Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Alexander N. Moseley

Dixon & Moseley, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Elizabeth Eichholtz Walker

Becker Bouwkamp Walker, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lela Jo Boucher,

Appellant-Respondent, 

v. 

Dennis J. Doyle, 

Appellee-Petitioner.

February 12, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-DN-1534 

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court

The Honorable John Feick, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

18C04-2112-DN-379 

Opinion by Judge Riley 

Judges Crone and Mathias concur.

Riley, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 2 of 14

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent-Cross-Petitioner, Lela Jo Boucher (Wife), appeals the 

trial court’s Order dividing the marital estate in favor of Appellee-PetitionerCross-Respondent, Dennis Doyle (Husband). 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Wife presents this court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether the trial 

court’s deviation from the presumptive equal division of the marital estate was 

clearly erroneous. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Husband and Wife wed on January 21, 2017. On the date of their marriage, 

Husband owned four bank accounts at Indiana Member’s Credit Union, stock

in Southern Company, a timeshare in Tennessee, funds which were ultimately 

rolled into two Edward Jones IRAs, a retirement savings account at Fidelity, 

and certain personal property. On the date of their marriage, Wife owned the 

home that the parties shared during the marriage, an Edward Jones IRA, and 

certain personal property. 

[5] Husband has a high school diploma and some technical school training.

Husband worked as a fleet and facility supervisor for thirty-six years at the same 

location under several different employers. Husband began working for 

Citizens Energy Group in 2016, and by the time of the final hearing was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 3 of 14

making $85,000 per year. Wife holds a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in 

health science. In 1997, Wife began working in the home health care field. 

Prior to the parties’ marriage, Wife had been able to pay all her own expenses 

through her income. For the first eighteen months of the marriage, Wife 

worked for an in-home health care company making $59,000 per year. In June 

of 2018, Wife voluntarily left her employment. From June 2018 to the date of 

separation, Husband paid all the parties’ expenses. After Wife left her 

employment, she obtained her real estate license in 2020. Wife sold real estate 

in 2020 and 2021 but had an actual net loss in income. 

[6] On December 8, 2021, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and 

on January 13, 2022, Wife filed a cross-petition which she amended once. On 

April 5, 2022, the trial court ordered the parties to participate in mediation, 

which was ultimately unsuccessful. 

[7] On April 21, 2023, the trial court held the final hearing. Wife was sixty-five 

years old as of the final hearing. As to her retirement account, Wife related that 

in 2017 she had rolled over approximately $150,000 in funds into her Edward 

Jones IRA. Wife testified that in 2022, she netted $12,000 from her real estate 

dealings but that she did not expect her income to increase because the real 

estate market in the area was low in stock and did not show any signs of 

improving. During the marriage and the pendency of the dissolution 

proceedings, Wife had not sought out any additional employment to 

supplement her earnings from her real estate dealings. Wife had hopes of using 

her real estate license to obtain employment managing real estate properties. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 4 of 14

Wife requested a 50/50 split of the marital estate. Husband testified that at the 

time of marriage, the approximate value of his bank and retirement accounts 

was $500,000. Husband essentially requested that each party be awarded the 

property and investments brought into the marriage, which would result in him 

receiving 62% of the marital estate, while Wife would receive 38%. 

[8] On April 26, 2023, the trial court entered a summary decree of dissolution of 

marriage. On June 8, 2023, the trial court entered its Decree of Dissolution 

dividing the parties’ marital estate. The trial court entered the following 

relevant findings of fact and conclusions thereon:

24. Because of the short-term nature of the marriage and the 

extent to which property was acquired by each spouse before the 

marriage, Husband has rebutted the presumption that an equal 

division of the marital estate is just and reasonable. 

* * * * 

26. Husband came into the marriage with the majority of the 

marital estate and 100% of the assets he now asks this court to 

award him. More specifically, Husband came into the marriage 

with the following funds and assets which have remained in his 

individual name for the duration of the parties’ relationship: 

a. IMCU *3801-001, *3801-0010, *3801-0030, *3801-0106, 

b. Southern Co. Stock; 

c. Tennessee Timeshare; 

d. Edward Jones *7017 IRA and *7103 IRA; and 

e. Fidelity Citizens Energy Group. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 5 of 14

27. The combined value of two (2) of Husband’s premarital 

retirement account assets (See Edward Jones *7017 IRA and 

*7103 IRA following rollovers from his accounts Suez and 

Citizens Energy Group in 2017) exceed $636,000 on the date of 

filing of this action. Neither of which were contributed to during 

the course of the parties’ marriage. 

28. Wife’s earning capacity with a [b]achelor’s [d]egree plus 

hours toward her [m]aster’s [d]egree and real estate license is 

potentially far more than that of Husband, who only holds a high 

school diploma; therefore, her economic circumstances and 

earning ability can be superior to those of Husband. 

29. Husband has been employed by Citizens Energy Group for 

36 years. Wife left her employment in June of 2018. At the 

time, she earned approximately $59,000 working at an in-home 

health care company. Husband financially supported the 

household from June of 2018 until December 8, 2021, including 

making all mortgage, insurance, property tax, utilities payments 

on the Marital Residence. In addition, Husband made 

improvements to the Marital Residence, both financial and 

nonfinancial. Husband has made all automobile loan payments 

on the Toyota Rav4. Husband has proposed Wife keep both the 

Marital Residence and the Toyota Rav4.

30. Wife obtained her real estate license during the marriage. 

Husband paid for Wife to obtain her real estate license as well as 

the start-up expenses for her real estate agency. Wife is currently 

underemployed and is looking to obtain employment as a 

property manager post-decree. Wife made no employment 

efforts during the 16 months this cause of action was pending. 

No reason was provided by Wife despite acknowledging she 

needed to change careers.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 6 of 14

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 19-20) (record citations omitted). The trial court 

found that it had “considered all marital property and weighed all factors 

provided for in Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5” and that Husband had 

rebutted the presumption of an equal division of the marital estate. (Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II, p. 20). The trial court awarded each party the assets, retirement 

accounts, and real property each had owned before the marriage and divided 

the parties’ other property, resulting in Huband receiving 62% of the marital 

estate and Wife receiving 38%. 

[9] Wife now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[10] Wife challenges the division of the marital estate following the trial court’s sua 

sponte entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law.1

 We review a trial 

court’s sua sponte findings and conclusions under a two-tiered standard of 

review to determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the 

findings support the judgment. Kakollu v. Vadlamudi, 175 N.E.3d 287, 295 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2021) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)), trans. 

denied. We will not set aside the trial court’s findings or its judgment unless it is 

clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge 

1 Neither party requested Indiana Trial Rule 52 findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Although the trial 

court permitted the parties to submit proposed decrees, the chronological case summary does not reflect that 

any were filed. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 7 of 14

witness credibility. Id. Findings of fact are only clearly erroneous where the 

record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them. Wyzard v. 

Wyzard, 771 N.E.2d 754, 756-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). When determining 

whether a finding or judgment is clearly erroneous, we consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the judgment, along with all reasonable inferences

therefrom, neither reweighing the evidence nor assessing witness credibility. Id. 

at 757. Issues not covered by the findings are reviewed under the general 

judgment standard, which means that, as a reviewing court, we should affirm 

based on any legal theory that is supported by the evidence. Kakollu, 175 

N.E.3d at 295. 

[11] We review a trial court’s division of marital assets and debts for an abuse of its 

discretion, which only occurs if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect 

of the facts and or reasonable inferences, if its misapplies the law, or if it 

overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors. Ivankovic v. Ivankovic, 205 

N.E.3d 1061, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The appellant “bears the burden of 

overcoming a strong presumption that the trial court considered and complied 

with the applicable statute, and that presumption is one of the strongest 

presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.” Crider v. Crider, 26 

N.E.3d 1045, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quote omitted). To succeed 

on appeal, it is not enough for the appellant to demonstrate that the evidence 

might support some other conclusion; rather, the appellant must show that the 

evidence positively requires the desired conclusion. Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 

304, 307 (Ind. 2002). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 8 of 14

II. Division of the Marital Estate

[12] Wife contends that the trial court’s unequal division of the marital estate is 

clearly erroneous. In Indiana, a presumption exists that an equal division of the 

marital estate is “just and reasonable.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. However, the 

presumption may be rebutted through “relevant evidence[,]” including evidence 

of the following factors:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the 

property, regardless of whether the contribution was income 

producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each 

spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the 

disposition of the property is to become effective . . . .

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to 

the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the 

parties.

Id. The list of statutory factors is non-exclusive, but when dividing the marital 

estate, a trial court must consider all the relevant factors. Id.; Smith v. Smith, 

136 N.E.3d 275, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). All of the factors are to be 

considered together, and no single factor is dispositive. In re Marriage of Marek, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 9 of 14

47 N.E.3d 1283, 1290-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Our supreme court 

has recently clarified that 

[s]o long as it expressly considers all assets and liabilities, and so 

long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal 

division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in 

dividing the marital estate and we will assume that it applied the 

law correctly.

Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 229 (Ind. 2022). 

[13] Here, the trial court found that it had “considered all marital property and 

weighed all factors provided for in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5[.]” 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20). In addition, it found that the parties’ less than 

five-year marriage was of short duration, Husband brought the majority of the 

assets into the marriage, during the marriage neither party had contributed to 

the major marital asset–Husband’s Edward Jones IRAs–, and that Wife had 

substantial earning capability. Thus, the trial court entered specific findings and 

conclusions on the statutory factors of the contributions of the parties, the 

premarital nature of the parties’ assets, and the earning capabilities of the 

parties.2

 Once the trial court considered all the statutory factors, it was not 

required to enter findings and conclusions regarding each factor. See Israel v. 

2 The trial court also detailed the history of various motions filed by Husband seeking compliance with discovery 

requests and documentation requirements provided for in the provisional orders, found that Husband had incurred 

additional attorney’s fees, and noted that it had “considered [H]usband’s excess payment of attorney fees in the 

division of the property.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 25). Neither party mentioned these findings on appeal, so 

we exclude them from our analysis. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 10 of 14

Israel, 189 N.E.3d 170, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that after considering 

all the statutory factors, a trial court “is not required to explicitly address all the 

factors in every case”), trans. denied. In addition to the statutory factors, the trial 

court properly considered the short duration of a marriage, which “may rebut 

the presumption favoring equal division, especially if one party brought 

substantially more property into the marriage.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227

(citing Houchens v. Boschert, 758 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). 

[14] Despite the evidence, findings, and conclusions supporting the trial court’s 

judgment, Wife argues that “the trial court erred by giving considerable weight 

to the extent of assets that Husband brought into the marriage, while failing to 

recognize that Wife also brought a significant amount of assets into the 

marriage.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). Wife contends that this is illustrated by the 

fact that the assets she brought into the marriage were valued at $446,000 when 

the parties separated. However, the trial court necessarily considered the 

amount and value of Wife’s premarital assets when it found that Husband 

brought the “majority” of the assets into the marriage, a finding that Wife does 

not specifically dispute, and the value of Wife’s assets at the time of marriage, 

not separation, is the relevant value for purposes of this issue. (Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II, p. 19). We observe that at the time of marriage, Wife’s Edward 

Jones account had a value of approximately $150,000, while Husband brought 

at least $500,000 into the marriage, and there was no evidence presented at the 

final hearing regarding the value of Wife’s other major premarital asset, the 

marital home, at the time of marriage. Wife’s argument on this point is merely 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 11 of 14

a request that we reweigh the evidence, which, pursuant to our standard of 

review, we will not do. Wyzard, 771 N.E.2d at 757.

[15] Next, Wife asserts that the trial court failed to consider evidence of the 

economic circumstances of the parties, a factor which she maintains weighed in 

her favor, and she contends that the trial court clearly erred when it found that 

she was in a superior economic position to Husband. However, Wife’s 

argument mischaracterizes the trial court’s findings, which emphasized the 

short duration of the marriage, the premarital nature of the majority of the 

parties’ assets, and their earning capabilities. The trial court found that, given 

her education, Wife’s economic circumstances “can be superior to those of 

Husband[,]” not that they were superior. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20)

(emphasis added). Wife does not argue that this was an improper 

consideration. In addition, the trial court also expressly found that it had 

“weighed all factors provided for in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5[.]” 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20). Having done so, it was not required to enter 

findings and conclusions regarding the parties’ economic circumstances at the 

time of dissolution. See Israel, 189 N.E.3d at 176. In addition to the trial court’s 

express finding that it had considered all the statutory factors, we indulge a 

strong presumption that the trial court did so and applied the law correctly. 

Crider, 26 N.E.3d at 1047; Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009) (“[W]e presume that the trial court considered these factors.”). 

Wife has failed to overcome this presumption. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 12 of 14

[16] Wife’s final contention is that “the trial court’s finding that Wife has a higher 

earning ability than Husband is not supported by the evidence.” (Appellant’s 

Br. p. 13). This argument is unpersuasive. The trial court did not find that 

Wife’s earning capability was superior to Husband’s; rather, it found that, given 

her education, it “can be” superior to Husband’s, a consideration which Wife 

does not contend was improper, and it determined that Wife was 

underemployed. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20). A trial court may consider a 

party’s work history, occupational qualifications, prevailing job opportunities, 

and earning levels in the community to find that a party is underemployed for 

purposes of determining earning capability in a dissolution proceeding. See 

Hyde v. Hyde, 751 N.E.2d 761, 767-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (applying these 

factors from the Indiana Child Support Guidelines in evaluating the trial court’s 

determination that a party was underemployed when dividing the marital 

estate). 

[17] The evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment was that Wife is not disabled 

and that, since no children were born of the marriage, she had not absented 

herself from the workforce during the marriage for child rearing responsibilities. 

Wife has a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in health science, from which it can 

be inferred that she has earning capability. See Trost-Steffen v. Steffen, 772 

N.E.2d 500, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (inferring from evidence that mother held 

a master’s degree and father held a Ph.D. that both parties were capable of 

earning), trans. denied. Although Wife makes much of Husband’s thirty-six-year 

work history at the same employment, the record reflects that Wife worked 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 13 of 14

from 1997 to 2018 in the home health care industry and that, prior to the 

marriage, she made up to $59,000 per year and was able to support herself from 

her labor in that field. Wife contends that in 2018, she was “forced to switch 

careers” when her employer closed, but Husband testified that Wife had left 

voluntarily due to frustration with the work and with the other people who 

worked there. (Appellant’s Br. p. 14). Inasmuch as Husband’s testimony 

supports the trial court’s judgment, it is the evidence we will credit. Wyzard, 

771 N.E.2d at 757. In addition, during the marriage, Wife obtained a real 

estate license which she planned to use to obtain employment in property 

management. Although Wife had failed to earn any significant income from 

her real estate dealings, she had never sought any other form of work to 

supplement her income. 

[18] Given this evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that Wife 

was underemployed was supported by the evidence and, thus, that the trial 

court’s determination on this issue supported the judgment. Wife’s reliance on 

Gish v. Gish, 111 N.E.3d 1034, 1038-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied, 

wherein another panel of this court held that it was an abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion to award the husband his entire retirement account, resulting in an 

unequal division of the marital estate, is misplaced. Gish is factually 

distinguishable because the parties were married for twenty-six years, the 

husband’s earning capability was four times greater than the wife’s, the wife’s

earning capability was limited by the solo nature of her hair styling business, 

and the wife had health issues. Id. at 1038. Gish is additionally distinguishable 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-1534 | February 12, 2024 Page 14 of 14

because, despite this evidence, the trial court did not enter any findings and 

conclusions thereon regarding the earning capability of the parties. Id. Here, 

the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon on this 

statutory factor. Wife’s argument on this issue otherwise consists of directing 

our attention to her version of events and to evidence that does not support the 

judgment, both of which are contrary to our standard of review. See Wyzard, 

771 N.E.2d at 757. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s judgment. 

CONCLUSION

[19] Based on the foregoing, we hold that Wife has failed to demonstrate that the 

trial court’s deviation from the presumptive equal split of the marital estate was 

clearly erroneous. 

[20] Affirmed. 

[21] Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur