NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YEVGENIY V. SIDOROV, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, FKA Transamerica Occidental 

Life Insurance Company; 

TRANSAMERICA OCCIDENTAL LIFE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-16876 

D.C. No. 

2:17-cv-00002-KJM-DB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 19, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Yevgeniy Sidorov brings a host of claims against Transamerica Life 

Insurance Co. (TLIC) for its conduct in managing a life insurance policy for 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 21 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Sidorov’s mother before and after she was murdered by his stepfather. However, 

his substantive claims are all barred by res judicata or failure to file within the 

statutes of limitations, and his claim for declaratory relief was based on those 

barred claims. Therefore, we will affirm the district court’s order granting TLIC’s 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.1

We review de novo rulings on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Coto Settlement v. 

Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010). We will reverse a 12(b)(6) 

dismissal only “if, taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, [the 

complaint] contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1. Res judicata bars Sidorov’s claims for breach of contract and breach

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing insofar as they are based on 

allegations of delay or underpayment of insurance proceeds. The doctrine “applies 

when [an] earlier suit: (1) reached a final judgment on the merits; (2) involved the 

same cause of action or claim; and (3) involved identical parties or privies.” Leon 

v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2006). However, “cause of action” 

is construed broadly to mean “the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered, 

regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory . . . advanced.” Boeken 

1 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We 

have jurisdiction to review a district court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3 

v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010). In practice, this means 

res judicata bars claims against an insurer for breach of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing when the claim “might have been raised and litigated 

in” a prior action concerning a policy breach. Lincoln Prop. Co., N.C. v. Travelers 

Indem. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 45 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Mattson v. City of 

Costa Mesa, 164 Cal. Rptr. 913, 916 (Ct. App. 1980)).

Here, the probate court made a final decision regarding the sum of life 

insurance proceeds TLIC was required to pay out to Sidorov by agreeing to the 

parties’ stipulated amount, including “applicable interest” and “premiums paid 

following” the insured’s death. If Sidorov wanted to seek additional interest or 

proceeds from the premiums, or if he wanted to bring additional claims against 

TLIC for breaching implied covenants of the policy by delaying payment to 

Sidorov, those claims “might have been raised and litigated in” the probate court. 

See Lincoln Prop. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 45; see also Estate of Kraus, 108 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 760, 766 (Ct. App. 2010) (a probate court can hear “causes of action, or 

matters that are normally raised in a civil action to the extent that the matters are 

related factually to the subject matter of a petition”). Instead, Sidorov again seeks 

a monetary award from TLIC for the same alleged underpayment of the life 

insurance policy proceeds, but from another court. Thus, his claims for breach of 

contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, insofar 
4 

as they are based on the insurance proceeds, are barred by res judicata.

2. Sidorov’s remaining claims were all appropriately dismissed for 

failure to abide by the relevant statutes of limitations. The negligence, negligence 

per se, and wrongful death claims needed to be brought within the relevant twoyear statutes of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 339. His remaining 

contract claims have four-year statutes of limitations. Id. § 337(1). And his 

remaining claims for implied breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 

had to be brought within four years if based on an implied contractual promise and 

two years if seeking tort remedies. See Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 

249 n.4 (Ct. App. 1990). To be timely, Sidorov needed to bring all these claims 

within either two or four years after “the cause[s] of action [were] complete with 

all of [their] elements.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 83 (Cal. 1999).

But he was too late. The final elements of the wrongful death and 

negligence claims would have been complete when the insured was murdered on 

January 22, 2010. The remaining breach of contract and breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims are based on TLIC allegedly overinsuring Sidorov’s mother in 2003 and failing to investigate the false report of her 

death in 2007. And Sidorov did not bring this lawsuit until December 30, 2016. 

While he contends various exceptions to the statues of limitations should 

apply, they cannot save his late claims.
5 

First, Sidorov argues the delayed discovery rule, which “postpones accrual 

of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the 

cause of action,” should apply. Id. But Sidorov was in possession of the 

documents necessary to discover his claims that are not barred by res judicata in 

2011, making his 2016 lawsuit too late.

2

Second, he argues the continuous accrual doctrine should allow him to bring 

claims for TLIC’s post-murder conduct because a claim does not accrue until “the 

occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.” El Pollo Loco, Inc. 

v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting April Enters., Inc. v. 

KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 432 (Ct. App. 1983)). However, as stated above, the 

last alleged elements for the negligence and wrongful death claims were complete 

upon the insured’s 2010 murder. The breach of contract and breach of implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims are based on conduct either 

completed in 2003 or 2007, or they are barred by res judicata.

Third, Sidorov argues equitable estoppel should apply as he relied upon 

TLIC’s actions taken after being notified of the insured’s death in 2014, which

allegedly “lulled [Sidorov] into a sense of security preventing him from instituting 

proceedings before the running of the statute . . . .” See Holdgrafer v. Unocal 

2 Sidorov suggests his claims were not discoverable until the probate 

court’s July 2014 order, which named him as the life insurance beneficiary. Even 

under his theory, the December 2016 suit was too late.
6 

Corp., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 231–32 (Ct. App. 2008). But his reliance argument is 

of no use to his negligence and wrongful death claims, where the last elements

would have been complete in 2010, before Sidorov even knew of TLIC. Likewise, 

his contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims relate to 

conduct prior to his knowledge of TLIC, except for those barred by res judicata.3

3. The district court also properly dismissed Sidorov’s claim for 

declaratory relief. The claim was entirely based on the tort and contract claims 

previously discussed. As those claims were appropriately dismissed, so too was 

his claim for declaratory relief.

AFFIRMED.

3 Finally, his argument for equitable tolling is directed towards his 

breach of contract claim. But that argument is once more based on the contract 

claims concerning TLIC’s post-death conduct, which are barred by res judicata.