F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

J U S T I N A L L A N R I C H A R

D S O N , Defendant-Appellant

. N o. 11-10346

D.C. No. 3:10-cr-00087- ECR-VPC-1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Edward C. Reed, J r ., Senior District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted April 16, 2012—San F rancisco, California Submission Vacated May 4, 2012 Resubmitted J une 11, 2014

F iled J une 19, 2014

B efore: Stephen Reinhardt and Mary H. Murg uia, Circuit J udg es, and David A. Ez ra, District J udg e. *

Per Curiam Opinion

* T h e Ho n o rab l e D a v i d A

. Ezra, District J u d g e f o r th e U.S. District Co u rt f o r th e District o f

Haw aii, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 2

SUMMARY * *

Crim inal Law

Affirming a conviction for violating the r eg istrat i o n req u i r ements of the Sex Offender Reg istration a nd Notification Act, the panel held that (1) SORNA’s deleg ation of authority to the Atto r n e y General to determine the

a pplicability of SORNA’s reg istration requirements to p r e

SORNA sex offenders is consistent with the requirements o f the n o n-deleg ation doctrine; a nd ( 2) SORNA does not violate the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle.

The panel wrote that the defendant’s arg uments that SORNA’s r eg istration requirements v iolate the Commerce Clause and the Ex Post F acto Clause are foreclos ed i n this circuit.

The panel resolved a sentencing issue in a concur r e n t l y

filed memorandum disposition.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 3

COUNSEL

Dan C. Maloney ( a r gu ed), Research & W riting Attorney
, Ramon Acosta, Assistant F ederal Public Defender, Renee L

. Val ladares, F ederal Public D efender, Reno, Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.

Eliz abeth A. Olson (arg ued), Assistant United S t ates Attorney
, Robert L

. Ellman, App e l l a te Chief, Daniel G

. B og den, U nited States Attorne y , D i strict of Nevada, Reno, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OP INION

PER CURI AM:

J ustin Allan Richardson appea l s his conviction a nd
sentence for violating the reg istration requirements of the Sex Offender Reg istration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). He raises several constitutional challeng es to SORNA and arg ues that the district court e r

red in calculating his criminal history

. W e affirm. 1

BACK G ROUND

I n 1994, Richardson w as convicted of lewd and lascivious
acts w ith a c h i l d in a California state court and ordered to

r eg ister as a sex offender. On J u ly 21, 2010, a fede r a l gr a n d j ury indicted Richardson for f ailing to reg ister as a se x offender as required by S O R N A. Richardson moved to

1 W e co n sid er an d reso lv e th e sen ten cin g iss u e i n a m e m oran d u m d isp ositio n

f i led co n cu rren tly

h erew ith

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 4

d i s m i s s t h e i n d i c t m e n t , a r gu i n g t h a t S O R N A i s unconstituti o n al because it violates the non-deleg ation doctrine, the Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Ex P ost Facto Clause. The di strict court denied Richardson’s motion, and he subsequently pled g uilty to the sing le-count indictment without a plea ag reement. However, Richardson o bjec t e d t o t

h e P r e s e n t e n c e I

n vestig ation Report’s assessment of one criminal histor y point for a 2000 misdemeanor conviction that r esulted in a sentence of time served. Rich a r dson a

rg ued that h e was not represented b y counsel during that proceed i ng

. The district court overruled his obj e c tion and sentenced h im to twenty -seven months’ imprisonment

. Richardson appealed. W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

D ISCUSSION

Richardson arg ues that SORNA is unconstitutional on the
g rounds that it violates the non-deleg ation doctrine, the T e nth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Ex Post F a cto Clause. W e reject each of these arg uments.

I. Non-Delegation Doctrine

Richardson arg ues that SORNA’s prov i s ions allowing the Attorney General to d e termine the applicab i l i ty of its
reg istr a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s t o p r e

- SORNA sex offenders violate the non-deleg ation doctrine, w hich prohibits Cong ress from “deleg at[ ing ] i t s leg islative power to another branch o f
g overnment.” Tou b

y v

. United States
, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991). Three y ears ag o, we summariz ed the orig ins, history
, and requirements of the non-deleg ation doctrine:U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 5

The Supreme Court has only twice invalidated leg islation under this d o c trine, the last time being seventy -five y ears ag o. A rticle I
, § 1 of
t h e C o n s t itution p r ovides that “[ a] ll leg islative Pow e r s herein g ranted shall b e vested in a Cong r ess of the United States.” I n practice, o f

c o u r s e , C o n g r e s s d e l e g a t e s a u t h o r i t y frequently

. The relevant q u e s tion is how,

w h e n , a n d u n d e r w h at ci r c u m s t a n c e s Cong r ess may deleg ate its author ity

. The Supreme Court’s answer: “[ W ] h en Cong ress confers d e c i s i o n m a k i n g authority upon ag encie s C ong r ess must lay down b y leg islative act an i n t ellig ible principle to which the person or body authoriz ed to act is di re cted to conform.” W h itman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns
, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). “ O nly if [ a court] c o uld say that there is an absence of standards for the
g uidance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would b e impossible in a proper proceeding
to ascertain whether the will of Cong ress has been obey ed, w ould [ it] be j u stified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared purpose.

. . . ” Y

akus v. United States
, 3 2 1 U.S. 414, 426 ( 1944). I n apply ing t h e in t e llig ible principle test to c ong ressional deleg ations, the Supreme Court “has been driven by a p ractical understanding that in our increasing l y complex society
, replete with

e v e r chang ing and more technical problems, Cong r ess simply cannot do its job abs e n t an ability to deleg ate power under b road g eneralU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 6

directives.” M

istretta [v. United States
, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)]

. Hepting v. AT & T Corp. ( I n re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig.)
, 671 F .3d 881, 895 –96 (9th Cir. 2011) (alterations in orig inal).

R i chardson’s specific c ontention is that Cong ress v i o l a t e d the non-deleg ation doctrine when it deleg ated its authority to the Attorney General to determine the a p p l icability o f SORNA’s reg istrat i o n requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). Every court of appeals
to have considered the question has concluded that Cong ress did not violate the Constitution when it d eleg ated this impleme ntation authority to the Attorney General. S ee, e.g. , United States v. Cooper
, No. 13-2324, 2014 W L 1386816, at *8 (3d Cir. Apr. 10, 2014) (“Appl y i n g the intellig ible principle test, we conclude that Cong ress did not v iolate the nondeleg ation doctrine in deleg ating r e s p o nsibility to the Attorney G eneral to determine the applicability of SORNA’s reg istration requirements for pre-Act offenders in 42 U .S.C. § 16913(d). I n enacting SORNA, Cong ress laid o u t the
g eneral policy
, the public ag ency to apply this policy
, and the boundaries of the deleg ated author i t y

. T h is is a ll that is required u nder the modern n ondeleg ation juri sprudence.”); United States v. Goodwin
, 717 F .3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2 013) (“SORNA directs the A ttorney General to ex ercis e his discretion in a manner consisten t w ith the intellig ible principle of ‘protecting the p ublic’ from sex offenders a nd establishing a ‘ comprehensive’ reg istry ; the statute identifies the Attorney G eneral as the official to ex ercise this deleg ated
aut h o rity ; and the A ttorney General’s authority is narrowly restricted to determining the applicability of SORNA to offenders whose crimes p re d a te the statute’s enactment.”);U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 7

United States v. W

haley
, 577 F .3d 254, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2009) ( “SORNA’s statement o f purpose, to ‘es t a blish[ ] a comprehensive national sy stem’ o f sex o ffender reg istration
to ‘protect the public from sex offenders and offenders

a g ainst c hildren,’ 42 U.S.C. § 16901, is an intellig i b l e principle that g uides the Attorney General in ex erci sing his discretion.” ( alt eration in orig inal)). 2 W e are persuaded b y

2 S ee a l so Un ited S ta tes v. Fern a n d ez , 7 1 0 F.3 d 8 4 7
, 8 5 0 (8 th Cir. 20 1 3) ( “S O RNA ’ s relativ ely n arro w d eleg atio n o f au th o rity to th e A t to r ne y Gen eral is g u id ed b y a n in t ellig ib le p rin cip le an d is co n sisten t w ith th e req u irem en t s o f th e n o n d eleg atio n d o ctrin e.”); Un ited S ta tes v. Felts
, 6 7 4 F.3 d 5 9 9
, 6 0 6 (6 th Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) ( “ C o n g ress’ s d eleg atio n s u n d er SORNA
p o ssess a s u itab le ‘ in tellig ib le prin cip le’ an d are “w e l l w ith in t h e o u ter lim its o f [th e Su

p rem e Co u rt’ s] n o n deleg atio n p reced en t s.” (alteratio n in

o rig in al)); Un ited S ta tes v. Gu zma n , 5 9 1 F.3 d 8 3
, 9 3 (2 d Cir. 2 0 1 0 ) (“ T h e A tto rn ey Gen eral’ s au t h o r ity u n d er SORNA i s h ig h ly circu m scrib ed

. SORNA i n c lu d es sp ecif

ic p ro v isio n s d elin eatin g w h at crim es req u ire
reg istratio n , 4 2 U .S.C. § 16 9 1 1 ; w h ere, w h en , an d h o w an o f

f en d er m u st reg ister, id

. § 1 6 9 1 3 ; w

h at i n fo rm atio n i s req u ired o f reg istran ts, id

. § 1 69 1 4 ; an d th e elem en t s an d p en alties f o r t h e f ed eral crim e o f f

ailu re to reg ister, 1 8 U.S.C. § 2 2 50 . If § 1 6 9 1 3 (d ) g iv es th e A tto rn ey Gen eral th e p o w er to d eterm in e SORNA ’ s ‘ retro activ ity ,’ it d o es so o n ly w ith resp ect to t h e lim ited class o f in d iv id u als w h o w ere co n v icted o f co v ered sex

o f f en ses p rio r to SORNA ’ s en actm en t; t h e A tto rn ey Gen eral can n o t d o

m u ch m o re th an sim

p ly d eterm in e w

h eth er o r n o t SORNA ap p l ies to th ose i n d iv id u als an d h o w th ey m ig h t co m p ly as a lo g istical m atter. If
, on th e

o th er h an d
, § 1 6 91 3 (d ) g iv es th e A tto rn ey Gen eral th e au th o rity o n ly to imp lemen t S O RNA w ith resp ect to all s ex o f f en d ers, w h eth er o r n o t th ey

w ere co n v icted p re- en actm en t, th en th e sco p e of t h a t a u t h o rity is ev en

m o re circu m scrib ed

. T h e Su p rem e Co u

rt h as u p h eld m u ch b ro ad er d eleg atio n s th an th ese.” (citatio n s o m i t t ed )); Un ited S ta tes v. Amb ert , 5 6 1 F.3 d 1 2 0 2
, 1 2 1 3– 1 4 (1 1 th Cir. 2 00 9 ) (“ W e are satisf ied th at C o n g ress h as p ro v id ed th e A tto rn ey G en eral w ith ‘ i n tellig ib le p rin cip l es’ i n th e Sex Of f en d er Reg istratio n an d No tif icatio n Ac t

. Co n g ress h as u n d en iab ly
p r o v i d e d t

h e A tto rn ey Gen eral w ith a p olicy f ram ew o rk in § 1 69 0 1 to g u id e h is ex ercise o f d i scretio n u n d er § 1 69 1 3 (d ); an d it h as m ad e a series

o f leg islativ e j u d g m en ts in § § 1 6 9 1 1
, 1 6 9 1 3
, 1 6 9 1 4 an d 2 2 5 0 th atU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 8

the reasoning of our colleag ues in th e s e other circuits a nd adopt it as our own. According ly
, w e hold that SORNA’s deleg ation of authority

to the Attorney

General to determine the applicability of SORNA’s r eg istration requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders i s consistent with the requirements of the non-deleg a tion doctrine.

II. Tenth Am endm ent

Richardson n ex t a rgu es that SORNA violates the T e nth Amendment. He contend s that SORNA unlawfully forces states and state officials to create sex offender reg istries that
meet federal standards and to comply with SORNA’s many other c omplex and onerous requirements. I n other words, he
arg ues that SORNA v i o l a t es the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering principle. S e e generally Printz v

. United States , 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).

Ag ain, we j o i n every other c o u rt of appeals that has

c o n sidered the question in holding that SORNA does not violate the T enth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle and adopt the other circuits’ r easoning for doing so. See United States v. Felt
, 674 F .3d 599, 6 0 6

– 0 8 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Johnson
, 6 3 2 F .3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2011); Kennedy v. Allera
, 612 F

. 3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2010). SORNA does not compel states or state officia l s t o comply with its requirements; rather, Cong ress e ng ag e d in a constituti o n al ly valid ex ercise of its spending power b y conditioning t h e receipt of certain federal funds on the implementation of SORNA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1 6 924, 16925(a); Felts
, 674 F .3d at 6 08 ( “Cong ress throug h SORNA

co n strict t

h e A tto rn ey Gen era l ’s d iscretio n to a n arro w an d d ef in ed categ o ry .”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 9

has not commandeered Tennessee, nor compelled the state to comply w ith its requirements. Cong ress has s i m p l y placed conditions o n the receipt of federal funds. A state is free to keep its ex isting sex -offender reg istry in place (and r i s k los i n g funding ) or adhere to SORNA’s requirements (and maintain f

u nding ).”); Johnson
, 632 F .3d at 920 ( “W hile SORNA orders sex o f

f e nders traveling interstate to r eg ister and keep their reg istration current, SORNA does n ot require the States to comply with its d i r ectives. I nstead, the statute

a l l ows jurisdictions to decide whether to implement i t s provisions o r lose ten percent of their federal funding otherwise allocated for c r iminal justice assistance.” (citations omitted)); Kennedy
, 612 F

. 3d at 2 69 (“[ W ] hile S ORNA imposes a duty on the sex offender to reg ist er, it nowhere imposes a requirement on the State to accept such

r e g i s t r a t i o n

. ” )

. A c c o r d ing ly
, Richardson’s Tenth A m e n d m e n t challeng e fails.

III. Com m erce Clause and Ex Post Facto Clause

F inally
, Richardson arg ues that S ORNA’s reg istration requirements violate the Commerce Cl a u s e and Ex Post F

a cto Clause. These challeng es ar e f oreclosed in this circuit. See United S tates v. Cabrera-Gutierrez
, No. 12-30233, 2 014 W L 998173, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2014) (Comm e rce Clause); United States v. Shoulder
, 738 F .3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2 013) ( E x Post Facto Clause challeng e to the SORNA reg istration requirements); United States v. Elkins
, 683 F .3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (same). W e therefore reject them.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I C H A R D S O N 10

CONCLUSION

We h o l d t h a t Richardson’s non-deleg ation doctri n e , T e n t h Am e n d ment, Commerce Clause, and Ex Post Facto Clause challeng es to SORNA fail.

AF F IRMED.