T he foo d i ns pect or t es t i f i ed t hat t he defendan t ’ s es t abl i s hment f ai l ed t he Jan uar y 21 i ns pect i on b ut pas s ed 1 (c o n tinu e d ...) 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 13, 200 5 a t K noxv ill e
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. AL EJAN DR O GON Z ALE Z
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2003-D- 3032 Cheryl Blackbu rn, Judge

No. M2005- 00756-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 8, 2006

Th e de fe nd a nt, Al e

ja nd ro Go nza le z, a

pp e a ls a c e rt if ie d qu e sti on of la w f

oll ow ing his g uil ty

ple a to possessio n o f coc aine, within 1000 fe et of a school, with intent to sell or deliver, an of fense for which he rec eived a n eig ht-y ear sentenc e to be se rved in a community

corr ections prog ram. The qu e sti on c e rt if

ie d for app e a l is wh e the r a

Me tr o N a sh vil le po lic e of fi c e r h a d s uf

fi c ie nt c a us e to
sear ch a g roce ry

bag the def

endant wa s car

ry ing, in whic h the offic er f ound 2 6 grams of coca ine. B e c a us e we ho ld that the se arc h wa s la wf ul andthat th e fr

uit s th e re of

we re a dmi ssi ble , w e a ff

ir m.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and D AVI D G. H AYES , J J ., joined.

V a n e s s a Sa e n z, N a s h v il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e A p p e ll a n t, A le

jan d r o G o n za le z.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Mark A. F ulks, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. Joh ns on , I I I , D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a nd Rob Mc Gu ir e , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

The e vidence prese nted at the hearing on the defe ndant’s motion to suppress showed that on the e ve nin g of Se pte mbe r 19 , 20 03 , a fo od ins pe c tor wi th the Me tr o Pub lic Hea lth Depa rtment, a re p re s en t ative of the fire ma rshal’s of fice , a sanitation inspector , and thre e police office rs – a team describe d as an Envir onmental Task For ce – arrived at the Mex ican Ty pical B ar, an esta blishment operated by

the def endant. Their purpose was to conduct a se miannual inspection to determine c ompliance with pub l i c h ealth, sanitation, and f ire saf ety laws and r eg ulations. The establishment had last bee n inspected on January 21, 2003, and wa s due for inspection. 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

o n J a n u a ry 2 2 , 2 0 0 3

. -2-

Th e fo odins pe ctor te sti fi e d th a t he r j ob wa s to fo c us on wh e the r f oo d s e rv e d in rest au ra n t s and mar

kets ca me from authorized sources, wa s kept at prope r temper ature s, and wa s handled in properly sanitiz ed containers by worke rs who follow hy g ienic pra ctices. She te stified that she had inspected other locations earlier in the day on September 19, and she inspecte d the Mexican Ty pical B ar in the e vening hours because the establishment was only open at night. She testified that the inspections are conducted, when due, without prior noti ce or warning. She testified that she wa s authorized to inspect food for “take -out” befor e it is handed ove r to the consumer ; however , she had
never befor e stopped a

“deliv er y ” person who w as ca rrying f ood away from the pr emises being inspected.
The food inspe ctor testified that, afte r she ha d been in the de fenda nt’s establishment for a bout 20 minutes and was wor king in the kitchen are a, she saw the def endant, whom she knew as the owne r of the busine ss, take a pla stic, g roce ry -ty pe bag from a coole r and w alk towar d the door. She be lie ve d th a t th e ba g c on ta ine d f oo d th a t c ou ld h a ve c ome fr om an un a uth orize d s ou rc e or c ou ld have been “o u t o f temper ature .” Not wa nting to y ell acr oss the bar f or the de fenda nt to stop, she asked one of the e scorting police off icer s to stop the defenda nt and to bring him back with the bag beca use she suspec ted the bag contained f ood. The off

icer followed the de fenda nt out the door.

The off icer testified that he had eleve n y ear s’ experience as a police of fice r and ha d conducte d about 100 narc otics arr ests. He had serve d as a me mber of the Environmental Ta sk Forc e for eig ht or nine y ear s as an a djunct to his reg ular patrol duties. As a task for ce me mber, he and two oth e r o ff ic e rs e sc orte d th e ins pe c tor s w he n n ig ht- tim e ins pe c tio ns we re pe rf orme d. Hi s r ole wa s to
ensure the safe ty of the inspectors. On the evening of September 19, 2003, the Mexican Ty pical B ar was the second or third establishment the team visited, a nd the team condu ct ed o t h er inspections afte r they left the Mexican Ty

pical B ar.
The off icer testified that he wa s standing in th e door to the kitchen when the food inspector told him that she suspec ted that a ba g being car ried out by

the def endant c ontained food, that she nee ded to inspect the ba g , and that he should stop the def endant a nd bring him back inside with the bag

. The officer testified t hat, after he and the defe ndant had taken five or six steps outside t h e b u i l d i n g, h e a s k ed t h e d ef en d an tt o s t o p an d t o l d h i mt h at h e n ee d ed t o s ee wh at wa s i n t h e b ag. Th e of fi c e r t e sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt b e g a n to se arc h thr ou g h the ba g , s e le c tin g ite ms t o p ull ou t. Ul tim a te ly , th e de fe nd a nt p ull e d o ut a qu art c a n o f a c e ton e , a

c of fe e g ri nd e r, a

sma ll s e t of

e le c tr on ic scale s, some plastic sandwic h b ags , and som e “G NC” powde r. Ac cording to the office r, the defe ndant ende avore d to remove some items while le aving others in the bag. T he off icer conclude d that the pre sence of the e lectronic s ca l es , which in his opinion would not be found typically in a restaur ant oper ation, an d t h e sandwich bag s sugg ested tra fficking in drug s. He informed the de fe nd a nt that he ne e de d to se e the re ma ini ng c on te nts of the ba g , took the ba g fr om the de fe nd a nt, and found 26 g rams of c ocaine inside.-3- The defenda nt testified t hat he did not pul l any items from the plastic bag ; rather , the office r took the bag and re moved the items himself.

T h e t ri al co u rt o v erru l ed t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p re s s t h e c o ca i n e fo u n d i n t h e p l as t i c b ag. Ul tim a te ly , th e de fe nd a nt e nte re d a be st- int e re sts g uil ty

ple a , r e se rv ing a ndc e rt if y ing fo r a pp e llate revie w the suppre ssion issue. For the f ollowing r easons, we aff

irm the trial court’s de nial of re lief.

On app e a l, the de fe nd a nt c la ims that he wa s no t su sp e c te d of c omm itt ing a ny

c ri me when h e w a s d e tain e d a n d th a t th e w arr a n tl e s s s e ar c h o f h is g r o c e r y b a g w a s u n supported by probable cause

. Moreove r, the defe ndant ar g ues that the g radua l removal of innoc uous items from the g roce ry

bag , at some point befor e the c ocaine was found, dispe lled any suspicion that the bag contained f

ood. The state a

rg ues t hat t he search and seizure ar e justified by state law r equiring the administrative inspection of e nterprise s serving food to the public, as we ll as by constitut i o nal
c a se la w that r e c og nize s w arr ant les s searc he s th a t are inc ide nta l to arr e st. I n a ny e ve nt, the state claims that the coc aine wa s admissible in evidence beca use its discovery

was inevitable

.
I. Sta nd ar d o f R e v ie w.
When review ing a trial court’ s findings of fac t and conc lusions of law on a motion to suppress evidenc e, we are g uided by the s tandar d of re view set forth in State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18 (T e nn . 199 6)

. Un de r thi s sta nd ard , “a tr ia l cou rt ’s fi nd ing s of fa c t in a su pp re ssi on he ari ng wi ll be upheld unless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise.” Id. at 23. When the t rial court, however , does not set forth its finding s of fa ct upon t he record of the proceeding s, this court determines where the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e lies. Fi e lds v . S tat e , 40 S.W.3 d 4 50 , 4 57 n. 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; see al so Gan zev oo rt v . R us se ll , 9 4 9 S. W. 2 d 2 9 3 , 2 9 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. A s in a ll c a s e s o n ap p e a l, “ [t ]he pr e va ili ng pa

rt y in the tr ia l c ou rt

is a ff or de d th e ‘s tr on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll
rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that e vidence .’” See State v . Carter , 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 6 2 , 7 6 5 (T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( q u o t i n g Sta te v . Ke ith , 978 S.W .2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998) ). Fur th e r mo r e , w e r e v ie w th e tria l c o u r t’ s c o n c lu s io n s o f la w u n d e r

a d e n o v o s tan d ar d w ith o ut
acc ording any presumption of correc tness to those conc lusions. See, e.g., State v. W alton , 41 S.W .3d 75 , 8 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; State v. Crutcher , 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999)

.
II . S e arc h a nd

Se izu re Lim ita tio ns
. Th e F ou rth A me nd me nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on pr ov ide s:

Unre asonable sear ches a nd seizures. – The right of the people to be
se c ur e in the ir

pe rs on s, ho us e s, pa

pe rs, and ef

fe c ts, a g a ins t
unrea sonab le sea

rche s and seizures, shall not be violated, a nd no
war r a n ts s h a ll is s u e , b u t u p o n p r o b ab le c a u s e , s u p p o r te d b y o a thor aff irmation, and particularly describing the pla ce to be sear ched, and the per son or things to be seized.-4-

U.S. Const. amend. I V. Simil arly , Article 1, § 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution guar antee s that the people sha ll b e secur e in their pe rsons, houses, pape rs and possessions, from u n re asonable sear ches a nd seizures; and that g ener al war

rants, whe reby

an off icer m ay be commande d to searc h
s u s p e c te d p la c e s , w ith o u t e v id e n c e o f th e f a c t c o mm itte d , o r

to s e iz e a ny pe rs on or pe rs on s no t name d, wh os e of fe nc e s a re no t pa rt ic ula rl y described and supporte d by evidenc e, ar e dang erous to li b er t yand oug ht not to be gr anted.
Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 7. The intent and purpose of the prohibition a g ainst unrea sonable sear ches a nd
se izur e s f ou ndin the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion ha vebe e n h e ld to be the sa me a s f ou ndin the F ou rth Amendment to the United States Constituti on. See State v . Simpson , 968 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998). Under both the Unit ed S tates and the Tennessee Const itutions , a sea rch or seizure conduc ted without a wa rr an t i s presumed unr easona ble. Se e Coo lid

ge v . Ne w H

am ps hire , 403 U.S. 443, 45 4- 55 , 9 1 S. Ct. 20 22 , 2 03 2 ( 19 71 ); State v. W atkins , 827 S.W .2d 293, 29 5 (Tenn. 1992)

. There fore , evidenc e seized as a result of a

sear ch or se izure conducte d without a wa rr an t m u st be suppressed unle ss that searc h or seizure wa s conducte d pursuant to one of the rec og nized ex ceptions to the war rant re quirement. See W

atkins , 827 S.W .2d at 295.

II I. Ex c e pti on s to In ad

mi ssi bil ity of Fruits of W

arrantless Search.

A. Administrative Sear ch Exception.

On e re c og nize d e xce pti on to the wa rr a nt re qu ir e me nt is kn ow n a s th e “ pe rv a siv e ly reg ulated business doctrine .” See New Y o rk v

. B u rger , 482 U.S. 691, 699-703, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 26 42 -4 4 (1 98 7) (o pe ratio n of a jun ky ardpe rv a siv e ly

re g ulate d) ; Donovan v . Dewey , 452 U.S. 594, 59 8- 60 0, 10 1 S. Ct. 25 34 , 25 37 -3 8 (1 98 1) (c oa l min ing pe rv a si vel yreg ulate d) ; Marshall v. B a r lo w’ s , I

n c. , 4 36 U. S. 3 07 , 3 11 -1 3, 98 S. Ct . 1 81 6, 18 20 -2 1 ( 19 78 ) ( wa rr a ntl e ss i ns pe c tio ns to
e nf or c e OSH A r e g ulatio ns no t auth orize d b y pe rv a siv e ly re g ulate d b us ine ss d oc tr ine ); United States
v . B isw e ll , 4 06 U. S. 3 11 , 9 2 S. Ct. 15 93 (1 97 2) (f ir e arm s p e rv a siv e ly

re g ulate d) ; Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States , 397 U.S. 72, 90 S. C t. 774 (1970) (liquor pe rvasively reg ulated). Al tho ug h th e F ou rth A me nd me nt’ s p ro te c tio ns a g a ins t un re a so na ble se arc he s a nd se izur e s app ly to private c ommercia l property , under the perva sively reg ulated business doctrine , administrative
sear ches of private commerc ial property conducte d without a sear ch wa rra nt pursuant to leg islative scheme s authorizing such se arc hes do not ne cessa rily violate the Fourth A mendment. See D ewey , 452 U.S. at 598-99, 101 S. Ct. at 2537- 38. This doc trine “re flec ts the fac t that the expectation of privac y that the owner

of commer cial prope rty

enjoy s in such property

differ s signific antly

from the
sa nc tit y a c c or de d a n indi vid ua l’ s home , an d tha t this p ri va c y int e re st m a y , in c e rt a in c ir c ums ta nc e s, be ade quately

protec ted by reg ulatory scheme s authorizing warra ntless inspections.” Id ., 10 1 S. Ct. 25 37 -3 8. B e c a us e of

the pe rv a siv e ne ss o f g ov e rn me nt r e g ulatio ns in c e rt a in i nd us tr ie s, bu sin e ss ow ne rs or op e rator s in tho se “ c los e ly re g ulate d” ind us tr ie s ha ve a re du c e d e xpe c ta tio n o f p ri va c y in-5-

their busi ness operations. See B urger , 482 U.S. at 702, 107 S. Ct . at 2643-44. Thus, be cause of the reduc ed expectation of privacy in heavily

or per vasively

reg ulated bus inesses, the Supreme Court has dete rmi n ed that “the wa rra nt and proba

ble-c ause r equire ments, which fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standar d of re asonable ness for a government sear ch, have lessene d application i n this contex t.” See id. , 1 07 S. Ct . at 26 43 . T o b e re a so na ble un de r the F ou rth A me nd me nt, ho we ver , a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e se arc h o r i ns pe c tio n p ur su a nt t o th e pe rv a siv e ly re g ulate d b us ine ss doctrine must satisfy

three criteria.

F ir st, the re mus t be a “ su bs ta nti a l” g ov e rn me nt i nte re st that in fo rm s the re g ulatory

scheme pursuant to which the inspe ction is made.

S e c on d, the wa

rr a ntl e ss i ns pe c tio ns mus t be “ ne c e ssa ry to further [t he] reg ulatory

scheme .”

. . . . Finally , “t h e statute’s inspec tion prog ram, in terms of the
c e r tain ty a n d r e g u la

r it y o f it s ap p li c a ti o n , [m u s t] p r o v id[e] a
c on sti tut ion a lly ade qu a te su bs titute fo r a wa rr a nt. ” I n o the r w or ds , the re g ulatory

statute must perform the t wo b as i c functions of a
war rant: it must advise the owner of the commercial pr emises that the
sear ch is being made pur suant to the law and ha s a prope rly define d scope, a nd it must limit the discre tion of the inspecting office rs.
Id. at 702-03, 107 S. Ct. at 2644 (citations omitted).

B. Inevitable Disc overy

Rule.

Even if no r ecog nized ex ception to the wa rra nt require ment would pave the way for the a dmi ssi on of

e vid e nc e ob ta ine d v ia

a wa rr a ntl e ss s e arc h, th e evi dence ma y sti ll b e a dmi ssi ble when its discovery

by state ac tors would have be en inevitable. U nder the inevitable discove ry doctrine, illeg ally

obtained evide nce is a dmissibl e whe n t h e evidence w ould have inevitably been discovere d by

lawful mea ns. See State v . Patton , 8 9 8 S.W .2d 732, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (c i t i n g Nix v. W

illiams , 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984)). Proof of inevitable discove ry

may involve “no spec ulative eleme nts but focuses on demonstrated historica l fac ts capa ble of re ady verific ation or impeac hment.” Nix , 46 7 U. S. a t 44 4 n .5 , 1 04 S. Ct . at 25 09 n. 5; see State v . Cothran , 11 5 S. W.3 d 5 13 , 5 25 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 03 ) ( un de r i ne vit able dis c ov e ry do c tr ine , il legal ly obtained evide nce is a d m i s s i ble if the e vidence would have othe rwise be en discove red by lawful means).-6- IV. Application.

I n Tenne ssee, “ [n] o person sha ll ope rate a

. . . food ser vice e stablishment who does
n o t h o l d a v al i d permit issued . . . on or bef ore July1 of ea ch y ear .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 68-14- 305(a) (2001). Permits to operate food service e stablishments may be suspende d or eve n revoke d wh e n th e c omm iss ion e r o f h e a lth de te rm ine s via on -s ite ins pe c tio ns that th e e sta bli sh me nt i s n ot i n compliance with public health laws a nd reg ulations. Se e id . §§ 68-14-306, - 307, -308 & -317 (2001); §§ 53-8- 205(4) ( requiring semiannual inspec tions of food service e stablishments), -209 & -210 (pro v iding f

or suspension and r evocation of permits) (2001). Furthermor e, “a leg al ag ent of the state de partment of a g riculture ha s full power at all times to enter eve ry building, room, ba sement
or ce llar occ upied or used

. . . fo r t h e p roduction for sale, . . . stora g e, sale , distribution or transportation of fo o d , an d t o inspect the pre mises.” Id. § 5 3- 8- 11 5 ( 19 99 ); see also id. §§ 53-8- 205( 7 ) ( b ) ( 2 0 0 1 ) ( p r o v id in g f o r a u th o r it y o f c o mm is s io n e r o f a g r ic u ltu r e to b e e xe r c is e d b y local health depa

rtments) & -202 (2001) (dec laring leg islative intent to “eliminate duplicate inspe ctions of re tail food stores”)

. “F ood may be examined or sampled by [i nspectors] as dee med nec essary for the enf orce ment of this part.” Id. § 68- 14 -3 19 (2 00 1) ; see also id. §§ 53 -8 -2 18 (a ) ( 19 99 ) ( sim ila rl y empowering a g ents of the commissioner of ag riculture) , -1-104 ( 1999) (de fining “adulter ated” food, including te mperature re quirements for food st orag e), 68- 1-103(a ) (2001) (empowe ring the commissioner of hea lth to adopt rules and reg ulations). A person commits a C lass C misdemeanor who “f ails or re fuses to comply

with any of the [applicable r

ules and regul ati ons], or obstructs or hin d e r s t h e r e g u l a t o r y

a u t h o r i t y i n t h e d i s c h ar g e o f

t h e r e g u l a t o r y

a u t h o r i t y ’ s d u t i e s o r

oth e rw ise operates a . . . food se rvice establishment in violation of [t he provisions for inspection] or rules a nd reg ulations.” Id. § 6 8- 14 -3 22 (2 00 1) ; see id. §§ 53 -8 -2 21 (1 99 9) (s a nc tio nin g sim ila r a c tiv ity a s a Cla ss C mi sd eme a no r) & -1 15 (p ro sc ri bin g a s a Cla ss C mis de mne a no r a re fu sa l to c omp ly

wi th provisions for inspection).

B a se d u po n th e se pr ov isi on s f or e ns uring the pu bli c he a lth , we ha ve no dif fi c ult y in determining that t h e fo o d inspector in the pr esent c ase w as authorized to enter and inspec t the defe ndant’s commer cial pre mises, where , indisputa b l y , fo od was served. We likewise ha ve no difficulty in discerning that a subst antial government interest attends the reg ulation of public food service

. The prevention of disease is a vit al concern to the public and the state g overnme nt, and the imperative f

or re g ulation is obvious. See id. § 6 8- 1- 10 4 ( 20 01 ) (c ha rg ing c omm iss ion e r of

he a lth to supervise “ the intere sts of health and life of t he citiz ens of this state”)

. Furthermore , we hold that the pre scribed w arr antless inspections, as mea ns of deter ri n g s af et yand hea lth violations , are nece ssary to further

the regu latory

scheme

. See B urger , 482 U.S. at 702-03, 107 S. Ct. at 2644. Finally , per the Burger

reg imen, we hold that the Te nnessee scheme for f ood reg ulation advises the
e sta bli sh me nt o wn e r that un a nn ou nc e d s e mia nn ua l in sp e c tio ns wi th a pr op e rl y de fi ne d s c op e wi ll be per formed and that the scheme , throug h specific ity of materials and conditions to be examined, limit s the discre tion of the inspectors. Se e id ., 107 S. Ct . at 2641.

There fore , based upon the statutory scheme for insp e c ti o no f

th eM e xic anTy

pical B ar as a c losely

reg ulated business and the constitutional la rge s s t hat permits such inspections to be pe rf orme d w ith ou t a war

rant, the fo od ins pe c tor in the pr e se nt ca se didno t pe rf orm a n u nr e a so na

ble-7-

se arc h o r s e izur e wh e n, thr ou g h d e le g a tin g he r a uth ority to ano the r s ta te of

fi c e r, sh e un de rt oo k to
sear ch the bag being car

ried away from the premises by the def endant. She he ld a re asonable belief t h a tt h e b a g c o n t a i n e d f

o o d , a n d a s s t a t e d ab o v e , s h e w a s a u t h o r i z e d t o e x a m i n e f o o d “ a s n e c e s s ar y” to enforc e the r eg ulations. W e dee m it reasonable and nec essary in the prese nt case for the inspe ctor to examine the c ontents of a g roce ry bag that the defe ndant took f rom a coole r during the cour se of the inspection and tried to r emove from the premises. We note that the defe ndant, as the owne r or operator of the e stablishment, had rec eived a failing scoreon the i nitial visit of the most rec ent prior inspection. We disc ern that prohibiting the inspector from investigating the defe ndant’s remova l of
a g ro c e ry ba g that r e a so na

bly mig ht c on ta in no n- c omp ly ing fo od stu ff s w ou ld f ru str a te the pu rp os e a nde ff e c t of a le g iti ma te re g ulatory

sc he me , th us e nd a ng e ri ng the pu bli c . T he re su lt i s th a t th e fr uit s of the de te nti on a nd se arc h we re g e ne ra lly a dmi ssi ble – sub je c t to the sc op e of

the se arc h b e ing its e lf
rea sonable.

I n th is r e g ard , the de fe nd a nt cl a ims that th e de fe nd a nt’ s g ra du a l r e ve a lin g of c on te nts of the ba g sh ou ld h a ve dis pe lle d a ny no tio n th a t th e ba g c on ta ine d f oo d. We a

re un pe rs ua de d b y

thi s arg ume nt, ho we ve r. We b e lie ve the of fi c e r wa s ini tia lly a uth orize d to do wh a t the de fe nd a nt a c tua lly claimed he did

– t ak e t h e b ag from him at the outset and se arc h it hims elf. The office r wa s not constraine d to bide the def endant’ s orche stration of the sea rch of the b ag. I f the off

icer was authorized to detain the de fenda nt, as we ha ve dete rmined, he w as ce rtainly authorized to car

ry out the ac tivitythat the detention wa s intended to allow.

I n p a s s i n g , w e o b s e r v e t h a t w e n e e d n o t r e s o r t t o t h e i n e v i t ab l e d i s c o v e r y rule a s a basis for a ffirming the trial court’s action. The inspector, and throug h her the police off icer , had the
nece ssary and re asonable authority to thoroug hly sear ch an opaque gr ocery bag that the def endant procur e d f r o m a nappar ent food stora g e ar ea. T he off icer ’s ac tions constitut ed the inspec tor’s sea rch, thus obviating the ne ed to theorize a subse quent, inevitable se arc h by the inspector he rself.

V. Conclusion.
Finding no err or in the trial court’s determination, we af firm the convic tion.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE