alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2657 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2657

 To suspend temporarily the duty on machines, and their parts, for use 
         in the manufacture of digital versatile discs (DVDs).

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 25, 2000

 Mr. Coverdell introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To suspend temporarily the duty on machines, and their parts, for use 
         in the manufacture of digital versatile discs (DVDs).

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DUTY.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

      

``    9902.84.13    Machines or       Free              No change         No change         On or before 12/
                     mechanical                                                              31/03            ''
                     appliances,                                                                               .
                     whether
                     imported
                     separately or
                     as an entirety,
                     and parts
                     thereof, for
                     use in the
                     manufacture of
                     digital
                     versatile discs
                     (DVDs)
                     (provided for
                     in subheading
                     8477.10.90)....

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 264

To increase the Federal medical assistance percentage for Hawaii to 59.8

percent.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 20, 1999

Mr. AKAKA introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To increase the Federal medical assistance percentage for

Hawaii to 59.8 percent.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. INCREASED FMAP FOR HAWAII.

4 (a) INCREASED FMAP.—The first sentence of sec5 tion 1905(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.

6 1396d(b)) is amended—

7 (1) by striking ‘‘and (3)’’ and inserting ‘‘(3)’’;

8 and

9 (2) by inserting before the period at the end the

10 following: ‘‘, and (4) for purposes of this title and
2

•S 264 IS

1 title XXI, the Federal medical assistance percentage

2 for Hawaii shall be 59.8 percent’’.

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

4 subsection (a) shall apply to—

5 (1) items and services furnished on or after Oc6 tober 1, 1998, under—

7 (A) a State plan or under a waiver of such

8 plan under title XIX; and

9 (B) a State child health plan under title

10 XXI of such Act;

11 (2) payments made on a capitation or other

12 risk-basis for coverage occurring under plans under

13 such titles on or after such date; and

14 (3) payments attributable to DSH allotments

15 for Hawaii determined under section 1923(f) of such

16 Act (42 U.S.C. 1396r–4(f)) for fiscal years begin17 ning with fiscal year 1999.

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4900 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4900

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to prevent veterans from 
  being disqualified from contributing to health savings accounts by 
  reason of receiving medical care for service-connected disabilities 
   under programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 19, 2014

   Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to prevent veterans from 
  being disqualified from contributing to health savings accounts by 
  reason of receiving medical care for service-connected disabilities 
   under programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Helping Veterans Save for Health 
Care Act of 2014''.

SEC. 2. VETERANS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNT BY REASON 
              OF RECEIVING MEDICAL CARE FOR SERVICE-CONNECTED 
              DISABILITIES UNDER PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE 
              DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS.

    (a) In General.--Section 223(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) Special rule for individuals eligible for 
                certain veterans benefits.--An individual shall not 
                fail to be treated as an eligible individual for any 
                period merely because the individual receives hospital 
                care or medical services under any law administered by 
                the Secretary of Veterans Affairs for a service-
                connected disability (within the meaning of section 
                101(16) of title 38, United States Code).''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to months beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### William Jenne, Respondent, v. Otis Elevator Company, Appellant.

Judgment and order affirmed,. with costs. No opinion.'

Jenks, P. J., Woodward and Rich, JJ.., concurred;. Thomas and Carr, JJ., voted to reverse on the ground of error in the reception, of evidence at folio 250, etc.
llpp_ex101.htm

EXHIBIT 10.1
 
AMENDMENT NO. 1
TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
  
This Amendment No. 1 (this "Amendment") to the Employment Agreement (the "Agreement") dated June 29, 2015, by and between Loop Industries, Inc., a Nevada corporation ("Employer"), and Daniel Solomita ("Executive"), is entered into February 15, 2016. Employer and Executive may be collectively referred to herein as the "Parties". 
 
WHEREAS, the Parties have entered into the Agreement and wish to further amend the Agreement, as set forth herein.
 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of covenants and agreements contained hereinand such other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by each of the Parties hereto, the Parties agree as follows:
 
1. Definitions. All defined terms used herein shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Agreement unless otherwise defined herein, and all of the terms of the Agreement shall continue to apply unless as amended hereby.
 
2. Amendment and to the Agreement. Notwithstanding Section 2 of the Agreement, the Agreement is amended, so that Employer shall, immediately upon creation of the Series A Preferred Stock of the Employer, issue Executive one share of Employer's Series A Preferred Stock for consideration of Executive agreeing not to terminate his employment with Employer for a period of five (5) years from the date of this Amendment. 
 
3. Continuing Effect of the Agreement. Except as specifically set forth herein, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and shall not be waived, modified, superseded or otherwise affected by this Amendment. This Amendment is not to be construed as a release, waiver or modification of any of the terms, representations, warranties, covenants, rights or remedies set forth in the Agreement, except as specifically set forth herein.
 
4. Governing Law. This Amendment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Nevada.
 
5. Entire Agreement. The Agreement and this Amendment, and the exhibits and schedules delivered pursuant to the Agreement contain all of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the Parties relating to the subject matter of the Agreement and supersede all prior agreements, negotiations, correspondence, undertakings, and communications of the Parties, whether oral or written, respecting that subject matter.
 
[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
 
	 
	1


	

	 

 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first written above.
 
    	Employer:
			 	
						
	LOOP INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Nevada corporation
			EXECUTIVE
	
						
	By:	/s/ Daniel Solomita
		By:	/s/ Daniel Solomita
	
		Daniel Solomita 
			Daniel Solomita
	
		President and Chief Executive Officer
				

          2
#### CLARENCE B. CONGER, Individually and as Trustee, etc., of CATHARINE ANN HEDGES and Others, Appellants, *v.*THE NEW YORK, WEST SHORE AND BUFFALO RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent.

*Specific performance of a contract, entered into by a railroad company to make a station at a certain place*— *will be refused when a change of circumstances malees it more onerous to the party required to perform, without any great benefit to the other party.*

Appeal from a judgment entered upon the trial of this action by the court without a jury refusing to enforce the specific performance of a contract.

The Court at General Term said: “The Jersey City and Albany Railway Company was one of the lesser corporations which was *297finally consolidated as the New York, West Shore and Buffalo Railway Company. The plaintiff’s predecessor in title, Catharine Ann Hedges, owned land in Rockland county and the Jersey City and Albany Railway Company laid out its route through the same. An agreement was made by which the owner of the land agreed to give the right of way and, among other conditions, the Company agreed to make a station at the place known in the case as the *‘*Long Clove.’

“ Before the road was built the final consolidation was made and the defendant changed the route through the Hedges land and built their route upon the changed line and did not make a station at Long Clove. The change of route was not so marked but that the defendant took the bulk of the land agreed to be given to the Jersey City and Albany Railroad Company, and still it was so wide and, substantial as to change the situation of the parties m respect to the station at Long Clove. The first route went around the high peak of land south of Haverstraw under which the defendants constructed a tunnel. The place of the station under this arrangement would be north of the tunnel, and near its mouth and upon a sharp curve. The grade is heavy in both directions j the place of the station is almost if not entirely wild, and the station would be costly to build and maintain and would not benefit the land owner, so far as disclosed by the evidence. The public service would be injured and there would be no corresponding benefit to the public from a station at the point in question.

“ Under this evidence it is not a matter of right to ask a specific performance of a contract. When a contract was fair when made, if subsequent events change the conditions so as to make the same onerous, and without any great benefit to the party who asks the decree'for specific performance, the same should be denied. *(Trustee of Cohmibia College*v. *Thacher,*87 N. Y. 311; *Clarke*v. *Rochester, etc., R.*R. *Co,,*18 Barb. 350.) No real injustice is done. The party can have his action for damages and the judgment reserved this right.

“ The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.”

*Clarence R. Conger,*for the appellants.

*Ashbel Creen*and *C. Frost,*for the respondent.

Opinion by

Barnard, P. J.;

Pratt, J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of PennantPark Investment Corporation for the annual period ended September 30, 2019 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Aviv Efrat, as Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

 

| /s/ Aviv Efrat |
|----------------|
| Name:          |   | Aviv Efrat |
| Title:         |   | Chief Financial Officer |
| Date:          |   | November 21, 2019 |
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#### J. I. and H. H. PERRY v. MATTHEW PERRY.

(Filed 16 September, 1925.)

Ejectment —■ Leases — Landlord and Tenant — Evidence — Questions for Jury — Title.

'While tbe defendant in summary ejectment may not deny tbe title to tbe property of tbe one under whom be obtained possession while continuing therein, it is competent for him to show by bis evidence that in fact be rented from and entered possession under another.

Appeal by defendant from Oranmer, *J.,*at March Term, 1925, of Pasquotank.

Summary ejectment between plaintiffs, alleged landlords, and defendant, alleged tenant, and from a judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiffs, the defendant appeals.

The defendant’s appeal challenges the exclusion of evidence offered by him tending to show that the defendant rented the *locus in quo*from another, and that there was a dispute as to the title, and that defendant’s wife, as well as one Bundy, claimed an interest in this land. There was no motion to dismiss, for that title to land was in controversy.

*126*W. L. Small, Ehringhaus & Sail for plaintiffs.*

*Aydlett & Simpson for defendant.*

Vaeseb, J.

In summary ejectment there is, of course, only one main issue involved, and that is tenancy and the holding over. *McDonald v. Ingram,*124 N. C., 272; *McIver v. R. R.,*163 N. C., 545. However, it naturally follows that the summary remedy in ejectment provided by statute is restricted to cases in which the relation between the parties is that of landlord and tenant. *McIver v. R. R., supra; Hauser v. Morrison,*146 N. C., 248; *McCombs v. Wallace,*66 N. C., 481; *Hughes v. Mason,*84 N. C., 472; *Fertilizer Works v. Aiken,*175 N. C., 398; *Hargrove v. Cox,*180 N. C., 362.

The defendant denies that this relation exists. He expressly testifies that he *did not*rent the lands *from*the plaintiffs. The evidence *offered*is not competent to show title in another, if the relation of landlord and tenant does exist. This testimony as to a rental by defendant from Bundy, in 1923 and 1924, and as to a controversy between the Perrys and defendant’s wife is competent to be considered by the jury on the issue as to the rental contract, as a circumstance, in determining whether there was such a contract. It is also competent as corroborative of the defendant’s testimony. These are the only purposes for which it is competent. Thus restricted, the testimony ought to have been admitted.

Of course, as stated in *Davis v. Davis,*83 N. C., 71, if the defendant did enter as tenant of the plaintiffs or became such after entry, then he is estopped to deny the plaintiffs’ title (16 R. C. L., 469), or to assert title in himself (16 R. C. L., 657) until he has restored the possession to the plaintiffs, but he may contest the issue of tenancy by any competent evidence.

Therefore, let there be a

New trial.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 102 (Thursday, May 27, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29759-29760]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-12779]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Update to Notice of Financial Institutions for Which the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Has Been Appointed Either Receiver, 
Liquidator, or Manager

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

ACTION: Update Listing of Financial Institutions in Liquidation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (Corporation) has been appointed the sole receiver for the 
following financial institutions effective as of the Date Closed as 
indicated in the listing. This list (as updated from time to time in 
the Federal Register) may be relied upon as ``of record'' notice that 
the Corporation has been appointed receiver for purposes of the 
statement of policy published in the July 2, 1992 issue of the Federal 
Register (57 FR 29491). For further information concerning the 
identification of any institutions which have been placed in 
liquidation, please visit the Corporation Web site at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html or contact the 
Manager of Receivership Oversight in the appropriate service center.

    Dated: May 24, 2010.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Pamela Johnson,
Regulatory Editing Specialist.

[[Page 29760]]



                                           Institutions in Liquidation
                                             [In alphabetical order]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          FDIC Ref. No.                 Bank name               City                State           Date closed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10240............................  Pinehurst Bank.....  Saint Paul.........  MN.................       5/21/2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2010-12779 Filed 5-26-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
#### Ellen Reisman et al., Appellants, v Nancy Finnel, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

May 22, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Arnold E. Rubenstein*for appellants. *Párente & Kornblau (Allan I. Kornblau*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order entered December 3, 1986 reversed, the petition reinstated and the matter remanded to the court below for further proceedings, with $10 costs to the appellant.

*861Petitioners husband and wife commenced holdover proceedings to recover possession of tenant’s rent-stabilized apartment. Petitioners, who reside in the building, planned to use the tenant’s apartment as a drafting and design room "predominantly” for personal use. Before issue was joined, tenant moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion was based upon the purported exclusive jurisdiction of the Division of Housing and Community Renewal to determine applications to withdraw dwelling units from the rental market where the landlord requires the apartment for his own use in connection with a business owned and operated by the landlord (Code of Rent Stabilization Association of New York City, Inc. former § 54 [D] [2]).

Civil Court dismissed the petition, finding that the landlords intended to use the tenant’s apartment for business purposes and that no statutory basis then existed for noninstitutional landlords, such as petitioners, to deny the tenant a renewal lease on such grounds.

We reverse and reinstate the petition. Inasmuch as tenant’s motion to dismiss was not converted to a motion for summary judgment *(Rovello v Orofino Realty Co.,*40 NY2d 633; CPLR 3211 [c]), the petition, as amplified by petitioners’ notice of nonrenewal incorporated therein, was entitled to all favorable inferences. The court below thus erred in dismissing the petition on the merits. In any event, the precise nature of landlords’ plans to occupy tenant’s apartment is a matter best resolved at trial *(Cucin v Weitzner,*NYLJ, Feb. 9, 1984, at 7, col 2 [App Term, 1st Dept]).

Hughes, P. J., Riccobono and Parness, JJ., concur.