### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 01 36 -C R

______________________________ J ESSI E RUI Z , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the Criminal J udicial District Court #4

Dallas County , Texas Trial Court No. F 07-23594-K

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleyI n cause numbe rs 06 -0 8- 00 13 7- CR, 06 -0 8- 00 13 8- CR, and 06 -0 8- 00 13 9- CR, he a

pp e a ls 1 c on vic tio ns fo r p os se ssi on of mari hu ana in an amount b e tw e e n f our o un c e s and

fi ve po un ds , po sse ssi on of le ss tha

n on e g ra m of c oc a ine , a

nd e va din g arr e st, re sp e c tiv e ly . In th e se thr e e c a se s, Rui z wa s se nte nc e d to tw o y e ars ' imp ri so nme nt in a state -j a il fa c ili ty , to ru n c on c ur re ntl y . Rui z al so appea ls his conviction in c ause number 06-08- 00140-CR of possession of methamphetamine in an a mou nt b e tw e e n o ne and fo ur g ra ms. Rui z wa s se nte nc e d in t his c a se to f

ive y e ars ' imp ri so nme nt, to run conc urre ntly . Finally , in cause number 06-08-00141-CR, Ruiz was convicted of attempting to t a ke a we a po n f ro m a po lic e of

fi c e r, fo r w hic h h e re c e ive d tw o y e ars ' imp ri so nme nt i n a state -j a il fac ility , to run conc urre ntly , and wa s assessed a $2,000.00 fine. Th e c on vic tio n h a vin g be e n in Da lla s Co un ty , th is c a se wa s o ri g ina lly a pp e a le d to the F if

th 2 Court of Ap pe a ls a

nd wa s the n tr ans fe rr e d to thi s Court by the Te xas S up re me Court purs ua nt t o it s docket e qualization efforts. See T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 73.001 (Ve rnon 2005). We are unawa re of any conflict be tween pr ece dent of the F ifth Court of Appea ls and that of this Court on any rele vant issue. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 41.3. 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON J essie R uiz w a s tr ie d

o ns ix c h ar g e s ar is in g f r o m t w o s e p ar a te e n c o u n te r s w it h la w enfor ceme nt office rs, was c onvicted of a ll six char g es (includingthis one, a cha rg e of posse ssion of betwee n four g rams and 200 gr ams of methamphe tamine with the intent to deliver, for which he

re c e ive d a se nte nc e of

tw e nty y e ars ' and fo ur mon ths ' imp ri so nme nt) , and ha s a pp e a le d e a c h o f t

ho se 1 convictions. The ba sis for ea ch of hi s complaints rests upon a c laim that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. Ruiz ' s alleg ations arise ove r the lac k of any objection by

his trial counsel 2 when the State m ad e three sepa rate comments during closing arguments. We disagr ee, hold that Rui z fa ile d to sh ow that he re c e ive d ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, a

nd a ff ir m a ll s ix co nv ic tio ns .3

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound I n the first enc oun t er, dur ing the ear ly morning hours of Mar ch 10, 2007, Ruiz sl ammed a

car into a signal light pole, knoc king it to the g round, dama g ing the car sufficie ntly

that it was

re nd e re d " no t dr iva

ble [sic ]." Th e inv e sti g a tin g of fi c e r dis c ov e re d th a t Ru iz ha d n o p ro of of lia bil ity ins ur anc e and

purp os e d to imp ound the ve hic le

. A ro uti ne inv e nto ry of the a uto mob ile inc ide nt t o its im poundment found it to contain seventy -eig ht gr ams of methamphe tamine, two bag s containing marihuana , cra ck coc aine, sc ales used to we igh d ru gs , a rea listi c-looking plastic BB g un, a used sy ring e, small plastic bag s, and other a ssorted drugpara pherna lia. After

this di scover

y , Ruiz was promptly arr ested a nd indicted on seve ral c ounts as a re sult of this i ncident, including : 1) possession of me tha mph e tami ne in an amo un t mo re tha n f our g ra ms b ut l e ss t

ha n 2 00 g ra ms w ithint e nt t o distribute; 2) possession of marihuana in an amount over

four ounc es but less than five pounds; and 3) possession of less than one g ram of c ocaine . I n due cour se, Ruiz was relea sed fr om jail. More trouble s with the oper a ti o n o f a mo to r v e hicle pre cipitated Ruiz's next poli ce e ncounter

. At tw o in the mor nin g on July 10 , 2 00 7 ( wh ile the c a se s ari sin g fr om th e fi rst inc ide nt w e re sti ll pending trial), anothe r Da llas police off icer , T. W. McClure, observe d a re d For d pickup truck driving on the wrongside of the r oad. McClure switched on his re d and blue lig hts and stopped the tr uc k, dr ive n b y

Rui z. Mc Clure a

pp ro a c he d the tr

uc k and a sk e d Rui z to p ro du c e his dr ive r' s li c e ns e for inspec tion, but a nervous Ruiz failed to respond to the r equest. As Mc Clure aske d him to st ep out of the truck a

nd rea ched to ope n the door, Ruiz acc eler ated and sped aw ay . McClure ra n backWit h a leve l one (or c linical) re straint, pressure is a pplied to both sides of the nec k with the 3 trac hea a nd throat beingprotec ted in the crook of the elbow. Pre ssure is applied by squeezing the fore arm a nd bicep tog ether , while pre ssing in and down on the elbow. No pr essure is directed to the throat, and the subject ca

n still breathe and spe ak with only minimal dis comfort. With a level two (or locke d) re straint, the pre ssure a pplication is identical, but this restrai n t i s l ocked into position with the subject' s second a rm. By locking a vascular restraint into position, i t preve nts the restra int fr o m s l i d i n g into a respiratory restra int (bar- arm c hoke hold), whic h is common during a n actua l phy sical strug g le. http:// www.br azilianjiuj itsuge ar.c om/forums/showthread. php? t=5201. 4 to h is p a tr ol car an d c ha se d, wi th s ir e ns bla ri ng , a ft e r R

uiz. Du ri ngthe e ns uin g c ha se , Ru iz proce eded a g ains t t h e fl ow of tra ffic on a one-w ay street; per

Dallas police policy , McClure terminated the chase rathe r than follow. F or ty min ute s late r, Mc Clure c a

ug ht s ig ht o f t

he tr uck again and

re su me d h is p ur su it, initiating a f

ifteen- minute high- speed c hase (during which McClure estimated the spee d of the truc k at ninety miles per hour on ma in roads and sixty to seventy

miles per hour throug h residential a rea s). Two other patrol car s (one dr iven by Offic er M. L

. S t

. C l ai r and another driven by Offic er K . D. Ty ler) joined the ch as e. As is t y pical of ma

ny high- speed police chase s, Ruiz lost control of the truck, drivingit into a tree. Ruiz then jumped out of the t ru ck an d continued his flig ht on foot thr ou g h th e re sid e nti a l ar e a in wh ic h he wa s th e n lo c a te d. St. Cla ir , f oll ow ingon

fo ot, ta c kle d Ru iz to the g round and the two beg an to wre stle. Ruiz swung his arms at St. Clair and struck him in the che st. St. Clair g ot on top of Ruiz and administered a level one latera l va scular neck restra int. As St. Clair was attempting to secure a leve l two restra int, h e fe l t a t u g o n his right side a nd saw that Ruiz had gr asped his pistol and holster. 3 St. C lair scr eame d for a ssistance a nd instinctively ro lled on his side to prevent Ruiz from ga ining5

fu ll a c c e ss t o th e pis tol

. Tyle r ra n to the wr e stl ing ma

tc h an d str

uc k Ruiz o n h is h e a d tw ic e wi th h is flashlig ht, w here upon Ruiz rele ased his g rasp on the pistol, but continued to resist and eve n g rabbe d St. C lair' s pepper

spray . The two off

icer s could not restra in Ruiz by themselves. Fi n al l y , M cC l u re arri v edat t h e s ce n e o f t h e b ra wl an d ad m i n i s t er ed p ep p er s p ra y i nR u i z 's fac e. This ena

bled the thre e off

icer s to ga in control of Ruiz and p l ac e h i m i n handcuf fs. As they

w e r e e s c o rti n g Ru iz to a

p a tr o l c ar , a

c r o w d ( a p p ar e n tl y c o n s is ti n g of family or fr ie n d s o f Ru iz ) be c a me un ru ly

and sc re a me d at the po lic e of fi c e rs . Th e c ro wd wa s contr oll e d, Rui z wa s p la c e d in the back of a patrol car, and the office rs conduc ted a se arc h of the truc k Ruiz had bee n driving . The

sear ch re veale d methamphetamine. As a re sult of this second incident, Ruiz was c harg ed with eva ding a rre st, possession of betwee n one and f

our g rams of me thamphetamine, a nd attempt to take a w eap o n from a police office r. The c harg es fr om the Marc h 10 and Jul y 10 incidents wer e combine d an d Ruiz enter ed a plea of g uilty to all six counts, with punishment to be decided by a jury

. Rui z co mpl a ins tha

t hi s c ouns e l w a s in e ff

e c tiv e be c a

us e he failed to o bje c t to c e rt a in statements made by

the State during jury

argument a

t p unishment; those statements discussed parole , ref ere nced ple a bar g ains, and a lleg edly introduced ne w evidenc e. II. Stand ard of Review Any alleg ation of ineffe ctiveness must be firmly founded in the r ecor d. Go od sp e e d v . S tat e , 18 7 S. W.3 d 3 90 , 3 92 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 9 S.W. 3d 80 8, 81 3 ( Te x. Cr im.6

A p p . 1 9 9 9 )

. F r o m t h e r e c o r d r e c e i v e d b y t h i s C o u rt , R

u i z b e ar s t h e b u r d e no f

p r o v i n g b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that counse l was ineff ective. See Goodspee d , 187 S.W .3d at 392; Thompson , 9 S.W. 3d a t 81 3; Can no n v . S tat e , 6 6 8 S. W. 2 d

4 0 1 , 4 0 3 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p . 1 9 8 4 )

. We apply the two-prong ed Strickland test handed dow n by the United States Supreme Co u r t t o d e te rmine

w h e th e r Ru iz r e c e iv e d in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). F ailure to satisfy

either pr ong of the Strickland test is fatal. J

au be rt v. Sta te , 74 S.W .3d 1, 9 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Thus, if one of the prong s of the Strickland test cannot be met, we need not e x amine the other

. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 697. Ruiz must first show counsel' s perf orman ce fell below an objective standa rd of

rea sonablene ss when conside ring preva iling prof essional norms. Id. at 6 87–88. "T his require s sh ow ingtha

t c ouns e l ma de e rr or s so se ri ou s th a t c ouns e l w a s n ot f un c ti on in g as th e ' c ouns e l' guaran tee d the defen dan t by th e S ix th Am end men t. " Sa nc he z v . S tat e , No. 07-06-0435-CR, 2008 Tex. App

. L E X I S 4 3 6 3 , a t * 3 ( T e x. A p p . — A ma r il lo Ju n e 1 3 , 2 0 0 8 , n o p e t. ) ( me m. o p . , not desig nated f

or publication). Our

revie w of c ounsel' s perf

ormanc e i s h i gh l y

defe rential. Ex

pa rte W hit e , 1 60 S.W. 3d

46 , 5 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Ton g v . S tat e , 25 S.W.3 d 7 07 , 7 12 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2000). The re is a s trong presumption that counsel' s conduct fe ll within t he wide r ang e of

rea sonable prof

essional assistance and that the c halleng ed ac tion could be consider ed sound trial strateg y . Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 9; W hit e , 1 60 S.W. 3d

a t 51 ; Tong , 25 S.W .3d at 712. There fore , we will not second guess the strateg y of counsel at trial throug h hindsight. Bl ott v . S tat e , 588 S.W .2d7

58 8, 59 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 79 ); Ha ll v . S tat e , 161 S.W .3d 142, 152 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pe t. r e f' d)

. Whe re the re c or d is sil e nt a s to wh y c ouns e l f a ile d to make an o bje c tio n o r t a ke c e rt a in actions, we will assume it was due to any strateg ic motivation that ca n b e i m agined, and the appellant will have failed to re but the presumption that trial counsel' s actions w er e i n some way

rea sonable. Ma ta v . S

tat e , 2 26 S.W. 3d

42 5, 43 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 57 S.W .3d 43 6, 44 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Fo xv . S tat e , 175 S.W .3d 475, 485–86 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. re f' d). I n other words, we will not conclude the challeng ed conduc t deficie nt unless it was so outrag eous that no compe tent attorney would have e ng ag ed in it. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 808; Fox , 175 S.W .3d at 485–86. Next, it is not enoug h for Ruiz to show that the error s had s o m e co n ce i v ab le ef fec t on the outcome of the proce eding

. See Strick land , 466 U.S. at 693. To meet the se cond prongof the Strickland test, Ruiz must show that the def icient per formanc e dama g ed his defe nse to such a de g ree that th e re is a

re a so na ble pro bab il it y th e re su lt o r o utc ome of the tr ia l w ou ld h a ve be e n d if fe re nt. Id. ; Tong , 25 S.W .3d at 712. We evaluate t his fac tor while t aking into consideration the totality of repr esentation and the par ticular c ircumstance s of this case. Thompson , 9 S.W. 3d a t 81 3; Ex

pa rte Felton , 815 S.W .2d 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).8

III . App lic at ion A. The State's Argum ent Re garding Par ole Was P roper I nac co rdwi t h Ar t i c l e 3 7

. 0 7 o f t h e T ex as C o d e o f C ri m i n al P ro ce d u re , t h e t ri al co u rt 's punishment charg e stated: I t is also possibl e that the leng th of time for whic h the def endant will be imprisoned might be r educe d by

the awa rd of pa role.

. . . i f t h e d e f e n d a n ti s s e n t e n c e d

t o a t e r mo f i mp r i s o n m e n t , h e w i l l n o tbe c ome eli gi b l e fo r parole until the actual time ser ved equa ls one-four

th of the sentenc e imposed or 15 y ear s, whicheve r is less, without any considera

tion of any

g ood conduct time [] he may

ear n.

. . . . You may consider the exist ence of the pa role lawand g ood conduct time. Howe ver, y ou are not to consider the extent to which g ood conduct time may be aw arde d to or forf eited by this particular de fenda

nt. Y ou are not to consider the manne r in which the pa ro le law m ay

be a pp lie d to thi s p art ic ula

r d e fe nd ant. Se e By rd v . S tat e , 192 S.W .3d 69, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, pet. re f' d). Ruiz com p l ains that the State made an improper jury argument reg ardingparole when

ar gu i n g t h e f

o l l o wi n g: A c ou ple of thi ng s I wo uld lik e to poi nt out to y ou . On the tw o la rg e r c a se s, the 2 to 10 and the 5 to 99 or life , the J udg e re ad y ou a portion about parole . What y ou g e t to kn ow a

bo ut tho se tw o c a se s is tho se tw o c a se s, a pe rs on be c ome s e lig ibl e fo r p aro le a ft e r s e rv ingon e -q ua rt e r o f t he ir tim e or 15 y e ars , w hiche ve r i s le ss. O k ay ? So let's take , for e x ample, somebody g ets 20 y ear s. A quarte r time is 5. I t's le ss than the 15, so they ' re e ligible f or par ole in 5. That includes g ood time. All right? Make s e n s e ?9

Now, let' s say

somebody

g ot 70. Quarte r time of that is 17 and a half. 15 is less than 1 7 an d a h al f, s o t h ey wo u l d b ec o m e el i gi b l e i n 1 5

. W h at t h e l aw s ay s i s y o uca n 't g o b a c k a nd say , H e y , le t' s g ive so me bo dy 50 be c a us e the y ' re g oin g to be e lig ibl e in a quar ter time. Can' t do that. But the la w does say

y ou can be awa

re of that for your d e l i b e r a t i o n s . O k ay? The State may

explain the parole law ' s exi stence

. Tay lor v . S tat e , 2 33 S.W. 3d

35 6, 35 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); se e als o Tay lor v . S tat e , 9 11 S.W. 2d

90 6, 91 1– 12 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 1 99 5, pe t.

re f' d) (S ta te ' s jury

argume nt t

hat " if a pe rs on is s e nte nc e d to 20 y e ars . . . th e n th e y be c ome e lig ibl e to be consider ed for

rele ase on pa

role a fter one quarte r, which i s fi v e" m ere ly discussed the trial

c ourt ' s c ha

rg e and wa s pro pe r)

. Th is issu e ha s bee n d e c ide d b y the Te xas C ourt

of Cr imi na l App e a ls and by this Court. Taylor , 2 33 S.W. 3d a t 35 8; J oh ns on v . S

tat e , N o . 0 6

- 0 4

- 0 0 0 3 8

- CR , 2 0 0 4 T e x. App. L E X I S 1 1 1 0 6 , a t * 2

– 3 ( T e x. A p p . — T e xar k an a D e c . 1 0 , 2 0 0 4 , n o p e t. ) ( n o t d e s ig n a te d for publication) (holding counsel' s failure to object t o S t at e' s argument reg ardingparole law not ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel). I n Taylor , the trial cour

t's jury char g e tracked the parole lang uag e employ ed by the t rial cour t in this case. 233 S.W.3d at 358. During closing argument, the State argued, " A 40-y ear sentenc e means the de fenda

nt becomes e ligible f

or par ole af

ter ser ving 20 y ear s. . . . A 6 0 -y ea r sentenc e means he become s elig ible afte r ser ving 30 y ear s. A sentenc e of life or 75 still means he bec omes eli gibl e aft er 30 y ears ." Id. The Te x as Court of Criminal Appea l s held this arg ument was prope r b ec au s e t h e S t at e "d i d

n o tco n v ey

an y i n fo rm at i o n b ey o n d wh at wa s p ro p er l y co n t ai n edi nt h e c h ar geI n mos t ple a ba rg a in ne g oti a tio ns , on e of the iss ue s in vo lve s w he the r t he de fe nd ant w ou ld 4 enter a g uilty plea. In such a c ircumstance , if a jury hear d mention of plea ne g otiations, it might infe r 10 when he explained how t he parole eligibility rules set out in the cha rg e wor ked with forty , six ty

and

sev ent y -fi ve y ear s ent ences ." Id. at 359. I n Sanchez , the defe ndant complained that the State' s argument that the jury would "se e that the onl y protec tion of t he communit y that y ou can be assured of would be ha lf of whatever y ou send him," and the State' s calc ulation if "you send him for 40 y ear s, he would only be ther e for

20," w as an " attempt to ina

ppropriate ly apply the parole law" to the defe ndant. 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 4363,

a t *6 . T he Am ari llo Court of Ap pe a ls h e ld d e fenda

nt' s c ouns e l w a s n ot i ne ff e c tiv e in f

a ili ngto object b e c a u s e th e St a te c o mm itte d n o e r r o r s in c e th e la

n g u a g e r e g ar d in g p ar o le d u r in g jur y argument mere ly

trac ked the tria l court' s jury char g e. Id. at *6–7. Her e, as in Tay lor and Sanchez , the State mere ly trac ked the lang uag e in the jury char g e and explained the application of the parole formula in g ener al terms. As such, no err or wa s committed. Ruiz ' s first point of err or is overr uled. B. P le a Ba r ga in Un le ss c le arl y inv ite d by de fe ns e c ouns e l or intr od uc e d as ev ide nc e by

the de fe ns e , atte mpt s at plea ba rg aini n g s hould never

be alluded to in ar g ument by prosec utors. Cla

y ton v . S tat e , 502 S.W .2d 7 5 5 , 7 5 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). During jury argument, the State said, " You know, sometimes the rea lity is that the State and the defe ndant can' t a g ree on a plea ba rg ain. That' s why

we have the 12 of y ou." 4that the defe ndant would have enter ed a ple a of guilty if promised a lig ht sentence . Howeve r, the po te nti a l im

pa c t of a sta te me nt suc h a s th is i s su bs tanti a lly

re du c e d w he n, a s h e re , a ple a of g uil ty is entere d, rende ring the sole neg otiation point as being the penalty to be assesse d. 11 Even a ssuming arg uendo that this argument constituted err or, declining to obj ect to a por tion of the State' s argument is often a n inhere ntly

tactica l decision based on the way the trial is unfolding and the trial strateg y employ ed. Tay lor v . S tat e , 947 S.W .2d 698, 704 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997, pet. re f' d). Counsel could have made a tactica l decision not to draw a ttention to, or re-e nforc e the State ' s a rgume nt i n f

ro nt o f t he jur y . Abs ent a reco rd

statin g the re a so ns fo r c ouns e l' s f a ilure to obj ec t , we wi l l not second g uess counse l throug h hindsight. Claims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel are often be st developed throug h motions for new trial. Thompson , 9 S. W. 3 d a t 8 1 4

. We have no suc h evidenc e as mig ht have be en deve loped at such a hear ing he re. F urther, Ruiz f ai led to b ri e f o r o the rw ise de mon str a te ho w c ouns e l' s f a ilure to ob

ject to thi s si ngula

r s ta te me nt w ou ld have r esulted in a diff

ere nt o u t co m e. There fore , since Ruiz failed to meet either prong of the Strickland test, this point of er ror is over

ruled. C. No Ne w Evide nc e Wa s In te r je c te d Du r ing th e St at e 's C los ing Ar gum e nt Finally , Ruiz contends the f ollowing jury

argument interjec ted new e vidence : So I submit t o y ou these incide nts, state jails, third deg ree s, one first deg ree case , this is not hing t o be looked at individually beca use they wer e not done by separ ate individuals. They wer e done by one person, Mr. Ruiz. I submit t o y ou that yo u l o o k a t e v e r

yt h i n g t h a t h e ' s d o n e an d

yo ut a k e t h a ta

n d yo ul o o k a ti tan d yo us ay, wher e does he fall betwe en that 5 or the low end to 99 y ear s or l ife on the hig h end? Do we take off

five y ea rs b ec au se he did not g et the we apon? Do we take off five y ear s beca

use he w as not a

ble to take the pe pper spr ay from the of

fice r? Do we take of f f ive y e ars be c a

us e he wa s not ab le to suc c e ssf ull y fo rc e Of

fi c e r St. Cla ir

of f h is12

back? Do we take of

f five y ear s beca

us e h e did not have a c ar w rec k and hurt somebody

in the commun i t y on the stree ts? Do we take off five y ear s beca

use he wa s a ble to no t ha

rm any oth e rs on the str e e t? Or do we take of f f ive y e ars be c a

us e not only did he not take out -- he took out a traff ic stop, but he hit -- didn' t hit parked car s he swer

ved ar ound. Are as of pr oper jury argument include summation of the evide nce pr esente d at trial, answe r to argument made by opposing counsel, or plea for la w enf orce ment. J

ac k so n v . S tat e , 17 S.W .3d 66 4, 67 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Ga dd is v . S tat e , 753 S.W .2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). A " jur y argume nt m

us t be e xtre me or

manif e stl y imp ro pe r, o r in

jec t ne w a

nd ha rm fu l f a c ts i nto evi den ce t o co ns ti tu te r ever si bl e erro r." Ga dd is , 753 S.W .2d at 398. We rejec t Ruiz ' s theory that the jury argument above interjec ted new evidenc e which had not been pr esente d. I t does no more than summar ize some of the evidenc e elicited by off i ce rs during the trial, evide nce w hich establ i s h ed t h at althoug h he tried, Ruiz was unable to g ain control of St. Clair' s wea

pon or pepper spray , that Ruiz was eventually controlled by the offic ers, that no one was phy sically

harme d during either the Marc h 10 or the July 10 incidents, and that he did not collide with any other ve hicles d u ring either inc ident. Additionally , we be lieve that the a rg ument was

mere ly a plea for law enfor ceme nt. Be cause the S t at e's argument was prope r, counse l was not require d to object. Ther efor e, the f ailure of Ruiz ' s counsel to object to this argument did not de ny him the effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel.13

IV. Conclusion We h old tha t Ru iz' s c ouns e l w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to ob je c t to the S tat e's p ro pe r r e fe re nc e s to parole and its p lea f

or law e nforc ement. Ruiz also failed to meet his burden to prove that he wa s p re j u d i c e d b y v i rt u e o f h i s co u n s el 's fa i l u re t o o b j ec tt o t h e S t at e's re fe re n ce t o p l eab ar gai n i n g. Acc ording ly , we find that Ruiz failed to show that he was de nied the ef fec tive assistance of counse l during the punishment trial. We affir m the judgme nt.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: J anuar y 5, 2009 Date D ecide d: J anuar y 8, 2009 Do No t Pu

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