In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-22-00109-CR

CARLOS ROMEO CRAIG, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 102nd District Court

Bowie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 22F0161-102-A

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Carlos Romeo Craig appeals his conviction for aggravated assault upon a person with 

whom Craig had a family, household, or dating relationship.1 Craig argues that the evidence did 

not support the jury’s conclusion that he used or exhibited a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon in 

the course of assaulting his girlfriend. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we find 

that the evidence supports the jury’s verdict. We note an error in the trial court’s judgment, 

though, and will modify that judgment. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Background Facts

In the early morning hours of July 11, 2020, Craig and his girlfriend, Shirley,

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resumed 

an argument they had had a few hours earlier. Shirley was driving her car with Craig in the 

passenger seat, and Craig began punching Shirley over and over. Shirley stopped the car and got 

out. Craig pursued her, resumed beating her, then “chunk[ed]” her into the passenger 

compartment of the car. Craig then drove the car while continuing to punch Shirley, and he 

threatened to kill her. Shirley was able to open the passenger door. She tried to “roll out of the 

car” but was caught by one of the tires and was dragged down the road. Craig accelerated, 

“mashing the gas and going even faster,” according to Shirley. She said Craig accelerated while 

she “was being hung out of the car. Like the minute [she] open[ed] up the door and [her] body 

1See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (Supp.). The indictment alleged that Craig caused bodily injury to

Shirley, someone with whom he had a dating or family relationship, and that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon, 

a motor vehicle, in the commission of the assault. 

2The complainant, Craig’s girlfriend, requested the use of a pseudonym during the prosecution and trial. We use 

that pseudonym in this opinion. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 58.202 (Supp.).
3

[wa]s outside of the car he mashed the gas.” Her foot was caught by the tire, then she fell away 

from the car to the ground. 

Shirley suffered a fracture in her foot. At trial, the State introduced a photo of her injury. 

It shows Shirley’s leg from the knee down. The photo is a little blurry, but it shows a significant 

avulsion with several layers of tissue falling away from the wound, which roughly extends from 

her instep to her heel. Above that wound is a large abrasion, extending beyond her ankle. Then 

at the top of that abrasion is another deep laceration or avulsion revealing more bloody tissue. At

the back of her big toe, on the inside of her foot, is another tear or avulsion, perhaps the size of a 

dime or nickel. Officer Clint Akin saw Shirley in the hospital after Craig dragged her down the 

road. He described her foot as “mangled.” He testified, “To this day I have not forgotten what 

that foot looked like, it was - - it was bad. It was a really nasty injury.” 

More than two years after the event, Shirley said she had pain and sometimes swelling in 

her foot whenever the weather was cold or rainy. She continued to have “issues with [her] foot, 

[her] leg, and [her] back” since the incident.3

Texarkana Police Officer Clint Akin found the car abandoned and still running in the 

neighborhood where Shirley was found. He testified that there were “definite signs of a very 

violent struggle . . . all over the vehicle,” including blood spots and “what looked to be flesh . . . 

a chunk of something” in one of the wheel wells. There was blood spatter on one of the rear 

fenders and wheels. Officer Jarod Dean also described seeing “what looked like tissue between 

the tire and the wheel well, on the wheel well itself.” 

3She also suffered intermittent headaches that she attributed to Craig’s repeated punching. She suffered a broken 

nose, but there was no testimony whether that was from the punching or being dragged down the road by the car. 
4

II. Vehicle as a Deadly Weapon

A. Standard of Review

In his sole point of error, Craig claims that the evidence does not prove he used or 

exhibited a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. We do not agree. 

“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). “Our rigorous [legal sufficiency] review focuses on the quality 

of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). 

“We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference 

to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, 

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. 

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). 

“[A] motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se.” Couthern v. State, 571 S.W.3d 786, 

789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). “A motor vehicle may be a deadly weapon where ‘the vehicle was 

intentionally, recklessly or negligently used as a weapon by the accused.’” Nguyen v. State, 506 

S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d) (quoting English v. State, 828 S.W.2d 

33, 38 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991, pet. ref’d)). “A motor vehicle, in the manner of its use or 

intended use, is clearly capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and therefore can be a

deadly weapon.” Ex parte McKithan, 838 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam) 
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(orig. proceeding). In Dotson v. State, 146 S.W.3d 285, 300 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. 

ref’d), the defendant drove and swerved his recreational vehicle toward the victim, struck her, 

and killed her. This supported a finding that the vehicle was used as a deadly weapon. Id. It is 

not required that someone be “actually seriously hurt” by the use of the vehicle. Moore v. State, 

520 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). It is sufficient that the evidence showed someone 

was “actually, not simply hypothetically, endangered.” Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 797 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Cates v. State, 102 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “A 

deadly-weapon finding is justified if a rational jury could have concluded that the defendant’s 

vehicle posed an actual danger of death or serious bodily injury.” Nguyen v. State, 506 S.W.3d

69, 76 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250, 254, 

256–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). 

III. Analysis

In Nguyen, the defendant tried to race a motorcycle driver, followed very closely behind 

that driver, and passed then pulled in front of the motorcycle driver and “jammed on the brakes,” 

forcing the motorcycle to crash. Id. In finding that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that 

Nguyen used his vehicle as a deadly weapon, we considered the evidence of Nguyen’s driving 

and the injuries sustained by a victim. Id. at 77.

In Morgan v. State, 775 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.), the 

defendant was test-driving a Porsche and tried to leave the car salesman behind. Id. at 405. The

salesman grabbed the back of the car and held on as Morgan “raced out of the parking lot and on 

to the feeder road.” Id. Morgan drove at high speeds and then suddenly braked several times,
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trying to force the salesman off the car. Id. The reviewing court found the evidence sufficient to 

prove that Morgan “used the Porsche so that it was capable of causing death or serious bodily 

injury.” Id. at 407.

Here, the evidence showed that Shirley tried to get out of the car because Craig continued 

punching her in her face. Shirley was able to extricate herself from the moving vehicle, only to 

be caught, then run over, by one of the tires. While she was in that precarious position, Craig 

accelerated the car, putting her in further danger. She suffered a broken bone in her foot, and 

two years after the incident, she continued to have recurring pain in that foot. The jury saw a 

gruesome photograph of damage done to her foot. The car had blood on the exterior and some of 

what likely was Shirley’s flesh in the wheel well. Two law enforcement officers described 

Shirley’s foot as “mangled.” The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Craig 

used or exhibited the car as a deadly weapon.4

We overrule Craig’s point of error.

IV. Modification of Judgment

Although not directly raised by the parties, we observe that the judgment states Craig was 

convicted of a first-degree felony. This is not correct. The indictment alleged that Craig caused 

4Craig directs us to Vasquez v. State, No. 13-06-00586-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 26, 2008, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication), https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=

c72d1b10-9871-4ba6-9933-c20c58291b52&coa=coa13&DT=Opinion&MediaID=8a9f1c58-cc9c-46cb-b64f-6be94f

76ca83 (last visited May 22, 2023). There, a trooper stopped Vasquez’s vehicle for speeding. In the course of the 

traffic stop, Vasquez got back in his vehicle and fled. The trooper stood on the running board of Vasquez’s vehicle

and grabbed the steering wheel. Id. at 2. Vasquez punched the trooper several times, accelerated, and shoved the

trooper off the running board and to the ground. The court of appeals upheld the jury’s finding that Vasquez used 

the vehicle as a deadly weapon. Id. at 6–7. Craig argues that, because there is no evidence he pushed Shirley off the 

moving vehicle, he did not use the car as a deadly weapon. As explained above, use or exhibition of a vehicle as a 

deadly weapon is a case-specific decision. The circumstances in this case support a finding that Craig used the 

vehicle as a deadly weapon. 
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bodily injury to Shirley while using or exhibiting a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. That is a 

second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b) (Supp.).

5

 The State did 

prove a prior felony conviction that increased the punishment range to that of a first-degree 

felony,

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but that did not change the degree level of the offense for which Craig was convicted. 

See Ford v. State, 334 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Bledsoe v. State, 480 

S.W.3d 638, 642 n.11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d).

“This Court has the power to correct and modify the judgment of the trial court for 

accuracy when the necessary data and information are part of the record.” Anthony v. State, 531 

S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. 

State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d)). “The authority of an appellate court to reform incorrect 

judgments is not dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it turn on the question of 

whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.” Id. (quoting Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 

529–30).

5Had the indictment alleged that Craig caused serious bodily injury to Shirley, the family/dating relationship 

between the two (which Craig does not challenge and the jury affirmatively found) would have made the offense a 

first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(1).

6See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(b). Craig was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
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We, therefore, modify the trial court’s judgment to recite that Craig was convicted of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under Section 22.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, a 

second-degree felony. We affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified.

Jeff Rambin

Justice

Date Submitted: April 4, 2023

Date Decided: June 6, 2023

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