2024 IL App (1st) 230171

FIFTH DIVISION

June 28, 2024 

No. 1-23-0171 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LOUIS HAMPTON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 22 CR 3 

Honorable 

Peggy Chiampas, 

Judge presiding. 

JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

Justice Navarro dissented, with opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant Louis Hampton was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) (720 

ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)) and sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, he argues he was 

denied a fair trial because the trial court refused to instruct the jury that, to find him guilty, it had 

to find that he “knowingly” possessed a firearm. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand 

for a new trial.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State charged Mr. Hampton by indictment with AHC and other related offenses. The 

AHC count alleged that he “knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm” after being convicted 

of certain other felonies. Before jury selection, the trial court read that language to the prospective 

jurors.

¶ 4 During opening statements, defense counsel asserted that Mr. Hampton was not guilty of 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 2 - 

AHC because, although police officers discovered a firearm underneath the seat in a vehicle he 

was driving, the State could not prove that he knew the firearm was there. 

¶ 5 Chicago police officer Michael Carreon testified that, around 7 p.m. on November 16, 

2021, he and three other officers drove past a Jeep with an inoperable headlight. Officer Carreon 

made a U-turn, caught up to the Jeep, and activated his police vehicle’s lights, siren, and spotlight. 

The Jeep turned left onto another street, and the spotlight illuminated the driver’s side of the Jeep. 

Officer Carreon testified that he observed the Jeep’s driver “make a forward movement” while

“leaning towards the floorboard of the vehicle.” The Jeep traveled about a quarter of a block more 

and pulled over. 

¶ 6 Officer Carreon approached the Jeep and encountered Mr. Hampton, whom he identified 

in court, in the driver’s seat. Officer Carreon testified that he smelled fresh cannabis through the 

open driver’s side window. Mr. Hampton gave Officer Carreon identification that was not a 

driver’s license and insurance documentation for the Jeep that did not specifically list him as an 

insured driver. According to Officer Carreon, Mr. Hampton did not make eye contact and appeared 

nervous. Officer Carreon asked Mr. Hampton to put the vehicle in park, which he did. He then

asked Mr. Hampton to exit the Jeep, but Mr. Hampton refused. Officer Carreon asked Mr. 

Hampton to exit several more times over the course of about five minutes. At that point, the car’s 

passenger, whom the officer had also been asking to leave the car, exited, and as that person did 

so, all the Jeep’s doors unlocked. Officer Carreon opened the driver’s door and again asked Mr. 

Hampton to exit the vehicle. Mr. Hampton complied and was placed in handcuffs. 

¶ 7 Officer Carreon then looked into the driver’s side of the car and found a loaded, black, 

semiautomatic pistol “protruding” from underneath the seat. He “had to do a slight lean” to see the 

firearm, which “wasn’t deep underneath the seat,” but the firearm was not buried under anything. 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 3 - 

As the officers attempted to place Mr. Hampton in a police vehicle, he pulled away “pretty 

aggressive[ly]” and attempted to flee.

¶ 8 The State published footage from Officer Carreon’s body-worn camera. It is included in 

the record on appeal and has been reviewed by this court. It depicts officers parking their vehicle, 

exiting, and approaching a dark SUV. Officer Carreon approaches Mr. Hampton, the driver of the 

SUV, but there is no audio until approximately 30 seconds into their conversation. When the audio 

begins, Mr. Hampton asks why the officer has stopped him, and Officer Carreon responds that one 

of his headlights is out. Mr. Hampton states that the vehicle is his “girl’s” and provides an 

identification card, which the officer notes is not a driver’s license, as well as proof of insurance, 

which the officer notes does not list Mr. Hampton as an insured driver of the vehicle. Officer 

Carreon asks Mr. Hampton if there is a gun in the car, and either Mr. Hampton or the passenger 

responds “No.” 

¶ 9 Officer Carreon then asks Mr. Hampton to step out of the vehicle. Mr. Hampton does not 

comply; he asks the officer to call “a white shirt,” which Officer Carreon testified means a senior 

officer or supervisor. Officer Carreon asks multiple times if Mr. Hampton has any “weed” in the 

vehicle, and Mr. Hampton responds that he does not. Mr. Hampton speaks to someone else as if 

on the phone. He repeatedly declines the officer’s requests to exit the vehicle. After a few minutes 

of conversation, Officer Carreon opens the driver’s door, grabs Mr. Hampton’s shoulder, and tells 

him to step out. Mr. Hampton complies. The officers pat him down and handcuff him. Officer 

Carreon leans into the vehicle from the open driver’s door, but the camera points towards the street. 

As he straightens, the camera depicts him holding a firearm. He also searches the rear driver’s side

of the vehicle. As the officers go to place Mr. Hampton in the police vehicle, the camera is 

obstructed, and the officers repeatedly say that he is making it “worse” for himself and is going to 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 4 - 

be charged with resisting. 

¶ 10 At trial, Officer Carreon marked on a still image from his body-worn camera footage the 

place where he discovered the firearm. He noted that the firearm was not visible from the angle 

the image was taken, so he marked on the seat the spot where the firearm was beneath the seat. 

The image is included in the record on appeal and depicts a red mark a few inches back from the 

front of the seat. 

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Officer Carreon acknowledged that his camera footage did not 

depict him asking Mr. Hampton why he reached downwards. On redirect examination, he testified 

he did not ask that because he did not want Mr. Hampton to flee the traffic stop. 

¶ 12 Chicago police officer Timothy Karn testified that he tested the firearm Officer Carreon 

identified, a 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol, and it was functional. The firearm’s magazine 

could hold 12 rounds, with 1 additional round in the chamber. The State entered stipulations that 

Mr. Hampton had two prior convictions qualifying him for AHC and that there were four

fingerprint impressions on the firearm’s magazine but that they were unsuitable for identification. 

¶ 13 Mr. Hampton called his girlfriend, Darshay Scott, as a witness. Ms. Scott testified that she 

owned the Jeep that Mr. Hampton had been driving. She also owned a black 9-millimeter firearm

and had been issued a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card in 2017. She explained that an 

ex-boyfriend gave her the firearm in 2019. She kept it in a closet at her sister-in-law’s home rather 

than at her own home, as she had an autistic son. On November 16, 2021, her sister-in-law had a 

party. There were children present, including Ms. Scott’s. Ms. Scott therefore took the firearm to 

her Jeep and placed it under the driver’s seat. She did not tell Mr. Hampton, who was talking to 

Ms. Scott’s sister at the time. A few hours later, Mr. Hampton borrowed Ms. Scott’s Jeep to drop 

off a friend. 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 5 - 

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Ms. Scott testified that she had one biological daughter and, in 

November 2021, three foster children. She took the firearm to her sister-in-law’s home in 2019 

when she got her foster children. Ms. Scott had not been to her sister-in-law’s house between then 

and the party, as they had been “having difficulties.” She believed the firearm could hold 15 

rounds, could not pronounce the name of the manufacturer, and did not know the model. She never 

had a case or holster for the firearm. 

¶ 15 Before Mr. Hampton was arrested, Ms. Scott was on Facetime with him. She testified that 

she did not tell him in that conversation about the firearm in the Jeep. When asked whether she 

thought it was important to tell him there was a loaded gun in the car, she said that she had been 

drinking and was under the influence. After Mr. Hampton was arrested, Ms. Scott went to the 

police station and told officers the firearm was hers. An investigator from the state’s attorney’s 

office came to her home later, but she did not give a statement because she was on her way out. 

The investigator left his contact information, but Ms. Scott did not contact him. 

¶ 16 On redirect examination, Ms. Scott identified the firearm Officer Carreon recovered as the 

one she had placed under the seat in her vehicle, although she noted the “clip” that had been in the 

firearm was missing. The defense entered a stipulation that Ms. Scott had title to the Jeep and a 

valid FOID card. 

¶ 17 During the jury instructions conference, the court noted the State had proposed an 

instruction defining AHC. The instruction provided that “[a] person commits the offense of [AHC] 

when he possesses any firearm after previously being convicted of two qualifying felony offenses.” 

Defense counsel objected that the instruction was improper because it “remove[d] the knowingly 

portion, the requirement that he have the mens rea.” The State responded that the instruction 

tracked the language of the AHC statute and that there would also be a “possession instruction.” 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 6 - 

The court overruled defense counsel’s objection. 

¶ 18 The next proposed instruction, to which counsel did not object, was Illinois Pattern Jury 

Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.16 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). That instruction 

provided that “[a] person has actual possession when he has immediate and exclusive control over 

a thing. A person has constructive possession when he lacks actual possession of a thing but he 

has both the power and the intention to exercise control over a thing ***.” Id.

¶ 19 In closing argument, the State referenced both actual and constructive possession, although 

it spent more of its argument explaining why the jury should find that Mr. Hampton had 

“constructive possession.” The State also noted that defense counsel repeatedly argued that, to find 

Mr. Hampton guilty, the jury would need to find that he knew the firearm was in the Jeep. In 

rebuttal, the State argued that Mr. Hampton “leaned forward because of this firearm that he had in 

the car that he knew he wasn’t supposed to have.” 

¶ 20 The court issued the jury instructions and released the jury for deliberations around 5:39 

p.m. At about 7:30 p.m., the jury sent a note asking if the firearm was registered to Ms. Scott or, 

if not, “registered in general.” The parties agreed the court should answer that the jurors had the 

instructions on the law and should continue to deliberate. At 7:55 p.m., the jurors sent another note 

stating that they were not unanimous—“[p]arties have indicated there is nothing that can change 

their opinion”—and asking what to do. The court instructed them to continue deliberating. Around 

8:57 p.m., the court released the jury for the night. The next morning, the jury began deliberating 

again around 10:35 a.m. At 1:57 p.m., the jury reached a verdict and found Mr. Hampton guilty of 

AHC. 

¶ 21 Mr. Hampton filed a motion for a new trial in which he did not specifically argue that the 

court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State had to prove he “knowingly” possessed the 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 7 - 

firearm. The court denied the motion and sentenced Mr. Hampton to six years in prison. 

¶ 22 II. JURISDICTION

¶ 23 Mr. Hampton was sentenced on January 12, 2023, and he filed his notice of appeal the 

same day. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under article VI, section 6, of the Illinois 

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) 

and Rule 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021), governing appeals from final judgments in criminal cases. 

¶ 24 III. ANALYSIS

¶ 25 On appeal, Mr. Hampton argues that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by 

refusing his request to instruct the jurors that, to find him guilty of AHC, they had to find that he 

“knowingly” possessed a firearm. Mr. Hampton asserts that as the jury instructions failed to inform 

the jury of that required mental state, an element of the offense, the instructions failed to accurately 

convey the applicable law. The parties agree that, where, as here, the issue is whether the jury 

instructions accurately stated the law, our standard of review is de novo. People v. Hartfield, 2022 

IL 126729, ¶ 45. 

¶ 26 Initially, the State argues that Mr. Hampton has forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in 

his posttrial motion. See People v. Brand, 2021 IL 125945, ¶ 32 (noting that, to preserve alleged 

error for review, a defendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial 

motion). Mr. Hampton argues that the issue was preserved for appeal, as counsel objected to the 

instruction at trial, and the trial court’s error implicates his due process right to a fair trial and is 

therefore constitutional and cannot be forfeited. See People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 16 

(“constitutional issues that were properly raised at trial and may be raised later in a postconviction 

petition” are not subject to forfeiture for failure to file a posttrial motion). Alternatively, he asks 

us to review the issue for plain error or to conclude that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 8 - 

assistance by failing to preserve the issue. 

¶ 27 Because we find that Mr. Brown’s claim of error succeeds on the basis of first prong plainerror, we need not reach these alternative bases for avoiding forfeiture. Under the plain-error 

doctrine, we may review a forfeited claim where a clear or obvious error occurred and (1) “the 

evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against 

the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error” or (2) “the error is so serious that it 

affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, 

regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. 

Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535, ¶ 55; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(c) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) (noting that 

substantial defects in jury instructions “are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto 

if the interests of justice require”). The first step in plain-error review is determining whether an 

error occurred. Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535, ¶ 55. 

¶ 28 Jury instructions are intended to help jurors properly apply the law to the evidence 

presented and reach a correct verdict. People v. Hudson, 2023 IL App (1st) 192519, ¶ 67; People 

v. Falco, 2014 IL App (1st) 111797, ¶ 15, overruled on other grounds by People v. Ramirez, 2023 

IL 128123. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 451(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) provides that, when the Illinois 

Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI) contain an applicable instruction, that instruction “shall be used, 

unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.” Falco, 2014 IL App (1st) 

111797, ¶ 15. Where no applicable IPI instruction exists, the court has discretion to give a 

nonpattern instruction. Id. The nonpattern instruction “should be simple, brief, impartial, and free 

from argument.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013). 

¶ 29 At the time of Mr. Hampton’s trial, the IPI did not contain an instruction defining AHC or 

listing its elements. The court therefore had no choice but to give a nonpattern instruction 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 9 - 

explaining what the State had to prove to convict Mr. Hampton of AHC. The instruction the court 

gave provided that “[a] person commits the offense of [AHC] when he possesses any firearm after 

previously being convicted of two qualifying felony offenses.” 

¶ 30 In our view, this instruction did not accurately state the law because it failed to convey to 

the jury that it had to find that Mr. Hampton knowingly had possession of the gun. Section 24-

1.7(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)) provides that a person 

commits AHC when he receives, sells, possesses, or transfers a firearm after having been convicted 

of two or more qualifying offenses. The statute does not expressly provide that the defendant must 

“knowingly” possess a firearm, nor does it require any other mental state. See id. But since this is 

clearly not an absolute liability offense, a mental state must be inferred. See Ramirez, 2023 IL 

128123, ¶¶ 20-22. 

¶ 31 Our supreme court addressed this issue recently in Ramirez. The court held there that, 

where a defendant is charged with possession of a defaced firearm, the State is required to prove 

the defendant’s knowledge of both the possession and the defacement. Id. ¶ 25. As the court 

recognized, where a statute does not prescribe a mental state or create an absolute liability offense, 

the applicable mental state is either intent, knowledge, or recklessness. Id. ¶ 22. As the Ramirez

court further explained, where an offense is possessory in nature and the statute does not include 

a specific mental state, “knowledge is the appropriate mental state.” Id. Thus, as Ramirez makes 

clear, the elements of AHC include both (1) knowing possession of a firearm and (2) two or more 

prior qualifying convictions. People v. Wallace, 2023 IL App (1st) 200917, ¶ 38 (citing Ramirez, 

2023 IL 128123, ¶ 22); see also 720 ILCS 5/4-2 (West 2020) (noting that possession is a voluntary 

act only if “the offender knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of his 

control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate his possession”). 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 10 - 

¶ 32 Here, the court’s jury instruction provided that a person commits AHC “when he possesses 

any firearm after previously being convicted of two qualifying felony offenses.” The instruction

did not specify that the person must “knowingly” possess the firearm. Nor did it, or any other 

instruction, otherwise indicate that knowledge was an element of AHC. The jury instructions

therefore failed to apprise the jury of an essential element of the charged offense. 

¶ 33 The State argues that the instruction was sufficient because it tracked the statute, which 

also does not provide a specific mental state. The State cites People v. Garland, 254 Ill. App. 3d 

827, 832 (1993), for the “general rule” that “instructing the jury in the elements of an offense as 

the offense is defined in the statute is sufficient.” Mr. Hampton responds that Garland rests on an 

“outdated” statute, which has since been amended to explicitly include a mental state, and an 

“antiquated” distinction between general and specific intent crimes. We need not decide in this 

case whether Garland is still good law since the court recognized there that “the failure to include 

a mental state in the jury instructions is grounds to reverse a conviction where the record reveals 

that the principal contested issue was [the] defendant’s mental state.” Id. at 833. Certainly, this 

was the principal contested issue in this case.

¶ 34 The State also argues that the instructions, as a whole, accurately stated the law because 

the instructions given to the jury defined possession as follows: 

“Possession may be actual or constructive. A person has actual possession when he has 

immediate and exclusive control over a thing. A person has constructive possession when 

he lacks actual possession of a thing but he has both the power and the intention to exercise 

control over a thing ***.” IPI Criminal 4th No. 4.16. 

¶ 35 While we agree with the State that an “intention to exercise control” likely encompasses 

knowledge, the instructions also allowed the jury to find Mr. Hampton guilty based on actual, 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 11 - 

rather than constructive, possession. Certainly, a defendant could have immediate and exclusive 

control over a firearm without necessarily knowing that it is there. Where, as here, the jury could 

have found actual or constructive possession, the fact that a finding of constructive possession 

would encompass a finding of knowledge simply does not cure the deficiency in the AHC 

instruction. 

¶ 36 We must next determine whether the error in the instructions satisfies either prong of the 

plain-error doctrine. We find there was plain error under the first, “closely balanced” prong. As 

our supreme court has made clear, there is “plain error” where “the evidence is so closely balanced 

that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the 

seriousness of the error.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535, ¶ 55. To 

determine whether evidence was closely balanced, we “evaluate the totality of the evidence and 

conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the case.” People v. 

Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion. Pacheco, 2023 IL 

127535, ¶ 55.

¶ 37 The State and Mr. Hampton presented two competing versions of events, relative to 

whether Mr. Hampton knew the firearm was under his seat in the vehicle. On one hand, Officer 

Carreon testified that he observed Mr. Hampton lean toward the floor, Mr. Hampton appeared 

nervous and repeatedly refused to exit the vehicle, and, when he did exit the vehicle, Officer 

Carreon found the firearm underneath the driver’s seat where he had seen Mr. Hampton reach. 

¶ 38 On the other hand, Mr. Hampton told Officer Carreon that there were no firearms in the 

vehicle, the vehicle was his “girl’s,” the firearm was not visible until Officer Carreon leaned down 

to search under the seat, and Mr. Hampton’s girlfriend Ms. Scott testified that both the firearm and 

the vehicle belonged to her. Ms. Scott further testified that she had placed the firearm in the vehicle 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 12 - 

to remove it from a party with children. She was under the influence of alcohol at the time and did 

not tell Mr. Hampton what she had done, and Mr. Hampton borrowed her vehicle to drop off a 

friend. The parties stipulated that Ms. Scott had title to the vehicle and a valid FOID card. No 

forensic evidence connected Mr. Hampton to the firearm. 

¶ 39 The jury might have believed Ms. Scott, or it might have accepted the State’s circumstantial 

evidence that Mr. Hampton had placed the gun under the seat. No extrinsic evidence corroborated 

or contradicted either version of events. Alternatively, one or more jurors may have believed that 

it did not matter whether Mr. Hampton knew the gun was there, since he was driving a car with a 

gun under the driver’s seat, and this gave him immediate and exclusive control over the gun. Thus, 

Mr. Hampton could have been found guilty based on actual possession and the incomplete and 

therefore incorrect statement of the law set out in the AHC instruction. 

¶ 40 During deliberations, the jurors sent a note asking whether the firearm was registered to 

Ms. Scott or “registered in general.” About half an hour later, they sent another note indicating 

that they were deadlocked. The court sent the jurors home for the night, and they deliberated for 

several more hours the next day before finding Mr. Hampton guilty. The jurors’ notes indicate that 

they were struggling to reach a consensus on whether the State had proven its case. See People v. 

Walker, 211 Ill. 2d 317, 342 (2004) (relying on notes and questions sent by the jury to find that 

improper evidence “tipped the scales”). 

¶ 41 The State points out both that the indictment charged Mr. Hampton with knowingly or 

intentionally possessing a firearm and the court read that language to the prospective jurors, and 

that the parties repeatedly indicated in their opening statements and closing arguments that the jury 

would have to find Mr. Hampton knew of the firearm’s presence to find him guilty. The State 

argues that this rendered any deficiency in the instructions harmless. But when the jury indicated 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 13 - 

it was deadlocked, the court instructed it to look again to the jury instructions. It also admonished 

the jurors, as it always does, that it would instruct them on the law, that the law they should apply 

to the case was stated in the jury instructions, and that the opening and closing arguments made 

by the lawyers did not constitute evidence and should be “disregarded” if not based on the 

evidence.

¶ 42 “Omitting an element of the offense from a jury instruction is harmless if the reviewing 

court determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” 

People v. Lindmark, 381 Ill. App. 3d 638, 656 (2008), abrogated by People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 

115459; see People v. Saraceno, 341 Ill. App. 3d 108, 116 (2003) (where evidence was closely 

balanced, State could not show that error in jury instruction was “harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt”). We are not convinced that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the principal 

contested issue of Mr. Hampton’s knowledge, when the evidence was closely balanced and the 

jury indicated that it was struggling to reach a verdict and was told to review the jury instructions, 

was harmless. 

¶ 43 We note that double jeopardy principles do not bar retrial, as viewing Officer Carreon’s 

testimony and body-camera footage in the light most favorable to the State, the trial evidence was 

sufficient for a rational juror to find that Mr. Hampton had knowledge that he possessed the gun 

and was therefore guilty. See People v. Drake, 2019 IL 123734, ¶¶ 20-21 (double jeopardy does 

not bar retrial when conviction is overturned due to procedural error unless trial evidence, viewed 

in light most favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient to sustain the conviction). Thus, we 

remand this case for a new trial.

¶ 44 Finally, while the State does not expressly rely on this, both parties address the fact that, 

subsequent to Mr. Hampton’s trial, IPI instructions were promulgated that now define AHC in the 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 14 - 

same way the trial court did in this case. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 

18.07B, 18.08B (approved Feb. 3, 2023) (hereinafter IPI Criminal Nos. 18.07B, 18.08B). The 

instructions provide (1) that a person commits AHC when he receives, sells, possesses, or transfers 

any firearm after having been convicted of two qualifying offenses and (2) that to sustain a charge 

of AHC, the State has to prove (a) that the defendant received, sold, possessed, or transferred a 

firearm and (b) that he had previously been convicted of two qualifying offenses. Id. Thus, the IPI 

instructions promulgated for AHC after Mr. Hampton’s trial do not include the knowledge 

requirement we find necessary here. 

¶ 45 The dissent finds this compelling. We agree with the dissent that there is a rebuttable

presumption that IPI instructions accurately reflect the law. Our supreme court rules require that 

“the IPI Criminal instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately 

state the law.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013). However, Rule 451(a) also provides that a 

trial court may modify an IPI instruction where it does not accurately state the law. Id.; People v. 

Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 81 (2008); see People v. Ortiz, 2017 IL App (1st) 142559, ¶ 50 (non-IPI 

instruction should be used if IPI instruction is inaccurate). As our supreme court has recognized, 

pattern jury instructions, while extremely important and valuable to the administration of justice 

in this state, “are not exempt from challenge.” Powers v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 91 Ill. 2d 

375, 385 (1982). Such instructions are not judicially approved in advance, and “[a]n instruction is 

approved or rejected only after it has been judicially questioned and considered.” Id.

¶ 46 Our judicial examination of IPI Criminal Nos. 18.07B, 18.08B leads us to conclude that 

they do not correctly state the law. As we explain above, the gun possession element of AHC can 

only be met where a defendant has knowledge that he is in possession of a gun. While that is not 

explicit in the AHC statute, as Mr. Hampton notes, all of the other IPI instructions in Rule 18, 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 15 - 

which focus exclusively on weapons offenses, do require proof of knowledge or intent to convict. 

This includes IPI instructions for crimes that do not include a mental state in the relevant statute. 

For example, Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 18.17 (approved July 28, 2023) 

(hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 18.17) provides: “A person commits the offense of unlawful 

possession of [(firearms) (firearm ammunition) (handguns)] when he *** is under 18 years of age 

and knowingly has in his possession a [(firearm of a size) (handgun)] which may be concealed 

upon his person.” This, despite the fact that the corresponding statute provides only that “(a) A 

person commits the offense of unlawful possession of firearms or firearm ammunition when:

(1) He is under 18 years of age and has in his possession any firearm of a size which may be 

concealed upon the person[.]” 720 ILCS 5/24-3.1 (West 2020). The committee note to IPI Criminal 

No. 18.17 makes this clear, stating: “Although Section 24-3.1 does not include a mental state, any 

possession must be knowing.” (Emphasis added.) IPI Criminal No. 18.17, Committee Note. Thus, 

regardless of whether the statute contains an express mental state, one is required by all of the IPI 

instructions on weapons offenses, except for AHC. 

¶ 47 Neither of the parties has ventured an explanation for the omission of a mental state in the 

IPI instructions for this one offense. The notes on the IPI instructions, which are often helpful, 

provide no explanation. In short, we are at a loss for why the new IPI instruction on AHC does not 

include this knowledge requirement. It is our role, as a court, to determine whether the instruction 

given here complied with the law, and we find that it did not, whether or not it corresponds with a 

later-promulgated pattern jury instruction. Obviously, we urge the committee to address this as 

soon as possible. We also express no opinion on whether, in future cases, the failure to give an 

instruction that includes the knowledge requirement will require reversal based on the facts of the 

case. 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 16 - 

¶ 48 IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County 

and remand for a new trial.

¶ 50 Reversed and remanded. 

¶ 51 JUSTICE NAVARRO, dissenting: 

¶ 52 I agree with the majority’s analysis that rejects the State’s forfeiture argument that Mr. 

Hampton failed to raise his claim in his posttrial motion. 

¶ 53 However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that the instructions given in 

this case did not accurately state the law. As has been discussed, at the time of Mr. Hampton’s 

trial, the IPI did not contain an instruction for AHC. As a result, the court gave a non-IPI instruction 

for AHC. The instructions the court gave were the same instructions later promulgated after the 

conclusion of Mr. Hampton’s trial. See IPI Criminal Nos. 18.07B, 18.08B. 

¶ 54 Trial courts are directed to use the IPI instructions whenever possible and to only use nonIPI instructions when necessary. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 451 (eff. Apr. 8, 2013). In this instance, the court 

used a non-IPI instruction for AHC that later became the IPI. See IPI Criminal Nos. 18.07B, 

18.08B. While IPI instructions are not exempt from challenge, I do not believe that the presumption 

that the IPI instructions accurately reflect the law was rebutted here where the jury was instructed 

on both AHC and possession. See IPI Criminal 4th No. 4.16. I agree with the majority that Mr. 

Hampton’s mental state was a contested issue at trial. However, the AHC instruction, given in 

conjunction with the possession instruction and taken with the indictment, renders any deficiency 

in the instructions in defining a mental state harmless. See People v. Tompkins, 2023 IL 127805, 

¶ 56 (an error in a jury instruction is harmless if it is demonstrated that the result of the trial would 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 17 - 

not have been different had the jury been properly instructed). Thus, I respectfully dissent. 
No. 1-23-0171 

- 18 - 

People v. Hampton, 2024 IL App (1st) 230171 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-CR-3; 

the Hon. Peggy Chiampas, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys

for 

Appellant:

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Kara Kurland, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Attorneys

for 

Appellee:

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique 

Abraham, Retha Stotts, and Lynnette Cusack, Assistant State’s 

Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.