United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-1239

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Johnny L. Chatmon

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

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 Submitted: November 18, 2013

 Filed: February 5, 2014

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Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Following a jury trial, Johnny Chatmon was convicted of unlawful possession

of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Chatmon appeals his conviction, arguing that the Government did not present
sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and that the district court erred in 1

refusing his proposed theory-of-defense jury instruction. For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm.

While on patrol on the evening of January 19, 2012, Omaha Police Officer

Joshua Kelley noticed a vehicle driving without headlights or taillights. He activated

his emergency lights in order to pull over the vehicle. It continued on for

approximately two blocks before pulling over, during which time Officer Kelley

observed the driver moving around inside the vehicle. Once the vehicle stopped,

Officer Kelley approached and asked the driver, Johnny Chatmon, for the vehicle’s

registration. Chatmon presented him with a rental car agreement, which did not list

Chatmon as an authorized driver. Instead, it listed only De-Borah Williams, later

identified as Chatmon’s mother, as an authorized driver. After contacting the rental

car company and running a background check, Officer Kelley detained Chatmon.

Officer Kelley impounded the vehicle at the request of the rental agency and

conducted an inventory search. During the search, Officer Kelley noticed that the

change tray in the center console was loose. He removed the loose tray, revealing a

compartment containing a firearm. He then placed Chatmon under arrest. 

Subsequent searching of the vehicle also revealed several textbooks and some

electrical equipment, which were identified as belonging to Chatmon. Once he was

placed under arrest, Chatmon insisted that he had not been driving the vehicle but

rather “that he was walking down the street and that [the police officers] were setting

him up.”

A grand jury indicted Chatmon on one count of being a previously convicted

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At trial,

The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, Chief Judge, United States District Court

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for the District of Nebraska.

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Williams testified that she had rented the vehicle on January 13. Although she had

discussed with Chatmon that he was not permitted to drive the vehicle, he

nevertheless drove it at least once. Williams testified that no one other than she and

Chatmon had driven the vehicle while it was leased to her. She also testified that she

does not own any firearms and had never seen the firearm that wasfound in the rental

vehicle. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Chatmon wassentenced to sixty-eight

months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Chatmon challenges his conviction on two grounds. First, he

argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal

on the ground that the Government did not present sufficient evidence to support the

jury’s verdict. We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal based on

the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Goodale, 738 F.3d 917, 922

(8th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm unless, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Government and accepting all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn in favor of the verdict, no reasonable jury could have found [the defendant]

guilty.” United States v. Bynum, 669 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2012). “To convict [a

defendant] under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government needed to prove [that]: (1)

[he] had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more

than one year; (2) he knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm had been in

or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Garrett, 648 F.3d 618, 622 (8th

Cir. 2011). Chatmon stipulated to the first and third elements of the offense and

contests only the sufficiency of the evidence that he knowingly possessed the firearm

found in the rental vehicle.

Knowing possession of a firearm under § 922(g) may be either actual or

constructive. Id. “Constructive possession requires that the defendant has dominion

over the premises where the firearm is located, or control, ownership, or dominion

over the firearm itself. Constructive possession may be established by circumstantial

evidence alone, but the government must show a sufficient nexus between the

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defendant and the firearm.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

(quoting United States v. Evans, 431 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 2005)).

The Government presented ample evidence to permit the jury to find beyond

a reasonable doubt that Chatmon knowingly possessed the firearm found in the rental

vehicle. Chatmon was the driver and sole occupant of the rental vehicle in which the

firearm was found. See United States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2006)

(finding constructive possession where defendant was driver and sole occupant of

vehicle at time of incident); United States v. Hiebert, 30 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir.

1994) (finding constructive possession because firearmwas “found in the vehicle that

[the defendant] was driving”). Officer Kelley testified that after he had turned on his

emergency lights but before Chatmon had pulled over, he could see Chatmon moving

around in the vehicle. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this testimony

that Chatmon was hiding the firearm in the center console compartment. See United

States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 667 (8thCir. 2006) (holding that “quick and unusual

movements by the driver of the car” before search of vehicle could permit jury to

infer “that the driver may have been trying to hide an object in the back seat”); United

States v. Stevens, 453 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 2006) (“As the officers approached the

vehicle, Stevens bent and leaned over for several seconds, [permitting] the inference

[that] he was placing the pistol underneath the seat.”). Williams testified that the

firearm was not hers and that she was the only other person who had operated the

vehicle since she had taken possession of it. The jury could have reasonably inferred

from this testimony that Chatmon placed the firearm in the vehicle. The textbooks

and electrical equipment found in the vehicle were determined to belong to Chatmon. 

See United States v. Knox, 888 F.2d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that presence

of possessions belonging to the defendant in vehicle supported conclusion that

defendant constructively possessed cocaine found in vehicle). Finally, after being

arrested, Chatmon stated that he had not been driving the rental vehicle. Because this

statement conflicted with Officer Kelley’s testimony, the jury could have inferred that

the statement was false and that its falsity indicated consciousness of guilt. See

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United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant’s

lying to arresting officers supported knowing possession of firearm); United States

v. Penn, 974 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1992) (“False exculpatory statements are

admissible as substantive evidence tending to show guilt.”). Taken together, this

evidence permitted the jury to infer that Chatmon knew that the firearm was present

in the vehicle and that he exercised dominion and control over it. Thus, the

Government presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Chatmon knowingly possessed the firearm

found in the rental vehicle.

Chatmon countersthat the firearm could have been left in the vehicle by a prior

lessee. At trial, an employee of the car rental agency testified that although the

interior of every returned car is inspected, the inspection is “more like a glance” than

a “detailed search.” This testimony could have permitted the jury to conclude that a

prior lessee—rather than Chatmon—placed the firearm in the vehicle. But the jury

did not draw that inference. “[T]he facts and circumstances relied on by the

government must be consistent with guilt, but they need not be inconsistent with any

other hypothesis, and it is enough to convict if the entire body of evidence is

sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is

guilty.” United States v. Lam, 338 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United

States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000)). As explained above, the

Government presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that Chatmon

knowingly possessed the firearm found in the rental vehicle.

In his second point on appeal, Chatmon argues that the district court erred in

refusing to give his proposed theory-of-defense jury instruction. Chatmon proposed

the following “mere presence” instruction:

Johnny Chatmon contends he was merely present in the vehicle and did

not know a firearm was in the vehicle. Mere presence or proximity to

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a firearm is not enough to support a finding that defendant knowingly

possessed a firearm, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt Johnny

Chatmon knew the firearm was present in the vehicle and intended to

exercise dominion and control over the firearms [sic] either directly or

indirectly.

The district court declined to give this instruction because other instructions 

adequately conveyed the substance of the proposed instruction.

“We review a district court’s rejection of defendant’s proposed instruction for

abuse of discretion . . . .” United States v. Ironi, 525 F.3d 683, 688 (8th Cir. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Hayes, 518 F.3d 989, 994 (8th Cir. 2008)). We will affirm

so long as the jury instructions given by the district court, “taken as a whole, fairly

and adequately submitted the issues to the jury.” United States v. Engelmann, 720

F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Whitehill, 532 F.3d 746,

751 (8th Cir. 2008)). “Defendants are entitled to a theory of defense instruction if it

is timely requested, is supported by the evidence, and is a correct statement of the

law . . . .” Id. (quoting Whitehill, 532 F.3d at 752). 

However, a defendant is not entitled to a particularly worded instruction

where the instructions given by the trial judge adequately and correctly

cover the substance of the requested instruction. A mere presence

instruction is unnecessary where it would have duplicated the

instructions outlining the elements of the offense, the definition of

possession, and the burden of proof.

United States v. Cantrell, 530 F.3d 684, 692 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion because the instructions it gave

adequately and correctly conveyed the substance of Chatmon’s proposed instruction.

Our decision in Cantrell is dispositive. In that case, the defendant—who was also

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charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—requested a “mere presence” instruction nearly

identical to the one requested by Chatmon. Id. The jury instructions given by the

district court inCantrell “required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt Cantrell

‘knowingly possessed’” a firearm. Id. The district court also instructed the jury on

the meaning of possession using Eighth Circuit Model CriminalJury Instruction 8.02. 

Id. at 693. We held that the “‘mere presence’ instruction was unnecessary in

Cantrell’s case because it ‘would have duplicated the instructions outlining the

elements of the offense, the definition of possession, and the burden of proof.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Serrano-Lopez, 366 F.3d 628, 637 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this

case, the district court similarly instructed the jury that, in order to convict Chatmon,

it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed a firearm. And

its instruction defining “possession” is identical to that given by the district court in

Cantrell. Because this case is not materially distinguishable from Cantrell, we

likewise conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to

give Chatmon’s proposed “mere presence” instruction.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Chatmon’s conviction.

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