### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Ma rch 18, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1363 9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 2- 00 25 7- CR-T-2 3- TGW UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us ALVIN SMITH, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ar ch 18, 200 5) Be fo re T JO FL A T , RO N E Y and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: On Fe bruary

5, 2003, following a j ury trial in the United State s DistrictSe c tio n 2 25 1( a ) p ro vid e s: 1 Any person who e mploy s, uses, persua des, induce s, entices, or coer ces a ny minor to eng ag e in . . . any

sexually expli cit conduct f

or the purpose of produc ing a ny visual depiction of such c onduct, shall be punished . . . if suc h person knows or has re ason to know that such visual de piction will be transported in interstate or fo re ign c omm e rc e or

ma ile d, if

that vi su a l de pic tio n w a s p ro du c e d u sin gmate ri a ls that have be en mailed, shipped, or transporte d in interstate or f oreign commerc e by any means, includingby

computer, or

if such visual depic tion has actua lly been transporte d in interstate or f oreign commerc e or ma iled. Se c tio n 2 25 2A (a )( 5) (B ) p ro vid e s: 2 Any pe rs on wh o . . . kn ow ing ly

po sse sse s a

ny bo ok , ma g a zine , p e ri od ic a l, f ilm , vid e ota pe , c omp ute r d isk , o r a

ny oth e r m ate ri a l th at c onta ins an im a g e of c hil d pornography

that has bee n mailed, or shipped or transporte d in interstate or fore ign c ommerce by

any means, includingby

computer, or

that was produc ed using materials that have been ma iled, or shipped or tra nsported in interstate or fore ign c ommerce by

any means, includingby

computer . . . sha ll be punished. . . . 2 Co urt f or the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida , A lvi n S m ithw as c onvi ct ed of one c ount of pr oduc ing c hil d po rn ogr ap hy in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 22 51( a) and o ne c ount 1 of pos se ssi ng c hil d po rn ogr ap hy in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ). T he 2 co ur t s en te nc edhi m

to 18 8 m on th s i n p ris on an d 6 0 m on th s o f supe rv is edrel eas e. Sm ithappe al ed

and f ile d hi s op en ing br ie f on M ay 4, 200 4. O n O ct obe r 1, 200 4, in United States v. Maxwe ll, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004 ), this court held th at purely intrastate possessio n of child porno graphy wa s not conv erted “ into an ac tiv ity sub j ec t t o C om

m er ce Cl au se r eg ulatio n” sim ply be ca use “ the dis ks o n w hic h th e por

nogr ap hy w as ult im at el y

c opi ed tr av el ed , w he n bl an k, to Fl or ida fr om som ep la ce out sid e of

F lor ida . ” I d. a t 10 68. Maxw el l ne ce ssari ly c as ts d oubt on S m ith ’ s c onvi ct ionbe ca use the a sse rt ed

ba sis f or f ed er al j ur isd ic tio n ov er

hisAfter oral a rgument, we r equeste d that counsel submit supplemental letter memor anda 3 a dd re ssi ngthe e xtent to wh ic h M axwe ll a nd L e vy sh ou ld i nf

or m ou r r e so lut ion

of thi s a pp e a l. 3 of fe nse s is that the f

ilm , pho to p ap er , and f

ilm pr oc es sor

use d to pr oduc e the pic tur es he pos se sse d ha d tr av el ed in int er state c om

m er ce som et im e be fo re be ing u s e dt o p r o du c e th e m. Be fo re de te rm ini ng whe the r Ma xw el l c ontro ls this c as e, how ev er , w e m ust fi rs t de te rm ine w he the r it is r el ev an t at a ll in l igh t of anothe r re ce nt d ec isi on o f thi s c ourt. I n U nit ed

S ta te s v. L ev y , 379 F . 3d 1 241, r eh ’ g e n banc de nie d, 391 F. 3d 1 327 (1 1thCi r. 200 4) , w e he ld tha t the une xc ep tio na l r ule that i ssu es not br ie fe d are de em ed

w ai ve d a ppl ie s e ve n to the e xc ep tio na l c as e whe re the de fe ndant s ee ks t o r ai se ac la im that w as squ ar el y

f or ec los ed by our own pr ec ed en t at the tim e his openin g brief w as filed but has since been m ade viable by an in te rv en in g d eci si on . Id. at12 41 -4 2; see als o Lev y , 39 1 F .3dat 1 33 6 (Tjo fla t, J ., dis se nti ng f

ro m the de nia l of

r eh eari ng e n banc ) (o bse rv ing that i t w as “ ce rt ai nly unde rs tanda

ble ” that the de fe ndant d id n ot r ai se the “ w ai ve d” c la im in his ope nin g br ie f gi ve n t ha t o urown pre ced en t “ un equi vo cal ly rejectedth e sa m e arg um en t” ). U nde r L ev y , Ma xw el l do es not appl y unl es s S m itha dvanc ed

a Ma xw el l- ty

pe claim in his op ening brief. I n his supplem ental letter m em orandum , Sm ith argues 3 that tw o of

the iss ue s r ai se d inhis ope nin g br ie f fa ir ly e nc om pa ss the Ma xw el l4

i s s u e ; th e Go v e rn men td i s a g r e e s . Al th o u g h S mi th ’s b r i e f i s n o tamo d e l o f

c l ar i ty, in ligh t of the principle that we “ liberally rea d briefs to ascerta in the issu es raised on ap pe al ,” Uni te d S ta te s v . Sta rk e, 62 F.3d13 74 , 13 79 (11 th Cir . 19 95 ), we c o n c l u d e th a tS mi th h a s s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e s e n t e dth e M a x w e l l i s s u e . Ac c o r d i n g l y, L ev y doe s no t pr ec lud e him

f ro m r el y ing on M ax w el l, a lth oughw e w ill r ev ie wthe is su e o nl y

forpl ai n e rro r be cau se Sm it h d idno t ra is e itat t ria l. InP ar t I , w e br ie fl y

r ec ount the f ac ts o f thi s c as e. I n P ar

t I I, w e ad dr es s th e L e v y i s s u e . I nP artI I I , w e a d dr e s s S mi th ’s M a x w e l l c l a i m. I. InMarc h 20 02, the T am

paP oli ce D ep ar

tm en t e xe cu te d ase ar chw ar rant o n the hom e of

the de fe ndant’ s m oth er . T he se ar chw as part of an in ve sti ga tio n of

the de fe ndant’ s br oth er , w ho l ive d a t the r es ide nc e an d w as sus pe ct ed of pos se ssi ng an d se lli ng dru gs. A cc or din gly , the f oc us o f the w ar

rant w as dr

ugs an d dr

ug para phe rn al ia . Upon en te ri ng the r es ide nc e, anarc oti cs dog a le rt ed the of fi ce rs to a loc kbox that w as sli ght ly a j ar . O ne of

the of fi ce rs ope ne d th e loc kbox and dis co ve re d anum

be r of pho tog ra phs that w er e por

nogr ap hic in na tur e. S om e of th e p ic tu res de pi ct edwhat ap pe aredto be “ ve ry , very y ou ng gi rls ha vi ng sex . . . wi th a mal e w h o [w as l at er ] id en t i fi edas th e d ef en d an t .” Attri al , t h e d ef en d an t ’s m other testified that the lockbo x belong ed to Sm ith, although he w as not livi ng atThe Gove rnment introduce d a proof sheet c ontaining twe nty -six thumbnails of the g irl 4 and a numbe r o f t

he ph oto s d e pic te d o n th e sh e e t. T he Go ve rnme nt a lso int ro du c e d a bir th cer tificate f rom the victim’s native Mexico that g ave he r date of birth as Mar ch 12, 1985. 5 th e res id en ce atth e ti m e o f th e se arch be cau se he was i n p ris on . Po lic e la te r de te rm ine d th at the loc kbox c ont ai ne d 17 68 p ic tur es . A lm ost al l of the pho tos w er e se xua lly e xpl ic it, tho ugh m any

w er e of pe rs ons ab ove the age of eighteen. As part of the investig ation, an office r in the departm ent’ s sex cr im es and c hil d a

buse uni t be gan vi sit ing loc al she lte rs f or r unaw ay s and a ski ng c o u n s e l o r s wh e th e r

th e y re c o g n i z e dan y o f

th e g i r l s i nth e p i c tu r e s . Ev e n tu a l l y, the officer

wa s able to locate a girl who was in a num ber of photos th at dated N ove m be r 1999 , a t whic h ti m e the gir l w as sti ll fo urte eny ears old . S he 4 co nf irm ed that the pho tos w er e of

he r, and, f

ro m anothe r phot o f

ound in the l o c k b o x , s h e i d e n t i f

i e dS mi th a s th e manw h o h a dt ak e nth e m. A t tri al , the gir l t es tif

ie d th at she w as li vin g onthe str ee t a s ar unaw ay in N ove m be r 1999 w he n S m ithappr oa ch ed he r an d he r the n- se ve nte en -y ear- old boy friend, Dom inick. D om inick go t into Sm ith’s c ar, and Sm ith and Dom inick l e f tan dr e tu rn e daf

e wmi n u t e s l a t e r . D o mi n i c kt o l dh e r th a ts h e c o u l dmak e s o me m oney if she w ouldallow S m ith to take som e pictures of her in her underwear, an d sh e ag re ed

to do s o. S he and D om ini ck the n go t ba ck

int o S m ith ’ s c ar

and w en t w ithhim

to a hous e w he re he r etri ev ed ac am er a an d so m e fi lm . T he thr ee of6

the m the n w en t t o ahot el , and S m ithw en t i nsi de and p ai d f or ar oom . O nly

S m ith and the girl actually

we nt into the room ; Dom inick stay ed outsid e. Onc e in si de th e ro om , Sm it h t ol d t he gi rl t o t ak e o ff al l o f he r cl ot he s. Although Dom inick had to ld her that she would not h ave to take off her unde rw ear, she did

a s S m ithins tr

uc te d. S m iththe n be gan takin g pi ct ur es ; he instructed her how to pose a num ber of tim es and even phy sically spread her ge nit al iahim se lf

f or apart ic ularl y

gr ap hic sho t. A ft er

w ar d, he gave he r $60 or $ 7 0 an dl e f

t , an ds h e an dD o mi n i c ks p e n tth e n i g h ti nth e r o o m. In addition to the testim ony of the w itness and sev eral of the officer s inv olv ed in the inv es tig at ion , the G ove rn m en t i ntr oduc ed ar ec or din g of

apho ne co nve rs at ionbe tw ee n S m ithand h is m oth er . S m ithpla ce d th e ca ll w hil e inc ar ce rate d a t the H ill sbor oughCo unty Ja il in June 200 2. A t on e poi nt i n th e co nve rs at ion , he c om

pla ine d, “ I m ean, the re is no l awa ga ins t havin ’ no p ic tur es , an d th er e is n o lawa ga ins t t ak in’ no p ic tur es . B ut the y tr y in’ to m ak e it se em

li ke I w ent out and to ok pictu res of a fourteen y ear old gi rl and I knewit.” Another part of the c onve rs at ionw en t a s f oll ow s: L U CI L L E S MI T H : Ape rs on s houl d be able to take pic tur es or w ha te ve r if

the y w an t t o. A L V INS MI T H : Y eah. I t a in’ t l ike I w en t out, j ust . . . w en t out and an d a ndki dn ap pe d s om eb od y an d t oo k i t. . . . L U CI L L E S MI T H : A nd any w ay , the m

pic tur es that y ou t ook, the7

girls m ust have wanted y ou to take ’ em , or else they wouldn’ t of let yo ut o o k’e m. A L V INS MI T H : O f co ur se the y did . B ut y eah, tho ugh the y tr y in’ to m ak e itsee m

li ke it ’s su ch a cri m e, su ch a cri m e. . . .

. . . . A L V INS MI T H : . . . I tol d he r, y ou know , j ust the y takin ’ it too pe rs ona l. I m ean, ti m es have c hange d. LUCILLE SMITH: An d I’d o f to ldhe r, well , no w lo ok y he re. I co uldn’ t of

too k th em

pic tur es if

the m gir ls d idn ’ t w an t m e to t ak e ’ em . They

posed and everything for m e to take ’ em . It’ d of been dif fe re nt i f y ou j ust

too k it w ith out the y , uh, the ir

a cknow le dgm en t. ALVIN SMITH: I k no w. T o e sta bli sh the statut es ’ j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t— i. e. , that the por nogr ap hy

“ w as pr oduc ed

usi ng m at er ia ls tha t have be enm ai le d, shi ppe d, or tr an spor te d in int er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce ”— the G ove rn m en t c al le d th e V ic e- Pr es ide nt o f Photo Operations for E ckerd’ s Dr ugs. She testified that som e of the photos were pr int ed on K odak pa

pe r that E ck er d’ s r ec ei ve d f ro m Ro ch es te r, N ewY ork, and processed by

equipm ent that it received fr om California. At the c lose of the evidence, the def ense m oved for a j udgm ent of acquittal unde r Fe de ra l R

ule of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 29. A s to the pos se ssi on c ount , the defense ar gued that th ere wa s insu fficient evidence that S m ith kn ewthat the girl wa s less than eight een y ears of age. The defense also argued that there w as ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce to es ta

bli sh the j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t of e ith er c ount . T he court denied the m otion , and sent th e case to the jury . The j ury returned a ver dict8

of gui lty on b othc ount s. T he ve rd ic t i nc lud ed spe ci fi c fi ndi ngs that the pornog raphy

wa s produced us ing film , photo paper, and a film processor that had traveled in interstate or for eign comm erce . II. Ac cording to th e Suprem e Court, “ a newrule for the conduct of crim inal prosecution s is to be appli ed retroac tively to all cases . . . pending on d irect r eview or not y et f ina l. ” G ri ff

ithv. K en tuc ky , 479 U . S. 314 , 328 , 107 S . Ct . 708 , 716 , 93 L . E d. 2d 6 49 ( 1987 ). I n th is c ir cu it, how ev er , thi s pr inc ipl e doe s no t a ppl y if the de fe ndant d id n ot a dvanc e a cl ai m ba se d onthe “ ne wr

ule ” in h is o pe nin g br ie f on ap pe al . I f the “ ne wr

ule ” is announc ed

a ft er the de fe ndant’ s op en ing br ie f is f ile d, it w ill be appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y onl y if the de fe ndant m ad e a sim ilar ar gum en t i n hi s initial brief, f

or we will not allow him

to subs titute or sup plem ent his ini tial brief or pe tit ionf or r eh eari ng i n or de r to r ai se the c la im . S ee , e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. Nj au, 386 F. 3d 10 39, 1041-42 (11th Cir.2004) (letter subm itted und er F ederal Ru le of Appe llate P ro ce dur e 28( j )) ; Unit ed

S ta te s v. H em

br ee , 381 F . 3d 1 109, 1110 ( 11th C ir . 2004 ) (s ubst itute or a m en de d pr inc ipa l br ie f) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. Curt is, 380 F . 3d 1 308, 131 0- 11 ( 11th C ir . 2004 ) (s uppl em en ta l br ie f) ; L ev y , 379 F. 3d at 12 41- 42 ( pe tit ionf or r eh eari ng) . I nde ed , the L ev y r ule appl ie s e ve n if Su pr em e Co urt va cate s our ini tia l de ci sio n and r em an ds the c as e fo r9

reconsideration in lig ht of the very case that annou nces the “ new r ule.” United St at es v. A rd le y , 242 F . 3d 9 89, 990 , r eh ’ g e n banc de nie d, 273 F . 3d 9 91 ( 11th Ci r. 2001 ). T he re fo re , de spi te the f ac t tha t M ax w el l w as de ci de d on ly a ft er S m ith fi le d hi s op en ing br ie f, it s ho ldi ng i s ir re le vant t o our dis posi tio n of thi s c as e unl es s S m ith ’ s op en ing br ie f can be r ea d to m ak e a Ma xw el l- ty pe arg um en t. Inhis sup ple m en ta l l ette r m em or an dum , S m ithc ont en ds tha t tw o of the issues raised in his opening brief e ncom pass a Maxwe ll-ty

pe claim . A c ursory reviewof the brief sugg ests that this is not th e case . Sm ith’s statem ent of issues va gue ly f ram es the se c la im s a s “ the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in ins tr uc tin g th e j ur

y on the e le m en ts o f the c harg es ” an d “ in d eny ing [ his ] m oti on f or aj udgm en t of acquittal.” M oreover, Sm ith do es not cite United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740 , 146 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2000), U nited States v. L opez, 514 U. S. 549, 115 S . Ct . 162 4, 131 L . E d. 2d 6 26 ( 1995 ), or any oth er c as e ad dr es sin g th e sc ope of the F ed er al G ove rn m en t’ s auth or ity und er the Co m m er ce Cl au se . I nde ed , the arg um en ts t o whic h S m ithpoi nts us r el y e xc lus ive ly

on F ir st Am en dm en t ca se s. I t i s c le ar

that S m ith ’ s pr im ar

y arg um en t i n th es e tw o se ct ion s is that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by f ai lin g to ins tr

uc t the j ur

y that kn ow le dge of

the vic tim ’ s a ge is an essential elem ent of both §2 252A(a)( 5)(B) and §225 1(a) and that th ere wa s no evidence that Sm ith was aw are that the victim wa s under eighteen y ears of age.10

A t l ea st o ne pa ssa ge of

thi s se ct ion , how ev er , a ll but hit s th e Ma xw el l c la im on the he ad . S m itharg ue s: [W ] hil e Co ngr es s ha s auth or ity to pa ss l aw s a ff

ec tin g in te rs ta te and fo re ignc om

m er ce , Co ngr es s do es not have auth or ity

to pr osc ri be [s ic ] ge ne ra l c ri m ina l st at ute s. S m ithc ont en ds i n or de r fo r the [ Ch ild Po rn ogr ap hy

P re ve nti on A ct ] to be c onst itutio na l un de r the Co m m er ce Cl au se , the gov er

nm en t m ust pr ove m or e than he too k phot os in Tam

pa, F lorida, and developed the pho tos in Tam pa, Florida, f or personal poss ession, but th e governm ent m ust prov e that pr oduc ing or

pos se ssi on o f phot ogr ap hs h ad am at er ia l a ff

ec t [ sic ] on interstate com

m erce , and that Sm ith kn ewthe photo graphs wer e developed us ing m aterials shipped in in terstate or f oreign comm erce . Over the next fewpages, S m ith contend s that his con viction m ust be reversed be ca use the G ove rn m ent pr es en te d no e vid en ce that he kne wthat the m at er ia ls use d to pr oduc e the pic tur es tr av el ed in int er state c om

m er ce . H e al so b ri ef

ly argues that the “ facts cannotsuppo rt [that] he w as a ‘ producer’ as the evidence on ly sho ws p ho to gr ap hy for p ers on al us e rat he r th an di st rib ut io n a ndsal e.” Inhis r ep ly

br ie f, S m ithbr oa dly

a sse rt s th at

“ [t ] he G ove rn m en t e sse nti al ly atte m pts to lim it the kno w le dge r equir em en t f or ape na l st at

ute w hil e expandi ng the auth or ity

of Co ngr es s to pr osc ri be [ sic ] ge ne ra l c ri m ina l st at ute s. ” H e al so re ite rate s hi s c la im

that the G ove rn m en t sh oul d have be enr equir ed to pr ove both that he was aware that the m aterials used to produce the pornog raphy had traveled in interstate com

m erce and that his “ poss ession o f the photog raphs had a m aterialL e vy a pp lie s to re ply

br ie fs a s w e ll. L e vy , 3 79 F .3 d at 12 44 . T he re fo re , Sm ith ’s re ply 5 brief w ould be irre levant we re the re no hint of a Maxwell-ty

pe cla im in his initial brief; howeve r, beca use Smith’s opening br ief a ppear s to contain such a c laim, we may consider “ counsel’s amplification of his position in the reply brief a nd at ora l argument.” Starke , 62 F.3d at 1379. At oral a rgument, counsel e x plicitly argued that Smith’s conviction was unconstitutional under Maxwell and, not surprisingly , that this was part of the argument made in his initial brief. In Bonne r v. Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 ( 11th Cir.1981) (en ba nc), w e adopte d as 6 binding pr ece dent all dec isions of the former Fifth Circuit re ndere d prior to Octobe r 1, 1981. 11 ef fe ct on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . ” F ina lly , he a tte m pts to cl ar if

y his arg um en t re gard ing the statut or

y te rm “pr oduc ing ”: Se ct ion225 1( a) is a ch ar ge f or pe opl e in the bus ine ss o f m ak ing c hil d por nogr ap hy , w hic h w ithan in te rs ta te or f or ei gn n ex us b ec om es a m atter under the authority of Congress under the Com m erce Clause, but appl y ing S ec tio n 22 51( a) to Sm ithw as unc onst itutio na l be ca use Sm ithha d no thi ng t o do w ithpr oduc ing c hil d po rn ogr ap hy if S ec tio n 2251 (a ) w er e to b e co nst itutio na lly appl ie d to S m ith . G ivi ng S m iththe be ne fi t of the doubt, w e thi nk tha t this la st arg um en t i s th at § 2251 (a ) is b ey ond the auth or ity of Co ngr es s un de r the Co m m er ce Cl au se unl es s the te rm “pr oduc ing ” is i nte rp re te d to r ef er to co m m er ci al pr oduc tio n. 5 Our principle that “briefs ar e re ad liberally with re spect to ascertaining what is su es are ra is edon ap pe al ” is lo ng st an di ng . Kin cad e v . Gen. Ti re & R ub be r Co ., 635 F. 2d 5 01, 504 ( 5thCi r. Jan. 30, 198 1) ; a cc or d S tark e, 62 F . 3d at 13 79; 6 A lls ta te I ns. Co . v. S w ann, 27 F . 3d 1 539, 154 2 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. Mi lam , 855 F . 2d 7 39, 743 ( 11th C ir . 198 8) ; F SL IC v. H ar al son, 813 F . 2d 3 70, 373 n. 3 ( 11th C ir . 198 7) . O nly tho se “ [i ] ssu es that c le ar ly are not de sig na te d inthe12

ini tia l br ie f or din ar ily

are c onsi de re d a

bandon ed . ” S tark e, 62 F . 3d at 13 79. T hus, even when it has been “ extrem ely difficult to discern from

[a def endant’ s] initial brief exac tly

what issues he raises on appeal, ” w e have “ liberally rea d” that brief an d a lso c onsi de re d “ co unse l’ s am pli fi catio n of

his pos iti on i n th e re ply

br ie f an d at oral ar gum ent” in order to identify the issues presented. Id. A nd in Kincade, supra, w e re asoned that even a fewabbreviated descriptions o f an ar gum ent are or din ar ily suf fi ci en t t o r ai se it

on a ppe al , a t l ea st whe re oth er part s of the br ie f do not cont ain “ express indication s” that the appellant does no t intend to advance that ar gum en t. 635 F . 2d at 50 4- 05. Apply ing th is principle to th e instant case, we conclude that Sm ith’s initial brief suffic iently

raised the Maxw ell issue. Sm ith specifically argued that in order to p ro se cu te him

und er it s C om m er ce Cl au se auth or ity , “ the gov er nm en t m ust pr ove m or e than he too k ph oto s inT am pa , F lor ida , and d ev el ope d th e phot os i n Tam pa, F lorida, f

or personal poss ession, but th e governm ent m ust prov e that pr oduc ing or

pos se ssi on o f phot ogr ap hs h ad am at er ia l a ff

ec t [ sic ] on i nte rs ta te com m erce .” Cf. Maxwe ll, 386 F.3d at 1061 (“ we reviewMaxwe ll’ s conduct ind ep en de ntl y

and d et er m ine that i ts l ink

to a subs tanti al e ff

ec t onint er state com m erce , if any , is exce edinglyattenuated”); id. at 1068 (ho lding that the m ere fa ct that “ the dis ks o n whic h th e por nogr ap hy w as ult im at el y

c opi ed tr av el ed ,13

when blank, to Florida fr om som eplace outside of Florida” does not transform pur el y intra state c ri m ina l a ct ivi ty “ int o an a ct ivi ty

sub j ec t t o C om

m er ce Cl au se regulation”). H e also m ade the re lated argum ent that the statutes were uncons titutio nal unless th eir re fere nces to pornog raphy production we re int er pr et ed to ap ply onl y to co m m er ci al pr oduc tio n. C f. id. ( not ing that the Governm ent did no t allege or prove any com m ercia l purpos e). In light of the fact that Maxwell w as decided only after briefing in this case was c om pleted, w e re ad these claim s liberally

to encom pass the issu e decided in that case. It is, of course, he lpf ul t o th e co urt i f lit igants c ite Co m m er ce Cl au se c as es to supp ort the ir Com m erce Clause ar gum ents, but we will not deem Sm ith’s argum ent waived sim ply be ca use c ouns el c hose to re ly on F ir st Am en dm en t c as es ins te ad . III . The G overnm ent argues that even if w e re ach the Maxw ell issue our review i s l i m i t edt o p l ai nerro r b ec au s e S m i th fa i l edt o ra i s e t h e i s s u e a ttri al . S m i th ’s attor ne y c onc ed ed

the sam e at

or al arg um en t. O n S m ith ’ s m oti on f or aj udgm en t o f a c qu i t t a l , th e r e wa s s o me d i s c u s s i o no f th e C o mm e r c e C l au s e . P r i mar i l y, Sm ith’s c ouns el argued that the G overnm ent had failed to establish th e statutory j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok, but

a t on e poi nt s he did

go s o f ar to ar gue that “ thi s is ac as e wher e the governm ent is stretching th is interstate com m erce nexus as far a s it can14

an d w e be lie ve it

—f ar e noug h to br eak it . ” S he a lso arg ue d th at , und er “ thi s se t of circum stances, it is a stre tch that there’ s any interstate com

m erce nexus at all, let al one one str ong en oughto m ee t the bur de n f or f ed er al pr ose cu tio n. ” Ar ea din g of the entire transcr ipt, however , suggests that coun sel wa s m aking on ly a statutory int er pr et at ionarg um en t, nam el y , that C ongr es s di d no t i nte nd t o r ea chc as es li ke thi s on e unde r the r el ev an t st at ute s. T his im

pr es sio n is c onf

irm ed by the A ssi stant U . S. A tto rn ey ’ s r es pons e: “ Co ngr es s ha s sp oke n. A nd the y put dir ec tly in the statut e that this is pr ec ise ly the kin d of

int er state ne xus the U nit ed S ta te s c oul d use . . . . I t i s r igh t i n th e statut e. A nd this c ourt w oul d have to am en d th e statut e in order to agree with [the def endant’ s] argum ent.” Moreover, when the district j udge de nie d S m ith ’ s m oti on, he state d, “ T his is not the ti m e an d pl ac e, I thi nk, an d pe rh ap s no t the statut e to m ak e the L ope z ar gum en t. ” I f co unse l w as , in fa ct , m ak ing ac onst itutio na l arg um en t, thi s w oul d have be enthe ti m e an d pl ac e to cl ar if y he r posi tio n f

or the r ec or d. I n li ght

of he r fa ilure to do s o, and a ppe llate co unse l’ s c onc es sio n a t or al arg um en t, w e w ill r ev ie wthe Ma xw el l i ssu e fo r pla in e rr o r o n l y. U nde r Fe de ra l R

ule of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 52( b) , “ [a ] pla in e rr or that a ff ec ts s ub s t an t i al ri g h t s m ay b e c o n s i d er edev en th o u g h i twa s n o tb ro u g h tt o th e c o u rt ’s attention.” “ W e have discretion to correct an error under the plain error standardIn Olano, the Supre me Court did “not consider the specia l case wher e the e rror was 7 unclea r at the time of tr ial but becomes c lear on appea l beca

use the a pplicable law

has bee n clar ified.” Instead, it stated simply that, “[a]t a mini mum, a court of a ppeals c annot cor

rec t an err or pursua

nt to Rul e 52(b) unless the er ror is cle ar unde r cur

rent law .” Olano, 507 U .S. at 734, 113 S. Ct . at 1777. Subsequently , in J ohnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S. C t. 1544, 137 L . Ed. 2d 718 (1997), the Court held that “whe re the law at the time of trial was se ttled and c le arl y c ontr ary to t he law at th e tim e of

a pp e a l . . . it

is e no ugh th at an e rr or

be ‘p la in’ at th e tim e of appe llate consider ation.” I d. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. Bec ause the law at the time of Smith’ s tr ia l w a s “ un c le ar” rathe r t ha n “ se ttl e d a

nd c le arl y c ontr ary to” him , th is c a se pr e se nts the issue that Olano r eser ved judg ment on rathe r than the one that J ohnson expl icitly decide d. See g ener ally

Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1068 n.25 (notinga cir cuit split i n simil ar c ases) . Pre-Johnson, we broadly

stated that “e rror

is ‘plain’ . . . whe re the ‘plainness’ of err or be c ome s a

pp are nt o n d ir e c t r e vie w. ” Un ite d St ate s v . K ra me r, 73 F .3 d 1 06 7, 10 74 n. 16 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 6) . B ut K

ra me r w a s n ot a

“ sp e c ia l c a se ” of

the so rt de sc ri be d in

Ol ano ; r athe r, it prese nted the issue explicitly decide d in J ohnson. See Kra mer, 73 F .3d at 1074. Post-J ohnson, we c onsidered the Olano “spe cial ca se” issue a nd held that it was appr opriate to e valuate the plainness of the e rror

based on the law at the time of appea l rather

than as of the time of trial. United States v. Humphrey , 164 F.3d 585, 587- 88 & nn.2 & 5 (11th Cir. 1999); see a lso United States v. Prieto, 232 F.3d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 2000) ( “F or it to be ‘plain,’ the err or must either have be en cle ar unde r the lawat the time the er ror wa s made, or c lear ly

contra ry to the law at the time of the appe al.”) . In c ontr a st, the Ni nth

Cir c uit ha s li mit e d Johns on

to i ts n arr owho ldi ng : if

the law i s mere ly “unsettled” at the time of trial, whe ther the e rror was “ plain” will be dete rmined under that unsettled law. United States v. Tur man, 122 F.3d 1167, 1170- 71 (9th Cir. 1997). The c ourt rea sons that J ohnson’s appa rent c oncer

n—that evaluating e rror

as of the time of

trial would lead to t ri a l “ c ouns e l’ s in e vit a

bly makin ga lon gand vir tua lly us e le ss l a

un dr y lis t of ob je c tio ns to ru lin g s th at w e re pla inl y

su pp or te d b y e xistin gpr e c e de nt, ” John so n, 52 0 U .S. at 46 8, 11 7 S. Ct.

15 wher e (1) an error occurred, (2) the er ror w as plain, (3) the error aff ected subs tanti al r igh ts, and ( 4) the e rr or se ri ousl y a ff ec ts the f ai rn es s, int eg ri ty

or pub lic re put at ionof

j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. D unc an , __ F . 3d _ _, __ ( 11th Ci r. 200 4) ( ci tin g U nit ed

S ta te s v. O lano, 507 U . S. 725 , 732 -3 6, 113 S . Ct . 177 0, 1777 -7 9, 123 L . E d. 2d 5 08 ( 1993 )) . T he e rr or m ust be “pla in” at

the ti m e of ap pe llate c onsi de ratio n; the de fe ndant i s no t r equir ed to es ta bli sh tha t i t w as pla in at the ti m e of

tr ia l. 7at 1549—is inapplicable if the law wa s not settled at the time of trial. Turma n, 122 F.3d a

t 1170- 71. In prac tice, of c ourse, this is the same a s no plain err or re view at a ll, as err or will never be “plain” unde r “unse ttled” law. Thus, the de fenda nt is obli g ed to object if the law is unsettled, and if he does not he ha s waived the objection fore ver. “Unde r the prior

panel r ule, we a re bound by

the holdings of

ear lier pane ls unless and until the y are c le arl y

ov e rr ule d e n b anc or

by the Sup re me Court .” Swa nn v. S. H e a lthPart

ne rs , Inc., 388 F .3d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 2004). “B ut, the prior pane l rule does not extend to dicta.” I d. Arguably , Humphrey

does not “hold” that error need only

be “pla in” at the time of a ppeal in a case such as this one, a s the Humphrey panel de cided a g ainst the defe ndant eve n under that more g ener ous standard. See , e.g ., Bla ck v. United States, 373 F .3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 2004) (“D ictum is a term that has be en var iously define d as a state ment that neither c onstitut es the holding of

a ca se, nor a

rises fr om a par

t of the opinion that is necessa ry to the holding of

the c a se .” ). Ev e n if

we a ssume , th ou g h, that w e are no t bo un d b y Humphre y , w e wo uld

e va luate case s such as this one under curr ent law be cause this approac h has the a dvantag e of a voiding the nece ssity of distinguishingbetwee n case s in which “the la w at the time of tria l was settled and clea rly contra ry to the law at the time of

appea l” on the one ha

nd and ca ses in which it was mere ly “unsettled” on the other. 16 A. We f i rs tco n cl u d e t h at , u n d erMa x we l l , e rr o r o cc u rr edb ec au s e S m i th ’s pur el y intra state , non -c om

m er ci al pr oduc tio n and p oss es sio n of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy is n ot s ubj ec t t o C om

m er ce Cl au se r eg ulatio n. W e be ginw iththe sim ple pr inc ipl e that “ Co ngr es s c anle gis la te onl y w ith in the a m

bit of the spe ci fi c pow er s th e Co nst itutio n c onf

er s onit . ” Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 53- 54. T he Co nst itutio n gr an ts C ongr es s th e au tho ri ty “ [t ] o r eg ulate Co m

m er ce w ithf

or ei gn N at ion s, and a mo n g th e s e v e r a l S t a t e s . ” U . S . C o n s t . art . I , § 8 , c l . 3 . I nL o p e z , th e S up r e me Co urt e xpl ai ne d th at

the re are “ thr ee br oa d c at eg or ie s of a ct ivi ty that C ongr es s m ay regulate under its com

m erce power” : Fi rs t, Co ngr es s m ay

r eg ulate the use of

the c hanne ls o f int er state17

com m erce . Second, C ongress is em powere d to regulate and protect the ins tr um en ta lit ie s of

int er state c om

m er ce , or pe rs ons or

thi ngs in int er state c om

m er ce , e ve n th oughthe thr eat m ay c om e onl y

f ro m intrastate activities. F inally , C ongress’ c omm erce authority includes the pow er to re gul at e tho se a ct ivi tie s havin g asub stanti al r el at ionto interstate com

m erce , i. e. , those activities that subs tantially aff ect interstate com

m erce . L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 55 8- 59, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 29- 30 ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed ). A s in Maxwe ll, w e have no difficulty concludin g that the challenged statu tes govern neither the channels nor the inst rum entalities of interstate com m erce . See Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 55. A lth oughS m ith , unl ike Ma xw el l, w as c onvi ct ed f or pr oduc tio n un de r § 22 51( a) in ad dit ionto poss es sio n un de r § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ), thi s dis tin ct iondoe s no t br ing his c ondu ct w ith in e ith er

“ L ope z 1” or

“ L ope z 2, ” as the pr oduc tio n of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

ha s no m or e to d o w iththe c hanne ls o f int er state com m erce than m ere poss ession d oes, and “ the Governm ent did no t establish th at the proscribed im ages we re ‘ thing s in interstate com m erce .’ ” Id. (quoting Lopez, 51 4 U.S. at55 8, 1 15 S. Ct. at16 29 ). T he re fo re , Co ngr es s ha s th e pow er to pr osc ri be Ma xw el l’ s c ondu ct onl y if it is s ubj ec t t o r eg ulatio n un de r “ L ope z 3, ” i. e. , onl y if it “ subs tanti al ly

a ff ec ts” int er state c om

m er ce . I n U nit ed

S ta te s v. Mo rr iso n, dr aw ing on i ts e ar lie r de ci sio n in L ope z, the S upr em e Co urt outli ne d f our f ac tor s th at

are im portant t o th is que sti on: F ir st, w e m

ust de te rm ine w he the r the c ha lle nge d st at ute ha s anythi ng “ toTh e fi rs t and fo ur th M or ri so n f a c tor s a re “ the mos t im

po rt ant o ne s. An

a c tiv ity that is 8 utterly lackingin commerc ial or ec onomic char acte r would likely have too attenuated a relationship t o interstate c ommerce and would, ac cording ly , not be subject to re gulation under the Commerce Clause.” United States v. Mc Coy , 323 F.3d 1114, 1119 ( 9th Cir. 2003). 18 do w ith‘ co m

m er ce ’ or any sor t of e co nom ic e nte rp ri se , how ev er br oa dly one m igh t de fi ne tho se te rm s. ” Mo rr iso n, 529 U . S. a t 61 0, 120 S . Ct . a t 17 49- 50 (quot ing L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 56 1, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 24) . I nde ed , “ a fa ir r ea din g of Lopez shows that the noneconom ic, crim inal nature of the conduct at issue was central to [the] decision in th at case. ” Morr ison, 529 U.S . at 610, 120 S. Ct. at 1750 . Second, w e consider whether the statute contains an “ express j urisdictio nal elem ent which m ight lim it its reach to a discrete set of [c ases] that . . . have an explicit conn ection with or eff ect on interstate com

m erce .” Id. at 611-12, 120 S. Ct . a t 17 50- 51 ( quot ing L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 56 2, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 24) . T hir d, congression al findings , if relevant, m ay

inform our inqui ry . Morrison, 529 U. S. at 612, 120 S . Ct . a t 17 51. F ina lly , Mo rr iso n di re ct s us to co nsi de r the de gr ee of atte nuatio n be tw ee n th e ac tiv ity and the pur

porte d e ff ec t onc om

m er ce . I d. a t 61 2- 13, 120 S. C t. at 1751 . W ith these factors in m ind, we m ust determ ine whether 8 the re is anythi ng a

bout S m ith ’ s c as e that c andis tin gui sh i t f ro m Ma xw el l f

or Com m erce Clause purposes. Bec ause there is no significant difference betwee n Smit h ’s p o s s es s i o nan dMa x we l l ’s p o s s es s i o n , o u r a n al ysi s wi l l fo cu s o nSmit h ’s19

i n tr a s t a t e , n o n - c o mm e r c i a l p r o du c t i o no f c h i l dp o rn o g r ap h y. 1. A s inMa xw el l, “ w e dis ce rnnothin g c om m er ci al or

e co nom ic ” ab out Sm ith ’ s c ondu ct . Maxw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 56. W ic kard v. F ilb ur n, 317 U . S. 111 , 63 S . Ct . 82, 87 L . E d. 122 ( 1942 ), “ is p er ha ps the m ost

f ar r ea ch ing e xam

ple of Co m m er ce Cl au se auth or ity

ove r intra state a ct ivi ty , ” L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 56 0, 115 S. Ct. at 1630, and y et Sm ith’s c onvi ction, if upheld, w ouldrea ch m uch further. In W ickard, the Suprem e Court upheld a federa l regulatory program that restricted the a m ount

of w he at af ar m er m igh t pr oduc e not

onl y f or sa le and d istri but ion , but al so f or c onsum pti on o n hi s own f

ar m . A n O hio f

ar m er c ha lle nge d th e statut e on the gr ound

that C ongr es s la ck ed

the pow er

to re gul at e his pur el y

loc al pr oduc tio n and consu m

ption and its m inim al indirect eff ect on interstate com

m erce . See W ic kard , 317 U . S. a t 11 3- 19, 63 S . Ct . a t 83 -8 6. T he Co urt, how ev er , r ej ec te d hi s ar gum en t and e xpl ai ne d why the statut e w as ape rm iss ibl e m ethod of r eg ulatin g interstate com

m erce : The m aintenance by

governm ent regulation of a price f or wheat undo ubt ed ly

c anbe a cc om

pli she d a s e ff

ec tiv el y by sus ta ini ng o r inc re as ing the de m an d a s by li m iti ng the sup ply . T he e ff ec t of the statut e be fo re us i s to r es tr ic t the am ount w hic h m ay

be pr oduc ed

f or m ar ke t and the e xte nt a s w el l t o whic h on e m ay f or es ta ll re sort t o th e m ark etby pro du ci ng to m eethi s o wn n eed s. Th atap pe ll ee’s o wn co ntr ibu tio n to the de m an d f or w he at m ay be tr ivi al by

it se lf is not20

enough to rem ove him

from the scope of feder al regulation where , a s here, his contribu tion, taken together with that of m any others sim ilarl y sit ua te d, is far fr om

tr ivi al . It is we ll establish ed by

decisions o f this Court that the power to regulate com

m erce includes the po we r to regulate the price s at which com

m oditi es in that com

m erce are dealt in and practices af fe ct ing suc h pr ic es . O ne of the pr im ar

y pur pose s of the A ct in que sti on w as to inc re as e the m ar ke t pr ic e of

w he at and t o th at

e nd t o lim it the vol um e the re of

that c oul d a ff

ec t the m ar

ke t. I t c anhard ly

be denied that a factor of such vol um e and variability as hom e-consum ed wheat w ouldhave a substantial influ ence on price and m arket co ndi tio ns. T his m ay

ari se be ca

use be ing in m ar

ke ta ble c ondi tio n suc h whe at

ove rh an gs the m ar

ke t and i f ind

uc ed by r isi ng p ri ce s te nds t o f l o wi n t o th e mark e tan dc h e c kp r i c e i n c r e a s e s . B u ti f w e a s s u me that i t i s ne ve r m ar

ke te d, it sup pli es ane ed

of the m anw ho g re wit w hic h w oul d othe rw ise be r ef le ct ed by pur ch as es in the ope n m ar ke t. Hom e-g ro wn wh eatin th is sen se co m pe te s wi th whea t i n c omm erce . T he sti m ulatio n of c om m er ce is a use of

the r eg ulator

y f unc tio n qu ite as definitely

as prohibiti ons or restrictions th ereon. T his record leaves us in no d oubtthat Congress m ay properly have considered that whe at

c onsum ed

on the f ar m w he re gr ow n if

w hol ly out sid e the sc he m e of

r eg ulatio n w oul d have asub stanti al e ff ec t i n de fe at ing and obstru ct ing it s purp ose to sti m ulate tr ad e the re in at i nc re as ed pr ic es . Id . at 1 27 -2 9, 6 3 S . Ct. at90 -9 1 (c it at io ns an d fo ot no te om it te d) . In other wor ds, the W ickard regulation sou ght to m aintain nation al m arket prices by controlling suppl y

and dem and. T he Court noted that “ [c] omm erce am ong the state s inw he at is larg e an d im

portant, ” that “ w he at

[ w as ] r ai se d in ev er y state but one , ” that “ [t ] he w he at

ind ustry [ ha d] be enapr obl em

ind ustry f or som e y ears, ” and that in the absence of re gulatio ns wheat price s would have been gr eatly a ff ec te d by the w or ld m ar

ke t. I d. a t 12 5- 26, 63 S . Ct . 89- 90. B ec au se thi s21

regulation was so plainlyintended to regulate com m erce , the C ourt held that it was ap pr opr ia te to co nsi de r the “ far fr om tr ivi al ” ag gr eg at e ef

fe ct on the m ar

ke t of a ll co nsum pti on o f hom e- gr ow n whe at r athe r than th e iso la te d e ff ec t of asin gle O hio farm er. Id. at 127-28, 63 S. C t. 90; see also id. at 127, 63 S. C t. at 90 (“ The e ffec t of consum

ption of hom egrown wheat on interstate com m erce is due to the fact that it constit utes the m ost variable factor in the disappearance of the w heat crop. ”). Whe re as the W ic kard

statut e re gul at ed

an in te rs ta te m ar

ke t i ndi re ct ly through regulation of purely local production , the sam e cannot be said of § 2251 (a) or § 2252 A( a)(5) (B). T hese statutes “ m ake[] no effort to control national trade by regulating intrastate activity . I nstead, [they ] attem pt[] to regulate prim ary conduct di rectly , e ven within state borders.” Maxwe ll, 386 F.3d at 1057. E ven if, in the a ggr eg at e, of

fe nde rs li ke S m ithsom eh owim pa ct an in te rs ta te m ar

ke t by producin g child po rnography for their own use, “ Congress is clearly not concerned w iththe sup ply

of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

f or the pur pose of a voi din g surp lus es and shor ta ge s or f or the pur pose of sti m ulatin g it s tr ad e at

inc re as ed

pr ic es . ” I d. T he conclusio n is thu s inevitable that th e statutes under which Sm ith was convicted are not concerned “ with ‘ com m erce ’ or any

sort of econom ic enterprise, however broadly one m ight d efine those term s.” Morrison, 529 U. S. at 610, 120 S. C t. at 1749 -50 (quotin g Lopez, 514 U.S . at 561, 115 S. Ct. at 1624). “ As the r egulated22

activity . . . is not comm ercia l, W ickard’ s aggregation analy sis is no t applicable.” Ra ic h v. A shc ro ft , 352 F . 2d 1 222, 123 0 ( 9thCi r. 200 3) , c er t. gr an te d, 124 S . Ct . 2909 , 159 L . E d. 2d 8 11 ( 2004 ); se e al so M or ri son, 529 U . S. a t 61 1 n. 4, 120 S . Ct . at 175 0 n. 4 ( “ in e ve ry

c as e w he re w e have sus ta ine d f ed er al r eg ulatio n un de r the ag gr eg at ionpr inc ipl e in [ W ic kard ] , the r eg ulate d a ct ivi ty w as of an a ppare nt co m m er ci al c hara ct er ”) . W ic kard is thu s r ea dil y

dis tin gui sha

ble , a s th e statut e it sustain ed wa s far m ore obviou sly a re gulatio n of com

m erce . W e ar e not inclined t o e x p an dth e l i mi t s o f

th e f e d e r a l c o mme r c e p o w e r

b e yo n dw h a tth e S up r e me Co urt ha s su gge ste d to be it s ou te r lim its . 2. A s inMa xw el l, the G ove rn m en t r el ie s onastatut or y j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok t o establish federal j urisdictio n over Sm ith’s off enses: the pictures wer e “produced usi ng m at er ia ls tha t [ ha d] be enm ai le d, shi ppe d, or tr an spor te d inint er state or fo re ignc om

m er ce . ” 18 U . S. C. §§ 2 251( a) , 225 2A (a )( 5) (B ). I n M ax w el l, w e he ld th atth i s ju ri s d i ct i o n al h o o kwa s “p at en t l y i n s u ff i ci en tt o en s u re th e s t at u t e’s co nst itutio na l a

ppl ic at ion . ” Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 63. W e w ill not r ei te rate a ll that w e sa id the re , a s th e poi nt c anbe m ad e br ie fl y : Aj ur isd ic tio na l ho ok i s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y s i g n i f

i c an to n l y i f

i twi l l “ e n s u r e , th r o u g h c a s e - b y- c a s e i n qu i ry, that the [offense] in questio n affe cts interstate com m erce .” L opez, 514 U. S. atWe express no opinion on t he statutes’ othe r jurisdictional hooks. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) 9 (“ if su c h p e rs on

kn ow s o r h a s r e a so n to kn owthat su c h v isu a l de pic tio n w ill be tr ans po rt e d in interstate or

fore ign c ommerce or mailed . . . or if such visual depiction has a ctually been transporte d in interstate or f oreign commerc e or ma iled”); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (“ Any person who knowing ly

possesses any

book, mag azine, periodica l, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other mate rial that conta ins an imag e of c hild pornog raphy that has bee n mailed, or shipped or transporte d in interstate or f oreign commerc e . . . .”) .

23 561, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. Where, as here, Congress seeks to regulate under “ Lopez 3, ” the hoo k is onl y

sig nif ic an t i f it es se nti al ly

r equir es the G ove rn m en t t o pr ove that the of

fe nde r’ s c ondu ct

sub stanti al ly

a ff ec ts i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . T he j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t us ed in both § 2 251( a) and § 225 2A (a )( 5) (B ), how ev er , “ not onlyfails to lim it the reac h of the statute[s] to any category or cate gories of cases that have apart ic ular ef

fe ct on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce , but , to the c ontrary , it encom passes virtuallyevery

case im aginable, so long as any m odern-day phot ogr ap hic e qui pm en t or m at er ia l ha s be enuse d. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Mc Co y , 323 F. 3d 1 114, 112 4 ( 9thCi r. 200 3) ( ev al ua tin g an id en tic al j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t i n 18 U. S. C. § 225 2(a)( 4)(B) ). A s such, the fac t that Sm ith’s pictures w ere

“pr oduc ed

usi ng m at er ia ls tha t [ ha d] be enm ai le d, shi ppe d, or tr an spor te d in int er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce ” doe s no t a ff

ec t our co nst itutio na l ana ly sis . 9 3. I nM a x w e l l , w e r e v i e w e dth e l e g i s l at i v e h i s t o ry o f § 2 2 5 2 Aan ds o me re la te d st at

uto ry pr ovi sio ns— inc lud ing 18 U . S. C. § 22 51, se e Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d24

at 106 6 n. 24— an d “ [f

ound ] nothin g to pe rs ua de us tha t po sse ssi ng c hil d pornog raphy

produced with m aterials transpo rted in interstate com m erce is an act iv it y th atha s a s ub st an ti al effe cton in te rs ta te co m m erce .” Id . at 1 06 7.

“ Instead, the vast m aj ority of the findings s uppo rt the broader pr opos iti on” —whic h w e ar e ce rt ai nly pr ep ar ed to ac ce pt— “ that c hil d po rn ogr ap hy (e ve n th at w hic h is ge ne rate d by

c om put er w ith out a ct ua l pe opl e) is ba d and harm fu l t o c hil dr en . ” I d. a t 10 65. A r ecent Fir st Circuit opini on succinctlysumm arize s the additio nal legislative his tory

and congression al findings relevant to 18 U. S. C. § 225 1(a): When Congress origi nally passed the Protection of Children A ga ins t S ex ua l E xpl oit at ionA ct of 197 7 . . . it

sup porte d th e legislation with findings th at “ child po rnography . . . has becom e [a ] hig hly or ganiz ed , m

ult im ill iondol lar ind

ustr[ y ] that op er at e[ s] on a nationwide scale . . . [ and that] the sale and distribut ion of such por nogr ap hic m at er ia ls are c ar ri ed on t o asub stanti al e xte nt thr ough the m ai ls and o the r ins tr

um en ta lit ie s of

int er state and f

or ei gn co m m erce .” In198 4, Co ngr es s am en de d th e A ct to, int er a lia , e lim inate the re qui re m en t tha t the pr oduc tio n, r ec ei pt, tr an spor ta tio n, or distribu tion o f child pornog raphy be for a “pecuniary

profit.” Co ngr es s di d so be ca

use it f ound that this c om

m er ci al pur

pose re qui re m en t c re at ed

an e nf or ce m en t ga

p: “ Many of the ind ivi dua ls w ho d istri but e m at er ia ls c ove re d [ by the statut e] do s o by

gif t or ex ch an ge w ith out

any c om m er ci al m oti ve and thus re m ai n ou tsi de the co ve ra ge of

thi s pr ovi sio n. ” N oti ng that “ [g ] en er al ly , the dom es tic m at er ia l i s of

the ‘ hom em ad e’ vari ety , w hil e the im porte d m at er ia l i s pr oduc ed by c om m er ci al de al er s, ” Co ngr es s de te rm ine d th at the statut or y r eg im e m

ust be upd at ed

to en sur e ef

fe ct ive pr ose cu tio n of25

pr oduc er s and d istri but or s. Congress am ended the Act a gain [in 198 6 after] finding th at “ch i l de x p l o i t a t i o nh a s b e c o me amu l t i - mi l l i o nd o l l ar i n du s try, i n f i l tr a t e dan do p e r a t e db y e l e men t s o f o r g an i z e dc r i me, an db y a na tio nw ide ne tw ork of

ind ivi dua ls o pe nly

a dve rt isi ng the ir

de sir e to exploitchildren.” In199 6, Co ngr es s am en de d th e A ct to re de fi ne c hil d pornog raphy

. . . . In passing th ose am endm ents, Congress found that “ the existence of a tra ffic in child pornographic im ages . . . inflam es the desires of child m olesters, pedophiles, and child porno graphers w ho p re y on c hil dr en , the re by

inc re as ing the c re at ionand d istri but ion of child porno graphy . . . .” T he Senate R eport also explained th at “pr ohi bit ing the pos se ssi on and v ie w ing of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

w ill en co ur ag e the pos se sso rs of suc h m at er ia l t o r id the m se lve s of or de str oy the m at er ia l, the re by

he lpi ng . . . to el im inate the m ar ke t f or th e se xu al ex pl oi ta ti ve us e o f ch il dr en .” Fi na lly , Co ngr es s am en de d th e A ct a ga in i n 19 98, e sta

bli shi ng j urisdictio n for the production of child pornog raphy if the “ visual de pic tio n w as pr oduc ed

usi ng m at er ia ls tha t have be enm ai le d, shi ppe d, or

tr an spor te d inint er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce by any m ean s,” wh ic h i s t he pro vi si on no w bef or e u s. Co ng res s o ffer edtwo reasons for this am endm ent. F irst, it w anted the new j urisdictio nal elem ent of the production statute to m irror the e xistin g jurisdictional elem ent of the possess ion statu tes. S econd, Congress wa s concerned ab o u tf e d e r a l l awe n f

o r c e me n t ’s c u rr e n ti n ab i l i ty t o p r o s e c u t e “a num be r of c as es w he re the de fe ndant p ro duc ed the c hil d po rn ogr ap hy bu t d idno t i nt en d t o t ran sp or t t he im ag es in in te rs ta te co m m erce .” U nit ed S ta te s v. Mo ra le s- D e Je sus , 372 F . 3d 6 , 10- 12 ( 1st Ci r. 200 4) ( ci ta tio ns and f o o tn o t e s o mi t t e d ) . We wi l l c o mm e n to ne a c h o f th e s e f i n d i n g s s e p ar a t e l y. W e have a lr ea dy

a ddr es se d th e 1977 f

ind ing s inMa xw el l. T he se f ind ing s

“ re m ar k[ ] onl y on i nte rs ta te c hil d po rn ogr ap hy and t ea ch [] nothin g a

bout the ef fe ct s of intra state c hil d po rn ogr ap hy or non co m m er ci al c hil d po rn ogr ap hy f or26

that m atte r. ” Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 66. T he sam e can be sa id o f the 198 6 finding s. T hat we are here c oncerned with noncomm ercia l productio n for personal use rather than m ere noncomm ercia l poss ession is not sig nificant. T he subst ance of the se f ind ing s is m er el y

that a m ult im ill iondol lar int er state ind ustry e xis ts, not th atno nc omm erci al pro du cer- co ns um ers su chas S m it h s ub st an ti al ly affectit . To say that su chf

ind ing s su

ppor t f ed er al j ur isd ic tio n inthi s c as e is the e qui va le nt o f say ing that C ongr es s c an , f or e xam ple , r eg ulate ba cky ar d c ooko uts sim ply be ca use a m ult ibi lli on- dol lar int er state r es taur an t i ndus tr y e xis ts. T he 198 4 f

ind ing s r ef

er to the pr obl em

of ind ivi dua ls who tra de , le nd, or oth er w ise dis tr ibu te c hil d po rn ogr ap hy w ith out ac om m er ci al pur

pose . I f Sm ith h a db e e np r o s e c u t e df

o r s u c h n o n c o mm e r c i a l d i s tr i b u t i o no f c h i l dp o rn o g r ap h y, the n th es e fi ndi ngs m igh t be r el ev an t. T he y do n ot, how ev er , e sta

bli sh tha t the nonc om m er ci al pr oduc tio n of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

f or the pr oduc er ’ s own us e subs tantially

aff ects interstate com

m erce . The 1996 finding s relate solely to the “ addiction theory ”—i.e ., the theory that a pe rs on p oss es sin g in tr as ta te c hil d po rn ogr ap hy c oul d de ve lop an in cr ea sin g appetite for m ore such m aterials that eventually aff ects the interstate m arket subs tanti al ly

—a dopt ed

by the T hir d C ir cu it in Unit ed S ta te s v. Ro dia , 194 F . 3d 465, 478 -7 9 ( 3d C ir . 199 9) . W e pr ev iou sly r ej ec te d th is the or

y in Ma xw el l, and27

our r ea soni ng a

ppl ie s w ithe qua l f

or ce he re . T he the or

y sim ply “pr ovi de s to o attenuated a link to in terstate com m erce and would require us ‘ to pile inference uponinf er en ce in a m anne r that w oul d bi d f ai r to c onve rt

c ongr es sio na l auth or ity unde r the Co m

m er ce Cl au se to a ge ne ra l po lic e pow er of the sor t r et ai ne d by

the St at es . ’ ” Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 61 ( quot ing L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 56 7, 115 S . Ct . at 1634). Fi na lly , Co ngr es s’ s r at ion al e fo r am en din g th e statut e in 1 998 to a dd the j urisdictio nal provisi on at issu e does noth ing to explain how producer-consum ers suc h a s S m ithsub stanti al ly a ff ec t i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . I nde ed , in 1998 Co ngr es s m er el y e xpl ai ne d th at

und er the old ve rs ionof

the statut e it ha d be enuna ble to re ac h so m e co nduc t tha t i t w ish ed to pr osc ri be . T ha t C ongr es s w an te d to pr ose cu te m or e ch ild

por nogr ap he rs is unde rs tanda ble , but it ha s li ttl e to d o w ith interstate com

m erce . In sum , the r elevant congression al findings do little to p ersuade us that act iv it y su ch as t ha t atis su e in th is cas e su bs ta nt ia ll y affe ct s i nt ers ta te co m

m erce .

“ [T ] he e xis te nc e of

c ongr es sio na l f

ind ing s is not

suf fi ci en t, by

it se lf , to sus ta in the co nst itutio na lity

of Co m m er ce Cl au se le gis la tio n. ” Mo rr iso n, 529 U . S. a t 61 4, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. “ [S] im ply because Congress m ay

conclude that a particular activity subst antially

aff ects interstate com

m erce does not n ecessar ily m ake it so.”Th e F ir st C ir c uit vie we d th e se fi nd ing s d if fe re ntl y ; it

c on c lud e d th at, “ [g ]ive n th is 10 compre hensive ba ckdrop, the re is no question that Cong ress ha s made e x plicit findings about the extensive national market in child pornography and the ne ed to diminish t hat national mar ket by prohibiting the pr oduction of child pornography at the loca l level.” Mora les-De J esus, 372 F.3d at 12. As explained in the text , we do not question the fir st part of this statement—that is, the finding s support the exist ence of a national market in child pornography —but we fa il to see any substantial connec tion between it and pr oducer -consumer s such as Smith. W e thus part with the F ir st C ir c uit

on thi s p oint. S e e id. at 21 (“ Mo ra le s se xua lly e xploi te d a

thi rt e e n- y e ar- old

g ir l, coer cingher into per formingsex acts with him on m ultiple occasions, for the purpose of vid e ota pin gthe ir e nc ounte rs . A s th is c on du c t se e ms w e ll w ith in t he bo un ds of

wh at Co ngre ss intended—and ha d the authority —to proscribe under its Commerce Clause power , we r ejec t Morales’ s as-a

pplied challeng e.”) . 28 H ode l v. V a. S ur fa ce Mi nin g & Re cl am at ionA ss’ n, 452 U . S. 264 , 311 , 101 S . Ct . 23 52 , 23 91 , 69 L. Ed. 2d1 (1 98 1) (Reh nq ui st , J., co nc urrin g i n t he jud gm en t). The f indin gs not ed above supp ort the propos ition that intrastate com m ercia l pr oduc er s of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

a ff ec t i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . T he y

e ve n su gge st that pe rs ons w ho d istri but e ch ild por nogr ap hy non co m m er ci al ly a ff ec t the int er state m ar

ke t. T he y

do n ot, how ev er , sup port the pr opos iti on tha t pure ly intra state pr oduc tio n and p oss es sio n f or pe rs ona l us e have asim ilar ef fe ct . 10 4. In Maxwe ll, w e concluded that any link between the defendant’ s conduct an d asub stanti al e ff

ec t onint er state c om

m er ce w as , a t be st, “ ex ce ed ing ly attenuated.” Maxwe ll, 386 F.3d at 1061. I ndeed, w e re asoned that “ [t] he causal ch ai n ne ce ssary

to lin k hi s a ct ivi ty

w ithany sub stanti al im

pa ct on i nte rs ta te co m m er ce m igh t be lon g e noug h to r ea chthe out er li m its of the sol ar sy ste m . ” I d.29

at 105 8. W e not ed

that so m e ci rc uit s ha d id en tif ie d am or e dir ec t i m

pa ct by ag gr eg at in g t he effe ctof a ll si m il ar o ffen de rs . Id. at10 59 & n .17 . Butas we expla ine d inP ar

t I II . A . 1, sup ra , “ thi s a ggr eg at e ap pr oa chc annot be appl ie d to intrastate crim inal activity of a noneconom ic nature. ” Id. at 1059. T herefor e,

“ [t ] he e ff ec t on. . . int er state c om

m er ce . . . m

ust be m ea sur ed

in re la tio n to the iso la te d c ondu ct

a t i ssu e, r athe r than a s ana tio nw ide a ggr eg at e, be ca use the intrastate possessi on of child po rnography is a crim inal, noneconom ic activity .” Id . a t 10 61. W e al so r ej ec te d th e ar gum en t tha t a m or e dir ec t c onne ct ionc oul d be es ta bli she d vi a the “ ad dic tio n th eo ry ” dis cu sse d inP ar t I II . A . 3, sup ra . I d. W ithr es pe ct

to the de gr ee of

a tte nuatio n be tw ee n th e co nduc t at i ssu e an d the ult im at e ef

fe ct , if any , on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce Maxw el l and the pr es en t c as e ar e virtua lly

ind ist ing uis hable . T ha t S m ith ’ s c ondu ct is m or e re pr eh en sib le sim ply ha s no be ar ing on i ts c onne ct ionto int er state c om m er ce . H is p ro duc tio n and poss es sio n w as intra state , c ri m ina l, and n one co nom ic . T he re fo re , a ggr eg at ionis not appr opr ia te . Jud ge d iniso la tio n, any li nk b etw ee n S m ith ’ s c ondu ct and a subs tanti al e ff

ec t onint er state c om

m er ce is “ ex ce ed ing ly

a tte nuate d. ” A nd f

or the sam e re as ons giv enin Ma xw el l and i n P ar t I II . A . 3, sup ra , the “ ad dic tio n th eo ry ” is so f ar r ea ch ing and r el iant u

pon inf er en ce that i t c annot

pr ovi de aba sis f

or establishi ng a direct link to int erstate c omm erce .30 * * * * * Insum , w e hol d th at

S m ith ’ s c ondu ct

doe s no t su

bst an tia lly

a ff ec t i nte rs ta te co m m erce . Becau se itis a no ne co no m ic , pu rel y in tra st at e cri m in al act iv it y , we m ay c onsi de r onl y

it s is olate d e ff

ec ts, not the a ggr eg at e ef

fe ct of a ll suc h a ct ivi ty that oc curs na tio nw ide . T he a ct ivi ty S m ithe nga ge d inis not

“ co m m er ci al ” or

“ econom ic” in any

sense of those term s. T he j urisdictio nal elem ent in § 22 51(a) and § 225 2(a)( 5)(B) is, f

or Com m erce Clause purposes, utterly useless given that

“ it en co m pa sse s vi rt

ua lly e ve ry c as e im ag ina

ble . ” Mc Co y , 323 F . 3d at 11 24. T he re le vant c ongr es sio na l f

ind ing s, tho ugh pe rh ap s us ef ul i n c as es inv olv ing com m ercia l producers or even noncomm ercia l distribu tors or traders, are of little, if any , im port i n th e ca se of

ade fe ndant who h as pr oduc ed c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

f or his own use entirely

within the borders of a single state. Finally , the link betwe en Sm ith ’ s a ct ivi ty

and a sub stanti al e ff

ec t onint er state c om

m er ce is, a t be st, exceedingly

attenuated. I n ligh t of these fac tors, Congress lacks the power under the Co m m er ce Cl au se to pr osc ri be S m ith ’ s c ondu ct , “ er ro r” oc curr ed , and the f

ir st pr ong of the pla in e rr or

standard is m et . T he G ove rn m en t’ s atte m

pts to dis tin gui sh M ax w el l are unp er sua siv e. T he Governm ent em

phasizes that Maxwell invalidated § 225 2A(a )(5)( B) a s applied and therefore cannot be autom atically extended to the facts of this case. SeeFo r e x amp l e, we re s erv ed“j u d gm en t . . . as t o wh et h er

th e d i s t i n ctac t s o f p ro d

u ci n g, 11 buying , s e lli ng , tr a din g , w are ho us ing , d istri butin g , o r m ark e tin gc hil d p or no g ra phy c on sti tut e economic or

commerc ial activity .” Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1056 n.15. We note, however , that production—at lea st, that is, production for per sonal use—is by far the least “ commerc ial” of these a ctivities and has ea sily the most attenuated link to interstate c ommerce . The Gove rnment also points to Max well’s stateme nt that “there is simpl y no rec ord e vid e nc e to s ug g e st that Maxwe ll w a s a po te nti a l c hil d mo le ste r o r t hat hi s c on du c t w ou ld l ike ly incre ase the cre ation and distribution of child pornog raphy elsewhe re, muc h less to the extent that such cr eation and distribution would have a substantial effe ct on interstate c ommerce .” I d. at 1 0 5 9 . Inc o n tr a s t , th e r e i s e v i d e n c e th atS m i thi s , a s th e G o v e r n m e n tp ut s i t , “ n o to n l y a ‘p ote nti a l c hil d mo le ste r, ’ b ut a n a c c omp lis he d o ne .” Whil e thi s f a c t c e rt a inl y

make s Smi th more wor thy of punishment, we do not see how it makes him more wor thy of fe dera l punis hme nt, i.e ., ho w i t pr ov ide s a mor e dir e c t li nk

be tw e e n h is c on du c t a

nd int e rs tate commerc e. More over, a lthough Smith’s conduct obviously did “incre ase the cre ation . . . of c hil d p or no g ra phy ,” the e vid e nc e wa s th at th is c re atio n w a s f or pe rs on a l us e . T he re fo re , Sm ith did not increa se distribution or cre ation “else wher e,” which is rea lly what this passag e fr om Maxwell is about—i.e., the idea that any distribution of child pornogr aphy eventua lly

aff ects a nd incre ases the inter state marke t and leads to e ven more cre ation and distribution. And, as we ha ve explained at leng th in this Part, there is no evidence that Smit h’s conduc t, viewed in isolation, had a substantial e ffe ct on interstate c ommerce . Finally , in Max well we listed a number of thing s that the Gover nment had not prove n, amongthem “that Maxwell produce d the pornography .” I d. at 1068. We also noted, howe ver, that there was no proof

that Maxwell (1) purcha sed pornography , (2) tra ded or distributed pornography , (3) a ffe cted the ma rket supply

of pornography , (4) e ncoura g ed other s to seek pornography , (5) obtaine d the pornography itself throug h the interne t or any other c hannel of interstate c ommerce or eve n (6) f rom another

state, or ( 7) took or intended to take the pornography

out of state for

either c ommercia l or persona l use. I d. All of these obse rvations, of course , apply

with equal for ce to the instant c ase. 31 Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 52- 53 & n. 12. I t a lso poi nts out that M ax w el l e xpl ic itl y re se rv ed de ci sio n a s to w he the r the pr oduc tio n of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

is w ith in the pow er of Co ngr es s to pr osc ri be . T his is tr ue , but appl y ing the r ea soni ng o f 11 L ope z, Mo rr iso n, and M ax w el l t o th is c as e, w e dis ce rn no c onst itutio na lly s i g n i fi ca n td i s t i n ct i o n s . In re ac h i n g th i s co n cl u s i o n , we d ec l i n e t h e G o v ern m en t ’s invit ation to in fer that Sm ith dis tributed childpornography . In its supp lem ental32

le tte r m em or an dum , the G ove rn m en t no te s th at the re w as not

am at ch ing developed pi cture or c opy for ever y “ thum bnail print” in th e lockbox. It then ar gue s th at

the abse nc e of

the se pic tur es “ re ad ily

sup ports the inf

er en ce that bo th the original pictu res of S m ith’s victim and copies of several of those pictures are

‘ in c ir cu la tio n. ’ ” H ow ev er , S m ithw as not ind ic te d f

or dis tr ibu tin g c hil d pornog raphy . Nor did the j ury specifically

or necessar ily

find that he had dis tr ibu te d c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . I nde ed , the f ac t tha t the m iss ing pho tos w er e not in the seized lockbox j ust as “ readily suppo rts the inference ” that they we re som ewhe re in the S m ithhom e that the of fi ce rs did not se ar ch . T hus, w e co nti nue to reserve j udgm ent as to whether pr oof of noncomm ercia l distribu tion—as well as num er ous oth er

a ct ivi tie s, se e Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 56 n . 15— w oul d be sufficient to sustain a conviction un der the Com m erce Clause. B. In this section, we address the questio n whether the Maxwell er ror w as

“plain.” “ Plain err or is, by its term s, er

ror which is so obvio us and substantial th at i ts h o u l dn o th av e b ee np erm i t t edb y th e t ri al co u rtev en ab s en tth e d ef en d an t ’s tim el y a ssi stanc e in d et ec tin g it . ” U nit ed S ta te s v. P ri et o, 232 F . 3d 8 16, 823 ( 11th Cir. 2000 ). In a c ase such as this, w here the lawwa s unsettl ed at the tim e of trial an d ha s be enc lari fi ed

by the ti m e of

appe al , the de fe ndant n ee d on ly sho wthat the33

error is plain un der curr ent law; S m ith is no t required to show that the error wa s plain at the tim e of trial. See supra note 7. T hus, we m odify the ordinary

standard an d a sk, “ If

S m ith ’ s pr ose cu tio n w er e ini tiate d to day , w oul d hi s c ondu ct be so obvi ousl y be y ond the pow er

of Co ngr es s to pr osc ri be that the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d ra ise the iss ue sua

spo nte e ve n a

bse nt a ti m el y obj ec tio n?” Inli ght

of Ma xw el l, w e an sw er

thi s qu es tio n inthe a ff

irm at ive ; a cc or din gly , w e hol d th at the e rr or ide nti fi ed in Part I II . A , sup ra , w as pla in. A t the out se t, w e not e that the r ule in thi s c ir cu it is tha t “ w he re ne ith er the Suprem e Court nor this Court has ever resolved an issue, and other circ uits are spl it on i t, the re c anbe no p la in e rr or in re gard to that i ssu e. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Aguillard, 217 F. 3d 13 19, 1321 (11t h Cir. 2000 ). T he Suprem e Court has never re sol ve d th is i ssu e, and, a s w e ac know le dge d inMa xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 68 n . 25, oth er c ir cu its are spl it on i t. T he re fo re , the e rr or is pla in o nly

if Ma xw el l i tse lf m ade it so. W e hold that it d id for two r easons: First, the diffe rences betw een Max well an d t hi s ca se are, atlea stforCo m m erce Cla us e p ur

po se s, t ru ly m in im al . Bo th p ro se cu tio ns b as ed

j ur isd ic tio n onthe f

ac t tha t c er

ta in m at er ia ls trave le d in int er state c om

m er ce be fo re the de fe ndant u se d th em , w hic h M ax w el l thor ough ly discredited as a m eans for e stablish ing cons titutio nal j urisdictio n. T he only rea l dif fe re nc e be tw ee n th e tw o c as es is that M ax w el l i nvol ve d in tr as ta te pos se ssi on34

fo r pe rs ona l us e, w he re as the pr es en t c as e inv olv es intra state pos se ssi on and pr oduc tio n f

or pe rs ona l us e. S ec ond, on e ac h of the f our Mo rr iso n f

ac tor s, the conclusio n is inescapable that Maxwell’ s reasoning appl ies to Sm ith’s c ase. Significantly , in Maxw ell we rea soned th at § 2252 A( a)(5) (B) is not an

“ ef fo rt to co ntr ol n at ion al tr ad e by r eg ulatin g in tr as ta te a ct ivi ty . I nst ea d, it attem pts to regulate prim ary

conduct directly , e ven within state borders.” Id. at 1057 . D ist ing uis hin g W ic kard , w e re as one d th at Co ngr es s c le ar ly

ha s no int er es t in c ontro lli ng “ the sup ply of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

f or the pur pose of a voi din g surplus es and shortages or for the purpose of stim ulating its trade at incre ased pr ic es . ” I d. W e al so n ote d th at the statut e’ s j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok “ sm ac ks o f pr et ex t, ” as Co ngr es s c le ar ly ha s no int er es t i n r ed

uc ing tr af fi c in p ro duc tio n m at er ia ls s uc h a s c am er as or f ilm . I d. a t 10 58. “ T hus, w e co nc lud e[ d] that the re gul at ed intra state a ct ivi ty

. . . [ w as ] m or e sim ilar by f ar to the br an d of

intra state cr im ina l c ondu ct

that i s apr ope r subj ec t of state r eg ulatio n a lon e than it is to the sort of econom ic activity

addressed in W ickard.” Id. Indeed, “ the nonecono m ic, cr im ina l natur e of

Ma xw el l’ s c ondu ct

[ w as ] c en tr al to our

de ci sio n. ” I d. T his re as oni ng a

ppl ie s w ithe qua l f

or ce he re . I n th is c ont ex t, intra state pr oduc tio n f or pe rs ona l us e is n o m or e a pla usi ble sub

j ec t of “ m ar ke t” r eg ulatio n th anis intra state poss es sio n f

or pe rs ona l us e. S m ith ’ s c ondu ct , li ke Ma xw el l’ s, is obvi ousl y35

n o n ec o n o m i c a n dcr i m i n al i nn at u re . Ac co rd i n g l y, iti s “p l ai n ” t h atMo rr i s o n ’s fi rs t f ac tor w ei ghs ag ai nst

sus ta ini ng f

ed er al r eg ulatio n of

it . Ma xw el l f

ound the sam e j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok at i ssu e in this c as e to b e

“pa te ntl y ins uf fi ci en t” a s ac onst itutio na l m atte r. I d. a t 10 63. A lso , the Ma xw el l co urt r ev ie w ed

m ost of the c ongr es sio na l f

ind ing s th at

are r el ev an t and f

ound

“ nothin g to pe rs ua de [ it] that po sse ssi ng c hil d po rn ogr ap hy pr oduc ed

w ith m aterials transpo rted in interstate com m erce is an activity

that has a substant ial ef fe ct on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . ” I d. a t 10 67. I n th is c as e, w e ad dr es s in tr as ta te pr oduc tio n f

or pe rs ona l us e, but

the pr obl em

that w as e vid en t and e m

pha siz ed in Ma xw el l i s e vid en t he re a s w el l: the f ind ing s m er el y

pe rs ua de that a

luc rativ e ch ild por nogr ap hy ind ustry e xis ts, not

that the a ct ivi ty

a t i ssu e in this c as e ha s any sort of sub stanti al e ff

ec t onit . S ee id. a t 10 66. I n sh or t, it is “pla in” to us tha t the se co nd and thir d M or

ri son fa ct or s w ei gh a ga ins t the G ove rn m en t. E va luatin g th e fi na l M or

ri son fa ct or

—the de gr ee of

a tte nuatio n be tw ee n th e ch ar ge d c ondu ct

and any sub stanti al e ff

ec t onint er state c om

m er ce —the Ma xw el l court began by

rea sonin g that the non ecom ic, crim inal nature of the conduct

“ al on e n eces sa ril y

att en ua te s t he rel at io ns hi p . . . to so m e d eg ree.” Id. at10 58 . Bu t j ust howa tte nuate d th at

r el at ion shi p w as be cam e cl ear onl y a ft er c onsi de ri ng Ma xw el l’ s sp ec if

ic , iso la te d c ondu ct . I d. T his appr oa chw as r equir ed be ca use the36

W ickard “ aggregate approach cannotbe applied to int rastate c rim inal activity of a none co nom ic na tur e. ” I d. a t 10 59. Whe n vi ew ed in iso la tio n, “ [t ] he c au sa l c ha in ne ce ssary to lin k [ Ma xw el l’ s] a ct ivi ty w ithany sub stanti al im

pa ct on i nte rs ta te co m m er ce m igh t be lon g e noug h to r ea chthe out er li m its of the sol ar sy ste m . ” I d. at 105 8. E ve n if

w e as sum e that S m ith ’ s pr oduc tio n pl ac es him one li nk c los er

to interstate com

m erce in the causal chain (and thus on e link rem oved from the outer lim its of the solar sy stem ), it is clear under Maxwell that the connection between Sm ith ’ s c ondu ct

and a sub stanti al e ff

ec t i s e xtr em el y

r em ote . T he onl y

hop e the Governm ent would have under this p rong would be to rely on the W ickard ag gr eg at ionpr inc ipl e. B ut M ax w el l square ly hol ds that this pr inc ipl e “ cannot be ap pli ed to intra state c ri m ina l a ct ivi ty of anon ec onom ic na tur e, ” w hic h c le ar ly includes Sm ith’s c ondu ct. Ther efore, it is again “ plain” that the fourth and final Mor ri son fa ct or

w ei ghs he av ily

a ga ins t the G ove rn m en t. T he G ove rn m en t su gge sts that this c as e can be dis tin gui she d ( if not on the m er i t s , t h en atl ea s ten o u g h s o th atth e e rr o r w as n o t“p l ai n ”) b as edo nMa x we l l ’s passing observation th at there w as “ sim ply no record evidence to suggest th at Ma xw el l w as apot en tia l c hil d m ole ste r or that hi s c ondu ct

w oul d li ke ly

inc re as e the creation anddistribu tion o f child pornog raphy elsew here. ” Id. at 1059. Rea d in c ont ex t, se e supr a not e 10, how ev er , the pr im ar y im port of thi s ob se rv at ionis37

that M ax w el l w as not

c ontri but ing c hil d po rn ogr ap hy to the m ar

ke t. T he re is al so no e vid en ce he re that S m ithw as c ontri but ing to the m ar ke t. I n any

e ve nt, in lig ht of the r es t of

the opi nio n’ s ob vio us a

ppl ic ab ili ty

to the f ac ts o f thi s c as e, thi s sin gle se nte nc e sim

ply is not sig nif ic an t. Insum , w e thi nk tha t i t i s pl ai n th at Ma xw el l’ s r ea soni ng unde r al l f our pr ongs of Mo rr iso n a

ppl ie s he re and tha t S m ith ’ s c ondu ct is be y ond the pow er

of Co ngr es s to pr osc ri be . I f anide nti ca l pr ose cu tio n w er e ini tiate d inone of the dis tr ic t c ourts i n th is c ir cu it tod ay , w e w oul d e xpe ct the c ourt t o r ai se the iss ue sua spon te even absent an objec tion o n the part of the defendant. It is true that Ma xw el l’ s f

ac ts are not

ide nti ca l, and i t di d no t sp ec if ic al ly a ddr es s § 2 251( a) , but we discern no disti nction th at m akes the resolution of the question presented here anythi ng l es s th anc le ar

und er c ur re nt l aw . T he r

ule in the qua lif

ie d im m uni ty context is th at “ [f] or a constitutio nal right to be clearly established, its contou rs m ust be suf fi ci en tly c le ar that a r ea sona ble of fi ci al w oul d un de rs tand tha t wha t he is d oin g vi olate s th at

r igh t. T he ve ry

a ct ionin que sti on d oe s no t have to have be enf ound unl aw fu l, but

in lig ht o f pr e- ex ist ing lawthe unl aw fu lne ss m ust be ap pare nt. ” Ma glu tav. S am ple s, 375 F . 3d 1 269, 128 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( em pha sis ad de d) (ci ti ng Hop e v . Pel zer, 5 36 U.S. 73 0, 7 39 , 12 2 S . Ct. 2 50 8, 2 51 5, 1 53 L. E d. 2d 6 66 ( 2002 )) . S im ilarl y , und er Ru le 52( b) it

is not ne ce ssary

f or apr ev iou sAs in M axwe ll, we a c kn ow le dg e that ot he r c ou rt s h ave re a c he d d if

fe re nt r e su lts in 12 simil ar, though not identical, ca ses. Compare Mc Coy , 323 F.3d at 1126, 1133 (holding that an identical jurisdictional eleme nt in 18 U.S.C . § 2252(a) (4)( B) “provide s no support for the . . . asser tion of fede ral jurisdiction” a nd that Congr ess ca

nnot proscribe “simple intrastate posse ssion of a vis ua l de pic tio n ( or

de pic tio ns ) t

hat ha s n ot b e e n ma ile d, sh ipp e d, or tr ans po rt e d inte rs tate and is not intended for

interstate distribution or for e conomic or c ommercia l use, includingthe exchang e of the prohibited materia l for other prohibited materia l”), United States v. Corp, 236 F.3 d 3 25 , 3 33 (6t h C ir . 2 00 1) ( ho ld in g thatth e id ent ica l j uri sd ict io nal ele men t i n § 22 52 (a)(4 )(B) was insuffic ient to establish fede ral jurisdiction and that Cong ress c annot proscr ibe intrastate, noncommerc ial possession of child pornography —at least to the e x tent that the proscr iption re a c he s a tw e nty-t hr e e -ye ar- old

de fe nd ant’ s p os se ssi on

of ph oto s o f h ims e lf

e ng a g e d in consensua l sex with a seve nteen- y ear -old), United States v. Jeronimo-Ba utista, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277-83 (D. Utah 2004) (holding§ 2251(a) unconstitutional as applied to the pure ly local crime of a def endant who took pictur es of, a nd participated in, the sexual assault of a minor), a nd United States v. Matthews, 300 F . Supp. 2d 1220, 1237-38 (N.D. Ala . 2004) (holding§ 2251(a) and § 2 25 2A (a )( 5) (B ) u

nc on sti tut ion a l a s a

pp lie d to int

ra state pr od

uc tio n a nd po sse ssi on

of c hil d pornography

that has not trave led in interstate c ommerce and is not intended for interstate or economic distribution of any kind), with United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 90-91 ( 2d Cir. 20 03 ) ( up ho ldi ng§ 2 25 1( a ) a s a pp lie d to int

ra state , n on c omm e rc ia l pr od uc tio n o f c hil d p o rn o grap h y

), Un i t edS t at es v . Ka l l es t ad , 2 3 6 F. 3 d 2 2 5 , 2 2 7 -3 1 (5 thC i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( u p h o l d i n g a conviction for intra state, noncommer cial possession of c hild pornography under § 2 2 5 2 (a )( 4 )( B) ), Un i t edS t at es v . An gl e, 2 3 4 F. 3 d 3 2 6 , 3 3 5 -3 8 (7 thC i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( u p h o l d i n g a con vi cti onfor

in tr ast ate , n on com mer cia l p os ses si onof ch il d p orn ograph y un der § 22 52 (a)(4 )(B) wh er e t h e d ef

en d an twa s al s o co n v i ct edo f o rd er i n g ch i l d p o rn o grap h y

v i a e m ai l an d

s o l i ci t i n g a minor to eng ag e in sexually expli cit activity

via telephone and the inter net), Rodia, 194 F .3d at 47 0- 82 (c on c lud ingthat th e ide nti c a l juri sd ic tio na l e le me nt i n § 22 52 (a )( 4) (B ) w a s e sse nti a lly us e le ss b ut n on e the le ss u ph old inga

c onvic tio n f

or int ra state no nc omm e rc ia l po sse ssi on of c hil d p o rn o grap h y

), an d Un i t edS t at es v . Bau s ch , 1 4 0 F. 3 d 7 3 9 , 7 4 0 -4 1 (8 thC i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( u p h o l d i n g a conviction for intra state noncommer cial possession of c hild pornog raphy solely on the basis of § 2252(a) (4)( B) ’s identical jurisdictional ele ment). In Maxwell, we expli citly reje cted the rea soning of

a number of those ca ses upholding similar c onvictions. See Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1059 & n.17, 1061, 1066, 1068 n.25. T here fore , even though some of these opinions addressed pr od uc tio n o f c hil d p or

no g ra phy rathe r t ha n me re po sse ssi on , th e y

re ma in u np e rs ua siv e be c a

us e the y did so by c omm itt ingso me c omb inatio n o f t he fo llo wi nge rr or s: c ha

ra c te ri zingpla inl y noncommerc ial activity

as “c ommercia l,” applying the inapplicable Wickar d ag g reg ation principle, e mphasizi nginapposite congressional finding s, and re lying on a patently defic ient 38 ca se to have f

ound that the ve ry

c ondu ct in que sti on i s be y ond the pow er of Co ngr es s to pr osc ri be ; r athe r, it is en oughthat— as is the c as e he re —the e rr or be

“ ‘ cl ear’ or

. . . ‘ obvi ous. ’ ” O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 4, 113 S . Ct . a t 17 77. 12jur isd ic tio na l e le me nt. We p la c e fa r m or e signif

ic anc e on the fa c t th at a

dis tr ic t c ourt

wi thi n th is circ uit—even without the bene fit of Maxwell—rece ntly had little difficulty

concludingthat §§ 2251(a) and 2252(a )(5) (B ) we re unc onstitut ional as applied to e ssentially indisti nguishable fa cts. Matthews, 300 F . Supp. 2d at 1227-1238. Two circ uits have sug g ested that a defe ndant who is “c lear ly involved in exactly

the ty pe of child-e x ploitive and abusive be havior that Cong ress sought to prohibit” is more likely to be subject to fede ral jurisdiction. United States v. Andre ws, 383 F.3d 374, 378 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (distinguishingCorp, supra, on this basis); ac cord Mor ales-D e Jesus, 372 F.3d at 20-21. The rea soning of

these opinions seems to be a s follows: First, as longas it is actually regulating interstate c ommerce , Congr ess is fre e to leg islate for “ moral” or “socia l” re asons. See He art of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257, 85 S. Ct. 348, 357-58, 13 L . Ed. 2d 258 (1964). This princ iple is well-established. Sec ond, the child pornography statutes wer e intended to protect c hildren fr om sex ual exploit ation; Congre ss obviously has no intere st in regulating the marke t for child pornography in the ordinary

sense. So fa

r, so g ood. Third, bec ause the rea l purp os e of

the statut e s is to p ro te c t c hil dr e n f ro m e xploi tatio n, the y

c an b e c on sti tut ion a lly applied to any

case in which the def

endant himself ha s expl oited children. It is thi s sugg estion that is novel and unsupported by prec edent. F eder al moral or soc ial leg islation under the Commerce Clause is constituti onal if, and only if, it is a regulation of commerc e. When Con g re ss h a s c ho se n a dd

re ss a mor a l wro ngthr ou g h c omm e rc ia l r e gulatio n, it l a c ks the po we r t o then insist that the regulation be applied whe reve r the wr ongis found. This point shoul d be ob vio us : it

is the su bs tanti a l e ff

e c t on int e rs tate c omm e rc e , n ot t he mor a l wro ng , th at su

pp or ts fede ral jurisdiction. Cf. Matthews, 300 F . Supp. 2d at 1235 (“[T]he gove rnment would have the court substitute an issue of unque stioned national conc ern, c hild pornography , for the constitutional requireme nt that the g overnme nt demonstrate that the vide o tape pr oduced a nd possessed wholly

within one state had a

‘substantial’ ef

fec t on interstate commer ce. T his the court c annot do.”) . 39 C. U nde r Ru le 52( b) , w e have the dis cr et ionto co rr ec t a pla in e rr or

onl y if it

“ affe cts subst antial rights.” In gener al, this “ m eans that the error m ust have been prej udicial: It m

ust have affec ted the outcom e of the district court proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S . at 734, 113 S. Ct. at 1778. W e have no difficulty concludin g that Sm ith ’ s “ subs tanti al r igh ts” w er e af fe ct ed : the c ourt se nte nc ed him to 188 m onths in p ri son an d 60 m onths o f supe rv ise d r el ea se , whe re as Ma xw el l r equir es that hi s40

ind ic tm en t be dis m iss ed . D. Rule 52(b) is discretionary : “ A plain er ror that af

fects substantial right s m ay be considered even thou gh it was not broug ht to th e court’ s attention.” Fed. R. Cr im . P . 52( b) ( em

pha sis a dde d) . T he S upr em e Co urt ha s he ld tha t our dis cr et ion shou ld be utili zed “ to correct only ‘ particularly

egregious errors, ’ those errors that

‘ seriouslyaff

ect the fa irness, integrity

or public reputation of j udicial pr oc ee din gs. ’ ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Y oung , 470 U . S. 1, 15, 105 S . Ct . 103 8, 104 6, 84 L . E d. 2d 1 ( 1985 ) (quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. F ra dy , 456 U . S. 152 , 163 , 102 S . Ct . 1584 , 159 2, 71 L . E d. 2d 8 16 ( 1982 ), and Unit ed S ta te s v. A tki nson , 297 U . S. 157 , 160, 56 S. C t. 391, 392, 80 L . E d. 555 (1936)). An error m ay satisfy this stand ard

“ ind ep en de nt o f the de fe ndant’ s innoc en ce . C onve rs el y , apla in e rr or a ff ec tin g subs tanti al r igh ts d oe s no t, w ith out m or e, satis fy

the . . . standard , f

or oth er w ise the dis cr et iona ff

or de d by Ru le 52( b) w oul d be il lus or y . ” O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 6- 37, 113 S . Ct . a t 17 79. T he c ondu ct

f or w hic h S m ithw as c onvi ct ed is cl earl y pun ish ab le . T he onl y problem is that it is no t puni shable federally . Thus, ther e is som e sense in which af fi rm ing sho uld

not und er m ine pub lic c onf

ide nc e in the c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m or co nst itute am isc ar

ri ag e of j ust ic e. I n U nit ed

S ta te s v. W al ke r, 59 F . 3d 1 196 (1 1thThis disti nction is possibl y rele vant to the question whethe r a district c ourt has subjec t 13 matter jurisdiction over a case . Compare Walker , 59 F.3d at 1198 (“In essenc e, the statute w as vo id a b in iti o, and

c on se qu e ntl y , th e dis tr ic t c ourt be low la c ke d s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n w ith respe ct to that char g e.”) , with United States v. Viscome, 144 F .3d 1365, 1370 (11th Cir.1998), and Al ikh ani v . Unit e d St ate s, 20 0 F .3 d 7 32 , 7 35 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 0) (“ An

e ff e c t on int e rs tate c omm e rc e may

be re qu ir e d f

or Con g re ss t o h ave a

uth or ity un de r t he Comme rc e Cla

us e to f or bid cer tain conduct. B ut . . . that does not imply that a district cour

t fac ed with an insuff

icient interstate- commerc e nexus loses subject-matter jur isdiction of the case .” (c itation omit ted)). 41 Ci r. 199 5) , w e ex er ci se d our dis cr et ionund er Ru le 52( b) to re ve rs e a co nvi ct ionin li gh t o f Lop ez, s ta ti ng th atwe co ul d “ th in k o f no pl ai ne r erro r th an to all ow a convictio n to standunder a statute which Congress w as without power to enact. ” Id . a t 11 98 ( ci tin g O lano f or the pr opos iti on tha t an “ ap pe llate c ourt sh oul d co nduc t pl ai n e rr or

r ev ie wund er

Ru le 52( b) ‘ in those c as es w he re am isc ar ri ag e of j ust ic e w oul d othe rw ise r es ult ’ ”) . W al ke r is arg uably dis tin gui sha

ble in that i t in va li da te d ast atut e as faci al ly unc on st itut io na l ra th er t ha n a s ap pl ie d; als o, we 13 vacated only

one of W alker’ s convictio ns, leaving him with a substantial sentence to s er ve on h is r em ai nin g dr

ug- and f ir earm -r el at ed

c onvi ct ion s. I d. W e have fo und re la tiv el y

li ttl e ad dit ion al c as el awon this iss ue . C om pare U nit ed

S ta te s v. Su ar ez , 263 F . 3d 4 68, 489 ( 6thCi r. 200 1) ( Bo ggs, J. , dis se nti ng) ( “ A llo w ing [ the defendant to rem ain in prison ] , while largely believing th at his prosecutio n . . . wa s be y ond the pow er

of Co ngr es s, w oul d c er

ta inl y se em to ca ll int o qu es tio n th e fa ir ne ss o f the j udi ci al pr oc es s. ”) , and Unit ed S ta te s v. K

now le s, 29 F . 3d 9 47, 951 - 52 ( 5thCi r. 199 4) ( “ [O ] ur f ai lur e to a ddr es s [ the de fe ndant’ s C om m er ce Cl au se42

ch al le nge ] w oul d se ri ousl y a ff ec t the f ai rn es s, int eg ri ty , and p ubl ic r ep utatio n of j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs. ”) , w ithU nit ed S ta te s v. F el ic iano, 223 F . 3d 1 02, 125 -2 6 ( 2d Ci r. 200 0) ( statin g th at

“ the f ourth p ro ng o f the O lano p la in e rr or inquir y is not satisfied” wher e the defe ndant was w ell aw are “ that he was c omm itting a very se ri ous fe lony ” an d th e onl y iss ue w as “ w he the r he sho uld have be entr ie d in federa l or state court”). T em pti ng a s it m ay be to say that a ff irm ing S m ith ’ s c onvi ct ionw oul d no t harm the integrity

or public reputation of the crim inal justice sy stem , w e think th at it w oul d. T he r ea l i ssu e at thi s po int

in the c as e is whe the r Sm ithsho uld r em ai n in fe de ra l pr iso n f

or c om m itt ing a ct s th at

the F ed er al G ove rn m en t l ac ks the co nst itutio na l po w er

to cr im ina liz e sim

ply be ca use w e thi nk h is p uni shm en t i s de se rv ed . U lti m at el y , w e thi nk tha t i t w oul d un de rm ine pub lic c onf ide nc e in the j udi ci al sy ste m

to so b la tantl y

br ush as ide the li m its our

Co nst itutio n pl ac es on the F e d e r a l G o v e rn me n t , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r w e h a v e s o r e c e n t l y e n f

o r c e dth o s e s a me li m it s i n a n e ss en ti al ly ind is ti ng ui sh ab le cas e. As we ex pl ai ne d i n M ax well ,

O ur N at ion ’ s F ound er s w er e not na ive about

the r isk of an a llen co m pa ssi ng c en tr al pow er , nor , it se em s, did

the y ign or e the poss ibi lity

that the le gis la tur e m igh t be te m pte d to ove rs te p it s bo unds to l eg isl at e ide al s f

av or ed by it s c onst itu en ci es . F ed er al ism is no academ ic shibbo leth. I t is neither an inane legalism , nor an anachronous vest ige of a by gone colon ial era . The f ederalist sy stem pla ce s avit al c he ck

on the pow er

of the c en tr al gov er

nm en t t o43

tr es pa ss o n our fr ee dom . F ed er al ism e nsur es ar ole f

or the governm ents of the states and affords the voting publi c a m ore re sonant v oic e in the de ba te ove r m any le gis la tiv e iss ue s of pr inc ipa lly

loc al c onc er

n. Id. at 1069 (citations om itted). T hat constitu tional lim itations on gov ernm ental power designed to protect indiv idual freedom s will som etim es benefit evildoers shou ld c om e as no s ur

pr ise . “ [E ] ve ry

guarante e en shr ine d inthe Co nst itutio n, our basic charter

and the guarantor of our m ost precious lib erties, is by it endowed w ithan in de pe nde nt v ita lity and v al ue , and this Co urt i s no t f re e to c urta il tho se co nst itutio na l gu ar an te es e ve n to pun ishthe m ost obv iou sly

gui lty . ” S ton e v. Po w el l, 428 U . S. 465 , 524 , 96 S . Ct . 303 7, 306 6, 49 L . E d. 2d 1 067 (1 976) (Bre nnan, J., dissenti ng). In su m , we ho ldth atth e fo ur th pro ng of Ol an o i s s at is fie d, an d we ac co rd ing ly

e xe rc ise our

dis cr et ionto not ic e pla in e rr or , nam el y , the f ai lur e of the G ove rn m en t t o e sta

bli sh tha t S m ith ’ s c ondu ct sub stanti al ly

a ff ec ts i nte rs ta te co m m er ce suc h th at

it c anbe va lid ly

r eg ulate d th ro ugh fe de ra l C om m er ce Cl au se le gi sl at io n. IV. As in Maxw ell, “ [w ] e believe Morr ison’s fr am ew ork produces the correct re sul t i n th is c as e. ” Ma xw el l, 386 F . 3d at 10 67. U nde nia bly , our hol din g li m its44

the e xte nt t o whic h th e Fe de ra l G ove rn m en t c anpr ose cu te pur el y intra state pr oduc er s and p oss es sor s of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . B ut, to take aste p ba ck f ro m our ex te nde d ana ly sis of

Co m m er ce Cl au se pr ec ed en t, the re is qui te sim ply no pr ovi sio n of

the U nit ed

S ta te s C onst itutio n th at

gr an ts the F ed er al G ove rn m en t a ge ne ra l po lic e pow er

of the ty pe that st at e gove rn m en ts u se to pr ose cu te pe opl e lik e A lvi n S m ith . F ed er al auth or ity in thi s are a is thus lim ite d to c as es inv olv ing

“ Co m m er ce w ithf

or ei gn N at ion s, and am ong the se ve ra l S ta te s. ” U . S. Co nst . art . I, § 8, cl. 3. O bvio usly , this is not su ch a ca se. For the fore goin g reasons, Sm ith’s c onvi ctions are REVERSED.