[Cite as In re J.G., 2024-Ohio-1101.]

Atty. Alyson Byerly Carbon, for Appellee and

Atty. Tracey A. Laslo, for Appellants.

Dated: March 21, 2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:

J.G.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 23 MA 0075

Juvenile Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio

Case No. 2018 JC 00939

BEFORE:

William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,

Sitting by Assignment,

Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.
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KLATT, J.

{¶1} Appellants, W.M. and R.M., maternal great uncle and great aunt of J.G. 

(d.o.b. 3/22/2016), appeal the judgment entry of the Mahoning County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, awarding legal custody of J.G. to his father, S.G. The juvenile 

court sustained Father’s objections to the original and amended magistrate’s decision, in 

which the magistrate concluded J.G.’s best interest was served by Appellants’ continuing 

custody.

{¶2} A.L., J.G.’s mother and his residential parent prior to the decision of the 

Juvenile Court currently on appeal, suffers from illegal drug dependency and did not 

participate in the proceedings. Appellants and Father each filed motions for custody of 

J.G. after Mother relinquished J.G.’s care to Appellants in July of 2021. Father was an 

illegal drug abuser at the time of J.G.’s birth through October of 2020. Mother and Father 

regularly entrusted J.G. to Appellants in the first four-and-a-half years of his life.

{¶3} In their first assignment of error, Appellants argue the juvenile court abused 

its discretion in awarding custody to Father, and the judgment entry is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence and not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In their 

second assignment of error, Appellants contend Father committed a procedural error due 

to his failure to file objections to the magistrate’s second amended decision, which was 

filed after Father’s objections to the original and amended decisions were filed. Appellants 

further argue the trial court exceeded its authority by relying on arguments that were not 

raised by Father’s objections. For the following reasons, the judgment entry of the 

juvenile court awarding custody of J.G. to Father is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶4} On August 14, 2018, a complaint was filed by the Mahoning County 

Children Services Agency (“Agency”) alleging J.G. was a dependent child. J.G. was twice 

found wandering unsupervised by a stranger while in Mother’s care. As a consequence, 

J.G. was placed in the interim temporary custody of the Agency. 

{¶5} On October 18, 2018, interim temporary custody was awarded to 

Appellants, based in large measure on the fact that Mother and Father had routinely 
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placed J.G. in Appellants’ care for extended periods of time. Parenting time for Mother 

was to be supervised by the Agency. Father’s parenting time was to be supervised by 

Appellants.

{¶6} After Mother underwent treatment for her addiction, the Agency filed a 

motion to transfer custody to Mother and for an order of protective supervision on August 

2, 2019. On October 23, 2019, custody of J.G. was returned to Mother subject to courtordered protective supervision. No parenting time was granted to Father at that time. 

Appellants’ temporary custody was terminated. 

{¶7} After Mother successfully completed additional court-ordered drug 

treatment programs, protective services were terminated on September 15, 2020. 

Accordingly, Mother was awarded legal custody and ordered to provide one hour of 

supervised parenting time per week and video contact two times per week to Father. 

Father agreed to the juvenile court’s award of custody of J.G. to Mother.

{¶8} On October 18, 2021, Appellants filed a complaint for custody, as well as a 

motion for temporary custody and motion for an expedited hearing for educational 

purposes. J.G. had once again been left in Appellants’ care by Mother. Appellants filed 

the motion for temporary custody and an expedited hearing in order to acquire the legal 

authority to enroll J.G. in kindergarten.

{¶9} On October 21, 2021, the juvenile court awarded temporary custody of J.G. 

to Appellants. J.G. was enrolled in the Marlington Local School District where he attends 

Lexington Elementary School. J.G. began kindergarten approximately two months after 

the first day of school.

{¶10} Pretrial hearings were held on January 13, 2022 and February 16, 2022. 

Both hearings resulted in temporary custody remaining with Appellants. No parenting time 

for J.G.’s parents was ordered. A guardian ad litem (“GAL”) was appointed on February 

17, 2022. 

{¶11} On March 4, 2022, Father filed his motion for custody/reallocation of 

parental rights and responsibilities and support. At a pretrial hearing on April 6, 2022, 

Father was awarded supervised parenting time at the Hope House. Father submitted to 

periodic drug testing pursuant to an order of the juvenile court.
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{¶12} On May 11, 2022, the GAL issued his original report recommending that 

legal custody be awarded to Appellants. On May 18, 2022, the competing motions for 

custody were tried before the magistrate. Mother did not attend the trial. 

{¶13} Father testified he had been sober since October of 2020 (nineteen months 

of sobriety as of the date of the hearing). He suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 

and is prescribed medical marijuana. He had last seen J.G. on March 22, 2022, and had 

visited J.G. on three occasions in the previous year. 

{¶14} According to Father’s testimony, Appellants had severely limited his ability 

to visit J.G. and completely prohibited him from spending time with J.G. outside of their 

home. Appellants countered they were as cooperative as possible with Father’s requests 

to visit with J.G., however they believed a previously-issued court order required 

supervised visitation. 

{¶15} Father similarly blamed Mother for his failure to parent J.G. while she was 

the residential parent. Despite his allegations, Father conceded he never sought court 

enforcement of his visitation rights.

{¶16} At the trial, Father misidentified J.G.’s birthday, could not identify J.G.’s 

teacher, and had no information regarding J.G.’s classes or grades. Despite Father’s 

limited exposure to J.G. over the course of the previous year, Father opined that J.G. 

suffered from depression based on J.G.’s abnormal weight gain and “sad behavior 

whenever [Father] would leave.” (5/18/22 Trial Tr., p. 96.)

{¶17} Father testified he had been employed as a warehouse selector for roughly 

one year. At the hearing on Father’s objections to the magistrate’s decision roughly one 

year later, Father had just began working at a new job. There was no testimony taken at 

the hearing, but the new job was mentioned during a colloquy with the juvenile court 

regarding drug screening.

{¶18} At the trial, Father testified he had a child support enforcement obligation of 

$50 per month for J.G., but was roughly $1,250 in arrears. Father is legally obligated to 

financially support two children. Father conceded he did not provide any necessities or 

sustenance for J.G., nor did he provide any basic care for J.G. in the past year. Father 

could not recall when he began making child support payments for J.G.
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{¶19} Father obtained an independent living space, that is, a small apartment in 

Kent, Ohio, roughly one month prior to the trial. The GAL expressed concern about the 

size and location of Father’s apartment, as it is located in close proximity to a busy 

highway. Although there is no yard for recreation at Father’s apartment, a park is located 

within walking distance. The GAL conceded he had not observed any interaction between 

Father and J.G.

{¶20} L.M., J.G.’s paternal grandmother, testified on Father’s behalf. She had not 

seen J.G. since he was two years of age. Father lived with her for approximately four 

years after Father and Mother ended their relationship. Although Paternal Grandmother 

conceded Father’s illegal drug use, she denied Father was ever addicted to illegal drugs. 

{¶21} Paternal Grandmother explained she would assist Father with J.G.’s care 

should he be awarded custody of J.G. However, she conceded on cross-examination 

that each of her five children had been the subject of Agency intervention and oversight. 

{¶22} Appellants testified a typical day in J.G.’s life includes quality time with each 

of them. Great Aunt is J.G.’s full-time caretaker and she assists J.G. with his schoolwork. 

Great Aunt further testified that she and J.G. play outside with various toys and games. 

Great Uncle has a full-time position as a laboratory supervisor.

{¶23} Great Uncle testified J.G., who was 6 years of age on the date of the 

hearing, attends counseling because he struggles with the knowledge that he had an 

older brother who died before J.G.’s birth. J.G.’s preoccupation and sadness about his 

deceased brother and the instability of his early years prompted Appellants to arrange for 

counseling sessions for J.G. 

{¶24} The GAL testified J.G. told him he was “happy” residing with Appellants and 

had a few friends at school. However, the GAL conceded he had not consulted with J.G.’s 

counselor or teacher. When asked about Father’s belief that J.G. suffered from 

depression, the GAL responded J.G. was “pretty happy” during the GAL’s single visit. 

(Id., p. 121.) Nonetheless, the GAL expressed concern for J.G.’s health because he is 

“obesely overweight.” (Id.)

{¶25} According to the GAL, Appellants could not identify J.G.’s pediatrician 

during their interview. However, J.G. was a patient at Akron Children’s Hospital and had 

seen various physicians there, most recently for a COVID-19 test. Despite Appellants’ 
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inability to identify J.G.’s pediatrician, they informed the GAL that J.G. was fully 

vaccinated, because it is a requirement for enrollment in public school. 

{¶26} The GAL reported that Appellants provided for J.G.’s basic needs and were 

his sole financial support. The GAL opined at the trial that custody should be awarded to 

Appellants, and Father should be granted progressive liberal visitation. 

{¶27} On December 21, 2022, Father filed an ex parte/emergency motion for 

immediate custody or visitation. Although Appellants had agreed to visitation at their 

residence following the closure of Hope House, Father alleged Appellants terminated all 

means of contact and/or visitation “under the pretense of being advised to withhold 

visitation until a decision is rendered.” An agreed entry was filed on December 22, 2022 

permitting Father two hours of visitation on Christmas Eve at Appellants’ home. 

{¶28} On January 31, 2023, the original magistrate’s decision and judgment entry 

adopting the original decision was filed. On February 3, 2023, an amended magistrate’s 

decision was filed. On February 6, 2023, a judgment entry adopting the amended 

magistrate’s decision was issued.1 On February 14, 2023, Father filed objections to the 

original and amended magistrate’s decisions. 

{¶29} On March 16, 2023, a second amended magistrate’s decision was filed. For 

the first time in the second amended magistrate’s decision, the magistrate concluded that 

no change of circumstances had occurred. The first two magistrate’s decisions did not 

undertake any change of circumstances analysis. No objections were filed to the second 

amended magistrate’s decision. It appears the second amended magistrate’s decision 

was issued in order to address a change of circumstances, which was one of the 

objections advanced by Father in his February 14, 2023 pleading.

{¶30} On March 27, 2023, oral argument on Father’s objections was held. At the 

hearing, Father’s counsel incorporated the second amended magistrate’s decision into 

his objections.

1 On February 6, 2023, a magistrate’s decision was issued relating to Appellants’ request for child 

support, which was adopted on February 7, 2023. No appeal was taken from the child support 

entry.
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{¶31} On May 1, 2023, the juvenile court conducted an in camera interview with 

J.G., which the GAL attended. J.G. was seven years of age during the in camera interview 

and was within a month of completing first grade. 

{¶32} On May 30, 2023, the GAL filed a supplemental report changing his 

recommendation. In the supplemental report, the GAL opined that custody should be 

awarded to Father, with liberal visitation awarded to Appellants. On June 2, 2023, the 

judgment entry on appeal was issued by the juvenile court sustaining Father’s objections 

and overruling generally the “magistrate’s decision.” 

{¶33} In the judgment entry on appeal, the juvenile court first opines that a change 

of circumstances has occurred based on the “positive improvements” Father had made 

in his life. The juvenile court also cites J.G.’s considerable weight gain as a change in 

circumstances. (6/2/23 J.E., p. 3.) The parties concede on appeal that a change of 

circumstances occurred when Mother, the then-residential parent pursuant to the juvenile 

court’s September 25, 2020 judgment entry, relinquished J.G.’s care to Appellants. 

{¶34} With respect to the statutory factors, the juvenile court noted “the in camera 

interview was significantly important in determining this matter and reversing the 

[magistrate’s decision.]” (Id., p. 2.) More specifically, the juvenile court found:

Father has made great strides in overcoming past challenges. He has 

made considerable adjustments to his life and home and is prepared to 

parent [J.G.]. Father is sincere, loving, and caring. He is passionate about 

raising his son. [Great] Aunt and Uncle have been good guardians of [J.G.] 

when they were needed to assist. The time has come for Father to assume 

his role as parent and he is prepared to do so. [J.G.] expressed his wishes 

and the Court has considered them. The Court found [J.G.] competent, 

truthful, and sincere. The [GAL] also found [J.G.] to be truthful and honest. 

The Court finds that [J.G.] loves his Father and wishes to be with him too. 

Minor Child is appreciative of the care provided to him by [Great] Aunt and 

Uncle. The in camera interview was very compelling and much weight is 

given to it by this reviewing Court. 

(Id., p. 3.) 
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{¶35} The juvenile court discounted the fact that Great Aunt provided full-time care 

for J.G. The juvenile court observed that many parents place their children in day care, 

and further there is “no evidence that Paternal Grandmother posed any harm to J.G.” (Id.) 

Finally, the juvenile court found that Father “will be more likely to facilitate visitation.” (Id.)

{¶36} With respect to the best interest analysis, the juvenile court opined J.G. 

“does not have access to physical sports but spends most of his time playing videos or 

watching television.” (Id., p. 3-4.) The juvenile court further opined J.G. had “free and 

open access to non-nutritional food” and his weight gain has “negatively affected his 

ability to interact with other children.” 

{¶37} The juvenile court concluded, “[t]here has been some significant harm to 

[J.G.] while in the care and custody of [Appellants’] home and care [sic]. [J.G.] has gained 

considerable weight and his medical and basic needs are not being addressed despite 

[Appellants’] testimony.” (Id., p. 3.) 

{¶38} As a consequence, the juvenile court awarded custody to Father, with 

companionship time awarded to Appellants, including one week during each summer. 

This timely appeal followed. 

LAW

{¶39} The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the 

custody of a child who is not a ward of another Ohio court. R.C. 2151.23(A)(2). See also

R.C. 2151.23(F)(1) (the juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child custody 

matters in accordance with R.C. 3109.04). The custody of a child is a “fundamental liberty 

interest” of a parent. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 

599 (1982).

{¶40} This right of a parent to rear her own child presents itself in custody 

proceedings between a parent and a non-parent, as opposed to a custody proceeding 

between two parents. In re Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 96, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977). In 

such a dispute, it has long been held that a “suitable” parent has a “paramount right” to 

the custody of their minor child “unless they forfeit that right by contract, abandonment, 

or by becoming totally unable to care for and support those children.” Id. at 97, citing Clark 
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v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 310 (1877); Masitto v. Masitto, 22 Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 488 

N.E.2d 857 (1986).

{¶41} However, Mother was J.G.’s residential parent, pursuant to the September 

15, 2020 judgment entry, when the motions for legal custody filed by Appellants and 

Father were before the juvenile court. Appellants were awarded temporary custody of 

J.G. for the purpose of admitting him to public school and during the pendency of 

Appellants’ motion for legal custody, which was combined in the same pleading with the 

motion for temporary custody. Insofar as the competing motions for legal custody did not 

involve the original award of custody, but instead a modification of the original award of 

custody, the suitability test does not apply. In re DeLucia v. West, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 

05-MA-5, 2005-Ohio-6933, ¶ 32. 

{¶42} R.C. 2151.42, captioned “Modification or termination of dispositional order,” 

reads in its entirety:

(A) At any hearing in which a court is asked to modify or terminate an order 

of disposition issued under section 2151.353, 2151.415, or 2151.417 of the 

Revised Code, the court, in determining whether to return the child to the 

child’s parents, shall consider whether it is in the best interest of the child.

(B) An order of disposition issued under division (A)(3) of section 2151.353, 

division (A)(3) of section 2151.415, or section 2151.417 of the Revised 

Code granting legal custody of a child to a person is intended to be 

permanent in nature. A court shall not modify or terminate an order granting 

legal custody of a child unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since 

the order was issued or that were unknown to the court at that time, that a 

change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the person who 

was granted legal custody, and that modification or termination of the order 

is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.

{¶43} Although the statute does not provide specific best interest factors, courts 

may consider the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) (applicable to permanent 

custody) in conjunction with R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (applicable to allocation of parental 
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rights). In re M.G., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 22 MA 0078, 2023-Ohio-3423, ¶ 29. The 

permanent custody statute provides a non-exhaustive list of considerations including the 

child’s interactions, interrelationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for 

permanence. R.C. 2151.414(D). The custody statute includes similar considerations and 

additionally lists the child’s adjustment, the mental and physical health of all involved, 

support arrearage, the history and likelihood of honoring visitation orders, certain criminal 

convictions, and establishment of a residence out of state or plan to do so. R.C. 

3109.04(F)(1). Finally, “[a] change of circumstances must be one of substance, not slight 

or inconsequential, to justify modifying a prior custody order.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio 

St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.26 1159 (1997).

{¶44} Although the trial court was required to consider all relevant factors, the 

statute does not require a court to address each listed factor considered in its written 

decision. In re J.K., 7th Dist. Carroll No. 14 CA 899, 2014-Ohio-5502, ¶ 31. Moreover, a 

court is presumed to consider the factors absent evidence to the contrary. Id. citing In re 

Henthorn, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 00BA37 (Nov. 28, 2001).

{¶45} “[L]egal custody where parental rights are not terminated is not as drastic a 

remedy as permanent custody.” In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455, 751 N.E.2d 552 

(2001). Accordingly, “[t]he trial court’s standard of review is not clear and convincing 

evidence, as it is in a permanent custody proceeding, but is merely preponderance of the 

evidence.” Id. An award of legal custody is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. An 

abuse of discretion exists if the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). If 

the court’s decision on the children's best interests or on other factual issues surrounding 

legal custody is not supported by competent and credible evidence, then it is 

unreasonable. In re M.G., 2023-Ohio-3423, 224 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 9 (7th Dist.).

{¶46} Credibility issues are critical in custody cases, and important information 

may be evident from the demeanor and attitude of the witnesses that does not translate 

into the record. Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). The 

trial court is in the best position to weigh the testimony and observe the witnesses’ 

demeanor in order to gauge their credibility. Id. at 418-419. 
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{¶47} The Ohio Supreme Court in Davis further cautioned:

“ * * * A reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply because it 

holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and 

evidence submitted before the trial court. A finding of an error in law is a 

legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of 

witnesses and evidence is not. The determination of credibility of testimony 

and evidence must not be encroached upon by a reviewing tribunal, 

especially to the extent where the appellate court relies on unchallenged, 

excluded evidence in order to justify its reversal.”

This is even more crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much 

evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the 

record well.

Id. at 419, quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 81, 461 

N.E.2d 1273 (1984).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

GRANTING LEGAL CUSTODY OF [J.G.] TO [FATHER] AS SUCH 

DECISION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND WAS 

NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT 

SUCH DECISION WAS IN [J.G.’S] BEST INTEREST.

{¶48} In their first assignment of error, Appellants argue Father’s sobriety is 

laudable, however he offered no testimony regarding a treatment regimen or a support 

system in place to maintain his sobriety. They further argue Father has little to no support 

system to help care for J.G., but for Paternal Grandmother, who has a troubled history of 

raising her own children. 

{¶49} Appellants assert the juvenile court ignored Father’s lengthy struggle with 

drug addiction, as well as his failure to financially support J.G. They also cite Father’s 
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employment history alleging that Father has changed jobs three different times in the 

previous three years.

{¶50} Next, Appellants argue there is no evidence in the record that J.G. has free 

and open access to non-nutritious food. They argue in the absence of evidence to the 

contrary that J.G.’s weight problem may be genetic. 

{¶51} Finally, Appellants contend there is no evidence in the record to show they 

intentionally interfered with Father’s visitation. They assert the juvenile court blamed 

them for Father’s failure to spend time with J.G., despite Father’s historical failure to care 

for and support J.G. Appellants allege the juvenile court “unmistakably has a strong 

disdain for [Appellants] for some unknown reason despite [Appellants] willingly and 

unquestionably caring for [J.G.]” (Appellants’ Brf., p. 18.) Appellants conclude, “[i]t is clear 

that the [juvenile court] supports parents having custody of a child, when it is not in the 

child’s best interest.” (Id., at p. 19.)

{¶52} The juvenile court was clearly impressed with Father’s efforts to amend his 

life. As of the date of the oral argument on Father’s objections, Father had maintained 

his sobriety for over two-and-a-half years, and had been living independently for more 

than one year. Father had been employed for roughly three years. Although he changed 

employers three times, there is no evidence in the record that he was terminated from 

any job. 

{¶53} Father impressed the juvenile court as “sincere, loving, and caring,” and 

“passionate about raising his son.” The foregoing observations fall within the ambit of 

credibility, which did not translate in the record, so we must defer to the juvenile court’s 

characterization of Father.

{¶54} In determining J.G.’s best interest, the juvenile court was required to 

consider a non-exclusive list of factors, including the child’s interactions, 

interrelationships, wishes, custodial history, need for permanence, the child’s adjustment, 

the mental and physical health of all involved, any support arrearage, and the history and 

likelihood of honoring visitation orders. There was no testimony offered at the hearing 

that J.G.’s interactions and interrelationship would be affected by a change in custody, or 

that any adjustment, for instance J.G.’s school, would be impacted should Father be 

awarded custody. As a consequence, the juvenile court focused on two factors, J.G.’s 
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health and the likelihood that the respective parties would honor visitation orders. Both 

factors favored Father. 

{¶55} The juvenile court was particularly troubled by J.G.’s weight. According to 

Father’s testimony, J.G.’s weight increased dramatically over the course of the previous 

year. The GAL described J.G. as morbidly obese. While Father expressed concern about 

J.G.’s weight, Appellants neither acknowledged the problem nor offered any testimony 

regarding their effort to help J.G. maintain a healthy weight.

{¶56} Next, the juvenile court opined that Father would be more likely to honor 

visitation orders. While there was conflicting testimony regarding the responsibility for 

Father’s limited visits over the previous year, we must defer to the juvenile court’s 

credibility determination regarding the parties’ dispute.

{¶57} Finally, the juvenile court described the in camera interview with J.G. as 

“very compelling” and the juvenile court afforded “much weight” to the interview in its best 

interest analysis. Likewise, the GAL amended his recommendation following the in 

camera hearing in favor of Father. 

{¶58} “[C]ustody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions a 

trial judge must make. Therefore, a trial judge must have wide latitude in considering all 

the evidence before him or her * * *.” Davis, supra, at 418. The juvenile judge heard and 

saw the parties as they spoke and judged their credibility, sincerity, and attitude, which is 

the trial court’s primary function and prerogative. Id. at 418-419. Having reviewed the 

record, we find the juvenile court’s decision was supported by competent, credible 

evidence, and therefore, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting 

custody to Father. Accordingly, Appellants’ first assignment of error has no merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, THUS ABUSING 

ITS DISCRETION, IN RULING ON FATHER’S OBJECTIONS TO 

MAGISTRATE’S DECISIONS WHEN SAID MAGISTRATE’S DECISIONS 

WERE AMENDED, WITHOUT FURTHER OBJECTION; WHEN THE 

OBJECTIONS DID NOT COMPLY WITH OHIO RULES OF CIVIL 
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PROCEDURE 53(D); WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE 

OBJECTIONS RAISED. 

{¶59} Appellants argue Father committed a procedural error by failing to object to 

the second amended magistrate’s decision. Although Father did not amend his 

objections, he did incorporate the second amended magistrate’s decision into his

objections at oral argument. However, Appellants do not argue they suffered any 

prejudice as a result of the procedural error.

{¶60} Next, Appellants contend Father’s objections were general in nature, 

contrary to the requirements of Civ. R. 54(D)(3)(b)(ii) which reads, “[a]n objection to a 

magistrate’s decision shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for 

objection.” To the contrary, Father advances specific procedural and substantive 

objections to the magistrate’s decisions.

{¶61} Finally, Appellants assert the juvenile court relied on facts that were not the 

subject of Father’s specific objections. Juvenile Rule 40(D), captioned, “Action of Court 

on Magistrate's Decision and on Any Objections to Magistrate’s Decision; Entry of 

Judgment or Interim Order by Court,” reads in relevant part: 

(b) Action on Magistrate’s Decision. Whether or not objections are timely 

filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision in whole or in part, 

with or without modification. A court may hear a previously-referred matter, 

take additional evidence, or return a matter to a magistrate.

{¶62} The juvenile court rejected the magistrate’s decision based in large 

measure on the in camera interview. Insofar as the juvenile court acted within its authority 

to take additional evidence, we find no procedural error. 

{¶63} Based on the foregoing analysis, Appellants have failed to demonstrate any 

procedural error. Accordingly, we find Appellants’ second assignment of error has no 

merit.
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CONCLUSION

{¶64} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entry of the juvenile court awarding 

custody of J.G. to Father is affirmed.

Robb, P.J., concurs.

Hanni, J., dissents with dissenting opinion.
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Hanni, J., dissenting.

{¶65} With regard and respect to my colleagues, I must dissent from the majority 

opinion. I agree that Father’s current drug-free status is commendable, as well as the 

facts that he has a job, and recently moved into an apartment.

{¶66} However, reviewing R.C. 2151.414(D), in conjunction with R.C. 

3109.04(F)(1), the factors for determining the child’s best interest, I would find that it is in 

J.G.’s best interest to remain with his maternal aunt and uncle. Factors to review include 

the child’s interactions, wishes, custodial history, need for permanence, the child’s 

adjustment, the mental and physical health of all involved, any support arrearage, and the 

likelihood of honoring visitation. 

{¶67} Father has had three jobs in three years and moved into his apartment just 

one month prior to the court hearing. Father has visited J.G. only three times in the past 

year. 

{¶68} J.G. has a strong relationship with maternal aunt and uncle. Maternal aunt 

and uncle have been J.G.’s only familial stability throughout his young life. Maternal aunt 

is home all day and maternal aunt and uncle have consistently provided for J.G’s mental

and physical needs. They enrolled him in school and have him in counseling to assess 

and provide for his mental well-being. 

{¶69} Father has cared for J.G. for only 2 out of his 7 years of life. Father did not 

know where J.G. was enrolled for school, who his teachers were, or what his classes or 

grades were. Father is in arrears with his child support. J.G.’s paternal grandmother has 

offered to help father provide care for J.G. while father is at work. However, she last saw 

J.G. when he was two years old and all of her five children had involvement with children’s 

services agencies when they were young. Further, the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) had not 

observed any interactions between father and J.G.

{¶70} The court and the GAL expressed great concern over J.G.’s increased 

weight. The court even considered this weight gain a “significant harm” to J.G. while in 

the care of maternal aunt and uncle. The court held that due to this weight gain, J.G.’s 

“medical and basic needs are not being addressed” despite the contrary testimony of 

maternal aunt and uncle. The court further found that J.G. did not have access to physical 

sports and spent most of his time playing videos or watching television. 
– 17 –

Case No. 23 MA 0075

{¶71} However, the GAL did not speak to J.G.’s teachers, counselor or the 

pediatricians who had treated J.G. to provide additional relevant information, considering 

the significance placed on this factor. Further, there was no evidence that J.G. lacked 

access to physical sports or activity while in the custody of maternal aunt and uncle. 

{¶72} Accordingly, I would find that the court abused its discretion by overruling 

the magistrate’s decision and granting custody to father. I would sustain maternal aunt 

and uncle’s first assignment of error. 
[Cite as In re J.G., 2024-Ohio-1101.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of 

the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

Costs to be taxed against the Appellants.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.