Filed 12/23/20 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.G., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B304063

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. VJ46670’

 ORDER MODIFYING 

 OPINION 

 NO CHANGE IN 

JUDGMENT

THE COURT*:

The opinion filed December 14, 2020, in the above-entitled 

matter is ordered MODIFIED as follows:

1. On the disposition page, the panel member,

“WILLHITE, Acting P.J.” should be removed and 

replaced with “MANELLA, P.J.” as the correct panel 

member.

2. On the disposition page, the panel member

“COLLINS J.” should be removed and replaced with

“WILLHITE J.” as the correct panel member.

There is no change in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________

MANELLA, P.J. WILLHITE, J. CURREY, J. 
Filed 12/14/20 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.G., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B304063

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. VJ46670

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Kevin Brown, Judge. Affirmed.

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Shezad H. 

Thakor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Columbine. Sandy Hook. Virginia Tech. Marjory Stoneman 

Douglas. These are but a few of a staggering number of American 

schools where fatal mass shootings have occurred. Seared into 

the national consciousness, their names evoke a panoply of strong 

emotions: grief for innocent students and school staff killed or 

wounded; sympathy for those who loved them; and fear of future 

tragedies at more schools.

In this case, the juvenile court found defendant A.G., a 

minor high school student, made criminal threats when he posted

a photo of a realistic looking replica gun on his Snapchat account,

which was visible to about 60 people he identified as friends. The 

photo bore the caption, “Everybody go to school tomorrow. I’m 

taking gum.”

On appeal, A.G. contends, as he did below, that he was 

“joking” when he posted his “story” on Snapchat, and insufficient 

evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings. The juvenile 

court, however, rejected A.G.’s testimony that he was joking as 

not credible and inconsistent with what A.G. told a school police 

detective who investigated the threats. We defer, as we must, to 

the trial judge’s credibility determinations. (People v. Jones

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) And we note there is nothing funny 

about threatening to take a gun to school in any event. Because 

the juvenile court’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence, we affirm. 
3

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Los Angeles County District attorney filed a petition 

under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging A.G.

made a criminal threat against a minor we will refer to as “D.J.” 

(Penal Code1 § 422, count 2) and a teacher named Carol 

Henriquez (§ 422, count 3) and attempted a third criminal threat 

(§§ 422, 664; count 1). A.G. denied all three allegations. Following 

an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found counts 2 and 3 

true and dismissed count one for insufficient evidence. The 

juvenile court ordered A.G. to six months of probation. A.G. 

timely appealed. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Snapchat is a phone application that, among other things, 

allows users to post “stories.” A story is a photograph or video

posted by a Snapchat user. The user can add captions and other 

effects to the photographs and videos. A user can identify 

“friends” on Snapchat. Once users become friends, they can see

each other’s posted stories. The stories expire from the 

application after 24 hours, but a user can delete the story before 

the time is up. The stories can be set to be private so they can be

only viewed by some people. If the story is public, it can be sent to 

users who are not friends of the user who posted the story.

Snapchat also allows users to send individualized photos or 

videos directly to people. Snapchat users can also chat with each 

other within the application and can partake in group chats. 

Texts, photos, and videos can all be sent using the chat function. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
4

A. D.J.’s Testimony

D.J., a high school senior at Linda Marquez School for 

Social Justice (“Linda Marquez”), had the Snapchat application 

on her phone. At approximately 9:00 pm on March 3, 2019, she 

received a screenshot of A.G.’s story through a group chat. The

story showed an image of what appeared to be a gun with the 

caption “Everybody go to school tomorrow. I’m taking gum [sic].” 

D.J. testified that she was worried when she saw the story 

because she knew school shootings happened regularly.

D.J. discussed her fear with her friends in the group chat 

and told them they should tell a teacher. D.J. and other students 

in the group chat forwarded A.G.’s story to a Linda Marquez 

teacher, Carol Henriquez, using the Remind application. The 

Remind application allows teachers and students to communicate 

via text. D.J. told Henriquez that she did not know the name of 

the sender because she did not recognize him by his username. 

After notifying Henriquez, D.J. looked at the screenshot 

and realized the sender was her friend on Snapchat. She went to 

the user’s profile and viewed the story. D.J. later discovered the 

user was A.G. based on the conversation in the group chat and by 

checking her contact list. D.J. knew A.G. because they previously

had a class together during their freshman year. She believed 

A.G. was a student at her school at the time the story was posted

because she also had a class with him earlier that year. 

A few hours later, D.J. was alerted that A.G had posted a

second story and she went to his profile to view it. The story was

a black screen captioned: “Everyone, it wasn’t real. I was xanned 

out.” D.J. testified that the second story did not change how she 

felt. She still believed the first story was a threat to her and 
5

others at her school. D.J. stated that she did not recognize the 

word “gum” when she originally saw the first story. She was 

instead focused on the photograph of a gun. She also testified the 

word “gum” did not change how she felt about the image because 

the letters “m” and “n” are similar and could be easily mistaken. 

Henriquez provided police with D.J.’s phone number and 

they contacted D.J. the same night. D.J. told police about A.G.’s 

story and that she was worried a school shooting would happen.

D.J. went to school the next day and felt nervous.

B. Carol Henriquez’s Testimony

On March 3, 2019, Henriquez was a tenth grade English 

teacher at Linda Marquez. She received a message from her 

student, D.J., on the Remind application. The message included

the image posted by A.G. Henriquez testified she felt fear, 

concern, and confusion when she saw the image. She was afraid 

the image was a threat of a school shooting and felt she and her 

students were in danger. 

Henriquez notified police of the image because, as a 

teacher, she was a mandated reporter. She testified that even if 

she was not a mandated reporter, she still would have told police 

about the image because she was afraid for herself and her 

students. Henriquez was asked by police to go to the station. 

Once there, she showed police the image and filed a report. 

Henriquez testified her fear and concern was ongoing even 

after she reported the image to police because she was not sure 

what would happen the following day at school. Even though 

Henriquez received the second image posted by A.G., she still felt 
6

afraid because of the commonplace occurrence of school shootings 

at high schools. 

Once Henriquez saw a photo of A.G., she recognized that he 

had been her student. Henriquez and A.G. had a regular 

teacher/student relationship and A.G. had never displayed any 

animosity towards her. 

C. Detective Steve Jeong’s Testimony

Detective Jeong is employed by the Los Angeles School 

Police Department. On the day after A.G. posted his stories, 

Detective Jeong went to Simon Rodia Continuation School 

(“Simon Rodia”) where A.G. was present. After A.G. waived his 

Miranda rights, Jeong interviewed him. A.G. admitted sending 

both Snapchat stories. Detective Jeong asked A.G. “why he would 

do such a thing.” A.G. responded, per the Detective, “he likes to 

see reaction in people, what people might say.” A.G. seemed 

apologetic, and denied any intention to carry out a school 

shooting or threaten anyone. But he did not say he intended the 

initial Snapchat story as a joke. Detective Jeong then went to 

A.G.’s friend’s home where the replica gun was located, and 

examined it. He confirmed it was not an actual gun.

D. A.G.’s Testimony

A.G. had approximately 60 friends on Snapchat. Some of 

those friends currently went to school with him, and some had 

gone to school with him in the past. He had gone years without 

speaking to some of his Snapchat friends. At the time of the post, 

A.G. was a student at Simon Rodia Continuation School. He had 
7

attended Linda Marquez until transferring to Simon Rodia 

earlier that year.

A.G. testified he posted the image on Snapchat because he 

was being immature, and he meant for the story to be a joke. A.G. 

further testified he did not intend for the post to be taken as a 

threat. Instead, he thought his friends would understand the post 

was a joke because they understood his sense of humor. The gun, 

which was fake, belonged to A.G.’s friend. He understood people 

were taking the post seriously because a friend notified him. He 

posted the second message to calm the situation down. He hoped 

recipients of the second story would interpret the alleged drug 

use as an excuse as to why he posted something “dumb.” He 

confirmed he was not on Xanax or any other drug at the time he 

posted the stories. He was not asked about nor did he volunteer 

any reason why the caption on the photo said “gum” rather than 

“gun”.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, A.G. contends counts two and three are 

unsupported by substantial evidence. Specifically, A.G. contends 

the evidence failed to establish: (1) he intended his Snapchat post 

to be understood as a threat; (2) he willfully threatened to 

unlawfully kill or cause great bodily injury to anyone; (3) he 

intended to threaten D.J. or Henriquez specifically; (4) any 

alleged threat was unequivocal or unambiguous to reasonably 

sustain fear in either D.J. or Henriquez; or (5) any threat to D.J. 

or Henriquez was sufficiently immediate to place either of them 

in fear. We reject these arguments. 
8

“The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of 

evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile cases: we review the 

whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide 

whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a 

reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[Citations.]” (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540.)

The elements of the crime of making a criminal threat are 

as follows: “‘(1) that the defendant “willfully threaten[ed] to 

commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury 

to another person,” (2) that the defendant made the threat ‘with 

the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a 

threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,’ (3) 

that the threat—which may be “made verbally, in writing, or by 

means of an electronic communication device”—was “on its face 

and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so 

unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey 

to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate 

prospect of execution of the threat,” (4) that the threat actually 

caused the person threatened “to be in sustained fear for his or 

her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety,” and 

(5) that the threatened person's fear was “reasonabl[e]” under the 

circumstances.’ [Citations.]” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 

620, 630 (George T.).)

2

2 Section 422, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: 

“Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will 

result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the 

specific intent that the statement, made . . . by means of an 

electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even 

if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face 

and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so 

unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey 
9

“[S]ection 422 requires that the communication must be 

sufficient ‘on its face and under the circumstances in which it is 

made’ to constitute a criminal threat. This means that the 

communication and the surrounding circumstances are to be 

considered together. ‘Thus, it is the circumstances under which 

the threat is made that give meaning to the actual words used. 

Even an ambiguous statement may be a basis for a violation of 

section 422.’ [Citations.]” (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 

854, 860 (Ryan D.).)

“With respect to the requirement that a threat be ‘so 

unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey 

to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate 

prospect of execution of the threat,’ . . . ‘The four qualities are 

simply the factors to be considered in determining whether a 

threat, considered together with its surrounding circumstances, 

conveys those impressions to the victim.’ [Citation.]” (George T., 

supra, 33 Cal.4th 620, 635.)

Weighing the circumstances surrounding A.G.’s actions, we 

conclude there was sufficient evidence he threatened D.J. and 

Henriquez. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s findings. We 

will address each of A.G.’s arguments in turn. 

to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate 

prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that 

person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own 

safety . . .”
10

A. The record contains sufficient evidence A.G. 

intended his Snapchat post to be understood as a 

threat and that he willfully threatened to kill or 

cause great bodily injury

A.G. alleges the evidence failed to show he intended his 

Snapchat post to be understood as a threat. Instead, he argues

the image posted was a joke as evidenced by his use of the word 

“gum” and because he posted a follow-up image stating the first 

post was a joke. In a related contention, A.G. argues the record 

contains insufficient evidence that he willfully threatened to kill 

or cause great bodily injury. 

We reject these contentions. As noted above, the juvenile 

court rejected on credibility grounds A.G.’s assertion that he 

intended the first message as a “joke,” and we are bound by that 

determination. In any event, even if A.G. made the post as a joke, 

a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the joke was made with 

the intent that it be understood by others as a threat. As A.G. 

conceded to detective Jeong, he posted the story to see others’ 

reactions. Because people would only react to the story if they 

perceived it as a threat, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude 

that A.G.’s post was a willful threat to kill or cause great bodily 

injury because it suggested he was going to bring the gun to 

school and harm people with it.

A.G. compares his actions to those of the minor in In re 

Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 854 (Ryan D.). The minor in 

Ryan D. created a painting showing a police officer being shot in

the back of the head. The painting showed the badge number of a 

female officer who had previously given the minor a citation. 

(Ibid.) The person shooting the gun appeared to be the minor. 
11

(Ibid.) The minor later admitted the officer in the painting was 

the officer who had given him the citation and that he was the 

person shooting the gun. (Ibid.) The court found the painting 

failed to constitute a criminal threat because the intent was 

“ambiguous.” (Id. at p. 863) The minor took the picture “to class 

and turned it in for credit[,]” never displayed it to the officer “or 

put it in a location where he knew she would see it[,]” and did not

communicate with her “in any manner to advise her that she 

should see the painting.” (Id. at p. 864.) In sum, “the evidence 

[was] not sufficient to establish that . . . the minor harbored the 

specific intent that the painting would be displayed to [the 

officer.]”

In contrast with the minor in Ryan D., A.G’s intent was not 

sufficiently ambiguous to warrant reversal. The evidence 

permitted the conclusion that A.G. wanted to see a reaction from 

people who understood his story as a threat to unlawfully kill or 

cause great bodily injury. A.G. admitted he was friends on 

Snapchat with people who went to his current school and schools 

where he was previously enrolled. Students at his then current 

school, and students and teachers at his former school (whether 

or not they were aware A.G. had transferred to another school) 

reasonably could conclude A.G. was threatening to bring a gun to 

their school the next day.

A.G. also compares his actions to those of the minor in

George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th 620. In George T. the minor wrote a 

poem which ended with the line: “I can be the next kid to bring 

guns to kill students at school. So parents watch your children 

cuz I'm BACK!!” (Id. at p. 625.) The minor handed the poem to 

another student who became frightened. (Ibid.) The court found 

dissemination of the poem was not an unequivocal threat because 
12

it failed to show “immediate prospect that [the] minor would 

bring guns to school and shoot students.” (Id. at pp. 638-639.)

Instead, the court found the poem “understood in light of the 

surrounding circumstances” was “‘dark poetry’” and a form of 

literature.” (Id at p. 638) In sum, the court found the school was 

“justified in taking action” based on the poem, but the “poem did 

not constitute a criminal threat.” (Id. at p. 639, fn. omitted.)

In contrast to the minor in George T., A.G.’s post was 

specific in that he stated he would “bring gum” (which as D.J.’s 

testimony confirmed, could be interpreted by a reader to mean 

gun) to school the next day. He also showed he had the means to 

commit a school shooting because the image showed what 

appeared to be a real gun.

In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

conclusions that A.G. (1) willfully threatened to kill or cause 

great bodily injury; and (2) intended that his Snapchat post be 

understood as a threat. 

B. Communication of threat to D.J. or Henriquez

A.G. further argues that he did not specifically intend to 

communicate a threat to D.J. or Henriquez. In support he argues 

there was no evidence his initial post would reach Henriquez 

because Henriquez was not one of A.G.’s friends on Snapchat. 

A.G. also argues there was no evidence he understood his posts 

could be screenshot or forwarded to others. A.G. further contends 

the threat could not have been directed to D.J. or Henriquez 

because he was no longer a student at Linda Marquez.

In support of these contentions, A.G. cites George T.;

however, he misstates the rationale of the case. The court in 
13

George T. concluded that “the poem was not an unequivocal 

threat[.]” The court, therefore, “need[ed] not, and d[id] not, 

discuss minor's contention that he did not harbor the specific 

intent to threaten the [alleged victims.]” (George T., supra, 33 

Cal.4th 620, 639.)

A.G. admitted he was a student at Linda Marquez earlier 

in the school year. D.J. testified she had a class with A.G. earlier 

in her senior year. Henriquez also testified that A.G. was 

previously one of her students. Finally, there was no evidence 

showing A.G. did not understand how Snapchat worked. 

Considering these circumstances, we determine that by posting 

the story, A.G. communicated a threat of a school shooting to D.J. 

and Henriquez. By placing the post on Snapchat, A.G.

disseminated the threat to a large group of people, including D.J. 

It can be inferred from the way Snapchat works that A.G.

intended many people to see it, and he must have been aware 

that anyone who saw it might feel threatened. He also had to be 

aware that people who saw it might send it to others. In sum, a 

reasonable trier of fact could have found A.G. intended to 

threaten an expansive group of people, which included D.J. and 

Henriquez.

C. A.G.’s threat was unequivocal and specific 

A.G. contends his post was not sufficiently unambiguous

and unequivocal to satisfy section 422. He contends the post was 

“the definition of ambiguity and equivocation” because the gun 

was a replica and the caption said he was going to “bring ‘gum.’”

A.G. adds that there was no animosity between him and anyone 

in his community and that he was known to joke around. Finally,
14

A.G. contends D.J. did not see the caption with the word “gum,” 

and that if she did, she might have understood the post was a 

joke. 

“To constitute a criminal threat, a communication need not 

be absolutely unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific. 

The statute includes the qualifier ‘so’ unequivocal, etc., which 

establishes that the test is whether, in light of the surrounding 

circumstances, the communication was sufficiently unequivocal, 

unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the victim 

a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution. 

[Citation.]” (In re Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 861, 

original emphasis.)

D.J. testified the word “gum” did not change her fear of a 

school shooting because the letters “m” and “n” are close to each 

other on the keyboard and could easily be mistaken. Considering

the surrounding circumstances, including the notoriety of 

previous school shootings, A.G.’s story was sufficiently specific 

and unequivocal to convey the threat of a school shooting the next 

day. 

D. The threat was immediate and reasonably placed 

D.J. and Henriquez in fear

A.G. finally argues there was no evidence presented that 

the Snapchat story conveyed an immediate threat. A.G. points to 

the fact that the post was sent on the night of March 3, 2019, and 

suggests that if anyone took the post seriously they could have 

decided to stay away from school. A.G. also contends his school 

was ten miles from Linda Marquez. In sum, A.G. argues the story 
15

could not reasonably have been construed to communicate a 

threat of imminent harm to either D.J. or Henriquez. 

A.G. contrasts his actions to those of the minor in In re 

David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655 (David L.) The minor in 

David L. told a third party that he had a gun and that he was 

going to shoot the victim the next day. (David L., supra, 234 

Cal.App.3d at p. 1658.) The court found the threat “was of an 

immediate, unconditional nature and reasonably caused the

victim to undergo sustained fear [which] is all [section 422] 

requires.” (Id. at p. 1660.) The court explained section 422 “does 

not require the showing of an immediate ability to carry out the 

stated threat[,]” it “requires only that the words used be of an 

immediately threatening nature and convey ‘an immediate 

prospect of execution’ (italics added) even though the threatener 

may have no intent actually to engage in the threatened conduct. 

The threat is sufficient if it induces a ‘sustained fear.’” (Ibid.) The 

court further found “[t]he minor's threat . . . was not ‘on its face 

and under the circumstances in which it [was] made’ either 

conditional or in jest. According to the testimony, it was without 

equivocation or ambiguity. . . . [¶] The threat was . . . also 

sufficiently specific. Although it did not communicate a time or 

precise manner of execution, section 422 does not require those 

details to be expressed. It is enough to threaten ‘death or great 

bodily injury to another person.’ The minor's threat to shoot the 

victim easily satisfie[d] that element of the statute.” (David L., 

supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1660.)

Here, both D.J. and Henriquez testified that A.G.’s story 

induced fear that a school shooting would occur the following 

school day. Neither victim interpreted the post as a joke. Based 

on the cultural climate where school shootings sadly and 
16

tragically happen on a regular basis, it was reasonable that both 

D.J. and Henriquez sustained fear based on the story. Both D.J. 

and Henriquez testified they believed A.G. was still a student at 

Linda Marquez because he had been a student there earlier in 

the year. Further, both victims believed the gun in the story to be 

real, and that A.G.’s post indicated he would be taking the gun to 

school the following day. We therefore find A.G.’s threat was 

sufficiently specific under section 422. 

“The primary goal of the juvenile justice system is to 

rehabilitate offenders rather than punish them. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code section 202, subd. (b).) The rationale for this approach is the 

susceptibility of some juveniles to immature and irresponsible 

behavior and the greater likelihood they, as opposed to adults, 

will be reformed by proper guidance and treatment programs. 

[Citation.]” (In re R.C. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 302, 310.) Here, the 

juvenile court took A.G.’s remorse into account when fashioning 

his rehabilitation program. The court reduced the felony charges 

to misdemeanors and placed A.G. at home on probation. As the 

trial judge emphasized, if A.G. successfully completed his 

probation, his juvenile record could be sealed. 
17

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court findings are affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

CURREY, J.

WE CONCUR:

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

COLLINS, J.