J-A31027-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYLER MITCHELL BRADSHAW

Appellant No. 114 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 16, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0003479-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2015

Tyler Mitchell Bradshaw appeals from the judgment of sentence, 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, after a jury 

trial in which he was convicted of second-degree murder,1robbery,2and 

conspiracy to commit these crimes.3 Upon review, we affirm. 

The trial court summarized the facts of this matter as follows:

On November 18, 2012, between approximately 10:00 and 

11:00 p.m., Sergeant Todd Lindsay of the Silver Spring 

Township Police Department was dispatched to the Hess Station 

at 7034 Carlisle Pike, Silver Spring Township, Cumberland 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
J-A31027-15

- 2 -

County. Upon arriving at the Hess Station, Sergeant Lindsay 

was directed behind the counter where he found Linda Ness, the 

store clerk, with blood on her face. Paramedics arrived at the 

Hess Station shortly after Sergeant Lindsay, and Miss Ness was 

determined to be deceased.

In an effort to determine the circumstances which led to Miss 

Ness’s death, Sergeant Lindsay reviewed a soundless 

surveillance video. The video, according to Sergeant Lindsay, 

shows an individual entering the Hess Station. The individual 

briefly engages in conversation with someone off to his right, 

presumably Miss Ness, and then leaves the store. Shortly 

thereafter, two individuals dressed in black, wearing masks and 

gloves, enter the store. They approach the counter with one 

behind the other. The individual closest to the counter lifts up 

his shirt with his right hand [and] pulls a gun from his waistband 

with his left hand. Although Miss Ness is not fully visible in the 

video at this point, the tips of her fingers come into view. He 

then proceeds to point, either at the register or at Miss Ness, 

with his finger and then with the gun, alternating between the 

two. Miss Ness then suddenly collapses to the ground and the 

two individuals leave the store.

On November 20, 2012, an autopsy was performed on Miss Ness 

by Dr. Johnson, a forensic pathologist, at the Lehigh Valley 

Medical Center. During the autopsy, three bullet fragments were 

recovered from Miss Ness, and Dr. Johnson determined that the 

cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the neck and 

chest.

Officer Seth Weikert, Silver Spring Township Police Department, 

and Detective Les Freehling of the Cumberland County Criminal 

Investigation Division interviewed co-defendant Shante Rice. 

Mr. Rice explained that he was the first individual seen on the 

video surveillance to enter the Hess Station and that, after 

leaving the store, he passed the two individuals that next 

entered the store. Mr. Rice admitted providing the gun to the 

shooter approximately an hour before the shooting. Mr. Rice 

said that he and three other individuals planned the robbery at 

the Hess Station approximately five minutes before stopping 

there.

[Bradshaw] also was interviewed as a suspect. That interview 

was conducted by the lead investigator, Detective Jared Huff of 

the Silver Spring Township Police Department, and Detective 
J-A31027-15

- 3 -

Richard Keefer of the Cumberland County Criminal Investigation 

Division. [Bradshaw], like Mr. Rice, admitted that he and three 

other individuals discussed robbing the Hess Station on the 

Carlisle Pike prior to arriving there. He also admitted that he 

and one of the other three individuals entered the Hess Station 

together, with [Bradshaw] entering first. Once inside, 

[Bradshaw] approached the counter and pointed a gun at Miss 

Ness, telling her to turn around and get the money. He then 

shot Miss Ness, fatally injuring her. According to [Bradshaw], 

the gun just went off. After Miss Ness collapsed, [Bradshaw] 

and the other individual left the store empty handed.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/26/15, 2-4.

Bradshaw was convicted on September 11, 2014 and sentenced on 

December 16, 2014. In addition to a sentence of life imprisonment for 

second-degree murder, the court imposed concurrent sentences of ten to 

twenty years’ incarceration for conspiracy to commit murder, and five to ten 

years’ incarceration each for robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. 

This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Bradshaw raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that [firstdegree murder] and [second-degree murder] carr[y] the same 

penalty when the death penalty is withdrawn.

[2.] The trial court erred in not allowing sufficient crossexamination of the co-defendants [who] testified against 

[Bradshaw] under a “deal” for a lesser offense.

Brief of Appellant, at 7.

In his first issue, Bradshaw claims that the trial court erred by not 

instructing the jury that the penalty for first-degree or second-degree 

murder would be identical in his case. Our standard of review regarding jury 

instructions involves deference to the trial court, and we will reverse the 
J-A31027-15

- 4 -

court’s decision only if it abused its discretion or committed an error of law. 

Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 798-99 (Pa. 2009). 

We note that in order to preserve a claim regarding erroneous jury 

instructions, a specific objection must be made at trial. Commonwealth v. 

Parker, 104 A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014) appeal denied, 117 A.3d 296 

(Pa. 2015); see Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) (“No portion of the charge nor 

omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific 

objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.”). Indeed, 

“the mere submission and subsequent denial of proposed points for charge 

that are inconsistent with or omitted from the instructions actually given will 

not suffice to preserve an issue, absent a specific objection or exception to 

the charge.” Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 225 (Pa. 2005). 

Even if an appellant objects to an instruction during the charging conference, 

this Court has found the issue waived if there is no objection after the actual 

instructions have been given. See Parker, supra, at 29.

Instantly, the record reveals that during the charging conference, 

Bradshaw’s counsel requested a jury instruction indicating that the penalty 

for first-degree or second-degree murder would be identical in this matter. 

The court denied this request, to which counsel indicated that “[he would] 

make an objection.” N.T. Trial, 9/10/14, at 194. However, after the jury 

was given instructions, which did not include the requested instruction 
J-A31027-15

- 5 -

regarding penalties, Bradshaw’s counsel did not raise the issue again. Thus, 

this issue is waived.4 Pressley, supra; Parker, supra.

Bradshaw next asserts that the trial court did not permit adequate 

cross-examination of his co-defendant, Brandon Mathna,5regarding a plea 

agreement he may have made with the Commonwealth. “The scope and the 

manner of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will not be overturned unless the court has abused that 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d 756, 761 (Pa. Super. 

2008). The scope of cross-examination generally includes “inferences, 

deductions, or conclusions which may be drawn therefrom, which explain or 

destroy the effect of direct testimony.” Id. at 762. In particular,

[when] a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the 

prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because 

of any non-final criminal disposition against him within the same 

jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known 

to the jury. Even if the prosecutor has made no promises, either 

on the present case or on other pending criminal matters, the 

witness may hope for favorable treatment from the prosecutor if 

____________________________________________

4 Moreover, even if counsel had preserved this issue, we note that the 

argument that the instruction should have been permitted is without merit, 

since “[p]unishment is a matter solely for the court and not for the jury to 

know or to consider during its deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Waters, 

483 A.2d 855, 860 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citing Commonwealth v. Lucier,

225 A.2d 890 (Pa. 1967)).

5 Bradshaw states the issue as objecting to limits on the cross-examination 

of two co-defendants, Christian Conway and Mathna. However, argument 

has been developed only as to Mathna. Moreover, counsel stated that he 

was satisfied with what he was able to elicit during cross-examination of 

Conway. See N.T. Trial, 9/9/14, at 100. 
J-A31027-15

- 6 -

the witness presently testifies in a way that is helpful to the 

prosecution. [I]f that possibility exists, the jury should know 

about it.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 647 A.2d 907, 912 (Pa Super. 1994).

Bradshaw’s counsel had the following exchange with Mathna:

[By Mr. Abeln:] 

Q: What -- what promise or anything did you get from the 

Commonwealth to have you come here today and tell them 

what you say is true?

A: I have just come here so maybe after this I could have 

some leniency in my overall --

Q: All right. Let’s talk about that. What -- what do you 

describe as leniency?

A: Less than what the total end could be.

Q: Less than what?

A: My total sentence could be.

Q: Less than what your total sentence could be?

A: Yeah. Like, the maximum.

. . .

Q: What did [First Assistant District Attorney] Keating tell 

you if you testified today or whoever from the District 

Attorney’s Office?

A: Just that if I do this that they may -- might show me 

mercy in the end when my time comes to be sentenced.

Q: Did you ask him what mercy meant?

A: Just as I said, not the maximum sentence, like, the 

overall, the main I can get.

N.T. Trial, 9/9/14, at 134-35. Counsel next asked Mathna what he thought 

the maximum sentence would be, to which the Commonwealth objected. 
J-A31027-15

- 7 -

The Court sustained the objection as to the form of the question, and 

provided the following guidance:

The Court: . . . You may ask if he was promised a specific length 

of the sentence or a general ballpark of what his sentence would 

be. Length.

You may not get into anything that includes what the penalties, 

maximum penalties are for the offenses that are charged. And 

you are not to be leading down that direction to elicit that. You 

have already taken that bite once or twice.

Id. at 138-39. Counsel resumed questioning Mathna:

By Mr. Abeln:

Q: I’m going to clarify my last question to you. Were you 

promised anything by the Commonwealth as to what the 

length of your sentence would be if you testified?

A: No.

Mr. Abeln: Okay. That’s all I have, Your Honor.

Id. at 140.

Bradshaw argues that the maximum penalty was relevant for the 

purpose of impeaching Mathna and should have been permitted to be 

discussed during the above exchange. However, as the trial court noted:

In the absence of an agreement between Mr. Mathna and the 

Commonwealth, the maximum penalty for the charges against 

Mr. Mathna was not pertinent to Attorney Abeln’s attempt to 

impeach Mr. Mathna’s credibility. The maximum penalty may 

have been relevant had Mr. Mathna already entered into an 

agreement with the Commonwealth for a particular sentence as 

it would have informed the jury as to the extent and generosity 

of that agreement. . . . Additionally, by circumscribing Attorney 

Abeln’s questioning of Mr. Mathna, we wished to insure that he 

did not attempt to circumvent our ruling excluding reference to 

the potential penalties faced by [Bradshaw] by introducing those 

penalties through the testimony of Mr. Mathna.
J-A31027-15

- 8 -

Trial Court Opinion, 3/26/15, at 11. 

The trial court correctly notes that Mathna had no specific agreement 

with the Commonwealth that would have made a maximum penalty relevant 

in comparison to the length of his sentence. Moreover, the jury was 

permitted to hear testimony of the possibility that Mathna could receive 

leniency in his sentence, as mandated in Smith, supra. Finally, the trial 

court’s decision to curb testimony to avoid the introduction of specific 

penalties is also sound. Waters, supra. Thus, we discern no error in the 

trial court’s rulings during Mathna’s cross-examination.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2015