NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 18a0205n.06 

 Case No. 17-2188 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

SANDRA PLETOS; MITCHELL PLETOS, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

MAKOWER ABATTE GUERRA WEGNER 

VOLLMER, PLLC, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN 

BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; GUY and DONALD, Circuit Judges. 

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. In 2005, Plaintiffs-Appellants Sandra 

and Mitchell Pletos ceased paying their homeowners association fees. When the association 

recorded liens on their property for the unpaid amounts, the Pletoses brought a fifteen-count 

lawsuit against it in state court. After the association successfully counterclaimed, and the 

Pletoses’ case was dismissed, the Pletoses still refused to pay the judgment or any continuing 

fees. This action represents their latest attempt to evade payment, thirteen years after their first 

missed installment and six after their initial suit. As such, the district court dismissed the case as 

to certain defendants, and granted summary judgment to others. For the reasons that follow, we 

AFFIRM the district court’s order in full. 
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I. 

The Pletoses own a portion of “Lake in the Woods,” a plotted subdivision in the 

Township of Shelby, Macomb County, Michigan. By virtue of that ownership, the Pletoses are 

members of the Lake in the Woods Association, Incorporated (“LWA”), a Michigan nonprofit 

corporation homeowners association. From 2005 to 2012, the Pletoses failed to pay annual and 

special assessments set forth in the LWA governing documents. In 2012, LWA recorded liens 

against the Pletoses’ property for $1,295.53 and $6,271.74. See Pletos v. Lake in the Woods 

Homeowners Ass’n, No. 319087, 2015 WL 1650803, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015). The 

Pletoses then brought a fifteen-count suit in Macomb County Circuit Court alleging violation of 

LWA bylaws, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and for slander of title, among others. Id. 

LWA responded by retaining John Finkelman and his law firm, Makower Abbate Guerra 

Wegner Vollmer, PPLC (the “Makower Defendants”) to file a counterclaim seeking unpaid 

assessments, interest, late charges, and fees. Id. 

LWA is governed by: (1) its Articles of Incorporation, (2) the Declaration of Easements, 

Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Lake in the Woods Subdivision (“DECCR”) and 

(3) its Bylaws. Under Article III, Sections 1 and 3 of the Bylaws, lot owners must pay general 

dues and special assessments on a yearly basis. (RE 8-3, PageID #399-401.) Section 8 also 

provides that dues and assessments that are not paid within 30 days will be subject to interest and 

late charges. (Id. at PageID #427-429.) Article IV of the DECCR obligates lot owners to pay 

annual general assessments and special assessments for capital improvements. (Id. at PageID 

#402.) Article IV also provides that “[a]ll annual and special assessments, whether general or 

related to the Lake Lots, together with interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, shall from 
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date of assessment be a charge and a continuing lien upon the Lot against which each such 

assessment is made.” (Id.) 

Considering the governing documents, the Macomb County Circuit Court granted 

summary disposition in LWA’s favor, both as to the Pletoses’ complaint and LWA’s 

counterclaim. Pletos, 2015 WL 1650803 at *4. In sum, the court found that LWA followed the 

DECCR and its Bylaws and did not breach its covenant with the Pletoses—who failed to prove 

that any delinquent assessments were in error. Id. The court also found that LWA was not a 

debt collector, eliminating any FDCPA claims. Id. at *5. After an evidentiary hearing, the court 

awarded LWA $20,553.64, as well as any additional legal fees that LWA incurred in attempting 

to collect the judgment. Id. at *6. 

The Pletoses appealed and the court granted a stay conditioned on posting of a $25,000 

bond. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Pletos, 2015 WL 1650803 at *1. The 

Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Pletos v. Lake in the Woods Homeowners 

Ass’n, 499 Mich. 881, 876 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 2016). Still, the Pletoses refused to pay either the 

judgment entered against them or continuing fees. 

Before and after the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision, various at-issue 

communications occurred: Mrs. Pletos requested documents from LWA to review; Defendant 

Finkelman corresponded with the Pletoses’ counsel regarding how to respond to Mrs. Pletos; the 

Pletoses’ attorney chastised Defendant Finkelman for failing to instruct LWA to communicate 

with Mrs. Pletos directly; Defendant Finkelman responded to Mrs. Pletos’s document request; 

LWA sent the Pletoses an invoice for the fees due, as well as the judgment entered; the Pletoses 

responded and objected to LWA’s internal procedures, reiterating many of the allegations in the 

Pletoses’ original complaint; the Makower Defendants corresponded with the Pletoses’ counsel 
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regarding payment of the judgment and the calculation of the same; Defendant Finkelman sent 

the Pletoses’ counsel a letter indicating the outstanding amount; Defendant Finkelman contacted 

CNA Surety—the Pletoses’ appeal bond provider; and CNA Surety declined to pay the appeal 

bond directly to LWA. At that point, Defendant Finkelman moved for judgment against CNA 

Surety for the bond, which the state court granted. The Pletoses moved for reconsideration, 

which the court denied. 

Before the state court’s judgment against CNA Surety, the Pletoses filed this action 

against Roger Papa, Giovan Agazzi, Danny Landa, Kati Azia, and Mike Desjardines—LWA 

Board members (the “LWA Defendants”)—and the Makower Defendants alleging FDCPA, 

Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Practices Act, Michigan Regulation of Collection Practices Act 

violations, as well as seeking an accounting and injunctive relief preventing further collection 

activity. The district court partially granted the Makower Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and 

the LWA Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment finding: (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

barred all the Pletoses’ claims; (2) the FDCPA claims were either barred by the statute of 

limitations or failed to state a claim; (3) the RICO claims were not sufficiently pleaded; and 

(4) the majority of the Pletoses’ claims were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. After 

dismissing or granting summary judgment on all federal claims, the district court declined to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction of the remaining state law claims. It also summarily denied 

the Pletoses’ motion to supplement their complaint to add communications allegedly violative of 

the FDCPA. 

II. 

We first review de novo the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

See Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013). We also review de novo a district 
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court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. See Sutherland v. 

Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 611 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). We then 

review the district court’s denial of the Pletoses’ motion to supplement for abuse of discretion. 

Spies v. Voinovich, 48 F. App’x 520, 527 (6th Cir. 2002).

III. 

The Pletoses’ first argument—that the district court improperly applied the RookerFeldman doctrine—is largely dispositive to their appeal. Rooker-Feldman is a combination of 

abstention and res judicata. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 

280, 283-84 (2005) (citing Dist. Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), 

and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)). Under the doctrine, the 

Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction precludes lower federal courts from engaging in appellate 

review of state court proceedings. Id. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases . . 

. brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection 

of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. Thus, Rooker-Feldman deprives a 

lower court of jurisdiction only when the cause of the plaintiff’s complaints is the state judgment 

itself. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). To determine whether 

Rooker-Feldman applies, we must look to the “source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the 

federal complaint” and determine if the injury is the state court itself, or another source—such as 

a third party’s actions. Id. at 393. However, if the third party’s actions “are the product of a 

state court judgment, then a plaintiff’s challenge to those actions are in fact a challenge to the 

judgment itself.” Id. at 394. 
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The district court found that all the actions complained of were the product of the state 

court judgment and that the Pletoses’ arguments otherwise were attempts to relitigate issues 

already decided by the state courts. The Pletoses, however, argue that the injuries they allege 

were caused not by the state court judgment, but by the actions of various LWA members 

seeking to collect on that judgment and continue to collect LWA-related fees. An examination 

of their claims proves otherwise. 

First, the Pletoses argue that their FDCPA claims are against new parties and in response 

to new alleged debts. But the “new parties” are simply LWA members for their conduct in that 

capacity and relate to the assessments of LWA debts. The alleged debts include amounts 

incurred prior to this suit—and which the state court already determined were valid—as well as 

fees sustained in the attempt to assess and collect those amounts. While some amounts alleged 

fall outside of those addressed in state court, they flow from the very same conduct and, as 

addressed below, the Pletoses’ attacks are identical to those lodged in state court. While FDCPA 

claims often involve allegations of misconduct in underlying state-court litigation, and prior 

litigation does not itself trigger Rooker-Feldman, the Pletoses’ claim seeks to invalidate both the 

right to assess, and the manner in which LWA assessed and collected, fees. And the state court 

has already ruled on each. Even claims against “third parties”—the Makower Defendants—are a 

direct result of the state court judgment. 

Next, in their RICO claim, the Pletoses again argue that the homeowners association dues 

were unsubstantiated, that the liens were not valid, and that the LWA members were improperly 

elected or appointed, thereby eliminating their ability to assess the fees and obtain the liens. All 

of these arguments were disposed of at the state level. Likewise, the Pletoses’ fraud claims 
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allege that the debt is unsubstantiated and that the LWA Defendants have no legal right to collect 

the debt. The state court squarely denied this very argument. 

Similarly, the Pletoses’ abuse of process claims allege, essentially, that the previous 

litigation was fraudulent and vexatious. This very claim belies the Pletoses’ contention that the 

defendants here are different and that the difference negates application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. The Pletoses could not sue LWA members for abusing the litigation process when 

those members were not personally party to that suit. Any claims would thus be necessarily 

brought against LWA. Instead, this claim illustrates that the parties are largely the same and the 

Pletoses seek to circumvent or obviate the result of their litigation against LWA. While this 

Circuit has found that Rooker-Feldman did not preclude such abuse of process claims when the 

injury flowed from independent abuse rather than the state court judgment itself, here, the claims 

are related to the state litigation. See Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., 434 F.3d 432, 

436-37 (6th Cir. 2006). And if LWA’s counterclaim was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise 

abusive, the Pletoses could have moved to dismiss the counterclaim throughout that litigation. 

The Pletoses’ claim for an accounting seeks only to determine the “rights and 

responsibilities of the parties based on facts surrounding the alleged account statement and 

unsubstantiated billing notices from 2013 through 2016.” (RE. 1, PageID #27.) Again, the state 

court has determined what the rights and responsibilities of the parties are, finding that the 

Pletoses owed LWA $20,553.64 for the previously unpaid dues. The state court found the fees 

properly assessed and reaffirmed LWA’s right to do so. We cannot disturb that finding. Though 

the Pletoses purportedly seek to challenge later-years’ missed payments, their reasoning is nearly 

identical. 
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Finally, the Pletoses’ claim for injunctive relief is equally foreclosed. It not only asks 

that we order LWA not to enforce its judgment against the Pletos, but that we re-determine what 

LWA is owed. This is nothing more than an attempt to avoid paying the homeowners 

association fees that the state court already determined they must—this time for a longer period 

of delinquency, as well as on a prospective basis. 

The nature of each of the Pletoses’ claims shows that they stem from the state court 

litigation. “A court cannot determine the source of the injury ‘without reference to the plaintiff’s 

request for relief.’” Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 299 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Here, 

virtually all of the Pletoses’ requested relief seeks to negate LWA’s ability to assess or collect 

homeowners association fees, either by attacking LWA’s right to do so or their collection 

methods. Thus, with slight nuances, the Pletoses effectively seek to appeal the state court order 

finding that homeowners association fees were properly assessed. Under Rooker-Feldman, the 

district court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction to review that decision. As do we. 

IV. 

The only conceivable claims that might not be barred by Rooker-Feldman are the 

FDCPA claims in which the Pletoses allege that various defendants attempted to collect debt 

from them, whether related to the judgment entered or otherwise. We have previously declined 

to apply Rooker-Feldman over arguably similar claims. See Brown v. First Nationwide Mortg. 

Corp., 206 F. App’x 436, 439–40 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding jurisdiction because the injury resulted 

from the actions of various people involved in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings before the 

state judgement was entered). But this is a different case. The Pletoses’ FDCPA claims are 

nonetheless caused by state court judgment. See Durham v. Haslam, 528 F. App’x 559, 563 (6th 

Cir. 2013); (RE. 1, PageID #7.) 
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Even if we were to assess those claims on the merits, the district court’s opinion 

adequately addressed them, providing numerous grounds for dismissal. First, the majority of the 

alleged violations fall outside the one-year statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). 

Second, the communications with CNA Surety are barred by collateral estoppel, as the state 

court already ruled on the contention that the Makower Defendants were not permitted to contact 

the company. Third, the remaining communications that are not barred by the statute of 

limitations do not, as alleged, violate the FDCPA. The district court fully explained why each 

innocuous communication was not violative of the FDCPA. (RE 42, PageID #1504-07.) 

V. 

The Pletoses lastly claim that the district court abused its discretion when it denied their 

Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint, instanter. Generally, the district court “has 

discretion to deny a motion to amend a complaint after an answer has been filed . . .” Rose v. 

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000). That said, “when a district 

court is presented with a motion to supplement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) it must at the very 

least issue a ruling on that motion.” Spies, 48 F. App’x at 527. Though the district court entered 

a ruling, it did not specifically state a basis for its decision. See Rose, 48 F. App’x at 527. 

Still, we will not find that the district court abused its discretion. The Pletoses’ motion 

was filed almost a year after their initial pleading, eight months after their first amended 

complaint, and one day before oral argument was scheduled on Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. See Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 

459 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of leave to amend, in part, because it was sought a yearand-a-half after filing of complaint). While not filed post-judgment here, the district court 

found—and we agree—that that the state court had entered judgment on the issues of this case 
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years before. Given the prospect of future unnecessary delay, the district court was within its 

discretion when it denied the motion. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 

401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971) (explaining that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny reopening a 

case because the motion to reopen to submit additional proof was untimely) (citations omitted); 

Patrick v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 676 F. App’x 573, 575 (6th Cir. 2017); In re Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 

250 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The district judge here exercised his discretion to exclude an extraneous 

matter to be included in already omnifarious litigation. This was not an abuse of discretion.”). 

Moreover, abuse of discretion by denying a motion to supplement amounts only to 

harmless error when the proposed amendment would not survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

See Rose, 203 F.3d at 421. Although not explicitly stated by the district court, the Pletoses’ 

proposed additions would not save it from dismissal. The allegations the Pletoses wished to 

supplement simply built on the claims being dismissed under Rooker-Feldman, and for failure to 

state a claim and collateral estoppel. Allowing the Pletoses to so supplement would have been 

futile. 

VI. 

The district court correctly found that Rooker-Feldman applied to the entirety of the 

Pletoses’ claims. While purportedly brought under partially different statutes, against arguably 

different parties, in a different forum, the gravamen of the Pletoses’ claims is the same: an 

attempt to avoid paying homeowners association fees. The state court already determined that 

they must, and we cannot and do not revisit that ruling. 

Though the claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman, the district court provided additional 

reasoning as to why each claim fails—including failure to state a claim, the statute of limitations, 
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res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Even were we to find jurisdiction, we would adopt the 

reasoning of the district court and its conclusions and deny the Pletoses’ appeal. We AFFIRM. 

 
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RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring. I respectfully disagree with the 

majority’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to allegations of defendants’ conduct 

occurring after the issuance of the state-court judgment against plaintiffs. Although richly 

interspersed with insinuations that the state-court judgment was unjust, the amended complaint 

alleges that the methods defendants used to collect the state-court judgment violated the FDCPA. 

Allegations of unlawful post-judgment conduct included attempts to collect a debt in excess of 

the judgment, refusal to verify that debt, and violation of statutes governing whom a debt 

collector may contact and how. 

The majority acknowledges this, but concludes that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are 

“nonetheless caused by the state court judgment.” In fact, plaintiffs’ injury stems not from the 

state-court judgment, but from the attempts to collect on it. A jury could, in theory, find for such 

a plaintiff without undermining the state-court judgment. The availability of statutory damages 

under the FDCPA is proof of this. I am concerned that the majority’s analysis could be used to 

insulate any judgment-collection activity—however brazenly unlawful—from the FDCPA or 

other laws, whenever Rooker-Feldman prevents us from reviewing the underlying state-court 

judgment and injuries caused by that judgment. 

I concur in the result, however, because the majority adequately sets forth alternative 

grounds for disposing of plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims. I would rely on those grounds exclusively in 

affirming the district court on this issue.