IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0843

Filed March 25, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ETHAN JOSEPH WALZTONI,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, David F. Staudt, 

Judge. 

An eighteen-year-old convicted of second-degree robbery challenges his 

sentence as cruel and unusual. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney 

General, and Shawn Harden, County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
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TABOR, J.

Noting he is only “slightly above the age of majority,” Ethan Walztoni

challenges the mandatory minimum aspect of his sentence for second-degree 

robbery as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment of the Federal 

Constitution and article 1, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Because we 

conclude the statutory requirement that he serve seven years of his ten-year 

sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his role in an armed home invasion, 

we affirm.

Eighteen-year-old Walztoni and two accomplices entered the 

Independence home of Adam Yarlott late in the night of February 2, 2014. 

Wearing a mask, Walztoni found a rifle inside the home and pointed it at the 

victim. Meanwhile, his accomplices held the victim down and struck the victim in 

the head with a hammer. Walztoni participated in the crime because he needed 

money for his rent and believed they could steal “weed” from the residents. The 

State originally charged Walztoni with six felony offenses: (1) robbery in the first 

degree, a class “B” felony; (2) burglary in the first degree, also a class “B” felony; 

(3) intimidation with a dangerous weapon, a class “C” felony; (4) and (5) two 

counts of going armed with intent, class “D” felonies, and (6) assault while 

participating in a felony, a class “D” felony. He reached a plea agreement,

reducing the charges to three lesser counts: (1) robbery in the second degree, a 

class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 711.3 (2013), which carried a 

mandatory minimum term of seven years under Iowa Code sections 902.9(d) and 

902.12(5); (2) attempted burglary, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code 
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section 713.4; and (3) assault while participating in a felony, a class “D” felony

under Iowa Code section 708.3, which carried a five-year mandatory minimum 

based on the use of a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code section 902.7. 

Under the agreement, the parties jointly recommended concurrent sentences.

At a combined plea and sentencing hearing, the district court accepted the 

plea agreement and imposed concurrent indeterminate terms of ten years, ten 

years, and five years. The sentencing order noted the mandatory minimums of 

seven years and five years. Walztoni filed a notice of appeal. In his appellate 

brief, Walztoni challenges only the mandatory seventy-percent sentence for the 

second-degree robbery conviction.

Because Walztoni questions the constitutionality of his sentence, our 

review is de novo. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009). He 

may raise this illegal sentence challenge at any time. Id. at 871–72.

Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 

section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit the infliction of cruel and unusual 

punishment. U.S. Const. amend VIII; Iowa Const. art. I, § 17. (“Excessive bail 

shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and 

unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.”). Cruel-and-unusual-punishment 

claims come in two varieties: a categorical approach, seeking to invalidate a 

general sentencing practice, and a gross disproportionality comparison of a 

particular defendant’s sentence with the seriousness of the particular crime. See 

State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 48, 60 (2010)). Walztoni raises the second kind of challenge, arguing the 
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seven-year mandatory minimum is cruel and unusual as applied to his specific 

case.

1 Because Walztoni invokes the Iowa Constitution, “we will apply our more 

stringent gross-disproportionality review to the facts of his case.” See id. at 650.

To determine whether Walztoni’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to 

his crime we turn to the three-step test developed in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 

277, 290–92 (1983) (outlining the objective criteria as (1) the gravity of the 

offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) sentences imposed on other 

criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences imposed for the same crime 

in other jurisdictions). The first factor poses a high burden for Walztoni. See 

Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873 (noting “it is a rare case in which a threshold 

comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an 

inference of gross disproportionality”). Only if a challenge survives this threshold 

test do we progress to the second and third Solem prongs. Id.

During our proportionality review, we are mindful of four principles. Oliver,

812 N.W.2d at 650. First, we defer to legislative determinations of punishment 

and realize a sentence need not adhere to strict proportionality to be 

constitutional. See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872 (opining that “a reviewing court 

is not authorized to generally blue pencil criminal sentences to advance judicial 

perceptions of fairness”); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) 

 

1 Walztoni does not raise a categorical challenge to the mandatory minimum provision. 

Because he was an adult when he committed his offense, his situation is not controlled 

by State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014) (“[O]ur holding today has no 

application to sentencing laws affecting adult offenders. Lines are drawn in our law by 

necessity and are incorporated into the jurisprudence we have developed to usher the 

Iowa Constitution through time. This case does not move any of the lines that currently 

exist in the sentencing of adult offenders.”).
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(emphasizing a reviewing court does not “sit as a ‘superlegislature’ to secondguess policy choices”). Second, although we impose a more rigorous review 

under our state constitution than under its federal counterpart, it remains rare that 

a sentence is so grossly disproportionate to the offense that it satisfies the 

threshold inquiry under Solem. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650 (citing Iowa cases in 

which defendants failed to meet this preliminary standard). Third, we regard a 

recidivist offender as more culpable and, therefore, more deserving of a longer 

sentence than a first-time offender. Id. Fourth, the unique features of a case 

may “‘converge to generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality.’” Id.

at 651 (quoting Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884).

Keeping these principles in mind, we turn to the instant facts and consider 

whether Walztoni’s seven-year mandatory minimum sentence was grossly 

disproportionate to his robbery offense under article 1, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution. In support of his gross disproportionality claim, Walztoni points out 

he “did not personally wield the hammer,” which could have seriously injured the 

victim. He also underscores the fact that the gun he procured in the victim’s 

home and pointed at the victim was not loaded. In addition, he asserts he has no 

prior criminal history and took full responsibility for his offense during sentencing. 

Walztoni’s circumstances are not so unique as to “converge to form a high 

risk of disproportionality.” See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884. Unlike the 

situation in Bruegger, Walztoni’s actions were not “inadvertently caught by a 

broadly written statute.” See Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 651. Walztoni’s conduct—

entering into a home without permission for the purpose of committing theft, 
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aiding and abetting an assault, and threatening an occupant with fear of 

immediate serious injury—falls squarely within the elements of second-degree 

robbery. 

To fully address the proportionality question, we consider the totality of 

circumstances, including the mitigating factors identified by Walztoni, as well as 

other “potential factors that tend to aggravate the gravity of the offense and 

magnify the consequences on [the victim].” See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 886. 

The sentencing court captured the gravity of the offense in its remarks 

concerning the impact on the victim:

[Y]ou put this man in great fear. I can’t imagine the horror that he 

went through to wake up in the middle of the night, have people 

inside his home, someone attacking him, hitting him with a 

hammer, someone point a gun at him; he didn’t know if it was 

loaded or not. 

After considering the features of Walztoni’s case, we do not find the 

mandatory minimum sentence of seven years to be grossly disproportionate to 

the offense of robbery in the second degree. Because the punishment does not 

create an inference of gross disproportionality, we do not need to analyze the 

second and third factors of Solem. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 653.

AFFIRMED.