NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER JAMES WOODS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0414

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-147343-001

The Honorable Warren J. Granville, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; MODIFIED IN PART

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Janelle A. McEachern Attorney at Law, Chandler

By Janelle A. McEachern

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WOODS

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2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Christopher Woods appeals his convictions and sentences for 

one count each of first degree felony murder, attempted armed robbery, 

and conspiracy to commit possession or use of marijuana. After searching 

the entire record, Woods’ defense counsel has identified no arguable 

question of law that is not frivolous. Therefore, in accordance with Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), 

defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental error. 

Woods thereafter filed a supplemental brief in propria persona. After 

reviewing the record, Woods’ convictions are affirmed, as are his sentences 

for first degree murder and conspiracy. However, we find fundamental 

error as to Woods’ sentence for attempted armed robbery, and, in our 

discretion under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 13-4037,1 we 

modify his sentence accordingly.

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On the night of July 25, 2012, between 9:00 and 10:30 p.m., 

Woods, Leroy Jackson, and a third, unidentified individual drove to Scott 

T.’s residence at 83rd Avenue and McDowell Road. The four men planned 

to then drive across town to Mesa, where Scott intended to purchase 

marijuana for Woods because Scott’s marijuana dealer, David C., refused to 

deal with individuals with whom he was not acquainted. After picking 

Scott up, the men stopped at a Walgreens. Scott and Woods used the 

restroom while Jackson purchased a three-pack of work gloves.

 

1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s 

verdict, with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant. State 

v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 404 n.2, ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (quoting State v. Valencia, 186 

Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996)).
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¶3 At David’s house, someone handed Scott one hundred 

dollars. He took the money inside David’s house while the other three men 

waited inside the car “in the vicinity.” Scott was supposed to call the other 

three men after he had purchased marijuana from David and was ready to 

leave. Fifteen minutes later, the transaction was completed, and David 

walked Scott to the front door. 

¶4 Unbeknownst to Scott, Woods and Jackson planned to break 

in and rob David. As Scott was walking out the front door, he saw multiple 

individuals, later determined to be Jackson and Woods, wearing masks and 

hoods standing against the wall just outside the door. Jackson then forced 

Scott out of the doorway and entered the house; in his later statements to 

the police, Woods admitted he was keeping watch outside the home near 

the front door during this time. David attempted to close the door on 

Jackson, but after failing to do so, turned around and ran toward the back 

of the house in an apparent escape attempt. Jackson then fired three shots 

from a handgun, one of which perforated David’s heart and resulted in his 

death. 

¶5 Meanwhile, Scott fled to a friend’s nearby apartment. Scott

telephoned Woods to ask about the shooting and eventually met Woods at 

a nearby apartment complex. When Scott confronted Woods about the 

shooting, Woods responded only that “it wasn’t supposed to happen like 

that.” Scott understood Woods’ response to mean Woods “knew 

something about what happened.” Woods was eventually taken into 

custody and repeated “what happened that night . . . was not supposed to

fucking happen that night.” 

¶6 Jackson and Woods were each charged with one count of first 

degree murder, one count of armed robbery, and one count of conspiracy 

to commit possession of marijuana, but Woods’ armed robbery charge was 

later amended to attempted armed robbery. Jackson pled guilty to one 

count of second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-two years’ 

imprisonment. Woods’ eighteen-day jury trial began in February 2015. At 

the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Woods’ counsel unsuccessfully 

moved for a judgment of acquittal as to the first degree murder and 

attempted armed robbery charges. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a). The jury

ultimately found Woods guilty as charged. 

¶7 The parties agreed the guilty verdicts established beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the attempted armed robbery involved the use or 

threatened use of a weapon, and the conspiracy to possess marijuana was 

completed in the presence of an accomplice. The trial court denied Woods’ 
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subsequent motion to declare the felony murder statute unconstitutional as 

applied to him and sentenced Woods as a non-repetitive offender to the 

presumptive term on all counts. Woods was sentenced to concurrent 

sentences of life with the possibility of parole after 25 years for first degree 

felony murder, a class one dangerous felony, 10.5 years for attempted 

armed robbery, a class three dangerous felony, and 1 year for conspiracy to 

commit possession of marijuana, a class six felony. The court also gave

Woods credit for 1009 days of presentence incarceration. Woods timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 

13-4031, and -4033(A)(1), (4).

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶8 In his supplemental brief, Woods concedes he is guilty of 

conspiring to commit possession of marijuana, but argues his other 

convictions are in error because he was merely present for the attempted

armed robbery and subsequent murder. We review the sufficiency of the 

evidence de novo, State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 289, ¶ 30 (App. 2015) (quoting 

State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011)), and will reverse “only where 

there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction,” 

State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996) (quoting State v. Scott, 113 Ariz. 

423, 424-25 (1976)). We do not reweigh the evidence and defer to the jury’s 

resolution of any inconsistencies therein. See State v. Parker, 113 Ariz. 560, 

561 (1976) (“[I]t is the jury’s function to weigh the evidence as a whole, to 

resolve any inconsistencies therein and then to determine whether or not a 

reasonable doubt exists.”) (citing State v. Money, 110 Ariz. 18, 25 (1973)).

¶9 As relevant to Woods’ convictions: 

A person commits first degree murder if . . . [a]cting either 

alone or with one or more other persons the person commits 

or attempts to commit . . . robbery under [A.R.S. §]§ 13-1902, 

13-1903 or 13-1904 . . . and, in the course of and in furtherance 

of the offense or immediate flight from the offense, the person 

or another person causes the death of any person.

A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2). A person commits robbery if “in the course of taking 

any property of another from his person or immediate presence against his 

will, such person threatens or uses force against any person with intent 

either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such 

person taking or retaining property.” A.R.S. § 13-1902(A). Robbery is 

armed if, “in the course of committing robbery . . . such person or an 
STATE v. WOODS

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accomplice . . . is armed with a deadly weapon or a simulated deadly 

weapon; or . . . [u]ses or threatens to use a deadly weapon . . . .” A.R.S. 

§ 13-1904(A). The offense is considered an attempt if the person “act[s] with 

the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of an offense,” 

and “[e]ngages in conduct intended to aid another to commit an offense, 

although the offense is not committed . . . .” A.R.S. § 13-1001(A)(3). A 

person is also criminally accountable for the conduct of his accomplice, and 

“the natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable consequences” 

therefrom. A.R.S. § 13-303(A). An accomplice is one who “aids, counsels, 

agrees to aid or attempts to aid another person in planning or committing 

an offense.” A.R.S. § 13-301(2). 

¶10 Generally, “[g]uilt cannot be established by the defendant’s 

mere presence at a crime scene or mere association with another person at 

a crime scene. The fact that the defendant may have been present does not 

in and of itself make the defendant guilty of the crimes charged.” State v. 

Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 284 (App. 1996) (citation omitted). In this case, 

however, evidence was presented upon which the jury could determine 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Woods agreed to and did in fact help 

Jackson attempt to rob David in his home by donning a mask and hood and 

keeping watch outside the home. Woods’ statement that the events 

“w[ere]n’t supposed to happen like that” indicate he was not merely 

present for the robbery attempt but was actively involved in the planning 

and execution. Furthermore, Jackson, Woods’ accomplice, used a deadly 

weapon in the course of and in furtherance of the attempted robbery that 

resulted in David’s death. That the events did not transpire as Woods 

intended is irrelevant; David’s murder was a reasonably foreseeable 

consequence of the armed robbery, and Woods is criminally responsible for 

the actions of his accomplice under A.R.S. § 13-303(A).

¶11 Woods also argues the record does not support his conviction 

because, under the corpus delicti doctrine, he cannot be convicted of a crime 

based solely upon his statements to the police. See State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 

442, 453, ¶ 43 (2003) (“The State must establish the corpus delicti of a 

homicide by showing that the alleged injury to the victim — death, in this 

case — occurred and that the injury was caused by criminal conduct rather 

than by suicide or accident.”) (citations omitted). Although Woods is 

correct that the “corpus delicti doctrine incorporates the rule that a defendant 

cannot be convicted of a crime based solely upon an uncorroborated 

confession or admission,” id. (citing Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152 

(1954), and State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 506 (1983)), “[o]nly a reasonable 

inference of the corpus delicti need exist before a confession may be 

considered,” Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 (citing State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 
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170 (1982)). And, the corroborating evidence may be circumstantial. Hall, 

204 Ariz. at 453, ¶ 43 (citation omitted).

¶12 Here, the State presented independent evidence, through 

Scott’s testimony, that Woods stated he did not intend for the attempted 

robbery to result in a homicide. The State also established through Scott’s 

testimony, Walgreens’ security footage, and Woods’ and Scott’s cell phone 

data, that Woods was in the area immediately surrounding the crime scene 

during the relevant time period. Although circumstantial, this evidence 

supports a reasonable inference that David’s death was not an accident, 

and, therefore, the corpus delicti existed before Woods’ statements to the 

police were considered. Although Woods presented evidence to support 

his defenses, the resolution of evidentiary conflicts is solely within the 

province of the jury. Sufficient evidence supports Woods’ convictions, and 

we find no error.

II. Fundamental Error Review

¶13 Woods was charged with and convicted of attempted armed 

robbery, a class three dangerous felony, and sentenced to 10.5 years’ 

imprisonment. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1904(B) (“Armed robbery is a class 2 

felony.”), -1001(C)(2) (“Attempt is a . . . [c]lass 3 felony if the offense 

attempted is a class 2 felony.”). Although the sentence of 10.5 years’ 

imprisonment is within the range permitted for a class three dangerous 

felony under A.R.S. § 13-704(A) where, as here, the jury has found one 

aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court announced its 

intention to sentence Woods to the presumptive term, and the presumptive 

term for a class three dangerous felony is 7.5 years. Indeed, both the 

transcript of the sentencing hearing and the sentencing minute entry reflect 

the court improperly sentenced Woods to the presumptive term for the 

completed crime of armed robbery, a class two dangerous felony of which 

he was not convicted. See A.R.S. §§ 13-704(A), -1904(B). 

¶14 Because Woods did not raise this issue before the trial court, 

however, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Trujillo, 227 Ariz. 

314, 317, ¶ 9 (App. 2011) (citing State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 

(2005)). Fundamental error occurs “in those rare cases that involve ‘error 

going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the defendant a 

right essential to his defense, and error of such magnitude that the 

defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.’” Henderson, 210 

Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 (1984)). To grant 

relief under this standard of review, both fundamental error and prejudice 

must be present. Id. at ¶ 20 (citations omitted).
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¶15 “The failure to impose a sentence in conformity with 

mandatory sentencing statutes makes the resulting sentence illegal.” State 

v. Cox, 201 Ariz. 464, 468, ¶ 13 (App. 2002) (“The sentencing process was 

fundamentally flawed because the trial court used sentencing ranges other 

than those mandated for the offenses in question.”) (quoting State v. 

Carbajal, 184 Ariz. 117, 118 (App. 1995)). And imposition of an illegal 

sentence constitutes fundamental error. State v. Munninger, 213 Ariz. 393, 

397, ¶ 11 (App. 2006); State v. Thues, 203 Ariz. 339, 340, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). 

Sentencing Woods for the more serious, completed crime of armed robbery 

when he was actually convicted of the less severe, preparatory crime of 

attempted armed robbery goes to the foundation of Woods’ case and 

constitutes fundamental error.

¶16 We also find Woods prejudiced by the error. The trial court 

explicitly stated its intention to sentence Woods to a presumptive term. 

Based on this pronouncement and the fact that the trial court sentenced 

Woods to the presumptive term on the other counts, it is likely that, absent 

its erroneous belief that Woods was convicted of the crime of armed 

robbery, the court would have sentenced him to the presumptive term for 

attempted armed robbery — only 7.5 years. In a situation where, as here,

the sentencing court imposed an unlawful sentence “and we are able to 

ascertain the trial court’s intention by reference to the record,” State v. 

Contreras, 180 Ariz. 450, 453 n.2 (App. 1994), we will use our authority under 

A.R.S. § 13-4037(A) to amend the illegal sentence consistent with the court’s 

intent, see State v. Gourdin, 156 Ariz. 337, 339 (App. 1988) (stating A.R.S. § 

13-4037(A) “authorizes us to modify an illegal sentence imposed upon a 

lawful finding of guilt by the trial court.”). We have no doubt the court 

intended to sentence Woods to the presumptive term for attempted armed 

robbery, and therefore modify his sentence for that crime to 7.5 years’ 

imprisonment, to be served concurrently with all other counts.

¶17 Further review reveals no fundamental error. See Leon, 104 

Ariz. at 300 (“An exhaustive search of the record has failed to produce any 

prejudicial error.”). All of the proceedings were conducted in compliance 

with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. So far as the record reveals, 

Woods was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and was 

present at all critical stages including the entire trial and the verdict. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 26.9. The jury was properly comprised of twelve jurors, and the 

record shows no evidence of jury misconduct. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23; 

A.R.S. § 21-102(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(a). At sentencing, Woods was 

given an opportunity to speak, and the trial court stated on the record the 

evidence and materials it considered and the factors it found in imposing 

sentence. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.10. Additionally, the sentences imposed for 
STATE v. WOODS

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Woods’ first degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit possession of 

marijuana convictions were within the statutory limits. See A.R.S. §§ 13-

702(D), -752(A), -1003(D), -2405(B)(1).

CONCLUSION

¶18 Woods’ convictions are affirmed. His sentences for first 

degree felony murder and conspiracy to possess marijuana are affirmed. 

However, Woods’ sentence for attempted armed robbery is modified to the

presumptive term of 7.5 years’ imprisonment. 

¶19 Defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Woods’ 

representation in this appeal have ended. Defense counsel need do no more 

than inform Woods of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, 

unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to 

our supreme court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 

584-85 (1984).

¶20 Woods has thirty days from the date of this decision to 

proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. See Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Upon the Court’s own motion, we grant Woods thirty 

days from the date of this decision to file an in propria persona motion for 

reconsideration.