13-2099 

Jin v. Lynch

BIA 

Sichel, IJ 

A087 970 728

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF 

IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

1st day of October, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

REENA RAGGI,

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

SHUNAI JIN, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 13-2099 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL,*

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

 

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), 

Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted 

for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. as Respondent. 
2

FOR PETITIONER: Guang Jun Gao, Law Offices of Guang 

Jun Gao, LLP, Flushing, New York. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney 

General; Erica B. Miles, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; C. Frederick 

Sheffield, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, Washington, 

D.C. 

 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Shunai Jin, a native and citizen of the People’s 

Republic of China, seeks review of a May 7, 2013 decision of 

the BIA, affirming the May 30, 2012 decision of an Immigration 

Judge (“IJ”), denying her application for asylum, withholding 

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). See In re Shunai Jin, No. A087 970 728 (B.I.A. May 

7, 2013), aff’g No. A087 970 728 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. May 30, 

2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions “‘for the sake of completeness.’” 
3

Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006)). The 

applicable standards of review are well established. See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 

513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

 For asylum applications like Jin’s, governed by the REAL 

ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

circumstances . . . base a credibility determination on” 

inconsistencies in an applicant’s statements and other record 

evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of 

the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). 

We give “particular deference” to an IJ’s credibility 

determinations where, as here, “the IJ’s ability to observe the 

witness’s demeanor places her in the best position to evaluate 

whether apparent problems in the witness’s testimony suggest 

a lack of credibility or, rather, can be attributed to an 

innocent cause such as difficulty understanding the question.” 

Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 

2006). 
4

 In this case, the totality of the circumstances supports 

the agency’s adverse credibility determination. The IJ 

reasonably relied on Jin’s failure to mention her month-long 

hospitalization in her asylum application. Jin alleged severe 

physical mistreatment by Chinese police, but then testified 

inconsistently with her application concerning that 

mistreatment. Thus, the IJ “‘identified a material 

inconsistency in an aspect of [Jin]’s story that served as an 

example of the very persecution from which [she] sought 

asylum.’” Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 

295 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 

80 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3 

(explaining that inconsistency and omission are “functionally 

equivalent”). When asked why she omitted her hospitalization 

from her application, Jin stated that she was not asked about 

it and did not think it was important. Considering the length 

of Jin’s hospital stay and its direct connection to the main 

harm alleged in her asylum application, the IJ was not required 

to credit this explanation. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81. 
5

 The IJ also reasonably found Jin’s description of the 

medical document she failed to submit both inconsistent and 

incredible. Jin argues she was confused as to which document 

she was being asked to describe. But an IJ’s inconsistency 

finding may not be disturbed unless “a reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude” that there was no inconsistency, 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), and the transcript here does not 

compel such a conclusion. There was no reason for Jin to 

believe she was being asked to describe a document other than 

the medical records, and the IJ was in the best position to 

evaluate whether Lin’s testimony reflected credibility issues 

or, rather, confusion regarding the questions being asked. See

Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d at 109. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the agency’s adverse credibility 

finding was supported by substantial evidence.1

 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

 

1

 In light of our determination, we need not address the agency’s 

alternative and independent basis for denying relief, namely, 

that Jin did not adequately corroborate her claim with available 

evidence as required by the REAL ID Act. 
6

and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

34.1(b). 

 FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court