IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

JOY BILLINGS, ) 

) 

Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) C.A. No. N14A-03-011FWW

) 

) 

MERIT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ) 

BOARD, )

)

Appellee. ) 

Submitted: November 14, 2014

 Decided: February 13, 2015

Upon Appellant’s Appeal of the Merit Employee Relations Board’s Decision: 

AFFIRMED.

OPINION AND ORDER 

Joy Billings, pro se, 89 Pike Creek Road, Apartment 6B, Newark, Delaware 

19711, Appellant.

Kevin R. Slattery, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, 820 North French

Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801; Attorney for the Court of Common Pleas.

WHARTON, J.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

Joy Billings (“Appellant”) filed a Notice of Appeal on March 17, 2014

requesting judicial review of the February 17, 2014 decision of the Merit 

Employee Relations Board (“MERB”). Appellant contends that the MERB erred 

in upholding her termination and rejecting her hostile work environment claims. 

Additionally, Appellant asserts that the MERB erred in making certain evidentiary 

rulings, that the process of appeal to the MERB was overly confusing and that a 

job post advertising the vacancy at her job position was made prematurely.

In considering the appeal, the Court must determine whether the MERB’s 

decision to uphold Appellant’s termination and reject Appellant’s hostile work 

environment claims is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 

Upon consideration of the pleadings before the Court and the record below, the 

Court finds that there is substantial evidence to support the MERB’s ruling and the 

MERB did not err in reaching its decision. Accordingly, the MERB’s decision is 

AFFIRMED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT

Appellant was employed as an Administrative Specialist I with the 

Investigative Services Office (“ISO”) in the Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) of 

the State of Delaware from January 2001 until she was terminated on December 
3

10, 2012.1 Prior to 2009, ISO employees did not receive regular performance 

reviews2 but, in November 2009, a new Chief Investigative Services Officer 

(“Chief”) was hired and he created performance plans for every ISO employee that 

he supervised, including Appellant, and began conducting regular performance 

reviews.

3

 According to Appellant’s first performance plan, her role was to provide

administrative support for the ISO Unit.

4

 Appellant’s duties included: maintaining

data and filing systems; composing correspondence; communicating effectively 

with staff, employees and the public; and executing instructions from ISO staff.

5

 

In her 2010 mid-year review, Chief gave Appellant an “unsatisfactory” 

rating.6

 Some of the issues Chief documented in the review were that Appellant 

could not maintain the filing system, made numerous errors in prepared 

correspondence and that other co-workers had not given Appellant work for over 

eight months because Appellant’s work product was unacceptable.7

 As a result of 

that review, Chief sent Appellant to professional skill development courses in May 

and June of 2010.8

 

 1 R. at 766.

2 R. at 478

3 R. at 479.

4 R. at 429. 

5 Id. 6 R. at 422. 

7 R. at 423-27. 

8 R. at 426-27. 
4

Appellant also received an “unsatisfactory” rating on her next performance 

review which covered May 2010 through September 2010.

9

 In that review Chief

noted that Appellant continued to make the same errors.

10 Chief directed 

Appellant to attend additional professional training courses.11 Appellant’s next 

three performance reviews which covered September 2010 through August 2011 

were all “unsatisfactory.”12 Chief detailed the same type of mistakes being made 

and noted that the classes seemed to have no effect on Appellant’s level of 

performance.13 By letter dated November 22, 2011, the Court Administrator 

confirmed that Appellant was on a three month period of probation for her poor job 

performance beginning October 26, 2011 through January 26, 2012.14 

Around the same time, Appellant approached the Court Administrator and 

alleged that Chief was creating a hostile work environment.

15 Appellant contended

that Chief was using the performance evaluations to harass her and that she felt she 

was not receiving fair evaluations.

16 Appellant also alleged that Chief had an 

offensive talking doll in his office that he used to harass her and that there were 

 9 R. at 412.

10 R. at 413-19 .

11 R. at 419. 

12 R. at 404; 390; 381.

13 R. at 381-410. 

14 R. at 373. 

15 R. at 532. 

16 Id.
5

offensive cartoons in the break room that contained profanities.17 The Court 

Administrator investigated the incidents and Chief was required to remove the 

talking doll from the workplace.

18 The Court Administrator also temporarily 

reassigned Appellant to the CCP Costs and Fines Unit to work under a different 

supervisor in December 2011.

19 Appellant received another “unsatisfactory” 

performance review on July 5, 2012 from the Costs and Fines supervisor.20 

In July 2012, the Court Administrator transferred Appellant back to the ISO 

Unit and Appellant executed a “Last-Chance Agreement” wherein she was given 

three months to bring her job performance up to a “meets expectations” standard 

and was subject to monthly performance reviews.21 Appellant received three

“unsatisfactory” ratings for each month from July 9, 2012 through October 9, 

2012.22 

By letter dated October 17, 2012, Chief recommended that Appellant be 

dismissed.23 A pre-decision meeting was held on November 14, 2012 and the

Court Administrator terminated Appellant’s employment by letter effective 

December 10, 2012.24 

 17 R. at 536-37.

18 R. at 537.

19 R. at 373.

20 R. at 365-66. 

21 R. at 292-99.

22 R. at 283; 275; 265. 

23 R. at 254-62.

24 R. at 242-52. 
6

On January 11, 2013, Appellant filed a merit system grievance appeal to 

both the MERB and the Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Human 

Resources Management Section.25 On March 26, 2013, an OMB Hearing Officer 

upheld Appellant’s dismissal26 and Appellant pursued her appeal to the MERB. 

The MERB held a hearing on February 6, 2014 and issued its written opinion 

upholding Appellant’s termination for just cause and dismissing Appellant’s 

hostile work environment claims.

27 

A. The Pre-Hearing Conference and Hearing 

Prior to the February 6, 2014 hearing, Appellant submitted various 

documents to the MERB including a brief totaling over 200 pages that was not 

organized.

28 In an attempt to clarify the factual and legal issues, a MERB Referee 

held a pre-hearing conference with the parties on September 24, 2013. The day 

before the pre-hearing conference, Appellant submitted several hundred pages of 

additional documents allegedly pertaining to her MERB hearing.29 The Referee 

recommended that the MERB exclude all but thirteen pages of Appellant’s initial 

submissions because the Referee found that they were irrelevant.30 Additionally, 

 25 R. at 1. 

26 R. at 431-36.

27 R. at 765-775.

28 R. at 221.

29 R. at 222. 

30 Id.
7

the Referee recommended that the MERB exclude all documents submitted the day 

before the pre-trial conference as untimely.

31 

The Board accepted the Referee’s recommendations and further limited the 

subject matter of the hearing to only those three performance reviews received 

after the “Last-Chance Agreement” was executed because the MERB determined 

that Appellant’s failure to timely grieve the prior performance reviews precluded

MERB review.32 The MERB also permitted testimony related to the hostile work 

environment claim.

33 

At the February 6, 2014 hearing, the Court Administrator and Chief testified 

as representatives of the CCP and Appellant testified on her behalf. Appellant had 

requested that Arthur Stone, a former CCP colleague, be subpoenaed to testify on 

Appellant’s behalf regarding the hostile work environment claim but Stone failed 

to appear at the hearing despite being properly subpoenaed.

34 The MERB 

determined, after hearing all of the other evidence, that Stone’s testimony would 

not aid the MERB in rendering a decision.35 The Court will not recount in its

entirety the testimony that can be obtained from the record but will note some of 

the relevant portions related to Appellant’s job performance and hostile work 

environment claim. 

 31 Id.

32 Tr. at 23: 17-23. 

33 Tr. at 26: 11-22.

34 Tr. at 15: 19-20.

35 Tr. at 265: 22-24; 266: 1.
8

i. Appellant’s Job Performance

Chief testified that Appellant was under a “Last-Chance Agreement” 

beginning in July 2012 when she returned to the ISO Unit.36 He testified that 

Appellant was given three monthly reviews under the agreement and that for the 

first review, covering July 9, 2012 to August 9, 2012, Appellant earned an 

“unsatisfactory” rating because there were multiple areas in which Appellant’s job 

performance was deficient.

37 Chief recounted incidences of incorrectly maintained

case logs,

38 incorrect statistical reports39 and major issues with Appellant’s typing 

and correspondence skills including numerous typographical errors.40 Chief 

testified that he counseled Appellant and provided her opportunities to correct her 

mistakes but that Appellant continually submitted “very, very poor work.”41 Chief 

testified that he provided the written performance review to Appellant including 

samples of some of the issues related to Appellant’s work performance and that 

Appellant acknowledged that she had read and understood the performance 

review.

42

Chief testified that he issued a second “unsatisfactory” monthly performance 

review, covering August 9, 2014 through September 9, 2014, because Appellant 

 36 Tr. at 32:19-24. 

37 Tr. at 34: 1-7.

38 Tr. at 36: 22-24.

39 Tr. at 37:19-22. 

40 Tr. at 38: 13-24. 

41 Tr. at 39: 3-4.

42 Tr. at 39: 8-19.
9

exhibited similar deficiencies in job performance that Chief had memorialized in 

the first monthly performance review.43 Additionally, Chief testified that the final 

monthly review, covering September 9, 2012 through October 9, 2012, was also 

“unsatisfactory” for similar reasons contained in the first two monthly performance 

reviews.

44 He testified that Appellant acknowledged receiving all three monthly 

performance reviews45 and that Appellant did not grieve any of the performance 

reviews.46 Additionally, Appellant conceded that she did not grieve the negative 

reviews.47

Additionally, Chief testified that the court administration enrolled Appellant 

in four professional training classes to assist her in improving her work 

performance and simplified her job responsibilities prior to executing the “LastChance Agreement.”48 He stated that, ultimately, he recommended Appellant’s 

termination because he “felt over a two-year period [the court administration]

exhausted every means possible in trying to get [Appellant’s] performance to meet 

 43 Tr. at 43: 6-15.

44 Tr. at 46: 12-18; 47:6-8.

45 Tr. at 39:8-19; 42:23-24- 43:1; 46:22-23.

46 Tr. at 43: 2-5; 46:24-47:2.

47 See Tr. at 205:6-13. Appellant testified that she did not grieve the negative performance 

reviews because 

if someone gives you a really negative performance review, you 

could imagine you are exhausted. You have to fight for each issue 

in the performance review. No, I did not because it was a lot of 

them were in general and offensive, so I did not. I was waiting for 

[Chief] to write me a single written reprimand on topics...

48 Tr. at 47:14-18.
10

the expectation level, the minimum expectation level for [the ISO] office. It just 

wasn’t there.”49 

The Court Administrator testified at the hearing that she had temporarily 

placed Appellant in the Cost and Fines Unit prior to Appellant executing the “LastChance Agreement” because “there happened to be an employee out on extended 

leave, and so it was an opportunity for [Appellant] to be evaluated, as she had 

requested, by an independent evaluator.”50 She testified that Appellant exhibited 

the same job performance issues in that unit

51 but that she “wanted to give 

[Appellant] every opportunity to show [Court Administrator] that [Appellant] 

could do the job.”52 The Court Administrator testified that the decision to 

terminate Appellant was reached after a pre-decision meeting with Appellant 

because “it was very clear that despite training, despite training classes, on-the-job 

training, job shadowing, there didn’t seem to be any method that could be put to 

use that effected any change in [Appellant’s] job performance.”53 The Court

Administrator asserted that Appellant’s job performance was so poor that “it was 

either have [Appellant] sit downstairs and give her no work to do...or we had to 

 49 Tr. at 49: 3-7.

50 Tr. at 83: 7-18.

51 Tr. at 85: 6-10.

52 Tr. at 84: 21-23.

53 Tr. at 86: 23; 87:1-3.
11

make the decision that if it wasn’t going to work, that we needed to let her go and 

replace her with somebody who was capable of performing the job functions.”54

ii. Hostile Work Environment Claim

Appellant testified that Chief had a talking doll in his office that played 

various sayings including “Silence. I’ll kill you.”55 She testified that Chief played 

it when she was nearby and she found the doll offensive because she is from an 

island and is not accustomed to people playing pranks on one another.56 Appellant 

contended that Chief was harassing her with the doll and that the sayings were 

directed at her personally because Chief continued to play the offensive saying 

even after Appellant did not laugh, participate or otherwise indicate that she 

thought it was funny.57 

Chief testified that he was given the doll as a gift from several co-workers58

and that he was asked to remove the doll from the workplace in the fall of 2011.59 

He testified that the doll played prerecorded statements that rotated and that he had 

no control over which statement the doll played when he pressed the button.60 

Chief testified that after he was asked to remove the doll, he replaced the doll with 

 54 Tr. at 87: 4-10. 

55 Tr. at 197: 22-24; 198: 1.

56 Tr. at 198: 21-22.

57 Tr. at 199: 1-5.

58 Tr. at 50: 4-6.

59 Tr. at 51: 12-14.

60 Tr. at 57: 3-9.
12

a picture of the doll.61 He testified that he was asked to remove the picture and he 

complied.62 

Appellant also testified that she found a specific cartoon posted in a break 

room offensive because it contained a profanity.

63 Appellant admitted that she had 

not complained about the cartoon when it was posted in the old courthouse and that 

she had never asked for it to be removed despite seeing it since 2003.

64 Chief 

testified that the cartoon in the break room that Appellant complained about had 

been there when he became Chief and he did not post it.65 He testified that at no 

time prior to lodging a formal complaint had Appellant confronted him about the 

doll or the cartoon.

66 

At the hearing, Appellant referenced several incidents as evidence of an 

alleged hostile work environment claims. She testified that Chief made her remove 

a religious article from her desk67 but admitted that the item had scripture written 

on it.68 She asserted that a co-worker used a racial slur when relaying a message 

from a member of the public in which the person identified Appellant as an 

 61 Tr. at 51: 19-20.

62 Tr. at 52: 2-5.

63 Tr. at 59: 22-23.

64 Tr. at 61: 8-24; 62:1.

65 Tr. at 53: 13-16.

66 Tr. at 53: 23; 54: 1-5.

67 Tr. at 222: 17-20.

68 Tr. at 228: 16-17.
13

“oriental woman.”69 Appellant conceded that a member of the public identifying 

her as an “oriental woman” is not a racial slur but maintained that it is a “racial 

issue.”70 Appellant also asserted that she was offended by a comment made to 

Arthur Stone that he “dresses like a pimp” because it is “a degrading sexual slur.”71 

However, Appellant acknowledged that the comment was not directed at her.

72 

Appellant also acknowledged that she did not report the incident to management 

because she did not know how Stone felt about the remark.

73 Appellant testified 

that Chief had distributed inappropriate birthday cards to two employees who 

displayed the cards on their desks in their offices.

74 She asserted that the cards 

offended her but acknowledged that they were not directed toward her.75 

Appellant contended that management permitted employees to play offensive 

music that contained profanities in the workplace but did not assert that the 

profanities were directed toward her.

76 

The Court Administrator testified that in the fall of 2011, Appellant 

contacted her and raised the issues of the doll and the cartoon.77 She testified that 

 69 Tr. at 230: 19-24; 231: 1-14.

70 Tr. at 232: 9-10.

71 Tr. at 226: 5-6.

72 Tr. at 227: 3-5. 

73 Tr. at 15: 19-24; 16:1.

74 Tr. at 134: 8-10.

75 Tr. at 135: 3-4.

76 Tr. at 180: 10-12.

77 Tr. at 88: 18-24; 88: 1-2.
14

Appellant did not raise job performance evaluation issues with her at that time.78 

The Court Administrator testified that she observed the doll and posters in the 

workplace and made a recommendation that they be removed.79 She testified that 

they were removed the same day.80 The Court Administrator asserted that 

Appellant did not raise any other issues of harassment until after her pre-decision 

meeting when she alleged that various colleagues had sexually harassed her.81 

B. The MERB’s Written Decision

In a decision issued on February 17, 2014, by a unanimous vote, the MERB

denied Appellant’s appeal.82 The MERB found that Appellant executed the “LastChance Agreement” with the understanding that failure to raise her performance to 

“meets expectations” would result in termination.83 The MERB also found that 

Appellant’s performance review for the period July 9, 2012 through August 9, 

2012 was unsatisfactory and that Chief had attached five single-spaced typewritten 

pages detailing specific instances of Appellant’s job deficiencies for that period.84 

Additionally, the MERB determined that Appellant’s performance reviews for the 

period August 9, 2012 through September 9, 2012 and for the period September 9, 

2012 through October 9, 2012 were also unsatisfactory based upon the typewritten 

 78 Tr. at 89: 3-6.

79 Tr. at 89: 7-17.

80 Tr. at 89: 22-23.

81 Tr. at 90: 3-16.

82 R. at 774.

83 R. at 769. 

84 R. at 768.
15

pages attached to the reviews in which Chief detailed Appellant’s job 

deficiencies.85 The MERB found that Appellant acknowledged receiving all three 

reviews and noted on the bottom of the last two that her signature did not indicate 

that she agreed with the assessment of her performance but the MERB noted that 

Appellant did not grieve any of the three reviews.86

The MERB found that Chief notified Appellant of the intent to terminate her 

by letter dated October 17, 2012 for failing to meet the terms of the “Last-Chance 

Agreement” and that Appellant requested a pre-decision meeting.

87 The MERB 

also found that the pre-decision meeting took place on November 14, 2012 and that 

following the meeting, Appellant was notified by letter dated December 10, 2012 

that she had been terminated from her position as an Administrative Specialist I 

with the CCP for failure to meet the terms of her “Last-Chance Agreement.”88

Based upon those findings, the MERB concluded that the CCP 

administration had just cause to terminate Appellant for an unsatisfactory job 

performance pursuant to Merit Rule 12.1.

89 The MERB reasoned that the CCP 

 85 Id. 

86 Id. 

87 Id. 

88 Id. 

89 See R. at 769. 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.1 states:

Employees shall be held accountable for their conduct. 

Disciplinary measures up to and including dismissal shall be taken 

only for just cause. "Just cause" means that management has 

sufficient reasons for imposing accountability. Just cause requires: 

showing that the employee has committed the charged offense; 
16

administration had spent three years offering Appellant re-training, personal 

counseling and transferred her to another unit and that, despite these efforts, 

Appellant was unable to complete her job duties which harmed the ISO Unit and 

other employees who had to perform additional work to compensate for 

Appellant’s deficiencies.

90 Moreover, the MERB ultimately concluded that “[t]he 

[MERB] believes that the CCP bent over backwards to try to help [Appellant] 

improve her job performance. When nothing seemed to work, the agency had just 

cause to terminate her.”91 

The MERB also determined that Appellant did not make out a prima facie

hostile work environment claim.

92 The MERB found that Appellant must prove 

the following to make out a hostile work environment claim: 1) that Appellant 

suffered intentional discrimination because of Appellant’s race, sex or religion; 2) 

that the discrimination was pervasive and regular; 3) that the discrimination 

detrimentally affected Appellant; 4) that the discrimination would detrimentally 

affect a reasonable person of the same sex, race or religion in Appellant’s position; 

and 5) that respondeat superior liability existed.93 

 

offering specified due process rights specified in this chapter; and 

imposing a penalty appropriate to the circumstances.

90 R. at 769-70.

91 Id.

92 Id.

93 Id.
17

The MERB found that although Appellant alleged that other co-workers

made racial slurs toward her, Appellant failed to provide the MERB with dates, 

times or names of the offending employees.94 Regarding Appellant’s claim that 

co-workers disrespected her cultural heritage, the MERB determined that an 

employee memorializing a complaint in which Appellant was described as an 

“oriental woman” by a member of the public was not culturally or racially 

motivated.95 Additionally, the MERB found that the “you dress like a pimp”

comment made to Arthur Stone and the allegedly offensive birthday cards given to 

two employees were not directed at Appellant and had no particular racial or 

sexual stigma attached to them.96 The MERB also found that the alleged offensive 

music played by a co-worker was not directed at Appellant personally and that 

Appellant never requested that the music be turned off.97 Finally, the MERB found 

that where Appellant reported incidents to management, the incidents were 

investigated and remediated.98

The MERB determined that “[a]t most [Appellant] had shown a few, 

isolated incidents of what may have been inappropriate or insensitive conduct in 

the workplace by co-workers. The [MERB] does not believe that they were 

directed towards [Appellant] to ridicule her race, national origin, gender, or 

 94 R. at 771. 

95 Id. 

96 R. at 772.

97 Id. 

98 R. at 773. 
18

religion.”99 Moreover, the MERB concluded that “[m]ost of the incidents 

recounted by [Appellant] were not targeted at her race or sex or religion, or were 

not pervasive or regular, or were not brought to the attention of management so 

they would have an opportunity to investigate and, if necessary, to take prompt 

remedial action.”100 

III. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

Appellant characterizes the questions presented on appeal as follows:

A. Whether the Board’s decision was based upon a 

limited acceptance by Deputy Attorney General, 

Tupman counsel for Merb only 54 pages of “Written 

Appeal” testimony from Appellant. Given the 

Appellant’s full complaint consisted of 248 pages in 

its totality. ‘A controversy must remain alive 

through the course of the appellate review.’ 

Moriarty, 588 A.2d at 1064. ‘ a change in the facts 

can render an issue or entire case moot.’(quoting 

Boocock, 553 A.2d at 575 n.3)...

B. Whether the Board erred in their process of ‘method 

of appeal’ by giving conflicting instructions on the 

MERB Form.

C. Whether the OMB at the Step 3 process violated 

merit rules and employment rights with advertising 

the Administrative Specialist I position, prior to 

notifying employee of Step 3 decision.

D. Whether the Board applied Merit Rulings accordingly 

as their guidelines dictate. Whereas, Merit Rule 12.2 

states ‘Employees shall receive a written reprimand

 99 Id.

100 Id. 
19

where appropriate based on specified misconduct, or 

where a verbal reprimand has not produced the 

desired improvement.’

E. Whether the Board applied ‘harassment’ law 

according to applicable case law.101

However, Appellant submitted very few discernable arguments addressing the 

issues raised. In addition to these issues, Appellant asserts that the MERB 

wrongfully precluded the testimony of Arthur Stone when he failed to appear at the 

hearing.102 

Counsel for the CCP contends that the MERB’s decision was based upon 

substantial evidence and free of legal error.103 Specifically, Counsel for the CCP 

argues that the MERB correctly determined that the CCP had just cause to 

terminate Appellant,

104 the MERB did not err in considering or applying the prima 

facie elements for a hostile work environment claim,105 the MERB’s evidentiary 

rulings are entitled to great deference,106 and that arguments not raised before the 

MERB should not be considered by the Court on appeal.

107

 101 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4. 

102 Id. at 7. 

103 CCP’s Resp. Br. at 14. 

104 Id. at 15. 

105 Id. at 17

106 Id. at 23.

107 Id. at 22. 
20

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The MERB’s decision must be affirmed so long as it is supported by 

substantial evidence and free from legal error.108 Substantial evidence is that 

which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.109 

While a preponderance of evidence is not necessary, substantial evidence means 

“more than a mere scintilla.”110 Questions of law are reviewed de novo111 but 

because the Court does not weigh evidence, determine questions of credibility, or 

make its own factual findings, it must uphold the decision of the MERB unless the 

MERB “acts arbitrarily or capriciously” or its decision “exceeds the bounds of 

reason.”112 Furthermore, “[j]udicial deference is usually given to an administrative 

agency’s construction of its own rules in recognition of its expertise in a given 

field.”113 Thus, an appellate court will not disturb an agency’s interpretation of its 

rules unless the interpretation is “clearly wrong.”114 

IV. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court must address the substance and form of 

Appellant’s submissions. Although it has long been recognized that pro se

 108 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. of Dept. of Labor v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del. 1975).

109 Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (citing 

Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)).

110 Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Del. 1988).

111 Ward v. Dep’t of Elections, 2009 WL 2244413, at * 1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 27, 2009).

112 PAL of Wilmington v. Graham, 2008 WL 2582986, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 18, 2008). 113 Div. of Soc. Servs. V. Burns, 438 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Del. 1981). 

114 Id. at 1229. 
21

litigants should be afforded some leniency in presenting their case to the Court, 

there is no different set of rules for pro se litigants to follow.

115 Moreover, “the 

[pro se litigant’s] brief at the very least must assert an argument that is capable of 

review.”116 However, the Court prefers to decide cases on the merits where 

possible rather than reject submissions for procedural deficiency.117

Appellant filed a Record on Appeal that consisted of over eight hundred 

pages of transcripts and documents.118 Additionally, Appellant filed a sixty-four 

page “Opening Brief” that haphazardly referenced several excerpts from what 

appears to be various documents, emails, personal anecdotes, CCP internal 

procedures and quotations to case law that allegedly pertain to her appeal.119 In the 

voluminous submissions, Appellant does very little to articulate any discernible 

argument. Therefore, in the absence of more concrete assertions but in an effort to 

dispose of the case on the merits, the Court construes Appellant’s arguments as 

follows: 1) The MERB Form for filing an appeal is confusing; 2) OMB wrongfully 

posted a job opening for Appellant’s job position before her termination was 

finalized; 3) the MERB erred in affirming Appellant’s termination; 4) the MERB 

erred in denying Appellant’s hostile work environment claim; 5) the MERB erred 

in accepting the Referee’s recommendations to limit the contents of her appeal

 115 Draper v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 767 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. 2001). 

116 In re Estate of Hall, 882 A.2d 761, at *1 (Del. 2005)(Table). 

117 City of Wilmington v. Flamer, 2013 WL 4829585, at *4 (Del. Super. May 22, 2013).

118 See D.I. 7-8.

119 See D.I. 18.
22

submitted to the MERB; and 6. the MERB erred in concluding that the testimony 

of Arthur Stone, one of Appellant’s witnesses, was unnecessary to render a 

decision.

A. The Court Must Preclude Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal.

When considering Appellant’s arguments on appeal, the Court is limited to 

the record that existed at the time of the MERB’s decision.120 Therefore, to the 

extent than an issue was not previously raised before the MERB, the Court cannot 

consider it now on the merits.

121

Appellant’s first two arguments, that the MERB appeal form is overly 

confusing and that OMB improperly posted a job opening for Appellant’s position 

prior to her termination, were not raised before the MERB. Therefore, the Court 

declines to address the merits of those two arguments. 

B. The MERB’s Decision That the CCP Had Just Cause to Terminate 

Appellant is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free of Legal 

Error.

Appellant asserts that she was entitled to receive and did not receive 

“reprimands” before being terminated in violation of Merit Rule 12.2.

122 However, 

 120 See Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 352 A.2d 761, 763 (Del. 1976)(“Upon 

appeal...the Superior Court is limited to consideration of the record which was before the 

administrative agency”). 

121 Id. 

122 Merit Rule 12.2 provides, in relevant part:

Employees shall receive a written reprimand where appropriate 

based on specified misconduct, or where a verbal reprimand has 

not produced the desired improvement.
23

the Court has previously considered and rejected a similar argument when it 

determined that performance-based terminations do not require that the employee 

be given progressive discipline.123 Instead, performance-based terminations are 

governed by the “just cause” standard which is defined as “legally sufficient reason 

supported by job related factors that rationally and logically touch upon the 

employee’s competency and ability to perform [her] job duties.”124 

Additionally, Merit Rule 12.1 defines “just cause” as “showing that the 

employee has committed the charged offense; offering specified due process rights 

specified in this chapter; and imposing a penalty appropriate to the 

circumstances.”125 The due process requirements regarding performance reviews 

are set forth in Merit Rules 13.1,126 13.2127 and 13.3128 and the due process 

 123 Stanford v. MERB and DHSS, C.A. No. N10A-12-009 at 13(Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2011). 

124 Vann v. Town of Cheswold, 945 A.2d 1118, 1122 (Del. 2008). 

125 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.1.

126 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-13.1 provides: “The Director shall provide for systematic 

performance review to communicate expectations and responsibilities, recognize achievement, 

and identify areas for skill development and work performance improvement.”

127 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-13.2 provides, in relevant part: “Recognition of effort, 

accomplishment, improvement or the need for further skill development shall be addressed as 

needed by verbal discussions, written communication, and/or formal documentation.”

128 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-13.3 provides:

When an employee's work performance is considered 

unsatisfactory, the performance must be documented in writing, 

and the specific weaknesses must be made known to the employee. 

The employee shall be given documented assistance to improve by 

the designated supervisor. An opportunity for re-evaluation will be 

provided within a period of 3 to 6 months.
24

requirements regarding employee termination are set forth in Merit Rules 12.4,129

12.5130 and 12.6.131

The MERB determined that the CCP had just cause to terminate Appellant 

from her job for consistent poor job performance because the MERB found that the 

CCP had spent three years offering Appellant re-training, personal counseling and 

transferred her to another unit before terminating her.

132 The MERB found that, 

despite these measures, Appellant was unable to complete her job duties and it was 

harmful to the ISO Unit and other employees who had to perform additional work 

to compensate for Appellant’s job deficiencies.

133 The MERB noted that “[t]he 

 129 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.4 provides:

Employees shall receive written notice of their entitlement to a predecision meeting in dismissal, demotion for just cause, fines and 

suspension cases. If employees desire such a meeting, they shall 

submit a written request for a meeting to their Agency's designated 

personnel representative within 15 calendar days from the date of 

notice. Employees may be suspended without pay during this 

period provided that a management representative has first 

reviewed with the employee the basis for the action and provides 

an opportunity for response. Where employees' continued presence 

in the workplace would jeopardize others' safety, security, or the 

public confidence, they may be removed immediately from the 

workplace without loss of pay.

130 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.5 provides: “The pre-decision meeting shall be held within a 

reasonable time not to exceed 15 calendar days after the employee has requested the meeting in 

compliance with 12.4.”

131 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.6 provides: “Pre-decision meetings shall be informal meetings to 

provide employees an opportunity to respond to the proposed action, and offer any reasons why 

the proposed penalty may not be justified or is too severe.”

132 R. at 769.

133 R. at 770. 
25

Board believes that the CCP bent over backwards to try to help [Appellant] 

improve her job performance.”134 

The facts contained in the record support the MERB’s ruling. Based upon 

the detailed testimony of Chief and Court Administrator regarding Appellant’s 

poor job performance including several poor performance reviews, additional 

training opportunities provided to Appellant and a temporary transition to another 

unit, there is substantial evidence to conclude that Appellant lacked the job related 

factors required for that position. Therefore, the MERB did not err in determining 

that the CCP had just cause to terminate Appellant. 

Additionally, the Court cannot find that the MERB was “clearly wrong” in 

determining that the CCP satisfied the procedural requirements set forth in the 

Merit Rules. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings that 

Appellant was given several systematic performance reviews pursuant to Merit 

Rule 13.1; in administering the performance reviews, CCP administration 

documented Appellant’s weaknesses and gave her resources and opportunities to 

improve pursuant to Merit Rules 13.2 and 13.3; and Appellant was afforded a predecision hearing consistent with Merit Rules 12.4 through 12.6. Therefore, the 

Court finds that the MERB’s decision to uphold Appellant’s termination is 

supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 

 134 Id. 
26

C. The MERB’s Decision to Reject Appellant’s Hostile Work Environment 

Claims is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free of Legal Error. 

Without being particularly specific, Appellant alleges that the MERB 

improperly applied “harassment law.”135 To establish a prima facie case for a 

hostile work environment claim, the employee must show that: 1) the employee 

suffered intentional discrimination as a result of her race, sex or religion; 2) the 

discrimination was regular and pervasive; 3) the discrimination detrimentally 

affected her; 4) that a reasonable person of her likeness would be detrimentally 

affected; and 5) the employer is liable under the theory of respondeat superior.

136 

The Court finds that the MERB appropriately applied the correct legal

standard and determined that “[a]t most [Appellant] had shown a few, isolated 

incidents of what may have been inappropriate or insensitive conduct in the 

workplace by co-workers. The [MERB] does not believe that they were directed 

towards [Appellant] to ridicule her race, national origin, gender, or religion.”137 

The MERB also found that most of the incidents alleged were not brought before 

management and that the few reported incidents brought to management’s 

attention were properly investigated and remediated.138 The MERB concluded that 

Appellant did not make out a hostile work environment claim.139 

 135 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4. 

136 Hemphill v. Wilmington, et al., 813 F.Supp.2d 581, 587-88 (D.Del. 2011). 

137 R. at 773.

138 Id.

139 Id.
27

The Court finds that the record supports the MERB’s conclusions. The 

MERB found that Appellant brought the doll and the cartoon to the attention of 

CCP management and that the issues were swiftly remediated.140 Additionally, at 

the hearing before the MERB, Appellant conceded that some of the incidents to 

which she took offense were not directed at her personally but were aimed at other 

co-workers141 and Appellant admitted that being referred to as an “oriental 

woman” by a member of the public was not a racial slur made by the co-worker 

who repeated the message as stated to a supervisor.142 Furthermore, Appellant did 

not report any of the incidents to management besides the doll and cartoon until 

her pre-decision meeting.143 Therefore, the MERB did not err in denying

Appellant’s hostile work environment claim and the decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

D. The Court Cannot Disturb the MERB’s Evidentiary Rulings Because 

There Is Substantial Evidence to Support the MERB’s Decision. 

Pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 10125(b)(3), the MERB has the authority to 

“[e]xclude plainly irrelevant, immaterial, insubstantial, cumulative and privileged 

evidence.” Moreover, it is clear that “[i]n dealing with evidentiary matters on 

appeal, this Court does not stand as the trier of fact...and, therefore, it cannot 

 140 R. at 772-73.

141 See Tr. at 227: 3-5;135: 3-4; 180: 10-12.

142 Tr. at 232: 9-10.

143 Tr. at 90: 3-16.
28

substitute its own opinion for that of the [MERB’s] if there is sufficient evidence to 

support the [MERB’s] decision.”144 

Appellant asserts that the MERB erred in accepting the Referee’s 

recommendations to limit Appellant’s submissions to the MERB and that the 

MERB erred in concluding that Arthur Stone’s testimony would not affect the 

MERB’s decision. Because the Court finds that the MERB’s decision is supported 

by substantial evidence, the Court cannot evaluate evidentiary rulings that are 

within the exclusive province of the MERB as the trier of fact. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the MERB’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence and free from legal error. Therefore, the decision of the MERB is hereby 

AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton, Judge

 144 Lopicko v. Del. Dep’t of Servs. For Children, 2003 WL 21976409, at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 15, 

2003).