2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

1-29-2004 

# U S A v . Albinson

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 01-1265

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 01-1265

UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v.

STANL EY A. ALBI NSON,

Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania D.C. CriminalNo. 95-cr- 00019 (H ono rab le L ow ell A . Re ed, J r.)

Argued October 28, 2003

Be for e: S CIR ICA , Chief Judge , NYGAARD a nd A MBRO, Circuit Judges

(Fil ed January27, 2004)

JENNI FER B. SAULNIE R, E SQUIRE (AR GUED) Jones Day One M ellon Bank Cente r 500 Grant Str eet, Suite 3100 Pitt sburgh, Pennsyl vania 15219 Attorneyfor Appella nt ERIC B. HENSON, E SQUIRE (AR GUED) Office of United St ates Att orney 615 Chestnut St

reet, Suite 1250 Philadelphia, Pennsyl vania 19106 Attorneyfor Appelle e

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

SC IRI CA , Chief Judge

. Stanley A. Albinson appeal s the denial of his moti on for ret urn of prope rty fil ed under

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) (form erly Fed. R. Crim . P. 41(e)) 1 without an e videnti ary hearing. The government ass erted t

hat it no longer retai ned possess ion of the seized property. At issue i s whether the District Court was requi red to conduc t an evidentiaryinquiry as set forth in United States v. Chambers , 192 F.3d 374 ( 3d Cir. 1999) . We will r everse and remand.

1 Fed . R. C rim. P. 4 1 w as am ende d in 2002 “as part

of a generalrestyl ing of the Crim inal R ules to m ake th em m ore ea sily underst ood and to make styl e and terminol ogy cons ist ent thr oughout the rules .” See Fed. R . Crim. P. 41 a dvisory committee notes. As a result of the 2002

amen dmen ts , t

he p re vi ous Fed . R. Cri m. P. 41 (e) no w a ppea rs with mino r stylistic ch an ge s a s R ul e 4 1( g) . F or co ns ist en cy, we will refe r onl y t o Fed. R. Cri m. P. 41(g ) even thou gh A lbinso n filed his motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) and

mo st of th e relev ant ca se law refers to the previ ous rule

.I.

On February 24, 1994, FBI and Naval Investigati ve Service agents ac ting und er a sea rch w arrant s eized prop erty 2 from the gar age and resi dence of Stanl ey A. A lbinso n at 69 M ine R un R oad in Limerick , Pennsylvania. O n Febru ary 10, 1995, Albi nson was arres ted for t he unauthori zed sale of United States pro per ty in vio latio n of 18 U .S.C . § 64 1. The indictm ent alleg ed A lbinso n sold United States property to government agents on s ix occasi ons in 1993. The indict ment did not , however, charge Albinson with any offe nse rel ated t o the pro per ty seize d du ring the 1 994 sea rch

. On April 24, 1995, Albinson entere d a guilt

y pl ea on all six count s of the ind ictme nt. Alb inson subs eque ntly atte mpted to withdraw his gui lty plea, but th e Di st ri ct Cou rt de ni ed hi s mo ti on. On February18, 1998, Albi nson was sentence d to 15 months i n prison, plus three y ears of s upervis ed rele ase. On April 21, 1998, while serving his sentence, Albinson filed a pro se motion for return of pr opertyunder Fed. R. Crim. Pr o. 41(g) . Albins on sought return of “ev ery item listed on the seizure

war ra nt /p ro pertyli st

and th ose it ems seized where no recei pt was given. ” App. 124. Albins on alle ged he had been deprived of

property bythe government and that the sei zures were “made by government agent s/employ ees.” Id . O n August 2, 1998, Albinson filed a pro se

mo tion fo r sum mary jud gm ent on his Ru le 41(g ) mo tion. T he go vern men t did not res pond to eit

her motion.
On M ay 14, 1999, the Distri ct Court ente red a defaul t judgment in favor of Albinson, and ordered t he government to ret urn the s eized pr opertyby June 15, 1999. The District

Court als o ordered the government

to fil e a “veri fied declar ation ba sed on fir st hand knowledge” for each i tem that “had been lost, d estro yed [ or] m ispla ced ,” desc ribing th e “rea sons wh y the prop erty cannot be r eturned . . . to hold an evid entia ry hea ring ther eon .” A pp. 1 6. On June 15, 1999, t

he government respo nded that it w as “p hysically una ble to comply” with the order, because certain prop erty had b een re turned to Albinson, and the re maining i tems had been either acqui red by thir d parti es or destr oyed. App. 146. The government subm itted no docu men tary evide nce in supp ort of its r espo nse. It sim ultane ously file d a motion for

reconsi derati on requ esting a n op portu nity to respo nd to Albinso n’s motion s. The D istrict Court granted t he motion for

reconsi derati on, and th e gov ernm ent res pon ded to Albinson’s motions. On January 16, 2001, t

he District Court denie d Albinson’s Rule 41(g) motion without conducting an evid entia ry hea ring

. United Stat es v. 2 The inven tory of se ized p rope rty lists over 200 items, inc luding fl oor ti les, tool kits , ethanol, batte ries , a pump and motor, ovens, stainl ess steel si nks, computer modems, r olodex rec ords, ear plugs and t

rousers . Supp. App. 29- 42.Albinson , No . 95-1 9-01 , 2001 U.S . Dist.

LE XI S 3 74 ( E.D . Pa. J an. 1 7, 20 01)

. The Distri ct Court f

ound the government fail ed to carry its burden of provi ng a “cognizabl e clai m of ownership or right of possess ion” in t

he seize d property, but den ied th e m otio n ne ver thele ss. Id . at *7. The District

Court dete rmined the government had i rrevocabl y l ost or destr oyed t

he seize d property, and theref ore thi s Court’s holding i n United States v . Bein , 214 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2000), rend ered it “pow erless” to aw ard monetarydamages in l ieu of re turni ng the s eize d pr ope rty. Albinson , 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 374, at *15. The Dist rict Cou rt concluded that an eviden tiary hearing was “not

requir ed in li ght of the futil e outcome.” Id . at

*16.
Alb inson timely filed this app eal. 3

II.
A. Property se ized bythe government as part of a criminal i nvestigation “must be returned once cri minal proc eedings have concluded, unless i t is contraba nd

or su bjec t to fo rfei ture .” 4 Cham bers , 192 F.3d a t 376. Under Fed. R. Cri m. P. 41(g), A person aggri eved by a n unlawful search and seizur e of propert

y or by the de privatio n of prop erty may move for the pro per ty’s retu rn . . . . The
court must r

eceive evidence on any factual issue ne cessary t

o decide the motion . If i t grant s the motion, the court must return the proper

ty to the movant, but may impose

reaso nable cond itions to protect access t o the property and i ts use i n late r proceedings.
Fed . R. C rim. P . 41( g) (e mp has is ad ded ). At the concl usion of a criminal proceed ing, the eviden tiary burden for a Rule 41(g) moti on shift s to the government to demo nstrate i t has a legit imate r eason to r etai n the sei zed pro per ty. Cham bers , 192 F.3 d at 3 77. The burden on the government is hea vy because there is a presumpti on that t he person fr om whom the proper ty was take n ha s a rig ht to its retu rn. Id

. The Distri ct Court he ld, a nd the parti es do not di spute, that t he government fai led to meet its burden on Alb inso n’s R ule 4 1(g ) mo tion

. Albinson , 200 1 U .S. D ist. L EX IS 3 74, a t *9

. Indeed, t he District Court

concluded t

hat Albinson’s “motion probably would be granted as to th e items on the inventory 3 We exercise appe llate juri sdiction over the Dis tri ct Court’ s denialof the Ru le 41 (g) m otio n un der 28 U .S.C . § 129 1. Un ited Sta tes v. P antelid is , 335 F.3d 22 6, 233-34 (3d Cir. 200 3).

4 It is und isputed that the prop erty seized during the 1994 s earch i s neit her contraba nd nor subje ct to f orfeit ure.lis ts, ” but for t he percei ved futi lit

y of gra ntin g su ch a n or der

. Id . Albins on argu es the D istrict Co urt abu sed its discr etion by

denyi ng his Rule 41( g) motion without conducting an evidentiaryhearing a nd inst ead rel yi ng solely on the gove rnmen t’s repres entations that it

no longer r etai ned pos sess ion of th e se ized pro per ty. Albinson cont ends that

even if the Distri ct Court pr operlydetermi ned that the seiz ed pr oper ty is “physically

unav ailable,” he is en titled to a h earing to dete rmin e w hat h app ene d to the p rop erty. The governm ent responds that because Alb inson failed to con test its repres entatio ns in th e D istrict Co urt, there were no disput ed issue s of fact which required an evidentiaryhearing.
We review the District Cou rt’s decisio n to “e xercis e its equ itable jur isd iction” underFed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) for abuse of dis creti on. 5 Cham bers , 192 F.3d at 376.
B.
Rule 41 (g) directs a district court to “rec eive evi dence” on is sues of fact

necessary t o dispose of

the moti on. Fed. R. Crim . P. 41(g). W e provided more spec ific gu idanc e on th e sco pe of this evidentiaryinquiry i n United Stat es v. Cham bers , 192 F.3 d 37 4 (3 d C ir. 19 99)

. In that case, pe titioner Chambers f iled a Ru le 41(g ) mo tion fo r return of p rope rty seized by the go vern men t during his

arre st. Id . at

375. The government argued Chambers’ motion was moot because i t no longer

retai ned possess ion of th e se ized pro per ty. Id . The dis tri ct court agreed, and denied Chambe rs’ motion based on represent ations by the government that the property at issue ha d been forfei ted, reposses sed, r eturned or destr oyed, and there fore coul d not be retu rne d. Id. We revers ed on appe al, concludi ng that t

he “government ca n not defeat a p roperly filed motion f or return of property merel y bystating that it has destr oyed t

he property or

given the property t o thir d parti es.” Id . at 37 7. Rather, “[t]he govern ment m ust do m ore than s tate, w ithout d ocum entary su ppo rt, that i t no longer

possesse s the pr opertyat issue. ” Id . at

377-78.
We also held that a d istrict court must make cert ain evi dentiary inquiries before deci ding a Rule 41( g) motion for

re tu rn of pr op er ty:

If . . . the gov ernm ent ass erts that it no lo nger has th e pro perty 5 We do not reach the merits of the Distri ct Court’ s decis ion to deny Alb in so n’ s Ru le 41( g) motio n. On appeal, we consider onl y the District Court’s de cisi on to not conduc t an evidentiaryhearing prior t o decidi ng Alb in so n’ s Ru le 41( g) motio n, an d we review that deci sion for abuse of discr etion. We note, however, that ot her courts of appeals have revi ewed de novo the grant or denialof Rule 41(g) motions after the concl usion of criminal pro cee din gs. See, e. g., Unit ed State s v. Potes , 260 F.3d 1310, 13 14 n.8 (11 th Cir. 2001).sought, the Distri ct Court must

determi ne, i n fact, whether the government re tains possessi on of the proper

ty ; if i t finds that t

he government no l onger posses ses the property, the District Cou rt

mu st determ ine w hat ha ppen ed to the property. The D istrict Court must hold an evi dentiary hearing on any di sputed i ssue of fact

necessary t o the res oluti on of the

mo tion

. . . .

. . . If the Dis tri ct Court concl udes that

the gov ernm ent’s a ctions in eithe r regar d were not proper, it s hall de termine wha t remedies are avail able.
Id . at 378 (citations om itted).
We note a t the ou tset that a district co urt nee d no t nece ssarily condu ct an eviden tiary hearing on every Rule 41(g) moti on

. The rule on ly directs a dist rict court t o “recei ve evidence on any fac tual i ssue neces saryto deci de the

mo tion .” Fe d. R . Cri m. P . 41( g). Lik ew ise, Cham bers does not m anda te the method by which a district court must “determine, i n fact, whether the government re tains possessi on of the property, ” so long as this determi nation rest s on a firmer basis than the government’s unsubstant iate d assert

ions that it “no long er po ssesse s the p rope rty at is sue.” Id . at

377-78. For

example, affidavi ts or doc umentaryevidence, such as chain of

custodyrecords , may be sufficient to sup port a fact find er’s dete rmin ation

. Cham bers , howe ver, requir es the di stri ct court to hold an evidentiaryhearing on “ any di sputed issue of fact neces saryto the resolution of the moti on,” which may include determi ning “what happened” to the seiz ed p rop erty. Id . at

378.
The Distric t Cou rt expr essly acknowledged the Cham bers inquiry, but decid ed a h earing wa s “no t require d in light of the futile outcome.” Albinson , 2001 U.S. Dist . LEXIS 374, at *16. The District Cou rt determined m onetary damages were the onl y poss ible remedy based o n the gov ernmen t’s repres entations that it

no longer r etai ned pos sess ion of th e se ized pro per ty. Recognizing our

decisi on in United States v . Bein , 214 F.3d 408, 415 (3d Cir. 2000), 6 prohibi ts monetar y damages on a Rule 41 (g) motion, the D istrict Court

conc luded there w as “n o oth er relief to which petition er is en titled un der R ule 41[g].” Albinson , 2001 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 374, at *17.
The Distri ct Court f

ound the Bein prohibi tion on monet ary damages

6 Two of our sist er circuits have suggested that a district court may aw ard

mo netary da mag es as a n equ itable

rem edy o n a R ule 4 1(g ) mo tion

. See, e.g. , Mora v. United State s , 955 F.2d 156 , 159- 60 (2 d C ir. 1992 ); United Stat es v. Marti nson , 809 F .2d 13 64, 13 68 (9 th Cir. 19 87). B ut w e hav e con clude d to th e c on tra ry.“undermined Cha mbe rs’ hearing

req uire me nt,” 7 id. at *13, and creat ed a “Catch-22” i n cases i n which the government ass erts it has lost or de str oye d t he se ize d p ro pe rty: On the one hand, Cham bers demands that this Court engage i n an inquiry as to what happened to the lost

or missi ng property and decid e on a n app ropria te remedy. On the other han d, Bein forecl oses the only app ropria te rem edy in a case where the government has l ost or destr oyed per sonal pro per ty: mo ney d am age s. In o ther wo rds, Bein makes the inquiry requir ed by Cham bers an ex ercise in futil ity , because even if the Court were to c onclude after a hearin g that a Ru le 41[g] peti tioner

was entitled to t

he return of property, and that

the gov ernm ent im prop erly di sp os ed of th e p ro pe rty, the C ourt is p ow erless to

aw ard the only ava ilable

re m ed y. Id. at *14-15. Although Bein forec loses c ertain

reme dies fo r Ru le 41(g ) petition ers, it does not nece ssari ly creat e a ju ri sp ru de nt ia l c onu ndr um. An evidentiaryinquiry ens ures that a di stri ct court has suffici ent inf

ormation to decide a Ru le 41(g ) mo tion. A t the sam e time , it provides an opportuni ty for a Rule 41( g) petit ioner t o demand the government return prop erty to wh ich he is rightfu lly entitled. This inqui ry assis ts an aggrieve d partyin ident ify ing and recovering property seized in the course of a crim inal i nve stiga tion

. As th e D istrict Co urt cor rectly recogniz ed, an evi dentiary hearing potenti ally

offers cer

tain be nefici al effects . For exampl e, a “hearing might spark a government invest igati on that resul ts i n the dis covery or recovery of property the government i niti ally thought to be los t or des troy ed.” Id. at *1 5 n.8

. Alternat ively , an evi dentiary hearing “might re sult

in the gove rnment bei ng able t o prove that

the proper

ty was
own ed by the gov ernmen t,” and therefo re not sub ject to retu rn. Id . In ei ther ca se, the pros pect of a hearing pr ovides an incen tive fo r the go vern men t to retain

ac cu ra te r ec or ds of se ize d p ro pe rty, consistent w ith its regulatory obligations. 8

7 The Distri ct Court s uggested t hat “[a]n argu men t could be m ade th at Bein

essen tially attemp ts to ov errule Cham bers .” Albinson , 2001 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 374, at *16 n.9. 8 Department of J usti ce regul ations requir e the FBI to mai ntain de tail ed chain of cus tody records for allseized pro per ty. See, e. g. , 41 C.F. R. § 128-Bein , by contr ast, prescribes a

limi tati on on the remedi es avail able t o a Rule 41(g) pet

iti oner by precludi ng the

aw ard o f mo netary da mag es. Th is limi tati on is “not

inconsi stent ” with the requir ement that

a dist rict court conduc t an evidentiaryhearing be fore deci ding a Ru le 41 (g) m otio n. Bein , 214 F.3d at 416. Although Cham bers directs a dist rict court t o determi ne what remedies are available to a R ule 41(g) p etitioner, Bein “did not c onsider

whether such avail able re medies would inc lude an award of monetarydamages.” Id. Moreover, the questi on of remedies s hould ari se onlyafter the dist rict court has investigate d the st atus of the seized prop erty. Wh ile repres entations bythe government may be credi ble and may suggest t hat “the likel ihood of actual rec overy of the property [i s] very

sli m,” Alb inso n, 2001 U.S. Dist . LEXIS 374, at *15 n. 8, a fact finder maynot deny a Rule 41(g) motion based on a pros pecti ve assess ment of the remedies t

hat might

(or might

not) be availa ble. A llow ing the gov ernm ent to defeat a Rul e 41(g) moti on simplyby assert ing that it no l onger ret ains poss ession of the prop erty wo uld frustrate t

he purpose of t

he Fed R. Civ. P. 41 (g) ev identia ry inquiry set fo rth in Cham bers . The District Court was justifi ably concerned with the “harsh

con seq uen ces ” of suc h a r esu lt. Id. at *17.
C. The g overnm ent argues the re were no “d isputed issues o f fac t” that w ould requir e the Dist

rict Court to conduc t an evide ntiary hea ring b ecau se A lbinso n did not challeng e the gov ernmen t’s assert ions that it

no longer r etai ned po ss es sio n o f th e s eiz ed pr op er ty. Alb inson respo nds th at a he aring is required be cause the g overnm ent’s unsupporte d declar ation di d not res olve all di sp ut ed iss ue s o f f ac t. S pe cif ica lly, Albinso n argues th e gove rnmen t’s declar ation di d not ident ify the thirdparti es who allege dly acquire d the property, the pers ons who destroy ed or distribu ted the prop erty, or the p rope rty that w as a llege dly retu rne d. As mentioned, neithe r the Feder al Rule no r Cham bers make s an eviden tiary hearin g a pr erequ isite for d ecidin g a R ule 41( g) m otio n. Cham bers only requir es an evidentiaryhearing on “ any di sputed issue of fact neces saryto the resolution of the moti on.” 192 F.3d at 378. But Cham bers also makes cl ear that “[t ]he government must

do more than st ate, without document ary support, that i t no longer pos sesses the proper ty at is sue.” 50.101 (“Each bur eau shallbe responsi ble for e stabl ishi ng and main taining inven tory record s of its seiz ed p erso nal p rop erty to e nsu re th at . . . (d) A well documented chai n of custody is kept ; and (e) All information i n the inventor y r ecords i s accurate and current.”). If the FBI maintains these chain of cus tody records as requi red by regulation, the bu rden of a n eviden tiary inquiry i s signi ficantly reduced.Id . at

377-78. That

standar d was not sati sfied here. Moreover, even if the Distri ct Court pr operlydetermi ned the government no l onger posses sed the property, it di d not addres s the r emainder of the Cham bers inquiry r egarding “ what happened to the property. ” Id . at 37 8. A distri ct court may be able t o make these determi nations based upon affi davits or verifie d do cum entary ev idenc e. Bu t if there are dis puted is sues of fact relat ing to the s tatus of the prope rtyor what happ ened to it, the dis trict cou rt shou ld hold an ev identia ry hearing . This decisi on is l eft t o the sound di scretion of the D istrict Co urt.
III.
Finall y, Albinson ar gues that if an evidentiaryinquiry r eveals i ndividual government agent s improperlydisposed of his pr operty , he i s enti tled to amend his Rule 41( g) motion t o stat e alt ernati ve claims con sistent with this Co urt’s decisi on in Bein . Speci fical ly , Albins on argues that if the e videntiary inquiry

revea ls facts in dicatin g that sp ecific gov ernm ent ag ents v iolated his

cons titutional rig hts, he s hou ld be a ble to amend his ple adings t o stat e a Bivens complaint . The government responds that it was not error to d eny Albinson ’s motion without a hearing because Albinson negl ected t o assert alte rnati ve cl ai ms i n the Dis tric t C our t. Whi le we leave this matter als o to the s ound discre tion of the D istrict Co urt, w e note that, depending on what i s adduced th ro ug h t he ev id en tia ry in qu iry, ame ndm ent m ay be pa rticularly appropri ate on the facts of this case. 9

IV. To summarize, t

he able Dist

rict Cou rt did not cond uct the full eviden tiary in qu iry r eq ui re d b y Cham bers in dec idin g A lbin son ’s R ule 4 1(g ) mo tion

. The Distri ct Court de termine d Alb inson ’s prop erty was unav ailable based u pon the g overnm ent’s unsubstant

iate d assert

ions, and made no determi nation regarding what happened to the seized property . Whether these determi nations ulti matelyrequir e an

9 The allegations of a pro se litigant are gener ally

held to a “less stri ngent standar d” than formal pleadi ngs prepar ed by a lawyer. Mitchell v. Horn , 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir . 2003) ( citi ng Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Fed. R. C rim. P. 4 1(g) m otions are civ il in nature , and s hou ld be tre ated a s a “civ il complaint .” United States v. McGlory , 202 F.3d 664, 670 ( 3d Cir. 2000) (cit ation omi tted) . Therefor e, a pro se Ru le 41(g ) mo tion sh ould be libe rally construed to al low the ass erti on of alte rnati ve clai ms. “[A]ffi rming the denial [of a pro se Rule 41(e) motion] without l eave to amend would have t he same effect a s a 12(b)( 6) dismi ssal of a pro se com plaint,” w hich a re gen erally disf avo red

. Pena v. United St ates , 157 F.3d 984, 987 ( 5th Cir. 1998) (re versi ng dismis sal of pro se petition er’s R ule 41(g ) mo tion w ithout le ave to ame nd to stat e a Bivens actio n).evidentiaryhearing or merelythe submissi on of affidavi ts and documentaryevidence, we leave to t he

soun d disc retion o f the D istrict Co urt.
For th e fore goin g reas ons, w e w ill

revers e and remand for pr oceedings consistent with t

his opi nion.