NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0105n.06

Case No. 22-5651

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM RAY HARGIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

O P I N I O N

Before: McKEAGUE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Defendant William R. Hargis pleaded guilty to drug and 

firearms offenses. He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized 

during a search pursuant to a warrant of an office in a commercial building in Lexington, Kentucky. 

Hargis alleges that the search was not supported by probable cause, as the bulk of the affidavit 

supporting the warrant relied on information from an informant whose reliability was insufficiently 

established and whose information was insufficiently corroborated. Because we find that there was 

a substantial basis to believe probable cause existed based on the warrant affidavit, we AFFIRM. 

I.

1. Facts

A series of events, beginning in April 2021, led to Lexington Police Department Detective 

Brandon Hazelwood seeking and receiving a search warrant for 1795 Alysheba Way, Lexington, 
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Kentucky, Unit 1002 (the “Alysheba Office” or “Office”). In the affidavit supporting the warrant, 

Hazelwood explained the events in detail: 

First, on April 29, 2021, Hazelwood received information from a confidential informant 

(CI) stating that a young, Black male going by the name “Youngin” was trafficking large amounts 

of drugs, namely heroin and/or fentanyl. The CI alleged that Youngin drove a newer silver Dodge 

Ram pickup truck. Hazelwood later met with the CI on two occasions to orchestrate and observe 

controlled drug purchases between the CI and Youngin. At both controlled buys, police observed 

the described silver Dodge Ram truck. The CI later told police he believed Youngin was an 

individual named Lamonte Brown, and positively identified a picture of Brown as Youngin.

Police then began surveilling Brown. On May 11, 2021, officers observed Brown meeting

outside his residence with an unidentified black male, later discovered to be Tequan Anderson.1

Anderson was seen exiting a green Dodge Charger, walking over to the Dodge Ram truck 

identified as Brown’s vehicle, and returning to the Charger with a black bag. Anderson was then 

seen exiting the Charger with the bag and entering a black Toyota Camry, before leaving the area.

Officers pulled over Anderson in the Camry, eventually searching the vehicle and uncovering a 

pound of methamphetamine, an ounce of cocaine, individual bags of marijuana, drug 

paraphernalia, and a large amount of cash. During the search, Anderson fled on foot, but was 

apprehended and taken into custody.

Anderson eventually told the police that he received the drugs from his cousin, Brown, just 

prior to leaving Brown’s residence (where Anderson had been seen interacting with Brown). He 

alleged that he could purchase a large amount of drugs from Brown, and that Brown and his 

associates stored drugs at the Alysheba Office, which is located in a commercial townhouse-style 

1 The affidavit refers to Anderson as “Tequan,” while the briefs use “Tiquan.”
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office park. Anderson directed the officers to the Office and told officers the door would have a 

keypad. Hazelwood observed upon arrival at the Office that the door did indeed have a keypad.

Anderson also told officers that he had been inside the Office within the last week with Brown and 

a white male called “Mitch,” where he observed Brown and Mitch packaging, cutting, and storing 

drugs. He stated that there were approximately 40 kilos of drugs hidden in the ceiling of the Office.

Hazelwood then observed Anderson make a FaceTime call (a video call using an iPhone) 

to Brown, during which Anderson told Brown he needed to make a “play” (slang for a drug 

transaction). Brown asked how much he needed, Anderson replied 3 kilos of heroin, and Brown 

agreed to the sale, telling Anderson that Brown needed to pick up the drugs. Brown also told 

Anderson to meet him for the deal at a separate location. Anderson told officers that if Brown 

needed to pick up drugs as he said, it would be from the Alysheba Office. A short time later, 

officers observed the silver Dodge Ram pickup truck frequently driven by Brown enter the parking 

lot of the office complex; it “slowly drove by the building, circled detectives, and then left the 

parking lot.” R. 39-1 at PID 186. 

Based on this information in the affidavit, Fayette District Court Judge Joseph T. Bouvier 

issued a search warrant for the Alysheba Office the next day. The subsequent search of the Office 

revealed over fifty pounds of methamphetamine, half a pound of fentanyl, a cutting agent, firearms, 

and paraphernalia. 

Hargis was arrested after an interaction with officers that began while Hazelwood was 

obtaining the search warrant for the Office. Officers observed a black GMC Denali—later 

determined to be driven by Hargis—park in front of the Alysheba Office building. Police saw a

man exit the vehicle, go inside the office building, and come out shortly after with a black bag, 

reentering the vehicle. Police began to follow the vehicle, which eventually stopped at a parking 
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lot in Hamburg. In the parking lot, another vehicle, driven by an individual named Jonathan Tye, 

pulled up beside the Denali. Tye subsequently got into the Denali with Hargis. Tye then exited the 

Denali and returned to his own vehicle. Police removed Hargis and Tye from their vehicles and 

searched them. They found a firearm in Hargis’s vehicle and a large quantity of pressed Xanax 

pills in Tye’s vehicle. Tye told officers he bought the pills from Hargis. Police recovered $5,000 

in cash either from Hargis’s vehicle or his person. Hargis was detained and ultimately arrested.

2. Procedural History 

On June 17, 2021, Hargis was indicted on two charges. On August 5, 2021, a superseding 

indictment charged him with (a) conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine 

and 400 grams or more of fentanyl, both Schedule II controlled substances, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); (b) possession of 500 grams or more of 

methamphetamine and 400 grams or more of fentanyl with the intent to distribute, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (c) (Count 2); and (c) possession of firearms in furtherance of the drugtrafficking crimes charged in Counts I and II, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 4).2

Later, a second superseding indictment corrected a typographical error in the previous indictment 

in Count 2 (which incorrectly listed the amount of methamphetamine as 500 grams) and added an 

additional count charging Hargis with money-laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 5).

Hargis filed a motion to suppress the fruits of the search of the Alysheba Office, alleging 

lack of probable cause for the search warrant.3 The district court denied the motion. The court 

2 Count 3 related only to Anderson, not Hargis.

3 Hargis also filed a motion to suppress relating to his supposedly illegal detention, which was denied.
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found that the information in the warrant affidavit established probable cause, and that the 

information given to police by Anderson was sufficiently corroborated.

Hargis eventually pleaded guilty to each count in which he was named pursuant to a written 

plea agreement. In the agreement, he reserved: 

[T]he right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his Motion to Suppress, specifically 

limited to the District Court’s determination that there was sufficient probable cause for 

the issuance of the Search Warrant for the [Alysheba Office].

R. 126 at PID 659 (internal citation omitted). On July 18, 2022, Hargis was sentenced to 420 total 

months imprisonment. On July 29, 2022, Hargis timely appealed the suppression motion denial.

II.

Hargis challenges the probable cause supporting the search of the Alysheba Office on two 

fronts: indicia of reliability and corroboration of the information given by informant Anderson that 

formed the bulk of the warrant affidavit. We conclude that there was sufficient corroboration of

Anderson’s statements, and that even if there were not, the good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule applies.4

1. Corroboration 

a.) Standard of Review 

When reviewing a district court’s ruling regarding a suppression motion, we apply a de

novo standard to the district court’s legal determinations and a clear error standard to its factual 

findings. United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 2020). In cases such as this one—where

a state magistrate approved the challenged search warrant, and the district court denied the motion 

4 Because we conclude that there was sufficient corroboration of Anderson’s statements, we decline to address whether 

the warrant affidavit contained sufficient indicia of Anderson’s reliability such that corroboration was not needed, or 

Hargis’s contention that the government conceded below and therefore waived its reliability argument. See United 

States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 275 (6th Cir. 2015) (sufficient corroboration can overcome lack of information regarding 

reliability). 
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to suppress—our review is extremely deferential. Specifically, we view the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the Government, see United States v. Ickes, 922 F.3d 708, 710 (6th Cir. 2019), 

and analyze only whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause for the 

search, see United States v. Perry, 864 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2017). Great deference is given to 

the magistrate’s decision; “the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny . . . 

should not take the form of de novo review.” United States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678, 681–82 (6th 

Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). In reviewing a state magistrate’s determination, this Court may consider

only information found within the “four corners of the affidavit.” United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 

332, 338 (6th Cir. 2009). In order to find probable cause to search a particular place, a magistrate 

must find that, under the totality of the circumstances, there is “a fair probability that contraband 

or evidence of a crime will be found” there. United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 381 (6th Cir. 

2016). 

b.) Analysis 

On appeal, Hargis argues that the warrant affidavit provided no “meaningful indicia of 

reliability on the part of the informant [Anderson],” and no “substantial corroboration of [the]

alleged nexus” between the Alysheba Office and the criminal activity proffered by Anderson. 

Appellant’s Br. at 19. In general, when a warrant relies upon information from a confidential 

informant to generate probable cause, this Court must “examin[e] the ‘veracity, reliability, and 

basis of knowledge’ of the source.” United States v. Helton, 35 F.4th 511, 518 (6th Cir. 2022) 

(quoting United States v. Hines, 885 F.3d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 2018)). An affidavit sufficiently 

supports a finding of probable cause “[s]o long as an issuing judge is ‘informed of some of the 

underlying circumstances . . . from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity 

need not be disclosed, was credible, or his information reliable. . . .’” United States v. May, 399 
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F.3d 817, 824 (6th Cir. 2005) (first alteration in the original) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 

108, 114 (1964)). Even if an affidavit is deficient in establishing an informant’s reliability, it “may 

support a finding of probable cause, under the totality of the circumstances, if it includes sufficient 

corroborating information.” United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 275 (6th Cir. 2015). 

Corroboration can take many forms. A police officer personally witnessing a controlled 

drug buy between an informant and a suspect following the informant’s tip can constitute sufficient 

corroboration. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 470 F.3d 299, 307–08 (6th Cir. 2006); United 

States v. Sales, 247 F. App’x 730, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2007). However, we have never said that 

observation of a successful controlled purchase of narcotics is necessary for sufficient 

corroboration, as Appellant seems to imply. In fact, we have stated that:

The additional evidence substantiating an informant’s reliability need not be obtained from 

a source unrelated to the confidential informant—e.g., an independent police investigation 

or a second confidential informant—but may be any set of facts that support the accuracy 

of the information supplied by the informant.

May, 399 F.3d at 824. The corroboration necessary is that which would, in combination with the 

informant’s statement, create a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found” at the searched location. Brown, 828 F.3d at 381. 

This is a flexible, commonsense inquiry, not one driven by rigid rules. Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 

462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of 

probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of 

legal rules.”); United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A] judge issuing a 

warrant must ‘make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 

forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 

crime will be found in a particular place.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 

887, 892 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that warrant affidavits “[m]ust be tested and interpreted by 
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magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion” (quoting United States v. 

Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965))). And we have, in multiple cases, found corroboration 

without a subsequent controlled illegal transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Tuttle, 200 F.3d 892, 

894 (6th Cir. 2000); May, 399 F.3d at 825; United States v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 532–33 (6th 

Cir. 2000); United States v. Martin, 526 F.3d 926, 937 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding sufficient 

corroboration when police found cocaine residue in the defendant’s trash and the defendant had 

an extensive criminal history related to drugs); cf. United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 480–81 

(6th Cir. 1999) (“Defendant’s position, essentially, is that unless the police conducted surveillance 

and saw defendant with a gun, there would be insufficient corroboration. We emphatically 

disagree.”). 

On the whole, there is sufficient corroboration in this case. Here, the informant, Anderson, 

alleged with specificity that he had received the drugs found by police in his vehicle from Brown, 

that he could purchase more from Brown, and that he had recently been inside the Alysheba Office, 

the entrance of which he described. Anderson alleged that within the last week he had been inside 

the Office with Brown and an associate, at which time he observed them packaging, cutting, and 

storing drugs, and that there were 40 kilos of drugs in the Office’s ceiling. The corroborating 

evidence for this information that the Government points to includes: 

(1) the two controlled drug buys orchestrated by police between the confidential 

informant and Brown before police spoke to Anderson; 

(2) the incident in which police observed Anderson apparently receive a bag from 

Brown outside Brown’s residence, after which time they pulled Anderson over and 

found drugs and drug paraphernalia in his car; 

(3) the fact that the door to the Alysheba Office matched Anderson’s description; 

(4) the FaceTime call in which Anderson arranged to purchase drugs from Brown,

and Brown told Anderson that Brown would need to pick up the drugs; and 

(5) Anderson’s prediction that Brown would pick up the drugs from the Office, 

followed by police’s observation shortly after of the car apparently belonging to 
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Brown entering the parking lot for the Office building, “slowly [driving] by the 

building, circl[ing] detectives, and then [leaving] the parking lot,” R. 39-1 at PID 

186.

This evidence directly links Brown to the Alysheba Office and connects Brown and the 

Office to drug activity, corroborating Anderson’s allegations that Brown used the Office to process 

and store drugs. And Anderson’s correct predictions regarding the appearance of the Office door 

and Brown stopping by the Office after their call5lend even more credence to his information. See

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983) (“The corroboration of the letter’s predictions that the 

Gateses’ car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and 

that he would drive the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that 

the informant’s other assertions also were true. ‘[Because] an informant is right about some things, 

he is more probably right about other facts.’” (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 427

(1969) (White, J., concurring))).

There is just as much, if not more, corroborating information here than in several other 

cases in which we have found sufficient corroboration. For example, in Tuttle, an informant told 

police that an “auto sales shop was currently selling cars and trucks assembled with stolen parts 

by [the defendant] Tuttle at a garage rented by Tuttle on property owned by [his] codefendant. . . .” 200 F.3d at 893. A detective involved in the investigation had previously inspected 

an automobile purchased from that store, which was rebuilt for the store by Tuttle, and had 

5 Appellant argues that the fact that Brown’s car drove away upon reaching the parking lot cuts against corroboration 

of Anderson’s statements, and that the Government cannot argue that the car turned away upon seeing officers as that 

information was not apparent from the warrant affidavit. However, the affidavit stated: “Shortly after the phone call 

was made to Mr. Brown, the above listed Silver Dodge Ram Pickup truck was observed pulling into the parking lot 

of the office building. The truck slowly drove by the building, circled detectives, and then left the parking lot.” R. 39-

1 at PID 186 (emphasis added). From this information, the magistrate could have easily inferred that the driver of the 

car saw the detectives and was scared off, which is completely in line with what would happen if the driver was there 

to pick up drugs. Thus, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must, see Ickes, 922 F.3d 

at 710, this fact corroborates Anderson’s story rather than cutting against it. 
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determined that the car was made from stolen parts. Id. This Court concluded that “[t]his 

information already within [the detective’s] knowledge clearly provided independent 

corroboration of the informant and the information the informant relayed that Tuttle was currently 

rebuilding trucks with stolen parts. . . .” Id. at 894. Here, there is even more evidence linking 

Brown to drug activity than Tuttle to illegal activity, along with at least some evidence linking 

Brown’s drug activity to the Alysheba Office (his arrival to the Office after the phone call). 

In May, we found sufficient corroboration of an informant’s tip that the defendant had 

obtained powder cocaine and “would have the cocaine cooked into crack cocaine at 130 E. Warren 

Ave. utilizing [the informant],” where police observed the informant entering the Warren Ave. 

residence, the informant told police that he was in the process of cooking the cocaine for the 

defendant, police knew that the informant was involved in other unrelated drug activity, and a 

years-earlier search of the residence had revealed drugs and weapons. 399 F.3d at 825. Further, in 

United States v. King, a search warrant relied on an informant’s tip that the defendant was 

trafficking drugs, and that a drug dealer, Cook, had recently delivered drugs to the defendant’s 

residence. 227 F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir. 2000). The court found the following corroborating evidence 

of the informant’s statement sufficient: 

[T]he affidavit indicates that Detective Gannon verified with the Ohio Department of 

Motor Vehicles that the vehicle described by the informant was registered to Defendant 

and that the address provided by the informant was Defendant’s address. Detective Gannon 

also verified that Defendant had a prior history of criminal offenses for which he had spent 

time in prison. Finally, Detective Gannon, as an experienced member of the task force 

established to ferret out drug-related crimes, averred that he was aware that Antonio Cook 

is a person known to members of the task force as a supplier of cocaine, which further 

supported the [informant’s] allegations.

Id. at 742 (internal citations omitted). 

Here, similar to May, Anderson’s predictions were accurate. And similar to both May and 

King, officers in this case were aware of information directly linking both Anderson and Brown to 
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drug activity. Just as we found probable cause in Tuttle, May, and King, so we find probable cause 

here. 

Appellant argues that the corroborating information proffered by the Government is not 

enough because no controlled purchase of drugs was observed after Anderson’s statements to the 

police, Brown did not actually attempt to access the Office after the FaceTime call, and the 

description of the door only constituted “details on the margins.” Appellant’s Br. at 24. However, 

as stated, subsequent controlled drug purchases are not required, and it is clear that the 

corroboration in this case extended far beyond marginal, non-incriminating details. The 

corroborating evidence included the controlled buys with Brown before Anderson’s apprehension, 

drugs found on Anderson just after meeting with Brown, the FaceTime call during which Anderson 

arranged to buy drugs from Brown, and the appearance of Brown’s vehicle at the Office building 

shortly after that call. This is all incriminating and substantive, rather than marginal. 

The cases cited by Appellant as support for his position are inapposite. In United States v. 

Higgins, officers arrested an individual after finding drugs in his car; the individual alleged that he 

had bought the drugs from the defendant at his home. 557 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2009). The 

officers elicited similar statements from two of the individual’s passengers. Id. This Court found 

that there was insufficient corroboration of the informant’s information as the police did not 

“corroborate any of the informant’s statements” that he had purchased drugs at the defendant’s 

address “beyond the innocent fact that [the defendant] lived at the stated location and the irrelevant 

. . . fact that [the defendant] had a criminal record.” Id. at 390. We noted that the affidavit was 

silent on how the other passengers corroborated the informant’s statements, and emphasized the 

fact that the affidavit did not “contain any assertion that the informant had been inside [the 

defendant’s] apartment or that the informant had seen drugs or other evidence in or around [the]
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apartment.” Id. Here, by contrast, there was plenty of corroborating information for Anderson’s 

statements regarding illegal activity, including the controlled drug buys with Brown; the 

interaction between Brown and Anderson outside Brown’s residence, after which police 

confiscated drugs from Anderson; the FaceTime call between Brown and Anderson arranging a 

drug deal; and Anderson’s accurate prediction that Brown would come to the Alysheba Office 

after their call. And Anderson alleged to have recently been inside the Office and to have seen 

illegal drug activity there at that time. Thus, Higgins is not controlling here. 

United States v. Neal is also inapposite. 577 F. App’x 434 (6th Cir. 2014). In that case, a 

confidential informant told police officers that she had twice traveled with an individual to his 

brother’s residence, where the individual delivered cocaine; he and his brother then allegedly sold 

the cocaine out of the house and split the profits. Id. at 436–37. Police confirmed that the address 

the informant alleged was inputted by the individual into the car’s GPS on their trips, which led 

them to the area of the residence, did not exist, and police “hypothesized” that using the fake 

address would lead the driver to a spot in close proximity to the residence. Id. at 438. Police also 

confirmed that the residence’s appearance was as the informant described and that the brother 

resided there. Id. at 437–38. Police further observed that an “inordinate” number of people visited 

the residence, and discovered that the brothers had criminal records relating to drugs. Id. at 438. 

Finally, the informant told the police about a third upcoming trip to the residence; the police 

tracked her location on the trip and saw the car she alleged to have been traveling in arrive at the 

residence, observing the driver grabbing a bag out of the trunk and both driver and passenger 

heading into the house. Id. Based on this information, police obtained a search warrant for the 

residence. Id.
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This Court concluded that there was insufficient corroboration of the informant’s statements

to support probable cause, as nothing actually corroborated the first two trips, and “none of the 

corroborating information include[d] any observations of criminal activity.” Id. at 445. The Court 

noted that the informant “did not provide any information regarding future events that agents could 

verify through independent observation to bolster the reliability of the rest of [the informant’s]

statements.” Id. at 445–46. Unlike in Neal, however, the corroboration here involves more than 

“innocent facts” and did “include verification of future activities [the informant] stated would 

happen.” Id. at 447. Here, police had orchestrated controlled drug buys with Brown, had found 

drugs in Anderson’s car after watching Anderson interact with Brown, observed Anderson 

arranging a drug deal with Brown, and saw a car that appeared to belong to Brown arrive at the 

Alysheba Office, as Anderson predicted. This corroboration includes incriminating facts related to 

drug-dealing and predictions that were fulfilled. Neal’s logic thus does not apply here. 

Similar differences distinguish this case from others cited by Appellant, which involve 

minimal or no corroboration of criminal activity and far less specific information on the part of the 

informant. See United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 823 (6th Cir. 2003) (police did not

independently corroborate anonymous tipster’s statements that an individual was storing drug 

money in her house, beyond pointing to telephone records indicating calls between that individual 

and a suspected drug trafficker); United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1379 (6th Cir. 1996) (no 

corroboration beyond “innocent details” for informant’s assertion that the marijuana he allegedly 

saw at the defendant’s premises was intended for distribution; “the combined boilerplate language 

and minimal handwritten information provide few, if any, particularized facts of an incriminating 

nature and little more than conclusory statements of affiant’s belief that probable cause existed 

regarding criminal activity”); United States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765, 771–72 (6th Cir. 2003) 
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(no sufficient corroboration of vague statement by informant regarding drug operation at the 

defendant’s residence when purported corroboration included similarly vague anonymous phone 

calls and a single drive-by of the residence by police). Here, Anderson gave specific, detailed 

information, and the police investigation before and after interacting with Anderson corroborated 

criminal activity (via observing controlled buys with Brown, observing Anderson arrange a drug 

deal with Brown over FaceTime, and observing a car thought to belong to Brown arrive at the 

Alysheba Office after the call, as predicted by Anderson). This case thus does not fall within the 

category of cases cited by Appellant wherein little-to-no incriminating information was 

corroborated. 

In light of the substantial corroboration of Anderson’s information indicated in the warrant 

affidavit, we conclude that there was sufficient probable cause such that the magistrate’s decision 

to grant the warrant was not arbitrary. See United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 

2013) (“[W]e may only reverse a magistrate’s decision to grant a search warrant if the magistrate 

arbitrarily exercised his or her authority.”). 

2. The Good-Faith Exception 

In light of our conclusion that the magistrate had a sufficient basis to find probable cause, 

we decline to analyze in full the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

6

See United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 2009) (“There is no need to go into a 

lengthy analysis of whether the agents relied on the search warrant in good faith because the 

magistrate judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause.”). However, we do note that it 

6 Appellant argues that the Government waived its ability to argue that the good-faith exception applies, alleging that 

the Government’s discussion of the exception in the briefing was “cursory.” However, we decline to view the 

Government’s argument on this front—nearly an entire page of its brief, containing the relevant legal standard and its 

application—as so cursory as to constitute waiver, particularly as Appellant’s own argument regarding the exception 

is of similar length. This is especially so as here an argument that probable cause exists, which comprised most of the 

Government’s brief, also comprises a large part of the argument that the good-faith exception applies. 
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is clear here that the exception would apply even if we were to come to the opposite conclusion 

regarding probable cause. 

The good-faith exception applies where officers reasonably rely on a warrant obtained from 

a neutral judge. See United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006). It does not 

apply: 

(1) when the affidavit supporting the search warrant contains a knowing or reckless falsity; 

(2) when the magistrate who issued the search warrant wholly abandoned his or her judicial 

role; (3) when the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that a belief in its existence 

is objectively unreasonable; or (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that it cannot 

reasonably be presumed valid.

Id. Here, Hargis has not alleged that the warrant contained false information or that the magistrate 

abandoned his judicial role; he argues only that the “affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable 

cause that a belief in its existence is objectively unreasonable.” Appellant’s Br. at 26 (quoting 

McPhearson, 469 F.3d at 525). This standard “is less demanding than the ‘substantial basis’ test 

necessary for probable cause in assessing the sufficiency of an affidavit.” Neal, 577 F. App’x at 

448. As discussed above, there was a great deal of corroborating information in the affidavit, 

aligning this case more closely with those that have found probable cause than those that have not. 

It was therefore not unreasonable for the officers to rely on the state magistrate’s determination. 

Further, in multiple cases upon which Appellant relies, including Higgins, upon which Appellant 

appears to place the most weight, this Court applied the good-faith exception. See Higgins, 

557 F.3d at 391; Neal, 577 F. App’x at 449. As also discussed above, the corroborating evidence 

here exceeds the corroborating evidence proffered in those cases. Thus, the good-faith exception 

would apply even if we declined to find probable cause. 

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hargis’s motion to suppress.