IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-0580

Filed August 3, 2022

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF THOMAS EDWARD GRAY AND

NORMALEENA RAMIREZ GRAY n/k/a NORMALEENA RAMIREZ GREBE

Upon the Petition of

THOMAS EDWARD GRAY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning

NORMALEENA RAMIREZ GRAY n/k/a NORMALEENA RAMIREZ GREBE,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Margaret 

Reyes, Judge.

Normaleena Ramirez Grebe appeals the district court’s dismissal of her 

application for rule to show cause on res judicata grounds. AFFIRMED.

P. Shawn McCann of McGinn, Springer & Noethe, P.L.C., Council Bluffs, 

for appellant.

Leslie A. Christensen, Omaha, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

The district court dismissed a contempt application arising from a claimed 

failure to pay spousal support. The court concluded the question was raised and 

decided in a prior action. We must decide whether that sole ground for dismissal 

was erroneous.

The issue arose following the divorce of Normaleena Ramirez Grebe and 

Thomas Edward Gray. The original dissolution decree did not provide for spousal 

support. In 2014, Grebe and Gray stipulated to the addition of spousal support 

language, and the district court filed a corrected order containing the following 

provision: 

[Gray] shall pay [Grebe] spousal support in the sum of $2500.00 per 

month beginning March 1, 2014, and continuing the first day of every 

month thereafter until [Gray] retires from military service; If [Gray] 

pursues a career in federal service following his military service 

career, then [Gray] shall continue to make monthly spousal support 

payments to [Grebe] in the sum of $2500.00, until he retires from 

federal service.[1]

Gray retired from military service approximately a year and a half after the 

stipulated order was filed. He stopped paying spousal support at that time. Gray 

then began working for a company that contracted with the federal government. 

Grebe filed an application to modify the dissolution decree. She alleged 

Gray’s employment with the federal contractor constituted “federal service” within 

the meaning of the 2014 order, requiring Gray to continue paying spousal support. 

1 The 2014 order also stated, “[U]pon [Gray’s] retirement from military service, or 

federal service, if applicable, [Grebe] shall be entitled to 50% of the disposable 

military retired pay [Gray] would have received had [he] retired with a retired base 

pay of $8005.90 and with 21 years of creditable service.”
3

Following a hearing, the district court denied the application without addressing the 

“federal service” issue.2 Grebe did not appeal the order. 

Within a few months, Grebe filed an application for rule to show cause, 

again alleging Gray “pursued a career in federal service following his military 

service career” and she was owed $122,500 for the forty-nine months of his 

employment with the contractor. She further alleged his failure to pay that sum 

amounted to a willful violation of the 2014 order.

Gray moved to dismiss the application on the ground that the acts Grebe 

alleged and the recovery she demanded were “the same” as the acts and recovery 

sought in the “prior” modification “action.” He asserted Grebe “should be barred 

under res judicata from relitigating the spousal support issue which ha[d] already 

been decided by the Court.” As noted at the outset, the district court concluded 

the question of “federal service” was raised and decided in the modification 

proceeding and Grebe could “not relitigate this issue in this matter.” The court 

denied Grebe’s motion to reconsider. 

On appeal, Grebe argues she “should not be barred under res judicata 

because [she] is not relitigating the issue of spousal support but rather is simply 

requesting the court to enforce its 2014 stipulated order.” The parties agree our 

review is for errors of law. See Nazarchyk v. Talkington-Nazarchyk, No. 09-1219, 

2010 WL 2080115, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 26, 2010).

“The doctrine of res judicata embraces the concepts of claim preclusion and 

issue preclusion.” Spiker v. Spiker, 708 N.W.2d 347, 353 (Iowa 2006) (citation 

2 This record does not contain a transcript of the modification hearing.
4

omitted). “The general rule of claim preclusion holds that a valid and final judgment 

on a claim bars a second action on the adjudicated claim or any part thereof.” 

Dorsey v. State, 975 N.W.2d 356, 361 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). “Issue 

preclusion prevents parties from relitigating issues already raised and resolved in 

a prior action.” Clark v. State, 955 N.W.2d 459, 464 (Iowa 2021). 

“The fundamental underpinning of res judicata is that there must be 

separate lawsuits filed.” Scheuermann v. Gumm, No. 12-1946, 2013 WL 3458185, 

at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2013); see also Spiker, 708 N.W.2d at 353 (“The 

general rule of claim preclusion provides a valid and final judgment on a claim 

precludes a second action on that claim or any part of it.” (emphasis added)

(citation omitted)); Clark, 955 N.W.2d at 464 (“Issue preclusion prevents parties 

from relitigating issues already raised and resolved in a prior action.” (emphasis 

added)). The parties do not address the question whether the modification 

proceeding was a separate action from the contempt proceeding. Accordingly, we 

need not address it. See Scheuermann, 2013 WL 3458185, at *5 (stating a plaintiff 

could not assert claim preclusion where the defendant filed an “application in the 

same action”); cf. In re Marriage of Rathe, 521 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Iowa 1994) 

(concluding an application to have a person held in contempt for nonpayment of 

child support filed in one county was “merely an adjunct to” a dissolution-ofmarriage action filed in a different county; the application needed “to be pursued 

only within the original [dissolution-of-marriage] proceeding”; and “[w]e do not think 

the legislature intended for bifurcation of disputes concerning support, 

modification, or other matters that may arise within a [dissolution-of-marriage]

proceeding”); but see In re Marriage of Engler, 532 N.W.2d 747, 750, 750 n.2 (Iowa 
5

1995) (holding Iowa Code “section 598.25[3] allows a party subject to an Iowa 

dissolution decree to seek to modify that decree in a court other than the district 

court entering the dissolution decree,” and distinguishing Rathe based on the 

statutory provision). For purposes of our analysis, we will assume the modification 

proceeding was a “prior action.”4

The doctrine of issue preclusion “prevents a party to a prior action in which 

a judgment has been rendered from relitigating in a subsequent action issues 

raised and resolved in the previous action.” Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 

577 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted). The court’s ruling in the 

modification action did not answer the question whether Gray’s employment with 

the contractor amounted to “federal service.” Instead, the court focused on 

Grebe’s financial circumstances and her ability to meet her expenses with 

retirement pay. Ultimately, the court concluded Grebe failed to establish a 

substantial change of circumstances warranting a modification of the decree. 

Because the “federal service” question was not decided, issue preclusion was 

inapplicable. See Lake Panorama Servicing Corp. v. Cent. Iowa Energy Coop.,

3 The provision states in pertinent part:

Whenever a proceeding is initiated in a court . . . for modification of 

a judgment of alimony . . . granted in an action for dissolution of 

marriage, [certain] requirements must be met if such proceedings are 

initiated in a court other than the court which granted the dissolution 

decree.

Iowa Code § 598.25 (2021).

4 The supreme court has also addressed the nature of an “action” in the statuteof-limitations context. See Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 898 N.W.2d 

127, 136 (Iowa 2017) (“An application to show cause is a means of seeking a 

court’s redress; it thus initiates a ‘proceeding.’ Because the process initiated by 

an application to show cause is a ‘proceeding,’ we conclude it constitutes an 

‘action’ within the meaning of section 614.1.”), overruled on other grounds by TSB 

Holdings, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 913 N.W.2d 1, 10–14 (Iowa 2018). 
6

No. 98-2267, 2001 WL 1014805, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2001) (“[T]he issue

. . . was never decided by the bankruptcy court. . . . Because the bankruptcy court 

never determined the [issue], the district court correctly determined that no basis 

for an instruction on issue preclusion existed.”); see also Dorsey, 975 N.W.2d at 

361 (refusing to apply issue preclusion to the defendant’s state constitutional 

claims where the defendant’s “2014 motion to correct an illegal sentence raised 

federal and state constitutional claims, but the district court’s order addressed only 

[defendant’s] federal claim”).

We turn to claim preclusion. Although the district court did not address 

claim preclusion in granting Gray’s dismissal motion, Gray raised the elements of 

claim preclusion in his motion and reprises the theory on appeal. Accordingly, we 

may affirm on this alternative basis. See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62–63 

(Iowa 2002).

Claim preclusion applies when: “(1) ‘the parties in the first and second action 

were the same;’ (2) ‘the claim in the second suit could have been fully and fairly

adjudicated in the prior case;’ and (3) ‘there was a final judgment on the merits in 

the first action.’” Spiker, 708 N.W.2d at 353 (citation omitted). There is no question 

the first and third elements were satisfied. The only question is whether the second 

element was satisfied. 

In deciding whether the “federal service” question could have been fully and 

fairly adjudicated in the modification proceeding, we begin with the proposition that 

“the district court retains authority to interpret and enforce its prior decree.” In re 

Marriage of Morris, 810 N.W.2d 880, 886 (Iowa 2012). “A party need not 

demonstrate a change in circumstances when the party seeks only to clarify the 
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terms of the dissolution decree.” Christy v. Lenz, 878 N.W.2d 461, 465 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 2016); In re Marriage of Shipley, No. 15-1418, 2016 WL 757416, at *2 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) (same). 

In Morris, the court concluded a party was “not seeking to impermissibly 

modify the dissolution decree” when she sought interpretation of an ambiguous 

provision in the decree. 810 N.W.2d at 886; see also In re Marriage of Lawson, 

409 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Iowa 1987) (noting “the action to establish petitioner’s rights

. . . is in the nature of a modification”); In re Marriage of Heath-Clark & Clark, No. 

15-0525, 2016 WL 2753779, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016) (finding no 

jurisdictional concern where party was not requesting a modification of the property 

division but a modification of a qualified domestic relations order “to conform to the 

property division as set forth in the decree”). We turn to the modification record in 

this case. 

As noted, Grebe alleged Gray’s employment with the federal contractor 

constituted “federal service” within the meaning of that order. The phrase “federal 

service” required interpretation of the 2014 order. Grebe asked Gray to answer 

interrogatories on the issue. Gray provided detailed responses as well as a letter 

from his employer addressing the issue. We conclude the federal service issue 

was before the modification court, all parties had notice of it, and the court could 

have fully and fairly adjudicated it.

Having concluded the second element of claim preclusion was satisfied and 

the first and third elements were undisputed, we further conclude the litigation in 

the modification proceeding barred Grebe from raising the federal service question 
8

in her contempt application. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting 

Gray’s motion to dismiss the contempt application.

AFFIRMED.