UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALEXANDER OTIS MATTHEWS, as 

Personal Representative for the Estate of 

Ezana Alexander Matthews,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

 No. 18-cv-1190 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

“Nothing that [the Court] write[s], no matter how well reasoned or forcefully expressed,

can bring back the victim of [the] tragedy” at hand. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 

(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). In this case, as in all cases, the Court’s obligation remains to 

apply the law. And, here, that obligation requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims on behalf of his 

son, Ezana Matthews.

A full account of the tragic circumstances of Ezana Matthews’s death are recounted in 

this Court’s prior opinion, Dkt. 23 at 1–4, but the following facts from the amended complaint 

warrant repetition and are taken as true for purposes of the District’s motion to dismiss. See 

Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014). Ezana was a 25-year-old Army veteran. Dkt. 25 at 

2. Upon his honorable discharge from the Army, Ezana lived with his paternal grandmother in 

Washington, D.C. Id. On May 4, 2017, Ezana’s 81-year-old grandmother came home and found 

him hanging from a pull-up bar in a bedroom. Id. Unable to cut him down herself, as instructed 

by the 911 operator, she “ran to a neighbor’s home” and found a group of men “who were able to 

physically perform the task.” Id.
2

When an officer from the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) arrived, that officer 

allegedly “made no effort” to revive Ezana, such as by “attempt[ing] CPR,” “provid[ing] 

oxygen,” or deploying a defibrillator. Id. That inaction, according to Plaintiff, violated “all 

applicable laws, statutes, regulations [and] MPD special and general orders when encountering 

unconscious persons.” Id. Plaintiff also contends that MPD officers and detectives were 

“wholly negligent in their investigation of the circumstances surrounding [his son’s] death.” Id.

Plaintiff’s original complaint asserted claims under the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and under D.C. tort law. See Dkt. 1. The District moved to 

dismiss that complaint with respect to all claims, Dkt. 5, and the Court granted that motion while 

granting Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. See Dkt. 23, Dkt. 24. In the memorandum 

opinion granting that motion, the Court construed the Plaintiff’s due process claims as

substantive due process claims and dismissed them on the basis that “the Due Process Clauses 

generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary 

to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the 

individual.” Dkt. 23 at 5 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t Social Servs., 489 U.S. 

189, 196 (1989)).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is itself ambiguous as to whether it asserts a common law 

tort claim in addition to a procedural due process claim. See Dkt. 25 at 3. But, in his response to 

the District’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff categorically states that he “argued no Common Law 

Tort Claims in the amended complaint so the defendant’s opposition to these claims is 

misplaced.” Dkt. 30 at 1. Thus, the Court is left only to consider Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s new procedural due process claim. That claim must be dismissed.
3

The Supreme Court has held that the “Due Process clause . . . is not implicated by the 

lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty or property.” Davidson v. 

Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986) (applying this rule to both procedural and substantive due 

process claims). And, Plaintiff makes no allegations that the offending officer’s actions were 

anything other than “negligent.” See Dkt. 25 at 2. More importantly, the “fundamental” interest 

the Due Process clause protects is the “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner,’” when the government makes decisions that deprive individuals of life, 

liberty, or property interests. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (quoting 

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Because Plaintiff does not allege that he—or 

his son—was denied an “opportunity to be heard,” or denied any other procedural protections,

the Court must dismiss his complaint for failure to plead facts sufficient to state a plausible claim 

for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196; 

Futch v. Fine, 342 Fed. App’x 638, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming a dismissal for 

failure to state a claim where a complaint “alleged a due process right to an investigation”).

The Court will, accordingly, GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss. A separate order 

will issue.

 /s/ Randolph D. Moss

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

 United States District Judge 

Date: December 20, 2019