J-S23023-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ERIC WILLIAM 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1685 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 17, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008144-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2018

Appellant Eric William1 appeals from the judgment of sentence of life 

imprisonment imposed after a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder,2

carrying a firearm without a license,3 and possession of an instrument of 

crime.4 Appellant claims that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion 

for continuance in order to obtain his preferred counsel; (2) admitting color 

photographs of a witness whom Appellant attacked while in pretrial custody; 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Although Appellant spelled his last name as “Williams” in open court, we 

retain the original caption of this appeal so that it conforms to the trial court’s

record. 

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 907. 
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and (3) overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s conduct during closing 

arguments. Additionally, Appellant challenges the weight and sufficiency of 

the evidence. We affirm.

On May 29, 2015, Appellant was charged with murder generally, three 

firearms offenses, and possessing an instrument of crime for the killing of 

Bryant Younger (Decedent). On June 19, 2015, W. Fred Harrison, Jr., Esq. 

entered an appearance as Appellant’s private counsel. Attorney Harrison 

apparently remained counsel of record until September of 2015. The docket 

then indicated that Appellant “failed to retain counsel.” Present counsel, 

Stephen Thomas O’Hanlon, Esq. (trial counsel) was appointed to represent 

Appellant and requested continuances from September 15, 2015, to January 

12, 2016. 

The docket indicates that on February 23, 2016, Appellant rejected a 

plea offer, and trial was scheduled for October 24, 2016. On October 17, 

2016, the trial court ordered a continuance to May 8, 2017, due to an 

outstanding DNA report and the court’s unavailability. 

At some time prior to trial, trial counsel apparently informed the court 

that Appellant wanted private counsel to enter an appearance.5 See N.T., 

5/8/17, at 5-6. The trial court denied that request because Appellant’s 

preferred counsel would not be available until the following year. See id. 

____________________________________________

5 The record does not show when trial counsel discussed a continuance for 

private counsel to enter an appearance or the contents of trial counsel’s 

communication with the trial court. No formal motion or an order denying

such motion was entered into the record. 
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On May 8, 2017, before jury selection, Appellant requested a 

continuance to replace trial counsel with private counsel. Id. The trial court 

denied the request for continuance on the record, and Appellant proceeded to 

trial represented by trial counsel. 

The trial court summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:

[O]n May 10, 2015, at around 12:15 a.m., Police Officer 

Christopher Thompson and his partner, Police Officer Joseph. 

Hodge, were on patrol near the 1200 block of Atlantic Street. They 

heard a “pop” sound, which suggested a muffled gun shot. They 

drove around and observed a person running from a silver Dodge 

Avenger. The officers proceeded to the vehicle, where they 

observed the body of [Decedent], who was bleeding, but still alive. 

The officers transported [Decedent] to the nearest hospital, where 

he expired.

Assistant United States Attorney Leo Tsao testified that about a 

decade earlier, [Decedent] had aided Federal officials in building 

a case against [Appellant]. [Appellant] ultimately pleaded guilty 

and went to prison. In consideration for his cooperation, 

[Decedent] received a reduced sentence.

Police recovered a wallet containing [Appellant’s] identification 

from the vehicle. Police also recovered a Taurus .38 six shot 

revolver, and two fired cartridge cases from the left rear seat of 

the vehicle.

Brian Gaeta testified that after hearing two shots, he looked out 

his window and saw a man standing by a vehicle. He did not see 

any other people on the scene. At trial and at a police photo array, 

he identified [Appellant] as having been on the scene. He was 

unable to identify a suspect at a police lineup. Testifying for the 

defense, the lineup supervisor, Detective William Urban stated 

that [Appellant] was in a lineup conducted on August 10, 2015 

and that Mr. Gaeta did not pick out [Appellant] or any other person 

in the lineup.

Dr. Albert Chu, Chief Deputy Medical Examiner, testified that 

[Decedent] suffered two shots through his brain. The manner of 

death was homicide. 
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Latavia Hudson testified that at the time of the offense, she was 

in a relationship with [Appellant]. A 2011 Dodge Avenger was 

registered in both of their names. She testified that on May 9, 

2015, [Appellant] took the Dodge Avenger, drove away and never 

returned with the car. 

Officer Gregory Welsh, of the Firearms Identification Unit, testified 

that two bullets recovered from [Decedent]’s brain were fired from 

the Taurus revolver found in the Dodge Avenger. 

Benjamin Sapir Levin, who works in the DNA laboratory of the 

Police Department’s Office of Forensic Science, testified that 

[Appellant’s] DNA was found on the Taurus revolver. 

It was stipulated that Police Officer Jason Stark of the Crime Scene 

Unit recovered [Appellant]’s latent finger prints from the left rear 

door frame and the right rear door frame of the Dodge Avenger. 

It was stipulated that [Appellant] was not licensed to carry a 

firearm. 

Testifying for the defense, Detective Theodore Hagan of the 

Homicide Unit, stated that three cellular telephones had been 

recovered from the Dodge Avenger. One telephone was owned by 

[Appellant]; the second telephone was owned by [Decedent]; and 

the third telephone was owned by a man named Aquil Sowell. 

[Appellant] testified that he had no animus toward [Decedent]. He 

told the jury that on the evening of May 9, 201[5], [Appellant]

and [Decedent] picked up “Ace” (presumably Aquil Sowell) in 

connection with a drug transaction. As they drove to Atlantic 

Street, a dispute broke out between Ace and [Decedent]. 

[Appellant] said that he stopped the car and got out to avoid 

hearing the argument. [Appellant] claimed that he heard two 

shots and saw Ace get out of the car and run away. [Appellant] 

testified that he also ran away. 

Trial Ct. Op., 11/27/17, at 7-10. 

The Commonwealth called Sylvester Ellis, Decedent’s stepfather, in 

rebuttal. Ellis testified that he was incarcerated in Philadelphia County Prison, 

where Appellant was in custody for the instant charges. According to Ellis, on 

November 26, 2015, while they were in county prison, Appellant assaulted 
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him and made a statement indicating that he killed Decedent. The trial court, 

over Appellant’s objections, permitted the Commonwealth to publish two color 

photographs of Ellis following the attack. The photographs showed Ellis in a 

neck brace, with a tube in his mouth, and with swelling and blood on his face.

6

 

Toward the end of the Commonwealth’s closing argument, the 

prosecutor asked the jury to “return the only verdict that speaks the truth and 

have the courage to say, as I do right now.” N.T., 5/17/17, at 44. The 

prosecutor immediately thereafter addressed Appellant, stating: “for what you 

did . . . on May 10th . . . in 2015 for when you took that .38 caliber revolver, 

you put if within six inches of [Decedent’s] head and you pulled the trigger 

not once but twice, sir, you are guilty.” Id. Appellant’s counsel objected, 

noting that the prosecutor, when making those statements, raised his voice, 

approached within five feet of Appellant, and pointed at Appellant. Id. at 76. 

The court overruled Appellant’s objection. 

On May 17, 2017, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder, 

carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of an instrument of crime. 

The trial court sentenced Appellant that same day to life imprisonment for 

first-degree murder and concurrent terms of imprisonment for the remaining 

offenses.7 

____________________________________________

6 The Commonwealth did not attempt to admit or publish another photograph,

which depicted a wound to Decedent’s stepfather’s scrotum. 

7 Specifically, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of three-and-onehalf to seven years for carrying a firearm without a license and two-and-onehalf to five years for possessing an instrument of crime. 
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Appellant challenged the weight of the evidence in a timely postsentence motion. The trial court denied the motion on May 25, 2017. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and after obtaining an 

extension of time, complied with the trial court’s order to submit a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. The trial court filed a responsive opinion. 

Appellant presents the following questions for review: 

1. Was Appellant denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of 

his choice because the trial court denied Appellant a continuance 

so that Appellant’s counsel of choice could be prepared and ready 

to represent Appellant at trial?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing inflammatory 

color photographs of a witness that was injured by Appellant while 

Appellant was in pretrial custody? 

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing the 

prosecutor to engage in misconduct when the prosecutor was 

allowed to stand a few feet from Appellant during closing 

argument and when the prosecutor repeatedly pointed and 

shouted directly at Appellant? 

4. Is Appellant’s conviction for first-degree murder against the 

weight of the evidence because, inter alia, there was no 

eyewitness testimony, because people knew that Appellant was 

with Decedent so there is a lack of prior planning, and the revenge 

motive is questionable because Appellant and Decedent had 

previously socialized without incident? 

5. Was there insufficient evidence to convict for first-degree 

murder because there was no eyewitness testimony, because 

people knew that Appellant was with Decedent so there is a lack 

of prior planning, and the revenge motive is questionable because 

Appellant and Decedent had previously socialized without 

incident?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5. 
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Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his request for 

a continuance to retain private counsel. By way of background, the record 

contains the following discussion on the day of jury selection. 

[Appellant]: A while ago, I dismissed O’Hanlon [trial counsel] as 

my lawyer.

THE COURT: Well, is he someone that you retained?

[Appellant]: Yes, Mr. --

[Trial counsel]: No. Am I someone that you retained?

[Appellant]: Mr. Harris.

THE COURT: Mr. O’Hanlon, was he retained by you?

[Appellant]: He was court-appointed.

THE COURT: Okay.

[Appellant]: I wanted a private counsel.

THE COURT: Well, have you -- how long ago did you make that 

decision?

[Appellant]: I was told by Mr. O'Hanlon that you denied Fred 

Harrison, Jr. as being my attorney because it was -- the case was 

going on too long.

THE COURT: That’s correct. Now my memory is refreshed, and 

that request was made much too close to the trial date, and Mr. 

Harrison indicated that he could not be ready. His own schedule 

was such that he was tied up and could not try this case if he 

remained as counsel, if he became your counsel, until next year, 

sometime in February or March of next year. So I denied the 

request. If he were ready, I would have granted it.

[Appellant]: The only issue I’m having right now is that me and 

Mr. O’Hanlon is not seeing eye-to-eye. This is my life. This ain’t 

a 5-to-10 or a 10-to-20 where I’m going home. This is if I lose, 

it’s over.

THE COURT: I realize what the charges are, yes.
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[Appellant]: If we continue with him as my lawyer, it’s going to 

be ineffective counsel because I am not communicating with him 

no more about my case. I don’t want nothing to do with it. I am 

not communicating with him.

THE COURT: That’s a decision you have to make, but it will be on 

you. My advice to you is you communicate with Mr. O’Hanlon and 

you assist in the trial of your case. But if your perspective is that 

you refuse to do that, it’s on you. That’s not ineffective assistance 

of counsel, that’s ineffective cooperation with counsel. It's a 

difference.

[Appellant]: He is just -- like I understand that this case has been 

drawn along. I have been arrested since May the 28th, 2015. I 

understand that it’s been over two years. But I really need Mister 

-- I really need private counsel. Like, I really need it. Like, if I 

have to wait until next year -- I am the one that’s going to be 

incarcerated. Like, I understand that.

THE COURT: I understand. Mr. O’Hanlon, are you prepared to try 

this case?

MR. O’HANLON: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: All right. Then this case is going to go forward and 

we’re going to begin jury selection today.

N.T., 5/8/17, at 5-8.

The trial court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, explained its decision to deny 

the requested continuance as follows: 

The docket entries show that [trial counsel] entered his 

appearance on September 9, 2015. The last listing prior to trial 

was October 26, 2016, at which time the Commonwealth’s [plea] 

offer was rejected and the case was continued until [the trial date 

of] May 8, 2017. [Appellant] had sufficient time to retain a lawyer 

who would have been available for the trial date. This court 

cannot allow a defendant to upset the court calendars and delay 

the administration of justice. [Appellant] failed to exercise his 

right to choose a lawyer. . . . . Therefore, the request to substitute 

counsel on the day of trial was properly denied.

Trial Ct. Op. at 4. 
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Appellant argues that the trial court violated his right to his choice of 

counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant’s Brief at 10-

11 (citation omitted). Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to accord 

“sufficient deference to Appellant’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice” 

and overemphasized the “efficiency of court calendaring[.]” Id. at 11. 

The principles governing our review of Appellant’s claim are set forth in 

Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539 (Pa. Super. 2009):

[A] trial court’s decision to deny a request for a continuance

will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of 

discretion. As we have consistently stated, an abuse of 

discretion is not merely an error [in] judgment. Rather, 

discretion is abused when “the law is overridden or 

misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record. . . .”

With respect to the right to counsel, The Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania has stated:

[t]he right to counsel is guaranteed by both the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article 

I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In addition to 

guaranteeing representation of the indigent, these 

constitutional rights entitle an accused “to choose at his own 

cost and expense any lawyer he may desire.” The right to 

“counsel of one’s own choosing is particularly significant 

because an individual facing criminal sanctions should have 

great confidence in his attorney.”

We have held, however, that the constitutional right to 

counsel of one’s choice is not absolute. Rather, “the right of 

the accused to choose his own counsel, as well as the 

lawyer’s right to choose his clients, must be weighed against 

and may be reasonably restricted by the state’s interest in 

the swift and efficient administration of criminal justice.” 
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Thus, this Court has explained that while defendants are 

entitled to choose their own counsel, they should not be

permitted to unreasonably “clog the machinery of justice or 

hamper and delay the state’s efforts to effectively 

administer justice.” At the same time, however, we have 

explained that “‘a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness 

in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the 

right to defend with counsel an empty formality.’”

Prysock, 972 A.2d at 541-42 (citations omitted).

In Prysock, the defendant was charged in May 2007. Id. at 540. Trial 

was scheduled for August 2007, even though counsel was not appointed. Id. 

The trial court appointed counsel and continued the trial date to November 

2007. Id. Immediately before jury selection on November 1, 2007, appointed 

counsel informed the court that the defendant was dissatisfied with counsel’s 

representation and wished to retain private counsel. Id. The trial court denied 

the request for a continuance and directed jury selection to begin. Id. The 

defendant continued to express his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel 

following the first day of jury selection, and he again requested a continuance 

to obtain private counsel. Id. 

The next day, private counsel attempted to enter an appearance. Id. 

However, private counsel asserted that he was not prepared for trial and 

requested a continuance of jury selection and trial. Id. The trial court denied 

private counsel’s request for a continuance, and the defendant proceeded 
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through the remainder of jury selection and trial with appointed counsel.8 Id.

at 541. 

Following his conviction, the defendant appealed to this Court asserting 

that the trial court erred in denying his requests for continuances to obtain 

private representation. The Prysock Court agreed and remanded for a new 

trial. 

In reversing the trial court, the Prysock Court reviewed several factors 

including (1) the lack of “an ‘extensive inquiry’ into the underlying defendant’s 

dissatisfaction with current counsel”; (2) whether the defendant’s 

dissatisfaction with counsel amounted to “‘irreconcilable difference’”; (3) “the 

number of prior continuances”; (4) “the timing of the motion” for continuance; 

(5) “whether private counsel had actually been retained”; and (6) the 

readiness of private counsel to proceed in a reasonable amount of time. Id.

at 543. Following its review, the Prysock Court concluded that the trial court 

failed to engage in an appropriate balancing of the defendant’s constitutional 

right to retain counsel against the Commonwealth’s interest in the swift 

administration of justice. Id. at 544. 

Instantly, Appellant stated that he was not comfortable with trial 

counsel, that they were not “seeing eye-to-eye,” and that he wished to 

____________________________________________

8 The Court further noted that the defendant’s “difficulties with appointed 

counsel pervaded every aspect of the trial, as [the defendant] objected to 

counsel’s handling of jury selection, his handling of the suppression hearing, 

his questioning of witnesses at trial, and his refusal to call requested character 

witnesses.” Prysock, 972 A.2d at 545.
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proceed with private counsel. N.T., 5/8/17, at 7. However, Appellant did not 

articulate any grounds to find an irreconcilable difference with trial counsel. 

The record also shows there were numerous continuances prior to trial, 

and nearly two years had passed since Appellant was charged. Although it is 

unclear when Appellant first requested that private counsel replace trial 

counsel, there is no indication that Appellant did more than express an interest 

in having private counsel enter into the case. Significantly, the trial court 

indicated that private counsel would not be ready to proceed until February of 

the next year, approximately least nine months from the scheduled start of 

trial.

Based on the totality of the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that 

the trial court assessed the appropriate factors when considering Appellant’s 

requests for a continuance and private counsel. See Prysock, 972 A.2d at 

543-44. The trial court’s balancing of the swift administration of justice 

against Appellant’s right to choice of counsel did not evince a myopic 

insistence of expeditiousness over a justified request for further delays. See 

id. at 542, 543. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s denial of Appellant’s request for a continuance to retain private 

counsel. See id. at 541. 

Appellant’s second claim assails the trial court’s rulings permitting the 

Commonwealth to publish photographs of the injuries Appellant inflicted on 

Decedent’s stepfather, Sylvester Ellis. Appellant contends that trial court 

erred in admitting inflammatory color photographs that were cumulative of 
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Ellis’ rebuttal testimony. Appellant’s Brief at 13. He further contends that the 

trial court should have excluded the photographs of the injuries because they 

“showed that Appellant had a propensity for inflicting serious injury.” Id.

Our standards of review are well settled.

Where a photograph “possesses gruesome or inflammatory 

qualities likely to inflame the passions of the viewer” a trial court 

must not merely exclude them based on those qualities, but must 

determine whether their “essential evidentiary value . . . clearly

outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of 

the jurors.” A trial court’s determination in that regard must be 

affirmed unless the trial court has abused its discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1069 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted). Additionally, the presentation of testimony as to a person’s injuries 

“does not render photographs per se inadmissible.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1034 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

Instantly, the Commonwealth introduced Ellis’ testimony that Appellant 

attacked him and stated he was going to kill Ellis as he did Decedent as 

rebuttal evidence. Specifically, the Commonwealth introduced the evidence 

to counter Appellant’s testimony that he harbored no ill-will against Decedent

and that a third individual in the car shot the Decedent. N.T., 5/17/17, at 38-

40. Additionally, the Commonwealth asserted that Appellant attempted to 

“eliminate a witness” to whom Appellant made an admission. N.T., 5/8/17, 

at 117. The Commonwealth published the photographs to the jury during 

Ellis’ account of the attack and the injuries he suffered. 
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The photographs illustrated the extent of the injuries Appellant inflicted,

and the mere fact that Ellis testified to the attack does not obviate the 

admissibility of the pictures. See Johnson, 42 A.3d at 1034. While 

unpleasant, they were not unduly gruesome or inflammatory. Thus, we 

discern no basis to disturb the trial court’s ruling that the publication of the 

photographs to establish the extent of Ellis’ injuries clearly outweighed the 

possibility of prejudice. See Lyons, 79 A.3d at 1069. 

Appellant, in his third claim, challenges the Commonwealth’s conduct at 

the end of its closing argument, when the prosecutor “stood within five feet 

of Appellant and repeatedly pointed and shouted at Appellant.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 15. Appellant asserts that “such zealous and personal condemnation” 

affixed prejudice in the minds of the jury. Id. 

We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in considering the nature of the misconduct 

and the degree of any resulting prejudice. Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 

A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009). As to the alleged misconduct, “[i]t is well 

settled that a prosecutor has considerable latitude during closing arguments 

and his arguments are fair if they are supported by the evidence or use 

inferences that can reasonably be derived from the evidence.” Id. at 1020 

(citation omitted). Prosecutorial misconduct will not be found based on 

oratorical flair or if the conduct at issue did not prejudice the jury by impeding 

their ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. Id. 
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In Commonwealth v. Culver, 51 A.3d 866 (Pa. Super. 2012), this 

Court affirmed a trial court’s ruling that the defendant was entitled to a new 

trial due to the cumulative effect of several instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct. Culver, 51 A.3d at 872, 882. Specifically, in Culver, the trial 

court found that the prosecutor (1) despite the court’s admonitions, continued 

to intimidate the defendant by invading the defendant’s and his counsel’s 

“personal space” by pointing his finger in their faces and yelling; (2) personally 

opined on the credibility of the defendant; and (3) referred to evidence that 

was not in the record. Id. at 872. Discussing the prosecutor’s repeated 

conduct, this Court noted:

At best, such behaviors demonstrate a lack of professionalism in 

the courtroom. At worst, they could be interpreted as intentional 

conduct intended to inflame the passions of the jury or to instigate 

a reaction from the defendant or his counsel. What is clear is that 

such behavior has no part in the rational, logical, and 

contemplative evaluation of the evidence that should occur during 

a criminal trial.

The deprivation of an individual’s liberty should never turn upon 

the theatrical presentation of arguments or evidence, the volume 

and tone of an advocate’s voice, or due to physical acts of 

intimidation. That such behavior occurred in front of a jury only 

serves to increase its potential prejudicial effect. While we might 

presume that a trial judge could resist the prejudicial effect of such 

theatrics, especially where the trial judge had prior experience 

with a particularly dramatic attorney, we cannot assume the same 

when a case is tried before a jury. A jury might well become 

distracted from their task by the theatrics of an over-zealous 

prosecutor. We, therefore, have no reservation in determining 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

these events contributed greatly to denying . . . a fair and 

impartial trial.

Id. at 875-76. 
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Instantly, Appellant’s suggestion that the prosecutor yelled at Appellant 

is not supported in the record. See N.T. 5/17/17, at 76 (indicating that trial 

counsel objected based, in part, on the prosecutor’s use of a “slightly raised” 

voice). Moreover, the prosecutor’s “do as I do now” argument, which was 

accompanied by the prosecutor pointing a finger within five feet of Appellant,

did not personally opine on the credibility of any witness or serve to intimidate 

the defense. The trial court was in the best position to observe prosecutor’s 

conduct and tone and concluded that the prosecutor merely used a “raised 

voice” near Appellant and “did nothing to prejudice the jury or impede the 

rendering of a true verdict.” Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7. 

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the prosecutor’s limited 

theatrics did not exceed the bounds of oratorical flair. See Judy, 978 A.2d at 

1019; cf. Culver, 51 A.3d at 875-76. Thus, we have no basis to disturb the 

trial court’s conclusion Appellant’s claim did not establish prosecutorial 

misconduct. 

Appellant, in his final two claims, raises challenges to the weight and 

sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 19, 21. In both claims, 

Appellant contends that the case against him was circumstantial as no 

eyewitness testified that Appellant shot Decedent. He further argues that the 

trial evidence supported his testimony that a third person in this car, Ace, 

killed Decedent. Id. at 19, 21. Moreover, Appellant suggests that he could 

not have planned, intended, or actually shot Decedent when Decedent’s family 

was aware that Decedent was with Appellant when he was killed, the killing 
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occurred inside a vehicle associated with Appellant, and Appellant testified 

that he harbored no ill-will against Decedent. Id. at 19, 21. 

As noted in Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 

2000), challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence 

are distinct. See Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751.

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of 

law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict 

when it establishes each material element of the crime charged 

and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in 

contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human 

experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient 

as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim the court 

is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary 

to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no 

obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A 

new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the 

testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have 

arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than 

reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would 

not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, 

in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the 

trial judge is to determine that “notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.”

* * *

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of 

discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has 
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had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an 

appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings 

and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence.

Id. at 751-53 (citations omitted). 

As to Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial court noted that

there was ample circumstantial evidence establishing Appellant killed 

Decedent. The court specifically referenced the undisputed facts establishing 

that Appellant was at the scene of the murder, that Appellant’s DNA was on 

the murder weapon, that Decedent had cooperated with federal authorities 

against Appellant, and that Appellant assaulted Ellis in prison. Trial Ct. Op. at 

11. 

We add that the jury was entitled to reject Appellant’s assertions that a 

third person in the car shot Decedent, that Appellant harbored no ill-will 

against Decedent, and that Appellant would not have shot Decedent when 

Decedent’s family was aware that Decedent was with Appellant at the time of 

the shooting. Thus, we discern no basis to disturb the trial court’s conclusion 

that the interests of justice did not require a new trial. See Widmer, 744 

A.2d at 753.

As to Appellant’s sufficiency claim, a review of Appellant’s arguments 

reveals that Appellant essentially rehashes his weight of the evidence claim. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 21. In any event, it is well-settled that 

To sustain a conviction for murder of the first-degree, the 

Commonwealth must prove that: (1) a human being was 

unlawfully killed; (2) the person accused is responsible for the 
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killing; and (3) the accused acted with specific intent to kill. 

“Specific intent may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon 

on a vital part of the victim’s body.” Also, . . . the period of 

reflection required for premeditation to establish the specific 

intent to kill “may be very brief; in fact the design to kill can be 

formulated in a fraction of a second. Premeditation and 

deliberation exist whenever the assailant possesses the conscious 

purpose to bring about death.” 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1220 (Pa. 2009) (citations 

omitted). 

Instantly, the record reveals that Appellant was present at the time of 

the shooting and his DNA was on the murder weapon. A witness testified that 

he only saw one person, Appellant, fleeing the scene of the murder. The 

victim was shot twice in the head. Thus, there was ample evidence from which 

the jury could have concluded that Appellant killed the decedent and that it 

was his conscious purpose to bring about death. See id. Thus, no relief is 

due. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/18