The Honor able Ma rk R. Kravitz , United States District J udg e for the District of * Connecticut, sitting by

desig nation. 06
- 55 02
- cr U ni t ed St at es v. M ar t i nez 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E S EC ON D C IR C U IT

_____________________ August Term, 2007 (Argued: May

5, 2008 Dec ided: May 9, 2008) Docke t No. 06-5502-c r

_____________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee , -v.- DA VID M AR T I

NE Z, De

fe nd an t- Ap pe lla nt.

_______________________ BEF ORE: WI NTER and HA L L , Circuit Judges , and KRAVI TZ , District Judge. * Appea l from the judg ment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork (Pre ska, Judge ) dec lining to re -sentenc e De fenda nt-Appellant a fter this Court’s
rema nd pursuant to United States v. Crosby , 397 F.3d 103 ( 2d Cir. 2005). Def endant- Appellant ple a de d guil ty

to o ne c ount o f p os se ssi nga fi re arm a ft e r h avin g be e n c on vic te d o f a fe lony , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). At De fenda nt-Appellant’s se ntencing , the district court applied a f

our-leve l enhanc ement to his base of fense level af

ter finding , by

a pre pondera

nce of the e vid e nc e , th a t D e fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt h a d u se d o r p os se sse d th e fi re arm in c onne c tio n w ith another felony offe nse. B eca

use we hold that the district court applied the corr ect standa rd of proof to the f

acts supportingthe enha

nceme nt, we also hold that the sente nce imposed by the district court wa s rea sonable. F inally , we hold that the doc trine of c onstitut ional avoidanc e does
no t a pp ly to i nv a lid a te the se nte nc e imp os e d in thi s c a se . We a ff

ir m.2 ________________________ D ONNA N EW MAN , L aw Of fice of Donna

Newma n, Esq., New Y ork, Ne w York, for Defendant-Appe llant
. P AR VI N D APHN E M OYNE , Assistant United States Attorney , Southern District of New Y ork (Cathy

Seibel, Deputy

United States Attorney , on the brief ), for Michae l J , Gar cia, United States A ttorney , Southern District of Ne w York, N ew York, for Appellee.

________________________ PER CU RI AM : Da vid Mart ine z ap pe a ls f

ro m th e or de r o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

de c lin ingto r e -s e nte nc e him afte r this Court’s remand pur suant to United States v. Crosby , 397 F.3d 103 ( 2d Cir. 2005). On
a p p e a l , M art i n e z ar g u e s t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o urti mp r o p e r l y r e l i e d o nf a c t s d e t e r m i n e d b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e in applying a four- level enha

nceme nt pursuant to former Section 2K2.1(b)( 5) of the United States SentencingGuidelines to Martinez’s base offe nse leve l. Mart ine z al so argue s th a t th e do c tr ine of c on sti tut ion a l avo ida

nc e re qu ir e s th is C ourt

to deter mine that the district court e rre d in applying othe r than a rea sonable doubt standar d to the fa c ts r e le va

nt t o th e se nte nc inge nh anc e me nt. We d isa g re e , a nd ho ld t hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did not err in a

pply ing a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standa rd to the fa cts establishing the
e nh anc e me nt. I. Bac kgr ound I n May 2002, the Gover

nment filed an indictment c harg ing Ma rtinez with one count of po sse ssi nga

fi re a rm a ft e r h avin g be e n c on vic te d o f a fe lony , in

vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 922(g )(1) . I n Dec ember 2002, Martinez pleade d g uilty to the single count alleg ed in the indictment. At his plea hea ring , Martinez descr ibed his conduct with re spect to the off ense by statin g , “ On

Janu ary 2 [20 02 ] in the B ro nx Iwa s in po sse ssi on

of a we a po n a nd Iwa s– I ’m a pa st felon a nd Iknew that wa s ag ainst the law.” FollowingMartinez’s plea, the Probation Offic e pre pare d a Pre- Sentence Investig ationThe PSR relied on the 2002 ver sion of the Guidelines. Sec tion 2K2.1 has since be en 1 renumbe red a

nd, in the 2007 version of the Guidelines, the provision allowingfor a 4-leve l e nh anc e me nt b a se d o n th e de fe nd ant’ s u se of the fi re arm

in c onne c tio n w ithoth e r f e lon ie s is c on ta ine d in

§ 2 K2 .1 (b )( 6) . T he te xt of the se c tio n r e qu ir ingthe e nh anc e me nt i s th e same in bo th v e rs ion s: I f t he de fe nd ant u se d o r p os se sse d a ny fi re a rm or ammunit ion

in c onne c tio n w ith another felony offe nse; or possessed or

transfe rre d any

firea rm or ammunition wi th k no wl e dg e , inte nt, or

re a so n to be lie ve that it

wo uld be us e d o r p os se sse d in connec tion with another fe lony offe nse, incre ase by

4 levels. I f the re sulting offe nse leve l is less than level 18, incre ase to leve l 18. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2002); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)( 6) (2007)
. 3 Report (“ PSR ”), which ca lculated Ma rtinez’s base of

fense level under

the United States Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s ( “ USS G” or “ Gu ide lin e s” ) t o b e 20 , p ur su ant t o § 2K2. 1( a )( 4) (A ), and his adjusted off

ense le vel to be 23, af

ter: (1) a four -leve l increa se, pursua nt to § 2K2.1(b)(5) , 1 beca use Mar tinez had used the fire arm in conne ction with other fe lony offe nses; (2) a

two-leve l incre ase, pur suant to § 3C1.1, because Martinez had obstructe d justice duringthe cour se of the investigation and prosec ution of the offe nse; and (3) a thre e-le vel dec rea se, pursua nt to § 3E1.1, beca use Mar tinez had timely

acc epted r esponsibility

for the of fense . The Probation De partment deter mined that Martinez had 13 cr iminal hist ory points, resulting in a Criminal History Categ ory of VI , a nd Gu ide lin e s r ang e of

92 to 1 15 months
. There afte r, the district cour t conducted a

hear ing pur suant to United States v. Fatico , 579 F.2d 707 ( 2d Cir. 1978), wher e it hear d evidenc e re lating to the e nhance ments sugg ested in the PSR . At a sente ncinghear ing c onducted in Apr il 2004, the district court deter mined, based on the evidenc e off

ere d at the Fatico hear ing, that, on the night of the offe nse alleg ed in the indictment, Martinez had taken the wea pon in question to an apar tment in the Bronx with the intention of assaulting Sony a Gr een. T he cour t noted that “[t] here is no dispute that a violent fi g ht b ro ke out, s tart ingwi th [M art ine z] pun c hin g Ms. Gr e e n in the fa c e , a

nd tha t a ft e r M s.4

Gre en wa s bleedingand excited and f rig htened a

nd running about, [Martinez] pointed a gun at he r a s sh e ra

n a wa y .” Th e c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t Ma

rt ine z ha d “ po sse sse d a

nd us e d [th e g un ] in
connec tion with reckless e ndang erme nt in the first deg ree .” F urther, the court re lied on testimony g iven at the Fatico hear ing that Martinez had g one to Gre en’s a partment “ to collect on
a dr u g d e b t, ” an d

c o n c lu d e d

th a t “ it is c le ar an d it [h a s ] b e e ne s ta

b li s h e d th a t [ M arti n e z] po sse sse d h is gun

in c onne c tio n w itha

na rc oti c s c on sp ir a c y

and na rc oti c s d istri butio n . . . bo th felonies unde r fe dera l law.” Ac cording ly , the cour t determined that the 4-leve l enhanc ement for using the firea

rm in connec tion with another fe lony was a ppropriate
. The district cour

t also conclude d that Martinez had obstructe d justice duringthe investigation and prosec ution of the offe nse by lying to the N ew Yor

k City police dete ctive investigating the of

fense . Acc ording ly , the district court de termined that “ a total offe nse leve l of 2 3 i s a p p r o p r i a t e , ” an d

s e n t e n c e d

M art i n e z t o a

1 1 5
- m o n tht e r

mo f i mp r i s o n m e n t , f

o l l o w e d b y a three -y ear term of supe rvised re lease . Martinez appea led and, pur suant to United States v. Crosby , 3 97 F .3 d 1 03 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 ), thi s Co ur t r e mand e d th e c a se fo r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

to consider whether , in light of United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), it would rese ntence M arti n e z. On re mand, in support of re sentenc ing, Ma rtinez argued that, inte r a lia , th e F if th Am e ndme nt r e qu ir e d th e dis tr ic t c ourt to a pp ly a re a so na ble do ub t st and ard

of pr oo f t o th e fa c ts establishing that he had use d the fire arm in conne ction with another f elony . In November

2006, th e d is tr ic t c o u rt i s s u e d

ane n d o r s e me n t o r d e r

d e c li n in g to r e s e n te n c e M arti n e z. This appea l followed. II. Discussion A. Evid entiary Standard O na p p e a l , M art i n e z d o e s n o tar g u e th a td u e p r o c e s s r e qu i r e s a

d i s tr i c tc o urtt o a

p p l y a5

rea sonable doubt standar d to fac ts supporting a ll sentence enhanc ements. Rather , Martinez argues that, bec ause the enhanc ement applied to his base offe nse leve l require d the district court to determine that he had c ommitt ed a ne w and se para te offe nse, the F ifth Amendment re quires that the district court a

pply a re asonable doubt standard to the f acts supportingthat enhanc ement. This Court has not y et consider ed whe ther the due proce ss rig ht to proof beyond a
rea sonable doubt attac hes to fac ts releva nt to a Guidelines sentenc e whe n those fac ts constitute a separ ate of

fense . The sing le Circuit that has consider ed the que stion has answer ed it in the neg ative. See U

nited States v. Grier , 475 F.3d 556, 567- 68 (3d Cir. 2007). In Grier , the defe ndant, who wa s subject to the same se ntence enhanc ement at issue he re, r aised the evidentiar y standard a

rgument that Martinez advanc es her e. In reje cting the ar g ument and aff irming the district court’s a pplication of the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e standa

rd, the Third Circuit beg an by

noting that, a fter Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 5 30 U. S. 4 66 (2 00 0) , a de fe nd ant i s
e nti tle d to pr oo f b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t on

any fa c ts c on sti tut inge le me nts of a c ri me , th os e “that incr ease the maxim um punishment to which the defe ndant is exposed under g overning law.” Id
. at 5 6 2 (c i t i n g Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490). The T hird Circuit acknow ledg ed the
c o n s t i tu t i o n a l p r o b l e mc r e a t e d b y Apprendiand its application to the Sentenc ing Guidelines. Id
. at 5 6 3 (c i t i n g United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220, 233-35 (2005)) . The c ourt observe d, howeve r, that the Supreme Court had “r esolved this problem” w ith its decision in Booke r , when it severe d and excised the two statutory provisions that crea

ted and e nforc ed the mandatory application of the Guidelines, thus rende ring the Guidelines a dvisory
. Id . at 56 3- 65 (“ Th e on ly chang e is that the final Guide lines rang e does not bind the district cour t, but merely

serve s as one of a numbe r of f

actor s to be consider ed in fa shioning the ultimate sente nce.” ). Ac c or din g to t

he Th ir d Ci rc uit , “ [p]os t- Booke r , th e punis hme nts c ho se n b y Con g re ss i n the Un ite d St a te s Co de de te rm ine the statut or y ma ximumfo r a

c ri me ,” and , “ [n]on e of

the fa c ts6

rele vant to enhanc ements or de parture s under the Guidelines ca n incre ase the maxi mum punishment to which the defe ndant is exposed.” Id . at 56 5- 66 . T he Court c on c lud e d th a t, l ike a ll fac ts releva

nt to application of the Guide lines, fac ts that constitute a separ ate of fense do not implicate the rig hts to a jury trial and proof

beyond a re asonable doubt beca use, under

an advisory Guidelines sy stem, those fac ts do not increase the maxim um punishment to which a defe ndant is exposed. Id . at 56 7. Rathe r, the Th ir d Ci rc uit no te d, fa c ts t

hat c on sti tut e a

se pa rate offe nse “infor

m the district court’s discr etion without lim iting its authority . They there fore do not constitute ‘elements’ of a ‘c rime’ unde r the rationale of Apprendiand do not implicate the rig hts to a jury

trial and proof

beyond a re asonable doubt.” Id . at 567-68. Al tho ug h th is C ourt

ha s n ot a dd

re sse d th e sp e c if

ic iss ue pr e se nte d h e re , o ur po st- Booke r jurisprudenc e addr essing the standar d of evide nce a pplicable to fa cts rele vant to Guidelines sentenc es supports the re asoning of the Third Circ uit, and compels us to adopt the holding of Grier . This Court has determined that, “[j] udicial authority to find fac ts releva

nt to sentencing by a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e surv ive s Booke r ,” Un ite d S tates v . G arc ia , 413 F.3d 201, 220 n.15 (2d Cir. 2005), and that, “with the mandator y use of the Guidelines excised, the traditional
a uth or ity of a se nte nc ingjud g e to f

ind a ll f a c ts r e le va

nt t o s e nte nc ingwi ll e nc ounte r n o Si xth Amendment objec tion,” Crosby , 3 97 F .3 d at 11 2. No thi ngin t his Court ’s jur isp ru de nc e su g g e sts any basis for a

pply ing a differ ent evidentiar

y standard to r eleva

nt fac ts merely

beca use they constitute a sepa

rate offe nse, so long as those fa cts do not increa se the maximum statutory punishment to which a def endant is exposed. This rea soning is re inforce d by our dec ision in United States v. Vaughn , 430 F.3d 518, 525-26 (2d Cir. 2005), where this Court rejected the defe ndants’ ar g ument that, afte r Booke r , dis tr ic t c ourt s c ou ld n o lo ng e r t ake a c qu itt e d c on du c t in to a c c ount i n d e te rm ini ngde fe nd ants ’ sentenc es. In that case , we obse rved that the defe ndants’ “a rgument misse[ d] t he distinction7

betwee n elements of a

n offe nse and f

acts re levant to sentenc ing. E lements of an of fense must be tried to a jury , but fac ts releva nt to sentencingmay

be found by

a judg e, within the constra ints of the Six th Amendment.” Vaughn , 430 F.3d at 526. Accor dingly , in Vaughn , we c oncluded that the dis tr ic t c ourt

ha d n ot e rr e d in

re lyingon

a c qu itt e d c on du c t in

de te rm ini ngthe de fe nd ants ’ sentenc e bec ause that court had “ sentenc ed [defenda nts] within the statutory

rang e author ized by the jury verdic t and within the Guidelines ra ng e dete rmined in ac corda nce w ith the fac ts the court found by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e.” Id . at 527. He re , M art ine z ar g ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re lia nc e on his us e of

the fi re arm

in
connec tion with a separa

te offe nse to enha

nce his sente nce “ stripped” him of the pr esumption of innocenc e with re spect to that other of fense . Howeve r, as in Vaughn , Martinez’s ar g ument “misses the distinction between e lements of an of fense and fa cts rele vant to sentenc ing.” The district court did not sentence Martinez for the se parate offe nse; rathe r that sepa rate offe nse wa s rele vant to the sentenc e imposed base d on Martinez’s violation of § 922(g )(1) . Martinez’s sentenc e, more over, w as not in excess of the 10-year term provided f

or in § 924(a) (2) f

or violations of § 922(g )(1) . Acc ording ly , Martinez’s ar g ument that the fa cts rele vant to the enhanc ement at issue in this case should have be en subjec t to a highe r standar d of proof lacks merit. The district cour

t properly applied the pr eponder ance of the e vidence standard to the rele vant fa cts in this case. B. Constitutional Avoid ance Mart ine z ar g ue s th a t th e do c tr ine of “ Con sti tut ion a l A vo ida

nc e ” re qu ir e s th is C ourt

to direc t the district court to apply the re asonable doubt standard to fa cts rele vant to the § 2K2. 1( b) (5 ) e nh anc e me nt at is su e he re . T he Go ve rnme nt a rgue s th a t th e do c tr ine do e s n ot a pp ly beca use the que stion in t his case doe s not involve statutory interpre tation. The Supreme Court has desc ribed the doc trine of c onstitut ional avoidanc e as “ a tool for c hoosing be tween c ompeting8

pla us ibl e int e rp re tatio ns of

a statut or y te xt, r e sti ngon

the re a so na

ble pr e sumpt ion

tha t Co ng re ss did not intend the alternative which ra ises serious constitutional doubts.” Clark v. Martinez , 543 U. S. 3 71 , 3 80 -8 1 ( 20 05 ). Un de r t he do c tr ine , w he n a

c ourt is c on fr on te d w ithtw o p la us ibl e constructions of a

statute, one of which “would r aise a multit ude of c onstitut ional problems,” that court must adopt the construc tion that avoids the constitutional is sues. Id . at 380. I n th is c a se , M art ine z do e s n ot s pe c if y the statut e tha

t is a lle g e dly

su bje c t to mul tip le interpre tations such that this Court m ust apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance . Rather, his argument can be construed to r equire this Court t o avoid the constitutional problems he alleg es ar e ca

used by the district court’s r eliance on a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e by

requiring the application of a re asonable doubt standard. B eca use re solution of these issues does not require this Court t o interpre t any statute, this case doe s not invit e the a pplication of the doc trine of constitutional avoidance . Fur ther, a s discussed above , the district court’s a pplication of the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standa rd in this case pr esents no constitutional problems. Acc ording ly , the doctrine of constitutional avoidance prese nts no basis for disturbing the district court’s judg ment in this case. III. Conclusi on F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

ins of ar a s it applied a pr eponder ance of the e vidence standard to the f acts re levant to the enha

nceme nt under Guidelines § 2K2.1(b) (5). We dispose of Ma rtinez’s remainingclaim in an ac company ing summary order
.