J-S22032-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JOHN J. LYNCH 

Appellant

v.

BENJAMIN COOPER, ESQ. ALLAN J. 

SAGOT, ESQ. ALLAN J. SAGOT 

ASSOCIATES

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2200 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered September 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 190100419

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 18, 2023

The Majority holds that, because this timely appeal was taken from an 

interlocutory order, we must quash this appeal. Majority Memorandum at 9. 

I respectfully disagree that quashal is mandatory, and, therefore, I 

respectfully dissent. 

I begin by noting that the trial court purported to dismiss the case in its 

entirety, not merely the claims against the lone defendant who filed a praecipe 

to enter a judgment of non pros, and that the docket entry for the appealedfrom order designates it as an order entering a final disposition. As such, the 

argument could be made that the order from which Mr. Lynch appealed is 

indeed a final order that erroneously disposed of claims not before the court. 

However, in Bloome v. Alan, 154 A.3d 1271, 1274 (Pa.Super. 2017), upon 
J-S22032-22

- 2 -

which the Majority relies in its disposition, this Court held in the same 

circumstances that the order did not effectively terminate the action against 

unserved defendants despite its stated intent to dismiss the complaint in toto. 

Therefore, I proceed with the understanding that, despite all indications to the 

contrary, Mr. Lynch’s claims against Attorney Sagot and Sagot Associates 

were not dismissed by the trial court’s September 29, 2021 order. 

Nonetheless, while Bloome may control the determination of the finality of 

the order before us, neither it nor the appellate rules mandates that this 

appeal be quashed. 

The Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly state that they “shall be 

liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 

of every matter to which they are applicable.” Pa.R.A.P. 105(a). “In the 

interest of expediting decision,” with exceptions not pertinent here, this Court 

may “disregard the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a 

particular case on application of a party or on its own motion and may order 

proceedings in accordance with its direction.” Id. 

Along these lines, our Rules provide that “that jurisdiction in appellate 

courts may be perfected after an appeal notice has been filed[.]” U.S. Bank, 

N.A. for Certificateholders of LXS 2007-7N Tr. Fund v. Hua, 193 A.3d 

994, 998 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). For example, Rule 902 explains that 

the “[f]ailure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a 

notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 902. 
J-S22032-22

- 3 -

Instead, the failure “is subject to such action as the appellate court deems 

appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, remand of the matter to 

the lower court so that the omitted procedural step may be taken.” Id. Rule 

905, in turn, provides that “[a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement 

of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated 

as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.” Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5).

Accordingly, it is well-settled that, to further the interests of judicial 

economy, quashal of an interlocutory appeal need not necessarily result if the 

correction of a procedural misstep could perfect our jurisdiction. Pursuant to 

case law, we may exercise the option “to regard as done that which ought to 

have been done” when it is clear from the record that the appealed-from order 

was intended “to be a final pronouncement on the matters.” Franciscus v. 

Sevdik, 135 A.3d 1092, 1094 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up). In other 

instances, we have ordered what ought to have been done to actually be done 

within a limited timeframe to avoid quashal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Young, 280 A.3d 1049, 1057 (Pa.Super. 2022) (remanding for the appellant 

to file separate notice of appeal within ten days and stating failure to do so 

will result in quashal); Heasley v. Carter Lumber, 843 A.2d 1274, 1275 n.1 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (deciding merits of appeal filed from interlocutory order after 
J-S22032-22

- 4 -

the appellants complied with this Court’s direction to file a praecipe for the 

entry of judgment).1 

In my view, since this appeal has been fully briefed and assigned to a 

merits panel for disposition, automatic quashal is not in keeping with “the just, 

speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this matter. Pa.R.A.P. 105(a). 

Rather, I would enter an order giving Appellant an opportunity, if he chooses 

to forgo his claims against those defendants, to file a praecipe to dismiss his 

claims against Attorney Sagot and Sagot Associates before quashing this 

appeal and making the parties start the process anew. 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 

____________________________________________

1 See also Zaminsky v. Dodge, 2107 EDA 2014 (Pa.Super. March 23, 2015) 

(per curiam order granting the appellants ten days to dismiss outstanding 

claims within ten days or face quashal); Reinoso v. Kohl’s Department 

Stores, Inc., 3174 EDA 2012 (Pa.Super. July 1, 2014) (per curiam order 

directing the trial court to enter an order concluding the litigation as to all 

parties or to inform this Court whether any claims remained undecided).