SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5704-14T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DAMEION L. EDGERTON, a/k/a

DAMION EDGERTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

Submitted April 5, 2017 – Decided 

Before Judges Manahan and Lisa.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 

14-04-0718.

Clifford E. Lazzaro, attorney for appellant.

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Sarah E. Ross, Deputy 

Attorney General, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

After his suppression motion was denied, defendant pled 

guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to three counts in a six 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

May 30, 2017
2 A-5704-14T1

count indictment against him, namely, Count Two, second-degree 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5b(2), Count Four, second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b, and Count Five, second-degree possession of a 

firearm in the course of committing a drug offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4.1a.

Defendant was sentenced on Count Two to five-years 

imprisonment with a two-year parole disqualifier. On Count Four, 

he was sentenced to five-years imprisonment with a three-year 

parole disqualifier. On Count Five, he was sentenced to fiveyears imprisonment with a three-year parole disqualifier. Counts 

Four and Five were ordered to be served concurrent to each other 

and consecutive to Count Two, thus resulting in an aggregate 

sentence of ten-years imprisonment with a five-year parole 

disqualifier. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the remaining counts 

of the indictment were dismissed.

The sole issue before us in this appeal is whether the trial 

court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence 

seized as a result of a warrantless search. More particularly, 

defendant argues:

POINT I: BASED UPON THE TOTALITY OF THE 

CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TERRY STOP AND FRISK OF THE 

DEFENDANT WAS UNREASONABLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE.

We reject defendant's argument and affirm.
3 A-5704-14T1

In the early morning hours of May 17, 2013, specifically at 

about 2:30 a.m., Asbury Park Police Officers William Whitley and 

Daryl Whitley were conducting crowd control activities near a 

restaurant known as "Mr. Pizza." Police were routinely dispatched 

to this area during the early morning hours because crowds would 

gather after clubs closed. This was a high-crime area, with a 

high level of drug activity and gun violence. The officers were 

keenly aware of these characteristics.

While dispersing the crowd, William Whitley recognized 

defendant. He did not know defendant personally, but he knew him 

from the neighborhood in Asbury Park in which William Whitley grew 

up. He knew that defendant's street name was "Rocky," and that 

defendant had a prior history of drug activity and possession of 

a firearm.

A short while later, both William Whitley and Daryl Whitley 

heard a gunshot ring out. William Whitley called in a report of 

the shot to police headquarters. He then ran on foot to the 

location in the area of Ivy Place where the shot appeared to have 

come from. Daryl Whitley got into his patrol vehicle and drove 

toward that area. 

As he was running toward the area, William Whitley heard 

three more shots ring out from the same area. When he arrived at

Ivy Place, he observed defendant walking slowly and calmly toward 
4 A-5704-14T1

a parked vehicle with a partially opened door. As he walked, 

defendant was looking over his shoulder. His demeanor and conduct 

struck William Whitley as being suspicious.

Because of the nature of the neighborhood as a high crime 

area with known episodes of gun violence, because of defendant's 

suspicious demeanor, because William Whitley was aware of 

defendant's prior drug activity and firearm possession, and 

because four shots had recently been fired from that immediate 

area, with defendant being the only person there, William Whitley 

drew his sidearm and pointed it at defendant. He ordered him to 

show his hands and lay on the ground. Defendant complied. As he 

did so, William Whitley observed the handle of a handgun protruding 

from defendant's rear pants pocket.

As this was happening, Daryl Whitley arrived in his patrol 

car. William Whitley seized the handgun from defendant's pocket 

and gave it to Daryl Whitley. William Whitley proceeded to pat 

down defendant for any additional weapons and placed him under 

arrest.

At about this time, Detective Javier Campos arrived on the 

scene. He searched defendant's person incidental to the arrest 

and recovered cash in the amount of $3648. 

Campos then approached the vehicle that defendant had been 

walking toward. He observed in plain view what appeared to be 
5 A-5704-14T1

cocaine in the panel of the driver's side door and also in the 

center console area. Because of those observations, the police 

had the car towed to the police station. At some point, the 

individual who was the lessee of the car and had lawful authority 

over it came to the police station. She consented to a search of 

the car. Additional cocaine was found in the trunk.

At the suppression hearing, William Whitley and Campos 

testified for the State. Daryl Whitley was called by the defense. 

Through their testimony, the facts we have related were elicited.

Defendant's argument at the suppression hearing was that the 

initial investigatory stop and pat down of defendant was 

unjustified, and thus the seizure of the weapon from his person 

was unlawful, as a result of which evidence of the weapon should 

have been suppressed. Defendant further argued that because the

initial police action was unlawful, and because it provided the 

impetus for the search of defendant's person and of the car, 

evidence seized from defendant's person and from the car should 

have also been suppressed because they constituted fruit of the 

initial unlawful search.

After hearing all of the evidence and arguments of counsel, 

Judge Anthony J. Mellaci, Jr. issued a comprehensive and wellreasoned oral opinion. Despite the vigorous cross-examination and 

defense arguments attacking the credibility of the State's 
6 A-5704-14T1

witnesses, Judge Mellaci found that both William Whitley and Campos 

were very credible witnesses. He explained in detail the basis 

for those credibility findings. Likewise, he found Daryl Whitley 

to be very credible.

Judge Mellaci summarized his factual findings regarding the 

stop and pat down of defendant, the critical portion of this 

episode, as follows:

He [William Whitley] says, while clearing the 

cloud [sic], he heard a total of four shots 

-- one and then three more -- coming from what 

he believed to be Ivy Place, which was down 

the street. He said how did you know that 

that's where they came from? I -- I -- I've 

heard shots before. I've heard firecrackers. 

Sounded like shots. Sounded like where they 

came from. I beat feet and ran down there. 

Now, whether it took him 10 seconds, 15 

seconds, 20 seconds, 30 seconds, to me, is of 

no moment.

The crucial testimony is when he got down at 

the end of the block, he saw one person in 

close proximity to him, within four or five 

feet, walking towards the car, reached to the 

car to open it up. He immediately told that 

person to stop, get down on the ground. It's 

then that the second Officer Whitley, Daryl 

Whitley, apparently shows up, either 

immediately prior to -- immediately prior to 

Mr. Edgerton being ordered to the ground.

He said it was his intention based on the 

things that he had pointed out, which included 

what he believed to be a history of this 

individual with a firearm, the shots being 

fired in closed proximity, the length of time 

it took him to run down to where he located 

Mr. Edgerton, the fact that Edgerton was the 
7 A-5704-14T1

closest one to him, that he was looking over 

his shoulder at what he believed to be a little 

bit of a strange manner, and that he wasn't 

running from the shots -- he was walking --

that caused him for his safety to order him 

down, so that he can conduct a Perry stop --

a Terry pat down.

He indicates that before he actually took part 

in the Terry pat down, when defendant got to 

the ground, he saw the butt handle of a handgun 

sticking out of his back pocket. I've heard 

no contradictory information to that effect 

during this trial. I have no reason not to 

believe that's what he saw and I certainly 

have no reason to believe that he didn't have 

a reasonable and articulable suspicion to 

order the man down. Certainly, I think I would 

have done the same thing, if I was out in the 

street at that point. He takes the gun, brings 

him over, continues to pat him down. The gun 

is handed off to somebody else.

Based upon those findings of fact, the judge concluded that 

William Whitley, under the totality of the circumstances,

possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant 

was engaged in criminal activity and might be armed and dangerous, 

thus justifying the investigatory stop and the protective search

for his own safety and that of others in the area. The judge also 

concluded that the plain view observation of drugs in the car and 

the subsequent consent search of the car were valid on their own 

and were not the fruit of any prior unlawful police activity. He 

therefore denied defendant's motion to suppress in its entirety. 
8 A-5704-14T1

On appeal, defendant primarily reargues the facts. His

argument focuses on pointing out aspects of William Whitley's 

testimony which might have a tendency to weaken his credibility. 

However, the same arguments were presented to Judge Mellaci. In 

the overall context of William Whitley's testimony, Judge Mellaci 

was satisfied that these points were relatively insignificant and 

did not compromise William Whitley's credibility. The judge 

expressed his credibility finding about William Whitley, thusly:

Much has been made about the false testimony 

of Officer [William] Whitley. Look, I sat 

here. I watched him. I listened to him. I 

listened to him under direct examination and 

I watched him, and I listened and watched him 

under cross-examination. Was he the most 

articulate witness I've ever seen? Absolutely 

not. Did he leave some things out of his 

report that he could have put in? Every time 

he was questioned about something he may have 

left out his report, he said well, I didn't 

think it was important at that point. You 

know, I was more focused on this. To me, 

that's believable. I did not find him to be 

incredible. I did not find him to be a liar. 

I find him -- found him to testify to the best 

of his recollection, based on the one-page 

report that he did, of an incident that 

happened about 18 months ago now. I found it 

to be credible and I heard no contradictory 

story to anything he said. So, no, I -- I 

don’t find him to be a deceptive witness, a 

non-credible witness.

Our review of a trial court's decision on a suppression motion 

is circumscribed. We must defer to the trial court's factual 

findings as long as those findings are supported by sufficient 
9 A-5704-14T1

credible evidence in the record. State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 

243 (2007). A reviewing court should especially "give deference 

to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially 

influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and 

to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot 

enjoy." Id. at 244 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 

(1964)). Those findings should only be disregarded when they are 

clearly mistaken. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015) 

(citing Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162). "A trial court's findings 

should not be disturbed simply because an appellate court 'might 

have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal.'" 

State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011) (quoting Johnson, supra, 

42 N.J. at 162). Abiding by these principles, we have no occasion 

to interfere with Judge Mellaci's credibility assessments of all 

of the witnesses, including William Whitley, and on all of the 

judge's factual findings, which are amply supported by sufficient 

credible evidence in the record.

Based upon those findings, Judge Mellaci applied the correct 

legal principles in reaching the conclusion that the initial 

investigatory stop and pat search were legally justified under 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 

The facts found by the trial court, which we accept, overwhelmingly 

support the conclusion that the reasonable and articulable 
10 A-5704-14T1

suspicion test required for a Terry stop was satisfied here. We 

affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Mellaci 

in his oral opinion of November 5, 2014.

Affirmed.