Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2355 | April 22, 2019 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Sean C. Mullins

Appellate Public Defender

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Samantha M. Sumcad

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert Antonio Dunbar,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 22, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2355

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Diane Ross 

Boswell, Judge

The Honorable Kathleen A. 

Sullivan, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

45G03-1709-F4-34

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2355 | April 22, 2019 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] Robert Antonio Dunbar appeals his probation revocation, challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a probation 

violation. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The evidence most favorable to the judgment is as follows. In September 2017, 

Dunbar broke into the home of ex-girlfriend Sushi Staples, who was sixteen 

weeks pregnant with his child. Staples was asleep when Dunbar entered her 

bedroom. She awoke to find him striking her on the head and body. Then, in 

the presence of Staples’s four-year-old son, Dunbar threw Staples across the 

hallway, into the bathroom, and into the tub. Staples phoned police and 

reported that she believed Dunbar to still be inside her home. Police found him 

hiding inside a closet underneath some clothes, and he refused the officers’ 

orders to come out. He physically resisted their efforts to pull him out but was 

eventually subdued. 

[3] The State charged Dunbar with level 4 felony burglary, level 5 felony domestic 

battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman, level 6 felony domestic 

battery in the presence of a person less than fourteen years old, class A 

misdemeanor invasion of privacy, and class A misdemeanor resisting law 

enforcement. On March 5, 2018, Dunbar pled guilty via plea agreement to 

level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a person less than fourteen

years old, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. The stipulated plea
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2355 | April 22, 2019 Page 3 of 6

agreement reads, in part, “The parties agree that there shall be a No Contact 

Order entered against the defendant in regards to the victim in this case for the 

length of his sentence[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 29. That same day, the

trial court sentenced Dunbar to two and one-half years, with one year executed 

in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) and one and one-half years 

suspended to probation. 

[4] Within a week of his release from the DOC, Dunbar made attempts to contact 

Staples via Facebook Messenger. Lake County Probation Officer Gisela 

Thielbar confronted Dunbar about contacting Staples, and although he denied 

it at first, he later said, “Okay, I’ll stop.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 14-15. The State filed a 

petition to revoke Dunbar’s probation, alleging that Dunbar attempted to 

contact Staples in violation of a no-contact order and that he had failed to pay 

probation fees totaling $180. After a hearing, the trial court found that Dunbar

had violated his probation and executed the remaining eighteen months of his 

sentence. Dunbar now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Dunbar asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s

determination that he violated his probation. Probation is a matter of grace left 

to the trial court’s sound discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is 

entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court 

determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the 

probationer violates those conditions. Id. On review, we neither reweigh 

evidence nor reassess witness credibility; rather, we consider the evidence and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2355 | April 22, 2019 Page 4 of 6

reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 

752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 

[6] Probation revocation is a two-step process, wherein the trial court first makes a 

factual determination as to whether the probationer violated the terms of his 

probation. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Because a 

probation revocation proceeding is civil in nature, the State need only prove the 

alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Holmes v. State, 

923 N.E.2d 479, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). If a violation is found, the court 

then determines whether the violation warrants revocation. Woods, 892 N.E.2d 

at 640. Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke 

probation. Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. 

denied. 

[7] Dunbar maintains that the State failed to prove that Staples was the person who 

contacted Thielbar about the Facebook Messenger friend requests and that 

Dunbar was “Capo Rob,” the sender of the friend request messages. State’s Ex. 

1. During the revocation hearing, Thielbar testified that Staples had called her 

concerning the friend requests. Although the officer had never met Staples in 

person, she testified that she believed that Staples was the caller because the 

caller provided information to her that was not publicly available concerning 

the case. Staples took screenshots of the friend request messages and emailed 

them to Thielbar. These messages include photos of Dunbar. When Thielbar

confronted Dunbar about contacting Staples, he denied it at first but later said, 

“Okay, I’ll stop.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 14-15. With respect to this statement, Dunbar 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2355 | April 22, 2019 Page 5 of 6

told the court, “Yes. I made a mistake when I caught the case. By me telling 

her I would stop contacting her, I never said—if I did do it, I admit to what I 

did. I feel like this is my first violation and I was going through paying my fees 

and my interstate compact.” Id. at 19-20. Dunbar’s admission completely

undercuts his argument that the State failed to prove that he was the sender of 

the messages and that Staples was the recipient.

[8] For the first time on appeal, Dunbar challenges the existence of the no-contact 

order and points us to an online registry to show the absence of an entry 

concerning it. However, the record includes several references to the entry of a 

no-contact order. First and foremost, the no-contact order was a provision in 

Dunbar’s stipulated plea agreement. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 29 (“The 

parties agree that there shall be a No Contact Order entered against the 

defendant in regards to the victim in this case for the length of his sentence[.]”). 

The no-contact order is also referenced in the sentencing order. See id. at 35 

(“Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant enters into a No Contact 

Order, for the length of the sentence.”). Moreover, probation officer Thielbar 

testified at the revocation hearing concerning the existence of the no-contact 

order. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 8 (“Q. Does the sentencing order indicate a no contact 

order was, in fact, entered[?] A. Yes.”). Finally, the no-contact order is

referenced in the chronological case summary. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 4

(March 5, 2018 entry: “Pursuant to PA, a NCO is entered.”). The evidence 

most favorable to the judgment is sufficient to support the existence of a valid 

no-contact order. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2355 | April 22, 2019 Page 6 of 6

established by a preponderance of the evidence that Dunbar violated his 

probation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment revoking Dunbar’s 

probation.

[9] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.