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Filed 8/17/20 Morgan v. Druhet-Johnson CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ERNEST MORGAN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MIRIAM Y. DRUHET-JOHNSON, 

et al.,

Defendants,

DESHONNE DRUHET,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A157790

 (San Francisco 

 Super. Ct. No. CGC-17-558418)

In 1973, three children—Harvey Druhet, Roger Druhet, Jr., and Estelle 

Hayes—inherited one-third shares of a San Francisco property as tenants in 

common. Harvey Druhet and his wife Annette Morgan-Druhet subsequently 

occupied the property for several decades, until their deaths. In 2017, 

Annette’s son Ernest Morgan, as administrator of her estate, brought suit 

seeking to quiet title to the property, and successfully moved for summary 

judgment on the ground that Harvey and Annette had acquired sole title to 

the property as against Roger and Estelle by adverse possession.

1 Defendant 

1 For clarity, we will refer to certain of the parties involved by their 

first names. 
2

Deshonne Druhet appeals, raising seven challenges to the trial court’s 

rulings. We conclude that none of the challenges has merit, and we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Roger Druhet, Sr. was the owner of a home located on Thornton Avenue 

in San Francisco (the property). In 1973, after Roger Sr.’s death, three of his 

children—Harvey, Roger Jr., and Estelle—each inherited one-third shares of

the property as tenants in common. At that time, Harvey was married to 

Annette and living in San Diego. Roger Jr. and Estelle were living in New 

Orleans. 

Shortly after Harvey inherited his interest, he and Annette moved from 

San Diego into the property. And between 1973 and 2014, Harvey and 

Annette lived exclusively and continuously at the property, holding 

themselves out to the public as its only owners. They paid the various 

expenses associated with the property, including the mortgage, utilities, 

insurance, property taxes, maintenance, and improvements. They received

mail and deliveries at the property and parked their vehicles there. Annette 

also ran her interior design business from the property. Harvey died in 2009, 

and Annette in 2014. 

Meanwhile, Estelle died in 1997, and Roger in 2001. 

Plaintiff Ernest Morgan was Annette’s son, and Harvey’s stepson. 

After his mother’s death in 2014, he became administrator of her estate. In 

that capacity, on April 27, 2017, he filed the instant action in San Francisco 

Superior Court, naming as defendants Miriam Y. Druhet-Johnson, the 

administrator of Harvey’s estate, as well as the testate and intestate 

successors of Roger and Estelle. The suit sought declaratory relief and to 

quiet title to the property. 
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Miriam filed an answer to the complaint. Seven of Roger’s children and 

grandchildren, including his granddaughter appellant Deshonne Druhet

(when referred to collectively, defendants), filed a separate answer and also a 

cross-complaint for partition, trespass, quantum meruit, and unjust 

enrichment. 

On September 26, 2018, Morgan moved for summary judgment, on the 

basis that Harvey and Annette had acquired sole title to the property by 

adverse possession. In support of the motion, Morgan attached his own

declaration, with six exhibits that Morgan testified he had found among his 

mother’s papers.

The first exhibit was a letter dated July 20, 1979, from Harvey to 

Roger. The letter referred to an agreement between Harvey and Roger, 

stating that Harvey had paid off the mortgage and property tax payments on 

the property, and that “upon completion of mortgage payments I would pay 

each of you ten thousand dollars ($10,000) purchasing your interest in the 

property.” The letter further provided that an installment payment of $2,000 

would be made “upon receipt of signed agreement,” with monthly payments of 

at least $150 to follow. The agreement was signed by Harvey and Roger, and 

notarized in San Francisco on July 30, 1979. 

The second exhibit was a check register, listing a beginning balance of 

$10,000, an initial payment of $2,000 dated August 7, 1979, followed by 

monthly payments of $200 each month thereafter, all to “R. Druhet,” with the 

final $200 payment made December 7, 1982. 

The sixth exhibit was a letter to Harvey dated June 29, 1979, from 

William J. Guste, III, an attorney representing Estelle, stating that Harvey

had not responded to Guste’s previous letter of June 6 and asking Harvey to 

“be advised that if I have not heard from you by July 14, 1979, we will engage 
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San Francisco counsel to take whatever legal action may be necessary to 

protect our client’s interest.” 

Morgan’s declaration also included the following paragraphs:

“5. In late 1982, Harvey and Annette threw a large party at the 

Property and invited all of their close friends. The express purpose of the 

party was to celebrate their having finalized the purchase of Roger, Jr. and 

Estelle’s interests in the Property, thus becoming the sole owners of the 

Property. I worked the party as a bartender at my parents’ request. While 

there, I spoke with Harvey and Annette about their purchase of the Property. 

Annette and Harvey were so happy and conveyed to me that they were 

pleased to have reached agreements with Roger, Jr. and Estelle to purchase 

their interests in the Property.” 

“6. Between 1973 and 2014, Harvey and Annette lived continuously at 

the Property. At all points in time they held themselves out to the public as 

the true and only owners of the Property. They actually, continuously, and 

exclusively resided at, occupied, controlled, and exercised all ownership 

rights to the Property by, among other things, living there on a day-to-day

basis, paying the mortgage, utilities, and insurance, receiving mail and 

deliveries there, parking their vehicles there, maintaining and making 

improvements to the Property, and paying all taxes assessed against the

Property. Their claimed ownership, occupancy, and use of the Property was

readily visible for anyone to see. Annette even ran her interior design 

business out of the Property.” 

“8. Estelle was in town visiting from New Orleans. During her stay at 

the Property, she set fire to the living room floor. Following this incident, she 

was asked to leave the Property by Harvey and Annette and not come back.

To my knowledge, she never returned to the Property after that visit.” 
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The motion was set for hearing on December 17, 2018. 

On November 21, defendants moved ex parte to continue the hearing 

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), on the 

ground that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for 

reasons stated, be presented,” allegedly due to Miriam’s failure to respond to 

document requests served on her by Morgan in late July.

Following oral argument, the trial court granted the request and 

continued the hearing until March 14, 2019. However, the trial court further 

ordered that defendants’ opposition be filed in accordance with the original 

December 17, 2018 hearing date, with a supplemental opposition limited to 

“new information obtained from Miriam” to be filed based on the new 

March 14, 2019 hearing date. Plaintiff’s reply was then to be filed based on 

the new hearing date. Defendants objected to this schedule. 

On November 30, defendants filed opposition to the motion. In support 

were attached two virtually identical declarations from Deshonne and Roger

Jr.’s son Emile. Emile’s declaration provided in part that: 

“18. My father, ROGERS [sic] DRUHET, JR. (II) never sold his interest 

in the Property to anyone, and I can categorically state that as my father’s 

son, I was in a position to know that he did not.

“19. My aunt, ESTELLE HAYES née DRUHET never sold her interest 

in the Property to anyone, and I can categorically state that as my aunt’s 

close nephew, I was in a position to know that she did not.” 

“21. My aunt, ESTELLE HAYES née DRUHET, was never excluded or 

refused entry to the Property by anyone and was certain[ly] not by her very 

brother, HARVEY DRUHET or his second wife.” 

Similarly, Deshonne’s declaration provided:
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“22. My great-aunt, Estelle Hayes née Druhet never sold her interest in 

the Property to anyone, and I can categorically state that, as my aunt’s 

favorite great-niece, I was in a position to know that she did not.

“23. Neither my father, Rogers Druhet, III, nor my grandfather, Rogers 

[sic] Druhet, Jr. (or II) was ever excluded or refused entry to the Property by 

anyone and Rogers [sic] Druhet, Jr. (or II) was certainly not ever denied entry 

by his very brother, Harvey Druhet or his second wife.

“24. My great-aunt, Estelle Hayes née Druhet, was never excluded or 

refused entry to the Property by anyone and was certainly not ever denied 

entry by her very brother, Harvey Druhet or his second wife.” 

Defendants’ supplemental opposition was due February 28, 2019. 

Defendants served Miriam with written discovery on January 29, and on 

February 26, defendants’ counsel filed a declaration indicating that Miriam 

had not yet responded to their requests. 

On March 7, Miriam filed a “Notice of Non-Opposition” to Morgan’s 

motion for summary judgment, and a declaration in support thereof. Her 

declaration stated that it was “[her] understanding that Roger, Jr. and 

Estelle agreed to sell their interest in the Property to Harvey and Annette,” 

and that she did “not oppose Plaintiff’s effort to clear up the title error and in 

fact, I support it. Title to the Property should be held by Harvey and 

Annette.” 

No supplemental opposition to the motion was ultimately filed by 

defendants. 

Plaintiff filed his reply, and the motion came on for hearing on 

March 14, in advance of which the trial court issued a tentative ruling 

granting the motion. After the hearing, the trial court adopted its tentative 
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ruling in a written order, granting the motion and concluding in part as 

follows: 

“Harvey and Annette ousted Roger, Jr. as a co-tenant by virtue of their 

purchase of his interest in the Property. [Citation.] Harvey and Annette 

ousted Estelle as a co-tenant by virtue of their purchase of her interest in the 

Property, requesting she physically leave the Property, and Estelle’s attorney 

threatening litigation to protect her interest in the Property. [Citation.]” 

Judgment was subsequently entered quieting title to the property in 

Harvey and Annette, from which Deshonne alone appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Deshonne raises seven arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred 

in extending the deadline for defendants’ response to the motion only with 

respect to newly obtained discovery from Miriam; (2) the trial court erred in 

not striking Miriam’s notice of non-opposition to the motion; (3) Deshonne 

and Emile’s declarations in support of the opposition to the motion created 

triable issues of fact; (4) Morgan failed to establish that Harvey and 

Annette’s possession of the property was hostile to Roger and Estelle; (5) the 

trial court abused its discretion in overruling defendants’ evidentiary 

objections to the exhibits attached to Morgan’s declaration; (6) certain of the 

statements in Morgan’s declaration were inadmissible hearsay; and (7) 

certain statements in Miriam’s declaration were inadmissible hearsay. 

Deshonne Was Not Prejudiced by the Briefing Schedule

Deshonne’s first argument is that by ordering Morgan to file only one 

reply brief addressing both defendants’ November opposition and their March 

supplemental opposition based on any discovery obtained from Miriam, the 

trial court unfairly gave Morgan approximately an extra three months to 

respond to the November opposition, instead of the typical nine-day period. 
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(See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(2) & (b)(4).) But Code of Civil 

Procedure, section 437c, subdivision (b)(4) provides that any reply shall be 

served and filed “not less than five days preceding the noticed or continued 

date of hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise,” so the 

briefing schedule set by the trial court was not prohibited by that section. 

Beyond that, Deshonne has not even attempted to show that defendants were

prejudiced by the briefing schedule, and “[a]bsent an explicit argument that a 

procedural error caused prejudice, we are under no obligation to address the 

claim of error.” (Quail Lakes Owners Assn. v. Kozina (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 

1132, 1137; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [reversal for a procedural error 

requires a “miscarriage of justice”].) 

The Trial Court Did Not Rely on Miriam’s Notice or Declaration

Deshonne argues that the trial court should have struck Miriam’s 

“Notice of Non-Opposition” to Morgan’s motion (argument two), and that 

certain statements in Miriam’s accompanying declaration were inadmissible 

hearsay (argument seven). We need not consider these arguments, because 

Deshonne has failed to articulate any prejudice from the alleged errors

relating to Miriam’s declaration—a point made in Morgan’s brief, to which 

Deshonne did not file a reply. The trial court’s written order, including its 

description of the material facts and specific evidence relied upon in granting 

the motion, makes no mention of Miriam’s notice or her declaration, and 

instead bases its conclusions on Morgan’s declaration and the exhibits 

attached thereto. 

Deshonne’s Evidentiary Objections to Morgan’s Declaration Fail

We turn next to Deshonne’s evidentiary objections to Morgan’s 

declaration in support of his motion, arguments numbered five and six. 

Deshonne first argues that the six exhibits to the declaration were 
9

improperly admitted, asserting that the documents were “cherry-picked,” and 

are “self-serving, vague, ambiguous, and incomplete.” Passing over that most 

documents submitted by a party are “self-serving,” and that “cherry-picked” 

is not a valid objection, Deshonne’s objections are plainly meritless—indeed 

frivolous. To take one representative example, with respect to the check 

register, Deshonne’s brief asserts “[i]f it is a check register, the question 

arises, where are the cashed checks which were returned to the couple’s 

bank? Their absence speaks volumes.” And, after noting that the final entry 

in the check register is dated December 7, 1982: “Morgan would have us 

believe, that the couple paid off Roger Jr. in 1982[], but in 32 years the couple 

never altered the title to the property to remove Roger Jr.’s name from it.”2 

These are not even cognizable evidentiary objections, never mind meritorious 

ones. 

Deshonne also contends that Morgan’s declaration contained 

inadmissible hearsay. She points to Morgan’s statement that Annette and 

Harvey were “so happy and conveyed to me that they were pleased to have 

reached agreements with Roger, Jr. and Estelle to purchase their interests in 

the property,” and his statement that following the alleged incident in which 

Estelle set fire to the living room floor, Estelle was “asked to leave the 

Property by Harvey and Annette and not come back.” 

The first statement is arguably covered by the state of mind exception 

to the hearsay rule,

3 but even if not, the trial court made no mention of the 

2 Morgan’s complaint alleged that the failure to transfer title to the 

property was “due to a clerical error.” 

3 (See Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a) [“evidence of a statement of the 

declarant’s then existing state of mind” admissible to “prove the declarant’s 

state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time” or to “prove or 

explain acts or conduct of the declarant”].)
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statement in reaching its decision or in detailing the evidence it relied on, 

and Deshonne has not explained how the alleged error was in any way 

prejudicial. (See Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 119 [on 

appeal of evidentiary rulings on summary judgment appellant must 

“articulate how the admission of that evidence was prejudicial”]; In re Auto. 

Antitrust Cases I & II (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 127, 141–142.) 

As to the second statement, a request or demand by Harvey and 

Annette that Estelle not return to the property is not hearsay because it was 

not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. (See People v. Jurado

(2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 117 [“Because a request, by itself, does not assert the 

truth of any fact, it cannot be offered to prove the truth of the matter 

stated”].) 

Defendants’ Declarations Did Not Create Triable Issues of Fact

Finally, we turn to Deshonne’s two arguments on the merits, 

arguments three and four—arguments we review de novo. (Nealy v. City of 

Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 370.)

First, Deshonne contends that the declarations submitted in support of 

defendants’ opposition create a triable issue of fact. We disagree. To begin 

with, declarations are required to set forth “[e]videntiary facts,” and 

“[c]onclusions of fact or law are not sufficient.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice 

Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 10:119.) 

Beyond that, neither declaration offers any explanation for how Deshonne or 

Emile knew that Roger or Estelle never sold their interest in the property. 

They do not allege that either Deshonne or Emile ever discussed the property 

or its ownership with Roger or Estelle. And neither Emile nor Deshonne

would reasonably be expected to know whether a 1979 sale of the property 

had taken place simply by virtue of their close family relationship. (See 
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Moua v. Pittullo, Howington, Barker, Abernathy, LLP (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 

107, 116 [“ ‘[A]n issue of fact is not raised by “cryptic, broadly phrased, and 

conclusory assertions” [Citation.]’ ”]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: 

Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 10:109 [personal 

knowledge “ ‘must be shown by facts set forth in the declaration, and not 

merely by conclusions. The matters alleged must be something about which 

the declarant has reason to know personally—as distinguished from matters 

of opinion or hearsay’ ”].) These conclusory declarations do not suffice to 

establish a triable issue. 

Second, Deshonne argues that there was a triable issue of fact as to 

whether Harvey and Annette adversely possessed the property as against 

Roger and Estelle. 

“ ‘ “ ‘ “Before title may be acquired by adverse possession as between 

cotenants, the occupying tenant must bring home or impart notice to the 

tenant out of possession, by acts of ownership of the most open, notorious and 

unequivocal character, that he intends to oust the latter of his interest in the 

common property. [Citations.] Such evidence must be stronger than that 

which would be required to establish a title by adverse possession in a 

stranger. [Citation.]” . . . In short, one tenant in common cannot by mere 

exclusive possession acquire the title of his cotenant. [Citation.]’ ”

[Citations.]’ (Preciado v. Wilde (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 321, 325, italics 

omitted.)” (Hacienda Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011)

198 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128.)

Deshonne contends that Morgan failed to establish ouster, essentially 

by casting doubt on the statements in Morgan’s declaration. She argues that 

the idea that Harvey and Annette failed to change the title of the property 

after the alleged purchases is “simply too absurd and farfetched to carry any 
12

weight,” and the description of the living room fire is “so obliviously [sic] 

contrived as to border on the absurd.” These arguments are simply 

challenges to Morgan’s credibility, which standing alone are insufficient to 

defeat summary judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (e) [“summary 

judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credibility . . . of witnesses 

furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary judgment”].)

Finally, Deshonne argues that Harvey and Annette’s offers to purchase 

Roger and Estelle’s interests undermine their claim for adverse possession, 

relying on Preciado v. Wilde, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 321. There, the plaintiff 

brought a quiet title action against his niece, and at trial “admitted he never 

excluded [defendant] from the property,” “never restricted her access, or 

informed her he was challenging her ownership,” and that fences he 

constructed “were not designed to exclude family members, such as 

[defendant].” (Id. at p. 325.) The plaintiff had also written a letter to the 

defendant, offering to purchase her interest in the property. (Id. at p. 323.) 

The trial court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish adverse 

possession, in part because the plaintiff’s offer to buy defendant’s interest 

was “ ‘inconsistent with a claim of an ouster.’ ” (Id. at p. 324.) The Court of 

Appeal affirmed, noting that the plaintiff “undermined his claim of adverse 

possession when he testified he tried to buy [defendant’s] interest. His 

September 9 letter is an admission that [defendant] held legal title. It 

refutes the allegations of [plaintiff’s] complaint and impeaches his 

credibility.” (Id. at p. 326.) But there is nothing similarly inconsistent about 

Morgan’s position here, where he acknowledges that Roger and Estelle held 

interests in the property and alleges that Harvey and Annette effected an 

ouster in part by completing purchases of those very interests. 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Morgan shall recover his costs on appeal. 
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_________________________

Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

Morgan v. Druhet-Johnson (A157790)