In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-14-00345-CR 

________________________

MARC ALLEN MASON, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the 251st District Court 

Randall County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 23,957-C; Honorable Ana Estevez, Presiding 

 

November 10, 2015 

 

ORDER CONCERNING MOTION 

TO OBTAIN JUDICIAL ORDER 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Appellant, Marc Allen Mason, was convicted by a jury of the state jail felony 

offense of burglary of a building.

1 Punishment was enhanced by two prior felony 

convictions, and Appellant was assessed a sentence of seventeen years confinement 

and a fine of $5,000. On March 10, 2015, Appellant’s court-appointed attorney filed a 

brief on the merits raising two issues: (1) the alleged violation of Appellant’s right to a 

 

1

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (a)(1) (West 2011). 
2

speedy trial and (2) the failure of the trial court to stay proceedings until the issue of 

Appellant’s competence was resolved. The State filed its reply brief on April 9, 2015, 

and on September 2, 2015, this court heard oral arguments. 

Two weeks prior to oral arguments, Appellant filed a pro se brief presenting and 

arguing two additional issues: (1) an alleged violation of Appellant’s Due Process and 

Equal Protection rights arising from the State’s habitual offender allegations and (2)

Appellant’s alleged “legal disability” arising from an “audio implant” surgically embedded 

within his right maxillary sinus cavity and larynx by “clandestine” State operatives. The

pro se brief did not disavow the brief filed on Appellant’s behalf by his court-appointed 

counsel but instead referred to that brief as being separately filed. The pro se brief also 

prayed for relief in accordance with the “reasons presented within [the pro se brief] and 

Appellant’s brief filed by [court-appointed counsel].” By this brief, Appellant does not 

seek self-representation; he seeks hybrid representation. See Landers v. State, 550 

S.W.2d 272, 278-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (describing “hybrid representation” as 

representation in court by means of “both [self-representation] and by counsel acting at 

the same time or alternating at defendant’s pleasure”). By letter dated August 21, 2015, 

this court notified Appellant that he was not entitled to hybrid representation and that 

while represented by counsel, his pro se filings would not be considered. See Robinson 

v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

Prior to the issuance of a final decision in this matter, Appellant has now filed his 

Objection & Motion to Obtain Judicial Order on Pro Se Filings. By this filing, he asserts

this court “has no right to bar U.S. constitutionally protected rights, or State of Texas 

Constitution & Statutory Rights” and he prays that this court consider his pro se filings.
3

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 818, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 

(1975), the Supreme Court recognized a defendant’s right of self-representation at the 

trial court level whenever a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right to selfrepresentation has been made. While Texas has long recognized that there is no 

absolute right to hybrid representation, Landers v. State, 550 at 278-79, trial courts 

should still be mindful of a defendant’s right of self-representation and may allow hybrid

representation when, in their discretion, there is no inherent conflict in the arguments 

presented by the appellant and those presented by counsel. Hawthorn v. State, 848 

S.W.2d 101, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). That being said, the Supreme Court has also 

recognized that because appellate proceedings are different from trial court 

proceedings, an appellant does not have a constitutional right to represent himself on 

direct appeal from a criminal conviction. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 

Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 163-64, 120 S. Ct. 684, 145 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000).

 In this case, it is apparent that Appellant has not clearly and unequivocally 

asserted a right to self-representation. Furthermore, given the absence of an absolute 

right to hybrid representation in an appellate proceeding, Appellant’s objection to this 

court’s decision not to consider any pro se filings while he is represented by counsel is 

overruled. Ex parte Bohannan, 350 S.W.3d 116 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (noting that 

pro se documents filed while represented by counsel would be disregarded).

It is so ordered.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.