[Cite as In re D.J., 2023-Ohio-3523.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: D.J. C.A. No. 30185

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE No. DL 11 11 2532

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 29, 2023

FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, D.J., appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court 

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. This Court 

affirms.

I.

{¶2} When D.J. was fifteen years old, he anally raped his three-year old sister. She died 

from her injuries. D.J. was charged with rape and felony murder. The juvenile court adjudicated 

him delinquent. The court found him to be a serious youthful offender. It imposed a blended 

sentence. D.J. was committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”) until his 

twenty-first birthday. The juvenile court also imposed an adult sentence of life in prison with 

parole eligibility after twenty-five years. The court stayed the adult sentence on the condition that 

D.J. successfully complete his juvenile disposition. At the time of his disposition, D.J. was 

seventeen years old.
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{¶3} Less than two months before D.J.’s twenty-first birthday, the State moved to invoke 

the adult portion of his sentence. The juvenile court held an invocation hearing. The court then

granted the State’s motion. The court sentenced D.J. to life in prison with parole eligibility after 

twenty-five years. D.J. appealed. This Court affirmed the juvenile court’s invocation judgment. 

In re D.J., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28472, 28473, 2018-Ohio-569.

{¶4} While his appeal was pending, D.J. filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The 

juvenile court dismissed his petition based on res judicata. D.J. appealed. This Court affirmed the 

juvenile court’s judgment on other grounds. In re D.J., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29119, 2019-Ohio2988. D.J. later moved for reconsideration, and we agreed to reconsider his appeal. In re D.J., 

9th Dist. Summit No. 29119 (June 16, 2020). On reconsideration, we reversed a portion of the 

juvenile court’s judgment. In re D.J., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29119, 2020-Ohio-3528, ¶ 18-22. We 

remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 22.

{¶5} On remand, the juvenile court once again dismissed D.J.’s petition for postconviction relief. The court rejected the petition because it did not set forth sufficient operative 

facts justifying relief. D.J. appealed. At oral argument, this Court questioned whether the juvenile 

court still had jurisdiction over D.J. We noted that D.J. had filed his petition after his twenty-first 

birthday. This Court ordered the parties to brief the jurisdictional issue. Our order terminated the 

assignment to the panel to allow the parties time to respond. 

{¶6} D.J. and the State have filed supplemental briefs addressing the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction. D.J.’s appeal is now before this Court. It contains one assignment of error for review. 
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II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN DENYING D.J.’S POST-CONVICTION 

PETITION ON THE GROUNDS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL.

{¶7} In his assignment of error, D.J. argues the juvenile court erred when it dismissed 

his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that his petition had merit. Because the juvenile 

court lacked jurisdiction to consider D.J.’s petition, we affirm its judgment of dismissal on other 

legally correct grounds. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Oberlin City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn., 9th Dist. 

Lorain No. 08CA009517, 2009-Ohio-3526, ¶ 13.

{¶8} The subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court is “a question of law which this 

Court reviews de novo.” In re J.L.M., 9th Dist. Summit No. 28867, 2018-Ohio-2175, ¶ 9. 

“Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate 

a particular class or type of case.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23. It 

“can never be waived and may be raised at any time, by any party, or sua sponte by the court.” 

Sunrise Cooperative, Inc. v. Joppeck, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 16CA010984, 2017-Ohio-7654, ¶ 9. 

“This is because jurisdiction is a condition precedent to the court’s ability to hear the case. If a 

court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.” State ex rel. Jones v. 

Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75 (1998).

{¶9} “A juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction only if expressly granted the authority 

to do so by statute.” Rowell v. Smith, 133 Ohio St.3d 288, 2012-Ohio-4313, ¶ 13. “The general 

rule is that a juvenile court has jurisdiction over juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent 

until they reach the age of 21 * * *.” In re R.B., 162 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-5476, ¶ 27. 

Accord R.C. 2152.02(C)(6). “The obvious flip side of that statement is that juvenile courts do not 
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have jurisdiction over adjudicated delinquents once they are 21 years old.” In re J.V., 134 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 23.

{¶10} D.J. turned twenty-one in November 2016. He did not file his petition for postconviction relief until January 29, 2018. There is no dispute that he filed his petition after his 

twenty-first birthday. The only question is whether the juvenile court had subject matter 

jurisdiction to rule on his petition.

{¶11} The Supreme Court has recognized that, in limited instances, a juvenile court may 

issue rulings beyond a juvenile’s twenty-first birthday. In State ex rel. N.A. v. Cross, the Supreme 

Court found that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to proceed with a delinquency case even though 

the juvenile therein had turned twenty-one. 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471. N.A. successfully 

appealed his initial adjudication and turned twenty-one before the juvenile court could conclude 

his adjudication proceedings on remand. Id. at ¶ 4. The Supreme Court found N.A. was still a 

“child” by statute because his offense occurred before he turned 18 and his delinquency proceeding 

was a “hearing on [his] complaint” under that subdivision. Id. at ¶ 10, quoting R.C. 2152.02(C)(2). 

Further, the Supreme Court found that the jurisdictional age cap set forth in R.C. 2152.02(C)(6) 

did not apply to N.A. because he had not been adjudicated delinquent before turning eighteen. Id.

at ¶ 11. While N.A.’s age would prevent the juvenile court from committing him to ODYS, the 

Supreme Court found his age was not a barrier to the juvenile court’s continued exercise of 

jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 12-14. 

{¶12} The Supreme Court also has found that juvenile courts have statutory authority to 

review previously imposed juvenile sex offender classifications after juveniles turn twenty-one. 

In re R.B., 162 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-5476, ¶ 3. In In re R.B., the Court held that R.C. 

2151.23(A)(15) “grants the juvenile court ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ to carry out its 
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obligations under the sex offender-classification statutes * * *.” Id. at ¶ 28, quoting R.C. 

2151.23(A). If a juvenile court complies with the classification statutes, it may continue to exercise 

its jurisdiction for “as long as the classification remains in effect * * *.” In re R.B. at ¶ 30. Thus, 

In re R.B. recognized that specific statutes can provide independent authority for a juvenile court’s 

exercise of jurisdiction after a delinquent child turns twenty-one. Id. at ¶ 32. 

{¶13} When delinquency proceedings have concluded and no independent statutory 

authority exists for a juvenile court’s continued exercise of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has 

repeatedly found that juvenile courts lose jurisdiction once an adjudicated delinquent turns twentyone. See In re A.W., 160 Ohio St.3d 193, 2020-Ohio-1457 (juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to 

invoke adult portion of serious youthful offender sentence after adjudicated delinquent turns 

twenty-one); State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697 (juvenile 

court lacks jurisdiction to perform an initial sex offender classification once disposition complete 

and adjudicated delinquent turns twenty-one); In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961 

(juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to hold new sentencing hearing to correct disposition and impose 

post-release control after adjudicated delinquent turns twenty-one). Those cases comport with the 

plain language of R.C. 2152.02(C)(6). That statute provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he juvenile 

court has jurisdiction over a person who is adjudicated a delinquent child * * * prior to attaining 

eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty-one years of age * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

{¶14} D.J. was adjudicated delinquent before he turned eighteen. Thus, R.C. 

2152.02(C)(6) applied to him. The juvenile court only had jurisdiction over D.J. until he turned 

twenty-one. Compare State ex rel. N.A., 125 Ohio St.3d 6, 2010-Ohio-1471, at ¶ 10-11. Further, 

any proceedings the juvenile court held on his petition for post-conviction relief did not qualify as 

a “hearing on [his] complaint” under R.C. 2152.02(C)(2). See State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste at ¶ 20 
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(agreeing that “a ‘hearing on the complaint’ [under] R.C. 2152.02(C)(2) is limited to matters of 

adjudication”). “A post-conviction proceeding is a collateral civil attack” on a previously imposed 

judgment. State v. Tayse, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30456, 2023-Ohio-1354, ¶ 8. It is not an extension 

of the proceedings on the underlying judgment. See id. While the post-conviction relief statute 

allows a person adjudicated delinquent to seek post-conviction relief, it does not alter the subject 

matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See Former R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a). Nor does R.C. 

2151.23 expressly grant the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction to conduct postconviction proceedings. Compare In re R.B., 162 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-5476, ¶ 28. Because 

D.J. filed his petition for post-conviction relief after he turned twenty-one, the juvenile court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider it. See In re A.W. at ¶ 8; In re J.V. at ¶ 22-24. See also In re T.L., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 100328, 2014-Ohio-1840, ¶ 12-13.

{¶15} In his supplemental brief, D.J. argues that, if he cannot pursue post-conviction 

relief, “then the invocation statute is unconstitutional as applied to him given there are no other 

means for [him] to raise the ineffective assistance constitutional violations at issue in this appeal.” 

This Court is not persuaded by his argument for three reasons. First, the invocation statute merely 

permits the juvenile court to invoke the adult portion of a person’s serious youthful offender 

dispositional sentence. See R.C. 2152.14(E)(1). The question of what, if any, remedies are 

available to a person adjudicated delinquent once the juvenile court invokes the person’s sentence 

is a separate issue. Second, “[s]tate collateral review itself is not a constitutional right.” State v. 

Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281 (1999). It is a statutory construct. A petitioner seeking postconviction review “receives no more rights than those granted by the statute.” Id. Neither the 

post-conviction relief statute nor the statutes governing the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 

currently provide the juvenile court with the authority to consider D.J.’s petition. See Discussion, 
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supra. Finally, and relatedly, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that certain avenues of relief 

may be closed to juveniles based on principles of statutory construction. In In re T.A., the Supreme 

Court held that the plain language of App.R. 26(B) does not afford juvenile offenders the ability 

to argue that they did not receive effective assistance of appellate counsel pursuant to that rule. 

171 Ohio St.3d 44, 2022-Ohio-4173, ¶ 22. While the Supreme Court recommended the rule be 

amended to permit juveniles to pursue applications to reopen, the Supreme Court interpreted the 

rule as currently written. See id. at ¶ 22-23. This Court likewise must interpret the applicable 

statutes herein as written. Absent a legislative amendment to the statutes governing the jurisdiction 

of the juvenile court or the post-conviction relief statute, we have no choice but to conclude that 

the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider D.J.’s petition for post-conviction relief.

{¶16} The juvenile court dismissed D.J.’s petition, finding that it did not set forth 

sufficient operative facts establishing any substantive grounds for relief. The juvenile court ought 

to have dismissed the petition based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this 

Court affirms its judgment of dismissal on other legally correct grounds. See State ex rel. Johnson, 

2009-Ohio-3526, at ¶ 13. D.J.’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶17} D.J.’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JILL FLAGG LANZINGER

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J.

CONCURS.

CARR, J.

CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.

{¶18} I agree with this Court’s decision to affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. 

Because I would affirm the juvenile court’s judgment on the merits, however, I concur in judgment 

only.

{¶19} Any person adjudicated a delinquent child has a statutory right to collaterally attack 

the judgment of the juvenile court. See R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i). Much like their adult 

counterparts, juveniles have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. In re C.S., 

115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, ¶ 78-79. While the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
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generally expires once a child turns twenty-one, see R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), “[o]ur jurisprudence 

requires that protections afforded adult criminal defendants, when appropriate, be extended to 

juveniles who stand in equal jeopardy of having their liberties taken.” State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio 

St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, ¶ 49. “Because the juvenile’s right to counsel is predicated on due 

process, it is malleable rather than rigid.” In re C.S. at ¶ 80. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court 

has recognized that, at the appellate level, a juvenile may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel pursuant to case law even though App.R. 26(B) does not apply in appeals from 

juvenile adjudications. In re T.A., 171 Ohio St.3d 44, 2022-Ohio-4173, ¶ 18, citing State v. 

Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60 (1992). Since the issuance of In re T.A., the Commission on the 

Rules of Practice and Procedure also has proposed amendments to App.R. 26 to permit delinquent 

children to seek the reopening of their appeal following a disposition or commitment.

{¶20} This Court previously exercised its jurisdiction in a prior post-conviction relief 

appeal filed by D.J., thereby implicitly recognizing that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to 

consider his petition. See In re D.J., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29119, 2020-Ohio-3528. The majority’s 

interpretation of R.C. 2152, et seq., and R.C. 2953.21 effectively denies D.J. the means to

collaterally attack the juvenile court’s judgment on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. D.J. turned twenty-one only five days after the juvenile court granted the State’s motion 

to invoke the adult portion of his sentence. Five days was not enough time for him to mount and 

pursue a challenge to the court’s judgment on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. If 

D.J. had the right to effective assistance of counsel during his invocation proceedings, he must 

have had some means to enforce that right. Accordingly, I would conclude that the juvenile court 

properly exercised its jurisdiction to hear D.J.’s petition for post-conviction relief.
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{¶21} While I do not agree that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over D.J.’s petition, 

I agree this Court should affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. For the reasons outlined by the 

juvenile court, I would conclude that D.J. failed to set forth sufficient operative facts establishing 

any substantive grounds for relief. As such, I concur in judgment only. 

APPEARANCES:

STEPHANIE F. KESSLER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.