FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SATPAL SINGH CHAWLA; JASBIR 

No. 05-74823 KAUR; INDERPREET SINGH CHAWLA,

Petitioners, Agency Nos.

A077-427-104

v.  A077-427-105

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney A077-427-108

General, OPINION Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

February 9, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed March 26, 2010

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Stephen S. Trott and

Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Trott

4965
COUNSEL

Christopher Stender, San Francisco, California, for the petitioner. Martin Avila Robles, San Francisco, California, was

on the briefs.

4968 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
William Munick, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for the respondent. Marion E. Guyton, Trial Attorney,

Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., was on the brief.

OPINION

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Satpal Singh Chawla (“Chawla”), his wife Jasbir Kaur, and

his son Inderpreet Singh Chawla (collectively “Petitioners”)

petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”)

denial of Chawla’s applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief. The

BIA’s decision was based on an adverse credibility finding.

We grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioners are a Sikh family from Delhi, India. Chawla,

who was the president of a local Young Sikh Association in

India, claims he was persecuted by the Indian police on two

occasions. According to Chawla, the first incident of persecution occurred on March 15, 1998, when he was arrested by

Indian police at a rally attended by Sikhs protesting the implementation of a new helmet law. The helmet law required all

Sikhs to wear helmets while driving or riding on two-wheeled

vehicles unless they were wearing a turban. The Sikhs were

protesting the law because wearing helmets is against the Sikh

religion.2 Chawla testified that while he was making a speech,

1

In Chawla v. Holder, No. 05-77410, Petitioners petition for review of

the BIA’s denial of their motion to reopen. We address that petition in a

separate memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion. 

2Evidence in the record explains that Sikh scriptures provide clear

guidelines that “cursed is the Sikh who wears headgear,” and that by forcing Sikh women to wear helmets, the Indian government is “prohibiting

[Sikhs] from practicing [their] religion.” 

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4969
rally participants began shouting anti-government slogans and

the police began beating them with sticks. The police then

arrested Chawla and detained him for seven days, during

which time they kicked him, slapped him, beat him with

sticks, tied him to a cart, pushed a stick into his mouth, and

told him “now make a speech now against us. . . . Sikh’s [sic]

like you we are going to wipe them out.” Chawla was released

after his father paid the police a bribe of 10,000 rupees.

The second incident of alleged persecution began on May

15, 1998, when Chawla was arrested following an explosion

on the bus he was driving. Chawla testified he was driving the

bus when a gas cylinder, which belonged to a passenger who

sold balloons, exploded on the bus. The police stopped to

investigate the explosion, arrested Chawla, and detained him

for ten days. Chawla testified that during his detention, the

police beat him, broke his right wrist, and accused him of

having links with terrorists and deliberately causing the explosion. Chawla was released after his father and two others paid

the police a bribe of 50,000 rupees.

Chawla testified that after he was released, he went to Patiala, Pajabi, and stayed at his brother-in-law’s house. He

stayed there for only a few weeks, however, because his relatives asked him to leave after the police came looking for him

at the house. Chawla testified that he then returned to Delhi

and stayed in a Sikh temple for a few days, during which time

his wife came to see him and told him that, on three or four

occasions during the previous month, the police came to the

family home looking for him. Chawla then moved to his

father-in-law’s house, where he stayed until he, his wife, and

his child left India.

Petitioners entered the United States on non-immigrant

visas. Prior to the expiration of his visa, Chawla applied for

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Chawla’s

wife and son are beneficiaries of the asylum application.

4970 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
After three merits hearings, the IJ found Chawla not credible and denied all forms of relief. The IJ further found that

even if Chawla was credible, he had not established that he

will suffer future persecution on account of a protected

ground.

The BIA dismissed Petitioners’ appeal of the IJ’s decision.

The BIA, citing In re Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA

1994), adopted and affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding and thereby affirmed the IJ’s denial of Chawla’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.

However, the BIA did not adopt or affirm the portion of the

IJ’s decision finding that even if Chawla were credible, he

failed to meet his burden for relief. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence

and law, appellate review “is limited to the BIA’s decision,

except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Adverse credibility findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard and “will be upheld unless the evidence compels a contrary result.” Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d

738, 741 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted). The agency must

articulate a legitimate basis to question the petitioner’s credibility and must offer specific and cogent reasons for any

stated disbelief. Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir.

2002) (citation omitted). The articulated reasons “must be

substantial and bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hen each

of the IJ’s or BIA’s proffered reasons for an adverse credibility finding fails, we must accept a petitioner’s testimony as

credible.” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.

2004).

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4971
III. DISCUSSION 

Our review is limited to the BIA’s decision and the portion

of the IJ’s decision concerning the adverse credibility finding.

We do not review the portion of the IJ’s decision that found

that Chawla failed to meet his burden of proof for relief even

if he were credible because the BIA did not expressly adopt

or affirm that holding. See Hosseini, 471 F.3d at 957.

The IJ articulated six reasons for finding Chawla not credible, and the BIA independently articulated a seventh reason.

None of the reasons articulated by the IJ or BIA, considered

either separately or in combination, provide a legitimate basis

to question Chawla’s credibility. Therefore, we hold that the

adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial evidence.

A. Submission of Differing Newspaper Articles

At the first merits hearing, Chawla testified that, at the

March 15, 1998 rally, Indian police beat protestors with sticks

and arrested several protestors, including Chawla. Chawla

also submitted Exhibit 4G, a newspaper article about the

March 15, 1998 rally. The article is from “Current News

Today,” a newspaper distributed throughout Delhi, India. The

article specifically names Chawla and notes that he gave a

speech at the rally, but it does not indicate that any arrests or

violence occurred. The last lines of the article reads: “[T]he

police headquarters and senior officers have guaranteed . . .

that this law will not be enforced, that they will not issue tickets. . . . After that the demonstration was ended.”

3

3Two different translators offered two different translations of Exhibit

4G. The translator present at the hearing provided the translation quoted

above. Prior to the hearing, another translator provided a written translation of Exhibit 4G. According to the second translator, the final sentence

of Exhibit 4G reads: “The senior officers of police assured the Sikhs to

consider this matter sympathetically and the protest was finished after

this.” The minor differences in these translations are immaterial to our

analysis. 

4972 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
The IJ asked Chawla if Exhibit 4G was the only news

report of the rally in question and if there were any news

reports indicating that protestors were arrested. Chawla

replied that he had read some news articles that reported the

arrests, but that he did not currently have any of those articles

in his possession. Chawla explained that he originally submitted Exhibit 4G to an asylum officer because the asylum officer had asked him for supporting documentation, and Exhibit

4G is what he obtained through his father. When the IJ asked

Chawla why Exhibit 4G did not indicate that anyone at the

rally had been arrested, Chawla replied, “Maybe it’s not written there, I don’t know. There are some people who are

against the Sikh’s [sic].” When asked on cross-examination

why Exhibit 4G indicates that the protestors “had a peaceful

meeting with the police officials,” Chawla replied, “[E]ven

the press is prone to lying about issues. What can I say about

this?” When asked why he would submit Exhibit 4G, an “inaccurate” article, in support of his case, Chawla replied, “This

was to prove basically the fact that the rally did in fact take

place and so I was asked to furnish some kind of documentation that affected and this was not given to the court, this was

submitted to the INS office.” 

At the end of the first merits hearing, the IJ again asked

Chawla if Chawla had any reports that might confirm his version of what happened. Chawla replied that he did not have

any reports at the present time, but that he would ask his

father.

At the second merits hearing, Chawla submitted Exhibit 13,

a newspaper article from the “Evening Punjabi Samachar,”

which is a newspaper distributed in an area inhabited by a

large number of Sikhs. The last lines of Exhibit 13 read,

When Satpal Singh Chawla, president of Young Sikh

Association was speaking, some Sikhs raised anti

police and anti government slogans. Some of them

started pro Khalistan slogans. On this the police

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4973
force started mercilessly beating the Sikhs. In the

rally, many Sikh men, women and children were

injured. Satpal Singh Chawla and few other Sikhs

arrested.

Although the IJ agreed with the government attorney that

Exhibit 13 was “highly suspicious,” the IJ did not question the

authenticity of Exhibit 13 in his decision.

The IJ questioned Chawla’s credibility based on Chawla’s

submission of Exhibits 4G and 13 because Chawla “never satisfactorily explained, if he did not agree with Exhibit 4G, why

he presented it in the first place.” The BIA characterized this

as a “compelling aspect” of the IJ’s decision and concluded

that Chawla “should have contemporaneously clarified the

article’s inaccuracy.”

[1] Chawla’s submission of Exhibits 4G and 13 does not

support the adverse credibility finding. First, we note that

Exhibits 4G and 13 are not wholly inconsistent. Exhibit 4G

simply states that the March 15, 1998 rally ended after the

police assured the Sikh protestors that no tickets would be

issued for violations of the helmet law, and although Exhibit

4G fails to report that any violence or arrests did in fact occur,

it also does not state that violence or arrests did not occur.

[2] Second, Chawla provided reasonable explanations for

the different accounts of the rally in Exhibits 4G and 13, and

he reasonably explained why he submitted Exhibit 4G in support of his case. Chawla explained that the newspaper articles

likely differ because Exhibit 4G is from a newspaper distributed throughout Delhi, whereas Exhibit 13 is from a newspaper distributed in an area with a large Sikh population.

Chawla also explained that Exhibit 4G may be inaccurate

because “the press is prone to lying about issues.” Further,

Chawla explained that he submitted Exhibit 4G because the

INS office asked him for documents supporting his claim for

4974 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
asylum, and when he submitted the article, his focus was on

proving that the March 15, 1998, rally occurred. 

[3] Third, neither the IJ nor the BIA specifically addressed

Chawla’s explanation for the different accounts of the rally

contained in the articles or his explanation as to why he submitted Exhibit 4G. See Kaur, 379 F.3d at 887 (“An adverse

credibility finding is improper when an IJ fails to address a

petitioner’s explanation for a discrepancy or inconsistency.”).

[4] Finally, Chawla’s submission of Exhibit 4G, without

providing a contemporaneous clarification that the article was

not entirely accurate, does not support the adverse credibility

finding because, again, Exhibit 4G is not wholly inconsistent

with Chawla’s testimony or Exhibit 13. Thus, requiring

Chawla to clarify Exhibit 4G’s “inaccuracy” upon submission

of that exhibit to the immigration court would have required

that Chawla be omniscient; Chawla would have had to have

known that the IJ would find Exhibit 4G as different as “night

and day” from Exhibit 13. An asylum applicant cannot be

expected to sua sponte “clarify,” upon submission to the

immigration court, evidence that is not wholly inconsistent

with the applicant’s testimony or other documentary evidence.

[5] For the above reasons, we conclude that Chawla’s submission of Exhibits 4G and 13, and his failure to clarify upon

submission that Exhibit 4G was not entirely accurate, do not

support the adverse credibility finding.

B. Failure to Explain Sentence in Newspaper Article

Submitted by the Government

At Chawla’s second merits hearing, the government introduced Exhibit 17 into evidence. Exhibit 17 is a compilation

of various newspaper articles, some of which discuss the

Indian helmet law. One of those articles is dated January 5,

1998, and one sentence in that article reads, “Accused of

interfering with religious freedom, the Delhi Police hastily

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4975
exempted sardarnis (Sikh women) from a new law requiring

helmets for pillion riders on two-wheelers.” Another article in

Exhibit 17 contains a copy of the helmet law, which reads, in

part, “provided further that the State Government [may] provide for such exceptions [to the helmet law] as it may think

fit.” 

Chawla was asked why Exhibit 17 states that Sikh women

had been exempted from the helmet law as of January 5,

1998, a date that preceded the March 15, 1998 rally. In

response, Chawla testified, “I don’t know why this article

says what it says,” and “It’s solely published but its not true,

it’s a lie.” The BIA, adding to the reasons articulated by the

IJ for the adverse credibility finding, questioned Chawla’s

credibility based on Chawla’s failure to explain the abovequoted sentence from the newspaper article in Exhibit 17. 

[6] Chawla’s failure to explain the sentence in the newspaper article does not support the adverse credibility finding.

First, we question the reliability of the newspaper article’s

sentence at issue because the sentence says that the Delhi

police exempted Sikh women from the helmet law. However,

according to the helmet law as reproduced in Exhibit 17, only

state governments can craft exceptions to the helmet law, not

state police. Both the IJ and the BIA failed to note this internal contradiction contained in Exhibit 17.

Additionally, Exhibit 6, a newspaper article from “The Hindustan Times,” introduced into evidence by Chawla, appears

to contradict the sentence at issue in Exhibit 17, a fact that the

IJ and BIA also failed to note. Specifically, Exhibit 6 states

that Sikh women were protesting the helmet law on July 25,

1998, by refusing to wear helmets. However, if, as the sentence at issue in Exhibit 17 states, Sikh women had indeed

been exempted from the helmet law as of January 5, 1998,

there would have been no reason for the Sikh women to protest that law more than six months later, in July 1998.

4976 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
For the above reasons, we conclude that Chawla’s inability

to explain the single, contradicted sentence in Exhibit 17 does

not support the adverse credibility finding.

C. Failure to Provide Corroborating Evidence 

Regarding Suspension from Employment, and

“Inconsistent” Evidence Regarding End of

Employment

At the first merits hearing, Chawla testified that on March

27, 1998, he was suspended from his job at the Hotel Kanishka because his employer considered the seven days during

which he was detained after the March 15, 1998, rally to be

leave without permission. Chawla testified that he was given

a written letter of suspension, and the IJ stated that he would

like to see that letter. Chawla informed the IJ that he did not

have the letter with him, but that he would check his files or

ask his father “if it [was] still available.” Chawla then testified

that he had never been formally terminated from his job at the

Hotel Kanishka because “[t]hat takes time for the inquiries

and everything, I came here in August.”

At the second merits hearing, Chawla submitted Exhibit 12,

which is titled, “Termination Order,” and is dated June 7,

1999. The Termination Order is from the Hotel Kanishka and

reads, in part,

This is in reference to the Show Cause Notice

referred to above sent to you . . . in respect of the

charges contained in the charge sheet . . . dated

27.10.1998. . . . Since the charges levelled [sic] and

proved against you in the enquiry are grave and serious in nature, you are hereby awarded the punishment of TERMINATION OF SERVICES with

immediate effect.

The IJ asked Chawla where the suspension letter was, and

Chawla replied, “It’s in De[lh]i in India. I didn’t know that I

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4977
have to bring so many papers, bring them across with me.”

Chawla informed the IJ that he had not been aware of the Termination Order until his father sent it to him after he asked his

father to send documents regarding the end of his employment at the Hotel Kanishka.

At the third merits hearing, Chawla testified that his father

could not find the original suspension letter and that his father

tried to get a copy of the suspension letter but was unable to

do so because all of the hotels under the India Tourism Development Corporation (“ITDC”), including the Hotel Kanishka,

had been closed.

The IJ questioned Chawla’s credibility, concluding that the

Termination Order did not relate to the suspension letter. The

IJ reasoned that, because the Termination Order indicated that

the charges leveled against Chawla were “grave and serious”

in nature, the Termination Order must relate “to some other

charges far more serious than leave without permission.” 

[7] The IJ’s conclusion that the charges referred to in the

Termination Order must be “far more serious than leave without permission” was based on speculation and conjecture.

Chawla testified that, to his knowledge, no formal criminal or

civil charges had ever been filed against him in India, and

there is no evidence demonstrating that Chawla was ever

accused or convicted of any crime or civil charge more serious than being absent from work without permission.

Although the Termination Order refers to charges that are

“grave and serious in nature,” it provides no further explanation or hint as to what those charges could be. Any speculation as to what charges the Termination Order refers to is just

that—pure speculation. Such speculation cannot be used to

support the adverse credibility finding. See Shah v. INS, 220

F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We cannot uphold an

adverse credibility finding that rests on conjecture and speculation.” (citation omitted)).

4978 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
The IJ also did not believe Chawla’s testimony that his

father was unable to obtain the charge sheet referred to in the

Termination Order because all the hotels operated under the

ITDC were closed. The IJ stated that “[t]his court does not

accept that testimony as credible, but will demand corroboration that such is the case.”

An IJ can demand corroborating evidence when he “has

reason to question the applicant’s credibility,” and when the

evidence requested is “non-duplicative, material, [and] easily

available.” Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000);

see also Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1200-01 (9th Cir.

2004) (holding that corroborative evidence of job termination

was not “easily available” because the certificate of dismissal

was in China). Here, however, the charge sheet was not easily

available to Chawla because it was in India and under the

control of a third party, the ITDC. Further, because the charge

sheet was not easily available, Chawla’s failure to provide

that corroborating evidence does not support the adverse credibility finding. See Sidhu, 220 F.3d at 1092; Guo, 361 F.3d at

1201.

Adding to the IJ’s reasoning, the BIA articulated four additional reasons for finding Chawla not credible based on the

above evidence. First, the BIA found that the Termination

Order did “not comport with [Chawla’s] earlier testimony

regarding the suspension,” and that Chawla “specifically

stated that he was not terminated from his employment.” We

disagree with the BIA because our review of the evidence

demonstrates no inconsistency between Chawla’s testimony

and the Termination Order. Specifically, Chawla’s testimony

that he had never formally been terminated from the Hotel

Kanishka took place at his first merits hearing, before Chawla

was informed by his father that a formal Termination Order

had arrived at his father’s house in India. At the second merits

hearing, Chawla explained, “I didn’t even know that letter had

arrived. . . . [My father] said there was a termination order or

letter of that effect and I asked him to send it to me conseCHAWLA v. HOLDER 4979
quently.” That Chawla was unaware of the existence of the

Termination Order at the first merits hearing is further supported by the fact that Chawla arrived in the United States on

August 11, 1998, nearly ten months before the Termination

Order was issued on June 7, 1999.

Second, the BIA concluded that the Termination Order was

“poorly drafted and formatted,” which undermined its reliability. Again, we disagree. Looking at the Termination Order,

we fail to see how the BIA concluded that it was “poorly

drafted and formatted,” and the BIA offered no specific or

cogent reason supporting its conclusion. Moreover, even if the

Termination Order were “poorly drafted and formatted,” such

a conclusion does not bear a substantial and legitimate nexus

to the adverse credibility finding. To the contrary, if the Termination Order was not reliable, then the nexus relied on by

the IJ—that the charges in the Termination Order relate “to

some other charges far more serious than leave without

permission”—would be further undermined. Thus, the BIA’s

conclusion that the Termination Order was “poorly drafted

and formatted” does not support the adverse credibility finding. See Gui, 280 F.3d at 1225 (“The IJ must have a legitimate articulable basis to question the petitioner’s credibility,

and must offer a specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief. Any such reason must be substantial and bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)).

Third, the BIA questioned “why [Chawla] chose not to

challenge his suspension in light of the fact that he acknowledged it was basically due to a personal dispute with his manager, that he had been employed by the company since 1977,

and was the General Secretary of the union.” The BIA’s disbelief of Chawla’s decision not to challenge his suspension

from work was based on speculation and conjecture about

what someone in Chawla’s position would or would not do;

thus, it does not support the adverse credibility finding. See

Shah, 220 F.3d at 1071 (“We cannot uphold an adverse credi4980 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
bility finding that rests on conjecture and speculation.” (citation omitted)); see also Zhou v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 860, 865

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an IJ’s disbelief of an applicant’s

testimony did not support an adverse credibility finding

because the IJ’s disbelief was “based on speculation and conjecture about Zhou’s position in Chinese society and what

someone in that position would or would not do”).

Fourth, the BIA found that Chawla’s “account also conflicts with an affidavit submitted by his neighbor in India, that

states that [Chawla] quit his job.” Again, we disagree because,

contrary to the BIA’s assertion, the neighbor’s affidavit is not

inconsistent with Chawla’s testimony.4 The neighbor’s affidavit begins by stating that Chawla “was forced to leave his

job,” which is consistent with Chawla’s testimony that he was

suspended from work. The later statement in the affidavit that

Chawla “quit” his job was made in reference to the fact that,

in order to keep his job, Chawla would have to compromise

his religion by cutting his hair and beard, and Chawla was not

willing to do so. This statement in the affidavit is consistent

with Chawla’s testimony that the general manager of the

Hotel Kanishka told Chawla that he would give Chawla his

job back if Chawla cut his hair and trimmed his beard, but

that Chawla was not willing to do so. 

[8] Finally, we note that Chawla did not claim that being

suspended or terminated from his employment at the Hotel

Kanishka was an act of persecution. Thus, even if there were

a minor inconsistency between Chawla’s testimony and the

4The affidavit states, in relevant part, 

Satpal Singh’s trouble was further compounded because he was

forced to leave his job at a prestigious Delhi Hotel. Satpal Singh

told me that his boss was prejudiced against Sikhs and wanted

him to cut his hair and shave his beard in order to continue working at the hotel. The growing of a beard and long hair is a

requirement of Sikhism and Satpal Singh told me that he was not

willing to compromise his religion for the sake of his job so he

quit the hotel. 

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4981
exhibits he submitted, such an inconsistency would not go to

the heart of Chawla’s claims of persecution and, thus, would

not support the adverse credibility finding. See Mendoza

Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Minor inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the

basis of an applicant’s alleged fear of persecution, go to the

heart of the asylum claim, or reveal anything about an asylum

applicant’s fear for his safety are insufficient to support an

adverse credibility finding.” (citation omitted)).

D. Failure to Provide “Strong” Corroborating Evidence

of Bus Explosion and Subsequent Arrest and

Mistreatment 

Chawla testified that following the May 15, 1998, explosion on the bus he was driving, the police arrested him,

detained him, beat him, and broke his right wrist. Chawla

went to a chiropractor in the United States who told him that

“all of the bones [in his right wrist] are jammed, not fixed

properly.” Chawla testified that no media reports related to

the bus explosion exist and, therefore, he was unable to locate

any such reports. He explained to the IJ, “It was a minor incident, these kind[s] of minor accidents go unreported, they are

too small.” When the IJ questioned Chawla about characterizing the incident as “minor,” Chawla replied, “They knew it

was not a bomb. The police got to it, it was not a bomb.”

Chawla testified that the police did not issue an accident

report, but that the police did take written notes from witness

interviews. Later during the hearing, the IJ stated, “you see

the police might have thought it was a bomb which is all the

more reason why I would have expected there to have been

a report of what happened and an investigation to find out

why it happened.” Chawla reiterated his earlier testimony that

the police did investigate, but that there was no report. At the

end of Chawla’s second merits hearing, the IJ acknowledged

that Chawla is “absolutely convinced there is [no accident

report] so I won’t pursue that. I can’t imagine it but stranger

things have happened. I’m not disputing it.”

4982 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
Additionally, Chawla testified that he did not file an insurance claim or report for the damage done to the bus by the

explosion because he was able to fix the damage—which consisted of broken windows—himself and making an insurance

claim is an extremely lengthy procedure that wastes a lot of

time.

Finally, Chawla submitted a letter from Professional Chiropractic Care, located in Sacramento, California; notes from an

Indian doctor; and notes from an Indian hospital. The letter

from Professional Chiropractic Care, dated March 6, 2000,

states, in relevant part: “Mr. Satpal Chawla . . . . has right

wrist pain from injury in India approximately May 1998. The

injury left him with two fractured bones in the wrist.” The

Indian doctor’s notes, dated May 25, 1998, contain Chawla’s

name at the top and refer to a right wrist. The Indian hospital

notes, also dated May 25, 1998, contain Chawla’s name at the

top and refer to an x-ray for a right wrist.

In finding Chawla not credible, the IJ acknowledged that

Chawla provided evidence that he suffered a fractured wrist,

but then noted, “but the question persists as to the circumstances under which [Chawla] might have sustained the

injury, since that is not confirmed in terms of the medical

record.” Similarly, the BIA questioned Chawla’s credibility in

regard to the bus explosion because Chawla “did not provide

any strong corroborating evidence to verify that it occurred

and resulted in his arrest and mistreatment.” 

[9] The IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion that media or police

reports of the explosion exist was based on impermissible

speculation and conjecture. Chawla repeatedly testified that

no such reports exist, or, if they did, that he was unable to

locate such reports, and neither the IJ nor the BIA point to any

evidence in the record that indicates that such reports do exist.

Accordingly, Chawla’s failure to provide corroborating media

or police reports does not support the adverse credibility finding. See Shah, 220 F.3d at 1071 (“We cannot uphold an

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4983
adverse credibility finding that rests on conjecture and speculation.” (citation omitted)). 

Moreover, to the extent the IJ and BIA faulted Chawla for

not providing a corroborating police report, we find that such

a report, if it does exist, would not be easily available to

Chawla because obtaining such a report would require

Chawla’s persecutors to comply with his request for evidence.

Accordingly, Chawla’s failure to provide a corroborating

police report does not support the adverse credibility finding.

See Sidhu, 220 F.3d at 1092 (holding that an IJ can, in certain

circumstances, demand corroborating evidence when that evidence is “non-duplicative, material, [and] easily available”).

[10] Finally, we hold that the BIA improperly questioned

Chawla’s credibility based on Chawla’s failure to provide

“strong” corroborating evidence of the bus explosion and his

subsequent arrest and mistreatment. Likewise, the IJ improperly required Chawla to submit medical records that conclusively establish that Chawla’s injury resulted from police

mistreatment. When appropriate, our case law provides that

an IJ or the BIA can require corroborating evidence. However, our case law does not require that such evidence be

“strong” or “conclusive.” See, e.g., id.

E. “Implausible” Explanation of How Chawla Received

Visa to Enter the United States

Chawla testified that he and his family physically went to

the U.S. Consulate in New Delhi in order to obtain visas to

enter the United States. When asked what he told the officer

as a basis for his visa to the United States, Chawla testified,

“Just to visit.” Chawla further testified that, at the time the

visas were issued, he did not have intentions of permanently

residing in the United States. The IJ then asked Chawla,

“What were you thinking?” and Chawla replied, “I was very

afraid at that time. The only intention was to get away from

there. . . . I thought maybe if I’m able to come here I might

4984 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
be able to save myself.” Chawla then reiterated that he did not

come to the United States with the intention of seeking asylum, and that he “thought that when the conditions improve

in India, [he] would return back.”

The IJ characterized Chawla’s testimony as follows:

During the [hearing, Chawla] was questioned with

regard to the circumstances under which he applied

for and received the visas and he indicated that he

wished to visit the United States to “save himself”

and that he would return to India when “conditions

changed.” This Court finds any such conversation

with the United States Consulate at the Embassy in

New De[lh]i inherently unworthy of belief if it

resulted in the issuance of a non-immigrant visitors

visa.

[11] The IJ’s characterization of Chawla’s testimony is

inaccurate. Specifically, Chawla did not testify that he

received a visa as a result of telling the officer at the U.S.

Consulate that he wished to visit the United States in order to

“save himself.” To the contrary, Chawla testified that he told

the officer that he wanted a visa so that he could “visit” the

United States. Chawla’s testimony regarding “saving himself”

was in response to the IJ’s question of what Chawla was

thinking at the time; there is no evidence that Chawla shared

that thought aloud with the officer.

[12] Because the IJ’s skepticism as to the plausibility of

Chawla’s testimony was based on a mischaracterization of

that testimony, such skepticism did not provide a proper basis

for upholding the adverse credibility finding. See Singh v.

Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The IJ’s

skepticism as to the plausibility of [an applicant’s] account

may be a proper basis for finding his testimony is inherently

unbelievable, if [the IJ’s] logical inferences are supported by

substantial evidence.” (citation omitted)).

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4985
F. Background Information Regarding Current

Treatment of Sikhs in New Delhi

At the final merits hearing, the government submitted the

“U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices — 2003” for India (“2003 Country Conditions

Report”). This report was the last exhibit admitted into evidence that provided statistics about the Sikh population in

India.

While discussing the grounds on which he was basing the

adverse credibility finding, the IJ stated,

In terms of the latest statistics, there is a sizeable

Sikh community currently residing outside of the

Punjab and in particular, in New De[lh]i. There is

nothing in this background information that suggests

that the Sikh community in New De[lh]i is suffering

persecution at this particular time on account of any

one or more of the five factors for consideration. 

[13] The IJ and BIA erred to the extent they based the

adverse credibility finding on the statistics contained in the

2003 Country Conditions Report because those statistics

reveal nothing about the circumstances or persecution of

Sikhs living in New Delhi in 1998, the year in which Chawla

claims he was persecuted. Gui, 280 F.3d at 1225 (holding that

a reason supporting an adverse credibility finding “must . . .

bear a legitimate nexus to the finding” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)).

G. Testimony that the Indian Police are Still Interested

in Chawla

Chawla testified that his father told him on several occasions that the Indian police had come looking for Chawla

since he departed for the United States. Chawla also submit4986 CHAWLA v. HOLDER
ted Exhibit 19, an affidavit from his father, which reads, in

relevant part,

[D]uring the previous days I have been threatened by

the Local Police, who always forced me to call you

son/children from USA. [O]n [February 23, 2004,]

the local police also threate[ne]d . . . me and also

harrassed [sic] me for calling my children from USA

which is not easy presently, and when I argued with

them they pressurised [sic] me very badly. 

The IJ concluded that, unless there were facts that Chawla

withheld from the court as to precisely what his situation was

in India when he left, it was “inherently unworthy of belief”

that the local police would still be interested in Chawla after

almost six years simply because Chawla was communicating

with his father by phone from the United States.

[14] The IJ’s disbelief of Chawla’s testimony and his

father’s affidavit was based on speculation and conjecture

about the circumstances under which the local Indian police

would remain interested in Chawla, and that Chawla may be

withholding facts from the court. Such “conjecture and speculation cannot serve as a reason for an adverse credibility finding.” Shah, 220 F.3d at 1071 (citation omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

[15] Because each of the IJ’s and BIA’s proffered reasons

for the adverse credibility finding fail, we accept Chawla’s

testimony as credible. See Kaur, 379 F.3d at 890. This determination, however, is not the end of the matter, because the

BIA did not address (1) whether Chawla’s treatment in India

amounted to persecution, (2) whether his treatment was on

account of one of the grounds protected by our asylum law,

and (3) whether he has a well-founded fear of persecution

should he be returned. See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d

1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)

CHAWLA v. HOLDER 4987
(42)(A)). Thus, we remand to the BIA for further proceedings,

including a determination of his eligibility for withholding of

removal or CAT relief.

Petition GRANTED.

4988 CHAWLA v. HOLDER