In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-2194

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RONALD E. WAYLAND,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 07 CR 40039—J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 16, 2008—DECIDED DECEMBER 3, 2008

Before RIPPLE, EVANS and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A jury found Ronald E. Wayland

guilty of making false statements relating to health care

matters, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1035(a)(2), 24(b). At

sentencing, the district court concluded that Mr.

Wayland used “sophisticated means” to perpetrate the

fraud and, accordingly, applied a two-level upward

adjustment to his offense level, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9).

The district court sentenced Mr. Wayland to 41 months’

imprisonment; Mr. Wayland filed a timely notice of
2 No. 08-2194

appeal. Because the district court did not clearly err in

determining that Mr. Wayland used sophisticated means

to commit this fraud, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services (“the

Department”) oversees a program through which Illinois

residents with disabilities can use Medicaid funds to pay

for the services of in-home personal assistants and

thereby avoid transfer to nursing homes. Dorothy

Wayland, a program participant, was essentially incapacitated. Consequently, her son Ronald Wayland, acted on

her behalf under a power of attorney. In that role,

Ronald Wayland defrauded the Department of more

than $108,000 by claiming that a man named Cyril

Sturm was serving as his mother’s personal assistant.

Sturm, in fact, had died in 1983, but Mr. Wayland

persuaded the Department that Sturm was caring for

Dorothy Wayland. Mr. Wayland somehow obtained

Sturm’s social security number and submitted it, along

with identification cards that he created by using a relative’s photograph, to the Department. Mr. Wayland also

registered a post office box in both his name and Sturm’s,

to which the Department sent correspondence

addressed to Sturm. Mr. Wayland also opened a joint

checking account into which he, and later the Department,
No. 08-2194 3

deposited checks payable to Sturm. The bank let Mr.

Wayland establish the account because he represented

that Sturm was homebound. Because the Department

would pay Sturm to assist Dorothy Wayland only during

those hours in which Mr. Wayland could not be at home,

Mr. Wayland also submitted fraudulent documents

showing that he was employed at local hospitals. Additionally, Mr. Wayland filed tax returns for Sturm because,

the Government asserts, Mr. Wayland knew that the

Department was withholding taxes on Sturm’s behalf,

and he did not want the scheme to attract the IRS’ attention.

After nine years, the scheme began to unravel. The

Department sent letters to Sturm and to Mr. Wayland

requesting a meeting with Sturm; he never showed up.

The Department pressed Mr. Wayland to document

Sturm’s existence and employment. In three written

responses, Mr. Wayland insisted that Sturm existed and

diligently was looking after Dorothy Wayland and that

all of the identification submitted to the Department was

genuine. These letters formed the basis of his indictment

on three counts of making false statements regarding

health care matters. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1035(a)(2), 24(b). A jury

found Mr. Wayland guilty on each count.

B. Sentencing

The probation officer recommended a two-level upward

adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) for Mr.

Wayland’s use of sophisticated means to perpetrate the

fraud. Mr. Wayland disputed that his conduct met this
4 No. 08-2194

standard, but the district court stated: “If this wasn’t a

sophisticated means of perpetrating a fraud, I don’t know

what is.” R.95 at 71. Mr. Wayland’s total offense level of

20 and criminal history category of I yielded an

advisory guidelines range of 31 to 41 months’ imprisonment. After considering the sentencing factors set forth

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court imposed three concurrent prison terms of 41 months.

II

DISCUSSION

We review for clear error a district court’s finding

that the defendant employed sophisticated means.

United States v. Robinson, 538 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2008).

The sentencing guidelines call for a two-level upward

adjustment if an individual has perpetrated a fraud

through sophisticated means. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(9)(C).

Application note 8 to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 states:

“ ‘[S]ophisticated means’ means especially complex or

especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the

execution or concealment of an offense.” The note goes

on to provide several examples of such conduct, including the use of fictitious entities or corporate shells;

but this list is not exhaustive and merely suggests the

wide variety of criminal behavior covered by the guideline. United States v. Allan, 513 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2008).

Mr. Wayland contends that fraudulently registering

both a post office box and checking account, as well as

filing false tax returns, are not complex or intricate actions,
No. 08-2194 5

and therefore, are not sophisticated. He relies on two

cases from other circuits holding that sophisticated conduct did not extend to fraudulently registering a post

office box, United States v. Hance, 501 F.3d 900, 911 (8th

Cir. 2007), or to filing false tax returns, United States v.

Lewis, 93 F.3d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir. 1996).

Offense conduct is sophisticated if it displays “a greater

level of planning or concealment” than a typical fraud of

that kind. See Robinson, 538 F.3d at 607-08 (finding defendant’s use of false contact information for check counterfeiting made the scheme sophisticated); United States v.

Fife, 471 F.3d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that

the defendants’ use of detailed planning and more concealment than typical made the tax fraud sophisticated);

Hance, 501 F.3d at 909 (“[T]he government must show that

Hance’s mail fraud, when viewed as a whole, was

notably more intricate than that of the garden-variety

mail fraud scheme.”). We must decide whether

Mr. Wayland’s crime involved a greater level of planning

or concealment than the typical health care fraud case.

Mr. Wayland’s conduct was far more intricate than that

in a typical health care fraud scheme. According to an

agent who investigated the case, a typical fraud of this

kind involves inflated claims of hours actually worked

by a personal assistant. Here, the personal assistant did

not exist. Mr. Wayland submitted false documents so the

Department would believe that Dorothy Wayland had

a personal assistant. He also fraudulently registered a

joint bank account and post office box to facilitate the

Government’s payments and filed fraudulent tax re-
6 No. 08-2194

turns so that the IRS would not alert the Department.

This scheme required a greater level of planning or concealment than the typical health care fraud case. It certainly was not clear error for the district court to find

that Mr. Wayland’s conduct was sophisticated.

Mr. Wayland also submits that, because he erred in

the design and execution of his fraud, it could not have

been sophisticated. He suggests that his admission that

he shared an account with Sturm was foolish and

that his forgeries must have been amateurish because

investigators quickly were able to uncover the fraud.

However, a sophisticated scheme need not exhibit intelligence or expertise. See Fife, 471 F.3d at 754. It does not

matter that Mr. Wayland might have done a better job

perpetrating and concealing the fraud. See United States

v. Madoch, 108 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that,

even though “more elaborate mechanisms” of concealing

fraud were possible, the defendant nevertheless used

sophisticated means to perpetrate fraud). Nor does it

matter that Mr. Wayland’s own sloppiness or errors of

judgment may have contributed to the unraveling of his

scheme. See United States v. Rettenberger, 344 F.3d 702, 709

(7th Cir. 2003). Mr. Wayland’s scheme displayed a

greater level of planning and concealment than the

typical health care fraud and its failings do not suggest

that the district court clearly erred.

Even if Mr. Wayland’s individual actions could be

characterized as unsophisticated, we would follow the

approach of our sister circuits and affirm Mr. Wayland’s

sentence on the ground that his overall scheme, which
No. 08-2194 7

lasted nine years and involved a series of coordinated

fraudulent transactions, was complex and sophisticated.

See United States v. Jackson, 346 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2003)

(holding that even if each step in the appellant’s

scheme was not elaborate, an enhancement for employing “sophisticated means” was nevertheless appropriate where “the total scheme was sophisticated in

the way all the steps were linked together”); United States

v. Halloran, 415 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that

an enhancement was appropriate where certain aspects

of the appellant’s scheme were not elaborate, but the total

scheme was sophisticated); see also Rettenberger, 344 F.3d

at 709 (affirming a finding of sophisticated means where

the appellant engaged in “[c]areful execution and coordination over an extended period. . . .”).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

AFFIRMED

12-3-08