Filed 5/28/24 P. v. Oliva CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAMON RUESGA OLIVA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B329696

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. KA110580)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with directions.

Jose Jordan & Associates and Jose R. Jordan for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

* * * * * * * * * *
2

Defendant and appellant Ramon Ruesga Oliva appeals 

from the denial of his motion to vacate pursuant to Penal Code 

section 1473.7. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Defendant was charged with one count of possession of an 

assault weapon (Pen. Code, § 30605, subd. (a)). In January 2016, 

at a hearing at which defendant was represented by counsel and 

was assisted by a Spanish language interpreter, he pled no 

contest to the weapons charge. 

In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the 

court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on 

three years of formal probation. Defendant was ordered to serve

15 days of community service and three days in jail. He was 

given credit for time served. 

Defendant successfully completed probation. In 2018, 

defendant obtained an order reducing the conviction to a 

misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b). 

In 2019, defendant obtained an order setting aside his plea, 

vacating his conviction and dismissing the case pursuant to 

section 1203.4. The expungement pursuant to section 1203.4 has 

no effect on federal immigration consequences. (People v. 

Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 560.)

In August 2022, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 

plea and vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code 

section 1473.7, supported by his declaration, a declaration from 

his present counsel and several exhibits. Defendant argued he 

did not meaningfully understand the legal ramifications of his 

plea and that his former counsel did not fully inform him of the 

specific immigration consequences of the plea offer. 
3

At the start of the hearing on defendant’s motion, defense 

counsel advised the court that he and the prosecutor “have come 

to an agreement on the motion and we’d like–I believe that they 

will be joining with the motion. And I believe they will be adding 

a count.” But the court said the motion to vacate would have to 

be adjudicated before there would be any basis for discussing a 

new disposition. 

The parties then submitted on their papers. The court

denied defendant’s motion. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Accurate information about immigration consequences 

allows “many noncitizen defendants . . . to plead to a conviction 

and sentence that satisfy the prosecution and court, but that 

have no, or fewer, adverse immigration consequences than the 

original charge.” (Pen. Code, § 1016.2, subd. (d).) To promote 

this outcome, California law provides that “[t]he prosecution, in 

the interests of justice, and in furtherance of the findings and 

declarations of Section 1016.2, shall consider the avoidance of 

adverse immigration consequences in the plea negotiation 

process as one factor in an effort to reach a just resolution.” 

(§ 1016.3, subd. (b).) The Legislature has also enacted 

section 1473.7, which “allows noncitizens who have served their 

sentences to vacate a conviction if they can establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that their conviction is ‘legally 

invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [their] ability to 

meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept 

the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a 

conviction or sentence.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 

311, 316.)
4

Despite this clear legislative and judicial emphasis on the 

importance of immigration consequences in plea agreements in 

the interests of justice, the trial court here refused to even 

consider what was apparently a joint prosecution and defense 

agreement that defendant should be permitted to withdraw his 

plea and plead to a new, immigration-neutral offense. The record 

before us offers no information about the parties’ agreement, 

because the trial court would not even permit the parties to 

describe their agreement on the record. However, it seems 

reasonable to assume, as we do here, given the context of this 

matter and the nature of the hearing, that the added count to 

which the parties had agreed was an immigration-neutral 

offense. Defendant’s counsel on appeal stated in his opening brief 

that he had “convinced the People to stipulate to a grant of the 

motion to vacate in question, after which Appellant would plea[d] 

out to a different offense, one that would not entail adverse 

immigration consequences.” For the trial court to refuse to 

consider the parties’ agreement was an abuse of its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Ramon Ruesga Oliva’s motion to vacate 

is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with 

instructions to consider any proposed agreement between the 

prosecution and the defense to vacate the plea and enter a new 

plea and, if the proposed agreement is not accepted by the court, 

hold a new hearing on Oliva’s motion to vacate.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J.