J-A15042-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

STEVEN G. EAKIN

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1113 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered September 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-61-CR-0000647-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MAY 2, 2023

I respectfully dissent. Upon review, I believe that the learned Majority

misapplied the relevant factors in determining whether a violation of the 

Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (“MPJA”) required suppression. For the

reasons that follow, I conclude that suppression was not an appropriate 

remedy for the technical violation of the MPJA in this case and would therefore 

reverse the trial court’s suppression order.

I begin with our standard of review. “When reviewing an order granting 

a motion to suppress we are required to determine whether the record 

supports the suppression court’s factual findings and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn by the suppression court from those findings are accurate.” 

Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 969 (Pa.Super. 2008) (cleaned 

up). In the case sub judice, the facts largely are not in dispute. Rather, this 

case hinges on the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. In that 
J-A15042-22

- 2 -

regard, “[o]ur scope of review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions

. . . is plenary.” Id. (citations omitted). 

From the outset, I note that I take no issue with the Majority’s 

conclusion that Chief Sharp’s extraterritorial conduct at the time of the stop 

was not authorized by statute. As conceded by the Commonwealth, Chief 

Sharp’s actions were not authorized by the Intergovernmental Cooperation 

Act (“ICA”) because the 2006 Joint Municipal Agreement, which called for Polk 

Borough police officers to provide police services for Frenchcreek Township, 

had not been adopted by ordinance in Frenchcreek Township, as was required 

at that time by the ICA for the agreement to take effect.

1

 Additionally, the 

Commonwealth concedes that Chief Sharp’s actions were not authorized by

the MPJA as they did not fall within one of the six enumerated circumstances. 

____________________________________________

1 The parties stipulated to the following recitation surrounding the interplay 

between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township:

At the time of the traffic stop, which is the subject of this case, it 

occurred in Frenchcreek Township. . . . Chief Sharp observed 

[Eakin] operating the vehicle, which was the basis of his stop when 

he was in . . . Frenchcreek Township. . . . At the time of the stop, 

there was a Joint Municipal Agreement between Polk Borough and 

Frenchcreek Township for police services to be provided by officers 

of Polk in Frenchcreek. Frenchcreek had a resolution to adopt the 

agreement, but no ordinance. Polk had an ordinance as to the 

agreement. So, as of the time of the stop in Frenchcreek 

Township, Frenchcreek had no ordinance adopting the agreement.

N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 68 (capitalization altered). I note the ICA has 

since been amended to expressly permit adoption of such an agreement by 

ordinance or resolution. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 2305. 
J-A15042-22

- 3 -

Chief Sharp’s technical violation of the MPJA, however, does not

automatically compel suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the 

traffic stop. See Commonwealth v. Hobel, 275 A.3d 1049, 1058 (Pa.Super. 

2022). In determining the appropriate remedy for an MPJA violation, this 

Court employs a case-by-case approach. Id. “The factors to be considered . 

. . consist of all the circumstances of the case including the intrusiveness of 

the police conduct, the extent of deviation from the letter and spirit of the 

MPJA, and the prejudice to the accused.” Id. (cleaned up). This case-by-case

approach permits “this Commonwealth’s courts to tailor a remedy in situations 

where police intentionally have overstepped their boundaries while still 

affording our courts the flexibility to deny suppression when police have acted 

to uphold the rule of law in good faith but are in technical violation of 

the MPJA.” Id. (cleaned up). Upon review, I find that the case sub judice is 

a textbook example of Chief Sharp acting “to uphold the rule of law in good 

faith [while] in technical violation of the MPJA[,]” and therefore the trial court 

erred in granting suppression.2 Id. 

My analysis of the first factor is guided by our Supreme Court’s decision 

in Commonwealth v. Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2019), wherein the High 

Court considered the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint. Rather than 

considering the intrusiveness of a checkpoint for an unimpaired driver, the 

____________________________________________

2

I note with displeasure that the trial court utterly failed to apply this test, 

instead concluding summarily that “[t]he remedy is suppression of the 

evidence” based on Chief Sharp not having the authority to stop Eakin. See 

Order of Court, 9/8/21, at 2.
J-A15042-22

- 4 -

Court concluded that it “must instead measure the level of intrusion of a stop 

that results in an arrest, since only in this circumstance does the issue of

possible suppression of evidence arise.” Id. at 1048. In Hlubin, the officer 

initially questioned Hlubin for 30-45 seconds and then, based upon that 

interaction, “removed Hlubin from her vehicle and took her to a testing area, 

where she was subjected to field sobriety testing, blood testing and arrest.” 

Id. Our High Court determined that such an interaction “resulted in a high 

level of intrusiveness[.]” Id.

In accordance with Hlubin, I consider the entirety of the encounter from 

when Chief Sharp stopped Eakin to when Eakin was arrested to determine the 

level of intrusiveness. In that regard, Chief Sharp conducted a traffic stop of 

Eakin based upon a traffic violation. Upon observing a martini glass in the 

vehicle and realizing that Chief Sharp had a personal relationship with the 

driver, he called for another officer to conduct the traffic stop. That officer 

arrived and ultimately transported Eakin to a hospital for blood testing and 

arrest. Based on Hlubin, I am constrained to agree with the Majority that 

this interaction involved a high level of intrusiveness and thus the first factor 

favors Eakin. See Majority at 11-12.

My analysis differs from the Majority as to the second and third factors. 

Turning to the second factor, I consider “the extent of deviation from the letter 

and spirit of the MPJA[.]” Hobel, supra at 1058. This Court has held that 

“the spirit, or purpose of, the MPJA is to proscribe investigatory, 

extraterritorial forays used to acquire additional evidence where probable 
J-A15042-22

- 5 -

cause does not yet exist.” Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, the MPJA endeavors 

“to promote public safety while maintaining police accountability to local 

authority; it is not intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls 

benefiting only criminals hidden in their shadows.” Commonwealth v. 

Lehman, 870 A.2d 818, 820 (Pa. 2005) (cleaned up). 

Of relevance, the MPJA permits an officer to act outside his jurisdiction 

where he “is on official business and views an offense, or has probable cause 

to believe that an offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort 

to identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a felony, 

misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which presents an immediate 

clear and present danger to persons or property.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(5). 

Instantly, at the time of the stop, Chief Sharp was operating pursuant 

to a belief that his conduct in Frenchcreek Township was authorized by the 

ICA based on the agreement between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek 

Township.

3

 See N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 51 (stating that he had 

jurisdiction in Frenchcreek Township). Upon review, I find that he had a good 

faith belief that he was in Frenchcreek Township on official business.4 While 

____________________________________________

3

I observe, again, that the 2006 agreement had been adopted by resolution 

in Frenchcreek Township at the time of the stop, but not by ordinance as was 

required by the ICA at that time. As noted, our legislature amended the ICA 

in 2019 expressly to permit adoption by ordinance or resolution. See 53 

Pa.C.S. § 2305.

4 While not pursued by the Commonwealth, Chief Sharp testified at the 

suppression hearing that he was in Frenchcreek Township while en route to 

Utica, a municipality where he stated that he also had jurisdiction. See N.T. 

Suppression, 8/27/21, at 51.
J-A15042-22

- 6 -

in Frenchcreek Township on what he reasonably believed to be official 

business, Chief Sharp observed Eakin driving his vehicle for one-half of a mile 

in the wrong direction on a public roadway. Unequivocally, Eakin’s driving

presented “an immediate clear and present danger” to other vehicles on the 

roadway. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(5); Hobel, supra at 1062-63

(concluding that Hobel’s driving presented “an immediate clear and present 

danger” when he swerved back and forth across the road into the oncoming 

traffic lane). Under these circumstances, but for Frenchcreek Township’s

misguided decision to adopt the agreement by resolution instead of ordinance, 

Chief Sharp would have been in Frenchcreek Township on official business

when he observed Eakin’s dangerous driving, and therefore his conduct would 

have been authorized by the MPJA. 

The Majority finds this factor weighs in favor of Eakin, essentially 

positing that the violation of the MPJA “contravenes the MPJA’s policy[.]” See 

Majority at 12. I cannot countenance a conclusion that amounts to a selffulfilling prophecy. If the second factor favors the accused whenever there is 

a violation of the MPJA, then every application of this test would have the 

second factor favoring the accused because we only apply it in circumstances 

where the police have violated the MPJA. In fact, such a rigid application

focusing solely on police accountability ignores that the MPJA also endeavors 

“to promote public safety while maintaining police accountability to local 

authority; it is not intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls 

benefiting only criminals hidden in their shadows.” Lehman, supra at 820 
J-A15042-22

- 7 -

(cleaned up); see also Hlubin, supra at 1048 (observing that our Supreme 

Court previously “held that the goals of the MPJA are the promotion of public 

safety while maintaining jurisdictional police lines and to expand the powers 

of local police to protect the public, where such expansion would not adversely 

affect the ultimate goal of maintaining police accountability to local authority”

(cleaned up)). Given the entire letter and spirit of the MPJA, I find that its 

objectives were advanced by Chief Sharp’s conduct in this case. Thus, I 

disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that this factor favors Eakin. 

Finally, I consider the prejudice to Eakin. See Hobel, supra at 1058. 

This factor requires us to consider “whether the search would not have 

otherwise occurred or would not have been as intrusive.” See Hlubin, supra

at 1048 (cleaned up). The Majority concludes that this factor favors Eakin 

because there was no evidence that the stop otherwise would have occurred. 

While it is unclear whether the search would have otherwise occurred, it is 

likely that any other officer pulling over Eakin would have conducted the 

search in the same manner as Officer Heller, who was ultimately called to the 

scene, transported Eakin for blood testing, and arrested him for drunk driving. 

Therefore, even if another officer had conducted the stop, the resulting search 

would have been equally intrusive. Thus, I disagree with the Majority’s 

conclusion that the third factor favors Eakin.

Based on the foregoing, I conclude that in this case “suppression would 

not be an appropriate remedy under the MPJA, the legislative intent of which 

is to advance public safety and not shield criminal behavior.” Hobel, supra
J-A15042-22

- 8 -

at 1064 (citation omitted). Since I would reverse the suppression order and 

remand for further proceedings, I respectfully enter this dissent.