2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-6-2014

Joseph Santos v. Jin Byunchak

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket 13-3700

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"Joseph Santos v. Jin Byunchak" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 10.

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BLD-138 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-3700

___________

JOSEPH A. SANTOS,

Appellant

v.

DOCTOR JIN BYUNCHAK; DOCTOR MINHI

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-00961)

District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 19, 2013

Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 6, 2014)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Joseph A. Santos appeals from the District Court’s sua sponte 

dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. Because his appeal does not present a 

substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
2

On April 1, 2013, while working in SCI Greene’s kitchen, Santos was pushing a 

food cart when it slid and hit the wall, causing his finger to be smashed. He was 

immediately seen by the defendants, who wrapped his finger and gave him ibuprofen. 

They prescribed Santos a 24-day supply of ibuprofen, and instructed him to take 600 

milligrams once a day. Santos filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 

that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by providing inadequate 

medical care. According to him, the defendants should have given him a larger quantity 

and higher dosage of ibuprofen because of his pain. The Magistrate Judge recommended 

that his complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The District Court agreed and 

sua sponte dismissed Santos’ complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1). This appeal followed.1

We agree with the District Court that the allegations contained in Santos’ 

complaint do not plausibly state a claim that the defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference to Santos’ medical needs by “recklessly disregard[ing] a substantial risk of 

serious harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in 

original); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Santos admits that the

defendants promptly responded by wrapping his finger and providing him with ibuprofen 

 

1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District 

Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Santos’ complaint is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 

229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive dismissal, a plaintiff’s complaint must 

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
3

for the pain and swelling. Furthermore, the exhibits attached to his complaint show that 

when his initial prescription for ibuprofen ended, it was refilled for 30 additional days. 

Additionally, Santos was prescribed aspirin to be taken every day on an ongoing basis. 

While Santos may not have received the exact treatment he wanted, the record lacks any 

indication of deliberate indifference. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d 

Cir. 1998) (Eighth Amendment does not guarantee an inmate’s medical treatment of his 

choice). Rather, as noted by the District Court, Santos’ claim constitutes a disagreement 

with the type of care he was provided, see Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. 

Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987), and does not rise to the level of inadequate 

medical care.

In sum, the District Court properly dismissed Santos’ complaint for failure to state 

a valid Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care. Under the circumstances 

presented, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Santos’ complaint 

without offering leave to amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 

110-11 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm 

the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.