This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6
EDWIN GURULE, individually, 7 and as personal representative of 8 the estate of SAMMY GURULE, 9 deceased, 10 Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 11

v. NO. 29,296 12 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 13 Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 14

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF RIO ARRIBA COUNTY 15 Timothy L. Garcia, District Judge 16
Law Office of James B. Ragan 17 James B. Ragan 18 Corpus Christi, TX 19 Arrazolo Law Firm, P.C. 20 Gilbert Arrazolo 21 Albuquerque, NM 22 for Appellee 23 Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. 24 Edward Ricco 252 Jeffrey M. Croasdell 1 Albuquerque, NM 2
Dickinson Wright PLLC 3 Robert W. Powell 4 Detroit, MI 5 for Appellant 6 MEMORANDUM OPINION 7 WECHSLER, Judge. 8 Defendant Ford Motor Company appeals, arguing that the district court erred 9 in denying Defendant judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff Edwin Gurule, 10 individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Sammy Gurule (Gurule), 11 failed to provide sufficient evidence that th e alleged defect caused Gurule’s enhanced 12 fatal injuries and failed to provide sufficient evidence thatan alternative design would 13 have prevented the fatal injuri es. Defendant further argues th at the district court erred 14 in admitting expert testimony of two e xperts who were unqualified and relied on 15 methods that were unreliable. Plaintiff cross-appeals, arguing that the district court 16 erred in granting Defendant’s motion re garding punitive damages. We hold that 17 Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the alleged defect caused 18 Gurule’s fatal injuries. We further hold that the district court did not err in admitting 19 expert testimony of Dr. Michael Huerta and Mr. William Patterson or in granting 203 Defendant’s motion regarding punitive damages. Therefore, we affirm. 1

BACKGROUND 2 On November 10, 2006, Gurule’s 1993 Ford Ranger pickup truck left the 3 highway and rolled over, cavi ng in the roof and killing Gu rule. The vehicle initially 4 entered a passenger-side leading roll, but becau se the vehicle was airborne, it first hit 5 the ground on the driver’s side roof. Plaintiff sued Defendant for wrongful death, 6 alleging strict products liabilityregarding the allegedly de fective roof and negligence 7 regarding the design and testing of the roof. Plaintiff sought both compensatory and 8 punitive damages. The parties disputed at trial whether Gurule’s head was inside the 9 vehicle or outside of it when he hit the ground, but on appeal, the parties agree that, 10 for purposes of this appeal, his head wa s inside. The parties do not dispute that 11 Gurule’s death was caused by “‘blunt force injury to the head’” due to a “‘sudden 12 impact.’” They do dispute, however, howGurule’s head impacted the vehicle. 13 Defendant contends that Gurule ’s head was “‘touching the r oof’” of the vehicle at the 14 time it first impacted the ground and, cons equently, caused the brain to hemorrhage 15 and the skull to fracture. Plaintiff conte nds that Gurule’s h ead was struck by the 16 collapsing roof of the truck due to the “i nward crushing and buckling of the roof in 17 a V shape.” 184 At trial, Plaintiff presented the testimony of various experts, attempting to show 1 that the collapsing roof caused Gurule’s injuri es and that, if the roof had not collapsed, 2 Gurule would have walked away from the accident. Defendant contested the 3 admission of much of this testimony through mo tions in limine, objections at trial, and 4 post-verdict motions for judgment notwithst anding the verdict or new trial. The 5 district court denied the motions and overruled the objections, allowing testimony of 6 Plaintiff’s experts. After Plaintiff’s case, Defendant filed a motion for directed 7 verdict, which the district court granted w ith regard to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive 8 damages. 9 The jury ultimately found for Plaintiff on strict liability for Plaintiff’s product 10 liability claim and for negligence in design and manufacture. The jury awarded 11 compensatory damages to Plaintiff for $8.5 million. Defendant filed a motion for 12 judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, which the district court 13 denied. Defendant appeals and Plaintiff cross-appeals. 14 SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 15 Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment 16 as a matter of law because Pl aintiff failed to prove that the alleged defect caused the 17 fatal injuries. Defendant a dditionally argues that Plaintiff failed to present “evidence 18 that an alternative, non-defective roof de sign would have limited roof crush in this 195 accident sufficiently to prevent the fatal in juries.” We review whether there was 1 sufficient evidence to uphold a jury verdic t “by examining whether the verdict is 2 supported by such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate to 3 support a conclusion.” Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. , 2009- 4 NMCA-095, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791 (internal quotation marks and citation 5 omitted). We review the evidence in a lightfavoring the verdict and resolve conflicts 6 in favor of the prevailing party. Id. 7 Defendant first argues that Plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to 8 support a finding that the alleged roof defectcaused the enhanced injuries to Gurule. 9 This Court dealt with a similar argument in Couch v. Astec Industries, Inc. , in which 10 the defendant argued that “there was insufficient eviden ce from which the jury could 11 reasonably determine that [the d]efendant was responsible for [the p]laintiff’s 12 ‘enhanced injury’ or that [the d]efendant was negligent or strictly liable to [the 13 p]laintiff.” 2002-NMCA-084, ¶ 2, 132 N.M. 631, 53 P.3d 398. In Couch , the plaintiff 14 sued the defendant, a manufacturer of asphalt plants and road paving equipment, for 15 injuries sustained after the plaintiff b ecame entangled in a m achine manufactured by 16 the defendant, arguing that the asphalt plant’ s protective guard was inadequate and 17 that the plant should have been equipped with an emergency pull cord on the conveyor 18 belt, which would have allegedly resulted in less extensive injuries. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5-7. 196 In Couch , we held that in order to establis h an “enhanced injury,” a plaintiff 1 must prove “(1) that the defective design caused injuries over and above those which 2 otherwise would have been sustained, and (2) the degree of enhancement.” Id. ¶ 35. 3 We further stated that “[t]he degree of enhancement may be established by proof of 4 what injuries, if any, would have resulted had an alternative, safer design been used.” 5 Id. We concluded that the evidence supporte d an inference that the defendant was 6 exposed to more extensive injuries and that , therefore, “the jury reasonably could have 7 found that [the p]laintiff proved his claim fo r enhanced injury due to the absence of 8 a pull cord.” Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Acknowledging that the defendant presented evidence that 9 supported a different outcome, we reiterated that “[t]hequestion is not whether 10 substantial evidence exists to support th e opposite result, but rather whether such 11 evidence supports the result reached.” Id. ¶ 39 (alteration in original) (internal 12 quotation marks and citation omitted). 13 Similar to the defendant in Couch , Defendant argues that there is insufficient 14 evidence to support a jury’s finding that th e allegedly excessive roof crush caused 15 Gurule’s fatal injuries. In support of its argument, Defendant asserts that “there was 16 no conflict that excessive roof crush did not cause the fatal injuri es because Plaintiff’s 17 own expert testified unequivocally that it did not.” Defendant clarifies that Plaintiff’s 18 expert “testified unambiguously” that Gurule ’s head was touching the roof of the 197 vehicle when it hit the ground and that the in itial roof deformation caused the injuries, 1 “not the allegedly excessive crush as the roof continued to deform.” 2 However, although Defendant makes an argument for its interpretation of the 3 facts, other facts exist that support the jury ’s verdict. Dr. Joseph Peles, Plaintiff’s 4 expert in bioengineering, testified that Gurule’s injury occurred because of the V5 shape buckling of the roof, which introdu ced the enhanced, fatal component. Dr. 6 Peles further stated that the roof of Gu rule’s vehicle was not strong enough to resist 7 the combination of the lateral and verticalforce on the roof cau sed by the impact, that 8 a strong roof would have only deformed ina shape “conform[ing to the] ground,” and 9 that such a deformation would not have cau sed sufficient injury to Gurule to cause 10 death. Additionally, Dr. Peles testified that if the roof crush were limited to two to 11 three inches, the V-buckling would likel y be limited and prevented. Although 12 Plaintiff concedes that, at th e point of impact, Gurule’s h ead was “of course, in contact 13 with the roof header panel,” as he argued at trial, Plaintiff contends that the “critical 14 factor” was the “extra component of force resulting from [the] V[-]buckling of the 15 roof structure.” Dr. Peles was asked to cl arify his testimony by the district court and 16 he testified that, if the vehicle had a strong roof, the V-buckling would not have 17 initially occurred. Specifically, Dr. Peles stated that the “ori ginal cave-in that[] 18 caus[ed] the injury” would not have occu rred because, in a strong roof, the roof 198 conforms to the ground, whereas in a weak roof, it can buckle. Combined with Dr. 1 Ian Paul’s testimony that Guru le’s fatal injury was cons istent with Gurule’s head 2 being struck by the collapsing roof of the truck, a jury could reasonably conclude that 3 the roof was unreasonably weak, that the ex cessive roof crush caused the V-buckling, 4 that the V-buckling would no t have occurred in a stronger roof, and that the V5 buckling caused Gurule’s fatal injuries. Although Defendant presents evidence and 6 arguments to support its interpretation of th e facts, on appeal, we do not reweigh the 7 evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury, provided there is sufficient 8 evidence to support the verdict. State v. Fuentes , 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 13, 147 N.M. 9 761, 228 P.3d 1181; see also State v. Lucero , 2010-NMSC-011, ¶ 8, 147 N.M. 747, 10 228 P.3d 1167 (stating that it is the province of the jury “to weigh and resolve 11 conflicting evidence and testimony” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 12 Defendant further argues that Plaintiff n eeded to show that the “residual” roof 13 crush, that occurred after the initial roof crush, caused Gurule’s injuries in order to 14 prove enhanced injury. However, Defendant presents no authority, and we are aware 15 of no authority, that asserts that an enhancedinjury case requires pr oof of a defect that 16 causes an injury later in time, rather than greater in force. See In re Adoption of Doe , 17 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (stating that we do not review 18 arguments unsupported by authority on appeal). Defendant attempts to bolster its 199 argument by stating that Plaintiff’s expert, Dr . Peles, admitted that the “initial cave-in” 1 was the cause of Gurule’s fatal injuries. Although we do not agree with this iteration 2 of Dr. Peles’ testimony, we see no reason to conclude that the alleged V-buckling that 3 occurred at impact, which caused Gurule’s injuries, was not a result of the excessive 4 roof crush in dimension, rather than in time. Plaintiff asserts that “the excessive roof 5 crush that killed . . . Gurule was [the] V[-]buckling, or caving in, which occurred 6 because the roof was too weak.” In other words, the excessive roof crush was the 7 excessive amount the roof crushed in due to the allegedly defective design. As 8 discussed above, Plaintiff presented sufficien t evidence with which a jury could agree 9 with this conclusion. Again, we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our 10 judgment for that of the jury. Fuentes , 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 13. 11 Defendant next argues that Plaintiff presented no evidence that an alternative 12 design would have prevented the fatal injuries. Defendant asserts that the two 13 alternatives that were presented by Dr. Huerta, Plaintiff’s expert in structural 14 engineering, did not prove that the roof crush would have been limited “in this 15 accident to two or three inches.” However, Dr. Huerta testified that, after conducting 16 testing on exemplar vehicles, he conc luded that the vehicle was unreasonably 17 dangerous and that a feasibleand affordable alternative design would have prevented 18 the enhanced and fatal injuries. He additi onally testified that moderate reinforcement 1910 of the roof would have improved its strength and limited intrusion of the roof into the 1 passenger area to between two and three inch es. Defendant argues that Dr. Huerta’s 2 testimony was theoretical and that the te sts performed did not meet the requisite 3 standard. But again, although Defendant presents viable arguments for its perspective, 4 it is for the jury to weigh eviden ce and resolve conflicting testimony. Lucero , 2010- 5 NMSC-011, ¶ 8. As such, in this case, the evidence presented was sufficient that a 6 reasonable jury could conclude that Dr . Huerta’s testimony presented a viable 7 alternative that would have prevented the fatal injuries. 8 EXPERT TESTIMONY 9 Dr. Huerta 10 Defendant argues that the district court erred in admitting Dr. Huerta’s 11 prejudicial expert testimony. Plaintiff initially asserts that Defendant did not preserve 12 this argument for appeal. Plaintiff contends that Defendant did not move to strike 13 testimony and that its post-trial motions regarding the testimony came “too late.” 14 However, Defendant did object to Dr. Huerta’s opinions at trial, as well as in its post15 verdict motion. Indeed, Defe ndant asserted at trial that Dr. Huerta was not qualified 16 to render opinions regardi ng whether a roof design was safe. The district court 17 overruled the objection, and De fendant was not required to repeat its objection since 18 the purpose of the preservation rule had been met. See State v. Soto , 2007-NMCA- 1911 077, ¶ 14, 142 N.M. 32, 162 P.3d 187; see also Rule 12-216(A) NMRA (“To preserve 1 a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was 2 fairly invoked, but formal exceptions are not required[.]”). 3 We review admissibility of evidence, in cluding expert opinion, for an abuse of 4 discretion. State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 169, 861 P.2d 192, 205 (1993). An abuse 5 of discretion occurs when a ruling is cl early contrary to the logical conclusions 6 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case. State v. Campbell , 2007- 7 NMCA-051, ¶ 9, 141 N.M. 543, 157 P.3d 722. We focus our inquiry on whether the 8 expert’s testimony will “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 9 determine a fact in issue.” State v. Hughey , 2007-NMSC-036, ¶ 17, 142 N.M. 83, 163 10 P.3d 470 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 In determining whether to admit non-sc ientific expert te stimony under Rule 11- 12 702 NMRA, we look to whether (1) the expert is qualified, (2 ) the testimony will 13 assist the trier of fact, and (3) the testimony is limited to the area of scientific, 14 technical, or other specialized knowle dge in which they are qualified. Fuentes , 2010- 15 NMCA-027, ¶ 23. Defendant argues that Dr. Huerta was not qualified to testify 16 regarding automotive design and safety and that the testimony was not based on a 17 reliable foundation. We address each in turn. 18 Defendant first asserts that Dr. Huerta was not qualified. Dr. Huerta has a Ph.D 1912 in mechanical engineering and is employed as a mechanical engineering consultant. 1 Specifically, Dr Huerta has an educati onal background and professional experience 2 in stress analysis and structural analysis, a discipline that is used to determine how a 3 structure responds to loading conditions, to calculate the strengths, deflections, and 4 stresses. Additionally, he ha s taught stress analysis, structural engineering, and finite 5 element analysis at the Univ ersity of Texas, El Paso. 6 Defendant concedes that Dr. Huerta has professional experience in structural 7 analysis, but asserts that he has no education, training, or experience specifically in 8 motor vehicle design or passenger safety. De fendant contends that the district court 9 erred in concluding that Dr. Huerta’s qualif ications went to weight not ability to 10 testify because Alberico “makes clear that a lack of qualifications renders the opinions 11 inadmissible.” See 116 N.M. at 166, 861 P.2d at 202. Although we acknowledge that 12 Dr. Huerta’s qualifications may not typically apply to vehicle design or passenger 13 safety, the principles of structural anal ysis and stress analysis do “apply across the 14 board to all fields of engineering.” As he testified, Dr. Huerta evaluated the structural 15 integrity of the exemplar 1993 Ranger Gurulewas driving at the time of the accident 16 and determined in what areas the roof mi ght fail structurally and how to design a 17 structure so as not to fail. As Defendant additionally establishes, Dr. Huerta testified 18 regarding the cost to incorporate his pr oposed reinforcements into a production roof 1913 and the weight it would add to the vehicl e, as well as his “hazard analysis” on the 1 vehicle’s roof design and the technological and economical feasibility of a safer 2 design. Although Dr. Huerta may not haveextensive background in vehicle design, 3 Defendant made no objection as to Dr. Huerta’s qualifications as a structural engineer. 4 On appeal, Defendant presents us with no authority, and we findno authority, that 5 states that an expert in the “strength and integrity of structures” may not testify as to 6 the strength and integrity of a specific typeof structure, such as a vehicle. See In re 7 Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. at 765, 676 P.2d at 1330 (s tating that we do not review 8 arguments unsupported by authority on appeal). Indeed, Dr. Huerta was qualified as 9 an expert in mechanical engineering, and we cannot say that the district court abused 10 its discretion in allowing him to testify as to the safety of a structure without having 11 a specific background in vehicle design and safety. Cf. Couch , 2002-NMCA-084, 12 ¶ 14 (qualifying a non-engineer expert withno experience in designing machinery that 13 caused injuries to testify regarding inad equacy of safety mechanisms on a paving 14 machine based on experience and e ducation in occupational safety). 15 Defendant next asserts that Dr. Huerta’s opinions were not reliable. Defendant 16 states that Dr. Huerta’s opinion that an alternative roof design would have limited roof 17 crush had “no reliable basis or methodology because it was not based on any testing 18 or calculation of forces.” Under the third prerequisite to the admissibility of expert 1914 testimony, the proponent of expert testimony must show that the expert testimony has 1 “a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.” Alberico, 116 2 N.M. at 167, 861 P.2d at 202 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 “[W]hen testing the reliability of non-scientific expert te stimony, . . . the court must 4 evaluate [the] expert’s personal knowledge and experience to determine whether the 5 expert’s conclusions on a given subject may be trusted.” State v. Torrez , 2009- 6 NMSC-029, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 331, 210 P.3d 228. 7 Dr. Huerta testified in detail regarding the technique and methodology he used 8 in evaluating the structural integrity of the exemplar 1993 Ranger. He testified that 9 he conducted drop tests, in which he suspende d two vehicles, twenty-four inches and 10 eighteen inches respectively, above a concre te surface and oriented to test the portion 11 of the vehicle at issue. As a result of both tests, the vehicles suffered from 12 deformation of the structure in a similar manner in which Gurule’s vehicle had 13 deformed. Defendant argues that this te sting methodology has been “rejected in the 14 relevant scientific field by the Society of Automotive Engineers, because it is not 15 repeatable and does not relate to injurycausation in rollovers.” However, Dr. 16 Huerta’s testimony was not admitted to prove injury causation. It was admitted for 17 the purpose of showing that the roof was structurally weak and could have been 18 strengthened at a reasonable cost. 1915 Defendant further asserts that drop test s are unreliable and invalid in judging 1 the safety of roof structures in rollovers. However, Dr. Huerta gave specific 2 instructions on how he conduc ted his drop tests and was subject to cross-examination 3 on his methodology. Further, there was evid ence that drop tests have been performed 4 by automobile manufacturers to test roof strength for various purposes, including by 5 Defendant. See, e.g. , Styles v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 799 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (App. Div. 6 2005) (“[I]t is uncontroverted that ‘drop testing’ of vehicles to determine the 7 crashworthiness of roofs is a routine, wi dely accepted scientific technique.”). We 8 therefore cannot say that the district c ourt abused its discretion in allowing Dr. 9 Huerta’s testimony due to a lack of a re liable basis in the know ledge and experience 10 of his discipline. 11 Defendant also attempts to present Dr . Huerta’s testimony as nothing more than 12 an untestable, unreliable, and therefore, inadmissible factual conclusion that Gurule 13 was fatally injured as a result of the weakness in the vehicle’s structural integrity. 14 However, as noted, Dr. Huerta’s testimony was admitted for the purpose of evaluating 15 the structural integrity of the roof, not in jury causation. Although Dr. Huerta did state 16 that the vehicle was “unreasonably dangerous ,” as an expert qualified in mechanical 17 engineering and the structural analysis of the vehicle and relying on his tests of the 18 structural integrity of the ve hicle, he was permitted to te stify as to this opinion. See 1916 Rule 11-702 (“[A] witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify thereto in the form 1 of an opinion or otherwise.”); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 2 579, 592 (1993) (“[A]n expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including 3 those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.”). Mr. Patterson 4 Defendant also argues that the districtcourt erred in admitting Patterson’s 5 expert testimony regarding hedonic damages because (1) testimony purporting to 6 quantify the value of life is not a proper s ubject of expert testimony because this type 7 of expert testimony does not assist the jury and is not sufficiently tailored to the life 8 of a specific plaintiff, (2) Patterson wa s not qualified, and (3) Patterson’s opinions 9 were unreliable pursuant to Alberico because they were not based on an established 10 scientific methodology or procedure and the methodology has not been widely 11 accepted in economic literature. Plaintiff agai n asserts that Defendant did not preserve 12 its argument regarding the admissibility of Patterson’s testimony. However, Plaintiff 13 concedes that Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of 14 Patterson, that Defendant objected at trial to Patterson testifyi ng regarding hedonics, 15 and that Defendant again objected that Patterson should not be permitted to discuss 16 enjoyment of life. Plaintiff asks this Court to “specifically adopt the rule . . . that 17 [Defendant]’s motion in limine did not preserve its claim of error in the admission of 18 . . . Patterson’s testimony.” We decline to do so. See Robertson v. Carmel Builders 1917 Real Estate , 2004-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 33, 50, 135 N.M. 641, 92 P.3d 653 (stating that 1 issues were preserved in motions in limine). 2 Patterson testified that ec onomists have used a variety of methods to place an 3 economic value on a human life and that there are various economic studies that have 4 attempted to quantify the value of an entire human life. Patterson further testified that 5 there is a component of the total value of a human life attributed to the pleasure of life, 6 meaning the “slice” of time sp ent pursuing leisure activities. According to Patterson, 7 the total value of life is th e sum of an individual’s earning capacity over the lifetime, 8 the value of household services an individual produces, and the pleasure of life 9 component. He next testified that there are a number of studies, aside from those that 10 value an entire human life, that provide be nchmarks to place an economic value on the 11 pleasure of life component. He testified th at the study measuring the enjoyment of life 12 component that he “like[s] the best” is a meta-study conducted in 1988 that analyzed 13 the results of 67 individual studies that valued human lives based on willingness to 14 pay studies, subtracted the earning capacity and household services portion, and 15 attributed the rest to the enjoyment of life component. The study concluded that the 16 average total value for the enjoyment of life component was $55,000 per year in 1988, 17 or roughly $100,000 in 2008 dollars. He then testified that he utilizes this $100,000 18 benchmark as an upper range “to aid the finders of fact, to aid the jury in cases like 1918 this.” Applying this figure to the remainder of Gurule’s life, Patterson concluded that 1 “[i]f you [the jury] believe th at the value of pleasure of life is $100,000 per year . . . 2 it comes to $5.99 million” and that if the jury believes the value of life component is 3 “only worth [$]10,000 per year, the presen t value of the loss across . . . Gurule’s 4 lifetime is about $598,680.” The jury awarde d $5.8 million as damages for “life apart 5 from his earning capacity.” 6 Defendant first contends that tes timony purporting to quantify the value of 7 enjoyment of life, or hedonic damages, is not the proper subject of expert testimony. 8 Defendant relies on Couch , 2002-NMCA-084, ¶ 20, for the proposition that hedonic 9 damage calculations are analogous to calculations for damages for pain and suffering, 10 which is a determination that is solely with in the province of the jury and not a proper 11 subject of expert testimony. However, this Court has held that “it is not improper for 12 the [district] court to permit an economist to testify regarding his or her opinion 13 concerning the economic value of a plaintiff’s loss of enjoyment of life.” Sena v. 14 N.M. State Police , 119 N.M. 471, 478, 892 P.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 1995). Indeed, 15 the expert challenged in Couchoffered a “range of values ” and thus provided the jury 16 with calculations. 2002-NMCA-084, ¶ 18. 17 Defendant further argues that the methodology used by Patterson “‘failed to 18 meet the Alberico standard of scientific reliability .’” Our Supreme Court has applied 1919 a nonexclusive, four-factor test in determining the scientific reliability of expert 1 testimony. We consider 2 (1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) 3 whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and 4 publication; (3) the known potential rate of error in using a particular 5 scientific technique and the existe nce and maintenance of standards 6 controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether the theory or 7 technique has been generally accepted inthe particular scientific field. 8 Lee v. Martinez, 2004-NMSC-027, ¶ 18, 136 N.M. 166, 96 P.3d 291 (internal 9 quotation marks and citation omitte d). In particular, Defendant contends that (1) the 10 scientific reliability of the meta-s tudy relied upon by Patterson for the $100,000 11 benchmark fails to meet th e reliability standard of Alberico , (2) the method by which 12 Patterson calculated the loss of enjoyment of life for the bottom number of the range, 13 by moving the decimal point on the $100,000 benchmark to $10,000, had no basis and 14 thus fails the scientific reliability standard of Alberico (3) the methodology used by 15 Patterson has not been widely accepted in the scientific literature, and (4) courts have 16 almost uniformly rejected proposed expert testimony purporting to quantify hedonic 17 damages because it is unreliable. 18 However, in State v. Torres , 1999-NMSC-010, ¶¶ 43-44, 127 N.M. 20, 976 19 P.2d 20, our Supreme Court limited the application of the Alberico standard to expert 20 testimony that requires scientific knowledge. Torresadopted the rationale of 21 Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc. , 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir 1996), that 2220 Alberico does not extend to expert testimony based on experience or non-scientific 1 knowledge, and New Mexico has continue d to recognize this principle despite 2 Compton being overruled by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137 (1999). See 3 Bustos v. Hyundai Motor Co. , 2010-NMCA-090, ¶ 14, 149 N.M. 1, 243 P.3d 440, 4 cert. granted , 2010-NMCERT-010, 149 N.M. 65, 243 P. 3d 1147. Thus, in examining 5 the expert testimony of Patterson, we do not apply the Alberico standard of scientific 6 reliability. Patterson’s tes timony was not based on scientific knowledge, but instead 7 was based on his specialized knowledge and experience as an economist regarding the 8 interpretation and applicati on of studies that apply ec onomic concepts to value a 9 human life. See State v. Aleman , 2008-NMCA-137, ¶ 18, 145 N.M. 79, 194 P.3d 110 10 (“Specialized knowledge, while it may result in conclusions or opinions drawn from 11 observations and experience with scientific facts, deals more with the technical 12 application, rather than the theoretical application of facts.” (internal quotation marks 13 and citation omitted)). We therefore address the reliability of Patterson’s testimony 14 in the context of whether a proper foundati on was laid as to whether there was “a 15 reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.” Alberico , 116 N.M. 16 at 167, 861 P.2d at 202. We must “evaluate [the] expert’s personal knowledge and 17 experience to determine whether the expert ’s conclusions on a given subject may be 18 trusted.” Torrez , 2009-NMSC-029, ¶ 21. 1921 While we recognize that most courts have found quantifying the value of a 1 human life, including the loss of enjoyment component, to be ba sed on an unreliable 2 methodology post- Daubert , we do not believe that the di strict court erred in finding 3 Patterson’s testimony reliable. See, e.g. , Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. , 214 F.3d 1235, 4 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Troubled by the disparity of results reached in published 5 value-of-life studies and skeptical of th eir underlying methodology, the federal courts 6 which have considered expert testimony on hedonic damages in the wake of Daubert 7 have unanimously held quantifications of such damages inadmissable.”). Contrary to 8 Defendant’s characterization of Patters on’s testimony, Patterson’s testimony was 9 mostly definitional in nature as to the type s of considerations that can be taken into 10 account when an economic value is placed on the enjoyment of a human life. He 11 testified that economists haveused several differing methods in valuing a human life, 12 including the enjoyment component, and that application of these methods has led to 13 a wide disparity in the dollar amounts thateconomists have provided as benchmarks. 14 He then provided a very broad range of values for an i ndividual Gurule’s age, based 15 on present value calculations of an annual range determined by a meta-study that 16 averaged 67 individual studies to exemp lify the wide divergence between economists 17 in determining the value of the enjoyment of life. We cannot say that the district court 18 abused its discretion in finding that this testimony had a reliable basis. See Smith , 214 1922 F.3d at 1244-46 (applying New Mexico law and holding that expert testimony as to 1 the “definition of loss of enjoyment of life” is reliable and based on a 2 “noncontroversial conclusion” based on the assumption that “life is worth more than 3 what one is compensated for one’s work”). 4 Defendant further argues that Patterson’ s testimony “could not assist the jury 5 because the jury was charged with the task of determining the value of a particular 6 life.” In Couch , this Court addressed an identi cal argument. 2002-NMCA-084, ¶¶ 16- 7 20. Couch involved the expert testimony of an ec onomist, who testified that several 8 academic studies “posited a range of valu es” for the economic value of a loss of an 9 entire life. Id. ¶ 18. The expert refused to testify as to the specific value of the entire 10 life that the plaintiff specifically lost as a result of his injuries, explaining that the jury 11 would determine the percentage based on other evidence that was specific to the 12 plaintiff, such as how the plaintiff “derived the most enjoyment from his life and how 13 his injuries affected that enjoyment.” Id. ¶¶ 18-19. This Court held that this type of 14 testimony was helpful to the jury and therefore permissible, and further, if the expert 15 “offered a specific value for [the p]lainti ff’s hedonic damages claim, he would have 16 intruded improperly” on the jury’s domain. Id. ¶ 20. Patterson’s testimony similarly 17 provided guidance and definitions on the meaning of hedonic damages and “gave the 18 jury a range of monetary values that likely proved helpful in evaluating Plaintiff’s 1923 claim” based on the same type of studies. Id. ¶ 19. We therefore cannot say that the 1 district court abused its discretion in determining that Patterson’s testimony did not 2 assist the jury through his specialized knowledge. 3 Defendant also argues thatPatterson was not qualified as an expert because he 4 lacked a “specialized education, traini ng or experience in valuing the ‘loss of 5 enjoyment of life.’” However, as noted, Patterson testified only as to the theories and 6 techniques economists use in determini ng the value of a human life, and his 7 calculations were not based on his personal perceptions on the value of enjoyment of 8 life, but instead were based on values derived from a benchmark meta-study. As to 9 Patterson’s qualifications, he has a bachel or’s degree in economics, has taught a 10 variety of economic topics, has authored materials on a variety of legal-economic 11 topics, including the valuing of life, ha s been an expert in court over 120 times, 12 including testimony regarding hedonic damage s, and has been retained by Defendant 13 in other cases. Additionally, Defendant cross-examined Patterson both on his 14 qualifications and on his testimony. A general economic bac kground in conjunction 15 with experience as an expert are sufficien t qualifications for expert testimony on the 16 economic theories underlying the values provided by benchmarks studies on loss of 17 enjoyment of life and calculating the pres ent value of a range of benchmarks. See 18 Sena , 119 N.M. at 478, 892 P.2d at 611 (“[I]t is not improper for the [district] court 1924 to permit an economist to testify regardi ng his or her opinion concerning the economic 1 value of a plaintiff’s loss of enjoyment of life.”). Based on the nature of Patterson’s 2 testimony and his background, we cannot say that the district court abused its 3 discretion in finding that Patters on was qualified as an expert. 4 PUNITIVE DAMAGES 5 Plaintiff argues on cross-appeal that the district court erred in granting 6 Defendant’s motion for directed verdic t on the issue of punitive damages because 7 Defendant’s actions show a reckless state of mind, warranting consideration of 8 punitive damages. In granting Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on punitive 9 damages, the district court found insuffici ent evidence of the required mental state. 10 We review a district c ourt’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict de novo. 11 Littell v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 2008-NMCA-012, ¶ 59, 143 N.M. 506, 177 P.3d 1080. We 12 resolve conflicts in favor of the party resisting the directed verdict. Id. “To be liable 13 for punitive damages, a wrongdoer must have some culpable mental state, and the 14 wrongdoer’s conduct must rise to a willful, wanton, malicious, reckless, oppressive, 15 or fraudulent level[.]” Clay v. Ferrellgas, Inc. , 118 N.M. 266, 269, 881 P.2d 11, 14 16 (1994) (citation omitted). Reckless is defined as “the intentional doing of an act with 17 utter indifference to the consequences.” Couch , 2002-NMCA-084, ¶ 58 (internal 18 quotation marks and citation omitted). 1925 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that th ere was sufficient evidence that (1) 1 Defendant was aware of the dangers of rollover accidents, as evidenced by an 2 acknowledgment that rollover fatalities increase due to intrusion of the roof structure, 3 an acknowledgment in 1991 that 50 percent of light truck fatalities resulted from 4 rollover impact versus 24 percent for pa ssenger cars, and knowle dge of legal claims 5 alleging rollover deaths; (2) Defendant knew how to build safe roofs, citing 6 Defendant’s 1994 Mustang as an example; (3) Defendant could have manufactured 7 a safe roof for the 1993 Ranger at a cost of $100 per vehicle according to Dr. Huerta; 8 and (4) Defendant disregarded a 1967 cost-b enefit analysis in which it concluded 9 rollover protection could be justified if the cost per car was lower than $119. Plaintiff 10 then asserts that a jury may draw reasonable inferences based on common knowledge 11 and common sense between th e knowledge of rollover dangers and the ability to build 12 a safe roof, and thereby come to a conclusi on that Defendant’s failure to build a safer 13 roof was in reckless disregard of the lives that would be lost. 14 In granting Defendant’s directed verdict on the punitive damage issue, the 15 district court found that Defendant did not ignore the knowledge of greater risk of 16 fatalities in rollover accidents and that, ind eed, Defendant attempte d to strengthen the 17 roof of the 1993 Ranger. Plaintiff’s own expert, Dr. Huerta, testified that Ford added 18 roof reinforcements to increase the stre ngth of the Ranger roof between the 1992 and 1926 1993 model years and that Ford undertook a program to increase roof strength in 1991 1 after several lawsuits were filed claiming excessive roof crush. This Court has 2 previously held that undertaking safety measures and attempting to correct unsafe 3 conditions is evidence that a defendant was not reckless in addressing the mental state 4 for punitive damages, even if the jury f ound that the “[d]efendant should have done 5 things differently” and found for the plaintiff in regard to liability. Couch , 2002- 6 NMCA-084, ¶ 61. Further, Pl aintiff’s expert testified th at the roof of the 1993 Ranger 7 exceeded the federal roof strength standard by almost 50 percent. Plaintiff failed to 8 introduce any counter evidence that the 1991 safety program or the roof reinforcement 9 in 1992 was recklessly deficient and thus failed to show a “culpable mental state” 10 required for punitive damages on the part of Defendant. 11 Further, to the extent that Plaintiff ar gues that the 1967 cost-b enefit analysis and 12 acknowledgment that a greater proportion of light truck fatalities are caused by 13 rollovers compared to passenger cars, coupledwith evidence that a stronger roof was 14 feasible, provide sufficient ev idence that a jury may draw reasonable inferences of a 15 culpable mental state that Defendant’s actions were reckless in designing the 1993 16 Ranger, we are unpersuaded. Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant ignored the 17 information, either intentionally or reckle ssly, in designing the 1993 Ranger. It is not 18 enough to simply show that Defendant wa s aware of the dangers caused by rollover 1927 accidents and that it was feasible to design a reinforced roof. Instead, in order to 1 survive a directed verdict, there must bea particularized showing that Defendant 2 disregarded that knowledge in a reckless manner. Cf. Couch , 2002-NMCA-084, ¶ 60 3 (holding that “unsafe features in [the d]efendant’s plant do not give rise to an 4 inference [of] reckless[ness] ” when the plaintiff did not provide any additional 5 evidence “to show that the safety probl ems arose from or reflected a reckless 6 indifference”). 7 Further, Plaintiff’s reliance on Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. , 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 8 (Ct. App. 1981) is unpersuasive. In Grimshaw , there was evidence that the defendant 9 knew that the vehicle at issue had a fuel tank and rear structure that would expose 10 consumers to serious injury or death in a 20 to 30 mile-per-hour collision and that the 11 defendant could have corrected the design def ect at a slight cost but decided to defer 12 correction after a cost benefit analysis showed that it was more profitable to not 13 correct the defect. Id. at 384. Particularly, the plai ntiff presented detailed testimony 14 and other evidence from several sources th at the defendant’s chain of command met 15 and “defer[red] corrective acti on” even after being informedthat the vehicle’s “fuel 16 tank . . . rupture[d] at low sp eed rear impacts” resulting in“significant risk of injury 17 or death of the occupants by fire” after c onducting a “cost-benefit analysis balancing 18 human lives and limbs against corporate profits.” Id. at 384-85. The evidence also 1928 showed the defendant’s “institutional ment ality was shown to be one of callous 1 indifference to public safety.” Id. at 384. Plaintiff has failed to present any such 2 evidence of a “callous indifference to public safety” or that a conscious or reckless 3 decision was made to ignore design defect s with regard to the roof of the 1993 4 Ranger. Indeed, the evidence shows that Defendant did take steps to increase the 5 strength of the roof of the Ranger in 1991 and 1992 in order to allow the vehicle to 6 better withstand rollover impacts. 7 While the jury ultimately decided that the roof of the 1993 had a design defect, 8 the design defect was not the result of a culp able mental state, which is required for 9 punitive damages. Therefore the districtcourt did not err by granting Defendant’s 10 motion for directed verdict. 11 CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

_______________________________ 15 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 16

WE CONCUR: 1729 __________________________________ 1 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 2

__________________________________ 3 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 4