IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-10811

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

QUAYLAN ANDERSON,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

U.S.D.C. No. 3:12-CR-234-1

Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Quaylan Anderson (“Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one charge of 

Producing Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). He 

challenges the denial of his motion for suppression of the evidence. We 

AFFIRM. 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 20, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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I. Background

A thirteen-year-old girl known as “Jane Doe” (“Doe”) ran away from her 

foster home. Doe was accompanied by an eighteen-year-old female ward, 

known as “RW.” Three days later, while attempting to locate Doe, Texas police 

officers received information from RW leading them to believe that Doe was in 

a home belonging to Defendant’s grandmother, Mamie Anderson (“Anderson”). 

Officers J. Acosta (“Acosta”) and A. Woods (“Woods”) asked Anderson for

permission to enter the home and search for Doe. Anderson refused the 

request, telling the officers that they would have to obtain a search warrant to 

enter. She also insisted that Doe was not in the house. After Anderson refused 

entry, Acosta and Woods left and called their duty supervisor, Officer C. 

Huerta (“Huerta”), to assist them. In the meantime, RW told police that Doe 

had engaged in sexual intercourse with the 24-year old Defendant earlier that 

day. In light of this information, the officers again attempted to get consent 

from Anderson to enter the home; she again refused. At this point, Acosta 

handed Anderson a portable phone and had her speak with his supervisor, 

Sergeant T.C. May (“May”). After speaking with May, Anderson allowed the 

officers into her home to search for Doe.

The officers located Doe in a locked bedroom with Defendant, who was 

placed under arrest. Doe told the officers that Defendant had engaged in 

intercourse with her and that he had recorded it on his cellular phone. The 

officers sought, obtained, and executed a search warrant to return to the home 

and collect and search the cellular phone. Defendant was charged with 

Production of Child Pornography in violation of § 2251(a) and (e) and Sex 

Trafficking of a Minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2).

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the 

search of Anderson’s home as well as the evidence acquired from the 

subsequent search warrant. At the suppression hearing, there was some 

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dispute over what exactly May said to Anderson in order to obtain her consent.

Anderson’s side of the conversation was recorded by officers at the home, but 

May’s side was not recorded. He testified that he attempted to gain Anderson’s 

consent first by advising her that she could be arrested if Doe was found in the 

house and Anderson knowingly concealed that information from the police. 

After Anderson still refused to consent, May appealed to Anderson as a 

grandmother, asking her whether she would want the police to do everything 

they could to find her granddaughter. According to May and Huerta, it was 

this appeal that led to Anderson’s consent, which was corroborated by the 

recording reflecting her statement that “of course I would,” and then saying 

“ok, I’m going to let them in and look ‘cause I haven’t seen nobody so I don’t 

have anything to hide.” She then stepped aside and allowed the officers to 

enter her house. Acosta also testified.

Anderson, on the other hand, testified that she only consented because 

May threatened to put her under arrest for refusing to consent to the search, 

regardless of whether she knew of Doe’s whereabouts. Based on the evidence 

presented, the trial court found the testimony of May and Huerta to be credible 

and corroborated by the video evidence. It also found that Acosta’s testimony 

supported May and Huerta’s testimony. Finally, the trial court did not find 

Anderson to be a credible witness because the video evidence indicated that 

she consented as a result of May’s appeal to Anderson’s emotions, rather than 

his statements that she could be arrested for harboring Doe. 

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, 

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement reserving his right to 

appeal the suppression ruling, to one count of production of child pornography 

and was sentenced. He now appeals the district court’s denial of the motion to 

suppress the evidence, asserting that the police conducted an illegal search of 

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Anderson’s home and that the government failed to turn over Brady

information related to Acosta’s credibility. 

II. Discussion

A. Voluntariness of the Consent

The district court found that Anderson’s consent was given voluntarily 

and that, in the alternative, exigent circumstances existed to enter Anderson’s 

home given RW’s indication that Defendant was engaging in sexual 

intercourse with a minor, Doe. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress 

the evidence, we review factual findings, including credibility choices, for clear 

error. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 435 (5th Cir. 2002). “A factual 

finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record 

as a whole.” United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001). We 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. 

Warrantless searches are not considered per se unreasonable when the 

search is conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 

218, 219 (1973). Whether the consent was voluntary is a question of fact to be 

determined by the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 227. Defendant 

challenges the voluntariness of Anderson’s consent, arguing that the police 

procedures were coercive because May threatened to arrest Anderson if she 

refused consent. However, the district court found that May told Anderson she 

would be arrested only if she knew Doe was in her house; the district court also 

explicitly rejected Anderson’s testimony that May threatened to arrest her 

regardless of her knowledge. There was no clear error in the district court’s 

determination since it was a plausible credibility determination in light of the 

evidence. See Jacquinot, 258 F.3d at 427. Furthermore, the evidence supports 

the district court’s determination that Anderson’s will was not overborne by 

May’s statement that she could be arrested if she was knowingly concealing 

Doe because Anderson continued to refuse consent until May appealed to her 

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emotions. Because there is no clear error, we affirm the district court’s finding 

that Anderson’s consent was voluntary.1 See id.

B. Brady Claim

Before the suppression hearing, the government received potential 

Brady evidence regarding Acosta’s credibility. This information was submitted 

to the district court at the suppression hearing, and after assessing the 

information in camera, the district court concluded that the government had 

no disclosure obligations. Defendant has requested that we independently 

review the sealed materials to determine whether the district court clearly 

erred in finding no disclosure obligations. See United States v. Scroggins, 485 

F.3d 824, 836 (5th Cir. 2007) (conducting an independent review of information 

that the district court reviewed in camera for Brady information). We review 

a district court’s ruling that potential Brady material reviewed in camera is 

not discoverable only for clear error. See United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 

589 (5th Cir. 2011). 

To prevail, Defendant would need to show that the district court clearly 

erred in concluding, inter alia, that the undisclosed evidence was material. See 

United States v. Edwards, 442 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 2006). “Evidence is 

material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 562 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the evidence under seal affected 

Acosta’s credibility generally, it would not have changed the district court’s 

ruling because Acosta’s testimony, which did not address the contents of the 

1 For this reason, we need not reach the issue of whether the district court erred in its 

alternate finding that there were exigent circumstances.

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critical May—Anderson conversation2, played no material role in determining 

whether Anderson voluntarily consented. See id. Furthermore, the record 

shows that Acosta’s testimony did nothing more than corroborate the 

testimony provided by Huerta and May, whom the court found independently 

credible, and was corroborated by the videotape evidence. Therefore, 

Defendant’s ability to undermine Acosta’s credibility in general would not have 

changed the district court’s ruling. See id. The district court did not clearly 

err in determining that the prosecution was under no obligation to disclose the 

information. See id.

AFFIRMED.

2 It appears that the defense called Acosta to rebut the claim of exigent 

circumstances.

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