lARKWHITE ittorneyGeneral 

# The Attorney General of Texas July 27, 1979

Honorable W.B.Anderson Lamar County Auditor Lamar CountyCourthouse Paris, Texas Opinion No.MW-34 Re: Authority of a county to pay a former county judge for services rendered in acquiring right-of-way for the ‘county. Dear Mr. Anderson: You have requested our opinion regarding the authority of a county to pay a former county judge for services rendered in acquiring right-of-ways for the county. The county attorney has issued an opinion in thii matter with which you disagree. Wehave asked that you provide uswith the dates of the various transactions, and our opinion is based 

### onthe narrative you have provided. You state that, on December 28, 1978, prior to the expiration of his term, the county~judge ofLamar. County made an informal agreement with each other member of the commissioners court. Under the terms of the contract, the county judge would act as the agent for the county in squiring parcels of land for a highway project. OnJanuary 8,1979, after the county judge had left office, the commissioners court officially considered the matter, butleft it unresolved. OnJanuary 22,1979, the commissioners court assigned all further duties in regard to obtaining rxht-of-way to the county attorney’s office. Subsequently, the former county judge submitted his claim for $l,SllO.OOfor services rendered from January l-26. On April 9, 1979,the commissioners court, on the basis of the December 28 contract, authorized apayment of $800.00 to the former judge. You ask anumber of questions regarding the validity of these actions. Article 2340, V.T.C.S., requires that, upon entering the duties of office, acounty judge and each member ofthe commissioners court

take a written oath that he will not be directly or indirectly interested in any contract with, q claim against, the county in whichheresides.

... It haslong been firmly established in this state that a contract between a public official and the public body of which he is a member is contrary to

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public policy and therefore void, if the official has any personal pecuniary interest in the contract. Bexar County v. Wentworth, 378 S.W.2d 126(Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1964, writ refed n.r.e.); Starr County v. Guerra, 297 S.W.%d379 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1956,no writ); Meyers v. Walker, 276S.W.305(Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1925, no writ). This office has said that the purpose ofarticle 2340 is“to eliminate any conflicts of interest between the county and those who manage its fiscal affairs.” Attorney General Opinion No. II*24 (19751. See Attorney General Opinions M-R40 (1972);WW-1406 (1962). Even compelling circumstances are not sufficient to render sucha contract lawful. Attorney General Opinions H-734, H-695 (1975). Since, under the circumstances you have described, the contract was entered into while the individual still occupied the office of county judge, we must conclude that it wasvoid ab.initio. Such a contract may not be subsequently ratified, Limestone County v. Knox, 234 S.W. 131(Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1921,no writ), and thus,’the $800.00 payment by the commissioners court on April 9,1979, on the basis of that contract, wasinvalid. SUMMARY Under thecircumstances described, a commissioners court may not authorize payment to a former county judge for services rendered under a contract with the county entered into while the judge still occupied his office.

MARK WHITE Attorney General of Texas JOHN W.FAINTER, JR. First Assistant Attorney General TEDL.HARTLEY Executive Assistant Attorney General Prepared byRick Gilpin Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE C. Robert Heath, Chairman David B.Brocks Walter Davis Susan Garrison Rick Gilpin William GReid Bruce Youngblood

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