alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT**

March 14, 2006

U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission450 Fifth Street, N. W.Washington, D.C. 20549

Ladies andGentlemen:

The certification set forth below is being submitted tothe Securities and Exchange Commission solely for the purpose of complying withSection 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Thiscertification is not to be deemed to be filed pursuant to the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 and does not constitute a part of the Annual Report on Form 10-K(the “Report”) accompanying this letter and is not to be incorporated byreference into any filing, whether made before or after the date hereof,regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.

I, Edward R.Muller, the Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer ofMirant Corporation (the “Company”), certify that, subject to the qualificationsnoted below, to the best of my knowledge:

1.                the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.                theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operation of Mirant Corporation.
| Name:  | /s/ EDWARD R. MULLER                                                                |   |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | *Chairman of the Board, President and  Chief Executive Officer* |   |

 

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to Mirant Corporation and will be retainedby Mirant Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commissionor its staff upon request.

----
#### State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Richard Ware, appellant.

468 N.W.2d 616

Filed May 3, 1991.

No. 90-290.

Richard Scott for appellant.

Robert M. Spire, Attorney General, and Alfonza Whitaker for appellee.

*31Hastings, C.J., Boslaugh, White, Caporale, Shanahan, Grant, and Fahrnbruch, JJ.

Per Curiam.

Richard Ware appeals from the judgment of the district court for Platte County regarding Ware’s misdemeanor conviction and sentence for issuing a bad check, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-61 1(1)(c) (Reissue 1989).

Ware, who represented himself throughout the county court proceedings, now claims that his guilty plea is invalid and that the sentence imposed is excessive.

Regarding the validity of Ware’s guilty plea and, therefore, his conviction, the issue is whether Ware waived his right to counsel. We have examined the record and conclude that Ware knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel regarding his plea-based conviction. See, *State v. Clear,*236 Neb. 648, 463 N.W.2d 581 (1990) (characterization of waiver); *State v. Kennedy,*224 Neb. 164, 396 N.W.2d 722 (1986) (valid guilty plea waives right to counsel); *Faretta*v. *California,*422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975) (defendant’s right to self-representation on waiver of right to counsel).

Ware’s claim of excessiveness of the sentence imposed, namely, 6 months’ imprisonment and restitution, is without merit. Under § 28-61 l(l)(c), issuing a bad check is a Class I misdemeanor, which has the following penalty: “Maximum — not more than one year imprisonment, or one thousand dollars fine, or both. Minimum — none.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-106(1) (Reissue 1989). “A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal unless the sentencing court has abused its discretion in the sentence imposed.” *State*v. *Kitt,*232 Neb. 237, 240, 440 N.W.2d 234, 236 (1989).

Ware’s conviction and sentence are affirmed; therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6136

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

AFNAN JEROME PARKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 97-6548

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

AFNAN JEROME PARKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. James H. Michael, Jr.,

Senior District Judge. (CR-91-15)
2

Submitted: August 28, 1997 Decided: September 16, 1997

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Afnan Jerome Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Julie C. Dudley, Assistant

United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia; Stephen Urban Baer,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

In No. 97-6136, Appellant appeals from the district court's

order denying his motion for resentencing based on an amendment to

the Sentencing Guidelines. In No. 97-6548, Appellant appeals from

the district court's orders denying his Rule 60(b) motion and his

motion for reconsideration. In the Rule 60(b) motion, Appellant

raised claims more appropriately asserted in a motion pursuant to

28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997), yet he specified that

the motion was not to be construed as a § 2255 motion. We have

reviewed the record and the district court's opinions and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. United States v. Parker, No. CR-91-15 (W.D. Va.

Dec. 4, 1996; Mar. 24, 1997; Apr. 8, 1997). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# Longest-Serving Party Leaders

**

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89tii Congress ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ( D ocument

2d Session j } No. 520

GILMOUR C. MACDONALD

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT 0E THE UNITED STATES

RETURNING

WITHOUT APPROVAL THE BILL (H.R. 7546) FOR THE RELIEF OF 

(HLMOUR C. MACDONALD, COLONEL, U.S. AIR FORCE, RETIRED

October 11, 1906.--Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and ordered, 

to be printed together with the accompanying bill

To the House o f Representatives:

I regret that I must return without my approval H.R. 7546, a bill 

for the relief of Gilmour C. MacDonald, colonel, U.S. Air Force Force 

(retired), which would, in part, confer upon the Court of Claims 

jurisdiction to render judgment upon an equitable claim.

The Acting Attorney General has advised me that this bill is unconstitutional. In his opinion, in the special sphere of private claims, 

equitable connotes what the Government should do as a matter of 

moral, as distinguished from legal, responsibility; as a constitutional 

court, the Court of Claims cannot receive and exercise such a jurisdiction, and the power to determine what the Government should do in 

such circumstances is legislative in nature and nondelegable.

L yndon B. J ohnson..

T he W hite H ouse, October 10, 1966.

65-011
2 gilmour c. Macdonald

H.R. 7546

Eighty-N inth Congress of the U nited States of America, at the Second

Session, Begun and H eld at the City of Washington on Monday, the

Tenth D ay of January, One T housand N ine H undred and Sixty-Six

AN ACT For the relief of Gilmour C. MacDonald, colonel, United States Air Force (retired)

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of

America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any statute of limitations, 

lapse of time, or bars of laches, jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the United 

States Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon any claim, 

legal or equitable, filed by Gilmour C. MacDonald, colonel, United States Air 

Force (retired), Shalimar, Florida, for compensation for the usage by the United 

States during World War II and the Korean conflict of a tubular caltrop tire 

puncturing device allegedly invented by the said Gilmour C. MacDonald, the 

said Gilmour C. MacDonald having submitted drawings and models of such device 

to the National Inventors Council, Department of Commerce, in 1940, with the 

alleged understanding that he would be compensated for his invention if it were 

used by the United States.

Sec. 2. Suit upon any such claim may be instituted at any time within one

year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Except as otherwise provided 

herein, proceedings for the determination of such claim, and review and payment 

of any judgment thereon shall be had in the same manner as in the case of claims 

over which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction under section 1491 of title 28 of the 

United States Code. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as an inference of 

liability on the part of the United States.

John W. McCormack,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Quentin N. B urdick,

Acting President of the Senate pro tempore.

o
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 94 (Monday, May 17, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27617-27618]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-11718]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration


Notice of Intent To Release Certain Properties From Certain 
Terms, Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions of a Quitclaim Deed 
Agreement Between the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority and the 
Federal Aviation Administration for the Tampa International Airport, 
Tampa, FL

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Request for public comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA hereby provides notice of intent to release certain 
airport properties 5.88 acres at the Tampa International Airport, 
Tampa, FL from certain conditions, reservations, and restrictions as 
contained in a Quitclaim Deed agreement between the FAA and the 
Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, dated November 5, 1947. The 
release of property will allow the Hillsborough County Aviation 
Authority to use property for other than aeronautical purposes. The 
property is located in the southeast quadrant of Tampa International 
Airport property, Hillsborough County, Florida. The parcel is currently 
designated as aeronautical use. The property will be used for 
nonaeronautical use/revenue generation. The fair market value of the 
property has been determined by appraisal to be $2,690,000. The airport 
will receive at least fair market rental value for the property. 
Documents reflecting the Sponsor's request are available, by 
appointment only, for inspection at the Tampa International Airport and 
the FAA Airports District Office.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 125 of The Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) requires the 
FAA to provide an opportunity for public notice and comment prior to 
the ``waiver'' or ``modification'' of a sponsor's Federal

[[Page 27618]]

obligation to use certain airport land for nonaeronautical purposes.

DATES: Comments are due on or before June 16, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Documents are available for review at the Tampa 
International Airport, and the FAA Airports District Office, 5950 
Hazeltine National Drive, Suite 400, Orlando, FL 32822. Written 
comments on the Sponsor's request must be delivered or mailed to: 
Rebecca R. Henry, Program Manager, Orlando Airports District Office, 
5950 Hazeltine National Drive, Suite 400, Orlando, FL 32822-5024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebecca R. Henry, Program Manager, 
Orlando Airports District Office, 5950 Hazeltine National Drive, Suite 
400, Orlando, FL 32822-5024.

W. Dean Stringer,
Manager, Orlando Airports District Office, Southern Region.
[FR Doc. 2010-11718 Filed 5-14-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

<PAGE>



                                  Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Amended Quarterly Report of Roaming Messenger,  Inc.
(the  "Company")  on Form  10-QSB/A  for the period  ending  March 31, 2005 (the
"Report")  I,  Jonathan  Lei,  Chief  Executive  Officer,  President,  and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18USC ss.1350, as adopted
pursuant  to ss.906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  that to the best of my
knowledge and belief:

     (1)  The Amended  Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section
          13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information  contained in the Amended Report fairly  presents,  in
          all  material  respects,   the  financial  condition  and  results  of
          operations of the Company.


May 25, 2005


\s\ Jonathan Lei
------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Lei, Chief Executive Officer, President, and
Chief Financial Officer

         This  certification  accompanies  the Report pursuant to Section 906 of
the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### Commonwealth, By, et al. v. Stumpf's Admr.

(Decided January 9, 1912.)

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (Chancery Branch, First Division).

General Demurrer Sustained — Dismissing Petition for Want of Jurisdiction Void Judgment. — Tlie Circuit Court dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction, and also holding the petition insufficient on general demurrer, the judgment dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction being affirmed, so much of the judgment as held the petition insufficient on demurrer is void, as the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter.

M. J. HOLT for appellant.

HELM BRUCE, BRUCE & BULLITT for appellee Stumpf.

TYLER BARNETT for appellee German Bank.

WEHLE & WEHLE for appellee German Insurance Bank.

Opinion of the Court by Chief

Justice Hobson

Affirming.

Michael Stumpf resided in Indiana. He had on time deposit in two banks in Louisville a large sum of money on which he was receiving interest at the rate of 3 per cent, per annum. After his death the Citizens Trust Company qualified as administrator in, Indiana and collected from the banks the deposit with interest. Thereafter this proceeding was brought in the Jefferson County Court by Arthur E. Hopkins as revenue agent, against the Citizens Trust 'Company, as administrator of Michael Stumpf, Adam Stumpf, the devisee under the will, and the two banks to obtain in that court a judgment .ascertaining the amount of the inheritance tax due. The administrator did not appear, but Adam Stumpf, the de-visee, and the two banks, filed a special demurrer to the petition on the ground that the Jefferson County Court had no jurisdiction. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the proceeding. The plaintiff appealed *133to tlie Jefferson Circuit Court which sustained tlie special demurrer and also sustained tlie general demurrer to tlie petition which liad been filed with tbe special demurrer. Tbe proceeding having been dismissed, tbe Commonwealth appeals.

Tbe decedent, Michael Stumpf, owned no real estate in Jefferson County, and did not reside there. He resided in Indiana. The case is practically tbe same as Commonwealth v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., this day decided, in which we hold that the Jefferson County Court in such a state of case is without jurisdiction. The county court being without jurisdiction, properly dismissed the proceeding. When the case reached the circuit court on appeal from the county court that court was likewise without jurisdiction. When it held that it was without jurisdiction, this was an end of the case. So much of its judgment as sustained the general demurrer to the petition is void, as it had no power to render any judgment on the merits when it was without jurisdiction. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider any of the other matters urged by counsel, and no opinion is intimated on these matters as the question of jurisdiction is the only one properly before us on the appeal.

Judgment affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

         In connection with the periodic report of Rancon Realty Fund IV (the
"Partnership") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Daniel L.
Stephenson, General Partner of the Partnership, hereby certify as of the date
hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United
States Code, that I perform the functions of chief executive officer and chief
financial officer of the Partnership and that, to the best of my knowledge:

         (1)      the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

         (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Partnership at the dates and for the periods indicated.

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Partnership and will be retained by the Partnership and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Date: November 14, 2003      /s/ Daniel Stephenson
                             ------------------------------------
                             Daniel Stephenson, General Partner
                             Rancon Realty Fund IV
# Democratic Conference Secretaries

**

----

1. Served as acting secretary. 

        -  Contact 
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### Related Link 

About Parties and Leadership

### Senate Historical Office 

Information provided by the Senate Historical Office.

Questions about Senate History?Email a Senate historian.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 20

- 40479 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,**

Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus

**Chad Calhoun,**

Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:15

- CR

- 17

- 1

Before **King, Smith,** and **Wilson,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** *
Chad Calhoun, federal prisoner # 22975

- 078, was convicted by jury verdict of receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography and was sentenced to a total of 135 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. Calhoun now challe nges the district court’s denial of his

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED April 14, 2021
Lyle W. Cayc e Clerk Case: 20-40479 Document: 00515822210 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/14/2021No. 20

- 40479

2 motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115

- 391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194. He argues that extraordinary and compelling reason s warrant his compassionate release because his elderly and ailing father requires his
assistance

. He also asserts that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh in his
favor.
We review the district court’s decision to deny a prisoner’s motion for compa ssionate release for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Chambliss , 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). The district court concluded that Calhoun was not entitled to an early release because he failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons and because the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not weigh in his favor. Regarding the district court’s assessment under the § 3553(a) factors, Calhoun has not shown that the district court based its decision on a legal error or a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence. See id. His disagreement with the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors is insufficient to show an abuse of discretion. See id. at 694. Because we may affirm on this ground, we need not consider the other bases
for the dis trict court’s denial. See United States v. Chacon , 742 F.3d 219, 220 (5th Cir. 2014).

**AFFIRMED**

. Case: 20-40479 Document: 00515822210 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/14/2021
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<NAME> 83A.TXT
       
<S>                             <C>
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<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
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