93d Congress, 1st Session House Document No. 93-171

VETOING HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 542, A 

JOINT RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE WAR 

POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OE THE UNITED STATES

VETOING HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 542, A JOINT

RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE WAR POWERS OF

CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

October 25,1973.—Message and accompanying joint resolution

ordered to be printed as a House document

99-011 O

U.S. GOVERNMENT. PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1973
To the House of Representatives:

I hereby return without my approval House Joint Resolution 542— 

the War Powers Resolution. While I am in accord with the desire 

of the Congress to assert its proper role in the conduct of our foreign 

affairs, the restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the 

authority of the President are both unconstitutional and dangerous 

to the best interests of our Nation.

The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the conduct 

of foreign affairs have been debated since the founding of our country. 

Only recently, however, has there been a serious challenge to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in choosing not to draw a precise and 

detailed line of demarcation between the foreign policy powers of 

the two branches.

The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of foreseeing 

every contingency that might arise in this complex area. They acknowledged the need for flexibility in responding to changing circumstances. They recognized that foreign policy decisions must be 

made through close cooperation between the two branches and not 

through rigidly codified procedures.

These principles remain as valid today as they were when our Constitution was written. Yet House Joint Resolution 542 would violate 

those principles by defining the President^ powers in ways which 

would strictly limit his constitutional authority.

CLEARLY U N CO NSTITU TIO NAL

House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by a mere 

legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years. One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty days 

unless the Congress extended them. Another would allow the Congress 

to eliminate certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent 

resolution—an action which does not normally have the force of law, 

since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving legislation.

I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional. The only 

way in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution—and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone is clearly without 

force.

U N D E R M IN IN G OUR FOREIGN POLICY

While I firmly believe that a veto of House Joint Resolution 542 

is warranted solely on constitutional grounds. I am also deeply disturbed by the practical consequences of this resolution. For it would 

seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis. As a result, the confidence of

(l)

H.D. 171
2

our allies in our ability to assist them could be diminished and the 

respect of our adversaries for our deterrent posture could decline. A 

permanent and substantial element of unpredictability would be injected into the world’s assessment of American behavior, further increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and war.

If this resolution had been in operation, America’s effective response 

to a variety of challenges in recent years would have been vastly complicated or even made impossible. We may well have been unable to 

respond in the way we did during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban 

missile crisis of 1962, the Congo rescue operation in 1964, and the 

Jordanian crisis of 1970—to mention just a few examples. In addition, 

our recent actions to bring about a peaceful settlement of the hostilities in the Middle East would have been seriously impaired if this 

resolution had been in force.

While all the specific consequences of House Joint Resolution 542 

cannot yet be predicted, it is clear that it would undercut the ability 

of the United States to act as an effective influence for peace. For example, the provision automatically cutting off certain authorities after 

60 days unless they are extended by the Congress could work to prolong or intensify a crisis. Until the Congress suspended the deadline, 

there would be at least a chance of United States withdrawal and an 

adversary would be tempted therefore to postpone serious negotiations 

until the 60 days were up. Only after the Congress acted would there 

be a strong incentive for an adversary to negotiate. In addition, the 

very existence of a deadline could lead to an escalation of hostilities in 

order to achieve certain objectives before the 60 days expired.

The measure would jeopardize our role as a force for peace in other 

ways as well. It would, for example, strike from the President’s hand 

a wide range of important peacekeeping tools by eliminating his ability to exercise quiet diplomacy backed by subtle shifts in our military 

deployments. It would also cast into doubt authorities which ^ Presidents* have used to undertake certain humanitarian relief missions in 

conflict areas, to protect fishing boats from seizure, to deal with ship 

or aircraft hijackings, and to respond to threats of attack. Not the 

least of the adverse consequences of this resolution would be the prohibition contained in section 8 against fulfilling our obligations under 

the NATO treaty as ratified by the Senate. Finally, since the bill is 

somewhat vague as to when the 60 day rule would apply, it could lead 

to extreme confusion and dangerous disagreements concerning the prerogatives of the two branches, seriously damaging our ability to respond to international crises.

FAILURE TO REQUIRE POSITIVE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

I am particularly disturbed by the fact that certain of the President’s constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed 

Forces would terminate automatically under this resolution 60 days 

after they were invoked. No overt Congressional action would be required to cut off these powers—they would disappear automatically 

unless the Congress extended them. In effect, the Congress is here attempting to increase its policy-making role through a provision which 

requires it to take absolutely no action at all.

H.D. 171
3

In my view, the proper way for the Congress to make known its will 

on such foreign policy questions is through a positive action, with full 

debate on the merits of the issue and with each member taking the 

responsibility of casting a yes or no vote after considering those merits. 

The authorization and appropriations process represents one of the 

ways in wrhich such influence can be exercised. I do not, however, 

believe that the Congress can responsibly contribute its considered, 

collective judgment on such grave questions without full debate and 

without a yes or no vote. Yet this is precisely what the joint resolution 

would allow. It would give every future Congress the ability to handcuff every future President merely by doing nothing and sitting still. 

In my view, one cannot become a responsible partner unless one is 

prepared to take responsible action.

STRENGTHENING COOPERATION BETW EEN T H E CONGRESS A ND T H E

EXECUTIVE BRANCHES

The responsible and effective exercise of the war powers requires the 

fullest cooperation between the Congress and the Executive and the 

prudent fulfillment by each branch of its constitutional responsibilities. 

House Joint Resolution 542 includes certain constructive measures 

which would foster this process by enhancing the flow of information 

from the executive branch to the Congress. Section 3, for example, calls 

for consultations with the Congress before and during the involvement 

of the United States forces in hostilities abroad. This provision is 

consistent with the desire of this Administration for regularized consultations with the Congress in an even wider range of circumstances.

I believe that full and cooperative participation in foreign policy 

matters by both the executive and the legislative branches could be 

enhanced by a careful and dispassionate study of their constitutional 

roles. Helpful proposals for such a study have already been made in 

the Congress. I would welcome the establishment of a non-partisan 

commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. This commission could make a 

thorough review of the principal constitutional issues in ExecutiveCongressional relations, including the war powers, the international 

agreement powers, and the question of Executive privilege, and then 

submit its recommendations to the President and the Congress. The 

members of such a commission could be drawn from both parties—and 

could represent many perspectives including those of the Congress, the 

executive branch, the legal profession, and the academic community.

This Administration is dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs 

and to preserving the constitutional prerogatives of both branches of 

our Government. I know that the Congress shares that goal. A commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President 

would provide a useful opportunity for both branches to work together 

toward that common objective.

R ichard N ix o n.

T h e W h ite H ouse, October 1973.

H.D. 171