The Attorney General of Texas 

July 5. 1982 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. BOX 12546 

Austin. TX. 78711. 2546 

5121475~2501 

Telex 9101674.1367 

Telecopier 51214759266 

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Dallas. TX. 75201-4709 

214l742.8944 

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El Paso. TX. 79905.2793 

9151533.3464 

1220 Dallas Ave.. Suite 202 

Houslon. TX. 770026986 

7 131650.0666 

806 Broadway. Suite 312 

Lubbock. TX. 79401.3479 

.8Wl747~5230 

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San Antonio. TX. 78205-2787 

312,225.4191 

An Equal OppOrtunityI 

Attirmative Aclion Employer 

Mr. Maurice S. Pipkin 

Executive Director 

Opinion No. MU-483 

State Commission on Judicial Conduct Re: Authority of county judge 

P. 0. Box 12265. Capitol Station to receive fees for temporary 

Austin. Texas 78711 commitment hearings 

Dear Mr. Pipkin: 

You ask whether: 

a county judge of one county may enter into a 

contract with another county to be compensated 

personally from public funds for holding hearings 

on temporary commitments to an institution of the 

Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental 

Retardation. 

Article 5547-31, V.T.C.S., provides in part as follows: 

A SWO73l Application for Temporary 

Hospitalization of a proposed patient may be filed 

with the county court of the county in which the 

proposed patient resides or in which the patient 

is found or in which the proposed patient is 

hospitalized by court order. (Emphasis added). - 

Article 5547-33. V.T.C.S.. provides in part that: 

When Application for Temporary 

Hospitalizat:tn is filed, the county judge shall 

set a date for a hearing to be held within 

fourteen (14) days of the filing of the 

Application. 

Article 5547-41. V.T.C.S., provides in part that: 

A sworn Petition for the indefinite commitment 

of a person to a mental hospital may be filed with 

the county court of the‘ county- in which the 

proposed patient is hospitalized, the county from 

which he is temporarily committed. or the county 

in which he resides or is found. (Emphasis 

added). 

D. 1704 
Mr. Maurice S. Pipkln - Page 2 (bfw-483) 

Article 5547-43. V.T.C.S., reads as follows: 

When a Petition and the required Certificate of 

Medical Examination for Mental Illness I see 

V.T.C.S. art. 5547-421 are filed, the county judge 

shall set a date for a hearing to be held within 

thirty (30) days of the filing of the Petition.... 

The briefs and correspondence submitted to this office indicate 

that the relevant facts are as follows. The judge in question is the 

constitutional county judge of a county within which a Texas 

Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation [hereinafter MHMR] 

facility is located. This facility serves several neighboring 

counties. In 1979, this county judge informed these counties that his 

workload was such that he could “no longer hold temporary commitment 

hearings for [counties other than his own].” By this, he apparently 

meant that he would no longer conduct subsequent commitment 

proceedings involving patients who are originally committed to ‘the 

MMR facility from other counties. Shortly thereafter, however, he 

agreed with other counties to hold commitment hearings involving such 

patients where the committing county agreed to pay him a prescribed 

fee for holding them. The agreement attempted CO designate him 

“special judge.” 

We are informed that the applications which triggered the 

comirment hearings in question were filed in the county in which the 

judge regularly serves, I.e.6 the county in which the NRMR facility is 

located; not in the counries from which the patients were committed. 

Thus, the fee agreements were obviously predicated upon the judge’s 

conclusion that he is under no legal obligation to conduct cowmitmenr 

proceedings involving patients committed from other counties, even 

when an application is filed in his county, but that he may 

voluntarily agree to do so for a fee. As we shall explain, this 

conclusion was erroneous. 

Under articles 5547-31 and 5547-41. a commitment application may 

be filed in the county in which the proposed patient is hospitalized. 

When such application is filed,’ the county judge is required to 

schedule a hearing. V.T.C.S. arts. 5547-33, 5547-43. Thus, when the 

applications for the continued commitment of patients who were 

hospitalized in the HRMR facility located in the judge’s county were 

filed in that county, the judge assumed a duty to hold a commitment 

hearing, as his county was the one “in which the proposed patient 

[was] hospitalized.” V.T.C.S. arts. 5547-31, 5547-41. He could not 

refuse to perform this duty as county judge and insist that he be 

compensated therefor as “special judge.” See Nueces County v. 

- 

Currington, 162 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1942). 

Ue are aware of no constitutional or statutory provision which 

would authorize this county judge, acting as county judge or “special 

judge,” to receive compensation for conducting these commitment 

p. 1705 
Mr. Maurice S. Pipkin - Page 3 (MU-483) 

hearings. As noted, the duty to conduct these hearings was imposed 

upon the judge by the foregoing statutes. Consequently. we conclude 

that he is not legally authorized to charge these fees. See Nueces 

County v. Currington. supra (unless a fee is provided by G for an 

official service required to be performed and the amount thereof fixed 

by lav, none can lawfully be charged therefor); McCalla v. City of 

Rockdale, 246 S.W. 654 (Tex. 1922). Even if he could lawfully charge 

such a fee. moreover, he would be obliged, under article XVI. section 

61 of the Texas Constitution and article 3912k, V.T.C.S., to turn the 

fee over to the county treasury. Wichita County v. Robinson, 276 

S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1954); Binford v. Robinson, 244 S.W. 807 (TeX. 1922); 

McLennan County v. Boggess, 137 S.W. 346 (Tex. 1911). 

Under the facts before us, therefore, we answer your question in 

the negative. 

SUMMARY 

Under the facts before us, a county judge of 

one county could not enter into a contract with 

another county to be compensated personally for 

holding a hearing which he is statutorily required 

to hold in his capacity as county judge. 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

RICHARD E. GRAY III 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Jon Bible 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Susan L. Garrison, Chairman 

Jon Bible 

Walter Davis 

Rick Gilpin 

Patricia Hinojosa 

Jim Moellinger 

Bruce Youngblood 

p. 1706