alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with
the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, filed pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, of Cadence Financial Corporation (the Corporation) for the period ended September 30, 2009, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Richard T. Haston, the Chief Financial Officer of the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Richard T. HastonName:

Richard HastonTitle:

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:

November 5, 2009


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Cadence Financial Corporation and will be retained by Cadence Financial Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



58
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2279 Referred in House (RFH)]

106th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2279

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 6, 2000

                 Referred to the Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To authorize the addition of land to Sequoia National Park, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ADDITION TO SEQUOIA NATIONAL PARK.

    (a) In General.--As soon as practicable after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior shall acquire by donation, 
purchase with donated or appropriated funds, or exchange, all interest 
in and to the land described in subsection (b) for addition to Sequoia 
National Park, California.
    (b) Land Acquired.--The land referred to in subsection (a) is the 
land depicted on the map entitled ``Dillonwood'', numbered 102/80,044, 
and dated September 1999.
    (c) Addition to Park.--Upon acquisition of the land under 
subsection (a)--
            (1) the Secretary of the Interior shall--
                    (A) modify the boundaries of Sequoia National Park 
                to include the land within the park; and
                    (B) administer the land as part of Sequoia National 
                Park in accordance with all applicable laws; and
            (2) The Secretary of Agriculture shall modify the 
        boundaries of the Sequoia National Forest to exclude the land 
        from the forest boundaries.

            Passed the Senate July 27, 2000.

            Attest:

                                                    GARY SISCO,

                                                             Secretary.
```
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ CONSENT**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-38635, 333-68229, 333-93663, 333-42192, 333-39026,333-67716, 333-84556 and 333-104477 of Hall Kinion & Associates, Inc. and subsidiaries on Form S-8 of our report dated April 5, 2004 (which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes a explanatory paragraph regarding adoption of a newaccounting standard in 2002) appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Hall, Kinion & Associates, Inc. and subsidiaries for the year ended December 28, 2003. 

 

/s/    DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP 

 

San Francisco, California 

April 5, 2004
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2

Written Statement of the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned officer
of JAKKS Pacific, Inc. (Registrant), hereby
certifies that the Registrants Annual Report on
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

Date: March 15, 2004



| |                             
| | ----------------------------
| | /s/ JOEL BENNETT            
| |                             
| | JOEL BENNETT                
| | Executive Vice President and
| | Chief Financial Officer     

81
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2189

___________

Herman Jackson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota.

Flint Ink North American Corporation, *

also known as Flint Ink Corporation, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2004

Filed: August 27, 2004

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and RILEY, Circuit

Judges.

___________

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Herman Jackson filed a petition for rehearing in this case, maintaining that

whether an environment is objectively hostile is always a question of fact for a

properly instructed jury. We reject this argument. The question of whether an

environment is sufficiently hostile to be actionable is a legal question, and, like any

legal question, is a matter for the court to decide. In other words, a showing of some

minimal level of harassment is necessary before a case is submissible to a jury. A

court of course may decide this issue of submissibility on summary judgment. See,

e.g., Alagna v. Smithville R-II School Dist., 324 F.3d 975, 979-81 (8th Cir. 2003).
-2-

We have, however, reexamined the record to determine whether Mr. Jackson's

evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment, and we now conclude that it

was. We refer particularly to Mr. Jackson's deposition testimony (which neither party

pointed us to directly) that his name was written in a shower at his workplace and that

there was an arrow connecting his name with a burning cross and a KKK sign. We

think that an objective observer would regard this combination of figures as a threat

of serious bodily harm if not death to Mr. Jackson; and when this threat is combined

with all of the other incidents that Mr. Jackson complained of, and which we detailed

at length in our previous opinion, see Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp., 370 F.3d

791, 793-96 (8th Cir. 2004), we conclude that the present case is governed by Reedy

v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2003). 

We admit that the matter is not altogether free from doubt, and we think that

this case is on the cusp of submissibility. But our best judgment is that an objective

observer in Mr. Jackson's shoes would be justified in reacting to his situation in a way

that would affect a term or condition of his employment.

We note that on remand Flint Ink may deny that it had notice of Mr. Jackson's

environment or may assert that they took remedial action sufficient to absolve them

from any liability. These matters were not before the court on appeal.

We grant rehearing and reverse the judgment of the district court as to

Mr. Jackson's hostile work environment claim, and we remand this case to the district

court for further proceedings.

______________________________
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-6467

LUIS EDWIN DELGADO,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE JOHNSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

No. 04-6782

LUIS EDWIN DELGADO,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE JOHNSON,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. David G. Lowe, Magistrate

Judge. (CA-03-428-3)

Submitted: June 24, 2004 Decided: July 1, 2004

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
- 2 -

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Luis Edwin Delgado, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 3 -

PER CURIAM:

Luis E. Delgado seeks to appeal the district court’s

orders dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition and denying

his motion for a certificate of appealability. Delgado cannot

appeal these orders unless a circuit judge or justice issues a

certificate of appealability, and a certificate of appealability

will not issue absent a “substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A habeas

appellant meets this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and

that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are

also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

326 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently

reviewed the record and conclude Delgado has not made the requisite

showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0643

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JENNIFER RENEE SKAW,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including July 8, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and 

serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 2 2022

06/02/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0643
No. 2,017.

#### STATE ex rel. DURAND, Relatrix, *v.*DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al., Respondents.

*Original*— Certiorari.

Decided December 15, 1903.

*Air. Robert B. Smith, Mr. M. Donlan,*and *Air. H. L. Maury,*for Relator.

Per Curiam.

Tbe application for a wait of *certiorari*herein is denied.
#### STATE ex rel. DARLING, Relator, *v.*BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.

(No. 3,634.)

(Submitted February 20, 1915.

Decided March 22, 1915.)

[148 Pac. 314.]

*Mandamus*— Dismissal—Moot *Case.*

1. Where, after the institution of a *mandamus*proceeding in the supreme court, the Act under which it was sought to compel a board of county commissioners to do certain things toward the creation. of a new county, was repealed, the proceeding ordered dismissed.

Original application 'by the State, on the relation of M. S'. Darling, for writ of mandate running to the board of county commissioners of Teton County.

Proceeding dismissed.

*Messrs. Freeman & Thelen*and *Mr. Wm. T.*Pigott, for Relator.

*Mr. T. H. Pridham,*for Respondent.

MR. JUSTICE HOLLOWAY

delivered the opinion of the court.

Petitions in due form having been presented to the board of county commissioners of Teton county, praying for the creation of a new county from portions of Teton and Chouteau counties and to be'known as Pondera county, the board gave the required notice and fixed a time for hearing. At the hearing two withdrawal or counter petitions were presented, one for the exclusion of nine townships in a body, and the other known in the record as exhibit 28 for the exclusion of about six and one-half sections. Each of these counter-petitions was granted. By excluding the territory embraced in exhibit 28, the proposed new county was divided into two noncontiguous parts. The board thereupon denied the petition for the creation of the new county, and this proceeding was instituted to compel it to reassemble, determine the boundaries of the proposed new county, including therein the territory embraced in exhibit 28, and to *435proceed as required by sections 2-6, Chapter 133, Laws of 1913. An alternative writ of mandate was issued, and upon the return the respondent board interposed a demurrer and motion to quash, and the matter was submitted.

Since this proceeding was instituted the statute under which it was sought to create Pondera county has been repealed. The demurrer and motion are sustained and the proceeding is dismissed.

*Dismissed.*

Mr. Chief Justice Brantly and MR. Justice SanneR concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains certain summary financial information extracted from the
Company's financial statements and notes thereto and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.  The Company files an
unclassified balance sheet, certain line items are not applicable.  All values
except share amounts are in thousands.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1996	
<CASH>                                      	84,285
<SECURITIES>                                  4,795
<RECEIVABLES>                               408,143
<ALLOWANCES>                                     	0
<INVENTORY>                                      	0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 	0
<PP&E>                                       59,355
<DEPRECIATION>                               36,907
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              813,953
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            	0
<BONDS>                                      94,099
<COMMON>                                      5,276
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            	0
<PREFERRED>                                    	858
<OTHER-SE>                                   56,136
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                813,953
<SALES>                                          	0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            595,592
<CGS>                                            	0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               577,938
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             14,114
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 	0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            1,975
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               1,974
<INCOME-TAX>                                   	888
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           1,086
<DISCONTINUED>                                   	0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  	0
<CHANGES>                                        	0
<NET-INCOME>                                  1,086
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  	.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  	.10
        	

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND> THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                             65
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   6,321
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              181,657
<PP&E>                                         20,744
<DEPRECIATION>                               (14,014)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                188,387
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       1,321,013
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                    3,765,618
<OTHER-SE>                                (4,898,244)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  188,387
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    0
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              423,295
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             48,025
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (471,320)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (471,320)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                (471,320)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.02)


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael I. Ruxin, MD, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

|(1) | The Annual Report of Global Med Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                                                                                                          
|   

|Dated: March 25, 2009 | /s/ Michael I. Ruxin, M.D. 
Michael I. Ruxin, M.D. 
Chief Executive Officer
|--------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Global Med Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by Global Med Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 8, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-41589 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus DAVID JUAREZ-PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 5:05-CR-836-ALL

-------------------- Before REAVLEY, GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * David Juarez-Perez (Juarez) appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Juarez appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard by virtue of its failure to make the findings necessary to deny the motion, i.e., that Juarez initiated further contact with the agents and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. Once an accused has invoked his right to counsel, his responses to further police questioning are admissible only afterNo. 05-41589 -2- a finding that he “‘(a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.’” United States v. Cruz , 22 F.3d 96, 98 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Illinois , 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984)). The district court did not explicitly rule whether Juarez or the DEA agents initiated discussion of his case; nevertheless, we will assume that the district court impliedly found that Juarez initiated the conversation because such finding is essential to the constitutional inquiry and, additionally, is supported by Agent Melvin Sinoben’s testimony and the waiver form. See Reich
v. Lancaster , 55 F.3d 1034, 1057 (5th Cir. 1995). To the extent that Juarez’s testimony conflicted with that of Sinoben on this issue, we assume that the district court accepted the Government’s version of events as more credible. See United States v. Santiago , 410 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 1565 (2006). Our review of the record indicates that Juarez did not raise the issue whether he voluntarily waived his right to counsel in the district court. That issue is therefore waived. See United States v. Pope , 467 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.