COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker, Benton, Coleman, Elder, 

 Bray, Fitzpatrick, Annunziata and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LEATHIO WILLIAMS 

v. Record No. 0826-93-2 OPINION 

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA FEBRUARY 13, 1996 

UPON A REHEARING EN BANC 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 

Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge 

 Connie Louise Edwards (Connie Louise Edwards, 

P.C., on briefs), for appellant-respondent. 

 Donald R. Curry, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on briefs), for appellee-petitioner. 

 On February 7, 1995, a panel of this Court reversed and 

remanded the conviction of Leathio Williams (appellant) for 

violation of Code § 18.2-55 (knowingly and willfully inflicting 

bodily injury on an employee of a correctional facility). See 

Williams v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 600, 453 S.E.2d 575 (1995). 

 The Commonwealth's petition for rehearing en banc was granted 

and the mandate of that opinion stayed. Upon rehearing en banc, 

we affirm the judgment of the trial court and order that the 

mandate of the February 7, 1995 opinion be vacated. 

 Before the panel, appellant argued that the trial court 

erred in refusing to strike for cause six persons from the 

venire, one of the challenged members, Juror Person, being a 

correctional officer. In reversing and remanding appellant's 
- 2 - 

conviction, the panel held that where a defendant, pursuant to 

Code § 18.2-55, is charged with assaulting a correctional 

officer, a venireman who is "a correctional guard is disqualified 

per se from serving on [the] jury." Id. at 604, 453 S.E.2d at 

577. 

Per se presumptions of bias are not favored. See, e.g., 

Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 452, 339 S.E.2d 899, 901 

(1986), aff'd, 233 Va. 5, 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987). Absent the 

existence of a per se ground for exclusion, rulings concerning 

the qualifications of a juror are left to the sound discretion of 

the trial court and will not be overturned absent a showing of 

manifest error. Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 375, 337 

S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985). 

 At voir dire, Juror Person stated that although he was 

employed by the Department of Corrections that fact would not 

influence his decision, and he could be impartial and fair in 

this case. 

 A per se rule in Virginia has been approved only where the 

venireman knew of an accused's prior conviction for the same 

offense, id.; stood in a near legal relationship to the victim of 

the accused, Gray v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 591, 593, 311 S.E.2d 

409, 410 (1984), Jaques v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 690, 

693 (1853); or was a part owner of a victim bank; Salina v. 

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 92, 93, 225 S.E.2d 199, 200 (1976). 

 Here, the only relationship between the victim and Juror 
- 3 - 

Person is that they share the same occupation and the risk of 

suffering the same type of assault upon which this action was 

based. 

 We hold that under the facts disclosed by this record, the 

application of a per se rule is unwarranted, and that Juror 

Person's employment, without more, does not require that bias 

should be imputed. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 447, 

339 S.E.2d 899 (1986), aff'd, 233 Va. 5, 353 S.E.2d 460 (1987). 

 Appellant also argued before the panel that the trial court 

erred in refusing to strike five other jurors for cause. 

 Juror Wilson was the ninth grade school teacher of the 

victim. She stated that she had not seen the victim routinely 

since she taught her and indicated without equivocation that she 

could be fair and impartial. Nothing in the record required 

disqualification of Juror Wilson. See Barker, 230 Va. at 375, 

337 S.E.2d at 733 (1985). 

 Juror Vaughan had two relatives who worked in law 

enforcement. Juror Wray was a former law enforcement officer, 

and Juror Michaels was employed as a juvenile probation officer. 

 Appellant challenged these jurors because of their association 

with law enforcement. All three of these jurors, however, 

indicated that they could be fair and impartial, and nothing in 

the record indicates otherwise. Therefore, the trial court did 

not err in refusing to strike these jurors for cause. See

Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 492, 404 S.E.2d 227, 
- 4 - 

233-34 (1991) (trial court did not err in refusing to strike 

former probation officer who demonstrated impartiality). 

 Juror Johnson, whose brother worked at the same correctional 

facility as the victim, indicated that she had heard about the 

incident from her brother. In response to a question concerning 

what she may have heard, Juror Johnson stated, "I just remember 

that something happened." When asked whether the fact that her 

brother worked at the correctional facility would influence her 

in any way, she stated, "No, sir, it wouldn't." She indicated 

that she could decide the case on the evidence presented at trial 

and not on anything she may have heard. Accordingly, the trial 

court did not err in refusing to strike Juror Johnson for cause. 

See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 309, 384 S.E.2d 785, 

794 (1989) ("'[I]t is not necessary that prospective jurors be 

entirely ignorant of the facts and issues in the case.' All that 

is required is that the venireman 'can lay aside [his] 

impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the 

evidence presented in court.'"). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.
- 5 - 

Elder, J., with whom Benton, J., joins, dissenting. 

 I dissent for the reasons stated in the panel opinion as to 

the juror who was a correctional officer. While the trial judge 

did not abuse his discretion by failing to disqualify the five 

other jurors, when viewed collectively the jury was not "as free 

from suspicion as possible." Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 

Gratt.) 941, 943 (1879). For these reasons, I would reverse the 

judgment of the trial court.