NO. 4-05-1027 Filed 8/2/06 

 IN THE APPELLATE COURT 

 OF ILLINOIS 

 FOURTH DISTRICT 

QUINCY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 172, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR 

RELATIONS BOARD and QUINCY 

EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL NO. 

809, IFT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 

 Respondents-Appellees. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Direct Administrative 

 Review of the 

Illinois Educational 

 Labor Relations Board 

No. 01-CA-0035-S 

______________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the 

court: 

Petitioner, Quincy School District No. 172 (School 

District), seeks direct review of a November 2005 order of the 

Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB), finding the 

School District had violated section 14(a)(1) of the Illinois 

Educational Labor Relations Act (Labor Act) (115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1) 

(West 2004)) as alleged in the August 2001 unfair-labor complaint 

filed by the Quincy Educational Association, Local No. 809, 

IFT/AFT, AFL-CIO (Association). 

On review, the School District argues (1) the IELRB 

erred in not following this court's directive to hold a hearing 

on the merits following remand and (2) the IELRB erred in not 

holding the Association had waived or was estopped from bringing 

a motion to deem all allegations of the complaint admitted. We 

reverse and remand. 
- 2 -

I. BACKGROUND 

In January 2001, the Association filed an unfair-laborpractice charge with the IELRB, asserting the School District had 

violated the Labor Act by failing and refusing to submit a 

grievance to arbitration as demonstrated by the School District's 

filing of a lawsuit to enjoin a scheduled arbitration hearing. 

On August 8, 2001, the IELRB's executive director issued a 

complaint and notice of hearing. On August 28, 2001, the School 

District filed its answer, along with a motion for leave to file 

the answer one day out of time. 

 In January 2002, an administrative law judge (ALJ) 

denied the School District's motion for leave to file a late 

answer. In its July 2002 recommended decision and order, the ALJ 

found the School District's answer was in fact late and the 

School District failed to show "good cause" for the late filing. 

 Because of the School District's failure to file a timely 

answer, the ALJ deemed admitted the complaint's allegations. In 

doing so, the ALJ saw no need to require the Association to file 

a motion to have the complaint's allegations deemed admitted. 

In January 2003, the IELRB affirmed the ALJ's recommended decision and order, finding, inter alia, the School 

District had failed to show "good cause" for its filing an 

untimely answer, and thus it need not address whether the School 

District presented a meritorious defense. The IELRB also found 
- 3 -

the Association's response to the School District's motion to 

reconsider, in which it only argued the School District should 

not be granted leave to file a late answer, was the equivalent of 

a motion to have the complaint's allegations deemed admitted. 

Thus, the IELRB deemed admitted the complaint's allegations and 

then found the School District had violated section 14(a)(1) of 

the Labor Act. Based on that violation, the IELRB ordered the 

School District to cease and desist from certain actions and to 

take certain affirmative actions. The School District's appeal 

followed. 

This court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated 

in part, and remanded the cause to the IELRB for further proceedings. Quincy School District No. 172 v. Illinois Educational 

Labor Relations Board, No. 4-03-0181 (March 2, 2004) (unpublished 

order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We affirmed the IELRB's 

holding that good cause did not exist for the School District's 

late answer. However, we reversed the IELRB's decision deeming 

the complaint's allegations admitted even though no motion had 

been filed, finding the IELRB's interpretation of section 

1120.30(d)(3) of Title 80 of the Administrative Code (80 Ill. 

Adm. Code '1120.30(d)(3) (Conway Green CD-ROM January 2001) (eff. 

January 5, 1990)) was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Specifically, we noted section 1120.30(d)(3) expressly 

required a party to file a motion when seeking to have the 
- 4 -

allegations of a complaint admitted when the other party failed 

to file a timely answer. As the Association never sought to have 

the complaint's allegations deemed admitted, the IELRB's interpretation of section 1120.30(d)(3) would render the "[o]n motion 

of a party" language meaningless. Thus, we reversed the IELRB's 

finding that the complaint's allegations should be deemed admitted and vacated that portion of its order based on the admission 

of the allegations. We then concluded as follows: 

"Since no party filed a motion to have the 

complaint's allegations deemed admitted, we 

remand the cause for a hearing on the merits." Quincy School District No. 172, slip 

order at 14. 

This court issued its mandate on March 30, 2004. 

On April 21, 2004, the Association filed a motion 

pursuant to section 1120.30 to deem the allegations of the 

complaint admitted. On April 26, 2004, the IELRB ordered the 

case remanded to the ALJ for a hearing on the merits. On April 

29, 2004, the ALJ ordered the School District to show cause why 

the Association's motion should not be granted. In May 2004, the 

ALJ granted the Association's motion and recommended that the 

allegations of the complaint be deemed admitted. 

In November 2005, the IELRB, in a 3 to 2 decision, affirmed the ALJ's recommended decision and order. The IELRB 
- 5 -

majority concluded the ALJ correctly declined to conduct a 

hearing on the merits and instead determined that the School 

District had admitted to violating section 14(a)(1) of the Labor 

Act by failing to file a timely answer to the complaint. The 

majority acknowledged this court's order requiring a hearing on 

the merits "[s]ince no party filed a motion to have the complaint's allegations admitted." However, the IELRB read this 

court's "direction to have a hearing on the merits was conditioned on the fact that no such motion had been filed." Since 

the Association filed a motion to have the allegations of the 

complaint deemed admitted after this court's order was handed 

down, "a ruling that there should be no hearing on the merits 

because the [Association] has filed a motion to have the allegations of the [c]omplaint be deemed admitted does not conflict 

with the [a]ppellate [c]ourt's ruling." 

The IELRB also responded to the School District's 

argument that the Association waived or was estopped from having 

the allegations in the complaint deemed admitted because the 

Association delayed in filing its motion and stated during a 

January 15, 2002, conference call that it had no other motions to 

raise. The IELRB found the Association filed its motion "with 

reasonable promptness" after this court's decision and before the 

Association received the IELRB's order scheduling a hearing. In 

finding the School District admitted the allegations of the 
- 6 -

complaint by failing to file a timely answer, the IELRB concluded 

the School District violated section 14(a)(1) of the Labor Act by 

refusing to arbitrate the grievance. 

Two members of the IELRB dissented, pointing out this 

court specifically stated "we remand the cause for a hearing on 

the merits." The dissenting members found this court's direction 

to be "clear and specific" and stated the majority's decision 

would invite "further litigation over this issue and resulting 

delay." This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

The School District argues the IELRB erred in ignoring 

the express directive of this court to hold a hearing on the 

merits on remand. We agree. 

A. Standard of Review 

When a trial court or other tribunal is told to proceed 

in conformity with the appellate court's mandate, those tribunals 

"should consult the opinion to determine what the mandate requires." Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board, No. 1-

05-2319, slip op. at 10 (June 13, 2006), Ill. App. 3d , 

 , N.E.2d , . After remand, the tribunal "is required to exercise its discretion within the bounds of the 

remand. Whether it has done so is a question of law." Clemons 

v. Mechanical Devices Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 351, 781 N.E.2d 1072, 
- 7 -

1078 (2002). Thus, whether the IELRB complied with our mandate 

is subject to de novo review. See Clemons, 202 Ill. 2d at 352, 

781 N.E.2d at 1078; People ex rel. Department of Transportation 

v. Firstar Illinois, No. 2-05-0392, slip op. at 4 (May 18, 2006), 

 Ill. App. 3d , , N.E.2d , . 

B. The IELRB's Decision on Remand 

The appellate court's mandate is its judgment, which, 

"upon transmittal to the trial court, vests the trial court with 

authority only to take action that conforms with the mandate." 

In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1149, 1152, 769 

N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (2002). A tribunal "must follow the specific 

directions of the appellate court's mandate to the letter to 

insure that its order or decree is in accord with the decision of 

the appellate court." Ludwinski, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1152, 769 

N.E.2d at 1098. 

"'The correctness of the trial court's 

action on remand is to be determined from the 

appellate court's mandate, as opposed to the 

appellate court opinion. [Citations.] However, if the direction is to proceed in conformity with the opinion, then, of course, 

the content of the opinion is significant. 

[Citations.] In construing the language, 

matters which are implied may be considered 
- 8 -

embraced by the mandate. [Citation.] The 

trial court may only do those things directed 

in the mandate. [Citations.] The trial 

court has no authority to act beyond the 

dictates of the mandate. Thus, the controlling question in the appeal from the remand 

in this case is whether the trial court complied with the mandate.'" Aardvark Art, Inc. 

v. Lehigh/Steck-Warlick, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 

3d 627, 630-31, 672 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (1996), 

quoting PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment 

Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 308-09, 427 N.E.2d 563, 

571 (1981). 

In the case sub judice, this court's mandate stated as 

follows: 

"It is the decision of this court that 

the order on appeal from the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board be AFFIRMED IN 

PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and 

the cause be REMANDED to the Board for further proceedings as more fully set forth in 

the order of this court, a copy of which is 

attached hereto." 

In the last sentence of the order prior to the conclusion sec-
- 9 -

tion, this court stated: "Since no party filed a motion to have 

the complaint's allegations deemed admitted, we remand the cause 

for a hearing on the merits." Quincy School District No. 172, 

slip order at 14. 

The mandate in this case directed the IELRB to conduct 

further proceedings as stated in our order. That order required 

a hearing on the merits to be conducted on remand. "[W]hen a 

reviewing court remands a cause with specific directions, they 

must be followed exactly." County of Menard v. Illinois State 

Labor Relations Board, 202 Ill. App. 3d 878, 883, 560 N.E.2d 

1236, 1238 (1990); see also Stuart v. Continental Illinois 

National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 75 Ill. 2d 22, 28, 387 

N.E.2d 312, 314 (1979) ("Precise and unambiguous directions in a 

mandate must be obeyed"); Berry v. Lewis, 27 Ill. 2d 61, 62-63, 

187 N.E.2d 688, 689 (1963); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Otis 

Elevator Co., 297 Ill. App. 3d 383, 387, 696 N.E.2d 697, 700 

(1998); Independent Voters of Illinois v. Illinois Commerce 

Comm'n, 189 Ill. App. 3d 761, 767, 545 N.E.2d 557, 560 (1989); 

County of La Salle ex rel. Peterlin v. Pollution Control Board, 

146 Ill. App. 3d 603, 608-09, 497 N.E.2d 164, 168 (1986) (When 

"the mandate of a court of review is precise and unambiguous, the 

mandate must be followed by the tribunal to which it is issued"); 

Jones v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of the Village of 

Mundelein, 127 Ill. App. 3d 793, 805, 469 N.E.2d 393, 402 (1984) 
- 10 -

("[a]fter a judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded, the 

inferior tribunal can take only such further proceedings as 

conform to the judgment of the appellate tribunal"). The language in this court's mandate and order was clear, specific, and 

binding. The IELRB erred in not holding a hearing on the merits 

consistent with our order. 

In its decision and now in its appellate brief, the 

IELRB contends a hearing on the merits was no longer necessary 

since the Association filed a motion to have the complaint's 

allegations admitted after this court's order was handed down. 

However, the IELRB's interpretation of our directive was erroneous. This court did not say that "unless a party files a motion 

in the future to have the complaint's allegations deemed admitted," a new hearing must be conducted on remand. The "[s]ince no 

party filed a motion" language does not lend itself to any 

discretionary action or future filing. 

The IELRB also argues this court's order did not 

preclude the filing of an appropriate motion by the Association. 

 However, the reasons for the rule that the directions in the 

court's mandate must be obeyed is "that it would be impossible to 

negate every conceivable issue in an opinion and that a decision 

which failed to exclude a particular result did not include it by 

implication." City of Springfield v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571, 

574-75, 413 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1980). The language in the order, 
- 11 -

in effect, foreclosed the filing of a motion and specifically 

required the matter proceed to a hearing on the merits. If the 

IELRB was dissatisfied with this court's previous order to hold a 

hearing on the merits, it could have petitioned for a rehearing 

or appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois. See Foster v. 

Kanuri, 288 Ill. App. 3d 796, 799, 681 N.E.2d 111, 114 (1997). 

"When an appellate court reverses and remands the cause 

with a specific mandate, the only proper issue on a second appeal 

is whether the trial court's order is in accord with the mandate." Foster, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 799, 681 N.E.2d at 113-14. 

We hold the IELRB's decision was not in accord with our mandate. 

 Thus, that decision must be reversed, and this cause must be 

remanded once again for a hearing on the merits. Because of our 

resolution of this issue, we need not address the School District's remaining argument on appeal. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we reverse the IELRB's order 

and remand the cause for a hearing on the merits. 

Reversed and remanded. 

STEIGMANN and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.