## United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-6072

In re: * * Virgil Hurd, Jr., * * Debtor. * * Fred C. Moon, * Appeal from the * United States Trustee - Appellant, * Bankruptcy Court for the * Western District of Missouri v. * * Virgil Hurd, Jr. , * * Debtor - Appellee. *

Submitted: December 1, 2010 Filed: December 15, 2010

Before KRESSEL, Chief Judge, SCHE RMER and NAIL, Bankruptcy Judges SCHERMER, Bankruptcy Judge Fred C. Moon, Chapter 7 trustee (the “Trustee”) for the bankruptcy estate of Virgil Hurd, Jr. (the “Debtor”), appeal s from an order overruling the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s claim of an exemption in a 1997 Wrangler Gooseneck 2 Horse Trailer (the “Trailer”) pursuant to § 513.430.1(6) of the Missouri Revised1 The Debtor’s schedules refer to the Trailer as a “camping trailer.” At trial and in papers filed with the bankruptcy court, the Debtor described the Trailer as the item he listed as a “camping trailer” on his schedules.

2 On his Schedules, the Debtor claimed the Trailer exempt pursuant to “RSMo 513.430(6).” It is clear from a reading of th e statute that the Debtor was referring to M O

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. § 513.430.1(6).
2 Statutes. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

ISSUE The issue on appeal is whether the De btor was entitled to an exemption in the Trailer under § 513.430.1(6) of the Missouri Revised Statutes. We conclude that he was not.

BACKGROUND On April 7, 2010, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United St ates Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri. He listed the Trailer on his schedule of personal property, assigning it a value of $3,000. 1 The Debtor included the Trailer on his schedule of exemptions , claiming the entire $3,000 value of the camping trailer as exempt under M O

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. § 513.430.1(6). 2

The Debtor moved into the Trailer in 2008 after his ex-wife “kicked [him] out.” At the time of his move, he fixed the Tra iler as his living quart ers so he could stay warm. The Debtor obtains electricity for the Trailer by plugging it into a socket. His water comes from a barrel with a pump. The Trailer is twenty feet long and six feet wide.

The Debtor receives his mail at the addr ess listed for the land where the Trailer is parked. The Trailer is parked on the property of the Debto r’s friend, Jeff Julian.3 When the Debtor began parking his Traile r on Mr. Julian’s property, the Debtor was renting Mr. Julian’s farm. Thereafter, Mr . Julian allowed the Debtor to park the Trailer on his property without paying rent, pr ovided that the Debtor paid the electric bill.
The Debtor’s girlfriend lives in a house. Since January 2010, the Debtor has spent approximately seventy percent of his time staying overnight at his girlfriend’s house. During the winter of 2009, he spent approximately fifty-five to sixty percent of his time staying overnight at his girlfriend’s house. Prior to the time when he filed his bankruptcy petition, the Debtor was serv ed with process at his girlfriend’s house.
In addition to using the Trailer as a place to sleep, the Debtor has also used it for transporting his own horses and his girlfri end’s horses. The Tr ailer is moved using the Debtor’s pickup truck.
The Trustee objected to the Debtor’s claim of an exem ption in the Trailer. At a trial on the Trustee’s objection, the Trustee contended that during the six to twelve month period before the Debt or filed his bankruptcy petition, the Debtor did not use the Trailer as his principal residence. He also argued that the Trailer did not qualify as a “mobile home” under § 513.430.1(6) and did not meet the requirements for the definition of a “manufactured home” under § 700.010 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.
The bankruptcy court overruled the Tr ustee’s objection to the Debtor’s exemption. It explained that exemp tions should be liberally construed and commented that it did not necessarily know that Missouri law requires all mobile homes to satisfy the definition of “manufactured home” under § 700.010. The bankruptcy court noted that even though the structure was not manufactured with the intent that it be used as a residence, it was somewhat modified such that it could be used as the Debtor’s residence, it was used by the Debtor at least part of the time as4 a home, the Debtor is not married and has no other place to live except his girlfriend’s home. The Debtor used the Trailer because he had no other place to live.
On appeal, the Trustee argued that the bankruptcy court should not have determined that the Trailer was a “m obile home” under § 513.430.1(6) without proof that the Trailer satisfied the requirement s of §700.010, and that the bankruptcy court erred when it determined that the Trailer wa s used as the Debtor’s principal residence. The Debtor did not participate in any way in this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the bankruptcy court’s findi ngs of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Moss v. Block (In re Moss), 266 B.R. 697, 700 (B.A.P. 8 th Cir. 2001)(citations omitted), aff’d, 289 F.3d 540 (8 th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION In general, a debtor’s bankruptcy estate consists of “all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencem ent of the case.” 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(1); Benn v. Cole (In re Benn ), 491 F.3d 811, 813 (8 th Cir. 2007). Bankruptcy Code § 522(b) provides a debt or with the option to exempt certain property from his estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). “[M]ost asse ts become property of the estate upon the commencement of the bankruptcy case, see 11 U.S.C. § 541, and exemptions represent the debtor’s attempt to reclaim those assets or, mo re often, certain interests in those assets, to the creditors’ detriment.” Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Mwangi) , 432 B.R. 812, 820 (B.A.P. 9 th Cir. 2010)(quoting Schwab v. Reilly , 560 U.S. —, —, 130 S.Ct. 2652, 177 L.Ed.2d 234 (2010)).
Pursuant to § 522(b) of the Bankrupt cy Code, a debtor may exempt from property of the estate: (1) property listed in Bankruptcy Code § 522(d); or (2) property which is exempt under appli cable federal law other than § 522(d) and the state and local laws of the place wher e the debtor has been domic iled for a specified period of5 time. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). A state ma y opt out of the §522(d) exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). A debtor whose domicile is in a state that has opted out of the federal Bankruptcy Code exemptions is lim ited to the exemptions applicable under federal law other than § 522(d) and the laws of such state and locality. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) and (3).
The Trustee does not dispute that Missour i is the Debtor’s domicile. Pursuant to § 513.427 of the Missouri Revised Statutes , Missouri has opted out of the federal exemption scheme. M O

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. § 513.427. Because the Debtor claimed an exemption pursuant to § 513.430.1(6) of th e Missouri Revised Statutes, the scope of the exemption is to be dete rmined by Missouri state law. Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten (In re Tveten), 848 F.2d 871, 873 (8 th Cir. 1988)(“When the debtor claims a state-created exemption, the scope of the claim is determined by state law.”). Exemptions are to be construed liber ally in favor of the exemption. Id . at 875. The Trustee bears the burden of proving that the exemption should be disallowed. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c)(obj ecting party has burden of proving that exemption is not properly claimed).

M O . R EV . S TAT . §513.430.1(6)
Section 513.430.1 sets forth a list of prope rty for which a debtor’s interest is exempt from attachment and execution. M O

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. § 513.430.1. Subsection 6 includes “[a]ny mobile home used as the principal residence but not on or attached to real property in which the debtor has a fee interest, not to exceed five thousand dollars in value.” M O

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. § 513.430.1 (6)(emphasis added). The term “mobile home” is not defined in § 513.430. However, § 700.010(6) defi nes the phrase “manufactured home,” in pertinent part, as:
a factory-built structure or structures which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet or more in width or forty body feet or more in length , or, when erected on site, contains thr ee hundred twenty or more square feet ,6 equipped with the necessary service connections and made so as to be readily movable as a unit or units on its or their own running gear and designed to be used as a dwelling unit or units with or without a permanent foundation.
M O

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. § 700.010(6)(emphasis added). No se parate definition is included for the term “mobile home” in § 700.010.
We interpret the description of “manufactured home” in § 700.010(6) as defining the term “mobile home” in § 513.430.1(6). The title of Chapter 700 of the Missouri Revised Statutes refers to manufactured homes and mobile homes synonymously. It is called “Manufactured Homes (Mobile Homes).” M O

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. § 700.010 et seq . In contexts other than defining the term “mobile home” under § 513.430.1(6), Chapter 700 has been regard ed as applying to mobile homes. See, e.g., Meyers v. Johnson , 182 S.W.3d 278, 281 and n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)(using Chapter 700 section that discusses application for certificate of title for manufactured home to determine court’s jurisdiction based on title, if any, appellant obtained over mobile home); In re White , 287 B.R. 232, 234-35 (Bankr. E .D. Mo. 2002)(examining whether mobile home was converted to realty unde r section of Chapter 700 that refers to manufactured homes); In re Thornton , 269 B.R. 682, 684-85 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001)(same); Parker v. Parker (In re Parker) , 25 S.W.3d 611, 615-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)(same); Ferrell Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Holloway , 954 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)(determining party’s right of possession to mobile home under sections of Chapter 700 referring to abandoned manufactured homes); see also Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Co leman (In re Coleman) , 392 B.R. 767, 772-73 (B.A.P. 8 th Cir. 2008)(discussing the classification of manufact ured homes and mobile homes as real or personal property under Chapter 700).
The Trailer does not qualify as a mobile home. It measures twenty feet long and six feet wide, meaning it contains only 120 square feet. Section 700.010(6) requires the structure to be eight feet wide and forty feet long or to contain three7 hundred and twenty or more square feet. Because the Trailer does not meet the threshold requirement under § 513.430.1(6) that it be a m obile home, we do not need to analyze whether the Trailer was used by the Debtor as his principal residence as required by § 513.430.1(6).

M O . R EV . S TAT . § 513.475.1
The Debtor claimed the exemption in the Trailer pursuan t to § 513.430.1(6). However, we note that the Debtor also w ould not be entitled to exempt the Trailer under § 513.475.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. That statute provides, in pertinent part, an exemption for “[t]he ho mestead of every person, consisting of a dwelling house and appurtenances, and the land used in connection therewith, not exceeding the value of fifteen thousand dollars, which is or shall be used by such person as a homestead.” M O

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. § 513.475.1. A plain reading of the term “dwelling house” suggests that it does not incl ude a trailer designe d and constructed to move horses from one place to another.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the bankruptcy court.