[Cite as State v. Barnthouse, 2019-Ohio-5209.] 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

CHADWICK BARNTHOUSE, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-180286 

TRIAL NO. B-1705430 

 O P I N I O N.

 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 18, 2019 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Springman, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Joshua A. Thompson,

Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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BERGERON, Judge. 

{¶1} Looking to replace several windows in their home, Donald and Rita 

Stopler, via a chain of referrals, contacted defendant-appellant Chadwick Barnthouse 

in November 2014. He provided the Stoplers with a favorable estimate, which 

convinced them to enter into a contract with him for the job, and consistent with 

their agreement, the Stoplers handed him a check for several thousand dollars. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Barnthouse never performed his end of the bargain, nor did he 

return all of the money. Eventually convicted for theft, Mr. Barnthouse now appeals, 

challenging his conviction on weight and sufficiency grounds. Our review of the 

record, however, convinces us that the jury had before it sufficient and credible 

evidence upon which to convict him. We accordingly affirm his conviction. 

I. 

{¶2} After receiving an outreach from Mrs. Stopler, Mr. Barnthouse visited 

the Stopler residence, inspected the windows, and provided the Stoplers with an 

estimate of $7,200 for the total cost of the window replacement (i.e., parts and 

labor). Encouraged because Mr. Barnthouse’s estimate fell below other estimates 

that they had received, the Stoplers entered into a written contract with him for the 

work, signed by both Mr. Barnthouse and Mrs. Stopler. Though Mr. Stopler did not 

sign the contract, both Mr. and Mrs. Stopler testified that he was present when the 

contracting occurred. 

{¶3} The contract called for Mr. Barnthouse to remove seven windows and 

to install new windows in their place. The total price was $7,267, of which the 

Stoplers paid $6,200 upfront to Mr. Barnthouse in the form of a personal check from 

their joint-checking account. After about six weeks, with no windows materializing, 

Mrs. Stopler contacted Mr. Barnthouse, who claimed that the windows were 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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delivered, but in the wrong size. After another six weeks elapsed, Mr. Barnthouse 

reported that the windows were again delivered in the wrong size. Eventually, the 

Stoplers grew suspicious with Mr. Barnthouse’s evasiveness and the lack of any new 

windows. After giving him several opportunities to perform under the contract, they 

turned the matter over to the authorities. 

{¶4} Mr. Barnthouse ultimately returned $1,000 to the Stoplers, but never 

repaid the balance nor did he perform any of the work required under the contract. 

A warrant for his arrest was issued in spring of 2015, but authorities did not 

apprehend him until 2017. After his arrest, Mr. Barnthouse was indicted and tried 

before a jury for the theft of the $5,200 still owed to the Stoplers. A jury ultimately 

found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to a year in prison (for which he 

was credited 267 days) and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $5,200. 

{¶5} Mr. Barnthouse now appeals his conviction and raises a single 

assignment of error challenging both the weight and sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction. 

II. 

{¶6} In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must ask, 

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, whether a 

rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Brooks, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-000763, 2001 WL 

1590643, *2 (Dec. 14, 2001). Evaluation of a challenge to the manifest weight of the 

evidence requires that the appellate court review the entire record, weigh the 

evidence and reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and 

determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost 

its way, resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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A. 

{¶7} Initially, Mr. Barnthouse challenges the evidence underlying the 

elevation of the offense pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(B)(3) to a theft involving a person 

in a protected class. R.C. 2913.02(B)(3) provides that: 

if the victim of the offense is an elderly person * * * a violation of [R.C. 

2913.02] is theft from a person in a protected class, and division (B)(3) 

of this section applies. * * * If the value of the property or services 

stolen is one thousand dollars or more and is less than seven thousand 

five hundred dollars, theft from a person in a protected class is a felony 

of the fourth degree. 

R.C. 2913.01(CC) defines an “elderly person” as “a person who is sixty-five years of 

age or older.” In this case, Mr. Stopler was 65 or older, whereas Mrs. Stopler was 

not, and that distinction draws most of Mr. Barnthouse’s attention on appeal. 

{¶8} Based on the ramifications under R.C. 2913.02(B)(3), Mr. Barnthouse 

insists that if he stole from anyone, it was Mrs. Stopler rather than her husband, and 

thus the elevation of the crime to a fourth-degree felony pursuant to R.C. 

2913.02(B)(3) should not have occurred. Mr. Barnthouse emphasizes the lack of 

proof that Mr. Stopler qualified as the “owner” of the funds in the joint-checking 

account or that he contributed financially to the funds from the joint-checking 

account. This formalistic argument posited by Mr. Barnthouse, however, places too 

high a standard on the requisite proof of ownership for purposes of the elevation of a 

conviction under R.C. 2913.02. Indeed, he seems to demand some type of auditing 

precision that would need to trace each dollar handed to him to an income source 

originating with Mr. Stopler. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶9} The theft statute, R.C. 2913.02(A), however, is not so draconian. It 

provides that “[n]o person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or 

services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services * 

* * (3) [b]y deception[.]” R.C. 2913.01(D) defines an “owner” as “any person, other 

than the actor, who is the owner of, who has possession or control of, or who has any 

license or interest in property or services[.]” The standard for proving ownership 

under R.C. 2913.02 requires showing that the defendant deprived someone “ ‘of 

property who had “possession or control of, or any license or any interest in” that 

property.’ ” State v. Grayson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2006-L-153, 2007-Ohio-1772, ¶ 26, 

quoting State v. Rhodes, 2 Ohio St.3d 74, 76, 442 N.E.2d 1299 (1982); State v. 

Miller, 2015-Ohio-644, 29 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 30 (3d Dist.) (same). Moreover, “[t]he 

important question is not whether the person from whom the property was stolen 

was the actual owner, but rather whether the defendant had any lawful right to 

possession.” Id.

{¶10} The undisputed evidence presented by the state at trial demonstrated 

that the money which Mr. Barnthouse received came from a joint-checking account 

held in both Mr. and Mrs. Stoplers’ names. Mr. Stopler testified that the account was 

a shared account and “State’s Exhibit 2” depicts an image of the check to Mr. 

Barnthouse which bears the names of both of the Stoplers. Mr. Stopler certainly had 

an interest in the joint-checking account and the lawful right to possess and spend 

those funds. 

{¶11} The jury accordingly had before it sufficient evidence that enabled it to 

conclude that the “victim,” Mr. Stopler, was an “owner” of the checking account and 

over the age of 65 at the time of the incident, thus satisfying the requisites of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(3) and (B)(3) for “theft from a person in a protected class.” See State v. 
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Flanagan, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017-CR-2423, 2019-Ohio-4665, ¶ 22 (account 

holder’s testimony and bank records sufficient to establish that joint-checking 

account holder was also “owner” on account); State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

92921, 2010-Ohio-902, ¶ 13 (state presented sufficient evidence from which a 

rational trier of fact could conclude that the victim was the “owner” of the stolen 

property, because evidence adduced proved that victim “possessed” the items). This 

evidence also disposes of Mr. Barnthouse’s weight challenge regarding the elevation 

to a fourth-degree felony—the jury had before it evidence of Mr. Stopler’s age, the 

joint-checking account, and the joint presence of the Stoplers when Mr. Barnthouse 

came and pitched them on his proposal. We see nothing to cast doubt on the jury’s 

findings or the trial court’s judgment. Thus the R.C. 2913.02(B)(3) finding was 

supported by both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. 

B. 

{¶12} Mr. Barnthouse also challenges the weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence demonstrating his intent to deceive. For matters involving theft “by 

deception,” a conviction under R.C. 2913.02(A)(3) requires the state to establish that 

the defendant engaged in a deceptive act to deprive the victim of possession of 

property or services. State v. Edmonson, 92 Ohio St.3d 393, 398, 750 N.E.2d 587 

(2001) (“The state must prove that the accused engaged in a deceptive act to deprive 

the owner of possession of property or services.”). R.C. 2913.01(A) defines deception 

as “knowingly deceiving another * * * by withholding information, by preventing 

another from acquiring information, or by any other conduct, act, or omission that 

creates * * * a false impression in another[.]” 

{¶13} In cases involving a contract for services, such as here, the state can 

prove a violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3) by demonstrating that at the time Mr. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Barnthouse “took the money he had no intent to repay the money or perform under 

the contract in exchange.” State v. Burton, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 15CAA100083, 

2016-Ohio-5380, ¶ 20; State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-11-275, 2005-

Ohio-6551, ¶ 9 (“[T]he state must demonstrate that at the time the defendant took 

the money, he had no intent to repay the money or perform under the contract in 

exchange.”). Generally, performance of a significant amount of such a contract tends 

to demonstrate intent to perform, while minimal work performed tends to show the 

opposite. Burton at ¶ 20; State v. Kerr, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-13-036, 2015-Ohio2228, ¶ 20 (“[P]erformance of a significant amount of the work under the contract 

demonstrates an intent to perform the contract[.]”). This is a fact-dependent inquiry 

that requires consideration of all of the evidence and context. 

{¶14} Here, both the Stoplers testified that Mr. Barnthouse never performed 

any work required under the contract. While they did acknowledge that he claimed 

to have ordered the windows, Mr. Barnthouse never presented evidence 

corroborating any such purchase. If Mr. Barnthouse actually ordered the windows 

and was hoodwinked by the manufacturer, that might help show that he actually 

intended to perform. See Kerr at ¶ 22 (“We conclude that appellant’s placing an 

order for the building * * * alone does not constitute significant performance of the 

contract[.]”). But such evidence is not before us—instead, we see a contractual 

promise with absolutely no performance. 

{¶15} Furthermore, although he returned $1,000 to the Stoplers, trial 

testimony indicates that he failed to repay the remaining $5,200 despite repeated 

promises to the Stoplers, and failed to contact the Stoplers for approximately two 

years thereafter. See State v. Lewis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21722, 2004-Ohio-1233, ¶ 

26 (defendant’s failure to return money or contact victims supported inference that 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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defendant took the victim’s money with no intent to perform consideration for the 

money and satisfied both the weight and sufficiency of the conviction). 

{¶16} While none of this is conclusive evidence of intent, it certainly 

provided the jury with circumstantial evidence that Mr. Barnthouse never intended 

to perform the contract or return the money. Circumstantial evidence is “ ‘proof of 

facts or circumstances by direct evidence from which [the factfinder] may reasonably 

infer other related or connected facts that naturally flow according to the common 

experience of people.’ ” State v. Shabazz, 145 Ohio St.3d 404, 2016-Ohio-1055, 57 

N.E.3d 1119, ¶ 18, quoting Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 409.01(4) (Rev. Aug. 

17, 2011). And when we delve into questions of intent, circumstantial evidence is 

often all that we have. State v. Adams, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180337, 2019-Ohio3597, ¶ 9 (“We typically consider circumstantial evidence surrounding these events 

to evaluate intent, absent a defendant’s admission.”). 

{¶17} Based on the evidence presented by the state, the jury could have 

reasonably concluded that Mr. Barnthouse did not intend to do the work or repay the 

remaining money to the Stoplers, and that he engaged in a deceptive act to deprive 

Mr. Stopler of the money, i.e., entering into the contract by which he promised to 

perform the work on the Stoplers’ home. See State v. Dalton, 11th Dist. Portage No. 

2008-P-0097, 2009-Ohio-3149, ¶ 32 (fact that defendant accepted payment, avoided 

contact with victim and performed minimally on the contract supported the 

inference that the defendant intended to deprive the victim of her money by 

deception). 

{¶18} As to the weight of the evidence, Mr. Barnthouse references various 

facts in the record which he essentially contends negate intent to deceive. Among 

these is (1) the fact he did not seek out the Stoplers, (2) entering the written contract, 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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(3) providing his legitimate contact information, (4) accepting payment via check, (5) 

returning calls, and (6) returning a portion of the money. Notwithstanding the 

foregoing points, however, there was ample, credible evidence provided via the 

Stoplers’ testimony to support the jury’s conclusion that Mr. Barnthouse intended to 

deceive and took the money by deception. The jury was free to credit the Stoplers’ 

testimony and other evidence as it saw fit and, as a reviewing court, we give 

substantial deference to that credibility assessment. See State v. Groesser, 5th Dist. 

Stark No. 2017CA00182, 2018-Ohio-2713, ¶ 48, 50-51 (noting that it is the 

providence of the trier of fact to choose between reasonable or conflicting views of 

the evidence, which the reviewing court may only disturb upon finding the trier of 

fact clearly lost its way); State v. Wells, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2008 CA 6, 2009-

Ohio-908, ¶ 51 (appellate court to give deference to credibility determinations of the 

trier of fact). 

{¶19} Nothing in the record before us indicates that, in resolving any 

conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way resulting in a manifest 

miscarriage of justice. Simply because the jury did not interpret or credit the 

evidence in the manner Mr. Barnthouse puts forth, does not mean that it lost its way; 

his conviction was supported by the weight of the evidence. For the foregoing 

reasons, we accordingly overrule Mr. Barnthouse’s single assignment of error and 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment affirmed. 

MOCK, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note: 

The court has recorded its own entry this date.