Filed 4/25/23

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KATHY POOL-O’CONNOR et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

CHRISTOPHER GUADARRAMA, as Trustee, 

etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F083954

(Super. Ct. No. BPB-19-002534)

OPINION

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Andrew B. 

Kendall, Commissioner.

Law Offices of Robert H. Brumfield and Robert H. Brumfield III for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Van Sciver Law and Kurt Van Sciver for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

-ooOoo-

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for publication with the exception of sections I, II and V.
2.

INTRODUCTION

This case involves disputes over the disposition of assets of Albert R. Pool 

(Albert)1following his demise. The assets at issue include monies held in a joint 

checking account and real and personal property assets held in trust pursuant to the 

Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (unnecessary capitalization omitted) (“Original 

Trust Instrument”) as amended and restated in the 2013 Amendment and Restatement of 

the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (unnecessary capitalization omitted) 

(“Amended/Restated Trust” or “Trust”). Appellant Christopher Guadarrama 

(Christopher) was Albert’s nephew, as well as his attorney-in-fact under a durable power 

of attorney (POA), executor under a pour-over will, and successor Trustee under the 

Amended/Restated Trust. 

Christopher appeals from an order (the “subject order”) of the superior court 

sitting in probate (the “probate court”) entered on December 15, 2021, in connection with 

an Amended Petition to Surcharge Trustee for Breach of Trust; Petition to Determine 

Trust Ownership of Assets and for Damages Pursuant to Probate Code Section 859 

(unnecessary capitalization omitted) brought by respondent Kathy Pool-O’Connor 

(Kathy) and joined in by respondents Rachelle Lapham (Rachelle) and Sharon Whiteside 

(Sharon), each of whom were beneficiaries under the Amended/Restated Trust.

We conclude the subject order should be modified to correct a transpositional 

error, and remand for that purpose. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.

1 For purposes of clarity and convenience, we refer to the parties and various 

family members by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
3.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

A. Select Family History

Albert was a businessman and property owner in Lebec, California. Albert and his 

wife, Mabeleen, owned various residences, vacant lots, and a mini-mart in Lebec. Prior 

to her passing, Mabeleen was the primary operator of the mini-mart, and did the banking 

for her and her husband. She predeceased Albert in 2002. 

Albert and Mabeleen had four biological children, Kathy, Sharon, Diana Pool, and 

an older brother, Michael Pool. Michael died before any of the events in question. In 

addition, Albert adopted his granddaughter Rachelle who is Kathy’s daughter. 

Albert’s wife, Mabeleen, had a sister, Maxine, and Christopher was Maxine’s son. 

After Mabeleen died, Sharon, Kathy, and Maxine operated the mini-mart. Maxine took 

over managing finances for the mini-mart and for Albert. When Maxine’s health began 

to decline, a decision was made to close the mini-mart. 

Starting in 2012, Christopher began helping Albert and Maxine manage the family 

finances and pay the family bills. Christopher would make out the checks and either 

Albert or Maxine would sign them. Maxine would also give Christopher signed blank 

checks for Christopher to fill out with payee and payment information. Albert had only 

one bank account and it was jointly held by him and Maxine up until 2013 at which time 

Christopher was added as an authorized signer on the account (the “joint account”). 

From 2012 up to the date of Albert’s passing, only Albert’s money was ever deposited 

into the joint account. Albert did little, if any banking himself. He could not read well 

and secreted cash in various locations.2 His daughter Sharon described him as a “miser.” 

2 For example, in the First Account and Report of Christopher Guadarrama, 

Trustee for Albert R. Pool Family Trust (bold type and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted), Christopher disclosed a total of $89,894.50 in cash and coins found in Albert’s 

home, other real property he owned, automobiles and a recreational vehicle. 
4.

B. Albert’s Estate Planning Documents

Albert and Mabeleen created the Original Trust Instrument on December 6, 1992. 

(Albert and Mabeleen are sometimes referred to as the “Settlors” in connection with the 

Original Trust Instrument. Albert is sometimes referred to as the “Settlor” in connection 

with the Amended/Restated Trust.) 

As mentioned, Mabeleen predeceased Albert in 2002. The Original Trust 

Instrument provided, in part: “Except as otherwise expressly provided ..., on the death of 

the first Settlor, the designation of beneficiaries or specific gifts in the trusts created ... 

shall become irrevocable and not subject to amendment or modification.” 

On February 28, 2013, Albert executed a series of estate planning documents. 

Specifically, and without limitation, Albert executed (1) the Amended/Restated Trust 

naming his nephew, Christopher, first successor Trustee of the Amended/Restated Trust, 

and Christopher’s mother, Maxine, second successor Trustee in the event Christopher 

could not, or would not, serve; (2) a pour-over will in which Albert gifted his entire estate 

to the Trustee of his Trust and nominated Christopher to serve as executor of his will; and 

(3) the POA appointing Christopher as his attorney-in-fact. 

In Exhibit A to the Amended/Restated Trust, Albert “transfer[red] and grant[ed] to 

the Trustees all of the property of the Settlor” including “all real property of the Settlor, 

and any interests therein ....”; “[a]ll motor vehicles, boats, and trailers” owned by the 

Settlor; “[a]ll accounts, certificates of deposit, or other investments with any brokerage 

house or financial institution, in which the Settlor has any interest ...”; and “[a]ll personal 

property of any nature ....” 

As to Trust assets not subject to a gift provision, the Amended/Restated Trust 

provided that Sharon, Kathy, Diana, Rachelle and Maxine (or their respective issue if 

they did not survive Albert) would each receive a 16.6% share of the total Trust property 

for a total cumulative percentage share of 83%. Barring certain circumstances and 
5.

subject to other contingencies, the remaining 17% share was to be equally divided among 

a handful of individuals including Christopher. 

C. The Joint Account

On September 8, 2017, Albert added Christopher as an authorized signer to the 

joint account. Albert died a little over five months later on February 28, 2018. 

Christopher testified that, from the time the POA was signed up until Albert’s death, all 

of his acts with respect to the joint account were taken in his capacity as attorney-in-fact. 

Christopher testified Albert’s mental capacity diminished a “[c]ouple of months 

before his death” in February 2018. When asked if Albert’s mental capacity was 

diminishing as early as September or October of 2017, Christopher was unable to say. 

Rachelle was asked about Albert’s mental state. She testified that his mind was slipping, 

he was forgetful, he would say off-the-wall stuff, and would suddenly go quiet midconversation. One of his eyes was practically closed. Beginning in 2017, he began to 

struggle, began falling, had hurt his lip and hit his head, and needed regular blood 

transfusions due to leukemia. 

Christopher testified that during the period 2012 through 2015, the balance of the 

joint account was never much more than $7,800. After said period, several large deposits 

were made to the joint account. On March 11, 2016, at Albert’s instruction and prior to 

Christopher being added as an authorized signer, Christopher deposited $59,516.24 into 

the account. The deposit consisted of proceeds from the sale of 2103 Lebec (the minimart property). 

After Christopher was added to the joint account, Christopher caused two 

additional large deposits of Albert’s money to be made into the account. Specifically, on 

October 23, 2017, Christopher deposited $99,720.46 of Albert’s money into the account. 

On November 30, 2017, Christopher deposited another $104,922.07 of Albert’s money 

into the account. Christopher was unable to testify as to the source of the funds for these 

two deposits. He had no recollection of making the deposits. When asked if Albert told 
6.

him “anything about these funds when [Christopher] deposited them, he responded, “I 

don’t remember specific deposits and amounts, so no.” 

Christopher testified he did not believe the money in the joint account had 

anything to do with the Trust. However, when Christopher loaned $25,000 from the joint 

account to his cousin, Albert Ratcliffe, in March 2018, he prepared an installment note 

for the loan and drafted the note so that it was made payable to the Trust. For several 

months thereafter, Christopher, in his capacity as Trustee, collected money on the note 

and deposited the money into a new Trust account he had set up. Christopher was asked, 

“Doesn’t this indicate that in your mind at this time in March 2018 that you believed the 

money in that account was a [T]rust asset?” Christopher responded, “No.” He testified 

he believed he was loaning Mr. Ratcliffe his own money. Christopher later explained at 

trial that he had previously loaned Mr. Ratcliffe money and had trouble getting it back. 

He thought Mr. Ratcliffe would be more likely to pay it back if he thought the Trust 

required repayment. 

1. Withdrawals From the Joint Account Following Albert’s Death

On or about April 28, 2018, Christopher wrote himself a check from the joint 

account in the amount of $200,000. The following month, on or about May 24, 2018, 

Christopher wrote himself another check from the joint account in the amount of 

$50,000, leaving an ending balance of $6,712.95 in the account. 

Christopher was asked what Albert Pool told him about the joint account at the 

time he was added to the account as an authorized signer. Christopher responded, “When 

we left—well, prior to going there, nothing other than we were going there to add me to 

the account.” He was subsequently asked, “On that day and after [Albert] and you signed 

this signature card, did [Albert] discuss anything with you about this account?” 

Christopher responded, “Yes.” Christopher testified Albert said, “That when he was 

gone, it was mine to do with as I wanted.” He was then asked, “did you have any further 

discussions after that time, after that day, as to this account and before he died?” 
7.

Christopher responded, “No.” He testified that, after that day, Albert never made any 

further comments about Christopher receiving the money in the joint account upon 

Albert’s death. 

Christopher was questioned further about his statement that Albert told him the 

joint account would be his to do with as he wanted once Albert passed away. Christopher 

was asked the following questions and gave the following answers:

Q. “Did [Albert] mean that you would receive the funds on behalf of the 

trust?” 

A. “No.” 

Q. “Did he discuss the [T]rust with you in that conversation?”

A. “In that conversation, no.”

Q. “Did he ever say, ‘I’m leaving you this money in the account and the 

[T]rust is totally separate?”

A. “Yes.”

Q. “When did he say that?”

A. “At a later date he instructed me where there was cash.” 

2. Withdrawals From the Joint Account Prior to Albert’s Death

Christopher also made a number of withdrawals from the joint account 

prior to Albert’s death. On numerous occasions Christopher withdrew monies from the 

joint account via ATMs in California and in Nevada. He also transferred money to his 

girlfriend via Western Union on numerous occasions. The probate court found that 

$42,059 was withdrawn by Christopher prior to Albert’s passing. Under the POA, 

Christopher was authorized to make gifts to himself “in amounts not to exceed the annual 

federal gift tax exclusion to him or her, but only in the proportions authorized in 

[Albert’s] will, trust, and other estate planning documents.” 
8.

D. 433 South Drive, Lebec, California (the “Subject Property”)

The Trust specified a number of special gifts of real and personal property to be 

made upon Albert’s death. One gift provision gave Maxine (i.e., Christopher’s mother) 

the “right to occupy the property located at 433 South Drive, Lebec, CA [the “Subject 

Property”] for her lifetime or until she no longer wishes to occupy the property.” Once 

Maxine passed away or chose to vacate the Subject Property, it was to be sold by the 

Trustee and the proceeds added to the Trust residue. Because Maxine predeceased 

Albert, the gift lapsed under the Trust. 

On August 1, 2018, Kathy’s attorney sent Christopher’s attorney a letter 

requesting an inventory of assets held in the Trust estate and related information. On 

August 23, 2018, Christopher’s attorney responded to Kathy’s attorney. The letter 

including the following paragraph: 

“The Trustee has also indicated to me that there has been some interest on 

the part of some of the beneficiaries of purchasing one or more of the 

houses from the trust at fair market value. This includes the house 

currently occupied by the Trustee [i.e., the Subject Property]. (He has 

occupied if for some time with the permission of Albert ..., who intended 

that he get the house, but felt unable to change the beneficiaries after his 

wife passed.) The Trust expressly permits this—and the Trustee too can 

purchase for fair market value. Should the Trustee determine in his 

discretion that a sale would be appropriate, he will retain a neutral, licensed 

professional appraiser to determine value.... Before any property is thus 

sold to a beneficiary, a copy of the appraisal will be sent to your client 

along with the other beneficiaries, so they have a chance to make a written 

objection supported by legally relevant facts if they desire.” 

On November 7, 2018, Christopher’s attorney sent a letter to beneficiaries of the 

Trust. The letter included proposed dispositions of several Trust real properties including 

the Subject Property. As to the latter, the following proposal was made:

“The Trustee has resided at [the Subject Property], for some time, 

with permission from the Settlors, who intended that it be his residence. It 

is my understanding that he has spoken with each of the beneficiaries, and 
9.

they are willing to waive any interest in this property and consent that it be 

transferred to the Trustee. 

“The Trustee obtained an appraisal from Michael Burger & 

Associates, a licensed appraiser. Mr. Burger is the Probate Referee for the 

County of Kern, and is responsible for valuing estates for the court. He has 

no personal connection to either myself or the [T]rustee, although 

obviously I have used him professionally on numerous occasions.

“I have enclosed the appraisal, which came in at $60,000.00.

“This letter serves as notice of the Trustee’s intent to transfer this 

property to himself. Any objections need to be made in writing within 

60 days of this letter, or the objection will be deemed waived.” 

On January 29, 2019, Christopher, in his capacity as Trustee deeded the Subject 

Property to himself by way of a grant deed. The grant deed was recorded on January 31, 

2019, and contained the following notation: “Documentary transfer tax is $ 0.00. 

Distribution from Grantor Trust.” 

On February 12, 2019, Christopher’s attorney wrote Kathy’s attorney concerning 

efforts taken in managing the real property of the Trust. As to the Subject Property, the 

letter read:

“In the letter to the beneficiaries back in November, we gave notice 

of the intent to distributed [sic] this property to the Trustee. It was our 

understanding that all beneficiaries consented to this as being consistent 

with the decedent’s wishes and because Christopher has resided there for 

years, maintaining the property. We received no objections, so that 

property was transferred as proposed.” 

II. Procedural Background

A. Pleadings and Interim Orders

On June 27, 2019, Kathy filed a Petition to Remove Trustee and to Appoint 

Successor Trustee, and for Current Trustee to File Accounting (unnecessary 

capitalization omitted) (“Removal Petition”). 

On November 5, 2019, Kathy filed a Petition to Suspend Trustee[’]s Powers and 

Appoint an Independent Person [Prob[ate] Code [section] 15642] (unnecessary 
10.

capitalization omitted). That same day, Kathy also filed an Ex-Parte Application and 

Declaration to Suspend Trustee[’]s Powers and Appoint an Independent Person

[Prob[ate] Code [section] 15642] (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Following the parties’ briefing on Kathy’s ex parte application, the probate court 

issued a minute order indicating it had granted the ex parte application to suspend 

Christopher’s powers as Trustee. On February 21, 2020, the probate court issued a 

formal order suspending Christopher’s powers as Trustee “pending the action.” The 

formal order required, among other things, that Christopher’s attorney provide the court 

with a “plan for the timeline for the distribution” of Trust assets, and authorized 

Christopher to “pay up to $2,000 for any ongoing expenses” but prohibited him from 

contacting Trust beneficiaries during his suspension. 

On July 13, 2020, Kathy filed an Amended Petition to Surcharge Trustee for 

Breach of Trust; Petition to Determine Ownership of Assets and for Damages Pursuant to 

Probate Code Section 859 (unnecessary capitalization omitted) (“Surcharge Petition”). 

On August 25, 2020, the parties filed a stipulation in which they stipulated, among 

other things, that (1) Christopher would resign as Trustee without prejudice to his right to 

(a) contest the claims made in the Removal Petition and Surcharge Petition; (b) seek 

reimbursement of costs incurred as Trustee and to claim Trustee fees; (2) that the court 

should appoint an identified individual as successor Trustee (a) under specified terms of 

payment for successor Trustee fees and expenses; and (b) with a provision for the 

appointment of counsel for the successor Trustee under specified terms; (3) that the court 

authorize the successor Trustee to “sell all vacant real property ... along with all vehicles 

and personal properties without further notice, petition, or hearing”; and (4) that 

Christopher will provide an accounting for the period preceding appointment of the 

successor Trustee. On September 1, 2020, the probate court accepted the parties’ 

stipulation. 
11.

On October 14, 2020, Christopher filed objections to the Surcharge Petition. On 

October 28, 2020, Christopher filed his final accounting for the period he served as 

Trustee. On April 5, 2021, Kathy filed objections to Christopher’s final accounting. 

On July 6, 2021, Rachelle and Sharon joined in the Surcharge Petition brought by 

Kathy. The probate court granted the joinder but indicated they were bound by the 

pleadings and could not raise new issues. 

B. The Probate Court Granted, In Part, and Denied, In Part, the Relief 

Sought By Way of the Surcharge Petition

Trial on the Surcharge Petition commenced on July 7, 2021. 

On December 15, 2021, the probate court issued its Ruling and Order on Court 

Trial Regarding Amended Petition to Surcharge Trustee for Breach of Trust; Petition to 

Determine Trust Ownership of Assets and for Damages Pursuant to Probate Code 

Section 859; and Final Accounting by Former Trustee Christopher Guadarrama 

(unnecessary capitalization omitted) (i.e., the “subject order”) from which Christopher 

appeals. 

In the subject order, the probate court made the following findings and orders: 

(1) “[Christopher] is ordered to reconvey title of the [Subject Property] to the [T]rust[]”; 

(2) “[Christopher] shall be allowed [a] right of first refusal to buy the [Subject Property] 

at fair market value determined as of the date the court’s order becomes final[]”; 

(3) “Double damages under Probate Code section 859 are denied[]”; (4) “The [joint 

account] is not a [T]rust asset[]”; (5) “[Christopher] is ordered to deliver $335,779 to [the 

new] [T]rustee ... or any other duly appointed successor [T]rustee[]”; (6) “Trustee’s fees 

are denied[]”; (7) “[Christopher’s request for reimbursement of $4,017 in loan payments 

is denied[]”; (8) “[Kathy’s] reasonable attorney’s fees and costs shall be paid out of the 

[T]rust[]”; (9) “The [T]rustee shall deduct: the cost of cable, internet, utilities, and 

insurance expenses that were paid by the [T]rust from the distributive shares of the 

beneficiaries who benefitted; $2,198 for costs related to the Cadillac from Ratcliffe’s 
12.

distributive share; $440.00 for the cost of car covers from [Christopher’s] distributive 

share[]”; (10) “[Kathy’s] requests for reimbursement to the [T]rust of $3,279 in petrelated expenses and $11,955 in home repair costs are denied[]”; and (11) “[Kathy’s] 

request that [Christopher] be ordered to pay $3,171 for Rachelle[’s] ... towing fees is 

denied.” 

On February 9, 2022, Christopher timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the 

subject order. On appeal Christopher challenges only certain aspects of the subject order, 

namely the orders and related findings: (1) requiring Christopher to reconvey title to the 

Subject Property to the new Trustee; (2) requiring Christopher to deliver $205,643 to the 

Trustee (i.e., a portion of the $335,779 he was ordered to deliver to the Trustee) to 

reimburse for two withdrawals taken from the joint account; (3) requiring Christopher to 

deliver $28,059 to the Trustee (again, a portion of the aforementioned $335,779) for other 

withdrawals taken from the joint account; (4) requiring Christopher to deliver $20,281 to 

the Trustee (the remaining portion of the aforementioned $335,779) for withdrawals 

made from the joint account to pay his attorney; and (5) denying Christopher fees for his 

service as Trustee. `

Additional facts relevant to Christopher’s appeal are discussed below.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, ... ‘the power of an 

appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any 

substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the findings below.” 

(Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660.) We “view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party” and give that party “the benefit of every 

reasonable inference.” (Ibid.) All conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the 

prevailing party. (Ibid.) “[W]e do not reweigh the evidence.” (Schmidt v. Superior 

Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581. (Schmidt).)
13.

Where the construction of a statute or written instrument is at issue, our review is 

de novo “unless the interpretation depends on the competence or credibility of extrinsic 

evidence or a conflict in that evidence.” (Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546, 551.) 

“[I]n a bench trial, the trial court is the ‘sole judge’ of witness credibility.” (Schmidt, 

supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at 582.) “Credibility determinations ... are subject to extremely 

deferential review. (Ibid.) 

II. The Probate Court Did Not Err By Ordering Christopher to Reconvey the 

Subject Property to the Trustee

The terms of the Amended/Restated Trust are not in dispute. With regard to the 

Subject Property, the Trust provides, in relevant part: “Maxine ... shall have a right to 

occupy the [Subject Property] for her lifetime or until she no longer wishes to occupy the 

property.... Upon the [sic] Maxine’s death or her choice to vacate the premises, the 

[T]rustee shall sell the property and add the proceeds to the residue of the [T]rust.” The 

Trust further provides that the gift shall lapse if Maxine does not survive Albert. Maxine 

did not survive Albert.

As discussed previously, instead of following the above provision, Christopher, 

through a November 7, 2018, letter written by his attorney, proposed that he transfer the 

property to himself. The letter advised its addressees that failure to object within 60 days 

of the letter would be deemed a waiver of any objection to the transfer. Having received 

no objections within that period of time, Christopher deeded the property to himself. 

At trial, Christopher offered three defenses in support of his decision to transfer 

the Subject Property to himself. He contended that the Trust beneficiaries verbally 

consented to transfer; that his lawyer’s November 7, 2018, letter constituted a notice of 

proposed action and the beneficiaries did not object; and that he relied on his counsel’s 

advice in making the transfer. 

The probate court found against Christopher on each of the aforementioned 

defenses. On appeal, Christopher contends that “[a]ny one of these defenses, if justified, 
14.

would result in a lawful distribution of the property.” However, Christopher only argues 

the court erred by failing to recognize that the transfer was lawful due to the 

beneficiaries’ failure to object to his lawyer’s November 7, 2018, notice of the proposed 

action. Consequently, he has forfeited any argument related to his remaining defenses in 

connection with his transfer of the Subject Property to himself.3 (Golden Door 

Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 555 [“Issues not 

raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.”].)

With regard to the November 7, 2018, notice of proposed action, the probate court 

wrote: “[The attorney’s] letter to the beneficiaries informing them that [Christopher] 

intended to distribute the house to himself unless they objected did not cure the breach. 

A trustee may not buy or exchange trust property through use of the notice of proposed 

action procedure. (Prob. Code, § 16501, subd. (d)(5), (6).).”4 Section 16501 provides, in 

part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the trustee may not use a 

notice of proposed action in any of the following actions: [¶ ... ¶] (5) Sale of property of 

the trust to the trustee or to the attorney for the trustee[; and ¶] (6) Exchange of property 

of the trust for property of the trustee or for property of the attorney for the trustee.” 

(§ 16501, subd. (d)(5), (6).)

Christopher acknowledges section 16501 bars a trustee from using the notice of 

proposed action to effectuate a “ ‘sale’ of trust property to himself ..., or an ‘exchange’ 

of trust property for his own. ... However, [he contends, it] pointedly does not bar use of 

3 Christopher does not challenge the probate court’s finding that not all 

beneficiaries verbally consented to the transfer, that Christopher admitted he did not 

discuss the matter with beneficiary Heath Poff (Sharon’s son), and that Rachelle credibly 

testified Christopher never discussed the matter with her. Nor does Christopher 

challenge the court’s finding and determination that the advice of counsel defense is not 

applicable due to the fact Christopher told his counsel that all beneficiaries had consented 

to the transfer, which was not true. 

4 All statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise noted.
15.

the procedure where a trustee seeks to ‘distribute’ property to himself.” In support of his 

argument, Christopher notes that subdivision (a)(2) of the statute uses the

term “distribution” whereas subdivision (d) does not.5 Thus, he argues, “the 

[L]egislature made a deliberate choice to permit trustees to use the notice of proposed 

action mechanism to shield themselves from liability for making ‘distributions’ of trust 

property to themselves.” 

Christopher does not proffer any definitions for the terms “distribution,” “sale,” or 

“exchange” as used in section 16501. Aside from noting the varied use of the terms in 

section 16501, his argument is based solely on (1) his use of the term “distributed” in the 

grant deed he executed as Trustee to convey the Subject Property to himself; and (2) the 

probate court’s use of the term “distribution” in the subject order to describe 

Christopher’s conveyance of the Subject Property to himself. Christopher contends the 

court’s use of the term twice on page 4, three times on page 6, and three times on page 7, 

constitutes a finding that the conveyance of the Subject Property was a distribution and 

not a sale or exchange of Trust property to himself.

Christopher’s argument is not persuasive. The probate court used the term 

“distribution” in describing the conveyance on those specific pages, as follows: “[Kathy] 

asks that [Christopher] be surcharged for multiple alleged breaches of trust, including the 

distribution of ... [the Subject Property] to himself[,]” (italics added). “[Christopher] 

states that the beneficiaries consented to his distribution of [the Subject Property] ...[,]” 

(italics added). “[Christopher] never received any objections to the proposed 

distribution[,]” (italics added). “[Christopher] admitted during his testimony that he 

5 Subdivision (a)(2) of Probate Code section 16501 provides: “(a) The trustee

who elects to provide notice pursuant to this chapter shall deliver notice pursuant to 

Section 1215 of the proposed action to each of the following: [¶ ...¶] (2) A beneficiary 

who would receive a distribution of principal if the trust were terminated at the time the 

notice is given.” (§ 16501, subd. (a)(2).)
16.

never spoke to beneficiary Heath Poff about consenting to the distribution[,]” (italics 

added). Rachelle ... also testified that [Christopher] never discussed the distribution with 

her[,]” (italics added). “[Christopher’s] distribution of [the Subject Property] to himself 

was unauthorized and a breach of trust[,]” (italics added). “[Christopher proffered the 

defense that] he relied on the advice of counsel in distributing the house to himself[,]” 

(italics added). “Rachelle ... testified credibly that [Christopher] never discussed the 

distribution with her[,]” (italics added). “[Christopher’s counsel’s] letter to the 

beneficiaries informing them that [Christopher] intended to distribute the house to 

himself unless they objected did not cure the breach. A trustee may not buy or exchange 

trust property through the use of the notice of proposed action procedure[,]” (italics 

added). 

“A court order is interpreted under the same rules for interpreting writings in 

general. [Citations.] The language of a writing governs if it is clear and explicit. But 

when it is susceptible ‘to two interpretations, the court should give the construction that 

will make the [writing] lawful, operative, definite, reasonable and capable of being 

carried into effect and avoid an interpretation which will make the [writing] 

extraordinary, harsh, unjust, inequitable or which would result in absurdity.’ [Citation.] 

Subsequent actions by the rendering judge may be considered as bearing upon the 

judgment’s intended meaning and effect.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 964, 989.) “If an order is ambiguous, the reviewing court may examine 

the record for its scope and effect and may look at the circumstances of its making.” (In 

re Marriage of Samson (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 23, 27.)

It is clear from the subject order that the probate court did not find that 

Christopher was, as the language of the referenced statute provides, “[a] beneficiary who 

would receive a distribution of principal if the trust were terminated at the time the notice 

is given.” (§ 16501, subd. (a)(2).) Nothing in the subject order suggests otherwise and to 

so interpret the subject order would result in absurdity. Unmistakably, the court found 
17.

that Christopher’s conveyance of the subject property was a “sale” or “exchange” as 

those terms are used in the statute. (Id., at subd. (d).) That finding is supported by the 

court’s finding that “[Christopher’s] distribution of [the Subject Property] to himself was 

unauthorized and a breach of trust[]” and its order that he reconvey title to the property to 

the Trust. The court even cited subdivision (d)(5) and (d)(6) of section 16501 as 

authority for its determination that Christopher could not use the notice of proposed 

action procedure to cure the breach. 

It is also evident that the term “distribution” in the subject order was largely used 

to describe how the litigants themselves described the conveyance. In those instances 

where the court used the term as an easy reference to the conveyance, it is clear that the 

court was not using the term to describe a distribution that complied with Trust 

provisions. The court was merely describing the process of conveying the asset from the 

Trust to Christopher, nothing more. Christopher does not proffer an alternative meaning 

for the word “distribution” and it is not the job of an appellate court to develop an 

appellant’s arguments for him or her. (Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 

28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1.) The fact that Christopher used the term in the grant deed 

by which he conveyed the Subject Property to himself is irrelevant and of no moment. 

Christopher had no entitlement to the Subject Property under the terms of the Trust. 

Finally, we note that the November 7, 2018, letter from Christopher’s counsel in 

which he gave notice of the proposed action reads, in relevant part: “This letter is 

intended to be an update as to the status of the [T]rust, as well as notice of intent to sell a 

property to the [T]rustee for fair market value as provided in Paragraph 7.13 of the 

[T]rust[,]” (italics added). This is the very letter that Christopher relies upon in arguing 

he was entitled to the Subject Property. Similarly, the earlier letter from Christopher’s 

attorney on August 23, 2018, indicated the notice of proposed action would follow if 

Christopher “determine[d] in his discretion that a sale [to Christopher] would be 

appropriate.” Both the notice of proposed action sent to Trust beneficiaries and the 
18.

prefatory letter sent to Kathy’s attorney characterize the proposed action as a sale. A 

notice of proposed action may not be used to effectuate a “sale of property of the trust to 

the trustee ....” (§ 16501, subd. (d)(5).)6 

We affirm the probate court’s disposition of the Subject Property in the subject 

order.

III. The Probate Court Did Not Err In Ordering Christopher to Deliver 

Approximately $205,643 Plus Interest to the Current Trustee

As discussed, in the few months that preceded Albert’s death, Christopher made 

two large deposits into the joint account in the amounts of $99,720.46 and $104,922.07 

for a total deposit of $204,642.53 (the “subject funds”). Christopher could not provide

any information concerning the deposits. He did not know the source of the funds and 

had no recollection of making the deposits. There were no discussions between 

Christopher and Albert concerning the funds. 

Notably, Christopher treated money in the joint account as if it were money 

belonging to the Trust. He loaned money from the account to Mr. Ratcliffe and had 

Mr. Ratcliffe sign a promissory note in favor of the Trust. The probate court could have 

concluded this was an acknowledgment by Christopher that the subject funds in the joint 

account belonged to the Trust; and that, at the time he made the deposits, he did so with 

the belief he was properly allocating that money to the Trust. Substantial evidence 

supports such a finding. However, there are more compelling reasons to affirm the 

probate court’s order with respect to the subject funds. As discussed below, 

6 Moreover, to the extent the conveyance of the Subject Property to Christopher 

was intended to be offset against his just entitlement under the Trust, if any, it would 

nonetheless qualify as an “[e]xchange of property of the trust for property of the 

trustee ....” (§ 16501, subd. (d)(6).) A notice of proposed action cannot be used to 

effectuate such an exchange. (Ibid.)
19.

Christopher’s deposit of the subject funds into the joint account was a breach of his 

fiduciary obligations as Albert’s attorney-in-fact.

An attorney-in-fact is a fiduciary. (§ 39.) “The exercise of authority by an 

attorney-in-fact is subject to the attorney-in-fact’s fiduciary duties.” (§ 4266.) “[I]n 

dealing with property of the principal, an attorney-in-fact shall observe the standard of 

care that would be observed by a prudent person dealing with property of another ....” 

(§ 4231, subd. (a).) “An attorney-in-fact has a duty to act solely in the interest of the 

principal and to avoid conflicts of interest.” (§ 4232, subd. (a).) “The attorney-in-fact 

shall keep the principal’s property separate and distinct from other property in a manner 

adequate to identify the property as clearly belonging to the principal.” (§ 4233, 

subd. (a).) An attorney may comply with the obligation to keep the principal’s property 

separate and distinct from other property “if the property is held in the name of the 

principal or in the name of the attorney-in-fact as attorney-in-fact for the principal.” 

(§ 4233, subd. (b).) “The attorney-in-fact shall keep records of all transactions entered 

into by the attorney-in-fact on behalf of the principal.” (§ 4236, subd. (a).) An attorneyin-fact is prohibited from making gifts of the principal’s property, and from creating 

survivorship interest in the principal’s property absent an express grant of such authority 

in the power of attorney. (§ 4264, subds. (c) & (e).) 

Christopher did not adhere to his fiduciary duties in managing the subject funds. 

He failed to keep the deposits separate and distinct from other property and, instead, 

deposited the funds into an account that did not clearly identify the property as belonging 

to Albert. He did not avoid the conflict-of-interest that presented itself in depositing 

funds into a joint account to which Christopher had unfettered access in his personal (as 

opposed to fiduciary) capacity. He did not keep a record of the transactions involving the 

subject funds which were the two largest deposits ever made to the joint account as 

reflected in the record on appeal. Christopher’s interest in the joint account was held in 

Christopher’s individual capacity. That is, he was not named to the joint account in the 
20.

capacity as attorney-in-fact for Albert. A prudent person acting as attorney-in-fact would 

have put the subject funds in an account that only Albert or his attorney-in-fact, acting in 

such capacity, could have accessed. 

Importantly, the POA did not authorize Christopher to create a survivorship 

interest in subject funds by depositing them into the joint account. There is no evidence 

that Albert instructed Christopher to deposit the funds into the joint account, that Albert 

intended for this money to be deposited in the joint account, or that Albert knew the 

money was deposited into the joint account. The survivorship interest in the subject 

funds was created by Christopher at a time when Albert’s health was failing and his death 

was likely imminent. Whether couched as a “gift” or the creation of a “survivorship 

interest,” the act of depositing the subject funds into the joint account violated 

section 4264. (See § 4264, subds. (c) & (e).)

In Schubert v. Reynolds, the defendant was one of four daughters of the decedent. 

(Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 102 (Schubert).) Approximately two 

months prior to the decedent’s death, the decedent executed a power of attorney 

appointing the defendant as his attorney-in-fact. (Ibid.) The day before the decedent 

died, the defendant, in her capacity as attorney-in fact, created an inter vivos trust which 

she executed as both trustor and trustee. (Ibid.) The inter vivos trust created in the 

defendant a life estate in the decedent’s house to the exclusion of her sisters and contrary 

to the decedent’s will. (Id. at pp. 102, 104.) The plaintiff (i.e., the defendant’s sister) 

filed suit for declaratory relief and constructive trust. (Ibid.) The matter was tried and a 

judgment issued declaring the inter vivos trust invalid. (Id. at p. 103.) The appellate 

court affirmed the judgment. (Id. at p. 110.) The appellate court, like the trial court 

before it, concluded that subdivision (f) of section 4264 prohibited the creation of the 

trust because it “constituted an attempt to change the beneficiary designation, as 

established under either the 1988 will or the laws of intestate succession. (Schubert, at 

p. 104.)
21.

Similar to Schubert, Christopher’s deposit of the subject funds into the joint 

account amounted to an attempted change in the beneficiary designations under Albert’s 

will and the Trust. This violated subdivision (f) of section 4264 which provides, absent 

an express grant of authority in a power of attorney, an attorney-in-fact is prohibited from 

“[d]esignat[ing] or chang[ing] the designation of beneficiaries to receive any property ... 

on the principal’s death.” (§ 4264, subd. (f).) But for the fact the subject funds were 

deposited into the joint account, the monies would have passed to the Trust by virtue of 

Albert’s pour-over will. 

Moreover, even had Albert orally approved Christopher’s deposit of subject funds 

into the joint account, Christopher would not be entitled to them. In Estate of Huston, the 

petitioner was the attorney-in-fact for the decedent. (Estate of Huston (1997) 

51 Cal.App.4th 1721, 1723 (Huston).) Prior to decedent’s death, the decedent verbally 

instructed the petitioner to purchase an annuity with a certificate of deposit that would be 

maturing soon. (Id. at p. 1724.) The decedent wanted to provide for the petitioner and it 

was agreed between them that the decedent would receive the annuity payments during 

her lifetime and that the annuity would pass to the petitioner upon her death. (Ibid.) The 

petitioner, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, used the certificate of deposit proceeds to 

purchase the annuity and instructed the bank as to the decedent’s wishes concerning 

annuity payments during her lifetime and that it would pass to the petitioner on 

decedent’s death. (Id. at pp. 1724–1725) After the decedent died, the petitioner learned 

that the annuity had not been structured in accordance with the decedent’s wishes. (Id. at 

p. 1725.) The petitioner, in his individual capacity, then filed a petition to determine 

ownership of the annuity. (Id. at p. 1723.) A residuary beneficiary under the decedent’s 

will opposed the petition on grounds the power of attorney expressly prohibited the 

petitioner from making gifts to himself. (Id. at p. 1726) The trial court, “as sole judge of 

the credibility of witnesses,” accepted the petitioner’s testimony concerning the details of 
22.

the transaction, and entered an order holding that the decedent’s estate held the annuity in 

trust for the petitioner. (Id. at pp. 1725–1727.) 

On appeal, the appellate court determined “substantial evidence ... support[ed] the 

trial court’s findings that the annuity was purchased with the decedent’s knowledge, 

consent, and approval. (Huston, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1727.) Notwithstanding, the 

court reversed the judgment. (Id. at p. 1728.) Relying on section 4264, subdivision (c), 

which prohibits an attorney-in-fact from making a gift of the principal’s property to 

himself absent express authorization in the power of attorney, the appellate court 

determined the gift was void because it was outside the scope of the power of attorney. 

(Id. at pp. 1726–1727.) The court then considered “whether decedent’s oral assent to the 

gift served to ratify the transaction and make the gift valid.” (Id. at p 1727.) The court 

held it did not. (Ibid.) It wrote, “ ‘[a] power of attorney is a written authorization to an 

agent to perform specified acts on behalf of the principal. [Citation.]’ The rights and 

liabilities created by such authority are centered in the law of agency. [Citations.]” 

(Ibid.) “Because a power of attorney must be in writing, any act performed by the agent 

acting under the power of attorney must therefore be ratified in writing to be valid.” 

(Ibid.) The court held that, despite the fact the evidence showed the decedent wished to 

make the gift, the gift was void for failure to comply with necessary formalities. (Ibid.)

Here, even had evidence existed to demonstrate that Albert wanted Christopher to 

have the subject funds, the lack of any written document authorizing Christopher to 

deposit the monies into the joint account would be fatal to Christopher’s appeal 

concerning the subject funds. 

We conclude Christopher’s deposit of the subject funds in the amount of 

$204,642.53 violated section 4264, subdivision (e) by creating a survivorship interest in 

the subject funds in his favor. Christopher’s deposit of the subject funds violated 

section 4264, subdivision (f) by effectuating a change in the designation of beneficiaries 

who would have otherwise shared in the entitlement to the subject funds. Finally, 
23.

Christopher’s deposit of the subject funds was tantamount to gifting the funds to himself 

in violation of section 4264, subdivision (c). 

Section 4231.5 provides, in part: “If the attorney-in-fact breaches a duty pursuant 

to [division 4.5 of the Probate Code pertaining to powers of attorney], the attorney-in-fact 

is chargeable with any of the following, as appropriate under the circumstances: [¶] 

(1) Any loss or depreciation in value of the principal’s property resulting from the breach 

of duty, with interest.” Given our determination that Christopher violated section 4264 

which is part of division 4.5 of the Probate Code, we see no error in the probate court 

having ordered Christopher to deliver these sums plus interest to the current Trustee. 

We agree with Christopher, however, that a transpositional error occurred in the 

amount of the subject funds. The probate court indicated the amount of those deposits 

was $205,643. The evidence, however, demonstrates without contradiction that the 

amount was actually $204,642.53. Thus, we remand the matter to the court to correct the 

sum of, and interest attributable to, the subject funds and, with that modification, affirm 

the court’s order with respect to those funds.

IV. The Probate Court Did Not Err In Ordering Christopher to Deliver to the 

Current Trustee Sums that Were Withdrawn From the Joint Account During 

Albert’s Lifetime Plus Interest Thereon

A. The Probate Court Did Not Err in Ordering Christopher to Deliver 

$28,059 Plus Interest to the Current Trustee

The probate court found that Christopher withdrew $42,059 from the joint account 

prior to Albert’s death on February 28, 2018, in violation of the POA and “the law 

concerning joint tenancy accounts.” The POA only allowed Christopher to make gifts to 

himself “in amounts not to exceed the annual federal gift tax exclusion ..., but only in the 

proportion authorized in [Albert’s] will, trust, and other estate planning documents. The 

court determined, and the parties do not dispute, the amount of the annual gift tax 

exclusion in 2017 was $14,000. The court further determined Christopher “was entitled 
24.

to just one-seventh of 17 percent of the [T]rust residual, plus one-half of Maxine’s 

16.6 [percent] share, under the [Amended/Restated Trust].” 

On appeal, Christopher argues the court erred by impliedly finding Albert did not 

give Christopher permission to make the withdrawals, a finding that is not supported by 

the evidence. Rather, Christopher argues, the only evidence in the record demonstrates 

Albert wanted Christopher to “own all of the joint account funds after Albert’s death” and 

that if Christopher had “not withdrawn the funds prior to Albert’s death, he would have 

inevitably acquired them by operation of the right of survivorship.” Christopher does not 

contend the withdrawals were for Albert’s benefit. He only contends that the evidence 

demonstrates Albert wanted all the money in the joint account to pass to Christopher. 

Respondents counter that “[a]n attorney-in-fact has a duty to act solely in the 

interest of the principal and to avoid conflicts of interest,” quoting section 4232, 

subdivision (a). Respondents contend Christopher used the $42,059 on himself and for 

his own benefit. Respondents argue “when a fiduciary’s actions are questioned, the 

fiduciary has the burden of proof to justify his actions,” citing Purdy v. Johnson (1917) 

174 Cal. 521, 527. (See ibid. [“Trustees are under an obligation to render to their 

beneficiaries a full account of all their dealings with the trust fund [citation], and where 

there has been a negligent failure to keep true accounts, or a refusal to account, all 

presumptions will be against the trustee upon a settlement.”]; LaMonte v. Sanwa Bank 

California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 509, 517 (LaMonte) [“The beneficiary of the trust has 

the initial burden of proving the existence of a fiduciary duty and the trustee’s failure to 

perform it; the burden then shifts to the trustee to justify its actions.”].) Respondents 

further note there is no evidence that Albert permitted the withdrawals. 

Undoubtedly, Christopher, as attorney-in-fact, had a fiduciary duty to Albert under 

the POA. (§§ 39, 4266.) Moreover, Christopher’s withdrawals from the joint account 

during Albert’s lifetime were, as admitted by Christopher, performed in his capacity as 

attorney-in-fact. An attorney-in-fact is required to avoid conflicts of interest (§ 4232, 
25.

subd. (a)); has a duty to “keep records of all transactions entered into by the attorney-infact on behalf of the principal” (§ 4235, subd. (a)); and is precluded from making gifts to 

himself absent an express grant of authority (§ 4264, subds. (c)). As noted, Christopher’s 

authority to make gifts to himself was limited to the federal gift tax exclusion of $14,000.

Conversely, had Christopher left the withdrawn funds in the joint account and, 

assuming Albert would not have withdrawn the funds from the account, they would have 

passed to Christopher by right of survivorship. The California Multiple-Party Accounts 

Law (CMPAL) (§ 5100 et seq.) provides, in part: “An account belongs, during the 

lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by each, unless 

there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent.” (§ 5301, subd. (a).) “Sums 

remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving 

party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing 

evidence of a different intent....” (§ 5302, subd. (a).) 

Only Albert’s money was deposited in the joint account. Thus, during Albert’s 

lifetime, the money in the joint account belonged to Albert alone. (§ 5301.) 

Christopher’s personal withdrawals from the joint account during Albert’s lifetime were, 

according to Christopher, performed under the authority of the POA. Under the POA, 

however, he was limited from making gifts to himself in excess of $14,000, the federal 

gift tax exclusion. There is no evidence Albert approved the withdrawals or an increase 

in the gift amount limitation. Thus, Christopher’s withdrawals from the account in 

excess of $14,000 were outside his authority under the POA. Although he had the power

to withdraw from the joint account by virtue of the fact he was a joint holder of the 

account, he did not have the right to make the withdrawals as attorney-in-fact absent 

express written authorization. (Huston, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1727 [“any act 

performed ... under the power of attorney must ... be ratified in writing to be valid”].) 

We agree with respondents that it was incumbent on Christopher to demonstrate 
26.

sufficient authorization for the withdrawals but the record is lacking any such evidence. 

(See LaMonte, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.)

We now turn to Christopher’s contention that he would have been entitled to the 

sums withdrawn upon Albert’s death had he not withdrawn them. The problem with 

Christopher’s contention is that he did withdraw the sums from the joint account. In 

doing so, he not only violated his fiduciary duties to Albert, but he also removed the 

funds from the very source that would have given him a right of survivorship in the 

funds—the joint account. Having wrongfully removed the sums from the joint account 

during Albert’s lifetime, Christopher essentially stood in the position of a constructive 

trustee of the funds for the benefit of Albert or, following Albert’s death, his heirs. He 

effectively extinguished any right of survivorship in the funds that he might have 

otherwise had by withdrawing them from the joint account.

We conclude the probate court did not err in ordering Christopher to deliver 

$28,059 plus interest in the amount of $9,821, to the current trustee as a result of the 

aforementioned withdrawals.

B. The Probate Court Did Not Err in Offsetting the Gift of $14,000 

Christopher Made to Himself From Christopher’s Share as Trust Beneficiary

Christopher challenges the subject order to the extent it provides that the $14,000 

gift that Christopher was authorized to make, and did make, to himself from the joint 

account “be deducted from his distributive share” of the Trust. He argues the probate 

court’s determination “is contrary to the court’s finding that the joint account ‘is not a 

[T]rust asset.’ ” 

The POA provides, in part: “Notwithstanding any other provision in this Power,

my attorney in fact may make gifts in amounts not to exceed the annual federal gift tax 

exclusion to him or her, but only in the proportions authorized in my will, trust, and other 

estate planning documents[,]” (italics added). Christopher argues this provision “does 

not mean that such gifts must be made from trust assets. It merely limits the amount of 
27.

such gifts to the ‘proportions’ authorized in the [T]rust. Because the $14,000 was not a 

trust asset, ordering it to be deducted from [Christopher’s] distributive share would result 

in an unmerited windfall for the other beneficiaries.” 

Here, the record is silent concerning the meaning of the italicized language in the 

preceding paragraph. However, the POA’s limitation that gifts may only be made in 

proportion to the dispositions made in Albert’s will, trust and other estate planning 

documents, evidences a clear intent on the part of Albert, as principal, to protect the 

interests of his devisees and Trust beneficiaries in their inheritances. 

We disagree with Christopher’s contention that the probate court’s order that the 

$14,000 gift be deducted from Christopher’s distributive share of the Trust is inconsistent 

with the court’s determination that the joint account is not a Trust asset. Once the gift 

was made, it was no longer part of the joint account. The court’s determination that the 

joint account is not a Trust asset did not affect monies that were no longer part of the 

joint account at the time of Albert’s death.

We conclude the probate court did not err in ordering the $14,000 gift be deducted 

from Christopher’s distributive share of the Trust.

V. Christopher’s Remaining Claims Are Denied

Christopher contends that, in the event this court finds in his favor on any of the 

above matters, it should reverse the probate court’s denial of Christopher’s request for 

Trustee fees and denial of his request for attorney fees. Because we have not found in 

Christopher’s favor on any of the matters above—with the minimal exception of 

acknowledging the need to correct a transpositional error—we decline Christopher’s 

invitation to reverse the court’s orders with regard to his request for Trustee fees and 

attorney fees.

DISPOSITION

To the extent the subject order of the probate court included an order that 

Christopher deliver to the current Trustee of the Trust “$205,643, plus interest of 
28.

$71,975, calculated at ten percent over 3.5 years,” we remand the matter to the probate 

court to modify the subject order by correcting the stated principal sum from $205,643 to 

$204,642.53, and recalculating the interest thereon based on the corrected principal sum. 

All other sums ordered delivered to the current Trustee are affirmed in the 

amounts stated in the subject order and, together with the recalculated sums referenced 

above, are to be delivered to the current Trustee. All remaining provisions of the subject 

order are affirmed. 

With the modification referenced above, the subject order is affirmed in its 

entirety. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents Kathy Pool-O’Connor, Rachelle 

Lapham and Sharon Whiteside.

SNAUFFER, J.

WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

DE SANTOS, J.