J-A05020-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

STRAUSSER ENTERPRISES, INC. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SEGAL AND MOREL, INC., SEGAL AND 

MOREL AT FORKS

TOWNSHIP II, LLC, SEGAL AND MOREL 

AT FORKS 

TOWNSHIP III, LLC, SEGAL AND MOREL 

AT FORKS 

TOWNSHIP IV, LLC AND KENNETH 

SEGAL

Appellants No. 176 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order December 8, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Civil Division at No(s): C48CV20104518

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STRAUSSER ENTERPRISES, INC. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.l

SEGAL AND MOREL, INC., SEGAL AND 

MOREL AT FORKS TOWNSHIP II, LLC, 

SEGAL AND MOREL AT FORKS 

TOWNSHIP III, LLC, SEGAL AND MOREL 

AT FORKS TOWNSHIP IV, LLC AND 

KENNETH SEGAL

Appellants No. 761 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered February 6, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Civil Division at No(s): C48CV20104518

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
J-A05020-16

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STRAUSSER ENTERPRISES, INC. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SEGAL AND MOREL, INC, SEGAL AND 

MOREL AT FORK TOWNSHIP II, LLC, 

SEGAL AND MOREL AT FORK TOWNSHIP 

III,LLC,

SEGAL AND MOREL AT FORK TOWNSHIP 

IV,LLC, 

AND KENNETH SEGAL

Appellants No. 1251 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Civil Division at No(s): C48CV20104518

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2016

In these consolidated appeals, Segal and Morel, Inc., Segal and Morel 

at Fork Township II, LLC, Segal and Morel at Fork Township III, LLC, Segal 

and Morel at Fork Township IV, LLC, and Kenneth Segal (collectively 

“Segal”), appeal from the orders entered December 8, 2014, February 6, 

2015, and the judgment entered March 20, 2015, in the Northampton 

County Court of Common Pleas, confirming an arbitration award entered in 

favor of Strausser Enterprises, Inc. (“Strausser”), and entering judgment on 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A05020-16

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that award.1 On appeal, Segal contends the trial court erred when it: (1) 

determined the arbitration panel rendered a valid award despite the fact that 

the decision was not unanimous, and the panel failed to resolve all issues; 

(2) improperly limited the scope of the arbitration panel on remand from a 

prior decision of this Court; (3) denied Segal’s petition to vacate the award 

when the arbitration panel, on remand, failed to conduct a hearing, or 

deliberate on all issues; and (4) denied Segal’s request to permit discovery 

and conduct a hearing on the petition to vacate.2 For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the judgment entered at Docket No. 1251 EDA 2015, and 

dismiss, as moot, the appeals docketed at Nos. 176 EDA 2015 and 761 EDA 

2015.

The factual and procedural history underlying this appeal were aptly 

summarized by a panel of this Court in a prior appeal:

The pertinent background underlying this matter can be 

summarized as follows. “The parties to this action ... were at 

one time engaged in a number of agreements relative to the 

development of real estate in Northampton County.”[3] The 

____________________________________________

1 The appeals were consolidated by this Court for disposition. See Order, 

6/23/2015. As will be discussed infra, the appealable, final order was the 

March 20, 2015, entering judgment on the arbitration award.

2 We have consolidated and reordered Segal’s issues on appeal for purposes 

of disposition.

3 The arbitration panel’s Majority Opinion, issued September 26, 2012, 

explained the parties’ background as follows:

[Strausser] is an owner and developer of certain real 

estate located in Forks Township, Pennsylvania known at The 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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parties agree that the contract which governs their relationship 

requires them to submit their disputes to common law 

arbitration.

On May 6, 2010, Strausser filed a “Petition to Compel the 

Appointment of an Arbitrator to Serve as if Appointed by 

[Segal].” On May 28, 2010, the trial court ordered Thomas 

Wallitsch to serve as an arbitrator as if [Segal] appointed him. 

[Segal] sought reconsideration of the May 28, 2010 order. On 

November 9, 2010, the trial court issued an order in response to 

[Segal’s] petition for reconsideration, directing [Segal] to name 

an arbitrator to hear Strausser’s breach of contract claims.

Thereafter, Strausser filed an arbitration complaint. Strausser 

included in this complaint a request for counsel fees that 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Riverview Estates and The Riverview Country Club (“Riverview”). 

Segal and Morel, Inc. (“Segal, Inc.”) is a builder and developer. 

Segal and Morel at Forks Township II, LLC [], Segal and Morel at 

Forks Township III, LLC [], Segal and Morel at Forks Township 

IV, LLC [] (Collectively “the Segal Entities) are single purpose 

Pennsylvania limited liability companies. Kenneth Segal (“Mr. 

Segal” is an owner of, and the president of, Segal, Inc. Mr. 

Segal is also an owner of, and the managing member of, [the 

Segal Entities]. Mr. Segal controls all of the Segal Entities. 

Riverview has been subdivided into a number of different 

parcels to be developed, in phases, into various types of 

residential homes such as single family dwelling, townhouses 

and condominiums, as well as a golf course and country club. 

[Strausser] entered into a series of agreements with Segal, Inc. 

to sell off some phases of the project, while retaining certain 

other phases. ... Segal, Inc. assigned its rights under the [] 

agreements to [the Segal Entities]. 

Under the Agreements of [S]ale, [Strausser] was to 

perform all of the site work (meaning all of the work that is on or 

under the ground including sanitary sewer, storm sewer, water 

lines, utilities, curbs and topsoil). Segal was to do all of the 

above-ground, or “vertical” construction.

Majority Opinion, 9/26/2012, at 1-2 (record citaitons omitted). The claims 

before the arbitration panel arose from the parties’ agreements of sale.
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Strausser incurred in litigating its petition to compel arbitration. 

[Segal] refer[s] to the arbitration panel that considered this 

complaint as “the Redding Panel.” It also is important to note

that, prior to the arbitration proceedings in front of the Redding 

Panel, the parties litigated several issues in front of a different 

arbitration panel. [Segal] refer[s] to this initial panel of 

arbitrators as “the Walters Panel.”[4]

The Redding Panel conducted hearings in late February and early 

March of 2012. In a document dated September 26, 2012, two 

of the three arbitrators ruled in favor of Strausser (Majority 

Decision). In addition to awarding Strausser monetary 

damages, the Majority Decision stated, inter alia, that it included 

“[a]n order [sic] for a subsequent hearing to determine the 

amount of [Strausser’s] counsel fee award[.]” The Majority 

Decision also noted, “In the event that the panel determines that 

it needs [Segal’s] profit/lot to determine damages, the parties 

have agreed to present that evidence at a later phase of this 

proceeding....”

The Majority Decision was accompanied by an opinion in support 

thereof (Majority Opinion). Regarding Strausser’s claim for 

counsel fees, the Majority Opinion stated that Strausser 

prevailed with respect to its petition to compel and the litigation 

in front of the Redding Panel. The Majority Opinion, therefore, 

concluded that, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Strausser is 

entitled to reimbursement of its counsel fees. The Majority 

Opinion asserted, “We will hold a subsequent hearing to 

determine the amount of the counsel fee award.” 

____________________________________________

4 The Walters Panel found in favor of Segal in its claims against Strausser 

and awarded Segal more than $1,000,000. See Praecipe to Enter 

Judgment, 4/24/2008; Praecipe to Enter Judgment, 3/23/2009. The 

decision of the Walters Panel was joined by both Segal’s named arbitrator, 

Joel Scheer, Esq., and the neutral arbitrator, Thomas L. Walters, Esq. 

Strausser’s named arbitrator, Joseph Corpora III, Esq., dissented from all 

claims denying Strausser relief and awarding Segal monetary damages. See

Arbitration Opinion, 12/11/2007; Arbitration Opinion, 4/16/2008. Likewise, 

Scheer dissented with regard to a claim denying Segal damages. Id. 

Despite the fact that the decision was not unanimous, Segal praeciped to 

enter judgment on the award.
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The lone dissenting arbitrator, Joel M. S[c]heer, did not sign the 

Majority Decision.[5] Instead, he authored a dissenting opinion 

dated October 10, 2012 (Dissenting Opinion).

On October 26, 2012, [Segal] filed a “Motion to Stay and Setting 

of Date for Filing of Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award.” In this 

motion, [Segal] acknowledged that they had thirty days from the 

date the arbitrators’ award became final in order to file a petition 

to vacate the award and, thus, challenge the award. [Segal] 

averred that they received copies of the Majority Decision, the 

Majority Opinion, and the Dissenting Opinion on October 24, 

2012. [Segal] argued that the earliest deadline to file a petition 

to vacate was November 9, 2012, which was thirty days from 

the date Mr. S[c]heer signed the Dissenting Opinion.

On November 5, 2012, Strausser filed a petition to confirm the 

arbitration award. The following day, the trial court denied 

[Segal’s] “Motion to Stay and Setting of Date for Filing of Petition 

to Vacate Arbitration Award.” [] Segal [then] filed a “Petition to 

Vacate Majority [Decision] and Opinion, and to Preclude Entry of 

Judgment Pending Resolution of Petition.” ...

[Segal also] filed a response to Strausser’s petition to confirm 

the arbitration award. Therein, [Segal] averred, inter alia, that 

the trial court could not confirm the Majority Decision because it 

does not constitute a final award for purposes of common law 

arbitration. In this regard, [Segal] highlighted that the Majority 

Decision did not dispose of Strausser’s claim for counsel fees and 

that the Majority Decision noted that the parties had agreed to 

present evidence regarding damages at a later proceeding.

On November 21, 2012, Strausser filed a motion to strike 

[Segal’s] allegedly untimely-filed petition to vacate the 

arbitration award. [Thereafter, Segal filed a motion requesting 

the trial court certify its order for appeal. The court granted 

Segal’s motion. However, in February of 2013, this Court denied 

Segal’s petition for permission to appeal.] 

____________________________________________

5 We note that Segal’s appointee, Scheer, was the only arbitrator to serve on 

both the Walters and Redding Panels.
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On April 19, 2013, the trial court entered an order [which] 

granted Strausser’s motion [] to strike [Segal’s] petition to 

vacate and, thus, struck the petition. Next, the court granted 

Strausser’s petition to confirm the arbitration award. As to its 

action in this regard, the court concluded, inter alia, that, 

because Strausser’s claim for counsel fees is ancillary “to the 

issues in the case,” ... the unresolved nature of the claim does 

not impact the finality of the arbitrators’ decision. Lastly, the 

court directed the prothonotary to enter a judgment in 

conformity with this order.

On April 22, 2013, Strausser filed a “Praecipe to Enter Judgment 

in Conformity with the Court's April 19, 2013 Order.” That same 

day, judgment was entered in favor of Strausser in the amount 

of $15,699,721.00. [Segal] timely filed a notice of appeal.

Strausser Enterprises, Inc. v. Segal & Morel, Inc., 89 A.3d 292, 293-

295 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded “the trial court lacked the 

authority to enter an order confirming the Redding Panel’s decision and to 

enter judgment in conformity with that order.” Id. at 300. Specifically, the 

panel determined “Strausser’s claim for counsel fees [was] unresolved.” Id.

at 298. The panel opined:

[T]he Redding Panel concluded that Strausser is entitled to 

counsel fees in connection with Strausser’s successful litigation 

of its petition to compel and its arbitration claims. The Redding 

Panel, however, has yet to determine the amount of fees to 

which Strausser is entitled and clearly has indicated that an 

additional hearing is needed in order to reach this determination. 

In order to set the amount of fees due to Strausser, the Redding 

Panel certainly will have to make factual determinations and 

possibly will have to rule on legal issues. Moreover, because the 

Redding Panel only concluded that Strausser is entitled to 

counsel fees in connection with Strausser’s successful litigation 

of its petition to compel and its arbitration claims, we reject the 

trial court’s assertion that “the award of counsel fees in the 

instant case clearly cannot be ascertained until the case is 
J-A05020-16

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complete, thereby necessitating that the award be confirmed 

and the proceedings closed prior thereto.” 

Id.6 Accordingly, the panel vacated both the order confirming the 

arbitration award and the judgment entered upon the award, and remanded 

the matter to the trial court. Id. at 300. The panel explicitly directed: “On 

remand, the trial court shall remand to the Redding Panel in order to allow 

the panel to complete its work.” Id.

Upon remand, Judge Craig Dalley, who had presided over the matter 

since 2012, disqualified himself sua sponte, and the case was reassigned to 

President Judge Stephen Baratta. See Order, 5/21/2014. On May 23, 

2014, the trial court entered an order stating, “this matter is hereby 

REMANDED to the arbitration panel comprised of Edward Redding, Esquire, 

Walter Weir[,] Jr., Esquire and Joel Scheer, Esquire for disposition of 

[Strausser’s] outstanding claim for attorneys’ fees.” Order, 5/23/2014. 

Segal then sought clarification of the court’s May 23rd order, and requested 

the court appoint new arbitrators. On June 12, 2014, the trial court entered 

the following order, clarifying its May 23rd order: 

This matter is hereby REMANDED to the arbitration panel 

comprised of Edward Redding, Esquire, Walter Weir[,] Jr., 

Esquire and Joel Scheer, Esquire (“the Redding Panel”) “in order 

to allow the panel to complete its work,” consistent with the 

limited directives contained in the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania’s Order of April 1, 2014.

____________________________________________

6 The panel also rejected the trial court’s assertion that the issue of counsel 

fees was an ancillary claim that did not affect the order’s appealability. Id. 

at 299.
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Order, 6/12/2014.

However, before the matter was remanded to the Redding Panel, 

Strausser wrote to the panel and withdrew its outstanding claim for 

attorneys’ fees. Segal responded to Strausser’s letter by requesting a 

conference, and stating its position that there were other outstanding issues 

for the panel to resolve. However, the Redding Panel did not respond to 

Segal’s request, and on August 4, 2014, the Majority issued a supplemental 

opinion, concluding that, after Strausser withdrew its claim for counsel fees, 

“all matters submitted by the parties have been decided ... these proceeding 

are concluded and [its] earlier Award in the amount of $15,699,721 stands 

as the Final Award of this Panel.” Supplemental Opinion, August 4, 2014, at 

5. Arbitrator Scheer issued a supplemental dissenting opinion advocating 

that “this entire matter should have been remanded to the Walters Panel[.]” 

Dissent to Supplemental Opinion, 8/8/2014, at 3.

On September 2, 2014, Segal filed a petition to vacate the arbitration 

award, followed by an amended petition on November 3, 2014. The trial 

court conducted a hearing on November 7, 2014, and, on December 8, 

2014, entered an order denying all of Segal’s outstanding motions. 

Thereafter, on December 30, 2014, Strausser filed a petition to reinstate 

confirmation of and enter judgment on the arbitration award. On January 7, 

2015, Segal filed an appeal from the trial court’s December 8, 2014, order. 

See Docket No. 176 EDA 2015. 
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On January 20, 2015, Segal filed a petition in opposition to Strausser’s 

request that the trial court confirm the supplemental majority arbitration 

award. However, on February 6, 2015, the trial court entered an order, 

reaffirming that its December 8, 2014, order “was intended to be a final 

Order making this matter [ripe] for review by the Superior Court. The intent 

of our Order was that Judge Dally’s original confirmation was not disturb[ed] 

under the Rule of Coordinate Jurisdiction.” Order, 2/6/2015. Segal filed a 

timely appeal of that order. See Docket No. 761 EDA 2015.

Thereafter, on March 20, 2015, Strausser filed a praecipe for the entry 

of judgment on the arbitration award. Judgment was entered on the docket, 

and a third notice of appeal followed.7 See Docket No. 1251 EDA 2015.

In its first issue on appeal, Segal argues the trial court erred in 

determining the Redding Panel entered a valid arbitration “award.” 

Specifically, Segal asserts that the award is not enforceable because it was 

____________________________________________

7 We note that the third appeal, from the March 20, 2015, entry of 

judgment, is the proper appeal to preserve all of Segal’s claims on appeal. 

Therefore, we dismiss the appeals at Docket Nos. 176 EDA 2015 and 761 

EDA 2015, as they were not final orders, and the issues are now ripe for 

review under the appeal at Docket No. 1251 EDA 2015. See Seay v. 

Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., a Subsidiary of Prudential Ins., 543 

A.2d 1166, 1168 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding the 30-day appeal period 

begins to run from the entry of judgment on an arbitration award, and not 

from the entry of the order confirming the award), appeal dismissed as 

improvidently granted, 565 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1989).
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not rendered unanimously, and because the Redding Panel did not resolve 

all issues on remand. 

As a panel of this Court stated in the earlier appeal: 

Whether the arbitrators’ decision constitutes an award for 

purposes of common law arbitration presents a question of law. 

“Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to 

the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as [the 

appellate] court may review the entire record in making its 

decision.” 

Strausser, supra, 89 A.3d at 297 (internal citations omitted).

In the present case, there is no question the parties agreed to settle 

their disputes through common law arbitration. See Levy v. Lenenberg, 

795 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“An agreement to arbitrate a dispute 

that does not state that the Uniform Arbitration Act applies is conclusively 

presumed to be an agreement to common law arbitration.”). The longstanding general rule of common law arbitration is that the arbitrators’ 

decision must be unanimous.8 See Weaver v. Powel, 23 A. 1070 (Pa. 

1892); Sukonik v. Shapiro, 5 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1939). Nevertheless, our 

courts have consistently recognized an exception to this general rule when 

the parties agree, by “express terms or by fair implication” to be bound by a 

majority decision. Weaver, supra, 23 A. at 1070. See Rosenbaum v. 

____________________________________________

8 Conversely, when proceeding under statutory arbitration, the general rule 

is that the parties agree to a majority decision, “unless otherwise prescribed 

by the agreement or provided [in the Arbitration Act].” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7306. 

See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 7307(a)(5).
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Drucker, 31 A.2d 117, 118 (Pa. 1943) (“The parties may agree that the 

award may be made by a majority of the arbitrators. Such intent may be 

gathered from the very fact of submission and from the attendant 

circumstances.”).

The relevant arbitration clause in the present case provided as follows:

In the event of any dispute arising under or from this or 

any previous Addendum or the Agreements of Sale between the 

parties, then the parties agree that any such dispute shall be 

subtmitted to binding arbitration. Each party shall name an 

arbitrator, the two of whom shall name the third 

arbitrator, and a hearing shall be held promptly 

thereafter. Their decisions shall be final and binding and 

may be entered as a judgment in the Court of Common

Please (sic) of Northampton County. In the event that any 

party fails or refuses to name an arbitrator after five days notice 

to do so, then either party shall have the immediate right to 

apply to said Court for the appointment of such arbitrator. The 

arbitrator shall have the right to award counsel fees to the 

prevailing party. 

Petition to Compel the Appointment of an Arbitrator to Serve as if Appointed 

by the Respondents, 5/6/2010, Exhibit D, Third Addendum to Agreements of 

Sale dated July 5, 2001 and April 25, 2003, at ¶ 24 (emphasis supplied) 

(hereinafter “Arbitration Clause”).

Segal argues that because the arbitration clause at issue does not 

indicate the parties’ intention to be bound by a majority decision, the 

general rule requiring unanimity applies. See Segal’s Brief at 30. Segal 

claims the manner in which the arbitrators were chosen in the present case 

is the same as in Weaver, supra, where the Supreme Court reversed an 
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arbitration judgment entered upon a non-unanimous decision. See id. at 

30-31.

Moreover, Segal contends that nothing in the parties’ conduct implied 

their intent to be bound by a majority decision. To the extent the trial court 

relied on Segal’s acquiescence to a non-unanimous decision issued by the 

prior arbitration panel, the “Walters Panel,” Segal claims the court erred 

because (1) only one of the named Segal entities herein was involved in the 

prior arbitration proceedings, and (2) Segal had no reason to challenge the 

Walters Panel award because the ruling was issued in its favor. See id. at 

32, 34. Furthermore, Segal asserts the trial court also erred in considering 

the parties’ actions during the Walters Panel because the trial court had 

already determined that the Walters Panel “was extinguished and therefore 

had ‘no authority with respect to this case[.]’” Id. at 33, quoting Trial Court 

Opinion, 11/9/2010, at 7. 

The trial court succinctly disposed of this claim as follows:

Given the terms of the parties’ arbitration clause, and the 

circumstances, inclusive of their prior course of conduct with 

regard to the clause, the Court finds that it made a fair inference 

as to the parties’ consent to be bound by a majority award.

Order of Court, 12/13/2012, at 11.

We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the terms of the 

parties’ arbitration clause, as well as their conduct, evidenced an intent to be 

bound by a majority decision. First, we note the arbitration clause at issue 

provided that each party would name an arbitrator, and those two 
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arbitrators would choose a third arbitrator. See Arbitration Clause. While 

this was the same procedure the Supreme Court determined required a 

unanimous ruling in Weaver, supra,

9

subsequent case law has reflected a 

more relaxed view of the unanimity requirement. 

In Sukonik, supra, the Supreme Court again recognized that, 

generally, common law arbitration awards must be unanimous, but found 

evidence which demonstrated the parties agreed “by fair implication” to be 

bound by a majority award. Sukonik, supra, 5 A.2d at 109. The Court 

cited the arbitration agreement, which provided, in pertinent part, that 

disputes “shall be submitted to a committee of three parties, one selected by 

each of the parties to this agreement and a third disinterested party selected 

by the two disputees.” Id. (citation omitted and emphasis in original). In 

that case, the two arbitrators selected by the parties were their attorneys, 

and had already attempted to settle the dispute to no avail. Id. The Court 

stated, “Clearly, therefore, the submission must have contemplated an 

award by only two of the arbitrators.” Id. at 110. 

In Rosenbaum, supra, an issue was initially submitted to an 

arbitration panel, which decided the controversy. Rosenbaum, supra, 31 

A.2d at 118. However, when the parties failed to abide by the panel’s 

____________________________________________

9 See Weaver, supra, at 1071 (“In our case each party named an 

arbitrator, the two persons named were to select a third, and the arbitrators 

thus chosen were to view the premises, and make an award under their 

hands and seals.”).
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directives, the matter was referred back to the same arbitrators. Id. The 

losing party later complained because the second ruling was signed by only 

two of the three arbitrators. However, the Supreme Court concluded: “[i]t 

is manifest that these arbitrators were originally named, and thereafter 

renamed, not only because of their peculiar knowledge [of the issues 

involved], but because certain of the arbitrators were obviously partisan in 

their views.” Id. Therefore, the Court found “it is a fair implication that the 

parties agreed and understood that any award could be made by a majority 

of the arbitrators.” Id.

Here, we find no reason to disagree with the trial court’s determination 

that the parties agreed, by fair implication, to be bound by a majority award. 

First, the procedure used to appoint the arbitration panel herein - where 

each party named an arbitrator and the two named arbitrators choose a 

third - carries with it an implication that arbitrators named by each party will 

be partisan and the third arbitrator will be neutral. We recognize that the 

Supreme Court in Weaver came to a different conclusion. However, as 

noted above, that conclusion appears to have been modified by the Court’s 

subsequent decisions in Sukonik and Rosenbaum.

10

____________________________________________

10 Segal claims that the Legislature’s 1982 amendments to the Pennsylvania 

Uniform Arbitration Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7301 et seq., “manifests the continuing 

requirement of a unanimous decision for common law arbitration awards[.]” 

Segal’s Brief at 26. We do not disagree. Sections 7306 and 7307(a)(5) of 

the Act specifically provide for majority decisions in statutory arbitrations, 

but were not made applicable to common law arbitrations. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Moreover, in the present case, unlike in Weaver, we find that the 

parties’ conduct demonstrated by “fair implication” that they intended to be 

bound by a majority award. Sukonik, supra, at 109. Significantly, we note 

the prior arbitration award, rendered by the Walters Panel in favor of 

Segal, was joined by only two of the three arbitrators – the neutral 

arbitrator and the arbitrator named by Segal. Segal did not hesitate to 

confirm and enter judgment on that award. Although Segal argues the prior 

arbitration involved different parties, we find this contention hollow. The 

Segal entities named in that dispute were Segal and Morel, Inc. and Segal 

and Morel at Forks Township VII, LLC. As explained in the Majority Opinion, 

Segal and Morel, Inc. is the parent corporation of a number of single 

purpose limited liability companies created for the development of The 

Riverview Estates in Forks Township, including Segal and Morel at Forks 

Township VII, LLC, which was named in the prior dispute, and Segal and 

Morel at Forks Township II, LLC, Segal and Morel at Forks Township III, LLC, 

Segal and Morel at Forks Township IV, LLC, which are named in the present 

dispute. See Majority Opinion, 9/26/2012, at 1. Furthermore, Kenneth 

Segal is an owner and the president of all the aforementioned corporations. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

7342(a). However, as will be discussed infra, we find, in the present case 

the parties agreed by “fair implication” that they intended to be bound by a 

majority award. See Rosenbaum, supra. 
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Therefore, we find the parties involved in this dispute are in privity with 

those involved in the prior dispute.11

Segal contends, however, that we should not consider anything that 

occurred during the Walters Panel proceedings for two reasons. First, it 

emphasizes the trial court determined “the Walters Panel was functus 

officio—i.e., the Panel was extinguished and therefore had ‘no authority with 

respect to this case[.]’” Segal’s Brief at 33 (emphasis in original and citation 

omitted). Second, Segal claims that even if we could consider the prior 

proceedings, Segal could not have challenged the non-unanimous award 

issued by the Walters Panel because it was not an aggrieved party. Id. at 

34. We disagree with both of Segal’s contentions.

Segal’s citation to the trial court’s statement that the Walters Panel 

had “no authority” in this case is taken out of context. The trial court made 

this comment in a November 9, 2010, opinion which was issued in response 

to Segal’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s May 2010 order naming 

Wallitsch to serve as Segal’s designated arbitrator in the Redding Panel 

proceedings. Segal had claimed the first arbitration panel, the Walters 

____________________________________________

11 Segal complains that Kenneth Segal should not have been found jointly 

and severally liable because he was not a party to any arbitration agreement 

with Strausser. Segal’s Brief at 32. However, Kenneth Segal’s liability, or 

lack thereof, was an issue for the arbitration panel. As we will discuss, infra, 

this Court’s review of a common law arbitration award is extremely limited. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341.
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Panel, retained jurisdiction over the issues presented. Trial Court Opinion, 

11/9/2010, at 4. The court disagreed, finding the Walters Panel had issued 

a final award and was “functus officio.” Id. at 5-6. However, because it was 

“unclear whether [Segal] in fact received notice” of Strausser’s petition to 

appoint an arbitrator, the court granted Segal’s motion for reconsideration, 

and directed it to appoint an arbitrator within five days. Id. at 4. Segal 

thereafter, once again, named Scheer to arbitrate the claims arising from 

the parties’ land development project. The trial court correctly determined 

the Walters Panel was exhausted, and that the new claims should be 

presented to a new arbitration panel. It did not comment on whether the 

parties’ actions during the Walters Panel arbitration were relevant in 

determining whether the parties agreed to accept a non-unanimous ruling. 

Furthermore, with respect to Segal’s complaint that it could not have 

challenged the non-unanimous award rendered by the Walters Panel 

because it was not an aggrieved party, we find this argument specious. The 

Walters Panel did not find for Segal on all its claims. Specifically, the panel 

denied Segal’s request for reimbursement of a $13,000 contribution it had 

made to the Homeowners Association. See Arbitration Opinion, 12/11/2007, 

at 13-14. The Walters Panel Majority determined this amount was not 

recoverable, and Segal’s named arbitrator, Scheer, dissented on this issue. 

See Dissent, 12/11/2007. Therefore, Segal was an “aggrieved party” with 

regard to this claim for relief, and could have challenged the arbitrator’s 

decision. Moreover, if Segal believed a non-unanimous decision was not 
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permitted under the parties’ arbitration clause, it could have asserted that 

the arbitration process was tainted by an “irregularity.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341. 

Its failure to do so supports our conclusion that the parties’ actions support 

the fair implication that they intended to be bound by a majority decision.

Consequently, while the issues raised during the present proceedings 

were distinct from those raised during the Walters Panel, the claims arose 

from the same land development project, and were subject to the same 

arbitration clause. Furthermore, Segal named the same arbitrator, who 

had ruled in its favor during the Walters Panel, to the Redding Panel. 

Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the determination of the trial court 

that the parties agreed, by “fair implication,” to be bound by a nonunanimous decision.

Segal also asserts the Redding Panel’s award was not a final award 

because the panel failed to resolve all issues. Segal asserts it wrote to the 

Redding Panel twice after remand and requested a conference “to discuss 

various issues related to the arbitration.” Segal’s Brief at 36. However, the 

panel never responded to its request, but rather, on August 11, 2014, issued 

the supplemental opinion and dissent.

It is well-established that “the sine qua non of an award is its finality 

in disposing of all the matters submitted by the parties to the arbitrator for 

his or her decision.” Fastuca v. L.W. Molnar & Associates, 10 A.3d 1230, 

1240 (Pa. 2011). However, the only unresolved issue Segal identifies in its 

brief is a request for counsel fees it incurred “in litigating [Strausser’s] 
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unsuccessful attempt to confirm the Majority Order and Opinion as an 

‘award.’”12 Id. See Strausser, supra, 89 A.3d at 300. Segal bases this 

request upon the following language in the arbitration provision: “The 

arbitrator shall have the right to award counsel fees to the prevailing party.” 

Arbitration Clause. Segal further asserts this was not a new claim, because 

it had requested counsel fees, in addition to judgment in its favor, in its 

answer to Strausser’s arbitration complaint. See Segal’s Petition to Vacate 

Arbitration Decision, 9/2/2014, Exhibit 26, Answer with New Matter, at 9.

Strausser argues, however, that based upon this Court’s opinion, the 

only issues left unresolved upon remand were the amount of Strausser’s 

counsel fees and whether the Redding Panel “needed additional information 

to complete its damages award.” Strausser’s Brief at 13. When Strausser 

withdrew its claim for counsel fees, and the Panel determined it did not need 

additional information to determine damages,13 Strausser asserts the 

Redding Panel had “decided all issues from the original submission[,] ... the 

arbitrators’ jurisdiction was exhausted and the award was ripe for 

____________________________________________

12 We note that in a July 2014 letter to the Redding Panel requesting a 

conference, Segal listed several issues which it characterized as “unclear and 

unresolved.” Letter, 7/24/2014, at 1. However, almost all of those issues 

concerned legal challenges to the panel’s decision. See id. at 1-3 

(asserting, inter alia, certain claims were barred by res judicata or the 

statute of limitations). As we will discuss infra, the mandate of the remand 

decision was clear and limited. Segal was not entitled to re-litigate claims 

that were already decided.

13 See Supplemental Opinion, 8/4/2014, at 4-5.
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confirmation.” Strausser’s Brief at 15 (footnote omitted). Moreover, 

Strausser argues that Segal’s claim for counsel fees was not authorized 

under the arbitration clause. We agree.

A review of the remand opinion reveals this Court did not intend for 

the Redding Panel to re-open the arbitration proceedings and re-litigate the 

issues it had already decided. Rather, the Court explained that the only 

issues still unresolved were the amount of Strausser’s counsel fees and 

whether the Panel required Segal’s profit per lot calculations to determine 

damages. Specifically, the Court opined:

Strausser’s claim for counsel fees is unresolved. Thus, pursuant 

to Fastuca, the Redding Panel’s decision does not constitute a 

common law arbitration award. Our conclusion in this regard is 

bolstered by the footnote in the Majority Opinion. It is unclear 

exactly what the Redding Panel was contemplating when it 

noted, “In the event that the panel determines that it needs 

[Segal’s] profit/lot to determine damages, the parties have 

agreed to present that evidence at a later phase of this 

proceeding....” [Segal’s] Petition to Vacate Majority [Decision] 

and Opinion, and to Preclude Entry of Judgment Pending 

Resolution of Petition, 11/9/2012, Exhibit T, at n. 1. However, a 

reasonable interpretation of this footnote indicates that the 

Redding Panel must decide whether it needs [Segal’s] “profit/lot 

to determine damages” and whether “a later phase” of 

arbitration is necessary.

Strausser, supra, 89 A.3d at 298-299. While this Court may not have 

clearly articulated its intent in the remand directive – “[o]n remand, the trial 

court shall remand the matter to the Redding Panel in order to allow the 
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panel to complete its work”14- a review of the entire opinion reveals the 

panel’s limited directive. Thus, when Strausser withdrew its claim for 

counsel fees, and the Redding Panel Majority decided it did “not need any 

additional ‘profit/lot [calculations] to determine damages[,]’” the panel had 

resolved all issues pending before it. Supplemental Opinion, 8/4/2014, at 4-

5. The Redding Panel Majority, therefore, properly declared that the “earlier 

Award in the amount of $15,699,721 stands as the Final Award of this 

Panel.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, we find the arbitration award entered 

following the remand by this Court was a final award, and Segal is entitled to 

no relief on this claim.

Similar to its last claim, Segal also contends the trial court improperly 

limited the scope of the arbitration panel on remand. In support of this 

assertion, Segal points to the following. After this Court filed its opinion on 

April 1, 2014, the trial court entered an order on May 23, 2014, which 

stated: “AND NOW, this 23rd day of May 2014, this matter is hereby 

REMANDED to the arbitration panel comprised of Edward Redding, Esquire, 

Walter Weir Jr., Esquire and Joel Scheer, Esquire for disposition of 

[Strausser’s] outstanding claim for attorneys’ fees.” Order, 5/23/2014. 

Segal responded by seeking clarification of the court’s May 23, 2014, order 

and the appointment of new arbitrators. Thereafter, on June 12, 2014, the 

____________________________________________

14 Strausser, supra, 89 A.3d at 300.
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trial court entered an order, clarifying its previous order, and stating that the 

matter would be remanded to the Redding Panel “‘in order to allow the panel 

to complete its work,’ consistent with the limited directives contained in the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s Order of April 1, 2014.” Order, 6/12/2014. 

Segal contends the trial court had no authority to, first, direct the 

Redding Panel to consider only the outstanding claim for counsel fees, and 

second, instruct the Panel to comply with the “limited directives” in this 

Court’s Opinion. Segal’s Brief at 50-51. Segal further argues the trial 

court’s actions “resulted in significant prejudice,” namely,

[t]he Supplemental Opinion discloses that Arbitrators Redding 

and Weir were operating under the mistaken impression that this 

Court or the Trial Court somehow constrained the Redding 

Panel’s ability on remand to consider issues other than: (1) 

awarding attorneys’ fees to [Strausser]; and (2) the need for 

profit/lot information to properly calculate damages.

Id. at 51. Accordingly, Segal claims the award should be vacated.

In addressing this claim, the trial court stated:

We believed that the Superior Court’s remand was clear, 

specific, and required no interpretation. As we read the Superior 

Court’s Order, it was specific as to the nature of the remand –

there was no award addressing Strausser’s claim for attorney’s 

fees[.] ... Thus, we issued no directive to the Redding Panel other 

than to comply with the Superior Court’s directive to accept the 

remand. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/2015, at 12. 

As we explained supra, we agree with the trial court’s interpretation of 

the remand opinion. What Segal fails to acknowledge is that the Redding 

Panel Majority did not limit its scope of review based upon the trial court’s 
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directives. Rather, the Majority looked to this Court’s opinion, and 

determined the only unresolved issues were those involving Strausser’s 

attorneys’ fees and the method by which to calculate the damage award. 

See Supplemental Opinion, 8/4/2014, at 4. Accordingly, we reject Segal’s 

contention that the trial court improperly limited the Redding Panel’s 

authority on remand. 

Next, Segal argues the trial court erred in denying its petition to 

vacate the arbitration award. Specifically, it contends the Redding Panel 

denied Segal’s right to a hearing and failed to deliberate on all issues. 

When considering a common law arbitration award, we must bear in 

mind our statutorily limited scope of review. 

Judicial review of a common law arbitration proceeding is 

prescribed by statute, under a provision of the Pennsylvania 

Judicial Code: 

§ 7341. Common law arbitration

The award of an arbitrator in a nonjudicial arbitration ... is 

binding and may not be vacated or modified unless it is 

clearly shown that a party was denied a hearing or that 

fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity caused 

the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable 

award.

42 Pa.C.S. § 7341. In accordance with this provision, our scope 

of review is extremely narrow. “The arbitrators are the final 

judges of both law and fact, and an arbitration award is not 

subject to a reversal for a mistake of either.” Prudential 

Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stein, 453 Pa.Super. 227, 683 

A.2d 683, 685 (1996). Neither we nor the trial court may retry 

the issues addressed in arbitration or review the tribunal's 

disposition of the merits of the case. Rather, we must confine 

our review to whether the appellant was deprived of a hearing or 

whether “fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity” 
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tainted the award. The appellant bears the burden to establish 

both the underlying irregularity and the resulting inequity by 

“clear, precise, and indubitable” evidence. Chervenak, Keane 

& Co., Inc. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., Inc., 328 Pa.Super. 

357, 477 A.2d 482, 485 (1984). In this context, “irregularity 

refers to the process employed in reaching the result of the 

arbitration, not to the result itself.” Id. A cognizable irregularity 

may appear in the conduct of either the arbitrators or the 

parties. Paugh v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 278 Pa.Super. 108, 

420 A.2d 452, 458 (1980).

McKenna v. Sosso, 745 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 759 

A.2d 924 (Pa. 2000). “A trial court order confirming a common law 

arbitration award will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion or an error 

of law.” Toll Naval Associates v. Chun-Fang Hsu, 85 A.3d 521, 525 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

As noted above, Segal first contends the award must be vacated 

because the Redding Panel denied Segal a full and fair hearing on remand. 

Segal emphasizes it “requested a conference before [the p]anel to discuss 

open items on five separate occasions[,]” however, the panel did not 

respond to those requests, and instead, issued a supplemental opinion 

adopting its earlier award as final. Segal’s Brief at 40. Segal asserts:

Thus, [this] claim of error with regard to the Redding Panel’s 

post-remand conduct is premised upon a procedural deficiency –

the actual denial of a hearing, as opposed to such hearing’s 

fullness or fairness – and has nothing to do with the merits of 

the controversy or the fact that Arbitrators Redding and Weir 

“agreed” with [Strausser]. 

Id. at 42-43.

Again, we find Segal is entitled to no relief. While the denial of a 

hearing is one of the few bases upon which a party may attack a common 
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law arbitration award, we conclude, here, Segal was not denied an 

arbitration hearing. Indeed, Segal does not contend the panel failed to 

conduct a hearing before the entry of the initial arbitration “award.” 

Rather, Segal complains only about the denial of a hearing upon remand. 

However, as noted above, the remand order from this Court was limited to 

two issues, namely, the amount of Strausser’s counsel fees and whether the 

panel required Segal’s profit per lot calculations to determine damages. 

After Strausser withdrew its claim for attorneys’ fees, and the Majority 

decided it did not need to conduct further damage calculations, it had 

“complete[d] its work,” and there was no need for a hearing or telephone 

conference. Strausser, supra, 89 A.3d at 300. Accordingly, the trial court 

properly denied Segal’s petition to vacate the award on this basis. 

Compare Andrew v. CUNA Brokerage Servs., Inc., 976 A.2d 496, 498-

499, 502-503 (2009) (arbitration panel entered award finding plaintiff’s 

claims time-barred by statute of limitations after conducting only a prehearing telephone conference; Superior Court vacated award and remanded 

case, holding panel’s failure to conduct a “hearing to consider evidence and 

testimony as to whether [plaintiff’s] causes of action are timely” constituted 

“the denial of a full and fair hearing.”).

Segal also contends the trial court erred in denying its motion to 

vacate the award because the Redding Panel failed to deliberate on all 

issues. See Segal’s Brief at 43. In support of this claim, Segal points to 

Arbitrator Scheer’s comments in his October 2012, dissent in which he 
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stated the Majority Opinion “was never distributed by the Chairperson for 

comment” and there was “no deliberation with respect to which party might 

be liable.” Dissent, 10/10/2012, at 1, 3. Segal notes that Arbitrator Scheer 

made a similar comment in his supplemental dissent where he stated 

Arbitrator Weir circulated a draft supplemental opinion, which Arbitrator 

Redding joined without further deliberation. See Dissent to Supplemental 

Opinion, 8/8/2014, at 1. Accordingly, Segal asserts “Arbitrator Redding and 

Weir’s exclusion of Arbitrator Scheer was a procedural irregularity that 

resulted in an unjust, inequitable, and unconscionable decision[.]” Segal’s 

Brief at 46. 

However, we find Segal has not established by “‘clear, precise, and 

indubitable’ evidence” an irregularity that “tainted the award.” McKenna, 

supra, 745 A.2d at 4 (citation omitted). Arbitrator Scheer, in his original 

dissent, did not express that the arbitrators failed to deliberate at all on the 

issues. Rather, he stated the majority opinion was not distributed for 

comment before it was filed. See Dissent, 10/10/2012, at 1. As he 

explained in his supplemental dissent, after both he and Arbitrator Weir 

submitted proposed draft adjudications, Arbitrator Redding signed Arbitrator 

Weir’s draft without requesting “further deliberations between the panel 

members, [or] further comment by the parties to discuss a final draft[.]” 

Dissent to Supplemental Opinion, 8/8/2014, at 2. This statement, however, 

does not establish that the parties did not discuss the issues. It simply 

indicates there was no further deliberations after the proposed drafts were 
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distributed.15 Cf. Goeller v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 568 A.2d 176, 178 

(Pa. 1990) (reinstating the order of the trial court directing the parties to 

convene a new arbitration panel when “[t]he record indicate[d], and it [was] 

not disputed, that one of the members of the panel in this case was denied 

his opportunity to deliberate.”). Accordingly, we find the trial court did not 

err or abuse its discretion when it denied Segal’s petition to vacate the 

arbitration award.

In its last issue, Segal contends the trial court erred in denying its 

request for a hearing and discovery. Segal attached a rule to show cause to 

its petition to vacate the arbitration award in contemplation that the trial 

court would conduct an evidentiary hearing on its claims. Although the court 

executed the Rule and scheduled a hearing for December 15, 2014, it 

subsequently entered the order denying Segal’s petition before the 

scheduled hearing. See Order, 12/8/2014. Segal asserts:

[T]he Trial Court’s failure to hold a hearing in this matter 

deprived [Segal] of [its] right to develop an evidentiary record 

concerning disputed issues of fact raised by the Petition to 

Vacate and [Strausser’s] Responses thereto, including whether 

the parties to the Third Addendum intended to be bound by a 

decision made by only a majority of arbitrators.” 

Segal’s Brief at 49.

____________________________________________

15 Perhaps, at that point, it was evident the arbitrators’ views on the issues 

were so disparate that no compromise was possible.
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Segal also complains the trial court would not permit it to conduct 

discovery on Arbitrator Redding’s possible misconduct. Indeed, Segal notes 

that, in October of 2014, Arbitrator Redding “pled guilty to conspiracy to 

defraud financial institutions in connection with numerous real estate 

transactions.” Segal’s Brief at 20. It asserts this fact “underscored the 

fundamental premise of the Petition to Vacate, namely, that the individuals 

presiding over the arbitration did not carry out their duties in accordance 

with the law.” Id. at 50. Segal argues the trial court prematurely rejected 

its claim without affording it “the opportunity to develop that argument 

through discovery.” Id. 

In its opinion, the trial court noted Segal’s claim that the court denied 

it an opportunity “to make a record is disingenuous ... [as Segal] had no 

evidence to proffer.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/2015, at 17. It commented 

that during various hearings and court listings, Segal never appeared with 

witnesses or requested “to make an evidentiary presentation.” Id. 

Furthermore, with respect to its denial of Segal’s request for discovery, the 

court offered the following explanation:

We feel compelled to note that [Segal has] been dancing 

around a claim that something nefarious occurred when the 

majority of the panel issued an award against [it]. However, 

there has been no proffer of fraud, misconduct or corruption.

We have heard numerous presentations, generally 

repetitive, with regard to these claims. The only issues that 

have been developed are the following claims: (1) Two of the 

arbitrators, one appointed by Strausser (Weir) and the neutral 

arbitrator (Redding), improperly issued a majority award without 

the consent of the dissenting arbitrator, Scheer. (2) Significant 
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portions of the majority opinion are alleged to have been lifted 

or plagiarized from the Strausser Brief. (3) After the completion 

of the Redding Panel’s work, Mr. Redding plead (sic) guilty in 

Federal court to fraud/theft; however, the conviction was wholly 

unrelated to the parties and the dispute. 

None of these issues support an interference with the 

arbitration process. This nonjudicial arbitration process was 

contracted by the parties. These parties specifically sought to 

exclude this dispute from our jurisdiction. We understand that 

[Segal] strongly feel[s] as though the Redding Panel’s decision 

was not supported by the record and erroneous. Unfortunately 

for [Segal], a weak work product or a mistaken determination of 

the factual or legal issues is not enough for Court intervention.

Based on the proffers made by [Segal], it was clear that 

the discovery was a fishing expedition and nothing more. 

Without a proffer supporting fraud, misconduct, or other 

irregularity causing an unconscionable award, we were unwilling 

to allow post-award discovery related to the entry of a common 

law arbitration award.

Id. at 15-16. 

We find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 

Once again, Segal fails to acknowledge the very limited bases for judicial 

review of a common law arbitration award. See McKenna, supra, 745 A.2d 

at 4 (review of common law arbitration award limited to “whether the 

appellant was deprived of a hearing or whether ‘fraud, misconduct, 

corruption or other irregularity’ tainted the award.”) (citation omitted).

 We note Segal’s petition to vacate was based on the following claims: 

(1) the award was rendered in a non-unanimous decision; (2) Segal was 

denied a hearing upon remand from this Court; (3) the arbitrators failed to 

deliberate on all issues; (4) the arbitrators failed to give full consideration to 

all of the evidence presented by Segal; and (5) Arbitrator Redding pled 
J-A05020-16

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guilty to federal crimes after the final award was entered. See generally, 

Petition to Vacate Arbitration Decision, 9/2/2014, and Addendum to Petition 

to Vacate, 11/3/2014. As we have determined supra, the first three 

arguments are without merit, and the court properly disposed of them 

without conducting a hearing. See supra at 13-19 (non-unanimous award 

was proper), 25-26 (arbitrators were not required to conduct a hearing upon 

remand); and 26-28 (arbitrators properly deliberated on remaining issues 

upon remand). Further, Segal’s contention that the arbitrators failed to give 

full consideration to the evidence it presented seeks to undermine the 

factual and legal basis of the award, which is not a proper reason upon 

which to vacate a common law arbitration award. It is well settled that 

“arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact, and an arbitration 

award is not subject to reversal for a mistake of either.” McKenna, supra, 

745 A.2d at 4 (citation omitted). 

Consequently, Segal’s only basis for vacating the award which could 

have, arguably, supported its request for a hearing and discovery, was its 

claim that Arbitrator Redding was unqualified to serve on the panel because 

he was under federal investigation for fraud. Segal contends this fact 

demonstrated an “irregularity” in the arbitration process, and it should have 
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been permitted to “develop that argument through discovery.”16 Segal’s 

Brief at 50. 

We find the trial court properly denied Segal’s request to conduct 

discovery, and agree its application was nothing more than a “fishing 

expedition.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/2015, at 16. There is no allegation 

that Redding’s criminal activities were, in any way, connected to the instant 

arbitration hearing or the parties herein, or tainted the proceedings in such a 

way as to disadvantage Segal. In fact, Segal does not explain in its brief 

what it hoped to uncover through discovery, save for “the opportunity to 

develop”17 its argument, nor does it state what evidence it intended to 

present during an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we find no basis to 

disturb the ruling of the trial court.

Judgment affirmed at Docket No. 1251 EDA 2015. Appeals at Docket 

Nos. 176 EDA 2015 and 761 EDA 2015 are dismissed as moot.

____________________________________________

16 We note that Segal takes care in its brief not to allege the arbitration 

award was based on fraud. Indeed, as the trial court explained during the 

November 7, 2014, hearing, Segal did not allege fraud in its petition to 

vacate. N.T., 11/7/2014, at 10. Further, the court commented: “There has 

to be, at the very least, clear evidence of fraud or bias in order to entitle 

somebody to drag a post-award proceeding out, delay it, and take 

discovery.” Id. at 9. Here, there has been no evidence at all that the award 

was fraudulently obtained by Strausser.

17 Segal’s Brief at 50.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2016