[Cite as In re L.M., 2024-Ohio-2974.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: L.M. :

:

:

:

APPEAL NOS. C-240048

C-240049

TRIAL NOS. 23-915-02Z

23-915-03Z

 O P I N I O N.

Appeals From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgments Appealed From Are: Reversed, Adjudications Vacated, and Cause 

Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 7, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Norbert Wessels, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee State of Ohio,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, Assistant 

Public Defender, for Appellant L.M.
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CROUSE, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant L.M. appeals from his adjudications of delinquency for 

receiving stolen property and possession of criminal tools. L.M. was alleged to be a 

delinquent child after he crashed a car that appeared to have been stolen. L.M. argues 

that his due-process rights were violated when the juvenile court failed to order a 

competency evaluation, even though he presented a reasonable basis for doing so. 

L.M. also argues that his adjudications were based on legally insufficient evidence and 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, L.M. argues that it was improper 

for the juvenile court to order him to pay restitution to the alleged owner of the car 

when the state failed to show that the car he crashed was the same car that had been 

stolen from the alleged owner. For the following reasons, we vacate L.M.’s 

adjudications, reverse the judgment of the juvenile court denying a competency

evaluation, and remand the cause for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} At around 11 p.m. on April 2, 2023, Cincinnati police officers Brandon 

Hiatt and Noah Reinhart were on patrol when they saw a white 2014 Kia Rio “go left 

of center on a double-yellow, pass another vehicle, and then attempt to get back into 

the right-hand lane and striking a pole, causing a motor vehicle accident.” After 

deflating the Kia’s deployed airbag with a knife, Reinhart found L.M. behind the wheel 

with no one else in the car. L.M. was badly injured.

{¶3} Reinhart observed that the steering column of the car had been 

“peeled,” meaning that the area where the key would be inserted had been popped out 

so that the wiring was visible where the key hole would have been.

{¶4} Reinhart eventually determined that L.M. was 14 years old and had no 
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driver’s license. On searching L.M., Reinhart discovered a screwdriver and a USB cord. 

Reinhart testified that these tools are commonly used to steal Kia and Hyundai 

vehicles. Reinhart also testified that he did not find any keys in the vehicle.

{¶5} Shortly before 11 p.m. that day, Shainelle Shannon reported the theft of 

a white 2014 Kia Rio from the parking lot of her apartment in Millvale. Shannon 

testified that she had borrowed the car from her mother, Diane Ras. Shannon knew 

that the car had been stolen because there was broken glass in the space where the car 

had been parked, and the glass had a distinctive “no smoking” sticker that had been 

on the car’s rear window. Shannon and Ras testified that they did not know L.M., and 

neither of them permitted L.M. to drive the car. Ras testified that she never got the car 

back because it had been “totaled,” and she did not receive any payment from her 

insurer because she did not carry comprehensive coverage.

{¶6} L.M. was eventually alleged to be a delinquent child for acts that, if 

committed by an adult, would constitute grand theft of a motor vehicle, receiving 

stolen property, and possession of criminal tools. L.M. was also alleged to be a juvenile 

traffic offender for reckless operation of a motor vehicle and operation of a motor 

vehicle without a license.

{¶7} At the probable-cause hearing, L.M. filed a motion requesting a 

competency evaluation. The magistrate scheduled a hearing on the competency docket 

for the next week. At the hearing on the motion, the magistrate asked for more 

information regarding L.M.’s condition and how the car accident had impaired his 

ability to assist in his own defense. The magistrate continued the hearing to the 

following week and ordered L.M. to produce his medical records to the court and the 

state. At the next hearing, defense counsel represented that she had the medical 
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records, but because they contained privileged information, she did not think it was 

appropriate to disclose the records to the state. The magistrate rescinded the order to 

produce the records. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate decided that L.M. 

had not shown reasonable cause to order a competency evaluation. L.M. filed a motion 

to set aside the magistrate’s decision, which the juvenile court denied.

{¶8} Following a trial before a magistrate, the magistrate dismissed the 

charges of grand theft of a motor vehicle and receiving stolen property because “the 

State failed to prove a nexus linking Ms. Ras’[s] vehicle to the vehicle that [L.M.] was 

driving.” However, the magistrate adjudicated L.M. delinquent on the charge of 

possession of criminal tools. The magistrate also adjudicated L.M. to be a juvenile 

traffic offender for reckless operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle 

without a license.

{¶9} In the case numbered 23-915-02Z, the state filed an objection to the 

magistrate’s decision on the receiving-stolen-property charge. In the case numbered 

23-915-03Z, L.M. filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision on the possession-ofcriminal-tools charge. The juvenile court heard arguments on the objections. 

Following a hearing, the juvenile court sustained the state’s objection and overruled 

L.M.’s objection. The juvenile court adjudicated L.M. delinquent on both charges. The 

court then committed L.M. to the permanent custody of the Department of Youth 

Services but suspended his commitment “on the condition that [L.M.] obey all laws 

and orders of this Court.” The court placed L.M. on probation and ordered that he pay 

$4,616 in restitution to Ras. The court also ordered that L.M. stay away from Shannon 

and Ras and that he complete rehabilitative programming provided through his 

probation. This appeal timely followed.
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II. Analysis

{¶10} L.M. argues in three assignments of error that the juvenile court erred 

in adjudicating him delinquent and ordering restitution to the alleged victim of his 

offenses.

Competency Evaluation

{¶11} In his first assignment of error, L.M. argues that the juvenile court erred 

when it refused to order a competency evaluation. L.M. argues that this error requires 

vacation of his adjudications and a remand for a competency evaluation.

{¶12} It is a fundamental due-process requirement that, before a person may 

be convicted of a crime, the person must be legally competent to stand trial. In re A.H., 

12th Dist. Brown No. CA2017-05-005, 2018-Ohio-364, ¶ 12. This applies equally to 

adult criminal defendants and juveniles in delinquency proceedings. Id. A juvenile 

court’s failure to comply with the juvenile competency statute is reversible error. See 

id. at ¶ 14; see also State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 177, 761 N.E.2d 591 (2002)

(vacating appellant’s convictions and remanding for new trial after finding that trial 

court violated appellant’s constitutional and statutory rights to a competency hearing).

{¶13} R.C. 2152.51-.59 govern juvenile competency proceedings. The present 

juvenile competency statute was adopted in 2011, at a time when no separate statute 

governed competency determinations for juveniles. See In re D.G., 4th Dist. Ross Nos. 

13CA3382 and 13CA3383, 2014-Ohio-650, ¶ 24 (“Until September 30, 2011, the 

Revised Code did not contain any provisions for determining a juvenile’s competence 

to stand trial. In re Stone, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2002-09-035, 2003-Ohio-3071, 

¶7. With the enactment of 2011 H.B. 86 (effective September 30, 2011), the juvenile 

code now contains statutory provisions that govern juvenile competency 
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determinations.”). Juvenile courts previously looked to the standards for adults set 

forth in R.C. 2945.37(A) and applied them “in light of juvenile rather than adult 

norms.” In re Gooch, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19339, 2002-Ohio-6859, ¶ 7, quoting

In re Williams, 116 Ohio App.3d 237, 242, 687 N.E.2d 507 (2d Dist.1997).

{¶14} This is an issue of first impression for this court. There are no cases in 

Ohio dealing with the situation in this case: refusal of the juvenile court to order a 

competency evaluation. The cases cited by the parties in their briefs pertain either to 

adult proceedings, juvenile court cases where a competency evaluation was ordered by 

the court prior to a competency hearing, or cases prior to the adoption of the current 

statutory framework for juvenile competency determinations enacted in 2011.

{¶15} R.C. 2152.51(A)(1) provides that:

“Competent” and “competency” refer to a child’s ability to understand 

the nature and objectives of a proceeding against the child and to assist 

in the child’s defense. A child is incompetent if, due to mental illness, 

due to developmental disability, or otherwise due to a lack of mental 

capacity, the child is presently incapable of understanding the nature 

and objective of proceedings against the child or of assisting in the 

child’s defense.

{¶16} R.C. 2152.52(A) states:

In any proceeding under this chapter other than a proceeding alleging 

that a child is an unruly child or a juvenile traffic offender, any party or 

the court may move for a determination regarding the child’s 

competency to participate in the proceeding.

{¶17} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.53(A), a court must, within 15 business days after 
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a motion is made for a competency determination, do one of the following:

(1) Make a determination of incompetency under division (B) of section 

2152.52 of the Revised Code;

(2) Determine, without holding a hearing, whether there is a reasonable 

basis to conduct a competency evaluation;

(3) Hold a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to 

conduct a competency evaluation.

{¶18} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.53(B), “[i]f the court holds a hearing” and 

“determines that there is a reasonable basis for a competency evaluation,” “the court 

shall order a competency evaluation and appoint an evaluator.” In this case, the court 

held a hearing and determined that there was not a reasonable basis to conduct a 

competency evaluation. We note that there is no definition of “reasonable basis” in the 

juvenile competency statute.

{¶19} An adult court’s decision whether to order a competency evaluation is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cullen, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2022-

08-016, 2024-Ohio-1916, ¶ 38. Because the juvenile court must determine whether 

there is a “reasonable basis” to conduct a competency evaluation, we likewise find that 

abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review in juvenile proceedings. 

When we conduct an abuse-of-discretion review, we will “not reverse the trial court’s 

judgment unless the court has exercised its discretionary judgment over the matter in 

an unwarranted way or committed legal error.” In re I.J., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-220553, 2023-Ohio-2024, ¶ 9. However, we review a lower court’s interpretation of 

a statute de novo. In re A.J., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210111, 2021-Ohio-3917, ¶ 7.

{¶21} At the hearing on the competency motion, defense counsel represented 
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that L.M. had recently suffered a traumatic brain injury and was experiencing severe 

depression. In the April 2023 car crash, L.M. suffered a concussion and nerve damage. 

Defense counsel represented that L.M. has no memory of the car accident. He also 

received serious physical injuries, including facial fractures and loss of several teeth, 

necessitating hospitalization for nearly a month. Defense counsel stated that she did 

not have cause to question L.M.’s competency prior to the April car crash, despite 

familiarity with him for about a year.1 However, following the crash, L.M. seemed to 

be “much more delayed” than previously. The magistrate continued the hearing and 

ordered L.M. to produce medical records to support defense counsel’s representations.

{¶22} At the subsequent hearing on the motion, defense counsel represented 

that she had the medical records, but felt it was inappropriate to enter the records as 

evidence because they contain information that should not be released to the state. 

However, defense counsel made additional representations as to L.M.’s condition. 

L.M. suffers from hallucinations and has suicidal ideations. L.M. is developmentally 

delayed, is on an IEP, and has educational issues. Defense counsel assessed that L.M. 

was slower than before the accident. He seemed not to understand when counsel told

him things about the trial, and although he could “parrot” back information, counsel 

questioned whether he had actually absorbed the information.

{¶23} In response, the state acknowledged that L.M. had been in a serious car 

accident, had suffered serious physical injury, and showed signs of mental illness. 

However, the state emphasized that these factors do not suggest incompetency to 

stand trial.

{¶24} In her decision on the motion, the magistrate found “by the 

1 Defense counsel had been representing L.M. in an unrelated juvenile delinquency matter and was 

currently in the middle of trial on that case.
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preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has failed to present sufficient 

evidence to overcome the presumption of competency.” R.C. 2152.52(A)(2) provides 

for a presumption of competency under certain circumstances:

In any proceeding under this chapter other than a proceeding alleging 

that a child is an unruly child or a juvenile traffic offender, if the child 

who is the subject of the proceeding is fourteen years of age or older and 

if the child is not otherwise found to have a mental illness or 

developmental disability, it is rebuttably presumed that the child does 

not have a lack of mental capacity. This presumption applies only in 

making a determination as to whether the child has a lack of mental 

capacity and shall not be used or applicable for any other purpose.

{¶25} The magistrate determined that, “Due to the youth being 14 years old, 

the burden is on the youth to rebut the presumption of competency.” The magistrate 

noted specifically:

Counsel’s arguments focused on the youth’s physical injuries rather 

than the concussion and the effects on the youth’s mental capacity. The 

court also heard that the youth suffers from depression and that there 

were other concerns about his mental health that Counsel just became 

aware of after reviewing the youth’s medical records. The youth was 

diagnosed with these issues prior to the start of his trial, and Counsel 

acknowledges that prior to trial, she had no concerns about youth’s 

competency even though she has worked with him for about a year. The 

court does not find that there is a reasonable basis to conduct a 

competency evaluation for this youth. The court finds the State’s 
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argument to be more persuasive, finding that the youth has not rebutted 

the presumption of competency.

{¶26} Following the magistrate’s denial of the competency evaluation, L.M. 

filed a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order. At the hearing on the motion before 

the juvenile court judge, defense counsel represented that L.M. continued to suffer 

from symptoms of the traumatic brain injury: persistent severe headaches, blurred 

vision, slurred or confused speech, and memory loss. From conversations with L.M., 

defense counsel reported that L.M. was confused and could not remember 

information. Defense counsel noted that L.M. “could parrot back information,” but it 

was unclear whether he actually remembered and understood the information. L.M. 

also continued to exhibit symptoms of acute stress, including anxiety, trouble sleeping, 

and trouble concentrating. L.M. also experienced hallucinations and reported hearing 

voices.

{¶27} In response, the state argued that L.M. had appeared via Zoom at 

hearings and responded appropriately. The state also emphasized that much of L.M.’s 

basis for questioning his competency relates to physical symptoms, rather than signs 

that he lacked a present ability to understand and participate in the delinquency 

proceedings. Additionally, the state argued that counsel’s suggestions of 

incompetence, without further objective evidence, failed to meet the “good cause” 

standard under R.C. 2945.37, which is the adult competency statute.

{¶28} Following the hearing, the court denied the motion to set aside the 

magistrate’s decision. The court determined that, “[t]he standards in O.R.C. 

2945.37(A) govern competency evaluations of juveniles, so long as they are applied in 

the light of juvenile, not adult norms. In re Gooch, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 19339, 
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[2002-Ohio-6859], ¶ 7.” The court further determined that, “a defendant is presumed 

to be competent unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that 

their present mental condition makes them unable to understand the nature and 

objective of the proceedings against them or assist in their defense. Id. at ¶ 26.” The 

court determined that “L.M. is presumed to be competent” and that there was “no 

reasonable basis for a competency evaluation to be conducted.” The court held “by a 

preponderance of the evidence that L.M. failed to overcome the presumption of 

competence.”

{¶29} As a preliminary matter, we reject the continued application of In re 

Gooch to the determination of competency in juvenile cases. Gooch was decided before 

the present juvenile competency statute was adopted in 2011, at a time when no 

separate statute governed competency determinations for juveniles. See In re D.G., 

4th Dist. Ross Nos. 13CA3382 and 13CA3383, 2014-Ohio-650, at ¶ 24. Juvenile 

competency determinations are now made under R.C. 2152.51-.59. Id.

{¶30} Under R.C. 2152.53(A), once a party or the court has raised the issue of 

competency by motion, the juvenile court may find that the juvenile is not competent 

without a hearing or a competency evaluation. Otherwise, the juvenile court’s role is 

limited to determining whether there is a reasonable basis to conduct a competency 

evaluation. R.C. 2152.53(B). When the court finds that there is a reasonable basis, the 

court shall order a competency evaluation. Id.

{¶31} Here, the juvenile court held that L.M. had not rebutted the 

presumption of competency by a preponderance of the evidence, and as a result had 

not shown a reasonable basis to order a competency evaluation. This is not the correct 

standard when determining whether to order a competency evaluation. The 
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presumption of competency “applies only in making a determination as to whether the 

child has a lack of mental capacity and shall not be used or applicable for any other 

purpose.” R.C. 2152.52(A)(2). Accordingly, the presumption is inapplicable to the 

court’s determination of whether a reasonable basis exists to order an evaluation. The 

juvenile court’s review is only whether there is a reasonable basis for an evaluation.

L.M. does not have to rebut a presumption of competency to be eligible for an 

evaluation.

{¶32} L.M.’s attorney represented that L.M. had suffered a traumatic brain 

injury, and as a result, he no longer appeared to be able to process information she 

provided, as he had been previously. The attorney had been working with L.M. for 

around a year, and so she had ample time to become familiar with L.M. and his 

cognitive abilities. The information L.M.’s attorney presented regarding L.M.’s recent 

cognitive difficulties, including the specific medical basis arising from his recent brain

trauma, set forth a reasonable basis to conduct a competency evaluation. See, e.g.,

Were, 94 Ohio St. 3d at 176, 761 N.E.2d 591 (relying heavily on defense counsel’s 

“repeated allegations” that “cast doubt” on defendant’s competency in finding that the 

trial court violated defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to a competency 

hearing).

{¶33} The state argues that mental illness is insufficient to find that a juvenile 

is not competent to stand trial. R.C. 2152.58(D)(2) states, in relevant part:

The court shall not find a child incompetent to proceed solely because 

the child is receiving or has received treatment as a voluntary or 

involuntary mentally ill patient * * *, is or has been 

institutionalized * * *, or is receiving or has received psychotropic or 
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other medication, even if the child might become incompetent to 

proceed without that medication.

{¶34} We agree that this standard is relevant to an eventual competency 

determination and may inform the court’s evaluation of whether a reasonable basis 

exists to order a competency evaluation. However, in this case, L.M.’s condition is not 

limited to mental illness, institutionalization, or psychotropic or other medication. 

L.M.’s attorney informed the court that L.M.’s ability to assist in his defense has been 

diminished since the car crash and cited his documented brain injury as a potential 

reason.

{¶35} We hold that the juvenile court applied the incorrect legal standard 

under the juvenile competency statute in making its decision of whether to order a 

competency evaluation of L.M and abused its discretion in refusing to order a 

competency evaluation. Accordingly, we sustain L.M.’s first assignment of error. We

vacate L.M.’s adjudications and dispositions, reverse the court’s judgment denying his 

motion for a competency evaluation, and remand the cause to the juvenile court with 

instructions that the court shall order a competency evaluation.

Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶36} In his second assignment of error, L.M. argues that his adjudications of 

delinquency for receiving stolen property and possession of criminal tools were not 

based on legally sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

{¶37} A decision that the evidence was legally insufficient would result in a 

dismissal of the charges and discharge of L.M. from further prosecution, In re S.J., 

2023-Ohio-3441, 225 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 61 (1st Dist.), but a decision that the juvenile 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence would result only in 

a new trial. In re J.P., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220647 and C-220648, 

2023-Ohio-4816, ¶ 17. Because we have determined that L.M.’s adjudications must be 

vacated and the cause remanded for a competency evaluation, we limit our review to 

the sufficiency of the evidence, should L.M. be found competent for a retrial.

{¶42} “Challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence in a juvenile 

case are reviewed under the same standards of review applied in adult criminal cases.” 

In re S.J. at ¶ 19. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our task is to ask

“whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Id., quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

1. Receiving Stolen Property

{¶43} L.M. argues that the evidence on the charge of receiving stolen property 

was legally insufficient because the state did not show that the car he was driving had 

been stolen. Although the state presented testimony from Ras and Shannon that Ras’s 

2014 Kia Rio had been stolen, the state never established that the Kia L.M. had been 

driving was the one stolen from Ras. L.M. argues that, because the state did not show 

that Ras was the owner of the car, the state had failed to prove that he was not 

authorized by the owner of the vehicle to possess it.

{¶44} R.C. 2913.51(A) defines the offense of receiving stolen property:

No person shall receive, retain, or dispose of property of another 

knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property has 

been obtained through commission of a theft offense.
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{¶45} In a prosecution for receiving stolen property, the defendant’s 

knowledge will usually have to be proven through circumstantial evidence. State v. 

Funderburke, 4th Dist. Ross No. 19CA3689, 2020-Ohio-3847, ¶ 11. Courts have 

routinely held that a defendant may properly be found guilty of receiving stolen 

property where “an accused’s possession of recently stolen property is not 

satisfactorily explained in light of surrounding circumstances developed from the 

evidence.” Id. Some of the circumstances that are appropriate to consider include “1) 

the accused’s unexplained possession of the property; 2) the nature of the property; 3) 

the frequency with which such property is stolen; 4) the nature of the accused’s 

commercial activity; and 5) the length of time between the theft and recovery of the 

property.” Id., quoting State v. Woodruff, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2972, 

2008-Ohio-967, ¶ 9. “The State does not have to offer the testimony of the actual 

owner, but [it] must present some evidence the property was stolen.” State v. Renne, 

5th Dist. Licking No. 11-CA-127, 2012-Ohio-3623, ¶ 27.

{¶46} A review of the evidence shows that there is scant support for the 

conclusion that the Kia possessed by L.M. belonged to Ras. The undisputed evidence 

consists of (1) the match between Ras’s car and the subject vehicle, each being 

identified as a white 2014 Kia Rio, and (2) Reinhart’s body-worn camera video, 

showing a broken window in the rear door on the driver’s side of the car, which 

matches Shannon’s testimony that the rear window had been broken.

{¶47} However, to sufficiently prove L.M. guilty of receiving stolen property, 

the state need not present the testimony of the actual owner. See Renne at ¶ 27. The 

state only needs to show that the property had been stolen and that the circumstances 

indicate that L.M. either knew or should have known that the property had been 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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stolen. See Funderburke at ¶ 11. Officer Reinhart testified that:

• L.M. had been in the driver’s seat of the car;

• L.M. was alone in the car at the time of the crash;

• L.M. did not have a valid driver’s license;

• L.M. had a screwdriver and a USB cord in his pockets, which are tools 

commonly used to steal Kia vehicles;

• The steering column of the car had been “peeled,” indicating that 

someone had removed the mechanism where the car’s key is inserted;

• The “peeled” condition of the steering column was visible from the 

driver’s seat; and

• No keys were found in the car or on L.M.

{¶48} L.M. did not provide any explanation for his possession of the car. 

Officer Reinhart testified that he had seen Kia vehicles stolen by the use of a 

screwdriver and USB cord in “numerous” cases, and that such thefts are a problem 

statewide. L.M. was 14 years old at the time of the crash and consequently was not yet 

eligible to obtain a driver’s license.

{¶49} We hold that the evidence is sufficient to show that L.M. knew or should 

have known that the car was stolen. The state did not need to show a nexus to the 

alleged owner of the car to present legally sufficient evidence to prove a charge of 

receiving stolen property. Accordingly, L.M.’s adjudication on this charge was based 

on legally sufficient evidence.

2. Possession of Criminal Tools

{¶50} L.M. was charged with possession of criminal tools based on the 

screwdriver found in his possession following the car crash. L.M. argues that the 
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condition of the screwdriver does not support an inference that it was used in the theft 

of the car. L.M. attempts to distinguish his screwdriver from the one used in State v. 

Sanders, where the screwdriver bore physical signs of having been used to pry out the 

ignition of a stolen car. State v. Sanders, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23504, 

2007-Ohio-2898, ¶ 15.

{¶51} Under R.C. 2923.24(A), “[n]o person shall possess or have under the 

person’s control any substance, device, instrument, or article, with purpose to use it 

criminally.” A conviction for possession of criminal tools requires the state to prove 

“both control of the article and the specific intention to use the article to commit a 

crime.” State v. Dorsey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110623, 2012-Ohio-4043, ¶ 7, 

quoting State v. McDonald, 31 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 509 N.E.2d 57 (1987).

{¶52} It is not necessary to prove that the criminal tool in question was 

actually used in the commission of a crime. It is sufficient to show that the defendant 

had the intent to use the tool in a crime. See Sanders at ¶ 13 (“To establish that 

Appellant was in possession of a criminal tool, the State was required to establish that 

he possessed or had under his control an item, with the purpose of using it 

criminally.”).

{¶53} Based on the state’s evidence, there was sufficient evidence to show that 

the car had been stolen and that the screwdriver and USB cord found in L.M.’s 

possession are tools specifically suited to the theft. L.M. was found in the car without 

keys, and with tools—including the screwdriver—that were particularly suited to steal 

that model of car. Accordingly, the state presented sufficient evidence of the offense of 

possession of criminal tools.

{¶54} Accordingly, we overrule the portion of L.M.’s second assignment of 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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error that alleges that his adjudications of delinquency were based on legally 

insufficient evidence. We decline to consider the portion of this assignment of error 

alleging that the adjudications were against the manifest weight of the evidence as 

moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

Restitution

{¶55} In his third assignment of error, L.M. argues that the juvenile court 

erred in ordering restitution to Ras. At disposition, the juvenile court ordered L.M. to 

pay restitution to Ras as the alleged owner of the stolen car. L.M. argues that the state 

failed to present any evidence that the car actually belonged to Ras, and therefore the 

state has not shown that Ras is an appropriate victim to receive restitution.

{¶56} Because we have vacated L.M.’s adjudications and remanded the cause 

for the court to order a competency evaluation, L.M.’s third assignment of error is 

moot, and we decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

III. Conclusion

{¶57} For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the juvenile court’s adjudications

and dispositions of L.M., and we reverse the court’s judgment denying L.M. a

competency evaluation. We remand the cause to the juvenile court for the court to 

order a competency evaluation of L.M. and for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

Judgments reversed, adjudications vacated, and cause remanded.

BOCK, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.