PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 22-2788

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ADA ANGLEMEYER; RICHARD C. ANGLEMEYER; 

JEFFREY ANGLEMEYER; JOSEPH KLUSKA,

Appellants

v.

CRAIG AMMONS; BRIAN ATKINSON; NATHAN 

AUKAMP; MARK A. BENSON; DAVID BRODEUR; 

JOHN P. CHULOCK; PETER DEL GAIZO; BRIAN L. 

KING; MICHAEL D. LANG; VINCENTE LOPEZ; 

ROBERT W. MCGARVEY; TERRANE W. MERANTE; 

CLINTON C. PAINTER; JASON PELOTTE; MATTHEW J. 

PIEROTTI; LANCE SCHIMP; KEVIN WARD; DANIEL 

WILK; MATTHEW WYSOCKY; JOHN DOE

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 5:19-cv-03714)

District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge

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Argued: September 12, 2023

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2

Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PORTER

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: February 7, 2024)

______________

Caleb Kruckenberg [ARGUED]

Brian Zeiger

Levin & Zeiger, LLP

1500 JFK Blvd., Suite 620

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellants.

Claudia M. Tesoro [ARGUED]

Office of Attorney General

1600 Arch St., Suite 300

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellee.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Policing can be rough business. But the Constitution 

requires police to use reasonable restraint, even when force 

may be necessary. Here, four family members who were not 

suspected of any wrongdoing suffered injuries at the hands of 

certain officers executing a pre-dawn, no-knock raid. The
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injured family members sued the officers for excessive use of 

force. The District Court determined the officers were entitled

to qualified immunity. We will reverse.

I

Richard and Ada Anglemeyer live in Bangor Township, 

Pennsylvania, with several family members, including their 

two sons—Jeffrey and Mark Anglemeyer—and their son-inlaw, Joseph Kluska. At about 6:00 a.m. on February 23, 2018, 

forty-three officers with the Special Emergency Response 

Team (SERT) of the Pennsylvania State Police took positions 

outside of the Anglemeyer home and prepared to execute a noknock search warrant. They were acting on information that 

Mark allegedly engaged in multiple sales of methamphetamine 

in a workshop near the family home. No other members of the 

Anglemeyer family were suspected of wrongdoing. The SERT 

officers were informed that some members of the Anglemeyer 

family may own firearms. They were also informed that Mark 

was a white male and 52 years old. 

Shortly after arriving, one of the officers noticed 

Richard looking out his window and radioed the other SERT 

members that the team’s secrecy was compromised. The 

officers then rushed into the family home. Their faces were 

partially obscured, and they wore helmets but not nameplates 

or badge numbers. The four plaintiffs in this case—Ada, 

Richard, Jeffrey, and Joseph—each provide their own account 

of the events that followed and the injuries that they allegedly

suffered.

Ada was 76 years old at the time of the incident. She

awoke in her first-floor bedroom after hearing a loud noise as 
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the SERT team forcibly entered her home. As she took a step 

outside of her bedroom wearing her night clothes, Officer 

Clinton Painter struck her in the face with his shield, causing 

her to fly backwards on her back. The blow broke multiple 

teeth and one vertebra, which required long-term treatment. 

Ada testified that the SERT officers did not announce 

themselves and that she did not hear Officer Painter give 

instructions or warnings before striking her.

Richard was 77 years old at the time of the incident. He

slept on the couch that night in the living room. Waking from 

the sound of his dog growling, Richard went to the window 

where he saw flashing lights. He assumed that it was the fire 

department and thought the house might be on fire. As he 

moved toward the door to investigate, SERT officers burst 

through and stormed inside. An officer whom Richard later 

identified as Officer Mark Benson approached and shined a 

flashlight into his eyes. Officer Benson then struck Richard in 

the head with the flashlight, grabbed his neck, and forced him 

to the ground. The fall caused Richard to hit his head on the 

fireplace, rendering him briefly unconscious. Richard suffered 

multiple contusions and facial abrasions and tore the menisci 

in his right knee, requiring surgery. 

Jeffrey was 55 years old at the time of the incident. He 

was asleep in the living room near his father when he awoke to 

loud noise and bright lights. Thinking there was a fire, Jeffrey 

walked into the kitchen and was met by Officer Robert

McGarvey, who shouted at Jeffrey to get down. Before Jeffrey 

could comply, Officer McGarvey clothes-lined him and forced 

him to the ground. An officer, whose identity is in dispute, then 

placed his boot on the back of Jeffrey’s neck, zip-tied him, 

pulled him up by the zip-ties, and sat him in a chair. Jeffery 
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witnessed the attacks on his mother and father and demanded 

that someone call for an ambulance. The same officer who ziptied Jeffrey slapped him across the jaw and repeatedly punched 

him. Jeffrey’s testimony suggests that Officer McGarvey ziptied and punched him, while a police report suggests that it was 

Officer Vicente Lopez. Jeffrey suffered sprains to his shoulder 

and other lasting injuries.

Joseph was 45 years old at the time of the incident. He

was asleep in an upstairs bedroom when SERT officers burst 

into his room. Officer Matthew Wysocky jumped onto 

Joseph’s bed and zip-tied him. Though Joseph was 

cooperative, Officer Wysocky lifted him up and slammed him 

on the floor. Joseph suffered tears in both rotator cuffs, 

requiring surgery.

After subduing the occupants, the SERT team searched

the property. They did not discover methamphetamine, and

Mark Anglemeyer was never convicted of any crime resulting 

from the search.

Ada, Richard, Jeffrey, and Joseph sued several officers 

who participated in the raid, alleging that they used excessive 

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court 

concluded that the SERT officers were entitled to qualified 

immunity and granted summary judgment. It found that, under 

the facts presented for Ada, Jeffrey, and Joseph, the officers 

did not engage in objectively unreasonable conduct sufficient 

to constitute a claim for unconstitutional use of excessive 

force. It further found that Richard’s and Jeffrey’s claims for 

excessive force fail because they could not identify with 

sufficient particularity the officer or officers who allegedly 
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injured them. In reaching its holding, the District Court 

predominantly credited the officers’ version of events. 

Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s decision as it 

relates to their claims against Officers Benson, Painter, 

McGarvey, Lopez, and Wysocky.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.

We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 

grant of summary judgment. Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 77 

n.1 (3d Cir. 2021). “Similarly, we review de novo the legal 

grounds underpinning a claim of qualified immunity.” Mack v. 

Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 227 n.14 (3d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation

marks and quoted source omitted). “Summary judgment is 

appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted). “We 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and quoted source omitted).

III

We use a two-pronged analysis to evaluate qualified 

immunity claims. Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 

633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015). “First, [we] must decide ‘whether the 

facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown make out a violation of a 
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constitutional right.’ And second, [we] must determine 

‘whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time 

of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Id. (quoting Pearson 

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). The officers bear the 

burden of persuasion under each prong. Mack, 63 F.4th at 227.

A

The right to be free from the use of excessive force has 

been recognized under the Fourth Amendment, which 

guarantees the right of citizens “to be secure in their persons 

. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 394 (1989); see Jefferson, 21 F.4th at 78.

The question in excessive force cases is whether, under 

the totality of the circumstances, “the officers’ actions are 

objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 

motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (internal quotation

marks and quoted source omitted). We analyze this question 

“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. And 

we make “allowance for the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that 

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount 

of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 397.

In assessing the officers’ reasonableness, we consider 

factors such as “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. We also 

consider “the physical injury to the plaintiff, the possibility that
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the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent 

or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action 

takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility 

that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with 

whom the police officers must contend at one time.” El v. City 

of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal

quotation marks and quoted source omitted).

Here, the District Court failed to construe the evidence 

in favor of each plaintiff. Instead, the District Court 

predominantly credited the officers’ version of events. But 

when viewing the evidence in the non-movants’ favor, as we 

must at this stage of the case, a reasonable jury could find that 

the officer or officers who harmed each plaintiff used 

objectively unreasonable force.

1. Ada Anglemeyer

There is no dispute that Officer Painter struck Ada with 

his shield after she stepped outside of her bedroom in her 

nightgown. Giving weight to Ada’s testimony, Officer Painter 

could not reasonably believe that Ada posed an immediate 

threat to his or his fellow officers’ safety, particularly in light 

of Ada’s age and stature. Additionally, the Anglemeyers 

owned guns. But a jury could find that Officer Painter should 

have known that Ada—confused and dressed only in a 

nightgown—was not armed. Officer Painter also knew prior to 

entering the Anglemeyer home that Mark Anglemeyer lived 

with his elderly parents and other family members, who were 

not suspected of any wrongdoing. And he could not reasonably 
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confuse Ada with Mark, who Officer Painter knew was a white 

male and 52 years old.

A reasonable factfinder could also conclude that Officer 

Painter failed to give prior instructions or warnings before 

striking Ada, affording her no opportunity to comply. 

Although Officer Painter contends that Ada failed to cooperate 

with his commands, her testimony refutes that allegation. And 

we must weigh the facts in Ada’s favor. Mack, 63 F.4th at 227 

n.14. Viewing these facts in the totality, a jury could find that 

there was no need for any force against Ada, making Officer 

Painter’s conduct toward Ada objectively unreasonable. See 

Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 497 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding 

unconstitutional excessive force where officers tackled 

plaintiff in his own home, even though plaintiff was unarmed, 

cooperative, and not resisting arrest or attempting to flee); 

Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 195-96 (3d Cir. 

2021) (finding that the officer used unconstitutional excessive 

force in striking an unarmed, compliant, and non-threatening 

individual). 

2. Richard Anglemeyer

As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute which 

officer allegedly hit Richard in the head with a flashlight, 

strangled him to the ground, and caused him serious injury. 

Through process of elimination, Richard concludes that it must 

have been Officer Benson, while the officers contend that 

Richard failed to successfully zero in on one defendant because 

other officers were also in the vicinity. The District Court 

agreed with the officers and found that Richard failed “to 

present evidence establishing the personal involvement of the 

defendant.” (App. Vol. I 21-22.)
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We disagree. Officer McGarvey testified that he took 

down a male in the kitchen who was “not [a] senior citizen,” 

which thus rules out Richard. (App. Vol. II 164.) Officer Lance 

Schimp confirmed in his police report that while Officer 

McGarvey handled the male in the kitchen, Officer Benson 

was “dealing with another male” in the next room on the 

ground floor. (App. Vol. II 221.) That room could only be the 

living room, where Richard was attacked. So Richard has 

brought forth sufficient evidence implicating Officer Benson 

as the officer who engaged with him. Jutrowski v. Twp. Of 

Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[A] plaintiff 

must produce evidence supporting each individual defendant’s 

personal involvement in the alleged violation to bring that 

defendant to trial.”).

A reasonable factfinder could also conclude that Officer 

Benson’s force was objectively unreasonable. Based on 

Richard’s testimony, he was plainly unarmed and cooperative, 

following Officer Benson’s flashlight with his eyes before 

Officer Benson gratuitously struck him. And Officer Benson

could not reasonably confuse Richard with Mark, who Officer 

Benson knew was 52 years old. Like Ada’s case, a jury could 

find that no force was necessary against Richard—let alone 

force of the degree exercised, particularly against a nonthreatening and elderly individual. See Couden, 446 F.3d at 

497; Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195-96.

3. Jeffrey Anglemeyer

The parties dispute the identity of the officer or officers 

who attacked Jeffrey. While the record clearly shows that 

Officer McGarvey was the officer who initially took down 
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Jeffrey in the kitchen, they offer competing evidence as to who 

subsequently zip-tied him and struck him in the face. Based on 

the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could conclude 

that, after Officer McGarvey struck Jeffrey with his shield, 

Officer Lopez zip-tied Jeffrey’s wrists, sat him up in a chair, 

and punched him. Though Jeffrey’s testimony implicates 

Officer McGarvey in those acts, Officer Lopez’s police report 

states that he zip-tied a man who matched Jeffrey’s description. 

And Jeffrey later claimed that the same person who zip-tied 

him also punched him. At this stage in the case, that is enough 

to proceed to trial against Officer Lopez. See Smith v. 

Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that, even 

though the plaintiff was not sure who participated in the 

beating, competing evidence as to the identity of the officers 

was “a classic factual dispute to be resolved by the fact 

finder”).1

1 The officers argue—and the District Court held—that 

our decision in Jutrowski necessitates dismissing Jeffrey’s 

action against Officer Lopez because Jeffery focused on 

several “possible wrongdoers” instead of homing in on one 

defendant (Appellee’s Br. at 29, citing Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 

280). But Jutrowski held that the plaintiff could not proceed 

against multiple officers because he failed to provide “any

ascertainment” of who engaged in excessive force. Jutrowski, 

904 F.3d at 292 (internal quotation marks and quoted source

omitted) (emphasis added). We thus concluded that the “record 

[was] insufficient for any reasonable jury to identify which, if 

any, of the [i]ndividual [d]efendants used excessive force.” Id.

at 292-93 (footnote omitted). But here, Jeffrey has offered 

evidence implicating Officer Lopez—most persuasively 

Officer Lopez’s own police report suggesting he zip-tied 
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Weighing the evidence in favor of Jeffrey, a reasonable 

jury also could conclude that the officers’ force was objectively 

unreasonable. Like his mother and father, Jeffrey was unarmed 

and not suspected of any wrongdoing. Jeffrey also had no time 

to comply with Officer McGarvey’s command to get down 

before Officer McGarvey struck him with his shield. Once 

Jeffrey was zip-tied, the officers could not have reasonably 

believed that Jeffrey posed any threat, and there is no 

indication that he was resisting the officers’ restraints. So a jury 

could find that an officer stepping on Jeffrey’s neck, yanking

him up by his zip-ties instead of aiding him to his feet, and 

punching him—all while Jeffery was bound and defenseless—

rises to objectively unreasonably conduct. See Couden, 446 

F.3d at 497; Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195-96; Smith, 293 F.3d at 649 

(“Punching and kicking someone who is handcuffed behind his 

back and under the control of [officers] . . . is ‘repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind.’”) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).

4. Joseph Kluska

Finally, giving weight to Joseph’s testimony, a 

reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Wysocky engaged 

in objectively unreasonable conduct when he picked up Joseph

by his zip-tied arms and dropped him to the floor, tearing both 

Jeffrey—sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude Officer 

Lopez ultimately punched him. While Officer Lopez’s alleged 

conduct may not ultimately be proven, the very fact that this 

material evidence is disputed necessitates reserving this 

question for the jury.
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of his rotator cuffs. Though Officer Wysocky saw a handgun 

lying on the back of Joseph’s bed, Officer Wysocky harmed 

Joseph after he was fully secured, cooperative, and not at risk 

of flight. As we have previously explained, “striking a 

physically restrained and nonthreatening” person is “nowhere 

near the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” 

Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 197 (internal quotation marks and quoted 

source omitted).

B

Because the officers have failed on the first prong of the 

qualified immunity analysis, they are entitled to summary 

judgment only “if they can bear the burden of showing, on the 

second prong, that reasonable officers could not have known 

that their actions violated clearly established law.”

2 Mack, 63 

F.4th at 228. We must proceed by defining the right allegedly 

violated with a “high degree of specificity” and then asking 

“whether that right was clearly established at the time of its 

2 The District Court at times conflates both prongs of 

the qualified immunity analysis. (See App. Vol. I 14-15, 17.) 

However, like the parties, we understand the District Court’s 

opinion to resolve only the first prong of the qualified 

immunity analysis. Because we resolve the first prong in favor 

of Plaintiffs, we exercise our discretion to also address the 

second prong. See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. 

Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that it is 

“generally appropriate” for us to reach an issue that the district 

court did not if “the issues provide purely legal questions, upon 

which an appellate court exercises plenary review”). 
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alleged violation.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 

63 (2018) (internal quotation marks and quoted source

omitted); Mack, 63 F.4th at 228.

“Clearly established means that, at the time of the 

officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is 

unlawful.” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 196 (quoting Wesby, U.S. at 63). 

“In each case, we must focus on ‘whether the violative nature 

of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (quoting

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). “Thus, the central 

question is whether the existing law gave the officer ‘fair 

warning’ that his particular conduct was unlawful.” Id. (citing 

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2011)).

“[E]xisting precedent . . . [must] place[] the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” Dennis v. City of 

Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal 

quotation marks and quoted source omitted). Thus, the 

“specificity of caselaw [is] ‘especially important.’” Jacobs, 8 

F.4th at 196 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12). While “we do 

not require that the prior precedent have indistinguishable 

facts,” Dennis, 19 F.4th at 288, “[c]ases with closely analogous 

facts can . . . help move a case beyond the otherwise hazy 

border between excessive and acceptable force and thereby 

provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is 

unlawful.” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 196 (internal quotation marks and 

quoted source omitted).

Here, all four plaintiffs had the right to be free from 

serious bodily harm as individuals who were plainly unarmed, 

substantially outnumbered by law enforcement, cooperative, 

not suspected of wrongdoing, and in their own home. Our prior 
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decision in Couden—a “closely analogous” case to the facts

before us here—shows that Plaintiffs’ rights were clearly 

established. 

In Couden, the Delaware Joint Violent Crime Task

Force, after receiving a tip that a fugitive wanted for drug

charges might be staying at a certain address, conducted a

stakeout in a Delaware neighborhood. 446 F.3d at 489. Two

houses down from the surveilled address, Pamela Couden and

some of her children, including 14-year-old Adam, drove up to

their home in the family car. Id. Adam exited the car and

entered his home. Id. Presumably thinking Adam was the

wanted fugitive simply entering a different home, the police

attacked Pamela’s car, causing her to drive off to call 9-1-1. Id.

at 490. At least four officers then stormed inside the house,

grabbed Adam inside his home, and threw him to floor. Id.

While one officer pressed his knee into Adam’s back, they

pushed Adam’s head into the ground, pointed guns at him, and

sprayed him with mace. Id. at 490, 497.

We held that it was clearly established that it was 

unlawful for the officers to engage in this level of force when 

the individual posed no “potential threat” to the officers, was 

substantially outnumbered by officers in his own home, and 

was not “resisting arrest, armed, or attempting to flee.” Id. at 

497. We determined that, at the very most, officers under this 

set of facts would be entitled to only “the use of low level 

force.” Id. Our sister circuits have denied qualified immunity 

in cases factually similar to Couden. See, e.g., Shannon v. 

Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding it was 

clearly established that it is unlawful for an officer to engage 

in serious bodily harm when the individual posed no danger to 

the officer and did not resist or attempt to flee); Darden v. City 
16

of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 733 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that 

the officer’s conduct would violate clearly established rights if 

he used violent force, such as slamming or striking, against a 

plaintiff who did not resist or presented no safety threats).

Here, the officers’ force against all four plaintiffs was 

even more egregious than the force exercised in Couden. The 

plaintiffs were not only plainly unarmed, substantially 

outnumbered, cooperative, and in their own home, but they 

were not suspected of any wrongdoing or facing arrest. 

Accordingly, any reasonable officer in our case would have 

known that the officers’ force was unlawful under this set of 

facts. 

* * *

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

each plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the officer who 

harmed each plaintiff used objectively unreasonable force. At

the time of the officers’ conduct, it was clearly established that 

it was unlawful for the officers to inflict serious bodily harm 

on individuals who were plainly unarmed, substantially 

outnumbered by law enforcement, cooperative, not suspected 

of wrongdoing, and in their own home. We will therefore 

reverse the District Court’s order granting summary judgment 

to the officers.