FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SLOBODANKA BLAZEVSKA, surviving 

spouse and personal representative

of the Estate of Risto Blazevski,

deceased; ELEONORA BLAZEVSKA,

surviving child of Risto Blazevski,

deceased; DIMITAR BLAZEVSKI,

surviving child of Risto Blazevski,

deceased; DRAGAN BOSKOVIK, as

surviving spouse and personal

representative of the Estate of

Dimka Ilkovka-Boskovik,

deceased, and as guardian of their

minor child Ana Boskovik;

No. 06-16028 VESELIN BOSKOVIK, surviving child

of Dimka Ilkovka-Boskovik, D.C. No.  deceased; BILJANA BOZINOVSKA, as CV-05-04191-PJH

surviving spouse and personal OPINION

representative of the Estate of Ace

Bozinovski, deceased and as

guardian of their two minor

children, Stefan and Andrej

Bozinovski; VESENA IVANOSKA, as

surviving spouse and personal

representative of the Estate of

Branko Ivanovski, deceased and as

guardian of their two minor

children, Marta Ivanovska and

Andrej Ivanovski; MIRJANA

GLAVCIC-KRESTEVSKA, as surviving

spouse and personal representative 

3755
of the Estate of Mile Krestevski, 

deceased; VLADIMIR KRESTEVSKI,

surviving child of Mile Krestevski,

deceased; VIOLETA MARKOVSKA, as

surviving spouse and personal

representative of the Estate of

Marko Markovski, deceased;

ZORAN MARKOVSKI; GORAN

MARKOVSKI, surviving children of

Marko Markovski, deceased;

VILMA TRAJKOVSKA, as surviving

spouse and personal representative

of the Estate of Boris Trajkovski,

deceased, and as guardian of their  two minor children, Sara

Trajkovska and Stefan Trajkovski;

ZLATKA VELINOVA, as surviving

spouse and personal representative

of the Estate of Boris Velinov,

deceased; JOVANCE VELINOV; OLGA

VELINOVA, surviving parent of

Boris Velinov, deceased,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a

Kansas Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

3756 BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO.
Argued and Submitted

February 14, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed April 10, 2008

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson and Michael Daly Hawkins,

Circuit Judges, and Robert J. Timlin,* Senior Judge.

Opinion by Judge D.W. Nelson

*The Honorable Robert J. Timlin, Senior United States District Judge

for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 

BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO. 3757
COUNSEL

Robert J. Nelson, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein,

LLP, San Francisco, California, for the appellants. 

3758 BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO.
Kirk C. Jenkins, Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold LLP,

Chicago, Illinois, for the appellee. 

OPINION

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge: 

Slobodanka Blazevska and her co-appellants are the family

members of eight Macedonian residents who died in a plane

accident in Bosnia on February 26, 2004. The decedents,

including the Macedonian president, were killed when their

Beechcraft Super King Air 200 crashed into a hilltop. The

plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Raytheon,

the manufacturer of the plane. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that plaintiffs’

action was barred by the eighteen-year statute of repose in the

General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”). Pub.

L. No. 103 298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101

notes). The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the presumption

against extraterritoriality precludes GARA’s application in

this case. We affirm the order of the district court granting

summary judgment for appellee Raytheon. The presumption

against extraterritoriality is not implicated in this case, so

GARA bars appellants’ suit. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In early 1980, appellee Raytheon Aircraft Company

(“Raytheon”) manufactured a Beech Super King Air 200 Aircraft in Wichita, Kansas. Around April 4, 1980, Raytheon

sold the aircraft to “The Beechcraft Organization for Central

Europe.” Later that month, the aircraft was delivered to the

Republic of Macedonia, which retained ownership of the

plane until its eventual destruction. 

On February 26, 2004, the aircraft departed Skopje, Macedonia, bound for Mostar, Bosnia, with the President of MaceBLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO. 3759
donia and his senior advisors aboard. In a thicket of rain and

fog, the plane struck a tree while attempting to land. The accident killed all nine passengers, including the two co-pilots.

The Aircraft Accident Report, prepared by the Bosnia and

Herzegovina Directorate of Civil Aviation, ultimately attributed the crash to pilot error. 

On October 17, 2005, appellants filed a wrongful death

action against Raytheon. The complaint alleged three causes

of action, all under Macedonian law, claiming the aircraft was

defective and not crashworthy. On November 10, 2005, Raytheon filed its answer, denying the allegations and raising a

number of affirmative defenses. Raytheon contended that the

action was barred by GARA’s eighteen-year statute of repose.

The parties agreed to proceed with limited discovery until the

district court resolved the issue of whether GARA applied. On

February 15, 2006, Raytheon filed a motion for summary

judgment, again asserting that GARA required a finding in its

favor. On May 12, 2006, the district court issued an order

granting Raytheon’s motion for summary judgment, holding

that GARA precluded the plaintiffs’ claims. On that same

day, the court entered judgment in favor of Raytheon on all

claims. 

JURISDICTION

Federal diversity jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a)(2). Appellants are all Macedonian citizens, appellee

is a Kansas corporation, and the amount in controversy

exceeds seventy-five thousand dollars. This court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of a district court under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment that was based upon uncontested facts and a disputed construction of a federal statute. Boyd v. United States,

3760 BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO.
762 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir. 1985). We must determine

whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933,

938 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We also review de novo a district

court’s interpretation and construction of a federal statute.”);

Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.

2004).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard — GARA

[1] GARA is a statute of repose that limits aircraft manufacturers’ liability to eighteen years after an aircraft is delivered. GARA §§ 2(a), 3(3). In 1994, Congress enacted this

measure to limit the “long tail of liability” imposed upon the

manufacturers of general aviation aircraft. Lyon v. Agusta

S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing H.R. Rep.

No. 103-525, pt. I, at 1-4 (1994), as reprinted in 1994

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1638, 1638-41). Congress was “deeply concerned about the enormous product liability costs” suffered by

manufacturers. Id. The pertinent sections of GARA provide:

Section 2. Time limitations on civil actions against

aircraft manufacturers. 

(a) In general. — Except as provided in subsection

(b), no civil action for damages for death or injury

to persons or damage to property arising out of an

accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be

brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or

the manufacturer of any new component, system,

subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its

capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred

— 

(1) after the applicable limitation

period beginning on — 

BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO. 3761
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft

to its first purchaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or 

(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in the business

of selling or leasing such aircraft . . . . 

Section 3. Other definitions. 

For the purposes of this Act — 

. . . . 

(3) the term “limitation period” means 18 years

with respect to general aviation aircraft and the components, systems, subassemblies, and other parts of

such aircraft . . . . 

GARA §§ 2(a), (3)(3). 

[2] The statute bars suits stemming from accidents that

occurred more than eighteen years after the initial transfer of

an aircraft. Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1084 (“If [the accident] occurs

on the day after the GARA period runs, no action whatsoever

is possible.”). The statute acts not just as an affirmative

defense, but instead “creates an explicit statutory right not to

stand trial.” Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron,

Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The accident at issue here occurred in 2004, more than

eighteen years after appellee delivered the plane to the Macedonian government in 1980. Accordingly, Raytheon argues

that GARA bars appellants’ claims. Appellants counter that,

in accord with the the presumption against extraterritoriality,

GARA’s time bar should not apply under the circumstances

of this case. 

3762 BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO.
II. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

[3] “The Supreme Court and this court have adhered to the

longstanding principle of American law that legislation is presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the

United States unless the contrary affirmative intention of Congress is clearly expressed.” ARC Ecology v. U.S. Dep’t of the

Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing EEOC

v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (hereinafter “Aramco”)); see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.

197, 203-04 (1993) (holding that the presumption applied to

preclude application of the Federal Tort Claims Act’s

(“FTCA”) waiver of sovereign immunity for a claim arising

in Antarctica). 

[4] Under this presumption, a law passed by Congress is

generally assumed to apply only to regulate conduct occurring

within the boundaries of the United States. See Pakootas v.

Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1077-79 (9th Cir.

2006); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530-31

(D.C. Cir. 1993). The presumption “serves to protect against

unintended clashes between our laws and those of other

nations which could result in international discord.” Aramco,

499 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). In order

to overcome the presumption, a party must show a clear

expression of congressional intent to apply a statute beyond

American soil. Id. at 258. 

In Aramco, the centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s recent

jurisprudence on the presumption, the Court held that Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to a United

States citizen working for an American company in a foreign

country. Id. at 249. Despite administrative interpretations to

the contrary, the Court held that it must assume that Congress

legislates under the presumption that a statute “is primarily

concerned with domestic conditions.” Id. at 248. The Court

further held that the presumption was not overcome because

Congress did not make a “clear statement” suggesting that

BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO. 3763
Title VII should apply to conduct occurring in a foreign country. Id. at 258. 

III. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply

To GARA

[5] Simply because a case’s factual background involves

some conduct occurring abroad does not mean that every statute governing the matter is subject to the presumption against

extraterritoriality; a court must first inquire into whether

applying a statute implicates any issue of extraterritoriality.

Massey, 986 F.2d at 531-32. This requires considering the

conduct the statute seeks to regulate. See id.; see also

Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1077 (“The difference between a

domestic application of United States law and a presumptively impermissible extraterritorial application of United

States law becomes apparent when we consider the conduct

that the law prohibits.”). Appellants contend that the conduct

at issue in this case is a tort injury suffered in Macedonia.

Under their logic, the place where the tort claim arises determines whether the various federal statutes governing a case

are being applied extraterritorially. Appellants’ reasoning

oversimplifies the analysis. 

In Massey, an environmental group brought a suit under the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), attempting to

enjoin a federal agency from permitting the incineration of

food waste in Antarctica. 986 F.2d at 529. Writing for the

D.C. Circuit, Chief Judge Mikva stated:

[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality is not

applicable when the conduct regulated by the government occurs within the United States. By definition, an extraterritorial application of a statute

involves the regulation of conduct beyond U.S. borders. Even where the significant effects of the regulated conduct are felt outside U.S. borders, the

statute itself does not present a problem of extraterri3764 BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO.
toriality, so long as the conduct which Congress

seeks to regulate occurs largely within the United

States. 

Id. at 531 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 38 (1965)). The court concluded that “NEPA is

designed to control the decisionmaking process of U.S. federal agencies, not the substance of agency decisions.” Id. at

532. As a result, NEPA regulates domestic conduct because

the federal agency’s decisionmaking process occurs within

the United States. Id. at 533. As summarized by Chief Judge

Mikva, “since NEPA is designed to regulate conduct occurring within the territory of the United States, and imposes no

substantive requirements which could be interpreted to govern

conduct abroad, the presumption against extraterritoriality

does not apply to this case.” Id.

[6] Here, appellants have failed to show that an application

of GARA would impermissibly regulate conduct that has

occurred abroad. GARA only regulates the ability of a party

to seek compensation from general aviation airplane manufacturers in American courts. See GARA § 2(a). It is not a statute

governing the substantive standards involved in tort claims.

GARA merely eliminates the power of any party to bring a

suit for damages against a general aviation aircraft manufacturer, in a U.S. federal or state court, after the limitation

period. The only conduct it could arguably be said to regulate

is the ability of a party to initiate an action for damages

against a manufacturer in American courts — an entirely

domestic endeavor. Congress has no power to tell courts of

foreign countries whether they could entertain a suit against

an American defendant. It would be up to any foreign court

to determine whether it wanted to apply GARA to litigation

occurring within its borders. Accordingly, the presumption

against extraterritoriality simply is not implicated by GARA’s

application.

Appellants attempt to differentiate Massey from the present

case because the former was not a tort action. Appellants

BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO. 3765
argue that Massey is distinguishable because it depended upon

the conclusion that NEPA is a procedural regulation of a federal agency rather than a substantive rule of law. This is misleading. Massey did recognize that “NEPA is designed to

control the decisionmaking process of U.S. federal agencies,

not the substance of agency decisions.” Massey, 986 F.2d at

532. But that recognition was not intended to suggest that

there is something meaningful in the distinction between procedural and substantive laws. Rather, what was determinative

for the D.C. Circuit was the locus of the conduct regulated by

the statute — in that case, the agency’s decisionmaking. See

id. at 533. As the court noted, “[b]ecause the decisionmaking

process of federal agencies take place almost exclusively in

this country and involve the workings of the United States

government, they are uniquely domestic.” Id. at 532. As reasoned by Massey, when deciding whether a statute implicates

the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts must determine whether application of that statute would govern conduct occurring abroad. Id. at 533. Appellants have failed to

show that GARA regulates any non-domestic conduct,

because GARA only determines the scope of a manufacturer’s

liability in American courts. 

[7] Appellee’s position finds further support in the only

opinion issued by a federal court to consider explicitly the

application of GARA to an accident that occurred abroad. See

Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.

Tex. 1996).1 In Alter, plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action

arising out of a helicopter crash in Israel. Id. at 533. Plaintiffs

argued that GARA did not apply to bar a suit stemming from

1Other courts have held that GARA applies to bar suit in American

courts stemming from foreign accidents, but without expressly discussing

the presumption against extraterritoriality. See Bain ex rel. Bain v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 932, 937 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (GARA bars

tort claims brought by survivors of victim who died in a helicopter crash

in Canada); Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202,

209-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (GARA barred claim arising out of accident

occurring in Australia). 

3766 BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO.
an accident occurring in a foreign country. Id. at 541. The district court rejected this argument, noting that all of the cases

applying the presumption against extraterritoriality dealt with

statutes that create a cause of action rather than statutes that

preclude claims. Id. (finding no “authority which holds that a

federal statute barring enforcement of claims in courts of the

United States bars only claims arising within the United

States”).2 The court further pointed out that “[p]laintiff’s

interpretation of GARA would have the anomalous effect of

preventing litigants from bringing an action in the United

States for an accident occurring in the United States while

allowing litigants to bring the same action in the United States

if the accident occurred abroad.” Id. We find this reasoning

persuasive and supportive of our holding that a statute that

does not regulate conduct occurring abroad does not implicate

the presumption against extraterritoriality. 

Our approach is consistent with the case law applying the

presumption against extraterritoriality. Uniformly, the cases

invoke the presumption when applying a statute would have

the effect of regulating specific conduct occurring abroad. See

Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74

(1993) (deportation of aliens from international waters);

Smith, 507 U.S. at 203-04 (federal tort claims arising in Antarctica); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248-51 (employment discrimination in Saudi Arabia); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,

285-86 (1949) (minimum overtime pay provisions for

employees working in Iraq and Iran); United States v. Palmer,

16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818) (anti-piracy laws in international waters); ARC Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1097 (environmental assessment in Philippines); Gushi Bros. Co. v. Bank of

Guam, 28 F.3d 1535, 1542-43 (9th Cir. 1994) (banking regulation in Marshall Islands); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe

2We emphasize that our decision is not premised on a categorical distinction between a remedial and defensive statute. Rather, the inquiry goes

to whether a specific statute’s application would effectively regulate conduct occurring abroad. 

BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO. 3767
Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095-97 (9th Cir. 1994) (en

banc) (copyright infringement in foreign distribution of

films). 

On the other hand, when a statute regulates conduct that

occurs within the United States, the presumption does not

apply. See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1077-78 (holding that, since

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act regulates the actual release of hazardous

materials, no issue of extraterritoriality arises when a company arranged for disposal in Canada of hazardous substances, but the release itself occurred within the United

States). Here, Congress passed a statute regulating the ability

of a party to bring a suit against a general aviation aircraft

manufacturer in American courts. Following these cases,

GARA itself does not regulate any conduct that occurred

abroad, so the presumption does not apply. 

Despite appellants’ assertions, the Second Circuit’s opinion

in Kollias v. D & G Marine Maintenance, 29 F.3d 67 (2d Cir.

1994), does not compel a contrary result. The Kollias court

grappled with the issue of whether the Longshore and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) applied in a suit

brought by an employee injured on the high seas. Id. at 68.

The court held that the presumption did apply, id. at 72, but

that it was overcome by Congress’s clear indication that it

intended for the LHWCA to apply outside the United States.

Id. at 73. Appellants rely on dicta in Kollias noting that all

statutes, “without exception, be construed to apply within the

United States only, unless a contrary intent appears.” Id. at 71.

The court made this statement in response to the defendants’

contention that the presumption against extraterritoriality

should categorically not apply to maritime legislation. Id.

Contrary to appellants’ assertions, our holding will not create

any exception to the presumption. Rather, if a statute does not

regulate conduct occurring abroad, then the presumption

against extraterritoriality is not even implicated. This is

entirely consistent with the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Kol3768 BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO.
lias, where the court invoked the presumption when the statute at issue governed conduct that took place in international

waters. See id. at 70-73. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

final judgment. 

AFFIRMED. 

BLAZEVSKA v. RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT CO. 3769