United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 9, 2021 Decided September 3, 2021

No. 19-3042

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LONNELL TUCKER,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 19-3043, 19-3078

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-cr-00267-1)

(No. 1:18-cr-00267-2)

(No. 1:18-cr-00267-6)

Paul S. Rosenzweig, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause for appellant Anthony Fields. Amelia Schmidt, appointed 

by the court, argued the cause for appellant Abdul Samuels. 

With her on the briefs was Matthew G. Kaiser, appointed by 

the court. Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by the court, argued 

the cause for appellant Lonnell Tucker.
2

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Elizabeth 

Trosman, Chrisellen R. Kolb, and Gregory P. Rosen, Assistant 

U.S. Attorneys.

Before: KATSAS, RAO, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Appellants Anthony Fields, Abdul Samuels, 

and Lonnell Tucker were convicted on several drug- and 

firearm-related offenses. Each appellant challenges his 

convictions, and Samuels also challenges his sentence. We 

affirm.

I

In May 2018, a grand jury indicted Fields, Samuels, 

Tucker, and three other individuals on several charges related 

to an alleged drug-dealing conspiracy. The indictment 

stemmed from an investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) of drug activity at 

Next Level Cuts, a barbershop in the District of Columbia.

Much of the government’s evidence came from searches

in the months preceding the indictment. During a traffic stop 

in November 2017, officers found what appeared to be a drug 

ledger, approximately $9,000, and drug paraphernalia in 

Fields’s vehicle. The ATF executed a search warrant on the 

barbershop three months later. In a suite above the barbershop, 

agents found cash, firearms, more drug paraphernalia, and 

large quantities of narcotics — heroin mixed with fentanyl, 

PCP, Suboxone, and synthetic marijuana. In the same room, 

they also found a document listing a medical appointment for 

Fields and a receipt for a purchase made with his credit card. 

A search of Fields’s home led to more drug ledgers, two of 
3

which listed “Foots” (i.e., Samuels). During the ensuing 

searches of Samuels’s home, ATF agents found a shotgun, drug 

paraphernalia, crack cocaine, marijuana, and synthetic 

marijuana. During the search, Samuels admitted that he kept 

the gun under his bed for protection.

Also central to the government’s case was testimony from 

Byran Clark, a drug dealer who purportedly worked for Fields. 

Clark testified that Fields ran a drug operation out of the 

barbershop’s upstairs suite and that Samuels often acted as a 

gatekeeper to the suite. He also reported that Tucker sold drugs 

out of the barbershop and frequented the suite.

Five defendants proceeded to trial. One pleaded guilty 

during the trial. The jury returned a mixed verdict as to the 

other four. It acquitted one defendant on the sole charge 

against him. It also acquitted Fields and Samuels on several 

firearms- and narcotics-related charges. But it found Fields, 

Samuels, and Tucker guilty of conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute various narcotics. See 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841, 846.1 It also found Fields guilty of possessing 

with intent to distribute each of the narcotics alleged in the 

conspiracy. Id. § 841(a). And it found Samuels guilty of 

possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base, id., of 

possessing synthetic marijuana, id. § 844, and of felony 

possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

The district court sentenced Fields to 192 months of 

imprisonment, Samuels to 84 months of imprisonment, and 

1 The jury found Fields guilty of conspiring to distribute PCP, 

heroin, fentanyl, buprenorphine, marijuana, and synthetic marijuana. 

Samuels was found guilty of conspiring to distribute heroin and 

fentanyl. And Tucker was found guilty of conspiring to distribute 

heroin.
4

Tucker to 60 months of imprisonment. All three appealed and 

collectively raise eight claims. We address each claim in turn.

II

We start with Fields, who contends that the police officers 

who searched him and his vehicle in November 2017 lacked a 

sufficient basis to conduct their traffic stop, violating the 

Fourth Amendment. Prior to the search, officers conducting

undercover surveillance on a store known to sell drug 

paraphernalia witnessed Fields exit the store. The officers 

followed him. Fields drove to a nearby parking lot where 

another person entered Fields’s car and then left after less than 

two minutes. Suspecting a drug sale and wanting to remain 

undercover, the officers called for backup and followed Fields 

to another nearby parking lot. 

When backup officers arrived, they observed Fields 

illegally speed through that parking lot and then park. They 

momentarily observed Fields before they approached him and 

asked for his driver’s license and registration. “Due to his 

nervous behavior and furtive movements,” they then asked 

Fields to step out of his car and keep his hands away from his 

pockets. App. 145. 

Contrary to the instruction, Fields made “constant furtive 

movements towards his pockets.” Id. So the backup officers 

conducted a pat down, during which Fields spontaneously 

uttered “that white powder in my pocket is a supplement.” Id. 

The “white powder” was Mannitol, a known cutting agent for 

cocaine. Id. at 146. 

The backup officers also found $2,000 in cash and a ledger 

on Fields. Inside his car, a K-9 found another $7,001 in cash 

and multiple bottles with concealed “false bottoms containing 
5

trace amounts of white powder.” Id. Fields was subsequently 

arrested. 

Months later, in February 2018, ATF agents applied for a 

search warrant of Fields’s car and the barbershop, which was

suspected of being a stash house. The 18-page application 

included a paragraph about the November 2017 stop. After a 

court granted the search warrant, ATF agents found additional 

evidence of Fields’s drug trafficking. 

Before trial, Fields challenged the legality of the vehicular 

stop and search warrant. The district court held an evidentiary 

hearing on the stop. Sergeant Chaney (one of the two 

undercover officers) and Officer Haskett (one of the backup 

officers) both testified. The court found their testimony 

credible, concluded that there was probable cause to stop 

Fields, and denied Fields’s suppression motion. The court also 

denied Fields’s motion to suppress evidence from the February 

2018 search. 

As to the November 2017 stop, Fields challenges the 

court’s findings that (1) the officers were credible, and 

(2) there was probable cause for the stop. In addition, he 

disputes the district court’s rejection of his argument regarding 

the 2018 search, and he now adds an argument not raised in the 

district court — that the evidence from the February 2018 

search warrant should be suppressed as poisonous fruit of the 

allegedly unlawful November 2017 stop. 

A

As for the officers’ credibility, we review the district 

court’s findings for clear error. United States v. Delaney, 955 

F.3d 1077, 1081–82 (D.C. Cir. 2020). And we reverse “when 

a district court credits exceedingly improbable testimony.” 
6

United States v. Delaney, 651 F.3d 15, 18 (2001) (cleaned up) 

(emphasis added).

Fields offers three reasons for reversal. 

First, he argues that because Officer Haskett did not 

immediately stop him or take the necessary steps to cite him 

for speeding, no speeding actually occurred. But that 

conclusion does not follow from those facts. Officer Haskett 

was taking steps to cite Fields for speeding until he discovered 

evidence of a more serious crime — Fields’s drug trafficking. 

It is therefore understandable the stop did not end how it began. 

Second, Fields makes much of Sergeant Chaney’s 

statement that he could not recall “[i]f there were any obvious 

reasons for the stop.” App. 118. What Chaney actually said, 

when asked if he could recall “[i]f there were any obvious 

reasons for stop,” was: “I believe there were, but off the top of 

my head, I couldn’t tell you what it was. Id. But in any event, 

Sergeant Chaney was not even the officer who conducted the 

stop. Cause for the stop here depends on what was seen by 

Officer Haskett. And he recalled that Fields was speeding. 

Third, Fields argues that Officer Haskett’s testimony that 

Fields “was going a little fast,” id. at 133, is inconsistent with 

his written report that Fields was “traveling at a high rate of 

speed through the parking lot” and that officers approached 

Fields to confront him “about speeding through the parking 

lot,” id. at 145. 

That argument, however, distorts Officer Haskett’s 

testimony, which included at least five statements about 

Fields’s driving:

(1) “I saw a silver Range Rover speeding through the 

parking lot”; 
7

(2) Fields “was going a little fast for people to — for [him] 

to react to people walking across the road”; 

(3) “I already had probable cause to stop the vehicle 

because of speeding”; 

(4) “I don’t know the exact speed limit, but I do know that 

he was driving faster than he should if people are 

walking with their children and families shopping”; and 

(5) Fields’s “[s]peed [was] greater than reasonable.” 

Hr’g Tr. 9, 11, 31, ECF No. 246 (emphases added).

Contrary to Fields’s argument, there is no genuine 

inconsistency between the written report and the totality of 

Officer Haskett’s testimony. One can imagine a case where it 

might matter whether a defendant was barely speeding or 

dangerously speeding. But this is not that case. All that matters 

is that Fields committed a traffic violation. 

The district court did not err in finding the officers’ 

testimony credible. And we, like the district court, rely on it 

for the next part of our analysis.

B

We review the district court’s determination that there was 

a legal basis for the stop de novo. See Delaney, 955 F.3d at

1081–82.

Because Officer Haskett observed Fields speeding, he had 

probable cause for the stop. It is well settled that a traffic stop 

“is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe 

that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 

517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); see also United States v. Sheffield, 
8

832 F.3d 296, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. 

at 810).

2

We will not consider Fields’s argument that the speeding 

was merely a pretextual justification for the stop because the 

Supreme Court’s precedents “foreclose any argument that the 

constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the 

actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren, 

517 U.S. at 813. So too do this court’s precedents. See 

Sheffield, 832 F.3d at 302–03. 

We affirm the district court’s denial of Fields’s motion to 

suppress.

C

Because Officer Haskett lawfully stopped Fields, there is 

no poisonous tree from which poisonous fruit could fall.

Moreover, Fields forfeited his argument that the evidence from 

the February 2018 search warrant should be suppressed as fruit 

of the poisonous tree by not raising that argument in district 

court. “[S]uppression arguments that are not presented to the 

trial court are deemed waived and cannot be argued on appeal.” 

United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(cleaned up). 

III

Fields next argues that the district court erred when it 

denied his request to represent himself at trial. Fields had a 

difficult relationship with his attorneys throughout the 

prosecution. He fired his first attorney in 2018. Three months 

2 Even without probable cause, an officer’s reasonable suspicion is 

alone enough to justify a traffic stop. See Heien v. North Carolina, 

574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014).
9

before trial, he fired that attorney’s successor. And then, seven 

days into trial, he tried to fire his third attorney. At that point, 

over his co-defendants’ objections, Fields moved to represent 

himself. When the district court asked why, Fields said his 

attorney had not had time to learn the details of the case. He 

also believed his attorney was not “aggressive enough” during 

the trial. App. 361. The district court denied Fields’s request,

noting they were far along in the trial and Fields’s selfrepresentation at that juncture might harm his co-defendants.

Fields asks us to review the district court’s decision de 

novo. But when a defendant’s request to represent himself is 

made after trial has begun, we review the district court’s 

decision for abuse of the court’s “considerable discretion.” 

United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 498 (1st Cir. 1997); see 

also United States v. Washington, 353 F.3d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 

2004) (applying abuse of discretion standard).

“A person accused of a crime has an absolute right, under 

the Sixth Amendment, to represent himself only if he asserts 

that right before trial.” Washington, 353 F.3d at 46 (emphases 

added). But if asserted after a trial begins, the right of selfrepresentation is qualified. It must yield to other interests when 

those interests, such as harm to co-defendants, outweigh it. See

United States v. Bankoff, 613 F.3d 358, 373–74 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(“However, after trial has commenced — i.e., at least after the 

jury has been empaneled — the right of self-representation is 

curtailed. In that context, district courts have discretion to deny 

an untimely request to proceed pro se after weighing the 

prejudice to the legitimate interests of the defendant against the 

potential disruption of proceedings already in progress. How 

this balance should be struck is ultimately within the sound 

discretion of the district court, and we will review its decision 

under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”)

(cleaned up); United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 108 (2d 
10

Cir. 1998) (“Once a trial has begun, the defendant’s right to 

self-representation is sharply curtailed. In cases in which the 

request is made following the commencement of the trial, the 

district judge must balance the prejudice to the legitimate 

interests of the defendant against the potential disruption of 

proceedings already in progress. On appeal, considerable 

weight will be given to the district court’s assessment of this 

balance.”) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Dougherty, 

473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 

Citing this court’s concern in United States v. Washington

that a defendant’s request to make his own closing argument 

may be an attempt to tell his story while evading crossexamination, see 353 F.3d at 46, Fields says, “At most, 

Washington stands for the proposition that a defendant may be 

denied self-representation when the request is an effort to game 

the system.” Appellants’ Br. 42. We disagree. Although a 

defendant’s attempt to manipulate the process is a sufficient 

reason to deny a mid-trial request for self-representation, it is 

not a necessary reason. Prejudice to co-defendants is also a 

sufficient reason. So too is disruption of the proceedings. 

Bankoff, 613 F.3d at 373. 

Here, the district court stated it could not “ignore the 

interests and the rights of the other defendants in this case.” 

App. 367. It thoroughly explained to Fields his request would 

“risk harming” his co-defendants, “whether it’s by a question 

you ask; whether it’s by some objection you make or by an 

objection you don’t make.” Id. The court then again noted its 

duty to “not only consider your rights but the rights of these 

four other men” and concluded “the rights of these four other 

men will be jeopardized.” Id. Therefore, the court denied 

Fields’s mid-trial request, “given the late juncture and the 

amount of time that has passed in this case and where we find 

ourselves in this case.” Id. 
11

“A trial involving a pro se defendant and co-defendants 

who are assisted by counsel is pregnant with the possibility of 

prejudice.” United States v. Veteto, 701 F.2d 136, 139 (11th 

Cir. 1983) (cleaned up). In this case, the reasons to fear that 

possibility — listed above by the district court — were 

compelling. And the district court could have added to those 

reasons Fields’s erratic trial attendance and unwarranted 

hostility to fair proceedings. See, e.g., Appellee’s Supp. App.

422 (Fields: “I’m being railroaded here, man. I’m being 

railroaded here. I said this from the beginning that we wasn’t 

going to get no justice in this court.”); id. at 424 (Fields refused 

to attend afternoon trial proceedings); App. 372 (Fields: “I’m 

fighting the prosecution and I’m fighting you.” Court: “You’re 

not fighting me.” Fields: “I’m definitely fighting you.”). 

The district court did not abuse its considerable discretion 

when it denied Fields’s request to represent himself. 

IV

Fields raises two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

prevail, he must show (1) “that counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 

the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that the error 

prejudiced his defense. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 

104 (2011) (cleaned up). “Even under de novo review, the 

standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most 

deferential one.” Id. at 105. We “must apply a strong 

presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 104.

Because Fields’s claims are raised for the first time before 

this Court, we have two options — remand for an evidentiary 

hearing or reject them outright. The latter is permitted when

defendants present their claims in a vague or conclusory 
12

manner, when the trial record shows no deficient performance, 

or when that record shows no prejudice. United States v. 

Sitzmann, 893 F.3d 811, 831–32 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam); 

United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909–10 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). 

Here, every paragraph of Fields’s brief — with the 

possible exception of his third of five paragraphs, noted below 

— is conclusory. And even when his arguments are at their 

least conclusory, the trial record shows no deficient 

performance or prejudice. 

A

His first claim is laid out in four paragraphs. He begins in 

paragraph one by alleging that the relationship with his 

attorneys — recall that he fired the first two, and tried to fire 

the third — was “broken” and that their investigations were not 

“adequate”:

As we set forth above, Mr. Fields had a broken 

relationship with each of his attorneys. With 

respect to the first two, Mr. McCants and Mr. 

Retureta, one aspect of their ineffectiveness is 

already identified in the record but requires 

further exploration on remand — namely, their 

lack of adequate investigation.

Appellants’ Br. 48. 

Then in paragraph two, Fields describes his version of the 

evidence against him: 

As the Court is aware from the recitation 

elsewhere in this brief there was limited direct 

evidence against Mr. Fields. No surveillance 
13

photos showed him engaging in drug 

transactions. The only testimonial evidence 

against him came from a cooperating witness 

who, like all such witnesses, had mixed 

motivation. Thus, the main ground for Mr. 

Fields’ conviction lay in the Government’s 

attempt to tie him to drugs found in a room on 

the second floor above the barbershop. His 

alleged constructive possession of the goods 

found in that room was a critical piece of the 

government’s case in chief.

Id.

Next, in paragraph three, Fields comes as close as he gets 

to a non-conclusory argument. He alleges other people had 

access to a room above the barbershop where he kept personal 

items and instrumentalities of drug trafficking. And he faults 

his initial attorneys for not finding them. But he never says 

how many people had access, who they were, or why we should 

believe that these unidentified people actually exist — aside 

from Fields’s entirely self-serving “insiste[nce]” that they do:

And thus, negating that inference of 

constructive possession was a vital component 

of Mr. Fields’ defense. Throughout the time 

prior to trial, Mr. Fields insisted that other 

individuals also had keys to the room above the 

barbershop — a fact which, if established, 

would have afforded him the opportunity to 

argue the insufficiency of the government’s 

evidence attempting to attribute those drugs to 

him. Yet, Mr. Fields’ initial attorney, Mr. 

McCants, does not appear to have conducted the 

investigation necessary to evaluate Fields’s 
14

requests. And Mr. Fields maintains that there is 

no evidence that Mr. Retureta pursued that 

investigation, either.

Id. at 48–49 (cleaned up). 

Even assuming this, Fields’s least conclusory paragraph, 

is sufficiently non-conclusory — which is doubtful — it was 

neither deficient performance nor prejudicial for his counsel 

not to investigate “other individuals” with “keys to the room 

above the barbershop” where Fields kept cash, drugs, drug 

paraphernalia, and personal items. Connecting others to the 

room would not have eliminated the evidence connecting 

Fields to the room. So even if his attorney had investigated the 

unnamed “other individuals,” and even if they too were drug 

dealers, the jury would have learned nothing more than the 

unremarkable fact that Fields, a drug dealer, hung out and 

shared space with other drug dealers. Cf. Trial Tr. 69, ECF No. 

312 (“[D]espite the fact that you heard Mr. Fields in person and 

on the phone again and again and again talk about how 

everybody has got keys, everybody has access . . . , [m]ultiple 

people can jointly have property in their constructive 

possession. That’s the concept of both constructive possession 

and a conspiracy. It’s teamwork.”).

Finally, in paragraph four, Fields ends his first claim where 

he began — by repeating his conclusory claim that his 

attorneys should have “conduct[ed] an investigation”:

As the Supreme Court recently put it: 

“Counsel . . . has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision 

that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary. . . . In any ineffectiveness case, a 

particular decision not to investigate must be 

directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 
15

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of 

deference to counsel’s judgments.” Here, no 

assessment has been made as to the judgment of 

counsel in failing to conduct an 

investigation — manifestly necessitating an 

evidentiary inquiry.

Id. at 49 (cleaned up). 

B

Fields’s other (conclusory) claim is laid out in one

paragraph — paragraph five. There he alleges his attorney did 

not adequately cross-examine Clark, the government’s witness

who identified him as the leader of the conspiracy. But Fields 

identifies no question his attorney should have asked that 

would have impeached Clark or exculpated Fields. Instead, 

Fields faults his attorney for not mentioning the absence of call 

records reflecting Clark’s conversations with Fields. The 

absence of evidence, however, is not evidence of absence. So 

the absence of call records would not, in Fields’s words, have 

“exploit[ed] inconsistencies” in Clarks’s testimony. Id. And 

Fields fails to specify any other purported inconsistencies:

In addition, at an evidentiary hearing Mr. Fields 

would also establish the reasons for his 

dissatisfaction with the representation provided 

by Ms. West, whose cross-examination of the 

cooperating witness, Byran Clark, was in Mr. 

Fields’ view inadequate. She failed to exploit 

inconsistencies between the proffers that Mr. 

Clark earlier had made to the government and 

his sworn testimony. By way of example, 

although Clark contended that he was in 

frequent contact with Mr. Fields there were no 
16

call records — none — reflecting conversations 

between them.

Id. 

In short, Fields does little more than state his 

“dissatisfaction” with his attorneys based on an investigation 

and cross-examination he deems inadequate for the vaguest of 

reasons and then conclude that this alone entitles him to relief. 

But we reject conclusory claims that leave out specific reasons 

for counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice under 

Strickland. It is not nearly enough for Fields to simply state his 

dissatisfaction and then conclude that his dissatisfaction 

satisfied Strickland. We will therefore not remand Fields’s 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for an evidentiary 

hearing and instead reject those claims.

3

V

We now turn to Samuels’s claims. He first contends that 

his trial counsel, Joseph Conte, provided ineffective assistance. 

Samuels primarily argues that Conte was ineffective under 

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), which requires the 

defendant to show “(1) that his lawyer acted under an actual 

conflict of interest” and (2) that the conflict caused “an actual 

lapse in representation.” United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 

846, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); see Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 

349. Because Cuyler relaxes Strickland’s prejudice 

3 We also hold a non-conclusory argument would have fared no 

better. With regard to Clark’s testimony, the performance of Fields’s 

trial attorney was not deficient or prejudicial. She repeatedly elicited 

purported inconsistencies between his pre-trial statements and trial 

testimony, as did three attorneys for Fields’s co-defendants. Fields’s 

attorney even made the point about the absence of text messages in 

her closing argument. 
17

requirement, we are “reluctant to allow defendants to force 

their ineffective assistance claims into the ‘actual conflict of 

interest’ framework and thereby supplant the strict Strickland

standard.” United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 930 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). We thus closely scrutinize claims 

under Cuyler.

Samuels argues that Conte was conflicted because his 

daughter worked for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District 

of Columbia, which prosecuted Samuels. Although Conte 

mentioned his daughter’s job to the prosecutor, he informed 

neither Samuels nor the district court. Shortly before 

Samuels’s sentencing, the district court learned about the issue, 

appointed new counsel, and ordered briefing. The court 

concluded that Conte’s failure to disclose his daughter’s job

raised a potential conflict of interest, and it set an evidentiary 

hearing on that issue. Later, the court granted the parties’ joint 

motion to vacate the hearing without resolving the conflict 

issue. Now on appeal, Samuels again contends that Conte had

a conflict of interest.

As discussed, we ordinarily remand “colorable and 

previously unexplored claims of ineffective assistance” for 

evidentiary hearings. United States v. Marshall, 946 F.3d 591, 

596 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up); see McGill, 815 F.3d at 942. 

But remand is unwarranted where the record establishes that 

counsel was not ineffective, where the appellant’s allegations 

are vague and conclusory, or where the appellant fails to 

identify an issue that “requires a determination of facts.” 

Sitzmann, 893 F.3d at 832 (cleaned up). Moreover, our 

standard for remand is blunted by “the strong presumption that 

counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment,” which extends to claims 

under Cuyler. Taylor, 139 F.3d at 934 (cleaned up); see also 

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987) (“[W]e generally 
18

presume that the lawyer is fully conscious of the overarching 

duty of complete loyalty to his or her client.”).4

We assume that Conte was conflicted and resolve this 

appeal under Cuyler’s second prong, which considers whether 

the conflict led to an “actual lapse in representation.” McGill, 

815 F.3d at 943 (cleaned up). To satisfy this standard, Samuels 

must articulate a strategy that a reasonable, nonconflicted 

defense counsel would have pursued. See United States v. 

Gantt, 140 F.3d 249, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The conflict must 

have caused the failure to pursue this strategy, United States v. 

Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and must have

“significantly affected counsel’s performance . . . rendering the 

4 We are skeptical that Samuels preserved his ineffective-assistance 

claim. “The law in this circuit is that a claim of ineffective assistance 

must be made in a motion for a new trial ‘when counsel changes prior 

to appeal and when there is still a reasonable opportunity to challenge 

a conviction in the District Court.’” United States v. Wood, 879 F.2d 

927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Debango, 780 

F.2d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Before he appealed, Samuels received 

new counsel and pressed a claim that his former counsel was

ineffective because of a conflict of interest. Moreover, after the 

district court set an evidentiary hearing to explore the conflict issue, 

Samuels — acting through his new counsel — affirmatively moved 

to proceed without a hearing. Nevertheless, the government waived 

any forfeiture (or waiver) argument by stipulating that it would not 

raise that issue in the joint motion to vacate the evidentiary hearing. 

See United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The 

government’s stipulation is not binding on us, see Weston v. 

WMATA, 78 F.3d 682, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and we have significant 

concern with remanding now for a hearing that Samuels 

affirmatively eschewed. But because we may reject Samuels’s 

Cuyler claim on the present record, we accept the stipulation and 

proceed to the merits.
19

verdict unreliable, even though Strickland prejudice cannot be 

shown,” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173 (2002).

Under this standard, Conte’s failure to tell anyone other 

than the prosecutor about his daughter’s job is not itself enough

to establish ineffective assistance. Cuyler “requires proof of 

effect upon representation.” Id. Without more, the “inadequate 

disclosure” of a conflict is “not an adverse effect on counsel’s 

performance.” United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1536 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878, 881–

82 (7th Cir. 2013). And Samuels does not explain how Conte’s 

limited disclosure so significantly affected his performance as 

to make the verdict unreliable.

To show an adverse effect, Samuels identifies three points

that he claims Conte failed to raise. According to Samuels, 

Conte (1) missed an argument supporting a motion to suppress

his statement about the shotgun found under his bed, (2) failed 

to timely oppose expert testimony on drug distribution, and (3) 

did not cite evidence to support a multiple-conspiracy 

instruction. Samuels posits that Conte avoided these points to 

advance his daughter’s interests as an employee in the U.S. 

Attorney’s office — i.e., he “pulled punches that a reasonable, 

conflict-free counsel would have thrown.” Appellants’ Br. 51. 

Samuels concludes that these failures make his verdict 

unreliable. We disagree.

To begin, Samuels failed to identify any plausible link 

between the alleged conflict and the points that Conte 

purportedly missed. See Bruce, 89 F.3d at 896. His theory of 

causation — that Conte “pulled punches” to help his daughter

— is belied by the trial record, which shows that the punches 

Conte threw were no less forceful than the ones he ostensibly

pulled. For example, as explained below, Conte sought to

sever Samuels’s trial from Fields’s, which would have 
20

considerably increased the government’s workload, see 

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987). He also 

forcefully challenged the credibility of the government’s 

central witness and offered alternative explanations for why 

Samuels appeared on Fields’s ledger (to pay for car insurance) 

and for why Samuels identified the shotgun (to cover for his 

girlfriend). With no distinction between these arguments and 

the ones that Conte ostensibly missed, Samuels’s theory of 

causation is not plausible.

Separate from causation, none of the purportedly missed 

arguments identifies a plausible lapse in representation. The 

first concerns Conte’s unsuccessful motion to suppress 

Samuels’s admission that he owned the shotgun agents found 

in his house. Conte had argued that the admission was 

involuntary because Samuels was suffering from heroin 

withdrawal at the time. The district court disagreed. On 

appeal, Samuels faults Conte for not also arguing that the 

statement was involuntary because he was under the influence 

of cocaine.

Conte’s failure to make this argument was not a colorable 

lapse in representation. The “mere fact that one has taken 

drugs, or is intoxicated, or mentally agitated, does not render 

consent involuntary.” United States v. Castellanos, 518 F.3d 

965, 969 (8th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Instead, “coercive police 

activity” is necessary to find a confession involuntary. 

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). And the 

district court, in rejecting the heroin-withdrawal argument,

found that the audio recording of Samuels’s confession showed

“no coercive police activity.” App. 89. It would thus have 

been futile to argue that Samuels’s consent was involuntary due 

to cocaine use. And the failure to raise a meritless objection is 

not colorably deficient. See Sitzmann, 893 F.3d at 833.
21

Second, Samuels argues that Conte failed to investigate or 

timely challenge testimony from a government expert that the 

amount of cocaine seized from Samuels’s home —

approximately 3.5 grams — was consistent with distribution

rather than personal use. Conte moved to exclude the 

testimony on the day of the expert’s testimony, but the district 

court denied the motion as untimely.

Samuels again identifies no colorable deficiency. For one 

thing, he does not explain why the motion to exclude the expert 

testimony might have been successful if timely, so this 

argument is too vague and conclusory to support remand. See 

id. at 832–33. He instead contends that Conte failed to develop 

evidence to counter the government’s expert. But Conte forced 

the expert to concede that the amount of cocaine in Samuels’s 

possession could have been for personal use. And he relied 

heavily on the possibility of personal use in his closing 

arguments, contending, for example, that Samuels owned a 

scale because he bought in bulk and did not want to be cheated. 

In other words, Samuels faults Conte for not offering 

cumulative evidence to support personal use, which is not 

enough for remand. See id. at 833.

Finally, Samuels contends that Conte botched his request 

for a multiple-conspiracy instruction, which would have 

clarified that the jury needed to find that Samuels was a 

member of the same conspiracy charged in the indictment to 

support a guilty verdict. In denying Conte’s request, the district 

court reasoned that there was no evidence of Samuels 

“interacting with anyone else . . . who’s not identified as a 

conspirator in this case.” App. 609. Samuels contends that 

there was such evidence, which Conte missed, namely Clark’s 

testimony that Samuels obtained crack cocaine to distribute in 

Virginia from “a guy named Miguel Harris.” Id. at 391. The 
22

indictment mentioned neither Harris nor a conspiracy to 

distribute crack cocaine.

It is at least plausible that Samuels would have received 

the multiple-conspiracy instruction had Conte flagged this 

evidence. If requested, a district court must give the instruction 

where the “record evidence supports the existence of multiple 

conspiracies.” United States v. Sanders, 778 F.3d 1042, 1047 

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). And Clark testified that Samuels 

“started purchasing” crack from Harris for distribution. 

App. 391. This testimony could perhaps support the inference 

that Harris was a “regular source,” which would be enough to 

create a separate conspiracy. United States v. Morris, 836 F.2d 

1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

But Conte’s failure to secure the instruction is not enough

to show that a conflict “significantly affected” his performance 

and made the verdict “unreliable.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173. 

Whatever the contours of this standard, the failure to recall a 

single line of testimony in a three-week trial that might support 

a peripheral jury instruction cannot fairly be described as 

significant. Moreover, it casts no doubt on the verdict, which 

found that Samuels was guilty of conspiring to distribute heroin

and fentanyl, not crack cocaine. Samuel’s case thus falls well 

outside Cuyler, which “is designed to protect a defendant when 

it is impossible to reconstruct what might have occurred 

without counsel’s conflict of interest.” Plunk v. Hobbs, 766 

F.3d 760, 766 (8th Cir. 2014).

Samuels alternatively contends that Conte was ineffective 

under Strickland, which requires him to show that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient and prejudicial, see 466 U.S. at 687. 

For the reasons given above, Samuels has not proven deficient 

performance. And because he does not satisfy Cuyler’s lower 

standard to prove a “significant[]” effect on representation, he 
23

also fails to satisfy Strickland’s more demanding requirement 

of prejudice. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173.

In sum, Samuels has established no colorable claim of

ineffective assistance under Cuyler or Strickland. His Cuyler 

claim fails because he has not plausibly proven that Conte’s 

alleged conflict of interest caused an adverse effect that rises to 

the level of an actual lapse in representation. And his 

Strickland claim fails for lack of any colorable case for 

deficient performance or prejudice.

VI

Samuels next argues that the district court impermissibly

limited his ability to cross-examine Clark, the government’s 

central witness, about his prior bad acts. When Clark testified, 

he had previously pleaded guilty to kidnapping and obstruction 

of justice as part of a plea agreement that depended on his 

cooperation against Samuels in this case. Samuels claims that 

Clark earned the kidnapping charge by taking a person hostage 

at gunpoint, robbing him, and pointing a gun at the victim’s 

head. For obstruction of justice, Samuels contends that Clark

directed a third party to threaten a witness to not testify. Clark 

also had other prior convictions, including one for murder. 

Samuels sought to cross-examine Clark about his convictions 

and the facts underlying them to impeach Clark’s credibility

and to establish that the plea agreement gave Clark a bias.

The district court adopted a halfway approach, explaining 

that it had to balance the probative value of Clark’s prior bad 

acts against the risk that the facts would “just dirty [him] up 

because he’s a bad dude.” App. 428. The court allowed 

Samuels to cross-examine Clark about the existence of his prior 

convictions; about the facts underlying charges the government 

reduced, dropped, or never brought due to Clark’s cooperation; 

and about other possible sources of bias. But it excluded 
24

questions about the facts underlying his convictions, reasoning 

that they would be “more prejudicial than probative.” 

Appellee’s Supp. App. 490. It also agreed with the government 

that those questions risked a “circus within a circus, a trial 

within a trial” about Clark. App. 433–34. Finally, it refused to 

let Samuels question Clark about the alleged witness 

intimidation after concluding that Samuels had no factual basis 

in the record to assume a threat occurred.

Samuels contends that the district court’s ruling violated 

both the Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence

403. Under the Confrontation Clause, a trial court “may limit 

cross-examination only after there has been permitted, as a 

matter of right, a certain threshold level of cross-examination.” 

United States v. Hall, 945 F.3d 507, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 

(cleaned up). That threshold is satisfied “so long as defense 

counsel is able to elicit enough information to allow a 

discriminating appraisal of a witness’s motives and bias.” Id.

(cleaned up). Otherwise, district courts “retain wide latitude” 

to “impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination” under 

the Federal Rules of Evidence. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 

U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Relevant here, Rule 403 allows courts 

to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice” or “confusing 

the issues.” We review limits on cross-examination for an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760, 768 

(D.C. Cir. 1996); Henderson v. Geo. Wash. Univ., 449 F.3d 

127, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

The district court did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 

Such a violation occurs “only when the court bars a legitimate 

line of inquiry that might have given the jury a significantly 

different impression of the witness’s credibility.” United 

States v. Miller, 738 F.3d 361, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned 

up). Samuels elicited ample testimony to give the jury the 
25

impression that Clark was lawless and had a substantial reason 

to testify in favor of the government. Among other impeaching 

facts, the jury learned about Clark’s cooperation agreement; his 

prior convictions; and that he robbed and kidnapped a man,

stole a car, and used a firearm during various crimes. This

cross-examination easily clears the threshold required by the 

Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Hall, 945 F.3d at 513 (no 

violation where defendant cross-examined government witness 

on guilty plea in cooperation deal).

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion under Rule 

403. Without acknowledging the court’s concerns about unfair 

prejudice, Samuels argues that the salacious facts underlying 

Clark’s prior convictions are “information the jury should have 

heard to evaluate whether someone with that little regard for 

human life and the law would have any compunction about 

lying under oath to reduce his time in prison.” Appellants’ Br. 

75. But while “evidence of lawlessness can undermine the 

perpetrator’s probable truthfulness . . . admission of such 

evidence is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court.” 

United States v. Garcia Sota, 948 F.3d 356, 363 (D.C. Cir. 

2020); see also FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A). And the court here 

acted well within its discretion in concluding that the risk of 

unfair prejudice stemming from the facts it excluded

substantially outweighed any cumulative probative value. This 

Court has long acknowledged the risk that evidence of prior 

criminal activity would impermissibly lead juries to discredit

witnesses because they are “bad men,” rather than because they 

are biased or not credible. United States v. Fox, 473 F.2d 131, 

135 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Thus, “when evidence of a prior 

conviction is admitted for purposes of impeachment, crossexamination is usually limited to the essential facts rather than 

the surrounding details of the conviction.” United States v. 

Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Not only did the 

district court allow cross-examination on the essential facts of 
26

Clark’s convictions, it let the jury hear about a wide range of 

Clark’s other criminal activity. We find no error in the district 

court’s limited restrictions on Clark’s cross-examination.

Samuels also contends that the details underlying the 

obstruction charge are particularly probative because they 

involved a threat to intimidate a witness. But the district court 

did not limit questions about witness intimidation based on

Rule 403. As noted, it restricted those questions because 

Samuels lacked a factual basis to ask them. See Lin, 101 F.3d 

at 768 (“counsel must have a reasonable basis for asking 

questions on cross-examination which tend to incriminate or 

degrade the witness”) (cleaned up). In his reply brief, Samuels 

objects that the district court erroneously discounted evidence 

that provided a factual basis for the questions. This objection 

is forfeited, see M.M.V. v. Garland, 1 F.4th 1100, 1111 (D.C. 

Cir. 2021), and also meritless. Samuels points to no record 

evidence suggesting that Clark threatened a witness. Instead, 

he gestures at unspecified grand-jury testimony that he admits 

is not in the record, which is not good enough. See United 

States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871–72 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (basis for 

cross-examination must be in the record). Samuels also faults 

the government for not providing further evidence to support 

its representation that Clark’s obstruction charge did not 

involve threats. But an objection to limits on crossexamination is not the appropriate vehicle to challenge the 

government’s compliance with discovery obligations. Samuels 

held the burden of proffering a sufficient factual basis to 

question Clark about threats. See Lin, 101 F.3d at 768. And 

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that 

he failed to satisfy that burden.

Moreover, any error by the district court would have been

“rendered fully harmless by the broad range of other heinous 

conduct that the court allowed defense counsel to bring out in 
27

cross-examination.” Garcia Sota, 948 F.3d at 363; see Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684; United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 

609, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As explained, Samuels extracted 

testimony from Clark about his convictions and the facts 

underlying several violent crimes for which the government 

declined to prosecute him. Samuels’s inability to elicit similar 

impeaching evidence was harmless because the crossexamination “was enough to enable the jury to assess the 

relation between [Clark’s] lawlessness and his propensity for 

truthfulness.” Garcia Sota, 948 F.3d at 363.

In sum, the district court acted well within its discretion

under the Confrontation Clause and Rule 403 in limiting 

Clark’s cross-examination, and any improper limits would 

have amounted to harmless error.

VII

We next consider the arguments made by Samuels and 

Tucker that the district court abused its discretion in denying 

their motions to sever their trials from Fields’s trial. Samuels 

and Tucker argue that severance was warranted due to 

“spillover” prejudice resulting from the disparity in evidence 

between them and Fields as well as Fields’s obstreperous 

behavior during trial. Fields, the undisputed ringleader of the 

drug distribution conspiracy, frequently displayed less than 

exemplary behavior in court. At one point, he absented himself 

from the trial for part of a day. Towards the end of trial, Fields 

testified on his behalf. He was the only defendant to do so, and 

the testimony did not go well. Fields gave conflicting and 

unbelievable explanations for the evidence against him, 

accused the government of planting evidence, speculated about 

the government’s motives for prosecuting him and his codefendants, and became combative with the prosecutor and the 

district court. Both before and after Fields’s testimony, 
28

Samuels and Tucker moved to sever their trials on the ground 

that Fields’s lies and misbehavior would be held against them 

by the jury. The district court denied this motion, explaining 

that Fields’s credibility was a matter for the jury to decide and 

that Fields did not say anything “about the other defendants that 

already didn’t come in the government’s case-in-chief.” App.

725. 

“We review the denial of a motion to sever for abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1015 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit 

joinder of defendants “alleged to have participated in the same 

act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, 

constituting an offense or offenses.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).

Joint trials are preferred in federal criminal cases because they 

“promote efficiency and serve the interests of justice by 

avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.” 

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (cleaned up). 

The preference for joint trials is “‘especially strong’ when ‘the 

respective charges require presentation of much the same 

evidence, testimony of the same witnesses, and 

involve . . . defendants who are charged, inter alia, with 

participating in the same illegal acts.’” Wilson, 605 F.3d at 

1016 (cleaned up). We find that neither the disparity in 

evidence between co-defendants, nor Fields’s behavior during 

trial, warranted severance because any risk of prejudice was 

curable with appropriate instructions. 

A joined defendant may seek to sever his trial from that of 

his co-defendants. “If the joinder 

of . . . defendants . . . appears to prejudice a defendant . . . , 

the court may . . . sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any 

other relief that justice requires.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a) 

(emphasis added). The permissive language of this rule makes 

clear that severance is not required “even if prejudice is 
29

shown.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538–39. Instead, Rule 14 grants a 

district court “significant flexibility to determine how to 

remedy any potential risk of prejudice posed by the joinder of 

multiple defendants in a single trial.” United States v. Moore, 

651 F.3d 30, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Severance is 

the exception rather than the rule and is required only when 

there is “a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a 

specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury

from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” 

Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. Although a serious risk may arise 

when “defendants are tried together in a complex case and they 

have markedly different degrees of culpability,” even in cases 

where the risk of prejudice is high, “less drastic measures, such 

as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of 

prejudice.” Id. In light of these principles, motions to sever 

should be granted “sparingly.” United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 

818, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

Appellants “carr[y] the burden of demonstrating prejudice 

resulting from a failure to sever.” United States v. Gooch, 665 

F.3d 1318, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Samuels and Tucker here 

assert spillover prejudice, namely the risk “the jury would use 

evidence of one defendant’s guilt against another.” United

States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1996). They 

maintain this prejudice arose from trying them, peripheral 

players in the conspiracy, together with Fields, “a perjurious 

and obstructionist lead defendant.” Appellants’ Br. 97. 

Samuels and Tucker fail to demonstrate prejudice.

First, Samuels and Tucker have not demonstrated 

prejudice from evidentiary spillover. Disparity in evidence 

requires severance “when the evidence against one defendant 

is ‘far more damaging’ than the evidence against the moving 

party,” but will not require severance in a conspiracy trial when 

there is “substantial and independent evidence of each 
30

defendant’s significant involvement in the conspiracy.” 

Moore, 651 F.3d at 95–96 (cleaned up). “[A]bsent a dramatic

disparity of evidence, any prejudice caused by joinder is best 

dealt with by instructions to the jury to give individual 

consideration to each defendant.” Id. at 95 (cleaned up). The 

varying roles played by members of a conspiracy will “not 

render joint trial inappropriate as long as the jury can 

reasonably compartmentalize the substantial and independent 

evidence against each defendant.” United States v. Straker, 

800 F.3d 570, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam). As we will 

explain in Part VIII, the government introduced substantial and 

independent evidence of Samuels’s and Tucker’s involvement 

in the conspiracy. Although Samuels and Tucker played a 

subordinate role in the conspiracy led by Fields, we hold “the 

disparity of evidence did not rise to a level necessary to 

mandate severance.” Moore, 651 F.3d at 96. 

Second, Samuels and Tucker have not established 

prejudice from Fields’s misbehavior during trial. Courtroom 

misconduct by a co-defendant must be especially egregious to 

mandate severance. See, e.g., United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 

219, 229 (5th Cir. 1990) (no severance required when codefendant “mouthed the words, ‘You are dead,’ and moved a 

finger across his throat” during a witness’s direct examination); 

United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446, 448, 452 (2d Cir. 

1972) (no severance required when a co-defendant directed 

obscenities at the court and witnesses, absented himself, threw 

a chair towards the jury box, and cut his wrists during 

summation). “Cautionary instructions . . . should remain the 

primary weapons against improper jury bias.” United States v.

Mannie, 509 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2007). Fields’s behavior 

was mildly disruptive: he was combative on the stand, refused 

to attend part of the trial, and made demonstrably false 

statements during his testimony. This misbehavior is simply 

not so beyond the pale as to mandate severance. 
31

At bottom, this is not a case in which curative instructions 

were ineffective against potential prejudice. The district court 

gave several careful and tailored instructions throughout the

trial. When Fields failed to show up one day, the district court 

instructed the jury that his “absence should not . . . be viewed 

as evidence or held against any other defendant in this matter 

in any way whatsoever.” App. 347. The district court also 

instructed the jury that “each defendant is entitled to have the 

issue of his guilt as to each of the crimes for which he’s on trial 

determined from his own conduct and from the evidence that 

applies to him as if he were being tried alone.” Appellee’s 

Supp. App. 784–85. The instructions explicitly stated that the 

jury’s verdict as to one defendant should not “influence [its]

verdict with respect to any other defendant as to that count or 

any other count in the Indictment.” Id. at 785. The 

effectiveness of the district court’s instructions is indicated by 

the jury returning mixed verdicts as to each of the defendants, 

including Fields. See United States v. Gilliam, 167 F.3d 628, 

636 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that mixed “verdicts indicate 

that the jury was able to distinguish between the defendants”).

We presume that juries follow the court’s instructions when, as 

here, there is no evidence to the contrary. Id.

The district court cured any potential prejudice to Samuels 

and Tucker with limiting instructions and did not abuse its 

discretion in denying their motions to sever.

VIII

We turn next to Samuels’s and Tucker’s challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions for 

conspiracy to distribute heroin under 21 U.S.C. § 846. 

To overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, “a 

defendant faces a high threshold.” United States v. Washington, 

12 F.3d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In reviewing for 
32

sufficiency of the evidence, we consider “‘whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 

United States v. Gaskins, 690 F.3d 569, 576–77 (D.C. Cir. 

2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 

In applying this standard, we “draw[] no distinction between 

direct and circumstantial evidence, and ‘giv[e] full play to the 

right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence 

and draw justifiable inferences of fact.’” United States v.

Williams, 836 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United States

v. Battle, 613 F.3d 258, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 

To convict Samuels and Tucker of conspiracy to distribute 

heroin, the government had to prove they acted knowingly and 

with the “specific intent to further the conspiracy’s objective.” 

United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

The evidence here easily passes muster under our deferential 

standard of review. 

With respect to Samuels, sufficient evidence supports that 

he knowingly furthered the conspiracy to distribute heroin. 

Fields controlled operations in the drug distribution conspiracy 

from the suite above the barbershop, where agents found 

approximately $60,000 worth of heroin as well as other drug 

paraphernalia. The evidence established that Samuels assisted 

Fields in this endeavor. Clark, the cooperating witness who 

testified that he frequently went to the barbershop to obtain 

heroin from Fields, placed Samuels regularly with Fields while 

Fields packaged drugs for distribution. GPS data from 

Samuels’s cellphone also put him in the vicinity of the 

barbershop hundreds of times during the life of the conspiracy. 

As Clark testified, Samuels assisted Fields by opening the door 

and controlling access to the upstairs suite where the drugs 

were, which was corroborated by text messages to Samuels that 
33

included “let me in” and “open the door.” Appellee’s Supp. 

App. 191–92. Text messages also demonstrated that Samuels 

was in frequent contact with other members of the conspiracy 

and used coded references to drug transactions. Moreover, 

Clark testified that Samuels had delivered five grams of heroin 

on one occasion when Clark was in a car with two other 

members of the conspiracy. Viewed in the light most favorable 

to the government, this evidence, combined with Samuels’s

frequent presence in the barbershop while Fields, the leader of 

the conspiracy, engaged in drug transactions, is sufficient to 

sustain Samuels’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute 

heroin. See, e.g., Childress, 58 F.3d at 712 (finding the 

evidence sufficient when defendants personally handled drugs, 

prepared them for sale, and did so at the direction of the 

conspiracy’s leader).

Sufficient evidence also supported Tucker’s conviction 

and established his role as a street-level dealer in the 

conspiracy. Clark’s testimony put Tucker at the barbershop 

frequently, “[a]cting like [Tucker had] a license to sell 

drugs . . . [h]aving . . . no discretion, . . . no trying to hide it or 

anything, just out in the open.” Appellee’s Supp. App. 457. 

Tucker’s frequent presence at the barbershop was corroborated 

by GPS data and law enforcement surveillance. Notably, 

agents observed Tucker engaged in “what appeared to be a 

hand-to-hand narcotics transaction” on the street in front of the 

barbershop. Id. at 363. Clark testified that he saw Tucker 

coming from the upstairs suite of the barbershop adjusting his 

“lower crotch area,” and explained that when he used to sell 

drugs, he hid his stash in his “crotch area” to avoid detection 

by the police. Id. at 458. Clark also explained that heroin could 

be pink or tan depending on the substance it was cut with and 

that dealers often used slang to talk about narcotics. Tucker’s 

text messages mentioned selling pink shirts and tan shoes, 

statements the jury could reasonably infer were references to 
34

narcotics. Given Tucker’s close relationship with Fields and 

frequent presence at the barbershop, the jury also could 

reasonably infer that Tucker obtained the heroin he sold from 

Fields. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, sufficient evidence supported Tucker’s 

conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin. 

Samuels and Tucker also seek to rely on Gaskins, in which 

this court found the evidence insufficient to sustain a drugtrafficking conspiracy conviction. In that case, despite 

extensive police surveillance and searches, no evidence put 

Gaskins in the presence of drugs, nor did any witness connect 

him to the conspiracy. See 690 F.3d at 572. Tucker argues that 

the evidence against him is similarly flimsy because he did not 

directly text members of the conspiracy, and Clark’s testimony 

and the street-level buys at most established his role as an 

independent street-level dealer. Samuels also points to the lack 

of controlled buys, wiretaps, or surveillance as reasons why the 

evidence against him was insufficient. These arguments 

founder on the fact that the evidence against both Samuels and 

Tucker was far more robust than the evidence in Gaskins. 

Unlike Gaskins, both Samuels and Tucker “discussed drugs, 

distributed drugs, [and were] in the presence of drugs 

connected to the conspiracy.” Gaskins, 690 F.3d at 577; see 

also United States v. Shi, 991 F.3d 198, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2021) 

(distinguishing Gaskins as a case in which there was an 

“overwhelming lack of evidence”). 

For these reasons, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 

convictions of Samuels and Tucker.

IX

Tucker also challenges his sentence, arguing that the 

district court erred in calculating the quantity of heroin 

attributable to him for purposes of setting his Sentencing 
35

Guidelines range. Although the district court’s calculation was 

based on inferences, those inferences were reasonable in light 

of the record. 

We “review[] a sentence imposed under the Guidelines to 

determine whether it is ‘reasonable.’” United States v. Flores, 

995 F.3d 214, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. 

Blalock, 571 F.3d 1282, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). This 

determination involves two steps: First, we ensure the district 

court did not commit a “significant procedural error,” and 

second, we review whether the sentence is objectively 

reasonable. United States v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920, 923 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007)). Tucker challenges only the district court’s 

methodology for calculating the drug quantity attributable to 

him — a procedural error. Significant procedural errors 

include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 

[Sentencing] Guidelines range, . . . selecting a sentence based 

on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 

chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

A defendant’s sentence for a drug conspiracy is based on 

the amount of drugs attributed to him. Under the Sentencing 

Guidelines, a defendant’s base offense level is derived from his 

“relevant conduct,” which includes the drug quantity involved 

for an offense. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (2018) (cleaned up); United 

States v. Burnett, 827 F.3d 1108, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2016). When 

necessary, such as when there has been “no drug seizure or the 

amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense,” the 

district court must approximate the drug quantity. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.5. Further, when a defendant is part of a drug 

conspiracy, his relevant conduct includes “all reasonably 

foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the 

jointly undertaken criminal activity.” United States v. Bostick, 

791 F.3d 127, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S.S.G. 
36

§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)). “We review the District Court’s 

determination of drug quantity relevant for sentencing under a 

clear error standard.” United States v. Mack, 841 F.3d 514, 527 

(D.C. Cir. 2016). 

The district court attributed 75 grams of heroin to Tucker. 

Although the presentence report found Tucker’s relevant 

conduct included 546.7 grams due to his involvement in the 

conspiracy, the district court declined to hold Tucker 

responsible for all the sales made from the barbershop or to 

Clark. Instead, it estimated the amount of heroin for which 

Tucker was personally responsible. Based on the amount of 

heroin sold by Tucker to the confidential informant (0.58 

grams), the GPS data, Clark’s testimony, and surveillance, the 

district court estimated that Tucker sold 0.5 grams of heroin 

five times weekly for thirty weeks, totaling 75 grams. That 

quantity resulted in a Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months, and 

with Tucker’s career offender enhancement, the range 

increased to 210 to 262 months. The district court found this 

range overstated Tucker’s criminal history, so it used the 

sentences received by other members of the conspiracy as 

benchmarks and ultimately sentenced Tucker to sixty months’ 

imprisonment. The district court’s calculation of the drug 

quantity attributable to Tucker, which was based on reliable 

evidence in the record, was not clearly erroneous.

Tucker argues the district court erred by using a method 

for calculating the drug quantity for his base offense level that 

was “unduly speculative.” Appellants’ Br. 105. We find, 

however, that the district court employed a reasonable method, 

which resulted in a conservative estimate. While it found 

“Tucker was part of a core group of individuals that operated 

out of that barbershop,” Appellee’s Supp. App. 794, it chose 

not to attribute the 546.7 grams of heroin recommended by the 

presentence report. The court instead used the amount of 
37

heroin Tucker distributed in a single controlled buy to 

extrapolate five similarly sized sales per week for thirty weeks. 

Although one sale is a small sample size, that does not render 

the court’s extrapolation unduly speculative, particularly when 

it results in a conservative estimate. Cf. United States v. 

Correa-Alicea, 585 F.3d 484, 491 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming a 

district court’s use of two controlled purchases multiplied by a 

“highly conservative” “estimate of one transaction per day”). 

In addition, the district court’s estimation that five sales per 

week were of heroin is reasonable based on Tucker’s frequent 

presence at the barbershop and the quantity of heroin seized 

there. “[D]rug quantity calculations are an art, not a science,” 

and the district court chose a reasonable method. United States 

v. Block, 705 F.3d 755, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining “we 

afford trial courts some room for speculation and reasonable 

estimation so long as percentages and quantities were not 

pulled out of thin air”) (cleaned up). 

In sum, the district court did not clearly err in calculating 

the drug quantity attributable to Tucker. 

X

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

So ordered.