BENJAMIN WASHBURNE ET AL. v. TOWN OF MADISON ET AL. (AC 38721)
Alvord, Sheldon and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff W, individually and on behalf of her minor son, B, who had sustained a broken leg when he was kicked in the shin area by another student while playing soccer in a third grade physical education class, sought to recover damages for negligence from the defendants, the town of Madison, the town’s Board of Education, the principal of the elementary school where B was injured, and D, a substitute physical educationteacherwho was supervising B’s class atthe time ofhis injury. W alleged that B was not wearing shin guards at the time he was injured and that the defendants did not provide B or other children with shin guards, which she alleged violated existing school policies and resulted in B’s injuries. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment on the ground of governmental immunity and rendered judgment thereon, from which W appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the courthaving determined that the acts or omissions underlying W’s negligence claims were discretionary in nature and, thus, subject to governmental immunity; the defendants having presented evidence to demonstrate that the decision of whether to require shin guards involved the exercise of judgment and, thus, inherently was discretionary in nature, and W having failed to meet her burden of demonstrating the existence of a clear and unequivocal policy or other written directive mandating the use of shin guards by the town’s third grade students, W failed to establish her claim that a genuine issue of material fact existed about whether safety guidelines in the board’s physical education guide, specifically, a provision indicating that students shouldwearshinguards foradditionalprotection, created aministerial duty the implementation of which was not protected by governmental immunity, as she did not produce any regulation, rule or other directive promulgated by the town or the board that required all students to wear shin guards whenever playing soccer. 2. W could not prevail on her claim that, even if the defendants’ acts or omissions were discretionary in nature, there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether B had been subject to imminent harm and, thus, fell within the identifiable person/imminent harm exception to governmental immunity; Wpresented no evidence that D orthe other defendants were aware that an injury similar to the one suffered by B

was so likely to happen that they should have acted to prevent it by requiring the students to wear shin guards, nor did W present any evidence to dispute certain ofthe board’s interrogatory answers, which demonstrated that the probability ofsoccer related injuries in gym class

was very low, or to show that the number of injuries was low because students usually wore shin guards when playing soccer, and although W presented evidence that it was apparent to the defendants that an injury to a child playing soccer without shin guards could occur, the foreseeability of such an injury did not translate to imminent harm without a showing that the probability that the injury would occur from the lack of shin guards was high enough to necessitate that the defendants act to prevent it. Argued March 9—officially released August 15, 2017

Procedural History Actiontorecoverdamagesforthe defendants’ alleged negligence, broughtto the Superior Courtinthejudicial district of New Haven, where the court, Nazzaro, J., granted the defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment and rendered judgment thereon; thereafter, the courtdenied the plaintiffs’ motion to reargue, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed

. Hugh D. Hughes, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Flood and Alexander Bates, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Matthew Dallas Gordon, with whom, on the brief,
was Nicholas Norton Ouellette, for the appellees (defendants).Opinion PRESCOTT, J. The plaintiff, Jennifer Washburne, who brought the underlying action on behalf of her minor son, the plaintiff Benjamin Washburne (Benjamin), and herself individually,1 appeals from the summaryjudgmentrenderedbythetrialcourtinfavorofthe defendants—the town of Madison (town); the town’s Board of Education (board); Kelly Spooner, the principal of Ryerson Elementary School (Ryerson Elementary); and Erik Delehanty, a substitute physical education teacher—on the ground that the action was barred by governmental immunity.2 According to the complaint, Benjamin’s leg was broken when he was kicked in the shin or ankle by another student while playing soccer at school. The incident occurred during
a physical education class at Ryerson Elementary that Delehantywas supervising. The defendants didnotprovide Benjamin or the other children with shin guards, and Benjamin was not wearing shin guards at the time he was injured, which the plaintiff alleged violated existing school policies and resulted in Benjamin’s injuries.
The plaintiff claims on appeal that the court improperly rendered summary judgment as a matter of law despite the existence ofgenuine issues ofmaterial fact regarding (1) whether safety guidelines in a curriculum guide, which provided that students playing soccer should ‘‘wear shin guards for additional protection,’’ imposed aministerial duty on the defendants to require the use of shin guards by students, and (2) whether,
even if such a duty was discretionary, Benjamin had been subject to imminent harm and, thus, an exception to governmental immunity was applicable. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm thejudgment ofthe trial court.
The record before the court, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, reveals the following facts and procedural history. On March 16, 2010, Benjamin was a third grade student at Ryerson Elementary. On that day, as part of an organized activity during a gym class supervised by Delehanty, Benjamin and his classmates were permitted to play soccer on the school’s athletic field. Before allowingthemtoplay, Delehantyinstructedthe children about safety and the rules of the game, but he did not require the children to wear shin guards. Several minutes into the scrimmage, Benjamin was kicked in the shin or ankle by another student, which resulted in
a fracture to Benjamin’s lower left tibia and fibula.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants on February 3, 2012. The complaint contained eight counts, each sounding innegligence. Count
one invoked General Statutes § 52-557n and claimed that Benjamin’s injuries were the result of negligence by the town. The next three counts of the complaint,which also were brought on behalfofBenjamin, alleged negligence on the part of Spooner, Delehanty, and the board, respectively. The remaining four counts, one against each of the defendants, were brought by the plaintiff in her individual capacity to recover funds spentcaringforBenjamin’sinjuries andonhisrecovery. The gravamen of the plaintiff’s negligence claims was that rules, policies, or procedures ofthe school district required students to wear shin guards when playing soccer, but no shin guards were provided to Benjamin
on the day he was injured.3
The defendants filed an answer to the complaint on November 20, 2012, denying the negligence allegations. They also asserted by way of a special defense that the town and its agents were immune from liability for any alleged negligence on the basis of governmental immunity, citing § 52-557n (a) (2) (B). The plaintifffiled
a reply denying all allegations of the special defense.
On August 1, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendants claimed that they
were entitledtojudgmentonall counts ofthe complaint
as a matter of law because of the discretionary act immunityaffordedby § 52-557n (a) (2) (B), andbecause theplaintiffcouldnotshowthatBenjaminwasanidentifiable person subject to imminent harm, as required to fall within the relevant exception to governmental immunity. In support of the motion for summaryjudgment, the defendants submitted a memorandum oflaw attached to which were excerpts from copies of the depositions of Spooner and Delehanty.
The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment on March 19, 2015. According to the plaintiff, there were genuine issues ofmaterial fact that should be resolved by thejury concerning whether the defendants had a ministerial duty, as set forth in a school policy or directive, to ensure that students wore shin guards whenplaying soccerat school. The plaintiff further argued that, even ifthe decision to require shin guards was discretionary in nature, there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Benjamin
was an identifiable person subject to imminent harm, and, thus, whetheran exceptionto governmentalimmunityapplied.Attachedasexhibitstotheoppositionwere portions of the town’s responses to interrogatories; a chart from a curriculum guide titled ‘‘Madison Public Schools Physical Education Program: AFramework for Integrated Teaching and Learning’’ (physical education guide); portions of Madison Public Schools’ ‘‘Student Welfare/Safety Requirements’’; and additional excerpts from Spooner’s and Delehanty’s depositions.
The defendants filed areplymemorandum in support of summaryjudgment and in response to the plaintiff’s opposition on July 1, 2015. Attached to the reply was
an affidavit by James Flanagan, a physical education teacher and physical education coordinator for theboardwhowas responsible forthe drafting ofthephysical education guide; additional excerpts fromthe physical education guide; and a copy ofBenjamin’s ‘‘Medical Release From Elementary Physical Education,’’ which indicated that, despite a physical issue regarding his foot, he could participate in most regular physical education activities, including playing soccer. The only restricted activity noted was participation in the mile
run. The plaintiff filed a response to the reply memorandum on July 31, 2015, attached to which were excerpts from a publication titled ‘‘Madison Public Schools Department of Athletics 2009–2013 Handbook for Student-Athletes, Parents and Coaches’’; excerpts from Flanagan’s deposition testimony; and another copy of Flanagan’s affidavit. That same daythe defendants filed
ashortsurreply. The court,Nazzaro, J ., heardargument
on the motion for summary judgment at a hearing on August 3, 2015.
On November 5, 2015, the court issued a memorandum of decision rendering judgment on all counts of the complaint in favor of the defendants. The court concluded on the basis of the pleadings and evidence submitted by the parties that the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity as a matter oflaw. Specifically, the court determined that the defendants had established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment because the court’s construction of relevant excerpts from the physical education guide and the averments of Flanagan established that the use of shin guards by students was not a mandatory requirement but, rather, involved a discretionary determination as to whetherthe extraprotection affordedby shin guards
was warrantedunderthe circumstances. The court also determined that the evidence submitted by and relied uponbythe plaintiffin oppositionto the summaryjudgment motion failed to raise a genuine issue of material factregardingwhetherthe supervision ofstudentsplaying soccer during aphysical education class was a ministerial act orthat any policy or procedure in place was intended to limit the discretion of the defendants or prescribe ‘‘how to instruct on and provide safety equipment for soccer played during physical education class.’’
The courtalso determinedthattheplaintiffhadfailed to establish that a genuine issue ofmaterial fact existed regardingtheidentifiableperson/imminentharmexception to governmental immunity. In particular, the court statedthat the plaintiff’s arguments and evidence could not support a determination thatthe harm suffered was imminent. Thecourtreasonedthatalthoughtheplaintiff had established that a potential for injury may have been apparent to the defendants, she had failed ‘‘to present evidence to demonstrate that the probability of injury to students from not wearing shin guards ingym class was so high that the defendants had a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent harm, namely, to provide shin guards for students.’’ The plaintifffiled amotion for reargument and reconsideration, which the court denied. This appeal followed.
Before turning to the plaintiff’s claims on appeal, we begin by setting forth the standard ofreview applicable to atrial court’s decisionto grant amotionforsummary judgment. ‘‘Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summaryjudgment shall be rendered forthwith ifthe pleadings, affidavits andanyotherproofsubmittedshowthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and thatthe movingpartyis entitledtojudgmentas amatter of law.

. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court mustview the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

. . . The party seeking summaryjudgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to ajudgment as a matter of law

. . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

. . . [I]ssue-finding, ratherthan issue-determination, is the keyto the procedure.

. . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

. . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.

. . . Our review ofthe decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary.

. . . We therefore must decide whether the court’s conclusions were legally and logically correct and find support in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiMiceli

v. Cheshire, 162 Conn. App. 216, 221–22, 131 A.3d 771 (2016).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly renderedsummaryjudgmentas amatteroflawbecause
a genuine issue of material fact existed about whether safety guidelines in the board’s physical education guide, specifically, a provision indicating that students should ‘‘wear shin guards for additional protection,’’ created aministerial duty, the implementation ofwhich
was not protected by governmental immunity. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. In opposing summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the defendants had a ministerial duty to
ensure that all children wore shin guards when playing
soccer during physical education classes. In support of that argument, the plaintiff cited to the physical education guide, which included a section titled ‘‘Safety Guidelines.’’ That section was in chart format, broken down by sport. Under each sport heading, there were five columns with the following subheadings: ‘‘equip-ment,’’ ‘‘clothing/footwear,’’ ‘‘facilities,’’ ‘‘special rules/ instruction,’’ and ‘‘supervision.’’ For soccer, the following bullet points were listed under the subheading of clothing/footwear: ‘‘no metal or molded cleats’’; ‘‘wear suitable footwear and clothing’’; ‘‘wear shin guards for additional protection’’; ‘‘wear sun protection’’; and ‘‘no jewelry.’’
In Flanagan’s affidavit, he averredthatthe use ofshin guards was, as indicated in the safety guidelines, only for additional or extra protection, and was meant only
as a suggestion to be exercised at the discretion of the individual teacher, not as an absolute requirement. Flanagan also explained that one of the reasons that shin guards were not mandatory equipment was because cleats were prohibited in gym class. He further indicated that there were no notes, records, or other information on file that would have alerted Delehanty that Benjamin needed the additional protection of shin guards. The plaintiff submitted no counteraffidavit or evidence, other than the physical education guide, to directly contradict Flanagan’s explanation of the guide.
We next set forth the well settled law in this state regarding the liability of municipalities and municipal agents. Although, at common law, amunicipality generallywas immune from liability for anytortious acts, our Supreme Court has long recognizedthat ‘‘governmental immunity may be abrogated by statute.’’ Williams v. New Haven, 243 Conn. 763, 766, 707 A.2d 1251 (1998), citing Wysocki v. Derby, 140 Conn. 173, 175, 98 A.2d 659 (1953). General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except as otherwise provided by law,
a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damagestopersonorpropertycausedby: (A) Thenegligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties

. . . .’’ ‘‘This language clearly and expressly abrogates the traditional common-law doctrine in this state that municipalities are immune from suit for torts committed by their employees and agents.’’ Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 29, 818 A.2d 37 (2003).
Subdivision (2) of § 52-557n (a), however, contains two significant limitations to the statutory abrogation of governmental immunity. The exception at issue in the present appeal provides as follows: ‘‘Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by

. . . (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion
as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’ General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (B). The statutory scheme of § 52-557n, accordingly, distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts, ‘‘with liability generally attaching to amunicipality only for negligently performed ministerial acts, not for negligently performed discretionary acts.

. . . ‘‘The hallmark ofadiscretionary actis thatitrequires the exercise ofjudgment.

. . . In contrast, [m]inisterial refersto adutywhichisto beperformedinaprescribed
manner without the exercise ofjudgment or discretion.

. . . In order to create a ministerial duty, there must be a city charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or any other directive [compelling a municipal employee] to [act] in anyprescribed manner.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiMiceli v. Cheshire, supra, 162 Conn. App. 224.
It is important to emphasize that ‘‘[e]xceptions to governmental immunity will be found only if there is a duty to act that is so clear and unequivocal that the policy rationale underlying discretionary act immunity—to encourage municipal officers to exercisejudgment—has no force.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ventura v. East Haven, 170 Conn. App. 388, 402, 154 A.3d 1020, cert. granted, 325 Conn. 905, 156 A.3d 537 (2017), citing Bonington v. Westport, 297 Conn. 297, 307, 999A.2d 700 (2010). Thus, only ‘‘[i]f by statute or other rule of law the official’s duty is clearly ministerial rather than discretionary’’ willacause ofactionthenlieforanindividualinjuredas
aresult ofan official’s allegedly negligentperformance. (Emphasis added.) Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 153, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982). ‘‘Although the determination ofwhether official acts
oromissions areministerialordiscretionaryisnormally
a question of fact for the fact finder

. . . there are
cases [in which that determination] is apparent from the complaint.

. . . [W]hether an act or omission is discretionary in nature and, thus, whether governmental immunity may be successfully invoked pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (2) (B), turns on the character of the act or omission complained of in the complaint.

. . . Accordingly, where it is apparent from the complaint that the defendants’ allegedly negligent acts or omissionsnecessarilyinvolvedthe exercise ofjudgment, and thus, necessarilywere discretionaryinnature, summary judgment is proper.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiMiceli v. Cheshire, supra, 162 Conn. App. 224–25. Furthermore, as this court explained in Ventura v. EastHaven, supra, 170 Conn. App. 388, anytime adetermination ofwhether official acts are ministerial or discretionary ‘‘turns on the interpretation of a municipal ordinance or policy,’’ this raises a question of law that ‘‘is inappropriate for a jury to decide.’’ Id., 403, citing, inter alia, Honulik v. Greenwich, 293 Conn. 698, 710, 980 A.2d 880 (2009) (noting principles ofstatutory construction govern interpretation of town policies), and GeneralAccidentIns. Co. ofAmericav.Powers, Bolles,Houlihan & Hartline, Inc., 38 Conn. App. 290, 296–97, 660 A.2d 369 (improper to instructjury to decide question of law requiring statutory interpretation), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 904, 665A.2d901 (1995). Theinterpretation of policy language is, thus, properly decided by the court, subject to our plenary review. Ventura v. East Haven, supra, 403.
As indicated, we construe amunicipally created rule, directive, or policy pursuant to the principles of statutory construction. ‘‘The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent ofthe legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text ofthe statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning ofsuch text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance tothelegislativehistoryandcircumstancessurrounding its enactment, tothelegislativepolicyitwas designedto implement, andto its relationship to existing legislation and commonlawprinciples governingthe same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 404–405. Turning to the present case, we are unconvinced on the basis of our review of the evidence submitted in conjunction with the summary judgment proceedings that any language in the safety guidelines clearly imposed aministerial dutyonthe defendantstoprovide Benjaminandtherestofhisclassmateswithshinguards
or to ensure that shin guards were worn whenever the children played soccer. The defendants presented evidence to demonstrate that the decision of whether torequire shinguardsinvolvedthe exercise ofjudgment and, thus, was inherently discretionary in nature, and the plaintiff simply provided no evidence in rebuttal thatraisedagenuineissue ofmaterialfactonthatissue.
The plaintiff, in arguing that the defendants violated
a ministerial duty, had the burden ofdemonstrating the existence of a clear and unequivocal policy or other written directive mandating the use of shin guards by the town’s third grade students. In attempting to meet thatburden, the plaintiffprimarilyreliedupon language found in the soccer section of a chart taken from the board’sphysicaleducationguide. Specifically, theplaintiff directs the court’s attention to a single bullet point stating, ‘‘wear shin guards for additional protection.’’Thatlanguagebyitself, however, isnotthetype ofclear, directory language that courts have found to impose on schools or physical education teachers a ministerial duty ‘‘to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise ofjudgment ordiscretion.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) DiMiceli v. Cheshire, supra, 162 Conn. App. 224. For example, nowhere in the guide is it stated that gym teachers are ‘‘required to,’’ ‘‘must,’’

or ‘‘shall ensure’’ that all students wear shin guards wheneverplayingsoccer. Theplaintiffhasnotproduced any regulation, rule, or other directive promulgated by the town or the board to that effect. Significantly, the chart relied on by the plaintiff
comes from a section of the physical education guide titled, ‘‘Materials and Resources,’’ in a subsection titled ‘‘Physical Education Safety Guidelines.’’ The words ‘‘Safety Guidelines’’ are also clearly printed on top of the chart. The inclusion of the safety guidelines in this chapter suggests that they were intended to be used by teachers as a ‘‘resource’’ or information, rather than as strict policy directives that they were obligated to adhere to withoutthe exercise ofdiscretion orindependent judgment. In common parlance, a ‘‘guideline’’ is generally understood to reflect an informed suggestion
orabestpractice. Thus, theuseoftheterm‘‘guidelines,’’ rather than ‘‘mandates’’ or ‘‘directives,’’ implies that, except where accompanied by specific and clear directory language, the bullet points in the safety guideline charts were informative rather than mandatory in nature. Certainly, taken out ofcontext, thephrase ‘‘wearshin guards’’ might be construed, as a matter of grammar,
as an imperative statement, arguablymandatingthe use ofshinguards. Inthepresentcase, however, thatphrase is followed by the modifier, ‘‘for additional protection,’’ suggesting that some additionaljudgment or discretion neededtobe exercisedto determinewhethersuchadditional protection was needed before the phrase would become directive. Furthermore, thephrase isbut one of several bullet points addressing clothing and footwear, andfollows amore clearly directive notation, ‘‘no metal
or molded cleats.’’ Because cleats are expressly forbidden in gym classes, this logically renders the use of shinguards relativelyless importantas asafetyconcern and, in fact, renders more significant the latter, ‘‘for additional protection,’’ language. Moreover, in the section of the chart dedicated to ‘‘special rules/instructions’’ for soccer, there is nothing requiring an instruction on the use ofshin guards, which one would expect to find if the use of shin guards were, in fact, mandatory.
To the extent that the phrase ‘‘wear shin guards for additional protection’’ is ambiguous, and thus susceptible to different meanings, that fact alone supports a determination that the language in the physical educa-tion guide was not intended to be a clear and unequivocalwaiver ofgovernmental immunity. Thatnotionfinds further support in Flanagan’s affidavit, in which he describesthe physical education guide as generallyrepresenting ‘‘anarticulationofwhatstudentsshouldknow and be able to do and supports teachers in knowing how to achieve these goals.’’ Flanagan’s understanding comports with our own construction of the guide as simply a resource for information, and undermines the plaintiff’spositionthatthe safetyguidelinesinthe guide
were intended as mandates that the defendants were obligated to adhere to without the exercise of discretion.
In short, the sole evidence before us regarding the intent of the drafters of the physical education guide andthe languageinquestionindicatesthatitwas simply intended to provide information that shin guards could be worn for additional protection. As we have already concluded, whether extra protection was needed and whether to utilize shin guards in any given situation required the exercise ofjudgment and, in the present case, fell within the discretion exercised by the defendants.
We are unconvinced that the trial court improperly determined that the acts or omissions underlying the plaintiff’s negligence claims were discretionary in nature and, thus, subject to governmental immunity. Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff’s claim.
II
We next turn to the plaintiff’s alternative claim that,
even if the defendants’ acts or omissions were discretionary in nature, the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Benjamin had been subject to imminent harm and, thus, fell within the identifiable person/imminent harm exception to governmental immunity.4 We disagree. ‘‘The imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity [for municipalities and their employees] applies when the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm

. . . . By its own terms, this test requires three things: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable [person]; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that [person] to that harm.

. . . [Our Supreme Court has] stated previouslythatthis exceptionto the generalrule ofgovernmental immunity for employees engaged in discretionary activities has receivedvery limited recognition in this state.

. . . [T]he ultimate determination of whether [governmental] immunity applies is ordinarily a question oflaw for the court

. . . [unless] thereare unresolved factual issues material to the applicability of the defense

. . . [in which case] resolution of thosefactualissuesisproperlylefttothejury.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.)Strycharzv. Cady, 323 Conn. 548, 573–74, 148 A.3d 1011 (2016).
In Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303, 101 A.3d 249 (2014), ourSupreme Courtreexaminedandclarified
ourjurisprudence with respectto the principle ofimminent harm. The court overruled in part its prior holding in Burns v. Board ofEducation, 228 Conn. 640, 650, 638 A.2d 1 (1994), to the extent that it appeared to
narrowthedefinitionofimminentharmtoharmsarising from dangerous conditions that were temporary in nature. Haynes v. Middletown, supra, 322–23. Instead, it reemphasized its earlier interpretation of imminent harm as stated in its decision in Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501, 559 A.2d 1131 (1989), in which it explained that a harm is not imminent if it ‘‘could have occurred at any future time or not at all’’; id., 508; and clarified that it ‘‘was not focused on the duration of the alleged dangerous condition, but on the magnitude of the risk that the condition created.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Haynes v. Middletown, supra, 322. ‘‘[W]hen the court in Haynes spoke of the magnitude of the risk

. . . it specifically associated itwiththeprobabilitythat harm would occur, not the foreseeability ofthe harm.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Housing Authority, 159 Conn. App. 679, 704–705, 124 A.3d 537, cert. granted on other grounds, 319 Conn. 947, 125 A.3d 528 (2015). In sum, the Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘the proper standardfordeterminingwhetheraharmwasimminent is whether it was apparent to the municipal defendant that the dangerous condition was so likely to cause harm that the defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent the harm.’’ Haynes

v. Middletown, supra, 322–23.
In Williams v. Housing Authority, supra, 159 Conn. App. 679, this court construed Haynes as setting forth the following four part test with respect to imminent harm. ‘‘First, the dangerous condition alleged by the plaintiffmust be ‘apparent to the municipal defendant.’

. . . We interpret this to mean that the dangerous condition must not be latent or otherwise undiscoverable by a reasonably objective person in the position and with the knowledge ofthe defendant. Second, the alleged dangerous condition must be likely to have caused the harm suffered by the plaintiff. A dangerous condition that is unrelated to the cause of the harm is insufficient to satisfy the Haynes test. Third, the likelihood ofthe harm must be sufficient to place upon the municipal defendant a ‘clear and unequivocal duty’

. . . to alleviate the dangerous condition. The court in Haynes tied the duty to prevent the harm to the likelihood that the dangerous condition would cause harm.

. . . Thus, we consider ‘a clear and unequivocal duty’. . . to be one that arises when the probability that harm will occur from the dangerous condition is high enoughto necessitate thatthe defendantactto alleviate the defect. Finally, the probability that harm will occur must be so high as to require the defendant to act immediately to prevent the harm.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 705–706. Applying the Haynes standard to the facts of the present case, the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law and, thus, was properly rejected by the trial court. The plaintiff presented no evidence that Delehanty or the defendants were aware that an injury similar to the
one suffered by Benjamin was so likely to happen that they should have acted to prevent it by requiring the students to wear shin guards. The only real evidence presented at summary judgment regarding the magnitude ofthe risk ofa student being injured while playing
soccer in gym class was contained in the answers to interrogatories provided by the board. The board was asked to identify the number of times during the three year period prior to Benjamin’s injury that ‘‘a student
was injured while participating in a Madison public school gym class.’’ The response was that twenty-eight incidents had occurred. The next interrogatory asked the board to ‘‘identify the number of injuries which occurred during a soccer focused gym class.’’ The
answer was none. Thus, the probability of a soccer related injury was statistically very low. The plaintiff presented no evidence to dispute those responses or to show that the number of injuries was low because students usuallywore shin guards whenplaying soccer. Certainly, the plaintiffpresented evidence that it was apparent to the defendants that an injury to a child playing soccer without shin guards could occur, as evidenced by Flanagan’s and Delehanty’s deposition testimony acknowledging the potential for such an injury. Foreseeability ofan injury, however, does not translate to imminent harm without also showing that the probabilitythataninjurywilloccurfromthe dangerous condition—here, the lack of shin guards—is high enough to necessitate that the defendants act to prevent it. Because we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff failed to present evidence demonstrating a genuine issue ofmaterial fact regarding the probability ofinjury to students from not wearing shin guards in third grade gym class, we rejectthe claim thatthe courtimproperly granted summaryjudgment in favor ofthe defendants.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 For purposes of clarity and convenience, we refer in this opinion to Jennifer Washburne as the plaintiff, and Benjamin Washburne as Benjamin.

2 Spooner and Delehanty were sued only in their official capacities.

3 As stated in the court’s memorandum of decision, the plaintiff alleged that Benjamin’s injuries were the result ofthe following negligent and careless acts and omissions: ‘‘failure to establish rules or guidelines of supervision and protection of students participating in soccer during school hours;failure to and/or inadequate supervision of students participating in soccer during schoolhours; failure to establishguidance onhowto structure soccer to prevent injury; failure to adopt, instruct, or enforce rules to protect students and prevent injury to students in physical activities and physical education; failure to put in place the proper student to teacher ratio for physical education class and sufficient staff to supervise students; failure to properly train and screen substitute teachers, administrators, and staff to prevent harm to students; permitted substitute teachers without proper training to supervise students; and did not require or provide safety equipment forsoccer.’’ In addition, the plaintiffalleged that ‘‘the defendants knew

orshouldhave knownthatparticipationinsoccerwith[out] safetyequipment subjectedstudentstoinjury; permittingsubordinateswithoutpropertraining to supervise students posed a risk of harm; and safety procedures were needed andwarranted.’’ In opposing summaryjudgment, theplaintifflimited her argument that the alleged negligent acts or omissions ofthe defendants

were ministerial in nature to those allegations related to the defendants’ failure to follow existing rules requiring students to wear shin guards. Because that is also the sole issue briefed on appeal, we need not consider anyunrelated specifications ofnegligence. See Verderamev. TrinityEstates Development Corp., 92 Conn. App. 230, 232, 883 A.2d 1255 (2005) (claims not raised and adequately briefed on appeal deemed abandoned).

4 We note thatthe defendants do not dispute that Benjaminwas an ‘‘identifiable person’’ for purposes of the exception, conceding at oral argument

on the motion for summaryjudgment that, as a schoolchild, ‘‘[h]e belongs, most likely, to the only set of identifiable persons for purposes of applying the exception that exists in Connecticut.’’ For purposes of our analysis, we focus on the disputed issue of imminent harm.