2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-29-2015

Luz Paradoa v. Philadelphia Housing Authority

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Recommended Citation

"Luz Paradoa v. Philadelphia Housing Authority" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 428.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 14-3191

____________

LUZ PARADOA,

 Appellant

v.

PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No. 13-cv-06012)

District Judge: Hon. Timothy J. Savage

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 23, 2015

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 29, 2015)

____________

OPINION

____________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

This is an employment discrimination action arising under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and under 

 

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951, et seq. 

Luz Paradoa appeals the District Court’s order granting appellee Philadelphia Housing 

Authority’s (“PHA’s”) motion for summary judgment on all claims. For the following 

reasons, we will affirm.

I.

Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly 

summarize the facts relevant to our decision. Paradoa joined PHA in 2000 as a property 

manager. Appendix (“App.”) 104a. In 2008, PHA promoted her to “Manager of the 

Community Partners Program,” which required her to oversee staff, manage budgets, and 

supervise contractors. App. 105a-106a. Six or seven staff members reported to Paradoa. 

App. 106a.

In 2010, Paradoa’s first cousin Angelique Martez joined PHA as a family selfsufficiency counselor. App. 183a-184a. Martez noted on her application that she knew 

someone who worked at PHA, but she did not specifically disclose her relationship to 

Paradoa. App. 185. Paradoa was Martez’s supervisor until 2012. App. 190a. 

In 2012, three of Paradoa’s staff members filed Human Resources complaints 

accusing Paradoa of bullying them and showing favoritism toward Martez. App. 529a530a. Joanne Strauss, PHA’s director of Human Resources, reported that between seven 

and nine staff members complained to her about Paradoa, and at least four of them 

specifically complainted that Paradoa and Martez would speak together in Spanish and 
3

laugh and point in ways that suggested they were making fun of other employees. App. 

139a-140a. 

PHA employment administrator Cheryl DeVose interviewed Paradoa regarding 

the complaints. App. 149a. Paradoa claims that DeVose asked her if she was Hispanic, 

if she spoke Spanish, and if she spoke Spanish at work or around her co-workers. App. 

399a. DeVose denies asking if Paradoa was Hispanic. App. 155a. Following her 

investigation, DeVose recommended to Joanne Strauss that Paradoa’s employment be 

terminated. App. 154a.

Joanne Strauss determined that Paradoa’s conduct violated multiple PHA policies. 

First, PHA’s “Non-Fraternization Policy” prohibits employees from supervising those 

with whom they have a close relationship, and the policy’s definition of “close 

relationship” includes first cousins. App. 248a. Second, the Human Resources Policy 

Manual in effect from 1999 to 2012 – the period when Paradoa was employed – defined 

an employee’s direct supervision of a relative as a conflict of interest and charged 

supervisors to notify Human Resources whenever an assignment created such a conflict. 

App. 321a-322a. Third, Section 5.2 of PHA’s Workplace Management Policy warns that 

bullying will result in discipline up to and including termination. App. 266a. As 

punishment for violating these policies, Strauss terminated Paradoa’s employment. App. 

132a.

Paradoa responded by this lawsuit. In March 2014, PHA moved for summary 

judgment. The District Court granted that motion. Paradoa timely appealed.
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II.1

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Montone v. City of Jersey City, 

709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine 

issues of material fact are presented, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). We resolve all 

factual doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. DL 

Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007).

III.

Race discrimination claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the PHRA are, 

in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, subject to the burden-shifting 

framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). First, the plaintiff must 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a 

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Finally, should the defendant carry 

this burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the defendant were 

not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Id. 

To establish a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 

1981, and the PHRA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, 

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
5

(2) she was qualified for the position she sought to attain or retain, (3) she suffered an 

adverse employment action, and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could 

give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. Mandel v. M & Q Packaging 

Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013). Only the final element is under dispute in this 

case.

Paradoa argues that two circumstances of her termination give rise to an inference 

of discrimination. First, PHA has shown little evidence that Paradoa knew about and 

violated its anti-nepotism policies. Second, DeVose asked during her investigation if

Paradoa was Hispanic.

Even if these statements were true, they would not be sufficient evidence of 

discrimination to survive summary judgment. PHA is not required to show evidence that 

it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Paradoa until after she has 

established her prima facie case. If Paradoa could meet that burden by arguing her 

adversary had not produced its evidence yet, it would upend McDonnell Douglas’s 

burden-shifting framework. Moreover, even positive evidence that PHA’s stated reason 

for firing Paradoa was a pretext would not be evidence that the real reason was 

discriminatory unless it was paired with some other evidence of racial bias – for example, 

evidence that non-Hispanic employees were treated differently or that Paradoa was the 

only Hispanic person on staff. 

Paradoa has no such evidence here. The record shows that DeVose was asking 

Paradoa about her use of the Spanish language because she was investigating claims that 
6

Paradoa bullied her co-workers in Spanish. See App. 139a-140a, 150a. A further

question about Paradoa’s nationality – as opposed to her language ability – might have 

been irrelevant, but it does not suggest racial animus. See Takele v. Mayo Clinic, 576 

F.3d 834, 839 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding mere references to nationality did not suggest 

discriminatory animus without resorting to speculation). “[S]peculations, generalities, 

and gut feelings, however genuine, when they are not supported by specific facts, do not 

allow for an inference of discrimination to be drawn.” Adeniji v. Admin. for Child. 

Servs., 43 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (speculation not sufficient to withstand summary 

judgment).

Paradoa has failed to present evidence from which an inference of discrimination 

can be drawn and so cannot make out a prima facie case.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 

summary judgment in favor of Philadelphia Housing Authority.