18-176 

Dong v. Barr 

BIA 

Poczter, IJ 

A208 190 350/352

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 19th day of February, two thousand twenty. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

 Chief Judge, 

PETER W. HALL, 

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

YU MEI DONG, JIA ZHANG JIANG, 

AKA MING KU, 

 Petitioners, 

v. 18-176 

 NAC 

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Richard Tarzia, Law Office of 

Richard Tarzia, Belle Mead, NJ. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

General; Anthony C. Payne, 
2

Assistant Director; Jennifer A. 

Bowen, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioners Yu Mei Dong and Jia Zhang Jiang, natives and 

citizens of the People’s Republic of China, seek review of a 

January 5, 2018 decision of the BIA affirming a May 10, 2017 

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their 

applications for asylum and withholding of removal.1 In re 

Yu Mei Dong and Jia Zhang Jiang, No. A 208 190 350/352 (BIA 

Jan. 5, 2018), aff’g No. A 208 190 350/352 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. 

City May 10, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with 

the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of 

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 

1 The IJ also denied Petitioners protection under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). The BIA determined that Petitioners had not appealed the portion of 

the IJ’s decision addressing their CAT claims, and Petitioners do not challenge 

that holding. 
3

524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review 

are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei 

Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing 

adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence). 

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on” inconsistencies between an applicant’s 

statements or between statements and other evidence or 

witnesses. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . 

to an IJ’s credibility determination unless . . . it is plain 

that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse 

credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 

167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse 

credibility determination. 

 First, there were several inconsistencies between 

Jiang’s testimony and his statements during his credible fear 

interview. Jiang’s testimony was inconsistent with his 

credible fear interview regarding how many times he attended 

church gatherings before he was arrested: at the credible 

fear interview he stated he attended four times, but he 
4

testified to ten. His testimony was also inconsistent with 

his credible fear interview regarding where he attended 

church: at the credible fear interview he stated that he 

attended gatherings at the home of a friend, Jian Li. But he 

testified to the contrary, stating that Jian Li was not a 

member of his group. Furthermore, Jiang’s testimony was 

inconsistent with the credible fear interview regarding the 

date that he was arrested. The IJ was not required to credit 

Jiang’s explanation that he was nervous. See Majidi v. 

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must 

do more than offer a plausible explanation for his 

inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate 

that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit 

his testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted)). Nor did the agency err in relying on these 

inconsistencies because the record of the credible fear 

interview was sufficiently reliable. The officer noted that 

he attempted to provide a verbatim record of the interview, 

“the proceeding was memorialized in a typewritten document 

setting forth the questions put to petitioner as well as h[is] 

responses,” the questions were designed to elicit the details 
5

of an asylum claim, and Jiang indicated that he understood 

the interpreter. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 

721, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that interview record may be 

considered if it “(1) provides a verbatim account or 

transcript of the alien’s statements; (2) was conducted in a 

manner designed to elicit the details of an asylum claim; and 

(3) contains no indication that the alien was reluctant to 

reveal information or did not understand English or the 

translations provided by the interpreter.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

 Second, Dong’s and Jiang’s descriptions of Dong’s 

injuries were inconsistent. Jiang testified that after Dong 

left detention, she had swelling on the back of her head, 

whereas Dong testified that she did not have any swelling. 

Even a minor inconsistency between their testimony such as 

this bolsters the adverse credibility determination. See Xiu 

Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[A]n IJ may rely on any

inconsistency . . . as long as the ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant is not 

credible.”). 

 Finally, Dong and Jiang have not challenged the agency’s 
6

finding that their documentary evidence did not rehabilitate 

their credibility. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 

117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the 

briefs are considered waived and normally will not be 

addressed on appeal.”). However, even if this argument was 

not waived, the agency was justified in determining that Dong 

and Jiang’s documentary evidence did not rehabilitate their 

credibility. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 

(2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his . 

. . testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of 

corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to 

rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 

question.”). Documents showing that Dong and Jiang attend 

church in the United States did not rehabilitate their claim 

of past persecution. Nor did the IJ err in giving diminished 

weight to affidavits from individuals in China who were not 

subject to cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 

324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s 

evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s 

documentary evidence.”); id. at 334 (deferring to BIA’s 

decision declining to credit letter from spouse in China); 
7

Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) 

(giving diminished weight to letters from relatives because 

they were from interested witnesses not subject to crossexamination), rev’d on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. 

Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012). 

 Given the inconsistencies and lack of reliable 

corroboration, we find that substantial evidence supports the 

adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. And 

since Dong and Jiang’s claims were all based on the same 

factual predicate, the adverse credibility determination is 

dispositive of all forms of relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 

444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court