*

 District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

 

________________

No. 94-10088

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TERRY BURTON KIMBROUGH,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

__________________________________________________

November 9, 1995

Before REAVLEY and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and PRADO*, District Judge.

EDWARD C. PRADO, District Judge:

Terry Burton Kimbrough appeals his convictions for two counts under Title 18

U.S.C. Section 2252(a)(2) and 2 for receipt of child pornography and for two counts under Title 18

U.S.C. Section 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2 for possession of child pornography. For the following reasons,

his conviction is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

BACKGROUND

In 1992, the United States Customs Service (USSC) became aware of a computer

bulletin board system (BBS) in Denmark known as BAMSE. USSC began to investigate BAMSE

and discovered theBBS wasinvolved in the international distribution of pornography, including child

pornography, via computer. USSC also uncovered two additional Danish BBS’s which included child
2

pornography. Subscribers to these BBS’s can transport or “download” Graphic Interchange Format

(GIF) filesthrough modems attached to their computers. Once downloaded, the files can be viewed

as pictures on the computer screen and they can be printed. Further investigation disclosed that a

person identifyinghimself as TerryKimbrough with the defendant’s office address and phone number

had downloaded two GIF files containing child pornography. 

In February of 1993, USSC held a three-day briefing for its agents on its

investigation, known as Operation Long Arm, into the illegal importation of child pornography from

computer bulletin boards. The agents received training regarding the applicable law, technical

methods for computer searches and seizures and evidence handling. After the training program,

Agents Kemp Johnson and Eric Rembold commenced further investigation of Kimbrough and, based

on the information uncovered, eventually applied for search warrants for Kimbrough’s home and

business in Abilene, Texas.

. OnMarch4, 1993, agents executed searchwarrantsfor Kimbrough’s residence and

business. During the execution of the warrants, they seized a number of items including computers

and computer related equipment, computer disks and accessories, videocassette and audio cassette

tapes, magazines, receipts, ledgers, and various records. Among the seized materials were several

depictions of child pornography primarily recovered from the computer equipment. 

Kimbrough was indicted in Count 1 and Count 2 for knowingly receiving, by

computer, a visual depiction, which had been transported in interstate commerce and the production

of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct in violation of Title 18

U.S.C. Sections 2252(a)(2) and 2; in Count 3 of knowingly possessing three or more matters which

contain visual depictions that had been shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce,

the production of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and which

visual depictions were ofsuch conduct in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2;

inCount 4 of knowingly possessing three or more matters which contain visual depictions, produced

using materials which had been transported by anymeans, including interstate and foreign commerce,

the production of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and which
3

visual depictions were ofsuch conduct in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2;

in Counts 5-7 of knowingly using a means of interstate commerce for the purpose of transporting

obscene material in interstate commerce in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 1465 and 2; and in

Count 8 of forfeiture pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2253(a). The Government subsequently

dropped Counts 5, 6 and 7. After a jury trial, Kimbrough was found guilty of Counts 1-4 and

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 72 months as to Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment and 60

months as to Counts 3 and 4, with all sentences to run concurrently.

DISCUSSION

Legality of Search and Seizure Issue

Kimbrough contends that the search warrants were unconstitutional on their face

because, considering that many of the items were “presumptively protected speech,” the warrants

failed to sufficiently specify with particularity the items to be seized. The warrants sought seizure of

Tapes, cassettes, cartridges, streaming tape, commercial

software and manuals, hardware, computer disks, disk drives,

monitors, computer printers, modems, tape drives, disk

application programs, data disks, system disk operating systems,

magneticmedia-floppydisks, CD ROMs, tape systems and hard

drive, other computer related operational equipment, and other

similar materials in addition to, magazines, photographs,

negatives, photographic slides, video cassette tapes or other

visual depictions or equipment used to visually depict a minor

engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and, bills,

correspondence,receipts, ledgers, Postalreceipts and telephone

records all of which show orders and deliveries to or from any

known foreign or domestic distributer of child pornography.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits issuance of general warrants allowing officials

to burrow through a person’s possessions looking for any evidence of a crime. Andreson v.

Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2748, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). A warrant must

particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or thingsto be seized. Id.; United States

v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1722, 131 L. Ed 2d 580

(1995). In testing whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire

whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what

items are to be seized. Layne, 43 F.3d at 132. In circumstances where detailed particularity is
 

2

 Kimbrough relies primarily on Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1708, 6 L.

Ed. 2d 1127 (1961); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, (1965);

Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S. Ct. 2319, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920 (1979); and Fort

Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 109 S. Ct. 916, 103 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1989).

 

3

 Kimbrough’s complaints regarding the broad seizure of his records and other papers are best

addressed in the portion of this opinion focused on the execution of the warrants. The warrants’

authorization for seizure of “bills, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, Postal receipts and

telephone records all of which show orders and deliveries to or from any known foreign or

domestic distributer of child pornography” are certainly sufficiently particular to withstand

scrutiny. See United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that seizure of

evidentiary materials does not implicate the First Amendment concerns implicated by seizures

based on ideas); United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446

U.S. 957, 100 S. Ct. 2928, 64 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1980) (finding a warrant for “records, documents

and writings related to the transportation, sale and distribution in interstate commerce of lewd,

lascivious and filthy films” to describe the things to be seized with sufficient particularity); United

4

impossible, generic language is permissible if it particularizes the types of items to be seized. Id. In

cases where warrants seek to seize material presumptively protected by the First Amendment, the

level to which the items to be seized must be particularly described is heightened. Marcus v. Search

Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731, 81 S. Ct. 1708, 1716, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1961). 

The warrants here are sufficiently particular to withstand Kimbrough’s challenge.

The language in the warrants properly limited the executing officers’ discretion by informing them

what items were to be seized. See Layne, 43 F.3d at 132-33 (holding that a warrant seeking “Child

pornography;records ofvictims;drawings;pictures; computer disks; sexual devices; videotapes; child

abuse books; magazines; audio tapes; and any other obscene or child pornographic material” was

particular enough to limit the officer’s discretion). 

Kimbrough’s reliance on cases involving obscenity is misplaced.2 The

determination of which presumptively protected materials are obscene is a legal one and, therefore,

not to be left to the discretion of the executing officers. Identification of visual depictions of minors

engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in comparison, is a factual determination that leaves little

latitude to the officers. See Id.; See also United States v. Hurt, 808 F.2d 707, 708 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 816, 108 S. Ct. 69, 98 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1987) (“Any rational adult person can

recognize sexually explicit conduct engaged in by children under the age of 16 when he sees it.”)

(emphasis in original). We therefore find this contention to be without merit.3
States v. Jacobs, 513 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding a warrant for “certain documents

pertaining to the interstate shipment of obscene materials” to survive scrutiny). 

5

Kimbroughfurther contends that, even assuming the warrants were valid, they were

illegallyexecuted. He argues that the law enforcement agents seized virtually every record, document

and paper found at the premises, and confiscated every video and audio cassette tape. The

Government denies that the search was overbroad. Specifically, the Government, through the

testimony of Agent Johnson at the suppression hearing before the trial court, argues that the seizure

of all video and audio tapes was necessary because the titles of such tapes were not dispositive of

their content and that the absence or presence of child pornography in such items could not be

determined by a cursory examination on the premises. 

Blatant disregard by executing officers of the language of a search warrant can

transform an otherwise valid search into a general one and, thus, mandate suppression of all evidence

seized during the search. United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978); United States

v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1988). The execution of a search warrant “must be one

directed in good faith toward the objects specified in the warrant.” Gurleski v. United States, 405

F.2d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981, 89 S. Ct. 2140, 23 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1969).

Kimbrough has failed to meet his burden of proof in challenging the execution of

the search warrants. See United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Virgo, 413 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1969). The fact that the executing officers chose not

to review each video tape, audio tape and document on the premises does not make this search

presumptively invalid. While the executing officers seized numerous documents that were later

determined to be irrelevant to the case against Kimbrough, the record reflects significant numbers of

documents were left at the scenes after an initial review showed them to be not within the scope of

the warrants. Kimbrough has not directed our attention to specific examples of seized items that

would demonstrate an absence of the executing officers’ good faith belief that the items were

described in the warrants. We find this argument to be without merit. 
 

4Count 3 charges Kimbrough with 

On or about March 4, 1993, . . . knowingly possess[ing] three (3) or more matters

which contain visual depictions that had been shipped and transported in interstate

and foreign commerce by computer, the production of which involved the use of a

minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and which visual depictions were of

such conduct, to wit, matters entitled: 

‘CHERRYA.GIF’

‘CHERRYB.GIF’

‘CHERRYC.GIF’

‘WC221501.GIF’

‘LITSIS.GIF’ 

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2. 

Count 4 charges Kimbrough with

On or about March 4, 1993, . . . knowingly possess[ing] three (3) or more matters

which contain visual depictions which were produced using materials which had

been transported, by any means, including interstate and foreign commerce, the

production of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit

conduct and which visual depictions were of such conduct, to wit, matters entitled:

‘MBON006.JPG’

‘MBON007.JPG’

‘DS-X-219.GIF’

‘INNOCNT.JPC’

‘KID013,GIF’ 

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2. 

6

Multiplicitious Counts Issue

Kimbrough contends that Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment against him are

multiplicitous and should have been dismissed or the Government should have been required to elect

a single count on which to proceed.4 We review trial court rulings on multiplicity claims de novo.

United States v. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108, 1112 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 605,

126 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1993). The rule against multiplicity stems from the 5th Amendment to the

Constitution which forbids placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for one offense. The rule prohibits

the Government from charging a single offense in several counts and is intended to prevent multiple

punishmentsfor the same act. Id.; United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1401 (5thCir. 1992), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __; 113 S. Ct. 1643, 123 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1993); United States v. Hurt, 795 F.2d 765,

774 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 707 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816,

108 S. Ct. 69, 98 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1987). Kimbrough raised this challenge to the charges against him
7

prior to trial by way of a motion to dismiss and at trial as part of his motion for judgment of acquittal.

The trial court denied both requests. 

The Appellee first argues that the grouping of the offenses by the trial court under

the Sentencing Guidelinesremoved the danger ofmultiple punishments. It contends that for “offenses

that are to be grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, the applicability of a single punishment prevents any

Fifth or Eighth Amendment violations.” This argument completely misstates applicable law. This

Court has explicitly held that for double jeopardy purposes, sentences are not truly concurrent where

a mandatory special assessment is separately imposed on each conviction. United States v. Berry,

977 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1992). Kimbrough’s sentence included mandatory special assessments

for each count. Furthermore, the Supreme Court precedent clearly holds that, for purposes of double

jeopardy, a “separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse . . .

consequences.” Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865, 105 S. Ct. 1668, 1673, 84 L.Ed.2d 740

(1985). 

The Appellee next argues that the materials that give rise to the two possessionbased counts are different because the materialsin Count 3 were themselvestransported in interstate

commerce while the materials referenced in Count 4 were produced using materials that had been

transported in interstate commerce. The Appellee attempts to compare the separate counts here with

counts charging possession ofseparate drugs or weapons. However, each count charges possession

of “three or more” items and, under the particular facts of this case, each of the itemslisted in counts

3 and 4 both traveled in commerce (via the computer) and was produced using materialsthat traveled

in interstate or foreign commerce.

Both Counts 3 and 4 charge violations of the same statute on or about the same

date and both involve possession of three or more items. The only difference between the charges

relied on by the government in their brief is the jurisdictional element -- whether the pictures or the

materials used to produce them traveled in commerce. We find this distinction to be artificial and an
§

 We decline to employ the Appellee’s suggestion that the charges in question pass the

different-element test articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct.

180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1932). That test applies to determinations of whether Congress

intended the same conduct to be punishable under two criminal provisions. By contrast, Counts 3

and 4 both charge a violation of the same criminal provision. See Sanabria v. United States, 437

U.S. 54, 70 n. 24, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2182 n. 24, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1978). That criminal provision

states, in relevant part,

(B) [Any person who] knowingly possesses 3 or more books, magazines,

periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction

that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed or so

shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if-

(I) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in

sexually explicit conduct; and

(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct;

shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

Title 18 U.S.C. §2252(a)(4)(B).

 

6

 It is this language that distinguishes the offense of possession of child pornography from the

offenses of transporting and receiving child pornography for purposes of the multiplicity

argument. Cf. United States v. Cipollone, 951 F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir. 1991).

8

unlawful attempt to divide a single offense into multiple offenses.5 See Sanabria v. United States, 437

U.S. 54, 66 n. 20, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2180 n. 20, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1978)(“A single offense should

normally be charged in one count rather than several, even if different means of committing the

offense are alleged.”) 

We must defer to the legislature’s determination of whether a specific course of

conduct constitutes one or more separate crimes. Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 70, 98 S. Ct. at 2182, 57 L.

Ed. 2d 43. In construing this statute, we look first to the plain language chosen by Congress. United

States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 942 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1389, 131

L. Ed. 2d 241 (1995). In this case, the plain language of the statute’s requirement that a defendant

possess “three or more” items indicates that the legislature did not intend for this statute to be used

to charge multiple offenses.

6

 Furthermore, to the extent that the statute can be considered

ambiguous, the rule oflenity requires usto resolve that ambiguity in favor of Kimbrough. See United
9

States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 936, 943 n. 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 481, 121

L. Ed. 2d 386 (1992)(“WhenCongressfailsto indicate the allowable unit of prosecution with clarity,

doubt asto congressional intent should be resolved in favor of lenity for the accused.”) We find that

Counts 3 and 4 of Kimbrough’s indictment are multiplicitous. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S.

81, 84, 75 S. Ct. 620, 622, 99 L. Ed. 905 (1955) (holding “if Congress does not fix the punishment

for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be respolved against turning a single

transacion into multiple offenses”). Therefore, the trial court should vacate Kimbrough’s conviction

on either of Counts 3 or 4. See Heath, 970 F.2d at 1402; Brechtel, 997 F.2d at 1112. 

Kimbrough further argues that his entire conviction should be reversed as he has

been prejudiced by the multiplicitous indictment through the possibility that the repeated assertions

of details regarding the two counts could have confused the jury by suggesting that several crimes

were committed rather than one. We do not find that the trial court’s refusal to dismiss one of the

two countsrequiresreversal of Kimbrough’s entire conviction. The trial court charged the jury that,

“Each count and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately.” Kimbrough has not

presented specific factual allegations of potential confusion. We find that Kimbrough has failed to

demonstrate that any jury confusion was sufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

Access to Evidence Issues

Kimbrough next argues that the Government’s refusal to allow him to copy the

items of evidence charged in the indictment and in restricting his access to the evidence violated his

constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel. On September 10, 1993,

the trial court granted Kimbrough’s motion for discovery to the extent that it requested information

discoverable pursuant to FederalRule ofCriminal Procedure 16 and the lines of casesstemming from

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). The court ordered the government

to “make discovery and give inspection” on or before September 17, 1993. 

Kimbrough’s motion had requested inspection and copying of the materials in
10

question. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides in relevant part:

Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the

defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers,

documents, photographs [and] tangible objects . . . which are

within the possession . . . of the government . . . and which are

material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense or are

intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the

trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1)(C). Despite Kimbrough’s requests and the language of Rule 16, the

Government refused to allow Kimbrough to copy the charged items of child pornography. 

Kimbrough moved for dismissal of Counts 1-4 of the indictment based on the Government’s refusal

to allow copying. He also moved for a continuance and to designate the matter as a “complex case”

pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. §3161(8)(B)(ii). In response, the government

offered to take the child pornography to Kimbrough’s expert to save the expert the trip to San

Angelo. The Government also offered to allow Kimbrough to examine the child pornography at the

United StatesCustoms Service office, the United States Attorney’s office or defense counsel’s office.

The trial court denied Kimbrough’s motions.

Child pornography is illegal contraband. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4); Tex. Penal

Code § 43.26; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-59, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3354-55, 73 L. Ed. 2d

1113 (1982). We decline to find that Rule 16 provides such contraband can be distributed to, or

copied by, the defense. However, even if there was a Rule 16 violation, Kimbrough’s argument fails.

The Government’s offer to make the materials available for inspection but not to allow them to be

copied wasreasonable. Furthermore, Kimbrough has failed to demonstrate that any actual prejudice

arose from his inability to procure copies of the charged items. His conclusory assertion that the

amount of material seized and the time it took the Government agents to review the material

demonstrates he was precluded from having an adequate opportunity to review the material and

obtain an expert for trial is simply insufficient. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 663, 104

S. Ct. 2039, 2049, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (“Neither the period of time that the Government spent

investigating the case, nor the number of documentsthat its agentsreviewed during that investigation,

is necessarily relevant to the question whether a competent lawyer could prepare to defend the case
11

in [the time available]. The Government’s task of finding and assembling admissible evidence that

will carry its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is entirely different from the

defendant’s task in preparing to deny or rebut a criminal charge.”) We find that any prejudice or

technical violation of Rule 16 is insufficient to comprise a deprivation of Kimbrough’s constitutional

rights. We therefore find this contention to be without merit.

 Fair Trial Issues

Kimbrough contends that he was denied a fair trial because he was refused an

adequate opportunity to prepare for trial and because the District Court admitted numerous

Government exhibits despite the Government having listed them as exhibits on the day of trial. A

trial court’s denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, viewed in light of all the

circumstances, and requires a defendant to show serious prejudice. United States v. Kelly, 973 F.2d

1145, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v Terrell, 754 F.2d 1139, 1149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

472 U.S. 1029, 105 S. Ct. 3505, 87 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1985).

One month before trial, Kimbrough filed a motion pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C.

Section 3161(8)B(ii) requesting a continuance based in part on his counsel’s desire to have access

to the charged material. The following day, September 10, 1993, the Government sent Kimbrough’s

counsel a telefax indicating that the materialsseized fromKimbrough’sresidence and business would

be available for viewing the week of September 20th through the 24th of 1993. Kimbrough then filed

a supplement to his motion for continuance arguing that the Government’s “delay in making available

to the defense all material in this case, [rendered] it impossible for [him] to be adequately prepared

for trial by October 4, 1993.” The trial court denied both motions without elaboration. 

On October 6, 1993, the Government tendered its exhibit list containing 20

exhibits. The morning of trial, the Government submitted an amended exhibit list containing more

than 70 exhibits. Kimbrough objected on the record to the introduction of these new exhibits. The

Government responded that the earlier exhibit list had included most of the exhibits on the amended

list and had merely not listed themindividually. The Government noted that the remainder of the new
12

exhibits were added in response to the defendant’s exhibit list. The trial court found that the

arguments were best taken up on an item-by-item basis as the exhibits were offered during the trial.

Kimbrough made such objections as the trial progressed and the trial court overruled those

objections.

Although we cannot condone unreasonable restriction of meaningful access to

potential exhibits, Kimbrough has not shown the serious prejudice necessary to succeed on this

argument. Any error, therefore, was harmless. Kimbrough’s counsel was given two weeks notice

ofthe week that the exhibits would be available for hisinspection. As discussed above, Kimbrough’s

conclusory assertion that the amount of material seized and length of the Government’s review of

the material demonstrates prejudice isinsufficient to succeed on this argument. See Cronic, 466 U.S.

at 663, 104 S. Ct. at 2049, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657. Kimbrough has failed to support his assertions that he

was precluded from having an adequate opportunity to review the material or obtain an expert for

trial The nature of the defense raised -- that the depictions had been altered and were not of actual

children -- would not require review of each document. Furthermore, while Kimbrough claims it was

necessary for him to “consult with experts in the field of computer technology and pediatric and

adolescent anatomy . . . and interview potential witnesses involved in the Government’s

investigation,” he hasfailed to show the connection between hisfailure to accomplish these tasks and

the trial court’s denial of his motions for continuance. Similarly, he argues it was necessary to “have

an analysis conducted of the computer files seized” but fails to describe what type of analysis would

have been done and what he expected the analysis would have demonstrated. On the facts and

arguments before us, we are unable to say that the trial court’s decision to denyKimbrough’smotions

for continuance prevented him from receiving a fair trial. We therefore find this argument to be

without merit.

Kimbrough’s argumentregarding theGovernment’s amended exhibit list is similarly

unconvincing. The Government contends that the expanded exhibit list added only two pieces of

evidence, both of which were necessary for rebuttal of Kimbrough’s defense. The Government

contends that the remainder of the list merely specified which portions of the previously identified
13

exhibits were to be introduced. Kimbrough, who bears the burden on this issue, has failed to rebut

the government’s assertion and an examination of the record supportsthe Government’s contention.

We find Kimbrough’s assertion that he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of exhibits listed in

the Government’s amended exhibit list to be meritless. 

Constitutionality of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2252 Issues 

Kimbrough contends that Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2252 is unconstitutional. He

adopts the arguments of the Ninth Circuit holding the statute to be unconstitutional for lacking a

scienter requirement for the age of minority. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d

1285 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 464, 130 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1994). Since the

briefing on the case at bar, the Supreme Court has held that Section 2252 passes constitutional

scrutiny because the term“knowingly” in Section 2252(a)(1) and (a)(2) “extendsto both the sexually

explicit nature ofthe material and to the age ofthe performers.” United States v. X-Citement Video,

Inc., __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 464, 472, 130 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1994). Thus, Kimbrough’s argument as

to Counts 1 and 2 is without merit. Furthermore, as the language and composition of Section

2252(a)(4) parallelsthe language in Section 2252(a)(1) and (a)(2), Kimbrough’s argument is without

merit as to Counts 3 and 4 as well.

Jury Instruction Issue 

Kimbrough contends that the jury instructions did not explain the Government’s

burden on proving the mens rea as to each element of the offenses. The Court instructed the jury:

As to counts one and two, Title 18, United States Code,

Section 2252(a)(2), makes it a crime for any person to

knowingly receive any visual depiction shipped or transported

in foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, if

the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a

minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and such visual

depiction is of such conduct.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be

convinced that the government has proved each of the

following beyond a reasonable doubt:
14

First: That the defendant knowingly received certain visual

depictions;

Second: That such visual depictions were shipped or

transported in foreign commerce;

Third: That such visual depictions were shipped or transported

in foreign commerce by any means, including by computer;

Fourth: That the production of such visual depictions involved

the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;

Fifth: That such visual depictions are of minors engaged in

sexually explicit conduct; and

Sixth: That the defendant knew that at least one of the

performers in such visual depictions was a minor.

The instructions as to counts three and four are substantially similar but substitute the possession

language forthe receiving language. Kimbrough argues that the Court should have instructed the jury

that “it must find Defendant knew the producing of the depiction involved the actual use of a minor

engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”

As noted above, in X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 472, the Supreme Court

held that the term“knowingly” in Section 2252(a)(1) and (a)(2) “extendsto both the sexually explicit

nature of the material and to the age of the performers.” See also, United States v. Burian, 19 F.3d

188, 191 (5thCir. 1994) (holding that Section 2252 requires “actual knowledge or reckless disregard

of a performer’s minority.”). The trial court specifically instructed the jury the Kimbrough had to

know at least one of the persons depicted was a minor. Further instruction regarding the age of the

performers would have been redundant and is not required by the statute or the case law. Had the

jury believed Kimbrough’s defense -- that the depictions had been altered and were not of actual

children -- they could have easily found so applying the instructions as given. The jury instructions

properly charged scienter with regard to the age of the performers. 

Sentencing Guidelines Issues 

Kimbrough objects to three aspects of his Presentence Report (“PSR”) and the

resulting calculation of hissentencing guidelines. In examining the sentence imposed, we review the
15

trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and review purely legal conclusions or interpretations of

the meaning of a guideline de novo. United States v. Meija-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir.

1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S. Ct. 3257, 106 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1989); United States v. Dean,

59 F.3d 1479, 1494 (5th Cir. 1995). We review t he trial court’s determination “that conduct is

relevant to the offense of conviction . . . under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v.

Cockerham, 919 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1990).

A. Two Level Increase for Prepubescent Minor or Minors Under the Age of 12

Kimbrough objected at sentencing to the increase for receiving materialsinvolving

prepubescent minors or minors under the age of 12. The PSR recommended this two-level increase

under U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2(b)(1). Kimbrough contends that the Government failed to produce

any evidence to show that he intended to receive such materials.

At trial, United States Customs Office Agent Eric Rembold testified that a listing

of a file entitled “BAM Young List” had been retrieved from Kimbrough’s office computer. On that

list, file FAM03.GIF is described as “Eight Years Indian Girl” and file PPO4@.GIF includes the

words “Preteen Scho ol Girl” in the description. Agent Rembold further testified that both

FAM03.GIF and PPO4@.GIF were retrieved from computer disks obtained during the execution of

the search warrants and that both had been downloaded to Kimbrough’s computer from BAMSE.

We find that the trial court heard sufficient evidence, even apart from that contained in the PSR, to

conclude that Kimbrough intentionally ordered and possessed child pornography which depicted

prepubescent minors or minors under the age of 12, or, at the very least, had reckless disregard of

the age of the performers. See Burian, 19 F.3d at 191. We therefore find no clear error in the twolevel enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2(b)(1).

B. Four Level Increase for Material Portraying Sadistic or Masochistic Conduct

Kimbrough also objected at sentencing to the 4 level increase for material

portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct or other violence. The PSR recommended this four-level

increase under U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2(b)(3). Kimbrough argues that the material involved in the

counts of conviction did not portray such conduct and that, at any rate, there was no evidence that
 

7

 Kimbrough objects to the use of adult pornography to enhance his sentence because private

possession in the home of such materials is presumptively protected by the First Amendment. See

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). We need not reach the question of whether such adult

pornography can be considered for sentencing purposes as the child pornography admitted at trial

provides sufficient basis to affirm the trial court’s ruling.

16

he intended to receive such material. 

At trial, Agent Rembold testified that Kimbrough had downloaded file

MBON006.JPG and file MBON007.JPG from the BAMSE. He further testified that Kimbrough’s

computer contained file descriptions of these two files: MBON006.JPG is described as “Bound and

Gagged Spread in Chair” and MBON007.JPG is described as “Same Girl Almost Same Position.”

The PSR stated that “Two of the child pornography pictures admitted into evidence are those of a

female minor in bondage. Adult pornography possessed by the defendant also displayed sadomasochistic acts.” We find that the trial court heard sufficient evidence at trial to conclude that

Kimbrough intentionally ordered and possessed pornography which depicted sadistic or masochistic

conduct. We therefore find no clear error in the four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section

2G2.2(b)(3)7.

C. Five Level Increase for Distribution of Obscene Material

Finally, Kimbrough objected at sentencing to the five-level increase for his

purported intent to distribute child pornography. The PSR recommended this five-level increase

under U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2(b)(2). He argues that there was no evidence that he intended to

distribute the material.

A sentencing court must be afforded wide discretion in the sources of information

it may consider. United States v. Schmeltzer, 20 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,

115 S. Ct. 634, 130 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1994). Therefore, Kimbrough bears the burden of demonstrating

that information the trial court relied on in sentencing is “materially untrue.” See United States v.

Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 943 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 180, 130 L. Ed. 2d 115

(1994); United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1113 (5th Cir. 1989). 

At sentencing, Agent Rembold testified that he recovered evidence from
-17-

Kimbrough’s office computer and a back-up tape which showed Kimbrough had set up his own

bulletin board system named “Unbridled, Unlimited.” A bulletin board system is designed to

distribute and receive files. Agent Rembold testified that Kimbrough’s bulletin board system included

closed files containing pornographic material depicting children. Agent Rembold also testified that

the search had uncovered advertisementsfor “Unbridled, Unlimited” which indicated that the bulletin

board was a sexually oriented bulletin board. Agent Rembold testified that he found no evidence to

show Kimbrough had actually engaged in a commercial distribution of the pornography. 

Kimbrough offered no evidence to rebut Agent Rembold’stestimony. Under these

circumstances, the sentencing court was justified in relying on the testimony and on the PSR in

finding that the five-level increase was warranted.

Cumulative Effect Issue 

Finally, Kimbrough argues that even if no single alleged impropriety rose to the

level of reversible error, taken together, their cumulative impact so prejudiced him as to require

reversal of his conviction. See United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976). We

find, with the exception of Kimbrough’s multiplicitous argument, Kimbrough’s arguments to be

without merit. Kimbrough’s current argument merely restates arguments we have already rejected

and completely fails to specify how the cumulative effects of these events prejudiced him. We

therefore reject this argument.

CONCLUSION

We affirmthe judgment ofconvictionregardingCounts One and Two. We reverse

as to Counts Three and Four and remand for the trial court to vacate Kimbrough’s conviction on

either of those counts and to resentence Kimbrough if the trial court chooses to do so. AFFIRMED

IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
 

8

 

8

1

The visual depictions referred to in the separate Counts 3 and 4

Although I concur in most of the opinion of the Court, I dissent from Court's

treatment of the "Multiplicitous Counts Issue." I am not convinced by the majority's statement that

“[i]n this case, the statute’s requirement that a defendant possess ‘three or more’ items would seem

to indicate that the legislature did not intend for this statute to be used to charge multiple offenses.”

I believe the majority is reading too much into the "three or more" language.

Section 2252(a)(4)(B)states a crime of possession, with three alternative grounds

for asserting jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. Any person who

(B) knowingly possesses 3 or more books, magazines,

periodicals, films, video t apes, or other matter which contain

any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped

or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was

produced using materials which have been mailed or so shipped

or transported, by any means including by computer, if))

such visual depictionsinvolve child pornography, violates 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). A conviction

thus requires a showing that the defendant knowingly possessed 3 or more items depict ing child

pornography, and that each ofthese items also satisfies one ofthe alternative groundsfor jurisdiction.

The three items must each be shown to have either been "mailed," or "shipped or transported" in

interstate commerce, or "produced" from an item that was mailed or so shipped or transported. The

jurisdictional requirement does not change the basic nature of the item or the crime, which is

possession of child pornography. The three alternative jurisdictional grounds merely allows a federal

court to decide the underlying violation of possession, it does not alter what is being possessed.

Itherefore agreewiththemajoritythat the jurisdictionaldifference between the two

sets of items in Counts 3 and 4 is insufficient by itself to support separate counts. The Government

could not, for example, plead the same three items in separate counts merely because the same three

had been "shipped" in interstate commerce and "produced" using materials which had been mailed

or so shipped. The key, rather, is whether the items are in fact distinct and different items, regardless

of whether they were "mailed," "produced," or "shipped."8
appear to be ten different items. That is, the depictions listed in Count 3))

“CHERRYA.GIF”, ”CHERRYB.GIF”, ”CHERRYC.GIF”, “WC221501.GIF”, and

“LITSIS.GIF”))appear to be different depictions from those listed in Count

4))“MBON006.JPG”, “MBON007.JPG”, “DS-X-219.GIF”, “INNOCNT.JPC”, or “KID013.GIF”.

Accordingly, I believe the Government has not alleged the "same three items" in

separate counts. 

 

9 2

This language is quoted with approval in United States v.

Cipollone, 951 F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir. 1991), cited by the majority in footnote

6.

3

My research has not uncovered any case that addresses the issue

of multiple counts under this provision. In every case, the prosecution

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While it may be true that "[a] single offense should normally be charged in one

count rather than several, even if different means of committing the offense are alleged," Sanbria v.

United States, 437 U.S. 54, 66 n.20, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2180 n.20, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1978), we have held

that the act ofmailing three child-pornography photographsin separate envelopes may be punishable

in three separate counts, even though the three photographs were mailed at the same time. See

United States v. Gallardo, 915 F.3d 149, 151 (5thCir. 1990) (“With respect to the child pornography

statute, each separate use of the mail to transport or ship child pornography should constitute a

separate crime because it is the act of either transporting or shipping that is the central focus of this

statute.”).9 In the context of mail fraud, we have also held that "[e]ach separate use of the mail in

furtherance of[a scheme to defraud] constitutes a separate crime." United States v. Blankenship, 746

F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1984).

The first two sections of the child pornography statute and the mail fraud statute

speak of "any visual depiction" and "any scheme or artifice" (or "any counterfeit or spurious coin")

respectively. "Any" is synonymous with "one or more." And we have held that a prosecutor has

discretion to bring a single count or several counts where there is more than one item. Why should

we read the phrase "three or more" in a more restrictive manner? Under the majority's interpretation

of the statute, a prosecutor could only charge a defendant with one count under § 2252(a)(4)(B)

whether he possessed three books or several thousand.10 I believe that some additional authority, in
apparently chose to bring only one count under § 2252(a)(4)(B), even where, in

one instance, the possession charge involved ten items. See United States v.

Burian, 19 F.3d 188, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1994) (defendant was in possession of ten

video tapes received through the mails). If the prosecution has the discretion

to bring a single count even where the facts would permit several counts, these

cases do not tell us very much. In the present case, the Government apparently

believed, mistakenly in my opinion, that it needed to rely on a jurisdictional

distinction in order to bring more than one count.

4

The legislative history contains no reference whatsoever to the

language and purpose of § 2252(a)(4)(B). If Congress intended to remove

prosecutorial discretion under this particular section of the statute, one would

expect to find some reference to this limitation.

 

12 4

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and § 2252(a)(2) with

§ 2252(a)(4)(B).

-20-

the form of legislative history or analogous case law, should be required before we assume that

Congress intended t o distinguish this section of the statute from the other sections by limiting the

prosecutor's discretion to bring multiple counts.11 

It is not obvious how Congress could have written this provision to make it clearer

that multiple counts were permitted. It would have been confusing to omit the "or more" language

from the "three" because this would seemto suggest that the possession of four or more items would

not be a violation. The phrase "at least three" does not say anything different from "three or more."

Nor do I believe that Congress's meaning would have been much clearer if they had stated "any three

or more," even though this would have more closely paralleled the preceding provisions.12

Therefore, it ismore reasonable to assume thatCongresssimplywanted to heighten

the evidentiary burden for convictions based on the mere possession of child pornography by

requiring the Government to prove at least three items, but that Congress did not intend to eliminate

the prosecutor's discretion to bring additional counts where there were more than three items, aslong

as each count is supported by three different and distinct items. The "or more" language affirms the

prosecutorial discretion rather than removes it, by allowing the prosecutor to charge nine different
 

13 5

Similarly, Congress would not have used the language "each three"

because this might be read to remove prosecutorial discretion, requiring

prosecutors to bring a separate count for each group of three items discovered

in the defendant's possession.

items, for example, as one count or as three.13 Accordingly, I do not believe that the "three or more"

language indicates that Congress intended to eliminate the prosecutor's discretion to bring one or

several counts under this particular provision of the statute. Counts 3 and 4 should be held sufficient

not because they assert different jurisdictional grounds, but because they are supported by at least

three separate and distinct items. I would therefore affirm as to both counts.