F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

L E N A C H I L D S , an individual; D O N A L D C H I L D S , an individual; T. C H I L D S , a minor by

and throug h her
g uardian ad litem, L ena Childs; A. C H I L D S , a minor by

and throug h her
g uardian ad litem, L ena Childs,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

,

v

.

S A N D I E G O F A M I L

Y H O U S I

N G L L C, a California L imited L iability Corporation; L I

N C O L N M I L I T A R

Y P R O P E R T Y M A N A G E M E N T , L P, a Delaware L imited Partnership,

Defendants-Appellants

,

and

I N D E P T H C O R

P O R A T I O N , a California Corporation; D O E S , 1 throug h 25 inclusive, Defendants. N o. 20-56049

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-02329- J M-MDD

OPI NI ONC H I L D S V

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A ppeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California J effrey T. Miller, District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted Aug ust 31, 2021 Pasadena, California

F iled J anuary

14, 2022

B efore: Sandra S. I

k uta, Mark J . B ennett, and Ry an D. Nelson, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by J udg e I k

uta

SUMMARY *

Appellate Jurisdiction

The panel dismissed, for lack of appellate jurisdiction, defendants’ appeal from the district court’s order d e ny ing their claim of derivative sovereig n immunity in a tort suit concerning military

housing

.

The panel held that the district c ourt’s order was not immediately a

ppealable under the c o llateral order doctrine, under w hich an order that does n ot terminate the litig ation is nonetheless treated as final if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) reso lves an important issue completely separate f

rom the merits of the act i o n , and ( 3) is

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.C H I L D S V

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effectively unreview a b l e on appeal from a final judg ment. J oining the Fi fth Circuit, the panel h eld that the first two prong s w ere satisfied, but the denial of der i v a t i v e sovereig n immunity was not e ffectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg ment because deny ing an immediate appeal would not imperil a substantial public interest. The panel held that the public interest underly ing derivative sovereig n immunity is ex tending the federal g overnme n t ’ s immunity from liability

, in n arrow circumstances, to g overnment ag ents carry ing out the federal g overnment’s directions

, and this interest could be vindicated after trial. The pan el concluded that Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez
, 577 U.S. 153 (2016), did
not undercut Ninth Ci r c uit case law holding that federal sovereig n immunity and g overnment contractor immunity protect d efendants from lia b i l i ty , rather than providing immunity from suit.

COUNSEL

Don W illenburg (arg

ued), Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani L L P, Oakland, California ; Kristin N. Rey na Deha r t and Matthew P. N ug ent, G ordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani L L P, San D ieg o, Californ ia; for DefendantsAppellants.

Martin Nebrida B uchanan ( arg ued), L aw Offices of Martin N

. B uchanan, San Dieg o, California; Robert J

. F itz patrick, F itz patrick L aw APC
, S a n Dieg o, California, for PlaintiffsAppellees.C H I L D S V

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Daniel W inik (arg

u ed) a nd H. Thomas B y

ron I I I
, Appellate Staff; Randy S. Grossman, Acting United Stat e s Attorney ; B rian M. B o y

nton, A cting Assistant Attorney General; Un i t e d States Department of J ustice, Civil D ivision, W a shing ton, D. C .; for Amicus Curiae United States o f America.

OP INION

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e:

I n this a ppeal, d efendants claim they have derivative

sover ei g n immunity u nder Y earsley v. W

.A. Ross Construction Co.
, 309 U.S. 18 ( 1 9 4 0), and therefore the d i s t rict court should have g ranted their motion to dismiss

. W e hold that a district court order deny i n g a cl aim o f derivative sovereig n immunity is not immediately appealable under the c ollateral order d octrine, see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.
, 3 3 7 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), and therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I

Donald Childs and his fa m i l y leased a house in military family housing at Na v al Amphibious B ase Coronado near San Dieg o while Childs was o n active duty in the Navy

. The military housing was owned by San Dieg o F amily Housing

, L L C, (SDF H), a public-private v enture created by statute, in which the United States N a v y is a minority L L C member. S D F H c o n t r a c t e d w i t h L i n c o l n M i l i t a r y P r o p e r t y M a n a g e m e n t , L. P

. , ( Li n c o l n ) t o p r o v i d e p r o p e r t y manag ement services.C H I L D S V

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Soon after moving in, the Childs family reported a series of w ater-intrusion and mold problems in their home to SDF H and L in c o l n. SDF H, L incoln, and I nDepth, a mold remediation company re t a i n ed by L incoln, were unable to resolve the problem to the Childs family ’s satisfaction. The Childs f amily broug ht s u it in California state court alleg ing
neg lig ence and o ther state t o r t c laims. SDF H and L incoln removed the case to federal court based on federal e n clave jurisdiction and other theories.

Once in federal c o u r t, SDF H and L incoln moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 1 SDF H and L incoln asse r t e d they were g overnment contractors acting at the direction of the federal g overnment, and therefore had d e r ivative sovereig n immunity

. See Y e a rsley

, 3 09 U.S. a t 22. The C h i lds family opposed the motion. So did the United States, which filed a statement o f interest in the case with the permission of the district court.

The district court held that SDF H and L incoln were not entitled to derivative sovereig n immunity under Y earsley a nd denied the motion to dismiss. SDF H and L incoln appealed the order. The court entered a p a r t i a l stay of proceeding s pending resolution of the appeal.

1 Ru le 1 2 (b )(1 ) o f th e F e d e r al Ru les o f Civ il P ro ced u re p ro v id es:

“ Ev ery d ef

en se to a claim f

o r relief in an y p l ead in g m u st b e asserted in th e

r e s p o n s i v e p lead in g if o n e is req u ired

. B u t a p arty m ay assert th e f o llo w in g d ef

en ses b y m otio n : (1 ) lack o f su b j ect- m atter j u risd i ctio n .” Fed . R. Civ . P . 1 2 (b )(1 ).C H I L D S V

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I I

The question b efore u s is whether we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to hear the appeal of the dismissal order. “[ W ] e have jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction to h ear the case.” Atl. Nat’l Tr. LLC v

. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co.
, 621 F .3d 9 3 1
, 9 3 3 (9th Cir. 2010) ( q u o t ing Aguon-Schulte v. Guam Election Comm’n
, 469 F .3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2006)).

A

W e “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the d istrict courts o f the United States.” 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291. This means “that a party may not take a n ap p e a l u n der this section until t h e r e h a s been a d ecision b y the District Court that en d s t h e litig ation o n the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but ex ecute the judg ment.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord

, 4 49 U.S. 368, 373 (1981) (cleaned u p). Under the Supreme Cour t ’ s collateral order doctrine, however, the term “final decisions” in § 1291 also includes “a

narrow class o f decisions that do not terminate the litig ation, but must, in the interest of achieving a h ealthy leg al sy stem, nonetheless be treated as final.” Digit. E q u i p

. Corp. v

. Desktop Direct, Inc.
, 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (cleaned u p). The Supreme Court has emphasiz e d that this doctrine is
narrow, because otherwise the doctrine could “overpower the substantial fin a l i t y interests § 1291 is meant to further,” including judicial efficiency

. W ill v. Hallock , 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006).

To fall within the n ar r o w c l ass of o rders satisfy ing the Supreme Court’s collatera l o r der doctrine, an order must (1) “conclusively determine the d isputed question,”C H I L D S V

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(2) “ resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,” and (3) “be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg ment.” Id. at 349 (quo t i ng P

. R. A q ueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & E ddy, I nc. , 50 6 U

. S

. 139, 144 (1993)). 2 W hen the Court d etermines that a ty pe o f order is immediately appealable, that ruling is applicable to all orders in that categ o ry

. V an Cauwenberghe v. Biard

, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (198 8 ) ( “ I n fashioning a rule o f appealability under § 1291, however, we look to categ o ries o f
cases, not t o particular injustices.”); see also Carroll v

. Un ited States
, 354 U .S. 394, 405 (1957) (“Appeal rig hts cannot depend on the facts of a particular case.”).

Some categ o r i es of orders deny ing dismissal on the
g round of immunity fro m s u i t are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. This i n c l udes orders deny ing motions to dismiss on the g r o u n d s of absolute immunity

, Nixon v. Fitzgerald

, 457 U.S. 731, 742–43 ( 1 982); qualified immunity

, Mitchell v. Forsyth

, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); a state’s Eleventh A mendment immunity

, P

. R. Aqueduct

, 506 U.S. a t 144–45; and rig h ts u n der the D ouble J eopardy Clause, Abney v. United Sta t e s , 431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977).

Despite its ruling s in this line of cases, the Supreme Court has declined t o derive a r ule that the denial of any ty pe o f immunity from suit is immed i a tely appealable. Hallock

, 546 U .S. at 351. Such a rule would g o too far, the Supreme Court held, because “ collateral order a ppeal would b e a matter of rig ht whenever the Government lost a motion to dismiss u nder the Tort Claims Act, or a federal officer lost

2 Becau se t h e s e th ree co n d i tio n s w ere f irst set f o rth in Co h en , 3 3 7 U.S. at 5 4 6 , th is test is o f ten ref erred to as th e Co h en test.C H I L D S V

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one on a Bivens action,” and “§ 1291 would fa d e o ut whenever the G overnment or an o fficial lost an early round.” Id. at 353–54; see also Digit. Equip. Corp.
, 511 U.S. at 873 (ex plaining that the focus on a “rig h t n o t to stand trial” is mis placed because “virtually every rig ht that could be enforced appropriately by p retrial dismissal mig ht loosely be described as conferring a ‘rig h t not t o s t and trial’”). Therefore, H

allock held that the third prong of the collateral order doc trine is satisfied only if deny ing an immediate appeal and requiring the defendant to stand trial would “imperil a substantial p ublic interest,” such as “honoring the separation of p owers, preserving the effic i e n c y o f g overnment and the initiative of its o fficials, r especting a State’s dig nitary interests, and mitig ating the g overnment’s advantag e over the individual.” Id. at 352–53.

B

Here, the order deny ing the motion to dismiss the Childs’ complaint was not one that “ends the litig ation on the merits,” and the district court did not certify its order for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 129 2 ( b )

. Therefore, we have appellate jurisdiction over this or d e r o n l y if it qualifies as a final order under the collateral order doctrine.

The parties do not dispute that the first two prong s of the collateral order doctrine are satisfied: the orde r i n this case conclusively determined the disputed question as to whether the defendants were entitled to derivative so v e reig n immunity under Y earsley

, and that decision resolved an important issue separate from the merit s o f the a c tion. Therefore, we consider the question whether t h e d enial of derivative sovereig n immunity

is “effectively

unreviewable” on appeal from a final judg ment because such a denial would “imperilC H I L D S V

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a substantial public interest” that meets the requirements i n Hallock . 546 U.S. at 353.

To make this determination, we beg in by identify ing the public interest in Y

e arsley

. I n Y

earsley

, p laintiffs sou ght damag es from a company whose construction of dikes in the Missouri River “ washed away ” part of the plaintiffs ’ l a nd. 309 U.S. at 19. B ecause the company ’s work “w as all authoriz ed and directed by the Government of th e U n i ted States for the purpose of improving the navig ati o n of this navig able river,” and the g ove r n m e n t would be responsible for providing the plai n t i f f s just compensation if the action

c o n stituted a taking

, Y

earsley held “there is no g round for holding [the g overnment’s] ag ent liable who is simply acting under the authority thus validly conferred.” Id

. at 20–22. W e later held that the derivative sovereig n immunity e stablished by Y earsley “is limited to cases in which a contractor ‘had no discretion in the desig n process and co m p letely followed
g overnment specifications,’” and does not ex tend to “military

c o n t ra c t o r s e x er c i s i n g a discretiona r y go v er n m e n t al function.” Cabalce v. Thomas E. B lanchard & Assocs., Inc.
, 79 7 F

. 3d 720, 732 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig.
, 534 F .3d 986, 1 0 0 1 (9th Cir. 2008)). B ased on these precedents, the public inter e s t underly ing derivative sovereig n immunity is e x t ending the federal
go v e r n m e n t ’ s i m m u n i t y f r o m l i a b i l i t y , i n n a r r o w circumstances, to g overnment ag ents c arry ing o ut the federal
g overnment’s directions.

Having identified the public interest at stake, we nex t turn to the question whether this p u blic interest is a substantial o ne that meets the standard in Hallock

. Our inquiry is g uided b y

c ases considering a

nalog ous claims of immunity

. Alt h o u gh

we have not directly conside r e d the applicability of theC H I L D S V

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collateral order doctrine to the denial of claims of derivative sovereig n immunity under Y earsley

, we h ave previously h eld that the collateral order doctr i n e does not apply to orders deny ing assertions of sovereig n immunity of the federal sovereig n itself, see State of Alaska v. United States
, 64 F .3d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1 9 9 5 )

, or orders deny ing assertions o f the government contractor d efense, Rodriguez v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
, 627 F .3d 1259, 1262 (9th Cir. 2010). B ecause both of these categ ories of claims a re based on the sovereig n immunity of the federal g overnment, much like derivative sovereig n immunity under Y ears ley

, we are g uided by their analy sis of whether the interest at issue meets the third prong of the collateral order doctrine. 3

I n Alaska

, we held that Cong ress has carved “such broad

ex c e ptions” out o f federal sovereig n immunity by statute that the United States e ff

ectively surrendered its rig ht to be free from suit in its own courts. 6 4 F .3d at 1356 & n.7 (citing Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc. v. U nited States , 23 F .3d 1166, 1169 (7th C ir. 1994)). Therefore, “federal sovereig n immunity is not best characteriz e d as a ‘rig ht n ot to stand trial altog ether,’” but is “ more accura t e l y considered a rig ht to prevail at trial, i.e.
, a d e fe n s e to pay ment of damag es.” Id.
at 1355. W e ex plained t hat the public interest in reviewing the denial of federal sovereig n i m m u n i ty is n ot “ weig htier than the societal interests advanced b y the ordinary operation of fina l judg ment principles,” because the only hardship

3 In d eed

, th e g o v ern m en t co n tracto r d ef en se an d d eriv ativ e s o v ereig n im m u n ity b o th d eriv ed f ro m Yea rsley. S

ee In re Ha n

fo rd Nu clea r Rsrv. Litig

. , 5 34 F.3 d at 10 0 1 (h o ld in g t h a t t h e Su p rem e Co u

rt “ p lan ted th e seed s o f th e g o v ern m en t co n tracto r d ef en s e ” in Yea rsley

, b ef

ore

ex p an d in g th e d o ctrin e in Bo yle v. Un i ted

Tech n o lo g ies Co rp

. , 4 8 7 U.S. 5 0 0 (1 98 8 )).C H I L D S V

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imposed by postponing review is “the need t o prepare for trials.” Id

. a t 1356 (quoting D igit. Equip. Corp.
, 511 U.S.
at 879)

. W e therefore concluded that “ [ t] he interest served by federal sovereig n im m u n i ty ( the United States’ f reedom from pay ing damag es without Cong ressional consent) may be served equally well if review follows a f inal judg ment on the merits,” and therefore an o r d e r deny ing federal sovereig n immunity is not a n i m mediately appealable collateral order. Id. at 1355.

L ike derivative s o v ereig n immunity

, the g overnment

co n t r actor defense “shields c o n tractors from tort liability in
state or federal actions where p laintiffs alleg e they sustained injuries as a result of ex posure t o d efective products o r equipment manufact

u r ed or supplied under a g overnment contract.” Rodriguez

, 627 F .3d at 1265. Rodriguez held that the g o vernment contractor d efense provided “only a corollary financial benefit flowing f rom the go v e rnment’s sovereig n immunity .” Id. at 1266. Therefore, a n o r d e r deny ing the
g overnment contractor defense c ould be reviewed effectively after final judg ment and w as not immediately appealable. Id.

Our c o n clusion in Alaska that the interest served b y federal sovereig n immunity ( i.e.
, g iving th e g overnment a defense to pay

ment of damag es) “may be served equally w ell if r eview follows a final judg me n t on the merits,” 64 F .3d
at 1355, is applicable to parties claiming derivative sovereig n immunity u n d er Y

e a rsley

, see 3 0 9 U.S. at 1 9–20. And our reasoning i n R o driguez that the interest served by the
g overnment contractor immuni t y ( i.e.
, g iving contractors a shiel d f rom financial liability ) can b e v indicated after trial,

see 627 F .3d at 1 266, is also applicable t o p a rties claiming d e r ivative sovereig n immunity

. Therefore, the reasoning of A laska and Rodriguez compels the conclusion that it w o u l dC H I L D S V

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not “imperil a substantial public interest,” Hallock

, 546 U.S.

a t 353, to require a g o vernment contractor with derivati v e sovereig n immunity und e r Y earsley to stand trial. T o the contrary , immediate a

ppellate review of such an o rder would b e “ s i m p l y a b b r e v i a t i n g l i t i ga t i o n t r o u b l e s o m e t o Government employ ees,” which the Supreme Court has h eld is an insufficient basis to apply the collateral order doctrine. Id. ; see also Alaska , 64 F .3d at 1356.

B e cause t h e denial of derivative sovereig n immunity under Y earsley is effectively review a b l e after trial, the third
prong of the colla t e r a l order d octrine is not satisfied. Therefore, we hold that the denial of a motion to dismiss on the g r ound of derivative sovereig n immunity under Y earsley is not immediately appealab l e under the collateral order doctrine. I n reaching this conclus i on, we join the F ifth Circuit’s well-reasoned conclusion t h a t the denial o f derivative s o vereig n immunity under Y earsley is not immediately appealable. M artin v. Hall i b u rton , 6 18 F .3d 476, 485 & n.14 (5th Cir. 2010).

SDF H and L incoln arg ue that our reasoning in A laska a nd R odriguez has been undercut b y the Supreme Cour t ’s decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez
, 577 U.S. 153 (2016). I n Campbell

, the Supreme Court considered whether

a fe d e r al contractor who violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending tex t messag es to individuals w ho had not ag reed to receive them could claim derivative sovereig n im m u n i t y under Y earsley. See id. at 156. I n the

course o f holding that a p arty is not entitled to de ri v ative sovereig n immunity if it v i olates both federal law and the Government’s ex plicit i n structions, the Court in passing framed the q

uestion presented a s whether a contracto r w a s “immune from suit” under Y earsley

. Id. at 166. A ccordingC H I L D S V

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to the d e fendants, this p assing r eference overrules the reasoning in Alaska and Rodriguez that feder al sovereig n immunity and g ov ernment contractor immunity protected defendants from liability , not immunity from suit.

W e disa g ree. The few brief references in CampbellEwald —which merely restates the Supreme Court’s long standing classification of f ederal sovereig n immunity a s immunity from suit, see, e.g. , FDIC v. Meyer
, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)—have not “under c u t the theory or r easoning underly ing ” Ala ska and Rodriguez “in such a way that the

cases are clearly irreconcilable,” Miller v. Gammie
, 335 F .3d 889, 9 0 0 (9th Cir. 2003) (en b anc). Unlike Campbell-Ewald

, which considered t h e scope of a g overnment contractor’s immunity

, Alaska and Rodriguez analy z ed whether the interests at stake when a district court denies a m o t i o n to dismiss based on a claim of federal s overeig n immunity o r the g overnment contractor defense a re i mportant enoug h to merit an immediate appeal. T his is ex actl y t h e i nquiry required by Hallock

. Campbell-Ewald ’s passing c omments do not impact our conclusions in A las k a a n d Rodriguez that the in t e r e s t in avoiding a judg ment of d a mag es is insufficiently weig hty to satisfy the third p rong o f t he collateral order doctr ine

. “[ I ] t is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public inter e s t , that c ounts when asking whether an order is ‘effectively ’ unreviewable if r eview is to be l e f t u ntil later.” Hallock

, 546 U.S. a t 353 (emphasis added) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay , 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). 4

4 B ecau se th e t

h ird pro n g o f th e co llat e r a l o r d er d o ctrin e req u i res

c o n sid eratio n o f w

h eth er b ein g f

o rced to stan d trial w o u ld im p er i l a

su b stan tial p u

b lic in terest, Ha llo ck

, 5 4 6 U.S. a t 3 5 3
, SDFH’ s an d L in co ln ’ s relian ce o n Cu n ni n g h a m v. G en era l Dyn a mics In fo rma tio nC H I L D S V

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I I I

The district court’s order was not an immediately appealable collateral o rder, and SDF H and L incoln fail to ide n t ify a ny other statutory basis that permits us to ex ercise jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Therefore, we lack appellate jurisdiction u nder 28 U.S.C. § 1291. S ee Cohen

, 337 U.S. at 545–47.

DISMISSED.

Tech n o lo g

y, In c. , 8 8 8 F.3 d 6 4 0
, 6 49

– 5 1 (4 th Cir. 2 0 1 8), is m i s p laced

. A lth o u g h Cu n n i n g h a m stated th at d eriv ativ e s o v ereig n im m u n ity u n der Yea rsley p ro v i d e s i m

m u n ity f ro m s u i t, it d i d n o t ad d ress th e d istin ct q u estio n w

h eth er an o rd er d en y in g deriv ativ e so v ereig n im m u n ity w ou ld im p eril a s u b stan tial p u

b lic in terest. Fo r th e sam e reaso n , SDFH an d L in co ln ’ s attem

p t to an alo g ize d eriv ativ e so v ereig n i m m u n ity to qu alif

ied im m u n ity f ails, b ecau se th e d en ial o f q u alif ied im m u n ity w o u ld im

p act th e

su b stan ti a l p u

b lic in terest in in d u cin g “ of f icials to s h o w reaso n ab le in itiativ e w

h en t h e relev an t law i s n o t ‘ clearly es tab lish ed .’ ” Ha llo ck

, 5 4 6 U .S. at 35 3 (q u o tin g H a rlo w v. Fitzg era ld

, 4 5 7 U.S. 8 0 0
, 8 18 (1 9 8 2 )). B y co n trast, th e d en ial o f d eriv ativ e so v ereig n im m u n ity d o es n ot im

p eril

an y sim i larly su b stan tial p u

b l ic in terest. S

ee su p ra at 1 2

.