PS4-155 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 14-1380

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MARC ANTWAIN X. RIVERS MUHAMMAD, SR.,

Appellant

v.

VINCENT CAPPELLINI, Court Appointed Counsel;

LUZERNE COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES ORPHANS COURT;

LUZERNE COUNTY COURT COMMON PLEAS ORPHANS COURT;

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; 

JOHN A. BELLINO, Guardian ad Litem; GERRY LYNN BUTLER, Case Worker; 

THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-02374)

District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

August 1, 2014

Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 7, 2014)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

In November 2010, Marc Antwain X. Rivers Muhammad, Sr., filed a pro se 

complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
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alleging various constitutional violations in connection with the termination of his 

parental rights in the Orphans’ Court Division of the Luzerne County Court of Common 

Pleas (“LCCCP”). Among the defendants was the Luzerne County Children and Youth 

Services (“LCCYS”). The District Court dismissed the complaint. In regards to LCCYS, 

the District Court ruled that Muhammad had failed to state a claim. The District Court 

nonetheless allowed Muhammad to amend his complaint, noting, inter alia, that a 

conspiracy claim against LCCYS could be plausible if supported by more particular facts. 

Muhammad filed an amended complaint, which the District Court also dismissed. 

In relation to the conspiracy claim against LCCYS, the District Court ruled that he failed 

to plead enough facts to state a plausible claim for conspiracy. Upon review, we affirmed 

the District Court’s judgment. See Muhammad v. Cappellini, 477 F. App’x 935 (3d Cir. 

2012).

After his appeal, Muhammad returned to the District Court with a “Motion for 

Federal Injunctive Relief & Damages Pursuant to § 1983” raising new claims against the 

LCCCP, a former LCCCP judge, and Pennsylvania Superior Court judges in connection 

with the LCCCP proceedings. The District Court construed the motion (with its demand 

for custody of his son and $50 million in damages) as a new complaint, reviewed it 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and dismissed the claims raised therein on immunity 

grounds. We again affirmed the District Court. See Muhammad v. Cappellini, 532 F. 

App’x 127 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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Subsequently, on October 1, 2013, Muhammad again returned to the District 

Court, filing a “Motion for Federal Injunctive Relief and Damages under 42 U.S.C.A. 

§ 1983 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.” Citing Rule 

60(b)(6), he sought reopening. He argued that his parental rights were improperly 

terminated by LCCYS and claimed that immunity was improperly granted to LCCYS by 

the District Court. In his motion, he made an offer of settlement to the LCCYS, namely 

custody of his son and $100 million in damages. On December 31, 2013, Muhammad 

submitted a brief in support of his motion. 

The District Court ordered Muhammad’s brief stricken from the docket as 

untimely filed and denied his motion. Muhammad appeals. In his brief, he repeats his 

argument that LCCYS is not entitled to immunity. He also presents arguments about 

why he believes he is entitled to custody of his son. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Torres v. Carter, 125 F.3d 166, 

167-68 (ed Cir. 1997). 

Despite the allusion to preliminary injunctive relief in its title, Muhammad’s 

motion was a motion to reopen under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the 

content of a motion, not its title, controls). Generally, we review orders denying Rule 

60(b) motions for abuse of discretion. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 

251 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining also that we exercise plenary review over orders 

granting or denying relief under Rule 60(b)(4)). An appeal from the denial of Rule 60(b) 
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relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review. See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t 

of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). Also, we review how a district court controls its 

docket for abuse of discretion. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 

(3d Cir. 1982). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Erie 

Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988). 

Upon review, we will affirm the District Court’s order. Muhammad claimed legal 

error, but “legal error, without more, cannot justify granting a Rule 60(b) motion.” Smith 

v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988). Furthermore, his claim of legal error was 

based on a misapprehension of the District Court’s rulings. The complaint and amended 

complaint against LCCYS were dismissed for failure to state a claim, not on the basis of 

immunity. Furthermore, Muhammad did not otherwise present a basis for relief under 

Rule 60(b). He did not put before the District Court material new evidence that could not 

have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence. See Compass Tech., Inc. v. 

Tseng Labs,, Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995). He also did not make the 

necessary “showing of exceptional circumstances” to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 

See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2002). Lastly, it was 

within the District Court’s sound discretion to strike Muhammad’s late-filed brief from 

the docket.