UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DORALEH CONTAINER TERMINAL SA, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI, 

 Respondent.

Civil Action No. 20-02571 (TFH)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Doraleh Container Terminal SA (“DCT”) brings this action against Respondent 

the Republic of Djibouti ( “Djibouti”) seeking confirmation of two arbitration awards issued in 

2019 by the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) in favor of DCT. DCT seeks to 

confirm the awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., which codifies the 

1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New 

York Convention”). 

Djibouti opposes confirmation of the awards, arguing that this Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over the Petition and that confirmation must be denied pursuant to the New York 

Convention. 

On January 26, 2023, this Court heard the parties’ arguments on the Petition and issued a 

bench ruling confirming the arbitration awards. Consistent with that ruling, this Memorandum 

Opinion provides further explanation for this Court’s decision. 
2

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

DCT is a joint venture between Djibouti’s port authority, Port de Djibouti SA (“PDSA”), 

and DP World Djibouti (“DP World”). Pet. to Confirm Foreign Arbitration Award ¶ 1 [ECF No. 

1]. Upon the venture’s formation, DP World held a minority 33.34% share interest in DCT, but 

had the right to appoint a majority of the members of DCT’s board of directors and exercised 

control over the entity. Id. DCT was incorporated by a statute passed by Djibouti’s Parliament. 

Id. ¶ 11. Djibouti is a foreign state within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1330. Id. ¶ 3. 

In October 2006, Djibouti and DCT entered into a Concession Agreement to build and 

develop a new international container terminal on the Red Sea in Doraleh, Djibouti. Id. ¶ 12. In 

exchange for building the terminal, the Agreement granted DCT the exclusive right to handle 

container shipping in Djibouti, and required Djibouti to pay royalties for any ships that did not 

dock at the terminal. Id. ¶ 12. Article 20 of the Agreement provides for arbitration of any dispute 

between the parties under LCIA Rules if it cannot be amicably settled. Id. ¶ 13. The Concession 

Agreement was ratified by Djiboutian Parliament on December 18, 2006. Id. ¶ 12. DCT 

completed the terminal on schedule in accordance with the agreement in December 2008. Id. ¶ 

14. Pursuant to the Agreement, DP World managed the day-to-day operations of the terminal. Id. 

In 2014, Djibouti commenced the London Arbitration, LCIA No. 142732, against DCT, 

DP World, and Dubai International, claiming, among other things, that the Concession 

Agreement should be rescinded because it had been procured through bribery and corruption. Id. 

¶ 15. DCT and DP World brought counterclaims against Djibouti for failure to pay certain 

royalties and for breach of their exclusivity rights under the Concession Agreement. Id. ¶ 17.
3

The arbitration hearing was conducted under LCIA rules before a tribunal of arbitrators 

in the Fall of 2016. Id. ¶ 16. On February 20, 2017, the tribunal issued the first of four awards, 

dismissing the claims brought by Djibouti to invalidate the Concession Agreement in their 

entirety, and finding that Djibouti was obligated to pay costs and legal fees. The tribunal issued 

the Second Partial Final Award on June 29, 2017, awarding DCT costs and fees totaling £7 

Million. Id. This award has been paid. Id.

The First and Second Awards did not address DCT’s two counterclaims, which were 

stayed at the end of the 2016 hearing to allow for commercial settlement discussions between the 

parties. Id. ¶ 17. The counterclaims were instead addressed in the Third and Fourth Awards, 

which are the awards at issue in this litigation. Id. During 2017 and into 2018, the parties 

unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the counterclaims. Id. ¶ 18. 

Prior to the eventual arbitration hearing, in 2017, Djibouti enacted a law permitting the 

Djiboutian government to demand re-negotiation of “strategic infrastructure contracts” and 

unilaterally terminate them should such negotiation fail. Id. ¶ 19. In December 2017, the 

Djiboutian government invoked this law to re-negotiate the Concession Agreement, but DCT and 

DP World refused to engage. Id. In response to Djibouti’s demands, in February 2018, DCT 

issued a notice of dispute to Djibouti, and commenced a second and separate arbitration 

proceeding to confirm the Concession Agreement. Id. ¶ 19.

Two days after DCT brought the second arbitration, “in apparent retaliation,” the 

President of Djibouti issued an executive order claiming to terminate the Concession Agreement, 

and Djibouti took physical control of the container terminal. Id. ¶ 20. Despite Djibouti’s law and 

executive decrees purporting to terminate the Concession Agreement, the tribunal in the second 

arbitration found that it “remains valid and binding.” Id. 
4

In September 2018, Djibouti applied to the Djibouti Court of First Instance in an ex parte

proceeding seeking the appointment of an administrator over DCT due to “tensions” between the 

shareholders, DP World, and PDSA, a division of the Djiboutian government. Id. ¶ 21. The 

Djiboutian court appointed Chantal Tadoral as the provisional administrator of DCT. Id. 

On November 9, 2018, the original London tribunal held an arbitration hearing on DCT’s 

counterclaims. Id. ¶ 23. Though Djibouti had initiated the proceedings in 2016, it did not appear. 

Id. Instead, on November 18, 2018, Ms. Tadoral, claiming to represent DCT, applied to stay the 

arbitration. Id. ¶ 21. On January 3, 2019, the tribunal rejected the application for a stay because 

it had already proceeded to the hearing stage without any challenges from the counterclaimants. 

Id. ¶ 22. 

On May 3, 2019, the arbitration tribunal issued its Third Partial Final Award, granting 

declarations that Djibouti breached the Concession Agreement and awarding total damages and 

legal costs to DCT in the amount of $474,388,673, not including interest. Id. ¶ 23. On July 1, 

2019, the tribunal issued the Fourth Partial Final Award awarding interest on the unpaid royalties 

and legal fees to DCT. Id. ¶ 24. Total damages amount to $485,755,717.80, excluding interest on 

the exclusivity claims and the royalty claims since April 11, 2019. Id.

B. Procedural History

On September 14, 2020, DCT filed in this Court a Petition to Confirm Arbitration 

Awards against the Republic of Djibouti. See generally Pet. After a lengthy dispute over service 

of process, Djibouti entered a stipulation in which it agreed to respond to the Petition by 

November 22, 2021. Stipulation [ECF No. 25]. On November 22, 2021, Djibouti filed its

Answer, generally denying the allegations in the Petition, and asserting seven affirmative 

defenses. Answer [ECF No. 28]. After DCT objected to various discovery requests from 
5 

Djibouti, on January 24, 2022, DCT filed a notice letter advising the Court that Djibouti’s 

Answer was “an improper response to the Petition” under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 

its discovery requests were “premature and improper,” and that the Petition was ripe for 

resolution on the merits. Notice Letter [ECF No. 30-1]. On February 3, 2022, Djibouti filed a 

Motion to Compel Discovery and Response to Petitioner’s Notice Letter. Mot. to Compel [ECF 

No. 31]. The Court held a motion hearing on November 14, 2022, denied the Motion to Compel, 

and ordered the parties to submit a stipulated briefing schedule to resolve the Petition on the 

merits. Minute Entry (Nov. 14, 2022). On January 3, 2023, Djibouti submitted its Response in 

Opposition to DCT’s Petition. Resp., ECF No. 37. On January 24, 2023, DCT submitted its 

Reply in Support of the Petition. Reply, ECF No. 39. 

This Court heard arguments on the Petition on January 26, 2023, and confirmed the 

arbitration awards. This opinion sets forth the Court’s reasoning for that decision, consistent with 

the findings it made during the hearing. 

III. ANALYSIS 

Djibouti argues that this Court should deny the Petition for two reasons: first, that this 

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Petition under the Federal Arbitration Act; and

second, that two grounds for denying confirmation of the award under the New York Convention 

apply. 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under D.C. Circuit precedent, “[w]here jurisdiction is sought over a foreign sovereign for 

the enforcement of an arbitral award...two conditions must be satisfied: ‘First, there must be a 

basis upon which a court in the United States may enforce a foreign arbitral award; and second, 

[the foreign sovereign] must not enjoy sovereign immunity from such an enforcement action.’” 
6 

Diag Human, S.E v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 

Consistent with the Circuit’s decision, this Court will review those conditions in reverse 

order. See id.; see also Belize Bank Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, 191 F. Supp. 3d 26, 31-32 (D.D.C. 

2016) (addressing sovereign immunity before the court’s basis to enforce the award). Both are 

satisfied here, and this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition. 

1. Sovereign Immunity

First, Djibouti has waived sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 

Act (“FSIA”). The FSIA is “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the 

courts of the United States.” Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, 794 F.3d 99, 101 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)). 

Under the statute, “a foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States 

courts; unless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction...” 

Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993). And because “subject matter jurisdiction in 

any such action depends on the existence of one of the specified exceptions...[a]t the threshold 

of every action in a District Court against a foreign state...the court must satisfy itself that one of 

the exceptions applies...” Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983); 

see also Stati v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 199 F. Supp. 3d 179, 187 (D.D.C. 2016). 

This Court is so satisfied here. Section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA states that “[a] foreign 

state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States ... in any case ... in 

which the foreign state has waived its immunity ... by implication.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). The 

D.C. Circuit has found that an implied waiver of sovereign immunity occurs when “a foreign 

state has filed a responsive pleading in an action without raising the defense of sovereign 
7 

immunity” so long as it “exhibit[s] a conscious decision to take part in the litigation.” ForemostMcKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Djibouti does 

not contest this Court’s jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds, and has filed numerous 

substantive pleadings, including its answer to the Petition, a discovery motion, and its response. 

See Answer; Mot. to Compel; Resp. Its clear, “conscious decision to participate in the litigation” 

is more than enough to demonstrate an implied waiver of its sovereign immunity. ForemostMcKesson, 905 F.2d at 444; see also Stati, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (finding respondent waived its

sovereign immunity when it “filed two substantive responsive pleadings” without raising such a 

defense). 

2. Basis to Enforce the Awards 

Second, the Court has the jurisdiction to enforce the awards under the FAA. The New 

York Convention, as codified by the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., is a multilateral treaty that 

applies to “the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State 

other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought.” Art. 

I(1), 21 U.S.T. 2517 (1970). The FAA declares that

[a]n action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise 

under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United 

States ... shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, 

regardless of the amount in controversy. 

9 U.S.C. § 203; see also Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d at 137 (“We have already 

established that the New York Convention, as codified by the United States, grants federal courts 

jurisdiction over arbitration disputes that fall within its ambit.”).

The parties here do not dispute that the arbitral awards fall under the jurisdictional ambit 

granted by § 203. Djibouti instead argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because

9 U.S.C. § 207 allows a court to “confirm a foreign arbitration award only if the petition is made 
8 

by a ‘party to the arbitration’ to a ‘court having jurisdiction.’” Resp. at 9 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 

207). Underlying this argument is Djibouti’s contention that the DCT lacks the authority to bring 

suit because its purported provisional administrator did not approve the Petition. Id. at 11-12. 

Djibouti claims that this lack of authority means that DCT was not a “party to the arbitration” 

and thus the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction does not extend to this suit. Id. Djibouti also 

argues that for similar reasons, DCT lacks standing. Id. at 9-10. 

However, this argument lacks merit for at least three reasons: (1) no other court has 

dismissed a claim for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 207; (2) even if § 207 

is a jurisdictional barrier, DCT meets the statutory requirements to bring suit and has standing; 

and (3) Djibouti’s authority argument has no bearing on the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

First, it is not clear that § 207 is a barrier against the Court’s exercise of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 9 U.S.C. § 207 states, in its entirety:

[w]ithin three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made, 

any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this 

chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the 

arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for 

refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said 

Convention. 

9 U.S.C. § 207. 

Djibouti does not provide, nor could the Court find, any cases where a court dismissed a 

petition for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 207.1 Rather, courts have 

read § 207 primarily as requiring a court to enforce a foreign arbitral award unless it finds one of 

the specific grounds for denying enforcement under the New York Convention. See, e.g., Tatneft 

v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th 829, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Ukraine v. PAO Tatneft, 

1

 Nor could Djibouti point to any cases where a court dismissed a confirmation petition

under the broader contention that the party did not have the authority to bring suit. 
9

143 S. Ct. 290 (2022) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 207 for the prospect that the “New York Convention in 

general requires American courts to enforce international arbitral awards.”); Chevron Corp. v. 

Republic of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Pursuant to the Convention, a 

district court ‘shall confirm the [arbitral] award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or 

deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.’”) (quoting 

9 U.S.C. § 207). While § 207 certainly provides the basis by which a court can dismiss a 

Petition, this Court sees nothing to suggest that doing so would be on jurisdictional grounds. 

Second, even accepting § 207 as a limitation on the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction,

DCT’s claim still falls within the New York Convention’s basis for enforcing an arbitral award.

DCT is named on the record in both the London Arbitration and this suit. In both proceedings, 

DCT is represented by Quinn Emanuel. See LCIA Third Partial Award, Pet. Ex. A at 5n. 1 

(“Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP ("QE") acted then [at the outset of the arbitration]

and now for the respondents.”) And as noted in DCT’s briefing, “the same board that authorized 

the arbitration authorized this ancillary proceeding seeking to enforce the Awards...” Reply at 

14. Under any reasonable reading of the statute, DCT was a party to the underlying arbitration, 

and is therefore able to bring suit under § 207. 

Djibouti’s related argument that DCT lacks standing to bring the case fails for similar 

reasons. The Restatement (Third) on the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration states 

that a “person that participates in an arbitral proceeding as a party without objection by any other 

party has standing to bring a post-award action” Restatement (Third) U.S. Law of Int'l Comm. 

Arb. § 4.28 PFD (2019). Not only did DCT participate in the arbitration as described above, but 

Djibouti had the opportunity to object to its status as a party in that arbitration and failed to do 
10

so.2 Accordingly, the New York Convention provides this Court with a basis to enforce the 

awards. Along with Djibouti’s waiver of sovereign immunity, this is sufficient for the Court to 

find that it has the subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the awards.

Third and finally, Djibouti’s authority argument has no bearing on the Court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction. It strikes the Court as a disguised attempt to challenge the award on grounds 

that could have been brought before the arbitrator, rather than an authentic challenge to the 

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Despite an invitation from the arbitral tribunal to comment on 

DCT’s authority, Djibouti declined to respond, and instead raises its argument here for the first 

time. See Reply, Sinclair Decl. ¶¶ 29-34. But it is not this Court’s job to engage with questions 

that could have been addressed before the arbitrator. The scope of a court’s review of an arbitral 

award is “extremely limited.” Kurke v. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., 454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). And as other courts have held, “[i]f a party fails to raise an issue...to the arbitrators, that 

issue is forfeited.” Chem. Overseas Holdings, Inc. v. Republica Oriental Del Uruguay, 371 F. 

Supp. 2d 400, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (cleaned up), quoting Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano 

Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir.1998); see also Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 961 (7th Cir.1993) (“Permitting parties to keep silent 

during arbitration and raise arguments in enforcement proceedings would undermine the purpose 

of arbitration which is to provide a fast and inexpensive method for the resolution 

of...disputes.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If Djibouti wanted to dispute DCT’s 

2 Chantal Tadoral, the purported provisional administrator of DCT and a non-party to the 

arbitration, did write to the tribunal and ask for a stay of the proceedings for Djiboutian courts to 

resolve any authority issue, but Djibouti did not. See Resp. Decl. (Second) of Chantal Tadoral. 

Djibouti, as discussed below, had notice of the arbitration and the opportunity to participate but 

failed to do so. “Any lost opportunity to be heard therefore was self-inflicted.” Belize Bank Ltd., 

191 F. Supp. 3d at 39.
11

authority to bring a claim, it needed to do so before the arbitrator, not as a challenge to this 

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Further, after finding that it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Petition, this Court 

cannot consider Djibouti’s authority argument as an independent ground upon which to dismiss 

the Petition. A party’s lack of authority to bring a claim is not one of the explicit grounds upon 

which a Court can deny an arbitral award under the New York Convention.

3 See 9 U.S.C.§ 207; 

TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (a district court 

“may refuse to enforce the award only on the grounds explicitly set forth under Article V of the 

convention.”). DCT’s authority to bring suit has no bearing on the Court’s decision to confirm 

the awards, whether on jurisdictional grounds or otherwise.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over DCT’s 

Petition.

B. Djibouti’s Defenses under the New York Convention

This Court turns next to Djibouti’s arguments for denying the awards under the New 

York Convention. A district court “may refuse to enforce the award only on the grounds 

explicitly set forth under Article V of the convention.” TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 

487 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, 126 

3 “Pursuant to the New York Convention: (1) an arbitral award may be refused at the 

request of the party against whom it is invoked where (a) the parties to the agreement were under 

some incapacity; (b) the party against whom the award is invoked did not receive proper notice 

of the arbitration proceedings; (c) the award deals with an issue not falling within the terms of 

the parties’ submission to arbitration; (d) the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in 

accordance with the parties’ agreement; (e) the award has not yet become binding; or (2) 

recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused in the country where it is 

sought if (a) the issue arbitrated is not capable of being arbitrated under the law or (b) it would 

be contrary to the public policy of such country”. Pao Tatneft v. Ukraine, No. CV 17-582 

(CKK), 2020 WL 4933621, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2020) (citing New York Convention, Art. V).
12 

F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “there is now considerable caselaw holding that, in an 

action to confirm an arbitration award...the grounds for relief enumerated in Article V of the 

Convention are the only grounds available for setting aside an arbitral award”). “Given that the 

New York Convention provides only several narrow circumstances when a court may deny 

confirmation of an arbitral award, confirmation proceedings are generally summary in nature.” 

Int'l Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aerospace Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d 12, 20 (D.D.C. 

2011). “The burden of establishing the requisite factual predicate to deny confirmation of an 

arbitral award rests with the party resisting confirmation and the showing required to avoid 

summary confirmation is high.” Belize Bank Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

 Djibouti advances two grounds for rejecting the awards under Article V of the New York 

Convention: (1) it received inadequate notice of the resumption of the arbitration proceedings; 

and (2) confirming the award would violate United States public policy. Resp. at 18. This Court 

addresses both below. 

1. Article V(1)(b)—Improper Notice

This Court rejects Djibouti’s argument that the Petition should be denied under the New 

York Convention for inadequate notice. Under Article V(1)(b), a court can refuse to enforce an 

award if “[t]he party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 

appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present 

his case.” art. V(1)(b); see also Belize Bank Ltd., F. Supp. 2d at 38. That provision “essentially 

sanctions the application of the forum state's standards of due process.” Anatolie Stati v. 

Republic of Kazakhstan, 302 F. Supp. 3d 187, 204 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Iran Aircraft Indus. v. 

Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1992)). Under United States law, “due process 
13

requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 

the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Crooks v. 

Mabus, 845 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also Anatolie Stati v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 

302 F. Supp. 3d 187, 205–06 (D.D.C. 2018) (applying this standard to a confirmation proceeding 

under the New York Convention). Further, actual notice “more than satisfie[s] due process 

rights.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010).

Djibouti argues that the Petition should be denied because “the tribunal violated those 

due process standards when it lifted the stay of its proceedings on the counterclaims against the 

Republic without notifying the Republic of those resumed proceedings.” Resp. at 18. But the 

record before this Court demonstrates that Djibouti had actual notice of the proceedings, and 

declined to participate in the arbitration when given the opportunity. 

On November 9, 2018, the Tribunal held a hearing on DCT’s counterclaims without 

Djibouti’s participation. Pet. Ex. A. ¶¶ 16-17, ECF 1-2. Five days later, however, Djibouti’s 

lawyer, Cabinet Ghaleb, copied the arbitral panel on an email to Chantal Tadoral, inviting her to 

ask the panel to stay the proceedings to resolve the authority issue. See Reply, Ex. 7. As DCT 

points out in its Reply, “[g]iven the confidential nature of the arbitration, it is simply impossible 

for Cabinet Ghaleb to have known about the hearing and case status...if the Republic did not 

have actual notice of the arbitration proceeding.” Reply at 21 (emphasis in original). Other 

courts have similarly found that contacting the tribunal evidences adequate notice under the New 

York Convention. See CBF Industria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 635, 

653 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that a party’s request for an extension of time and response to a 

letter in the proceedings was “evidence that [the party] was provided proper notice of the 

arbitration”); Huzhou Chuangtai Rongyuan Inv. Mgmt. P'ship v. Qin, 2022 WL 4485277, at *8 
14 

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2022) (“the fact that [the respondent contacted [the arbitration tribunal] to 

request additional copies of the arbitration documents...suggests that he was aware of the 

proceeding.”). Djibouti’s actual notice of the proceedings “more than satisfied [its] due process 

rights.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 559 U.S. at 272. 

Further, the Tribunal clearly gave Djibouti “the opportunity to be heard” as required 

under the due process standard. After November 14, 2018 Mr. Ghaleb was copied on numerous 

communications between the parties and the tribunal, but beyond acknowledging receipt, he and 

his client chose to remain silent. See Reply, Ex. 1, Sinclair Decl. ¶¶ 29-34. The Panel even asked 

Djibouti through its counsel to comment on the authority issue, but it still declined to respond. 

Id. “Any lost opportunity to be heard therefore was self-inflicted.” Belize Bank Ltd, 191 F. Supp. 

3d at 39. Therefore, Article V(1)(b) does not offer a ground to deny the Petition. 

2. Article V(2)(b)—Contrary to U.S. Public Policy 

Djibouti’s argument that enforcing the award would violate U.S. public policy also fails. 

Article V(2)(b) permits a court to deny confirmation of an award when “recognition and 

enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the [forum] country.” New 

York Convention art. V(2)(b). Under this Circuit’s precedent, “[t]he public policy defense is to 

be construed narrowly to be applied only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s 

most basic notions of morality and justice.” TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 

928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak 

Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004)). 

Relying on Article V(2)(b), Djibouti contends that enforcing the award would “interfere 

with the Public’s ability to control the Port—its sovereign territory.” Resp. at 21. Its sole support 

for this contention is Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India), Inc. v. Gov't of India, Ministry of Petroleum 
15 

& Nat. Gas, which held only that the “enforcement of the specific performance portion of the 

arbitral award would violate United States public policy. 314 F. Supp. 3d 95, 114 (D.D.C. 2018) 

(emphasis added). There is no specific performance element to the award here, and no 

subsequent threat to Djibouti’s sovereignty. A purely compensatory award does not violate 

United States public policy. See Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 244 

F. Supp. 3d 100, 121 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that “enforcing this award does not risk violating 

public policy” because “the award...only requires Venezuela to compensate Crystallex”). The 

monetary damages here compensate DCT for Djibouti’s breach of a contract, and do not threaten 

sovereignty or otherwise violate U.S. public policy. Therefore, Article V(2)(b) does not provide 

a ground to deny the Petition. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as the reasons stated on the record during the January 

26, 2023 hearing, the Court granted DCT’s Petition to Confirm Arbitration Awards. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

February 15, 2023 ___________________________________ 

 Thomas F. Hogan 

 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE