Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

STEPHEN T. OWENS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

BORAHM KIM ANGELA N. SANCHEZ

Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis,Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

COREY A. CRAIG, )

)

Appellant-Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 48A04-1311-PC-568

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Angela Warner Sims, Judge

Cause No. 48C01-1008-PC-308

August 22, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

SHARPNACK, Senior Judge 
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Corey A. Craig appeals from the post-conviction court’s order denying his petition 

for post-conviction relief, contending that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was 

prejudiced by that inadequate representation. We affirm. 

ISSUES

Craig presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether there was a sufficient factual basis for his plea of guilty to

intimidation as a Class C felony; 

II. Whether his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; 

and

III. Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying Craig’s petition for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Without the benefit of a plea agreement, Craig pleaded guilty to child molesting1as 

a Class A felony, criminal confinement2as a Class B felony, and intimidation3as a Class 

C felony. The facts set forth in our memorandum opinion affirming Craig’s sentence on 

direct appeal are as follows:

On March 8, 2004, officers from the Anderson Police Department 

were dispatched to Saint John’s Hospital in reference to a six-year-old child, 

F.N., being treated for vaginal injuries. F.N. had been taken to the hospital 

with injuries and bleeding to her vaginal area. These injuries required 

emergency surgery. Initial information revealed F.N. was home with Craig 

and Darrel Gene Bradberry and received a straddle-type injury while playing 

with Craig and Bradberry. After the emergency surgery, the cut was found

 

1

 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(2) (1998). 

2

 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(2)(A) (2002).

3

 Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A) (2003). 
3

to be larger than doctors originally believed. Further, F.N.’s doctors 

indicated to police that the injuries were not consistent with a straddle-type 

injury, but, rather, more consistent with a cutting-type injury.

F.N. was interviewed. She initially gave an account consistent with 

the reported straddle-type injury. Upon further inquiry, however, she 

indicated that Craig and Bradberry had held her down at the house while both 

of them had a knife and one of them had a fork. While restraining the child, 

the young men proceeded to insert a knife and fork into her vagina causing 

her injury and bleeding. They then threatened F.N. that if she said anything 

about what had happened they would put her in a large grill that was outside 

the residence and feed her to a large dog that was at the residence.

Craig v. State, No. 48A02-0511-CR-1030, slip op. at 2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. April 28, 2006). 

The trial court sentenced Craig to the presumptive sentence for each of the offenses: thirty 

years, ten years, and four years, respectively. The trial court ordered the sentences for child 

molesting and criminal confinement to be served concurrently, and ordered the sentence 

for intimidation to be served consecutively to the sentence for child molesting, for an 

aggregate sentence of thirty-four years.

After his sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, Craig filed a pro se petition for 

post-conviction relief that was later amended by counsel on January 29, 2013. The postconviction court held a hearing on the petition after which it issued findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon denying Craig’s petition. Craig now appeals. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Craig appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. “A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief faces a rigorous 

standard of review” on appeal. Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001). The postconviction court’s denial of relief will be affirmed unless the petitioner shows that the 

evidence “leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the 
4

post-conviction court.” Rowe v. State, 915 N.E.2d 561, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.

denied. A petitioner has the burden of establishing the grounds for relief by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). Accordingly, a

petitioner appeals from a negative judgment. Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ind.

2007).

This court will not disturb the denial of relief unless the evidence is without conflict 

and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court reached the opposite 

conclusion. Carter v. State, 738 N.E.2d 665, 671 (Ind. 2000). Furthermore, this court 

accepts the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

Bigler v. State, 732 N.E.2d 191, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. We consider only 

the probative evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom that support the postconviction court’s determination, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness 

credibility. Id.

In general, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under a two-part 

test: (1) a demonstration that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms, and (2) a showing that the deficient 

performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 

1031 (Ind. 2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 

80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). Prejudice occurs when the defendant demonstrates that there is 

a reasonable probability that, if not for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Grinstead, 845 N.E.2d at 1031. A reasonable 

probability occurs when there is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
5

outcome. Id. Failure to satisfy either prong of the two-part test will cause the defendant’s 

claim to fail. Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ind. 2008). If we can easily dispose 

of an ineffective assistance claim based upon the prejudice prong, we may do so without 

addressing whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Id.

Each of Craig’s arguments originate from the difference between the statutory 

enhancement language describing the elevated offense of intimidation as a Class C felony 

and the language used in the charging information. Craig contends that had the charging 

information language tracked the language of the intimidation statute, he would not have 

pleaded guilty. Further, he claims that he could not be found guilty of intimidation as a 

Class C felony because of the defective wording of the charge and that there was no factual 

basis that he drew or used a fork or knife while intimidating F.N.

I. ADEQUACY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS 

The version of the statute at the time of Craig’s offenses provides in pertinent part 

as follows:

A person who communicates a threat to another person, with the intent: that 

the other person engage in conduct against the other person’s will; commits 

intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a: Class C 

felony if, while committing it, the person draws or uses a deadly weapon.

Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1. Count III of the charging information against Craig alleged that he 

had committed Class C felony intimidation by communicating “a threat to [F.N.] while 

armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife and/or fork, with the intent that [F.N.] engage 

in conduct against her will, to wit: not to report a sexual assault.” Direct Appeal App. p. 

25. Craig argues that the difference between “draws or uses a deadly weapon” and “while 
6

armed with a deadly weapon” is significant enough that his decision to plead guilty was 

compromised because of his trial counsel’s failure to note the defect. 

The factual basis set forth by the State at Craig’s guilty plea hearing was as follows:

More specifically, the State would present evidence to show that on March 

8

th of 2004, officers from the Anderson Police Department were dispatched 

to Saint John’s Hospital reference a six-year-old child being treated for a 

vaginal injuries [sic]. Upon arrival the hospital staff indicated that [F.N.], 

date of birth 8-28 of ’97 had . . . she had been taken to the hospital with 

injuries and bleeding to her vagina area. Upon observation by doctors, it was 

determined that there was a cut in her vaginal area. These injuries required 

emergency surgery which was performed by a Doctor Gist. . . . The 

information given at the hospital and initially to the police were [sic] that 

[F.N.] was at the residence of 2121 Hendricks Street which was her home in 

Anderson, Madison County, Indiana. And at the time of the injuries she was 

home alone with the defendant, Corey A. Craig and a [D.B.] The information 

initially received was that the . . . Mr. Craig and [D.B.] were playing with 

[F.N.] and that she had injured her vaginal [sic] in a straddle-type injury, 

either at one point by pulling her legs a part and another point of the story 

was that she had fallen over a couch. After the emergency surgery was 

performed, the cut was larger than what they believed to begin with. Both 

the E.R. physician, Dr. Hanna and the surgeon, Dr. Gist, indicated to police 

that the injuries were not consistent with a straddle-type injury and that it was 

more consistent with a cutting type injury. [F.N. was interviewed. Initially 

she gave the same story that it was a straddle-type injury. However, upon 

interviewing her further, she did indicate that the defendants Corey A. Craig 

and [D.B.] had her held . . . held her down at the house and that both of them 

had a knife and one had a fork. Had inserted the knife and the fork into her 

vagina causing her injury and bleeding. She also indicated that the two 

individuals had threatened her that if she told about what had happened they 

had indicated that one, they would put her in a large grill that was outside the 

residence and they also indicated that they would feed her to a large dog that 

was at the residence. She was held down during this time when she was hurt 

while they had a knife and fork that injured her and her vagina, against her 

will. All these events occurred here in Madison County, State of Indiana.

Direct Appeal Tr. pp. 14-16 (emphasis added). After the factual basis was recited, Craig 

indicated that he had heard the prosecutor’s statements and that they were true. All parties 
7

stated that they were satisfied with the factual basis and the trial court accepted Craig’s 

guilty plea. 

The post-conviction court took judicial notice of the prior proceedings and the 

filings, pleadings, and record in the case. Included among those items is the probable cause 

affidavit supporting the charges filed against Craig. The probable cause affidavit provided 

as follows:

On 3/8/04, APD officers were dispatched to St. John’s Hospital at 2015 

Jackson St. reference a 6 year old child, [F.N.], being treated for vaginal 

injuries not consistent with those of an accident. These injuries required 

emergency surgery, which was performed by Dr. Gist. Both the ER 

physician, Dr. Hanna, and the surgeon, Dr. Gist, felt these injuries were not 

the result of an accident. The persons acting as caregiver to the child at the 

time of her injuries were Corey A[.] Craig and Darrel Gene Bradberry. The 

day following the victim’s surgery, she gave a video statement in which she 

advised that Corey Craig and Darrel Bradberry held her down and inserted a 

knife and fork into her vagina and threatened her with physical harm if she 

told anyone of the incident. The insertion of the foreign objects into her 

vagina caused pain and bleeding. Both suspects took steps to conceal the 

results of their actions. Both initially advised that the victim’s injuries had 

occurred while engaging in play, however Darrell [sic] Bradberry later 

provided a videotaped statement acknowledging that the acts had occurred, 

but that he was only an observer.

Corey Alan Craig & Darrel Gene Bradberry, with a child under 14 years of 

age, performed deviate sexual conduct resulting in serious bodily injury by 

inserting foreign objects into the vagina of a 6 year old girl causing such 

injury as to require surgery. Corey Alan Craig & Darrel Gene Bradberry 

knowingly and intentionally confined the aforementioned victim by holding 

her down with her arms crossed on her chest and her legs pinned towards her 

head and refusing to allow her to leave during the assault. Both subjects 

threatened physical bodily harm to the victim and told her she would be taken 

from her mother if she told anyone. The threats were made while the subjects 

were holding the knife and fork, which could be perceived as deadly 

weapons. 

Direct Appeal App. p. 23 (emphasis added).
8

During the hearing on Craig’s petition for post-conviction relief, Craig’s trial 

counsel, Zaki Ali, testified that he did not realize that the wording of the statute defining 

the offense differed from the language used in the charging information. He further stated 

that his failure to challenge the defect was not part of a strategic decision. On cross 

examination, however, he testified as follows with respect to the factual basis that the knife 

and fork were drawn or used:

I want to go back to your question earlier, if I may, and mention that, is there 

a difference between draws and uses? Yes. Um, draw would mean to flash, 

to show, to demonstrate. To use would actually, to put to use. In this case, 

um, it wasn’t drawn, it was actually used. The utensils. . . . I think they were 

shown and they were probably flashed.

Tr. p. 12. Thus, despite the defect, even Craig’s trial counsel appeared to agree that the 

facts of the case fit within the statutory definition of the offense. 

In an opinion on rehearing in Hall v. State, 837 N.E.2d 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), a 

panel of this Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for 

intimidation as a Class C felony where the issue involved whether the defendant was in 

actual possession of a weapon at the time the threat was communicated. We relied on our 

Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889 (Ind. 1985), analyzing the use 

of the term “while” in the context of a murder eligible for the death penalty because it was 

committed while committing the underlying felony of child molesting. We set forth the 

following analysis from Davis:

Although we have not previously considered [the word “while”] as it is used 

in the death penalty statute, we have repeatedly found that the phrase “while 

committing” denotes a continuing chain of events under our felony-murder 

statute. In other words, when there is a close proximity in terms of time and 

distance between the underlying felony and the homicide and there is no 
9

break in the chain of events from the inception of the felony to the time of 

the homicide, we treat the two events as part of one continuous transaction.

Hall, 837 N.E.2d at 160 (quoting Davis, 477 N.E.2d at 894). 

Here, the factual basis clearly establishes the proximity in time and distance between 

the child molesting and confinement involving the use of the knife and the fork and the 

threat to put her on a large grill and feed her to a large dog at her home if she told anyone 

about the incident. The probable cause affidavit supports a finding that the knife and fork 

were in hand at the time the threat was made. Nonetheless, it is clear that they were used 

at least immediately prior to the making of the threatening statements. Although the threat 

did not specifically refer to the knife and the fork, their presence and prior use would at the 

least make F.N. think that they would be used again. We cannot say that Craig has met his 

burden of showing that the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, 

and the post-conviction court reached the opposite conclusion. The factual basis is 

adequate to support the conviction despite the defect in the charging information.

II. GUILTY PLEA

Craig also argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily made because he was misled by the State about the nature of the intimidation 

charge. He claims that the language in the charging information did not specifically advise 

him that a deadly weapon had to be drawn or used in order to enhance the offense to a 

Class C felony. 

Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2(a)(1) (2003) provides that a trial court “shall not 

accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime without first 
10

determining that the defendant understands the nature of the charge against him.” A guilty 

plea is not “voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he 

committed the offense unless the defendant received ‘real notice of the true nature of the 

charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.’” 

Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 2257-58, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976) 

(quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S. Ct. 572, 574, 85 L. Ed. 859 (1941)). 

Our Supreme Court has held that unless an element of the offense is a critical element of 

the offense, such as specific intent to kill is to the offense of attempted murder, notice of 

the elements of the offense is not required in order to satisfy Henderson’s requirement of 

notice of the true nature of the charge. Patton v. State, 810 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Ind. 2004). 

What is required under Henderson is that (1) a defendant have real notice of the true nature 

of the charge to which he pleads guilty, (2) the record of the guilty plea hearing contains 

an explanation of the charge by the trial court or a representation by trial counsel that the 

nature of the offense has been explained to the defendant, or absent an explanation a 

presumption that trial counsel routinely explains the nature of the offense sufficiently to 

give notice to the accused, (3) where intent is a critical element of the offense, notice of 

the element is required, and (4) even where required notice has not been given nor can it 

be presumed, that lack of notice is subject to analysis for harmless error. Id. at 696. 

Unlike specific intent in the context of attempted murder charges, the difference 

between committing an offense while armed with a deadly weapon and while drawing or 

using that deadly weapon is not so significant as to be a critical element of the offense. The 
11

trial court read the charging information and confirmed that Craig understood the charge. 

The trial court further advised Craig as follows:

So in order to be guilty of [intimidation] the State would have to prove on or 

about March the 8th you had done these things to little [F.N.] and you told 

her if she told anybody you were gonna hurt her or something like that. Do 

you understand . . . and plus you had this knife and fork or I don’t know 

which one you had. Maybe it’s both. Maybe it’s one or the other. Do you 

understand what I’m telling you?

Direct Appeal Tr. pp. 8-9. Craig responded that he understood. During the hearing on 

Craig’s petition, Ali testified that in addition to the factual basis set forth by the State, Ali 

and Craig went through the facts of the case and reviewed the discovery provided by the 

State indicating what evidence supported the charges. Craig has not met his burden of 

establishing that the post-conviction court erred by concluding that Craig’s guilty plea was 

entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Craig raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his trial 

counsel’s failure to advise him of the defective wording of the intimidation charge 

prejudiced him.

When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a “strong 

presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 

Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 2001). Evidence of isolated 

poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics will not support a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Clark v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (Ind.

1996), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171, 117 S. Ct. 1438, 137 L. Ed.

2d 545 (1997). As a result, most ineffective assistance claims can be resolved 

by a prejudice inquiry alone. Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Ind.

1999), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113, 120 S. Ct. 1970, 146 L. Ed.

2d 800 (2000). Moreover, if a petitioner is convicted pursuant to a guilty 

plea, and later claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because 
12

counsel overlooked or impaired a defense, the petitioner must show that a 

defense was indeed overlooked or impaired and that the defense would have 

likely changed the outcome of the proceeding. Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 

496, 499 (Ind. 2001).

Richardson v. State, 800 N.E.2d 639, 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. 

Here, Craig’s argument is not that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial on 

the intimidation charge had he known about the defect. Rather, he argues that had his 

counsel advised him of the defective wording of the charge, he could only have been 

convicted of intimidation as a Class D felony. We disagree.

We have already concluded that the factual basis for intimidation as a Class C felony 

was adequate to support Craig’s guilty plea. Therefore, Craig cannot establish prejudice 

from his trial counsel’s failure to notice the defect and advise him. Furthermore, if Craig’s 

trial counsel noticed the defect and brought that to the attention of the State or the trial 

court, there is every reason to believe that the State would have corrected the information 

to comport with the statutory language. Craig has not established that the post-conviction 

court erred by finding and concluding that Craig was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s 

representation. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the above, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision. 

Affirmed. 

RILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.