Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, District Judge for the Northern



District of Illinois, is sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-1430

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SHAKIR MEUX,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 03 CR 39—Christopher A. Nuechterlien, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 10, 2009—DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 2010

Before POSNER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and DERYEGHIAYAN, District Judge.



DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge. Shakir Meux was sentenced in the instant case to a term of imprisonment

and was ordered to pay a mandatory restitution. All postjudgment proceedings were referred by the district court
2 No. 09-1430

judge to the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge

granted the Government’s motion for turnover of funds.

Meux appeals the ruling of the magistrate judge. For

the reasons stated below, we affirm the ruling of the

magistrate judge.

I. Background

Shakir Meux was sentenced on October 24, 2003, in

the instant case (Case Number 03 CR 39) to a term of

imprisonment of 37 months. He was also ordered to pay

a mandatory restitution of $134,218.52, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3663A of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act

(MVRA). On February 8, 2008, the Government filed

with the district court an “Agreed Motion for Order

Directing Employer to Make Deductions from Employee’s Income and Pay to the United States.” On February 11, 2008, the district court judge referred the matter to the magistrate judge for all post-judgment proceedings. On February 14, 2008, pursuant to the agreed

motion, the magistrate judge ordered that $50 be

garnished from each of Meux’s paychecks to be paid to

the United States. In an unrelated criminal matter (Case

Number 01 CR 185), the United States Marshal had

custody of $4,881.00 that belonged to Meux. On December 15, 2008, the Government filed a Motion for

Turnover of Funds for Restitution, seeking turnover of

the $4,881.00. The record reflects that the $4,881.00

was seized in 2001 and there is no indication that Meux

showed any interest in reclaiming the $4,881.00 before

the filing of the Government’s Motion for Turnover,
No. 09-1430 3

approximately seven years later. On January 30, 2009,

a hearing was held before the magistrate judge regarding

the Government’s Motion for Turnover, and on February 2, 2009, the magistrate judge granted the Government’s motion. Meux appeals the February 2, 2009

ruling of the magistrate judge.

II. Discussion

Meux argues that the Government should have filed a

motion for garnishment of the $4,881.00, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 3205 of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures

Act (FDCPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq. as opposed to

filing the Motion for Turnover. Meux also argues that

the magistrate judge was without jurisdiction to enter

a final order directing that the $4,881.00 be turned over

to the Government in partial satisfaction of the restitution order.

We first decide whether we have jurisdiction to hear

this appeal. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction to hear “appeals from all final decisions of the

district courts of the United States. . . .” Id. Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 3008, “[a] district court of the United States

may assign its duties in proceedings under this chapter

to a United States magistrate judge to the extent not

inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United

States.” Id. The magistrate judge in the instant case,

after assignment by the district court, entered a final

judgment. Since the district court judge properly

assigned its duties relating to post-judgment proceedings to the magistrate judge, and the magistrate
4 No. 09-1430

judge pursuant to that assignment entered a final judgment, we have appellate jurisdiction in this matter.

We now turn to the issue of whether the magistrate

judge had jurisdiction to rule on the Government’s

Motion for Turnover. Although the magistrate judge

could have ordered the turnover of the $4,881.00 in garnishment proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 3205 of the

FDCPA, the magistrate judge was not limited to conducting garnishment proceedings. As indicated above,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3008, a “district court of the

United States may assign its duties in proceedings under

this chapter to a United States magistrate judge to the

extent not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws

of the United States.” Id. The FDCPA provides that the

availability of proceedings, such as garnishment proceedings, as a mechanism for collecting debts “shall not

be construed to curtail or limit the right of the United

States under any other Federal law or any State law to

collect any fine, penalty, assessment, restitution, or forfeiture arising in a criminal case.” 28 U.S.C. § 3003(b)(2).

In addition, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a) and (f) of

the FDCPA, the United States is authorized to enforce a

judgment imposing a fine or restitution “in accordance

with the practices and procedures for the enforcement of

a civil judgment under Federal law or State law.” 18

U.S.C. § 3613(a), (f); see also e.g., United States v. Hosking,

567 F.3d 329, 334-35 (7th Cir. 2009). Under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3613(c) of the FDCPA, once the restitution was ordered

in this case, all of Meux’s property became subject to a

lien. The magistrate judge, having been assigned by

the district court judge the duties to conduct all post-
No. 09-1430 5

judgment proceedings, had authority in the instant case

to hold a hearing and to order the turnover of funds to

satisfy that lien. Liens based on restitution orders “are

treated like tax liens . . . so that they are ‘effective against

every interest in property accorded a taxpayer by state

law. . . .’ ” United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 802

(7th Cir. 2007) (quoting in part United States v. Denlinger,

982 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Hosking, 567

F.3d at 335 (stating that “§ 3613 treats a restitution

order under the MVRA like a tax liability” and “[t]his

means that any property the IRS can reach to satisfy a

tax lien, a sentencing court can also reach in a restitution order”). Thus, the $4,881.00 was subject to a lien to

satisfy the restitution obligation.

In addition, the record reflects that Meux was provided

with essentially the same due process protections he

would have been accorded in garnishment proceedings.

Specifically, Meux was provided with notice of the Motion

for Turnover, was appointed counsel to represent Meux

relating to the motion, and was granted a hearing before

the magistrate judge to address the motion.

Meux owed the United States $134,218.52 in restitution.

The United States is unmistakably entitled to collect the

restitution owed by Meux. Meux had his day in court

and the magistrate judge properly ordered the turnover

of the $4,881.00, which was in partial satisfaction of the

restitution amount. Meux has not shown any meaningful relief he can gain from this appeal, nor has Meux

shown any reason to disturb the order of the magistrate

judge. 
6 No. 09-1430

III. Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, we AFFIRM the ruling of

the magistrate judge granting the Turnover Motion.

2-26-10