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*********************************************** 
JOE BALTAS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 44259)

Bright, C. J., and Moll and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of murder

and assault in the first degree in connection with his stabbing of three

persons, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his

trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. Following a trial, the

habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient and

that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice. Thereafter, the habeas

court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner

appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that the resolution of his claims

involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court

could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions

raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further:

there was no merit to the petitioner’s claim that his right to autonomy

was violated when his trial counsel inappropriately conceded his guilt

during closing arguments by arguing that the petitioner should not be

found guilty because there was evidence that he was not the only potential assailant at the crime scene and the state failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the petitioner, and not the other potential assailant, was responsible for the stabbings, as the record supported the

habeas court’s conclusion that, in making that argument, trial counsel

did not concede the petitioner’s guilt, and, therefore, contrary to the

petitioner’s contention, McCoy v. Louisiana (138 S. Ct. 1500) was not

applicable and the petitioner’s right to autonomy was not implicated;

moreover, the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

which was premised on the petitioner’s assertion that his trial counsel

conceded his guilt during closing arguments, was unavailing, this court

having concluded that the habeas court properly found that trial counsel

did not concede the petitioner’s guilt.

Argued November 8, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

Procedural History

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and

tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment denying the

petition; thereafter, the court denied the petition for

certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to

this court. Appeal dismissed.

James E. Mortimer, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Kathryn W. Bare, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state’s

attorney, and Adrienne Russo, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

BEAR, J. Following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner, Joe Baltas, appeals

from the judgment of the habeas court denying his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the

petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal

because his rights to autonomy and to the effective

assistance of counsel were violated. We dismiss the

petitioner’s appeal.

The following facts, as recited by our Supreme Court

in the petitioner’s direct appeal, and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of the petitioner’s appeal.

‘‘The [petitioner] was involved in a relationship with

[Misty] Rock, one of the complaining witnesses . . .

from December, 2005 until October, 2006. At some point

during the month of October, the two discussed leaving

Meriden, the town in which both of them lived, to start

a new life in South Carolina.

‘‘On October 25, 2006, Rock was living with her

brother, Christopher Laverty (Christopher), her mother,

Linda Laverty (Linda), and her stepfather, Michael

Laverty (Michael). At approximately 10 p.m., Linda and

Michael were sitting in the living room of their apartment watching a movie, while Christopher and Rock

were on the second floor of the home. Christopher

came downstairs and opened the door to the basement,

intending to check on the status of a load of laundry.

As he opened the basement door, he encountered a

masked person who was dressed all in black, wearing

a ski mask, and holding at least one knife. The masked

person stabbed Christopher in the stomach, and then

moved out of the basement and into the living room,

where he proceeded to fatally stab Michael. The masked

person then turned to Linda, stated ‘die, bitch,’ and

stabbed her in the neck. Linda later testified that she

recognized the masked person as the [petitioner]

because of his eyes, the sound of his voice, and his

body mannerisms. The masked person walked to the

staircase leading to the upper floor of the home, and

while on the staircase, he ran into Rock, who had heard

the commotion from upstairs. In the collision, the

masked person’s knife went through Rock’s sweatshirt

and [T]-shirt and inflicted a scratch on her stomach.

The masked person then forced Rock in front of him,

grabbed her by the hair, and forced her out of the

apartment. While this was happening, Christopher

grabbed a knife from the kitchen and a telephone and

exited the home, running next door to ask a neighbor

to call the police. Rock and the masked person then

exited the apartment and were walking down the street,

away from the apartment. Christopher attempted to

stop them, and Rock told him to stop and not come

any closer. Christopher then sat down on a bench and

called the police himself, identifying the [petitioner] as
the masked person who had just assaulted his family.

‘‘The [petitioner] and Rock then walked to an abandoned car and sat in it. Rock testified that, at this point,

the [petitioner] told her that he had killed Michael and

stabbed Linda and, although Rock could not remember

if the [petitioner] was still wearing a mask, Rock recognized his voice. The [petitioner] and Rock waited in the

car until Rock informed the [petitioner] that she needed

to use the bathroom. The [petitioner] led Rock to the

Pulaski school, at which point the [petitioner]—who at

that time was not wearing a ski mask or a dark shirt—

and Rock were confronted by police officers. The police

observed the [petitioner] holding a butter knife in his

hand and told him to drop it. When the [petitioner] did

not comply with their command, the police tasered him

and he fell to the ground; as he did so, a folding knife

later found to be stained with Michael’s blood fell out

of the [petitioner’s] pocket.

‘‘A K-9 officer was also dispatched as a result of

Christopher’s 911 call, and the officer’s dog tracked the

path that the [petitioner] and Rock took away from the

apartment. The K-9 officer also had his dog perform an

‘article recovery . . . .’ Between the K-9 officer’s

search and the actions of other police officers in the

area, the following items along the path taken by the

[petitioner] and Rock were recovered that evening: (1)

a ski mask, the interior of which later tested positive

for the [petitioner’s] DNA, and the exterior of which

tested positive for Michael’s blood; (2) a dark, bloody

shirt which tested positive for the blood of Linda and

Michael; (3) a latex glove stained with the blood of

Linda and also possibly of Michael; and (4) a long knife

stained with the blood of Michael, which the state medical examiner later concluded was the weapon that

caused his fatal wounds. Tests also indicated that

Michael and Linda were the sources of various bloodstains found on the [petitioner’s] pants, sneaker, and

arms when he was arrested. Finally, the police matched

a shoe print that was formed in blood at the crime

scene to the shoe of the [petitioner].’’ (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Baltas, 311 Conn. 786, 790–92, 91 A.3d

384 (2014).

‘‘The [petitioner] . . . was convicted, after a trial by

jury, of one count of murder in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-54a (a), two counts of assault in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1),

one count of burglary in the first degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1), one count of burglary

in the first degree in violation of § 53a-101 (a) (2), and

one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 52a-94 (a).’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 789. On appeal, the petitioner’s convictions of

murder and assault in the first degree were affirmed,

his convictions of burglary in the first degree and kidnapping in the second degree were vacated, and the
case was remanded for a new trial on those charges.

Id., 828–29. The state declined to reprosecute those

charges, and the petitioner’s total effective sentence

was reduced from 115 years to 75 years of incarceration.

On September 8, 2015, the petitioner filed an amended

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting claims

of (1) prosecutorial impropriety, (2) police misconduct,

and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In

response, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, raised special defenses of procedural default and

res judicata. After a trial, the habeas court denied the

petitioner’s habeas petition, finding, inter alia, that his

trial counsel’s performance was not deficient and that

he had failed to establish prejudice.1 The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for certification to appeal,

which also was denied by the court. The petitioner then

appealed to this court from the denial of his petition

for certification to appeal. On appeal, the petitioner

claims that his trial counsel inappropriately conceded

his guilt, thereby violating his rights to autonomy and

to the effective assistance of counsel.

We now turn to our familiar standard of review.

‘‘Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition for

certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate

review of the [denial] of his petition for [a writ of]

habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test

enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden,

229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in

Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126

(1994). First, he must demonstrate that the denial of

his petition for certification [to appeal] constituted an

abuse of discretion. . . . Second, if the petitioner can

show an abuse of discretion, he must then prove that

the decision of the habeas court should be reversed on

the merits. . . .

‘‘To prove an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must

demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim

involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of

reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . In

determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification,

we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas

court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s

appeal was frivolous. . . .

‘‘In evaluating the merits of the underlying claims on

which the petitioner relies . . . we observe that [when]

the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [the

reviewing court] must determine whether they are

legally and logically correct . . . and whether they find

support in the facts that appear in the record. . . . To

the extent that factual findings are challenged, this

court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the
habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous . . . .

[A] finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is

no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 778, 794–95,

189 A.3d 135, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911, 186 A.3d

707 (2018).

I

The petitioner’s first claim is that his right to autonomy was violated when his trial counsel inappropriately

conceded his guilt. Specifically, the petitioner argues

that the habeas court’s conclusion that trial counsel did

not concede his guilt was clearly erroneous because it

failed to properly analyze the claim under McCoy v.

Louisiana, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1500, 200 L. Ed. 2d

821 (2018). In response, the respondent argues, inter

alia, that the petitioner’s autonomy claim fails because

his trial counsel did not concede his guilt, and, thus,

McCoy is inapplicable. We agree with the respondent.

‘‘The [s]ixth [a]mendment guarantees to each criminal defendant the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his

defence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1507.

‘‘[A] defendant need not surrender control entirely to

counsel. For the [s]ixth [a]mendment, in grant[ing] to

the accused personally the right to make his defense,

speaks of the assistance of counsel, and an assistant,

however expert, is still an assistant. . . . Trial management is the lawyer’s province . . . . Some decisions,

however, are reserved for the client—notably, whether

to plead guilty . . . . Autonomy to decide that the

objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs

in this [reserved for the client] category. Just as a defendant may steadfastly refuse to plead guilty in the face

of overwhelming evidence against [him or] her, or reject

the assistance of legal counsel despite the defendant’s

own inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, so may [the defendant] insist on maintaining [his

or] her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial.

These are not strategic choices about how best to

achieve a client’s objectives; they are choices about

what the client’s objectives in fact are.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1508. ‘‘In McCoy, the United States Supreme

Court held that defense counsel overrode his client’s

sixth amendment right to autonomy by admitting the

client’s guilt without the defendant’s consent. Violation

of a client’s autonomy constitutes structural error and

is not subject to harmless error analysis.’’ John B. v.

Commissioner of Correction, 194 Conn. App. 767, 784

n.13, 222 A.3d 984 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 919,

222 A.3d 513 (2020).

In the present case, during closing argument at the
petitioner’s criminal trial, the petitioner’s trial counsel

argued that the petitioner should be found not guilty

because there was evidence that he was not the only

potential assailant at the crime scene, and because the

state had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the petitioner, and not the other potential assailant,

was responsible for the stabbings. In making this argument, the petitioner’s trial counsel did concede that the

petitioner was present at the crime scene.2 The habeas

court concluded, however, that, in making this argument, the petitioner’s trial counsel did not go so far as

to concede the petitioner’s guilt.3 We conclude that the

evidence in the record supports the habeas court’s conclusion. In fact, unlike in McCoy and the other cases

on which the petitioner relies, in the present case, rather

than concede their client’s guilt, counsel argued strenuously that the jury should find the petitioner not guilty.

Accordingly, because the habeas court properly found

that the petitioner’s trial counsel did not concede his

guilt, we conclude that McCoy is inapplicable and that

the petitioner’s right to autonomy has not been implicated. Therefore, the petitioner has not demonstrated

that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying

his petition for certification to appeal with respect to

this claim.

II

The petitioner’s second claim is that his right to the

effective assistance of counsel was violated when his

trial counsel conceded his guilt during closing arguments. Specifically, the petitioner argues that ‘‘[t]he

habeas court incorrectly concluded that trial counsel

merely conceded the petitioner’s presence at the scene,

which was a reasonable tactical decision under the

circumstances of this case.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Because we have concluded that the habeas

court properly found that the petitioner’s trial counsel

did not concede his guilt; see part I of this opinion; the

petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

which is premised on that assertion, is unavailing.

We conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the petition for certification to

appeal, as the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that

the issues raised are debatable among jurists of reason,

that a court could have resolved the issues in a different

manner, or that the issues raised deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 181 Conn. App. 794–95.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 With regard to the petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial impropriety and

police misconduct, the habeas court found that these claims were barred

by res judicata and that, even if res judicata did not apply, they were

procedurally defaulted. The petitioner does not challenge those rulings

on appeal.

2 The petitioner cites two specific statements in trial counsel’s closing

argument to the jury: ‘‘It’s not just [the petitioner] acting alone in this
particular case,’’ and ‘‘you can’t be firmly convinced that [the petitioner]

acted alone . . . .’’

3 Specifically, in addressing the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, the habeas court explained: ‘‘[T]he petitioner alleges that defense

counsel argued to the jury that there were two participants in the crime

without his consent. Said another way, the petitioner alleges that defense

counsel conceded his guilt to at least some of the charges without consulting

with him or obtaining his permission. The petitioner’s claim is not supported

by the evidence . . . . [T]here was overwhelming identification, physical

and circumstantial evidence placing the petitioner at the scene of the crime

as the masked person. . . .

‘‘Reading the entire closing argument in context, defense counsel did not

argue that there were two perpetrators as a concession of the petitioner’s

guilt. Instead . . . they were trying to use the overwhelming evidence of

the [petitioner’s] presence at the scene and the fact that the state had

charged and tried the case under the theory that the petitioner was the sole

perpetrator to their best advantage. . . . To the extent defense counsel

conceded the petitioner’s presence at the scene, that was a reasonable

tactical decision under the circumstances and one that defense counsel

ha[d] the authority to make. . . . Viewing the entire closing argument in

context, defense counsel provided the petitioner with competent and vigorous advocacy, despite substantial and overwhelming evidence. . . . Given

the overwhelming evidence, there is also no reasonable probability the

petitioner would have received a more favorable outcome had defense

counsel contested his presence at the scene during oral argument, or simply

not mentioned it. Therefore, the claim fails because the petitioner has not

proven prejudice or deficient performance.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes

omitted.)