In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-2225

LEROY EPPS and ROBERT VENABLE, III,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CREDITNET, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 00-C-1451—John Paul Godich, Magistrate Judge.

____________

ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2002—DECIDED FEBRUARY 28, 2003

____________

Before CUDAHY, COFFEY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit

Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Leroy Epps and Robert Venable, III appeal a summary judgment entered

against them in their suit against defendant Creditnet,

alleging that Creditnet’s earlier action in Indiana Small

Claims Court for check deception violated the Indiana

Uniform Consumer Credit Code’s limitation on charges

associated with consumer loans. Because the Small Claims

Court’s judgment of civil damages for check deception is

a valid state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine denies the district court and this court subject mat-
2 No. 02-2225

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-5-5 reads in part:

(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally issues or delivers

a check, a draft, or an order on a credit institution for the

payment of or to acquire money or other property, knowing

that it will not be paid or honored by the credit institution

upon presentment in the usual course of business, commits

check deception, a Class A misdemeanor.

ter jurisdiction to review that prior state court decision.

We remand to the district court with instructions to

dismiss.

I.

Leroy Epps and Robert Venable (Plaintiffs) both financed

the purchase of automobiles using a retail installment

contract that they entered into with Auto Advantage

Corporation. Auto Advantage subsequently assigned all

right, title and interest in the contracts to defendant

Creditnet, Inc. (Creditnet). Epps tendered a check of

$330.00 to Creditnet in payment of an installment of his

contract that was returned unpaid to Creditnet because

of insufficient funds. Venable tendered a check of $280.38

to Creditnet in payment of an installment of his contract

that was returned unpaid to Creditnet because Venable

did not have an account at the drawee bank. Creditnet

sent both Epps and Venable a letter notifying them that

their respective checks had not been honored. Neither

Epps nor Venable has ever made good on his respective

check.

In September 1999, Creditnet and attorney Charles

Sheeks (as debt collector for Creditnet) filed suit against

both Epps and Venable in Marion County, Indiana,

Small Claims Court for $990.00 and $841.14, respectively.

The suits were filed under Indiana Code §§ 35-43-5-5,1
No. 02-2225 3

2 Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1 reads in part:

If a person suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation

of Ind. Code § 35-43, Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3, Ind. Code

§ 35-42-3-4, or Ind. Code § 35-45-9, the person may bring a

civil action against the person who caused the loss for the

following:

(1) An amount not to exceed three (3) times the actual

damages of the person suffering the loss.

(2) The costs of the action.

(3) A reasonable attorney’s fee.

***

(7) All other reasonable costs of collection.

3 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that:

Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly

provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of

(continued...)

34-24-3-1,2 the Indiana check deception statutes criminalizing the intentional delivery of a bad check and providing the victim a civil action for treble damages for such

a criminal violation. Judgment was thereafter entered

against Epps and Venable for treble damages.

A year later, Epps and Venable filed suit in federal court

in the Southern District of Indiana against Creditnet

and Sheeks alleging in count I a class claim under the

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1692 et seq., against Sheeks only; in count II a class

claim under the Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code

(IUCCC), Ind. Code §§ 24-4.5-1-1 et seq., against Creditnet

only; and in count III an individual claim under the FDCPA

against Sheeks for attempting to collect from Venable a

debt that had been discharged in bankruptcy. The district

court purported to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the state law claim in count II under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a).3
4 No. 02-2225

3 (...continued)

which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same

case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include

claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional

parties.

4 The court granted in part and denied in part the cross-motions

for summary judgment of Sheeks and the Plaintiffs with respect to counts I & III. Summary judgment on those counts is

not before us on appeal.

The claim in count II against Creditnet alleged that the

IUCCC limited penalties for bad checks to $20, Ind. Code

§ 24-4.5-3-202(1)(f), and that the “seeking or collecting” of

any amount above the allowed $20 made Creditnet liable

“to cancel or make restitution of the excess charges.”

Complaint at ¶72. On cross-motions for summary judgment on a stipulated record, the district court granted

Creditnet’s motion for summary judgment on count II.4

 The

district court found that the IUCCC did not conflict with

the Indiana criminal and civil bad check statutes, and

that the IUCCC did not preclude civil liability for violation of the bad check statutes. Further, the court ruled

that the IUCCC is concerned with charges in a consumer

loan contract, not with limiting liability for criminal check

deception. The district court entered final judgment on

the claims brought against Creditnet in April 2002. This

appeal followed.

II.

A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed

de novo, construing all facts and drawing all reasonable
No. 02-2225 5

5 Rooker-Feldman was mentioned but not argued by Creditnet

in the district court. The district court, in a footnote, found the

doctrine inapplicable because “Plaintiffs’ claims are predicated

upon actions by Mr. Sheeks that occurred before the small claims

court entered judgment.” App. at 9 n.1. While this may be true

with respect to the FDCPA claim against Sheeks, the statement

does not address the IUCCC claim against Creditnet before us

in the present case.

inferences from those facts in favor of the non-moving

party. Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 326 (7th

Cir. 2002). The parties have stipulated to all of the facts

in this case, and the only questions for us are issues of

interpretation of state law, which are also reviewed de novo.

Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rugg & Knopp, Inc., 165 F.3d 1087,

1090 (7th Cir. 1999). A district court’s determination that

it has subject matter jurisdiction is additionally one that

we review de novo. Daniels v. Area Plan Comm’n, 306 F.3d

445, 452 (7th Cir. 2002).

The first and dispositive issue that we must address

concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Creditnet argues

that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5 See, e.g., Dist. of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a principle of jurisdiction that

precludes the lower federal courts from applying appellate review to state court decisions. An action in federal

court that alleges an injury “inextricably intertwined” with

a state court decision, such that success in the federal court

would require overturning the state court decision, is

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Lewis v.

Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2002); Edwards

v. Illinois Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, 261 F.3d 723, 729

(7th Cir. 2001). Epps and Venable’s suit against Creditnet attacks the validity of the Indiana state court’s treble
6 No. 02-2225

damages judgment and is, therefore, an action over

which the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Epps and Venable’s claim arises under Indiana’s Uniform

Consumer Credit Code, which provides, in part,

(1) In addition to the loan finance charge permitted

by [other IUCCC code sections], a lender may contract for and receive the following additional charges

in connection with a consumer loan:

***

(f) A charge not to exceed twenty dollars ($20) for each

return by a bank . . . of a dishonered check . . . issued

by the debtor.

Ind. Code § 24-4.5-3-202(1)(f). Epps and Venable allege

that the treble damages assessed under the bad check

statutes are not authorized by the IUCCC. The Plaintiffs

also allege that under the IUCCC they cannot be required to pay such “excess charges” and can recover damages for the assessment of “excess charges.” Ind. Code § 24-

4.5-5-202(3)-(4); see also Complaint at ¶72. Their prayer

for relief asks the district court to set aside the judgment

of the Marion County Small Claims Court and “refund”

(constructively, since the damages have not been paid) the

damages assessed by the state court against Epps and

Venable. According to the Plaintiffs, we should find that

the application by the Small Claims Court of the bad

check statutes was in error because the IUCCC preempts

the bad check statutes. Thus, the claim before us is inextricably intertwined with the civil bad check claim previously adjudicated by the state court.

Epps and Venable argue that their claim does not ask

us to review the state court judgment because their

claim arose at the time Creditnet filed its suit in state

court and exists regardless of the state court’s ultimate
No. 02-2225 7

adjudication. But the Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the

IUCCC is fundamentally flawed. The Plaintiffs were not

liable under the civil bad check statutes until the state

court entered judgment against them. Indiana law

makes treble damages available in a civil action, but

damages do not lie until a court has found liability, determined damages and entered judgment.

Epps and Venable try to avoid this result by recharacterizing the Small Claims action as an enforcement

action “to collect the excess charge.” Appellants’ Br. at 16.

This argument is specious. The state court action in

question clearly was not an enforcement action. The

purpose of the state court action was to seek a determination of legal liability and damages. Therefore, the “charge”

against which the Plaintiffs’ current suit was filed did

not come into existence prior to judgment, and the Plaintiffs’ current suit has as its principal purpose the invalidation of that judgment. Contrary to the assertions of Epps

and Venable, if the underlying Small Claims state court

action had never gone to judgment, there would be no

“charge” and, consequently, nothing to be set aside by the

present suit.

Epps and Venable cite an unpublished district court

opinion and an unpublished district court order to support their position. But these cases are not helpful. Witt

v. Westfield Acceptance Corp., No. IP 00-1001-CS/H, 2002

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7821 (S.D. Ind. March 25, 2002), also

involved state law claims under the IUCCC. Witt also

sought to overturn a treble damages award under Indiana state law. In addition, she claimed that she was

not challenging the judgment but instead challenging

the filing of the lawsuit to collect more than the charges

allowable under the IUCCC. Id. The district court dismissed this count of the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. Epps and Venable note that a co-plaintiff

in Witt raising identical claims did not suffer dismissal.
8 No. 02-2225

They want us to infer that this co-plaintiff’s claims under

the IUCCC went forward in the face of Rooker-Feldman.

The conclusion, argue Epps and Venable, is that Witt’s

claim that the IUCCC defeated the prayer for treble

damages would also have been justiciable in the face of

Rooker-Feldman. Appellants’ Br. at 17. But it is pure

speculation whether the co-plaintiff’s claim went forward

in the face of a Rooker-Feldman challenge and whether

Witt’s claim would have been justiciable if it had survived

the statute of limitations. We find this argument unpersuasive.

In addition, the refusal of the district court in Brooks

v. Auto Sales & Service, Inc., No. IP 00-1467-CM/S, 2001

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8059 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2001), to dismiss an FDCPA claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, is similarly unpersuasive. The court in Brooks found

that Rooker-Feldman did not bar an FDCPA claim in

federal court when an attorney acting as a debt collector

had filed suit in Small Claims Court for amounts due on

a retail installment contract plus attorney’s fees. Id. The

federal suit, the court found, arose before the entry of

judgment in the state action. The cause of action in Brooks,

however, stemmed from conduct allegedly in violation of

15 U.S.C. § 1692e, which prohibits certain types of representations in the course of collecting a debt. The representation at issue was the filing of a suit requesting attorney’s fees that the plaintiffs alleged was false, deceptive

or misleading. The present case is not an FDCPA case,

and it does not involve the representations made in filings in the Small Claims Court (despite Plaintiffs’ assertion to the contrary). Instead, it involves the entry of a

money judgment against Epps and Venable.

The Plaintiffs further seek to avoid the bar of RookerFeldman by attempting to diminish the weight of the state

court decision. Indiana law commands that a “small claims

court shall not be a court of record.” Ind. Code § 33-11.6-1-4.
No. 02-2225 9

Indiana Rule of Small Claims Court 11(f) states that a

“judgment shall be res judicata only as to the amount

involved in the particular action and shall not be considered an adjudication of any fact at issue in any other action or court.” The Plaintiffs argue that because the Small

Claims decision would have no preclusive effect in a subsequent action, it is not entitled to deference under RookerFeldman. But Plaintiffs’ argument merely reinforces our

belief that the state judgment carries the day here. The

judgment of the Small Claims Court is final with respect

to its amount, which is the only determination at issue

in the present case. Epps and Venable are attacking the

treble damages assessed by the state court as an “excess charge” under the IUCCC. Without reference to the

amount of the state court judgment, their suit has no

meaning.

Epps and Venable’s argument that they may still be

able to obtain review of the Small Claims Court’s decision

in an Indiana state court supports our conclusion that

we have no jurisdiction over this state law claim. Reply

Br. at 21-22 (“Plaintiffs have a continuing right to seek

appellate review of the Small Claims Court’s Judgment . . . . Plaintiffs have not lost their ability to challenge the Small Claims Court’s Judgment directly.”). The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine blocks the Plaintiffs’ attempt

to use the federal courts as a substitute appellate tribunal for the state courts.

III.

Epps and Venable cannot allege a “charge” sufficient to

support a violation of the IUCCC without a legally binding obligation to pay the treble damages award in question. The treble damages award is enforceable only by

virtue of the state judgment assessing liability. Therefore, we are asked to review and possibly reverse the
10 No. 02-2225

6 Epps and Venable also requested, in the alternative, that we

certify certain questions of Indiana state law allegedly relevant

to the merits of this case to the Indiana Supreme Court for

resolution. Given that Messrs. Epps and Venable filed this

undeniably state law claim in federal court and then vigorously

fought to maintain supplemental jurisdiction in the district court,

we find this request somewhat disingenuous. If what the Plaintiffs argue is meritorious, and they can still attack the Small

Claims Court judgment in state court, then we will have done

them one better by dismissing this case and giving Epps and

Venable the opportunity to litigate this case in the appropriate

state forum.

USCA-02-C-0072—2-28-03

judgment of a state court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

holds that we lack subject matter jurisdiction for such a

review.6

 Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the

district court and REMAND with instructions to dismiss.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit