30160 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 91 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–29305; Amdt. No. 

91–314] 

RIN 2120–AI92 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance— 

Broadcast (ADS–B) Out Performance 

Requirements To Support Air Traffic 

Control (ATC) Service 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This final rule amends FAA 

regulations by adding equipage 

requirements and performance 

standards for Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS–B) Out 

avionics on aircraft operating in Classes 

A, B, and C airspace, as well as certain 

other specified classes of airspace 

within the U.S. National Airspace 

System (NAS). ADS–B Out broadcasts 

information about an aircraft through an 

onboard transmitter to a ground 

receiver. Use of ADS–B Out will move 

air traffic control from a radar-based 

system to a satellite-derived aircraft 

location system. This action facilitates 

the use of ADS–B for aircraft 

surveillance by FAA and Department of 

Defense (DOD) air traffic controllers to 

safely and efficiently accommodate 

aircraft operations and the expected 

increase in demand for air 

transportation. This rule also provides 

aircraft operators with a platform for 

additional flight applications and 

services. 

DATES: This final rule is effective on 

August 11, 2010. The compliance date 

for this final rule is January 1, 2020. 

Affected parties, however, do not have 

to comply with the information 

collection requirement in § 91.225 until 

the FAA publishes in the Federal 

Register the control number assigned by 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for this information collection 

requirement. Publication of the control 

number notifies the public that OMB 

has approved this information 

collection requirement under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The 

incorporation by reference of certain 

publications listed in the rule is 

approved by the Director of the Federal 

Register as of August 11, 2010. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this final 

rule, contact Vincent Capezzuto, 

Surveillance and Broadcast Services, 

AJE–6, Air Traffic Organization, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

385–8637; e-mail 

vincent.capezzuto@faa.gov. 

For legal questions concerning this 

final rule, contact Lorelei Peter, Office 

of the Chief Counsel, AGC–220, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone 202– 

267–3134; e-mail lorelei.peter@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules on 

aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the 

United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle 

I, Section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the agency’s 

authority. 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 

40103, Sovereignty and use of airspace, 

and Subpart III, Section 44701, General 

requirements. Under section 40103, the 

FAA is charged with prescribing 

regulations on the flight of aircraft 

(including regulations on safe altitudes) 

for navigating, protecting, and 

identifying aircraft, and the efficient use 

of the navigable airspace. Under section 

44701, the FAA is charged with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

sections 40103 and 44701 because it 

prescribes aircraft performance 

requirements to meet advanced 

surveillance needs to accommodate 

increases in NAS operations. As more 

aircraft operate within the U.S. airspace, 

improved surveillance performance is 

necessary to continue to balance the 

growth in air transportation with the 

agency’s mandate for a safe and efficient 

air transportation system. 

Guide to Terms and Acronyms 

Frequently Used in This Document 

ACI–NA—Airports Council InternationalNorth America 

ACSS—Aviation Communication and 

Surveillance Systems 

ADIZ—Air Defense Identification Zone 

ADS–B—Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast 

ADS–C—Automatic Dependent SurveillanceContract 

ADS–R—Automatic Dependent SurveillanceRebroadcast 

AGL—Above Ground Level 

AIA—Aerospace Industries Association of 

America 

ALPA—Air Line Pilots Association, 

International 

AOPA—Aircraft Owners and Pilots 

Association 

ARC—Aviation Rulemaking Committee 

ASA—Aircraft Surveillance Applications 

ASAS—Aircraft Surveillance Applications 

System 

ASDE–X—Airport Surface Detection 

Equipment, Model X 

ASSA—Airport Surface Situational 

Awareness 

ATC—Air Traffic Control 

CAA—Cargo Airline Association 

CDTI—Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 

CNS—Communication, Navigation, and 

Surveillance 

EAA—Experimental Aircraft Association 

ELT—Emergency Locator Transmitter 

ES—Extended Squitter 

EUROCAE—European Organisation for Civil 

Aviation Equipment 

EUROCONTROL—European Organisation for 

the Safety of Air Navigation 

FAROA—Final Approach Runway 

Occupancy Awareness 

FedEx—Federal Express 

FIS–B—Flight Information Service–Broadcast 

FL—Flight Level 

GA—General Aviation 

GAMA—General Aviation Manufacturers 

Association 

GNSS—Global Navigation Satellite System 

GPS—Global Positioning System 

HAI—Helicopter Association International 

IATA—International Air Transport 

Association 

ICAO—International Civil Aviation 

Organization 

MHz—Megahertz 

MOPS—Minimum Operational Performance 

Standards 

MSL—Mean Sea Level 

NACP—Navigation Accuracy Category For 

Position 

NACV—Navigation Accuracy Category for 

Velocity 

NAS—National Airspace System 

NBAA—National Business Aviation 

Association 

NextGen—Next Generation Air 

Transportation System 

NIC—Navigation Integrity Category 

NM—Nautical Mile 

NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board 

OPD—Optimized Profile Descent 

OMB—Office of Management and Budget 

RAA—Regional Airline Association 

RAIM—Receiver Autonomous Integrity 

Monitoring 

RFA—Regulatory Flexibility Act 

RNP—Required Navigation Performance 

SANDIA—Sandia National Laboratories 

SARPs—Standards and Recommended 

Practices 

SCAP—Security Certification and 

Accreditation Procedures 

SDA—System Design Assurance 

SIL—Source Integrity Level 

SSR—Secondary Surveillance Radar 

TCAS—Traffic Alert and Collision and 

Avoidance System 

TIS–B—Traffic Information ServiceBroadcast 

TMA—Traffic Management Advisor 

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TSO—Technical Standard Order 

UAT—Universal Access Transceiver 

UPS—United Parcel Service 

URET—User Request Evaluation Tool 

VFR—Visual Flight Rules 

WAAS—Wide Area Augmentation System 

Table of Contents 

I. Background 

A. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

B. ADS–B Aviation Rulemaking Committee 

C. Summary of the Final Rule 

1. Airspace 

2. Datalink Requirements 

3. System Performance Requirements 

4. Antenna Diversity and Transmit Power 

Requirements 

5. Latency of the ADS–B Out Message 

Elements 

6. Conforming Amendments and Editorial 

Changes 

D. Differences Between the Proposed Rule 

and The Final Rule 

E. Separation Standards Working Group 

II. Discussion of the Final Rule 

A. Airspace 

1. 2,500 Feet Above Ground Level 

Exclusion in Class E Airspace 

2. Airspace for Which ADS–B is Required 

3. Requests for Deviations From ADS–B 

Out Requirements 

B. Dual-Link Strategy 

1. Altitude To Require the 1090 MHz ES 

Datalink 

2. Automatic Dependent SurveillanceRebroadcast (ADS–R) 

3. 1090 MHz Frequency Congestion 

C. Performance Requirements—System 

1. Performance Requirements Tailored to 

Operator, Airspace, or Procedure 

2. Navigation Accuracy Category for 

Position (NACP) 

3. Navigation Accuracy Category for 

Velocity (NACV) 

4. Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) 

5. Surveillance Integrity Level 

6. Source Integrity Level (SIL) and System 

Design Assurance (SDA) 

7. Secondary Position Sources 

D. Performance Requirements—Antenna 

Diversity 

E. Performance Requirements—Transmit 

Power 

F. Performance Requirements—Total and 

Uncompensated Latency 

G. Performance Requirements—Time To 

Indicate Accuracy and Integrity Changes 

H. Performance Requirements— 

Availability 

1. Preflight Determination of Availability 

2. System Availability 

I. Performance Requirements—Continuity 

J. Performance Requirements—Traffic 

Information Service—Broadcast Integrity 

(TIS–B) 

K. Broadcast Message Elements 

1. NACP/NACV/NIC/SDA/SIL 

2. Receiving ATC Services 

3. Length and Width of the Aircraft 

4. Indication of the Aircraft’s Barometric 

Pressure Altitude 

5. Indication of the Aircraft’s Velocity 

6. Indication if Traffic Alert and Collision 

Avoidance System II or Airborne 

Collision Avoidance System is Installed 

and Operating in a Mode That May 

Generate Resolution Advisory Alerts 

7. For Aircraft With an Operable Traffic 

Alert and Collision Avoidance System II 

or Airborne Collision Avoidance System, 

Indication If a Resolution Advisory Is in 

Progress 

8. Indication of the Mode 3/A Transponder 

Code Specified by ATC (Requires 

Flightcrew Entry) 

9. Indication of the Aircraft’s Call Sign 

That Is Submitted on the Flight Plan, or 

the Aircraft’s Registration Number 

(Aircraft Call Sign Requires Flight Crew 

Entry) 

10. Indication if the Flight Crew Has 

Identified an Emergency, Radio 

Communication Failure, or Unlawful 

Interference (Requires Flightcrew Entry) 

11. Indication of the Aircraft’s ‘‘IDENT’’ to 

ATC (Requires Flightcrew Entry) 

12. Indication of the Emitter Category 

13. Indication Whether an ADS–B in 

Capability Is Installed 

14. Indication of the Aircraft’s Geometric 

Altitude 

L. Ability To Turn Off ADS–B Out 

Transmissions 

M. Existing Equipment Requirements 

1. Transponder Requirement 

2. Emergency Locator Transmitter 

Requirement 

N. Program Implementation 

1. Timeline 

2. Financial and Operational Incentives 

3. Decommissioning Traffic Information 

Service-Broadcast (TIS–B) 

O. Safety 

P. Efficiency 

1. Improved Position Reporting 

2. Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs) 

3. Reduced Aircraft Separation 

4. Expanded Surveillance Coverage 

Q. ADS–B In 

R. ADS–B In Applications 

1. Surface Situational Awareness With 

Indications and Alerting 

2. In-Trail Procedures 

3. Interval Management 

4. Airport Surface Situational Awareness 

and Final Approach Runway Occupancy 

Awareness 

S. International Harmonization 

T. Backup ATC Surveillance 

U. Privacy 

V. Security 

W. Alternatives to ADS–B 

X. ADS–B Equipment Scheduled 

Maintenance 

Y. Specific Design Parameters 

Z. Economic Issues 

1. ADS–B Out Equipage Cost 

2. FAA Cost Savings With ADS–B Out 

Compared To Radar 

3. Business Case for ADS–B Out and In 

4. Improved En Route Conflict Probe 

Benefit Performance 

5. Capacity Enhancements, Airspace 

Efficiency, and Fuel Savings Benefits 

6. Deriving Benefits From Capstone 

Implementation in Alaska 

7. Regional Airline Benefits 

8. General Aviation: High Equipage Costs 

With Little Benefit 

AA. Revisions to Other Regulations 

III. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Paperwork Reduction Act 

B. International Compatibility 

C. Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory 

Flexibility Determination, International 

Trade Impact Analysis, and Unfunded 

Mandates Assessment 

VI. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

VII. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation 

in Alaska 

VIII. Environmental Analysis 

IX. Regulations That Significantly Affect 

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 

X. Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

I. Background 

While there is currently a drop in air 

travel due to a general economic 

downturn, delay and congestion 

continue to build in the nation’s busiest 

airports and the surrounding airspace. 

The FAA must not only address current 

congestion, but also be poised to handle 

future demand that will surely return as 

the nation’s economy improves. The 

FAA has been developing the Next 

Generation Air Transportation System 

(NextGen) for the purpose of changing 

the way the National Airspace System 

(NAS) operates. NextGen will allow the 

NAS to expand to meet future demand 

and support the economic viability of 

the system. In addition, NextGen will 

improve safety and support 

environmental initiatives such as 

reducing congestion, noise, emissions 

and fuel consumption through increased 

energy efficiency. for more information 

on NextGen, go to http://www.faa.gov/ 

about/initiatives/nextgen/. 

As part of NextGen development, the 

FAA has determined that it is essential 

to move from ground-based surveillance 

and navigation to more dynamic and 

accurate airborne-based systems and 

procedures if the agency is to enhance 

capacity, reduce delay, and improve 

environmental performance. Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast 

(ADS–B) equipment is an advanced 

surveillance technology that combines 

an aircraft’s positioning source, aircraft 

avionics, and a ground infrastructure to 

create an accurate surveillance interface 

between aircraft and ATC. It is a key 

component of NextGen that will move 

air traffic control (ATC) from a radarbased system to a satellite-derived 

aircraft location system. ADS–B is a 

performance-based surveillance 

technology that is more precise than 

radar. ADS–B is expected to provide air 

traffic controllers and pilots with more 

accurate information to help keep 

aircraft safely separated in the sky and 

on runways. The technology combines a 

positioning capability, aircraft avionics, 

and ground infrastructure to enable 

more accurate transmission of 

information from aircraft to ATC. 

ADS–B consists of two different 

services: ADS–B Out and ADS–B In. 

ADS–B Out, which is the subject of this 

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1ADS–R collects traffic information from each 

broadcast link and rebroadcasts it to ADS–B Inequipped operators on the other broadcast link. 

This is further explained in section B.2., Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast. 

2TIS–B uses primary and secondary surveillance 

radars and multilateration systems to provide 

proximate traffic situational awareness, including 

position reports from aircraft not equipped with 

ADS–B. TIS–B data may not provide as much 

information as could be received directly from an 

aircraft’s ADS–B Out broadcast, because of the 

required data processing. The TIS–B signal is an 

advisory service that is not designed for aircraft 

surveillance or separation, and cannot be used for 

either purpose. 

3With FIS–B, aircraft equipped with 978 

megahertz (MHz) Universal Access Transceiver 

(UAT) ADS–B In avionics can receive weather 

information, notices to airmen, temporary flight 

restrictions, and other relevant flight information, at 

no additional cost. 

4A copy of this report is available from the Web 

site http://www.regulations.gov. To find the report, 

enter FAA–2007–29305–0009.1 in the search field. 

5A copy of this report is available from the Web 

site http://www.regulations.gov. To find the report, 

enter FAA–2007–29305–0221.1 in the search field 

6An extended squitter is a long message that 

Mode S Transponders transmit automatically, 

without needing to be interrogated by radar, to 

announce the own-ship aircraft’s presence to nearby 

ADS–B equipped aircraft or ground based Air 

Traffic Control. 

7The 1090 MHz ES broadcast link uses the 1090 

MHz frequency. The UAT broadcast link uses the 

978 MHz frequency. 

rulemaking, periodically broadcasts 

information about each aircraft, such as 

identification, current position, altitude, 

and velocity, through an onboard 

transmitter. ADS–B Out provides air 

traffic controllers with real-time 

position information that is, in most 

cases, more accurate than the 

information available with current 

radar-based systems. With more 

accurate information, ATC will be able 

to position and separate aircraft with 

improved precision and timing. 

ADS–B In refers to an appropriately 

equipped aircraft’s ability to receive and 

display another aircraft’s ADS–B Out 

information as well as the ADS–B In 

services provided by ground systems, 

including Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance–Rebroadcast (ADS–R),1

Traffic Information Service–Broadcast 

(TIS–B),2 and, if so equipped, Flight 

Information Service–Broadcast (FIS–B).3

When displayed in the cockpit, this 

information greatly improves the pilot’s 

situational awareness in aircraft not 

equipped with a traffic alert and 

collision avoidance system (TCAS)/ 

airborne collision avoidance system 

(ACAS). Benefits from universal 

equipage for ADS–B In currently are not 

substantiated, and standards for ADS–B 

In air-to-air applications are still in their 

infancy. Thus it is premature to require 

operators to equip with ADS–B In at this 

time. This rule, however, imposes 

certain requirements that will support 

some ADS–B In applications. 

As noted in the preamble of the 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 

associated with this rule, published in 

the Federal Register on October 5, 2007 

(72 FR 56947), Congress enacted the 

‘‘Century of Aviation Reauthorization 

Act’’ in 2003. That Act mandated that 

the Secretary of Transportation establish 

a Joint Planning and Development 

Office (JPDO) to manage NextGenrelated work, including coordinating the 

development and use of new 

technologies for aircraft in the air traffic 

control system. Since 2006, Congress 

has appropriated over $500 million to 

the FAA for implementing ADS–B and 

developing air-to-air capabilities. The 

FAA remains committed to 

implementing NextGen and adopts this 

final rule, with some modifications, as 

discussed in further detail below. 

A. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

The FAA published the NPRM for 

ADS–B Out in the Federal Register on 

October 5, 2007 (72 FR 56947). The 

comment period for the NPRM was 

scheduled to close on January 3, 2008. 

In response to several commenters, the 

FAA subsequently extended the 

comment period to March 3, 2008 (72 

FR 64966, Nov. 19, 2007). The FAA 

received approximately 190 comments 

to the docket on the NPRM. 

Commenters included air carriers, 

manufacturers, associations, 

Government agencies, and individuals. 

B. ADS–B Aviation Rulemaking 

Committee 

As part of the rulemaking effort, the 

FAA chartered an aviation rulemaking 

committee (ARC) on July 15, 2007, to 

provide a forum for the U.S. aviation 

community to make recommendations 

on presenting and structuring an ADS– 

B Out mandate, and to consider 

additional actions that may be necessary 

to implement its recommendations. The 

ADS–B ARC submitted its first report, 

‘‘Optimizing the Benefits of Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast,’’ 4

on October 3, 2007. 

The FAA also tasked the ARC to make 

specific recommendations concerning 

the proposed rule based on the 

comments submitted to the docket. The 

ARC submitted its second report, 

‘‘Recommendations on Federal Aviation 

Administration Notice No. 7–15, 

Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS–B) Out Performance 

Requirements to Support Air Traffic 

Control (ATC) Service; Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking,’’ 5 to the FAA on 

September 26, 2008. 

To give the public an opportunity to 

comment on the recommendations 

received from the ARC, the FAA 

published a notice in the Federal 

Register on October 2, 2008 (73 FR 

57270), reopening the comment period 

of the ADS–B Out NPRM docket for an 

additional 30 days. The purpose of 

reopening the comment period was to 

receive public comments on the ARC 

recommendations only. This comment 

period closed November 3, 2008, with 

the FAA receiving approximately 50 

comments to the ARC’s 

recommendations. Commenters 

included air carriers, manufacturers, 

associations, and individuals. 

C. Summary of the Final Rule 

This final rule will add equipage 

requirements and performance 

standards for ADS–B Out avionics. 

ADS–B Out broadcasts information 

about an aircraft through an onboard 

transmitter to a ground receiver. Use of 

ADS–B Out will move air traffic control 

from a radar-based system to a satellitederived aircraft location system. As 

discussed more fully in the sections of 

this preamble describing equipage 

requirements and performance 

standards, operators will have two 

options for equipage under this rule— 

the 1090 megahertz (MHz) extended 

squitter 6 (ES) broadcast link or the 

Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) 

broadcast link. 7 Generally, this 

equipment will be required for aircraft 

operating in Classes A, B, and C 

airspace, certain Class E airspace, and 

other specified airspace. See section C.1. 

‘‘Airspace’’ below for additional details. 

The NPRM proposed performance 

requirements for ADS–B Out to be used 

for ATC surveillance. In addition, 

several aspects of the proposal would be 

necessary for future ADS–B In 

applications. The comments to the 

NPRM and the ARC recommendations 

raised significant concerns about the 

operational needs and costs of the 

proposed performance requirements, as 

well as the proposed antenna diversity 

requirement. 

The FAA specifically proposed higher 

ADS–B Out and antenna diversity 

requirements than what is needed for 

ATC surveillance to enable certain 

ADS–B In applications. As discussed in 

further detail in this document, the FAA 

has reconsidered these elements in view 

of the comments and has changed the 

implementation plan for ADS–B. 

The FAA has concluded that this rule 

will require only the performance 

requirements necessary for ADS–B Out. 

While certain requirements adopted in 

this rule will support some ADS–B In 

applications, the agency is not adopting 

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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 30163 

8These airports are listed in appendix D to part 

91. 

9These applications include enhanced visual 

acquisition, conflict detection, enhanced visual 

approach, Airport Surface Situational Awareness 

(ASSA), and Final Approach Runway Occupancy 

Awareness (FAROA). 

10Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B) and Traffic 

Information Service—Broadcast (TIS–B) Equipment 

Operating on the Radio Frequency of 1090 

Megahertz (MHz). 

11Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS–B) 

Equipment Operating on the Frequency of 978 

MHz. 

12RTCA, Inc. is a not-for-profit corporation 

formed to advance the art and science of aviation 

and aviation electronic systems for the benefit of 

the public. The organization functions as a Federal 

Advisory Committee and develops consensus-based 

recommendations on contemporary aviation issues. 

The organization’s recommendations are often used 

as the basis for government and private sector 

decisions as well as the foundation for many FAA 

TSOs. For more information, see http:// 

www.rtca.org. 

13Minimum Operational Performance Standards 

for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS–B) and 

Traffic Information Services—Broadcast (TIS–B). 

14Minimum Operational Performance Standards 

for Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast. 

15Minimum Operational Performance Standards 

for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B) and 

Traffic Information Services–Broadcast (TIS–B). 

16Minimum Operational Performance Standards 

for Universal Access Transceiver Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast. 

17A number of these items address issues with 

the current TSOs. 

the higher performance standards that 

would enable all of the initial ADS–B In 

applications. The agency is mindful, 

and operators are advised, that in 

accepting the commenters’ and the 

ARC’s positions regarding antenna 

diversity and position source accuracy, 

compliance with this rule alone may not 

enable operators to take full advantage 

of certain ADS–B In applications. 

Operators may voluntarily choose 

equipment that meets the higher 

performance standards in order to 

enable the use of these applications. 

The following table provides an 

overview of the costs and benefits of 

this final rule. 

SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS

3% Discount Rate: 

Low Costs ............................... $2.74 

High Benefits ........................... 5.03 

Net Benefits-High Benefit/ 

Low Cost .......................... 2.29 

High Costs .............................. 5.47 

Low Benefits ........................... 3.98 

Net Benefits-Low Benefits/ 

High Costs ....................... (1.49 ) 

7% Discount Rate: 

Low Costs ............................... 2.15 

High Benefits ........................... 2.74 

Net Benefits-High Benefit/ 

Low Cost .......................... 0.59 

High Costs .............................. 4.11 

Low Benefits ........................... 2.09 

Net Benefits-Low Benefits/ 

High Costs ....................... (2.02 ) 

1. Airspace 

This final rule prescribes ADS–B Out 

performance requirements for all aircraft 

operating in Class A, B, and C airspace 

within the NAS; above the ceiling and 

within the lateral boundaries of a Class 

B or Class C airspace area up to 10,000 

feet mean sea level (MSL); and Class E 

airspace areas at or above 10,000 feet 

MSL over the 48 contiguous United 

States and the District of Columbia, 

excluding the airspace at and below 

2,500 feet above the surface. 

The rule also requires that aircraft 

meet these performance requirements in 

the airspace within 30 nautical miles 

(NM) of certain identified airports 8 that 

are among the nation’s busiest (based on 

annual passenger enplanements, annual 

airport operations count, and 

operational complexity) from the 

surface up to 10,000 feet MSL. In 

addition, the rule requires that aircraft 

meet ADS–B Out performance 

requirements to operate in Class E 

airspace over the Gulf of Mexico at and 

above 3,000 feet MSL within 12 NM of 

the coastline of the United States. 

2. Datalink Requirements 

ADS–B requires a broadcast link for 

aircraft surveillance and to support 

ADS–B In applications. Operators have 

two options for equipage under this 

rule— the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link 

or the UAT broadcast link. The 1090 

MHz ES broadcast link is the 

internationally agreed upon link for 

ADS–B and is intended to support 

ADS–B In applications used by air 

carriers and other high-performance 

aircraft. The 1090 MHz ES broadcast 

link does not support FIS–B (weather 

and related flight information) because 

the bandwidth limitations of this link 

cannot transmit the large message 

structures required by FIS–B. The UAT 

broadcast link supports ADS–B In 

applications 9 and FIS–B, which are 

important for the general aviation (GA) 

community. 

This final rule requires aircraft flying 

at and above 18,000 feet MSL (flight 

level (FL) 180) (Class A airspace) to 

have ADS–B Out performance 

capabilities using the 1090 MHz ES 

broadcast link. This rule also specifies 

that aircraft flying in the designated 

airspace below 18,000 feet MSL may use 

either the 1090 MHz ES or UAT 

broadcast link. 

3. System Performance Requirements 

When activated, ADS–B Out 

continuously transmits aircraft 

information through the 1090 MHz ES 

or UAT broadcast link. The accuracy 

and integrity of the position information 

transmitted by ADS–B avionics are 

represented by the navigation accuracy 

category for position (NACP), the 

navigation accuracy category for 

velocity (NACV), the navigation integrity 

category (NIC), the system design 

assurance (SDA), and the source 

integrity level (SIL). 

In the proposed rule, the FAA 

referenced the accuracy and integrity 

requirements to the appropriate NACP, 

NACV, NIC, and SIL values defined in 

Technical Standard Order (TSO)– 

C166a 10 (for operators using the 1090 

MHz ES broadcast link), and TSO– 

C154b 11 (for operators using the UAT 

broadcast link) as the baseline 

requirements for ADS–B Out 

equipment. TSO–C166a adopted the 

standards in RTCA, Inc.12 (RTCA) DO– 

260A.13 TSO–C154b adopted the 

standards in RTCA DO–282A.14

After the NPRM was published, the 

ADS–B ARC issued numerous 

recommendations in response to public 

comments on the TSOs referenced in 

the proposal. Based on the ARC 

recommendations and broad industry 

input, RTCA revised DO–260A to 

become DO–260B15 and revised DO– 

282A to become DO–282B.16 The new 

RTCA revisions include: (1) An 

allowance for transmitting a NIC of 7 on 

the surface, (2) procedures for correctly 

setting the NACV, (3) clarifying the 

latency requirements, (4) removing the 

vertical component of NACP, NACV, 

NIC, and SIL, (5) revising the definition 

of SIL to correspond to the definition in 

the FAA NPRM, (6) clarifying the 

definition of SIL by dividing it into SIL 

and SDA message elements, (7) creating 

a medium power single antenna class, 

and (8) redefining the bit for the ‘‘ADS– 

B In capability installed’’ message 

element.17 DO–260B and DO–282B are 

more mature standards and fully 

support domestic and international 

ADS–B air traffic control surveillance. 

The updated standards do not increase 

performance requirements. 

The FAA updated the TSOs in 

accordance with these new RTCA 

standards. In addition, the FAA has 

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30164 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

18Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B) and Traffic 

Information Service–Broadcast (TIS–B) Equipment 

Operating on the Radio Frequency of 1090 

Megahertz (MHz). 

19Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B) 

Equipment Operating on the Frequency of 978 

MHz. 

20Operators with equipment installed that meets 

a later version of TSO–C166b or TSO–C154c, as 

applicable, are in compliance with this rule. 

decided that it is necessary to require 

the new standards contained in TSO– 

C166b 18 (1090 MHz ES) and TSO– 

C154c 19 (UAT) as the minimum 

performance standards in this final 

rule.20 The updated standards 

incorporate multiple changes that 

address public comments and the ARC’s 

recommendations on the proposal. On 

September 11, 2009, the FAA 

announced in the Federal Register the 

availability of draft TSO–C166b and 

TSO–C154c for comment (74 FR 46831). 

The FAA issued final versions of the 

above TSOs on December 2, 2009. The 

FAA also added additional language in 

§§ 91.225 and 91.227 stating that 

equipment with an approved deviation 

under § 21.618 also meet the 

requirements of the rule. 

In addition, this final rule specifies 

the performance requirements for 

accuracy and integrity (NACP, NACV, 

and NIC) in meters and nautical miles 

rather than referencing the numerical 

values used in DO–260B, DO–282B, or 

the NPRM. This change translates the 

values but does not alter the actual 

performance requirements. The FAA 

wants to avoid any misinterpretations of 

the performance requirements for this 

rule, if in the future, RTCA revises 

NACP, NACV, and NIC. 

Table 1 summarizes the NACP, NACV, 

NIC, and SIL values proposed in the 

NPRM and their equivalent 

measurements, as noted in DO–260A 

and DO–282A. Table 2 summarizes 

NACP, NACV, NIC, SDA, and SIL values 

as defined in DO–260B and DO–282B. 

These two tables contain only the values 

applicable to the NPRM and the final 

rule. See DO–260B paragraph 2.2.3 or 

DO–282B paragraph 2.2.4 for complete 

information on all values. 


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21 In the NPRM, SIL was defined as surveillance 

integrity level and represented the maximum 

probability of exceeding the NIC containment 

radius and a maximum probability of a failure 

causing false or misleading data to be transmitted. 

In this final rule, SIL is referred to as source 

integrity level and defines the probability of 

exceeding the NIC containment radius; SDA 

represents the probability of transmitting false or 

misleading position information. 

22 Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) is a 

generic term for a satellite navigation system, such 

as the Global Positioning System (GPS), that 

provides autonomous worldwide geo-spatial 

positioning and may include local or regional 

augmentations. 

In this final rule, the NACP must be 

less than 0.05 NM. The NACV and NIC 

values are adopted as proposed. The 

NACV must be less than 10 meters per 

second. The NIC must be less than 0.2 

NM. The SIL parameter from the NPRM 

has been divided into two separate 

parameters and is discussed in detail 

later in this document.21 In this final 

rule, the SDA parameter must be less 

than or equal to 1x10 ¥5 per hour, 

which is equivalent to an SDA of 2, and 

the SIL parameter must be less than or 

equal to 1x10 ¥7 per hour or per sample, 

which is equivalent to a SIL of 3. Global 

navigation satellite system (GNSS) 

systems 22 will set their SILs based on a 

1x10 ¥7 per-hour probability. Operators 

must meet these performance 

requirements to operate in the airspace 

where ADS–B is required. Any ADS–B 

position source that meets the specified 

performance standards is acceptable and 

complies with the requirements in the 

final rule. 

4. Antenna Diversity and Transmit 

Power Requirements 

The aircraft antenna is a major 

contributor to ADS–B system link 

performance and an important part of 

the overall ADS–B Out system. In the 

NPRM, the FAA proposed an antenna 

diversity requirement that would 

support ADS–B In applications, such as 

Airport Surface Situational Awareness 

(ASSA) and Final Approach Runway 

Occupancy Awareness (FAROA). 

The FAA has reconsidered the need 

for antenna diversity in view of the 

comments submitted. The agency has 

determined that a single bottommounted antenna is the minimum 

requirement for ATC surveillance. 

Furthermore, the analysis of ASSA and 

FAROA does not conclude that antenna 

diversity is required for these 

applications. As discussed later, the 

FAA decision to require a NACP less 

than 0.05 NM signifies that certain 

ADS–B In applications, including ASSA 

and FAROA, will not be fully 

supported. 

If future analysis indicates that 

antenna diversity is required for ASSA 

and FAROA, a higher NACP than that 

required in this rule also would be 

necessary to support these applications. 

The FAA does not adopt antenna 

diversity as a requirement for ADS–B 

Out under this rule because it is not 

required to support ATC surveillance. 

Operators must note that this rule does 

not remove or modify any existing 

antenna diversity requirements for 

transponders or TCAS/ACAS. 

Aircraft must transmit signals at a 

certain level of power to ensure ground 

stations and ADS–B In-equipped aircraft 

and vehicles can receive the transmitted 

signals. As proposed, the final rule 

requires UAT systems to broadcast at a 

16-watt minimum-transmit power, and 

1090 MHz ES systems to broadcast at a 

125-watt minimum-transmit power. 

5. Latency of the ADS–B Out Message 

Elements 

When using an ADS–B system, 

aircraft receive information from a 

position source and process it with 

onboard avionics. The aircraft’s ADS–B 

system then transmits position and 

other information to the ground stations 

through antenna(s) using either the UAT 

or 1090 MHz ES broadcast link. 

Generally, latency is the time lag 

between the time that position 

measurements are taken to determine 

the aircraft’s position, and the time that 

the position information is transmitted 

by the aircraft’s ADS–B transmitter. The 

latency requirements in this final rule, 

although different from the proposal, 

represent a more appropriate way to 

address latency. The proposal created 

ambiguities that are addressed in these 

modifications and are supported by the 

commenters. Under this rule, total 


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30166 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

23The SSWG findings are available from the Web 

site http://www.regulations.gov. The docket number 

for this rulemaking is FAA –2007–29305. 

latency cannot exceed 2.0 seconds. 

Within those 2.0 seconds, 

uncompensated latency cannot exceed 

0.6 seconds. Total and uncompensated 

latency are explained in further detail in 

section II F. ‘‘Performance 

Requirements—Total And 

Uncompensated Latency.’’ 

6. Conforming Amendments and 

Editorial Changes 

Section 91.225 requires ADS–B Out 

for operations in Class A, B, and C 

airspace. In the NPRM, the FAA 

inadvertently left out the proposed 

conforming amendments to §§ 91.130, 

91.131, and 91.135, which address Class 

A, B, and C airspace. This rule amends 

these sections to include the ADS–B Out 

performance requirements for the 

appropriate airspace. 

In addition, the regulatory text for 

§ 91.225 has been reorganized from the 

proposed rule language. The 

restructuring of the text should make 

this section clearer and more readerfriendly. 

Lastly, the proposed regulatory text 

has been moved from Appendix H to 

new § 91.227. 

All substantive changes to this rule 

are fully discussed in Section II, 

Discussion of the Final Rule. 

D. Differences Between the Proposed 

Rule and the Final Rule 

Table 3 summarizes the substantive 

changes between the proposed rule and 

this final rule. Editorial changes and 

clarifications are explained elsewhere in 

this preamble. 

TABLE 3.— SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROPOSED RULE AND THE FINAL RULE

Issue area The NPRM— The final rule— 

Technical Standard Order .... Proposed performance standards as defined in TSO– 

C166a (1090 MHz ES) or TSO–C154b (UAT).

Requires performance standards as defined in TSO– 

C166b (1090 MHz ES) or TSO–C154c (UAT). 

Airspace ............................... Proposed requiring all aircraft above FL 240 to transmit 

on the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link.

Requires all aircraft in Class A airspace (FL 180 and 

above) to transmit on the 1090 MHz ES broadcast 

link. 

Proposed ADS–B performance standards for operations 

in all Class E airspace at and above 10,000 feet MSL.

Requires ADS–B performance standards for operations 

in Class E airspace at and above 10,000 feet MSL, 

excluding the airspace at and below 2,500 feet AGL. 

NACP .................................... Proposed a NACP ≥ 9, which provides navigation accuracy < 30 meters.Requires NACP < 0.05 NM. 

(NACP ≥ 8) 

NIC ....................................... Proposed changes in NIC be broadcast within 10 seconds.Requires changes in NIC be broadcast within 12 seconds. 

SIL ........................................ Proposed a SIL of 2 or 3 ................................................ Requires an SDA of 2. 

Requires a SIL of 3. 

Antenna Diversity ................. Proposed antenna diversity in all airspace specified in 

the rule.

Does not require antenna diversity. 

Total Latency ....................... Proposed latency in the position source < 0.5 seconds 

and latency in the ADS–B source < 1 second.

Requires uncompensated latency ≤ 0.6 seconds and 

maximum total latency ≤ 2.0 seconds. 

Message Elements .............. Proposed a broadcast message element for ‘‘receiving 

ATC services’’.

Does not require a broadcast message element for ‘‘receiving ATC services.’’ 

An ability to turn off ADS–B 

Out.

Proposed that the pilot be able to turn off ADS–B transmissions if directed by ATC.Does not require the pilot be able to disable or turn off 

ADS–B transmissions. 

E. Separation Standards Working Group 

The FAA established an internal 

Surveillance and Broadcast Systems 

Separation Standards Working group 

(SSWG) to develop methodologies and 

define metrics as appropriate that 

evaluate the end-to-end performance of 

ADS–B and wide area multilateration 

surveillance systems. These evaluations 

include investigating the integration of 

these technologies in conjunction with 

legacy surveillance technologies, that is, 

separation between target positions that 

are derived from ADS–B, radar, and 

wide area multilateration on ATC 

displays. 

This SSWG was tasked to perform: (1) 

Analyses of performance using system 

models and simulations, including the 

identification of key performance 

drivers and the development of test 

scenarios; (2) preliminary evaluations 

with prototype system components to 

enable verification and validation of the 

models and as early evidence of system 

performance; and (3) analyses of test 

results, operational testing and 

dedicated separation standards flight 

tests for each key-site with fully 

functional end-to-end systems. Also 

included is a test period for each system 

where performance data is collected on 

aircraft operating in the surveillance 

service volume. 

The SSWG analyses and evaluations 

are the basis for most of the performance 

requirements specified in this rule.23

II. Discussion of the Final Rule 

Below is a more detailed discussion of 

the final rule relative to the comments 

received on the proposal: 

A. Airspace 

1. 2,500 Feet Above Ground Level 

Exclusion in Class E Airspace 

The NPRM proposed that aircraft 

meet ADS–B Out performance 

requirements to operate in Class E 

airspace at and above 10,000 feet MSL 

over the 48 contiguous states and the 

District of Columbia. 

Several commenters, including the 

DOD and the Experimental Aircraft 

Association (EAA), stated that the 

proposed ceiling of 10,000 feet MSL for 

aircraft without ADS–B would be a 

major hardship and safety issue for 

aircraft operators flying in mountainous 

terrain. Commenters and the ARC 

suggested that the final rule exclude 

Class E airspace at and below 2,500 feet 

above ground level (AGL), similar to the 

exclusion in § 91.215, ATC Transponder 

and Altitude Reporting Equipment and 

Use. 

The FAA recognizes the benefit of 

excluding this airspace in the rule, 

particularly for visual flight rules (VFR) 

pilots flying in mountainous areas. This 

modification addresses airspace that is 

not affected by the agency’s efforts to 

maximize NAS efficiency and capacity. 

Excluding this airspace from the rule 

minimizes any unnecessary financial 

and operational burdens being placed 

on aircraft operators who fly in 

mountainous areas that encroach on 

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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 30167 

24An Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is 

an area of airspace over land or water in which the 

ready identification, location, and control of civil 

aircraft is required in the interest of national 

security. 

Class E airspace at and above 10,000 feet 

MSL, but choose not to equip for the 

ADS–B Out performance standards in 

this rule. Consequently, the final rule 

does not require ADS–B performance 

standards for operations 2,500 feet AGL 

and below in Class E airspace at and 

above 10,000 feet MSL. 

2. Airspace for Which ADS–B Is 

Required 

The NPRM proposed requiring ADS– 

B performance standards for operations 

in most classes of airspace where 

operators currently are required to carry 

a transponder. 

Numerous commenters recommended 

that the FAA limit ADS–B performance 

requirements to aircraft operating in 

Class A airspace only, or Class A and B 

airspace only. Several commenters 

questioned the proposed ADS–B 

performance requirements in Class E 

airspace above 10,000 feet MSL. Many 

of these commenters made varying 

requests to the FAA concerning the 

proposed altitude for which ADS–B Out 

would be required, including 12,000 

feet MSL, 15,000 feet MSL, FL 180, and 

FL 250. The United States Parachute 

Association noted that skydiving 

operations are typically conducted 

above 10,000 feet MSL and sometimes 

conducted in Class A, B, and C airspace. 

ADS–B cannot be used for ATC 

surveillance if all aircraft are not 

appropriately equipped. Moreover, it is 

unreasonable to set up a regulatory 

framework and performance standards 

that are based on using two primary 

systems for surveillance; nor is it 

feasible to fund and maintain two such 

systems. The airspace requirements 

specified in this rule for ADS–B Out 

meet ATC surveillance needs. 

Class B and C airspace have the 

highest volume of air carrier and GA 

traffic. They also experience the most 

complex transitions of aircraft from the 

en route environment to the terminal 

area. With the intricate nature of the 

airspace, current regulations dictate 

more stringent operational requirements 

to operate within Class B and C airspace 

areas. 

In addition, ATC must have 

surveillance data for all aircraft 

operating in these areas to ensure 

appropriate situational awareness and to 

maximize the use of the NAS. ADS–B 

Out will enhance surveillance in 

controlled airspace areas where 

secondary surveillance radar (SSR) 

currently exists. 

One commenter stated that the FAA 

should expand the airspace in which 

ADS–B is required and specifically 

recommended including Air Defense 

Identification Zones (ADIZ) 24 and 

Offshore Control Area Extensions. 

This rule applies to aircraft operating 

within U.S. airspace, which extends 12 

NM from the U.S. coast. (The airspace 

also includes the Washington, DC, 

Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA), 

referred to as an ‘‘ADIZ’’ prior to 2009.) 

Most of the airspace in the ADIZ falls 

outside the 12 NM boundaries. 

3. Requests for Deviations From ADS–B 

Out Requirements 

This rule requires operators to 

broadcast ADS–B Out information when 

operating in specified airspace. If an 

aircraft is not capable of meeting the 

performance requirements, the operator 

may request a deviation from the ATC 

facility responsible for that airspace. 

However, as noted in the NPRM, ATC 

authorizations may contain conditions 

necessary to provide the appropriate 

level of safety for all operators in the 

airspace. ATC may not be able to grant 

authorizations in all cases for a variety 

of reasons, including workload, runway 

configurations, air traffic flows, and 

weather conditions. 

B. Dual-Link Strategy 

The NPRM proposed a dual-link 

strategy for ADS–B Out broadcasts. 

Under the proposal, aircraft operating 

above FL 240 would be required to use 

the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link. 

Aircraft operating below FL 240 and in 

airspace where ADS–B Out performance 

requirements were proposed could use 

either the 1090 MHz ES or UAT 

broadcast link. 

Many commenters suggested that a 

single-link system would reduce 

operational complexity. The 

commenters noted that the installation 

and maintenance costs of a dual-link 

system exceed those of a single-link 

system. Some of the commenters 

proposed a single-link solution but 

disagreed over which link should be 

chosen. Commenters supporting a 

single-link UAT system noted that 1090 

MHz ES does not support FIS–B and is 

at risk for frequency congestion in a 

future air traffic management 

environment. Commenters supporting a 

single-link 1090 MHz ES system 

explained that UAT is not 

internationally interoperable and 

opposed a system that requires 

international operators to equip with 

both links. 

Boeing noted that most of the NAS 

system delays are associated with 

arrivals and departures. Therefore, 

Boeing recommended that the airborne 

surveillance functions should provide 

benefits at all altitudes and on the 

ground. Ultimately, Boeing commented 

that a single 1090 MHz ES broadcast 

link would advance future ADS–B In 

applications at low altitudes. 

In mandating ADS–B, the FAA is 

mindful that some members of the 

international air transport community 

and the GA community have already 

purchased ADS–B Out equipment, 

which use either the 1090 MHz ES or 

UAT broadcast link. The FAA finds that 

a dual-link system is necessary for the 

United States to meet the operational 

needs of all NAS operators. Moreover, if 

the FAA were to require one segment of 

the aviation community to equip to 

meet the needs of another segment of 

the community, this would present 

additional costs for some operators to 

equip. 

1. Altitude To Require the 1090 MHz ES 

Datalink 

Under the proposal, aircraft operating 

above FL 240 would be required to use 

the 1090 MHz ES broadcast link. 

Operators using only the UAT broadcast 

link would be limited to operations 

below FL 240. 

The Air Line Pilots Association, 

International (ALPA) recommended that 

the FAA require operators to use 1090 

MHz ES above 18,000 feet MSL to be 

consistent with the Class A airspace 

lower boundary (rather than introduce a 

new subclassification of established 

airspace). In addition, several GA 

commenters requested limiting ADS–B 

performance requirements to only Class 

A airspace. The EAA and some 

individuals stated that UAT would work 

just as well as 1090 MHz ES above FL 

240 and that aircraft should be 

permitted to use exclusively UAT for 

operations above FL 240. 

The final rule specifies FL 180 (the 

lower boundary of Class A airspace) as 

the ceiling for operating an aircraft 

equipped only with UAT. Using 1090 

MHz ES at or above FL 180 provides a 

clear operational boundary for 

controllers and pilots, and does not 

create conditions of mixed equipage for 

existing or future applications. The FAA 

recognizes that this modification will 

affect certain operators that want to 

operate above FL 180 and equip only 

with UAT. However, the agency 

concludes that requiring 1090 MHz ES 

performance standards for operations in 

all of Class A airspace is not only 

reasonable for surveillance, but also 

establishes a baseline for ADS–B In. 

The requirement to broadcast 1090 

MHz ES at and above FL 180 does not 

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30168 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

25ASA comprises a number of flight-deck-based 

aircraft surveillance and separation assurance 

capabilities that may directly provide flight crews 

with surveillance information and alerts. 

26The service coverage volume for ADS–B In 

applications is explained in greater detail at 

http://www.adsb.gov. 27ADS–B ARC Task II Report to the FAA 

Appendix N, ADS–R Latency and Reliability 

Expectations (September 26, 2008), available on the 

Web site, http:///www.regulations.gov, FAA–2007– 

29305–0221.1. 

28To date, the requirements for using ADS–B for 

advanced iterations of merging and spacing, and 

self separation have yet to be defined. 

29A copy of this report is available from the Web 

site http://www.regulations.gov. The docket number 

for this rulemaking is FAA–2007–29305. 

preclude UAT reception of FIS–B 

services up to FL 240 for aircraft with 

a dual-link reception capability. 

2. Automatic Dependent SurveillanceRebroadcast (ADS–R) 

Under a dual-link strategy, the FAA 

will use ADS–R to allow ADS–B Inequipped aircraft using one type of 

broadcast link to receive messages about 

aircraft transmitting on the other 

broadcast link. 

Various commenters, including the 

Air Transport Association of America, 

Inc. (ATA), Airservices Australia, the 

Australia Civil Aviation Safety 

Authority, the Aircraft Owners and 

Pilots Association (AOPA), Boeing, 

British Airways, and the International 

Air Transport Association (IATA), 

expressed concern about a dual-link 

system. Some of these commenters 

asserted that the need for ADS–R 

introduces additional system-wide 

latency into the ADS–B system and 

poses a single point of failure for the 

degradation or loss of surveillance data. 

In their view, this could limit potential 

separation and efficiency improvements 

and affect the air-to-air surveillance 

element of future ADS–B In 

applications. In addition, some 

commenters expressed concern about 

the additional risk of faults or failures 

that could result from translating, 

merging, and rebroadcasting data from 

the 1090 and 978 MHz frequencies. 

Some commenters, including Boeing, 

contended that ADS–R may not have 

sufficient growth capability to support 

future ADS–B In air-to-air applications. 

Such applications include merging and 

spacing, self separation, or using ADS– 

B data to supplement or replace TCAS 

because of potential of latency or loop 

delays. Rockwell-Collins stated that 

ADS–R should be able to support many 

ADS–B In air-to-air applications, 

including closely spaced parallel 

approaches and enhanced visual 

approach. It recommended developing 

ADS–R to support more demanding 

aircraft surveillance applications 

(ASA).25

Several commenters, including 

AOPA, asserted that the dual-link 

system presents a safety hazard because 

aircraft equipped with different links 

cannot ‘‘see’’ each other on ADS–B In 

displays in areas without ADS–R 

coverage. The commenters suggested 

providing ADS–R at all public airports 

where a mix of both systems will be 

encountered. 

The FAA is deploying ADS–R in all 

areas where ADS–B ATC surveillance 

exists.26 ADS–R collects traffic 

information broadcast on the 978 MHz 

UAT broadcast link and rebroadcasts 

the information to 1090 MHz ES users. 

Similarly, ADS–R collects traffic 

information provided on the 1090 MHz 

ES broadcast link and rebroadcasts the 

information to UAT users. ADS–R 

permits aircraft equipped with either 

1090 MHz ES or UAT to take advantage 

of ADS–B In applications. 

The FAA disagrees with the 

comments suggesting that ADS–R 

introduces safety issues because of the 

added latencies attributed to ADS–R 

processing. ATC automation systems do 

not require or use ADS–R to provide 

surveillance. The added latency in the 

rebroadcast of the original ADS–B 

message are measurably small and do 

not degrade the reported NACP, NACV, 

and NIC values. The ARC agreed in its 

report that the latency in ADS–R 

processing does not degrade the 

reporting of the position quality 

parameters.27 Latency attributed to 

ADS–R does not compromise the safety 

of the initial ADS–B In applications. 

The intended functions of ADS–B, as 

identified in the NPRM, are not 

compromised by the latency introduced 

with rebroadcasting the messages. 

However, future ADS–B In applications 

necessarily may be limited becauseof 

the latency associated with ADS–R.28

The FAA has a strong interest in 

providing the option for operators to 

equip with UAT, so they may benefit 

from FIS–B service. In making the 

decision to use a dual-link strategy, the 

FAA acknowledged and weighed the 

fact that potential benefits of future 

applications may not be fully realized 

based on this decision. In situations 

where an airport is not within the 

planned ADS–B coverage area, the 

airport will not have ADS–R coverage. 

Consequently, an aircraft with ADS–B 

In will not have the benefit of ADS–R, 

and ADS–B In will not provide 

awareness of aircraft that are 

broadcasting on a different broadcast 

link. 

If an aircraft leaves the ADS–B 

coverage area, there will be an 

indication to the pilot that the aircraft 

is no longer within range of ADS–R 

service. In this case, the pilot needs to 

maintain separation in the same manner 

done today, which is relying on visual 

scanning and directions from ATC. The 

FAA will ensure that the dual-link 

strategy does not impact safety as future 

applications are developed. 

3. 1090 MHz Frequency Congestion 

Boeing, Federal Express (FedEx), and 

IATA suggested that the FAA assess 

future 1090 MHz frequency congestion. 

The ARC supported the dual-link 

strategy, but recommended that the FAA 

study the necessary mitigations of 1090 

MHz frequency congestion. The ARC 

specifically recommended that these 

mitigations ensure 1090 MHz ES is 

interoperable with ACAS and SSR, 

while providing sufficient air-to-air 

range to support NextGen ADS–B In 

applications. 

Congestion on the 1090 MHz 

frequency is a risk shared by TCAS/ 

ACAS and SSR systems using the Mode 

S transponder. The FAA conducted a 

study to assess 1090 MHz frequency 

congestion in the future air traffic 

environment.29 The FAA is analyzing 

alternatives and will enact the necessary 

mitigations to reduce the 1090 MHz 

frequency congestion risk for ADS–B, 

TCAS, and SSR, while enabling ranges 

appropriate for many ADS–B In 

applications through 2035. 

C. Performance Requirements—System 

While some commenters supported 

the proposed performance requirements, 

numerous organizations and individuals 

commented that the performance 

requirements generally were too 

stringent, unnecessary, and would entail 

an undue economic burden on 

operators. 

1. Performance Requirements Tailored 

to Operator, Airspace, or Procedure 

The NPRM proposed specific 

performance requirements for ADS–B 

Out. Several commenters, including the 

Aerospace Industries Association of 

America (AIA), Boeing, the DOD, EAA, 

Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, and the 

ARC, asked the FAA to tailor the ADS– 

B performance requirements based on 

specific application requirements or 

airspace. 

Lockheed Martin and the DOD noted 

that some military aircraft may not meet 

the proposed equipage requirements 

and would need accommodations to 

operate in ADS–B Out-designated 

airspace. One commenter was 

concerned that the DOD was exempt 

from the proposed requirements. 

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30 ADS–B ARC Task II Report to the FAA 6 

(September 26, 2008), available on the Web site, 

http://www.regulations.gov, FAA–2007–29305– 

0221.1. 

31ASDE–X is a traffic management system for the 

airport surface that provides seamless coverage and 

aircraft identification to air traffic controllers. The 

system uses a combination of surface movement 

radar and transponder multilateration sensors to 

display aircraft position. 

32ADS–B ARC Report to the FAA Appendix P, 

Programmatic Decision Analysis (September 26, 

2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov, 

FAA–2007–29305–0221.1. 

33A copy of the Separation Standards Working 

Group report is available from the Web site http:// 

www.regulations.gov. The docket number for this 

rulemaking is FAA–2007–29305. 

The FAA has determined that it is not 

operationally feasible to assign different 

performance requirements dependent 

on the nature of the operation. It would 

not be effective to require both pilots 

and controllers to verify specific 

performance parameters before any 

given operation or change of airspace. 

Therefore, the FAA is specifying 

minimum performance requirements for 

all ADS–B Out-equipped aircraft to 

operate in certain designated airspace. 

No special allowance is made in this 

rule to relieve the military from the 

same performance requirements as the 

civilian aviation community. The FAA 

recognizes that the DOD and other 

Federal agencies are NAS users, and 

need access to all areas of the NAS 

today and in the future. This rule 

provides procedures for an aircraft that 

does not meet the ADS–B Out 

performance requirements, i.e., to obtain 

an ATC authorized deviation to operate 

in the airspace for which ADS–B is 

required. The FAA will collaborate with 

the appropriate U.S. Government 

departments or agencies (including but 

not limited to DOD, and the Department 

of Homeland Security) to develop 

Memorandums of Agreement to 

accommodate their National defense 

mission requirements while supporting 

the needs of all other NAS users. 

2. Navigation Accuracy Category for 

Position (NACP) 

The NPRM proposed requiring a 

NACP greater than or equal to 9. This is 

equivalent to horizontal position 

accuracy of less than 30 meters and 

vertical position accuracy of less than 

45 meters. A NACP of less than 30 

meters horizontal would support ATC 

surveillance, ASSA, FAROA, and other 

future ADS–B In applications. 

Airbus, ATA, Aviation 

Communication and Surveillance 

Systems (ACSS), Boeing, RockwellCollins, United Airlines, and United 

Parcel Service (UPS) questioned the 

necessity of a NACP greater than or 

equal to 9. The ARC recommended that 

the FAA institute NACP requirements 

based on domains of airspace defined by 

different types of operations, with 

minimum NACP values ranging from 5 

through 9.30 The ARC also 

recommended that when a NACP greater 

than or equal to 9 is necessary, operators 

should only be required to equip with 

a position source that could meet a 

NACP greater than or equal to 9 for 95 

percent of an hour and meet a NACP

greater than or equal to 8 for 99.9 

percent of an hour. 

Boeing commented that there is no 

need for vertical accuracy because 

neither ATC nor any of the initial ADS– 

B In applications require it. The ARC 

recommended that the FAA not apply 

the vertical position accuracy 

requirement associated with a NACP of 

9 for surface operations. The ARC also 

recommended that the FAA modify the 

definition of a NACP of 9 in DO–260A 

and DO–282A. This modification would 

remove the vertical accuracy 

requirement if the aircraft is on the 

surface. 

The FAA reviewed these comments 

and the necessary requirements for the 

ADS–B Out and ADS–B In applications 

that are contemplated today. A NACP of 

less than 0.05 NM is required for ATC 

surveillance. A NACP of less than 30 

meters is required only for ASSA and 

FAROA. Because surface surveillance 

benefits enabled by ADS–B will only be 

fully available where Airport Surface 

Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE– 

X) systems,31 and ADS–R and TIS–B are 

in use, the FAA has reconsidered the 

universal requirement of a NACP of less 

than 30 meters. 

While the higher NACP would 

support a limited number of ADS–B In 

applications, it could also increase 

costs 32 to all operators required to meet 

the ADS–B performance standards. 

Therefore, this final rule reduces the 

position accuracy reporting requirement 

and adopts a NACP of less than 0.05 

NM. This NACP requirement applies to 

all aircraft operating in the airspace 

identified in this rule. 

In addition, the FAA considered the 

comments regarding the vertical 

accuracy component of NACP. As there 

are no ATC separation services 

requirements for vertical accuracy or 

integrity, the FAA has removed the 

vertical accuracy and integrity 

requirement from NACP, NACV, NIC, 

and SIL in TSO–C154c and TSO–C166b. 

3. Navigation Accuracy Category for 

Velocity (NACV) 

The NPRM proposed requiring a 

NACV greater than or equal to 1, which 

is equivalent to velocity accuracy of less 

than 10 meters per second. 

The European Organisation for the 

Safety of Air Navigation 

(EUROCONTROL) commented that a 

NACV of 1 is not sufficient for ATC 

services or advanced ADS–B In 

applications. The ARC recommended 

that NACV should not be required. 

Different air navigation service 

providers may need different 

performance requirements depending 

on the airspace in which they 

implement ADS–B separation services. 

The FAA reviewed this requirement and 

concludes that a NACV is required for 

separation services in the United States. 

The agency modeled and calculated the 

NACV requirements for aircraft 

separation, using assumptions unique to 

the U.S. environment. Based on this 

analysis, the FAA determined that a 

horizontal velocity accuracy of less than 

10 meters per second, as proposed in 

the NPRM, is required for ATC 

surveillance within the NAS.33

Therefore, this requirement is adopted 

as proposed. 

4. Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) 

The NPRM proposed requiring a NIC 

greater than or equal to 7, which 

provides navigation integrity of less 

than 0.2 NM. Boeing questioned the 

necessity of this requirement. The ARC 

recommended that the FAA adopt NIC 

requirements based on airspace, with 

minimum NIC values ranging from 0 to 

7. 

The FAA reviewed this requirement 

and determined that a NIC of less than 

0.2 NM is necessary for ATC separation 

services, particularly in the approach 

environment. Similar to the NACP, it is 

not practical to assign different NIC 

values based on types of airspace. 

Therefore, this rule requires a NIC of 

less than 0.2 NM. 

5. Surveillance Integrity Level 

The FAA’s proposal for surveillance 

integrity level stated that the 

surveillance integrity level is based on 

both the design assurance level of the 

ADS–B Out avionics and the position 

source. Several commenters, including 

Rockwell-Collins, pointed out that the 

proposed definition was inconsistent 

with the surveillance integrity level 

definition provided in DO–260A. 

Commenters stated that DO–260A 

Change 2 defined surveillance integrity 

level as including only the position 

source. The ARC recommended that the 

FAA use the definition of surveillance 

integrity level found in RTCA DO– 

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30170 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

34Minimum Aviation System Performance 

Standards (MASPS) for Aircraft Surveillance 

Applications (ASA). 

35 GPS is a U.S. satellite-based radio navigation 

system that provides a global-positioning service. 

36ADS–B ARC Task II Report to the FAA 

Appendix T, Antenna Diversity Comments on Cost, 

(September 26, 2008), available at http:// 

www.regulations.gov, FAA–2007–29305–0221.1. 

289,34 which also limited the design 

assurance to the position source. 

The FAA asserts that the design 

assurance of the ADS–B system needs to 

represent the complete system, and not 

a single piece of that system, to provide 

air traffic separation services. The FAA 

agrees that the inconsistency between 

the proposed rule and the RTCA 

standard is unworkable; however, RTCA 

has updated the design assurance 

requirements in DO–260B and DO–282B 

to include the entire ADS–B avionics 

system, rather than just the position 

source. The ADS–B system includes 

ADS–B transmission equipment, ADS–B 

processing equipment, position source, 

and any other equipment that processes 

the position data transmitted by the 

ADS–B system. The DO–260B change is 

consistent with the rule. 

6. Source Integrity Level (SIL) and 

System Design Assurance (SDA) 

In DO–260A (TSO–C166a) and DO– 

282A (TSO–C154b), SIL was defined as 

surveillance integrity level and 

represented two separate components: 

(1) The maximum probability of 

exceeding the NIC containment radius 

and (2) a maximum probability of a 

failure causing false or misleading data 

to be transmitted. DO–260B (TSO– 

C166b) and DO–282B (TSO–C154c) 

separate these two components into two 

distinct parameters. SIL is now referred 

to as source integrity level and defines 

the maximum probability of exceeding 

the NIC containment radius; SDA now 

defines the maximum probability of a 

failure causing false or misleading data 

to be transmitted. 

The FAA proposed a SIL value of 2 or 

3. A SIL of 2, as stated in TSO–C166a 

and TSO–C154b, represented: (1) A 

maximum probability of exceeding the 

NIC containment radius of 1x10¥5 per 

hour or per sample; and (2) a maximum 

probability of a failure causing false or 

misleading data to be transmitted of 

1x10¥5 per hour. 

A SIL of 3 represented: (1) A 

maximum probability of exceeding the 

NIC containment radius of 1x10¥7 per 

hour or per sample and (2) a maximum 

probability of a failure causing false or 

misleading data to be transmitted of 

1x10¥7 per hour. 

The FAA proposed these two values 

for SIL because its separation standards 

modeling determined that the 

probability of exceeding the NIC 

containment radius must be less than 

1x10¥7 per hour or per sample and the 

probability of a failure causing false or 

misleading data must be less than 

1x10¥5 per hour. The FAA’s TSOs and 

the corresponding RTCA documents did 

not allow for this combination. 

Therefore, in developing and issuing 

the NPRM, the FAA assumed that most 

operators, in upgrading their equipment 

for ADS–B, would equip with a global 

positioning system (GPS) 35 that would 

provide a NIC containment radius of 

1x10¥7 per hour (a SIL of 3). However, 

to require the associated maximum 

probability of failure causing false or 

misleading data to be transmitted at 

1x10¥7 per hour was not only 

unreasonable but also unnecessary. 

Therefore, the FAA proposed that a SIL 

of 2 was also acceptable. 

With the separate SIL and SDA values 

available under DO–260B and DO– 

282B, the rule requires a maximum 

probability of exceeding the NIC 

containment radius of 1x10¥7 per hour 

or per sample (which equates to a SIL 

of 3), and a maximum probability of 

1x10¥5 per hour of a failure causing 

false or misleading data to be 

transmitted (which equates to an SDA of 

2). 

Changing the proposed probability of 

exceeding the NIC containment radius 

from 1x10¥5 per hour or per sample to 

1x10¥7 per hour or per sample should 

not impact NAS users. This is because 

currently available ADS–B Out systems 

using GNSS will provide an integrity 

metric based on 1x10¥7 per hour. 

7. Secondary Position Sources 

The General Aviation Manufacturers 

Association (GAMA), IATA, and 

Rockwell-Collins commented that the 

final rule should specify separate 

performance requirements for secondary 

position sources in the event that their 

primary position source is unavailable. 

The FAA disagrees that a separate set 

of requirements is necessary for 

secondary position sources because the 

rule does not require a secondary 

source. The NACP, NACV, NIC, SDA and 

SIL requirements in this rule apply 

regardless of the position source in use. 

D. Performance Requirements— 

Antenna Diversity 

The NPRM proposed that aircraft 

meet optimum system performance by 

equipping with both a top and a bottom 

antenna to support ADS–B In 

applications. 

Several commenters, including 

AOPA, did not support this aspect of 

the proposal because antenna diversity 

significantly increases the cost of ADS– 

B. AOPA also noted that historical 

TCAS and transponder use does not 

indicate that dual antennas are 

necessary. 

Airservices Australia and the 

Australia Civil Aviation Safety 

Authority noted that Australia is not 

requiring antenna diversity for GA 

aircraft. The ARC recommended 

allowing non-diversity antenna 

installations for VFR aircraft flying 

through Class B and C airspace and 

below 15,000 feet MSL (1090 MHz ES) 

or below 18,000 feet MSL (UAT), but 

not landing at a primary airport. The 

ARC also recommended that the FAA 

undertake further studies to assess and 

validate the need for antenna diversity 

in low-altitude airspace. 

The FAA proposed dual antennas to 

support ADS–B Out and ADS–B In airto-air applications. For ATC 

surveillance, only a single bottommounted antenna is necessary. The 

commenters and the ARC identified this 

element of the proposal as requiring 

significant costs for the GA operators.36

The FAA has reconsidered its initial 

strategy for launching the ADS–B 

requirements and is adopting the 

performance standards necessary for 

ATC surveillance. Therefore, this rule 

does not require antenna diversity for 

ADS–B to operate in any airspace. This 

change does not alter or affect antenna 

diversity requirements for other aircraft 

systems, such as transponders or TCAS 

II. 

Operators should be aware that a dual 

antenna installation could provide 

additional benefits that are not included 

in the scope of this rule. Airport surface 

situational awareness or alerting 

applications may be compromised by a 

single-antenna installation. Operators 

who equip with a single antenna may 

not be able to accrue all available 

benefits from some or all future ADS– 

B In applications. 

While requirements for these 

applications have not yet been fully 

defined, modeling performed by both 

the ARC and the FAA has indicated that 

a single antenna may not be able to 

perform adequately for surface 

applications. If the FAA, for example, 

issues a future mandate requiring 

surface performance capability, 

operators of single-antenna-equipped 

aircraft may need to upgrade the 

avionics installed on their aircraft. 

Operators should also be aware that 

single-antenna installations are not as 

capable as dual-antenna installations of 

receiving ADS–B messages in an 

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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 30171 

37The commenters specifically referenced the 

RTCA Airborne Surveillance Applications 

Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards 

and DO–303 Safety ‘‘Safety, Performance and 

Inoperability Requirements Document of the ADS– 

B Non-Radar-Airspace (NRA) Application.’’ 

environment with a highly congested 

spectrum. Because of increasing 

congestion on the 1090 MHz frequency 

over time, single-antenna installations 

of ADS–B may not be able to achieve the 

same range for ADS–B In applications as 

aircraft with two antennas. 

This limitation on the upper bound of 

ADS–B In application range for singleantenna installations does not impact 

any of the application benefits cited in 

this rule. The FAA is actively pursuing 

strategies to mitigate spectrum 

congestion concerns of the 1090 MHz 

frequency. However, operators 

employing the 1090 MHz ES broadcast 

link should be aware that future air-toair applications that require longer 

range reception may require dual 

antennas or a UAT system. 

E. Performance Requirements— 

Transmit Power 

The NPRM proposed that aircraft 

equipped with UAT would have a 

minimum 16-watt transmit power 

performance and aircraft equipped with 

1090 MHz ES would have a minimum 

125-watt transmit power performance. 

Some commenters, particularly AOPA, 

argued that the proposal was not 

warranted and imposed unnecessary 

expense. The ARC commented that 

using the existing power level without 

antenna diversity may provide the 

performance needed to make broader 

use of non-diversity antenna 

installations. 

The FAA has determined that 

reducing the transmit power 

requirement would significantly impact 

the ground infrastructure. The FAA will 

rely on a series of approximately 800 

ground stations to provide ATC 

separation services throughout the 

United States. The ground stations will 

be placed 150 to 200 miles apart and 

will require the minimum aircraft 

output power specified in the rule to 

ensure coverage. Lowering the aircraft 

output power requirements, as 

suggested by the commenters, would 

require the FAA to expand and redesign 

the ADS–B ground infrastructure. 

Consequently, the power levels remain 

unchanged in the final rule. 

F. Performance Requirements—Total 

and Uncompensated Latency 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to 

define latency as the time information 

enters the aircraft through the aircraft 

antenna(s) until the time it is 

transmitted from the aircraft. The FAA 

further proposed that the navigation 

sensor should process information 

received by the aircraft’s antenna(s) and 

forward this information to the ADS–B 

broadcast link avionics in less than 0.5 

seconds. The processed information 

then would be transmitted in the ADS– 

B message from the ADS–B Out 

broadcast link avionics in less than 1.0 

second from the time it was received 

from the navigation sensor. 

Several commenters, including 

Airbus, Boeing, EUROCONTROL, 

GAMA, and Honeywell, commented 

that the latency requirements are not 

well defined, are too stringent, and are 

not consistent with other standards.37

United Airlines and UPS recommended 

that the FAA specify the accuracy of 

position information at the time of 

transmission. Boeing and Honeywell 

recommended that the FAA specify 

latency, based on the time of 

applicability of the position source. 

The ARC stated that the FAA should: 

(1) Specify latency requirements at the 

aircraft level, not the equipment level; 

(2) specify the maximum 

uncompensated latency to minimize or 

eliminate installation wiring changes of 

existing ADS–B Out implementations, 

while meeting ATC surveillance 

requirements; (3) specify total latency 

and uncompensated latency; and (4) 

reference latency to the time of 

applicability of the position provided by 

the position sensor, rather than the time 

of measurement. 

The FAA adopts three of the four ARC 

recommendations. First, the FAA agrees 

that latency must be defined at the 

aircraft level and not the equipment 

level. Second, the latency requirements 

are set at the maximum value that will 

allow ATC surveillance. Although the 

latency requirements will drive wiring 

changes in some aircraft, the 

requirements will minimize the number 

of aircraft affected to the maximum 

extent possible. Third, the FAA has 

defined the latency requirements as 

total latency and uncompensated 

latency. The FAA does not agree with 

the fourth recommendation to measure 

latency at the time of applicability. To 

do so would place latency requirements 

only on part of the overall system and 

specifically exclude the position source 

latency. Since the entire system’s 

latency, including the position source, 

must be limited to ensure accuracy of 

the transmitted position the rule 

requires latency to be measured from 

the position source time of 

measurement and not the time of 

applicability. 

This rule specifies two separate 

latency requirements: Total latency and 

uncompensated latency. Total latency is 

defined as the time between when 

measurements are taken to determine 

the aircraft’s geometric position 

(latitude, longitude, and geometric 

altitude) and when the ADS–B 

transmitter broadcasts the aircraft’s 

position. Under this rule, the total 

latency cannot exceed 2.0 seconds. 

Latency is compensated to account for 

the movement of the aircraft while the 

unit is processing the position 

information. The avionics usually 

compensate latency based on velocity 

but may also compensate based on 

acceleration. 

Uncompensated latency is defined as 

the time the avionics does not 

compensate for latency. Under this rule, 

within the 2.0 second total latency 

allocation, a maximum of 0.6 seconds 

may be uncompensated latency. The 

avionics must compensate for any 

latency above 0.6 seconds up to the 

maximum of 2.0 seconds by 

extrapolating the position to the time of 

transmission. 

Aircraft velocity, as well as position 

accuracy and integrity metrics (NACP, 

NACV, NIC, SDA, and SIL), must be 

transmitted with their associated 

position measurement, but are not 

required to be compensated. 

G. Performance Requirements—Time To 

Indicate Accuracy and Integrity 

Changes 

The NPRM proposed that changes in 

NIC and NACP must be broadcast within 

10 seconds. This proposed requirement 

would bind the latency of the NIC and 

NACP, however this requirement would 

also bind the maximum amount of time 

an integrity fault can exist without an 

indication, as an integrity fault is 

indicated by changing the NIC and 

NACP to zero. 

The ARC, GAMA, and RockwellCollins commented that 10.0 seconds is 

not enough time to indicate a change in 

the NIC. They specifically noted that 

GNSS position sources use the entire 

10-second allocation, which does not 

allow time for the ADS–B equipment to 

actually transmit the change. RockwellCollins, GAMA, and the ARC 

recommended instead that changes in 

NIC and SIL be broadcast within 12.1 

seconds. 

Position sources typically provide an 

accuracy and integrity metric with each 

position that is output. To allow GNSSbased position sources time to detect 

and eliminate possible satellite faults, 

GNSS systems allow the integrity metric 

associated with a position to actually lag 

behind the output of the position. TSO– 

C145/146 and TSO–C196 GNSS systems 

have up to 8.0 seconds to alert to an 

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38RTCA DO–229, Minimum Operational 

Performance Standards for Global Positioning 

System/Wide Area Augmentation System Airborne 

Equipment, defines the availability of a navigation 

system as the ability of the system to provide the 

required function and performance at the initiation 

of the intended operation. Availability is an 

indication of the ability of the system to provide 

usable service with the specified coverage area. 

Signal availability is the percentage of time that 

navigational signals transmitted from external 

sources are available for use. Availability is a 

function of both the physical characteristics of the 

environment and the technical capabilities of the 

transmitter facilities. 

39WAAS is a U.S. wide-coverage augmentation 

system to GPS that calculates integrity and 

correction data on the ground and uses 

geostationary satellites to broadcast the data to GPS/ 

SBAS (Satellite-Based Augmentation System (nonU.S.)) users. 

40Required Navigation Performance (RNP) is a 

statement of the total aircraft navigation 

performance necessary for operation within a 

defined airspace. 

41 DO–229 defines the continuity of the system as 

the ability of the total system (comprising all 

elements necessary to maintain aircraft position 

within the defined airspace) to perform its function 

without interruption during the intended operation. 

More specifically, continuity is the probability that 

the specified system performance will be 

maintained for the duration of a phase of operation 

(presuming that the system was available at the 

beginning of that phase of operation), and predicted 

to exist throughout the operation. 

integrity fault. TSO–C129 systems do 

not have an overarching integrity fault 

time-to-alert requirement, but they do 

have navigation mode specific integrity 

fault time-to-alert requirements. 

Specifically, TSO–C129 systems must 

indicate an integrity fault within 10 

seconds in terminal and approach 

modes. 

The requirement to indicate a change 

in NIC applies to the time between 

when a fault-free NIC is transmitted 

with a faulted position and when the 

NIC is updated to indicate the fault. 

Thus, the clock to indicate the change 

in NIC does not start at the onset of the 

fault, but rather at the broadcast of the 

faulted position from the ADS–B 

system. Thus, the total time to update 

the NIC is based on the cumulative 

effect of—(1) the position source fault 

detection and exclusion time, and (2) 

the worst-case asynchronous 

transmission difference between when 

the fault-free NIC with faulted position 

is transmitted and when the faulted NIC 

is transmitted. 

The FAA reviewed the separation 

standards work to determine if a 12.0 

second delay in the broadcast of an 

integrity fault would impact separation 

standards. The FAA found that no 

existing terminal and en route 

surveillance standards would be 

impacted with a 12.0 second delay, and 

thus the rule requires that changes in 

NIC be broadcast within 12.0 seconds. 

The ARC, GAMA, and RockwellCollins also commented that changes in 

NACP, NACV, and SIL should be 

broadcast within 3.1 seconds versus 

10.0 seconds. The FAA determined that 

there is no basis to tighten the 

requirement. Therefore, the 10.0 second 

requirement applies to indicating 

changes in NACP, NACV, SDA, and SIL. 

H. Performance Requirements— 

Availability 

The FAA did not propose any 

availability 38 requirements for this rule. 

The proposed rule generated multiple 

comments concerning statements in the 

preamble regarding availability and 

whether the FAA should require 

operators to accomplish a preflight 

determination of GNSS availability. 

Other commenters focused on a 

perceived requirement for operators to 

equip with avionics that had a system 

availability equivalent to Wide Area 

Augmentation System (WAAS) 39. 

1. Preflight Determination of 

Availability 

The proposal preamble explained that 

operators must verify ADS–B Out 

availability before flight as part of their 

pre-flight responsibilities. This is 

similar to the requirement for preflight 

determination of availability for certain 

Required Navigation Performance 

(RNP) 40 operations. 

ATA argued that the process to 

determine availability could be time 

consuming for operators and that the 

FAA should provide further 

justification. Boeing stated that the 

NPRM did not include an availability 

requirement; therefore, the FAA should 

correct its statement in the NPRM 

preamble advising operators to make 

this part of their preflight actions. 

The ARC recommended that the FAA 

provide preflight prediction systems 

that assess the ability of typical 

positioning sources to meet the position 

accuracy and integrity requirements. 

This rule requires operators to meet 

the adopted minimum position accuracy 

and integrity performance requirements 

to operate in the airspace described in 

the rule. To facilitate compliance with 

the rule and assist pilots for the flight 

planning, the FAA will provide a 

preflight availability prediction service 

by 2013. Therefore, prior to departure, 

operators should verify that the 

predicted performance requirements 

will be met for the duration of the flight. 

This service will determine whether 

GNSS equipment is capable of meeting 

§ 91.227 position accuracy and integrity 

requirements for operating in the 

airspace defined in this rule. Operators 

may also use their own preflight 

availability prediction tools, provided 

the predictions correspond to the 

performance of their equipment. The 

FAA advises operators to consult 

manufacturers’ information on specific 

avionics and prediction services. 

2. System Availability 

Numerous commenters, including the 

DOD, contended that the proposal 

required WAAS (or implied that the 

positioning service used by the aircraft 

have an availability equivalent to 

WAAS.) 

As stated in the NPRM, operators may 

equip with any position source. 

Although WAAS is not required, at this 

time it is the only positioning service 

that provides the equivalent availability 

to radar (99.9 percent availability). The 

FAA expects that future position 

sources such as GNSS using the L5 GPS 

signal, GPS using Galileo signals, and 

GPS tightly integrated with inertial 

navigation systems will also provide 

99.9 percent availability. Operators who 

equip with other position sources, such 

as non-augmented GPS, may experience 

outages that limit their access to the 

airspace defined in this rule. 

If an aircraft’s avionics meet the 

requirements of this rule but 

unexpected GPS degradations during 

flight inhibit the position source from 

providing adequate accuracy (within 

0.05 NM) and integrity (within 0.2 NM), 

ATC will be alerted via the aircraft’s 

broadcasted data and services will be 

provided to that aircraft using the 

backup strategy. An aircraft that is not 

equipped to meet the requirements of 

this rule will not have access to the 

airspace for which ADS–B is required. 

The FAA notes that preflight availability 

verification eliminates any need for the 

system to meet a specified availability 

requirement upon installation. 

I. Performance Requirements— 

Continuity 

The FAA did not propose a 

continuity 41 requirement in the NPRM. 

Several commenters, including Airbus, 

GAMA, Rockwell-Collins, and the ARC, 

suggested that the FAA add a continuity 

requirement. These commenters argued 

that such a requirement would ensure 

that an aircraft could continue 

providing the ADS–B information 

throughout a flight. 

Aircraft are to meet the performance 

requirements for the duration of the 

operation, not just a portion of the 

flight. The FAA’s preflight availability 

prediction service will help pilots 

ensure that the aircraft can continue 

transmitting ADS–B information 

throughout their planned flight, based 

on expected operations. Unexpected 

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42ASDE–3 is an airport radar that shows to tower 

controllers the location of aircraft on the surface. 

failures will be accommodated, as 

described in the discussion on 

availability; therefore, there is no need 

for a separate continuity requirement. 

J. Performance Requirements—Traffic 

Information Service—Broadcast 

Integrity (TIS–B) 

The NPRM did not propose any 

changes to the standards for TIS–B. 

Boeing stated that the FAA’s plans to 

implement TIS–B with a SIL of 0 would 

severely limit its utility for ADS–B In 

applications. Boeing recommended that 

the FAA change TIS–B to provide a SIL 

of 2 or greater, to be consistent with the 

SIL proposed for ADS–B Out. 

Honeywell commented that a TIS–B 

integrity level should be established for 

value-added, near-term applications. 

The ARC did not specifically comment 

on the TIS–B SIL, but did recommend 

that the FAA include a discussion of the 

FIS–B and TIS–B benefits in the 

preamble to the ADS–B Out final rule. 

The TIS–B system is expected to 

support four of the five initial ADS–B In 

applications. The FAA acknowledges 

that future ADS–B In applications may 

require improved representation of the 

position integrity metrics. With the SIL 

and SDA changes incorporated in DO– 

260B and DO–282B and possible 

changes to future versions of DO–317, 

the FAA plans, outside of this 

rulemaking effort, to evaluate the 

usefulness of the broadcast of integrity 

parameters from TIS–B. 

K. Broadcast Message Elements 

1. NACP/NACV/NIC/SDA/SIL 

The NPRM did not specifically 

propose NACP, NACV, NIC, or SIL as 

broadcast message elements in section 4 

of appendix H to part 91, Minimum 

Broadcast Message Element Set for 

ADS–B Out. These requirements were 

specified in section 3 of appendix H to 

part 91, ADS–B Out Performance 

Requirements for NIC, NAC, and SIL. 

Honeywell noted that NACP, NACV, 

NIC, and SIL are required message 

elements in DO–260A. 

To resolve any questions, the FAA has 

repeated the indications for these 

elements in § 91.227(d)(16) through (19). 

In addition, and consistent with TSO– 

C166b and TSO–C154c, SIL and SDA 

are listed as separate values. 

2. Receiving ATC Services 

The NPRM proposed requiring the 

message element ‘‘Receiving ATC 

Services.’’ Several commenters, 

including ACSS, Airbus, Boeing, 

EUROCONTROL, United Airlines, and 

UPS, commented that this message 

element is unnecessary and poorly 

defined. UPS and United Airlines 

suggested that the FAA use the ground 

automation system to accomplish the 

function of this message element. Some 

commenters also contended that this 

message element could require an 

additional user interface, which is not 

available on current equipment. 

The ARC recommended that the FAA 

clarify the definition of this message 

element and explain how it can be 

implemented without pilot entry. The 

ARC also requested that the FAA 

research whether both ‘‘Receiving ATC 

Services’’ and ‘‘Mode 3/A Code’’ are 

necessary. 

The FAA concludes that ‘‘Receiving 

ATC Services’’ is not necessary for ATC 

surveillance because this information 

can be directly inferred from the Mode 

3/A code. Furthermore, this message 

element could increase costs for an 

additional user interface. Therefore, this 

rule does not include ‘‘Receiving ATC 

Services’’ as a required broadcast 

message element. 

3. Length and Width of the Aircraft 

The NPRM proposed requiring a 

message element to broadcast the length 

and width of the aircraft. 

Airbus and EUROCONTROL 

commented that length and width 

information is not necessary for 

surveillance or airborne ADS–B Out 

applications. Airbus and an individual 

commenter noted that length and width 

information should be quantified 

relative to the aircraft position reference 

point or to a known offset. 

GAMA and Rockwell-Collins noted 

that the TSOs allow some aircraft to 

continuously transmit ‘‘in-air’’ because 

these aircraft do not have a means to 

determine their air/ground status. 

Rockwell-Collins commented that the 

rule should require all aircraft to assess 

their air/ground status and broadcast the 

appropriate set of messages for that 

status. The ARC recommended that the 

FAA address this issue in the preamble 

to the final rule. 

The FAA notes that TSO–C154c and 

TSO–C166b allow the operator to 

determine whether to transmit the 

aircraft’s latitude and longitude 

referenced to the GPS antenna location 

or the ADS–B position reference point. 

The ADS–B position reference point is 

the center of a box, based on the aircraft 

length and width. With the position 

offset to the ADS–B reference point, the 

ADS–B is able to report the position of 

the edges of the aircraft. This rule does 

not require operators to apply the 

position offset because ATC 

surveillance does not require a position 

offset. 

The FAA concludes that the 

requirement to transmit aircraft length 

and width is necessary because this 

message element will be used as an 

input for ASDE–X systems and allows 

the FAA to decommission ASDE–3 

radars 42 that interface with ASDE–X, as 

well as the surface movement radar 

systems that are at certain ASDE–X sites 

without ASDE–3. The length-width 

code will be preset when ADS–B 

equipment, meeting the standards in 

TSO–C154c or TSO–C166b, is installed 

in the aircraft. 

ADS–B equipment transmits an 

airborne position message when the 

aircraft is airborne, and a surface 

position message when the aircraft is on 

the ground. Aircraft automatically 

determine airborne or ground status and 

transmit the appropriate message. For 

aircraft that are unable to determine 

their air-ground status automatically, 

the RTCA standards and TSOs allow the 

aircraft to continuously transmit the 

airborne position message. However, the 

length width code is a required message 

element in this rule, and is only 

transmitted in the surface position 

message. Thus, to comply with the rule, 

the aircraft must automatically 

determine its air-ground status and 

transmit the surface position message 

which includes the length width code 

when on the ground. 

4. Indication of the Aircraft’s Barometric 

Pressure Altitude 

The NPRM proposed a broadcast 

message that would report the aircraft’s 

barometric pressure altitude. Several 

commenters, including the ARC, 

GAMA, Rockwell-Collins, Sandia 

National Laboratories (SANDIA), and 

UPS, identified an inconsistency 

regarding the barometric altitude 

message element between the proposed 

rule’s preamble and regulatory text. 

The FAA agrees that the NPRM 

preamble was not completely clear and 

should have better reflected the 

proposed regulatory text. The proposed 

regulatory text stated that the pressure 

altitude reported for ADS–B Out and 

Mode C/S transponder is derived from 

the same source for aircraft equipped 

with both a transponder and ADS–B 

Out. The FAA confirms that the 

barometric altitude reported from the 

aircraft’s transponder and ADS–B Out 

must be derived from the same source. 

In addition, the FAA is striking the 

January 1, 2020 compliance date from 

proposed § 91.217(b). If an operator 

chooses to use ADS–B before January 1, 

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30174 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

43EUROCAE MOPS for 1090 MHz Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B). 

2020, the operator must meet the 

provisions of that section. 

5. Indication of the Aircraft’s Velocity 

The NPRM proposed a message 

element that would provide ATC with 

information about the aircraft’s velocity 

and direction. However, the NPRM 

preamble mistakenly referred to velocity 

as airspeed. Several commenters, 

including Airbus, the ARC, RockwellCollins, SANDIA, and UPS, 

recommended that the message element 

reflect velocity instead of airspeed. 

Rockwell-Collins noted that velocity 

could be derived from other sources, 

including an inertial navigation system. 

ACSS, United Airlines, and UPS 

recommended that the FAA require the 

velocity source for ADS–B 

transmissions to be the most accurate 

velocity source on the aircraft. The ARC 

recommended that the issue of velocity 

source be referred to RTCA. 

This message element will provide 

ATC with the aircraft’s velocity, as well 

as a clearly stated direction and 

description of the rate at which an 

aircraft changes its position. The 

velocity must be transmitted with a 

NACV of less than 10 meters per second. 

Any velocity source that meets these 

requirements will comply with this rule. 

The FAA referred the question on 

velocity source to RTCA for further 

review, as the ARC recommended. 

RTCA determined that the velocity 

source must be the same source that 

provides the aircraft’s position, and 

included this requirement in DO–260B 

and DO–282B. 

6. Indication If Traffic Alert and 

Collision Avoidance System II or 

Airborne Collision Avoidance System Is 

Installed and Operating in a Mode That 

May Generate Resolution Advisory 

Alerts 

The NPRM proposed requiring a 

message element that would (1) identify 

to ATC whether the aircraft is equipped 

with TCAS II or ACAS and (2) identify 

whether the equipment is operating in 

a mode that could generate resolution 

advisory alerts. Airbus asked for more 

information on why this message 

element is required. EUROCONTROL 

commented that this message element 

should be internationally harmonized 

before the FAA adopts this requirement. 

UPS asked whether this message should 

be indicated if the TCAS II is operated 

in the traffic advisory mode. The ARC 

sought to retain this message element, 

but asked the FAA to clarify its 

intended use in the final rule. 

The TCAS installed and operating in 

a mode that can generate a resolution 

advisory message will be used by the 

FAA to monitor in-service performance 

to address NAS inefficiencies and take 

appropriate corrective actions. This 

information may also be used to support 

future ADS–B In applications. This 

message element was harmonized with 

the international community in the 

development of DO–260B and ED– 

102A.43

7. For Aircraft With an Operable Traffic 

Alert and Collision Avoidance System II 

or Airborne Collision Avoidance 

System, Indication If a Resolution 

Advisory Is in Progress 

The NPRM proposed a message 

element to indicate that a resolution 

advisory is in progress. EUROCONTROL 

recommended that the FAA 

internationally harmonize this message 

element before adopting the 

requirement. Airbus noted that this 

element may be achieved with DO– 

260A. 

Similar to the discussion in II.K.6. 

above, the message that a TCAS 

resolution advisory is in progress will 

be used by the FAA to monitor inservice performance to address NAS 

inefficiencies and take appropriate 

corrective actions. This information may 

also be used to support future ADS–B In 

applications. This message element was 

harmonized with the international 

community in the development of DO– 

260B and ED–102A. 

8. Indication of the Mode 3/A 

Transponder Code Specified by ATC 

(Requires Flightcrew Entry) 

The NPRM proposed a message 

element to transmit the aircraft’s 

assigned Mode 3/A transponder code. 

Several commenters, including ACSS, 

Boeing, SANDIA, and UPS, argued that 

this message element should not be 

necessary with ADS–B surveillance, and 

suggested deleting the requirement. 

GAMA expressed concern that different 

codes in the Mode 3/A transponder and 

the ADS–B could result in an indication 

of a traffic conflict. GAMA specifically 

recommended a one code entry or 

revising the automation to resolve 

conflicting information. Airbus and the 

ARC supported this message element 

requirement and the ARC requested 

more information on its intended use. 

The FAA has determined that the 

same ATC-assigned Mode 3/A code 

must be transmitted by both the 

transponder and the ADS–B Out 

message. If the code transmitted by 

ADS–B differs from the Mode 3/A code 

transmitted by the transponder, it could 

result in duplicative codes or inaccurate 

reporting of aircraft position. If the 

aircraft’s avionics are not capable of 

allowing a single point of entry for the 

transponder and ADS–B Out Mode 3/A 

code, the pilot must ensure that 

conflicting codes are not transmitted to 

ATC. 

ATC uses the Mode 3/A code to 

identify aircraft that are under 

surveillance and possibly under ATC 

direction. This identifier is necessary to 

issue directions to specific aircraft about 

nearby air traffic. The Mode 3/A code 

and the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) 24-bit address are 

duplicative for some functions. This 

duplication is necessary because many 

current ATC automation systems are not 

yet capable of using the ICAO 24-bit 

address. Therefore, the FAA retains this 

message element in the rule. 

9. Indication of the Aircraft’s Call Sign 

That Is Submitted on the Flight Plan, or 

the Aircraft’s Registration Number 

(Aircraft Call Sign Requires Flightcrew 

Entry) 

The NPRM proposed a requirement 

for this message element to indicate 

either the aircraft’s call sign (as 

submitted on its flight plan), or the 

aircraft’s registration number. An 

individual commenter disagreed with 

the required broadcast message element 

for aircraft identity and noted that it 

uses unnecessary bandwidth. 

This message element correlates flight 

plan information with the data that ATC 

views on the radar display, and 

facilitates ATC communication with the 

aircraft. This message element also will 

support certain ADS–B In applications 

such as enhanced visual approach. 

In the final rule, the regulatory text is 

amended to provide that an operator 

does not need to populate the call sign/ 

aircraft registration field for a UAT 

equipped aircraft if he or she has not 

filed a flight plan, is not requesting ATC 

services, and is using a UAT selfassigned temporary 24-bit address. 

Although the FAA does not prohibit the 

anonymity feature, operators using the 

anonymity feature will not be eligible to 

receive ATC services, may not be able 

to benefit from enhanced ADS–B search 

and rescue capabilities, and may impact 

ADS–B In situational awareness 

benefits. 

10. Indication If the Flightcrew Has 

Identified an Emergency, Radio 

Communication Failure, or Unlawful 

Interference (Requires Flightcrew Entry) 

The NPRM proposed this message 

element to alert ATC that an aircraft is 

experiencing emergency conditions. 

Airbus asked the FAA to clarify which 

emergency/priority codes are required. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 30175 

44Mode A codes 7700, 7600, and 7500 currently 

are reserved for these emergencies. See Annex 10 

to the Convention on International Civil Aviation 

Aeronautical Telecommunications, Volume 4, 

Surveillance and Collision Avoidance Systems, 4th 

Edition, July 2007. 

45CDTI is a generic display that provides a flight 

crew with traffic surveillance information about 

other aircraft, surface vehicles, and obstacles, 

including their identification, position, and other 

message set parameters. CDTI information would 

commonly be displayed on a Multifunction Display 

(MFD). 

The ARC recommended that the FAA 

explain in the final rule the emergency 

status requirement and describe how it 

will be used. 

This message element alerts ATC that 

the aircraft is experiencing emergency 

conditions and indicates the type of 

emergency. Both TSO–C154c and TSO– 

C166b identify six unique emergency 

codes. All emergency codes may be 

transmitted. Under this rule, only 

emergency, radio communication 

failure, and unlawful interference are 

required. This information will alert 

ATC to potential danger to the aircraft 

so it can take appropriate action. 

Message elements for minimum fuel, 

downed aircraft, and medical 

emergency are not required by this 

rule.44 ADS–B equipment may 

automatically set these required 

emergency conditions based on the 

Mode 3/A code. 

11. Indication of the Aircraft’s ‘‘IDENT’’ 

to ATC (Requires Flightcrew Entry) 

The NPRM proposed this message 

element to help controllers quickly 

identify a specific aircraft. United 

Airlines and UPS commented that they 

believe controllers use the ‘‘IDENT’’ 

function to attain aircraft identification 

information. They noted that future 

identification systems should include 

aircraft information; therefore, they 

believed this element is not necessary. 

FreeFlight commented that ‘‘IDENT’’ 

should be retained. The ARC 

recommended that the FAA clarify how 

the ‘‘IDENT’’ requirement will be used. 

The ‘‘IDENT’’ function is used 

regularly in current ATC operations to 

help controllers quickly identify a 

specific aircraft. The ‘‘IDENT’’ feature 

also allows ATC to quickly identify 

aircraft that have entered incorrect flight 

identification or Mode 3/A codes. The 

FAA is adopting this message element 

in this rule. 

12. Indication of the Emitter Category 

The NPRM proposed requiring a 

message element for an aircraft’s emitter 

category. 

EUROCONTROL questioned the 

business case behind this requirement. 

UPS asked that the FAA better define 

the emitter categorizations in the final 

rule. 

This message element is necessary for 

ATC separation services and wake 

turbulence separation requirements. 

TSO–C166b and TSO–C154c provide a 

list and description of the different 

emitter categories. Emitter category is 

set during installation of the ADS–B 

avionics in the aircraft and will not 

change over time. 

13. Indication Whether an ADS–B In 

Capability Is Installed 

The NPRM proposed this message 

element to indicate to ATC whether a 

cockpit display of traffic information 

(CDTI) 45 is installed and operational. 

Several commenters, including Boeing, 

EUROCONTROL, and SANDIA, 

commented that this message element 

was poorly defined, difficult and 

expensive to implement, and of little 

value to ADS–B In applications and 

ATC surveillance. UPS asked whether a 

message is required when a CDTI is 

installed but not operating. The ARC 

recommended that the FAA clarify the 

use of this data element. 

RTCA updated the definition of this 

message element in DO–260B and DO– 

282B. The FAA adopted these updates 

in TSO–C166b and TSO–C154c. This 

message element now indicates which 

aircraft are capable of receiving ADS–B 

In services and therefore require TIS–B 

and ADS–R transmissions from the 

ground. Under the new definition, this 

message element now indicates whether 

an ADS–B In capability is installed in 

the aircraft, but does not require a report 

of operational status. 

14. Indication of the Aircraft’s 

Geometric Altitude 

The NPRM proposed a message 

element indicating the aircraft’s 

geometric altitude. 

Several commenters, including 

Airbus, Boeing, Dassault, the European 

Business Aviation Association (EBAA), 

EUROCONTROL, Honeywell, and 

Rockwell-Collins, commented on the 

proposed requirement. Most of the 

commenters questioned this message 

element and stated that neither ATC 

surveillance nor ADS–B In require 

geometric altitude. Dassault, EBAA, 

EUROCONTROL, and Honeywell 

supported this message element. The 

ARC recommended that the FAA justify 

the need for this message element. 

Geometric altitude is the height of the 

aircraft above the World Geodetic 

System 84 ellipsoid, which is a 

scientific approximation of the earth’s 

surface. This message element will be 

used within the ADS–B ground system 

to confirm accuracy and identify 

discrepancies between geometric 

altitude and barometric altitude. 

Additionally, the FAA will integrate 

this comparison function into a 

continuing airworthiness monitoring 

function. 

L. Ability To Turn Off ADS–B Out 

Transmissions 

The NPRM proposed requiring a pilot 

to turn off ADS–B equipment if directed 

by ATC, for example, if the ADS–B unit 

was broadcasting erroneous 

information. 

The ARC, Boeing, United Airlines, 

and UPS recommended eliminating the 

requirement to turn off ADS–B Out 

transmissions. A few commenters, 

including British Airways, were 

concerned that being able to turn off 

ADS–B Out, while keeping the 

transponder on, could require 

additional design changes and increase 

costs because most existing equipment 

is not capable of operating in this 

manner. Boeing stated that eliminating 

erroneous ADS–B transmissions could 

be accomplished by turning the 

transponder off or having a capability 

within the ground system to allow the 

controller to manually remove selected 

targets. Rockwell-Collins recommended 

that the FAA require the ADS–B 

equipment to detect failures and disable 

ADS–B Out transmissions of erroneous 

data. 

The FAA modified the ground 

automation system to be able to exclude 

incorrect ADS–B data. With this 

enhancement to the automation, the 

aircraft does not need to have a 

capability for a pilot to disable ADS–B 

transmissions. Therefore, the final rule 

does not require the pilot to be able to 

turn off ADS–B Out transmissions. 

M. Existing Equipment Requirements 

1. Transponder Requirement 

The NPRM specified that the proposal 

for ADS–B equipage would not alter 

existing transponder regulations. 

Several organizations and individuals, 

including AOPA, opposed adding ADS– 

B Out performance requirements 

without removing the transponder 

requirement. ATA and Boeing requested 

that the FAA make a commitment to 

remove transponders. Several 

organizations and individuals further 

commented that the FAA should pursue 

an ADS–B based collision-avoidance 

system and reconsider the backup 

strategy, which is based on secondary 

surveillance systems. ALPA supported 

the FAA’s plan to retain transponders. 

The ARC made multiple 

recommendations associated with 

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30176 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

46An ELT is an electronic battery-operated 

transmitter developed as a means of locating 

downed aircraft. 

47The ARC recommended DO–260A Change 3, 

which is DO–260B. 

transponder removal: (1) The ADS–B 

implementation strategy should include 

the removal of transponders from lowaltitude aircraft without an ACAS; (2) 

the FAA should commit to a strategy for 

achieving transponder removal from 

low-altitude domestic aircraft; and (3) 

the FAA should study whether ACAS 

can be modified to use ADS–B as the 

primary surveillance data for collision 

avoidance, as well as what ACAS 

upgrades are required to support 

NextGen. 

Removing the transponder 

requirement would involve substantial 

changes to the ADS–B backup strategy 

and TCAS II/ACAS, which are outside 

the scope of this rulemaking. 

Transponders will still be required 

when the backup surveillance strategy 

using SSR is necessary and to interact 

with TCAS- and ACAS-equipped 

aircraft. Separate from this rulemaking, 

the FAA may consider (in coordination 

with the appropriate surveillance and 

NextGen planning organizations), 

whether transponders could eventually 

be removed and, if so, what steps are 

necessary to accomplish this. 

2. Emergency Locator Transmitter 

Requirement 

The NPRM did not propose any 

changes to the emergency locator 

transmitter (ELT) 46 requirements. 

Several commenters, including ATA 

and the National Business Aviation 

Association (NBAA), argued that ADS– 

B should be used instead of an ELT, and 

that ELT requirements could be 

included in this rule. AOPA also 

recommended a long-term strategy to 

include ELT removal, and stated that 

ADS–B could enhance current searchand-rescue procedures to increase the 

number of successful rescues. 

The ARC recommended that the FAA 

explore whether an ADS–B tracking 

service also could be used for search 

and rescue to aid in crash locating. The 

ARC also recommended that the FAA 

conduct a study considering an ADS–Bbased search-and-rescue solution that 

would enable removal of 121.5 MHz 

ELTs for certain domestic operations. 

The FAA has determined that the 

ADS–B system currently cannot replace 

the ELT function. The ADS–B system is 

not required to be crashworthy and, 

thus, may not be operable or able to 

transmit following an aircraft accident. 

Additionally, current search-and-rescue 

technology is not compatible with ADS– 

B operations because ELTs broadcast on 

121.5 or 406 MHz (not 1090 or 978 

MHz). The FAA recognizes the value of 

a ground application that could allow 

for timely and accurate flight tracking of 

downed aircraft and is evaluating this 

capability separate from this 

rulemaking. 

The FAA considered the ARC 

recommendation to evaluate the 

feasibility of replacing the ELT with the 

ADS–B system. However, the FAA has 

determined that ADS–B is not a feasible 

replacement for the ELT, as discussed 

above; therefore, the FAA does not plan 

to undertake such a study at this time. 

N. Program Implementation 

1. Timeline 

The FAA proposed that all aircraft 

operating in the airspace areas specified 

in the rule meet the performance 

requirements by January 1, 2020. 

The majority of commenters 

recommended various options for the 

implementation of ADS–B, including 

the discontinuation of secondary and/or 

primary radar systems once ADS–B is 

operational NAS-wide. Some 

commenters, including AIA and AOPA, 

requested that the FAA provide certain 

basic levels of ADS–B service for several 

years before the ADS–B compliance 

date. 

Several commenters, including ALPA 

and the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB), suggested that the 

compliance date or service provision of 

ADS–B occur sooner than 2020, to 

obtain benefits more quickly. United 

Airlines recommended a 2015 

compliance date for operations above FL 

240. The Cargo Airline Association 

(CAA) recommended lower performance 

requirements for a 2015 compliance 

date. Several commenters, including the 

Aircraft Electronics Association, FedEx, 

and the National Air Carriers 

Association, suggested extending or 

adding flexibility to the 2020 

compliance date. 

Numerous commenters, including 

ATA, Boeing, IATA, and RockwellCollins, suggested a two-phased 

implementation strategy. The first phase 

would use existing equipment, avionics 

standards, and capabilities, which 

would allow industry and the FAA to 

demonstrate, validate, and evaluate 

ADS–B applications. After operational 

experience in the first phase was 

sufficient to generate the appropriate 

standards, the second phase would 

establish a mandate for ADS–B Out 

performance standards. Some 

commenters suggested that the second 

phase be a combined ADS–B In and 

ADS–B Out rule. 

The ARC endorsed the proposed 2020 

compliance date, but recommended that 

the FAA allow operators to use existing 

equipage to accrue early benefits. 

Specifically, the ARC recommended 

that the FAA: (1) Take advantage of 

existing 1090 MHz ES-equipped aircraft 

and allow their operation in the Gulf of 

Mexico for non-radar airspace and (2) 

transition to a fully functional ADS–B 

Out capability enabled by DO–260B,47

to allow access to the additional 

applications and services for ADS–B In. 

The ARC also recommended that the 

FAA adopt the European Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) Acceptable 

Means of Compliance 20–24 (permitting 

the use of early DO–260 avionics for 

separation) in non-radar airspace, with 

appropriate measures to ensure ADS–B 

integrity. 

After reviewing all the comments, the 

FAA finds that a 2020 compliance date 

remains appropriate because NAS users 

need time to equip to the requirements 

of the rule. Most air carriers can use 

regularly scheduled maintenance to 

install or upgrade their equipment. The 

FAA also expects that this timeframe 

will provide sufficient operational 

experience to make ADS–B the primary 

source for surveillance in 2020. 

FIS–B and TIS–B services are already 

available in several areas of the country 

for ADS–B In-equipped aircraft and will 

continue as an integral part of the 

implementation of the ADS–B ground 

infrastructure. NAS-wide ground 

infrastructure implementation is 

scheduled to be complete in 2013, 

which would provide operators with at 

least 7 years of operational experience 

with these services before the ADS–B 

compliance date of 2020. 

The FAA examined whether it is 

operationally feasible and economically 

beneficial to use DO–260 avionics in 

radar and non-radar airspace before 

2020. From an operational perspective, 

the FAA found that the existing DO–260 

equipment does not meet the 

surveillance needs for ATC in the 

United States for various reasons: (1) 

DO–260 avionics do not independently 

report the accuracy and integrity 

metrics; (2) DO–260 avionics allow the 

integrity metric to be populated with 

accuracy information during integrity 

outages, which is unacceptable for 

aircraft separation services; (3) DO–260 

avionics do not include a message 

element for Mode 3/A code, which is 

necessary for aircraft surveillance; and 

(4) the majority of existing DO–260 

installations were accomplished on a 

noninterference basis under the 

transponder approval guidelines. (This 

certification verifies that the equipment 

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48URET is an air traffic control tool that assists 

controllers with timely detection and resolution of 

predicted air traffic problems. 

49A copy of the DO–260 Business Case Analysis 

is available from the Web site http:// 

www.regulations.gov. The docket number for this 

rulemaking is FAA–2007–29305. 

50The analysis concluded that it was not costbeneficial to use DO–260 avionics in the Gulf of 

Mexico prior to 2020. 

51A copy of the Honeywell Technology Solutions 

Inc. DO–260 study is available from the Web site 

http://www.regulations.gov. The docket number for 

this rulemaking is FAA–2007–29305. 52The DO–260 Business Case Analysis assumed 

the cost of $15,000 to upgrade an aircraft equipped 

with DO–260 only. The cost does not include all 

costs to meet the rule. The cost was used for the 

DO–260 Business Case Analysis and not used in the 

Regulatory Impact Analysis. 

53The planned ADS–B service coverage is 

explained in greater detail at http://www.adsb. 

gov/. 

is safe onboard the aircraft, but does not 

issue any approval that would permit its 

use for ADS–B operations.) 

Therefore, the FAA concluded that 

without upgrades to the equipment, the 

use of DO–260 avionics will not meet 

the surveillance needs in the NAS. 

Furthermore, without appropriate 

integrity monitoring, DO–260 avionics 

cannot be used for separation of aircraft. 

Its utility would be limited to 

potentially reducing separation in nonradar areas, or increasing efficiency in 

radar airspace through more timely 

updates of information. 

Further analysis addressed whether 

existing DO–260 avionics could be 

beneficial to provide separation services 

in the Gulf of Mexico, or to provide 

efficiency benefits through improved 

performance of User Request Evaluation 

Tool (URET) 48 and Traffic Management 

Advisor (TMA). 

To use DO–260 avionics in the Gulf 

of Mexico, the FAA estimated it would 

incur approximately $4 million in costs 

to upgrade the automation; would need 

to provide additional ground stations 

and receiver autonomous integrity 

monitoring (RAIM) predictions; would 

need to develop procedures; and would 

need to address aircraft certification 

issues.49 Comparatively, the FAA 

concluded that benefits from this action 

would only recover approximately 70 

percent of the costs. 

The costs associated with using 

existing DO–260 avionics relative to 

improved performance of URET and 

TMA were estimated at $31 million and 

the estimated benefit in performance 

was $72 million. While this analysis 

indicated that the benefits of improved 

URET and TMA performance outweigh 

the costs of accommodating DO–260 

equipped aircraft,50 the FAA found that 

it raised some policy concerns. 

First, the FAA does not expect to have 

the full NAS-wide ADS–B infrastructure 

completed for this effort until 2013. As 

the ADS–B rule would go into effect in 

2020, any benefits accrued through the 

use of DO–260 avionics would only be 

available for approximately 7 years. 

Operators would be required to make a 

second investment in avionics to 

comply with the rule in 2020. 

Second, a collection of broadcast 

samples indicated that there is a wide 

variety of equipage among current DO– 

260 users. Although approximately 

7,500 aircraft in the United States 

transmit some ADS–B data that would 

conform to DO–260, only about 1,500 

aircraft transmit enough data to be 

useful for 5 NM separation in the Gulf 

of Mexico and input into ATC decision 

support tools (URET and TMA).51 Many 

DO–260 operators would require some 

upgrade costs to bring their existing 

systems into compliance with a unified 

standard; these would be in addition to 

the costs incurred for taking aircraft out 

of service for certification. Although the 

user costs were not thoroughly assessed 

by the ARC, the FAA estimated the costs 

at $15,000 per aircraft.52

Given the above, the FAA could not 

justify the proliferation of avionics for 

the short-term that would not be 

compliant with the final rule in 2020. 

Therefore, the agency concluded that 

the public interest was not best served 

by using DO–260 avionics for ADS–B 

applications in radar and non-radar 

airspace before 2020. 

2. Financial and Operational Incentives 

Numerous commenters, including 

AIA, the ARC, and NBAA, 

recommended a variety of financial and 

operational incentives to make ADS–B 

more cost-beneficial for the end user. 

Some commenters specifically 

recommended that the FAA offer 

additional incentives for operators who 

adopt early. NBAA recommended 

accelerated operational benefits to 

encourage early installation of ADS–B 

equipment. Several commenters stated 

that without operational incentives, 

aircraft operators with legacy equipment 

will delay upgrades until the mandated 

compliance date. 

AOPA and the Helicopter Association 

International (HAI) recommended 

several operational improvements and 

safety enhancements for ADS–B, 

including: (1) Flight following and radar 

services at lower altitudes, (2) terminal 

ATC services at GA airports, 

(3) automatic instrument flight plan 

closure, (4) instrument flight rules (IFR) 

low altitude direct routing, (5) enhanced 

flight service information, and 

(6) improved real time weather. HAI 

also recommended that the FAA install 

ground stations near hospitals and 

trauma centers to maximize benefits for 

the emergency medical services 

community and encourage ADS–B 

equipage. 

ATA, CAA, the National Air 

Transportation Association, NBAA, and 

UPS recommended specific operational 

incentives for early equipage, including: 

(1) Implementing ADS–B in under-used 

areas of the NAS, (2) providing 

preferential access to congested 

airspace, (3) deploying the necessary 

ADS–B infrastructure for traffic crossing 

the Gulf of Mexico, and (4) providing 

services for on-demand operators at 

small community airports. 

Some commenters, including AOPA, 

HAI, and CAA, recommended financial 

incentives or tax credits for ADS–B 

equipage. 

The following activities are scheduled 

to be complete by 2013: 

• Ground infrastructure coverage 

needed for the mandated airspace,53

• ADS–B interface to automation 

systems, 

• Guidelines for equipment 

certification, 

• Operations Specifications approval, 

• Approval to use ADS–B to meet 

established separation standards, 

• ATC operational procedures for 

non-radar airspace that has ADS–B 

coverage, and 

• FAA controller training and 

procedures. 

The ADS–B program is currently 

funded and designed to provide services 

in parts of Alaska, the Gulf of Mexico, 

and areas in the NAS where radar 

coverage currently exists. Additionally, 

actual ADS–B coverage may exceed the 

defined radar coverage at lower 

altitudes in some areas. The FAA cannot 

assess, however, the extent of this 

coverage or its potential use for the 

ADS–B service until the ADS–B 

implementation is complete in 2013. 

The FAA acknowledges that the ADS– 

B system could be improved by 

expanding the surveillance coverage of 

ADS–B to non-radar airspace. The 

improved accuracy and update rate 

afforded by ADS–B provides the ability 

to improve future NAS operations. As 

the number of projected flight 

operations continues to increase, 

efficiency improvements to the NAS are 

critical to addressing new demands. 

Therefore, the FAA will continue to 

explore opportunities to use the ADS– 

B infrastructure to provide additional 

coverage in non-radar areas. The FAA 

also notes that ADS–B implementation 

will not affect flight following services 

in effect today. 

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The FAA is actively pursuing 

agreements with airlines, avionics 

manufacturers, airports, and other NAS 

users to encourage early equipage of 

ADS–B. These agreements incorporate a 

variety of items, including: (1) The 

possibility of developing preferred 

routes and cost sharing for avionics in 

testing new applications, and (2) early 

equipage and experience with advanced 

ADS–B applications that are not 

available to non-equipped aircraft. 

The FAA currently has several 

agreements with airlines and state 

entities specifying that the FAA may 

enable benefits in exchange for early 

ADS–B equipage. Additionally, the 

FAA, HAI, and oil platform owners have 

an agreement for the Gulf of Mexico by 

which the FAA is providing 

communication, navigation, and 

surveillance for ADS–B-equipped 

helicopter operators. 

The FAA and UPS have an agreement 

for testing and developing merging and 

spacing, CDTI/Multi Function Display 

Assisted Visual Separation (CAVS), and 

surface situational awareness 

applications in an environment that 

provides measurable benefits. 

Additionally, the FAA is working with 

Honeywell and ACSS to accelerate 

ASSA, FAROA, and surface indication 

and alerting applications. 

The FAA is working with US Airways 

to develop a work plan for 

implementing ADS–B/NextGen 

technologies and procedures in parts of 

the East Coast as a prelude to national 

implementation. In addition, the FAA 

has an agreement with United Airlines 

to expedite oceanic in-trail procedures 

development. The FAA is also working 

with NetJets on several NextGen 

initiatives for performance-based 

navigation, communication, and 

surveillance applications. 

The FAA has established an ADS–B 

compatible Wide Area Multilateration 

system in the mountainous areas of 

Colorado pursuant to an agreement with 

the Colorado Department of 

Transportation. The FAA continues to 

examine different areas of the country to 

determine opportunities for surveillance 

service expansion and is continuing to 

work with various state aviation offices. 

In addition, the FAA continues to 

examine opportunities to provide ADS– 

B services in areas that would benefit 

from increased surveillance. The FAA 

does not currently have a list of airports 

that are targets for ADS–B expansion. 

However, the FAA has started to 

identify areas that would benefit most 

from ADS–B services. The FAA 

encourages cities, states, airports, and 

private interests (such as hospitals and 

trauma centers) to help determine 

surveillance needs and opportunities. 

ADS–B can provide surveillance at 

lower altitudes than radar. Moreover, 

ADS–B infrastructure is more easily 

deployed than most radar in remote and 

hard-to-reach areas. The flexibility 

associated with implementing ADS–B 

can facilitate service by helicopters to 

certain communities. Deployment of 

ADS–B systems on medical, police, or 

tourist helicopters could provide a level 

of asset tracking and search-and-rescue 

capability that would be difficult to 

replicate with existing surveillance 

systems. The FAA has already 

developed agreements with HAI to 

support operations in the Gulf of 

Mexico. The FAA is open to 

implementing similar agreements as 

opportunities for ADS–B service 

expansion present themselves. 

While this rule does not mandate 

ADS–B equipage in all airspace 

classifications, the FAA is analyzing 

whether ADS–B services can be 

expanded to provide improved safety 

and capacity enhancements for low 

altitude flight operations and airports 

underlying non-mandated airspace. The 

FAA will work with users to identify 

new candidate airports for these 

services. This activity will continue 

throughout the initial implementation 

period and post 2013 when the 

nationwide ADS–B infrastructure is 

expected to be available NAS-wide. 

The extent to which ADS–B can 

contribute to operations in special use 

airspace is still being studied; however, 

the FAA is committed to examining any 

proposals for the use of ADS–B outside 

of the scope of implementation 

described in this rule. 

3. Decommissioning Traffic Information 

Service–Broadcast (TIS–B) 

In the NPRM preamble, the FAA 

noted that once all aircraft are equipped 

with ADS–B Out, ADS–R will provide 

the complete traffic picture and the FAA 

will decommission TIS–B. 

A few commenters, including the 

DOD, questioned the assumption that all 

aircraft would be equipped for ADS–B 

Out. Rockwell-Collins recommended 

retaining TIS–B after the ADS–B 

mandate takes effect, because it 

provides a critical support for ADS–B 

airborne applications. 

The original purpose of TIS–B was to 

provide proximate traffic information to 

ADS–B In-equipped aircraft about 

targets that were not equipped with 

ADS–B. When this rule takes effect in 

2020 aircraft operating in the airspace 

subject to this rule must be equipped 

with ADS–B, thus theoretically 

eliminating the need for the TIS–B 

service. However, the FAA realizes that 

TIS–B may still have value after 2020 as 

a backup traffic service for ADS–B In 

aircraft during GNSS outages or when 

an individual target’s ADS–B system is 

inoperative. Thus, the FAA, outside of 

this rulemaking effort, will evaluate the 

benefits of continuing TIS–B past the 

2020 rule compliance date. 

O. Safety 

Several commenters, including 

AOPA, the ARC, and Boeing, suggested 

that the FAA expand the ADS–B service 

volume and ensure that TIS–B, FIS–B, 

and ADS–R are included in the ADS–B 

expanded coverage area. 

Some commenters believed that 

reducing primary radars would reduce 

safety. These commenters noted that 

primary radar is important to track 

aircraft without ADS–B. They also 

recommended that the FAA continue 

requiring transport category aircraft to 

equip with Mode S transponders and 

TCAS II as an independent collision 

avoidance system. Some commenters 

argued that the complexity of the 

ADS–B system poses a collision risk. 

Other commenters noted that ADS–B 

In cockpit displays can be confusing 

and distracting, which may cause a pilot 

to lose situational awareness. They 

added that the FAA should evaluate the 

CDTI to understand the additional 

monitoring responsibility and workload 

placed on the flightcrew. One 

individual contended that ADS–B will 

increase a pilot’s dependence on cockpit 

equipment and reduce the pilot’s 

tendency to look outside the aircraft. 

Another individual commenter asked 

for data to prove that ADS–B will not be 

susceptible to own-ship ghosting or 

target duplication. (‘‘Own-ship ghosting’’ 

is a term that is used to describe a traffic 

display showing one’s own aircraft as an 

actual target. Ensuring targets that are 

transmitting ADS–B are not also 

transmitted as TIS–B targets helps 

reduce the chances of seeing one’s own 

aircraft as a target on the display.) 

The final rule does not eliminate the 

requirement for transponders, TCAS, or 

primary radars. The FAA notes that any 

aircraft required to have TCAS II or 

ACAS, or that voluntarily has TCAS II 

or ACAS installed, must also be 

equipped with a Mode S transponder. 

This generally includes all aircraft 

operated under 14 CFR parts 121, 125, 

and 129, and certain aircraft operated 

under 14 CFR part 135. 

Mode S transponders transmit both 

aircraft altitude and aircraft 

identification information. Both Mode 

A/C transponders and Mode S 

transponders require interrogation to 

provide information. ADS–B In Conflict 

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54Surveillance and Broadcast Services Systems 

Engineering Separation Standards Working Group, 

Final Report on Operational Evaluation of 5 NM 

ADS–B to Radar Separation Services in Alaska, 

November 30, 2006. 

Detection does not replace the functions 

of TCAS II or ACAS; however, future 

versions of hybrid surveillance systems 

may use passive ADS–B messages to 

reduce unnecessary interrogations and, 

thus, reduce 1090 MHz spectrum 

congestion. 

As stated in the NPRM, the FAA is 

maintaining its current network of 

primary radars. However, the FAA 

expects to reduce a large percentage of 

its secondary radars as a result of this 

rule. Both primary surveillance radar 

and SSR will continue to be used for 

surveillance during the transition period 

of ADS–B avionics equipage. 

The benefits of certain ADS–B In 

applications cannot be fully realized in 

areas where there is no ADS–B 

coverage; however, the lack of ADS–B 

surveillance or ADS–R does not present 

a safety risk. When an aircraft is outside 

of the ADS–B coverage area, the ADS– 

R/TIS–B system will inform the pilot 

that the traffic picture is not complete. 

In all areas, regardless of ADS–B 

coverage, pilots will use the same 

procedures they have today to maintain 

safe separation of aircraft. TIS–B and 

FIS–B services are advisory and cannot 

be used to maneuver an aircraft without 

ATC clearance. The FAA will 

investigate ADS–B service expansion as 

part of the ADS–B NAS-wide 

implementation. 

With regard to the comment regarding 

own-ship ghosting, the ADS–B system 

minimizes the chance of target 

duplication because it will not transmit 

TIS–B data on a target that is 

broadcasting ADS–B. This is because 

ADS–R is designed to relay information 

about aircraft transmitting on a different 

broadcast link, and TIS–B is designed to 

relay information only about aircraft not 

broadcasting ADS–B messages. 

This rulemaking only mandates ADS– 

B Out, which does not involve any 

requirements for a cockpit display. 

Before any mandate of ADS–B In, the 

FAA will conduct extensive safety 

analysis and training. The current ADS– 

B Out rule does not eliminate or reduce 

the requirement under § 91.113 for 

pilots to see and avoid other aircraft. 

P. Efficiency 

In the NPRM preamble, the FAA 

stated that ADS–B will enhance ATC 

surveillance, which will increase 

airspace efficiency and capacity to meet 

the predicted demand for ATC services. 

Several commenters, including the 

Airports Council International—North 

America (ACI–NA), Boeing, and FedEx, 

commented on the anticipated 

efficiency improvements stated in the 

NPRM. Some commenters contended 

that the proposed rule did not prove 

that a decrease in en route separation of 

aircraft will decrease delays or increase 

airspace capacity. Two commenters 

argued that the FAA has not 

demonstrated that system choke points 

can handle the increased capacity if en 

route separation is reduced. 

Other commenters, including the 

National Air Traffic Controllers 

Association, argued that reducing 

separation will not mitigate commercial 

traffic delays caused by an inadequate 

number of runways, weather, hub-andspoke operations, or airline scheduling 

practices. Era Corporation 

recommended that the FAA improve the 

infrastructure at small airports to relieve 

congestion. Boeing stated that ADS–B 

alone will not lead to the advances 

required by NextGen. 

The FAA has consistently stated that 

ADS–B will not produce a complete 

NextGen air traffic management 

solution, but rather will set the initial 

steps to achieving a NextGen solution. 

The airport infrastructure is a crucial 

component of the NAS. Efficiency and 

capacity of the NAS can be positively 

affected by improving the efficiency of 

individual flights and improving the 

quality of input to air traffic controllers. 

ADS–B can help maximize the use of 

existing airport infrastructure. The 

ability to transmit ADS–B Out messages 

can increase the efficiency of the NAS 

in radar airspace by providing accurate 

updates at a faster rate than many 

existing surveillance systems. This 

increased update rate permits ATC to 

merge and sequence aircraft more 

effectively into existing airport choke 

points, which should mitigate, rather 

than increase, congestion and delay. 

This rule’s regulatory evaluation does 

not include any benefits that are 

dependent on, or attributable to, other 

NextGen systems outside the scope of 

this rulemaking. 

The FAA expects that ADS–B Out 

will enable the establishment of more 

direct routes outside airspace subject to 

this rule, which would use less fuel, 

emit less carbon dioxide and nitrogen 

oxide, and increase NAS efficiency. The 

FAA is currently developing specific 

ADS–B routes for certain areas that have 

the potential for significant benefits 

(airspace off the shore of the east coast 

and over the Gulf of Mexico). The FAA 

expects that other opportunities for 

routes enabled by ADS–B will emerge as 

the ground infrastructure is 

implemented NAS-wide. 

1. Improved Position Reporting 

According to operational 

evaluations,54 ADS–B provides 

improved accuracy over radar in most 

air traffic scenarios. While some 

terminal radars can provide increased 

accuracy the closer the aircraft is to the 

receiver, ADS–B provides consistent 

position accuracy regardless of the 

aircraft’s range from a receiver. ADS–B 

also provides more timely information 

updates than conventional radar. Unlike 

radar, the accuracy and integrity of 

ADS–B Out is uniform and consistent 

throughout the service areas. Therefore, 

ATC’s ability to accurately identify and 

locate aircraft that are further away from 

the air traffic control facilities will be 

better than radar. 

ADS–B does not scan an environment 

in the same way as radar; therefore, 

ADS–B does not provide unnecessary 

returns based on weather or other 

obstructions, which can impede the 

effectiveness of primary radars. 

ADS–B provides consistent, 

frequently updated position reporting 

and additional aircraft information for 

ATC decision-support tools, which 

increases ATC confidence in aircraft 

position. This will allow ATC to apply 

existing separation standards more 

exactly and without the need for ATC to 

correct for possible radar inaccuracies. 

The regulatory evaluation provides 

more discussion on the benefits of 

improved surveillance information. 

2. Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs) 

The FAA plans to use the information 

broadcast by ADS–B to better sequence 

aircraft approaching the terminal area 

with the development of a Merging and 

Spacing application. This ground-based 

system sends precise suggested speed 

instructions to en route aircraft. These 

exact-speed instructions should allow 

aircraft to arrive at extended terminal 

area merge points at times that are much 

more precise than currently feasible. 

As part of the Merging and Spacing 

application, the FAA is developing both 

a ground tool and aircraft requirements 

that can be used to optimize aircraft 

spacing. In addition to other airspace 

efficiencies, this tool will enable a fuelsaving procedure called Optimized 

Profile Descent (OPD), previously 

referred to as Continuous Descent 

Arrivals (CDAs). 

OPDs are a type of terminal arrival 

procedure, specifically designed to keep 

an aircraft at, or near idle power during 

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55The final approach fix identifies the beginning 

of the final approach segment, and is the fix from 

which the final instrument flight rule (IFR) 

approach to an airport is executed. 

56These applications include Enhanced visual 

acquisition, conflict detection, and enhanced visual 

approach. 

the entire arrival until the final 

approach fix.55 These procedures 

increase flight efficiencies while 

reducing noise, fuel consumption, and 

emissions. OPDs eliminate step-down 

altitudes and the associated inefficient 

power adjustments. OPDs depend on 

minimal aircraft vectoring to maintain 

the arrival pattern. Therefore, aircraft 

must be accurately metered with ADS– 

B-enabled spacing and sequencing tools 

prior to and during descent and 

approach. 

Below a certain level of demand, 

controllers can authorize OPDs using 

current onboard equipment and 

procedures. As the terminal demand 

increases, it becomes progressively more 

difficult for controllers to allow OPDs 

because of interference with other traffic 

flows in the airspace. As demand 

approaches capacity, the tradeoff 

between total airport throughput (and 

delays) and individual flight profile 

efficiency (that is, OPDs) would most 

likely prohibit OPDs for very high traffic 

density situations. This situation will be 

aggravated over time as air traffic 

resumes growth and terminal airspace 

constraints increase. 

Many airports start to exhibit 

significant delays when demand reaches 

approximately 70 percent of capacity. 

The proposed FAA spacing tool, using 

more accurate ADS–B position 

information, would enable OPDs in 

medium-density terminal airspace when 

the demand approaches the point where 

delays would be encountered. The FAA 

believes that ADS–B Out can expand 

use of OPDs into medium levels of 

traffic density (40 percent to 70 

percent), which may not be possible 

without ADS–B Out. Accomplishing 

OPDs at this level of traffic density 

would have important environmental 

and energy benefits with no increase in 

congestion or delay. 

3. Reduced Aircraft Separation 

In non-radar airspace, ADS–B Out 

allows ATC to apply radar-like 

separation standards in areas where 

ATC currently applies non-radar, 

procedural separation. In some cases, 

routes laterally separated without radar 

by as much as 90 NM are now separated 

with ADS–B at only 20 NM. 

Longitudinal separation of typically 10 

minutes (80 NM) can be reduced to 5 

NM. 

Boeing commented that the accuracy 

and integrity values proposed in the 

NPRM will not support reduced en 

route separation standards. ADS–B 

position accuracy supports current 

surveillance standards. Experience with 

the mature system may allow reductions 

at a future time. The FAA plans to 

expand 3 NM separation to locations in 

the NAS that currently only permit 5 

NM separation. Currently, the FAA is 

modeling several scenarios to determine 

if ADS–B can support 3 NM en route 

separation based on a target level of 

safety. The FAA will not move forward 

with reduced separation until all safety 

and operational analyses have been 

completed and ADS–B has been 

certified to perform this service. 

4. Expanded Surveillance Coverage 

In the future, there may also be an 

opportunity for ATC to use ADS–B Out 

data for surveillance in areas of the NAS 

below the floor or outside the lateral 

coverage of existing radar surveillance. 

The FAA does not yet know where in 

the NAS this extra coverage might be 

available. This information will likely 

not be available until ADS–B 

surveillance has already been 

implemented in a service area. As the 

FAA identifies areas with additional 

coverage, the FAA will investigate how 

this additional coverage could be used. 

Q. ADS–B In 

Many commenters, including ACSS, 

ALPA, CAA, Lockheed Martin, the 

NTSB, and UPS, commented that the 

majority of the ADS–B benefits will be 

derived from ADS–B In. Numerous 

commenters asserted that ADS–B Out 

alone would not be cost-beneficial or 

provide them with any added benefits 

compared to their operations today. 

Some commenters noted that ADS–B In, 

however, would provide necessary 

services to the cockpit. Many of these 

commenters asserted that ADS–B In 

should be mandated as well. However, 

AOPA specifically recommended that 

ADS–B In be voluntary because it is 

cost-prohibitive for most GA owners. 

British Airways also questioned the 

business case for ADS–B In. 

Many commenters, including the 

DOD, ACI–NA, and AIA, pointed out 

that the capabilities and functions of 

ADS–B Out alone will not provide the 

full range of benefits available from 

ADS–B. To improve the overall system, 

they recommended developing 

standards for ADS–B Out in unison with 

standards for ADS–B In. GAMA and 

IATA recommended that the FAA work 

to define the requirements for ADS–B In 

to encourage ADS–B equipage. ATA 

specifically asked the FAA to define 

ADS–B In standards by 2010. IATA 

noted that many operators will delay 

upgrades until there is a single, defined 

ADS–B package with avionics and 

procedures to support NextGen and the 

Single European Sky Air Traffic 

Management (ATM) Research Program. 

The ARC recommended that the FAA, 

in partnership with industry, define a 

strategy for ADS–B In by 2012 and 

ensure that the strategy is compatible 

with ADS–B Out avionics. The ARC also 

recommended that the FAA describe 

how to proceed with ADS–B In beyond 

the voluntary equipage concept 

discussed in the NPRM. 

A few commenters, including NBAA, 

praised the benefits of ADS–B and 

recommended that the FAA resolve 

ADS–B In display requirements, 

including human factors. The NTSB 

stated that ADS–B would significantly 

improve situational awareness for 

pilots, especially during ground 

operations. GAMA recommended that 

the FAA not limit display options in the 

final rule. 

The FAA fully recognizes that 

ADS–B In and other future air-to-air 

applications are functions that could 

provide substantial benefits to aircraft 

operators and the NAS. While 

additional benefits can be accrued using 

ADS–B In functions, requirements for 

an ADS–B In system are not sufficiently 

defined to implement them at this time. 

ADS–B Out is necessary to establish 

an air transportation infrastructure that 

is consistent with the NextGen plan and 

will change the way the NAS operates. 

Further, the economic evaluation of the 

ADS–B Out proposal found the system 

to be cost-beneficial if ADS–B Out 

avionics costs are at the low end of the 

estimated cost range and if the benefits 

are at the high end of the estimated 

benefits range. 

Given the value of ADS–B In services 

to individual operators and the benefits 

to future NAS operations, the 

requirements adopted for ADS–B Out 

also support certain ADS–B In 

applications.56 The FAA has modified 

several aspects of the proposed rule to 

minimize the cost impact to operators of 

the requirements driven by ADS–B In. 

The requirements in this final rule also 

establish a stable infrastructure for 

current and future applications of 

ADS–B In. 

The FAA concurs with the ARC’s 

recommendation to define a strategy for 

ADS–B In equipage by 2012 and is 

working with industry to develop a 

strategy for future ADS–B In 

applications. By 2012, the requirements 

and benefits of ADS–B In applications 

should be well enough defined for the 

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57ASAS provides the platform for the processing 

and display of ADS–B In applications. 

FAA to specify a set of performance 

requirements that would be tied to a 

well-defined bundle of applications. 

Furthermore, RTCA has completed 

the DO–317, Minimum Operational 

Performance Standards (MOPS) for 

Aircraft Surveillance Applications 

System (ASAS), 57 and the FAA is 

currently developing a TSO to utilize 

this RTCA standard. 

R. ADS–B in Applications 

Multiple commenters, including 

SANDIA, asked for more information 

about potential ADS–B In applications. 

This information is provided below. 

1. Surface Situational Awareness With 

Indications and Alerting 

This application is being designed to 

provide information regarding potential 

traffic conflicts on or near the airport 

surface to the flightcrew. The ADS–B In 

cockpit display would indicate the 

relevant runway occupancy status. 

Depending on the severity of the 

conflict, the system would alert the 

flight crew with visual and/or audible 

alerts. 

2. In-Trail Procedures 

This application is being designed to 

facilitate aircraft conducting oceanic intrail flight level changes using a reduced 

separation standard. This application 

should improve the use of oceanic 

airspace, increase efficiency, reduce fuel 

consumption, and increase safety by 

helping flightcrews avoid turbulent 

flight levels. With this application, ATC 

will continue to provide procedural 

non-radar separation services. However, 

the FAA is exploring whether 

controllers would be able to allow flight 

level changes where aircraft are 

separated by only 15 NM during climb 

or descent, instead of 100 NM in use 

today. 

3. Interval Management 

This application is intended to 

improve current merging and spacing 

capabilities to ensure more consistent 

aircraft spacing, and potentially increase 

airspace capacity. With this application, 

controllers would issue a different set of 

instructions to pilots, for example, to 

maintain a given time or distance from 

the preceding aircraft. The flight crews 

will then use ADS–B In information to 

adjust their airspeeds or flight paths to 

maintain the instructed separation. 

4. Airport Surface Situational 

Awareness and Final Approach Runway 

Occupancy Awareness 

ASSA and FAROA increase 

situational awareness of potential 

airport ground conflicts at several of the 

nation’s busiest airports. However, the 

reduced NACP requirement in this rule, 

while sufficient for ADS–B Out, is not 

sufficient for all aircraft to use in ASSA 

and FAROA. 

S. International Harmonization 

Several commenters stated that the 

ADS–B program technical standards and 

requirements in the NPRM may be 

exclusive of, and not harmonized with, 

ICAO and international efforts under 

way in Europe, Australia, and Canada. 

Several individual commenters and 

AOPA questioned the interoperability of 

UAT in international airspace, 

including Canada and Mexico. They 

also questioned the applicability of UAT 

through ICAO Standards and 

Recommended Practices (SARPs). The 

ARC recommended that the FAA 

advocate national policies that 

explicitly allow for the use of non-U.S. 

positioning sources (for example, 

Galileo) as part of the infrastructure to 

meet aviation performance 

requirements. 

The FAA fully supports the need for 

international regulators to focus on a 

global interoperability of ADS–B 

through the continuing development of 

standards for equipment, applications, 

flight procedures, and operating rules. 

The RTCA standards for DO–260B and 

DO–282B (referenced in TSO–C166b 

and TSO–C154c) were developed with 

close international cooperation. The 

FAA supports the RTCA/European 

Organization for Civil Aviation 

Equipment (EUROCAE) Requirements 

Focus Group, which is internationally 

coordinating ADS–B In. Additionally, 

the FAA actively meets with 

EUROCONTROL, the Australian Civil 

Aviation Safety Authority, and 

Transport Canada to internationally 

coordinate ADS–B regulation. 

The FAA has structured the ADS–B 

Out program on performance 

requirements and not a specific 

navigation or positioning source. The 

FAA is proposing harmonized 

requirements for aircraft separation to 

ICAO, with the support of Australia, 

Canada, and EUROCONTROL. The 

United States is working with other 

GNSS providers to ensure system 

interoperability, improve performance, 

and reduce costs for integrated receiver 

equipment. This rule does not prohibit 

the use of international GNSS; any 

navigation source that meets the 

requirements complies with this rule. 

The performance standards for the 

UAT were developed by RTCA through 

international cooperation and 

coordination. The standards were 

published in DO–282B, (MOPS for UAT 

ADS–B). Additionally, DO–282B was 

developed in accordance with Annex 10 

to the convention of international civil 

aviation. As such, individual states are 

allowed to invoke these standards as 

their own requirements. 

T. Backup ATC Surveillance 

In the NPRM, the FAA described an 

ADS–B backup strategy that included a 

reduced network of SSRs to support 

high-density terminal airspace, all en 

route airspace above 18,000 feet MSL, 

and medium-density terminal airspace 

above certain altitudes. In the proposal, 

the FAA noted that it intends to retain 

all primary surveillance radar as a 

means to mitigate single-aircraft 

avionics failures. 

Several aviation associations, air 

carriers, pilots, and various other 

organizations commented on the 

proposed backup strategy. The 

commenters suggested several potential 

alternatives including Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance—Contract 

(ADS–C), long range navigation 

(LORAN), enhanced long range 

navigation (eLORAN), fusion, and 

multilateration. 

Some commenters, including UPS 

and United Airlines, recommended that 

the FAA develop a backup system that 

not only backs up surveillance, but also 

works in a fusion process to increase the 

accuracy, integrity, and availability of 

the primary surveillance system. Boeing 

recommended that during RAIM 

outages, ADS–B could broadcast 

position data derived from a flight 

management system or an inertial 

navigation system. Other commenters 

questioned whether there was a robust 

and fully independent airborne- or 

ground-based backup timing system in 

the event of GPS timing signal loss. The 

DOD contended that the backup must be 

able to support planned GPS electronic 

testing and solar flare activity. 

Several commenters opposed having 

one interdependent service for both 

navigation and surveillance. They 

believed that this combination of 

navigation and surveillance could be 

detrimental when a pilot experiences a 

GPS outage while operating in 

instrument meteorological conditions. 

The ARC recommended that the FAA, 

in coordination with other Government 

agencies, develop an integrated 

communication navigation and 

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58 It is important to recognize that this is a 

performance-based rule and does not require GNSS. 

For the purpose of the backup strategy evaluation 

the FAA assumed that users would equip with a 

GNSS as their position source. 

59The standard for reverting to backup 

surveillance is also discussed in H.2, System 

Availability. 

surveillance (CNS) strategy to address 

GNSS interference and outages. 

Various entities also questioned the 

procedures that would be in place for 

aircraft operating with a NACP value of 

less than 9. One individual asked how 

the system will accommodate aircraft 

without ADS–B, if an entire broadcast 

link is inoperable. 

The FAA will provide ATC separation 

services for aircraft meeting the 

minimum ADS–B-required performance 

parameters (NACP, NACV, NIC, SDA, 

and SIL) for airspace subject to this rule. 

If, during flight, an individual aircraft 

does not meet the minimum ADS–Brequired performance parameters, then 

ATC may provide separation services 

using the backup (for example, radar 

where available and procedural 

separation elsewhere). This transition 

will be seamless because secondary 

surveillance data will be one of several 

surveillance sources fused into the 

display used by ATC. 

The ADS–B ground automation 

combines or ‘‘fuses’’ all available 

surveillance information from ADS–B 

with primary surveillance radar and 

SSR. This provides a complete or 

‘‘fused’’ picture of all the traffic 

operating in a given area. Multi-sensor 

fusion allows the automation to 

combine data from various sensors, and 

use the most accurate measurements. In 

most cases, a Kalman Filter Tracker 

optimizes the accuracy of track 

estimates from multiple sensors. In 

addition to improved aircraft position 

accuracy, data fusion uses all the 

updates from multiple sensors, which 

increases the overall update rate. The 

FAA currently uses practical trackers for 

data fusion with the CommonAutomated Radar Terminal System and 

the Standard Terminal Automation 

Replacement System. 

If the ADS–B ground infrastructure or 

a particular broadcast link is out of 

service, or a sufficient number of aircraft 

cannot meet the minimum required 

performance for a given airspace and 

controller workload is adversely 

impacted, ATC will use the backup 

system to provide ATC separation 

services for all aircraft in that airspace. 

Transition to the backup strategy will 

not impact the ability of ATC to provide 

separation services to the operator. 

The FAA completed the Surveillance/ 

Positioning Backup Strategy 

Alternatives Analysis 58 on January 8, 

2007. This study included a 

comprehensive analysis of various 

strategies for mitigating the impact of 

the loss of GPS on ADS–B surveillance. 

The analysis identified a reduced 

network of SSRs as the recommended 

backup for ADS–B. This strategy retains 

all existing en route SSRs (150) and 

approximately 50 percent of SSRs in 

high-density terminal areas (40). 

The FAA assessed numerous 

technologies as part of this analysis, 

including: Multilateration; eLORAN; 

distance measuring equipment (DME); 

DME/inertial reference units; satellitebased augmentation systems; groundbased augmentation systems; and 

various combinations and 

implementations of these technologies. 

The FAA determined the backup 

strategy based on the most effective 

tradeoff between performance, schedule, 

and cost factors among airborne and 

ground segments of the NAS 

architecture. 

This backup strategy will support 

continued use of the separation 

standards in effect today. However, for 

select areas experiencing degraded 

surveillance coverage during an outage, 

ATC may increase aircraft separation as 

operationally required.59 The FAA 

concludes that these operational 

capabilities are sufficient, given that 

loss of required position information is 

expected to be a rare event. 

In meeting the performance standards 

adopted by this rule, an aircraft’s 

navigation and surveillance functions 

may be dependent on the same position 

source. Using GNSS technology for 

ADS–B provides for improved 

performance (i.e., increased update rate, 

increased accuracy at long range, and 

cleaner surveillance picture to ATC) 

over other surveillance systems and 

allows for a more flexible ground 

infrastructure. 

The risks posed by this dependency 

have been accepted because the 

navigation and surveillance functions 

have independent backup systems. In 

evaluating the options, the FAA 

specifically considered the scenario in 

which the satellite positioning source 

failed. As a result, the FAA determined 

that an effective backup system could 

not also be satellite-based. The FAA 

further determined that these backup 

capabilities ensure sufficient navigation 

and surveillance capabilities during a 

positioning source outage and maintain 

appropriate levels of safety. 

U. Privacy 

The NPRM proposed requiring a 

message element to transmit the 

aircraft’s assigned 24-bit ICAO address. 

Many commenters, including AOPA 

and Rockwell-Collins, strongly argued 

against ADS–B Out broadcasts of 

identifiable data, including aircraft tail 

number and operator name. These 

commenters argued that the information 

could be used to continuously watch all 

aircraft and ultimately could be used by 

the FAA for enforcement or assessing 

user fees. Certain commenters argued in 

favor of retaining the anonymous mode 

for VFR operations because aircraft 

identification is only required for ATC 

purposes. 

Commenters suggested several 

alternatives: (1) Use UAT’s privacy 

message function (which allows the 

pilot to select ‘‘VFR’’ mode) to have the 

UAT system randomly select a 24-bit 

ICAO address; (2) require manufacturers 

to design ADS–B systems that archive 

data onboard, and advise pilots to 

archive the data so there is an 

independent data source that 

corroborates government data; and (3) 

design a system host configuration 

protocol to assign transponder codes 

through a unique address when the 

UAT or 1090 MHz ES is turned on. They 

contended that this would allow a 

network to eliminate system duplicity 

and guarantee anonymity to the pilot of 

the aircraft (therefore, the 24-bit Mode S 

identifiers would no longer be needed). 

The ARC made three 

recommendations regarding privacy: (1) 

The FAA should treat the 24-bit ICAO 

code assignments as information 

covered under privacy laws, so they are 

available only to authorized personnel 

or released by the holder; (2) the FAA 

should use the anonymity feature of 

UAT and develop an equivalent 

anonymity feature for 1090 MHz ES that 

would apply to VFR operations not 

using ATC services; and (3) the FAA 

should accommodate assignment of the 

24-bit ICAO codes so that they do not 

easily correlate to an aircraft tail number 

and they permit aircraft call signs to be 

something other than the aircraft 

registration number when receiving 

ATC services. 

The FAA reviewed all the comments 

regarding privacy and notes that most of 

the commenters specifically addressed 

VFR operations. The FAA notes that 

there is no right to privacy when 

operating in the NAS. The FAA 

specifically designates airspace for 

which the identification of aircraft is 

necessary, so that the agency can 

effectively separate aircraft. The 

transponder rule specifies that an 

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aircraft operating in airspace designated 

in § 91.215 must have ATC transponder 

equipment installed that meets the 

performance requirements of TSO– 

C74b, TSO–C74c, or TSO–C112. 

Many GA aircraft are equipped with 

Mode C, which has the capability to 

squawk 1200 and meets the 

requirements of § 91.215, without 

specifically identifying the aircraft. 

Most of these commenters are seeking 

similar treatment under ADS–B so that 

ATC can track the aircraft without 

specifically identifying the aircraft. 

TSO–C154c includes a feature to 

temporarily and randomly assign a 24- 

bit address for UAT-equipped aircraft. 

This rule does not prohibit the use of 

this feature. UAT-equipped aircraft 

conducting VFR operations that have 

not filed a flight plan and are not 

requesting ATC services may use this 

feature. Although the FAA does not 

prohibit the anonymity feature, 

operators using the anonymity feature 

will not be eligible to receive ATC 

services and will not be able to benefit 

from enhanced ADS–B search and 

rescue capabilities. TSO–C166b does 

not include a feature to accommodate 

anonymous 24-bit addresses. Should 

safety or efficiency of the NAS so 

require, the FAA could initiate 

rulemaking to prohibit an operator from 

using the anonymity feature. 

Additionally, if the FAA, in 

coordination with the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), determines 

that the anonymity feature is an 

unacceptable risk to security, the FAA 

could initiate rulemaking to prohibit an 

operator from using the anonymity 

feature. 

This rule does not implement any 

type of user fee. Subsequent agency 

rulemaking would be necessary to 

establish such fees. Furthermore, this 

rule does not affect the process for the 

FAA assigning the 24-bit ICAO codes. 

The FAA has not determined that 

archiving data onboard the aircraft is 

necessary for ATC surveillance. 

However, this rule does not preclude 

manufacturers from designing 

equipment with this function. 

V. Security 

Various commenters, including the 

DOD, commented on the security 

aspects of the ADS–B system. They 

contended that, as ADS–B will 

broadcast the location and identity of 

users, malicious parties could monitor 

transmissions from the aircraft and ATC 

to obtain information to target and harm 

the aircraft. Another commenter stated 

that the ADS–B information could be 

used by an unmanned aircraft to target 

passenger aircraft. Some commenters 

alleged that security safeguards are 

needed for ADS–B to protect aircraft 

from terrorist attacks. 

Other commenters argued that an 

aircraft’s ADS–B transmissions or GPS 

position/timing signals could be subject 

to inadvertent or intentional 

interruption or loss of the GPS timing 

signal. Several commenters 

recommended a planned oversight 

feature (for example, requiring ADS–B 

ground receivers to be licensed) to 

ensure that only authorized personnel 

access the data collected, and that the 

data is only accessed for authorized 

purposes. The DOD recommended that 

the FAA work with DHS and the DOD 

to determine ADS–B risks and 

appropriate countermeasures. 

The FAA conducted several analyses 

on the security aspects of ADS–B. These 

analyses include the information system 

for collecting data, transmitting and 

storing data, as well as risk assessments 

on the vulnerability of ADS–B broadcast 

messages. All FAA information, 

including ADS–B transmissions 

received by the FAA, that is collected, 

processed, transmitted, stored, or 

disseminated in its general support 

systems and applications is subject to 

certification and accreditation, under 

National Institutes of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) information 

technology standards. It is a continuing 

process that protects the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of the 

information. 

The FAA’s Security Certification and 

Accreditation Procedures (SCAP) were 

developed in accordance with Federal 

law, including: (1) The Federal 

Information Security Management Act 

of 2002, (2) OMB Circular A–130 

(Management of Federal Information 

Resources), (3) Federal Information 

Processing Standards 199, and (4) NIST 

Special Publications (SP) 800–37 (Guide 

for the Security Certification and 

Accreditation of Federal Information 

Systems), NIST SP 800–53 

(Recommended Security Controls for 

Federal Information Systems), and NIST 

SP 800–53A (Guide for Assessing the 

Security Controls in Federal Information 

Systems). 

The FAA completed the SCAP for the 

ADS–B system originally in September 

2008. The FAA completed a new SCAP 

in October 2009 as a result of changes 

made to the ADS–B system. This 

process ensures that ADS–B does not 

introduce new security weaknesses. It 

also ensures that the hardware and 

software composing the ADS–B system 

meets rigid and well-documented 

standards for infrastructure security. 

ADS–B meets all qualifications and 

mandates of this process. As part of the 

SCAP, the system is tested annually for 

security compliance, and every 3 years 

the system goes through an entirely new 

SCAP. In addition, the FAA specifically 

assessed the vulnerability risk of ADS– 

B broadcast messages being used to 

target air carrier aircraft. This 

assessment contains Sensitive Security 

Information that is controlled under 49 

CFR parts 1 and 1520, and its content 

is otherwise protected from public 

disclosure. While the agency cannot 

comment on the data in this study, it 

can confirm, for the purpose of 

responding to the comments in this 

rulemaking proceeding, that using ADS– 

B data does not subject an aircraft to any 

increased risk compared to the risk that 

is experienced today. As part of this 

process, the FAA forwarded the 

assessment to its interagency partners, 

including the DOD, the Transportation 

Security Administration, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, the United 

States Secret Service, and other 

appropriate agencies for review. These 

entities evaluated the modeling 

approach, analysis, and risk outcome. 

They did not identify any reason to 

invalidate the analysis which 

determined that ADS–B data does not 

increase an aircraft’s vulnerability. The 

FAA commits to annual updates of this 

assessment to monitor any changes in 

the underlying assumptions in the risk 

analysis, and to monitor new threat 

information that becomes available. 

The FAA concludes that ADS–B 

transmissions would be no more 

susceptible to spoofing (that is, 

intentionally broadcasting a false target) 

or intentional jamming than that 

experienced with SSR transmissions 

(Mode A, C, and S) today. Spoofing of 

false targets and intentional jamming 

very rarely occur with the surveillance 

systems in place today. 

The ADS–B transmission signals from 

aircraft will be fused with surveillance 

data from both primary and secondary 

radars before it is displayed for ATC. 

The controllers, therefore, are receiving 

and viewing a composite of aircraft data 

from multiple surveillance systems. The 

FAA does not expect spoofing and 

jamming to occur during the transition 

to using this fused data for surveillance. 

This is because the automation will 

reveal the discrepancy between a 

spoofed or jammed ADS–B target and 

the target reported by radar and SSR 

position reports. Fusion also provides 

for a smooth transition to backup 

surveillance if an ADS–B system is 

experiencing interference. Furthermore, 

encryption of any ADS–B data would 

unnecessarily limit its use 

internationally. 

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The FAA also concludes that 

additional certification and 

accreditation of ground equipment will 

not be necessary because of the strict 

SCAP provision certifying that crucial 

information and equipment are not 

available to unauthorized individuals. 

The FAA finds no basis at this point 

that ADS–B Out provides any greater 

security risks to air navigation systems 

to the United States. The FAA continues 

to meet regularly with DOD and DHS 

representatives regarding the use of 

ADS–B information and national 

security issues. 

W. Alternatives To ADS–B 

The NPRM compared: (1) Radar as it 

exists today, (2) multilateration, and (3) 

ADS–B. In the NPRM, the FAA’s 

alternatives analysis found radar to be 

the most cost-effective solution; 

however, radar would neither be 

effective in supporting air traffic growth 

over time nor provide the necessary 

technical capabilities to support the 

NextGen concept of operations. 

Several commenters indicated that the 

existing radar system is sufficient for 

operations. Some commenters suggested 

expanding the radar infrastructure or 

implementing an alternative reporting 

system using commercial off-the-shelf 

technologies that have a means to 

encode and transmit GPS position data. 

Other commenters believed that 

multilateration could provide similar 

benefits to ADS–B at a potentially lower 

cost. Boeing requested that the FAA 

provide an analysis explaining its 

conclusion that multilateration would 

not provide the same level of benefits as 

ADS–B. ATA specifically stated that 

they do not believe multilateration is a 

viable alternative; however, it can 

provide highly accurate position reports 

for surface ADS–B In applications. 

Several commenters objected to the 

prohibitive cost of upgrading the 

avionics with ADS–B because there are 

commercial products currently available 

that provide real time weather and 

traffic information. 

The agency has determined that the 

improved accuracy and update rate 

afforded by ADS–B is a critical segment 

of the NextGen infrastructure and 

capabilities that offer the opportunity to 

make the system more efficient. 

Specifically, enhanced surveillance data 

via ADS–B will improve the 

performance of ATC decision-support 

tools (URET and TMA) which rely on 

surveillance data to make predictions. 

The end result will be fewer, more 

efficient reroutes to avoid potential 

conflicts, as well as improved metering 

into the terminal area. This will allow 

increased and more efficient use of 

OPDs, which have lower energy and 

emissions profiles. Unlike radar and 

multilateration, ADS–B provides more 

detailed flight information (for example, 

update rate, velocity, and heading) that 

supports ground-based merging and 

spacing tools. These tools use this 

information to determine optimal tracks 

for ATC arrival planning. 

FIS–B and TIS–B provide the uplink 

of weather and traffic information to the 

cockpit. Equipping with the necessary 

ADS–B In avionics (receiver and display 

components) is voluntary for operators 

and is not required by the ADS–B rule. 

The FAA analyzed alternative sources 

for weather and traffic information. 

Individually, these alternative sources 

may be less costly than the ADS–B 

solution. However, the FAA’s analysis 

showed that the bundling of 

surveillance, weather, and traffic 

information is cost-effective for users 

who have not already invested in 

alternative capabilities. The FAA 

compared the costs and benefits of 

ADS–B, multilateration, and radar, as 

well as the cost savings for bundling 

services. A report (‘‘Exhibit 300, 

Attachment 2, Business Case Analysis 

Report for Future Surveillance, JRC 

Phase 2a’’) is available in the docket for 

this rulemaking. 

In sum, none of the alternatives offers 

the range of capabilities nor supports 

the NextGen concept of operations as 

well as ADS–B. 

X. ADS–B Equipment Scheduled 

Maintenance 

The NPRM did not propose any 

additional continuing airworthiness 

requirements associated with the 

installation of ADS–B avionics 

equipment. A few commenters 

questioned the FAA’s plan for 

continued airworthiness inspections for 

ADS–B equipment. 

This final rule does not add any 

continuing airworthiness inspection 

requirements. Transponder-based ADS– 

B systems will still be required to meet 

the requirements of § 91.413. However, 

ADS–B systems, without a transponder, 

do not have any new inspection 

requirements. The FAA will use the 

ground automation system to 

continuously monitor ADS–B 

functionality, which accomplishes the 

purposes of a recurrent inspection. 

Y. Specific Design Parameters 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed 

performance standards for ADS–B Out, 

but did not specify any specific design 

parameters. 

Several commenters, including the 

EAA, and the United States Parachute 

Association, recommended specific 

design parameters for ADS–B avionics, 

including size, weight, and power 

consumption. 

The FAA again notes that this is a 

performance-based rule and does not 

mandate a particular system or design 

specifications (including size, weight, or 

power consumption). A performancebased rule provides industry with the 

opportunity to use innovative 

approaches in designing ADS–B 

avionics to meet the needs of their 

customers. 

Z. Economic Issues 

The FAA updated the cost and benefit 

estimates in the final regulatory impact 

analysis for this rule. For a summary of 

the final regulatory impact analysis, see 

Section III. The full final regulatory 

impact analysis may be found in the 

docket for this rulemaking. The 

following section discusses comments 

the FAA received on the proposal’s 

regulatory evaluation. Where 

appropriate, the discussion includes 

information on the updated costs and 

benefits for this final rule. 

1. ADS–B Out Equipage Cost 

The FAA estimated that costs for the 

proposed rule would be between $2.3 

billion and $8.5 billion. The FAA also 

considered that industry would start to 

incur equipage costs in 2012, ranging 

from $1.27 billion to $7.46 billion. In 

the final rule, the FAA estimates total 

costs to range from $3.3 billion to $7.0 

billion, and industry equipage costs to 

range from $2.5 billion to $6.2 billion. 

Several commenters, including ATA, 

Boeing, British Airways, Delta Airlines, 

EAA, Honeywell, NBAA, and the 

Regional Airline Association (RAA), 

questioned specific cost estimates in the 

proposal’s economic analysis or asked 

for more information about the cost and 

benefit estimates. Most of the 

commenters believed that equipage 

costs for ADS–B Out would exceed the 

estimates provided in the proposal. 

Several commenters, including 

AOPA, EAA, Embraer, and the United 

States Parachute Association, stated that 

the cost to equip with ADS–B Out was 

too high. Commenters pointed out that, 

given the value of most GA aircraft, the 

cost of equipage could represent a 

significant percentage of, or possibly 

exceed, the current value of the aircraft. 

Some commenters noted that costs of 

this magnitude could make recreational 

or business flying cost-prohibitive. 

Some commenters, including FedEx, 

noted that equipage costs will be 

significantly higher for aircraft not 

currently equipped with a certified 

GPS/WAAS position source. 

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60This report was published in August 2007. A 

copy of this report is available from the Web site 

http://www.regulations.gov. To find the report, 

enter FAA–2007–29305–0013.1 in the search box. 

For the proposed rule, the FAA 

contacted manufacturers, industry 

associations, and ADS–B Out suppliers 

to estimate ADS–B equipage and 

maintenance costs by aircraft model. 

The proposal included industry 

estimates for the cost of installation, 

maintenance, additional weight, and the 

addition of ADS–B Out equipment to 

meet the performance mandate. The 

proposal’s regulatory impact analysis 

also assumed that all active airframes in 

service would be retrofitted by 2020. 

The FAA expects that the increased 

demand for the ADS–B Out equipment 

required by this performance-based rule 

will result in a more competitive 

market, such that the prices may 

decrease in the coming years for certain 

aircraft groups. The FAA also 

anticipates that any investment in ADS– 

B Out equipage will increase the 

residual value of that aircraft and will 

allow easier access to the regulated 

airspace. 

The FAA agrees that equipping 

aircraft with ADS–B Out will cost more 

for those aircraft that are not equipped 

with a position source capable of 

providing the necessary accuracy and 

integrity. To capture this cost in the 

proposal, the FAA requested that 

industry categorize large category 

turbojet airplanes by classic, neo-classic, 

modern, and new production classes, as 

well as the existing level of airplane 

equipage for each class. However, due to 

the confidentiality of cost data, the 

regulatory evaluation does not present 

ADS–B-supplier level data details. The 

FAA fully acknowledges that the 

general aviation community will incur 

significant costs from this rule. 

However, this must be balanced against 

the foundation this capability provides 

in moving toward the NextGen 

infrastructure and benefits from its 

overall usage. 

2. FAA Cost Savings With ADS–B Out 

Compared to Radar 

The FAA considered the following 

three systems for future NAS 

surveillance: (1) Radar, (2) 

multilateration, and (3) ADS–B. The 

FAA explained in the proposal that 

radar was the lowest cost option. Based 

on forecasts at the time of the NPRM, 

the FAA did not expect that radar could 

accommodate the projected increase in 

traffic. 

Several commenters, including EAA 

and RAA, stated that the ADS–B 

program would result in a cost savings 

to the FAA because it would have less 

radar to maintain, operate, and replace. 

Most of the commenters claimed that 

the ADS–B program would shift costs 

from the FAA to aircraft operators. 

The ADS–B program is not expected 

to result in a cost savings to the FAA 

from 2009 through 2035. As ADS–B 

becomes operational, the FAA plans to 

decommission some SSR. While this 

will reduce the operational costs of 

maintaining radar, the FAA will incur 

additional costs for ADS–B ground 

stations. This results in a net increase in 

cost for the FAA. 

3. Business Case for ADS–B Out and In 

In the NPRM, the FAA estimated that 

the total costs of ADS–B Out and In 

(excluding avionics for ADS–B In), 

relative to the radar baseline, would 

range from $2.8 billion to $9.0 billion. 

The FAA further estimated that ADS–B 

Out and In would yield $13.8 billion in 

total benefits. 

The FAA concluded that ADS–B Out 

and In would be cost beneficial at a 

present value of 7 percent, if: The 

avionics costs for ADS–B Out are low 

($670 million at a 7 percent present 

value) and the avionics costs for ADS– 

B In do not exceed $1.85 billion at a 7 

percent present value. 

As stated in the NPRM, ADS–B Out 

and In would be cost beneficial at a 3 

percent present value if: (1) The 

avionics costs for ADS–B Out are low 

($950 million at a 3 percent present 

value) and the avionics costs for ADS– 

B In do not exceed $5.3 billion at a 3 

percent present value or (2) the avionics 

costs for ADS–B Out are high ($5.35 

billion at a 3 percent present value) and 

the avionics costs for ADS–B In do not 

exceed $870 million. 

Boeing asked for further clarification 

of scenarios in which ADS–B may not 

be cost beneficial. Specifically, Boeing 

referred to the 3 percent present value 

estimate in the NPRM with high 

avionics costs. Boeing noted that it does 

not believe ADS–B In avionics costs will 

be less than ADS–B Out avionics costs. 

Boeing also asked for the cost beneficial 

values of ADS–B Out and In at a 7 

percent present value if avionics costs 

are high. 

Boeing suggested that the FAA 

conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis 

for the ADS–B program, including 

accurate cost estimates for ADS–B In. 

Boeing further recommended that if the 

FAA cannot determine the costs 

associated with ADS–B In, the FAA 

should not include these costs and 

benefits in the economic analysis. 

Boeing also questioned why the FAA 

estimated the benefits for ADS–B Out 

and In at $13.9 billion in the proposal, 

while the FAA estimated the ADS–B 

Out and In benefits at $18.5 billion in 

the ‘‘Surveillance and Broadcast 

Services Benefits Basis of Estimates’’ 60

(SBS BOE) report. 

The FAA agrees with Boeing that if 

the costs of ADS–B Out avionics are at 

the high end of our estimates and if 

ADS–B In avionics are more expensive 

than ADS–B Out avionics, then the costs 

estimated for ADS–B Out and In will 

exceed the quantified benefits, given the 

assumptions in the economic 

evaluation. The FAA also notes that at 

a 7 percent present value with the 

assumptions in the economic evaluation 

(i.e., if industry costs for ADS–B Out 

avionics are at the high end of the 

range), then ADS–B Out and In will not 

be cost-beneficial. The FAA does not 

agree that the estimates in the regulatory 

impact analysis need to be consistent 

with the estimates in the SBS BOE 

report. The economic analysis quantifies 

the potential benefits that the FAA 

expects to result from adoption of the 

rule. The economic analysis does not 

include benefits that could be realized 

without the rule. 

Specifically, the regulatory impact 

analysis did not include benefits from 

ADS–B in Alaska or for low altitude 

operations in the Gulf of Mexico 

because these benefits would occur 

without the rule. The regulatory 

evaluation also did not include benefits 

related to controlled flight into terrain 

because terrain avoidance warning 

systems currently provide these 

benefits. Other benefits that the FAA 

did not consider in the proposal, but are 

in the SBS BOE, include: An estimate of 

the reduction in FAA subscription 

charges because of value added services 

and a reduction in costs to obtain 

weather information. 

In addition, the regulatory impact 

analysis did not specifically include a 

benefit for radar system replacement 

cost avoidance. Rather, the FAA 

compared the total cost of continuing 

full radar surveillance (the baseline) to 

the cost of providing surveillance with 

ADS–B. This included the costs of 

gradually discontinuing some radar and 

continuing some radar as a backup. The 

lower costs of radar (what is referred to 

as ‘‘surveillance cost avoidance’’ in the 

SBS BOE) were captured in the cost 

comparison of radar under the baseline 

and radar under the ADS–B Out 

scenario (the rule). 

The draft regulatory impact analysis 

released with the NPRM included a 

cost-benefit analysis of ADS–B Out 

alone, as well as for the scenarios for 

ADS–B Out and In. For the final rule, 

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61This translates to $840 million at a 7 percent 

present value or $1.8 billion at a 3 percent present 

value. 

62Economic Values For FAA Investment and 

Regulatory Decisions, A Guide, Final Report 

Revised Oct. 3, 2007, GRA Incorporated. 

the FAA also queried industry for 

equipage costs for ADS–B Out and In. 

Although the FAA initially attempted to 

capture the benefits for ADS–B In, upon 

further consideration the agency has 

determined that the performance 

requirements are not sufficiently 

developed to conduct a meaningful 

analysis. The FAA has not included 

ADS–B In costs and benefits in the final 

regulatory impact analysis. 

4. Improved En Route Conflict Probe 

Benefit Performance 

In the NPRM, the FAA estimated the 

benefit for en route conflict probe at 

$3.3 billion.61 To calculate this savings, 

the FAA estimated the reduction in ATC 

vectors resulting from improved en 

route conflict probe. Then, the FAA 

attributed this time savings to direct 

aircraft operating costs and the 

passenger value of time. 

Several commenters questioned the 

improved en route conflict probe benefit 

estimates. The commenters noted that 

the amount of time saved per passenger 

was low, compared to other delays in 

the overall travel environment (for 

example, late arrivals at the airport and 

waiting for baggage). They 

recommended that the FAA delete the 

passenger value of time from its benefit 

estimate. 

The FAA does not agree that the 

passenger value of time should be 

removed from its benefit estimate and 

therefore includes it in the final 

regulatory impact analysis. There has 

been significant discussion about 

whether small increments of time 

should be valued at lower rates than 

larger increments. The present state of 

theoretical and empirical knowledge 

does not appear to support valuing 

small increments of time less than larger 

ones.62

5. Capacity Enhancements, Airspace 

Efficiency, and Fuel Saving Benefits 

In the NPRM, the FAA estimated that 

between 2017 and 2035, ADS–B would 

allow for more efficient handling of 

potential en route conflicts. In the 

NPRM, the FAA estimated this would 

save 410 million gallons of fuel and 

eliminate 4 million metric tons of 

carbon dioxide emissions. The FAA also 

noted in the initial regulatory impact 

analysis that, during this same time 

period, continuous descent approaches 

(now referred to as OPDs), would allow 

for a 10 billion pound fuel savings and 

a 14 million ton reduction in carbon 

dioxide emissions. Furthermore, the 

FAA noted that optimal routing over the 

Gulf of Mexico would eliminate 300,000 

metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions 

between 2012 and 2035. In the final 

regulatory impact analysis, the FAA 

estimated a net reduction in carbon 

dioxide emissions attributable to the 

rule and calculated a monetary value to 

this net reduction. See the full 

regulatory impact analysis for details. 

A few commenters, including RAA, 

questioned the cost savings associated 

with more efficient flights using ADS– 

B. Some of these commenters also asked 

the FAA to remove the discussion on 

reduced carbon dioxide emissions 

because the efficiency and fuel saving 

claims have not been validated. 

RAA noted that the FAA has 

considerable experience justifying rules 

that enhance safety, but suggested that 

the FAA is not experienced in justifying 

rules based on increased airspace 

capacity and fuel savings. RAA asked 

the FAA to validate whether the 

reduced vertical separation minimum 

(RVSM) program reduced fuel 

consumption, as estimated in the RVSM 

regulatory evaluation. RAA also noted 

that the benefit analysis should quantify 

the benefits that ADS–B would provide 

over current descent procedures enabled 

without ADS–B. 

GAMA and an individual commenter 

noted the environmental impact of 

airspace modernization. GAMA 

encouraged the FAA to provide 

additional details and quantify the 

benefit from fuel savings that the FAA 

expects ADS–B surveillance will 

provide. 

In the proposal’s benefit analysis, the 

FAA quantified the benefits that ADS– 

B alone will provide over current, 

recognized OPD procedures. The agency 

agrees that the efficiency benefits are, in 

part, conceptual, and with new 

technologies, conceptual efficiency 

benefits analysis is the only option. 

While outside the scope of this 

rulemaking, as noted by a commenter, 

the RVSM program offers an example of 

how airspace redesign and new 

technological capabilities can result in 

significant efficiency and operational 

(fuel savings) gains. 

6. Deriving Benefits From Capstone 

Implementation in Alaska 

In the NPRM, the FAA explained that 

ADS–B has been demonstrated and used 

in Alaska for terrain and traffic 

awareness, and that it had a noticeable 

effect on safety. Several commenters 

argued that Capstone is an insufficient 

basis to assume benefits from ADS–B 

equipage. The commenters noted that 

Capstone is a strong component of the 

justification for the system; they added 

that a major component of Capstone is 

the addition of terrain information and 

warnings. Commenters also noted that 

the flight environment in southeast 

Alaska is unlike any in the lower 48 

states. 

The FAA understands that the 

conditions in Alaska do not translate to 

the continental United States. While the 

regulatory impact analysis does not 

include any benefits from Capstone, the 

rulemaking action does highlight the 

potential benefits derived from more 

accurate and timely positioning 

information from ADS–B. 

7. Regional Airline Benefits 

In the NPRM, the FAA quantified the 

benefits as shown in Table 4. 

TABLE 4—ESTIMATED BENEFITS INCLUDED IN THE NPRM REGULATORY EVALUATION

Benefit area Benefit 2007 

M$ 

Discounted at 

3% 

Discounted at 

7% 

Total Benefits ............................................................................................................................... $9,948.5 $5,484.3 $2,657.7 

Gulf of Mexico: 

High Altitude Operations ...................................................................................................... 2,067.2 1,104.4 509.9 

More Efficient En Route Separation Delay Savings ............................................................ 1,810.6 946.1 421.3

Additional Flights Accommodated Optimal and More Direct Routing .................................. 256.6 158.4 88.6 

Improved En Route Conflict Probe Performance ........................................................................ 3,258.1 1,774.0 840.1 

More Efficient Metering Based on Improved TMA Accuracy ...................................................... 1,746.6 944.9 441.1

Increased Ability to Perform Continuous Descent Approaches .................................................. 2,876.7 1,661.0 866.6 

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63The FAA also calculated this midpoint to be 

$2.1 billion at a 3 percent present value or $1.5 

billion at a 7 percent present value. 

64The costs of radar will be about $1 billion less 

with ADS–B Out, although the total ground costs 

of ADS–B Out with the cost to sustain and 

decommission select radar will exceed the cost of 

continuing radar without implementing ADS–B. 

RAA expressed concern that regional 

operators do not have equal access to 

large airports; therefore, they will not 

achieve the same benefits as larger air 

carriers. RAA specifically noted that the 

FAA has not committed to a measurable 

reduction in aircraft-to-aircraft 

separation standards. They believed that 

without reduced separation standards, 

the benefits would be localized and 

would not apply to regional airlines. 

RAA also noted that regional aircraft 

typically do not carry life rafts and, 

therefore, they cannot conduct extended 

over-water operations. As a result, they 

will not benefit from more efficient 

aircraft separation over the Gulf of 

Mexico. 

The FAA agrees that regional 

operators who cannot operate over the 

Gulf of Mexico will not attain this 

separation benefit. However, the FAA 

did not estimate benefits specifically for 

regional carriers. The agency expects 

regional airlines to benefit from ADS–B 

Out even without reduced aircraft-toaircraft separation standards. This is 

because other benefits, including 

improved en route conflict probe 

performance, apply to all aircraft in 

Class A airspace, including regional 

airlines. 

8. General Aviation: High Equipage 

Costs With Little Benefit 

In the proposal, the FAA estimated 

that the total cost to equip GA aircraft 

from 2012 through 2035 would range 

from $1.2 billion to about $4.5 billion 

with a mid-point average of nearly $2.9 

billion.63 Although the FAA did not 

specifically estimate GA benefits in the 

NPRM, the agency now estimates that 

GA could receive up to $200 million in 

ADS–B Out benefits. 

Numerous commenters, including 

AOPA and EAA, expressed concern that 

the proposed rule would require GA 

operators to add costly equipment to 

their aircraft, while providing these 

operators with few benefits. GAMA 

noted that many of the benefits for GA 

operators exist with ADS–B In. Several 

of the commenters noted that GA 

aircraft do not substantially contribute 

to delays or congestion in the NAS. 

They further stated that if ADS–B 

lessens traffic delays, it will benefit the 

airlines rather than the GA community. 

AOPA recommended that the FAA work 

with key stakeholders to identify a 

strategy that either removes low-altitude 

airspace users from the proposal or 

greatly improves the benefits for them. 

The FAA considered three options to 

resolve the GA cost benefit comments. 

First, the FAA considered modifying 

performance requirements to reduce 

equipage costs. Second, the FAA 

evaluated options to provide additional 

benefits to GA operators. Third, the 

FAA explored tailoring the rule such 

that fewer GA operators would be 

affected. 

For the first option, the FAA 

determined that opportunities do exist 

for reducing the equipage costs for GA 

operators. In the rule, the FAA bases the 

performance requirements solely on 

ATC separation services; whereas in the 

proposal, the performance requirements 

were based on ATC separation services 

and five initial ADS–B In applications. 

This change eliminated the need for 

ADS–B antenna diversity because the 

ATC separation services can operate 

effectively without it and the ADS–B 

Out benefits can be achieved. Multiple 

commenters and the ARC felt that 

removing antenna diversity would help 

make the rule cheaper to implement for 

light general aviation operators. 

For the second option, using 

comments received by the GA 

community, the FAA has identified 

opportunities to provide additional 

benefits to GA operators by expanding 

ADS–B services throughout the NAS to 

areas not currently serviced. Thus, 

outside of this rulemaking effort, the 

FAA intends to explore the costs and 

benefits for the following ADS–B 

enabled service expansions: 

(a) Expanding low altitude 

surveillance coverage, both in areas 

receiving increased collateral coverage 

from the initial ADS–B ground station 

infrastructure and in areas that could 

benefit from additional ground station 

coverage. 

(b) Providing radar-like terminal ATC 

services at airports not currently served. 

(c) Providing an automated 

mechanism for the closure of IFR flight 

plans based on the new technologies 

ability to detect an aircraft’s arrival at its 

destination airport. 

(d) Making enhancements to current 

search and rescue technology and 

procedures that will assist rescue 

personnel in determining the last 

known location of aircraft that are 

reported missing. 

(e) Providing Flight Service Stations 

(FSSs) with ADS–B positional display 

information and assisting in the 

development of automation systems that 

will allow for more tailored in flight 

service functions. 

For the third option, the FAA looked 

at tailoring the ADS–B airspace such 

that the number of general aviation 

aircraft needing to equip would be 

minimized. Specifically the FAA 

considered limiting the rule to only 

Class A and B airspace. Although ADS– 

B surveillance is not as critical to the 

NexGen goals in lower density airspace, 

such as Class E airspace above 10,000 

feet and Class C airspace, ADS–B 

equipage for all aircraft in these areas is 

essential to gaining the overall stated 

ADS–B benefits, realizing savings 

associated with radar 

decommissioning,64 the expansion of 

potential future benefits discussed 

above, and moving towards the NextGen 

concept of operations. Thus, the 

airspace subject to this rule remains 

unchanged. 

AA. Revisions To Other Regulations 

Several commenters, including ACI– 

NA, ACSS, ATA, United Airlines, and 

UPS, recommended changes to other 

regulations. Specifically, they 

recommended that the FAA update 

subpart F of 14 CFR part 25 to include 

ADS–B requirements. ACI–NA 

recommended that the FAA amend 14 

CFR part 139 to require airport surface 

vehicles to equip with ADS–B to 

prevent runway incursions. Airbus 

recommended that the FAA update 

advisory circular (AC) 120–86, Aircraft 

Surveillance Systems and Applications. 

This rule only amends the operating 

regulations in part 91. At this point, the 

FAA has not identified any ADS–B Out 

requirements for parts 23, 25, 27, and 

29. The FAA will issue the appropriate 

aircraft installation and operational 

guidance material consistent with the 

requirements of this rule upon issuance 

or shortly thereafter. The FAA is 

discussing with airports and the Federal 

Communications Commission whether 

ADS–B would benefit airport ground 

vehicles. 

III. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Paperwork Reduction Act 

As required by the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 

3507(d)), the FAA submitted a copy of 

the new (or amended) information 

collection requirement(s) in this final 

rule to the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) for its review. OMB 

assigned the number 2120–0728 in 

advance, but has not yet approved the 

collection. Affected parties do not have 

to comply with the information 

collection requirements until the FAA 

publishes in the Federal Register notice 

of the approval of the control number 

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65 ICAO references: Procedures for Air Navigation 

Services—Air Traffic Management, Doc 4444, 

Amendment 4, (24/11/05) Procedures for Air 

Navigation Services—Air Traffic Management; Doc 

9694, ICAO Manual of Air Traffic Services Data 

Link Applications; Annex 2, Rules of the Air; 

Annex 4, Aeronautical Charts; Annex 6 Part II, 

Operation of Aircraft; Annex 11, Air Traffic 

Services; Annex 15, Aeronautical Information 

Services; Doc 9689, Manual for Determination of 

Separation Minima; Circular 311, SASP Circular— 

ADS–B Comparative Assessment; Circular 278, 

National Plan for CNS/ATM Systems Guidance 

Material; Annex 10 Vol. IV, Amendment 82, 

Aeronautical Telecommunications; Doc 9871, 

Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and 

Extended Squitter. 

assigned by OMB for these information 

requirements. Approval of the control 

number notifies the public that OMB 

has approved these information 

collection requirements under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 

The FAA received comments on the 

proposed performance requirements for 

ADS–B Out aircraft equipment. Those 

comments are discussed in section II, 

Discussion of the Final Rule, elsewhere 

in this preamble. However, the agency 

received no comments specifically on 

the burden associated with collecting 

aircraft transmissions from the ADS–B 

Out equipment required by this rule. 

A description of the annual burden is 

shown below. 

Use: This final rule will support the 

information needs of the FAA by 

requiring avionics equipment that 

continuously transmits aircraft 

information to be received by the FAA, 

via automation, for use in providing air 

traffic surveillance services. 

Respondents: The average number of 

aircraft that will be equipped annually 

for the first 3 years—577. The number 

of aircraft (general aviation, regional, 

and majors) that will be equipped by 

2035: 247,317. 

Frequency: ADS–B equipment will 

continuously transmit aircraft 

information in ‘‘real time’’ to FAA 

ground receivers. The information is 

collected electronically, without input 

by a human operator. Old information is 

overwritten on a continuous basis. 

Annual Burden Estimate: Base-case 

start-up cost for an ADS–B Outcompliant transponder: $4,371.09 

million (in 2009 dollars). 

An agency may not collect or sponsor 

the collection of information, nor may it 

impose an information collection 

requirement unless it displays a 

currently valid OMB control number. 

B. International Compatibility 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to ICAO SARPs to the 

maximum extent practicable. ATA, 

British Airways, and EUROCONTROL 

recommended that the FAA harmonize 

this rule with the appropriate ICAO 

SARPs. Considering that the long-term 

global capabilities of ADS–B are not yet 

fully defined, ICAO SARPs will 

continue to evolve to reflect developing 

ADS–B applications. In addition, 

current ICAO SARPs for the 1090 MHz 

ES and UAT ADS–B links will be 

updated to reflect harmonized changes 

to both RTCA and EUROCAE minimum 

performance standards, as appropriate, 

for ADS–B Out operations. The FAA has 

reviewed the existing ICAO 

requirements 65 as related to ADS–B Out 

operations and has identified no 

differences with these regulations. The 

FAA also will continue to work with the 

international community to ensure 

harmonization. 

C. Regulatory Impact Analysis, 

Regulatory Flexibility Determination, 

International Trade Impact Assessment, 

and Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 directs that 

each Federal agency propose or adopt a 

regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires 

agencies to analyze the economic 

impact of regulatory changes on small 

entities. Third, the Trade Agreements 

Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies 

from setting standards that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. In 

developing U.S. standards, this Trade 

Act requires agencies to consider 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis of 

U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a Federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

State, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more annually (adjusted 

for inflation with a base year of 1995). 

This portion of the preamble 

summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the 

economic impacts of this final rule. The 

FAA suggests that readers seeking 

greater detail read the full regulatory 

impact analysis, a copy of which has 

been placed in the docket for this 

rulemaking. 

In conducting these analyses, the FAA 

has determined that this final rule: (1) 

Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is 

an economically ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ as defined in section 3(f) of 

Executive Order 12866; (3) is 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) 

will have a significant economic impact 

on a substantial number of small 

entities; (5) will not create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States; and (6) will impose an 

unfunded mandate on the private sector 

but not on state, local, or tribal 

governments. These analyses are 

summarized below. 

Regulatory Impact Analysis 

The FAA reviewed the following three 

alternatives for surveillance and found 

Alternative 2 (the rule) to be the 

preferred alternative: 

1. Baseline radar—Maintain the 

current radar based surveillance system 

and replace radar facilities when they 

wear out; 

2. ADS–B—Aircraft operators equip to 

meet performance requirements 

required by the rule and the FAA 

provides surveillance services based on 

downlinked aircraft information. 

3. Multilateration—The FAA provides 

surveillance using multilateration. 

Key Assumptions 

• All costs and benefits are 

denominated in 2009 dollars. 

• The final rule will be published in 

2010 and have a compliance date of 

2020. 

• Present value rates are 3% and 7%. 

• Period of analysis: 2009–2035. 

Benefits of the Final Rule 

The benefits of the final rule include 

the dollar value of savings in fuel, time, 

net reduction in CO2 emissions, and the 

consumer surplus associated with the 

additional flights accommodated 

because of the rule. The estimated 

quantified benefits of the rule range 

from $6.8 billion ($2.1 billion at 7% 

present value) to $8.5 billion ($2.7 

billion at 7% present value). 

Costs of the Final Rule 

The estimated incremental costs of 

the final rule range from a low of $3.3 

billion ($2.2 billion at 7% present value) 

to a high of $7.0 billion ($4.1 billion at 

7% present value). These include costs 

to the government, as well as to the 

aviation industry and other users of the 

NAS, to deploy ADS–B, and are 

incremental to maintaining surveillance 

via current technology (radar). The 

aviation industry would begin incurring 

costs for avionics equipage in 2012 and 

would incur total costs ranging from 

$2.5 billion ($1.4 billion at 7% present 

value) to $6.2 billion ($3.3 billion at 7% 

present value) with an estimated 

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midpoint of $4.4 billion ($2.3 billion at 

7% present value) from 2012 to 2035. 

Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

and Analysis 

Introduction and Purpose of this 

Analysis 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a 

principle of regulatory issuance that 

agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 

the objectives of the rule and of 

applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and 

informational requirements to the scale 

of the businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions to assure that such proposals are 

given serious consideration.’’ The RFA 

covers a wide range of small entities, 

including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a rule will have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. If 

the agency determines that the rule will 

have such an impact, the agency must 

prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis 

as described in the RFA. Section 603 of 

the RFA requires agencies to prepare 

and make available for public comment 

a final regulatory flexibility analysis 

(FRFA) describing the impact of final 

rules on small entities. As the FAA 

Administrator, I certify that this rule 

will have a significant economic impact 

on a substantial number of small 

entities. The purpose of this analysis is 

to provide the reasoning underlying this 

FAA determination. 

Section 603(b) of the RFA specifies 

the content of a FRFA. 

Each FRFA must contain: 

• A description of the reasons why 

action by the agency is being 

considered; 

• A succinct statement of the 

objectives of, and legal basis for, the 

final rule; 

• A description and an estimate of the 

number of small entities to which the 

rule will apply; 

• A description of the projected 

reporting, record keeping and other 

compliance requirements of the final 

rule including an estimate of the classes 

of small entities which will be subject 

to the requirement and the type of 

professional skills necessary for 

preparation of the report or record; 

• An identification, to the extent 

practicable, of all relevant Federal rules 

which may duplicate, overlap, or 

conflict with the final rule; 

• A description of any significant 

alternatives to the final rule which 

accomplish the stated objectives of 

applicable statutes and minimize any 

significant economic impact of the final 

rule on small entities. 

• A summary of significant issues 

raised by public comments in response 

to the initial regulatory flexibility 

analysis and how the agency resolved 

those comments. 

Reasons Why the Final Rule is Being 

Promulgated 

Public Law 108–176, referred to as 

‘‘The Century of Aviation 

Reauthorization Act,’’ was enacted 

December 12, 2003 (Pub. L. 108–176). 

This law set forth requirements and 

objectives for transforming the air 

transportation system to progress further 

into the 21st century. Section 709 of this 

statute required the Secretary of 

Transportation to establish in the FAA 

a Joint Planning and Development 

Office (JPDO) to manage work related to 

NextGen. Among its statutorily defined 

responsibilities, the JPDO coordinates 

the development and use of new 

technologies to ensure that, when 

available, they may be used to the 

fullest potential in aircraft and in the air 

traffic control system. 

The FAA, the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA), and 

the Departments of Commerce, Defense, 

and Homeland Security have launched 

an effort to align their resources to 

develop and further NextGen. The goals 

of NextGen, as stated in section 709, 

that are addressed by this final rule 

include: (1) Improving the level of 

safety, security, efficiency, quality, and 

affordability of the NAS and aviation 

services; (2) Taking advantage of data 

from emerging ground- and space-based 

communications, navigation, and 

surveillance technologies; (3) Being 

scalable to accommodate and encourage 

substantial growth in domestic and 

international transportation and 

anticipate and accommodate continuing 

technology upgrades and advances; and 

(4) Accommodating a wide range of 

aircraft operations, including airlines, 

air taxis, helicopters, GA, and 

unmanned aerial vehicles. 

The JPDO was also charged to create 

and carry out an integrated plan for 

NextGen. The NextGen Integrated Plan, 

transmitted to Congress on December 

12, 2004, ensures that the NextGen 

system meets the air transportation 

safety, security, mobility, efficiency and 

capacity needs beyond those currently 

included in the FAA’s Operational 

Evolution Plan (OEP). 

As described in the NextGen 

Integrated Plan, the current approach to 

air transportation (i.e., ground based 

radars tracking congested flyways and 

passing information among the control 

centers for the duration of flights) is 

becoming operationally obsolete. The 

current system is increasingly 

inefficient, and despite decreases in air 

traffic, still subject to significant delays. 

Resumption of growth will only 

aggravate congestion and delays, given 

the capabilities of the present system. 

The current method of handling air 

traffic flow will not be able to adapt to 

the volumes, density, and approach to 

managing air traffic in the future. The 

need for significant improvements 

towards operational efficiency and 

reduced environmental impacts, as well 

as resumed growth, will create 

significant challenges. Moreover, the 

diversity of aircraft is forecast to grow 

as the use of unmanned aircraft systems 

and very light jets are developed for 

special operations. 

The FAA believes that ADS–B 

technology is a key component in 

achieving many of the goals set forth in 

the NextGen Integrated Plan. This final 

rule is a major step toward strategically 

‘‘establishing an agile air traffic system 

that accommodates future requirements 

and readily responds to shifts in 

demand from all users,’’ by embracing a 

new approach to surveillance that can 

lead to greater and more efficient 

airspace use. ADS–B technology not 

only assists in the transition to a system 

with less dependence on ground 

infrastructure and facilities, but also 

creates capabilities for precision and 

accuracy, which in turn will make the 

system more operationally and 

environmentally efficient. 

Statement of the Legal Basis and 

Objectives 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules 

regarding aviation safety is found in 

Title 49 of the United States Code. 

Subtitle I, Section 106, Federal Aviation 

Administration, describes the authority 

of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the agency’s 

authority. 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 

40103, Sovereignty and Use of Airspace, 

and Subpart III, Section 44701, General 

Requirements. Under section 40103, the 

FAA is charged with prescribing 

regulations on: (1) The flight of aircraft, 

including regulations on safe altitudes; 

(2) the navigation, protection, and 

identification of aircraft; and (3) the safe 

and efficient use of the navigable 

airspace. Under section 44701, the FAA 

is charged with promoting safe flight of 

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civil aircraft in air commerce by 

prescribing regulations for practices, 

methods, and procedures the 

Administrator finds necessary for safety 

in air commerce. 

This final rule is within the scope of 

sections 40103 and 44701 because it 

promulgates aircraft performance 

requirements to meet advanced 

surveillance needs that will 

accommodate projected increases in 

operations within the NAS. As more 

aircraft operate within the U.S. airspace, 

improved surveillance performance is 

necessary to continue balancing air 

transportation growth with the agency’s 

mandate for a safe and efficient air 

transportation system. 

Projected Reporting, Record Keeping 

and Other Requirements 

As required by the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 

3507(d)), the FAA submitted a copy of 

the new information collection 

requirements in this final rule to the 

Office of Management and Budget for its 

review. See discussion in Section III 

elsewhere in this preamble. 

Overlapping, Duplicative, or 

Conflicting Federal Rules 

The FAA is not aware that the final 

rule will overlap, duplicate or conflict 

with existing Federal rules. 

Significant Issues Raised by Public 

Comments to the Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis 

In the NPRM, the FAA addressed the 

impact of the proposed rule on smallbusiness part 91, 121, and 135 operators 

with less than 1,500 employees. The 

proposal noted that a substantial 

number of small entities would be 

significantly affected by the proposed 

rule. 

One individual commented and 

challenged the assumption that only 

small businesses directly involved in 

aviation would be affected. The 

commenter explained that many 

businesses use aircraft indirectly in 

their operations and that higher aircraft 

equipage costs will affect overall 

business costs. The commenter believed 

that one half of all non-turbine GA 

aircraft are involved in small business 

activity. 

Publicly available data regarding 

internal company financial statistics for 

GA operators is limited. Therefore, the 

FAA estimated the financial impact by 

obtaining a sample population of GA 

operators from (1) the U.S. DOT Form 

41 filings, (2) World Aviation Directory, 

and (3) ReferenceUSA. The FAA 

applied this sample to U.S. Census 

Bureau data on the Small Business 

Administration Web site. This was done 

to develop an estimate of the total 

number of small businesses affected by 

the proposed rule. 

The FAA agrees that GA operators use 

airplanes for indirect business use and 

has determined that this final rule will 

have a significant impact on a 

substantial number of small businesses. 

Estimated Number of Small Firms 

Potentially Impacted 

Under the RFA, the FAA must 

determine whether a rule significantly 

affects a substantial number of small 

entities. This determination is typically 

based on small entity size and cost 

thresholds that vary depending on the 

affected industry. 

Using the size standards from the 

Small Business Administration for Air 

Transportation and Aircraft 

Manufacturing, the FAA defined 

companies as small entities if they have 

fewer than 1,500 employees. 

The FAA considered the economic 

impact on small-business part 91, 121, 

and 135 operators. Many of the GA 

aircraft that are operating under part 91 

are not for hire or flown for profit, so the 

FAA does not include these operators in 

its small business impact analysis. 

This final rule will become effective 

in 2020. Although the FAA forecasts 

traffic and air carrier fleets to 2040, our 

forecasts are of a generic nature and do 

not forecast the number of small 

entities. These forecasts also do not 

estimate whether an operator will still 

be in business or will be a small 

business entity. Therefore the FAA uses 

current U.S. operator’s revenues and 

applies the industry-provided costs to 

determine if this final rule will have a 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of small entity operators. 

The FAA obtained a list of part 91, 

121 and 135 U.S. operators from the 

FAA Flight Standards Service. Using 

information provided by the U.S. DOT 

Form 41 filings, World Aviation 

Directory, and ReferenceUSA, the FAA 

eliminated operators that are subsidiary 

businesses of larger businesses and 

businesses with more than 1,500 

employees from the list of small entities. 

In many cases, the employment and 

annual revenue data are not public, so 

the FAA did not include these 

companies in its analysis. For the 

remaining businesses, the FAA obtained 

company revenue and employment from 

the above three sources. 

The methodology discussed above 

resulted in a list of 34 U.S. part 91, 121 

and 135 operators, with less than 1,500 

employees, who operate 341 airplanes. 

Due to the sparse amount of publicly 

available data on internal company 

financial statistics for small entities, it 

was not feasible to estimate the total 

population of small entities affected by 

this final rule. The total population of 

U.S. part 91, 121 and 135 operators, 

with less than 1,500 employees, has the 

potential to be large. We used this 

sample set of small business operators 

to develop percentage estimates to apply 

to the U.S. Census Bureau data to 

estimate the population. 

These 34 U.S. small entity operators 

are a representative sample. The sample 

was used to assess the cost impact on 

the total population of small businesses 

who operate aircraft affected by this 

final rulemaking. This representative 

sample was then applied to the U.S. 

Census Bureau data on the Small 

Business Administration’s Web site to 

develop an estimate of the total number 

of affected small business entities. 

The U.S. Census Bureau data lists 

small entities in the air transportation 

industry that employ less than 500 

employees. Other small businesses may 

own aircraft and may not be included in 

the U.S. Census Bureau air 

transportation industry category. 

Therefore our estimate of the number of 

small entities affected by this final rule 

will likely be understated. The estimate 

of the total number of affected small 

entities is developed below. 

Cost and Affordability for Small 

Entities 

To assess the cost impact to small 

business part 91, 121 and 135 operators, 

the FAA contacted manufacturers, 

industry associations, and ADS–B 

equipage providers to estimate ADS–B 

equipage costs. The FAA requested 

estimates of airborne installation costs, 

by aircraft model, for the output 

parameters listed in the ‘‘Equipment 

Specifications’’ section of the Regulatory 

Impact Analysis. 

To satisfy the manufacturers’ request 

to keep individual aircraft pricing 

confidential, the FAA calculated low, 

baseline, and high range of costs by 

equipment class. The baseline estimate 

equals the average of the low and high 

industry cost estimates. The dollar value 

ranges consist of a wide variety of 

avionics within each aircraft group. The 

aircraft architecture within each 

equipment group can vary, causing 

different carriage, labor, and wiring 

requirements for the installation of 

ADS–B. Volume discounting, versus 

single line purchasing, also affects the 

dollar value ranges. On the low end, the 

dollar value may represent a software 

upgrade or original equipment 

manufacturer (OEM) option change. On 

the high end, the dollar value may 

represent a new installation of upgraded 

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avionic systems necessary to assure 

accuracy, reliability and safety. The 

FAA used the estimated baseline dollar 

value cost by equipment class in 

determining the impact to small 

business entities. 

The FAA estimated each operator’s 

total compliance cost as follows: 

Multiplying the baseline dollar value 

cost (by equipment class) by the number 

of aircraft each small business operator 

currently has in its fleet. The FAA 

summed these costs by equipment class 

and group. The FAA then measured the 

economic impact on small entities by 

dividing the estimated baseline dollar 

value compliance cost for their fleet by 

the small entity’s annual revenue. 

Each equipment group operated by a 

small entity may have to comply with 

different requirements in the final rule, 

depending on the state of the aircraft’s 

avionics. In the ‘‘ADS–B Out Equipage 

Cost Estimate’’ section of the Regulatory 

Impact Analysis, the FAA details its 

methodology to estimate operators’ total 

compliance cost by equipment group. 

For small entity operators in the 

sample population of 34 small aviation 

entities, the ADS–B cost is estimated to 

be: (1) Greater than 2% of annual 

revenues for about 35% of the operators; 

and (2) greater than 1% of annual 

revenues for about 54% of the operators. 

Applying these percentages to the air 

transportation industry category of the 

2006 U.S. Census Bureau data, the 

ADS–B cost is estimated to be: (1) 

Greater than 2% of annual revenues for 

at least 1,015 small entities; and (2) 

greater than 1% of annual revenues for 

at least 1,562 small entity operators. 

As a result of the above analysis, the 

FAA has determined that a substantial 

number of small entities will be 

significantly affected by the rule. Every 

small entity that operates an aircraft in 

the airspace defined by this final rule 

will be required to install ADS–B out 

equipage and therefore will be affected 

by this rulemaking. 

Business Closure Analysis 

For commercial operators, the ratio of 

costs to annual revenue shows that 7 of 

34 small business air operator firms 

would have ratios in excess of 5%. 

Since many of the other commercial 

small business air operator firms do not 

make their annual revenue publicly 

available, it is difficult to assess the 

financial impact of this final rule on 

their business. To fully assess whether 

this final rule could force a small entity 

into bankruptcy requires more financial 

information than is publicly available. 

In the NPRM, the FAA requested 

comment and supporting justification, 

from small entities, to assist the FAA in 

determining the degree of hardship the 

final rule will have on these entities. 

Comments were also requested on 

feasible alternative methods of 

compliance. The FAA did not receive 

any comments specific to this request. 

Competitive Analysis 

The aviation industry is an extremely 

competitive industry with slim profit 

margins. The number of operators who 

entered the industry and have stopped 

operations because of mergers, 

acquisitions, or bankruptcy litters the 

history of the aviation industry. 

The FAA analyzed five years of 

operating profits for the affected smallentity operators listed above, and was 

able to determine the operating profit 

for 18 of the 34 small business entities. 

The FAA discovered that the average 

operating profit for 33% of these 18 

affected operators was negative. Only 

four of the 18 affected operators had 

average annual operating profits that 

exceeded $10,000,000. 

In this competitive industry, cost 

increases imposed by this regulation 

will be hard to recover by raising prices, 

especially by those operators showing 

an average five-year negative operating 

profit. Further, large operators may be 

able to negotiate better pricing from 

outside firms for inspections and 

repairs, so small operators may need to 

raise their prices more than large 

operators. These factors make it difficult 

for small operators to recover their 

compliance costs by raising prices. If 

small operators cannot recover all the 

additional costs imposed by this 

regulation, market shares could shift to 

the large operators. 

Small operators successfully compete 

in the aviation industry by providing 

unique services and controlling costs. 

The extent to which affected small 

entities operate in niche markets will 

affect their ability to pass on costs. 

Currently small operators are much 

more profitable than established major 

scheduled carriers. This final rule will 

offset some of the advantages of lower 

capital costs of older aircraft. 

Overall, in terms of competition, this 

rulemaking reduces small operators’ 

ability to compete. 

Disproportionality Analysis 

The disproportionately higher impact 

of the final rule on the fleets of small 

operators results in disproportionately 

higher costs to small operators. Due to 

the potential of fleet discounts, large 

operators may be able to negotiate better 

pricing from outside sources for 

inspections, installation, and ADS–B 

hardware purchases. 

Based on the percent of potentially 

affected current airplanes over the 

analysis period, small U.S. business 

operators may bear a disproportionate 

impact from the final rule. 

Analysis of Alternatives 

Alternative One 

The status quo alternative has 

compliance costs to continue the 

operation and commissioning of radar 

sites. The FAA rejected this status quo 

alternative because it is becoming 

operationally obsolete to use groundbased radars to track congested airways 

and pass information among control 

centers for the duration of flights. The 

current system is not able to upgrade to 

the NextGen capabilities, nor 

accommodate the estimated increases in 

air traffic, which would result in 

mounting delays or limitations in 

service for many areas. 

Alternative Two 

Alternative Two would employ a 

technology called multilateration. 

Multilateration is a separate type of 

secondary surveillance system that is 

not radar-based and has limited 

deployment in the U.S. At a minimum, 

multilateration requires at least four 

ground stations to deliver the same 

volume of coverage and integrity of 

information as ADS–B, because of the 

need to ‘‘triangulate’’ the aircraft’s 

position. 

Multilateration is a process that 

determines aircraft position by using the 

difference in time of arrival of a signal 

from an aircraft at a series of receivers 

on the ground. Multilateration meets the 

need for accurate surveillance and is 

less costly than ADS–B (however, more 

costly than radar), but cannot achieve 

the same level of benefits as ADS–B, 

such as system capacity and 

environmental improvements. 

Multilateration would provide the same 

benefits as radar, but the FAA estimates 

that the cost of providing 

multilateration (including the cost to 

sustain radar until multilateration is 

operational), would exceed the cost to 

continue full radar surveillance. 

Alternative Three 

Alternative Three would provide 

relief by having the FAA provide an 

exemption to small air carriers from all 

requirements of this rule. This 

alternative would mean that small air 

carriers would rely on the status quo 

ground-based radars to track their flights 

and pass information among control 

centers for the duration of the flights. 

As discussed previously, ADS–B Out 

cannot be used effectively as the 

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primary surveillance system if certain 

categories of airspace users are subject 

to separate surveillance systems. The 

small air carriers operate in the same 

airspace as the larger carriers and 

general aviation. Such an exemption 

would require two primary surveillance 

systems, which adds the cost of an 

additional surveillance system without 

improving the existing benefits. Thus, 

this alternative is not considered to be 

acceptable. 

Alternative Four 

Alternative Four exempts smallpiston engine GA operators from the 

requirements of this final rule. This 

final rule provides minimal benefits to 

small-piston engine GA operators, while 

adding significant costs by mandating 

these operators to retrofit and equip 

about 150,000 small piston engine GA 

airplanes with ADS–B Out. Even though 

the FAA determined that the percentage 

of small piston engine GA airplanes 

operating at the top Operational 

Evolution Plan 35 airports is less than 

5%, the number of GA operations 

within a 30-nautical-mile radius of these 

airports is significant. This alternative 

was not considered acceptable because 

ADS–B equipage for all aircraft 

operating in the airspace subject to this 

rule is essential to gaining the overall 

stated ADS–B benefits, realizing savings 

associated with radar decommissioning, 

and the expansion of potential future 

benefits. 

Alternative Five 

This alternative is the final ADS–B 

rule. ADS–B does not employ different 

classes of receiving equipment or 

provide different information based on 

its location. Therefore, controllers will 

not have to account for transitions 

between surveillance solutions as an 

aircraft moves closer to or farther away 

from an airport. To address congestion 

and delay, fuel consumption, emissions, 

and future demand for air travel without 

significant delays or denial of service, 

the FAA found ADS–B to be the most 

cost-effective solution to maintain a 

viable air transportation system. ADS–B 

provides a wider range of services to 

aircraft users and could enable 

applications that are not available with 

multilateration or radar. 

International Trade Impact Analysis 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 

the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such the 

protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed 

the potential effect of this final rule and 

determined that it will impose the same 

unit costs on domestic and international 

entities and thus has a neutral trade 

impact. 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$136.1 million in lieu of $100 million. 

This rule is not expected to impose 

significant costs on small governmental 

jurisdictions such as State, local, or 

tribal governments. However, the rule 

will result in an unfunded mandate on 

the private sector because it will result 

in expenditures in excess of the $136.1 

million annual threshold. The FAA 

considered two alternatives to the rule, 

as described above, and four alternatives 

in the regulatory flexibility analysis 

described above. 

VI. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We 

determined that this action will not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, or the relationship between the 

Federal Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and, therefore, 

does not have federalism implications. 

VII. Regulations Affecting Intrastate 

Aviation in Alaska 

Section 1205 of the FAA 

Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 

3213) requires the FAA, when 

modifying its regulations in a manner 

affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to 

consider the extent to which Alaska is 

not served by transportation modes 

other than aviation, and to establish 

appropriate regulatory distinctions. The 

FAA did not receive any comments on 

whether the proposed rule should apply 

differently to intrastate aviation in 

Alaska. The FAA has determined, based 

on the administrative record of this 

rulemaking, that there is no need to 

make any regulatory distinctions 

applicable to intrastate aviation in 

Alaska. 

VIII. Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined that this 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 312f and involves no 

extraordinary circumstances. 

IX. Regulations That Significantly 

Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 

Use 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The 

FAA has determined that it is not a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under 

Executive Order 13211. This is because, 

while it is a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866 

and DOT’s Regulatory Policies and 

Procedures, it is not likely to have a 

significant adverse effect on the supply, 

distribution, or use of energy. In fact, 

adoption of this final rule offers the 

potential to produce reductions in 

energy use in the NAS. 

X. Availability of Rulemaking 

Documents 

You can get an electronic copy of 

rulemaking documents using the 

Internet by— 

1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal at http://www.regulations.gov; 

2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies Web page at http:// 

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or 

3. Accessing the Government Printing 

Office’s Web page at http:// 

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. 

You can also get a copy by sending a 

request to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 

ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue 

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 

calling (202) 267–9680. Be sure to 

identify the amendment number or 

docket number of this rulemaking. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 30193 

Anyone is able to search the 

electronic form of all comments 

received into any of our dockets by the 

name of the individual submitting the 

comment (or signing the comment, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 

65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78) or you 

may visit http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act 

The Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 

1996 requires the FAA to comply with 

small entity requests for information or 

advice about compliance with statutes 

and regulations within its jurisdiction. If 

you are a small entity and you have a 

question regarding this document, you 

may contact your local FAA official, or 

the person listed under the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the 

beginning of the preamble. You can find 

out more about SBREFA on the Internet 

at http://www.faa.gov/ 

regulations_policies/rulemaking/ 

sbre_act/. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91 

Aircraft, Airmen, Air traffic control, 

Aviation safety, Incorporation by 

Reference, Reporting, and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

The Amendment 

■ In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

amends chapter I of 14 CFR as follows: 

PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND 

FLIGHT RULES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 91 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1155, 40103, 

40113, 40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 

44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717, 

44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506– 

46507, 47122, 47508, 47528–47531, articles 

12 and 29 of the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation (61 stat. 1180). 

■ 2. Amend § 91.1 by revising paragraph 

(b) to read as follows: 

§ 91.1 Applicability. 

* * * * * 

(b) Each person operating an aircraft 

in the airspace overlying the waters 

between 3 and 12 nautical miles from 

the coast of the United States must 

comply with §§ 91.1 through 91.21; 

§§ 91.101 through 91.143; §§ 91.151 

through 91.159; §§ 91.167 through 

91.193; § 91.203; § 91.205; §§ 91.209 

through 91.217; § 91.221, § 91.225; 

§§ 91.303 through 91.319; §§ 91.323 

through 91.327; § 91.605; § 91.609; 

§§ 91.703 through 91.715; and § 91.903. 

* * * * * 

■ 3. Amend § 91.130 by revising 

paragraph (d) to read as follows: 

§ 91.130 Operations in Class C airspace. 

* * * * * 

(d) Equipment requirements. Unless 

otherwise authorized by the ATC having 

jurisdiction over the Class C airspace 

area, no person may operate an aircraft 

within a Class C airspace area 

designated for an airport unless that 

aircraft is equipped with the applicable 

equipment specified in § 91.215, and 

after January 1, 2020, § 91.225. 

* * * * * 

■ 4. Amend § 91.131 by revising 

paragraph (d) to read as follows: 

§ 91.131 Operations in Class B airspace. 

* * * * * 

(d) Other equipment requirements. No 

person may operate an aircraft in a Class 

B airspace area unless the aircraft is 

equipped with— 

(1) The applicable operating 

transponder and automatic altitude 

reporting equipment specified in 

§ 91.215 (a), except as provided in 

§ 91.215 (e), and 

(2) After January 1, 2020, the 

applicable Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast Out equipment 

specified in § 91.225. 

■ 5. Amend § 91.135 by revising 

paragraph (c) to read as follows: 

§ 91.135 Operations in Class A airspace. 

* * * * * 

(c) Equipment requirements. Unless 

otherwise authorized by ATC, no person 

may operate an aircraft within Class A 

airspace unless that aircraft is equipped 

with the applicable equipment specified 

in § 91.215, and after January 1, 2020, 

§ 91.225. 

* * * * * 

■ 6. Amend § 91.217 by redesignating 

paragraphs (a) through (c) as paragraphs 

(a)(1) through (a)(3), redesignating the 

introductory text as paragraph (a) 

introductory text, and by adding 

paragraph (b) to read as follows: 

§ 91.217 Data correspondence between 

automatically reported pressure altitude 

data and the pilot’s altitude reference. 

* * * * * 

(b) No person may operate any 

automatic pressure altitude reporting 

equipment associated with a radar 

beacon transponder or with ADS–B Out 

equipment unless the pressure altitude 

reported for ADS–B Out and Mode C/S 

is derived from the same source for 

aircraft equipped with both a 

transponder and ADS–B Out. 

■ 7. Add § 91.225 to read as follows: 

§ 91.225 Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) Out 

equipment and use. 

(a) After January 1, 2020, and unless 

otherwise authorized by ATC, no person 

may operate an aircraft in Class A 

airspace unless the aircraft has 

equipment installed that— 

(1) Meets the requirements in TSO– 

C166b, Extended Squitter Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 

(ADS–B) and Traffic Information 

Service-Broadcast (TIS–B) Equipment 

Operating on the Radio Frequency of 

1090 Megahertz (MHz); and 

(2) Meets the requirements of 

§ 91.227. 

(b) After January 1, 2020, and unless 

otherwise authorized by ATC, no person 

may operate an aircraft below 18,000 

feet MSL and in airspace described in 

paragraph (d) of this section unless the 

aircraft has equipment installed that— 

(1) Meets the requirements in— 

(i) TSO–C166b; or 

(ii) TSO–C154c, Universal Access 

Transceiver (UAT) Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 

(ADS–B) Equipment Operating on the 

Frequency of 978 MHz; 

(2) Meets the requirements of 

§ 91.227. 

(c) Operators with equipment 

installed with an approved deviation 

under § 21.618 of this chapter also are 

in compliance with this section. 

(d) After January 1, 2020, and unless 

otherwise authorized by ATC, no person 

may operate an aircraft in the following 

airspace unless the aircraft has 

equipment installed that meets the 

requirements in paragraph (b) of this 

section: 

(1) Class B and Class C airspace areas; 

(2) Except as provided for in 

paragraph (e) of this section, within 30 

nautical miles of an airport listed in 

appendix D, section 1 to this part from 

the surface upward to 10,000 feet MSL; 

(3) Above the ceiling and within the 

lateral boundaries of a Class B or Class 

C airspace area designated for an airport 

upward to 10,000 feet MSL; 

(4) Except as provided in paragraph 

(e) of this section, Class E airspace 

within the 48 contiguous states and the 

District of Columbia at and above 10,000 

feet MSL, excluding the airspace at and 

below 2,500 feet above the surface; and 

(5) Class E airspace at and above 3,000 

feet MSL over the Gulf of Mexico from 

the coastline of the United States out to 

12 nautical miles. 

(e) The requirements of paragraph (b) 

of this section do not apply to any 

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aircraft that was not originally 

certificated with an electrical system, or 

that has not subsequently been certified 

with such a system installed, including 

balloons and gliders. These aircraft may 

conduct operations without ADS–B Out 

in the airspace specified in paragraphs 

(d)(2) and (d)(4) of this section. 

Operations authorized by this section 

must be conducted— 

(1) Outside any Class B or Class C 

airspace area; and 

(2) Below the altitude of the ceiling of 

a Class B or Class C airspace area 

designated for an airport, or 10,000 feet 

MSL, whichever is lower. 

(f) Each person operating an aircraft 

equipped with ADS–B Out must operate 

this equipment in the transmit mode at 

all times. 

(g) Requests for ATC authorized 

deviations from the requirements of this 

section must be made to the ATC 

facility having jurisdiction over the 

concerned airspace within the time 

periods specified as follows: 

(1) For operation of an aircraft with an 

inoperative ADS–B Out, to the airport of 

ultimate destination, including any 

intermediate stops, or to proceed to a 

place where suitable repairs can be 

made or both, the request may be made 

at any time. 

(2) For operation of an aircraft that is 

not equipped with ADS–B Out, the 

request must be made at least 1 hour 

before the proposed operation. 

(h) The standards required in this 

section are incorporated by reference 

with the approval of the Director of the 

Office of the Federal Register under 5 

U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All 

approved materials are available for 

inspection at the FAA’s Office of 

Rulemaking (ARM–1), 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202– 

267–9677), or at the National Archives 

and Records Administration (NARA). 

For information on the availability of 

this material at NARA, call 202–741– 

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/code_of_federal_ 

regulations/ibr_locations.html. This 

material is also available from the 

sources indicated in paragraphs (h)(1) 

and (h)(2) of this section. 

(1) Copies of Technical Standard 

Order (TSO)–C166b, Extended Squitter 

Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS–B) and Traffic 

Information Service-Broadcast (TIS–B) 

Equipment Operating on the Radio 

Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz) 

(December 2, 2009) and TSO–C154c, 

Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) 

Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS–B) Equipment 

Operating on the Frequency of 978 MHz 

(December 2, 2009) may be obtained 

from the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Subsequent Distribution 

Office, DOT Warehouse M30, Ardmore 

East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th 

Avenue, Landover, MD 20785; 

telephone (301) 322–5377. Copies of 

TSO –C166B and TSO–C154c are also 

available on the FAA’s Web site, at 

http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/ 

design_approvals/tso/. Select the link 

‘‘Search Technical Standard Orders.’’ 

(2) Copies of Section 2, Equipment 

Performance Requirements and Test 

Procedures, of RTCA DO–260B, 

Minimum Operational Performance 

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended 

Squitter Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) and 

Traffic Information Services-Broadcast 

(TIS–B), December 2, 2009 (referenced 

in TSO–C166b) and Section 2, 

Equipment Performance Requirements 

and Test Procedures, of RTCA DO– 

282B, Minimum Operational 

Performance Standards for Universal 

Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 

(ADS–B), December 2, 2009 (referenced 

in TSO C–154c) may be obtained from 

RTCA, Inc., 1828 L Street, NW., Suite 

805, Washington, DC 20036–5133, 

telephone 202–833–9339. Copies of 

RTCA DO–260B and RTCA DO–282B 

are also available on RTCA Inc.’s Web 

site, at http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/ 

allproducts.cfm. 

■ 8. Add § 91.227 to read as follows: 

§ 91.227 Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) Out 

equipment performance requirements. 

(a) Definitions. For the purposes of 

this section: 

ADS–B Out is a function of an 

aircraft’s onboard avionics that 

periodically broadcasts the aircraft’s 

state vector (3-dimensional position and 

3-dimensional velocity) and other 

required information as described in 

this section. 

Navigation Accuracy Category for 

Position (NACP) specifies the accuracy 

of a reported aircraft’s position, as 

defined in TSO–C166b and TSO–C154c. 

Navigation Accuracy Category for 

Velocity (NACV) specifies the accuracy 

of a reported aircraft’s velocity, as 

defined in TSO–C166b and TSO–C154c. 

Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) 

specifies an integrity containment 

radius around an aircraft’s reported 

position, as defined in TSO–C166b and 

TSO–C154c. 

Position Source refers to the 

equipment installed onboard an aircraft 

used to process and provide aircraft 

position (for example, latitude, 

longitude, and velocity) information. 

Source Integrity Level (SIL) indicates 

the probability of the reported 

horizontal position exceeding the 

containment radius defined by the NIC 

on a per sample or per hour basis, as 

defined in TSO–C166b and TSO–C154c. 

System Design Assurance (SDA) 

indicates the probability of an aircraft 

malfunction causing false or misleading 

information to be transmitted, as 

defined in TSO–C166b and TSO–C154c. 

Total latency is the total time between 

when the position is measured and 

when the position is transmitted by the 

aircraft. 

Uncompensated latency is the time 

for which the aircraft does not 

compensate for latency. 

(b) 1090 MHz ES and UAT Broadcast 

Links and Power Requirements— 

(1) Aircraft operating in Class A 

airspace must have equipment installed 

that meets the antenna and power 

output requirements of Class A1, A1S, 

A2, A3, B1S, or B1 equipment as 

defined in TSO–C166b, Extended 

Squitter Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) and 

Traffic Information Service-Broadcast 

(TIS–B) Equipment Operating on the 

Radio Frequency of 1090 Megahertz 

(MHz). 

(2) Aircraft operating in airspace 

designated for ADS–B Out, but outside 

of Class A airspace, must have 

equipment installed that meets the 

antenna and output power requirements 

of either: 

(i) Class A1, A1S, A2, A3, B1S, or B1 

as defined in TSO–C166b; or 

(ii) Class A1H, A1S, A2, A3, B1S, or 

B1 equipment as defined in TSO–C154c, 

Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance– 

Broadcast (ADS–B) Equipment 

Operating on the Frequency of 978 

MHz. 

(c) ADS–B Out Performance 

Requirements for NAC P, NACV, NIC, 

SDA, and SIL— 

(1) For aircraft broadcasting ADS–B 

Out as required under § 91.225 (a) and 

(b)— 

(i) The aircraft’s NACP must be less 

than 0.05 nautical miles; 

(ii) The aircraft’s NACV must be less 

than 10 meters per second; 

(iii) The aircraft’s NIC must be less 

than 0.2 nautical miles; 

(iv) The aircraft’s SDA must be 2; and 

(v) The aircraft’s SIL must be 3. 

(2) Changes in NACP, NACV, SDA, 

and SIL must be broadcast within 10 

seconds. 

(3) Changes in NIC must be broadcast 

within 12 seconds. 

(d) Minimum Broadcast Message 

Element Set for ADS–B Out. Each 

aircraft must broadcast the following 

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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 103 / Friday, May 28, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 30195 

information, as defined in TSO–C166b 

or TSO–C154c. The pilot must enter 

information for message elements listed 

in paragraphs (d)(7) through (d)(10) of 

this section during the appropriate 

phase of flight. 

(1) The length and width of the 

aircraft; 

(2) An indication of the aircraft’s 

latitude and longitude; 

(3) An indication of the aircraft’s 

barometric pressure altitude; 

(4) An indication of the aircraft’s 

velocity; 

(5) An indication if TCAS II or ACAS 

is installed and operating in a mode that 

can generate resolution advisory alerts; 

(6) If an operable TCAS II or ACAS is 

installed, an indication if a resolution 

advisory is in effect; 

(7) An indication of the Mode 3/A 

transponder code specified by ATC; 

(8) An indication of the aircraft’s call 

sign that is submitted on the flight plan, 

or the aircraft’s registration number, 

except when the pilot has not filed a 

flight plan, has not requested ATC 

services, and is using a TSO–C154c selfassigned temporary 24-bit address; 

(9) An indication if the flightcrew has 

identified an emergency, radio 

communication failure, or unlawful 

interference; 

(10) An indication of the aircraft’s 

‘‘IDENT’’ to ATC; 

(11) An indication of the aircraft 

assigned ICAO 24-bit address, except 

when the pilot has not filed a flight 

plan, has not requested ATC services, 

and is using a TSO–C154c self-assigned 

temporary 24-bit address; 

(12) An indication of the aircraft’s 

emitter category; 

(13) An indication of whether an 

ADS–B In capability is installed; 

(14) An indication of the aircraft’s 

geometric altitude; 

(15) An indication of the Navigation 

Accuracy Category for Position (NACP); 

(16) An indication of the Navigation 

Accuracy Category for Velocity (NACV); 

(17) An indication of the Navigation 

Integrity Category (NIC); 

(18) An indication of the System 

Design Assurance (SDA); and 

(19) An indication of the Source 

Integrity Level (SIL). 

(e) ADS–B Latency Requirements— 

(1) The aircraft must transmit its 

geometric position no later than 2.0 

seconds from the time of measurement 

of the position to the time of 

transmission. 

(2) Within the 2.0 total latency 

allocation, a maximum of 0.6 seconds 

can be uncompensated latency. The 

aircraft must compensate for any latency 

above 0.6 seconds up to the maximum 

2.0 seconds total by extrapolating the 

geometric position to the time of 

message transmission. 

(3) The aircraft must transmit its 

position and velocity at least once per 

second while airborne or while moving 

on the airport surface. 

(4) The aircraft must transmit its 

position at least once every 5 seconds 

while stationary on the airport surface. 

(f) Equipment with an approved 

deviation. Operators with equipment 

installed with an approved deviation 

under § 21.618 of this chapter also are 

in compliance with this section. 

(g) Incorporation by Reference. The 

standards required in this section are 

incorporated by reference with the 

approval of the Director of the Office of 

the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved 

materials are available for inspection at 

the FAA’s Office of Rulemaking (ARM– 

1), 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202– 

267–9677), or at the National Archives 

and Records Administration (NARA). 

For information on the availability of 

this material at NARA, call 202–741– 

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/code_of_federal_ 

regulations/ibr_locations.html. This 

material is also available from the 

sources indicated in paragraphs (g)(1) 

and (g)(2) of this section. 

(1) Copies of Technical Standard 

Order (TSO)–C166b, Extended Squitter 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance– 

Broadcast (ADS–B) and Traffic 

Information Service–Broadcast (TIS–B) 

Equipment Operating on the Radio 

Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz) 

(December 2, 2009) and TSO–C154c, 

Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance– 

Broadcast (ADS–B) Equipment 

Operating on the Frequency of 978 MHz 

(December 2, 2009) may be obtained 

from the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Subsequent Distribution 

Office, DOT Warehouse M30, Ardmore 

East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th 

Avenue, Landover, MD 20785; 

telephone (301) 322–5377. Copies of 

TSO –C166B and TSO–C154c are also 

available on the FAA’s Web site, at 

http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/ 

design_approvals/tso/. Select the link 

‘‘Search Technical Standard Orders.’’ 

(2) Copies of Section 2, Equipment 

Performance Requirements and Test 

Procedures, of RTCA DO–260B, 

Minimum Operational Performance 

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended 

Squitter Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) and 

Traffic Information Services-Broadcast 

(TIS–B), December 2, 2009 (referenced 

in TSO–C166b) and Section 2, 

Equipment Performance Requirements 

and Test Procedures, of RTCA DO– 

282B, Minimum Operational 

Performance Standards for Universal 

Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 

(ADS–B), December 2, 2009 (referenced 

in TSO C–154c) may be obtained from 

RTCA, Inc., 1828 L Street, NW., Suite 

805, Washington, DC 20036–5133, 

telephone 202–833–9339. Copies of 

RTCA DO–260B and RTCA DO–282B 

are also available on RTCA Inc.’s Web 

site, at http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/ 

allproducts.cfm. 

9. Amend appendix D to part 91 by 

revising section 1 introductory text to 

read as follows: 

APPENDIX D TO PART 91— 

AIRPORTS/LOCATIONS: SPECIAL 

OPERATING RESTRICTIONS 

Section 1. Locations at which the 

requirements of § 91.215(b)(2) and 

§ 91.225(d)(2) apply. The requirements of 

§§ 91.215(b)(2) and 91.225(d)(2) apply below 

10,000 feet above the surface within a 30- 

nautical-mile radius of each location in the 

following list. 

* * * * * 

Issued in Washington, DC, on May 21, 

2010. 

J. Randolph Babbitt, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2010–12645 Filed 5–27–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

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