J-S34044-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

QUINTEZ DEVAR HALL

Appellant No. 1796 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed October 20, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0007930-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2015

Appellant, Quintez Devar Hall, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on October 20, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of York County 

following his conviction of two firearms violations. Appellant contends the 

evidence was insufficient to support either conviction. We disagree and, 

therefore, affirm.

On September 5, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of persons not to 

possess firearms and for possessing a firearm not to be carried without a 

license.1 On October 20, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five to 

ten years in prison as a person not to possess a firearm and imposed a 

concurrent sentence of three to six years for his second conviction. 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106, respectively.
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Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s 

directive to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal, asserting 

“[t]he evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient as a 

matter of law to support the jury verdict of guilty for Carrying a Firearm 

without a License and Person not to Possess a Firearm.” Statement of 

[Errors] Complained of under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 11/6/14, at 1. The issue 

Appellant asks this Court to consider is worded substantially identically to his 

1925(b) statement.

Before addressing Appellant’s issue, we shall first address the 

Commonwealth’s contention that Appellant has waived his issue for failure to 

preserve it for appellate review. In support of this position, the 

Commonwealth cites, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 

1252 (Pa. Super. 2008), for the proposition that an appellant asserting 

insufficiency of evidence must specify the element or elements upon which 

the evidence was insufficient. As this Court explained in Williams:

If [an a]ppellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence 

was insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify 

the element or elements upon which the evidence was 

insufficient. This Court can then analyze the element or 

elements on appeal. The instant 1925(b) statement simply does 

not specify the allegedly unproven elements. Therefore, the 

sufficiency issue is waived.

Id. at 1257 (emphasis deleted). However, waiver will not be found in all 

instances. As this Court recognized in Williams:

We are cognizant of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

Commonwealth v. Laboy, 594 Pa. 411, 936 A.2d 1058 
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(2007)[,] in which the Court vacated this Court’s Order and 

remanded the case for us to decide the merits of certain issues 

the appellant had raised on appeal. The Supreme Court 

determined a panel of this Court had erred in deciding the 

appellant had failed to adequately develop his claim of 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction in his statement of 

matters complained of on appeal and noted that the case was a 

“relatively straightforward drug case” though “in more complex 

criminal matters the common pleas court may require a more 

detailed statement to address the basis for a sufficiency 

challenge.” Id. at 1060.

Id. at 1258 n.9. 

We find that this case is a “relatively straightforward” firearms case, 

especially in light of the stipulation at trial that Appellant “is a person not to 

possess and has been since the year 2007. [Also, Appellant] did not have a 

valid license to carry a concealed firearm on his person or within a vehicle.” 

Notes of Testimony (N.T.) Trial, 9/4/14, at 82. As the trial judge instructed 

the jury after counsel presented the stipulation:

Again you may accept that stipulation. The stipulation is that 

[Appellant] did not have a license at the time the gun was 

located and, secondly, that he is a person not to possess a 

firearm. So those two facts may be accepted by you. There is 

still obviously other issues that remain to determine whether or 

not [Appellant] had the firearm in his possession.

Id. at 83. Under the circumstances of this case, we decline to find waiver 

for Appellant’s failure to specify in the 1925(b) statement the elements upon 

which he bases his insufficiency challenge.

The statutory provisions for the crimes in question provide that “a 

person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b) . 

. . shall not possess . . . a firearm in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 
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6015(a)(1). Further, “any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or 

any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except 

in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully 

issued license . . . commits a felony of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6106. Because it was stipulated that Appellant was a person not to possess 

under § 6105(a)(1) and was not licensed to carry a firearm under § 6106, 

the only issue for the jury to determine was whether Appellant was in 

possession of, or was carrying, a firearm.

The only witnesses at Appellant’s trial were three Commonwealth 

witnesses from the York City Police Department: Officer Christopher Roosen, 

Sergeant Nicholas Figge and Officer Derek Hartman. The trial court 

summarized the officers’ testimony as follows:

In this case, the jury heard that on October 21, 2013, Officer 

Christopher Roosen was on patrol around 11:00 p.m. Officer 

Roosen saw a known male, Brandon Orr, for whom there were 

outstanding warrants walking towards him. Officer Roosen then 

testified that at this point Mr. Orr ran. Officer Roosen alerted 

Sergeant Nicholas Figge that Mr. Orr was known to utilize or ride 

in a silver [J]eep. Sergeant Figge testified that he saw and 

pursued the sliver [J]eep in question. While attempting to flee, 

the [J]eep crashed and Sergeant Figge testified that three 

suspects ran from the vehicle. Sergeant Figge was able to 

identify [Appellant], in blue jeans and a sweatshirt, as one of the 

fleeing subjects.[2] 

____________________________________________

2 Sergeant Figge testified that two of the three individuals ran in a southerly 

direction while the third, Appellant, ran down an alleyway in a different 

direction. N.T. Trial, 9/4/14, at 91.
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The jury heard Officer Derek Harman testify that he pursued an 

individual dressed as Sergeant Figge described. Officers Roosen 

and Hartman testified that upon apprehension of this person, a 

firearm was located near the individual’s hands. Sergeant Figge 

identified the individual as [Appellant], who was one of the three 

individuals he had seen flee the crashed [J]eep. Officer Roosen 

related to the jury that 9 mm ammunition was found in the 

crashed [J]eep. The firearm [in] question is a 9 mm handgun. . 

. . All of the officers who testified stated that they never saw 

[Appellant] in physical possession of the firearm. And Officer 

Roosen stated that the gun was not fingerprinted because there 

was no question who the actor was in this case. The jury also 

heard a stipulation that [Appellant] is a person not to possess 

firearms and has been since 2007. . . . The jury was provided 

with the stipulation that [Appellant] was a person not to possess. 

Ergo, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), the Commonwealth 

would only have needed to show the element of possession. 

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/29/15, at 3-4 (references to Notes of 

Testimony omitted).

Again, the sole issue before this Court involves the sufficiency of 

evidence. This Court has stated:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 
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and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, 

part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted). In Cruz, this Court explained:

Illegal possession of a firearm may be shown by constructive 

possession. Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 

(Pa. Super. 2004).

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic 

construct to deal with the realities of criminal law 

enforcement. Constructive possession is an inference 

arising from a set of facts that possession of the 

contraband was more likely than not. We have defined 

constructive possession as “conscious dominion.” We 

subsequently defined “conscious dominion” as “the power 

to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that 

control.” To aid application, we have held that 

constructive possession may be established by the totality 

of the circumstances.

Id. at 1253 (quoting Parker, 847 A.2d at 750) (additional citations 

omitted). 

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth must prove Appellant had 

both the power to control the firearm and the intent to exercise control, 

contending mere presence at the scene is insufficient. Appellant’s Brief at 

11 (citing Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 453 A.2d 1058, 1059 (Pa. 

Super. 1982), in turn citing Commonwealth v. Townsend, 237 A.2d 192 

(Pa. Super. 1968); and Commonwealth v. Luddy, 422 A.2d 601 (Pa. 

Super. 1980)). While we do not disagree with the premise Appellant 

advances, we find the cases he has cited inapposite. Unlike the cases cited 

by Appellant, Appellant was alone when he was apprehended. When he and 
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the other subjects fled the Jeep, Appellant headed in a different direction 

from his associates. Neither of the other individuals was noted to be 

anywhere near Appellant when Appellant was taken into custody. Moreover, 

the officers each testified that the handgun was within a few feet of 

Appellant’s hand.3 As the trial court observed:

[Appellant] was apprehended with the firearm near his hands. 

[Appellant] was identified as one of the individuals who fled the 

crashed [J]eep which contained more ammunition of the sort 

used in the firearm recovered. Taken together, these facts are 

the strongest basis upon which to find possession. There is no 

specific quantum of evidence that the Commonwealth must 

produce in order for a court to find that sufficient evidence has 

been presented; but, rather, we must evaluate whether the 

evidence was so weak and inconclusive that no probability of fact 

may be drawn from the combined circumstances. It strains 

credulity to believe that [Appellant] was unlucky enough to be 

apprehended within reach of a firearm for which there was 

matching ammunition in the vehicle from which [he] fled.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/15, at 4-5. We agree. Viewing all the evidence—

including circumstantial evidence—in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, coupled with the stipulation that Appellant 

was a person not to possess a firearm, we conclude the evidence was 

sufficient to enable the jury to find every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant contends that testimony indicating multiple subjects exited the 

Jeep and fled after it crashed suggests that “anyone from that Jeep could 

have been in possession of that firearm and have dropped it while fleeing.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 11. In light of the officers’ testimony, Appellant’s 

proposition is without foundation.
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With respect to Appellant’s conviction of firearms not to be carried 

without a license, we likewise conclude the evidence was sufficient to 

support the conviction. As the trial court noted, Officer Hartman testified 

that he continually commanded Appellant to show his hands during his 

pursuit and that Appellant failed to do so. “This evidence tends to show that 

[Appellant] had concealed the weapon upon his person and would not show 

his hands in order to maintain his grasp upon the firearm.” Id. at 6. When 

the officers apprehended Appellant, the gun was observed on the ground 

next to Appellant, “within his reach.” N.T. Trial, 9/4/14, at 75. Again, in 

conjunction with the stipulation that Appellant did not have a license to carry 

the firearm, we conclude the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth was sufficient to prove the elements of the crime 

charged. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/21/2015