COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Be ales and Senior Judge Fitzpatrick

LATRICIA PORTER MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1787-07-3 PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 5, 2008 ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE Charles N. Do rsey, Judge (James P. Cargill; Law Office of Ja mes P. Cargill, P.C. , on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (William M. Hackworth, City Attorney; Heather P. Ferguson, Assistant City Attorney; Ph illip R. Lingafe lt, Guardian ad litem for the infant child; Glenn Feldman Darby Goodlatte, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
Latricia Porter appeal s the termination of her parental ri ghts to her son pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C)(2). Porter argues that the Roanoke City Department of Social Services (DSS) violated her due process right by failing to provide r easonable and appropriate services for her special needs and that the eviden ce was insufficient to support DSS’s allegations against her. We disagree and affirm the trial court.
BACKGROUND As required, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence proved that T.P. was born on December 7, 2004 when Porter was a minor. On March

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - 30, 2005, Shauna Bryant, a child protective services investigator, received a complaint that Porter was not properly caring fo r T.P. by yelling at him and by handl ing him roughly. Bryant referred Porter for services at the health department and for services at Child Health Investment Partnership. On April 28, 2005, DSS received a second complaint that Porter an d Porter’s mother, Ms. Carter, were fighting about the care of T.P. Bryant dete rmined it was not safe for Porter, who was then seventeen years old, to remain with Carter, and DS S removed Porter from Ca rter’s custody. Porter and T.P. were placed in the same foster home. At the subs equent preliminary removal hearing, custody of Porter was returned to Carter. During the short time Porter was in foster care, DSS received a co mplaint on May 2, 2005 alleging physical neglect of T.P. by Porter. T.P. had eczema; Port er failed to apply the necessary prescribed medication, and T.P. developed a secondar y skin infection. Porter also had difficulties measuring the correct amoun t of water and formula when she ma de T.P. a bottle, and she could not remember how often she need ed to feed T.P. Porter had also continued to yell at T.P. Although Porter was open to redirection, Bryant believed Porter did not retain the information regarding the care and feeding of T.P. A co mplaint was founded against Po rter for physical neglect. On June 11, 2005, th e Roanoke City police no tified DSS of a physical altercation between Porter and Carter. Porter, who wa s still a minor, refuse d to stay with Carter . DSS responded and found Porter “out of control” and refusing to comply wi th its requests regarding T.P. Porter was unable to identify a plan as to where she and T.P. would stay as she left Carter’s house. Believing T.P. was in danger, DSS removed T.P. from Porter’s custody and removed Po rter from Carter’s custody. Porter and T.P. were placed in the same ther apeutic foster home in order for Porter to continue to parent T.P. The initial goal of the foster care service plan was return to parent. The service plan required Porter to participate in i ndividual counseling, to successfully complete parenting classes and anger management classes, to comply with other services assessed by DSS,- 3 - and to complete a psychologica l evaluation. DSS referred Porter to Blue Ridge Behavioral Healthcare for mental retardation services, to Piedmont Community Services for psychiatric treatment, and to the Department of Rehab ilitative Services for employment counseling. Nancy Majors, the foster care worker for Porter and T.P., te stified Porter complied with some of the requirements of the service plan. Although Porter co mpleted the parenting class, the instructor of the class reported th at Porter seemed more interested in the clothing and grooming of other individuals in the group rath er than with the cont ent of the program. Porter never informed the instructor that she did not understand the mate rial, and Porter never asked the instructor for additional assistance. Porter completed anger management cl asses and attended individual counseling. Majors never received any feedback that Porter had difficulty with the classes or counseling. At the termination he aring, Majors testified she could not think of any other services that DSS could have provided to Porter. Majo rs explained that T.P.’s father ha d limited cognitive abilities and he was provided services at East Hornbeck Services, but Porter wa s not referred to East Hornbeck Services because DSS pr ovided Porter with one-on-one serv ices at a therapeutic foster home. Ruby Wade, the therapeu tic foster mother, understood that she was to work with Porter and to teach Porter to care for T.P. Porter moved into Wade’s home in June 2005, and Wade worked with Porter one-on-one. Wade sh owed Porter how to properly mix formula, instructed her on the appropriate amount and frequency for feeding T.P ., showed her how to ap ply T.P.’s medication, showed her how to give T. P. a bath, and showed he r how and when to change T.P.’s diaper. Wade testified Porter was resistant to her help and wo uld curse her. Wade knew Porter had limited cognitive abilities and she de monstrated to Port er exactly what needed to be done to care for T.P., but Porter was unable to follow the directions. Wade testified one ti me Porter was on the telephone when she left T.P. unsuperv ised on a bed and T.P. fell off the bed. Porter also used an entire tube of- 4 - medication for T.P.’s eczema in two days when the tube was meant to last thirty days. Porter also gave T.P. medication for acid refl ux. When Wade questioned Porter about the dose, Porter stated she gave the recommended dose, bu t Porter failed to re alize the dose she gave T.P. was an adult dose. Wade realized she was not helping Porter, and Porter left Wade’s house in October 2005. After Porter left Wade’s home, she received mentoring services from DSS until March 2006 when Porter turned eighteen and emancipated herself from foster car e. On July 25 , 2006, Majors provided transportation for Porte r’s initial appointment at the Department of Rehabilitative Services, but Porter was not home. Porter did not attend a rescheduled appoi ntment on August 15, 2006, and she told Majors that she had been drinking at a motel the night before . After Porter left foster care, she missed six scheduled supervised visits with T.P., and when Port er did visit T.P., Majors had to redirect Porter’s behavior and Porter frequently ta lked on her cell phone and did not interact with
T.P. T.P. has cerebral palsy, a seiz ure disorder, developm ental delays, an astigmatism, a hearing problem, eczema, and a te ar duct deformity. T.P.’s medical needs require several therapies and medications, and he has medical appointments at leas t once a week. Porter te stified she thought that T.P. needed speechtherapy every six months and was uns ure how often he required physical therapy for his cerebral pals y. Once during a supervised visit, Porter aske d Majors if T.P. still had cerebral palsy. Dr. Doris Nevin completed a ps ychological evaluation of Po rter and diagnosed her with mild mental retardation and impuls e disorder. Dr. Nevin testified unl ess someone assist ed Porter as a co-parent, given the special needs of T.P. and her cognitive limitations, it was unlikely Porter would ever be able to parent T.P.- 5 - ANALYSIS
I. Porter argues her right to due process was violated wh en the trial court te rminated her rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)( 2) because DSS failed to provide he r with reasonable and appropriate services for a mentally challenged individual. Porter contends DSS should have offered her one-on-one services devised for a mentally challenged individual. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provide s, in pertinent part: The residual parental rights of a parent . . . of a child placed in foster care . . . may be terminated if the court finds . . . that is in the best interests of the child and that: * * * * * * * 2. The parent or parents, wit hout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable pe riod of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placem ent notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Subsection C(2) specifically re quires a showing that DSS has provided “reasonable an d appropriate” services to a delinquent parent prior to terminating his ri ghts. In this way, the statute establishes a time frame after the ch ild has entered foster care for the parents “to receive rehabilitativ e services to enable them to correct the conditions that led to foster care placement.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 269, 616 S.E.2d 765, 771 (2005) (quoting L.G. v. Amherst County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 41 Va. App. 51, 57, 581 S.E.2d 886, 889 (2003)). “‘Reasonable and appropriate’ effort s can only be judged with reference to the circumstances of a particular case. Thus, a c ourt must determine what constitutes reasonable and appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Ferguson v. Stafford County Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. , 14 Va. App. 333, 338, 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992).- 6 - “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal, unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Peple v. Peple , 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1988)). DSS referred Porter to Blue Ridge Behavioral Healthcare for mental re tardation se rvices, to Piedmont Community Services fo r psychiatric tr eatment, and to the Depa rtment of Rehabilitative Services for employment counseling. DSS provided transportation for Porter for an appointment at the Department of Rehabilitative Serv ices, but Porter was no t home. Porter also failed to attend a rescheduled appointment becaus e she had been drinking at a motel the night before the appointment. DSS provided indi vidual counseling, anger manageme nt classes to assist with her impulse control issue, and psychiatric medication. DSS provided pa renting classes. DSS was never informed that Porter did not understand the mate rial presented in the parenting class, but the instructor informed DSS that Port er seemed more interested in th e clothing and grooming of other individuals in the group rather than with the content of the program. Prior to T.P.’s removal, Porter was also provided with services through the Chil d Health Investment Partnership and with the one-on-one services of Wade, a therapeutic foster mother. Wade worked with Porter for approximately five months, and she demonstrat ed to Porter basic paren ting skills such as how to prepare a bottle and how to change a diaper. Port er did not follow Wade’s advice and would curse Wade. After Porter left Wade’s home, she was provided with mentoring services with DSS until Porter turned eighteen and emancipa ted herself from foster care. At the termination hearing, Majors testified she could not think of any other services that DSS could have pr ovided to Porter and explained that Porter was not referred to East Hornbeck Services because she was offered one-on-one parenting with Wade and other supp ortive services. Based upon a review of the circumstances of this case, DSS provided “reasonable and appropr iate” services to Porter and- 7 - Porter’s right to due process was not violated when the trial court terminated her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
II. Porter argues DSS failed to present clear and convincing eviden ce to support termination of her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B). She contends DSS failed to prove T.P. suffered either abuse or neglect that presented a serious and substantial threat to his life and that the alleged conditions could not be substant ially corrected. Code § 16.1-283(B) requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that 1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and 2. It is not reasonably likely th at the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be subs tantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s safe retu rn to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the court shall take into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitate the parent or parents by any pub lic or private social, medical, mental health or other rehabilita tive agencies prior to the child’s initial placement in foster care. DSS presented clear and convincing evidence th at Porter’s neglect of T.P. presented a serious and substantial threat to his life, health or development, and it was not reasonably likely that the conditions could be substantially correct ed within a reasonable period of time. When T.P. was four months old, Porter yelled athim and handled him roughly, which included throwing him in the air and catching him. When Po rter and T.P. were sent to Wade’s therapeutic foster home, she was not feeding T.P. adequately and she did not know when or how to change his diaper. T.P. had eczema, an d Porter failed to apply the ne cessary prescribed medication and T.P. developed a secondary skin infection. Later, while in Wade’s home, Porter used a thirty-day supply of a topical medication for T.P.’s eczema in two days. After attending parenting classes, Porter continued to yell at T.P. Porter also left T.P. unsupervised on a be d while she talked on the phone, and T.P. fell off the bed. T.P. has cerebral palsy and, during one superv ised visit, Porter- 8 - asked if T.P. still had cerebral palsy. T.P. has several addition al medical proble ms that require special therapies and medications, and he has medical appointments at least once a week. Porter missed six scheduled supervised visits and mi ssed her appointments at the Department of Rehabilitative Servi ces. At the termination hearing, Porter admitted sh e did not know how often T.P. needed physical therapy and thought he needed speech therap y every six months. Dr. Nevin’s psychological evaluation s howed that Porter was mildly retard ed and suffered from an impulse disorder. According to Dr. Nevin, unless someone a ssisted Porter as a co-p arent, given the special needs of T.P. and Porter’s cognitive limitations, it was unlikely Porter would ever be able to parent T.P. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming hi s responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not err in terminating Porter’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B). Accordingly, the trial court’s decision term inating Porter’s parent al rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) is affirmed. Affirmed.