[Cite as State v. Payne, 2016-Ohio-2819.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

BROLIN PAYNE 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 27947 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 2012 01 0028 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: May 4, 2016 

 

SCHAFER, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Brolin Payne, appeals the judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas denying his successive petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} This Court affirmed Payne’s convictions for rape and gross sexual imposition on 

direct appeal. See State v. Payne, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26655, 2013-Ohio-5230, ¶ 26. 

However, while the direct appeal was still pending before this Court, Payne filed a Motion to 

Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction or Sentence with the trial court. The trial court 

denied Payne’s petition, finding that the claims were barred by res judicata. Payne did not 

appeal the trial court’s denial of his petition. On December 23, 2014, Payne filed a Motion to 

Amend Post Conviction Petition with Leave. The trial court construed Payne’s motion as a 

second or successive petition for post-conviction relief and denied it on March 25, 2015 for 

failing to meet the criteria set forth in R.C. 2953.23. 
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{¶3} Payne filed this timely appeal, presenting two assignments of error for this 

Court’s review. To facilitate our analysis, we elect to address both of Payne’s assignments of 

error together. 

Assignment of Error I 

Law enforcement officers misconduct denied the petitioner his privileges and 

immunities, due process, and equal protection under the law guaranteed to 

him by the 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution by 

performing an illegal wiretap without the petitioner’s consent or “oral 

approval for interception” which further denied the petitioner’s 4th and 5th 

Amendment Rights to the U.S. Constitution. [Sic]. 

Assignments of Error II 

Trial court deprived the petitioner freedom self incrimination and due 

process of law guaranteed to him by the 5th and 14th Amendment to the 

United States Constitution by allowing the admission use and disclosure of 

the contents of a “wire communication” from an illegal wiretap in a hearing 

and trial without presenting 10 days before the hearing or trial a copy of a 

written representation of a judge of a court of common pleas or of a 

prosecuting attorney that a “oral order interception without warrant” had 

been granted pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2933.57, 2933.62(B) or 

18 USCS § 2518 et seq. [Sic]. 

{¶4} In his two assignments of error, Payne challenges the propriety of law 

enforcement’s “one party consent call” and the trial court’s decision to admit the tape of the 

phone call into evidence at trial. Payne asserts that the “one party consent call” and the trial 

court’s decision to admit the taped phone call into evidence both constitute constitutional 

violations. We decline to address the merits of the assignments of error, however, as we 

conclude that the trial court was correct in determining that it lacked the authority to consider 

Payne’s successive petition for post-conviction relief. 

{¶5} This Court has recognized that “[s]uccessive petitions for post-conviction relief 

are governed by R.C. 2953.23.” State v. Kyle, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25974, 2012-Ohio-456, ¶ 7. 

R.C. 2953.23(A) precludes trial courts from “entertain[ing]” untimely petitions for post-
3 

 

conviction relief unless one of the statute’s exceptions applies. Since this matter does not 

involve DNA testing, the only possible exception that could apply in this matter is the one 

contained in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). This provision requires that the petitioner establish two 

conditions: (1) that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he 

relies in the petition, or that the United States Supreme Court has, since his last petition, 

recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to the petitioner; and (2) 

showing by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable factfinder would not have found him 

guilty but for constitutional error at trial. See R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). “A defendant’s failure to 

either timely file a petition for post-conviction relief or meet his burden under R.C. 

2953.23(A)(1) deprives a trial court of [authority] to entertain the petition.” State v. Taylor, 9th 

Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010549, 2014-Ohio-5738, ¶ 9. 

{¶6} Here, the trial court denied Payne’s second or successive petition for postconviction relief after concluding that the petition did not meet the criteria set forth in R.C. 

2953.23. Payne does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s conclusion that he failed to meet 

his burden under R.C. 2953.23. As such, we determine that the trial court did not err in denying 

Payne’s successive petition for post-conviction relief. 

{¶7} Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

III. 

{¶8} The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
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 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JULIE A. SCHAFER 

 FOR THE COURT 

MOORE, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

BROLIN PAYNE, pro se, Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.