NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

GURPREET KANG, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

PARMINDER KANG, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0182

FILED 09-04-2014

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County

No. SO300DO201100615

The Honorable Ted Stuart Reed, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Aspey, Watkins & Diesel, P.L.L.C., Flagstaff

By Louis M. Diesel and Daniella M. Ferrari

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Law Office of Benjamin L. Deguire PLLC, Flagstaff

By Benjamin L. Deguire 

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
KANG v. KANG

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Parminder Kang (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s decree of 

dissolution awarding Gurpreet Kang (“Mother”) child support, spousal 

maintenance, and attorneys’ fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the 

court’s awards of spousal maintenance and attorneys’ fees. We vacate, 

however, the court’s child support order and remand for further 

proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 At the time of the parties’ marriage in 2008, Father was a 

medical resident in Texas and Mother was nearing completion of her

medical degree. The parties then relocated to Missouri, where Father

worked as an orthopedic fellow.

¶3 In September 2011, Father signed an employment contract 

with a medical practice group in California that would provide Father with 

an annual salary of $340,000 but was contingent on Father obtaining a 

California medical license. Later that month, the parties separated and 

Father moved to his parents’ home in Nevada, while Mother moved to 

Flagstaff to live with her family. Father applied for and received his 

Nevada medical license while his application for a California license was 

still pending. Father subsequently withdrew his application for the 

California license. At the time of trial, Father was working for a Nevada 

orthopedic group on a six-month fellowship earning a salary of 

approximately $130,000.

¶4 Prior to the parties’ separation, Mother had completed her 

medical degree and passed the first of three tests required to become a 

licensed physician. At the time of trial, she had been unable to pass the

second test despite several attempts. 

¶5 Mother filed a petition for legal separation in Arizona in 

October 2011, which was ultimately converted to a dissolution proceeding. 

After a two-day trial, the court awarded Mother child support of $1,117.96 
KANG v. KANG

Decision of the Court

3

per month, spousal maintenance in the amount of $5,000 a month for thirtytwo months, and $16,133.62 in attorneys’ fees. Father filed a timely notice 

of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

A. Child Support Award

¶6 We generally review child support awards for an abuse of 

discretion. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 30, ¶ 6, 49 P.3d 300, 302 (Ariz. 

App. 2002). In doing so, we “accept the trial court's findings of fact unless 

they are clearly erroneous, but draw our own legal conclusions from facts 

found or implied in the judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶7 The trial court listed Father’s income in the child support 

worksheet as $20,000 per month. The portion of the decree relating to 

spousal maintenance, however, states that at the time of trial, Father was 

earning approximately $10,833 per month. Father argues that the 

worksheet is clearly erroneous. Mother counters that the amount attributed 

to Father in the worksheet should be upheld because he has an earning 

capacity of at least $20,000 a month, and the court had discretion to attribute 

a greater earning potential to Father. 

¶8 For purposes of calculating child support, a court has 

discretion to impute income to a parent “when a parent is unemployed or 

working below his or her full earning potential . . . if the parent’s earnings 

are reduced voluntarily and not for reasonable cause.” Little v. Little, 193 

Ariz. 518, 521, ¶ 6, 975 P.2d 108, 111 (1999) (citing Appendix to Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 25-320, Child Support Guidelines 

(Guidelines) § 5(E)).1 At trial, the parties disputed whether additional 

income should be attributed to Father because he signed an employment

contract for an annual salary of $340,000 prior to the parties’ separation and 

he had informal discussions with his current employer for a salary of 

$250,000 upon completion of his fellowship. In the decree, the trial court

acknowledged this evidence, but did not address whether it would be 

appropriate to impute a higher income to Father. In discussing spousal 

maintenance, the court found that Father makes approximately $10,833 per 

month and can contribute to Mother’s support, but did not make separate 

findings to explain the substantial difference relating to Father’s income for 

determining child support. 

 

1 We cite to the current version of the Guidelines because there has 

been no substantive change to this section since the Little decision. 
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¶9 Mother argues nonetheless that we may accept the higher 

income on the child support worksheet for purposes of calculating child 

support because the trial court had discretion to attribute income to Father 

based on his voluntary decision to earn less money. Mother’s position, 

however, fails to account for the fact that Father requested findings of fact

and therefore the court was obligated to perform the balancing test set forth 

in Little, 193 Ariz. at 522-23, ¶ 13, 975 P.2d at 112-13, if it wished to impute 

a higher income to Father. See also Elliott v. Elliot, 165 Ariz. 128, 132, 796 

P.2d 930, 934 (App. 1990) (when a request for findings of fact has been 

made, the court must “address all of the factors with respect to which the 

parties presented evidence” and “set forth the mathematical basis of the 

spousal maintenance award”). A mathematical figure by itself “does not 

inform an appellate court of the basis for the trial court’s decision.” Elliott,

165 Ariz. at 132, 796 P.2d at 934. There is nothing in the court’s findings 

suggesting it performed any such analysis. Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors of 

Pinal County, 175 Ariz. 296, 299, 855 P.2d 1357, 1360 (1993) (“The reviewing 

court needs a sufficient factual basis that explains how the trial court 

actually arrived at its conclusion.”).

¶10 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not make 

adequate findings supporting the $20,000 per month income figure used in 

the child support worksheet. We therefore vacate the superior court’s child 

support order and remand for additional findings of fact and, if necessary, 

re-calculation of the child support award.

B. Spousal Maintenance Award

¶11 Father argues the trial court erred in awarding any spousal 

maintenance to Mother, and alternatively, he contends the amount and 

duration of the award were excessive. We review the award of spousal 

maintenance for an abuse of discretion, Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 354, 

¶ 9, 160 P.3d 231, 233 (App. 2007), and, in doing so, view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to Mother, Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 348, 

¶ 14, 972 P.2d 676, 681 (App. 1998). We will affirm the court’s rulings if 

there is any reasonable evidence to support them. Id. We do not re-weigh 

conflicting evidence or re-determine the preponderance of the evidence on 

appeal. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16, 219 P.3d 258, 262 (App. 2009). 
KANG v. KANG

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¶12 The trial court may award spousal maintenance when any 

one of the four factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-319(A)2 is present. Here, the 

court found that Mother: (1) lacked sufficient property to provide for her 

reasonable needs; (2) was unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate 

employment; and (3) was the custodian of a child whose age is such that 

she should not be required to seek employment outside the home. 

¶13 Father does not dispute that Mother was awarded no 

property, as the parties had no assets to divide. This factor alone supports 

the court’s finding that Mother is entitled to an award of spousal 

maintenance pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1). Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 348, 

¶ 17, 972 P.2d at 681 (explaining that “spousal maintenance may be 

awarded where any one of the four factors is present”). 

¶14 The evidence also supports the trial court’s implicit finding 

that it would take time for Mother to become self-sufficient through 

appropriate employment. See A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(2). Mother testified she 

made reasonable attempts to find employment since the parties’ child was 

born prematurely in March 2012, but has been unsuccessful. Mother also 

explained she intends to complete the additional requirements to become a 

practicing physician; however, it would take at least a year and a half to do 

so. 

¶15 Father contends the trial court erred in finding Mother made 

diligent efforts to find employment. He argues that Mother holds a medical 

degree, is in good health, and should be able to find suitable employment.

Although Father challenges Mother’s testimony that she has unsuccessfully 

applied to many non-medical positions, she offered into evidence several 

rejection letters she had received from prospective employers. We defer to 

the court’s determination of the credibility of witnesses, see Gutierrez, 193 

Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680, and therefore find no abuse of discretion. 

 

2 As set forth in A.R.S. § 25-319, the court may order spousal 

maintenance if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: (1) lacks 

sufficient property to provide for that spouse’s reasonable needs, (2) is 

unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate employment or is the 

custodian of a child whose age or condition is such that the custodian 

should not be required to seek employment outside the home or lacks 

earning ability in the labor market adequate to be self-sufficient, (3) 

contributed to the educational opportunities of the other spouse, or (4) had 

a marriage of long duration and is of an age that may preclude the 

possibility of gaining employment adequate to be self-sufficient. 
KANG v. KANG

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¶16 Father also challenges the trial court’s finding that Mother

“has passed the first of three tests necessary for her to be admitted to the 

practice of medicine and employable as a medical doctor.” This finding is 

relevant to several factors such as: Mother’s earning ability, the parties’ 

comparative financial resources, Mother’s financial resources, and the time 

needed to acquire sufficient education or training to enable Mother to find 

appropriate employment. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(3), (5), (9), and (10). Father

testified that one can begin a paid medical residency having passed only 

the first and second licensing exams. Thus, Father contends, Mother need 

only pass the second exam before she can apply to paid residency 

programs. However, Mother did not testify as to what was possible in 

general; her testimony was specific to her situation of having custody of an

infant child. She explained that under these circumstances it would take 

longer for her to complete these requirements than Father claimed. The 

court accepted Mother’s explanation. Viewing the evidence in light most 

favorable to Mother, the record supports this finding. 

¶17 Father also challenges the trial court’s findings that each exam 

costs $2,000 and that Mother anticipates spending $5,000 for a review class. 

Because the parties presented conflicting evidence as to the cost of these 

exams and the need for Mother to take a review course, the court did not 

abuse its discretion. 

¶18 Regarding Father’s ability to pay spousal maintenance and 

the parties’ comparative financial resources, Father contends the trial court 

failed to consider his ability to meet his own needs while paying 

maintenance. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(4). Father also argues the court did not 

consider his own student loan debt. Although Father testified that he had 

approximately $230,000 in student loan debt and was currently making 

payments, he failed to disclose the amount of his monthly obligation either 

through his trial testimony or an updated affidavit of financial information

(“AFI”). 

¶19 Father also argues the trial court did not consider a $10,000

advance he must repay to the California practice group or the debts he was 

ordered to pay in the decree. Appellate courts presume that a trial judge 

has considered the evidence presented before making a decision. Fuentes v. 

Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55-56, ¶ 18, 97 P.3d 876, 880-81 (App. 2004). As such, 

we presume that the court was aware of these obligations when the court 

determined the amount of the spousal maintenance award. 

¶20 Father’s AFI supports the trial court’s finding that his 

monthly expenses were $1,631, even though the AFI was dated and did not 
KANG v. KANG

Decision of the Court

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reflect any student loan obligation. Father’s AFI also did not include any of 

the other expenses he claims the court failed to consider. The trial court 

found that Father had no housing expenses and none are listed in his AFI. 

The court also found that Mother lived with her family and had no rent or 

living expenses. Thus, we reject Father’s argument that the trial court 

“completely ignored” Mother’s lack of living expenses. The fact that 

Mother has minimal living expenses because she is dependent on her family 

for support does not mean, as Father suggests, that Mother has no need for 

spousal maintenance. One of the purposes of spousal maintenance is to 

help a spouse achieve financial independence. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 

24, 972 P.2d at 682. This cannot be accomplished if Mother must rely on her 

family to pay her living expenses. Mother appropriately included 

anticipated living expenses in her AFI and the court considered these 

expenses in determining the amount of spousal maintenance. Father, on 

the other hand, listed no anticipated living expenses in his AFI. The trial 

court’s findings regarding the parties’ living expenses do not constitute an

abuse of discretion.

¶21 Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

considering the parties’ ability to contribute to the child’s future education 

costs because the child is an infant and future contributions are highly 

speculative. Ability to contribute to future education costs is an 

appropriate consideration under A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(8). The trial court 

found that, essentially, Mother’s ability to contribute to future education 

costs was uncertain and Father’s ability would improve in the future. Based 

on the record, we find no abuse of discretion. 

¶22 Regarding the duration of the award, Father argues that it 

constitutes an incentive for Mother to delay completing her residency and 

is excessive in light of the short marriage. The trial court accepted Mother’s 

testimony that she anticipated starting her residency in July 2015. That 

date is two and one-half years from when the decree was entered, which 

roughly corresponds to the length of the support award. We therefore find 

no abuse of discretion. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680. 

¶23 Father argues that this award is inconsistent with spousal 

maintenance awards in other cases and the Spousal Maintenance 

Guidelines adopted in Maricopa County.3 The trial court determines 

spousal maintenance awards on a case-by-case basis and, even in Maricopa 

County, is not bound by spousal maintenance guidelines. See Cullum, 215 

 

3 Father provides no citation indicating that such guidelines are still 

in effect. 
KANG v. KANG

Decision of the Court

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Ariz. at 356, ¶ 17, 160 P.3d at 235 (explaining that the purpose of the 

guidelines is to give the court and the parties a starting point for discussion 

and are not intended to “replace the court’s obligation to consider the 

specific evidence and statutory factors”). We therefore affirm the spousal 

maintenance award to Mother. 

C. Attorneys’ Fees 

¶24 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(A), a court may award attorneys’ 

fees and costs in a dissolution proceeding after considering the parties’ 

financial resources and the reasonableness of their positions throughout the 

litigation. We review the award of fees for an abuse of discretion. See Cohen 

v. Frey, 215 Ariz. 62, 68, ¶ 18, 157 P.3d 482, 488 (App. 2007). 

¶25 The trial court awarded Mother $16,133.62, which was 

approximately half of the attorneys’ fees she requested, after finding there 

was a substantial disparity in the parties’ financial resources. The court also 

found that Father acted unreasonably in filing a motion to dismiss Mother’s 

petition for legal separation without an adequate basis, but noted that the 

motion was “one relatively small component of the entire litigation in this 

matter.” 

¶26 Father argues that Mother took unreasonable positions at 

trial, such as seeking a spousal maintenance award of $6,000 a month for 

six years; alleging Father’s income for purposes of child support should be 

$500,000 per year; and demanding that Father pay all her student loans. He

also contends that his motion to dismiss was meritorious and therefore not

unreasonable.4 Father did not request, however, that the trial court enter 

findings explaining what portion of the fee award was based on financial 

disparity and what portion was based on Father acting unreasonably in the 

litigation. See A.R.S. § 25-324(A) (“On request of a party . . . the court shall 

 

4 Specifically, Father argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction because 

Mother was not domiciled in Arizona for ninety days at the time she filed 

her petition for separation and he filed a petition for dissolution in Nevada 

before the trial court converted Mother’s petition for separation to a petition 

for dissolution. Father raises this issue only within the context of 

challenging the award of attorneys’ fees to Mother and expressly states that 

he is not seeking to have the decree of dissolution reversed or vacated 

despite the alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction. More importantly, 

on February 2, 2012, Father and Mother stipulated to a dismissal of the 

Nevada action with prejudice. The matter is therefore moot and we need 

not address it. 
KANG v. KANG

Decision of the Court

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make specific findings concerning the portions of any award of fees and 

expenses that are based on consideration of financial resources and that are 

based on consideration of reasonableness of positions.”). The record 

supports the court’s conclusion that at the time of trial, Father had 

“considerably more financial resources available” than Mother. The court 

therefore acted within its discretion in directing Father to pay a portion of 

Mother’s fees and costs. 

¶27 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on 

appeal, but only Mother cites the relevant authority for her request. See 

A.R.S. § 25-324(A). In any event, neither party has taken an unreasonable

position on appeal and we have no current information regarding the 

parties’ financial resources. Accordingly, in the exercise of our discretion, 

we decline to award attorneys’ fees or costs to either party. 

CONCLUSION

¶28 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s decree of 

dissolution except for the child support award because the court failed to 

make adequate findings supporting Father’s monthly income. We 

therefore vacate that portion of the decree and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision.