### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on

Briefs J uly 9, 2002
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD EUGENE PURDY Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for M adison County No. 00-958 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

No. W2001-02868-CCA-R3-CD - Filed August 6, 2002

The trial court placed the defendant

on probation for eight years. As a condition of probation, the defen d ant was required to complete a one-year drug rehabilitation program. When the defendant violated his probation by failing to complete the program and failing to report to his probation officer upon his discha

rge fro m the prog

ram, the State filed a p

robation violation r

eport wit h the cour

t. After a hearing, the trial court

revoked the defendant’s probation. The def endant appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its dis cretion in revoki ng his prob ation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
A LAN E. G LENN , J., del ivered the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VERETT W ILL IAMS and N ORMA M C G EE O GLE , JJ., joined. George Morton Googe, District Public Defender, and Stephen P. Spr acher, Ass istant Publi c Defender, for the appellant, Ronald Eugene Purdy.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; P. Robin Dixon, Jr., Assis tant Attor ney Gene ral; James G. Wooda

ll, Distric t Attorne y Gener al; and Jo dy Picken s, Assista nt District Attorney Gen eral, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
The defendant , Ronald Eu gene Pur dy, was in dicted f

or aggra vated bur glary, a Cla ss C felony

. On May 21, 2001, the defendant pled guilty to burglary, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a persistent offender to e ight years in

the Tennessee Department of Correc tion. The trial court then suspendedthis sentence and placed the defendant on proba tion for eight years. The trial court conditioned the defendant’s probation on the following: (1) completion of one year at Teen Challenge, a drug rehabilitation program, (2) super vision by a state probation officer, (3) no contact with the victim, (4) payment of costs a t the rate of $50 a mo nth starti ng thirty d ays afte r his comple tion of t he drug program, and (5) incarce ration until admittance in the drug program. On-2-

August 8, 2001, the defendant entered the Teen Challen ge pro gram. According to the Teen Challenge r eport sent to the defendant’s probation officer, on August 22, 2001, the defe ndant “refused to do his discipline after using foul language,” requested to l eave the program, and was discharged. Two days later, on August 24, 2001, Danny Dudley, the defendant’s probation officer, filed a probation violation report for the defendant’s failure to report after his discharge from the program.
The defendant’s probation revocation hearing wa s he ld on November 19, 2001. At the beginning of the he aring, bo th sides s tipulated tha t the def endant ha d previou sly pled gu

ilty to burglary on May 21, 2001, in exchange for an eight-year probation period. At the hearing, the trial court advised that

the violation alleged as to the defendant was “[f]a ilure to complete treatment as required.” To this, defe nse counsel responded: “Admits to leaving Teen Challenge before completing it, Your Honor. Has an explanation.” Danny Du dley, the defendant’s probation officer, was the only witness to testify at the revocation hea

rin g. Dudley testified that he was a probation officer for the Tennessee Board of Probation and Paro le and ha d been in charge of supervising the defendant. Pursuant to the court’s judgment, the defendant was incarcer ated unti l his acce

ptance i nto the Te en Challe nge prog ram. Dudley said that the defendant entered the program on August 8, 2001. Dudle y said the defendant knew he was to report to his office when he was discha rg ed from t

he program. However, the defendant never notified him or his office that he had been dischar ged. Dudley said

he had no record of the defendant coming to his office at any time. Defense counsel declined

to question Dudley on cross-examination. The defendant did not put on any proof, including an “explanation” for leaving the program, or present any further argument during the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ma de its find ings:
The Court finds under the circumstances, based upon the Defendant’s own admiss ion, he fa iled to complete the program which was required.
I also f ind by a preponderance of the evidenc e based upon the probation officer ’s testimony that this Defendant knew when to report if and when he left th e progra m, and the probation officer’s testimony is the records didn’t indicate the Defendant eve r reported to him, and if he’s obvi ously not in the program, he’s in custody and admitted he left the progr am. So that has been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Defendan t not having complied , in violati on, is rev oked to serve sentence as imposed.
On November 26, 2001, the trial court entered its order revoking the defendant’s probation, citing the defenda nt’s fail ure to re port to his probation officer and his failure to complete the drug-3-

treatment program as orde red. The def endant filed a timely notice of appeal. In his appeal, the defendant argues only that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his proba tion.
ANALYSIS
The defenda

nt argue s that the t

rial cou rt abuse d its discr

etion bec ause no su

bstantia l evidence was presented at the hearing to support its decision to revoke probation. He claims that he was on

ly required to en ter, not co mplete, th e Teen Ch allenge

rehabil itation pr ogram as a conditi on of his probation. A trial court is granted broad authority to revoke a suspended se ntence and to reinstate the original sentence if it finds by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated the terms of his or her probationand susp ension of sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310, -311 (199 7)

. The revocation of probation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Harkins , 811 S.W.2d

79, 82 (Te

nn. 1991) ; State v. Stu

bblefield , 953 S.W.2d 223, 226 ( Tenn. Cri m. App. 1997) ; State v. Mitchell , 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). To show an a

buse of discretion in a probation revocation case, “a defendant must demonstrate ‘that the record contains no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trialjudge that a violation of the conditions of probation has occurred.’” State v. W all , 909 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tenn . Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Statev. Delp , 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)). The proof of a probation violation neednot be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is sufficient if it allows the trial court to make a conscientious and intelligent judgment. Harkins , 811 S.W.2d at 82 (citing State v. Milton , 673 S.W.2d 555 , 557 (Te nn. Crim

. App. 1984)). We review this issue, therefore, f or an abuse of discretion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this matter. The defendant’s judgment form explicitl y states : “Defe

ndant must

success fully comp lete Tee n Chall eng e (1 Year Program).” Additiona lly, the pr obation or

der, whi ch bear s the def

endant’ s signatur

e, lists, as a special condition of probation, t hat the “[d]efendant must successfully complete [the] te en challenge (1 yr. pr

ogram). ” Despite

this one-yea

r requir ement, the defendant left the program after only two week s. Although the def endant a sserts on appea

l that he w as requi

red only t o “enter” the program , not to comp lete it, he present ed no bas is, eith er at the

hearin g or on appeal, for such an assertion. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant violated his probation by failing to comple

te the Teen Challenge

program
. The evidence also clearly supports the trial court’s findi ng that the d efenda nt violate d his probation by failing to report to his probation officer. Danny Dudley, the defenda nt’s probation officer, testified that al though he instructed the defendant to report to him as soon as he was discharged

from the program, he had no record of the defendant ever coming to his office. Given this evide nce, we find this is sue withou

t merit as well.
The record on appeal supports the trial court’s revoking the de f endant’ s p robation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so doing.-4- CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we aff irm the revocation of probation.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE