[Cite as State v. Hamad, 2016-Ohio-5077.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 ERIE COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. E-15-068 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. 2014-CR-505 

v. 

Yousif N. Hamad DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: July 22, 2016 

* * * * * 

 Karin L. Coble, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

OSOWIK, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal brought by appellant from the judgment of the Erie County 

Court of Common Pleas. In this case, the court accepted appellant’s guilty plea to a 

violation of R.C. 2923.01(A)(1), Count 1 of the original indictment, conspiracy to 

commit aggravated robbery, a felony of the second degree in case No. 2014-CR-505. 

The remaining two counts of the indictment were dismissed and all five of the counts of 
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the indictment in case No. 2014-CR-220 were also dismissed. Appellant was sentenced 

to serve a period of incarceration of five years and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000 in 

addition to all costs. 

{¶ 2} Appointed counsel has filed a brief and requested leave to withdraw as 

counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 

(1967). Under Anders, if, after a conscientious examination of the case, counsel 

concludes the appeal to be wholly frivolous, he should so advise the court and request 

permission to withdraw. Id. at 744. This request must be accompanied by a brief 

identifying anything in the record that could arguably support the appeal. Id. In addition, 

counsel must provide appellant with a copy of the brief and request to withdraw, and 

allow appellant sufficient time to raise any additional matters. Id. Once these 

requirements are satisfied, the appellate court is required to conduct an independent 

examination of the proceedings below to determine if the appeal is indeed frivolous. Id. 

If it so finds, the appellate court may grant counsel’s request to withdraw, and decide the 

appeal without violating any constitutional requirements. Id. 

{¶ 3} In this case, appellant’s appointed counsel has satisfied the requirements set 

forth in Anders, supra. This court further notes that appellant did not file a pro se brief 

on his own behalf in this appeal. Appellee, state of Ohio, has not filed a responsive brief. 

{¶ 4} Accordingly, this court shall proceed with an examination of the potential 

assignments of error set forth by counsel. We have reviewed and considered the entire 

record from below including the transcripts of all proceedings and journal entries and 
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original papers from the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, as well as the briefs filed 

by counsel. Upon this review, we will determine if this appeal lacks merit and is, 

therefore, wholly frivolous. 

{¶ 5} Counsel refers to several possible, but ultimately indefensible, issues: 

(1) appellant’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, and (2) the trial court, in imposing 

incarceration for the offense, failed to properly consider the relevant sentencing statutes 

and the sentence is not supported by the record. 

{¶ 6} A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if 

done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, “with sufficient awareness of the relevant 

circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 

L.Ed.2d 747, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (1970). 

{¶ 7} “Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea 

unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” 

State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). 

{¶ 8} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) was adopted in 1973, giving detailed instruction to trial 

courts on the procedure to follow when accepting pleas. That rule states: 

 In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a 

plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest 

without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the 

following: 
4.

 (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, 

with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 

penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for 

probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the 

sentencing hearing. 

 (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, 

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. 

 (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, 

to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for 

obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to 

prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the 

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

{¶ 9} In this case before the court today, the transcript of the plea proceedings of 

August 31, 2015, establishes that the court engaged in a proper colloquy with the 

appellant. The court initially inquired about his educational status, whether he 

understood the English language, and whether he was under the influence of any 

medication. The court then proceeded to explain each of the enumerated rights that he 

was giving up with his plea, including the right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses 

against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in appellant’s favor, and 
5.

to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at 

which the appellant would not have been compelled to testify against himself. In each 

instance, the appellant responded that he understood. The court also went on to then 

explain to appellant the maximum sentence that was associated with his plea to the 

charge of the indictment. Appellant indicated that he understood the sentence. 

{¶ 10} The transcript also reveals that the trial court advised appellant of the 

consequences of being placed on community control. 

{¶ 11} The plea form that was executed by appellant in the courtroom on 

August 31, 2015, also advised appellant of his constitutional rights. 

{¶ 12} The record shows that Crim.R. 11(C) was properly followed and appellant 

made an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary acceptance of the plea agreement. 

{¶ 13} Therefore, the record establishes that appellant’s plea was knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered into by appellant. The proposed first assignment of 

error presented by counsel is found not well-taken. 

{¶ 14} Counsel presents a second proposed assignment of error that claims that the 

trial court, in imposing incarceration for the offense, failed to properly consider the 

relevant sentencing statutes and the sentence is not supported by the record. 

{¶ 15} R.C. 2953.08(G) compels appellate courts to modify or vacate sentences if 

they find by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support any relevant 

findings under “division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of 

section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code.” 
6.

{¶ 16} Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is 

more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty 

as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in 

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established. Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954). 

{¶ 17} We note that the sentence in this case does not require the findings that 

R.C. 2953.08(G) specifically addresses. However, the Supreme Court has recently held 

in State v. Marcum, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1002: 

 Nevertheless, it is fully consistent for appellate courts to review 

those sentences that are imposed solely after consideration of the factors in 

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 under a standard that is equally deferential to the 

sentencing court. That is, an appellate court may vacate or modify any 

sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the 

appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does 

not support the sentence. 

{¶ 18} R.C. 2929.11 states, in relevant part: 

 (A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided 

by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes 

of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum 

sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without 
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imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. 

To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for 

incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future 

crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of 

the offense, the public, or both. 

 (B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated 

to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in 

division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the 

seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and 

consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 

offenders. 

 (C) A court that imposes a sentence upon an offender for a felony 

shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic background, gender, or 

religion of the offender. 

{¶ 19} R.C. 2929.12 states, in relevant part: 

 (A) Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the 

Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an 

offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to 

comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 

2929.11 of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall 

consider the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating 
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to the seriousness of the conduct, the factors provided in divisions (D) and 

(E) of this section relating to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism, 

and the factors set forth in division (F) of this section pertaining to the 

offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States and, in addition, 

may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes 

and principles of sentencing. 

 (B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that 

apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other 

relevant factors, as indicating that the offender’s conduct is more serious 

than conduct normally constituting the offense: 

 (1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the 

offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the 

physical or mental condition or age of the victim. 

 (2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical, 

psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense. 

 (3) The offender held a public office or position of trust in the 

community, and the offense related to that office or position. 

 (4) The offender’s occupation, elected office, or profession obliged 

the offender to prevent the offense or bring others committing it to justice. 
9.

 (5) The offender’s professional reputation or occupation, elected 

office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to 

influence the future conduct of others. 

 (6) The offender’s relationship with the victim facilitated the 

offense. 

 (7) The offender committed the offense for hire or as a part of an 

organized criminal activity. 

 (8) In committing the offense, the offender was motivated by 

prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, or 

religion. 

 (9) If the offense is a violation of section 2919.25 or a violation of 

section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code involving a 

person who was a family or household member at the time of the violation, 

the offender committed the offense in the vicinity of one or more children 

who are not victims of the offense, and the offender or the victim of the 

offense is a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of one or 

more of those children. 

 (C) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that 

apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other 

relevant factors, as indicating that the offender’s conduct is less serious 

than conduct normally constituting the offense: 
10. 

 (1) The victim induced or facilitated the offense. 

 (2) In committing the offense, the offender acted under strong 

provocation. 

 (3) In committing the offense, the offender did not cause or expect to 

cause physical harm to any person or property. 

 (4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender’s conduct, 

although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense. 

 (D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that 

apply regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors 

indicating that the offender is likely to commit future crimes: 

 (1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under 

release from confinement before trial or sentencing; was under a sanction 

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised 

Code; was under post-release control pursuant to section 2967.28 or any 

other provision of the Revised Code for an earlier offense or had been 

unfavorably terminated from post-release control for a prior offense 

pursuant to division (B) of section 2967.16 or section 2929.141 of the 

Revised Code; was under transitional control in connection with a prior 

offense; or had absconded from the offender’s approved community 

placement resulting in the offender’s removal from the transitional control 

program under section 2967.26 of the Revised Code. 
11. 

 (2) The offender previously was adjudicated a delinquent child 

pursuant to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or 

pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender has a 

history of criminal convictions. 

 (3) The offender has not been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree 

after previously being adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to Chapter 

2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 

2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender has not responded favorably to 

sanctions previously imposed for criminal convictions. 

 (4) The offender has demonstrated a pattern of drug or alcohol abuse 

that is related to the offense, and the offender refuses to acknowledge that 

the offender has demonstrated that pattern, or the offender refuses treatment 

for the drug or alcohol abuse. 

 (5) The offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense. 

 (E) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that 

apply regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors 

indicating that the offender is not likely to commit future crimes: 

 (1) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been 

adjudicated a delinquent child. 

 (2) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been 

convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense. 
12. 

 (3) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had led a lawabiding life for a significant number of years. 

 (4) The offense was committed under circumstances not likely to 

recur. 

 (5) The offender shows genuine remorse for the offense. 

 (F) The sentencing court shall consider the offender’s military 

service record and whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or 

physical condition that is traceable to the offender’s service in the armed 

forces of the United States and that was a contributing factor in the 

offender’s commission of the offense or offenses. 

{¶ 20} Appellant pled guilty to one count of a multiple-count indictment. He pled 

guilty to a violation of R.C. 2911.01 and 2923.01(A)(1), an offense of conspiracy to 

commit aggravated robbery, a second-degree felony. The transcript of the October 8, 

2015 sentencing establishes that the court had listened to statements of the victim, the 

prosecutor, appellant’s mother, defense counsel, appellant himself, as well as a 

presentence report. The court indicated the gravity of the offense that was characterized 

as a home invasion where one of the perpetrators had possession of a firearm. Also, the 

victim was restrained with some type of tape over her arms, legs and face. The court also 

noted that appellant did not have any prior conviction of a criminal nature and that he had 

some type of medical condition. 
13. 

{¶ 21} The court found that the victim suffered serious physical, psychological 

and economic harm and that injury was exacerbated by the age of the victim. The court 

also found that appellant acted for hire as part of an organized criminal activity. The 

court also found that while there are factors that would make recidivism less likely, 

appellant did not express remorse for his crime. The court further found that the 

maximum sentence would not have been appropriate. 

{¶ 22} The court concluded that it had found appellant not amenable to 

community control and had considered the principles and purposes of sentencing under 

R.C. 2929.11 and further balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 

2929.12. These conclusions were also incorporated into the sentencing judgment entry of 

October 8, 2015. 

{¶ 23} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial 

court considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed 

in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant 

within the permissible statutory range. State v. Ahlers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-

100, 2016-Ohio-2890, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 24} After a thorough review of the entire record including the pleadings, 

transcripts and reports made available to the court, we find appellant’s second proposed 

assignment of error not well-taken. 
14. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 25} We have accordingly conducted an independent examination of the record 

pursuant to Anders v. California and have further considered appellant’s proposed 

assignments of error. The motion of counsel for appellant requesting to withdraw as 

counsel is granted, and we have determined this appeal to be wholly frivolous. 

{¶ 26} The judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. The clerk is 

ordered to serve all parties with notice of this decision. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

James D. Jensen, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.