NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

VICTOR MANUEL CASTILLO ESTOBAR, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0110 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2009-007077-001

The Honorable Maria del Mar Verdin, Judge (Retired)

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Victor Manuel Castillo Estobar, Douglas

Petitioner Pro Se

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Maurice Portley joined.
STATE v. ESTOBAR

Decision of the Court

2

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Victor Manuel Castillo Estobar petitions this Court 

for review from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. For 

the following reasons, we grant review and deny relief.

¶2 A jury convicted Estobar of participating in a criminal 

syndicate, smuggling, forgery, and two counts of kidnapping. The trial 

court sentenced him to an aggregate term of forty-two years’ imprisonment,

and we affirmed the convictions and sentences as modified on direct 

appeal. State v. Estobar, 1 CA-CR 10-0442, 2011 WL 2306651, *2, ¶ 8 (Ariz. 

App. June 2, 2011) (mem. decision). Estobar filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief after his counsel found no colorable claims for relief. The 

trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and Estobar now seeks review. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.9(c). 

¶3 Estobar first argues his convictions were based in part on 

information law enforcement officers obtained illegally when they placed a 

Global Positioning System (“GPS”) device on Estobar’s vehicle without 

obtaining a warrant.

1 This issue is precluded because Estobar could have 

raised it on direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). None of the 

exceptions under Rule 32.2(b) apply.

¶4 Estobar next argues the trial court erred when it allowed one 

victim to remain in the courtroom during the testimony of another victim. 

This issue is also precluded because Estobar could have raised it on direct 

appeal. Further, Rule 9.3(a) provides that a victim has the right to be 

present at all proceedings at which a defendant has the right to be present. 

This includes the right to be present during the testimony of another victim.

¶5 Finally, Estobar argues his counsel was ineffective when he 

failed to file a motion to suppress all evidence obtained directly or 

indirectly through the warrantless use of the GPS device. To state a 

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and 

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We deny relief. At the time of 

Estobar’s 2010 trial, then-current decisions of the United States Supreme 

Court and the Ninth Circuit held that the warrantless use of an electronic 

 

1 Estobar conceded below that no GPS evidence was actually admitted 

at trial. 
STATE v. ESTOBAR

Decision of the Court

3

device to track the movements of a suspect’s vehicle did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983); 

United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 

132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012), affirmed on remand, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012)

(affirming in part because law enforcement agents acted within thenexisting circuit precedent in attaching tracking devices to defendant’s 

vehicle). Counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion in light of the law 

existing at that time did not fall below objectively reasonable standards.2 

¶6 Although the petition for review arguably presents additional 

issues, Estobar did not raise those issues in the petition for post-conviction 

relief he filed below. A petition for review may not present issues not first 

presented to the trial court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii); State v. Bortz, 169 

Ariz. 575, 577, 821 P.2d 236, 238 (App. 1991).

¶7 For the reasons stated, we grant review and deny relief.

 

2 Estobar makes no reference to the Supreme Court’s subsequent 

decision in United States v. Jones, in which the Court held for the first time 

that government installation of a GPS device on a vehicle to monitor

movement constitutes a “search” that ordinarily requires a warrant. United 

States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). Even so, defense 

counsel’s failure to predict the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, which 

came nearly two years after Estobar’s trial, did not fall below objectively 

reasonable standards.