UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4063

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NORMAN SENEKA BOWERS, 

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:13-cr-00458-NCT-1)

Submitted: June 12, 2015 Decided: July 10, 2015

Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United 

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, WinstonSalem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Norman Seneka Bowers (Bowers) 

pled guilty to possession of a firearm after a felony 

conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, over Bowers’

objection, the district court applied a four-level enhancement 

under United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual

(USSG), § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) to Bowers’ offense level because the 

firearm he possessed had an altered serial number. The 

application of the § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement increased 

Bowers’ sentencing range from 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment to 

70 to 87 months’ imprisonment. He was sentenced to 78 months’

imprisonment. On appeal, Bowers challenges the district court’s 

application of the § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement. We affirm.

I

On December 7, 2013, in Lexington, North Carolina, Bowers 

fled on foot following a stop of his vehicle by then-Officer 

Jason Pardue (Officer Pardue) of the Lexington Police 

Department. During the chase, Officer Pardue tackled Bowers, 

and a struggle ensued. After Bowers pointed a gun at Officer 

Pardue, Officer Pardue punched Bowers in the face which caused 

Bowers to fall to the ground. Bowers was then subdued and 

placed under arrest. 
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The gun recovered at the scene was examined by ATF Special 

Agent Matt Amato. Such examination revealed that the serial 

number on the gun had been altered in that three of the five 

digits comprising the gun’s serial number had “gouges” in them 

making them “unreadable.” (J.A. 80).

On December 16, 2013, a federal grand jury in the Middle 

District of North Carolina charged Bowers with possessing a 

firearm after a felony conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and 

with possessing a firearm with a serial number that had been 

altered or obliterated, id. § 922(k). Bowers pled guilty to the 

§ 922(g)(1) offense.

In preparation for sentencing, a presentence investigation 

report was prepared by a United States Probation Officer. The 

probation officer recommended that Bowers’ offense level be 

enhanced four levels under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) because the gun 

he possessed had an altered serial number. Bowers objected to 

the § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement on the basis that he had no 

knowledge of the serial number being altered. At sentencing, 

the district court overruled the objection. Following the 

imposition of a 78-month sentence, the district court entered 

judgment from which Bowers now appeals.
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II

Bowers challenges the district court’s application of the 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement to his offense level. According to 

Bowers, § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) requires the government to prove that, 

at the time the defendant possessed the firearm, he had 

knowledge that the serial number on the gun was altered or 

obliterated. Since the government did not offer proof of such 

knowledge at his sentencing, Bowers posits that the district 

court erred in applying the enhancement.

In applying enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines, 

the district court employs the preponderance of the evidence 

standard, not the reasonable doubt standard. United States v. 

Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2007). In considering 

the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, 

we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions 

de novo. United States v. Allen, 446 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir.

2006).

Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines 

provides a base offense level of 20 when a defendant with one 

prior felony conviction for either a crime of violence or a 

controlled substance offense is convicted of possessing a 

firearm. This Guideline applied to Bowers because he had a 

qualifying prior controlled substance offense. 

Section 2K2.1(b)(4) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a 
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two-level enhancement where the defendant possessed a stolen 

firearm, USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), and a four-level enhancement 

where the defendant possessed a firearm with an altered or 

obliterated serial number, id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). The USSG 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancements apply “regardless of whether the 

defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm was 

stolen or had an altered or obliterated serial number.” Id.

§ 2K2.1, comment. (n.8(B)). The district court applied the 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement because the gun Bowers possessed 

had an altered serial number. Bowers received a two-level 

enhancement for obstruction of justice, id. § 3C1.2, and a 

three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of 

responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a), (b), resulting in a sentencing 

range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment, using Bowers’ Criminal 

History Category IV.

Bowers does not dispute that the gun he possessed on 

December 7, 2013 had an altered serial number. Under the 

Guidelines’ commentary, there is no requirement that he have any 

knowledge, or reason to believe, the gun had an altered serial 

number. Id.; see also United States v. Perez, 585 F.3d 880, 883 

(5th Cir. 2009) (“This court has continually enforced the clear 

and unambiguous language of § 2K2.1(b)(4) and its strict 

liability standard.”); United States v. Statham, 581 F.3d 548, 

553 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] need not have known that 
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serial numbers had been removed from the weapons.”); United 

States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4) is a strict liability enhancement provision);

United States v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1996) 

(holding that § 2K2.1(b)(4) is a “‘strict liability’”

enhancement provision and that the “‘omission of a mens rea

requirement’” in § 2K2.1(b)(4) “‘does not violate due process’”

(quoting United States v. Goodell, 990 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 

1993))). Thus, the district court properly applied the 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement to Bowers’ offense level. 

Notwithstanding the plain language of § 2K2.1’s commentary 

and the persuasive circuit authority cited above, Bowers points 

us to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 

Roxborough, 99 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1996), in support of his 

argument. In Roxborough, undercover ATF agents purchased two 

firearms with obliterated serial numbers from an individual. 

Id. at 213. When the obliterated serial numbers were restored, 

the firearms were traced back to the defendant, a licensed 

firearms dealer. Id. With regard to these two firearms, the 

defendant pled guilty to dealing in firearms away from his 

licensed premises, 18 U.S.C. § 922(c). Roxborough, 99 F.3d at 

213. At his sentencing, the defendant’s offense level was 

enhanced because the serial numbers on the firearms had been 

obliterated. Id. Notably, the government could not establish
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that the serial numbers had been obliterated by the defendant or 

that the serial numbers were obliterated when he sold the 

firearms. Id. On these facts, the Roxborough court declined 

to uphold the district court’s application of the enhancement. 

Id. at 214-15.

Bowers’ reliance on Roxborough is misplaced. First, the 

decision in Roxborough conflicts with the plain language of 

§ 2K2.1’s commentary which clearly states that the § 2K2.1(b)(4)

enhancements apply regardless of whether the defendant knew or 

had reason to believe that the firearm was stolen or had an 

altered or obliterated serial number. Second, the court in 

Roxborough considered it important that the government could not 

prove that the firearms’ serial numbers were obliterated at the 

time of the offense. Id. at 214 (stating that there was “no 

evidence at sentencing either that Roxborough obliterated the 

serial numbers or that the firearms had obliterated serial 

numbers at the time that he sold them”). In our case, there is 

no dispute that the gun’s serial number was altered at the time 

Bowers committed his offense. Third, the Sixth Circuit has 

declined to follow Roxborough on the basis that it conflicts 

with its earlier decision in Murphy, which held that 

§ 2K2.1(b)(4) is a strict liability enhancement provision. See

United States v. Burns, 109 Fed. App’x 52, 57 (6th Cir. 2004) 

(“To the extent that Roxborough conflicts with the earlier-
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decided Murphy, we are not constrained to follow it.”). 

Consequently, Roxborough is of no help to Bowers.

 

III

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the 

district court did not err when it applied the § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)

enhancement to Bowers’ offense level. Accordingly, the judgment 

of the district court is affirmed. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED