FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-4106

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ABRAKA OKPOSIO,

Appellant,

v.

BARRY UNIVERSITY (Main 

Campus),

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Florida Commission on Human Relations.

Michelle Wilson, Executive Director.

September 25, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Abraka Okposio, a Canadian citizen, appeals a 

Notice of Dismissal entered by the Florida Commission on Human 

Relations (“Commission”) wherein the Commission dismissed 

Appellant’s Public Accommodations Complaint in which he 

claimed that Appellee, Barry University, discriminated against 

him based on race and national origin because it would not assist 

him with financing his third year of law school. In its Notice of 

Dismissal, the Commission informed Appellant that it did not have 

authority to investigate his charge of discrimination. Appellant 

challenges the Commission’s dismissal based upon his contention 

that Appellee is a place of “public accommodations” under the 

Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“Act”) because it has libraries or 
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“places of entertainment” on its premises. For the following 

reasons, we reject Appellant’s argument and affirm. 

The general purposes of the Act are to:

secure for all individuals within the state freedom from 

discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, 

pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital 

status and thereby to protect their interest in personal 

dignity, to make available to the state their full 

productive capacities, to secure the state against 

domestic strife and unrest, to preserve the public safety, 

health, and general welfare, and to promote the interests, 

rights, and privileges of individuals within the state.

§ 760.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). Section 760.08, Florida Statutes 

(2016), provides that “[a]ll persons are entitled to the full and equal 

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages 

and accommodations of any place of public accommodation without 

discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, national 

origin, sex, pregnancy, handicap, familial status, or religion.” The 

term “[p]ublic accommodations” is defined as “places of public 

accommodation, lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling 

food for consumption on the premises, gasoline stations, places of 

exhibition or entertainment, and other covered establishments.” § 

760.02(11), Fla. Stat. (2016). Each of the following establishments 

“which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within 

the meaning” of subsection (11):

(a) Any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which 

provides lodging to transient guests, other than an 

establishment located within a building which contains 

not more than four rooms for rent or hire and which is 

actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment 

as his or her residence.

(b) Any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, 

soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in 

selling food for consumption on the premises, including, 

but not limited to, any such facility located on the 
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premises of any retail establishment, or any gasoline 

station.

(c) Any motion picture theater, theater, concert hall, 

sports arena, stadium, or other place of exhibition or 

entertainment.

(d) Any establishment which is physically located within 

the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by 

this subsection, or within the premises of which is 

physically located any such covered establishment, 

and which holds itself out as serving patrons of 

such covered establishment.

§ 760.02(11), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added). 

The goal of statutory construction, which is a pure question of 

law reviewable de novo, is to identify the Legislature’s intent. 

Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294, 301 (Fla. 

2017). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must use 

the plain language of a statute and avoid rules of statutory 

construction to determine legislative intent. Id. Where statutory 

language is unclear or ambiguous, statutory construction rules 

should be applied. Id. at 302. One such rule requires courts to 

presume that the Legislature intended the words it chose to 

include in a statute. Id. Under the canon of construction expressio 

unius est exclusio alterius, the supreme court has reasoned that 

“the Legislature purposefully excluded items not included in a 

list.” Id. 

In support of his argument on appeal, Appellant relies upon 

the fact that section 760.02(11) does not expressly exclude libraries 

from the definition of “public accommodations.” However, under 

the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it can be said 

that the Legislature purposefully excluded libraries from the 

definition of “public accommodations” by not including them

therein. While Appellant argues that a library could be considered 

a “place of entertainment” under section 760.02(11)(c), we

disagree. A library is distinct from a “motion picture theater, 

theater, concert hall, sports arena, [or] stadium.” Although

Appellant cites United States v. DeRosier, 473 F.2d 749, 751-52 
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(5th Cir. 1973), in support of his argument that a library should be 

considered a place of entertainment, the place at issue in that case 

was a “neighborhood bar,” not a library. In addressing this issue, 

we find it of interest that 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7)(H), which is part 

of the federal Civil Rights Act and applies to discrimination 

against people with disabilities, defines “public accommodation” to 

include “a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display 

or collection.” Museums and galleries are far more similar to 

libraries than the places listed in section 760.02(11)(c). Had the 

Florida Legislature wished to include such places within its 

definition of “public accommodations,” it certainly could have done 

so. Because it did not, Appellant’s argument is meritless. We, 

therefore, affirm the order on appeal.

AFFIRMED. 

WOLF and LEWIS, JJ., concur; ROWE, J., concurs in result.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Abraka Okposio, pro se, Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.