[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13801

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WASEEM DAKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THERESE S. BARNES,

Clerk, 

HAROLD D. MELTON,

Chief Justice, 

DAVID E. NAHMIAS, 

Presiding Justice, 

KEITH R. BLACKWELL,

Justice, 

MICHAEL P. BOGGS, et al., 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 1 of 16
2 Opinion of the Court 21-13801

Justice, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-04131-MLB

____________________

Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Waseem Daker appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 

U.S.C. section 1983 complaint for misjoinder and improper venue. 

Daker also challenges the district court’s refusal to recuse the 

judges in the Northern District of Georgia and its refusal to consider his amended complaint. Because the district court did not err 

by recusing only one judge in the Northern District of Georgia, by 

disregarding Daker’s deficient amended complaint, or by dismissing his complaint for misjoinder and improper venue, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2020, Daker brought eight claims against forty-seven 

defendants for violating 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and for other alleged constitutional and statutory violations. The forty-seven defendants were made up of current and former Georgia state judges 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 2 of 16
21-13801 Opinion of the Court 3

and court clerks, including Judge Ray, who was assigned to preside 

over Daker’s case. After reviewing Daker’s complaint, the magistrate judge found it did not allege any claim for relief against the 

forty-seven defendants arising from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and thus violated

the joinder rule in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20. The magistrate judge explained that multiple claims against different defendants involving different sets of facts must be brought in separate 

complaints, and she ordered Daker to recast his complaint in compliance with rule 20. The magistrate judge warned that if he failed

to do so, she would construe his complaint as against only defendant Sherry Bland, the first defendant in count one, and to consist of 

only counts one and three through six, to the extent they raised 

claims against Bland. 

Instead of correcting the misjoinder, Daker filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s order, asserting that joinder of the 

forty-seven defendants was proper. He alternatively asked the district court to resolve the misjoinder by severing his claims into separate actions, rather than dismissing and requiring him to refile separate claims, “so as to preserve his claims as timely under the statute of limitations.” Daker also requested, if the district court determined any of his claims were improperly joined, that it construe 

his action as against the defendants employed by the Georgia Supreme Court. On the same day, Daker filed an amended complaint 

that included the same misjoined claims and added seven new 

counts. Daker alleged that joinder was proper because the defendants’ actions were part of the same series of transactions. Daker 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 3 of 16
4 Opinion of the Court 21-13801

moved to recuse Judge Ray, and the remaining judges on the 

Northern District of Georgia, because they worked with Judge 

Ray. 

The magistrate judge made two recommendations on December 17, 2020. In the first, the magistrate judge recommended 

that the district court grant Daker’s motion to recuse Judge Ray, 

but deny the motion to recuse the other judges on the court (including herself). In the second recommendation, the magistrate 

judge found that Daker’s amended complaint “d[id] not seriously 

attempt to comply with” the earlier order to amend. She thus ordered that Daker’s amended complaint be disregarded, construed 

his original complaint as only against Bland, and recommended dismissing the complaint against Bland under 28 U.S.C. section 1915A 

and dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice. The magistrate judge explained that venue in the Northern District of Georgia was improper as to Bland, who was employed in the Southern 

District of Georgia, and that transfer of Daker’s claims against 

Bland would be futile because they were barred by the two-year 

statute of limitations. 

Judge Ray adopted the part of the first recommendation to 

recuse him. The case was then reassigned to Judge Brown. On

January 19, 2021, Daker objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendations, arguing that the other judges on the Northern District 

of Georgia should be recused, and that the decision to disregard his 

amended complaint denied him his right to amend his pleadings as 

a matter of course under rule 15(a)(1). Daker also renewed his

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 4 of 16
21-13801 Opinion of the Court 5

recusal motion, arguing that the magistrate judge “[wa]s ruling in 

such a way as to specifically shield . . . Judge Ray from suit.” 

In August 2021, the district court adopted the magistrate 

judge’s recommendations, overruled Daker’s objections, and dismissed his claims without prejudice, some for misjoinder and the 

rest for improper venue. The district court agreed that because the 

amended complaint included the same defendants and claims as his 

original complaint, and then added seven unrelated claims, Daker 

failed to comply with the order to amend. The district court explained it was well within its discretion to dismiss Daker’s misjoined claims, even if doing so rendered some of them untimely, 

because counts one, three, five, and six were not based on the same 

operative facts and thus did not arise from the same series of transactions or occurrences. The district court noted that many of the 

defendants had judicial immunity, so that it would be futile to sever 

Daker’s claims. The district court also denied Daker’s renewed 

motion for recusal. 

Daker appeals the district court’s recusal and dismissal orders.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Daker argues the district court erred by: (1) failing to recuse the judges on the Northern District of Georgia; (2) disregarding his amended complaint; (3) ruling that his complaint suffered from misjoinder and construing it as only against Bland; and 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 5 of 16
6 Opinion of the Court 21-13801

(4) dismissing his complaint because the judges were judicially immune. We address each argument in turn.

Recusal

Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion to recuse the judges on the Northern District 

of Georgia because they must regularly confer with Judge Ray and 

this creates an appearance of bias and impropriety. He contends

that the district court should have recused the magistrate judge and 

Judge Brown, who he says were biased in Judge Ray’s favor. 

“We review a district court’s denial of a recusal motion for 

abuse of discretion.” Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 779 (11th 

Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). A federal judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably 

be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test under section 455(a) 

“is whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed 

of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought 

would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” 

Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988). The 

judge’s bias must be personal, rather than judicial in nature. Bolin 

v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that recusal 

was not required of a judge who “sat by designation on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the past, ha[d] a long-term working relationship with a large majority of the defendants, and oversaw a grand jury investigation of one of the plaintiffs”). “[A] judge’s 

rulings in the same or a related case may not serve as the basis for 

a recusal motion,” except “when the movant demonstrates 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 6 of 16
21-13801 Opinion of the Court 7

‘pervasive bias and prejudice.’” McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 

906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990). “[T]he rule of necessity allows 

at least those judges . . . who have not been involved in plaintiffs’ 

prior appeals to hear th[e] appeal.” Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239.

Daker has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions to recuse the judges on the Northern 

District of Georgia, including Judge Brown. Even though the 

judges may have had a long-term working judicial relationship 

with one of the defendants, Judge Ray, this alone is insufficient to 

cause an objective, disinterested, lay observer to entertain a significant doubt about the judges’ impartiality. See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 

1239.

Daker has also not shown that the magistrate judge abused 

her discretion by failing to recuse herself. Daker’s primary contention in support of recusal of the magistrate judge is that she has 

since recused herself in other cases brought by him. However, 

apart from that fact, Daker fails to cite any additional evidence 

showing that the magistrate judge exhibited pervasive bias or prejudice. See McWhorter, 906 F.2d at 678; Hamm v. Members of Bd. of 

Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). And nothing about the magistrate judge’s decision to prophylactically recuse 

in other cases would cause an objective, disinterested lay observer 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 7 of 16
8 Opinion of the Court 21-13801

to question her impartiality in this case. See Parker, 855 F.2d at 

1524.

1

Daker’s Amended Complaint

Daker next argues that the district court erred by disregarding his amended complaint because it lacked the discretion to do 

so, and because misjoinder was an improper basis on which to reject the amended complaint. 

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, 741 

F.3d 1185, 1188–89 (11th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff may amend his 

complaint once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after

serving it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “Where a plaintiff fails to make 

meaningful modifications to [his insufficient] complaint, a district 

court may dismiss the case under the authority of either [r]ule 41(b) 

or the court’s inherent power to manage its docket.” Weiland v. 

Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 n.10 (11th Cir. 

2015). 

The district court here did not violate Daker’s right to 

amend his complaint, nor did it abuse its discretion by disregarding 

his amended complaint. The district court not only allowed Daker 

to amend his complaint pursuant to rule 15, but ordered him to do 

so, and identified the specific deficiencies he should fix. But Daker 

disregarded the district court’s warning and submitted an amended 

1

Daker also moves to recuse Judges Branch and Grant. But because neither 

of them is on the panel we deny the motion as moot.

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 8 of 16
21-13801 Opinion of the Court 9

complaint with the same deficiencies as his original complaint. He 

attempted to circumvent the statute of limitations by joining timebarred claims that he otherwise could not bring, and then refused 

to fix the misjoinder, retaining the original misjoined claims without showing how they arose from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences under rule 

20(a)(2)(A). The district court thus did not err by disregarding the 

amended complaint. 

The District Court’s Misjoinder Ruling and Dismissal of Claims

Daker next argues that the district court erroneously:

(1) found that he misjoined defendants and claims; (2) dismissed 

the misjoined claims; and (3) dismissed his complaint after construing it as against Bland. We address each argument below.

Misjoinder. We review de novo the interpretation of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including rule 20—the misjoinder

rule. Hinchee, 741 F.3d at 1188–89. “[A]lthough we are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro selitigants, we nevertheless 

have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

Rule 20 allows joinder of defendants if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series 

of transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A). To 

determine if claims arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, 

or series of transactions or occurrences, we use the logical relationship test, which asks whether “the same operative facts serve as the 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 9 of 16
10 Opinion of the Court 21-13801

basis of [the] claims.” Republic Health Corp. v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 

Inc., 755 F.2d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see also 

7 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 

§ 1653 (3d ed.). “[C]laims that do not arise from common operative 

facts are not logically related.” Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp. v.

Juster, 932 F.2d 1378, 1381 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991). 

Daker contends that the claims he raised against the fortyseven defendants arose from the same series of transactions or occurrences. But his claims spanned multiple cases at the trial and 

appellate levels, involved several different Georgia statutes and 

court rules, and were based on different sets of facts, some dating

back to 2011. Daker argues that his claims were related because 

[t]he question of whether the trial court erred in denying [Daker’s] filing . . . is a sub-question of whether the 

Court of Appeals . . . rubberstamp-denied his applications to appeal those denials . . . . And both [of those 

questions] become sub-questions to the question of 

whether the Supreme Court[’s] [] refusal to even file 

his petitions for certiorari from those denials . . . denied him court-access[.]

Daker is wrong because he failed to show how his claims 

satisfy the logical relationship test. His claims do not arise from the 

same operative facts; he has only argued that his claims are related, 

but he has not shown a shared factual foundation. Daker’s cases

before the state trial courts, the Court of Appeals, and the Georgia 

Supreme Court were separate transactions and occurrences and

based on different facts and procedural history. 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 10 of 16
21-13801 Opinion of the Court 11

Dismissal of Misjoined Claims. “We review the district court’s 

decision to dismiss a case for failure to comply with the rules of the 

court for an abuse of discretion,” Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 

(11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), and “review a district court’s decision on a motion to sever for abuse of discretion,” Weatherly v. 

Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013). 

“Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just 

terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim 

against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Before dismissing a complaint 

with prejudice, a district court must give a pro se plaintiff “at least 

one chance to amend the complaint” if “a more carefully drafted 

complaint might state a claim.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 

(11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(en banc). Dismissal of claims without prejudice can have “the effect of precluding [an] appellant from refiling his claim due to the 

running of the statute of limitations,” making it “tantamount to a 

dismissal with prejudice.” Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503, 505 (5th 

Cir. Unit B May 1981). “The severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice . . . can be imposed only in the face of a clear record of delay 

or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Morewitz v. W. of Eng. 

Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (Luxembourg), 62 F.3d 1356, 

1366 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). However, “dismissal upon 

disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 

863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 11 of 16
12 Opinion of the Court 21-13801

Daker argues the district court erred by requiring him to file 

separate claims instead of severing his claims into separate actions. 

He contends it was error for the district court to dismiss the misjoined claims. Most of Daker’s misjoined claims accrued over two 

years before he filed this action, and are barred by “the [two-year] 

statute of limitations governing personal injury actions” in Georgia. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008); Ga. Code 

§ 9-3-33. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing

Daker’s misjoined claims, even though it was tantamount to dismissal with prejudice due to the expired statute of limitations. See 

McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173. The district court did not immediately 

dismiss Daker’s misjoined claims but instead gave him “at least one 

chance to amend the complaint.” Bank, 928 F.2d at 1112. When 

he refused to do so, the district court acted within its discretion to

dismiss his claims because Daker “disregard[ed its] order” after being “forewarned.” Moon, 863 F.2d at 837. Daker failed to comply

with the magistrate judge’s order when he did not amend his complaint to demonstrate how his claims arose out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Id. 

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Daker’s misjoined claims.

Defendant Bland. The district court did not err by construing 

Daker’s complaint as against Bland, and then dismissing the claims 

against her based on improper venue. The district court had “unquestionable authority to control [its] own docket” and this 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 12 of 16
21-13801 Opinion of the Court 13

authority “include[d] broad discretion in deciding how to best manage the case[] before [it].” Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 

1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). While we afford pro se 

pleadings leniency, that “does not give a court license to serve as de 

facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 

F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 

The magistrate judge warned Daker that if he failed to fix his 

complaint’s deficiencies, she would construe his complaint as 

against Bland only because she “[wa]s the first defendant identified 

in count one.” The district court gave Daker sufficient notice of 

the consequences of his failure to fix the misjoinder, and was not 

required to serve as Daker’s de facto counsel by fixing his complaint for him. See Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168–69. 

Daker counters that he is the master of his complaint and 

that he “[t]hrice[] explicitly stated” his desire for the district court 

to construe his action as against the defendants from the Georgia 

Supreme Court if it determined his claims were improperly joined. 

But Daker stated this preference only after the district court ordered 

him to fix the misjoinder and warned him of the consequences of 

failing to do so. We agree with the district court that, “[w]hile 

Daker is . . . the master of [his] complaint, that master must nonetheless comply with the Federal Rules.” See Albra, 490 F.3d at 829. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by “deciding how to 

best manage” Daker’s case when he failed to file a properly 

amended complaint. See Smith, 750 F.3d at 1262. 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 13 of 16
14 Opinion of the Court 21-13801

Finally, the district court did not err by dismissing the remaining claims against Bland. A district court “shall review . . . a 

complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and must dismiss the prisoner’s complaint if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted,” id. § 1915A(b)(1). We review dismissal under section 1915A(b)(1) de novo if dismissal is for failure to 

state a claim, Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278–79 (11th 

Cir. 2001), and for an abuse of discretion if dismissal is for frivolity, 

Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2021). As is relevant 

here, a district court may only grant relief against a defendant for 

whom venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Venue is proper if an

action is brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides 

or in which the claims arose. Id. When venue is improper, the 

district court may, in the interests of justice, transfer the case to a 

district in which it could have been brought. Id. § 1406(a). Additionally, a section 1983 action must be brought within the applicable statute of limitations, which, for claims arising in Georgia, is 

two years. Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2008). 

The district court did not err in ruling that Daker’s complaint against Bland should be dismissed. Daker’s claims against 

Bland are for actions she allegedly took or failed to take in 2016 and 

2017 while employed with Tattnall County Superior Court. 

Tattnall County is in the Southern District of Georgia, but Daker 

brought this action in the Northern District of Georgia, where 

venue was improper. Additionally, the interests of justice did not 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 14 of 16
21-13801 Opinion of the Court 15

warrant transfer to the Southern District of Georgia because the 

claims against Bland were time-barred by the statute of limitations. 

See Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A] transfer . . . would not benefit [the petitioner] because his application . . . 

was indisputably time-barred.”). And Daker does not challenge the 

district court’s determinations that venue was improper or that his 

claims against Bland were untimely. 

Judicial Immunity

Finally, Daker argues that “[t]he district court erred in holding that [the] [d]efendants were entitled to judicial immunity in order to justify denying recusal.” He also argues that, even if his

claims were misjoined, “the district court abused its discretion by 

declining to split [his] action into several actions based on its erroneous immunity holdings.” 

When appropriate, we review de novo whether an official is 

entitled to judicial immunity, Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 

(11th Cir. 2001), but we will not review statements made in dicta, 

United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1153 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(en banc) (“A bedrock principle upon which our appellate review 

has relied is that the appeal is not from the opinion of the district 

court but from its judgment.” (quotation omitted)). Dicta comprises those parts of an opinion that are “not necessary to deciding 

the case” before the court. United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 

1322 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 

1327 (11th Cir. 2006). 

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 15 of 16
16 Opinion of the Court 21-13801

The district court’s statements about judicial immunity here 

were dicta because the court did not dismiss Daker’s claims against 

the judiciary defendants based on immunity. The district court 

mentioned judicial immunity only as an observation, and not because it was necessary to dismiss Daker’s complaint. Thus, it was 

dicta, which we do not review.

AFFIRMED.

2

2

 Daker’s pending motions are denied.

USCA11 Case: 21-13801 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 16 of 16