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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT S.*

(AC 38667)

Alvord, Prescott and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of criminal violation of a protective order arising

out of a telephone call made from the defendant’s cell phone to the

home in which the victim, his former wife, was residing, the defendant

appealed to this court. Held:

1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of

criminal violation of a protective order; although the defendant claimed

that the jury could not reasonably have found that he had the requisite

intent to engage in conduct that violated the condition in the protective

order that prohibited him from contacting the victim, there was sufficient

evidence before the jury from which it could have concluded that the

defendant intended to, and did, call the home in which the victim resided

in violation of the protective order, as both the victim and a police

officer testified that that the phone number that appeared on the home’s

caller ID belonged to the defendant, and the jury was free to infer that

the defendant had made the call, there having been no evidence before

the jury from which it reasonably could have inferred that someone

other than the defendant had access to his cell phone, nor any evidence

to support a conclusion that the defendant had inadvertently dialed the

home from his cell phone.

2. The defendant could not prevail, pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn.

233), on his unpreserved claim that the trial court denied him due process

at sentencing by relying on unreliable information and denying him an

opportunity to present mitigating evidence, as he failed to establish that

a constitutional violation existed; it was clear from the record that the

trial court, in determining the defendant’s sentence, did not substantially

rely on certain statements by the victim that the defendant maintained

were materially untrue or unreliable, as the record demonstrated that

the court, in determining the proper sentence, did not refer directly to

the challenged evidence and had sufficient reliable information before

it, including the defendant’s statements to the court, its own assessment

of the defendant’s behavior, and information contained in a presentence

investigation report, and it was within the trial court’s discretion to

prevent the defendant from presenting certain evidence that it determined was not relevant to the sentencing proceeding.

Argued November 14, 2017—officially released February 27, 2018

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of harassment in the second degree and

criminal violation of a protective order, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, geographical area number fourteen, and tried to the jury

before the court, Suarez, J.; verdict and judgment of

guilty of criminal violation of a protective order, from

which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, with whom were

Megan Wade, assigned counsel, and, on the brief, Cameron Dorman, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state’s attorney, with

whom were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and, on the

brief, Kathleen Dwyer, former senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Robert S., appeals from

the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial,

of one count of criminal violation of a protective order

in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223.1 On appeal,

the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient

evidence presented at trial to support his conviction,

and (2) the trial court denied him due process by using,

and denying him the opportunity to contest, unreliable

information during sentencing. We affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

jury reasonably could have found the following facts.

The defendant and the victim were married in 2006 and

divorced in 2013. The couple has two minor children,

ages four and five at the time of trial, both of whom

live with the victim. On October 22, 2014,2

the court,

Murphy, J., issued a protective order against the defendant, naming the victim as the protected person.3 The

order provided in relevant part: ‘‘Do not contact the

protected person in any manner, including by written,

electronic or telephone contact, and do not contact

the protected person’s home, workplace or others with

whom contact would be likely to cause annoyance or

alarm to the protected person.’’ Under ‘‘Additional

Orders of Protection,’’ the order provided: ‘‘Any access

to the minor child must be arranged and facilitated

through a third party relative,’’4 and ‘‘[t]he [d]efendant

is allowed to have contact with the protected person

only through Our Family Wizard software.’’5

In 2015, the victim and the children were living at

the maternal grandmother’s home in Bloomfield. That

house had a landline telephone (landline). On January

5, 2015, a phone call was placed from the defendant’s

cell phone to the landline. The victim recognized the

defendant’s cell phone number on the landline’s caller

ID. The victim did not answer the phone call. The victim

felt anxious when she received this phone call. She

checked on the children, checked the doors and locks,

and then called the police.

Officer Adrian J. Loignon of the Bloomfield Police

Department responded to the residence. Officer Loignon spoke to the victim, who showed him the landline’s

caller ID. Officer Loignon recorded the phone number

from the caller ID, and when he returned to the police

department, called the phone number four times. No

one answered his calls, and the voicemail box was full.

Officer Loignon reviewed the police department’s inhouse records and learned that the phone number

recorded from the caller ID was listed as the defendant’s

phone number. He also reviewed the in-house records

and confirmed that there was a protective order prohibiting the defendant from contacting the victim. On the

basis of this information, Officer Loignon applied for
an arrest warrant for the defendant.

After trial, the jury convicted the defendant of criminal violation of a protective order.6 The court, Suarez,

J., sentenced the defendant to a term of incarceration

of five years, execution suspended after three years,

followed by five years of probation. This appeal

followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence at trial

was insufficient to support his conviction of criminal

violation of a protective order. The defendant does not

challenge that he was subject to a valid protective

order,7 or that a call was made from his cell phone to

the landline at the home where the victim was living.

Rather, the defendant argues that the jury reasonably

could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

he had the requisite intent to engage in conduct that

violated the protective order’s condition that prohibited

him from contacting the victim because there was insufficient evidence that (1) the defendant made the phone

call to the landline, or (2) if he did in fact make the

call to the landline, he did so intentionally. We disagree.

We begin with the applicable standard of review and

principles of law that guide our analysis. ‘‘In reviewing

a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a twopart test. First, we construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we

determine whether the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably

could have concluded that the cumulative force of the

evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not

required to accept as dispositive those inferences that

are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . .

The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to

be reasonable and logical. . . . This does not require

that each subordinate conclusion established by or

inferred from the evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . .

because this court has held that a jury’s factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable. . . .

‘‘[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable

doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt

. . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require

acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by

the defendant that, had it been found credible by the

trier, would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On

appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable

view of the evidence that would support a reasonable

hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there

is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the

jury’s verdict of guilty. . . . Furthermore, [i]n [our]
process of review, it does not diminish the probative

force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in

part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than

direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact

of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case

involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . .

Indeed, direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind

is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often

inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative

effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational

inferences drawn therefrom. . . . [A]ny such inference

cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or conjecture.

. . . It is axiomatic, therefore, that [a]ny [inference]

drawn must be rational and founded upon the evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 79–81, 905 A.2d

1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S. Ct. 1491,

167 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2007).

A conviction of criminal violation of a protective

order requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that

‘‘an order . . . has been issued against such person,

and such person violates such order.’’8 General Statutes

§ 53a-223 (a). Regarding intent, ‘‘the violation of a protective order statute is not a specific intent crime. All

that is necessary is a general intent9

that the defendant

intended to perform the activities that constituted the

violation.’’ (Footnote in original.) State v. Larsen, 117

Conn. App. 202, 208, 978 A.2d 544, cert. denied, 294

Conn. 919, 984 A.2d 68 (2009).

On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude

that there was sufficient evidence before the jury from

which it could conclude that the defendant both

intended to, and did, call the landline in violation of

the protective order. The jury heard evidence that the

defendant and the victim were married, that they shared

two children, and that the couple subsequently

divorced. A copy of the protective order was entered

into evidence, along with a transcript of the hearing

at which the order was issued. The protective order

prohibited the defendant from ‘‘contact[ing], including

by . . . telephone contact . . . the protected person’s

home . . . .’’ The jury heard evidence that, on January

5, 2015, a call was placed from the defendant’s cell

phone to the landline at the grandmother’s house, where

the victim and children were living. The victim testified

that she recognized the phone number on the caller

ID as belonging to the defendant, that this made her

anxious, and that she did what she ‘‘usually’’ does when

‘‘calls come in at odd times’’ and checked on the kids,

the doors, and the locks before calling the police. We

conclude that this evidence provided a sufficient basis

for the jury’s conclusion that the defendant called the

landline, thereby contacting the protected person’s

home, in violation of the protective order.

As to the defendant’s argument that the state did not
prove that he, rather than someone else, made the call

on January 5, we conclude that the jury was free to

infer that the defendant made the call. The defendant

testified that he did not remember making the call. The

victim testified, however, that she recognized the phone

number on the caller ID as belonging to the defendant.

See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 46 Conn. App. 661, 682,

701 A.2d 663 (sufficient evidence that defendant drove

by victim’s house because jury could draw reasonable

inferences from testimony of victim that she identified

defendant’s truck, which was known to her, driving

past her apartment), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 940, 702

A.2d 645 (1997).

Officer Loignon testified that he confirmed with inhouse records that the phone number on the caller ID

was listed as belonging to the defendant. There was no

evidence before the jury from which it reasonably could

have inferred that someone other than the defendant

had access to his cell phone. The absence of direct

evidence that the defendant made the phone call from

his cell phone to the landline does not compel a conclusion by this court that there was insufficient evidence

from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant placed the phone call. ‘‘If it is reasonable and

logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an

inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider

the fact proven and may consider it in combination

with other proven facts in determining whether the

cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Moreover, it does not

diminish the probative force of the evidence that it

consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Stanley, 161 Conn. App. 10, 16, 125

A.3d 1078 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 918, 131 A.3d

1154 (2016). We conclude that it was reasonable and

logical for the jury to infer, in light of the evidence, that

the defendant placed the phone call from his cell phone

to the landline. Furthermore, there was no evidence

that would compel a conclusion by the jury that the

defendant inadvertently dialed the landline from his cell

phone. In other words, the jury was free to infer, on

the basis of this record and its common sense, that

if a call is placed from a phone, the call was made

intentionally in the absence of credible evidence to

the contrary.

On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude

that there was sufficient evidence before the jury from

which it could conclude that the defendant was guilty

of criminal violation of a protective order.10

II

The defendant next claims that the court denied him

due process under the federal constitution11 at sentencing. Specifically, he argues that the court abused its
discretion in (1) relying on ‘‘unreliable information’’ in

sentencing the defendant, and (2) denying the defendant the opportunity to present mitigating evidence to

contest that information. The defendant concedes that

this claim was not properly preserved before the trial

court, but nonetheless seeks review pursuant to our

Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Golding, 213 Conn.

233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel

R., 317 Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).12 Here, the

record is adequate to review the defendant’s claim, and

the issue of a denial of due process at sentencing is an

issue of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Ruffin,

144 Conn. App. 387, 395, 71 A.3d 695 (2013), aff’d, 316

Conn. 20, 110 A.3d 1225 (2015). The defendant cannot,

however, establish a constitutional violation. Therefore,

we conclude that the defendant’s due process claim

fails under the third prong of Golding.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. On August 31, 2015, the defendant and his counsel appeared before the trial court,

Suarez, J., for sentencing. Prior to that hearing, a presentence investigation (PSI) was completed, and the

PSI report was submitted to the court. The state argued

for the maximum sentence, five years incarceration.

The state also requested that the court impose a standing criminal protective order.

The victim was present for sentencing. She submitted

and read a letter to the court, also requesting that the

court impose the maximum sentence. In relevant part,

the victim stated that: (1) the defendant ‘‘broke into

my house that I presently live in,’’ (2) the defendant

‘‘kidnap[ped] the kids only to be found by the police

states away,’’ and (3) that she was ‘‘threatened by bodily

harm by [the defendant], despite court protective

orders . . . .’’

The defendant also submitted a letter to the court.

During allocution, the defendant claimed, in relevant

part, that: (1) the protective order at issue in the case

was ‘‘an outdated court order,’’ which had been modified ‘‘specific to things like family access and stuff like

that’’; (2) the family court, in its dissolution order,

issued credibility determinations regarding certain

claims made by the victim; (3) there was ‘‘documentation in opposition’’ to some of the claims made by the

victim; (4) he documented the victim’s family members

threatening and harassing him, even while he was incarcerated; and (5) he had ‘‘supporting documents showing

things contrary’’ to ‘‘things that [the victim] alleged in

the police report.’’

The court explained to the defendant that it could

not ‘‘assess the credibility of what somebody else said

at some other hearing,’’ and that it could ‘‘only decide

what happened in the hearing that [it] presided over.’’

The court further explained: ‘‘All I’m here to do right

now is to decide how much time, if any, should be given
to you because of that finding of guilty. I recognize the

two of you had a long history of custody battles and

trials and things of that sort. That’s been made very

clear, but what I’m saying to you is that it wasn’t me

who decided the credibility of those people at those

separate trials. All I have to do is decide how much

time to give you as a result of a jury finding you guilty

of this violation.’’

The court concluded that a period of incarceration

was appropriate, and in consideration of the defendant’s statements to the court, the victim’s statement,

and information contained in the PSI report, the court

sentenced the defendant to five years incarceration,

execution suspended after three years, followed by five

years of probation. The court also issued a standing

criminal protective order, listing the victim as the protected person, until August, 2065. In articulating the

basis for the sentence imposed, the court noted, in

relevant part, that it found the defendant to be stubborn,

aggressive, manipulative, and controlling. The court

also noted that the victim indicated that she was fearful

for the safety of herself and her children, and that the

defendant’s statements to the court and behavior in

violating the protective order indicated that ‘‘whatever

order I issue, you are not particularly going to abide

by because you are accusing everybody else of being

the wrong people and not accepting any responsibility

at all, and I have absolutely no assurance for the safety

of this victim and the children.’’

The defendant requested that the court reduce his

sentence, and the court responded: ‘‘I understand that

you want to have a relationship with your children, but

as I said to you just a minute ago, I am deeply troubled

by your manipulation particularly when you accused

everybody in this courtroom and other courts of preventing you from having a relationship with your children when it’s your behavior that has done so. . . .

‘‘[M]ore importantly, because of your statements to

this court today and the PSI and the letter that you

wrote to this court leads me to believe that you don’t

care about court orders or that you will do whatever

you need to do regardless of anybody’s orders, which

leads me to believe that in this particular case, the

victim’s safety is in question.’’

The court concluded its reasoning: ‘‘I continue to

be very nervous about the safety of these individuals

because of your actions and because of the attitude

toward this whole case.’’

We now set forth the applicable standard of review.

Our rules of practice provide, in relevant part: ‘‘Before

imposing a sentence . . . (1) [t]he judicial authority

shall afford the parties an opportunity to be heard and,

in its discretion, to present evidence on any matter

relevant to the disposition, and to explain or controvert
the presentence investigation report . . . or any other

document relied upon by the judicial authority in imposing sentence. . . .’’ Practice Book § 43-10.

‘‘A sentencing judge has very broad discretion in

imposing any sentence within the statutory limits and

in exercising that discretion he may and should consider

matters that would not be admissible at trial. . . . It

is a fundamental sentencing principle that a sentencing

judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in

scope, and largely unlimited either as to the kind of

information he may consider or the source from which

it may come. . . .

‘‘Nevertheless, [t]he trial court’s discretion . . . is

not completely unfettered. As a matter of due process,

information may be considered as a basis for a sentence

only if it has some minimal indicium of reliability. . . .

As long as the sentencing judge has a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on the information which he

uses to fashion his ultimate sentence, an appellate court

should not interfere with his discretion.’’ (Citations

omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Eric M., 271 Conn. 641, 649–50, 858

A.2d 767 (2004). ‘‘Nonetheless, the mere reference to

information outside of the record does not require a

sentence to be set aside unless the defendant shows:

(1) that the information was materially false or unreliable; and (2) that the trial court substantially relied on

the information in determining the sentence.’’ State v.

Collette, 199 Conn. 308, 321, 507 A.2d 99 (1986).

We conclude that when the record is read as a whole,

it is clear that the court did not substantially rely on

the challenged information when it determined the

defendant’s sentence. See State v. Anderson, 212 Conn.

31, 50, 561 A.2d 897 (1989). Again, the court received

statements from both the defendant and the victim,

heard the defendant’s allocution, reviewed the PSI

report, and heard argument from counsel. We therefore

reject the defendant’s claim that the court violated his

due process rights by considering the victim’s statement

to the court and ‘‘not [permitting him] to present any

evidence in mitigation of the sentence . . . .’’ Before

imposing the sentence, the court noted: (1) that the

case stemmed from a ‘‘long history’’ of conflict between

the parties, particularly over child care and custody;

(2) the evidence from trial that contradicted the defendant’s claim that he called the landline to arrange visitation with the children; (3) information and statements

contained in the PSI, including one by a relative referring to him as ‘‘stubborn and aggressive,’’ and one by

a friend that indicated that the defendant was ‘‘not

willing to lose the battle to win the war’’; (4) the ‘‘contentious’’ nature of this case; (5) its own assessment of

the defendant’s parenting skills, particularly in light of

his decision to place the children ‘‘in the middle of a

custody battle’’; (6) evidence that the defendant violated
the protective order; (7) the defendant’s statements to

the court, particularly accusations against the victim’s

family members and the courts, which indicated to the

court ‘‘how manipulating and controlling’’ the defendant

could be; (8) the defendant’s failure to accept responsibility for his actions; and (9) its own concerns for the

safety of the victim. Even if this court were to assume,

arguendo, that the victim’s statements to the court contained information that was materially untrue or unreliable, as the defendant contends, we conclude that the

defendant has not shown that the court substantially

relied on that information. The court did not directly

refer to the challenged information, and there was sufficient reliable information on which the court relied

in sentencing.

We are similarly unpersuaded by the defendant’s

argument that ‘‘[b]ecause the trial court did not permit

the defendant to present any evidence in mitigation of

the sentence, the defendant’s due process rights were

violated.’’ The court did not, as the defendant contends,

impose ‘‘an absolute bar on any offer of evidence.’’ The

court permitted the defendant to submit evidence and

to address the court, both during allocution and through

counsel. The court declined only to hear evidence that

it determined was outside the scope of the sentencing

hearing. As we have noted, our rules of practice afford

the court discretion in permitting evidence ‘‘on any

matter relevant’’ to the disposition. It was within the

court’s discretion to prevent the defendant from presenting evidence that it determined was not relevant

to the sentencing. Because the defendant has failed

to establish a constitutional violation, his due process

claim fails under the third prong of Golding.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interest of the

victim of a criminal violation of a protective order, we decline to identify

the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained.

1 General Statutes § 53a-223 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of criminal

violation of a protective order when an order issued pursuant to subsection

(e) of section 46b-38c, subsection (f) of section 53a-28, or section 54-1k

or 54-82r has been issued against such person, and such person violates

such order.’’

2 A prior protective order was issued on August 31, 2014. That order was

not admitted into evidence at trial.

3 At the October 22 hearing, the court noted that the defendant had two

criminal files pending, one of which was for custodial interference.

4 The defendant arranged and facilitated access to the children through

the victim’s maternal aunt, who did not live in the victim’s home.

5 Our Family Wizard is a communication software used in high conflict

divorces. The software allows professionals, such as attorneys or guardians

ad litem, to monitor communications between the parents.

6 The defendant was also charged with and acquitted of harassment in

the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a) (3).

7 A copy of the operative protective order was entered as a full exhibit

at trial.

8 The defendant testified that he was aware of the protective order and

its terms.

9

‘‘General intent is the term used to define the requisite mens rea for a

crime that has no stated mens rea; the term refers to whether a defendant
intended deliberate, conscious or purposeful action, as opposed to causing

a prohibited result through accident, mistake, carelessness, or absent-mindedness. . . . State v. Charles, 78 Conn. App. 125, 131, 826 A.2d 1172, cert.

denied, 266 Conn. 908, 832 A.2d 73 (2003).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Larsen, 117 Conn. App. 202, 208 n.4, 978 A.2d 544, cert. denied,

294 Conn. 919, 984 A.2d 68 (2009).

10 Alternatively, the defendant argues that ‘‘even had the defendant called

the ‘family phone,’ it was permissible under the protective orders,’’ because

‘‘it was established that the [g]randmother was a third party relative and

the ‘family phone’ was a phone number the defendant could use to contact

the [g]randmother.’’ We reject this argument for two reasons.

First, the plain terms of the protective order prohibit the defendant from

contacting the victim’s home. Second, even if we were to assume arguendo

that the protective order stating ‘‘[a]ny access to the minor child must be

arranged and facilitated through a third party relative’’ created an exception

from the blanket prohibition on calling the victim’s home, we conclude that

there was sufficient evidence before the jury from which it could reasonably

infer that the defendant was not calling for that purpose. Although the

defendant testified that he would communicate with the children on the

landline, and that he would contact the grandmother to facilitate visitation

with the children, the jury heard evidence that contradicted that testimony.

Specifically, during the grandmother’s testimony, the following exchange

occurred:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Thank you. You’re aware that visitation for your grandchildren is facilitated—has to be facilitated through a third party; correct?

‘‘[The Witness]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Who is that third party; do you know?

‘‘[The Witness]: Well, it’s my sister.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Does your sister live with you?

‘‘[The Witness]: No.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Why is it not you?

‘‘[The Witness]: I—Robert don’t want to have any dealings with me.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So there’s no reason for him to call your house?

‘‘[The Witness]: No.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So if he wanted visitation with the children he should

be calling the—your sister’s house?

‘‘[The Witness]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: When was the last time that you talked to [the

defendant]?

‘‘[The Witness]: Over a year or more.’’

‘‘In evaluating the evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept

as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s

innocence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arthurs, 121 Conn.

App. 520, 524, 997 A.2d 568 (2010), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 957, 82 A.3d 626

(2013). Furthermore, the jury was free to credit the testimony of one witness

and not the other. See State v. Miles, 132 Conn. App. 550, 563, 32 A.3d 969

(2011) (‘‘[c]onflicting testimony and the credibility of witnesses is a matter

left to the province of the jury’’), cert. denied, 303 Conn. 934, 36 A.3d

692 (2012).

11 To the extent that the defendant also asserts a claim in violation of his

due process rights under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution,

we conclude that he has abandoned this claim by failing to provide an

independent analysis of this issue under the state constitution. See State v.

Schultz, 100 Conn. App. 709, 712 n.2, 921 A.2d 595, cert. denied, 282 Conn.

926, 926 A.2d 668 (2007).

12 Pursuant to Golding, a defendant may prevail on a claim of constitutional

error not preserved at trial only if all four of the following conditions are

satisfied: ‘‘(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;

(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . .

deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error

analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged

constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see also In re Yasiel R., supra,

317 Conn. 781 (modifying third prong of Golding by eliminating word

‘‘clearly’’ before words ‘‘exists’’ and ‘‘deprived’’).