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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GARY V. JENKINS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-3757 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(January 9, 2023)

This matter is before the Court on sua sponte review of pro se Plaintiff’s [1] Complaint. 

Plaintiff alleges that the State of Rhode Island and the East Providence Firefighters, Local 850 

IAFF, AFL-CIO (“Local”), apparently his former union, failed to properly compensate him after 

an allegedly on-duty injury when Plaintiff worked as a firefighter in the State of Rhode Island. 

From Plaintiff’s short paragraph of allegations and the Complaint’s attachments, it appears 

Plaintiff further argues that various Rhode Island entities and the Local breached a collective 

bargaining agreement with Plaintiff by refusing to award him certain benefits. Inexplicably, 

Plaintiff also names as a defendant the United States of America. 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s factual allegations here, such as they are, appear identical to 

factual allegations raised in a prior case, Jenkins v. Rhode Island, C.A. No. 19-00312-WES 

(D.R.I. 2019) (“Jenkins I”). The court there dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on the merits. 

Judgment, ECF No. 12, C.A. No. 19-00312-WES (D.R.I. Oct. 28, 2019). As such, all claims 

against Defendants in this action that Plaintiff also sued in Jenkins I are res judicata and shall be 

dismissed on the merits. The Court shall sua sponte transfer the remainder of this matter to the 

United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

A. Res Judicata
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Res judicata, literally “the thing decided,” “refers to the effect of a judgment in 

foreclosing litigation of a matter that has never been litigated, because . . . it should have been 

advanced in an earlier suit.” See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 

n.1 (1984). At its essence, the doctrine furthers the equitable principle “that a party who has 

once had a chance to litigate a claim before an appropriate tribunal usually ought not to have 

another chance to do so.” See SBC Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 407 F.3d 1223, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). Although often understood as a “defense” to be raised by the parties, “even a party’s 

forfeiture of the right to assert it . . . does not destroy a court’s ability to consider the issue sua 

sponte.” See Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis 

altered); see also Klayman v. Rao, Civ. A. No. 21-2473 (RC), 2021 WL 4948025, at *6 (D.D.C. 

Oct. 25, 2021) (sua sponte dismissing action on, in part, res judicata grounds). 

It is familiar Hornbook law that, for res judicata to apply, there must be “(1) an identity 

of parties in both suits; (2) a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) a final 

judgment on the merits; and (4) the same cause of action in both suits.” Coleman v. PEPCO, 

310 F. Supp. 2d 154, 160 (D.D.C. 2004) (RMC). Importantly, “cause of action” does not refer to 

a claim, but rather refers to the nucleus of facts as alleged in the relevant complaint. See Stanton, 

127 F.3d at 78. In simpler terms: same conduct, same cause of action. See Ramey v. PEPCO, 

580 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2008). Only claims “that could not have been anticipated when 

the first suit was filed or would have been utterly impracticable to join at the time” escape res 

judicata’s grip. See U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Blake Const. Co., Inc., 765 F.2d 195, 205 & n.21 (D.C. 

Cir. 1985). 

When comparing the two complaints, it is clear that Plaintiff is suing over the same 

common nucleus of facts. In this action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants (improbably including 
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the United States) took various adverse pecuniary and employment actions against him after 

improperly classifying a November 11, 2016 injury Plaintiff insists should be considered “onduty.” Compl. at 1. He seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief in the 

form of “reinstatement as [sic] employee.” Id. Based on the Complaint’s attachments, he 

appears to place at least some right to recovery in a collective bargaining agreement. See ECF 

No. 1-1 at 2. In Jenkins I, he sued the Local, the State of Rhode Island, and the City of East 

Providence, Rhode Island based on, it appears, misclassification regarding the very same injury. 

See Jenkins I, ECF No. 1 at 5. He also asked for similar relief. See id. at 6. The United States 

District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed his complaint on jurisdictional grounds, 

relying primarily on the Younger abstention doctrine. See Jenkins I, Report and 

Recommendation, ECF No. 9, at 1-3 (Aug. 6, 2019). 

That court went even further than “dismissal;” it outright entered judgment against 

Plaintiff. Jenkins I, Judgment, ECF No. 12 (Oct. 28, 2019). Therefore, as to the common 

defendants in this action, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered a 

final, valid judgment on the merits against Plaintiff on the “same cause of action” as here. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES all claims against Defendants State of Rhode Island, East 

Providence Firefighters, Local 850 IAFF, AFL-CIO, and City of East Providence, Rhode Island. 

B. Transfer 

The following defendants remain: the International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F. 

United States) (“Union”); Malcolm Moore, apparently in his official capacity as the Finance 

Director for the City of East Providence, Rhode Island (“Moore”); Joseph F. Penza, purportedly 

an attorney for the Local (“Penza”); and the United States. Because, even against the remaining 
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Defendants, the District of Columbia is not the appropriate forum for this matter, the Court shall 

transfer this matter to the District of Rhode Island. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a Court may “transfer, rather than dismiss[] [a case], 

when a sister federal court is the more convenient place for trial of the action.” Sinochem Int’l 

Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007). Although not frequently 

invoked sua sponte, it is the law of this Circuit that a district court may transfer a matter on its 

own authority. See In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Miller v. Toyota

Motor Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 109, 117 (D.D.C. 2009) (ESH) (transferring matter sua sponte). 

“For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court 

may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . 

. .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether to transfer a matter, the Court considers a 

variety of public and private interests. Santos v. Trustees of Grinnell College, 999 F. Supp. 2d 

219, 223 (D.D.C. 2013) (RC). Although one such factor is the plaintiff’s choice of forum, that 

factor receives little weight where the chosen forum is not the “plaintiff’s home forum and most 

of the relevant events occurred elsewhere.” Demery v. Montgomery Cty., 602 F. Supp. 2d 206, 

210 (D.D.C. 2009). The Court must also consider “factors of systemic integrity and fairness.” 

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988). 

Here, Plaintiff’s short paragraph of allegations show practically no connection to the 

District of Columbia. Plaintiff, currently a resident of the State of Georgia, alleges he was 

injured in and by the State of Rhode Island while living and working in the State of Rhode 

Island. His alleged physical and pecuniary injuries also occurred in the State of Rhode Island. 

Although the Union is headquartered in the District of Columbia, it is evident from Plaintiff’s 

short set of allegations that the Union’s connection to the purported events lies only in its 
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relationship with its Rhode Island Local. As such, the only connection to the District of 

Columbia is Plaintiff’s summary invocation of the United States. Yet it is difficult for the Court 

to fathom a set of facts––not pleaded––that connects the United States qua the Department of 

Justice in the District of Columbia to a mundane employment dispute arising in the State of 

Rhode Island. As such, neither public nor private interests would be served by permitting this 

matter to proceed in this forum. The Court shall therefore TRANSFER this action to the United 

States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. 

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall, by separate order, DISMISS all claims against 

Defendants State of Rhode Island, East Providence Firefighters, Local 850 IAFF, AFL-CIO, and 

City of East Providence, Rhode Island and TRANSFER the remainder of this matter to the 

United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

Dated: January 9, 2023 /s/

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge