[Cite as Cleveland v. Melton, 2016-Ohio-5139.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

 No. 103809 

CITY OF CLEVELAND

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

vs.

VERNOL MELTON

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cleveland Municipal Court 

Case No. 2015 TRC 28153 

BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Kilbane, P.J., and E.T. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 28, 2016 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Barbara Langhenry 

City of Cleveland 

Director of Law 

BY: Karyn J. Lynn 

Assistant City Prosecutor 

1200 Ontario Street - 8th Floor 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Robert L. Tobik 

Chief Public Defender 

BY: John T. Martin 

 Gusty A. Rini 

Assistant Public Defenders 

310 Lakeside Avenue - Suite 200 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to 

App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1. The city of Cleveland (“the city”), appeals from the 

Cleveland Municipal Court’s order granting Vernol Melton’s motion to suppress the 

evidence obtained following a traffic stop. We affirm. 

{¶2} In July 2015, an Ohio State Highway Patrol officer stopped Melton for 

speeding. Melton was cited for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, with a .108 blood 

alcohol concentration; reckless operation; and having fictitious plates. Melton filed a 

motion to suppress, in part arguing that there was no reasonable suspicion to administer 

field sobriety tests. 

{¶3} The trial court held a hearing. The officer testified to the following facts. 

Melton was driving a vehicle owned by his passenger’s son. After pulling Melton over 

for speeding, the officer began to ask Melton questions. The passenger responded; the 

officer had approached the vehicle from the passenger side. Melton did not make eye 

contact with the officer. Melton asked for permission to step out of the vehicle and 

exited his vehicle. The parties dispute whether the officer ordered Melton to exit the car 

or whether Melton asked to exit so he could reach his driver’s license. Regardless, after 

Melton exited the car, the officer maintained that he smelled alcohol and further clarified 

that the odor was from Melton’s person and not from his breath. At that point, the 

officer decided to administer field sobriety tests, which Melton failed. After the tests 
were administered, Melton admitted to consuming a single beer. The trial court granted 

the motion to suppress based on those facts. 

{¶4} The city appealed, claiming that “[t]he trial court erred in finding that the 

officer’s decision to allow [Melton] to step out of the car was dispositive of the 

admissibility of the remaining evidence.” Within this sole assignment of error, the city 

argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence from the field sobriety tests 

because Melton was lawfully stopped, and therefore, the officer had probable cause to 

remove Melton from the car and all evidence subsequently obtained was admissible. We 

agree that the officer may have been authorized to remove Melton from the vehicle, but 

our agreement does not mean the trial court erred. Whether the officer was authorized to 

remove Melton from the vehicle after a lawful stop is irrelevant to the determination of 

whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of intoxication justifying the 

administration of the field sobriety tests. 

{¶5} The record reflects that the trial court “assumed for the sake of discussion” 

that the officer had the right to remove Melton from the car and requested an argument 

justifying the officer’s decision to administer field sobriety tests. Tr. 60:3-9. This is 

the correct analysis under the relevant law in Ohio. “[A] police officer must have a 

reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the suspect is intoxicated before the 

officer may administer field sobriety tests.” Chagrin Falls v. Calabrese, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 101197, 2014-Ohio-5340, ¶ 13, citing Cleveland v. Harding, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98916, 2013-Ohio-2691, ¶ 6. 
 {¶6} The city has not presented any arguments or citations to the relevant law on 

the only dispositive issue. App.R. 16(A)(7). Our review must be limited to the 

arguments as presented. Whether the officer had probable cause to stop Melton for 

speeding in the first place is not relevant to determining whether the officer had a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that Melton was intoxicated for the purpose of 

administering the field sobriety tests after the lawful stop. We must affirm. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cleveland 

Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR