OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALOF TEXAS AUSTIN
GERALD C. MANN Attorney General

Honorable E. G. Garvey County Auditor Bexar County San Antonio, Texas '
Dear Sir: Opinion No. 2600 Re: Road and Bridge Law for Bexar County, Texas This will acknowledgereceipt of your letter ofAugust 5, 1940, requesting the opinion of this department as to the proper road and bridge law applicableto Be::arCounty, Texas, inview of the 1940 Federal censusplacing the population of the county at 337,557.

In 1931 theRegular aesslon of the 42nd Legislatureenacted Senate Bill 575, acts 1931, Special Laws, p. 259, ch. 137, a sloecial road and bridge law forBexar County, Texas, only. Session of the 43rd Legislature, In 1933 at the Regular thatbody enactedRouse Bill 911, Acts 1933, General Laws, p. 805, ch. 236. This latter law was a general one, whereas the former was special,and it applied to all counties in the statehaving a population between 300,000 and 350,000 inhabitants, according to the lastpreceding Federal census. Dallas County was the only one in the state fallingwithin the provisions of this enactment at the time of its passage. The question here presented for consideration is whether or not Jouse Bill 911 of the 43rd Legislature, insofar as8exar Co-sty is concerned. The last enactment,Rouse Sill 911, is undoubtedly a general law; the prior enactment, Senate Biil 575, ismost assuredlya special or local one. ;Ytiich

must prevail?

In Black on Construction and Interpretation of the Law, p. 116 the rule is stated as follows:
"As a corollary from the doctrine that impliedrepeals are not favored, it has come tobe an established rule in the construction of statutes that a subsequent act, treating a subject ingene-al terms, and not expressly contradictingthe provisions of a prior special statute, is not to be considered as intended to affect themore particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give itswords any meaning at all. This rule is foundedupon, or expressed by, the maxim 'Generalia specialibus non deroqant,!Thus, when theprovisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state are repugnant to the provisions of a previously enacted special law, applicable in aparticular locality only, the passage of such general law does not operate tomodity or repeal the special law, either Iholly or inpart, unless suchmodification orrepeal is provided for in expresswords."Honorable E. G. Oarvey, Page 2, 0-2600 ’

.

This is also the Fstablished rule in Texas. Bates (C.C.A. 1907) 106 S. W. 448: As stated in Paul vs.

"It iswell settled that special legislation or local laws are not repealed by a later general act, unless speciallymentioned in the general law 

### or such purpose ismade manifest from the plain provisions of the general law. Ex Parte Neal (Tex. Cr. App.) 83 

### S.W.831; State **VS.** Connor, 86 Tex. 26 AWI.& hg. Enc. 133, 23 S. W. 1103; Ellis vs.Ratts, 26 Tex. 703; of Law (2dEd.) p. 730, and note 3. In the authority last cited after stating the rule substantially aswe have above, though more elaborately, it is said: 'Thereason whichhas been given for this rule is that in passing a special act the Legislaturehas its attention directed to the special case which the actaas made tomeet, and considers and provides for all the circumstancesof that special case, and, having done so, it isnot to be consideredthat the Legislature by a subsequentgeneral enactment intended to derogate from the special provisions previouslymade, when itwas notmentioned in such enactment'." Again in Sullivan vs. City of Galveston, 17 S.W. (2d)478, affirmed, Corn. App., 34 S. X. (2d) 808, the ccurt stated:
"It iswell settled that a special lawpassed by the Legislature is not repealed by an act subsequentlypassed by anotherLegislature unless the first is expressly repealedby the subsequentact, or unless it is made c'learlyto appear from the subsequent act that it was the intended intention of the Legisleture to repeal the first."
In Townsend vs. Terrell, 118 Tex. 463, 16 S. I'J. (2d) 1063, the Commission of Appeals reaffirmed the rile and stated: This rule of cnstruction has found frequent and apt illustration where one of the s,;pposedly confiictly statuteswas general in its terms and the other specific. In such acase it isunlvtrsallyheld that the specific statutemore clearly evidences the intentionof the Legislature than the neneral one, and therefore that it will control. In-such a case both s;atutes are-permitted to stand--thegeneral one applicable to all cases except the particular one embraced in the specific statute&" (Underscoringours).
See also allis vs. Batts, 26 Tex. 703; City of Leredovs. Martin, 52 Tex. 548; Burkhart vs. Brazes River Harbor NavigationDistrict (C.C.A. 1931) 

### 42 s. W. (2d) 96; 39 Tex. Juris. 

### 149a
The rule is peculiarly fitting in the instant case. In 1933 when the Legislature .enactedHouse Bill 911 Bexar Countycould not have been within the legislativemind nor could House Bill 911 in anywise supersede Senate Bill 575 for the verypatent reason that fiexarCounty at the time, according th the 1930 Federal census,was not within the population brackets set forth in Rouse Bill 911.

### XonorabxeL. G. @anor, Page 3

prori8ionrprovlourlymada,when it 

### wa8 not sontionedinsuoh enaotsent'." Again inSullivan~8.Cityof Oalreeton, 

### 17 9.Y. (ea) 478, alrimd, Con. App., 34 S. W. (2d) 808, the **court** 

### stated: "Ii i8well settledthata speoiallaw passed by the Legislature is not repeled 

### by an aot subsequently passed by another L&rl’aturs unless the first is expressly repealed by the iubeequent aot, or unless 

### it irmade clearly to appear iron the subsequent 

### aot that 

### itwas the 

### ihtendedintention of the Legielature to repeal the flrat.” In 

### Towrrnd?8. Terrell, 115 Tex. 463, 16 3. N. (26) 1063, the **conu&a8ion** or 

### Appeal8rratrirmsdthe **rulr** 

### and rtated;

“This rule of construction ha8 

### round frequent and apt illustration where on8 Oi the supposedly conflictly statute8 wa8 genoral in its terns and the other 8pOOiriQ. In such a case it is universally 

### held that the specific st.+tute nore clearly eridenoer the intention of the La&3lature than th8 reneral one. and therefore that it will ‘con

### trol

. In such a case both statutes are permitted to stand--the general one a;plicable to all cases except the particulrir one e+ braced In the soecific statute.” (UndersoorLfngours) See also Allis vs. Batto, 26 Tex. ,703; City of Laredo vs. Xartin, 52 Tex. 540i Burkhart ~8. 

### SrazosRiver Harbor 

### NavigationDistrict(C.C.k. 1931)42 S.W. (2d) 96; 39 Tex. Juris. 149.

The rule is peouliarly fftting in the instant case. In 1933 whenthe Legislature enacted House Bill 911 Bexar County oould not have been within the leglelativ8 **mfnd** nor could House Bill 911 in anywise supersede Senate Bill 375 for the very pitent reason that Bexar County at the time, according to the lQ3CFederal census, wa8 not within th8 population braakets set rorth in House Bill 911.Honorable E. G. Garvey, Page 4, 0-2600

Certainly the legislative intent to repeal or supersede Senate Bill 575 was not in existence at the time of the enactment of House Bill 911. Is it plausible to say that sevenyears after the enactwnt of the Tenera law it for the first time supersedes or repeals by implication a previously existing special law? rJethink not. Consequently, it Is the opinion of this department and you are respectfully advised that senateJill 575, theBexar County Road and Bridge Law, enactedby the Legislature in 1931, is still the road and bridge law applicable toBexar County, Texas, and this enactment has not been superseded or affected (becauseof recently announced population figures) by Rouse Bill 911 enactedby the 43rd Legislature, 1933.

Vrry trulyyours ATTORNEY GElrZRAL

OF TEXAS s/ James D. Smullen

APPROVED AUGUST 19, 1940 s/ Grover Sellers FIRST ASSISTANT ATl'ORNEY GEW::RAL BY James D. Smullen Assistant

AP;ROVED 0;Iiu'ION CC:"i:?ITT~IE: By RWF, Chairman JDS:J%/cg