UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOPE LEE-THOMAS, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 18-591 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 3 : LAB CORP, : : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM OPINION G RANTING D EFENDANT L AB C ORP ’ S M OTION TO D ISMISS I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Hope Lee-Thomas brings suit against Defendant Laborat ory Corporation of America (“LabCorp”) for failing to protect her privacy and conf identiality in violation of the Health Insurance Portability a nd Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). LabCorp moved to dismiss on the ground that Ms. Lee-Thomas’s complaint failed to state a cl aim upon which relief can be granted because HIPAA does not prov ide individuals with a priva te cause of action. For the reasons set forth below, the Cour t grants LabCorp’s motion and dismisses Ms. Lee-Thomas’s

case. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1 Hope Lee-Thomas was a patient at Providence Hospital in Washing ton, D.C. on June 15, 2017, where she received treatment from Defendant, LabCorp. Com pl. at 3, ECF No. 1-1. 2 Ms. Lee-Thomas was instructed by a Lab Corp technician to submit her medical information using a

1 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts the plaintif f’s factual allegations as true. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). 2 Unless indicated otherwise, all relevant documents are filed u nder ECF No. 1-1. The citations are paginated in rela tion to each individual document therein.2 computer intake station on the pr emises. Pl.’s Att’y Letter (“L etter”) at 1. LabCorp’s computer intake station was in close proxi mity to a Quest Diagnostics in take station, and Ms. LeeThomas’s personal health informa tion was visible to another pat ient who was using the Quest Diagnostics station. Compl. at 3. When Ms. Lee-Thomas realized her health information was being disclosed within eyesight a nd earshot of another patient, she informed a LabCorp technician of the violation a nd photographed the two stations i n question. Id. On July 3, 2017, Ms. Lee-Thomas sent a letter to Providence Hos pital informing them of possible HIPAA privacy violations. See Letter. She then filed a com plaint with the Department of Health and Human Services’s ( “HHS”) Office of Civil Rights. HHS Compl. at 2. On October 10, 2017, Ms. Lee-Thomas filed an additional complaint with the District of Columbia’s Office of Human Rights (“OHR”) citing L abCorp’s failure to make proper “public accommodations” by maintaining non-HIPAA complia nt facilities. Compl. at 2–3. Both of Ms. Lee-Thomas’s adminis trative complaints were unsucce ssful. See HHS Resp.; OHR Resp. On November 15, 2017, HHS inf ormed Ms. Lee-Thomas the agency would not pursue her claim. HHS Res p. at 1–3. On November 28, 2017, the D istrict of Columbia alerted Ms. Lee-Thomas that her complain t was similarly dismissed based on her failure to state a claim. OHR Resp. at 1–2. The District of Columbia informed Ms. Lee-Tho mas of her right to bring a private action before the D.C. S uperior Court and Ms. Lee-Thoma s proceeded to do so. Id. at 2. LabCorp removed the case to thi s Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Def.’s Notice of Removal (“Notice”), ECF No. 1. Before the Court is LabCorp’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rul e 12(b)(6) on the ground that Ms. Lee-Thomas failed to sta te a claim because HIPAA does not provide for a private cause3 of action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6 ); Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Def. ’s Mot.”), ECF No. 3. For the forthcoming reasons, the Court grants LabCorp’s motion to dismi ss. III. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Proce dure require that a complaint c ontain a “short and plain statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair not ice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Ci v. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismi ss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, but rat her whether a plai ntiff has properly stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A court considering a mo tion to dismiss presumes the co mplaint’s factual allegations are true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g. , United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss , a complaint must contain suf ficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief th at is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Assuming all factual allegations are true, a plainti ff’s right to relief must rise a bove “the speculative level.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555–56 (2007) (citations omitted). Because she has filed this lawsuit pro se , Ms. Lee-Thomas’s claim is held to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). That being said, pro se plaintiffs must still comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch , 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987), and the Court need not assume the role of plaintiff’s ad vocate. See Davis v. Kelly , 160 F.3d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1998); Sun v. D.C. Gov’t , 133 F. Supp. 3d 155, 168 n.6 (D.D.C. 2015)4 (“[I]t is not the Court’s job to canvass the record for documen ts supporting a pro se party’s position.”). IV. ANALYSIS Ms. Lee-Thomas alleges that the pu blic nature of LabCorp’s medi cal intake computer station violated HIPAA’s privac y protections. Compl. at 3. LabC orp contends that no private cause of action exists under HI PAA and, as such, Ms. Lee-Thomas ’s claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Def.’s Mot at 1–2. Additionally, after LabCorp moved for dismissal on March 16, 2018, Ms. Lee-Thomas f ailed to file a timely memor andum of points and authorities in opposition to LabCo rp’s motion and, therefore, p ursuant to Local Rule 7(b), conceded her opposition to the motion. See Local Civ. R. 7(b). The Court will address both grounds for dismissal below. A. Private Cause of Action Under HIPAA LabCorp asserts that dismissal of Ms. Lee-Thomas’s claim is app ropriate because HIPAA provides for no private cause of action. Def.’s Mot. 1–2. HIPAA regulates the confidentiality of medical information by imposing pr ivacy requirements on the Dep artment of Health and Human Services, healthcare pro viders, and insurers. See Health Insurance Portab ility and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 262 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to d-8); Logan v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs , 357 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155 (D.D.C. 2004). While the statute pro vides both civil and criminal penalties for impr operly handled or disclosed info rmation, the language of the statute specifically limits e nforcement action to HHS and indiv idual states’ attorneys general.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 to d-6 (defini ng terms and enforcement pr otocol); Hudes v. Aetna Life Ins., Co. , 806 F. Supp. 2d 180, 196 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d , 493 F. App’x 107 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Furthermore, courts in this and ot her circuits that have consid ered the question have reached a5 consensus that the statutory l anguage of HIPAA grants no privat e right of action. See, e.g. , Adams v. Eureka Fire Prot. Dist. , 352 F. App’x 137, 138–39 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that “Courts have repeatedly held” that HIPAA does not create a private righ t of action); Acara v. Banks , 470 F.3d 569, 571–72 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Ever y district court that ha s considered this issue is in agreement that the statute doe s not support a private right of action.”); Briscoe v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 61 F. Supp. 3d 78, 90 (D.D.C. 2014) (fi nding that plaintiff’s complaint lacked cognizable legal theory because HIPAA provides no private cause of action); Hudes , 806 F. Supp. 2d at 195–96 (collecting cases indicating no private HIPA A cause of action); Johnson v. Quander , 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 100 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing HIPAA claim involving disclosure of medical information because no private cause of action exist ed), aff’d , 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006). LabCorp’s alleged HIPAA violati on is the only cause of action M s. Lee-Thomas has included in her case. Compl. at 2–3. Given the statutory langua ge and the clear consensus among courts that have addressed t he question, no private action exis ts under HIPAA and accordingly Ms. Lee-Thomas has failed to sta te a claim upon which relief ca n be granted. 3
B. Plaintiff’s Failure to Respond t o the Motion Under Local Rule 7 (b) While this Court does not recogn ize a private cause of action u nder HIPAA, even if Ms. Lee-Thomas’s complaint had sta ted a cognizable claim, Ms. Lee-T homas’s failure to respond to LabCorp’s motion to dismiss furthe r necessitates dismissal of h er case. See Local Civ. R. 7(b) (“Within 14 days of the date of ser vice or at such other time a s the Court may direct, an opposing

3 Although the D.C. OHR informed Ms . Lee-Thomas of her ability to pursue a private action in D.C. Superior Court, see OHR Resp. at 2, OHR was referri ng solely to a claim pursuant to the D.C. Human Rights Act, w hich plaintiff does not raise he re. See D.C. Code §§ 2-1402– 1403; OHR Resp. at 2.6 party shall serve and file a me morandum of points and authoriti es in opposition to the motion. If such a memorandum is not filed wit hin the prescribed time, the Court may treat the motion as conceded.”) Though this circuit has rejected the application of this standard to motions for summary judgment, see Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean , 843 F.3d 503, 507–08 (D.C. Cir. 2016), it remains in place for motions to dismiss. Id. at 508 (“[N]othing in this opinion is meant to address the applicability of L ocal Rule 7(b) to motions othe r than motions for summary judgment”); see, e.g. , Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia , 819 F.3d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming dist rict court decision to gran t motion to dismiss as conceded under local rule); Habliston v. FINRA Dispute Resolution, Inc. , 251 F. Supp. 3d 240, 245 (D.D.C. 2017) (applying Local C iv. R. 7(b) to motion to dismiss ). Thus, when a plaintiff fails to address or respond to a motion to dismiss, as happened here, the Court may treat that motion as conceded. See Local Civ. R. 7(b). LabCorp filed a motion to dismiss on March 16, 2018. See Def.’s Mot. at 3. The Court ordered Ms. Lee-Thomas to file a response by April 25, 2018. Fox/Neal Order at 2, ECF No. 8. Ms. Lee-Thomas never filed a response, and therefore , under Local Rule 7(b), the mat ter is conceded. V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant LabCorp’s Motion to Dismis s (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separate ly and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: June 15, 2018 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge