COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Bumgardner and Clements 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

STACEY W. JOHNSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1216-01-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 APRIL 9, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK 

Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge 

 Christopher P. Reagan, Assistant Public 

Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Stacey W. Johnson (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial 

for being an accessory after the fact to burglary, a violation of 

Code § 18.2-19. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the conviction. Finding no error, we 

affirm the trial court. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) 

(citation omitted). The credibility of the witnesses, the 

weight accorded testimony, and the inferences drawn from the 

proven facts are matters to be determined by the fact finder. 

See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 

476 (1989). The judgment of the trial court will not be 

disturbed unless plainly wrong or unsupported by evidence. See

Code § 8.01-680. 

I. 

 On November 9, 2000, the Suffolk home of Jennifer Savage 

was burglarized. Property stolen from the residence included 

"two TV sets," "a VCR," "stereo," "cordless phone," "cellular 

telephone," "many jewelry items," "two jewelry boxes," and "a 

long ["dark"] duffel bag" containing "$700 worth of fragrances." 

Defendant was subsequently indicted in the trial court for the 

related offenses, statutory burglary and grand larceny. 

 At trial, defendant's "girlfriend," Kerry Leigh, testified 

she had accompanied defendant and Eddie Baul to the Savage home 

on the early evening of the offenses. Baul, driving Leigh's 

vehicle, "parked on the side of the house with the bushes," and 

he and defendant exited the car and disappeared from Leigh's 

view. After "about twenty minutes . . . thirty minutes," 

defendant returned to the vehicle, followed "a little while 

later" by Baul carrying "[s]tereo equipment," "a VCR," "a bottle 

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of liquor" and "[a] bunch of small stuff." At Baul's request, 

defendant "help[ed] him get [a] TV into the car," and Baul 

"finished throwing the stuff in the back seat." The three 

proceeded to an apartment "where [Baul] was staying," and 

defendant and Baul "unloaded" "a TV and stereo equipment" into 

the carport. 

 The following morning, Paul Fiorentino, Leigh's "upstairs 

neighbor," noticed defendant "coming out from underneath 

[Fiorentino's] pickup truck with a large black satchel." In 

"[a]n hour or so," Fiorentino encountered Jennifer Savage, 

learned her "house got robbed last night" and recounted his 

earlier observations of defendant. Police were summoned, and a 

search of the area yielded Savage's "day planner underneath 

[Fiorentino's] truck" and the cellular telephone taken from the 

Savage home. Upon further investigation, additional articles 

stolen during the burglary were recovered from Leigh's apartment 

and the carport at Baul's residence. 

 At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court was 

unable to "determine beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] 

broke into the home or was present at the time of the break-in," 

but found "beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that [defendant] was 

present following the completion of the break-in, . . . assisted 

. . . in the carrying away of property . . . taken . . . [and] 

. . . knew . . . there was a break-in in order to produce that 

property." Accordingly, the trial court convicted defendant as 

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an accessory after the fact to burglary, a violation of Code 

§ 18.2-19, resulting in the instant appeal. 

II. 

 Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

prove the offense,1 arguing the Commonwealth failed to establish 

"beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] encouraged, aided or 

abetted Baul in breaking into and entering the Savage 

residence." 

 The definition of an accessory after 

the fact is one of ancient origin. "To 

constitute one an accessory after the fact, 

three things are requisite: 1. The felony 

must be completed; 2. He must know that the 

felon is guilty; 3. He must receive, 

relieve, comfort or assist him. It is 

necessary that the accessory have notice, 

direct or implied, at the time he assists or 

comforts the felon, that he has committed a 

felony." 

Manley v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 642, 644-45, 283 S.E.2d 207, 208 

(1981) (quoting Wren v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 952, 

956 (1875)); see also Commonwealth v. Dalton, 259 Va. 249, 254, 

524 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2000). 

 Here, Leigh testified that defendant traveled with Baul to 

the Savage residence at the time of the offenses, disappeared 

with him into the darkened area surrounding the home, waited for 

him to return with an array of stolen articles, and assisted him 

 1

 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 

indictment to properly charge the offense. See Commonwealth v. 

Dalton, 259 Va. 249, 524 S.E.2d 860 (2000). 

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in loading and secreting much of such property. Thus, Leigh's 

testimony, corroborated by other evidence before the court, 

established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant assisted 

Baul following the burglary, with knowledge of the offense and 

Baul's involvement in it. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.

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