FILED

February 19, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

MARCIA WUBBENA STAFFORD, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Appeal No.

) 01-A-01-9804-CV-00174

v. )

) Warren Circuit

JAMES ARTHUR STAFFORD, ) No. 9108

)

Defendant/Appellant. )

)

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WARREN COUNTY

AT McMINNVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE CHARLES D. HASTON, JUDGE

BERNARD K. SMITH

P. O. Box 490

McMinnville, Tennessee 37111

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

J. HILTON CONGER

200 South Third Street

Smithville, Tennessee 37166

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
-2-

OPINION

The only issue presented for appellate review in this divorce action is

whether or not the marital property was equitably divided.

Marsha Wubbena Stafford and James Arthur Stafford were married on

June 23, 1990 and separated in Warren County, Tennessee on April 9, 1997.

There were no children born of the marriage. On April 17, 1997, wife sued for

divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and husband, on August 4,

1997, answered and counter-complained for divorce on inappropriate marital

conduct grounds.

At a hearing on October 14, 1997, the trial judge sustained the

complaint of the wife and granted her a divorce on grounds of inappropriate

marital conduct. The court referred to the Special Master the question of marital

property and its disposition. This hearing before the Special Master was also

held on October 14, 1997 with pertinent findings as follows:

At the conclusion of the proof, the Special master finds that

plaintiff brought into the marriage the sum of approximately

$200,000.00 (two-hundred thousand dollars), the defendant

less than $20,000.00 (twenty-thousand dollars). The parties

converted the individual property into marital property by

purchasing a house and real estate. The parties' residence

burned and the contents of the home were replaced with

insurance proceeds. While plaintiff was away on a trip,

defendant withdrew $84,000.00 (eighty-four thousand

dollars) cash, moved everything that was moveable, and gave

a "fake" bill of sale for the farm equipment to a neighbor in

an attempt to conceal these asset [sic] which could not be

moved. Defendant will admit filing no income tax returns

for the time of the marriage but claims income between $1.00

(one dollar) and $1,000,000.00 (one-million dollars) but took

the 5th as to the exact amount. Defendant indicates that he

has spent the $84,000.00 (eighty-four thousand dollars)

gambling and on bad business deals. Defendant indicates

that he has none of the funds left.

Plaintiff is left with a partially completed house, no

insurance proceeds and a substantial mortgage. It is the

finding of the Special Master that an equitable division of the

parties' assett [sic] would be to give the plaintiff the house,

real estate, personal property, automobiles, farm equipment

and cabinet equipment that defendant removed to
-3-

Mississippi, she would be responsible for the mortgage. In

addition a judgment in the amount of $42,000.00 (forty-two

thousand dollars) should be rendered against defendant.

While a judgment may be dischargeable in bankruptcy,

the U. S. Attorney may be interested in defendant's tax status.

The trial judge concurred in the findings of the Special Master and

husband appealed.

The proof in the case amply supports the actions of the Special Master

and the trial judge as to the disposition of property. At the time of the marriage,

wife owned various assets with an aggregate value of $202,743.16. Husband had

assets at the time of the marriage valued at $18,367.00. During the marriage wife

used her separate property for the benefit of both parties, providing the down

payment for an unimproved farm and providing the money for building their

home. This home burned on or about January 1, 1997 with insurance paying

approximately $95,000.00 for the home and later $67,749.53 for contents. Both

parties agree that the separate pre-marital property has been transmuted, and that

all resulting property is marital. See e.g. Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 585

(Tenn.App.1988).

With the reconstruction of the marital home unfinished, husband in

March of 1997 disappeared after withdrawing $84,000.00 fromthe savings of the

parties, taking all three of the parties' vehicles together with his cabinet making

tools and effecting a fraudulent transfer of farm equipment to a neighbor, James

Owens. He lost most of the money in gambling transactions at casinos in Tunica,

Mississippi. Husband's testimony is revealing.

Q. And where is the farm equipment?

A. It's at Jim Owens' house.

Q. And we've -- we had a bill of sale around here

that we could introduce, but that was not a true bill of sale;

is that correct?

A. No, sir, Jim told me he needed something to get

her off his back because she was calling and aggravating him

and his wife to death. And I made the bill of sale out and

took it to him. I told him if it come to court, tell the truth.

Q. Okay. And that's what you're here to do, too?

A. Yes, sir.
-4-

Q. When was the last time you filed an income tax

return?

A. Due to the grounds of my counsel's advice, I

refuse to answer that question. It may incriminate me.

Q. Did you file an income tax return during the

course of this marriage?

A. Due to my counsel's advi[s]e, I refuse to answer

that question on the grounds it may incriminate me.

Q. Did you earn any funds during the course of this

marriage?

A. Yes, sir, but I have no idea how much.

Q. You have no idea how much?

A. No, sir.

Q. It could be as little as a dollar.

A. Correct.

Q. Or as much as a million?

A. Correct.

Q. When you left here, you took everything with

you, all of your tools?

A. Yes, sir.

This court has held:

[13] A trial court's division of marital property is to be

guided by the factors contained in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(c). However, an equitable property division is not

necessarily an equal one. It is not achieved by a mechanical

application of the statutory factors, but rather by considering

and weighing the most relevant factors in light of the unique

facts of the case.

[14] Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(1) permits trial

courts to consider the duration of the marriage. In cases

involving a marriage of relatively short duration, it is

appropriate to divide the property in a way that, as nearly as

possible, places the parties in the same position they would

have been in had the marriage never taken place. In re

Marriage of McInnis, 62 Or.App. 524, 661 P.2d 942, 943

(1983).

[15] When relatively short marriages are involved,

each spouse's contributions to the accumulation of assets

during the marriage is an important factor. In re Marriage of

Peru, 56 Or.App. 300, 641 P.2d 646, 647 (1982). When a

marriage is short, the significance and value of a spouse's

non-monetary contributions is diminished, and claims by one

spouse to another spouse's separate property are minimal at

best. In re Marriage of Wallace, 315 N.W.2d 827, 830-31

(Iowa Ct.App.1981). 

Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn.App.1988).
-5-

The marriage at bar, one of only seven years duration, falls in the same

category as does the marriage in Batson. The husband brought a comparative

pittance to the marital estate. Under the decree of the trial court he received, in

property division, $42,000.00 of the money from marital assets that he had

squandered at the gambling tables; which is more than twice his marital

contribution. Wife received everything else. This division " . . . as nearly as

possible, places the parties in the same position they would have been in had the

marriage never taken place." Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859

(Tenn.App.1988).

The evidence certainly does not preponderate against the marital

property disposition made by the trial court and the judgment will therefore be

affirmed.

Such being the only issue raised on appeal it remains but to tax the

costs against the husband, James Arthur Stafford.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the case is remanded for

collection of costs.

__________________________________

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

CONCUR:

_____________________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, PRES. JUDGE, M.S.

_____________________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE