II

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2492

To expand and enhance United States efforts in the Russian nuclear complex

to expedite the containment of nuclear expertise that presents a proliferation threat, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 1, 2000

Mr. DOMENICI introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To expand and enhance United States efforts in the Russian

nuclear complex to expedite the containment of nuclear

expertise that presents a proliferation threat, and for

other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear Weapons

5 Complex Conversion Act of 2000’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 Congress makes the following findings:
2

•S 2492 IS

1 (1) The Russian nuclear weapons complex is

2 still at its Cold War size. Little information about

3 this complex is shared, and 10 of its most sensitive

4 cities remain closed. These cities house 750,000 peo5 ple and employ approximately 150,000 people in nu6 clear military facilities. Although the Russian Fed7 eration Ministry of Atomic Energy has announced

8 the need to significantly downsize its workforce, per9 haps by as much as 50 percent, it has been very

10 slow in accomplishing this goal. Information on the

11 extent of any progress is very closely held. The

12 major impediments to downsizing have been eco13 nomic and social conditions in Russia.

14 (2) The United States, on the other hand, has

15 significantly downsized its nuclear weapons complex

16 in an open and transparent manner. As a result, an

17 enormous asymmetry now exists between the United

18 States and Russia in nuclear weapon production ca19 pacities and in transparency of such capacities. It is

20 in the national security interest of the United States

21 to assist the Russian Federation in accomplishing

22 significant reductions in its nuclear military complex

23 and in helping it to protect its nuclear weapons, nu24 clear materials, and nuclear secrets during such re25 ductions. Such assistance will accomplish critical
3

•S 2492 IS

1 nonproliferation objectives and provide essential sup2 port towards future arms reduction agreements.

3 Without a significant, transparent reduction in nu4 clear weapons production capacity, the Russian Fed5 eration’s ability to quickly reconstitute its arsenal

6 remains inconsistent with current and contemplated

7 arms control agreements.

8 (3) Several current programs address portions

9 of the downsizing and nuclear security concerns. The

10 Nuclear Cities Initiative was established to assist

11 Russia in creating job opportunities for employees

12 who are not required to support realistic Russian

13 nuclear security requirements. Its focus has been on

14 creating commercial ventures that can provide self15 sustaining jobs in three of the closed cities. The cur16 rent scope and funding of the program are not com17 mensurate with the scale of the threats to the

18 United States sought to be addressed by the pro19 gram.

20 (4) To effectively address threats to United

21 States national security interests, progress with re22 spect to the nuclear cities must be expanded and ac23 celerated. The Nuclear Cities Initiative has laid the

24 groundwork for an immediate increase in investment

25 and potential for immediate risk reduction in the cit-
4

•S 2492 IS

1 ies of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Seversk, which house

2 four key Russian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the

3 Nuclear Cities Initiative has made considerable

4 progress with the limited funding available. How5 ever, to gain sufficient advocacy for additional sup6 port, the program must demonstrate—

7 (A) rapid progress in conversion and re8 structuring; and

9 (B) an ability for the United States to

10 track progress against verifiable milestones that

11 support a Russian nuclear complex consistent

12 with their future national security require13 ments.

14 (5) Reductions in the nuclear weapons-grade

15 material stocks in the United States and Russia en16 hance prospects for future arms control agreements

17 and reduce concerns that these materials could lead

18 to proliferation risks. Confidence in both nations will

19 be enhanced by knowledge of the extent of each na20 tion’s stockpiles of weapons-grade materials. The

21 United States already makes this information public.

22 (6) Many current programs contribute to the

23 goals stated herein. However, the lack of pro24 grammatic coordination within and among United

25 States Government agencies impedes the capability
5

•S 2492 IS

1 of the United States to make rapid progress. A for2 mal single point of coordination is essential to en3 sure that all United States programs directed at co4 operative threat reduction, nuclear materials reduc5 tion and protection, and the downsizing, trans6 parency, and nonproliferation of the nuclear weap7 ons complex effectively mitigate the risks inherent in

8 the Russian Federation’s military complex.

9 (7) Specialists in the United States and the

10 former Soviet Union trained in nonproliferation

11 studies can significantly assist in the downsizing

12 process while minimizing the threat presented by po13 tential proliferation of weapons materials or exper14 tise.

15 SEC. 3. EXPANSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF NUCLEAR CIT16 IES INITIATIVE.

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Energy shall, in

18 accordance with the provisions of this section, take appro19 priate actions to expand and enhance the activities under

20 the Nuclear Cities Initiative in order to—

21 (1) assist the Russian Federation in the

22 downsizing of the Russian Nuclear Complex; and

23 (2) coordinate the downsizing of the Russian

24 Nuclear Complex under the Initiative with other

25 United States nonproliferation programs.
6

•S 2492 IS

1 (b) ENHANCED USE OF MINATOM TECHNOLOGY

2 AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES.—In car3 rying out actions under this section, the Secretary shall

4 facilitate the enhanced use of the technology, and the re5 search and development services, of the Russia Ministry

6 of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) by—

7 (1) fostering the commercialization of peaceful,

8 non-threatening advanced technologies of the Min9 istry through the development of projects to com10 mercialize research and development services for in11 dustry and industrial entities; and

12 (2) authorizing the Department of Energy, and

13 encouraging other departments and agencies of the

14 United States Government, to utilize such research

15 and development services for activities appropriate

16 to the mission of the Department, and such depart17 ments and agencies, including activities relating to—

18 (A) remediation of the environmental con19 sequences of United States nuclear weapons ac20 tivities and Russian nuclear weapons activities;

21 (B) nonproliferation (including the detec22 tion and identification of weapons of mass de23 struction and verification of treaty compliance);

24 (C) global energy and environmental mat25 ters; and
7

•S 2492 IS

1 (D) basic scientific research.

2 (c) ACCELERATION OF NUCLEAR CITIES INITIA3 TIVE.—(1) In carrying out actions under this section, the

4 Secretary shall accelerate the Nuclear Cities Initiative by

5 implementing, as soon as practicable after the date of the

6 enactment of this Act, programs at the nuclear cities re7 ferred to in paragraph (2) in order to convert significant

8 portions of the activities carried out at such nuclear cities

9 from military activities to civilian activities.

10 (2) The nuclear cities referred to in this paragraph

11 are the following:

12 (A) Zarechnyy (Penza–19).

13 (B) Sarov (Arzamas–16 and Avangard).

14 (C) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk–70).

15 (D) Seversk (Tomsk–7).

16 (3) Before implementing a program under paragraph

17 (1), the Secretary shall establish appropriate, measurable

18 milestones for the first year of the program.

19 (d) PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE RUSSIAN NU20 CLEAR COMPLEX.—(1) The President, acting through the

21 Secretary of Energy, is urged to enter into negotiations

22 with the Russian Federation for purposes of the develop23 ment by the Russian Federation of a plan to restructure

24 the Russian Nuclear Complex in order to meet changes

25 in the national security requirements of Russia by 2010.
8

•S 2492 IS

1 (2) The plan under paragraph (1) should include the

2 following:

3 (A) Mechanisms to achieve a nuclear weapons

4 production capacity in Russia that is consistent with

5 the obligations of Russia under current and future

6 arms control agreements.

7 (B) Mechanisms to increase transparency re8 garding nuclear weapons production processes and

9 nuclear materials inventories in Russia to the levels

10 of transparency for such matters in the United

11 States, including the participation of Department of

12 Energy officials with expertise in transparency of

13 such matters.

14 (C) Measurable milestones that will permit the

15 United States and the Russian Federation to mon16 itor progress under the plan.

17 (e) ENCOURAGEMENT OF CAREERS IN NON18 PROLIFERATION.—(1) In carrying out actions under this

19 section, the Secretary shall carry out a program to encour20 age students in the United States and in the Russian Fed21 eration to pursue a career in an area relating to non22 proliferation.

23 (2) Of the amounts available under subsection (f),

24 $2,000,000 shall be available for purposes of the program

25 required under paragraph (1).
9

•S 2492 IS

1 (f) FUNDING FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001.—There is

2 hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Department

3 of Energy for fiscal year 2001, $50,000,000 for purposes

4 of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, including activities under

5 this section.

6 (g) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING FUNDING FOR

7 FISCAL YEARS AFTER FISCAL YEAR 2001.—It is the

8 sense of Congress that the availability of funds for the

9 Nuclear Cities Initiative in fiscal years after fiscal year

10 2001 should be contingent upon—

11 (1) demonstrable progress in the programs car12 ried out under subsection (c), as determined utilizing

13 the milestones required under paragraph (3) of that

14 subsection; and

15 (2) the development and implementation of the

16 plan required by subsection (d).

17 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

18 A NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR NON19 PROLIFERATION MATTERS.

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) there should be a National Coordinator for

22 Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate—

23 (A) the Nuclear Cities Initiative;

24 (B) the Initiatives for Proliferation Preven25 tion program;
10

•S 2492 IS

1 (C) the Cooperative Threat Reduction pro2 grams;

3 (D) the materials protection, control, and

4 accounting programs; and

5 (E) the International Science and Tech6 nology Center; and

7 (2) the position of National Coordinator for

8 Nonproliferation Matters should be similar, regard9 ing nonproliferation matters, to the position filled by

10 designation of the President under section 1441(a)

11 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruc12 tion Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104–201;

13 110 Stat. 2727; 50 U.S.C. 2351(a)).

14 SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

15 In this Act:

16 (1) NUCLEAR CITY.—The term ‘‘nuclear city’’

17 means any of the closed nuclear cities within the

18 complex of the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy

19 (MINATOM) as follows:

20 (A) Sarov (Arzamas–16 and Avangard).

21 (B) Zarechnyy (Penza–19).

22 (C) Novoural’sk (Sverdlovsk–44).

23 (D) Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk–45).

24 (E) Ozersk (Chelyabinsk–65).

25 (F) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk–70).
11

•S 2492 IS

1 (G) Trechgornyy (Zlatoust–36).

2 (H) Seversk (Tomsk–7).

3 (I) Zhelenznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk–26).

4 (I) Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk–45).

5 (2) RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COMPLEX.—The term

6 ‘‘Russian Nuclear Complex’’ refers to all of the nu7 clear cities.

Æ