CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 14 NATHANIEL H. WOODS

H.R. 2631. I am withholding my approval from H.R. 2631, for the relief of

the estate of Nathaniel H. Woods,

deceased.

The bill would direct the Secretary of

the Treasury to pay the sum of $13,-

476.50 to the estate of Nathaniel H.

Woods in refund of an estate tax which was erroneously paid.

The major portion of the estate tax in

question was paid in December 1951 on the assumption that the first of two wills

left by the decedent was valid. The

second will, under which no estate tax was due, was admitted to probate on April 16, 1953, and, after prolonged litigation, was sustained as the valid will in

December 1955. A claim for refund was

not filed until June 1956. It was re- jected by the Commissioner and the

Federal courts because not filed within

the period of limitations prescribed by

law.

It appears that the 3-year statutory

period of limitations for filing a timely

claim did not expire until April 16,

1956-3 years after the executor qualified under the second will and more than

4 months after the conclusion of the

litigation upholding the validity of the

second will. A protective claim for refund could have been filed at any time

during the 3-year period after the qualification of the executor under the second

will. It was not necessary to await the

conclusion of the prolonged litigation

concerning the wills. Even after the

conclusion of the litigation, there re- mained more than 4 months in which to

file a timely claim. The record in this case discloses no justification for the

failure to file a clai.m until June 1956.

The statute of limitations, which the

Congress has included in the revenue system as a matter of sound policy, is

essential in order to achieve finality in

tax administration. The limitation not

only bars taxpayers from obtaining re- funds, but also the Government from

collecting additional taxes. Granting

special relief in this case, where a refund was not claimed in the time and manner prescribed by law, would discriminate

against other similarly situated taxpay- ers and would create an undesirable

precedent.

Under the circumstances, therefore, I am constrained to withhold my approval

of the bill.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 22, 1959.

MRS. LOURENE 0. ESTES

H.R. 6335. I am withholding my approval from H.R. 6335, for the relief of

Mrs. Lourene 0. Estes.

Mrs. Estes, on her income tax returns

for 1952 and 1953, reported as income

certain disability payments received

from her employer. Prior to the time

the taxpayer filed these returns, the

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

had held that such disability payments were excludable from gross income, although the Internal Revenue Service had

ruled to the contrary.

On April 1, 1957, the U.S. Supreme

Court decided that disability payments

of the type here in question were excludable from gross income. On April 15,

1957, Mrs. Estes filed claims for refund

for 1952 and 1953 based upon the excludability of the disability pay received by

her. These claims were rejected because

they were filed after the expiration of

the 3-year period of limitations prescribed by law for the filing of such

claims.

During the last Congress, I approved

legislation designed to grant general re- lief, on a nondiscriminatory basis, to

taxpayers who had received disability

pay which was excludable from gross

income under the Supreme Court decision. This general legislation does not

provide relief for taxpayers, such as Mrs.

Estes, who did not attempt to protect

their rights by filing timely claims for

refund.

The statutory period of limitations,

which the Congress has included in the revenue system as a matter of sound

policy, is essential in order to achieve

finality in tax administration. A substantial number of taxpayers paid in- come tax on disability payments received

by them and failed to file timely claims

for refund. Accordingly, to grant special

relief in this case, where a refund was not

claimed in the time and manner prescribed by law, would be to discriminate

against such other similarly situated

taxpayers and to create an undesirable

precedent.

Under the circumstances, therefore, I am constrained to withhold my approval

from the bill.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 22, 1959.

MRS. MARY D'AGOSTINO

H.R. 1387. I am withholding my approval from H.R. 1387, for the relief of

Mrs. Mary D'Agostino.

Mrs. D'Agostino's claim for gratuitous

national service life insurance benefits,

filed April 20, 1956, was denied by the

Veterans' Administration because it had

not been filed within the statutory time

limitation of 7 years after the date of

death of her son on December 22, 1940.

The Veterans' Administration has also

determined that, even if her claim had

been timely filed, Mrs. D'Agostino would

not have been eligible for the benefit be- cause her son's death had occurred not

in line of duty and did not meet the

criteria specified in the law for such

benefits. A subsequent statutory liberalization of line of duty criteria had no retroactive effect.

H.R. 1387, in addition to waiving the

time limitation, would retroactively apply to this case the liberalized line of

duty criteria enacted in September 1944.

H.R. 3733 and H.R. 6529, 83d Congress,

also sought retroactively to apply liberalized eligibility standards which, as a matter of law, had only prospective

effect. In disapproving those measures I indicated that it seemed to me irrelevant and unwise to accept as justification

for those bills the fact that an ineligible

beneficiary could qualify under the then

existing law which was never intended

to have retroactive effect. My view has

not changed and applies with equal force

to the present case.

Approval of H.R. 1387 would be discriminatory and would create an undesirable precedent. Uniformity and

equality of treatment for all who are similarly situated must be the steadfast

rule if Federal programs for veterans

and their dependents are to be operated successfully. Approval of H.R. 1387

would not be in keeping with these

principles.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 23, 1959.

MRS. ELSE HAVERSTICK CASH

H.R. 1434. I am withholding my ap- proval from H.R. 1434, a bill for the relief

of Mrs. Elbe Haverstick Cash.

This bill would pay to Mrs. Cash $5,000 as compensation for the death of her son as a result of maltreatment in a Veterans' Administration hospital in

1955.

Mrs. Cash's son entered a Veterans'

Administration hospital in 1943 due to

service-connected mental illness. He was hospitalized continuously in VA facilities until his death in 1955. During this entire period, Mrs. Cash received on her son's behalf service-connected com- pensation ranging in amount from $138

to $190 monthly.

It appears that in February 1955, while

attendants were changing his clothes,

Mrs. Cash's son became unruly. In the

ensuing struggle the attendants set upon him, causing serious injuries from which

he later died. Although the attendants

involved were found not guilty of criminal acts, they were either fired or otherwise rigorously disciplined for their part in this tragic affair.

In addition to receiving $5,000 under a National Service Life Insurance policy, Mrs. Cash, as a dependent parent, cur- rently receives death compensation at

the rate of $75 monthly. This is paid

to her under general provisions of law

which provide that where a death occurs as a result of hospitalization by the VA

benefits are payable as if such death were service connected. Mrs. Cash has no remedy under the Federal Tort Claims

Act, since that act specifically bars

claims based on assault and battery.

My strong feeling of sympathy for this

mother in the unfortunate loss of her son is matched only by my distress that an incident of this kind should happen in a Government hospital. These strong feelings do not, however, alter the fact

that there is a generous, comprehensive, and assured system of benefits provided for the survivors of veterans who die, in

whatever manner, as a result of hospital- ization by the VA. Mrs. Cash is cur- rently a beneficiary of this system.

The situation here closely parallels

that resulting when a serviceman suffers a service-connected death. In such

cases, regardless of the manner in

which death occurs, I firmly believe that

the assured and general benefits to which

survivors are entitled by law should be

their exclusive remedy. This principle

has led to the disapproval of other private bills granting special awards in such cases (see H.R. 1315, 85th Cong., "A bill

for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. Charles H.

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