[Cite as State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-6885.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellant 

 v. 

JAMES WILLIAMS 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 19CA011568 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 04CR065188 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: December 28, 2020 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} The State of Ohio appeals an order of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas 

that granted judicial release to James Williams. For the following reasons, this Court reverses. 

I. 

{¶2} Following a trial to the bench, the trial court found Mr. Williams guilty of two 

counts of possession of marijuana, two counts of possession of cocaine, one count of trafficking 

marijuana, and one count of trafficking in cocaine. One of the possession of cocaine counts and 

the trafficking in cocaine count had major drug offender specifications. The court sentenced Mr. 

Williams to a total of 12 years imprisonment. He appealed, but this Court determined that the 

sentencing entry was not a final appealable order. Following amendments to the sentencing entry, 

Mr. Williams appealed again, and this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. 
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{¶3} After serving more than 10 years of his sentence, Mr. Williams filed a motion for 

judicial release. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted it. The State has 

appealed, assigning two errors. 

II. 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING WILLIAMS’ MOTION FOR 

JUDICIAL RELEASE AS DEFENDANT IS NOT AN ELIGIBLE OFFENDER 

AS DEFINED BY R.C. §2929.20. 

{¶4} The State argues that Mr. Williams was not eligible for judicial release because his 

entire 12-year sentences for the trafficking in cocaine offense and one of the possession of cocaine 

offenses are mandatory. Revised Code Section 2929.20(C) provides that “[a]n eligible offender 

may file a motion for judicial release with the sentencing court * * *[.]” An eligible offender is 

“any person who, on or after April 7, 2009, is serving a stated prison term that includes one or 

more nonmandatory prison terms.” R.C. 2929.20(A)(1)(a). 

{¶5} For one of the possession of marijuana counts, the trial court sentenced Mr. 

Williams to one year of imprisonment. For the other count, it did not impose a sentence. For one 

of the possession of cocaine counts and the trafficking in marijuana count, it also sentenced Mr. 

Williams to one year. For the possession of cocaine count that had the major drug offender 

specification, however, it sentenced him to 10 years for the offense and two years on the 

specification. Identically, for the trafficking in cocaine offense, it sentenced Mr. Williams to ten 

years for the offense and two years on the specification. The court ordered all of the one-year 

sentences to run concurrent with each other and with the longer sentences. It ordered the 10-year 

sentences to run concurrent with the other. It ordered the sentences for the specifications to run 

concurrent with each other, but consecutive to the 10-year sentences, resulting in an aggregate 
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sentence of 12 years. The court’s sentencing entry included the direction that the “sentence 

imposed [on the two offenses with the specifications] are mandatory.” 

{¶6} At the time of Mr. Williams’s offenses, the drug trafficking statute, Section 

2925.03(C)(4)(g), provided that, “[i]f the amount of the drug involved * * * exceeds one thousand 

grams of cocaine[,] * * * the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term the maximum prison 

term prescribed for a felony of the first degree and may impose an additional mandatory prison 

term prescribed for a major drug offender * * *.” The drug possession statute, Section 

2925.11(C)(4)(f), contained similar language regarding Mr. Williams’s offense under that section. 

At the time of the offenses, the maximum prison term for a felony of the first degree was 10 years. 

The trial court, therefore, was required to impose a mandatory 10-year sentence for Mr. Williams’s 

trafficking and possession of cocaine offenses. The trial court also had discretion to “impose an 

additional mandatory prison term” because Mr. Williams was a major drug offender. It chose to 

impose a two-year term for both offenses. Under the plain language of Section 2925.03(C)(4)(g), 

the additional two-year terms were also mandatory. The trial court’s sentencing entry confirms 

the mandatory nature of those sentences, providing that Mr. Williams’ sentences for the two 

counts, which included both the prison term imposed for the offense itself and the additional prison 

term imposed for the specification, “are mandatory.” 

{¶7} Although Mr. Williams’s one-year sentences were not mandatory, they had already 

been served by the time Mr. Williams moved for judicial release. Accordingly, upon review of 

the record, we conclude that Mr. Williams was not an eligible offender under Section 

2929.20(A)(1)(a) because at the time that he filed his motion for judicial release he was not serving 

a stated prison term that included one or more nonmandatory prison terms. The trial court, 
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therefore, incorrectly granted Mr. Williams judicial release. The State’s first assignment of error 

is sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING WILLIAMS’ MOTION FOR 

JUDICIAL RELEASE AS IT FAILED TO MAKE THE NECESSARY 

STATUTORY FINDINGS SET FORTH IN R.C. §2929.20(J). 

{¶8} The State also argues that the trial court failed to make the findings required under 

Section 2929.20(J)(1) before granting Mr. Williams’s motion for judicial release. In light of this 

Court’s resolution of the State’s first assignment of error, we conclude that this issue is moot. We, 

therefore, decline to address it. App.R. 11(A)(1)(c). 

III. 

{¶9} The State’s first assignment of error is sustained. Its second assignment of error is 

moot. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is 

remanded for proceedings in accordance with this decision. 

Judgment reversed, 

and cause remanded. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 
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mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellee. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCURS. 

CARR, P. J. 

DISSENTING. 

{¶10} I respectfully dissent as I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court 

imposed mandatory sentences on the major drug offender specifications in this case. 

{¶11} Under R.C. 2929.20(A)(1)(a), an “‘eligible offender’” for the purposes of judicial 

release is “any person who, on or after April 7, 2009, is serving a stated prison term that includes 

one or more nonmandatory prison terms.” As noted by the majority, former R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(g) 

provided that “[i]f the amount of the drug involved * * * exceeds one thousand grams of cocaine[,] 

* * * the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term the maximum prison term prescribed for 

a felony of the first degree and may impose an additional mandatory prison term prescribed for a 

major drug offender * * *.” Former R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(f) contained similar language. In my 

view, there are three ways to interpret the aforementioned statutory language regarding the trial 

court’s discretion to impose “an additional mandatory prison term” for the major drug offender 

specification. 
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{¶12} One way is as the majority does. The majority has interpreted the statute in such a 

way that any sentence imposed by the trial court on a major drug offender specification is 

automatically a mandatory sentence regardless of what the sentencing court intended. 

{¶13} A second way of looking at the statute is that if the trial court elects to impose 

sentence on a major drug offender specification, which is discretionary, then the judge may impose 

either a mandatory or nonmandatory sentence. The statute merely gives the judge the authority to 

impose additional mandatory time on the specification if warranted. 

{¶14} Yet a third interpretation would provide that the trial court has discretion solely to 

impose an additional mandatory sentence on the major drug offender specification, meaning that 

the imposition of a nonmandatory sentence would run afoul of the statute and render the sentence 

void. 

{¶15} My reading of the August 17, 2009 sentencing entry in this matter indicates that 

while the trial court specified that Williams’ ten-year sentences for trafficking in cocaine and 

possession of cocaine were mandatory, it did not designate the specifications attached to those 

sentences as mandatory. At the hearing on Williams’ motion for judicial release, the trial court 

rejected the State’s contention that the entirety of Williams’ 12-year sentence was mandatory. 

While the trial court acknowledged that it imposed a mandatory fine, it stated that it did “not 

impose a mandatory prison term[]” with respect to the specifications. Because I disagree with the 

majority’s conclusion that any sentence imposed on the specifications was automatically 

mandatory by operation of law, I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the trial court exercised 

its discretion to impose a nonmandatory sentence on the major drug offender specifications, 

making Williams an eligible offender for judicial release pursuant to R.C. 2929.20(A)(1)(a). 

{¶16} I am mindful of the rule of lenity in reaching this conclusion.
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With respect to criminal statutes * * * [e]ven if there were an ambiguity, meaning 

two reasonable ways of reading the statute, R.C. 2901.04 provides that we must 

read the language of the relevant statute not in favor of the government, but in favor 

of the accused. This rule of lenity, as codified, states that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided in division (C) or (D) of this section, sections of the Revised Code 

defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and 

liberally construed in favor of the accused.’ R.C. 2901.04(A). In other words, penal 

statutes may not be extended by implication to cases not falling within their terms. 

State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344, 2012-Ohio-2583, ¶ 81 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). 

{¶17} The trial court here imposed a sentence with the intent of making Williams eligible 

for judicial release after ten years. After serving more than 10 years in prison, and exhibiting good 

behavior during that time, Williams moved for judicial release. The trial court granted his motion 

on the basis that it never intended for the final two years of his twelve-year sentence to be 

mandatory. Under the current version of R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(g), the provision allowing for an 

additional mandatory prison term for major drug offenders has been eliminated, meaning that 

Williams would not have received more than a ten-year mandatory sentence under the current law. 

In light of the unique procedural facts in this case, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment and 

spare Williams the injustice of being sent back to prison after having served more than ten years. 

APPEARANCES: 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and PATRICK M. HAKOS, JR., Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellant. 

JAMES WILLIAMS, pro se, Appellee.