NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID SINGH, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 15-72640 

Agency No. A200-817-365 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 9, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and S. MURPHY,*** District 

Judge.

Petitioner David Singh sought review of an order from the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) that dismissed his appeal of the immigration judge’s 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy, III, United States District 

Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 11 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

(IJ) decision to deny his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on a lack of 

credible testimony. We deny the petition.

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Petitioner’s application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under CAT based on the adverse credibility 

determination of the IJ. We review the adverse credibility determination for 

substantial evidence. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted). Credibility determinations are owed “special deference,” and 

we “only exercise our power to grant a petition for review when the evidence 

compels a contrary conclusion.” Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 

2005) (cleaned up).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner failed 

to provide credible testimony to establish his eligibility for asylum and withholding 

of removal. Petitioner offered inconsistent testimony on three separate issues. 

Those inconsistencies provided substantial evidence to support the adverse 

credibility determination.

First, Petitioner gave inconsistent testimony relating to the day, month, and 

year of the incident that prompted him to seek asylum. And when questioned 

about the inconsistent dates, he gave a confusing explanation that the agency 

permissibly found to be unsatisfactory.
3 

Second, Petitioner claimed he did not know the identity of his attackers

during that incident because they attacked him from behind and wore coverings 

over their mouths. But he later testified that at least some attackers were police 

officers. He tried to reconcile these statements by making the incredible claim that

he recognized his attackers’ eyes as belonging to officers whom he had 

encountered years before. The agency was not compelled to accept that 

explanation.

Third, Petitioner provided inconsistent testimony relating to his arrest 

history. Petitioner first represented to an asylum officer that he had never been 

arrested for anything, in any country. Petitioner then claimed in his asylum 

application that he had been detained “twice or more” and placed in police custody 

“[o]n several occasions,” only to later testify that he was arrested precisely twice. 

In an attempt to explain his initial silence about the arrests, Petitioner testified 

before the IJ that he was too afraid to mention the police in his initial statements to 

immigration officers when he first arrived in the United States. Then, to clarify the 

discrepancy regarding the number of arrests, Petitioner testified that the police had 

only arrested him twice but that they appeared in his home two more times. The 

agency reasonably concluded that these inconsistencies undermined Petitioner’s 

credibility.

Together, the three independent discrepancies identified by the IJ and the 
4 

BIA support the adverse credibility finding, and the record does not “compel[] a 

contrary conclusion.” Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1064.

Last, we affirm the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s application for protection 

under CAT. When a petitioner’s “claims under [CAT] are based on the same 

statements . . . that the BIA determined to be not credible” for establishing

eligibility for asylum, the agency may rely on the same credibility determination to 

deny the petitioner’s CAT claims. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157 

(9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner relied on the same testimony for protection under CAT 

as for his application for asylum and withholding of removal. Because we affirm 

the agency finding that Petitioner’s testimony was not credible as to his application 

for asylum and withholding of removal, substantial evidence also supports the 

agency’s denial of CAT relief. See id.1

The petition is DENIED.

1 Petitioner’s brief asserts that the BIA abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion for a “sua sponte” reopening of his case. The inclusion of this point in his 

brief is apparently in error because Petitioner never filed any such motion before 

the BIA.