Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 14, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-00233-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF C.J.P., O.R.P., B.H.P., CHILDREN 

On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. JC-19-01286-X 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Goldstein 

Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness 

Father and Mother appeal the trial court’s decree terminating their parental 

rights to their children C.J.P., O.R.P., and B.H.P. At the time of termination in 2022, 

C.J.P. was eleven years old, O.R.P. was six years old, and B.H.P. was four years old. 

Father challenges the termination on jurisdictional grounds. Mother argues the 

evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding 

that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On September 3, 2019, and September 4, 2019, the Department of Family and 

Protective Services (the Department) received two referrals alleging physical abuse 

of C.J.P. by Father. The second referral was triggered by a suicide outcry made by 
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C.J.P. at school. The school reported that C.J.P. “talked about going home to choke 

himself to death” and indicated Father had choked him in the past. The school 

notified the police department and Mother. A police officer interviewed C.J.P. and 

Mother at the school. Mother told the officer Father had not choked or hurt the 

children. She revealed the children may have witnessed Father choking her “a long 

time ago.” She also reported that Father “talks about committing suicide all the time, 

quite frequently.” 

On September 6, 2019, Department investigator Anette Ezeomodo 

interviewed C.J.P. at school. C.J.P. told Ezeomodo that Father choked him until he 

passed out but could not remember when it happened. C.J.P. reported falling off his 

scooter the prior evening, and Ezeomodo observed he had a bruise on his left eye 

and a scar on the back of his right hand. Ezeomodo also interviewed Mother and 

Father at their residence. During those interviews, Mother again denied that Father 

ever choked C.J.P. and reported Father “talks about suicide all the time.” Father 

stated he does not abuse C.J.P. and denied being suicidal. Ezeomodo observed 

O.R.P. and B.H.P in the home but did not interview them due to their young ages. 

Over the following weeks and months, Department investigators met with Father, 

Mother, the children, and third parties who knew the family. Father and Mother 

agreed to cooperate with the Department’s services but were unwilling to participate 

with Family based Safety Services (FBSS). On December 19, 2019, the Department 
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filed its Petition for Order to Participate in Services. The trial court did not hear or 

rule on the petition. 

On May 4, 2020, the Department received a new open investigation on the 

case based on concerns of domestic violence in the home. The incident triggering 

that investigation was an altercation between Mother and Mother’s sister, Austina 

Mock. According to Mock and Father, Mother grabbed Mock by the hair and “ripped 

out about half of [Mock’s] hair” and caused her scalp to bleed. Mother maintains 

Mock was the aggressor and testified she grabbed Mock’s hair “to restrain her from 

attacking.” Mother also testified she did not pull Mock’s hair intentionally. Rather, 

the hair came out when Father tackled Mother into a wall. Police officers arrested 

Mother at the home. She was charged and received a sentence of nine months 

deferred adjudication probation, which she completed. The Department took 

possession of the children following the assault and filed its original petition for 

protection of the children, for conservatorship, and for termination of parental rights. 

On May 5, 2020, the trial court signed an ex parte order for emergency care and 

temporary custody appointing Dallas County Child Protective Services temporary 

managing conservator of the children. In support of the appointment, the trial court 

found a continuing danger to the physical health and/or safety of the children if 

returned to the parents, and determined it was contrary to the children’s welfare to 

remain at home and placement would be in the best interest of the children. The case 

was set for trial on April 13, 2021 and had a May 10, 2021 dismissal date. 
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After an unsuccessful mediation, Mother filed a “Joint1

 Motion to Extend 

Deadline, Motion for Jury Trial Setting and First Motion for Continuance” on April 

6, 2021. The basis for the requested extension was that the parties were unable to 

reach a mediated settlement agreement and the children’s counselors believed the 

parties could benefit from additional family counseling. Father also indicated he 

would request a jury trial if the parties could not reach a settlement. 

The trial court granted the agreed motion by written order on April 7, 2021. 

The order stated the trial court was granting the motion “for good cause shown,” set 

the case for a jury trial on October 11, 2021, and set a new dismissal date of 

November 8, 2021. Father filed a motion to extend the dismissal date on September 

27, 2021. The trial court granted Father’s extension motion and set the new dismissal 

date for December 1, 2021. Trial commenced November 29, 2021. 

The trial court conducted the termination proceeding on six dates between 

November 29, 2021, and March 1, 2022. The trial court stated its ruling on the record 

at a March 7, 2022 hearing and signed the decree of termination on March 15, 2022. 

The trial court terminated Father and Mother’s parental rights under sections 

1

 The motion states it is filed “jointly by and through” the parties’ counsel, but is signed only by 

Mother’s counsel. On appeal, Father describes the motion as one “purported to be a joint motion” by the 

parties. Father did not object to the motion in the trial court. Any objection to the motion on appeal has, 

therefore, been waived. Further, Mother’s counsel certified that the parties conferred on the motion and 

“agreed upon” the items presented in the motion. No party objected to that certification below. Under this 

record we construe the “joint motion to extend deadline” as an agreed motion. 
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161.001(b)(1)(D) and 161.001(b)(1)(E) of the family code. The trial court also found 

termination was in the best interest of the children. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS 

Father and Mother appeal the termination order on different grounds. Father 

contends the termination order was signed after the mandatory dismissal date and is 

void. Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the trial court’s best interest findings. We address Father’s jurisdictional challenge 

first because if we conclude the termination order is void, Mother’s appeal of the 

merits of the order will be mooted. See White v. Smith, 591 S.W.3d 198, 202–03 

(Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, no pet.) (“If a ruling is void, the appellate court lacks 

jurisdiction to review the ruling’s merits.”); Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 

372 S.W.3d 621, 623–24 (Tex. 2012) (“[A]ppellate courts do not have jurisdiction 

to address the merits of appeals from void orders or judgments; rather, they have 

jurisdiction only to determine that the order or judgment underlying the appeal is 

void and make appropriate orders based on that determination.”); Custom Corps., 

Inc. v. Sec. Storage, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2006, no pet.) (dismissing appeal as moot where related mandamus proceeding had 

declared judgment upon which appeal was based as void). 

I. Father’s appeal 

In one issue, Father contends the March 15, 2022 termination order is void 

because the trial court signed it after the initial statutorily required dismissal date of 
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May 10, 2021 had passed. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a) (providing for 

automatic dismissal of termination suit if trial has not commenced or an extension 

has not been granted on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the temporary 

order appointing the Department temporary managing conservator). More 

specifically, Father maintains the trial court lost jurisdiction when it extended the 

dismissal date on April 7, 2021, without making findings that extraordinary 

circumstances necessitated the children remaining in the temporary managing 

conservatorship of the Department and such an extension would be in the children’s 

best interest. We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction and statutory 

interpretation de novo. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. 

2020); Hegar v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 605 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. 2020). “When 

interpreting statutes, we look to the plain meaning of the enacted text” and enforce 

it “as written.” KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 183 

(Tex. 2019). Similarly, we interpret court orders, including the supreme court’s 

emergency orders, “according to the plain meaning of their terms.” Kim v. Ramos, 

632 S.W.3d 258, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.); Green v. Villas 

on Town Lake Owners Ass’n, Inc., No. 03-20-00375-CV, 2021 WL 4927414, at *9 

(Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 22, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Under this record, we 

conclude the trial court had jurisdiction over the case when it signed the termination 

decree. 
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A. Jurisdictional requirements of TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401 

In cases where the Department requests termination of parental rights or 

conservatorship of a child, the family code requires the court to begin trial no later 

than “the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a 

temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator.” 

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a). The trial court may extend the deadline once for 180 

days upon finding that “extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining 

in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that continuing 

the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best 

interest of the child.” Id. § 263.401(b). “If the court retains the suit on the court’s 

docket, the court shall render an order in which the court: 

(1) schedules the new date on which the suit will be automatically 

dismissed if the trial on the merits has not commenced, which date must 

be not later than the 180th day after the time described by Subsection 

(a); 

(2) makes further temporary orders for the safety and welfare of the 

child as necessary to avoid further delay in resolving the suit; and 

(3) sets the trial on the merits on a date not later than the date specified 

under Subdivision (1).” 

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(b)(1–3). If the trial court grants an extension under 

subsection (b) but fails to commence the trial on the merits before the new dismissal 

date, “the court’s jurisdiction over the suit is terminated and the suit is automatically 

dismissed without a court order.” Id. § 263.401(c); In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 

292 (Tex. 2021). 
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Here, the trial court named the Department temporary managing conservator 

of the children on May 5, 2020. Thus, the initial dismissal date was Monday, May 

10, 2021. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a) (dismissal date is “the first Monday 

after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing 

the department as temporary managing conservator.”). On April 7, 2021, the trial 

court granted the parties’ “joint” motion to extend the dismissal deadline and ordered 

a new dismissal date of November 8, 2021. Father maintains the extension was 

ineffective because the trial court “did not make the required findings” set out in 

section 263.401(b). According to Father, the trial court lost jurisdiction after May 

10, 2021, because it failed to issue specific findings “that extraordinary 

circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing 

conservatorship of the Department” and “that continuing the appointment of the 

department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child.” 

We disagree. 

The Texas Supreme Court held in In re GHX that such alleged defects are not 

jurisdictional and must be preserved for appellate review: 

In sum, we conclude that, while a trial court’s failure to timely extend 

the automatic dismissal date before that date passes—through a docketsheet notation or otherwise—is jurisdictional, claimed defects relating 

to the other requirements of 263.401(b) are not. Accordingly, with the 

exception of a trial court’s failure to extend the automatic dismissal date 

before it passes, complaints regarding the trial court’s compliance 

with the requirements in subsection (b) must be preserved for 

appellate review. Because the parents failed to preserve them in this 

case, we hold their complaints regarding the timing and form of the 
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order resetting the trial and dismissal dates are waived. See TEX.R. APP.

P. 33.1. 

In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 301 (emphasis added). This Court and several of our 

sister courts have applied In re G.X.H. to hold that complaints regarding a trial 

court’s failure to comply with the requirements of subsection (b), including a failure 

to make best interest and extraordinary circumstances findings, must be preserved 

for appellate review and are, therefore, not jurisdictional. E.g., In re P.Z.F., 651 

S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, pet. denied) (noting In re G.H.X. holding 

that “claimed defects relating to the other requirements of 263.401(b) are not 

[jurisdictional]” and concluding “Father’s other complaints that the trial court failed 

to make the findings described in subsection (b) were not raised in the trial court 

and, thus, were not preserved for our review.”) (citing In re G.H.X.); M. P. v. Tex. 

Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00163-CV, 2022 WL 4281617, at *5 

(Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 16, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (applying In re G.X.H.

and concluding Mother did not preserve jurisdictional argument for review because 

she did not raise her complaint about the lack of a best interest finding until after the 

initial dismissal date had passed); In re P.R., No. 10-22-00062-CV, 2022 WL 

3655402, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 24, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“any 

complaint regarding the failure of the trial court to make an express finding of 

extraordinary circumstances was not preserved for appellate review.”); In re J.F., 

No. 07-22-00058-CV, 2022 WL 3328274, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 11, 

2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“While a trial court’s failure to timely extend the 
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automatic dismissal date before that date passes is jurisdictional, claimed defects 

relating to the other requirements of subsection 263.401(b) are not.”); In re R.J.R., 

No. 04-21-00246-CV, 2021 WL 5813827, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 8, 

2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (appellant’s complaint the trial court failed to make 

the section 263.401(b) findings was not preserved for review because she did not 

raise the issue in the trial court). 

Here, Father’s complaint that the trial court failed to issue section 263.401 

findings was not preserved for review. Father did not raise this issue when the trial 

court issued the April 7, 2021 extension order or at any time after the initial dismissal 

date passed. Indeed, Father continued to participate in the litigation after the first 

extension order. He moved to take the deposition of C.J.P.’s therapist and to employ 

a third-party therapist, filed a response to the guardian ad litem’s motion to modify 

the temporary orders, and objected to a visiting judge presiding over hearings. Father 

even filed a motion to extend the dismissal date on September 27, 2021. The trial 

court granted Father’s extension motion and set the new dismissal date for December 

1, 2021. Trial commenced November 29, 2021. Father did not assert objections to 

the extension order at commencement of trial, during trial, or to the trial court’s 

rendition of judgment. Father also failed to raise deficiencies in the extension order 

in his post-judgment motion for new trial. Applying In re G.X.H. and In re P.Z.F., 

we conclude Father failed to preserve this issue for review. In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 

at 301 (“Accordingly, with the exception of a trial court’s failure to extend the 
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automatic dismissal date before it passes, complaints regarding the trial court's 

compliance with the requirements in subsection (b) must be preserved for appellate 

review.”); In re P.Z.F., 651 S.W.3d at 153; M. P., 2022 WL 4281617, at *5; In re 

P.R., 2022 WL 3655402, at *3; In re J.F., 2022 WL 3328274, at *3; In re R.J.R., 

2021 WL 5813827, at *3. We overrule Father’s first issue. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. 

Father contends the best interest and extraordinary findings are jurisdictional 

and, thus, not waivable. He relies on this Court’s decision in In re J.S., No. 05-21-

00898-CV, 2022 WL 620709 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2022, pet. granted) (mem. 

op.) to support his argument. In J.S., the initial dismissal date for the termination suit 

was February 8, 2021. Id. at *3. The case was first set for trial on that date, but trial 

did not commence; instead, the “court conferred off the record with the parties’ 

attorneys and then announced on the record that the parents would receive a jury 

trial and that the trial would take place on June 14.” Id. At the Department’s request, 

and without objection from the parents, the court made verbal findings that it was in 

the child’s best interest to extend the case and retain the Department as the child’s 

temporary managing conservator. Id. The trial court did not issue a written order 

setting a new dismissal date until March 30, 2021, nearly six weeks after the initial 

dismissal date. The March 30 order included findings that “ ‘extraordinary 

circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing 

conservatorship of the Department,’” and continuing the appointment is in the 
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child’s best interest. Id. The court set the new dismissal date for August 7, 2021. Id.

Trial commenced on June 14, 2021. Id.

On appeal, the panel noted the March 30 order was entered too late to extend 

the jurisdictional period because it came after the initial dismissal date of February 

8. In re J.S., 2022 WL 620709 at *3. Thus, the question on appeal was whether the 

February 8 oral finding on the record satisfied section 263.401(b) and extended the 

dismissal date. Id. The J.S. panel concluded the oral finding did not satisfy 

263.401(b) because the trial court made only a best interest finding on February 8 

and did not mention extraordinary circumstances. Id. (“A finding that it is in the 

child's best interest for the case to be extended and for the Department to remain as 

temporary managing conservator is not a finding of extraordinary circumstances as 

required by subsection (b).”). Under that record, the case was automatically 

dismissed after February 8 and the trial court's judgment was void. Id. Father 

maintains the same logic applies here. We disagree, however, because In re J.S. is 

distinguishable from the case at bar. 

For example, the panel in J.S. answered a different question than the one 

presented here. There, the panel concluded that making one of the required findings 

under section 263.401(a) did not constitute making the other required finding. In re 

J.S., 2022 WL 620709 at *3. Here, the trial court made both required findings. The 

trial court explicitly found good cause for the extension in its written order. The 

finding of “good cause” encompassed a finding of extraordinary circumstances and, 
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as such, met the requirements of 263.401(b). E.g., Foster v. Cunningham, 825 

S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (“good cause exception 

is necessarily a narrow one requiring a showing of extraordinary circumstances.”); 

see also In re G.A., No. 01-11-00565-CV, 2012 WL 1068630, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“a finding of 

extraordinary circumstances under section 263.401(b) satisfies the “good cause” 

requirement of Rule 18a.”). As for a best interest finding, the parties agreed in the 

joint motion for extension that it was in the best interests of the children to extend 

the dismissal date and the Department’s role of temporary managing conservator. 

As such, by granting the joint extension motion, the trial court necessarily made a 

best interest finding. See, e.g., In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 316 

(Tex. 2009) (concluding trial court’s decision to order forensic examination implied 

a finding that evidence was not reasonably available and required extraordinary steps 

for retrieval and production);see also In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 

2006) (absent a trial court’s express finding that a party received late notice of the 

judgment, a finding should be implied by the court's granting of a motion for new 

trial). see also In re F.S., No. 09-22-00114-CV, 2022 WL 4371008, at *8 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Sept. 22, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“since the parties did not 

ask the trial court for written findings, the findings may be implied if the record 

before the appellate court supports the ruling the trial court made.”). Unlike In re 

J.S., the trial court made both subsection (b) findings here. Further, the extension 
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order was signed, and those findings made before the initial dismissal date passed. 

In J.S., in contrast, the extension order was not signed until after the dismissal 

deadline had already passed. Id. Moreover, the panel in J.S. was not presented with 

the question of appellate preservation. We conclude J.S. is inapplicable to our 

analysis here. 

We instead find this case analogous to In re G.X.H. and In re P.Z.F. In those 

cases, as here, the extension order (or its equivalent) was signed or made before the 

initial dismissal date, and both the Texas Supreme Court and this Court concluded 

the issuance of extraordinary circumstances and best interest findings were not 

jurisdictional.2

 Applying those holdings here, we conclude the Department’s suit 

was not automatically dismissed on May 10, 2021, because the trial court extended 

the automatic dismissal date by written order on April 7, 2021, and retained 

jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, even assuming Father preserved his 

complaint about the form of the order for our review, we overrule Father’s sole issue. 

2

 To the extent In re J.S. can be construed as conflicting with In re P.Z.F. regarding preservation of 

error or the non-jurisdictional nature of the best interest and extraordinary circumstances findings required 

by the statute, we are bound by stare decisis to follow In re P.Z.F., the earlier case. Mitschke v. Borromeo, 

645 S.W.3d 251, 256–58 (Tex. 2022) (“If one appellate panel decides a case, and another panel of the same 

court differently resolves a materially indistinguishable question in contravention of a holding in the prior 

decision, the second panel has violated the foundational rule of stare decisis.” Under those circumstances, 

a third panel is “objectively bound to follow the earliest non-superseded line of cases . . . .”). Further, the 

Texas Supreme Court denied the petition filed in In re P.Z.F., but granted the petition for review on 

rehearing in In re J.S. The Texas Supreme Court will hear argument in In re J.S. in January 2023. The 

granting of the petition signals that at least four justices are convinced the court of appeals erred in its 

judgment. Texas Rules of Form: The Greenbook Appendix D (Texas Law Review Ass’n ed., 14th ed. 2018). 
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B. Jurisdiction after first extension 

Father’s appeal is limited to his argument that the April 7, 2021 order did not 

extend the trial court’s jurisdiction, However, on October 6, 2021, the trial court 

extended the dismissal date a second time. Section 263.401 only empowered the trial 

to extend the automatic dismissal date for 180 days. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(c). 

Because the trial court extended the dismissal date a second time, we must determine 

whether the trial court retained jurisdiction over this matter between November 8, 

2021, the first extended dismissal date, and November 29, 2021, the date trial began. 

See Nalle v. City of Austin, 85 Tex. 520, 550, 22 S.W. 960, 961 (1893) (“Every court 

must, in the first instance, determine its own jurisdiction”); see also Ex Parte 

Monroe, No. 07-14-00429-CV, 2015 WL 690826, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 

18, 2015, no pet.) (“A court of appeals is required to determine its own jurisdiction 

in each case.”) (citing Ex parte Lewis, 663 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 

1983, orig. proceeding)). 

On September 27, 2021, Father filed a motion to extend the dismissal date 

Father requested the extension to provide his expert witness additional time and 

opportunity to evaluate the notes of the children’s therapists, interview Father, 

observe a visit between Father and children, and formulate an opinion concerning 

conservatorship of the children. Father cited “the current COVID Order” as authority 

to extend the dismissal date and continue the trial setting. The trial court granted 
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Father’s motion by written order on October 6, 2021, and set the new dismissal date 

for December 1, 2021. Trial commenced November 29, 2021. 

When Father filed the extension motion on September 27, 2021, the trial court 

had already granted the sole 180-day extension allowed by statute on April 7, 2021. 

However, the supreme court has issued a series of emergency orders in response to 

the COVID-19 pandemic that “permit[ ] trial courts to suspend the deadlines and 

procedures in Section 263.401.” C.C. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 

No. 03-21-00587-CV, 2022 WL 1121428, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 15, 2022, 

no pet.) (mem. op.); E. N. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-21-

00014-CV, 2021 WL 2460625, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 17, 2021, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (stating emergency orders “would theoretically have allowed the district 

court to extend the case indefinitely by granting an extension under each successive 

order.”). Two of those orders were in effect when the second extension was sought 

and granted here. The Fortieth Emergency Order was in effect when Father filed his 

extension motion, and the Forty-Third Emergency Order was in effect when the trial 

court issued its second extension order on October 6, 2021. Fortieth Emergency 

Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. 2021) 

(effective August 1, 2021); Forty-Third Emergency Order Regarding the COVID19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. 2021) (effective October 1, 2021). The 

Forty-Third Emergency Order provides that in any proceeding under Subtitle E, Title 
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5 of the family code, “the dismissal date may be extended, without a participant’s 

consent, as follows: 

a. for any such proceeding that, on May 26, 2021, had a dismissal date 

that was previously modified under a prior Emergency Order 

Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, the court may extend the 

dismissal date for a stated period ending no later than December 1, 

2021; 

b. for any such proceeding that, on May 26, 2021, had been previously 

retained on the court's docket pursuant only to Section 263.401(b) or 

(b-1), the court may extend the dismissal date for a stated period ending 

no later than February 1, 2022; 

c. for any such proceeding that, on May 26, 2021, had not been 

previously retained on the court's docket pursuant to Section 263.401(b) 

or (b-1), the court may extend the initial dismissal date as calculated 

under Section 263.401(a) for a stated period ending no later than April 

1, 2022; or 

d. for any such proceeding that is filed on or after May 26, 2021, the 

court may extend the initial dismissal date as calculated under Section 

263.401(a) only as provided by Section 263.401(b) or (b-1). 

Forty-Third Emergency Order, 629 S.W.3d at 930; see also Fortieth Emergency 

Order, 629 S.W.3d at 912 (same dates as found in paragraph 5 of Forty-Third 

Emergency Order). Paragraph 5.b of the Forty-Third Emergency Order applied to 

the underlying proceeding because the trial court’s first extension order was signed 

April 7, 2021. Accordingly, on May 26, 2021, the underlying proceeding “had been 

previously retained on the court’s docket pursuant only to Section 263.401(b) or (b1).” Forty-Third Emergency Order, 629 S.W.3d at 930. The Forty-Third Emergency 

Order, therefore, permitted the trial court to extend the dismissal date a second time 

“for a stated period ending no later than February 1, 2022.” Id.; E.g., C.C., 2022 WL 
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1121428, at *4 (concluding trial court retained jurisdiction over the case at the time 

of trial where three extensions of dismissal date were permitted by Covid emergency 

orders in effect at the time of each extension). 

C. Conclusion 

We conclude the trial court’s extension of the court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 

Section 263.401(b) was made timely for the trial court to extend its jurisdiction over 

the proceedings, and any complaint regarding the failure of the trial court to make 

an express finding of extraordinary circumstances was not preserved for appellate 

review. We overrule Father’s sole appellate issue. 

II. Mother’s Appeal 

In a single issue, Mother contends the evidence was legally and factually 

insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that terminating her parental 

rights was in the best interests of the children. 

A. Standard of Review 

Because the fundamental liberty interest of a parent in the care, custody, and 

control of her child is one of constitutional dimensions, involuntary parental 

termination must be strictly scrutinized. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 748 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (first citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–

66, (2000); In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014); and then citing Holick 

v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). In parental termination cases, due process 

requires the petitioner to justify termination by clear and convincing evidence. TEX.
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FAM. CODE § 161.001(b); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012) (citing 

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). 

“Clear and convincing evidence” is that “measure or degree of proof that will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of 

the allegations sought to be established.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 

2019) (per curiam) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007); In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 

465, 475 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). 

On appeal, we apply a standard of review that reflects the elevated burden at 

trial. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014); In re A.T., 406 S.W.3d 365, 370 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied). “As a matter of logic, a finding that must be 

based on clear and convincing evidence cannot be viewed on appeal the same as one 

that may be sustained on a mere preponderance.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 

(Tex. 2018) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)). Under both legal 

and factual sufficiency standards, we (i) consider all the evidence, (ii) defer to the 

factfinder's credibility determinations, and (iii) determine whether the factfinder 

could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination 

were proven. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 748 (first citing In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 

475; and then citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002)). “The 

distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed 

evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–

31. 
 –20– 

In conducting a legal-sufficiency review of an order terminating parental 

rights, the reviewing court cannot ignore undisputed evidence contrary to the finding 

but must otherwise assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of the 

finding. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 748–49. We “consider all the evidence, not just 

that which favors the verdict,” and we assume the fact-finder resolved disputed facts 

in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact-finder could do so. In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 

at 475. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could have 

disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id.

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

termination finding, an appellate court asks whether, in light of the entire record, the 

evidence is such that a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm conviction about the 

truth of the State's allegations against the parent. In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 475; In 

re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). The appellate 

court must also consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable 

fact-finder could not have reconciled the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. 

In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 475. If the disputed evidence is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the 

evidence is factually insufficient. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 749. “And in making 

this determination, the reviewing court must undertake ‘an exacting review of the 

entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’ ” In re 

A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26). 
 –21– 

B. Best interest of the children 

A judicial determination of the “best interest” of a child “is not dependent 

upon, or equivalent to, a finding that the child has been harmed by abuse or neglect 

or is in danger of such harm.” In re M.J.P., No. 05-16-01293-CV, 2017 WL 655955, 

at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rather, “best interest” 

is “a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based 

evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” Id. (quoting In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 

445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding)); see also In re C.R., 263 S.W.3d 368, 375 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“[P]arental rights may not be terminated merely 

because a child might be better off living elsewhere.”). 

The supreme court has identified nine factors that may assist our review of a 

best-interest finding: 

(1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to 

the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the person 

seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the person seeking 

custody in promoting the best interest of the child; (6) plans for the 

child by the person seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or 

proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may 

indicate the parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any 

excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).3

 The Holley factors focus 

on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent, and are not 

3

 Section 263.307(b) lists several best-interest factors the trial court and the Department can consider 

in determining whether a child’s parents are willing and able to provide the child with a safe environment. 
 –22– 

exhaustive. Dupree v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 

86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. 

A best interest finding need not be supported by evidence of every Holley

factor, particularly if there is undisputed evidence that the parental relationship 

endangered the child’s safety. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Undisputed evidence 

of just one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that 

termination is in the child’s best interest. D.M. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective 

Servs., No. 03-17-00137-CV, 2017 WL 2628949, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 13, 

2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant 

to each factor will generally not support such a finding. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. 

Although courts may consider any other factor relevant to the child’s best interest, 

there is “[a] strong presumption ... that a child’s best interests are served by 

preserving the parent-child relationship, where possible.” In re D.D.M., 2019 WL 

2939259, at *5 (quoting Burns v. Burns, 434 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)); In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116 (“there is a strong 

presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a 

parent”). However, although there is a strong presumption that maintaining the 

parent–child relationship serves the child’s best interest, there is also a presumption 

that promptly and permanently placing the child in a safe environment is in the 

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b). Mother does not cite this provision or discuss these other factors in her 

brief. We, therefore, analyze only the Holley factors here. 
 –23– 

child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 153.131(b); 263.307(a); In re D.W., 445 

S.W.3d 913, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). 

C. Application of Law to Facts 

Mother contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support 

the trial court’s best interest finding. Mother does not specifically cite any Holley

factor in her brief. Her arguments and the evidence she cites in support, however, 

implicate factors two, four, five, six, and seven. She also argues generally that no 

reasonable trier of fact could form a firm belief or conviction that termination of her 

parental rights is in the best interest of the children, even considering all the evidence 

in light most favorable to the Department. Because our analysis of the entire record 

is guided by the Holley factors, we will apply each factor to the evidence here. 

1. The desires of the child 

The first Holley factor, the child’s desires, is generally considered neutral 

where, as here, the children did not testify due to their young ages. See In re A.C., 

394 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“The young 

age of the child render[s] consideration of the child’s desires neutral.”). None of the 

children testified here, and there is no evidence of their desires. We, therefore, view 

this Holley factor neutrally. See In re G.A.L., No. 05-19-00844-CV, 2020 WL 

582282, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, the 

children’s second foster mother, K.M., testified that B.H.P. did not enjoy in-person 

visits with either parent and would beg K.M. not to take her to the visit. According 
 –24– 

to K.M., before a parental visit B.H.P. would scream “please don’t take me, please 

keep me safe, I don’t want to go.” This evidence shows a desire of B.H.P. to avoid 

contact with Mother and Father. As to B.H.P., we view this factor slightly in favor 

of termination. See In re A.O., No. 05-21-00789-CV, 2022 WL 620631, at *9 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (if there is no direct evidence of a 

child's desires, a factfinder may infer the child’s desires from the other evidence 

admitted at trial). 

2. The emotional and physical needs of the children now 

and in the future 

The second Holley factor addresses the current and future emotional and 

physical needs of the children. Evidence of this factor generally demonstrates what 

the child’s emotional and physical needs are, specifically any special needs, and 

whether the parent seeking custody was willing and able to meet those needs. See In 

re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Tex. 2012). Here, the evidence established the 

children suffered severe emotional trauma and physical abuse by their parents that 

continued to have adverse effects on their mental health and would require the 

children to continue therapy in the future. 

C.J.P.’s outcries included allegations Father choked him until he passed out 

and punished him by forcing C.J.P. to run laps at the school track and perform 

excessive exercises. At the time of trial, C.J.P. was in a residential treatment center 

receiving intensive therapy and a specialized level of care. This was due to C.J.P.’s 

violent outbursts and incidents where he acted out sexually. For example, in the first 
 –25– 

foster home placement, the family reported C.J.P. was “performing oral sex on a 

foster sibling” so he was removed from that home. He was then placed in a 

residential treatment center. Conservatorship Caseworker Travis Gump testified that 

C.J.P. “has a fairly high level of need” because he is in a residential treatment center 

receiving intensive therapy. C.J.P. has anger issues, violent acting out, and sexual 

acting out. He also acts out violently against staff members at the treatment center. 

At the time of trial, C.J.P. was making some progress in treatment, but would need 

to continue in residential treatment for the foreseeable future. The girls, O.R.P. and 

B.H.P., were also experiencing behavioral and emotional issues while in foster care 

and were undergoing therapy and counseling. Both girls made outcries of sexual 

abuse by Father and Mother. The evidence also shows B.H.P. has hydrocephalus. 

Mother insists she has “the ability to house and educate” the children. Other 

than being willing to continue the children’s therapy, however, Mother does not 

explain how and why she is in a position financially and emotionally to meet the 

emotional and physical needs of the children. Under a legal-sufficiency review, we 

must presume the trial court disbelieved Mother’ s testimony that she could meet her 

children’s emotional and physical needs. See In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d at 87. 

Accordingly, under a legal-sufficiency review, this factor weighs in favor of 

termination. 

Under a factual-sufficiency review, we must consider all of the evidence. In 

re N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 475. Mother insists she has the means and willingness to meet 
 –26– 

the children’s physical needs because she has a job making $800 a month and an 

apartment set up with space for all of the children, furniture, food, and clothing. 

Mother also plans to put the children in school and get them the therapy they need. 

Mother’s best friend, Michelle McAtee, told the trial court she believes Mother’s 

apartment and income are sufficient for the three children to live with Mother. There 

is no evidence, however, of how Mother planned to meet C.J.P.’s high level of needs 

during and after his discharge from residential treatment. Similarly, the evidence 

shows B.H.P. has hydrocephalus. The record is silent as to what special needs she 

has because of that medical condition. Prior to removal, Kristy Breukelman, a 

Family Based Safety Services (FBSS) caseworker assigned to this case observed the 

home was consistently “cluttered and dirty” and “smelled like urine,” and the 

children appeared dirty. The record does not show whether Mother had corrected 

those issues before trial. 

As to the children’s emotional needs, the record shows Mother failed in the 

past to meet those needs. Mother expressed disbelief that C.J.P. was suicidal during 

the investigation and at trial and dismissed O.R.P.’s outcries as fabrications made by 

a child seeking attention. Caseworker Breukelman concluded Mother did not believe 

C.J.P. was suicidal and observed Mother did not appear to be protective of C.J.P. 

and did not believe the concerns about him. Mother was not receptive to receiving 

services for herself or the children and did not cooperate with FBSS until order by 

the court to cooperate. She did not think services were necessary because they had 
 –27– 

contact with CPS in the past and had completed counseling services then. The trial 

court could reasonably conclude from Mother’s own testimony that she does not 

believe the children were suffering emotional trauma requiring continued therapy. 

Caseworker Gump testified Mother failed to protect the children from sexual 

and physical abuse “because she took no action to stop it or prevent it from occurring 

again.” CASA Caseworker Larry Dolan agreed with Gump’s assessment. According 

to Dolan, Mother admitted to him that domestic violence occurred in the home and 

she failed to protect the children from it. Mother also admitted she did not protect 

C.J.P. or intervene when Father picked C.J.P. up by the throat and choked him. The 

record also shows Mother did not timely report an incident in which she witnessed 

O.R.P. touching Father’s penis. The judge could infer from Mother’s past conduct 

endangering the children’s welfare that similar conduct would recur if the children 

were returned to her care. In re D.W., 445 S.W.3d 913, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2014, pet. denied) (first citing In re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d at 467–68; and then citing 

In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (op. on 

reh’g)). Considering the entire record, we conclude the second Holley factor 

supports termination here and is supported by factually sufficient evidence. 

3. The emotional and physical danger to the children now 

and in the future 

The third Holley factor addresses the emotional and physical danger of the 

child now and in the future. Evidence of past misconduct or neglect can be used to 

measure a parent’s future conduct. In re A.M., 385 S.W.3d 74, 82 (Tex. App.—Waco 
 –28– 

2012, pet. denied). We conclude evidence of Mother’s neglect, physical abuse, and 

failure to intervene to stop Father’s abuse of the children supports the trial court’s 

best interest finding. See, e.g., id., 385 S.W.3d at 82–83 (evidence of mother’s 

history of neglecting and endangering children by exposing them to domestic 

violence supported trial court’s finding that termination was in children’s best 

interest). 

The record shows Mother had three children from a previous relationship who 

were subject to Department referrals and ultimately removed from Mother’s 

custody. The oldest child in that group, O.C., came to the Department’s attention in 

2008 when O.C.’s father was accused of sexually abusing her. O.C.’s father 

confessed to the sexual abuse, was indicted, and his parental rights were terminated. 

Mother’s reaction to the sexual abuse allegations, even in the face of the father’s 

confession, was disbelief. Mother maintained her parental rights to O.C. but did not 

keep custody of her. The parents caring for O.C. became her possessory managing 

conservators. In 2009, another child in that family group, Z.C., received head injuries 

including subdural hematomas. It was alleged Mother and her boyfriend, Marcello 

Romero, caused the injuries. Z.C. was removed and placed with the family caring 

for O.C. Mother had a third child, N.R., with Romero. N.R. was removed and placed 

in foster care shortly after he was born. In June 2009, N.R. was given back to Mother 

on a monitored return. She was living with Father at that time. On August 25, 2009, 
 –29– 

there was a domestic violence incident between Mother and Father. N.R. was 

removed and eventually placed with O.C. and Z.C. 

Caseworker Gump testified he sees “a pattern of behavior” by Mother that 

began with the first family group (O.C., Z.C., and N.R.) and continued with C.J.P., 

O.R.P., and B.H.P. This pattern included domestic violence in the home, sexual 

abuse of a child, and Mother’s refusal to accept the sexual abuse occurred. According 

to Gump, he “saw a significant parallel between the first sibling group and the 

second” concerning the impact of Mother completing services. Specifically, Gump 

noted that Mother “completed services in the first case designed to address the risk 

factors in the family” but was still involved in domestic violence with the Father and 

her sister, Austina Mock, in this case. Gump explained that despite receiving 

services in both cases, he saw Mother engage in the same or similar behaviors 

following those services. Indeed, the current case arose when C.J.P. told a teacher 

he wanted to choke himself until he died. Although C.J.P. was in a residential 

treatment facility at the time of the final hearing, Mother was still not convinced 

C.J.P. was serious about those statements. Mother expressed the same disbelief 

during the investigation underlying this case. 

Domestic violence is a continuing theme in Mother’s life. In April 2020, 

Caseworker Breukelman visited the home following an instance of domestic 

violence between Mother and Father. The altercation occurred when Mother thought 

Father was having sex with Mock. Mother became upset, got into a physical 
 –30– 

altercation with Father, and “tried to rip his penis off.” Then, on May 4, 2020, 

Mother assaulted Mock in the home. That altercation resulted in Mother’s arrest, 

charge, and conviction for assault causing bodily injury. The record also shows 

Father was charged with aggravated assault against Mother before the children were 

born and felony assault against Mother after C.J.P. and O.R.P. were born. 

The record also includes allegations of sexual abuse of the children, and 

Mother’s failure to stop the abuse. Rona Amora is a licensed professional counselor 

who was treating O.R.P. and N.H.P. at the time of trial. O.R.P. told Amora and the 

girls’ second foster mother, K.M., that Mother and Father allowed her to watch them 

have sex. When K.M. asked O.R.P. “did you sneak to watch it,” O.R.P. responded 

“no, I had permission.” O.R.P. was five years old when she reported this. K.M. told 

the court about an incident in April 2021 when O.R.P. saw a couple on TV and said 

they “were about to have sex.” O.R.P. then explained “in great detail sexual acts” 

and the descriptions were “very graphic and very, very detailed.” According to K.M., 

O.R.P. accurately described what happens during sexual intercourse, including that 

a male penis begins “growing in size” and then moves in an out of the woman’s 

vagina before withdrawing and ejaculating. K.M. concluded O.R.P. gained that 

knowledge from watching Mother and Father have sex. Based on O.R.P.’s 

statements, K.M. believes Mother was present and participating in the sexual act and 

did not stop the children from watching. 
 –31– 

O.R.P. also told K.M. and Amora that Mother regularly allowed teenage boys 

to come to the house and engage in oral sex on O.R.P. Amora testified that O.R.P. 

reported the teenage boys came to the house and Mother allowed the boys to take 

off O.R.P.’s clothes and touch her inappropriately. O.R.P. told Amora that her 

mother “let them do it” and “didn’t care.” 

Amora described Mother and Father as “sexual abusers.” She testified that 

both girls reported that Father and Mother were the people having sex in front of 

them and allowing them to watch. Amora concluded Mother sexually abused the 

children by giving the children permission to watch her and Father have sex and by 

allowing teenage boys to inappropriately touch and sexually abuse O.R.P. 

Amora further explained she concluded Mother was a sexual abuser who 

abused the girls because the girls identified both Mother and Father as their abusers. 

Amora believed O.R.P.’s outcry in part because O.R.P. had “language and 

knowledge about sexual relations that children her age shouldn’t have.” Further, 

O.R.P. and B.H.P. engaged in sexual behaviors after removal inappropriate for their 

ages. 

Mother denied O.R.P.’s allegations regarding the teenage boys and allowing 

the children to watch her have sex with Father. However, Mother admitted she 

witnessed but did not report an incident in which she saw O.R.P. holding Father’s 

penis. Gump testified Mother told him that she had walked into the kitchen of her 

apartment and saw O.R.P. standing in the kitchen with Father’s penis in her hand in 
 –32– 

2018 or 2019. At trial, Mother described the incident differently. She testified she 

walked into the bedroom and saw Father and O.R.P. on the bed, and O.R.P. was 

“playing with his genitals.” Mother presented conflicting testimony concerning 

whether she reported the incident. She admitted, however, that she did not report the 

incident before the children were removed in 2020. 

In relation to the case with the first family group, the Department concluded 

any child in Mother’s care “would be in grave danger.” Caseworker Gump agrees 

with that assessment and believes that is still the case now. He further explained the 

Department’s concerns about the children’s safety stem from Mother’s engagement 

in this same behavior before. Mother completed services “designed to address this 

behavior” but those services “didn’t have any affect.” Gump, Amora, and the 

Guardian Ad Litem believe termination is in the children’s best interest. 

The trial court could have reasonably concluded that considering Mother’s 

past relationships, her demonstrated inability to protect her children from the 

emotional and physical dangers of domestic violence and sexual activity in the 

home, and her minimization of her children’s allegations, the children had and would 

continue to be subject to emotional and physical danger. We conclude the evidence 

is legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that the third Holley factor 

favors termination. 
 –33– 

4. The parental abilities of the person seeking custody 

In reviewing the parental abilities of a parent, a factfinder can consider the 

parent’s past neglect or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs of 

their children. I.D.G., 579 S.W.3d at 854. A factfinder “may infer from a parent's 

past inability to meet a child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or 

unwillingness to meet a child’s needs in the future.” J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. 

“Evidence of a recent improvement does not absolve a parent of a history of 

irresponsible choices.” In re A.M., 385 S.W.3d at 83. Mother maintains she has 

“exhibited the proper parenting skills that would serve the children’s best interests” 

and believes “she is ready to properly take care of her children” because she has 

completed and learned from the services provided by the Department. The 

Department, in contrast, argues Mother’s inability to provide for the physical and 

emotional needs of the children now and in the future “calls into question” Mother’s 

parental abilities. We agree with the Department. 

As discussed in detail above, the record shows Mother’s inability to meet the 

children’s physical and emotional needs. The evidence also shows Mother’s inability 

to protect the children from abuse. We conclude the evidence is legally and factually 

sufficient to support a finding that this factor weighs in favor of termination. 

5. The programs available to assist the person seeking 

custody in promoting the best interest of the child 

Mother testified she completed her court-ordered services and sought other 

therapies and classes so she could address any possible issues going forward. This 
 –34– 

included attending parenting classes at the Genesis Program, which is geared to 

helping parents navigate parenting with children who have been traumatized. 

Mother, however, refused to participate in services until ordered by the trial court to 

do so. Further, Caseworker Gump and the Department have concerns that 

completing services are not a marker of success for Mother because she completed 

services in the past and then reverted to old behaviors. Those behaviors included 

ongoing domestic violence in Mother’s relationships and her disbelief of her 

children’s outcries. Under these circumstances, we conclude the availability of 

services does not favor reunification here. 

6. Plans for the child by the person seeking custody 

7. The stability of the home or proposed placement 

We consider the sixth Holley factor, the plans for the children, and seventh 

Holley factor, the stability of the home or proposed placement, together. The 

factfinder may compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child and 

consider “whether the plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and 

ill-defined.” J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119-20. A parent’s failure to show that he or she is 

stable enough to parent children for any prolonged period entitles the factfinder “to 

determine that this pattern would likely continue, and that permanency could only 

be achieved through termination and adoption.” In re B.S.W., No. 14-04-00496-CV, 

2004 WL 2964015, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 23, 2004, no pet.) 

(mem. op.). A factfinder may also consider the consequences of its failure to 
 –35– 

terminate parental rights and that the best interest of the children may be served by 

termination so that adoption may occur rather than the temporary foster-care 

arrangement that would result if termination did not occur. In re B.H.R., 535 S.W.3d 

114, 124 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.). 

Mother told the trial court she has a plan for the children that includes taking 

them to school, providing them food, shelter, and clothing, and getting the children 

any therapy they may need. At the time of termination, Mother was employed 

cleaning houses and providing meals for her friends and earned approximately 

$800.00 per month. She also had an apartment set up for her and the children. The 

Department’s permanency plan is termination of the parental rights and adoption of 

the children. Gump, Amora, and the Guardian Ad Litem agreed the Department’s 

plan for termination and adoption was in the children’s best interests. We agree. 

There was legally and factually sufficient evidence for the trial court to 

determine that the Department’s plan to keep O.R.P. and C.H.P. in the care of their 

current foster parents for adoption would provide them with a permanent stable 

home they would not find with Mother. See, e.g., J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d at 389. 

“[P]ermanence is of paramount importance in considering a child’s present and 

future needs.” Dupree v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 907 

S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.). The Department’s plan provides 

permanence to these children. O.R.P. and B.H.P. have been in the care of their 

current foster parents since August 2021. Those parents want to adopt the girls and 
 –36– 

“are open to adopting” C.J.P. if the behaviors he is being treated for can be brought 

under control. We conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient for 

the trial court to form a firm conviction or belief that the Department's permanency 

plan was in the children's best interest. See In re A.O., 2022 WL 620631, at *11; see 

also In re D.V., 480 S.W.3d 591, 603 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). 

8. The acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate 

the parent-child relationship is not a proper one 

9. Any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent 

Finally, we consider the eighth and ninth Holley factors together. These 

factors consider acts or omissions of the parent that indicate the parent-child 

relationship is improper, as well as any excuses for the behavior. Mother and Father 

admitted they were in a physically abusive relationship before and after the 

children’s removal. The evidence also showed Mother sexually abused the children 

and failed to intervene when Father physically and sexually abused the children. 

Mother’s own testimony indicated a refusal to believe C.J.P. was suicidal. She also 

accused O.R.P. of making up her allegations of sexual abuse. Mother also blamed 

Father and Mock for causing the altercation that precipitated the children’s removal 

even though Mother was the only person arrested and charged. 

Given the extent of Mother’s acts or omissions and her failure to recognize 

her conduct was detrimental to the children, we conclude these two factors weigh in 

favor of termination of parental rights. See In re D.W., 445 S.W.3d 913, 932 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied); see also In re V.V., 349 S.W.3d 548, 556 (Tex. 
 –37– 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“Texas courts routinely consider 

evidence of parent-on-parent physical abuse in termination cases without 

specifically requiring evidence that the conduct resulted in a criminal conviction.”); 

In re A.M., 385 S.W.3d 74, 82–83 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied) (evidence 

of mother's history of neglecting and endangering children by exposing them to 

domestic violence supports finding termination was in each child's best interest). 

D. Summary of factors and conclusion 

Based on the record evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

ruling and as a whole, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed 

a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the 

children’s best interest and therefore hold the evidence is both legally and factually 

sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest findings as to both parents under 

section 161.001(b)(2). We overrule Mother’s sole appellate issue. 

CONCLUSION 

The trial court retained jurisdiction over the case and parties when it rendered 

the termination order therefore the order is not void. Further, we conclude the 

evidence supports the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights is in the children’s best interest. 

 
 –38– 

 Accordingly, we overrule Father and Mother’s appellate issues and affirm the 

trial court’s termination of Father and Mother’s parental rights to C.J.P., O.R.P., and 

B.H.P. 

220233F.P05 

 

/Robbie Partida-Kipness/

ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS 

JUSTICE 
 –39– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

IN THE INTEREST OF C.J.P., 

O.R.P., B.H.P., CHILDREN, 

No. 05-22-00233-CV V. 

 On Appeal from the 305th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. JC-19-01286-

X. 

Opinion delivered by Justice PartidaKipness. Justices Reichek and 

Goldstein participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee recover its costs of this appeal from 

appellants jointly and severally. 

Judgment entered this 14th day of October 2022.