IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30626

Summary Calendar

EARL P. THOMPSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

RYAN ZINKE, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:16-CV-17542

Before KING, GRAVES, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Earl Thompson appeals the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment to the Department of the Interior regarding his Title VII claims. 

Thompson asserts that racial discrimination was to blame for the fact that the 

Department of the Interior hired another candidate to fill a position for which 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 27, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Thompson interviewed. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment.

I.

In September 2015, Thompson and three other candidates applied for a 

petroleum-engineering-technician position with the Commingling and 

Measurement Approval Unit (C&MA Unit), which is located within the 

Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental 

Enforcement. The C&MA Unit relies heavily on pipeline data and generally 

does not conduct physical inspections or verify measurements in the field. The 

C&MA Unit supervisor, Kelly Johnson, interviewed each of the four 

candidates.

Johnson ultimately selected Rose Hampton for the position. Shortly 

thereafter, Johnson drafted a memo explaining his reasoning. That memo 

stated that Hampton had six years of relevant experience “in the Pipeline 

Section,” which was considered “advantageous” due to the C&MA Unit’s “heavy 

use[] of pipeline data.” The memo also stated that, “[u]nlike the other 

candidates, [Hampton] uses ArcGIS in her current job” and therefore “should 

be well prepared to learn how to use it for the maintenance of our pipeline 

commingling table and for the verification of this data using pipeline system 

maps.” In addition, Hampton was “familiar with the process for correcting 

pipeline data.” In total, Johnson believed that “[t]his experience should make 

her transition to the C&MA Unit an easy one.” 

Thompson’s work experience was different from Hampton’s in two 

important respects. First, he had thirty-eight years of experience in various 

positions within the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, though

he did not have any pipeline experience. Second, he lacked recent training in 

ArcGIS. 

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Thompson filed suit against the Department of the Interior in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Thompson alleged 

that the department discriminated against him on account of his race in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by selecting Hampton, a Caucasian 

female with less seniority, expertise, and experience. The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the Department of the Interior, and Thompson 

appealed.

II.

The district court correctly granted the department’s motion for 

summary judgment. “We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary 

judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.” Thomas 

v. Johnson, 788 F.3d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Robinson v. Orient 

Marine Co., 505 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2007)). “Summary judgment is 

appropriate if ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

a judgment as a matter of law.’” Robinson, 505 F.3d at 366 (quoting Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)).

A.

Title VII is designed “to assure equality of employment opportunities and 

to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered 

racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.” 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). A plaintiff lacking 

direct evidence must “provid[e] circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise an 

inference of discrimination,” in which case we “apply the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework.” Thomas, 788 F.3d at 179.

“Under this framework, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing 

of discrimination.” Id. If the plaintiff does so, the “employer must articulate a 

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legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). This “burden is only one of production, not 

persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment.” McCoy v. City of 

Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007). If the employer meets this 

burden, the plaintiff must then “show the articulated reason is pretextual.” 

Thomas, 788 F.3d at 179. “A plaintiff may establish pretext either through 

evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation is false or unworthy of credence.” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 

578 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the 

employee “must rebut each discrete reason proffered by the employer.” Burton 

v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 233 (5th Cir. 2015).

B.

The department’s articulated reason for hiring Hampton instead of 

Thompson was not pretextual. Soon after making his decision, Johnson 

documented his reasons for selecting Hampton: Hampton had Pipeline Section

experience and up-to-date expertise with ArcGIS. Thompson had neither of 

those qualities, and his “extensive experience inspecting offshore platforms 

and pipeline systems,” is less relevant to a position primarily concerned with 

data management. See Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 923 (5th Cir. 

2010) (concluding that differences in qualifications are generally not probative 

evidence of discrimination “[u]nless the qualifications are so widely disparate 

that no reasonable employer would have made the same decision” (citation

omitted)). While Thompson spent more years working in the oil-and-gas 

industry than Hampton, those years—which did not include any time in the 

Pipeline Section—did not necessarily make him better qualified. See id.

(rejecting an attempt to equate years served with superior qualifications).

The other pretext evidence that Thompson points to is a statement in 

Hampton’s deposition indicating that she does not “know much about 

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pipelines” and how they generally operate in the oil industry. It is not 

apparent, however, that general familiarity with pipelines—as opposed to 

familiarity with pipeline data—was required for the technician position that 

Hampton filled. Accordingly, we conclude that the rationale for hiring 

Hampton was not pretextual and that the district court’s decision to grant 

summary judgment was correct.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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