J-S16044-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER ANTHONY TAYLOR

Appellant No. 1168 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 17, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0003093-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 07, 2015

Christopher Anthony Taylor appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on June 17, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, 

made final by the denial of post-sentence motions on June 20, 2014. On 

March 8, 2013, a jury convicted Taylor of statutory sexual assault, 

aggravated indecent assault (complainant is less than 16 years of age), 

indecent assault (complainant is less than 16 years of age), unlawful contact 

with a minor (sexual offenses), involuntary deviate sexual intercourse 

(“IDSI”) (complainant is less than 16 years of age), corruption of minors 

(defendant is 18 years of age or older).1 The court sentenced Taylor to an 

____________________________________________

1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3122.1, 3125(a)(8), 3126(a)(8), 6318(a)(1), 3123(a)(7), 

and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.
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aggregate term of ten to 20 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Taylor raises 

several evidentiary issues and claims the verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence. Although we conclude the issues raised by Taylor on appeal 

are meritless, for the reasons set forth below, we are constrained to vacate 

the judgment of sentence, and remand for resentencing.

Taylor was a volunteer firefighter at the Dillsburg Citizens’ Hose 

Company #1, who engaged in a sexual relationship with the victim, a 

fourteen-year-old junior firefighter for a year-and-a-half. The victim 

indicated the relationship began in March of 2010, when she gave him her 

phone number, and the two called or texted one another. Then, in June of 

that year, they engaged in oral sex at his apartment for the first time. 

Taylor and the victim eventually progressed to sexual intercourse, which the 

victim testified occurred on a daily basis. The relationship became rocky, to 

the point that they were not speaking to one another, in August of 2011 

because the victim saw Taylor with another girl at his house, and 

subsequently ended in November of 2011, when the victim’s mother 

reported Taylor to the police. Taylor was arrested and charged with the 

aforementioned crimes. A three-day jury trial began on March 6, 2013.2 

The jury convicted Taylor of all counts. 

____________________________________________

2

 Taylor took the stand at trial and denied all of the allegations. He testified 

he had a strictly professional relationship with the victim. N.T., 3/6/2013-

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Prior to sentencing, Taylor’s counsel filed a post-verdict motion, and a 

motion to withdraw. The court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw and 

indicated counsel could make another request at the time of sentencing. On 

June 17, 2013, the court sentenced Taylor to concurrent terms of three to 

six years for statutory sexual assault, five to ten years for aggravated 

indecent assault, one to two years for indecent assault, ten to 20 years for 

IDSI,3and three to six years for corruption of minors.4 The court also 

granted counsel’s request to withdraw. 

New counsel was subsequently appointed and filed a petition to treat 

Taylor’s previously filed post-verdict motion as a timely filed post-sentence 

motion on July 17, 2013. The trial court granted this motion and ordered 

counsel to file any amendments to the post-sentence motion within ten days 

of receiving the trial transcripts. After counsel received the transcripts, the 

court scheduled a hearing on the motion for February 28, 2014. Following 

the hearing, the court granted the parties one month to file any supporting 

memoranda. Taylor’s counsel filed a memorandum on March 7, 2014, and 

the Commonwealth filed its memorandum on March 18, 2014. On June 20, 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

3/8/2013, at 235. He also stated the relationship “got violent and hostile,” 

and he “was having issues with [the victim] stalking [him].” Id. at 239.

3

 The court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence, pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9718, with respect to the IDSI conviction. See N.T., 6/17/2013, 

at 15; Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/2014, at 2.

4

 The unlawful contact conviction was nolle prossed at sentencing. N.T., 

6/17/2013, at 15.
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2014, the trial court denied Taylor’s post-sentence motion. This appeal 

followed.5

Taylor raises the following four questions on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the prior consistent 

statements of (1) [the victim]’s statements made to Noelle 

Williams about a sexual relationship with [Taylor] and (2) [the 

victim]’s electronic communications to [Taylor] and other 

parties when such statements were hearsay, offered 

substantively, and no limiting instruction was given regarding 

their ultimate use by the jury?

2. Whether admitting [the victim]’s prior consistent statements 

of (1) [the victim]’s statements made to Noelle Williams 

about a sexual relationship with [Taylor] and (2) [the 

victim]’s electronic communications to [Taylor] and other 

parties violates Pa.R.E. 613 when those statements went 

beyond mere rehabilitation and were instead used as 

substantive evidence by the Commonwealth?

3. Whether the trial court erred in applying the holding of 

Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 512 (Pa. Super 

2005) when the Tender Years’ Hearsay Exception was not 

raised, nor did it apply, to [Taylor]’s case?

4. Whether the guilty verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence because it is based off of inconsistent testimony 

from witnesses who had a motive to lie and who were not 

credible?

Taylor’s Brief at 5.

While Taylor raised his first three issues separately, he discusses them 

together in his brief based on the nature of the claims. Id. at 11. 

____________________________________________

5

 On July 14, 2011, the trial court ordered Taylor to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Taylor 

filed a concise statement on August 4, 2014. The trial court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on September 23, 2014.
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Moreover, Taylor focuses his argument on the alleged court error in 

admitting prior consistent statements made by the victim that she was in a 

sexual relationship with Taylor via the testimony of the victim’s friend, 

Williams. Id. Accordingly, we will confine our analysis to this aspect of his 

claim.6

Specifically, Taylor contends Williams’ “testimony did not rehabilitate 

[the victim], but was cumulative hearsay testimony that corroborated [the 

victim]’s corrupt motive for claiming she was in a sexual relationship with 

him.” Id. Taylor acknowledges that pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Evidence 613, prior consistent statements are admissible in situations where 

a witness has been discredited. However, he indicates, “To be admissible to 

rebut a charge of improper motive, the prior consistent statement must have 

been made before the motive to lie existed.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, 

Taylor argues that in admitting the contested testimony, the trial court did 

not address “whether the consistent statement was made before or after the 

____________________________________________

6

 With respect to his third issue, that the trial court erred in applying the 

holding of Hunzer, supra, because the tender years’ hearsay exception 

does not apply to the present case, we note that he appears to abandon this 

issue in his brief, and therefore, it is waived. See Taylor’s Brief at 13 n. 2 

(With respect to Hunzer, “[c]ertain statements were admitted pursuant to 

the Tender Years Exception. The victim in this case was over 12 years old. 

Thus, Tenders Years is inapplicable.”); see also In re Jacobs, 936 A.2d 

1156, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2007) (finding issue waived because appellant did 

not address it in argument section of appellate brief). Nevertheless, even if 

he did not abandon the claim, the trial court properly addressed the issue in 

its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/2014, at 4-5.
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corrupt motive arose.” Id. at 12. He states that while the victim’s version 

of events is that they engaged in a sexual relationship, he claims “she made 

it all up from the beginning based on a fantasy.” Id. at 13 (footnote 

omitted). Moreover, Taylor points to evidence that in September of 2010, 

the victim discovered he was dating an “age-appropriate woman”, and 

became hostile and violent, which demonstrated her “corrupt motive.” Id.

at 14. Therefore, when the victim told her friend in December of 2010, after 

the corrupt motive arose, about the relationship, her statements were 

inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 15. Lastly, Taylor asserts the admission of 

Williams’ testimony is not harmless error because “[p]ermitting Ms. Williams 

to corroborate [the victim]’s corrupt motive provided an unfair advantage to 

[the victim] when weighing her testimony to that of Mr. Taylor’s.” Id. at 16.

Our standard of review regarding the admissibility of evidence is well 

settled:

Admission of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of 

the trial court, and will not be reversed absent a showing that 

the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Not merely an error 

in judgment, an abuse of discretion occurs when the law is 

overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence on record.

Commonwealth v. Handfield, 34 A.3d 187, 207-208 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(quotation omitted).

With respect to the admission of prior consistent statements and the 

allegation of a witness’s corrupt motive, we are guided by the following:
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Pa.R.E. 613 provides, in relevant part ... :

Rule 613. Prior statements of witnesses

***

(c) Evidence of prior consistent statement of 

witness.

Evidence of a prior consistent statement by a witness is 

admissible for rehabilitation purposes if the opposing party 

is given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about 

the statement, and the statement is offered to rebut an 

express or implied charge of:

(1) fabrication, bias, improper influence or motive, or 

faulty memory and the statement was made before that 

which has been charged existed or arose; or

(2) having made a prior inconsistent statement, which the 

witness has denied or explained, and the consistent 

statement supports the witness’ denial or explanation.

Pa.R.E. 613(c) (bold in original).

The comment to this rule relevantly provides that “under 

Pa.R.E. 613(c), a prior consistent statement is always 

received for rehabilitation purposes only and not as 

substantive evidence.” See Commonwealth v. 

Counterman, 553 Pa. 370, 719 A.2d 284, 301 (1998) 

(stating: “As a general rule, a prior consistent statement 

is hearsay, and its admissibility is dependent upon an 

allegation of corrupt motive or recent fabrication. 

Additionally, such statements have been admitted in 

response to an allegation of faulty memory.”)

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 599 Pa. 1, 51, 960 A.2d 

59, 89-90 (2008).

“A prior consistent statement is admissible only if it is made

before the declarant has a motive to fabricate.” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 609 Pa. 605, 17 A.3d 873, 891 (Pa. 

2011) (citations omitted).
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When considering the admissibility of prior statements, the 

importance of timing has often been emphasized. See, 

e.g., Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 521 Pa. 482, 556 

A.2d 370 (1989) (requiring that, to be admissible, a prior 

statement must have been made before any corrupt 

motive has arisen). See also Pa.R.E. 613(c) comment 

(“When the witness admits and explains the inconsistent 

statement, the use of the consistent statement will depend 

upon the nature of the explanation and all of the 

circumstances that prompted the making of the consistent 

statement; the timing of that statement, although not 

conclusive, is one of the factors to be considered.”).

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 604 Pa. 386, 407, 986 A.2d 84, 

96 (2009).

Handfield, 34 A.3d at 208. Furthermore, “[w]here ... it is apparent that the 

defense centers around impeaching the credibility of a witness, a prior 

consistent statement may, at the discretion of the trial court, be admitted 

before impeachment.” Commonwealth v. Beale, 665 A.2d 473, 475-76 

(Pa. Super. 1995), citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 540 A.2d 246, 258 

(Pa. 1988).

Here, the trial court found the following:

The Court finds that Commonwealth v. Hunzer is 

instructive regarding the instant matter. 868 A.2d 498 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). In the instant case, [Taylor] proffered a theory 

that the victim fabricated [Taylor]’s sexual conduct and that the 

victim had a motive to lie. Under the rules of evidence, evidence 

of a prior consistent statement is admissible for rehabilitation 

purposes if opposing counsel had an opportunity to crossexamine the witness, and the evidence is offered to rebut an 

express or implied charge of fabrication or improper motive. 

Pa.R.E. 613(c). Case law further elaborates that “prior 

consistent statements may also be considered specially relevant 

when the witness’ status alone is such that his or her testimony 

may be called into question even in the absence of express 

impeachment.” Hunzer, 868 A.2d at 512 (quoting 
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Commonwealth v. Willis, 552 A.2d 682, 691-92 (Pa. Super. 

1988)). The Hunzer court further reasoned that this situation 

would include the testimony of child victims of sexual assaults. 

Id.

After considering this rule of evidence and applicable case 

law, the Court concludes that it did not err by allowing evidence 

of the victim’s prior consistent statements to be admitted during 

trial. As mentioned in his memorandum to the Court, [Taylor] 

still proceeds on a theory of fabrication and improper motive. 

Express charges of fabrication and improper motive are 

specifically enumerated exceptions to the general inadmissibility 

of prior consistent statements. See Pa.R.E. 613(c). Since 

[Taylor] had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness used 

at trial to produce this evidence, the Court properly admitted the 

evidence of the victim’s prior consistent statements. 

Additionally, this case presents one of the special situations 

presented in Hunzer, namely, that the case involves a child 

victim of sexual assault.

Order, 6/20/2014, at 1-2.

We agree with the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis. A careful 

review of the record indicates that the testimony was elicited in response to 

the defense’s theory that the victim fabricated the entire relationship. 

Defense counsel began this attack during opening statements with explicit 

assertions that the victim’s allegations were false:

So, basically our defense will be, here’s a young 14-year-old for 

14 months, meets her trainer at the fire department, her 

neighbor and becomes fixated on him. And you’ll hear the 

circumstances of how she would visit that apartment every time.

He’s 24 years old. He’s a good looking fellow. He was 

dating actually three girls during the course of this. Every time 

he would have a guest over to his apartment, she would show 

up. She would be threatening. She would raise a scene. 

He complained to multiple people. In fact, you’ll hear evidence 

that he went to his instructor, his EMT instructor, and said, what 
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am I going to do about this? This will [be] the first time that he 

has to tell his story.

I want you to listen carefully to her testimony and what 

our defense will be is here’s a young 14-year-old, now she’s 16, 

17. She still doesn’t realize the consequences of the first 

report, and she does not want to change her story. So this 

is going on like a snowball gathering size down the hill. Listen 

carefully to the way she testifies.

You’ll hear testimony that even after he was detained in 

York County Prison, people were coming over to his house when 

she purportedly had a boyfriend, she was still coming over 

and bothering them. That’s the extent of her fixation. 

N.T., 3/6/2013-3/8/2013, at 65-66 (emphasis added).

The victim was the first witness, and she stated she told Williams that 

she was sexually involved with Taylor. Id. at 79-80.7 The victim was 

subjected to extensive cross-examination and based on her response, a 

reasonable juror could infer whether or not she was fabricating her version 

of events. Id. at 102-129. Williams then testified, relaying that the victim 

told her about the relationship with Taylor in December of 2010. Id. at 131-

135.

The victim’s account was also impeached by Taylor’s own testimony 

that the sexual relationship did not occur, and that the victim was “violent” 

and “stalking” him. Id. at 221-279. Additionally, Taylor attempted to 

impeach the victim with testimony from his former girlfriend, Heidi Leahy, 

____________________________________________

7

 The victim indicated that she told her friend in September of 2010. Id. at 

80.
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regarding confrontations between herself and the victim and from Carol 

Hess, his EMT instructor, who he confided in and asked for advice regarding 

the victim. Id. at 206-215; 218-219.8 As such, Williams’ testimony 

regarding the victim’s sexual relationship with Taylor was offered not to 

prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to rehabilitate the victim’s 

credibility. 

Moreover, with respect to Taylor’s argument that the victim made 

these statements to Williams after she had a motive to fabricate, e.g. three 

months after discovering he was dating another woman, we find the timing 

is not so critical as Taylor failed to demonstrate the victim had an incentive

to fabricate at the time she made the disclosures in question. In 

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 986 A.2d 84 (Pa. 2009), the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court indicated that “[w]hen considering the admissibility of prior 

statements, the importance of timing has often been emphasized.” Id. at 

96. The Supreme Court pointed to Pa.R.E. 613(c) comment, which states, 

“the use of the consistent statement will depend upon the nature of the 

explanation and all of the circumstances that prompted the making of the 

consistent statement; the timing of that statement, although not 

conclusive, is one of the factors to be considered.” Id. (emphasis 

____________________________________________

8

 Further review of the trial testimony indicates that Taylor sought Hess’s 

advice regarding an incident, in which the victim broke into Taylor’s 

apartment. Id. at 218.
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added), citing Pa.R.E. 613(c), comment. Moreover, any notion of a motive 

to fabricate was thoroughly discussed during the testimony of the victim. 

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting 

the admission of the victim’s prior consistent statements in order to 

corroborate her impeached testimony. Therefore, Taylor’s first argument 

fails.

Next, Taylor claims that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence because “it is based off of inconsistent testimony from witnesses 

who had a motive to lie and who were not credible.”9 Taylor’s Brief at 17. 

He contends that “had the jury carefully considered [the victim]’s testimony, 

the jury would have found several aspects of it incredible and found [him] 

not guilty.” Id.10 Additionally, he states, “[T]he jury failed to adequately 

consider that [the victim] had confronted several women that Mr. Taylor had 

been dating on multiple occasions, including once after Mr. Taylor was 

incarcerated for the charges she brought against him.” Id. at 18.

Appellate review of a weight of the evidence claim is well-established:

____________________________________________

9

 Taylor properly preserved his challenge to the weight of the evidence by 

raising it at sentencing. His counsel renewed the claim at the February 28, 

2014, motion hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A); N.T., 6/17/2013, at 9; 

N.T., 2/28/2014, at 14.

10

 For example, he points to her testimony, in which she stated he was 

uncircumcised when he is actually circumcised. See Taylor’s Brief 17. 

Moreover, he indicates that the victim’s mother did not report him to the 

police for another four months after she found out about the relationship. 

Id.
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A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the 

ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in 

favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 318–20, 744 

A.2d 745, 751–52 (2000); Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 

Pa. 435, 443–44, 832 A.2d 403, 408–09 (2003). On review, an 

appellate court does not substitute its judgment for the finder of 

fact and consider the underlying question of whether the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence, but, rather, determines 

only whether the trial court abused its discretion in making its 

determination. Widmer, 560 Pa. at 321–22, 744 A.2d at 753; 

Champney, 574 Pa. at 444, 832 A.2d at 408.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 

134 S.Ct. 1792 (U.S. 2014).

Here, the trial court found the following: 

[Taylor] avers that no credible evidence exists because the 

jury based its verdict off of inconsistent testimony. Basically, 

[Taylor] reiterates the overarching argument that the witnesses 

for the Commonwealth had a motive to lie and, for this reason, 

were not credible. However, these arguments fail to note the 

standard for challenging the weight of the evidence and 

credibility determinations.

In this case, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none

of the testimony presented at trial. The jury chose to believe 

the victim’s account of the incident, which was corroborated by 

numerous Commonwealth witnesses, including the victim’s 

mother and friend. Although [Taylor] took the stand in his 

defense, the jury did not find his testimony and explanation of 

the facts to be credible. The jury’s decision to believe all, part or 

none of the testimony of these Commonwealth witnesses and 

[Taylor] does not shock this Court’s sense of justice. As such, 

the Court concludes that the jury’s verdict does not go against 

the weight of the evidence presented at trial.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/2014, at 5-6 (italics in original; citations omitted).
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We agree with the court’s well-reasoned analysis. Taylor fails to 

explain in what way the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

weight claim. Rather, his argument consists only of attacks on the credibility

of the witnesses and an assertion that the jury did not properly consider the 

evidence. Accordingly, he asks this Court to reweigh the evidence; however, 

we decline to do so. As our Supreme Court has made clear, we may not 

reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the trial court’s 

decision. See Lyons, supra. Moreover, it is well-established that the jury 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony presented at trial. Here, 

the jury chose not to believe Taylor’s version of events. Therefore, his 

weight claim also fails.

Nevertheless, our review of the record reveals the trial court imposed 

a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718, a statute 

that has been found to be constitutionally infirm in light of the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 

(U.S. 2013). See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, __ A.3d __, [98 MAP 2013] 

(Pa. June 15, 2015); Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (applying Newman to Section 9718). See also Commonwealth v. 

Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 811-812 (Pa. Super. 2014) (vacating mandatory 

minimum sentence imposed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9712 and 9718, even 

after a jury had determined triggering factors, because the unconstitutional 
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subsections of the statutes were not severable from the remainder of the 

statute). Although Taylor did not contest the imposition of the mandatory 

minimum sentence on appeal, “a challenge to a sentence premised upon 

Alleyne ... implicates the legality of the sentence and cannot be waived on 

appeal.” Newman, supra, 99 A.3d at 90. Moreover, this Court may 

address the legality of a defendant’s sentence sua sponte. Commonwealth 

v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 118 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 

95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014).

In Wolfe, supra, a panel of this Court applied the reasoning of the en 

banc Court in Newman, supra, and its progeny, to conclude that the 

mandatory minimum provisions in Section 9718 are facially unconstitutional. 

Wolfe, supra, 106 A.3d at 805. Although the Wolfe Court recognized the 

fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence, i.e., that the victim was 

less than 16 years of age, was actually “an element within the subsection of 

the IDSI statute under which [the defendant] was convicted[,]” the Court 

found it was, nonetheless, bound by the en banc decision in Newman, 

which held “that mandatory minimum sentence statutes in Pennsylvania of 

this format are void in their entirety.” Id. at 805, 806 (emphasis in 

original). The Court concluded, “[a]s Section 9718 is indistinguishable from 

the statutes struck down in Newman and Valentine, we are constrained to 

conclude that Section 9718 is also facially void.” Id. at 806.
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Therefore, although we conclude the issues raised by Taylor on appeal 

are meritless, we are constrained to vacate the judgment of sentence, and 

remand for resentencing in light of the erroneous imposition of the 

mandatory minimum sentences imposed pursuant to Section 9718.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing 

consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Panella, J., joins the majority decision.

Olson, J., concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2015