[Cite as In re T.G.O., 2017-Ohio-151.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

MADISON COUNTY 

IN THE MATTER OF: T.G.O. : 

 CASE NO. CA2016-02-009 

 : 

 O P I N I O N 

 : 1/17/2017 

 

 : 

APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

JUVENILE DIVISION 

Case No. 20540010 

Thomas J.C. Arrington, 67 East High Street, London, Ohio 43140, Guardian Ad Litem 

Shannon M. Treynor, 63 North Main Street, P.O. Box 735, London, Ohio 43140, attorney for 

child 

LeeAnn M. Massucci, 250 Civic Center Drive, Suite 360, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for appellee 

Petroff Law Offices, LLC, Erika M. Smitherman and Michelle J. Askins, 140 East Town 

Street, Suite 1070, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for appellant 

 S. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, the father of T.G.O. ("Father"), appeals from the decision of the 

Madison County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, modifying a term of the shared 

parenting plan he entered into with appellee, the mother of T.G.O. ("Mother"), designating 

her the residential parent of T.G.O. for school purposes. For the reasons outlined below, we 

affirm. 
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{¶ 2} The child at issue, T.G.O., was born on December 21, 2004. Mother and 

Father were never married. Following T.G.O.'s birth, the parties entered into a shared 

parenting plan that was approved by the juvenile court and entered as a final decree of 

shared parenting on July 14, 2005. As part of that shared parenting plan, Father was 

designated the residential parent of T.G.O. for school purposes. It is undisputed that at this 

time both Mother and Father lived in Madison County. 

{¶ 3} On November 7, 2014, upon notifying the juvenile court of her intent to relocate 

to Morrow County to live with her newly married husband, Mother filed a motion requesting 

the juvenile court to modify a term of the parties' shared parenting plan to designate her as 

the residential parent for school purposes. The juvenile court then scheduled the matter for a 

hearing and a guardian ad litem was appointed for the child. However, due to a conflict 

between T.G.O.'s stated wishes to have Mother designated as residential parent for school 

purposes and the guardian ad litem's recommendations to have Father remain as residential 

parent for school purposes, an attorney advocate was also appointed for T.G.O. The juvenile 

court later held an in camera interview with T.G.O. in order to personally address the child 

and ask her about her wishes. At the time of this in camera interview, T.G.O. was ten years 

old. 

{¶ 4} On December 1 and December 17, 2015, the juvenile court held a two-day 

hearing on the matter. During this hearing, both Mother and Father testified. Thereafter, on 

January 29, 2016, the juvenile court issued a decision granting Mother's motion to modify a 

term of the parties' shared parenting plan upon finding it was in T.G.O.'s best interest to 

designate Mother as the residential parent for school purposes. In support of this decision, 

because there were factors favoring both Mother and Father, the juvenile court found 

T.G.O.'s wishes as expressed during its in camera interview with her "tipped the scales in this 

case" for T.G.O. appeared "bright and well spoken" and "clear in her stated desire to reside 
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with Mother" and attend school in Morrow County. The juvenile court further found that 

T.G.O. was "very persuasive in the overall analysis of her best interest" since she appeared 

"sincere and truthful in her steadfast desire to live with her Mother and ultimately gave 

deference to [T.G.O.'s] wishes." 

{¶ 5} Father now appeals from the juvenile court's decision, raising two assignments 

of error for review. 

{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THAT 

THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A 

CHANGE IN SCHOOL PLACEMENT PARENT. 

{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Father argues the juvenile court erred by finding 

there was a change in circumstances sufficient to modify a term of the parties' shared 

parenting plan to designate Mother as the residential parent of T.G.O. for school purposes. 

However, a simple review of the record indicates the juvenile court never made such a 

finding, nor was it required to in accordance with this court's unanimous decision in In re 

E.L.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-09-177, 2015-Ohio-2220. As this court explicitly stated 

in that case: 

The specific issue presented by Mother in this assignment of 

error is whether the juvenile court's decision to change the 

designation of the child's residential parent for school purposes 

from Mother to Father is a modification of "a prior decree 

allocating parental rights and responsibilities" under R.C. 

3109.04(E)(1)(a), or merely a modification of a "term" of the 

parties' shared parenting plan under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b). We 

conclude that by changing the designation of the child's 

residential parent for school purposes from Mother to Father, the 

juvenile court merely modified a term of the parties' shared 

parenting plan that had been incorporated into the parties' 

shared parenting decree, and therefore, the juvenile court was 

not required to find that a change in circumstances of the child or 

either parent had occurred at some point after the prior shared 

parenting decree was issued before modifying this term of the 
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parties' shared parenting plan. 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. ¶ 38. 

{¶ 9} Therefore, in accordance with this court's decision in In re E.L.C., we find no 

merit to Father's first assignment of error. See also Fritsch v. Fritsch, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-140163, 2014-Ohio-5357, ¶ 21 ("[t]he court did not have to determine that a change of 

circumstances had occurred to modify the designation of the residential parent for school 

purposes"); Ralston v. Ralston, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-08-30, 2009-Ohio-679, ¶ 17 ("the trial 

court was required to apply the standard as articulated in R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b)" when 

modifying the designated residential parent for school purposes). Accordingly, Father's first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 10} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT NAMED [MOTHER] AS RESIDENTIAL PARENT FOR SCHOOL 

PLACEMENT PURPOSES. 

{¶ 12} In his second assignment of error, Father argues the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by modifying a term of the parties' shared parenting plan to designate Mother as 

the residential parent of T.G.O. for school purposes. We disagree. 

{¶ 13} Changing the residential parent for school purposes is a modification of a term 

of a shared parent plan that is governed by R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b). In re E.L.C., 2015-Ohio2220 at ¶ 42. Pursuant to that statute: 

The court may modify the terms of the plan for shared parenting 

approved by the court and incorporated by it into the shared 

parenting decree upon its own motion at any time if the court 

determines that the modifications are in the best interest of the 

children or upon the request of one or both of the parents under 

the decree. Modifications under this division may be made at 

any time. The court shall not make any modification to the plan 

under this division, unless the modification is in the best interest 

of the children. 
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{¶ 14} In determining the best interest of a child, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) requires the 

juvenile court to consider all relevant factors. In re A.D.B., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-10-

180, 2016-Ohio-7186, ¶ 12. These factors include, but are not limited to: (1) the wishes of 

the child's parents regarding the child's care; (2) the wishes and concerns of the child, as 

expressed to the court, if the court conducted an in camera interview; (3) the child's 

interaction and interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, and any other person who 

may significantly affect the child's best interest; (4) the child's adjustment to the child's home, 

school, and community; and (5) the parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved 

parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a), (b), (c), 

(d), and (f). "No one factor is dispositive." Carr v. Carr, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2015-02-

015 and CA2015-03-020, 2016-Ohio-6986, ¶ 22. Rather, the juvenile court has discretion to 

weigh any and all relevant factors as it sees fit. Id. 

{¶ 15} The juvenile court's determination of what is in the best interest of a child will 

not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Sayre v. Furgeson, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-

15-16, 2016-Ohio-3500, ¶ 38. An abuse of discretion implies that the court's attitude was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. In re B.K., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-12-324, 

2011-Ohio-4470, ¶ 12, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). "A 

decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that 

decision." AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 

50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). "This highly deferential standard of review rests on the 

premise that the trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses 

because he or she is able to observe their demeanor, gestures, and attitude." Rarden v. 

Rarden, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-06-054, 2013-Ohio-4985, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 16} In this case, the record shows that both Mother and Father are good and loving 

parents who share a strong bond with T.G.O. The record also indicates that T.G.O. has a 
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good relationship with both of her parents, her maternal and paternal grandparents, as well 

her half-siblings, step-siblings, stepfather, cousins, and Father's long-time girlfriend. As the 

juvenile court stated, "[t]estimony overwhelmingly showed [T.G.O.] gets along with everyone!" 

{¶ 17} However, although living and attending school in Madison County for her entire 

life, the record indicates T.G.O. had limited interaction with anyone in the Madison County 

area other than Father, a few of her classmates, and occasionally her cousins and paternal 

grandparents. On the other hand, Mother testified that T.G.O. has adjusted quickly to the 

Morrow County community, other children in the area, and her stepfather and his extended 

family, among others. This includes participating in church activities and attending church 

camp. Although Father testified otherwise, the record also indicates that both Mother and the 

guardian ad litem believe T.G.O. would have no issues being able to quickly adjust to 

changing schools from those located in Madison County to those located in Morrow County. 

{¶ 18} Unfortunately, the record also indicates that both Mother and Father have found 

ways to interfere with the others' requests for parenting time during special events; most 

notably, when Father refused to allow any reasonable accommodations to Mother so that 

T.G.O. could attend Mother's wedding or when Mother refused the same reasonable 

accommodations to Father when his family was visiting from out of state. Yet, although 

neither party is completely blameless, as the juvenile court determined, the record indicates 

Father "exhibited a rigidness that was palpable" towards Mother and "seemed completely 

incapable of cooperating with Mother on any matter." A review of the record supports this 

finding. 

{¶ 19} The record also indicates that Father has generally refused to communicate 

with Mother through any other method except over the phone or in person (conversations he 

then admittedly records) and desires to have no relationship with Mother whatsoever, 

although he acknowledges maintaining a daily "custody log" of Mother's activity. Father 
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testified that he was aware T.G.O. knew of both these activities, activities the juvenile court 

found assuredly indicated T.G.O. knew of Father's "disdain" for Mother. The record further 

indicates that T.G.O., who Father referred to as "the child" several times during the two-day 

hearing, has been seen with her "head down" and "shoulders drooping" when Father 

confronts Mother, such as when Father forced Mother to come to the door to pick T.G.O. up 

as opposed to merely letting her leave with her stepfather. 

{¶ 20} The guardian ad litem recommended that Father remain as the residential 

parent for school purposes. However, when asked about her wishes, the record indicates 

T.G.O. repeatedly stated that she wanted to reside with Mother and attend school in Morrow 

County. As noted above, the juvenile court found T.G.O.'s wishes as expressed during its in 

camera interview were "very persuasive in the overall analysis of her best interest" for she 

appeared "bright and well spoken" and was "clear in her stated desire to reside with Mother." 

 Although Father insists that T.G.O. had "been manipulated" by Mother, the juvenile court 

specifically found that T.G.O. was "sincere and truthful in her steadfast desire to live with her 

Mother" and attend school in Morrow County. 

{¶ 21} After a thorough review of the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in modifying a term of the parties' shared parenting plan upon finding it was in 

T.G.O.'s best interest to designate Mother as the residential parent for school purposes. Just 

as the juvenile court found, it is clear that both Mother and Father love T.G.O. and want what 

is best for her. However, when T.G.O. was specifically asked, the record indicates T.G.O. 

repeatedly stated to both the guardian ad litem and her attorney advocate, as well as to the 

juvenile court itself, that she wanted to reside with Mother and attend school in Morrow 

County. 

{¶ 22} Again, as the juvenile court stated, because there were factors favoring both 

Mother and Father, this "tipped the scales in this case[.]" While Father claims otherwise, 
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such a determination was well within the juvenile court's purview for the juvenile court is in 

the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses. The juvenile court also has 

discretion to weigh any and all of the relevant factors as it sees fit. This is true despite the 

fact that the guardian ad litem recommended Father remain the residential parent for school 

purposes, for it is well-established that the juvenile court was not bound to follow a guardian 

ad litem's recommendation. Gibson v. Gibson, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2016-01-002, 2016-

Ohio-4996, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 23} In so holding, we note that Father repeatedly states that the juvenile court's 

findings demonstrate a "blatant disregard of relevant testimony" that "is highly concerning 

and suggests possible bias." However, simply because the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, 

either did not find Father's testimony credible, or determined that such testimony was not 

entitled to any greater weight than it received, does not mean that the juvenile court was 

somehow biased against him, nor does this indicate the juvenile court failed to take Father's 

testimony into consideration when reaching its decision. Again, the juvenile court is in the 

best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and has discretion to weigh any and 

all of the relevant factors as it sees fit. 

{¶ 24} We further note that Father claims the juvenile court ignored testimony on what 

he believes are two highly relevant factors in this case; namely, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(g), 

concerning whether either parent has failed to make required child support payments, and 

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(j), which deals with whether either parent is planning to establish a 

residence outside of the state. However, as Father readily admits, there were no child 

support payments to consider, thus making that factor inapplicable to the juvenile court's best 

interest analysis. Moreover, although Mother did move from Madison County to Morrow 

County, a distance of approximately 70 miles, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 

Mother has any plans to move outside of the state, thus rendering that factor also 
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inapplicable to the juvenile court's best interest analysis. Father's attempts to construe these 

provisions more broadly in an effort to encompass facts not covered by those provisions is 

improper. 

{¶ 25} In light of the foregoing, we find nothing about the juvenile court's decision to 

modify a term of the parties' shared parenting plan to designate Mother as the residential 

parent of T.G.O. for school purposes that would render that decision unreasonable, arbitrary, 

or unconscionable so as to constitute an abuse of the juvenile court's discretion. Therefore, 

having found no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's decision, Father's second 

assignment of error is without merit and overruled. 

{¶ 26} Judgment affirmed. 

 PIPER, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.