* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

______________________________

No. 96-50461 (Summary Calender)

______________________________

CATARINA GARCIA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TEXAS YOUTH COMMISSION;
WEST TEXAS STATE SCHOOL,

Defendants,

STEVE ROBINSON, Individually

and as Executive Director of

Texas Youth Commission; JOHNNY WILLIAM, Individually and as Superintendent of West

Texas State School; KAY DOEBBELING, Individually and as Acting Superintendent
of West Texas State School,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________________________________

Appeal From the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

No. 95-CV-75

____________________________________________

May 23, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *1 898 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1995).

2 Plaintiff-Appellant Catarina Garcia appeals from the district

court’s partial grant of summary judgment on her workers’

compensation retaliation claims against Defendants-Appellees Steven

Robinson, Johnny Williams and Kay Doebbeling (“defendants”). The

district court dismissed the defendan ts i n their official

capacities , holding that (1) the Texas legislature has not waived

sovereign immunity from workers’ compensation retaliation claims

for the State of Texas and state agencies, and (2) the defendants,

acting in their official capacities, are cloaked with the same

immunity from suit.

In conducting our de novo review, we have carefully evaluated

the record on appeal, the arguments of counsel for both parties as

set forth in their respective briefs to this court, and the

applicable law. Our review convinces us that the district court

correctly analy zed the issue, applied the appropriate law, and

reached the correct result. Garcia’s singular reliance on C ity of

LaPorte v. Barfield 1 in support of her contention that sovereign

i mmunity has been waived by the Texas legislature in workers’

compe nsation retaliation cases is misplaced. In B arfield

, the

Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas legislature has granted a

limited waiver of sovereign immunity from workers’ compensation

retaliation claims for political subdivisions of the State of

Texas, such as cities and local school districts, but not for the2 Id. at 297-299.

3 919 S.W.2d 185, 187-188 ( Tex. App. - Eastland 1996) (writ denied). See also Bagg v. University of Texas Medical Branch at
Galveston

, 726 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex. App.

- Houston [14th Dist.]
1987) (writ ref’d n.r.e.) (officials enjoy same governmental immunity as state entity to the extent they act in their official capacity when they discharge an employee).

3 S tate of Texas itself or its agencies. 2 Moreover, another Texas

appellate decision has recently confirmed that a Texas state agency

and its officials acting in their official capacity are entitled to

sovereign immunity from claims of workers’ compensation

retaliation. 3 Accordingly, the district court properly granted

summary judgment to defendants in their capacities as officials of

either the Texas Youth Commission, a state agency, or its wholly

owned entity, the West Texas State School.

In any event, the district court did not grant summary

judgment on Garcia’s retaliation claims against the defendants in

their individual capacities, so Gar cia was able to present these

claims to a jury and did so. The jury found, however, that the

defendants had not discharged Garcia for her good faith filing of

a workers’ compensation claim, and thus had not discriminated

against her for filing that claim. Consequently, Garcia would be

collaterally estopped from re-litigating the same workers’

compensation retaliation claim in another trial against the

defendants in their official capacities that she had actually4 “Collateral e stoppel depends on three elements: (1) the

issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior

action; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior action; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior action must have a necessary part of the judgment in that earlier

action.” RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost

, 44 F.3d 1284, 1290 (5th
Cir. 1995). In this case, all three elements are clearly present.

4 litigated against the defendants in their individual capacities. 4

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Robinson, Williams and Doebbeling, d ismissing them as

defendants in their official capacities.

AFFIRMED.