alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.1






FIRST AMENDMENT TO

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




This First Amendment to Employment Agreement (this “Amendment”) is made this 11th day of June,
2009 by and between MMA FINANCIAL, INC., a Maryland corporation (“Employer”) and DAVID KAY
(“Employee”).



WHEREAS, Employer and Employee are parties to that certain Employment Agreement dated November
7, 2007 by and between Employer and Employee; and



WHEREAS, Employer and Employee desire to modify certain terms of the Employment Agreement as
more particularly set forth herein.



NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and other good and valuable consideration,
the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Employer and Employee hereby agree as
follows:



1. 2006 Form 10-K Completion Bonus. The parties agree that the 2006 Form 10K
Completion Bonus provided for in Section 2(c) of the Employment Agreement, shall be paid ratably
during the period from May 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009. Specifically, the Bonus shall be
paid in equal monthly installments (in the second pay period of the month) in accordance with and
as part of Employer’s normal payroll schedule and practices.



2. 2007 Form 10-K Completion Bonus. The parties agree that the 2007 Form 10K
Completion Bonus provided for in Section 2(c) of the Employment Agreement of 1.34 times Employee’s
base compensation then in effect upon the filing of the Company’s 2007 Form 10-K, will be replaced
by a bonus in the amount of 0.66 times Employee’s current base compensation. This amount shall be
paid ratably during the period from October 1, 2009 through March 15, 2010. These payments will be
made in equal monthly installments (in the second pay period of the month) in accordance with and
as part of Employer’s normal payroll schedule and practices.



3. Severance. Effective October 1, 2009, Section 7(a)(ii), Clause (z) of the
Employment Agreement is hereby amended to provide for severance payments in an amount equal to one
(1) year’s Base Compensation.



4. No Other Changes. Except as modified herein, the Employment Agreement remains in
full force and effect in accordance with its terms.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF and intending to be legally bound, the parties have executed this Amendment
as of the date and year first above written.



MMA FINANCIAL, INC.



By: /s/ Michael L. Falcone

Michael L. Falcone, President and CEO




By: /s/ David Kay


David Kay
Case 10 — INDICTMENT—

September 27.

#### Commonwealth v. James.

APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT.

Where a license to retail liquors is issued to a -firm composed of two partners, and one of the partners afterwards buys out the other, who thereupon retires from the business, the license . still protects the remaining partner in selling at the place and during the time for which it was issued.

WM. J.. HENDRICK, Attorney-General, for appellant.

A license to two as partners *ichilc the partnership continues*will authorize the sale of liquor under the. license by either one of the partners. But it will not authorize a sale by one partner in the name of the partnership after the partnership has been dissolved. (Bryant v. Proctor, 14 B. M., 457; Bentley v. White, 3 B. M., 266; McAdams v. Hanes, 9 Bush, 16; Conwell'v. Sandidge, 5 Dana, 213.)

W. G. WELCH for appellee. .

The withdrawal of one member of a firm to which a license has been issued does not deprive the remaining member of the right to do business under the license, even under a new firm name. (Hill v. Thixton, 13 Ky. L. R., 333; 2 Am. & Eng. Enc.-oi Law, 646 and notes; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 515 and notes.)

JUDGE HAZELRIGG

delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question presented on this appeal is whether, when a license to retail liquor has been issued to a firm composed of two partners, and one of the partners has bought out the other who thereupon retires from the business, the license still protects the remaining partner in selling at the place and during the time for which it was issued.

Upon what just ground the retirement of one member of the firm should work a forfeiture of the license we are not' *31able to perceive. The remaining partner has parted with no rights, and given up no privileges secured to him by name in the license to the firm: It is true a license is said to be a personal privilege, depending on the fitness of the licensee to properly exercise the grant. But it can hardly be supposed that the issual of a license to a firm or partnership is made to depend on the personal fitness of any particular member of the firm over that of any other member. Rather should we say that the law requires each member to be personally fit before the license should be granted. And the remaining member is certainly not rendered less fit personally to exercise the privileges of the license because his partner has retired.

Such has been the conclusion of this and the Superior Court with reference to peddlers’ licenses. (Hill v. Thixton, 94 Ky., 96.) And such was the conclusion of the Superior Court in this case on a former appeal by the present appellee. 16 Ky. Law Reporter, 445.

Judgment affirmed.
#### Eastman Kodak Company, Respondent, v. Maurice Gottlieb Gennert and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with Dake Drug Company.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

All concurred, except Robson, J., who dissented and voted for a modification of the order by striking out the provision restraining appellants from putting out, selling, etc., as Kodak acid fixing powder, any acid fixing powder other than that put out and sold by the plaintiff, etc.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**Written Statement of the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned officerof JAKKS Pacific, Inc. (“Registrant”), herebycertifies that the Registrant’s Annual Report onForm 10-K for theyear ended December 31, 2005 (the “Report”) fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thatthe information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Registrant.Date: March 15, 2006     /s/ Joel M. Bennett           JOEL M. BENNETT *Executive Vice President and* *Chief Financial Officer*
90
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of XETA Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended July 31, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Robert B. Wagner,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

                                                /s/  Robert B. Wagner
                                        ------------------------------------
                                        Robert B. Wagner
                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                        September 8, 2003
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.2

                                SECOND AMENDMENT
                                     TO THE
                              BOWATER INCORPORATED
                      RETIREMENT PLAN FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS
                             AS AMENDED AND RESTATED
                                FEBRUARY 26, 1999

         WHEREAS, Bowater Incorporated, a Delaware corporation (the
"Corporation"), established the Bowater Incorporated Retirement Plan for Outside
Directors (the "Plan"); and

         WHEREAS, the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the
Corporation desires to amend the Plan to provide for a lump sum distribution
option;

         NOW, THEREFORE, effective November 6, 2001, the Plan shall be amended
as follows:

1.       Section 4.04 shall be amended by adding the clause "Except as may be
         otherwise elected by the Participant pursuant to Section 4.05," at the
         beginning thereof.

2.       A new Section 4.05 shall be added as follows:

         "4.05 LUMP SUM OPTION: During each December beginning with December
         2001 (the "Election Period"), a Participant may elect to receive any
         benefits to which he is entitled under this Article 4 in a lump sum
         computed using the applicable mortality table defined in Internal
         Revenue Code Section 417(e)(3)(A)(ii)(I) and a 7% interest rate ("Lump
         Sum Election"). A Lump Sum Election must be made on or before the
         December 31st that is at least one full calendar year before the year
         of payment. A Lump Sum Election, once made, cannot be revoked except
         during an Election Period."

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Bowater Incorporated has caused this First
Amendment to be executed by a duly authorized member of the Executive Committee
of the Board of Directors as of the 6th day of November 2001.

                                         BOWATER INCORPORATED

                                         Executive Committee of the Board
                                         of Directors

                                         By: /s/ Arnold M. Nemirow
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Arnold M. Nemirow


                                         Date Signed: May 3, 2002
II

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2313

To provide each Member of the Senate with a mail allowance sufficient

to permit at least 1 mailing per fiscal year to each postal address

in each county in the State of that Member where the Member holds

and personally attends a town meeting.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 29, 2000

Mr. SPECTER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Rules and Administration

A BILL

To provide each Member of the Senate with a mail allowance

sufficient to permit at least 1 mailing per fiscal year

to each postal address in each county in the State of

that Member where the Member holds and personally

attends a town meeting.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. MAIL ALLOWANCE FOR SENATORS.

4 Section 506 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act,

5 1973 (2 U.S.C. 58) is amended by inserting after sub6 section (b) the following:
2

•S 2313 IS

1 ‘‘(c) In addition to the funds provided for in sub2 section (b), the amount available to a Member under sub3 section (b)(3)(A)(iii) shall include an additional amount

4 sufficient to pay the expenses that would be incurred mail5 ing 1 letter to each postal address in each county in the

6 State of that Member where the Member holds and per7 sonally attends a town meeting (not to exceed 1 town

8 meeting per county per year).’’.

Æ
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
         This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
unaudited  financial  statements of Liberty Housing Partners Limited Partnership
at and for the period  ended June 30, 1999 and is  qualified  in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.

</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         524,207
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               732,015
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,193,057
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          11,844,366
<BONDS>                                        1,073,635
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
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<OTHER-SE>                                     (10,724,944)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,193,057
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               167,009
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               66,360
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,135,343
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,034,694)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                2,654,107
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,619,413
<EPS-BASIC>                                  74.34
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0



</TABLE>
No. 1,707.

#### CASEY, Respondent, *v.*ST. PETERS, Appellant.

*Appeal from District Court,.Silver Bow County; John Lindsay, Judge.*

On motion to dismiss appeal.

Decided November 21, 1903.

*Mr. John N. Kirie,*andilír. *John W. Stanton,*for Appellant.

Per Curiam.

The motion 1» dismiss this appeal is hereby sustained, and the appeal is dismissed at the cost of appellant.
#### WOOD et al. *v.*VIRGINIA.

No. 79.

Decided June 10, 1963.

*Melvin L. Wulf, Leonard W. ffoít, Henry Halvor Jones*and *Simon Lawrence Cain*for petitioners.

*Robert Y. Button,*Attorney General of Virginia, and *R. D. McIlwaine III,*Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Per Curiam.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is vacated ana the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for reconsideration in light of *Peterson*v. *City of Greenville,*373 U. S. 244.

Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result on the premises stated in his separate opinion in *Peterson*v. *City of Greenville*and *Avent*v. *North Carolina,*373 U. S., at 248.
#### LARGEY, Appellant, *v.*MANTLE, Respondent. OWSLEY, Intervenor and Appellant.

(No. 1,063.)

(Submitted November 14, 1901.

Decided January 13, 1902.)

*Trial*— Instructions—General *Charge.*

where requested instructions are sufficiently covered by the general charge, it is not error to refuse them.

*Appeal from, District Court, Silver Bow• County; J. J. Melt aitón, Judge.*

; Action by P. A. Largey against Lee Mantle, defendant, and William Owsley, intervenor. Erom a judgment for defendant, and from orders denying a new trial, plaintiff and intervenor appeal.

Affirmed.

*Mr. John W. Cotter,*for Intervenor and Appellant.

*Mr. F. T.*McBride, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

*Messrs. Boote & Clark,*for Respondent.

MR. JUSTICE MILBURN

delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover the sum of $15,000, alleged to have been received by defendant for the use and benefit of plaintiff, for that a certain mining claim, called “Britannia,” and held in the name of the defendant, was the common property of the plaintiff and the defendant, and was sold by defendant for the sum of $30,000, the plaintiff having fully paid all charges and expenses owing by him for developing the claim, etc. By. leave of court one Owsley intervened, and claimed for himself the *265said sum, of $15,000, for that ba was the owner of the undivided one-half interest in the said Britannia lode claim-. Defendant denied that either owned any interest in the property, or had any interest in the proceeds of the sale. The jury found all the issues' in favor of the defendant, and judgment was entered accordingly. The plaintiff and the intervemor severally appealed from the judgment, and from an order denying their motions for a new¡ trial.

The plaintiff argues his appeal upon the alleged error of the court in giving certain instructions and in refusing’; others1. The intervenor does the like, adding that the court erred in overruling his objection to a certain question asked by defendant of a witness named Allpo-rt.

We find nothing prejudicial to either the plaintiff or the in-tervenor in these matter’s. The instructions given and complained of are not all very clear, but were snch as could be easily understood when read in connection with the rest of the charge; and those refused,’ so far as they stated the law, were sufficiently covered by those given.

We find no substantial error to; the prejudice of either the plaintiff or the interevenor.

The order denying the motion for a new trial and the judgment are affirmed.

*Affirmed.*
#### Mary L. Alderson, Respondent, v. Christopher Elmo Alderson, Appellant.

(No. 1.)

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

All concurred. *Betts,*J., not sitting.
#### LYON v. PLANKINTON BANK et al.

(Opinion filed, Nov. 1, 1905.)

On rehearing.

Former opinion modified, and order below modified.

For former opinion, see 18 S. D. 330, 100 N. W. 1127.

*Grigsby*& *Grigsby*and *Davis, Lyon*& *Gates (Aikens*& *Judge, of*counsel), for appellants. *Rogde*& *Winans (James P. Trottman*and *James G. Planders, of counsel),*for respondents.

FULLER, P. J.

Plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendants leave to serve and file an amended answer and counterclaim in an action to quiet title to real property; and for the reasons stated on rehearing in Murphy v. Plankinton Bank, 20 S. D. supra;105 N. *W.*245, herewith submitted and decided, such order is reversed in so far as the same provides for the foreclosure of an alleged mortgage upon the premises in controversy, and the case is *182remanded, with the direction that the trial court eliminate from such amended pleading all allegations essential to a foreclosure of the mortgage.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6619

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

VONDIA CLARY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert J. Staker, Senior

District Judge. (CR-88-222, CA-97-385-3)

Submitted: September 30, 1998 Decided: October 21, 1998

Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Vondia Clary, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Michelle Lecocq, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Vondia Clary appeals the district court’s order denying her

motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).

Clary’s case was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1994). The magistrate judge recommended that

relief be denied and advised Clary that the failure to file timely

objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of

a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this

warning, Clary failed to object to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation.

The timely filing of objections to a magistrate judge’s

recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the

substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned

that failure to object will waive appellate review. See Wright v.

Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.

Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 93-94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.

1208 (1984); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Clary has

waived appellate review by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice. We accordingly deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                             694
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           1,595
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 2,721
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                      1,529
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        118,638
<ALLOWANCE>                                        294
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 129,871
<DEPOSITS>                                      87,336
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<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,104
<LONG-TERM>                                     17,454
<COMMON>                                            28
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<OTHER-SE>                                      23,949
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  23,977
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  9,704
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                  127
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   388
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                10,219
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               4,565
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,552
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            4,667
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       41
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                   3187
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,021
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</TABLE>