Slip Op. 17-84 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge 

Consol. Court No. 14-00218 

OPINION 

[Remand results sustained.] 

Dated: July 12, 2017 

 Kelly A. Slater, Jay Y. Nee, and Edmund W. Sim, Appleton Luff Pte Ltd. of 

Washington, DC for Plaintiff Tension Steel Industries Co., Ltd. 

 L. Misha Preheim, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, U.S. Department of Justice of Washington, DC for Defendant United States. On 

the brief with him were Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. 

Davidson, Director, and Claudia Burke, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was 

Mercedes C. Morno, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Enforcement and 

Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce of Washington, DC. 

 Robert E. DeFrancesco, III and Alan H. Price, Wiley Rein, LLP of Washington, DC 

for Defendant-Intervenor Maverick Tube Corporation. 

 Jeffrey D. Gerrish and Jamieson L. Greer, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 

LLP of Washington, DC for Defendant-Intervenor United States Steel Corporation. 

 Roger B. Schagrin, John W. Bohn, and Paul W. Jameson, Schagrin Associates of 

Washington, DC for Defendant-Intervenors Boomerang Tube LLC, Energex Tube 

(a Division of JMC Steel Group), Tejas Tublar Products, TMK IPSCO, Vallourec Star, 

L.P., and Welded Tube USA Inc. 

TENSION STEEL INDUSTRIES CO., LTD., 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant. 
Consol. Court No. 14-00218 Page 2 

Gordon, Judge: This action involves the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 

(“Commerce”) final determination in the less than fair value investigation of certain oil 

country tubular goods from Taiwan. See Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from Taiwan, 

79 Fed. Reg. 41,979 (Dep’t of Commerce July 18, 2014) (final LTFV determ.), 

as amended, 79 Fed. Reg. 46,403 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 8, 2014) 

(“Final Determination”), and accompanying Issues and Decisions Memorandum for the 

Final Determination of the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Oil Country Tubular 

Goods from Taiwan, A-583-850 (Dep’t of Commerce July 10, 2014), available at 

http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/taiwan/2014-16861-1.pdf (last visited this 

date) (“Decision Memorandum”); Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Oil Country 

Tubular Goods from Taiwan: Proprietary Issues (Dep’t of Commerce July 10, 2014), 

CD 388 (“Confidential Decision Memorandum”).1

Before the court are the Results of Remand Determination, ECF No. 87-1 

(“Remand Results”), filed by Commerce pursuant to the court’s remand order in Tension 

Steel Indus. Co. v. United States, 40 CIT ___, 179 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (2016) 

(“Tension Steel I”). The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the 

Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012),2 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(c) (2012). For the reasons set forth below, the court sustains the Remand Results. 

 

1 “CD” refers to a document contained in the confidential administrative record. 

2 Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of 

Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2012 edition. 
Consol. Court No. 14-00218 Page 3 

I. Standard of Review 

For administrative reviews of antidumping duty orders, the court sustains 

Commerce’s “determinations, findings, or conclusions” unless they are “unsupported by 

substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). More specifically, when reviewing agency determinations, findings, 

or conclusions for substantial evidence, the court assesses whether the agency action is 

reasonable given the record as a whole. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 

1345, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 

488 (1951) (“The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record 

fairly detracts from its weight.”). Substantial evidence has been described as “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” DuPont Teijin Films USA v. United States, 407 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial 

evidence has also been described as “something less than the weight of the evidence, 

and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not 

prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” 

Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). Fundamentally, though, 

“substantial evidence” is best understood as a word formula connoting reasonableness 

review. 3 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 9.24[1] (3d ed. 2017). 

Therefore, when addressing a substantial evidence issue raised by a party, the court 

analyzes whether the challenged agency action “was reasonable given the circumstances 
Consol. Court No. 14-00218 Page 4 

presented by the whole record.” 8A West’s Fed. Forms, National Courts § 3.6 (5th ed. 

2017).

II. Discussion 

In the Final Determination, Commerce rejected adjustments for rebate payments 

made by the respondent, Tension Steel Industries Co., Ltd. (“Respondent” or “Tension”), 

pursuant to sales contracts that did not specifically include a rebate clause. Decision 

Memorandum at 11. According to Commerce, the only “legitimate rebates” proffered by 

Tension were those known by customers at or before the time of the sale. Id. Tension 

persuaded the court that Commerce’s practice of rejecting rebates when Commerce is 

not satisfied that customers were aware of the terms and conditions of the rebate at the 

time of the sale violated Papierfabrik August Koehler AG v. United States, 38 CIT ___, 

971 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (2014) (“Papierfabrik”), which held that Commerce’s practice 

contravened the plain language of Commerce’s regulations. Tension Steel I, 40 CIT 

at ___, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1190-91. The court noted that Papierfabrik explained that “the 

plain language of Commerce’s regulations require [Commerce] to calculate normal value 

‘net of any price adjustment . . . that is reasonably attributable to the . . . foreign like 

product’ that ‘[is] reflected in the purchaser’s net outlay.’” Tension Steel I, 40 CIT at ___, 

179 F. Supp. 3d at 1190 (quoting Papierfabrik, 38 CIT at ___, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-

53 (quoting 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.102(b)(38), 351.401(c))). The court also observed that 

Papierfabrik had become final, and instead of filing an appeal, Commerce chose to 

amend the applicable regulation. Accordingly, the court remanded this issue to 
Consol. Court No. 14-00218 Page 5 

Commerce to grant all of Tension’s rebate adjustments. Tension Steel I, 40 CIT at ___, 

179 F. Supp. 3d at 1191. 

On remand, Commerce granted all of Respondent’s reported rebates and 

recalculated Tension’s antidumping duty margin.3 Remand Results at 3. The petitioners, 

Maverick Tube Corporation (“Maverick”), United States Steel Corporation, and 

Boomerang Tube LLC (collectively “Petitioners”), argued that Papierfabrik is an outlier 

and that the then-existing regulations permitted Commerce to deny Tension’s claimed 

adjustments for rebates that were not contemplated at the time of sale. Id. Though it “did 

not disagree” with Petitioners’ arguments, Commerce determined that it would comply 

with the court’s remand in Tension Steel I. Id. at 4. 

Maverick now challenges Commerce’s determination to comply with the court’s 

remand and grant all of Tension’s reported rebate adjustments. In particular, Maverick 

argues that in Tension Steel I the court inappropriately relied upon Papierfabrik, “as 

[Papierfabrik] is an outlier, reflecting an unreasonable standard that is contrary to 

established Commerce practice as well as the spirit of the antidumping duty laws.” 

Maverick’s Comments on Remand Results at 3, ECF No. 93 (“Maverick’s Br.”). Maverick 

also contends that Commerce did not explain how its decision is supported by the record. 

Id. at 6. 

Maverick’s challenge to Papierfabrik is a continuation of the arguments raised by 

the Government and adopted by Maverick in the initial USCIT Rule 56.2 briefs on the 

 

3 The recalculated weighted-average margin for Tension was zero percent. 
Consol. Court No. 14-00218 Page 6 

merits in this action. See Def.’s Opposition to Pls.’ R. 56.2 Mot. for J. upon Agency Record 

at 33-36, ECF No. 62; Maverick Tube Corp.’s Response to Tension’s Mem. in Support of 

its R. 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency Record at 2, ECF No. 65 (agreeing, supporting, and 

incorporating by reference Defendant’s arguments (pages 25-36 of Defendant’s brief) on 

Commerce’s denial of certain rebate adjustments sought by Tension). Maverick again 

argues that Papierfabrik is “an outlier” from prior court decisions. See Maverick’s Br. 4 

(citing Koenig & Bauer Albert AG v. United States, 22 CIT 574, 15 F. Supp. 2d 834 (1998); 

Nachi-Fujikoshi Corp. v. United States, 19 CIT 914, 890 F. Supp. 1106 (1995); 

Dupont Teijin Films USA, LP v. United States, 28 CIT 896 (2004); and Mitsubishi Electric 

Corp. v. United States, 12 CIT 1025, 700 F. Supp. 538 (1988)). Specifically, Maverick 

contends that these decisions demonstrate that Commerce maintains broad discretion to 

require a respondent to prove the existence of claimed rebates and to reject any claimed 

price adjustments that are intended to evade or circumvent the antidumping duty law. Id. 

The court disagrees that these cases support Maverick’s argument. As noted in 

Papierfabrik, Koenig and Nachi-Fujikoshi are inapplicable as they arose from 

administrative determinations made prior to the implementation of the regulations 

applicable in this action. See Papierfabrik 38 CIT at ___, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. 

Furthermore, Maverick’s reliance on these four decisions is misplaced because Maverick 

does not contend, nor does the administrative record demonstrate, that any of Tension’s 

claimed rebates are either illusory or pose the risk of manipulation. See Koenig, 22 CIT 

at 576, 15 F. Supp 2d at 840 (upholding Commerce’s authority “to reject price 

amendments that present the potential for price manipulation”); Nachi-Fujikoshi, 19 CIT 
Consol. Court No. 14-00218 Page 7 

at 920, 890 F. Supp at 1110 (sustaining Commerce’s disallowance of claimed rebate 

given respondent’s failure to adequately provide record information supporting the rebate 

claim); Dupont, 28 CIT at 904 (noting Commerce’s authority to interpret the statutory price 

adjustment provisions in a manner that accounts for the risk of manipulation); Mitsubishi, 

12 CIT at 1046, 700 F. Supp. at 555 (upholding Commerce’s authority to act with “the 

purpose in mind of preventing the intentional evasion or circumvention of the antidumping 

duty law.”). Commerce has made no finding that Respondent’s claimed rebates were 

illusory, posed the risk of manipulation, or were otherwise aimed at the evasion or 

circumvention of the antidumping duty law. To the contrary, as the court has already 

noted, “Commerce was able to verify all of Tension’s proposed rebate amounts while onsite in Taiwan.” Tension Steel I, 40 CIT at ___, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1197 (citing Confidential 

Decision Memorandum at 10-11). 

Maverick’s preferred arguments regarding Commerce’s practice of rejecting 

certain claimed rebate adjustments under the prior version of the applicable regulations 

were considered and rejected in Papierfabrik. In challenging the Remand Results, 

Maverick is essentially asking the court to reconsider its decision in Tension Steel I. The 

court will not do this and continues to follow Papierfabrik. 

Turning to whether Commerce failed to explain how the record supports its 

Remand Results, the court concludes that Maverick’s argument lacks merit. In its remand 

order, the court examined and considered Papierfabrik in detail. This action presents the 

same scenario as in Papierfabrik, namely that Commerce found sufficiently documented 

rebates but rejected those rebates whose terms were not known to the buyer at the time 
Consol. Court No. 14-00218 Page 8 

of purchase. Here the court concluded that the same result as in Papierfabrik was 

appropriate—an order to grant all the rebates properly claimed by the Respondent. 

Tension Steel I, 40 CIT ___, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1191. In its Remand Results, Commerce 

acknowledged Maverick’s continued challenge to Paperfabrik while explaining that it was 

following the court’s order. Remand Results at 4. Given the administrative record, 

Commerce’s decision to obey that order and grant all proposed rebates is reasonable 

and must be sustained. Maverick’s re-reiteration of its dissatisfaction with Papierfabrik 

has once again failed to persuade the court otherwise. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, Commerce’s Remand Results are sustained. 

Judgment will be entered accordingly. 

 /s/ Leo M. Gordon 

 Judge Leo M. Gordon 

Dated: July 12, 2017 

 New York, New York