1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 14a0051p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

M ICHAEL B RAY and J AYNE B RAY , individually and natural parents and guardians on behalf of M.B., N.B., G.B., P.B.; E PIPHANY B RAY ; B ESEDA B RAY ; P ERSEVERANCE B RAY ; A LETHEA B RAY ; I SAAC B RAY , Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v

.
P LANNED P ARENTHOOD C OLUMBIA -W ILLAMETTE I NC ., et al., Defendants ,
C HRIS R ILEY ; J OEL K IMMET , Defendants-Appellees

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 12-4476

Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus No. 2:10-cv-00054—Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., District Judge. Argued: July 23, 2013 Decided and Filed: March 21, 2014
Before: ROGERS and DONALD, Circui t Judges; ANDERSON, District Judge. *

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Thomas W. Condit, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Richard Montague, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Thomas W. Condit, Cincinnati, Ohio, for A ppellant. Richard Montague, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

* The Honorable S. Thomas Anderson, United States Dist rict Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation. 

### >No. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 2

_________________ OPINION

_________________
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. If th e facts alleged in the complain t are true, this case involves an incident that is more like home raids by Red Guards during China’s Cultural Revolution than like what we should expect in the United States of America. A surprise raid was made on a judgment debtor’s home to enforce an order of execution on property of the debtor. The order was ostensibly for the purpose of obtaining prope rty of value to be se ized, but was obviously
focused instead on all means for the debtor to express ideas. The debtor was required to sit on his couch while flak-jacketed U.S. Marshals, along with agents of a dvocates for moral and political positions that the debt or despised, plus persons with unknown identities and purposes, went through and seized the books and papers, and computers and ca meras, of the debtor and his family. The only exception was fo r children’s books and Bibles. The interior of the home was videotaped. The debtor was not al lowed to leave the couch, to go outside, or to call his lawyer, although eventually a marshal called the debtor’s lawyer.
This kind of home attack on the ability to convey ideas should not happen in our Republic. It is true that the debtor’s ideas—that it is moral to take violent, illegal action to stop abortions—are repugnant. Bu t it is contrary to our fundamental norms to permit government-sanctioned attacks on the purveyance of ideas, even when those ideas are repugnant.
Three considerations nonetheless require us to affirm the district c ourt’s dismissal of the
debtor’s Bivens action against Riley and Kimmet, the tw o U.S. Marshals involved. First, notwithstanding the highly questionable way in which the court’s or der of execution was apparently aimed to stifle the debtor’s ability to express ideas, the debtor-plaintiff in this case has not challenged the validity or sc ope of the judge’s order. Sec ond, the debtor-plaintiff has settled with all of the participants in th e raid other than Riley and Kimmet , so that we are faced in this case solely with the actions of marshals carrying out a presumptively valid order of a federal judge. Third, although some of the actions a llegedly carried out by the marshals and not explicitly authorized by the order were not co nstitutional, that unconstitutionality was not thenNo. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 3

clearly established with sufficient specificity. Riley and Kimmet are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
Plaintiffs Michael and Jayne Bray, individually and on beha lf of their minor children, along with their adult children Epiphany Bray, Be seda Bray, and Perseverance Bray, brought this
action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). They allege that Deputy U.S. Marshals Chris Rile y and Joel Kimmet c onspired with Planned Parenthood Columbia Willamette, Inc. (“PPCW”) to seize their personal property in an unconstitutional manner, ostensibly to sati sfy an $850,000 judgment that PPCW had obtained against Michael Bray followi ng the publication of his book, A Time to Kill

. Bray is an antiabortion activ ist with views that his comp laint describes as “unpopular.” First Amended Compl. 5. He expressed these views in A Time to Kill , “defend[ing] as a moral and ethical proposition the use of force to de fend innocent human beings, born and unborn.” Id. & 4.3. In 1985, Bray was convicted in Maryland for a felony “relating to physical damage
inflicted on several abortion centers.” Id. & 4.2. As a result, he sp ent four years in prison. Id

. Despite his felony conviction and the provocative t itle and subject matter of his book, Bray says
that he “has never advocated or encouraged anyone to kill or phys ically attack a bortionists, nor to inflict damage on facilities wher e abortionists ply their trade.” Id. & 4.3.
PPCW is an Oregon corporation that performs abortions. PPCW was a plaintiff in a 1995 case in the District of Oregon, Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Wi llamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists , in which the organization and other abortion providers sued antiabortion activists (including Bray) for intimidation by threat of force under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248. A jury found the antiabor tion activists liable to the plaintiffs for $110 million. After a lengthy appellate process, see, e.g. , 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), PPCW was left with an $850,000 award against Bray.
In 2005, PPCW sought to enforce and collect on this judgment by filing an action in Bray’s home state of Ohio. In 2006, a district court issued a writ of execution authorizing the U.S. Marshals Service to seize specified property from Michael Bray. His wife then intervenedNo. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 4

in the action to assert her intere st in the property, delaying the ex ecution of the writ. On July 20, 2007, the district court r eactivated the writ.
Although not attached to the complaint in the present action, the district court took judicial notice of the writ that it had issued in the previous action. The writ provided:

This writ is for the seizure of th e following real and personal property located at the following address:
1. All real property located at 308 High Street, Wilmington, OH 45177; 2. A Compaq desktop computer in Defendant’s bedroom, along with a modem or other data transmission device, a Hewlett Packard scanner, a Hewlett Packard printer, and a facsimile machine; 3. A desktop computer located in Defendant’s study, along with a data transmission device (modem) and a ll other associated equipment; 4. Each and every other co mputer, printer, s canner, data tran smission device, and all other home office equipment; 5. An RCA-type of camcorder located in the library area of the Defendant’s residence, along with any other camera or camcorder located in the library area; 6. Two or more cameras located in th e Defendant’s bedroom, one digital and one thirty-five millimeter; 7. Any other cameras or video recordin g devices located in the residence; 8. All books located in the Defendant’s library and throughout the remainder of the house, with the ex ception of children’s entertainment and educational books and bibles. These books should incl ude any and all copies of materials written by the Defendant, both in published and unpublished form; 9. All VCR and DVD video equipment located throughout the residence, along with all televisions located throughout the residence; and 10. All stereo equipment located th roughout the residen ce, including both shelf and portable models. THEREFORE, YOU ARE COMMANDED to sell the above-described property of Defendant Michael Bray after giving the public notice of the time and place of the sale as required by law. Y ou are further commanded to make out of any other property of Defendant Michael Bray subject to execution the costs of suit and the costs of executing this writ. You shall execute this writ according to its terms and according to law.No. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 5

Bray v. Planned Parenthood Columbia Willamette, Inc ., No. 2:10-cv-054, 2011 WL 1043940, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2011). The language of this writ was ta ken verbatim from a proposed order filed by PPCW. A separate order issued the same day stated that “[i]f requested by the United States Marshal = s Service, a representative from [ PPCW] shall be present to assist in the identification of pr operty subject to seizure.”
Because the Brays understood that the seizure of their property was imminent, they had their attorney contact the U.S. Marshals Servi ce and the attorneys for PPCW (who are with the law firm of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey) to offe r assistance and cooperation to avoid a traumatic event for the Brays’ young children. The Marsha ls Service and the attorneys “responded in a spirit of professional cooperati on, but no details were discussed a bout the execution of the writ.” First Amended Compl. & 4.10. The deputy marshals allegedl y involved were Joel Kimmet, Chris Riley, and Micah Stevenson.
The Brays’ complaint describes the execution of the writ as follows:
4.11 On October 1, 2007 at approximately 10:00 a.m., with no advance notice of any kind to Mr. & Mrs. Bray or their respective counsel, Defendants Riley, Kimmet, Stevenson, one other Unite d States Marshal and one agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire arms (ATF) appeared at the Bray home with attorneys from the Squire law firm, at least two Clinton County sheriff deputies, and other unknown people. Most or all of the U.S. Marshals and the ATF agent were carrying firearms and we aring flak jackets. Defendant Riley informed Mr. Bray that the United States Marshal Service was there to seize the Bray[s’] personal property and that the Bray family had to vacate the house within 30 days. After asking Mr. Br ay if there were any guns in the house, Defendant Riley and the other marshals who were pr esent ordered Mr. Bray to remain on a sofa in the front room of the house, de nying him the right to walk about his own home and denying him the use of a telephone to call his attorney or anyone else. Eventually, Defendant Stevenson left a voi ce message at the office of Mr. Bray’s counsel that the raid was taking pl ace but by the time Mr. Bray’s counsel retrieved the voice message and [traveled] one hour to the Bray home the raid was almost completed. Both the attorney fo r the Squire law firm and the Defendant U.S. Marshals refused to identify for Mr . Bray’s counsel the numerous strangers who were present. 4.12 Meanwhile, PPCW’s attorneys and those multiple strangers were given free access to walk throughout the Bray home and yard. Confined to the sofa, Mr. Bray watched as one unide ntified male walked around carefully videotaping the inside of the Bray ho me, PPCW attorneys walked around withNo. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 6

clip boards, and others carried many boxe s of personal property out of the Bray home. The Defendants denied Mr. Bray’s request that he be permitted to verify what items were being removed from his home. 4.13 At one point Plaintiff Jayne Bray arrived home to find the Defendants and their accomplices having their way throughout the Bray home. Mrs. Bray asked Defendant Riley w hy the inside of her home was being videotaped by PPCW attorneys. Riley repl ied that the home would be taken from the Bray family in 30 days and the PPCW attorneys wanted to make sure they knew what the interior of the house looked like so that it rema ined in good order after Defendants left that day. 4.14 Shortly after 11:00 a.m., Plainti ff Beseda Bray arrived home from school and found herself guarded by a U.S. Marshal. Beseda Bray was required to leave her cell phone outside of the house and was then questioned by a U.S. Marshal when she attempted to go up to her bedroom to change her clothes. Defendants’ treatment of Beseda Bray ma de her feel like a cr iminal in her own home. Defendants’ display of firearms and their oppr essive behavior throughout the Bray home made Beseda fearful for he rself and for her parents and led her to weep during the ordeal. 4.14 At 12:30 p.m. Plaintiff Persever ance (“Persie”) Bray arrived home from school and was confronted by a U.S. Marshal telling her that she could not go anywhere in the house. She was required to have an escort to go to the kitchen for lunch and lost her appeti te for lunch as a U.S. Mars hal kept watch over her. Persie Bray therefore took some water and elected to flee the house to walk on foot around the neighborhood rather than staying in the presence of the intimidating, armed federal agents. Like her sister Beseda, Persie Bray was made to feel like a criminal in her own home and broke down weeping as a result of what she witnessed. 4.15 At approximately 2:00 p.m. Defe ndants were prepared to leave the house with a moving truck full of boxes. They had revi ewed nearly all of the papers in the Bray home before leaving, including family photo albums. Contrary to the Writ of Execution, De fendants removed from the Bray home books that Mr. Bray used to educate his children on reli gion, history and other subjects. Because both Mr. Bray and his counsel were deliberat ely cut out of the en tire process, they were in no position to call that violati on of the writ to Defendants’ attention.
Id. && 4.11

B .15.
Later that month, a magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the Brays asserted that some of the seized property was exempt from the writ and should be returned. On November 16, 2007, the district court ordered that many of the seized items be returned to the Brays on the grounds that the materials belonged to the Bray children or to third parties, or wereNo. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 7

otherwise exempt from seizure under Ohio law. Over one and a half years later, on June 22, 2009, PPCW returned the items.
On September 29, 2009, the Brays filed suit in an Ohio state court against PPCW; Squire, Sanders & Dempsey; and Deputy U.S. Marsha ls Joel Kimmet, Chris Riley, and Micah Stevenson. The deputy marshals removed the action to the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to
the Federal Officer Removal Statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1442.
In their amended complaint, the Brays asse rted two Fourth Amendment causes of action that remain relevant at this stage of the litiga tion: an unreasonable sear ch of the Brays’ home, and an unreasonable seizure of Michael Bray. In particular, the Brays alleged that: (1) seven law enforcement officers arrived at their home; (2) most or all of them carried firearms and wore flak jackets; (3) the deputy marshals ordered Michael Bray to sit on the couch in his living room and did not allow him to leave for approximately f our hours; (4) during that time, the marshals denied Michael Bray the use of his phone to call his attorney; (5) numerous private individuals accompanied the marshals; (6) the marshals refuse d to identify those indi viduals; and (7) one of the individuals, likely a represen tative of PPCW, carried a video camera and filmed the contents
of the home.
The deputy marshals moved to dismiss the ac tion based on the alternative theories of quasi-judicial absolute immunity, qualif ied immunity, and the lack of a Bivens remedy for an unconstitutional search by U.S. Mars hals executing a writ. The dist rict court granted the motion, holding that the deputy marshals were protectedby qualified immunity and by absolute quasijudicial immunity, which “extends to persons performing tasks so in tegral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.”
Bush v. Rauch , 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). The distri ct court reasoned th at implicit in the power the magistrate judge had granted to the marshals through the writ of execution was “the authority to exercise a degree of control over bot h the property being seized, the location wherein the property is located, and, by extens ion, those present at the location.” Bray , 2011 WL 1043940, at *4. According to the court, the detent ion of Michael Bray “served reasonable and legitimate safety and operational concerns.” Id. Moreover, the court held, the writ merely ordered a representative of PPCW to be present if requested by the marshals, and the writ did notNo. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 8

limit PPCW to one representative. Id. at *5. Finally, the court hel d, the filming of the home was both reasonable and permissible, because it capt ured a record of the condition of the property prior to its sale. Id . Following the settlement and dismissal of the Brays’ claims against PPCW and Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, the Brays appealed the judgment in favor of deputy marshals Kimmet and Riley. 1

For the reasons that follow, the marshals’ al leged actions violated the Brays’ Fourth Amendment rights, but the marshals are noneth eless protected by qua lified immunity. The Supreme Court has explicitly re cognized the permissibility of such reasoning: “defining constitutional rights and only then conferring immunity . . . is some times beneficial to clarify the legal standards governing public officials.” Camreta v. Greene , 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011).
Because the overwhelming focus of the wr it was media and communications property,
the relevant constitutional anal ysis is particularly exacting. The Fourth Amendment originated, in part, as a safeguard for free speech, see, e.g. , Stanford v. Texas , 379 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1965), and “[w]here the materials sough t to be seized may be protect ed by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with scrupulous exactitude.” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily , 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (internal quotations and citations removed); see also
Walter v. United States , 447 U.S. 649, 655 (1980); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas , 378 U.S. 205, 206–13 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant , 367 U.S. 717, 724–29 (1961).
Under a “scrupulous” application, the Fourth Amendment was violated by the detention of Michael Bray for four hours with no access to outside communicati ons while armed, flakjacketed U.S. Marshals worked with an organi zation Mr. Bray despised to seize his books and manuscripts (including books and ma nuscripts of insignificant market value) for the ostensible purpose of satisfying a debt. Re asonableness is determined by “balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment in terests against the importance of the governmental interests allege d to justify the intrusion.” Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (internal quotations and cita tions omitted). A detention or search that occurs within the

1 Micah Stevenson is no longer a party to this case. The Brays initially named Stevenson as a defendant, but he was never served with process.No. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 9

home is subject to particular scrutiny becau se, among the places and things protected by the Fourth Amendment, “the home is first among equals . At the Amendment’s very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government
intrusion.” Florida v. Jardines , 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (int ernal quotations and citations omitted).
No countervailing governmental interest jus tified the four-hour detention of Michael Bray. For one thing, the raid presented none of the operational and safety concerns that may justify seizing the occupants of a home during the executio n of a criminal warrant. See, e.g. , Los Angeles County v. Rettele , 550 U.S. 609, 614–16 (2007). Allowing Michael Bray to leave his home or to use the telephone would not have thre atened the completion of the search. Nor would an unrestrained Michael Bray have presented a safety concern. To the contrary, the marshals’ own actions belie that argument. Had the marsha ls believed that not restraining Michael Bray risked violence, they would not likely have permitted numerous representatives of PPCW to join in a surprise raid of his home.
Inviting multiple representatives from PPCW to join the search did more than undermine the argument that the marshals believed Michael Br ay to be a safety threat. In addition, the
action violated the Fourth Amendment because it exceeded the writ, which authorized only “ a representative from [PPCW]” to “b e present to assist in the iden tification of property subject to seizure.” First Amended Compl. & 4.11 (emphasis added). Contrary to this clear instruction, the marshals permitted not one, but “numerous” representa tives of the organization to join the raid.
Id. “[T]he Fourth Amendment ha s drawn a firm line at the entr ance to the house,” and a search
or seizure in the home without a warr ant is “presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York , 455 U.S. 573, 586, 590 (1980).
Adding further support to the conclusion th at the marshals’ ac tions violated the Constitution, the presence of multiple unauthorized representatives of PPCW served no valid purpose under the writ. Although the Fourth Amendment does not require that all conduct by an officer within a home be expressly authorized by a court order, it does demand that actions relate to the lawful objectives of the order. Wilson v. Layne , 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999). PPCW had noNo. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 10

articulated expertise in satisfying the ostensible purpose of the wr it, identifying valuable goods to satisfy a monetary judgment.
Moreover, because the presence of additio nal representatives of PPCW was not authorized, and because the writ made no provision for the use of a camera, it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment to permit the organizati on to film the home. A person who is not lawfully present in a home may violate the Constitution by engaging in warrantless filming of the area. The Supreme Court made clear in Wilson that the right to be present in a home does not necessarily entitle police to br ing photographers with them. Id. In this case, the unauthorized filming of the Brays’ home was particularly unreasonable because the raid was unannounced and the filming occurred within the home itself. More over, because of the loca tion and nature of the filming, the use of the camera posed a heightened risk of intimidating the family and capturing its intimate, unguarded moments.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the pl aintiffs, the marshals’ asserted actions add support to the argument that the ostensible goal of the raid (identifying valuable goods to satisfy a monetary judgment) served as a pretext for in timidating the Brays and identifying disfavored books and papers for confiscation. This inference is particularly strong in light of the writ’s focus on expressive materials of negligible market value. For example, the writ authorized the marshals to seize “all copies of materials written by [Michael Bray], both in published and unpublished form .” (Emphasis added.)
Expressive content cannot be targeted for c onfiscation, for instance under RICO, without a judicial determination that it is unlawful or ot herwise intertwined with an illegal enterprise.
See Alexander v. United States , 509 U.S. 544, 551 (1993). Similarly, when compensating the victims of a crime, it is presumptively unconstitu tional to target the profits associated with publications describing that crime. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd ., 502 U.S. 105, 115–23 (1991). Of course, the Brays have not rais ed these specific arguments. Nor have they challenged the underlying writ, the constitutionality of which we therefore do not address. Nonetheless, the Four th Amendment is not read in a vacuum, and “[a]
seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setti ng may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another kind of material.” Roaden v. Kentucky , 413 U.S. 496, 501No. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 11

(1973). In light of concerns a bout free speech and the sanctity of the home, and for the more specific reasons identified above, the marshals’ alleged actions in executing the writ were unreasonable, and they violated the Bray s’ rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Nonetheless, the officers are protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity, because these constitutional rights were not clearl y established at the time of the violations. 2 The defense of qualified immunity applies if a plainti ff fails to allege facts th at make out a violation of a constitutional right that wa s clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See
Messerschmidt v. Millender , 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012). A right is clearly established if “every reasonable officer would have understood that what he [was] doing vi olate[d] that right,” and “existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”
Reichle v. Howards , 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2013).
Because the legal and factual scenario presente d in this action is not identical to any the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court has previously addressed, the rights the marshals violated were not clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, and a reasonable officer could
have believed that his conduct wa s lawful. For one thing, the prolonged detention of Michael Bray might have been permissible in the di stinct but more common context of executing a warrant for criminal contraband. The Supreme C ourt has approved of confinement by officers of the occupants of a house to minimize the risk of bodily harm during the execution of a criminal warrant, to facilitate the orderl y completion of the search, and to prevent flight and the improper disposal of evidence. See, e.g. , Bailey v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1038–41 (2013). The right to detain in the somewh at analogous, albeit different, case of a search for contraband, is “categorical,” with no relationship to the “quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.” Michigan v. Summers , 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981).
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has ques tioned whether detention is permissible
in the context of a search for evidence other than contraband, see id. at 705 n. 20, the Court has
not examined the Fourth Amendmen t implications of a search or a seizure under a civil writ of

2 We need not reach the question of absolute quasi-judicial immunity.No. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 12

execution. It is true, though, that our court has held in the civil judgment enforcement context that absolute quasi-judicial immunity may apply if detention is specifically authorized in a valid
court order. See Cooper v. Parish , 203 F.3d 937, 943, 948–49 (6th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, in the absence of specific guidance to the contrar y, a reasonable officer could have interpreted existing precedent to permit th e detention of Michael Bray.
The marshals might also reasonably have beli eved that it was acceptable to invite additional representatives of PPCW to join the raid, because outside involvement in the
execution of a court order is sometime s permissible. For example, in United States v. Clouston , 623 F.2d 485, 486–87 (6th Cir. 1980), this circuit a pproved assistance by a telephone company’s employees in the execution of a warrant related to wiretapping, partly because the employees were present to aid in the iden tification of electronic devices covered by the warrant. Although
here the writ of execution identified the number of PPCW repres entatives who were authorized to be present, a marshal might nonetheless have concluded that it was permissible to invite additional representatives of PPCW to execute th e writ, because officers may sometimes seek the aid of third parties in executing court orders. Furthe r buttressing this conc lusion, the marshals’ actions in seeking outside assistan ce were distinct from those in which this circuit has recognized a possible constitutional violation. For example, th e marshals did not invite private individuals to join them after they had already completed a search au thorized by a warrant, as occurred in
Bills v. Aseltine , 958 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1992).

An officer who was unaware that the addi tional representatives of PPCW were not authorized to be present might also have reasona bly concluded that the i ndividuals could film the
home. Other circuits have a ssumed without deciding that vide otaping the execution of a valid
search warrant is lawful. See, e.g. , Marks v. Clarke , 102 F.3d 1012, 1033 n. 37 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, several circuits have held that warr antless filming does not violate the Constitution if the cameramen are authorized to be present in the home. See United States v. Wahchumwah , 710 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brathwaite , 458 F.3d 376, 380–81 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Davis , 326 F.3d 361, 366 (2d Cir. 2003). Although here the cameraman was not authorized to be present in the Brays’ home, reasonable officers who were mistaken about the lawfulness of inviting additional representatives of PPCW to join the raid mightNo. 12-4476, Bray v. Planned Parenthood, et al. Page 13

likewise have been mistaken about whether those representatives could film the home, particularly in light of the camera’s utility in capturing the condition of the property prior to its sale. Therefore, the rights the marshals breached were not clearly established at the time of the
violations.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.