IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2022 ND 3

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Emile Dargbeh, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20210175

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, 

the Honorable John C. Irby, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.

SheraLynn Ternes, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff and 

appellee.

Leah R. Carlson, West Fargo, N.D., for defendant and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JANUARY 6, 2022 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

State v. Dargbeh

No. 20210175

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Emile Dargbeh appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury 

found him guilty of two counts of forgery in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-24-

01(1)(b). We affirm, concluding that the court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting evidence and testimony in relation to a third, uncharged check and 

that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.

I

[¶2] In March and April of 2020, Dargbeh cashed three forged checks from 

Dacotah Paper Company. Each check was written out to Emile Dargbeh in an 

amount ranging from $1,900 to $2,180. The State obtained video showing 

Dargbeh cashing two of the three checks. The State charged Dargbeh with one

count of forgery for each check recorded on video but did not include a third 

count for the third check not recorded on video.

[¶3] A jury trial was held in May 2021. At the trial, the State mentioned the 

third check during its opening statements. Defense objected to the introduction 

of any evidence or testimony in relation to this third check under N.D.R.Ev. 

404(b) and 403. The district court overruled the objection, stating the third 

check could be used to show that Dargbeh had knowledge of the alleged forgery 

scheme and that he knew the checks were fraudulent. During Detective Dane 

Ronning’s testimony, the State introduced all three checks cashed by Dargbeh 

into evidence. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the third check 

as evidence, and the court overruled the objection.

[¶4] The State presented evidence that 26 people were involved in passing

fraudulent checks on Dacotah Paper’s account. Approximately 30 forged checks 

were passed through the account, resulting in a loss of $63,000. The individuals 

who cashed the checks would keep a share of the money while the person who 

printed the fraudulent checks would keep the rest. Detective Ronning testified 

that he believed Toki Agamiri—Dargbeh’s roommate—was the leader behind 
2

the forgery ring. Video footage was presented to the jury showing Agamiri with 

Dargbeh when Dargbeh cashed one of the fraudulent checks. Additionally, the 

State presented evidence that two cars rented to Dargbeh were used by other 

individuals cashing fraudulent checks. Further, the jury heard testimony from 

the vice president of accounting at Dacotah Paper who testified that Dacotah 

Paper issued no checks to Dargbeh and had never employed him.

[¶5] Dargbeh testified that he had no knowledge the checks in question were 

forged or that the checks were part of a larger forgery scheme. He testified that 

he cashed the checks for Agamiri, an employee of Dacotah Paper Company, 

because Agamiri “had issues with his [bank] account” so he cashed the checks 

for him “to help him out.” Dargbeh testified that no “red flags” were raised and 

that he had no suspicion about the checks being forged despite the fact that 

the checks were written out to him and not to Agamiri, an employee of Dacotah 

Paper Company. He testified that while he did not receive a share of any of the 

forged checks, he did receive some money from one of the checks to repay a 

debt owed to Dargbeh by Agamiri. The jury ultimately found Dargbeh guilty 

on both counts of forgery. He appeals from the criminal judgment.

II

[¶6] Dargbeh argues the district court erred in allowing evidence of the third 

check. Dargbeh argues the court failed to apply the required three-step 

analysis for considering the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence under 

N.D.R.Ev. 404(b) and failed to give a jury instruction regarding the limited 

purpose of that evidence. He also argues the evidence and testimony about the 

third check prejudiced him and the court failed to consider whether, under 

N.D.R.Ev. 403, the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the 

probative value of the evidence. The State, on the other hand, argues the third 

check is not Rule 404(b) evidence; rather, it is evidence of activity in 

furtherance of the charged criminal offense.

[¶7] This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary ruling under an abuse

of discretion standard. State v. Hirschkorn, 2020 ND 268, ¶ 6, 952 N.W.2d 225. 

“A district court abuses its discretion in evidentiary rulings when it acts 
3

arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, or it misinterprets or misapplies the 

law.” State v. Polk, 2020 ND 248, ¶ 10, 950 N.W.2d 764.

[¶8] This Court has “warned of the dangers inherent in allowing evidence of 

other acts to show propensity and of tempting a jury to convict a defendant for 

actions other than the charged misconduct.” State v. Shaw, 2016 ND 171, ¶ 7, 

883 N.W.2d 889. Rule 404(b), N.D.R.Ev., governs the admissibility of evidence 

involving a prior crime, wrong, or other act. It provides:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 

act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order 

to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This 

evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as 

proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. 

The prosecutor must:

(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of 

any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at 

trial; and

(B) do so before trial or during trial if the court, for good 

cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

[¶9] “Prior acts that are evidence of activity in furtherance of the same 

criminal activity a defendant is charged with may avoid exclusion under 

N.D.R.Ev. 404(b).” State v. Buckley, 2010 ND 248, ¶ 35, 792 N.W.2d 518. “Rule 

404(b) only excludes evidence of other acts and crimes committed by 

the defendant when they are independent of the charged crime.” State v. 

Christensen, 1997 ND 57, ¶ 8, 561 N.W.2d 631. Thus, evidence is 404(b) 

evidence only when the evidence is of “a wholly separate and independent 

crime” apart from the charged crime. See id.

[¶10] Furthermore, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible when “the evidence 

provides a more complete story of the crime by putting it in context of 

happenings near in time and place.” State v. Gaede, 2007 ND 125, ¶ 26, 736 

N.W.2d 418. Evidence of a defendant’s prior conduct that was “intertwined with 
4

the factual scenario leading up to” the charged crime is admissible to provide 

“context of happenings” for the jury. Id. at ¶ 28.

[¶11] The State argues that because the three separate checks involve the 

same course of conduct and the same victim, the third check is not an 

independent and wholly separate crime, but instead is inextricably intertwined 

with the two charged checks. Further, the State contends that the third check 

provided a more complete story of the crime as well. Dargbeh argues the State 

conceded at trial that the third check was Rule 404(b) evidence and now

contends for the first time on appeal that the third check was not Rule 404(b) 

evidence to begin with. We read the record differently. Responding to the 

objection at trial, the State discussed the similarities of all three checks, 

stating, “All of these checks are inherently related as they all happened in a 

short time frame, the same exact checks, the logo, they’re all made out from 

the same account number.” Further, the State also argued that the third check 

provided the jury a more complete story because the checks are “so inherently 

related that it’s pretty tough to bring up one without the other two.” Although 

the court admitted the third check under a permissible purpose of Rule 404(b), 

the State also argued at trial that the third check was evidence of activity in 

furtherance of the same criminal activity currently being charged to avoid 

exclusion under Rule 404(b). We conclude the State did not concede that the 

third check was 404(b) evidence at trial.

[¶12] Our case law has repeatedly held that prior bad acts evidence that is 

inextricably linked to the charged offense is not Rule 404(b) evidence. In 

Buckley, 2010 ND 248, ¶¶ 35, 38, this Court held that evidence of the 

defendant’s frequent marijuana use “was part of the conduct leading” to the 

manslaughter charge involving the malnourishment death of her infant 

daughter, rather than independent prior bad acts evidence. Further, in State 

v. Paul, 2009 ND 120, ¶ 25, 769 N.W.2d 416, and Christensen, 1997 ND 57, ¶ 8, 

we held that evidence about prior sexual abuse and touching perpetrated by 

the defendants against their victims was not 404(b) evidence but instead was

evidence of activity in furtherance of the charged criminal activity. Similarly, 

in State v. Alvarado, 2008 ND 203, ¶ 12, 757 N.W.2d 570, we held that evidence 
5

about prior acts of domestic violence perpetrated by the defendant did not raise 

a Rule 404(b) issue because they were not independent acts from the charged 

crime. Lastly, in Steinbach v. State, 2015 ND 34, ¶¶ 17-19, 859 N.W.2d 1, we 

held that testimony regarding the defendant’s prior drinking and fighting was 

not prohibited under Rule 404(b), but “was admissible evidence of the pattern 

of the same activity between the same people” that helped provide a “clearer” 

and “more complete story of the crime.”

[¶13] Moreover, the federal courts have held that evidence of uncharged 

fraudulent transactions does not fall within the context of Rule 404(b) if the 

uncharged transactions are inextricably intertwined with the charged crime. 

“When evidence of other crimes is so blended or connected, with the one on trial 

as that proof of one incidentally involves the other; or explains the 

circumstances thereof; or tends logically to prove any element of the crime 

charged, it is admissible as an integral part of the immediate context of the 

crime charged.” United States v. Thomas, 760 F.3d 879, 883 (8th Cir. 2014). In 

United States v. Hall, the defendant’s uncharged fraudulent trust transactions 

did not fall within prior bad acts evidence because the evidence “was relevant 

to show [the defendant] intended to defraud the [] investors” involved in the 

charged fraudulent scheme. 604 F.2d 539, 540, 544 (8th Cir. 2010). While the 

defendant was charged with crimes concerning only one trust, evidence of 

fraudulent transactions with a second trust was “inextricably intertwined with 

the charged crime” because the two trusts were “parts of the same fraudulent 

scheme” operated by the defendant “in the same manner.” Id. at 543. Finally, 

in United States v. Wilson, the defendant was charged with six counts of theft 

of government funds, each count alleging Wilson deposited a fraudulent taxrefund check. 788 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015). The court concluded

evidence of 31 uncharged tax-refund checks was not prior bad acts evidence 

because the checks “were clearly linked in time and circumstances with the 

charged crimes.” Id. at 1314. The court reasoned the uncharged checks were 

intrinsic to the charged crimes because “the checks arose out of the same series 

of transactions as the charged offenses and exhibited the same fraudulent 

indicators as the checks in the charged counts.” Id.
6

[¶14] Here, we conclude evidence of the uncharged check was not 404(b) 

evidence. This third check was not an “independent” and “wholly separate 

crime.” Although a separate crime in that it may have supported an additional 

criminal charge, it was not prohibited character evidence because it was part 

of the same series of fraudulent transactions involved in the charged crimes

against Dargbeh. Similar to Steinbach, the check was part of a “pattern of the 

same activity [involving] the same [person].” Here, the pattern was Dargbeh’s

cashing multiple forged checks on Dacotah Paper’s account. Additionally, the 

third check was “inextricably intertwined” and “blended with the one[s] on 

trial” because the third check was made out to the same person, contained the 

same logo, used the same account number, and was cashed during the same 

time period as were the two charged checks in question. Because the third 

check was clearly linked in time and to the circumstances of the two charged 

checks, proof of the two checks incidentally involves the third. We hold that the 

third check was not a prior bad act that was independent from the charged 

crime, but instead was evidence of activity in furtherance of the charged

offenses.

[¶15] Additionally, the third check was used to provide a more complete story 

of the crime for the jury. The State used the third check to help establish that 

Dargbeh had knowledge the checks were fraudulent and were part of a larger 

forgery scheme. The State argued that it was not an isolated transaction in 

which Dargbeh cashed a single fraudulent check, but instead was a series of 

unexplained transactions in which he cashed three separate checks from a 

business with which he has no connections. The State summarized its theory 

in its closing argument, stating that while “a person may try to claim ignorance 

or mistake one time but [after] three times,” it shows the knowledge element 

is met. We conclude that the third check puts Dargbeh’s participation in the 

forgery scheme into context for the jury because cashing the third check 

occurred “near the time and place” of the two charged counts of forgery.

Because the third check was not impermissible character evidence within the 

meaning of N.D.R.Ev. 404, the court was not required to complete the threestep analysis or give a limiting instruction. Therefore, we hold that the court 

did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence about the third check.
7

III

[¶16] Dargbeh also argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain a 

conviction for two counts of forgery under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-24-01(1)(b). When 

this Court considers a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

we look only to the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the 

reasonable inferences therefrom to see if there is substantial 

evidence to warrant a conviction. A conviction rests upon 

insufficient evidence only when no rational fact finder could have 

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after 

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution 

and giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences reasonably 

to be drawn in its favor.

State v. Johnson, 2021 ND 161, ¶ 7, 964 N.W.2d 500.

[¶17] To sustain a conviction for the offense of forgery, the State must prove: 

(1) the defendant knowingly uttered or possessed a forged check on the date 

alleged; (2) the defendant uttered or possessed such forged check pursuant to 

a scheme to defraud another of money in excess of $1,000; and (3) the defendant 

acted with intent to deceive or harm another person or knowingly facilitated 

that deception or harm by another. Dargbeh argues the State did not prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the checks were forged, that he 

possessed these checks pursuant to a scheme to defraud another of money, and 

that he acted with intent to deceive or harm the government or another person. 

The State presented the following evidence: Dargbeh cashed checks made out 

to him from a company he had never been employed by and did not do business 

with; he cashed three separate checks; he was with Toki Agamiri—the alleged 

leader of the forgery scheme—when Dargbeh cashed one of the forged checks; 

his roommate and younger brother were both involved in the forgery scheme; 

and two vehicles rented to Dargbeh were used by other individuals while 

cashing fraudulent checks in the forgery scheme. A reasonable fact finder could 

find knowledge and intent on the basis of this circumstantial evidence 

presented by the State. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 

guilty verdict for two counts of forgery.
8

IV

[¶18] The criminal judgment is affirmed.

[¶19] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte