[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-2638.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

CRAWFORD COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 3-22-51

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

AMANDA JOHNSON, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 3-22-52

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

AMANDA JOHNSON, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeals from Crawford County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court Nos. 21-CR-0180 and 21-CR-0309

Judgments Affirmed

Date of Decision: July 31, 2023

APPEARANCES:

William T. Cramer for Appellant

Daniel J. Stanley for Appellee
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WILLAMOWSKI, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Amanda Johnson (“Johnson”) appeals the 

judgments of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the trial 

court gave incorrect jury instructions and that her convictions are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, the judgments of 

the trial court are affirmed. 

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On June 5, 2021 at roughly 3:17 A.M., Delvin Duffield (“Duffield”) 

called 9-1-1 to report a domestic disturbance involving him and his girlfriend, 

Johnson. He stated that Johnson was using meth; that she was throwing things at 

him; and that he required assistance. Officer Deavon Wireman (“Officer 

Wireman”) of the Bucyrus Police Department responded to this call, going to the 

house where Duffield and Johnson were then living together. At the scene, Duffield 

told Officer Wireman that Johnson had been using narcotics and that she had been 

calling him names. In this process, Duffield showed him a picture on his phone of 

Johnson using narcotics.

{¶3} Officer Wireman went upstairs with Duffield where he encountered 

Johnson. While Johnson denied using any narcotics, Officer Wireman observed a 

cut straw on a nightstand and a mirror with residue on it. However, this interaction 

was cut short when Officer Wireman received a dispatch indicating that another 
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officer was in need of immediate assistance in apprehending a person who was 

fleeing from police custody. Officer Wireman then asked if Duffield and Johnson 

were able to “be civil, separate in each other’s rooms * * *, and [that] they agreed 

to do so.” (Tr. 137). At this point, Officer Wireman left to assist the other police 

officer. 

{¶4} Roughly in between 11:45 P.M. on June 5, 2021 and 12:00 A.M. on 

June 6, 2021, Duffield called 9-1-1, reporting that he was worried that Johnson was 

using meth. In response, Johnson’s probation officer, Tony Stover (“Stover”), went 

with Officer Jason Pennington (“Officer Pennington”) and two other police officers 

to the house where Duffield was then living. When they arrived, the police found 

Sarah Lewis (“Lewis”) and Noah Watkins (“Watkins”) sleeping on the ground in 

the garage. Lewis was Johnson’s sister, and Watkins was Lewis’s boyfriend.

{¶5} The police discovered a loaded syringe beside Lewis and a syringe in 

Watkins’s pocket. Stover and Officer Pennington then met Duffield and Johnson’s 

mother at the front porch of the residence. Duffield was standing at the door and 

told the police that Johnson was not currently at home but was at a friend’s house. 

Duffield then turned and began rushing up the stairs towards the second story of the 

house. 

{¶6} As Duffield was going up the stairs, Stover “heard a loud bang” that 

sounded like something fell over on the second floor of the house. (Tr. 89). Duffield 

did not respond to commands to return to the first floor. For this reason, Stover and 
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Officer Pennington followed him up the stairs where they encountered Johnson in 

her bedroom. She stated that she had directed Duffield to tell the police that she 

was not home because she did not want to go to jail. 

{¶7} Stover then “observed several marijuana pipes * * * on one of the 

dressers” in Johnson’s bedroom. (Tr. 90). Officer Pennington and Stover asked her

if she had or used any illegal drugs. In response, Johnson stated that she did 

“marijuana and stuff.” (Tr. 22). However, she also indicated several times that she 

only smoked marijuana and that “there were no other drugs.” (Tr. 90). 

{¶8} At this point, Stover noticed that a box fan was lying on its side next to 

the dresser in Johnson’s bedroom. He thought that “someone might have been doing 

something with the dresser, and knocked the fan over.” (Tr. 91). This could also 

explain the “loud bang” that he heard while Duffield was climbing the stairs. (Tr. 

89). Stover went to this area of Johnson’s bedroom and saw a purse stuck behind 

the dresser. As Stover retrieved this item from behind the dresser, he did not observe 

any cobwebs or dust on the purse. 

{¶9} While examining the contents of the purse, Stover discovered a change 

purse that contained what appeared to be meth, several pills, and a baggie of 

marijuana. He also discovered “feminine hygiene products in the purse * * *.” (Tr. 

94). The purse also contained an Electronic Benefit Transfer Card, a debit card, and 

a credit card that had Johnson’s name on them. While he found an identification 

card belonging to Duffield inside the purse, he did not find any other items that bore 
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the name of a person other than Duffield or Johnson. Officer Pennington also 

discovered a digital scale, plastic baggies, and a metal container in Johnson’s 

bedroom. 

{¶10} At this point, Johnson was arrested and taken to the local jail. Stover

later testified that he believed that did not seek a drug test in this situation because 

he viewed this as a drug possession case. Within one day of being taken into police 

custody, Johnson appeared before the trial court and was released on a personal 

recognizance bond. The contents of the change purse were sent to the Ohio Bureau 

of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) for testing and found to be methamphetamines 

and clonazepam. 

{¶11} On June 8, 2021, Johnson was indicted on one count of aggravated 

possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2529.11(A), a felony of the fifth degree, 

and one count of illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 

2925.14(C)(1), a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. This indictment became the 

basis of Case No. 21-CR-0180. On September 14, 2021, Johnson was indicted on

one count of possession of drugs in violation R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fifth 

degree.1 This indictment became the basis of Case No. 21-CR-0309. 

{¶12} On November 10, 2022, the State filed a motion that requested Case 

No. 21-CR-0180 be joined with Case No. 21-CR-0309 for trial. The trial court 

1 The items that Stover discovered in the change purse on June 6, 2021 were later tested and found to be 

Methamphetamines and Clonazepam. The charge of possession in Case No. 21-CR-0180 arises from the 

Methamphetamines. The charge of possession in Case No. 21-CR-0309 arises from the Clonazepam. 
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subsequently granted this motion on November 14, 2022. A jury trial was held on 

these indictments on November 17-18, 2022. On November 18, 2022, the jurors 

returned verdicts of guilty on all three counts against Johnson. The trial court 

sentenced Johnson on November 22, 2022.

{¶13} Johnson filed her notices of appeal on December 15, 2022. On appeal, 

she raises the following two assignments of error:

First Assignment of Error

The trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the issue of 

possession. 

Second Assignment of Error

The convictions for drug possession were not supported by the 

weight of the evidence. 

We will consider the second assignment of error before we consider the first

assignment of error. 

Second Assignment of Error

{¶14} Johnson argues that her two convictions for drug possession are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Legal Standard

{¶15} The manifest weight of the evidence analysis examines whether the 

State has carried its burden of persuasion at trial. State v. Wilson, 2022-Ohio-504, 

185 N.E.3d 176, ¶ 58 (3d Dist.). In this process, “an appellate court’s function * * 

* is to determine whether the greater amount of credible evidence supports the 
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verdict.” State v. Harvey, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-34, 2020-Ohio-329, ¶ 12, 

quoting State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 73 (3d Dist.). Accordingly, 

an “appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ * * *.” State v. Barga, 3d Dist. Shelby 

No. 17-17-14, 2018-Ohio-2804, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 

380, 388, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, 547 (1997).

Appellate courts “must review the entire record, weigh the evidence 

and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of 

witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered.’”

State v. Randle, 2018-Ohio-207, 104 N.E.3d 202, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.), quoting Plott at ¶ 

73, quoting Thompkins at 387.

{¶16} “A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate 

discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses.” State v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86, ¶ 38 (3d Dist.), 

quoting State v. Coleman, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-53, 2014-Ohio-5320, ¶ 7. “Only 

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ 

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Little, 2016-

Ohio-8398, 78 N.E.3d 323, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 

67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119.

{¶17} To prove the offense of possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A), the State must establish that the offender “[1] knowingly [2] obtain[ed], 
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possess[ed], or use[d] [3] a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” 

R.C. 2925.11(A). “Possession of drugs can be either actual or constructive.” State 

v. Bustamante, 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-12-26, 13-13-04, 2013-Ohio-4975, ¶ 25. 

“A person has ‘actual possession’ of an item if the item is within his immediate 

physical possession.” State v. McClain, 2020-Ohio-1436, 153 N.E.3d 854, ¶ 45 (3d 

Dist.), quoting State v. Williams, 4th Dist. Ross No. 03CA2736, 2004-Ohio-1130, ¶ 

23. 

{¶18} “A person has constructive possession of an item when he is conscious 

of the presence of the object and able to exercise dominion and control over that 

item, even if it is not within his immediate physical possession.” State v. Mabry, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 21569, 2007-Ohio-1895, ¶ 18. Constructive possession may 

be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Voll, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-12-

04, 2012-Ohio-3900, ¶ 19. “[T]he surrounding facts and circumstances, including 

the defendant’s actions, are evidence that the trier of fact can consider in 

determining whether the defendant had constructive possession.” Id. 

{¶19} Close proximity between a person and a controlled substance is, by 

itself, insufficient to establish constructive possession. McClain, supra, at ¶ 46. 

However, close proximity can be some evidence of constructive possession. Id. 

Thus, “presence in the vicinity of contraband, coupled with another factor or factors 

probative of dominion or control over the contraband, may establish constructive 
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possession.” State v. Lane, 2022-Ohio-3775, 202 N.E.3d 45, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.), quoting 

State v. Brown, 4th Dist. Athens No. 09CA3, 2009-Ohio-5390, ¶ 20.

Legal Analysis 

{¶20} On appeal, Johnson argues that the conclusion that she was in 

possession of drugs was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For this 

reason, we will focus our analysis on the element of possession. In this case, the 

illegal drugs were found in close physical proximity to where Johnson was located 

in her bedroom. However, the State produced additional evidence beyond close 

physical proximity to establish the element of possession. 

{¶21} In this case, the police went to the house where Johnson was living 

after receiving a call from her boyfriend that indicated she had been using meth. 

Officer Pennington testified that, on his arrival, Duffield stated that Johnson was 

not at the house and was elsewhere. When Duffield rushed upstairs, Officer 

Pennington followed and encountered Johnson at the top of the stairs. She informed 

him that she had directed Duffield to tell the police she was not there because she 

did not want to go to jail. 

{¶22} Stover testified that, when Johnson was asked about the marijuana 

pipes, “she commented several times, there were no other drugs, and all they did 

was smoke marijuana.” (Tr. 90). However, Officer Pennington testified that 

Johnson admitted that she had used illegal drugs, including “marijuana and other 

stuff.” (Tr. 22). In the body camera recording that was admitted as Exhibit 9, she 
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can be heard saying, “I had weed. I smoked it. I have done meth in the past week, 

you know. And I have had Benzos in the past week.” (Ex. 9). 

{¶23} Further, Stover testified that, as Duffield was rushing upstairs, he 

heard a “loud bang.” (Tr. 89). When Stover got upstairs, he observed a box fan 

lying on the ground next to a dresser in Johnson’s bedroom. He thought that the 

box fan might have been knocked on its side while someone was shifting the dresser 

around and that the box fan falling over may have been what caused the “loud bang” 

that he had heard. (Tr. 89). This led Stover to look behind the dresser and to 

ultimately locate the purse that was found to contain the illegal drugs. Stover 

testified that the purse “was jammed in behind the dresser” but did not have any 

dust or cobwebs on it that would suggest that it had been there for a while. (Tr. 96). 

He also stated that nothing else was located on top of the purse behind the dresser.

{¶24} Stover testified that he examined the contents of the purse. In addition 

to the illegal drugs, Stover said that he discovered feminine hygiene products in the 

purse. He also found Johnson’s name on an EBT card, a credit card, and a debit 

card that were in the purse. Stover testified that Johnson “admitted it was her 

bedroom dresser and ID” in the purse. (Tr. 103). Further, in searching Johnson’s 

bedroom, Officer Pennington found a digital scale and plastic baggies. Tr. 23. He 

testified that these items are commonly possessed by people “trafficking in drugs, a 

digital scale to weigh out the drugs and the plastic bags are to package them.” (Tr. 
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23). Stover indicated that Johnson was arrested that night because the contents of 

the purse led the police to believe that the purse belonged to her. 

{¶25} The Defense emphasized the fact that an identification card that 

belonged to Duffield was found in the purse in addition to feminine hygiene 

products, Johnson’s EBT card, Johnson’s debit card, and Johnson’s credit card. 

However, “[p]ossession of drugs, for purposes of R.C. 2925.11(A), includes both 

individual and joint possession.” State v. Sprouse, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 29406, 

29407, 2020-Ohio-91, ¶ 13. “Joint possession exists when two or more persons 

together have the ability to control an object, exclusive of others.” State v. Figueroa, 

9th Dist. Summit No. 22208, 2005-Ohio-1132, quoting State v. Alicea, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 78940, 2001 WL 1243944, *6 (Oct. 18, 2001). Officer Pennington 

testified that the purse did not contain any identification cards that belonged to a 

person other than Johnson or Duffield. Similarly, Stover testified that there was no 

indication the purse contained any items that belonged to anyone other than Johnson 

or Duffield.

{¶26} The Defense called Officer Wireman as a witness. Officer Wireman 

testified that he was at the house where Johnson lived less than twenty-four hours 

before she was arrested on June 6, 2021. He stated that he went to this location 

because Duffield had called 9-1-1 to report a domestic disturbance. Duffield told 

Officer Wireman that Johnson had been using narcotics. Officer Wireman testified 

that he observed a cut straw and a “makeup mirror with a white substance on it” on 
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the dresser before he had to leave the house to address another police emergency.2 

(Tr. 136). He explained that a narcotics user will oftentimes place the illegal drugs 

on the mirror and then “use[] the straw on the mirror to insufflate the narcotics.” 

(Tr. 143-144). 

{¶27} At trial, Johnson testified in her own defense. She stated that the house 

in which the drugs were located was her mother’s and that a number of people had 

access to the premises, including her mother; her mother’s boyfriend; Duffield; and 

her uncle. She also stated that, while Lewis and Watkins were not permitted to live 

in the house, Lewis was allowed to enter the house on occasion. Johnson stated that 

the purse was not hers; that she did not know who owned the purse; that she had 

never before seen that purse; that she did not know who placed the purse behind the 

dresser; and that the drugs inside the change purse were not hers. 

{¶28} On cross-examination, Johnson admitted that the room in which the 

drugs were found was her bedroom. She also admitted that the purse was found 

behind the dresser in which she stored her possessions. However, Johnson stated 

that she did not know about the EBT card, the credit card, or the debit card that were 

found inside the purse. She explained that she could not tell what the police were 

2 Officer Wireman referred to the dresser as a “nightstand” in his testimony. (Tr. 136). In speaking of this 

piece of furniture, Stover described it as “a dresser, could have been a nightstand, but I thought it was a 

dresser.” (Tr. 92). In this opinion, we use the word “dresser” because this is the term most used at trial to 

refer to this piece of bedroom furniture. 
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taking out of the purse while they were searching her room on the night of June 6, 

2021.

{¶29} The prosecution also questioned Johnson about a call that she made 

from jail to Duffield the night before she testified at trial. In this call, Johnson told 

Duffield that she did not “want him to come to court because * * * [she] d[id]n’t 

want him to tell on [her] * * *.” (Tr. 174). Johnson also admitted that she told 

Duffield to tell the police that she was not at the house on the night of June 6, 2021. 

She affirmed that she directed Duffield to do so because she did not want to “get in 

trouble.” (Tr. 177). She concluded her testimony by denying that she hid drugs 

behind the dresser when the police arrived at her house. 

{¶30} In summary, the State produced evidence from which a jury could 

conclude that Johnson was in possession of illegal drugs on June 6, 2021 that went 

beyond merely establishing that she was in close physical proximity to the illegal 

drugs in her bedroom. While Johnson stated that the drugs and the purse were not 

hers, the jurors were free to believe or disbelieve her testimony. State v. Slone, 3d 

Dist. Van Wert No. 15-22-04, 2023-Ohio-1110, ¶ 17. Having examined the record, 

we cannot conclude that the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily against 

Johnson’s convictions for possession of drugs. Johnson has not demonstrated that 

the jury lost its way and returned a verdict against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Accordingly, her second assignment of error is overruled. 
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First Assignment of Error

{¶31} Johnson argues that the trial court provided an incorrect jury 

instruction regarding the definition of possession. 

Legal Standard

{¶32} “A trial court’s instructions to a jury must correctly, clearly, and 

completely state the law applicable to the case.” State v. Orians, 179 Ohio App.3d 

701, 2008-Ohio-6185, 903 N.E.2d 656, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.). Jury instructions are also to 

be “appropriate to the facts of the case.” State v. Turner, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-04-

21, 2004-Ohio-6489, ¶ 35. When a jury instruction is challenged as being incorrect, 

an appellate court “must determine whether the jury charge probably misled the jury 

in a matter materially affecting the complaining party’s substantial rights.” State v. 

Frye, 2018-Ohio-894, 108 N.E.3d 564, ¶ 105 (3d Dist.), quoting Becker v. Lake Cty. 

Mem. Hosp. W., 53 Ohio St.3d 202, 208, 560 N.E.2d 165 (1990). “An appellate 

court reviewing jury instructions must examine the specific charge at issue in the 

context of the entire charge, and not in isolation.” Orians at ¶ 10.

{¶33} The “failure to object to jury instructions, stating specifically the error 

and the grounds, waives all but plain error.” State v. Parker, 7th Columbiana No. 

04 CO 44, 2005-Ohio-6777, ¶ 18. Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or 

defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought 

to the attention of the court.” Crim.R. 52(B). To establish plain error, the appellant 

bears the burden of demonstrating that an error constituted an obvious defect in the 
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proceedings that affected his or her substantial rights. State v. Eitzman, 3d Dist. 

Henry No. 7-21-03, 2022-Ohio-574, ¶ 42. Under this standard, “the appellant must 

demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the trial court’s error, 

the outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise.” State v. Bradshaw, 

2023-Ohio-1244, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.). Appellate courts take “[n]otice of 

plain error * * * with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only 

to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 

N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

Legal Analysis 

{¶34} In this case, the trial court asked if there were any objections to the 

jury instructions. In response, neither party objected. For this reason, Johnson 

concedes in her brief that the plain error standard of review applies to this challenge. 

On appeal, she argues that the trial court did not correctly instruct the jury on the 

definition of possession. The trial court instructed the jury on this matter as follows:

Possession is a voluntary act if th[e] possessor knowingly procured or 

received the item, or wa[s] aware of her control thereof for a sufficient 

period of time to have ended her possession. Possess or possession 

means having control over a thing or substance. 

A person has possession when she knows that she has the object on or 

about her person, her property, or she p[l]aces it where it is accessible 

to her use or direction and she has the ability to direct or control its 

use. 

Joint Possession, two or more persons may have possession if together 

they have the ability to control it, exc[l]usive of others. 
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* * * 

Ownership is not necessary. A person may possess or control 

property belonging to another. 

(Emphasis added.) (Tr. 226-227). These instructions closely follow the wording of 

the Ohio Jury Instructions that define possession. Ohio Jury Instructions, CR 

Section 417.21 (Feb. 2023). State v. Frye, 2018-Ohio-894, 108 N.E.3d 564, ¶ 107 

(3d Dist.) (considering adherence to the wording of OJI to be of significance in 

evaluating challenges to jury instructions).

{¶35} However, Johnson argues that the trial court’s jury instruction was 

incorrect because it did not include all of the wording in the statutory definition of 

possession that is contained in R.C. 2925.01(K). This definition reads as follows:

‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or 

substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the 

thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises 

upon which the thing or substance is found.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.01(K). In its jury instructions in this case, the trial 

court incorporated the italicized portion of R.C. 2925.01(K) but omitted the 

remainder of this section. 

{¶36} In the prior assignment of error, we concluded that the State produced 

evidence beyond Johnson’s mere proximity to the illegal drugs in her bedroom at 

the time of discovery to establish the element of possession. This same evidence

also went far beyond establishing that Johnson had “mere access” to the illegal drugs

“through ownership or occupation of the premises” where the drugs were located. 
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Given the other evidence presented by the State, we conclude that the outcome of 

this proceeding would have been no different if the trial court had told the jurors 

that they could not find possession in a situation where the State had only produced 

evidence of “mere access.” R.C. 2925.01(K). 

{¶37} Further, we also note that, in answering a question submitted by the 

jury, the trial court gave the following instruction: “a person has possession when 

she knows that she has the object on or about her person, her property, or places 

where it’s accessible to her use or direction, and has the ability to direct or control 

its use * * *.” (Tr. 238). In this statement, the trial court defined possession with 

reference to knowledge, accessibility, and ability. While not containing the wording 

of the final portion of R.C. 2925.01(K), this instruction does indicate that mere 

access does not, by itself, constitute possession. To follow this instruction on 

possession, the jury would have to find that Johnson had more than “mere access” 

as defined by R.C. 2925.01(K). These observations reinforce our conclusion that 

the outcome of the proceeding would not have been different even if all of the 

wording of R.C. 2925.01(K) had been included in the jury instructions. 

{¶38} In conclusion, Johnson has not identified an error that affected her 

substantial rights in this case. Further, even if the omission of the final portion of 

R.C. 2925.01(K) had constituted an error, she did not demonstrate a reasonable 

probability existed that the outcome of this proceeding would have been different if 

such wording had been included in the jury instructions. Since Johnson has failed 
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to carry the burden of establishing plain error, her first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

Conclusion

{¶39} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the judgments of the Crawford County Court of Common 

Pleas are affirmed. 

Judgments Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls