alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2676

To amend the National Labor Relations Act to provide for inflation adjustments to the mandatory jurisdiction thresholds of the National Labor

Relations Board.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 6, 2000

Mr. HUTCHINSON (for himself, Mr. GREGG, Mr. ENZI, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. SESSIONS, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. KYL, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. HELMS, Mr. ALLARD, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, and Mr. INHOFE) introduced the

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

A BILL

To amend the National Labor Relations Act to provide for

inflation adjustments to the mandatory jurisdiction

thresholds of the National Labor Relations Board.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS TO MANDATORY JU4 RISDICTION THRESHOLDS OF NATIONAL

5 LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

6 Section 14(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act

7 (29 U.S.C. 164(c)(1)) is amended to read as follows:
2

•S 2676 IS

1 ‘‘(c)(1)(A) MANDATORY JURISDICTION.—The Board

2 shall assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving

3 any class or category of employers over which it would

4 assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing on Au5 gust 1, 1959, with the financial threshold amounts ad6 justed for inflation under subparagraph (B).

7 ‘‘(B) INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS.—The Board, begin8 ning on October 1, 2000, and not less often than every

9 5 years thereafter, shall adjust each of the financial

10 threshold amounts referred to in subparagraph (A) for in11 flation, using as the base period the later of (i) the most

12 recent calendar quarter ending before the financial thresh13 old amount was established, or (ii) the calendar quarter

14 ending June 30, 1959. The inflation adjustments shall be

15 determined using changes in the Consumer Price Index

16 for all urban consumers published by the Department of

17 Labor and shall be rounded to the nearest $10,000. The

18 Board shall prescribe any regulations necessary for mak19 ing the inflation adjustments.’’.

Æ
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

N o. 04

- 23

- 00766

- CR

EX PARTE Efrain Santiago DELGADO HERRERA

From the County Court

, Kinney County, Texas

Trial Court No. 11581CR

Honorable Susan D. Reed , Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Beth Watkins , Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez , Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 25, 2023

DISMISSED

Appellant, Efrain Santiago Delgado Herrera, has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal in

compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a)

. See T EX

. R. A PP . P. 42.2(a). No

opinion has issued. See id

.

Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss this appeal. See id

. We dismiss any other

pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN D. PERCELLE,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

ALAN ROSENTHAL, DR.; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-17170

D.C. No. 3:05-cv-01998-WHA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William H. Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2010** 

Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Steven D. Percelle appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

FILED

NOV 22 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-17170

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2004). We affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Percelle did

not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to him while treating his neurological condition. See

id. at 1057–58 (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he knows

of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health and safety, and a

difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount

to deliberate indifference). 

Percelle’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1999
<CASH>                                           3,104
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,104
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,104
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          114,048
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        96,327
<OTHER-SE>                                   (207,271)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,104
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   23,319
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (23,319)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (23,319)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (23,319)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.00)





</TABLE>
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of First Franklin Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
   Date: May 15, 2009
    /s/ Thomas H. SiemersThomas H. SiemersPresident and Chief Executive Officer 20
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

<PAGE>




                                  Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Warp 9, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form  10-Q for the  period  ending  March  31,  2009  (the  "Report")  I,  Louie
Ucciferri,  Corporate  Secretary,  and  Acting  Chief  Financial  Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18USC Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  that to the best of my  knowledge  and
belief:

                  (1)      The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of
                           Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
                           of 1934; and

                  (2)      The  information   contained  in  the  Report  fairly
                           presents,  in all material  respects,  the  financial
                           condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: May 15, 2009

                         By: \s\Louie Ucciferri
                         -------------------------------------------------------
                         Louie Ucciferri, Corporate Secretary,
                         Acting Chief Financial Officer
                         (Principal Financial/Accounting Officer)

     This  certification  accompanies  the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### Nichols v. Smith.

(Opinion filed January 25, 1905.)

Appeal from circuit- court, Lawrence county; Hon. W. G. Rice, Judge.

Action by Thomas B. Nichols against Seth R. Smith. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

*Thos. L. Becllon*and *Martin &*Mason, for appellant.

*Joseph B. Moore,*for respondent.

Per Curiam.

As this case presents identically the same question as that decided at this term in Barron v. Smith, 19 S. D. 50, 101 N. W. 1105, and was submitted on the same abstract and briefs, the judgment of the trial court, on that authority,is affirmed.
#### George H. Passey, Respondent, *v.*Horace Craighead, Appellant.

*Motion for a new Mai*— the *entry of an order denying the motion is necessary to a review of the facts.*

The facts in a case can only be reviewed upon an appeal from an order denying amotion for a new trial, and to give the court jurisdiction to hear such an appeal the order denying the motion must be duly entered.

Appeal by the defendant, Horace Craighead, from a judgment of the County Court of Westchester county in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of "Westchester on the lftb. day of November, 1894, upon the verdict of a jury rendered after a trial at the "Westchester County Court, and also from an order of the County Court of Westchester county, entered *77in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester on the 17 th day of November, 1894, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

*William A.*Boyd, for the appellant.

*Frederick W.*Sherman, for the respondent.

Brown, P. J.:

The facts in this case are not before the court for review. "While the notice of appeal purports to be from an order denying a motion for a new trial, there is no such order in the case. The record states that a motion for a new trial was made upon the judge’s minutes, and denied, and there is an exception to that ruling. That exception is not, however, available to the appellant on an appeal from the judgment. The facts can only be reviewed upon an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial, and to give the court jurisdiction to hear such an appeal, the order denying the motion must be duly entered. *(Ehrman*v. *Rothschild,*23 Hun, 273; *Boos*v. *World Mut. Life Insurance Company,*64 N. Y. 236, 242.)

None of the exceptions to the rulings of the court are well taken. The action was to recover damages sustained from the bite of a dog. The plaintiff testified to a conversation with the defendant which, if believed, showed the dog to be vicious, and that the defendant was aware of its character. This testimony required the submission of the case to the jury, and the exception to the denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint cannot be sustained.

The counsel has called our attention to many circumstances tending to weaken the plaintiff’s testimony, but their consideration was all for the jury and affects only the weight of the evidence. As we are confined in our review of the case to the consideration of legal questions, the argument is without weight.

We have examined the exception to the rulings upon the admission of evidence and to the charge of the court, but none of them require the reversal of the judgment.

The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.

Dykman and Pratt, JJ., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### Mayer *&*Loavenstein, plaintiffs in error, *vs.*The Chattahoochee National Bank, defendant in error.

A return of a sheriff upon a writ of attachment, which states that he served a named person “personally” with a summons of garnishment, may be amended so as to show that he served such person as president of a bank. If the summons of garnishment has been lost, and the sheriff is dead, the plaintiff, on motion to do so, should be permitted to prove by *aliunde*testimony that the summons of garnishment was directed to the person served as president of the bank. If the garnishee denies it, he can tender an issue, which, if found in favor of the plaintiff, will entitle him to an order amending the return, “ so as to make the proceedings conform to the facts.”

Garnishment. Amendment. Eeturn. Before Judge Johnson. Muscogee Superior Court. May Term, 1872.

Mayer *&*Loivenstein commenced suit against a firm doing business under the name of McKee Brothers, and sued out process of garnishment for the purpose of having the same served on the Chattahoochee National Bank. When the cause Avas called Messrs. Moses, Ingram *&*CraAvford, Avithout appealing for the bank, moved that the suit against the garnishee abate on the ground that the bank had not been served, and exhibited to the Court tivo returns of the sheriff' made at different times, each stating that he had “ served a summons of garnishment personally upon H. H. Epping.” Plaintiffs proposed to prove that the summons of garnishment were directed to H. H. Epping as president of the *607bank, and moved, on such proof, to have the returns amended. The Court ruled that the sheriff might amend his returns, if he so desired, but refused to allow the proof. It was admitted that the sheriff who made the returns was dead, and that the summons of garnishment were lost. The Court sustained the motion of Messrs. Moses, Ingram & Crawford, and ordered that the proceedings of garnishment against said bank do abate. To which ruling counsel for plaintiffs excepted and now assign the same as error.

Henry L. Benning ; Grigsby E. Thomas, for plaintiffs in error.

The return was amendable by parol evidence: Code, sections 3447, 3456; 36 Ga. R., 602; 16 *Ib.,*198; 19 *Ib.,*283. For every right there shall be a remedy: Code, sections 3185, 3447 ; 16 Ga. R., 198.

R. J. Moses; Ingram & Crawford, for defendant.

Montgomery, Judge.

We think this ease controlled by sections 3456 and 3447 of the Code, and, as we understand those sections, they compel us to reverse the judgment of the Court below. Our judgment is fully set forth in the head note.

Judgment reversed.
#### Fay I. Maxon, Respondent, v. A. Burstein, Appellant.

(No. 1)

Order appealed from modified by striking therefrom the allowance of costs, and as so modified affirmed, without costs.

All concurred.
**Exhibit
      15.1**






**TO
      WHOM IT
      MAY CONCERN**




We
      make reference to the information that Quilmes Industrial (Quinsa) S.A. files
      from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and in
      particular to form 20F to be filed for the year 2006.




We
      hereby consent to the specific disclosure of the information described in the
      20F which was provided by ACNielsen to Cerveceria y Malteria Quilmes (“CMQ”)
      pursuant to the rendering of marketing research services regarding beer and
      soft
      drinks in Argentina covering the period from 2001 to 2006 provided that Quinsa
      indemnifies ACNielsen, its parents, affiliates, officers, directors and
      employees against any loss or damage suffered by reason of publication of this
      data in the Offering Memorandum.




We
      point out that this disclosure consent will only be valid and effective if
      Quinsa includes the following disclaimer in the 20F, in a clear manner in order
      for any third parties to be unequivocally aware of the information included
      herein:




*“ACNielsen
      information reflects estimates of market conditions based on samples, and is
      prepared primarily as a marketing research tool for consumer packaged goods
      manufactures and others in the consumer goods industry. This information should
      not be used as a basis for investing in Quinsa and/or any of its subsidiaries
      and references to ACNielsen should not be considered ACNielsen’s opinion as to
      the value of any security or the advisability of investing in
      Quinsa.”*




In
      case the terms above exactly reflect our understandings as of this date, we
      ask
      that a copy of this letter be signed by Quinsa and returned to us for our
      files.




Regards,




/s/
                Christian
                NordenstahlA.C.
                Nielsen
                S.A. de C.V. Sucursal ArgentinaChristian
                NordenstahlApoderado







Agreed
                by
                QuinsaQuinsa
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of CardioTech International, Inc., a
Massachusetts corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael F. Adams, Chief Executive Officer and
President of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
best of my knowledge:




(1)                The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)                The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
      Michael F. AdamsMichael
      F. AdamsChief
      Executive Officer and PresidentDate:
      June 27, 2008







This
certification accompanies each report of the Company on Form 10-Q and Form 10-K
pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the
extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the
Company for purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.




A signed
original of this written statement required by §906 has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
unaudited  financial  statements of Liberty Housing Partners Limited Partnership
at and for the period ended  September 30, 1997 and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         69,034
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               69,034
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,340,661
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          532,854
<BONDS>                                        10,843,413
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     (9,035,606)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,340,661
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               246,748
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               100,407
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,621,465
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,475,124)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (67.69)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
        


</TABLE>