NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

__________ 

No. 19-2079 

__________ 

BRUCE A. KIBE, JR., 

 Appellant 

v. 

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 

__________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(District Court Civil No. 2-18-cv-00228) 

District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

 November 1, 2019 

BEFORE: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 16, 2019) 

__________ 

OPINION*

__________ 

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

 Appellant Bruce Kibe, Jr., appeals from the decision of the District Court granting 

summary judgment to the Commissioner of Social Security who denied Kibe’s claim for 

disability benefits. We review to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence.1

 We will affirm. 

 As the parties are familiar with the record, we raise here only those facts that are 

essential to our decision. Kibe contends, first, that the ALJ erred at step three of the fivestep analysis by concluding that his impairments (learning disorder/borderline intellectual 

functioning, bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder) did not show the marked 

restrictions necessary to be “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing gainful 

activity”2

 consistent with the impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 

12.05 (intellectual disorder). Kibe points to his verbal comprehension IQ score of 70 and 

contends the ALJ erroneously relied on speculative inferences from the record to 

discredit it. Kibe also complains that the ALJ ignored the fact that, while in school, he 

was placed in specialized classes for learning disabled students. This placement, of itself, 

he says, was significant evidence of his impairment. 

Yet, the ALJ pointed to an array of evidence that undermined the IQ score as an 

accurate reflection of the severity of Kibe’s impairment. Kibe did not produce any 

physician diagnoses of an intellectual disability. Dr. David Newman diagnosed only 

 

1

 Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). “We have jurisdiction under 

both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review final determinations by the 

Commissioner.” Id. 

2

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). 
3 

borderline intellectual functioning. In addition, Kibe showed adaptive ability by: tending 

to his own personal care; independently making and keeping his own medical 

appointments; showing an ability to read and write; and, exhibiting an ability to do 

gainful employment. Moreover, after acknowledging that Kibe was in special education 

classes and had academic scores in a low to moderate range, the ALJ evaluated this 

evidence as insufficient to show low intellectual function. In short, the ALJ did not 

ignore or misinterpret crucial evidence relevant to step three of the analysis, nor did the 

decision rely on mere speculation. The ALJ’s decision that Kibe’s impairments did not 

show the marked restrictions necessary to meet a listed impairment is supported by 

substantial evidence. There is no basis here to remand. 

 Kibe next contends that the ALJ did not include his borderline intellectual 

functioning, as well as marked limitations in a number of areas, in the questions to the 

vocational expert at step five of the analysis. He maintains that this undermines the 

Residual Functional Capacity finding. The ALJ erred, he argues, by disregarding 

evidence of limitations in social interactions, as exhibited in Kibe’s verbal and physical 

altercations with co-workers, and similar behavior with people outside of work. He 

contends this demonstrates a marked limitation on his ability to work with others. 

Next Kibe says the ALJ brushed aside the opinion of his treating physician who 

opined that Kibe was completely disabled. He maintains that Dr. Joel Last’s observations 

and conclusions carried great weight because he was his treating physician. He also 

asserts that the ALJ relied instead on “stale” evidence. 
4 

There are a number of problems with his contentions. The ALJ has wide latitude 

to create hypothetical questions that incorporate a claimaint’s functional limitations. The 

ALJ also has ample discretion to weigh Kibe’s own opinions about his difficulties in 

work environments. With that said, noting that Kibe had mental limitations and moderate 

difficulties in social functioning, the record shows that the ALJ constructed hypotheticals 

accounting for superficial or minimal contact with the general public and co-workers. 

The hypotheticals also addressed a need for simple, repetitive tasks and precluded work 

with a fast pace or with production quotas. As for Dr. Last’s opinion, the ALJ did not 

disregard it. He accepted Last’s diagnosis of a schizoaffective disorder. But, as for his 

opinion on functional limitations and his general assessment that Kibe was completely 

disabled, the ALJ noted that the Doctor’s own record did not support his conclusions. 

The ALJ characterized Kibe’s medical treatment as conservative and largely successful in 

managing his impairments (for instance, dropping from monthly appointments to threemonth appointments to monitor his medication), contradicting Dr. Last’s conclusions 

about Kibe’s marked limitations. This led the ALJ to give less weight to Last’s opinion, 

eliminating any concerns about the date of the evidence the ALJ relied upon. The ALJ’s 

hypotheticals reflected the entire record; his analysis properly focused on assessing 

evidence of Kibe’s functional limitations. We conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. 

For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.