[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Wilson, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-182.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-182

THE STATE EX REL. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER v. WILSON,

1 DIR.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Wilson, Slip Opinion No. 

2024-Ohio-182.]

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Requested records are security records 

exempt from disclosure when public office presents evidence showing that 

information in requested records is directly used for protecting and 

maintaining public office’s safety—Security records exempt from disclosure 

are not public records and therefore are not subject to redacted release—

Writ denied.

(No. 2022-0425—Submitted June 27, 2023—Decided January 23, 2024.)

IN MANDAMUS.

____________________

1. The Enquirer filed its complaint against the former director of the Ohio Department of Public 

Safety, Thomas Stickrath. Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B), Andy Wilson, the current director, is 

automatically substituted as a party to this action.
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2

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Relator, the Cincinnati Enquirer, seeks a writ of mandamus 

compelling respondent, Andy Wilson, the director of the Ohio Department of 

Public Safety (the “department”), to produce records regarding the travel and 

expenses for Ohio State Highway Patrol troopers and staff attending the 2022 Super 

Bowl in Los Angeles, California, with Governor Mike DeWine. The Enquirer also 

seeks statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.

{¶ 2} The department withheld the requested records on the basis that they 

are “security records” under R.C. 149.433(A)(1). We find that the requested 

records fall within the statutory exemption. Therefore, we deny the Enquirer’s 

request for a writ of mandamus and its requests for statutory damages, court costs, 

and attorney fees.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 3} On February 14, 2022, Laura Bischoff, a reporter for the Enquirer,

sent the department and the governor’s office a public-records request under Ohio’s 

Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, for “electronic copies of the travel and expenses 

for troopers and/or staff attending the 2022 Super Bowl in Los Angeles, CA with 

Gov. DeWine.” Specifically, Bischoff requested “overtime pay expenses, airline 

ticket expenses, meal and hotel expenses, [and] vehicle rental expenses for the trip.”

{¶ 4} The department responded by letter dated March 11, denying the 

Enquirer’s request on the grounds that the records were not public records under 

R.C. 149.433(B)(1) because they were protected from disclosure as “security 

records” under R.C. 149.433(A)(1). According to the department, releasing 

“records containing information about the Governor’s security detail would reveal 

patterns, techniques, or information relevant to the size, scope, or nature of the 

security and protection provided to the Governor * * * [and] could be used to attack, 

interfere, or sabotage the Governor or his security detail.”
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3

{¶ 5} The Enquirer sent a follow-up letter to the department on March 21, 

disagreeing with the department’s assertion that disclosure of the requested records 

would reveal information that was directly used for tactically protecting or 

maintaining the security of a public office. The department responded by email on 

March 31, averring that disclosure of the records could reveal

details such as the number and qualifications of [Ohio State 

Highway Patrol] Troopers assigned to the Governor’s security detail 

for various types of assignments, the number of cars used during 

travel, and other details pertinent to protecting the Governor and his 

family. While this information may seem inconsequential to [the 

Enquirer], it nevertheless can be used to reveal patterns, techniques, 

or information directly related to the security of the Governor.

{¶ 6} The Enquirer filed this action in this court on April 20, seeking a writ 

of mandamus ordering the department to produce the requested records. We 

granted the parties’ joint motion to issue an alternative writ and set a schedule for 

filing evidence and merit briefs. We also sua sponte ordered the department to file 

under seal for in camera inspection unredacted copies of all withheld records. 168 

Ohio St.3d 1411, 2022-Ohio-3636, 196 N.E.3d 836. The department complied with 

the order, and the parties timely submitted evidence and merit briefs.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Mandamus and the Public Records Act

{¶ 7} Ohio’s Public Records Act requires a public office to make public 

records available upon request, within a reasonable period of time. R.C. 

149.43(B)(1). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 

R.C. 149.43. State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio 

State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, 
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¶ 6. To be entitled to the writ, the Enquirer must demonstrate, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that it has a clear legal right to the requested relief and that 

the department has a clear legal duty to provide that relief. State ex rel. Cincinnati 

Enquirer v. Sage, 142 Ohio St.3d 392, 2015-Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 10. We 

construe the Public Records Act “liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt 

is resolved in favor of disclosure of public records.” State ex rel. Cincinnati 

Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996).

B. The Department’s Claimed Exemption—Security Records Under

R.C. 149.433(A)(1)

{¶ 8} “If a record does not meet the definition of a public record or falls 

within one of the exceptions to the law, the records custodian has no obligation to 

disclose the record.” State ex rel. Plunderbund Media v. Born, 141 Ohio St.3d 422, 

2014-Ohio-3679, 25 N.E.3d 988, ¶ 18, citing R.C. 149.43(B) (“all public records 

responsive to the request shall be promptly prepared”). The department claims that 

the records requested by the Enquirer are not subject to disclosure under the Public 

Records Act, because they are “security records” as defined by R.C. 149.433(A)(1).

{¶ 9} R.C. 149.433(A)(1) defines “security record” as “[a]ny record that 

contains information directly used for protecting or maintaining the security of a 

public office against attack, interference, or sabotage.” And R.C. 149.433(B)(1) 

provides that “a record kept by a public office that is a security record is not a public 

record under section 149.43 of the Revised Code and is not subject to mandatory 

release or disclosure under that section.”

{¶ 10} Exemptions to the disclosure requirement under the act are strictly 

construed against the records custodian, who has the burden to establish the 

applicability of any claimed exemptions. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. JonesKelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, ¶ 10. “Unless it is 

otherwise obvious from the content of the record, the proponent invoking the 

security-record exemption under R.C. 149.433(A)(1) must provide evidence 
January Term, 2024

5

establishing that the record clearly contains information directly used for protecting 

or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, or 

sabotage.” Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 163 Ohio St.3d 

337, 2020-Ohio-5371, 170 N.E.3d 768, ¶ 51. Conclusory statements in an affidavit 

that are not supported by evidence are not sufficient to establish the exemption’s 

applicability. Id. at ¶ 30.

1. The department’s argument and evidence in support of the statutory 

exemption

{¶ 11} The department does not contend that the nature of the records is 

readily apparent based on a review of their content alone. Nor is the applicability 

of the security-records exemption readily apparent from the content of the requested 

records. Therefore, the burden falls on the department to prove facts establishing 

that the requested records fall squarely within R.C. 149.433(A)(1). Welsh-Huggins

at ¶ 35.

a. The department’s reliance on Plunderbund is well taken

{¶ 12} The department argues that under Plunderbund, 141 Ohio St.3d 422, 

2014-Ohio-3679, 25 N.E.3d 988, the past use of information contained in a record 

is sufficient to trigger the security-records exemption when the evidence confirms 

that the agency will continue to make use of that information in the future. We 

agree.

{¶ 13} The relator in Plunderbund sought records related to closed

investigations that the Highway Patrol had conducted of threats against the 

governor. Id. at ¶ 3, 5. The department refused to produce the records—even in 

redacted form—because, it argued, the records contained information directly used 

for protecting and maintaining the security of the governor’s office and thus were 

“security records” under R.C. 149.433(A). Id. at ¶ 1, 4-5, 7, 18.

{¶ 14} We held that the department’s evidence in Plunderbund—which 

consisted solely of affidavits from several law-enforcement personnel—was 
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sufficient to show that the requested records fell within the security-records 

exemption. Id. at ¶ 11, 23-28. Specifically, the department’s director attested that 

disclosing the requested records “ ‘potentially reveals security and safety 

violations, * * * would expose security limitations and vulnerabilities, and * * * 

increases the risks to the safety’ of the governor and others.” Id. at ¶ 24. Similarly, 

the Highway Patrol superintendent stated that release of the threat information 

could “ ‘reveal patterns, techniques or information’ related to security.” Id. at ¶ 25. 

A member of the governor’s security team averred that public disclosure of the 

threats “may require law enforcement to change its tactics, * * * may lead to copycat offenses, * * * [and] diminishes the effectiveness of law enforcement.” Id. at 

¶ 27. And the executive director of Ohio Homeland Security averred that 

“ ‘[s]ecurity planning, response plans, and techniques’ used by the department 

‘detail security limitations and vulnerabilities’ and are therefore ‘deemed security 

records.’ ” Id. at ¶ 26. This affiant further stated “that documents disclosing ‘the 

content, number or treatment of prior or current threats’ contain security 

information that ‘if disclosed (even piecemeal), could be used to commit terrorism, 

intimidation, or violence.’ ” Id.

{¶ 15} Based on that evidence, we held that the records of closed-threat 

investigations were exempt from disclosure as security records because they 

contained information that revealed (1) security limitations and vulnerabilities that 

would increase the risks of harm to the governor if disclosed, and (2) security 

planning, techniques, patterns, and response plans that if disclosed would require 

law-enforcement personnel to change tactics and would diminish their ability to 

protect the governor. Id., 141 Ohio St.3d 422, 2014-Ohio-3679, 25 N.E.3d 988, at 

¶ 24-28, 30; see also Welsh-Huggins, 163 Ohio St.3d 337, 2020-Ohio-5371, 170 

N.E.3d 768, at ¶ 52 (noting that the testimony in Plunderbund showed that the 

requested records contained information directly used for tactically protecting or 

maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, or sabotage).
January Term, 2024

7

{¶ 16} We reaffirmed our holding in Plunderbund in State ex rel. Ohio 

Republican Party v. FitzGerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, 47 N.E.3d 

124, ¶ 23-24. In that case, we considered whether records of keycard-swipe data 

documenting when FitzGerald—a county executive at the time of the records 

request—entered and exited county buildings and parking facilities were subject to 

disclosure under the Public Records Act. We held that at the time of the publicrecords request, the keycard-swipe-data records were exempt from disclosure as 

security records. Id. at ¶ 2, 24. As in Plunderbund, we credited sworn statements 

from law-enforcement personnel as evidence that it was critical to protect the 

keycard-swipe data from release because it revealed information regarding 

FitzGerald’s manner and pattern of travel, ingress and egress, and timing, that if 

disclosed would diminish the effectiveness of the security detail charged with 

protecting him. See id. at ¶ 23-24, 27.

b. The department’s evidence supports application of the security-records 

exemption in this case

{¶ 17} Similar to the respondents in Plunderbund and FitzGerald, the 

department in this case submitted evidence from law-enforcement personnel that 

the requested records “contain[] information directly used for protecting and 

maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, or sabotage.” 

R.C. 149.433(A)(1). Specifically, the department’s witnesses testified that release 

of the requested records would pose a substantial risk to the governor’s safety by 

revealing the security detail’s planning, techniques, and patterns, and by exposing

security limitations and vulnerabilities.

{¶ 18} Highway Patrol Captain Craig Cvetan, who had supervisory 

oversight of payroll records for the governor’s security detail and approved the 

expenses that are at issue in this case, attested that the travel receipts contain 

information identifying the (1) names of each member assigned to the security 

detail and the size of the security contingent, (2) names of the vendors providing 
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8

transportation and lodging, (3) mode or manner of travel, (4) dates and times of 

travel for each member of the detail, (5) sequencing or staging of travel, and (6) 

number of vehicles used by the security detail and the duration of their use. Cvetan 

also testified that the fuel receipts reveal the (1) dates and times of refueling, (2) 

pattern of refueling, and (3) specific locations of refueling and distance proximity. 

And the compensation and meal-expense-reimbursement records contain 

information identifying (1) each member of the security detail, (2) the total number 

of members comprising the detail, (3) the dates of each member’s specific 

engagement, and (4) the location of the assignment.

{¶ 19} Highway Patrol Staff Lieutenant James Thompson, who spent eight 

years assigned to the governor’s security detail, testified that he had reviewed the 

records at issue and determined that they are “directly related to the movements and 

operations of [the governor’s] security team.” According to Thompson, the records 

identify the number of plain-clothes troopers assigned to the security detail for the 

trip, the mode and manner of transportation of the detail, whether the detail sent an 

advance team to Los Angeles before Governor DeWine arrived, and the lodging of 

the security team in relation to the governor. Thompson also averred that disclosure 

of the fuel receipts would tend to establish a pattern on the location, duration, and 

times for refueling while the governor is traveling. And Thompson maintained that 

disclosure of this information would “create[] substantial risk” to the governor’s 

safety by providing “ ‘another piece of the puzzle’ ” for an attacker to strike at 

perceived weaknesses in the security detail.

{¶ 20} In addition, Thompson testified that there are certain protocols that 

the security detail implements when the governor travels, such as (1) how many 

members of the security detail are needed, (2) the physical proximity of the detail 

to the governor, (3) whether an advance team is used, and (4) the number of vehicles 

used to provide protection. Thompson attested that “when planning for future trips 

with the Governor, including out-of-state travel, [s]ecurity [i]nformation from prior 
January Term, 2024

9

trips will inform how the Governor’s security personnel allocate resources and 

personnel” for the governor’s safety and “may also inform whether, and in what 

manner, the Governor’s security personnel may modify its protocols for a particular 

trip or in response to a particular risk.” According to Thompson, although the 

department develops a unique plan every time the governor travels, many of the 

elements that were incorporated into the security plan for the Super Bowl trip, such 

as how the advance team is dispatched, would also be incorporated into future 

security plans. Thompson further attested that “[e]ven where travel is made to 

disparate locales, there is frequently regularity or a pattern to the security staffing, 

approach, and means given the limited size of the security detail and preferred 

vendors.”

{¶ 21} The department also points to evidence from Kurt Douglass, whose 

42-year law-enforcement career included service with the United States Secret 

Service and Indiana State Police. According to Douglass’s affidavit, adversaries 

planning to attack a government official necessarily focus on the defensive security 

measures deployed by a security detail, such as the number of law-enforcement 

agents assigned to the detail, how the detail travels, the number of vehicles required, 

the agents’ physical proximity to the official, the route followed, and the preferred 

places of lodging. Douglass explained that this type of information is considered 

“law enforcement sensitive” because it can be used to plan an attack.

{¶ 22} Douglass also testified that governors are considered “soft” targets 

because they generally do not have large security contingents for protection—in 

contrast to the president, who is considered a “hard” target because he is protected 

by multiple layers of Secret Service agents. Douglass attested that disclosing 

security-detail costs for travel, lodging, and refueling poses a much greater risk to

a soft target by “provid[ing] a would-be aggressor, both sophisticated and 

unsophisticated, insight of the size and magnitude of the security coverage, thus 

creating vulnerability for future trips.” Douglass averred that “[t]he risk that an 
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10

aggressor can, from reviewing data, identify trends and patterns of a particular 

security detail is more likely to occur where small protective units are operational, 

such as in the case of a * * * governor.” In Douglass’s opinion, it is more important

to protect the financial information associated with the security staff assigned to a 

soft target than a hard target.

{¶ 23} Douglass also echoed Thompson’s assessment that security 

information from prior trips does not become less sensitive once a trip is completed. 

Douglass stated that “[e]ven when a particular trip is completed, disclosure of 

[s]ecurity [i]nformation from a past trip would increase the security risk to the 

Governor. Security [i]nformation from previous travel is precisely the material that 

a potential aggressor would review in attempting to discern patterns followed by 

the Governor’s security detail, and exploit any perceived vulnerabilities.”

{¶ 24} The above evidence supports the department’s claim that the 

requested records contain information about the movements and operations of the 

security detail that the department directly used for protecting and maintaining the 

safety of the governor’s office against attack, interference, or sabotage. As was the 

case in Plunderbund, 141 Ohio St.3d 422, 2014-Ohio-3679, 25 N.E.3d 988, and 

FitzGerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, 47 N.E.3d 124, the evidence here 

shows that disclosure of these defensive security measures would reveal 

vulnerabilities in the assigned security detail and would pose increased risk to the 

safety of the public office. And the evidence also reflects that the department will 

rely on information contained in the security detail records for the Super Bowl trip 

in formulating future security plans for the governor’s office. Accordingly, we hold 

that the department met its burden to show that the requested records are exempt 

from public disclosure as security records under R.C. 149.433(A)(1).
January Term, 2024

11

2. The Enquirer’s arguments supporting disclosure lack merit

{¶ 25} The Enquirer makes three arguments to support its position that the 

department is required to disclose the requested records under the Public Records 

Act. None have merit.

a. The Enquirer’s reliance on Welsh-Huggins is misplaced

{¶ 26} The Enquirer first contends that under Welsh-Huggins, 163 Ohio 

St.3d 337, 2020-Ohio-5371, 170 N.E.3d 768, the travel and expense records at issue 

here are not security records. In Welsh-Huggins, we considered whether a county 

prosecutor had properly denied a public-records request for video footage from a 

courthouse-security camera that had captured the shooting of a local judge. After 

first rejecting the prosecutor’s argument that it was readily apparent that the video 

was a security record just by viewing it, we turned to whether the prosecutor’s 

evidence was sufficient to show that the security-records exemption applied.

{¶ 27} We explained that under existing precedent, “it is not enough to say 

that a record is probably within a statutorily prescribed exemption: the public office 

or records custodian must show ‘that the requested record falls squarely within the 

exemption.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 63, quoting Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 

81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, at paragraph two of the syllabus. We then 

held that the prosecutor had failed to prove that the requested video was a security 

record under R.C. 149.433(A)(1), because her evidence did not explain how the 

video—or the information contained within it—was directly used for protecting or 

maintaining the security of the public office against attack, interference, or 

sabotage. Welsh-Huggins at ¶ 55-65. We determined that absent a showing how 

the video footage was directly used to protect or maintain the security of a public 

office, the concerns expressed by the prosecutor—that release of the video would 

disclose courthouse-security plans and capabilities and would reveal potential 

weaknesses in security that could be used to plan a future attack—were insufficient 

to trigger the security-records exemption. Id. at ¶ 65; see also id. at ¶ 57. “Under 
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R.C. 149.433(A)(1), a record’s status as a security record is determined by the 

public office’s actual use of the information. It is not determined by a public 

requester’s potential use or misuse of the information.” Id. at ¶ 69.

{¶ 28} Against this backdrop, the Enquirer claims that the department failed 

to show how the records requested by Bischoff fall squarely within the securityrecords exemption as required by Welsh-Huggins. According to the Enquirer, the 

department’s evidence shows that its sole basis for withholding the requested 

records is its concern that someone could misuse the records, rather than any 

showing how the department actually uses or will use the information for protecting 

or maintaining the security of the governor against attack, interference, or sabotage.

{¶ 29} Contrary to the Enquirer’s assertion, the department has shown that 

it directly uses information contained in the requested records for protecting or 

maintaining the security of the governor. Upon in camera review, the requested 

records reveal that the travel and overtime-expense records contain (1) the identity 

of each member of the security detail, (2) dates, times, and sequences of travel of 

the security detail, (3) the name of the airline and names and number of troopers on 

each flight, (4) the name of the rental-car agency, and the number, model, and 

license plates of rental cars used by the security detail, (5) the place of lodging, 

number of guests, and dates of lodging, and (6) locations, dates, and times of 

refueling. As discussed above, Thompson, the department’s witness, testified that 

this information is “directly related to the movements and operations of [the 

governor’s] security team.” And as discussed, these records are exempt from 

disclosure as security records because the evidence shows that the department uses 

information in the records to plan for the governor’s security on a day-to-day and 

event-to-event basis. That is, the records contain information “directly used for 

protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, 

or sabotage,” and, therefore, are “security records” under R.C. 149.433(A)(1).
January Term, 2024

13

{¶ 30} The Enquirer offers little more than a blanket assertion that the 

department’s evidence is defective. First, the Enquirer points to testimony from 

Thompson that he had no knowledge of whether the security detail was using the 

security information from the Super Bowl trip for ongoing training. Based on this 

single excerpt from Thompson’s deposition testimony, the Enquirer contends that 

he “offer[ed] no evidence that the [department] is using the requested records in 

any way.” Thompson’s lack of knowledge of any ongoing training sessions, 

however, does not prove that he offered “no evidence” to show that the securityrecords exemption applies. In fact, Thompson attested that in planning for future 

trips with the governor, some of the same security protocols that were incorporated 

into past security plans—including the Super Bowl trip—will inform how the 

security detail allocates resources and personnel for the governor’s safety and may 

also be used to determine whether security protocols need to be modified for a 

particular trip or in response to a particular risk.

{¶ 31} The Enquirer also challenges the affidavit of Douglass on the basis 

that he had no personal knowledge regarding whether or how the department used 

the requested records. But Douglass did not attest to his personal knowledge 

regarding how the department used the requested records in providing security for 

the governor. Rather, his affidavit was based on his firsthand experiences of 

providing security for two presidents and other government officials and dignitaries 

while serving with the Secret Service and on a security detail for the governor of 

Indiana. In short, Douglass testified as a subject-matter expert. And since the 

Enquirer does not otherwise challenge Douglass’s qualifications or the relevance 

of his testimony, we reject this argument.

b. The Enquirer did not prove that the requested records are no longer exempt

{¶ 32} Second, the Enquirer argues that the records are no longer exempt 

from disclosure under FitzGerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, 47 N.E.3d 
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14

124, and State ex rel. Rogers v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 155 Ohio St.3d 545, 2018-

Ohio-5111, 122 N.E.3d 1208. Neither case is helpful to the Enquirer’s position.

{¶ 33} As discussed above, we determined in FitzGerald that when the 

keycard-swipe data were first requested, R.C. 149.433(A) exempted the requested 

records from disclosure as security records. Id. at ¶ 24. But by the time we rendered 

our decision, the county had moved its administrative offices to a new building, it 

had demolished the old building where the keycard system was installed, 

FitzGerald was no longer the county executive, and the county had released the 

requested records to the media. Id. at ¶ 3. Based on these changed circumstances, 

we held that the keycard-swipe data were no longer security records. Id. at 

¶ 27-30.

{¶ 34} In Rogers, we ordered the release of security-camera footage, 

finding that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had failed to provide 

evidence showing that the 2015 video recording was being used in a current 

investigation regarding the incident depicted in it or that the video disclosed any 

current security-response plans or protocols. Id. at ¶ 21. We explained that even if 

the requested record had been properly withheld as a security record when 

requested, “ ‘R.C. 149.433(A)(1) does not establish the exception in perpetuity.’ ” 

Id., at ¶ 20, quoting Gannett GP Media, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, Ct. of Cl. 

No. 2017-00051-PQ, 2017-Ohio-4247, ¶ 32. Instead, in resolving a public-records

request, this court must “ ‘consider the facts and circumstances existing at the time

that [we make our] determination on a writ of mandamus, not at some earlier 

time.’ ” (Brackets sic.) Id., quoting State ex rel. Quolke v. Strongsville City School 

Dist. Bd. of Edn., 142 Ohio St.3d 509, 2015-Ohio-1083, 33 N.E.3d 30, ¶ 29.

{¶ 35} The Enquirer maintains that the security detail’s deployment for the 

Super Bowl trip was completed at the time of Bischoff’s records request and that 

the requested records related to a one-time, unique assignment and are no longer 

directly used for security. Therefore, according to the Enquirer, the statutory 
January Term, 2024

15

exemption no longer applies under the authority of FitzGerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 

2015-Ohio-5056, 47 N.E.3d 124, and Rogers, 155 Ohio St.3d 545, 2018-Ohio5111, 122 N.E.3d 1208. We disagree.

{¶ 36} Thompson, the Highway Patrol staff lieutenant, testified that the 

security detail develops a “different[,] unique” security plan for each trip the 

governor takes. He also confirmed that the security protocols implemented for the 

trip to the Super Bowl “would be different from the protocols that [the security 

detail would] engage for [the governor’s] trip from the governor’s mansion to the 

State Capitol every day.” And Thompson explained that the protocols would vary 

“based on [the] specific differentiation in travel and location” of the trip and that 

the size of the security detail is affected by whether the governor travels alone or 

with his family. According to the Enquirer, the point that Thompson established is 

that no two travel events are the same and that each involves individual planning 

and execution. As a result, the Enquirer asserts, it is inaccurate to claim that 

information about a completed detail would provide valuable information to a 

would-be wrongdoer or information that will be used directly for security for future 

trips.

{¶ 37} The Enquirer selectively quotes Thompson’s deposition testimony, 

while ignoring other evidence from Thompson averring that even though the 

department develops a unique plan every time the governor travels, in planning for 

future trips the security detail will incorporate some of the same security protocols 

that were incorporated into the Super Bowl trip and will also use this information 

to determine how the security detail allocates resources and personnel for the 

governor’s safety and whether security protocols need to be modified for a 

particular trip or in response to a particular risk. In short, the department has proved 

that the security records at issue are still being used.
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c. The department did not violate the Public Records Act by failing to produce 

redacted records

{¶ 38} Lastly, the Enquirer argues that even if the records are exempt from 

disclosure, the department violated the Public Records Act by failing to produce 

redacted versions of the requested records. The Enquirer cites R.C. 149.43(B)(1), 

which states:

If a public record contains information that is exempt from the duty 

to permit public inspection or to copy the public record, the public 

office or the person responsible for the public record shall make 

available all of the information within the public record that is not 

exempt.

{¶ 39} But under R.C. 149.433(B)(1), “a record kept by a public office that 

is a security record is not a public record under section 149.43 of the Revised Code 

and is not subject to mandatory release or disclosure under that section.” Thus, if 

the requested records fall under the security-records exemption in R.C. 

149.433(A)(1), they are not public records, and the public office would not be 

required to release or disclose redacted versions pursuant to R.C. 149.433(B)(1).

{¶ 40} We considered exactly the same issue in Plunderbund, 141 Ohio 

St.3d 422, 2014-Ohio-3679, 25 N.E.3d 988, in which we upheld the department’s 

refusal to release records of threats against the governor—even redacted records—

on the ground that they were security records under R.C. 149.433(A) and hence 

were not public records under R.C. 149.433(B). Plunderbund, at ¶ 1, 30. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the department did not violate the Public Records 

Act by refusing to release redacted versions of the requested records to the Enquirer 

in this case.
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C. The Enquirer’s Requests for Statutory Damages, Court Costs, and 

Attorney Fees

{¶ 41} The Enquirer also requests awards of statutory damages, court costs, 

and attorney fees. Because we hold that the department has not failed to comply 

with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B), we deny the Enquirer’s requests. See 

R.C. 149.43(C)(2), 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i), and 149.43(C)(3)(b).

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 42} We deny the writ of mandamus. We also deny the Enquirer’s 

requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.

Writ denied.

FISCHER, LUPER SCHUSTER, and DETERS, JJ., concur.

KENNEDY, C.J., concurs, with an opinion.

DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART and BRUNNER, 

JJ.

BETSY LUPER SCHUSTER, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting 

for DEWINE, J.

_________________

KENNEDY, C.J., concurring.

{¶ 43} I concur in the majority’s judgment denying relator Cincinnati 

Enquirer’s request for a writ of mandamus seeking records related to Governor 

Mike DeWine’s trip to the 2022 Super Bowl in Los Angeles, California, from 

respondent, Andy Wilson, the director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety. I 

also concur in the majority’s reasoning in reaching that judgment and in its denial 

of the Enquirer’s requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees. I 

write separately to highlight the evidentiary distinction between this case and 

Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 163 Ohio St.3d 337, 2020-

Ohio-5371, 170 N.E.3d 768. Unlike the respondent in Welsh-Huggins, the 
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department presented evidence establishing that the requested records contain 

information that qualifies them as security records exempt from disclosure.

Security Records

{¶ 44} Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, guarantees the public 

access to records kept by governmental entities in Ohio. Such access promotes the 

policy “that open government serves the public interest and our democratic 

system.” State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 

N.E.2d 472, ¶ 20. But not all records in the government’s possession are subject to 

release. For example, a record may be exempt from release if it qualifies as a 

“security record”—that is, if the record “contains information directly used for 

protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, 

or sabotage.” R.C. 149.433(A)(1).

Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office

{¶ 45} In Welsh-Huggins, this court determined that a courthouse’s 

surveillance video capturing the shooting of a judge was not a “security record” 

that qualified for the exemption from the disclosure requirement. Welsh-Huggins

at ¶ 1. The majority explained that when a public office or a person responsible for 

public records seeks to prevent the disclosure of a record based on a statutory 

exemption, the public office or records custodian has the burden “to plead and 

prove facts clearly establishing the applicability of the exemption.” Id. at ¶ 27. The 

majority further clarified that “[c]onclusory statements in an affidavit that are not 

supported by evidence are not sufficient evidence to establish the exemption’s 

applicability,” id. at ¶ 30, and concluded that “a record’s status as a security record 

is determined by the public office’s actual use of the information,” id. at ¶ 69. So, 

it follows that “[a] record is not a security record if it does not contain information 

directly used to protect and maintain the security of the public office.” (Emphasis 

sic.) Id. at ¶ 82 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment only).
January Term, 2024

19

{¶ 46} The prosecutor in Welsh-Huggins relied on three affidavits offered 

as evidence in support of the assertion that the requested copy of the surveillance 

video fit squarely within the security-records exemption. Id., 163 Ohio St.3d 337, 

2020-Ohio-5371, 170 N.E.3d 768, at ¶ 55, 59-60. But there was an initial issue—

the affidavits were fatally defective. Id. at ¶ 83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 

judgment only). The affidavits were “made to the best of [the prosecutor’s] 

knowledge, information, and belief,” but this assertion did not satisfy the personalknowledge standard under Evid.R. 602. Id. at ¶ 83. (Kennedy, J., concurring in 

judgment only), citing State ex rel. Esarco v. Youngstown City Council, 116 Ohio 

St.3d 131, 2007-Ohio-5699, 876 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 15-16. Therefore, the prosecutor 

did not proffer any evidence to show how the video was directly “used to protect 

or secure any public office from attack, interference, or sabotage.” Id. (Kennedy, 

J., concurring in judgment only).

{¶ 47} But even when considering the affidavits as evidence of the securityrecords exemption’s application, the majority found that the prosecutor still had not 

met the burden of production so as to justify exempting the requested copy of the 

surveillance video from the disclosure requirement. Id. at ¶ 55, 67. The 

prosecutor’s first purported affidavit asserted in a “conclusory fashion that the 

video was directly used for protecting or maintaining the security of a public office” 

and “did not explain how the video was used for protecting or maintaining the 

security of a public office.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 55. The second purported 

affidavit similarly “failed to explain how the video qualified for the [securityrecord] exemption.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 59. And the third purported affidavit 

revealed only technical information about the video and a concern that “disclosure 

of the video would reveal perceived vulnerabilities” of the public office. Id. at 

¶ 60. The majority held, therefore, that there was no basis for determining that the 

requested surveillance video contained information that fit squarely within the 

security-records exemption. Id. at ¶ 69.
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The Evidence in this Case

{¶ 48} The evidence presented by the department in this case stands in stark 

contrast to the evidence presented in Welsh-Huggins. For starters, the department 

presented multiple valid affidavits based on personal knowledge to support the 

applicability of the security-records exemption. The relevant affidavits included 

sworn testimony from Highway Patrol Captain Craig Cvetan, Highway Patrol Staff 

Lieutenant James Thompson, and Kurt Douglass, who averred that he had served 

for 42 years in law enforcement with both the United States Secret Service and the 

Indiana State Police.

{¶ 49} The affidavits submitted by the department do not merely state in 

“conclusory fashion,” id., 163 Ohio St.3d 337, 2020-Ohio-5371, 170 N.E.3d 768, 

at ¶ 55, that the requested records were directly used in protecting the governor. 

Rather, they explain that the requested records contain information identifying the 

names and number of members of the governor’s security personnel; dates, times, 

and sequencing of the governor’s travel; and patterns related to the governor’s 

security detail. Lieutenant Thompson specifically explained in his affidavit that 

this information will be used “when planning future trips with the Governor” and 

“will inform how the Governor’s security personnel allocate resources and 

personnel” for the governor’s safety. Lieutenant Thompson’s affidavit confirmed 

that “many of the elements that were incorporated into the security plan for the 

Super Bowl trip, such as how the advance team is dispatched, would also be 

incorporated into future security plans.” Majority opinion, ¶ 20. Therefore, the 

requested records “are exempt from disclosure as security records because the 

evidence shows that the department uses information in the records to plan for the 

governor’s security on a day-to-day and event-to-event basis.” Id. at ¶ 29.

Conclusion

{¶ 50} The department has met its burden of production by presenting 

evidence that clearly establishes the applicability of the security-records exemption 
January Term, 2024

21

by showing that the requested records “contain[] information directly used for 

protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, 

or sabotage,” R.C. 149.433(A)(1). Accordingly, the majority correctly rejects the 

Cincinnati Enquirer’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the disclosure of 

the requested documents and correctly denies the Enquirer’s requests for statutory 

damages, court costs, and attorney fees.

{¶ 51} Therefore, I concur.

_________________

DONNELLY, J., dissenting.

{¶ 52} As the majority opinion states, relator, the Cincinnati Enquirer,

sought disclosure under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, of “electronic 

copies of the travel and expenses for troopers and/or staff attending the 2022 Super 

Bowl in Los Angeles, CA with Gov. DeWine.” Majority opinion, ¶ 3. There is no 

question that the records sought are initially presumed to be public records—they 

are records kept by a public office. R.C. 149.43(A)(1). The question is whether an 

exception to the disclosure requirement applies.

{¶ 53} The Ohio Department of Public Safety and its director—respondent, 

Andy Wilson—denied the Enquirer’s public-records request, concluding that the 

request was for security records, which are statutorily defined as “not a public 

record,” R.C. 149.433(B)(1). Today, after an in camera review, a majority of this 

court agrees with the department, concluding that the records sought are not public 

records. Despite noting that “[e]xemptions to the disclosure requirement under the 

act are strictly construed against the records custodian,” majority opinion at ¶ 10, 

citing State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-

Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, ¶ 10, nothing in the majority opinion suggests that the 

members of the majority have adhered to that standard.

{¶ 54} “Security record” means any of the following:
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(1) Any record that contains information directly used for 

protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against 

attack, interference, or sabotage;

(2) Any record assembled, prepared, or maintained by a 

public office or public body to prevent, mitigate, or respond to acts 

of terrorism, including any of the following:

(a) Those portions of records containing specific and unique 

vulnerability assessments or specific and unique response plans 

either of which is intended to prevent or mitigate acts of terrorism, 

and communication codes or deployment plans of law enforcement 

or emergency response personnel;

(b) Specific intelligence information and specific 

investigative records shared by federal and international law 

enforcement agencies with state and local law enforcement and 

public safety agencies;

(c) National security records classified under federal 

executive order and not subject to public disclosure under federal 

law that are shared by federal agencies, and other records related to 

national security briefings to assist state and local government with 

domestic preparedness for acts of terrorism.

(3) An emergency management plan adopted pursuant to 

section 5502.262 of the Revised Code.

R.C. 149.433(A).

{¶ 55} The records sought in this case do not fit clearly and squarely into 

any of those categories, as they must in order to be exempt from disclosure. See 

State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 136 Ohio St.3d 350, 2013-Ohio3720, 995 N.E.2d 1175, ¶ 23. The only provision in R.C. 149.433(A) that might at 
January Term, 2024

23

first glance seem potentially applicable here is the first one, which states that

documents that “contai[n] information directly used for protecting or maintaining 

the security of a public office against attack, interference, or sabotage” are security 

records, R.C. 149.433(A)(1). But information in payroll ledgers, per diem lists, and

receipts related to gas-station, hotel, rental-car, and airline expenditures is not

“directly used for protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against 

attack, interference, or sabotage.” On its face, it is obvious that the security-records 

exception does not apply—let alone after construing the Enquirer’s request liberally 

in favor of broad access. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of 

Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 28 (“We 

construe R.C. 149.43 liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in 

favor of disclosure”); see also Jones-Kelly, at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 56} Although a bad actor could misuse these ledgers, lists, and receipts 

to glean information about the governor’s security detail that might be of some use 

in planning a future attack, we have previously rejected a similar argument against 

disclosure. In Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 163 Ohio St.3d 

337, 2020-Ohio-5371, 170 N.E.3d 768, ¶ 69, we stated that “a record’s status as a 

security record is determined by a public office’s actual use of the information. It 

is not determined by a public requester’s potential use or misuse of the 

information.” Here, the department uses the requested records as evidence of 

expenditures, not to protect or maintain security. It is more than a stretch to argue 

that the department has directly used a receipt for the purchase of gasoline to protect 

or maintain security.

{¶ 57} In this case, there is no evidence—or reason to believe—that the 

department uses its expense records for anything related to protecting or 

maintaining security; there is evidence only that such records could be misused by 

someone else. Although there was testimony suggesting that information about 

past security procedures could be used in planning and training for future events, 
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there was no suggestion that the information in these records (basically, a collection 

of receipts) will be used for security training—and it is pretty hard to imagine how 

they could be used in that way.

{¶ 58} It is obvious that all disclosures of public records come with some 

security concerns. As an extreme example, there is no doubt that any governor 

would be much safer if no one knew his or her name, what she or he looks like, or 

where he or she lives and works. But the incremental concern at issue here is not, 

to my mind, sufficient justification for shrouding government spending in 

secrecy. The best guarantee of good government is transparency, which is why the 

General Assembly has decreed that doubts regarding the release of public records 

are to be decided in favor of disclosure.

{¶ 59} The security interests ostensibly at stake in this case are de minimus 

in general, let alone when weighed against the people’s right to know how much 

public money was spent while the governor was in California to watch the Super 

Bowl. I would conclude that the requested records—copies of expenditures for 

meals, travel, lodging, and overtime pay—are not security records and, therefore, 

that they should not be exempt from disclosure. I would issue a writ ordering 

production of the requested records subject to any proper redactions necessary for 

security reasons.

{¶ 60} Accordingly, I dissent.

STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.

_________________

Graydon Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., John C. Greiner, Darren W. Ford, and 

Kellie A. Kulka, for relator.

Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., Marion H. Little Jr., and John W. Zeiger, 

Special Counsel to Attorney General Dave Yost, for respondent.

_________________