SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1322-15T4

JEFFREY J. SOUTHARD,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE 

PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

_________________________

Submitted March 6, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Haas and Currier.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole 

Board.

Jeffrey J. Southard, appellant pro se.

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; 

Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on 

the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Jeffrey Southard appeals from the March 25, 2015 

final administrative decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

March 15, 2017
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("Board") denying him parole and imposing a twenty-month Future 

Eligibility Term ("FET"). We affirm.

On June 15, 2009, appellant pled guilty to one count of firstdegree money laundering and one count of second-degree securities 

fraud. On December 4, 2009, the trial court sentenced appellant 

to a fifteen-year prison term on the money laundering charge, with 

a five-year period of parole ineligibility, and to a concurrent 

ten-year term on the securities fraud charge.

In October 2014, appellant appeared before a two-member panel 

of the Board, at which he was considered for parole for the first 

time since his incarceration. The panel denied parole for several 

reasons. Among other things, the panel noted that appellant was 

incarcerated for a multi-crime conviction, had committed numerous, 

serious disciplinary infractions, and lacked sufficient problem 

resolution because he had no remorse for his actions and still 

sought to portray himself as a victim.

Appellant filed an appeal with the full Board. On March 25, 

2015, the full Board similarly concluded that appellant was 

ineligible for parole, and imposed a twenty-month FET.1 The Board 

noted that there were several mitigating factors, including 

 

1 This was the presumptive FET for appellant's convictions because 

he was serving a mandatory minimum term of between four and eight 

years. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(3).
3 A-1322-15T4

appellant's lack of a prior criminal record, and his participation 

in appropriate institutional programs. However, the Board found 

that appellant continued to minimize his conduct, which involved 

the misappropriation of over $1 million in funds. In addition, 

defendant had multiple institutional infractions, including one 

in May 2014 that involved appellant operating an unauthorized 

business at the prison. 

Because the Board found that there was a reasonable 

expectation that appellant would violate the conditions of parole 

if he were released, the Board denied parole. This appeal 

followed.

On appeal, appellant contends that the Board's decision is 

arbitrary and capricious and should be set aside. We disagree.

We must accord considerable deference to the Board and its 

expertise in parole matters. Our standard of review of the Board's 

decisions is limited, and "grounded in strong public policy 

concerns and practical realities." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole 

Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 200 (2001) ("Trantino V"). "The decision of a 

parole board involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a 

multiplicity of imponderables[.]'" Id. at 201 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. 

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 

677 (1979)). 
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"To a greater degree than is the case with other 

administrative agencies, the Parole Board's decision-making 

function involves individualized discretionary appraisals." Ibid.

(citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59 

(1973)). Consequently, our courts "may overturn the Parole Board's 

decisions only if they are arbitrary and capricious." Ibid. We 

will not disturb the Board's factual findings if they "could 

reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in 

the whole record." Id. at 172 (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State 

Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 24 (1998) ("Trantino IV") (quoting N.J. 

State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.), 

certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988))); see also McGowan v. N.J. 

State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002) 

(applying that standard).

Having reviewed the record in light of these well-accepted 

standards, including the materials in the confidential appendix, 

we conclude that appellant's arguments are without sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(D). There is abundant support in the record for a 

conclusion that there is "a reasonable expectation that 

[appellant] will violate conditions of parole . . . if released 

on parole at that time." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a). Therefore, we 

discern no basis for disturbing the Board's decision to deny 
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parole. We are likewise satisfied that the presumptive twentymonth FET imposed by the Board is supported by the record and is 

neither arbitrary or capricious. 

Affirmed.