establishing corpus delicti at the preliminary hearing." We conclude that 

the district court did not err by denying Gasper's pretrial habeas petition. 

See Sheriff v. Dhadda, 115 Nev. 175, 180, 980 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1999) 

("The same standard that applies to probable cause for guilt applies to 

proof of the corpus delicti."); Sheriff v. Hodes, 96 Nev. 184, 186, 606 P.2d 

178, 180 (1980) (probable cause to support a criminal charge "may be 

based on slight, even 'marginal' evidence because it does not involve a 

determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused" (internal citations 

omitted)). 

Additionally, the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to 

satisfy the corpus delicti rule, see generally Doyle v. State, 112 Nev. 879, 

892, 921 P.2d 901, 910 (1996), overruled on other grounds by Kaczmarek 

v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 333, 91 P.3d 16, 29 (2004), and establish guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact, see 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 

807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). The same loss prevention agent 

testified as she did at the preliminary hearing, albeit in greater detail 

about Gasper's suspicious behavior inside the store. The loss prevention 

agent also acknowledged that she did not look inside Gasper's purse and 

see that it was empty after the stolen items were removed, but clarified 

that lilt looked empty." After the State presented the loss prevention 

agent, Deputy Craig Erven of the Carson City Sheriff's Office testified that 

Gasper confessed to the burglary, stating, "She needed some stuff for her 

kids[,] that she knew she did not have any money with her, that she knew 

beforehand that she was going to Wal-Mart to steal some items, and that 

she got caught." See West v. State, 119 Nev. 410, 417, 75 P.3d 808, 813 

2 

&7; .:7,31mErieetp,,J-i

. 
(2003) (corpus delicti must be established by independent evidence before 

defendant's extrajudicial admissions can be considered). 

Circumstantial evidence alone may satisfy the corpus delicti 

rule and sustain a conviction. See id. at 416, 75 P.3d at 812; Buchanan v. 

State, 119 Nev. 201, 217, 69 P.3d 694, 705 (2003); see also Grant v. State, 

117 Nev. 427, 435, 24 P.3d 761, 766 (2001) ("Intent need not be proven by 

direct evidence but can be inferred from conduct and circumstantial 

evidence."). It is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to 

give conflicting testimony, McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 

573 (1992), and a jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where, as 

here, sufficient evidence supports the verdict, Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 

73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see also NRS 205.060(1). We conclude that the 

jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that Gasper 

committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Character/impeachment evidence 

Gasper contends that the district court erred by allowing the 

State to ask her on cross-examination about a prior conviction and arrest. 

"We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an 

abuse of discretion." Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 

109 (2008). Here, after watching the surveillance videotape of her actions 

inside Wal-Mart and in response to one of defense counsel's questions 

about her decision to steal, Gasper stated, "They said I looked nervous 

because I was because I never had done anything like that before." The 

district court ultimately found that Gasper "was implying that she's never 

had any prior theft or incidents with respect to that" and ruled that she 

opened the door to questioning about her prior acts on cross-examination 

by the State. The district court specifically found that the evidence was 

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admissible pursuant to NRS 48.045(1)(a) (permitting rebuttal character 

evidence), and for impeachment purposes, see NRS 50.085(3), and 

provided the jury with a limiting instruction. We conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion. See Jezdik v. State,121 Nev. 

129, 136-40, 110 P.3d 1058, 1063-65 (2005). 

Alleged hearsay 

Gasper contends that the district court erred by sustaining the 

State's objection to alleged hearsay, specifically, her testimony that while 

shopping in Wal-Mart, her husband either called or sent a text message 

informing her that there was not enough money left on the prepaid debit 

card to pay for the items she sought to purchase. Gasper argues that her 

testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but rather 

to demonstrate her belief and state of mind and to prove she did not form 

the intent to steal until after she entered the store and received her 

husband's message. We agree with Gasper and conclude that the district 

court abused its discretion by sustaining the State's objection on hearsay 

grounds. See NRS 51.035; Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 578, 119 P.3d 

107, 124 (2005) ("[T]he hearsay rule does not exclude a statement merely 

offered to show that the statement was made and the listener was affected 

by the statement." (quotation omitted)); see also Mclellan,124 Nev. at 267, 

182 P.3d at 109. Nevertheless, in light of the overwhelming evidence of 

Gasper's guilt, we conclude the district court's error was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. See Tabish v. State, 119 Nev. 293, 311, 72 P.3d 584, 

595 (2003) ("Harmless error analysis applies to hearsay errors."). 

Motion in limine/confession 

Gasper contends that the district court erred by denying her 

motion in limine to suppress her alleged confession to Deputy Erven that 

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she entered the Wal-Mart with the intent to steal.' Without citation to 

case law for support, Gasper claims that because Deputy Erven could not 

remember her exact words, "the statement does not fall within the 

exception to the hearsay rule." See NRS 51.035(3)(a). We disagree. The 

district court conducted a hearing and Deputy Erven testified that he 

remembered "the gist of the conversation" with Gasper when "she 

admitted it to me that she did not have any money, that she went to WalMart solely to steal." The district court found that Deputy Erven 

"indicated clearly what he thought she said" and determined that Gasper's 

statements were admissible non-hearsay pursuant to NRS 51.035(3)(a). 

We agree and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying Gasper's motion in limine. See Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 267, 182 

P.3d at 109. 

Prosecutorial misconduct 

Gasper contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct 

during the State's closing argument by making a golden rule argument. 

See Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 22, 174 P.3d 970, 984 (2008) (golden rule 

arguments ask "jurors to place themselves in the position of one of the 

parties" and "are improper because they infect the jury's objectivity"). 

Gasper did not object and we conclude that she fails to demonstrate plain 

error. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008) 

(challenges to unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for 

plain error); Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003) 

(when reviewing for plain error, "the burden is on the defendant to show 

'At trial, Gasper rebutted Deputy Erven's testimony and claimed 

that she never confessed to burglary. 

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actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice"); see alsoNRS 178.602 ("Plain 

errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they 

were not brought to the attention of the court."). 

Cumulative error 

Gasper contends that cumulative error deprived her of a fair 

trial and requires the reversal of her conviction. Balancing the relevant 

factors, we conclude that Gasper's contention is without merit. See 

Valdez,124 Nev. at 1195, 196 P.3d at 481. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction a FIRMED. 

/ 

AM 

Gibbons 

cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge 

State Public Defender/Carson City 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Carson City District Attorney 

Carson City Clerk 

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