****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andbound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JASON ANDERSON (AC 35432)
Keller, Prescott and Schaller, Js. Argued October 16, 2014—officially released June 30, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Ansonia-Milford, Markle, J.)
DanielP. Scholfield, with whom was Hugh F. Keefe, for the appellant (defendant). Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was KevinD. Lawlor, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion PRESCOTT, J. This criminal prosecution arises out ofa fatal motor vehicle accident. The defendant, Jason Anderson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, renderedfollowing ajurytrial, oftwo counts ofmisconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-571 and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) declined to direct ajudgment of acquittal on certain counts of the information in light of the jury’s answer to an interrogatory, which
answer was inconsistent with the jury’s verdicts of guilty with respect to those counts; (2) vacated the jury’s verdicts and ordered thejury to resume deliberations; and (3) coerced or misled thejury into returning guilty verdicts after it had resumed its deliberations.2 Because we agree in part with the defendant’s second and third claims, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 2 a.m. on June 12, 2009, the defendant, an on-duty Milford police officer, was returningfromWestHaven, where he and otherofficers had earlier been dispatched to provide assistance to the West Haven Police Department in dealing with a public disturbance. On his return to Milford, the defendant drove his cruiser westbound on the Boston Post Road in Orange at an extremely high rate of speed, despite the fact that he was not responding to any calls for assistance, and neither his emergency lights nor siren was activated. Although the posted speed limit
was forty miles per hour, the defendant’s speed on the Boston Post Road at times exceeded ninety miles per hour.
As the defendant approachedthe intersection ofBoston Post Road and Dogwood Road in Orange, a Mazda driven by David Servin and also occupied by Ashlie Krakowski approached the same intersection from the opposite direction. Both Servin and Krakowski were nineteen years of age. Servin was intoxicated, and his blood alcohol level was 0.14 percent. Without coming to a complete stop at the flashing red traffic signal at the intersection or yielding to oncoming traffic, Servin then attemptedto turn left onto Dogwood Road in front of the defendant’s cruiser. Although the defendant applied his brakes approximately one second before the vehicles collided, the defendant’s cruiser struck the Mazdaatahighrate ofspeedintherightfrontpassenger door. The impact caused the Mazda to roll over, and Krakowski was ejected from the vehicle. The defendant’s cruiser also sustained extensive damage.
Both Servin and Krakowski died as a result of their injuries sustained in the collision. The defendant was injured, taken by ambulance to a hospital, and releasedlater that morning.
The defendant subsequently was charged in an information with two counts ofmanslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) (1)3 in connection with the deaths ofServin and Krakowski, and one count of reckless driving in violation of § 14- 222. Counts one and two pertained to the deaths of Servin and Krakowski, respectively. Following a jury trial, the jury unanimously found the defendant not guilty of both counts of manslaughter in the second degree, guilty of two counts of the lesser included offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle, and guilty of reckless driving.
The issuesraisedbythe defendantinthis appealarise from a series of events that occurred primarily after the jury began deliberations. We, therefore, set forth the procedural history related to the jury deliberations in detail.
Prior to the commencement of jury deliberations, the court asked both parties whether they intended to requestanyinterrogatories andgavethemuntilthe next day to submit any proposals. The following day, the defendantsubmittedaproposedinterrogatory. Theproposed interrogatory asked: ‘‘Didthe conduct of [Servin] constitute an intervening cause ofthe automobile collision?’’ The interrogatory included an option for the jury to check either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no.’’ After accepting the interrogatory without objection, the court instructed the jury.
As to counts one and two, the court instructed the jury on the elements of manslaughter in the second degree and the lesser included offenses of misconduct with a motor vehicle and negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. The court stated: ‘‘As to the first lesser included offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle; again, I emphasize, if you unanimously find the defendant not guilty of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree in both count one and count two, you shall then go to consider the lesser offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of § 53a-57.

. . . If

. . . you have unanimously found the defendant not guilty ofthe crime ofmisconduct with a motorvehicle, then you should go on to the next step and consider the lesser offense of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, in violation of General Statutes § 14-222a. Do not consider this offense unless and until you have unanimously found the defendant not guilty ofmisconduct with a motor vehicle.’’
The court then instructed the jury on the elements of each offense. Additionally, the court discussed the doctrine of intervening cause and instructed the jury to apply it to counts one and two, including each lesser included charge it was to consider. Specifically, the courtchargedthejuryasfollows: ‘‘The defendant,JasonAnderson, claims that his conduct was not the proximate cause of [Servin’s] or [Krakowski’s] deaths because his acts did not set in operation the factors which caused the deaths. The defendant claims that the acts of [Servin], by his operating the motor vehicle withabloodalcohollevelof0.14 [percent] andbyfailing to stop at the blinking red light and by failing to yield the right-of-way to oncoming vehicles, constitutes an intervening cause which caused the death ofboth [Servin] and [Krakowski]. Now, this is a question of fact for you, as jurors, to determine. If you find that the state has not proven that it was the defendant’s acts whichsetin operationthefactorsthatcausedthe death, then you cannot find the defendant guilty. If you find that it was the acts of others which have actually set in operation the factors which caused the death in this case, you must find these acts to be an intervening
cause. Ifyou determine that an intervening cause exists and caused the death in the case, then the defendant’s conduct, reckless or not, cannot legally be the proximate cause of [Servin’s] or [Krakowski’s] death.’’
At the conclusion of the jury instructions, the court stated: ‘‘[T]here is one other matter I almost forgot,’’ referring to the interrogatory submitted by the defendant. The court failed to explain the content orpurpose of the interrogatory, or how it related to the court’s instructions regarding the substantive offenses. The court simply instructed the jury as follows: ‘‘It’s going to be marked as a court exhibit, and it’s labeled as an interrogatory. The foreperson, on behalf of the jurors, will answer this one question before coming out and returning the verdict. You’ll fold that interrogatory in half, hand it to the marshal and the marshal will hand it to the clerk, all right. So, there will be one question which calls for a yes or no answer, all right.’’ Jury deliberations began shortly thereafter. The court did not instruct thejurythat its answerto the interrogatory mustbe unanimous. Italso didnot explain, withrespect to the interrogatory, that the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Servin’s conduct
was not an intervening cause. Ashorttime aftercommencing deliberations, thejury sent a note to the court asking whether the issue of intervening cause was applicable only to the charge of manslaughter in the second degree in counts one and two, or if it also was to be considered in conjunction with the lesser included charges of misconduct with a motor vehicle and negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. The court referred the jury to two pages of its instructions. Thatportion ofthe instructions statedthat intervening cause was to be applied to counts one and two, including each lesser included offense. The jury then returned to its deliberations.
Sometime thereafter, the jury sent a second note to the court stating that it had reached a verdict. Thejury returned to the courtroom and the verdicts were announced by the foreperson. As to counts one and two, pertaining to the respective deaths of Servin and Krakowski, the jury found the defendant not guilty of both counts of manslaughter in the second degree. As to the death of Servin (count one), the jury found the defendant not guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle, butguilty ofthe lesserincluded offense ofnegligent homicide. As to the death of Krakowski (count two), thejury found the defendant guilty ofmisconduct with
a motor vehicle. With respect to count three, the jury foundthe defendantguiltyofrecklessdriving. The court then accepted and recorded the verdicts. The court did not, at this time, review the jury’s answer to the interrogatory or make any inquiries of the jury with respect to it.
The court asked thejury to return to the deliberation
room. After the jury left the courtroom, the court then reviewed the answer to the interrogatory and stated: ‘‘Counsel, the interrogatorycame backandthe question was, did the conduct of [Servin] constitute an intervening cause of the automobile collision, and the answer
was yes.’’ The court noted aperceived conflict between the guilty verdicts and the answer to the interrogatory: the guilty verdicts and answer to the interrogatory appeared to simultaneously find the defendant guilty
on the lesser included charges in counts one and two and relieve him of criminal responsibility on those
same charges.
The defendant requested that the court vacate the guiltyverdictsonthelesserincludedchargesastocount
one and two because those verdicts were inconsistent with thejury’s answer to the interrogatory, and render
ajudgment of acquittal on those charges. In response, the state asked that the jury be reinstructed and have the opportunity to resolve the inconsistency. After discussingtheseissues, the courtstatedthatitwasinclined to vacate its order accepting the verdicts, reinstruct the jury, and send the jury back for further deliberations
on all counts. Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘Because the court is concerned with the inconsistency in a very basiclegalprinciple ofcausationandintervening cause, the courtfeelsthatitis obligatedto, atthispoint, vacate my order accepting the verdict, and I will do that at this point in time. I am going to vacate the acceptance of that verdict. The court has decided that it is going to reinstruct the jurors as to both the causation issue and the instruction on intervening cause, and, second,
as to the inconsistency that applied between count one andtwofindingadifferentmentalstate ofthe defendant in each of those charges. So, those are my intentions. I have given each side, the state and [defense counsel],
a copy of the proposed instruction. I have made some minor changes, and I’ll say minor. I’ll hear from both sides, first from the state.’’4The state agreedwiththe court’sposition.5The defendant objected to the court’s intended plan. Specifically, he requested that the court vacate the guilty verdicts and render a judgment of acquittal on those charges. The defendantfurtherarguedthatreinstructingthejury
as to intervening cause would implicitly convey to the jury that it must have made a mistake and that it could rectifythe mistake by simply changing its interrogatory
answer from ‘‘yes’’ to ‘‘no.’’ The defendant argued that such a course would be highly prejudicial and, therefore, renewed his oral motion to vacate the guilty verdicts because ofthe inconsistency ofthe answer to the interrogatory relative to the guilty verdicts, and asked that the court render judgment of acquittal as to the guilty verdicts on the lesser included charges in counts
one and two.
The court ultimately denied the motion, stating: ‘‘I

am going to deny that because of the reason that this
case went to thejurors. I feel that there is an inconsistency, but thejurors should render a decision. I am not
sure if they just do not understand the legal principle,
as I explained it to them. But certainly it is within the province of the jury to have an opportunity to correct and to convey to us their intentions in this case. So, I
am very reluctant to just cast aside the jurors’ verdict in theirplace. I think they should be given the opportunityto explain to the court and to the parties what their intentions were. As I said, if their intentions were to find that [Servin], his actions, his conduct, constituted
an intervening cause of the automobile collision, then in fact that finding would relieve the defendant of all of the criminal offenses. That may be what they wish to do, but the way they have rendered this verdict is legally inconsistent, and I can’t—I am not just going to set aside their verdict without them having a full understanding. I believe the best way to address that is to reinstruct them as to the principles of the law so that they can render that decision.’’
The court then reinstructed the jury and premised its reinstruction on the basis of its determination that thejury’sverdict‘‘[was] inconsistentwiththeapplicable legal principles,’’ and therefore could not be accepted by the court. The court first reinstructed the jury on the doctrine ofintervening cause, providing adefinition and articulating the practical implications of a yes or
no answerto the interrogatory. Itstated: ‘‘[T]he answer, yes, to the interrogatory means that the intervening
cause has relieved the defendant of criminal responsibility, and you must find the defendant not guilty as to counts one and two ofthe information, and to its lesser included offenses.

. . . [I]f you have found that the conduct of [Servin] does not constitute an intervening
cause of the accident, only then may you go on to consider the verdict of guilty to the charges and also to the lesser included offenses that were outlined incounts one and two.’’
The court next turned its attention to the second articulatedinconsistency, pertainingtothe inconsistent mental states required to convict the defendant of the lesser included offenses contained within counts one and two. The court stated: ‘‘[I]t is inconsistent to find the defendant guiltyofcriminal negligence in count one and find misconduct with a motor vehicle in count two becausethose statutesrequirethatyoumake adifferent finding as to the defendant’s mental state at the time of his actions.’’ In addition, the court outlined the two mental states and the requirements of each: ‘‘Criminal negligence requires you to find the defendant failed to
use or exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The misconduct with a motor vehicle statute defines the mental state as failingto perceive asubstantial and justifiable risk that will occur.’’ Following the reinstruction, the court stated, ‘‘I hope this helps to clarify some of the inconsistencies that has led this court not to accept yourverdict. Therefore, and simply once again, the court will not invade in your findings offacts. However, it is very important that the jury interrogatory as to causation is consistent with the ultimate verdict.’’ The jury resumed its deliberations. Sometime thereafter, the jury sent a note to the court stating that ‘‘it could not and will not be able to’’ reach
a verdict as to counts one and two. In response, the court delivered a Chip Smith instruction on the need to deliberate further. See State v. O’Neil, 261 Conn. 49, 74, 801 A.2d 730 (2002).
Thejuryresumeddeliberationsandlatersentanother note asking if it could ‘‘rescind’’ its earlier answer to the interrogatory, which stated that Servin’s conduct
wasaninterveningcauseintheaccident. Overobjection from defense counsel, the court determined that the jury had not yet answered the interrogatory and, thus, would need to resume deliberations. Accordingly, the court reasoned that there was nothing to rescind.6 The court referred the jury back to the prior reinstruction and asked it to return to its deliberations and answer the interrogatory question. Shortly thereafter, the jury sent another note to the court. This note read: ‘‘Your Honor, [w]ith all due respect, we, the jurors, still remain in agreement with the interrogatory statement that [Servin’s] actions contributed to the accident. Our question remains if there is a distinction between the accident and the deaths.’’ (Emphasis added.) Outside ofthe presence ofthejury, the court noted to counsel that thejury used the phrase ‘‘contributed to’’ rather than ‘‘intervening cause,’’ and that the court did not understand the second portion of the note. The court indicated that it would attempt to answer this note the following day.
The following day, overobjectionfrom defense coun-sel, the court stated that it intended to resubmit the interrogatoryto thejury: ‘‘Iwill saythisto both counsel, thatitisclearthatwhentheysentoutthenoteyesterday they used an incorrect legal term. What they meant I cannot infer, and that is the reason why I am resubmitting the jury interrogatory because it has the correct legal term of whether or not they find an intervening
cause. So, in light ofthe term that they used, contributing factor, it has to be clarified, and that is the purpose that the court is going to resubmit the interrogatory, justsothe recordis clear. And oncetheyhave answered that interrogatory, and since I had already reinstructed them as to the law, I am giving them the opportunity to render a verdict. If they are able to render a legally consistent verdict, this court is bound by that verdict. If it is not consistent, then this court is going to be bound by the factual findings, all right.’’7
The court then, in the presence of the jury, gave the following instruction: ‘‘So, as I indicated, in the first part of your note you indicated that you had come to
afindingregarding [Servin’s] conduct. Now, atthispoint in time the court is going to resubmit to you the jury interrogatory. It is being resubmitted to you solely for the purpose that your finding be recorded in writing, whatever it may be. Now, also I want to indicate to you—andI’ve instructedyou onthis onprioroccasions, and let me emphasize this to you once again. You are the sole finders of fact and that it is only my role to instruct you as to the law you are to apply to the case. Andbecause you are the sole finders offact, you should notbe influenced bymyreinstructions orthe resubmission of the interrogatory to you, and you should not interpret it as any indication of an opinion as to how you should determine the issues offact. That is for you alone to decide and, as I indicated, the purpose is to have this recorded in writing on the interrogatory form. After you answer this interrogatory, then you should consider my recent instructions to you, and if you are able to render a verdict as to counts one and two, you should send out a note indicating that you are able. If you hand a note to the marshal—as I say, if you want to resubmit to the first question, you may also do that. Once you are able to answer the interrogatory and let the marshal know if you are able to reach a verdict or not, then I’ll call you back and we’ll read the interrogatory in open court and a verdict, ifyou shall have that, all right.’’ Following its return to deliberations, the jury sent another note stating: ‘‘[1] The jurors would like a copy ofthetranscripts of[the court’s] comments andinstruction to the jurors with regard to inconsistency of the verdicts given bythejurors dated 11/6/12. [2] We would like a copy ofthe original interrogatory statement completedbythejurors because it appears that it is worded differently. [3] The reason we raised the question ‘was there any distinction between the accident and thedeaths’ is, and based on testimonies, because SOME of
us jurors believe that [Servin’s] actions contributed to the accident but their deaths are caused by the speed.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The court ordered that the requested transcripts and original interrogatory be submitted to the jury, and reinstructed the jury regarding the court’s limited role injuror deliberations as follows: ‘‘I want to emphasize again that the law that I have given you is what the court’s duty is to do, provide you with the applicable law. So, that applicable law you must find to the facts of the case. Whatever you as jurorsfindthefactstobe, thatisforyoualoneto decide, all right. So, you find the facts, you take the law as I have given it to you on the jury charge, and you take only that law. That is the applicable law and you apply it.’’ The court did not provide thejury with any instructions regarding whether there was a legally significant distinction between the accident and the deaths. Following additional deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court indicating that it had reached a unanimous verdict. The interrogatory was read first: ‘‘The Clerk: Jury interrogatory. Did the conduct of [Servin] constitute an intervening cause ofthe automobile collision? Do you want me to read their answer, Your Honor? ‘‘The Court: Yes, please. ‘‘The Clerk: No. Signed, the foreperson

. . . .’’
Theforepersonthenannouncedtheverdicts. Thejury unanimously found the defendant not guilty of manslaughterintheseconddegreeastobothcountsoneand two. Thejury found the defendant guilty ofmisconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of § 53a-57 on both counts one and two, as theypertained to the respective deaths of Servin and Krakowski. The court accepted and recorded these verdicts. The court also stated that it would ‘‘accept the previously rendered verdict of guilty on countthree [reckless driving], andthatverdict shall be accepted and recorded at this time.’’8 The jury
was polled and the verdicts were determined to be unanimous.
After the jury was excused, the defendant made an oral motion, pursuant to Practice Book § 42-51, for a judgment of acquittal. The defendant argued that the jury had been pressured to change its interrogatory
answer by the instructions given by the court and that double jeopardy had attached after the jury had returned its initial verdicts.9 The state maintained that the initialverdictwasinherentlyflawedandthatfurther deliberation had been necessary. The court denied the defendant’s motion and stated: ‘‘Well, first and foremost, I’mgoingto denyyourmotionto enterajudgment ofacquittal andto set aside theverdictforthe following
reasons: One, the factual basis here was one of which thejurors could not have legally rendered averdict thefirst time around. It was a legally inconsistent verdict with their findings. The court, giving great deference to the jurors who sat here, listened to the evidence,
was assigned with the duties thatjurors must to make certain finding of fact, to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. There is deference to the jurors to do their job and for the court not to interfere with their factfinding process. However, when they returned the verdict which was legally inconsistent with their factual findings, this court had a duty to uphold the law and also a duty to honor the findings. So, it was very clear that it was a clarification that was needed to be given to the jurors, at which time I reinstructed them, the
same instructionthatwas given out ofthe same instruction package out of the jury charge as to the meaning ofintervening cause. I think that in their questions they clearly indicated to the court that they did not have
a clear understanding of the legal implication of the intervening cause; otherwise, they could not have reached that inconsistent verdict. So, for the record, the court did not accept that verdict, that’s all. The court just could not accept a finding that was legally inconsistent, reinstructed them as to the law, and sent them back to perform their duties. At this point in time, the court now finds that their findings are consistent after they’ve had an opportunity to re-review the jury instruction, re-review my instruction to them, and to considerthe evidence in the case. So, the court is going to do what it needs to do, which is to make sure that the jurors’ intent is preserved and also honored, and it is my duty to be bound by the findings, factual findings, submitted by the jurors. And those are my reasons,
once again, that the verdict was not accepted the first time around, and it was only accepted by the court upon a return of a consistent verdict with the law.’’ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly declined to direct a judgment of acquittal on counts
one and two of the information and ordered the jury to resume its deliberations, despite the fact that the jury’s answerto the interrogatorywasinconsistentwith the jury’s verdict of guilty on certain lesser included offenses contained in those counts. Specifically, the defendant argues that because the affirmative answer to the interrogatory regarding intervening cause appeared to relieve him of criminal responsibility as to counts one and two, it should be deemed an acquittal
as a matter of law and should have prevailed over the guilty verdicts on the lesser included offenses under those counts.10 Accordingly, the defendant argues that the correct course of action would have been to discharge the jury and then direct judgments of acquittal
on both counts one and two. We are not persuaded.
ABecause some types of inconsistent verdicts are legally permissible, the defendant’s claim necessarily requires us to first discuss whether our case law on inconsistent verdicts required the court to accept the verdicts as initially returned by the jury and, thus, prevented the court from ordering the jury to resume its deliberations to eliminate any inconsistency between the verdicts and the interrogatory. This case law is generally divided into two categories.
Thefirstcategoryinvolvescasesinwhichitisclaimed that two convictions are inconsistent with each other
as a matter oflaw or are based on a legal impossibility. See, e.g., State v. Nash, 316 Conn. 651, 659, A.3d (2015). Such convictions, commonly referred to as ‘‘mutually exclusive convictions,’’ are reviewable, and cannot withstand a challenge if ‘‘the existence of the essentialelementsforone offensenegatesthe existence of [one or more] essential elements for another offense ofwhichthe defendantalso stands convicted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The present case does not involve such a claim.11
The second category involves cases in which the defendant claims that one or more guilty verdicts must be vacated because there is an inconsistency between those guilty verdicts and a verdict of acquittal on one
or more counts, or an acquittal of a codefendant. See, e.g., State v. Arroyo, 292 Conn. 558, 586, 973 A.2d 1254 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 911, 130 S. Ct. 1296, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1086 (2010); State v. Rosado, 178 Conn. 704, 705, 425A.2d 108 (1979) (conviction ofsale ofnarcotics, acquittal of possession of narcotics); State v. Keating, 151 Conn. 592, 593–94, 200 A.2d 724 (1964) (after two defendants were convicted of conspiracy and one was acquitted, appealing defendants claimed that their convictions were inconsistent with acquittal of their codefendant), cert. denied sub nom. Joseph v. Connecticut, 379 U.S. 963, 85 S. Ct. 654, 13 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1965). It is well established that such inconsistent verdicts are notreviewable andthe defendantisnotentitledto relief because ‘‘[when] the verdict could have been the result of compromise or mistake, we will not probe into the logic orreasoning ofthejury’s deliberations oropenthe door to interminable speculation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 313, 630 A.2d 593 (1993).
Our Supreme Court has further reasoned that inconsistent verdicts of this type ‘‘should not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the [g]overnment at the defendant’s expense. It is equallypossible that thejury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion [of guilt] on [one charge], and then through mistake, compromise, orlenity, arrived at aninconsistent conclusion
on another offense. But in such situations the [g]overnment has no recourse if it wishes to correct the jury’s error; the [g]overnment is precluded from appealing orotherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the [c]onstitution’s [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause.

. . . ‘‘[A]n individualized assessment ofthe reason forthe inconsistencywouldbebasedeitheruponpure speculation, or would require inquiries into thejury’s deliberations that courts generally will not undertake.

. . . [A] criminal defendant already is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 585.
Thepresent case doesnotfitintothis categoryeither. Instead, the jury’s initial answer to the interrogatory creates a possible inconsistency with respect to each guilty verdict without reference to any other count on whichthe defendantmayhavebeenconvictedoracquitted. In otherwords, asto each count, thejuryseemingly both convicted and acquitted the defendant. By finding him guilty either of misconduct with a motor vehicle
or criminally negligent homicide, it must have concludedthatthe defendantproximatelycausedthe death of Servin and Krakowski, and yet, the jury simultaneouslyfound, asexpressedintheanswertotheinterrogatory, that the defendant was not the proximate cause of the collision because Servin’s conduct was an intervening cause. This apparent inconsistency does not require any comparison of the jury’s verdict on different counts but instead seemingly creates an internalinconsistencywithrespecttothejury’sguiltyverdict
on anyparticular charge. Thus, theprinciples discussed inArroyothatunderlieacourt’sunwillingnesstoreview claimsofinconsistentverdictsandinstead‘‘letthe chips fall where they may’’ do not pertain to the present case because we, in fact, are left not knowing whether the defendant was convicted or acquitted on any of the charges for which the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Accordingly, we concludethatourcaselawoninconsistent verdicts is not dispositive ofthe defendant’s claim and does notprevent further considerationbythe court
as to how to resolve the apparent inconsistency.
B
Theissuewhether, inacriminalcase, afactualfinding expressed by a jury in an answer to an interrogatory that relieves a defendant of criminal responsibility trumps an inconsistent guilty verdict on one or more of the charges is a question of first impression in this state. The dearth of authority in Connecticut on this issue is unsurprising because, as a general rule, jury interrogatorieshavenotbeenpartofourcriminalprocedure. See State v. Sitaras, 106 Conn. App. 493, 501, 942 A.2d 1071, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 906, 950 A.2d 1283 (2008); see also State v. Anonymous (1971-3), 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 393, 397, 275A.2d629 (1971) (theuse ofinterrogatories ‘‘is not appropriate in criminal jury trials’’ and‘‘[i]t is the duty of a jury to return a general verdict in a criminal trial’’). Nevertheless, interrogatories have sometimes been used in criminal cases in Connecticut and may well be appropriate or required12 in certain limited contexts, such as when the jury is required to find certain facts, which are not otherwise an element of the offense, before a sentence may be enhanced. In this case, however, neither party asserts that the use of an interrogatory in the circumstances of this case
was improper. We, therefore, leave to another day the question ofwhether ajury interrogatory is appropriate in this or related contexts.13
To determine whether the court was required to render ajudgment of acquittal on the basis of an inconsistency between the answer to the interrogatory and the guilty verdicts, we look to established doublejeopardy principles and to guidance from other jurisdictions in answering this thorny, and rarely decided, question. The fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall

. . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb

. . . .’’ ‘‘We have recognized that the DoubleJeopardyClause consistsofseveralprotections: It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense afteracquittal. Itprotectsagainstasecondprosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple prosecutions for the same offense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 294, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005). The United States Supreme Court has held that ‘‘[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of doublejeopardyjurisprudence has beenthat [a] verdict of acquittal

. . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice injeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977). ‘‘Ajudgment ofacquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal.’’ United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S. Ct. 2187, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1978).
Most of the reported cases involving this species of double jeopardy law focus on the nature and timing of the actions by the trial court in granting a motion for
ajudgment ofacquittal, eitherin casestriedto the court
or in circumstances in which the jury is deadlocked. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court has ‘‘emphasized that what constitutes an acquittal is not to be controlled by the form of the judge’s action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. 571. Rather, ‘‘[a]n acquittal results from a resolution, correct or not,of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Statev.Paolella, 210 Conn. 110, 122–23, 554 A.2d 702 (1989), quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 571.
The present case requires this court to analyze, not the actions of the trial court, but, rather, the jury’s

answer to the interrogatory and determine whether it should be deemed an acquittal because it represents a resolution adverse to the state of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. We now turn to the reported cases that have addressed this question in the context of an inconsistency between a jury’s

answer to an interrogatory and guilty verdict on one
or more counts of an information or indictment.
The state directs our attention to the decision by the United States Court ofAppeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 901, 184 L. Ed. 2d 698 (2013). In Shippley, the defendant was charged with various drug offenses in connection with his participation in a motorcycle gang. Id., 1193. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 but, in response to the District Court’s special interrogatories, found that the defendant had not conspired to distribute any of the drugs listed in the indictment. Id. Thus, as the Tenth Circuit noted, the jury ‘‘[i]n effect

. . . both convicted and acquitted [the defendant] of the charged conspiracy.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id.
On appeal, the defendant in Shippley argued that pursuant to United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984),14 and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S. Ct. 134, 88 L. Ed. 48 (1943),15the District Courtshouldhave rendered ajudgment ofacquittal. United States v. Shippley, supra, 690 F.3d 1194. The Circuit Court in Shippley affirmed the District Court and rejected the defendant’s reliance on this reasoning and stated that, ‘‘[e]ven accepting for argument’s sake [the defendant’s] premise that Powell and Dotterweich implicitly require (rather than permit,
astheyhold) adistrictcourtto acceptaverdictlogically inconsistent as between counts or defendants, that still does not speak to our case. In our case, it wasn’t just logically incongruous to enter the jury’s verdict, it was metaphysically impossible. Powell and Dotterweich involved logical inconsistencies between counts and between defendants

. However illogical, the verdicts in those cases could be given full effect. This case, by contrast, involves an inconsistency on the same count with the same defendant—an inconsistency that simply could not have been given full effect. Something had to give in our case that didn’t have to give in these other cases. To enter an acquittal, the district courtwould have needed to disregard the fact that the jury expresslyfound [the defendant] guilty. To enter aguilty verdict, the court would have needed to overlook the special verdict findings that [the defendant] did not conspire to distribute any of the drugs at issue in the
case.

. . . ‘‘If anything, Powell might even suggest the opposite conclusion. The [c]ourt in Powell refused to undo the defendant’s conviction on a compound offense despite his acquittal on the underlying felony because it was unclear whose ox ha[d] been gored: thejury’s inconsistent verdict may have favored the government, but it
was equally possible it benefitted the defendant.

. . . That same sort of problem exists here. To enter any verdict when thejuryfirst returned, the district court would have had to choose to ‘gore’ one side or the other—justwhatPowellsuggestscourtsshouldnotdo.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1195–96. The court in Shippley explicitlylimited its decision to instances ‘‘where ajury returns a guilty verdict but indicates in its answers to special interrogatories that the defendant is innocent.’’ Id., 1196. Although the logic of Shippley is appealing on its face, we decline to follow it for the following reason. The courtinShippley explicitlyrecognizedthatit ‘‘d[id] not purport to address other arguments, possibly emanating from the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause or otherwise, [the defendant] doesn’t raise.’’ Id. In the absence ofacontrollinglegalprinciple, suchas doublejeopardy, the court in Shippley simply could not find any principled justification for choosing to gore one party’s ox
overthe other’s. In the present case, however, the state concedes that the defendant properly raised a double jeopardy claim at trial and, thus, Shippley does not
answer whether double jeopardy principles required the courtto gore the state’s oxinthese circumstances.16 Althoughnotcitedbyeitherthestate orthe defendant in this case, we find the decision of the United States Court ofAppeals forthe Eighth Circuit in UnitedStates

v.Mitchell, 476F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2007), andthe decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), to be much more instructive. InMitchell, the defendant was charged with two counts ofbankruptcy fraud arising from his filing of a bankruptcy petition. UnitedStates v. Mitchell, supra, 541. The United States District Courtforthe Northern District ofIowa charged thejury on the substantive criminal law that applied to each count, including that, in order to be found guilty
on the second count, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any false statements made by the defendant regarding his petition were ‘‘material,’’ that is, the statements ‘‘had a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing theoutcome of the bankruptcy petition.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 542. The District Court also submitted to thejury a series ofinterrogatories related to each count, including one that specifically asked the jury if it ‘‘unanimously [found] beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more ofthe [statements] were material

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The jurywasaskedto check‘‘yes’’ or‘‘no’’inresponsetothis interrogatory. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Thejury returned averdict ofguilty as to each count, but checked the ‘‘no’’ box to this interrogatory, indicating ‘‘that it could not make aunanimous finding beyond
a reasonable doubt that one or more of the false statements [were] material.’’ Id. The defendant subsequently moved for ajudgment ofacquittal or, in the alternative,
a new trial. Id., 542–43. The District Court vacated the guilty verdict on the second count, concluding that because ‘‘thejury had convicted [the defendant] ofviolating [the Bankruptcy Code provision] without finding any materiality

. . . the jury’s verdict

. . . cannot stand,’’ and ordered a new trial. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 543. The defendant then moved to dismiss the charge on doublejeopardy grounds, but the District Court denied that motion. Id.
Onappeal, the defendantarguedthatdoublejeopardy barred the government from continuing to prosecute this charge because, in essence, the jury’s answer to the interrogatory constituted a factual finding made beyond areasonable doubtthat was fatal to the government’s case. Although the Eighth Circuit essentially agreed with the defendant’s assertion that the double jeopardy clause applies not only to verdicts ofacquittal but also to ‘‘final [adverse] adjudications of fully litigated legal issues’’; id., 544; it refused to accord the jury’s answer to the interrogatory the legal significance urged by the defendant. Id., 544–45.
In rejecting the defendant’s double jeopardy claim, the court began its analysis by emphasizing that ‘‘[t]he burdenisonthe defendantto demonstratethattheissue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided’’ previously by the jury. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 544, citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350, 110 S. Ct. 668, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1990). The court then considered the precise wording of the interrogatory and reasoned: ‘‘The response to the interrogatory does not suggest that the jury made a unanimous factual finding with respect to the materiality ofthe misstatements. The finding means
one oftwo things: either (1) thejuryunanimouslyfound the statements immaterial, or (2) some jurors found thestatementsmaterialandsomejurorsfoundthestatements immaterial. In the former case, jeopardy would attach, and inthe latter casejeopardywouldnot attach. The language ofthe interrogatory itselfis not susceptible to discerningjust what, specifically, thejury found;we know merely that it was unable to unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements
were material. There is nothing in the language that suggests thejury has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were immaterial.’’ United States v. Mitchell, supra, 476 F.3d 545. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit Court ofAppeals concluded that the defendant had failed to meet his burden to demonstrate thatjeopardy attached and affirmed the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Id.
We next turn to the First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Fernandez, supra, 722 F.3d 1. Fernandez involved two defendants, Juan Bravo Fernandez (Bravo) and Hector Martinez Maldonado. Bravo was found guilty by a jury of (1) conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce in aid ofracketeering (count one), and (2) interstate travel in aid of racketeering with the intent to promote bribery in violation of Puerto Rico law (count two).17 Id., 7. With respect to count one, the government had alleged that Bravo had conspired to committwo separate offenses: briberyinviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (federal bribery) and traveling in interstate
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act). Id. In a special finding with respect to count one, the jury rejected the federal bribery offense as an object ofthe conspiracy and found that he had conspired only to travel in interstate commerce ‘‘in aid ofracketeering

. . . .’’ Id. The only ‘‘racketeering’’ conduct alleged by the government was bribery in violation of federal and Puerto Rico laws. Id. Thejurors had not been asked to specify the unlawful purpose of the travel. Id., 29.
With respect to count two, the substantive Travel Act offense, the jury found Bravo guilty of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to commit bribery in violation of Puerto Rico bribery law, but found that he did not violate the Travel Act with the intent to commit federal bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666. Id. ‘‘Thus, in both the context of identifying the object of the alleged conspiracy (§ 666 bribery or Travel Act) and in the context of choosing the unlawful activity that was the target of the Travel Act (§ 666 bribery or bribery under Puerto Rico law), the jury rejected the allegation that Bravo’s conduct implicated the federal bribery statute.’’ Id.
The double jeopardy issues in Fernandez came to the fore because the District Court had granted Bravo’s posttrial motion for ajudgment ofacquittal as to count two, the substantive Travel Act offense, on the ground that ‘‘the repeal ofthe Puerto Rico bribery laws before thetriptookplacemadeitimpossibleforBravo’’tohave engaged in conduct thatviolated one ofthe elements of the offense. Id., 7. Accordingly, because the District Court rejected, as a matter oflaw, aviolation ofPuerto Rico law as a basis for the Travel Act offense, and the jury factually rejected federal bribery law as a basis ofthat offense, the defendant was entitled to ajudgment of acquittal on count two.
Bravo also moved on double jeopardy grounds for a judgment of acquittal as to count one, the conspiracy offense. Id., 29. ‘‘His theory was as follows: if the only targetoftheTravelActfoundbythejurywhenconsidering the substantive Travel Act charge (count two) was to further a violation of the Puerto Rico statutes, and that targeted activity was not unlawful, there could be
no unlawful conspiracy to violate the Travel Act. In other words, he argued that the conspiracy count must be dismissed because the jury verdicts rejecting 18 U.S.C. § 666 as an object of the conspiracy and as a predicate forthesubstantiveTravelActchargeleftonly the repealed Puerto Rico bribery laws as the crime the jury could have found as the racketeering activity alleged to be the target of the Travel Act conspiracy. In that circumstance, there was no viable predicate for the Travel Act conspiracy.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 30. ‘‘The district court denied the motion. It held that thejurycouldhave reached differentconclusions about the objective of Bravo’s travel when separately considering the conspiracy and substantive TravelAct counts. Stated otherwise, the courtfoundthatthejury’s unelaborated finding on count one that Bravo had conspired to travel ‘in aid of racketeering’ could have reflected a finding that Bravo had conspired to violate the Travel Act with the intent to promote federalprogram bribery. The court considered this outcome possible even though, when considering the substantive Travel Act crime (count two), the jury found that Bravo did not violate the TravelAct forthatpurpose and eventhough thejury explicitly found (on count one) that Bravo did not conspire to violate § 666. The court held that any inconsistency in such a scenario was not problematic.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.
Onappeal, the First Circuitrejectedthe government’s claim that Bravo’s conviction of conspiracy could be upheld because the inconsistencies discussed previously could be reconciled. As the appeals court reasoned, ‘‘the problem here is not merely the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. Rather, even if we were to
assume thatthejury could have relied on a § 666 theory in finding Bravo guilty on the Travel Act conspiracy count, we do not in fact knowwhetherthe racketeering activity found by the jury as a predicate was bribery under federal law or bribery under the repealed Puerto Rico statutes. We are thus confronted with a situation in which the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and itis impossible to tellwhich ground the jury selected. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1957), overruled
on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). When ajury hasbeen presented with several bases for conviction, one ofwhich is legally erroneous, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury convicted upon, the conviction cannot stand. United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 730–31 (1st Cir.1996); see also United States v. Mubayyid, 658 F.3d 35, 71 (1st Cir. 2011) [cert. denied sub
nom. Al-Mona v. United States, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2378, 182 L. Ed. 2d 1052 (2012)]; United States v. Kavazanjian, 623 F.2d 730, 739–40 (1st Cir. 1980) (reversing verdict on multi-object conspiracy conviction under [18 U.S.C.] § 371 where one object failed to state a crime).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Fernandez, supra, 722 F.3d 33.
The First Circuit then turned to the question of the appropriate remedy and determined that, although normally anewtrial should be ordered ifthejury mayhave found guiltupon alegallyinvalidbasis, doublejeopardy principles barred Bravo’s retrial on count one. Id., 33– 34. The court reasoned that, taken together, the jury’s explicit finding on count one that Bravo had not conspired to violate federal bribery law and its finding on count two that he had not violated the federal bribery statute, constituted a necessary finding that the federal law did not serve as a basis for the jury’s conclusion
on count one that Bravo had conspired to violate the Travel Act ‘‘in aid of racketeering

. . . .’’ Id., 34. Said another way, the jury’s special findings on counts one and two trumped its inconsistent general verdict of guilty of conspiracy.
We agree with the First and Eighth Circuits18 that if
a jury in an answer to an interrogatory or in a special finding makes a unanimous factual finding beyond a reasonable doubt and that finding negates one or more ofthe essential elements oftheunderlying offense, such
afinding constitutes an acquittal regardless ofageneral verdict by the jury finding a defendant guilty of that offense. This result is required because the jury’s answer, in the parlance of the double jeopardy cases previously discussed, constituted ‘‘aresolution, correct
or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Paolella, supra, 210 Conn. 122–23, quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. 571.19
C
We turn then to analyzing the jury’s answer to the interrogatory in this case to determine whether, in light of all of the circumstances, it constituted a unanimous resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of any ofthe charges ofwhich thejury found the defendant guilty. We also emphasize that ‘‘[t]he burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided’’ previously by the jury. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Mitchell, supra, 476F.3d 544. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the defendant has not met that burden.
We recognize, and the parties do not dispute, that the state hadthe obligationwithrespectto both counts, and any lesser included offenses thereof, of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the proximate cause ofthe deaths ofServinand Krakowski. This burden, in the circumstances ofthis case, required the state to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that Servin’s conduct constituted an intervening cause such that the defendant’s conduct was not the proximate
cause ofthe deaths of Servin and Krakowski. See, e.g., State v. Kwaak, 21 Conn. App. 138, 146, 572 A.2d 1015 (‘‘causation element requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt, first that the death of a person would not have occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s [wrongful conduct], and second, that the defendant’s [wrongful conduct] substantially and materially contributed to the death

. . . in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient, intervening cause’’), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 811, 576 A.2d 540 (1990). Ifthejury unanimously concluded thatthe state hadfailedto meetthisburden ofproofbeyondareasonable doubt, then the defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal despite its verdict of guilty on the lesser included offenses with respect to count one and count two.
The jury interrogatory, which was drafted by the defendant, asks: ‘‘Did the conduct of David Servin constitute anintervening cause ofthe automobile collision? Yes

___ No ___.’’ The jury checked the ‘‘No’’ space. First, it is highly significant that the interrogatory is silent regarding the need forjury unanimity. It does not ask thejury whether its conclusion with respect to this question was reached unanimously. Thus, without the interrogatoryaskingthejuryaboutitsunanimity, weare left to speculate regarding whether the answer simply reflects a majorityvote. Even the ambiguous interrogatory in Mitchell was clear that the jury’s finding on materiality must be unanimous. Moreover, we are unwilling to presume unanimity because the jury was
never given any specific instructions on the meaning ofthe interrogatory, how it relatedto itsverdicts onthe various counts,20or, mostimportantly, thatits answerto it must be unanimous. The court, as an afterthought, simply told the jury to fill it out and to hand it into the marshal. Finally, we note that thejurywas neverpolled
on its initial answer to the interrogatory. Second, the language of the interrogatory conflicts withthe charge the court gave thejurors on intervening
cause. The court’s charge correctly informed the jury thatithadto consider, indecidingwhetherthe statehad proven proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt, whether Servin’s conduct was an intervening cause in the deaths of Servin and Krakowski. See General Stat-utes §§ 53a-56 (a) (1), 53a-57 and 14-222a; see alsoState

v. Lawson, 99 Conn. App. 233, 241, 913 A.2d 494, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 901, 918A.2d888 (2007). Theinterrogatory, however, asked the jury to determine whether the conduct of Servin was an intervening cause of the automobile collision

. Thus, the jury, by answering the interrogatory‘‘yes,’’ didnotnecessarilymake adetermination regarding an essential element of the offenses with which he was charged.
We recognize, ofcourse, that ifServin’s conduct was the intervening cause of the collision, it is difficult to fathom how the defendant’s actions could still be the proximate cause ofthe deaths. In this regard, however,
we note that the distinction between the cause of the collision and the cause ofthe deaths appeared to be of
some importance to the jury. After returning its initial verdicts, in a note to the court on November 6, 2012, the jury asked ‘‘if there is a distinction between the accident and the deaths.’’ The following day the jury continued to express its struggle with the interrogatory and the court’s charge by stating in another note: ‘‘The

reasonwe raisedthe question ‘wasthere anydistinction between the accident and the deaths’ is, and based on testimonies, because SOME of us jurors believe that [Servin’s] actions contributed to the accident but their deaths are caused by speed.’’ (Emphasis in original.) We decline to speculate as to why thejurybelieved this distinction was significant. What is noteworthy is that there either may have been confusion about the legal principles of proximate and intervening cause, or individual jurors may have been wrestling with different factual scenarios that made this distinction important tothem. Inanyevent, the interrogatorydidnotaskthem unanimously to resolve, correct or not, an essential element of the offenses charged. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has not met his burden ‘‘to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided’’ previously by the jury, and, therefore, he is not entitled to ajudgment of acquittal on either count one ortwo ofthe information.
II Having concludedthatthe defendantwasnot entitled to a judgment of acquittal on counts one and two, we next turn to the issue of whether the court properly vacated all of the verdicts and ordered the jury to
resume its deliberations on all ofthe charges, including those offenses for which the jury initially found the defendant not guilty. The state argues that, in light of the perceived inconsistency between thejury’s answer to the interrogatory and the verdicts ofguilty, the court properly vacated all of the verdicts and ordered the jury to resume deliberation on all of the counts. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, it
was improper for the court to vacate the verdicts of not guilty on the two counts of manslaughter in thesecond degree and the lesser included offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle under count two, and order the jury to resume deliberations on all of the offenses charged under counts one and two.21
A
Aswe havepreviouslydiscussed, ‘‘[p]erhapsthe most fundamentalrule inthe historyofdoublejeopardyjurisprudence has been that [a] verdict of acquittal

. . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. 571. In support of its argument that doublejeopardydidnotbarthetrialcourtfromvacating the verdicts ofnot guilty, the state principally relies on
our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Colon, supra, 272 Conn. 106. In Colon, the defendantwas found guilty ofone count ofmurder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54b (9). Id., 127. After ajury found the defendant guilty, a separate penalty hearing was conducted. Following deliberations, the jury sent a communication to the court and indicated that it had reached a verdict. Id., 278. The clerk then asked the jurors about their findings from their special verdict form, and the jury reported that it had unanimously agreed, among other things, that the aggravating factor had not outweighed the mitigating factors found by one or more members ofthejury. Id., 278–79. The initial special verdict form was then read and accepted. Id., 279. The jury’s initial verdict would not have permitted the imposition ofthe death penalty. Immediately upon exiting the courtroom, a member ofthejury informed a sheriffthat there was a problem with the verdict. Id. At this time, the jury remained undispersed, without any communication from or with outside parties. Id. The court was informed ofthe problem and, after discussion in chambers with both sides,
ajurypollwastakenandeachindividualjurorindicated thathis orherintentwasto announce thatthe aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. The jury was then instructed to complete another special verdict form, which indicated its intended findings. Id. Thecorrectedverdicttherefore calledfortheimposition of the death penalty. Id., 280.
On appeal, the defendant in Colon claimed that the

‘‘ ‘enforcement’ ofthejury’s second verdictviolated his rights under the double jeopardy clause because the jury’s [initial] verdict constituted a ‘complete and final judgment’ to which jeopardy attached.’’ Id., 294. Our Supreme Court, after extensively reviewing precedent from around the country, concluded that the trial court’s acceptance ofthejury’s correctedverdict, prior to the jury’s discharge, did not violate the defendant’s double jeopardy rights, as the jury had not been dis-charged prior to its correction. Id., 297. Critical to the court’s ultimate conclusion, however, was the fact that the jury never ‘‘actually unanimously agreed that the aggravating factor did not outweigh the mitigating factor or factors

. . . and, therefore, the defendant was not acquitt[ed] within the meaning of’’ our doublejeopardyjurisprudence. (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 298.
The circumstances ofthe present case, however, are fundamentally different from those presented in Colon
orthe cases on which Colon relied. Here, thejury never expressed to the court that its verdicts were not what it intended. No juror expressed to the court or court staff at any time that he or she had truly intended to find the defendant guilty of the offenses on which he
or she had voted not guilty. Accordingly, we conclude that the state’s reliance on Colon is not justified.
Wealso emphasizethatnojurorindicatedtothe court that he or she had any concern regarding unanimity on the verdicts of not guilty.22 Thus, this case is unlike Thomas v. United States, 544 A.2d 1260 (D.C. 1988), which is relied on by the state. In Thomas, the jury originally returned a split verdict, which was followed by a jury poll. Id., 1261. After only two jurors were polled, itwasevidentthatconfusionandlackofunanimity existed. Id. Without polling the remainingjurors on that count or any of the remaining counts, the court concludedthatthere was alack ofunanimity. The court then sent the jury back to continue its deliberations,
on all counts, until a unanimous verdict was reached.23 Id. The issue on appeal in Thomas was whether ‘‘the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause bars ajury from engaging in further deliberations regarding charges as to which the foreperson has announcedverdicts ofnot guiltybut which have not yet been accepted or recorded by the court.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 1262. Here, it was the trial court, not the jury, that raised the issue of a possible inconsistency between the verdictand interrogatory, and soughtto rectifyaperceived problem with the verdict, after it had already accepted and recorded the initial verdicts as delivered by the foreperson. Indeed, when the jury was asked to return tothe courtroomafterithadreturneditsinitialverdicts, thecourttooknostepstoascertainwhethertheverdicts returnedwere reflective ofthejury’strue intent orwere not unanimous. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the jury’s

answerto the interrogatorywas not inconsistent in any way with the verdicts of not guilty. Thus, although the apparent inconsistency between jury’s answer to the interrogatoryandthe guiltyverdicts mayhave giventhe court apermissible basis to vacate the guiltyverdicts, it could not have served as a basis for vacating the not guilty verdicts. Hypothetically, the jury may have concluded that the defendant was not guilty ofmanslaugh-ter in the second degree as alleged in counts one and two because the state failed to meet its burden ofproof
on some element ofthat offense (such as recklessness) otherthantheelementofproximate cause.Accordingly,
we conclude that the court improperly vacated the initial verdicts of not guilty. Therefore, because the jury
on count one (Servin) ultimately returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of misconduct with
a motor vehicle and the jury had previously acquitted him of that offense as to the death of Servin, we concludethatwemustdirectthe courttorenderajudgment of acquittal as to that offense.
B Having concluded that the court improperly vacated the verdicts of not guilty, we turn then to whether the court properly vacated the guilty verdicts and ordered thejury to resume deliberations. The defendant argues
on appeal, and we have addressed in part I of this opinion, that the court should not have vacated those verdicts and ordered the jury to resume deliberations, but instead, as required by double jeopardy principles, shouldhave rendered ajudgment ofacquittal on counts
one and two in their entirety. Because we have decided that claim adverse to the defendant, we can divine no other logical basis on which to conclude that he was aggrieved by, or would have objected to, the court ordering the jury to resume its deliberations on the lesser included offenses for which the jury initially returned verdicts ofguilty. Indeed, the defendant in his brief does not raise any independent claim that it was improper to order further deliberations on those offenses for which the jury initially found him guilty, butinsteadreliessolelyonthe claimthathewasentitled to ajudgment ofacquittal on all charges. In light ofour rejection of that claim, the defendant could only have benefitedfromthejuryreconsideringits guiltyverdicts. Thus, any error was harmless in these circumstances and cannot entitle the defendant to relief. Accordingly,
no further discussion of this issue is warranted.
III Finally, we turn to the defendant’s claim that even if the court properly directed thejury to resume deliberations, the court’s supplemental instructions to the jury
were neverthelessimproper. Specifically, the defendant claimsthatwhile directingthejurytoresumeitsdeliberations, and at various times thereafter, the court improperly instructed the jury on the relevant legal principles that would inform its deliberations, and conveyed that its answer to the interrogatory should conform to its initial findings of guilty. The state argues in response that the court’s instructions were correct and notimproperlysuggestivebecausetheyemphasizedthe jury’s sole role as the fact finder. We conclude that the court’s instructions both failed to accurately and completely instruct the jury on the principles that itwas to apply during its additional deliberations, and, at times, implicitly suggested to the jury that it should change its initial answer to the special interrogatory to
a conclusion that Servin’s conduct was not an intervening cause. We begin by setting forth the applicable legal principles and standard of review that govern our analysis. Because the court’s instructions following its rejection of the initial verdicts related to the existence or lack of an intervening cause, an essential element of the state’s case, the defendant’s claim raises an issue of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Johnson, 316 Conn. 45, 58, 111 A.3d 436 (2015) (‘‘[i]t is

. . . constitutionally axiomatic that thejury be [properly] instructed
on the essential elements of a crime charged’’ [internal quotationmarks omitted]). ‘‘Ifan improperjuryinstruction is of constitutional magnitude, the burden is on the state to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘[A]n instructional constitutional error is harmless ifthere is
no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 288 n.13, 664 A.2d 743 (1995); see id. (perceiving ‘‘no functional difference between the two formulations’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). ‘‘In performing harmless error analysis, we keep in mind that [i]n determining whether it was indeed reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial court’s instructions, the charge to thejuryis not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but it is to be considered rather
as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding them to a correct verdict in the case.

. . . The charge is to be read as awhole andindividualinstructions are notto bejudgedin artificialisolationfromthe overall charge.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 166–67, 869A.2d 192 (2005). ‘‘In otherwords,
we must consider whether the instructions [in totality]
are sufficientlycorrectin law, adaptedto the issues and ample for the guidance ofthe jury.

. . . A challenge to the validity ofjury instructions presents a question of law over which [we have] plenary review.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101, 190–91, 49 A.3d 566 (2012).
With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the defendant’s claim. At the outset, we observethatthe court’s supplementalinstructionswere not delivered during one continuous charge, but over the course ofseveral separate exchanges with thejury, many of which were prompted by questions posed to the court by thejury during the resumed deliberations. Mindful that we must consider the court’s instructions in their entirety, we review each ofthe court’s relevant remarks in the order and context in which they were delivered. Because the court’s initial instructions regarding the interrogatory established the founda-tional principles that the jury was to apply during its deliberations, webeginouranalysiswiththoseremarks.
At the conclusion of its charge to the jury, the court stated: ‘‘And then there is one other matter I almost forgot.

. . . It’s going to be marked as a court exhibit, and it’s labeled as an interrogatory. The foreperson, on behalfofthejurors, willanswerthis onequestionbefore coming out and returning the verdict. You’ll fold that interrogatory in half, hand it to the marshal and the marshal will hand it to the clerk, all right. So there will be one question which calls for a yes or no answer, all right.’’ Although there is no requirement that the court engageinaprolongedexplanationofthe considerations that will inform the jury’s responsibilities with respect to an interrogatory, these remarks were especiallybrief and provided virtually no guidance to the jury about the purpose of the interrogatory and how it related to the individual offenses with which the defendant was charged. Most significantly, the court did not explain to thejury that the question posed in the interrogatory should not be considered in isolation from its instructions on the specific charges upon which the jury was to deliberate. The court also did not advise the jury that an affirmative answer to the interrogatory would dispose, in the defendant’s favor, of all charges in counts one and two, and would obligate it to return a verdict of not guilty as to those counts. The court also failedtoinstructthejurythatitsanswertotheinterrogatory must reflect the unanimous view of the jury. Finally, the court did not remind thejury, as previously discussed in this opinion, that the state had the obligationto disprovebeyondareasonable doubtthatServin’s conduct was an intervening cause in the deaths of Servin and Krakowski. In sum, at the time that the jury first began its deliberations, it had no explanation from the court regarding the purpose of the interrogatory, its critical connection to the possible verdicts the jury could lawfully return, and the other requirements, such
as unanimity, that must have been met before the jury couldreturnananswer. Indeed, afterthejuryfirstbegan its initial deliberations, it sent a note to the court that indicatedthatitwasalreadystrugglingwiththedoctrine of intervening cause and how that doctrine related to the various offenses upon which it was deliberating.
After the jury returned its first verdicts and answer to the interrogatory, the court, outside of the jury’s presence, vacated its acceptance of all of the verdicts. It then recalled the jury and stated: ‘‘The reason why I have calledyoubackisthatIhave to adviseyouthatthe court is unable to accept the verdict as it was rendered because it is a verdict that is inconsistent with the applicable legal principles with which I have instructed you.’’ The court then stated its intention to reinstruct the jury, and began by reviewing its prior instructionsregarding causation and intervening cause. Following those instructions, the courtturnedto the interrogatory and instructed the jury as follows: ‘‘Directly related to that issue of causation was the interrogatory that was posedtoyou: didthe conductofDavid Servin constitute
an intervening cause of the automobile collision?

. . . So, the answer, yes, to the interrogatory means that the interveningcausehasrelievedthe defendantofcriminal responsibility, and you must find the defendant not guilty as to counts one and two ofthe information, and to its lesser included offenses. Now, if you have found that the conduct of David Servin does not constitute
an intervening cause of the accident, only then may yougo onto considertheverdictofguiltytothe charges and also to the lesser included offenses that were outlined in count one and two.’’
The court continued: ‘‘So, in summary, I hope this helps to clarify some ofthe inconsistencies that [have] ledthis court notto acceptyourverdict. Therefore, and simply once again, the court will not invade in your findings offacts. However, it is very important that the jury interrogatory as to causation is consistent with the ultimate verdict. Therefore, I am going to direct you to take these instructions into consideration and engage infurtherdeliberations, andforyouto clarifywhatyour intentionswere. Didyouintendto relieve the defendant ofcriminalresponsibilityordidyounotintendtorelieve the defendant of criminal responsibility by finding an intervening cause? Whatever your decision is, that is your decision to make, all right.’’
The court concluded by stating: ‘‘So, thank you. I am going to ask you to go back to the deliberation room. I am going to ask you to then send a note to the court that you have reached your conclusion, at which point I am going to have you come back down again, and I
am going to have the

. . . clerk read to the jury the jury interrogatory. Read it, you will answer it and then go on to the verdict form again and take your response, all right.’’ Although these instructions provided the jury with
more information about the purpose of the interrogatory, they were problematic in several other respects. Initially, by focusing its instructions almost entirely on the element of causation and its relationship to the doctrine of intervening cause, the court narrowed the scope of the jury’s redeliberations to resolving those specific issues. The jury was free, however, to reconsider and continue deliberating on any aspect of its verdicts, including any of the other elements of the charges alleged in counts one and two of the information. Althoughitwasreasonableto emphasizetheissues that most likely gave rise to the jury’s confusion, by failing to advise the jury that it was also free to reconsider all of its findings, the court implicitly suggested thatthejury’sspecificfindingswithrespecttocausationand the doctrine of intervening cause should be the focus of its attention. Furthermore, although the court stated that it could not accept the jury’s verdicts, it had already done so in the jury’s presence. Thus, it was not made clear to the jury that the verdicts had been vacated and were
nolongerineffect. Thislackofclaritycreatedasubstantial risk that the jury would view its task as having to correct a defect in its original verdicts, rather than return new verdicts altogether. A number of remarks madebythetrialcourtthencompoundedthisambiguity by suggesting that the problem in the original verdict
was the jury’s answer to the interrogatory. First, rather than emphasizing that the special interrogatory and verdict must be consistent with each other, the court stated that it was ‘‘very important that the jury interrogatory

. . . is consistent with the ultimate verdict.’’ (Emphasis added.) This remark was likely to direct thejury’s focus to the interrogatory and the potential need to change its answer to it. In other words, it suggested that the interrogatory could simply be changed to match thejury’s initial verdicts of guilty
on certain of the offenses. The fact that the court focused its supplemental instructions on the element of causation and its interplay with the interrogatory only further suggested that the affirmative answer to the interrogatory, rather than both the general verdicts of guilty and the answer to the interrogatory, was the
cause ofthe court’s refusal to accept its initial verdicts. Second, the court’s query to the jury—’’[d]id you intendtorelievethedefendantofcriminalresponsibility
ordidyounotintendtorelievethedefendantofcriminal responsibility by finding an intervening cause’’— improperly suggested that thejury’s overarching intent to hold, or not hold, the defendant criminally responsible should govern its answer to the special interrogatory. In truth, however, the answer to the special interrogatory constituted afactualfindingthatthejury
was required to make regardless of whether it desired to hold the defendant criminally responsible or not. By tying the answer to the interrogatory to the legal outcome ofthe case, the court distracted thejury from its primary task of deciding the factual issues put before it.
The court next instructed thejury after thejury sent the court another note. In the note, thejury stated: ‘‘We would like to know if the interrogatory statement can be rescinded.’’24 This note confirms our concern that the court’s earlier instructions would be considered as suggesting to the jury that it could fix the problem by changingits answertothe interrogatory. The courtthen heard argument from the state and defense counsel outside ofthe jury’s presence. Defense counsel moved for ajudgment ofacquittal, arguing that thejury’s question indicated that it had interpreted the court’s previ-ous charge as an instruction to change its answer to the interrogatory. In response, the state maintained its positionthatthejuryshouldbeaffordedtheopportunity to clarify its findings. The state also suggested that the court should explain to thejurythat the questionposed in the interrogatory ‘‘is going to be re-asked

. . . .’’ The court stated its intention to proceed as follows: ‘‘[The Court]: [Defense counsel], itwas—theinterrogatory was proposed by you to give to the jurors, and you requested that they answer this question. ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. ‘‘[The Court]: So, I think they have not yet answered the question. And to say, can you just rescind, is not part of the directions. That wasn’t in any direction. It wasn’t a possibility. They had not been instructed on anything to rescind. So, the answer, when I pull them out, is, I think, to say that my instructions to you prior [were] that the clerk would read the interrogatory to you and you would answer it. What I am going to do is adjourn, let them deliberate for a short period of time, call them out and, when they are ready, send a note and the clerk will ask them the question and they
can answer yes or no and go from there, all right.’’
Atthatpoint, the court recalledthejury andprovided the following instructions: ‘‘Ladies and gentlemen, I did receive your note. It states, we would like to know if the interrogatory statement can be rescinded. I amjust going to refer you back to a prior instruction, which
was that what would happen is, I would call you down, and the clerk would read the interrogatory to you and you would then answer aloud what your decision is on that. So, what I am going to do at this time is, I’m going to have you just go back; stay down here. You can deliberate, and if you can answer that interrogatory, the first step of that, I’ll bring you back in, and the clerk will ask you that question and the foreperson can
answer that question, once again, yes or no, the interrogatory.’’
As defense counsel and the state appeared to recognizeatthetime, thejury’snoteismostlogicallyinterpreted as questioning whether the jury could rescind its
answer to the interrogatory. Said another way, thejury seemed to be laboring under the impression that its original answer remained in effect and could only be changed if it was first rescinded. In response to the jury’squestion, the courtdidnotprovide aclearanswer. It stated only that it would recall the jury and have it state its answer to the interrogatory in open court. The court did not explain that the jury’s original answer to the interrogatory was no longer in effect, and that the jury was to reconsider and answer the interrogatory as if it had never previously done so. This omission again risked creating or reinforcing the impression that the jurywasnotbeginningits deliberations anew, bothwithrespect to the verdicts and the interrogatory, but that it instead needed to undo its answer to the interrogatory.
Later in the day, the jury sent another note to the court. This note stated, in relevant part: ‘‘Your Honor, [w]ith all due respect, we, the jurors, still remain in agreement with the interrogatory statement that [Servin’s] actions contributed to the accident.’’ The jury’s note also stated: ‘‘Our question remains if there is a distinction between the accident and the deaths.’’25 In response, defense counsel again moved for ajudgment ofacquittal, arguing that althoughthejury had not used ‘‘the magic words,’’ it was clear from its note that it
was affirming its prior answerto the interrogatory. The court declined to rule on the defendant’s motion at that time, however, instead deferring the matter until the next day.
The following day, the court advised the state and defense counselthatitintendedto submittheinterrogatory to thejury again26 and refer thejury to its previous instructions. Specifically, the court stated that ‘‘when [the jury] sent out the note yesterday they used an incorrect legal term. What they meant I cannot infer, and that is the reason why I am resubmitting the jury interrogatory because it has the correct legal term of whether or not they find an intervening cause. So, in lightofthetermthat [thejury] used, contributingfactor, it has to be clarified and that is the purpose that the court is going to resubmit the interrogatory

. . . and since I had already reinstructed them as to the law, I
am giving them the opportunity to render a verdict.’’
The court then recalled the jury and instructed it as follows: ‘‘Now

. . . yesterday afternoon, as you’ll recall, the court didnotacceptyourverdictas to counts
one andtwo. Then I gave youthe instruction onthe law pertaining to causation and the meaning ofintervening
cause. So

. . . in the first part of your note you indicated that you had come to a finding regarding David Servin’s conduct. Now, at this point in time the court is going to resubmit to you the jury interrogatory. It is being resubmitted to you solely for the purpose that yourfindingberecordedinwriting, whateveritmaybe.’’
The court continued: ‘‘Afteryou answerthis interrogatory, then you should consider my recent instructions to you, and if you are able to render a verdict as to counts one andtwo, you should send out anote indicatingthatyouare able. Ifyouhandanotetothemarshal—
as I say, if you want to resubmit to the first question, you may also do that. Once you are able to answer the interrogatory and let the marshal know if you are able to reach a verdict or not, then I’ll call you back and we’ll read the interrogatory in open court and averdict, ifyou shall have that, all right.’’ The court then directed the jury to resume deliberations. By asking the jury to answer the interrogatory first,andthen, ‘‘if [thejurywas] able to,’’ return averdict, the court divorced the jury’s consideration of the question posed by the interrogatory from the factual determinations it needed to make to return general verdicts on the substantive charges. It thereby created the risk that the jury would dissociate its verdicts from its answer to the interrogatorywhenthe two were actuallyinextricablyintertwined. Thus, it risked exacerbating any confusion regarding the interplay between the interrogatory answer and the verdicts. Instead, the court onlyreferenceditspriorinstructions and directed the jury to resume deliberations. Although the court’s prior instructions may have explained the interplay between the verdicts and the interrogatory, the court’s

more recent instructions that thejury answer the interrogatory first and then decide on the verdicts undermined the earlier instructions and, again, unduly focused the jury on the interrogatory rather than on the verdicts and interrogatory together. Moreover, at some point after the court provided these instructions, the jury sent another note to the court explaining its previous question asking whether
a distinction existed between Servin’s conduct constituting an intervening cause in the accident and his conduct constituting an intervening cause in his and Krakowski’s deaths.27 See footnote 25 of this opinion. Specifically, the jury stated: ‘‘The reason we raised the question ‘was there any distinction between the accident and the deaths’ is, and based on the testimonies, because SOME of us jurors believe that [Servin]’s actions contributed to the accident but their deaths are caused by the speed.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
In this instance, the jury may well have been raising
a very insightful concern about the incongruence between the court’s instructions on proximate cause with respect to the counts, and the phrasing of the interrogatory. As discussed previously, the court’s charge correctly informed the jury that it needed to determine whether Servin’s conductwas anintervening
cause in the deaths, while the jury interrogatory asked whether his conduct was an intervening cause in the collision

. Inexplicably, the court failed to answer the jury’s question and instead respondedto a separate and largely unrelated question submitted by thejury earlier in its deliberations. Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘I am also goingtonotethatcourt’s exhibit 7wasaddress[ed]: Your Honor, while explaining the laws, can you please describe ifcontributory negligence is applicable in this matter. That was sent outvery early on. The court gave you the jury charge. You have a hard copy of it. And contributory negligence is not contained in that jury charge. It is not part ofthe law that is applicable to the
case here, all right. So, you have the charge. You must apply only that law which the court gave you, and you remember my instruction that it is that law that you must applyto the case, all right.’’ This failure to addressthe point of confusion raised by the jury deprived it of proper guidance in performing its critical duty of making a factual finding on an essential element of the charged offenses.
To summarize, the court’s initial instructions to the jury provided it with no explanation about the purpose of the interrogatory, its connection to the charges alleged in counts one andtwo ofthe information, orthe importantrequirementthatthejuryreturn aunanimous
answer. In its supplemental instructions directing the jury to redeliberate, it was unclear whether the court had vacated thejury’s initial verdicts and interrogatory
answer such that the jury would need to return an entirely new answer to the interrogatory and verdicts. In failing to provide the jury with this clear guidance, it is reasonably likely that the court left the jury with the impression that its task was to ‘‘fix’’ its answer to the interrogatory, rather than begin deliberations anew with respect to both the verdicts and the interrogatory. Moreover, the court’s focus in its instructions on the doctrine of intervening cause and its relation to the interrogatory created a substantial risk that the jury would view its original answer to the interrogatory as the cause ofthe trouble. By then advising the jury that itwas ‘‘veryimportant’’ that its interrogatory answerbe consistent with its ‘‘ultimate verdict,’’ the court further suggested that the original verdict ofguilty was correct and that the answer to the interrogatory was not. Similarly, the court’s instructions casting the relevant inquiry as focusing on the jury’s intent to hold, or not hold, the defendant ‘‘criminally responsib[le],’’ suggested that the resolution of the issue of intervening
cause should be governed by thejury’s desire to obtain
aparticularoverall result. Furthermore, the court’sprocedural direction to answer the interrogatory first, and then, ifthejury was able to, return a verdict, conveyed that the verdicts were severable from the interrogatory and not inextricably intertwined with it. Finally, the court completely failed to address a substantive question posed by the jury pertaining to a critical issue regarding an essential element ofthe offenses charged in counts one and two of the information. Thus, when considered in their entirety, the court’s instructions did not provide the jury with appropriate guidance on the principles that would inform its deliberations.
The state nevertheless argues that the court instructed thejury in such a way that it could not have been misled; for example, by repeatedly emphasizing that thejury was the sole fact finder and that the court would not invade the jury’s findings. We are not persuadedthatthe extensive omissions and misstatements in the court’s instructions, as well the implicit suggestion that the interrogatory answer was incorrect, could be cured by the court’s generic reminders of the jury’s role as the sole fact finder. We note, for instance, that thejuryspecificallyrequested atranscript ofthe court’sinstructions ‘‘with regard to inconsistency of the verdicts’’; see footnote 27 of this opinion; thus suggesting that it was experiencing some difficulty applying the court’s instructions. Even ifnone ofthe court’s instructions, by themselves, were misleading, we conclude that, taken together, it was reasonablypossible that the court’s instructions misled the jury.
We emphasize again that because the defendant’s claim of instructional impropriety is of constitutional magnitude, the burden is on the state to prove that it was not ‘‘reasonably possible that, considering the charge as awhole, thejurywasmisled.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, supra, 273 Conn. 166; see State v. Johnson, supra, 316 Conn. 63 (‘‘[t]he test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless

. . . is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubtthat the error complained ofdid not contribute to the verdict obtained’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Given the extent of the instructional improprieties, and their close relation to a heavily contested element of the state’s case, we conclude that the state has failed to satisfy this significant burden.
We turn next to the task of determining the appropriate remedy. The defendant argues that the proper remedy under the circumstances is to have the case remanded to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of acquittal on counts one and two of the information. ‘‘It is well established [however] that instructional impropriety constitutes ‘trial error’ for whichthe appropriate remedyis anewtrial, ratherthan
ajudgment of acquittal. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978), ‘reversal fortrial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendanthasbeenconvictedthroughajudicialprocess which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining
a fair readjudication ofhis guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished.’ ’’ State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 434–35, 953 A.2d 45 (2008). Accordingly, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is to vacate the guilty verdicts and order a new trial, with respect to count one (Servin), on the lesser included offense of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, and, with respect to count two (Krakowski), on the lesserincluded offenses ofmisconductwith amotorvehicle andnegligenthomicide with a motor vehicle.28
Thejudgment is reversed only with respect to countsone and two. The case is remanded with direction to renderajudgment ofacquittal onthe offense ofmisconduct with a motorvehicle on count one ofthe information, and for a new trial on the lesser included offense of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle in count one, and on the lesser included offenses ofmisconduct with a motor vehicle and negligent homicide with a motor vehicle in count two. The judgment of guilty on the offenseofrecklessdrivingincountthreeisaffirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 53a-57 (a) provides: ‘‘Aperson is guilty ofmisconduct with a motor vehicle when, with criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, he causes the death of another person.’’

2 The defendantalso claimsthatthe courtimproperlyrefusedto give effect to thejury’s reaffirmation ofits original answerto thejury interrogatory. We conclude that it is unnecessary to address this claim separately because we treat it as subsumed within our analysis of the defendant’s third claim.

3 General Statutes § 53a-56 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty ofmanslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death of another person

. . . .’’

4 The courtstateditsintentiontovacatealloftheverdicts, whichnecessarily would have included the acquittals and verdict of guilty of reckless driving as alleged in count three.

5 After the court expressed its intent to reinstruct the jury, the state reiteratedits support ofthis actionwhenitstated, ‘‘Ithinkthat’s appropriate, given the inconsistencies in the verdict, and obviously it seems as if there is a basic misunderstanding of the law as given to them in Your Honor’s jury instructions, and therefore I think it is important for thejury to receive those instructions and then assure that the verdict is legally correct.’’

6 Specifically, the court reasoned: ‘‘[R]escind is not part ofthe directions. That wasn’t in any direction. It wasn’t a possibility. They had not been instructed on anything to rescind.’’

7 The courtdidnotexplainwhyitwouldbeboundbyasecondinconsistent verdict, but was not bound by that scenario after the initial verdicts.

8 The courtpreviouslyvacatedthejury’s initialverdict ofguilty ofreckless driving on count three ofthe information. The court never ordered thejury toresume its deliberations onthatcount. Whenthe courtultimatelyaccepted the jury’s final verdicts, the court indicated that it would accept the previously vacated guilty verdict on count three. The defendant does not raise any claim of error with respect to count three, and this court, therefore, leaves it undisturbed.

9 The defendant renewed his previous argument and stated: ‘‘[The] verdict

was internallyinconsistentwiththe specialinterrogatorythattheyanswered yesterday affirmatively saying that David Servin’s conduct constituted an intervening cause of the deaths of the teenagers in that case. That was the verdict, and at that point I made a motion for judgment of acquittal on the lesser included offense because it was inconsistent with the special interrogatory. Therefore, it fit a classic definition of a [Practice Book §] 42- 51 motion ofacquittal in that thejudge, upon motion ofthe defendant, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal on any lesser included offense forwhichthe evidence does notreasonablypermit afinding ofguiltybeyond

a reasonable doubt. That was classically the situation. I made a motion that Your Honor enter a finding of not guilty on the lesser included offenses, and Your Honor denied that.’’

10 Insupportoftheclaimthatthe courtshouldhavefoundtheinterrogatory dispositive, the defendant also cites Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310, 40 S. Ct. 543, 64 L. Ed. 919 (1920), Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 351, 441 A.2d 604 (1982), State v. Alonzo, 131 Conn. App. 1, 6, 26 A.3d 109, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 912, 32 A.3d 965 (2011), and Practice Book § 42-30 (‘‘[t]he judicial authority shall, if the verdict is in order and technically correct, accept itwithout comment’’) to bolsterthe propositionthat questions offact

are inthe sole domainofthejuryandshouldbemadewithoutinterferenceby the court. The defendantarguesthat, byrejectingthejury’sinitialverdictandanswer to the interrogatory, the courtinvadedhis constitutionalrightto have factual determinations made by the jury. The defendant’s brief, however, contains little or no discussion of these authorities and makes no attempt to applythem to the facts ofthis case. We, therefore, consider this claim abandoned except to the extent that it relates to the defendant’s doublejeopardy claim. We also note that the decisions in Ex Parte Peterson and Hickey are both civil cases and therefore provide minimal or no guidance with respect to the complicated issues in this criminal prosecution.

11 Although the initial guilty verdicts on the lesser included offenses of negligent homicide (count one) and misconduct with amotorvehicle (count two) were arguably ‘‘mutually exclusive convictions,’’ the defendant has not challenged the verdicts on this ground.

12 See, e.g., State v. Bush, 156 Conn. App. 256, 260, 263 n.4, 112 A.3d 834 (General Statutes § 53-396 [b] requires special verdict in racketeering prosecution), cert. granted, 317 Conn. 903, A.3d (2015).

13 For a cogent discussion of why interrogatories should not be used in most criminal cases, see State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 199–200, 398 A.2d 861 (1979); id., 204 (‘‘special interrogatories as a tool in criminal trials are not condoned, and their use [is] discouraged’’); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969) (‘‘[t]o ask the jury special questions might be said to infringe on its power to deliberate free from legal fetters; on its power to arrive at a general verdict without having to support it by reasons or by

a report of its deliberations’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

14Powell did not involve an inconsistency between ajury’s answer to an interrogatory and a verdict of guilty. Instead, Powell involved an inconsistency between an acquittal on one or more counts and verdicts of guilty

on one or more other counts. The United States Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘there is no reason to vacate [the defendant’s] conviction merely because the verdicts cannot rationally be reconciled. [The defendant] is given the benefit ofher acquittal on the counts on which she was acquitted, and it is neither irrational nor illogical to require her to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which the jury convicted.’’ United States v. Powell, supra, 469U.S. 69. TheresultinPowellis consistentwith Connecticut law on inconsistent verdicts, as discussed in part I A of this opinion.

15Dotterweich also did not involve an inconsistency between a jury’s

answer to an interrogatory and a verdict of guilty. Instead, Dotterweich involved inconsistent verdicts between defendants in the case, which the United States Supreme Court concluded should be left undisturbed. This result is also consistent with Connecticut law.

16 The state also relies heavily on State v. Searles, 113 Conn. 247, 255, 155 A. 213 (1931), inwhich ourSupreme Courtstated: ‘‘Whenthere isuncertainty

as to the actual intent ofthe jury, the power ofthe court in a criminal case to return them to their room to render a clear and unambiguous verdict is, in this country, recognized as indispensable to an orderly and impartial administration ofjustice.’’ We do not agree that Searles is applicable in this case. First, the court in Searles did not discuss double jeopardy principles, and Searles was decided long before the federal constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793–98, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969). Moreover, Searles did not involve inconsistent verdicts ofanykind, butinsteadasituationinwhichajuror, duringtheannouncement of the verdict, expressed to the court that the stated verdict was not the jury’s true verdict.

17 The jury also found Bravo guilty of a third crime that is not relevant to

our analysis. United States v. Fernandez, supra, 722 F.3d 7.

18 Our research has revealed only a few other cases that are worthy of mention. First, in afootnote, the United States Supreme Court inPipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 400 n.11, 92 S. Ct. 2247, 33 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1972), addressed a claim by certainpetitioners that a special findingbythejurythata‘‘willfulviolationof[theunderlying criminalstatute]

was not contemplated amountedto an acquittal’’ because itwas inconsistent with the jury’s guilty verdict. The Supreme Court rejected this claim on the ground that the petitioners ‘‘not only failed to object to the trial court’s requirement that the jury return a special finding as inconsistent with the general charge, but also failed to move for acquittal on the ground now offered once the special findingwas returned.’’ Id. After essentiallydeclining to review this claim, the court, in dicta, indicated that even ifthe petitioners

were correct that there was an inconsistency between the verdict and the special finding, the remedy would be a new trial, not an acquittal. Id., 401 n.11. This comment was made in dicta and devoid of (1) any accompanying analysis ofwhetherthe verdict and special interrogatory were in fact inconsistent and (2) any discussion of the relevant double jeopardy principles.Accordingly, we conclude that it lacks precedential value on this topic.

Second, the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Crawford v. Fenton, 646 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 872, 102 S. Ct. 344, 70L. Ed. 2d 178 (1981), afederalhabeas actionchallenging

a state prosecution, involved a scenario in which the jury’s answers to special interrogatories arguably conflicted with a general verdict of guilty. Before the state court had taken steps to accept the verdict, it ordered the jury to resume its deliberations. Id., 813. Although the Third Circuit concluded that double jeopardy did not prevent the defendant’s retrial after the state court had declared a mistrial when the jury could not ultimately arrive at a unanimous verdict, the federal appeals court did so on the basis of a double jeopardy claim different from the one presented here. In Crawford, the habeas petitioner contended that the state court had improperly declared a mistrial in violation of double jeopardy; id., 815–16; not because the jury had necessarily acquitted him as a result of its findings in

a special interrogatory, but because he has a ‘‘valued right to have his trial completed by aparticular tribunal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 816. The Third Circuit in Crawford then recognized that double jeopardy prevents a second trial if a mistrial is declared because ‘‘the state, wishing to decrease the risk of an acquittal, desires the opportunity [of a second trial] to buttress weaknesses in [its] evidence

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quotingArizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 507, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978). Thus, Crawford is inapposite. Finally, the Washington Court of Appeals, in State v. Hurley, 4 Wn. App. 781, 483 P.2d 1274, review denied, 79 Wn. 2d 1005 (1971), concluded that

a guilty verdict was void because the jury’s answer to an interrogatory negated one of the essential elements of the offense for which the jury returned a guilty verdict. Id., 783–84. Although the defendant requested that the court grant a motion for ajudgment of acquittal, the Washington Court of Appeals determined that the appropriate remedy was a new trial. Id., 784. We decline to follow Hurley because it lacks any discussion of the relevant double jeopardy principles.

19 We also take note of the United States District Court’s decisions in United States v

. Lucarelli, 476 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (D. Conn. 2007) (ruling

on motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial) and United States v

. Lucarelli, 490 F. Supp. 2d295 (D. Conn. 2007) (ruling onmotionforreconsideration on judgment of acquittal). In Lucarelli, the jury’s general verdicts of guilt were arguably inconsistent with its answer to an interrogatory that the defendant had the specific intent to defraud, an essential element of the offenses upon which the jury found the defendant guilty. Although the court ultimately concluded pursuant to double jeopardy principles that the jury’s answer to the interrogatories prevented the defendant’s retrial, part of its reasoning was based on doubt regarding whether there was true inconsistency between the answer and the guilty verdicts in light of erroneousjuryinstructions ofthe specificintentto defraudelementofthe offenses. United States v

. Lucarelli, supra, 476 F. Supp. 2d 169–70. In the absence of true conflict, the District Court concluded that the jury’s explicit and unambiguous answer to the interrogatory constituted an adverse factual resolution ofan essential element ofthe offense charged by the government and, thus, amounted to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. United States v

. Lucarelli, supra, 490 F. Supp. 2d 301–302.

20 In fact, the firstnote sentbythejury during deliberations askedwhether intervening cause applied to all of the lesser included offenses.

21 We note again that the court did not direct the jury to redeliberate on the charge of reckless driving alleged in count three. See footnotes 4 and 8 of this opinion.

22 Similarly, no juror expressed any concern after the verdicts that the jury’s initial answer to the interrogatory may have been incorrect. Indeed, after the jury resumed its deliberations, the jury attempted to reaffirm its initial answer to the interrogatory.

23 On appeal, the court in Thomas noted that ‘‘[t]he [trial] court neither gave additional instructions nor directed the jury to deliberate only on the charge of assault [the charge for which a lack of unanimity was found]. Appellant raised no objection at that time to the course of action chosen by the court. Nor did appellant ask the court to record

. . . a partial verdict

on the three charges to which the foreperson had announced a verdict of not guilty.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Thomas v. United States, supra, 544 A.2d 1261–62.

24 Prior to sending this note to the court, the jury had sent another noteindicating that it was deadlocked and would not be able to reach a verdict

on counts one and two. In response, the court provided thejury with a Chip Smith instruction and directed it to continue deliberating.

25 In response to the second portion of the note, the court advised the jury that it could not provide a response because it did not understand the jury’s question.

26 This remark is particularly perplexing because it appears to suggest that thejury did not have the interrogatory before it. This possibility is itself problematic because the court had instructed the jury after rejecting the initial verdicts that it must resume deliberations on the verdicts and interrogatory.
27 In this note, the jury also requested two other items. First, it requested

a copy of the transcripts of the court’s ‘‘comments and instruction to the jurors with regard to inconsistency ofthe verdicts given by thejurors dated [November 6, 2012].’’ Second, the jury requested ‘‘a copy of the original interrogatory statement completed by the jurors because it appears that it is worded differently.’’ The court responded to the jury’s first request by directing the court monitor to prepare and provide a copy ofthe requested portions of the court’s instructions to the jury. With respect to the second request, the court advised the jury that the court had inspected the two interrogatories, found them to be worded identically, and directed the clerk to provide the jury with both of them.

28 As explained previously in footnote 8 of this opinion, the defendant does not claim any error with regard to the guilty verdict returned on count three, and any instructional error is unrelated to that count.