This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1

STATE OF NEW MEXICO , 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 34,858 4 JUSTIN D., 5 Child-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY 7 Fernando R. Macias, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender 12 Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 KENNEDY, Judge. 17
{1} Justin D. (Child) appeals from the distri ct court’s order denying his suppression 18 motion. This Court’s calendar notice propos ed to affirm. Child filed a memorandum 192 in opposition to the proposed disposition. Not persuaded by Child’s arguments, we 1 affirm the judgment and sentence. 2
{2} Child challenged whether reasonable grounds existed to suspect that a search 3 of his vehicle would uncover evidence of a violation of law or school rules [DS 6], 4 and whether the search of his vehicle wa s reasonably related in scope under the 5 circumstances which justified the search in the first place. [DS 6] The calendar notice 6 proposed to conclude that Child consented to the search on the basis that when the 7 principal asked Child if he would mind opening the door to the vehicle, Child replied 8 no and unlocked the door. [DS 5] See State v. Gutierrez , 2004-NMCA-081, ¶ 6, 136 9 N.M. 18, 94 P.3d 18 (stating that consensual searches and seizures are one exception 10 to the warrant requirement). In response, Child argues that the testimony presented at 11 the suppression hearing suggested that the a ssistant principal may not have presented 12 the search as an option because while he te stified that he asked Child “if he would 13 mind” permitting them to search, the security officer testified that the assistant 14 principal may have also informed Child that they had a right to search his truck. [MIO 15 10] To the extent Child argues the search was therefore involuntary, we disagree. 16 [MIO 10] 17
{3} Child relies on State v. Davis , 2013-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 10-13, 304 P.3d 10, for the 18 proposition that “merely acquiescing to a showing of lawful authority . . . . does not 193 constitute valid consent,” and State v. Ingram , 1998-NMCA-177, ¶ 8, 126 N.M. 426, 1 970 P.2d 1151, for the contention that compliance with a directive of an official is not 2 consent. However, as Child acknowledges, when evidence is conflicting, we view it 3 a manner that supports the district court’s ruling, drawing all inferences and indulging 4 all presumptions in favor of it. State v. Pablo R. , 2006-NMCA-072, ¶ 17, 139 N.M. 5 744, 137 P.3d 1198; see State v. Cline , 1998-NMCA-154, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d 6 785 (“We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress to determine 7 whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing the facts in the light most 8 favorable to the prevailing party.”). We suggest that viewing the evidence in this 9 manner, particularly in the context of a school search where a lower standard applies, 10 the district court’s ruling was supported by the evidence. See State v. Crystal B. , 2001- 11 NMCA-010, ¶ 14, 130 N.M. 336, 24 P.3d 771 (recognizing that the lower standard 12 applicable to “the legality of a search of a student . . . . only in furtherance of the 13 school’s education-related goals; that is ina situation where the student is on school 14 property or while the student is under c ontrol of the school” and “depends on the 15 reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search”). 16
{4} Additionally, we cannot say that the evidence here supports a determination of 17 clear coercion as a matter of law. “Ultimately, the essential inquiry is whether 18 [Child’s] will has been overborne.” State v. Pierce , 2003-NMCA-117, ¶ 20, 134 N.M. 194 388, 77 P.3d 292 (citation omitted). We suggest that the principal’s indication that 1 they had a right to search Ch ild’s truck, in combination with the mere request “if he 2 would mind” permitting them to search, was not clear coercion. See Davis , 2013- 3 NMSC-028, ¶ 24 (recognizing that “an officer’sbelief in his or her ability to obtain 4 a warrant is permissible and neither cons titutes coercion or invalidates consent”); see 5 also State v. Chapman , 1999-NMCA-106, ¶ 21, 127 N.M. 721, 986 P.2d 1122 6 (“Coercion involves police overreaching thatovercomes the will of the defendant.” 7 (citation omitted)). Therefore, we propose toaffirm the district court’s ruling. See also 8 In re Ernesto M., Jr. , 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 15, 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318 (“The 9 question is whether the [trial] court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, 10 not whether the trial court could have reached a different conclusion.” 11
{5} Because we affirm on grounds that Child consented to the search, we need not 12 address the arguments concerning probable cause for the search. For these reasons, 13 and those stated in this Court’s calendar notice, we affirm. 14
{6} IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

_______________________________ 16 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 17 WE CONCUR: 18

___________________________________ 19 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 205 _________________________________ 1 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 2