J-A26001-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDREA MICHELLE WELLS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1449 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 10, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0004079-2018

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2019

Appellant, Andrea Michelle Wells, appeals from the judgment of 

sentenced entered on September 10, 2018, following her conviction of one 

count of theft by deception.1 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

Maggie Chou testified that in December 2017, she was a 

student at Carnegie Mellon University[.] Chou testified that she 

was walking to class on December 4, 201[7], when a car stopped 

in the middle of the street and Appellant rolled down her window 

and asked Chou for help. Appellant told her that Appellant’s 

mother had suffered a stroke and was in the hospital, and 

Appellant needed gas money because she left her home in such a 

hurry that she forgot her wallet. Appellant seemed frantic to 

Chou. Appellant asked for $30, but Chou said she did not have 

any money on her person. Appellant offered to drive Chou to an 

ATM to withdraw some money for her. Chou took $20 out of the 

ATM and gave [it] to Appellant. Chou testified that Appellant told 

her that Appellant would pay her back. Chou stated that Appellant 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1).
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gave her a phone number to reach her to arrange repayment. 

Appellant told Chou the number as she entered it into her phone. 

To insure that she had read the correct number, Chou read the 

number back to Appellant and called the number in Appellant’s 

presence. Chou later called the number Appellant gave her in an 

attempt to obtain repayment, but no one ever answered. Chou 

estimated that she called the number over fifteen times. Chou 

also testified that as Appellant drove away, Chou observed the 

first three letters of Appellant’s license plate were “HXX.” Chou 

identified Appellant in court as the person to whom she gave the 

money. 

Officer Jeremy Norton of the Cranberry Township Police 

Department testified that in December 2017 he was employed as 

a Carnegie Mellon University police officer. He testified that he 

took the complaint from Chou, and that she gave him the partial 

plate information. Based on the information from Chou and 

previous reports with that registration plate, Appellant was

identified as a suspect. A photo line-up was conducted and 

Appellant was arrested. 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/19, at 3 (internal citations omitted).

As a result, Appellant was charged with one count of theft by deception. 

Following a nonjury trial on September 10, 2018, Appellant was convicted of 

that charge. On the same date, the trial court sentenced Appellant to one 

year of probation, and ordered her to pay $20.00 in restitution, have no 

contact with Ms. Chou or Carnegie Mellon University, and continue drug and 

alcohol treatment. N.T., 9/10/28, at 36. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on 

October 10, 2018. Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Where the Commonwealth presented only evidence showing 

that [Appellant] failed to return $20.00 within three days, but not 

showing any intent by [Appellant] to deceive Ms. Chou or to never 

return the $20.00, whether the Commonwealth offered sufficient 

evidence to prove [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
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II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt’s stated rationale in support of 

its verdict destroyed [Appellant’s] presumption of innocence and 

shifted the burden of proof to [Appellant]?

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

In her first issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty of theft by deception. 

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Specifically, Appellant maintains that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish both that Appellant intended to deprive Ms. 

Chou of her money and that Appellant intentionally deceived Ms. Chou to 

obtain the $20.00. Id. Accordingly, Appellant asserts, her conviction for theft 

by deception must be overturned and vacated. Id.

The standard for evaluating sufficiency claims is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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For a defendant to be convicted of theft by deception, he must 

“intentionally obtain[ ] or withhold[ ] property of another by deception.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3922(a). Deception is defined as intentionally creating or reinforcing 

a false impression, “including false impressions as to law, value, intention or 

other state of mind.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). The Commonwealth must also 

show that the victim relied on the false impression created or reinforced by 

the defendant. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 848 A.2d 977, 983 (Pa. Super. 

2004).

In addressing this issue, the trial court concluded:

This [c]ourt reasonably determined from the evidence 

admitted at trial that Appellant had taken money from the victim 

with no intention of returning it. “Intent can be proven by direct 

or circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct 

or from the attendant circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Roche, 

783 A.2d 766, 768 (Pa.Super.2001), appeal denied, 798 A.2d 

1289 (Pa. 2002). Appellant provided the victim with her phone 

number. Chou confirmed the number with Appellant, and called 

it over fifteen times in the next three days, without any answer 

from Appellant. From these facts, this [c]ourt reasonably 

concluded that Appellant had the intent to deceive Chou into 

giving Appellant money, with no intention whatsoever of repaying 

the money to Chou. Based on the totality of the circumstances, 

the elements of the offense have been established beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and Appellant’s claim of error is without merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/19, at 4-5. 

We agree. The evidence of record establishes that Appellant stopped 

Ms. Chou, a student at Carnegie Mellon University, on campus while Ms. Chou 

was on her way to class. N.T., 9/10/18, at 11-12. Appellant stopped her car 

in the middle of the street to ask Ms. Chou for money. Id. at 12. Ms. Chou 
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testified that Appellant was frantic. Id. at 13. Appellant told Ms. Chou that 

Appellant’s mother had a stroke, and that Appellant had rushed out of her 

home so quickly that she had forgotten her phone and wallet, and needed 

money for gas. Id. at 12-13. Although Ms. Chou had no money on her, she 

agreed to have Appellant drive her to a nearby ATM so she could withdraw 

money to give to Appellant. Id. at 13. Ms. Chou gave Appellant $20.00. Id.

Ms. Chou testified that Appellant reassured her that Appellant would repay the 

money that night. Id. at 14. In support of this assertion, Ms. Chou testified 

as follows:

[Prosecutor]: What happened then after you gave the money to

[Appellant]?

[Ms. Chou]: Well, she reassured me that she would return the 

money back to me. She asked me where I live and said that she 

would give it to me that night. And she gave me a phone number, 

which I called and it rang. And after that, she dropped me off at

the end of Craig [Street] and she went on her way.

[Prosecutor]: Before you got the money out, did she tell you that 

she was going to pay you back?

[Ms. Chou]: Yes, she did.

Id. In addition to obtaining Appellant’s phone number, Ms. Chou also stated

that she made note of Appellant’s vehicle and remembered the first three 

letters of Appellant’s license plate number. Id. at 14-15. 

Ms. Chou explained that on that same evening, she began to call the 

telephone number that Appellant had given her, but the phone rang with no 

answer. Id. at 15. The two had arranged to schedule a time to meet for 
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Appellant to repay the money to Ms. Chou. Id. at 16. Ms. Chou also explained 

that she told Appellant where she lived on campus, and that Appellant had 

told Ms. Chou that she was an alumnus of Carnegie Mellon University. Id. at 

16-17. Ms. Chou continued to try to reach Appellant on the telephone number 

provided, to no avail. Id. at 16. Ms. Chou testified that she attempted to call 

Appellant multiple times over the course of the next few days, estimating that 

she had attempted to call “over 15 times.” Id. After being unable to contact 

Appellant over the course of several days, Ms. Chou reported the incident to 

police on December 7, 2017. Id. at 19. 

Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we agree that there was sufficient evidence that Appellant 

obtained $20.00 from Ms. Chou by deception. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a). The 

evidence supports the conclusion that Appellant deceived Ms. Chou by 

intentionally creating the false impression that she was borrowing the money 

with the intent to return it. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). The evidence further 

supports the conclusion that Ms. Chou relied on the false representation in 

agreeing to loan Appellant the money. Sanchez, 848 A.2d at 983. Thus, 

there was sufficient evidence to establish the elements of the crime of theft 

by deception, and Appellant is entitled to no relief on this claim.

Appellant next argues that the trial court impermissibly relieved the 

Commonwealth of its burden to prove Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt by requiring her to prove her innocence. Appellant’s Brief at 30. 
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Appellant maintains that the trial court’s statements required her to prove that 

she made some attempt to return the $20.00 to Ms. Chou. Id. Appellant 

identifies the following remarks made by the trial court as support for her 

position:

This victim did make significant efforts to ensure that she could 

get her money back, including getting a phone number, entering 

it into her phone, reading it back to [Appellant], calling the 

number to ensure that it was a valid number and that it did ring.

While Ms. Chou does not recall whether or not she gave her own 

phone number to [Appellant], she does recall giving her address, 

the location that she was residing in. She recalls that [Appellant] 

indicated that she was an alumn[us]. There’s no indication

that [Appellant] made any effort to either go to the 

dormitory, or to the university to locate Ms. Chou to return 

the money or once identified, indicated that she made 

efforts to repay that.

[Appellant] was identified by her license plate as well as her photo. 

I think all the circumstantial evidence taken together does prove 

that she intended to take this money without returning it. I find 

her guilty.

Id. at 35-36 (quoting N.T., 9/10/18, at 32-33)2 (emphasis in original). 

Accordingly, Appellant asserts that: “[Appellant] is entitled to a new trial as 

a result, since this burden-shifting violated [Appellant’s] constitutional rights 

to due process, a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and against selfincrimination under the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions.” Id. at 30. 

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2 The notes of testimony reflect that no objection was made to the trial court’s 

statement at the nonjury trial. N.T., 9/10/18, at 33-37.
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We first note that Appellant has raised this issue for the first time on 

appeal in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. It is well-settled that “[i]ssues 

not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time 

on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Issues must be raised prior to trial, during 

trial, or in a timely post-sentence motion to be preserved for appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Melendez–Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1288–1289 (Pa. 

2004)(en banc). “[A] party cannot rectify the failure to preserve an issue by 

proffering it in response to a Rule 1925(b) order.” Id. at 1288 (citation 

omitted). 

Appellant failed to provide any indication of how or when she raised and 

preserved the issue for our review. “[I]t is not the responsibility of this Court 

to scour the record to prove that an appellant has raised an issue before the 

trial court, thereby preserving it for appellate review.” Commonwealth v. 

Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 502 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008). Nevertheless, upon review 

of the record it appears that Appellant did not raise the claim before the trial 

court or in a timely post-sentence motion. Because Appellant raised the claim 

for the first time in her Rule 1925(b) statement, this issue is waived.

Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009).

Even if this issue had not been waived, we would find no merit to 

Appellant’s claim. As noted previously, the evidence presented was sufficient 

to establish the elements of the crime of theft by deception. The trial court’s 

observation that Appellant made no effort to return the money to Ms. Chou 
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was another piece of evidence that supported the conclusion that Appellant 

had taken the money from Ms. Chou by deception and had no intention of 

repaying her. Accordingly, had the issue not been waived, we would conclude 

that there is no merit to Appellant’s claim. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/12/2019