with the second decision by respondent and opined that the arthritic 

changes in appellant's knee were preexisting and nonindustrial. Based on 

this opinion, respondent again denied reopening of the claim. A hearing 

officer affirmed this third and final decision, and appellant appealed. 

The appeals officer determined that a medical question existed 

regarding whether appellant's current condition was related to the 

industrial injury and entered an interim order directing a new physician 

evaluation. This evaluation was conducted by Dr. Swanson, who opined 

that the original industrial injury aggravated a likely preexisting arthritic 

condition, but that appellant's current condition was related to the 

industrial injury. The appeals officer determined that Dr. Swanson's 

report was the most credible of the three physician opinions presented for 

review and also concluded that, based on Dr. Shannon's PPD rating 

report, appellant's arthritic condition in the knee had been part of 

appellant's original industrial claim. Therefore, the appeals officer 

reversed respondent's decision and ordered that appellant's claim be 

reopened for further treatment of his knee. Respondent filed a petition for 

judicial review, which the district court granted. Appellant then filed the 

instant appeal. On appeal, appellant argues that the appeals officer's 

determination is supported by substantial evidence, and thus, it was error 

for the district court to grant judicial review. We agree and reverse the 

district court's decision. 

This court reviews an appeals officer's decision in a workers' 

compensation matter for clear error or abuse of discretion. NRS 

233B.135(3); Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS,124 Nev. 553, 557, 188 P.3d 

1084, 1087 (2008). Judicial review is confined to the record before the 

appeals officer, and on issues of fact and fact-based conclusions of law, the 

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appeals officer's decision will not be disturbed if it is supported by 

substantial evidence. Vredenburg, 124 Nev. at 557, 188 P.3d at 1087-88; 

Grover C. Dils Med. Ctr. v. Menditto, 121 Nev. 278, 283, 112 P.3d 1093, 

1097 (2005). "Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable person 

could accept as adequately supporting a conclusion." Vredenburg, 124 

Nev. at 557 n.4, 188 P.3d at 1087 n.4 (quotation omitted). The court will 

not substitute its judgment for that of the appeals officer as to the weight 

of the evidence on questions of fact. Maxwell v. SITS, 109 Nev. 327, 331, 

849 P.2d 267, 271 (1993). 

While this court has concluded that an application to reopen a 

workers' compensation claim "does not permit reconsideration of the 

accuracy of a prior decision that an injury is industrial in nature," Day v. 

Washoe County Sch. Dist., 121 Nev. 387, 390-91, 116 P.3d 68, 70 (2005), 

here, a factual question existed regarding whether the arthritis in 

appellant's knee had been accepted as part of his original claim. 

Consequently, the appeals officer made factual determinations that the 

arthritis in appellant's knee was part of his original industrial injury 

claim and that his current condition warranted claim reopening and 

further treatment. See NRS 616C.390(1) (explaining that a workers' 

compensation claim shall be reopened by the insurer if a change of 

circumstances, caused primarily by the industrial injury, warrants an 

increase or rearrangement of compensation). Although respondent argues 

that arthritis was never part of appellant's original claim, after appellant's 

2004 injury, respondent accepted appellant's workers' compensation claim 

for "left knee," and the record demonstrates that neither party sought to 

narrow this description of the industrial injury. See NRS 616C.175(1) 

(recognizing that when an industrial injury aggravates, precipitates, or 

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accelerates a preexisiting nonindustrial condition, the resulting condition 

is compensable unless the insurer proves that the industrial injury is not a 

substantial contributing cause of the resulting condition). While the presurgery reports in the record do not clearly mention appellant's arthritis 

in his knee, after Dr. Thomas performed the knee surgery on appellant, 

his post-surgery report included a diagnosis of arthritis and osteoarthritis. 

Moreover, although Dr. Shannon's PPD rating report evaluated 

appellant's condition using two different methods, only one of which 

discussed arthritis, the physician's ultimate assessment of appellant's 

injury was "[m]edial meniscus tear with aggravation of underlying 

arthritis: industrial." Respondent accepted this rating and based 

appellant's PPD award on this report. We therefore conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the appeals officer's factual determination 

regarding the scope of appellant's claim, and thus, the district court 

abused its discretion when it reversed this determination on judicial 

review. See Vredenburg, 124 Nev. at 557, 188 P.3d at 1087. 

In addition, the appeals officer found that, based on Dr. 

Swanson's report, appellant's current condition was causally related to his 

industrial injury and that his current condition warranted further 

treatment. While varying opinions were presented to the appeals officer 

regarding appellant's current condition and whether it was industrially 

related, the appeals officer found Dr. Swanson's opinion to be the most 

credible. As neither this court nor the district court may substitute its 

judgment for that of the administrative officer on the weight of the 

evidence on a question of fact, see Weaver v. State, Dep't of Motor 

Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 498, 117 P.3d 193, 196 (2005), there was no abuse 

of discretion in the appeals officer's determination that a change in the 

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condition of appellant's knee was caused primarily by the industrial injury 

and warranted further treatment. The district court therefore abused its 

discretion when it also reversed the appeals officer's determination on this 

point. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order granting 

respondent's petition for judicial review. 

It is so ORDERED. 

Hardesty 

, J. 

Parraguirre 

cc: Hon. Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, District Judge 

William F. Buchanan, Settlement Judge 

Greenman Goldberg Raby & Martinez 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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