This decision was not selected for publication inthe New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of non-precedential dispositions. Please also note that this electronic decision may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Supreme Court. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 Filing Date: July 19, 2018 2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4

v. NO. S-1-SC-35942 5 ALBERT TEGEDA, III, 6 Defendant-Appellant. 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 8 Steven L. Bell, District Judge 9 Robert Tangora, L.L.C. 10 Robert Tangora 11 Santa Fe, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 14 John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 DECISION 182 MAES, Justice 1 {1} Following a three-day jury trial, Defe ndant Albert Tegeda was found guilty of 2 first-degree murder for willfully and deliberately killing Celso Martinez contrary to 3 NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994). The jury acquitted Defendant of the 4 charge of conspiracy to commit murder. See NMSA 1978, § 30-28-2 (1979). The 5 district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. 6 {2} On direct appeal pursuant to Artic le VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico 7 Constitution and Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA, De fendant raises four issues: (1) the 8 district court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he made to law 9 enforcement; (2) his trial counsel was ine ffective for not challenging the testimony of 10 Dr. Michelle Barry, forensic pathologist; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support 11 his conviction for first-degree murder; and (4) the district court’s errors taken together 12 constitute cumulative error. 13 {3} We affirm Defendant’s c onviction. Because Defendant raises no questions of 14 law that New Mexico precedent does not already sufficiently address, we issue this 15 non-precedential decision. See Rule 12-405(B)(1) NMRA. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 {4} The following facts are from the trial te stimony of Defendant, Edna Hernandez, 183 Thomas Archuleta, Richardo Ortega, and Ramon Loya Jr. All were chronic 1 methamphetamine users and were together at different times on the morning of the 2 shooting. Defendant, Hernand ez, and Archuleta testified that by the morning of the 3 shooting, they had been up for over five days consuming the drug. Hernandez said 4 she had known Defendant for about a year and ran into him fro m time to time, but 5 they were not friends. Defendant said hemet Hernandez in the “drug circle,” they 6 “got along pretty good,” and “we were justalways getting high.” Hernandez and 7 Archuleta were friends with the victim, Celso Martinez. 8 {5} Approximately two to three weeks befo re Martinez was killed, Archuleta and 9 Martinez held two garage sales at Arc huleta’s house. Martinez became angry with 10 Archuleta because he believed Archuleta was taking more thanhis share of the profits. 11 The dispute escalated, and on two occasions Martinez violently confronted Archuleta 12 at his house while Archuleta’s wife and kids were present. Martinez struck Archuleta 13 on the head with the butt of his handgun and fi red a shot at Archuleta but missed. The 14 police were called, and Martinez hid two guns on Archuleta’s property. Hernandez 15 testified that Archuleta was afraid of Martinez. 16 {6} In the early morning of November 30, 2007, Archuleta and Hernandez ran into 17 Martinez outside a friend’s house. The three went to the home of Ramon Loya Jr. 184 After they arrived at Loya’s house, they decided to steal gasoline from trucks parked 1 at Goddard High School. They drove to Goddard High, and Hernandez and Loya 2 waited in the car while Archuleta and Martinez siphoned gas from the trucks. 3 {7} After stealing the gasoline, Hernandez and Archuleta then left Loya’s house and 4 went to Richardo Ortega’s house. Loya and Martinez stayed behind. Hernandez said 5 Defendant was at Ortega’s house when theyarrived. At Orte ga’s house Defendant, 6 Hernandez, and Archuleta hung out and smoked methamphetamine. Hernandez said 7 she brought a gun to Ortega’s house. She said she showed the gun to everyone and 8 everyone picked it up, but she did not know w ho ended up with it. Archuleta testified 9 that he retrieved the gun from his house befo re going to Ortega’s and left it “in the 10 middle of the seat” of his car. 11 {8} At some point, Ortega’s roommate aske d Hernandez if she would go to Loya’s 12 house and trade methamphetamine for some of the stolen gasoline. As Hernandez was 13 leaving, Defendant asked her if he could go along so he could pick up his girlfriend. 14 When Defendant and Hernandez arrived at Loya’s, Martinez got in the back seat of 15 the car, saying he wanted a ride to a frie nd’s house. Loya also asked Hernandez for 16 a ride. According to Loya, Hernandez saidit would not be a good idea to go with her 17 because they were “about to go merk some f ool.” Loya said that “merk” is street 185 slang for “kill somebody.” Hernandez deniedsaying this to Loya, said she did not 1 know what “merk” meant, and had never used the word. Defendant said he did not 2 want to give Loya a ridebecause his girlfriend was waiting for him. Hernandez, 3 Defendant, and Martinez left Loya ’s house and Loya stayed behind. 4 {9} After the three left Loya’s place, Martinez began to argue with Hernandez and 5 became angry. Defendant te stified he became concerned that Martinez might assault 6 Hernandez. Defendant said a gun was fired inside the car , and he told Hernandez to 7 pull over. Hernandez did not testify that a shot was fired inside the car. After 8 Hernandez pulled over, Defendant and Martinez got out of the car. Defendant 9 testified that Martinez pointed the gun at Defendant and Defendant grabbed it. The 10 two men struggled for control of the gun and it fired, hitting Martinez. Defendant got 11 back in the car, and he and Hern andez returned to Ortega’s house. 12 {10} Hernandez testified there was no plan to kill Martinez. She said that the two 13 men said nothing to each other before they got out of the car and she did not see what 14 happened afterward because she stayed in the car. Hernandez said she did not hear 15 any gunshots because the music on the radio was very loud. She said she did not 16 know that Martinez had been shot or why he didn’t get back in the car. 17 {11} Deputy Raul Valderaz and Deputy George Wallner both testified about the law 186 enforcement investigation into Martinez’s death. After the shooting, the deputies 1 initially turned their attention to Archulet a due to the dispute between Archuleta and 2 Martinez. When deputies located Archuleta later that same morning of the shooting, 3 he was with Defendant and Hernandez. Deputies briefl y questioned Defendant, and 4 he denied knowing anything about the s hooting. Deputies found methamphetamine 5 on Defendant, and six days later on December 6, 2007, Defe ndant was arrested for a 6 probation violation and brought to the Chav es County Sheriff’s office and questioned 7 about the Martinez shooting. 8 {12} The deputies advised the Defendant of hi s rights, and he again told them that 9 he knew nothing about the shooting. Defendant then said he did not want to talk 10 anymore, and the interview was terminated. Deputy Valderaz took Defendant to a 11 holding cell where he was to wait to be tr ansported to the county detention center to 12 be held on the probation violation. 13 {13} As Defendant waited, Deputy Valderaz checked on Defendant and asked him 14 on two or three occasions if he was okay. The last time Valderaz checked on 15 Defendant, Defendant asked Valderaz about the possible charges he was facing. 16 Valderaz told Defendant he was facing an open charge of murder. Defendant then 17 asked Valderaz about possible charges ag ainst other people involved in the case. 187 Valderaz said that at that point Defendant became emotional and started to cry. 1 Valderaz said it seemed like Defendant wantedto speak to the deputies again, and he 2 asked Defendant if he wanted to do so. Defendant said hewould speak to the deputies 3 again, and Valderaz took Defendant back to the interview room. After he was 4 reminded of his rights, Defendant told the deputies that heshot Martinez. Defendant’s 5 second statement was made about thirty minutes after his first statement. 6 {14} The State charged Defendant with murd er and conspiracy to commit murder. 7 Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder but acquitted of the charge of 8 conspiracy to commit murder. 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 A. The District Court Did Not Err inAdmitting Defendant’s Statements to 11 Law Enforcement Officers 12 {15} Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his statements to the deputies. 13 After a hearing, the district court issued twenty-one findings of fact and denied the 14 motion in a written order filed on the first day of the jury trial. On appeal, Defendant 15 argues that the district court erred in de nying his motion to suppress the statements he 16 made to Deputy Valderaz and Deputy Walln er on December 6, 2007. Specifically, 17 Defendant contends that his first statement was involuntary and his waiver of his 18 Mirandarights was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Concerning his second 198 statement, Defendant concedes that he agreed to speak to the deputies but argues that 1 he did so because he was coerced. However, Defendant offers no details and makes 2 no argument as to how he was coerced or why his agreeing to speak to the deputies 3 the second time was the product of police overreach. 4 {16} On appeal, the district court’s admissi on of incriminating statements made by 5 the defendant is reviewed de novo. State v. Cooper , 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 25, 124 N.M. 6 277, 949 P.2d 660; State v. Juarez , 1995-NMCA-085, ¶ 7, 120 N.M. 499, 903 P.2d 7 241 (applying de novo review to voluntariness of confession). We review the entire 8 record and the circumstances under which the statement or confession was made in 9 order to make an independent determination of whether a defendant’s confession was 10 voluntary. State v. Fekete , 1995-NMSC-049, ¶ 34, 120 N.M. 290, 901 P.2d 708 11 (citations omitted). To satisfydue process standards, “a confession must have been 12 freely given and not induced by promise or threat.” Aguilar v. State , 1988-NMSC13 004, ¶ 11, 106 N.M. 798, 751 P.2d 178. A confession is involuntary only if official 14 coercion has occurred. State v. Munoz , 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 21, 126 N.M. 535, 972 15 P.2d 847. Official coercion occurs when “a defendant’s will has been overborne and 16 his capacity for self-determination [h as been] critically impaired.” Id. ¶ 20 (citation 17 omitted). “The prosecution has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a 189 defendant’s statement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fekete , 1995-NMSC1 049, ¶ 34. 2 1. Defendant’s First Statement 3 {17} Defendant testified that, when he gave hi s first statement, he was advised of his 4 Mirandarights and signed a waiver of those ri ghts. But Defendant did not say that 5 the deputies coerced or threaten ed him to sign the waiver form or to speak to them on 6 the first occasion. A review of the tes timony at the suppression hearing supports the 7 district court’s conclusion that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 8 waived his right to remain silent. Accordingly, Defendant’s first statement to the 9 deputies was voluntary and not the product of official coercion and we affirm the 10 district court. 11 2. Defendant’s Second Statement 12 {18} Approximately thirty minutes elapsed between Defendant’s first and second 13 statement. Defendant testified that he returned to the interrogation room because 14 Valderaz badgered him to “get it off [his] ch est” and “come clean.” At the conclusion 15 of the first interview, a deputy told Defendant that they would be looking at possible 16 charges against the Defendant’s grandmother. As he was escorted to the booking cell, 17 Deputy Wallner told Defendant his grandmother would be arrested if they found out 1810 the Defendant was not at her house at the time of the murder. While Defendant waited 1 in the booking cell, Valderaz checked on De fendant on two or three occasions and 2 asked Defendant if he was okay. On th e last occasion, Defendant asked Valderaz 3 about the possible charges he was facing. Valderaz told Defendant he was facing an 4 open count of murder. Defendant then asked Valderaz about possible charges for 5 others involved and Valderaz told Defendant that they could also be charged with 6 murder. Valderaz said that at that point, Defendant appeared as if he were about to 7 cry and that he wanted to talk. Valderaz escorted Defendant back to the interrogation 8 room. Defendant was reminded of the Mirandawarnings previously given but was 9 not given the full Mirandawarning. Defendant was asked if he wished to speak to the 10 deputies again and he replied th at he did. Defendant was asked if he had been forced 11 or coerced in any way to provide a further statement, and Defendant said he had not. 12 Defendant was crying when he returned to the interrogation room but stopped crying 13 and then proceeded to give his statement about the events leading up to and including 14 the shooting of Martinez. 15 {19} Upon review of the testimony of the events between the interviews, we 16 conclude that the district court did not err in finding the Defendant voluntarily spoke 17 to the deputies in the second interview. The Defendant told th e deputies he would 1811 speak with them and testified that he was not forced or coerced to do so. Neither the 1 threats to arrest or bring charges agains t Defendant’s grandmother or Valderaz telling 2 Defendant to “come clean” and “get it off his chest” appear to have been so coercive 3 as to overcome Defendant’s will such thathis statement was not the product of his 4 own volition. The Defendant had been advised of his Mirandarights before the first 5 interview, and the second interview was not so long after the fi rst such that the 6 deputies were required to fullyadvise Defendant of his Mirandarights again. See 7 State v. Gilbert , 1982-NMSC-095, ¶ 12, 98 N.M. 530, 650 P.2d 814 (holding that a 8 second Mirandawarning was not required whenthe defendant was previously 9 informed of his Mirandarights earlier the same day and the defendant was still aware 10 of his rights). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s 11 motion to suppress his second statement to the deputies. 12 B. Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Failing to Object to the 13 Testimony of Dr. Michelle Barry 14 {20} Defendant argues that his attorney wa s ineffective because he should have 15 objected to the testimony of Dr. Miche lle Barry regarding the findings and 16 conclusions of the autopsy performed on Martinez. Defendant claims that because Dr. 17 Barry did not perform the autopsy of Martin ez, his right to confront the witnesses 18 against him was violated. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. Defendant further argues that 1912 he was prejudiced because the trajectory of the bullet wounds were critical to his claim 1 of self-defense. 2 {21} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 3 show: “(1) counsel’s performance was defi cient, and (2) the deficient performance 4 prejudiced the defense.” State v. Favela , 2015-NMSC-005, ¶ 10, 343 P.3d 178 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Lopez , 1996-NMSC-036, ¶ 6 25, 122 N.M. 63, 920 P.2d 1017. Defendant has the burden to show both 7 incompetence and prejudice. State v. Baca , 1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 333, 8 950 P.2d 776. 9 {22} Defendant cites State v. Navarette , 2013-NMSC-003, 294 P.3d 435, in support 10 of his confrontation claim. In Navarette , this Court held that the defendant’s 11 confrontation rights were violated becau se a forensic pathologist who did not 12 participate in or observe the autopsy on th e victim was allowed to relate testimonial 13 hearsay about the findings and c onclusions of the autopsy. Id. ¶ 23. In the present 14 case, Dr. Barry testified that she did not conduct the autopsy but she supervised the 15 autopsy, examined the body both externallyand internally, examined photos and 16 looked at slides of the body under the micr oscope, and personally signed the autopsy 17 report along with the presiding pathologist. The facts of this case are similar to the 1813 facts in State v. Cabezuela , 2011-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 49-52, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705. 1 In Cabezuela , this Court ruled a supervising pathologist (in that case, also Dr. Barry) 2 who had examined the body, examined photographs, conducted a microscopic 3 examination, and co-signed autopsy reports had sufficient personal knowledge to 4 testify as to what the attending pathol ogist discovered through the autopsy. Id. ¶ 52. 5 Like Cabezuela , we conclude that in this cas e Dr. Barry had sufficient personal 6 knowledge of the conclusions of the aut opsy, her testimony wa s based on her own 7 observations, and she was not merely relating hearsay testimonial evidence. 8 Defendant had the opportunity to confr ont Dr. Barry about her testimony and 9 challenge her conclusions. 10 {23} We hold that Defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated and Defendant 11 failed to demonstrate how Dr. Barry’s tes timony prejudiced his defense. Accordingly, 12 Defendant’s trial counsel was not ineff ective for failing to object to Dr. Barry’s 13 testimony. 14 C. The State Presented Sufficient Evid ence to Support the Jury Verdict of 15 Deliberate First-Degree Murder 16 {24} Defendant argues that there was insuffi cient evidence of his intent to kill 17 Martinez because his actions were impulsiveand in reaction to Martinez pulling a gun 18 on him. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 1914 evidence introduced at trial to determine “w hether substantial evidence of either a 1 direct or circumstantial nature exists tosupport a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable 2 doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Sutphin , 1988- 3 NMSC-031, ¶ 21, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314. We view the evidence in the light 4 most favorable to the verdic t, resolving all conflicts and indulging all inferences in 5 favor of the verdict. State v. Apodaca , 1994-NMSC-121, ¶ 3, 118 N.M. 762, 887 P.2d 6 756. “We will not substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder, nor will we re7 weigh the evidence.” State v. Treadway , 2006-NMSC-008, ¶ 7, 139 N.M. 167, 130 8 P.3d 746 (citations omitted) . “Contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not 9 provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject [the d]efendant’s version 10 of the facts.” State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. 11 {25} The jury was correctly instructed that to find Defendant guilty of first-degree 12 murder by a deliberate killing, the State was required to establish that 13 1. The defendant killed Celso Martinez; 14 2. The killing was with the deliberate intention to take away the life 15 of Celso Martinez; 16 3. The defendant did not act in self defense; 17 4. This happened in New Mexi co on or about the 30th day of 18 November, 2007. 1915 A deliberate intention refers to th e state of mind of the defendant. 1 A deliberate intention may be inferred from all of the facts and 2 circumstances of the killing. The word deliberate means arrived at or 3 determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the 4 consideration for and against the propos ed course of action. A calculated 5 judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time. A 6 mere unconsidered and rash impulse , even though it includes an intent 7 to kill, is not a deliberate intenti on to kill. To constitute a deliberate 8 killing, the slayer must weigh and c onsider the question of killing and his 9 reasons for and against such a choice. 10 The jury was also instructed on self-defense: 11 Evidence has been presented that the defendant killed Celso 12 Martinez in self defense. 13 The killing is in self defense if: 14 1. There was an appearance of immediate danger of death or 15 great bodily harm to the defendant as a result of Celso Martinez 16 threatening the defendant with a gun; 17 2. The defendant was in fact put in fear by the apparent danger 18 of immediate death or great bodily harm and killed Celso Martinez 19 because of that fear; and 20 3. A reasonable person in the same circumstances as the 21 defendant would have acted as the defendant did. 22 The burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 23 the defendant did not act in self defense. If you have a reasonable doubt 24 as to whether the defendant acted in self defense, you must find the 25 defendant not guilty. 26 {26} The State claimed that Defendant killed Martinez because Martinez was 2716 harassing Archuleta and Archuleta was faili ng to stand up for himself. There was 1 evidence that approximately two weeks be fore the shooting, Martinez assaulted 2 Archuleta on more than one occasion and harassed Archuleta’s family. Hernandez 3 testified that Archuleta was afraid of Martinez. Archuleta testified that when 4 Hernandez and Defendant returned to Ortega’s house, sh e told Archuleta that his 5 “problem was taken care of and [he] didn’t have to worry anymore.” Archuleta also 6 said he heard Defendant say he shot Martinez with “[a] few shots in the head and a 7 few in the chest.” Hernandez and Archuleta both testified they had a gun on the 8 morning of the shooting, and Archuleta said he left it in his car or gave it to 9 Hernandez. Ortega testified he overh eard Defendant talking about “whooping them 10 or something” and “[t]aking care of it.” L oya testified that Hernandez told him they 11 were “about to go merk some fool.” 12 {27} In addition to this evidence, a reas onable jury could have also rejected 13 Defendant’s claim of self-defense. Firs t, Defendant initially told police he knew 14 nothing about the shooting and then later conf essed. Second, the evidence showed the 15 victim was shot four or five times, and this could reasonably be viewed as 16 contradictory to Defendant’s claim that the gun went off while the two men struggled 17 for control. Finally, Defendant made several statements that could be taken by the 1817 jury as an admission of guilt such as “now I got to deal with the fact I have another 1 man’s blood on my hands that I had no right to take” and “[i]f I could take that day 2 back, I would rather have changed places so I wouldn’t have to deal with the guilt and 3 with myself.” 4 {28} This evidence, when viewed as a whol e, is sufficient to support the jury’s 5 finding that Defendant intended to kill Martin ez and did not act in self-defense. The 6 jury was free to reject Defendant’s versi on of the events. Accordingly, we affirm 7 Defendant’s conviction. 8 D. There Was No Cumulative Error 9 {29} Finally, Defendant argues that cumulative errors on the part of the district court 10 render the verdict inherentlyunreliable. “The doctrine of cumulative error applies 11 when multiple errors, which by themselves do not constitute reversible error, are so 12 serious in the aggregate that they cumulatively deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” 13 State v. Roybal , 2002-NMSC-027, ¶ 33, 132 N.M. 657, 54 P.3d 61. “Where there is 14 no error to accumulate, there canbe no cumulative error.” State v. Samora , 15 2013-NMSC-038, ¶ 28, 307 P. 3d 328 (alteration, internalquotation marks, and 16 citation omitted). Because we have found that the district court did not err when it 17 admitted Defendant’s confession, that Defe ndant’s counsel was not ineffective for 1818 failing to object to the testimony of Dr. Barry, and that there wa s sufficient evidence 1 to support the jury’s verdict, we rejectDefendant’s claim of cumulative error. 2 III. CONCLUSION 3 {30} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm De fendant’s conviction for first-degree 4 murder. 5 {31} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

___________________________________ 7 PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice 8 WE CONCUR: 9

___________________________________ 10 JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Chief Justice 11

___________________________________ 12 CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice 13

___________________________________ 14 BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice 1519 ___________________________________ 1 GARY L. CLINGMAN, Justice 2