SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3838-21 

R.R., 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

DIVISION OF MEDICAL 

ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH 

SERVICES and MORRIS 

COUNTY OFFICE OF 

TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE, 

 Respondents-Respondents. 

___________________________

Submitted April 8, 2024 – Decided April 19, 2024 

Before Judges Sabatino and Vinci. 

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human 

Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health 

Services. 

Mandelbaum Barrett, PC, attorneys for appellant 

(Richard I. Miller, of counsel and on the briefs; Donald 

A. Dennison III, on the briefs). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent New Jersey Department of Human Services,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3838-21

Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services

(Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Francis Xavier Baker, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief). 

John A. Napolitano, Morris County Counsel, and 

Johnson & Johnson, attorneys for respondent Morris 

County Office of Temporary Assistance (John A. 

Napolitano and William George Johnson, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Petitioner R.R. appeals from the June 14, 2022 final agency decision of 

the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance 

and Health Services ("Division") denying his application for retroactive 

Medicaid benefits for June, July, and August 2021. Based on our review of the 

record and applicable legal standards, we affirm. 

Petitioner, now deceased, suffered from dementia and resided in a nursing 

facility. On March 10, 2021, he was adjudicated an incapacitated person, and a 

guardian of the estate was appointed. On April 7, 2021, letters of guardianship 

were issued. Petitioner's guardian investigated his assets, which included a 

Toyota Landcruiser and a Chevrolet Corvette. The guardian asked petitioner's 

wife, who was appointed as guardian of R.R.'s person, to search for both vehicle 

titles. The titles were not located. 
3 A-3838-21

On June 28, 2021, the guardian obtained a duplicate title for the Toyota 

from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission ("MVC"). On July 12, 2021, 

petitioner, through his guardian, applied for Medicaid benefits with the Morris 

County Department of Human Services, Office of Temporary Assistance 

("OTA"), requesting retroactive eligibility as of June 1, 2021. Petitioner 

disclosed his ownership of both vehicles on the application. 

On July 28, 2021, the OTA issued a letter confirming receipt of the 

Medicaid application and requesting further information and documentation. It 

noted Medicaid regulations allow an exemption for one car but advised it "must 

consider the value of one car to be a countable resource until it is sold." On 

August 9, 2021, the guardian sold the Toyota for $6,000, and spent down the 

proceeds to meet Medicaid eligibility standards. 

On December 9, 2021, the OTA issued a second letter requesting further 

information and documentation to determine petitioner's eligibility for 

Medicaid. It also advised that his "second car," the Toyota, was countable as an 

available resource. It reasoned because the funds from the sale of the Toyota 

were deposited into petitioner's bank account on August 9, 2021, "the earliest 

eligibility [the OTA] can consider would be [September 1, 2021,] upon 
4 A-3838-21

confirmation that [petitioner] was otherwise eligible at that time." On January 

4, 2022, R.R. died. 

On January 10, 2022, the OTA issued a third letter, requesting the same 

information and documentation requested in its previous letter, again noting it 

considered the Toyota a countable resource. By letter dated January 31, 2022, 

the OTA determined petitioner was eligible for Medicaid effective October 5, 

2021. According to the OTA, petitioner would have been eligible effective 

September 1, 2021, but it imposed a penalty period of ineligibility of thirty-fourdays for transferring resources.1

 The same day, the OTA issued a corresponding 

Retroactive Notice of Eligibility, denying petitioner's request for retroactive 

Medicaid benefits for June, July, and August 2021, because petitioner's 

resources exceeded the $2,000 maximum for Medicaid eligibility set forth in 

N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5(c) during those months. 

Petitioner requested a Fair Hearing to appeal the OTA's decision, and the 

Division transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law. On April 

21, 2022, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") conducted a telephonic hearing, 

during which petitioner's guardian and Maira Rogers, the OTA caseworker, 

testified. 

1

 Petitioner does not dispute the penalty and it is not a subject of this appeal. 
5 A-3838-21

Petitioner's guardian testified he was the only person with the legal right 

and authority to sell the vehicles, but he was not able to locate the original titles 

to the vehicles, and without the titles he was not able to sell the vehicles. He 

testified, "after [he] got appointed as the guardian of the property[,] [he] made 

an effort to obtain a replacement title so that . . . the cars . . . could be sold 

because . . . [he] was aware that the property needed to be sold in order to spend 

down and qualify for Medicaid." The guardian continued: 

So, I visited the [MVC] in order to get a replacement 

title. And I did that on June 28, 2021 . . . . And then 

first I needed to make an appointment [be]cause 

everything was by appointment only at that point. And 

I was able to receive the title to the Toyota in person on 

June 28[] . . . at my visit to . . . [the MVC]. 

 According to Rogers, Medicaid regulations exempt one vehicle from 

being counted as an available resource, but any additional vehicles are countable 

as available resources. The OTA determined the Toyota was petitioner's second 

vehicle and counted toward his available resources. According to Rogers, but

for the Toyota petitioner would have been eligible for Medicaid benefits 

effective June 1, 2021. 

On April 29, 2022, the ALJ issued an initial decision affirming the OTA's

denial of petitioner's application for retroactive Medicaid benefits. The ALJ 

concluded the Toyota was countable as an available resource valued at $6,000. 
6 A-3838-21

Because petitioner had available resources in excess of $2,000 in June, July, and 

August 2021, he was ineligible for benefits during those months. She found 

petitioner, through his guardian, "did have the right, power[,] and authority to 

liquidate [the] [Toyota] during the three months predating eligibility" and "only 

had to request a duplicate title from the MVC in order to do so." 

She reasoned: 

[t]he car was a nonliquid resource owned by 

[petitioner] at the time, and while this resource may not 

have been available to him when he was adjudicated 

mentally incapacitated in March 2021, it remained an 

available resource as [the guardian] became 

[petitioner's] [g]uardian at that time. While the 

[g]uardian may not have been legally authorized to sell 

the [Toyota] without the title, his inability to locate the 

title of the car alone does not render the resource

unavailable. 

The ALJ also noted although the guardian "testified that he and 

[petitioner's wife] looked for the title, there is nothing in the record to suggest 

that the [g]uardian was unable to present to the [MVC] for a duplicate title 

months prior to August 2021." 

On June 14, 2022, the Division issued a final agency decision adopting 

the ALJ's initial decision. The Division determined petitioner, through his 

guardian, "had the right, power[,] and authority to liquidate [the Toyota] during 

the months of eligibility, whether because he merely had to request a duplicate 
7 A-3838-21

title or because he in fact held one." Because the guardian obtained the Toyota's 

duplicate title on June 28, 2021, the Division reasoned he "certainly had the 

power to liquidate the [Toyota] at least as early as June 2021." It further noted 

although "the ALJ found that [the guardian] credibly testified to his efforts" to 

obtain the duplicate title, "there is no documentation in the record to support his 

testimony or provide a timeline of his attempts to obtain a duplicate title." As a 

result, the Division determined petitioner "had countable resources in excess of 

the $2,000 limit for June, July[,] and August 2021" and "there is simply no 

provision [in the Medicaid regulations] which permits a relaxation of the 

eligibility date so long as the countable resources exceed the maximum limit." 

On appeal, petitioner argues: (1) his available resources fell below the 

$2,000 resource cap for Medicaid eligibility as of June 1, 2021; and (2) the 

Division's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not fairly and 

predictably apply the regulations. More particularly, petitioner argues the 

guardian could not sell the Toyota until he had the duplicate title, and he did not 

obtain the title from the MVC until June 28, 2021. Therefore, the Division's 

determination that he had the legal right, authority, or power to sell the Toyota 

prior to June 1, 2021, was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 
8 A-3838-21

"This court's review of [the Division's] determination is ordinarily 

limited." C.L. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 473 N.J. Super. 591, 

597 (App. Div. 2022). "An administrative agency's decision will be upheld 

'unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, 

or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" R.S. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & 

Health Servs., 434 N.J. Super. 250, 261 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. 

of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). "The burden of 

demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable 

rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action." E.S. v. Div. of 

Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 412 N.J. Super. 340, 349 (App. Div. 2010) 

(alteration in original) (quoting In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44

(App. Div. 2006)). 

"Deference to an agency decision is particularly appropriate where 

interpretation of the [a]gency's own regulation is in issue." I.L. v. N.J. Dep't 

Hum. Servs., Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 389 N.J. Super. 354, 364 

(App. Div. 2006). "Nevertheless, we are 'in no way bound by the agency's 

interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue.'" C.L., 

473 N.J. Super. at 598 (quoting R.S., 434 N.J. Super. at 261). 
9 A-3838-21

"Medicaid is a federally-created, state-implemented program that 

provides ‘medical assistance to the poor at the expense of the public.'" In re Est. 

of Brown, 448 N.J. Super. 252, 256 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Est. of DeMartino 

v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 373 N.J. Super. 210, 217 (App. Div. 

2004)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1. To receive federal funding, the State must 

comply with all federal statutes and regulations. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 

301 (1980). 

In New Jersey, the Medicaid program is administered by the Division 

pursuant to the New Jersey Medical Assistance and Health Services Act, 

N.J.S.A. 30:4D-1 to -19.5. Through its regulations, the Division establishes 

“policy and procedures for the application process . . . .” N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(b). 

“[T]o be financially eligible, the applicant must meet both income and resource 

standards.” Brown, 448 N.J. Super. at 257; see N.J.A.C. 10:71-3.15; N.J.A.C. 

10:71-1.2(a). 

To be financially eligible for Medicaid, an applicant's total countable 

resources cannot exceed $2,000. N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5(c). A resource is "any real 

or personal property which is owned by the applicant []or by those persons 

whose resources are deemed available to him or her . . . and which could be 

converted to cash to be used for his or her support and maintenance." N.J.A.C. 
10 A-3838-21

10:71-4.1(b). Only "available" resources are counted in determining eligibility. 

N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1(c). A resource is considered "available" to an applicant if 

"[t]he person has the right, authority or power to liquidate real or personal 

property or his or her share of it." N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1(c)(1). 

Certain resources are classified as excludable in determining eligibility. 

N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4(b). For example, "[o]ne automobile is totally excluded 

regardless of value if it is used for transportation for the individual or a member 

of the individual's household." N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4(b)(2)(i). "Any other 

automobiles shall be considered to be non-liquid resources." N.J.A.C. 10:71-

4.4(b)(2)(ii). Resources "which are not accessible to an individual through no 

fault of his or her own" are also excluded from the eligibility determination. 

N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4(b)(6). "Resource eligibility is determined as of the first 

moment of the first day of each month." N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1(e). 

We are satisfied the Division's decision is amply supported by the record 

and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Petitioner's contention that 

his guardian did not have the legal right, power, or authority to sell the Toyota 

because he could not locate the original title is not convincing. As the Division 

concluded, the guardian had the legal authority and power to obtain a duplicate 
11 A-3838-21

title and sell the Toyota upon his appointment as guardian on March 10, 2021.2 

Petitioner does not offer any explanation for the guardian's delay in obtaining 

the duplicate title and, as the Division noted, failed to proffer any evidence to 

establish a "timeline of his attempts to obtain a duplicate title." 

As the Division properly concluded, the Toyota was personal property that 

could have been sold "at least as early as June 2021," but was not sold because 

petitioner, through his guardian, did not take the first step necessary to effectuate 

the sale until June 28, 2021. There is no evidence in the record to support 

petitioner's contention that a duplicate title could not be obtained before June 

28, 2021, nor is there any evidence to support petitioner's contention that the 

delay was "through no fault of [his own]." Even if, as petitioner contends, he 

could only obtain the duplicate title from the MVC by appointment, he offers no 

explanation as to why he did not make an appointment before June 28, 2021. 

Petitioner failed to meet his burden to demonstrate the Division's determination 

was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Petitioner's contention that the 

Division's decision violates "the spirit of" our Supreme Court's decision in 

2

 The guardian had the authority and power to obtain a duplicate title, at the 

latest, as of April 7, 2021, when the letters of guardianship were issued. 
12 A-3838-21

Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 327 (1984), 

lacks merit for the same reasons. 

The Division's decision is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the 

record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). To the extent we have not otherwise 

addressed petitioner's arguments, they are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.