1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### EC TE RM OF YE AR S TRU S T v . UNITE D STATE S CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 05–1 54 1. Ar g u ed Feb r u a r y26, 2007 —D ec ided April 30, 20 07 Un der26 U. S. C. §742 6(a) (1), if th e In t e r n a l Rev e n u e Ser v ic e (IRS )

lev i es u p ona th ir d par t y ’ s p r oper tyto c o llec ttax es ow edbyan oth e r , th e th ir d par t ymaybr in gaw r o n g fu l lev yac tionag ain s t th e Un ite d S t at es , s o lon ga s s uch a c t i on is b r oughtb e fore “ t h e ex pira t i on of 9 mon t h s fr om th e date of th e lev y , ” §6532(c )(1). Inc o n t rast, th e lim i

tation s per i odforataxr e fu n dac tion u n der28 U. S. C

. §1346(a)( 1 ) beg i n s w i tha nadmin i s t r ati v e c l aim th at maybe file d w i th inat le as t tw o y e ar s, an d may be br ou gh t to c o u r tw i th inan oth e rtw o y e ar s af

teranadmin i str ativ e den i a l

. Th e IRS lev i ed ona ban k ac c o u n tin whichpet i t i oner (T rus t) h a d depos i t e d funds b e ca us e t h e IRS a s su med th at th e Tr u s t’s c r e at or s h a d tr an sfer r e d assets to th e Tr u s t to ev ade tax es. Th e ban k r e spon ded w i tha c h e c kto th e Tr easu r y . Al

most a y e arl a ter , th e Tr u s t an d oth e r s br ou gh t a §742 6 ( a)(1) ac tion cla i ming wron g ful levies , b u tt h e Dis t rict Courtdis m is sed t h e com pla i nt b e ca us e it wa s filed aft e r t h e 9

- mont h limit a t ions period h a d expired. Aft e r uns ucces s f ully purs ing at a x refund a tt h e a d minis t ra tiv e lev e l, th e Tr u s t filed a r efu n dac tionun der§1346(a)( 1 ). Th e D i s tr ic t Cou r th e ld th at a w r o n g fu l lev yc l aim u n d er§7426( a)(1) w a s th e s o le remedy pos s i b l e a n d dismis s e d, a n d t h e Fift h Circuita ffirmed. Held: Th e Tr ust mis s ed § 7 4 26(a)( 1 )’s deadline for cha llenging alevy,

an d mayn o t br in gth e ch allen g e as a taxr efu n dc l aim u n d er §134 6(a)(1). Sec t ion742 6( a)(1) pr ovides the exclusive remedy for t h ird-pa rt y wr ongful levycla i ms . “ [A] precis ely dra wn, d e t a iled s t at

ute pre-empts more gene ral remedies,” Brownv. GSA , 425 U. S. 820, 834, an d i t b r ac es th e pr e e mptionc l a i m w h e nr e sor tto ag e n e r a l remedy wo uld effectively ext e nd the lim itations period for the specific one, see id. , at 83 3. If th ir d par t ies c o u l d av ail th emselv es of §1346(a)(1)’s general tax refund j urisdiction, they could effortlessly2 EC TERMOF YEARS TRU S T v. UNITED STATE S Sy llabu s evade §7426( a)(1)’s much shorter limi tatio ns period. T h e Trust ar

g u es th at, be c a u s e United Statesv. Will iams , 514 U. S. 52 7, c o n s t rued §1 34 6 ( a)(1 )’s genera l j uris d ic tion a lg r an t ex pan s iv elyen ou gh to c o v e rth ir d par t ies’ w r o n g fu l lev yc l aims, tr ea tin g§742 6(a)(1) a s t h e exclus ive av enue for t h es e cla i ms would a m ountt o adis f a v ored h o ldin gth at § 742 6(a)(1) imp lic itlyr e peale d§13 46( a)(1)’s pr e-ex istin g ju r i sdic tion al g r an t. Bu t this r e ads Willi ams too br oad l y . Williams involved alien a n d wa s decided on t h e s p ecific unde r s t anding t h a tno ot her remedy wa s open t o t h e pla i nt iff. Here, t h eTr u s tcha llenges a lev yan d c o u l d h a v e made a timelyc l ai m u n der§7426( a)(1). Ev enif th e pr esu m pti o nag ain s t im plied r e peals applied h e r e , §742 6(a)(1)’s 9

- mont h limita t i ons period ca nnotb e reconciled wit ht h e not i on t h at t h e s a me cha llenge wo uld b e open u n der §1 3 4 6 ( a)(1 ) for up t o fo ur yea r s . Nor ca n t h e t w o s t a t ut ory s chemes b e ha rmonized b ycons t ru in g§7426(a)( 1 )’s filin gdeadlin e to c o v e r on lyth ose ac tion s seekin g pr edepr i v ationr e medies u n av aila ble u n d er§1346(a)( 1 ). O nits fac e , §742 6(a)(1) a pplies to pr edepr i v ationa n d postdepr iv ationc l ai m s alike. Pp. 4–7. 434 F. 3d 80 7, affir m ed.

S OUTER , J ., del i vered t h e opi n ion forauna nimous Court

._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 54 1 

### EC TE RM OF YE AR S TRU S T, PE TITIONE R v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Apr il 30, 20 0 7 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S OUTER

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. This is a challenge to the Intern al Revenue Servi c e’s levy upon the propertyof a trust, to collect taxes owed by another, an action specifically authorized by 26 U. S. C. §7426(a)(1), but subject to a sta t u t ory filing deadline the trust missed. The question is whether the trust may still challenge the levy through an action for tax refund under 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(1). We hold t hat it may not. I The Internal Revenue Code provides that “[i]f any per

son liabl e to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay th e same after demand, th e amount .

. . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to prop

erty, wheth e r real or p e rsonal, belonging to s u ch person. ” 26 U. S. C. §6321. “A federal tax lien, however, is not self

executing,” and the IRS must take “[a]ffirmati v e action .

. . to enforce c o llection of the unpaid taxes.” U n it e dSt at e s v. National B a nk of Commerce , 47 2 U. S. 713, 720 (1985). One of its “principal t ools,” ibid. , is a l e vy, which is a “legally san ctioned seiz ure and sal e of property,” Black ’ s Law Di ctionary 926 (8 th ed. 2004); see als o §6 331(b) (“Th e2 EC TERMOF YEARS TRU S T v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt 

### term ‘lev y’ as used in this title includes the power of di s traint and s e izure by any means”). To protect against a “ ‘wrongful’ ” imposition upon “prop

erty whi c h is not the taxpayer’s,” S. Rep. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1966), the Federal Tax Lien Act o f 1966 added §7426(a)(1), providi n g tha t“[i ]f a levy h a s been made on proper ty .

. . any person (ot h er than the person against whom i s assessed the tax outof whichsuc h levy arose) who claim s an interest in .

. . s u ch proper t y and that such propert ywas wron gfully levied upon may bring a civi l action against the United States in a district court.” 80 Stat. 114 3. The action must, however, be brought before “the expiration of 9 months from the date of the levy.” 1 

### §6532(c)(1). This short limitations period contrasts w i th its counterpart in atax refund action unde r 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(1), which begins with an administra

tive claim t hat may be filed withinat least tw o years, and may be bro u ght to cou rt with in a n other two after an ad

ministrative denial. 2 

### T h e demand for greater haste when a third party contests a levy is no accident; as the Gov

ernment explained in the hearings before pa ssage of th e Act, “[s]inc e after seizure of property for nonpayment of taxes [an IRS] distric tdirecto r is likely to suspend further

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1 This period ca n b e ext e nded for up t o 1 2 mont hs if t h e t h ird pa rt y makes anad min i str a tiv e r e qu est forth e r e tu r nof th e pr oper tywr ong fu llylev i ed u p on . See 26 U. S. C. §6532(c ) ( 2 ).

2 Title 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)( 1 ) g i v e s distr i c tc o u r t s “ju r i sdic tion , c o n cur rentwit ht h e Unit ed S t at es Courtof Federa lCla i ms ,” over “ [ a] ny c i v il ac tionag ain s t th e Un it ed St ates fort h e r e c o v e r yof,” amon goth e r th in g s , “an yin ter n a l-r e v e nu e taxalleg e dto h a v e beener r o n e ou slyor illegally asse ssed or collected.” A taxpayer may bring such an action w i th intw o y e ar s afterth e IRS dis a llow s t h e tax pay e r ’ s admin i s t r ativ e r efu n d c l aim. See 26 U. S. C. §§653 2(a)(1)–(2); see al so §742 2(a) (r e quiring a taxpayer to file the admi nistr ative claim before seeking a refund in cour t)

. An a d minis t ra t i ve refund cla i m must , in t urn, b e filed w i th intw o y e ar s fr om th e d ate th e taxw a s pa id or th r e e y e ar s fr om th e time the tax return was file d, whicheve ri s later. See §6511( a).3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### collection activities ag ainst the taxpayer, itis essential that he be advised promptly if he has s e i z ed property which does not belong to the taxpa y er.” Hearings on H. R

. 11256 and H. R. 11290 before th e House C o mmittee on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 57–58 (1966) (written s t a t ement of S t anley S. S u rrey, Assistant Sec r e tary of the Treasury); see also id

. , at 72 ( s tatement of Laurens Williams, Cha i rman, Special Committee on Fed

eral Liens, American Bar Association) (“A short (9 month) statute of limitations i s provided, because it i s important to get such controvers ies de cided quickly so the Govern

ment may p u rsue the taxpayer ’s own property if it made a mistake the first time”). II After Elme r W. Cullers, Jr., and Dorothy Cu llers estab

lished the EC Term of Years Trust in 1991 , the IRS a s sessed federal tax liabilities aga i nst them for what th e Government claimed (and the Trust does not dispute, s ee Tr. of OralArg. 7) we re unwarra nted income tax deduc

tions in the 1980s. The Government assumed that the Cullerses had transfer r ed assets to the Tru s t to evade taxes, and so filed a tax lien against the Tru s t in Au gus t 1999. The Trust denied any obligation, but for the sake of preventingdisruptive collection efforts bythe IRS, it deposited f unds in a b ank accoun t, against which the IRS issued a notice of levy to the bank in September 1999. In October, th e bank res p onded with a check for over $3 million to the United States Treasury. Almost a year after that, the Trust (joined by several other trust s created b ythe Cullerses) brough t a ci vil ac

tion under 26 U. S. C. §7426(a)(1) claiming wrongful lev

ies, but the District C o urt dismissed it because the com

plaint was filed after the 9-month limitations period had expired, see §6532(c)(1). The court also noted that ta xrefund claims under 2 8 U. S. C. §1346(a)(1) were not op en4 EC TERMOF YEARS TRU S T v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt 

### to the plain t iff trusts because §742 6 “ ‘ a ffords the exclusive remedy foran innocent third p a rty whose propertyis confiscated by the IR S to satisf y another person’s ta x liability.’ ” BSC T erm of Y e ars T r ustv. United S t a t es , 2001–1 USTC ¶50,174 , p. 87,237, n. 1, 87 AFTR 2d ¶2001– 390, p. 20 01–547, n. 1 (WD Tex., 2000) (q uoting Tex a s Comm. Ban kFort Worth, N. A. v. United States , 896 F. 2 d 152, 156 (C A5 1990); emphasis del e ted). At fi rst the Trus t sought review by the Court of Appeals for t h e Fifth Ci r cuit, but th en voluntarily dismissed its appeal. BSC Term of Years T r ustv. United States , 87 AFTR 2d ¶2001–1039, p. 2001–2532 (2001). After unsuccessfully pursui n ga ta x re fu nd a tth e admi ni stra tive lev e l, t h e Tru s t f i l e d a sec o ndacti on, t h i s on e f o r a r e fu nd und e r§13 46( a)( 1 ). Th e Di strict C o ur t rema in ed o f th e vi ew that a claim for a wr ongful levy under §742 6(a) (1) had been th e sole r e medy pos s i b l e a n d dismissed. 3

### The C o urtof App e a l s for th e F i fth Circu it aff i rmed. Because the Ninth Circuit, on t h e contrary , has held that §7426(a)(1) is not the exclusive remedy for third parties challenging a levy, see WW SM Investo rsv. United Sta t es , 64 F. 3d 456 (1995), we granted certiorari to re

solve the conflict, 549 U. S ___ (2006). We affi rm. III “In a variety of contexts the Court has h e ld t hat a pre

cisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.” Brownv. GSA , 425 U. S. 820, 8 34 (1976); see Blockv. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and Schoo l Lands , 461 U. S. 273, 284–286 (1983) (adverse claimants to real property of the United States may not rely on “officer’s suits” or on other general remedies because the

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3 The Dis t rictCourtdeclined t o dis m is s the Trus t ’ s cla i m on res j u di

c ata g r ou n d s, an d th e G o v e r n m en t does n o t ar g u e c l aim orissu e pr ec lu sionint h is Cou r t , see Br ief forUn ited State s 5, n

. 2.5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Quiet Title Act of 1972 is theirexclusive recourse); s ee also Stonite Products Co. v. Melv in Lloyd Co. , 315 U. S. 561 (1942) (venue in patent infringement cases is gov

erned by a statute dealing specifically with patents, not a general venue provision). It braces the preemption claim when resort to a general reme dy would effectively extend the limitations period for the specific one. See Brownv. GSA , supr a , at 833 (rej ecting an in terpretatio nthat would “driv[e] out of currency” a narrowly aimed provision “with its rigorous .

. . time limitations” by permit ting “ac c ess t o the courts u n der other, less demanding statut es”); see also Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams , 544 U. S. 113, 122–12 3 (2005) (concluding that 47 U. S. C. §332(c) precludes resort to the general cause of action under 42 U. S. C. §1983, i n part becaus e §332 “limits relief inways that §1983 does not” by req u iring judic i al revi ew to be sought within 3 0 days); 544 U. S., at 130, n. (S TEVENS 

### , J., concurring in judgment) (same). Resisting the force of t h e better-fitted statute requires a good countervailing reason, and none appears here. Con

gress specifically tailored §7426(a) (1) to third party claims of wrongful levy, and if third parties could avail them

selves of the general tax refund ju risdiction of §1346(a)(1), they could effortlesslyevade the levy statute’ s 9-month limitations period thought essential to the G o vernment’s tax collection. The Trust a r gues that i n United Statesv. Willi ams , 514 U. S. 527 (1995), we construed th e general jurisdictional grant of §1346(a)(1) expansively enough to cover third parties’ wro ngful levy c l aims. So, according t o the Trust, treating §7 426(a)(1) as the excl usive avenue for the s e claims would amount to a disfavored holding that §7426(a)(1) implicitly repealed the pre-existing jurisdic

tional grant of §1346(a)(1). See Radzanowerv. Touc h e Ross & Co. , 426 U. S. 148 (1976); Mortonv. Mancari , 41 7 U. S. 535 (1974).6 EC TERMOF YEARS TRU S T v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt 

### But the Trust reads Williams too broadly. Although we decided that §1346(a)(1) authorizes a tax-refund claim by a third part y whose property was s ubjected to an allegedly wrongful ta x lien, we so held on the specificunderstandin g that no other remedy, not even a timely claim under §7426(a)(1), was open to the plaintiff in tha tcase. See William s , supra , at 53 6–538. Here, on the contrary, th e Trust chall e nges a levy , not a lien , and could have made a timely clai m under §7 426(a)(1) for the relief it now seeks under §1346(a)(1). 4 

### And even i f the canon against im plied repeals applied here, the Trust still could not prevail. We si mply canno t reconcile t h e 9-monthlimitation s period for a wrongful levy claim under §7426(a)(1) with the notion that the same challenge would be op en under §1 346(a)(1) for up to fou r years. See Posadasv. Natio n al Ci ty Bank , 29 6 U. S. 497,

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4 Itha s b een commonly un ders t o od t h a t Williams did not extend §134 6(a)(1) to par t ies inth e Tr u s t’s position

. See 434 F. 3d 807, 81 0 (CA5 2006) (case below) (“T o construe Wil liams to allow analter n ativ e r e medyun der §1346, w i thits lon g erst atu te of limit ation s per i od , would underm i ne t h e s uret yprovided b ythe clea r a v enue t o recover y u n d er§7426” ( c itationom itte d)); Dahnv. United Stat es , 127 F. 3d 12 49 , 125 3 (CA 10 1 997) (“[T]h er e w e r e n o taxl e v i es in v o lv ed in [Williams]

. Thus , t h e Cou r twa s concer n ed s o lely with t h e rea ch of §1 3 4 6per s e ; t h e exclus ivit y of a concur re nt§7 42 6 cla i m wa s never in is s u e. Indeed, th e Cou r tspec ific allyemph asized th e in a pplic abi lityof §7426 (oran y oth e rmean in g f u lr e medy) to r e in for c eits br oad r e adi n gof §1346”); WWSM In ves t ors v. United States , 64 F. 3 d456, 459 (C A9 19 95) (Br u netti, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court recognized Williams as a refund, nota wron g ful levy, ca s e , a n d [did not] even hintt h a t§7 42 6 wa s nott h e exclus ive reme dy for acla i med wrongf u l le vy ”); Rev. Rul. 200 5– 49, 20 05 –2 Cu m. Bu ll. 126 (“ Th e r ati on ale in Williams is inappl i

cab l e t o wrongful levy s u it s b e ca us e Congres s crea t e d a nexclus iv e remedy unders e ct ion 7 4 26 for t h ird per s ons cla i ming a nint e res tin property levied upon bythe [IRS]”); but se e WWSM Inve stors , sup ra , at 459 ( m ajor i t yopin ion) (“[S]eizin gmon e yfrom WWSM ’ s b a n kac c o u n tis funct iona lly eq uiva lentt o wha tt h e IRS did in Williams —pla cing alien on propert yi nes crow u n d er circ ums t ances whic hc o mpelled Mrs. Willi ams to p a y the IRS and discharge the l i en”).7 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### 503 (1936) (“[W]here provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the late r act to the extent of the conflict con s titutes an implied repeal of the earlier one”). On this point, the Trust proposes that the two statutor y schemes ca n be “harmonized” by construing the deadlin e for filing §7426(a)(1) claims to cover only those action s seeking “pre-deprivati on” remedies unavailable under §1346(a)(1). See Repl y Brief for Petitioner6. But this reading wo uld violate the clear text of §7426(a)(1), which on its face applies to pre-deprivati o n and post-deprivatio n claims alik e. See 26U. S. C. §7426(a)(1) (“Such actio n may be brought witho u t regardt o whether such propert y has been surrendered t o or sold by the Secreta ry”). * * * The Trust missed the deadline for challenging a levy under §7426(a)(1), and may not b r ing the ch allenge as a tax refund claim under §1346(a)(1). The judgment of th e Court of Ap peals is accordingly aff i rmed. It is so orde red.