alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CASE 18 — PETITION EQUITY

— JUNE 4.

#### Watts, &c. vs. Pond, &c.

APPEAL PROM MALISON CIRCUIT COURT.

1. In a proceeding lor the sale of infants’ real estate under the statute, the record must show that the commissioners, appointed to report the net value of the infants'* *62estate, <fce., were sworn; otherwise the court has no jurisdiction to order a sale, and the sale, if made, will be yoid.

2. The report of the commissioners must show whether the interest of the infants requires the sale to be made, or the sale will be void. It will not be sufficient to state that in their opinion “it would redound to the benefit of the said infants to have said land sold»”

Squire Turner, for appellants,

cited *Rev. Statutes, (old edi*tion,) *page*592 ; 16 *B. Mon.,*295 ; 18 *lb., 781 ;*2 *Met.,*514.

C. F. Burnam, for appellees,

cited *Morehead*& *Brown’s Digest,*808 ; *Civil Code, secs.*96, *97.*

JUDGE BULLITT

delivered the opinion op the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court, overruling a motion to quash a sale' of infants’ lands, and the bonds for the purchase money given by the appellants.

The record of the proceeding, in which the sale was ordered, does not show that the commissioners, appointed to report the net value of the infants’ estate, &c., were sworn. Their report states that, in their opinion, “ it would redound to the benefit of the said infants to have said land sold.”

The statute declares that, “ before a court shall have jurisdiction to decjee a sale of infants’ lands, three commissioners must be appointed to report, and must report under oath, to the court, the net value of the infants’ j’eal and personal estate, and the annual profits thereof, and whether the interest of the infant or idiot requires the sale to be made.” (R. *S., chap.*86, *art. 3, sec.*2.)

In this case the court had no jurisdiction to order a sale; *first,*because the report did not state whether the interest of the infants required the sale to be made ; *(Mattingly vs. Read,*decided, at the last term ;) *secondly,*because the commissioners did not report under oath, as required by the statute. The sale was, therefore, void, and the motion should have been sustained.

The judgment is *reversed,*and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
#### JOHN J. CORBETT. Appellant, *v.*HORATIO G. GIBSON, Respondent. SAME *v.*SAME.

*Address of plaintiff*— attorney *may be required to furnish it.*

The court may, in a proper case, make an order requiring the attorney for the plaintiff to furnish the defendant with the plaintiff’s residence and address.

Appeal from an order made at Special Term, requiring the attorney for the plaintiff to furnish the defendant with the residence and address of the plaintiff, and also from an order denying a motion to vacate the first order, and staying all proceedings until the determination of an appeal taken therefrom.

The action was brought by the plaintiff, a private soldier stationed at Port Wadsworth, to recover damages for an alleged libelous publication by the defendant, the commanding officer thereof.

The action was brought on March 13, 1878. On March 11, 1878, the plaintiff was discharged from the service, and his present *50whereabouts is unknown to the defendant. The application for information as to his residence and address was made on the ground, among others, that defendant desired to examine the plaintiff before trial.

The order directed “that the plaintiff’s counsel furnish the defendant’s counsel with a sworn statement of the residence, occupation and present address of the plaintiff’ herein, showing the State, county, town or village where said plaintiff resides, and if said plaintiff lives in a city, the street and street number in said city at which the said plaintiff lives.”

*Fred. A. Ward,*for the appellant.

*Ooudert Brothers,*for the respondent.

A defendant is entitled to know the residence and temporary address of the plaintiff who is suing him. *(Johnson*v. *Birley,*5 Bar *&*Aid., 540; *Wortenr. Smith,*6 J. B. Moore, 110; *Ninety-nine Plaintiffs*v. *Vanderbilt,*1 Abb. Pr., 200.)

BrKMAN, J.:

The order requiring the disclosure of the residence and address of the plaintiff was made in the reasonable exercise of the discretion and power of the court. The moving affidavit of the defendant disclosed facts tending to show that the action was being prosecuted without the knowledge or desire of the plaintiff, and in that view alone it was proper enough to afford an opportunity for his examination. Besides this, it was the right of the defendant to examine the plaintiff before trial, and to that end to be •informed of his whereabouts.

The order must be affirmed, with costs and disbursements, and it follows that the other order appealed from must take the same • course.

Baekard, P. J., concurred; Gilbert, J., not sitting.

Order directing statement of plaintiff’s residence, etc., affirmed, with costs and disbursements.

Order refusing to set aside order directing statement of plaintiff’s residence, etc., affirmed, with costs and disbursements-
# Carl Hayden: A Featured Biography

**

----

Some senators are known as workhorses and some are seen as show horses. Carl Hayden was known as a workhorse. As he once explained to former Senate parliamentarian Floyd Riddick, Hayden learned early on in his career “to say little and get things done.” As chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee for 14 years, from 1955 to 1969, he helped fund the era’s most vital programs, from the creation of the federal highway system to President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society initiatives. He was particularly notable for his focus on western land development and water transportation projects for his constituents. Representing Arizona in the Senate from 1927 to 1969, he served as president pro tempore from 1957 to 1969. At the time of his retirement, he had served longer than any other member. He was known affectionately as the "Dean of the Senate.”

All Featured Biographies

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### Organizational Chart 

This chart shows the relationships among Senate leaders and officers who manage the flow of legislative and administrative business in the Senate.  

### Contact Your Senator 

Can't find your senator's name in the list of Senators?  Perhaps he or she is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, or a Senator in your State Legislature.

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### Related Art 

Carl Hayden
SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

PETER QUINN ELVIK, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

ADAM P. LAXALT, ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, 

Respondent. 

No. 69369 

FILED 

JAN 1 4 2016 

r.EMAN 

-I EDO' 

/1114 At 

CIE 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This is a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner 

seeks an order directing that he be considered for parole pursuant to the 

legislative changes set forth in A.B. 267. See A.B. 267, 78th Leg. (Nev. 

2015). We have reviewed the documents submitted in this matter, and 

without deciding upon the merits of any claims raised therein, we decline 

to exercise original jurisdiction in this matter. See NRS 34.160; NRS 

34.170. This issue should be presented to the district court in the first 

instance where a factual record may be made regarding the computation 

of time served and where the district court may consider in the first 

instance the legislative amendments set forth in A.B. 267 and this court's 

recent decision in State v. Boston, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 98, P.3d 

(0) I947A 4570). 
Hard 

ditta 

J. 

(2015) determining that the new legislation would apply to aggregate 

consecutive sentences.' Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

J. 

cc: Peter Quinn Elvik 

Attorney General/Carson City 

'It appears that the petitioner named the wrong respondent in that 

the Director of the Department of Corrections determines when a prisoner 

is eligible to appear before the Parole Board. Petitioner may fix the error 

in naming the incorrect respondent in any new action filed in the district 

court. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A 40
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk October 4, 2012

p0927 

# Order

October 4, 2012

144902

PEOPLE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF GROSSE ILE,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 144902

COA: 303792

Wayne CC: 10

- 013012

- AR

JAMES EDWARD BRITTAIN,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 14, 2012

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

M ARILYN K ELLY and H ATHAWAY , JJ., would grant leave to appeal.
Exhibit 32.2



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), I, Edward F. Lange, Jr.
hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004 of BRE Properties, Inc. (the Form 10-Q) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of BRE Properties, Inc.



|                      |  |                                                                                     
|--------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: March 15, 2005 |  | /s/ Edward F. Lange, Jr.                                                            
|                      |  | Edward F. Lange, Jr. Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH 

	NO. 2-04-236-CV

ROBERT WELCH, AS NEXT	APPELLANT

FRIEND OF LORI WELCH, A

MINOR	

	V.

KELLER MIDDLE SCHOOL AND   	APPELLEE

KELLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL

DISTRICT

	----------

	FROM THE 153RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

	----------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

	----------

	We have considered the “Joint Motion To Dismiss.”  It is the court’s opinion that the motion should be granted; therefore, we dismiss the appeal.   See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(2), 43.2(f).  

	Costs of appeal shall be paid by the party incurring same, for which let execution issue.

								PER CURIAM 		

PANEL B:	GARDNER, DAUPHINOT, and MCCOY, JJ.

DELIVERED: April 7, 2005
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 3/1/96 TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 95-6225 v. ) (D.C. No. CR-92-108-T) ) (W.D. Okla.) PABLO LUIS GOMEZ , ) ) Defendant-Appellant. )

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, MCKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. SeeFed. R. App. 34(a); 10th Cir. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Pablo Luis Gomez, a pro se prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his-2-

second motion seeking post conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Mr. Gomez contends he is entitled to (1) a reduction in his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and (2) an evidentiary hearing to obtain a ruling to his objections to the presentence report. Mr. Gomez did not file a direct appeal. He first raised his objection in a motion for post conviction relief. “The failure of a defendant to present an issue on direct appeal bars the defendant from raising such an issue in a § 2255 motion . . . unless good cause is shown.” United States v. Khan , 835 F.2d 749, 753-54 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied , 487 U.S. 1222 (1988). We have carefully reviewed the record and Mr. Gomez’s arguments on appeal, and we hold that he has failed to show good cause. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons given by the district court. The mandate shall issue forthwith. ENTERED FOR THE COURT Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 92 (Thursday, May 13, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 27009]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-11482]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i>12161 and <greek-i>12162]


Tennessee Disaster Number TN-00038

AGENCY: Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 1.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Tennessee 
(FEMA-1909-DR), dated 05/04/2010.
    Incident: Severe Storms, Flooding, Straight-Line Winds and 
Tornadoes.
    Incident Period: 04/30/2010 and Continuing.
    Effective Date: 05/05/2010.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 07/06/2010.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 02/04/2011.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for Private Non-Profit organizations in the State of 
Tennessee, dated 05/04/2010, is hereby amended to include the following 
areas as adversely affected by the disaster.

Primary Counties: Dyer, Mcnairy, Montgomery, Perry, Shelby, Tipton.

    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)

James E. Rivera,
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2010-11482 Filed 5-12-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### Abraham Einstein, plaintiff in error, *vs.*C. T. Latimer *et al.,*defendants in error.

Where a creditor applies for letters of administration upon the estate of his deceased debtor, it was error in the Court to exclude notes and mortgage to secure the same, made by the debtor, which were offered in evidence to show the indebtedness, on the ground that no affidavit had been filed of the payment of taxes thereon. (R.)

Caveat. Administration. Eelief Act of 1870. Tax-affidavit. Before Judge Sessions. Ware Superior Court. March Term, 1872.

For the facts of this case, see the decision.

John C. Nichols; George B. Williamson, represented by Newan & Harrison, for plaintiffs in error.

John L. Harris, for defendant.

Warner, Chief Justice.

This case came before the Court below on an appeal from the Court of Ordinary. Einstein applied for letters of administration on the estate of Joseph Hillman, as principal creditor of the intestate. A caveat to the application was filed. On the trial in the Superior Court, the appellant and *316the applicant for letters of administration offered in evidence the notes of the intestate and a certified copy of a mortgage from the record, (having accounted for the loss of the original,) for the purpose of showing that he ivas a creditor of the intestate, which was objected to by the caveators, on the ground that no affidavit had been filed that all legal taxes had been paid on the debts, which objection was sustained by the Court and the evidence rejected. Whereupon the appellant excepted.

The rejection of the notes and copy mortgage, when offered in evidence to show the indebtedness of the intestate to the appellant, because there was no affidavit that the taxes due thereon had been paid, was manifest error. There was no suit on the notes or mortgage, as contemplated by the Act of 1870, requiring an affidavit ollthe payment of taxes. The notes and mortgage were offered in evidence to show that the appellant was a creditor of the intestate. There is no law, within our knowledge, that requires an affidavit of the payment of taxes to do that; most certainly the Act of 1870 does not require it.

Let the judgment of the Court below be reversed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>              5
<CIK>                  0001010579
<NAME>                 VIS VIVA CORPORATION

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                    0
<SECURITIES>                         418999
<RECEIVABLES>                         36740
<ALLOWANCES>                              0
<INVENTORY>                               0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     548858
<PP&E>                                    0
<DEPRECIATION>                            0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       548858
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                118533
<BONDS>                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<COMMON>                              12700
<OTHER-SE>                           417625
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         548858
<SALES>                                   0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      75508
<CGS>                                     0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      16176
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     6393
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       52939
<INCOME-TAX>                           8213
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   44726
<DISCONTINUED>                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<CHANGES>                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                          44726
<EPS-BASIC>                          0.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                          0.03


</TABLE>
EX-4.1






Exhibit 4.1




CONSENT OF BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP




June 15, 2009




     We hereby consent to the references to our name contained under the heading “Legal Matters”
and to our opinion contained under “Certain Canadian Federal Income Tax Considerations” in the
take-over bid circular included in the Registration Statement on Form F-8 dated the date hereof
relating to the registration of common shares of Silvercorp Metals Inc.



Sincerely,




/s/ BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP




Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                        AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
              SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Community Bancorp, Inc.
(the "Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned James A. Langway, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, and Donald R. Hughes, Jr., Treasurer, Clerk and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, each certifies, to the best of his knowledge and
belief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 2002; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.




/s/ James A. Langway                            /s/ Donald R. Hughes, Jr.
--------------------                            -------------------------
James A. Langway                                Donald R. Hughes, Jr.
President and                                   Treasure, Clerk and
  Chief Executive Officer                         Chief Financial Officer


Date:  August 8, 2002                           Date:  August 8, 2002
# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 22, 2009

Decided April 30, 2009

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08

‐ 2860

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellee,

v.

MICHELLE MAYS,

Defendant

‐ Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

No. 06

‐ CR

‐ 207

Rudolph T. Randa,

Chief Judge

.

Michelle Mays was part of a ring that beginning in the mid

‐ 1990s sold millions of

dollars worth of cocaine in Milwaukee. Mays pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute

cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment.

Mays’s appointed counsel seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California

, 366 U.S. 738 (1967).

We invited Mays to respond to counsel’s submission, see C IR

. R. 51(b), but she has not. We

limit our review to the one potential issue considered in counsel’s supporting brief. See

United States v. Schuh

, 289 F.3d 968, 973

‐ 74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel questions whether Mays could argue that her prison sentence is

unreasonable. Mays was classified as a career offender based on felony convictions for

aggravated battery and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 08

‐ 2860 Page 2

therefore applied a criminal history category of VI

, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and calculated an

advisory imprisonment range of 262 to 367 months. At sentencing Mays did not contest

her status as a career offender. Instead, she argued that the guidelines overstate the

seriousness of her criminal history because both of her predicate felonies are more than

fifteen years old and she had not been convicted of any other serious crime since. Mays

further argued that her significant assistance to the government, her age, and her serious

medical issues warranted a sentence below the guidelines range. The district judge

disagreed that her criminal history was overstated but did grant the government’s motion

for a below

‐ range sentence based on Mays’s substantial assistance, see U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.

After also addressing the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court settled upon 150

months.

A sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumed reasonable,

Rita v. United States

, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United States v. Cano

‐ Rodriguez

, 552 F.3d

637, 639 (7th Cir. 2009), and therefore a below

‐ guidelines sentence is also presumed

reasonable, United States v. Liddell

, 543 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, the guidelines

range was correctly calculated. The district court also considered the statutory factors and

sentenced Mays far below the guidelines range, and so any argument that her sentence is

unreasonable would be frivolous. See, e.g., United States v. Shannon

, 518 F.3d 494, 496 (7th

Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is

DISMISSED.