ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Rebecca R. Vent

McIntyre Hilligoss Vent O’Keefe & 

Welke

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Alan D. Wilson

Kokomo, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Beth A. Ahls,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Carleton E. Ahls,

Appellee-Respondent

March 11, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

34A02-1509-DR-1416

Appeal from the Howard Superior 

Court

The Honorable George A. 

Hopkins, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

34D04-1307-DR-588

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Beth A. Ahls (“Wife”) appeals a property distribution order issued in 

conjunction with the dissolution of her marriage to Carleton E. Ahls 

(“Husband”). She asserts that the trial court clearly erred in dividing Husband’s 

three retirement accounts; refusing her request for survivor benefits associated

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with those accounts; and in refusing to order Husband to pay a portion of her 

attorney’s fees. Finding that the trial court clearly erred in applying the 

coverture fraction formula to the division of Husband’s retirement accounts, we

reverse and remand. In all other respects, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] Husband and Wife married in 1993 and had one child of the marriage

(“Daughter”). In 2013, Wife filed a petition for marital dissolution. At the 

time of the dissolution hearing, the child was leaving for college and was 

deemed emancipated. The marital assets included Husband’s three vested 

retirement accounts: a Thrift Savings Plan (“Thrift”), a Civil Service Pension, 

and a Military Pension. The parties’ experts presented conflicting valuations of 

the accounts as of the time of the hearing, and the trial court adopted the 

valuations presented by Husband’s expert: $311,208.01 for the Thrift, $289,817 

for the Civil Service Pension, and $265,578 for the Military Pension. The 

parties agreed that for both the Thrift and Civil Service Pension accounts, 62% 

was earned during the marriage, and for the Military Pension, 36% was earned 

during the marriage. The remainder of each account, earned by Husband 

before the marriage, was set aside as Husband’s personal property. 

1

 We note that Wife’s appellant’s appendix does not comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure 

in the following respects: (1) it does not include a table of contents as required by Appellate Rule 50(C); (2) it 

is not properly paginated as required by Appellate Rule 51(C); and (3) it contains exhibits, which are 

considered part of the transcript and therefore are not to be reproduced in the appendix pursuant to Appellate 

Rules 29 and 50(F). 

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[3] As part of the property division order, the trial court sua sponte issued findings 

of fact and conclusions thereon. In its findings, the trial court adopted a 50/50 

division of the marital property, ordered each party to pay his/her own 

attorney’s fees, and adopted the valuations and proposed distribution 

percentages contained in Husband’s exhibits. Using those figures, the trial 

court awarded Wife 15.5% of the value of the Thrift, 15.5% of the value of the 

Civil Service Pension, and 9% of the value of the Military Pension. The court

ordered Husband to pay an equalization judgment of $52,168.45. The final 

order was silent regarding survivor benefits under any of Husband’s retirement 

accounts. 

[4] Wife now appeals, challenging the trial court’s calculations of her share of 

Husband’s retirement accounts, as well as its decision not to award her survivor 

benefits or attorney’s fees. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Where, as here, the trial court enters findings and conclusions sua sponte, the 

findings control only with respect to the issues they cover, while a general 

judgment standard applies to issues on which there are no findings. In re 

Marriage of Sutton, 16 N.E.3d 481, 484-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We affirm a 

general judgment entered with findings if it can be sustained on any legal theory 

supported by the evidence. Hurt v. Hurt, 920 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). When the court has made findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we 

review those findings and conclusions using a clearly erroneous standard. 

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Sutton, 16 N.E.3d at 485. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the record 

contains no facts to support the findings, either directly or by inference. Hurt, 

920 N.E.2d at 691. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong 

legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. In conducting our review, we first 

determine whether the evidence supports the findings; then we determine 

whether the findings support the judgment. Id. Here, the trial court entered 

findings on the issues of apportionment of Husband’s retirement accounts and 

attorney’s fees but did not enter a finding on survival benefits. 

Section 1 – The trial court clearly erred in applying the 

coverture fraction formula when dividing Husband’s 

retirement accounts.

[6] Wife contends that the trial court miscalculated her portion of Husband’s three 

retirement accounts. In dissolution actions, we follow the “one pot” theory, 

meaning that all marital property is included in the marital pot for division, 

regardless of whether it was owned by one spouse before marriage, acquired by 

one spouse after the marriage and before final separation, or acquired through 

the joint efforts of both. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a); Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 

N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Including all marital assets in the 

marital pot ensures that the trial court will first determine the value of each 

asset before endeavoring to divide the property. Id. “While the trial court may 

decide to award a particular asset solely to one spouse as part of its just and 

reasonable property division, it must first include the asset in its consideration 

of the marital estate to be divided.” Id.

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[7] Wife contends that the trial court clearly erred in applying the coverture fraction 

formula to Husband’s accounts. 

The “coverture fraction” formula is one method a trial court may 

use to distribute pension or retirement plan benefits to the 

earning and non-earning spouses. Under this methodology, the 

value of the retirement plan is multiplied by a fraction, the 

numerator of which is the period of time during which the 

marriage existed (while pension rights were accruing) and the 

denominator is the total period of time during which pension 

rights accrued.

In re Marriage of Fisher, 24 N.E.3d 429, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Hardin 

v. Hardin, 964 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted) 

(emphasis omitted)). We apply the coverture fraction formula to determine 

what portion of a retirement asset is subject to division. Barton v. Barton, No. 

32A04-1412-DR-550, 2015 WL 7983011, at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2015), 

trans. denied.

[8] Here, the trial court stated in its findings that it was dividing Husband’s three 

retirement accounts pursuant to the figures contained in “Respondent’s Exhibits 

P, W, X, Y, and Z.” Appellant’s App. at 8. We note that the trial court could 

have facilitated our review and alleviated confusion had it included in its 

findings the actual figures taken from the exhibits instead of incorporating the 

exhibits wholesale. Exhibit P lists the value of Husband’s Military Pension as 

$265,578; Exhibit W lists the value of his Civil Service Pension as $289,817; 

Exhibit X lists the value of the Thrift as $311,208.01 and calculates the 

percentage due to Wife from both the Civil Service Pension and the Thrift as 

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31%; Exhibit Y calculates the percentage due to Wife from Husband’s Military 

Pension as 18%; and Exhibits Y and Z calculate the monthly payments to Wife 

under each of the three accounts. 

[9] Wife does not dispute the value attached to each plan as listed in Exhibits P and 

W. Nor does she dispute that the percentages listed in Exhibits X and Y are the 

final and accurate percentages to which she was entitled after equal division. 

However, she correctly maintains that the trial court incorrectly applied the 

coverture fraction formula. We agree. 

[10] First, with respect to the Thrift and the Civil Service Pension, Husband had 

been enrolled in both plans for ten years before the couple’s almost twenty-year 

marriage. Broken down into months, the marital time divided by the total 

accrual time came to 62%. Using the coverture fraction, this means that 62% of 

each of the two accounts was subject to division (here, equal). As such, Wife 

was entitled to 31%. But the trial court incorrectly divided the 31% in half 

again to determine Wife’s ultimate portion, which meant that although she was 

married to Husband for nearly two-thirds of the duration of each account, she 

ultimately was awarded only 15.5%, or one-fourth of the two-thirds. The same 

error occurred with respect to the Military Pension, of which the coverture 

fraction correctly would have amounted to 36%, which, when divided evenly,

meant 18% for Wife. But the trial court incorrectly divided this in half, 

meaning that Wife was awarded only 9% of the total Military Pension instead 

of the 18% to which she was entitled. 

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[11] Put another way, the calculations should have looked like this:

Total Value Marital Portion 

Thrift: $311,208.01 × 62/100 = $192,948.96 

Civil: $289,817.00 × 62/100 = $179,686.54

Military: $265,578.00 × 36/100 = $ 95,608.08

Total Subject to Equal Division: $468,243.58

Wife’s Rightful Portion: $234,121.79

What Wife was Actually Awarded: $116,561.91

[12] Simply put, instead of awarding Wife one-half of the marital portion of each of 

Husband’s three retirement accounts, the court ultimately awarded her only 

about one-fourth of the marital portion of the accounts.2

 This amounts to clear 

error, and therefore we reverse and remand for a proper division using the 

coverture fraction formula. To the extent that this may affect the equalization 

of the marital estate, we order the trial court to revisit that figure as well. 

Section 2 – Wife has waived her claim concerning survivor 

benefits associated with Husband’s retirement accounts.

[13] Wife challenges the trial court’s refusal to award her survivor benefits in 

conjunction with Husband’s retirement accounts. Her argument consists of 

2

 To add to the confusion, Husband argues that the marital portion may be determined by adding the 

percentages and dividing by three. See Appellee’s Br. at 7 (advocating the following equation: “31% + 31% + 

18% ÷ 3 = 26.9%”). Two problems are evident in this approach: (1) the value of the accounts is not the 

same, so to add and divide percentages does not work mathematically; and (2) the approach does not follow 

the caselaw for application of the coverture fraction formula.

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assertions that Husband is depressed, suicidal, and cannot hold a fulltime job.

She has failed to include any citation to relevant authority and therefore has 

waived review of this issue pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). See

Hartley v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding waiver of 

any issue for which appellant fails to develop cognizable argument with 

adequate citation to authority).

Section 3 – The trial court acted within its discretion in 

refusing to order Husband to pay a portion of Wife’s 

attorney’s fees.

[14] Wife also maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to order Husband to 

pay a portion of her attorney’s fees. We review a trial court’s decision to award 

or deny attorney’s fees in connection with a dissolution decree using an abuse 

of discretion standard. Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013), trans. denied. The trial court has broad discretion in assessing attorney’s 

fees, and we will reverse only if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect 

of the facts and circumstances before it or if it misapplies the law. Fackler v. 

Powell, 923 N.E.2d 973, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[15] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-15-10-1, a trial court may order a party in 

a dissolution proceeding to pay a reasonable portion of the other party’s 

attorney’s fees, after considering the parties’ resources, economic condition, 

ability to engage in gainful employment and earn income, and other factors 

bearing on the reasonableness of the award. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d at 1142-43. In 

considering these factors, we promote the legislative purpose for awarding 

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attorney’s fees, that is, to insure that a party in a dissolution proceeding who 

could not otherwise afford an attorney is able to retain representation. Id. at 

1143.

[16] Here, the trial court found that the “equal division of the marital property 

between the parties is just and reasonable.” Appellant’s App. at 8. Wife does 

not challenge this finding. The record shows that Wife’s weekly earnings

exceed those of Husband, that she had recently received a raise, and that she is 

able to pay her attorney. Respondent’s Ex. A; Tr. at 137-38, 157. “[Where] the 

parties’ resources are relatively on par with each other, the only basis for an 

award of attorney fees would have been the improper actions of one party 

necessitating the incurrence of attorney fees by the other party.” Troyer, 987 

N.E.2d at 1143. 

[17] As for any improper conduct by Husband, Wife first cites his refusal to 

contribute to Daughter’s college expenses. However, the trial court specifically 

found that Daughter had repudiated her relationship with Husband. 

Appellant’s App. at 7. Wife does not challenge this finding. Also notable is 

that Daughter received academic awards and scholarships as well as a tuition 

waiver based on Father’s military service. Tr. at 135-36. 

Wife also claims that she is entitled to attorney’s fees based on Husband’s 

alleged dissipation of marital funds. Dissipation is a factor to be considered in 

the context of determining whether the trial court may deviate from the 

presumption in favor of equal distribution of marital property under Indiana 

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Code 31-15-7-5. Here, Wife does not challenge the trial court’s special finding 

that an equal distribution of marital property is just and reasonable. Instead, 

she raises dissipation in the context of entitlement to attorney’s fees. We note 

that she has cited no authority pertaining to dissipation of marital assets. See, 

e.g., Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“The test 

for dissipation is whether the assets were actually wasted or misused. 

Dissipation has also been described as frivolous or unjustified spending of 

marital assets, including the concealment of marital property. In determining 

whether dissipation has occurred, a court should consider: (1) whether the 

dissipating party had the intent to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset; (2) 

whether the expenditure benefited the marital enterprise or was made for a 

purpose entirely unrelated to the marriage; (3) whether the transaction was 

remote in time and effect or occurred just before the filing of a divorce petition; 

and (4) whether the expenditure was excessive or de minimis”) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). As such, Wife has waived this issue for 

review pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Hartley, 862 N.E.2d at 

284.

[18] To the extent that Wife uses the term dissipation to characterize Husband as 

having engaged in improper conduct justifying an award of attorney’s fees, we 

note the following. Petitioner’s Exhibit 8 and Respondent’s Exhibit AA list

Husband’s expenditures of marital funds during the pendency of the 

proceedings, including basic living expenses and sums for homeowner’s 

insurance, air travel, legal fees, and a retirement account deposit. The fact that 

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Husband listed these expenditures and introduced them as evidence in Exhibit 

AA indicates that he was not attempting to conceal them. Moreover, most of 

the expenditures relate to the preservation rather than the depletion of marital 

assets such as the marital residence and the retirement accounts. With respect 

to air travel, Husband took a trip to Arizona in connection with his clinical 

depression, and it does not appear frivolous or excessive. As for his legal fees, it 

is unclear whether the trial court accounted for this expenditure in determining 

that an equal division was just and reasonable and in reaching its final division 

of the assets and ordering Husband to pay an equalization judgment of 

$52,168.45. For that matter, it is unclear whether Wife made any payments to 

her attorney during the pendency of the proceedings and, if so, from what 

source. Finally, we note that Wife failed to demonstrate how these 

expenditures caused her to incur additional attorney’s fees. Simply put, Wife 

has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

her request for attorney’s fees.

[19] In sum, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in applying the coverture 

fraction formula, and therefore we reverse and remand for a corrected 

calculation as well as any adjustments necessary to accomplish an equal

division of the marital estate. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other 

respects.

[20] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 

Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.

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