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Filed 6/15/15 P. v. C ory CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). T his opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. WILLIAM CHRIST OPHER CORY, Defendant and Appellant. E061930 (Super.Ct.No. SWF1303140) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Patrick F. Magers, Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant t o
art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed. William Christopher Cory, in pro. per.; Alissa Bjerkhoel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 I STATEMENT OF THE CASE On March 4 , 2014, a felony information charged defendant and appellant William Christopher Cory with one count of stalking under Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a) 1 (count 1). On February 20, 2014, at the close of the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to
h ave his charge reduced to a misdemeanor. The trial court denied the motion, noting that the number of contacts and the nature of the contacts between defendant and the victim did not indicate misdemeanor behavior. On June 3, 2014, defendant moved to set aside the information based on insufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing under section 995. The trial court denied the motion. On June 26, 2014, a jury found defendant guilty as charged. The probation department recommended that defendant be given formal probation for three years. Defendant argued that he had a mental disorder. The mental disorder (1) explained why defendant did not comprehend the wrongfulness of his actions; (2) would be exacerbated by imprisonment; and (3) could be treat ed with psychiatric treatment. The People requested the upper term of three years. On September 5, 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years in state prison, noting the serious nature of the case. On September 15 , 2014, de fendant f iled a timely notice of appeal.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.3 II STATEMENT OF FACTS In the spring of 2011, the victim, who was 17 years old at the time, was living in Riverside with her paren ts. She worked at a local Food 4 Less as a utility clerk; she stocked items, pushed c arts, or helped customers. She typically worked from four to six days per week, between 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. , until 12:30 a.m. or 1:0 0 a.m. Around April or May 2011, defendant, who was a customer, started paying the victim a lot of attention. Defendant asked the victim for the location of certain items in the store, made small talk about how the victim’s day was going, and retrieved the faraway shopping carts so she would not h ave to do so. Defendant increased the frequency of his visits with the victim and started to come to see her at Food 4 Less during approximately half of her shifts. The victim testified that she never asked him to come to the store and never initiated conversations with defendant. She also never told him to leave her alone either . Instead, she had regular conversations with him over the period of the next several months. During that time, defendant never threatened to hurt the victim and never said anything inappropriate. Nevertheless, the victim felt “creeped out” by defendant ’s attention. She was uncomfortable with the frequency o f defendant’s contact with her.4

Although the victim did not c all the police, in September 2011, she informed the store managers about her concerns regarding the frequency of defendant’s visits to the store to see her. In response, management told defendant to leave the store and not to return. The victim was present for this conversation. Def endant left and did not return. The victim quit working at Food 4 Less in October 20 11. One of the reasons she qui t was because of her encounter s with defendant. The victim was uncomfortable going to work every day, wondering if defendant would be around th e premises or inside the

store. On December 22, 2011, the victim received a letter from defendant at her parents’ house. She never told defendant where she lived. The victim testified that she was “freaked out” because she did not know how defendant found her address; she did not want him to know where she lived, and did not want him to find her or talk to her. In the letter, defendant stated that he missed seeing the victim at F ood 4 Less and that he hoped she had a good holiday. Defendant provided his telephone number and e

- mail address; he ask ed that the victim contact him. That same day, the victim cre ated a fake e

- mail account and sent defendant an

e - mail. She told d efendant that she had moved out of state with her parents and boyfriend due to family problems. She had hoped that defendant would stop contacting her. The victim also told defendant tha t she hoped all was well and wished him a M erry Christmas. The victim told defendant not to write her any letters but invited him to correspond with her via e

- mail. Over the next month, the victim and defendant engaged5

in conversation via e - mail. During these communications, defendant never threatened the victim, her family, or sai d anything inappropriate. On January 30, 2012, defendant asked the victim to go on a hike with him; she declined. The next series of messages from defendant accused the victim of being “cold” to him, lying, and keeping him at a distance. Defendant told the victim t hat they should not be adversaries. The victim was afraid of making defendant angry ; she did not want
him showing up at her house. Therefore, she continued to resp ond to defendant’s e

mails. On February 2, 2012, defendant asked the victim to go on a hike again; she declined. Defendant told the victim in several e

- mails that he missed her. Defendant also criticized the victim’s r elationship with her boyfriend.
On February 6, 2012, defendant offered to stop by the victim’s home. The victim told defendant to leave her alone, that he was creeping her out, and that she would call the police if he did not respect her wishes. Defendant believed that the victim did not want to get the police involved because she did not want her boyfriend to discover that the victim actually liked defendant. The victim told defendant several more times to never contact her or she would call the police. Defendant told her that he would “never” stop contacting her. Defendant suspected that the victim was not the person writing the

e - mails and requested a tele phone call to verify that it was the victim, and not her boyfriend, who was telling him to stop contacting her. When the victim a gain told defendant to stop, defendant made negative comments about her boyfriend, and told the victim that defendant and victim were meant to be together. Defendant also made6

comments about the victim’s living arrangements, details she never disclosed to defendant. Based on defendant’s comments, the victim believed that defendant was watching her at her house. Eventually, the victim asked for defendant’s tele phone number. She gave defendant’s tele phone number to the police officer who worked at her hig h school. The officer contacted defendant. Later that day, defendant e

- mailed the victim and told her, “You should not have done that.” Defendant accused the victim of using the police to try and scare him off, even though she liked him. He stated that he was not afraid of the police and that this tactic would not scare him off. The victim was scared that defendant would keep coming after her because he was not deterred when l aw enforcement became involved. That same day, the victim stopped responding to defendant’s e

- mails. Defendant, however, continued to write e - mails to the victim. He discussed matters regarding her parents’ financial issues, which she never discussed with defendant. After February, 2012, however, defend ant ceased e

- mailing the victim. In March 2012, the victim got a job at Ch ili’s in Riverside as a hostess. In Ap ril 2012, the victim notice d defendant riding his bicycle in the parking lot of Chili’s a few times each week. This continued for several months. The victim never en gaged defendant in conversation or made eye contact with him. The victim never saw defendant when she was leaving work, but she was scared and had other empl oyees escort her to her vehicle

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I n June 2012, defendant e

- mailed the victim. He told her that h e just returned from New York and asked , “what’s up?” In September 2012, the victim set up a Facebook account to stay in touch with her family. She used her first name and her soon

to

- be married last n ame. She married in October 2012. She moved to Heme t w ith her husband and had a baby. Defendant found the victim’s Facebook account and sent a series of private
messages to her in December 2012. She blocked his account each time he contacted her. When she would do so, defendant would create a new accoun t under a different name; he used 39 different names . In two instances, defendant used the last name of the victim’s stepfather and the la st name of the victim’s mother. In the Facebook messages, defendant chastised the victim for getting married so
youn g, called her and her parents “white trash, ” asked her to ge t an annulment of her marriage , claimed she had been brainwashed, indicated that he had seen her driving on several occasions, said he talked to her parents, accused her of being promiscuous, told her he knew where she lived, accused her husband of trying to isolate her from defendant, made derogatory comments about her husband, sent her links to pictures of his penis, indicated he would only increase his contact if she ignored him, and told her he was not going away. Defendant also called the victim sexy, gorgeous, and a “pure, innocent, natural beauty.” He indicated he had gone to her house and threatened to turn her husband in for statutory rape if she involved the police . He asked her to send him pictures, sent her a picture he had taken of her house, said he contemplated moving into8

the house down the stre et from her, told her that he owned a shotgun and that he used it to scare off some criminals, commented that he loved her, talked about li ving with her in the future, and told her that he was determined to get her away from her husband. Defendant

a lso sent messages to the Facebook account of the victim’s mother. Defendant asked the victim’s mother about the victim, talked about his Nordic heritage, accus ed the mother of facilitating statutory rape, and told her the victim “down

- br eeded” by marrying her
husband. Defendant had come to the victim’s house twice; she was home on both occasions. The first time was on September 12, 2013. The vi ctim was alone at home when the doorbell rang. She looked out the peephole and saw defendant. She locked the door and tele phoned her husband, who was almost home. Her husband confronted defendant , told defendant to leave the victim alone because she was scared of him, that she was crying on the tele phone, and the victim was married. The second time defendant had come to the victim’s house was on September 16, 2013. The victim was alone at home when the doorbell rang and there was also knocking at the d oor. She looked out the peephole and saw defendant. She tele phoned 911 and defendant left. The messages left by defendant made the victim worried, scared and “creeped out.” Despite defendant’s assurances that he would not hurt the victim, she feared fo r her safety and her husband’s safety. Because defendant saw the victim’s husband as someone standing in the way of a potential relationship between defendant and the9

victim, she was afraid defendant would harm her husband to get him out of the picture. Moreover, she was afraid defendant would try to kidnap or rape her.
I I I ANALYSIS After defendant appealed, and upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and requesting this court to undertake a review of the entire record. We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he has done so. On May 7 , 2015 , defendant filed a seven - page typewritten brief. In the brief, defendant essentially argues that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for stalking under s ection 646.9. Defendant argues the evidence presented at trial does not show he harassed the victim or made a credible threat that would cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety.

“ In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing co urt ’ s task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence

— that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value

— such that a reasonable trier of fact could find t he defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ” ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11. ) “ In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conf licts and inconsistencies in the10

testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. ” ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “ On appeal, we must accept that part of the testimony which supports the judgment. ” ( In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 C al.App.4th 824, 830.) Defendant was charged with stalking in violation of section 646.9, which states in pertinent part, as follows: “Any person who .

. . maliciously harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that pe rson in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family is guilty of the crime o f stalking

. ” ( § 646.9, subd. (a).) “For the purposes of this section, ‘harasses’ means engages in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 646.9, subd. (e).) “Credible threat” is defined as “a verbal or written threat, including that performed through t he use of an electronic communication device, or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal, written, or electronically communicated statements and conduct, made with the intent to place the person that is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety

. . . and made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family. It is

not nece ssary to prove that the defendant had the intent to actually carry out the threat

. ” (§ 646.9, subd. (g).)11

In our view, the record discloses more than sufficient evidence of a credible threat that would cause a reasonable person to be fearful for her perso nal safety. As provided in detail above, defendant e

- mailed the victim, contacted her on Facebook under 39 aliases when the victim would block defendant, showed up at the victim’s house uninvited after the victim moved to Hemet and got married, made state ments about loving the victim and having a future with the victim, stated that he wanted to move closer to the victim, and stated he was determined to get the victim away from her husband. In other words, knowing the victim was afraid and not interested i n pursuing a relationship with defendant, defendant continued to act obsessively and unreasonably toward her given the circumstances. Understandably, the victim testified she was afraid because she was unsure what he might do to her ; hence, she was fearfu l for her safety and her husband’s safety. Although defendant argues that he “has been punished for common social interaction,” these actions are a far cry from “common social interaction.” B ased on our review of the record, the jury could reasonably con clude the messages , e - mails, and visits were credible threats made with the intent to frighten the victim and to cause her to be fearful of her personal safety. Given the circumstances, the jury could also reasonably conclude the victim’s fear was reasona ble. We therefore reject defendant’s contention there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Moreover, d efendant claims that the victim lied about defendant stalking her. Defendant writes that he “never s talked the alleged victim. Rath er, she lied about the stalking and claimed she did not know appellant because she did not want to upset her partner. Her partner was the one who took her down to the police station and pressured12

her to lie. He accompanied her to all of her court appeara nces too. The police reports are a complete work of fiction with only a shred of truth.” An appellate court will not uphold any judgment based upon inherently improbable evidence. ( People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 306.) However, “[t]o warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by the [ trier of fact ] , there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. [Citations. ] Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” ( Ibid. ) Here, the victim’s testimony is neither physically impossible nor false on its face. In fact, the victim’s testimony was consistent and believable. Accordingly, we are bound by the jury’s determination of h er credibility

co ncerning defendant’s behavior.
Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have independently reviewed the record for potential error and find no error.13 IV DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHE D IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER Acting P. J.
We concur:

KING J.

MILLER J.