UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

______________________________________________ MICHAEL S. OAKEY, P laintif f,
v. 1:03-CV -2373 (F JS) US AIRWAYS P ILOT S DISABI LITY INCOME P LAN, Defendan t. 1

______________________________________________ AP P EARANCES OF COUNSEL MILLER & CHEVALIER, CHARTERED ANTHONY F . SHE LLE Y, ESQ. 655 15th Street NW TIMOTHY O' TOOL E, ES Q. Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005-5701 Attorney s for Plaintiff LATHAM & WATK

INS, LL P EVERETT C. JOHNSON, JR., ES Q. 555 11th Street NW G. A NDREW LUNDBERG , ESQ . Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20004-1300 Attorney s for De fenda

nt O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP MARK W. ROBERTS ON, ESQ . Times Square Tow er 7 Times Square New Y ork, Ne w York 10036 Attorney s for De fenda

nt SCULLIN, S enior Judge

Although the actua l caption of this action is Boivin v. US Airways, Inc

. , beca use the only 1 Plaintiff remainingis Michael Oakey and the only

rema ining De fenda

nt is US Airway s Pil ots Disability Income Plan, the Court has use d the names of these pa rties in the ca

ption.MEMORAN DUM- DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Currently befor e the Court is Def

endant' s motion t o dismiss for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction. SeeDkt. No. 95. The Court he ard or al ar g ument in support of, and in opposition to, this mot ion on March 13, 2012. A t the conclusion of the a rgument, the Court orally g rante d Def endant' s motion and advised counse l that it would is sue a written dec ision setting forth the
rea sons for its determination.

II. BACKG ROUND Whil e Plaintiff was a

n active e mploy ee of

US Airway s, as a pilot, he bec ame disable d due to suffe ringleukemia. SeeDkt. No. 90, Second Ame nded Complaint, at ¶ 14. The Pilot Retirement B oard of

US Airway s, a body

associate d with the 1975 Disability Plan, approve d Plaintiff's a

pplication for disability

benef its effe ctive January

30, 2002. See id. at ¶ 15 & Ex hibit "2" attache d there to. On J anuar y 9, 2003, US Airway s notified Plaintiff that he would be furloug hed as of

Fe bruar y 4, 2003. See id. at ¶ 17 & Ex hibit "4" attache d there to. On Marc h 11, 2003, I NG, the third-pa

rty claims administrator of the 1975 Disability Plan, sent Plainti ff a

letter notifying him of the termination of his disability benef its. See id. at ¶ 18 & Ex hibit "5" attache d there to. On August 1, 2003, Pl aintiff re tired fr om US Airway s. See id. at ¶ 30. At the time he retire d, Plaintiff had not attained nor mal retire ment ag e but had to take a re duced r etireme nt benef it under an e arly

retire ment option to ensure some income afte r his disability benef its were terminated a

nd to preser

ve his hea lth benefits. See id. In his second ame nded complaint, which c ontains only one ca use of a ction, Plaintiff
-2-states that he " bring s this action to recove r bene fits due to him under the ter ms of a disability plan g overne d by

the Employ ee Re tirement Income Sec urity Act of 1974 . . . a

nd for other equitable r elief ne cessa

ry to remedy

the plan' s illega l and wrong ful ac tions." See id. at " first unnumbere d para g raph." He f urther sta tes that " the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to sec tion 502(e)( 1) of ERI SA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) ." See id. at ¶ 3.

III. DISCUSS ION To resolve this mot ion, the Court must address two issues: (1) whe ther Plaintiff' s claim is subject to the Railway

L abor A ct (" RL A" ) and ( 2), if so, whe ther his claim constitutes a major or minor dispute under the RLA. The RLA establishes mandatory proce dures f

or re solving disputes within its covera g e. In 1936, Congr ess extended the RLA to air c arr iers, see45 U.S.C. § 184, and require d those "c arr iers and the ir employ ees, a ctingthroug h their re prese ntatives, to establish sy stem boards of adjustment" to re solve disputes betwee n air c arr iers and the ir employees " over the interpre tation and application of the parties' collective ba rg ainingag ree ment[s] ." Bonin v. Am. Airlines, Inc

. , 621 F.2d 635, 637- 38 (5th Cir. 1980) (c itation and footnote omitted). " These sy stem boards of adjustment are the ' mandatory , exclusive, and compre hensive sy stem for re solving g rieva nce disputes.'" Id. at 638 (quotation omitted). In 1974, Congr ess ena cted the E mploy ee Re tirement Income Sec urity Act (" ERI SA") to addre ss the explos ion of employ ee pe nsion plans. Despite its express provision allowing plaintiffs to bringsuits over the cove rag e and a pplication of pension plans in fe dera l court, "E RI SA was not intended to, nor did it, pree mpt the mandatory arbitration provisions of the
-3-Railway L abor A ct." Id. (citation omitted). This conclusion finds support in the express statutory provision that ERI SA should not be construed " to alter, amend, modify , invalidate, impair, or super sede a

ny law of the United States (except as pr ovided in sections 1031 and 1137(b) of

this ti tle) or a

ny rule or r egulation issued under a ny such law." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). "T he RLA' s mandatory

arbitration procedur es apply only to issues arising out of the interpre tation of the collec tive barg ainingag ree ment and not to independe nt statutory claims under ERI SA." Eve rett v. USAir Group, Inc

. , 927 F. Supp. 478, 482 (D.D .C. 1991) (citations omitted). "Contra ctual ' doubts about the arbitra bility of issues[, however] should be re solved in favor of cove rag e.' " Id. (quotation omitted). Finally , if the cour t determines that a

dispute is mandatorily

arbitra ble under the RL A, it lacks jurisdiction to consider it. See id. In this case, Plaintiff ar gues that his claim is not subject to the RL A bec ause the Court's resolution of his claim does not re quire the Court to interpr et the 1975 Disability Plan but rather require s the Court simply to determine whether

the 1975 Disability

Plan or the 1997 Restatement, which Plaintiff c hara cter izes as Defe ndant' s unilateral a ttempt to modi fy

the 1975 Disability Plan, applies to his claim. Furthe rmore, Plaintiff c oncede s that, if the Court finds that the 1997 Restatement a

pplies to his claim, he is not entitl ed to bene fits; however , he asse rts that, if the Court deter

mines that the 1975 Disability Plan applies to his claim, he is entitled to benef its. To support his positi on, Plaintiff relies, in par t, on Sturge v. Northwest Airli nes, Inc

. , 658 F.3d 832, 836 ( 8th Cir. 2011). In Sturge , the plaintiff conc eded that a terminate d pilot was not entitled to benef

its and that his termination for a violation of his employ er' s drugpolicy was proper under the collective ba

rg ainingag ree ment. He c laimed, howeve r, that his employ er ha d

-4-acte d with an improper pur pose – to reta liate ag ainst him for claimingERI SA-protec ted bene fits or to interfe re w ith his receipt of those be nefits. In assessingthe plaintiff' s claim, the cour t in Sturge noted that cour ts could "' resolve questions of fede ral or state law involvinglabor c laims,'" but "' only if the issues d[id] not require the cour t to construe the c ollective bar g ainingag ree ment.' " Id. at 836 (quotation omitted). Fur thermore , the Sturge court stated that courts could " resolve issues tha t require [d] mere ref ere nce to a

collective ba

rg ainingag ree ment." Id. (citations omitted). Fina lly , the cour t explained that "the RLA d[id] not deprive c ourts of jurisdiction to decide ' "pur ely fac tual questions" a

bout an employ ee' s conduct or a n employ er' s conduct a

nd motives' that 'd[id] not "r equir[e] a court to interpre t any term of the c ollective-ba rg ainingag ree ment."' " Id. at 837 (quotation omitted). Applying the se leg al principles to the f acts be fore it, the Sturge court conclude d that the plaintiff' s claim was a n independe nt claim under ERI SA beca use the c ourt only had to re solve a pure ly

fac tual question about the employ er' s motives. Sturge is easily

distinguishable f

rom this case. A lthough Plaintiff ar g ues that he is
asser ting a n independe nt ERI SA claim beca use the Court does not have to interpret the 1975 Disability Plan to resolve his claim but only has to deter

mine a fa ctual issue, i.e., whe ther the 1975 Disability

Plan or the 1997 Restateme nt applies to his claim, the Court disag ree s. Unlike the plaintiff in Sturge , Plaintiff is not challeng ing D efe ndant' s motive for deny ing him disability benef its. Rather, he is claimingthat Def endant wr ong fully

terminated his disability

benef its to which he c laims he is entitled under the 1975 D isability Plan. Thus, unlike the claim at issue in Sturge , Plaintiff's c laim require s the Court to interpret the 1975 Plan, a s well as past pra ctices under that Plan, and other doc uments ref err ing to those pr actice s and interpr etingthat Plan,
-5-including the 1997 Restatement, to the extent it is rele vant, to deter mine whether , under the 1975 Disability Plan, Plainti ff is entitled to the bene fits he see ks. Acc ording ly , for a ll these rea sons, the Court conclude s that Plainti ff' s claim is subject to the RL A. This conclusion, howeve r, does not end the Court's inquiry . The Court may still exercise subject matter jur isdiction over an RLA claim if that c laim constitutes a "ma jor" dispute within the meaningof the RLA. 2 Under the RL A, major disputes re late to disputes over the f

ormation of collec tive ag ree ments or ef forts to secur e them. The y

arise where there is no such ag ree ment or wher e it is sought to cha

ng e the ter

ms of one, and the ref

ore the issue is not whether a

n exis ting a g ree ment controls the controve rsy . They

look to the acquisition of rig hts for the futur e, not to assertion of rig hts claimed to have vested in the pa st. Elgin, Joliet &E. Ry. Co. v. Burle y , 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). Minor disputes, however , contemplate

the exist ence of a c ollective agree ment alre ady conclude d or, at a

ny rate , a situation in which no eff ort is made to bringabout a f ormal chang e in terms or to c reate a ne w one. The dispute relate s either to the meaningor prope r application of a par ticular provision with ref ere nce to a

specific situation or to an omitted case. . . . [T]he claim is to rights a ccr

ued, not mere ly

to have ne w ones c reated for the future
. Id. The distinction betwee n major and minor disputes re sts on the determination of " whether

Under the RL A, whethe r a dispute is major or minor, the parties ha

ve a duty to 2 neg otiate. See45 U.S.C. § 152; W ien Air Alaska, Inc . v. Bac hner , 865 F.2d 1106, 1109 ( 9th Cir. 1989) (c itation omit ted). I f the pa rties fa il to resolve the dispute throug h neg otiations, the RL A provides diffe rent proc edure s on how the par ties will procee d to resolve their dispute depending on whether

it is classified as major or minor. See id.

-6-a cla im has been ma de that the ter ms of an existi ngag ree ment either e stablish or ref ute the prese nce of

a rig ht to take the disputed ac tion." Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Exe cs.' Ass' n , 491 U.S. 299, 305 (1989). Thus, if the c ourt ca n conclusively

resolve the claim by

interpre ting the exist ing c ontrac t, the dispute is minor. See id. (citation omitted). In other wor ds, "[w]here a n employ er a sserts a c ontrac tual rig ht to take the conte sted ac tion, the ensuing dispute is minor if the ac tion is arg uably

justified by

the terms of the parties' collective- barg ainingag ree ment. Where, in contra st, the employ er' s claims are frivolous or obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major." Id. at 307. Plaintiff asserts that, if the Court finds that his claim is subject to the RLA, the Court should conclude that it constit utes a major dispute be cause the par ties disag ree about whethe r the 1975 Disability

Plan or the 1997 Restateme nt applies to his claim. Specifica lly , he cla ims that, when his disability

benef its were te rminated be cause he wa s furloughed, the only explanation he
rec eived f rom Def endant to support the ter

mination of his benefits was a one pag e docume nt, the 1997 Restatement, pursua nt to which Plaintiff claims Defe ndant unilatera lly attempted to cha

ng e the terms of the 1975 Disability Plan reg ardingwhether

furloug hed pilots were entitled to disability benef its. Def endant, on the othe r hand, c ontends that the 1997 Restateme nt did not chang e the terms of the 1975 D isability Plan; rather, it mer ely

codified pa st practice s under the 1975 Disability Plan. To support this contention, Defe ndant points to the minut es of the Ma y 15, 1991 USAir Pilot s Retirement B oard me etingand L etter of Ag ree ment (" L OA" ) 84, which D efe ndant contends de monstrate that the pa st practice under the 1975 Disability Plan was not to provide disability benef its to furloughe d pilots.
-7-There are sever al problems with Plaintiff' s argument that his claim constitutes a major

dispute under the RLA. Fir st, Pl aintiff' s claim rela tes to the application of a par ticular provision of the 1975 Disability

Plan to his specific situation. As such, his claim is a " g arde n varie ty disag ree ment[] over the interpre tation of an e x isting collec tive ag ree ment." Vollmer v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 705 F. Supp. 1154, 1165 (E.D. V a. 1989) ( citation omitted). Furthe rmore, " [e] ven if this classification of plaintiff[' s] claim[ ] i s in doubt 'c ourts construe [such] disputes as minor.'" Id. (quotation and footnote omitted). Second, " [u] nder the RL A, the union . . . exclusively controls the prose cution of major disputes. Id. at 1164 (footnote omitted); see also W ien Air Alaska, Inc . v. Bac hner , 865 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1989) (holdingthat, "[b]ecause a major dispute will af fec t the future of

the unit's e ntire constituency , its resolution li es exclusively within the authority

of the e mploy ees' collective ba

rg ainingrepr esenta

tive" ( citations omitt ed)) . There fore , if this were a major dispute, Plaintiff's union would be the prope r plaintiff to sue De fenda nt, not Pl aintiff individually . Third, unlike Plaintiff's c laim which see ks to enforc e rig hts that have pre viously vested, major disputes "look to the a cquisition of rig hts for the futur e, not to asser tion of rig hts claimed to have vested in the past." Burley , 325 U.S. at 723. Finally , under the RL A, " [t ]here is a strongpresumption 3 in favor of

finding a dispute to be minor." Id. (citation omitted). In this case, a lthough De fenda nt acknowle dg es that the 1975 Disability Plan does not expli citly state that fur loughe d pilots are not entitled to disability benef its, itrelies on pa st
Even if the Court we re to find that Plaintiff' s claim constituted a major dispute unde r the 3 RL A, the Court could not g rant Plaintiff the re lief he se eks. Rather , "[i]f the dispute is 'major,' the cour t may issue an injunction to preser ve the status quo while the pa rties under g o a mandatory

period of ba

rg ainingand mediation." United Transp. Union v. Nat' l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 966 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D .C. 1997) (citations omitted). -8-prac tices under that Plan, prac tices, which D efe ndant ar gues, ar e conf irmed in the May

15, 1991 minutes of the quar

terly meetingof the USAir Pilot Retirement Boa rd: " The Company ' s policy is that disability

pay ments and disability

status will cease upon furloug h" a nd the express languag e of L OA 84, which Plaintiff' s union signed, c onfirmingthat furloug hed pilots are not e ligible f or disability benef its. "[I ]tis well established that the pa rties' ' prac tice, usag e and c ustom' is of sig nificanc e in interpre ting their

agree ment." Consol. Rail Corp. , 491 U.S. at 311 (quotation omitted). Fur thermore , "[w]here a

n employ er a sserts a c ontrac tual rig ht to take the conte sted ac tion, the ensuingdispute is minor if the action is arg uably justified by

the terms of the collectivebarg ainingag ree ment." Id. at 307. Althoug h in determiningwhether a dispute is minor under the RL A, the cour

t's " view of the merits" of Def endant' s justification is irrelevant, Air Line Pilot s Ass'n, Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. , 869 F.2d 1518, 1521 ( D.C. Cir. 1989), it may take a "pe ek" at Def endant' s contrac tual justification "to dete rmine whe ther the issue is ar g uably one of contra ct interpre tation." Id. at 1522. Moreove r, " ' [w] here the par ties disag ree over whether the dispute can be resolved by ref ere nce to a

n ag ree ment the dispute is minor unless the claims of contra ctual justification ar e " frivolous" or " obviously insubstantial."' " Id. (quotation and other citation omitted). Ba sed on all the e vidence in the rec ord, the Court conc ludes that Def endant ha s asserte d
an ar g uably

justifiable rea son for ter

minating Plaintiff' s disability benef its under the 1975 Disability Plan, taking the expli cit terms of that Plan, as we ll as past prac tices under that Plan, into consideration. The ref ore, the Court concludes that Plainti ff' s claim constitutes a minor dispute under the RLA, over which the Court does not have subjec t matter jurisdiction.

-9-IV. CONCLUSION After revie wingthe entire file in this matter, the par ties' submissi ons and ora l arguments, and the a pplicable law , as we ll as for the a bove-state d rea sons and the re asons that the Court expressed at ora l argument, the Court here by ORDERS that Def

endant' s motion t o dismiss for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction is GR ANTED ; and the Court furthe r ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: Marc h 19, 2012 Sy rac use, Ne w York

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