Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1408-PL-404 | March 16, 2015 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Eugene M. Feingold

Steven P. Kennedy

Law Offices of Eugene M. Feingold

Munster, IN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Gregory Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Kathy Bradley

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, IN

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Redevelopment Commission of 

the Town of Munster, Indiana,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Indiana State Board of Accounts 

and Paul D. Joyce, State 

Examiner of State Board of 

Accounts,

Appellee-Respondent

March 16, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A04-1408-PL-404

Appeal from the Lake Circiuit Court

The Honorable Thomas W. Webber, 

Sr., Judge Pro Tempore

Cause No. 45D04-1310-PL-92

Mathias, Judge.

[1] The Munster Redevelopment Commission (“the Commission”) appeals the 

Lake Circuit Court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of the Indiana 
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State Board of Accounts1 (“the Board”) in which the trial court determined that 

Indiana Code section 36-7-14-28 does not permit the Commission to use tax 

incremental financing funds to pay for the ongoing maintenance of redeveloped 

properties. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February 2006, the Commission initiated a project to redevelop a designated 

area in Munster, which included the Munster Centennial Park and the Munster 

Community Park. The Commission financed the parks’ improvements, in part, 

using funds acquired through tax allocation financing, also known as tax 

increment financing2 (“TIF”). After the redevelopment of the parks was 

completed, ownership of the parks was transferred from the Commission to the 

 

1 The Indiana State Board of Accounts supervises the financing and accounting practices of Indiana’s 

municipal corporations.

2 The Indiana Supreme Court has explained the tax allocation scheme in Indiana: 

Under the tax allocation statutes, an impetus towards redevelopment of blighted urban areas is 

achieved by the reallocation of local tax money in such a fashion that overlapping taxing 

jurisdictions which benefit from improvements in the renewal areas also share in their cost. The 

overlapping taxing bodies are all beneficiaries of any post-development revenue increases due to 

increased assessed values in the development area. Prior to the legislative amendments 

authorizing tax allocation procedures, the [Commission] alone bore the costs of land 

acquisition, clearance, and improvements associated with any redevelopment and the 

overlapping taxing bodies did not share in the public costs of the redevelopment. The tax 

allocation legislation requires a sharing of those costs by all public bodies benefiting from the 

redevelopment by requiring all post-development tax revenues attributable to increased assessed 

values to be paid to the [Commission] until all costs of public improvements associated with the 

redevelopment have been paid. The taxing bodies remain entitled to all property tax revenues 

not attributable to the development within the Allocation Area. When the redevelopment costs 

have been paid, the tax allocation is discontinued and all public bodies share in tax revenues as 

they did prior to the redevelopment and enjoy the benefits of increased property tax values and 

revenues. 

S. Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of S. Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ind. 1981).
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Munster Municipal Center Corporation and Parks Department (“the town”). 

The town allocated in its annual budget a portion of TIF funds to pay for the 

ongoing maintenance of the parks. 

[4] At some point, the town learned that the Board did not consider maintenance 

of redeveloped properties to be proper use of TIF funds. The town consulted its 

legal counsel as to whether it was permissible for the town to use TIF funds to 

maintain the two parks. On May 16, 2013, the town’s counsel wrote: “It is our 

view that the statutes authorize activities of this nature when those activities are 

in conjunction with the overall redevelopment purposes of the Town.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 38. Counsel’s memo also stated:

[I]f the Redevelopment Commission is utilizing the tax levy for general 

expenses to fulfill [its duty to use the land in the manner that best 

serves the town] and has concluded that it ought to promote this use of 

parks and cooperate with the Town, its decision fits squarely within 

the statutory framework and intent and is certainly incident to its 

statutory powers and duties. 

Id.

[5] The town also sought the opinion of the Board. On August 22, 2013, the town 

received a letter from the Board, which provided: 

The legislature has provided that the expenditure of redevelopment 

funds for maintenance is to occur only to maintain buildings in the 

situation where the redevelopment commission has determined that 

demolition of those buildings is not considered necessary to carry out 

the redevelopment plan. Such funds cannot be used to maintain park 

land. This should not be construed as a legal opinion but represents 

the position we would take in an audit of the Town’s records.
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Appellant’s App. p. 37.

[6] On October 7, 2013, the Commission filed a complaint against the Board 

seeking declaratory relief. Specifically, the Commission alleged that 

“[d]isallowing the use of TIF funds for maintenance of a TIF financed 

redevelopment project . . . will create a substantial additional tax expense to its 

property owners” and that “[f]ailure to comply with the notification of the State 

Board of Accounts would place the Town of Munster and its Redevelopment 

Commission at risk of fines, penalties, and other punitive actions . . . taken 

by . . . the State Board of Accounts.” Appellant’s App. p. 3. 

[7] On June 2, 2014, the Commission filed a motion for summary judgment. The 

trial court denied the Commission’s motion on August 1, 2014, and granted 

summary judgment in favor of the Board, finding that that the language in the 

relevant statutes shows that “the legislature [did not intend] to allow TIF funds 

to be used for the continued maintenance of properties acquired and improved 

through the use of TIF funds.” Appellant’s App. p. 8. The court also noted 

that the parks in question were now owned by the town, not by the 

Commission, and that “this is not a matter that falls within I.C. § 36-7-14-22.5 

where maintenance of real property owned by the commission can be 

maintained by [the] commission with TIF funds.” Id. 

[8] The Commission now appeals. The Board cross-appeals. 
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I. The Commission’s Standing

[9] In its cross-appeal, the Board argues that the Commission did not have standing 

to bring an action for declaratory judgment because “there is no real or actual 

controversy.” Appellee’s Br. at 7. Specifically, the Board contends that the 

Commission has “shown no injury based on the [Board’s] letter stating that the 

position of the [Board] is that TIF funds may not be used for park 

maintenance.” Id. at 8. The Board argues that the Commission’s claims that 

prohibiting the use of TIF funds for the maintenance of the parks will increase 

property owners’ tax obligations and place the Commission at risk of punitive 

actions are “purely speculative.” Id. 

[10] Standing is defined as having a “sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable 

controversy.” Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 716 

N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ind. 1999). The point of the standing requirement is to ensure 

that the party before the court has a substantive right to enforce the claim that is

being made in the litigation. Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. 1995). 

Standing is “a significant restraint on the ability of Indiana courts to act, as it 

denies the courts any jurisdiction absent an actual injured party participating in 

the case.” Id. at 488. 

[11] The standing requirement obligates courts to act only in real cases and shun 

action when called upon to engage only in abstract speculation. Id. An actual 

dispute involving those harmed is what confers jurisdiction upon the judiciary:
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For the disposition of cases and controversies, the Court requires 

adverse parties before it. Standing focuses generally upon the question 

whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the 

Court’s power. However, more fundamentally, standing is a restraint 

upon this Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction in that we cannot proceed 

where there is no demonstrable injury to the complainant before us.

Id. (quotation omitted). Put simply, in order to have standing, the challenging 

party must show adequate injury or the immediate danger of sustaining some 

injury. Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n, 716 N.E.2d at 945.

[12] In its complaint, the Commission sought declaratory relief allowing it to use 

TIF funds to maintain the redeveloped parks. Indiana Code section 34-14-1-2 

defines a person who may obtain declaratory judgment:

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other 

writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal 

relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or 

franchise, may have determined any question of construction or 

validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or 

franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal 

relations thereunder.

[13] “In order to obtain declaratory relief, the person bringing the action must have 

a substantial present interest in the relief sought.” Hibler v. Conseco, Inc., 744 

N.E.2d 1012, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “The basis of jurisdiction under the 

Declaratory Judgment Act is a justiciable controversy or question, which is 

clearly defined and affects the legal right, the legal status, or the legal 

relationship of parties having adverse interests.” Little Beverage Co., Inc. v. 

DePrez, 777 N.E.2d 74, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
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[14] In the instant case, the Commission asked the trial court to enter a declaratory 

judgment to determine its authority to use TIF funds to pay for the maintenance 

of the parks it redeveloped. Because the Commission had already budgeted and 

utilized TIF funds to pay the maintenance expenses of the parks, and in light of 

the position the Board took in its letter to the Commission, the Commission has 

shown that it had a substantial interest in determining whether its use of the 

TIF funds was proper as well as the immediate danger of injury. See Ad Craft, 

Inc. v. Area Plan Comm’n of Evansville & Vanderburgh Cnty., 716 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999) (uncertain zoning status of a vacated right-of-way upon which a 

billboard had been built was a controversy which an area plan commission 

could seek to resolve via a declaratory judgment action, particularly considering 

the intricacies of the various zoning and permit issues involved and the legal 

and economic necessity of a prompt resolution thereof); Lutheran Hosp. of Ft. 

Wayne, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Allen Cnty., 397 N.E.2d 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1979) (hospitals had standing to bring action for declaratory judgment whether 

they were entitled to reimbursement from county department of public welfare 

for emergency medical treatment rendered to indigents in light of fact that the 

expenditures incurred by hospitals in treating the indigents approximated 

$450,000). We therefore conclude that the Commission had standing to bring 

its claim for declaratory relief. 
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II. Use of TIF Funds

[15] The Commission argues that the trial court erred when it granted the Board’s 

motion for summary judgment. Our standard of review of summary judgment 

appeals is well established:

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our standard of review 

is the same as that of the trial court. Considering only those facts that 

the parties designated to the trial court, we must determine whether 

there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether “the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In 

answering these questions, the reviewing court construes all factual 

inferences in the non-moving party’s favor and resolves all doubts as to 

the existence of a material issue against the moving party. The moving 

party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are 

no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law; and once the movant satisfies the burden, 

the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate and 

produce evidence of facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.

Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind. 2009) 

(citations omitted). 

[16] The party appealing a summary judgment decision has the burden of 

persuading this court that the grant or denial of summary judgment was 

erroneous. Knoebel v. Clark County Superior Court No. 1, 901 N.E.2d 529, 531-32 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Where the facts are undisputed and the issue presented is 

a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo. Crum v. City of Terre 

Haute ex rel. Dep’t of Redev., 812 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
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[17] Our resolution of the issue presented in this appeal hinges on our application of 

several interrelated sections of Indiana Code title 36-7. We initially observe 

that statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the court and is 

reviewed de novo. Ind. Pesticide Rev. Bd. v. Black Diamond Pest & Termite Control 

Inc., 916 N.E.2d 168, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), trans. 

denied. De novo review allows us to decide an issue without affording any 

deference to the trial court’s decision. Id. Our goal in statutory construction is 

to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature. Id. 

When a statute has not previously been construed, our interpretation is 

controlled by the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory 

construction. Id. We review the statute as a whole and presume the legislature 

intended logical application of the language used in the statute, so as to avoid 

unjust or absurd results. See Curley v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration, 

896 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[18] To determine the intent of the legislature, we examine the statute as a whole 

and also read sections of an act together so that no part is rendered meaningless 

if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute. Id. (citing City of N. 

Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg’l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 2005)). The best 

evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. U.S. Steel Corp. 

v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 951 N.E.2d 542, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Thus, we 

must give all words their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated 

by statute. Id. When the language in a statute is ambiguous or uncertain, we 

may look not only to the language, but also to the nature and subject matter of 
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the act and the object to be accomplished thereby in ascertaining the legislative 

intent. Johnson v. Morgan, 871 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). If, 

however, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face, we will 

give such a statute its apparent and obvious meaning. U.S. Steel, 951 N.E.2d at 

552.

[19] Indiana Code section 36-7-14-39(b)(2)(J) provides specifically that TIF funds 

may be used to “[p]ay expenses incurred by the redevelopment commission for 

local public improvements that are in the allocation area or serving the 

allocation area. Public improvements include buildings, parking facilities, and 

other items described in section 25.1(a) of this chapter.”

[20] Indiana Code section 36-7-14-11 provides that the Commission shall, in 

relevant part:

(6) select and acquire the areas needing redevelopment to be 

redeveloped under this chapter; and

(7) replan and dispose of the areas needing redevelopment in the 

manner that best serves the social and economic interests of the unit 

and its inhabitants.

[21] Indiana Code section 36-7-1-18 defines “redevelopment” as:

(1) Acquiring real property in areas needing redevelopment.

(2) Replatting and determining the proper use of real property 

acquired.

(3) Opening, closing, relocating, widening, and improving public 

ways.

(4) Relocating, constructing, and improving sewers, utility services, 

offstreet parking facilities, and levees.
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(5) Laying out and constructing necessary public improvements, 

including parks, playgrounds, and other recreational facilities.

(6) Restricting the use of real property acquired according to law.

(7) Repairing and maintaining buildings acquired, if demolition of 

those buildings is not considered necessary to carry out the 

redevelopment plan.

(8) Rehabilitating real or personal property to carry out the 

redevelopment or urban renewal plan, regardless of whether the real or 

personal property is acquired by the unit.

(9) Investigating and remediating environmental contamination on 

real property to carry out the redevelopment or urban renewal plan, 

regardless of whether the real property is acquired by the unit.

(10) Disposing of property acquired on the terms and conditions and 

for the uses and purposes that best serve the interests of the units 

served by the redevelopment commission.

(11) Making payments required or authorized by IC 8-23-17.

(12) Performing all acts incident to the statutory powers and duties of a 

redevelopment commission.

[22] The Commission argues that the “statutory powers granted the [Commission] 

are broad and include the use of TIF funds for maintenance of redevelopment 

projects.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. According to the Commission, Indiana Code 

section 36-7-1-18’s grant of “specific power to develop parks and recreational 

facilities” also includes “the power to perform all actions incidental to its 

assigned powers, expending funds for the maintenance of a project initially 

financed with redevelopment commission funds[.]” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 

[23] The Commission also argues that Indiana Code section 36-7-14-39 should be 

interpreted broadly to allow for the use of TIF funds to maintain the parks 

because “[t]he maintenance expenses to which the redevelopment commission 

applies TIF funds are expenses incurred because of the development.” 
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Appellant’s Br. at 11. It acknowledges that the statute does not specifically 

permit use of TIF funds to maintain redeveloped parks but points to Indiana 

Code section 36-7-14-39(b)(2)(G), which allows the Commission to use TIF 

funds to reimburse the town for expenditures for improvements made in the 

allocation area; section 36-7-14-39(b)(2)(H), which allows the Commission to 

use TIF funds to reimburse the town for expenses related to “rentals paid by it 

for a building or parking facility that is physically located in or physically 

connected to that allocation area”; and section 36-7-14-39(b)(2)(J), which 

allows the Commission to “[p]ay expenses incurred by the redevelopment 

commission for local public improvements that are in the allocation area or 

serving the allocation area. Public improvements include buildings, parking 

facilities, and other items described in . . . this chapter.”

[24] However, the plain language of the statutes leads us to conclude that the trial 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board was proper. “It is 

clearly established that boards of county commissioners possess only such 

powers as have been granted expressly by statute and those which must be 

necessarily implied to execute some expressed power.” S. Bend Pub. Transp. 

Corp. v. City of S. Bend, 428 N.E.2d 217, 225 (Ind. 1981). Our review of the 

relevant statutes fails to lead us to any provision that expressly permits the 

Commission to use TIF funds for ongoing maintenance of properties that have 

already been redeveloped. 

[25] Indiana Code section 36-7-14-39(b)(2) provides that TIF funds “may be used by 

the redevelopment district only to do one or more of the following,” then lists 
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the allowable uses. Notably absent from the list of permissible uses is general 

and ongoing maintenance of redeveloped properties. Instead, the language of 

the statute indicates that TIF funds are to be spent on the construction and 

installation of improvements, rather than continuing maintenance. The sole 

provision in the statute specifically authorizing the use of TIF funds for 

maintenance is section 36-7-1-18(7), which allows TIF funds to be used for the 

maintenance of buildings on property acquired before redevelopment is 

complete. Also, Indiana Code section 36-7-14-39 states that “[t]he allocation 

fund may not be used for operating expenses of the commission” (emphasis 

added). 

[26] Our supreme court has observed about the former version of the tax allocation 

statute: 

When the redevelopment costs have been paid, the tax allocation is 

discontinued and all public bodies share in tax revenues as they did 

prior to the redevelopment and enjoy the benefits of increased property 

tax values and revenues. The legislature passed the tax allocation 

financing statutes at this time to provide redevelopment commissions 

with a necessary means to promote development when local 

governments are facing massive cutbacks in federal assistance and 

increasingly tight fiscal constraints attributable to the property tax 

freeze.

S. Bend Pub. Transp. Corp., 428 N.E.2d at 219. This language, along with 

statutory language instructing the Commission to dispose of the redeveloped 

properties once redevelopment is complete, see Indiana Code section 36-7-14-

11(7), is indicative of the General Assembly’s intention that TIF funds no 

longer be used once redevelopment is complete. 
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[27] The Commission also argues that section 36-7-1-18(12), which gives the 

Commission the right to perform “all acts incident to the statutory powers and 

duties of a redevelopment commission” in the statutory definition of 

“redevelopment” necessarily includes the right to use TIF funds to fund the 

parks’ maintenance. We disagree. The powers granted by this provision are 

limited to the express statutory powers, or powers incidental to the expressed 

powers, of the Commission. See S. Ry. Co. v. Harpe, 223 Ind. 124, 131, 58 

N.E.2d 346, 349 (1944). As we have determined, the Commission’s use of TIF 

funds for the ongoing maintenance of a redeveloped property is not expressly or 

impliedly permitted in the relevant statutes.3

Conclusion

[28] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the Commission had standing to 

bring its declaratory judgment. We further conclude that the trial court did not 

err in determining that Indiana statute does not permit the use of TIF funds for 

the continued maintenance of completed redevelopment projects. 

[29] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Bradford, J., concur. 

 

3 The Commission also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Commission could not use TIF 

funds to maintain the parks because the parks are no longer owned by the Commission. We find no error 

here. The transfer of ownership of the parks from the Commission to the town is simply additional evidence 

that the redevelopment of the parks is complete and the use of TIF funds to maintain the parks is not 

permitted under the relevant statutes.