FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION 

RICHARD GUINO, a french trust,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 07-15582 JEAN-EMMANUEL RENOIR, an

individual, D.C. No.  Defendant-Appellant, CV-03-01310-MHM

and

BESEDER INC., doing business as

Rima Fine Art; DROR DAREL,

husband; TRACY L. PENWELL, wife,

Defendants. 

SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION 

RICHARD GUINO, a french trust,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 07-15583 JEAN-EMMANUEL RENOIR, an

individual, D.C. No.  Defendant, CV-03-01310-MHM

and

BESEDER INC., doing business as

Rima Fine Art; DROR DAREL,

husband; TRACY L. PENWELL, wife,

Defendants-Appellants. 

16111
SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION 

RICHARD GUINO, a french trust,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

RICHARD W. MORRIS; MORRIS LAW

FIRM, PLLC, No. 07-17209

Appellants,

D.C. No.

v.  CV-03-01310-MHM

JEAN-EMMANUEL RENOIR, an OPINION

individual; BESEDER INC., doing

business as Rima Fine Art; DROR

DAREL, husband; TRACY L.

PENWELL, wife,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Mary H. Murguia, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 20, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed December 9, 2008

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Dorothy W. Nelson and

Stephen Reinhardt, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge D. W. Nelson

16112 SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR
COUNSEL

David Steiner and Michael Hambly, Steiner & Associates,

PLC, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellantplaintiff-cross-appellee Jean-Emmanuel Renoir. 

Joshua Kaufman, Venable LLP, Washington, DC, for

defendants-appellants-plaintiffs-cross-appellees Beseder Inc.,

Dror Darel, Tracy Penwell, and CSTPGU, LLC. 

Richard Morris, Surprise, Arizona; Richard Stevens, Phoenix,

Arizona, for plaintiff-appellee-defendant-cross-appellant

Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino. 

OPINION

D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge: 

Beseder, Inc., Dror Darel, Tracy Penwell, and CSTPGU

LLC (collectively “Beseder”) and Jean-Emmanuel Renoir

(“Renoir”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Societe Civile (“Societe”) on Societe’s copyright infringement claim. Societe and Renoir appeal other

issues unrelated to the finding of copyright infringement

which are discussed in an accompanying memorandum disposition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

French artist Pierre-Auguste Renoir and one of his assistants, Richard Guino, created the eleven sculptures at issue

between 1913 and 1917 (“the sculptures”). The sculptures

were first published in France no later than 1917 under PierreAuguste Renoir’s name. There was no pre-1978 publication

containing an American-style copyright notice. 

16116 SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR
In 1973, Guino obtained a determination by the French

Supreme Court that he was a co-author to certain works of

sculpture by Pierre-Auguste Renoir, including the sculptures

at issue, and he was awarded a one-half interest in the RenoirGuino sculptures. 

In 1974, the sculptures were exhibited as Renoir-Guino

works for sale at the Hotel Bristol in Paris. 

In 1982, the Guino family and certain members of the

Renoir family (not including appellant, Pierre-Auguste

Renoir’s great grandson, Renoir) entered into an agreement,

providing that the Guino family would thereafter control production and reproduction of the sculptures using plaster casts

from the originals. Under this agreement, the Guino family

received exclusive rights to create subsequent editions. A trust

(hereinafter “Societe”) was formed to implement the Guino

family’s rights under the agreement. 

In 1984, Societe obtained U.S. Copyright Office registrations for the sculptures, and in the registrations represented

that the sculptures were either first published in England in

1983 or unpublished. 

In 2003, Renoir sold some of the sculptures, or molds or

castings thereof, to Beseder, who advertised and sold the

sculptures and castings at its gallery in Scottsdale, Arizona. 

On July 10, 2003, Societe filed its complaint against

Beseder and Renoir (Renoir’s mother, Hernandez, was added

later as a defendant), alleging federal copyright infringement

under 17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. and false designation and false

description of sponsorship in violation of the Lanham Act.

Societe alleged that Renoir and Beseder (collectively, the

“Defendants”) engaged in sales, marketing, and reproduction

activities in 2003 that infringed upon Societe’s copyrights in

the sculptures. Although Defendants disagree with some of

Societe’s characterizations, they generally admit that “if

SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR 16117
Societe had legitimate, existing copyright interests under

American law in the sculptures, then some of Renoir’s and the

Beseder Defendants’ actions would constitute infringing

acts.” 

In late 2003, both Beseder and Renoir answered the complaint, alleging that the sculptures were in the public domain.

In late 2004, Societe moved for partial summary judgment

on liability of its copyright claims, but leaving open for trial

the question of damages. Societe contended that if the sculptures had fallen into the public domain, they were nonetheless

subject to restoration under 17 U.S.C. § 104A. Defendants

opposed the motion and asserted cross-motions for partial

summary judgment on Societe’s copyright claims. 

On January 30, 2006, the district court (after an initial September 2005 order, motions for reconsideration by Defendants, and an order granting reconsideration) entered partial

summary judgment for Societe on its claim for copyright

infringement and denied the Defendants’ cross-motions for

summary judgment. Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino

v. Beseder, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 944, 952 (D. Ariz. 2006).

The district court, relying on Twin Books v. Walt Disney Co.,

83 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the sculptures were not

in the public domain because the publications were in a foreign country and without notice of the U.S. copyright.

Societe, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 951. The district court, therefore,

concluded that 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act

applied because the sculptures were “created before January

1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain or copyrighted.” Id. at 952. Under § 303(a), the sculptures were protected

for seventy years after the death of the last surviving author.

Id. Because Guino passed away in 1973, the sculptures were

entitled to copyright protection until 2043. Id. The district

court, however, was critical of both the reasoning of Twin

Books and the “unreasonable result” it requires when applied

16118 SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR
to a pre-1978 work that was published in a foreign country

but not republished with a notice of copyright. Id. at 949-51.

On May 24, 2006, Judge Mary Murguia became the presiding judge in this case. 

Defendants petitioned this court to allow an interlocutory

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This court denied the

petition on May 26, 2006, without considering the merits. 

The issues of copyright infringement damages, among

other claims, were tried to a jury in October 2006. On

November 2, 2006, a jury awarded $125,000 in damages to

Societe on its copyright infringement claims against Defendants for ten of the eleven sculptures (the district court

directed a verdict in favor of Defendants concerning one

sculpture, Venus Victrix). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews “a district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo.” Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co.,

321 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2003). Questions of law are

reviewed de novo. Beeman v. TDI Managed Care Servs., 449

F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006). “Whether a particular work

is subject to copyright protection is a mixed question of fact

and law subject to de novo review.” Cavalier v. Random

House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). 

DISCUSSION

I. Copyright Protection of the Sculptures 

Whether the sculptures are protected by copyright turns on

analyses of both the 1909 and the 1976 Copyright Acts. 

SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR 16119
a. Copyright Protection for works published/created prior

to 1978

1. 1909 Act 

“Under the 1909 Act, an unpublished work was protected

by state common law copyright from the moment of its creation until it was published or until it received protection

under the federal copyright scheme.” La Cienega Music Co.

v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 1995), superceded by

statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C. § 303(b). When a work

was published, it lost common law protection. See id. at 953.

The owner could obtain federal protection for the published

work by complying with the 1909 Act’s requirements; otherwise, the work entered the public domain. ABKCO Music,

Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2000). Under § 9

of the 1909 Act, “[a]ny person . . . may secure copyright for

his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright

required by this title.” 

The 1909 Act provided that an author was entitled to

twenty-eight years of protection from the date he secured a

copyright on a work, and that the copyright could, before the

first twenty-eight-year period expired, be renewed for another

twenty-eight-year term. See Twin Books, 84 F.3d at 1165. 

2. The 1976 Act 

The Copyright Act of 1976 changed the basis of copyright

protection from publication of a work to creation of a work.

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 (2003). That

change applies to works “created on or after January 1, 1978.”

17 U.S.C. § 302. In making that change, Congress also provided copyright protection terms for works created before

1978. Currently, copyright law protects four types of works:

(1) works created on or after January 1, 1978, id. § 302; (2)

works copyrighted as of January 1, 1978, id. § 304; (3) works

“created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the

16120 SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR
public domain or copyrighted,” id. § 303(a); and (4) foreign

works not in the public domain in their country but in the public domain, for enumerated reasons, in the United States, id.

§ 104A. 

Section 302 does not apply because the sculptures were

created between 1913 and 1917. Neither does § 304, because

the works were not copyrighted until 1984. Whether the

sculptures are protected by §§ 303(a) or 104A turns on

whether the sculptures passed into the public domain in the

United States. 

b. Pre-1978 works and the public domain: Twin Books

The copyright statute does not define the phrase “public

domain.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, a

work enters the public domain when it is published in the

United States without copyright protection. ABKCO Music,

217 F.3d at 688 (“When a work was published, it lost common law protection. . . . The owner could obtain federal protection for the published work by complying with the 1909

Act’s requirements; otherwise, the work entered the public

domain.”). 

Publication in a foreign country affects whether the work

is published without copyright protection, and thereby affects

whether the work is in the public domain in the U.S. In Twin

Books, this court held “that publication without a copyright

notice in a foreign country [does] not put the work in the public domain in the United States.” 83 F.3d at 1167. In Twin

Books, a book, Bambi, A Life in the Woods, was published in

Germany in 1923 without copyright notice and then again

published in 1926 in Germany with copyright notice. Copyright was registered in the U.S. in 1927 and renewed in 1954.

Id. at 1164. Under the 1909 Act, copyright must be renewed

within twenty-eight years of the commencement of copyright

protection. Id. at 1165. Therefore, the 1954 renewal was

timely if the copyright protection began with the 1926 publiSOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR 16121
cation, but not if protection began with the 1923 publication.

See id. at 1168. 

[1] Although the Twin Books court found that the public

domain question was “heatedly debated,” id. at 1166, the

court held that “publication without a copyright notice in a

foreign country did not put the work in the public domain in

the United States.” Id. at 1167. In support of its conclusion,

the court cited Supreme Court decisions holding “that United

States copyright law should not be given extraterritorial

effect.” Id. at 1166. The court also adopted the holding in

Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946),

reading Heim to hold that “publication without a copyright

notice in a foreign country did not put the work in the public

domain in the United States.” Twin Books, 83 F.3d at 1167.

[2] The court then addressed whether the 1923 publication

without notice in Germany commenced the term of U.S.

copyright protection. Id. The court looked to the language of

the 1909 Act to reject “the proposition that publication abroad

without notice of copyright secures protection under the 1909

Copyright Act.” Id. at 1168. As a result, between 1923 and

1926, the book was neither in the public domain, nor protected by copyright. Id. at 1167. The court found that the

copyright term commenced in 1926, when the book was

republished in Germany with notice of copyright, and the

1954 renewal was timely. Id. at 1168. 

c. Application of Twin Books to this case: were the

sculptures in the public domain or protected by copyright?

[3] Applying Twin Books, the sculptures in this case were

not in the public domain. The sculptures were published in

France as Renoir works in 1917. The sculptures were published as Renoir-Guino works in 1974, in an exhibition held

in Paris. Neither party asserts that the sculptures were published with notice of U.S. copyright either in 1917 or 1974.

16122 SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR
Because those publications were in a foreign country and

without notice of United States copyright, they “did not put

the work in the public domain in the United States.” Twin

Books, 83 F.3d at 1167. 

[4] Furthermore, because the sculptures were never published with copyright notice, under Twin Books, the sculptures

were not protected by copyright under the 1909 Act. See id.

at 1168 (rejecting “the proposition that publication abroad

without notice of copyright secures protection under the 1909

Copyright Act”). For the years between 1917 and 1978, therefore, the sculptures were neither protected by copyright nor

injected into the public domain. See id. at 1167. 

[5] An analysis under the 1976 Act is required to determine

Societe’s rights in the sculptures between 1978 and the time

of its claim in 2003. The Copyright Restoration Act, 17

U.S.C. § 104A, permits restoration of copyright protection for

foreign works that are not in the public domain in their home

country but are in the public domain in the United States

because of noncompliance with formalities imposed at any

time by United States copyright law, including lack of proper

notice. The sculptures would not be entitled to protection

under this section because, pursuant to Twin Books, the sculptures have not passed into the public domain as required by

§ 104A(h)(6)(c) as they were published abroad without copyright notice. See Twin Books, 83 F.3d at 1167. 

[6] Section 303(a) of the 1976 Act applies because the

sculptures were “created before January 1, 1978, but not

theretofore in the public domain or copyrighted.” 17 U.S.C.

§ 303(a). The sculptures were created between 1913 and

1917. Pursuant to Twin Books, the sculptures have not passed

into the public domain, 83 F.3d at 1167, and were not protected by copyright after foreign publication without notice,

see id. at 1168. The sculptures were not copyrighted until

1984. Section 303(a) provides protection for the term provided by § 302, which is a term seventy years after the death

SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR 16123
of the last surviving author. Because Guino passed away in

1973, the sculptures are entitled to protection until 2043,

which the district court properly held.1

d. Can Twin Books be distinguished on a principled

basis?

Defendants offer three reasons for their contention that

Twin Books is distinguishable and therefore should not apply.

None is persuasive. 

[7] First, Defendants argue that Twin Books should not

apply here because there was no foreign publication with

notice within a few years or while the 1909 Act was in effect.

This distinction does not warrant a limited application of Twin

Books. Nothing in Twin Books suggests that the republication

of the work with notice was essential to its holding that foreign publication without notice did not trigger copyright protection. Indeed, the Twin Books court describes the very

situation that this case raises: the status of the work after foreign publication without notice. “During [the years before

publication with notice], anyone could have sold the Bambi

book in the United States or made some derivative movie of

the Bambi book.” Twin Books, 83 F.3d at 1167. Although it

is unclear how this status differs from the public domain, the

Twin Books court clearly contemplated the status of works

like the sculptures, which were between publication without

notice and publication with notice. As such, Twin Books

1Although not pressed on appeal, it is worth noting that § 303(a) also

provides that “if the work is published on or before December 31, 2002,

the term of copyright shall not expire before December 31, 2047.” Under

the 1976 Act, the sculptures may have been published “before December

31, 2002,” because they were distributed for public sale in 1917 and 1974.

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“Publication” is defined as “the distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership”).

Although perhaps a minor distinction, the district court conducted no

inquiry into whether the sculptures were published for purposes of the

1976 Act. 

16124 SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR
squarely controls the decision here and is binding precedent.

Cf. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001)

(stating that “a later three-judge panel considering a case that

is controlled by the rule announced in an earlier panel’s opinion has no choice but to apply the earlier-adopted rule”). 

Second, Defendants argue that Twin Books should not

apply because of a possible conflict between certain Twin

Books language and the copyright protection accorded to the

sculptures. In Twin Books, the court stated: 

the clear language of section 10 of the 1909 Act provides that an author ‘may secure copyright for his

work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title.’ There is absolutely no

way to interpret that language to mean that an author

may secure copyright protection for his work by

publishing it without any notice of copyright. 

83 F.3d at 1168. From this, Defendants conclude that Twin

Books “does not stand for the proposition that works, which

have never been published with a copyright notice, are protected by U.S. copyright law.” 

[8] The language at issue, however, is not inconsistent with

the application of Twin Books in this case. The district court

did not grant copyright protection to a work that had only

been published abroad without copyright notice. Instead, the

district court’s holding was entirely consistent with Twin

Books because it held that from 1917 to 1978 (before the 1976

Act granted protection), the sculptures were neither protected

by copyright nor placed in the public domain. Twin Books, 83

F.3d at 1167 (noting that for years after publication without

notice and before publication with notice, “anyone could have

sold the [work] in the United States or made some derivative

movie of the [work]”). The district court held only that copyright protection began in 1978, when § 303(a) of the 1976 Act

granted a copyright term of seventy years after the death of

SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR 16125
the last author (in this case Guino in 1973). Societe, 414 F.

Supp. 2d at 952. 

Third, Defendants argue that Twin Books should not be

applied to this case because the sculptures were published

before 1923, and the Bambi book was published in 1923.

Twin Books, 83 F.3d at 1164. Thus, their argument goes, this

court should hold that pre-1923 publications abroad without

notice triggered copyright protection, while constraining the

Twin Books holding that publication abroad without notice did

not trigger copyright protection to only post-1923 publications. 

[9] The year 1923 is significant because the 1976 Act,

which became effective on January 1, 1978, and the 1998

Copyright Extension Act, operate together to create a bright

line rule for which works are now in the public domain:

works published before January 1, 1923, are generally in the

public domain. Section 304(b) of the 1976 Act at its passage

provided: “The duration of any copyright, the renewal term of

which is subsisting at any time between December 31, 1976,

and December 31, 1977, inclusive . . . is extended to endure

for a term of seventy-five years from the date copyright was

originally secured.” However, a series of interim extensions

passed before the 1976 Act extended a renewal term that

would have expired between September 19, 1962, and

December 31, 1976, to December 31, 1976. See Pub. L. 87-

668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962); Pub. L. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581 (1965);

Pub. L. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (1967); Pub. L. 90-416, 82 Stat.

397 (1968); Pub. L. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360 (1969); Pub. L. 91-

555, 84 Stat. 1441 (1970); Pub. L. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490

(1971); Pub. L. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181 (1972); Pub. L. 93-573,

88 Stat. 1873 (1974); 3-9 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 9.11[A], at pp. 9-148 to 9-149.

Consequently, the 1976 Act grants works subject to the above

interim extensions a nineteen-year extension of the renewal

term from the time the twenty-eight year term would have

expired, for a total of seventy-five years of protection. See 3-

16126 SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR
9 Nimmer on Copyright § 9.11[A], at p. 9-149. And although

the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act

extended the copyright in all subsisting works for another

twenty years, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b), it did not rescue any work

from the public domain or recapture protection for that work,

see id.; 3-9 Nimmer on Copyright § 9.11[B][1], at pp. 9-152

to 9-153. Thus, a work published before January 1, 1923,

received, at most, protection for seventy-five years,2 such that

after December 31, 1997, any work published before January

1, 1923, was in the public domain. See United States Copyright Office, How to Investigate the Copyright Status of a

Work, Circular 22, at 8 (2006) (“[T]he U.S. copyright in any

work published or copyrighted prior to January 1, 1923, has

expired by operation of law, and the work has permanently

fallen into the public domain in the United States.”); United

States Copyright Office, Extension of Copyright Terms, Circular 15t, at 3 (2004) (same); 3-9A Nimmer on Copyright,

§ 9A.04[A][1][b][iv], at p. 9A-26.3 (“Because protection for

works first published anywhere in the world earlier than 1923

has since expired, those works are not subject to current U.S.

protection . . . .”). 

Therefore, the argument goes, by the time of Defendants’

alleged infringing activity in 2003, the sculptures had already

entered the public domain in 1992, seventy-five years after

the 1917 publication, and there could be no copyright

infringement. 

[10] This difference in the dates of publication, however, is

not enough to distinguish Twin Books on a principled basis.

The Twin Books court did not raise the significance of the

1923 date. Nor did it cite the 1976 Act or its effect on works

2Protection for works published before September 19, 1906, would have

expired before Congress’ interim extensions began in 1962, and thus

receive, at maximum, two twenty-eight-year terms of protection. Pub. L.

87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962); 3-9 Nimmer on Copyright § 9.11[A], at pp.

9-149 to 9-150. 

SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR 16127
originally governed by the 1909 Act. The significance of the

year 1923 in copyright is such that if the Twin Books court

wanted to draw a distinction, it would have. The absence of

such citations indicates that the Twin Books court did not

intend to draw a line between works published before and

after January 1, 1923. Whether the Twin Books court should

have drawn a distinction is a matter more appropriately

addressed en banc. 

[11] Furthermore, if this court were to agree with Defendants and distinguish Twin Books from this case, the court

would be creating questionable law just to contain another

arguably questionable law. By following Defendants’ argument, this court would create a rule that treats works published abroad without notice before 1923 differently from

those published after 1923, by finding that the former’s copyright term began with publication, while the latter’s, per Twin

Books, did not. See 83 F.3d at 1168. As explained above, it

is true that, by operation of the 1976 and 1998 Acts, the copyright terms of a work published before 1923 and one published after 1923 may be different. But there is no basis to

treat a work published abroad without notice in 1923 differently from one published in 1922 for purposes of when copyright protection begins. 

Although the reasoning of Twin Books can be, and has

been, criticized, it is still binding in this circuit. We are thus

bound to follow it. See Hart, 266 F.3d at 1170 (“[A] later

three-judge panel considering a case that is controlled by the

rule announced in an earlier panel’s opinion has no choice but

to apply the earlier-adopted rule.”). 

II. The Constitutionality of Twin Books

Beseder argues, in the alternative, that application of Twin

Books to this case violates the Constitution and Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), by creating a limitless term of

U.S. Copyright for works published abroad. The Copyright

16128 SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR
and Patent Clause of the Constitution states: “Congress shall

have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by

securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . . the exclusive

Right to their . . . Writings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In

Eldred, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the

Copyright Term Extension Act because the extended term

was finite and definable. 537 U.S. at 199-200 (a “limited

Tim[e]” means “confine[d] with certain bounds,” “restrain[ed],” or “circumscribe[d]”). 

[12] Beseder argues, citing Nimmer on Copyright, that

under the Twin Books rationale, a newly discovered ancient

Greek work, “published obviously without notice a millennia

ago,” would not be in the public domain and would still be

eligible for copyright protection, thus creating a limitless

copyright term. See 1-4 Nimmer on Copyright § 4.01[C][1], at

4-10.1. While an ancient work may be protected today under

the ruling of Twin Books, the term is not limitless. Instead, the

copyright term for a newly discovered ancient work that is not

in the public domain or copyrighted would be limited to a

finite term of seventy years after the death of the last author,

§§ 303(a), 302(a), (b), or December 31, 2047, whichever is

later, § 303(a); see also 1-4 Nimmer on Copyright

§ 4.01[C][1], at 4-10.1 n.35.23; 3-9 Nimmer on Copyright

§ 9.09[A], at 9-133. Thus, Twin Books does not conflict with

either the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution or

Eldred. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find that Defendants

infringed Societe’s copyrights in the sculptures. We therefore

AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Societe on its copyright infringement claim. 

AFFIRMED 

SOCIETE CIVILE SUCCESSION v. RENOIR 16129