[Cite as In re T.C., 2023-Ohio-1922.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LUCAS COUNTY

In re T.C., B.S. Court of Appeals No. L-22-1222

Trial Court No. JC 21283539

 

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Decided: June 9, 2023

* * * * *

Adam H. Houser, for appellant.

* * * * *

SULEK, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant-mother T.S. appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which terminated her parental rights and awarded 

custody of the minor children, T.C. and B.S., to appellee Lucas County Children Services 

(“LCCS”). For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
2.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} T.S. is the mother of T.C., born in 2017, and B.S., born in 2019.1 The 

present matter was initiated on March 5, 2021, when LCCS filed a complaint in 

dependency, abuse, and neglect.

{¶ 3} The complaint alleged that on February 15, 2021, LCCS received a referral 

that in December 2020, mother’s boyfriend stabbed her in the presence of the children 

and bit T.C.’s finger. The complaint also alleged that mother was homeless and stayed in 

drug houses. Mother admitted to the caseworker that she had previously used Percocet 

and cocaine, and that she had no independent housing or employment. At the time, 

mother and the children were residing with S.S.

{¶ 4} On February 25, 2021, LCCS received another referral that T.C. put his 

hands down the diaper of S.S.’s baby and that T.C. reported that “Mikey” (age 11 or 12) 

touched T.C. inappropriately and had put toys up B.S.’s “cooch.”

{¶ 5} On March 1, 2021, it was reported to LCCS that mother was being 

prostituted by S.S. On March 2, 2021, mother confirmed that S.S. was making her 

engage in prostitution and told the caseworker that S.S. threatened her. The caseworker 

went to the home on March 3, 2021, but found that mother had left the children with S.S. 

while she was in Toledo with her boyfriend.

1 T.C.’s father, T.C., Sr., has not appealed the trial court’s termination of his parental 

rights. B.S.’s father has never been identified.
3.

{¶ 6} Finally, the complaint alleged that mother failed to drop urine as requested 

on February 26 and March 1, 2021, but that she tested negative for substances on March 

2, 2021.

{¶ 7} A shelter care hearing was held on March 5, 2021, at which the trial court 

placed the children into the interim temporary custody of LCCS. At the subsequent 

adjudication and disposition hearing on April 15, 2021, mother consented to a finding 

that the children were dependent, abused, and neglected, and consented to LCCS being 

awarded temporary custody. A case plan was developed and services were provided to 

assist mother in addressing the concerns of being a victim of domestic violence, making 

poor parenting choices, having a history of substance abuse, and being homeless.

{¶ 8} On January 14, 2022, LCCS moved for permanent custody of B.S.

{¶ 9} On March 2, 2022, the trial court held an annual review hearing. At the 

hearing, Madison Williams, the LCCS caseworker, testified that mother was 

recommended for a dual diagnostic assessment in February 2021, but missed her 

appointments in March, April, and May 2021. Mother finally completed her dual 

diagnostic assessment at Unison in July 2021 and was recommended for non-intensive 

outpatient services. Unison discharged mother in September 2021 for not attending her 

classes. In December 2021, mother engaged with New Concepts to receive non-intensive 

outpatient services and had been actively participating in those services through the time 

of the annual review hearing. In addition, mother was referred for domestic violence 

survivor’s classes in February 2022, and had been attending those as well. Mother also 
4.

was recommended for housing services and she was still working on obtaining stable, 

independent housing. Finally, Williams testified that mother would be referred to 

parenting services once she made more progress on her other services. As a result of the 

annual review hearing, the trial court extended LCCS’s temporary custody of the 

children.

{¶ 10} On April 28, 2022, LCCS moved for permanent custody of T.C.

{¶ 11} At the August 24, 2022 permanent custody hearing, Williams testified that 

communication with mother is very sporadic. Mother’s voice mailbox is always full, so 

Williams is never able to leave a message. Most of their communication occurs via text 

message, but Williams testified that mother is generally not communicative unless she 

has an issue with her visitation. Originally, Williams had her monthly meeting with 

mother at the residence where mother was living with her partner’s mother. However, 

once mother and the other residents were evicted, Williams unsuccessfully attempted to 

locate a new address for mother. Rather than provide a new address, mother asked 

Williams to have their monthly meetings at Tim Horton’s, which did not happen. 

Williams alternatively asked mother to meet her at the agency, but mother never did.

{¶ 12} As to services, Williams testified that mother has not completed the nonintensive outpatient services at New Concepts, and described that mother has made “little 

to no progress.” Williams identified records from New Concepts from May, June, and 

July 2022, which showed generally that mother had been inconsistent with her treatment 

having recorded several no-call/no-show appointments. The no-call/no-show 
5.

appointments were for scheduled phone appointments where mother did not answer and

her voicemail inbox was full. The records also showed that mother still regularly used 

marijuana, but claimed to have been sober from other drugs. In addition, the records 

showed that mother reported that she was still homeless and was having difficulty

securing housing. As to other services, Williams testified that at one point mother was 

receiving domestic violence victim’s services from Providence Center, but Williams did 

not have any records showing that mother completed the services. Mother had not yet 

been referred to parenting services because of her lack of progress in the other areas.

{¶ 13} Williams also testified to mother’s history of drug usage. Williams 

testified that throughout the pendency of LCCS’s involvement, the agency had requested 

mother to provide urine screens 13 times. Mother only complied and provided a urine 

screen three of those times, the last one being on May 16, 2022. The agency’s policy, as 

explained to mother, is that a no-show for a urine screen is treated as a positive test for all 

substances. Of the screens that mother did provide, all three tested positive for THC and 

two tested positive for cocaine.

{¶ 14} Regarding mother’s housing situation, Williams testified that when she first 

became involved in February 2022, mother was living with her partner’s mother.

Thereafter, the residents were evicted and mother would not tell Williams where she was 

living. At the time of the hearing, Williams did not know where mother was living. 

Notably, mother sent Williams a “very bad photo” of a document that mother claimed 

was a lease, but the document contained no address or identifying information.
6.

{¶ 15} Williams also explained that mother’s partner, L.A., has a long criminal 

history, with a current pending charge for domestic violence. Williams noted that it has 

long been speculated that L.A. was trafficking and abusing mother. Mother has 

previously admitted to being in a relationship with L.A., and in June 2022, Williams 

observed mother’s Facebook posts that show that she is now married to L.A. Williams 

has been unable to engage with L.A. to determine if he needs services as well.

{¶ 16} As to visitations with the children, Williams testified that since January 

2022, there have been 32 scheduled visits. Mother appeared for only 16 of them. 

Williams testified that the majority of missed visits were no-call/no-show. When 

Williams first became involved in February 2022, mother was required to call one hour 

before the scheduled visit because of her history of being inconsistent and missing 

visitations. Mother continued to be inconsistent and not call, so she was then required to 

arrive one hour before the scheduled visit. Again, mother was inconsistent. Williams has 

not observed any visits between mother and the children.

{¶ 17} Finally, Williams testified that the children are doing very well in their 

foster home. They are developing, hitting their milestones, and getting smarter every 

day. Williams testified that it is clear the children are bonded to each other and to their 

foster parents.

{¶ 18} On cross-examination, Williams testified that she was concerned about the 

children returning to mother because of mother’s substance abuse issues, her relationship 

with L.A., and her lack of proper housing. Williams testified that she also received a call 
7.

from mother’s case manager at New Concepts, who stated that she was in fear of the 

children going home to mother because mother has not made any lifestyle changes.

{¶ 19} In addition to Williams’s testimony, LCCS called the children’s foster 

parents, W.S. and R.S., as witnesses. The foster parents testified that the children are 

doing well in the home and are growing and developing. The foster parents affirmed that 

they would be interested in adopting the children if that was a possibility.

{¶ 20} Finally, Megan Ward, the guardian ad litem, testified. In addition to 

submitting her report, Ward testified that she does not believe that it would be in the best 

interest of the children to be reunified with mother. Ward explained that mother has not 

made any lifestyle changes and while mother has made some effort with her services, she 

has not been successful. Ward noted mother’s recent positive cocaine screen in May 

2022, and her social media posts and photographs that show that she is engaged or 

married to a man that has a pending domestic violence felony charge. Ward testified that 

she has not spoken to mother since May 2022, despite repeated attempts. Ward testified 

that she has been involved in the case for a long time and has seen the children grow, 

develop, and be successful in the current foster placement with foster parents that are one 

hundred percent committed to the children. For all those reasons, Ward recommended 

that permanent custody of the children be awarded to LCCS.

{¶ 21} In her closing argument at the hearing, mother requested that the court not 

prematurely award permanent custody of the children to LCCS, but instead requested that 
8.

the court grant an extension of time for mother to successfully complete her services and 

reunite with the children. The trial court took the matter under advisement.

{¶ 22} Following the permanent custody hearing, the trial court entered its 

judgment terminating mother’s parental rights and awarding permanent custody of the 

children to LCCS. As to mother, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence 

that the children cannot be placed with her within a reasonable time or should not be 

placed with her. Specifically, the trial court found under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) that 

notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by LCCS, mother has failed 

continuously and repeatedly to remedy the conditions that caused the children to be 

placed outside of the family home in that mother has failed to substantially comply with 

case plan services. The trial court also found under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) that mother has 

demonstrated a lack of commitment to the children by failing to regularly support or visit 

with the children when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to 

provide an adequate permanent home. In particular, the court found that mother’s visits 

have been sporadic and mother has failed to make the necessary lifestyle changes in that 

she continues to abuse illegal drugs, does not have stable, independent housing, and has 

not been consistent with substance abuse and mental health services.

{¶ 23} Finally, the trial court found under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) that it was in the 

best interest of the children to award permanent custody to LCCS for adoptive placement 

and planning. The court noted that the children are thriving in a prospective adoptive 

home and are bonded with their foster family. The court also noted that mother has made 
9.

little progress in her case plan services since March 2021, not enough progress to support 

an extension of time, and the children deserve a legally safe, secure, and permanent 

environment.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 24} Mother has timely appealed the judgment terminating her parental rights 

and now asserts four assignments of error for our review:

1. Lucas County Children Services failed to make reasonable efforts 

when they failed to properly investigate mother’s home and who she was 

residing with.

2. It was against the manifest weight of evidence for the trial court 

to grant permanent custody to Lucas County Children Services when 

appellant was being substantially compliant with case plan services.

3. Trial court made reversible error when it failed to grant 

appellant’s motion for extension of time.

4. Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial 

counsel failed to object and allowed impermissible hearsay to be considered 

by the trial court.

III. Analysis

{¶ 25} In her first three assignments of error, mother challenges the trial court’s 

decision to terminate her parental rights.
10.

{¶ 26} “A trial court’s determination in a permanent custody case will not be 

reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re A.H., 

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1057, 2011-Ohio-4857, ¶ 11, citing In re Andy-Jones, 10th 

Dist. Franklin Nos. 03AP-1167, 03AP-1231, 2004-Ohio-3312, ¶ 28. “Reversal is proper 

only where its determined, after weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences 

including the credibility of the witnesses, that the juvenile court clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed.” In re 

S.S., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1219, 2023-Ohio-1663, ¶ 27, citing In re T.J., 2021-Ohio4085, 180 N.E.3d 706, ¶ 40 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

{¶ 27} In addition, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to 

weigh the evidence and evaluate the testimony. In re A.H. at ¶ 11, citing In re Brown, 98 

Ohio App.3d 337, 342, 648 N.E.2d 576 (3d Dist.1994). “Thus, in determining whether 

the judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable 

intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and 

the finding of facts.” In re S.S. at ¶ 28, quoting In re W.M., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-

1016, 2022-Ohio-1978, ¶ 42.

{¶ 28} In order to terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a 

child to a public services agency under R.C. 2151.414, the juvenile court must find two 

things by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that one of the enumerated factors in R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply, and (2) that permanent custody is in the best interests of the 
11.

child. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). Clear and convincing evidence is that which is sufficient to 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to 

be established. In re T.J., 2021-Ohio-4085, 180 N.E.3d 706, ¶ 36 (6th Dist.), citing Cross 

v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

The clear and convincing standard requires more than a preponderance of the evidence, 

but it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cross at paragraph three of the 

syllabus.

{¶ 29} In this case, mother contests the trial court’s finding that R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies. Mother does not separately contest the trial court’s 

determination that permanent custody is in the best interests of the children.

{¶ 30} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) provides that a trial court may grant permanent 

custody of a child to the agency if it finds that, in addition to the placement being in the 

best interest of the child,

The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period, * * * and the child cannot be placed with either 

of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with 

the child’s parents.
12.

R.C. 2151.414(E) requires a trial court to find that a child cannot be placed with either of 

the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if 

any of sixteen factors are met.

{¶ 31} Here, the trial court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (4) applied to 

mother. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) states,

Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and 

notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency 

to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to 

be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and 

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be 

placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have 

substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and 

rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to 

the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to 

resume and maintain parental duties.

R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) states,

The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child 

by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when 

able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an 

adequate permanent home for the child.
13.

{¶ 32} In her first assignment of error, mother argues that the trial court relied on 

her homelessness when deciding to award permanent custody to LCCS. Mother asserts, 

however, that she provided a lease to her caseworker and LCCS failed to follow up with 

her to ask for her address or to investigate her living situation. Thus, mother contends

both that LCCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that the trial 

court’s finding regarding her homelessness was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

{¶ 33} As to the reasonable efforts argument, “[t]he state must make reasonable 

efforts to reunify the family before terminating parental rights.” In re C.F., 113 Ohio 

St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 4. “In determining whether the agency 

made reasonable efforts, ‘the issue is not whether the agency could have done more, but 

whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard under the statute.’” In re 

I.P., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1136, 2015-Ohio-4061, ¶ 37, quoting In re D.H., 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-13-1152, 2013-Ohio-5286, ¶ 21. “‘[R]easonable effort’ is an ‘honest, 

purposeful effort, free of malice and the design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable 

advantage.’” Id., quoting In re D.H. at ¶ 21.

{¶ 34} Here, Williams attempted to contact mother numerous times over the 

course of several months before the permanent custody hearing. Williams also did a 

separate search for an address for mother, which was unsuccessful. Despite these 

numerous attempts, mother never provided an address to Williams. Instead, mother 

texted a low-quality photo of a document that she claimed was a lease, but which did not 
14.

include any identifying information. Identifying an address to determine mother’s living 

situation is a simple task that should not require an extraordinary effort on the part of the 

caseworker. The caseworker made reasonable attempts to find mother’s address, but 

mother’s conduct evidenced that she clearly did not want to provide it to the caseworker. 

Therefore, the trial court’s finding that LCCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the 

family is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 35} As to the trial court’s finding that mother was homeless, that issue dovetails 

with her second assignment of error, in which she argues that the trial court’s finding 

under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of 

her second assignment of error, mother asserts that she was progressing on her case plan 

services because she was in treatment for her mental health and drug issues, was working, 

and had an apartment of her own.

{¶ 36} Although the record discloses that mother was working at the time of the 

permanent custody hearing, it does not support the conclusion that mother was 

progressing on her case plan services or that she had an apartment of her own. To the 

contrary, the record demonstrates that mother was inconsistent in her case plan services. 

She was initially referred for a dual diagnostic assessment in February 2021, but did not 

complete it until July 2021, and did not begin to successfully engage in the services until 

December 2021. Even then, mother’s participation was inconsistent as evidenced by 

numerous no-call/no-shows in the few months preceding the permanent custody hearing. 

Mother’s sporadic participation is consistent with her pattern of poor communication 
15.

with her LCCS caseworker and the guardian-ad-litem. Mother also continued to use 

illicit substances, testing positive for marijuana three times and cocaine twice, including 

one time within three months of the permanent custody hearing, not to mention the 

thirteen other times that she failed to provide a urine screen. Further, although mother 

claims in her appellate brief that she had an apartment of her own, there is no evidence in 

the record to support such a conclusion. To the contrary, mother’s unwillingness to 

provide an address to Williams and her social media posts describing her ongoing 

relationship and marriage to a person who has a long criminal history and pending 

domestic violence felony charges manifestly supports the conclusion that mother did not 

have independent, safe, and stable housing. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding under 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) that mother has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially 

remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home is not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 37} Relatedly, in her third assignment of error, mother argues that the trial 

court should have allowed her an extension of time of seven months to complete her case 

plan services. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) requires the trial court to determine that the 

children cannot be placed with their parent within a reasonable time. R.C. 

2151.414(E)(1) requires such a finding where the parent has failed “continuously and 

repeatedly” to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed 

from the home. Here, LCCS has been providing mother services for 17 months. During 

that time, mother has not been consistent in engaging with the services, her caseworker, 
16.

or the guardian ad litem, and tragically has not made any lifestyle changes demonstrating 

that she is on a path to providing a safe, stable home for the children. Instead, mother 

continues to use illegal substances, avoids her caseworker, and associates and resides 

with people who would not foster a safe environment for the children. As such, the factor 

under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) has been met and the record contains no indication that 

delaying permanency for the children for another seven months would lead to a different 

result. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying mother’s oral motion for an

extension of time.

{¶ 38} Accordingly, mother’s first, second, and third assignments of error are not 

well-taken.

{¶ 39} Finally, in her fourth assignment of error, mother argues that she received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial counsel failed to object to Williams’s 

hearsay statement that mother’s case manager at New Concepts told Williams that she 

was in fear of the children going home to mother because mother has not made any 

lifestyle changes.

{¶ 40} “The test for ineffective assistance of counsel in a parental rights 

termination proceeding is the same as that used in criminal cases.” In re G.P., 6th Dist. 

Lucas Nos. L-18-1126, L-18-1130, L-18-1132, 2018-Ohio-4584, ¶ 76, citing In re T.C., 

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1154, 2016-Ohio-7631, ¶ 30. To prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance, mother must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness, and a reasonable probability exists that, but for 
17.

counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “The 

object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to 

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice * * * that 

course should be followed.” Id. at 697.

{¶ 41} Here, mother cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability exists that the 

results of the proceedings would have been different had counsel objected to the hearsay 

testimony and had it stricken. The remaining evidence presented at the permanent 

custody hearing overwhelmingly supports the trial court’s determination under R.C. 

2151.414(E)(1) that mother continuously and repeatedly failed to remedy the conditions 

causing the removal of the children. The inclusion of the New Concepts case manager’s 

opinion that she was in fear of the children going home to mother was harmless in the 

context of the entire proceedings.

{¶ 42} Accordingly, mother’s fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Mother is ordered to pay the costs of this 

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.
18.

In re T.C., B.S.

C.A. No. L-22-1222

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See 

also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________

 JUDGE

Myron C. Duhart, P.J. 

____________________________

Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE

CONCUR. 

____________________________

 JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.