### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 21, 200 9 S es sio n JO HN C. BLAI R v. ROBE RT SULLI VAN, JR., ET AL 

### .
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-004325-06 D 'Army Bailey, Judge

No. W2008-01649-C OA-R3-C V - Filed August 13, 2009

Th is a pp e a l in vo lve s th e pla int if f’ s neg lig e nc e c la im w hic h a ro se fr om a

mot or ve hic le a c c ide nt w ith the de fe nd ant. Pla int if

f f ir st a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a llo wi ngpla int if

f’ s p os iti ve dr

ugte st to be admitted as e vidence . Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court’s jury instructions were improper and that the jury ’s ver dict is not supported by the evidenc e. R eviewing plaintiff’s first assertion, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discre tion in admitt ing the drug test as evidenc e. L ikewise, we f ind that the jury

instructions were proper

and that ther e is material evidenc e supporting the jury ’s

ve rd ic t. A c c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Af firme d

J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.

Geor ge Todd East, Kingsport, Tenne ssee a nd Russell John Johnson, M emphis, Tennesse e, for the Appellant, John Blair.

Melanie M. St ew ar t , M at t h ew S

. R u s s el l , Ge rm an t o wn , T en n es s ee , fo r t h e A p p el l ee R obert Sullivan, Jr.

OP IN ION

Ba ckg round

Th is a pp e a l ari se s f

ro m a laws uit inv olv inga

mot or ve hic le c oll isi on

oc c ur ri ngin M e mph is, Tenne ssee. On Aug ust 18, 2005, Pl aintiff/Appellant John C. Blair was driving an eig hteen- whee l trac tor trailer

hauling l i q u i d chemica ls on behalf of his employ er, Ente rprise Tr ansportation (“ Enterpr ise”). H e drove eastwa rd on Channel Ave nue, a two- lane r oad with one lane in eac h direc tion. As plaintiff approa ched his de stination, the W M Ba rr f acility , he moved to the lef t side-2-

of the ro a d in or de r to ne g oti a te a sh a rp ri g ht t

ur n. B e fo re he c ou ld t

ur n, pla int if f s top pe d th e ve hic le to allow a pede strian to cross the r oad.

At the same tim e , De fe nd a nt/Ap pe lle e Rob e rt Sul liv a n, Jr., wa s tr a ve lin g be hin d p la int if f i n an eig hteen- whee l tractor tr ailer. See ing pla intiff’s vehicle stop p ed o n the left side of the roa d, defe ndant beg an to pass plaintiff’s vehicle. As he moved a longside of plaintiff’s ve hicle, plaintiff

commence d his right- hand turn. The vehicles the n collided as de fenda nt struck the rig ht side of pla int if f’ s tr uc k. Af te r t he a c c ide nt, a

fe llo w e mpl oy e e of En te rp ri se too k pla int if f to a me dic a l c lin ic wher e a dr

ug scre en wa s conducte d.

Mr. Bla ir filed a c omplaint in S helby County Circuit Court on August 17, 2006. He alleg ed that the ac cident with Mr. Sullivan cause d him phy sical injuries and impaired hi s ability to secure employ men t

. T h e co mplaint alleg ed both neg lige nce a nd neg lige nce pe r se on the pa rt of Mr. Sul liv an. Th e c omp la int name d sev e ra l def e nd a nts in a dd iti on

to M r. Sul liv a n, bu t hi s c la ims a g a ins t those defe ndants wer e dismissed prior to tr ial and are not r eleva nt on appea l. Mr. Sulli van filed an

answe r and a lleg ed the c omparative fault of Mr. B lair as a defe nse.

Prior to tr ial, plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude his dr ug test from evide nce. T he drug test was administered to Mr

. Bla ir on the day of the a ccide nt at the re quest of Enter prise. The test y ielded a positive r esult for marijuana

. Mr. Bla ir denied consuming marijuana and cha lleng ed the a c c ur a c y

of the te st. I n h is m oti on , h e a rgue d that the te st wa s ir re le va nt a nd wo uld c a us e him substantial prejudice if admitted as evide nce.

Mr. Sullivan countere d that the drugtest was re l evant on the issues of causation and damag es. F irst, he ar g ued that t h e t es t co u l d show that Mr. B lair wa s impaired at the time of the

acc ident. Second, he a

rg ued that the positive drugtest, rathe r than the a ccide nt, was the re ason Mr. B la ir c ou ld n ot o btai n emp lo y me nt a s a tr uc k d ri ve r. Mr . Su lli va

n a lso a rgue d th a t th e dr

ugte st should be admissible to attack Mr. B lair’s c re d i b i l i t y as a witness to the ac cident. Af ter he aring argument from counse l, the trial court r uled that the drugtes t wa s ad m i ssible on the issues of

c a us a tio n a nd Mr

. B la ir ’s c re dib ili ty

. Th e tr ia l c ourt , ho we ve r, fo un d that the te st wa s no t a dmi ssi ble on the issue of damag es.

The matter was hear d by a jury over thre e day s in April 2008. I n addition to evidence on Mr. Bla ir’s dama g es, the jury hear d the testimony of the two parties and the ey e witness ac count of Ruby Handy , a secur ity g uard employ ed at the WM B arr fac ility

. Mr. Bla ir testified that he ha d exercised

rea sonable c are as a driver on the day of the a ccide nt. He testified that he had looked in his rea rview mirrors prior to turningbut had not seen Mr . Sulli van’s ve hicle appr oaching

. He a lso addresse d the pos it iv e dr

u g te s t s tati n g th a t h e h a d n o t u s e d ma r ij u a n a

. M r

. Su ll iv a n a ls o te s ti f ie d th e h e had exercised due car e on the da y of the a ccide nt. He noted that it was routine to see truc ks stopped on Channel Ave nue and that there w as suffic ient space to pass Mr. B lair’s ve hicle in the rig ht lane. He did not directly

addre ss Mr. Bla ir’s drugtest, but he did testify that Mr. Bla ir had a

ppear ed re d-ey ed as if under

the influenc e of a

drug

.-3-

At the close of

all the proof, the parties a nd the trial cour t prepa

red jury instructions. Mr. Bla ir could not find a jury instruction on the issue of whe ther Mr. Su l l i v an proper ly passed Mr. Bla ir’s vehicle in the rig ht la ne. Consequently , he proposed, and the tria l court ag ree d, to instruct the jur y by re a din g Te nn . Co de Ann. § 5 5- 8- 11 8, wh ich pro vid e s w he n o ve rt a kin g on the ri g ht i s permissible. Althoug h it was his sug g estion, Mr. Blair l ater objected to the t rial court’s use of the statute as an instruc tion in his motion for a new trial.

Af te r r e c e ivi ngthe tr ia l c ourt ’s ins tr uc tio ns , th e jur

y re tur ne d a ve rd ic t f ind ingtha t Mr . B la ir and Mr. Sullivan wer e both fifty perc ent at fa

ult for the acc ident. Acc ording ly , on April 22, 2008, the trial cour

t entere d an orde r g ranting a judgme nt in favor of Mr. Sulli van. After his moti on for

a new trial was de nied, Mr. B lair filed this appe al.

Mr. B lair ra ises three issues, as stated in his brief, f or re view:

1. Whether the trial c ourt’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion in l imine and allowing the jury to consider the cha lleng ed mar ijuana test re sults was more pre judicial than probative. 2. Whether t he jury instruction g iven reg arding passing on the right so confuse d the jury that a new trial was wa

rra nted. 3. Whether the ve rdict of the jur y for a fifty -fifty compar ative fa

ult was ag ainst th e we i gh t of the evidenc e.

L a w a nd An a ly sis

A. Ad mis sib ili ty

of Pla int if f’ s D ru g Te st

Mr . B la ir fi rs t a lle g e s th a t the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis pr e -t

ri a l mo tio n to e xclu de his drug tes t fr o m ev i dence . Gene rally , a “tr ial court’s de cision to admit or exclude evidence will be overturne d on appea l only wher e ther e is an abuse of di scre tion.” Merce r v. V anderbilt Un iversity, Inc. , 1 34 S.W. 3d 12 1, 13 1 (T e nn . 200 4)

. A t ri a l c ourt “ a bu se s it s d isc re tio n o nly

wh e n it ‘a pp lie [s]

an in c or re c t le g a l sta nd a rd , or re a c he [s] a de c isi on wh ic h is ag a ins t log ic or re a so nin g that c a

us e [s] an injustice to the par

ty complaining .’” Eldridge v. E ldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) ( quoting State v. Shi rley , 6 S.W. 3d 24 3, 24 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ). Th is s tand a rd of re vie w d oe s n ot p e rm it the appe llate cour

t to substi tute its judgment for that of t he trial court. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d at 85.

Whe n it de nie d p la int if

f’ s mo tio n in

lim ine , th e tr ia l c ourt

ruled th at th e dr

ugte st r e su lt would be admissible for two r easons. F irst, the trial court f ound that the drugtest result would be admissible on “the issue of w hether [P laintiff] was at fa

ult or had som e fa u l t pertinent to the

acc ident.” Second, the trial court r uled that the drugtest result would be admissi ble on the i ssue of pla int if f’ s c re dib ili ty

a s a wi tne ss. At

tr ia l, pla int if

f did no t ra ise a ne w obj e c tio n to th e a dmi ssi bil ity of the drug test result. Specific ally , plaintiff did not object when de fenda nt’s attorney

prese nted the drug test result on the issue of plaintiff’s damag es during closing arg ument. Although the trial court ha d p re vio us ly

ru le d th a t th e dr

ug te st re su lt wa s n ot a dmi ssi ble on thi s is su e , p la int if

f’ s f a ilure to-4-

ob je c t r e su lts in a

wai ver of thi s is su e on

a pp e a l. S e e Te nn . R. Ev id. 10 3( a ); Sta te v . Smith , 24 S.W .3d 274-279-80 ( Tenn. 2000).

Our r e v i e w i s t h e r e f

o r e l i m i t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s i n i t i a l r u l i n g o n p l a i n t i f

f ’ s m oti on in limine. I n that motion, plainti ff argues that the drugtest was irre levant on the issue of causation. Relevant e vidence is defined by Tenn. R. Evid. 401 as “evidence having any tendenc y to make the

e xiste nc e of

a ny fa c t th a t is of

c on se qu e nc e to t

he de te rm inatio n o f t

he a c tio n mor e pr ob a

ble or le ss pr ob a ble tha n it wo uld be wi tho ut t

he e vid e nc e .” I f t

he e vid e nc e is r e le va

nt, it i s a dmi ssi ble un le ss another leg al rule e x cludes it. Tenn. R. Evid. 402.
To support his argument that the drugtest result is irreleva nt, plaintiff relies he avily on Inte rst ate Me c hanic al C

ont ra c tor s, Inc . v . M c Into sh , 229 S.W .3d 674 (Tenn. 2007) . I n Mc Into sh , a wo rk e r’ s c omp e ns a tio n c a se , th e c la ima nt em plo y e e ’s dr

ugsc re e n r e ve a le d T HC le ve ls that w ou ld have imp a ir e d h is r e a c tio n ti me a t the tim e of his a c c ide nt. Du e to the ra pid natur e of

the a c c ide nt, howeve r, the Supreme Court upheld the trial cour t’s finding that “th er e d [ i d ] n ot appea r to be a

connec tion between the claimant' s impaired re action time and the cause of the injury .” Id . at 681. Consequently , the Court found that the claimant’s marijuana use was not the proxi mate cause of the inj ury

. Id . Plaintiff arg ues that the a ccide nt in this case , like the one in Mc Into sh , occur

red suddenly and without war

ning. A ccor dingly , he ar g ues that any evidenc e off

ere d to show that the plaintiff was impaire d is irreleva nt.

Plaintiff’s relianc e on Mc Into sh is mispl ace d. The Mc Into sh c ourt

a dd re sse d w he the r, in the context of a worke r’s c ompensation ca se, the c l ai m an t had re butted the statutory presumption that his dr ug use was the proxi mate cause of the ac cident. Id . at 680-81. Mc Into sh , howeve r, does

no t r e nd e r e vid e nc e of

dr ugus e ir re le va nt i n a c a se inv olv inga su dd e n ac c ide nt. De fe nd a nt c ou ld sti ll h a ve of

fe re d th e dr

ugte st r e su lt to show that pla int if f wa s impa ir e d at the tim e of the a c c ide nt. The jury , l i k e the trier of fac t in Mc

Into sh , c ou ld t

he n d e c ide that th e e vid e nc e did no t e sta bli sh

c a us a tio n. Th is p os sib ili ty

do e s n ot a ff

e c t th e a na ly sis of

the dr ugte st’ s r e le va

nc e un de r T e nn . R. Ev id. 40 1. Con se qu e ntl y , w e fi nd that th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr in f ind ingthat th e dr

ugte st r e su lt

was re levant evide nce. Plaintiff also argues that the drugtes t’s probative va lue is outweig hed by its prejudicial impact. Under

Tenn. R. Evid. 403, the trial cour t may exclude rele vant ev i d en ce “if its probative value i s s u bstantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, c onfusion of the issues, or misleading the jury , or by considerations of undue delay , waste of time, or nee dless prese ntation of cumulative evidenc e.” This rule re quires trial c ourts to conduct a two- part ba lancing test. Whit e v. V anderbilt Un iv. , 21 S.W .3d 215, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). F irst, the trial court must balanc e the probative value of the challeng ed evide nce a g ainst the counter vailing f actor s. Id

. I f i t finds that the prejudice substantially

outweig hs the probative va lue, the trial court may exercise its discre tion and exclude the evidenc e. Id

.
Her e, Plaintiff does not explain how the introduction of the dr ug test result into evidence would result i n unfair prejudice

. Plaintiff’s sole complaint is that defe ndant’s attorne y discussed the-5-

dr ugte st’ s e ff

e c t on dama g e s d

ur ingc los ingargume nt. As men ti on ed abo ve , p la int if f f a ile d to object to these statements in the trial court. B eca use plaintiff doe s not point t o any other pre judice, we f ind that the t ri al co urt did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the drugtest result was not excluded under Te nn. R. Evid. 403.
B. Jury I nstruction
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court’s jury instruction on Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-118 wa s inc or re c tly state d a nd mis le a din g to t

he jur y . T he statut e pr ov ide s: (a ) Th e dr ive r of a ve hic le may ov e rt a ke a nd pa ss upo n the ri g ht of a no the r v e hic le

on ly un de r t he fo llo wi ngc on dit ion s: (1) When the ve hicle over taken is making or about to make a lef t turn; (2) Upon a s t ree t or hig hway with unobstructed pave ment not occupied by parke d vehicles of suffic ient width for two (2) or more lines of moving ve hicles in ea ch direc tion; and (3) Upon a one-w ay street, or upon any roadw ay on which tra ffic is re stricted to one (1) dire ction of movement, whe re the roadw ay is free from ob s t ru cti ons and of

su ff ic ie nt w idt

h f or tw o ( 2) or

mor e lin e s o f m ov ingve hic le s. (b ) T he dr ive r o f a

ve hic le may ov e rt a ke a nd pa ss an oth e r ve hic le up on the ri g ht o nly under c onditions permitti ng that movement in safe ty

. I n no event shall the movement b e m a d e b y dr i v i n g o f

f t h e p a v e m e n to r

m a i n
- t r a v e l e d

p o rt i o n o f

t h e r o a dw a y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 8-118. At plaintiff’s r equest, the tria l court re ad this statute in its entirety as an instruction to the jury

.
Pla int if f f ir st c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y fa ili ngto e xpla in the c on te xt of the statut e and by failing to omit cer

tain irrele vant provisions of the statute in its ins truction. Parties, howe ver,
are not en t i t l ed to relief on appe al from invited er ror. Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a). Plaintiff aske d the trial court to re ad the entire statute as a jury instruction. Consequently , he is not e ntitled to relief on appea l on this i ssue.
We will, however, a ddress plaintiff' s complaint that the trial court inadver tently misread the statute to the jury

in its i nstruction. Pla i n t i ff a sserts, and the r ecor d confirms, that the tria l court

s u b s t i tu t e d " o v e rt a k i n g " f

o r " o v e rt a k e n " w h e n r e a d i n g s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) ( 1 ) o f

t h e s t a tu t e t o t h e j u r

y. I n revie wing this iss ue, this Court "s h o u l d n ot set aside a jur y ' s verdict be cause of an e rrone ous instruction unless it affirmatively appea rs that the er

roneous instruction ac tually misle d the jury ." Grandstaff v. Hawks , 36 S.W .3d 482, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I n the present case , plaintiff has

no t po int e d to a ny

e vid e nc e ind ic a tin g that th e tr ia l c ourt ' s in a dv e rt e nt m isr e a din g of the statut e misled the jury

. Fur

thermore , plaintiff concedes that subsection (a)(1), even if rea d proper ly , was not releva nt in the present case . I n Helm s v. Weav er , 770 S.W .2d 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), the court found that a jury instruction ba sed on an inapplicable statute was ha rmless err or bec ause it wa s-6-

"di ffi cul t t o en vi si o n th at a ju ry wou ld con si der t he s tat ut e in any way app li cabl e." Id . at 553. Acc ording ly , we f

ind tha t the trial court' s rea ding of the statute does not c onstitut e re versible e rror

.

C. W eig ht of the Evidenc e

Plaintiff next asser

ts th a t t h e ju ry ’s finding that both plaintiff and def endant we re f

ifty perc ent at fa ult is ag ainst the weight of the evidence. The standard of revie w when examini ng a jury verdic t approve d by

the trial cour

t is whe ther there is a

ny materia l e vidence to support the verdic t. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). To deter mine if materia l e vidence supports the jury ’s verdic t, the appellate court sh a ll: “ (1 ) t a ke the str on g e st le g iti ma te vie w of a ll the e vid e nc e in f a vo r o f t he ve rd ic t; ( 2) a ssume the truth of all evidenc e that supports the verdic t; ( 3) allow all rea sonable infere nces to sustain the verdic t; a nd (4) disca

rd all [counterva iling] evidence .” Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 48 S.W .3d 6 9 8 , 7 0 4 (T en n. 2000) ( citing Crabtree Masonry Co., In c. v. C & R Const r., Inc. , 575 S.W .2d 4, 5 (Tenn. 1978) ).

Her e, the jury hear d the testimony of three witnesses re levant to the issue of c ausation: the plaintiff, the def

endant, a nd Ms. H andy

. Reviewing this e vidence , we f ind that the there is material evidenc e supporting the jury ’s finding on the issue of the c omparative fault of the pa rties. The two pa rt ie s r e la te d th e ir

a c c ounts of

the a c c ide nt, a nd

the jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly c onclu de f

ro m th is testimony that the parties wer e equally at fault. On appeal, P laintiff has not pointed to any evidenc e in the rec ord indicating that the jury ’s finding was improper

.
Conclusion

For the fore go i n g rea sons, the judgme nt of the trial cour t is affirmed. Costs of appe al ar e assessed to Appe llant J ohn C. Blair.

___________________________________ J. STE VE N ST AFF OR D, J.