Reverse and Render in part; Affirm in part and Opinion Filed March 11, 

2024

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-22-00759-CV

FAZEL RAHMANI & FORT WORTH LEGACY INVESTMENTS, L.P., 

Appellants

V.

AMY SADEGHIAN, Appellee

On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-06526

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Nowell

Opinion by Justice Molberg

Fazel Rahmani and Fort Worth Legacy Investments, L.P. (FWLI), appeal the 

trial court’s judgment awarding damages to Amy Sadeghian in their suit for

partition. In two issues, Rahmani and FWLI argue the trial court erred in granting 

Sadeghian relief for which she had not pleaded and in failing to reopen the evidence

following trial. Because we agree, we reverse and render judgment for Rahmani and 

FWLI on Sadeghian’s unpleaded claims for reimbursement of property taxes and 

maintenance and repair expenses. We affirm the remainder of the judgment.
–2–

Background

On May 7, 2020, Rahmani and FWLI sued Sadeghian seeking to partition the 

property they jointly owned. Rahmani and FWLI alleged they were entitled to 

partition under Chapter 23 of the Texas Property Code, stating the property should 

be sold and the proceeds apportioned according to the parties’ equal, one-third 

interests to effect equitable partition because the layout of the property prevented 

equitable division in kind. Sadeghian answered with a general denial. She also 

requested Rahmani and FWLI provide the information required by rules of civil 

procedure 194.1 and 194.2. 

Nearly two years later,1 on March 31, 2022, Sadeghian filed a motion for leave 

to file counterclaims and contemporaneously filed counterclaims in which she 

alleged she was entitled to a reimbursement of $37,935.41 from the plaintiffs for 

maintenance and repair of the property, taxes, and survey costs. Sadeghian also filed 

a motion to exclude in which she requested the court to exclude from trial Rahmani

and FWLI’s “information or material, or offer any testimony of a witness (other than 

a named party) that was not timely disclosed under Rules 194.1 and 194.2 of the 

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure” because, she alleged, Rahmani and FWLI failed to 

 

1 The docket sheet in the clerk’s record before us indicates the case was dismissed for want of 

prosecution on July 9, 2020, and not reinstated until September 3, 2020. The case was originally set for 

trial on May 18, 2021, but according to Sadeghian’s response to the motion for new trial, the court continued 

the trial to February 1, 2022, to allow the parties to discuss alternative dispute resolution. The parties agreed 

to continue the case once more to finalize an agreement to partition the property. 
–3–

respond to her request for disclosure filed and served on Rahmani and FWLI on July 

24, 2020. Sadeghian argued exclusion under rule 193.6 was automatic. 

The trial court held a bench trial on April 5, 2022. Before hearing evidence, 

the court denied Sadeghian’s motion for leave to amend her pleadings, noting it was 

filed outside the scheduling order, “as well as outside the Texas rules.” The court 

stated the parties had agreed regarding partitioning the property and sharing survey 

fees but said “whether or not the parties should share cost[s] on the back paid taxes” 

was the sole remaining issue. Although the reporter’s record does not include any 

exchange where Rahmani objected to the trial on reimbursement, Sadeghian 

acknowledged in a response to Rahmani’s motion for new trial that Rahmani “argued 

in opposition, claiming [Sadeghian] was required to plead for affirmative relief, and 

since she did not, she could not put on evidence of said claims.” The trial court also 

granted Sadeghian’s motion to exclude. 

Despite identifying Sadeghian’s affirmative but unpleaded reimbursement 

claim as the sole remaining issue, the trial court asked Rahmani and FWLI to 

proceed. Rahmani testified he made annual tax payments throughout the course of 

his ownership of the property by mailing his one-third share directly to the appraisal 

district. Without objection, a payment-information readout from the tax assessor’s 

website was admitted. Rahmani said it did not accurately reflect all of the payments 

he had made over the years, which he made through his companies One Tel 

Communication and Holiday Lodge, Inc. He said since the time he has owned the 
–4–

property jointly with Sadeghian, he had not communicated much with her, and she 

had never told him he owed her taxes. Rahmani said the tax bills had all been sent

to Sadeghian’s address, and he did not recall ever receiving a refund from the county 

for overpayment. On cross-examination, he reiterated that the tax assessor’s website 

did not accurately reflect each payment he had made, and he said on one occasion 

he sent his one-third share of the taxes to Sadeghian because she had made the full 

payment. The trial court questioned Rahmani about where the remainder of the 

checks were, instructing him he had the burden of proof as the plaintiff, and he said 

he could produce them if given time. Kourosh Hemyari testified he was the general 

partner of FWLI and that he paid taxes for FWLI each year by sending one-third of 

taxes listed on the tax assessor’s website to the tax office. He testified that the tax 

office’s website did not accurately reflect his payments because Sadeghian’s name 

was on the top of the deed so refunds went to her office. He testified he did not 

receive two such refunds, despite the fact the records showed they had been made to 

FWLI. 

Sadeghian testified she purchased the property in April 2007. The trial court 

admitted Sadeghian’s exhibit summarizing the parties’ tax payments; Sadeghian 

stated the summary was based upon information received from the tax office. 

Sadeghian testified the tax payments made for the property over the pertinent time 

period added up to $51,110.87, which amounted to $17,036.96 for each co-tenant. 

She said neither Rahmani nor FWLI had paid that amount. She said she paid 
–5–

$48,124.30 in total, and she said she received some refunds from the office and her 

co-tenants received some refunds. Sadeghian said Rahmani had paid $3,650.03 in 

taxes and FWLI had been refunded $663.46 more than it had paid; thus, she said, 

Rahmani owed her $13,386.93 in taxes and FWLI owed $17,700.42. The trial court 

also admitted Sadeghian’s exhibit of duplicate tax receipts from 2007 through 2021. 

Additionally, Sadeghian said she paid for a cleanup at the property following a code 

violation, which totaled $2,700, or $900 per co-tenant, and for the survey to partition 

the property totaling $7,572.09, or $2,524.03 per co-tenant. On cross-examination, 

Sadeghian agreed she had not presented any canceled checks and that her testimony 

was based upon the tax receipts acquired from the tax office. The parties sparred

over the meaning of the tax receipts and why Sadeghian seemed to make multiple 

payments per year. At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court took the matter 

under advisement and asked the parties to submit proposed judgments, telling 

counsel for Rahmani and FWLI that she knew “you guys don’t feel like you have to 

reimburse, but I think you know that’s probably not going to be the most equitable 

thing. Give me a good faith order based on what is obvious here to some degree.” 

On April 13, 2022, Rahmani and FWLI filed a motion to reopen the case in 

chief and a post-trial brief. They argued that before trial, they had “urged that 

because Defendant had no pleadings on file seeking any monetary relief, that issue 

was not before the Court,” but the trial court ruled it would hear evidence on that 

issue regardless. They further stated:
–6–

Plaintiffs were not prepared to try this issue since there were no 

pleadings on file warranting evidence on these matters. While Plaintiffs 

did not and do not consent to try the issue by consent, they recognize 

that the Court may determine that such issues are appropriately before 

it. Therefore, Plaintiffs seek leave to proffer additional evidence on the 

issue of tax payments.

On that issue, they contended the “take-away from the testimony [at trial] was that 

the Tax Office records were not entirely reliable” because they indicated 

overpayments had been made, with most of the overpayments being reimbursed to 

Sadeghian and some to Rahmani and FWLI, who had testified they remitted their 

share of taxes yearly. They argued Sadeghian’s tax receipts failed to accurately 

reflect “who paid the taxes” and sought to offer “copies of checks and bank 

statements” showing their payment of their share of taxes. Included with their 

motion to reopen were checks and records showing sixteen payments from Rahmani 

and FWLI to the tax office. 

On April 21, 2022, the trial court rendered final judgment and partitioned the 

property according to the parties’ agreement. The court also awarded damages to 

Sadeghian, ordering Rahmani to pay $13,386.93 for property taxes, $900.00 for 

maintenance and repair, and $2,524.03 for survey costs, and FWLI to pay 

$17,700.42 for property taxes, $900.00 for maintenance and repair, and $2,524.03 

for survey costs. 

Rahmani and FWLI filed a motion for new trial on May 20, 2022, again 

arguing no pleadings supported monetary relief and reiterating their contentions 
–7–

made in the motion to reopen evidence. In response, Sadeghian acknowledged 

Rahmani and FWLI argued before trial that she “was required to plead for 

affirmative relief, and since she did not, she could not put on evidence” of claims for 

reimbursement for property taxes and maintenance and repair. Sadeghian argued 

“the nature of the suit itself” allowed “the Court to adjust the equities in this suit for 

partition and cause Plaintiffs to pay their pro rata share of expenses for maintenance 

and repair and property taxes.” Further, Sadeghian argued Rahmani and FWLI were 

prohibited from submitting additional evidence because the trial court had granted 

her motion to exclude. This appeal followed. 

Discussion

Rahmani and FWLI first argue the trial court erred in awarding Sadeghian 

damages for property taxes and maintenance and repair expenses because she failed 

to plead for such relief.

2

 “The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, 

the nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give 

the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity.” TEX. R.

CIV. P. 301. A trial court has no authority to grant relief not requested by the parties. 

In re S.M.G., No. 05-22-00937-CV, 2023 WL 3963992, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

June 13, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). “This is so because pleadings must provide fair 

 

2 Although the trial court awarded damages for survey costs in addition to maintenance, repair, and 

taxes, Rahmani and FWLI state in their brief they do not challenge that portion of the judgment because 

they agreed to share survey costs. 
–8–

notice of the claims asserted and allow the opposing party to ascertain the nature and 

basic issues of the controversy.” Id. 

Here, Rahmani and FWLI’s petition stated the suit sought no money damages 

but only partition of real property under Chapter 23 of the property code, and 

Sadeghian’s answer generally denied the petition’s allegations and requested 

disclosures under rule 194.1. No other pleadings were before the trial court. Despite 

this failure to plead for reimbursement, Sadeghian argues the equitable nature of a 

partition suit allowed for trial on reimbursement questions, even if unpleaded. We 

cannot agree. Sadeghian cites Callicoatte v. Callicoatte, 417 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.), for the proposition that a general denial in a 

partition suit is sufficient to support a judgment of monetary relief for the defendant. 

However, the question on appeal in that partition suit was whether the parties had 

orally partitioned their community property, whether the oral partition was void, and 

whether any pleading supported the trial court’s finding that the parties had orally 

partitioned the property. See Callicoatte, 417 S.W.2d at 620. The court concluded 

the pleadings supported the finding of oral partition because trial courts in partition 

suits may determine “all questions of law or equity affecting the title to such land 

which may arise.” Id. at 621. Thus, Callicoatte did not decide any questions relating 

to reimbursement. 

Similarly, the other authorities cited by Sadeghian stand for the general 

propositions that a trial court shall determine in a partition suit “all questions of law 
–9–

or equity affecting the title to the land to be partitioned,” see TEX. R. CIV. P. 760, or 

that upon dissolution of a co-tenancy, one co-tenant may have an account from 

another “for rents and profits received, waste committed, moneys fraudulently 

obtained, betterments made, and taxes, etc., paid, either as an incident of a partition 

suit or otherwise,” see Sayers v. Pyland, 161 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. 1942). None of 

these authorities speak to pleading requirements, and those that do cut against 

Sadeghian’s argument. For example, in Wooley v. West, 391 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex. 

App.—Tyler 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.), West sued her brother, Wooley, for trespass to 

try title and alternatively for partition of a seven-acre property, alleging she had 

purchased the property from her separate funds and was entitled to the proceeds from 

the sale of the property, and she requested that she be reimbursed for expenditures 

in preserving the property. Wooley generally denied the allegations. Id. Judgment 

was entered for West in certain respects and Wooley in others, but as pertinent here, 

Wooley was found to have contributed “more services than the plaintiff toward the 

purchase price of the property,” and the jury found the value of those services was 

$250. Id. On cross-appeal, West argued no pleading supported this award. Id. The 

court of appeals agreed and concluded Wooley’s “claim for services in connection 

with the purchase of the property cannot be considered as an equitable claim growing 

out of the joint tenancy and therefore any claim for such services would require 

affirmative pleadings in order to support a recovery thereon,” but that even if the 
–10–

claim “could be considered as a claim for equitable relief growing out of the cotenancy, pleadings in support thereof would nevertheless be required.” Id. at 161.3

In a case this Court decided more recently than those cited by Sadeghian, we 

applied the normal pleading rules in a partition suit. See Bailey-Mason v. Mason, 

334 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (stating party seeking 

reimbursement in partition suit was “required to plead and prove entitlement to such 

relief”). In that case, the appellee sued for partition and the trial court ultimately 

ordered the property in question sold and the proceeds distributed to the parties 

according to their interests. Id. at 42. The appellant argued on appeal, among other 

things, that if appellee owned one half of the property in question, the trial court 

should have ordered her to reimburse the appellant for the appellant’s expenses 

incurred related to the property, including taxes. Id. at 45. This Court concluded 

the appellant’s reimbursement claim for taxes failed because her pleading was 

insufficient to support recovery of the taxes—her pleading “sought reimbursement 

only ‘for improvement to the property.’” Id. 

 

3

In another case cited by Sadeghian, Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 552 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court did not address any question of the sufficiency of pleadings in a 

partition suit, but we note that the plaintiff sued for partition and sought to recover “the reasonable value of 

the use of rents and revenues on their portion of the properties” in question and to make “any and all 

adjustments which it may, in equity, find to exist.” The defendant in his answer and counterclaim alleged, 

among other things, he was entitled to a credit for all expenses, charges, and debts incurred in the 

maintenance and protection of the properties. Id.
–11–

Here, Sadeghian’s pleading did not seek any reimbursement. Accordingly, 

we follow Bailey-Mason and conclude the trial court erred in awarding her damages 

for property taxes and maintenance and repair.

Nevertheless, we must consider whether these issues were tried by consent 

because “[t]rial by consent can cure lack of pleading.” Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 

293, 306 (Tex. 2018). When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express 

or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 

been raised in the pleadings. TEX. R. CIV. P. 67. An issue is not tried by consent 

merely because evidence regarding the issue is admitted; instead, we examine the 

record “for evidence of trial of the issue.” Bos, 556 S.W.3d at 306–07 (emphasis in 

original) (quoting Sage Street Assocs. v. Northdale Constr. Co., 863 S.W.2d 438, 

446 (Tex. 1993)). A party’s unpleaded issue may be deemed tried by consent when 

evidence on the issue is developed under circumstances indicating both parties 

understood the issue was in the case, and the other party failed to make an 

appropriate complaint. Case Corp. v. Hi-Class Bus. Sys. of Am., Inc., 184 S.W.3d 

760, 771 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). Trial by consent does not occur 

where the complaining party properly objects to the submission of issues not raised 

by the pleadings. Webb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass’n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 374, 380 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). The rule of trial by consent is limited to those 

exceptional cases where the parties clearly tried an unpleaded issue by consent—it 
–12–

should be applied cautiously and not in doubtful situations. Elliott v. Hollingshead, 

327 S.W.3d 824, 837 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, no pet.).

As described above, the reporter’s record demonstrates trial of Sadeghian’s 

claims for reimbursement for property taxes and maintenance and repair expenses. 

However, the parties agreed in their motion for new trial and response to the motion 

for new trial that, before trial commenced, Rahmani and FWLI objected to the trial 

of Sadeghian’s claims, and Rahmani and FWLI again objected to relief on the 

unpleaded claims in their motion to reopen, which was filed before the trial court 

rendered judgment. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the issue of 

reimbursement was tried by consent. Cf. Hampden Corp. v. Remark, Inc., 331 

S.W.3d 489, 497 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (in determining whether 

claim was tried by consent, considering, among other things, post-trial brief 

objecting to relief on unpleaded claim); Cont’l Homes of Tex., L.P. v. City of San 

Antonio, 275 S.W.3d 9, 17 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied) (finding 

parties had not tried by consent unpleaded defense when opposing party, among 

other things, objected in motion for new trial to trial court’s findings and conclusions 

relying on the defense); Compass Bank v. MFP Fin. Services, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 844, 

856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (concluding trial court did not abuse 

discretion in finding no trial by consent on claim when, among other things, party 

objected in post-trial brief that party seeking relief failed to plead the claim).
–13–

Because the trial court awarded Sadeghian relief for which she had not 

pleaded, we reverse and render judgment for Rahmani and FWLI on Sadeghian’s 

reimbursement claims for property taxes and maintenance and repair. Having 

rendered judgment on this issue, we do not reach Rahmani and FWLI’s second issue 

in which they complain the trial court erred in denying their motion to reopen 

evidence on the claims. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

Conclusion

We reverse and render judgment for Rahmani and FWLI on Sadeghian’s

reimbursement claims for unpaid taxes and maintenance and repair. We affirm the 

judgment in all other respects.

220759f.p05 /Ken Molberg/

KEN MOLBERG

JUSTICE
–14–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

FAZEL RAHMANI & FORT 

WORTH LEGACY 

INVESTMENTS, L.P., Appellants

No. 05-22-00759-CV V.

AMY SADEGHIAN, Appellee

On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-06526.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and 

Nowell participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion of the trial court’s 

judgment awarding Sadeghian damages for property taxes and maintenance and

repair expenses, and we RENDER judgment that Sadeghian take nothing on those 

claims. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

It is ORDERED that appellants FAZEL RAHMANI & FORT WORTH 

LEGACY INVESTMENTS, L.P. recover their costs of this appeal from appellee 

AMY SADEGHIAN.

Judgment entered this 11th day of March, 2024.