Filed 2/27/14 Duston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

WENDY DUSTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent. B245453
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC473132)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Los Angeles County, Teresa Sanchez-Gordon, Judge. Affirmed.

The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin; Shernoff Bidart Echeverria Bentley, William M. Shernoff and Travis M. Corby for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Barger & Wolen, Royal F. Oakes, Michael A.S. Newman and James C. Castle for Defendant and Respondent.

________________ ________________2 Wendy Duston and her two sons, Zachary Morrison and Joel Morrison (individually referred to by their first names, collectively as plaintiffs), appeal from the judgment entered against them after the tr ial court granted the motion of defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance, a New York corpor ation (hereinafter referred to as MetLife) for judgment on the pleadings . We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL & PROCED URAL BACKGROUND Summary of Facts Wendy was married to Peter Morrison, th e father of Zachary and Joel. Peter owned a $2.38 million in surance policy on his own life is sued by MetLife, which named Wendy, Zachary and Joel as be neficiaries (the Policy). Wendy filed a petition for marital dissolution in August 1997. At that time Zachary and Joel were adults. During the course of the proceedings, in June 1999, We ndy’s counsel sent MetLife a notice pursuant to Family Code section 2050, notifying it that the Policy wa s the subject of community property claims in th e dissolution proceedings. 1 In July 1999, Wendy ’s lawyer sent MetLife a follo w-up letter which stated, inter alia, “As you know, this office served MetLife with a Notice to Insurance Carriers which was received by you in the ab ove entitled matter on June 7, 19 99. [¶] Please be advised that, on behalf of Wendy J. Morrison, MetL ife is authorized to reduce the coverage
amount on the life of Peter Morrison to a minimum of $1,530,000 on policy number 0098049-376-50-8405-0. [¶] Any excess premium on other cash value resulting from the reduction in coverage must be retained as part of the cash value and must not be
distributed without written authorization from Ms. Morrison. [¶] As a courtesy, I am sending a copy of this letter by facsimile to Patricia Chase to whom I understand Mr. Morrison’s initial reduction request was transmitted.” In December 1999, a judgment of marital dissolution was entered.

1 The text of the letter and the specific language of the statute will be discussed, infra

.3 The Judgment, which was 22 pages, provided, inter alia, that Pe ter was to maintain a $1.3 million life insurance polic y for a period of 20 years na ming the plaintiffs as the beneficiaries in the following amounts: Wendy $300,000, Zach $500,000, and Joel $500,000. It also provided that Peter was to cause th e insurance company to notify Wendy in the event the policy lapsed for a ny reason and authorized Wendy to obtain
information from the insu rance company about the Policy. It stated that if Peter did not comply with the te rms, that Wendy would have a claim against the estate. MetLife received a copy of the Judgment. Peter died on October 8, 2010. Plain tiffs submitted a claim under the Policy and
MetLife informed them that Peter had surrendered the policy sometime in 2000 and it was no longer in effect. There were no assets left in Peter’s estate. In November 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint against MetLife, alleging (1) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, (2 ) breach of contract, and (3) negligence. MetLife moved for judgment on the plead ings. The hearing on the motion was held on August 22, 2012. The court heard argument and took the matter under submission. On October 3, 2012, the cour t issued its order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court’s order stated, inter alia: “The divorce Court’s order created no contractual duty between MetLife and Plaintiffs . It did not purport to do so, and could not do so even if it had so purported. Nothing in the Court order could create a contractual relationship between MetLife and Plaintiffs where none existed. [Citation.] Furthermore, the Court did not purport to crea te such a contract. In fact, the Court did
not order MetLife to do anything. It ordered Peter to do certain things, and gave Plaintiffs recourse against Peter’s estate (but not against MetL ife) in the event he failed to do such things. The fact his estate tu rned out to contain insufficient funds to compensate Plaintiffs for his actions does not create a theory of rec overy against MetLife, which was in no way bound by the divorce Court’s order. . . . Section 2051 does not, by its plain language, impose any positive duty on the recipient. All it does is prescribe the4 text of a letter to be sent to an insurer . . . . For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ theories, predicated on the idea that MetL ife owed Plaintiffs a duty, must fail. Thus, MetLife’s
First Cause of Action For Breac h of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Second
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract both fail, because MetLife had no duty of any kind to maintain the Policy in force, The Third Cause of Action for Negligence fails for the same reason, and because negligence is not among the theories generally available as against insurers, as Plaintiffs concede in their opposition brief.” (Emphasis in original.) Judgment was subsequently entered in favor of MetLife and plaintiffs appeal.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred because the notice requirements in Family
Code sections 2050 and 2051 2 imposed a duty on MetLife to notify them about the change in the status of the Po licy. They also contend that because MetLife breached its duty to provide notice, it is lia ble for damages under the breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair deali ng and negligence causes of action. MetLife contends in response that the plain language of sections 2050 and 2051 provides only for the text of a letter but do es not impose any duty on the insurer. It argues that because those s ections do not impose a duty, it cannot be held liable to plaintiffs under any of the causes of action alleged. It also argues in the alternative that even if a duty is imposed under sections 2050 and 2051, negligence is not a theory of recovery available against insurers.
DISCUSSION 1. Judgment on the Pleadings Rules A motion for judgment on the pleadings cha llenges the sufficiency of the causes of action in the complaint. In reviewing a mo tion for judgment on the pleadings, we review the complaint de novo, and assuming all the properly pleaded material facts are true, determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action or if

2 All subsequent undesignated statutory re ferences shall be to the Family Code.5 any defects can reasonably be cured by ame ndment. We affirm a dismissal based upon an order granting the motion if it is proper on any grounds raised in the motion, and not only the reasons set forth by the trial court. ( American Airlines, Inc. v. County of San
Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1110, 1118; Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213-1214.)
2. Section 2050 Section 2050 provides: “U pon filing of the petition, or at any time during the proceeding, a party may transmit to, or the co urt may order transmittal to, a health, life, or disability insurance carrier or plan the following notice in substantially the following
form:
“YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED , PURSUANT TO A PENDING PROCEEDING, IN RE MARRIAGE OF _____ , CASE NUMBER __ __, FILED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF _____, THAT OWNERSHIP OF, OR BENEFITS PAYABL E UNDER, A POLICY OF HEALTH, LIFE, OR DISABILITY INSURANCE WH ICH YOU HAVE ISSUED TO ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING, PO LICY NO. ______, IS AT ISSUE OR
MAY BE AT ISSUE IN THE PROCEEDING. [¶] YOU ARE HEREBY
INSTRUCTED TO MAINTA IN THE NAMED BENEFICIARIES OR COVERED DEPENDENTS UNDER THE POLICY, UNLESS THE TERMS OF THE POLICY OR OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW REQUIRE OTHERWISE, OR UNTIL RECEIPT OF A COURT ORDER, JUDGMENT, OR ST IPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES PROVIDING OTHER INSTRUCTIONS. [¶ ] YOU ARE FURTHER INSTRUCTED
TO SEND NOTICE TO THE NAMED BENE FICIARIES, COVERED DEPENDENTS,
OR OTHER SPECIFIED PERSONS UPON CANCELLATION, LAPSE, OR CHANGE OF THE COVERAGE, OR CHANGE OF DESIGNATED BENEFICIARES UNDER
THE POLICY.” Wendy sent the following notice on pl eading paper, with the dissolution action caption: “TO METROPOLITAN LI FE INSURANCE COMPANY:6 “YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuan t to a pending proceeding, In Re Marriage of Morrison, case number 97 D007787, filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Orange, that owne rship of, or benefits payable under, policies which you have issued to one of the parties to this pro ceeding, policy numbers 0098049-
376-50-8405-0 and 00980490-571-45-5276-0, are at issu e in the proceeding. [¶] You are hereby instructed to maintain the name d beneficiaries or covered dependents and present benefits under the policies, unless the te rms of the policies or other provisions of law require otherwise, or until receipt of a Court Order, Judgment, or Stipulation between the parties providing other instructions. [¶] You are further instru cted to send notice to
the named beneficiaries in care of the un dersigned, covered dependents, or other specified persons upon cancellation, lapse, or change of the coverage, or change of designated beneficiaries under the policy.” Judgment was entered in th e dissolution and stated, inter alia, “22. Husband shall for a period of twenty years, commenci ng the date on which the parties sign this Judgment, maintain and pay in a timely manner all premiums for a policy of insurance on
his life with a minimum total death benefit of $1,300,000, and shall designate Wife as sole owner and beneficiary thereof until her deat h as to a $300,000 death benefit, Zachary Morrison as sole beneficiary as to a $500,000 death benefit, and Joel Morrison as sole beneficiary as to a $500,000 death benefit, commencing forthwith. Husband shall do the

necessary [sic] to cause the carrier of said policy to notify Wife in the event that the policy lapses or will lapse for any reason, in cluding nonpayment of premiums, so that Wife will have ample opportunity to rectify the situation , at which time Husband shall
forthwith reimburse Wife for all amounts which she must advance to cure or prevent the lapse. In addition, Wife is authorized to obtain all information concer ning said policy directly from the provider and shall be notifie d directly by the provider in the event of any change or lapse in said po licy, without the necessity of any prior authorization from
Husband . In the event that Husba nd is not in compliance with this paragraph at the time of his death, then each required beneficiar y under this paragraph shall have a claim against his estate in the amount of the death benefit ordered herein. Husband may change7 the policy holder at his election, so long as there is no lapse and he remains in full compliance with this paragr aph.” (Italics added.) MetLife apparently received a copy of the Judgment, 3 but Wendy did not send a notice pursuant to section 2051, which provides for notice to an insu rer of a judgment in dissolution proceedings. 4
MetLife contends that sections 2050 and 2051 simply provide the text for a notice to be sent to an insurer but do not impos e any statutory duties on the insurer. We consider this contention in light of the word s of the statute and the legislative history.

3 In their opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, plaintiffs alleged they learned through discovery that MetLife had received a copy of the Judgment.

4 Section 2051 provides: “Upo n the entry of an order or judgment in the proceeding requiring a party to maintain existing health , life or disability insurance coverage for a spouse or children or after an order or judg ment in the proceeding requiring a party to purchase life or disability insura nce and name to spouse or children as beneficiaries and upon receipt of the name, title, and address of the insurer, or the name of the plans’ trustee, administrator, or agent for service of process, a party may transmit to, or the court may order transmittal to, the insurer or plan a copy of the order or judgment endorsed by the court, together with th e following notice in substant ially the followi ng form:

“PURSUANT TO A PROCEEDING, IN RE MARRIAGE OF ______, CASE NUMBER _____, IN THE SUPERIOR CO URT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ______,YOU R INSURED, ____ HAS BEEN ORDERED TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING (HEALTH )(LIFE)(DISABILIT Y) INSURANCE, POLICY NO. _______, IN FORCE FO R THE NAMED BENEFICIARIES OR COVERED DEPENDENTS AS SPECIFIED IN THE ATTACHED ORDER OR JUDGMENT. [¶] THE AT TACHED ORDER OR JUDGMENT REQUIRES YOU TO MAINTAIN THE NAMED BENEFICI AIRES UNDER THE POLICY AS IRREVOCABLE BENEFICIARIES OR COVE RED DEPENDENTS OF THE POLICY AND YOU MUST ADMINISTER THE COVE RAGE ACCORDINGLY, UNTIL THE DATE SPECIFIED, IF ANY, IN THE OR DER OR JUDGMENT, OR UNTIL THE RECEIPT OF A COURT ORDER, JUDG MENT, OR STIPULATION PROVIDING OTHER INSTRUCTIONS. [¶] YOU ARE FURTHER INSTRUCTED TO SEND NOTICE TO THE NAMED BENEFICIAI RES, COVERED DEPENDENTS, OR OTHER SPECIFIED PERSONS UPON ANY CANCELLATION, LAPSE, OR CHANGE OF COVERAGE, OR CHANGE OF DESIGNATED BENEFICIARIES UNDER THE POLICY.”8 In interpreting a statute, the objective is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent and thereby effectuate the pur pose of the statute. ( Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4t h 1142, 1147; Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.) To ascertain that intent, we begin with the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. ( Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340.) “If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers mean t what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” ( Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272; see also Smith, supra , 39 Cal.4th at p. 83.) “If, however, the statutory terms are ambi guous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such circumst ances, we ‘“select the constr uction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legisl ature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, a nd avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.”’” ( Day v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.)
We do not construe a statute in isolati on, but rather construe it in context with
reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole scheme may be harmonized and still be effective. ( Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 14.) We presume that when enacting a statute, th e Legislature was aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time and in tended to maintain a consistent body of rules. ( Stone Street Capital, LLC v. California State Lottery Com. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109.) Reading the statutes litera lly, the terms clearly specify the text of a notice and are not ambiguous. The language provides that a party or court may transmit a notice and provides the text of the notice in quotation ma rks. It does not specify that an insurance company must take certain action once th e notice is sent nor does it impose any mandatory duties on insurers. Both parties nonetheless urged us to examine the legislativ e history, submitting
voluminous documents in the record. Both parties point to statements made in legislative hearings as support for their positions. MetLife claims the statements i ndicate an acknowledgment that the statute9 provides nothing more than the text of a notice; plaintiffs contend that the enactment of the statute indicates an intent to impose a duty on the insurance companies. We have
reviewed the documents and conc lude that nothing in them de monstrates an intent other
than that contained in the st atutes. There is no indication of an intent to impose a mandatory duty on insurers to give notice. Plaintiffs argue that if in surers do not have a duty to co mply with the text of the notices, then sections 2050 and 2051, as well as 2053 which contains detailed mailing provisions, would be rendered useless. Plaintiffs then cite California Teac hers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 634 for the proposition that “We cannot presume the Legislature, . . . engaged in an idle act or enacted a superfluous statutory provision. [Citation.]”
The documents reveal that several related bills (AB 1141 and AB 4388) were proposed but never passed in the years prior to the 1990 enactment of sections 2050 and 2051. The concerns leading to those proposed bills were th at “frequently in dissolution proceedings a spouse with ownership or contro l over an insurance policy will change the coverage for the dependents or change de signated beneficiarie s on the policy without court authorization or the agreement of the ot her spouse. . . . [T]his bill would eliminate unnecessary litigation in the family law contex t by providing notice and instructions to insurance carriers.” (Co mments from Assembly Committee on Judiciary for AB 1141 and AB 4388) AB 4388 initially proposed jo ining insurance compan ies in the marital dissolution proceedings in the same way pension plans were joined to ensure division of assets. Joinder was strongly opposed by insuran ce companies with the recognition that it would increase the costs of litigation for the pa rties to the dissolution proceedings. AB 4388 was later amended, omitti ng the joinder provisions a nd simply providing for notice to the carrier. It was approv ed by the Assembly but “held in the Senate by the author because of continuing discussi ons as to whether notice to the insurer was sufficient or
whether the insurer should be joined as a party to a family law action.”10 In 1989, AB 1141 was introduced to amend the Civ il Code with a similar statute providing the terms of a notice to be sent to a life insurance carrier. Joinder of insurance companies was contemplated, but ultimately not contained in the pr oposed language. The Summary prepared fo r the Assembly Committee on Judiciary notes that: “This bill provides a notice, whic h provides specific instruction, to the insurer. However, the insurer is not specifically required by law to comply with the instructions of requiring the named beneficiary or any other court orde red beneficiary to become the irrevocable beneficiary. There are no sanctions imposed if the insurer fails to comply, although it is implied that the insurer would be subject to liability for damages pursu ant to a separately filed tort action. A party would not be able to request the court in a family law action to compel the insurer to honor the notice created by this bill , until the insurer is joined as a party to the action. [¶] Should an explicit du ty be established, in either the Family Law Act or the Insurance Code, requiring insurers to comply with th is bill and imposing a sanction enforceable in either the family law action or by separate action?” (Emphasis in original.) AB 1141 was also approved by the Assemb ly and delayed in the Senate “over the
issue of whether the insurers s hould be joined or noticed.” When the current bill (AB 3974) was proposed in 1990, 5 there was an informational hearing of the Judiciary Committee on March 7, 1990. A Summary prepared for the Assembly Committee on Judici ary discusses the hear ing in the Comment section. It states: “This proposal is ba sed upon State Bar Conference of Delegate Resolution 9-2-86, which provided for jo inder of the life, health or disability insurance company in the family law acti on. This bill provides, instead , a notice to the insurer that a family law matter is pending or that an or der relating to the insurance policy has been entered. Two prior bills . . . were approved by the assembly: In 1988 AB 4388 (Wright) and in 1989, AB 1141 (Wright). Both bills were delayed in the Senate over the issue of

5 AB 3974 was enacted as an amendment to the Civil C ode. The statute was later reenacted as part of the Family Code. (Stats. 1992, c. 162.)11 whether the insurers should be joined or notic ed. [¶] This bill is anticipated to reduce some costs to parties to family law proceed ings because it will be tter ensure that the parties entitled to insurance benefits will receiv e the benefits. [¶] Th e sponsor states that frequently in dissolution pro ceedings a spouse with owne rship or control over an insurance policy will change the coverage for dependents or change designated beneficiaries on the policy without court auth orization or the agreement of the other spouse. Since the insurer has been neither joined to the action nor notified of pending family law proceeding, the carrier will allow the named owner of the policy to accomplish the change in coverage (including cancellation) or designation. [¶] The sponsor also states th at an unauthorized ch ange to the policy forces the beneficiary spouse or dependent to seek court assistance in rectifying the situation, which can be particularly complex if the owner-spouse ha s remarried and died. The sponsor believes that this will help eliminate unne cessary family law litigation.” MetLife contends that the Judiciary Co mmittee determined that compliance by insurance companies was only intended to be vol untary. We have reviewed the transcript of the hearing, and have determined that the comments cited by MetL ife were simply the views of Committee Chair Isenberg and we re made during a discussion which also involved provisions of the bill relating to h ealth insurance. Th ey were simply the viewpoint of a single legislator and were no t observations about the ultimate reach of the
statute. Thus we cannot re ly on these statements. ( Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 726, di sapproved on another point in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854, fn. 19; Metropolitan Water Dist. V. Imperial Irr. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1425-1426.) Because joinder of insura nce companies had previously been contemplated but was not ultimately included in the approved lang uage, it is clear there was no intent to bind a third party. The Legislature had prev iously enacted statutes requiring joinder of pension plans in marital dissolution proceeding s (§ 2060). Since it did not make a similar provision here we can only conclude the omission was deliberate. ( Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 811; In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273.) We cannot12 conclude that sections 2050 and 2051 compel insurance comp anies to maintain
beneficiaries or to send notice of cancella tion, lapse, or change of coverage or
beneficiaries. We therefore consider the question of whether, apart from these statutes, MetLife has a duty to plaintiffs. 3. Did MetLife Owe a Comm on Law Duty to Plaintiffs? Since this matter is an appeal from the granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings we only need to evaluate whether plaintiffs may proceed on any of the causes of action in the complaint: (1) breach of cont ract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) negligence. Of those causes of action, the only ones whic h involve a duty owed by Met Life are the bad faith and negligen ce causes of action. A. Negligence A cause of action for negligence must a llege a duty of care was owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. A duty of care may arise through statut e or by contract. A duty may arise out of the general character of the activity in which the defendant engaged or out of the relationship between the parties. ( J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803.) Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law. ( Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 57-58; Prouty v. Gores Technology Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1233.) Since we have concluded that sections 2050 and 2051 do not impose a statutory duty, we examine whet her a common law duty of care exists.
The factors to be considered in determin ing whether a duty of care exists between parties who do not have a contractua l relationship were set forth in Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647: “The determination whether in a sp ecific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in priv ity is a matter of po licy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which ar e the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered inju ry, the closeness of the conn ection between the defendant’s13 conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct and the policy of preventing future harm.” ( Id . at p. 650.) We examin e each of these factors.
1 . Extent to which the transaction was intended to affect plaintiffs
In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397, the court recognized that there are pragmatic considerations in extending the duty of care. Bily held that with respect to an auditor’s liability to investors in a company fo r negligent preparation of an audit report, a foreseeable risk of injury, standing alone, is not sufficient to impose liability for negligent conduct. The recognition of a duty to members of the public who might rely on the audit report could lead to a disproportionate imposition of liability. ( Id. at p. 403.)
The contract of life insurance between Peter and MetLife was intended to benefit plaintiffs. Peter initially bought the Policy for the purpose of leaving money for his family when he died. Clearly it was not to benefit Peter, because there would be no payment until he had died. Once the dissolu tion petition was filed, the divorce court’s imposition of an order commanding Peter to keep the Policy in effect was to preserve that asset for the benefit of plaintiffs. The court order, however, was directed at Peter obligating him to maintain the Policy. The order did not name MetLife or order it to do anything. So while the Policy was intended to benefit plainti ffs, any duty to keep it in
effect was Peter’s.
2 . Foreseeability of harm The termination of the Policy would clear ly have a foreseeable effect on Wendy and children, since they were named as benefi ciaries. Life insura nce exists to protect against the foreseeable event of death. The notice inform ed MetLife that the $1 million Policy was considered an asset in the disso lution proceedings and that Peter had been ordered to maintain the Policy with Wendy and the children as beneficiaries. Again, the court order was directed at Peter and provided that plaintiffs’ recourse was against his estate. Therefore, it was not foreseeable th at MetLife’s actions would harm plaintiffs
because it had no basis to believe Peter woul d violate a court order or cancel the Policy14 without informing plaintiffs or leave a valueless estate. ( Richard B. Levine Inc. v. Higashi (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 566, 582.)
3 . The degree of certainty of injury There is no question that plaintiffs could prove they suffered injury from the cancellation of the Policy. But there was far le ss of a degree of certainty that the injury
would have resulted from the lack of notice. As discussed previous ly, MetLife would not
have known Peter would have violated a court order and left nothing in his estate. The degree of certainty of injury was not absolute. ( Mintz v. Blue Cross (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1612-1613.)
4 . The connection between the conduct and the harm The theory of the complain t is that MetLife’s failure to notify resulted in the loss
of a marital asset. This loss would still have to be proven at trial, and Wendy would have
to show that she could have obtained a cour t order for Peter to reinstate the Policy or make the premium payments herself. Ther e was a connection between the conduct and the harm but it depended on many variables. ( Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 58; Giacometti v. Aulla (2010) 187 Cal.Ap p.4th 1133, 1140.)
5 . Moral blame “Negligence in the execution of contractua l duties is generally held to be morally blameworthy conduct. [Citation.]” ( Nat’l Union v. Cambridge, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) Here, however, there was no cont ract between MetLife and plaintiffs. We cannot conclude MetLife was morally blameworthy. ( Richard B. Levine, Inc. v. Higashi,

supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) The only morally bl ameworthy party here was Peter.
6 . Policy of preventing future harm Bily noted that “As a matter of economic and social policy, third parties should be encouraged to rely on their ow n prudence, diligence and contract power, as well as other information tools.” ( Bily v. Arthur Yo ung & Co., supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 403.) The parties dispute whether Wendy coul d have discovered information about the Policy on her own by directly re questing it from MetLife or Peter.15 Insurance Code section 791.13 prohibits an insurance company from disclosing “personal or privileged information about an individual collected or received in
connection with an insurance tr ansaction.” There are several exceptions enumerated in the section: (1) if there is written authorizati on of the individual (subd. (a)); (2) if it is otherwise permitted or required by the law (s ubd. (g)); or (3) if it is requested by a “person shown on the records of an insurance institution . . . as having a legal or beneficial interest in a policy of insurance. . . .” (subd. (r)). The judgment provides that Wendy was “authorized to obtain all information concerning said policy directly by the prov ider and shall be notified directly by the provider in the event of any ch ange or lapse in said policy, without the necessity of any prior authorization from Husband.” Wendy thus could have requested notic e from MetLife to ascertain the Policy’s status over the years in addition to sending the section 2050 notic e and copy of the judgment. The record contains no other evid ence of a request for information. Wendy did not send a post-judgment section 2051 notice which woul d have explicitly informed MetLife of the judgment. Wen dy also could have insisted on a provision in the judgment of marital dissolution requiring Peter to provid e her with annual accountings or proof that he had made the premium payment, and file an appropriate order to show cause in the family law case if Peter failed to provide such proof for any year. Even w ithout such an explicit provision in the judgment of marita l dissolution, Wendy co uld have requested
information about the status of the policy from Peter at any time during 1999-2010. Instead, she did nothing during those years to ensure and compel Pe ter’s compliance with his obligations to maintain the insurance policy. 7. Conclusion from Biankaja factors Examining all the factors set forth in Biankaja, supra , 49 Cal.2d 647, we conclude that no duty can be imposed on MetLife to give notice to plaintiffs. While some factors may weigh in favor of finding a duty, others do not. We are reluctant to impose a duty especially when the Legislature has considered this issue more than once and opted not to impose one.16 B. The duty of good faith and fair dealing
MetLife maintains that there can be no du ty of good faith and fair dealing imposed with respect to someone who is a not a party to the insurance contra ct. We agree that without either a statutory or common law dut y and in absence of a specific request from Wendy after the entry of judgment, there is nothing to which a duty of good faith and fair dealing can attach.
C. Breach of contract cause of action The motion for judgment on the pleadings for the breach of contract cause of action was properly granted. Since plaintiffs had no express contract with MetLife and it is undisputed that Peter failed to pay the pr emiums, plaintiffs cannot state a cause of
action for breach of contract for MetL ife’s denial of claim benefits.
DISPOSITION
While we have concluded that neith er sections 2050 nor 2051 impose an affirmative duty on life insurers and no common law duty exis ts in this case, we do so with extreme reluctance. The Legislature’ s apparent belief that the statutory notice would be sufficient, and that insurers w ould voluntarily comply with notices sent pursuant to the statute, was overly optimistic. The very da ngers identified by those who unsuccessfully tried to include a joinder provisi on in the statute have materialized in this case. Therefore, we urge the Legislature to clarify the extent of duties owed by life
insurance carriers in dissolu tion proceedings. Until then , we cannot presume a duty
exists from the unamb iguous terms of sections 2050 and 2051. The judgment in favor of MetLife is affi rmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

WOODS, Acting P. J. We concur:
ZELON, J. SEGAL, J.*

________________ __________________ __________________ _________________ *Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chie f Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.