IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-10882

 

PEGGY MASTERSON STINNETT; PEGGY MASTERSON STINNETT, Trustee

of the R.B. Masterson Trusts; The Bennett Masterson Trust #1

and the Ben Masterson Stinnett Trust; LAUREL S. EMMETT;

SIDNEY S. BOYCE; MARY KRITSER MILLER; GEORGE SHELBY MILLER;

JOHN SIEBERT MILLER; MARTHA MILLER JARNAGIN; ELIZABETH K.

MASTERSON, Co-Trustee of the R. B. Masterson III Trust;

WILLIAM A. MASTERSON, Co-Trustee of the R. B. Masterson III

Trust; MARY LEWIS KLEBERG, Trustee of the Mary Lewis Kleberg

Trust; NATIONSBANK CORPORATION, Trustee of the T. B. Masterson

Jr. Trust; FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF AMARILLO, Trustee of the

Anna Belle Kritser Testamentary Trust; Trustee of the David

Sloan Kritser Trust; Trustee of the Shelby Masterson Kritser

Trust; Trustee of the Tom Moylan Kritser Trust; and Trustee

of the Mary Kritser Miller Trust; AMARILLO NATIONAL BANK,

Joint-Trustee of the Michael Weymouth Campbell Life Income

Trust; MARY ANN MUSICK, Joint-Trustee of the Michael

Weymouth Campbell Life Income Trust; ANN CAMPBELL MUSICK,

Custodian for Sarah Elizabeth Campbell; MICHAEL CAMPBELL,

Custodian for Sarah Elizabeth Campbell; TEXAS COMMERCE

BANK-AUSTIN, NA, Trustee of the Zachary T. Scott, Jr. Trust

No. 1 U/A dated November 1, 1941; The Zachary T. Scott,

Jr. Trust No. 2 U/A dated January 17, 1944; The Zachary T.

Scott, Jr. Trust No. 3 U/A dated December 16, 1952; The Ann

Scott Hearon Trust No. 1 U/A dated November 1, 1941; The Ann

Scott Hearon Trust No. 2 U/A dated January 17, 1944; and The

Ann Scott Hearon Trust No. 3 U/A dated December 16, 1952;

GEORGE C. MILLER, Executor of the Mary Kritser Miller Estate;

AMARILLO NATIONAL BANK, Trustee of the Susan Weymouth Snyder

Trust; The Betsy Bradshaw Life Income Trust; The Edmond L.

Bradshaw Revocable Trust; The Mary Ann Campbell Musick 

Trust; The Thomas C. Campbell Revocable Trust; The Thomas C.

Campbell Children’s Trust f/b/o Karly Nicole Campbell; The

Thomas C. Campbell Trust f/b/o Skyler Elise Campbell; The

Shannon Kay Parr Revocable Trust; The Michael W. Campbell II

Trust; The M. W. Campbell Children’s Bond Trust; The Michael

Weymouth Campbell Children’s Trust f/b/o Michael Weymouth

Campbell, III and Sarah Elizabeth Campbell; The Thomas Betsy

Jane Campbell Lien Trust; and the Betsy Campbell Lien Trust;

Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,

versus
2

COLORADO INTERSTATE GAS COMPANY, 

Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffAppellee-Cross Appellant,

versus

MESA OPERATING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Third Party Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

___________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas, Amarillo

___________________

September 8, 2000

BEFORE DAVIS, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges

WIENER, Circuit Judge.

Grounded in mineral exploration, development, and production

in the panhandle of Texas with a history almost as long as that

State’s oil and gas industry itself, the case that engenders the

instant appeal requires interpretation of contractual provisions

contained in several agreements and application of such

interpretation to facts that are either undisputed or have been

determined by a jury. The plaintiffs (collectively, “the

Mastersons”), as lessors and successors in interest to lessors of

minerals in the West Panhandle Field (the “Field”), instigated this

litigation in district court on the jurisdictional basis of

diversity citizenship, asserting damage claims for and related to

underpayment of lease royalties. The action was brought in 1992

against Colorado Interstate Gas Company (“CIG”) which in turn
1 Even though many of the parties to the instant litigation

are relative newcomers to the multi-decade leasing and production

history of the West Panhandle Field, we refer to the historical

lessors and their successors as the Mastersons and the historical

lessees as CIG, despite the fact that some of the information that

serves as background to the instant controversy involves

predecessors in interest on both sides of the lawsuit.

3

impleaded Mesa Operating Limited Partnership (“Mesa”), the operator

of the Field.1 

The long —— and frequently rancorous and litigious ——

contractual history of the oil and gas interests that lie at the

center of this controversy was consolidated and restated in 1955 in

a new and comprehensive mineral lease (the “1955 Lease”) from the

Mastersons as lessors to CIG as lessee. Over the ensuing decades

the parties entered into various supplemental and related

agreements and engaged in litigation of which the instant action is

but the latest chapter. After the district court dismissed some of

the Mastersons’ claims and a lengthy trial resulted in the jury’s

determination that the Texas theory of quasi-estoppel barred

recovery of all but a modicum of the multi-million dollar amount

sued for, the court entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of

CIG. This appeal ensued.

I.

Facts and Proceedings

Within a few years after execution of the 1955 Lease new

controversies arose, culminating in a settlement agreement (the

“1967 Settlement”). A key provision of that contract, and one that
2 Thousand cubic feet.

4

is central to this case, is a “favored nation clause” (“FNC”) which

was engrafted on the basic market value pricing scheme of the 1955

Lease. The FNC is contained in the third of four subsections of

Section A(2) of the 1967 Settlement: Subsection (a) fixes the

royalty rate of the 1955 Lease at 1/8th of 14¢ per mcf2 of gas

produced between July 1, 1967 and December 31, 1969; subsection (b)

fixes the royalty rate at 1/8th of the higher of 14¢ per mcf or

market value of the gas at the wellhead produced from January 1,

1970 through the remainder of the 1955 Lease term; subsection (c)

spells out the FNC; and subsection (d), which addresses maximum

royalty rates in the event of Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) gas

price regulation, is acknowledged by the parties to be irrelevant

to this litigation. In its entirety, subsection A(2)(c), the FNC,

states: 

In the event that [CIG] should, at any time

after July 1, 1967, voluntarily pay to any of

its lessors in the West Panhandle Field

royalty for gas produced from the West

Panhandle and Red Cave Formations at a rate

based on a price per Mcf higher than that

price upon which royalties are then being

computed and paid to Masterson hereunder,

[CIG] agrees to pay to Masterson royalties at

the rate of one-eighth (1/8) of such higher

price from and after such time through the

remainder of the lease.

None appear to dispute that the 1967 Settlement in general and

the FNC in particular constituted the agreed disposition of the

Mastersons’ complaints about past disparities in payment of
5

royalties, particularly in comparison to royalties paid to other

significant lessors in the Field (collectively the “Bivenses”).

Likewise undisputed is the overarching premise that, to function as

intended, the FNC had to operate in a single-price universe, in

which the Mastersons’ royalties would be calculated on the basis of

the highest gas price used for calculation of the Bivenses’

royalty.

The FNC worked as intended until the Federal Power Commission

(“FPC”) introduced price controls that established a multi-level

price scheme, keyed to the age of the well from which the gas in

question was produced. This change led the Mastersons and CIG to

modify their arrangement by executing another contract (the “1974

Agreement”) which created a tiered royalty calculation procedure.

Pertinent to this case is the provision in the 1974 Agreement that

payments made to the Mastersons under the 1955 Lease as modified by

the 1967 Settlement would be “in lieu of any and all other

royalties or payments to which [the Mastersons] might otherwise be

entitled.” The 1974 Agreement also specified that payment of

royalties to the Bivenses based on the same terms as those

contained in the 1974 Agreement would not trigger the FNC. The

thrust of this provision was to allow CIG to make the same pricing

“deal” with other lessors in the Field as made with the Mastersons

in the 1974 Agreement.

Matters became even more complex when, in 1978, the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) was created and empowered to
6

set maximum rates or “caps” on multiple categories of natural gas.

In response to this development, CIG entered into pricing

modifications with the Bivenses, then offered the same “deal” to

the Mastersons. Because this arrangement specified, among other

things, that eventually royalties would be calculated on the last

regulated rate preceding any eventual deregulation, the Mastersons

rejected it, preferring an arrangement following deregulation that

would require royalties to be calculated on the basis of the market

value of the gas. 

Despite rejecting the same deal that CIG had consummated with

the Bivenses, the Mastersons nevertheless asserted claims under the

FNC based on one provision —— the so-called City Rate for gas sold

to Amarillo —— that was being used to calculate royalties paid to

other lessors under the very arrangement that the Mastersons had

rejected. In 1988, these claims led to yet another pair of

modifying contracts, the Lease Amendment Agreement (the “1988

Amendment”) and the 1988 Royalty Agreement (collectively, the “1988

Agreements”), effective October 1, 1988. By virtue of these

revisions, the Mastersons both achieved the increased royalties and

the City Rate and retained their right to claim royalties

calculated on the basis of market value rather than the last FERC

rate following deregulation.

The incentive for CIG to (1) increase the Mastersons’ royalty

on so-called old gas, (2) pay the City Rate, and (3) permit the

Mastersons to retain the right to be paid royalties calculated on
7

the basis of market value pricing following deregulation, was the

release provision set forth in paragraph 9 of the 1988 Amendment,

in which the Mastersons agreed to release CIG and Mesa from all

claims, whether known or unknown, disclosed or undisclosed, related

directly or indirectly to gas produced under the 1955 Lease prior

to 1989. Regarding royalty payments related to gas produced under

the 1955 Lease after 1988, the parties agreed, in paragraph 7 of

the 1988 Amendment and paragraph 1(b) of the 1988 Royalty

Agreement, that all such payments would be “in lieu of any other

rate” and would “fully satisfy and comply with the provisions of”

the 1955 Lease and all intervening revisions and modifications.

Before trial, the district court granted a partial summary

judgment in favor of the Mastersons, holding the FNC valid; and, on

the eve of trial, the court granted a partial summary judgment in

favor of CIG, dismissing the Mastersons’ fraud and breach of

fiduciary duty claims and denying their “discovery rule” exceptions

to CIG’s release and statute of limitation defenses. 

A considerable portion of the testimony and documentary

evidence presented to the jury during the trial addressed the

machinations of the parties and their representatives that

transpired between the effective date of the 1988 Agreements (or

possibly even prior to that date) and the date in 1992 when the

instant lawsuit was filed. That evidence centers primarily on (1)

the positions taken by the parties and their representatives vis-avis one another, (2) the appropriate gas price or prices to be used
8

in the calculation of royalties, (3) the theories and bases of the

claims, and (4) matters disclosed and not disclosed in allegedly

disingenuous communications between and among those who were

purported to be secretly scheming and plotting claims and defenses

to claims. Rather than recounting all the details, it suffices for

the moment that the jury ultimately credited the version of these

actions and communications that led to its finding of quasiestoppel against the Mastersons on their post-1988 claims.

II.

Analysis

A. Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty

As the district court dismissed the Mastersons’ claims of

fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, we address them first. In

making its rulings on these issues, the district court did so as a

matter of law, grounding its decisions in material facts that are

not in dispute. Our review is therefore plenary. 

1. Fraud

In setting the stage for its ruling on the Mastersons’ fraud

claim, the district court correctly noted the elements of such a

claim in Texas: (1) A material representation was made (2) that

was false when made (3) by a speaker who either knew the statement

was false or made it as a positive assertion recklessly and without

knowledge of its truth (4) with the intent that the statement be

acted on, and (5) the party opposite acted in reliance on the false

material representation and (6) was injured as a result of doing
3 See, e.g., Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Sharbauer, 807 S.W.2d

714, 723 (Tex. 1990).

4 See Hickok Prod. & Dev. Co. v. Texas Co., 128 F.2d 183, 185

(5th Cir. 1942).

9

so.3 The foundation of the Mastersons’ claim of fraud is the

omission from CIG’s monthly royalty statements of any information

about the rates CIG was using to calculate the royalties it was

paying to the Bivenses. As such, the Mastersons’ fraud allegations

rest entirely on CIG’s silence; CIG is not accused of making any

affirmative misrepresentation regarding the rates used to figure

the royalties being paid to the Bivenses. 

We have long recognized that Texas’s law of fraud does not

impose liability for silence except when the one who has remained

silent is under a special duty to speak.4 In recognition of this

requirement when a claim of fraud is based on failure to speak, the

Mastersons advance the theory that the FNC produced a fiduciary

relationship between themselves and CIG, which relationship is

sufficient to meet the special duty requirement of fraud through

silence.

2. Fiduciary Relationship

The district court concluded that the Mastersons’ contention

that the FNC embodies a fiduciary duty requiring CIG to divulge

with each royalty statement the additional information about the

rate of royalty being paid to the Bivenses finds no support in the

applicable case law. We agree. In Texas, a “fiduciary
5 Castillo v. First City BancCorp. of Texas, 43 F.3d 953, 957

(5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v TBS Int’l, Inc.,

975 F.2d 1134, 1143 (5th Cir. 1992).

6 See Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp.

Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Tex. 1992).

7 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).

10

relationship is an extraordinary one and will not be lightly

created.”5 Fiduciary duties do not abound in every, or even most,

garden variety, arms-length contractual relationships, even those

among trusting friends.6

More specifically, favored nation clauses are anything but

rara avis in the Texas oilpatch; and there is a plethora of

opinions implicating Texas mineral contracts to be found in the

pages of the South Western Reporter and the Federal Reporter. Yet

in our independent research we have failed to locate any cases

holding that a favored nation clause in a contract between an oil

and gas lessor and its lessee produces a fiduciary relationship;

and the Mastersons have cited us to none. In attempting to do so,

however, they have referred us to cases which they advance as

holding that a variety of contractual relationships gives rise to

fiduciary duties. Their reliance on these cases is unavailing.

Manges v. Guerra,

7 for example, eschews a rule of contract-based

fiduciary duty, holding instead that such a duty “arises from the

relationship and not from express or implied terms of the contract
8 Id. at 183; see also Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson,

959 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Tex. 1997) (tightly restricting holding of

Manges while stating that “a holder of executive rights to a

mineral estate owes a fiduciary duty to the non-executive

interest”)

9 See HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex.

1998) (“Texas law has never recognized a fiduciary relationship

between a lessee and royalty owners.”); Mitchell Energy Corp. v.

Sampson Resources Co., 80 F.3d 976, 985 (5th Cir. 1996)(applying

Texas law); Hurd Enters., Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 112 (Tex.

App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Cambridge Oil Co. v. Huggins,

765 S.W.2d 540, 544-45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ

denied).

10 Sanus/New York Life Health Plan v. Dube-Seybold-Sutherland

Management, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 191, 199 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st

Dist.] 1992) (holding HMO had fiduciary obligations in its

treatment of member physician partnership which was “totally

dependent on [certain patient] information and relied exclusively

on [HMO] to provide it”); LeCuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W 2d 190,

192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (concerning

a relationship “distinguishable from that found in most cases of

this kind,” in that lessee was both gas producer and pipeline

operator, enabling it to “contract[] with itself respecting prices

of gas at the wellhead.”).

11

or deed.”8 As mineral lessors and lessee, the Mastersons and CIG

are not in a fiduciary relationship.9 In actuality, the facts of

the cases relied on by the Mastersons to support the proposition

that a mineral lessee is in a fiduciary relationship with his

lessor are so distinguishable from the instant facts as to be

inapposite.10 Our de novo review of the district court’s dismissal

of the Mastersons’ claims grounded in fraud and fiduciary duty

satisfies us that the court was correct, and we affirm.

B. The Mastersons’ Pre-1989 Claims

1. Release Clause: 1988 Amendment.
11 See In re: Fender, 12 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1995). 

12 See REO Indus., Inc. v. Natural Gas Pipeline of America,

932 F.2d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 1991).

13 Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (

Tex. 1987).

14 See Exxon Corp. v. West. Tex. Gathering Co., 868 S.W.2d

299, 302 (Tex. 1993); Nguyen Ngoc Giao v. Smith & Lamm, P.C., 714

S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986).

15 See D.E.W., Inc. v. Local 93, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.

Am., 957 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1992).

12

The Mastersons’ damage claims for underpayment of royalties

and related matters both before and after 1989, and CIG’s

contentions in opposition to claims for both periods, require

interpretation of the several contracts implicated by those claims

and defenses. Initially, therefore, we must determine whether the

1955 Lease and subsequent amendments and contracts affecting it are

ambiguous or unambiguous, as our standard of review depends on the

answer to that threshold question: Interpretation of ambiguous

contracts implicates questions of fact,11 which we review for clear

error; interpretation of unambiguous contracts presents questions

of law,12 which we review de novo. Whether a contract is or is not

ambiguous, however, is a question of law,13 which we review de novo.

A contract is ambiguous only if its meaning is susceptible of

multiple interpretations when subjected to applicable rules of

contract construction and interpretation.14 The mere fact that

lawyers may disagree on the meaning of a contractual provision is

not enough to constitute ambiguity.15
16 See Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. United States, 988

F.2d 1418, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993).

17 Ideal Lease Serv., Inc. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 662 S.W.2d 951,

953 (Tex. 1983).

13

The district court performed the correct analysis on the

pertinent portions of the 1967 Settlement as well as subsequent

amendments and agreements relative to the 1955 Lease and concluded

that all provisions of those modifying contracts implicated in this

case are unambiguous. For essentially the same reasons, we agree

and therefore proceed to construe those contracts and their

pertinent provisions de novo.

16 This in turn obligates us to give

effect to the clear written expression of the intent of the

parties.17

Although the FNC provision which first appeared in the 1967

Settlement lies at the heart of the Mastersons’ claims, both before

1989 and following 1988, we bifurcate consideration of their claims

because different legal and factual considerations apply, depending

on which of those time periods is involved. The FNC as contained

in section A(2)(c) of the 1967 Settlement specifies that if at any

time CIG voluntarily pays to any of its major lessors in the Field

royalties calculated on the basis of a higher rate than the rate on

which the Mastersons’ are being figured, CIG must pay the

Mastersons’ c royalty based on such higher rate, from that time

through the remainder of the lease. The Mastersons’ claims based

on CIG’s alleged violation of the FNC date from 1975 and thus
18 811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991).

19 943 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. 1997). In a post-argument letter

furnished by CIG pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

28(j), we are referred to the recent Texas Supreme Court case of

14

implicate the periods 1975 through 1988, and 1989 and following.

The reason for our bifurcation will become evident when we test the

efficacy of the release provision of the 1988 Amendment’s Paragraph

9 (the “Release”), which states:

Lessors do hereby release and forever

discharge Lessee from all causes of actions,

claims and demands, known or unknown, of

whatever type, which Lessor has ever had, now

have or may have hereafter arising out of,

incident to, or directly or indirectly

connected with gas produced to the [1955]

Lease prior to October 1, 1988 and from

October 1, 1988 to 1989, except as those

royalties are to be paid as provided herein. 

Pretermitting consideration at this juncture of the years 1989

and following, we turn to the language of the Release to see if it

bars the Mastersons’ FNC claims for the period 1975 through 1988.

The Mastersons do not appear to dispute the absence of ambiguity in

the Release or even CIG’s interpretation of its wording, only its

legal effects. Their contention is that Texas law requires such

releases to be specific and that the Release is not sufficiently

specific to exonerate CIG from pre-1989 liability under the FNC.

The Mastersons rely primarily on Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v.

Brady,

18 in response to which CIG relies primarily on the standard

of specificity announced more recently in Memorial Med. Ctr. of

East Texas v. Keszler.

19 The district court agreed with CIG’s
Keck, Mahin & Cate v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,

20 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tex. 2000) (“Nothing in Brady forbids such a

broad-form release. Brady simply holds that the release must

‘mention’ the claim to be effective. It does not require that the

parties anticipate and identify each potential cause of action

relating to the release’s subject matter. Although releases often

consider claims existing at the time of execution, a valid release

may encompass unknown claims and damages that develop in the

future.”) (internal citations omitted).

20 Memorial Medical Center, 943 S.W.2d at 434; Victoria Bank

& Trust Co., 811 S.W.2d at 938.

21 Memorial Medical Center, 943 S.W.2d at 435; Victoria Bank

& Trust Co., 811 S.W.2d at 938-39; Keck, Mahin & Cate, 20 S.W.3d at

698. 

15

position which, because it presents a question of law, we review de

novo.

Both Victoria Bank and Memorial Medical Center recognize that

to be legally enforceable a release must “mention” the claim or

claims being released.20 We are satisfied that “mentioning” does

not require particularized enumeration or detailed description,

only that the claim being released come within the express

contemplation of the release provision when viewed in context of

the contract in which the release provision is contained, here the

1988 Amendment.21 We conclude, as did the district court, that this

standard is met by the Release vis-à-vis the pre-1989 claims

asserted by the Mastersons.

The 1988 Amendment is concerned with the calculation of

royalties under the 1955 Lease as modified in 1967 and 1974. The

Release, embedded as it is in paragraph 9 of the 1988 Amendment,

addresses “all causes of action” arising out of “gas produced
22 See Mem. Med. Ctr. of East Texas, 943 S.W.2d at 434-35;

Keck, Mahin & Cate, 20 S.W.2d at 697-98. 

16

pursuant to the [1955] Lease.” Surely the accusation that CIG

failed to comply with its FNC obligations presents a cause of

action that arises out of gas produced pursuant to the 1955 Lease,

and is thus covered by the Release. 

We likewise find unavailing the Mastersons’ argument that the

1988 Amendment was so narrowly tailored as to cover only two very

specific items, FERC Order 4051 and the City Rate. Even though

most of the provisions of the 1988 Agreements address those two

matters, read in full context those contracts address the entire

relationship between the parties. In addition, the plain language

of the Release itself reflects the clear intention of the parties

that its coverage be broader than just the FERC Order and the City

Rate, i.e., that it apply to claims arising from or connected with

other provisions of predecessor contracts of which the FNC is one,

irrespective of the primary focus of the 1988 Amendment of which

the Release is a part. The Mastersons’ contentions to the contrary

notwithstanding, Texas law does not proscribe enforcement of such

generally-worded release provisions as long as they can be fairly

read as “mentioning” the kinds or classes of claims intended to be

covered.22

In addition to their insistence that (1) the Release is not

sufficiently specific to block their claims for CIG’s purported

violations of the FNC, and (2) the Release should be applied only
17

to the FERC Order and the City Rate, the Mastersons also advance

fraud as a ground to avoid enforcement of the Release. They insist

that CIG knew full well it had violated the 1955 Lease, as

modified, when it negotiated and entered into the 1988 contract

that contains the Release. The thrust of this argument is that

CIG’s silence in the face of such knowledge was a fraudulent

attempt to avoid liability under the FNC. Our foregoing analysis

of the Mastersons’ claim of fraud through failure to divulge

(silence), as distinct from affirmatively uttering a false

statement, is applicable here; but their fraud assertion regarding

the Release fails for another, independent reason as well. The

Release expressly applies to “all causes of action,” including

those that at the time were “disclosed or undisclosed.” The plain

language of the Release demonstrates that, in exchange for the

benefits and concessions granted to the Mastersons, CIG bargained

for and received an express release from those past violations that

were undisclosed as well as any that were disclosed. This negates

the contention that CIG was under any obligation, whether from

provisions of the 1988 Amendment or Texas law, to list or otherwise

disclose prior lease violations, if any. The record confirms that

the Mastersons —— themselves anything but “widows and orphans” ——

and their sophisticated legal and financial advisors were well

aware, before signing on, that the Release would —— in their own

colorful vernacular —— “wash all [of CIG’s] sins away.”
23 The district court also found the Mastersons’ pre-1989

claims barred by the statute of limitations. As we conclude de

novo that the Release bars such recovery, we need not address the

statute of limitations. Having familiarized ourselves with the

relevant facts, the legal arguments advanced by the parties in

their briefs, and the reasoning of the district court, however, we

note in passing that the district court appears to have “gotten it

right” on time bar as well.

24 CIG also advanced an “in lieu of” provision contained in

the 1974 Agreement. Having concluded that the Release effectively

absolves CIG from claims of violating its obligations under the

1955 Lease occurring prior to 1989, however, it is not necessary

for us to focus on the “in lieu of” provision of the 1974

18

The Mastersons have cited us to no authority holding that

bargaining for such a release is fraudulent. Like the district

court before us, we are convinced that, as a matter of law, the

Release bars the Mastersons from prosecuting claims for violations

assertedly occurring from 1975 through and including 1988.23

2. Claims for 1989 and Following

a. “In lieu of” defense

One affirmative defense asserted by CIG in preclusion of

recovery by the Mastersons is founded on the Texas doctrine of

quasi-estoppel. This defense was credited by the jury and, at

least by implication, by the district court. Before reaching

quasi-estoppel, however, we are constrained to address CIG’s

contractual contention that enforcement of the Mastersons’ post1988 claims is precluded by a fair reading of pertinent portions of

the subject agreements. The contract provision to which CIG

invites our attention is the “in lieu of” provision in the 1988

Amendment.24 Paragraph 7 of that contract states:
Agreement, even though the similarity in wording of the 1974 and

1988 provisions would make our analysis generally applicable to

that provision in the earlier agreement, and thus to the pre-1989

claims, were they not barred by the Release.

19

Lessors agree that all royalty payments made

pursuant to this Agreement are in lieu of any

other rate, reimbursement or method of

measurement and shall constitute and be deemed

full payment by Lessee for all gas, including

casing head gas, produced pursuant to the

Lease and shall fully satisfy and comply with

the provisions of the [1955] Lease as amended

herein. Except as stated in this Agreement,

the Lease is not otherwise amended.(emphasis

added). 

As a foundation for its argument that payments made pursuant

to the specific provisions of the 1988 Agreements fully satisfy and

comply with the provisions of the 1955 Lease as amended, CIG

attempts to distinguish the “Agreement” referred to in Paragraph 7

(the 1988 Amendment) from the “Lease” referred to in that paragraph

(the 1955 Lease). From that starting point, CIG contends that the

portions of the 1955 Lease that were not expressly restated in the

1988 Agreements —— specifically, the FNC as incorporated by

reference into the 1955 Lease by the 1967 Settlement —— are of no

force or effect after 1988. This creative but unsupported

interpretation is fatally flawed for several reasons. First, we

need not go beyond the plain wording of the provisions of the 1988

Amendment which proclaim that “[e]xcept as stated in this

[Amendment] Agreement, the [1955] Lease is not otherwise amended.”

This declaration states the diametric opposite of CIG’s proffered

interpretation which would posit that any provision of the 1955
25 See Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 529

(Tex. 1987) (a contract and its subsequent modifications must be

considered as a whole).

20

Lease that is not reiterated in this 1988 Amendment is no longer in

force or effect. That might well be a fair provision in a document

purporting to be a total restatement or republication of an earlier

agreement but not in an errata-type amendment like the 1988

Amendment. Absent an express statement to that effect, no accepted

canons of contractual interpretation would support such a reading.25

To accept CIG’s reading of the 1988 Amendment as broadly repealing

all provisions of the 1955 Lease other than those expressly

reiterated in the 1988 Amendment also runs contrary to the express

declaration of the latter. 

More to the point, when the 1988 Amendment is construed as a

whole, it becomes clear that Paragraph 7's “in lieu of” provision

does not render the FNC nugatory or, in CIG’s terms, “fulfilled.”

Specifically, CIG argues that, because Paragraph 7 specifies that

“all royalty payments made pursuant to this [1988] Agreement are in

lieu of any other rate...,” all royalty payment obligations of

Section A(2) of the 1967 Settlement are satisfied by payments to

the Mastersons pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the 1988 Amendment. The

flaw in this logic lies in the language of paragraph 3 of the 1988

Amendment that states unambiguously that “[t]he provisions of

paragraphs A(2)(a) and (b)” of the 1967 Settlement are the ones

replaced by paragraph 3. As paragraph 2 of the 1988 Amendment
21

makes pellucid, paragraph 3 replaces only the two denominated subparagraphs of Paragraph A(2) of the 1967 Settlement, i.e., A(2)(a)

and A(2)(b); clearly nothing in the 1988 Agreements repeals or

otherwise affects or supplants subparagraph A(2)(c) of the 1967

Settlement, which, as we know, is the FNC. 

When we hark back to the declaration in the 1988 Amendment to

the effect that “[e]xcept as stated in [the 1988] Amendment, the

[1955] Lease is not otherwise amended,” no doubt can remain that

payments made “pursuant to” the 1988 Agreements must comply with

the provisions of the FNC. Inasmuch as (1) the 1988 Amendment

declares the continued efficacy of all provisions of, inter alia,

the 1967 Settlement that are not expressly repealed, substituted,

or modified by provisions of the 1988 Agreements, and (2)

subparagraph A(2)(c), the FNC provision, is not expressly

supplanted, payments made in conformity to those contracts must

conform to the FNC as well. 

We agree with the Mastersons and the district court that the

“in lieu of” provisions of Paragraph 7 of the 1988 Amendment do not

shield CIG from the Mastersons’ post-1988 FNC claims. That leaves

quasi-estoppel as CIG’s last bastion.

b. Quasi-estoppel

With the Mastersons’ post-1988 claims being free from the

strictures of time bar and from the assertion by CIG, which we have

rejected, that those claims are precluded by the “in lieu of”

provisions of Paragraph 7 of the 1988 Amendment, CIG as appellee
26 Lopez v. Muñoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P. et al, 22 S.W.3d

857, 864 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Atkinson Gas Co. v. Albrecht, 878

S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied)

(citations omitted). See also Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Barner,

964 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998)

(“Misrepresentation by one party, and reliance by the other, are

not necessary elements of quasi-estoppel.”) (citations omitted);

Vessels v. Anschutz Corp., 823 S.W.2d 762, 765-66 (Tex. App.-

Texarkana 1992, writ denied). Contrary to the Mastersons’

assertion, the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Trevino v.

Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1978) has not added the

additional element of “full requisite knowledge” of the facts and

law to the definition of quasi-estoppel. But, even if Trevino did

stand for that proposition, which it does not, the Mastersons’

assertion that they lacked such knowledge is refuted by the record.

22

can sustain the finding of the jury and judgment of the district

court only by prevailing under the Texas doctrine of quasiestoppel. A generally accepted verbalization of that doctrine

states:

[The principle of] quasi-estoppel precludes a

party from asserting, to another’s

disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a

position [it has] previously taken. The

doctrine applies when it would be

unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a

position inconsistent with one to which he

acquiesced, or from which he accepted a

benefit.26 

Despite its awarding of a relatively nominal recovery to the

Mastersons, the jury found that they are quasi-estopped from

asserting the multimillion dollar claim that is the principal

thrust of this litigation. Quasi-estoppel is a factual

determination and thus the province of the jury, which we review by

testing the sufficiency of the evidence. When we do so, we will

reverse only if no reasonable jury could have arrived at the
27 Boeing v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en

banc), overruled on other grounds by Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine,

Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

23

verdict, considering “all the evidence...in the light and with all

reasonable inferences most favorable to the party” in whose favor

the verdict was rendered.27 

A review of the evidence presented to the jury in this case

does not produce an overwhelming weight either favoring or

rejecting a factual basis for quasi-estoppel. Thus the evidence

does not support an indisputable factual conclusion either way. It

follows, therefore, that reasonable jurors and reasonable juries

could differ, thus precluding a conclusion on appellate review that

no reasonable jury could have found quasi-estoppel.

The record reflects that the parties operated under a socalled “deal-for-deal” interpretation of the FNC for several of the

years in question. After sending monthly market price letters to

CIG in a now-apparent effort to imply continued reliance on the

proffered theory of their claims, the Mastersons precipitously

asserted claims against CIG based on a “weighted average price”

(“WAP”) interpretation of the FNC, a 180-degree change of position

by the Mastersons. Under their WAP interpretation, CIG would owe

them in excess of $61 million, clearly a change of position

detrimental to CIG. Significantly, the Mastersons even stipulated

that they would not be entitled to damages under a “deal-for-deal”

interpretation of the FNC.
24

Our review of the jury’s finding of quasi-estoppel next leads

us to inquire whether the evidence was sufficient to support a

determination that the prior deal-for-deal position had produced an

advantage for the Mastersons. The record reflects that the

Mastersons intended and were able to use the FNC beneficially as a

“bargaining chip” or “tool” for leverage in dealings with CIG, and

that they received royalty price increases and preferable pricing

terms by pressing the deal-for-deal interpretation. A reasonable

jury could find, as this one did, that the Mastersons benefitted

from their previously maintained position.

We turn finally to the question whether a reasonable jury

could conclude that the Mastersons’ change of position was

unconscionable. The Mastersons have not assigned error to the

district court’s defining “unconscionable” as grossly unfair or

unjust. They have, however, attempted to characterize CIG’s

argument of unconscionability as merely quarreling with the size of

the Mastersons’ claim. We perceive this to be an inaccurate smoke

screening by the Mastersons to obfuscate the proper

characterization of CIG’s argument: The breaches the Mastersons

now assert could have been avoided had CIG not relied on and acted

in response to the Mastersons’ original deal-for-deal position as

maintained over a considerable period of time. Even though

reliance is not an element per se of quasi-estoppel, the

Mastersons’ allegation that CIG continuously breached the WAP
28 We nevertheless note that the record contradicts the

Mastersons’ insistence that the jury was not free to disregard the

“uncontradicted” testimony of the Mastersons’ expert, relying on

Webster v. Offshore Food Serv., Inc., 434 F.2d 1191, 1193 (5th Cir.

1970). Our review of the record demonstrates that the testimony

was disputed by impeachment on cross examination and by live

testimony of the witnesses.

25

interpretation of the FNC, assertedly accumulating millions of

dollars in damages, was the product of its conforming to the dealfor-deal interpretation as mutually understood by the parties.

This is relevant: When the correct analysis of the facts is

applied to another viable interpretation, i.e., that the Mastersons

stood mute despite their knowledge that CIG’s actions were —— in

the Mastersons’ opinion —— forming the basis of a multimillion

dollar claim against CIG that the Mastersons were confecting, we

cannot charge this jury with making a finding that no reasonable

jury could have made, i.e., that the Mastersons are unconscionable

in asserting their present claims on the basis of WAP after

cynically misleading CIG with the deal-for-deal theory for FNC

determination. We find no reversible error in the jury’s

determination of quasi-estoppel, and therefore affirm. A result of

affirming that finding is to make moot the Mastersons’ argument

that the jury’s award of $140,554.24 is not supported by the

evidence.28

III.

Conclusion
26

Given the protracted and contentious history of the

relationship of the parties and their predecessors, we are not

sanguine that our judgment today will produce an end to

hostilities. That, however, is not our mission: As a court of

error, we are charged only with determining whether the errors of

fact and law asserted by appellants present valid reasons for

reversing the results reached by the district court and the jury.

For the reasons set forth above, we are convinced that affirmance,

not reversal, is in order. The Mastersons’ assertions of fraud and

breach of fiduciary duty were properly dismissed by the district

court for the reasons we have stated. Their claims for alleged

breach of contract occurring prior to 1989 are barred by the

Release they granted to CIG in the 1988 Amendment. The several

amendments and contractual supplements to the 1955 Lease do not bar

the Mastersons from asserting post-1988 breaches of the favored

nation clause because it was not repealed or supplanted by the “in

lieu of” provisions of Paragraph 7 of the 1988 Amendment: That

agreement affected only subparagraphs A(2)(a) and A(2)(b) of the

1967 Settlement, and not A(2)(c) in which the FNC is contained.

Nevertheless, the jury did not err reversibly in concluding as a

matter of fact that the Mastersons are quasi-estopped from

asserting and recovering on their post-1988 claims. Finally, the

district court’s take-nothing judgment against the Mastersons is

appropriate, despite the jury’s award of $140,554.24, given the
27

Mastersons’ concession that they cannot recover on a deal-for-deal

claim under the FNC, which was the basis of the jury’s award of

that sum. Therefore, the judgment of the district court and all

rulings implicated in this appeal are, in all respects

AFFIRMED.