### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 00 43 -C V

______________________________ TOM RAMSAY, Appellant

V. TEXAS TRADI

NG CO., I

NC., AND ADM I NVESTOR SERVI CES, I NC., Appellee s
On Appea l from the 62nd Judi cial District Court

Hopkins County , Texas Trial Court No. CV37122

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Op ini on by Chi e f Jus tic e Mo rr iss Dissenting O pinion by

J ustice Carte r2 O P I N I O N L ess t h an a ha lf hour bef ore the cattle- futures ma

rkets close d Dec ember

23, 2003, Tom Ramsay appea

red at Texas Trading Company , I nc.' s Sulphur Springs offic e and w anted a persona l
ac co u n to p en eds o h e c o u l d s el l "s h o rt " fi v e ca t t l e- fu tu re s co n tra ct s fo r h i s p er s o n al ac co u n tt h ro u gh ADM Investor Servic es, Inc. (ADM) , Texas T rading ' s clea ring broker in I llinois
. That is the sce ne Charles Da

wson, the principal owner of Tex as Trading , and his daug hter (a nd then Texas Trading employ ee) L iz Harper de scribed c oncer ning that day . That day , Ramsay repor tedly i n d i cate d that he did not have the time to sign an a ccount a g ree men t, so Harpe r re portedly delivere d a for

m ag ree ment to him as he left Te x as Tra di n g's o ff i ce . L ater , Har

per sig ned the f

orm ag ree ment for Ramsay , though the testimony conflicts on whether he authorized that signature. Still l ater , pursuant to a no the r t e rm

of the fo rm a g re e me nt an d af

te r num e ro us Ramsa

y -i nit iate d tra de s thr ou g h th e ne wl y established ac count, R amsay ' s position, at t hat t ime, was li quidated to cover exis ting losses. Ramsay l o s ta l ar g e s u m o f

m o n e y. At the hea

rt of this case , filed by Ramsay , is whether an agr eeme nt betwee n Ramsay , Texas Trading , and ADM w as establish ed based on the terms set out in that form a nd, if so, whether

a forum sele ction clause in that ag ree ment was e nforc eable
. I n a nar rowly focuse d jury t ri al

— l imited to jus t the question of whethe r Ramsay had authorized Har

per to sig n the ag ree ment for him—the jury found the sig nature authorized. Wit h that jur y fi nd ing , the tr ia l court dis mis se d th e re st o f t he laws uit

on the ba sis that th e a g re e me nt' s f or um-3

se le c tio n c la

us e a llo we d AD M to r e qu ir e any re late d li tig a tio n to oc c ur in I lli no is. Ramsa

y a pp e a ls,
ur g ingnume ro us iss ue s. We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ' s act io n becau se w e ho ld ( 1) the re wa s n o a bu se of dis c re tio n in ho ldi nga sep arat e tr ial on

Ha rp e r' s a uth or iza tio n to sig n f

or Ramsa y , ( 2) the re wa s n o e rr or in allowing ADM and Tex as T ra d i n g to argue first a nd last in closing a

rg ument, (3) leg ally

and fac tually sufficie nt evidence supports the jury ' s finding that the sig nature was a uthorized, and (4) the ag ree ment' s forum-se lection clause is enforc eable
. ( 1) There W

as No Abuse of Discretion i n Holding a Separate T rial on Harper's Aut horization to Sign for Ramsay We first addre ss the question of whethe r the trial c ourt had the a uthority to b i fu rcate the p r o c e e d i n g an d

t r y t h e s i g n i n g - a

u t h o r i t y i s s u e s e p ar a t e l y. Procedur ally , ADM filed a motion to bifurcate trial to se ek a jury deter mination of whether the alleg edly

forg ed signature was authorized by Ramsay
. The trial court g rante d the motion, stating that the first phase of trial would dec ide whethe r Ramsay ' s signature wa s authorized. This issue is controlled by Rule 174(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e: Th e c ourt in f ur the ra nc e of c on ve nie nc e or

to a vo id p re jud ic e may

or de r a se pa ra te tr ia l of an y c la im, c ro ss- c la im, c ounte rc la im, or thi rd -p art y c la im, or of

any se pa ra te issue or of any

number of c laims, cross-c laims, counterc laims, third-party claims, or iss ue s. T EX . R. C IV . P. 174(b). The rule is e x cee dingly broad. Although Ramsay argues that this constitutes an abuse of the trial court' s discretion, we disag ree based on the brea dth of the rule. I n an extensiveW e n o t e t h at t h e ru l e w o u l d n o tex t en d

t o au th o ri z i n g s ep ar at e t ri al s o f l i ab i l i t y an d d am age 1 issues in pe rsonal injury

litigation. See I

ley , 311 S.W .2d at 650; 3 R OY W. M C D ONAL D & E L AI NE A. G R AF TON C AR L S ON , T EX A S C I V I L P RACTI CE 2d § 17.27. 4 discussion of this rule, McDona ld's Te x as Civil P rac tice points out that the rule provide s broad a nd
rea l discretion to order

separ ate tria ls of issues. See 3 R OY W. M C D ONAL D & E L AI NE A. G R AF TON C AR L S ON , T EX A S C I V I L P RACTI CE 2d § 17.27 (2000). [W ]e have said that the di scre tion to require sever ance s and separate trials confe rre d o nt ri al co u rt s b y

t h i s an d o t h er R u l es i s 'ab o u tas b ro adas l an gu age co u l d m ak e i t '. Iley v. Hughe s , 158 Tex. 362, 311 S .W.2d 648, 650 (1958). 1 Appellant attacks the trial cour t's de termination based on " long sta nding policy

and pra ctice"
a g a i n s t " p i e c e m e a l t r i a l s , " w h i c h w a s a l s o art i c u l a t e d b y Iley
. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Morie l , 879 S.W .2d 10, 47, n.29 (Tex. 1994). Iley , h ow e ve r, a dd re sse d th e pr op ri e ty

of div idi ngthe lia

bil ity from the da

mag es portions of lawsuits, and c oncluded that, based on l ong -standing policies of the state, and the desire to a

void a multipli city

of suits, the two should be tried tog ether . Even so, ther e is a ba lan ce th a t mu st b e str uc k b e tw e e n th e a

bil ity to s ho rt e n th e pr oc e ss a

nd the ne e d to a vo id pie c e me a l tr ia ls. The trial c ourt' s actio n in first hear ing the authorization issue is a rea sonable proc edure
su g g e ste d b y

the log ic a l stru c tur e of

the c a se. The iss ue of

a uth or iza tio n w a s o f c on sid e ra ble i mp o rt an c e i nd e t e r

m i n i n g a c r i t i c a l t h r e s h o l d i s s u e : w h e t h e r t h e c o n t r a c tw a s b i n d i n g o nR a m s ay,
and thu s w he the r t

he c on tr a c t' s for

um- se le c tio n cla

us e c ou ld be c on sid e re d f

or e nf or c e me nt a g a ins t him. Bef

ore the court c ould determine w hether a valid fo rum -selec tion clause would re quire5

dismiss al of the r emainder of the law suit, it would be nece ssary to de termine whether that clause was part of a n exis ting c ontrac t. Proc eeding in this fashion allowe d the trial cour t to avoid a full-blown tr ia l on mos t of the iss ue s th a t w ou ld not be e ff e c tiv e ly tr ie d in Te xas, if the c on tr a c t and

the fo rumselec tion c l ause were enfor cea ble. Had the jury

come in with the opposite ver dict, all involved
wo uld kn owho w t o p ro c e e d mo st a dv anta g e ou sly wi th t he re ma ind e r o f t

he tr ia l in Te xas. Th is i s the ty pe of discr etion contemplated by the rule. The re w as no er ror he re. ( 2) There W

as No Error in Al lowing ADM and Texas Trading to Argue Firs t and Last i n Closing Argument Ramsay also argues that, proc edura lly , the trial cour t erre d by allowing Texas T radingand AD M to op e n a

nd c on c lud e c los ingargume nts . T e xas T ra din g and AD M h a d a sk e d to b e pla c e d in that position for prese ntation of evidenc e, bu t t h e co u rt had de clined to do so, based on the untimeliness of the motion. After e vidence was prese nted, howeve r, the c ourt cha ng ed its mind and
a llo we d A DM and

Te xas T ra din g to a

rgue fi rs t and

la st d ur ingc los ingargume nts
. This is an issue resolv ed b y re ad i n g two rules tog ether . I t is true that Rule 266 say s the plaintiff has the rig ht to open and conclude both e vidence and argument unless the burden o f t he whole ca se re sts on the de fenda nt. Rule 266 ope ns, howeve r, with the phra se " except as provided in Rule 269." Rule 269(a) of the Te x as Rules of C ivil Procedur e st ates that the party having the burde n of proof on a ll matters submitt ed to the j ury is entitled to open and conclude the argument. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 269(a)
.6

I n this case, Te x as Tra ding a nd ADM had the burden of proof on a ll m at ters submitted by the cha rg e. Thus, under the rule, they had the rig ht to open and conc lude ar g ument. There was no
err or her e. ( 3) Le ga lly an d Fac tua lly Su

ffi c ie nt Ev ide nc e Su

pp or ts th e Jur

y' s Fi nd ing Tha t the Sig

na tur e W as Authorized The test for leg al sufficie ncy is " whether the evidenc e at trial would enable rea sonable a nd fai r-m in dedpeo pl e to reach th e ver di ct u nd er rev iew ." City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 82 7 ( Te x. 20 05 ). I n ma king th is de te rm inatio n, we c re dit fa vo ra ble e vid e nc e if

a re a so na ble fac t-finder could, and disreg ard contrar y evidenc e unless a r easona ble fa ct-finde r could not. Id . So long a s the evidenc e fa lls withi n the zone of re asonable disa gre em en t , we may not substit ute our judgme nt for that of the fac t-finder
. Id . at 82 2. Th e tr ie r of fa c t is the so le jud g e of the c re dib ili ty of t h e wi tnesses and the weig ht to give the ir testimony
. Id . at 819. Althoug h we c onsider the evidenc e in a light mos t favor able to the challeng ed finding s, indulgingever y rea sonable infe renc e that supports them, we may not disreg ard e vidence that allows only one infe renc e. Id . at 822. Whe n c on sid e ri nga

fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e to a

jur y ' s ver dic t, co ur

ts o f a pp e a ls mus t consider a

nd weig h all of the e vidence , not just t hat evidenc e which suppor ts the verdict. Ma r. Ov e rse as Cor

p. v . E lli s , 971 S.W .2d 402, 406–07 (Tex. 1998)
. A court of appea ls c an set aside the
ve rd ic t on ly

if it i s so c on tr ary

to t he ov e rwhe lmi ngwe ig ht of the e vid e nc e that th e ve rd ic t is c le arl y wrongand unjust. Id. at 407; Cai n v . B ain , 7 09 S.W. 2d 17 5, 17 6 (T e x. 19 86 ). Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls is not a fac t-finder . As stated above , we may not pass on the witnesses' cre dibilit y or substitute our7

judgme nt for that of the jury , even if the evidenc e would clea rly support a diffe rent re sult. El lis , 971 S.W .2d at 407. There was e vidence that company policy require d persona l signingof the a g ree ment, and Ramsay repe atedly testified that he did not authorize anyone to sig n on his behalf. L iz Harper a g ree d that an author ization t o sign on another ' s behalf should a lso be obtained in writing , but testified that she did sign on Ramsay ' s behalf
. She testified that he ha d been in a hurry to open an a ccount so that he could pr ofit from a tra ding oppor tunity persona lly

and not make that trade i n an exis ting joint
a c c ount h e sh are d w ithano the r c us tom e r. She te sti fi e d in de ta il that Ramsa

y ha d c ome in v e ry

late in the trading day ; that he wa nted the per sonal ac count immediately ; that Ramsay indicated a

lack of tim e to s tay

and sig n ac c ount pa

pe rs ; tha t she ha

nd e d h im a

fo rm a g re e me nt f

or him to t a ke wi th him ; and that, a s h e wa s wa lki ng ou t the do or , he a sk e d he r t o f ill the pa pe rs ou t and

sig n h is n a me to them. Severa l day s later, Ramsay called a nd asked her if the ac count had be en opene d. Har per t o l d h i m t h at i tco u l d

n o t h a v e b ee nb ec au s e h e h ad n o tre tu rn edt h e a cc o u n tp ap er s . R am s ay 's
re sp on se , a c cor din g to H arp e r, wa s to dis pla y ir ri tatio n a nd to s ay " that he ha d a lr e a dy

tol d me to sign it and to just g et it open." Har per c ontinued that, when she explained a sec ond time that Ramsay
wo uld ne e d to c ome in and sig n the a pp lic a tio n, he re sp on de d by sa ying he did

no t se e ho w h e c ou ld g et to town. "H e said just g o ahea d and sig n my name. I ' ve already told y ou twice. Just s ign the m." She testified that she ultimately did fill out and sign the a ccount pa pers a s Ramsay

direc ted her
.Ramsay also attac ks the clause on the basis that he did not sig n the agr ee m en t
. Bu t, as 2 s u ff i ci en t ev i d en ce s u

p p o rt ed t h e ju ry 's d et erm i n at i o n t h at t h e agr ee m en t wa s s i gn edwi t h R am s ay 's authorization, that arg ument fails her e. 8 Th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d to the jur y wa s in c on fl ic t. Th e jur

y ma de a de te rm inatio n, and

bo th leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence supports its decision. ( 4) TheAg

re e me nt's Fo ru m- Se le c tio n Clau se Is En forc e ab le Th e m o s tc h a l l e n g i n g i s s u e i nt h i s a p p e a l i s p r e s e n t e d

b y t h e f o r u m - s e l e c t i o nc l a

u se
c on ta ine d in

pa ra g ra ph19 of the a g re e me nt: All actions or proc eeding s arising direc tion, indir ectly or otherw ise, in connec tion w i t h , o u t o f

, r e l a t e d t o , o r f r o m t h i s a g r e e m e n to r

an y t r an s a c t i o nc o v e r e d

h e r e b y, shall be g overne d by

the law of

I llinois and may , at the discre tion and elec tion of [ADM] , be litigated in a cour t whose situs is withi n I llinois
. Ramsa y a ssai ls th e claus e , a

rguin g that it

re a lly is a ve nu e -s e le c tio n c la

us e tha t is
un e nf or c e a ble a s a g a ins t pu

bli c po lic y , th a t the c la

us e did no t pr ov ide fo r e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n in Il l i n o i s , an d

t h a tt h e c l a

u s e ' s p l a c e m e n to f

d i s c r e t i o ni nA D M w a s f a t a l t o i t s e n f

o r c e a b i l i t y. 2 A motion to dis miss is the prope r proc edura l mechanism for enfor cing a forum-selec tion clause that a party to the agr eeme nt has vi olated in filing suit. See I n re AIU Ins. Co. , 148 S.W .3d 10 9, 11 1– 21 (T e x. 20 04 ); Phoenix Network Techs. ( Europe) Ltd. v. Neon Sys., Inc

. , 177 S.W .3d 605, 610 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2005, no pet.). We revie w t he trial court' s g rantingof such a motion for an abuse of discretion. See Phoenix Network Tec hs. ( Europe) Ltd. , 177 S.W .3d at 610. To the e xten t tha t our re vie w inv olv e s the c on str uc tio n o r i nte rp re tatio n o f a n unambi g uo us c on tr a c t,9

howeve r, the st an dard of

revie w is de novo. See id. ; D e e p W a te r S le n d e r W e ll s , Lt d

. v . S h e ll I n t' l Exploration & Prod., Inc. , 234 S.W .3d 679, 687 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, no pet.). I n the pre sent ca se, interpr etation and e nforc eability of the for

um -s elec tion clause a

re the issues prese n t ed o n appeal, and ar e leg al matters this Court review s de novo. Fisk Elec . Co. v. Constructors & Assocs., Inc

. , 8 88 S.W. 2d 81 3, 81 4 (Te x. 19 94 ); CM S P ar tne rs, Ltd

. v . P lum ro se USA, Inc

. , 101 S.W .3d 730, 737 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). We construe a

contra ct containinga for

um-selec tion clause a s we do a ny contra ct, ac cording to its plain languag e. See Phoenix Network Tec hs. ( Europe) Ltd. , 177 S.W .3d at 615. I f a c ontrac t is w or de d s o th a t it

c an b e g ive n a

c e rt a in o r d e fi nit e le g a l me anin g or int e rp re tatio n, we wi ll construe the contra ct as a matter of law. Enter. Leasing Co. v. B arrios , 1 5 6 S. W. 3 d 5 4 7 , 5 4 9 ( T e x. 2004).

a. A V

e nu e -S e le c tio n Cl

au se ? Ramsay contends that this is not a forum -selec t i o n clause , but that it is instead a venue selec tion clause
. He fails to persua de us, howeve r, how the di stinction makes a ny differ ence here
. A forum, a s defined, is a place wher e a c ase ma

y be hea rd by a cour t. Venue , as def

ined by the common law, is the prope r plac e for a lawsuit to proce ed. In t h i s context, the two concepts a re eff ectively intercha ng eable
. See B LACK ' S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 680, 1591 (8th ed. 2004). B y defining a prope r for

um, where the action may proce ed, the c lause a lso determines the pr oper ve nue for the action. B lack' s defines a forum-se lection clause in near ly prec ise l y t h o s e t er ms: "a c ontrac tualSee CNOOC Se. Asia Lt d. v. Paladin R es . (SU N DA) Ltd. , 2 2 2 S. W. 3 d

8 8 9 , 8 9 2 ( T e x. 3 App.— Da l l as 2007, pet. denied) (for um-selec tion clause " desig nates Te x as as the ve nue and e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n f

or laws uit s" ; see als o Tri-State Bldg. Specialties, Inc. v . NCI Bldg. Sys., L.P. , 184 S.W .3d 242, 249 (Tex. A p p . — Hous ton [ 1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (c lause used te rm " venue" rathe r than " forum" ). We also rec og nize that a ca se fr om this C ourt, Busse v. Pacific Cattl e Fe eding Fund #1, L td. , 4 896 S
. W
. 2 d 807, 812–13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. denied) , revie wed a forum-se lection clause stating that venue w ould lie in one of selec ted I owa c ounties. The mea ning w as cle ar, e ven if the languag e could ha

ve bee n more c are fully

selec ted. 10 provision in which the par ties establish the place (such a s the country , stat e, o r t y pe of c ourt) for sp eci fi ed l it igat io n b etw een t hem ." Id . at 681. 3 Ramsay direc ts our attention to Fleming v. Ahum ada , 193 S.W .3d 704 (Tex. App.—Corpus Chr isti 2006, no pet.), as authority for the sug g estion that a venue provision cannot be the subject
o f a p r iv a te c o n tr a c t u

n le s s p r o v id e d

b y s tatute
. T h a t i s c o r

r e c t, b u t, th o s e c a s e s ar e in th e c o n te xt of state ve nue provisions that set out which cour t (county ) within this state has authority to hear a particula r ca se, with ag ree ments setting ve nue in an imprope r location. This clause does not purpor t to mov e ve nu e fr om a pr op e r to an imp ro pe r l oc a tio n, bu t in ste a d s pe c if ie s th e fo rum in

wh ic h a c a se wi ll b e he ard , p re suma

bly in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he " ve nu e ru le s" of

that f or um. 4 The Corpus Christi court has re cently been c onfronted w ith the s am e ar gu m ent and f ound it to be without merit. In re Gr e at Lak es D re dge & Do c k

Co. L.L. C. , No. 13-07-437- CV,As no te d the re , the te rm s, a lth ou g h ov e rl a pp ing , a lso have dis tin c t le g a l me anin g s in c e rt a in 5 contexts, although those nice ties have not be en consistently observe d in the repor

ted ca ses. A clause stating that any suits would be taken i n t h e United King dom found 6 su ff ic ie nt— a lth ou g h it did no t sp e c if y wh ic h of the va

ri ou s su bd ivi sio ns of the UK

wa s to be the sit e of any suit. Phoenix Network Tec hs. ( Europe) Ltd. , 177 S.W .3d at 619. 11 2008 WL 100505, at *3 (Te x . App.—Corpus Christi J an. 10, 2008, orig . proce ed i n g), discusses dif fe re nc e s b e tw e e n th e tw o te rm s a s u se d in Te xas. 5

" F o r u m" g e n e r a ll y r e f

e r s to a s o v e r e ig n o r a s tate. See Sc ott v. Gallagher , 209 S.W .3d 262, 264 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (" [V] enue ' ref ers to the propriety

of prosecuting , in a particular f orm, a suit on a g iven subject matter with specific pa

rties, over

which the f

orum must, necessa

rily , have subje ct-matter jurisdiction.'" ) (e mphasis added) . I n contra st, "[a]t common l aw, ' venue' meant ' the neig hborhood, plac e, or c ounty in which the injury

is de clar ed to ha

ve bee n done or in factdecl aredto hav e hap pen ed. '" Sta te v . B lan k e ns hip , 1 7 0 S. W. 3 d

6 7 6 , 6 8 1 ( T e x. Ap p . — Au s t i n2 0 0 5 , p et
. re f'd ) ( qu o t i n g B LACK ' S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 1557 (6th ed. 199 1 ))
. I n T ex as, "venue " r efe rs to the county in which suit is proper within the forum state. Acc elerated Christian Educ., Inc ., 92 5 S. W.2 d at 73 ; Es tra da v . S tate , 148 S.W .3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.). Thus, a " forum" -selec tion a g re e me nt i s o ne tha

t c ho os e s a

no the r s tate or

so ve re ig n a s th e lo cat io n for tr ia l, wh e re a s a " ve nu e " -s e le c tio n ag re e me nt ch oo se s a par tic ula r co un ty or c ourt wi thi n that state or sove reig n. Fo ru m -s el ec t ion clauses may be so broa d as to requir e a c ase to be hear d in a par ticular
c ountr y or state (a s in

thi s c a se ). To su g g e st t hat th is c la

us e imp ro pe rl y

c ho os e s a

ve nu e in 6

c on tr a ve nti on

of c on tr oll inglaw m isr e a ds the c on c e pt.Th e c a se s dis c us s se ve ra l fa sh ion s in wh ic h a c la us e may be ina de qu a te , o f whic h th e mos t 7 common by

far is the situation where the proposed f orum is not adequate ly

define d. 12 b. A One- W

ay Clause? Ramsa y argues th at, be c a

us e thi s c la

us e is n ot m and a tor

y a s to bo th p art ie s und e r a ll circ umstances, it is not e nforc eable
. Of the a rg uments raised, this one ha s the most viabilit y . He 7 relies most direc tly

on lang uag e found in a

footnote in Phoenix Network Technologies ( Europe) Ltd. , wh ic h s ta te s: The other threshold matter r equire d by the Texas courts-of

-appe als test—that the proponent show tha t t he par ties contrac tually

ag ree d on an exclusive forum—a dds nothing to the M/S Breme n and Shute test and is consistent with it. I f the pa rties have no t a g re e d to an ex clu si ve fo rum, t he n th e c la

us e to whic h th e y

a g re e d is no t a forum-se lection clause in the first place
. See 177 S.W .3d 605, 624, n.6

. I n th is ar g ume nt, Ramsa y a dd re sse s ( wh a t w a s unti l 20 04 ) a fa ir ly
u n s ett led ar ea of

the law. He argues that, bec ause the clause does not contain languag e re quiring both parties, in all circ umstances, to fil e s u i t o n ly in a par ticular for

um, it is not a mandator y ag ree ment to have the case hear d in a par ticular for um; thus, i t is not a valid forum-sele ction clause
. For merly , forum-se lection clau s es were enf orce able in Te x as base d on a dete rmination of whether (1) the pa rties had c ontrac tually

consente d to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of another state, and ( 2) the other

state re cog nized the valid i t y o f s u ch provisions
. CMS Partners, Ltd. , 101 S .W .3 d at 73 2; Sw. Intelecom , Inc. v . Hotel Networks Corp. , 9 9 7 S
. W
. 2 d 3 2 2 , 3 2 4 ( T e x. App .— Aus tin

19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Acc elerated Christian Educ., Inc. v . Oracle Corp. , 9 2 5 S. W.2d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, no wr it).En fo rc e me nt o f a fo rum- se le c tio n c la

us e wo uld

be unre a so na

ble and un

jus t if 8 (1) e nforc ement of the clause would contravene a strong public policy of the for um in which suit was fi le d o r ( 2) t he bal anc e of c on ve nie nc e is s tr on g ly

in f a vo r o f l iti g a tio n in

the fo rum in

wh ic h s uit wa s f iled , a nd lit ig a tio n in

the fo rum id e nti fi e d in

the c la us e wo uld

be so manif

e stl y and g ra ve ly inconvenient to the resisting pa rty that the re sisting par

ty eff ectively would be depr ived of a meaning ful day in court. See M /S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 4 07 U. S. 1 , 1 9 ( 19 72 ); AI U I ns . Co. , 1 48 S.W. 3d

a t 11 1– 12 ; Dee

p W ater Slender W

ells, Ltd. , 234 S.W .3d at 693.
13 I n a ser ies of recent c ases, the T exas Supreme Court has re considere d the appr opriate r eview to determine w hether

forum-se lection clause s should be enfor ced. See M ichiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v . Holten , 168 S.W .3d 777, 793 (Tex. 2005); In re Automated Collection Techs., Inc. , 15 6 S. W.3 d 5 57 , 5 59 (T e x. 20 04 ); AIU I ns. Co. , 148 S.W .3d 109. As a re sult, enforc ement of forum-se lection clause s is mandatory unless the par

ty opposing e nforc ement " clea rly show[s] that enfo rc em en t would be unre asonable and unjust, or that the cla use wa s invalid for such r easons a s fr a ud or ov e rr e a c hin g." Au tom ate d Co lle c tio n Te c hs

. , Inc ., 15 6 S. W.3 d at 55 9; see Holten , 168 S.W. 3d a t 79 3; AIU

, 1 48 S.W. 3d

a t 11 2; Boye

s v. Morris Pol ich &Purdy, L.L.P. , 169 S.W .3d 448, 458 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.). 8 I n AIU , the court held that enfor ceme nt of forum-se lection clause s is ma ndatory unless the pa rt y op po sin g e nf

or c e me nt " c le arl y

sh ow [s] that e nf

or c e me nt w ou ld b e unre a so na ble and un jus t, or t hat th e cl aus e was in val idfor su ch re aso ns as fraud or overreach in g." AIU I ns. Co. , 148 S.W .3d 109. I n Automated Collecti o n Technologies , th e c ourt re c og nize d th e po ssi bil ity that, i n s ome
c ir c ums tanc e s, the c la

us e mig ht b e inv a lid

and un e nf

or c e a ble , bu t did no t e xpla in wh a t mi g ht c a us e such invalidity
. See Automated Collection Techs., Inc

. , 156 S.W .3d at 559.14

Under the ea rlier c ases, it was re cog nized that such clauses a re va lid if contrac tually

ag ree d to by the parties, and that would seem to re main a nec essar y adjunct to our de termination. Ba rn e tt
v. N et w o r k Solut ions, Inc. , 3 8 S. W.3 d 2 00 , 2 03 (T e x. Ap p— Ea stl and 20 01 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Sw. Intelec om, Inc

. , 9 97 S.W. 2d a t 32 4; Acc elerated Christian Educ., Inc. , 925 S.W .2d at 70. Ramsay does not sug g est that the subject matter of the under ly ing la wsuit is outs ide the scope of t he agr eeme nt or t hat i t cannot be deter mined which forum is named. The issue ra ised is whether thi s la ngua g e re qu ir e s li tig a tio n to pr oc e e d in that fo rum—b e c a us e it l e a ve s d isc re tio n to AD M to decide whether

to liti g ate in I llinois . The fa ct that the cla use mig ht be enf

orce d at the ele ction of ADM, howe ver, is not a matter that has not previously , in isolation, been consider ed a c ontrolling question. There are repor ted ca ses in which similar languag e has be en enf orce d without qualm or
c omm e nt b y

the c ourt s. An e xamp le of

thi s t y pe of langua g e is f

ound inAcc elerated Christian Educ., Inc. , 925 S.W .2d at 69, 70–71. In that case , the cour t considere d the following forum-se lection clause and found it sufficient to re quire suit to proce ed as c hosen under the clause
. [I ]f [Accele rate d] bring s the action, it s hall be instituted in one of the cour ts specified in s ub pa ra g ra ph(a) a bo ve . O ra c le may

ins tit ute le g a l a c tio n in

any a pp ro pr iate jurisdiction. Th e c la us e thu s a llo we d on e pa

rt y , a t its e le c tio n, to c ho os e on e of se ve ra l c ourt s in

wh ic h to be g in lit ig a tio n, wh ile a llo wi ngthe oth e r p art y to i ns tit ute a c tio n w herever " a

pp ro pr iate ." Th a t c la

us e15

provided a far g reater deg ree of di scre tion than allowed in the c ontrac t clause in this case , but was
never theless treated as mandatory and enf orce able.

c. Permissive F

orum? Th e c la us e state s th a t " a ll a c tio ns or pr oc e e din g s . . . sh a ll b e g ov e rn e d b y the law o f I lli no is
and may , at th e dis c re tio n and e le c tio n o f A DM , b e lit ig a te d in a c ourt
. . . w ith in I lli no is. " Do e s th is provide only

an additional location wher e li tigation might procee d, perha ps in a situation where the forum mi g ht not otherwise be available, rather than a mandatory require ment? Or does it mean that AD M m ay

ch o o s e t o re qu i re l i t i gat i o nt o p ro ce edi nI l l i n o i s , m ak i n g s u ch ch o i ce b i n d i n g? O n e mi g h t a

tt e mp t t o u n d e r s ta

n d th is p r o v is io na s a

" p e r mi s s iv e f o r u m s e le c ti o nc la

u s e ," under w hich the parties there by consent to the jurisdiction of a par ticular for um but do not require the pa rt ie s to fi le su it o r l iti g a te the re . T he ph ra se " pe rm iss ive fo rum se le c tio n c la us e " a pp e ars to have be en coine d, define d, and first used i n Texas in a law re view ar ticle. See Pa

ul H artman Cr os s andHub ertOx for d, I V, "F L OATI NG " F OR UM S EL EC TI ON AN D C H O I CE O F L AW C L AUSES , 4 8 S. T e x. L . Rev. 125 (2006). The phrase seeme d to gr ow out of an e ffor t to dist ingui s h p er m i s s i ve fr om
man dat ory

cla us es, "whi ch p rov id e th at a ll li ti gati on mu st , s hal l, or i s t o b e fi led in th at f oru m. " Id. at 131. Th e on ly

c a se c ite d to su

pp or t th is c on c e pt i s Southwest Intelecom , Inc. , 997 S.W .2d 322. I n that case , the cour

t summarized three c ases, Acc elerated Christian Education , Gree nwood , and Ba rn e tt , eac h of which c ontained absolute c ommand lang uag e that any leg al ac tion would be broug htAnother c ase cited in the ar ticle, My Café CCC, Lt d. v. Lunchstop, Inc. , 107 S.W .3d 860, 9 86 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 3, no pe t.) , is ina pp os ite . T he fo c us the re wa s w hethe r th e cl a us e e nc omp a sse d a ll c a

us e s o f a c tio n r e latin g to t he a g re e me nt. 16 or instituted in a stated forum or court. I n Southwest Intelecom , though, the Austin court re viewed
a c la us e that r e a d a s f

oll ow s: 8.9 Applicable L aw. This Ag ree ment shall be gover ned by the l aws of the State of Minnesota. The Parties sti pu late to j ur isd ic tio n a nd ve nu e in R a mse y

Cou nty , Minn e so ta , a s if

thi s Ag ree ment wer e executed in Minnesota. I n it s ana ly sis , th e Au sti n c ourt fo c us e d o n th e fa c t th a t th e c la us e mand a te d w hic h la

w wo uld a pp ly and that the pa

rties stipulated only

that jurisdiction and venue in the na med forum we re pr oper. The
co u rt u s edt h e d i ct i o n ary

d ef i n i t i o no f " s t i p u l at e" t o d et erm i n e th at t h e pa rt i es ' i n t en twa s t o "ar ra n ge or settle def

initely " that jurisdiction was proper and ava ilable i n Minnesota and that the pr ovision
mer ely "set tl e[ d] any

qu est io n o f wh eth er t he co urt s o f t hat st ate hav e ju ri sd ict io n. " Id. a t 32 6. Thus , the cour t concluded, the clause did not pr ovide Minnesota cour ts with ex clusive jurisdiction to hear
a l l d i s p u t e s ar i s i n g f

r o m t h e a g r e e m e n t , an d

d e c l i n e d t o f i n d t h e c l a u s e t o b e m an d a t o r

y. 9 A simil arly imprecise clause is discusse d in Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enterprises, Inc. , 29 S.W .3d 291, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2000, no pet.): I t is a l s o a g r e e d

b e t w e e nt h e p art i e s [t

h a t ] b e c a u s e o f t h e m u l t i

- s t a t e an d

m u lti

country jurisdiction involved due to the location s of the princ ipals, banks and depositories, etc ., the laws of . . . N ige ria will apply and the F eder al D i strict of Nig eria shall have ve nue.17

The c ourt compar ed this clause to those in sever al fe dera l case s and conc luded that, just beca use the clause said that a c ourt had ve nue, it did not ex clude the possibility of an o t her f

orum also being proper . The c ourt used the r easoningof Southwest Intelecom , c on c lud ing that, wi tho ut expl ic it langua g e pr ov idi ngfo r e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n in Ni g e ri a , th e pa

rt ie s d id n ot c on tr a c tua lly c on se nt t o submit t o exclusive jurisdiction i n Nig eria
. I n examining this particular clause to determine its meaning , we mu s t c o n s id e r s e v e r al fa ctors
and a pp ly a pp lic a ble te sts
. I f the written instrument is so worde d that it can be g iven a c erta in or definite leg al meaningor interpr etation, then it is not ambiguous and the court wi l l co n s true the c on tr a c t a s a matte r of law. A c on tr a c t, ho we ve r, is a mbi g uo us wh e n its me anin g is u n ce rt ai nan d

d o u b t fu l o r i ti s re as o n ab l y s u s ce p t i b l e t o m o re t h an o n e m ea n i n g. Whether a c ontrac t is ambiguous is a que stion of law f o r t he cour

t to decide by looking at the circ umstances prese nt when the contra ct was enter ed. When a contra ct contains an a

mbiguity , the g ranting of a motion for summary judgme nt is im proper beca use the interpr etation of the instrument be comes a fac t issue. Coker v. Cok

er , 650 S.W .2d 391, 393–94 (Tex. 1983). Ob vio us ly , sinc e the c on tr a c t wa s on a for m pro vid e d by AD M, AD M is re sp on sib le fo r i ts wording . We acknowle dg e the long -standing g ener al rule that, wher e an instrument is open to two
rea sonable c onstructions, it will be construed aga inst it s author. Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer , 37 4 S. W.2 d 6 62 , 6 65 (T e x. 19 64 ); Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Danie l , 2 4 3 S. W. 2 d 1 5 4 ( T e x. 1951). That r

ule applies, howeve r, onl y wher e, after the ordinary rules of interpre tation have be en ap p l i ed , the ag ree ment rema ins ambiguous. Daniel , 2 4 3 S
. W
. 2 d a t 1 5 7
. T h e p r i m ar y g oa l in18

construing the meaningof a c ontrac t is to asc erta in a nd g ive ef fec t to the parties' intent as expressed in the contra ct. See I

deal Lease Serv., I

nc. v. A moco Prod. Co. , 662 S.W .2d 951, 953 (Tex. 1983). We also consider a

nother leg al maxim : "No sing le provision taken a lone w i l l be g iven
c o n t r o l l i n g e f

f e c t ; r a t h e r , a l l t h e p r o v i s i o n s m u s tb e c o n s i d e r e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e w h o le in st rum ent ." J.M. D avidson, Inc. v . W ebster , 128 S.W .3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003), c iti ng My e rs v . G ulf Coa st Mi ne ra ls M

gm t. C or p ., 36 1 S. W.2 d 1 93 , 1 96 (T e x. 19 62 ); Citi zens Nat'l Bank v. Tex . & P. Ry. Co. , 136 Tex. 333, 150 S .W.2d 1003, 1006 (1941). The re al question here is w hether Ramsay contra cted to a llow A DM to c hoose whe ther a ny lawsuit betwee n them woul d proce ed in I llinois . To answe r that question, we c onsider that the contra ct was dr afte d by

ADM and not by

Ramsay , we a cce pt ou r responsibi lity to construe a

n unambig uous contrac t, and we look at the entire sentenc e (not just the word " may ") . When we do those things, we come to an ine scapa ble conc lusion: R amsay did contrac t to give A DM that choice
. Th e langua g e a llo ws AD M to requ ir e th e lit ig a tio n o f a ny a c tio n to pr oc e e d s ole ly in I lli no is. De sp ite Ramsa

y ' s su g g e sti on s o the rw ise , h e ha s p ro vid e d us with no a uth or ity su g g e sti ngthat th is ty pe of discr etion in one par ty rende rs the cla

use invalid or unenf

orce able. We a g re e that the us e of the wo rd " may " in thi s c la us e , w hil e int e nd ingmand a tor y e ff e c t, i s unfortunate
. The word ordinarily sug g ests a conditional or possible result rather than a mandatory one. Althoug h we ag ree that the word "ma y " makes interpre tation of this clause cha lleng ing, w e find fr om t he c on te xt that th e pa

rt ie s in te nd e d to make the fo rum ma nd a tor y on ce AD M ma de itsWe also note t hat any question of whether ADM waived that rig ht by its action or ina ction 10 is not an issue befor e us in this case. We a ls o no te th a t, a c c or din g to t he ple a din g s, AD M' s p ri nc ipa l pl a c e of bu sin e ss i s in 11 I llinois , and t here is no sugg estion that the forum itself would fit within the limitations place d on fo rum- se le c tio n c la

us e s o n th e g ro un d th a t it wa s so me ho w unr e a so na ble or un jus t on that ba sis
. Ramsay also brief ly argues that the clause was unenfor cea ble bec ause of

overr eac hing by 12 Tex as T ra d i n g an d ADM, but that is based on a lleg ed wr ong doing by them and alleg ed lac k of evidenc e to show that Ramsay ' s signature wa s authorized. As we have found, suf ficient e vidence supports that conclusion re g ardingRamsay ' s signature. Ove rre achingis not shown. 19 c ho ic e . Othe rw ise , th e wo rd s g ivi ngAD M d isc re tio n to c ho os e wo uld me an n oth ing . In th is 10

c o n t e x t , th e t e r

m " m an d a t o r

y" d o e s n o te x c l u d e t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n t r a c tf o r d i s c r e t i o ni no n e p art y, which, if e x erc ised, would make the provision mandatory on others to the contr act. Readingthe clause as a w hole, we c onclude it provides AD M with the discretion to dec ide whether litigation must procee d in a court in I llinois . The a g ree ment allows ADM to dec ide whethe r it would allow liti g ation to proce ed in Texas, in this case , or t o require it to procee d in I llinois
. The 11 clause cover s all liti g ation. We hold that it i s a for um-selec tion clause adequate to support the trial
c ourt ' s d e c isi on

to d ism iss the lit ig a tio n in Te xas. 12 Under the controlling prec edents on for um- s el ection clauses, the par ties' barg ained- for
a g re e me nt m e ri ts j ud ic ia l r e sp e c t. T his dis pu te sh ou ld b e he ard in I lli no is, a s c ho se n b y AD M, pursuant to the contract between the pa rties. See I

n re AutoNation, Inc. , 2 2 8 S. W. 3 d 6 6 3 , 6 6 9 ( T e x. 2007).20

We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

J o s h R
. M o r r i s s , III Chief J ustice
DI SSENTI

NG OPI NI ON B e c a us e Ibe liev e the fo rum- se le c tio n c la us e is p e rm iss ive and

no t ma nd a tor y , I dis se nt t o the majority

opinion. The c lause states that "a ll actions or proc eeding s . . . shall be g overne d by the law o f I lli no is a

nd may , at th e dis c re tio n a

nd ele ctio n o f A DM , b e lit ig a te d in a c ourt
. . . w ith in I llinois ." D oes this languag e nece ssarily mean that all litigation betwe en these parties wa s require d to be conducted i n I llinois ? Or does this mean that I llinois "ma y " be s elec ted by ADM as a plac e of proper jurisdiction? The diff iculty with the majority

opinion is t he attempt to explain that "may " r eal ly means

" sh a ll. " On e e nte ri ng thi s c on tr a c t w ithfu ll k no wl e dg e that th e c on tr a c t w a s e nte re d in Te xas, Ramsay was a Texas resident, all tra

nsactions would be made throug h the local office in Texas, the corpor ations were licensed to do business in Texas, would properly believe that, if liti g ation resulted fr om t his c on tr a c t, j ur isd ic tio n o f t he lit ig a tio n w ou ld n e c e ssa ri ly lie in T e x as. I lli no is a

pp e ars to have no sig nificant c ontacts other tha n ADM' s location. Fur

ther, one could log ically b el ieve that enter ing the contr ac t i n question g ave A DM a rig ht that it would not ot herw ise have —it could no longe r ar g ue that I llinois did n o t h av e jurisdiction in the event AD M elec ted to file suit there.21

Consequently , the clause was not m eaning less. The fa ct that the par ties ag ree that litigation betwe en them may , if elec ted by

ADM, be conducte d in I llinois does not pla ce the parties on notice that no other state ha s jurisdiction of their litigation. Ibelieve this ca se is simil ar to Southwest Intelecom, Inc. v . Hotel Networks Corp. , 997 S.W. 2d 32 2 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) , w he re the pa rt ie s st ipu late d " to j ur isd ic tio n" in Minnes o t a. J u s t as the majority opinion states here , in Southwest Intelecom , Inc. , the trial cour t int e rp re te d th e jur isd ic tio n c la us e to p ro vid e fo r exc lus ive jur isd ic tio n in Minn e so ta c ourt s " be c a

us e th e pro vi si on wou ld be m eani ngles s . . . " Id. at 326. But the Austin court held that interpre ting the prov i s i o n to mean that both par ties ag ree d to jurisdiction and venue in Minnesota ( but not exclusively) ena

bled the appe llee to sue in its headqua rters state without worrying a bout jur isd ic tio na l is su e s. With ou t th e jur isd ic tio n cla us e , it wa s do ub tf

ul t hat a Minne so ta

c ourt wo uld have be en unable to exercise jurisdiction since that state ha d littl e conta ct. Ibelieve this c lause is similar to that in Southwest Intelecom , Inc ., and should be interpr eted
a s p ro vid ing pe rm iss ive , n ot e xclu siv e , ju ri sd ic tio n in

I lli no is. F or

the se re a so ns , I

re sp e c tf ull y dissent to the majority

opinion.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: April 2, 2008 Date D ecide d: May 5, 2008