Filed 5/ 6 /15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re J.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________ THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Re spondent,

v.
J.W.,
Defendant and Appellant. B255656
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MJ21052 )

APPEAL from a n order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Nancy S. Pogue , Juvenile Court Referee . Affirmed.

Jeanine G. S trong , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and
Robert M. Snider , Deputy Attorney s General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________2

Appellant J.W. appeals from the decision of the trial court rejecting his request to seal his juvenile record s

. He contends that the court erred by considering the seri ousness of his offenses and abused its discr etion by not finding him rehabilitated . Moreover, appellant argues that the application of s ection 781 , subdivision ( a ) of the Welfare and
Institutions Code violated his right to due process , in that the statute is unconstitutionally

vague

. 1 We conclude that the court did not err in declining to seal the records of the appellant , and therefore affirm.

FACT UAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ap pellant was born i n October 1995. His juvenile record s consisted of at lea st 14
incidents. We state only the significant facts. When he was 1 4 years old, appellant was arrested for petty theft in violation of Penal Code section 488

. He was counseled and
released

. When he was 15 years old, h e was arrested for disturbing the p eace in violation
of Penal Code Section 415. He was counseled and released as well. A couple of months
later
, on October 2, 2011, he committed three counts of attempted robbery in violation of
Penal Code section s 664 / 211, and one count of battery causing serious bodily injury in
violation of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d)

. In this i ncident, appellant and three
other individuals took part in a n attempted robbery. Appellant and his companions
surrounded the victims and demanded that the victims e mpty their pockets. When one of
the victims refused the command , appellant punched him on the left side of his face. 2 For
those offenses
, he was ordered home on probation for six months

. During this time, appellant committed a series of infractions for which he was fined. They are identified as

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the We lfare and Institutions Code.

2 At the hearing on appellant’s motion to seal, the court discussed the facts of this offense, as taken from the pre

- plea probation report. Appellant does not suggest that the facts were incorrectly stated. The Attorney Gen eral has requested that we take judicial notice of an appellate brief filed by appellant in case No. B240953 (Nov. 30, 2012 [nonpub. opn.]), in which appellant’s counsel sets forth the prosecution’s evidence in a nearly identical manner. We grant the requ est for judicial notice.3

“ LSMC ” violations, which appear to have been traffic related. On appeal, the A ttorney G eneral offers no further explanation of these violations

. The total amount of fines exceeded $1
, 000

. Appellant ’ s juvenile p robation ended on October 18, 2012

. He turned 18 i n October 2013

. Shortly thereafter , ap pellant petitioned the court to have his juvenile records sealed pursuant to section 781 , subdivision (a)

. Four days p rior to filing the petition, appellant paid $1
, 066, an amount he believed sufficient to satisfy his outstand ing
fines

. The court initially ordered the records sealed on December 26, 2013. However,
the court subsequently received i n formation t hat appellant had not fully paid his fines and
vacated its order. Then the court proceed ed to a hearing in order to consider once again
whether to seal appellant ’ s juvenile records

. 3 At the hearing, although it appeared that appellant might have been given incorrect information regarding the total amount of his o utstanding fines, the court accepted the $1066 as payment in full

. During the hearing , appellant presented evidence of his
rehabilitation in the form of three letters

. Two were from a counselor at Antelope Valley
Youth Build. The first indicated that ap pellant had completed his community service, and the second was a generic letter of recommendation. Finally, a p astor who had mentored appellant for the past 18 months wrote a letter attesting to appellant ’ s good
character. A ppellant provided proof that he had attended and finished high school , was currently enrolled in a community college class, and w anted to join the U nited States Air
Force. The Air Force recruiter advised appellant to attempt to have his records sealed

. The court weighed the evidenc e of the rehabilitation proffered by appellant but
declined to seal his juvenile record s

. The court was concerned that appellant ’ s October 2
, 2011 attempted robbery/battery offense s were serious and insufficient time ha d elapsed

3 Section 781, subdivision (a) provides that, once a petition for record sealing is filed, “[t]he court shall notify the district attorney of the county and the county probation officer, if he or she is not the petitioner, and t he district attorney or probation officer or any of their deputies or any other person having relevant evidence may testify at the hearing on the petition.” The trial court may have concluded that it had acted prematurely in granting the petition prior to hearing.4

s i nce the crime

. The cour t concluded appellant was not yet rehabilitated, but left open the possibility of sealing the records after m ore time had passe d

. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. The Complementary Pillars of Juvenile Justice
The juvenile delinq uency system is not concerned merely with punishing juvenile offenders. Instead, the court is also concerned with rehabilitating them. ( In re
Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal. A pp.4th 423, 432

- 433

. ) The purpose of the juvenile court system
is set forth in section 202. “ Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, th at holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their
circumstances. ” (§ 202, subd. (b).) The minor ’ s rehabilitation and the concomitant protection of public safety are important consideration s in the juvenile justice system. ( In
re Carl N
., at pp. 432

- 433.)

2. The Court ’ s Discretion t o Seal Juvenile Records

S ection 781
, subd ivision (a) grants the court discretion to seal the ju venile ’ s delinquency records unless the juvenile has committed a n offense specified under section
707 , subdivision (b)

. Appellant has not committed a ny of the enumerated offenses that would render him statutorily ineligible to have his records sealed. Section 781
, subdivision (a) provides that a n eligible juvenile offender can “ at any time after the

per son has reached the age of 18 years, petition the court for sealing of the records, including records of arrest, relating to the person ’ s case, in the custody of the juvenile court and probation officer and any other agencies, including law enforcement age ncies, and public officials as the petitioner alleges, in his or her petition, to have custody of the
records. ” R ecords shall be ordered sealed only “ if

. . . the court finds that since the5

termination of jurisdiction [ the petitioner ] has not been convict ed of a felony or of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that rehabilitation has been attained to the
satisfaction of the court. ” 4 (§ 781, subd. (a).) Th is court reviews the trial court ’ s order
for abuse of discretion. ( In re Gina S. (2005) 13 3 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082

. )

3. The Court May Consider the Seriousness of the Offense
Appellant ’ s principal argument on appeal is that the trial court relied on an improper factor to deny his petition: the seriousness of his offenses. Appellant argues
that the seriousness of his offenses should not be considered because the focus in such a hearing should be on the applicant ’ s rehabilitation
, that is, on his behavior following the juvenile adjudication, not on his prior criminal activity. We agree with app ellant that the focus is on the juvenile ’ s rehabilitation but part company with his assertion that the seriousness of the offense s is somehow unrelated to
rehabilitation. First, the language of section 781 suggests the court should consider the
seriousnes s of the juvenile ’ s offenses. If the juvenile has committed an offense enumerated under section 707, subdivision (b), the court may not seal the records even if the court concludes the juvenile is otherwise rehabilitated. (See In r e G.Y. (2015)
234 Cal.A pp.4th 1196 , 1204 .) As the statute provides that some offenses are so serious juvenile records must remain open as a matter of law, it would be at odds with the legislative intent for the trial court to be precluded from even considering the seriousness

o f the offense in determining whether the juvenile has or has not been rehabilitated

. Second, other statutory schemes that require a determination of rehabilitation
allow consideration of the seriousness of the offense. We find an analogy to adult parole. Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (b) states that a release date must be set “ unless [ the Board ] determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is s uch that

4 There is no suggestion appellant has committed a felony or moral turpitude misdemeanor post termination of probation.6

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting. ” In effecting Penal Code section 3041 subdivision (b), our Supreme Court h eld in In r e Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1221, that the critical determination in a parole decision is whether the inmate presents a current risk of danger to society. However, the gravity and seriousness of the commitment offense may be relevant to th at determination, particularly when there has not been a lengthy passage of time or other evidence of a change in the
inmate ’ s psychological or mental attitude indicating the offense is no longer predictive of current dangerousness. “ Indeed, as establis hed in the companion case of In re Shaputis [ ( 2008 ) ] 44 Cal.4th 1241, 125 9

- 1 261 , filed concurrently with this opinion, the Governor does not act arbitrarily or capriciously in reversing a grant of parole when evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the circumstances of the crime continue to be predictive of current dangerousness despite an inmate ’ s discipline

- free record during
incarceration. ” ( In r e Lawrence , at p. 1228.) In short, an individual ’ s offenses, especially when committed recently
, may serve as a predictor of future behavior and may suggest in light of all the evidence that rehabilitation has not been reached. Third, we find it helpful to compare the juvenile records sealing statute with the provisions of the Penal Code governing h ow an adult offender may obtain a certificate of rehabilitation. Penal Code section 4852.03 provides that the period of rehabilitation must
be for at least five years, with additional time based on the severity of the offenses. 5 Section 4852.1 provides t hat for the purpose of rehabilitation
, the court may “ require such testimony as it deems necessary, and the production, for the use of the court . . . of all records and reports relating to the petitioner and the crime o f which he was convicted,

. . . show ing his conduct

. . . . ” Thus, in determining whether an adult has
been statutorily rehabilitated, the Legislature requires that the severity of prior wrongdoings must be taken into account.

5 We do not intend to imply that a juvenile cannot be found to be rehabilitated until five years have passed since his last offense. We simply note that the statutes regarding adult rehabilitation impose time limits depending on the severity of the offense.7

As discussed, the principles of juvenile justice address both the potential for
rehabilitation and the safety of the community. If in considering whether a juvenile offender is sufficiently rehabilitated, the seriousness of the offense and resulting danger to society, if any, are ignored, the delinquency system is s everely compromised.
We find no error in the trial court ’ s consideration of the seriousness of the offense in deciding whether to seal appellant ’ s records.

4. The Trial Court D id Not Abuse I ts Discretion i n Finding Appellant Was N ot Yet Rehabilitated

A p pellant produced some evidence that he had turned his life around

. A ppellant
ha d improved his behavior , finished high school
, and wa s taking a class at a community college. We find this admirable. But the trial court was well within its discretion in

co ncluding that the seriousness of the offenses and their recent commission precluded a finding that appellant was rehabilitated. As the trial court acknowledged, the passage of time works in his favor, and if appellant furthers his rehabilitation, he will in the future have the oppor t unity to ask the trial court to seal his records

.

5. The Court D id N

ot Violate the Due Process by Refusing to Seal the Juvenile Records
Appellant next contends he was denied due process because the term

“ rehabilitation ” set f

orth in section 781 is unconstit ut ionally vague. A statute is vague if

a person of common intelligence must gu ess the meaning of the statute or its application. ( People v. iMergent, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333, 339.) “ ‘ “ ‘ [A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intellig ence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. ’ ” ’ ” ( Ibid. ) T he “ ‘ “ requiremen t that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power

. . . reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination in the admi ni stration of the laws,

en a b les individuals to conform their conduct to the requireme nts of law, and permits8

meaning ful judicial review s

. ” ’ ” ( I bi d

. ; quoting S c hweitzer v. Westminster I nves tment,
Inc. (20 0 7) 157 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1206

. ) Appellant contends section 781 is unconstitutional because it leaves the
determination of “ rehabilit ation ” to the discretion of the court, without affording appellant with a reasonable means to determine what showing he must make in order to
have his records sealed

. We reject the argument. “ I n determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague, only a reasonable certainty is required and a statute will be upheld if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language. ” ( In re
Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 435.) “ [A] statute will be deemed sufficiently precise if its meaning c an be fairly ascertained by references to similar statutes or other judicial determinations, or to the common law or the dictionary, or if the words have a common and generally accepted meaning. ” ( Ibid. ) The number of common terms that
courts have found not impermissibly vague is as varied as is our law. (See, e.g., People
v. Flores (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1074

- 1075 [ “ unreasonable ” in “ unreasonable risk of danger to public safety ” not unconstit ut ionally vague]; In re Mariah T.
, at p. 437 [ “ serious p hysical harm ” not unconstit ut ionally vague ] ; Katz v. Department of Motor
Vehicle s (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 679 [ “ good taste and decency ” not unconstitutionally vague] .)

“ R ehabilitation ” is a common term , with a generally accepted meaning throughout juvenile a n d adult offender law. (See, e .g. , In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910; In re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1100

. ) In Palacios

- Torres v. INS (7th Cir. 1993) 995 F.2d 96, the United States Court of Appeal expressly concluded that

“ rehabil itation ” was not unconstit ut ionally vague . In that case, a deportable resident alien sought relief from the order of deportation on the basis that, although he was convicted of drug offenses, he had been rehabilitated. He argued that the Board of Immigra tion Appeals had not set forth the criteria of rehabilitation, and that, therefore, he was denied

“ fair notice of the type of evidence he must bring forth in order to demonstrate
rehabilitation. ” ( Id. at p. 99.) The court disagreed, concluding that rehab ilitation is a judgment call, “ involving an estimate or prediction of an individual ’ s future conduct. ”9

( Ibid. ) Numerous facts and circumstances related to the individual and his offenses (including the nature of the crime, repeat offenses, remorse, admis sion of guilt, credibility, and attempts to live a drug

- free life) must be taken into account to make this
determination. The court concluded that “ the concept of rehabilitation as applied by the Board [was not] so vague as to deny an applicant notice of the type of evidence relevant to a successful showing. ” ( Id. at p. 100.) We agree. We conclude that section 781 is not unconstitutionally vague. Although the

statute provides that sealing will not be ordered unless “ rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, ” the statute is not so vague as to require an applicant to guess as to the showing that must be made. The term “ rehabili ta tion ” is, by its nature, predictive. An applicant seeking to seal his or her juvenile records must ma ke a showing sufficient to convince the court that criminal behavior is in the past and will not be repeated. This is a determination based on the totality of the circumstances and
individual factors will inevitably vary. It is the life that the juvenile has lived that will
direct the trial court ’ s ruling. No one is in a better position to explain this rehabilitation
than the offender. A ppellant understood what was required of him and attempted to make a sufficient showing. H e submitted letters purport ing to show his development into
a mature individual and evidence of high school completion and enrollment in college, all in order to show steps he had taken toward a law

- abiding lifestyle . His discussion with
an Air Force recruiter reflected a commitmen t to future plans that did not involve criminal activity. All of these factors were relevant to the determination of rehabilitation; the trial court simply found that they were insufficient to establish rehabilitation given the
short time since appellant ’ s commission of a serious offense.10 DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant ’ s petition to seal his records is affirmed.

RUBIN, J. WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

GRIMES, J.