1 14-4371-cv Baker v. Gates UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PR OCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS CO URT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMEN T FILED WITH THIS CO URT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATA BASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMM ARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seco nd Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United Stat es Courthouse, 40 Foley Sq uare, in the City of New York, on the 28 th day of December, tw o thousand fifteen. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

___________________ __________________ PATRICK SCOTT BAKER, i ndividually and as the personal representative of th e Estate of David Baker, JERRY BAKER, individually and as the personal representative of the Esta te of David Baker, LOIS BAKER, individually and as the personal representative of the Esta te of David Baker, STACIE BAKER, individually and as the substitute executrix and successor in interest of the Estate of Scarlett Rogencamp, and as the executr ix of the Estate of Hetty E. Peterson, VALERIE PETERSON, as executor of the estate of Vernon W. Pete rson, PATRICIA A. HENRY, individually and as the substitute executrix and successor in interest of the Estate of Scarlett Rogencamp, and as the executr ix of the Estate of Hetty E. Peterson, KATHARINE D. DORIS, PAUL G. PETERSON, MICHELLE Y. HOLBROOK, JACKIE2 NINK PFLUG, RYLMA NINK, EUGENE NINK, GLORIA NINK, MARY NINK, SCOTT PFLUG, Petitioners-Cross Defendants-Third-Party Defendants-Appellees , CRAIG BAKER, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of David Baker, Petitioner-Third-Party Defendant-Appellee

v. No. 14-4371-cv FRANCIS GATES, individually and as administrator for the Estate of Olin Euge ne “Jack” Armstrong, PATI HENSLEY, SARA HENSLEY, JAN SMITH, Third-Party Defendants-Cross Defendants-Appellants , NATIONAL BANK OF EGYPT, CITIBANK, N.A., INTESA SANPAULO S.P.A, COMMERZBANK AG, Respondents , JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Respondents-Third-Party Plaintiffs , BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, Respondent-Third-Party Plaintiff-Counter Defendant , ESTATE OF JACK HE NSLEY, BANCA UBAE, S.P.A., MSC MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY S.A., VANBRE DA INTERNATIONAL, N.V., MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY (CYPRUS) LTD., LEBANON & GULF BANK, S.A.L., UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME TRUST FUND, COMMERCIAL BANK OF SYRIA, DEVELOPMENT OF3 NATIONAL BIO-SAFETY, AYMAN KALAI, BLOM BANK S.A.L., INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA, SEETECH CO., LTD., EBLA PETROLEUM COMPANY, BANK OF MONTREAL, LONKAR SERVICES LTD., SUNCOR ENERGY GERMANY GMBH, f.k.a. Petrocanad a Germany Gmbh, HSBC TRINKAUS & BURKHARD T (INTERNATIONAL) SA, HSBC BANK USA, N.A., BUFFALO BRANCH, DOHA BANK PETRONASH FZE, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, NEW YORK, ALTUWAIJRY BELAL ABDULLAHA, MINISTRY OF CULTURE, CENTRAL BANK OF SYRIA, ARAB LIBYAN MAURITANIAN BANK FOR TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, ARAB CULTURAL AND COMMUNITY CENTER, AL ALAMIAH EXCHANGE GROUP LTD., STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, SYRIATEL MOBILE TELECOM S.A., SYRIAN TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY, GENE RAL PETROLEUM COMPANY, ESTATE OF JACK ARMSTRONG, NATIONAL BANK OF KU WAIT SAK, NATIONAL BANK OF KUWAIT, NEW YORK, A.H. ALSAGAR & BROS., CREDIT SUISSE, SWITZERLAND, RIYAD BANK, ABDULRAH MAN ABDULLAH AL ZAMIL, HSBC PRIVATE BANK SUISSE S.A., HONG KONG, REX BERNARD MARTIN, JR., BANK MUSCAT, ONIC HOLDING, AMWAL Q.S.C., ABN AMRO BANK N.V., NEW YORK, ABN AMRO BANK N.V., DUBA I, ABRAAJ GROUP, as successor to Abraaj Capital (Cayman) Limited, ABU DHABI COMMERCIAL BANK, P.J.S.C., MAJID AL FUTTAIM TRUST LLC, HSBC BANK MIDDLE EAST LIMITED, DUBAI, DUBAI INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL LLC, INHERITORS OF LATE ABDULAZIZ AL SAGAR, EMIRATES NBD, as successor to National Bank of Dubai, Ltd., AL FUTTAIM CAPITAL COMPANY, LLC, KHALID ABDULLA AL SAGA R CHAM HOLDING COMPANY S.A.L., NATIONAL BANK OF RAS AL KHAIMAH, TRIAD SOFTWARE SERVICES,4 SYRIA DUTY FREE SHOPS, LEBANESE CANADIAN BANK, SAL, BLOM BANK S.A.L., CYPRUS, I.B.C.S. TRAD ING AND DISTRIBUTION CO. LTD., PUIG MIDD LE EAST FZCO, ARAB UNION REINSURANC E COMPANY, SUEZ CANAL INSURANCE CO MPANY, SUEZ CANAL BANK, BYBLOS BANK S. A.L., UNION BANK OF INDIA, J.B. BODA REINSURANCE BROKERS PVT. LTD., SYRICAN AR AB AIRLINES, BRITISH ARAB COMMERCIAL BANK PLC, BANK OF IRELAND, SHANNONSIDE AVIATION SERVICES LTD., Third-Party Defendants , FRONTIER OPPORTUNITIES FUND I, L.P., SHUAA CAPITAL PSC, Third-Party Defendants-Cross Claimants-Counter Claimants

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___________________ __________________ APPEARING FOR APPELLANTS: JOHN F. SALTER, Barnes Law Group LLC, Marietta, Georgia (James P. Bonner, Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, New York, New York, on the brief ).

APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: SANDRA CAVAZOS (Michael Dockterman, on the brief ), Steptoe & Johnson LLP, New York, New York. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (George B. Daniels, Judge ).

* The Clerk of Court is directed to ame nd the official caption as shown above.5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERE D, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment deemed to have been entered on March 19, 2015, is

AFFIRMED. 1 Appellants, a group of default judgment cr editors against the Sy rian Arab Republic (“Syria”) collectively referred to as the “Gates Plaintiffs,” a ppeal from the denial of their motion to vacate a default judgm ent entered in favor of a di fferent group of judgment creditors, collectively referred to as the “Baker Plaintiffs,” agai nst Syria. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). “We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion,” Johnson ex rel. United States v. University of Rochester Med. Ctr., 642 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2011), though the denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion challenging an underlying judgment as void is reviewed de novo, see Cent ral Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 189 (2 d Cir. 2003). We assume the pa rties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedur al history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. The Gates Plaintiffs’ default judgment ar ose out of the 2004 murders of U.S. civilian contractors Jack Armstrong and Jack Hensley by al-Qaeda in Iraq, for which a

United States District Court for the District of Columbia fou nd Syria liable to their estates and surviving family members in the amount of $412,909,587. See Ga tes v. Syrian Arab

1 Because the district court did not enter a sepa rate judgment as require d by Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), a judgment is deemed to have been ente red 150 days after the October 20, 2014 entry of the district court’s orde r denying appellants’ motion and dismissing them from the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2 )(B); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).6 Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). The Baker Plaintiffs’ default judgment arose out of the 1985 hijacking of EgyptA ir Flight 648 and the shooting of three Americans, one of whom—Scarlett Rogenkamp —was killed, and two of whom—Patrick Baker and Jackie Pflug—were grievously inju red. See Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 775 F. Supp . 2d 48 (D.D.C. 20 11). Syria did not initially make an appearance in Baker, and default judgment in the amount of $601,969,151.50 was entered by a magistrate judge, to whom the case had been referred for all purposes. See App’x 140–41. Syria subsequently appeared in Ba ker to challenge the de fault on grounds that, inter alia, it had not consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). The magistrate judge rejected this argument, see Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 810 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98–99 (D.D.C. 2011), and Syria, after initially appealing the default ju dgment, voluntarily dism issed its appeal, see Baker v. Qadhdhafi, No. 11-7034, 2011 WL 5515579 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 2011). The Baker Plaintiffs subsequently registered their judgment in the Southern District

of New York and filed a turnov er petition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5225, 5227. Petition resp ondents JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of New York Mellon interpleaded, inter alia, the Gates Plaintiffs, who unsu ccessfully moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) in that action to vacate the Baker judgment as void.

We need not here decide the merits of th e Gates Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Baker judgment, because we conclude that the Gates Plaintiffs lacked sta nding to bring the Rule7 60(b) motion. See S humway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It is beyond cavil that an appellate court may affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground appearing in the record.”). On its face, Ru le 60(b) affords relief from judgment only to “a party or its legal repres entative.” Fed. R. Ci v. P. 60(b). Under certain circumstances, we have held that a nonparty “sufficiently connected and identified

with” an action can obtain relief under Rule 60. Dunlop v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 672 F.2d 1044, 1052 (2 d Cir. 1982). The non-parties to w hom we applied this conclusion in Dunlop were Pan Am employe es suing the airline under stat e law. They made a Rule 60(b) motion to modify a stipula tion of dismissal in a federal case between the Secretary of Labor and Pan Am to clarify that the dismissal did not preclude their state action. See id. at 1047–49. We held that “[ a]lthough Rule 60(b)(6) would no t ordinarily be available to non-parties to modify final judgments, . . . on the facts of this case appellants were sufficiently connected a nd identified with the Secretary’s su it to entitle them to standing to invoke Rule 60(b)(6).” Id. at 1052 (emphasis added) (f ootnote omitted). We have on

one other occasion extende d Rule 60(b) to a non- party. In Grace v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, 443 F.3d 180 (2 d Cir. 2006), we held that [W]here plaintiffs enter into a settlement agreement with a judgment-proof, pro se defendant with the intent at the time of the settlement to collect from a third party th at allegedly received fraudulent conveyances, a nd further, they attempt to use the judgment as a predi cate for a fraudulent conveyance action against the third party, the third party is “strongly affected” by the judgment and en titled to standing to bring a Rule 60(b) motion.8 Id. at 188. As in Dunlop, however, we limited the holding to the facts of the case. See id. These extensions of Rule 60(b) are so factually cabined that we have summarily refused to construe Dunlop or Grace to reach more broadly. See Federman v. Artzt, 339 F. App’x 31, 34 (2d Cir. 20 09) (summary order) (“Both Dunlop and Grace involved extraordinary circumstances in which a non-party had interests on which the outcome of the proceedings ha d significant conse quences for the movants, ye t those interests had not been adequately represented du ring litigation, because of th e peculiar structure of each case. There is nothing similarly extraordinar y about the situation before us.”). Nothing

about the instant situation is sufficiently extraordin ary to warrant a different conclusion. We have considered all of appellants’ re maining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court