IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

March 7, 2017 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KALANDRA LACY

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 14-04930 Carolyn Wade Blackett, Judge

No. W2016-00837-CCA-R3-CD

The defendant, Kalandra Lacy, appeals her Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded 

conviction of abuse of a corpse, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her bid for 

judicial diversion. Following a de novo review occasioned by the trial court’s failure to 

consider on the record all the factors relevant to the denial of judicial diversion as well as 

the trial court’s consideration of irrelevant factors, we conclude that the defendant is 

entitled to judicial diversion. We remand the case for entry of an order placing the 

defendant on judicial diversion under the same terms and conditions of her previouslyimposed sentence of probation.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed and Remanded

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., joined.

Vicki M. Carriker, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kalandra Lacy.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrew C. Coulam, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Paul Goodman, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On May 12, 2015, the defendant entered an open plea of guilty to one count 

of abuse of a corpse, a Class E felony. The State summarized the facts of the offense:

[O]n October the 19th of 2014 officers started an 

investigation at the Gus’s Fried Chicken on North 

Germantown Road in Bartlett, Tennessee. A motorist had 

found the remains of a deceased new born infant in the alley 

05/12/2017
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there behind the restaurant. Officers located a clear plastic 

bag with what appeared to be blood inside the bag [and] an 

infant’s body. The umbilical cord was attached to the infant, 

and it appeared that the body of the infant had been run over 

by a vehicle.

Officers traced this in their investigation to the interior 

of the restaurant to a woman’s restroom inside. They were 

told that the defendant . . . was possibly pregnant although it 

was not known for sure by coworkers. The store employee 

was contacted and advised that there had been a miscarriage 

that had happened in the women’s restroom and [the 

defendant] had left work early on that occasion. The officers 

tracked down the defendant. The defendant told officers that 

she knew why they were there. And she stated that she had 

had a miscarriage and had put the baby in the dumpster 

behind the Gus’s restaurant. . . . She stated that she had 

placed the body of the infant in the plastic bag.

The Medical Examiner’s Office of course examined 

the infant and they could not determine cause of death. They 

could not determine whether this was a live birth or not. 

There was no way to say medically whether the infant had 

been born alive. The defendant is not charged with homicide 

but abuse of a corpse which was the charge that the State 

could have proven in this case.

The State noted that the defendant “does qualify for diversion” but indicated that the 

“State is not agreeing to that.”

At a hearing conducted that same day, the defendant, who had previously 

given birth to three children, testified that on October 19, 2014, she went to the restroom 

near the end of her shift and “had a miscarriage” inside the restroom. She said that her 

“baby came out. It wasn’t moving or making any sounds or anything.” She described the 

infant as “pretty small.” She said that she “was weak” and “in shock.” She described 

what happened next:

I just was thinking I just really want to go home. I just 

have to go home. And so I put the baby in the bag and put it 

in the dumpster and I told my manager I have to go. I had 
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a[n] accident. And of course he could see all the blood and 

stuff over me.

She said that she was “distraught, hurt and shocked and just weak all in one.” The 

defendant said that she sat in her car “a while” because she “couldn’t drive or anything.” 

She eventually went home. The following morning, her mother came and took her to the 

hospital, where she was treated and released.

The defendant denied running over her child. She asked the trial court to 

grant judicial diversion so that the offense would not prevent her from obtaining “a good 

job” so that she could provide for her other children. She said that she knew that what 

she did was wrong.

During cross-examination, the defendant said she could not explain why 

she had done what she did, saying, “I can’t give you an answer to why I did it. I was just 

in shock.”

The trial court expressed incredulity at the defendant’s lack of explanation 

for her actions and implored the defendant to offer more, saying, “This is the only time 

you’re going to get a chance to go through this and you might as well tell me now 

because it will depend on how I rule on this. I don’t care what the truth is. I just want to 

know what it is.” The defendant adamantly denied that she acted out of a desire to get rid 

of the child. The defendant responded, “I just was really weak and tired and I just wanted 

to go home. . . . I knew I couldn’t leave it in the bathroom. So that’s why I took it to the 

dumpster.” She said that she did not know how the child had gotten out of the dumpster 

but that the police had told her that “cats drug the infant out of the garbage.” The trial 

court stated its belief that the conviction needed to be on the defendant’s “record to let 

people know” that the defendant had “a problem” because the defendant could not “even 

tell [the court] why.” The court indicated that the defendant needed “serious counseling” 

and expressed concern that the defendant was “likely to repeat the same behavior again.” 

The trial court indicated that it was not prepared to rule on the defendant’s request for 

judicial diversion. The court ordered the defendant to take parenting classes and undergo 

counseling and asked the defendant to provide “a written report from a doctor and a 

psychologist.”

On July 28, 2015, the defendant asked the trial court for more time to 

complete the evaluation process requested by the trial court. The court then reset the case 

two more times before holding a sentencing hearing on April 13, 2016. During the 
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intervening eleven months, the defendant underwent two mental health evaluations1and 

attended counseling.

At the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for diversion, 

ultimately concluding that the court “would want people to have notice” in the form of a 

felony conviction on the defendant’s criminal record “that if for some reason, or another, 

something like this even remotely happened, again, due to this, everyone would be put on 

notice.” The court expresed “a very, very deep concern” “for the safety of her children 

that she has now, any children she may have in the future,” and stated that it was this 

concern that made the court “want to make sure that the records were accessible and not 

in terms of diversion, there was no mention of any of this.” The court indicated that it 

had “thought about it” and had done “some outside research” on cases similar to the 

defendant’s. The court said:

There is a huge number, in terms of the increase of the 

number of women who are being prosecuted exactly for this 

same type of offense. And they are not going as far as we 

went on this case. They have a woman who has recently had 

a baby, or a miscarriage, or was pregnant and if they can find 

the fetus, or the baby, they are prosecuting murder one, across 

this country, in numbers that you would not believe. And I 

do not want the same thing to happen to her.

The trial court ordered that the defendant serve one year of “intensive” supervised 

probation.

In this timely appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by 

denying her bid for judicial diversion, arguing that the trial court failed to weigh and 

consider all the factors relevant to a determination of judicial diversion. The State 

contends that the trial court appropriately considered all the relevant factors and that the 

court’s decision to deny judicial diversion based upon the circumstances of the offense 

was justified.

“Judicial diversion” is a reference to the provision in Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-35-313(a) for a trial court’s deferring proceedings in a criminal 

case. See T.C.A. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(A). Pursuant to such a deferral, the trial court places 

the defendant on probation “without entering a judgment of guilty.” Id. To be eligible or 

“qualified” for judicial diversion, the defendant must plead guilty to, or be found guilty 

 

1

The defendant’s memorandum in support of her request for diversion indicated that she had had 

two evaluations, and both defense counsel and the court indicated that reports from both evaluations were 

included “in the jacket.” Only one report appears in the record on appeal.
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of, an offense that is not “a sexual offense or a Class A or Class B felony,” and the 

defendant must not have previously been convicted of a felony or a Class A 

misdemeanor. Id. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(B)(i)(b), (c). Diversion requires the consent of the 

qualified defendant. Id. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(A). “[A] ‘qualified’ defendant is not 

necessarily entitled to diversion. Whether to grant judicial diversion is left to the 

discretionary authority of the trial courts.” State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 326 (Tenn. 

2014). Following a determination that the defendant is eligible for judicial diversion, the 

trial court must consider 

“(a) the accused’s amenability to correction, (b) the 

circumstances of the offense, (c) the accused’s criminal 

record, (d) the accused’s social history, (e) the accused’s 

physical and mental health, and (f) the deterrence value to the 

accused as well as others. The trial court should also consider 

whether judicial diversion will serve the ends of justice—the 

interests of the public as well as the accused.”

Id. (quoting State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). “Further, 

the trial court must weigh the factors against each other and place an explanation of its 

ruling on the record.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 326 (citing State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 

S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)).

Although judicial diversion is not a sentence, our supreme court determined 

that the standard of review first expressed in State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012),

applies to “appellate review for a trial court’s sentencing decision to either grant or deny 

judicial diversion.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 325. Importantly, however, the court 

emphasized that the adoption of the Bise standard of review “did not abrogate the 

requirements set forth in Parker and Electroplating, which are essential considerations 

for judicial diversion.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 326.

The trial court need not provide a recitation of all the applicable “factors 

when justifying its decision on the record in order to obtain the presumption of 

reasonableness,” but “the record should reflect that the trial court considered the Parker

and Electroplating factors in rendering its decision and that it identified the specific 

factors applicable to the case before it.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 327. When the trial court 

considers each of the factors enumerated in Parker and weighs them against each other, 

placing its findings in the record, as required by Electroplating, Inc., we “apply a 

presumption of reasonableness,” per Bise, and will “uphold the grant or denial so long as 

there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision.” Id. When “the 

trial court fails to consider and weigh the applicable common law factors, the 

presumption of reasonableness does not apply and the abuse of discretion standard . . . is 
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not appropriate.” Id. Instead, “the appellate courts may either conduct a de novo review 

or, if more appropriate under the circumstances, remand the issue for reconsideration. 

The determination as to whether the appellate court should conduct a de novo review or 

remand for reconsideration is within the discretion of the reviewing court.” Id. at 328.

Here, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the defendant’s 

memorandum in support of her bid for judicial diversion, which included each of the 

factors relevant to the consideration of diversion, but the trial court did not consider each 

factor on the record and did not weigh the factors against each other or place an 

explanation of its consideration of each factor on the record. The trial court did not 

mention any of the applicable factors and focused exclusively on the circumstances of the 

offense and its own concerns about the potential of future harm to the defendant’s 

children. Additionally, the trial court indicated that it had conducted “independent 

research” and had weighed this research heavily in the decision to deny judicial 

diversion. Consequently, the ruling of the trial court is not entitled to a presumption of 

reasonableness, and the abuse of discretion standard of review is “not appropriate.” 

“Because, however, the record is sufficient for de novo review, we have chosen to 

address whether the denial of judicial diversion was appropriate in these circumstances, 

rather than remand the case for reconsideration by the trial court.” King, 432 S.W.3d at

328.

The record clearly establishes that the 23-year-old defendant is qualified for 

judicial diversion. The defendant’s social history weighs heavily in favor of a grant of 

judicial diversion. The defendant has no criminal record. The record contains no 

evidence that the defendant uses illegal drugs or that she consumes alcohol in excess. 

She possesses a high school diploma and some college credits toward her associate’s

degree. At the time of the hearing, the defendant had been gainfully employed for the 

entirety of her adult life. By the time of the hearing, the defendant had already lost one 

well-paying job as a result of her arrest in this case, but she had managed to obtain full 

time employment as an office assistant at a tax preparation office.

The defendant shares three children with her partner, Michael Baines, who 

was also the father of the deceased infant in this case, and the record indicates that she 

has the support of her mother and other extended family members. The family had never 

been the subject of an investigation or any other action by the Department of Children’s 

Services. Although the trial court expressed a concern for the safety of the defendant’s 

children, the record contains no evidence that might have given rise to such a concern. 

No evidence suggested that the defendant had ever harmed any of her children or that she 

had made a pattern of the behavior that gave rise to the charge in this case. Importantly, 

no evidence in the record indicates that the defendant caused the death of her infant in 

this case.
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Medical records exhibited to the hearing established that the defendant’s 

third child was born prematurely in December 2012 after the defendant suffered a 

“complete placental abruption.” That child spent several weeks in the neonatal intensive 

care unit. 

At the trial court’s insistence, the defendant underwent a mental health 

evaluation. The defendant’s sentencing memorandum actually states that the defendant 

underwent two evaluations, but the copy of only one evaluation appears in the record on 

appeal. The examiner concluded that the defendant did “not suffer from a mental illness” 

but that “her judgment was undoubtedly impaired at the time of her miscarriage.”

The record indicates that the defendant had complied with all of the 

conditions of her release on bond prior to her guilty plea as well as those additional 

conditions imposed by the trial court during the 11 months between her guilty plea and 

the sentencing hearing in this case. The defendant garnered no new criminal charges 

during this time period.

With regard to the circumstances of the offense, the record establishes that 

the defendant suffered a miscarriage in the restroom of the Gus’s Fried Chicken, where 

she was working at the time. The defendant, who had experienced the premature birth of 

her third child, testified that the premature infant was “pretty small” and “gray.” The 

medical examiner could not determine whether the infant had been born alive, and the 

record clearly establishes that the defendant believed the infant to be dead. The 

defendant said that she was disoriented, distraught, and in shock when she placed the 

infant’s body in a plastic bag and then placed the bag into the dumpster. She then drove 

home. Officers later discovered the infant’s body in the alley; it had been run over by a 

car. The record suggests that animals removed the body from the dumpster, and, 

importantly, no evidence suggests that the defendant was responsible for the damage 

inflicted on the body after she placed it in the dumpster.

The defendant did not attempt to conceal her pregnancy either before or 

after the offense. When she went to the hospital for treatment, she told doctors that she 

had suffered a miscarriage. Then, when contacted by police, the defendant immediately 

admitted what she had done. She testified that she understood and accepted 

responsibility for the wrongfulness of her actions. The defendant’s version of the offense 

remained consistent throughout the case.

As mentioned, the trial court indicated that it had performed “outside 

research” that evinced an exponential increase in “this same type of offense,” indicating, 

perhaps, the need for deterrence to the defendant and others. The trial court’s conducting 
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independent research into facts outside the record and then relying on that evidence was 

wholly improper. To be sure, a trial court may take into account matters that are of 

common knowledge to every person but may not “base [its] decisions on the existence or 

nonexistence of facts according to [its] personal beliefs or experiences.” Fairbanks v. 

State, 508 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Tenn. 1974). Our supreme court has explained,

There is ample authority for the proposition that a judge is not 

to use from the bench, under the guise of judicial knowledge, 

that which he knows only as an individual observer outside of 

the judicial proceedings. Judicial knowledge upon which a 

decision may be based is not the personal knowledge of the 

judge, but the cognizance of certain facts the judge becomes 

aware of by virtue of the legal procedures in which he plays a 

neutral role. No judge is at liberty to take into account 

personal knowledge which he possesses when deciding upon 

an issue submitted by the parties. In other words, “[i]t 

matters not what is known to the judge personally if it is not 

known to him in his official capacity.”

Vaughn v. Shelby Williams of Tenn., Inc., 813 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tenn. 1991) (citations 

omitted). To the extent that the trial court’s “independent research” consisted of news 

reports of “this same type of offense,” our supreme court has observed that Rule 201 does 

not permit a trial judge to take judicial notice of the contents of news articles. State v. 

Henretta, 325 S.W.3d 112, 144 (Tenn. 2010) (“While Rule 201 of the Tennessee Rules of 

Evidence allows a court to take judicial notice of certain adjudicative facts, it does not 

allow a court to take judicial notice of hearsay statements contained in a newspaper 

article.”). No evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding of a significant 

increase in the occurrence of cases similar to the defendant’s.

Referencing her “outside research,” the trial judge also noted that cases 

similar to the defendant’s had been prosecuted as first degree murder, suggesting that the 

defendant had been granted some largesse in being permitted to plead guilty to abuse of a 

corpse. Although this court has previously “recognized that leniency in the terms of a 

plea agreement may support the imposition of a formidable sentence,” we have done so 

only when the defendant was originally charged with, and the facts supported a finding 

of, a much greater charge. State v. John Clayton Fields, No. M2014-01691-CCA-R3-

CD, slip op. at 9-10 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 6, 2015), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. Oct. 23, 2015); see also, e.g., State v. Krystal Bowman, No. E2011-01906-CCAR3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Aug. 13, 2012); State v. Larry J. Coffey, Jr., No. 

E2008-00087-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Feb. 18, 2009). In this case, 

the defendant pleaded guilty to the offense charged in the indictment, and only evidence 
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to support that offense was placed into the record. Under these circumstances, the trial 

court should not have considered an offense that the defendant “could” or “should” have 

faced. See State v. Chyanne Elizabeth Gobble, No. E2014-01596-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. 

at 10-12 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Aug. 12, 2015). In Chyanne Elizabeth Gobble, 

this court concluded that “[a] trial court’s consideration of an offense different or greater 

than that for which the defendant was indicted when determining whether the defendant 

should receive judicial diversion offends the constitutional right to due process.” Id., slip 

op. at 12.

Clearly, the defendant’s amenability to correction, her lack of criminal 

record, her social history, and her physical and mental health all weigh in favor of a grant 

of judicial diversion. Turning then to the circumstances of the offense, we observe that 

the seriousness of the offense may serve as the sole basis for denying judicial diversion 

only when “the circumstances of the offense as committed [are] especially violent, 

horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or 

exaggerated degree, and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a 

sentence other than confinement.” State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006). 

The evidence established that the defendant suffered a miscarriage and then placed the 

miscarried infant into a dumpster behind her place of work. The defendant’s conduct 

certainly evinces a serious mistake in judgment, which judgment “was undoubtedly 

impaired at the time of her miscarriage.” As a result of the defendant’s poor judgment, 

the infant’s body was dragged from the dumpster and run over by a car. These facts, 

while unsettling, were already incorporated into the conviction offense. As charged in 

this case, “[a] person commits an offense who, without legal privilege, knowingly . . . 

[p]hysically mistreats a corpse in a manner offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary 

person.” T.C.A. § 39-17-312(a)(1). The record contains no evidence to suggest that the 

defendant’s actions significantly exceeded those required to satisfy the elements of the 

offense. Furthermore, the defendant’s actions following the discovery of the infant, 

including her ready admission and full cooperation with the police, weigh in favor of a 

grant of judicial diversion. See Chyanne Elizabeth Gobble, slip op. at 15.

Because we conclude, based upon our de novo review of the record, that 

each of the factors weighs in favor of a grant of judicial diversion in this case, we reverse 

the judgment of the trial court denying judicial diversion and remand the case for the 

entry of an order placing the defendant on judicial diversion for one year under the same 

conditions attendant to the previously-imposed sentence of probation.

_________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE