DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CHRISTOPHER TAVARIS DEAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-2406

[April 8, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Karen Miller, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2005-CF-004089-

AXXX-MB.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Melanie Dale Surber, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Matthew Steven Ocksrider, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CIKLIN, J.

The primary issue before this court is whether Christopher Tavaris

Dean was entitled to de novo resentencing, following the Florida Supreme 

Court’s unequivocal remand and instructions to this court which we in 

turn passed on and remanded to the trial court—also with unequivocal 

instructions. We agree with Dean that he was deprived of the “clean slate”

resentencing hearing to which he was entitled, and we reverse and remand 

for yet another sentencing hearing. 

As a reminder to all parties, this is what the Florida Supreme Court 

determined and directed we do: 

We quash the Fourth District’s holding regarding Dean’s 

PRR sentences and remand for resentencing because his 

designation as a PRR is not supported by the evidence in the 

record in this case. See Davenport v. State, 971 So. 2d 293, 

295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“It is permissible for a trial court to 
2

take judicial notice of its own files, but the trial judge has to 

put such evidence in the record of each case when sentencing 

a defendant as an HFO and PRR.”), rev. denied, 993 So. 2d 

511 (Fla. 2008). On remand, the State may present evidence 

to prove that Dean meets the statutory requirements to be 

sentenced as a PRR. See Ward v. State, 11 So. 3d 459, 459 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2009); see also State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 

990 (Fla. 2008) (“[B]ecause a resentencing is a new 

proceeding, the State may present additional evidence on 

remand to prove the defendant qualifies for habitual felony 

offender sentencing.”)[.]

. . . .

. . . [W]e quash the Fourth District’s holding regarding 

Dean’s PRR sentences and remand for resentencing.

Dean v. State, 230 So. 3d 420, 424-25 (Fla. 2017) (footnote omitted).

Of particular importance is the Florida Supreme Court’s specific cite to 

State v. Collins in which, in pertinent part, the court held:

In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that 

“resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing 

hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. 

State, 825 So. 2d 362, 367-68 (Fla. 2002); see also Galindez 

v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 525 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., specially 

concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing 

proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the 

defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and his 

‘resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on 

the proper sentence.’” (citation omitted)); Walker [v. State, 988 

So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)] (Altenbernd, J., concurring 

specially) (“Generally, courts have held that once a defendant 

successfully challenges his sentence on appeal and the cause 

is remanded for resentencing, the resentencing is a ‘de novo’

proceeding, at which either side may present evidence anew 

regarding the appropriate sentence.”).

The principle of de novo sentencing often benefits the 

defendant. See, e.g., Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 525 (Cantero, J., 

specially concurring) (“In fact, because resentencing is de 

novo, the State was required to produce evidence on 

sentencing issues even if the State established the fact at the 
3

original sentencing.”); Tubwell v. State, 922 So. 2d 378, 379 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“As this resentencing proceeding was de 

novo, the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior 

offenses.” (citations omitted)); Rich v. State, 814 So. 2d 1207, 

1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that because resentencing 

following reversal is a new proceeding, the State must 

introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced 

sentencing, even though such evidence was introduced in the 

previous sentencing hearing); Mills v. State, 724 So. 2d 173, 

174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that even though the 

defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the 

original sentencing, law-of-the-case principles do not insulate 

the State from proving them at resentencing); Baldwin v. 

State, 700 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (agreeing that 

because resentencing is a new proceeding, the defendant may 

challenge the accuracy of prior convictions included on his 

scoresheet, even though he did not challenge them at the 

original sentencing).

We have also recognized that because a resentencing is a 

new proceeding, the court is not limited by the evidence 

originally presented. See Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380, 387 

(Fla. 2003) (“[A] resentencing court is not limited by evidence 

presented (or not presented) in . . . the original . . . sentencing 

phase.”); Mann v. State, 453 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 1984) 

(recognizing that where a remand directs a new sentencing 

proceeding, both sides may present additional evidence).

Collins, 985 So. 2d at 989 (alterations in original) (emphasis in original).

Despite the fact that Dean was permitted to present evidence at the 

hearing, statements made by the trial court and the prosecutor at the 

hearing patently evidence their belief that the only purpose of remand was 

to introduce evidence that Dean qualified as a Prison Releasee Reoffender. 

We encountered a similar situation in Davis v. State, 227 So. 3d 137, 138 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2017). In an earlier opinion, Davis’s previous sentence was 

reversed and remanded for resentencing. Id. At resentencing, the trial 

court announced that it had read everything submitted to it, including 

Davis’s sentencing memorandum, letters from Davis’s family and friends, 

and certificates from the programs he completed while incarcerated. Id. 

The parties were permitted to present their desired evidence and 

arguments. Id. However, in pronouncing sentence the trial court 

indicated that it was not inclined to “revisit” the sentence of the 

predecessor judge or consider new evidence regarding Davis’s behavior in 
4

prison, and again imposed a life sentence. Id. at 138-39. This court 

reversed on the basis that Davis was not afforded the full panoply of due 

process considerations when he was resentenced:

From our review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial 

court, upon resentencing, afforded Davis due process by 

reviewing in advance all materials submitted by the defense 

for the resentencing hearing and allowing him to present any 

evidence and arguments he wanted. We note that Davis 

makes no issue on appeal regarding whether the successor 

judge was sufficiently familiar with the facts of the case, the 

trial, or the prior sentencing proceeding.

However, the statements by the successor judge during the 

hearing lead us to conclude that the trial court did not proceed 

on a “clean slate” on resentencing and intentionally decided it 

was not going to evaluate the same evidence submitted at trial 

and the initial sentencing hearing, together with the new 

evidence, which included information about Davis’s 

performance in prison. The trial court acknowledged it was 

“permitted,” by our remand instructions, to go through an 

evaluation process and change the length of the initial 

sentence, but announced “I am not going to revisit that,” 

referring to the prior sentence, and “I am not prepared to do 

that,” referring to consideration of Davis’s performance while 

in prison. Thus, although the trial court afforded substantial 

due process to Davis on resentencing, it failed to afford the 

full panoply of due process, to which he was entitled.

Id. at 139-40.

As in Davis, Dean was permitted to present mitigating evidence, but the 

trial court’s statements clearly indicate that it was not proceeding as if this 

was a “clean slate”:

[THE STATE]: [T]he sentence has always been affirmed; . . . 

it was remanded for the state to prove up the 

documentation of the PRR.

. . . .

THE COURT: But isn’t the issue here today -- and I agree 

with you; I believe Mr. Dean is extremely remorseful --

but -- and correct me if I’m wrong -- it was reversed for 
5

the state to present evidence to see whether or not he 

qualified as a prison releasee reoffender, correct?

[THE STATE]: That is correct . . . .

THE COURT: . . . [T]his is just, you know, going through the 

machinations of the state getting the paperwork in order, 

none of the appellate courts . . . reversed the underlying 

convictions, correct?

. . . .

And the sole purpose of the remand was to rightly or 

wrongly give the state an opportunity to prove the PRR 

status; if he is PRR then it’s still a mandatory sentence, 

correct?

. . . .

[THE STATE]: That is correct.

(Emphasis added.) Because the trial court and state clearly expressed that 

the hearing’s purpose was for “documentation of the PRR” and “the state 

getting the paperwork in order,” it is apparent that Dean did not receive a 

de novo sentencing hearing. Thus, as in Davis, “although the trial court

afforded substantial due process to” Dean by allowing him to present

evidence, “it failed to afford the full panoply of due process, to which he 

was entitled.” See Davis, 227 So. 3d at 140.

A major distinguishing factor between this case and Davis is that the 

trial court in Davis was not statutorily required to impose a specific 

sentence. By contrast, the trial court in this case was bound to impose 

the PRR sentence that Dean received. One might be tempted to conclude 

that this renders the error “harmless.” But because Dean was deprived of 

the full panoply of due process, the harmless error analysis does not apply. 

See Jackson v. State, 880 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“Because 

the deprivation of the right to due process constitutes fundamental error, 

a harmless error review is not appropriate.”). 

Relying on the trial judge’s reasoning below, the dissent concludes that 

the sentence should be affirmed in that Dean was allowed to present 

evidence, because a PRR sentence is “proper,” because the defendant’s 

objective is to convince the state not to seek PRR sentencing on remand, 

and because the record already reflects “the State’s intention to exercise 
6

its discretion to pursue a PRR sentence.” As accurate as these 

observations may be, respectfully, that is not the issue before us: When 

Dean was denied a de novo sentencing hearing, he was denied due 

process.1 To limit the analysis to the propriety of the end result or the 

likelihood of imposition of an identical sentence on remand is akin to a 

harmless error analysis, which is not applicable here.2

Although the dissent accurately sets forth an excellent summary of the 

forty-nine minute, forty-one page transcript of the full sentencing hearing, 

it matters not—because the trial court irrevocably tainted the process. 

Based on the trial court’s own words, there was never a chance that Dean 

would receive the “clean slate” sentencing hearing to which he was entitled 

and which both the Florida Supreme Court and this court ordered.

Accordingly, we once again remand this matter to the trial court for a 

“clean slate” resentencing of the appellant with the full panoply of existing 

procedural protections. So we are entirely clear, “resentencing should 

proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence,” Collins, 985 

So. 2d at 989 (citation omitted), which means that the state should 

determine whether to seek PRR sentencing, not merely “prove up” PRR 

qualification, see generally § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla. Stat., and that if the 

state elects to pursue a PRR sentence, the state must introduce evidence 

supporting a PRR sentence, regardless of whether such evidence was 

introduced at a prior hearing, see Collins, 985 So. 2d at 989. Furthermore, 

the “full panoply” of procedural protections includes “any new 

constitutional protections that have been recognized since the defendant’s 

1 See Davis, 227 So. 3d at 140 (Ciklin, J., specially concurring) (“I agree with the 

dissent's suggestion that the defendant's original sentence may very well have 

been ‘entirely appropriate for the crime appellant committed, given his criminal 

history.’ But, respectfully, that notion misses the point of the majority opinion: 

A unanimous three-judge panel of this court ordered that the original sentence 

be vacated and that Davis be resentenced with the commensurate panoply of due 

process rights.”).

2 Additionally, we must note and disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that 

everyone “was on the same page.” Although co-counsel for the defense indicated 

agreement with the trial court’s conclusion that the purpose of the hearing was 

“going through the machinations of the state getting the paperwork in order” as 

well as its accurate statement that the PRR sentence was mandatory, Dean’s 

other attorney asserted that “we are here for a de novo sentencing; it’s not just to 

perfect the PRR, prove up part of it . . . .” Moreover, this conclusion is belied by 

the facts that Dean presented evidence at the hearing and that, prior to the 

hearing, he filed a substantive motion to preclude the imposition of a life 

sentence.
7

original sentencing.” See Davis, 227 So. 3d at 139 (quoting Galindez, 955 

So. 2d at 525-26 (Cantero, J., specially concurring)).

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

MAY, J., concurs.

GERBER, J., dissents with opinion.

GERBER, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

The defense filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) 

motion raising the exact argument which the defense has raised in this 

appeal – that certain statements made at the resentencing hearing indicate

the state’s and the trial court’s belief that the only purpose on remand was 

to introduce evidence proving the defendant qualified as a prison releasee 

reoffender (PRR), thus depriving the defendant of his due process right to 

a “clean slate” de novo resentencing hearing.

However, after considering that argument, the trial court entered an 

order denying the defense’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. In the order, the trial 

court properly recognized it held a de novo sentencing hearing at which 

the state exercised its discretion to pursue a PRR mandatory life sentence.

A. The Trial Court’s Well-Reasoned Order

I adopt the trial court’s well-reasoned order, which relies on the 

complete record, not on isolated statements out of context from the 

resentencing hearing:

In Defendant’s Motion to Correct Sentencing Error, 

Defendant asserts that this Court’s August 9, 2018 

resentencing hearing was not conducted in accordance with 

the Florida Supreme Court’s directive. Defendant argues that 

while the Florida Supreme Court remanded the case for a de 

novo resentencing hearing, the parties and the Court were 

under the “misconception” that the resentencing hearing was 

solely for the purpose of determining whether Defendant 

qualified as a PRR. Specifically, Defendant alleges that the 

State was under the misimpression that it was required to 

seek PRR sentencing on remand, and that as a result, the 

Court should set aside Defendant’ s sentence and order a new 

sentencing hearing. The Court disagrees.
8

Defendant was convicted of Second Degree Felony Murder 

on Count 1 and Burglary on Count 2. Normally, second 

degree felony murder is a first-degree felony punishable by a 

term of years not exceeding life, § 782.04(3), Fla. Stat. (2004), 

and burglary (as committed in this case) is a second-degree 

felony punishable by a maximum sentence of fifteen years, § 

810.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). However, because Defendant was 

found to qualify as a PRR, Defendant’s sentences of life on 

Count 1 and fifteen (15) years on Count 2 were mandatory. § 

775.075(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). 

As noted above, the Florida Supreme Court remanded this 

case because at Defendant’s February 7, 2014 resentencing 

hearing, the State failed to supply sufficient documentary 

evidence supporting Defendant’s PRR designation. Dean, 230 

So. 3d at 424-25. Instead, as the Florida Supreme Court 

determined, this Court improperly relied upon the transcript 

of Defendant’s original December 18, 2008 sentencing hearing 

at which the proper documentary evidence supporting a PRR 

designation was supplied. Id. 

Defendant correctly argues that on remand, the State had 

the discretion as to whether to seek PRR sentencing again. 

Section 775.082(9)(a)3. provides that if a state attorney 

determines a defendant qualifies for PRR sentencing, ‘‘the 

state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the 

defendant as a prison releasee reoffender,” (emphasis added), 

and Florida’s courts have repeatedly held that the discretion 

to seek PRR sentencing lies solely with the state attorney. See, 

e.g., State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 348-49 (Fla. 2000); State 

v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Phillips v. 

State, 834 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Further, as 

noted by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Collins, 985 

So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008), remanding for resentencing 

creates a new proceeding. See also Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 

380, 387 (Fla. 2003) (“[A] resentencing court is not limited by 

evidence presented (or not presented) in ... the original ... 

sentencing phase.”); Mann v. State, 453 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 

1984) (recognizing that a remand for new sentencing 

proceeding is not limited to a “reweighing”; both sides may 

present additional evidence). Thus, in the present case, no 

error occurred where the Court allowed the defense to call 

witnesses on Defendant’s behalf and the State to submit 
9

Supplemental Discovery (DE #666) to support designating 

Defendant a PRR.

However, insofar as Defendant asserts the State was under 

the “misconception” that it was required to seek PRR 

sentencing on remand, the Court finds Defendant’s claim is 

refuted by the record. On July 10, 2018, the State filed 

separately a Notice to Take Judicial Notice of Records Under 

Seal (DE #678) and Notice of Defendant’s Qualification as a 

PRR and the State’s Intention to Seek Maximum Statutory 

Penalty (DE #679) in preparation for Defendant’s August 9, 

2018 resentencing hearing. (Ex. “B,” Notice to Take Judicial 

Notice and Notice of Defendant’s PRR Qualification). Such 

filings are indicative of the State’s intention to exercise its 

discretion to pursue a PRR sentence. Moreover, during the 

resentencing hearing, defense counsel informed the Court 

that it had attempted “for quite some time” to persuade the 

State to exercise its discretion by not seeking PRR sentencing, 

but that “the state is very powerful in their authority to 

exercise their discretion and they have chosen not to exercise 

that ....” (Ex. “A,” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 23:15-18.) Therefore, 

the Court finds that the State did, in fact, exercise its sole 

discretion by choosing to pursue a PRR designation and 

sentence at Defendant’s August 8, 2019 resentencing. 

Further, once the Court found that the State’s evidence proved 

that Defendant qualified as a PRR, the Court was obligated to 

find Defendant a PRR and to sentence Defendant to a term of 

life on Count 1 and fifteen years on Count 2, which is exactly 

what the Court did. See Smith, 832 So. 2d at 250 (“once [the 

State] proves that a defendant is qualified under the PRR Act, 

the trial court has no discretion ....”).

(italics in original; underlining added).

B. The Complete Record Supports the Trial Court’s Order

I see no due process violation in this record. Again, the complete record 

is controlling. I summarize the forty-nine minute, forty-one page 

transcript of the full sentencing hearing as follows:

• The trial court, the defense, and the state began by discussing 

why the case had been remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 

The trial court began by stating, “We are here for the new 

sentencing?” The defense responded, “Yes.” The state 
10

responded, “actually the sentence has always been affirmed; the 

Supreme Court reversed it in the last -- just as to the issue of the 

court each time had declared the defendant a PRR offender and 

sentenced to the mandatory life and then -- the Supreme Court 

said as to that this is reversed for the state because the document 

-- there was no documentation in the file; it was remanded for 

the state to prove up the documentation of the PRR.” The defense 

replied, “we agree; it’s essentially there was no evidence of PRR 

that was in the record and that’s why we’re back.” (T. 3-4; R. 

3819-20) (emphasis added).

• The state presented its witness and eleven exhibits to verify the 

defendant’s PRR qualifications. The defense chose not to crossexamine that witness, and did not object to any of the state’s 

eleven exhibits. (T. 5-17; R. 3821-33).

• The defense asked how the trial court wished to proceed. The 

trial court responded, “Whatever you want to present.” (emphasis 

added). (T. 18; R. 3834).

• The defense objected to one aspect of the scoresheet’s points 

assessment. After hearing the state’s response, the trial court 

overruled the defense’s objection. The state rested. (T. 18-19; R. 

3834-35).

• The defense stated, “We’d like to put on some evidence.” The 

state did not object, and the trial court responded, “Sure.” (T. 

19; R. 3835.) (emphasis added).

• The defense began by stating, “[W]e are here for a de novo 

sentencing; it’s not just to perfect the PRR; prove up part of it, 

but it is a de novo sentencing hearing here today.” The state did 

not object at this point, nor did the trial court say anything to 

contradict the defense’s statement. (T. 20; R. 3836).

• After the defense continued arguing its position instead of 

presenting evidence as previously indicated, the state objected, 

but merely to say, “I think we’ve moved on to argument and I 

would object to argument as opposed to presenting evidence . . . 

otherwise I do have argument also.” The trial court interjected, 

“I’m going to give everybody the opportunity to tell me anything 

they want to tell me, but I don’t know if this is sort of like a little 

preamble to your evidence?” The defense responded, “Just a little 
11

– it’s a preamble I suppose, Judge.” The trial court replied, 

“Okay, but the state will have an opportunity to tell me anything, 

present anything, argue anything as for the defense.” (emphases 

added). (T. 20-21; R. 3836-37).

• The defense proceeded to recount the case’s sentencing history: 

“[The first sentencing court] said that this case presented the 

strangest facts and circumstances that he had witnessed in his 

28 years as a lawyer and that, ‘It’s very unfortunate that [the 

defendant] ended up in this tragedy; which I think is a tragedy 

for all sides, but I had no choice in the sentence unfortunately.’

And then we have the . . . added interesting aspect of when this 

case was remanded for a second trial by the Fourth District Court 

of Appeals [sic]; the Fourth remanded it not just for a new trial 

but -- or plea negotiations is the term that they used twice in 

their opinion, which is a rarity I think when we look at the 

opinions that come out . . . from the Fourth. And now strangely 

we are here just back for the sentencing [from the Florida 

Supreme Court] . . . there was the issue with this manslaughter 

instruction but [a partial concurring opinion] said that that was 

a pyrrhic victory for him, that he had won that legal issue but it 

does not get him a new trial, and so we’re here for the 

sentencing.” (T. 21-22; R. 3837-3838).

• The defense continued, “[W]e were pursuing this other option for 

quite some time -- is that [Florida] Statute 775.082(9)(a)3[.] does 

allow the state to abandon seeking PRR in certain extenuating 

circumstances including when the victim’s recommendation is 

that the offender not be sentenced at PRR, and that was made 

abundantly clear in multiple ways that -- of how the victim was 

feeling about this case, but the state is very powerful in their 

authority to exercise their discretion and they have chosen not to 

exercise that, and so here we are with [the defendant] facing a 

mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. . . . The

issue is -- with the Eighth Amendment is that whether [the 

defendant] is remorseful or whether he is redeemable or . . .

whether the opinion of the family or the opinion of the public 

differs from that of a mandatory life sentence being a punishment 

that fits the crime. These are things that unfortunately the PRR 

statute does not allow room for, and I will be frank with Your 

Honor that the precedent of course is not on [the defendant’s] 

side.” (T. 23-24; R. 3839-40) (emphasis added).
12

• The defense requested to present two exhibits to show why the 

defendant did not deserve a life sentence. The first exhibit was a 

Department of Corrections’ certificate of some sort (which is not 

contained in the record). The second exhibit was a nine-minute 

documentary video which the defense prepared “in our efforts to 

have the state exercise [its] discretion with hopefully maybe not 

pursuing [a PRR life sentence].” (T. 25-26; R. 3841-42) (emphasis 

added). The state did not object to either exhibit, and the trial 

court admitted both exhibits into evidence. (T. 26; R. 3842).

• The defense played the nine-minute documentary video. The 

video featured statements from family members describing, 

among other things: the defendant’s father was killed two 

months before he was born “so you think about a child [like the 

defendant] that never had a father”; growing up, he followed 

around one of his brothers on the streets, “like the criminals, he 

wanted to try to be like me”; after the crime, he “was not out there 

professing his innocence . . . he was just unwilling to accept the 

fact that he could possibly be criminally responsible for the death 

of [the defendant’s accomplice]”; his trial counsel “was [the] more 

interested [person] in taking this case to trial . . . [the defendant] 

would have preferred resolving it”; after thirteen years in prison, 

he has “a good head on his shoulders”; although he missed being 

with his children while they grew up, he “always said that school 

comes first . . . because he want to see us succeed in everything 

that we do” and “[e]ven though he’s like been gone for a while he 

still like tries to stay in my life the best way he can”; he “is missing 

out on moments that he shouldn’t miss out on”; “he has paid his 

dues to society for what he’s done and he’s had a lot of time to 

think about it and we hope -- he hopes that he would eventually 

. . . be able to live life outside of prison and have a chance at . . . 

being a productive member of society”; “[H]e’s got a really good 

heart. If they really sit down and talk with [him] they will see . . 

. Just give him a second chance . . . just for his kids . . . so he 

can be with his kids in life.”; “I hope that he comes out and just 

wants to just make up all of that time that he missed outside, 

have different objectives, good job and educate himself . . . have 

his own life outside of criminal stuff.” (T. 27-35; R. 3843-3851).

• The defense had the defendant allocute before the trial court. The 

defendant first briefly recounted his upbringing. He then 

described his feelings about his accomplice who was killed in the 

aftermath of the crime. “My friend, my brother . . . was an 
13

extremely good friend of mine, pretty much my brother in every 

aspect of the word; we shouldn’t have been involved in this chain 

of events that unfortunately cost my brother his life. I tried my 

best to save [him] from being (indiscernible) like he did. The day 

that [he] died the old [me] died too on that same day also. On 

that day everything -- aspect of my life have changed forever. 

There are events that occur in a person’s life sometimes that open 

up their eyes to appreciate every -- of how life is supposed to be. 

For the past 13 years of my incarceration I have come to 

appreciate every person, individual person who have -- for who 

they are. I am deeply in love with the [man who I am] -- being 

today; I promise everyone in this courtroom today that I will love 

to give -- be given another chance.” (T. 36-38 ; R. 3852-54).

• The defendant completed his allocution by thanking the 

accomplice’s mother: “[Y]ou along with my mother have been --

sincerely been like a hand from heaven. . . . Your unconditional 

support throughout this entire situation . . . you have lost a 

biological son . . . 13 years ago but I want you -- for you to know 

that the rest of my life I will never -- forever be -- I will ever forever 

be your son too.” (T. 38; R. 3854).

• The trial court asked, “Anything else from the defense?” The 

defense responded, “No, that’s all.” (T. 38-39; R. 3854-55) 

(emphasis added).

• The trial court then heard closing argument before rendering the 

mandatory PRR life sentence. That transcript portion is quoted 

here verbatim:

[STATE]: Just brief argument, Judge. First of all, I just 

would like to point out that there’s been a mixture of points 

being made here today. I do appreciate that [the defendant]

has turned his life around while he’s been in custody and 

that’s -- and I do think that that’s genuine; mixing up with 

that is this continuous trying to blame [the burglary victim 

who killed the accomplice], which is inappropriate and 

contrary to the law. For example, in the video just now 

playing that [the victim] is [driving] 100 miles an hour, that 

only meant that the defendant was going much faster than 

100 miles an hour because [the burglary victim], everybody 

knows, couldn’t catch him. And with regard to how this is 

so different, it’s not different. There’s second-degree 
14

murder felony murder cases that happen every week in this 

courthouse; two guys go in to rob a 7-11, the clerk pulls 

his gun and kills one of them, we send those -- we send 

Defendant A to prison for life always and nobody blinks an 

eye, so this really isn’t different at all. [The burglary victim]

could have theoretically shot and killed [the accomplice]

during the burglary . . . and [the defendant] would still be 

charged with second-degree felony murder. So I do think 

that there’s a mixture of issues with regard to that because 

I do think [the defendant] has made a good --

THE COURT: But isn’t the issue here today -- and I agree 

with you; I believe [the defendant] is extremely remorseful 

-- but -- and correct me if I’m wrong -- it was reversed for 

the state to present evidence to see whether or not he 

qualified as a prison releasee reoffender, correct?

[STATE]: That is correct, and basically under 775.082(d) it 

speaks of the legislative intent on the sentencing, and 

under 775.082(3) the defendant must be sentenced to the 

mandatory life and 15 --

THE COURT: And even in the Supreme Court opinion --

or maybe it was in the defense’s motion when they said this 

is just, you know, going through the machinations of the 

state getting the paperwork in order, none of the appellate 

courts starting at the Fourth all the way up to the Supreme 

Court reversed the underlying convictions, correct?

[DEFENSE]: Correct.

THE COURT: And the sole purpose of the remand was to 

rightly or wrongly give the state an opportunity to prove the 

PRR status; if he is PRR then it’s still a mandatory 

sentence, correct?

[DEFENSE]: Correct.

[STATE]: That is correct.

THE COURT: Okay. I didn’t mean to cut you off but I 

wanted to make sure we were all on the same track.
15

[STATE]: No, that was my final point, was that the PRR 

statute has been proven here today and it is mandatory.

THE COURT: And the PRR statute was established under 

the exhibits that were all moved in without objection?

[STATE]: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes, sir?

[DEFENSE]: We really don’t have anything to add. Judge, 

we obviously are objecting that it’s a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment and we hope that one day that will be taken 

out and we’ll see [the defendant] back here again. The only 

thing I would say to [the state] is we disagree about I guess 

factually what happened in some ways; but for [the 

burglary victim’s] behavior nobody would have died -- not 

to say that he isn’t a victim as well, he was, he is of the 

burglary, but in comparison to the robbery example where 

-- I mean that’s just a much, much different situation, the 

victim in the robbery that no -- that takes no action to do 

anything other than to defend himself in that particular 

moment, and that’s not what we had here and I think that’s 

why [the first sentencing court] said what he said and the 

Fourth said what they said about plea negotiations, and 

unfortunately we couldn’t agree on that before we came 

before you today.

THE COURT: All right. Well, is there anything else from 

anybody?

[STATE]: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else from the defense?

[DEFENSE]: No.

THE COURT: All right, so based on the exhibits that were 

moved into evidence without objection then I do find that 

the defendant is a prison releasee reoffender and by statute 

it is a mandatory life sentence. The original sentence will 

stand.

(T. 39-43; R. 3855-59) (emphasis added).
16

Having presented a summary of, and then a verbatim portion of, the 

resentencing hearing, it is clear that everyone, including the defense, was 

on the same page. The defense did not challenge the state’s PRR evidence. 

The defense was permitted to, and did, present all of its requested evidence 

and argument. The defense twice stated on the record that it had no 

further evidence or argument. The defense never raised a due process 

objection or claimed the trial court was not providing the defense with a 

de novo resentencing hearing or a full opportunity to be heard. Instead, 

the defense ultimately (and properly) conceded that once the state proved 

the defendant qualified as a PRR, the trial court had no choice but to 

impose a mandatory life sentence.

C. The Majority’s Reliance on Davis v. State is Misplaced.

The majority’s reliance on Davis v. State, 227 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2017), is misplaced. To make this point, a detailed summary of Davis is 

required.

Davis was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender to life in 

prison with a minimum mandatory of fifteen years. Id. at 138. Davis later 

filed a motion to correct illegal sentences on the ground that he did not 

qualify as a habitual violent felony offender. Id. The trial court denied the 

motion. Id. We reversed the trial court and remanded the case for 

resentencing with the following direction: “Although [Davis] does not 

qualify as an [habitual violent felony offender], he may qualify as a habitual 

felony offender and those sanctions may be sought on remand.” Davis v. 

State, 164 So.3d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (emphasis added).

On remand, the state filed its notice of intent to seek an enhanced 

penalty for Davis as a habitual felony offender. 227 So. 3d at 138. Davis 

filed a sentencing memorandum, listing several mitigating factors, 

including letters from family and friends, and evidence of rehabilitation 

through programs while incarcerated. Id.

A resentencing hearing was held by a successor judge, because the 

judge who tried the case and imposed the original sentence was no longer 

on the bench. Id. At the beginning of the hearing, the successor judge

stated he had read everything that was submitted, including Davis’s 

sentencing memorandum, the letters from his family and friends, and his 

certificates for the programs which he completed while incarcerated. Id.
17

The parties stipulated that Davis qualified for sentencing as a habitual 

felony offender. Id. The successor judge then permitted both parties to 

present whatever evidence and arguments either desired. Id.

However, when pronouncing sentence, the successor judge indicated 

he was not inclined to “revisit” the sentence imposed by the judge who 

tried the case, or consider the new evidence regarding Davis’s behavior 

while in prison. Id. Instead, the trial court simply determined Davis to be 

a habitual felony offender and sentenced him again to life in prison with 

the mandatory minimums. Id. at 138-39.

On appeal, Davis argued the successor judge’s sentence was illegal

because the successor judge, on remand, did not resentence him with the 

“full panoply of due process.” Id. at 139. We agreed with Davis’ argument, 

reasoning:

From our review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial 

court, upon resentencing, afforded Davis due process by 

reviewing in advance all materials submitted by the defense 

for the resentencing hearing and allowing him to present any 

evidence and arguments he wanted. We note that Davis 

makes no issue on appeal regarding whether the successor 

judge was sufficiently familiar with the facts of the case, the 

trial, or the prior sentencing proceeding.

However, the statements by the successor judge during the 

hearing lead us to conclude that the trial court did not proceed 

on a “clean slate” on resentencing and intentionally decided it 

was not going to evaluate the same evidence submitted at trial 

and the initial sentencing hearing, together with the new 

evidence, which included information about Davis's 

performance in prison. The [successor judge]

acknowledged it was “permitted,” by our remand 

instructions, to go through an evaluation process and

change the length of the initial sentence, but announced 

“I am not going to revisit that,” referring to the prior 

sentence, and “I am not prepared to do that,” referring 

to consideration of Davis’s performance while in prison. 

Thus, although the trial court afforded substantial due 

process to Davis on resentencing, it failed to afford the 

full panoply of due process, to which he was entitled.

Id. at 139-40 (emphasis added).
18

As the majority here acknowledges, “a major distinguishing factor 

between this case and Davis is that the [successor judge] in Davis was not 

statutorily required to impose a specific sentence,” whereas “the trial court 

in this case was bound to impose the PRR sentence that Dean received.” 

Maj. Op. at 5 (emphasis added). However, the majority discounts that 

“major distinguishing factor” on the basis that the trial court’s own words 

“irrevocably tainted the process,” id. at 6, even though those words were

wholly correct as a matter of law.

In my view, that “major distinguishing factor” is why this case should 

be affirmed. The successor judge in Davis was required by law to engage 

in an “independent assessment” of Davis’s sentence because the successor 

judge had the ability to do so. 227 So. 3d at 140. Here, once the state 

proved the defendant was PRR-qualified, the trial court was required by 

law to sentence the defendant to life in prison. The trial court had no 

ability to conduct an “independent assessment” of anything except for 

whether the state proved the defendant was PRR-qualified. The state did 

so without challenge from the defense, and the trial court exercised the 

only power it had under the law.

Conclusion

In sum, the due process violation which the defense’s briefs now allege, 

and upon which the majority expressly relies, simply did not occur.

By leading the majority into concluding that a due process violation 

occurred, when the record plainly reveals otherwise as shown above, the 

defense has achieved what was undeniably its true goal – to set aside the 

defendant’s PRR life sentence and obtain a fourth sentencing hearing in 

the hope that it can have yet another opportunity to convince the state to 

no longer seek a mandatory PRR life sentence.

I acknowledge that the defense, and perhaps others, may disagree with 

the state’s decision to have sought a mandatory PRR life sentence under 

the facts of this case. In fact, in the transcript quoted above, the defense 

twice interpreted this court’s precedent in the defendant’s case as implying 

this court’s disagreement. See Dean v. State, 124 So. 3d 997, 997 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2013) (twice stating, “We grant the petition and remand for a new 

trial or plea negotiations.”) (emphasis added). As the defense suggested, 

remand language implying that plea negotiations be employed is “a rarity 

I think when we look at the opinions that come out . . . from the Fourth.”

However, regardless of whether any such disagreement exists or is 

justified, the state repeatedly has exercised its prosecutorial discretion to 
19

seek a mandatory PRR life sentence, which is its prerogative. See State v. 

Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 351 (Fla. 2000) (“[A]bsent a compelling equal 

protection argument, the exercise of . . . prosecutorial discretion is not 

generally subject to judicial review.”).

The state has once again exercised its prosecutorial discretion in this 

case, and the sentence was proper under the law. The trial court provided 

the defense with a de novo sentencing hearing, with the opportunity to 

present “[w]hatever you want” and “anything [you] want to tell me.” The 

defense did so.

No due process violation occurred. Once the state proved the defendant 

qualified as a PRR, the trial court had no choice but to impose a mandatory 

life sentence. This is not a “harmless error” case. This is a “no error” case. 

We should affirm.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.