J-S67031-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROY ROBINSON

Appellant No. 3366 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0837291-1988

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2016

Appellant, Roy Robinson, appeals pro se from the order entered on 

October 20, 2015, denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the 

lower court treated as a PCRA petition.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Following the 

shooting death of Christopher Washington on February 20, 1988, Appellant 

was arrested, and represented by counsel, he proceeded to a jury trial. The 

jury convicted Appellant of, inter alia, first degree murder, and on April 30, 

1990, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison. On direct appeal, 

this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on May 9, 1991. See 

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1

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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Commonwealth v. Robinson, 595 A.2d 193 (Pa.Super. 1991) 

(unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance 

of appeal with our Supreme Court. 

Appellant filed his first collateral petition on October 30, 1991, and 

following the lower court’s denial of the petition, this Court affirmed on 

August 20, 1999. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 745 A.2d 45 

(Pa.Super. 1999) (unpublished memorandum). The Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

Thereafter, Appellant filed serial PCRA petitions, all of which the PCRA 

court dismissed. Appellant appealed the dismissal of his sixth PCRA petition, 

and in a published opinion filed on January 14, 2011, this Court affirmed. 

See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 12 A.3d 477 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

Specifically, the panel concluded Appellant’s sixth PCRA petition was 

untimely filed and subject to no exceptions. See id.

On December 3, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of 

habeas corpus,

2

and treating the petition as one filed under the PCRA, the 

PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its intent to dismiss. Appellant 

filed several responses, and by order filed on October 20, 2015, the PCRA 

court dismissed the petition as being untimely filed. This timely pro se

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2 Although Appellant’s pro se petition was docketed on December 5, 2014, 

we deem it to have been filed on December 3, 2014, when Appellant handed 

it to prison officials. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931 A.2d 710 

(Pa.Super. 2007) (discussing the prisoner mailbox rule). 
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appeal followed. The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement; however, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion explaining the reasons it found Appellant’s latest filing to be 

untimely.3 

At the outset, contrary to Appellant’s argument, we conclude the PCRA 

court properly treated Appellant’s instant petition, entitled “Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus,” under the auspices of the PCRA. The PCRA provides: 

“The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of 

obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and 

statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter 

takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9542. Thus, where a petitioner's claim is cognizable under the PCRA, 

regardless of the title given to the petition, the court must analyze the 

petition under the auspices of the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 

A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

In his instant petition, Appellant alleged that his conviction and 

sentence are illegal since they are derived from a collection of books entitled 

Purdon’s, and these books are defective. Appellant also alleged that his 

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3

Following the filing of his appellate brief, Appellant filed an application 

seeking leave to file a post-submission communication brief. By order 

entered on July 11, 2016, this Court granted Appellant’s application, 

indicating we would treat his “post-submission communication” as a 

supplemental brief. 
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sentence is illegal on the basis it is not supported by a written sentencing 

order.4 As the PCRA court correctly observed, challenges to the legality of a 

petitioner’s judgment of sentence are cognizable under the PCRA. See 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa.Super. 2011). Accordingly, 

the PCRA court properly treated Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus as a PCRA petition.

With regard to petitions filed under the PCRA, as this Court has 

observed: 

The filing mandates of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and 

are strictly construed. The question of whether a petition is 

timely raises a question of law. Where the petitioner raises 

questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review plenary. An untimely petition renders this Court 

without jurisdiction to afford relief. 

Taylor, 65 A.3d at 468 (citations omitted). Thus, at this juncture, we must 

determine whether Appellant’s December 3, 2014, petition was timely filed 

under the PCRA.

The most recent amendments to the PCRA, effective January 19, 1996, 

provide that a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall 

be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 

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4 The Commonwealth countered that the trial court entered a written 

sentencing order.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).5 A judgment is deemed final “at the conclusion 

of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the 

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of 

the time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

Three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA 

allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition 

will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a 

petition must allege and the petitioner must prove:

(i) the failure to raise a claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 

or the law of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

law of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provide in this section and has been 

held by that court to apply retroactively.

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5 The PCRA provides that where a petitioner’s judgment of sentence became 

final on or before the effective date of the amendments (January 16, 1996), 

a special grace proviso allows first PCRA petitions to be filed by January 16, 

1997. See Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056–1057 

(Pa.Super. 1997) (explaining application of PCRA timeliness proviso). Here, 

as discussed infra, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final before the 

effective date of the amendments, however, Appellant did not file his instant 

petition by January 16, 1997. Moreover, the proviso does not apply to 

“second or subsequent petitions[,]” and thus, Appellant does not meet the 

requirements of the proviso on this basis as well. Commonwealth v. 

Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa.Super. 2002). 
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

“We emphasize that it is the petitioner who bears the burden to allege 

and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” Commonwealth 

v. Marshall, 596 Pa. 587, 596, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (2008) (citation 

omitted). 

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on or about June 

10, 1991, when the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal to the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113 (“[A] petition for 

allowance of appeal shall be filed with the Prothonotary of the Supreme 

Court within 30 days after the entry of the order of the Superior Court[.]”). 

Therefore, Appellant had until approximately June 10, 1992, to file a timely 

PCRA petition. Appellant’s instant petition was not filed until December 3, 

2014, more than twenty-two years after his judgment of sentence became 

final. Accordingly, the instant petition is facially untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). 

Nevertheless, Appellant suggest that, since his sentence is illegal in 

that there is no valid sentencing order, he is not subject to the PCRA’s 

timeliness restrictions. However, our Supreme Court has held specifically 

that, “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within the 

PCRA, [legality of sentencing] claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time 

limits or one of the exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 

313, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999). 
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In the case sub judice, Appellant has not invoked any of the applicable 

exceptions to the PCRA, and therefore, we agree with the PCRA court that 

Appellant’s instant petition was untimely filed.

Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/7/2016