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WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 

Stephen Karotkin (pro hac vice) 

(stephen.karotkin@weil.com) 

Jessica Liou (pro hac vice) 

(jessica.liou@weil.com) 

Theodore Tsekerides (pro hac vice) 

(theodore.tsekerides@weil.com) 

Matthew Goren (pro hac vice) 

(matthew.goren@weil.com) 

767 Fifth Avenue 

New York, NY 10153-0119 

Tel: 212 310 8000 

Fax: 212 310 8007 

Attorneys for Debtors

and Debtors in Possession

KELLER & BENVENUTTI LLP 

Tobias S. Keller (#151445) 

(tkeller@kellerbenvenutti.com) 

Peter J. Benvenutti (#60566) 

(pbenvenutti@kellerbenvenutti.com) 

Jane Kim (#298192) 

(jkim@kellerbenvenutti.com) 

650 California Street, Suite 1900 

San Francisco, CA 94108 

Tel: 415 496 6723 

Fax: 650 636 9251 

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

In re: 

PG&E CORPORATION, 

 - and - 

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, 

Debtors. 

 Affects PG&E Corporation 

 Affects Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

 Affects both Debtors 

* All papers shall be filed in the Lead Case, 

No. 19-30088 (DM).

 Bankruptcy Case No. 19-30088 (DM) 

Chapter 11 

(Lead Case) (Jointly Administered) 

PRELIMINARY RESPONSE IN 

OPPOSITION TO WENDY 

NATHAN’S MOTION FOR RELIEF 

FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY 

[Relates to Dkt No. 2048] 

Date: June 11, 2019 

Time: 9:30 a.m. 

Place: United States Bankruptcy Court 

 Courtroom 17, 16th Floor 

 San Francisco, CA 94102 

Debtors’ Response Deadline: 

 June 6, 2019 

 4:00 p.m. (Pacific Time)

 

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the “Utility” or the “Debtor”), as debtor and debtor in 

possession in one of the above-captioned Chapter 11 Cases (the “Chapter 11 Cases”), respectfully 

submits this preliminary response in opposition to Wendy Nathan’s (“Nathan’s”) Motion for Relief 

from the Automatic Stay (the “Motion”). See Dkt. No. 2048. 

As discussed more fully below, the circumstances underlying Nathan’s Motion are factually 

and legally indistinguishable from those presented by the motion brought by Marina and Mikhail 

Gelman (the “Gelmans”). Dkt. No. 1310, filed April 10, 2019. In its Memorandum Decision on 

Motions for Relief From Stay filed May 12, 2019 [Dkt. No. 1982] (the “Gelman Decision”), the 

Court denied the Gelmans’ motion, and a separate motion by creditor Valero Refining Company – 

California (“Valero”), following preliminary hearings held on May 9, 2019, and instead continued 

both preliminary hearings to September 10, 2019. The Court should dispose of Nathan’s Motion in 

the same manner – by denying the Motion now and continuing the preliminary hearing to a date in 

September. 

On August 30, 2017, Wendy Nathan initiated a personal-injury action in Alameda County 

Superior Court (the “Nathan Action”) arising out of an alleged trip-and-fall incident, in which she 

named as defendants the Debtor, Ann D. Greevich as Successor Trustee of the Survivor’s Trust, 

Greevich Trust dated June 7, 1991, and Jane Inok Hong. Subsequently, the City of Oakland, 

California, was added as a third-party defendant. See Motion at 1-3. As of January 29, 2019, all 

claims against the Debtor in the Nathan Action have been stayed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Debtor 

filed a notice of the bankruptcy stay on February 4, 2019, in the Superior Court in which the Nathan 

Action was pending. Nathan now seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), 

to “allow for liquidation of the claims asserted against the Debtor.” See Motion at 2-3. 

Nathan asserts “cause” for stay relief based on the argument that abstention – either 

permissive or mandatory – would be appropriate here under 28 USC §1334(c)(1) or (2).1 Motion, 

 

1

 It is noteworthy that the Motion is explicitly styled one for relief from the automatic stay, and the 

only relief it seeks is modification of the stay; the Motion does not seek an order for abstention, 

either permissive or mandatory. 

 

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¶ 10, at page 3. Utility disputes that abstention would be appropriate here, or would provide cause 

for stay relief.2 But even assuming that Nathan could establish a prima facie basis for stay relief 

predicated on abstention principles, the Motion fails to address the broader considerations that led 

the Court to conclude less than a month ago that “PG&E has carried its burden in opposition under 

11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2),” and to deny stay relief to the Gelmans and Valero in its discretion “at this 

time.” Gelman Decision at 3. Those same considerations apply equally to Nathan’s Motion, and 

compel the same result here. 

Nathan’s personal-injury claim is indistinguishable in any material respect from the 

Gelmans’ claim. See Gelmans’ motion, Dkt. No. 1310. Just as with the Gelmans’ motion, Nathan 

does not and cannot distinguish her trip-and-fall claim from the numerous other claims that face the 

Debtor, including all other prepetition tort claims, and she offers no justification for diverting the 

Debtor’s resources and management attention away from carrying out its reorganization. The 

Nathan Action is in no way unique, either compared to the approximately one hundred other nonwildfire tort cases against the Debtor for personal injury and/or property damages—approximately 

half of which include other non-debtor defendants—and certainly not compared to the thousands of 

wildfire related claims and lawsuits. As with the Gelmans’ Motion, and Valero’s, “it is still too 

early in these complex reorganization cases to force the Debtor[] to defend the claims of [Nathan] 

in [a] different court[] while at the same time attempting to make progress toward the goal of a 

successful reorganization.” Gelman Decision at 2. “[I]t is far more preferable to make progress 

toward that goal before the individual claims be dealt with.” Id. “Debtors make a persuasive 

demonstration that more time is needed to attend to the myriad issues in this case without forcing 

them to resume defense of these two actions absent compelling circumstances to justify relief [from 

stay] now.” Id. at 3 – 4. “Relief from stay for these [] motions now is not appropriate.” Id. at 5. 

Nathan has failed to demonstrate sufficient compelling circumstances to justify compelling 

Utility to defend against her disputed personal-injury claim now. Granting the Motion would force 

 

2

 See discussion at 6 below. 

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the Debtor to devote resources to address Nathan’s claims ahead of the thousands of other tort 

claimants, especially all other prepetition claimants who properly follow the normal claims filing 

and administration process that is central to Chapter 11. 

Permitting the Nathan Action to proceed also threatens to open the floodgates for all tort 

plaintiffs to request relief from stay, rather than filing proofs of claim via the customary bankruptcy 

process. Such a result would defeat the purpose of the automatic stay and disrupt the pending 

Chapter 11 Cases. The Court should deny requests for relief from the stay to litigate individual tort 

claims like the Nathan Action to protect orderly and fair estate administration as to all tort claims. 

In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (“Even slight interference with the 

administration [of the debtor’s estate] may be enough to preclude relief [from the automatic stay] in 

the absence of a commensurate benefit.”). 

It is of no moment that Nathan “only seeks to liquidate her claim.” Motion at 4. Just as with 

the Gelmans and Valero motions, if Nathan were granted the relief she seeks, she would “still not 

be able to enforce [her] claim or take other actions to recover without further permission from the 

[C]ourt.” Gelman Decision at 2-3. Nathan admits that she does “not [seek] to enforce the resulting 

judgment against the Estate.” Motion at 4. Rather, Nathan’s admission underscores her failure to 

demonstrate compelling circumstances to justify why the Court should grant this relief now. Debtor 

filed the notice of bankruptcy in the Nathan Action on February 4, 2019. Nathan did not bring her 

Motion until May 16, 2019—four days after the Court’s Gelman Decision continued the Gelmans 

and Valero motions until September 10, 2019. Since Nathan waited three-and-a-half months to 

even seek relief from the automatic stay, it is unclear why she cannot wait three more for the 

consideration of her Motion. Nathan fails to offer any explanation. 

Likewise, it is of no consequence that “[r]ecently, knowing that [Nathan’s] motion would be 

filed shortly, the Superior Court ordered the parties to participate in mediation before August 30, 

2019, and set a new trial date for February 21, 2020.” Declaration of Seth I. Rosenberg Re: Motion 

for Relief from the Automatic Stay (the “Rosenberg Decl.”) ¶ 8. These “recent” actions taken by 

the Superior Court, both setting a negotiation deadline and a trial date, violate the automatic stay, 

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and are void ab initio. In the Ninth Circuit, “judicial proceedings in violation of the automatic stay 

are void ab initio.” In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1082 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000). Debtor does not need to 

make any attempt to have such a violation voided in bankruptcy since “violations of the automatic 

stay are void, not voidable.” In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). 

Indeed, “it does not fall on the debtor” to “effectuate the purpose of the automatic stay” and therefore 

Debtor needs not undertake any further efforts for this Court to recognize that continued prosecution 

of the Nathan Action violates section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code and is therefore void ab 

initio. In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Abrams, 127 B.R. 

239, 243 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991)). 

Nathan’s assertion that relief from the stay would promote judicial economy is baseless. 

Relief from the stay would be especially inappropriate here where Nathan indicates that the parties 

are not prepared to go to trial. See Motion at 2 (indicating the possible need of “further discovery . 

. . with respect to co-defendants”). Indeed, Nathan has proffered no evidence that the parties are 

trial-ready. See Motion at 6-7. It would be a more efficient use of judicial resources to deny stay 

relief and channel Nathan’s claims into the normal claims process, as is customary in cases under 

Chapter 11. Given the magnitude of tort claims confronting the Debtor, an orderly process to resolve 

these claims is essential. As this Court has found, “there is too much at stake in needing to craft the 

contours of the reorganization than to require a debtor this soon to tackle specific individual cases. 

[The Debtor] must have breathing room in order [to] at least outline where and how these and other 

claims will be handled.” Gelman Decision at 4. 

Nathan’s assertions that “[i]t is impossible to sever the state law claims” simply miss the 

mark. See Motion at 4. “Nothing prevents [Nathan] from severing [her] action and proceeding 

separately against the other defendants but [she] has declined that option.” Gelman Decision at 3. 

Nathan nowhere alleges how separate proceedings would prejudice her, nor can Nathan plausibly 

claim that the stay prevents her from recovering from the City of Oakland or the individual 

defendants under generally applicable joint liability theories. Nathan could also pursue her claim 

against the Debtor by filing a proof of claim and participating, along with other unsecured creditors, 

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in the claims allowance process.3 Nathan has shown nothing unique about litigating against other 

defendants as there are numerous other claimants who brought tort claims against the Debtor and 

other non-debtor defendants. That a claimant would have the option to proceed sooner by pursuing 

claims against debtor and non-debtor defendants in different forums does not determine whether the 

Court should lift the stay. See In re Sonnax Indus., Inc., 907 F.2d 1280, 1287 (2d Cir. 1990) 

(holding that balance of harms weighed in favor of stay where the movant had the right to proceed 

with its claims in a separate proceeding against non-debtor defendants). Nathan’s choice not to 

proceed separately is but another indication that even from Nathan’s perspective there is simply no 

rush for Debtor to address her claims now. 

Nathan’s Motion relies on the doctrines of permissive and mandatory abstention, but her 

ability to proceed depends entirely upon an order from this Court lifting the automatic stay. See In 

re Conejo Enterprises, Inc., 96 F.3d 346, 352 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “a finding that mandatory 

abstention applies to [a] state [court] action does not preclude denial of relief from § 362’s automatic 

stay”). The Court need not consider abstention in the first instance because the Court should deny 

relief for lack of any cause to lift the stay. See In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 309 B.R. 14, 18 n.3 

(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (stating that if “the Court finds that [no] cause exists to lift the automatic 

stay, the Court will not [need to] address [the movants’] arguments for permissive abstention” 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1)). 

Additionally, the Court could also deny Nathan’s abstention request merely because 

Nathan’s Motion fails to set forth evidence showing that the circumstances of her lawsuit and the 

Chapter 11 Cases weigh in favor of abstention. For instance, while “the complexity of state law 

issues . . . ‘particularly favors abstention’” (Parmalat Capital Fin. Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 671 

F.3d 261, 268 (2d Cir. 2012)), Nathan has argued that her “issues are not complex” and “concern 

typical negligence and premises-liability issues that the Superior Court adjudicates every day.” 

Motion at 4, 6. Similarly, while the need for “swift resolution” is a relevant factor (Parmalat, 671 

 

3

 If Nathan opted to proceed against the non-debtor defendants to judgment in the Nathan Action, 

the non-debtor defendants could also file proofs of claim against the Debtor for any purported 

indemnity claims. 

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F.3d at 268), Nathan has shown little haste or other evidence of a need for “swift resolution” of her 

case. Nathan also presents no basis for assessing “the backlog of the state court’s calendar relative 

to the federal court’s calendar.” Id. at 266. While ultimately Nathan is not entitled to stay relief for 

lack of cause, she also falls short of demonstrating a persuasive argument for either permissive or 

mandatory abstention.4

In sum, the Motion fails to establish a prima facie basis for its requested relief from the 

automatic stay, or compelling circumstances why – given the early state of the Debtor’s chapter 11 

case – Nathan’s underlying lawsuit against the Debtor should be permitted to proceed now. The 

Court should deny Nathan’s request for relief from the automatic stay at this time, and continue the 

preliminary hearing on her Motion until September 10, 2019, or as soon thereafter, as with the 

Gelmans and Valero Motions. 

 

4

 If the Court were inclined to consider the abstention issue, the Debtor requests that the Court set 

a briefing schedule for the Debtor to submit a full response to all of the abstention arguments in 

the Motion before it rules. 

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 

KELLER & BENVENUTTI LLP 

By: /s/ Peter J. Benvenutti 

 Peter J. Benvenutti 

Attorneys for Debtors 

and Debtors in Possession

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