OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

GERALD C. MANN 

Attorney General 

Honorable E. G. Garvey 

County Auditor 

Bexar County 

San Antonio, Texas ' 

Dear Sir: Opinion No. 2600 

Re: Road and Bridge Law for 

Bexar County, Texas 

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 5, 1940, 

requesting the opinion of this department as to the proper road and 

bridge law applicable to Be::ar County, Texas, in view of the 1940 

Federal census placing the population of the county at 337,557. 

In 1931 the Regular aesslon of the 42nd Legislature enacted Senate 

Bill 575, acts 1931, Special Laws, p. 259, ch. 137, a sloecial road 

and bridge law for Bexar County, Texas, only. 

Session of the 43rd Legislature, 

In 1933 at the Regular 

that body enacted Rouse Bill 911, 

Acts 1933, General Laws, p. 805, ch. 236. This latter law was a 

general one, whereas the former was special, and it applied to all 

counties in the state having a population between 300,000 and 350,000 

inhabitants, according to the last preceding Federal census. Dallas 

County was the only one in the state falling within the provisions 

of this enactment at the time of its passage. 

The question here presented for consideration is whether or not Jouse 

Bill 911 of the 43rd Legislature, insofar as 8exar Co-sty is concerned. 

The last enactment, Rouse Sill 911, is undoubtedly a general law; the 

prior enactment, Senate Biil 575, is most assuredly a special or local 

one. ;Ytiich must prevail? 

In Black on Construction and Interpretation of the Law, p. 116 the rule 

is stated as follows: 

"As a corollary from the doctrine that implied repeals are not favored, 

it has come to be an established rule in the construction of statutes 

that a subsequent act, treating a subject in gene-al terms, and not 

expressly contradicting the provisions of a prior special statute, is 

not to be considered as intended to affect the more particular and 

specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely 

necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. 

This rule is founded upon, or expressed by, the maxim 'Generalia 

specialibus non deroqant,! Thus, when the provisions of a general law, 

applicable to the entire state are repugnant to the provisions of a 

previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality 

only, the passage of such general law does not operate to modity or 

repeal the special law, either Iholly or in part, unless such modification orrepeal is provided for in express words." 
Honorable E. G. Oarvey, Page 2, 0-2600 

’ . 

This is also the Fstablished rule in Texas. 

Bates (C.C.A. 1907) 106 S. W. 448: 

As stated in Paul vs. 

"It is well settled that special legislation or local laws are not 

repealed by a later general act, unless specially mentioned in the 

general law or such purpose is made manifest from the plain provisions 

of the general law. Ex Parte Neal (Tex. Cr. App.) 83 S.W. 831; State 

VS. Connor, 86 Tex. 

26 AWI. & hg. Enc. 

133, 23 S. W. 1103; Ellis vs. Ratts, 26 Tex. 703; 

of Law (2d Ed.) p. 730, and note 3. In the authority 

last cited after stating the rule substantially as we have above, 

though more elaborately, it is said: 'The reason which has been given 

for this rule is that in passing a special act the Legislature has its 

attention directed to the special case which the act aas made to meet, 

and considers and provides for all the circumstances of that special 

case, and, having done so, it is not to be considered that the 

Legislature by a subsequent general enactment intended to derogate 

from the special provisions previously made, when it was notmentioned 

in such enactment'." 

Again in Sullivan vs. City of Galveston, 17 S. W. (2d) 478, affirmed, 

Corn. App., 34 S. X. (2d) 808, the ccurt stated: 

"It is well settled that a special law passed by the Legislature is not 

repealed by an act subsequently passed by another Legislature unless 

the first is expressly repealed by the subsequent act, or unless it is 

made c'learly to appear from the subsequent act that it was the intended 

intention of the Legisleture to repeal the first." 

In Townsend vs. Terrell, 118 Tex. 463, 16 S. I'J. (2d) 1063, the Commission 

of Appeals reaffirmed the rile and stated: 

This rule of cnstruction has found frequent and apt illustration where 

one of the s,;pposedly confiictly statutes was general in its terms 

and the other specific. In such acase it is unlvtrsally held that 

the specific statute more clearly evidences the intention of the 

Legislature than the neneral one, and therefore that it will control. 

In-such a case both s;atutes are-permitted to stand--the general one 

applicable to all cases except the particular one embraced in the 

specific statute&" (Underscoring ours). 

See also allis vs. Batts, 26 Tex. 703; City of Leredo vs. Martin, 52 

Tex. 548; Burkhart vs. Brazes River Harbor Navigation District (C.C.A. 

1931) 42 s. W. (2d) 96; 39 Tex. Juris. 149a 

The rule is peculiarly fitting in the instant case. In 1933 when the 

Legislature .enacted House Bill 911 Bexar County could not have been 

within the legislative mind nor could House Bill 911 in anywise 

supersede Senate Bill 575 for the very patent reason that fiexar County 

at the time, according th the 1930 Federal census, was not within the 

population brackets set forth in Rouse Bill 911. 
Xonorabxe L. G. @anor, Page 3 

prori8ionr provlourly mada, when it wa8 not 

sontioned in suoh enaotsent'." 

Again in Sullivan ~8. City of Oalreeton, 17 9. Y. 

(ea) 478, alrimd, Con. App., 34 S. W. (2d) 808, the court 

stated: 

"Ii i8 well settled that a speoial law 

passed by the Legislature is not repeled by 

an aot subsequently passed by another L&rl’aturs unless the first is expressly repealed 

by the iubeequent aot, or unless it ir made 

clearly to appear iron the subsequent aot 

that it was the ihtended intention of the 

Legielature to repeal the flrat.” 

In Towrrnd ?8. Terrell, 115 Tex. 463, 16 3. N. 

(26) 1063, the conu&a8ion or Appeal8 rratrirmsd the rulr 

and rtated; 

“This rule of construction ha8 round 

frequent and apt illustration where on8 Oi 

the supposedly conflictly statute8 wa8 genoral in its terns and the other 8pOOiriQ. 

In such a case it is universally held that 

the specific st.+tute nore clearly eridenoer 

the intention of the La&3lature than th8 

reneral one. and therefore that it will ‘control . In such a case both statutes are permitted to stand--the general one a;plicable 

to all cases except the particulrir one e+ 

braced In the soecific statute.” (UndersoorLfng ours) 

See also Allis vs. Batto, 26 Tex. ,703; City of 

Laredo vs. Xartin, 52 Tex. 540i Burkhart ~8. Srazos River 

Harbor Navigation District (C. C. k. 1931) 42 S. W. (2d) 

96; 39 Tex. Juris. 149. 

The rule is peouliarly fftting in the instant 

case. In 1933 when the Legislature enacted House Bill 911 

Bexar County oould not have been within the leglelativ8 

mfnd nor could House Bill 911 in anywise supersede Senate 

Bill 375 for the very pitent reason that Bexar County at 

the time, according to the lQ3C Federal census, wa8 not 

within th8 population braakets set rorth in House Bill 911. 
Honorable E. G. Garvey, Page 4, 0-2600 

Certainly the legislative intent to repeal or supersede Senate 

Bill 575 was not in existence at the time of the enactment of 

House Bill 911. Is it plausible to say that seven years after the 

enactwnt of the Tenera law it for the first time supersedes or 

repeals by implication a previously existing special law? rJe think not. 

Consequently, it Is the opinion of this department and you are 

respectfully advised that senate Jill 575, the Bexar County Road and 

Bridge Law, enacted by the Legislature in 1931, is still the road and 

bridge law applicable to Bexar County, Texas, and this enactment has 

not been superseded or affected (because of recently announced population figures) by Rouse Bill 911 enacted by the 43rd Legislature, 

1933. 

Vrry truly yours 

ATTORNEY GElrZRAL OF TEXAS 

s/ James D. Smullen 

APPROVED AUGUST 19, 1940 

s/ Grover Sellers 

FIRST ASSISTANT ATl'ORNEY GEW::RAL 

BY 

James D. Smullen 

Assistant 

AP;ROVED 0; Iiu'ION CC:"i:?ITT~IE: 

By RWF, Chairman 

JDS:J%/cg