Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

PAULA M. SAUER GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Danville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

NICOLE M. SCHUSTER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

BRADLEY S. SATER, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 32A04-1204-CR-182

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE HENDRICKS SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable David H. Coleman, Judge

Cause No. 32D02-1012-FA-2

December 11, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DARDEN, Senior Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Bradley Sater appeals his convictions for Class A felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1 (2006), and Class C felony possession of 

methamphetamine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1 (2006). We affirm the dealing conviction 

and remand with instructions to vacate the possession conviction.

ISSUES

Sater raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions.

II. Whether his convictions violate double jeopardy principles.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Joshua Shumaker worked as a confidential informant to get his pending Class B 

felony drug charge reduced to a Class D felony. In July 2010, Shumaker met Detective 

Timothy Wells of the United Drug Task Force at the Plainfield Police Department to 

prepare for a controlled buy of methamphetamine from Sater. Detective Wells searched 

Shumaker and his vehicle and found no contraband. He then outfitted Shumaker with an 

audio/video recording device and gave him $550 in prerecorded buy money.

Detective Wells followed Shumaker to the Plainfield home of Sater’s parents. 

Sater met Shumaker outside in the driveway, and they went through the garage and into 

the house. Inside, Shumaker gave Sater the buy money, and Sater gave him a plastic bag 

containing 6.62 grams of methamphetamine. Sater was holding a meth pipe and asked 

Shumaker to smoke with him. Shumaker was in the house for about five to seven 

minutes. Other than Sater, he did not see anyone else in the residence.
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After Shumaker left the house, he met Detective Wells at a nearby carwash. 

Detective Wells took the bag of methamphetamine from Shumaker. Again, he searched 

Shumaker and his vehicle and found no other contraband. Shumaker gave Detective 

Wells a statement detailing his purchase from Sater.

In December 2010, the State charged Sater with Class A felony dealing in 

methamphetamine and Class C felony possession of methamphetamine. At trial, 

Detective Wells and Shumaker testified for the State, and the recording of the drug 

transaction was admitted into evidence and played to the jury. Sater testified in his own 

defense. He admitted that he was the person on the recording but claimed that he was 

holding a bag of marijuana and a marijuana pipe, not a bag of methamphetamine and a 

meth pipe. He also claimed that there were two other people in the house and that 

Shumaker must have obtained the methamphetamine from one of those people. No other 

witnesses testified for the defense.

The jury found Sater guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgments of 

conviction on both jury verdicts, merged the possession conviction into the dealing 

conviction, and sentenced Sater to twenty-five years for the dealing conviction. Sater 

now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Sater contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. In 

reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess 

the credibility of the witnesses. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ind. 2010). 
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Rather, we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support 

the verdicts. Id. We affirm the convictions if there is probative evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

In cases involving a controlled buy such as that presented here, the adequacy of 

the control goes to the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses presented,

which we may not reweigh. Heyen v. State, 936 N.E.2d 294, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), 

trans. denied. In addition, a conviction in a drug case may be sustained upon the 

testimony of an informant alone. Haynes v. State, 431 N.E.2d 83, 85 (Ind. 1982).

To convict Sater of possession of methamphetamine as charged here, the State had 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sater knowingly possessed three grams or more 

of methamphetamine without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the 

course of the practitioner’s professional practice. Appellant’s App. p. 11; see Ind. Code § 

35-48-4-6.1(a), (b)(1)(A). To convict Sater of dealing in methamphetamine as charged 

here, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sater knowingly delivered 

three grams or more of methamphetamine. Appellant’s App. p. 10; see Ind. Code § 35-

48-4-1.1(a)(1)(C), (b)(1).

Sater does not challenge the identification of the substance recovered from 

Shumaker as methamphetamine or its weight. Instead, he claims that someone else in the 

house must have sold Shumaker the methamphetamine, and that the recording only 

shows Sater holding marijuana and a marijuana pipe. He points out that there is no 

evidence that the police watched all entrances to the residence during the transaction;

multiple vehicles were parked at the residence at the time of the transaction, suggesting 
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other people were present; the recording showed Sater referring to seeds at the bottom of 

the bag, but the recovered bag of methamphetamine contained no seeds; and the buy 

money was not recovered.

These are merely requests for us to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. 

See Haynes, 431 N.E.2d at 86 (“The fact that the informant was not actually seen entering 

the house was a factor for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence.”). Here, 

Shumaker testified at trial that it was Sater who sold him the methamphetamine. This

testimony alone is sufficient to sustain Sater’s convictions for possession of and dealing 

in methamphetamine. See Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 368-69 (Ind. 1999) 

(informant’s uncorroborated testimony alone sufficient to sustain drug conviction despite 

appellant’s claim involving adequacy of control). The jury also heard Detective Wells’s 

testimony and viewed and listened to the recording of the transaction, which failed to 

demonstrate that there was anyone else in the house. It was for the jury to weigh this 

evidence against Sater’s version of events. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to 

sustain Sater’s convictions.

II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Sater next contends that his convictions violate double jeopardy principles. A 

defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when a court enters judgment twice for the 

same offense, but not when a defendant is simply found guilty of a particular count. 

Green v. State, 856 N.E.2d 703, 704 (Ind. 2006). A double jeopardy violation occurs 

when judgments of conviction are entered and cannot be remedied by the “practical 
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effect” of concurrent sentences or by merger after conviction has been entered. Gregory 

v. State, 885 N.E.2d 697, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

The 6.62 grams of methamphetamine Sater sold Shumaker serve as the basis for 

both the possession and dealing counts. The possession is thus a lesser included offense 

of the dealing. See Micheau v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1053, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) 

(concluding that possession of methamphetamine is lesser included offense of dealing in 

methamphetamine where offenses are based on same drugs), trans. denied.

The trial court entered judgments of conviction for both possession and dealing. 

See Tr. p. 305 (oral sentencing statement); Appellant’s App. pp. 120 (Judgment of 

Conviction, Sentencing Order, and Order of Commitment (“Judgment of Conviction”)), 

121 (Felony Sentencing Order), 123 (Abstract of Judgment). Although the court merged 

the possession conviction into the dealing conviction, this was not sufficient to remedy 

the double jeopardy violation. We therefore remand with instructions to vacate Sater’s 

conviction for possession of methamphetamine. See Gregory, 885 N.E.2d at 703 

(remanding with instructions to vacate conviction for conspiracy to deal in 

methamphetamine where trial court attempted to avoid double jeopardy violation by 

merging that conviction with dealing in methamphetamine conviction).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm Sater’s dealing conviction and remand with 

instructions to vacate the possession conviction. We also direct the court to amend the 

Judgment of Conviction, Felony Sentencing Order, and Abstract of Judgment to show 
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conviction only on the dealing count and to send copies of these amended documents to 

the Department of Correction.

Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions.

RILEY, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.