BLD-102 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-3073

___________

ANDREW FULLMAN,

Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;

POLICE COMMISSIONER DANIELLE M. OUTLAW;

CHARLES KING, #9008; SGT. CUNNINGHAM; 

MICHAEL GORMLEY; JOHN DOE; LAWRENCE SAMUEL KRASNER

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-22-cv-04282)

District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 11, 2024

Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 16, 2024)

_________

OPINION*

_________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Andrew Fullman appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of 

his civil rights complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the 

District Court’s judgment.

I.

Fullman set out the following allegations in his amended complaint. On April 4, 

2022, a woman allegedly pointed her licensed firearm at Fullman to threaten and 

intimidate him. Fullman reported this incident to the Philadelphia Police Department, but 

despite his many efforts to follow up with the investigation, either the Philadelphia Police 

Department did not pursue an arrest, or the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office 

declined to prosecute the case. Fullman alleged that his gun-pointing complaint would 

have been properly investigated and prosecuted, and his assailant would have had her gun 

seized and her permit revoked, if Fullman had not been black, had a criminal record, and 

“had a history with the Defendants.”

1 Additionally, Fullman alleged that Defendant 

Krasner blocks the prosecutions of gun cases in which the victims are black and have 

criminal records, and the suspects are women without criminal records. However, 

Fullman did not cite any examples of other criminal complaints.

Fullman additionally asserted that the defendants collectively retaliated against 

him after he engaged in constitutionally protected activity. Fullman generally alleged that 

1 Fullman’s “history with the Defendants” at least includes Fullman’s “prior and 

pending complaints, lawsuits, and . . . continuous fight to get justice for his 

nephew/roommate,” who was murdered in 2014. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 42, ECF No. 43.
3

the protected activity included his reports of the gun-pointing crime and other possible 

criminal and discriminatory conduct. However, the amended complaint specified only 

two interactions with the defendants that occurred after the gun-pointing complaint and 

were not part of Fullman’s efforts to pursue the gun complaint: First, on April 10, 2022, 

Fullman called police to report that a car was illegally parked near his residence in a 

parking spot reserved for people with disabilities. A police officer later removed a 

parking citation from the illegally parked car and placed it on Fullman’s car, which was 

lawfully parked in a nearby accessible parking spot. This caused the illegally parked car 

to receive two parking citations. Second, Fullman filed an ultimately successful petition 

in December 2022 to expunge a criminal record that had been pardoned by the Governor 

of Pennsylvania. The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office opposed the petition, 

claiming that the paperwork was incomplete. Fullman claimed that this opposition 

occurred in retaliation against his efforts to pursue a private criminal prosecution of the 

gun-pointing incident. 

The District Court permitted Fullman to amend his complaint once. See Order 

dated June 20, 2023, ECF No. 42. Fullman attempted to amend his complaint again, but 

the District Court denied that motion. See Mot. to File Substitute Compl., ECF No. 47; 

Order dated July 28, 2023, ECF No. 54. The case was reassigned to a different jurist, who 

granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint and dismissed 

Fullman’s claims with prejudice. Fullman timely appealed.
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II.

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary 

review over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. 

Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, we may affirm the 

District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record. See Hildebrand v. 

Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014). We may summarily affirm the 

District Court’s order if an appeal presents no substantial question for our review. See 3d 

Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6. 

III.

We agree with the District Court that Fullman’s amended complaint does not state 

a plausible constitutional claim. Fullman’s primary concern appears to be the appellees’ 

failure to adequately investigate or prosecute Fullman’s report of the gun-pointing 

incident, but that inaction did not violate Fullman’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to due 

process or equal protection. A victim of a private act of violence generally has no due 

process right to police protection or enforcement of state laws, with some narrow 

exceptions that do not apply here. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 

768 (2005); Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 146 (3d Cir. 2007).2

2 We have recognized two situations in which state actors may have an affirmative 

obligation to protect private citizens from harm. See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 

167 (3d Cir. 2013) (concerning a person who shares a special relationship with a state 

agency); Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 2020) (concerning a 

person who is subjected to an increased risk of harm by private citizens because of a 
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Additionally, a private citizen has no “judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 

nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Of 

course, law enforcement officers and prosecutors cannot exercise their considerable 

discretion in investigating or prosecuting criminal complaints in a discriminatory manner.

See Burella, 501 F.3d at 148-49 (outlining circumstances in which a victim of domestic 

violence might assert a gender-based equal protection claim based on police officers’ 

failure to enforce a restraining order); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 

(1996) (emphasizing that ordinary equal protection standards apply to selective 

prosecution claims). A plaintiff adequately pleads an equal protection claim by offering 

more than conclusory assertions and alleging that he was treated differently from other 

similarly situated individuals. See Children’s Health Def., Inc. v. Rutgers, State Univ. of 

N.J., 93 F.4th 66, 84-85 (3d Cir. 2024). Here, the District Court correctly concluded that 

Fullman has offered only conclusory allegations that police failed to adequately

investigate and District Attorney Krasner refused to prosecute his criminal complaint 

because Fullman is black, has a criminal record, and has a history with local law 

enforcement. Additionally, Fullman has failed to identify any similarly situated 

individuals who were treated differently; he compares himself only to his assailant, and 

he does not allege that his assailant reported a crime.

Fullman also failed to articulate a constitutional retaliation claim. We will liberally 

construe Fullman’s retaliation claim as a claim that law enforcement officials have 

state-created danger). Here, Fullman has not alleged anything suggesting that either 

situation could apply.
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retaliated against his exercise of his First Amendment rights. “To plead retaliation for the 

exercise of First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must allege (1) constitutionally protected 

conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 

exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally

protected conduct and the retaliatory action.” Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 649 (3d 

Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A plaintiff successfully pleads 

causation by pleading that his protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” 

that caused the retaliatory action. See Conard v. Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 184 (3d 

Cir. 2018) (quoting Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016)). Here, Fullman

asserts that the District Attorney’s Office retaliated against his efforts to prosecute the 

gun-pointing complaint by opposing his expungement petition. Fullman has not alleged 

anything suggesting that the prosecutors who opposed his expungement petition were 

even aware of his original report of the gun-pointing incident or his efforts to push the 

District Attorney’s Office to prosecute it. We note that Fullman reported the gun-pointing 

incident eight months before he filed his expungement petition, Fullman’s last alleged 

communication to the District Attorney’s Office about the gun-pointing incident occurred

three months before he filed his expungement petition, and Fullman does not mention

individual prosecutors or office employees that he spoke to about either case.

3

3 Additionally, it is unclear whether Fullman intended to allege that the parkingcitation incident was an act of retaliation against his report of the gun-pointing incident. 

If he did, then that claim fails because the issuance of two parking citations against 

another driver was not a retaliatory action that could have deterred Fullman from 

exercising his constitutional rights to report suspected criminal activity or police 

misconduct.
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Fullman’s remaining claims fare no better. First, the District Court properly 

dismissed Fullman’s Fifth Amendment claim, because the Fifth Amendment right to due 

process applies only to federal government action, and Fullman’s amended complaint 

mentions only state or municipal government actors. See Nguyen v. U.S. Cath. Conf., 

719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983). Second, the District Court correctly determined that the 

parking-citation incident did not violate Fullman’s constitutional right to due process, 

because another driver’s receipt of two parking tickets did not deprive Fullman of any 

life, liberty, or property interest. Finally, the District Court did not err by dismissing 

Fullman’s claims against the City of Philadelphia, because municipal liability does not 

attach if there is no violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Johnson v. City of 

Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 n.13 (3d Cir. 2020).

For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s decision to 

dismiss Fullman’s amended complaint with prejudice.

4

4 The District Court’s opinion refers to a “second amended complaint” and states 

that Fullman “has amended his complaint twice.” See Mem. Op. 1, 11 n.9. That is 

incorrect, however, and the District Court mistakenly relied solely on that ground in 

dismissing Fullman’s complaint with prejudice.

Regardless, it would have been futile to permit Fullman another opportunity to 

amend his claims. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 

2002). The defendants’ motions to dismiss informed Fullman of the key deficiencies in 

his complaint, and he failed to cure those deficiencies in his amended complaint or 

proposed “substitute” complaint. See Mots. to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 16, 17, & 22. None of 

Fullman’s filings in this Court or the District Court suggest that he has additional 

information that could cure the defects in his amended complaint.