2024 IL App (4th) 230093-U 

NO. 4-23-0093 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

DeANGELO MARTEZ LINDSEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Peoria County 

No. 09CF618 

Honorable 

Katherine S. Gorman, 

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lannerd and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s 30-year prison sentence for first degree murder was affirmed where 

(1) the trial court acted within its discretion by denying defendant’s request for 

funds for an expert and (2) the sentence was not excessive.

¶ 2 In 2010, a Peoria County jury found defendant, DeAngelo Martez Lindsey, guilty 

of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2008)) in connection with a shooting that 

occurred when defendant was 17 years old. Defendant originally received a sentence of 52 years 

in prison. In 2021, defendant filed a postconviction petition, seeking to be resentenced based, in 

part, on changes in the law regarding sentencing juvenile offenders. The State conceded the need 

for resentencing. In 2022, the trial court resentenced defendant to 30 years in prison. Defendant 

appeals, arguing that (1) the court erroneously denied his motion for funds to hire an expert and

(2) the sentence is excessive. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

FILED

February 27, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
- 2 - 

¶ 4 A. Defendant’s Conviction and Original Sentence

¶ 5 The 2013 opinion arising from defendant’s direct appeal contains a thorough 

summary of the trial evidence. People v. Lindsey, 2013 IL App (3d) 100625, ¶¶ 6-29. For purposes 

of this appeal, it will suffice to say that on May 27, 2009, Anil Dhingra was fatally shot at a gas 

station in Peoria during an attempted armed robbery committed by defendant (age 17) and Ali 

Evans (age 20). The gas station lacked surveillance cameras, and there were no witnesses to the 

shooting. Thus, the State could not prove definitively whether it was defendant or Evans who fired 

the gun repeatedly at Dhingra. Nevertheless, some circumstantial evidence suggested that 

defendant may have been the shooter. Specifically, a witness saw two males run out of the gas 

station after the shooting, and only one of them had a gun in his hand. Although this witness was 

unable to identify the person with the gun, she identified Evans as the person who did not have the 

gun. Additionally, the police found the murder weapon at defendant’s sister’s home, and 

defendant’s fingerprint was on it. Defendant testified in his own defense. Although he 

acknowledged being at the scene of the shooting, he denied participating in murdering or 

attempting to rob Dhingra. 

¶ 6 At defendant’s trial in April 2010, the prosecutor argued that defendant was guilty 

of first degree murder under an accountability theory, even if he did not personally fire the gun. 

The jury found defendant guilty. The trial court, Judge James Shadid presiding, sentenced 

defendant to 52 years in prison. On direct appeal, the appellate court held, inter alia, that 

defendant’s sentence was not excessive. Lindsey, 2013 IL App (3d) 100625, ¶¶ 53-59. 

¶ 7 B. Separate Proceedings Relating to Evans

¶ 8 Evans was tried separately for first degree murder, convicted, and sentenced to 58 

years in prison. The appellate court reversed Evans’s conviction and remanded for a new trial 
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based on an evidentiary error. People v. Evans, 2012 IL App (3d) 100737-U, ¶ 25. Evans was tried 

again, convicted, and resentenced to 58 years in prison. The appellate court reversed Evans’s 

conviction and remanded for a third trial based on a different evidentiary error. People v. Evans, 

2016 IL App (3d) 140120, ¶¶ 24, 59, 62. Evans then pleaded guilty to aggravated battery with a 

firearm, and he was sentenced to 28 years in prison.

¶ 9 C. Defendant Requests a New Sentencing Hearing

¶ 10 Meanwhile, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, 

567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012), that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 

parole for a juvenile offender violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution

(U.S. Const., amend. VIII). In 2016, the Illinois legislature responded to Miller by enacting section 

5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections(Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)), 

which contains additional mitigating factors a trial court must consider when sentencing someone 

for an offense committed as a juvenile. In November 2021, defendant filed a postconviction 

petition requesting to be resentenced. In May 2022, the State conceded that defendant’s 52-year 

sentence violated the eighth amendment because the trial court had failed to make specific factual 

findings as required by People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655. (During the pendency of this appeal, 

our supreme court overruled Holman in People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42). In June 2022, 

the trial court granted defendant’s postconviction petition and ordered defendant to be resentenced.

¶ 11 D. Defendant’s Request for Funds to Hire an Expert for Resentencing

¶ 12 On August 9, 2022, defendant filed a motion requesting funds to hire an expert for 

the forthcoming resentencing hearing pursuant to section 113-3(d) of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/113-3(d) (West 2022)). Defendant argued that “to properly 

develop all of the information required for the court to consider” under the additional statutory 
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sentencing factors relating to juvenile offenders (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022)), “the 

defense is in need of the services of an expert in psychology to review the defendant’s history and 

circumstances and to prepare a report for the court regarding the same.” Defendant indicated that 

his attorney had consulted with Dr. Oluwatamilore Odimayo, who charged $200 per hour. 

According to defendant’s motion, Dr. Odimayo’s rate was equivalent to or significantly less than 

other experts defense counsel consulted. Defendant requested the trial court to make available 

approximately $3000 for the defense to retain Dr. Odimayo to evaluate defendant.

¶ 13 Defendant presented this motion to the trial court on August 19, 2022. The 

prosecutor objected to the motion on that bases that (1) section 113-3(d) of the Code references 

“capital cases” (725 ILCS 5/113-3(d) (West 2022)), and this is not a capital case and (2) defendant 

had not shown the need for an expert. Defense counsel responded that although she could make 

arguments at the sentencing hearing by “applying general principles of adolescent development,” 

she was “certainly not an expert in that.” Thus, defense counsel proposed that it was reasonable to 

have a psychologist evaluate defendant and to “be able to offer an opinion as to those things.” With 

respect to the county paying for an expert, defense counsel contended that $3000 was “a drop in 

the bucket” because defendant faced a very lengthy prison sentence. 

¶ 14 The trial court questioned defense counsel about the need for an expert:

“Okay. Well, what would [the expert] add specifically to your client? 

Because, I mean, you can get into [defendant’s] background, you can get into the 

factors that apply to youth. We’ve all read all the studies. What really additionally 

will [the expert] add? I get it, [defendant] was 17. And I’ve done a few of these post 

conviction hearings on this specific issue, including resentencing someone, and I 

don’t—I don’t really know what [the expert] will add specifically.”
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Defense counsel responded:

“Your Honor, I think it’s hard to say until, you know, an evaluation is done, 

but I think specifically looking at the unique situation of my client’s childhood, 

which may have contributed to his impetuosity, I think specifically knowing what 

I know about my client it would be, you know, he had a traumatic childhood, which 

I know can affect, you know, frontal lobe development. So looking at the specifics 

of his childhood and the home life that he lived at the time, which may have led 

him to make decisions that he made back in 2009.”

The court continued to doubt the need for an expert:

“All of those things—it has been the Court’s experience that every 

adolescent that acts out in the inappropriate way that your client and the other 

individuals that find themselves incarcerated for a long time—it has been my 

experience that all of them have had a home life where none of us would wish that 

upon our worst enemy.

And so again, I don’t—and I understand that most certainly I would 

consider your individual client in—in assessing the mitigation factors, but I just 

don’t know what specifically would be contributed by this person at the County’s 

expense. So if you would like to present me with any additional information, I will 

allow that. But at first blush, I don’t know what specifically he’ll add, other than 

the general—generalities that all of us already are acquainted with.”

The court proposed continuing the matter for a few weeks, giving defense counsel time to submit 

what she would like before then. The court asked defense counsel whether that would give her 

enough time. Counsel responded, “That should be fine, Judge.” 
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¶ 15 The trial court addressed this issue again on September 9, 2022. The court asked 

defense counsel whether there was anything she would like to add. Defense counsel responded, 

“No. No, Your Honor.” The prosecutor again objected to the defense hiring an expert at the 

county’s expense:

“Well, I guess just to sum up our position, Judge, is that those factors are 

already codified and the reasons why are already codified as part of the—I guess 

the legislative history behind that act. And so I don’t think there would need to be 

funds for an expert to come explain those same things to you that are now required 

to consider.”

The court agreed with the prosecutor and denied defendant’s request for funds. 

¶ 16 E. Materials Submitted for the Resentencing Hearing

¶ 17 The materials submitted for resentencing showed the following.

¶ 18 Defendant was born in December 1991, and he had no spouse or children. He

completed the eighth grade. He had not yet obtained a general equivalency diploma (GED), though 

he intended to do so.

¶ 19 In May 2008, defendant was sentenced to 2 years of probation and 30 days of 

juvenile detention for residential burglary. Defendant violated the terms of his probation by failing 

to report, using marijuana, failing to be assessed for drug and alcohol treatment, and committing 

ordinance violations. Defendant later violated the conditions of probation again by failing to report, 

failing to notify of a change in address, and being unsuccessfully discharged from intensive 

outpatient treatment (evidently for substance abuse). On May 8, 2009, a warrant was issued for 

defendant’s detention in connection with the residential burglary case. On May 31, 2009, 

defendant was served with that warrant when he was arrested for murder in connection with 
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Dhingra’s May 27, 2009, shooting. Defendant had remained incarcerated since that time. In 2011, 

defendant was disciplined in prison for fighting with another inmate.

¶ 20 In 2013, defendant was convicted of direct criminal contempt and was sentenced to 

10 years in prison for failing to testify against Evans. However, defense counsel told the trial court 

at defendant’s resentencing hearing that this conviction had been vacated at some point. 

¶ 21 Defendant’s mother, who was a minister in Georgia, completed a family 

questionnaire as part of the presentence investigation for defendant’s resentencing. She indicated 

she and defendant’s father were never married, and she raised defendant without any help. 

Defendant’s mother represented that she parented defendant appropriately and successfully during 

his younger years. For example, she answered that defendant was “not at all” a disciplinary 

problem as a child or a teen, earned average grades, and never had any problems in school.

¶ 22 According to defendant’s mother, defendant encountered different circumstances 

when he was 15 years old and moved to live with his father, who had 22 children. Defendant’s 

mother lamented that it was the “biggest mistake of [her] life” to allow defendant to live with his 

father. She did not specify the details of defendant’s time with his father. However, she was told 

that defendant “was out to his own care” during that time. 

¶ 23 Apparently referencing the fact that defendant was incarcerated at age 17, 

defendant’s mother asserted in the questionnaire that defendant did not have the opportunity to 

participate in extracurricular activities or to graduate from high school. (In another questionnaire 

that is in the record, defendant’s mother responded that defendant participated in the Boys and 

Girls Club.) She believed that defendant was “normal” when he was first incarcerated, but he 

would need counseling after being “scared and mentally abused in the prison system.” Defendant’s 

mother still had a “very open and supportive” relationship with defendant, “to the best of [her] 
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ability.” She described defendant as a “very caring[,] compassionate person,” who was neither 

violent nor aggressive.

¶ 24 Defendant’s 2010 presentence investigation report in connection with the original 

sentencing hearing for murder was also submitted for the trial court’s consideration. This report 

included additional information that shed light on defendant’s childhood. Throughout his 

childhood, defendant “moved back and forth from his mother’s residence in Atlanta, Georgia to 

his fathers [sic] in Peoria.” Defendant’s father had “an extensive criminal record in Peoria County.” 

Defendant never attended a “ ‘regular’ ” high school, as “his father would not take the time to 

enroll him.” Defendant had been living with his father in Peoria prior to being incarcerated for 

murder. In 2008, defendant attended an adult education program, but he was soon dropped for 

“insubordination.” Defendant reported having a “very close relationship with his mother.” 

Although defendant loved his father, defendant reported that his father “ ‘was never there’ ” for 

him. When defendant had lived with his mother, he attended church, participated in activities, did 

chores around the house, and abided by a curfew. When defendant lived with his father, “he was 

not required to do chores and he was not punished for misbehavior and no curfew was set.” 

Defendant reported a history of using cannabis, but he denied using other drugs or alcohol.

¶ 25 The record includes multiple evaluations that defendant underwent during his 

incarceration. These reports indicate no notable mental health issues.

¶ 26 F. Defendant’s Resentencing Hearing

¶ 27 On December 8, 2022, the matter proceeded to a resentencing hearing. The 

sentencing range was 20 to 60 years in prison, and the trial court had the discretion to impose an 

additional 15-year firearm enhancement. However, the parties agreed the court could not impose 

a sentence exceeding defendant’s original sentence of 52 years in prison. The State presented no 
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evidence in aggravation. Defendant presented testimony from Wendell Robinson, who described 

his own work for an organization that helps people reacclimate to society after serving lengthy 

prison sentences. 

¶ 28 The trial court denied defendant’s request to introduce into evidence an “adverse 

childhood experience questionnaire” that defendant completed. At defendant’s request, the court 

admitted documentary evidence indicating that Evans was projected to be released from prison in 

March 2033 pursuant to a negotiated plea deal. The prosecutor asked the court to sentence 

defendant to 52 years in prison. Defense counsel requested 20 years in prison.

¶ 29 In his statement in allocution, defendant apologized to Dhingra’s family. Defendant 

indicated he was “trying to get a second chance at life.” He believed that during his incarceration, 

he had “become a rational person when it comes to being a cognitive thinker.” Defendant said that 

if he were given “a second chance and an opportunity to get out sooner rather than later,” he could 

prove his rehabilitation.

¶ 30 The trial court began its ruling by saying it considered (1) the presentence 

investigation report, (2) the entire court file, (3) the evidence and arguments, (4) defendant’s 

statement of allocution, (5) the statutory sentencing factors, including those relating specifically 

to juvenile offenders, (6) defendant’s history and character, and (7) the nature and circumstances 

of the offense.

¶ 31 The trial court then said the following about defendant’s childhood and upbringing:

“I’m just going to visit with you here for a few minutes and tell you that as 

a human being it just really makes me sad when I see people like you who didn’t 

have anybody to lean on when you were growing up. And that’s not your fault. It’s 
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not. And is it any surprise that when you’re a kid, you’re going to act out in a way 

that’s detrimental to you if nobody cares?

And maybe I’m being too hard on your parents, but just based upon what 

I’ve read, they may have cared, but were pretty neglectful in my opinion of the 

needs of you as a child and seen to it [sic] that you would have the opportunities 

available to you by just looking after you and being sure that you were taken care 

of and you had the opportunity to go to school and be with your peers and feel like 

you had a safe, secure place to go home to.

And I want to make it clear to you that I recognize that that’s not your fault. 

Period. And I’m sorry that that happened to you.

And having done this quite sometime [sic], it really makes me sad to see 

young people sitting here in this position that really do bad things. And I wish it 

would stop. I just wish that people would stop shooting each other and taking things 

that don’t belong to them because you feel like it.”

¶ 32 The trial court then said that what defendant did was “really horrible,” and the court 

had “to consider that a life was taken.” The court also considered that “it was planned.” Based on 

what the court had heard, although defendant was “not the person” (i.e., he did not personally shoot 

Dhingra), defendant was “along” and “should have known better.” The court understood that 

defendant was “approximately 17 years and 166 days old” at the time of the offense, and the court 

was “most certainly considering a young man of that age and behaving in that manner.”

¶ 33 The trial court also said it considered that because defendant “stopped going to 

school in the eighth grade,” “the structure that school provides to young people was not in place” 
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for him. The court stated that defendant had “behaved” while incarcerated. The court expressed 

that it was “[g]ood” that defendant still intended to obtain his GED. 

¶ 34 The trial court also mentioned that defendant had a juvenile record and that “a gun 

was used in the offense.” The court explained it was “doing damage” for young people to use guns 

in this community and across the country. The court added, “we can’t have young people running 

around with guns” and shooting people. 

¶ 35 After “considering all these things that I have just referenced,” along with its 

discretion whether to impose a 15-year firearm enhancement, the trial court sentenced defendant 

“to a total of 30 years” in prison. The court told defendant, “[I]t is my fondest hope that when you 

get out that you take advantage of the resources that are available and make better decisions for 

you.” 

¶ 36 G. Motion to Reconsider Sentence and Notice of Appeal

¶ 37 Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence. In relevant portion, he argued that the 

trial court erroneously denied his request for funds to hire an expert. He also argued that it was 

fundamentally unfair for him to serve a 30-year sentence at 100% when Evans was serving a 

28-year sentence at 85%. Defendant contended that his sentence was excessive and not in line with 

the objective of restoring him to useful citizenship.

¶ 38 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence.

¶ 39 This timely appeal followed.

¶ 40 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 41 A. Request for Funds for an Expert

¶ 42 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for funds for 

an expert. According to defendant, he was entitled to funds for an expert because (1) he was 
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indigent and (2) an expert “was indispensable in proving the central issue at sentencing,” 

defendant’s rehabilitative potential. Defendant maintains that his “rehabilitative capacity was 

critical to determining whether, under Miller and its progeny, he could be resentenced to life in 

prison without the possibility of parole.” As persuasive authority, defendant relies heavily on 

United States v. Pete, 819 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2016). Defendant requests for us to “vacate his 

sentence and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing, including the appointment of an 

expert.”

¶ 43 The State responds that defendant inappropriately relies on eighth amendment 

caselaw tracing its origins to Miller. According to the State, because defendant faced a 

discretionary sentencing scheme where the minimum available sentence was 20 years in prison, 

and because the trial court did not refuse to consider defendant’s youth, “defendant’s sentencing 

complied with Miller and the Eighth Amendment.” The State acknowledges that the 

nonapplicability of Miller does “not entirely resolve defendant’s claim,” as he also argues an expert 

was necessary to weigh the statutory mitigating factors. The State proposes that the court correctly 

denied defendant’s request for funds for an expert, as the materials available to the court for the 

resentencing hearing contained “sufficient information about defendant’s youth and attendant 

circumstances, as well as defendant’s rehabilitative potential.” The State further submits that any

error was harmless, as defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of access to an expert. 

¶ 44 Section 113-3(d) of the Code provides: 

“In capital cases, in addition to counsel, if the court determines that the defendant 

is indigent the court may, upon the filing with the court of a verified statement of 

services rendered, order the county Treasurer of the county of trial to pay necessary 
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expert witnesses for defendant reasonable compensation stated in the order not to 

exceed $250 for each defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/113-3(d) (West 2022).

Despite the language limiting this statute to capital cases, our supreme court has explained that “in 

certain instances,” the policy underlying this statute “should be extended to noncapital felonies.” 

People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 234 (1966). Additionally, the $250 statutory limit is not a strict 

limit where reasonable fees exceed that amount. People v. Evans, 271 Ill. App. 3d 495, 500-01 

(1995). 

¶ 45 Aside from this statute, circumstances may arise where the United States

Constitution requires the State to facilitate an indigent defendant’s access to an expert. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) ( “[W]hen a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his 

sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires 

that a State provide access to a psychiatrist’s assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot 

otherwise afford one.”). The Illinois Constitution provides a similar right, “when the expertise 

sought goes ‘to the “heart of the defense.” ’ ” People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1995) (quoting 

People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 221 (1994), quoting Watson, 36 Ill. 2d at 234). 

¶ 46 Whether considered as a constitutional challenge or as a request pursuant to statute, 

“a standard has evolved that there must be some showing that the requested expert assistance is 

necessary in proving a crucial issue in the case and that the lack of funds for the expert will 

therefore prejudice defendant.” Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d at 221. What is crucial differs from what is

merely “useful, helpful, valuable, or even important to the defense effort.” Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 7. 

“[W]hether the expertise sought is of that nature will vary with the circumstances of each case.” 

Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 7. “What is crucial to the defense effort is often made plain in taking account 

of the inculpatory evidence offered.” Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 8. We review for an abuse of discretion 
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the trial court’s decision to deny a defense motion seeking funds for an expert. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 

at 230. Under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, we may reverse the judgment only if the 

challenged decision is “ ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable 

person would agree with it.’ ” People v. Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 57 (quoting People v. Rivera, 

2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37).

¶ 47 As an initial matter, we note that throughout his brief, defendant cites eighth 

amendment caselaw tracing its origins to Miller. To be clear, the holding of Miller is not directly 

applicable to this appeal, as defendant does not argue that his 30-year prison sentence violates the 

eighth amendment. Additionally, defendant cites Holman, even though our supreme court 

overruled that case before defendant filed his brief. See Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42. 

¶ 48 Although defendant does not raise an eighth amendment challenge, section 

5-4.5-105(a)(1)-(9) of the Unified Code contains the following mitigating factors derived from 

Miller that a trial court must consider when sentencing someone for an offense committed as a 

juvenile: 

“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the 

offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and 

the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any;

(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer 

pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences;

(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social 

background, including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other 

childhood trauma;
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(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or 

both; 

(5) the circumstances of the offense;

(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, 

including the level of planning by the defendant before the offense;

(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her 

defense;

(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and

(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an 

expression of remorse, if appropriate.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(1)-(9) (West 

2022). 

¶ 49 Defendant filed a motion seeking approximately $3000 of public funds to retain Dr. 

Odimayo. Defendant submitted that “to properly develop all of the information required for the 

court to consider” under the statutory sentencing factors relating to juvenile offenders, “the defense 

is in need of the services of an expert in psychology to review the defendant’s history and 

circumstances and to prepare a report for the court regarding the same.”

¶ 50 When defendant first presented this motion, the trial court questioned defense 

counsel about the need for an expert, given that (1) counsel could address the relevant factors at 

the sentencing hearing, (2) “[w]e’ve all read all the studies” about juvenile offenders, and (3) the 

court had experience sentencing juvenile offenders. Defense counsel responded: 

“Your Honor, I think it’s hard to say until, you know, an evaluation is done, 

but I think specifically looking at the unique situation of my client’s childhood, 

which may have contributed to his impetuosity, I think specifically knowing what 
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I know about my client it would be, you know, he had a traumatic childhood, which 

I know can affect, you know, frontal lobe development. So looking at the specifics 

of his childhood and the home life that he lived at the time, which may have led 

him to make decisions that he made back in 2009.”

The court continued to doubt the need for an expert at the public’s expense, given that the court’s 

experience had shown that offenders facing long prison sentences universally had terrible home 

lives. The court offered defense counsel the opportunity to present additional information, beyond 

“generalities,” at the next court date.

¶ 51 When the matter returned to court, defense counsel declined the opportunity to add 

anything further in support of defendant’s motion. The prosecutor argued:

“Well, I guess just to sum up our position, Judge, is that those factors are 

already codified and the reasons why are already codified as part of the—I guess 

the legislative history behind that act. And so I don’t think there would need to be 

funds for an expert to come explain those same things to you that are now required 

to consider.”

The trial court agreed with the prosecutor and denied defendant’s request for funds.

¶ 52 Under the circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

Again, “there must be some showing that the requested expert assistance is necessary in proving a 

crucial issue in the case and that the lack of funds for the expert will therefore prejudice defendant.” 

Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d at 221. Here, the court indicated its familiarity with the caselaw, statutory 

factors, and studies pertaining to juvenile offenders. The court also gave defense counsel ample 

opportunity to identify a concrete reason why an expert was necessary for defendant’s resentencing 

hearing, and counsel arguably failed to do so. 
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¶ 53 The facts here are distinguishable from the cases defendant cites, where reviewing 

courts determined that the defense required the assistance of an expert. In both Ake and Lawson, 

the government relied on expert testimony, and the defense sought the assistance of an expert to 

counter that evidence. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 73 (noting that at the defendant’s capital sentencing 

hearing, the State relied on the opinions of its own psychiatrists, who had testified during the guilt 

phase of the proceedings that the defendant was dangerous to society); Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d at 229-

30 (reasoning that the State possessed an unfair advantage where the trial court denied the defense 

funds for an expert to counter the State’s expert, who offered the “strongest evidence” of the 

defendant’s guilt). Unlike in Ake and Lawson, defendant did not request an expert to counter the 

State’s expert evidence. Defendant also cites Watson, where our supreme court determined it was 

error to deny funds to hire a handwriting expert who potentially could have demonstrated the 

defendant’s innocence of a forgery charge. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d at 234. Watson is distinguishable, as 

the present case does not involve expert testimony that could be dispositive of defendant’s 

innocence. Defendant further cites Evans, where the defendant sought to present a defense 

(battered woman syndrome) that could only be established through expert testimony. Evans, 271 

Ill. App. 3d at 502. That is distinguishable from the present case, where the defense could argue 

the relevant sentencing factors without the assistance of an expert.

¶ 54 Defendant relies most heavily on Pete. In Pete, the defendant was 16 years old in 

May 2002, when he sexually assaulted and murdered a woman. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1124. In May 

2003, a forensic evaluator interviewed the defendant in connection with the government’s petition 

to transfer the case to adult court. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1125. The district court granted the 

government’s transfer petition. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1126. The defendant was found guilty in 2005, 

and the district court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1126.
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¶ 55 In 2013, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for resentencing in light 

of Miller. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1126. In advance of the resentencing hearing, pursuant to a federal 

statute, the defendant requested funds to retain Dr. Marc Walter to assist him in pursuing mitigating 

evidence. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1126. Given the passage of more than a decade since he had last been 

evaluated, the defendant proposed that,

“Dr. Walter would conduct a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation 

which would let us know [the defendant’s] ‘mental age,’ whether he has any 

cognitive dysfunction which could make him more suggestible or impair his 

judgment, and whether he has any particular mental disorders which could have 

played into his behavior.” Pete, 819 F.3d at 1126.

The defendant also contended that Dr. Walter could offer insight about the impact that 

incarceration had on the defendant. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1126. The district court denied the 

defendant’s motion, reasoning that (1) it was “ ‘difficult to conceive how’ ” the passage of time 

would have affected the mitigating evidence already contained in the 2003 evaluation, (2) a second 

evaluation would be duplicative of the first, and (3) the impact of incarceration was not mitigating 

evidence. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1127. The district court sentenced defendant to 59 years in prison. 

Pete, 819 F.3d at 1130.

¶ 56 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion by denying 

the defendant’s request for funds for an expert. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1130. In determining that the 

defendant had demonstrated that an expert was necessary, the court explained that the district court 

erroneously discounted the relevance of updated information showing how the defendant had 

changed since being incarcerated. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1130-33. With respect to the impact of the 

defendant’s incarceration, the court further reasoned that a defense expert was necessary to rebut 
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the State’s evidence that the defendant had behaved poorly in prison. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1133.

Moreover, according to the court, the defendant showed he was prejudiced by the denial of an 

expert, because he “ ‘requested expert services in furtherance of a claim that would, if meritorious, 

change the outcome of the case.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Pete, 819 F.3d at 1134 (quoting United 

States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2005)). On that point, the court reasoned 

that the proposed expert could have (1) updated the court about the defendant’s mental status, 

(2) placed the defendant’s prison record in context, and (3) potentially supported the defendant’s 

position about his rehabilitative potential and the positive changes he had made since being 

incarcerated. Pete, 819 F.3d at 1134. Because the district court was “skeptical, at best,” of the 

defendant’s arguments at the resentencing hearing, an expert evaluation “was likely the only 

Miller-related evidence that could possibly convince the district court that [the defendant] deserved 

leniency.” Pete, 819 F.3d at 1134.

¶ 57 Pete is distinguishable from our case and does not compel a conclusion that the trial 

court erred by denying defendant funds for an expert. In Pete, the district court’s analysis regarding 

the need for an expert was skewed by an erroneous belief that the defendant’s personal growth and 

maturation over more than a decade in prison were irrelevant at resentencing. Here, the court 

operated under no similar mistake of law. Moreover, unlike in Pete, the State here did not rely on 

defendant’s bad conduct while incarcerated as a basis for imposing a harsh sentence, so defendant 

did not need an expert to counter such evidence and put the infractions into perspective. 

Additionally, the prejudice to the defense of denying funds for an expert was more obvious in Pete, 

as the district court ultimately rejected the defendant’s claims at the sentencing hearing and 

sentenced him to 59 years in prison. Here, by contrast, the court expressly took account of 

defendant’s youth at the time of the offense and his difficult upbringing. The court also sentenced 
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defendant to 30 years in prison, which was 10 years more than the minimum sentence and far from 

the maximum. Thus, unlike in Pete, this was not a situation where an expert would have been 

defendant’s only chance to convince the court that he “deserved leniency.” Pete, 819 F.3d at 1134.

Furthermore, before denying defendant’s request for funds for an expert, the court here gave 

defense counsel the opportunity to present additional information regarding the request, and 

counsel declined that opportunity. 

¶ 58 Having determined that Pete is distinguishable and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion, we need not consider People v. Arrieta, 2021 IL App (2d) 180037-U, ¶¶ 101-05, an 

unpublished case the State cites in which the court deemed Pete unpersuasive in the context of a 

plain error analysis.

¶ 59 B. Excessive-Sentence Claim

¶ 60 Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by inadequately 

assessing his youth and its attendant circumstances, rendering his sentence excessive. Defendant 

insists he preserved this issue by raising it in a postsentencing motion, even though he did not raise 

a contemporaneous objection. Alternatively, defendant invokes the plain error doctrine. The State

responds that defendant forfeited this argument and failed to demonstrate plain error. As we will 

explain, defendant has not shown any error, much less a “clear or obvious” one, as would be 

required under the plain error doctrine. See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010).

¶ 61 The Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both 

according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful 

citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11. “ ‘In determining an appropriate sentence, a defendant’s 

history, character, and rehabilitative potential, along with the seriousness of the offense, the need 

to protect society, and the need for deterrence and punishment, must be equally weighed.’ ” People 
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v. Lawson, 2018 IL App (4th) 170105, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Hestand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 272, 281 

(2005)). The Unified Code specifies numerous “mitigating and aggravating factors that the trial 

court must consider when determining an appropriate sentence.” People v. Klein, 2022 IL App 

(4th) 200599, ¶ 35. Those factors are set forth in sections 5-5-3.1 and 5-5-3.2 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-

3.1, 5-5-3.2 (West 2022)). Section 5-4.5-105(a) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022)) contains 

additional factors that supplement, but do not replace, the normal sentencing provisions when the 

offender was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense. People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL 

App (4th) 210498, ¶ 31. 

¶ 62 Not all statutory mitigating factors apply in every case. Merriweather, 2022 IL App 

(4th) 210498, ¶ 31. “Moreover, the trial court need not articulate each factor it considers in 

rendering the sentence for a juvenile offender, and that omission does not mean the trial court did 

not consider all relevant factors.” Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 31; see also People 

v. Marks, 2023 IL App (3d) 200445, ¶ 61 (recognizing that failure to mention a sentencing factor 

listed in section 5-4.5-105(a) “does not mean [the trial court] did not consider [the factor] as 

important or relevant”). “Absent explicit evidence to the contrary, we also presume the court 

considered all mitigating factors.” People v. Page, 2022 IL App (4th) 210374, ¶ 52.

¶ 63 The trial court has discretion to weigh the appropriate factors, and “[t]he appellate 

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it might have 

weighed those factors differently.” Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 37. Additionally, “a 

reviewing court presumes that a sentence imposed within the statutory range provided by the 

legislature is proper.” Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 37. We may reverse a sentence within 

the statutory range only if the trial court abused its discretion, which means that the sentence is 
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“greatly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the 

nature of the offense.” Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 38. 

¶ 64 When defendant was originally sentenced in 2010, his sentencing range was 35 to 

75 years in prison (20 to 60 years in prison for first degree murder, plus a 15-year firearm 

enhancement). Lindsey, 2013 IL App (3d) 100625, ¶ 57. At the resentencing hearing, defendant 

had the benefit of section 5-4.5-105(b) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 

2022)), which authorized the trial court to decline to impose a firearm enhancement because 

defendant was under 18 years old at the time of the offense. The court resentenced defendant to 30 

years in prison, which indicates the court exercised its discretion not to impose a firearm 

enhancement.

¶ 65 The crime in this case was senseless, shooting repeatedly and killing an unarmed 

gas station clerk during an attempted robbery. There was some evidence suggesting that defendant 

might have been the shooter, but even if Evans was the shooter, defendant was legally accountable 

for the murder.

¶ 66 Moreover, defendant had a history of criminality. As a juvenile, he was sentenced 

to 2 years of probation and 30 days of detention for residential burglary. Defendant violated the 

terms of his probation, and there was a warrant for his arrest when he committed the murder at the 

gas station.

¶ 67 However, defendant was only 17 years old at the time of the murder, and he had a 

difficult upbringing. Defendant apparently had a strong support system when he lived with his 

mother in Georgia, but he faced much different circumstances in the two years before the murder, 

when he went to live with his father. Defendant’s father clearly did not provide defendant with the 

support, guidance, and stability that every child deserves.
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¶ 68 The record shows that the trial court accounted for the totality of the circumstances 

when concluding that a 30-year prison sentence was warranted. We recited the court’s comments 

at length above, and we need not do so again. It will suffice to say that the court expressly said it 

considered everything it should have, including the statutory sentencing factors relating to juvenile 

offenders. In its ruling, the court also specifically addressed defendant’s youth, upbringing, 

criminal history, and the nature of the offense. We cannot say that a 30-year prison sentence is 

either “greatly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the law” or “manifestly disproportionate to 

the nature of the offense.” Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 38. 

¶ 69 In arguing to the contrary, defendant proposes that the trial court (1) “did not 

adequately consider” the relevant factors, (2) misapprehended “how to consider the effects of 

youth and its attendant characteristics,” (3) “either disregarded factors, rendered them 

insignificant, or, at its worst, used them as aggravating factors,” and (4) “made no note” of some 

factors. Defendant scrutinizes the court’s comments and explains why he believes the court should 

have weighed the mitigating factors differently. As part of this argument, defendant mentions that 

Evans ultimately received a more lenient sentence than he did by pleading guilty to a lesser offense. 

Defendant further contends that People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, “offers valuable 

guidance in illustrating the court’s error.”

¶ 70 Defendant has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. The trial court expressly 

stated it considered the relevant statutory factors, and a court is under no obligation to articulate 

its reasoning with respect to each factor. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 31. At heart, 

defendant’s argument is a misguided plea for us to reweigh the applicable factors. The question 

for our consideration is whether the court abused its discretion, “not whether this court or any other 

court might have weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors differently.” (Emphasis in 
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original.) Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 42. The fact that Evans received a different sentence 

by pleading guilty to a lesser offense does not change our analysis. “[A] sentence imposed pursuant 

to a plea of guilty does not provide a valid basis of comparison to a sentence imposed subsequent 

to trial and conviction.” People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 171 (2001).

¶ 71 Defendant relies on McKinley, a case in which the First District exercised its power 

to reduce a 39-year prison sentence for a 16-year-old homicide offender. That case involved 

unusual circumstances that are not present here, including that (1) the defendant presented

“overwhelming” evidence of his rehabilitation during incarceration, (2) the trial court made 

comments at sentencing suggesting “a predisposition to punish certain types of offenders more 

harshly,” and (3) the trial court improperly determined that a mitigating factor (the effect of peer 

pressure) was an aggravating factor. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶¶ 73, 80, 88. McKinley

does not support defendant’s argument that the court here abused its discretion.

¶ 72 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 73 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 74 Affirmed.