court’s o rder denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was not a final, a ppealable order. On February 19, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment entry vaca ting Good’s resentencing hearing and finding that a resentencing hearing wa s barred by State v.

Henderson , 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784. {¶8} On March 19, 2021, Good filed a notice of appeal. He raises fo ur assignments of error for our consideration. Assignment of Error No. I The trial court’s actions of failing to comply with Criminal Ru le 11(C)(2)(a) requiring the defendant-appellant to understand theCase No. 2-21-02

-5- correct statutory maximum penalties in order for his pleas to b e knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and thereafter in sentencin g the defendant-appellant to statutorily excessive penalties whic h are void ab initio and resulted in manifest injustice to the defendant-appellant entitle him to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Criminal Rule 32.1. Assignment of Error No. II The failure of defense counsel to adequately advise the defenda ntappellant about the correct maximum penalties as to Counts One (1) and Eleven (11) constituted denial of effective assistance of counsel rendering his pleas of guilty involuntary, and impaired the knowing and voluntary nature of his pleas, requiring that t he defendant-appellant be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Assignment of Error No. III The trial court [erred] in sentencing the defendant-appellant t o concurrent sentences of twenty-five (25) years to possible life imprisonment as to amended Counts One (1) and Eleven (11) acted contrary to law and exceeded the statutory requirements pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2971.03(B)(1)(b) resulting in a sentence contrary to law. Assignment of Error No. IV The timeliness of defendant-appellant filing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Criminal Rule 32.1 should not bar him from relief due to the trial court advising him tha t in following the joint sentencing recommendation that the defendant-appellant would waive all rights to appeal. Said wai ver was not voluntary as it was based on errors by the trial court.

Discussion {¶9} Appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to wit hdraw a guilty plea is limited to whether the trial court abused its di scretion. State v.Case No. 2-21-02

-6- Cartlidge , 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-21-06, 2021-Ohio-3787, ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. State v. Adams , 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). {¶10} A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by Crim.R. 32.1, which provides: A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice t he court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and per mit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea. A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty or no-contest plea aft er sentencing bears the burden of demonstrating a “manifest injustice.” State v. James , 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-19-30, 2020-Ohio-720, ¶ 11, citing State v. Smith , 49 Ohio St.3d 261 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[A] postsentence w ithdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” Smith at 264. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined the manifest injustice standard as a “clear or open ly unjust act.” State

ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner , 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208 (1998). “‘A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of t he State’s case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.’” State v. Kimpel , 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-12, 2018-Ohio-2246, ¶ 16, quoting Brady v. United States , 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1463 (1970). “‘A “manifest injus tice” comprehends a fundamental flaw in the path of justice so extraordinary that the defendant couldCase No. 2-21-02

-7- not have sought redress from the resulting prejudice through an other form of application reasonably available to him or her.’” State v. Brooks , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23385, 2010-Ohio-1682, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Hartzell , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17499, *2 (Aug. 20, 1999). {¶11} Good raises three principal arguments in support of his positio n that he suffered a manifest injustice and, therefore, the trial cour t erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea after the imposition of sent ence. First, Good claims that he suffered a manifest injustice because the trial court failed to properly advise him of the correct maximum penalties prior to his change of plea. Second, Good argues that he suffered a manifest injustice because the t rial court imposed a

sentence that is contrary to la w. Finally, Go od c ontends that h e suffered a manifest injustice because he received ineffective assistance of trial c ounsel. We address

each of Good’s contentions in turn. {¶12} First, we consider Good’s argument regarding the trial court’s failure to correctly explain the maximum statutory penalties with respe ct to Counts One and Eleven. Good argues that the trial court abused its discre tion by denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, in part, beca use the trial court conducted an inadequate plea colloquy. Specifica lly, Good contends the trial court violated Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) because he was incorrectly notifie d of the maximumCase No. 2-21-02

-8- penalties he faced with respect to Counts One and Eleven, a def ect which Good argues renders the enforcement of his plea unconstitutional. {¶13} Crim.R. 11, which outlines the procedures that trial courts mus t follow when accepting pleas, “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntari ly made.’” State v. Dangler , 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone , 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). “If the plea was not made knowingly, in telligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.” Id. at ¶ 10. Crim.R. 11(C)(2), which applies specifically to a trial court’s accepta nce of pleas in felony cases, provides as follows: (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of g uilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally * * * and doi ng all of the following: (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maxi mum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sancti ons at the sentencing hearing. (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment a nd sentence. (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the right s to juryCase No. 2-21-02

-9- trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compul sory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and t o require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reaso nable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. Crim.R. 11 “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequen ces of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’ ” Dangler at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone at 168. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently reaffirmed that “our focus in reviewing pleas has not been on whether the trial judge has ‘[incanted] the precise verbiage’ of the rule, State v. Stewart , 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977), but on whether the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the conseq uences of his plea[.]” Dangler at ¶ 12, citing State v. Veney , 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio5200, ¶ 15-16. {¶14} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reverse d on appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trialcourt proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13, citing State v. Perry , 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶ 14-15; Crim.R. 52. Gene rally, to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant would have to establish t hat “his plea would

not have otherwise been made.” Dangler at ¶ 24.Case No. 2-21-02

-10- {¶15} There are limited exceptions to the prejudice requirement in th e criminal-plea context. “When a trial court fails to explain th e constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we pr esume that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of pr ejudice is required.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing State v. Clark , 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 31 and Veney at syllabus. The “constitutional” rights are set forth in Cri m.R. 11(C)(2)(c) above. See Dangler at ¶ 14. When a trial court fails to fully cover “nonconstitutional” rights in Crim.R. 11, “a defendant must aff irmatively show prejudice to invalidate a plea.” Dangler at ¶ 14, citing Clark at ¶ 17. {¶16} The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized one other exception to the prejudice requirement: “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudi ce.” (Emphasis sic.) Dangler at ¶ 15, citing State v. Sarkozy , 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22. However, “[a]side from these two exceptions, the tradition al rule continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unl ess he demonstrates that he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to compl y with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero , 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwi se been made.’” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Nero at 108.Case No. 2-21-02

-11- {¶17} Good argues that the trial court’s Crim.R. 11 colloquy was defe ctive because the trial court failed to properly advise him of the ma ximum penalties with respect to Counts One and Eleven. Good’s argument is without me rit. {¶18} With respect to Count One, rape of a victim less than 10 years old, the trial court had the option of sentencing Good to (1) a term of life imprisonment without parole pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B) or (2) a minimum ter m of 15 years and a maximum term of life imprisonment with the possibility of par ole pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b). With respect to Count Eleven, rape of a vict im less than 13 years old, the required sentence pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(a) wa s 10 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. {¶19} At the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court informed Good th at, with respect to Count One, it had the option of imposing a prison te rm of 25 years to life or a prison term of life without parole. (July 5, 2017 Tr. at 9-10). With respect to Count Eleven, the trial court advised Good that the charge carr ied a sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole. ( Id. at 10). Thus, although the trial court incorrectly informed Good of the minimum sentences with respect to Counts One and Eleven, the trial court did correctly advise Good of the maximum penalties of life without parole and life with the possibility of parole, re spectively. “Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires the trial court to determine whether a def endant is entering his plea with an understanding of the maximum penalty involved; by its terms, Crim.R.Case No. 2-21-02

-12- 11(C)(2)(a) does not require the trial court to determine wheth er the defendant is aware of every lesser penalty that could be imposed.” State v. Liles , 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-18-69, 2019-Ohio-3029, ¶ 19. Under the relevant statutes , 15 years in prison and 10 years in prison was not the maximum penalty Good was fac ing. Moreover, the record indicates that the trial court did actually inform G ood of the maximum penalties associated with Counts One and Eleven prior to accept ing his guilty plea. (July 5, 2017 Tr. at 9-10). Further, at the change-of-plea hea ring, Good acknowledged stated, “[I]t’s either life or life, so I’m going to take the lesser of the two evils.” ( Id. at 16). Good’s statement indicates that not only was he aware of the maximum sentences available to him, but that he accepted th e plea agreement for the purpose of avoiding the maximum penalty associated with Count One, life in prison without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to correctly apprise Good of the minimum sentence does not affect the sufficiency of the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy. See Liles at ¶ 19. {¶20} Even so, Good fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced from the trial court’s error. Rather than being sentenced to life impri sonment without parole, for Count One, Good received a term of 25 years to life in pris on, with the possibility of parole. Thus, as Good’s sentence was less than the actual po tential maximum and within the range stated by the trial court, Good did not suffer any prejudice. Liles at ¶ 21; State v. Bailey , 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2006-G-2734, 2007-Ohio-6160, ¶ 14-Case No. 2-21-02

-13- 15 (finding no prejudice where the trial court imposed a senten ce that was “less than the actual maximum potential sentence and within the limit of t he maximum sentence as stated by the trial judge”). Furthermore, Good fai ls to argue that but for the trial court’s alleged error he would not have entered pleas of guilty. Indeed, if Good was willing to accept a plea with a 25-year-to-life senten ce in 2017, it stands to reason that he would have accepted a 15-year-to-life or 10-y ear-to-life sentence if he had been correctly advised of the mandatory minimum sente nces. Accordingly, we do not find that Good suffered a manifest injus tice by the trial court’s misstatement of the mandatory minimum sentence. {¶21} Next, we consider Good’s argument that the trial court erred in sentencing him with respect to Counts One and Eleven, and that the error resulted in Good suffering a manifest injustice. {¶22} As an initial matter, we acknowledge that Good’s sentence is co ntrary to law. As detailed above, with respect to Count One, the tria l court had the option of sentencing Good to (1) a term of life imprisonment without p arole pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B) or (2) a minimum term of 15 years and a maximum term of life imprisonment pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b). With respect t o Count Eleven, the required sentence pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(a) was 10 years to life in prison. With respect to Count Seventeen, forcible rape, the st atutory range was 3 to 11 years in prison pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B) and R.C. 2929.14 (A).Case No. 2-21-02

-14- {¶23} However, acting pursuant to the joint-sentence recommendation proffered by Good and the State, the trial court sentenced Good to 25 years to life in prison with respect to Count One, 25 years to life in prison with respect to Count Eleven, and 11 years in prison with respect to Count Seventeen. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently for an aggregat e sentence of 25 years to life in prison, with the possibility of parole. Accor dingly, the trial court erred with respect to the sentences imposed as to Counts One an d Eleven. However,

we do not find that the sentence is void or that Good suffered a manifest injustice as

a result of the error. {¶24} Good argues that because the trial court’s sentence with respec t to Counts One and Eleven is contrary to law, his conviction and se ntence are void. Good is incorrect. “A judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant.” State v. Henderson , 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 43. Even if a sentence impos ed is not authorized by law, the sentence would only be voidable as long as the tria l court possessed both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Id. Here, Good’s argument is that his

sentence is void because it was based on an error and is contra ry to law. Accordingly, he does not allege, and we do not find, that the t rial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over him. Rather, we find that the sentences were merely

voidable. See Henderson at ¶ 1 (“sentences based on an error * * * are voidable ifCase No. 2-21-02

-15- the court imposing the sentence has jurisdiction over the case and the defendant”). “The failure to timely –at the earliest available opportunity—a ssert an error in a voidable judgment, even if that error is constitutional in natu re, amounts to the forfeiture of any objection.” State v Robey , 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2021-CA-00010, 2021-Ohio-3884, ¶ 25, citing Henderson . Accordingly, Good’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, filed several years after c onviction and sentence, is not the proper vehicle for Good to attack his sentence which was imposed by a court with proper subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Th us, although Good implores this court to vacate his sentence or remand his case f or resentencing because it is contrary to law, such actions are outside of the scope of our review of the trial court’s denial of Good’s postsentence motion to withd raw his guilty plea. Rather, our review of Good’s assignments of error must focus on whether the sentencing error amounted to a manifest injustice such that the trial court erred by denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. W e hold that it does

not. {¶25} First, as previously stated, a manifest injustice comprehends a flaw in the path of justice “so extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress from the resulting prejudice through another form of applicatio n reasonably

available to him.” Brooks , 2010-Ohio-1682, ¶ 8. Here, Good failed to file a direct appeal, and thus failed to seek the redress available to correc t the sentencing errorCase No. 2-21-02

-16- he now raises. Further, we note that Good still has the option of filing a motion for leave to file a delayed direct appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(A). 1 Accordingly, because Good has other means by which to correct his sentence, he does not show a manifest injustice. {¶26} Furthermore, our review of the record supports a finding that t he sentencing error of which Good complains does not rise to the l evel of a manifest injustice. First, the trial court could have lawfully imposed a sentence of 25 years to life in prison by imposing the mandatory minimum sentences f or Counts One and Eleven, 15 years to life and 10 years to life, respectively, an d running those sentences consecutively to each other and concurrently to the s entence imposed for Count Seventeen. Accordingly, the trial court had the ability to sentence Good to 25 years to life in prison. Moreover, the record indicates tha t the State’s willingness to run the sentences concurrently was based upon its understand ing that Good would receive a sentence of 25 years in prison. Specifically, the St ate acknowledged that it recommended running Counts One and Eleven consecutively beca use it “believe[d] that twenty-five years to life is a justified sente nce for [Good’s] crimes.” (July 5, 2017 Tr. at 29-30). Thus, Good bargained to receive a sentence of 25 years to life in prison, and he received the benefit of that bargain. Accordingly, we do not find that Good suffered a manifest injustice due to the trial c ourt’s sentencing error.

1 Of course Good must still comply with the requirements of the Appellate Rules and must not delay filing such a motion.Case No. 2-21-02

-17- {¶27} Finally, Good argues that he suffered a manifest injustice beca use he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specific ally, Good alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective by misinforming him of the co rrect maximum penalties for Counts One and Eleven, rendering his guilty pleas involuntary. Good argues that due to this incorrect legal advice, he was denied v ital information upon which to make a decision regarding whether to go to trial, nego tiate different terms during plea negotiations, or enter guilty pleas. Accordingly, Good contends that the trial court erred by denying his postsentence petition to withd raw his guilty plea. We disagree. {¶28} “In criminal proceedings, a defendant has the right to effectiv e assistance of counsel under both the United States and Ohio Con stitutions.” State

v. Evick , 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2019-05-010, 2020-Ohio-3072, ¶ 45. “A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may serve as a basis for seeking a postsentence withdraw of a guilty or no-contest plea under Crim.R. 32.1.” State v.

James , 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-19-30, 2020-Ohio-720, ¶ 14. “‘“When a n alleged error underlying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is ineffect ive assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1) that his counsels’ perform ance was deficient and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for co unsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty.”’” Id. , quoting State v. Taveras , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-06-054, 2017-Ohio-1496, ¶ 17, quoting, State v. Tapia-Cortes , 12th Dist.Case No. 2-21-02

-18- Butler No. CA2016-02-031, 2016-Ohio-8101, ¶ 13. The party rais ing a claim of

ineffective assistance has the burden of establish both element s to warrant relief. Id. {¶29} Good claims that his trial counsel incorrectly informed him of the maximum penalties associated with Counts One and Eleven. Howev er, a review of the record indicates that Good’s trial counsel incorrectly info rmed him of the mandatory minimum sentences associated with Counts One and Eleven, but correctly informed him of the maximum sentences associated therewith. (July 5, 2017 Tr. at 5-7). {¶30} Furthermore, given the totality of the circumstances, we do not find

that the misinformation Good received from his trial counsel re garding the maximum penalties amounts to a manifest injustice. Although Go od’s trial counsel was operating under the erroneous belief that the mandatory min imum sentences associated with Counts One and Eleven were 25 years to life in prison, the record indicates that the State and the trial court were also operatin g under the same mistaken understanding. Also, Good agreed to a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. It stands to reason that he would have pled guilty kno wing the court would impose terms of 15 years to life and 10 years to life and could run those sentences consecutively for an aggregate total of 25 years to life impris onment. {¶31} Additionally, Good’s trial counsel was successful in negotiatin g a plea that resulted in the trial court dismissing 38 of the 41 counts in the indictment.Case No. 2-21-02

-19- Notably, all 38 dismissed charges were first-degree felonies, 9 of which carried potential penalties of life in prison without the possibility o f parole. (Doc. No. 1). Furthermore, Good negotiated a plea that avoided the maximum se ntence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Therefore, the recor d supports the trial court’s determination that Good did not carry his burden in est ablishing both that

his trial counsel was defective and that but for counsel’s erro rs, he would not have pled guilty. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial cou rt did not abuse its discretion in finding that Good failed to establish a manifest injustice on the basis

of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel sufficient to wa rrant a postsentence withdrawal of his guilty plea. {¶32} Finally, in his fourth assignment of error, Good argues that hi s request to withdraw his guilty plea should not be required to comply wi th “any time constraints the law may require” because the trial court advise d him at the changeof-plea hearing that he was waiving “all” his rights to appeal his sentence. We disagree. R.C. 2953.08(A) provides specific grounds for a defe ndant to appeal a

sentence. State v. Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 10. Under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), “[a] sentence imposed upon a defendant is not su bject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has be en recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and i s imposed by a sentencing judge.” “In discussing jointly recommended sentence s, the OhioCase No. 2-21-02

-20- Supreme Court has recognized that ‘[t]he General Assembly inten ded a jointly agreed-upon sentence to be protected from review precisely beca use the parties agreed that the sentence is appropriate.’” State v. Morris , 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-12- 17, 2013-Ohio-1736, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Porterfield , 106 Ohio St.3d 5, 2005- Ohio-3095, ¶ 25. Here, although Good’s sentence was recommende d jointly by the defendant and prosecution and imposed by the trial court, for t he reasons detailed above, Good’s sentence is not authorized by law. However, the fact that Good’s sentence, which is voidable and not void, is contrary to law do es not entitle him to disregard the applicable time constraints and procedure. As we previously detailed, Good had the recourse of filing a direct appeal to challenge hi s sentence. Although Good failed to timely file a direct appeal, we once again note that he still has the option of filing a motion for leave to file a delayed direct ap peal. See App.R. 5(A). {¶33} Good’s assignments of error are overruled.

Conclusion {¶34} For the foregoing reasons, Good’s assignments of error are over ruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in th e particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Auglaize County Court of Common

Pleas. Judgment Affirmed WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.