NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

RENE CAMACHO, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0784 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. CR 1991-005756

 CR 1991-006641

The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Diane M. Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Rene Camacho, Florence

Petitioner
STATE v. CAMACHO

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge James P. Beene joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Rene Camacho petitions this court for review of the summary 

dismissal of his sixth petition for post-conviction relief. We have 

considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant review 

but deny relief.

¶2 In 1993, a jury found Camacho guilty of three counts of 

second degree burglary in two matters consolidated for trial. The trial court 

sentenced Camacho to an aggregate term of thirty-nine years’ 

imprisonment, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentences on 

direct appeal. See State v. Camacho, 1 CA-CR 93-0588, 1 CA-CR 93-0589

(Ariz. App. June 6, 1995) (mem. decision).

¶3 In his petition for review, Camacho argues Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-4509(C) (2010) constitutes a significant change 

in the law that entitles him to relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure (“Rule”) 32.1(g). Section 13-4509(C) provides in relevant part

that if a mental health expert determines a defendant is competent due to

treatment with psychotropic medication, the expert must describe any 

limitations the medication may have on the defendant’s competency. 

Camacho argues the numerous reports of experts who addressed his 

competency before trial did not include this information, and the new 

requirement in § 13-4509(C) constitutes a significant change in the law. He 

further argues the trial court erred when it considered the purportedly 

perjured trial testimony of one of the State’s mental health experts when it 

addressed this claim.

¶4 We deny relief. The legislature enacted A.R.S. § 13-4509(C) in 

1995. See 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 250, § 2 (1st Reg. Sess.). Camacho did

not file the first of his six petitions for post-conviction relief until 1996. 

Therefore, Camacho could have raised this claim in his first post-conviction 

relief proceeding. In general, claims a defendant could have raised in an 

earlier post-conviction relief proceeding are precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a). The exceptions under Rule 32.2(b) do not apply here. See Ariz. R. 
STATE v. CAMACHO

Decision of the Court

3

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (“When a claim under Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) is to 

be raised in a successive or untimely post-conviction relief proceeding, the 

notice of post-conviction relief must set forth the substance of the specific 

exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in the previous petition 

or in a timely manner. If the specific exception and meritorious reasons do 

not appear substantiating the claim and indicating why the claim was not 

stated in the previous petition or in a timely manner, the notice shall be 

summarily dismissed.”). Camacho’s lack of familiarity with the law is not 

a sufficient ground to require a court to consider a claim of an allegedly

significant change in the law twenty years after that change occurred.

¶5 Accordingly, although we grant review, we deny relief.