* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Kenneth S. Apfel , Commissioner of

Social Security, is substituted for Shirley S. Chat er as the defendant in this action.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### NOV 10 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHNNIE RENEE MCDANIEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 97-5042 (D.C. No. 95-CV-1096-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 The parties consented to proceed before a magistrat e judge. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). -2- Claimant Johnnie Renee McDaniel appeals the denial of her claims for supplemental security income and disability insuran ce benefits. After her application was denied administratively, an adminis trative law judge (ALJ), held a hearing and denied benefits at step five of the f ive-step sequential evaluation process, see Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing five steps). The Appeals Council and the district court 1 declined to reverse the ALJ’s decision. We affirm. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence basedon the entire record, and to ascertain whether he applied the correct legal stan dards. See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Soli z v. Chater , 82 F.3d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (further quotation omitted)). We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Kelley v. Chater , 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995).-3-

Claimant alleges disability due to mental problems, obesity, back pain, and swelling in her legs and feet. The ALJ determined that she could not return to her past work as a housekeeper, beauty operator, day care attendant, or food service worker, but that she could perform a full range of sedentary work. He then applied the “grids,” i.e., the medical-vocational g uidelines, 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, to find claimant not disabled. O n appeal, claimant asserts the ALJ failed to evaluate properly her mental impairme nt and to consider the impact of that impairment on her ability to work. She als o claims the ALJ was required to obtain the opinion of a vocational expert to eva luate the impact of claimant’s mental impairment on the jobs available to her. The record contains substantial evidence to supportthe conclusion that claimant’s mental condition does not impair her abi lity to perform sedentary work. The ALJ considered all of the evidence submi tted, see R. vol. II at 17, and he discussed the evidence he considered in completi ng the Psychiatric Review form, as required by Cruse v. United States Departm ent of Health & Human Services , 49 F.3d 614, 617-18 (10th Cir. 1995). Moreover, because claimant’s mental problems are treatable, they do not establis h disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (claimant must follow prescrib ed treatment if it can restore ability to work); cf. Pacheco v. Sullivan , 931 F.2d 695, 697-98 (10th Cir. 1991)-4-

(discussing standards for refusal to follow prescri bed treatment, indicating that benefits will cease if treatment can restore ability to work). The ALJ properly relied on the grids and was not re quired to obtain the opinion of a vocational expert because substantial evidence supports the determination that claimant’s psychological impairm ents do not limit her ability to perform sedentary work. See Eggleston v. Bowen , 851 F.2d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 1988) (presence of nonexertional impairment do es not preclude use of grids if nonexertional impairment does not limit claimant ’s ability to perform work); cf. Castellano , 26 F.3d at 1030 (ALJ’s reliance on grids was not error because claimant’s pain testimony was not fully credible). We also reject claimant’s alternative argument that even if her mental condit ion improved following her hospitalization in December 1993, her mental condit ion limited her ability to work from January 1992 to January 1994. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commissioner’s determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record and was based on correct legal standards. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge