COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LORENZO C. COLEMAN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1510-97-2 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE 

 JULY 14, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL 

Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge 

 Thomas E. Dempsey (Vergara & Associates, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Mary E. Shea, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General; Donald E. 

Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Lorenzo C. Coleman (appellant) was convicted of possession 

of cocaine. He alleges on appeal that the trial judge erred in 

admitting a certificate of analysis because the Commonwealth 

failed to mail or deliver a copy of the certificate, upon his 

request, as required by Code § 19.2-187. Because appellant 

requested a copy of the certificate in his motion for discovery, 

endorsed the discovery order which directed that all discovery 

would take place in the Commonwealth's attorney's office, and 

failed to appear at the prosecutor's office for discovery of the 

certificate in accord with the terms of the discovery order, his 

claim is without merit. 

 Appellant originally was charged with possession of cocaine 

with intent to distribute. On February 25, 1997, he filed in the 

circuit court a motion for discovery and request for exculpatory 
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evidence. In an unnumbered paragraph in the motion, he wrote, 

"Pursuant to Section 19.2-187 of the Code of Virginia, the 

defendant further requests that he be provided a copy of any 

certificate of analysis which the Commonwealth intends to 

introduce at trial." Appellant made no direct request to the 

clerk of the circuit court or to the attorney for the 

Commonwealth to mail or deliver a copy of the certificate of 

analysis to his counsel of record, as provided in Code 

§ 19.2-187. 

 On March 12, 1997, the judge entered a discovery order based 

upon appellant's discovery motion. The order was endorsed, "We 

ask for this," and was signed by defense counsel and the attorney 

for the Commonwealth. The court ordered the Commonwealth's 

attorney to permit counsel for the defendant within a reasonable 

time period, but not less than ten days prior to the scheduled 

trial, to inspect and copy or photograph certain documents, 

statements, and reports at the office of the Commonwealth's 

attorney, Monday through Friday, between the hours of 8:30 a.m. 

and 5:00 p.m. upon twenty-four hour advance notice. Among other 

items, the discovery order included: 

 2. Any written reports of fingerprint analysis, 

blood tests, [and] other scientific reports, 

. . . or copies thereof, that are known by the 

Commonwealth's Attorney to be within the 

possession, custody or control of the 

Commonwealth. 

(Emphasis added.). 

 At trial, appellant objected, on hearsay grounds, to the 
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introduction of the certificate of analysis. He argued that in 

his discovery motion he had requested a copy of any certificate 

of analysis the Commonwealth intended to introduce, and had not 

received one. The Commonwealth responded that a discovery 

conference was supposed to take place in the Commonwealth's 

attorney's office, and appellant's counsel had neither met with 

him nor requested a copy of the certificate. 

 The trial judge overruled appellant's objection to the 

admission of the certificate, stating that appellant's counsel 

had endorsed the discovery order, thus agreeing that discovery 

would take place under the terms of the order. The judge noted 

that the order permitted counsel to conduct discovery in the 

prosecutor's office at a specified time. The judge admitted the 

certificate and convicted appellant of possession of cocaine. 

 Code § 19.2-187 provides, in pertinent part: 

 In any hearing or trial of any criminal 

offense . . . a certificate of analysis of a 

person performing an analysis or examination, 

performed in any laboratory operated by 

. . . the Division of Forensic Science 

. . . when such certificate is duly attested 

by such person, shall be admissible in 

evidence as evidence of the facts therein 

stated and the results of the analysis or 

examination referred to therein, provided (i) 

the certificate of analysis is filed with the 

clerk of the court hearing the case at least 

seven days prior to the hearing or trial and 

(ii) a copy of such certificate is mailed or 

delivered by the clerk or attorney for the 

Commonwealth to counsel of record for the 

accused at least seven days prior to the 

hearing or trial upon request of such 

counsel. 
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 Thus, a certificate of analysis, reflecting the results of 

examinations performed by employees of certain laboratories, is 

admissible to prove the truth of its contents, without the 

presence in court of the technician who conducted the analysis, 

provided (1) the Commonwealth filed the certificate of analysis 

with the clerk of the court hearing the case at least seven days 

prior to the hearing or trial1

 and (2) upon request of counsel of 

record for the accused, a copy of such certificate was mailed or 

delivered by the clerk or the attorney for the Commonwealth to 

such counsel at least seven days prior to the hearing or trial. 

 Code § 19.2-187 should be construed strictly against the 

Commonwealth and in favor of the accused because "'it undertakes 

to make admissible evidence which otherwise might be subject to a 

valid hearsay objection.'" Mullins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 

372, 374, 404 S.E.2d 237, 238 (1991) (citation omitted). But see

Willis v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 430, 441, 393 S.E.2d 405, 411 

(1990) (holding penal laws ought not to be construed so strictly 

as to defeat intention of General Assembly). 

 A principle equally as important in our law instructs that 

"[t]he province of [statutory] construction lies wholly within 

the domain of ambiguity, and that which is plain needs no 

interpretation." Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 408, 

 

 1Appellant makes no claim that the certificate was not 

timely filed in the circuit court. Rather, he limits his claim 

to the lack of mailing or delivery of a copy of the certificate 

to him by the Commonwealth's attorney. 
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83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1954). See Harrison & Bates, Inc. v. 

Featherstone Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 253 Va. 364, 368, 484 

S.E.2d 883, 885 (1997). "Words are ambiguous if they admit to 

'being understood in more than one way[,]' . . . refer to 'two or 

more things simultaneously[,]' . . . are 'difficult to 

comprehend,' 'of doubtful import,' or lack 'clearness and 

definiteness.'" Diggs v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 300, 301-02, 

369 S.E.2d 199, 200 (1988) (en banc) (citation omitted). "Absent 

such infirmities, the manifest intent of the legislature clearly 

expressed in its enactments should not be judicially thwarted 

under the guise of statutory construction." Cregger v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 87, 90, 486 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1997). 

 The sole issue appellant raises is whether the trial court 

erred in allowing the certificate of analysis in evidence over a 

hearsay objection. In order to obtain pretrial possession of the 

certificate of analysis, appellant had at least three avenues to 

secure it. He could have: (1) requested it under the terms of 

Code § 19.2-187(ii) directly from the clerk of the circuit court 

or from the attorney for the Commonwealth; (2) made a motion for 

discovery under Rule 3A:11 to the court to order the Commonwealth 

to permit him to inspect and copy or photograph designated 

documents, including scientific reports; and (3) called upon the 

Commonwealth to produce exculpatory evidence under Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).2

 

 2A motion for discovery of exculpatory evidence would have 

produced no results in this case because the substance examined 
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 Instead of making a request under the terms of Code 

§ 19.2-187 directly, and requesting that the clerk of the circuit 

court or the attorney for the Commonwealth deliver to him, as 

attorney for the accused, a copy of the certificate of analysis, 

defense counsel chose to present his request for a copy of the 

certificate of analysis in a motion for discovery pursuant to 

Rule 3A:11. Subsection (e) of the Rule provides: 

 An order granting relief under this Rule 

shall specify the time, place and manner of 

making the discovery and inspection permitted 

and may prescribe such terms and conditions 

as are just. 

 The trial judge's order for discovery directed that all 

discovery should take place during business hours, in the 

prosecutor's office, not less than ten days before trial, upon 

twenty-four hour advance notice. By endorsing the discovery 

order, "We ask for this," appellant requested entry of the order 

and consented to the manner in which all discovery, including his 

request for the certificate of analysis, would occur. The 

Commonwealth's attorney reasonably could rely upon this endorsed 

order as controlling all requests made in the motion for 

discovery, including the request for any certificate of analysis. 

 The Commonwealth's attorney had no further obligation to make a 

separate mailing or delivery of the certificate of analysis. 

 Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the trial court 

are not necessary, provided a party, at the time the ruling or 

 

was cocaine, which would not have been exculpatory. 
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order is made or sought, "makes known to the court the action 

which he desires the court to take or his objections to the 

action of the court and his grounds therefor." Code 

§ 8.01-384(A). The Supreme Court has cautioned counsel that 

"generally it is advisable to have a court order or written 

stipulation specify precisely what is to be discoverable, thereby 

avoiding misunderstandings that may lead to fatal consequences on 

appeal." Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 713, 261 S.E.2d 

555, 558 (1980). 

 Appellant argues that his request for a copy of the 

certificate of analysis was included in his general motion for 

discovery and that such request made in this manner is 

permissible under Copeland v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 515, 

516-17, 452 S.E.2d 876, 876-77 (1995). He asserts that his 

request under Code § 19.2-187 and his motion under Rule 3A:11 are 

wholly different actions, the former being a request as provided 

by the statute and the latter being a motion for the entry of an 

order. He contends that the statutory requirements of Code 

§ 19.2-187 are not subject to abrogation by an agreed order. 

 Appellant argued to the trial court: "Clearly I have asked 

for the certificate. Clearly, I haven't been provided with it. 

There is abundance of case law and annotations in the statute 

that requires strict compliance." The trial judge responded: 

"And in this order, you had endorsed it as asking for it, meaning 

that you agreed that the discovery would take place under the 
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terms of this order, which permitted you to appear within ten 

days in the Commonwealth's Attorney's office from 8:00 a.m. to 

5:00 to get anything you wanted." 

 Appellant never made a direct request for the certificate of 

analysis under Code § 19.2-187, which specifically provides that 

the request be made to the clerk of the circuit court or to the 

attorney for the Commonwealth. Instead, when he proceeded 

through the discovery process, he chose to intermingle Code 

§ 19.2-187 and Rule 3A:11. In making his decision, the trial 

judge stated: 

 What I am suggesting, and what I believe to 

be the case here . . . is that after that 

request, you and the Commonwealth entered 

into a different agreement concerning all 

matters of discovery. And now you say that I 

should treat the Commonwealth's view 

differently than what you have agreed to. I 

think that would be inappropriate under the 

circumstances of this case. I will deny your 

motion for excluding it on that basis. 

 The trial judge found that appellant, by endorsing the 

discovery order without objection, was bound by the terms of the 

order for all matters of discovery, including the request in 

appellant's discovery motion for any certificate of analysis. We 

cannot say the judge was plainly wrong in so ruling. By failing 

to conduct discovery as prescribed by the discovery order, 

appellant waived any objection concerning delivery of the 

certificate to him. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.