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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-3830
U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

J O H N A. P E T E RS

, III , Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the So uthern Distri ct o f Indi ana , Indi ana pol i s Divisi on. No. 1: 11 -CR-0 00 85 -JM S-DM L-1 — Jane E. Ma gnus- Sti nson , Judg e.
A RGU E D A P RI L 11, 2013

— D E C I D E D F E B R UAR Y 27, 2014

Before E AS T E R

B R O O K , M AN I O N

, and R OVN E R

, Circ uit Judges.

R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. John A. Peter s, III , pled gui lty to one count of conspi racy to possess wi th intent to di strib ute heroin, i n v i olation o f 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1) and 846. He reserved hi s right to appe a l t he di stric t court’s deni al of hi s motion to supp r e ss e videnc e di scov ered duri ng the search of a car in whi ch he w as a pas senger . W e affi rm.2 No. 12-3830
I. On April 5, 2011, Pete r s w as a pass enger in a maroo n T o yot a Sci on on Inter state 70 in Indi ana. The Sci on w as tr av eli ng behind a whi te GMC Denali and both cars di splay ed Ohi o li cens e p l a tes. For reasons unrelated to thi s appeal, the
cars aro used the sus pi ci on of Offi cer Chris Borg man, a Greenfi eld poli ce offi cer assi gned to a multi -juris di cti onal task force that patro lled Inter state 70 in Hancock and Mar i on Counties in Indi ana. Offi cer Borg man deci ded to follow the Denali and he enli sted Deputy Ni ck Ernstes of the Hancock County Sher i ff’s Department to w atch the Sci on. Ev entually , Offi cer Borg man deci ded to pull ov er the Denali, whi ch w as foun d t o contai n heroin and other evidenc e of drug t raffi cking. A pas senger in the Denali, Aaro n Holmes, later fi led a motion to supp ress the evidenc e found in that car

. The di stric t court di scredit ed Offi cer Borg man’s v ersi on of the ev ents of that day a s “ too i mprobable” and “not establi shed by a preponder ance of the evidenc e,” and gr anted Holmes’ motion to supp ress. W e t he r e fo re do not rely on Offi cer Borg man’s testim ony in
asses sing Peter s’ clai m and turn to Deputy Ernstes’ accoun t of the ev ents. After being alert ed to the cars by Offi cer Borg man, Deputy Ernstes approached the Sci on and notic ed that i t w as approx i

mately fif t y to sev enty-fi v e feet behind the Denali

. The Sci on
w as tr av eli ng at approx i mate l y sixty to si xty -four mi les per hour

. The co mb inat i on of the hi gh speed and short di stance allow ed for less than tw o seconds ’ braking tim e betw een the

v ehi cles, a nd Deputy Ernstes beli ev ed that the driv er of the Sci on, Cor dell Adams, w as violating an Indi ana statute byNo. 12-3830 3
following too closely

. See In d

. C ode § 9-21-8- 14. Deputy 1 Ernstes deci ded to pull ov er the Sc io n. When the deputy acti v at e d his emerge ncy li ghts, Adams i mmedi ately pulled
ov er

. The deputy told Adams that he sto pped the c ar because i t
w as following too closely and Ad a ms apolog i zed. Adams deni ed that he w as tr av eling wi th another v ehi cle, told the deputy that he had left hi s li cens e at ho me , and sai d that he

w as d r iv i ng only becau se hi s pass enger , Peter s, had become too tired. Deputy Ernstes then approached the pass enger si de of the v ehi cle to request i denti fi cati on and v ehi cle reg i strat i on. When Peter s low ered the window , Deputy Ernstes smelled burnt mari

juana and saw small gr een particles that the deputy belie ved to be mari

juana on Peter s’ clothi ng. Peter s clai med that the particles ca me from a ci gar , but a closer look confi rmed the dep uty’s beli ef that the particles w ere mari juana. Contr ary to Adams’ clai m that t he Sci on w as not associ ated wi th any other v ehi cle, Peter s told th e d e p uty that they w ere tr av eli ng wi th the whi te Denali

. Based on the mari juana smell, Deputy Ernstes deci ded to se a r ch the Sci on. In response to questi ons, Peter s told Deputy Ernstes tha t he had prev i ously been arr ested for carry ing a concealed w eapon. For safety reasons, the deputy decid e d to handcuff Peter s and pat hi m down. The deputy recov ered a large amount of cash from Peter s’ pocket, tot aling more than $2500. He then placed Peter s

That statu te pro vi d e s: “ A perso n who dri v es a moto r v ehic l e may not 1 fo l l ow another v ehic l e more cl osel y tha n i s reasonab l e and prudent, hav i ng due regard fo r the speed of b oth v ehic l es, the time i nterva l b etween
v ehic l es, and the co nditi on o f the hi ghway.”4 No. 12-3830
i n a patro l ca r a nd searched the Sci on. He found a mari juana stem i n the front pass enger area, and again encoun t e r ed a mari juana odor

, thi s ti me in a su nglass stor age compart ment. The stor age compartment cov er w as cracked and had screws that appeared not to be or i gin a l factory equi pment. The deputy also found a cordless drill in the car

. The drill contai ned a sti cky sub stance whi ch w as later fo und to match a sub stance found on the screws of a panel concealing a kilogram of heroin i n the Denali

. Peter s w as then charged, alo ng wi th Aaro n Holmes, a pass enger i n the Denali, wi th conspi racy to possess wi th intent to di strib ute he r o in, in violati on of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1) and 846; and possess i on wi th int e nt to di strib ute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 8 4 1 (a )(1)

. Peter s mov ed to supp ress the evidenc e sei zed i n the stop of the Sci on. The di stric t court held 2
a hearin g to resolv e di sputes of fact reg ardin g the tr affi c stop. The court found that Deputy Ernstes had observ ed the Sci on tr av eli ng wi th less than tw o seconds of braking di st a nce behind the Denali

. Indi ana law prov i des that a driv er “may not follow another v ehi cle more cl o sely than i s reasonable and prudent.” Ind

. Code § 9-21-8- 14. Ci tin g our opin i on in United S ta tes v
. Muriel , 418 F .3d 720, 724 (7th Ci r
. 2005), the co ur t conclu ded that pr obable cau se exi sted to beli ev e that a dr i v er follow ed another too closely under Indi ana law when few er

He also jo i ned Hol mes’ moti on to suppress the evidence sei zed i n the stop 2 ofth e Dena l i . The di stric t court concl uded tha t P eters lacked the ab i l i ty to chall enge the sei zure of evid e nc e i n the other car as a “mere passeng er i n a convoy,” and Peters do es not chall enge tha t concl usio n on ap p e al

. We therefo re wil l not address the i ssue of Peters’ ab i l i ty to chall enge the sto p ofthe Denali o r the sei zure o f e v i dence fro m the Denali

.No. 12-3830 5
than tw o seconds ’ braking tim e separated t he v ehi cles. The court als o determi ned that t he sub sequent w arr antless search of the S ci on w as justifi ed by the s mell of burnt marijuana an d by the appearance of mari juana particles in t he car . The court there fore denied Peter s’ motion to suppress . Peter s appeals

. II. On appeal, Peter s contends that the di stric t court cl early
err ed when i t conclu ded that the sto p of the Sci on and the sub sequent search of the interior w ere supp or ted by probable
caus e. First, Peter s maintai ns that Deputy Ernstes’ testim ony
w as too v ague and conclu sory to suppor t a finding that the Sci on w as following the Denali too closely

. Second , Peter s contends that the co ur t err ed in credi tin g the deputy’s testimony reg ardin g the smell of mari juana in the car

. In consi der

i ng a di stric t court's decis ion on a motion to supp ress, w e rev i ew fin dings o f fact for clear err o r a nd questi ons o f law de
novo

. United States v
. W

ysinger, 683 F .3d 784, 793 (7th Ci r
. 2012); United States v
. Garcia-Garcia , 633 F .3d 608, 612 (7th Ci r
. 2011). W e begi n wi th the stop of the Sci on. The prosecuti on bears the burden of prov i ng by a preponder ance of the evidenc e that
a w arr antless stop i s supp or te d by probable caus e. GarciaGarcia , 633 F .3d at 612; U n i ted States v
. Basinski, 226 F .3d 829, 833 (7th Ci r
. 2000). When a poli ce offi cer rea so nably beli ev es that a driv er ha s commi tte d ev en a minor tr affi c offense, probable caus e supp or ts the stop. Whren v
. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996); Garcia-Garcia , 633 F .3d at 612

. W e co nclud ed i n Muriel that, in asses sing whether a v ehi cle i s followi ng another more closely than i s reasonable and prudent under Indi ana law

, the “use of th e ‘ t w o -s e cond rule’ as a gui de for6 No. 12-3830
reasonableness comport s wi th Indi ana law .” Muriel 418 F .3d at 724. The only questi on, then, i s whether the court clearly err ed when i t credi ted Deputy Ernstes’ testim ony that there w as less than tw o seconds ’ braking time be t w een the Sci on and the Denali. Accordi ng to Peter s, the deputy’s testim ony w as too
v ague and conclu sory reg ardin g the di stance betw een the tw o
v ehi cles to sati sfy the government’ s bu r d en on a probable
caus e deter minati on. In particu lar , Peter s complains t hat the deputy di d not explain how he measu red the di stance from the front bum per of the Sc io n to the rear bum per of the Denali

. Nor di d the deputy speci fy how he measu red the speed of the tw o v ehi cles. The di stric t court’s fact-findings were adequately support ed by the recor d

. A t the supp ressi on hearin g, Deputy Er ns t e s testifi ed that he w as dr i ving behi nd t he cars when he notic ed that the Denali slow ed i ts speed and the Sci on m ov ed closer to the back of the Denali . He w as then asked how close the Sci on came to the Denali as the tw o tr av eled in tandem on the in ter state. He r epli ed: The front bum per of the Sci on and the rear b umper of the Denali – and w e’re tr av eling at speeds aro und 60, 64 mi les an hour at thi s tim e, aro und 60, betw een that range. And i t got less than – for the major i ty of the tim e, i t w as be t w een 50 and 75 feet. But, i t w as, a short per i od of time, s hort er t han that. So

... R. 280, T

r
. at 156. When asked how he deter mine d a sa fe fo l l owing di stance, Deputy Ernstes testifi ed that he used the tw o-second rule described in the “Indi ana Dri v e r’s Manual.” That manual prov i des a table of di stances that a v ehi cle tr av elsNo. 12-3830 7
in one second at particu lar speeds. For example, the de p ut y testifi ed that a v ehi cle tr av eling fi fty-fi v e mi les per hour w ould tr av erse 80.7 feet i n o ne second, and a v ehi cle t rav eling si xty

fi v e mi les per hour w ould cov er 95.3 feet in one second. R. 280, T r . at 158–59. Under the tw o-second rule, a car tr av eling fi ftyfi v e mi les per hour should there fore allow approx i mately 160 feet of braking di stance; a car tr av eling si x t y -fiv e mi les per hour should stay approx i mately 190 feet behind any v ehi cle in front o f i t. Thus, ev en using the slowest speed that Deputy Ernstes described (si xty mi les per hour) and the l o ng e st di stance he observ ed bet w een the cars (sev enty-fi v e feet), the Sci on w as following the Denali too closely under Indi ana law

. Muriel , 418 F .3d at 724. As for the adequacy of Deputy Ernstes’ esti mates of the dist a nc e betw een the v ehi cles and the speed of the Sci on, the d e p ut y testifi ed that he had been a poli ce offi cer for fi ftee n year s wi th si gni fi cant tr aining and exper i ence in tr affi c enforcement, among othe r things. R. 280, T r
. at 149–52. The di stric t court found Deputy Ernstes to be credible and credi ted hi s testim ony

. W e mus t there fore defer to those findings of fact unles s they are clearly err oneous. Garcia-Garcia , 633 F .3d at 614. See also United States v
. Jones , 6 1 4 F

. 3 d 423, 425–26 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (a factfinder's choi ce betw een t w o p ermis si ble view s of the evidenc e cannot be clearly err oneous). Under Feder al Rule
o f E v ide nce 701, a wi tness who i s not testif yin g as an exper t may offer testim ony in the form of an opin i on i f the testim ony i s rat i onally based on the wi tness’s perception, he lpful to clearly understanding the wi tness’s testim ony or deter mining a fact i n i ssu e, and i s not based on sci entifi c, techni cal, or other speci ali zed knowledge wi thi n the scope o f R ule 702. Judging8 No. 12-3830
the speed of a v ehi cle or a di stance betw een tw o v ehi cles based
on an i ndi vid ual’s perception i s the quintessenti al kin d of evidenc e contemplated b y Rule 701. United Stat es v

. Conn , 297 F .3d 548, 554 n.2 (7th Ci r
. 2002). Perhaps the deputy could hav e confi rmed hi s esti mate of the car’s speed wi th radar

. Or he could hav e compared the speed of the Sci on to the speed of hi s own v ehi cle as h e follow ed the Sci on. He could hav e counted “one M i ssi ssi ppi, tw o Mis si ssi ppi ” to judge the di stance betw een the Sci on and the Denali

. Perhaps he di d all o f those thi ngs but nei ther the government nor t he d e fendant asked hi m to explain how he deter mined the car’s speed and tr ai ling di stance, and the defendant di d not object to thi s testim ony as lacking foundati on. In any case, none of those thi ngs w ere 3
necess ary for the court to credi t hi s tr uthful testim ony that, as an exper i enced poli ce offi cer , he judged the di stance to be too short for c ars moving so qui ckly . Nor is there anything v ague or conclu sory i n testim ony that a car w as tr av eling betw een si xty and si xty -f o ur mi les per hour , fi fty to sev enty-fi v e feet behind another v ehi cle. On the contrar y , that te st imo ny w as
v ery speci fi c. In short, the di stric t court commi tte d no err or in credi tin g the testim ony of an exper i enced poli ce offi cer that,

For the sak e of compl etene ss , we no t e tha t Peters di d not object to the 3 of fi cer’s testimo ny as l acking fo undatio n even though tha t i s the essence of his compl aint on appeal. He therefo re fo rfei ted his fo undatio n objecti on to this testimo ny. United States v. Jam es , 46 4 F.3d 69 9, 70 9 (7 th Ci r. 20 06 ) (when
a def en dant fail s to object to the admissio n of evidence on particul ar grounds until appeal, the argumen t i s fo rfei ted and our review i s l i mited to the cor recti on of pl ain error ). But the government di d not argue fo rfei ture and so we address the cl aim using the usual stan dard of review. See United States v. Dunkel , 92 7 F.2d 95 5, 95 6 (7 th Ci r
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( cl aims of waiver may themselves b e waived).No. 12-3830 9
after obser v ing tw o cars tr av eling in tandem for a period of tim e, he credibly beli ev ed that the tr ailin g car w as approx i

mately sev enty-fi v e fe e t behind the lead car at a speed of approx i mately si xty mi les per hour

. If an offi cer knowi ng 4 these facts could reasonably conclu de that thi s combinati on of speed and di stance vio l a ted Indi ana law , that i s all that i s necess ary to supp or t probable caus e. Garcia-Garcia , 633 F .3d at 614. As Peter s has conceded, w e deci ded that i ssu e again st hi m i n Muriel

. 418 F .3d at 724. The government thus met i ts burden of establi shing p r o ba ble caus e suffi ci ent to justif y the tr affi c stop. In addi tion to the stop i tself, Peter s objecte d to the su bs e
quent search of t he v ehi cle. He contends that the deputy’s testim ony that he smelled mari juana w as not credible. Th e deputy found only a few particles of mari juana, he complains, whi ch w as not consi stent wi th the deputy’s clai m t ha t there

w as a stro ng smell of burnt ma r i juana when Peter s ro lled down hi s window

. He a l so objects that the offi cer di d not collect any of the mari

juana p a r tic les for testing and di d not
summon a near -by poli ce dog that w as tr ained to sni ff for drugs, facts whi ch he clai ms undercut the deputy’s credibi li ty

. On a motion to supp ress, we rev i ew the di stric t co ur t ’ s
cr edibi li ty deter minati ons for clear err or

. United States v
. Brown , 664 F .3d 1115, 1117 (7th Ci r
. 2011). “A factual finding i s

The di stric t cour t also v i ewed and rel i ed on a v i deo tape of the traffi c stop, 4 fi nding that “the vide otape e stab l i shes tha t t he Scio n wasi n fact trav el i ng too cl osel y.” R. 16 6, at 9 n.6. The v i deo tape i s not part of the r e c o rd on appeal. W e ha ve no reason to questio n the cour t’s fi nding tha t the tape
cor ro b or ated the de puty’s testimo ny.10 No. 12-3830 clearly err oneous only i f, after consi dering all the evidenc e, w e cannot av oid or i gnor e a d e fini te and fi rm convic tion that a mi stake has been made.” Brown , 664 F .3d a t 1 1 17–18. See also United States v
. Kreiger, 628 F .3d 857, 869 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (fac tual fin ding reg ardin g demeanor and credibi li ty cannot be ove rturned unles s the wi tness w a s incredible as a matter of law). None of Peter s’ arg uments lead us t o beli ev e that the court
err ed i n credi tin g Deputy Ernstes. The deputy’s testim ony that he smelled burnt mari juana w as corr obor ated, not contradi cted, by hi s st atement that he found mari juana particles on Peter s’ clothi ng. Peter s w as no t ch arg ed wi th mari juana possess i on and so there w as no need for the deputy to collect the few crumbs that he observ ed on Peter s’ clothing. Gi v en that the smell w as of bur nt mari juana, there w as nothin g unus ual about the fact that only a few crumbs remain ed in the
car

. And there w as no need for the deputy to e mp l o y a dog speci ally tr ai ned to ferre t out sub tle odor s of i lli ci t drugs when the depu ty w as “hi t b y an ov erwhelming s mell of mari juana” when the w i ndow descen ded. R. 280, T r
. at 175. W

e hav e held that a poli ce offi cer “who smells mari juana coming from a car has probable caus e to search that car .” United States v
. Franklin , 547 F .3d 726, 733 (7th Ci r
. 2008). The judgment of the di stric t court is there fore AFF IRM ED.