This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 DEBBIE SMITH and PEGGY GRANGETTO, 2 Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-Appellants, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-34920 4 ROXANNE LUCERO and BRUCE DAVIS, 5 Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-Appellees. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY 7 Karen L. Parsons, District Judge 8 Law Office of Jane B. Yohalem 9 Jane B. Yohalem 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellants 12 Sanders, Bruin, Coll & Worley, P.A. 13 Ian D. McKelvy 14 Roswell, NM 15 for Appellees 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 ZAMORA, Judge. 182 {1} This appeal arises out of a “Pet Ownersh ip Agreement” (the agreement) for the 1 sale of two Chihuahua dogs (the dogs). Fourteen months after selling the dogs to 2 Defendants and delivering them from California to New Mexico, Plaintiffs initiated 3 a breach of contract action, alleging the dogs were not being cared for in accordance 4 with the terms of the agreement. Defendants responded by filing a counterclaim for 5 malicious abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 6 Defendants on Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. Defendants’ counterclaim 7 proceeded to a bench trial, and the district court found in favor of Defendants, 8 awarding attorney’s fees and costs, punitive damages, and prejudgment and 9 postjudgment interest. 10 {2} Plaintiffs appeal both the district c ourt’s order granting summary judgment in 11 favor of Defendants and its award of damages on Defendants’ counterclaim for 12 malicious abuse of process. We affirm the di strict court in part and reverse in part. 13 {3} Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the 14 factual and procedural background, we reserve discussion of the pertinent facts and 15 procedure within the context of the parties’ arguments. After the district court granted 16 summary judgment in favor of Defendants, it then held a bench trial on the merits on 17 Defendants’ counterclaim for malicious abuse of process. The district court entered 18 extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because Plaintiffs do not 193 specifically challenge any of the district c ourt’s findings of fact s, we rely on those 1 findings in our analysis. See Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA (“ The argument [in a party’s 2 brief-in-chief] shall set forth a specific attack on any finding, or such finding shall be 3 deemed conclusive.”); Seipert v. Johnson , 2003-NMCA-119, ¶ 26, 134 N.M. 394, 77 4 P.3d 298 (stating that “[a]n unc hallenged finding of the [dis trict] court is binding on 5 appeal”). 6 DISCUSSION 7 Summary Judgment was Proper on Plaintiffs’ Breach of Contract Claim 8 {4} Plaintiffs argue that the district c ourt erred in granting summary judgment to 9 Defendants because the parties’ agreemen t was ambiguous, specifically with regard 10 to the love-and-care provision. The agreemen t provided in part th at Defendants “agree 11 to love[-]and[-]care for [the dogs] in the be st possible manner in order to provide them 12 with a happy and healthy environment for the remainder of their normal lives” (the 13 love-and-care provision). They argue that th e court’s failure to consider extrinsic 14 evidence warrants reversal because such evidence would have illustrated ambiguity 15 within the agreement. Such ambiguity, they argue, raises a question for trial as to 16 whether Plaintiffs’ primary motivation in the agreement was the level of care they 17 expected Defendants to provide to the dogs . Plaintiffs also advance a number of 18 arguments that invite this Court to alter the agreement to their benefit and create a 194 remedy for them to get the dogs back where they did not otherwise contract to do so. 1 In response, Defendants argue that the distri ct court considered all relevant evidence, 2 and properly granted summary judgment becau se there was no triable issue of material 3 fact on the parties’ agreement. 4 {5} “Summary judgment is appropriate wh ere there are no genuine issues of 5 material fact and the movant is en titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bank of N.Y. 6 Mellon v. Lopes , 2014-NMCA-097, ¶ 6, 336 P.3d 443 (internal quotation marks and 7 citation omitted). “We reviewissues of law de novo.” Id. “On appeal from the grant 8 of summary judgment, we ordinarily revi ew the whole record in the light most 9 favorable to the party opposing summary judgment to determine if there is any 10 evidence that places a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.” City of Albuquerque 11 v. BPLW Architects & Eng’rs, Inc. , 2009-NMCA-081, ¶ 7, 146 N.M. 717, 213 P.3d 12 1146. 13 {6} “[T]he party opposing summary judgment has the burden to demonstrate the 14 existence of specific evidentiary facts whic h would require trial on the merits. A party 15 may not simply argue that such evidentiary facts might exist, nor may it rest upon the 16 allegations of the complaint.” Horne v. Los Alamos Nat’l Sec., L.L.C. , 2013-NMSC17 004, ¶ 15, 296 P.3d 478 (alterati on, internal quotation mark s, and citations omitted); 18

see Rule 1-056(E) NMRA (“When a motion for summary judgment is made and 195 supported as provided in this rule, [the pl aintiffs] may not rest upon mere allegations 1 or denials of [their] pleading, but [their ] response, by affidavits or as otherwise 2 provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 3 for trial.”). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence before the court considering 4 a motion for summary judgment would allow a hypothetical fair-minded fact[-]finder 5 to return a verdict favorable to the non-movant on that particular issue of fact. An 6 issue of fact is ‘material’ if the existence (or non-existence) of the fact is of 7 consequence under the substantive rules of law governing the parties’ dispute.” 8 Associated Home & RV Sales, Inc. v. Bank of Belen , 2013-NMCA-018, ¶ 23, 294 P.3d 9 1276 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “However, if no material issues 10 of fact are in dispute and an appeal pres ents only a question of law, we apply de novo 11 review and are not required to view the appeal in the light most favorable to the party 12 opposing summary judgment.” City of Albuquerque , 2009-NMCA-081, ¶ 7; Ovecka 13 v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 2008-NMCA-140, ¶ 9, 145 N.M. 113, 194 P.3d 14 728 (“[W]hen no facts are in dispute and th e undisputed facts lend themselves to only 15 one conclusion, the issue may properl y be decided as a matter of law.”). 16 {7} In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argued that any ambiguity 17 in the parties’ agreement was to be construed against Plaintiffs because they drafted 18 the agreement, and neither the agreement itself nor New Mexico law permitted 196 Plaintiffs to regain ownership of the dogs simply because they disagreed with the 1 manner in which they were provided care. Pl aintiffs argued that the genuine issue of 2 material fact in dispute was contained inthe love-and-care provision of the agreement. 3 They asked the district court to deny De fendants summary judgment on the basis that 4 Plaintiffs did not believe the dogs were being cared for in the best possible manner, 5 specifically that the dogs were around Defe ndants’ German Shepherds (the larger 6 dogs). 7 {8} When asked by the court whether th e agreement contained any provisions 8 requiring the dogs to be returned under such circumstances, Plaintiffs conceded there 9 were none. Plaintiffs instead requested th at the court craft an equitable remedy to 10 allow for such a result. The district court reasoned that Plaintiffs witnessing the dogs 11 in the presence of the largerdogs did not create a genuine issue of material fact, and 12 based upon the language of the parties’ ag reement it could not grant Plaintiffs’ 13 requested remedy of forci ng Defendants to return the dogs. The district court 14 subsequently granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint with 15 prejudice. 16 {9} Plaintiffs, California residents, who purchased and cared for the dogs in 2004 17 for approximately five years sought a new home for them in hopes of providing them 18 with more attention and greater outdoor space. Plaintiffs posted an announcement on 197 a dog breeder’s website seeking a “forev er home” for the dogs. Defendants, New 1 Mexico residents, responded to the announ cement and the parties proceeded to engage 2 in extensive communications concerning the dogs. The parties communicated for 3 several weeks regardi ng the possible transfer of the dogs, their physical conditions, 4 food, supplements, toys and bedding. On Oct ober 9, 2009, Plaintiffs personally visited 5 Defendants’ home to ensure it was a proper environment for the dogs. 6 {10} On October 19, 2009, the parties entered into the agreement wherein Plaintiffs 7 transferred ownership of the dogs to Defe ndants in exchange for $100.00. Plaintiffs 8 drafted the agreement without assistance from counsel or input from Defendants. As 9 noted earlier, the agreement included th e love-and-care provision. The agreement 10 further provided two specific means by which Pl aintiffs could regain ownership of the 11 dogs: (1) if Defendants chos e to relinquish ownership of the dogs; or, (2) if 12 Defendants predeceased the dogs. 13 {11} The agreement also required Defendants tokeep Plaintiffs apprised of their 14 current contact information for the duration, including their telephone number and 15 home address. Aside from caring for the dogs, this was Defendants’ only ongoing 16 contractual responsibility to Plaintiffs. The more technical aspects of the agreement 17 included that it is in effect through the natural lives of the dogs, New Mexico law 18 would govern the agreement and the document as executed was inclusive of the 198 parties’ entire agreement. Prior to entering into the agreement, Plaintiffs were aware 1 that Defendants owned larger dogs, that they were allowed to be with the smaller 2 dogs, Defendants had successfully raised and cared for other Chihuahuas in the same 3 environment, the dogs were under the care of a New Mexico licensed and reputable 4 veterinarian, and at least one of the Chihuahuas was already overweight. 5 {12} In the months that followed the execu tion of the agreement, the parties 6 remained in regular contact. Defendants w ould give Plaintiffs updates on the dogs and 7 how they were getting along withDefendants’ larger dogs. Plaintiffs argue that these 8 pre-dispute communications created a strong inference that the care, health, happiness, 9 and safety of the dogs were at the heart of the contract. In June 2010 Plaintiffs traveled 10 to Defendants’ home in New Mexico to vis it the dogs. During the visit, Plaintiffs were 11 displeased with the care Defendants were providing to the dogs. Chief amongst 12 Plaintiffs’ concerns were the dogs associ ating with Defendants’ larger dogs, the dogs 13 were exhibiting what Plaintiffs regardedas stressed behavior, and experiencing 14 allergies and weight gain. 15 {13} Following their visit to Defendants’ home, Plaintiffs sent an email to 16 Defendants requesting that they return the dogs. The email stated that it was apparent 17 the dogs were still attached to Plaintiffs, and that because the dogs were trying to get 18 in the car with them the dogs had not adjust ed to their new environment. In an email, 199 Plaintiffs noted that they had an emotionally difficult time with their decision to give 1 the dogs up and pleaded with Defendants to return the dogs. Defendants responded 2 indicating that they were unlikely to complywith Plaintiffs’ request due to their own 3 attachment to the dogs. This email exchangecontinued with Plaintiffs’ admissions that 4 they “have regretted giving up the [dogs] since the first day and have cried many 5 nights because we miss them so much” and they “have found it impossible” to live 6 without the dogs. 7 {14} After Defendants initially denied Plainti ffs’ request, Plaintiffs again sent an 8 email informing Defendants that they utilized an animal communicator who 9 purportedly communicated with the dogs by psychic means, and shared with them 10 their belief that the dogs were distressed under Defendants’ care. Defendants 11 responded with a final email stating: “Our decision to keep the [dogs] is final—end 12 of discussion. Except for the notification of address change, there will be no further 13 communication.” 14 {15} However, Defendants’ email sent with the goal of cutting off communication 15 did not achieve its end. Over the course of the next year, Plaintiffs sent seven emails 16 with subject lines including “[p]lease let th e [dogs] come back to us” and “[l]et the 17 [dogs] go.”Some of these emails were se nt from Plaintiffs’ personal email accounts 18 and others from email addresse s specially created after De fendants blocked Plaintiffs’ 1910 emails. After the email attempts proved to be unsuccessful, Plaintiffs mailed ten 1 postcards to Defendants’ home with me ssages purportedly from the dogs themselves 2 such as “[p]lease let us go home. We miss our mommies so much.” Other postcards 3 were sent with messages from Plaintiffs th emselves, including one that stated, “[y]ou 4 were right . . . [y]ou said you’re damned if you don’t[.]” 5 {16} In August 2011 Plaintiffs retained counselin California, who sent Defendants 6 a letter demanding the return of the dogs. This effort also did not result in Defendants 7 relinquishing ownership of the dogs. In December 2011 Plaintiffs filed a complaint 8 for return of property or, in the alternative, breach of c ontract. The complaint alleged 9 that “Defendants are in breach of the terms of [the] agreemen t and, having breached 10 the contract, should be required to return [the dogs] to . . . Plaintiffs.” Plaintiffs 11 essentially allege that by exposing the dogs to Defendants’ larger dogs, the dogs’ 12 health deteriorated, and therefore Defe ndants breached the love-and-care provision. 13 Plaintiffs sought judgment against Defe ndants and an order requiring that they 14 immediately surrender the dogs to Plaintiffs. Defendants responded by filing a 15 counterclaim for malicious abuse of process, alleging that Plaintiffs lacked probable 16 cause to bring the lawsuit and that their prim ary motive was to extort the return of the 17 dogs to which they were not legally entitled. 1811 {17} “The purpose, meaning, and intent of the parties to a contract is to be deduced 1 from the language employed by them[.]” Benz v. Town Ctr. Land, LLC , 2013-NMCA2 111, ¶ 31, 314 P.3d 688 (alterati on, internal quotation mark s, and citation omitted). 3 “We view the contract as a harmonious whol e, give meaning to every provision, and 4 accord each part of the contract its significance in light of other provisions.” Id. 5 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In interpreting any 6 contract, this Court “effectuate[s] the inte nt of the parties by adopting a reasonable 7 construction of the usual and customary meaning of the contract language.” Smith & 8 Marrs, Inc. v. Osborn , 2008-NMCA-043, ¶ 10, 143 N.M . 684, 180 P.3d 1183 (internal 9 quotation marks and citation omitted). “A contract is deemed ambiguous only if it is 10 reasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions. Whether ambiguity exists 11 is a question of law; therefore this Court reviews the district court’s decision de 12 novo.” Envtl. Control, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe , 2002-NMCA-003, ¶ 14, 131 N.M. 450, 13 38 P.3d 891 (citation omitted). “When the language of the contract clearly and 14 unambiguously expresses the agreed-upon intent of the parties, [the] Court will give 15 effect to such intent. The mere fact th at the parties are in disagreement on the 16 construction to be given does not necessarily establish ambiguity.” LensCrafters, Inc. 17 v. Kehoe , 2012-NMSC-020, ¶ 18, 282 P.3d 758 (internal quotation marks and citations 18 omitted). “[A]bsent any ambiguity, the [distric t] court may not alter or fabricate a new 1912 agreement for the parties.” CC Hous. Corp. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. , 1987-NMSC1 117, ¶ 6, 106 N.M. 577, 746 P.2d 1109. “[W]here such language is not ambiguous, it 2 is conclusive.” Benz , 2013-NMCA-111, ¶ 31 (internal quotation marks and citation 3 omitted). 4 {18} Plaintiffs included in their complaint, and were therefore aware, that the only 5 avenue by which Plaintiffs could regain ownership of the dogs was if Defendants 6 chose to relinquish ownership of the dogs; or, second, if Defendants predeceased the 7 dogs. Plaintiffs were also aware that ne ither of those conditions existed here. 8 {19} Nothing in the agreement required Defe ndants to keep the dogs separate from 9 the larger dogs. Moreover, Plaintiffs never mentioned their expectations or concerns 10 with the presence of the larger dogs and all of the dogs interacting. The district court 11 specifically found that Plaintiffs failed toprovide any proof that Defendants agreed 12 to keep the dogs separated from the largerdogs. To the contrary, the court found that 13 Plaintiffs knew the dogs would be around the larger dogs at the time they drafted the 14 agreement. In addition, although Plaintiffs claimed to be concerned about the health 15 of the dogs, they admitted that they never: (1) reviewed the dogs’ veterinarian records 16 provided by Defendants; (2) c onsulted with any veterinarians to review the dogs’ 17 records or to have the dogs independently examined. Plaintiffs ’ argument that the 18 court should have considered extrinsic evid ence is without merit as they provided no 1913 credible or admissible evidence. Rather, their concerns were based on subjective 1 personal opinions and the inadmissible opi nions of an animal communicator. Because 2 Plaintiffs presented no credible or admissibl e extrinsic evidence fo r consideration, the 3 issue is moot. 4 {20} It is important to point out that we are also bound by the district court’s 5 rejection of Plaintiffs’ findings of fact. See, e.g. , Hill v. Cmty. of Damien of Molokai , 6 1996-NMSC-008, ¶ 41, 121 N.M. 353, 911 P.2d 861 (“Failure to adopt a proposed 7 finding of fact is in effect a negative finding with respect to that fact, which binds this 8 Court on appeal.”). While there are numerous Plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact that 9 are in direct conflict with the district court’s findings of fact, most notable is 10 Plaintiffs’ proposed finding of fact number 36. It states that “Roxanne Lucero told 11 Debbie Smith and Peggy Grangetto that the big dogs and little dogs would never 12 meet.” The district court did not credit Pl aintiffs’ testimony on that point. So even if 13 summary judgment were improperly granted on Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim 14 because Plaintiffs’ proposed testimony about this alleged promise was sufficient to 15 create an ambiguity, it does not matter becausethe district court did not credit this 16 testimony when it was presented at trial. 17 {21} Plaintiffs are asking this Court to rewrite the agreement. Th e parties were free 18 to include a provision permitting Plaintiffs to regain ownership of the dogs if they 1914 disagreed with the level and manner of care provided to the dogs. It is not the role of 1 this Court to write such a provision into the parties’ agreement. See Benz , 2013- 2 NMCA-111, ¶ 31 (“The purpose, meaning, and intent of the parties to a contract is to 3 be deduced from the language employed by them; and where such language is not 4 ambiguous, it is conclusive.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 5 omitted)). 6 {22} The clear terms of the love-and-care pr ovision of the agreement were not made 7 ambiguous by Plaintiffs’ uncommunicated exp ectations of Defendants, in providing 8 such love-and-care to the dogs. We agree with the district court that, pursuant to the 9 terms of the parties’ agreement and under these circumstances, returning the dogs to 10 Plaintiffs was not an available remedy. As a result, we conclude th at the district court 11 was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 12 {23} Plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred by holding that NMSA 1978, 13 Section 77-1-1 (1912) preempts or supersedes their right to include the love-and-care 14 provision into the contract. However, we need not address their argument since the 15 district court discredited the factual basis for Plaintiffs’ claims. 16 Counterclaim for Malicious Abuse of Process 17 {24} Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on Defendants’ counterclaim 18 for malicious abuse of process. As noted earlier, Plaintiffs conceded that there was no 1915 contractual or equitable re medy available to get the dogs back. They reasoned that 1 their efforts to continue the lawsuit inlight of this c oncession should not be 2 interpreted as abusing the process because their goal was fo r this Court to read in or 3 create an equitable remedy as it pertained to the parties’ agreement. The district court 4 denied Plaintiffs’ motion an d Defendants’ malicious abuse of process claim proceeded 5 to a bench trial. The district court found in favor of Defendant s and held that they 6 were entitled to attorney’s fees and costs and punitive damages as a result of 7 Plaintiffs’ actions. The district court also aw arded prejudgment interest at a rate of ten 8 percent and postjudgment interest at a rate of 8.75 percent. 9 {25} Plaintiffs challenge both the legal and factual sufficiencyof the district court’s 10 ruling on Defendants’ counterclaim for malici ous abuse of process. Plaintiffs assert 11 that the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Plaintiffs lacked probable 12 cause to file the breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs further assert that reversal is 13 warranted on the district court’s award of punitive damages and prejudgment interest 14 based on the district court’s legal error. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are actually 15 asking that this Court to “interpret a general provision about ‘love-and-care’ as a 16 completely standardless forfeiture clause thatis entirely subjective in its application.” 17 {26} We apply a substantial evidence standard of review to claims involving the tort 18 of malicious abuse of process. “On appeal, we do not re-w eigh the evidence or 1916 substitute our judgment for that of the fact -finder, but determine whether substantial 1 evidence supports the result reached.” Dawley v. La Puerta Architectural Antiques, 2 Inc. , 2003-NMCA-029, ¶ 12, 133 N.M. 389, 62 P.3d 1271. “In determining whether 3 the evidence is legally sufficient to support th e district court’s decision, we resolve all 4 disputes of fact in favor of the successfulparty and indulge all reasonable inferences 5 in support of the judgment.” Id. In applying the substantial evidence standard of 6 review, “we are mindful that the tort of malicious abuse of proce ss must be construed 7 narrowly to protect the right of access to the courts.” Id. ¶ 13. 8 {27} To establish a claim for malicious abus e of process, the following elements 9 must be met: “(1) the use of process in a judicial pro ceeding that would be improper 10 in the regular prosecution or defense of a cl aim or charge; (2) a primary motive in the 11 use of process to accomplish an ille gitimate end; and (3) damages.” Durham v. Guest , 12 2009-NMSC-007, ¶ 29, 145 N.M. 694, 204 P.3d 19. “A use of process is [considered] 13 irregular or improper if it (1) involves a procedural irregularity or a misuse of 14 procedural devices such as discovery, subpoena s, and attachments, or (2) indicates the 15 wrongful use of proceedings, such as an extortion attempt.” Id. “[Mis]use of process 16 may be shown by (1) filing a complaint without probable cause, or (2) an irregularity 17 or impropriety suggesting extortion, delay, or harassment, or other conduct formerly 1817 actionable under the tort of abuse of process.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, 1 and citation omitted). 2 Use of Process 3 {28} Plaintiffs improperly used the judicial process in bringing and continuing their 4 breach of contract claim knowing that their demand for the return of the dogs was 5 never an available remedy under the contract. See Richardson v. Rutherford, 1990- 6 NMSC-015, ¶ 23, 109 N.M. 495, 787 P.2d 414 (noting that “[s]ome definite act or 7 threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use 8 of the process, is required” and that “[i]t is the abuse of the legal system that is at 9 issue” (emphasis, internal quotati on marks, and citations omitted)). 10 {29} Generally, Plaintiffs are asking this Court to rewrite their contract to impose 11 obligations on Defendants that were never communicated to th em, much less agreed 12 to, and to create a remedy not otherwise provided for in the agreement or by law. In 13 pursuing their claims and prior to filing suit, Plaintiffs’ California counsel 14 misrepresented the facts and nature of the agreement in a demand letter. Plaintiffs’ 15 primary motive throughout this litigation has b een the return of the dogs, despite the 16 fact that they had no such legal recourse. While Plaintiffs expressed a concern for the 17 dogs’ health, they never: (1) asked for the dogs ’ health records or medical records; (2) 18 they never contacted the dogs’ veterinarian , even after getting a letter from their 1918 veterinarian on the dogs’ physical condition, and the propriety of their placement with 1 Defendants; (3) they never did any independent research into the dogs’ current 2 veterinarian; (4) they never asked for additional or updated veterinarian records; (5) 3 they never had an independent veterinarian review the dogs’ records; and finally (6) 4 they never reviewed the veterinarian record s that were produced. There is substantial 5 evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs’ motives were 6 improper. 7 Misuse of Process 8 {30} Plaintiffs contend that they had probable cause to file their lawsuit because they 9 personally visited Defendants’ home to obs erve the condition of the dogs prior to 10 bringing suit and were saddene d to find that the dogs wereoverweight, were not kept 11 separate from the larger dogs, were not getting the level of exercise expected, and they 12 had allergies. Defendants challenge the district court’s “finding” that they did not do 13 a “reasonable” prefiling investigation. The di strict court actually found that Plaintiffs 14 never performed any pre-lawsuit filing inve stigation or any investigation at all to 15 determine the safety of the two dogs being around the larger dogs. 16 {31} Plaintiffs filed their complaint without conducting a reasonable prefiling 17 investigation and proceeded with their claim for purposes of pressuring Defendants 18 to return the dogs to them. “For the purpose of demonstrating misuse of process, 1919 probable cause is defined as the reasonabl e belief, founded on known facts established 1 after a reasonable pre[]filing investigation.” Dawley , 2003-NMCA-029, ¶ 18 (internal 2 quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 {32} As noted earlier, there were only two c onditions allowing for the return of the 4 dogs and Plaintiffs knew that neither condition applied in this case. Plaintiffs’ 5 allegations in their complaint were fals e. Even though Plaintiffs had knowledge of 6 Defendants’ larger dogs prior to drafting th e agreement, they never mentioned their 7 concern about the dogs interacting with th e larger dogs in any correspondence, much 8 less in the agreement itself. Plaintiffs’ credibility also was an issue at trial. Though 9 they claimed not knowing about the three larger dogs until their visit to Defendants’ 10 home, they were discredited with two photographs they had received prior to their 11 visit that showed the larger dogs with the dogs in their presence. The district court 12 found that Plaintiffs knew the dogs would be around the larger dogs at the time they 13 entered into the agreement. In addition, Plaintiffs never performed any prefiling 14 investigation, to any degree, to determine whether it was safe for the dogs to be 15 around the larger dogs, and whether or not their interactions would result in the 16 deterioration of the dogs’ health. Despite knowledge of these false allegations in the 17 complaint, Plaintiffs never ame nded or withdrew the allegations. 1820 {33} Plaintiffs also engaged in harassing behavior. Plaintiffs contacted the 1 Defendants multiple times by email, reques ting the return of the dogs. Even after 2 Defendants cut off all communication withPlaintiffs and blocked their email, 3 Plaintiffs created new email addresse s and continued to contact Defendants 4 nonetheless. The district court found that the purpose of this ongoing harassing 5 communication was to get Defendants to return the dogs to them. 6 {34} Plaintiffs’ assertion that they had probabl e cause to file their claim based solely 7 on their personal visit to Defendants’ home to observe the well-being of the dogs does 8 not fulfill their obligation to complete a prefiling investigation, much less a reasonable 9 one. Plaintiffs acknowledged before the distri ct court that they could not get the dogs 10 back unless Defendants predeceased the dogs or they no longer wanted them. As the 11 district court properly noted, neither situation was present. 12 {35} There was no remedy available to Plainti ffs simply because they disagreed with 13 the manner in which the dogs were being caredfor, or because they were experiencing 14 regret as a result of selling them. Even if wewere to consider that such a remedy could 15 have existed under such circumstances , Plaintiffs’ reliance on an animal 16 communicator, and their refusal to consult with the licensed veterinarians who were 17 treating the dogs or inspect their records was not reasonable for purposes of 18 conducting a prefiling investigation. 1921 {36} Before filing their lawsuit, Plaintiffs were legally obligated to investigate the 1 facts of their claim in an objective, di spassionate manner. Substantial evidence 2 supports the district court’s findings that Plai ntiffs lacked probable cause to file their 3 breach of contract claim and that they engaged in behavior illustrating harassment. 4 Plaintiffs lacked a reasonable factual basis for filing this lawsu it based on their belief 5 that the dogs would be better cared for under their watch. 6 Damages 7 {37} Finally, it is undisputed that Defendants incurred damages in defending this 8 lawsuit, their attorney’s fees and costs. Weconclude that the district court’s factual 9 and legal findings are supporte d by substantial evidence, and we therefore affirm its 10 judgment entered in favor of Defendants on their countercl aim for malicious abuse of 11 process. 12 Punitive Damages and Prejudgment Interest on Punitive Damages 13 {38} Plaintiffs argue that even if this Court affirms the malicious abuse of process 14 judgment, it should nonetheless reverse the award of punitive damages and 15 prejudgment interest at ten percent. Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s 16 award of attorney’s fees and costs, or postjudgment interest. The district court 17 awarded Defendants $50,000 in punitive damage s, plus prejudgment interest at ten 18 percent. Plaintiffs argue that the distri ct court’s decision “is founded on the court’s 1922 mistaken belief that the Plaintiffs pro ceeded in bad faith with a claim which no 1 reasonable person could have possibly viewed as valid.” 2 {39} On appeal, we review for substantial evidence the district court’s findings 3 underlying an award of punitive damages. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Diamond D. 4 Constr. Co. , 2001-NMCA-082, ¶ 36, 131 N.M. 100, 33 P.3d 651. “Substantial 5 evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 6 support a conclusion.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that the district court’s award of punitive 7 damages is based on a misapprehension of the law, but do not address the amount of 8 the punitive damages. Plaintiffs do not contest the district court’s specific factual 9 finding: “Plaintiffs’ [actions] were intentional, willful, wanton, reckless, and done in 10 bad faith.” Based on the district court’s undisputed finding of fact as well as our 11 discussion of the pertinent facts, there is substantial evidence to support the district 12 court’s award of punitive damages. We affirm the district court’s $50,000 punitive 13 damage award to Defendants. 14 {40} It appears that the district court applie d prejudgment interest to the entire award 15 of $94,199.99. Plaintiffs argue that punitiv e damages are not subject to prejudgment 16 interest. We agree. This Court has held that punitive damages awards are not subject 17 to prejudgment interest. See Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc. , 1998-NMCA-021, ¶¶ 53, 18 55, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089 (noting that by the very nature of punitive damages, 1923 they are a windfall on an otherwise fullycompensated party, thus to allow 1 prejudgment interest on punitive damages w ould only compound that recovery). This 2 Court concludes that Defe ndants were not entitled to prejudgment interest on the 3 punitive damages portion of the award. 4 {41} Prejudgment interest is authorized by NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4 (2004). The 5 purpose of prejudgment interest is to “foster settlement and prevent delay in all types 6 of litigation.” Weidler , 1998-NMCA-021, ¶ 52. The decision to award prejudgment 7 is “left to the discretion of the [district] court.” Gonzales v. N.M. Dep’t of Health , 8 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 38, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550; see § 56-8-4(B). In order for this 9 Court to find an abuse of disc retion, the Plaintiffs have “the burden [to] prove[] that 10 the district court’s decision is c ontrary to all logic and reason.” DeLisle v. Avallone , 11 1994-NMCA-012, ¶ 33, 117 N.M. 602, 874 P.2d 1266. Plaintiffs argue that the district 12 court’s award of prejudgment interest is based on a misapprehension of the law. 13 Based on the foregoing discussion, the districtcourt’s decision is not contrary to all 14 logic and reason. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 15 awarding Defendants ten percent prejudgment interest. 16 CONCLUSION 17 {42} We affirm both the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor 18 of Defendants, and its award of damages on Defendants’ counterclaim for malicious 1924 abuse of process for attorney fees and costs, prejudgment and postjudgment interest 1 for those fees and costs. We affirm the di strict court’s award of punitive damages and 2 postjudgment interest on those damages. Wereverse the district court’s award of 3 prejudgment interest as it applies to the punitive damages, and remand this matter to 4 the district court to correct the judgment accordingly. 5 {43} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 8 WE CONCUR: 9

10 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 11

12 EMIL KIEHNE, Judge 13