I N THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JT-281 

In the Matter of M.I., N.I.1, N.I.2, N.I.3, N.I.4, S.I. (Minor 

Children); Denis Koehlinger, 

Appellant (Guardian ad Litem)

–v–

K.H. (Mother), 

Appellee (Respondent)

A.I. (Father) and L.M. (Father),

Appellants (Respondents)

–v–

Indiana Department of Child Services, 

Appellee (Petitioner)

Argued: June 4, 2019 | Decided: August 9, 2019 

Appeal from the Allen Superior Court, 

Nos. 02D08-1710-JT-146, -147, -148, -149, -150, -151

The Honorable Daniel G. Heath, Judge 

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 

No. 18A-JT-1948 

Opinion by Chief Justice Rush

Justices David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-JT-281 | August 9, 2019 Page 2 of 7

Rush, Chief Justice.

Here, a trial court refused to terminate a mother’s parental rights, 

concluding termination was not in the children’s best interests. The court 

found that the children shared a strong bond with their mother, that DCS 

would struggle to find adoptive homes for the children, and that the 

mother had made progress complying with the requirements of her 

parent-participation plan. Yet the children’s guardian ad litem appealed, 

insisting that the mother’s parental rights should be terminated—solely 

because she had not yet found suitable housing for herself and her 

children.

We affirm the trial court. Even though the mother still lacked suitable 

housing, the court’s findings—which are supported by ample evidence—

reflect that termination would sever the children’s strong family bond 

with a mother who was making progress, only to leave them with 

doubtful prospects for a permanent adoptive home. And so, the court’s

conclusion that DCS failed to clearly and convincingly show that 

termination was in the children’s best interests was not contrary to law.

Facts and Procedural History

In late 2015, K.H. (Mother) took six of her children to an Indiana 

Department of Child Services (DCS) office. She told the department that 

she couldn’t care for them because of her alcohol addiction and recent 

homelessness. At the time, the children ranged in age from one to ten

years old.

On DCS’s petition, a court found the children in need of services. And 

it imposed on Mother a parent-participation plan with twenty-three 

requirements. That plan required her, in part, to maintain suitable housing 

and employment, attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, take part 

in counseling, enroll in home-based services, submit to random drug 

screens, and participate in visitations.

The children remained with Mother, and they all moved in with her

aunt. During this time, Mother was working and looking for housing. But 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-JT-281 | August 9, 2019 Page 3 of 7

when her aunt moved away in June 2016, Mother had not yet secured

housing, so the children were placed in foster care.

Over the next several months, Mother lived in various locations. She 

found employment, went to AA meetings, participated in counseling, 

completed a parenting program, submitted to random drug screens, and 

attended supervised visitations with her children. Because Mother did not

have a car, there were times she walked two hours each way to attend 

counseling, and forty minutes each way to attend visitations. Although 

Mother continued to look for housing, she was unsuccessful.

Then in December 2017, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights, citing her failure to satisfactorily comply with her parentparticipation plan.

The trial court held a four-day factfinding hearing, which included

testimony on the bond between Mother and her children; DCS’s potential 

struggle to find an adoptive home for the children; and Mother’s progress 

with the parent-participation plan. The children’s guardian ad litem 

(GAL)—who had neither met nor spoken with the children—was the only 

witness to opine that terminating Mother’s parental rights would be in the 

children’s best interests.

Concluding that the department failed to clearly and convincingly 

show that termination was in the children’s best interests, the trial court

denied DCS’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

The GAL appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. M.I. v. Ind. 

Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 18A-JT-1948, 2019 WL 419087, at *11–12 (Ind. Ct. 

App. Feb. 4, 2019). The panel reasoned that Mother’s inability to “obtain 

suitable housing for herself and the Children” leads to a “conclu[sion] that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the
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Children.” Id. at *11. Mother petitioned for transfer, which we granted, 

vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).1

Standard of Review

Here, the trial court concluded DCS failed to clearly and convincingly 

show that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests 

of her children. The GAL—aligned with DCS—challenges this 

determination and thus appeals from a negative judgment. See Town of 

Brownsburg v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, 124 N.E.3d 597, 601

(Ind. 2019); see also Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(a) (2018).

To prevail, the GAL must show that the court’s decision is contrary to 

law, meaning that the probative evidence and reasonable inferences point 

unerringly to the opposite conclusion. See Burnell v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1146, 

1150 (Ind. 2016). On review, we consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party, and we neither reweigh the evidence nor 

judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.; see Infinity Prods., Inc. v. Quandt, 810 

N.E.2d 1028, 1032 (Ind. 2004).

Discussion and Decision

Though it’s been oft-stated, it bears repeating: the parent–child 

relationship “is one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Neal 

v. Dekalb Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tillotson v. Clay Cty. Dep’t of 

Family & Children, 777 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied; In 

re D.L.M., 725 N.E.2d 981, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). Indiana law thus sets 

a high bar to sever that relationship—requiring DCS to prove four 

elements by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2); In re

Bi.B., 69 N.E.3d 464, 465, 467 (Ind. 2017). One of those elements, and our 

 1 We summarily affirm the part of the Court of Appeals opinion that affirms the trial court’s 

termination of parental rights of fathers A.I. and L.M. See App. R. 58(A)(2). Neither father 

petitioned for transfer. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-JT-281 | August 9, 2019 Page 5 of 7

focus today, is whether termination is in the children’s best interests. I.C. § 

31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C).

Despite Mother’s ongoing inability to secure suitable housing, the trial 

court couldn’t yet conclude that terminating her parental rights would be 

in her children’s best interests. The GAL argues that this best-interests 

determination is contrary to law. He maintains that Mother’s failure to 

find suitable housing for over two years leads to a “singular conclusion” 

that her parental rights must be terminated. We disagree.

When determining what is in children’s best interests, trial courts may 

consider a variety of factors. See In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234–35 

(Ind. 2013). The trial court here did just that. In reaching its best-interests 

conclusion, the court found that Mother and her children shared a 

“strong, loving bond”; that DCS would face challenges finding adoptive 

homes for the children; and that Mother had made progress complying 

with her parent-participation plan. As explained below, ample evidence in 

the record supports those findings, which in turn support the trial court’s 

best-interests conclusion.

We turn first to the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that 

Mother and her children shared a “strong, loving bond.” On this point, 

the court heard testimony from two witnesses with significant access to 

the children. Denise Jensen, the therapist overseeing visitations, explained 

that Mother and the children are “very enthusiastic” when seeing each 

other and are “always really glad to be together.” Likewise, the foster 

parent to three of the children noted that the children talk about Mother

“[a]ll the time” when they are not with her; that Mother and the children 

display genuine affection; and that “when they see her[,] they holler 

mommy and go to her.”

Similarly, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that DCS may 

“struggle to find adoptive parents” for the children. At the time of the 

hearing, the six children ranged in age from four to thirteen years old and 

were split up among different foster homes. Jensen explained that each 

child has “pretty challenging behaviors individually,” and when they get 

together, “sometimes those behaviors increase.” Given their ages and 

behavior issues, the current DCS case manager admitted that if adopted, 
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the children would likely remain apart. She acknowledged that finding a 

home for even three or four of them would be challenging.

Finally, we address the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings

on Mother’s progress complying with her parent-participation plan. At

the hearing, Mother testified that she had been unemployed for a total of 

only six weeks since the beginning of the case and currently had a fulltime job. Additionally, Mother confirmed that she was fully sober as a 

result of engaging in counseling and regularly attending AA meetings. 

She further explained that if she were reunited with the children, she 

would be able to provide them with food and healthcare. And Jensen

testified that Mother had shown significant improvement with her 

parenting skills.

To be sure, Mother has not consistently complied with, nor has she 

completed, all twenty-three requirements in her parent-participation 

plan—including the requirement that she secure suitable housing for 

herself and her children. But as the trial court aptly observed, full 

compliance with the plan “is difficult to accomplish, especially for 

someone without personal transportation.” After all, on multiple 

occasions, Mother went to counseling and visitations by foot; and DCS 

case managers conceded that the plan requirements were cumbersome,

often requiring Mother to be in three or four different places in a given 

week, while also keeping a job, attending visitations, and looking for 

housing. But despite any challenges Mother has faced, the evidence shows

that she has complied or made progress with most of the plan’s 

requirements.

In sum, the trial court recognized Mother’s struggles with finding 

suitable housing, but it properly looked to other factors—supported by 

the evidence—in concluding that DCS failed to meet its burden to show 

that terminating Mother’s parental rights would be in her children’s best 

interests. Given the evidence above that supports the trial court’s decision, 

that decision is not contrary to law.
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Conclusion

Because the GAL has failed to show that the trial court’s decision is 

contrary to law, we affirm.

David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLA N T D E NIS KOEHLINGER

Roberta L. Renbarger

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLE E K.H.

Thomas C. Allen

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTOR NEY FOR APPELLANTS A.I. AND L.M.

Gregory L. Fumarolo

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD 

SERVICES

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana