### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 16
, 200 4

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . CAREY STANFORD RICHMOND

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty Nos. S46,389, S46,269, S 46,973, S47,035 and S46,390 Phyllis H. Miller, Judge

No. E2003-01316-CC A-R3- CD May 18, 2004

The de fendant, Carey

Stanford Rich mond, appea ls from the Sullivan CountyCriminal Court’s imposit ion of i ncar cer ative sente ncing for numer ous conviction offe nses and f or an a dditional probation violation. She claims that she wa s entitled to alternat ive sentenc es, and be cause we dis a g re e , w e a ff

ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P. J . and J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., joined.

L arry S. W edding ton, Bristol, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Carey

Stanford Richmond.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic he lle R. Cha pman, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; H. Gre eley Wells, Jr., District Attorney Gene ral; and Robert H. Montgome ry , Assis t an t Di strict Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

T h e d e f e n d a n tw a s c o n v i c t e d o n h e r g u i l t y p l e a s o f

f a c i l i t a t i o n o f

a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, failure t o appea

r, sale of more than one -half ounc e of ma rijuana, and four c ounts of forg ery . She lik e wi se a dmi tte d a

pr ob a tio n vio la tio n in a c a se inv olv ing a c on vic tio n of int ro du c tio n of

dr ug s in to a pena l insti tution. These ca ses ca me bef ore the trial court f

or d et ermination of the me thod of

se rv ic e of

the se nte nc e s. Th e c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t a ll the se nte nc e s sh ould be serve d in inc arc e ratio n. Th e de fe nd a nt h a s f ile d th is a pp e a l se e kin g a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e s.
By the def endant’ s own ac count, she suff ere d from a serious drug addiction during the time that she commi tted her nume rous conviction off enses. The defe ndant testified, howe ver, that she had stopped using drug s since she w as ar rested and incar cer ated on the pr obation violation. At the time of the sentenc ing hearing, the defe ndant was pr eg nant by a man other

than her husband.-2-

She expressed a desire to divor ce her husband and maintain a r esponsible lifesty le for the sake of her unborn child.

The fa cts underlying the defe ndant’s convictions are these. In September 2001, the defe ndant stole and for g ed four chec ks which we re dr awn on a friend’ s bank a cc o u n t

. T he total

a mou nt o f the fo rg e ri e s w a s in e xce ss o f $ 1, 60 0. I n Oc tob e r 20 01
, the de fe nd a nt s old25 .9 g rams of marijuana

to an under cover

office r of the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation. I n Dec ember 2001, the defe ndant ar

rang ed a sa le of Xanax to a victim. S he told him that he would be mee ting a friend of he rs fo r the tr a ns a c tio n. Whe n th e vic tim app e are d at th e app oin te d lo c a tio n, he g ot i nto a ve hic le with the defe ndant’s husband, who drove the victim a round and then robbed him with what appea red to the victim to be a conce aled wea pon. I n J anuary

2002, the def

endant we nt to visi t her husband in ja il, wh e n a sea

rc h re ve a le d mariju a na on he r p e rs on . In Se pte mbe r 2 00 2, the de fe nd a nt f a ile d to appear in c o u r t f

o r a s e n te n c in g h e ar in g

. T h e d e f e n d a n t e xp lain e d h e r a

b s e n c e a t th a t h e ar ing by acknow ledg ing that she had “ lapsed ba ck into those old way s” at the time.

The de fendant testified that she would like to r ece ive alternative sente ncing so that she could e nroll in a drug treatment prog ram. She ha d place d herse lf on a wa iting list for re sidential treatment. She also claimed that she would be able to live with he r mother and h er m o t her’ s boy friend.

Af

te r r e c e ivi ng the e vid e nc e , th e low e r c ou rt fo un d th at th e defe nd a nt w a s n ot a favor able c and i d at e for alternative se ntencing and orde red that she serve her se ntence s in the Depa rtment of Corre cti o n, including the case in which the def endant a dmitted violating her probation.

Orig ina l Se nte nc ingin C a se s S46,269, S46,389, S 46,973, S47,035

We beg in wi t h a revie w of the r eleva nt law. I n making a fe lony sentenc ing determination, the trial court, at the c onclusion of the sente ncing hearing, de termines the ra ng e of the sentenc e and then determines the s pecif ic s entenc e and the propriety of sentenc ing a lternatives by considering (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at t h e trial and the se ntencing hearing, ( 2) the prese ntence report, ( 3) the principles of sentenc ing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives, ( 4) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved, (5) e vidence and information offer ed by the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors, (6) a ny statements the def

endant wishe s to make in t h e d ef

endant’ s behalf a

bout sentencing , and (7) the potential for r ehabilitation or treatment. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 40 -35 -21 0(a), ( b) (2 00 3) ; id . § 40 -3 5- 10 3( 5) (2 00 3) ; State v. Holland , 860 S.W .2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.

A d e fe nd a nt w ho “ is an e sp e c ia lly mit ig a te d o r s ta nd ardof

fe nd e r c on vic te d o f a

Cla ss C, D, or E fe lony

is presumed to be a

favor able c andidate f

or alternative sentencing options in the absenc e of e vidence to the contra ry .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 102(6) ( 2003). How ev er, a defe ndant who commits “the most sever e offenses, possess[ es] a criminal histor[ y ] evincing a clea r-3-

disreg ard f

or the law s and morals of soc iety , and [has failed] past eff orts at re habilitation” does not enjoy the pre sumption. See id. § 4 0- 35 -1 02 (5 ), (6 ) ( 20 03 ); State v. Fields
, 40 S.W

. 3 d 4 3 5
, 440 (Tenn. 2001) . A sentenc e involving c onfinement is appr opriate w hen

(A) Confinement is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a

defe ndant who ha s a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Con fi ne me nt i s n e c e ssa ry to a vo id d e pr e c ia tin g the se ri ou sn e ss o f the of fe ns e
or c on fi ne me nt i s e sp eci all ysu ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to others likely

to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Measur es l ess restrictive than confinement have freque ntly or re cently been

app lie d u ns uc c e ssf

ull y to the de fe nd a nt.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(1) (A) - (C) (2003)

.

Furthermore
, the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation or lac k there of should be examined when determining whe ther a n alternative sentenc e is appropriate. Id. § 40-35-103( 5) (2003) . Sentencing issues are to b e d et er m i n ed by the fa cts and c ircumstance s prese nted in eac h case

. See State v

. Taylor , 744 S.W .2d 919, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.

Whe n th e re is a

c ha lle ng e to the le ng th, rang e , o r m a nn e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e , it is the duty

of this court to conduc t a de novo review of the r ecor d with a pre sumption t hat the determinations made by

the trial court are corr ect. See Tenn. Cod e An n

. § 4 0 -35-401(d) (2003). This presumption is “conditioned upon the af firma t i v e s h o wing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S. W. 2 d 1 6 6
, 1 6 9 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 1 )

. L ik e w is e , th e tria l c o u r t h a s a n a f f irmati v e d u ty to s tate o n the

re co rd
, ei t h ero ra l l y

o r i n wr i t i n g, wh i ch en h an ce m en tan d m i t i gat i n g fa ct o rs i tfo u n d an d i t s fi n d i n gs of fa c t. Te nn . Code An n. § 40- 35 -2 09 (c ) ( 20 03 ); id. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (f ) ( 20 03 ); State v. Troutman , 979 S.W. 2d27 1, 27 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; Sta te v . R us se ll , 10 S.W .3d 270, 278 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

.

In t h e p re s en tca s e, t h e d ef en d an tac ce p t ed b y

p l eaagr ee m en tan ef

fe ctive twelve -year sentenc e. She wa s cate g orized as a Rang e I offe nder for all but the failure to a ppear conviction, for which she w as cate g orized as a Rang e I I offe nder. For the Rang e I offe nses, the defe ndant enter ed the proc ess of determining the manner of service of her sentence s with the presumption that she wa s a fa vorable candidate for a lternative se ntencing

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102( 6) (2003). She did not enjoy

that presumption for the Ra ng e I I sentenc e. See id. The lower court acknow ledg ed that the def endant wa s presumed a

favor able c andidate f

or a l t er n ati ve sente ncing for the Ra ng e I convictions. After

considering the evid e n c e, howe ver, the court found that the presumption had bee n rebutted.

Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s se nte nc in g d ete rmin a tio n is fa ulty be c aus e it f

ou ndthe fo llo wi ng e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s:-4-

( a ) The d e f

e n d a n t h a s a

p r e v io u s h is to r y

o f c r im in a l c o n v ic ti o n s o r

c r im in al behavior in addition to thos e nec essary to establish the appropriate rang e; (b) The de fendant was a l ea d er i n the commission of an off ense involving two (2 ) o r m or e c ri min a l a c tor s; (c ) Th e de fe nd a nt, wh o w a s p ro vid e d w ith c ou rt -a pp oin te d c ou ns e l w ill fu lly failed to pay

the administrative fe e asse ssed pursuant to § 40-14- 103(b)( 1).

Id . § 40-35-114( 2), (3) , (22) ( 2003).

We are unpersua ded that the lower c ourt err ed in finding that the enha nceme nt fac tor fo r p ri or c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or

be ha vio r a

pp lie d to the de fe nd a nt’ s sen te nc e s. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that the def

endant ha s a lengt hy

history of illicit drug use . Although she does not have prior convictions related t o this illega l activity
, it is proper ly considere d for pur

poses of this enhanc ement fac tor. See State v. Alexander
, 957 S.W .2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (e nhance ment fac tor for prior criminal hist ory

applied base d upon defe ndant’s coc aine a buse).

The de fendant also claims t h at the lower court should not have f ound that the enhanc ement fa ctor for

acting as a le ader

in the commission of the offe nse applied to the f acilitation of robbery conviction. She arg ues t hat t he evidence does not support this conclusion inasmuch a s the defe ndant was not present whe n the ac tual robbery occur red. Eve n so, the defe ndant was the one wh o a rr a ng e d th e sc e na

ri o w hic h s e t th e sta g e fo r the ro bb e ry

. She a g re e d to se ll dr ug s to the vic tim and made plans for the transac tion to take place. She told her husband whe re the victim would be, knowing that her husba nd planned to rob t he victim

. The lower court did not err in f inding that she

was a leade r in the commission of the fa cilitation of robbery offe nse.

The de fendant is corre ct, howeve r, that t he lower court should not have a

pplied the

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor , “ Th e de fe nd a nt, wh o was pr ov ide d w ith c ou rt -a pp oin te d c ou ns e l, w ill fu lly failed to pay

the administrative fe e asse ssed pursuant to § 40-14- 103(b)( 1)[.] ” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 22) (2003)

. The defenda nt contends that the court erre d in finding this fa ctor e x isted be c aus e sh e wa s in c arc e rate d at th e tim e the fe e wa s a sse sse d a nd the re a ft e r. Th e state c on te sts thi s fac tual assertion, arg uing that counsel wa s appointed on January 9, 2003, and the pr obation

re vo c a tio n o rd e r w a s n ot e nte re d u nti l May 2, 20 03 . It appe ars that th e de fe nd a nt w a s, in f a c t, confine d during the time she wa s repr esente d by appointed counse l. The re cord r ef l ec t s t h at the lower c ourt enter ed an order appointing c ounsel in case s S46,389, S 46,390, S46,973, and S46,269 on J anuary 9, 2003. I t appea rs from the record that prior to that time, the defe ndant was r epre sented by reta ined counse l. The orde r appointing counsel c ontai n s a handw ritten notation that the administrative fee is “ to be paid w/n 2 wks afte r rel. from custody .” The probation violation report in case S46,390 (introduction of drugs into a pena l insti tution) indicates that the def endant wa s
arr ested on the failure to a ppear prese ntment ( S46,973) on J anuary 6, 2003, and wa s still in custody when the r eport wa s filed on Marc h 6, 2003. The arre st war rant for the probation violation i ndicates the def endant’ s addre ss as the Sullivan CountyJ ail and re flec ts service on her on Marc h 11, 2003. The pre sentenc e re port notes that the defe ndant is “ unable to make bond.” The lower c ourt premised its a pp lic a tio n o f the e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor on a fi nd ing that the de fe nd a nt c ou ld h a ve c le a ne d h ou se s,-5-

m o we d l aw n s , o r ra k ed l ea v es t o ea rn m o n eyt o p ay t h e a d m i n i s tra t i v e f

ee b u tch o s e i n s t ea d t o go to North Carolina with he r boy friend. Obviously
, that is not the case , inasmuch as the def endant wa s in jail at the time the fee was a ssessed and the rea fter.

Th e de fe nd a nt a lso c la ims that in de te rm ini ng the ma nn e r of se rv ic e of he r s e nte nc e s, the court should have consider ed these mitigating fac tors: “The de f e n d an t’ s c riminal c onduct neither

cause d nor threatened serious bodily injury ” and “The defe ndant, beca use of y outh or old ag e, lac ked substantial judgme nt in committ ing the offe nse[.] ” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113(1), ( 6) (2003)

. The de fendant makes these claims without elaborating be y ond asserting that the r ecor d supports the application of the se fa ctors. The rec ord re flec ts that the court did, in fact, find that the de fendant’s

co n d u ctd i d n o tca u s e o r t h re at en s er i o u s b o d i l y i n j u ry i n al l ca s es o t h ert h an i n tro d u ct i o n o f d ru gs into a penal instit u t i o n and facilitation of ag g ravated robbe ry . The de fendant has not offe red a ny the ory wh y the mit ig a tin g fa c tor

sh ou ld a pp ly to the se c a se s, a nd we are no t pe rs ua de d o f e rr or in the abse nce of

such. Likewise, the defe ndant, who was day s shy of her twenty -sec ond birthday

at sentenc ing, ha s not ex plained why her y outh c aused her to lac k substantial judgment in committing her of fense s. The re cord de monstrates that the de fendant is an ex ceptionally brig ht y oung woman who has made poor choic es notwithstanding he r intellige nce. We a re unpe rsuade d of er

ror.

The de fendant arg ues, as we ll, that the sentencing considerations of Code section 40- 35-103(1) do not apply

to her. The state disag ree s. The trial c ourt was influe nced by the def endant’ s
s i gn i fi ca n th i s t o ryo f a l co h o l co n s u m p t i o n b egi n n i n g at age 1 6 an d i l l i ci t d ru g u s e be gi n n i n g atage 1 7

. It wa s l i k ew i s e i n fl u en ce d b y t h e d ef en d an t ’s re ce n t , u n s u cc es s fu l at t em p tat s er v i n g a pr ob a tio na

ry se nte nc e . T he se fa c ts d e mon str a te that “ [c]o nf ine me nt i s n e c e ssa

ry to p ro te c t so c ie ty by re str a ini ng a

de fe nd a nt w ho ha s a

lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t” a nd that “ [m]ea su re s le ss restric tive than conf

inement have fr equentlyor re cently been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant.” S ee id. § 40-3 5- 10 3( 1) (A ), (C ) ( 20 03 ). Ad dit ion a lly , th e low e r c ou rt wa s h e a vil y influence d by

the def endant’ s poor prospec ts for re habilitation given her la ck of c ompliance with a probationary

sentenc e, her

failure to appea

r for a court date, her s u b s t an ce abuse de spite three attempts at drug reha

bilitation, and her poor wor k history

. See id. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 ( 5 ) ( 2 003). The

re c or d s up po rt s th e low e r c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s o n th e se po int s. Th e pr e su mpt ionof fa vo ra ble candida c y

h a s b e e n r e b u tt e d ; th e d e f e n d a n t j u s tl y

d e s e r v e s to b e c o n f

in e d f o r th e te r m o f

h er sentenc es. The lowe r court did not err in imposing inca rce ration.

Sentence Following Probation Revocation

in Case S46,390

The de fendant does not specific ally addre ss as err or t

h etr ia l c o u r t’ s p lac in g into effe ct the def endant’ s four- y ear incar cer ative sentence following her admitting that she violated probation in her c o n v ic ti o n f

o r in tr o d u c ti o n o f

d ru g s in to a

p e n a l f a c il it y

. B e c a u s e , h o w e v e r , th e s tan dard

e mpl oy e d inre vie wi ng the low e r c ou rt ’s a c tio n inthi s r e g arddif fe rs fr om th at emp loy e d in

r e v i e w i n g a n o r i g i n a l s e n t e n c i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n , w e a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e s e p ar a t e l y.-6- The sta n d ar d o f

r e v ie w u p o n ap p e a l o f

a n o r d e r r e v o k in g p r o b a ti o n is th e ab u s e of discretion standa

rd. State v. Hark ins , 811 S.W .2d 79, 8 2 (T en n

. 1 9 9 1 ). I n order for a n abuse of discretion to oc cur, the revie wing court must find that the re cord c ontains no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial judge that a violation of the terms of probation has occ urre d. Id . at 82 ; Sta te v . D e lp , 614 S.W .2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) . The trial court is required only to find that the violation of probation occ urre d by a pre ponderance of the evidence. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311( e) ( 20 0 3 ). Up o n finding a violation, the trial court is vested with the statutory authority to “re voke probation and suspension of sentenc e and cause the defe ndant to c ommence the execution of t he judgment as orig inally enter ed.” Id. Furthermore
, when probation is revoked, “ the orig inal judgme nt so rende red by the trial judg e shall be in full for ce and eff ect f rom the date of the

re v o ca tion of such suspension.” Id. § 40-35-310 ( 2003). The trial judge reta ins the discretionary authority to order the defendant to serve the original sentenc e. See State v . Duke
, 902 S.W .2d 424, 427 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.

I n the court below, the def endan t co n ce ded that she ha d violated the terms of her probationary

sentenc e. See State v . Johnson , 15 S.W .3d 515, 518 (Tenn. Cr i m

. Ap p. 1999) (def endant’ s conce ssion of act c onstitut ing violation of pr obatio nis s u b s ta n ti a l e v id e nce of

violation,

a ndtr ia l c ou rt ’s re vo c a tio n b a se d the re on is n ot a bu se of dis c re tio n) . T hu s, the qu e sti on we mus t

answe r is w hether the court abused its discr etion in or dering the defe ndant to se rve th e remainder of her sentenc e in the De partment of Corr ection.

I n that reg ard, the rele vant statute commands th at upon revoc ation of a suspe nded sentenc e, “the orig inal judgme nt so render ed by the trial judg e shall be in full for ce and ef fec t from the date of

the re vocation of suc h suspension, and shall be e x ecute d acc ording ly

. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310 ( 2003). B ased on he r trac k rec ord, the trial c ourt was doubt ful that her perf ormanc e would improve if g iven a f urther r eprie ve fr om an incar cer ative sente nce. B ased upon the evidenc e bef

ore us, that de termination was within the l ower court’s discretion. Thus, the lower court did not err

in ordering the def

endant to serve her

four- y ear s en t ence in the Depa rtment of Correc tion.

For

these re asons, we aff

irm the lower

court’s imposition of incarc erative sentenc ing in a ll c a se s.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE