# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 10

, 20 20 *

Decided April 1 3 , 20 20

By the Court :

No. 19

- 3 385

SHERR Y WALKER

, Plaintiff

- Appellant

,

v

.

CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL OF
WIS C ONSIN

, Defendan t

- Appelle e

. Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 17

- C

- 0583

Lynn Adelman

, Judge

.

O R D E R

T he Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin mandated that Sherry Walker attend a counseling program because her baseless accusations against her coworkers eroded the

trust that was essential to office collaboration

. After she refused to let Ch i ldren’s verify
her attendance in the program, it fired her. Walker sued Children’s for disability and

race discrimination, and the district court entered summary judgment for the hospital. Because no reasonable juror could find that the firing was unlawful, we af firm.

Children’s hired Walker in September 2014 as a data analyst in its strategic planning department. The job description listed “the ability to effectively work with [others]” and to collaborate with coworkers and “users at all levels across the healt h system” as key to the role. Walker received positive performance reviews for her
technical skills

. But a fter a bout eight months on the job

, she began to raise allegations

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R

. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 19

- 3385 Page 2

about coworkers. She thought that one coworker gossiped about her

, did not support
her work

, recorded her

, and g ave the recording to the hospital’s security team
, whose
members then searched Walker’s purse without her consent

. She also reported rumors
that the department wanted to transfer her and monitor ed her computer usage.

Over the next year, Walker’s charges against her coworkers broadened. According to Walker

, colleagues tampered with work on her computer (though she had no evidence or specific examples) ; people considered her “disgusting ; ” and at times
staff averted their eyes from her because they “all knew something about her.” S he also reported that someone in the hospital’s parking lot snapped photos of her and that coworkers had tapped her home phone and planned to defame her.

Children’s investigat ed Walker’s complaints

, but when it found nothing to
substantiate them , it directed her to its employee assistance program. Her supervisor
recommended at least twice that Walker use the program , which counsel s and support s employees facing personal and professional challenges , to restore trust with her
coworkers

. When Walker did not schedule any sessions

, Children’s mandated that s he participat e in the p rogra m

. It explained that the department need ed to build “a more trusting work environment,” which required that Walker “becom [e] less distrusting of [her] peers

, ” since they had “ given [ her ] no cause for the serious allegations

... or the corresponding disruptions ” to collaboration that she had made.

Walker agreed to attend the employee assistance program

, which a third party, Empathia

, Inc., ran, but she refused to allow Children’s to verify her parti cipat ion

. Children’s asked Walker to sign Empathia’s HIPAA release form

, so that Children’s
could receive Walker’s medical information and confirm that she attended the program
and followed its recommendations. When Walker refused to sign the authorization ( citing privacy concerns ), Children’s provided her with alternate versions of Emp athia’s form. Each version was designed to narrow the scope of the release and t o assuage Walker’s uneas e. Children’s warned Walker that her continued employment depended

on her attending the assistance program and signing an authorization allowing it to verify her attendance

. T he final form that Children’s offered would have permitted Empathia to share only the dates of Walker’s sessions and confirm that she attended.
Walker signed that form but crossed out a clause acknowledging t hat Empathia did not control the hospital ’s use of the information that Empathia provided

. Because Walker removed that clause, the hospital believed that the authorization was not effective

.No. 19

- 3385 Page 3

Lacking the release

, Children’s fired Walker

. In a letter detailing its reasons for doing so, the h ospital explained that she had repeatedly refused to sign the release
form , despite its efforts to resolve her privacy concerns. Children’s also stated that Walker’s “baseless allegations divert organizational resources and attention while compromising team cohesion,” and that it had attempted to re build trust between
Walker and her coworkers by requiring her to attend the assistance program.

Walker sued Children’s , alleging discrimination based on a perceived mental disability

, see 42 U.S.C. § 121 12 ; 29 U.S.C. § 7 94 , and her race (black)

, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 2 (a) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court entered summary judgment for the hospital. It concluded that no reasonable juror could find that Walker was performing the essential functions of her job , or that the company fired her because of her perceived
mental disabilit y ( rather than for her refusal to sig n a n effective release ) or her race.

On appeal, Walker first argues that a reasonable juror could conclude that the hospital discriminated against her based on a perceived disability. To prevail on this
claim , Walker needed to supply evidence that (1) Children’s regarded her as disabled; (2) she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without a
reasonable accommodation ; and (3) she was fired because of the perceived disability.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12111

- 12

, 121 02( 1) ; s ee also Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr

. , 684 F.3d 667, 6 7 1

– 7 2 ( 7th Cir. 2012) (analyzing 29 U.S.C. § 7 94)

. We review de novo the grant of summary judgment. Stelter v. Wis

. Physicians Serv. Ins. Corp. 950 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2020)

.

Walker has not furnished evidence of the second element. We will assume , as the first element requires, that the hospital regarded Walker as mentally disabled when it
told her to attend the employee assistance program to regain trust in her coworkers. F or the second element, Walker insists that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job because her positive performance evaluations confirmed her
technical skill s in data analysis

. Even so, no reasonable juror could conclude that
Walker could perform all the essential functions of the job. When assessing the

“ essential functions ” of a job, the court consider s whether the employer has “ prepared a written descriptio n before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job” and, if so,
deems the “description ... evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8)

. Walker’s job description listed collaboration as essential , and Walker does not dispute this requirement

. But h er repeated, unfounded charges against coworkers
demonstrated an in ability to work with them , and her refusal to allow Children’s to verify her attendance in a program that could re store trust showed that this inability would persist

.No. 19

- 3385 Page 4

Walker ’s response does not persuade us. S he argues that, if the hospital regarded her as having a mental disorder that kept her from performing the essential function of her job, i t needed to accommodate that disorder. In her view, the hospital had to waive completely the need for her to sign a HIPAA release , because the paranoia that Children’s regarded her as having would pr event her from signing it

. But Children’s
did not need to provide this accommodation. U nder the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (h), employers “need not provide a reasonable accommodation ...
to an individual w ho ” i s regard ed as disabled

. In any case, the hospital provide d the
accommodation that she requested

— requiring only that she allow Empathia to verify
her attendan ce in the counseling program. Walker rejected that accommodation, but not
because she wanted a further accommodation from Children’s

. Instead, she wanted
more from Empathia

— she wanted it to agree that it control led what Children’s did
with the released attendance information.

Walker also fails on the third element

— that Children’s fired her because of her disability. She contends that the hospital’s proffered reason for firing her

— her failure to sign a HIPAA release and refusal to rebuild trust

— is a lie. She insists that she did sign a release authorizing Empathia to turn over her attendance record. Children’s does not dispute that Walker signed a purported release , but it is also uncontested that Walker
struck a key clause from it. C hildren’s believed that the s trike

- out invalidated the
release

. And W alker has supplied no evidence that this belief, even if it were inaccurate,

was insincere. Therefore, she has not c reated a triable question of pretext. See Graham v. Arctic Zone Iceplex , LLC

, 930 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2019) (no pretext if employer “honestly believed” its given reason).

Finally, we agree with the district court that Walker points to no evidence tha t

race motivated her firing . Her subjective “ certainty” that race had to be a factor because
she was the only racial minority on her team is not evidence of discrimination that can avoid a summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, In c. , 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986 )

.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment.