J-S13008-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MATTHEW ALLEN SAUTER

Appellant No. 958 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 21, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-41-CR-0000103-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2022

Appellant Matthew Allen Sauter appeals from the July 21, 2021 

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming 

County (“trial court”), following his bench convictions for multiple counts of 

sexual abuse of a minor. Upon review, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly, 

Appellant was charged with 96 counts of sexual offenses that arose out of 

his engaging in oral, anal and vaginal intercourse with a minor female when 

she was between the age of twelve (12) and fourteen (14) years.1 Appellant 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Specifically, Appellant was charged with twelve counts of rape of a child

(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c)), twelve counts of statutory sexual assault (18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(b)), twelve counts of involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse (“IDSI”) (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(7)), twelve counts of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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proceeded to a non-jury trial, following which the trial court found him guilty 

of all charges except six counts of rape of a child, six counts of aggravated 

indecent assault – complainant less than 13 years old, and six counts of 

indecent assault – complainant less than 13 years old. In total, the trial 

court found Appellant guilty of 78 separate counts of sexual offenses against 

the minor. On March 3, 2021, the trial court designated Appellant as a 

sexually violent predator and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 90 to 

180 years’ imprisonment.2 Following a motion for reconsideration of 

sentence, the trial court on July 21, 2021 amended the judgment of 

sentence to reflect that certain offenses merged with either rape of child, 

statutory sexual assault and/or IDSI for sentencing purposes. The merger, 

however, did not affect the trial court’s overall sentencing scheme or 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

aggravated indecent assault – complainant less than 13 years of age (18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(7)), twelve counts of aggravated indecent assault –

complainant less than 16 years of age (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(8)), twelve 

counts of corruption of minors (sexual offenses) (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6301(a)(1)(ii)), twelve counts of indecent assault – complainant less than 13 

years of age (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)), and twelve counts of indecent 

assault – complainant less than 16 years of age (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(8)). 

2

In particular, on each of the six convictions for rape of child, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to ten (10) to twenty (20) years in prison. The 

sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a total of 60 to 120 years’ 

imprisonment. On six of the twelve convictions for IDSI, the trial court 

imposed a sentence of five (5) to ten (10) years’ imprisonment. The IDSI 

sentences were to run consecutive to each other—for an aggregate of 30 to 

60 years in prison—and consecutive to Appellant’s sentence for rape of child. 

On the remaining 66 counts, the trial court either imposed sentences to run 

concurrently with the rape sentences or directed no further punishment.
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Appellant’s aggregate sentence. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant 

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review. 

I. Whether he sentencing court abused its discretion by 

imposing a manifestly excessive and unduly harsh 

sentence without sufficiently considering the fundamental 

norms underlying the sentencing process.

Appellant’s Brief at 7. Essentially, Appellant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in imposing upon him a de facto life sentence by 

directing that sentences for six counts of rape of the child and six counts of

IDSI be run consecutive to each other.3 

It is well-settled that “[t]he right to appeal a discretionary aspect of 

sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 

1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where an appellant challenges the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant’s appeal should be 

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3 When reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s discretion, our standard of 

review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is 

more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial 

court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the 

record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 575 (Pa. Super. 

2002)), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013). 
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considered as a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v.

W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. Super. 2007). As we stated in 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see 

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 

2006)). Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about 

the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-bycase basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. 

Super. 2001), appeal denied, 796 A.2d 979 (Pa. 2002). 

Here, Appellant has satisfied the first three requirements of the fourpart Moury test. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court, preserved the 

issue on appeal through his post-sentence motions, and included a Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f) statement in his brief.4 We, therefore, need to determine only if 

Appellant’s sentencing issues raise a substantial question.

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4 Rule 2119(f) provides that “[a]n appellant who challenges the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a 

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The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 

825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have found that a substantial question 

exists “when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the 

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 

A.2d 103, 112 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 964 

A.2d 895 (Pa. 2009). “[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions 

presented and the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to determine whether 

a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 

(Pa. Super. 2013), affirmed, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2015). 

It is settled that this Court does not accept bald assertions of 

sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 

1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). When we examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) 

statement to determine whether a substantial question exists, “[o]ur inquiry 

must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the 

facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal 

on the merits.” Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886-87 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). 
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Super. 2005)). A Rule 2119(f) statement is inadequate when it “contains 

incantations of statutory provisions and pronouncements of conclusions of 

law[.]” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 528 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(citation omitted).

Here, Appellant asserts in his Rule 2119(f) statement:

Appellant states a substantial question as to whether the 

sentence was contrary to the fundamental norms of the 

sentencing process because the court unreasonably sentenced 

[A]ppellant to consecutive sentences that would ultimately result 

in a life sentence.

Appellant’s Brief at 13.

5

 

“Although Pennsylvania’s system stands for individualized sentencing, 

the court is not required to impose the ‘minimum possible’ confinement.” 

Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (citation omitted). “Generally, Pennsylvania law 

affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently 

or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to 

sentences already imposed. Any challenge to the exercise of this discretion 

ordinarily does not raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. 

Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(a) (providing that the court may impose sentences “consecutively or 

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5 To the extent Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

failing to address sentencing factors or specifically failed to take into account 

the protection of public or his rehabilitative needs, the argument is waived. 

Appellant did not raise this issue before the trial court or in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii) (issues not included in a 1925(b) statement are waived).
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concurrently”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 873 A.2d 704, 709 n.2 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (noting that challenges to the trial court’s discretion to impose 

consecutive or concurrent sentences ordinarily does not raise a substantial 

question); Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 

1995) (stating that an appellant is not entitled to a “volume discount” for his 

crimes by having all sentences run concurrently). “The imposition of 

consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial 

question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the 

aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes 

and the length of imprisonment.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 171-72 (citation 

omitted). 

Based on Appellant’s 2119(f) statement, we accept that Appellant 

raises a substantial question, given the aggregate length of the sentence 

imposed. Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526 (Pa. Super. 2011).6

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6 Appellant’s suggestion that the trial court generally failed to consider his 

mitigating circumstances also does not raise a substantial question. In this 

regard, we have “held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate 

consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for 

our review.” Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. 

Super. 2010)); see also Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (explaining allegation that sentencing court failed to consider 

certain mitigating factor generally does not raise a substantial question); 

Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(“[a]n allegation that a sentencing [judge] ‘failed to consider’ or ‘did not 

adequately consider’ certain factors does not raise a substantial question 

that the sentence was inappropriate,”), appeal denied, 676 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 

1996); Commonwealth v. Bershad, 693 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Pa. Super. 

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Appellant principally relies upon Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 

A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 461 (Pa. 2014) for

relief. There, the defendant pled guilty to rape, IDSI, sexual assault, 

aggravated indecent assault, robbery, unlawful restraint, terroristic threats, 

and two counts of indecent assault that he committed when he was 19 years 

old. Coulverson, 34 A.3d at 138–39. The sentencing court imposed an 18 

to 90–year aggregate term of imprisonment, which included the imposition 

of multiple consecutive statutory maximum sentences to accomplish the 

upper end of the sentence. Id. at 139. On appeal, we found that the 

imposition of a 90–year maximum sentence on a 19–year old defendant was 

“clearly unreasonable” as the trial court imposed a virtual life sentence, 

failing to give any consideration to defendant’s characteristics and 

improperly basing its determination that defendant should “spend as much 

of his life in prison as the court could order[.]” Id. at 148.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

1997) (finding absence of substantial question where appellant argued the 

trial court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors and to impose an 

individualized sentence). Even if we were to find a substantial question, we 

still would conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief. Where, as here, the 

sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report, see

N.T. Sentencing, 3/3/21, at 19-21, we can assume the sentencing court was 

aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. See 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 

2013). 
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In the present case, as opposed to Coulverson, the trial court 

imposed a standard range sentence that did not extend to the statutory 

maximum. Indeed, the minimum sentence and the maximum sentence are 

both within the standard range of the guidelines and the maximum sentence 

is two times the minimum sentence. In contrast, in Coulverson, the 

defendant’s maximum sentence was five times his minimum sentence. 

Reliance on Coulverson, therefore, is misplaced.

The instant case, however, is similar to Prisk. There, the defendant 

was convicted of 314 offenses, including multiple counts of rape, IDSI, and 

indecent assault. Prisk, 13 A.3d at 528. He sexually abused his 

stepdaughter for seven years, beginning when she was ten years old. Id. 

The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 633 to 1,500 years’

imprisonment. Id. at 529. On direct appeal to this Court, the defendant

“assert[ed] his aggregate sentence [was] manifestly excessive and 

unreasonable, because the court imposed consecutive sentences for some of 

his convictions,” the “court failed to recognize the absurdity of the aggregate 

sentence imposed,” and “[b]ased on his current life expectancy, . . . his 

minimum sentence [was] roughly twelve times longer than necessary for the 

court to have effectively imposed a life sentence.” Id. at 532.

In denying relief, we reasoned:

[W]e must emphasize that the jury found [the defendant] guilty 

of [314] separate offenses. These offenses stemmed from [the 

defendant’s] systematic sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, which 

occurred on an almost daily basis over the course of six years.

Further, the court did not impose consecutive sentences for 
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every count. At the same time, [the defendant] was not entitled 

to a “volume discount” for his multiple offenses. Based upon the 

foregoing, we will not deem the aggregate sentence as excessive 

in light of the violent criminal conduct at issue.

Id. at 533 (citation omitted). 

Here, based on uncontradicted evidence of record, Appellant used his 

position of trust and authority as a father figure to sexually assault the 

minor female victim over two and a half years. As the trial court reasoned:

Here, Appellant’s acts were predatory, intentional and occurred 

repeatedly. Appellant formerly dated the victim’s mother for 

approximately five years. The victim and her brother viewed 

Appellant as a father figure. After Appellant and the victim’s 

mother ended their relationship, the victim’s mother lost her 

housing and abandoned the children. The victim’s mother joined 

a carnival and ultimately relinquished her parental rights to her 

sister and her sister’s husband. They suffered a house fire. 

They were living in a hotel and then a rental in the Williamsport 

area.

During this tumultuous time in the child’s life, she happened to 

see Appellant at a birthday party for a mutual acquaintance. 

Shortly thereafter, Appellant began visiting the children every 

other week. The visits occurred at the residence where 

Appellant lived with his mother. Appellant’s bedroom was in the 

basement of the house and the children slept downstairs with 

him. At first, the visits involved both children but shortly after 

the visits started Appellant began visiting with the victim one 

weekend and her brother the next. Appellant would make the 

victim’s brother sleep on an uncomfortable couch in his 

bedroom, but he would have the victim sleep in his bed with 

him.

While the victim was alone in the basement with Appellant, he 

repeatedly sexually abused her. He subjected her to vaginal, 

oral and anal intercourse on a biweekly basis. He violated her in 

countless degrading and unspeakable ways. He arranged for 

visits claiming he was a father figure, yet defied everything 

expected of a loving and fiduciary relationship. He utilized his 

position of trust to satisfy his deviant desires at the expense of 
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the victim’s quality of life. Although he may not have physically 

taken her life, she will have to live with what Appellant did to her 

every day of her life. She will have a lifetime of trauma, stress, 

remorse, physical issues, social issues and emotional issues. 

Her life is forever changed and the hurdles she will have to 

overcome to have a normal life, a normal sex life and a normal 

relationship with someone are going to be huge.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/4/21, at 4-5. Thus, we agree with the trial court that

Appellant must not receive a volume discount for committing multiple 

heinous crimes on account of his age or other factors. As noted, Appellant 

sexually assault a young girl, who viewed him as a father figure, over the 

course of two and a half years. Under the circumstances of this case, and 

consistent with Prisk, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 

sentencing discretion, especially where the court did not impose a 

consecutive sentence for every count. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled 

to relief.7 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

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7 Where, as here, the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence 

investigation report, see N.T. Sentencing, 3/3/21, at 19-21, we can assume 

the sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the 

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with 

mitigating statutory factors. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 

937 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), 

appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013). 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/09/2022