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U.S. Department of JusticeP.O. Box 875Washington, DC 20044-0875

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General

Civil Division

Ruth A. Harvey, Director

Kirk Manhardt, Deputy Director 

Matthew Troy (GA Bar No. 717258)

Marc S. Sacks (GA Bar No. 621931)

Danielle A. Pham (CA Bar No. 269915)

Shane Huang (IL Bar No. 6317316)

Trial Attorneys

P.O. Box 875, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044-0875

Telephone: (202) 514-7451

Email: marcus.s.sacks@usdoj.gov

danielle.pham@usdoj.gov

shane.huang@usdoj.gov

David L. Anderson (CA Bar No. 149604)

United States Attorney

Northern District of California

Attorneys for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

In re:

PG&E CORPORATION

-andPACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Debtors,

☐Affects PG&E Corporation

☒Affects Pacific Gas and Electric Company

☐Affects both Debtors

* All papers shall be filed in the Lead Case, 

No. 19-30088 (DM).

Case No.: 19-30088-DM

Chapter 11

(Lead Case)

(Jointly Administered)

RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL 

ENERGY REGULATORY 

COMMISSION TO MOTION BY THE 

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO FOR DETERMINATION 

THAT AUTOMATIC STAY DOES NOT 

APPLY UNDER § 362(B)(4) OR IN THE 

ALTERNATIVE, FOR RELIEF FROM 

THE AUTOMATIC STAY UNDER 

§ 362(D)(1)

[Relates to Dkt. 1535]

Date: May 9, 2019

Time: 9:30 a.m.

Place: Courtroom 17

450 Golden Gate Avenue

16th Floor

San Francisco, California

Judge: Hon. Dennis Montali

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U.S. Department of JusticeP.O. Box 875Washington, DC 20044-0875

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1

BACKGROUND......................................................................................................................1

DISCUSSION ..........................................................................................................................4

I. The San Francisco FERC Proceedings Fall Within the Police and Regulatory Exception 

to the Automatic Stay. ...................................................................................................4

II. Alternatively, Cause Exists to Lift The Automatic Stay with Respect to the San Francisco 

FERC Proceedings Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). ...........................................................8

A. FERC Is a Specialized Tribunal that Has Exclusive Jurisdiction to Adjudicate the 

San Francisco FERC Proceedings Under the FPA. ............................................. 8

B. The Balance of the Hurt Weighs In Favor of Lifting the Automatic Stay. ...........10

C. The Debtors’ Obligation to Comply with Federal Regulations While in 

Bankruptcy Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) Supports Lifting the Stay...............12

CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Atlantic Refining Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York,

360 U.S. 378 (1959)......................................................................................................2, 4, 7

Baker & Drake, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Nev. (In re Baker & Drake, Inc.),

35 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1994) .........................................................................................11, 13

Beker Indus. Corp. v. Fla. Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm’n (In re Beker Indus. Corp.),

57 B.R. 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ...................................................................................11

Berg v. Good Samaritan Hosp. (In re Berg),

230 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) ...........................................................................................5, 6

Briarcliff v. Briarcliff Tenants Ass’n (In re Briarcliff),

15 B.R. 864 (D.N.J. 1981)...................................................................................................13

Butner v. United States,

440 U.S. 48 (1979)..............................................................................................................11

Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc.,

375 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2004) .......................................................................................2, 7, 13

City & County of San Francisco v. PG&E Corp.,

433 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) .......................................................................................5, 6, 7

In re Edison Mission Energy, 502 B.R. 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013)....................................................................... 10, 11, 12

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972)............................................................................................................. 9

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956)............................................................................................................. 1

Fed. Power Comm’n. v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972)............................................................................................................. 3

Gulf States Util. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 411 U.S. 747 (1973)............................................................................................................. 2

Hart v. Massanari,

266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................. 5

Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n,

997 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1993) ...............................................................................................12

In re A Partners, LLC,

344 B.R. 114 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006)................................................................................... 8

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In re Adams Delivery Service, Inc.,

24 B.R. 589 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982)....................................................................................... 7

In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) ...................................................................................... 8

Dingley v. Yellow Logistics, LLC (In re Dingley), 852 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) ...........................................................................................5, 6

In re Hurvitz, 554 B.R. 35 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016)....................................................................................10

In re Kronemeyer, 405 B.R. 915 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2009)..................................................................................... 8

In re Lauriat’s Inc., 219 B.R. 648 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) ..................................................................................13

In re Plumberex Specialties Prods., Inc., 311 B.R. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004) .................................................................................. 8

In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990) .............................................................................................. 8

In re White Crane Trading Co., Inc., 170 B.R. 694 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994)..................................................................................13

La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378 (D.C. Cir. 2008).............................................................................................. 9

Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank,

364 U.S. 603 (1961)............................................................................................................11

Lockyer v. Mirant Corp.,

398 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) ...........................................................................................5, 6

MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald),

755 F.2d 715 (9th Cir.1985) ................................................................................................. 8

Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,

474 U.S. 494 (1986)............................................................................................................13

Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co.,

341 U.S. 246 (1951)............................................................................................................. 2

N.A.A.C.P. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976)......................................................................................................2, 4, 7

N.L.R.B. v. Cont’l Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1991) .........................................................................................4, 6, 7

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967)...........................................................................................2, 3

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Norris Square Civic Ass’n v. Saint Mary Hosp.,

86 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).....................................................................................12

NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165 (2010)............................................................................................................. 2

Palmer v. Webster & Atlas Nat’l Bank of Bos., 312 U.S. 156 (1941)............................................................................................................11

Penn. Elec. Co. v. FERC, 11 F.3d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1993)................................................................................................ 2

Saravia v. 1736 18th Street, N.W., Ltd. Partnership, 844 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).............................................................................................13

Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States (In re Universal Life Church, Inc.),

128 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................. 5

Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. State of Maine, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 128 B.R. 1 (D. Me. 1991)....................................................................................................12

Statutes

11 U.S.C. § 362...............................................................................................................passim

11 U.S.C. § 1129 ....................................................................................................................10

16 U.S.C. § 824...............................................................................................................passim

16 U.S.C. § 824d ..............................................................................................................1, 2, 9

16 U.S.C. § 824e ..............................................................................................................1, 2, 9

16 U.S.C. § 825h ..................................................................................................................... 2

28 U.S.C. § 1452(a)..............................................................................................................5, 8

28 U.S.C. § 959(b)............................................................................................................10, 12

Other Authorities

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,

81 FERC ¶ 61,323 (1997) .................................................................................................... 3

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,

148 FERC ¶ 61,072 (2014)................................................................................................... 3

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,

152 FERC ¶ 61,010 (2015)................................................................................................... 3

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,

167 FERC ¶ 63,009 (2019)................................................................................................... 4

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7 Collier on Bankruptcy P 1108.02 (16th ed. 2018)..................................................................12

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U.S. Department of JusticeP.O. Box 875Washington, DC 20044-0875

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”) hereby 

responds to the City and County of San Francisco’s (“San Francisco”) Motion for Determination 

that Automatic Stay Does Not Apply Under § 362(b)(4) or in the Alternative, for Relief from the 

Automatic Stay under § 362(d)(1) (the “Motion”). FERC files this Response to join in the relief 

requested by San Francisco and advise the Court that the FERC proceedings at issue in the Motion,

which arise under Sections 205, 206, and other provisions of the Federal Power Act (the “San 

Francisco FERC Proceedings”), are exempt from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4). In the 

alternative, to the extent that the Court may disagree with FERC that the San Francisco FERC 

Proceedings are exempt from the automatic stay, FERC submits this Response requesting that the 

Court lift the stay to permit the San Francisco FERC Proceedings to continue in the ordinary 

course.

BACKGROUND

In enacting the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), Congress declared that the provision of electric 

energy in interstate commerce is “affected with the public interest.” 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). Congress 

thus developed a comprehensive regulatory framework for protecting the public interest and 

created FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, to implement it. Fed. Power 

Comm’n v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) (“the purpose of the power given 

[FERC under the FPA] is the protection of the public interest.”). In furtherance of its public policy 

mission, FERC is vested with exclusive authority to regulate rates, terms, and conditions for 

interstate transmission and wholesale sales of electric energy. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824d, 824e. 

All proposed rates, terms, and conditions for interstate transmissions and wholesale power 

sales must be filed with the Commission and are subject to the Commission’s regulatory control. 

Id. §§ 824d(c), 824e. Under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA, the Commission has exclusive 

authority to review proposed, as well as previously filed, rates, terms and conditions to ensure they

are “just and reasonable” and “not unduly discriminatory or preferential.” Id. §§ 824d, 824e. 

Where it deems such rates, terms and conditions to be unlawful, the Commission may reject or 

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change them. Id. §§ 824d, 824e. Once rates for wholesale electric energy sales or interstate 

transmission are filed with FERC, they carry the force of law. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Util. Co. 

v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) (a party “can claim no rate as a legal 

right that is other than the filed rate, whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission, and not 

even a court can authorize commerce in the commodity on other terms.”); Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. 

Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (electric tariffs are “the equivalent of federal 

regulation”). No entity may engage in interstate commerce at anything other than the existing filed 

rate and the Commission has broad remedial authority to address violations of the filed rate, 

including ordering refunds. 16 U.S.C. § 825h; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Power 

Comm’n, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

The Supreme Court has reiterated that the Commission’s enforcement of the FPA protects 

the interests of the electricity-consuming public by ensuring stability and predictability, by 

preventing unjust and unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory or preferential rates in the 

electricity markets. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976) (stating that 

the “principal purpose” of the FPA is to protect consumers through the “orderly development of 

plentiful supplies of electricity at reasonable prices”); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 

of New York, 360 U.S. 378, 389 (1959) (noting the “overriding intent of the Congress to give full 

protective coverage to the consumer as to price”); cf. NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Me. Pub. 

Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 175 (2010) (observing that FERC’s promotion of market stability 

was, in certain contexts, “critical to maintaining reliability”) (internal citation and quotation 

omitted). The Supreme Court has also identified the FPA’s purposes to “curb abusive practices of 

public utility companies by bringing them under effective control, and to provide effective federal 

regulation of the expanding business of transmitting and selling electric power.” Gulf States Util. 

Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973); see also Penn. Elec. Co. v. FERC, 11 F.3d 

207, 210 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (FERC has the “duty of conducting an independent review of rates” 

under the assumption “that public utilities may abuse their market power”). The Commission’s

statutory authority in protecting the “public interest” is liberally construed. See, e.g., Gulf States, 

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411 U.S. at 757-58; see also, Fed. Power Comm’n. v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 406 U.S. 

621, 642 (1972) (stating that the Commission has broad authority to make “pragmatic adjustments” 

based on circumstances); Niagara Mohawk, 379 F.2d at 158–59 (finding that the Commission has 

implied as well as express authority to implement statutory purposes).

As relevant here, in 1997, Debtor Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (“PG&E” or “Debtor”) filed

with the Commission its Wholesale Distribution Tariff (“WDT”), which provides the rates, terms, 

and conditions of PG&E’s FERC-jurisdictional wholesale distribution service to customers. The 

Commission accepted PG&E’s filing, making the WDT the filed rate and therefore binding. Pac. 

Gas & Elec. Co., 81 FERC ¶ 61,323 (1997). The most recent changes to the WDT were approved 

by FERC in uncontested offers of settlement that PG&E filed in 2014 and 2015 in Docket No. 

ER11-1388. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 152 FERC ¶ 61,010 (2015); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 148 FERC 

¶ 61,072 (2014). 

To receive service under the WDT, a customer enters into a service agreement with PG&E 

that specifies the services to be provided, as well as the associated charges for the service. San 

Francisco is a customer of PG&E under the WDT. Over the past several years, San Francisco and 

PG&E have been parties to proceedings pending before the Commission with respect to the 

wholesale distribution service provided by PG&E (i.e., the San Francisco FERC Proceedings).

Specifically, in October 2014, San Francisco filed a complaint under sections 206 and 306 of the 

FPA against PG&E, contending that PG&E would unreasonably deny San Francisco service as the 

city transitioned from grandfathered service provided by PG&E pursuant to older contracts to 

service under the WDT. The Commission consolidated this complaint with related section 205 

filings submitted by PG&E, including the filing of an unexecuted service agreement with San 

Francisco under the WDT. In addition, San Francisco has protested several quarterly filings PG&E

made under section 205 of the FPA that identify new, changed, or canceled points of delivery 

receiving wholesale distribution service, as well as section 205 filings PG&E made seeking to 

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revise the underlying service agreement.1 The Commission set those filings for hearing and 

settlement judge procedures.2 Finally, on January 28, 2019, San Francisco filed a complaint 

pursuant to sections 206, 306, and 309 of the FPA against PG&E, which alleges that PG&E has 

unreasonably denied service to San Francisco under the WDT, and that PG&E is administering 

the WDT in an unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory manner.

DISCUSSION

I. The San Francisco FERC Proceedings Fall Within the Police and Regulatory 

Exception to the Automatic Stay.

FERC proceedings under the FPA fall within the police and regulatory exception to the 

automatic stay, because FERC’s enforcement of the FPA protects the broader public interest in 

reliable electric power and stable electric markets. N.A.A.C.P., 425 U.S. at 670 (stating that the 

“principal purpose” of the FPA is to protect consumers through the “orderly development of 

plentiful supplies of electricity at reasonable prices”); Atlantic Refining Co, 360 U.S. at389 (noting 

the “overriding intent to the Congress to give full protective coverage to the consumer as to price”). 

Courts have relied on two tests for determining whether an administrative proceeding falls within 

the police and regulatory exception of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4): the “pecuniary purpose” test and the 

“public policy” test. N.L.R.B. v. Cont’l Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1991).

 1 San Francisco filed protests in the following proceedings involving section 205 filings 

by PG&E: Docket Nos. ER17-910, ER17-1509, ER17-2181, ER17-2406, ER18-198, ER18-768, 

ER18-790, ER18-1102, and ER18-1482.

2 On April 16, 2019, the Settlement Judge in the section 205 dockets certified an 

uncontested partial settlement in those proceedings (Partial Settlement). Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 167 FERC ¶ 63,009 (2019). The Partial Settlement fully resolves issues in Docket Nos. ER17- 2406, ER18-198, ER18-768, ER18-790, and ER18-1482. The Partial Settlement resolves issues 

in Docket Nos. ER17-910, ER17-1509, and ER17-2181, and does not resolve issues in Docket 

No. ER18-1102. The Partial Settlement is currently pending before FERC.

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“Satisfaction of either test will suffice to exempt the action from the reach of the automatic stay.”3

City & County of San Francisco v. PG&E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006).4

The pecuniary purpose test inquires whether the action “primarily seeks to protect the 

government’s pecuniary interest.” San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1124. Notably, the pecuniary 

purpose test looks to the pecuniary interest of a governmental unit, not to the pecuniary interests 

of any private parties to the proceeding. See Berg v. Good Samaritan Hosp. (In re Berg), 230 F.3d 

1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting “an overly-literal interpretation of the phrase ‘pecuniary 

purpose test’” that would find the police and regulatory exception inapplicable merely because the 

funds would “inure to the benefit of a private party”); see also San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1125 

(concluding that the pecuniary interest test favored regulatory agencies because government units 

would “receive no pecuniary advantage”); Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States (In re 

Universal Life Church, Inc.), 128 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing the pecuniary 

purpose test as relating to “a pecuniary interest of the government unit”). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that the pecuniary purpose test exempts state court contempt proceedings for litigation 

misconduct, in part because the state court itself had no pecuniary interest in enforcing monetary 

sanctions. Dingley v. Yellow Logistics, LLC (In re Dingley), 852 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2017).

 3 The Official Committee for Unsecured Creditors (the “UCC”) incorrectly argues that 

“[c]ourts only invoke the police and regulatory power exception if both [the pecuniary purpose 

and public policy tests] are satisfied.” Dkt. 1813, at 3 (citing In re Dingley, 852 F.3d 1143, 1147 

(9th Cir. 2017)). Contrary to the UCC’s argument, the Dingley opinion directly quotes San 

Francisco’s holding that “[s]atisfaction of either test will suffice to exempt the action from the 

reach of the automatic stay.” Dingley, 852 F.3d at 1146 (quoting San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 

1124). To the extent that Dingley can be read to require the regulatory agency to satisfy both 

tests, rather than either test, such a reading would conflict with prior precedent. See Lockyer v. 

Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A suit comes within the exception of 

§ 362(b)(4) if it satisfies either test.”); Universal Life Church, 128 F.3d at 1297 (“The question in 

this case is whether [a governmental action] meets either test. We hold that it meets both.”). 

Thus, under this Circuit’s prior panel precedent rule, the earlier cases bind this Court. See, e.g., 

Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Once a panel resolves an issue in a 

precedential opinion, the matter is deemed resolved, unless overruled by the court itself sitting en 

banc, or by the Supreme Court.”).

4 In San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the phrase “police and regulatory power” 

within the context of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), and held that the phrase has the same

meaning in that provision as it does in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

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Here, FERC has no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the San Francisco FERC

Proceedings. For example, San Francisco’s January 28, 2019 administrative complaint requests 

that FERC “direct PG&E to comply with its [filed tariffs]” by providing service in a manner 

determined by certain technical criteria. Mapes Decl. Ex. B, Dkt. # 1538-3, at 33-36. In addition, 

San Francisco seeks refunds of “excess costs” incurred by San Francisco to comply with allegedly 

improper demands by PG&E. Id. at 36. FERC is not a market participant, so FERC’s decision 

whether to issue any such order would not have any bearing on FERC’s own pecuniary interests.

See San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1125. Therefore, under the pecuniary purpose test, the San 

Francisco FERC Proceedings are exempt from the automatic stay. See Dingley, 852 F.3d at 1147; 

Berg, 230 F.3d at 1168.

In the alternative,5 the public policy test6 exempts the San Francisco FERC Proceedings 

from the automatic stay. Courts applying the public policy test determine “whether the government 

seeks to effectuate public policy or to adjudicate private rights.” San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1125 

(quoting Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005); Continental Hagen, 932 

F.2d at 833) (internal quotation marks omitted). Proceedings that primarily advance public policy 

are exempt from the stay, even if resolution of the claims would incidentally benefit private parties. 

See Dingley, 852 F.3d at 1147 (sanctions for litigation misconduct effectuate public policy in 

deterring unprofessional misconduct, even if “sanctions award is ultimately payable to a private 

party”); San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1126 (civil restitution claims were “fundamentally law 

enforcement actions designed to protect the public,” even if “a successful result for the 

governmental entities may well result in money being paid to private parties”); Berg, 230 F.3d at 

1168 (“[A]lthough private parties may benefit financially from sanctions, the deterrent effect of 

 5 Courts need not conduct an inquiry under the public policy test if the proceeding in 

question satisfies the pecuniary interest test. See San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1125 (“Given that 

the governmental entities have satisfied the pecuniary interest test, it is unnecessary for us to 

reach the question of whether the restitution claim also satisfies the ‘public policy’ test.”).

6 Some cases refer to the public policy test as the “public purpose” test. See Lockyer v. 

Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2005).

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monetary penalties can be essential for the government to protect its regulatory interests.”); 

Continental Hagen, 932 F.2d at 834 (holding that NLRB proceedings further the public policy of 

federal labor laws, even in entering judgment for back pay to employees). Thus, even when acting 

in response to private complaints, public agencies engaged in a regulatory oversight function pass 

the public policy test when such agencies act upon such complaints in their own name. See, e.g., 

Continental Hagen, 932 F.2d at 834 (finding NLRB actions exempt from automatic stay because

the NLRB ”determine[s] which complaints it will act upon in its own name”). 

In this case, the San Francisco FERC Proceedings serve FERC’s public policy mission, 

consistent with the explicit Congressional declaration “that the business of transmitting and selling 

electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest.” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 824(a). To that end, FERC does not act as a mere forum where private parties submit their 

disputes, but rather exercises its power to protect the broader interests of third parties and of the 

public. SeeN.A.A.C.P., 425 U.S. at 670 (stating that the “principal purpose” of the FPA is to protect 

consumers through the “orderly development of plentiful supplies of electricity at reasonable 

prices”); Atlantic Refining Co, 360 U.S. at 389 (noting Congressional intent to protect consumers). 

FERC therefore does not merely adjudicate private rights, but rather enforces its regulations, 

analogous to how the National Labor Relations Board “determines which complaints it will act 

upon in its own name.” Continental Hagen, 932 F.2d at 834 (quoting In re Adams Delivery Service, 

Inc., 24 B.R. 589, 592 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982)); see also Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 839 (“Once filed with 

a federal agency, such tariffs are the equivalent of a federal regulation.”) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Thus, the incidental benefits that may flow to a complaining party, such as

San Francisco, do not transform the FERC proceedings into mere adjudication of private rights. 

Rather, the San Francisco FERC Proceedings are “designed to protect the public,” and therefore 

satisfy the public policy test. San Francisco, 433 F.3d at 1126. Thus, the FERC proceedings are

exempt from the automatic stay.

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II. Alternatively, Cause Exists to Lift The Automatic Stay with Respect to the San 

Francisco FERC Proceedings Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

To the extent the police and regulatory exception does not apply the San Francisco FERC 

Proceedings, the Court should lift the automatic stay so that those proceedings may continue before 

FERC under section 362(d)(1). On a request from a party in interest, the bankruptcy court shall

grant relief from the automatic stay, such as terminating, annulling, or modifying such stay, for 

“cause.” See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). “Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 

‘cause,’” relief from the stay is determined on a “case by case basis.” MacDonald v. MacDonald 

(In re MacDonald), 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir.1985); see also In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.2d 

1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990); In re A Partners, LLC, 344 B.R. 114, 127 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006) 

(“The term ‘cause’ as used in § 362(d)(1) ‘is a broad and flexible concept which permits a 

bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, to respond to inherently fact-sensitive situations.”).

In analyzing whether “cause” exists, courts have been guided by the twelve factors set forth 

in In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984). However, this list is non-exhaustive, and not 

all factors must be present for the court to find “cause” to grant relief from stay. See In re 

Kronemeyer, 405 B.R. 915, 921 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2009); In re Plumberex Specialties Prods., Inc., 

311 B.R. 551, 559 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004). FERC submits that San Francisco demonstrates ample 

“cause” for the court to modify the automatic stay to permit the San Francisco FERC Proceedings 

to move forward. In addition to the Curtis factors described in the Motion, the Court should 

consider the following additional factors, which also weigh in favor of granting relief from stay.

A. FERC Is a Specialized Tribunal that Has Exclusive Jurisdiction to 

Adjudicate the San Francisco FERC Proceedings Under the FPA.

The fourth Curtisfactor (another tribunal better suited to determination of the issue) weighs 

heavily in favor of granting relief from stay. Only FERC has the legal authority and technical 

expertise to decide the regulatory issues at the center of the San Francisco FERC Proceedings.

Specifically, San Francisco describes three categories of issues raised in those proceedings: “(1) 

issues related to the scope of San Francisco’s eligibility for service under the terms of the WDT 

and Federal Power Act, (2) issues related to PG&E’s quarterly filings to FERC about particular 

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points of delivery under the WDT, and (3) issues related to PG&E’s refusal to provide wholesale 

distribution service at secondary voltage levels consistent with the terms of its WDT.” Mot. at 2. 

These issues all require an interpretation of the WDT that was filed with FERC, and FERC is the 

Congressionally-created, specialized tribunal designated to decide such questions. See 16 U.S.C. 

§§ 824, 824d, 824e. Moreover, the FPA vests FERC with the exclusive jurisdiction to ensure that 

the WDT is “just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory” against one customer or another so 

these claims must be brought to FERC in the first instance. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). In contrast, 

the Bankruptcy Code does not provide this court with jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute regarding 

interpretation of a FERC-jurisdictional tariff. Unlike in instances where the bankruptcy court’s 

claims administration process replaces liquidation of claims through litigation, San Francisco 

would have no alternative avenue in this case to seek enforcement of a FERC-jurisdictional tariff 

because FERC has the exclusive authority to decide contested issues regarding filed tariffs. 

FERC also has the specialized knowledge required to adjudicate the San Francisco FERC 

Proceedings. San Francisco and the Debtors dispute whether the Debtors are in compliance with 

the WDT filed with FERC, which is the filed rate. FERC has developed decades-long technical 

expertise to adjudicate the San Francisco FERC Proceedings and is uniquely positioned to interpret 

the filed tariff because it is the Commission’s mission to ensure that the terms of filed tariffs are

not unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. 

FERC, 522 F.3d 378, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (the FPA “calls upon FERC to make fact-intensive 

judgment calls on the basis of its superior technical expertise”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power 

& Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 644 (1972) (“factual questions [are] within the area of competence of 

an administrative agency created by Congress, and when resolution of that question depends on 

‘engineering and scientific’ considerations, we recognize the relevant agency’s technical expertise 

and experience, and defer to its analysis”). Because of the foregoing, FERC’s expertise with 

respect to the San Francisco FERC Proceedings weighs heavily in favor of granting relief from 

stay.

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B. The Balance of the Hurt Weighs In Favor of Lifting the Automatic Stay. 

The twelfth Curtis factor (balance of hurt) weighs heavily in favor of lifting the stay 

because the harm to the public interest of non-compliance with the FPA outweighs the costs to the 

estates of litigating the San Francisco FERC Proceedings. 

The stay, if applicable, would do nothing more than delay, rather than absolve, the estate 

from incurring the expenses related to the FERC Proceedings. To the extent the San Francisco 

FERC Proceedings are stayed by section 362(a), the stay will terminate after a plan of 

reorganization goes effective and these regulatory proceedings will continue at that point. See 11 

U.S.C. § 362(c). Once the stay is terminated, the Debtors will have all the same statutory and 

regulatory obligations with respect to the FPA, including compliance obligations under its FERCfiled tariffs. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). Not to mention, the rates under the WDT will stay in place 

because the Bankruptcy Code does not permit the Debtors to change rates under any plan without 

FERC approval. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(6). Therefore, at most, the automatic stay delays these 

proceedings until the effective date of a plan, and the estates will have to incur the expense of these 

regulatory proceedings in the future and in the meantime, they must continue to comply with their 

post-petition regulatory obligations. Cf. In re Hurvitz, 554 B.R. 35, 40 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016)

(granting relief from stay where an obligation to comply with noncompetition provisions could not 

be discharged). However, such a delay is not appropriate here because there is comparatively 

significant harm done to the public interest by holding the enforcement of the FPA in suspense 

while the Debtors remain in bankruptcy.

In re Edison Mission Energy is instructive in analyzing whether “cause” exists to grant 

relief from stay for parties to seek enforcement of regulatory obligations. See 502 B.R. 830, 837-

41 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013). In that case, the Sierra Club brought a prepetition suit to enforce 

compliance with environmental regulations. Id. The Court agreed that the Debtors “will not be 

greatly prejudiced” because granting relief from stay would “merely expedite . . . compliance with 

environmental obligations that will continue to be in effect upon the Debtors’ emergence from 

bankruptcy.” Id. The court stated that it “fails to see how requiring [the debtor] to take immediate 

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action to address alleged environmental violations would be prejudicial to the Debtors.” Id. at 837-

38. Comparing the “de minimus” harm to the Debtors, the court found that the environmental 

concerns and the harm to the public weighed against having the automatic stay in effect. Id. at 839.

Compared to the limited “hurt” to the Debtors, FERC, market participants, and the public 

will suffer irreparable harm if the regulatory process is stayed. If FERC were unable to commence 

or continue administrative proceedings to enforce compliance with filed rates, the automatic stay 

would seriously undermine the public policy goals of the FPA. Furthermore, the Debtors would 

receive an unfair advantage by being able to operate in a highly-regulated business but cherrypicking which regulations they must comply with. Under the Bankruptcy Code, Congress carefully 

balanced the protections available in bankruptcy so that bankruptcy proceedings would not be 

havens for debtors to avoid regulatory compliance merely because it is not economical. See Baker 

& Drake, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Nev. (In re Baker & Drake, Inc.), 35 F.3d 1348, 1354 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (“Congress’s purpose in enacting the Bankruptcy Code was not to mandate that every 

company be reorganized at all costs, but rather to establish a preference for reorganizations, where 

they are legally feasible and economically practical.”). Furthermore, “[a]n ongoing business is not 

to be given a competitive edge merely by virtue of its attempt to reorganize under Chapter 11.” 

Beker Indus. Corp. v. Fla. Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm’n (In re Beker Indus. Corp.), 57 

B.R. 611, 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Palmer v. Webster & Atlas Nat’l Bank of Bos., 312 

U.S. 156, 163 (1941)). The Debtors should not be relieved of regulatory obligations just by filing 

for bankruptcy and, as a result, receive a “windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of 

bankruptcy.” Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 

364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). In contrast, if the Debtors are granted a temporary exemption from

their WDT, other parties that transact business with the Debtors under the WDT (such as San 

Francisco) would be harmed, which could have impact on end users. As a result, the balance of 

harms weighs in favor of lifting the stay to allow the San Francisco FERC Proceedings to continue.

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C. The Debtors’ Obligation to Comply with Federal Regulations While in 

Bankruptcy Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) Supports Lifting the Stay.

The Court may also lift the stay for “cause” based upon the Debtors’ obligations under 28 

U.S.C. § 959(b), which mandates that the Debtors must manage and operate property in their 

possession “according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is 

situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound if in possession 

thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). “[S]ection 959(b) operates as a weighty policy consideration that 

will in many circumstances require a bankruptcy court to grant relief from the automatic stay, if it 

is requested, so that a state may enforce its laws.” Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers’ 

Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 592 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Bankruptcy does not grant debtors rights greater than 

those they would receive outside bankruptcy.”); see also Norris Square Civic Ass’n v. Saint Mary 

Hosp., 86 B.R. 393, 398 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (“[I]t is inescapable to avoid the conclusion that 

28 U.S.C. § 959(b) requires a debtor to conform with applicable federal, state, and local law in 

conducting its business.”); 7 Collier on Bankruptcy P 1108.02 (16th ed. 2018) (noting that although 

28 U.S.C. § 959(b) “in deference to longstanding principles of federalism and comity, refers only 

to valid ‘state’ laws, it is clear that a business must be operated in accordance with federal 

nonbankruptcy laws as well”).

Section 959(b) ensures that the Debtors remain bound by generally applicable 

nonbankruptcy law while in bankruptcy. For example, in Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. State of 

Maine, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 128 B.R. 1 (D. Me. 1991), the district court relied upon section 959(b) 

to overturn a bankruptcy court’s injunction preventing the state from denying the debtor an air 

emission license. The court found “no exception [under section 959(b)] for debtors who would be 

inconvenienced or burdened by State laws” and explained that the Supreme Court held section 

959(b) was “evidence of congressional intent that debtors in possession comply with states’ 

environmental laws.” Id. at 2. Moreover, “[n]othing in the general language of section 105 suggests 

that Congress intended it to override the specific prohibition of section 959(b).” Id. at 3; see In re 

Edison Mission Energy, 502 B.R. at 838 (holding that the Sierra Club’s pending regulatory action 

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before the state pollution control board against a debtor affiliate for excess sulfur dioxide emissions 

was exempt from the automatic stay).

Thus, with respect to section 959(b), Debtor remains obligated to comply with the terms 

of its filed WDT throughout the bankruptcy.7 Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 839 (“Once filed with a federal 

agency, such tariffs are the equivalent of a federal regulation.”) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Debtor’s obligation to comply with the WDT continues throughout the 

bankruptcy, just as a debtor may not conduct an asset sale that violates state consumer protection 

laws, In re Lauriat’s Inc., 219 B.R. 648, 649 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998), In re White Crane Trading 

Co., Inc., 170 B.R. 694, 702 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994), increase rents that violate state rent control 

laws, Briarcliff v. Briarcliff Tenants Ass’n (In re Briarcliff), 15 B.R. 864, 866 (D.N.J. 1981), be 

relieved of a “public obligation . . . going to health and safety” to maintain an apartment building’s 

habitability, Saravia v. 1736 18th Street, N.W., Ltd. Partnership, 844 F.2d 823, 825-26 (D.C. Cir.

1988), or abandon property in violation of environmental protection laws, Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. 

N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986). These regulatory laws remain binding on the 

debtor’s estate, even if the burden makes a reorganization more difficult. See Baker & Drake, Inc., 

35 F.3d at 1354. While the question of whether Debtor has indeed violated its WDT is undecided, 

section 959(b) requires Debtor to continue to comply with the filed tariff while in bankruptcy. 

FERC should therefore retain the authority to evaluate Debtor’s compliance with its filed WDT in 

the San Francisco FERC Proceedings.

 7 FERC takes no position, at this time, on the merits of the underlying San Francisco 

FERC Proceedings, or whether Debtor has complied with the terms and conditions of its WDT.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should confirm that the automatic stay does not apply 

to the San Francisco FERC Proceedings, or, in the alternative, the Court should lift the automatic 

stay and permit the San Francisco FERC Proceedings to continue.

Dated: May 3, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH H. HUNT

Assistant Attorney General

RUTH A. HARVEY

Director

KIRK MANHARDT

Deputy Director

DAVID L. ANDERSON 

United States Attorney

Northern District of California

/s/Shane Huang

MATTHEW TROY (GA Bar No. 717258)

MARC S. SACKS (GA Bar No. 621931)

DANIELLE A. PHAM (CA Bar No. 269915) 

SHANE HUANG (IL Bar No. 7316316)

Trial Attorneys

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division

P.O. Box 875, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044-0875

Telephone: (202) 616-0341

Facsimile: (202) 514-9163

E-mail: shane.huang@usdoj.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR THE FEDERAL 

ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

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