(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

EC TERM OF YEARS TRUST v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 05–1541. Argued February 26, 2007—Decided April 30, 2007 

Under 26 U. S. C. §7426(a)(1), if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

levies upon a third party’s property to collect taxes owed by another,

the third party may bring a wrongful levy action against the United

States, so long as such action is brought before “the expiration of 9 

months from the date of the levy,” §6532(c)(1). In contrast, the limitations period for a tax refund action under 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(1)

begins with an administrative claim that may be filed within at least

two years, and may be brought to court within another two years after an administrative denial. The IRS levied on a bank account in 

which petitioner (Trust) had deposited funds because the IRS assumed that the Trust’s creators had transferred assets to the Trust to 

evade taxes. The bank responded with a check to the Treasury. Almost a year later, the Trust and others brought a §7426(a)(1) action

claiming wrongful levies, but the District Court dismissed the complaint because it was filed after the 9-month limitations period had 

expired. After unsuccessfully pursing a tax refund at the administrative level, the Trust filed a refund action under §1346(a)(1). The District Court held that a wrongful levy claim under §7426(a)(1) was the

sole remedy possible and dismissed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 

Held: The Trust missed §7426(a)(1)’s deadline for challenging a levy,

and may not bring the challenge as a tax refund claim under 

§1346(a)(1). Section 7426(a)(1) provides the exclusive remedy for 

third-party wrongful levy claims. “[A] precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies,” Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 

834, and it braces the preemption claim when resort to a general 

remedy would effectively extend the limitations period for the specific 

one, see id., at 833. If third parties could avail themselves of

§1346(a)(1)’s general tax refund jurisdiction, they could effortlessly 
2 EC TERM OF YEARS TRUST v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

evade §7426(a)(1)’s much shorter limitations period. The Trust argues that, because United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527, construed §1346(a)(1)’s general jurisdictional grant expansively enough 

to cover third parties’ wrongful levy claims, treating §7426(a)(1) as

the exclusive avenue for these claims would amount to a disfavored 

holding that §7426(a)(1) implicitly repealed §1346(a)(1)’s pre-existing

jurisdictional grant. But this reads Williams too broadly. Williams 

involved a lien and was decided on the specific understanding that no 

other remedy was open to the plaintiff. Here, the Trust challenges a 

levy and could have made a timely claim under §7426(a)(1). Even if 

the presumption against implied repeals applied here, §7426(a)(1)’s

9-month limitations period cannot be reconciled with the notion that 

the same challenge would be open under §1346(a)(1) for up to four 

years. Nor can the two statutory schemes be harmonized by construing §7426(a)(1)’s filing deadline to cover only those actions seeking

predeprivation remedies unavailable under §1346(a)(1). On its face, 

§7426(a)(1) applies to predeprivation and postdeprivation claims 

alike. Pp. 4–7. 

434 F. 3d 807, affirmed. 

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 05–1541 

EC TERM OF YEARS TRUST, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007] 

JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This is a challenge to the Internal Revenue Service’s

levy upon the property of a trust, to collect taxes owed by 

another, an action specifically authorized by 26 U. S. C. 

§7426(a)(1), but subject to a statutory filing deadline the 

trust missed. The question is whether the trust may still

challenge the levy through an action for tax refund under

28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(1). We hold that it may not. 

I 

The Internal Revenue Code provides that “[i]f any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the 

same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor 

of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.”

26 U. S. C. §6321. “A federal tax lien, however, is not selfexecuting,” and the IRS must take “[a]ffirmative action . . . 

to enforce collection of the unpaid taxes.” United States v. 

National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S. 713, 720 (1985). 

One of its “principal tools,” ibid., is a levy, which is a 

“legally sanctioned seizure and sale of property,” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 926 (8th ed. 2004); see also §6331(b) (“The 
2 EC TERM OF YEARS TRUST v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

term ‘levy’ as used in this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means”). 

To protect against a “‘wrongful’” imposition upon “property which is not the taxpayer’s,” S. Rep. No. 1708, 89th 

Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1966), the Federal Tax Lien Act of

1966 added §7426(a)(1), providing that “[i]f a levy has

been made on property . . . any person (other than the 

person against whom is assessed the tax out of which such

levy arose) who claims an interest in . . . such property

and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may

bring a civil action against the United States in a district 

court.” 80 Stat. 1143. The action must, however, be 

brought before “the expiration of 9 months from the date

of the levy.”1 §6532(c)(1). This short limitations period

contrasts with its counterpart in a tax refund action under

28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(1), which begins with an administrative claim that may be filed within at least two years, and 

may be brought to court within another two after an administrative denial.2 The demand for greater haste when 

a third party contests a levy is no accident; as the Government explained in the hearings before passage of the 

Act, “[s]ince after seizure of property for nonpayment of

taxes [an IRS] district director is likely to suspend further 

—————— 

1This period can be extended for up to 12 months if the third party

makes an administrative request for the return of the property wrongfully levied upon. See 26 U. S. C. §6532(c)(2). 2Title 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(1) gives district courts “jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims,” over “[a]ny 

civil action against the United States for the recovery of,” among other

things, “any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or

illegally assessed or collected.” A taxpayer may bring such an action 

within two years after the IRS disallows the taxpayer’s administrative 

refund claim. See 26 U. S. C. §§6532(a)(1)–(2); see also §7422(a) (requiring a taxpayer to file the administrative claim before seeking a 

refund in court). An administrative refund claim must, in turn, be filed 

within two years from the date the tax was paid or three years from the 

time the tax return was filed, whichever is later. See §6511(a). 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

collection activities against the taxpayer, it is essential 

that he be advised promptly if he has seized property 

which does not belong to the taxpayer.” Hearings on H. R.

11256 and H. R. 11290 before the House Committee on 

Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 57–58 (1966)

(written statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); see also id., at 72 (statement of 

Laurens Williams, Chairman, Special Committee on Federal Liens, American Bar Association) (“A short (9 month)

statute of limitations is provided, because it is important 

to get such controversies decided quickly so the Government may pursue the taxpayer’s own property if it made a 

mistake the first time”). 

II 

After Elmer W. Cullers, Jr., and Dorothy Cullers established the EC Term of Years Trust in 1991, the IRS assessed federal tax liabilities against them for what the

Government claimed (and the Trust does not dispute, see 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 7) were unwarranted income tax deductions in the 1980s. The Government assumed that the 

Cullerses had transferred assets to the Trust to evade 

taxes, and so filed a tax lien against the Trust in August

1999. The Trust denied any obligation, but for the sake of 

preventing disruptive collection efforts by the IRS, it

deposited funds in a bank account, against which the IRS 

issued a notice of levy to the bank in September 1999. In 

October, the bank responded with a check for over $3

million to the United States Treasury.

Almost a year after that, the Trust (joined by several 

other trusts created by the Cullerses) brought a civil action under 26 U. S. C. §7426(a)(1) claiming wrongful levies, but the District Court dismissed it because the complaint was filed after the 9-month limitations period had 

expired, see §6532(c)(1). The court also noted that taxrefund claims under 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(1) were not open 
4 EC TERM OF YEARS TRUST v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

to the plaintiff trusts because §7426 “‘affords the exclusive 

remedy for an innocent third party whose property is

confiscated by the IRS to satisfy another person’s tax

liability.’” BSC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 

2001–1 USTC ¶50,174, p. 87,237, n. 1, 87 AFTR 2d ¶2001–

390, p. 2001–547, n. 1 (WD Tex., 2000) (quoting Texas 

Comm. Bank Fort Worth, N. A. v. United States, 896 F. 2d 

152, 156 (CA5 1990); emphasis deleted). At first the Trust 

sought review by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but then voluntarily dismissed its appeal. BSC Term 

of Years Trust v. United States, 87 AFTR 2d ¶2001–1039, 

p. 2001–2532 (2001).

 After unsuccessfully pursuing a tax refund at the 

administrative level, the Trust filed a second action, this 

one for a refund under §1346(a)(1). The District Court 

remained of the view that a claim for a wrongful levy 

under §7426(a)(1) had been the sole remedy possible and

dismissed.3 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

affirmed. 

Because the Ninth Circuit, on the contrary, has held 

that §7426(a)(1) is not the exclusive remedy for third

parties challenging a levy, see WWSM Investors v. United 

States, 64 F. 3d 456 (1995), we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 549 U. S ___ (2006). We affirm. 

III 

“In a variety of contexts the Court has held that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general

remedies.” Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 834 (1976); see 

Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School 

Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 284–286 (1983) (adverse claimants

to real property of the United States may not rely on

“officer’s suits” or on other general remedies because the 

—————— 

3The District Court declined to dismiss the Trust’s claim on res judicata grounds, and the Government does not argue claim or issue 

preclusion in this Court, see Brief for United States 5, n. 2. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Quiet Title Act of 1972 is their exclusive recourse); see 

also Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 

561 (1942) (venue in patent infringement cases is governed by a statute dealing specifically with patents, not a

general venue provision). It braces the preemption claim

when resort to a general remedy would effectively extend 

the limitations period for the specific one. See Brown v. 

GSA, supra, at 833 (rejecting an interpretation that would 

“driv[e] out of currency” a narrowly aimed provision “with

its rigorous . . . time limitations” by permitting “access to

the courts under other, less demanding statutes”); see also 

Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 122–123 

(2005) (concluding that 47 U. S. C. §332(c) precludes resort 

to the general cause of action under 42 U. S. C. §1983, in

part because §332 “limits relief in ways that §1983 does

not” by requiring judicial review to be sought within 30

days); 544 U. S., at 130, n. (STEVENS, J., concurring in

judgment) (same).

Resisting the force of the better-fitted statute requires a 

good countervailing reason, and none appears here. Congress specifically tailored §7426(a)(1) to third party claims 

of wrongful levy, and if third parties could avail themselves of the general tax refund jurisdiction of §1346(a)(1), 

they could effortlessly evade the levy statute’s 9-month 

limitations period thought essential to the Government’s 

tax collection. 

The Trust argues that in United States v. Williams, 514 

U. S. 527 (1995), we construed the general jurisdictional 

grant of §1346(a)(1) expansively enough to cover third

parties’ wrongful levy claims. So, according to the Trust,

treating §7426(a)(1) as the exclusive avenue for these 

claims would amount to a disfavored holding that 

§7426(a)(1) implicitly repealed the pre-existing jurisdictional grant of §1346(a)(1). See Radzanower v. Touche 

Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 

U. S. 535 (1974). 
6 EC TERM OF YEARS TRUST v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

But the Trust reads Williams too broadly. Although we

decided that §1346(a)(1) authorizes a tax-refund claim by

a third party whose property was subjected to an allegedly

wrongful tax lien, we so held on the specific understanding 

that no other remedy, not even a timely claim under

§7426(a)(1), was open to the plaintiff in that case. See 

Williams, supra, at 536–538. Here, on the contrary, the 

Trust challenges a levy, not a lien, and could have made a

timely claim under §7426(a)(1) for the relief it now seeks

under §1346(a)(1).4 

And even if the canon against implied repeals applied 

here, the Trust still could not prevail. We simply cannot 

reconcile the 9-month limitations period for a wrongful 

levy claim under §7426(a)(1) with the notion that the same 

challenge would be open under §1346(a)(1) for up to four 

years. See Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 

—————— 

4 It has been commonly understood that Williams did not extend 

§1346(a)(1) to parties in the Trust’s position. See 434 F. 3d 807, 810 

(CA5 2006) (case below) (“To construe Williams to allow an alternative 

remedy under §1346, with its longer statute of limitations period,

would undermine the surety provided by the clear avenue to recovery

under §7426” (citation omitted)); Dahn v. United States, 127 F. 3d 1249, 

1253 (CA10 1997) (“[T]here were no tax levies involved in [Williams].

Thus, the Court was concerned solely with the reach of §1346 per se;

the exclusivity of a concurrent §7426 claim was never in issue. Indeed, 

the Court specifically emphasized the inapplicability of §7426 (or any

other meaningful remedy) to reinforce its broad reading of §1346”); 

WWSM Investors v. United States, 64 F. 3d 456, 459 (CA9 1995) (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court recognized Williams as a 

refund, not a wrongful levy, case, and [did not] even hint that §7426 

was not the exclusive remedy for a claimed wrongful levy”); Rev. Rul.

2005–49, 2005–2 Cum. Bull. 126 (“The rationale in Williams is inapplicable to wrongful levy suits because Congress created an exclusive 

remedy under section 7426 for third persons claiming an interest in

property levied upon by the [IRS]”); but see WWSM Investors, supra, at 

459 (majority opinion) (“[S]eizing money from WWSM’s bank account is 

functionally equivalent to what the IRS did in Williams—placing a lien 

on property in escrow under circumstances which compelled Mrs. 

Williams to pay the IRS and discharge the lien”). 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

503 (1936) (“[W]here provisions in the two acts are in

irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the 

conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one”). 

On this point, the Trust proposes that the two statutory

schemes can be “harmonized” by construing the deadline

for filing §7426(a)(1) claims to cover only those actions 

seeking “pre-deprivation” remedies unavailable under 

§1346(a)(1). See Reply Brief for Petitioner 6. But this 

reading would violate the clear text of §7426(a)(1), which 

on its face applies to pre-deprivation and post-deprivation

claims alike. See 26 U. S. C. §7426(a)(1) (“Such action

may be brought without regard to whether such property

has been surrendered to or sold by the Secretary”). 

* * * 

The Trust missed the deadline for challenging a levy 

under §7426(a)(1), and may not bring the challenge as a

tax refund claim under §1346(a)(1). The judgment of the 

Court of Appeals is accordingly affirmed. 

It is so ordered.