SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2306-15T1

EUGENE BERTA, 

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

_________________________________

Argued September 27, 2017 – Decided 

Before Judges Fuentes and Manahan.

On appeal from New Jersey State Parole Board.

Eric J. Marcy argued the cause for appellant 

(Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, PA, attorneys; 

Mr. Marcy, of counsel and on the brief).

Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General,

argued the cause for respondent (Christopher 

S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Lisa 

A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Mr. Bueno, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Eugene Berta, incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison, 

appeals from a final agency decision of the New Jersey State Parole 

Board (Board), affirming the Board panels' decisions denying him 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 26, 2017
2 A-2306-15T1

parole and imposing a 120-month future eligibility term (FET). We 

affirm.

In August 1983, Berta was indicted for murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3 (count one), and second-degree possession of a firearm for an 

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count two). The indictment 

arose from the July 16, 1983 discovery of the victim's partially 

decomposed body in the bathtub of her home in Metuchen. An autopsy 

revealed that the victim died from a gunshot to the back of her 

head. State v. Berta, Docket No. A-1909-12 (App. Div. June 5, 

2014), cert. denied, 221 N.J. 220 (2015). An investigation 

eventually led to Berta's arrest, the victim's paramour, who was 

married and was also carrying on affairs with other women. Berta 

entered a plea of not guilty. After a three-week jury trial, 

Berta was convicted as charged. In December 1984, Berta was 

sentenced to life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole 

ineligibility. 

Berta attained eligibility for parole on September 24, 2014. 

Predicated upon that parole status, a hearing officer referred the 

matter to a two-member panel for review. 

After consideration of Berta's eligibility status, on March 

26, 2015, the two-member panel denied Berta parole and referred 

the matter to a three-member panel to establish a FET outside of 

the presumptive schedule. The two-member panel cited 
3 A-2306-15T1

institutional infractions. The panel noted that although Berta's

last infraction was in October 2002, he had a number of earlier 

infractions. The panel further noted that there was insufficient 

problem resolution by Berta, specifically, his lack of insight 

into his criminal behavior, his denial of committing the crime, 

and his minimization of his conduct. In support of the panel's 

determination, it attached addenda, which included a confidential 

psychological report. 

In rendering its decision, the panel also considered Berta's 

interview, documentation in his case file, and the confidential 

material report filed. The panel found mitigating factors

including: no prior criminal record or minimal criminal record; 

participation in programs specific to behavior; participation in 

institutional programs; average to above average institutional 

reports; institutional adjustment has been favorable, last 

infraction in October 2002; and risk assessment evaluation, "10 

LSI-R" (Level of Service Inventory-Revised). The panel suggested 

Berta participate in behavior modification, one-to-one counseling, 

and institutional programs geared toward criminal behavior. 

On June 10, 2015, a three-member panel considered Berta's 

case. Three months later, in an eight-page written decision based 

upon the two-member panel's findings, the three-member panel 
4 A-2306-15T1

imposed a 120-month FET.1 A confidential addendum was also 

attached to the notice of decision.

Berta appealed the three-member panel's decision to the full 

Board. Upon review, the full Board issued a notice of final 

decision affirming the decision to deny parole and establish a 

120-month FET. This appeal followed.2

Berta raises the following arguments on appeal:

POINT I

THE PAROLE BOARD SUMMARILY AND ARBITRARILY 

DISMISSES OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT 

PLAINTIFF EUGENE BERTA WILL NOT COMMIT ANOTHER 

CRIME IF RELEASED ON PAROLE.

POINT II

THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO ASSESS PLAINTIFF'S 

SUITABILITY FOR PAROLE TO A RESIDENTIAL 

COMMUNITY TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM WAS ARBITRARY.

 

1 A FET for an inmate serving a sentence for a crime committed on 

or after to August 19, 1997, is not reduced by credits. See

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.2(i); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56(b). For an 

inmate who committed a crime prior to August 19, 1997, such as 

Berta, the FET is, however, reduced by credits. As a result, 

Berta's parole eligibility is October 2, 2021. However, the Board 

panel noted that if Berta's present work assignment and custody 

status were to continue, his projected parole eligibility date 

would be in January 2020. 

2 Thereafter, upon motion of the New Jersey State Parole Board, we 

entered a consent protective order on May 23, 2016. The Board's

confidential appendix includes various psychological evaluations, 

letters from the victim's family members, and confidential 

addendums, all of which were reviewed when considering Berta for 

parole.
5 A-2306-15T1

POINT III

THE CATCH-22, THE ASSERTION OF INNOCENCE IN 

PAROLE CONSIDERATION – THE CONSEQUENCES OF 

FAILING TO ADMIT GUILT AT THE PAROLE HEARING.

POINT IV

IT IS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS TO 1) PARSE 

THE RECORD TO DENY PAROLE; 2) IGNORE 

PLAINTIFF'S SUITABILITY FOR COMMUNITY 

RESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMS; 3) EXCLUDE 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION PSYCHOLOGICAL 

EVALUATIONS; AND 4) PERMIT THE SUPPRESSION OF 

RECOMMENDATIONS BY VOLUNTEERS.

Berta raises the following additional arguments on appeal under 

one point heading:

POINT I

THE BOARD EXCLUDED INFORMATION IT WAS REQUIRED 

TO CONSIDER, FOCUSED ENTIRELY ON THE FACTS OF 

THE ORIGINAL CRIME AND PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTION 

OF INNOCENCE, AND DISREGARDED COMPELLING 

POSITIVE INFORMATION REQUIRING A REMAND TO THE 

FULL BOARD[.] 

A. Lip Service to Having 

Acknowledged the Existence of 

Mitigating Information is Not a 

Substitute for an Honest 

Consideration and Evaluation of 

Compelling Positive Information 

that Supports Parole[.]

B. The Failure to Obtain and Review 

the Department of Correction 

Psychological Evaluation Violates 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)4, 11, 13, 

and, at a Minimum, Requires a 

Reversal and Remand for 

Consideration of Such Evaluations 

by the Full Board[.]
6 A-2306-15T1

C. The Appellate Division Should 

Confirm that Recommendations of 

Staff and Volunteers Should Not Be 

Suppressed — the Case Should be 

Remanded for Consideration of the 

Two Recommendations that were 

Withdrawn Under the Threat of 

Dismissal[.]

D. The State Relies Heavily on the 

Board's "Subjective Assessment of a 

"Deeply Rooted Pathology" Which, 

Under This Record, is a "Gut 

Feeling" that is Insufficient to 

Deny Parole[.] 

E. The Board's Actions in Submitting 

an Incomplete Record . . . [.]

The scope of appellate review of final decisions of 

administrative agencies is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J.

182, 194 (2011). We do not disturb decisions of the Board, like 

those of other administrative agencies, unless they are 

"arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [are] not supported by 

substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry 

v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580 (1980) (citing Campbell 

v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)); see also

Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 192 (2001)

(Trantino VI). We will set aside an agency decision only "if 

there exists in the reviewing mind a definite conviction that the 

determination below went so far wide of the mark that a mistake 

must have been made." N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. 
7 A-2306-15T1

Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.) (quoting 613 Corp. v. N.J., Div. of 

State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. 485, 495 (App. Div. 1986), certif. 

denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988). 

Berta argues that the Board failed to specifically discuss 

and analyze the weight accorded to each factor, including Berta's 

parole plan, employment and volunteer history prior to 

incarceration and during incarceration, and participation in 

educational and rehabilitate programs. We disagree.

The Supreme Court has held that the Board's "decisions are 

highly 'individualized discretionary appraisals.'" Trantino VI,

supra, 166 N.J. at 173. "Accordingly, the Board 'has broad but 

not unlimited discretionary powers,' and its determinations 'are 

always judicially reviewable for arbitrariness.'" Ibid. (quoting 

Monks v. N.J. State Parole Board, 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973). The 

Board's decisions "depend[] on an amalgam of elements, some of 

which are factual but many of which are purely subjective 

appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with 

the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability 

of parole release." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. 

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 

677 (1979). As the Court observed, parole boards should focus on 

"what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he 

has done." Ibid. (citation omitted).
8 A-2306-15T1

If the crime for which an inmate is incarcerated occurred 

before August 19, 1997, "the Board panel shall determine whether 

. . . by a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a 

substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under 

the laws of the State of New Jersey if released on parole."

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a).3 Thus, when an inmate becomes eligible 

for parole, there is a "presumption in favor of parole," In re 

Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347, 356 (1982) (Trantino 

II), and the burden is on "the State to prove that the prisoner 

is a recidivist and should not be released." Trantino VI, supra, 

166 N.J. at 172 (quoting N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J.

192, 205 (1983)).

This is a "highly predictive" determination, Thompson v. N.J.

State Parole Bd., 210 N.J. Super. 107, 115 (App. Div. 1986) 

(quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 368, 359 

(1973)), which must take into account "the aggregate of all of the 

factors which may have any pertinence." Beckworth, supra, 62 N.J.

at 360. 

 

3 Parole decisions for inmates who are serving sentences for crimes 

committed before August 18, 1997, are governed by the parole 

standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) prior to the 

amendment, whereas parole decisions made for those serving 

sentences for crimes committed after that date are governed by the 

revisions to that statute. Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 336 

N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 523 (2000).
9 A-2306-15T1

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b) (1) to (23) contains a non-exhaustive 

list of factors that the Board may consider in determining whether 

an inmate should be released on parole. Among the pertinent 

factors are "[s]tatements by the inmate reflecting on the 

likelihood that he or she will commit another crime; the failure 

to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation; or the reasonable 

expectation that he or she will violate conditions of parole[]" 

as well as "any other factors deemed relevant[.]" Ibid. "[T]he 

Board [must] focus its attention squarely on the likelihood of 

recidivism." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super.

544, 565 (App. Div. 2002).

Upon review of the record, we find the applicable factors 

were taken into account in reaching the decisions, as evidenced 

by the two-member panel's notice of decision, addendum, and 

confidential addendum, as well as the three-member panel's notice 

of decision, addendum, and confidential addendum. The addendum

to the two-member panel's decision offers noteworthy insight and 

is provided in full:

The crime in this case was the product 

of a toxically manipulative criminal 

personality. Inmate Berta's manipulation of 

his wife, the victim and at least one other 

woman resulted in the cold[-]hearted execution 

of a girlfriend[.] After shooting her with 

her own handgun, he simply left her body in 

her own bathtub and he left on a vacation with 

another lover — using the tickets purchased 
10 A-2306-15T1

by the deceased. His wife and children stayed 

in New Jersey. Trial testimony showed that 

[the victim] was murdered on July 8, 1983. 

Her body was discovered on July 16[,] after 

her parents became concerned when she didn’t 

appear to have returned from the planned 

vacation. The body was in an advanced state 

of decomposition.

Evidently, [i]nmate Berta's relationship 

with [the victim] had become strained after 

he had not sought a divorce from his wife. On 

the same day of the murder, [i]nmate Berta 

left for the vacation with [another 

girlfriend, P.B.]. The Pre-Sentence 

Investigation Report (PSI) summarized some of 

the testimony from trial as follows:

[P.B.] . . . testified that 

when she and [Berta] were at the 

Northwoods Motel in Barnum, 

Minnesota on the night of [July 9, 

1983, Berta] produced a handgun. 

She stated she did not see where the 

gun came from and when she asked 

[Berta what he] was doing with the 

gun, he told her that he always 

carried it with him. She stated 

that she did not see the gun the 

remainder of the trip. [P.B] also 

testified that on the way to the 

airport [Berta] asked her, "Do you 

love me?" She replied in the 

affirmative. He then asked her, "Do 

you believe that I love you?" She 

replied in the negative. [Berta] 

then stated, "You better, I just 

killed [three] people, I'll blow 

your God damn brains out." [Berta] 

also told [P.B.] that she did not 

have to worry about the victim as

she was completely out of the 

picture. It was also learned that 

the victim had given [Berta] $5000 
11 A-2306-15T1

on [June 24, 1983,] and another 

$5000 on [July 7, 1983].

While all of this lethal drama was taking 

place, [i]nmate Berta had a responsible job, 

a wife and children. He had never been 

convicted of any other crimes and he may have 

appeared to all of the world to be a normal, 

successful husband and father and a low risk 

for criminal activity. The profound nature 

of his many manipulations and the cold-blooded

nature of his execution of [the victim] tell 

quite a different story.

Inmate Berta's superficial success on the 

street is mirrored in his seeming success 

during his incarceration. In prison, he has 

taken many programs and has a low Level of 

Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) score of 

[ten]. For many inmates, such a record would 

be a very good sign of growth. However, a 

closer examination of [i]nmate Berta's prison 

programs reveals a mixed picture. He did take 

Anger Management, AA, Houses of Healing and

has sought to enter Palliative Care Program 

and, more recently, Focus on the Victim. The 

bulk of his completed programs, however, have 

been directed at academic or vocational 

interests — Building Trades, Culinary Acts, 

Masonry, U.S. History, Employment Readiness, 

Civil Rights, Urban American History, and 

Introduction to Sociology. Inmate Berta's 

challenge is not so much in finding a job. 

His challenge is in overcoming the truly 

malignant aspects of his manipulative 

personality.

Moreover, his Low LSI-R score is more a 

reflection of his work history on the streets, 

his age and certain other relatively static 

factors. In fact, it is likely that he would 

have similarly low score if he had taken the 

test on the day before his brutal crime. The 

panel finds and assigns less weight to the 
12 A-2306-15T1

LSI-R score and to some of his programs as it 

does to the current nature of his personality.

During his hearing, [i]nmate Berta flatly 

denied committing the murder. Instead, in a 

carefully worded statement, he stated[,]

"[Programs] have given me insight into my 

prior behavior which resulted in [the 

victim's] murder." I accept responsibility 

for that behavior and for the death of [the 

victim]." When pressed to explain what 

actions led to the victim's murder, he said: 

"Well, I was married as you know. I was having 

an affair with her and seeing another woman 

besides and I was aware of the fact that my 

wife did not appreciate me living the 

lifestyle that I was leading and I continued 

to do it anyway, not really caring at that 

time about how anybody felt."

When asked if he was implying that his 

then wife arranged for [the victim's] murder, 

[i]nmate Berta said: "I'm suggesting based on 

the evidence that was brought up during my 

trial, during the investigation, and since 

then, that she might have had some involvement 

in it. Yes."

The [p]anel carefully reviewed various 

statements that were made by [i]nmate Berta 

over time about the murder and his 

involvement. Clearly, his wife was the victim 

of an unfaithful, abusive and extremely 

manipulative husband. His recent denials and 

the attempt to shift blame to his wife are as 

chilling as they are disgusting. These 

statements are inconsistent with the weight 

of the evidence at trial and they are even 

inconsistent with each other.

It is often difficult for a panel to 

assess an offender's personality today 

compared with whom he or she was at the time 

of a long-ago crime. With [i]nmate Berta, 

there is no such difficulty. The panel finds 
13 A-2306-15T1

that [i]nmate Berta is as deeply possessed of 

criminal thinking and the compulsion to 

manipulate as he was when he ended the life 

of a young woman who loved him. The Panel 

finds that his is a deeply rooted pathology 

that is not mitigated by the programs he has 

taken, or the fact that he has a low LSI-R 

score. The [p]anel finds that he is a 

dangerous individual and that there is a 

substantial likelihood that he would commit 

another crime if released on parole.

Within the confidential addendum, the Board also referenced and 

considered the psychologist report. 

Contrary to Berta's assertions, the Board considered all 

applicable mitigating factors, including his achievement and 

maintenance of minimum custody status, and his favorable 

institutional adjustment, his last infraction having been 

committed in 2002. Yet, the Board found these mitigating factors, 

on balance, were outweighed by other factors. Berta's low LSI-R 

was specifically found to be less consequential than Berta's 

psychopathic and manipulative disposition. As such, the Board was 

well within its discretion to conclude there existed a substantial 

likelihood that Berta would commit a crime if released.

In the Board's assessment of Berta's likely future behavior, 

it relied on a "subjective appraisal" predicated upon its 

experience in parole-release decisions. The Board's decision to 

grant or deny parole requires a careful review of data gathered 

from various sources to create a rational basis from which it can 
14 A-2306-15T1

make an informed prediction of an inmate’s future behavior. This 

decision-making process is inherently fraught with subjectivity. 

We thus accord the Board broad discretion. Puchalski v. N.J. 

State Parole Bd., 104 N.J. Super. 294, 300 (App. Div.), aff'd, 55 

N.J. 113 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938, 90 S. Ct. 1841, 26 

L. Ed. 2d 270 (1970).

In sum, after our independent review of the record, we are 

satisfied that the Board's decision was supported by sufficient, 

credible facts in the record, including the Board's confidential 

appendices. See Greenholtz, supra, 442 U.S. at 9-10, 99 S. Ct.

at 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 677. The Board assessed the relevant 

factors, fully documented, and supported its decision pursuant to 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-318(f). In light of the Board's assessment of 

Berta, and mindful that we "must give 'due regard' to the ability 

of the factfinder" with expertise in this field to judge 

credibility, T.H. v. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 381 N.J. 

Super. 366, 381-82 (App. Div. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 189 

N.J. 478 (2007), we conclude that the decision was not arbitrary 

or capricious.

Berta also contends that the Board's imposition of a FET 

outside of the presumptive guideline was arbitrary, capricious, 

and unreasonable. We disagree. 
15 A-2306-15T1

An inmate serving a sentence for murder is ordinarily assigned 

a twenty-seven month FET after a denial of parole. N.J.A.C.

10A:71-3.21(a)(1). The Board in its discretion may add or deduct 

nine months to this FET. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(c). However, in 

cases where an ordinary FET is "clearly inappropriate due to the 

inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood 

of future criminal behavior[,]" a three-member panel may impose a 

FET in excess of administrative guidelines. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.21(d). Further, "[i]n making the determination that the 

establishment of a future parole eligibility date pursuant to (a) 

or (b) and (c) above is clearly inappropriate, the three-member 

panel shall consider the factors enumerated in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.11." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).4 

Appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for that 

of the Board with respect to denial of parole or the setting of a

FET. See Cestari, supra, 224 N.J. Super. at 547; see also In re 

Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982).

In this matter, the Board established a 120-month FET:

In establishing this [FET], the Board 

panel recognized that at the time of the 

 

4 Parenthetically, for an inmate who committed a crime prior to

August 19, 1997, such as Berta, the FET is reduced by credits. A

FET for an inmate serving a sentence for a crime committed on or 

after to August 19, 1997 is not reduced by credits. See N.J.A.C.

10A:71-3.2(i); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56(b).
16 A-2306-15T1

murder in this case, you had a clean criminal 

record and a very good work record, you were 

relatively well educated with a wife and 

children, and overall, you seemingly 

maintained an "outward appearance" of a 

normal, successful husband and father. 

However, the jury's verdict finding you guilty 

of the murder of [the victim] reveals your 

manipulation of your wife, the victim and at 

least one other woman resulting in the 

execution of your girlfriend[.] In assessing 

your present state of thinking at your 

hearing, the Board panel determined that, 

depending on your audience, your current 

version of the facts of the murder varies from 

outright denial, to mitigation of your actions 

leading up to the murder, to the suggestion 

of mere coincidence and supposition that your 

wife committed the murder, yet you accept 

responsibility for your "actions." Having the 

opportunity to assess your credibility, the 

Board panel finds that you have little to no 

credibility when it comes to questions that 

involve the murder or your personality and 

that you are as deeply possessed of criminal 

thinking and the likelihood to manipulate as 

you were when you ended the life of a young 

woman with whom you had a relationship. Your

disposition of manipulation continued even 

after many years of incarceration, thus 

revealing a lack of satisfactory progress in 

reducing the likelihood of future criminal 

behavior.

The Board enunciated specific reasons for the imposition of 

a 120-month FET. Particularly, the Board noted several reasons 

for establishing a FET outside of the administrative guidelines. 

This included Berta's overall institutional adjustment and his 

insufficient problem resolution. Although the Board noted that 

Berta's last infraction occurred in 2002, and his seven infractions 
17 A-2306-15T1

were minor in nature, the Board found there was "evidence of an 

inability or unwillingness to restrict [his] behavior to meet the 

rules and requirements of incarceration." Moreover, the Board 

detailed its findings regarding Berta's lack of insight into his 

violent behavior, denial of his crime, and minimization of his 

conduct. 

Although the 120-month FET is lengthy, the Board's decision 

was reached on sufficient credible evidence amply supported by the 

record and well within the Board's broad discretion; the imposition 

of a lengthier FET here is neither arbitrary nor capricious. See

Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J. at 24 (citing Brady v. Dep't of Pers., 

149 N.J. 244, 256 (1997). See, e.g., McGowan, supra, 347 N.J. 

Super. at 565 (upholding the establishment of a thirty-year FET).

See also Johnson v. Paparozzi, 219 F. Supp. 2d 635, 642-43 (D.N.J. 

2002) (rejecting an inmate's argument that the setting of a 120-

month FET was unconstitutional where the panel complies with the 

direction of N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21 and considers the twenty-three 

factors enumerated in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11).

Additionally, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d)(4), the 

Board provided a written statement of reasons for the establishment 

of a FET differing from the presumptive guideline established in 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a). While regard was also given to mitigating 

factors, which the Board enumerated in its decision, based on 
18 A-2306-15T1

"sufficient credible evidence in the whole record," the balance 

weighed in favor of denying parole and in fixing Berta's FET at 

120 months. See Cestari, supra, 154 N.J. Super at 547. 

Having reviewed the record in light of these well-settled 

standards, including the psychological evaluation and other 

materials in the confidential appendix, we conclude that 

appellant's arguments are without merit. We are satisfied that 

the Board considered the "aggregate of all pertinent factors," 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(a). The totality of the aggravating factors, 

supported by the record, provided the Board with sufficient bases 

to deny parole and impose the FET. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d). In 

sum, the Board's decision is entitled to our deference.

Affirmed.