IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 101 / 06-0478 

Filed February 8, 2008 

STATE OF IOWA, 

 Appellee, 

vs. 

ERROL EDWARD DECKER, 

Appellant. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Douglas S. 

Russell (suppression) and Marsha M. Beckelman (trial and sentencing), 

Judges. 

 Criminal defendant appeals conviction based upon the introduction of 

a police interrogation video during rebuttal, which had been suppressed 

during the case-in-chief for due process and Miranda violations. 

AFFIRMED. 

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson 

and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defenders, for 

appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant 

Attorney General, and Harold Denton, County Attorney, for appellee. 
2

APPEL, Justice. 

 In this case, we must decide whether a videotaped interrogation, 

suppressed during the State’s case-in-chief for constitutional violations, can 

be admitted as rebuttal evidence to combat an insanity defense. The trial 

court admitted the videotape, on the State’s motion, as evidence of the 

defendant’s demeanor less than twenty-four hours after commission of the 

assault. The defendant claims that the admission of the videotape violated 

his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by impermissibly using 

invocations of his right to remain silent as evidence of sanity. At the 

conclusion of a bench trial, the court convicted the defendant of attempted 

murder, burglary in the first degree, and willful injury. For the reasons set 

forth below we affirm. 

I. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings. 

 The evidence at trial showed that Amy McNeal, a young mother and 

Cedar Rapids native, began dating Errol Edward Decker, the defendant, in 

August 2003. The couple’s year-long relationship was a tumultuous one, 

punctuated by a series of breakups and reconciliations. Finally, McNeal 

permanently ended the relationship in July 2004. Thereafter a series of 

increasingly bizarre and violent events occurred. McNeal’s dog disappeared. 

After several days, she recovered the animal. Although Decker claimed not 

to have been involved, McNeal thought otherwise. Fearing for the safety of 

herself and her thirteen-year-old son Jacob, McNeal unsuccessfully 

attempted to obtain a no-contact order. On the advice of local police, 

however, McNeal sent Decker a letter detailing her wish to have no further 

contact with him. 

 On August 24, 2004, just days after the Linn County Sheriff’s 

Department delivered the letter, McNeal returned home around noon to care 
3

for her dog. Although it was her routine to return home each day, she 

usually did not take her lunch hour until one o’clock. After taking the dog 

outside, McNeal immediately noticed that her attic door was ajar and the 

rug normally pushed against it had been moved. As she went to investigate, 

Decker emerged from the hallway and attacked her. Decker repeatedly hit 

McNeal with a hammer on her head and neck and stabbed her with a knife 

in her chest, stomach, and back. McNeal testified that she had never seen 

the knife used in the attack before, but believed that the hammer could 

have come from a tool kit in her home. 

 According to the State’s evidence, McNeal attempted to fight Decker 

off and begged for her life. Decker responded that McNeal “was dead,” “that 

she had ruined his life,” and that he had already killed her son Jacob. The 

attack eventually progressed to Jacob’s bedroom. At some point, Decker 

headed to the basement and called for “boy,” and then for “Ted.” No one 

responded. McNeal used Decker’s momentary absence to call 911. Before 

the call connected, however, Decker returned, hitting her on the head with 

the hammer and choking her around the neck. Decker finally left the home 

after McNeal promised not to call the police. 

 Investigating police did not find anyone in the home, nor did they 

immediately locate an acquaintance of Decker’s named Ted. McNeal 

testified that she did not see anyone besides Decker at any point before, 

during, or after the attack. Exhibits introduced by the State showed 

Decker’s point of entry as a basement window. Jacob was later located, 

unharmed, at his school. 

 On the urging of his family, Decker turned himself in to the Iowa City 

Police Department and was transported to the Linn County jail. Upon 

arrival at the jail, Decker was arrested for attempted murder. The following 
4

morning, Detective Anne Deutmeyer initiated Decker’s interrogation. At the 

outset, Deutmeyer verbally informed Decker of his Miranda rights. She also 

presented Decker with a written statement of his Miranda rights for 

signature. When Decker did not sign the document, Deutmeyer asked him 

if he understood the information on the sheet. Decker responded, “I can 

read.” About a minute later, Deutmeyer asked Decker whether he wanted 

to talk to her, and Decker responded “not really.” When Deutmeyer 

continued her questioning, Decker was lethargic, routinely gazed at the 

floor, and was only minimally responsive to questioning. During the next 

twenty minutes, Deutmeyer repeatedly asked the defendant if he wanted to 

talk to her. In response, Decker either did not reply or stated that “I don’t 

want to talk about it” or “I don’t have nothing to say about it.” 

 The State charged Decker with attempted murder, burglary in the 

first degree, and willful injury. He entered a plea of not guilty, and later 

asserted the affirmative defenses of insanity and diminished capacity. After 

several requests to represent himself, the court appointed Decker a new 

attorney. Decker then moved to suppress videotaped statements he made 

during his interrogation. 

 The motion to suppress was heard by Judge Douglas Russell. Judge 

Russell granted defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the detective 

failed to honor Decker’s repeated invocations of his right to remain silent. 

Further, Judge Russell held that Deutmeyer made a promise of leniency in 

violation of Decker’s right against self-incrimination. As a result, Judge 

Russell ruled that any statements made by Decker during the interrogation 

be suppressed. 

 The matter came to a bench trial on August 15 before Judge Marsha 

Beckelman. At trial, the State presented detailed testimony about the 
5

assault from the victim, Amy McNeal. The State further offered testimony 

from two Cedar Rapids police officers. The officers testified that Decker 

refused to say anything about the crime during transport to the Linn 

County jail. His demeanor was described as “very quiet, sweaty, just sat 

quietly in the back of our squad car.” 

 In response, Decker put forth an insanity defense. His first witness 

was Susan Blome, a long-time registered nurse with experience in providing 

assessments of and medical monitoring for Linn County jail inmates. She 

testified that Decker was on suicide precaution while being held prior to 

trial. In records, she noted that Decker had difficulty tracking and 

answering questions. Blome characterized his mood as “vacant,” affect as 

“restricted,” and facial expressions “flat.” She also described Decker as alert 

and oriented, knew the date and where he was, and that his speech rate 

and rhythm were normal. Blome noted that Decker reported “psychotic 

symptoms” including hallucinations, auditory [sensations], and paranoia. 

During his stay in the Linn County jail, Decker reported that he heard 

voices and requested an increase in medication. Ultimately, Dr. Ali Safdar 

diagnosed Decker as “probable bi-polar with psychotic symptoms.” At the 

time of his diagnosis, Dr. Safdar noted that Decker was not hearing voices. 

 Additionally, Decker offered expert testimony from Dr. Scott Stuart. 

Stuart conducted a one-and-a-half hour interview with Decker, examined 

his medical records, and reviewed police reports about the events of 

August 24. The doctor concluded that at the time of the attack, Decker was 

suffering from untreated schizophrenia. As a result, the defendant was 

unaware of the nature and consequences of his actions, and unable to 

distinguish between right and wrong. In support of his opinion, Stuart 

noted that Decker called out to people that were not there. In particular, 
6

Stuart noted that Decker called out to “Ted,” who was not at the scene of 

the crime, and had various conflicting versions about Ted’s involvement. 

Stuart concluded that Ted was part of Decker’s delusional system. Relying 

on police reports that Decker was “not [all] there,” Stuart concluded that at 

the time of the crime he was in the midst of an untreated psychotic episode, 

consistent with untreated schizophrenia. 

 In addition to the direct testimony of Blome and Stuart, Decker 

offered into evidence medical records regarding his mental health. The 

records generally reveal a long history of treatment for psychological and 

behavioral matters. The diagnoses fluctuated from childhood behavior 

disorder, childhood schizophrenia, mild mental retardation, unsocialized 

aggressive reaction disorder, and attention deficit disorder. 

 On rebuttal, the State called Detective Deutmeyer to the stand. 

Deutmeyer was asked about her observations of Decker’s demeanor at the 

time of his interrogation. Deutmeyer testified that “he didn’t want to make 

eye contact with me, he was very evasive.” Decker’s counsel objected to the 

characterization that Decker did not want to make eye contact, asking the 

court to direct the witness to recast the testimony to simply state that 

Decker did not make eye contact with her. The district court overruled the 

objection. Deutmeyer further testified, without defense objection, “As I was 

speaking with him, he continually looked at the floor. He was kind of 

fidgety. That was about it.” 

 At this point, the State offered into evidence the entire videotape of 

Decker’s police interrogation. The State recognized that the tape been had 

suppressed during its case-in-chief, but contended that the defense had 

opened the door by asserting an insanity defense. Specifically, the State 

alleged that the tape would show the defendant’s “capacity” or demeanor 
7

shortly after the incident. The State further argued that the tape provided 

better evidence of Decker’s capacity than Detective Deutmeyer’s testimony. 

Finally, the State argued that the tape did not contain any statements that 

would be regarded as incriminating in any event. 

 Decker’s attorney objected to the offer of the videotape. The defense 

argued that the tape should not be admitted in light of the suppression 

ruling. Defense counsel conceded that the statements were made close in 

time and proximity, but questioned whether any arguably relevant aspects 

of the tape could be separated from unlawfully obtained evidence. 

According to defense counsel, “I don’t believe there is any way that . . . the 

court could be able to look at the tape and observe for demeanor and so 

forth and not listen to what is said on the tape.” The district court 

overruled Decker’s objection and admitted the interrogation videotape. 

 After the videotape was admitted, Deutmeyer continued her 

testimony. She testified that she did not know whether Decker understood 

her questions, but that she had to ask him questions several times before 

she got an answer. In terms of speech and demeanor, she testified, “He just 

seemed like he had a lot on his mind and wasn’t really there.” 

 The State also called Candice Martin, a friend of McNeal, as a rebuttal 

witness. She testified that she observed Decker a couple of times a week 

prior to the incident leading to his arrest. She testified that she had not 

observed Decker engage in any unusual or bizarre behavior. 

 The State’s final witness on rebuttal was Ted Dunkel, who was 

located by McNeal’s family on the third day of trial. Dunkel testified that he 

gave Decker a ride in his van to the area surrounding McNeal’s home on the 

date of the incident and that Decker instructed him to wait in the van. 

After waiting for more than half an hour, Dunkel left the keys in the van 
8

and walked to work. According to Dunkel, Decker appeared “fine,” 

“normal,” “not angry,” and “quiet.” 

 In response, the defense recalled Dr. Stuart. Dr. Stuart reconfirmed 

his prior diagnosis, despite “Ted’s” discovery. 

 In her ruling, Judge Beckelman rejected Decker’s insanity defense 

and found Decker guilty as charged. With respect to insanity, Judge 

Beckelman noted that while Dr. Stuart supported his opinion by pointing to 

auditory hallucinations with a nonexistent “Ted,” when the crime was 

committed the evidence showed that Ted, in fact, was quite real and in the 

immediate vicinity. 

 Contrary to Dr. Stuart, Judge Beckelman noted that the medical 

records, at least from 1976 to the present, tended to support the absence of 

ongoing auditory or visual hallucinations, psychotic symptoms, and 

delusional thinking. As a result, she disagreed with the opinion of 

Dr. Stuart that Decker had a long and clearly documented history of 

paranoid delusions. Instead, she found that claims of Decker’s 

hallucinations were self-reported only after his arrest. Further, review of 

the medical records drove Judge Beckelman to the opposite conclusion, 

namely, that Decker was of sufficient intelligence and mental capacity to 

form specific intent. 

 Aside from the medical evidence, Judge Beckelman also relied upon 

the testimony of lay witnesses. She observed that McNeal and Martin, both 

of whom had ample opportunity to observe Decker prior to the crime, 

testified that he behaved in a normal fashion. 

 Finally, Judge Beckelman cited the facts surrounding the attack. She 

concluded that the evidence showed that Decker purposefully planned and 

carried out the attack in revenge for the breakup of his relationship. Judge 
9

Beckelman found that Decker perpetrated the crime through deliberate, 

logical, and methodical steps. 

 Subsequent to his conviction, Judge Beckelman sentenced Decker to 

twenty-five years on both the attempted murder and burglary counts and to 

ten years on the willful injury count. Additionally, the court ordered that 

each of these sentences run consecutively, for a total of sixty years. Decker 

filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. Standard of Review. 

 Decker alleges that the admission of the interrogation video violated 

his right to due process by compelling him to be a witness against himself 

in violation of Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution and the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We review 

constitutional claims de novo. State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 901 (Iowa 

2003). 

III. Preservation of Error. 

 The State argues that Decker has failed to preserve error on his 

constitutional claim, citing: (1) Decker’s failure to object to either the calling 

of Detective Deutmeyer as a rebuttal witness or to her testimony regarding 

Decker’s interrogation demeanor; and (2) Decker’s failure to articulate the 

constitutional basis for his objection at trial. 

 Although the State is certainly correct that the detective introduced 

demeanor evidence without objection prior to the videotape’s introduction, 

we do not find this omission fatal. As will be discussed below, the 

demeanor evidence elicited before the tape’s introduction was permissible, 

physical demeanor evidence. The videotape, however, contains 

impermissible evidence—namely Decker’s repeated invocations of his right 

to remain silent and testimonial demeanor evidence. Decker did interpose a 
10

timely objection to the offer of the videotape and, as a result, the objection 

was timely with respect to this evidence. 

 Secondarily, the State argues that Decker’s objection to the admission 

of the videotape was too general to preserve error. The general rule with 

respect to error preservation is that unless the reasons for an objection are 

obvious a party attempting to exclude evidence has the duty to indicate the 

specific grounds to the court so as to alert the judge to the question raised 

and enable opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures to remedy 

the defect, if possible. State v. Clay, 213 N.W.2d 473, 476–77 (Iowa 1973). 

Although Decker’s counsel failed to state his objection with particularity, 

counsel repeatedly referenced the prior suppression ruling which held that 

the interrogation was inadmissible for Miranda violations and promises of 

leniency. Under this record, both the State and the court were informed of 

the underlying nature of the objection through incorporation of the grounds 

previously raised by the defense. As a result, error is preserved. 

IV. Discussion. 

A. Issues Presented on Appeal. Decker asserts that the trial court 

erred in admitting the videotaped interrogation in violation of his Fifth 

Amendment rights as incorporated against the State through the Due 

Process Clause of the United States Constitution and through the parallel 

provision in the Iowa Constitution.1 The State does not appeal the original 

suppression order, but asserts that the video was proper rebuttal evidence 

to show Decker’s demeanor less then twenty-four hours after his attack on 

 

1While Decker argues that the admission of the interrogation tape violated both 

state and federal constitutional provisions, he has failed to articulate any ground on which 

to treat or interpret the clauses differently. As such, the state constitutional ground will 

not be analyzed separately. See Pfister v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 688 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Iowa 2004) 

(“Because the parties have articulated no basis for distinguishing these clauses for 

purposes of determining a parolee’s right to counsel, our discussion of the federal due 

process claim applies equally to the claim made under the Iowa Constitution.”). 
11

McNeal. According to the State, this evidence of Decker’s demeanor tends 

to show that Decker was not delusional at the time the crime was 

committed. 

 The entire videotape of Decker’s interrogation was admitted into 

evidence for the purpose of showing Decker’s “demeanor.” The admission of 

the videotape in its entirety gives rise to several constitutional issues. 

 First, by offering the entire tape into evidence, the State included 

portions of the videotape where Decker asserted his Miranda rights. The 

question arises whether these portions of the videotape, which arguably 

demonstrate that the defendant is capable of rational and calculated 

behavior, were admissible and, if not, whether their admission requires 

reversal. Second, the videotape contains testimonial demeanor evidence 

elicited after Deutmeyer refused to honor Decker’s Miranda rights and after 

she made, according to the suppression ruling, an unlawful promise of 

leniency. The question arises whether the admission into evidence of 

testimonial demeanor evidence after these infractions was permissible and, 

if not, whether the admission requires reversal. 

 B. Admissibility of Testimony Showing Invocation of and 

Exercise of Miranda Rights. Over twenty years ago, the United States 

Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S. Ct. 634, 

88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986), held that due process prohibited the use of a 

defendant’s invocation of Miranda rights as evidence of his sanity. 

Expanding upon its decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 

49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), the Court noted that it would be fundamentally 

unfair to assure a suspect that his silence would not be used against him 

and then later renege on that promise to attack his proffered defense. 

Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 292, 106 S. Ct. at 639, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 630–31. In 
12

so ruling, the Court emphasized that “silence does not mean only muteness; 

it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as a desire to 

remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.” Id. at 295 n.13, 106 

S. Ct. at 640 n.13, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 63 n.13. In the videotape offered in this 

case, Decker asserted his right to remain silent at least five times and did 

indeed remain silent for a considerable period of time. Under Greenfield, 

this evidence is not admissible to show lack of sanity. 

 C. Admissibility of Demeanor Evidence Obtained After Miranda

Violations and Unlawful Offer of Leniency. It is axiomatic that only 

evidence that is testimonial in nature is protected by the Fifth Amendment. 

Nontestimonial evidence thus is unprotected and unaffected by Miranda 

and Fifth Amendment violations. “[I]n order to be considered testimonial, 

an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate to a 

factual assertion or disclose information.” Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 

201, 210, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2347, 101 L. Ed. 2d 184, 197 (1988). 

 Some evidence obtained through a defendant’s arrest is clearly 

nontestimonial. For example, compelling an arrested suspect to submit to 

fingerprinting, photographing, or other physical measurements, to write or 

speak for identification, to stand, walk, or make a particular gesture, or to 

submit to a blood test does not result in the gathering of testimonial 

evidence. Schmerber v. State, 384 U.S. 757, 764, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 

L. Ed. 2d 908, 916 (1966). 

 The line between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence is more 

difficult to draw, however, when the evidence is obtained in response to a 

police interrogation. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 

2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that 

“any slurring of speech and other evidence of lack of muscular coordination” 
13

in response to direct questioning “constitute nontestimonial components of 

those responses.” Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592, 110 S. Ct. at 2645, 110 L. Ed. 2d 

at 546. Slurring and lack of muscular coordination relate, of course, to 

physical rather than communicative acts or responses. 

 At the same time, the Supreme Court in Muniz rejected the argument 

that inferring the physiological function of an accused’s brain from his 

statements was nontestimonial. Id. at 593, 110 S. Ct. at 2646, 110 

L. Ed. 2d at 546. According to the court, the question is “whether the 

incriminating inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act 

or from physical evidence.” Id. Because the inference of confusion arose 

from the content of the accused’s statements and not from a purely physical 

response, the inference was impermissible as arising from a testimonial act. 

See Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1542 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The 

psychiatrist based his diagnosis not just on Cape’s demeanor and the 

sound of Cape’s voice, but on the contents and substance of Cape’s answers 

to his questions, ‘thus making Cape’s communications to him testimonial in 

nature.’ ” (quoting Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 911, 106 S. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1985))). 

 Drawing on Muniz, it appears that Decker’s fidgeting and slow speech 

pattern amount to nontestimonial evidence. On the other hand, any 

evidence related to the quality or content of his communication is 

testimonial and protected by Fifth Amendment privileges. To the extent the 

videotape contains communicative responses after Decker asserted his 

Miranda rights or the promise of leniency was made, including his ability to 

“track” or understand the conversation, it is inadmissible. 

 D. Application of Principles. Under the applicable case law, the 

nontestimonial evidence contained on the videotape, such as fidgeting, 
14

staring at the ground, the physical quality of his speech, and the lack of any 

involuntary hallucinations, would be admissible demeanor evidence 

notwithstanding the constitutional violations. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592, 110 

S. Ct. at 2645, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 546. Portions of the videotape, therefore, 

were properly admitted into evidence. 

 The problem, as stated by the defense, however, is that to the extent 

the tape contains any nontestimonial demeanor evidence, it is intertwined 

with impermissible evidence. In viewing the tape, the district court would 

be required to ignore Decker’s repeated attempts to exercise his Miranda

rights, ignore the communicative content of Decker’s testimonial 

statements, and focus solely on the physical aspects of Decker’s demeanor. 

 Decker argues that it would be extremely difficult for the finder of fact 

to separate out the permissible from the impermissible evidence, requiring 

reversal of his convictions. If this case were tried to a jury, Decker would 

have a strong argument. Before a jury, the limited probative value of the 

admissible features of the videotape would in all likelihood be outweighed 

by its prejudicial effect. Even with limiting instructions, it would be difficult 

for an untrained jury to consider only the physical demeanor evidence and 

not consider the fact that the videotape showed Decker invoking his 

Miranda rights and not consider the communicative content of his 

statements. See Robinette v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1162 (Ind. 2001) (holding 

that a trial court’s limiting instruction could not cure the wrongful 

admission of Miranda invocations in a jury trial). 

 Here, however, trial was to the court. Judges routinely are called 

upon to consider the admissibility of evidence that may be later excluded at 

trial. Judicial knowledge of evidence which is subsequently not admissible 

does not ordinarily undermine later judicial determinations in the case. See 
15

State v. Matheson, 684 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa 2004) (noting that “legal 

training helps equip those in the profession to remain unaffected by matters 

that should not influence the determination”). 

 The impermissible portions of the videotape, moreover, were not 

admitted into evidence. The record in this case demonstrates that the State 

was not offering the videotape to establish the truth of any assertions made 

by Decker or to show that Decker was rational enough to invoke his Fifth 

Amendment rights. Instead, the State asserted that the videotape was 

admissible for the limited purpose of allowing the court to “see the 

defendant and observe his demeanor.” While the district court simply 

admitted the videotape without further comment, in context, it is clear that 

the evidence was offered and admitted for the limited purpose of showing 

Decker’s demeanor. 

 Our rules of evidence allow evidence to be admitted for a limited 

purpose even though that same evidence is inadmissible for another 

purpose. Iowa R. Evid. 5.105. When admissibility is limited, the court 

“restrict[s] the evidence to its proper scope and instruct[s] the jury 

accordingly.” Id. When the case is tried to the court, however, we assume 

that the court considered the tape solely for the limited purpose for which it 

was offered. Here, the videotape was admitted for the limited purpose of 

demonstrating Decker’s demeanor. The mere fact that the tape also 

collaterally contained his Miranda invocations and testimonial demeanor 

evidence, thus did not make the tape wholly inadmissible. 

 There is no indication in the court’s decision, moreover, that it 

considered the impermissible evidence—either the Miranda invocations or 

the testimonial demeanor evidence—in reaching its decision. Although 

Judge Beckelman referred to the professional and lay demeanor evidence 
16

elicited at trial, she made no mention of the videotape or any of the evidence 

contained therein. See State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756 (Iowa 1998) (holding 

that the reviewing court places “great confidence” in judges to follow the law 

and will not assume that evidence in a sentencing hearing was considered 

for an improper purpose without a clear showing); In re O’Hara’s Estate, 204 

Iowa 1331, 217 N.W. 245 (1928) (holding that in a bench trial the appellate 

court presumes that the final judgment was based solely upon competent 

evidence and that impermissible evidence was disregarded). 

 Nothing in Matheson is to the contrary. In Matheson, the district 

court in a sentencing proceeding admitted into evidence a victim impact 

statement related to an out-of-state crime. 684 N.W.2d at 244. The 

evidence offered and admitted in Matheson’s sentencing proceeding was not 

admissible for any purpose. Id. Further, the improperly admitted evidence 

in Matheson contained substantial information not available from any other 

source. Id. at 245. Because the district court in Matheson did not 

affirmatively indicate that the harmful evidence was not considered, we 

vacated the resulting sentence and remanded the case for resentencing 

before a different judge. Id. 

 Here, as in Matheson, the district court order did not mention the 

challenged evidence in reaching its decision and instead relied upon other 

evidence in concluding that Decker was sane at the time of the crime. 

Unlike Matheson, however, the challenged evidence was offered and 

admitted for a valid limited purpose—physical demeanor evidence. Decker 

did not below and does not now question that demeanor evidence would be 

at least of some relevance on the issue of sanity. Because the tape had a 

permissive evidentiary purpose, its admission was not per se in error. 

Moreover, without at least some indication that the district court considered 
17

the tape’s impermissible evidence, Decker has not demonstrated that his 

right to due process has been violated. 

 V. Conclusion. 

 Although it is clear that the police interrogation video contained 

permissible and impermissible evidence, its admission did not amount to 

constitutional error as (1) the district court properly restricted the tape’s 

admission for demeanor evidence only; and (2) there is no indication that 

the court thereafter considered the videotape for an improper purpose. For 

the above reasons, the decision of the district court in this case is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.