Salinas. Salinas was awarded $2,181,750 and judgment was entered 

holding Donahue and Malco jointly and severally liable. 

Donahue and Malco appealed that judgment to this court, but 

Malco also filed post-trial motions pursuant to NRCP 59(e) and NRCP 

60(b) asking the district court to amend the wording of the judgment to 

conform to the verdict and to amend the judgment to apply several 

liability only. The district court denied both motions, and Malco appealed 

those orders as well. On appeal, Donahue argues that the district court 

erred in refusing to allow the amount of workers' compensation benefits to 

come into evidence. Additionally, Malco argues that the district court 

erred in denying its motion requesting that several liability only, rather 

than joint and several liability, be applied to the judgment. And, as a 

threshold issue, Salinas challenges this court's jurisdiction to consider this 

appeal. 

This court has jurisdiction over Donahue's appeal from the final judgment' 

Salinas argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider 

Donahue's appeal because, although the appeal was timely filed on August 

25, 2011, following the notice of entry of the final judgment, Malco made 

subsequent motions under NRCP 59(e) to amend or alter the judgment, 

and Donahue did not file additional notices of appeal following the district 

court's denial of those motions. 

Pursuant to NRAP 4(a)(6), this court may dismiss as 

premature an appeal that has been timely filed pursuant to a final 

judgment but before all motions delineated under NRAP 4(a)(4), including 

1We separately address below Salinas's challenge to this court's 

jurisdiction to consider Malco's joint and several liability argument. 

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NRCP Rule 59 motions, have been decided by the district court. However, 

if "a written order or judgment, or a written disposition of the lastremaining timely motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4), is entered before dismissal 

of the premature appeal, the notice of appeal shall be considered filed on 

the date of and after entry of the order. . . dispos[ing] of the lastremaining timely motion." NRAP 4(a)(6). 

Here, as Salinas concedes, Donahue timely filed its notice of 

appeal on August 25, 2011, after entry of the final judgment. Entry of the 

district court's order on the last-remaining timely motion occurred on 

February 7, 2012. Because this appeal was not dismissed as premature 

before entry of the district court's final order on the last-remaining timely 

motion, we conclude that Donahue's appeal is considered timely filed as of 

the date of entry of the order on the last-remaining timely motion and this 

court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

The district court committed reversible error by failing to admit as evidence 

the amount of workers' compensation benefits Salinas received 

Donahue and Malco argue that the district court erred when it 

refused to admit evidence regarding the amount of workers' compensation 

benefits paid to Salinas. Donahue and Malco contend that NRS 

616C.215(10) requires admission of this evidence. Salinas counters that 

the amount was not required to be admitted, that any error was harmless 

because Donahue and Malco were not prejudiced, and that if the amount 

is required to be admitted, then NRS 616C.215 is unconstitutional. 2 

2Salinas also argues that Donahue and Malco may not raise this 

issue on appeal because it was not preserved below. We conclude that this 

argument lacks merit. During the pretrial motions in limine, the parties 

fully briefed the issue of whether evidence of workers' compensation 

benefits paid to Salinas was admissible, and Donahue and Malco argued 

continued on next page... 

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NRS 616C.215(10) states that [iln any trial of an action by 

the injured employee, . . . the jury must receive proof of the amount of all 

payments made or to be made by the insurer or the Administrator." 

(Emphasis added.) In Tri-County Equipment & Leasing, L.L.C. v. Klinke, 

this court reversed a judgment on a jury verdict where the district court 

had refused to admit evidence of the amount of workers' compensation 

received by the plaintiff. 128 Nev. „ 286 P.3d 593, 596-97 (2012). 

Despite our holding in Tr-County, Salinas argues that because the 

mandate in NRS 616C.215(10) is entirely for the benefit of the plaintiff, 

we should determine that the plaintiff may waive that requirement. 

Citing Cramer v. Peavy, 116 Nev. 575, 581, 3 P.3d 665, 669 (2000), Salinas 

maintains that this court characterized the legislative intent behind the 

statute as a desire to curb speculation by juries that results in reduced 

awards for plaintiffs. But Salinas fails to recognize that in Tr-County we 

specifically discussed Cramer and held that NRS 616C.215 was meant to 

benefit both plaintiffs and defendants, and its primary purpose was to 

"avoid confusing the jury about the payment and nature of workers' 

compensation benefits, and their relation to the damages awarded." 128 

Nev. at 286 P.3d at 596. 

...continued 

that the exact amount was admissible. The district court then held a 

hearing on the issue and ruled that evidence that Salinas received 

workers' compensation benefits was admissible, but the exact amount of 

benefits paid was not because it was "immaterial." Thus, this issue was 

preserved for appeal. See Richmond V. State, 118 Nev. 924, 932, 59 P.3d 

1249, 1254 (2002) (holding that a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve 

an issue for appeal when the issue has been briefed, the district court has 

fully considered the issue, and the court has made "a definitive ruling"). 

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Furthermore, the plain language of the statute requires that 

the jury "must receive proof of the amount of all payments made." NRS 

616C.215(10) (emphasis added). There is nothing in the statute's 

language to indicate that disclosure occurs only when the plaintiff 

requests it, or that plaintiff can waive this requirement. See Potter v. 

Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 616, 119 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2005) ("When the language 

of a statute is clear and unambiguous, its apparent intent must be given 

effect."). 

Salinas also argues that even if the amount of workers' 

compensation benefits she received was required to be disclosed, any error 

was harmless. Although our review of the record reveals that the jury 

heard testimony regarding the amount billed by Salinas's medical care 

providers, there is nothing in the record to show the amount of workers' 

compensation benefits Salinas received or the amount actually paid to her 

medical care providers by the workers' compensation carrier. Thus, we 

cannot conclude that the error was harmless. In fact, while the record 

before us is limited, Salinas testified in her deposition that she received 

$8,615.49 in workers' compensation benefits, yet the jury awarded her 

$63,000 in past medical expenses. The large discrepancy, without more 

information, precludes any harmless error analysis. 

Finally, Salinas argues that if NRS 616C.215 is interpreted to 

require the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid to the 

employee to be disclosed to the jury, then it is unconstitutional because it 

violates the employee's equal protection rights. However, Salinas admits 

that there is no suspect class or fundamental right at issue and that 

rational basis review applies. 

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This court reviews the constitutionality of a statute de novo. 

Zamora v. Price, 125 Nev. 388, 391, 213 P.3d 490, 492 (2009). NRS 

616C.215 was enacted out of concern that juries were speculating as to the 

amount of the workers' compensation benefits received and reducing the 

award accordingly. See Cramer, 116 Nev. at 581, 3 P.3d at 669. Because 

requiring the jury to hear the amount of workers' compensation benefits 

received by a plaintiff is rationally related to the government interest in 

obtaining jury verdicts based on the law and facts, as opposed to 

speculation, we conclude that NRS 616C.215 does not violate equal 

protection. See Zamora, 125 Nev. at 395-96, 213 P.3d at 495 (stating that 

under "rational basis review . . we will not overturn a law unless the 

treatment of different groups 'is so unrelated to the achievement of any 

combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the 

[L]egislature's actions were irrational" (second alteration in original) 

(quoting Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 1509-10, 908 P.2d 689, 698-99 

(1995), overruled on other grounds by Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 17, 174 

P.3d 970,980 (2008))). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court committed 

reversible error when it refused to allow admission of evidence regarding 

the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid to Salinas. However, 

because the error is related solely to the issue of damages, and is not 

interrelated or connected to the issue of liability or the allocation of 

liability, we further conclude that any new trial would be limited solely to 

the issue of damages. Cf. Shere v. Davis, 95 Nev. 491, 493, 596 P.2d 499, 

500 (1979) (holding that a new trial on liability and damages is 

appropriate only where there is an "interrelationship of the liability and 

damage issues"). 

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This court does not have jurisdiction to consider Malco's joint and several 

liability argument 

Malco argues that the district court erred in applying joint and 

several liability to the amount of the judgment because, pursuant to NRS 

41.141, Maleo should only be held severally liable. Malco further argues 

that although NRCP 60(b) motions are limited in their scope, its motion 

was also validly brought pursuant to NRCP 59(e). Salinas argues that 

this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Malco's joint and several liability 

argument on appeal. We agree with Salinas. 

Notice of entry of the judgment was served on July 27, 2011. 

On August 3, 2011, an amended judgment was entered that simply 

corrected a clerical error, but the notice of entry of the amended judgment 

was not served until December 27, 2011. On August 4, 2011, Malco filed 

its first post-trial motion pursuant to NRCP 59(e) without arguing that 

joint and several liability was inapplicable. Although the district court 

orally denied that motion at a hearing held in late August 2011, notice of 

entry of the order was not served until February 7, 2012. 

Malco timely appealed the final judgment on August 25, 2011. 

In the meantime, on October 14, 2011, Malco filed another motion 

pursuant to NRCP 60(b) or, alternatively, NRCP 59(e), arguing for the 

first time that the judgment should be altered or amended because joint 

and several liability was inapplicable and that it should only be held 

severally liable. The district court denied that motion and the entry of 

that order was served on December 9, 2011. We first address Malco's 

arguments regarding the NRCP 59(e) alternative basis for its October 

2011 motion. 

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NRCP 59(e) 

A party seeking to alter or amend a judgment must file a 

motion "no later than 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the 

judgment." NRCP 59(e). Malco unpersuasively argues that we have 

jurisdiction to consider this issue since a "second" judgment was entered in 

August 2011, but written notice of entry of the "second" judgment was not 

served until December 2011. Thus, its NRCP 59 motion filed in October 

2011 was timely. We disagree. 

The very authority Malco cites in support of its argument 

states that the time for filing motions only runs from the second judgment 

if that judgment makes "a change of substance which 'disturbed or revised 

legal rights and obligations." Cornist v. Richland Parish Sch. Bd., 479 

F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell 

Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 212 (1952)). This is consistent with this 

court's similar pronouncement in Morrell v. Edwards that an amended 

judgment only affects the timing of an appeal when it "affect[s] the legal 

rights and obligations of the parties" as set out in the original judgment. 

98 Nev. 91, 92-93, 640 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1982). In this case, the amended 

judgment did not make any substantive changes affecting the legal rights 

or obligations of the parties; it merely corrected a clerical error. Therefore, 

the time for filing NRCP 59 motions was not altered by the entry of the 

amended judgment, and we conclude that, to the extent that Malco's 

October 2011 motion was based on NRCP 59(e), it was untimely. 3 

3In furtherance of its argument regarding the timeliness of its NRCP 

59(e) motion, Malco appears to infer that the timing for filing such a 

motion was extended because its first NRCP 59(e) motion was timely filed 

in August and, since notice of entry of the order denying that motion was 

not served until February 2012, the August motion was still pending 

continued on next page... 

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NRCP 60(b) 

Salinas argues that even if Malco's motion was made pursuant 

to Rule 60(b), this court still does not have jurisdiction because Malco had 

already filed a notice of appeal, and that divested the district court of 

jurisdiction to consider the motion. Malco argues that its October 2011 

motion was made pursuant to NRCP 60(b), as well as NRCP 59(e), and the 

motion was timely under NRCP 60(b) because it was filed within 6 months 

of service of the notice of entry of judgment. Because its motion was 

timely made, Mateo argues that the district court had jurisdiction to 

consider and deny the motion pursuant to this court's holding in Foster v. 

Dingwall, 126 Nev. 49, 52-53, 228 P.3d 453, 455 (2010). 

Generally "the perfection of an appeal divests the district 

court of jurisdiction"; however, the court does "retain[ ] a limited 

jurisdiction to review motions made in accordance with" the procedures set 

forth in NRCP 60(b). Foster, 126 Nev. at 52, 228 P.3d at 455. When 

reviewing such motions, "the district court has jurisdiction to direct 

briefing on the motion, hold a hearing regarding the motion, and enter an 

order denying the motion." Id. at 52-53, 228 P.3d at 455. This court 

clarified that, while the district court "lacks jurisdiction to enter an order 

granting such a motion" it "does have jurisdiction to deny such requests." 

Id. at 53, 228 P.3d at 455. Thus, although the district court had 

...continued 

before the court. However, Malco does not cite to any authority, nor are 

we aware of any, to support this proposition. Moreover, under NRAP 

4(a)(4)(C), a motion made pursuant to NRCP 59 will toll the time for filing 

a notice of appeal, but the rule makes no mention of tolling the time to file 

additional NRCP 59(e) motions beyond that rule's mandated period of "no 

later than 10 days after the service of the entry of the judgment." 

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jurisdiction to consider and deny Malco's NRCP 60(b) motion, we 

nonetheless conclude that the motion was an improper NRCP 60(b) 

motion. 

NRCP 60(b) allows the district court to relieve a party from a 

final judgment for several enumerated reasons, including, among others, 

mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect. Although Malco couched its 

October 2011 motion as a NRCP 60(b) motion, Malco did not specify the 

basis for which it was seeking relief under NRCP 60(b). Rather, the 

motion focused mainly on the law of joint and several liability and Malco's 

reasoning for why it should only be held severally liable. Thus, we 

conclude that the October 2011 motion was not a proper NRCP 60(b) 

motion, but rather, was a NRCP 59(e) motion that we have already 

concluded was untimely filed. As such, we further conclude that we are 

without jurisdiction to review the issue of joint and several liability raised 

by Malco on appea1. 4 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED with 

the exception of its award of damages. On the issue of damages, we 

4We have considered Donahue's and Malco's other assignments of 

error raised on appeal conclude that they lack merit. 

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, J. 

Hardesty 

•C7 

Do 

J 

Saitta 

REVERSE that portion of the district court's judgment AND REMAND 

this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the 

order. 

Gibbons 

Pickering 

410 a---9GCCJ 

Parraguirre 

cc: Chief Judge, The Eighth Judicial District Court 

Hon. Joseph T. Bonaventure, Senior Judge 

Larry J. Cohen, Settlement Judge 

Law Offices of Kenneth E. Goates 

Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP 

Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP/Las Vegas 

Stovall & Associates 

Thomas & Springberg, P.C. 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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