Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A01-1704-CR-954 | October 24, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Yvette M. LaPlante

Keating & LaPlante, LLP

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Laura R. Anderson 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Morley,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 24, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

87A01-1704-CR-954

Appeal from the Warrick Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Greg A. Granger, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

87C01-1503-F4-92

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A01-1704-CR-954 | October 24, 2017 Page 2 of 7

Statement of the Case

[1] Michael Morley appeals his conviction for child molesting, as a Level 4 felony, 

following a jury trial. Morley presents a single issue for our review, which we 

restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

permitted testimony that he alleges violated Indiana Rule 

of Evidence 404(b).

2. Whether the trial court properly admonished the jury 

when it admitted that testimony.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On October 12, 2014, Morley, his wife (“Amanda”), his daughter I.M., and 

Amanda’s children J.C., L.I., G.C., and S.C. went to the home of Amanda’s 

friend Sarah Meeks for a party, which included a sleepover. J.C.’s best friend, 

then-eleven-year-old C.B., joined them. Meeks’ husband and two children, as 

well as two other adults, were also at the party. During the evening, the adults 

drank alcohol. In particular, Morley drank several beers and some moonshine.

[4] At bedtime, C.B., J.C., S.C., L.I., and I.M., all girls, got into a fifteen-person 

tent to sleep for the night.1 At some point after the girls got settled into their 

 

1

 The male children attending the party slept inside the Meeks’ house.
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tent and had been sleeping, Morley went into the girls’ tent. L.I. told Morley to 

leave the tent, and Morley told L.I. to “shush.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 76. Morley then 

lay down on the floor of the tent with his head near C.B.’s head and his feet 

near S.C.’s head. L.I. heard some “rustling around.” Id. at 77. C.B. awoke 

and found Morley with his hand inside her bra touching her breasts. Morley 

then put his hand inside C.B.’s underwear, touched her near her vagina, and 

moved his hand “like in circles.” Id. at 56. C.B. got up, “got outta [sic] the tent 

and went inside” the Meeks’ house. Id. C.B. went into a bathroom “and just 

sat there for a little bit.” Id. C.B. then went outside and asked Meeks2 whether 

she could sleep inside the house. Meeks told C.B. that she was fine with that, 

and she told C.B. where she could find a blanket inside.

[5] In the meantime, Morley had moved over to the other end of the tent where 

J.C. was sleeping, and he lay down behind her. Morley placed his hand near 

J.C.’s vagina, over her pajamas. After about a minute, J.C. pushed his hand 

away. Morley then got up and left the girls’ tent.

[6] L.I. had noticed that C.B. was “frantic” when she had gotten up and left the 

tent, so L.I. went inside the house to see whether C.B. was alright. Id. at 77. 

L.I. found C.B. crying in the living room, and L.I. went back outside to get 

Meeks because L.I. “didn’t know how to handle the situation.” Id. at 78. 

When L.I. returned to the living room with Meeks, C.B. was still crying and 

 

2

 Meeks was sitting by a campfire at the time.
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told Meeks what had happened. Meeks then went back outside and told 

Amanda what had happened. No one called the police that night, and no one 

called C.B.’s mother. At some point thereafter, C.B. told her mother what 

Morley had done, and C.B.’s mother contacted law enforcement.

[7] The State charged Morley with child molesting, as a Level 4 felony, for the 

touching of C.B. During the jury trial, over Morley’s objection, J.C. testified 

that, while she was in the tent with C.B. the night of the party, Morley had 

touched J.C. near her vagina. The trial court admonished the jury that it could 

consider J.C.’s testimony only to prove “motive, or opportunity, something like 

that[,]” but not as evidence of Morley’s general character. Id. at 130. The jury 

found Morley guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment and sentence 

accordingly. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Evidence Rule 404(b)

[8] Morley contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted J.C. 

to testify that he had touched her near her vagina around the same that he 

allegedly had molested C.B. The trial court has “inherent discretionary power 

on the admission of evidence, and its decisions are reviewed only for an abuse

of that discretion.” McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 264 (Ind. 2004) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s 

judgment “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 
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and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 

38, 40 (Ind. 2014).

[9] Morley maintains that J.C.’s testimony violated Indiana Evidence Rule 

404(b)(1), which provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular 

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Morley 

acknowledges that, under Rule 404(b)(2), evidence of other wrongs or criminal 

acts may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. But Morley asserts 

that none of those exceptions apply here. We disagree and hold that J.C.’s 

testimony was admissible under the “plan” exception.

[10] In Turner v. State, 682 N.E.2d 491, 496 n.5 (Ind. 1997), our supreme court stated

that

[p]rior bad act evidence to prove a plan is only admissible in 

certain circumstances.

The prior offenses “must tend to establish a 

preconceived plan by which the charged crime was 

committed. The crimes must, therefore, be so related 

in character, time, and place of commission as to 

establish some plan which embraced both the prior 

and subsequent criminal activity and charged crime.”

Hardin[ v. State], 611 N.E.2d [123,] 130[ (Ind. 1993)].
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[11] Here, at trial, Morley admitted to having gone into the girls’ tent while they 

were sleeping, but he claimed that he did so merely to make sure that J.C. was 

not having a night terror, which she was known to experience on occasion. But 

J.C. testified that Morley touched her near her vagina, and that act, which took 

place in the same tent, immediately followed the molestation of C.B.,

3 and was 

of the same character as Morley’s molestation of C.B., tended to establish a 

preconceived plan for committing the charged crime.

4

 See id.; c.f. Stettler v. State, 

70 N.E.3d 874, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding evidence of prior bad acts did 

not fall under plan exception where there was no evidence that the prior acts 

were in any way committed in conjunction with the charged offense), trans. 

denied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted J.C.’s 

testimony.5

Issue Two: Admonishment

[12] Morley also contends that the trial court’s admonishment to the jury “was too 

open-ended to effectively prevent the jury from making the forbidden inference 

 

3

 L.I. testified that, as soon as Morley got up from his position near C.B., he went over to the area of the tent 

where J.C. was sleeping.

4

 The trial court found that, “because it[ was] the same night, same tent, . . . it’s relevant . . . and . . . the 

relevancy outweighs whatever prejudicial value there is.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 117.

5

 To the extent Morley appears to argue that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403, he 

does not support that contention with cogent argument. Rather, his argument in support of that contention 

goes to whether the alleged error was harmless. Because we hold that the trial court did not err, we need not 

address Morley’s contention that “the error is not harmless.” Appellant’s Br. at 14.
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or to prevent prejudice.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. Following J.C.’s testimony, the 

trial court admonished the jury as follows:

Alright, let me, uh, at this point then, uh, admonish the jury. 

Uh, you may not use the testimony of this Witness, uh, 

concerning the actions that she described of Mr. Morley in 

touching her as evidence of his general character. You can only 

use it to . . . prove, uh, motive, uh, or opportunity, something like 

that, okay? Just don’t consider it for his general character. Go ahead.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 130 (emphases added). Morley maintains that, “by using the 

phrase ‘something like that[,]’ the court has left the jury, untrained in the law, 

to fill in the law for themselves.” Appellant’s Br. at 16.

[13] But Morley did not object to the admonishment or otherwise ask the trial court 

to clarify it. As our Supreme Court has stated, “[n]othing is preserved on 

appeal where a defendant fails to object to a limiting instruction.” Stahl v. State, 

616 N.E.2d 9, 13, (Ind. 1993). Morley has waived this issue for our review.

[14] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.