14-263 Stevenson v. Bank of Am., N.A. 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JA NUARY 1, 2007, IS PE RMITTED AND IS GOVERNE D BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 13 th day of January, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, GERARD E. LYNCH, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ Anthony Stevenson, Plaintiff-Appellant , Deloise Green-Stevenson, AKA Deloise Green, Plaintiff-Counter-D efendant-Appellant,

v. 14-263 Bank of America, N.A., et al. , Defendants-Appellees , EAM Land Services, Inc., Defendant-Counter-Claimant , Brian T. Moynihan, et al. , Defendants

._____________________________________ For Appellants: Anthony Steven son and Deloise Green-Stevenson, Pro se, Brooklyn, NY. For Appellees: Susan M. Berger (Chris M. Larocco on the brief ), Bryan Cave LLP, New York, NY for Bank of America, N.A. et al

. Steven S. Rand, Zeicher Ellman & Krause LLP, New York, NY for Quicken Loans, Inc

.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States Di strict Court for the Eastern District of New York (Weinstein, J .). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and the motions to supplement the record, to vacate the judgm ent, for recusal, and to re ject Appellees’ oppositions are DENIED

. Appellants Anthony Stevenson and Deloise Gree n-Stevenson, proceeding pro se, appeal the district court’s j udgment dismissing their complaint a nd granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Also before the court are Appe llants’ renewed motion to supplement the record, their motion to vacate the district court’s judgment and for recusal of the district court judge and magistrate judge, and their motion to reject Appe llees’ papers filed in opposition. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural hi story of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review a grant of summar y judgment de novo, viewing th e facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. , 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genu ine dispute as to any material fa ct and the movant is entitled to3 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( a). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants raise several challenges to the dismissal of their complaint on summary judgment. Even after considering the records th at Appellants seek to reintroduce on appeal, most of these contentions are meritless and none of them warrant reversal. Accordingly, we decline to alter our prior order granting s upplementation of the record on appeal, and we deny as moot Appellants’ second motion to supplement the record. We affirm the district court’ s order granting summary judgment for substantially the same reasons stated in its opinion, with one exception. The district cour t erred in dismissing their claim against Appellee Quicken Loans, Inc. (“Quicken” ) under the Securities Act of 1934 on the basis of res judicata. The federal courts have exclusiv e jurisdiction over such claims, and it could not have been brought in the prior state court action. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. That claim fails nevertheless because Appellants’ complaint did not allege that they had purchased or sold securities. See Pross v. Katz , 784 F.2d 455, 457 (2d Cir. 1986) (“To violate the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, the fraud must be either in connection with the purchase or sale of a security or in the offer or sale of a security.”); see also Sudler v. City of New York , 689 F.3d 159, 168 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.”). The other federal claims asserted against Quicken were properly dismissed on res judicata grounds because the New York State Supreme Court had conc urrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to hear those claims. The statutes under which those other claims arise either affirmatively give4 state courts the authority to hear those claims or fail to “affirmatively divest state courts of their presumptively concurre nt jurisdiction.” Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly , 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990). Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of reconsider ation. We lack jurisdiction, however, to review that order because Appellants filed their notice of app eal before the district court had entered its order disposing of the motion for reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). Because Appellants’ motion to v acate the judgment challenged only the district court’s denial of reconsiderat ion, we also deny that motion. Appellants argue, in their brief an d motion for recusal, that the district judge and magistrate judge should have recused themselves sua spon te on the grounds that their adverse rulings exhibited bias and that the judge s engaged in ex parte communicat ions with Appellees during an on-the-record hearing at which Appellants failed to appear. These arguments are meritless. Without more, an adverse ruling does not support a claim for recusal, see United States v. Schwartz , 535 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Adverse ru lings, standing alone, do not establish judicial bias or prejudice . . . nor create a reasonable question of judicial impartiality.”), and the on-the-record hearing, of which Appellants had no tice and neglected to attend, does not constitute an improper ex parte contact. Appell ants’ recusal motion is denied. Appellees filed oppositions to Appellants’ moti ons for vacatur and recusal. Appellants asked this court to reject those oppositions. We d ecline to do so. Appellants raise no arguments in this regard that we ha ve not already addressed.5 We have considered all of Appellants’ rema ining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and DENY the motions to supplement the record, to vacate the judgment, fo r recusal, and to reject Appellees’ oppositions.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk