### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 21
- 00131
- CV IN THE INTEREST OF E.Z.G., A CHILD

From the 74th District Court

McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019
- 2789
- 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION
After Appellant’s parental rights to her child, E.Z.G. , were terminated following a bench trial, 1 Appellant’s appointed appellate c ounsel filed a notice of appeal. 2 Appellant’s counsel has now filed an Anders brief, asserting that s he diligently reviewed the record and that, in h er opinion, the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 4 93 (1967); In re E.L.Y. , 69 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2002, order) (applying Anders to termination appeal).

1 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant had violated Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and ( P) and that termination was in the child’s best interest. See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.001(b).

2 The parental rights o f E.Z.G. ’s father were also terminated, but he has not appealed.In the Interest of E.Z.G., a Child Page 2 Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders ; it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See
In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”); Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Appellant’s counsel has carefully discus sed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible
error in the trial court’s order of termination. Counsel has informed us that s he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal and (2) served a copy of the br ief and the appellate record on Appellant. By letter, we informed Appellant of her right to review the record and to file a pro se response. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319

– 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014);
Sta fford , 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); see also Schulman , 252 S.W.3d at 408

– 09. Appellant has not filed a pro se
response. Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 349

– 50, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). An appeal is “wholly frivolous” or “without merit” when it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v . Court of Appeals , 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902 n.10, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguablyIn the Interest of E.Z.G., a Child Page 3 support an appeal. 3 See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 82 7

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texa s Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, w e affirm the trial court’s order of termination. We also remind Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel that if Appellant, after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition for review, counsel is still under a duty to timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfie s the standards for an Anders
brief.” In re P.M. , 520 S.W.3d 24, 27

– 28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam); see In re G.P. , 503 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2016, pet. denied); see also T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 107.016.

MATT JOHNSON Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson , and Justice Smith Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed October 20, 2021 [CV 06 ]

3 Appellant’s counsel reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and determined that it would be frivolous to attack the findings. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant violated subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E). See In re N.G. , 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). The evidence here showed that Appel lant tested positive for methamphetamine during her pregnancy with E.Z.G. When E.Z.G. was then born, both his meconium and urine tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine, and at that time, Appellant also admitted her drug use to an investigator with the Department of Family and Protective Services. The evidence showed that a monitored return was then later ordered during this case but that the monitored return failed because Appellant and E.Z.G.’s father both relapsed and again used methampheta mines.