Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1540 | December 31, 2018 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Erin L. Berger

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of 

A.L., C.L., E.L., M.L., and J.P. 

(Minor Children) and 

N.L. (Mother)

N.L. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

December 31, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-1540

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, 

Judge

The Honorable Renee A. 

Ferguson, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

82D04-1703-JT-516

82D04-1703-JT-517

82D04-1703-JT-518

82D04-1703-JT-519

82D04-1703-JT-520
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1540 | December 31, 2018 Page 2 of 14

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] N.L. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her five 

children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the natural mother of five children: J.P., born in 2006; M.L., born in 

2007; C.L., born in 2008; A.L., born in 2010; and E.L., born in 2013

(collectively, “Children”). A.P. is the natural father of J.P., and K.L. 

(“Father”) is the natural father of the four youngest children.1 The facts that 

follow are taken primarily from the trial court’s findings of fact, none of which 

Mother challenges on appeal.2

[3] In November 2014, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report 

that Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) were “using

methamphetamine and sleeping on a porch.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 240-41. DCS 

conducted an assessment, and Parents tested negative for drugs. While the first 

assessment was still open, DCS received two more reports involving violence 

 

1 The trial court also terminated A.P.’s and Father’s parental rights, but neither is involved in this appeal.

2 Because Mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, we accept them as true. See Maldem v. 

Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (“Because Maldem does not challenge the findings of the trial court, 

they must be accepted as true.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1540 | December 31, 2018 Page 3 of 14

and abuse. The first report alleged that Mother tried to stab Father with a knife 

during a domestic-violence incident. Mother “denied that there was a knife 

involved” but admitted there was an “incident.” Id. at 243. The second report 

alleged that Father physically abused J.P. by pushing “him in a door sill when 

he got in trouble.” Id. at 244. In December, DCS substantiated all three reports

and filed petitions alleging that Children were Children in Need of Services 

(CHINS). Children remained in Parents’ home, and the trial court set a factfinding hearing for April 2015.

[4] In March 2015, before the fact-finding hearing, DCS received a report that 

Father beat M.L. with a cutting board and a belt and had been arrested on 

child-abuse charges. Family Case Manager (FCM) Ellen Moore visited 

Parents’ house and saw that M.L. had marks and bruises on his face, shoulders, 

and buttocks. FCM Moore also noticed that Parents’ house was filthy—

Children’s mattresses were soaked in urine, there were no clean clothes, and no 

personal hygiene products could be found in the house. FCM Moore told 

Mother that E.L. along with all her other children needed to be taken to the 

emergency room for evaluation. Mother took E.L. to the emergency room but 

did not take any of her other children. Thereafter, Children were removed from 

Mother’s care because she did not take all her children to the emergency room 

or seek any other medical attention. In April 2015, the trial court adjudicated

Children CHINS and entered a dispositional order requiring Mother to 

cooperate with in-home therapy, submit to random drug screens, engage in 

supervised visitation services, enroll in the YMCA domestic-violence program, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1540 | December 31, 2018 Page 4 of 14

and remain drug and alcohol free. The trial court also ordered that Father was 

not allowed to have contact with Children.

[5] In September 2015, the trial court ordered Mother to work with a parent aide 

for ninety days and participate in daily drop-ins for sixty days. The trial court 

also ordered that Children could begin a trial home visit with Mother. As soon 

as Children were placed back with Mother, issues arose. By the end of 2015, 

Mother was unemployed, the dirty and unsafe living conditions of her house 

had not improved, Mother was behind on rent, Children were dirty, and 

Mother failed to keep appointments for herself and Children. During this time, 

Mother also permitted Children to have contact with Father, in violation of the 

trial court’s no-contact order.

[6] Throughout the first half of 2016, DCS continued to provide intensive services 

to Mother while Children were in her care. The parent aide worked with 

Mother through April 2016 and attempted to address Children’s hygiene and 

the conditions in Mother’s house. However, no progress was made. In fact, 

Children’s school continually reported that Children were filthy, wore the same 

clothes day after day, and smelled of urine. By June 2016, FCM Moore 

restored daily drop-ins so that between all the various service providers, 

someone was checking on Children every day.

[7] Nonetheless, in August 2016, E.L. was found lethargic and unresponsive due to 

an overdose of a prescription sedative. At the time, Children were being cared 

for by their maternal grandfather (Grandfather) while Mother worked. 
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Sometime on the afternoon of August 9, Grandfather noticed that Children had 

gotten into some medication. He tried to contact Mother but was not able to 

reach her. When Mother got home from work, at approximately 5 p.m., E.L.’s 

eyes were closed, and he could barely hold his head up. Mother called an 

ambulance to come get E.L. FCM Moore arrived at Mother’s house at the 

same time as the ambulance. FCM Moore had come to bring Children new 

mattresses as Mother still had them sleeping on urine-stained mattresses. When 

she entered Mother’s house, FCM Moore noticed that two other children were 

lethargic. Ultimately it was discovered that three of the five children had 

ingested the sedative and had to be hospitalized. The next day, Children were 

removed from Mother’s care.

[8] In March 2017, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to 

Children. Over the course of five days (June 19, June 27, July 31, August 7, 

and August 25) the trial court held the fact-finding hearing. The trial court 

heard the testimony of twenty-six witnesses who were closely involved with 

Children and/or Mother, including multiple FCMs, teachers, school 

counselors, individual counselors, therapists, and medical professionals. At the 

end of the hearing, Mother’s attorney requested a continuance so that Mother 

could call two additional witnesses—her father, i.e., Grandfather, and her 

therapist, Melanie Menser. Mother’s attorney alleged that Grandfather was 

unavailable that day because he had a “heart doctor’s appointment” and that 

Menser was unavailable that day because the subpoena that was sent to her had 

the wrong date on it. Tr. Vol. V p. 11. The trial court denied Mother’s request 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1540 | December 31, 2018 Page 6 of 14

for a continuance and ordered that “the testimony and evidence for this trial is 

closed.” Id. at 13. The trial court issued an order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights in December 2017. The order provides, in relevant part:

[A]16. Any progress with [Mother] and her abilities to meet the 

basic needs of [Children] and provide a safe, stable environment 

was slow and slight, and did not prove to be sustainable. 

[Mother’s] non-compliance with services was ongoing and well 

established by witnesses from Southwestern Behavioral health, 

Ireland home based Services, First Steps representatives, current 

FCM’s and former FCM’s.

*****

[B]11. The Court finds that while in [Mother’s] care, [Children] 

ha[ve] been subjected to life and health endangering 

environments as evidenced by physical abuse, domestic violence, 

[Children] having access to prescription medication, the poor 

home conditions and the poor hygiene of [Children].

*****

[B]16. During the pendency of the underlying CHINS matter, 

[Mother] was not consistently employed, was unable to maintain 

sufficient food in the home, clothing or attention to hygiene. 

[Mother] testified that as of the last day of her Termination of 

Parental Rights hearing, she was behind on rent, had no money, 

confirmed she posted on social media the day prior asking friends 

[to] give her money to pay rent because she was behind and 

“Broke”. [Mother] has clearly not improved her ability to 

provide necessary food, shelter, clothing, support or any sort of 

stability for [Children.]
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[B]17. [Mother] has raised [Children] in a dangerous, harmful 

environment fraught with aggression, domestic violence, 

intimidation, neglect, and physical and emotional abuse. 

[Mother] has not been able to acknowledge any of her flaws or 

shortcomings as a parent and certainly has not remedied the 

reasons for [Children’s] removal, and the Court finds there is a 

reasonable probability that continuation of the parent child 

relationship with [Mother] poses a threat to the well-being of 

[Children].

[B]18. This judicial officer has presided over [Mother’s] previous 

CHINS cases as well as this instant case. The Court finds this 

situation to be literally hopeless. In observing [Mother] over 

these years, there has been no maturation of [Mother] as a 

parent. In observing and listening to [Mother], the Court finds 

that she is lacking in the ability to understand [Children’s] 

emotional, mental, and physical needs. [Mother] reacts with 

anger and resentment toward [Children] rather than insight and 

nurturing. A continued relationship between [Mother] and 

[Children] will be devasting and cause irreparable mental and 

emotional damage to [Children].

*****

[C]4. DCS, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), and 

the witnesses involved all believe that adoption is in [Children’s] 

best interest. The Court finds that adoption is in [Children’s] best 

interest.

[C]5. Mother’s habitual pattern of verbal abuse towards 

[Children], habitual pattern of failing to provide for the basic 

need[s] of [Children], lack of employment, inattention to 

medical, dental and health needs and total instability indicates 

that maintaining a parent-child relationship with [Children] is not 

in the best interests of [Children].
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Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 45-51.

[9] In January 2018, Mother filed her notice of appeal in appellate cause number 

18A-JT-94. In her initial appeal, Mother argued that the trial court violated her 

due-process rights when it denied her a continuance to call two additional 

witnesses. In April 2018, DCS filed a motion for stay and remand to permit 

Mother to call her two additional witnesses. In May 2018, this Court granted 

DCS’s motion and ordered in relevant part:

2. This appeal is dismissed without prejudice and remanded to 

the trial court with instructions that the trial court hold an 

evidentiary hearing within thirty (30) days of the date of this 

order so that Appellant may present her last two witnesses and so 

that the trial court may weigh said testimony and issue a new 

order in the underlying termination of parental rights case.

Id. at 54. On June 8, the trial court heard testimony from Grandfather. After 

he testified, Mother’s attorney requested that the court order DCS to contribute 

to the fees associated with Mother’s final witness, her therapist, Melanie 

Menser. Mother’s attorney argued that Menser was a service provider 

appointed by DCS and was “initially listed on the witness list” for DCS, but 

they chose not to call her. Tr. Vol. V p. 33. The trial court denied Mother’s 

request and stated, “It’s your client’s witness so she’ll be responsible for that 

witness[’s] time in Court.” Id. Thereafter, on June 12, the trial court heard 

testimony from Melanie Menser. Menser was a licensed social worker who 

provided individual therapy to Mother. She observed half-a-dozen visitations 

with Mother and Children and stated that the “interactions would be stressed” 
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and that on “at least two occasions” Mother and Children had to be “separated 

to lower the distress and try to come back together.” Id. at 39-40. Menser 

provided services to only Mother and stated that she did see “moderate to 

significant progress” in individual treatment. Id. at 43. Menser could not 

testify “to services about the kiddos” and said that she referred Mother to group 

therapy in October 2017, but Mother “did not show” for group therapy so she 

closed Mother’s case. Id. at 47.

[10] After Menser testified, the trial court took a brief recess. Upon return, the trial 

court issued an order terminating Mother’s parental rights. The order provides, 

in relevant part:

The Court after hearing and taking into consideration the 

testimony of [M]other’s two additional witnesses now finds that 

the Court’s prior ruling remains unaltered.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 13; see also id. at 14-17.

[11] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Mother makes three arguments on appeal. First, Mother argues that the trial 

court’s termination order does not comply with Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8. 

Second, Mother contends that the trial court failed to consider Menser’s 

testimony. Third, Mother asserts that the trial court erred by not ordering DCS 

to pay for Menser’s testimony.
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I. Second Termination Order

[13] First, Mother argues that the trial court’s second termination order does not 

comply with Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8 because the order “makes no 

findings or conclusions based upon the evidence that was presented at the factfinding hearing.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13.

[14] The termination of parental rights is controlled by Indiana Code section 31-35-

2-4(b)(2), which provides that a petition must allege, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. 

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). If the court finds that the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1540 | December 31, 2018 Page 11 of 14

allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child 

relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). If the court does not find that the 

allegations in the petition are true, it shall dismiss the petition. Id. at (b). 

Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8(c) provides that the trial court “shall enter 

findings that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsection (a) and 

(b)” to either terminate a parent-child relationship or to dismiss the termination 

petition. (Emphasis added). 

[15] When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions, we will not set 

aside the trial court’s findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. K.T.K., 

989 N.E.2d at 1229. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental 

rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial 

court’s findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 

N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). This means that the trial court’s findings of fact 

and conclusions of law are crucial to our review. In re N.G., 61 N.E.3d 1263, 

1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). However, where the findings of fact and 

conclusions of law are sparse or improperly stated and do not adequately 

address each of the requirements of the termination statute, we cannot conduct 

an adequate review. Id.

[16] Here, the trial court’s first termination order comprised twelve pages of specific 

findings of fact and conclusions of law that made clear why the court was 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed, and this Court 

remanded to the trial court so that Mother could present her last two witnesses. 
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After Mother presented those two witnesses, the trial court issued a second 

termination order, stating, in relevant part:

The Court after hearing and taking into consideration the 

testimony of [M]other’s two additional witnesses now finds that 

the Court’s prior ruling remains unaltered.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 13 (emphasis added). In other words, Mother’s last 

two witnesses did nothing to change the trial court’s mind and therefore the

trial court’s second order simply incorporated its first order. Because the

second order incorporates the first order—which contains ample findings of fact 

and conclusions of law upon which we could conduct an adequate review—we 

conclude that the second termination order complies with Indiana Code section 

31-35-2-8.

II. Weight of Menser’s Testimony

[17] Next, Mother asserts that the trial court failed “to consider” and gave “no

weight” to Menser’s testimony. See Appellant’s Br. p. 13. To the extent that 

Mother alleges that the trial court did not consider Menser’s testimony, she is 

incorrect. On remand, “after hearing and taking into consideration the 

testimony of [M]other’s two additional witness,” the trial court terminated 

Mother’s parental rights. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 13 (emphasis added). To 

the extent that Mother argues that the trial court should have given Menser’s 

testimony more weight because her testimony “refutes the findings made by the 

court”—that is a request for us to reweigh the evidence. When reviewing the 

termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness 
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credibility. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. Rather, we consider only the evidence 

and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment of the trial 

court. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal and therefore see no error 

in the trial court’s consideration of Menser’s testimony.

III. Cost of Menser’s Testimony

[18] Last, Mother contends that the trial court erred by “refusing to order DCS to 

pay for the testimony” of Menser—who Mother believes was an expert—

because her testimony “was necessary in presenting an adequate defense.” 

Appellant’s Br. pp. 18-19. To the extent Mother asserts this would be a basis 

for reversing the termination order, we disagree. Notwithstanding the trial 

court’s decision about fees, Menser ultimately testified. As such, the decision 

about fees had no impact on the merits of the case.

[19] In any event, the trial court did not err by declining to order DCS to pay for 

Menser’s testimony. Decisions about expert services for indigent defendants 

are left to the trial court, and these decisions are not overturned absent an abuse 

of discretion. Scott v. State, 593 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Ind. 1992). The trial court is 

not required to appoint at public expense any expert the defendant believes may 

be helpful. Id. The defendant requesting the appointment of an expert bears the 

burden of demonstrating the need for the appointment. Id. A defendant cannot 

simply make a blanket statement that he needs an expert without some specific 

showing of what that expert would provide for the defendant. Id. While 

Indiana Code section 25-23.6-4-6 generally prohibits a licensed social worker 
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from offering expert testimony, it does not prevent a trial court from qualifying 

a social worker as an expert witness under Indiana Evidence Rule 702. See B.H. 

v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[20] Here, Mother believes that Menser was an expert witness and therefore the trial 

court should have appointed her at public expense. However, Mother’s 

argument fails at the outset because Menser was not an expert witness. As the 

State correctly points out, “Mother did not seek Menser to be qualified as an 

expert, nor did the court do so during trial.” Appellee’s Br. p. 33. 

Furthermore, the record shows that Menser provided factual testimony, not 

expert testimony. Because only experts are appointed at public expense and 

Menser was not an expert, the trial court did not err by declining to order DCS 

to pay for Menser’s testimony.

[21] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.