FILED

April 21, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

SHEILA I. LAWSON ) FOR PUBLICATION

 )

) FILED: APRIL 21, 1997

Plaintiff-Appellee ) 

) HAMBLEN COUNTY

v . ) 

) HON. W.L. JENKINS,

LEAR SEATING CORPORATION ) JUDGE

 )

 Defendant-Appellant ) NO. 03-S-01-9509-CV-00105

For Appellant : For Appellee :

ROBERT D. VAN DE VUURST ROBERT C. EDWARDS

STEVEN H. TRENT Knoxville, TN

Johnson City, TN

OPINION
2

DECISION OF THE PANEL REVERSED; BIRCH, C.J.

JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.
3

In this case, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals

Panel concluded that Sheila I. Lawson, the employee, failed to

commence her action for benefits within one year of the accident

causing injury. After a thorough review of the record, we find

that Lawson commenced her action within the applicable period of

limitations.

I

For more than twenty years, Sheila Lawson was employed by

Lear Seating Corporation as a production line worker. In the late

1980's, she began to experience pain and numbness in her hands and

sought medical treatment from her family physician, John H. Kinser,

M.D. Kinser told her that her problems were related to her job and

recommended that she be rotated to a different job in the plant. 

After her initial visit to Kinser, Lawson notified her

supervisor of her problem with her hands and requested a transfer

to a different machine. The supervisor granted her request, and

Lawson’s symptoms diminished for a time. However, over the next

several years, the symptoms periodically recurred. During this

time, Lawson transferred to several different machines in an effort

to obtain relief. As she transferred from machine to machine, her

symptoms would abate temporarily--only to recur.

Subsequently, she developed pain in her shoulders and

arms because of her efforts to compensate for the pain in her
4

hands. Kinser gave Lawson monthly injections to alleviate the pain

in her shoulders and arms. 

During this entire period, Lawson continued to work fulltime and without restriction. She did not file a workers’

compensation claim with her employer, and Lear did not pay Kinser’s

bills.

On the morning of June 17, 1993, Lawson tried to pick up

her coffee cup, but unable to grasp it, she dropped it. After this

incident, Lawson went to the company nurse and informed her that

she could not work. The nurse referred Lawson to the company

doctor, who sent Lawson to E. Brantley Burns, Jr., M.D., a

specialist in orthopaedic medicine.

Burns diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome. Lear placed

Lawson on temporary disability. She then underwent surgery on both

wrists. Following a recuperative period, she returned to work.

During this period, Lear paid Lawson workers’ compensation

benefits.

Burns determined that Lawson had a ten percent permanent

partial impairment to each upper extremity. In April 1994, Lawson

filed this suit to recover permanent partial disability benefits.
1 We distinguish this case from those situations where carpal

tunnel syndrome develops as a result of an identifiable traumatic

event.

5

II

Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by a

presumption that the trial court’s findings of fact are correct

unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3).

As stated, the panel concluded that Lawson’s claim was

barred by the statute of limitations. We disagree. Repetitive

stress injuries are “accidental” and do not constitute occupational

diseases. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65, 69

(1961). Therefore, a suit to recover workers’ compensation

benefits for such an injury must be filed within one year of the

“accident resulting in the injury.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-203.

 

The identification of the “accident resulting in the

injury” is problematic in the case of a repetitive stress injury

such as Lawson’s. With carpal tunnel syndrome and other repetitive

stress injuries, the symptoms appear and worsen over an extended

period of time.1 As in Lawson’s case, the symptoms may be episodic

and may subside when the employee’s job is altered. Thus, it is

difficult, if at all possible, to determine when the “accident

resulting in the injury” occurs. Such a determination is important

because the statutory limitation period begins to run only after

the occurrence of the “accident resulting in the injury.”
6

In Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., 805 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn.

1991), the issue was which of two insurance carriers was obligated

to pay benefits for a carpal tunnel injury. Writing for the Court,

Justice Anderson held that because the employee suffered a new

injury each day at work and since the cause of those injuries was

constant, the accidental injury occurred on the date on which the

employee “could no longer perform her work.” Id. at 376. The date

of the accident for purposes of ascertaining the commencement of

the limitations period should be the same as the date of the

accident for purposes of ascertaining which insurance company

should pay benefits. We see no reason to distinguish between the

two. 

As Professor Larson notes:

This repeated-trauma or cumulative

trauma doctrine appears to have

originated with the House of Lords

decision in Burrell & Sons, Ltd. v.

Selvage [90 L.J. 1340 (H.L. 1921)],

in which compensation was awarded

for the disabling cumulative effect

of a long series of cuts and

scratches leading to infection and

arthritis. . . .

. . . .

The practical problem of fixing

a specific date for the accident has

generally been handled by saying

simply that the date of the accident

is the date on which the disability

manifests itself. Thus, in [Ptak v.

General Elec. Co., 13 N.J. Super.

294, 80 A.2d 337 (1951)], the date

of a gradually acquired sacroiliac

strain was deemed to be the first

moment the pain made it impossible

to continue to work. . . .
7

1B Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 39.40 and § 39.50

(1987)(citing Brown Shoe, supra)(quoted with approval in Barker,

supra).

Other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have

reached a similar conclusion. See Berry v. Boeing Military

Airplanes, 20 Kan. App.2d 220, 885 P.2d 1261, 1268 (Kan. Ct. App.

1994)(the date of “occurrence” or date of “injury” relates back to

the last date on which claimant worked); Ramsey v. Weyerhaeuser,

853 P.2d 774 (Okla. 1993)(date of “last trauma” is last day

worked); Brooks Drug, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board

(Parker), 161 Pa. Cmwlth. 81, 636 A.2d 246, 249 (1993)(“Each day of

work constituted a ‘new’ injury in that it further aggravated

Claimant’s condition . . . . The date of injury . . . is,

therefore, the last day Claimant worked.”).

In Berry, the Kansas Court of Appeals discussed at length

the problems associated with fixing the date of the accident in

carpal tunnel injury cases:

In the instant matter, both the

ALJ and the Board concluded that the

last day of work should be deemed as

the date of occurrence, at least

insofar as the bilateral carpal

tunnel condition is concerned. We

affirm that decision. We carry that

decision one step further and

conclude that the last day of work

should be the date from when

disability is computed in all cases

involving carpal tunnel syndrome

. . . . If we were to adopt either

the date on which the injury

“manifests itself” or the date on

which the injury is “diagnosed,” we

would set a potential trap for the

individual who, despite pain and
8

discomfort, continues to work long

after his or her carpal tunnel is

“diagnosed” or has “manifested

itself.” Those individuals would

find their claims for compensation

barred by the statute of

limitations. It seems to us that we

should adopt the rule that causes

the least potential prejudice and

upholds the spirit of our Workers

Compensation Act. We believe use of

the last day of work accomplishes

both of those purposes.

. . . .

Because of the complexities of

locating the date of injury in a

carpal tunnel syndrome case, the

process is simplified and made more

certain by adopting a rule that in a

carpal tunnel syndrome action, the

date from which compensation flows

is the last date worked by the

claimant.

Berry, 885 P.2d at 1267-1268. We find the policy reasons set out

by the Kansas court persuasive. Like the Kansas statute, our

workers’ compensation statute is remedial in nature. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-116. As we stated in Betts v. Tom Wade Gin, 810 S.W.2d

140 (Tenn. 1991),

this Court must interpret those

statutes in a manner designed to

protect workers and their families

from the economic devastation that,

in many instances, can follow

on-the-job injuries. Furthermore,

Tennessee's workers' compensation

laws must be construed so as to

ensure that injured employees are

justly and appropriately reimbursed

for debilitating injuries suffered

in the course of service to the

employer.

Id. at 142-143 (footnote omitted). Moreover, our holding today

establishes a clear point at which the limitation period begins to
9

run. See also Central Motor Express, Inc. v. Burney, 214 Tenn.

106, 377 S.W.2d 947, 951 (1964)(applying “last day worked” rule to

find workers notice of injury to the employer timely.)

We find the issue raised in this case distinguishable

from that raised in Livingston v. Shelby Williams Ind., Inc., 811

S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1991). In Livingston, the employee fell and hurt

his back. Initially, the employee did not think himself seriously

injured, and the injurious effects of the fall were not manifested

for several months. In that case, the date of the accident causing

injury for purposes of commencing the limitations period was the

date of the fall. However, the statute of limitations was

suspended until by reasonable care and diligence it was

discoverable and apparent that an injury had been sustained. Id.

at 515. In Livingston, even though not immediately apparent, there

was an identifiable event or accident after which the employee had

an injury. In the case of a repetitive stress injury, however,

there is no identifiable event, incident, or moment before which

the employee is not injured, but after which the employee is

injured. Thus, the “last day worked” rule that we announce today

applies only to repetitive stress injuries, i.e., the unexpected or

unusual injuries that result from the ordinary or usual strain or

exertion of the employee’s job. Central Motor Express, 377 S.W.2d

at 950.

Carpal tunnel syndrome may develop as a result of a

traumatic event, and in such situations, the statute of limitations

would begin to run when by reasonable care and diligence the
1 0

compensable injury is discoverable and it is apparent that such

injury is work-related. Livingston v. Shelby Williams Ind., Inc.,

811 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tenn. 1991).

 As in Barker, the repetitive movements of Lawson’s hands

as she performed her job caused her injuries. Each day Lawson

worked contributed to her injury. Because there is no one

particular incident or event identifiable as an “accident resulting

in the injury” and because Lawson suffered new trauma to her hands

each day she worked, we hold that the date of the accidental injury

is the date that Lawson was no longer able to work because of her

injury. The record establishes that June 17, 1993, was the first

day that Lawson was unable to perform her job; therefore, the

statute of limitations commenced at that time. As Lawson filed

this suit in April 1994, her claim is timely.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of

this appeal are taxed to Lear Seating Corporation, for which

execution may issue if necessary, and Lawson’s request for

additional sanctions is denied.

________________________________________

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Chief Justice

CONCUR:

Drowota, Anderson, Reid, JJ.