2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/900NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT



### No. 03-1986

MICHAEL J. KABACINS KI, Appellant

v. BOSTROM SEATING, INC.

APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT FO R T HE EA STE RN DIST RIC T O F PE NN SY LV AN IA

D.C. CivilNo. 02-cv-08910 Distri ct Judge: The Honorable Frankl in S. VanAntwerpen

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

February 24, 2004

Bef or e: RENDEL L, BARRY, and RO SE NN , Circuit Judges (Opinion Fi led March 30, 2004)

OPI NION

BA RR Y, Circuit

Judge We are asked to review th e M arch 7, 200 3 order of the Un ited States District Co urt for the Eas tern Dis tri ct of Pennsylvania denyi ng plaintiff’s motion t o reconsi der that2

Co urt’s Fe brua ry 13, 20 03 o rder g ranting the de fend ant’s m otion to have its mo tion to di smi ss dee med unop pos ed. We wil l a ffirm. I. The parties a re fam iliar with the fa cts of th is case , and, th us, w e w ill provid e but a brief s um mary of

those facts a t the ou tset. Appellant

Michael J. Kabacinski was empl oyed by Bostrom Seating’s, Inc. (“Bo strom ”), a D elaw are co rpora tion w ith its princ ipal pla ce of busin ess in A labam a, in Bostrom’s fa cility

in Allentown, PA. Bostrom clos ed its Allentown faci lit y i n early

2000, leavi ng only

one sales person employed in Pennsylvania . Short ly before the closing, Bostrom offere d Kabacinski a temporary

posit ion in i ts North Car olina f acil ity , which Kab acinski accep ted. In Septem ber 200 0, how ever, Bo strom laid K abacinski o ff as part of a compan y-wide eli mination of positions. Kabacinski c ommenced an employment discr iminat ion act ion by filing a Charge of Discri minati on with the EEOC in October 2000. The EEOC issued a “no cause” l ette r on October 31, 2001. Kabacinski f iled an Writ of Summons on January 24, 2002 (l ater amended on November 4, 2002) i n Pennsylvania st ate court agai nst Bostrom, all eging violations of t

he Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( “ADEA ”), 29 U.S. C. § 621 et seq. , the Americans with Dis abilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , and the Pennsylvania Human Relati ons Act (“PHRA”), 43 P A . C ONS . S TAT . §§ 9 55 a nd 9 62. Bostrom removed the case t o the U.S. Dis tri ct Court f or the East ern District

of1 Wh ile Kabac inski’s motion is en titled only as a motion to reco nsider the C ourt’s

granting of

this motion, given his request that the C ourt “reinstat[e] Plaintiff’s Co mp laint,” w e w ill assum e that h e inten ded th at the C ourt re cons ider its dis missa l of his 3 Pennsylvania on December 18, 2002, and on Januar y 6, 2003 moved to dismi ss under F ED . R. C IV . P. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)( 3) based on i mproper venue and because it was not an “em ployer,” a s that term is defin ed in th e PH RA . Bos trom s hortly there after a men ded its

mo tion, no ting tha t it did still em ploy on e sales perso n in P enns ylvania. B efore his respo nse w as du e, Ka bacin ski req uested an ex tension of tim e until F ebru ary 10, 20 03 to file opposit ion to t

he motion. The Distri ct Court gr anted the stipulate d-to ext ension, but stat ed in it s order t

hat no furt

her exte nsions would be pe rmitt ed. Kab acinski did no t file his opposition on Februa ry 10, but claims that his cou nsel’s assistan t mailed it on tha t day. On Feb ruary 12 , Bos trom m oved to hav e its mo tion to dism iss dee med uno ppo sed. O n Fe brua ry 13, K abac inski’s o ppo sition to th e mo tion to dismis s was fil ed. That s ame day, the Court gr anted Bostrom’s motion t o have it s motion to dis miss deemed unopposed, and grante d the moti on to dis miss, dismis sing Kabacinski’ s PHRA clai m with prejudi ce, and hi s ADEA and ADA clai ms without prejud ice to h is right to r efile the m in th e app ropria te Un ited Sta tes D istrict Co urt in Alabama. Both deci sions were memori aliz ed in one orde r fil ed on February 14. On February24, 2003, Kabaci nski moved for r econsider ation of that part of t

he February 14th order which granted Bostrom’s motion to have its motion to dismiss deemed unopposed, 1 arguing t hat by virt ue of F ED . R. C IV . P. 6(e) ( “Rule 6(e) ”) andcom plaint a s we ll. 4

Local Rule of Civi l Procedur e 7.1(c) (“Local Rule 7.1(c) ”), t he fil ing of his opposit ion pap ers w as tim ely. O n M arch 7, 20 03, t he D istrict Co urt d enie d th e m otio n to reco nsid er. Kab acinski app eals that order. II. Bostrom argues that we do not have appell ate j urisdi ction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291 bec aus e the Di stri ctCour t’ s order , wh ic h di smi ss ed Kabac in ski ’s ADEA andADA cl ai ms without pr ejudic e to his right to refi le the m in Alabama, i s not fi nal. “Ordinari ly , an order which termi nates fe wer than al l cla ims, or clai ms against

fewer than al l parties, does not consti tute a

‘final ’ order

for purpose s of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Carte r v. City of P hilade lphia , 181 F .3d 33 9, 343 (3d C ir. 1999 ); see also Fed. Home Loan M ortgage Corp. v. Scot

tsdal e Ins. Co. , 3 16 F .3 d 43 1, 438 -4 0 ( 3d C ir . 2 003 ) ( ge ne ra l r ul e tha t “ we lack appel late juri sdict ion over par tialadjudic ations when certai n of the cl aims before the district court have been dismis sed without pr ejudic e ”) (ci ting Erie Co unty Retirees A ss’n v. Co unty of E rie , 220 F.3d 193, 201 (3d Cir. 200 0)). The D istrict Court’s order, however, al though it

dismis sed the fe deral c laims wit hout prej udice, ended the proceedi ngs once and for al l in t he U.S. Dist

rict Court for t

he Easter n Distri ct of Pennsylvania. T he order, therefore, was final, and w e have jurisdiction over K abacinski’s appe al. Turn ing to th e me rits, “[t]he decisio n to d eny a M otion for R econ sidera tion is2 Ka bacin ski’s affidav it is acco mp anied by a certific ate of servic e, signe d by his counsel, indicating t

hat his brief in opposit ion to Bost rom’s moti on to dis miss was fil ed on F ebru ary 10, 20 03 b y first class m ail. This evide nce is o nly releva nt if K abac inski is entitled to a

three day ext ension under Rule 6(e). As we explain bel ow, Rule 6(e) doe s no t ap pl y. 5 within t he discr etion of

the Dist rict Court, but

‘if t he court' s denialwas based upon the inter pretation and appl icat ion of a l egal pre cept, review is plenary .’” Le v. Univ. of Pa. , 321 F.3d 403, 405- 06 (3d Cir. 2003) (quot ing Koshatka v. Phi la. Newspapers, Inc

. , 762 F.2d 329 , 333 ( 3d C ir. 1985 )). Tha t havin g bee n said , the stan dard a party m ust m eet to succeed on a moti on for recons ideration is quite hi gh: The purpose of a moti on for recons ideration,” we have held, “i s to cor rect manifest error s of law or fact

or to pr esent newly

discover ed evidence. ” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotni cki , 77 9 F .2d 90 6, 9 09 (3 d C ir. 1 98 5) . A cc or di ng ly, a judgment may

be alt ered or amended i f the party seeking r econsider ation show s at least o ne of

the fo llow ing g roun ds: (1) a n interv ening chan ge in the controll ing law; ( 2) the ava ilabi lit y of new evide nce that

was not avail able when the cour t grant ed the moti on for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear er ror of law or fact or to prevent manifest inju stice

. See North River I ns. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co. , 52 F.3d 1194, 12 18 (3d C ir. 1995). Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinte ros , 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Th ere is no a llega tion by K aba cins ki th at the con trollin g law has cha nge d. Further more, Kabacins ki’s argument that his affidavi t in s upport of hi s motion for reconsi derati on consti tutes new evidence, e ven if cor rect, does not warr ant reconsideration of the C ourt’s Febru ary 13 order. 2 Thus, Kabacinskimust show that the3 We recently noted the Distri ct Court’ s power to i mpose even harsh pena lti es for vio latio n of

loca l rule s. See Un ited Sta tes v. E leven Ve hicles, T heir E quip men t & Accessori es , 200 F .3d 20 3, 214 (3d C ir. 2000 ) (“Lo cal co urt rules play a sign ifican t role in the district courts’ efforts to manage themselves and their dockets .. .. i t is not an abuse of discr etion f

or a dis tri ct court

to impose a harsh res ult, such as di smissi ng a motion or an app eal, when a litigant fails to strictly comp ly with the terms of a local rule”). 6 Distri ct Court’ s decis ion to gr ant Bostr om’s motion was a cl ear err or of law and/ or resul ted in mani fest i njust ice. The Distri ct Court c oncluded that Kabacins ki did not do so. We agree. Kab acinski’s argum ents with resp ect to both R ule 6(e) and Local R ule 7.1(c) are unpersu asive. Un der Lo cal Rule 7 .1(c), he had fo urteen days after service of Bo strom’s motion t o dismis s to ser ve his br ief i n opposit ion, “ unless t he Court dir ects ot

herwise. ” E. D. P A . R. C IV . P. 7.1(c). T hat is ex actly wh at hap pene d her e: Ka bacin ski ha d un til fourtee n days after

Bostrom’s amended mot ion to di smiss was ser ved on January

17, 200 3, but th en the Co urt exte nded that de adline , pursu ant to th e partie s’ stipula tion, to February 10, 2003. I f Kabacinski missed t his new deadline, Local Rul e 7.1(c) gave the Dis trict C our t the p ow er to gra nt B ostro m’s mo tion as u nco ntes ted. See E. D. P A . R. C IV . P. 7.1(c) (“[i] n the absenc e of ti mely r esponse, the moti on may be granted as

uncon tested”). 3 Kabacinski argues that he di d not miss the deadl ine becaus e under Rule 6( e) he enjoyed a three da y extension beyond the Cou rt-ordered dea dline given tha t Bostrom ’s

mo tion to d ismiss w as serv ed on him b y mail. Ru le 6(e) s tates tha t “[w ]hen ever a party4 Kabacinski a lso ar gues that , under LocalRule 7.1( c), he s hould have been gi ven

fourtee n days to res pond to Bostr om’s motion t o have it s motion t o dismis s deemed unopposed (hi s respons e was served by mail on February16, 2003, a fter t he Distr ict Co urt had gran ted the mo tion). B ecau se Lo cal R ule 7.1 (c) do es no t require a mo tion to grant anot

her motion a s uncontes ted, we see no basis for the argument that he was enti tled to fourt een day s to re spond. I n any eve nt, any er ror by the Dist rict Court in ac ting t oo soon wa s harm less be caus e K abac inski cle arly misse d the C ourt-o rdered dead line to respond t o Bostrom’s mot ion to di smiss. Kabacinski argues, as well, that t he Distr ict Cou rt could hav e extende d the dead line by three days under F ED . R. C IV . P. 6(b). E ven if the Court “ could have” ext ended the deadl ine, it had a lready done so on Januar

y 24 upon the agre ement of the parti es, and s pecifi call y st ated that no othe r extens ions would be granted. 7 has the right or

is re quired t o do some act or take some proceedi ngs withi n a prescribed period after th e serv ice of a notic e or o ther pa per u pon the pa rty and the notice or pa per is served upon t

he party under Rule 5(b) (2)(B), (C), or (D), 3 day s shallbe added to t he prescr ibed peri od.” We hav e recognized that Rule 6(e) “adds a rebuttable presumption of three day s’ maili ng time t o be added to a pr escribed period whenever a stat utory period begins on recei pt or se rvice of

notice .” Ebbert v. DaimlerChry sler Corp. , 319 F.3d 103, 108, n.5 ( 3d Cir. 20 03). T he D istrict Co urt w as co rrect, ho we ver, tha t Rule 6(e) d oes n ot app ly to dea dlin es im pos ed b y, or fo llow ing , a co urt o rde r. See Albright v. Virt ue , 273 F.3d 564, 571 (3d C ir. 2001 ) (“‘R ule 6(e ) doe s not a pply to tim e perio ds tha t begin with the filing in court of ajudgment or order.’ ”) (quot ing with approval 1 J AMES M OORE ET AL ., M OORE ’ S F EDE RAL P RACTI CE § 6.053[ 3], at 6-35 (3d e d. 1998)). 4 Finally, even if Kabacins ki’s oppos iti on to Bostr om’s motion t o dismis s was fil edin a timely manner , Bostr om’s motion would s urely have been grant ed. As the Dis tri ct Court noted, venue for the ADA clai m was improper in t he Easter n Distri ct of Pen nsylvan ia bec ause Bo strom closed its Pen nsylvan ia fac ility before p laintiff filed this acti on, it s employment recor ds were in Alabama, and Kabacinski had accepte d Bo lstro m’s offer o f a te mp ora ry pos ition at its facility in No rth C aro lina. See 42 U .S.C . § 200 0-e-5 (f)(3) (“ Suc h an a ction m ay be bro ugh t in any jud icial district in the S tate in which the unl awful employment pract ice i s all eged to have bee n committed, in the judici al dis tri ct in whic h the employ ment recor ds rel evant t o such practice ar e maintained and administ ered, or

in the j udicia l dis tri ct in whic h the aggri eved person would have worked but for t

he all eged unlawful empl oyment pr acti ce”). Moreover, becaus e Bostrom no lo nger oper ated a facility in Pe nnsylva nia, an d it em ployed, a t mos t, one sa lesper son in the s tate, it w as n ot an “em plo yer” w ithin the m ean ing of th e PH RA

. See 43 P A . C ONS . S TAT . § 954(b) (“the term ‘em ployer’ includes ... any person em ploying four or m ore per son s w ithin the C om mo nw ealth ”). The order of t

he Distr ict Court

dated February13, 2003 willbe affir med.