CORWIN TELT SCHIK, P la in t if f,
v. WILLIAMS & JENSE N, P LLC, et al.,

De fend ant s. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci vi l A cti on 08 -00 08 9 (H HK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION AN D O RD ER Corwin Teltschik, forme r Tre asure r of Ame rica ns for a Republican Major ity

Polit ical Ac tio n Co mmi tte e (“ ARMPA C” ), br ing s th is a c tio n a g a ins t Will iams & Jens e n, PL L C, Wi lli ams & Jensen, P.C., (collectively “Willi ams & J ensen” ), and c urre nt and forme r Will iams & Jensen attorney s, Ba

rbar a Wix on Bonf

iglio, Mer edith Kelley

and Robert Ma

rtinez. This suit arises f

rom a complaint that wa s filed with the Fe dera l Election Commis sion (“F EC”) a g ainst ARMPAC and Teltschik, as ARMPAC’s Trea surer , that resulted in a Conc iliation Agr eeme nt alleg edly without h i s kn o w l e d g e o r

c o n s e n t . T e l t s c h i k

a s s e rt s c a

u s e s o f a c t i o nf o r b r e a c ho f f i d u c i ar y d u ty,
ne g lig e nc e , li be l, m isa

pp ro pr iatio n o f n ame and re putatio n, tor

tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th c on tr a c ts, tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th p ro sp e c tiv e e c on omi c a dv anta g e , a nd bu sin e ss d isp ara g e me nt. B e fo re the Court

are “ De fe nd ants ’ M oti on fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt” [#39 ], de fe nd ants ’

“ Mo tio n to Str ike Te lts c hik ’s Un ple d T he or ie s” [#53 ], T e lts c hik ’s “ Mo tio n to Am e nd Ple a din g s” [#52] , and “Plaintiff’ s Motion to S trike the De clar ations of B arba ra Wix on Bonf

iglio” [#50]. Upon consider ation of the motions, the oppositions t here to, and the re cord of this case, the Court conclude s that defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt and def

endants’ motion to strike2

should be g rante d in part and de nied in part, a nd that Teltschik’s motion to amend his complaint and Te ltschik’s motion t o strike should be denie d. I. BACKG ROUND The mate rial fa cts of this case , unless it is ot herw ise indicated, a re a s follows. In 1995, Teltschik, a Te x as-ba sed lawyer, be came Trea surer of ARMPAC, a political action committee fo rm e d to a ssi st R e pu

bli c an c and idate s f

or e le c tio n to the U. S. H ou se of Re pr e se ntativ e s w ith
a c tiv iti e s su c h a s th e so lic itatio n o f p oli tic a l c on tr ibutio ns . T e lts c hik did no t ha ve any fa mil iari ty with fede ral e lection laws a nd regulations. He asse rts that he only acc epted the position as Trea surer for ARMPAC after

beinginformed that Williams & J ensen, a law firm ba sed in the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , w ou ld h and le a ll o f A RMPA C’ s f ina nc ia l a ff a ir s, pr e pa

re and fi le a ll
nece ssary paper work with the F EC, and ensure that ARMPAC compli ed with all fe dera l election laws. Be fore acc eptingthe Tre asure r position, Teltschik asked B arba ra Wix on Bonf

iglio, a lawy er at Wi lliams & Jensen and the Assistant Tre asure r of ARMPAC, what his obligations under the law would be onc e he be came Trea surer . Acc ordingto Teltschik, Bonf iglio informe d him that he would not be re quired to sig n any chec ks or file a

ny repor ts, as she would pre pare and file a ll the reports with the F EC. Teltschik claims that Bonf iglio assur ed him that she possessed the c ompetence and experienc e nec essar y to fulfill these obligations. On June 9, 20 04 , th e F EC s e nt a no tic e to T e lts c hik

at Will iams & Jens e n’ s a dd re ss stating that it would conduct an audit of A RMPAC . Teltschik claims that he ne ver a uthorized the FE C to send his mail t o Wil liams & Jensen and that no one at Will iams & Jensen eve r informed him about the F EC notice.3

On Marc h 3 1, 20 05 , th e F EC s e nt T e lts c hik an inte ri m a

ud it r e po rt , a g a in t o Wil liams & J ensen’ s addre ss, informing him of discr epanc ies in repor ts filed on behalf

of ARMPAC. The FEC re quired a

response to the interim repor t before May

3, 2005. Ag ain, Teltschik cla ims that no one at Williams & J ensen infor med him that this report was r ece ived, that a r esponse wa s require d, or that Will iams & Jensen subseque ntly filed for , and obtained, a n extension of the response deadline. L ater that y ear , Citi zens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“ CREW ”) f iled a
c o mp l a i n tw i thth e F E C a g a i n s tA R M P A C b a s e d u p o nth e r e s u l t s o f

th e F E C ’ s a

u d i tr e p o rt . In response to CREW ’s complaint, the F EC opened Matter Unde r Review ( “MUR”) No. 5675. On August 17, 2005, the FEC sent anothe r letter to Te ltschik at Wi lliams & Jensen’s addre ss. The letter indicated that ARMPAC and Teltschik, as Tre asure r of ARMPAC, were named a s responde nts in a complaint filed by CREW and that if Te ltschik wished to be
re pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l, h e wa s r e qu ir e d to c omp le te a de signatio n o f c ouns e l f

or m and re tur n it to t he F EC. On September

6, 2005, Bonf

iglio ca lled Teltschik to inform him about the complaint and to reque st that he fill out the require d desig nation of counse l form. Teltschik asse rts that during the c ours e of

the c onve rs atio n, B on fi g lio a ssu re d h im that th e c omp la int wa s n oth ingbut a hara ssment tactic. Ac cordingto Teltschik, Bonf iglio, howe ver, did not tell him that he was named a s a re spondent in the complaint. That same day , Bonf iglio sent Te ltschik a blank copy of the de signatio n o f c ouns e l f or m and a sk e d h im t o s ig n th e fo rm and re tur n it to h e r. B on fi g lio did not send Teltschik a c opy of the c omplaint or the FEC letter addre ssed to him, however
. Teltschik re fused to sig n the form a nd told Bonfig lio that “[he] was re fusingbeca use [he] wanted4

to be in the loop reg ardingany further proce eding s pertainingto MUR 5675.” Pl.’s St atement of Contested I ssues (“Pl.’s Stmt.”) Ex. 1 ¶ 16. After Te ltschik refuse d to sign, B onfig lio filled out the form, de signating Don F . McGa hn I I , an attorne y

with McGahn a

nd Associates, PL L C, as counsel for

responde nts. Bonfig lio signed the form, in her own name, in the bla

nk space labeled responde nt. I n a letter

dated Septembe r 6, 2005, B onfig lio requested the FEC to g rant ARMPAC an extension of time for filinga re sponse to the complaint filed in MUR 5675. Bonf iglio filed the desig nation of counse l form with the FE C on September 30, 2005. That same da

y , the FE C rece ived a r esponse to CREW’s complaint, which McGahn submitted and sig ned as “ Counsel for Amer icans for a Republica

n Majority .” Pl.’s Stmt . Ex . 11 (“A RMPAC Response”) at 14. The r esponse, e ntitled “Response of Ame rica ns for a Republican Majority to the Complaint Filed by the Citiz ens for

Responsibili ty

and Ethics in Washington,” does not mention Teltschik in any capa city
. Id. No other r esponse wa s filed in MUR 5675. On J une 22, 2006, a Conc iliation Agr eeme nt in MUR 5675 (“Ag ree ment” or

“ Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt” ) w a s f ile d w iththe F EC. Th e Agre e me nt n ame d T e lts c hik , in his of fi c ia l c a pa c ity , a s a

re sp on de nt. Te lts c hik

a lle g e s th at th e Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt a c c us e d h im of cr iminal conduct and c onfesse d judgme nt on his behalf without his authorization. Specifica lly , the Ag ree ment states that “[t] he [FEC] found reason to be lieve that Amer icans for a R e p u b l i c anM a j o r i ty . . . an d

C o r w i nT e l t s c h i k , i nh i s o f

f i c i a l c a p a c i ty a s T r e a s ur e r , ( c o l l e c t i v e l y, ‘Respondents’) violated 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) and 11 C.F .R. §§ 102.5(a), 104.3( d), 104.10, 104.11, 106.5(f) and 106.6.” D efs.’ Mot. for Summ. J . Ex . E (“Conc iliation Agr eeme nt”) at 1. The Ag ree ment further

require s “Respondents” to ( 1) pay a $115,000 civil pena lty ; (2) ce ase a nd desist from furthe r violations; and (3) amend its reports to comport with the Agree ment and file aI t is unclear f rom the re cord whether

Kelley officia lly beca me ARMPAC’s 1 As sis tant T re a sure r a ft e r B on fi g lio le ft Willi ams & Jens e n. B oth B on fi g lio and

Ke lle y me re ly state in their re spective de clar ations that Kelley assumed B onfig lio’s duties after Bonf iglio lef t the firm. Teltschik also name d McGa hn as a de fenda

nt in his complaint, however, the 2 United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of Texas dismis sed McGa hn as a de fenda

nt 5 termination repor

t with the FEC. Mere dith Kelley , an attorne y at Will iams & Jensen who undertook B onfig lio’s duties reg ardingARMPAC upon Bonfig lio’s depar ture, sig ned the ag ree ment in her own na

me “F or Respondents.” Conc iliation Agr eeme nt at 9. 1 Teltschik’s wife found a c opy of the Conciliation Ag ree ment betwee n ARMPAC and the F EC o n th e Inte rn e t, a

nd , o n Augus t 6, 20 06 , s e nt i t to Te lts c hik . T e lts c hik a lle g e s th at he fi rs t lear ned that he ha d been na

med in the FE C’s proce edingag ainst ARMPAC when he was informed of

the proc eedingby

his wife. Te ltschik also alleg es that he w as unaw are that McGa hn had bee n hired to re prese nt ARMPAC and Te ltschik, that an answe r to the complaint had be en filed, or that a

Conciliation Agr eeme nt was ente red into on his behalf . Acc ordingto Teltschik,
e ve ry do c ume nt c on c e rn ingMU R 56 75 wa s f ile d w ith out hi s k

no wl e dg e and

wi tho ut h is
c on se nt; he a lle g e s th at he did no t a uth or ize anyon e to r e sp on d o n h is b e ha lf or re pr e se nt h im befor e the F EC. On August 15, 2006, Teltschik alleg es that he inquire d of Will iams & Jensen about the Conciliation Agr eeme nt that had bee n filed in MUR 5675 with the FEC. Ac cordingto Teltschik, Robert Martinez, manag ing pa rtner at Wi lliams & Jensen, informed him that McGa hn had bee n hired to re prese nt ARMPAC
. Almost a y ear

later, Te ltschik filed a complaint ag ainst defe ndants in the Southern District of Texas. The c ase w as subseque ntly transfe rre d to this C ourt. 2for lac k of per sonal jurisdiction. This Court denied Teltschik’s motion to reconsider that ruling
. In r e sp on se to d e fe nd ants ’ m oti on to s tr ike , T e lts c hik

no w s e e ks to a

me nd his 3 complaint. Teltschik had not soug ht leave to amend his complaint prior to defe ndants’ motion, howeve r. F or the re asons elabor ated infra, the Court wi ll d e ny Te lts c hik ’s mot ion

to a me nd his complaint. 6 II . MO TI ON S TO S TR IKE B e fo re the Court

a dd re sse s d e fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, it i s a

pp ro pr iate to addre ss defe ndants’ motion to strike various alleg ations that appea r in Teltschik’s opposition and Te lts c hik ’s mot ion

to s tr ike B on fi g lio ’s or ig ina l and su pp le me nta l de c laratio ns . A. De fend ant s’ M ot ion to St r ike Def endants c ontend that var ious alleg ations in Teltschik’s opposition to t heir motion for summary judgme nt do not appear

in his complaint and move to strike them. Def endants a rgue that discovery

in this case is closed a

nd that they

have not ha d an opportunity to conduct discovery on Teltschik’s new

alleg ations. Defe ndants also note that Te ltschik never sought leave to amend his complaint to include these ne w alleg ations. Specifica lly , defe ndants move to strike 3 the fo llo wi nga lle g atio ns : 1. That any

defe ndant could be liable beca use they [di d not] forwa

rd A RM PA C c o n tr ib u ti o n s to [T e lt s c h ik ]; 2. That any

defe ndant could be liable beca use they [di d not] g ive him orig inal re c or ds re late d to ARMPA C duri ngthe c ours e of thi s la ws uit ; 3. That any

defe ndant could be he ld liable to [ Teltschik] based on some . . . acc usation of forg ery , unrelated to MUR 5675; 4. Th at any

de fe nd ant c ou ld b e lia

ble fo r f ili ngre po rt s e le c tr on ic a lly in h is name or a s “ Tr e a sure r; ” 5. That [Teltschik] . . . was a “third-pa rty benef iciary” of a

n ag ree ment betwee n Wil liams & Jensen and ARMPAC; or 6. That any

defe ndant could be liable under a theory of res ipsa loquitor
. Def s.’ Mot. to St rike Pl.’s Unpled The ories (“ Def s.’ Mot. to St rike” ) at 2-3.Although T eltschik does not dispute that his complaint does not raise the 4 alleg ation that any

of the de fenda

nts is “liable for f

iling re ports elec tronically in his name,” the Court notes that Teltschik’s complaint does state that Wil liams & Jensen filed with the F EC ARMPA C’ s F if

th S tate me nt o f O rg anizatio n, wh ic h b e ars his fo rg e d e le c tr on ic signatur e . T his is the only

document that the c omplaint alleg es def endants filed e lectronic ally in Teltschik’s name pr ior to the openingof MUR 5675, howeve r, and it is not releva nt to any of Teltschik’s claims. The doc ument does not relate to MUR 5675 and Teltschik make s no further mention of it i n a ny of his su bs e qu e nt f

ili ng s. 7 Teltschik does not dispute def endants’ c ontention that he does not ra ise these a lleg ations in his complaint. Teltschik ar g ues, howe ver, that defe ndants’ motion to strike the alleg ations 4 should be denied be cause the alleg ations do not raise a ny new c laims and are mere ly additional fac ts asserted to support the c laims alrea dy in his complaint. Alternatively , Teltschik see ks leave to a me nd his c omp la int

to i nc lud e the a dd iti on a l a lle g atio ns . 1. Al le ga ti ons 1, 2, 3, and 4 A plaintiff may

not assert ne w alleg ations at the summary judgme nt stag e if such alleg ations amount to a “funda mental cha

ng e” in the nature of pla intiff’s claims. See H urlbert v. St. Mary’s He alth Care System, Inc

. , 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 ( 11th Cir. 2006) (stating that plaintiff could not expand his FML A alleg ations in response to def endant’ s motion for summary judgme nt beca

use the ne w alleg ations amount to a “funda mental cha

ng e” in the nature of pla int if f’ s c la im) ; se e als o Sharp v. Rosa Me xicano , D. C., L.L. C. , 496 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97 n.3 (D.D.C. 2007) ( stating that plaintiff may not, “throug h summary

judgme nt briefs, ra ise [ ] new claims . . . bec ause pla intiff did not raise them in his complaint, and did not file an amended
c omp la int ” ); DSMC, Inc . v. Conve ra Corp. , 479 F. Supp. 2d 68, 84 (D.D .C. 2007) (re jecting plaintiff’s attempts to broade n its conspiracy claims in its opposi tion to defenda nt’s motion for summary judgme nt). The a lleg ations numbered 1, 2, 3, a nd 4 fundame ntally

chang e the nature of Teltschik’s cla ims and theref ore must be stricke n.2 U.S.C. § 432(b)(1) pr ovides, in releva nt part, that “[e]very

person who r ece ives 5 a contr ibution for an author ized polit ical committee sha ll, no later than 10 da y s after rec eiving such contribution, forw ard to the tre asure r such c ontribution.” 2 U.S.C. § 432(b)(1).

2 U .S. C. § 43 2( d) pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art , th at “ [t]he tr e a sure r s ha ll p re se rv e a ll 6 re c or ds re qu ir e d to be ke pt b y thi s se c tio n a

nd c op ie s o f a ll r e po rt s r e qu ir e d to be fi le d b y thi s subchapte r for

3 y ear s after

the re port is filed.” 2 U.S.C. § 432(d). In his complaint, Teltschik does state that he reque sted that Wil liams & Jensen 7 send him ARMPAC’s orga nizational documents and that Wil liams & Jensen “fax ed to Plaintiff some of the r equeste d formation docume nts and sample bank statements.” Compl. ¶ 26. Teltschik does not asse rt that Wil liams & Jensen ref used to send the r emainingorg anizational documents or that suc h action wa s require d, howeve r.

In any event, a s discussed in Part I I I(B )(1) (a) (iii), Teltschik fa ils to establish t he 8 nece ssary elements re quired to make out a bre ach of fiduciar y duty or neg lige nce c laim based on defe ndants’ alleg ed fa ilure to deliver A RMPAC ’s re cords to him. 8 Reg ardingalleg ations 1 and 2, Teltschik a rgues that def

endants’ f ailure to for

war d contributions for ARMPAC to him , as re quired by 2 U.S.C. § 432(b)(1), and their f ailure a nd 5 ref usal to forwa

rd ARMPAC’s orig inal rec ords to him, as require d by 2 U.S.C. § 432(d), show 6 that de fe nd ants ow e d h im a statut or y duty . In h is c omp la int , h ow e ve r, Te lts c hik do e s n ot r e fe r t o either 2 U .S.C. § 432(b)(1) or 2 U .S.C. § 432(d), and does not mention, or e ven hint at, any alleg ed fa ilure on def

endants’ pa

rt to send him contributions for ARMPAC or ARMPAC ’s orig inal rec ords. Fur

thermore , Teltschik’s bre ach of fiduciar y duty and neg lige nce c laims were 7
no t ba se d o n s uc h a lle g atio ns . T e lts c hik state s th at de fe nd ants ow e d a duty to h im b e c a

us e

“ B on fi g lio (a

nd Willi am[s] & Jens e n) sp e c if ic a lly so ug ht [h is] a

uth or izatio n to re pr e se nt [h im] b e f o r e th e F E C o nth e c o mp l a i n t ” an d b e c a u s e “ W i l l i am s & J e n s e n , B o n f i g l i o an d K e l l e y, provided leg al servic es and a dvice to [him] .” Compl. ¶¶ 41, 42. Thus, by now asser

ting that de fe nd ants ow e d h im a

duty se pa rate and a pa rt fr om t ho se dis c us se d in

his c omp la int , T e lts c hik attempts to fundamentally chang e the nature of his bre ach of fiduciar y duty and neg lige nce
c la ims
. 89

Reg ardingalleg ations 3 and 4, Teltschik c laims that the forg ing of his signatur e on documents filed with the F EC and the filingof re ports with the FEC that purpor ted to be filed
e le c tr on ic a lly

by him pr ov e s th at B on fi g lio , K e lle y , a nd Willi ams & Jens e n b re a c he d th e ir fi du c iary duty to h im. Te lts c hik

a lso a pp e ars to a lle g e that a lle g atio ns 3 a nd 4 s up po rt his mis a pp ro pr iatio n o f n ame and re putatio n c la im. Teltschik’s complaint, howe ver, f ocuses on de fenda

nts’ activities associated with MUR 5675 and the Conciliation Ag ree ment that resulted f rom that MUR. Specifica lly , Teltschik’s brea ch of f

iduciary duty claim is cente red a

round def endants’ f ailure to notify

him of the
c omp la int that w a s f

ile d a g a ins t hi m and

the ir a lle g e d una

uth or ize d r e pr e se ntatio n o f h im i n MUR 5675. Teltschik may not now expand defe ndants’ alleg ed wr ong doings to include the forg ing of documents filed with the F EC that occur red longbefor e the F EC opened MUR 5675. Simi larl y , th e so le ba sis of the mis a pp ro pr iatio n o f n ame and re putatio n c la im p le d in Teltschik’s complaint is defe ndants’ alleg ed ac tion of enteringinto a Conciliation Agr eeme nt on his behalf without his consent. Thus, the subseque nt assertion of a n additional g round for mis a pp ro pr iatio n o f n ame —th e us e of Te lts c hik ’s name on

oth e r F EC f

ili ng s w ith out hi s authorization—amounts to a fundamenta l chang e in the natur e of Te ltschik’s misappropriation of
name a nd reputation claim. Te lts c hik pr oc e e de d thro ug h d isc ov e ry wi tho ut s e e kin gto a

me nd his c omp la int
. There fore , Teltschik may not raise these new a lleg ations now when discove ry is closed and the
c a se is i n th e mid st o f s umm ary jud g me nt p ro c e e din g s. Th e Court

a lso de nie s T e lts c hik ’s a lte rn ativ e mot ion to a me nd his c omp la int . N ot o nly does Teltschik fa il to offer a ny g rounds for le ave to amend, see Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e10

7(b), he also fails to attac h his proposed ame nded complaint as r equire d by L CvR 15.1, s ee Callow ay v. B rownlee , 366 F. Supp. 2d 43, 45 n.2 (D.D .C. 2005) (deny ing pla intiff’s motion for le ave to f ile an ame nd e d c omp la int fo r f a ilure to c omp ly

wi th t he loc a l r ule s w he n p la int if

f d id not attach the pr oposed ame nded complaint). I n any event, the Court f

inds that allowing Teltschik to amend his complaint at this late juncture “would re sult in delay or undue pr ejudice to the opposing pa

rty .” W illiamsburg W

ax Muse um, Inc . v. Historic Figures, Inc
. , 810 F.2d 243, 24 7 ( D. C. C ir . 1 98 7) ; se e als o Hoffmann v. United States , 266 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D .C. 2003) (statingthat “[a] plainti ff . . . c annot be pe rmitted to ‘circ umvent the ef fec ts of summary judgme nt by

amendingthe complaint eve ry time a termination of the a ction threatens’” ( quoting Glesenk amp v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. , 71 F.R.D. 1, 4 (N .D. Cal. 1974), aff’d per curiam , 540 F.2d 458 ( 9th Cir. 1976))). Te ltschik may not now raise ne w alleg ations by amendment y ear s after

he filed his orig inal complaint and af ter the pa rties have conducte d extensive discovery
. See W

illiamsburg W

ax Muse um, Inc
. v. Historic Figures, Inc
. , 810 F.2d 243, 127- 128 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Acc ording ly , defe ndants’ motion to strike will be gr anted a s it relates to alleg ations 1, 2, 3, and 4 and T eltschik’s motion to amend his complaint will be denied. 2. Al le ga ti on 5 In h is o pp os iti on

to d e fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to s tr ike , T e lts c hik

fa ils to r e sp on d to de fe nd ants ’ argument that the Court should strike alleg ation 5, that Teltschik was a third-par ty benef iciary of an agree ment betwee n Wil liams & Jensen and ARMPAC. The Court there fore treats the argument as conc eded. Se e Klu ge l v . S ma ll , 5 19 F . Su

pp . 2 d 6 6, 72 (D .D .C. 20 07 ) ( “ I t is we ll
e sta bli sh e d in the D. C. C ir c uit

that w he n a

pa rt y do e s n ot a dd

re ss a rgume nts ra ise d b y

a mov ant,11

th e c o urtm ay

tre atth o s e argu m en t s as co n ce d ed
. ” ( ci t i n g Hopkins v. W omen’ s Div. Ge n. Bd. of Global Ministri es , 238 F.Supp.2d 174, 178 (D.D .C.2002))). Acc ording ly , defe ndants’ motion to strike will be gr anted a s it relates to alleg ation 5. 3. Al le ga ti on 6 Finally , defe ndants contend that alleg ation 6, that any defe ndant ca

n be held liable unde r the do c tr ine of

re s ip sa loq uit ur , mu st b e str ic ke n b e c a

us e Te lts c hik

fa ile d to ple a d th e do c tr ine in h i s co mp l ai n t . Inth e a l t ern at i v e, d ef en d an t s co n t en d

th atT el t s ch i k

d o es n o tp ro v i d e e n o u gh evidenc e to survive summary judgme nt on this i ssue. Def endants’ a

rguments cannot be sustained. Withre sp e c t to de fe nd ants ’ a rgume nt t hat T e lts c hik ’s a sse rt ion

re g ard ingthe ir

lia bil ity
un de r t he do c tr ine of

re s ip sa loq uit ur mus t be str ic ke n b e c a

us e it w a s n ot p le a d in

his c omp la int , the ar g ument fails bec ause“ [i ]tis well settled in this j urisdiction that res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidenc e and not one of plea ding or substantive law.” Honey v. Ge orge Human Const. Co. , 63 F .R. D. 44 3, 45 1 ( D. D. C. 1 97 4) ; se e als o Powers v. Coates , 203 A.2d 425 (D.C. 1964) ( stating that “[i] t was er

ror f or the trial c ourt to rule that the doc trine of r es ipsa could not be c onsidered beca use not pleade d” bec ause “ [t ]he doctrine is a proc edura l rule of e vidence and is not a rule of pleading ”). The ref

ore, de fenda

nts’ motion to s trike alleg ation 6 will be denied. As for de fenda

nts argument that Teltschik has not established f acts suff icient to defe at the ir mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g e me nt w ithre sp e c t to Te lts c hik ’s inv oc atio n o f t he re s ip sa loquitur doctrine, the Court conc ludes that at this point—particularly when the e vidence must be viewed in a

light most favor able to Te ltschik—the Court is not able to say that defe ndants are
e n t i t l e d t o s u c ha r u l i n ga s a m at t e r o f l aw . T o r e i t e r at e , r e s i p s a l o qu i tur i s a r u l e o f e v i d e n c e . It12

is not subst antive law which is capa ble of providinga basis for holding a party liable on any
cause of ac tion. The Court will make a de cision whether res ipsa loquitur may

be invoked at an appropr iate time duringthe trial, per haps at the ve ry

end of the case afte r all of the e vidence has been pr esente d. B. Te lt sc hik’ s M ot ion to St r ike Te lts c hik mov e s to str ike B on fi g lio ’s or ig ina l de c lara tio n, su bmi tte d w ithde fe nd ants ’ mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, and

B on fi g lio ’s su

pp le me nta l de c lara

tio n, su bmi tte d w ith d e f e n d an t s ’ m o t i o nt o s tr i k e . T h e C o urtw i l l a d dr e s s e a c hd e c l ar at i o ns e p ar at e l y. First, ther e is no basis to strike Bonf iglio’s or igina l declar ation. Teltschik ar g ues that Bonf iglio’s or igina l declar ation should be stricken be cause she stated in a de position t hat she
never repr esente d to anyone or to a ny fede ral a g ency

that she wa s the Tre asure r of ARMPAC. Teltschik has de monstrated that this statement is likely false by attachingFEC filing s in which Bonf iglio sig ned her

name in the box labeled “Sig nature of Tre asure r.” A p art y mov ingto s tr ike “ be ars a he avy burd e n a s c ourt s g e ne ra lly dis fa vo r m oti on s to strike.” Canady v. ErbeElektrome dizin GmbH , 384 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180 (D.D .C. 2005). Te lts c hik ha s n ot m e t th is b ur de n. Poi nti ngso le ly to a n in a c c ur a c y

in B on fi g lio ’s deposition , Te lts c hik do e s n ot s pe c if

y any ob je c tio n to any

state me nts in B on fi g lio ’s original declaration
. Although B onfig lio’s deposition may have c ontained a f

alse stateme nt, Teltschik has not pr ov ide d a

ny su pp or t f or the pr op os iti on

that on e ina c c ur ate state me nt i n a de po sit ion

wa rr ants the striking of

a sepa rate decla ration. Even if

the fa lse statement we re in B onfig lio’s declar ation, the Court still would not strike the dec laration in it s entirety
. See A ftergood v. Centeral IntelligenceAgenc

y , 355 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565 (D.D .C. 2005) (statingthat if the cha lleng ed13

a ff ida vit c on ta ine d in a c c ur ate inf

or matio n, “ the c ourt

wo uld me re ly e xcis e the fa lse state me nt” instead of strikingthe af

fidavit in its entirety). Indeed, “ [i ]n resolving motions to strike . . . the court [should] use [ ] a sca lpel, not a butcher knife.” Canady , 384 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Be cause Teltschik fa ils to proffer a suff icient re ason to strike Bonf iglio’s or igina l declar ation from the r ecor d of this case , the Court conclude s that his moti on must be denied. Fur thermore , beca

use the Court g rants in par t defe ndants’ “Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Un ple d T he or ie s, ” inc lud ingthe a lle g atio n th at de fe nd ants c ou ld b e lia ble fo r f ili ngre po rt s elec tronically

in his name or as “ Trea surer ,” the Court nee d not consider B onfig lio’s supplemental dec laration, that was submitted by defe ndants solely

to respond to Teltschik’s
a lle g atio ns re g ard ingthe fi lin gof re po rt s w ithhis e le c tr on ic signatur e . T e lts c hik ’s mot ion to str ike B on fi g lio ’s su

pp le me nta l de c laratio n, a c c or din g ly , is moo t. III. DEFENDA NTS’ MOTION FOR SUM MARYJUDG MENT A. Legal Stand ard Summary judgme nt may

be g rante d only

wher e the “ pleading s, the discover y and disclosure mate rials on file, a nd any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any
mate ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (c )( 2) ; Qu igle

yv . G ibl in , 5 69 F .3 d 4 49 , 4 53 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 9) . Amate ri a l f a c t is on e that is capa ble of a ffe ctingthe outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 24 8 ( 19 86 ). A g e nu ine iss ue is o ne wh e re the “ e vid e nc e is s uc h th at a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld return a verdic t for the nonmovingparty ,” id. at 248, as opposed to e vidence that “is so one-sided that one par

ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w,” id. at 252. A cour

t consideringa motion for14

summary judgme nt must draw all “justifiable infe renc es” f rom the evide nce in f

avor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255. B ut the non-moving party ’s opposition must consist of more than me re unsupported alleg ations or denials a nd must be supported by

aff idavits or other c ompetent
e vid e nc e se tti ngfo rt

h s pe c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ngthat th e re is a g e nu ine iss ue fo r t

ri a l. F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (e )( 2) ; Ce lote

x Cor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317 (1986). B
. Negligence and B reac h of F idu ciary Duty Be cause the evidenc e and pr inciples of law r eg ardingTeltschik’s cla ims of neg lige nce and bre ach of

fiduciar y duty in this case over lap, the Court will addre ss defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt as to these cla ims togethe r. De fe nd ants c on te nd

that th e y are e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt a s to the se c la ims beca use Teltschik ha s failed to show that (1) any defe ndant owed T eltschik a duty ; (2) any defe ndant bre ache d a duty owed to Te ltschik; or (3) the e x istence of any proxi mately

cause d d am a g e s b a s e d

o nd e f e n d an t s ’ a l l e g e d

b r e a c ho f d u ty. 1. Duty A plaintiff may

only preva il on a claim for br eac h of fiducia ry duty or prof essional neg lige nce a g ainst a def

endant who ow ed a duty

of ca re to that plaintiff. Taylor v. Akin, Gump, Strau ss, Ha ue r &Fe ld , 859 A.2d 142, 147 (D.C. 2004); se e als o N. O. L. v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 674 A.2d 498, 499, n.2 (D.C. 1995) ( “The foundation of moder n neg lige nce la

w is the exist ence of a duty owed by the def endant to the plaintiff. N eg lige nce is a brea ch of duty ; if there is no d u ty , th er e c an b e n o b re ac h , an d h en ce n o n egl i gen ce . ” ( ci t i n g Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. , 248Th is a c tio n invo ke s th e Court ’s div e rs ity jur isd ic tio n. As a

fe de ra l c ourt

sittin gin 9 diversity , we a

re bound to a

pply state substantive law. See Erie R.R. v. Tompk ins , 304 U.S. 64 (1 93 8) . T he pa

rt ie s a g re e that th is c a se is g ov e rn e d s ub sta nti ve ly by Di str ic t of

Col umb ia common law. See Nov ak v. Capital Mgmt. &Dev . Corp. , 452 F.3d 902, 907 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that for pur

poses of a pplying the Erie doctrine, D .C. law qualifies a s state law ( citing Lee v. F lintkote Co. , 593 F.2d 1275, 1279 n.14 ( D.C. Cir. 1979))). 15 N.Y. 339 (1928) ). In asser ting that de fenda

nts did not owe Teltschik any duty that would make 9 the m li a ble to h im, de fe nd ants se e m to make tw o ma in a rgume nts : ( 1) no fi du c iary re latio ns hip
e xiste d b e tw e e n T e lts c hik and any of the de fe nd ants that w ou ld g ive ri se to a duty and (2 ) e ve n if
s u c ha r e l at i o n s h i p e x i s t e d , d e f

e n d an t s d i d

n o to w e T e l t s c h i k

an y d u ty pe rso na lly

beca use he w as
a re sp on de nt i n M UR

56 75 on ly

in h is off ic ial c ap ac ity . The Court will addre ss eac h argument in turn.
a. F iduc iar y R e lat ion ship Te lts c hik argue s, and

de fe nd ants c on te st, that he ha d a n atto rn e y -c lie nt r e latio ns hip wi th defe ndants. An attorne y

owes a duty of ca re to a client if an attorney -client re lationship ex ists. See, e .g. , Taylor , 8 59 A. 2d at 14 7; Battle v. Thornton , 646 A.2d 315, 319 (D.C. 1984). Whether an attorne y -client re lationship ex isted is to be determined by the fa ct finder

based on the circ umstances of

eac h case
. See I

n re Lieber , 442 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1982). A t this st ag e of the proc eeding s, the Court determines whether a re asonable jury

could deter

mine whether

“the parties, e x plicitly

or by their conduc t, manifest[ed] an intention t o cre ate the attorney /client relationship.” In re Ry an , 670 A.2d 375, 379 (D.C. 1996) ( discussing Te x as law a nd noting that

“ the law i n th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia

is n o d if fe re nt” ). In ma

kin gthi s d e te rm inatio n, c ourt s consider f actor s such as whe ther the c lient perc eived that a n attorney -client re lationship ex isted, whether the client soug ht professional a dvice or assistance from the attorney , whether the16

atto rn e y too k a c tio n o n b e ha lf

of the c lie nt, and

wh e the r t he atto rn e y

re pr e se nte d th e c lie nt i n proce eding s or otherw ise held her self out as the c lient’s attorney
. See, e .g. , In re Lieber , 442 A. 2d at 15 6; In re Shay , 7 56 A. 2d 46 5, 47 4- 75 (D .C. 20 00 ); In reBe rn ste in , 707 A.2d 371, 375 (D.C. 1998). An attorney -client re lationship can exist even if the par ties do not have a

written ag ree ment, the client does not pa y the attorne y

any fee s, and the attorney

does not g ive the client any leg al advice
. In re Lieber , 442 A.2d at 156.

i. B ar bar a Bo nfigl io In h e r d e c laratio n, B on fi g lio c la ims that sh e ne ve r f or me d a n atto rn e y -c lie nt r e latio ns hip with Teltschik or had a

ny fiduciar y relationship wit h him. Bonfig lio also states that “no attorney s from Will iams & Jensen par ticipated in any

actions, def

enses or neg otiations whatsoeve r with the F EC reg ardingMUR 5675 or in draf ting the Conc iliation Agr eeme nt which was ultimately

enter ed into by

ARMPAC and the FEC.” Def s.’ Mot. for Summ. J . Ex . A (“B onfig lio Decl.”) ¶ 16. Teltschik re joins that Bonfig lio did provide leg al servic es to, for, a nd on his behalf. He claims that he soug ht leg al advice specific ally from B onfig lio, which she voluntarily

provided. The e vidence submitt ed by the par ties illust rate s that a g enuine issue of materia l fac t
e xists a s to wh e the r B on fi g lio and Te lts c hik fo rm e d a n atto rn e y -c lie nt r e latio ns hip . Co ntr ary to he r d e c laratio n, a

re a so na ble jur y c ou ld d e te rm ine that B on fi g lio re pr e se nte d T e lts c hik a s h is attorney in past FEC matters. Pursua nt to 11 C.F.R. § 111.23, a responde nt that “wishes to be
re pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l w ithre g ard

to a ny matte r p e nd ingbe fo re the Commis sio n . . . sh a ll s o advise the Commission by sendinga letter

of re prese ntation signe d by the re spondent,” a

nd providing “[a] st atement a uthorizi ngsuch counse l to rece ive any and all notifications and otherAs mentioned ea rlier, B onfig lio also claims that she did not participate in a ny 10 actions with reg ard to MUR 5675. The e vidence , howeve r, sug g ests otherwise. I n a letter to the FEC date d September 6, 2005, B onfig lio requested a n extension of tim e for

the filing of a response to the complaint in MUR 5675. Pl .’s Stmt. Ex . 18.

I t is unclear f

rom the re cord howthe FE C rece ived an a ddress for Teltschik. 11 17 communications from the Commission on behalf of r espondent.” 11 C.F.R. § 111.23(a) (2010). Teltschik provides e vidence that the FE C rece ived letters of attorney desig nation, dated Dec ember

19, 2002 and De cembe r 28, 1999, authorizing B onfig lio to represe nt him in M UR 5338 and MUR 4953, re spectively . Pl.’s St mt. Ex . 12, 13. 10 In addition, there is evide nce in the r ecor d that Bonf iglio g ave T eltschik leg al advice
. Teltschik claims that he a sked B onfig lio for advice reg ardinghis duties as Trea surer , including “what would be leg ally

require d of [him] reg ardingthe re ceipt and disburse ment of ARMPAC funds and f

iling re ports as re quired by law.” Pl.’s Stmt. Ex . 1 (“Te ltschik Decl.” ) ¶ 3. Fur thermore , corr espondenc e fr om the FEC addr essed to Te ltschik was deliver ed to the office s of Will iams & Jensen. Bonf iglio re ceive d, rea d, and re sponded to corr espondenc e fr om 11 the FE C specifica lly

addre ssed to Teltschik. When the FE C sent time-sensitive leg al
c or re sp on de nc e to T e lts c hik

at Will iams & Jens e n’ s a dd re ss, B on fi g lio c a lle d T e lts c hik to a dv ise him about the complaint filed with the F EC and to advise him that the complaint wa s meritless. In d ee d , i nh er

d ec l ar at i o nBo n fi gl i o ad m i t s th ats h e c o n t ac t edT el t s ch i k as n ec es s ary

t o s i gn appropr iate for

ms as Trea surer . She soug ht, but did not receive , such authorization on September 6, 2005, when she a sked him to sign the de signation of counsel for m for MUR 5675. Even we re the Court to assume that there is no attorney -client re lationship between B on fi g lio and

Te lts c hik , a

re a so na ble jur y c ou ld s til l f

ind that th e re wa s a

fi du c iary re latio ns hip18

betwee n them. “District of Columbia law ha s deliberately left the de finition of ‘fiduciar y relationship’ flex ible, so that the relationship m ay chang e to fit new c ircumstance s in which a specia l relationship of trust may proper ly be implied.” High v. Mc Lean Fin. Corp. , 659 F. Supp. 15 61 , 1 56 8 ( D. D. C. 1 98 7) . Ind e e d, so me c ourt s h ave int e rp re te d f idu c iary re la tio ns hip s b ro a dly : [A] fiduciar

y relationship i s one founde d upon trust or confide nce r eposed by one pe rs on in t he int e g ri ty

and fi de lity of ano the r. I t is sa id t

hat th e re latio ns hip e xists in all case s in which influence has bee n acquir ed and be trayed. The rule e mbrac es bo th t e c hn ic a l f

idu c iary re latio ns and

tho se inf or ma l r e latio ns wh ic h e xist whene ver one man trusts in, and relies upon, a nother . . . . Church of Scientology Int’l v . Eli Li lly &Co. , 848 F. Supp. 1018, 1028 (D.D .C. 1994) (citations
and int e rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . A s me nti on e d p re vio us ly , th e re is e vid e nc e that T e lts c hik relied on B onfig lio’s assuranc e that all matter s would be prope rly handled by

Wil liams & Jensen. F ur the rm or e , T e lts c hik

ra ise s at le a st a

g e nu ine dis pute a

bo ut whe the r B on fi g lio and Te lts c hik ha d a fi du c iary re latio ns hip wh e n B on fi g lio op e ne d, re a d a nd ult imate ly

de c ide d what to do wi th
c or re sp on de nc e a dd

re sse d to him
. In s um, wh e n th e e vid e nc e is v ie we d in a light m os t f

avo ra ble to T e lts c hik , a

re a so na ble jury could find that a f

iduciary relationship ex isted betwee n him and Bonf iglio. ii. Mere dith Kelley T el t s ch i k as s ert s th atKe l l ey

s i gn edth e C o n ci l i at i o nAgr ee m en tas h i s at t o rn ey al th o u gh she wa s not authorized to do so. Defenda nts dispute Teltschik’s asser tion; they claim that Mc Ga hn wa s th e de signate d c ouns e l in MU R 56 75 and

that K e lle y

on ly signe d the Ag ree ment afte r James E. Ty

rre ll, one of McGa

hn’s staff members, told her

that all the par

ties involved had ag ree d to the Ag ree ment and that her signature wa s neede d in order to the f ile the Ag ree ment wi th t he F EC. Al tho ug h K e lle y signe d th e Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt o n b e ha lf of re sp on de nts , it

isNotably absent fr om the Conciliation Agr eeme nt is the signatur e of de signated 12 counsel for

responde nts, McGahn. 19 unclea r in what c apac ity

she sig ned. The Ag ree ment states that the F EC was re prese nted by L awr ence H. Norton, Ge nera l Counsel, and that the Ag ree ment was sig ned on his beha lf by Rho nd a J. Cos din g h, As so c iate Ge ne ra l Co un se l f or En fo rc e me nt. Suc h d e ta il, ho we ve r, is lackingwhen it comes to re spondents. No desig nation of title appea rs under Kelley ’s sig nature
and the re is n o o the r i nd ic atio n in wh at c a pa c ity Ke lle y signe d th e Agre e me nt. 12 Even if Ke lley

did not sign the Agree ment as Teltschik’s attorney , by signingon behalf

of Teltschik, Kelley

held her self out to be his ag ent. Kelley ’s sig nature on the Ag ree ment bound the parties, includingTeltschik, to the terms conta ined there in. Furthe rmore, a s will be elabora ted inf ra , in the event of

a bre ach of

the Ag ree ment, Teltschik could have been liable to the FEC, a third-par ty . See M ills v. Comm’r of Internal Rev enue , 132 F.2d 753, 755 ( 1st Cir. 1943) (d e sc ri bin gthe “ we ll k

no wn ” c ha

ra c te ri sti c s o f a

n a g e nc y re latio ns hip a s invo lvi ng“ int e r a lia , the power of the a g ent to bind his principal as to third persons; the e x istence of a fiduc iary relationship between princ ipal and ag ent; and the r ight of the principa l to control the conduc t of the ag ent with respe ct to matters entr usted to him”). Be cause it is unclear in what capa city Kelley signe d the Conciliation Ag ree ment, and beca use a r easona

ble jury could find that a f

iduciary relationship ex isted betwee n Kelley and Teltschik, summary

judgme nt may

not be g rante d as to her on this g round. iii. Robert Mar tinez Martinez was not involved with Wil liams & Jensen’s re prese ntation of ARMPAC and Teltschik in MUR 5675 or in the draf ting or execution of the Conciliation Ag ree ment in thatTeltschik also fa ils to allege that any harm re sulted from Mar

tinez’s alleg ed 13 fa ilure to d e liv e r t

he re c or ds
. Indeed, T eltschik does not eve n mention Martinez, or any activities in which 14 Martinez eng ag ed, in Teltschik’s “ Statement of Contested I ssues.” See L CvR 7(h)(1). 20 matter. Indeed, Ma

rtinez’s only

communication with Teltschik was in late August 2006, after the Conciliation Agr eeme nt had bee n signe d and filed. A s to Martinez, Teltschik alleg es only that Martinez ref

used to deliver A RMPAC ’s re cords to him—an alleg ation that Teltschik bring s up for the f irst time in his opposition t o defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt. As mentioned in Part I I , the Court will not consider alleg ations that fundamenta lly chang e the nature of Teltschik’s complaint at this late juncture
. Even we re the Court to consider Te ltschik’s claim that Martinez ref used to deliver ARMPA C’ s r e c or ds to h im, Te lts c hik fa ils to p ro du c e e vid e nc e , o r e ve n a lle g e , th at a
re latio ns hip e xiste d b e tw e e n h ims e lf and Ma rt ine z that w ou ld g ive ri se to a fi du c iary duty . T his is f ata l to Te lts c hik ’s c la im a g a ins t Ma rt ine z as the re c an b e no br e a c h o f d uty if a le g a l duty

is not owed to the cla imant . See Taylor , 859 A.2d at 147 (D .C. 2004). Acc ording ly , summary 13 jud g me nt s ha ll b e g ra

nte d in fa vo r o f d e fe nd ants re g ard ingTe lts c hik ’s br e a c h o f f idu c iary duty
an d n e g li g e n c e c la im s a g a in s t M arti n e z. 14

b. Distinction b etween off icial capacity suits and personal capacity suits Next, defenda

nts contend that eve n if they could be c onsidered T eltschik’s counse l, any duty the y may have ow e d h im d id n ot e xist w ithre g ard to t he ir a c tiv iti e s in

c onne c tio n w ith MUR 5675 beca

use they repr esente d Teltschik in this matter only in his official ca

pacity as ARMPA C’ s tr e a sure r. De fe nd ants argue that na min ga tr e a sure r i n h is o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity “ is simply another way of namingthe political action committee a nd does not subject [the] Treasure r21

to civil or criminal finding s or re sponsibili ty .” De fs.’ Mot. at 8. Ac cordingto defe ndants’ log ic, thi s d ist inc tio n r e lie ve s a ll d e fe nd ants fr om a ny duty the y may have ow e d T e lts c hik

pe rs on a lly reg ardingMUR 5675. Although the question of whethe r a le g al duty is owed to a plaintiff is usually a question of law to be deter

mined by the Court, se e In reSe ale d Ca se , 67 F.3d 965, 968 ( D.C. Cir. 1995), the exist ence of duty

in this case is depe ndent on whethe r any fiduciar y relationship t hat defe ndants may

have ha d with Teltschik persona lly , including a ny attorney -client re lationship, included def

endants’ a ctivities in connection with MUR 5675. Such a question is a matter of fac t for the jur y to decide. Cf. C & E Servic es, Inc . v. Ashland Inc

. , 6 01 F . Su pp . 2 d 2 62 , 2 71 (D .D .C. 20 09 ) ( statin gthat “ wh e the r t he pa rt ie s w e re a c tin gwi thi n th e sc op e of a fi du c iary re latio ns hip is
a qu e sti on of fa c t f or the jur y to d e c ide , n ot a

qu e sti on fo r t he c ourt ” ). I f a

re a so na ble jur y c ou ld de te rm ine that a

fi du c iary re latio ns hip be tw e e n d e fe nd ants and Te lts c hik inc lud e d d e fe nd ants ’
a c tiv iti e s in

c onne c tio n w ithMU R 56 75 , th e n b y law, de fe nd ants ow e d T e lts c hik a duty reg ardingMUR 5675. See e .g. , Mo rri so n v . M ac Nam ara , 407 A.2d 555, 561 (D.C. 1979) ( “[A] lawy er must exercise that deg ree of re asonable car e and skill expected of la wyers a ctingunder sim ila r c ir c ums tanc e s. ” ); Gove rnment of Rwanda v. Rwanda W orking Group , 227 F. Supp. 2d 45, 63-64 (D.D .C. 2002) (“An ag ent owes he r principa l a fiducia ry duty and a duty

of loy alty .” (citations omitted)). Def endants’ a

rgument that they

owed Te ltschik no duty

is premised on the distinction betwee n officia l capa city

suits and individual capac ity suits. To be sure, ther e is an important dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n o ff

ic ia l and ind ivi du a l c a

pa c ity su its . “ An

of fi c ia l c a pa c ity pr oc e e din g‘i s not a suit ag ainst the offic ial but rather is a suit ag ainst the offic ial’s offic e.’” Def s.’ Mot. for22

S u m m . J
. E x . K ( “F E C P o l i cy S t at em en t ”) at2 (qu o t i n g W ill v. Mich. De

pt. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). D efe ndants’ ar g ument that an off icial ca pacity suit is out side the scope of any fiduciar y relationship Bonfig lio and Kelley may have ha d with Teltschik and ther efor e relieve s them of any duty that they may have othe rwise owe d him makes a lea p that is not supported, howe ver. While defe ndants provide a leng thy explanation of when in the c ourse of an
e nf or c e me nt p ro c e e din ga

Tr e a sure r i s su

bje c t to F EC a c tio n in

his of fi c ia l c a pa c ity ve rs us his persona l capa city , defe ndants cite no a uthority for the pr oposition t hat a f iduciary relationship,
e sp e c ia lly an atto rn e y -c lie nt r e latio ns hip , d oe s n ot e xten d to matte rs wh e re an in div idu a l is
name d a s a

re sp on de nt i n h is o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity . Sp e c if

ic a lly , d e fe nd ants fa il t o s up po rt the ir contention that a c lient’s attorney or a pr incipal’s ag ent may sign a document of c onsequenc e on behalf of her client or princ ipal without his consent and ag ainst his ex presse d wishes if she
r e p r e s e n t s h i mi nh i s o f

f i c i a l c a p a c i ty o n l y. More importantly , defe ndants ig nore e vidence in the rec ord and a uthority cited by Teltschik, includingsections of the F EC Poli cy Statement and the F EC desig nation of counse l form sent to Teltschik, that show that Te ltschik, as a re spondent in MUR 5675, was the per son responsible for

repr esentingthe committee in any enfor ceme nt proce eding , filling out the desig nation of counse l form, and a biding by the terms conta ined in the Conciliation Ag ree ment. Ba sed on such e vidence and author ity , a re asonable jury could conc lude that B onfig lio and Ke lle y ha d a fi du c iary re latio ns hip wi th T e lts c hik , a nd the re fo re a

duty to T e lts c hik , in
c onne c tio n w ithMU R 56 75 . Su c h is so no tw ith sta nd ingthe fa c t th at he wa s n ame d a s a
r e s p o n d e n ti nh i s o f

f i c i a l c a p a c i ty.Al tho ug h T e lts c hik c ite s Com mi tte e of 1 00De mo c ra ts throug hout his opposit ion 15 fo r t he pr op os iti on

that a s a name d p art

y to t he c omp la int

and Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt h e c ou ld be held liable f

or ARMPAC’s brea ch of the ag ree ment, defe ndants contest the e x istence of such liability without dist inguishing , or eve n mentioning, Com mi tte e of 1 00De mo c ra ts . 2 U .S. C. § 43 7g (a )( 5) (D ) p ro vid e s: 16 In any case in which a pe rson has e ntere d into a conciliation agree ment with the Commi ssion under par ag raph ( 4)(A) , the Commiss ion may instit ute a c ivil action for r elief unde r par ag raph ( 6)(A) if it believes that the pe rson has violated a ny pr ov isi on of su c h c on c ili atio n a g re e me nt. F or the Commis sio n to ob ta in r e lie f i n any civil action, the Commissi on need only establish that the per son has violated, in who le or

in p art , a ny re qu ir e me nt o f s uc h c on c ili atio n a g re e me nt. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a )(5) (D) ( 2006).

Notably , the Conciliation Ag ree ment in MUR 5675 also require d Teltschik and 17 ARMPAC t o pay

a civil pena lty . One of

the conc iliation agr eeme nts in Committee of 100 De mo c ra ts require d responde nts to pay a $3,500 civil pena lty . The Conciliation Ag ree ment at i s s u e i nth i s c a s e r e qu i r e d r e s p o n d e n t s t o p ay a

$ 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 c i v i l p e n a l ty. 23 In Fe de ra l E le c tio n Co mm iss ion v . Co mm itte e of 1 00 De mo c ra ts , 8 44 F . Su

pp . 1 (D .D .C. 1993), this Court found that the defe ndant, who wa s named a s a re spondent in his capac ity as Trea surer of a political a ction committee, could be he ld personally liable for a

ny brea ches of

the
c on c ili atio n a g re e me nt. Id. at 6 ( “ [Th e tr e a sure r]’ s st atus a s a pa rt y to e a c h o f t

he a g re e me nts 15
su bje c ts h im t o p e rs on a l li a bil ity fo r t he ir vio la tio n. ” ); see also id. (ac ceptingthe FE C’s
argume nt t

hat “ the a g re e me nts are un ambi g uo us in t he ir a pp lic atio n to [the tr e a sure r], wh o is
name d a s a

pa rt y to e a c h o f t

he a g re e me nts ” and

“ the fa ilure to c omp ly

su bje c ts the pa

rt ie s, including [the trea surer ], t o an orde r enf orcingthe conc iliation agr eeme nts pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g (a) (5)( D)” ). There fore , in Com mi tte e of 1 00De mo c ra ts, the Court order ed the c ommitt ee 16 and its Trea surer

to pay the FE C the civil penalty that was a g ree d to in the conciliation ag ree ment in a dd iti on

to p ayinga

pe na lty fo r v iol atin gthe te rm s o f t he a g re e me nt. 1724

Even if Te ltschik could not be held personally liable for the brea ch of the Conciliation Ag ree ment, Com mi tte e of 1 00De mo c ra ts makes c lear that, at the ver

y least, as Tr easur er of ARMPAC and as a name d responde nt to the Conciliation Agre ement, he w as the individual responsible for

makingsure the c ommitt ee a bides by the terms of the Conciliation Agr eeme nt. Specifica lly , this Court st ated that a defe ndant’s status as Tr easur er on the ag ree ment is “of limit ed re levanc e.” A ccor ding to the Court, [i]t is re le va

nt i ns of ar a s th e su

bs tit uti on of the wo rd ‘t re a sure r’ fo r h is n ame in the [conciliation] Ag ree ment results in his being na med as a ‘re spondent’ who must comply

with that ag ree ment, and insofar as it enable d him to take measure s to bring the def

endant c ommitt ees into complianc e with their re spective c on c ili atio n a g re e me nts . Id. at 6-7. The F EC Poli cy

Statement further

indicates that the pa

rty named in a c onciliation ag ree ment is responsible for ma king sur e its terms are satisfied. Ac cordingto the FEC, the person who is identified a s a re spondent in an MUR is ultim ately responsible for

repr esentingthe committee in an enf

orce ment action. F urthermor e, whe n explaining the rationale for na ming Trea surer s in their officia l capa city , the Policy Statement explains t hat “tre asure rs of c ommitt ees
ar e i nth e b es tp o s i t i o nt o ca rry o u tth e r equ i re m en t s o f aco n ci l i at i o nagr ee m en ts u ch as p ay i n g a civil penalty , ref

unding or disgor g ing c ontributions, and amendingrepor ts.” Id. Indeed,
acc ordingto 11 C.F.R. § 102.7©, “[n] o expenditure shall be made for or on behalf of a political committee without the authorization of its treasure r or of an ag ent authorized ora lly or in writing by the trea surer .” The ref

ore, the Trea surer

is the only

member of

a committee who c an pay any monetary reme dies ag ree d to in a conciliation agree ment. Be cause any other membe r of the committee, eve n the Assistant Trea surer , would need the Trea surer ’s express authorization, noTh e Tr e a sure r’ s im po rt anc e is f

ur the r e vid e nc e d b y

the fa c t th at it

is t he on ly 18 position t hat a political committee is re quired to have
. See 2 U.S.C. § 432(a).

For example, defe ndants do not cite to any rule, re g ulation, or policy that provides 19 that a thi rd -p art

y , s uc h a s th e As sis tant T re a sure r, c an s ig n o n b e ha lf of the name d r e sp on de nts to a c omp la int

if it i s an o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity su it. 25 on e in A RMPA C c ou ld c arr y out th e te rm s o f t

he Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt i f T e lts c hik re fu se d to provide his authorization. 18 The F EC Poli cy

Statement’s stated rationale for na ming Tr easur ers in their of ficial capa city in MURs also seems to indicate that Te ltschik, as Trea surer of ARMPAC, is t he individual responsible for sig ning the require d desig nation of counse l form and a ny conciliation
a g re e me nt: the pr a c tic e [of

namin gthe tr e a sure r i n h is o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity] al so e ns ur e s th at a named individual who sig ns the conc iliation agr eeme nt on behalf of the committee (or obta ins leg al re prese ntation on behalf of the committee) is the one em p o we re d

b y l awt o d i s b urs e c o m m i t t ee fu n d s t o p ay a c i v i l p en al ty , d i s go rge funds, make r efunds, a

nd car ry out other monetar

y reme dies that the committee ag ree s to through the conciliation agree ment. FEC Policy

Statement at 2. Fur thermore , the desig nation of counse l form that was attached to the F EC’s letter addre ssed to Teltschik and 11 C.F .R. § 111.23 ex plicitly state that a r espondent to an MUR, he re Teltschik, must sign the f orm if he wishe s to have c ounsel repr esent him. See11 C.F.R. § 111.23; Pl.’s S tmt. Ex . 17 (“D esig nation For m”) at 2. And, neither 11 C.F .R. § 111.23 nor the de signatio n o f c ouns e l f

or m make s any

e xce pti on s f

or of fi c e rs name d in

the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c ity and def endants fa il to cite any

support for, or

the exist ence of, such a

n exception. Although the

19 FEC letter

expli citly

states that Teltschik, as a responde nt to the complaint, must si g n theThe Court notes that neither party included B onfig lio’s signe d desig nation of 20 c ouns e l f or m to the ir fi lin g s. Te lts c hik

atta c he d th e bla

nk fo rm that B on fi g lio faxed

him . B oth parties a g ree , howeve r, that B onfig lio signed the form whe n Teltschik re fused.

Te lts c hik do e s n ot r e sp on d to de fe nd ants ’ a rgume nt. 21 26 desig nation of counse l form, B onfig lio decided to sig n the form whe n Teltschik re fused to do
so. 20 Be cause a re asonable jury could find that B onfig lio and Kelley had a f iduciary relationship wit h Teltschik in connec tion with their activities involving MUR 5675, and owe d Teltschik a f

iduciary duty based on suc h a re lationship, defenda nts are not e ntitled to sum mary j u d g m e n to nth e g r o un d

th atth e i r r e l at i o n s h i p w i thT e l t s c h i k w a s i nh i s o f

f i c i a l c a p a c i ty o n l y. 2. Breac h of

Duty Th e fa c ts s ur

ro un din gB on fi g lio and

Ke lle y ’s a lle g e d b re a c h o f d uty are c le ar a

nd the ir specific actions ar e not conteste d. For example, defe ndants do not contest that B onfig lio failed to notify Teltschik that he wa s a re spondent to the complaint or that she sig ned the de signation form whe n he re fused to do so. Nor do de fenda nts dispute that Kelley

signe d the Conciliation Agre e me nt o n b e ha lf

of re sp on de nts . D e fe nd ants c on te nd , h ow e ve r, that T e lts c hik fa ils to prese nt expert testimony

require d to establish the applicable standard of car e and br eac h there of. 21 Although the Court ag ree s with defenda nts that ex pert testimony

most often is nece ssary to establish the applicable standard of car e and br eac h there of in leg al malpra ctice c laims, see Footbridge Ltd. T

rust v. Zhang , 584 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158-59 (D .D.C. 2008), there is no
re qu ir e me nt t

hat a pla int if f p re se nt e xpe rt

te sti mony

if the “ the atto rn e y ’s la c k o f c are and sk ill is so obvious that the trier of f act c an find ne g lige nce a s a matter of common knowledg e.” O’ Ne il27

v. Be rgan , 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C. 1982). The D.C. Circuit has provided e x amples of c onduct th atf a l l s w i th i nth e “ c o m m o nkn o w l e d g e ” e x c e p t i o nt o th e n e e d f o r e x p e rtt e s t i m o n y: allowingthe statute of limitations to run on a client’s cla im; permitti ngentry of defa ult judgment ag ainst the client; failingto instruct the client to answe r int e rr og atorie s; f

a ili ngto a lle g e a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e s; f

a ili ngto f ile tax re tur

ns ; failingto follow the client’s e x plicit inst ructions; and billing a client for time not sp e nt p ro vid ingse rv ic e s. Kae mp e v . M

y e rs , 367 F.3d 958, 966 ( D.C. Cir. 2004) (interna l citations omit ted). This is a close “c all.” The Court concludes, how ever , that the ac tions of Bonfig lio and Kelley ’s ac tions are of

the sort that fa ll within t he common knowledg e exception to the nee d for
e xpe rt te sti mony . F ir st, by

signin gthe de signatio n o f c ouns e l f or m w he n T e lts c hik

e xplic itl y ref used to do so, Bonf

iglio fa iled to follow Teltschik’s instructions. Fur thermore , Bonf

iglio’s failure to tell Teltschik that he was na med as a responde nt in CR EW’s complaint is also an action that would fall within the common knowledg e exception to the nee d for e x pert testimony
. Simi larly , a re asonable jury could find that Ke lley ’s ac tion of signingthe Conciliation Ag ree ment on Teltschik’s beha lf without his ex press c onsent constituted “neg lige nce a s a matter of common knowledg e.” Se e O’

Ne il , 452 A.2d at 341 (D .C. 1982). There fore , knowledg e of the standard of
c are a pp lic a ble to T e lts c hik ’s c la ims is w ith in t he pr ov inc e of

a lay jur or , a nd e xpe rt te sti mony

is not nece ssary

to establish the standard of car e her e. 3. Causation an d Dam ages De fe nd ants argue that T e lts c hik ha s n ot p ro vid e d a de qu ate e vid e nc e to s up po rt his
asser tion that defenda

nts’ alleg ed bre ach of

duty was the pr ox imate ca

use of his injury , or eve n that he su ff

e re d a ny dama g e s f

ro m th e Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt.Although T eltschik also claims that he ha s suffer ed mental a ng uish from 22 defe ndants’ alleg ed conduc t, he may not rec over da

mag es for mental anguish without proof of a phy sical injury
. Se e Di

str ic t of Colum bia v . S

mi th , 4 36 A. 2d

12 94 , 1 29 6 ( D. C. 1 98 1) (“ I t is g ener ally acc epted in this jurisdiction that there ca n be no re cover

y for ne g lige ntly

cause d emotional distress, mental disturbance , or any conseque nce the reof

, wher e ther e has be en no acc ompanying phy sical injury .” (c itations omi tted)). 28 At the outset, the Court notes that ca usation prese nts a question of fa ct usually rese rved for the jur y . Thompson v. Shoe W

orld, Inc. , 5 6 9 A. 2 d

1 8 7 , 1 9 0 (D
. C
. 1 9 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g W agshal v. Di str ic t of Colum bia , 216 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1966)) . Although pr ox imate ca use bec omes a que stion of law whe n, ba se d o n th e e vid e nc e no re a so na ble jur y c ou ld r atio na lly

c on c lud e that pr oximate
cause exis ted, se e W

as hingto n M

e tro . A re a Tran sit

Au th. v . D av is , 6 06 A. 2d 16 5, 17 0 ( D. C. 1992), such is not the ca se her e. Teltschik has a lso provided suffic ient evidenc e of da mag es. While it m ay

be true , as defe ndants contend, that the State Ba r of Te x as is barr ed by

the statute of limitations from pursuingany

disciplinary

action ag ainst Teltschik for the acts a nd/or omissions s et forth in the Conciliation Agr eeme nt, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J . Ex . H (“ Dec l. and Report of Jennifer A
. Ha sle y ” ) ¶

20 , T e lts c hik

pr od uc e s e vid e nc e that th e Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt h a s in jur e d h im i n other re spects. Specif

ically , Teltschik provides e vidence that the Conciliation Ag ree ment has
cause d him to los e at lea st two clients. Consequently , defe ndants are not entitled to summ ary 22 jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to the iss ue s o f c a us atio n a nd dama g e s. 4. Williams & Je nsen Finally , defe ndants contend that Teltschik’s claims for brea ch of f

iduciary duty and neg lige nce a g ainst Wi lliams & Jensen in reliance on the doctrine of re spondeat super ior ca nnot survive summary

judgme nt beca

use they are basele ss. Teltschik rejoins that def endants a re not29

entitled to summary

judgme nt on his claims ag ainst Wi lliams & Jensen beca use B onfig lio and Kelley wer e ac ting within the cour se and sc ope of the ir employ ment with Wi lliams & Jensen wh e n th e y

br e a c he d th e ir

duty to h im. Under the doctrine of re spondeat super ior, an e mploy er ma y be vica riously liable for the neg lige nt acts of its employ ee if the employ ee’ s actions ar e within the cour se and sc ope of he r employ ment. See Sc hecte r v. Me rchants Home D elivery , Inc. , 892 A.2d 415, 427 (D.C. 2006). As a g e ne ra l r ule , whe the r a

n e mpl oye e c omm itt e d a

tor t “ wi thi n th e sc op e of

[ ] emp loy

me nt” is “a que stion of fac t for the jury to determine.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 3 1 (D
. C
. 1 9 7 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Great A &P Tea Co., v. Ave ilhe , 1 1 6 A
. 2 d 1 6 2 , 1 6 4 ( D
. C
. 1 9 5 5 ) )
. It can, how ever , become a question of law “whe n all rea sonable trier s of fa ct must conclude that the serva nt’s act wa s independe nt of the master ’s business and solely for the se rvant’s pe rsonal benef it.” Id. at 32. Teltschik has provide d sufficie nt evidence for a rea sonable jury

to conclude that Bonf iglio and K elley

acte d within the scope of the ir employ ment with Wi lliams & Jensen when the y e ng a g e d in

the a c ts whic h und e rl ie Te lts c hik ’s ne g lig e nc e and br e a c h o f f

idu c iary duty
c la ims . A ll the c or

re sp on de nc e fr om t

he F EC a dd

re sse d to Te lts c hik

wa s se nt t o Wil liams & J ensen’ s addre ss. Bonfig lio and Kelley wer e wor king w ith ARMP AC in their capa city as Willi ams & Jens e n e mpl oye e s; Wi lli ams & Jens e n r e pr e se nte d A RMPA C and , a s Wil liams & J ensen attorney s, Bonf

iglio and K elley

handled f

eder al elec tion matters for va rious Polit ical Ac tio n Co mmi tte e s, inc lud ingARMPA C. A c c or din g ly , Wil liams & Jens e n is no t e nti tle d to summary judgme nt on the g round that it may not be held liable unde r the doc trine of r espondeat superior.Although the Court has found no ca ses in the District of Columbia that included a 23 c la im f or “ bu sin e ss d isp ara g e me nt, ” oth e r c ourt s h ave fo un d th at bu sin e ss d isp ara g e me nt i s essentially

the same of

fense as def

amation except that def

amation protec ts personal re putation and business dispara g ement prote cts ec onomic interests. See e .g., Forbes Inc . v. Granada Bioscience

s, Inc. , 124 S.W .3d 167, 171 (Tex. 2003); Hu rlb ut v . G ulf At l. L ifeIn s. Co ., 749 S.W. 2d 76 2, 76 6 ( Te x. 19 87 ). Th e re fo re , th e Court wi ll c on sid e r T e lts c hik ’s lib e l and bu sin e ss disparag ement cla ims togethe r.

Def endants a ssert that Teltschik’s c laims are a lso barre d by a fa ir repor

ting 24 pr ivi le g e and

pr ote c te d inte re st p ri vil e g e . B e c a us e the Court

fi nd s th at th e jud ic ia l and qu a sijudicial proce edingprivileg e bar s Teltschik’s cla ims, the Court will not addre ss whether other p r i v i l e g e s a l s o a

p p l y. 30 C. Libe l an d Busi ne ss D ispa r ag e m e nt Def endants ne x t argue that they are entitled to summary

judgme nt on Teltschik’s libel and business dispara g ement cla ims on severa l gr ounds. First, def endants c ontend that the 23 Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt d id n ot c on ta in a ny fa lse or de fa mator y state me nts a

bo ut T e lts c hik

in h is pe rs on a l c a

pa c ity ; and

that th e re is n o e vid e nc e that any of the de fe nd ants ma de any state me nts , defa matory or otherw ise, about Teltschik in any capa city . Specifica lly , defe ndants argue that Martinez, Bonf

iglio, Ke lley , and Willi ams & J ensen did not make any of the stateme nts in the Conciliation Agr eeme nt and that “[t] he one a nd only connec tion to the Agr eeme nt is Kelley ’s
s i gn ature o ni t , i n d i ca t i n g ARMPAC’s agre eme nt .” De fs .’ Mo t. f or Summ. J. at 18 (e mph a sis in orig inal). Ne x t, defe ndants claim that Teltschik ha s not alleg ed or a dduced pr oof that any d ef en d an t“p u

b l i s h ed ” t h e C o n ci l i at i o nAgr ee m en tt o a t h i rd -p arty . Fi n al l y , d ef en d an t s al l ege that even if

Teltschik could prove all the eleme nts of defa mation, the judicial and quasi-judicia l p r o c e e d i n gp r i v i l e g e b ar s h i s c l a i m s a g a i n s tK e l l e y. 24 As an in iti a l matte r, the Court a g re e s w ithde fe nd ants that T e lts c hik ’s lib e l and bu sin e ss disparag ement cla ims, which are based on the statements containe d in the Conciliation31

Ag ree ment, fail as to Mar tinez and Bonfig lio. Teltschik has failed to pr ovide any evidenc e that either Ma rtinez or Bonf

iglio had a

ny involvement with the prepa ration or e x ecution of the Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt. As Teltschik’s c laims relate to Ke lley , defe ndants argue, amongother re asons, that the claims fail bec ause a

ny alleg ed def

amatory statements attributed to her are shielded by

the judicial and quasi-judicia l proce edingprivileg e. De fenda nts are c orre ct. The D istrict of Columbi a “r ecognize[ s] an absolute privileg e for statements made [by

an attorne y ] preliminary to, or in the course of, a judicia l proce eding , so long a s the statements bea r some re lation to the proce eding .” Finkelstein, Thompson &Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. 774 A.2d 332, 33 8 ( D. C. 2 00 1) ; see also Arneja v . Gildar , 541 A.2d 621, 623 (D.C. 1988) ( stating that “[f] or the absolute immunity

of the privileg e to apply , two require ments must be satisfied: (1) the statement must have be en made in the course of or pr eliminary to a judicial proc eeding ; and (2) the statement must be re lated in some wa y to the underlying pr ocee ding” ). This judicial pr oc e e din g s p ri vil e g e do e s n ot r e qu ir e an “ a c tua l outbr e ak o f h os til iti e s, ” and atta c he s to statements made in se ttlement neg otiations before a lawsuit is filed. Messina v. Fontana , 2 60 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 7 3 , 1 7 8 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Fi nk e lste in , 7 74 A. 2d

at 34 3) ; see also Conservative Clu b o f W as hingto n v . F

ink e lste in , 738 F. Supp. 6, 13-14 (D .D.C. 1990). Th e jud ic ia l pr oc e e din g s p ri vil e g e ha s b e e n e xten de d to a pp ly to s tate me nts ma de in
connec tion with quasi-judicial proce eding s conducte d by administrative bodies “[w]here a proce edingis designe d to adjust the rig hts or liabiliti es of the pa rties bef ore it and c alls for a

n exercise of

g uided discre tion by

an impartial de cisionmaker.” Jones v . Mirgon , No. 88-7001, 1989 WL105498, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Aug . 31, 1989). Such quasi-judicia l proce eding s includeNeither party addre sses whethe r the privileg e applies to Ke lley if she sig ned the 25 Conciliation Agr eeme nt in a capa city other than a s responde nts’ attorney . Although Sec tion 586 of the Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of To rt s— the se c tio n mo st o ft e n q

uo te d b y Di str ic t of

Col umb ia c ourt s, and

c ite d b y de fe nd ants in t

he ir mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt—

re fe rs to t he a bs olute pr ivi le g e g ra

nte d to an “ atto rn e y

at la w, ” “ the pr ivi le g e a lso a

pp lie s to pa

rt ie s, jud ic ia l of

fi c e rs , witnesses, and juror s.” Armenian Assem bly of Am, Inc . v. Cafesjian , 597 F. Supp. 2d 128, 140 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Brown v. Collins , 402 F.2d 209, 212 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). 32 private a rbitration proc eeding s, Sturdivant v. Seaboard Serv . Sys., Ltd., 459 A.2d 1058, 1059-60 (D.C. 1983), he aring s befor e the Ha cker ’s L icense Appea l Boa rd, Ma za nd e ra n v . M c Gran e ry , 490 A.2d 180 (D.C. 1984), pr ocee dings be fore the Rental Ac commodations Offic e, Arneja, 541 A.2d at 623, and F CC lot tery -licensingproce eding s, Jones , 1989 WL105498, at *2-3. Also, as de fe nd ants no te , th e pr ivi le g e ha s b e e n a pp lie d to state me nts ma de duri ngthe c ours e of c e rt a in proce eding s in various fede ral a g encie s, including the Depa rtment of Employ

ment Service s, the Eq ua l E mpl oy

me nt O pp or

tun ity Commis sio n, and

the Oc c up atio na l Sa fe ty

and He a lth Administration. See Def

.’s Mot. for Summ. J . at 23 n.17 (c iting ca ses). Teltschik’s libel and business dispar ag ement cla ims are ba sed upon statements c ontained in the Conciliation Agr eeme nt. The Conciliation Ag ree ment was ne g otiated betwe en ARMPAC and the F EC preliminary

to its fili ngwith the FEC to re solve and “ conciliate” CREW S’ claims of elec tion law violations by ARMPAC. The activities of the F EC under the c ircumstance s were those of a qua si-judicial body
. Se e Ro me ro -B arc e lo v . A c e v e do -V ila , 275 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184
n. 1 ( D. P.R. 20 03 ) ( c iti ng2 U .S. C. § § 4 37 c -4 38 (1 99 4) ; se e als o F EC v . NR A P oli tic al V

ic tor y Fund , 5 13 U. S. 8 8, 97 (1 99 4) ; Bec ker v . FEC , 230 F.3d 381, 384 ( 1st Cir. 2000)). Ther efor e, any statements attributed to Ke lly as a r esult of her

signingthe Conciliation Ag ree ment on behalf of responde nts are a

bsolutely privileg ed fr om any

liability resultingfrom the a lleg ed def amatory statements containe d in the Ag ree ment. Acc ording ly , defe ndants are entitled to summary 25 jud g me nt o n T e lts c hik ’s lib e l and bu sin e ss d isp ara g e me nt c la ims
.Def endants a lso argue that Te ltschik’s misappropriation of name and r eputation 26 claim is barr ed by

absolute and qua lified privileg e, but they cite no author ity

for this proposition. Acc ording ly , the Court will not address this argument. See U nited States v. W

ade , 992 F. Supp. 6, 21 (D.D.C. 1997) ( ref

using to a ddress a

n argument, briefly

raised, but f

or which “ absolutely

no leg al, fa ctual, or r

hetorica l support” was of fer ed). 33 D. Misappropriation of Nam e and Reputation Def endants move f

or summary

judgme nt on Teltschik’s misappropriation of name a nd
re putatio n c la im o n th e g ro un d th at T e lts c hik do e s n ot p re se nt a

ny e vid e nc e to s up po rt

his c la im that defe ndants’ improper ly used his name f

or any commerc ial benef

it. Def endants c ontend 26 that ARMPAC designate d Teltschik as its Trea surer and the F EC named him as a r espondent on the Con c ili atio n A g re e me nt a s a ple a din gc us tom . T e lts c hik re joi ns that de fe nd ants fo rg e d h is name on other

“incor rec t reports” that they

previously

filed with the F EC and that they rec eived
c omp e ns atio n f

ro m A RMPA C f

or fi lin gthe se re po rt s. Te lts c hik c on te nd s th at th e fo rg ingof his signature on “ incorre ct re ports” is an improper use of his name and that the c ompensation which defe ndants rec eived f

rom ARMPAC is a commer cial bene fit. The District of Columbia has a dopted the def inition s et forth by

the Restatement ( Second) of Torts § 652 for

invasion-of-pr ivacy

torts, including the tor

t of misappropriation of na me. See W hitehead v. Paramount Pictures Corp. , 5 3 F. S u p p . 2 d 3 8 , 5 3 (D
. D. C
. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Vassiliades v. Garfinck

el’s , 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. 1985)) . Acc ordingto the Restatement, “[o]ne who appropr iates to his own use or be nefit the name or likene ss of another is subject to liabilit y

to the oth e r f or inv a sio n o f h is p ri va c y .” Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of To rt s, § 6 52 C ( 19 77 ); se e als o W alker v . Indepe ndenceFed. Sav . &Loan Ass’n , 5 55 A. 2d 10 19 , 1 02 3 ( D. C. 1 98 9) ; Tripp v. United States , 257 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40-42. The protec ted intere st is that of “the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity . . . in so far a s the use may be of be nefit to him or to others.” Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 652C cmt. a. And while a de fenda nt ty pically appropr iates the34

name or lik e ne ss o f a

no the r f or a c omm e rc ia l pu

rp os e , “ the ru le state d is no t li mit e d to
c omm e rc ia l a

pp ro pr iatio n. I t a

pp lie s a lso wh e n th e de fe nd ant m ake s u se of the pla int if

f’ s n ame or likeness for

his own purposes and be nefit . . . and e ven thoug h the bene fit sought to be obtained is not a pec uniary one.” Id. c mt. b. Th e be ne fi ts that de fe nd ant m ig ht s e e k to ap p ro p ri at e f

o r h i s o wn u s e i n cl u d e “ th e r ep u t at i o n , p re s t i ge, s o ci al o r c o m m er ci al s t an d i n g, public interest or othe r value s of the plaintiff’ s name or likene ss.” Id. cmt. c. Teltschik fa ils to present evidenc e ar ising fr om any alleg ation or cla im in his complaint that defe ndants used his name to obtain a ny advanta g e or be nefit or to take advanta g e of the value a ssociated with his name. Instead, in re sponding to de fenda nts’ motion for summary judgme nt, Teltschik focuse s on defe ndants’ alleg ed filing s of forg ed docume nts long be fore the Conciliation Agr eeme nt was eve n contemplated. A s discussed above , Teltschik’s alleg ations that defe ndants filed docume nts containing his forg ed sig nature with the FEC ar e stricke n beca use he f ailed to ra ise such alleg ations in his complaint. Bec ause Te ltschik fails to present evidenc e that would support his misappropriation of na me and r eputation claim, def endants a re
e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt a s to thi s c la im. E. Tortious Interference wi th Contract s and Tortious Interference wi th P rospect ive Econom ic Advantage Def endants a rgue that Te ltschik’s tortious int erf ere nce w ith contrac ts and tortious interfe renc e with prospec tive economic a dvantag e cla ims are mer itless because Teltschik has fa ile d to sh owthat a

c on tr a c t e xiste d o r t

hat he ha d a

pr os pe c tiv e a dv anta g e ou s b us ine ss transac tion. I n a mer e thre e sente nces, Te ltschik rejoins that Bonf iglio usurpe d the offic e of Trea surer by filing r eports with the F EC that show herse lf to be Tre asure r, there by interfe ring wi th h is r e latio ns hip wi th A RMPA C.35

In the District of Columbia, a tortious interfe renc e with contra ct claim has f our re quired elements: “( 1) the e x istence of a contr act; (2) knowledg e of the contra ct; (3) intentional procur ement of a

brea ch of the contra ct; and (4) damag es re sulting fr om the brea ch.” Casco Marina Dev ., L.L.C. v. District of Columbia Redeve lopment Land Agency , 83 4 A .2 d 7 7, 83 (D .C. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Pa ul v . H owa rd Un iv ., 754 A.2d 297, 309 (D.C. 2000)) . A tortious interfer ence wi th p ro sp e c tiv e e c on omi c a dv anta g e c la im h a s id e nti c a l e le me nts , e xce pt t hat th e pla int if

f m us t demonstrate the exis tence , knowledg e, and intentional pr ocure ment of a br eac h of a pr ospective advanta g eous business transa ction instead of mee ting those e lements as to a c ontrac t. Casco , 834 A. 2d at 84 ; se e als o B ro wn v . Ca rr , 503 A.2d 1241, 1247 (D.C. 1986) ( “The tort of intentional int e rf e re nc e wi th a

pr os pe c tiv e bu sin e ss a dv anta g e ru ns pa ra lle l to that f

or int e rf e re nc e wi th exis ting c ontrac ts.”) (inter nal citation and quotation mar ks omitt ed). Te lts c hik fa ils to s up po rt

his c la im. He do e s n ot p re se nt e vid e nc e or e ve n a lle g e that a contra ct exist ed, that def

endants kne w about any

exis ting c ontrac t, that a bre ach of contra ct
occur red, or that damag es re sulted from a br eac h of contra ct. Simil arly , he does not pre sent evidenc e or e ven alleg e any fac ts that would support the exi stence of a pr ospective a dvantag eous bu sin e ss t ra ns a c tio n, that de fe nd ants kn e w o f t he tr ans a c tio n, or

that de fe nd ants int e rf

e re d w ith the tr ans a c tio n. B e c a

us e Te lts c hik

fa ils to p re se nt e vid e nc e on the ba sis of

wh ic h a jur y c ou ld fi nd in h is f avo r o n h is t or

tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th c on tr a c ts a

nd tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi th pr os pe c tiv e e c on omi c a dv anta g e c la ims , d e fe nd ants are e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt o n th e se
c la ims
.36

F . P uni tive Dam ages Finally , defe ndants contend that they are entitled to summary

judgme nt on Teltschik’s claim for punitive damag es bec ause he has not prese nted any evidenc e sug g esting that they acte d with or harbor ed any

malice a g ainst him. Teltschik rejoins that he does not have to show actua l malice to re cover

punitive damag es bec ause “ the state intere st [ of providingreme dies for de fa matio n] a de qu ate ly

su pp or ts a wa rd s o f p re sume d a

nd punit ive dama g e s— e ve n a bs e nt a showing of ‘a ctual malice ’” Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to De fs.’ Mot. for Summ. J . at 26. As a g ener al matter, c ourts do not favor punitive damag es. See Sere v . Group Hospitalizat ion, Inc ., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1982). The purpose of awa rdingpunitive damag es is t o p un ish

an in div idu a l f

or outr a g e ou s c on du c t w hic h is ma lic iou s, wa nto n, re c kle ss, or

in willful disreg ard of

another ’s rig hts. Id. T h er ef o re , t o re co v er

p un i t i v e d am age s , i ti s n o ten o u gh to show that defe ndants ac ted with intent. Se e Di str ic t Ca ble v isi on Ltd

. P ’s hip v . B as sin , 828 A.2d 714, 726. Instead, the pla intiff must “prove . . . by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that [defendant a cted with] . . . a state of mind evinc ing ma lice or its equivale nt.” Daka, I nc. v. McCrae , 839 A.2d 682, 695 n.14 (D.C. 2003). B eca use Teltschik ha s not even a lleg ed that the defe ndants ac ted with malice or its equivalent, his claim for punitive dama g es fa ils. And, be c a us e de fe nd ants are e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt o n T e lts c hik ’s de fa matio n c la im, Te lts c hik cannot r ecove r punitive damag es eve n if he is cor rec t that a plaintiff who pr evails on a c laim of de fa matio n is no t r e qu ir e d to make a sh ow ingof

ma lic e in o rd e r t o r e c ov e r s uc h d ama g e s.37 III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, it is this 12 day of F ebrua

ry 2010 here by th OR DE RE D that de fe nd ants ’ m oti on to s tr ike [# 53 ] is G RA NT ED as to alleg ations defe ndants have numbere d 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and DE NI ED as to alleg ation 6; and it is further OR DE RE D that T e lts c hik ’s mot ion to a me nd his c omp la int

[#52 ] is DE NI ED ; and

it i s further ORDERED that T e lts c hik ’s mot ion to s tr ike [#50 ] is DE NI ED as to Bonf iglio’s or igina l decla ration and DE NI ED as moot as to Bonf iglio’s suppleme ntal decla ration; and it is further ORDERED that de fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt [# 39 ] is GR

ANTED a s to de fe nd ant M art ine z wi th r e sp e c t to Te lts c hik ’s c la ims of ne g lig e nc e and

br e a c h o f f

idu c iary duty and DENIED as to defe ndants Bonf iglio, Ke lley , and Willi ams & J ensen; a nd it is further ORDERED that de fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt [# 39 ] is GR

ANTED a s to
a ll d e fe nd ants wi th r e sp e c t to Te lts c hik ’s c la ims of lib e l, b us ine ss d isp ara g e me nt, misappropriation of name and r eputation, tortious interfer ence with contrac ts, tortious int e rf e re nc e wi th p ro sp e c tiv e e c on omi c a dv anta g e , a nd fo r p un iti ve dama g e s.
Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge