Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

GINSBURG, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

JABARI WILLIAMS v. LOUISIANA 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 

APPEAL OF LOUISIANA, FOURTH CIRCUIT
 

No. 14–9409. Decided June 20, 2016 

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are

granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. ___ (2016). 

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICES BREYER, 

SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN join, concurring in the decision to 

grant, vacate, and remand. 

“The Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 

U. S. 79 (1986)). Batson “provides a three-step process for

determining when a strike is discriminatory: 

“First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing 

that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the 

basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, 

the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for 

striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the

parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine 

whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Foster, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). 

This case concerns a Louisiana procedural rule that 

permits the trial court, rather than the prosecutor, to 

supply a race-neutral reason at Batson’s second step if

“the court is satisfied that such reason is apparent from 
 

2 WILLIAMS v. LOUISIANA 

GINSBURG, J., concurring 

the voir dire examination of the juror.” La. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann., Art. 795(C) (West 2013). Louisiana’s rule, as 

the Louisiana Supreme Court has itself recognized, does 

not comply with this Court’s Batson jurisprudence. State 

v. Elie, 05–1569 (La. 7/10/2006), 936 So. 2d 791, 797 (citing Johnson v. California, 545 U. S. 162, 172 (2005)). At 

Batson’s second step, “the trial court [must] demand an

explanation from the prosecutor.” Johnson, 545 U. S., at 

170; see id., at 172 (“The Batson framework is designed to

produce actual answers [from a prosecutor] to suspicions

and inferences that discrimination may have infected the

jury selection process. . . . It does not matter that the 

prosecutor might have had good reasons; what matters is 

the real reason [jurors] were stricken.” (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted)); id., at 173 (improper to 

“rel[y] on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of 

discrimination”).

The rule allowing judge-supplied reasons, nonetheless,

remains operative in Louisiana and was applied in petitioner’s 2012 trial. On remand, the appropriate state

court should reconsider petitioner’s argument that the 

rule cannot be reconciled with Batson. A Louisiana court, 

“like any other state or federal court, is bound by this

Court’s interpretation of federal law.” James v. Boise, 577 

U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (per curiam) (slip op., at 2). See also 

App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a (Belsome, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 

United States Supreme Court has made clear . . . that the

State is obligated to offer a race-neutral reason. The judge 

is an arbiter not a participant in the judicial process.

Allowing the court to provide race-neutral reasons for the

State violates [the Constitution].”). 
Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

JABARI WILLIAMS v. LOUISIANA 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 

APPEAL OF LOUISIANA, FOURTH CIRCUIT
 

No. 14–9409. Decided June 20, 2016

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

dissenting from the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. 

For the reasons set out in my statement in Flowers v. 

Mississippi, No. 14–10486, I would deny the petition. 

The concurring statement calls upon the appropriate

state court on remand to consider petitioner’s argument 

that the trial judge did not comply with the second step of

the procedure mandated by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 

79 (1986), because the judge, in accordance with a state

procedural rule, rejected a defense challenge on the

ground that a race-neutral reason for the strike was apparent from the voir dire of the juror in question. But 

whether petitioner is entitled to relief on this ground has 

nothing to do with Foster, which “address[ed] only Batson’s third step.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2016) (slip op., at 10).