IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-11734

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ANTHONY LAMOND THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:14-CR-441-1

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Anthony Lamond Thomas appeals the 180-month sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea conviction for possessing with intent to distribute 

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and possession of a 

firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). Thomas argues 

that the district court erred by sentencing him pursuant to the provisions of 

the Armed Criminal Career Act (ACCA), § 924(e)(1), based on his two prior 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 16, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-11734

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convictions for possession with intent to deliver cocaine, one prior conviction 

for delivery of cocaine, and one prior conviction for robbery. 

We review de novo the district court’s legal application of the ACCA. See 

United States v. Hawley, 516 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2008). Under the ACCA, 

a defendant, like Thomas, who is convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon

pursuant to § 922(g) is subject to enhanced punishment if he has at least three 

prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony” committed on 

different occasions. § 924(e)(1).

Thomas argues that his three prior drug convictions under Section 

481.112 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, which prohibits the knowing 

manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance, are not “serious drug offenses” for purposes of the ACCA because 

the Texas statute can be violated by an offer to sell, which is not included in 

the ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense.” He recognizes that we 

rejected this argument in United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 364-65 (5th 

Cir. 2008), but he contends that Vickers has been undermined by Johnson v. 

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2559, 2563 (2015), and Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. 

Ct. 1619 (2016). 

The ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense,” § 924(e)(2)(A), was not

at issue in either Johnson or Torres, and those cases do not represent an 

intervening change in the law regarding whether the Texas drug offenses at 

issue qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA and do not––either 

explicitly or implicitly––overrule our prior precedent. See Vickers, 540 F.3d at 

364-66; see also United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d 703, 706-08 (5th Cir. 2005).

Thomas’s reliance on United States v. Tanksley, 848 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.), 

supplemented by 854 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Renteria-

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Martinez, 847 F.3d 297 (2017), pet. for cert. filed (June 20, 2017) (No. 16-9608), 

is unavailing for the same reason.

Accordingly, because Thomas’s three prior drug convictions are “serious 

drug offenses,” the district court did not err in sentencing Thomas under the 

ACCA based on those convictions. In light of this, we need not address whether 

Thomas’s Texas conviction for robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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