### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Jul y 13, 200 5 S es sio n

RIC K A . H UGH ES and LISA J. HU GHES v. R ICHA RD C. PO ULT ON and AN NET TE L. PO ULT ON

An Appeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Wilson Cou nty No. 03261 C. K . Sm ith, Chan cellor

No. M2004- 01712-COA-R 3-CV - F iled October 25, 2005

This is a property

dispute betwee n next-door neig hbors over a gate acr oss a drive way

ease ment. The two neig hbors share d a common drive way from the public r oad in front of both properties. After a
c la sh be tw e e n th e tw o n e ig hb or s’ do g s, on e ne ig hb or e re c te d a fe nc e on the bo un da

ry lin e wi th a

g a te

acr oss the other ne ighbor ’s porti on of t he driveway

. This lawsuit followed. The trial court enjoined the def endant ne ighbor

from plac ing the fenc e and g ate over a portion of an easeme nt that was the only exis ting driveway

to the plaintiff’s re sidence on the adjoining pr operty . The trial c ourt found that the g ate wa s not nece ssary for the de fendants’ use and e njoy ment of their pr operty , and held that the def endants’ e rec tion of the g ate constituted an unre asonable interfe renc e with the plaintiffs’ right to use the ea sement. The defe ndants appea led. We affirm, finding that, although the g ate may not have be en an unrea sonable interfe renc e with the plaintiffs’ rig ht to use the e aseme nt, the evidenc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that it wa s not n e c e ssa ry fo r the de fe nd a nts ’

u s e a n d e n

j o ym e n to f

t h e p r o p e r t y.
Rule 3 Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Chancery Court is Aff irm ed

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J
., W.S
., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

Gary Vande ver, L ebanon, T N, for the appellants, Richar d C. Poul ton and Annette L . Poulton.

To mmy Ed mon ds on , N a sh vil le , T N, fo r the app e lle e s, Ric k A . H ug he s a ndLisa J. Hu g he s.

OP IN ION

Th is l a ws uit

te sts the a da g e “ g oo d f

e nc e s ma ke g oo d n e ig hb or s, ” or

in this c a se , g oo d d og s. Def endants/Appe llants Richard and Annette Poul ton (“Poulton”) and Plaintiffs/Appellees R ick and L isa Hug hes (“ Hug hes”) live next door to each other in Wilson County , Tenne ssee. The Hug hes had

a n e a se me nt a c ro ss the Pou lto ns ’ p ro pe rty fo r the on ly

drive way to the ir re sid e nc e . U nti l the e ve ntsT h e re c o rd c o n ta ins no ind ic a tio n o f t h e fate o f t h e un fo rtu n a te b a b y ra b b it. 1

S e e a ttac h e d e x h ib it fo r a n il lus tra tio n o f t h e e a se m e n t. 2

-2- which led to this litigation, t he boundary line betwee n the t wo parcels of property was unfe nced, and the neig hbors pea cea

bly coexisted.
The g enesis of t h i s l i t i gati on occur red on May

4, 2003, when a n alterc ation took place be tw e e n th e Hu g he s’ d og and th e Pou lto ns ’ d og . Ri c o, the Hu g he s’ fi ft e e n- po un d Jac k Ru sse ll T e rr ie r , w a s ap p ar e n tl y

f o n d o f b u n n y r ab b it s

. Sp ic e , th e Po u lt o n s ’ s e v e n ty

- f iv e p o u n d A k it a

- mi x, share d Ricco’s affinity for rabbits. When Rico caug ht a baby bunny rabbit on May 4, 2003, Spice noticed and proce eded to a g g ressively investigate. His subsequent char g e from the Poultons’ y ard

acr oss the property

line into the Hug hes’ y ard f orce d Rico into a fer vent def ense of his prize catch. The e nsuing frac as between the two dog s was viol ent, and proved quite traumatic for the childre n and ad u l t s in attendanc e. Unf ortunately for Rico, he appea

rs to have r ece ived the wor st of the confr ontation, and u l t i m ately require d $279.80 in medical tre atment. Not surprising ly , the 1

a lte rc a tio n b e tw e e n th e tw o d og s le d to ha rdfe e lin g s b e tw e e n th e Hu g he s a ndthe Pou lto ns

. The Hug hes own lot 26 in the Founta in Wood S ubdivision i n Wil son Co unty , and the Poultons own seve n acr es o n l o t 2 5 in the same subdivision. Both trac ts of land share a common drive to a c c e ss the ir pr op e rt ie s fr om a pu bli c ro a d. Th e c omm on drive is l oc a te d o n th e Pou lto ns ’ property . The drive splits i nto a “Y,” with one portion leading to t h e Hu gh es ’ re sidence , and the other portion lea ding to the Poultons’ re sidence

. A creek runs para llel to the publ ic road in front of both homes, and the Poultons’ property is the only

one of the two with a bridg e fo r cr ossing the

c re e k. Th e re fo re , th e sh are d d ri ve is the on ly me a ns of ing re ss ande g re ss f

or bo th p ro pe rt ie s. 2

Th e sh are d d ri ve wa s c re a te d by a pr e vio us ow ne r of the tw o pr op e rt ie s. Af te r the pr op e rty was divided, a nd two distinct properties cr eate d, the forme r o wn er cr ea t ed an e aseme nt for the benef it of lot 26 (eventually the Hug hes’ estate) to acc ess the public roa d acr oss the bridg e on lot 25 (eve ntually

belong ing to the Poultons). The c onvey ance of the prope rty to the Hug hes specified that it was subject to “a n ease ment for Driveway and waterline g rante d for use and bene fit of Tra ct No. 26 acr oss a portion of Tra ct No. 25, of r ecor d at Dee d Book 381, p age 4 4 3
, dated Nove mber 4, 1980.” The convey ance of the servient est at e t o t h e Poultons contained the same lang uag e. A detailed mete s and bounds desc ription of the ease ment provided that it would encompa ss an are a of 300 fee t by

120 fee t, and would perpe tually run with the land. Neither the exist ence , siz e, purpose , nor validity

of the e aseme nt is at issue in thi s liti g ation.

Af ter the Ma y

4, 20 03 , c on fr on ta tio n b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s’ do g s, the Pou lto ns be g a n to construct a

fenc e betwe en the two pr operties. I t is unclea r whe ther the f

ence was tec hnically

located on the Poultons’ property , on the prope rty line itself, or on the Hug hes’ pr operty . Reg ardle ss, the fenc e ran along side the prope rty line, with a g ate ove r the portion of the drive that split t owar d the Hug hes’ r esidenc e. As e rec ted, the fe ncing did not enclose the Poultons’ y ard, it simply ran a long-3-

the boundary

line betwee n the two properties. I nitially
, the g ate a cross the driveway measure d nine f e e t , e i g h ti n c h e s , i n w i d t h
, w h i c h p e r m i t t e d t h e P o u l t o n s ’ v e h i c l e t o e n t e r o r e x i tt h e i r p r o p e r t y.

I n re sp on se to the c on str

uc tio n of the g a te , the Hu g he s fi le d a la ws uit in the Wils on Cou nty Chance ry Court, asserting that the g ate unr easona bly interfe red w ith their rig ht of passag e ac ross the drive way e a se me nt, a ndthat th e g a te wa s n ot n e c e ssa ry fo r the pr e se rv a tio n an d u se of thePou lto ns ’ estate. The Hug hes’ pray er for relief soug ht an injunction pr ohibiting the Poultons from interf ering with the Hug hes’ use of the drive way and re quiring the Poultons t o move the posts of the g ate so that the entrance w ould be wider. I n addition, the Hughes requeste d that the P oultons be enjoined f rom allowing their dog to r oam fre ely on the Hug hes’ property

. Finally
, the Hug h es s o u gh t p u nitive damag es, alleg ing that the Poultons ’ ac tions in constructing the fenc e and g ate we re motivated by spite and malice

.
Af te r f ili ng the c omp la int , th e Hu g he s f ile d a mot ion re qu e sti ng a te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n to require the Poultons t o remove the g ate. I n support of their motion for a temporary

injunction, the Hug hes attac hed an a ffidavit a s s erting that one of their childre n had medica l issues and was fre quently

in need of medical attention. The Hug hes’ affidavit asserted that, on at l east one occa sion sin c e the e re c tio n o f the fe nc e , a n a mbu la nc e c omi ng to the Hu g he s’ ho me ex perien c e d d if fi c ulty neg otiating the na

rrow opening for the g ate lea ding into the Hug hes’ pr operty and as a result was de la y e d inits arriva l.

On Novembe r 4, 2003, pending a full hea ring on the matter, the trial court gr an ted the Hu g he s’ re qu e st f

or a te mpo ra

ry inj un c tio n, a nd or de re d the Pou lto ns to r e mov e the po sts fo r the g a te and widen the g ate f

rom nine fe et t o n o l es s t h an fifteen. More over, the trial court or dere d the Pou lto ns to c e a se a ll c on str uc tio n o f the fe nc e a ndpr op os e d g a te pe nd ing re so lut ionof the la ws uit

.
A benc h trial was he ld on March 15, 2004. There was e x tensive testimony at trial about the

c a nin e c omb a t onMa y

4, 20 03 , a s w e ll a s p ri or

inc ide nts in w hich the Po ult on s’ do g Spi c e c a me
on to t h e n e i g h b o r s ’ p r o p e r t y w i t h u n t o w ar d c o n s e q u e n c e s

. I tw a s u n d i s p u t e d t h a tt h e P ou lto ns ’ decision to ere ct the fe nce and g ate arose from the Hug hes’ understanda ble insistence that Spice be preve nted from c oming into t heir y ard, and the Poultons gave unref uted testimony

that, initially , the Hug hes did not oppose the idea of fe ncing and a g ate.

Prior to installi ng the fe nce, the Poultons did not have the property survey ed to ensure that the fe nce did not enc roac h o n t h e Hug hes’ pr operty ; however , Mr. Hug hes testified that the f ence appea red to ha ve bee n ere cted “ down the prope rty line.” T h e location and dimensions of the driveway ease m en t were not in disput e. The Hug hes testified that, re g ardle ss of the width of the g ate, they did not wan t a gat e ac ross the drivew ay by which they

acc essed their

property . The H u g h e s d i d
, h o w e v e r , w a n tS p i c e c o n t a i n e d t o t h e P o u l t o n s ’ p r o p e r t y.

Mr . Po ult on te sti fi e d that he a nd his so n pu t in a po rt ion of the fe nc ing he int e nd e d to e re c t,

a ndpu t in a

g a te . H e sa id that he pu rc ha se d ad dit ion a l fe nc ing a nd int e nd e d to e nc los e mor e of hisB o t h t he P o ul t o ns’ a t t o rney a nd M r. P o ul t o n al l ud e t o f enci ng “ t hi s b ack sect i o n, ” ap p arent l y i nd i cat i ng t o t he 3

t r i al c ou r t on a n u n n ame d e x h i bi t

. Con s equ en t l y , t h i s Cour t i s u n abl e t o de ci ph er f r om t h e t es t i mon y w h er e M r

. Poul t on i nt end ed t o i nst al l t he ad d i t i o nal f enci ng.

-4- property but stopped after entry of the Nove mber 2003 orde r t em p o ra ri l y enjoining the Poultons 3 from er ecting a g ate acr oss the Hug hes’ driveway ease ment. Mr. Poulton testi fied that he wanted,

a ts o m e p o i n t , t o h a v e h o r s e s o n h i s p r o p e r t y, a n d t o h a v e f e n c i n g ar o u n d h i s e n t i r e p r o p e r t y, allowing the horses a cce ss to the cre ek running in the front of the parties’ front y ards. He said he had neve r owne d horses be fore , and wa s uncertain about when he would ac quire them or how many or what kind he would have. Mr . Poulton emphasiz ed that he w anted f encing and a g ate be tween the parties’ prope rties s o that they could l et their dog Spice out of the house and into the y ard w ithout bo the ri ng ne ig hb or s.

After hearing the testimony , the trial court summed up the leg al standar d as re quiring that the Poultons
, as owners of t he servient estate, establish that the gate acr oss the Hughes’ ease ment was

ne c e ssa ry fo r the Pou lto ns ’ us e a nd e njo y me nt of the ir la nd
, a nd that the g a te did no t un re a so na bly interfe re with the Hughes’ rig ht of passag e. I n his oral ruling , he commente d that there wer e other way s to restrain a

dog , and observed that Mr. Poulton had indicated that he would f ence the entire property if he put horse s on his land. T he trial judg e noted, howe ver, that he did not y et have horses and had f ence d only

a portion of the bounda

ry line betwee n the parties’ properties. Additionally , the trial judg e said, “ . . . if y ou put a g ate in the re, it would not ke ep the dog in. The dog can w alk to the end of the fenc e . . . and just wa lk around it.” Meanwhile, he sa id, the Hug hes would be r equire d to open and c lose the g ate e very time they enter ed or e x ited their y ard. In light of this, the trial court made the f

ollowing f

indings of f

act a nd conclusions of law: the Hug hes hold a 300 foot by 120 foot

e a se me nt ove r the Pou lto n’ s pro pe rty fo r a dr ive way , wa te r lin e , a ndwate r m e te r; that th e Pou lto ns , as the owne rs of the se rvient estate, d o n o t h av e t h e rig ht to build a 300 foot fence to prohibit the Hug hes fr om entering the ease ment; that the Poultons ’ dog , Spice, poses a thr eat to the Hug hes and should be restrained from e nterin g t h e Hug hes’ pr operty ; that the Poultons did not prove that the g a t e s o v e r t h e H u g h e s ’ p r o p e r t y w a s n e c e s s ar y f o r t h e P o u l t o n ’ s u s e a n d e n

j o ym e n to f

t h e i r p r o p e r t y; and, that a g ate wo u l d u n re asonably interfe re w ith the Hug hes’ right of passag e and use of the

ease ment. Thus, the court enjoined the Poultons from placing a g ate ove r the Hug hes’ portion of the driveway and int er fe ri n g wi th the Hug hes’ use of the e aseme nt. Additionally , the Poultons were

e njo ine d f

ro m a llo wi ng the ir

do g to r oa m un res tra ine d, a ndor de re d to le a ve a dis ta nc e of

no le ss than fiftee n fee t be tween posts on either side of the Hug hes’ portion of the driveway

. The trial court declined to a war d the Hughes punitive da mag es, finding that the Poultons l acke d the re quisite malice or intent to support a punitive damag es aw ard. ThePoultons now appe al.

On app e a l, the Pou lto ns raise tw o is su e s f or re so lut ion : (1 ) wh e the r the Chanc e llo r e rr e d in ordering the Poultons to remove the g ate a cross the driveway ; and, (2) whether the Chance llor err ed in finding that the Poultons did not have a right to build a fe nce be tween the p ro p er t i es along the

e a se me nt. Th e Hu g he s a rg ue on app e a l th a t th e Pou lto ns a c te d w ithsu ff ic ie nt m a lic e , in te nt,

rec klessness, or oppre ssion to support an awa rd of punitive damag es, and that the trial court erre d in declining to awar d punitive damag es.A t t he o utset o f t he t rial
, t he t rial jud ge ad d resse d t he H ug he s: 4

N ow I un ders t and y our si t uat i on t hat t hat ’ s goi ng t o be i nconv eni ent t o hav e t o s t op , ge t out an d op en t hat ga t e.

. . . B eca us e wh en I was l i t t l e, we us ed t o hav e t o do i t al l t he t i me. A nd, q ui t e o f t en t hat

was my j ob

. And, I ha t ed ge t t i ng out an d do i ng i t al l t he t i me.
-5- I n a non-jury trial such as this, the trial court’s finding s of fac t a re reviewe d de novo upon the re cord, a ccompa nied by a pre sumption of corre ctness, unless the pre ponderance of the evidenc e is otherwise. Te nn. R. App. P. 13(d). The tria l court’s c onclusions of law, howe ver, a re r eviewe d de novo
, with no pr esumption of corr ectne ss. Carter v. Patrick
, 163 S.W .3d 69, 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

As the tr ia l c ou rt

no te d, in T e nn e sse e , th e g e ne ra l ru le is that a n ow ne r o f a se rv ie nt e state may utiliz e a g ate ove r a right- of-way if the g ate is nece ssary

for the use and enjoyment of the owne r of the servient estate, and if the g ate doe s not unrea sonably interfe re with the dom inant estate’ s rig ht of passa g e over

the ea sement. Col

e v. Dy ch , 5 35 S.W. 2d31 5, 32 0 ( Te nn . 1 97 6) ; Cooper v. Polos
, 89 8 S. W.2 d 2 37 , 2 42 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) ; Myers v . Wilson , 2000 WL 210266, *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 24, 2000). An express provision in a deed establishing, or g ranting the use of, an ease ment can limit the ava ilabilityof such a g ate. Foshee v. Brigm an , 1 29 S.W. 2d20 7, 20 8 ( Te nn . 1 93 9) ; My e rs , 20 00 WL 21 02 66 a t *2 -3 . H ow e ve r, a de e d tha t is sil e nt on the a va ila bil ity of g a te s will no t pr oh ibi t the utiliz ation of a g ate to obstruct the ease ment, so long as the g ate does not unr easona bly interfe re with the rig ht of passag e. Foshee , 129 S.W .2d at 208 (de clar ing that the prevailing rule is that “[u] nless it is ex pressly

stipulated that the way

shall be an ope n one or it appe ars f rom the terms of the g rant or c ircumstance s that such was the intention, the owner of t h e s ervie nt estate may ere ct g ates a cross the w ay .”).

I n the instant case , it is undi sputed that the l ang uag e in the document c reating the e aseme nt does not pr ohibit the Poultons ’ ere ction of the g ate. None of the convey ance s, deeds, or other written ins trume nts of

fe re d fo r pr oo f of the e a se me nt a t tria l c on ta in a ny la ng ua g e lim iti ng thea va ila bil ity of a gate. Consequently
, as di d the t rial j udg e, we focus on the application of the Cole v. Dy ch twopart test re quiring proof of nece ssityand the a

bsence of unre asonable interfe renc e.

T h e r e a s o n ab l e n e s s o f

t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e r e q u i r e s a t o t a l i t y d e t e r m i n a t i o n , m a d e o n a c a s e

- b ycase basis. R e i

d e rv
. O r me , 68 S.W. 2d 96 0, 96 3 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 33 ). Th e reas on abl e ne ss determination requires the court to consider the use of, and purpose for, the ea sement in question. Ogle v. T rotter , 4 95 S.W. 2d 55 8, 56 4 (T e nn . Ct. App . 197 3) . Alth ou g h a g a te a c ro ss the Hu g he s’ drive way wo uldun qu e sti on ably

c aus e so me de la y

e a c h ti me the Hu g he s so ug ht t o e nte r o r e xit th e ir pr op e rty , th e fo c us is o n w he the r i t w ou ld hinde r the ir abil ity to u se thee a se me nt f

or its contemplated pur

pose. See Walker v. M

ag i c In vestment

s, Inc. , 1 98 7 WL

77 22 *1 –2 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Marc h 12, 1987) (r

uling that locke d g ates blocking the rig ht of passag e to a business we re more than a mer e inconve nience , and wer e there fore an unrea sonable interfe renc e with the rig ht of way ). I f the g a te we re ne c e ssa

ry to k e e p th e Pou lto ns ’ dog on the ir pr op e rty , it is d ou btf ul that su c h a

g a te

wo uldbe de e me d a n u nr e a so na ble int e rf e re nc e wi th the Hu g he s’ us e of the ir drive way e a se me nt. 4A s not ed by t he t r i al cour t bel ow, t hi s hol di ng i s not a j udi ci al det er mi nat i on t hat t he P oul t ons ar e pr ohi bi t ed 5

f r om f enc i ng t hei r proper t y i n a manne r t hat woul d e nabl e t hem t o e nj oy t he f ul l bene f i t of t hei r proper t y , i ncl udi ng an appr opr i at e g at e, s h ou l d t h ey de ci de i n t h e f u t u r e t o do s o.

-6- Th e iss ue , th e n, be c ome s whe the r the g a te is ne c e ssa ry fo r the Pou lto ns ’ use a nd e njo y me nt o f the ir property

.

T h e P o u l t o n s , o f

c o u r s e , h a v e a r i g h t t o a l l o w t h e i r d o g s t o r o a m f r e e l y o n t h e i r o w n p r o p e r t y, inc lud ing the e a se me nt, so lon g a s it do e s n ot u nr e a so na bly int e rf e rewi th the Hu g he s’ us e of the ir property and their driveway

ease ment. The trial judge conclude d that the fe ncing that the Poultons plann e d t o im media te ly

e re c t w ou ld b e ine ff

e c tual to ke e p th e Pou lto n’ s d og s o ff of the Hu g he s’ property

. The evidenc e in the rec ord does not pr eponder ate ag ainst this c onclusion. M r. P o u l t on t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a ts o m e u n d e t e r m i n e d p o i n ti n t h e f u t u r e , h e h o p e d t o h a v e h o r s e s o n t h e i r p r o p e r t y, at which time he w ould put fencing around the entire pe rimeter. He did not, howeve r, indicate that he ha d im me diate plans to d o s o. Me a nw hil e , the fe nc ing in pla c e a t the tim e of tr ia l, w hic h r a n o nly along the property line betwee n the Hughes’ and P oulton’s properties, was found by the trial court t o b e i n ad eq u a t e f

o r t h e p u rp o s e o f k ee p i n g t h e d o g o u to f t h e H u gh es ’ y ar d

. T h e t ri al j u d ge ob se rv e d th a t th e do g c ou ld jus t wa lk do wn to the e nd of the fe nc e a nd e nte r the Hu g he s’ pr op e rty from either

the front or

the back. Mr . Poulton t estified that he stoppe d ere cting fenc ing a fter e ntry of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s or de r p ro hib iti ng theus e of a g a te a c ro ss the Hu g he s’ drive way , p e nd ing tr ia l, noting that the f

encing was not usef

ul without a gate. His testimony appea red to indi cate to the trial court the a dditional a

rea s he intended to f

ence , perha

ps pointing to an unnamed e x hibit. At any rate , his testimony in the appellate rec ord does not show the additional ar eas he planned to fe nce. U nder these c ir cu m s t an ce s , we c annot conc lude that the trial c ourt err ed in finding that the fe ncing the Poultons intended to er ect wou ld be inadequate to achie ve the state d objectives, a nd there fore the g a t e a c r o s s t h e H u g h e s ’ d r i v e w a y e a s e m e n tw a s u n n e c e s s ar y. 5

Th e Pou lto ns c on te ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inhold ing that th e y didno t ha ve a

ri g ht t o build a fenc e betwe en the pa rties’ prope rties. The tria l court held that the Poultons “as owne rs of the se rv ie nt e state do no t ha ve a ri g ht t o b uil d a

thr e e hu nd re d f

oo t f e nc e to p ro hib it [th e Hu g he s] from ente ring their ea sement.” The ref ore, the trial court did not prohibit the Poultons from erec ting a fe nce be tween the parties’ properties, only from er ecting fenc ing that w ould keep the H ug hes fr om uti lizin g the drive way

to e nte r the ir

pr op e rty . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.
Finally , the Hug hes ra ise on appea l the issue of punitive damag es, and contend that the trial court e rre d in finding that the Poultons did not act wit h sufficie nt malice to support an a war d of punitive damag es. The Hug hes assert that the Poultons lacke d any compelling rea sons for er ecting the fe n ce

. Ho weve r, a substantial portion of the trial testimony conce rned the need to ke ep the Poultons ’ dog s off of the Hug hes’ pr operty , and the testimony indicated a s well th at t he Hug hes initially supported the Poultons ’ proposal to f ence their property

. Fr om our revie w of the re cord, w e cannot f ind that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the t rial court’s conclusion t hat t he Hug hes we re
no t e nti tle d to pu nit ive da ma g e s.-7-

Th e deci si on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

is a ff ir me d. Cos ts o n a

pp e a l area sse sse d o ne -h a lf to De fe nd a nts /A pp e lla nts Ric ha rdPoult on a ndAn ne tte Pou lto n, a ndthe ir su re ty , a ndon e -h a lf

to Pla int if fs /A pp e llees Ri c k A . H ug he s a ndLisa J. Hu g he s, fo r w hic h e xec uti on ma y iss ue , if

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE