IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2021 WY 73

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2021

June 7, 2021

SUE ANN PAGE,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

LINDSEY MEYERS and CALVIN JOHN 

PAGE, III, 

Appellees

(Defendants).

S-20-0221

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The Honorable Richard L. Lavery, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Michael Stulken, Newcastle, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:

Mark W. Harris of Harris Law Office, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
1

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Sue Ann Page sued her adult stepchildren Calvin John Page III (Calvin) and Lindsey 

Meyers (Lindsey) for negligent misrepresentation and intentional interference with a 

contract, claiming they caused their father—her late husband, Calvin John Page II—to 

remove her as the primary beneficiary of his insurance plan. The district court granted 

summary judgment to Calvin and Lindsey on both claims. Ms. Page appeals. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] The dispositive issue is:

Were Calvin and Lindsey entitled to summary judgment on 

Ms. Page’s claims for negligent misrepresentation and

intentional interference with a contract?

FACTS

[¶3] Ms. Page is the surviving spouse of Mr. Page, who died intestate in September 2015. 

Calvin and Lindsey are Mr. Page’s children from a previous marriage. Mr. Page worked 

for Tata Chemicals North America, Inc. (Tata), and entered into a contract for a life 

insurance plan through Tata several decades before his death. At one point, Ms. Page was 

the sole beneficiary of that insurance plan. When Ms. Page asked Tata about the life 

insurance following Mr. Page’s death, Tata informed her she was no longer the sole

beneficiary—Mr. Page had changed his designations in December 2011, naming Lindsey

the primary beneficiary and Ms. Page and Calvin as secondary beneficiaries. Lindsey

received a payout of $157,000. Ms. Page brought this action against Lindsey and Calvin 

in September 2018. 

[¶4] According to Ms. Page’s complaint, Mr. Page was suffering severely from the side 

effects of hepatitis C in 2011, and he was “completely disoriented.” Her complaint alleged

that Calvin and Lindsey took advantage of Mr. Page’s disorientation:

22. When Mr. Page was disoriented from the diagnosis of 

Hepatitis C in December of 2011, to the point that Mr. Page 

was not competent to make any decision with regard to the 

same, Mr. Page changed his beneficiary designations pursuant 

to the life insurance contract.

23. [Calvin and Lindsey] caused Mr. Page to change the 

beneficiary designation pursuant to the life insurance contract.
2

24. Upon the urging and direction of [Calvin and Lindsey], Mr. 

Page changed his beneficiary designation pursuant to the life 

insurance contract to [Lindsey and Calvin].

25. [Calvin and Lindsey] knew of Mr. Page[’s] disorientation, 

and took advantage of the same by changing the beneficiary 

designations of the referenced life insurance contract. Also,

upon information and belief, [Calvin and Lindsey] indicated 

that Mr. Page was competent to change his life insurance

contract beneficiary designation.

[¶5] Ms. Page brought claims against Calvin and Lindsey for negligent misrepresentation 

and intentional interference with a contract.

1

 In her claim for negligent misrepresentation

she alleged: Calvin and Lindsey supplied false information regarding Mr. Page’s 

competency and “capacity to change his beneficiary”; reliance was had on this false 

information; and Ms. Page suffered pecuniary loss in the amount of $157,000 as a result. 

In her claim for intentional interference with a contract she asserted: her primary 

beneficiary status was “[a] valid contractual relationship or business expectancy”; Calvin 

and Lindsey knew of this contract or expectancy; and they intentionally interfered with and 

caused termination of it. Calvin and Lindsey answered the complaint, and the parties 

engaged in discovery.2

 

[¶6] In their summary judgment motion and supporting memorandum, Calvin and 

Lindsey argued the parties’ discovery showed there was a lack of evidence to satisfy one 

or more of the essential elements of each of Ms. Page’s claims. Specifically, they argued 

Ms. Page could not establish: Calvin and Lindsey provided false information regarding Mr. 

Page’s competency or capacity to change his beneficiary designation; there was a valid 

contract or expectancy between Ms. Page and Mr. Page; or, if there was a valid contract, 

Calvin or Lindsey knew about and interfered with it. 

[¶7] The district court determined Calvin and Lindsey met their summary judgment 

burden. And, after examining the record from the vantage point most favorable to Ms. 

Page, the court concluded she failed to present evidence to establish any genuine dispute

of material fact on these elementsfor trial. The court therefore awarded summary judgment

to Calvin and Lindsey. Ms. Page appealed. 

1 Ms. Page also brought a negligence claim against Tata for allowing Mr. Page to change his beneficiary 

designation. Tata answered the complaint and participated in discovery. The district court then granted a 

stipulated motion to dismiss the claim against Tata with prejudice. 

2 As part of discovery, Ms. Page, Calvin, and Lindsey all gave depositions. Ms. Page and her daughter 

provided sworn affidavits. Other discovery materials included: documents regarding the payment to 

Lindsey; the December 2011 beneficiary designation form; several of Mr. Page’s designation change forms 

dating back to 1981; and some of Mr. Page’s medical records. Though not part of the record on appeal, the 

record makes clear that Tata also produced numerous documents as part of discovery. 
3

[¶8] We include additional facts below as necessary to our discussion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9] Our standard of review on summary judgment is well established. We review the 

district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo and can affirm on any legal 

grounds provided in the record. Burns v. Sam, 2021 WY 10, ¶ 7, 479 P.3d 741, 743 (Wyo. 

2021) (citing Warwick v. Accessible Space, Inc., 2019 WY 89, ¶ 9, 448 P.3d 206, 210 

(Wyo. 2019)).

[W]e review a summary judgment in the same light as the 

district court, using the same materials and following the same 

standards. We examine the record from the vantage point most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 

party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be 

drawn from the record. A material fact is one which, if proved, 

would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential 

element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the 

parties.

Id. ¶ 7, 479 P.3d at 744 (quoting Warwick, ¶ 9, 448 P.3d at 210–11).

DISCUSSION

I. Negligent Misrepresentation

[¶10] As the moving parties, Calvin and Lindsey must establish a prima facie case for 

summary judgment. Id. (citing Warwick, ¶ 10, 448 P.3d at 211). Because they do not bear 

the ultimate burden of persuasion, they can establish their prima facie case “by showing a 

lack of evidence” on essential elements of Ms. Page’s claims. Id. (quoting Warwick, ¶ 10, 

448 P.3d at 211); see, e.g., Rammell v. Mountainaire Animal Clinic, P.C., 2019 WY 53, 

¶¶ 27–28, 442 P.3d 41, 49 (Wyo. 2019) (defendant presented evidence showing plaintiff 

could not establish the elements of tortious interference with a contract); Mantle v. N. Star 

Energy & Constr. LLC, 2019 WY 29, ¶ 116, 437 P.3d 758, 796 (Wyo. 2019) (defendant 

presented evidence showing plaintiff could not establish transfers were fraudulent).

[¶11] If Calvin and Lindsey make their prima facie case, the burden shifts to Ms. Page to 

show evidence exists to satisfy each essential element at issue, and thereby establish a 

genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Burns, ¶ 7, 479 P.3d at 744 (citing Warwick, 

¶ 11, 448 P.3d at 211). As the party opposing the summary judgment motion, Ms. Page’s 

evidence “must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments 

be entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 

wishful speculation.” Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 8, 13 (Wyo. 
4

2006) (quoting Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886, 890 (Wyo. 

2006)). “Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even 

probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact” on any essential element. 

Id. (quoting Cook, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d at 890).

[¶12] The elements of negligent misrepresentation are:

One who, in the course of his business, profession or 

employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a 

pecuniary interest, [1] supplies false information for the 

guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to 

liability for [2] pecuniary loss caused to them by [3] their 

justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise 

reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating 

the information.

Action Snowmobile & RV, Inc. v. Most Wanted Performance, LLC, 2018 WY 89, ¶ 9, 423 

P.3d 317, 321 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, 

¶ 42, 75 P.3d 640, 656 (Wyo. 2003)). Ms. Page must establish a disputed issue of material 

fact on each element for which Calvin and Lindsey have made a prima facie showing, see 

Burns, ¶ 7, 479 P.3d at 744 (citing Warwick, ¶ 11, 448 P.3d at 211); her failure to do so on 

any one is a sufficient basis to affirm summary judgment in favor of Calvin and Lindsey. 

[¶13] In her complaint, Ms. Page alleged:

35. When [Calvin and Lindsey] caused Mr. Page to change his 

life insurance contract beneficiary designation, they supplied 

false information, to wit: That Mr. Page was competent and 

had the capacity to change his beneficiary designation.

36. Reliance was had as to these representations and [Calvin 

and Lindsey] presented this information for the guidance of 

others.

37. [Calvin and Lindsey] failed to exercise reasonable care in 

relating the information.

38. [Ms. Page] has had pecuniary loss as a result of the 

justifiable reliance thereon in the amount of $157,000.

Notably, the complaint nowhere identified to whom Calvin and Lindsey supplied the “false 

information” or who then relied on that information. 
5

[¶14] Calvin and Lindsey moved for summary judgment arguing there was a lack of 

evidence to show they provided false information to Tata, the insurer, or anyone else 

regarding Mr. Page’s competency. Thus, they contended Ms. Page could not satisfy that

essential element of her negligent misrepresentation claim. They asserted that nothing in 

“the several hundred or thousands of pages of documents produced in discovery” showed 

they ever supplied information to Tata or the insurer regarding their father’s competency. 

They further showed that evidence to support Ms. Page’s “false information” allegation 

could not be found in any of the parties’ three depositions. To the contrary, Lindsey

testified her only contact with Tata was after Mr. Page’s death; Calvin testified he never 

had any contact with Tata; and, Ms. Page testified she did not know whether any one was 

present when Mr. Page made the beneficiary change—she only assumed Lindsey or Calvin 

was there—and no one told her that Calvin or Lindsey provided false information regarding 

Mr. Page’s competency.

[¶15] Ms. Page mischaracterizes Calvin and Lindsey’s reliance on the absence of evidence 

as reliance on “inadmissible evidence.” Her argument seems to derive from the district 

court’s comment that Calvin and Lindsey did “not submit admissible evidence on this 

point[.]” The record makes clear, however, that the court was not implying it was relying 

on inadmissible evidence. Rather, the court understood that Calvin and Lindsey were 

relying on the absence of any evidence in the several “hundreds or thousands of pages of 

documents from Tata or the insurer” that suggested Calvin or Lindsey provided any 

information, let alone false information. On our review of the record, we must agree with 

the district court that Ms. Page did not dispute the absence of such evidence. Because 

Calvin and Lindsey were entitled to rely on the absence of evidence to refute Ms. Page’s 

“false information” allegation, see Burns, ¶ 7, 479 P.3d at 744 (citation omitted), we 

conclude they made their prima facie case in support of summary judgment.

[¶16] Shifting the burden, the question becomes whether Ms. Page established there was 

a dispute of material fact concerning the “false information” element. Id. (citing Warwick, 

¶ 11, 448 P.3d at 211). The record, viewed in Ms. Page’s favor, contains no evidence to 

support her false information allegation. Rather than directly challenge Calvin and 

Lindsey’s assertion that no evidence exists to support this element, Ms. Page responded to 

the summary judgment motion with evidence regarding Mr. Page’s medical condition; the 

strained relationship between herself and Calvin and Lindsey; and Calvin and Lindsey’s 

pecuniary interest in Mr. Page’s life insurance. She also emphasized that she, Calvin, and 

Lindsey were the only people to drive Mr. Page around during this time, and claimed she 

did not drive Mr. Page to change his beneficiary designation so Calvin or Lindsey must 

have. At best, this evidence reflects Ms. Page’s speculation. It does not establish an issue 

of material fact for summary judgment.

[¶17] Ms. Page nevertheless argues she set forth enough circumstantial evidence—the 

timing of the beneficiary change and Mr. Page’s confusion, the strained relationships, and 

the fact that Calvin and Lindsey drove Mr. Page around—to defeat the summary judgment 
6

motion if we give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences from that evidence. We 

reiterate, however, that the essential element in question is whether Calvin and Lindsey 

provided false information regarding Mr. Page’s competency. Ms. Page provides nothing 

to dispute the lack of direct evidence on the false information element, and the evidence

she puts forth does not support a reasonable inference that Calvin and Lindsey supplied 

false information. 

[¶18] Ms. Page also challenges the district court’s finding that her negligent 

misrepresentation claim was “internally inconsistent” because the law requires that the 

party who suffers the pecuniary loss be the same party who was provided, and justifiably 

relied on, the false information.3

 She claims those parties need not be one in the same. 

The district court did not consider the noted inconsistency necessary to its summary 

judgment ruling, and neither do we. The dispositive issue is whether Ms. Page presented 

evidence sufficient to defeat Calvin and Lindsey’s prima facie case. For the reasons 

explained above, she did not. Ms. Page’s failure to establish a disputed issue of material 

fact concerning whether Calvin and Lindsey supplied false information is sufficient

grounds for us to affirm summary judgment in favor of Calvin and Lindsey on Ms. Page’s 

claim for negligent misrepresentation.

II. Intentional Interference with a Contract

[¶19]

The elements of a claim of intentional interference with a 

contract are: (1) the existence of a contract between the 

plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the 

contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional and improper 

interference with the contract which induced or caused a 

breach; and (4) resulting damages.

Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer Dist.,

2007 WY 206, ¶ 21, 173 P.3d 398, 404 (Wyo. 2007) (citation omitted).

3 The district court explained:

But even if the Court assumes for the sake of argument that Defendants 

supplied false information to Tata or the insurer, this case does not claim 

that Defendants should be liable for pecuniary loss caused to them by their

reliance on the information. Conversely, Plaintiff claims Defendants 

caused pecuniary loss to Plaintiff, but does not claim that Defendants 

supplied false information for Plaintiff’s guidance in Plaintiff’s business 

transactions. Stated differently, Plaintiff’s claim for negligent 

misrepresentation in this case is internally inconsistent.
7

[¶20] Ms. Page’s complaint alleged:

40. A valid contractual relationship or business expectancy 

existed in this case, to wit: [Ms. Page] being designated as the 

sole beneficiary to the referenced life insurance.

41. [Calvin and Lindsey] knew of this contractual relationship 

or business expectancy.

42. [Calvin and Lindsey] intentionally interfered in the 

aforesaid business expectancy, causing the termination thereof.

43. [Ms. Page] has been damaged because of this interference 

or business or contractual relationship disruption in the amount 

of $157,000.

[¶21] When Calvin and Lindsey moved for summary judgment, they argued they were 

entitled to relief as a matter of law because Ms. Page was not a party to the life insurance 

contract. Only in her summary judgment response did Ms. Page clarify she was not 

claiming intentional interference with the life insurance contract, but rather with the 

“contract” that arose when Mr. Page indicated to her that she and her daughter would “be 

taken care of upon [his] death.” Her affidavit in opposition to summary judgment stated:

During our marriage, Mr. Page indicated [] he would “take 

care” of my daughter and I. He specifically said that he would 

make sure that my daughter, Michaela, and I would be 

financial[ly] secure upon his death. This included that I would 

receive his life insurance proceeds. Mr. Page wanted to make 

sure of this especially since he had adopted Michaela.

In reply, Calvin and Lindsey objected to Ms. Page identifying “a new and completely 

different contract” after discovery had closed and they had moved for summary judgment. 

The district court considered Ms. Page’s clarified claim, but concluded that, at most, she 

established the existence of a promise, not a contract, between her and Mr. Page. 

[¶22] Ms. Page argues she did establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

an implied contract existed between her and Mr. Page. And she asserts the implied contract

was formed when Mr. Page offered to name her his primary beneficiary and she accepted. 

As consideration for the agreement, she claims she took care of Mr. Page, drove him to 

doctor appointments, and allowed him to adopt her daughter.4

 

4 To establish an implied contract, a party must prove offer, acceptance, and consideration. Rogers v. 

Wright, 2016 WY 10, ¶ 45, 366 P.3d 1264, 1278 (Wyo. 2016).
8

[¶23] Ms. Page cites to her affidavit to support her claim there was consideration sufficient 

to create an implied contract, but it provides no such support. Her affidavit avers that only 

she, Calvin, and Lindsey drove Mr. Page around during that time. It makes no mention of 

why she drove Mr. Page to his doctor appointments. Her affidavit also mentions that Mr. 

Page adopted her daughter, but it does not relate the adoption to the fulfillment of any 

agreement between Ms. Page and Mr. Page. Consequently, these assertions do not provide 

evidence for or support any reasonable inference that there was a disputed issue of material 

fact for trial concerning whether the consideration element of an implied contract could be 

satisfied.

[¶24] In sum, we found nothing in Ms. Page’s affidavit, her deposition, or elsewhere in 

the record to support a disputed issue of fact that Ms. Page provided consideration to Mr. 

Page in exchange for her beneficiary status. On the contrary, Ms. Page stated in her 

deposition that she and Mr. Page never discussed him listing her as his beneficiary until 

after he had done so, and that they never discussed the subsequent changes he made to 

reflect her name change after they married and when he added and removed her daughter 

from the policy. And she testified he first designated her as his beneficiary in 2006, which 

was five years prior to when he became disoriented, and before he needed to be taken care 

of. These undisputed facts undermine Ms. Page’s argument that she accepted Mr. Page’s 

offer to be the primary beneficiary on his life insurance and that she provided him 

consideration in return.

[¶25] Reviewing the record in Ms. Page’s favor, we conclude she failed to establish a 

dispute of material fact as to whether a valid contract existed between her and Mr. Page. 

Calvin and Lindsey are therefore entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

[¶26] We affirm.