1

 The Honorable Greg Kays, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

2 The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-2996

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

vs. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska

Kevin Jones, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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Submitted: January 13, 2009

 Filed: April 14, 2009

___________

Before MURPHY and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KAYS,1

 District Judge.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant Kevin Jones filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court2

 granted Jones a two level reduction and

imposed a 120 month within the Guidelines sentence. Jones appeals the court’s

refusal to grant more than a two-level reduction in the offense level. We affirm.
3

 The Honorable William G. Cambridge, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska. This case was assigned to Judge Smith Camp on May 16, 2006

following Judge Cambridge’s retirement.

4

 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed.2d 621 (2005).

5

 Jones did not seek to reduce his sentence on the firearms charge, and that

aspect of his sentence is not at issue in this appeal.

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I. Background

In 1998 Kevin Jones plead guilty by agreement to an amended information

charging him with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, commonly known

as “crack cocaine,” and using or carrying a firearm in connection with a drug

trafficking crime. In 1999 the district court,3

 applying the mandatory sentencing

guidelines in effect prior to United States v. Booker4

 sentenced Jones to 162 months

for distribution of crack cocaine to be served consecutively with a 60 month sentence

for carrying a handgun in conjunction with a drug offense. The 162 month sentence

was the maximum under the guideline range of 130 to 162 months resulting from an

offense level of 27 and a criminal history category VI.

On November 1, 2007, Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines went into

effect lowering sentencing ranges for crack cocaine offenses by two offense levels.

Amendment 713 subsequently made this change retroactive. 

On June 24, 2008, Jones filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) seeking

to reduce his sentence on the distribution charge based on the retroactive Guideline

Amendment.5

 The district court held a hearing on August 11, 2008, determined Jones

was entitled to a sentence adjustment, and reduced his sentence on the distribution

charge to 120 months, a sentence in the middle of his newly adjusted guideline range

of 110 to 137 months.

Jones appeals.
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II. Discussion

We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions about the scope of its

authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Lewis, 557 F.3d 601, 613

(8th Cir. 2009). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to reduce

a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Wyatt, 115 F.3d 606, 609

(8th Cir. 1997). 

Section 3582(c)(2) provides that “in the case of a defendant who has been

sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has

subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

994(0), . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the

factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a

reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The applicable policy statement here is

provided by section 1B1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which states that

proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) are not full resentencings and that a district court may

not reduce a sentence to a term less than the minimum amended guideline range. U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (2007). 

Jones argues that the district court improperly limited his sentence reduction to

a two-level reduction in the offense level. He argues that the district court erred in not

recognizing that Booker applies to resentencings under § 3582(c)(2), erred in treating

the amended guideline range as the default range, and abused its discretion in not

finding that the amended guideline range was still greater than necessary to serve the

sentencing goals of § 3553(a). All of his arguments turn on whether Booker applies

to his resentencing or not.

We recently held in United States v. Starks that Booker does not apply to

resentencings under § 3582(c). 551 F.3d 839, 840 (8th Cir. 2009). In Starks we

observed that “sentence reductions based on retroactive guideline amendments” are
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sentence modification proceedings governed by § 3582(c), and that in enacting §

3582(c) Congress limited the authority of a district court to modify a sentence. Id. at

841-42. We further noted that this limitation does not raise the constitutional concerns

at issue in Booker, and that Booker did not invalidate § 3582(c). Id. We concluded

that a district court may not reduce a sentence below the amended guideline range, and

that it was not error for a district court “to refuse to consider a further reduction based

on § 3553(a) or to hold an evidentiary hearing for that purpose.” Id. at 843; accord

United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rhodes, 549

F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008); but see United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 167 (9th Cir.

2007). 

Consistent with Starks, we hold that the district court did not err in limiting

Jones’ sentence reduction to a two-level reduction in the offense level. We affirm.

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