[Cite as In re A.D., 2023-Ohio-276.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JEFFERSON COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:

A.D., K.D., X.D., M.Y.D.,

DEPENDENT CHILDREN.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

Civil Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, of Jefferson County, Ohio

Case Nos. 20 DN 44; 20 DN 45; 20 DN 46; 20 DN 47

BEFORE:

Cheryl L. Waite, Gene Donofrio, Carol Ann Robb, Judges

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.

Atty. Eric M. Reszke, 100 North 4th Street, Suite 810, Sinclair Building, Steubenville, Ohio 

43952, for Appellant Father

Atty. Mary Adeline R. Lewis, 712 North King Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385, for Appellant 

Mother

Atty. Amanda J. Abrams, 125 South 5th Street, Steubenville, Ohio 43952, for Appellee 

Jefferson County DJFS, Children Services Division

Dated: January 27, 2023
– 2 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

WAITE, J.

{¶1} Appellants R.S. (“Mother”) and M.D. (“Father”) appeal four separate August 

22, 2022 judgment entries of the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile 

Division, granting permanent custody of their four children to Appellee Jefferson County 

Children Services (“Agency”). Appellants have filed separate appeals that have been 

consolidated for purposes of appeal. Mother and Father both argue that the court erred 

in its balancing of the best interests factors, and generally take issue with the court’s 

decision to grant permanent custody of the children to the Agency. In addition, Mother 

argues that, for various reasons, her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Father additionally argues that the court violated his right to due process when 

it failed to provide a remedy after it became known that his phone line had been 

disconnected for a significant period of time during the hearing. For the reasons provided, 

Appellants’ arguments are without merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} Mother and Father have been in an on and off, tumultuous relationship for 

several years. Their relationship has been plagued by drug and alcohol abuse and 

domestic violence. This relationship produced four children who are involved in this 

appeal: M.Y.D. (date of birth April 28, 2015), K.D. (date of birth March 14, 2018), A.D. 

(date of birth February 28, 2019), and X.D. (date of birth August 10, 2020). We note that 

Mother has several other children who are not directly involved in this matter but are 

referenced throughout the proceedings. It does not appear that Appellant M.D. is the 

father of those children.
– 3 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

{¶3} The Agency has had an ongoing file on the family since at least 2018. On 

March 14, 2018, the Agency received a report that K.D. (the second oldest child) tested 

positive for cocaine and Suboxone at birth. (Hrg. Tr., p. 86.) This caused the Agency to 

initially open a file, and a caseworker was assigned to the family. As a result, Mother 

began alcohol and drug treatment at Lighthouse Counseling and Mediation Services. The 

Agency began conducting monthly contacts with the family and referred the children to a 

program called “Help Me Grow.” 

{¶4} Additional concerns arose after the birth of A.D. (the third youngest child) 

on February 28, 2019. Mother tested positive for cocaine and THC throughout her

pregnancy and the child was born prematurely. On March 14, 2019, A.D. was 

hospitalized due to a condition called “congenital adrenal hypoplasia.” (Hrg. Tr., p. 89.) 

While the witnesses could not describe this condition, the symptoms leading to 

hospitalization included severe dehydration, grey skin coloring, and low weight. The 

attending physician informed Mother and Father that A.D. needed to be seen by an 

endocrinologist as soon as possible. Following two months of difficulty locating Mother 

and Father, a caseworker named Nicole Cook made contact with the parents and 

expressed concern over their failure to take the child to an endocrinologist. After 

additional significant efforts by the Agency, Mother and Father took the child to the 

Weirton Medical Center. Due to a high level of concern over the child’s condition, the 

medical center transported the child to Pittsburgh Children’s Hospital. On June 14, 2019, 

following A.D.’s discharge from the hospital, the Agency received an ex parte order from 

the court and removed the child from the home. The Agency received temporary custody 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

of A.D. and placed her with a foster family. The other children remained in the family 

home with Mother and Father and a case plan was devised for the family.

{¶5} Mother and Father complied with this case plan, and the Agency’s 

temporary custody of A.D. terminated and she was reunited with her parents. Following 

reunification, Mother allowed the child to continue to visit the foster family with whom she 

had bonded during her stay. 

{¶6} On August 22, 2020, X.D. (the youngest child) visited a pediatrician who 

determined that the child was failing to thrive. The physician provided the child with 

thickened formula. This visit triggered renewed communication from the Agency. Around 

that same time, Mother informed the Agency that Father had threatened to lock her out 

of the house. Mother also informed a caseworker that Father would leave the house 

during the winter and take the generator with him, leaving her and the children without 

heat. 

{¶7} On December 3, 2020, Mother called law enforcement during an argument 

with Father that escalated and became physical. (Hrg. Tr., p. 95.) It is this event that led 

to the instant proceedings. All four children apparently witnessed the argument. M.D. 

(the oldest child) informed officers that “Daddy hit mommy and made her cry.” (Hrg. Tr., 

p. 95.) Officers arrested Father for domestic violence. Mother’s erratic behavior 

concerned the officers and led the police to remove the children. Apparently, Mother 

acted in a manner consistent with drug abuse. An Agency representative arrived at the 

house and spoke with Mother. The caseworker also believed Mother was acting 

erratically. The children appeared to be unclean and had matted hair. The caseworker 

was also concerned that the children had continued to play, for the most part, during this
– 5 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

incident and did not appear to react appropriately to the situation. The caseworker 

believed the children had normalized their parents’ behavior. We note that Father was 

charged with domestic violence but later pleaded to the reduced offense of disorderly 

conduct.

{¶8} After this incident, the Agency placed A.D. with the foster family she 

previously had been with following her first removal. The remaining three children were 

placed with a foster family, but had to be moved after the foster mother gave birth to 

another child, placing the family over the limit for the number of children in their home. 

The children were then removed from a second home based on that family’s request, due 

to the behavior of M.D. The children remained in their third foster home at the time of the 

hearing in this matter.

{¶9} After the children were removed, Mother and Father’s relationship began to 

further unravel. Mother advised caseworkers that Father was abusive to her and that she 

was “petrified” of him. Specifically, Mother mentioned an incident where Father “put his 

hands on her neck and backhanded her in the face” and then “bit her index finger, which 

started bleeding.” (Hrg. Tr., p. 39.) The caseworker observed a bandage on Mother’s 

index finger. Caseworkers also observed bruises, marks, and scratches on Mother on 

several occasions that were believed to be caused by Father. 

{¶10} Mother also described several other events that concerned caseworkers. 

First, she claimed that Father had thrown her out of the house and she was afraid of him,

so she stayed in a tent in the woods. She claimed that he often took her phone away 

from her, leaving her with no way to call for help. The older children advised the 

caseworker that Father often hacks into Mother’s phone. Mother also claimed that Father
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

would insert screws to lock the windows so that she could not enter the house when he 

was not home. One of the caseworkers provided Mother with information for a domestic 

violence shelter called “ALIVE.” While Mother was inside the caseworker’s office, Father 

called her and repeatedly asked her what she was doing. Mother also told caseworkers 

that Father was a drug dealer, and provided photographs of drug paraphernalia at the 

house. 

{¶11} Mother and Father were permitted supervised visits with the children, but

these were problematic. Father began approaching the foster parents in the parking lot 

and attempted to argue with them. The foster parents informed the Agency, which

arranged for the foster family to enter the back of the building. However, Father learned 

about this and approached the foster parents there, as well. 

{¶12} Mother and Father informed the Agency that they had ended their 

relationship and requested separate visits. Prior to this, the parents received two hours 

of joint visitation with the children. After their separation, each parent was scheduled to 

have one hour with the children; once one parent ended their visitation, the other would 

be brought in for visitation. At some point, the parents went back to joint sessions with 

the children even though the Agency had arranged for separate visitation times. 

{¶13} The joint sessions led to several arguments between the parents in front of 

the children. Father apparently told the children that they could not come home because 

Mother “was a whore.” The foster family related that Father told A.D. that Mother was 

“bad and had to go to a time-out.” (Trial Tr., 47.) A.D.’s comments confirmed some of 

the Agency’s observations. The children appeared distressed due to these visits. The 

Agency observed the children clinging to their foster parents, and K.D. often had to be 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

reassured by her foster family that they were coming back after the parental visits 

concluded. Nicole Cook testified that “[w]hat I have knowledge of is the constant discord 

between [Father] and [Mother] during visits, constant arguing, just everything in front of 

the children, really inappropriate conversation, cursing, being loud; you know, doing all of 

that in front of the children; which is obviously not appropriate, not healthy.” (Hrg. Tr., pp. 

115-116.) The parents only sporadically attended the visits and some were prolonged 

because of tardiness, causing problems for the two foster families. 

{¶14} On January 28, 2021, the Agency prepared a case plan requiring Mother to 

seek alcohol and drug treatment, Father to obtain anger management therapy, and both 

parents to seek couples’ counseling. All parties electronically signed the document. 

Father provided the Agency with a certificate for the completion of an online anger 

management class, however, the Agency informed him that an online class was 

insufficient. Father then claimed that he attended an in-person class, however the 

institution he provided informed the Agency that it had no record of his attendance. 

Mother and Father blamed each other for the failure to attend couples’ counseling. Father 

claimed that he could not find Mother because she would not give her address due to her

fear of him. Mother claimed that Father was unwilling to seek counseling. Father was 

incarcerated at the time of the hearing due to a second domestic violence charge involving 

Mother.

{¶15} Mother had made some attempts at alcohol and drug treatment at 

Lighthouse and had set up treatment with a counselor, Faith Montgomery, three times a 

week. However, she was unemployed and had recently been arrested for criminal 

trespassing. Mother and Father had separate residences. Mother was in Carroll County 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

and Father was in Jefferson County, but both were interested in moving out-of-state. 

Father wished to move to Tennessee where his family resides and Mother desired to 

move to Virginia with a friend as Mother had received a job offer at a truck stop.

{¶16} Father requested that the children be placed with his mother in Tennessee. 

The Agency contacted its counterpart in Tennessee and was informed that Father’s

mother did not have her own residence and was unable to take the children. The Agency 

determined that Mother’s mother was also not available because she was caring for 

Mother’s other children. The caseworker believed four of Mother’s other children lived

with their grandmother.

{¶17} M.Y.D. had issues at school stemming from the lack of attendance before 

being placed in foster care. M.Y.D. was in the process of receiving an Individualized 

Education Program (“IEP”). K.D. also had some concerns at school. She received

speech therapy and was also in the process of obtaining an IEP. The youngest child, 

X.D., had difficulty learning to speak.

{¶18} K.D.’s foster family wishes to adopt her. The foster family of the other three 

children are strongly considering adoption but are waiting for the current proceedings to 

end before making a decision.

{¶19} On May 19, 2022, the Agency filed a motion seeking permanent custody of 

the four children. From the time of removal until the motion for permanent custody, the 

court reviewed the matter on a monthly basis and granted several extensions concerning 

the Agency’s temporary custody. At least one of these extensions was granted to allow 

Father’s mother to attempt to file for legal custody of the children. The initial GAL report 

and five supplemental reports detailed the children’s progress in their foster homes and 
– 9 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

provided observations regarding the wishes of the children. The GAL noted that the 

parents arrived late to most of their visitations, were ill prepared for those visits, and 

behaved inappropriately in front of the children. The GAL noted that the children were 

distressed before, during, and after visitation with their parents.

{¶20} On August 5, 2022, the court held a hearing on the matter. Mother and 

Father were separately represented by counsel. Also making an appearance was 

Rhonda Stubbs, a guardian ad litem from Court Appointed Special Advocates (“CASA”), 

along with Adam Martello, counsel for CASA. Relevant to this appeal, Mother and her 

counsel, Stubbs and Attorney Martello, and counsel for the Agency all appeared in 

person. During the hearing, several witnesses provided testimony, including: Kim 

Thrower (placement unit supervisor for the Agency), Nicole Cook (caseworker for the 

Agency), Mother, and Father. Although not sworn in nor subject to cross-examination, 

the foster parents were permitted to make statements at the conclusion of the hearing. 

Ms. Stubbs did not testify.

{¶21} Several issues arose during this hearing. First, counsel for the Agency 

raised a potential conflict of interest involving Adam Martello, counsel for CASA. Although 

not described within the record, it can be gleaned that CASA is a neutral party that serves 

a guardian ad litem role. Apparently Attorney Martello represented Father in an unrelated 

criminal case involving cruelty to animals. Father was ultimately convicted of this charge 

shortly before the children were removed in this case. Counsel for the Agency expressed 

her concern that, as she wished to use the conviction against Father in this matter, this 

evidence would be challenged on appeal given Attorney Martello’s role in that case. 

Counsel for the Agency believed she would be unable to use the conviction against Father 
– 10 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

if Attorney Martello remained involved in the case. The court, apparently 

misunderstanding the Agency counsel’s concern stated that Attorney Martello could 

continue to represent CASA in the matter because the Agency offered to withhold the 

evidence. The court also accepted Attorney Martello’s assertion that he had not 

discussed the case with the GAL before she completed her report and recommendation. 

{¶22} Next, the court learned that Father, who attended the hearing by means of 

a jail telephone due to his incarceration, had been disconnected for at least an hour during 

the hearing. Neither the trial court nor trial counsel attempted to question Father as to 

what testimony he last heard before he was disconnected. The record does not reveal if 

curative measures were taken as a result, however, it appears there were none.

{¶23} On August 22, 2022, the court issued four judgment entries, a separate 

entry for each of the four children. Within the entries, the court determined that the 

children’s interests were best served by granting permanent custody to the Agency. It is 

from these entries that Mother and Father separately appeal.

{¶24} After the notices of appeal were filed, several problems concerning 

transcripts arose which delayed this expedited appeal for almost three weeks. The 

Jefferson County Court Reporter requested an extension in which to file the transcripts

from the trial court. On October 11, 2022, the trial court granted the court reporter’s 

request and allowed him an additional fourteen days in which to file the transcripts. 

Despite the fact that a fourteen day extension was granted until October 24, 2022, the 

transcripts were not filed until October 27, 2022. This resulted in a delay of seventeen 

days. 
– 11 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

{¶25} Such delays are troublesome in any case, but are particularly problematic

in an expedited appeal. This particular appeal is also complicated by the fact that two 

notices of appeal were filed and multiple briefs were expected. We stress the importance 

of compliance at every stage of an expedited appeal with these deadlines, as they impact

every subsequent step of the expedited process. By statute, this case required prompt 

action by everyone involved. Unfortunately, this matter has fallen short of those statutory 

mandates.

{¶26} On review, for ease of understanding the assignments of error will be 

addressed out of order and some of Mother’s and Father’s assignments of error will be 

combined, as they address similar issues.

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY OF 

THE MINOR CHILDREN TO JEFFERSON COUNTY CHILDREN 

SERVICES AS MOTHER HAD SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED HER 

CASE PLAN AND THE AGENCY HAD FAILED TO ASSIST THE 

MOTHER IN RESOLVING THE ISSUES KEEPING THE CHILDREN 

FROM HER CUSTODY IN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME.

{¶27} Mother argues that the court erred in its decision because she substantially 

completed her case plan. Despite her claim that the Agency failed to provide basic 

resources to assist her in retaining custody of her children, she asserts that she has 

completed her original drug and alcohol assessment at Lighthouse and has begun some 

treatment. Although she concedes that she did not initially follow through with the 
– 12 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

treatment process after her assessment, she explains that the conditions at Lighthouse 

were inadequate to facilitate any real effort towards sobriety. She alleges that when she 

arrived at the Lighthouse facility she observed individuals, including her cousin, “passed 

out” and others in an obvious state of impairment. Despite this, she later connected with 

a counselor at the facility and began her treatment process. She claims she

supplemented her recovery at Lighthouse with additional treatment at a facility called 

“AppleGate Recovery,” located in Pennsylvania. She also questions the evidentiary value 

of introducing her failed drug tests, claiming they lacked authenticity. 

{¶28} The Agency responds by arguing that Mother showed little, if any, progress 

in fulfilling her obligations under the case plan. Mother’s domestic violence claims against 

Father triggered the requirement for Mother and Father to attend couples’ counseling. 

Neither Mother nor Father attempted to seek such counseling and domestic violence 

continued to be an issue up to the date of the hearing. The Agency’s continued concerns 

with Mother’s drug and alcohol issues had not been addressed from the time K.D. was 

born in 2018 until the issues leading to the second removal arose. Mother continued to 

test positive for drugs throughout the proceedings, including in a test taken shortly before 

the hearing. 

{¶29} The record reveals Mother’s drug problems were ongoing, as Mother 

continued to test positive for drugs more than three years after the Agency first became 

involved with the family. While Mother argues that she substantially complied with 

treatment, this assertion is contrary to the record. While Mother did receive an initial 

assessment at Lighthouse, she asserts that she was unable to follow up with treatment 

because the facility provided less than ideal conditions to allow for treatment. While 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

Mother’s concerns are noted, it is hard to imagine a treatment center where the residents 

are all entirely sober. Mother may certainly find these circumstances at any treatment 

facility. At some point, Mother must learn to be responsible for her own sobriety. While

she may have had some valid concerns, this record reflects that Mother has not made 

any real attempt to achieve sobriety. She appears to offer only excuses, and negatively 

respond to possible solutions.

{¶30} Mother was aware that the case plan required drug and alcohol treatment 

on at least January 28, 2021, when the parties signed the case plan. We note that the 

testimony suggests Mother had been required to undergo such treatment well before this 

date as a result of prior dealings with the Agency. 

{¶31} Nicole Cook referred to communications she had with Lucas Bennett, 

employed by Lighthouse. Bennett informed her that Mother had completed an 

assessment in March of 2022 and he planned to send Mother a closure letter after she

failed to attend treatment. Cook had not received any positive updates from that 

correspondence. Another Lighthouse employee sent Nicole Cook a letter advising that 

Mother was scheduled to begin treatment on June 21, 2022 and a second appointment 

was scheduled for July 19, 2022. While it appears Mother attended both of these 

sessions, she failed to appear for a July 25, 2022 session without notice. This

appointment was rescheduled for July 27, 2022. Mother again failed to attend the 

session.

{¶32} At the hearing, Nicole Cook provided the following drug test results for 

Mother: May 25, 2022, positive for cocaine, ecstasy, amphetamines, and 

methamphetamines; June 21, 2022, positive for THC; June 28, 2022, positive for THC; 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

July 6, 2022, positive for THC; and July 27, 2022 positive for THC. (Hrg. Tr., pp. 103-

104.) In addition, Cook testified that Mother had admitted to drug use during the time the 

case was pending, particularly marijuana. 

{¶33} While Mother now complains that these correspondences and test results

were not authenticated, no objection was made at trial. Mother previously had signed 

releases regarding all of this information. In fact, Mother seemed to agree in her 

testimony that she had not been able to meaningfully seek sobriety. She conceded that 

she tested positive for THC the day before the hearing. (Hrg. Tr., p. 143.) She 

volunteered that she had the test results in her car and would provide them if needed. 

When her trial counsel asked her if four months would be sufficient to allow her to comply 

with the terms of the plan, she responded in the affirmative.

{¶34} Again, Mother has been subject to her drug and alcohol treatment 

requirement since at least January 28, 2021. While there was discussion of an 

assessment scheduled for March of 2020, it does not appear the assessment was 

completed until May 21, 2022. Regardless, Mother did not begin treatment until late June 

of 2022, a year and a half after signing the case plan. When the Agency expressed 

concern that treatment had been delayed for such a significant period of time Mother’s 

counselor, Faith Montgomery, advised Nicole Cook that Mother’s attendance had been 

“[s]poradic” and inconsistent. (Hrg. Tr., p. 104.) As Mother never called to cancel 

sessions, no reason for her failure to appear was ever given.

{¶35} This record provides no support for Mother’s claim that four additional 

months would assist her in obtaining treatment. As pointed out by the Agency, the trial 

court granted four extensions of time before considering the motion for permanent 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

custody, each time finding that “the case plan is not completed and that the parents are 

not completing case plan goals.” These extensions were granted on April 19, 2021; 

February 22, 2022; March 21, 2022; and April 25, 2022. Again, the hearing for permanent 

custody occurred on August 5, 2022, giving Mother several additional months to attempt 

to comply with her case plan.

{¶36} Mother has not shown there was any particular obstacle to completing the 

case plan other than her personal failure, as she acknowledged in her testimony. (Hrg.

Tr., p. 151.) Thus, there is no evidence that granting another four months, or any other 

reasonable extension would allow Mother to abide by the terms of the case plan. Again, 

she has been familiar with this plan since at least January 28, 2021. This is particularly 

true as her treatment counselor described her attendance as “very sporadic.” (Hrg. Tr., 

p. 104.) Appellant’s limited attendance at the treatment center cannot, in good faith, be 

described as substantial compliance.

{¶37} We note that the Agency weighed Mother’s lack of compliance with couples’

counseling against her. The record clearly demonstrates that Father’s domestic violence 

was the reason for the couples’ counseling requirement. While it is true that both Mother 

and Father were required to complete this counseling, the Agency knew that Mother 

feared Father, and two caseworkers had knowledge of not only specific accusations 

involving Father’s abuse, but also observed marks on Mother’s body consistent with those 

claims. In addition to Father’s domestic violence arrest that led to these proceedings, 

Father was jailed at the time of the hearing due to a second domestic violence incident 

involving Mother. 
– 16 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

{¶38} In a vacuum, Mother’s concerns for her safety should not be held against 

her. Any decision to hold her responsible for being reluctant to provide Father with her 

contact information given her legitimate fears presents a slippery slope for domestic 

violence victims. That said, this record presents evidence that, despite Mother’s 

concerns, she continued to participate in joint visitation with Father even though the 

Agency arranged for them to have separate visitation to avoid forcing her to be in the 

same room as Father. 

{¶39} Because Mother did not substantially comply with either the drug and 

alcohol treatment or couples’ counseling, her second assignment of error is without merit 

and is overruled.

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT IT IS IN THE MINOR 

CHILDREN’S BEST INTEREST THAT THEY BE PLACED IN 

PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CHILDREN 

SERVICES AS THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF 

PROOF AND THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 

AGENCY’S MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY.

{¶40} Both Appellants attack the court’s decision that the best interests of the 

children were served by placing them in the permanent custody of the Agency. Mother 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

questions whether the court considered all of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors, 

specifically, whether secure placement of the children could be made without the award 

of permanent custody, and the wishes of the children. Mother argues that one of the 

caseworkers admitted that the Agency may not have given her proper guidance on how 

to satisfy the case objectives. Mother complains of the Agency’s failure to provide names, 

phone numbers, and locations of facilities that could assist her. Mother also asserts that 

the court relied on several findings within the GAL report, but claims this was error as the 

GAL did not testify at the hearing.

{¶41} Father’s arguments essentially challenge the witnesses’ testimony. He 

disputes the claim that he failed to seek anger management treatment. He challenges 

the testimony provided by the caseworkers and claims he has attended sessions at 

Christian Counseling Association and that he signed all requisite releases before the 

hearing, and there should be evidence to support his claims. As to the couples’

counseling, Father explains that he could not locate Mother and could not complete this

counseling without her. He also disputes the allegation that he is abusive and asserts the 

charge stemming from the incident leading to the incident at issue was reduced to 

disorderly conduct. He denies allegations that he confronted or in any other manner

engaged with the children’s foster families at visitation. He also contradicts testimony 

from the caseworkers and statements contained in the GAL reports: he claims that 

visitation with the children went well, he and Mother did not argue, he was attentive, and 

he played with the children and brought food and drinks for them. Finally, he argues that 

the Agency did not seriously consider other family members for the children’s placement.
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

{¶42} A parent’s right to raise a child has long been established as an essential 

and basic civil right. In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997). For this 

reason, Ohio courts have viewed the permanent termination of parental rights as the 

family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal law case. In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio 

St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14. However, statutory laws exist to permit 

an agency to intervene for the purpose of protecting children. Matter of J.C., 7th Dist. 

Monroe No. 20 MO 0012, 2021-Ohio-1476, ¶ 2, citing In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-

Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816.

{¶43} Where a child custody proceeding involves a parent and a nonparent, a 

court may not award custody to the nonparent “without first determining that a 

preponderance of the evidence shows that the parent abandoned the child; that the 

parent contractually relinquished custody of the child; that the parent has become totally 

incapable of supporting or caring for the child; or that an award of custody to the parent 

would be detrimental to the child.” Id., at ¶ 3. “A preponderance of the evidence is 

evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered 

in opposition to it. In other words, evidence that, as a whole, shows that the fact sought 

to be proved is more probable than not, or evidence that is more credible and convincing 

to the mind.” Id., citing JAD Rentals of Youngstown, LLC v. Cox, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 

19 MA 0096, 2021-Ohio-304, ¶ 20.

{¶44} Where the child custody proceedings involve a parent and nonparent, a twopart test is followed. First, an agency seeking permanent custody of a child bears the 

burden of proving that one or more of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through 

(e) applies. In its entirety, R.C. 2151.414(B) reads:
– 19 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

[T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to [the agency] if the 

court determines at the hearing * * * by clear and convincing evidence, that 

it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child 

to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of 

the following apply:

(a) The child * * * cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within 

a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents.

(b) The child is abandoned.

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are 

able to take permanent custody.

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of 

one or more public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more 

months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and * * * the child was 

previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another 

state.

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from 

whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an 

abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any 

court in this state or another state.
– 20 –

Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be considered 

to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the 

date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised 

Code [to be an abused, neglected, or dependent child] or the date that is 

sixty days after the removal of the child from home. 

{¶45} Here, the trial court found that the children could not be safely placed with 

either parent within a reasonable period of time and that the children had been in the 

custody of the Agency for more than twelve months since December 3, 2020. Neither 

Mother nor Father appear to contest the first prong. Instead, Mother and Father focus 

their arguments on the court’s evaluation of the best interest factors and its adherence to 

the requirement that the parents must be afforded all procedural and substantive 

protections.

{¶46} Proceeding to the second prong, the Agency holds the burden of proving by 

clear and convincing evidence that the grant of permanent custody is in the child's best 

interest. In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 26. In 

determining whether this burden has been met, courts are guided by R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) 

which provides a nonexhaustive list of factors for consideration. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) 

reads, in pertinent part:

In determining the best interest of a child * * *, the court shall consider all 

relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
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(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, 

siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any 

other person who may significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through 

the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;

(c) The custodial history of the child * * *;

(d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether 

that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent 

custody to the agency;

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply 

in relation to the parents and child. 

{¶47} The Ohio Supreme Court has declared that a parent facing permanent 

termination of a parental right “must be afforded every procedural and substantive 

protection the law allows.” (Citation omitted.) Hayes at 49, 679 N.E.2d 680. We review 

a trial court's judgment in child custody matters under an abuse of discretion standard. In 

re N.W.F., 2019-Ohio-3956, 147 N.E.3d 86 (7th Dist.), ¶ 15, citing, Davis v. Flickinger, 77 

Ohio St.3d 415, 418-419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). 

{¶48} Mother argues that the court failed to consider the wishes of the children. 

The GAL reports all contained findings that the children were too young to express their 

wishes in this matter. In fact, the GAL noted that the eldest child expressed a desire to 

live with her parents and “the mermaids.” In addition, there is a plethora of testimony that 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

the children clung to their foster families when arriving at visitation, had to be assured 

they would return to their respective foster families following visitation, and were 

distressed after visitation. As the court integrated this information into its findings, it 

clearly considered this factor. 

{¶49} Mother and Father both contend the children could be placed without 

granting permanent custody to the Agency. Their arguments attack the court’s findings 

that they failed to comply with any aspect of the case plan. However, this record reflects 

that neither Mother nor Father made any real attempt to comply with the case plan. There 

was ample testimony that Mother and Father constantly argued in front of the children at 

visitation, and Nicole Cook testified that the children were distressed by their visits. She 

testified that the children clung to their foster families, had to be reassured that they would 

return to their foster families, and were distressed after visitation. Cook believed that 

Mother and Father were more concerned with airing their grievances towards one another 

than they were with visiting the children. While Father did provide food at visits, he 

typically brought soda and junk food for these young children. On one occasion, neither 

Mother nor Father had diapers and had to borrow one from another family who happened 

to be conducting visitation that day. 

{¶50} Father also complains that more efforts should have been directed at finding 

other family members who could take the children. However, the Agency quickly ruled 

out Mother’s mother, as she already had custody of Mother’s other four children. Father 

informed the Agency that his mother, who lives in Tennessee, could take the children, but 

the Agency learned she did not have her own residence and had never met the children. 

We note that the Agency went to great effort to locate Father’s mother and contacted its 
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counterpart in Tennessee to evaluate her situation before determining that she was not a 

suitable option. The Agency also expressed concern for her failure to follow directions

and that she waited until the eleventh hour to become involved. There is no evidence 

that Mother or Father provided the name of any other relative to the Agency. Father now 

claims that he has other family in Tennessee, but no one has come forward expressing 

an interest in the children and there is no evidence that Father provided the Agency with 

the appropriate contact information for these individuals. It is unreasonable to expect the 

Agency to conduct an investigation into suitable relatives who were not disclosed by 

Mother or Father.

{¶51} Regarding Father’s arguments, he merely disagrees with witness

testimony, which creates an issue of credibility. Clearly the trial court believed the 

Agency’s witnesses and there is nothing in this record to suggest the court was 

unreasonable. 

{¶52} Mother claims that the Agency failed to provide resources that could help 

her meet her case plan objectives. However, a lack of resources does not appear to have 

been the obstacle preventing Mother from meeting her objectives. This record 

establishes that Mother was referred to Lighthouse for drug and alcohol assessment and 

treatment, but failed to take advantage of this referral. The Agency also referred Mother 

to a shelter that assists domestic violence victims. It does not appear that Mother ever 

contacted the shelter. Mother argues generalizations, and does not cite to any specific 

failure on the part of the Agency. 

{¶53} Based on the above, Mother’s and Father’s first assignments of error are 

without merit and are overruled.
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MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

THE MOTHER’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 

WAS VIOLATED WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO MAKE REAOSNABLE 

[SIC] REPRESENTATION WITH ANY TACTICAL CONSIDERATION.

{¶54} Mother lists an extensive list of alleged deficiencies in her trial counsel’s 

representation which she believes amount to ineffective assistance. Mother notes that 

the list is not exhaustive, however, we are limited to the issues she actually raises within 

her brief, as this Court does not independently review the record in search of unraised 

errors.

{¶55} In response, the Agency points out that Mother did not object to any of these 

alleged errors at the hearing, thus is limited to a plain error analysis. 

An appellant's failure to object at trial waives all but plain error.” Fearer v. 

Humility of Mary Health Partners, 7th Dist. No. 06 MA 84, 2008-Ohio-1181, 

2008 WL 697761, ¶ 119. Plain error is present when “there is an obvious 

deviation from a legal rule that affected the defendant's substantial rights by 

influencing the outcome of the proceedings.” In re T.J.W., 7th Dist. No. 13 

JE 12, 13 JE 13, 13 JE 14, 2014-Ohio-4419, 2014 WL 4959150, ¶ 11. Plain 

error review is not favored in civil cases and should only be used in the 

“extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstance where error, to 

which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby 

challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Kirin v. 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

Kirin, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 243, 2011-Ohio-663, 2011 WL 497080, ¶ 19, 

quoting Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), 

at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

In the Matter of S.B.J. v. Connolly, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 20 MA 0010, 2021-Ohio-1161, 

¶ 27, quoting Andes v. Winland, 7th Dist. Belmont Nos. 15 BE 0060 and 15 BE 0080, 

2017-Ohio-766, ¶ 45.

{¶56} Beginning with Mother’s arguments regarding the admission of three 

exhibits admitted into evidence, she is subject to a plain error review as she failed to 

object in the trial court. Exhibit A is a Tennessee “ICPC” letter in which that agency 

disclosed Father’s mother did not have her own home and requested to close the case. 

It is difficult to determine Mother’s exact argument, here. Regardless, Father testified to 

essentially the exact information contained within the exhibit. Thus, Mother cannot show 

introduction of this letter constituted a deficiency on the part of counsel, nor can she show 

prejudice.

{¶57} Exhibit B is a certified copy of Father’s disorderly conduct conviction. 

Mother questions the relevance of this document. It appears that Mother is confused,

believing the exhibit is a certified copy of her own conviction. However, this document is 

a certified copy of Father’s disorderly conduct conviction. Because this document does 

not involve Mother, it is difficult to discern how it affected her rights. 

{¶58} Even so, trial counsel did object to admission of this exhibit at the hearing, 

questioning its relevance. The trial court overruled the objection, as Father’s arrest and 

subsequent conviction is what triggered the removal process in this matter. The 

conviction is the result of Father’s arrest after Mother called the police to report domestic 
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violence, which led to the children being removed from the home. There is little question 

that this exhibit is relevant. As to its authenticity, the trial court correctly pointed out that 

a certified copy of a conviction is a self-authenticating document pursuant to Evid.R. 

803(22). 

{¶59} Mother also takes issue with exhibit E, which is a report from her Lighthouse 

counselor, Faith Montgomery. Mother does not take issue to the report itself, but to the

fact that a caseworker was permitted to testify about the contents of the report in lieu of 

Montgomery providing testimony. We note that Mother has signed releases allowing 

information from Lighthouse to be sent to the Agency. (Hrg. Tr., p. 104.) Cook’s 

testimony about the report included information as to Mother’s failure to attend certain 

scheduled appointments and her sporadic attendance in general. Mother has suffered 

no prejudice from this testimony, as she admitted at hearing that her attendance at the 

facility was sporadic and inconsistent. 

{¶60} Mother raises the same argument regarding Cook’s testimony about 

correspondence she received from Lighthouse employee, Lucas Bennett. Cook’s 

testimony regarding Bennett was also directed at Mother’s sporadic attendance at 

appointments. Again, Mother signed a release specifically pertaining to this information 

and provided her own testimony conceding that she missed many appointments and 

delayed the start of her treatment. 

{¶61} Mother argues the court erred in allowing the two foster families to provide 

statements, since they were unsworn witnesses who were not subject to crossexamination. We acknowledge that “although R.C. 2151.424(A) grants a foster parent 

the right to testify as a sworn witness at the permanent custody hearing, ‘[w]e are not 
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aware that the law affirmatively provides for foster parents to make unsworn statements 

in permanent custody proceedings.’ ” In re S.F., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27908, 2016-Ohio5213, ¶ 18

{¶62} That said, in Ohio, it “is well-established that a party may not, upon appeal, 

raise a claim that the oath of a witness was omitted or defective, unless objection thereto 

was raised at trial. If no objection was raised, the error is considered to be waived. This 

is because the failure to administer an oath can easily be corrected at the time; an 

attorney may not fail to object and then cite the lack of an oath as error.” In re R.S., 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110210, 2021-Ohio-2271, ¶ 48, quoting Stores Realty Co. v. 

Cleveland, 41 Ohio St.2d 41, 322 N.E.2d 629 (1975); State v. Norman, 137 Ohio App.3d 

184, 198, 738 N.E.2d 403 (8th Dist.1999); State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105299, 

2017-Ohio-8873. To establish plain error in these cases, Mother must show that the 

unsworn testimony affected the outcome of the proceedings or that she was otherwise 

prejudiced by the testimony. Id. at 49. There is no prejudice where the court does not 

rely on the statement, or the statement does not add to or change the evidence before 

the court. Id. See also In re S.F., supra.

{¶63} Contrary to Mother’s assertion, there is no evidence that the court relied on 

the statements made by the foster families. While it is true that some of the court’s 

findings are similar to the foster families’ statements, their testimony also mirrored the 

statements made by Cook and Kimberly Thrower in their testimony. Each of these 

witnesses testified to similar observations regarding the children’s relationship with their 

foster families. Thus, the record does not show the trial court relied on any statement 

made by the foster families. 
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{¶64} Mother also argues that testimony from Cook about an email she received 

from “Journey Home” constituted hearsay. This email discussed how the children were 

doing with their foster families. In reviewing this argument, we realize the Agency must 

routinely rely on outside sources in managing its casework. The Agency must obtain 

releases for much of its information and is subject to all rules of evidence at trial. That 

said, Kimberly Thrower testified the Agency “receives monthly reports surrounding the 

care of the children” regarding their foster families. (Hrg. Tr., p. 63.) Thrower did not go 

into detail about the contents of the emails, but did state her opinion that the children’s

needs were being met by their foster families. This is consistent with the GAL reports. 

As to A.D., Cook testified that she had personally observed the child while in the care of 

her foster family. While she did not personally view the remaining children in their foster 

home, Cook was receiving information from Journey Home and the GAL reports to update 

her on the progress of these children. In addition, she did personally observe the children 

at visitation on a number of occasions and could witness their interactions with their foster 

families and the difference in the children’s speaking ability and cleanliness. 

{¶65} This record contains no evidence of deficient performance on the part of 

counsel, nor is there any resulting prejudice concerning trial counsel’s performance. 

Mother’s third assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE 

PROCESS AT THE PERMANENT CUSTODY HEARING.

{¶66} As previously discussed, Father appeared at the hearing by telephone from 

the Carroll County jail. The record reveals the court attempted to communicate with 
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Father immediately after Mother’s testimony, and at that point discovered Father was no 

longer on the line. The Agency contacted the jail and reinitiated contact with Father. The 

court inquired from Father how long the call had been disconnected, and Father 

responded that it had been at least an hour. The court asked why the jail personnel did 

not take any efforts to inform the court that Father was no longer on the line. Father 

responded “[t]hey [the jail] didn’t know how to – what to do about it, like they didn’t know 

if you guys were going to try to call back or if they should try to call back or what court to 

call.” (Hrg. Tr., pp. 162-163.) The court indicated that it would determine “something in 

terms of the testimony that [Father] missed,” but nowhere in the record does it appear 

that the matter was again addressed. 

{¶67} We have recently acknowledged a parent’s right to be present at a 

termination of parental rights hearing. In re S.G., 7th Dist. Belmont No. 22 BE 0030, 

2022-Ohio-4292, ¶ 47. The First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Districts have classified this 

as a constitutional right. See In re N.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110302, 2021-Ohio-2525, 

¶ 24; In re S.G., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200261, 2020-Ohio-5244, ¶ 20; In re J.W., 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 24924, 2009-Ohio-6957, ¶ 20; In re Sears, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP715, 2002 WL 124718, *4 (Jan. 31, 2002). These courts have held that “[b]iological 

parents have a constitutionally protected right to be present at a permanent custody 

hearing.” In re N.J. at ¶ 24. 

{¶68} Regarding an incarcerated parent, the Tenth District has explained that 

“[a]lthough those same constitutionally protected rights extend to an incarcerated parent, 

those rights may not be absolute.” In re Sears at *6. Where a biological parent is 

incarcerated, a court reviews any infringement on the right to attend the hearing by 
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balancing the due process factors enumerated within Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 

335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Those rights include: “(1) the private interest 

affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used 

and the probable value, if any, of other procedural safeguards, and (3) the state's interest, 

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional 

procedural safeguards.” In re S.G. at ¶ 19, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, supra.

{¶69} The trial court in this matter initially granted Father the right to be present at 

the hearing. However, problems ensued in the manner in which the court attempted to 

achieve this goal. First, Mother and her counsel and the Agency and its counsel 

physically appeared at the hearing while Father appeared by phone, and Father’s counsel 

appeared by Zoom. This use of mixed technology became clearly problematic both at 

hearing and in producing the necessary transcripts in this case. 

{¶70} While we recognize that there may be times where it is appropriate to utilize 

technology in ensuring an appearance, the different types of technology used to obtain 

appearances by parties and their counsel presents unique problems. If a necessary party 

to the action cannot appear in person and requires some sort of accommodation, ideally 

all parties should appear in that same fashion. While we appreciate that technology has 

made courts more accessible and has increased access to justice, it can also affect the 

process in a negative way.

{¶71} That said, it is clear Father had a constitutional right to be present at the 

hearing and to hear all testimony against him. While we recognize that Ohio courts have 

held that an incarcerated individual may not have an absolute right to this protection, this 
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record reflects that the trial court granted Father the right to be present. Thus, the court 

was responsible for ensuring Father’s rights were accommodated. 

{¶72} Especially problematic here, is that no one asked Father what testimony he 

had last heard or whether he heard any portion of Mother’s testimony. Father alleges he 

was disconnected for over an hour. While we know that Mother’s testimony immediately 

preceded the court’s attempt to reconnect Father, we have no way of knowing how long 

each witness testified. Thus, it is possible that Father may have also missed part of Nicole 

Cook’s testimony. While the Agency appears to place the burden on Father to show at 

what point he was disconnected, it does not appear that Father had any way to 

accomplish this due to his incarceration.

{¶73} The Agency also seems to place the burden on Father to reestablish the 

lost connection. It appears from Father’s explanation that the jail staff had control over 

the telephone system. Father stated that the staff was confused when he was 

disconnected and Father, an incarcerated person, did not have the control or ability to 

place the call to reconnect with the hearing himself. Again, there was no inquiry into 

exactly what portion of the hearing Father missed.

{¶74} Based on this record, the trial court failed to completely ensure Father’s 

right to be present, failing to inquire as to what testimony Father missed. The court also 

failed to provide a meaningful remedy, such as ordering the relevant witness to be requestioned. It is also clear that trial counsel erred in failing to object or personally inquire 

of Father what testimony he heard so that it could be determined what portion of the 

hearing he missed. However, even though the record reflects error, in order to be 

reversible this error must also have caused harm. This record shows that the error did 
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not prejudice Father. It is clear from Father’s subsequent testimony that he knew the 

accusations against him and that the primary concerns against him involved domestic 

violence, his failure to seek couples’ counseling and anger management counseling, the 

issues surrounding his mother’s disqualification to take custody of the children, and his 

poor behavior at visitation.

{¶75} It is apparent from Father’s testimony that he was aware of the Agency’s 

evidence against him and of Mother’s allegations. In his testimony he addressed both 

domestic violence arrests, the allegation that he removed the generator from the family 

home during the winter leaving Mother and the children in the cold, the allegation that he 

screwed the windows shut to prevent Mother’s access to the house, and his failure to 

attend couples’ and anger management counseling. In addition, Father’s counsel, the 

Agency, Mother’s counsel, and counsel for CASA were able to question Father and he 

was able to address any additional concerns raised. Thus, although the trial court’s failure 

to remedy Father’s temporary involuntary absence from the hearing, the record reveals 

Father was not prejudiced by this error.

{¶76} We must also sua sponte note that the Agency raised a potential conflict of 

interest pertaining to counsel for CASA. CASA is described as a neutral third party who 

represents the GAL. At the commencement of the hearing, the Agency raised the fact 

that CASA’s counsel had represented Father in a 2020 criminal matter involving cruelty 

to animals. Apparently, counsel for the Agency sent counsel for CASA an email the day 

before the hearing expressing concern about this representation. Counsel for CASA sent 

Mother’s counsel a text message that night regarding the issue, but Father’s current 

counsel was unaware of the issue until it was raised at the hearing. 
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Case Nos. 22 JE 0016; 22 JE 0017

{¶77} At the hearing, the Agency expressed concern because it would not be able 

to use Father’s conviction against him if counsel for CASA were allowed to remain 

involved in the case. The Agency explained that it intended to use the conviction, but 

feared that this evidence would open the door to an appeal if counsel for CASA remained

involved. Accepting the Agency’s statement as a solution instead of a request for relief, 

the court permitted counsel for CASA to remain on the case. In addition to the court’s 

interpretation of the Agency’s “offer” to withhold the conviction from evidence, the court 

accepted counsel for CASA’s statement that the conviction had not been discussed with 

the GAL before the reports and recommendation were completed. 

{¶78} While this exchange is troubling, it appears that the only party to suffer any 

prejudicial harm may have been the Agency, which was unable to use the 2020 conviction 

against Father as it had originally planned. Despite the unusual procedural issues in this 

record, Father’s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶79} Mother and Father both contest the trial court’s decision that the children’s 

interests were best served by placing them in the permanent custody of the Agency. Both 

Mother and Father also raised due process concerns. Additionally, Mother argued that 

her counsel was ineffective. For the reasons provided, all of Mother’s and Father’s 

arguments are without merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs. 
[Cite as In re A.D., 2023-Ohio-276.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, of Jefferson County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs 

waived.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.