### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 416 -CR

G r e go r y C har le s G or m an , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

FR OM C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 2 OF WI L L IA MS ON C OU N T Y NO. 06- 4495 -2 , HO NORAB LE TIM OTH Y L. WRIGHT , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found appe llant Greg ory

Charles Gor

ma n g u il ty o f s e r v in g a lc o h olic bever ag es to a minor. See Te x. Al c o. B e v. Co de Ann . § 10 6. 06 (a ) ( Wes t 20 07 ). Go rm an w a s se nte nc e d to confine ment for 365 da

y s, suspended for

a period of 24 months, and a $4,000 fine, half of which w as probate d. On appe al, Gorma n argues that the trial c ourt err ed in allowing the S t at e to introduce evidenc e of e x trane ous acts of pr oviding a lcohol to a minor. Be cause we have dete rmined that the trial court did not er

r in admitting evidenc e of extraneous acts, we aff irm the judgme nt of

conviction.

BACK GR OUND Th e e ve nts g ivi ngri se to G or man’ s c on vic tio n—

the fa c ts o f whic h a

re larg e ly disputed—took place on F ebru ar y 11, 2006. At that time, Gorman wa s employ ed as the manag er of the B rookly

n Pie Company , a re staurant in Ge org etown, Te x as. The vic tim in this case, L .F., a sevente en-y ear -old employ ee at the restaur ant, testified that on the nig ht in question, she stay ed at2

the re staurant a fter c losing to help Gorman clea n up. She further

testified that Gorma

n offe red he r an alcoholic drink, which she acc epted, a nd that she then watched Gor man pour diff

ere nt ty pes of alcohol into a bucke t, cre ating a mix ture that wa s light g ree n in color and t h at she thoug ht “was supposed to be like a ma

rg arita.” L .F. testified that she dipped a c up into the bucket and dr ank fr om it periodically

while clea

ning the restaur ant, noting that the last thing she r emember s from the eveningwas “ sitti ngon the stool list ening to music, talking to [Gorman].”

Todd Wag ner, L .F.’ s boy friend a t the time of the incident, testified that he had made plans with L .F. for t hat particular evening , and that af ter seve ral unsucc essful attempts to contac t her t h r o u g h p h o n e c a l l s an d t e x t m e s s a g e s , h e b e c a m e c o n c e r n e d an d dr o v e t o B r o o k l ynP i e C o mp an y. When he ar

rived, Wag ner obse rved L .F.’ s car parke d outside and hea

rd loud m u sic playing f

rom inside the resta

urant. Ac cordingto Wagne r, he knoc ked on the door and windows of the restaur ant fo r ap pr o xi m a t e l y

f i v e t o t e nm i nu t e s , b u tr e c e i v e d n o r e s p o n s e . H e t h e nc a l l e d s o m e f r i e n d s, including Chris S harp, also a witness at t rial, for assistance

. Sharp and the other boy s arr ived on the

scene approximately

ten to fiftee n minutes later and the y c ontinued to knock until Gorman answe red. I n response to the boy s’ questions about L .F.’ s where abouts, Gorman insisted that she was not in the restaur ant and that she had been pi cked up by friends in a

black SUV e arlier

in the night. Gor

man acknow ledg ed in his testimony that he li ed to Wagne r and his friends a bout L .F.’ s prese nce in the building, stating that he had be en conc erne d about the boy s’ intentions.

Wagne r testified that he then pl ace d a phone call to J oan Surko, L .F.’ s mother, and passed the phone to Gorman, who told Surko that L .F. wa s not inside the restaur ant, and that she had been pic ked up by

friends in a

black L incoln towncar

.T h ere is some dispute reg ardingwhether Gorman r eente red the restaur ant prior to the 1 arr ival of the police . Gorman testified that he re mained outside, while both Wag ner a nd Sharp testified that Gorma

n went bac k into the restaur ant. Off icer R o b bins, the first office r to arr ive on t h e s ce n e, t es t i fi edt h at h e c o u l d n o tre ca l l w h et h er

Go rm an wa s o u t s i d e w h en h e a rr i v ed , s t at i n g, “I don’t re m em b er if he wa s standing r ight ther e in the fr ont door, or if I actua lly knocked on the door. Seems like I

knocked on it, but I ’m not—I ’m not a hundre d perc ent on that.” Robbins further testified, af

ter re viewing his incident report , that the re port implies that Gorman wa s outside the restaur ant when the police ar rived. After revie wing his incident repor t, Robbins t estified on cr oss-examination that the re port 2 indicated t h at Go rm an re fused to re spond to questions reg ardingwhether any one wa s inside the restaur ant. 3

B oth Sha rp and Wag ne r t e sti fi e d th a t a s th e y we re ta lki ngto G or

man, L .F . c a me to the door in the nude for a few brief moments befor e withdrawing into the restaurant a nd closing the door. They

further testified that Gorma

n insisted that the woman they had see n was his g irlfriend, wh o wa s visiti ng for Va lentine’s Da y wee kend. O n e o f th e b o y s c a ll e d th e p o li c e an d then,

a c c or din g to Wa g ne r a

nd Sha rp , G or man r e e nte re d th e re sta

ur ant. 1 Offic er Robbins of the Geor g etown Police De partment wa s the first offic er to a rrive on the sce ne in re sponse to Wagne r’s call, and sever al office rs followed. Acc ording to Robbins’s t es t i m o n y , Go rm an i n fo rm edt h e o ff i ce rs t h at n o o n e el s e wa s i n s i d e t h e b u i l d i n g. Gorman a g ree d 2 to allow a sea

rch of the building a

nd during th e sear ch, Robbins discovere d L .F. “ tucked down” behind a f

ree zer, in the space betwee n the fre ezer a nd the wall. Robbins t es t ified that the fr eezer

“ ha d b e e n mo ve d o ut w he re so me bo dy c ou ld g e t in

th ere, ” an d th a t he did

no t be lie ve L .F . c ou ld have g ott e n h e rs e lf

be hin d th e fr e e zer

be c a us e “ [s]he wo uld

have ha d to c lim

b on top of

the c he st fre ezer a nd then climb back down, and then g et in that position. I don’t think she would have be en capa ble of doingthat.” Robbins further testified t hat bec ause L .F. wa s intox icated a nd unresponsive, h e wa s forc ed to phy sically lift her fr om behind the fre ezer. Robbins also noted that he did notSever al wi t nesses, includingpolice off icer s and fe llow employ ees w ho returne d to the 3 restaur ant afte r lear

ning that emer g ency vehicles wer e on the premises, testified that they h ad observe d cups at the scene, c ontaining what appe are d to be an a lcoholic beve rag e. The number of cups, the c ontents and temper ature of ea ch cup, and whether or not li pstick marks we re pr esent on the side of any particula

r cup was disputed at trial. For our purposes, it is sufficie nt to note that cups containing alcoholic be vera g es we re obse rved at the scene

. 4 believe L .F., who w as fully clothed whe n Robbins f o u n d her be hind the fre ezer, wa s capa ble of dressingherse lf in her intoxi cate d state.

Surko, L .F.’ s mother, testified that by the time she g ot to the scene at some point after the arr iva l of

the po li ce, L .F . w a s n o lo ng e r u nr e sp on siv e bu t ha d b e c ome a g g re ssi ve and vio le nt, “[f]l ailing he r ar

ms and her ha

nds, scre aming and hollering .” EMS transported L .F. to Ge org etown Hospital, where it was deter mined that she had a

blood-alcohol leve l of .247. Gorman’ s testi m o ny

reg ardingthe eve nts on the night in question diffe red sig nif ic antl y fr om L .F .’ s te sti mony . A c c or din gto G or man, L .F . d id n ot r e ma in at th e re sta ur ant t o help clea n up afte r closing , but instead left with frie nds and re turned some time later , appea ring “twitchy and ner vous.” Gorma

n testified that when L .F. r eturne d, he g ave he r a cup of citrus soda from the r estaura

nt soda fountain, while he continued to drink fr om a bucke t of marg aritas that he h a d p r e p ar e d e ar l i e r i nt h e d ay. Gorman further testified that he sat and talked with L .F. in orde r 3 “to find out what was g oing on,” unt il Wagne r and his friends ar rived. He also explained that there

wer e two cups c ontaining a lcoholic bever ag es at the scene beca use he ha d inadver

tently added too much salt to his drink, and was usinga sec on d cu p to dilute the first. Gorman maintaine d that he did not offer

or provide a lcohol to L .F. at any time on the night in question.5 The jury found Gorman g uilty

of neg lige ntly

servingalcoholic be vera g e to a minor. Se e id . The trial c ourt sentenc ed him to one y ear ’s confine ment, suspended f or 24 months, and a $4,000 fine, ha lf of which w as probated, and Gor man now appe als his conviction.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to a dmi t e vid e nc e of e xtra ne ou s a c ts i s r e vie we d f

or an a bu se of discre tion. Sa e nz

v . S tate , 8 43 S.W. 2d

24 , 26 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). A tri a l c ourt sh ou ld o nly be re ve rs e d f

or an a bu se of dis c re tio n wh en the de c isi on lie s o uts ide the zon e of re a so na ble disag ree ment. W

alte rs v . S

tate , 247 S.W .3d 204, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Trial cou rt s h ave br oa d d isc re tio n in

the ir e vid e nti ary

ru lin g s b e c a

us e “ tr ia l cou

rt s are us ua lly

in t he be st p os iti on

to make the c all o n wh et h er cer tain evidenc e should be a dmitted or excluded.” Gu zm an v . S

tate , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

DI SCU SSIO N I n a sing le i ssue on appe al, Gorma n argues that the trial c ourt err ed in admitting evidence t h at he had committed ext rane ous acts of g iving a lcohol to a minor. This evidenc e wa s admitted throug h the testimony of C.J ., a for mer e mploy ee at the Br ookly n Pie Company . C.J ., who

wa s se ve nt een at the t ime of he r e mpl oy

me nt a t th e re sta

ur ant, te sti fi e d th a t G or

man w ou ld fre quently

offe r her alcohol while she was wor king f or him, and that he ha d occa sionally poured alcohol into her dr inks without her knowledg e or pe rmission. C.J. a lso te stifi ed, in r e sp on se to questions on cross-e x amination, that Gorman w as able to surreptitiously offe r her alco h ol duringC.J

. testified, “Most of the time [Gorman] would pull me aside, or in the bathr oom back 4 to the cabine t, and direc tly hand m e a bott le and tell me to take a swigor a shot.” She f urther testified that Gorma

n would offe r her

alcohol “a lmost every

shift.” 6 working hours without a ny one noticing, even though other employ ees wer e p resent in the

sma ll r e sta

ur ant. 4 Go rm ano b

j e c t e d t o C

. J. ’ s t e s t i m o n y , ar g u i n g t h a ti tc o n s t i tu t e d i n a dm i s sib le propensity

evidenc e, see Tex. R. Evi d. 404(b), a nd that its probative value was outweig hed by the dang er of unfair pr ejudice, see Tex. R. Evi d. 403. The trial c ou rt ad m i t t ed the evidenc e for the limit ed purpose of showing knowledg e and a bsence of mist a

k e , b ut r ejec ted the State’s a rg ument that the evidenc e wa s admissible as proof of a plan. See Tex. R. Evi d. 404(b) ( containing nonexhaustive list of purposes for w hich evidenc e of e x trane ous acts may be admitted, incl u d i n g to show knowledg e, plan, or

absenc e of mistake) . The tr i al co u rt gave the jury a limiting instruction reg arding C

. J

. ’s testimony , instructing the m to “consider he r testimony only so far as it indicates knowledg e or a

bsence of mistake on beha lf of the de fenda nt.” Rule 404( b) “I t is a fundamental tene t of our cr iminal just ice sy stem that an ac cused ma y be tried only for the of

fense for whic h he is cha rg ed a n d n o t for beinga cr iminal ge nera lly .” Pa v lac k a v . S tate , 892 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Theref ore, e vidence of extraneous acts is inadmissible to prove that a def endant a cted in conf

ormity with his chara cter

by committing the cha rg ed off ense. See Tex. R. Evi d. 404(b). Extraneous-of fense evidenc e may

be admitted, howeve r, if it “tends to make an ele mental or e videntiary fac t more or less pr obable or tends to rebut7

some defe nsive theory ,” beca use such evidenc e “is rele vant bey ond its tende ncy to prove a

person’ s char acte r or that he acte d in conformity there with.” J

on es v . S

tate , 119 S.W .3 d 412, 419 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2003, no pet.). Consequently , evidenc e of ex trane ous acts may be admitted to show “proof

of motive, opportunity , intent, prepa ration, plan, knowle dg e, identity , or abse nce of mistake or ac cident.” T ex. R . Evid. 404(b).

The jury in this case was inst ructe d to consider C.J .’s t estimony only to the ex tent that it s ho we d k

no wl e dg e or a

bs e nc e of mis take on be ha lf of the de fe nd ant. Ev ide nc e is a dmi ssi ble to show knowledg e whe n such evide nce te nds to pr ove a material fa ct in connec tion with the offense

. See, e .g. , F

e ld e r v . Sta te , 8 4 8 S

. W.2d 85, 98 (Tex. C rim. App. 1992) (e vidence of extraneous offe nses of flig ht or g iving false information to police office r is a dmissibl e to showknowledg e of g uil t) ; Tho mp so n v . S

tate , 54 S.W .3d 88, 99 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, pe t. ref’d ) (e v idence of extraneous offe nses was a dmissibl e to s how defendant’s knowledg e of ga ng leade r’s violent nature wh e re de fe nd ant c ha

rg e d a s p art

y to g ang -r e lated mur de r) ; Po we ll v . S tate , 5 S.W .3d 369, 383 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

1999, pet. re f’d) (evide nce of extraneous offe nse of c ocaine possession was admissible to show defenda nt’s knowledg e that subst an ce in his possession was coca ine); Du nc an v . S

tate , N o. 03 -9 9- 00 18 5- CR, 19 99 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 69 02 , at *5 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin Sept. 10, 1999, no pet.) (not desig nated f or publication) ( evidenc e of de fenda nt’s previous thef

ts was admissible to show defenda nt’s knowledg e that he c ould qui c k ly “turn ove r” stolen jew elry for c ash). I n the pre sent ca se, Gorma n’s knowledg e of the ease with which under ag e employ ees gai nac ce s s t o al co h o l i c b ev er age s wa s p u tat i s s u e b y d ef en s e c o u n s el ’s at t em p tt o s h o w, t h ro u gh

cross-e x amination, that Gorman took steps to pre vent under ag e employ ees f rom ac cessingalcoholMu lti ple wi tne sse s te sti fi e d that the B ro ok ly n Pie Comp any did no t hav e a lic e ns e to s e ll 5 alcoholic bever ag es, that Gorman kept tequila and marg arita mix in a n unlocked stor age cabinet located in th e employ ee bathroom at the bac k of the re staurant, a nd that, while ce rtain customer s wer e occa sionally

provided c omplimentary wine or be er, a lcohol stored in the employ ee bathroom wa s n e ve r o ff

e re d to c us tom e rs . 8 on the re staurant pr emises. Se e Ro bb ins v . S tate , 88 S.W .3d 256, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (e x t ra n eo u s -o ff

en s e ev i d en ce ad m i s s i b l e t o s h o w i n t en twh er e ap p el l an tp u ti n t en tat i s s u e t h ro u gh vigor ous cross-e x amination). Michae l L aMonica , an employ ee at the B rookly n Pie Company

at the time of the off

ense, te stified at trial that Gorma n kept alcoholic be vera g es in a c abinet at the ba ck of the re sta ur ant. On cr oss-exami n at i o n , defe nse counse l elicited testimony from L aMonica

that 5 he ha d ne ve r se e n Go rm an fu rn ish a lc oh ol t o a

n und e ra g e e mpl oy e e and that G or man to ok ste ps to

sa fe g ua rd his a lc oh ol f

ro m un de ra g e e mpl oy e e s, sto ri ng it “in a pla c e wh e re lim ite d a c c e ss [s ic ] if y ou g o th e re wi tho ut t

he bo ss’ s k

no wl e dg e y ou ’r e g oin g to g e t in tr ou ble.” Du

ri ngc ro ssexamination of Ang ela L aM o n ica, a nother e mploy ee at the restaur ant, def ense c ounsel elicited testi m o n y that “the c abinet that [the alcohol]’s phy sically in, the employ ees a

ren’ t supposed to be in there . . . unle ss y ou’re a mana g er a nd y ou’re of ag e.” T here fore , C.J .’s testimony that Gorman fre quently

offe red he r alc ohol during working hours and occa sionally poured alcohol into her drinks is p ro bativ e of

the mate ri a l f

a c t th a t G or

man h a d k

no wl e dg e that un de ra g e e mpl oy e e s c ou ld a nd did

e a sil y g a in a c c e ss t o a lc oh ol o n th e pr e mis e s. I n revie wing whether

C.J .’s testimony

was prope rly

admitted for the pu rp o s e of sh ow ing kn ow le dg e , we no te that a tr ia l c ourt ’s a dmi ssi bil ity de c isi on un de r 4 04 (b ) m

us t be up he ld on appea l if that decision is w ithin the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment. Robbins , 88 S.W .3d at 261. “An a ppellate c ourt would misapply the appe llate abuse of discre tion standard of r eview by reve rsing9

a trial c ourt’s admissibilit y decision solely

beca use the a

ppellate c ourt disag ree d with it.” Po we ll v . S

tate , 63 S.W .3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). I n light of the applicable standard of revie w and the f

act that the tr ial court “ has the be st vantag e fr om which t o d ec i d e” q u es tions of admissibili ty , Mo ntgom e ry v . S tate , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on re h’ g ), we hold that the tria l court did not abuse its discre tion in admitt ing C.J.’s testim ony . Be cause we have de termined that the tria l court did not e rr in a dmitti ng the evidenc e for the purpose of showing knowledg e, we need not a ddress whe ther the e vidence was a lso admissibl e t o show absenc e of mistake. See R obbins , 88 S.W .3d at 262 (trial c ourt dec ision must be upheld if it is corr ect on a ny theory of law a pplicable to the c ase, e specia lly with reg ard to a dmission of evidence ) (c iting Ro me ro v . S

tate , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

Rule 403 Having

determ i n edt h at t h e e x t ra n eo u s -o ff en s e e v i d en ce wa s properly admitted under Rule 404(b), we next review whe ther the tria l court abuse d its discretion b y o v er ru l ing G orman’s Rule 403 objections. Otherw ise rele vant and admissible evidenc e mus t be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, co n fusi on of the issues, or misleading the jury . Tex. R. Evid. 403. When a par ty objects to the admission of evidenc e on the bas is o f Ru le 4 0 3 , th e tr ia l c o u rt is r e qu ir e d to b a la n c e p r o b a ti v e v a lu e a g a in s t th e p o te n tial for prejudice

. Lon g v . S

tate , 823 S.W .2d 259, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). I n c on du c tin g a Ru le 40 3 b a lanc ingte st, the tr ia l c ourt mus t c on sid e r f

our f a c tor s: (1) the inhere nt probativene ss of the extraneous-of fense evidenc e, (2) the potential the evide nce ha s10

to i mpr e ss t

he jur y in a n ir ratio na l “ bu t ne ve rt

he le ss i nd e lib le ” wa

y , ( 3) the a mou

nt o f time the State will need to deve lop the evidenc e, duringwhich the jury ’s attention will be diverte d fr o m the indicted of

f e n s e , an d ( 4 ) th e f

o r c e o f th e St a te ’ s n e e d f o r th is e v id e n c e in o r d e r to p r o v e a f a c t of conseque nce. Mo ntgomery , 8 10 S.W. 2d a t 38 9- 90 . F ur

the rm or e , “ tr ia l c ourt s sh ou ld favor admi s s io nin

c lo s e c a s e s , in

k e e p in g w it

h th e p r e s u mp ti o no f

a dmi s s ib il it

y o f r e le vant evidenc e.” Id. at 389.

Th e fi rs t f

a c tor in t he te st, the inh e re nt p ro bativ e ne ss o f t he e xtra ne ous-o ffen se evidenc e, is established in the pre sent ca se by the s i m i l ar ities betwee n the extraneous offe nse—providing al cohol to C.J ., a minor employ ee at the restaur ant—and the c harg ed offe nse—providing alc o h o l t o L .F., a lso a minor employ ee at the restaur ant. See id. at 390 (probativeness is often “a function of the similarity of the e x trane ous transac ti on to the char g ed of fe ns e ” ). Th e inh e re nt p ro bativ e ne ss o f the e vid e nc e is fu rt he r e sta bli sh e d b y

the c los e ne ss i n ti me of the extraneous acts and the char g ed off ense. Se e Te mp lin v . S

tate , 7 11 S.W. 2d

30 , 3 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ) ( “ [t]he pe ri od of tim e se pa

ra tin g the e xtra

ne ou s tr ans a c tio n f

ro m th e c ha

rg e in c hie f i s a facto r to b e c o n s id e r e d ” in

Ru le 4 0 3 d e te r

mi n ati o n )

. C. J. te s ti f

ie d th a t s h e w o r

k e d f o r G orman from November 2005 to Fe bruar y 2006, and that Gor

man’s off ers to provide her w ith alcohol during this ti me period wer e “pretty much constant.” The c harg ed off ense took plac e on F ebrua ry 11, 2006, and while C.J. was not e mploy ed at the restaur ant at that time, she testified that L .F. ha d been hir ed as her repla ceme nt, sugg esting that there was a n extremely

short period of time be tween the extraneous ac ts and the cha rg ed off ense.11 F ur the rm or e , the str e ng th of

the e vid e nc e c onne c tin g Go rm an to the e xtra ne ou s a c ts also incre ases the probativene ss of C.J .’s testimony

. Whil e C.J .’s testimony is the only

evidenc e of the e xtra ne ou s a c ts, we no te that the so le e vid e nc e to the c on tr ary is G or man’ s su bs e qu e nt d e nia l. Simi larly conflicting evidenc e h a s b e e n c o n s idere d sufficie nt to connect a defe ndant to an extraneous event. See J

ones , 119 S.W .3d at 422 (upholding admissibili ty of ex t raneous-ac t evidence that

a pp e lla nt h a d o ff e re d und e ra g e g ir ls m on e y to re mov e the ir c lot hin g wh e re e vid e nc e c on sis te d s ole ly of g irls’ testimony

and contr ary evidenc e consisted solely of appe llant’s denial). The ref ore, in lig ht of the similarity

of the ex trane ous acts and the char g ed off ense, the closene ss in tim e, and the str e ng th o f t

he e vid e nc e c on ne c tin g Go rm an to the e xtra ne ou s a c ts, w e fi nd

that th e fi rs t f

a c tor in the balanc ing te st supports the trial court’s r uling unde r Rule 403. Th e se c on d fa c tor in the ba lanc ing te st, the po te nti a l th a t th e e vid e nc e wi ll i mpr e ss the jury in an irrationa l wa y , also supports the trial cour t’s ruling in this case. The extraneous ac t of providing alcohol to C.J . appea rs to be no m o re o b

j ec tionable than the c harg ed off ense of providing alcohol to L .F., a nd there fore was not likely to c reate such pre judice in the minds of the jury that it would have been una ble to limit its consideration of the e vidence to its proper purpose

. See Tay lor

v . S tate , 920 S.W .2d 319, 323 (Tex. Crim. App

. 1 9 9 6 ) (hol ding that previous murder committed by acc used was no more heinous than murde r for which he w as cha

rg ed, and the ref

ore evidenc e of e x trane ous offe nse not likely to be so inflammatory as t o preve nt jury from conside ring it for prope r purpose ).

The third fa ctor of the balanc ing te st also supports the trial co u rt ’s deter mination, beca use the amount of time neede d by the State to of

fer the extraneous-a ct evidenc e was minimal12

in co m parison to the entire trial. As the State notes in its brief, C.J.’s entire testimony , including

c ro ss- e xami natio ns and

a dis c us sio n o uts ide the pr e se nc e of the jur y , c on sti tut e s o nly

23 pa g e s in

a re porter’ s rec ord that devote s a total of thre e volumes and 317 pa g es to th e j u ry t ri al on g uilt/i nnocenc e. Simi larly , C.J

. was only one of eleven State’ s witnesses. Fur thermore , there is no i n d i c a t i o ni nt h e r e c o r d t h a t t h e S t a t e s p e n tane x c e s s i v e a m o u n to f t i m e d e v e l o p i n g C

. J

. ’ s t e s t i m o n y. The fourth and fina l fac tor of the Rule 403 ba lancingtest is the force of the State’s need f or the e x trane ous-offe nse evide nce in or der to pr ove a f act of conseque nce. Se e Mo ntg om e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 390. As pre viously discussed, C.J .’s testimony wa s n ec essary to show Gorman’ s knowledg e that under age e mploy ees c ould acc ess and c onsume alcoholic be vera g es stored at the restaur ant, re futing the def ensive theor

y that Gorman took steps to pre vent under ag e employ ees f rom drinking alcohol on the pr emises.

I n conducting our revie w of the trial court’s Rule 403 deter mination, we must bear in mind the applicabl e s t andard of re view, which is that “ a re viewing court is to reve rse the tr ial court’s judg ment ‘ra

rely and only afte r a c lear

abuse of discretion,’ r ecog nizi ng that the trial cour t is in a superior position to g aug e the impact of the re levant evide nce.” Jones , 119 S.W .3d at 421-22 (c i t i n g Mozo n v . S

tate , 991 S.W .2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). I n light of thi s d eferential standard of revie w and the fac t that eac h of the Rule 403 bala ncing test fac tors lends support to the tri a l c o u rt’ s r

u li n g , w e h o ld

th a t t h e tr ia l c o u rt d id

n o t a b u s e it s d is c r e ti o nin

d e te r mi n in g th a t the pr ob a tiv e va lue of C.J.’ s te sti mony wa s no t su bs tanti a lly ou tw e ig he d by the da ng er of un fai r prejudice . Gorman’ s sole issue on appea l is overruled.13 CO NC LU SION Be cause we have deter

mined that the trial court did not err in admitting e vidence of Gorman’ s ext rane ous acts of pr oviding a lcohol to a minor, we overrule appellant’ s issue and af firm the conviction.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Jul y

17, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh