[Cite as Roberts v. Pleasant Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2011-Ohio-4560.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MARION COUNTY 

 

DANIEL E. ROBERTS, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 9-11-04 

 v. 

PLEASANT LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 

BOARD OF EDUCATION, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2010-CV-0695 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: September 12, 2011 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Susan Hayest Kozlowski, William J. Steele and Lora A. Molnar 

 for Appellant 

Karrie M. Kalail, David S. Hirt and Peter Zawadski for Appellee
Case No. 9-11-04 

-2- 

ROGERS, P.J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Daniel E. Roberts (“Roberts”), appeals the 

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County dismissing the action 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal Roberts argues that the trial 

court erred by dismissing the action as he properly perfected his appeal. Based on 

the following, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

{¶2} The facts are not in dispute. Roberts was employed by DefendantAppellee Pleasant Local School District, Board of Education (“Pleasant” or 

“Board of Education”), as a special education teacher under a series of limited 

teaching contracts from the 1998-1999 school year through the 2009-2010 school 

year. 

{¶3} In April, 2010 the Board of Education sent Roberts a letter notifying 

him that it intended not to employ him at the expiration of his current limited 

teaching contract. In that same month, the Board of Education received a written 

request from Roberts requesting a written statement describing the circumstances 

that led to its decision not to renew his contract. The Board of Education sent him 

a letter describing the circumstances that led to its decision. 

{¶4} In May, 2010, Roberts sent Pleasant a written request for a nonrenewal hearing before the Board of Education, which was held July 19, 2010. 

The Board of Education subsequently affirmed its intention to non-renew Roberts’ 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-3- 

limited contract in a written decision dated July 20, 2010. On August 17, 2010, 

Roberts filed a complaint appealing the Board of Education’s order (“Complaint”) 

pursuant to R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. 

{¶5} On October 7, 2010, Pleasant filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint 

pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). On January 13, 2011, the trial court ruled that it 

lacked jurisdiction to rule on Pleasant’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the action 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3). It is from this 

judgment Roberts appeals, asserting the following assignment of error for our 

review. 

Assignment of Error 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION BY 

DISMISSING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DANIEL E. 

ROBERT’S (sic) APPEAL ON THE BASIS OF A LACK OF 

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, BECAUSE 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT PROPERLY PERFECTED HIS 

APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT PURSUANT TO 

OHIO REVISED OHIO (sic) SECTION 3319.11(G)(7). 

{¶6} In his sole assignment of error Roberts argues that the trial court erred 

in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. His argument is three-pronged. 

First, Roberts argues that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) solely vests subject matter 

jurisdiction in the court of common pleas as it is the statute which grants the right 

to appeal the decision to non-renew a teacher’s contract. Since he complied with 

that section, Roberts argues, the trial court erred by dismissing the Complaint. 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-4- 

Second, Roberts asserts that Revised Code Chapters 2505 and 2506 do not govern 

the filing of an appeal, but rather, govern the appeal once it has been initiated. 

Roberts argues that his failure to file a notice of appeal with the Board of 

Education, as required by R.C. 2505.04, could not have deprived the trial court of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Lastly, Roberts argues that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) is part 

of the Ohio Teachers’ Tenure Act, which must be construed liberally in favor of 

teachers. Consequently, Roberts asserts, the trial court erred in finding it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree. 

{¶7} Pleasant contends that the trial court properly determined that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Pleasant argues that Revised Code 

Chapters 2505 and 2506 in conjunction with R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) govern the 

procedure for filing an appeal. Pleasant asserts that since Roberts did not file a 

notice of appeal with the Board of Education within thirty days of receiving its 

written decision pursuant to R.C. 2505.04, the appeal was not properly perfected, 

and therefore, the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction. We agree. 

{¶8} Civ.R. 12(H)(3) allows a court to dismiss an action “whenever it 

appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction 

of the subject matter.” As a general matter, R.C. 2506.04 allows a party to appeal 

the court of common pleas’ decision on an administrative matter to an appellate 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-5- 

court “on questions of law as provided by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.” 

R.C. 2506.04; Thrower v. City of Akron, 9th Dist. No. 21153, 2003-Ohio-1307, at 

¶21. “[W]here a trial court resolves an attack on the facial sufficiency of a 

complaint and does not make any determinations with regard to disputed factual 

issues, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s application of 

the law was correct.” Manholt v. Maplewood Joint Vocational School Dist. Bd. of 

Edn. (Aug. 21, 1992), 11th Dist. No. 91-P-2410, *2, citing Jenkins v. Eberhart 

(1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 351, 355, 594 N.E.2d 29, citing Williamson v. Tucker 

(C.A. 5 1981), 645 F.2d 404, 413. 

{¶9} The general provisions regulating appellate procedure and 

administrative appeals are located in Revised Code Chapters 2505 and 2506, 

respectively, of the Ohio Revised Code. R.C. 2506.01(A) provides in pertinent 

part: 

Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, 

tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or 

other division of any political subdivision of the state may be 

reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which 

the principal office of the political subdivision is located as 

provided in Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code. 

R.C. 2506.01(A). 

{¶10} This section of the code provides a general right to appeal the final 

decision of a political subdivision. A school board of education falls within the 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-6- 

parameters of a “board” or “political subdivision” of R.C. 2506.01. Kiel v. Green 

Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 149, 152, 630 N.E.2d 716. 

{¶11} The general right to appeal an administrative decision is narrowed by 

Revised Code Chapter 2505, which governs appellate procedure. R.C. 2505.03(A) 

provides a means to appeal the final order of any administrative officer, agency, or 

board “when provided by law.” The law which provides the specific authority for 

a teacher to appeal the non-renewal of his or her contract is R.C. 3319.11(G)(7),1

which states: 

A teacher may appeal an order affirming the intention of the 

board not to reemploy the teacher to the court of common pleas 

of the county in which the largest portion of the territory of the 

school district or service center is located, within thirty days of 

the date on which the teacher receives the written decision, on 

the grounds that the board has not complied with this section or 

with section 3319.111 of the Revised Code. 

R.C. 3319.11(G)(7). 

{¶12} This section, however, is notably silent as to the manner in which the 

appeal is perfected. Therefore, we must look to Chapter 2505, specifically, R.C. 

2505.04 and 2505.07, for the means of perfection. R.C. 2505.04 prescribes such 

means, providing: 

 

1

 The Eleventh District explained that, whereas “[t]he right to appeal the decision of a school board’s 

affirmance of its intention not to re-employ a school teacher is conferred by both R.C. 2506.01 and 

3319.11(G)(7) . . . when taken as a whole, subsection (G)(7) of R.C. 3319.11 grants a right to appeal where 

none previously existed.” Estock v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Sept. 30, 1993), 11th 

Dist. No. 92-A-1757, at *2 (internal citations omitted). 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-7- 

An appeal is perfected when a written notice of appeal is filed, . . 

. in the case of an administrative-related appeal, with the 

administrative officer, agency, [or] board . . . After being 

perfected, an appeal shall not be dismissed without notice to the 

appellant, and no step required to be taken subsequent to the 

perfection of the appeal is jurisdictional. 

R.C. 2505.04 (emphasis added). Further, R.C. 2505.07 provides the time period 

for perfecting an appeal and mandates that: 

After the entry of a final order of an administrative officer, 

agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other 

instrumentality, the period of time within which the appeal shall 

be perfected, unless otherwise provided by law, is thirty days. 

R.C. 2505.07. 

{¶13} R.C. 2505.04 is clearly a jurisdictional requirement as it provides 

notice to the administrative body that an appeal of its decision is being filed. 

Richards v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio (1955), 163 Ohio St. 439, 445, 127 N.E.2d 402; 

see, also, Moore v. Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm. (1993), 11 Ohio App.3d 273, 465 

N.E.2d 482 (for the proposition that filing a notice of appeal pursuant to R.C. 

2505.04 is a jurisdictional requirement). R.C. 2505.03(B) further exemplifies this 

notion by explaining that in an appeal of an administrative decision, the 

administrative board “shall be treated as if it were a trial court whose final order, 

judgment, or decree is the subject of an appeal to a court of appeals or as if it were 

a clerk of such a trial court.” Therefore, in order for jurisdiction to be vested in 

the court of common pleas, an appellant must file a notice of appeal with the 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-8- 

agency from which the appeal is being taken within thirty days of receiving the 

agency’s written decision. 

{¶14} Roberts argues that the trial court erroneously determined the source 

of Roberts’ right to appeal was R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) in conjunction with R.C. 

2505.03(A) and R.C. 2506.01, rather than solely R.C. 3319.11(G)(7). Roberts’ 

foundation for this argument is Hansford v. Steinbacher, an unemployment 

benefits case in which the Ohio Supreme Court stated that “where a right of appeal 

is conferred by statute the appeal can only be perfected in the mode prescribed by 

that statute.” (1987), 33 Ohio St. 3d 72, 72, 514 N.E.2d 1385. Applying Hansford, 

Roberts argues that since he complied with R.C. 3319.11(G)(7), he perfected his 

appeal which was all that was required to vest jurisdiction in the trial court. 

{¶15} The analysis in Hansford is largely ineffective in the present case as 

R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) does not prescribe the mode of perfecting an appeal, unlike 

R.C. 4141.28(O), the statute at issue in Hansford. See Kiel, 69 Ohio St.3d 149 

(for the proposition that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) does not prescribe the mode of 

perfecting an appeal); see, also, discussion of Manholt, infra. R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) 

and R.C. 4141.28(O) are inapposite in that the latter explicitly specifies the 

manner in which an appeal must be taken, filed, and perfected. It then provides, 

“[s]uch filing shall be the only act required to perfect the appeal and vest 

jurisdiction in the court.” Id. citing R.C. 4141.28(O). In the present case, 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-9- 

however, R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) does not prescribe the mode of perfection, nor does 

it specify that the statute itself mandates how an appeal is perfected or that it 

confers jurisdiction in the court of common pleas. 

{¶16} Next, Roberts argues that Chapters 2505 and 2506 govern the 

appellate process once the appeal has been filed and perfected pursuant to R.C. 

3319.11(G)(7). In support of this argument, Roberts cites Kiel and Estock v. 

Conneaut Area City School District Board of Education. Roberts asserts that R.C. 

2505.04, which governs the perfection of an appeal, does not apply to appeals 

brought under R.C. 3319.11(G)(7). 

{¶17} The holding in Kiel, supra, was that since R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) is 

silent as to the procedure to be followed on appeal, the procedural provisions of 

Revised Code Chapter 2506 govern. The issue in Kiel was whether the school 

board could supplement the record in the court of common pleas. The Supreme 

Court held that since R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) is silent as to the procedure that must be 

followed, R.C. 2506 applies. Notably, this case did not address the perfection of 

an appeal, the court of common pleas’ jurisdiction over R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) 

appeals, or the application of Chapter 2505. The holding in Kiel affects the case 

sub judice only insofar as R.C. Chapter 2506 governs the procedure to be followed 

after the appeal has been perfected. 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-10- 

{¶18} In further support of his proposition, Roberts cites Estock v. 

Conneaut Area City School District Board of Education (1993), 11th Dist. No. 92-

A-1757. In Estock, the Eleventh District stated that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) only 

precludes application of R.C. Chapters 2505 and 2506 if they govern substantive 

matters on appeal. The court explained that since R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) limits a 

teacher’s right to appeal a board of education’s decision to non-renew the teacher 

only to the extent that the board of education did not follow the proper statutory 

procedure and not whether the decision was proper substantively, statutes 

governing this variety of administrative appeals apply only if they govern 

procedural rather than substantive review. The Eleventh District never determined 

whether R.C. 2505.04 was a procedural or substantive provision. Therefore, 

Estock does not stand for the proposition Roberts urges as it does not state that 

Chapters 2505 and 2506 only govern the process of an appeal after it has been 

properly filed in the court of common pleas, but rather, that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) 

appeals are limited to review only the procedure followed by the board of 

education. 

{¶19} The final case Roberts cites is Manholt v. Maplewood Joint 

Vocational School District Board of Education (Aug. 21, 1992), 11th Dist. No. 91-

P-2410, which he urges this Court to distinguish. Manholt is a strikingly similar 

case from the Eleventh District, which we find to be persuasive. In that case, 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-11- 

Donna Manholt was employed as a teacher by Maplewood from 1989 to 1991 

when Maplewood decided not to re-employ her. After a non-renewal hearing, 

Manholt filed a complaint in the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 

3319.11(G)(7), but did not file a notice of appeal with Maplewood within thirty 

days of Maplewood’s affirmance of its decision not to re-employ her. Maplewood 

filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to timely 

file the notice of appeal. The trial court granted the motion and the Eleventh 

District affirmed, holding that “ . . . in the absence of a special statutory or rule 

provision providing otherwise, since appellant failed to file a notice of appeal with 

appellee within thirty days, the trial court properly dismissed appellant’s 

complaint [for lack of subject matter jurisdiction] . . .” Id. at *2. Specifically, the 

court of appeals stated the following: 

In the case at bar, the right to appeal the decision of appellee 

affirming its previous intention not to re-employ appellant as a 

school teacher is conferred by both R.C. 2506.01 and 

3319.11(G)(7). Neither of these statutory provisions explicitly 

state how the notice of appeal is to be perfected. Accordingly, 

we must apply relevant sections of R.C. Chapter 2505, i.e. R.C. 

2505.03, 2505.04, and 2505.07. 

Id. at *4. 

{¶20} Lastly, Roberts argues that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) is part of the Ohio 

Teachers’ Tenure Act which must be liberally construed in order to provide 

teachers with employment stability. Roberts asserts that requiring R.C. 
Case No. 9-11-04 

-12- 

3319.11(G)(7) appeals to be perfected pursuant to R.C. 2505.04 in order for the 

court of common pleas to have jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the purpose 

of providing job protection for teachers as it would limit their ability to file an 

appeal. We think this is a hollow argument. Requiring teachers to perfect their 

appeal according to R.C. 2505.04 is not an impediment to filing an appeal, but 

rather is a preliminary step required to provide notice to the administrative body. 

Further, filing a notice of appeal is standard procedure. There is no reason why an 

exception should be made for teachers’ appeals from an administrative board. 

{¶21} Moreover, if we were to hold that R.C. 2505.04 is inapplicable in this 

context, we would essentially render R.C. 2505.04 superfluous. There is a 

difference between liberal construction and vitiating a statute. “Such liberal 

construction should not result in the exercise of the legislative power of 

amendment under the guise of statutory interpretation.” Manholt, at *5, citing 

State v. Moore (Jan. 20, 1992), 4th Dist. No. 91 CA 1966; Nelson v. Admr., Ohio 

Bur. Of Emp. Services (Aug. 19, 1987), 4th Dist. No. 1327. 

{¶22} Accordingly, we overrule Roberts’ assignment of error. 

{¶23} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

PRESTON and WILLIAMOWSKI, J.J., concur. 

/jlr