UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4318

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JACINTO BRACMORT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District 

Judge. (8:10-cr-00249-DKC-6)

Submitted: November 27, 2012 Decided: December 13, 2012

Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joshua R. Treem, Emily L. Levenson, SCHULMAN, TREEM & GILDEN, 

P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, 

United States Attorney, Adam K. Ake, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In August 2011, a jury convicted Jacinto Bracmort of 

conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine base and phencyclidine (“PCP”), in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2006). Bracmort was sentenced to 120 

months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. In 

this appeal, Bracmort assigns error to the district court’s 

denial of a requested jury instruction and the court’s failure 

to make specific factual findings relevant to the drug 

quantities attributable to him for sentencing purposes. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment. 

In his challenge to his conviction, Bracmort argues 

the district court abused its discretion in denying his request 

for a jury instruction on multiple conspiracies. “We review the 

district court’s decision to give or refuse to give a jury 

instruction for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Sarwari, 

669 F.3d 401, 410-11 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

A district court will be reversed for declining to 

give an instruction proposed by a party only when the 

requested instruction (1) was correct; (2) was not 

substantially covered by the court’s charge to the 

jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so 

important, that failure to give the requested 

instruction seriously impaired that party’s ability to 

make its case.
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Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 516 (2011).

“A court need only instruct on multiple conspiracies 

if such an instruction is supported by the facts.” United 

States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 1993). Thus, “[a] 

multiple conspiracy instruction is not required unless the proof 

at trial demonstrates that appellant[] [was] involved only in 

separate conspiracies unrelated to the overall conspiracy 

charged in the indictment.” United States v. Squillacote, 221 

F.3d 542, 574 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and 

emphases omitted). We have previously explained “that a single 

conspiracy exists[] when the conspiracy had the same objective, 

it had the same goal, the same nature, the same geographic 

spread, the same results, and the same product.” United States 

v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 567 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

Based on our review of the record in its present form, 

we conclude that the evidence adduced at trial established that 

Bracmort, cooperating witness Ricky Moore, and co-defendant Rico 

Toliver were part of a “loosely-knit association of members 

linked only by their mutual interest in sustaining the overall 

enterprise of catering to the ultimate demands of a particular 

drug consumption market” — here, the area in and around Prince 

George’s County, Maryland. United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 
4

1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993). Specifically, beginning in late 

2009, Moore and Toliver became partners in a common enterprise 

of distributing and possessing with the intent to distribute 

cocaine base and PCP. After obtaining drugs from Toliver and 

co-conspirator Darrell Banks, Moore would sell these drugs to 

Bracmort and others. Moore frequently and consistently supplied 

PCP to Bracmort, which Bracmort would either use or sell to 

others. Bracmort further aided the conspiracy by driving Moore 

to drug deals and by attempting to find potential buyers and 

sources.*

 Because the trial evidence established a single 

conspiracy rather than multiple smaller ones, we hold the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense 

counsel’s request to instruct the jury on multiple conspiracies. 

Bracmort also challenges his sentence, assigning error 

to the district court’s failure to make specific factual 

findings relevant to the drug quantities attributed to him for 

sentencing purposes. According to Bracmort, given the jury’s 

findings that less than 100 grams of PCP and less than 28 grams 

of cocaine base were attributable to him, the “court had an 

 * That the Government did not directly link Bracmort to 

Toliver simply is not legally significant. See United States v. 

Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “one 

may be a member of a conspiracy without knowing its full scope, 

or all its members, and without taking part in the full range of 

its activities or over the whole period of its existence” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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obligation to engage in fact finding to determine the specific 

amounts of drugs attributable to Mr. Bracmort.” (Appellant’s 

Br. at 15). And because the court did not make any factual 

determinations on this issue, Bracmort asserts the court lacked 

a sufficient basis for using the larger drug quantities for 

calculating his base offense level, thus resulting in the 

imposition of an unreasonable sentence. We disagree. 

Generally, this court reviews a sentence for 

reasonableness, using an abuse of discretion standard of review. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In reviewing the 

district court’s calculations under the Guidelines, “we review 

the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual 

findings for clear error,” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 

621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), and 

will “find clear error only if, on the entire evidence, we are 

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.” Id. at 631 (internal quotation marks and 

alteration omitted). However, because he did not object to the 

district court’s failure to make specific factual findings 

regarding the attributable drug quantities, Bracmort’s claim is 

reviewed for plain error. United States v. Blatstein, 482 F.3d 

725, 731 (4th Cir. 2007).

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A), the 

sentencing court “may accept any undisputed portion of the 
6

presentence report as a finding of fact.” Given Bracmort’s 

undisputed failure to object to the probation officer’s 

recommendation as to the drug quantities attributable to him, we 

discern no error, let alone plain error, in the district court’s 

reliance on the presentence report to support this factual 

determination. 

We further reject Bracmort’s contention that the court 

was obligated to make express factual findings — even in the 

absence of an objection to the presentence report — because the 

attributable drug quantities were greater than those found by 

the jury. The jury’s findings that Bracmort was accountable for 

less than 28 grams of crack cocaine and less than 100 grams of 

PCP, made under a reasonable doubt standard, were relevant to 

whether Bracmort would be subject to the enhanced statutory 

sentencing provisions applicable to crimes involving larger 

quantities of narcotics. This is plainly distinct from the 

court’s analysis of the attributable drug quantities as relevant 

to sentencing. See United States v. Young, 609 F.3d 348, 357 

(4th Cir. 2010) (“But beyond establishing the maximum sentence, 

the jury’s drug-quantity determination placed no constraint on 

the district court’s authority to find facts relevant to 

sentencing.”). And as we further recognized in Young, the 

sentencing court is “free to consider . . . whether the 

government could establish a higher quantity under a 
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preponderance of the evidence standard.” 609 F.3d at 357. To 

be sure, the Young court discussed the need, in such situations, 

for the sentencing court to “make relevant factual findings 

based on the court’s view of the preponderance of the evidence.” 

Id. However, in light of Bracmort’s failure to object to the 

presentence report, the court sufficiently satisfied this duty 

by adopting the drug quantity determinations set forth therein. 

Cf. United States v. Davis, 679 F.3d 177, 180, 187 (4th Cir. 

2012) (explaining that, where defendant objects to application 

of specific Guideline, the sentencing court must make factual 

findings as to disputed conduct). We thus reject this challenge 

to Bracmort’s sentence.

For these reasons, we affirm the criminal judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED