claim upon which relief may be granted" and dismissed her complaint 

pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). Iorio argues that the district court's decision 

was in error because Check City violated NRS 604A.415 and invaded 

Iorio's privacy. 

Dismissing a complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) is 

appropriate "only if it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could 

prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." 

Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 

672 (2008). However, if matters outside the pleadings are considered, this 

court reviews a dismissal order as though it were an order granting 

summary judgment. Witherow v. State Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, 123 Nev. 

305, 307-08, 167 P.3d 408, 409 (2007); see also NRCP 12(b). Summary 

judgment must be granted when the pleadings and evidence in the record 

"demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact [remains] and 

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 

Witherow, 123 Nev. at 308, 167 P.3d at 409 (alteration in original) 

(internal quotations omitted). "A genuine issue of material fact 

exists . . . when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party." Id. 

Here, the district court considered matters outside the 

pleadings when it granted Check City's motion to dismiss, or alternatively, 

for summary judgment. Accordingly, we review the district court's order 

dismissing Iorio's complaint as though it granted summary judgment. 

Iorio has failed to demonstrate that Check City violated NRS 

6044.415 

Chapter 604A of the Nevada Revised Statutes regulates short 

term lending in Nevada. When a licensed lending institution's customer 

defaults on a loan and the licensee attempts to collect the debt owed, the 

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"licensee must act in accordance with and must not violate sections 803 to 

812, inclusive, of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as 

amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a to 1692j, inclusive." NRS 604A.415(1). The 

parties do not dispute that Check City is a licensed lending institution 

under NRS 604A. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) defines 

"debt collector" as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate 

commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is 

the collection of any debts . . ." 115 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). 2 

Iorio first contends that Check City violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 

1692c(a)(1) and 1692c(a)(3) of the FDCPA by contacting her at her place of 

employment after she orally revoked her prior consent to be contacted 

there. If a debt collector has the consent of the consumer or a court's 

express permission, the debt collector can contact the consumer at an 

unusual time or place known to be inconvenient or at the consumer's place 

of employment. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(1), (3) (2012). A violation occurs if 

the debt collector does not have the consumer's consent or the express 

permission of a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. at § 1692c(a). In 

addition, a consumer must notify the debt collector in writing if the 

consumer wishes to terminate communications from a debt collector. Id. 

at § 1692c(c). 

IA person "may include labor organizations, partnerships, 

associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in 

bankruptcy, or receivers." Black's Law Dictionary 1142 (6th ed. 1990). 

2Check City asserts that it is not a debt collector as defined by the 

FDCPA but acknowledges that it is still subject to the FDCPA pursuant to 

NRS 604A.415(1), which explicitly mandates that licensed lending 

institutions are subject to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a to 1692j. 

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The record clearly demonstrates that Iorio entered into a loan 

agreement with Check City authorizing Check City to communicate with 

third parties regarding her debt and to contact her at work. However, 

there is no indication in the record that Iorio notified Check City in 

writing to cease communications at her workplace. As a result, Iorio has 

failed to demonstrate that Check City violated § 1692c(a)(1) or § 

1692c(a)(3). 

Iorio also contends that Check City made misleading legal 

threats in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), and that its failure to identify 

itself as a debt collector in communications violated § 1692e(11). "A debt 

collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or 

means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 

(2012). Section 1692e(5) prohibits "[t]he threat to take any action that 

cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken." 

Here, Check City contacted Iorio at work on three occasions. 

On each occasion, the caller left a voicemail message for Iorio identifying 

herself and stating that she was with Check City. On the third occasion, 

Check City's representative left a message stating that "[i]f [she did] not 

hear from [Iorio] by 5 PM," she would "forward [the matter] to the 

attorney's office on Monday." After receiving no response to this voicemail 

message from Iorio, Check City filed its complaint within approximately 

six weeks after leaving the allegedly misleading voicemail message. 

Because Check City could, and in fact did, take legal action against Iorio 

pursuant to NRS 604A.415(1) and (2), Iorio has also failed to demonstrate 

that Check City violated § 1692e(5). 

Pursuant to § 1692e(11), a debt collector violates the FDCPA 

when it fails to disclose "that the debt collector is attempting to collect a 

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debt and that any information obtained will be used for that 

purpose . . [and/or] that the communication is from a debt collector." 

However, explicitly excluded from the FDCPA's definition of "debt 

collector" is "any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the 

creditor, collecting debts for such creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A) 

(2012). A creditor is "any person who offers or extends credit creating a 

debt or to whom a debt is owed." Id. at § 1692a(4). 

Here, while Check City may not be a debt collector as defined 

by the FDCPA, it does meet the FDCPA's definition of a creditor. As such, 

we conclude that Check City's employees were attempting to collect a debt 

"in the name of the creditor." Id. at 1692a(6)(A). 3 

3Moreover, even if Check City's employees failed to disclose that 

they were calling to collect a debt for Check City, Iorio was not an 

unsophisticated consumer who reasonably would not have known what 

these calls were about. Pursuant to McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & 

Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2011), "[t]he FDCPA measures 

a debt collector's behavior according to an objective 'least sophisticated 

debtor' standard, . . . ensur[ing] that the FDCPA protects all consumers, 

the gullible as well as the shrewd, the ignorant, the unthinking, and the 

credulous." (internal quotations omitted). However, "even the least 

sophisticated consumer can be presumed to possess a rudimentary amount 

of information about the world." Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 

F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). 

Here, Iorio entered into a loan contract with Check City and then 

wrote three checks to Check City to pay back loans she took out pursuant 

to the contract. After the checks were dishonored by Iorio's bank, Check 

City immediately demanded repayment from Iorio by sending her notices 

for the returned checks. Because Iorio is the person who entered into the 

loan contract with Check City, wrote three checks payable to Check City to 

pay back loans obtained pursuant to the contract, and those checks were 

returned by Iorio's bank to Check City, she knew or should have known 

that Check City was calling to collect a debt. In addition, at the time she 

entered into the loan contract with Check City, Iorio was employed as a 

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lorio did not sufficiently demonstrate that Check City invaded her 

privacy by intrusion upon seclusion 

Iorio next argues that she had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy at her place of employment because she orally revoked her 

previous consent to be contacted at work. We disagree. 

In order for an individual to bring a claim for invasion of 

privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion, the individual must show: "1) 

an intentional intrusion (physical or otherwise); 2) on the solitude or 

seclusion of another; 3) that would be highly offensive to a reasonable 

person." PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 615, 630, 895 P.2d 1269, 

1279 (1995), overruled on other grounds by City of Las Vegas Downtown 

Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 644, 650, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (1997). 

As discussed above, Iorio consented to be contacted at work 

when she entered into the loan contract with Check City, and this consent 

was not revoked in writing as required under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). 

Accordingly, she did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy at her 

place of work. In addition, Iorio does not address the third element—

whether Check City's actions would be "highly offensive to a reasonable 

person," PETA, 111 Nev. at 630, 895 P.2d at 1279, and we thus do not 

consider whether this element has been met. See Edwards v. Emperor's 

Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) 

(stating that this court need not consider claims that are not cogently 

argued or supported by relevant authority). Since Iorio has failed to prove 

...continued 

processor by a consumer debt relief law firm in the firm's loan 

modification department. Accordingly, any claim that Check City violated 

the FDCPA during its phone calls to Iorio at her place of work by failing to 

fully identify itself as a debt collector is without merit. 

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each of the three required elements, we conclude that her claim for 

invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion fails. 

Because Iorio has failed to demonstrate that Check City 

violated NRS 604A.415, or sufficiently prove her claim for invasion of 

privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion, the district court correctly 

found that Iorio failed to put forth any facts that would entitle her to 

relief. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in granting 

Check City's motion for summary judgment pursuant to NRCP 56(c). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Check City's 

motion for Rule 11 sanctions and for attorney fees pursuant to NRS 

18.010(2)(b) 

This court reviews a district court's decision to award attorney 

fees pursuant to NRCP 11 and NRS 18.010(2)(b) for an abuse of discretion. 

Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 674-76, 856 P.2d 560, 563-64 (1993). A 

district court abuses its discretion when it acts "in clear disregard of the 

guiding legal principles." Id. at 674, 856 P.2d at 563. 

Iorio argues that because her claims are meritorious and were 

not filed for any improper purpose, the district court abused its discretion 

by imposing Rule 11 sanctions against her and awarding attorney fees to 

Check City pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b). We disagree. 

"NRCP 11 sanctions should be imposed for frivolous actions." 

Bergmann, 109 Nev. at 676, 856 P.2d at 564. In order to determine 

whether a claim is frivolous, the district court must conduct a two-pronged 

analysis: "(1) the court must determine whether the pleading is well 

grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 

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argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law;[ 4] and 

(2) whether the attorney made a reasonable and competent inquiry." Id. 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). Additionally, if a district court 

imposes sanctions, it must describe the conduct it determined violated 

NRCP 11 and "explain the basis for the sanction imposed." NRCP 11(c)(3). 

Before reaching its decision in this case, the district court 

thoroughly reviewed the parties' pleadings and conducted hearings on 

both Check City's motion to dismiss and its motion for sanctions and 

attorney fees, giving the parties an adequate opportunity to present the 

merits of their case. See Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 124 Nev. 

951, 967-68, 194 P.3d 96, 106 (2008) (stating that the appropriateness of 

attorney fees awarded pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b) "requires the court to 

inquire into the actual circumstances of the case"). 

Moreover, at the hearing on its sanctions motion, Check City 

presented evidence showing that its attorney requested on more than one 

occasion that Iorio's attorney explain the legal basis for his client's claims 

against Check City because those claims did not appear to be well 

grounded in existing law. Check City even went so far as to warn Iorio's 

attorney that it would file a motion for sanctions and attorney fees since 

Iorio's claims were not warranted by law. As Check City pointed out, the 

4Attorney fees awarded pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b) requires an 

analysis similar to this first prong. See Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, 

LLC, 124 Nev. 951, 967, 194 P.3d 96, 106 (2008) (stating that attorney fees 

are appropriate under NRS 18.010(2)(b) if the court "finds that a claim 

was frivolous or brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to 

harass the prevailing party"); see also NRS 18.010(2)(b) (permitting an 

award of attorney fees to the prevailing party "when the court finds that 

the claim . . . was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to 

harass the prevailing party"). 

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law firm representing Iorio holds itself out as specializing in consumer 

debt relief, and, as such, Iorio's attorney should have been familiar with 

the requirements of NRS 604A.415 and the FDCPA. There is no 

indication in the record to illustrate that Iorio's attorney ever provided a 

satisfactory response; rather, he simply referred Check City back to the 

general allegations in Iorio's complaint. 

We conclude that the district court conducted the proper twoprong analysis, and that the court's decision to grant Rule 11 sanctions 

and award attorney fees to Check City pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b) was 

not an abuse of discretion, especially in light of its proper order granting 

summary judgment. 5 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

5Iorio also contends that the district court's order is deficient 

because it does not provide a basis for the sanctions as required by NRCP 

11(c)(3); however, we conclude that this argument is without merit. The 

district court specifically concluded that Check City was entitled to Rule 

11 sanctions because Iorio's complaint was "not supported by existing law 

and was presented for an improper purpose." The court further concluded 

that Check City was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to NRS 

18.010(2)(b) because Iorio's complaint was "filed without reasonable 

grounds and to harass" Check City. 

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cc: Hon. Douglas Smith, District Judge 

Janet Trost, Settlement Judge 

Haines & Krieger, LLC 

Bailey Kennedy 

Holland & Hart LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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