[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-14368

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cv-00003-CAR

DORIS E. ADDISON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

INGLES MARKETS, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

________________________

(April 5, 2013)

Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Doris Addison, a 52-year-old African American, appeals from the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ingles Markets, Inc., in her

employment discrimination suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 621. On appeal, Addison argues that the district court incorrectly found that she 

had not presented any direct evidence that her termination from Ingles was 

motivated by racial animus. She also contends that the district court erred when it 

found that she had failed to establish a prima facie case of either race or age 

discrimination. After thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

affirm.

I.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all 

evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 

629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is only appropriate 

when the record presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The moving party bears the burden of 

establishing the absence of a dispute over a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986).

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person based 

on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that 

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“[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . 

as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and it also protects against employment 

discrimination on the basis of race. See Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163, 167 n.5 

(5th Cir. 1980). The elements of a race discrimination claim under § 1981 are the 

same as a Title VII disparate treatment claim in an employment context. RiceLamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000).

A plaintiff may establish a Title VII claim through the introduction of direct 

or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., Inc., 627 

F.3d 849, 854 (11th Cir. 2010). “Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence 

that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact without inference or presumption.” 

Id. (quotation omitted). “[O]nly the most blatant remarks, whose intent could 

mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor 

constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Accordingly, “remarks by non-decisionmakers or remarks unrelated to the 

decisionmaking process itself are not direct evidence of discrimination.” Standard 

v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). The evidence must 

reflect a “discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or 

retaliation complained of by the employee.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of 

Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Carter v. Three Springs 

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Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

The district court correctly found that Addison had not presented direct 

evidence of racial discrimination. The evidence showed that she worked in the deli 

of an Ingles grocery store until Ingles fired her for violating the employee anti-theft 

policy. Ingles’s loss prevention investigator discovered that Addison had failed to 

pay full price for a deli beverage. Ingles suspended and then ultimately terminated 

Addison for her violation, along with each of the other thirteen employees who 

were similarly found having violated the policy. Addison now contends that her 

termination constituted unlawful racial discrimination on account of a number of 

comments the Ingles manager made before her termination in August 2009.

None of the manager’s comments, however, constituted direct evidence of 

racial discrimination. The specific comments to which Addison points were made 

in November 2008 and February 2009, while Ingles did not even become aware of 

the acts that led to the investigation and subsequent terminations until July 2009. 

The allegedly racist comments were not made in the context of Addison’s 

termination or the termination of any employee. See Standard, 161 F.3d at 1330. 

Moreover, while the manager’s comments may have reflected racial bias generally, 

they did not directly relate to Addison or the termination of any employee. They 

did not establish, without further inference or presumption, that her firing was 

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racially motivated. See Dixon, 627 F.3d at 854. Accordingly, the district court did 

not err in finding that the manager’s comments did not constitute direct evidence of 

discrimination.

II.

When the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence of discrimination, we 

apply the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, 

Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish a prima facie case, a 

plaintiff may show that, among other things, her employer treated similarly 

situated employees who were not members of her protected class more favorably. 

Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). In 

determining whether employees are similarly situated in cases involving 

discriminatory discipline, we ask “whether the employees are involved in or 

accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.” Id. 

(quotation omitted).

If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, and the defendant offers a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the 

plaintiff may then show that the stated reason is a mere pretext for unlawful 

discrimination. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264. An employee must meet the 

employer’s stated reason “head on and rebut it, and [she] cannot succeed by simply 

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quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Id. at 1266. A plaintiff can do so 

directly, by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 

motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing “such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 

proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find 

them unworthy of credence.” Id. at 1265 (quotation omitted). Where the 

defendant offers the plaintiff’s violation of a work rule as its reason for the 

termination, the reason “is arguably pretextual when a plaintiff submits evidence 

(1) that she did not violate the cited work rule, or (2) that if she did violate the rule, 

other employees outside the protected class, who engaged in similar acts, were not 

similarly treated.” Damon, 196 F.3d at 1363.

We need not address the prima facie issue because the district court 

correctly determined that, even if Addison had set forth a prima facie case, she had 

not demonstrated that Ingles’s reason for her termination—violation of the antitheft policy—was a pretext for unlawful racial discrimination. None of the 

manager’s allegedly racist comments were related to Addison’s firing in any 

substantive way. The manager’s comments and his general remarks about famous 

African Americans not only did not relate to Addison’s termination, but moreover, 

they did not relate to her at all. Therefore, the fact of these comments, in and of 

themselves, does not suffice to establish that racial animus was more likely the 

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motivator of Addison’s termination than her violation of Ingles’s policy. See 

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265. Furthermore, while Ingles’s decision to terminate 

Addison for failing to pay full price for a beverage may seem harsh or even 

unwise, we do not ask whether the decision to fire her was “prudent or fair.” Id. at 

1266 (quotations omitted). The issue is whether the decision to fire Addison was 

racially motivated, and Addison presented no evidence that the manager acted 

toward her with any racial animus. In fact, Addison admitted that she was guilty of 

violating the anti-theft policy, and all fourteen employees accused of violating this 

policy—nine African Americans and five Caucasians—were fired. Finally, the 

record shows that the manager attempted to excuse Addison’s violation and only 

fired her once he learned that he could not make an exception for her.

On these facts, Addison did not demonstrate that Ingles more likely than not 

acted with discriminatory animus or that Ingles’s stated reason for her termination 

was unworthy of credence. See id. at 1265. Because she failed to present 

sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination, the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Ingles on her racial 

discrimination claim.

III.

The ADEA prohibits employers from discharging an employee who is at 

least 40 years of age because of that employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). As 

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with race discrimination claims, this Court generally evaluates ADEA claims based 

on circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Sims v. 

MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2013) (reaffirming the utility of the 

McDonnell Douglas framework post-Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 

U.S. 167, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), while also noting that McDonnell Douglas is not 

the only method by which ADEA plaintiffs may survive summary judgment). To

make a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff may show, among other 

things, that a substantially younger person filled the position that she sought or 

from which she was discharged, or that her employer treated employees who were 

not members of her protected class more favorably under similar circumstances. 

Morris v. Emory Clinic, Inc., 402 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff failed 

to show he received any lesser treatment than was afforded younger employees); 

Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (position 

sought by plaintiff was filled by substantially younger person).

If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of age discrimination, and the 

employer presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse 

employment action, the plaintiff then may establish that the nondiscriminatory 

reason for the action was a pretext for age discrimination. Chapman, 229 F.3d at

1024-25. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross, ADEA plaintiffs must 

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establish that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse action. See 

Sims, 704 F.3d at 1332-33.

The district court correctly found that Addison had not established a prima 

face case of age discrimination. Addison was unable to establish that a younger 

person filled her position, or was treated more favorably generally on account of 

age. Ingles terminated every employee who was found in violation of the anti-theft 

policy. In fact, nine of the fourteen employees were younger than 25, and only two 

were over the age of 40. Moreover, Addison’s supervisors were not proper 

comparators. As discussed above, neither supervisor was accused of or caught 

violating the anti-theft policy, and therefore neither was a similarly situated 

employee of Addison’s. Finally, Addison did not present any evidence that her age 

was the “but-for” cause of her termination. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176-77, 129 S.

Ct. at 2350-51; Sims, 704 F.3d at 1332. Accordingly, she did not present sufficient 

circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, and therefore the district court did 

not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Ingles on her age discrimination 

claim.

IV.

Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we 

affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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