CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

and unmanned weapon systems. The

unmanned systems, represented by the

ICBM's and the submarine-launched Polaris missile, have obvious advantages.

They are so swift-covering intercontinental distances in half an hour-that in

a surprise attack they give the victim

only a few minutes warning, at best.

Moreover, this same speed is baffling to

the designer of defensive counter weapons. Some observers have been so carried away with these advantages that

they have called the ICBM the "ultimate weapon."

But the ballistic missile also has some

clear disadvantages which require us to

deploy another, completely different,

type of weapon to give our defense structure the most elementary insurance.

One of these disadvantages is that the

weapon and its base are vulnerable to

preemptive attack. That is, if one thinks

an enemy has unleashed an attack, one

cannot get the missile up in the air and

let it cruise around while the attack is

confirmed. The missile, once well

launched, cannot be called back.

For this reason we must operate on the

assumption that it will have to ride out

the attack. To this end we plan hardened and mobile bases for our most advanced type missiles. But the principle

still holds that we cannot cut the rope

on our missile until we have been hit.

With only this weapon in our strategic

arsenal, our survival depends on the degree of success of an enemy's initial surprise assault. The effectiveness of our

defense becomes a function of the enemy's efficiency, not of our own. We

have lost control of our own defense.

Secondly, the ballistic missile offers no

means of reporting back to our command

centers on the results of our counterattack. As a practical matter, once a

nuclear war has begun we would have

little or no intelligence about the enemy.

We would not know where we have hit

the enemy. We would not know where

to hit him again. We would not know

where his remaining shots are coming

from. The only way we would know

that he is still in business is by the

punishment he would be delivering on

us. This, I maintain, is a classic example

of finding out the hard way. It could

well mean that we would find out too

late.

These are some of the reasons why our

professional airmen insist upon manned

weapons in our defense force. A manned

bomber does not have to ride out an

enemy attack. It can be up and away

at the first warning, without waiting

to find out whether the attack is the

real thing, a feint, or an error. If the

warning turns out to be false, the bomber

can be recalled to its base.

Once the battle is joined, the bomber

provides a means of firsthand observation over enemy targets. It can vary

its attack to suit the situation. And it

can report back on the remaining targets

to be destroyed.

The value of these attributes of the

manned bomber is not limited to actual

warfare. Equally important to all of us

is that they promise such a certain and

accurate retaliation that an enemy

would be deterred from attacking us in

the first place. For this reason the universal mobility of the bomber is especially important. Because it can be exercised throughout the world, potential

aggressors as well as uncommitted peoples can see it. It is its own powerful

argument for peace. As Gen. Thomas

White has pointed out, it is not enough

for us to say to other nations, "Oh, you

should see the submarines we have under

the sea and the missiles we have in these

holes all over the United States." With

the manned bomber, seeing is believing.

Now, if the manned bomber is an essential part of our deterrent force, are

we seeing to it that we continue to maintain this deterrent in the future? The

B-70 intercontinental bomber was conceived for just this purpose. With its

curtailment to prototype status, where

does that leave us? Gen. Thomas Power

has told us that as a general rule of

thumb, a bomber is obsolete in 10 years.

He further said that the B-52 even with

the improved capabilities that will be

provided for it, will become obsolete any

time in the mid-1960's. That is, the performance of Soviet interceptors and

surface-to-air missiles will by that time

be such that the B-52 will no longer be

a serious threat.

It happens that, through the foresight and initiative of Air Force planners, the B-70 was programed to come

into operation at about the time that

the B-52 would become obsolete. In

comparison to the B-52, the B-70 has

an astounding performance. It will

have a speed of mach 3 or 2,000 miles

per hour-more than three times faster

than the B-52. In contrast to our experience with other supersonic aircraft,

it can maintain this mach 3 speed

throughout its entire mission, while also

maintaining an intercontinental range.

This speed is above the speed of the

fastest Soviet interceptors that are coming into operation. Moreover, due to

certain aerodynamic and thermodynamic problems, at such speeds, it is not

likely that the Soviets can build an interceptor that could make the B-70 obsolete within the immediate foreseeable

future.

So far as altitude is concerned, the

B-70 flies above 70,000 feet, which is

higher than the utmost reach of Soviet

defenses-either interceptors or surfaceto-air missiles. Moreover, the B-70 has

a substantial growth potential to still

higher altitudes, so that in this dimension, as well, it promises to hold up

strongly as a retaliatory threat for

many, many years.

Thirdly, the B-70 would carry a full

complement of the most advanced defensive countermeasures known, in order to confuse and divert enemy weapons. It also contains provision for substantial increase in electric power capacity, so that it can make use of new

advances in the countermeasure state of

the art.

As a result of its superior performance, the B-70 would obsolete the present Soviet defensive system. If the

Soviets wanted to build a system that

would be at least competitive with the

B-70, they would have to spend a far

greater amount than the cost to this

country of the B-70 program.

In short, the B-70-as it was

planned-offers assurance that it can

get through to enemy targets in the

period following the obsolescence of the

B-52. As Gen. Nathan Twining has

told us, it is the only manned weapon

system that was programed for this role.

There is no substitute. But since last

December, the B-70 has been removed

from the role.

There has been no denial on the part of

the administration of the considerations

that I have just discussed. Instead

there has been only a vague and unsupported explanation that the B-70 is in

competition with four ballistic missile

programs. This explanation, Mr. President, is deliberately vague. It cannot

get specific. If it does, it has to face up

to the fact that our retaliatory force

needs an effective manned intercontinental bomber, and that the only effective intercontinental bomber planned

for the future is the B-70.

If we do not provide such a weapon,

are we keeping faith with the brave

crewmen who will have to fly our bombers in case of war? As Gen. Thomas

Power has told us, "I think if men are

going to have to go over there with the

sophisticated defenses, this country owes

it to them to give them a modern piece

of equipment so it can survive."

Mr. President, I call for a reinstatement of the B-70 to its full weapon system program, and to this end, the provision of adequate funds in the 1961

budget.

AREA REDEVELOPMENT BILL-VETO

MESSAGE (S. DOC. NO. 95)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I

ask unanimous consent that the veto

message by the President of the area

redevelopment bill be laid before the

Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BYRD

of West Virginia in the chair) laid before the Senate the following message

from the President of the United States,

which was read and, with the accompanying bill, was ordered to lie on the

table and be printed:

To the Senate of the United States:

I return herewith, without my approval, S. 722, the area redevelopment

bill.

For 5 consecutive years I have urged

the Congress to enact sound area assistance legislation. On repeated occasions

I have clearly outlined standards for the

kind of program that is needed and that

I would gladly approve.

In 1958 I vetoed a bill because it departed greatly from those standards.

In 1959, despite my renewed urging, no

area assistance bill was passed by the

Congress.

Now in 1960, another election year, a

new bill is before me that contains certain features which I find even more

objectionable than those I found unacceptable in the 1958 bill.

10302 May 13
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

The people of the relatively few communities of chronic unemployment-who

want to share in the general prosperityare, after 5 years, properly becoming increasingly impatient and are rightfully

desirous of constructive action. The

need is for truly sound and helpful legislation on which the Congress and the

Executive can agree. There is still time,

and I willingly pledge once again my

wholehearted cooperation in obtaining

such a law.

S. 722 is seriously defective in six

major respects which are summarized

immediately below and discussed in detail thereafter.

1. S. 722 would squander the Federal

taxpayers' money where there is only

temporary economic difficulty, curable

without the special Federal assistance

provided in the bill. In consequence,

communities in genuine need would receive less Federal help for industrial

development projects than under the

administration's proposal.

2. Essential local, State, and private

initiative would be materially inhibited

by the excessive Federal participation

that S. 722 would authorize.

3. Federal financing of plant machinery and equipment is unwise and

unnecessary and therefore wasteful of

money that otherwise could be of real

help.

4. The Federal loan assistance which

S. 722 would provide for the construction of sewers, water mains, access roads,

and other public facilities is unneces- sary because such assistance is already

available under an existing Government

program. Outright grants for such a purpose, a provision of S. 722, are wholly

inappropriate.

5. The provisions for Federal loans

for the construction of industrial buildings in rural areas are incongruous and

unnecessary.

6. The creation of a new Federal

agency is not needed and would actually

delay initiation of the new program for

many months. I

The most striking defect of S. 722 is

that it would make eligible for Federal

assistance areas that don't need it-thus

providing less help for communities in

genuine need than would the administration's proposal. S. 722, as opposed

to the administration bill, would more thtn double the number of eligible communities competing for Federal participation in loans for the construction or

refurbishing of plants for industrial

use-the main objective of both bills.

Communities experiencing only temporary economic difficulty would accordingly be made eligible under S. 722 and

the dissipation of Federal help among

them would deprive communities afflicted with truly chronic unemployment

of the full measure of assistance they

so desperately desire and which the administration bill would give them.

II

Lasting solutions to the problems of

chronic unemployment can only be forthcoming if local citizens-the people most

immediately concerned-take the lead In

planning and financing them. The principal objective is to develop new industry. The Federal Government can and

should help, but the major role in the

undertaking must be the local community's. Neither money alone, nor the

Federal Government alone, can do the

job. The States also must help, and

many are, but in many instances and in

many ways they could do much more.

Under S. 722, however, financing of

industrial development projects by the

Federal Government-limited to 35 percent under the administration's proposal-could go as high as 65 percent,

local community participation could be

as low as 10 percent, and private financing as little as 5 percent. Furthermore,

although S. 722 conditions this assistance

on approval by a local economic development organization, if no such organization exists one can be appointed from

Washington. U'

S. 722 would authorize Federal loans

for the acquisition of machinery and

equipment to manufacturers locating in

eligible areas. Loans for machinery and

equipment are unnecessary, unwise, and

costly. Much more money would be re- quired and unnecessarily spent, much

less money would find its way into truly

helpful projects, and manufacturers

would be subsidized unnecessarily vis-avis their competitors.

IV

S. 722 would authorize further unnecessary spending by providing both loans

and grants-up to 100 percent of the

cost-for the construction of access

roads, sewers, water mains, and other

local public facilities.

Grants for local public facilities far

exceed any appropriate Federal responsibiity. Even though relatively modest

at the start, they would set predictably

expensive and discriminatory precedents.

With regard to loans for such purposes, exemption from Federal income

taxes makes it possible today for local

communities in almost every case to borrow on reasonable terms from private

sources. Whenever such financing is

difficult to obtain, the need can be filled

by the existing public facility loan

program of the Housing and Home

Finance Agency-a program which S.

722 would needlessly duplicate and for

which an additional $100 million authorization has already been requested.

V

S. 722 would make a minimum of 600

rural counties eligible for Federal loans

for the construction of industrial buildings in such areas. The rural development program and the Small Business

Administration are already contributing

greatly to the economic improvement of

low income rural areas. Increasing the

impact of these two activities, particularly the rural development program,

is a preferable course.

VI

Finally, S. 722 would also create a

new Federal agency and would, in consequence, mean many unnecessary additions to the Federal payroll and a

considerable delay in the program before

the new agency could be staffed and

functioning effectively. None of this Is

necessary, for all that needs to be done

can be done-much better and immediately-by the existing Department of

Commerce.

Again, I strongly urge the Congress to

enact new legislation at this session-but

without those features of S. 722 that I

find objectionable. I would, however,

accept the eligibility criteria set forth in

the bill that first passed the Senate

even though these criteria are broader

than those contained in the administration bill.

Moreover, during the process of developing a new bill, I would hope that in

other areas of past differences solutions

could be found satisfactory to both the

Congress and the Executive.

My profound hope is that sound, new

legislation will be promptly enacted. If

it is, our communities of chronic unemployment will be only the immediate

beneficiaries. A tone will have been set

that would hold forth, for the remainder

of the session, the hope of sound and rewarding legislation in other vital areasmutual security, wheat, sugar, minimum

wage, interest rates, revenue measures,

medical care for the aged, and aid to

education to mention but a few.

Only this result can truly serve the

finest and best interests of all our people.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 13, 1960.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, one of

the difficulties in our American political

system is that the President is at once

the ceremonial head of our Government

and the Chief of State, and also. the Chief

Executive and the leader of his party.

When one criticizes the President, therefore, one is always accused of belittling

the ceremonial head of the Government

or the Chief of State. Nevertheless, if

the President, as party leader, writes a

message which is ignorant, unduly

unctuous, and hypocritical, the message

cannot escape criticism because of the

fact that the man who signed his name

to it also happens to be the ceremonial

Chief of State.

Of course, President Eisenhower, in all

probability, did not write this message.

This was written for him either by someone in the executive office, or, as is more

probable, by someone in the Department

of Commerce.

I have a real liking for the President.

It is in no personal sense, therefore, that

I repeat, this message betrays ignorance,

it is unctuous and hypocritical, and it is

greatly mistaken in its attitude toward

what is happening in this country.

The President says that he is for area

redevelopment. My reply is that one

can only tell whether a person is for area redevelopment or not by his actions and

not by his words.

I should like very briefly to summarize

some of the things which have been happening in the last 4 or 5 years.

In 1955 I introduced a bill to provide

for area redevelopment. The administration opposed that bill. We passed the

bill through the Senate, in the concluding days of that Congress. The bill went

to the House. Informal requests were

1960 10303