[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-12120

________________________

Agency No. A206-737-421, A206-737-422, & A206-737-423

MIRZA DINORA RIVERA-GERONIMO, 

ANYELO JOSIAS RIVERA-GERONIMO,

SANTIAGO MAURICIO GONZALEZ-RIVERA,

 Petitioners,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(August 28, 2019)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and MARTINEZ,* District

Judge. 

* Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge for the Southern District of 

Florida, sitting by designation. 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 1 of 14 
2

MARTIN, Circuit Judge:

Mirza Dinora Rivera-Geronimo1 petitions for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

denial of her application for asylum and humanitarian asylum. After careful 

consideration and with the benefit of oral argument, we deny the petition. 

I.

Ms. Rivera-Geronimo is a native and citizen of Guatemala. She entered the 

United States through Hidalgo, Texas, on May 11, 2014, without being admitted or 

paroled by an immigration officer. On May 12, 2014, the Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued her a notice to appear, which charged her with 

being removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 

1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for having unlawfully entered the United States.

Ms. Rivera-Geronimo filed an application for asylum.2

 In it, she said she 

was “a victim of domestic abuse by [her] domestic partner, Romulo David 

1

 Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s two children, Anyelo Josias Rivera-Geronimo and Santiago 

Mauricio Gonzalez-Rivera, were included in her application as derivative beneficiaries. She 

petitions for review of the BIA’s resolution of the claims concerning them. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(3)(A). Although our opinion refers to Ms. Rivera-Geronimo, our holding applies 

equally to her children. 

2 In her application, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo also requested withholding of removal and 

Convention Against Torture protection. Ms. Rivera-Geronimo does not challenge the denial of 

her application on these grounds. As a result, she has abandoned those issues on appeal. 

Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 2 of 14 
3

Gonzalez de la Cruz.” Ms. Rivera-Geronimo said when she was 15 years old, she 

met Mr. Gonzalez de la Cruz, who was 20 years her senior. After knowing each 

other for a month, Mr. Gonzalez de la Cruz “took [Ms. Rivera-Geronimo] out of 

[her] home.” Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s father “did nothing to prevent it.” She and 

Mr. Gonzalez de la Cruz never married. 

Mr. Gonzalez de la Cruz became abusive toward Ms. Rivera-Geronimo. 

“He would lock [her] in the house and would not let [her] out”; “insult [her]”; 

“beat [her] up”; and “force [her] to have sex[] [with him] when [she] did not want 

to.” On one occasion after drinking and taking drugs, Mr. Gonzalez de la Cruz 

screamed at Ms. Rivera-Geronimo and beat her with a chain, “almost 

demolish[ing]” her. On another occasion when Mr. Gonzalez de la Cruz became 

violent, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo called the police “looking for help but nobody 

arrived.” She “tried to file a denunciation but [the police] laughed at [her] and . . . 

simply told [her] that [domestic abuse] was not a crime for them.” In her 

application, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo explained the Guatemalan police “would not 

protect” her against Mr. Gonzalez de la Cruz because the police do not view 

“domestic violence . . . [as] a crime.” Instead, “in Guatemala, violence against 

women by a spouse or partner is considered a private matter between a couple.” 

At a hearing before the IJ, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo testified she lived with Mr. 

Gonzalez de la Cruz for six years, beginning when she was 15 years old. She said 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 3 of 14 
4

he forbade her from working, and he regularly beat and threatened her with knives. 

She also testified she reported Mr. Gonzalez de la Cruz to the police but they “did 

not pay any attention to [her].” She informed the IJ she did not leave Mr. 

Gonzalez de la Cruz sooner because he threatened that if she left, he would look 

for her, kill her, and take their children. 

The IJ asked Ms. Rivera-Geronimo to define her “particular social group.” 

Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s counsel responded her particular social group was 

“women [in] domestic relationships.” Counsel explained “the patterns of 

discrimination and violence against women are . . . deeply rooted in [Guatemalan] 

society” and “because violence against women is so pervasive, and [is] culturally 

rooted in society, [Ms. Rivera-Geronimo] . . . argue[s] that women in domestic 

relationships are . . . no different than married women for purposes of particular 

social group.” 

The IJ then issued an oral decision denying Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s asylum 

claim. The IJ first discussed Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), 

in which the BIA found that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to 

leave their relationship” constituted a cognizable particular social group under the 

INA. See id. at 392–93. The IJ highlighted that Matter of A-R-C-G- required a 

“marital relationship,” and Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s particular social group 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 4 of 14 
5

consisted of unmarried women. As a result, the IJ concluded Ms. RiveraGeronimo’s particular social group was not cognizable under the INA. 

The BIA reversed the IJ’s decision. According to the BIA, Matter of A-RC-G- did not “necessarily require that a domestic relationship involve a legal 

marriage in order for an alien to establish that she is a member of a cognizable 

particular social group where, for example, the relationship is of long duration.” 

The BIA remanded the case to provide Ms. Rivera-Geronimo with “a renewed 

opportunity to clearly and explicitly define the proposed particular social group 

upon which she seeks relief.”3

 

At the hearing on remand, the IJ asked Ms. Rivera-Geronimo to explain her 

particular social group. Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s counsel responded that her 

particular social group was “essentially the same group” as before and restated it as 

“Guatemalan women in domestic relationships.” After hearing additional 

argument, the IJ issued a second oral decision denying Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s 

request for asylum. The IJ concluded Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s particular social 

group was not cognizable because it lacked particularity and social distinction. 

The IJ explained: 

3

 On remand, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo amended her application for asylum. She added an 

additional claim for asylum based on the domestic abuse she faced by her second domestic 

partner, a Guatemalan man who she met in the United States. On appeal, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo 

raises arguments about the denial of this claim. But none of her arguments address the reasons 

the BIA affirmed the denial. As a result, she has abandoned this issue on appeal. See Sepulveda, 

401 F.3d at 1228 n.2. 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 5 of 14 
6

Guatemalan women in domestic relationships is a huge number of 

women, extremely diverse, and numerous and inchoate, and lacks the 

requisite particularity to constitute a particular social group, nor is there 

any showing that Guatemalan society views them with the requisite 

social distinction.

The IJ also denied Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s claim for humanitarian asylum because 

Ms. Rivera-Geronimo failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the 

Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to protect her. 

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. The BIA found that “‘Guatemalan 

women in domestic relationships’ is not [a] legally viable [particular social group]

because it lacks the required particularity and social distinction” and the particular 

social group in Matter of A-R-C-G- was more narrowly defined than “Guatemalan 

women in domestic relationships.” As a result, the BIA concluded Ms. RiveraGeronimo was ineligible for asylum. 

The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s humanitarian asylum conclusion but for 

different reasons than those relied on by the IJ. The BIA stated that “[b]ecause 

[Ms. Rivera-Geronimo] did not establish that her past persecution was on account 

of a protected ground—in this case, membership in a cognizable particular social 

group—she cannot qualify for humanitarian asylum.” The BIA therefore 

dismissed Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s appeal. Ms. Rivera-Geronimo filed a petition 

for review in this Court, which we now consider. 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 6 of 14 
7

II.

This Court reviews the BIA’s decision as the final judgment, unless the BIA 

expressly adopted the IJ’s decision. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 

403 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). “Where the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, 

we review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ to the extent of the agreement.” 

Id. “In a petition for review of a BIA decision, we review conclusions of law de 

novo,” including the question of “[w]hether an asserted group qualifies as a 

‘particular social group’ under the INA.” Id. 

Although we review de novo the BIA’s determination of a particular social 

group, our review “is informed by the principle of deference articulated in 

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 

104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).” Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1195

(11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). This is because the INA does not 

define what constitutes a particular social group. See INS v. Aguirre–Aguirre, 526 

U.S. 415, 425, 119 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1999) (“[T]he BIA should be accorded 

Chevron deference [when] it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning 

through a process of case-by-case adjudication.” (quotation marks omitted)). As a 

result, this Court applies the BIA’s interpretation of what constitutes a particular 

social group unless the interpretation is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or 

clearly contrary to law. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1196. 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 7 of 14 
8

III.

Ms. Rivera-Geronimo raises three issues on appeal—all of which concern 

the BIA’s interpretation of her particular social group.

4

 First, she argues the BIA 

erred in concluding she was not eligible for asylum because “Guatemalan women 

in domestic relationships” is a cognizable particular social group under the INA.

Second, she argues she does not need to be a member of a cognizable particular 

social group to qualify for humanitarian asylum. In the alternative, she argues 

because she is a member of a cognizable particular social group, the BIA erred in 

determining she was not eligible for humanitarian asylum. We address each of Ms. 

Rivera-Geronimo’s arguments in turn.

A.

Ms. Rivera-Geronimo contends the BIA erred in rejecting her proposed

particular social group—“Guatemalan women in domestic relationships”—as 

lacking particularity and social distinction. She says the group she proposed is 

particular and socially distinct, and it is “not defined by the fact that the applicant 

4 In her initial brief, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo also argues that because the IJ and the BIA 

gave different reasons for denying her humanitarian asylum claim, this Court reviews both the 

decision of the IJ and the decision of the BIA. However, this assertion is erroneous. This Court 

reviews only the BIA’s decision as the final judgment, unless the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s 

decision. Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir. 2007). The BIA expressly adopted the 

IJ’s decision for denying Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s asylum claim. As a result, we review both the 

BIA and the IJ’s decision on that claim. See id. However, the BIA did not adopt the IJ’s 

reasoning for denying Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s humanitarian asylum claim. We therefore review

only the BIA’s reasoning for denying it. See id. 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 8 of 14 
9

is or was subject to domestic violence.” She explains her proposed particular 

social group’s “defining characteristics” are “being ‘women’ and ‘being or having 

been’ in ‘a domestic relationship.’” 

Under the INA, an undocumented immigrant who arrives or is present in the 

United States may apply for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1); Castillo-Arias, 446 

F.3d at 1195. The BIA, through the Attorney General, has discretion to grant 

asylum if the immigrant meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(b)(1). The INA defines a “refugee” as: 

any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . 

and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling 

to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion. 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Under this definition, an applicant may establish she is 

a “refugee” if she either: (1) suffered past persecution on account of race, religion, 

nationality, or membership in a particular social group, or (2) has a “well-founded 

fear” that her race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group 

will cause future persecution. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th 

Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The burden is on the applicant to show that she qualifies 

as a “refugee.” Id. 

The BIA requires an applicant seeking asylum based on membership in a 

particular social group to show that the group is: “(1) composed of members who 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 9 of 14 
10

share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) 

socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. 

Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). This Court generally defers to the BIA’s interpretation 

of “particular social group.” See Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 404 (“We have . . . held 

that the BIA’s interpretation of the phrase ‘particular social group’ . . . is entitled 

to Chevron deference because the INA does not define the phrase and it is 

ambiguous.”). An applicant’s particular social group must meet all three criteria. 

See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237. A particular social group must 

not be defined so broadly that it becomes a “catch-all for all groups who might 

claim persecution.” Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1197. “The risk of persecution 

alone does not create a particular social group.” Id. at 1198. 

In support of her argument that “Guatemalan women in domestic 

relationships” is a cognizable particular social group, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo cites 

Matter of A-R-C-G-. There, the BIA found that “married women in Guatemala 

who are unable to leave their relationship” was a legally cognizable particular 

social group. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388–90. In making this 

determination, the BIA focused on Guatemalan societal expectations about gender 

and subordination and the lack of police interference to help women seeking 

protection from their abusive spouses. See id. at 393. According to the BIA, these 

societal norms, coupled with the group’s “defining characteristics” of “married,” 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 10 of 14 
11

“women,” and “unable to leave the relationship,” gave the particular social group 

“discrete and definable boundaries.” Id. 

But Ms. Rivera-Geronimo did not propose a group akin to the particular 

social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 

relationship.”5

 Instead, she proposed the group of “Guatemalan women in 

domestic relationships,” which is not a cognizable particular social group. 

“Guatemalan women in domestic relationships” knows no discrete boundaries and 

is not sufficiently particular. See Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 404 (“[T]he proposed 

group . . . must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.” (quotation 

marks omitted and alteration adopted)). The group consists of women who are in 

healthy, voluntary, and loving relationships as well as those who are in abusive 

ones. It offers no benchmark or distinguishable characteristic based on 

Guatemalan societal expectations and is thus overly broad and amorphous. See id.; 

see also Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221 (BIA 2014) (rejecting the 

particular social group of former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who 

renounced their gang membership because it could include “persons of any age, 

5 We recognize Matter of A-R-C-G- has been overruled by Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. 

Dec. 316 (AG 2018). But the BIA’s decision in this case came before Matter of A-B- when 

“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” was still a cognizable 

particular social group. 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 11 of 14 
12

sex, or background” and is “not limited to those who have had a meaningful 

involvement with the gang.”). 

Further, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo’s proposed particular social group is not 

perceived as socially distinct within Guatemalan society. To show social 

distinctiveness, Ms. Rivera-Geronimo points to data regarding the rampant levels 

of violence against women in Guatemala and the Guatemalan government’s

ineffective efforts to prevent that violence. But, even accepting it as true, this 

evidence shows us only that the Guatemalan government condones violence 

against women and treats Guatemalan women in abusive relationships as socially 

distinct. It does not show us that Guatemalan society perceives “Guatemalan 

women in domestic relationships” the same way. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & 

N. Dec. at 216–17 (explaining for a particular social group to be considered 

“socially distinct,” the applicant must present “evidence showing that society in 

general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular 

characteristic to be a group.”). If anything, this evidence demonstrates that Ms. 

Rivera-Geronimo—by virtue of being a Guatemalan woman—is at greater risk 

than others for domestic abuse without police intervention. But an increased risk 

of persecution alone does not give rise to a particular social group. See CastilloArias, 446 F.3d at 1193, 1196–98 (holding that members of a particular social 

group must “share a common characteristic other than their risk of being 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 12 of 14 
13

persecuted” (quotation marks omitted)). We therefore cannot recognize her 

particular social group on this basis. See id. 

Because “Guatemalan women in domestic relationships” is not sufficiently 

particular or socially distinct, the BIA reasonably concluded Ms. Rivera-Geronimo 

failed to assert a cognizable particular social group. We therefore deny her petition 

for review for her asylum claim. 

B.

The BIA found Ms. Rivera-Geronimo was ineligible for humanitarian 

asylum because she was not a member of a particular social group and thus not a 

“refugee” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Ms. Rivera-Geronimo argues 

the BIA erred in reaching this determination because she is not required to be a 

“refugee” under the definition set out in § 1101(a)(42) to qualify for humanitarian 

asylum. She says humanitarian asylum is available to all persons, irrespective of 

whether they are part of a cognizable particular social group, if they show 

“compelling reasons” for it based on “the severity of the persecution suffered” in 

their native county. 

This Court recently held in Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Attorney General, 913 

F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2019), that an applicant “must . . . establish that she is a 

refugee” to be “granted humanitarian asylum.” Id. at 1311 n.3. To show that an 

applicant is a “refugee,” she must have suffered “past persecution on account of a 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 13 of 14 
14

statutorily protected ground.” Id. These statutorily protected grounds include race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). As a result, and 

because Ms. Rivera-Geronimo is not a member of a cognizable particular social 

group, she is ineligible for humanitarian asylum. Perez-Zenteno, 913 F.3d at 1311 

n.3. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 

Case: 18-12120 Date Filed: 08/28/2019 Page: 14 of 14