Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed October 29, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05-12-01433-CR GLENNA RUTH EDDINGTON, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F12-71251-U 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices FitzGera ld, Francis, and Myers Opinion by Justice Francis Glenna Ruth Eddington was convicted of thef t of property valued at $1,500 or more but less than $20,000. The trial court assessed punishment, e nhanced by two prior felony convictions, at twenty years in prison and a $2,000 fine. The trial court’s judgment also ordered appellant to pay $244 in court costs. In two issues, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’ s order that she pay $244 in court costs and the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing her to imprisonment. We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified. In her first issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficien t to support the trial court’s judgment that appellant pay $244 in co urt costs because the cl erk’s record does not‐ 2 ‐ contain a bill of costs. The St ate responds that the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s order for appell ant to pay $244 in court costs. If a criminal action is appealed, “an officer of the cour t shall certify and sign a bill of costs stating the costs that have been accrued and send the bill of costs to the court to which the action or proceeding is . . . appealed.” T EX
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. art. 103.006 (West 2006). Costs may not be collected from the person charge d with the costs until a written bill, containing the items of cost, is produced and signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer entitled to receive pa yment for the cost. Id . art. 103.001. The clerk’s record in this case initially did no t contain a copy of the bill of costs. We, however, ordered the Dallas Count y District Clerk to file s upplemental records containing a certified bill of costs associated with this case, and the clerk did so. See T EX
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. P. 34.5(c)(1) (rules of appellate pro cedure allow supplementation of cler k’s record if relevant items has been omitted). Appellant’s complaint that the evidence is insufficient to support the imposition of costs because the clerk’s record di d not contain a bill of costs is now moot. See Coronel v. State , No. 05-12-00493-CR, 2013 WL 3874446, at *4 (Tex. App.––Dallas July 29, 2013, no pet. h.); Franklin v. State , 402 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). We overrule her first issue. In response to the Court’s order requiring supp lementation of the records, appellant filed an objection that the bill of cost s in the supplemental record is not a “proper bill[s] of costs” and the bill of costs was not filed in the trial court or brought to the tr ial court’s attention before costs were entered into the judgments. We reject both arguments. Appellant first contends that the bills of co sts in the records are not “proper bill[s] of costs” because they are “unsigned, unsworn com puter printout[s].” Appellant acknowledges the‐ 3 ‐ district clerk has certified that the documents cons titute costs that have accrued to date,” but says this does not “set out the costs as required by statute.” While th e code of criminal procedure requires a record to be kept, the code is silent on the form of the record except to the extent it must be certified and signed “by the officer who charged the costs or the officer who is entitled to receive payment for the cost.” See T EX
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. art. 103.001, .006; Coronel , 2013 WL 3874446, at *4. Here, the district clerk provided a “Bill of Co sts Certification” containing the costs that have accrued to date in the respective case, and the documents are certified and signed by the district clerk. Because the documents meet the mandate of the code of criminal procedure, we conclude appellant’s objection that the bill of costs is not “proper” lacks merit. See Coronel , 2013 WL 3874446, at *4. Appellant further argues there is no indication the bill of cost s was filed in the trial court or brought to the trial court’s at tention before costs were entere d in the judgments. Nothing in the code of criminal procedure or the statutes addressing the assessment of costs against defendants requires that a bill of costs be presented to the trial court at any time before judgment. See id. at *5. Article 42.16 provides that the judgment shall “adjudge the costs against the defendant, and order the collection thereof as in other cases.” T EX
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. art. 42.16 (West 2006). Court costs, as reflected in a certified bill of costs, are not pa rt of the sentence, do not alter the range of punishment, and need not be orally pronounced or incorporated by reference in the judgment to be effective. Armstrong v. State , 340 S.W.3d 759, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Coronel , 2013 WL 3874446, at *5. The code of cr iminal procedure does not require the bill of costs be filed at the time the tria l court signs the judgment of conviction; it only‐ 4 ‐ requires a bill of costs be produced if a crimin al case is appealed or costs are collected. See Coronel , 2003 WL 3874446, at *5. Because there is no requirement that the costs be presented to the trial court, we conclude appellant’s second objection to the su pplemented record lacks merit. See id. We overrule appellant’s objectio n to the supplemented record. In her second issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing her to imprisonment because such punishment violates the objectives of the penal code. Appellant asserts that because she was remorseful for her acti ons and explained the financial difficulties that led her to commit the offense, she should have received community supervision instead of the twenty-year prison term. The Stat e responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing appellan t to a twenty-year prison term. Appellant did not complain about the sentence e ither at the time it was imposed or in her motion for new trial. See T EX
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. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State , 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Thus, appellan t has not preserved her issue for our review. Moreover, as a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for an offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State , 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d). Appellant was convicted of a state jail felony offense that was enhanced to a second-degree punishment range based on two prior felony convictions.
See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.35, 12.425(b). The twenty-year se ntence assessed in this case is within the statutory range for a second-degree felony offense. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sent encing appellant to imprisonment. See Jackson v. State , 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Cr im. App. 1984) (sentence within proper range of punishment will not be di sturbed on appeal). We overrule appellant’s second issue.‐ 5 ‐ We note that appellant’s name is misspelled in the trial court’s judgment. Thus, we modify the judgment to correct the spelling of appellant’s name to Glenna Ruth Eddington. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.
─ Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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. P. 47 121433F.U05 /Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE‐ 6 ‐ 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

JUDGMENT

GLENNA RUTH EDDINGTON, Appellant
No. 05-12-01433-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. F12-71251-U). Opinion delivered by Justice Francis, Justices FitzGerald and Myers participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we MODIFY the judgment to correct the spelling of appellant’s name to Glenna Ruth Eddington. As modified, we AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment.

Judgment entered October 29, 2013

/Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE