J-A10022-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

WILLIAMS FIELD SERVICES COMPANY, 

LLC, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v.

CLEO R. TEEL AND GLORIA D. TEEL, 

HUSBAND AND WIFE, 

 Appellees No. 1475 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment entered August 8, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County, 

Civil Division, at No(s): 2012-1959-CP

BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN, and STABILE, JJ. 

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2014 

I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s disposition vacating the trial 

court’s judgment entered in favor of Cleo R. and Gloria D. Teel, husband and 

wife, (collectively “the Teels”), following the trial court’s entry of nonsuit in 

favor of the Teels. 

 Instantly, the entry of the nonsuit against Appellant effectively denied 

the equitable remedy Appellant sought, i.e., a permanent injunction against 

the Teels. Therefore, in reviewing the trial court’s denial of injunctive relief, 

an abuse of discretion standard applies, which precludes an “inquir[y] into 

the merits of the controversy,” and only allows an examination of the record 

“to determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the 
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actions of the court below.” Erickman v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 21 

A.3d 1203, 1206-1207 (Pa. Super. 2011). “Only if it is plain that no grounds 

exist to support the decree or that the rule of law relied upon was palpably 

erroneous or misapplied will we interfere with the decision of the [trial 

court].” Id. My review of the record indicates that the trial court had 

“reasonable grounds” for entering the nonsuit, and therefore I would affirm.1

 In granting the nonsuit in favor of the Teels, the trial court 

determined: 

The crux of [Appellant’s] argument as it pertains to this 

particular issue is that the Pipeline Right-of-Way and Compressor 

Site Grant executed on October 6, 2007 (hereinafter "Right-ofWay Agreement") and the Compressor Station Agreement 

executed on June 19, 2008 (hereinafter "Compressor 

Agreement") are controlling and merely require mutual consent 

that “shall not be unreasonably withheld.” Complaint, ¶29; see 

also Right-of-Way Agreement. It is [Appellant’s] contention that 

consent was, in fact, obtained from [the Teels]. 

[The Teels’] contention is simply that they never consented 

to construction of the discharge pipeline at issue in the instant 

matter. Answer and New Matter, ¶12. [The Teels] assert that 

they were "unilaterally sent a check for payment of the

easement rights requested by [Appellant] but refused to accept 

the check and tried to return it." 

____________________________________________ 

1 Contrary to the Majority’s assertion, a careful reading of this dissenting 

memorandum reflects the recognition that a trial court’s actions vis á vis 

injunctions and nonsuits are to be reviewed by our Court under an abuse of 

discretion standard. This dissenting memorandum has neither ignored nor 

conflated this standard of review. Any assertions to the contrary are 

inaccurate. After a careful scrutiny of the record, I respectfully disagree with 

the Majority’s disposition in this matter. 
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Based on the testimony provided at trial, we are of the 

opinion that [the Teels’] consent, as required by the Right-ofWay Agreement, was never obtained by [Appellant]. At no point 

did [Appellant] or its witnesses provide this Court with proof that 

consent was obtained. 

Preliminarily, [Appellant] admitted that mutual consent 

was required in order to move forward with the discharge 

pipeline. N.T., 07/10/13, p. 24, ¶9-24; p. 97, ¶7-24. However, 

during the negotiations between the parties, [the Teels] were 

consistent in their refusal to allow construction of the discharge 

pipeline absent agreement on certain provisions, as evidenced 

by the following testimony provided by Ms. Cremer: 

Q: Did you have any knowledge whether the Teels wanted 

this pipeline to be built at all on their property? 

A: I believe they did say that they would prefer not to 

have any more pipelines on their property. 

Id., at p. 50, ¶12-16. 

Q: Okay. How did that meeting end? What was the result 

of that meeting? 

A: Pretty much we were in agreement on the route, that 

was not an issue. I said that we would go back and take a 

look at the provisions and figure out what we could do or 

not do and I told them that - - there was no way that we 

would be able to budge on the money and I asked them to 

seriously consider that during that period of time and - 

that was it. 

Id., at p. 61, ¶1-9.

Q: I’m going to show you, Ms. Cremer, what we've marked 

as [Appellant’s] Exhibit Number 7. Do you recognize that 

document? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Okay. And what is that document? 

A: This is a - - letter from Mr. and Mrs. Teel sent to

[Appellant] to the person who actually issued the check 

stating that they will not accept payment for the pipeline 

right-of-way, and that contrary to what we have said or 
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what you had said, that they have not consented to the

location of the proposed pipeline, however, they still do 

remain interested in discussing [Appellant’s] desire to 

install an additional pipeline. 

Id., at p. 63, ¶11-24. 

Q: So there was no final agreement reached at the 

meeting on April 4th. 

A: No. 

Id. at p. 78, ¶ 19-11.

It is clear from the aforementioned testimony, along with 

other testimony provided at various stages of trial, that consent 

was never fully obtained. [Appellant] may argue that consent to 

location was obtained, but that hardly satisfies the consent 

requirement, considering the fact that [the Teels] had issue with 

monetary compensation, among other provisions. Each of 

[Appellant’s] witnesses stated that an agreement as to location 

was obtained. However, each witness also stated that there 

were outstanding provisions presented by [the Teels] that had 

yet to be finalized. Assuming for a moment that an agreement 

as to location was, in fact, obtained, we fail to see how agreeing 

on one (1) or a few issues, but failing to agree on the rest, 

constitutes consent as to the whole. 

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that [Appellant] failed to 

meet its burden of proof regarding mutual consent. Because no 

agreement was present between the parties, [Appellant] was not 

entitled to permanent injunction, rendering a nonsuit in favor of 

[the Teels] appropriate. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/13, at 3-5. My examination of the record comports 

with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant did not meet its burden of 

showing it was entitled to a permanent injunction against the Teels, such 

that a nonsuit was appropriate. 

An injunction is a court order that prohibits or commands virtually any 

type of action. It is an extraordinary remedy that should be issued with 
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caution and “only where the rights and equity of the plaintiff are clear and 

free from doubt, and where the harm to be remedied is great and 

irreparable.” Big Bass Lake Community Association v. Warren, 950 

A.2d 1137, 1144 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting 15 Standard Pennsylvania 

Practice 2d, § 83:2 (2005)). The requirements for permanent injunctive 

relief are well settled: a clear right to relief; an urgent necessity to avoid an 

injury that cannot be compensated in damages; and a finding that greater 

injury will result from refusing, rather than granting, the relief requested. 

Id. Even where the essential prerequisites of an injunction are satisfied, the 

court must narrowly tailor its remedy to abate the injury. Id. at 1144–1145 

(citing John G. Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing & Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 

1, 7, 369 A.2d 1164, 1167 (1977)). 

The power to grant or refuse injunctive relief “rests in the 

sound discretion of the court under the circumstances and the 

facts of the particular case.” Rick v. Cramp, 357 Pa. 83, 91, 53 

A.2d 84, 88 (1947). “The court which is to exercise the 

discretion is the trial court and not the appellate court. The 

action of the court may be reviewed on appeal for error in case 

of a clear abuse of discretion, but not otherwise.” Id. at 91, 53 

A.2d at 89. 

Woodward Township v. Zerbe, 6 A.3d 651, 658 (Pa. Commwlth. 2010). 

The testimony adduced at trial did not establish that Appellant’s right 

to build a new discharge pipeline on the Teels’ property was “clear” and “free 

from doubt.” See Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/13, At 3-5. Significantly, 

Appellant’s brief concedes that the Teels did not consent to the new pipeline. 

Specifically, while Appellant argues that the Teels’ consent was unnecessary, 
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Appellant’s brief states that “[u]pon approaching the Teels regarding the 

placement of the discharge line on their property under the existing 

agreements that [Appellant] acquired from Cabot, the Teels told [Appellant] 

that they did not want any additional pipelines on their land...” Appellant’s 

Brief at 7. Appellant further acknowledged, “after several months of 

meetings, telephone calls, and correspondence between the Teels and 

representatives of [Appellant], a new agreement regarding compensation 

and other terms for a pipeline agreement could not be reached among the 

parties.” Id. at 8. 

Furthermore, the record reviewed in toto does not evince “an urgent 

necessity to avoid an injury that cannot be compensated in damages.” Big 

Bass Lake, 950 A.2d at 1144 (internal citation omitted). Appellant is not 

without recourse at law. Appellant can initiate a civil action for damages 

against the Teels for a breach of contract alleging that the Teels 

unreasonably withheld their consent to the construction of the new pipeline. 

Finally, I am not persuaded by my review of the record that Appellant 

has demonstrated how a “greater injury will result from refusing, rather than 

granting, the relief requested.” See Big Bass Lake, supra. Therefore, I 

would affirm the trial court’s grant of nonsuit. Wyland v. West Shore 

School District, 52 A.3d 572, 582-583 (Pa. Commwlth. 2012) citing Cnty. 

of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 544 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. 1988) 

(emphasis in original) (“[Our] Supreme Court consistently holds that ‘for a 

preliminary injunction to issue, every one of [the] prerequisites [to the 
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granting of an injunction] must be established; if the petitioner fails to 

establish any one of them, there is no need to address the others.’”).