2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-11-2015

USA v. Warren Stokes

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Warren Stokes" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 485.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-3841

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

WARREN STOKES, 

a/k/a GEEZ

 Warren Stokes,

 Appellant 

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 10-cr-00620-08)

District Judge: Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

April 24, 2015

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: May 11, 2015)

_______________

OPINION

_______________

 

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Warren Stokes appeals his conviction and sentence in the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on his participation in a large-scale 

drug-trafficking enterprise known as the “Harlem Boys” that operated in the Bartram 

Village Housing Development in Philadelphia. On appeal, he challenges only the District 

Court’s denial of his motion to suppress a handgun seized during a warrantless search of 

co-Defendant Kareem Pittman’s residence. We will affirm. 

I. Background

The pertinent factual background surrounding the Harlem Boys drug-trafficking 

operation is set forth more fully in the opinion addressing the appeal of co-conspirator 

Ramel Moten. See United States v. Moten, No. 13-3801, Slip Op. at 2-5 (3d Cir. May 11,

2015). We provide here only the facts relevant to Stokes’s appeal.

On October 7, 2009, police responded to a radio call of a “male with a gun” who 

entered an apartment building on Harley Terrace in the Bartram Village Housing 

Development. (App. at 3260.) While searching for the gunman, police detected the odor

of marijuana emanating from Apartment 3A. The police knocked on the door and were 

eventually granted entry by a resident of the apartment. Stokes was sitting in the living 

room at the time the police entered the apartment. Tyreek Artis, who matched the 

description of the gunman, emerged from a back room and was immediately arrested. As 

Artis was being arrested, a police officer conducted a protective sweep and noticed a .38 

caliber Colt revolver in a shoe box in plain view. After obtaining consent to search the 

apartment, the police also found marijuana and crack cocaine in a closet in the living 
3

room. Later, the government recorded a telephone conversation between co-defendant 

Ramel Moten and a confidential informant, in which Moten identified the revolver and 

the drugs as “ours.” United States v. Moten, No. CRIM.A. 10-620-01, 2012 WL 

2873368, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2012). 

Stokes was later named along with nineteen other members of the Harlem Boys in 

an eighty-nine count superseding indictment. More specifically, he was charged with 

conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise (count 1), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1962(d); conspiracy to distribute 280 grams of cocaine base (crack) and marijuana 

(count 2), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(D) and 846; 

possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base (crack), and aiding and abetting

(counts 41, 46, and 60), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); possession 

of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (count 42), in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(I); attempted murder in aid of racketeering (count 53), in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5); and carrying and using a firearm during a violent crime (count 

54), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Stokes unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence stemming from the 

October 7, 2009 search and the case proceeded to trial. He was acquitted of attempted 

murder and an accompanying firearm charge (counts 53 and 54), but was convicted on all 

other charges and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, 5 years’ supervised release and 

ordered to pay various fines and special assessments. He now appeals the District 

Court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 
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II. Discussion1

Stokes challenges the District Court’s refusal to suppress the handgun, arguing 

that the warrantless search of the apartment was unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment because there was no need for the search after Artis was arrested, as any 

exigency had dissipated. 

As is explained more fully in the opinion issued in the related case of United 

States v. Moten, No. 13-3801, Slip Op. at 14-15, we conclude, as did the District Court, 

that the officers’ search was a reasonable protective sweep in light of the gunman’s arrest 

in the residence moments earlier. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335-37 (1990) 

(holding that arresting officers may briefly search a residence after an arrest is effectuated 

where “the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and 

articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those 

on the arrest scene”). Accordingly, the District Court did not err in refusing to suppress 

the evidence, and we need not address whether Stokes had standing to challenge the 

search. United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[S]tanding to 

challenge a search is not a threshold issue that must be decided before reaching the 

question of whether a search was or was not constitutional.”).

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s denial of a 

motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise 

plenary review of its application of the law to those facts. United States v. Perez, 280 

F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). 
5

III. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the ruling of the District Court.