COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, O’ Brien and Senior Judge Bumgardner

CARRIE E. ALLEN MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1746-15-2 PER CURIAM MAY 17, 2016 HENRICO DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY John Marshall, Judge (John W. Parsons, on brief), for appellant. (Karen E. Dottore, Assistant Co unty Attorney; Donna D. Berkeley, Guardian ad litemfor the minor child, on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication. Carrie E. Allen, mother, appeals the terminatio n of her residual parental rights to her son, G.A., pursuant to Code § 16.1-28 3(C)(2). She argues on appeal that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights beca use the evidence was insufficient to prove that termination was in the best interests of the child and that she had been unable or unwilling to remedy substantially the conditions that led to her son’s placement in foster care, notwithsta nding the rehabilitative efforts of the agencies i nvolved. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affi rm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. When reviewing a decision to terminate pare ntal rights, we presume the circuit court “thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory require ments, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests. ” Toms v. Hanover Dep’ t of Soc. Servs., 46UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Va. App. 257, 265-66, 616 S.E.2d 765, 769 (2005) (quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005)). On August 13, 2007, G.A. was born with opiates in his system. The Richmond Department of Social Services (RDSS) opened a case with the family. The foremost concerns mother faced were stable housing, substance a buse, and employment. Mother did not consistently participate in substance abuse treatment or counseling, and sh e relapsed on drugs several times. RDSS’s involvement with the family ended in2008 or 2009. In November of 2013, mother was arrested for charges relate d to prostitution. After the arrest, mother missed several cour t hearings and G.A. was absent from school for two weeks. In February of 2014, the Henrico Department of Soci al Services (HDSS) fac ilitated the transfer of custody of G.A. to family friends after mother was incarcerated for of fenses related to the possession of heroin. On July 8, 2014, the family coul d no longer care for G.A. HDSS placed him in foster care based on mother’s housing in stability, substance abuse, an d pending criminal charges. The initial foster care plan cont ained a goal of return home. In order for mother to regain custody, she needed to continue substance abus e treatment, improve her parentin g skills, maintain sobriety for at least one year, cr eate a support network to maintain sobriety, participate in therapy addressing her mental health issues, and establis h stable housing, employme nt, and finances. HDSS referred mother for substance abuse treatment an d counseling. In addi tion, HDSS monitored the case and arranged regular visitation. At that time , mother was residing w ith her boyfriend in the Fredericksburg area. G.A. had been in foster care for fifteen months at the time of the Oc tober 5, 2015 trial court hearing. During those fift een months, mother resided in three to four residen ces. At the time of the hearing, she was living w ith a male roommate and her name was not on the lease to the apartment. Mother provided HDSS with a sublease agreement ex ecuted between mother and the roommate, but- 3 - the lease was set to expire seven days after the hearing. Thus, mother still lacked stable housing at the time of the trial court hearin g. In addition, HDSS had been una ble to complete a home visit of mother’s current residence becaus e the roommate’s bedroom was lo cked at the time of the home visit. Furthermore, mother had not provided HD SS with completed backgr ound check forms for her roommate. The background check wa s required prior to placing G.A. back in mother’s custody as long as mother resided with the roommate. Seve ral weeks before the trial court hearing, mother asked the social worker to meet her roommate. In October of 2014, mother completed a parenting and ps ychological evaluation with Dr. Craig King. Dr. King diagno sed mother with opioid use disord er, alcohol abuse disorder, panic disorder, and major depressive diso rder. Dr. King recommended that mother complete an outpatient substance abuse program and, if that was not successful, that she part icipate in an inpatient program. Dr. King also recommended indivi dual therapy. Dr. King sugges ted that mother exhibit six to twelve months of stability in all areas of her life in order to demonstrate sh e could successfully raise G.A. HDSS had difficulty re aching mother to discuss Dr . King’s evaluation and his recommendations. At the time of the trial cour t hearing, mother ha d participated in, but had not completed substance abuse treatment despit e the recommendation from HDSS that she do so. Mother indicated to HDSS that she needed no further substance abuse treatment, but sh e did not execute the proper release forms so HDSS could verify her st atement. Mother began individual counseling services three weeks before the trial court hearing, although HDS S had recommended for about one year that she attend counseling. Mother’s visitation with G.A., which was suspende d in February 2015 until mother participated in substance abuse treatment and coun seling, had not resumed by the time of the trial.- 4 - Mother struggled with mainta ining employment. She was of ten financially reliant on a friend. James Turner, who had a car pet cleaning and insta llation business, testif ied mother had been employed by him for about two y ears. Mother had not reported to HDSS that she was employed during this time period. She al so resided in Fredericksburg duri ng part of this time frame, and Turner stated she did not work for him many h ours per week when she li ved in Fredericksburg. Evidence was presented that G. A. was doing well in foster care. He was receiving weekly therapy sessions as recommended. He had bonded with his foster parents and brother, and the current foster family wa s willing to adopt him. At the conclusion of the evidence, the tr ial court found that “the on ly thing that’s clear in this case so far is that . . . fo r whatever reason [mother] has not deemed it necessary to try to substantially comply until the last three or four weeks.” The court found the only area in which mother had shown any stab ility was her participation in substance abuse treatm ent. The trial court stated that HDSS gave mother “every opportunity at every turn to work with [her] to try to get [her] where [she] need[ed] to be.” Th e court found, however, that mother was “not out here doing the things that she needs to do to . . . to satisfy DSS . . . to show she’ s the best person for the child.” The trial court further f ound mother had had “plenty of time” to comply with th e recommendations of HDSS. The trial cour t also noted mother’s housing was not stable and her employment situation was unclear. The trial co urt terminated mother’s parental rights to G.A. “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or wi thout evidence to support it.’” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 266, 616 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Fiel ds, 46 Va. App. at 7, 61 4 S.E.2d at 659). “In its capacity as factfinder, therefore, the circuit court retains ‘broad discreti on in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests. ’” Id. (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)).- 5 - A court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). [S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that cr eated the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated fa ilure of the parent to make reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,” subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he has been offered rehabilitation services. Toms, 46 Va. App. at 271, 616 S. E.2d at 772 (quoting City of New port News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E. 2d 463, 466 (2003)). Contrary to mother’s argumen ts, the evidence proved that she did not substantially remedy the conditions that led to or required continuation of foster ca re for G.A. On July 8, 2014, G.A. was placed in foster care based on mother’s lack of stable housing, substance abuse issues, and pending criminal charges. Mother had a long history of drug abuse. In order for moth er to regain custody of G.A., she needed to complete su bstance abuse treatment, improve her parenting sk ills, create a support network to maintain sobriety, participate in therapy addressing her mental health issues, and establish stable housing, employment, and finances. As the trial court found, mother did participate in substance abuse treatment. Ho wever, she failed to provide HDS S with the appropriate consent forms so HDSS could verify her status in the trea tment program. Furtherm ore, over the fifteen months that G.A. had been in foster care, mother had resided in at least three to four residences. The lease at her current residenc e was set to expire shortly, an d HDSS had never approved that residence as a place where G.A. could reside due to mother’s failure to provide background- 6 - information on her roommate and her failure to allow HDSS to view the entire apartment to determine if there were any possibl e safety concerns for G.A. Th us, mother did not have stable housing at the time of the trial court hearing. Furthermore, her employmen t situation was questionable at best. In addition, G.A. was doing we ll in foster care and he had b onded with the foster family who wanted to adopt him. Moreover, mother had not had visitation with G. A. in more than one
year. “The twelve-month time limit established by Code § 16.1-283(C) (2) was designed to prevent an indeterminate state of foster care ‘dri ft’ and to encourage time liness by the courts and social services in addressing the circumstances that resulted in the fo ster care placement.” L.G. v. Amherst Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 51, 56, 581 S.E.2d 886, 889 (2003). In conclusion, mother had not substantially remedied the condi tions that led to G.A. being in, and remaining in, foster care. “It is clearly not in th e best interests of a ch ild to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Ka ywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va . App. 535, 54 0, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that termination of mo ther’s parental rights was in the best interest of G.A. and in concluding that clear an d convincing evidence supported the termination of mother’s pa rental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). For the foregoing reas ons, the trial court’s ruling is su mmarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.