Kil.rr us OF 3/I— 

In EXCLUSION Proceedings 

A-6421949 

Decided by Board June 4, 1958 

Assistant Commissioner's motion August 26, 1058 

Decision by Board August 27, 1958 

Decided by Attorney General September 5, 1958 

Exclnsion proceedings—Interrogation of alien by examining officer authorized—

First preference quota status—May be granted to sole owner of bona Me 

corporation-petitioner. 

(1) Absence of express statutory authority does not preclude assignment of 

• examining officer to interrogate applicant in exclusion hearing before special 

inquiry officer, as other provisions of law and regulations vest authority in 

the Attorney General and offices deaignoted by him to question applicauto 

for admission. 

(2) Special inquiry officer is justified in drawing adverse inference from ate 

plicant's refusal in an exclusion hearing to respond to interrogation by examining officer assigned to the case. 

(3) Alien who is the sole owner of a bona fide corporation may qualify as 

beneficiary of first preference petition filed by same corporation. 

EXCLUDED: ACT tit nia2-8ection 212 (24) (8 U.S.Q. 1182(0) (27) ) —'dnehn 

to enter United States to engage in activities prejudicial to public interest, etc. 

Act of 1952—Section 212(a) (19) (8 U.S.C. 1132(a) (19) )—Procured 

visa by fraud or misrepresentation. 

Act of 1952—Section 212 (a)(20) (8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (20) )—No valid 

immigrant visa or other valid entry document. 

BEFORE THE BOARD 

(June 4, 1958) 

Discussion: This is an appeal from a decision of a special inquiry officer excluding the alien from admission to the United 

States. The appeal is sustained.. 

The appellant is a 73-year-old married male, native and last a 

citizen of Rumania, who first entered the United States as a visitor 

on September 29, 1949, and has lived in this country during most 

of the period subsequent thereto. He was admitted for permanent 

residence on September 26, 1953. About December 1954 he departed 

24 
from the United States and on December 16, 1955, he applied for 

admission as a returning resident at which time he presented a reentry permit. After a hearing before a special inquiry officer, which 

commenced on January 25, 1956, and was completed on July 2. 1957, 

that officer rendered a decision on December 17, 1057, holding that 

the appellant was inadmissible on the three grounds mentioned 

above. It appears from the decision that the special inquiry officer 

concluded that the three grounds of inadmissibility were sustained 

on the theory that the appellant had failed to meet the burden of 

proof because of his "silence"; that, without resort to the adverse 

inference, the special inquiry officer would not have sustained the 

first two grounds; and that there was evidence other than the adverse inference which sustained the third charge. 

A 3-page brief of the examining officer and counsel's printed 

brief were filed with the special inquiry officer prior to his decision. 

On February 3, 1958, the Service filed a 138-page brief and on 

February 6, 1958, counsel filed a supplemental brief. The latter 

was not a reply brief but was limited to a discussion of the special 

inquiry officer's decision. The reply of counsel to the last brief filed 

by the Service appears in the oral argument. 

The record in this ,RSA is unusually long, consisting of a transcript 

of 4,849 pages and 315 exhibits. However, the only issues which 

require determination are whether the appellant is inadmissible on 

any of the grounds mentioned above. Since we conclude that he is 

not excludable, we do not reach the other issue raised by counsel 

relating to the possibility of granting discretionary relief. 

The appellant's case has been the subject of 3 court decisions. A 

decision of the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia on December 7, 1955, declared null and void the revocation by the Service of the appellant's reentry permit without a 

hearing. A docieion of the "United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida on February 15, 1956, in United States 

ex rel. Malaya v. Savaretti, 139 F. Supp. 143, contained conclusions 

of law that this appellant was entitled to notice of charges and 

that the restriction of his liberty and his confinement to the State 

of Florida, without notice of charges or a hearing and without assigning a basis therefor violates due process, is arbitrary, an abuse 

of discretion and illegal. Counsel asserts that because the Service 

still refused to state the charges against the appellant, a suit captioned Malaya v. Brownell was filed in the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 922-56) and 

on March 2, 1956, that court temporarily restrained the continuation 

of hearings, until notice of charges should be given to the appellant. 

The exclusion hearing commenced at Miami, Florida, on January 25, 1956, and continued in that city until February 14, 1956. 

25 

562713-61-4 
The remainder of the hearing took place in New York City and in 

Washington, D.C. Charges were served on March 6, 1936, immediately prior to the resumption of the hearing in New York City on 

that date. Counsel urges that so much of the exclusion hearing as 

took place at Miami prior to notice of charges was invalid, and the 

Service contends that it was valid. Under questioning 'by counsel, 

the appellant reaffirmed the testimony he had given at Miami and 

counsel reoffered in evidence all the exhibits which had been offered 

in evidence at Miami. Since our conclusion is favorable to the alien, 

the question of the validity or invalidity of the Miami part of the 

hearing need not be further discussed. 

In the first two points in its brief, the Service urges (1) that 

the exclusion hearing was conducted in accordance with the statutory provisions; (2) that the burden of proof is upon an alien 

applying for admission to the United States; and (3) that an applicant for admission must answer all pertinent and relevant questions. With respect to the second matter, it is clear, of course, from 

the Act itself (8 U.S.C. 1361) that the burden of proof is upon a 

person applying for admission to establish that he is not subject 

to exclusion. 

I. The Appellant's "silence" 

The first and third matters mentioned in the preceding paragraph 

relate to the assignment of examining officers to this exclusion 

hearing and the appellant's refusal to answer their questions. The 

special inquiry officer drew an adverse inference from the appellant's 

"silence," stating that the appellant's failure to submit to crossexamination was the same as silence. His findings of fact numbered 

(12) to (17) specifically refer to the appellant's silence. 

Actually, in the appellant's eaoe it eannot properly be said that 

he remained silent nor that there was an unqualified refusal to 

testify. The appellant did, in fact, testify at considerable. length. 

Much of the testimony was in response to questions which had been 

asked previously by the examining officer at the beginning of the 

hearing at a time when counsel had stated that the appellant would 

not answer questions propounded by the examining officer without 

notice of the charges but would answer questions of the special 

inquiry officer. 

After charges were furnished, which counsel contended were inadequate, there was a further refusal by counsel to submit the appellant to cross-examination by the examining officer but a reiteration 

of willingness to have him answer any questions asked by the special 

inquiry officer. Cbunsel specifically indicated his position that the 

statute requires the special inquiry officer to cross-examine the alien, 

and he inquired whether the special inquiry officer desired to do so, 

but that officer declined although he stated that he might ask some. 

26 
questions which were not to be regarded, however, as cross-examination. The special inquiry officer did, in fact, ask certain questions 

of the appellant which he answered. 

With respect to the discussion in the brief of the Service concerning the questions of whether an examining officer may be assigned to 

present the Government's case in an exclusion hearing, the matter 

was also discussed in counsel's brief and in the decision of the 

special inquiry officer. The Service quoted parts of subdivisions (a) 

and (b) of 8 U.S.C. 1225. The first sentence of 8 U.S.C. 1225(a) 

specifically provides: "The inspection * * of aliens '** * seeking 

admission * * * to . * the United States shill he conducted by 

immigration officers, except as otherwise provided in regard to special inquiry officers" (emphasis supplied). This provision seems to 

indicate that, although the inspection of arriving aliens "shall be 

conducted by immigration officers," a different rule applies under 8 

1226(a) in which it is stated that a special inquiry officer 

"shall conduct proceedings under this section." 8 CFII 236.11 

(a) provides, in part, as follows: "* * * The special inquiry officer 

shall rule upon objections, introduce material and relevant evidence 

in behalf of the Government and the alien, and otherwise regulate 

the cour3e of the hearing, and exorcise ouch other powere and au - 

thority as are conferred upon him by the Immigration and Nationality Act and this chapter. * *" 

Although there was a statement by the assistant examining officer that the hearing before the special inquiry officer was, in fact, 

a continuation of the appellant's inspection, we are of the opinion 

that what may be properly termed "inspection" is applicable only 

up to the point where the examining immigration officer makes the 

decision referred to in 8 1225(b) either to admit the alien 

or to detain him for further inquiry to be conducted by a special 

inquiry officer. EAllibit 2 .11tovb that the examining intudgratiou 

officer made this decision on December 16, 1985, when he delivered 

to the appellant Form 1-122 (Notice to Alien Detained for Hearing 

by Special Inquiry Officer). We believe that at this point the provisions of 8 D.S.C. 1226 come into effect. That section sets forth 

with particularity the procedure in hearings before a special inquiry officer and specifically refers to it as the sole and exclusive 

procedure. We agree with the special inquiry officer that the law 

and regulations neither provide for the assignment of an additional 

officer to present evidence in exclusion hearings, nor do they prohibit that procedure. For the reason stated in the next paragraph, 

we find it unnecessary to decide whether an examining officer may 

be assigned to an exclusion hearing. 

8 U.S.C. 1226(a) provides, in part, as follows: "A special inquiry 

officer shall conduct- proceedings under this section, administer oaths, 

27 
present and receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and crossexamine the alien or witnesses. * * * Proceedings before a special 

inquiry officer under this section * * * shall be the sole and exclusive 

procedure for dntertnining admissibility of a person to the United 

States under the provisions of this section. * 5 " It is clear from 

the record that, while the appellant was unwilling to subinit to crossexamination by the examining officer, he was willing to submit to 

such questioning by the special inquiry officer. Since that officer 

failed to perform the duty placed upon him by statute, there can 

be no justification for his action in drawing an adverse inference 

from the appellant's refusal to submit to cross-examination by some 

other officer. 

ExcluclubIZIty mac,. 8 U.S.C. 11880187) 

With respect to the charge that the appellant is inadmissible under 

8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (27), the primary emphasis appears to be on a 

period commencing some time prior to 1939 and continuing until 

the appellant's arrival in the United States in September 1946. In 

effect, the contention of the Service is that the appellant was affiliated with the Rumanian Iron Guard, the Nazi Party, and the 

Communist Party. 

Prior to World War II, the appellant had become the foremost 

industrialist in easteitt Europe. The metallurgical industry in Rumania had come into existence through his efforts. fie owned factories for the manufacture of locomotives, railroad equipment, seamless tubes and munitions; he had large forestry interests in Rumania; 

he was one of the pioneers of a steel-works; and he was president 

of the Ford Company of Rumania. 

About September 1940, Rumania became an Axis satellite and by 

January 1941 it had fallen entirely under German occupation. In 

January 1941 the appellant was arrested and, after a period of 

detention, was placed under house arrest, from which he was released 

on October 9, 1941. During this period from January to October 

1941, all of his industrial plants were seized by the Rumanian government and they were placed under the operation of a RumanianGerman company named Rogifer. In his decision of September 26, 

1951, granting the appellant's application under the Displaced Persons Act, the Assistant Commissioner made the following significant 

comment concerning the German seizure of appellant's industries: "It 

is the fact that a non-Jew, had his industries confiscated 

and turned over to the Nazi control under the ciretunstances in this 

case, at a time when history records the fact that non-Jewish Nazis 

were permitted to control and operate their industries for the benefit 

of the Nazis." 

28 
On October 9, 1913, the Rumanian government decreed that the 

appellant's factories be returned to him but the actual return took 

place on April 12, 1945. (A tube mill was not returned and will 

be discussed later.) During the period from 1941 to April 12, 1945, 

the appellant had no part in the operation of the plants. It appears 

that a primary reason why the Rumanian government finally returned the plants to the appellant was the fact that they were not 

being properly managed, and the production of the plants was needed 

by Rumania in connection with its obligation to the Soviet Union 

under a reparations agreement. 

The appellant's wife and his son were forced to escape clandestinely from Rumania in April 1948. A decree dated September 30, 

1948, of the Rumanian government divested the appellant of his 

Rumanian citizenship and confiscated all of his property in that 

country. 

N R , who is now deceased, testified for appellant in the 

Displaced Persons proceeding. R was premier of Rumania from 

December 6, 1944, until February 28, 1945, when he resigned under 

Soviet pressure. He testified that the appellant was well known to 

him for many years; that he was not a Nazi sympathizer; that he 

was not sympathetie towards the Rumanian Iron Guard ; and that 

he was anti-Communist. In the Displaced Persons proceeding, appellant denied that he was affiliated with or in sympathy with the 

Iron Guard, the Nazi Party or the Communist Party. He reaffirmed this testimony in the present proceeding. 

8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (27), with which we are here concerned, requires the exclusion of "Aliens who * * * the Attorney General 

knows or has reason to believe seek to enter the United States * * 

to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United 

States * * * ." In other words, the Service aRserte that at the time 

of the appellant's application for admission to the United States on 

December 16, 1955, he was seeking to enter the United States for 

one of these inimical purposes. 

As we have indicated above, much of the discussion of the Service 

relates to the appellant's activities from some time prior to 1939 until 

his arrival in the United States in September 1946. Ordinarily, 

matters occurring that long ago would seem to have little relevance 

to the issue involved here which is whether the appellant on December 16, 1955, was seeking to enter the United States to "engage 

in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or 

endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States." We 

are unable to determine from the brief of the Service exactly what 

activities of this nature it fears the appellant will pursue. The 

appellant is now 73 years old, and we do not believe it has been 

29 
established that during the 11 years he has lived in the United 

States he has engaged in any activities of the nature proscribed by 

8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (27). 

The Assistant Commissioner in hie decision of September 20, 1051, 

discussed fully the appellant's activities from 1939 until 1951 and 

reached the conclusion that the appellant had not been 'voluntarily 

affiliated with the Iron Guard, the Nazi Party or the Communist 

Party and that he was not within the classes of aliens specified in 

former 8 CFR 175.53, that is, aliens whose entry would be deemed 

to be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. Furthermore, 

the present position of the Service appears to be inconsistent with 

its approval of first preference status for the appellant on March 9, 

1953, since that action required a finding under 8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (1) 

(A) that the appellant's services are determined "to be substantially 

beneficial prospectively to the national economy, cultural interests, or 

welfare of the United States." 

When the Service on March 6, 1956, complied with the court's 

directive that notice of charges be served on the appellant, it was 

asserted that he was inadmissible under 8 U.S.G. 1182(a ) (27) "in 

that the applicant affiliated with, associated with, aided, abetted, 

or otherwise assisted various movements including the 'Rumanian 

Iron Guard', the Nazi Party and/or Movement, the Communist Party 

and/or Movement, which were and/or are hostile and detrimental to 

the best interests, welfare, safety and security of the United States." 

Counsel requested further particulars concerning this charge, that is, 

the years when it was alleged that the appellant was affiliated or 

associated with the three organizations mentioned; the form of activities; and what activities it is claimed the appellant would pursue in the United States which would be prejudicial to the public 

interest. Subsequently, the examining officer otated that the appellant 

was charged with affiliation or association with the Rumanian Iron 

Guard from 1933 to 1941, with the Nazi Party from 1934 to 1944, 

and with the Communist Party from 1944 until 1948. 

On page 11 of its brief the Service stated that the laying of specific charges was not a requirement of the statute in exclusion proceedings, and on page 23, at the beginning of the discussion concerning inadmissability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (27), the Service stated 

that it was eliminating from this charge the specifications contained 

in exhibit 146; that it had reserved the right to urge such further 

grounds of exclusion as might be deemed appropriate; and that the 

evidence includes, but is not limited to, 22 matters which were set 

forth on pages 23 to 25 of the brief. The appellant's case bears some 

analogy to Kwong Hai Chew v. Golding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). 

Counsel asserts that the court decisions in United States ex eel. Ma.- 

lam v. Savoretti and Malawi v. Browned, supra, have become the 

30 
law of the case with respect to this appellant. He argues that these 

court decisions specifically required notice to the appellant of the 

charges; that he tried the case on the basis of the charges as stated 

in exhibit 146; and that it is improper for the Service, after the 

close of the hearing, to attempt to disregard the original charges 

and substitute as new charges the 22 matters mentioned in the brief 

of the Service. He contends that the Board is limited by the court 

decisions to a consideration of the matters which were set forth in 

exhibit 146. 

We observe that the hearing was completed on July 2, 1957, and 

that there is nothing to indicate that the 22 matters mentioned 

above were urged prior to the time that the Service filed its brief 

on February 3, 1958. We believe there is considerable merit in 

counsel's position. Likewise, although the Service on page 25 of its 

brief referred to the 22 matters as "conclusions of fact," it would 

be more appropriate to characterize them as "charges." We need not 

reach a conclusion as to the propriety or the impropriety of adding 

new charges since we do not believe that these 22 charges are sustained nor that the evidence in the record constitutes a basis for 

excluding the appellant under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (27). 

Counsel noserte that the contention of the Service that the appellant 

is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (27) is an attempt to rehash 

matters which were disposed of favorably to appellant in the Displaced Persons proceeding. Some of the witnesses who appeared in 

that proceeding also testified in the present hearing and some of 

the documentary evidence there was again introduced in evidence 

during the exclusion hearing. There were, of course, additional witnesses in the present proceeding and evidence was introduced which 

had not previously been considered. 

The Service asserted on page 86 of its brief that the Displaced 

Persons decision was snot dispositive of the issues in the present pro 

ceeding, and in support of this statement seven "discrepancies" are 

set forth on pages 86 to 90 of the brief. We have considered each 

of them but we do not believe that, separately or collectively, they 

are of sufficient importance to warrant different factual findings than 

were made by the Assistant Commissioner on September 26, 1951. 

Only the second of these merits specific comment. 

The second "discrepancy" relates to the tube mill, previously mentioned, which was not returned to the appellant on April 12, 1945, 

with his other plants. There is another reference to the return of 

the factories and indemnification for the tube mill at pages 62 to 67 

of the brief of the Service, where exhibits 18, 19 and 21 are discussed. 

Exhibit 18 shows that on April 13, 1945, King Michael signed a 

law authorizing his Ministers to enter into a contract with three 

Malaxa companies, and exhibit 19 is an agreement dated April 17, 

31 
1945, between the Rumanian government and the three Malaxa companies, returning to the latter their plants and assets which had 

theretofore been under the control of the state-owned company known 

as Rogifer. The agreement of 4pri1 17, 1945, ale° provided for tho 

payment of $2,460,000 in United States currency for the Malaxa tube 

mill which was not returned. Exhibit. 21 is dated June 7, 1946, and 

indicates that the $2,460,000 had not yet been paid but was to be 

paid within two years. However, it was not paid in United States 

dollars but was actually paid in Rumanian currency in installments, 

and the payments to appellant were discontinued when a Communist 

took over as Rumanian Minister of Finance. 

Although the appellant and the Rumanian government had endeavored to dissuade the Russians from their plan, the latter decided on November 20, 3044, to remove appellant's tube mill 

to the Soviet Union. Since the transfer of the mill to the Soviet 

Union had become unavoidable, the Rumanian government succeeded 

in having it included in the reparations agreement of January 16, 

1945, in order that the value of the plant might be credited against 

the $300,000,000 in reparations which Rumania was obligated to pay 

to the Soviet Union. In an annex to the reparations agreement, 

the value of the appellant's tube mill was fixed at 2,460,000 United 

States dollars, which the appellant stated was less than half the 

value of the mill. The Rumanian government agreed to pay appellant this sum in United States dollars because it considered it necessary to rebuild the tube mill and appellant was supposed to make 

purchases of equipment outside of Rumania for that purpose and 

for the purpose of rebuilding other industries. 

In elaborating on what it has termed the second "discrepancy," 

the Service asserts that the appellant sought to create the impression 

in the Displaced Persons proceeding that the question of indemnification for the tube mill was considered and approved by the Radescu 

government and that E G—'s testimony shows that this was 

not the case. G— was Rumanian Undersecretary of the Treasury 

from about October 1944 until March 6, 1945. The position of the 

Service appears to be that Rumania came completely under Communist domination on March 6, 1945, when Petru Groan succeeded 

Nicolae Radescue as premier. This is not correct. At that time the 

Soviet Union was one of our allies and actual hostilities in Europe 

did not cease until May 8, 1940 (V–E Day). Rumania did come 

more and more under the domination of the Soviet Union and had 

been completely absorbed into the Communist orbit by December 30, 

1947, when King Michael abdicated. However, it is clear that there 

was no abrupt transition to a satellite status on March 6, 1945, when 

Oroza became premier. 

32 
As we indicated above, Radescu is now deceased but he had appeared as a witness during the Displaced Persons proceeding. His 

testimony was to the effect that his government, although it had 

agreed to pay the appellant for the tube mill, was overthrown before 

payment was actually made. 

When G— was questioned by an investigator of the Service on 

November 16, 1955, be was asked whether the Radescu government 

agreed at any time to pay the appellant $2,500,000 and he answered, 

"Not to my recollection." He also indicated that the matter had not 

been discussed. During the present hearing G was questioned 

concerning the apparent discrepancy between his statement of November 16, 1555, and Radescu's testimony in the Displaced Persons proceeding. G testified that, in principle, the Radescu government 

recognized the appellant's right to payment for the tube mill; that 

the appellant had requested $2,500,000 as payment; that it uas 

matter which was to be settled later ; that the negotiations concerning 

the matter were initiated under the Radescu government; that the 

appellant may have discussed the matter directly with Radescu; and 

that when he (G—) left the government, the actual understanding in legal form was being prepared by lawyers for the appellant 

and for the Rumanian government. H.— had testified in the Displaced Persons proceeding that property which the Rumanian government turned over to the Soviet Union as reparations was almost 

all paid for by the Rumanian government although the owners complained about the low value placed on their goods. 

We are entirely in accord with the view expressed by the Assistant 

Commissioner on September 26, 1951, that the return of appellant's 

plants to him on April 12, 1945, and his indemnification for the tube 

mill do not establish affiliation with the Communist Party under 

the circumstances of this case. We do not believe that the testimony 

in the present proceeding concerning indemni Section for the tube 

mill differs materially from that in the Displaced Persons proceeding, and we must disregard what is referred to as discrepancy 

numbered (2) on page 87 of the brief of the Service. 

There are other matters discussed in the Assistant Commissioner's 

decision of September 26, 1951, which are again referred to in the 

brief of the Service. For example, the Assistant Commissioner 

stated that the appellant was found by the appropriate American 

officials dealing with blocked assets in this country to be entitled to 

the unfreezing of certain funds which appellant had in the United 

States, and an allegation that the appellant made gifts to tho Com - 

munists shortly after coming to the United States was also fully discussed. These matters were the subject of adverse comments at pages 

76-79 and 83 of the brief of the Service. 

In the discussion concerning excludability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) 

(27), the Service has made frequent statements that the appellant 

83 
remained mute or that he refused to answer questions. As we 

pointed out above, the appellant testified at considerable length in 

this proceeding, and he was willing to answer any questions of the 

special inquiry officer. In addition, most of the matters had been 

fully covered in the Displaced Persons proceeding in which hearing 

he submitted fully to the questioning of the examining 'officer. 

That part of the brief of the Service relating to excludability 

under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (27), which has not yet been discussed, has 

received our careful consideration. It is not clear from the brief 

just how much of the information was before the Assistant Commissioner when he rendered his decision on September 26, 1951, but apparently he was aware of most of it. As to the matters concerning which 

the Assistant Commissioner had knowledge when he rendered his 

decision, we are inclined to agree with counsel that essentially the 

Service is attempting to rehash matters which have been decided. 

As to these, and considering the Assistant Commissioner's full discussion, we do not believe that his factual findings favorable to 

the appellant should now be disturbed unless there is some substantial basis for holding that the Assistant Commissioner reached 

an erroneous OnolTh• conclusion or unless reconsideration is appropriate because of subsequently discovered evidence. Neither in a reappraisal 

of the evidence in the Displaced Persons proceeding nor in a considerstinn of the new evidence produced in this proceeding do we 

find support for the various adverse statements and inferences set 

forth in the brief of the Service. We will not attempt to discuss 

each of these but a few illustrations will indicate our views concerning the matter. 

On page 29 of the brief of the Service a reference was made to 

exhibit 152 and it was stated that this was an excerpt from a book 

allegedly under the sponsorship of General Antonescu. Ho was 

premier of Rumania when this book was published at Bucharest in 

1941. Exhibit 152 indicates that the book mentioned is entitled "At 

the Margin of Disaster," and the excerpt is from a letter of Mihail 

Stelescu to Corneliu Codreanu dated April 1915. It indicates that 

Stelescu alleged that Codreanu made an unnamed individual Commissioner of the Dobruja and that this person brought Codreanu 

"funds from Malaxa and Company." Codreanu was apparently the 

founder of the Iron Guard. However, it has not been established 

whether nr not the writer of the letter was correct in hi seeeertion 

and, in the event the appellant actually did give funds to the unnamed individual, whether or not the appellant was aware that the 

funds were then to be transferred to Codreanu. In addition, the 

appellant was arrested on January 23, 1941, in connection with an 

Iron Guard revolt against General Antonescu, the revolt having 

commenced about two days before that. Three investigations which 

34 
were ordered by General Antonescu resulted in clearing the appellant 

of complicity in this revolt. It is apparent that the 1935 letter was 

not regarded as significant by the Rumanian investigators. 

In its brief (page 31) the Service referred to exhibit 155 as 

being in a sense pro - appellant. It is an article which appeared in 

the January 1956 issue of "Rumanian Exile," an Iron Guard publication. We find no basis for considering the article pro-appellant; 

on the contrary, we believe it clearly shows antipathy toward the 

appellant on the part of this newspaper. 

On page 30 of the brief of the Service, it was stated that exhibit 

213 "clearly demonstrates M—'s role in some of the clandestine 

political incidents in Rumania," and on page 36 of the brief it was 

stated that this exhibit clearly establishes that M— was so influential with the German Nazis that he was chosen by King Carol 

of Rumania to go to Berlin to placate the Nazis because of the killing of the leader of the Iron Guard. A C , a witness hostile 

to the appellant, had originally produced the document which is 

now exhibit 213, and on July 10, 1951, it had been marked exhibit 

59 in the Displaced Persons proceeding. 

Exhibit 213 is an unsigned copy of a typewritten memorandum 

dated January 29 and 30, 1939, by G—G , who was then Foreign Minister of Rumania. He testified as a witness for this appellant in the Displaced Persons proceeding and also executed an 

affidavit on July 17, 1951, in which he stated that he recalls having 

dictated such a note but cannot guarantee the authenticity of the 

copy which was produced. This 1939 memorandum was fully discussed by the Assistant Commissioner in his decision of September 

26, 1951. He commented on the fact that G and M denied 

that the latter made a trip to Germany in January 1939. The 

Assistant Commissioner reached the conclusion that 31 was opposed to the economic treaty of March 21, Mg, between Germany 

and Rumania and that it would be inconsistent to find that M—

made a German trip in January 1939 or that he had placated the 

German ire which had been aroused as a result of action against 

the Iron Guard. 

Exhibits 22 to 33, inclusive, are captured German documents, and 

these are discussed at pages 32 to 35 of the brief of the Service. All 

of these are dated in 1937 and 1938 and those which might possibly 

be considered as having some pertinence to this proceeding relate to 

the appellant's trip to Berlin, Germany, in January 1937. This was 

apparently the trip that the appellant mentioned in the Displaced 

Persons proceeding when he stated that in 1936 the Rumanian government had assigned him on a mission to Germany to obtain machinery for arming Rumania. That is about what the documents 

concerning the appellant's trip in January 1937 seem to imply. 

35 
Our consideration of the captured German documents does not 

lead us to the same inferences which the Service nas read into them. 

For example, with respect to exhibit 32, it is stated, "M--'s power 

and influence loomed so much in the relations between Rumania and 

Germany that he was made subject of special comment in this document." Exhibit 32 is a memorandum of a conference between the 

German Field Marshal General (Goering) and King Carol of Rumania on November 26, 1938. The only reference to the appellant 

is the following: "He (King Carol) said that he had entrusted the 

tack of building up an arms industry to the industrial magnate, 

M ." There was nothing unusual about King Carol's statement 

because the greater part of Rumania's industrial capacity appears to 

have been centered i n the sppellant and in 1026 the 

appellant commenced, with the approval of the Rumanian government, a large factory for the manufacture of munitions; and in 

January 1937 he had been sent to Germany on an armament mission by the Rumanian government. 

On page 42 of the brief, the following questions were propounded: 

"Wasn't it M who stated that in 1936 lie undertook to make 

arms deals with Germany?Wasn't this the beginning of the road 

that ended with the Wohlthat. Pact and followed by German occupation of Rumania and the inevitable swinging of Rumania and other 

Balkan countries into the Nazi orbit?" The Service has also supplied its own answer to these questions on the next page of the brief 

where it was stated that, while history may record various dates 

when Germany marched into countries, "the Nazi troops began their 

journey to Rumania not in 1939 or 1940 but with M 's march to 

Berlin since, at least, 1936." Although the appellant held no political office in Rumania, it seems apparent that the Service regards 

him as being accountable for the execution of the Rumanian-German 

treaty of March 23, 1939 (exh. 11; referred to by the Service as the 

Wohlthat Pact), and for the other event which culminated when 

Rumania became an Axis satellite in September 1840. G G 

one of the signers of the treaty of March 23, 1939, who was at that 

time Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, testified in the Displaced Persons proceeding that he knew that M opposed this 

treaty; the appellant also testified to that effect; and the Assistant 

Commissioner was satisfied that M opposed the treaty. 

In connection with the foregoing matter, the Service hoe quoted 

from a memorandum dated February 27, 1939, written by H 

W—, a German Minister, in which he stated that orientation of 

the Rumanian economy toward Germany would secure for Germany 

the dominant position in southeastern Europe. No doubt this was 

Germany's motivating purpose but it does not follow that the appellant's trip to Germany in January 1937 was to assist that coun36 
try nor that it was for any purpose other than to increase the 

defense capability of his own country. In fact, the captured German documents which were offered in evidence by the Service also 

indicate that the purpose of the appellant's January 1937 trip to 

Germany was to secure German assistance in strengthening Rumanian defenses. 

Another illustration of a matter which was previously disposed 

of in favor of the appellant is found on page 44 of the brief of 

the Service where reference is made to a letter from A to 

M (appellant). Although the brief does not indicate this letter 

had previously been considered, we observe that it is the letter of 

June 41, 1010, which the Assistant Commissioner cot forth in full 

in his decision of September 26, 1951, and concerning which he 

reached the conclusion that, after taking into consideration M 's 

testimony, this letter was "explained in such a way that it cannot, 

in and of itself, be held to be adverse to M—." 

A further illustration is the discussion on pages 81 to 83 of the 

brief of the Service concerning the Rumanian National Committee. 

On September 26, 1951, the Assistant Commissioner of the Service 

discussed the dispute between the two rival Rumanian groups, that 

is, the Rumanian National Committee and the Association of Free 

Rumanians in the United States. C and V—, who gave testimony adverse to appellant in the Displaced Persons proceeding, 

were members of the former group while General R— and the 

appellant belonged to the latter group. Both groups were apparently anti-Communist and were working for the liberation of Rumania. The Assistant Commissioner was of the opinion that this 

dispute must be considered in evaluating the testimony of the witnesses. However, we are satisfied that there is no justification for 

the conclusion in the brief of the Service that, since the dispute 

between the two Rumanian groups may have been advantageous to 

the Communists and since appellant 111— was active in one of the 

groups, he has given aid to the Communists. 

On page 49 of the brief of the Service it was stated that CM , the appellant's son, had testified that members of the Rumanian Iron Guard had been occupying a fashionable residence 

opposite the M house for several months prior to the revolt of 

January 1941 and that this fact was common knowledge. The brief 

then continues, "It is interesting to note that M— never mentioned 

this close presence of the Iron Guard in any of his present testimony or in the Displaced Persons proceeding_ We learn of it for 

the first time in the cross-examination of his son." However, this 

Board has observed that on July 11, 1951, when the appellant was 

being questioned in the Displaced Persons proceeding about the in. 

vasion of his home by the Iron Guard in January 1941, he stated 

Si- 
in part, "Across the street from my house, there was a house which 

belonged to a person of Jewish origin who is now in the United 

States. At the time, the house was empty so the Iron Guardists 

occupied that house as one of their headquarters for the revolutionary movement. * * *" The fact that the Iron Guard had been 

occupying a house opposite M 's home was actually an inconsequential matter and, even if M had not disclosed it, no unfavorable presumption would have arisen. 

During the last several paragraphs we have referred to various 

parts of the Service brief to illustrate why we do not agree with 

the adverse inferences which the Service has drawn. The basic questions here, as in the Displaced Persons proceeding, are the appellant's relations with the Rumanian Term Guard, the Nevi Party and 

the Communist Party. These matters were fully discussed by the 

Assistant Commissioner on September 26, 1951, and we agree with 

his conclusion that the appellant was not affiliated with any of these 

organizations. 

About the only matters which the Service asserts occurred subsequent to the Assistant Commissioner's decision of September 26, 

1911, are that the appellant obtained a first preference status in connection with his admission for permanent residence in 1953; that 

he procured a reentry permit in 1954; and that since 1951 he has 

apparently expended assets equal to or greater than the total assets 

he listed in 1951. The obtaining of the first preference status and 

the procuring of the reentry permit are the basis of the second and 

third grounds of excludability and will be discussed under the next 

heading. 

With respect to the matter of the appellant's assets, the Assistant 

Conamiscioneric deeicion of September 96, ices, chewed that the appellant stated that he had assets in the United States of over 

$650,000 and that he had a little money in Swiss and French banks. 

We do not find in the brief any explanation as to how the Service 

reached the conclusion that since 1951 the appellant has expended 

assets equal to or greater than the total assets listed in 1951. In an 

event, since there appears to be no evidence that the appellant has 

been expending money for illegal purposes, we do not believe it 

is within the proper province of the Service or of this Board to 

delve into the question of what the appellant. hen done with hie 

own money, that is, whether he still has it, whether he spent most 

or all of it, or whether he gave it away. There was a great deal 

of evidence favorable to the appellant in the Displaced Persons 

proceeding and again in the present proceeding. On the basis of all 

the evidence, it is our considered opinion that the appellant is not 

excludable under 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a) (27). 

38 
III. Excludability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(10) and 1182 (2)(20) 

(A) General 

The second and third grounds of inadmissibility mentioned above, 

that is, 1182(a)(19) and 1152(a) (20), are interdependent 

upon each other, and we will consider them together as the Service 

has done in its brief. Principally, they stem from the appellant's 

admission as a first preference quota immigrant on September 26, 

1953. The basic facts relating to that matter are as follows. 

In April 1951, the appellant organized Western Tube Corporation 

for the purpose of manufacturing seamless steel tubes on the West 

Coast and a considerable sum was expended in furtherance of the 

undertaking. On January 14, 1953, the corporation filed a visa 

petition on behalf of the appellant. Thereafter, the district director of the Service concluded that the appellant was entitled Lo first 

preference status under 8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (1) (A) and approved the 

visa petition. The Service subsequently authorized preexamination 

and on September 26, 1953, the appellant was admitted for permanent residence. Appropriate financing for Western Tube Corporation could not be obtained and its plant was never built. 

With respect to the question of inadmissibility under 8 P.S.C. 

1182(a) (19), the special inquiry officer's discussion is limited to the 

first paragraph on page 13 of his decision. He stated that lie based 

his findings of inadmissibility on the failure of the appellant to 

sustain the burden of proof (by reason of the appellant's "silence") 

and then made the following statement : "In examining the record 

as it now stands, without the necessity of rejecting the testimony of 

M—, his family, and the documents offered by him, I am led to a 

different conclusion. I cannot determine fully whether the statements made by H and C can properly be charged to M—." 

The effect of this is that the special inquiry officer says that he 

cannot, apart from the appellant's "silence," reach a conclusion that 

he procured a visa or documentation by fraud or misrepresentation. 

We have already indicated that the special inquiry officer was not 

warranted in drawing an adverse inference from the appellant's 

insistence that he would submit to cross-examination by the special 

inquiry officer and would not submit to cross-examination by the 

examining officer. 

In determining that the appellant was excluable under 8 U.S.C. 1182 

(a) (20), the special inquiry officer's discussion shows t list he concluded 

that the appellant wee not lawfully admitted to the United States on 

September 26, 1953, on the ground that he was not then entitled to 

admission as a first preference immigrant, and that the reentry permit presented at the time of the present application for admission 

was invalid since it was predicated on the 1953 entry which he had 

held was illegal. The conclusion of the special inquiry officer was 

39 
not based on the proposition that the 1953 immigrant visa was procured by fraud or misrepresentation. Instead, he proceeded on the 

theory that Western Tube Corporation had not actually begun manufacturing operations; that the appellant was the sole owner of this 

corporation; and that, for these reasons, the District Director of 

the Service had. acted erroneously when he approved the visa 

petition. 

In the notice of charges, which was served upon the appellant 

pursuant to the court's directive, it was stated that the appellant 

may be excludable: 

Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (19) "in that the applicant flied a petition for the 

admission of himself as beneficiary, under section 204(b) (8 1154 (5)) 

and further in that in his said application for a visa, the applicant failed to 

disclose that prior thereto, lie had been arrested anu/or imprisoned." 

Under 8 U.S,C. 1182(a) (20) "in that the reentry permit presented by the 

applicant was based upon a visa issued erroneously, and/or invalidly, since 

section 204(h) of the act (8 U.S.C. 1124(5)) does not contemplate that an 

alien shall petition in his own behalf for an immigrant visa." 

There was no validity to the charge that the appellant had failed 

to disclose an arrest in his application for a visa, and the special 

inquiry officer stated that the charge would not be sustained. It is 

apparent from the brief of the Service that it does not consider 

itself bound by the remaining specific matters contained in the notice 

of charges nor by the limited scope of the special inquiry Officer's 

decision. In addition to urging that the immigrant visa and the 

reentry permit were invalid because they were founded on the 

District Director's erroneous approval of the visa petition, the 

Service also contends that the appellant procured approval of the 

visa petition through fraud and misrepresentation; that this necessitates a conclusion that the immigrant visa and reentry permit were 

so obtained; that the reentry permit "was independently obtained by 

fraud and/or willful misrepresentation"; and that the appellant now 

seeks to enter the United States . by fraud and misrepresentation. 

In connection with the contention that there was independent 

fraud on the part of the appellant in obtaining the reentry permit, 

the, Service asserts that he stated in his application for the permit 

executed on December 2, 1954, that he was then employed by 'Western 

Tube Corporation ; that, in fact, he was not then so employed; and 

that, by that time, there was no longer any possibility that Western 

Tube Corporation would become a going concern. The Service 

further contends that the appellant's inclusion of this information 

in his, application for reentry permit could have had no other purpose than to cut off inquiry into the facts concerning the appellant's 

last arrival in the United States, and that the appellant attempted 

to avoid investigation of his prior entry "by falsely stating,* * * 

that he was then and there employed by the Western Tube Corpora40 
lion." Counsel stated during the oral argument that he prepared the 

reentry permit application and interpreted the question to mean the 

name and address of employer at the time he entered the 

United States for permanent residence. 

The application for reentry permit is on Service Form l-131 which 

has 5 numbered subdivisions. Subdivision 3 reads, ''Dahl as to 

Arrival in United States for Permanent Residence or as a Treaty 

Merchant." Under that there are 9 questions, including port and 

date of arrival, names of parents, name and address of person to 

whom destined, and name and address of employer. The last is the 

question which the Service says relates, not to the date of arrival 

for permanent residence, but to the date of applying for the reentry 

permit. Subdivision 4 reads, "Data as to Last Arrival in United 

States" and subdivision 5, "Data as to Departure." 

From the context in which the question concerning name and address of employer appears, we think it is obvious that it refers to 

the name and address of the employer at the time of admission for 

permanent residence. In the appellant's case the date of admission 

for permanent residence was September 26, 1953. That the question as to the name and address of employer does not relate to the 

employer at the time of the application for the reentry permit is 

further borne out by question 1 (b) (2) which is, "My present occupation and business activities and name of my employer are as 

follows." This question was not answered by the appellant since it 

was not applicable to his case but related only to treaty merchants. 

In view of what we have said, we reject the contention of the Service 

that this statement of the appellant was false. 

The contention that the appellant now seeks to enter the United 

States by fraud and misrepresentation is based entirely upon inferences which we do not believe are warranted. This contention does 

not merit, specific discussion with the exception of a reference on 

page 134 of the brief to the appellant's alleged false testimony in 

this proceeding concerning the expenditure of hundreds of thousands 

of dollars on behalf of Western Tube Corporation. That matter will 

be adverted to later herein. 

Counsel contends that the Government is precluded from asserting 

the invalidity of the reentry permit because of the decision in United 

States ex rel. Malaxa v. Savoretti, supra. In that case, one of the 

findings of the court (139 F. Supp. at p. 148) was the following : "On 

December 16, 1955, the petitioner (this appellant) arrived at Miami, 

Florida, in possession of valid travel documents, including a valid 

reentry permit, which he presented to the immigration authorities." 

Although res judicata apparently is not involved, the doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment, as discussed in Matter of H—, 

16420754, A-6726086-8, 7 I. & N. Dec. 407 (1957), may apply. 

41 

562713-61-5 
It is also asserted by counsel that, at the time the visa petition on 

behalf of the appellant was approved, it was the administrative 

view that the fact that an alien had stock control of a corporation 

did not bar the corporation from executing a visa petition on behalf 

of the alien, and that this was a contemporaneous interpretation of 

the statute. He submitted a copy of Lena Orlow's letter of October 

13, 1954, to the Assistant Commissioner in which she raised the 

question of whether her client "who has capital of approximately 

$100,000 could create a corporation in which he might be the major 

stockholder * * * and whether such a corporation as this could art 

as the petitioner, so that his interest in this corporation would not 

prevent his securing first preference in the quota * * *." In reply 

to this letter, the Assistant Commissioner stated on October 20, 1954, 

that, if it can be established that the corporation is a bona fide one 

which has an urgent need for the alien's services within the meaning 

of the statutory provision mentioned above, "the fact that the beneficiary is the major stockholder of the corporation would not prevent 

the corporation from filing a petition on your client's behalf." 

Counsel also contends that the prior administrative decisions concerningthe appellant are entitled to great weight. Theo° were the 

decision of the district director approving the visa petition, the 

decision of the American consular officer on September 25, 1953, 

under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) and 1201(g) that AI— was eligible to receive an immigrant visa, the decision of the immigration officer on 

September 26, 1953, that the appellant was admissible to the United 

States, and the decisions of the Service on December 8, 1953, and 

December 17, 1954, granting reentry permits to the appellant since 

these again recognized his status as a lawful permanent resident of 

the United States. Although these prior administrative decisions 

in the appellant's taco are not conclusive, they are entitled to considerable weight. 

The situation regarding the prior administrative decisions in the 

appellant's case is somewhat similar to the cases in which persons 

of Chinese descent have been admitted to the United States as citizens, and the courts have held that such an administrative determination by the immigration officials is prima facie evidence of United 

States citizenship until overcome by affirmative proof on the part 

of the Government that such person obtained admission to the United 

States fraudulently (Choy Yuen Chan v. United States, 30 F.2d 

516 (C.C.A. 9, 1929) ; Leong Kuuti Yin v. United States, 31 F.2d 

738 (C.C.A. 9, 1929) ; Chun Kock Quern, v. Proctor, 92 F.2d 326 

(C.C.A. 9, 1937) ; Yuen Boo Ming v. United States, 103 F.2d 355 

(C.C.S. 9, (1939)). 

We believe there is considerable merit in the three contentions of 

counsel mentioned above, that is, that the court decisions in the 
appellant's case, the contemporaneous administrative interpretation 

of the statute, and the administrative decisions in the appellant's 

case require a conclusion that the appellant's reentry permit was 

valid. However, we do not wish to base our decision solely on 

these grounds, and we will consider the two main contentions of the 

Service, namely, (1) that first preference status was secured by fraud 

or misrepresentation, and (2) that the visa petition was approved 

illegally, that is, that there was no statutory authority for that 

action. 

(B) Was visa petition approval procured through fraud or misrepresentationf 

With respect to the asserted procurement of first preference status 

by fraud or misrepresentation, the visa petition was executed on 

January 14, 1153, by f= C FT—, President of Western Tube 

Corporation. The principal contention of the Service is that the 

following matters were concealed in the visa petition: (1) that Western Tube Corporation was not an operating business; (2) that the 

entire project could not be undertaken without obtaining a governmental loan; and (3) that the appellant was the sole owner of 

Western Tube Corporation. 

As to the first matter, item 4 of the visa petition requests a 

description of the nature of the business conducted by the petitioner 

and was answered, "Seamless tubes manufacturing—Business just 

being formed." Mr. -1L– was the district director of the 

Service who approved M 's visa petition, and immediately prior 

to that action he had received a letter dated March 7, 1953, from 

Mr. 17 C which contained the statement, "One reason the 

company has not progressed more rapidly has been the uncertainty 

of Mr. M 's immigration status." 

At the hearing Mr. L testified that he and H—F—, the 

immediate supervisor of visa petitions, had discussed Western Tube 

Corporation's visa petition on at least two occasions, on one of 

which Mr. H was also present; that Mr. H explained that 

the corporation "had great plans of building a plant in Whittier * * * 

and he pointed out the need of Mr. M to help erect this plant, 

as far as its construction, and oversee its operation after completion." Mr. L— specifically admitted that he was aware that 

Western Tube Corporation had not yet erected its plant. Hence, 

there was no concealment of the fact that Western Tube Corporation 

was not an operating business and, on the contrary, the district 

director of the Service was fully aware that the plant had not even 

been erected. 

The second matter which is supposed to have been concealed is 

that the entire project was dependent upon securing a loan from 

the aovernment. Mr. 11,— was asked whether he was aware that 

43 
Western Tube Corporation was awaiting a loan from the government before it would go ahead in full swing with its business, and 

he answered, "I am not sure. I didn't consider that too much of a 

point." Mr. kite,. of March t, 1953, to Mr. L- was accompanied by a copy of a communication dated March 5, 1953, 

from Lehman Brothers. The letter of Lehman Brothers is now 

attached to the visa petition. It contained a specific statement indicating that Western Tube Corporation had requested from appropriate governmental agencies a loan amounting to 90 per cent of 

approximately $30,000,000. Accordingly, there was no concealment 

of this matter. 

The third matter relates to whether the appellant concealed the 

fact that he was the sole owner of Western Tube Corporation. 

Counsel contends that in December 1952 it was agreed with the 

Manheim brothers that M— was to become a minority stockholder and that equitably he no longer was the sole stockholder 

at the time the visa petition was executed. Mr. affidavit 

dated December 16, 1952, attached to the visa petition, contains the 

statement that Western Tube Corporation was "originally organized 

by Mr. N 

The situation concerning the ownership of Western Tube Corporation, when examined realistically, was this. The company was incorporated in Delaware on April 11, 1951. Its authorized common 

stock was $1,000,000 but only $1,000 of common stock was outstanding. At the time the visa petition was executed the appellant was 

the legal owner of all the outstanding stock. Western Tube Corporation had no appreciable assets with the exception of the considerable sums which had been expended in preliminary planning and 

surveys, down payment on the plant site, etc. These sums had been 

furnichr,r1 by the appellant personally or through Weeteorp, Inc., 

another corporation owned by him. Although the appellant was 

the sole stockholder of Western Tube Corporation as it existed when 

the visa petition was filed, this was merely an embryonic corporation which was to grow into the $30,000,000 concerned envisioned 

by M— and the other promoters. 

The original Western Tube Corporation and the $30,000,000 Western Tube Corporation would have been the same legal entity. However, the visa petition was not predicated on the corporation as it 

was originally constituted but on the assumption that the financing 

would be arranged; that Western Tube Corporation would build its 

plant; and, as stated in Item 4 of the visa petition, that it would 

have a probable income of approximately $3,000,000. It is clear 

from the record that, in the $30,000,000 Western Tube Corporation, 

Lehman Brothers and the public would have had a substantial interest and the appellant would have been only a minority stockholder 

44 
The record is replete with evidence as to the bona fides of the 

efforts of the appellant and his associates to establish Western Tube 

Corporation as a manufacturer of seamless tubes in California. 

We do not believe there was any deliberate effort on the part of the 

appellant nor Mr. to conceal the fact that the appellant was 

the legal owner of all the outstanding stock of Western Tube Corporation at the time the visa petition was filed. Under all the circumstances of the case, we think the Western Tube Corporation 

project must be viewed in its entirety. Since the appellant would 

have been only a minority stockholder in the $30,000,000 Western 

Tube Corporation ;we do not consider it material in this case that 

he was the actual owner of the outstanding stock ($1,000) of the 

embryonic Western Tube Corporation. 

At page 121 of the brief of the Service there appears a statement 

that affirmative representations were made on behalf of the appllant 

"that substantial investment had, in fact, already been made to the 

extent of $28,000,000 (ex. 75)." Exhibit 75, previously mentioned, 

was a handwritten letter of U C— to District Director L—

dated March 7, 1953. It contains no statement that $28,000,000 had 

already been invested, and the only similar passage was that $23,- 

000,000 in equipment had been ordered. 

The Service also stated at page 121 of its brief that Mr. C 's 

letter of March 7, 1953, "represented that there had been expenditures of hundreds of thousands of dollars; that real estate had been 

`purchased': that $23,000,000 in equipment had been ordered." The 

Service characterized these three statements as false. The pertinent 

part of Mr. C—'s letter is as follows: 

I have learned much more about the Company in the last two days. Three 

years' work and hundreds of thousands of dollars have gone into its planning 

and organization. Real estate has been bought from Southern Pacific for the 

plant vice Twenty-three million dollars in eauipment has been ordered from 

the nation's largest machine suppliers. 

In connection- with Mr. C 's reference to the expenditure of 

hundreds of thousands of dollars, the Service made the following 

statement: "M admitted in his closing statement in this hearing 

at page 4811, that the representation he made at page 242, with 

reference to expenditures of hundreds of thousands of dollars, was 

untrue and that he was, in fact, speaking of prospective indebtedness to TV estcorp by reason of future services" (emphasis as in 

original). At page 134 of the brief of the Service, there is another reference to thin same :natter. Although Mr. C--- had men 

tioned the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars, the appellant's testimony at pages 242-2-13 was: "The company (Western 

Tube Corporation) had to pay me, as the head of the Westcorp 

Company, approximately $300,000, and to me personally, approximately $80,000. The Westcorp was an engineering company and 

45 
had to make good all the expenses that were running up with all 

the work connected with the engineering phase." 

Under an agreement dated March 21, 1952, between Western Tube 

Corporation and Westcorp., Inc., the former set forth its desire to 

obtain the benefit of the studies made by Westcorp relative to the 

project of establishing a new seamless tube mill on the West Coast, 

and Western Tube Corporation also employed Westcorp for general 

engineering services for a period of 2 years. As compensation for 

services previously rendered and to be rendered in the future, Western Tube Corporation was to pay Westcorp 4 per cent of the total 

cost of the seamless tube mill. Attached to Western Tube Corporation's RFC application dated September 25, 1953, was a copy of the 

contract of March 21, 1952, and a statement that a settlement had 

been made between Western Tube Corporation and Westcorp under 

which the latter accepted Western Tube Corporation's note for 

$300,000 in full payment of all services rendered theretofore, and 

the contract of March 21, 1952, was cancelled. 

The $300,000 note to Westcorp and a note in favor of the appellant in the sum of $78,366.12 are shown under "Notes Payable" on 

page 10 of the RFC application. Hence, this information agrees 

substantially with the appellant's testimony. Mr. G—, who was 

formerly an employee of Westcorp, also confirmed the fact that the 

appellant had advanced approximately $80,000 directly to Western 

Tube Corporation and other funds through Westcorp, representing 

a total of close to one-half million dollars. 

In connection with the allegation of the Service that M— admitted at page 4811 of the transcript that his testimony at page 242 

was false, there is in truth no such admission. M was being 

questioned concerning the sum due to lirestcorp from Western Tube 

Corporation, the amount having bean rPfer,,,I to by previous witnesses both as $300,000 and as $800,000. His testimony is to the 

effect that there had been a misunderstanding between H and 

a Mr. B , who prepared a report dated May 19, 1953, for Lehman 

Brothers, and that as a result B 's report contained all erroneous 

statement indicating that Westcorp's expenses on behalf of Western 

Tube Corporation already amounted to $860,000. In reality, this 

represented the sum, based on 4 per cent of the value of the equipment ordered, that 'Western Tube Corporation was to pay Westcorp 

under the contract of March 21, 1952, for services already rendered 

and for services which Westcorp was to render in the future. 

M—'s testimony further indicates that, at the time of the application for the RFC loan, it was determined that Westcorp's expenses up to that time (apparently $300,000) should be paid. 

There is no doubt that the appellant advanced considerable funds 

in connection with the Western Tube Corporation project. For 

46 
example, Western Tube Corporation's application for the RFC loan 

shows payment of certain large sums, and these funds were apparently furnished solely by the appellant. In addition to the downpayment of approximately $29,000 for the plant site, there were 

payments of $10,632.25 as interest on the unpaid balance of the 

purchase price; taxes, $3,838.84; downpayment of $10,000 to Pacific 

Iron and Steel Company, contractor for the construction of the plant 

buildings; and legal fees of $15,000. 

As we have indicated above, appellant's testimony is to the effect 

that Westcorp was entitled to a fee of $300,000 from Western Tube 

Corporation for services already rendered and, since the figure was 

arrived at by agreement between the two corporations, there appears 

to be no valid basis for an inquiry by the Service or this Board into 

the question of whether Westcorp should have received more or less 

than this amount. Appellant apparently advanced all the money 

which was disbursed on behalf of Western Tube Corporation, 

whether paid out by that corporation or disbursed by Westcorp. 

The project of organizing a seamless tube industry on the West 

Coast had engaged his attention for a considerable period of time. 

G— testified that the project began receiving consideration in 

1949. We perceive no reason why we should disbelieve appellant's 

testimony that personally and through Westcorp he had expended 

approximately $380,000. For the same reason, we hold that the 

somewhat. similar statement in Mr. C—'s letter was not false_ 

The second statement in Mr. C—'s letter, concerning which the 

Service complains, reads: "Real estate has been bought from Southern Pacific for the plant site." The Service says that the land 

"was, in fact, only taken under a contingent option." 

The original agreement dated December 19, 1951, between Southern Pacific Company and Western Tube Corporation granted the 

latter "the exclusive option to purchase" certain real property for 

the full sum of $300,110. A further agreement was executed by the 

same parties on April 7, 1952, in which Western Tube Corporation 

exercised its option and there was an actual agreement on the part 

of Southern Pacific Company to sell and on the part of 'Western 

Tube Corporation to buy the property for $297,822.89. Southern 

Pacific Company acknowledged receipt of the downpayment of 

$29,782.29. 'Western Tube Corporation was given the right to immediately enter into the possession of the real property and became 

liable for the taxes on the property prorated from .April 7, 1939 

There was a provision under which the agreement of sale could be 

rescinded with the return to Western Tube Corporation of the downpayment less such items as interest on the unpaid balance of the 

total purchase price, taxes, etc. As indicated above, when Western 

Tube Corporation filed the RFC loan application on September 25, 

47 
1953, it had paid, in addition to the downpayment, interest on the 

unpaid balance amounting to $10,632.25 and taxes in the sum of 

$3,838.84. 

It is clear that as of April 7, 1952. there was no longer an option to purchase but an actual agreement of sale between Southern 

Pacific Company and Western Tube Corporation. The adreement did 

contain a provision under which it could be rescinded. Subject to 

that possibility, Western Tube Corporation on April 7, 1952, acquired such an interest in the land that it could have obtained 

specific performance of the contract in a court of equity. 81 C.J.S. 

Specific Performance § 62. On April 7, 1952, Western Tube Corporation made a downpayment of 10 per cent and was given the right 

to enter immediately into possession of the real property. Under 

these circumstances, we believe the transaction could be referred to 

properly as a purchase even though Western Tube Corporation had 

not received a deed for the property arid still owed Southern Pacific Company the 90 per cent balance of the purchase price. Hence, 

we reject the contention of the Service that the statement in Mr. 

C 's letter regarding purchase of a plant site was false. 

Mr. C 's third statement was that $23,000,000 in equipment had 

been ordered. The special inquiry officer said on page 5 of his decision that it was "factually accurate to say that $23,000,00 worth 

of goods had been ordered"; that there were no contracts ; and that 

the orders were merely tentative. The Service says (brief, p. 122) : 

"The record also shows that the so-called 'purchases of equipment' 

or 'contracts for the purchase of $23,000,000 worth of equipment' 

were contingent agreements, containing escalator clauses and expiration dates." The orders were in response to quotations received 

from the manufacturers; they were for particular items of equipmoot. it specific prices; and the manufacturing companies accepted 

the orders. Mr. C did not state in his letter that there had 

been "purchases of equipment" or "contracts for the purchase of 

equipment" but only that "Twenty-three million dollars in equipment has been ordered * * *.," We are satisfied that this statement 

cannot be construed as untruthful. 

For the reasons indicated above, we do not believe that there was 

misrepresentation nor a concealment of information by the appellant, 

by Mr. H who executed the visa petition, nor by the appellant's 

counsel. It is apparent that District Director L knew that 

Western 'tube Corporation's plant had not been erected and that 

he was aware that as of March 5, 1953 (four days prior to his 

approval of the visa petition), Western Tube Corporation had requested a governmental loan amounting to 90 per cent of $30,000,000. 

If any question existed as to whether the visa petition should be 

approved, the time to conduct the investigation was prior to the 

48 
approval of the petition. However, Mr. L— testified that he was 

quite sure that no investigation had been conducted by officers of the 

Service prior to the approval of the visa petition. He had talked to 

Mr. H on at least one occasion, and the latter was available for 

further questioning if additional information had bean desired . 

As early as 1951 the Service was aware that M was trying 

to organize a seamless tube industry in this country since that fact 

was specifically mentioned in the Assistant Commissioner's decision 

of September 26, 1951, in the Displaced Persons proceeding. Following the approval of the visa petition on March 9, 1953, the appellant was admitted for permanent residence in 1953 and the 

legality of this entry was recognized when he was granted a reentry permit on December 17, 1954. Inasmuch as we do not believe that the appellant and those acting on his behalf. concealed 

from the Service any material information in emmeetion with the 

visa petition and since the Service had the opportunity of making 

whatever investigation was considered necessary before approving it, 

we think that no proper basis has been set forth to support a conclusion that the approval of the visa petition was procured by fraud 

or misrepresentation. 

(C) Was visa petition illegally approved! 

The second main contention mentioned above is that the visa 

petition was approved illegally. We have already concluded that 

the appellant cannot be charged with fraud or misrepresentation in 

obtaining the first preference status. In effect, the position of the 

Service is that, even if its district director was aware of all the 

facts, he acted erroneously and illegally in approving the visa petition. This is based on the theory that the appellant was the owner 

of Western Tube Corporation and that the statute does not permit 

a corporation to file a visa petition on behalf of the owner. 

Among those who may file a visa petition under 8 U.S.C. 1154(b) 

to have an alien classified as a first preference quota immigrant 

under 8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (1) (A) is "any * * * organization." In 8 

U.S.C. 1101(a) (28), the term "organization" is defined as including a corporation. Hence, it is clear that generally a corporation 

may file a visa petition. In addition, the statute contains no specific language prohibiting a corporation from filing 8 visa petition 

because the beneficiary happens to be the owner of the corporation. 

In that respect, this case bears a certain analogy to Matter of 

D C lf I VP 3-1-112782, 7 1. & N. Dec. 632 (1957). 

There the district director denied the visa petition on the ground 

that it was prompted in part by a desire to aid the alien to migrate 

to the United States, and that the position was of limited duration. 

The Service reversed the district director and held that there was 

49 
no statutory requirement that the beneficiary remain indefinitely in 

the employ of the petitioner and that, if the petitioner and beneficiary met the statutory requirements, there was no basis for denial 

because they were close personal friends or relatives. 

In connection with its argument that the appellant was the sole 

owner of Western Tube. Corporation when the visa petition was executed, the Service contends that the situation is the same as though 

the alien had filed a visa petition on behalf of himself. Actually, 

the visa petition was executed by Mr. H—, the president of 

-Western Tube Corporation. We have indicated above that counsel 

asserted that equitably the appellant was not then the sole owner, 

and we took the position that, although District Director L—

was apparently not aware that M was the actual owner of the 

outstanding stock ($1,000) of the embryonic Western Tube Corporation, this could not be considered material under the circumstances 

of this case. 

Although the Service presently espouses the view that a corporation cannot legally file a visa petition on behalf of an alien who 

is the owner of the corporation, exhibit 268 (the Assistant Commissinner's letter of October 20, 15;54, tocatiuneAl above) shows that at 

that time it was the view of the Service that a corporation could 

petition for its major stockholder. From exhibit 156 it is also clear 

that in 1954 District. Director T— hail referred_ a PAce arising under 

section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to the Central 

Office of the Service. This case incidentally involved a claim that 

the alien was eligible for a first preference visa. Mr. L there 

raised the question of whether a person could petition for himself. 

He was not informed that first preference was unauthorized under 

such circumstances, but instead he was directed to resolve the question as to whether or not the alien's services were urgently needed. 

Exhibit 156 further indicates that as of April 2, 1956 "There are 

no precedent decisions or instructions from the Central Office on the 

issue whether a corporation may file a petition on behalf of a stockholder of that corporation," and that the position of the Service 

was that the issue was one which should be decided in the appellant's case. Under the circumstances, we believe it is incumbent 

upon the Service to demonstrate clearly that its present view, rather 

than its former view, is correct. 

We have carefully concidererl the eases cited on this point by the 

Service and by counsel but none is entirely analogous to the case 

of the appellant. It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a 

legal entity entirely separate and distinct from its stockholders, and 

this is true even though one person may own all or nearly all of 

the capital stock (Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404, 408, 410 (1932) ; 

Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 

50 
(1925) ; Haese v. A. R. Demory Investment Co., 38 F.2(1232 (C.C.A. 9, 

1930), cert. den. 282 T.J.S. 840). The fact that one person owns a 

majority or all of the stock in a corporation does not, of itself, 

make him liable for the debts of the corporation, and this rule 

applies even where an individual inuurporated his business for the 

sole purpose of escaping individual liability for corporation debts. 

18 C.J.S. Corporations § 581. In United States v. Weissman, 219 

F.2d 837 (C.A. 2, 1955), Weissman, the defendant, was the sole 

owner of a number of corporations and was the only person financially interested in any of them. The court held that there could be 

legal transactions between two of Weissman's corporations and that 

the same obligations would arise as if they had been between either 

corporation and a third person. 

The cases in which the corporate entity is to be disregarded are 

principally those in which fraud or illegal acts are attempted by 

means of the corporate device. Illustrations of these are Sampsell v. 

Imperial Paper A Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941), and Corn 

Products Refining Company v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554 (C.A. 2, 1956), 

which were cited by the Service. In the former, one Downey 

formed a corporation and transferred to it certain property, not in 

good faith, but for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. When 

Downey became bankrupt, the property of the corporation was considered property of the bankrupt estate. The second case involved 

contracts between a corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, 

and the court held that the existence of a separate corporation entity 

should not be permitted to frustrate the purpose of a federal regulatory statute. 

From its citation of Corn Products Refining Company v. Benson, 

supra, and from the discussion at the oral argument, it appears to 

be the position of the Service that we would be permitting the 

appellant to frustrate a federal statute if Ive allowed Western Tube 

Corporation to file a visa petition on his behalf. We have already 

indicated that the statute does not contain any specific prohibition 

against a corporation filing a visa petition on behalf of an alien 

who is the owner of the corporation. However, if there were such 

a provision and the alien, while still remaining the actual owner of 

the corporation, took steps to divest himself merely of the legal ownership, we would then have a situation comparable to the cited case. 

There is another matter of significance in connection with the 

question of whether there was an attempt to frustrate the purpose 

of the statute. Paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of 8 U.S.C. 1153(a) 

provide for a preference of the first 50 per cent of the quota, the 

next 30 per cent and the remaining 20 percent, respectively. The 

visa petition requested that the appellant be classified as a preference immigrant under paragraph (1) which relates to immigrants 

51 
"whose services are determined * * * to he needed urgently in the 

-United States because of the high education, technical training, 

specialized experience, or exceptional ability of such immigrants and 

to be substantially beneficial prospectively to the national economy, 

cultural interests, or welfare of the United States." Since these 

immigrants were granted the first 50 per cent of the qiiota of each 

quota area, it seems clear that the purpose of 8 U.S.C. 1153(a) (1) 

(A) was to encourage the immigration of such aliens. We believe 

the district director was correct in his finding that the appellant 

possessed the qualifications for first preference mentioned in the 

statute. Hence, we have here the situation where the purpose of 

the statute was accomplished rather than a frustration of the purpose as in Corn Products Refining Company v. Benson, supra. 

The Assistant Commissioner in October 1954 expressed no objection to the filing of a visa petition by a corporation to be created by 

the alien. On the other hand, Western Tube Corporation was incorpated in April 1951 to manufacture steel tubes on the West 

Coast, and on September 21, 1951, the project was certified to be 

necessary in the interest of national defense. At that time, the 

appellant was proceeding with his application for arljnstment of immigration status under the Displaced Persons Act, and on September 26, 1951, the application was granted by the Assistant Commissioner. The Immigration and Nationality Act did not become 

effective until December 24, 1952, and had been enacted on June 27, 

1952. Prior thereto there had been no provision for allowing a first 

preference to persons such as the appellant. We do not believe that 

there can be any question as to the bona tides of the Western Tube 

Corporation undertaking. Hence, the case is not one in which a 

company was organized for the purpose of facilitating the appellant's entry, and there was no connection between the organization 

of the corporation and its subsequent filing of the visa petition. 

In arguing the issue of whether Western Tube Corporation should 

be disregarded as a legal entity and considered as being identical 

with the appellant, the Service and counsel have cited a number of 

federal income tax cases and we have examined certain additional 

tax decisions. It is well settled that a corporation which is wholly 

owned by one taxpayer will be considered a legal entity separate 

and distinct from that taxpayer for income tax purposes National 

Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 319 U.S. 436 

(1943) ; Burnet v. Commonwealth. Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 

(1932)). Usually the owner and his wholly-owned corporation are 

separately taxable. 

At page 96 of its brief, the Service cited Parner v. Commissioner 

of Internal Revenue, 150 F. 2d 334 (C.C.A. 2, 1915). That case 

52 
involved a proceeding to review a decision of the Tax Court on four 

petitions. The four petitioners were the two members of a partnership and two corporations wholly owned by the partners, these 

being Westrich Realty Corporation and Raymep Realty Corporation, 

Inc. The petitioners contended that the corporations were mere 

"dummies" which should be disregarded for income tax purposes. 

The Circuit Court of Appeals at pages 336-337 held that the Raymep 

Realty Corporation was taxable and that Westrich Realty Corporation was not. The contrary conclusions concerning the two whollyowned corporations were based on the fact that Raymep Realty 

Corporation had been active enough to justify holding that it had engaged in business during the year in question whereas the other 

corporation had not. 

The Paymer case illustrates that the income tax decisions turn 

on various specific provisions of the Internal Revenue laws, as for 

example, whether a corporation was doing business during a particular year. For that reason, we do not consider that the income 

tax cases are particularly helpful in reaching a decision concerning 

the appellant except insofar as such cases support the general proposition that a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from 

its stockholders or its sole stockholder. 

To summarize, our views are as follows on the question of whether 

the visa petition was illegally approved. The general rule is that a 

corporation is a legal entity distinct from its sole stockholder. Our 

attention has not been called to any judicial decision which would 

require a conclusion that Western Tube Corporation was precluded 

by law from filing a visa petition on behalf of the appellant, nor 

is there any specific prohibition in the statute. We conclude that 

there is no basis for holding that the District Director's action was 

erroneous nor that he was not authorized by law to approve the visa 

petition. hence, we reject the Government's contention that the 

visa petition was illegally approved. 

IV. Canc/usion 

In addition to the foregoing, there are many other subordinate contentions set. forth in the brief of the Service. Many statements are 

couched as unassailable truths and are to the effect that the appellant has committed a variety of fraudulent and unlawful acts. Actually, they are surmises of the Service, most of which are controverted by the appellant or other evidence. Other matters are so 

remote in time to the present application for admission to the 'united 

States that they obviously have little relevance. Still others are 

vague, unsubstantiated or trivial assertions. We have not discussed 

any of these matters since they do not appear to require specific 

comment.. On the basis of this record and for the reasons indicated 

53 
above, it is our considered opinion that the appellant is not excludable from the United States on any of the grounds stated. Accordingly, we sustain the appeal. 

Order: It is ordered that the appeal be sustained and that the 

appellant be admitted for permanent residence. 

BEFORE THE CENTRAL OFFICE 

(August 26, 1958) 

Discussion: By order dated June 4, 1958, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the excluding decision of the special inquiry officer and directed that the appellant be admitted to the 

United States for permanent residence. 

The Board holds that an applicant for admission to the United 

States is not required to answer questions propounded by an examining officer at a hearing conducted pursuant to section 236 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1226). While the 

Board states that it is unnecessary to decide whether an examining 

officer may be assigned to an exclusion hearing, the effect of the 

decision is to preclude the use of such an officer except with the 

permission and consent of the applicant. 

An applicant for admission should not be permitted to control 

the procedure to be employed. The Service contends that the provisions of the law contain authority for the assignment of an examining officer at an exclusion hearing. Support for this view is 

contained in the Government memorandum and in the oral argument of this case before the Board. Sections 235 and 287(b) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225, 1357(b)) 

authorize immigration officers to take evidence concerning the privilege of any person to enter the United States. This is the function which the eAuniliting officer perfurui8. 

Because of the importance of this issue to the conduct of hearings 

in exclusion proceedings, review by the Attorney General is deemed 

essential. 

Request is hereby made that this case be referred to the Attorney 

General for review pursuant to 8 CFR 6.1(h) (1) (iii). 

BEFORE THE BOARD 

(August 27, 1958) 

Discussion: This case is before us on motion of the Assistant 

Commissioner that the case be referred to the Attorney General 

for review pursuant to 8 CFR 6.1(h) (1) (iii). 

The special inquiry officer had found the appellant inadmissible on 

the three grounds stated above. On June 4, 1958, we sustained the 

appeal after concluding that the appellant was not excludable 

on any of these grounds. The Assistant Commissioner, in his inn54 
tion, raises only one issue, that is, concerning that part of the 

Board's decision which relates to the appellant's willingness to submit to cross-examination by the special inquiry officer and his refusal 

to submit to cross-examination by the examining officer. As we 

indicated thole, he did teelify at xmeiderable length. 

In our decision, we stated that what may be properly termed 

"inspection," as covered by section 235 of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225), is applicable only up to the point 

Where the examining immigration officer makes the decision referred 

to in 8 U.S.C. 1225 (b) either to admit the alien or to detain him 

for further inquiry to be conducted by a special inquiry officer. 

Exhibit 2 shows that the examining immigration officer made this 

decision on DeceMber 16, 1955, when he delivered to the appellant 

Form 1-122 (Notice to Alien Detained for Hearing by Special Inquiry Officer). At this point, the provisions of 8 1'2'26 

come into effect. That section specifically provides for the crossexamination of the alien or witnesses by the special inquiry officer. 

We did not rule on the question of whether an examining officer 

may be assigned to an exclusion hearing and our conclusion was 

merely that, inasmuch as the special inquiry officer failed to perform the duty placed upon him by statute of cross-examining the 

appellant, there could be no justification for his action in drawing 

an adverse inference from the appellant's refusal to submit to 

cross-examination by some other officer. It is this ruling which the 

Assistant Commissioner wishes to have reviewed by the Attorney 

General. 

Order: It is ordered that this case be certified to the Attorney 

General in accordance with 8 CFR 6.1(h) (1) (iii). 

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

(September 5, 1958) 

Order: The order of June 4, 1958, which sustained the alien's 

appeal and directed that he be admitted for permanent residence is 

affirmed, but so much of the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals in this case as held the special inquiry officer to be 

without justification in drawing an adverse inference from the 

alien's refusal to submit to cross-examination by an examining officer 

is disapproved. 

This case is before me in accordance with the provisions of 8 

CFR 6.1(h) (1) (iii) for review of the Board's decision. 

A decision by a special inquiry officer found the alien, a returning resident, to he inadmissible to the United States. Upon appeal, 

the Board declined to sustain any of the charges against the alien. 

The order was, therefore, reversed and the Board entered its order 

'55 
on June 4, 1958, directing that he be admitted to resume his permanent residence. 

Among other conclusions, the Board ruled in its decision that the 

special inquiry vircer had nut been justified in drawing an unfavorable inference from the failure of the alien to answer questions 

put to him by an examining officer assigned to assist of the exclusion hearing. The Board's only objection to this procedure was the 

failure of the special inquiry officer "to perform the duty himself." 

Thus, the effect of the Board's ruling in the case is to cast in 

doubt the use of examining officers to assist in exclusion proceedings. 

the theory being that the special inquiry officer, and he alone, may 

present evidence and ask questions. 

Neither the law nor the regulations require the conclusion which 

the Board has reached. It is recognized that the statutory provisions relating to deportation proceedings mention the assignment of 

an additional immigration officer to present evidence, while the 

provisions relating to exclusion proceedings are without a similar 

provision. But this disparity must be interpreted along with other 

provisions of the law which govern the exclusion of aliens. These, 

together with the regnlAtinnc, vest in the Attorney General and in 

examining officers designated by him, the authority to question applicants for admission to the United States (8 U.S.C. 1225(a), 1357 

(b); 8 CFR 287.1(c) (1) and (3)). 

It has been the administrative practice to assign such examining 

officers to assist in exclusion cases from time to time. No reason 

is presented here which calls for a change in that practice. 

56