IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-10915

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CHRISTINE NICHOLE ESTRADA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:15-CR-45-1

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, Christine Nichole Estrada pleaded 

guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 

methamphetamine and aiding and abetting. She was sentenced to a statutory 

minimum sentence of 120 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised 

release. In her plea agreement, Estrada reserved the right to appeal the 

district court’s decision denying her motion to suppress in part. She argues on 

appeal that all evidence seized from a stash house should be deemed 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 29, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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inadmissible as fruits of an illegal mobile tracking device investigators 

attached to her vehicle. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I.

In the Spring of 2013, Tommy Lindley, a narcotics investigator for the 

Texas Department of Public Safety, received information from a cooperating 

individual that “Christine and Joel” were selling methamphetamine. Lindley, 

however, did not pursue an investigation at that particular time. He 

ultimately gathered further information regarding sales by Estrada and 

learned that she lived on North LaSalle Street and possessed two vehicles, one 

of which, a black Cadillac Escalade, was her primary vehicle.

Ultimately, Lindley submitted an affidavit in support of an application 

for the issuance of a mobile tracking device for that vehicle. TEX. CRIM. PROC.

CODE art. 18.21 § 14(c)(5). Finding that the facts set forth in the affidavit 

established reasonable suspicion, a state court judge granted Lindley’s 

application for the mobile tracking device. Lindley later testified that, if the 

judge had denied the application, he would have continued his investigation 

into Estrada via “physical surveillance as a team.”

On November 8, 2013, Lindley placed the mobile tracking device on 

Estrada’s Escalade and gathered information regarding a pattern of travel to 

North Lake Street addresses in Amarillo. On November 18, 2013, Lindley 

began conducting physical surveillance of Estrada without the use of the 

mobile tracking device. On that day, Lindley observed Estrada leave her 

residence on North LaSalle and travel to a residence located at 2407 North 

Lake Street. Lindley noticed that Estrada left the Escalade running while she 

visited the residence for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. After Estrada 

left the residence on North Lake Street, Lindley followed her to a restaurant 

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parking lot where she interacted with a man through her driver’s side window 

in what Lindley believed was a drug transaction. 

After further physical surveillance of Estrada without the aid of the 

mobile tracking device, Lindley followed Estrada to a store parking lot. 

Estrada was met in the parking lot by Jerry Thorn. After Estrada left the 

parking lot, Lindley approached Thorn, who was standing in the parking lot 

with his driver’s door open. Lindley confronted Thorn about purchasing drugs,

at which point Thorn retrieved a plastic bag containing approximately a 

quarter-ounce of methamphetamine from his console and confirmed that he 

had just purchased the methamphetamine from Estrada.

While Lindley questioned Thorn, other members of the surveillance team 

followed Estrada to a service station. When Lindley arrived at the service 

station, he confronted Estrada about selling methamphetamine to Thorn.

Estrada denied selling Thorn methamphetamine, but did admit to having 

marijuana in her purse. Upon discovery of the marijuana, Lindley placed 

Estrada under arrest and transported her to the district police station. At the 

station, Lindley advised Estrada of her Miranda rights and conducted an 

interview, during which Estrada confessed to selling methamphetamine to 

Thorn that evening and two days prior, on November 18. Estrada advised 

Lindley that the methamphetamine was part of a larger amount left over when 

her husband went to prison. Lindley also recovered a phone that Estrada 

denied owning. Lindley conducted a warrantless search of the phone and 

discovered “numerous text messages with dope talk, setting up meet locations 

and negotiations for purchases of methamphetamine.” Following the 

interview, Estrada was booked into jail on the marijuana charge.

Thereafter, Lindley and another officer decided to “conduct a knock-andtalk” at the North Lake residence. The resident there, Patricia Khweis

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(Estrada’s grandmother-in-law), allowed the officers to enter the residence. In 

response to an inquiry about a closed door, Khweis responded that she had 

some personal property in the room. When the investigators later passed the 

same door, Khweis again stated that the room contained some personal 

property and “a little bit of money.” When the officer opened the door, 

investigators observed stacks of money, gun safes, and a plate wrapped in 

aluminum foil believed to contain methamphetamine. Ultimately, Lindley 

obtained a search warrant that did not reference any information gleaned from 

use of the mobile tracking device. A search of the gun safes revealed 600 grams 

of methamphetamine, tablets of LSD, numerous weapons, and approximately 

$1,500 and an inculpatory notebook. Estrada moved to suppress this evidence,

which the district court, adopting the report and recommendations of the 

magistrate judge, denied in part and granted in part.

II.

“When the district court denies a motion to suppress, we review factual 

findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. 

Rodriguez, 702 F.3d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Payne, 

341 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2003)). We view the facts in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party, which, here, is the Government. United States v. 

Howard, 106 F.3d 70, 73 (5th Cir. 1997). 

III.

On appeal, the Government does not contend that the installation of the 

tracking device, based solely upon reasonable suspicion, was permissible. See 

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (addressing whether such 

devices constitute a “search”). However, even assuming that this conduct was 

impermissible, not all violations of the Fourth Amendment lead to a 

suppression of evidence. See United States v. Hernandez, 670 F.3d 616, 620 

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(5th Cir. 2012). Evidence that would otherwise be suppressible is purged of 

the primary taint if it derives from an independent source, if the link to the 

illegally secured evidence is attenuated, or if it would inevitably have been 

discovered without the aid of the illegally obtained evidence. United States v. 

Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 466 (5th Cir. 2001). 

The district court accepted the Government’s argument that, despite the 

Fourth Amendment violation, the evidence seized from the stash house was 

admissible under the independent source doctrine. Under that doctrine, “even 

if police engage in unconstitutional activities . . . evidence discovered during 

such illegal activities is nonetheless admissible if it is also discovered through 

an independent source.” United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 969 (5th Cir. 

1992). To determine whether the independent source doctrine applies,

[t]he district court must perform a two-part 

analysis . . . : (1) does the warrant affidavit, when 

purged of tainted information gained through the 

initial illegal entry, contain sufficient remaining facts 

to constitute probable cause (“probable cause”); and (2) 

did the illegal search affect or motivate the officers’ 

decision to procure the search warrant (“effect of the 

illegal entry”).

United States v. Hassan, 83 F.3d 693, 697 (5th Cir. 1996). On appeal, we 

review the first prong de novo and the second prong for clear error. Id. 

The district court determined there was an independent source for the 

evidence discovered at the North Lake residence, given the evidence obtained 

through the physical surveillance (unaided by the tracking reports) coupled 

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with Estrada’s own admissions.1 We agree that, as a matter of law, the first 

prong of the independent source doctrine is satisfied.2 

Estrada maintains that the magistrate judge failed to address the second 

prong of the independent source doctrine. See United States v. Grosenheider, 

200 F.3d 321, 328 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the district court must “find that 

the agents would have sought the warrant even if [the illegal conduct] had 

never taken place.”); Restrepo, 966 F.2d at 971 (“[T]he trial court [must] 

determine . . . whether information gained through the illegal search 

influenced or motivated the officers’ decision to procure a warrant.” (footnote 

omitted)). But Estrada failed to object to the report and recommendation on 

this basis, so we review for plain error. See Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d 612, 

617 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f a party did not object to a Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation, that party may not attack the proposed factual findings 

or legal conclusions except upon the grounds of plain error.”). Plain error 

review involves four parts, including that there was an error that was “clear or 

obvious.” United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(en banc).

As relevant to prong two of the independent source doctrine, the 

magistrate judge stated:

Although never directly asked whether he initiated 

the “knock and talk” at [the North Lake residence] 

based upon the tracking device information or based 

upon the surveillance conducted November 18 and 20, 

 

1 Estrada makes much of the magistrate judge’s use of the phrase “sufficiently 

independent.” But when considering the entirety of the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendations, the use of the phrase “sufficiently independent” simply reiterates the point 

previously made: that the surveillance was unaided by the tracking device reports. 

2 For the first time on appeal, Estrada argues that there was no independent source 

because the officers used the illegal tracking reports to gain Khweis’s consent to search her 

residence during the knock-and-talk. We review such a challenge for plain error, and we find 

none. See Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2008). 

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2013, there is sufficient evidence before the Court to 

conclude there was an independent and distinct source 

of information that led Agent Lindley to go to [the 

North Lake residence] for the “knock and talk.” 

By this statement, the court appears to have inferred from the evidence that 

the illegal tracking reports did not motivate Lindley to engage in the knockand-talk and obtain the subsequent search warrant. Indeed, the magistrate 

judge credited Lindley’s testimony that, without the tracking device, Lindley 

would have put together a team to conduct visual surveillance of Estrada. See

Restrepo, 966 F.2d at 971 (determining that the second prong “inquiry is 

answered in the negative if the district court finds that ‘the agents would have 

sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered’ the Regency residence”); see 

also United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that we 

defer to factual findings regarding credibility assessments). 

That Lindley would have taken this approach indicates that his 

surveillance and subsequent knock-and-talk were not motivated by the 

tracking reports. Such a finding has additional support in the record. Thus, 

there was no clear or obvious error. However, even assuming the court erred 

in failing to make explicit findings regarding the second prong of the 

independent source doctrine, given the evidence supporting the finding, 

Estrada has not established any harm to her substantial rights, as required 

under plain error review. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d at 419.3 

AFFIRMED.

 

3 To the extent that Estrada seeks to challenge the validity of Khweis’s consent on 

appeal, that argument is deemed waived. See United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 448 

(5th Cir. 2010). Although Estrada mentions the district court’s ruling regarding her cell 

phone, she does not challenge the ruling on appeal. Accordingly, this issue is deemed 

abandoned. See id. at 446–47. 

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