93d Congress, 1st Session Senate Document No. 93-41

AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

VETO MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OE THE UNITED STATES

RETURNING

WITHOUT APPROVAL THE BILL (S. 1317) ENTITLED

“THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF* 1973”

October 26,1973.— Read and ordered to be printed

99-011 o

U.S. GOVERNMENT. PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1973
To the Senate of the United States:

I am returning today without my approval S. 1317, the United 

States Information Agency Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973.

The major purpose of this bill is to authorize appropriations for 

operation of the USIA during fiscal year 1974. Unfortunately, however, the Congress has injected a separate issue which, in good conscience, I must oppose.

Traditionally, when it is deemed necessary for a Department or 

Agency to withhold certain confidential information that has been 

requested by the Congress, the President issues a directive or statement 

prohibiting the disclosure of such information and explaining the 

reasons for his action. The two branches then explore means of compromise by which data can be supplied in a way that is consistent with 

the constitutional obligations of each branch.

Section 4 of S. 1317 ignores this precedent. Instead, it would penalize the USIA with a possible cut-off of funds if it failed to meet a demand for confidential internal information made by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations or the House Committee on Foreign Affairs—however unreasonable that demand might be.

The Justice Department has advised me that section 4 is an unconstitutional attempt on the part of the Congress to undermine the President’s constitutional responsibility to withhold the disclosure of information when, in his judgment, such disclosure would be contrary to the 

public interest. From George Washington on, my predecessors have 

defended this Presidential responsibility, recognizing that the traditional division of powers and comity between the executive and legislative branches must be maintained. I intend to do no less.

A practical effect of section 4 would be to restrict the USIA access 

to sensitive foreign policy information essential to carrying out its 

mission. The Agency could also be forced to disclose internal documents and working papers which do not represent approved policy. 

Failure of the Congress to respect the confidentiality of such papers 

would prevent a free and frank exchange of views within the USIA 

and between it and other parts of the executive branch—an exchange 

that is vital if the USIA is to function as an effective arm of American foreign policy.

This Administration has invoked Executive privilege to withhold 

information only in the most compelling circumstances and only after 

thorough, thoughtful evaluation of the facts. As evidence of our good 

faith, the USIA has complied as fully as possible with every Congressional request for information during the authorization and appropriations hearings this year, and will continue to do so. For example, it provided the Senate Foreign Relations Committee alone with 

detailed answers to more than one hundred substantive questions prior 

to this year’s authorization hearings.

If a President failed to take a stand in this instance to protect the 

division of powers and uphold the doctrine of Executive privilege, the

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door would be opened to even more serious encroachments on the constitutional system. Already, provisions similar to those in section 4 

are contained in two vital bills at very advanced stages in the legislative process—S. 2335, the economic foreign assistance authorization 

bill, and S. 1443, the security assistance authorization bill.

The issue at stake is simple. It involves far more than the confidential documents of the USIA or our other foreign affairs and national 

security agencies. Rather, it involves the preservation of the basic 

ability of the executive branch to continue to function and perform 

the responsibilities assigned to it by the Constitution. Unless privacy 

in the preliminary exchange of views between personnel of the Executive agencies can be maintained, the healthy expression of opinion and 

the frank, forthright interplay of ideas that are essential to sound 

policy and effective administration cannot survive.

Richard Nixon.

T he White H ouse, October 23,1973.