SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

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NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, Petitioner

- Respondent ,

v. TROOPER MEGAN HABINA, #7870, Respondent

- Appellan t.

____________________________

Argued October 21, 2021

– Decided December 2 , 202 1 Before Judges Alvarez and Haas. On appeal from the New Jersey Division of State Police , Docket No s . 2016

- 0581 and 2017

- 0009. Claudia J. Gallagher argued the cause for appellant (Chance & McCann, LLC, attorneys; Kevin P. McCann , Claudia J. Gallaghe r and Matthew Weng , on the briefs). Jana R. DiCosmo , Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae

- Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alexis F. Fedorchak, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court

. " A lthough it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited

. R

. 1:36

- 3.2 A

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PER CURIAM Megan Habina appeals fr om a March 31, 2020 final agency decision of the Superintendent of the New Jersey Division of State Police terminating her employment as a state trooper . The Superintendent adopted the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John S. Kennedy 's initial decision sust ain ing two out of three disciplinary charges against Habina , and recommen d ing her termination. T he Superintendent agree d that "in light of the gravity of [ r ] espondent's actions, the appropriate penalty . . . is termination

. . . ." We affirm for the reas ons stated by the Superintendent. Sometime in October or November 2016, while on duty, Habina lost the alcohol influence report (AIR) necessary to complete the paperwork for a dr unk driving arrest

. She consulted with Trooper Casey McPartlin, who suggeste d she contact the Alcohol and Drug Testing Unit (ADTU) to retrieve a copy. Instead, Habina us ed another unrelated AIR to create a replacement AIR and signed McPartlin's name to it without his knowledge or consent. Habina admitted her
actions , but insist ed no harm was done because she used a report with the same blood alcohol percentage and chang ed no substantive information. She feared the repercussio ns of losing the AIR. As a result, she was served with three charges: acting or behaving in an official capacity to the personal discredit of3 A

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the member or the Division (a violation of Article 6, § 2.A, of the Rules and Regulations of the Division); maki ng a false or misleading official report, or knowingly entering into Division books or records inaccurate, false, or misleading information (a violation of Article 5, § 16, of the Rules and Regulations of the Division); and performing her job responsibilit ies in a "culpably inefficient manner" (a violation of Article 5, § 5, of the Rules and Regulations of the Division). On a separate occasion, Ha bina wrote a burglary investigation report alleg ing K.G. was a suspect because Habina had compared his driver's license picture to a surveillance video. K .G. did not have a New Jersey driver's license. Furthermore, Habina provided the address of an acquaintance of the suspect , falsely claiming it was "obtained through a Division database," when that simply

was n ot true. The Division learned of this false report when K.G. complai ned that these inaccuracies had "contributed to his arrest and incarceration." When interviewed about the false report in the company of a union representative, Habina said that she was uncertain whether she found K.G.'s license , but asserted that she utilized the license of K.G.'s similar

- looking son. Habina's report also inaccurately listed dates that other troopers as siste d her with the case, which they could not corroborate

. She a dmitt ed her report "was not4 A

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factual." As a result of this false report, Habina was served with the same charges as in the AIR matter

. T he Superintendent noted in the agency decision that police officers are public servants held to a high standard. F urther more, t rooper discipline is within the a g e nc y 's managerial prerogative due to the importance of maintaining discipline among the state police. The Superint endent did not credit Habina's attack on the Internal Affairs interview regarding the burglary report. H er expert testified at the administrat iv e law hearing that she was unfairly questioned. The Superintendent found no merit to this argument , because am ong other reasons, Habina did not dispute the substance of the charges making the claim immaterial

. As the Superintendent explained, Habina intentionally and inappropriately altered a Division record in connection with an arrest, including signing the na me of a [s] tate [t] rooper on the document without his consent or knowledge. Further, her investigation report of a burglary contains various inaccuracies, including the basis for the identification of the suspect. [Habina's] claims of lack of experience or fear of discipline do not excuse or lessen the severity of her misconduct and misjudgment. Further, her allegation of inadequate supervision, in an attempt to shift responsibility for her behavior to her supervisors, also lacks merit. [Habina's] misconduct violated the5 A

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POINT I
THE STATE DID NOT PR OVIDE PROOF THAT TROOPER HABINA ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OR CLEARLY KNEW THE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SHE WAS CHARGE D WITH VIOLATING.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING THE EVIDENCE THAT DET. SGT. RYON BARCLAY'S INTERVIEW WAS UNFAIR AND BIASED. These a rguments are so lacking in merit as to not warrant much discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11

- 3(e)(1)(E)

. T he Division need no t prove that a trooper signed to acknowledge written guidelines in order to hold th a t trooper accountable for falsifying info rmation. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, it is a law enforcement official's primary duty to " enforce and uphold the law. " In re Phillips , 117 N.J. 567, 576

- 77 (1990) (quoting Moorestown v. Armstrong , 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965)). H abina should have6 A

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known f alsify ing the AIR report and sign ing another trooper's name without his knowledge or consent violated Division policies , even if she never r ecei ved written standards to that effect

. The same is true with regard to the false burglary report. Even if we accept ed Habina's expert's opinion for the sake of argument , which we do not, the internal investigations officer 's credibility or "bullying" behavior is ultimately irrelevant

. Habina falsified the suspect's identificati on

— which may have caused his incarceration

— and inaccurately recorded the involvement of other officers in the investigation

. As the ALJ aptly pointed out, this conduct
alone would have cast doubt on Habina's future investigations. "Our review of administ rative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys. , 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). We uphold an administrative agency's final decision unless clearly "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or . . . lack[ing] fair support in t he record." Ibid. (quoting In re
Herrmann , 192 N.J. 19, 27

- 28 (2007)). We are "in no way bound by an agency's interpretation . . . of a strictly legal issue . . . ." Ibid. (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec. in the Div. of Consumer Affs. of th e Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety , 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). Thus, an agency's purely legal conclusions are7 A

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reviewed de novo. Ibid. In this case, we uphold the administrative agency's reasonable, factually supported, and legally sound final decision

. Affirmed

.