NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 09a0575n.06 No. 08-5912 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT Doris A. Poe, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,

v. C o m m i s s i o n e r

o f S o c i a l S e c ur i ty, Def endant- Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

Be for e : KEITH , C LA Y, and G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-App el l an t Doris Ann Poe (“ Poe”) a ppeals the district court’s de cision aff

irming the Commi ssioner of Social Sec urity ’s (“ Commi ssioner”) denial of Poe’ s application for disability insurance and supplemental secur ity income (“ SSI ”) be nefits. Poe ar g ues that: (1) the Administrative L aw Judge (“A L J ”) e rre d in failing to give con t rolling w eig ht to the opinion of her treating phy sician; and (2) the AL J ’s deter mination that Poe is c apable of doingother work is not supported by

substantial evidence . In addition, Poe contends that the district cour t erre d by substi t u t i n g i ts own “re vised rationale ” to uphold the dec ision of the Commi ssioner. F or the

re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

. I. Poe was born on Marc h 9, 1955. She attended high school up to the ninth gr ade, a nd later obtained a g ener al equivale ncy diploma ( GE D)

. Fo r approximately 25 y ear s, Poe worked a s an operator in a fa ctory

that manufa cture s rubber extrusion us ed to sea l car windows. The job re quiredNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 2

The issue promptingthe re mand was that many of the positions i dentified by the vocational 1 expert at the Jul y

21, 2004 hear ing had a specific voc ational pre paration level highe r than a llowed by the AL J ’s hy

pothetical question. Poe to run machine s and punch pr esses, p ac kag e the f inished parts in box es, and lift boxes that weig hed betwe en fifty

and seve nt y p o u n ds. Poe’s employ ment at the fa ctory

ended on or

around Ap r i l 1 , 2 0 0 3 , f

o r r e a s o n s r e l a t e d

t o h e r a l l e g e d d i s a b i l i ty. Poe a pp lie d f or dis a bil ity ins ur anc e and

SSI be ne fi ts o n Ap ri l 18 , 20 03 , a lle g ingdis a bil ity as of Apr il 1, 2003. Specifically , Poe alleg ed t h at s h e co u l d not lift box es and ke ep up with her production quota due to phy sical disabilities, including he r left hip “g iv[ ing] out,” pain in her lower back, an d nu mb n e s s in h e r h an d s an d f e e t, c a u s in g h e r s u c h s tr e s s th a t s h e w o u ld c r y . A f te r her

a p p l i c a t i o nw a s d e n i e d

i n i t i a l l y an d o nr e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , P o e r e qu e s t e d a h e a ri ng be f

o r e anA L J, which was held on J uly 21, 2004. On J uly 30, 2004, the AL J issued an unfa vorable decision, finding that Poe was not disabled. On January 21, 2005, the Appea ls C o u n ci l denied Poe’ s reque st for revie w. Poe appe aled the A L J ’s dec ision to t he district cour t and, on Marc h 2 9 , 2006, the cour t issued an orde r re versingthe AL J ’s deter mination and rema

nding the matter to the Commissioner for f urther c onsiderati o n . Sp e c if ic ally , the district court found that there w as not substantial evidenc e to s up po rt the AL J’s d e c isi on

in lig ht of the AL J’s re lia nc e on the te sti mony

of a vo c a tio na l e xpe rt , which conf

licted with information in the Dictionar y of Oc cupational Titles (“ DOT” ). See P oe v. 1 Ba rn ha rt , No. 05-CV-48- J BC (E.D . Ky . Mar. 29, 2006) (“ Poe I ”). In acc ordanc e with the district cour t’s rema nd, a sec ond hear ing w as held be fore the AL J on J uly 31, 2006. On Dec ember 1, 2006, the AL J once a g ain issued an unf avora ble dec ision, finding that Po e wa s not dis a

ble d. On June 12 , 200 7, the Ap pe a ls Counc il i ssu e d it s d e c isi on , d e c lin ingtoNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 3 assume jurisdiction, there by rende ringthe AL J ’s Dec ember 1, 2006 deter mination the final dec ision of the Commissioner. Poe appea led the AL J ’s sec ond denial to the district cour t and, on May 21, 2008, the cour t issued an order and opinion a ffirming the AL J ’s deter mination. See P oe v. A strue , No. 07-CV-253- GWU, 2008 WL 2151999, at *3 (E.D. K y . May 21, 2008) (“

Poe II ”). Poe fi le d a

tim e ly a pp e a l w ith this Court. II. A. Re le v an t M

e dic al H istor y In 2002, afte r complainingof ting lin g an dweakness in both hands, and discomfor t in her lower ba ck, Poe wa s ref

err ed to a neurolog ist, Dr

. Wil liam Blake . On September 3, 2002, Dr. B lake pe rf or me d a ne rv e c on du c tio n stu dy on Poe , w hic h s ho we d e vid e nc e of mil d c arp a l tunn e l sy

nd ro me in both ha nds. He order ed lower back x -ra y s and treated Poe with wrist splints. On March 1, 2003,

a se c on d ne rv e c on du c tio n stud y pe rf or me d on Poe by Dr . Bl ake sh ow e d sig ns of imp ro ve me nt i n both hands. On J uly 31, 2003, Dr. Micha el A. B oy d, Poe’s treating phy sician, pre sented medic al re cords to the Commi ssioner desc ribing hi s t re at m en t o f Poe fr om J une 28, 2001 throug h J uly 24, 2003. Acc ording to Dr. Boyd’s records, P oe complained of right s houlder pain on November 23, 2001, but maintained a full rang e of motion with slight tender ness. Howeve r, durin g t wo s u b s equent examinations, on Decembe r 5, 2001 and on September 11, 2002, Poe did not complain of shoulder , ba c k, wr ist

or ha nd pa in. On Se pte mbe r 2 0, 20 02 , Po e vis ite d D r. B oyd to ob ta in a tub e rc ulo sis te st beca use she wa s prepa

ringto set up a day

car e ce nter. In his report de tailing Poe’ s September 20,No. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 4 2002 visit, Dr. Boyd discussed the re sults of the lower back x -ra y s order ed by Dr. B lake a nd noted that Poe appea

red to be “doingquite well.” On Novembe r 25, 2002, Poe complaine d of t ender ness and muscle spasms in her nec k, but exhibi ted no sig ns or complaints of numbness or ting ling. Additionally , Dr. B oy d found no evide nce of abnor malities in P oe’s e x tremities. On t hree subsequent visits to Dr. Boyd (De cembe r 8, 2002, Janu ary 29 , 2 00 3, and

Marc h 1 2, 20 03 ), Poe ma de no men ti on of te nd e rn e ss o r m us c le sp a sms . DuringPoe’s Marc h 12, 2003 visit wit h Dr. B oy d she complaine d of l ower abdominal pain, but was not suffer ing f

rom bac k pain. On J une 17, 2003, Poe complaine d of numbness in he r hands, which Dr. Boyd opined was “proba bly car pal tunnel.” Following an examination of Poe on J uly 3, 2003, Dr. B oy d noted, “[Poe] said she has not be en able to work since April and the rea l pr oblem is that she has g one ahe ad and fi le d d isa bil ity

. . . . Ita lke d to he r a bo ut t he a pp lic a tio n f

or dis a bil ity . I did n’ t th ink sh e wa s r e a lly

a ca ndidate at this point in ti me.” On September

4, 2003, Poe was refe rre d for c onsultation with a rheumatolog ist, Dr. Manoj Ko hli . Ac c or din g to Dr . Koh li, Poe ma int a ine d a g oo d rang e of mov e me nt i n h e r s ho uld e rs , e lbo ws , wrists, fing ers, hips, knee s, and ankle s. Dr. Kohli’s assessment of Poe indicated she suffe red f rom fi br omya lg ia , d e pr e ssi on , s le e p d y sf un c tio n, and mil d c arp a l tunne l sy nd ro me . He pr e sc ri be d d a ily str e tc hin g and a e ro bic e xer c ise s. On Oc tob e r 3 0, 20 03 , D r. Ko hli no te d a n o ve ra ll i mpr ov e me nt i n Poe’s condition, as a r esult of phy sical thera py and the use of wrist splints. An MRIof the cer

vical spine perf

ormed on Poe on Fe bruar

y 19, 2004, reve aled “ multi-level deg ener ative cha

ng es . . . lea ding to mild spi nal ca nal stenosis at the C5-6 and the C6-7 ” ver tebra e.No. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 5 As a re su lt, Dr . B oyd r e fe rr e d Po e to D r. B re tt Sc ott fo r a ne ur olo g ic a l e va luatio n. Duri nghe r v isi t with Dr. Scott, on April 10, 2004, Poe complai n ed o f n ec k pain ra diating into the shoulder s. Dr. Scott noted, however , that Poe “does not re ally have a ny arm p ai n , weakness or numbness.” Dr. Scott recommende d rang e-of -motion ex erc ises for the ne ck. On Fe bruar y 22, 2005, Dr. Scott noted

a de c re a se d r ang e of

mot ion in P oe ’s ne c k, a s c omp are d to his Ap ri l 20 04 e xami natio n. Dr . Sc ott also observe d a “f

rozen” left shoulder, which Poe could not a bduct more than nine ty

deg ree s without experiencing some pain. Howeve r, Dr. Scott noted that Poe’s rig ht shoulde r was normal; that she

ma int a ine d a

no rm a l g a it a

nd c oo rd inatio n; a

nd tha t sh e ha d n or

ma l re fl e xes in he r b ic e ps , tr ic e ps , knees, a nd ankles, a s well as n o rm al s treng th and sensation in her arms and le g s. I n his final examination of Poe, on March 18, 2005, D r. Scott noted no cha ng e in Poe’s condition. On May 11, 2005, Dr. Char lotte Harr is perfor med surg ery

on Poe to “d ec o m press he r left

car pal tunnel.” On Ma

y 20, 2005, Dr. Ha

rris noted that the “numbness and burningin [ Poe’s] hand is dramatica lly

better.” Howeve r, on June 17, 2005, Poe returned to Dr. Har ris complaining of signific ant shoulder pain. An x-ray reve aled “ minimal AC spurring a nd hook[i ng ]” in the AC joint

o f P o e ’ s l e f ts h o u l d e r . C o n s e qu e n t l y, D r . H ar r i s r e c o m m e n d e d

a c o ur s e o f p h ys i c a l th e r a

p y. On August 24, 2006, Dr. B oy d completed a questionnaire de signe d to a ssess Poe’s phy sical abilities a nd limit ations. Dr. Boyd stated that his f indings wer e based on a ph y s i ca l ex ami nation. Howeve r, Poe did not submit a re cord of such examination. I n his findings, Dr . Boyd stated that Poe could lift no more than ten pounds, nor could she stand or walk more than two hours in an eig ht-hour workda y . He f urther stated that Poe was c apable of fr equent ba lancing as well as occa sionalNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 6 stooping, c r o u c h in g , kn e e li n g , an d c li mb in g , b u t n o c r aw li n g . F in a ll y , D r . B o y d n o te d th a t P o e ’s ability to rea ch, pull, handle, f

inge r, fe el, and push we re a ll lim ited. B. The

ALJ He aring At her J ul y 20 06 hear ing , in a dd iti on to t e sti fy ingthat sh e vo luntari ly

le ft he r j ob in A

pr il 2003 beca

use of ba ck proble ms which prec luded her from lifting , Poe testified that she suff ere d difficulties and e x perie nced pa in and other sy mptoms associated with her ne ck, l ef t s h o u lder, lef

t hip, left leg , elbows, fe et, hands, a nd fing ers, as well as car

pal tunnel sy

ndrome, for

which she w ore splints at night. She also noted that she wa s taking medication for her ne rves, but had stoppe d

a t t e n d i n g p h ys i c a l th e r a

p y. P o e f urth e r t e s t i f

i e d th a t s i n c e s h e s t o p p e d w o r k i n g , s h e s p e n d s h e r

d ays taking car e of he r six -y ear -old daug hter, includingmaking her f ood, helping her g et dre ssed, washing clothes, and groce ry

shopping. In addition to her own testim ony , Poe prese nted extensive medical re cords whic h confirme d that she had c arpa l tunnel sy ndrome a nd mild im pinge ment sy

ndrome in her left shoulder, a history of rig ht shoulder pain, a diagnosis of fibromy alg ia by a rhe umatologist, and a

diag nosis of depre ssion by a ps y c hiatr ist . Po e a lso pr e se nte d a fu nc tio na l c a

pa c ity a sses sme nt b y

he r t re a tin g fa mil y phy sician, Dr. B oy d, which esse ntially limit ed Poe to less than full-time sitting o r s t an d i ng . In a written statement, Dr . Boyd noted that his “finding s are subjective ba sed on phy sical exam and interview w ith patient” and that “ should objective finding s be nec essar y , [I ] recommend [ a] work ha rd e nin g e va luatio n. ” Ul tim a te ly , th e AL J a ff or de d Dr . Bo y d’ s o pin ion “ little we ig ht” be c a

us e it was “ based upon [Poe’s] subjective complaints without the benefit of obje ctive data .”No. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 7 Poe pr e se nte d o the r e vid e nc e of fu nc tio na l re str ic tio ns fr om s tate a g e nc y re vie wi ngso ur c e s. On J une 8, 2003, Dr. Carlos Her nandez, a state ag ency medical consultant, revie wed the r ecor d and conclude d that Poe could lift and ca rry fifty pounds occa sionally , twenty -five pounds f reque ntly , and sit, stand, and wa lk for up to six hours in an eig ht-hour wor k day . Dr. He rnande z also li mited Poe to n o mo re tha

n f reque nt b ilate ra l ha

nd lin g , a nd re c omm e nd e d th a t Po e avo id e ve n mo de rate exposure to vibratory

tools. On Aug ust 13, 2003, a second state ag ency medi ca l consultant, Dr. Jame s Ra msey , r e vie we d th e re c or d a nd re a c he d th e same c on c lus ion a s D r. He rn and e z. T he se fi n d i n gs by

Dr. He rnande z and Dr. Ramsey wer e consistent, albe it less restrictive, than the AL J ’s ultimate finding. At Po e ’ s Ju ly

2 0 0 6 a dmi n is tr a ti v e h e ar in g , th e A L J f o un d th a t P o e in d e e d

s u f f e r e d f r om

“ se ve re imp a ir

me nts ,” inc lud ing , “c hr on ic ne c k an d low ba c k pa in due to d e g e ne rativ e dis c dis e a se of the c ervic al and lumber spine with arthritis of the fa cet joints; mil d bilatera l car pal tunnel sy ndrome; g astroesoph ag eal r eflux disease; biliary dy skinesua; multiple arthralg ias, rule out fibromy al gi a; and de pression.” H oweve r, the AL J deter mined that althoug h Poe had “se vere impairments,” her

claims reg ardingher limit ations were “not entire ly cre dible” and f

ound that Poe reta ined the re sidual functional ca pacity to per fo rm a signific ant number of jobs ex isting in the national ec onomy . At the conc lusion of the hear i n g, the AL J asked the vocational e x pert to consider a hy pothetical individual with the residual f unctional capacity attributed t o Poe in the AL J ’s dec ision. Spe c if ic a lly , th e AL J ask e d th e vo c a tio na l e xpe rt wh e the r a

pe rs on of Poe ’sNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 8

This purported DO T entry , cited by the vocational expert in his t estimony at Poe’s Jul y

21, 2 2004 administrative h ea ri ng , and cited a g ain by the AL J in the subsequent unfa vorable decision issued on Dec ember 1, 2006, does not exis t in the DOT. Accor dingly , the Commiss ioner c oncede d befor e the district cour

t that this j ob should not be consi dere d in determining whether the AL J ’s decision wa s supported by substantial evidence

. Poe II , 2008 WL 2151999, at *5

. ag e, educ ation, and work e x perie nce c ould perfor m jobs if she were capa

ble of e ither light or se dentar

y exertion, and also had the following non-exertional restric tions: (1) could not climb ladder s, ropes, or scaf folds; (2) could not work with her ha nds above shoulder level; (3) could occa sionally flex a nd extend he r wrists, perf

orm occ asional ha nd lin g or g ri pp ing , an d oc c a sio na l push ing and pu lli ng wi th h e r u pp e r e xtre mit ie s; (4) c ould have no e x posure to conc entrated v ibration or vibratory hand tools; (5) could occ asionally

bend, twist, or cr awl; and ( 6) re quired simple work w ith repetitive proce dures, no f

reque nt chang es in work r outines, and no fast-pa ced assembly lines or rig id production schedule s. Th e vo c a tio na l e xpe rt

re sp on de d th a t w hil e su c h p e rs on c ou ld not pe rf

or m any of Poe ’s pa st

re le va nt w or k, the re we re job s h e or

sh e c ou ld p e rf

or m – “ba si cal ly

e ntr y le ve l, l owstr e ss j ob s” wher e ther e we re “ no fre quent cha ng es in work routine[,] [] no rig id production schedule s[,] and no fast-pa ced a ssembly

line work activities.” Specifica lly , the vocational expert testified that such an individual could perfor

m the following occupations as defined in the DOT: (1) counter c lerk (lig ht exertion level, DOT code 249.366-010); (2) monitor (light duty job, DOT code 372.667-040 ); (3) 2 surveillance secur ity

monitor (sedenta

ry job, DOT code 379.367-010) ; (4) attendant-re lated job (lig ht in exertion, DOT code 349.677-018); (5) usher ( light in exertion, DOT Code 344.677-014) ; and (6) machine te nding jobs (lig ht in ex ertion, DOT c ode 728.685-010)

. III . Judic ia l re vie w of the Commis sio ne r’ s dec isi on that a c la ima nt i s n ot d isa

ble d is lim ite d to deter mining whe ther the A L J applied the corr ect leg al standard in r eac hing his de cision and whe ther such dete rmination is supported by substantial evidence in the rec ord as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405No. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 9 (g ); Jones v . Comm’r of

Soc. Sec

. , 336 F.3d 469, 475 ( 6th Cir. 2003). We reviewthe district court’s leg al conc lusion that the AL J ’s dec ision was supported by substantial evidence de novo

. Valley v

. Comm’r of Soc. Se c. , 427 F.3d 388, 390 ( 6th Cir. 2005). “Substantial evidenc e exists when a ‘re asonable mind might acc ept’ the r eleva nt evidence ‘as adequate to support a conc lusion.’” W arner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 375 F.3d 387, 390 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kir

k v . S e c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 667 F.2d 524, 535 ( 6th Cir. 1981)). The Court must defer to the Commissioner’s dec ision “eve n if there is substantial evidence in the rec ord that would hav e s u pported a n opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidenc e supports the conclusion rea ched by

the AL J .” Key v . Callahan , 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the AL J ’s dec ision, thi s Court “[does] not try the ca se de novo , resolve conflicts in e vidence , or decide questions of cre dibilit y .” Bass v. Mc

Mahon , 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). IV. Poe raises thre e issues on appe al. She argues: (1) the AL J err ed in his determination of he r residual f unctional ca

pacity by failingto acc ord t h e p ro p er weight to the opinion of her tr eating phy sic ian and by a c tin g a s his ow n me dic a l e xpe rt in re nd e ri ng a re sid ua l fu nct io nal capacity assessment without proper consideration of the medica l opinions o f record; (2) the AL J ’s de te rm inatio n th a t Po e c an ma ke an a dju stm e nt t o o the r w or k ava ila ble in the natio na l e c on omy is

no t su pp or te d by su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e in l ig ht o f t he vo c a tio na l e xpe rt ’s te sti mony and “ fa ta l f laws ” in some of th e v o c a ti o n a l e v id e n c e ; a n d ( 3 ) th e d is tr ic t c o urt e n g a g e d in p r o h ib it e d

p o s t hocNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 10 rationalization, there by

aff irming the AL J ’s deter

mination for re asons not contained in the administrative dec ision. The So c ia l S e c ur it

y A c t d e f in e s d is a b il it y a s th e in a

b il it y “ to e n g a g e in

an y s u bstantial g ainful ac tivity

by rea son of any

medically

deter minable phy sical or menta l impairment which ca n be expected to r esult in death or which has lasted or c an be e x pecte d to last for a c ontinuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (A). An ind ivi du a l sh a ll b e de te rm ine d to be un de r a dis a bil ity on ly if his phy sic a l o r m e n t a l i mp a i r

m e n to r i mp a i r m e n t s ar e o f

s u c hs e v e r i ty th a th e i s n o to n l y unable to do his previous wor k but cannot, conside ring his ag e, educ ation, and wor k experience , eng ag e in any other kind of substantial g ainful work which exists i n the national ec onomy . 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)( A). To deter mine if a c laimant is disabled within the me aning of the Act, the A L J must follow

a fi ve -s te p a

na ly sis , a s se t f

or th i n 2 0 C. F .R. § 4 04 .1 52 0. Pur su ant t o th e fi ve -s te p in qu ir y : (1) A claimant who is e ng ag ing in substantial g ainful ac tivity will not be found to be disabled re g ardle ss of medica l findings. (2) A claimant who doe s not have a sever e impairment will not be found to be disabled. (3 ) A f

ind ingof dis a bil ity wi ll b e ma de wi tho ut c on sid e ratio n o f v oc a tio na l fa c tor s, if a c la ima nt i s n ot w or

kin g and is s uf fe ri ngfr om a

se ve re imp a ir

me nt which mee ts the duration re quirement a nd which mee ts or equals a listed imp a ir me nt i n App e nd ix 1 to Sub pa rt P of the Re g ulatio ns . Cl a ima nts with lesser impairments proc eed to step f our. (4 ) A c la ima

nt who c an p e rf

or m w or k th a t he ha s d on e in t

he pa st w ill no t be found to be disabled. (5) I f a c laimant cannot pe rfor m his past work, other f

actor s including a g e, education, past work experienc e and r esidual func tional capa city must beNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 11 considere d to determine if othe r work c an be pe rfor med. Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 5 0 2 F. 3 d 5 3 2 , 5 3 9 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g W yatt v. Sec’

y of H ealth & Hu ma n S e rv s. , 974 F.2d 680, 683- 84 (6th Cir. 1992)). The c laimant bear s the burden of proof at steps one through four. W arner , 375 F.3d at 390. At step five, howe ver, the burden shifts to the Commissi oner to identif y “a sig nificant number

of jobs in the economy

that acc ommodate the cla imant’s residual f unctional ca

pacity (dete rmined at step four) and vocational profile.” Jones , 336 F.3d at 474. In the instant a ppeal, it is undisputed that Poe can no long er pe rfor

m he r past work. Thus, this Court’s analy sis center s on whether substantial evidenc e supports the AL J ’s deter mination th at, based on Poe’s residua l functional ca pacity , ag e, education, and work e x perie nce, she can make an adjustment to other work available in the national economy . See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4)( v), 416.920(a )(4) (v). A. Re

sid ual Func tio nal

Cap ac ity Residual functional c apac ity is defined a s the most a claimant ca n still do despite the phy sical and mental limitations resulting fr om her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a) , 416.945(a)

. In th e ins tant m a tte r, th e AL J deter min e d th a t w hil e Poe ha d “ se ve re imp a ir me nts ,” he r c la ims reg ardin g h er

l i m i t at i o n s we re “n o ten t i re l y cr ed i b l e, ” a n d

th at , ac co rd i n gl y , P oe’s r esidual func tional

c a pa c ity do e s n ot p re c lud e he r f

ro m pe rf or min g : lig ht o r s e de nta

ry wo rk wi th n o c lim

bin g of ro pe s, la dd e rs or

sc a ff old s; n o wo rk

wi th hands above shoulder leve l; occasiona l flexi on or extension of the wrists; occa sional handling or g ripping ; occa sional pushing/pulling wi th the upper e x tremities; no ex p o s ure t o co n ce n tra t edv i b ra t i o no r v i b ra t i n g h an d t o o l s ; o cc as i o n al l y

b en d i n g, twisting, stooping or

cra wling; r equire s simple w ork with repe titive procedur es; no fre quent cha

ng es in work r outines; no fast-pac ed asse mbly lines or rig id production schedule s.No. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 12 Poe argues that the AL J ’s re sidual functional ca pacity deter mination is n ot supported by

su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e be c a

us e the A L J fa ile d to a c c or d p ro pe r w e ig ht t o D r. B oyd’ s o pin ion , in violation of the “tre ating phy sician” r ule set for th in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b) and 416.927(b). Poe cont e n d s th a t t

h e A L J in s te a d

a c te d a s h is o w nme d ic a l e xp e rt, th e r e b y r e n d e r in g a

r e s idual f un c ti o n a l c a

p a c it y finding w it

h o u t p r o p e r ly

c o n s id e r in g th e me d ic a l o p in io n s o f r e c o r d

. We disag ree . Pursuant to the Social Secur ity regulations, the AL J is require d to evaluate ever y medical opinion and consider the following non-exhaustive fac tors in decidingwhat we ight to g ive ea ch opinion: ex amining r ela t i o n s h i p , treatment relationship, the extent to which medical sig ns and laboratory

finding s support the opinion, the consistency of t he opini on with the record as a whole, and the spe cialization of the doctor rende ring the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). “Ge nera lly , the opinions of treating phy sicians ar e given substantial, if not controlling, def ere nce.” W arner , 3 7 5 F. 3 d

at3 9 0 (c i t i n g King v. Hec kler , 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6 t h C i r. 1984)). How ever , “[t] reating phy sicians’ opinions a re only g iven such de fer ence when supporte d by objective medic al evidenc e.” Id. ; Jones , 336 F.3d at 477. “I f the tr ea t i n g phy sician’s opinion is not supported by objective medic al evidenc e, the AL J is en t i t l ed to discredit the opinion as long as he se ts forth a

rea soned basis for

her [sic] rejection.” Jones , 3 3 6 F. 3 d at 4 7 7 (c i t i n g Shelman v. H eck ler , 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 1987)). “ [T] he det er m i n ati on of disability is the prer og ative of the [C ommissi oner], not the treating phy sician.” Harris v. Hec kler , 756 F.2d 431, 435 ( 6th Cir. 1985). Her e, substantial evidenc e supports the AL J ’s deter mination that the opinion of Dr. B oy d, Poe’s treating phy sician, wa s not en t i t l ed to def ere nce be cause it was based on Poe’ s subjectiveNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 13

Poe ’s a sse rt ion that the AL J wa s re qu ir e d to “r e -c on ta c t” Dr . B oyd f or c lari fi c a tio n is a lso 3 unsupported, as a

n AL J is require d to re-c ontact a tr eatingphy sician o n l y wh en the information rec eived is ina dequate to r eac h a deter mination on claimant’s disability status, not where , as her e, the AL J reje cts the limitations recommended by that p h y s i cian. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e) , 416.912(e)

. Fur thermore , althoug h the AL J did not give D r. B oy d’s opinion co n t rolling w eig ht, the 4 AL J’s r e sid

ua l fun c tio na l c a

pa c ity fi nd ingdid

inc or po ra te the lim itatio ns that w e re c on sis te nt w ith the other e vidence of re cord, inc luding the f indings of Poe’ s other tre ating phy sicians. c omp la int s, ra

the r t ha n ob je c tiv e me dic a l data . M or e ov e r, Dr . B oyd’ s o pin ion is i nc on sis te nt w ith the re cord a s a whole a

nd, arguably , not even supported by his own treatment notes. For e x ample, althoug h Dr. B oy d claimed that his August 24, 2006 conclusions reg ardingPoe’s re sidual function assessment we re ba sed on a phy sical ex am i n at i on as we ll as an interview with Poe, there is no evidenc e of a phy sical examination on or around that date. In fac t, the final medical rec ord re ceive d from Dr. Boyd was dated J uly 3, 2003, and re flec ted Dr. B oy d’s express opinion that Poe was not

a c an d i d a t e f

o r d i s a b i l i ty. P o e p r e s e n t e d

n o o th e r o b

j e c t i v e m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e t o e x p l a i nh o w o r w h y, in Dr. B oy d’s opinion, Poe was not a c andidate f or disability

in J u l y 2 0 0 3 , b ut deg ener ated to the point of being unable to per form sede ntary work by August 2006. Moreove r, the limitations 3 proposed by

Dr. B oy d wer e also c ontradicte d by the finding s of Poe’s other treating phy sicians, as well as two state ag ency medical consultants. Thus, we f ind that the AL J ’s deter

mination reg arding Dr. B oy d’s opinion was re asonable and supported by substantial evidence

. 4 Poe further argues that the AL J improperly based his re sidual functional ca pacity finding on h i s o w n i n t e r

p r e t a t i o no f

t h e m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e . In d e t e r m i n i n g P o e ’ s r e s i d

u a l f un c t i o n a l c a

p a c i ty, the AL J found t hat “[ a]fter listening to claimant’s testimony , observingher de meanor and obser ving said testimony

in light of the obje ctive medica l rec ords, it appea rs that t he claimant is trying to makeNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 14 her sy mptoms sound signific antly more seve re tha n they actua lly are .” In support of her

contention, Poe argues that “[t] he AL J does not cite any me dic a l op ini on to e xpla in o f [s ic ] the me dic a l f ind ing s, but bases the [residual func tional capa city ] deter mination on his own int erpr etation of the me dical

e vid e nc e , inf

e re nc e s he dr aws fr om the natur e and e xten t of the c la ima

nt’ s d a ily a c tiv iti e s, a s w e ll as his keen know ledg e of huma n nature .” Poe’s c ontention is belied by the re cord. The re sponsib i l i ty

for de termining a cla imant’s residual f unctional ca

pacity rests with the A L J, n o t a

phy sician. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c) , 416.946(c) . Although the AL J may not substitut e his opinion for that of a phy sician, he is not re quired to re cite the medic al opinion of a phy sician ver

batim in his residual functional capa city finding

. See20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a) (3), 416.945(a) (3). More over, a n AL J does not impro p erly assume the r ole of a

medical e x pert by

a sse ssi ngthe me dic a l and no n- me dic a l e vid e nc e be fo re re nd e ri ng a re sid ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity finding

. See F

ord v. Comm’r of Soc. Se c. , 114 F. App’ x 194, 197 (6th Cir. 2004). Acc ording ly , the AL J ’s re jection of Dr . Boyd’s opinion was per missibl e and suppor

ted by substantial evidence

. B. V oc ationa l Ex

pe rt As noted above, at s tep five of the assessment, the A L J must determine whe ther a claimant’s residual f unctional ca

pacity will al l o w h er t o perf

orm a sig nificant number of jobs in the national economy . See 20 C.F .R. §§ 40 4. 15 20 (g ), 41 6. 92 0( g ); W ebb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 368 F.3d 629, 6 3 3 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 4 ). I ns o d o i n g, ty p i ca l l y , t h e A L J p o s es a h y p o th et i ca l qu es t i o ni n co rp o ra t i n g a claimant’s r esidual func tional capa city to a vocational e x pert, a

nd asks how many

jobs, if any , the claimant ca

n perf orm. See id. I f the voc ational expert is a ble to identify

a sig nificant number

of jobsNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 15

Th e vo c a tio na l e xpe rt ide nti fi e d th e “ a tte nd ant- re late d” job s a nd the “ us he r” job s b y

the ir 5 separ at e D O T d e s ign a ti o n , b u t s tate d th a t t h e y p r o d u c e d a c o mb in e d

to ta l o f 4 1 0 , 0 0 0 jo b s in

the n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y. the hy po the tic a l indi vid

ua l c an p e rf

or m, s ub sta nti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts a fi nd ingthat th e c la ima

nt i s not disabled. Da v is v . S

e c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 915 F.2d 186, 189 ( 6th Cir. 1990). Her e, base d in part on the testimony of the voc ational expert, the A L J deter mined that

a lth ou g h Po e c ou ld no t pe rf or m he r p a st r e le va

nt w or k, sh e re ta ine d th e re sid

ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity to perfor m a signific ant number of jobs in the national economy and ther efor e wa s not disabled. The

vo c a tio na l e xpe rt

te sti fi e d th a t a

hy po the tical in di vidua l w iththe re sid ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity ultimately

adopted by

the AL J could per form the f ollowing occupations a s define d in the DOT: (1) counter cler k, (2) se curity

monitor, (3) surve illance se curity monitor, (4) attenda

nt/usher, and (6)

5 machine te nder. The Commi ssioner ac knowledg ed b ef o re the district court that the voc ational expert’s testimony

was inconsistent with the DOT in that the designation num ber provided by the

vo c a tio na l e xpe rt

fo r t he po sit ion

of “ se c ur ity mon ito r” do e s no t e xist. B e c a us e it w a s n ot p os sib le to determine the basis for the discrepa ncy in the DOT number provided by the vocational expert, the Commi ssioner conc eded that the job of secur ity monitor should not b e co n sidered in de termining wh e the r the AL J’s d e c isi on wa s su pp or te d b y su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e . T his dis c re pa nc y , h ow e ve r, is nothing more than har

mless error , as substantial evidenc e supports a f inding that Poe c ould perfor m five of the six jobs identified by the vocational expert, totaling appr ox imately 1,385,000 jobs in the national ec onomy . Poe’s numerous attempts to undermine the cr edibility of the voc ational expert’s testimony by asser ting that the pe rfor

mance require ments of the jobs listed by the vocational expert, with theNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 16

Br eslin provided his opinion by letter a nd thus was n ot available f or cr oss-examination. 6 Also, Br eslin’s opinion was provided on the vali d i t y of the testimony

offe red by

the vocational exper t i n Poe’s first administrative he aring , held on J uly 21, 2004, which re sulted in rever sal and rema nd by the di strict court. Thus, most of t he jobs discussed i n Br eslin’s letter we re not c ited by the vo c a tio na l e xpe rt

in t he July 31 , 2 00 6 a dmi nis tr a tiv e he ari nga t is su e in t his a pp e a l. possible exception of the “attendant/usher” jobs, are inc onsistent with the men t al an d /or phy sical limit ations, are not persua sive. For example, Poe argues t hat t he job of counte r cle rk is inconsistent with the m en t al l i m i t ations adopted in the hy pothetical posed by

the AL J . In support of her contention, Poe offe rs the testimony of her own vocational expert, Robert E. B reslin (“ Br eslin”), 6 who, re fer

ringto the Occ upational Outlook Handbook ( rathe r than the D OT), opine d t h at t he position of counter cler

k was not one of “r outine work” as posited in the hy pothetical, but rather a position t hat re quired a

n individual be able to handle se vera l tasks at one time, as c ustomer demand

re qu ir e d. Ho we ve r, wh ile the AL J is c e rt a inl y a uth or ize d to take a dmi nis tr a tiv e no tic e of job data fr om v ari ou s so ur c e s, inc lud ingthe te sti mony of Poe ’s ow n v oc a tio na l e xpe rt , h e wa s n ot required to a c c e pt B re sli n’ s o pin ion ov e r t hat of the vo c a tio na l expe rt wh o ba se d his o pin ion on the c on te nts of the DO T. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d), 416.966(d). As the district court cor rec tly noted, Social Se c ur ity Rul ing (S SR) 00 -4 p only re qu ir e s th e AL J to e lic it a re a so na ble e xplanatio n w he n th e re is conflict be tween t h e v o ca t i o n al ex pert a nd the DOT. See SSR00-4p, at *2. The ruling does not require that t he AL J attempt to addre ss or resolve conflicts betwe en the testimony of a voc ational expert and the Oc cupational Outlook Ha ndbook. Id. The AL J ’s summary of the evidenc e indicate s that he re viewed B reslin’s letter but chose to acc ept t he testi mony of t he vocational expert, which

was we ll within t he AL J ’s discre tion.No. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 17

Poe’s claim that this job no longe r applies to her due to her curr ent ag e of 55 is also ba sed 7 o nth e e r r o n e o u s a s s e rt i o nth a tt h e A L J f o un d h e r c a p a b l e o f p e r f o r m i n g l i m i t e d

s e d e n t ar y w o r k o n l y, as the rule upon which Poe re lies addre sses when the ability of an i n d i v i d u al found capable of perf orming sedenta

ry work be comes irr eleva

nt. Poe’s ar g uments that the requir ements for the surveillanc e sec urity

monitor and the mac hine t en der jobs ar e inconsistent with the phy sical limitations adopted in the hy pothetical posed by

the AL J ar e sim ila

rl y un ava ili ng . For ex ample , Po e ’s c ha lle ng e to t he job of surv e ill anc e se c ur ity monitor is rooted in the premise that the AL J found her capa ble of perf

orming l i m i t ed sedenta

ry

w o r k o n l y. H o w e v e r , th e A L J f o un d P o e c a p a b l e o f p e r f o r m i n g b o thl i m i t e d

s e d e n t ar y and light work. Thus, Poe’s ar g ument – that based on the AL J ’s re sidual functional c apac ity deter mination, 7

s h e c o u l d n o tw o r k a s a s ur v e i l l an c e s ys t e mm o n i t o r – i s n o t s u p p o rt e d

b y th e e v i d e n c e . F i n a l l y, Poe’s contention that the voca tional expert’s testimony

reg ardingthe phy sical re quirements for the job of machine tender is not c onsistent with the AL J ’s hy pothetical in light of

the DOT’ s statement that the job require s “fr equent f inge ringand re aching ” is also unavai l i n g, as the hy pothetical questions presente d to the vocational e x pert c ontain no limit s on Poe’s ability to r eac h and/or fing er. F ur the rm or e , th e DOT is con sis te nt w iththe hy po the tic a l in

that it re qu ir e s o nly

“ oc c a sio na l” handling , which is the f

ac t o r t h e vocational expert testified was most rele vant to the hy pothetical restric tions. Acc ording ly , we f

ind that substant i al evidence supports the AL J ’s re sidual functional capa city finding , as we ll as his conclusion that Poe can pe rfor m a sig nificant number

of jobs in the national ec onomy

and ther efor e wa s not disabled. C. Post Hoc Ration alizati onNo. 08-5912

Doris A. Poe v. Comm issioner of Social Security Pag e 18

We note, howeve r, that Poe’s c ontention is belied by the re cord, as the district cour t opinion 8 does not offe r a “ revised r ationale.” Rather, the court simply ref ere nced additional evidenc e in the rec ord to establish that the AL J ’s dec ision was supported by substantial evidence

. F ina lly , Po e argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp e rm iss ib ly us e d p os t ho c ra tio na lizatio ns , substitut ing its own “ revised r ationale” to uphold the decision of the Commission er . Beca use a revie w of the record clear ly shows that the AL J ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence , as dis c us se d he re in, we ne e d not a dd re ss t he se a lle g e d e rr or s. See Pasco v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 137 8 F. App’x 828, 847 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Having conducte d our own revie w of the A L J ’s dec ision and found it supported by

substantial evidence , we n ee d n o t addre ss [ claimant’s a lleg ations that the district court impermissibly used post-hoc r ationalizations t o uphold the AL J ’s dec ision] .”)

V. CO NC LU SION For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we AF F IRM the district court’s de cision.