CLD-043 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-3409

___________

MARYANN COTTRELL;

RICHARD HOLLAND

Richard Holland,

Appellant

v.

GOOD WHEELS; CUCUNATO INC.; CARMINE CUCUNATO;

CHRISTINE CUCUNATO; SETH FOX; ABC CORPORATION, fictional;

XYZ PARTNERSHIP, fictional

____________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-01738)

District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 17, 2011

Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 23, 2012)

_________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________

PER CURIAM

Richard Holland appeals pro se the order of the District Court entering final 
2

judgment in favor of the defendants. Because we conclude that this appeal presents no 

substantial question, we will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

I.

In April 2008, plaintiffs Richard Holland and Maryann Cottrell filed a pro se 

complaint in District Court against the Good Wheels car dealership and certain 

employees (“Good Wheels”) alleging unlawful retaliation under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), 

violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), and false imprisonment. 

Holland and Cottrell live together and care for Cottrell’s severely disable child, and are 

advocates for the disabled. They contact public authorities about businesses that do not 

provide required access for disabled persons, and lodge citizens’ complaints regarding 

improper use of parking spaces designated for persons with disabilities.

Holland testified that he shopped at Good Wheels, a car dealership, several times. 

During those visits he noticed cars parked in designated spaces without proper tags. On 

several occasions in February and March 2006, he took photos of improperly parked 

vehicles and filed citizen complaints. In April 2006, Holland arranged to meet a friend at 

Good Wheels to help him shop for a vehicle. The friend did not arrive, but Holland 

spoke to a Good Wheels employee named “Seth Greene” regarding a car. While Holland 

was leaving, a Good Wheels salesman, Seth Fox, stopped his car in front of Holland’s, 

walked over to Holland’s car and told him that he was not welcome at Good Wheels and 

that he was disrupting customers by taking photos of the parking spaces. 
3

Good Wheels disputed Holland’s allegation that he was on the premises to shop 

with a friend. It stated that if Holland had discussed a car with a sales representative, the 

conversation would have been logged in a “salesman report.” Fox testified that Holland 

could still have exited the premises by driving around Fox’s car. 

In September 2009, the District Court dismissed Cottrell from the suit for lack of 

standing, and denied Good Wheels’ motion to dismiss as to Holland. Both parties moved 

for summary judgment, and, in March 2011, the court denied Holland’s motion and 

granted summary judgment in favor of Good Wheels. Holland filed a motion seeking

reconsideration and relief from summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 59(e) and 60(b), which the District Court denied in August 2011. Holland 

filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing a District Court’s 

grant of summary judgment, we apply the same test the District Court applied. Saldana 

v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is proper when, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all 

inferences in that party's favor, there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 232; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or 

denials of the . . . pleading,” but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); 
4

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).

We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, while 

reviewing a District Court’s underlying legal determinations de novo and its factual 

determinations for clear error. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 

176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).

III.

A. Summary Judgment

The District Court first rejected Good Wheels’ arguments that Holland lacked 

standing to bring his claims and that the ADA and NJLAD do not apply to his activities. 

It then turned to Holland’s retaliation claim. To prove a claim of retaliation under the 

ADA and NJLAD, a plaintiff must first establish that (1) he was engaged in protected 

conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken; and (3) there is a causal link between the 

protected conduct and the adverse action and applied the burden-shifting framework. See

e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 757 (2004) (elements of 

prima facie case of retaliation in an ADA claim); Victor v. State, 4 A.3d 126, 141 (NJ 

2010) (elements of a prima facie case of retaliation in a NJLAD claim). Once a prima 

facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to present a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The plaintiff must then prove that the defendant’s proffered 

reasons were merely a “pretext for discrimination.” See Id. at 804. The District Court 

noted that this framework, though developed in the employment context, has been 
5

applied to discrimination claims regarding public accommodations. See Fahim v. 

Marriott Hotel Servs., 551 F.3d 444, 350-51 (5th Cir. 2008).

The District Court determined that Holland had stated a prima facie case of 

retaliation. The court then noted that Good Wheels had stated a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for banning Holland from its premises—that other Good 

Wheels customers were disturbed by Holland’s presence and actions and were distracted 

from their purpose for being at Good Wheels. The District Court then turned to Holland, 

but found that he offered no evidence to prove that Good Wheels’ proffered reason was 

pretextual. Thus, the District Court granted summary judgment to Good Wheels on 

Holland’s retaliation claim. Because Holland’s NJCRA claim hinged on his retaliation 

claim under the ADA and NJLAD, the District Court also granted summary judgment on 

the NJCRA claim.

Finally, the District Court granted summary judgment to Good Wheels on 

Holland’s false imprisonment claim. False imprisonment involves (1) the detention of a 

person against his will and (2) lack of legal authority or justification. Leang v. Jersey 

City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d 1097, 1117 (N.J. 2009) (internal questions omitted). The 

District Court found that Holland did not present any evidence in response to Fox’s 

testimony that Holland could have driven around Fox’s car and exited the premises 

through the driveway.

B. Reconsideration

Holland sought reconsideration and relief from summary judgment so that the 
6

District Court could consider Good Wheels’ recent acts and statements as new evidence 

of pretext, as well as evidence in the record that the court did not consider. He also 

argued that the court misapplied the summary judgment standard, the burden-shifting 

analysis, and the mixed-motive analysis. 

1. Rule 59(e)

A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must rely on one of three grounds: 

(1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need 

to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA 

Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). 

Holland claimed that “material” developments in the intervening time since the 

parties’ final submissions at the summary judgment stage demonstrate that Good Wheels’ 

reasons for banning him were pretextual. He pointed to the several citizen complaints he 

filed, his documentation of Good Wheels’ further violations, and a video recording of a

verbal altercation between himself and Good Wheels’ employees. The District Court

properly determined that it could not consider any events that took place after the time 

the parties completed their submissions at summary judgment. See Howard Hess Dental 

Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).

Holland claimed that the District Court overlooked testimony from Good Wheels 

employees who stated that they were aggravated by Holland’s activities. However, on 

reconsideration, the court noted that it did consider such evidence, and reiterated that 

Good Wheels overcame the prima facie case of retaliation by providing a 
7

nondiscriminatory reason for banning him from the premises. Holland also argued that in 

dismissing his false imprisonment claim, the court failed to consider his claim that he was 

trapped. The District Court noted that the issue was fully briefed, that the evidence 

showed that Holland was not detained, and properly concluded that Holland merely 

disagreed with its decision.

Next, Holland claimed that the District Court misapplied the summary judgment 

burden-shifting standard of McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. As stated above, 

the District Court first found that Holland had stated a prima facie case of retaliation 

under the ADA and NJLAD, then determined that Good Wheels provided a 

nondiscriminatory reason for the action, and concluded that Holland presented no

evidence demonstrating that that reason was pretextual. On reconsideration, Holland 

merely argued that his characterization of the facts was correct, not that the District Court 

misapplied the framework. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

reconsideration based on this claim. 

Finally, Holland claims that the District Court misapplied the mixed-motive 

analysis, which applies when legitimate motives for a challenged action coexist with

discriminatory motives. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009). If a 

plaintiff can show that the discriminatory motive and the challenged action are linked, the 

burden then shifts to the defendant to show that it is “more likely than not” that the 

legitimate motive was the primary reason behind the action. See id. The District Court 

undertook the mixed-motive analysis sua sponte at summary judgment. It rejected 
8

Holland’s argument that Good Wheels failed to show that their proffered 

nondiscriminatory reason was their primary motive. On reconsideration, the court 

remained convinced. As Holland failed to present any evidence that Good Wheels acted 

with primarily discriminatory motives, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse 

its discretion.

2. Rule 60(b)

Holland also sought relief from summary judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), which 

provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for “mistake, 

inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” He claimed that counsel misread Good Wheels’ 

brief and failed to address relevant portions of the record. The District Court properly 

determined that such an error is not a special circumstance that requires the extraordinary 

relief provided by Rule 60(b). See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). 

Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief 

under Rule 60(b). 

IV.

Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 

affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.