Filed 12/9/20 Jason v. American Automobile Assn. etc. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

TRENT JASON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 

ASSOCIATION OF NORTHERN 

CALIFORNIA, NEVADA & UTAH 

et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A158369

 (San Francisco City & County

 Super. Ct. No. CGC-18-563695)

Plaintiff Trent Jason purchased automobile insurance at his local 

American Automobile Association of Northern California, Nevada & Utah, 

Incorporated (AAA NCNU) office. Following an automobile accident with a 

third party, Jason submitted a report to defendant CSAA Insurance 

Exchange (CSAA). CSAA denied his claim for benefits. Jason subsequently 

sued CSAA and AAA NCNU, alleging AAA NCNU misrepresented that it was 

his insurer and the defendants improperly denied his claim. 

AAA NCNU and CSAA moved for summary judgment on the grounds 

Jason’s insurance policy did not cover the accident at issue. The trial court 

granted the motions and entered judgment against Jason. On appeal, Jason 

contends the trial court erred because AAA NCNU represented it was his 

insurer and thus CSAA and AAA NCNU were liable for improperly denying 
2

policy benefits and refusing to investigate his claim. We disagree and affirm 

the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Insurance Policy

Jason purchased automobile insurance through an insurance agent, 

whose offices were in a “AAA”-labeled building. The cover page of the 

insurance policy states “AAA Members Car Policy,” with the subheading 

“Designed exclusively for Members.” The bottom of the page provides the 

name and address for “CSAA Insurance Exchange.”1 The policy provides, 

“We agree with you, in return for your premium if paid when due, to insure 

you subject to all the terms of this policy.” The policy then defines “we,” “us,” 

and “our” in the policy as CSAA Insurance Exchange. The “Automobile 

Policy Declarations,” which summarize Jason’s coverage, states, “No 

Coverage,” for collision. Jason did, however, have uninsured motorists 

coverage. That coverage provided in relevant part, “We will pay for loss to 

your insured car which you are legally entitled to recover as damages from 

the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle . . . .” The coverage 

provision then defines “ ‘Uninsured Motor Vehicle’ ” as “any motor vehicle: [¶] 

(a) which is not insured by a property damage liability bond or policy at the 

time of the accident; or [¶] (b) which is insured by a property damage liability 

bond or policy at the time of the accident but the company denies coverage 

. . . ; or [¶] (c) which is used without permission of the owner if there is no 

1 The insurer was originally named California State Automobile 

Association Inter-Insurance Bureau, then changed its name to AAA Northern 

California, Nevada & Utah Insurance Exchange, and most recently changed 

its name to CSAA Insurance Exchange. At the time of the accident, the 

insurer was CSAA Insurance Exchange. 
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property damage liability bond or policy applicable at the time of the 

accident. [¶] However, a motor vehicle which has at least the minimum 

property damage liability limits required pursuant to . . . the State of 

California shall not be held to be an uninsured motor vehicle even when the 

property damage liability limits are not sufficient to compensate for all 

property damage caused by the owner or operator of the vehicle.” Jason paid 

his premiums for this insurance to “ ‘CSAA Insurance.’ ” 

2. The Accident and Subsequent Claims Process

While backing out of a parking space at a mall, another vehicle rearended Jason’s vehicle. The operator of the other vehicle refused to provide 

any identification or insurance information and left the scene. Jason 

recorded the other vehicle’s license plate number, spoke with mall security 

personnel, and submitted an accident report to the California Department of 

Motor Vehicles (DMV). The report he submitted to the DMV identified 

“CSAA Insurance Exchange” as his insurer. The collision caused 

approximately $1,400 in damages to Jason’s vehicle.

Jason subsequently reported the accident to CSAA. Upon receipt of the 

claim, CSAA attempted to identify the registered owner of the other vehicle. 

It also sought to obtain her insurance information, if any. 

Jason thereafter received a letter from a CSAA claims representative 

stating CSAA had opened a claim on his policy. The letter summarized in 

part Jason’s uninsured motorist property damage coverage and identified 

three conditions that must be met for the uninsured motorist property 

damage coverage to apply: “You are legally entitled to recover damages from 

the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle,” “Either you or someone 

on your behalf reports the incident to us within 10 business days following 

the loss,” and “The owner or operator of the uninsured vehicle is identified, or 
4

the uninsured vehicle is identified by its license number.” The letter also 

explained, “As a service to you, we will try to locate the other party’s 

insurance information, establish a claim on your behalf and provide you with 

the claim information.” The letter provided an address for CSAA Insurance 

Exchange and a “csaa.com” e-mail address for communications regarding the 

claim. 

A claims service adjuster obtained the other driver’s contact 

information and insurance information. He informed Jason the other driver 

“has been identified and has a valid insurance policy” with USAA (United 

Services Automobile Association). As a result, the claims service adjuster 

noted “Uninsured Property Damage coverage will not apply for this loss” and 

CSAA had “submitted a claim on your behalf.” 

USAA stated it was willing to accept 50 percent liability for the 

accident. After Jason objected to accepting any liability for the accident, the 

CSAA claims service adjuster informed Jason he “placed 100% Not at Fault 

for the accident” in his file. The claims service adjuster further explained, 

“Unfortunately, AAA will not be able to afford you any coverage for the loss, 

because you do not have any first party coverage (Collision).” He informed 

Jason, “[Y]ou will have to contact USAA, for any coverage that you wish to 

seek from [sic] for the damage to your vehicle,” and provided Jason with the 

USAA claim number and the name and telephone number of the USAA 

adjuster. The claims service adjuster then sent a formal letter to Jason 

denying the claim due to the lack of collision insurance. 

B. Procedural Background

Following an initial demurrer and motion to strike, Jason filed a first 

amended verified complaint against AAA NCNU, CSAA Insurance Services, 

Inc., CSAA, Stephan G. Perrando, Valera A. Barnhart, and Jane Doe 1. The 
5

amended complaint alleged nine causes of action: (1) breach of contractual 

duty to pay a covered claim; (2) breach of an implied obligation to good faith 

and fair dealing; (3) insurance bad faith for failure to properly investigate a 

claim; (4) unfair competition; (5) misrepresentation; (6) false promise; 

(7) fraud; (8) unlawful practice of law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6125); and 

(9) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

In response, CSAA Insurance Services, Inc., CSAA (the CSAA 

defendants), and Stephan G. Perrando filed a demurrer to the first amended 

complaint. They asserted the claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and 

failure to investigate lacked merit because Jason was not entitled to coverage 

for the damage to his vehicle under the terms of his insurance policy. As to 

the unfair competition claim, the CSAA defendants and Perrando asserted 

the first amended complaint failed to identify any unlawful conduct that 

resulted in direct harm to Jason. Similarly, they argued the claims for 

misrepresentation, false promise, and fraud failed to demonstrate any 

detrimental conduct by defendants that resulted in loss to Jason.2 Finally, 

the CSAA defendants and Perrando asserted Jason failed to plead facts 

establishing a duty, breach, causation, or damages in connection with his 

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. 

The trial court granted in part the demurrer. It sustained the 

demurrer with leave to amend as to the unfair competition, 

misrepresentation, false promise, fraud, and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress claims, but overruled the demurrer as to the claims for breach of 

contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 

2 The eighth cause of action for unlawful practice of law was also 

subject to demurrer and dismissed without leave to amend, but is irrelevant 

for purposes of this appeal. 
6

failure to investigate. The court instructed Jason to “file a succinct, no more 

than thirty page second amended complaint that removes all legal arguments 

and only alleges, without repetition, the ultimate facts supporting the 

elements of each [of] his claims.” 

Jason subsequently filed a second amended complaint (SAC) against 

AAA NCNU, the CSAA defendants, Barnhart, and Jane Doe 1, realleging all 

of the causes of action except for the unlawful practice of law claim. Jason 

argued numerous references to “ ‘AAA Insurance’ ” in relevant insurance 

materials indicated AAA NCNU and CSAA were either related entities or 

jointly provided his automobile insurance. He argued his policy entitled him 

to recover for damages caused by a hit-and-run driver, and thus defendants 

breached their insurance obligations by failing to provide coverage. 

While AAA NCNU answered the SAC, the CSAA defendants again filed 

a demurrer. The demurrer alleged the claims for unfair competition, 

misrepresentation, false promise, deceit, and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress should be dismissed because Jason failed to allege conduct 

supporting such causes of action. 

In response to the demurrer, Jason submitted a declaration, stating 

“nothing has changed as to my allegations in my Second Amended Complaint 

as was alleged in my First Amended Complaint; except that . . . my complaint 

is now only 31 pages in length . . . and that I have deleted the cause of action 

[for the unlawful practice of law], as ordered by the court.” Jason further 

argued the demurrer should be denied because CSAA represented he had 

coverage for uninsured motorists, and he believed the driver of the other 

vehicle, rather than the vehicle, was uninsured. 

The trial court granted the demurrer without leave to amend as to the 

unfair competition, misrepresentation, false promise, deceit, and negligent 
7

infliction of emotional distress claims. The court explained the SAC failed to 

allege facts showing CSAA engaged in unfair, dishonest, deceptive or 

fraudulent practices. It further noted the SAC did not adequately allege facts 

showing (1) who made what misrepresentations, or (2) Jason’s actual and 

justifiable reliance on any alleged misrepresentations to his detriment and 

incurred resultant damages. Finally, the court explained the negligent 

infliction of emotional distress claim fails because bad faith, not negligence, is 

the sole remedy against insurers for alleged mishandling of claims.3 The 

CSAA defendants subsequently filed an answer to the remaining causes of 

action. 

AAA NCNU and the CSAA defendants each filed motions for summary 

judgment, or alternatively summary adjudication. The CSAA defendants 

first argued Jason could not demonstrate CSAA failed to pay policy benefits 

that were owed because the accident was not covered under the terms of the 

policy. Likewise, the CSAA defendants argued Jason could not prove bad 

faith because no liability exists when an insurer denies policy benefits due to 

a genuine dispute as to coverage. The CSAA defendants argued the evidence 

demonstrated CSAA appropriately investigated the claim, and its denial was 

reasonable and proper. Finally, the CSAA defendants argued CSAA 

Insurance Services, Inc. should be dismissed as a matter of law because it 

was not a party to the insurance policy. 

In AAA NCNU’s motion for summary judgment, it argued the first 

three contract-based causes of action must fail because AAA NCNU is not an 

insurer and was not a party to the insurance policy. Next, AAA NCNU 

3 On appeal, Jason does not challenge the trial court’s order sustaining 

defendants’ demurrer as to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of 

action against CSAA. 
8

asserted Jason cannot establish his unfair competition or negligent infliction 

of emotional distress claims because no admissible evidence demonstrates 

AAA NCNU held itself out as an insurer. Similarly, AAA NCNU argued 

Jason could not establish claims for misrepresentation, false promise, and 

deceit because he failed to identify any specific misrepresentations and 

instead relied on unreasonable inferences from unsubstantiated evidence. 

AAA NCNU argued nothing in the evidence demonstrated it represented it 

was the insurer, and the evidence did not indicate any harm resulting from 

any alleged misrepresentation. Finally, AAA NCNU argued Jason failed to 

produce any evidence supporting his claims against AAA NCNU or 

demonstrate any damages as a result of AAA NCNU’s conduct. 

Jason opposed the motions for summary judgment. At the same time, 

he filed a request to dismiss with prejudice CSAA Insurance Services, Inc., 

which the court granted. In connection with CSAA’s motion, Jason argued 

the insurance policy was ambiguous as to uninsured motorists, as compared 

to uninsured motor vehicles. Regarding this ambiguity, Jason asserted it 

must be interpreted against CSAA to afford him coverage. Jason then argued 

CSAA engaged in bad faith and caused emotional distress by not attempting 

to identify the driver of the other vehicle. Based on this conduct, Jason 

asserted he was entitled to punitive damages. 

As to AAA NCNU’s motion, Jason argued AAA NCNU represented it 

was the insurer, sold him the uninsured motorist coverage, made promises 

regarding its claims handling, and was obligated under the policy to provide 

benefits. AAA NCNU’s alleged failure to do so caused Jason emotional 

distress. For these same reasons, Jason asserted AAA NCNU was liable for 

bad faith, unfair competition, misrepresentation, false promise, and deceit. 
9

The trial court granted both CSAA’s and AAA NCNU’s motions for 

summary judgment. As to CSAA’s motion, the trial court found the causes of 

action for breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing must fail because CSAA did not deny policy benefits owed to Jason. 

The court explained the evidence demonstrated no coverage was available for 

the accident because the other vehicle was insured by USAA. The court 

further held no evidence supported Jason’s bad faith insurance investigation 

claim because the evidence demonstrated CSAA researched the owner of the 

other vehicle, coordinated with USAA, apprised Jason of these developments, 

explained to Jason the basis for denying coverage, and provided him with the 

necessary information to file a claim with USAA. The court found the 

evidence “only [gave] rise to one reasonable inference,” namely, that CSAA’s 

conduct and its denial of coverage was reasonable. 

As to AAA NCNU’s motion, the court noted Jason’s declaration and 

discovery responses failed to provide specific facts to support his claims, and 

the exhibits demonstrated AAA NCNU held itself out as an insurance agent 

that “provides insurance coverage through its licensed insurer, CSAA 

Insurance Group.” Specifically, the court noted the breach of contract, breach 

of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and insurance bad faith 

claims fail because AAA NCNU, as an agent, is legally distinct from the 

insurer and not a party to the insurance policy. As to the claims for unfair 

competition, misrepresentation, false promise, and deceit, the court again 

noted Jason did not provide evidence showing AAA NCNU held itself out as 

an insurer, and the claims lacked specificity about the alleged 

misrepresentations. Finally, the court found the cause of action for negligent 

infliction of emotional distress subject to summary judgment because Jason 

offered no evidence to show AAA NCNU engaged in any negligent conduct or 
10

was the cause of any emotional distress. The trial court entered judgment 

against Jason, and he timely appealed.4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. The 

motion “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no 

triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We 

independently review an order granting summary judgment, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Saelzler v. 

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768; Lackner v. North (2006) 

135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1196.) In performing our independent review of the 

evidence, “we apply the same three-step analysis as the trial court. First, we 

identify the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, we determine whether the 

moving party has established facts justifying judgment in its favor. Finally, 

if the moving party has carried its initial burden, we decide whether the 

opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material fact 

issue.” (Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438.) Where “the 

facts are undisputed, the issue is one of law and the ‘appellate court is free to 

draw its own conclusions of law from the undisputed facts.’ ” (Suburban 

Motors, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1354, 

1359.)

We apply two separate standards of review on appeal when a demurrer 

is sustained without leave to amend. “We first review the complaint de novo 

to determine whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 

4 Jason dismissed defendant Valera A. Barnhart after the motions for 

summary judgment were granted. 
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action under any legal theory or to determine whether the trial court 

erroneously sustained the demurrer as a matter of law.” (Aguilera v. Heiman

(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 590, 595 (Aguilera).) In reviewing the complaint, we 

may consider any exhibits attached to the complaint as well as any matters 

that must or may be judicially noticed. (See Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV 

Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400.) “Second, we determine whether 

the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the demurrer without leave 

to amend. [Citation.] Under both standards, appellant has the burden of 

demonstrating that the trial court erred. [Citation.] An abuse of discretion is 

established when ‘there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the 

defect with an amendment.’ ” (Aguilera, at p. 595.)

Additionally, we note Jason is in propria persona. A party appearing in 

propria persona “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the 

same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.”

(Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 

1200, 1210.) “ ‘[T]he in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive 

rules of procedure as an attorney.’ ” (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol

(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125–1126.)

B. CSAA’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Demurrer

Jason argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment as to 

his claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing, and insurance bad faith. He also contends the trial court 

improperly granted CSAA’s demurrer as to the claim for negligent infliction 

of emotional distress and asserts he is entitled to seek punitive damages. We 

disagree. 
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1. Breach of Contract Claim

Jason’s breach of contract claim is based on his allegation that CSAA 

improperly denied him coverage under his policy’s uninsured motorist 

provision. He does not identify any other coverage at issue. As to the 

uninsured motorist coverage, Jason asserts he is entitled to coverage for 

property damage to his vehicle caused by a collision up to $3,500, “ ‘for which 

loss or damage to the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or 

operator of an uninsured vehicle.’ ” 

Insurance Code section 11580.26, subdivision (a)(2) generally requires 

insurers to provide “coverage for property damage to the insured motor 

vehicle . . . caused by the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle” if 

“the policy of motor vehicle liability insurance does not include collision 

coverage.” Subdivision (e) defines “ ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ ” as “any motor 

vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which there is 

no property damage liability insurance or bond applicable at the time of the 

accident, or there is applicable insurance or bond but the company writing 

the insurance or bond denies coverage thereunder or refuses to admit 

coverage thereunder, except conditionally or with reservation . . . . A motor 

vehicle which has at least the minimum property damage liability limits 

required pursuant to Section 16056 of the Vehicle Code shall not be held to be 

an uninsured motor vehicle even when the property damage liability limits 

are not sufficient to compensate for all property damage caused by the owner 

or operator of the vehicle.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.26, subd. (e).)

Jason’s position is premised on the assumption he was hit by an 

uninsured motorist. He argues even though the owner of the other vehicle 

was insured, the actual driver was a different individual who was not 

insured. However, the uninsured motorist coverage, required by Insurance 
13

Code section 11580.26, applies to an “uninsured motor vehicle.” Here, the 

undisputed evidence demonstrates the other vehicle involved in the accident 

with Jason’s vehicle was insured by USAA, and USAA did not deny 

coverage.5 Thus, the other vehicle did not qualify as an “uninsured motor 

vehicle” under the terms of Jason’s policy, and the uninsured motorist 

coverage was not applicable to the accident.

Jason next contends coverage was ambiguous because the 

“Declarations” page notes coverage for “Uninsured Motorists” rather than 

“uninsured motor vehicles.” He argues the policy must be interpreted against 

CSAA to provide coverage for uninsured motorists—as compared to 

uninsured motor vehicles. Based on such an interpretation, he contends 

CSAA was obligated to investigate the identity of the actual driver of the 

vehicle and provide coverage if that driver was uninsured. 

“ ‘[I]nterpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law.’ 

[Citation.] ‘While insurance contracts have special features, they are still 

contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply.’ 

[Citation.] Thus, ‘the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract 

is formed governs interpretation.’ [Citation.] If possible, we infer this intent 

solely from the written provisions of the insurance policy. [Citation.] If the 

policy language ‘is clear and explicit, it governs.’ ” (Palmer v. Truck Ins. 

Exchange (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1109, 1115.)

Jason’s mere reliance on the Declarations page is unavailing. As to

clear and conspicuous policy provisions, “ ‘ “ ‘ “[i]t is a general rule that the 

receipt of a policy and its acceptance by the insured without an objection 

5 CSAA affirmatively argued USAA did not deny coverage, and Jason 

does not contest this assertion or otherwise assert USAA’s offer to accept 50 

percent liability constitutes a denial of coverage. Accordingly, we assume 

USAA did not deny coverage for purposes of this analysis.
14

binds the insured as well as the insurer and he cannot thereafter complain 

that he did not read it or know its terms. It is a duty of the insured to read 

his policy.” ’ ” ’ ” (Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta 

Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1155.) Here, the policy does 

not fail “ ‘to alert a policyholder to limitations on anticipated coverage by 

hiding the disfavored language in an inconspicuous portion of the policy.’ ”

(Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1198, 1211 (Haynes).) 

Rather, the scope of the uninsured motorist coverage for property damage 

was fully and conspicuously set forth in “Coverage D2—Uninsured Motorists 

Car Damage Coverage.” That section expressly states, “We will pay for loss 

to your insured car which you are legally entitled to recover as damages from 

the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle . . . .” (Italics added.) 

The policy then defines “ ‘Uninsured Motor Vehicle’ ” to mean “any motor 

vehicle: [¶] (a) which is not insured by a property damage liability bond or 

policy at the time of the accident; or [¶] (b) which is insured by a property 

damage liability bond or policy at the time of the accident but the company 

denies coverage . . . ; or [¶] (c) which is used without permission of the owner 

if there is no property damage liability bond or policy applicable at the time 

of the accident. [¶] However, a motor vehicle which has at least the minimum 

property damage liability limits . . . shall not be held to be an uninsured 

motor vehicle . . . .” 

Nor is such policy language “ ‘unusual or unfair’ ” such that CSAA was 

required to have it specifically “ ‘brought to the attention of the party and 

explained.’ ” (Haynes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1210.) Rather, the policy 

language tracks the requirements imposed by Insurance Code 

section 11580.26, subdivision (a)(2) for uninsured motorist coverage. 
15

As explained above, the other vehicle does not qualify as an “uninsured 

motor vehicle” under the policy. Because the “claim does not fall within the 

terms of [the policy’s coverage] clauses, then no coverage exists.” (Palmer v. 

Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1115–1116.) Jason thus was 

not entitled to coverage and, accordingly, CSAA did not breach the insurance 

contract. (Dalrymple v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 

497, 512, fn. 4 [“ ‘ “Absent an actual withholding of benefits due, there is no 

breach of contract” ’ ”].) 

2. Claims for Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

and Insurance Bad Faith

Next, Jason asserts CSAA failed to act in good faith by refusing to 

investigate the identity of the other vehicle’s operator. However, as discussed 

in part II.B.1., ante, the identity of the other vehicle’s operator did not impact 

the analysis of whether uninsured motorist coverage applied. Rather, such 

coverage arises when an incident involves an “uninsured motor vehicle.” 

And, as further discussed above, whether the vehicle constitutes an 

“uninsured motor vehicle” depends entirely on the property damage liability 

coverage on that vehicle and whether the insurer of the other vehicle denied 

coverage. 

Because CSAA was justified in determining the uninsured motorist 

coverage under Jason’s policy did not apply to the accident, there was no 

viable basis on which CSAA could have been found to have acted in bad faith 

on the undisputed facts presented. (See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. 

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 36 [absent right to insurance benefits, “ ‘the implied 

covenant has nothing upon which to act as a supplement’ ” to an express 

contractual promise]; Rios v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1020, 

1027 [absent coverage for loss, claim of bad faith against insurer cannot be 

maintained].) Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted.
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3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Jason challenges the trial court’s order granting CSAA’s demurrer 

without leave to amend as to his claim for negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. He contends CSAA’s denial of his claim, and the resulting litigation 

instigated by Jason, caused him detriment and entitled him to damages for 

emotional distress. 

Negligent infliction of emotional distress “is a tort in negligence.” 

(Moon v. Guardian Postacute Services, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1005, 

1009.) “ ‘A person may not ordinarily recover in tort for the breach of duties 

that merely restate contractual obligations.’ ” (Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. 

Brown & Toland Medical Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1041.) For 

this reason, “negligence generally is not among the theories of recovery 

available against insurers.” (Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance 

Litigation (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 11:205.) “If an insured seeks to recover 

in tort for an insurer’s mishandling of a claim, it must allege more than mere 

negligence.” (Adelman v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 

352, 369.)

In support of this claim, the SAC merely restates his argument that 

CSAA improperly denied policy benefits. But, as discussed above, Jason’s 

automobile policy did not provide coverage for the accident at issue. Nor does 

any burden Jason faced by pursing this litigation support his claim. Were we 

to find otherwise, every party to a lawsuit could claim emotional distress. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed his claim for negligent 

infliction of emotional distress.

Jason also fails to offer any argument as to how he could adequately 

amend this claim to state a cause of action. We thus conclude he failed to 

meet his burden of demonstrating the trial court erred in sustaining the 
17

demurrer without leave to amend. (See Aguilera, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 595.)

4. Punitive Damages

Jason asserts CSAA’s failure to investigate his claim entitles him to 

punitive damages. However, Jason has not demonstrated the trial court 

erred in granting CSAA’s demurrer or its motion for summary judgment. 

Without a valid cause of action, Jason cannot maintain a claim for punitive 

damages as to CSAA. (569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against 

the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 429–430, fn. 3 [“In California, it is 

settled there is no separate cause of action for punitive damages.”].)

C. AAA NCNU’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Jason argues AAA NCNU misrepresented it was his insurer at the time 

he purchased his automobile insurance. He contends this misrepresentation 

should result in liability against AAA NCNU under the terms of the 

insurance agreement, and the trial court erred by granting AAA NCNU’s 

motion for summary judgment as to his claims for breach of contract, breach 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, insurance bad faith, 

unfair competition, misrepresentation, false promise, deceit, and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress. Jason also contends he is entitled to punitive 

damages. We again disagree.

1. Claims for Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant of 

Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Insurance Bad Faith

Jason contends AAA NCNU is liable for the breach of contract, breach 

of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and insurance bad faith claims 

because he “believed” he was insured by AAA NCNU. He asserts AAA 

NCNU represented it was the insurer for its members and thus has liability 

under the policy. 
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The record contains some conflicting evidence as to whether AAA 

NCNU represented itself as Jason’s insurer. The majority of the evidence 

identifies CSAA as the insurer. Most notably, the policy defines the insurer 

as CSAA. Similarly, the annual premium payment statement states, “ ‘Make 

your check payable to CSAA Insurance,’ ” and the e-mails from the claims 

service adjuster with whom Jason corresponded bore a signature block 

identifying his position with “CSAA Insurance Group, a AAA Insurer.” Many 

of the documents upon which Jason relies also state the insurance is provided 

by CSAA. The fact that Jason obtained his insurance, made changes to his 

insurance, and coordinated the appointment of a claims adjuster through 

AAA does not demonstrate it acted as his insurer. Jason fails to explain why 

such actions are not merely those of an insurance agent. 

The evidence also indicates Jason knew the identity of his insurer. 

Most notably, the accident report Jason submitted to the DMV lists CSAA as 

his insurer. Likewise, in response to CSAA’s separate statement of 

undisputed facts, Jason did not dispute he reported the accident to CSAA. 

However, certain evidence in the record indicates a blending of the 

AAA name and CSAA. For example, correspondence and other documents 

related to Jason’s insurance referenced “AAA Insurance.” An automobile 

insurance pamphlet, although created by CSAA, only identifies “AAA” on the 

front cover and states, “Since the early 1900s, when we first began providing 

auto insurance as an exclusive Member service . . . .” The pamphlet also 

provides a single telephone number for both “Membership and Auto 

Insurance Services.” A letter mailed to Jason encouraging online access to 

his insurance policy links CSAA and AAA through a website “csaainsurance.aaa.com” and states, “If you have other auto or home insurance 

policies with AAA, you can link them after you sign up for MyPolicy.” These 
19

statements could all give a reasonable interpretation that the policy is 

provided by AAA NCNU.

However, whether AAA NCNU represented to Jason it was his insurer 

is not a material fact for these causes of action. Even assuming AAA NCNU 

acted as Jason’s insurer, the claims for breach of contract, breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and insurance bad faith must 

fail for the same reasons those claims against CSAA were subject to 

summary judgment. (See part II.B.1., 2., ante.) 

2. Claims for Unfair Competition, Misrepresentation, False 

Promise, and Deceit

Next, Jason asserts the trial court improperly rejected his claims for 

unfair competition, misrepresentation, false promise, and deceit. These 

claims all require Jason to demonstrate he suffered harm as a result of AAA 

NCNU’s conduct. (See, e.g., Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 

246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166 [an element of a misrepresentation claim is 

“resulting damage”]; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 

[resulting damage an element for deceit and false promise]; Kwikset Corp. v. 

Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320–321 [private standing to bring an 

unfair competition claim “ ‘is limited to any “person who has suffered injury 

in fact and has lost money or property” as a result of unfair competition’ ”].) 

Jason first relies on the same evidence discussed above to argue AAA 

NCNU misrepresented it was his insurer. However, Jason has not identified 

any harm caused as a result of such conduct. He does not contend AAA 

NCNU offered different terms for insurance than those provided by CSAA or 

identify any manner in which his “belief” that AAA NCNU was his insurer 

negatively impacted his insurance or insurance claim. 

Jason then argues AAA NCNU misrepresented the scope of insurance 

provided for uninsured motorists and how it would handle any claims. 
20

Specifically, he contends AAA NCNU represented it would provide a claims 

adjuster and work towards “ ‘the satisfactory resolution of your claim.’ ” But 

the undisputed evidence demonstrates a claims adjuster was assigned to 

Jason’s claim and an investigation by CSAA was conducted. Jason 

acknowledged he communicated with a CSAA claims service adjuster, that 

adjuster contacted the other driver, obtained her insurance information, and 

provided Jason with claim information for the other driver’s insurer. Jason 

does not identify any specific services AAA NCNU represented it would 

provide that he did not receive from CSAA.

Based on the foregoing, Jason has failed to identify any 

misrepresentations or unfair conduct by AAA NCNU that caused him 

damage. Rather, his complaint is with CSAA’s refusal to pay benefits under 

his policy. But, as explained above, the trial court properly concluded Jason 

was not entitled to benefits under the terms of his policy.

3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim and Request 

for Punitive Damages

Finally, Jason asserts he is entitled to pursue his negligent infliction of 

emotional distress claim and request for punitive damages against AAA 

NCNU. However, for the same reason those claims fail as to CSAA, they also 

fail as to AAA NCNU. (See part II.B.3., 4., ante.)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants American Automobile 

Association of Northern California, Nevada & Utah and CSAA Insurance 

Exchange may recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

 
21

MARGULIES, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BANKE, J.

SANCHEZ, J.

A158369

Jason v. American Automobile Association of Northern California, Nevada & 

Utah