R-445 

RNEY GENE 

PRICE DANIEL 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

Honorable Perry 

County Attorney 

Travis 6%tnty 

Austin, Tsrae 

F EXAS 

June 12, 1947 

Lr Jones Opfnion No, v-250 

R8l Loeal option status of 

Gammon Sc?$aol Dlatricrt 

~0~ 43 w 00ntaima lin 

JufstSal?is' Prsolmts NQSp 

6 end 0 in Travla Cowatrr 

Deer Mro Jonest 
Honorable Perry L. Jones, Page 2 

"On March 25, 1939, in a local 

option election Justice Precinct No. 

5 voted WET, permitting the sale of 

all alcoholic beverages. 

"On October 24, 1946, in a local 

option election, Justice Precinct No. 

6 voted against sale of all alcoholic 

beverages. 

"On November 16, 1946, in a local 

option election, Justice Precinct No. 

5, voted WET. 

"You will note there has not been a local 

option election in the original Common Sohool 

District No. 43, St. Elao and Longview Consolid$efg;;hools since it was voted DRY on January 

In view or this fact and under the 

Suireme r!!ourt'e holding in the case of HOUCHINS 

VS. PLAINOS, ET AL.,, 110 S.W. (2d) 549, is the 

Common School District No. 43 dry until an election is held in the exact saae area that originally voted DRY? Or, did that part of Common 

School District No. 43 situated in Justice 

Precinct No. 5 become 'wet area' when Justice 

Precinct No. 5 became 'wet area'?" 

We assume throughout this opinion that all elections set forth in your letter were held in accordance with all statutory and constitutional provisions 

in efiect at the time of the elections, and that such 

elections were valid in all respects, 

The authority under which the 1918 election in 

Common School District No. 43 was held was Article XVI, 

Section 20 of the Constitution of Texas as amended in 

1891, and as quoted below: 

"The legislature shall at its first session 

enact e law whereby the qualified voters of any 

county, justice's precinct, town, city (or such 

subdivision of' a county as may be designated by 

the commissionerss court of said county) may by 

e majority vote determine from time to time 

whether the sale of intoxicating liquors shall 

be prahibited .withFn the prescribed Ifruits." 

Article XVI, Section 20 of the Texas Constitution 

as adopted in 1891 and as quoted above remained unchanged un- 

. 

Hmorable Perry L, Jonesp Page 4 
. 
Honorable Perry L. Jones, Page 6 

the State of Texas and in force at the time of 

the taking effect of Section 20, Article XVI . 

of the Constitution of Texas, it shall oontinue 

to be unlawful to manufacture, sell, barter or 

exchange in any such county, justice’s precinct’ 

or incorporated town or oity, any spirituous 

vinous or malt liauors or medicated bitters canable of producing -intoxication or any other intoxicants whatsoever, for beverage purposes, unless and until a majority of the.quali.fied voters 

in such county or .politi&al subdivision thereof 

votinu in an election held for such ouroose shall 

determine such to be lawful;. provided that this 

subsection shall not .prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages~ containing not more than 3.2 per 

cent alcohol by weight in cities, counties or- politioal subdivisions thereof in which the qualified 

voters have voted. to leaallze such sale under the 

provisions of Chapter 1x6, A&s of the Regular 

Session of the 43rd Legislature.” (Emphasis added). 

This constitutional provision is the one now in 

effect in this state, and the one, under which the question 

presented by you must. be decided. The effect of this repeal amendment is to legalize the sale of intoxicating 

liquors anywhere in Texas except in those specific areas 

named in subsection (c) which had voted to prohibit the 

sale of intoxicating liquors prior to the bakiw effect 

OS Section 20 of Article XVI. In support of this contention we quote again from the Houchins case, supra: 

“By the terms of this amendment, the entire 

State, as such is again made wet as to all intoxicating liquors; but with certain exceptions 

and limitations. In effect, this amendment contains provisions which make any county, justice’s 

precinct, or city, or town, dry whioh was dry at 

the time it became effective. In other words, 

this amendment preserves the status quo as to dry 

areas as ther existed at the time .it became effective. It-therefore preserved as dry any county, j ustice’s oreoinct, or city, or town, which 

was dry when it went into effect.* (Emphasis 

added. ) 

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, (the expression of one thing is exclusive of another) , it is ours opinion that, any subdivision not a county, justice’s precinot, or ~a11 inoorporated town or aity 

at the time it voted “dry” was not preserved as a ndryn 

area by this section of the Constitution. We are aware 
Honorable Perry L. Jones, Page 7 

that in the latter part 0r subseotion (0) after the specific enumeration of counties, justice's preancts, and 

incorporated towns and cities this language fs used: 

"in such county or politioal subdlvlsionw and woltles, 

counties, or political subdivisions thereof.' However, 

we think it clear that the words upolltloal subdivision* 

refer to those political subdivisions specifically set 

forth in the first part of subeeotion (o), namely oounties, justice9 precincts and incorporated towns ati 

cities. The Supreme Court of Texas inthe.language already quoted interpreting the 1933 provision construed 

the words npolltloal subdivision* as lnoluding the ar8a 

of any justice's precinct, or town, or.oitg. Such a 

contention is further supported by the dootrine of eju%- 

dem generis, to the effect that when general words follow specific words in an enumeration, the general words 

are construed to embrace only objeots slmiIar in nature 

to those.objects enumerated by the preceding specific 

words. 

That the Legislature interpreted the oonatita- . 

tional provision as preserving the dry status only in 

counties,, justioe's pracinots and inoorporated oities 

.or towns which had VOt8d dry prior to 1919, is shown in 

two provisions 0r the Texas Liquor Control Bat. 

Artlole 1, Section 23,of the Texas Liquor Control Act, codified as Arti 666-23 Of V8rnOn'%. Penal 

Code, .reads in part 'as follows: 

"Whenever th8 term *dry area' Is used in 

this Aot,.it shall mean and refer to all oounties, jostlce'precincts, inoOrpOrat8d cities 

or towns wherein'the sale of alooholio b8V8rages,'had been prohibited by valid local option 

elections held under the laws of the State in 

force at then time of the taking effect of geo- 

'tion 20, Article XVI, Constitution of Texas in 

the year 1919." 

Article 2, Seotion 2 of the abOV8 Act, oodified 

as Article 66~7-2 of Vernon's Penal Code, 1% in'part as 

r 0110ws: 

"It shall continue to be unlawful to manufacture, sell, barter or eXChalIg8 in any county, 

justice precinct, or inoorporated city or town 

any beer exoept in counties, justiae precinots, 

or incorporated cities or towns wherein the 

voters thereof had not adopted prohibition by 
I >. .,.. ‘, 

:>,. :’ .Y 

Honorable Perry L. Jones, Page 8 

local option elections held under the laws of 

. . . . . - the State of T8xa% and in,force at tne time or 

taking effect of Section 20, Article 16 of the 

Constitution of T8xasin'lQlQ; . . ." 

Both the constitutional provision of 1935 and 

the legislative interpretation of that provision as contained in the above quoted language of the Texas Liquor 

Control Act contains no language which could possibly 

be construed as preserving the Idry" status of a common 

school district.. Wa have carefully considered the language in the Houohins case to the effect that when an 

area voted dry it'remained dry until it was voted w8t 

at a subsequent election held in and for the same identical area which,.had theretofore voted ndry". How8v8r, 

in the Houchins case the subdivision considered was an 

area which had originally,voted "d.ry9" as.811 incorporated 

city and later dissolved its corporate existence and 

was aM8Xed t0 a "W8t".Oity. W8 think the language Of 

the Houohins case insofar a% It lays down a requirement 

for an election in the same identical area which had originally vote ?dryw is restrioted to the areas originally voting P "dry" as count s, 

incorporated towns 

justice's precinct% or 

It is, therefore, the opinion 0s this depaX'tm8nt 

that Article XVI, Section 20 88, adopted in.1919 abolished 

all local option area% in Texas, and that the repeal amend 

ment of 1935, now in effeot,.preserved only those areas 

as "dry" which had voted ndryw prior to 1919 a% a county~, 

justice’s precinct or as an incorporated town or city. 

Since Common School Distriot No. 43 did not vote in 1918 

as one of the subdivis1,on.s speoifically mentioned, th8 

area embraced within it% original boundaries must depend 

for its local option status on the ooMty, the justice's 

preoinot or the incorporated city or town in which it is 

located. Since you have stated in your request that Justice Precinct No.,,6 whioh Includes the East St. Blmo box 

and has in its last election voted against the sale of 

all alcohloic beverages we are of the opinion that East 

St. Elmo is a "dry" area. You have also stated that Justice Precinct No. 5 which includes the West St. Elmo box 

has in its last election voted to legalize the sale of 

intoxicating liquors. We are, therefore, of the opinion 

that West St. Elmo is a "wet" area. 

1. Article.XVI, Section 20, of the Texas Con- 
Honorable Perry L. Jones, Page 9 

stitution as adopted in 1935 and now in effect 

did not preserve Coamon School District No. 43 as 

a "dry* area. This constitutional provision preserved as "dry" only those areas which had voted 

ndryfr prior to 1919 as a county, justhess precinct, or as an incorporated town or city, 

2, East St. Elno is a *dryH area by vfrtue of the fact that Justice Precinct No, 6, 

of which it is a part, is "dry". 

3. West St. Elmo is a Rwetn area by 

virtue of the fact that Justice Precinct No, 

5, of which it is a part, is "wet." 

Yours very truly 

ATTORNEYGENERAL OFTEXAS 

APPROVED 

gL/ aGiLq 

ATTORNEY GEI'IERAL 

CYM/Jbk:jrb