IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 25, 2005

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. REBECCA G. RATLIFF

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

No. S47,686 R. Jerry Beck, Judge

No. E2004-00940-CCA-R3-CD - Filed March 15, 2005

The defendant, Rebecca G. Ratliff, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation

of her probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve

her original two-yearsentence in the Department of Correction. Because the record supports the trial

court in its discretionary determination to order incarceration, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, P.J.,

and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., joined.

Mark H. Toohey, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Rebecca G. Ratliff.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant Attorney General; H.

Greeley Wells, Jr., District Attorney General; and James Goodwin and B. Todd Martin, Assistant

District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On July 30, 1999, the defendant was convicted of attempt to pass a worthless check,

a Class E felony. Her two-year sentence was suspended but was imposed to run consecutively to a

sentence in a previous case. Based upon the consecutive alignment of sentences, the probationary

period in the present case was due to expire on June 16, 2003.

On January 25, 2002, the state issued a violation of probation report based upon the

defendant’s October 19, 2001 Virginia convictions of uttering bad checks. The resulting warrant was

not served on the defendant until March 2003. 

On April 15, 2004, the trial court conducted a revocation hearing. The defendant

admitted that she had violated the terms of her probation. She testified that she had three children,

ages 10, three years, and 16 months. She stated that, except for her Virginia offenses and
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convictions, she had complied with all other terms of her probation. She testified that the Virginia

offenses resulted from her discontinuing her medications for bipolar disorder. She had been taking

lithium and Panax and was on hiatus from the medications pursuant to her doctor’s order due to her

pregnancy. She testified that when she wrote the two bad checks in Virginia, she was having

financial difficulty and used the proceeds from the checks to buy groceries and pay utility bills. Her

mother paid the two checks in Virginia, and the defendant served six months on probation. 

The defendant testified that her 16-month-old son was born with a hole in his heart.

He had been hospitalized numerous times, the most recent hospitalization resulting from severe

dehydration following a viral episode. The defendant testified that the child was unable to walk and

underwent physical therapy once a week. She testified that her fiancee works a night shift and that

she is the only person available to care for her children. 

The trial court acknowledged that the defendant had a long history of medical or

psychological problems, including bipolar disorder and depression. The court also recognized that

the defendant had a long history of credit-related offenses, including four felonies in Sullivan County

and bad check misdemeanors in Virginia prior to the 2001 convictions in that commonwealth. The

judge stated, “[I]n this type of offense, the court is reluctant to incarcerate somebody, . . . but there

can be a certain point reached where the integrity of the [c]ourts . . . reach a limit of how many times

you can be put on [p]robation . . . .” The judge concluded that the succession of probations had “just

run out of reason and that even though mitigation factors were present, the mitigation was recycled.”

On April 21, 2004, the trial court ordered revocation of the defendant’s probation

based upon the Virginia convictions and ordered the defendant to serve her two-year sentence in the

Department of Correction. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve her

sentence in confinement. We disagree.

The standard of review upon appeal of an order revoking probation is abuse of

discretion. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). In order for an abuse of discretion

to occur, the reviewing court must find that the record contains no substantial evidence to support

the conclusion of the trial judge that a violation of the terms of probation has occurred. Id. The trial

court is required only to find that the violation of probation occurred by a preponderance of the

evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(e) (2003). Upon finding a violation, the trial court is

vested with the statutory authority to “revoke probation and suspension of sentence and cause the

defendant to commence the execution of the judgment as originally entered.” Id. Furthermore, when

probation is revoked, “the original judgment so rendered by the trial judge shall be in full force and

effect from the date of the revocation of such suspension.” Id. § 40-35-310. Thus, the trial judge

retains the discretionary authority to order the defendant to serve the original sentence. See State v.

Duke, 902 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
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In this case, the trial judge expressed sympathyfor the defendant’s plight, but he cited

apt, substantial bases for ordering her sentence served in confinement. The judge was concerned not

only that the defendant had amassed a long record of bad check or credit-related offenses, but also

that she had received probation repeatedly. The court concluded that it could no longer nod to her

lawless behavior, and the record supports this conclusion. The defendant has not shown that the trial

court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve her two-year sentence.

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed. 

___________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR,. JUDGE