Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2965 | May 28, 2020 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

William Elliott Happel

Thomasson, Thomasson, Long & 

Guthrie, P.C.

Columbus, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of K.B. & B.K. (Minor Children)

and

T.K. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner.

May 28, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-2965

Appeal from the Bartholomew

Circuit Court

The Honorable Kelly S. Benjamin,

Judge

The Honorable Heather M. Mollo, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

03C01-1809-JT-5148

03C01-1809-JT-5149

Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2965 | May 28, 2020 Page 2 of 19

Case Summary

[1] T.K. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of B.K. and K.B. (collectively, “the 

Children”).1 The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with 

Mother and the Children due to concerns of drug use by Mother. The Children

were removed from Mother’s care on August 25, 2017. Three days later, the 

Children were alleged to be children in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother 

subsequently admitted that the Children were CHINS and the juvenile court 

adjudged them as such. Following the CHINS adjudication, Mother was 

ordered to complete certain services, but failed to do so. In light of Mother’s 

failure to successfully complete services, DCS eventually petitioned to 

terminate her parental rights to the Children. Following an evidentiary hearing, 

the juvenile court granted DCS’s termination petition. On appeal, Mother 

contends that (1) DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the 

termination of her parental rights and (2) she was denied due process. 

Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the biological mother of the Children. K.B. was born on October 2, 

2012. B.K. was born on July 3, 2017. DCS became involved with Mother and 

the Children on or about July 3, 2017, after receiving reports that the Children 

1

 The Children are alleged to have different biological fathers, neither of which participates in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2965 | May 28, 2020 Page 3 of 19

were the victims of neglect and that B.K. had been born drug exposed. Mother 

subsequently admitted that she and B.K.’s alleged father smoked marijuana 

every night after the Children were put to bed. Mother submitted to a drug 

screen and tested positive for THC and cocaine. Despite Mother’s positive drug 

screen, the Children remained in Mother’s care. DCS received another report 

regarding the Children on or about August 19, 2017. This report alleged that 

K.B.’s alleged father had overdosed on heroin in Mother’s home after spending 

the night. Mother admitted to getting her marijuana from K.B.’s alleged father 

and that the marijuana was, on occasion, laced with heroin. Mother submitted 

to a drug screen, the results of which were positive for THC and Fentanyl.

[3] DCS removed the Children from Mother’s care on August 25, 2017, and filed a 

petition alleging that the Children were CHINS on August 28, 2017. Mother 

subsequently admitted that the Children were CHINS and that she and the 

Children “would benefit from their participation in services proved by DCS that 

they would not otherwise be able to receive without coercive intervention of the 

Court.” Petitioner’s Ex. 5. On December 17, 2017, the juvenile court, noting 

Mother’s admission, adjudged the Children to be CHINS and entered a 

dispositional decree. In its decree, the juvenile court noted that Mother reached 

an agreement with DCS as to needed services. The essential terms required 

Mother to complete certain services including therapy, home-based case 

management, and a substance-abuse assessment. Mother was also ordered to 

refrain from using illegal drugs and to submit to random drug screens as 

requested by DCS. The Children’s permanency plan was subsequently changed 
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to adoption after Mother failed to successfully complete the agreed-upon courtordered services. 

[4] On September 24, 2018, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on 

January 22, 2019. During this hearing, DCS presented evidence outlining 

Mother’s failure to comply with services, remain drug free, and make any 

significant progress in improving her ability to provide the necessary care for 

the Children. Following the conclusion of the evidence, the juvenile court took 

the matter under advisement. On November 15, 2019, the juvenile court issued 

an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

Discussion and Decision

[5] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. 

Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although 

parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the 

termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their 

parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), 

trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be 

subordinated to the best interests of the children. Id. Termination of parental 

rights is proper where the children’s emotional and physical development is 

threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the children are 
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irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is 

permanently impaired before terminating the parent–child relationship. Id.

[6] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the 

evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination 

of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only 

consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, 

our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the 

legal conclusions. Id. 

[7] In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we 

set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment terminating a parent–child 

relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly 

erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. 

Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the 

juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not 

support the judgment. Id.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of 

her parental rights to the Children. In order to support the termination of 
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Mother’s parental rights to the Children, DCS was required to prove, inter alia, 

the following: 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home of the 

parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, 

been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Mother claims that DCS failed to present sufficient 

evidence to establish the statutory requirements by clear and convincing 

evidence.2

A. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)

[9] It is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written 

in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find that one of the conditions 

listed therein has been met. See In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003), trans. denied. Therefore, where the juvenile court determines that one of 

the above-mentioned factors has been proven and there is sufficient evidence in 

the record supporting the juvenile court’s determination, it is not necessary for 

2

 Mother does not challenge the statutory requirements set forth in subsections (A) or (D).
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DCS to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, either of the other factors listed 

in Indiana Code section 31-34-2-4(b)(2)(B). See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882. 

In this case, DCS had to prove either that (1) the conditions resulting in 

removal from or continued placement outside Mother’s home will not be 

remedied or (2) the continuation of the parent–child relationship poses a threat 

to the Children. 

[10] The juvenile court determined that the evidence established a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal from and 

continued placement outside Mother’s care would not be remedied. When 

making a determination as to whether the conditions leading to placement 

outside a parent’s care are likely to be remedied, juvenile courts “should judge a 

parent’s fitness at the time of the termination hearing, considering any change 

in conditions since the removal.” Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children, 

861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “The trial court can also consider 

the parent’s response to the services offered through the DCS.” Id. “‘A pattern 

of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those 

providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a 

finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will 

change.’” Id. (quoting In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), 

trans. denied). 

[11] The juvenile court made numerous findings in support of its determination that 

the evidence established a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the Children’s removal from and continued placement outside 
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Mother’s care would not be remedied. Mother does not challenge any of the 

juvenile court’s findings, which are consistent with the testimony and 

recommendations of service providers, the DCS Family Case Manager 

(“FCM”) assigned to the family’s case, and the Children’s guardian ad litem 

(“GAL”). We will therefore accept the juvenile court’s findings as true. See 

Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged 

findings of the trial court must be accepted as correct).

[12] The juvenile court’s findings establish that the Children were removed from 

Mother’s care due to Mother’s drug use and the drug use of others at Mother’s 

home. After the Children were removed from her care, Mother was ordered, 

inter alia, to: (1) complete a substance-abuse assessment and participate in the

recommended treatment; (2) participate in home-based case management, 

which would include employment and behavior management assistance; (3) 

participate in individual counseling; (4) attend supervised visits with the 

Children; (5) maintain weekly contact with DCS; and (6) refrain from using 

illegal substances. 

[13] The juvenile court found that although Mother completed a substance-abuse 

evaluation, she did not successfully complete recommended treatment. 

Further, although Mother achieved a temporary period of sobriety, she relapsed 

and continued to test positive for drugs throughout the CHINS and TPR 

proceedings. Mother attributed her drug use to her claimed mental illness but 

failed to complete any psychological or mental-health treatment programs 

offered to her. She did not complete a psychological evaluation aimed at 
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determining appropriate services to help meet her mental-health needs. She 

also failed to successfully meet any home-based case management goals. 

[14] The juvenile court further found that Mother was not consistent in visiting the 

Children and provided “no reasonable excuse for the inconsistency.” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 15. Despite the flexibility offered by means of their 

placement in relative care, Mother last visited the Children in May of 2018. 

Further, despite having knowledge of K.B.’s special needs, Mother did not 

inquire about K.B.’s progress or, apart from allegedly obtaining a sign-language 

dictionary, seek training aimed to help her communicate with K.B. When 

asked during the evidentiary hearing why she has not reached out to K.B.’s 

school regarding his educational progress and needs, Mother responded as 

follows:

I honestly don’t have a reason. My to do list is a mile long, and 

I’m trying to put my kids last by no means ... I know what needs 

to be done in certain areas, like calling the school maybe, being 

one of those things ... I’m working on trying to, how do I put it, 

put my priorities in what comes first and what comes last.

Tr. Vol. II p. 149.

[15] Mother admitted that she had multiple periods of incarceration during 

pendency of the CHINS case and that at the time of the evidentiary hearing, she 

was “on probation, with a few more months left of supervision.” Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II p. 17. Mother was not employed or actively seeking employment 

and was living with her mother. Mother also did not engage in regular 
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communication with DCS or service providers. Further, despite claiming that 

she “has struggled in figuring out what to do first in order to move forward,” 

Mother failed to participate in services and canceled meetings aimed at helping 

her do so. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17. 

[16] Mother admitted that the Children “are better off in the homes they are in” and 

that “she needs the Children more than they need her.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 

II p. 18. In finding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions 

leading to the Children’s removal from Mother’s care would not be remedied, 

the juvenile court noted that although Mother “may love the Children and now 

fears losing” them, Mother has been unable to make the Children “a sufficient 

priority for reunification” and “drugs, jail, a lack of motivation, and perhaps a 

dose of self-pity, have prevented [Mother] from making any real progress with 

needed change.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. The juvenile court’s 

unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the conclusion that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s 

removal from Mother’s care would not be remedied. Mother’s claim to the 

contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh 

the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C)

[17] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in 

the best interests of the children, the juvenile court is required to look beyond 

the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. 

Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the 

parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent’s historical inability to 

provide a suitable environment along with the parent’s current inability to do 

the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best 

interests of the children.” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 373. Furthermore, this court has 

previously determined that the testimony of the case worker, GAL, or a CASA 

regarding the children’s bests interests supports a finding that termination is in 

the children’s best interests. Id. at 374; see also Matter of M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 79 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. 

[18] The juvenile court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the 

Children’s best interests. As for the Children, collectively, the juvenile court 

found that Mother has not “demonstrated a sufficient level of concern for the 

well-being of the Children.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. The juvenile court 

further found that in Mother’s absence, the Children “look to their paternal 

grandparents for love, support, and security.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. 

[19] With respect to K.B., the juvenile court found that K.B. has made significant 

progress since his special needs were addressed by paternal grandmother. His 

troubling and self-harming behaviors have stopped. In addition, his 

communication has improved since being enrolled at the Indiana School for the 

Deaf and placed in a home that embraces the use of sign language as a means to 

communicate. The juvenile court noted that after being placed with paternal 

grandmother, in the span of less than one year, K.B. “is almost up to age level 

with his communication skills.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17. As of the time 
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of the evidentiary hearing, K.B.’s ability to communicate with others had 

improved to a level where he was able to participate in therapeutic work. The 

juvenile court further noted that service providers have observed that K.B. and 

paternal grandmother have an affectionate relationship. Paternal grandmother 

is actively involved in K.B.’s progress and regularly communicates with his 

teachers in an effort to learn how to better communicate with him. Mother, on 

the other hand, has largely failed to show an interest in K.B.’s progress or 

inquire about his well-being.

[20] As for B.K., the juvenile court found that B.K. “is happy and healthy, with no 

developmental concerns.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. B.K. has a strong 

bond with paternal grandparents and it is “unlikely” that B.K. “would know 

Mother ... as he was approximately ten months old at the time of [her] last 

visit.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. The juvenile court noted that Mother 

“has never contacted paternal grandparents to inquire of the well-being of” B.K. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. Again, because Mother does not challenge any 

of the juvenile court’s findings, we accept the findings as true. See Madlem, 592 

N.E.2d at 687 (providing that unchallenged findings of the trial court must be 

accepted as correct).

[21] Further, in addition to the juvenile court’s unchallenged findings, FCM Sarah 

Palacios opined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Children’s 

best interests. FCM Palacios explained the reasons behind her opinion, stating 

as follows:
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I think that now is a crucial time for this to happen because 

[K.B.] is really starting to grow and develop in his own, and with 

his new culture that he’s created at [the Indiana School for the 

Deaf] and with [paternal grandmother] at her home, he has 

become just a different kid. I mean from seeing him two years 

ago ‘til now, the, the difference is astounding and the fact that he 

feels so loved and so cared for is very, very important to his well[-

]being and his health. And the same for [B.K.]. [B.K.] has 

always been loved and he’s always been care[d] for, but with 

[paternal grandparents], I mean, he’s just, he’s done so great and 

he’s learned so much, and I think that introducing [Mother] back 

into his life would really be harmful for him and all the progress 

that he’s made.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 131–32.

[22] The Children’s GAL, Emily Yardy, also opined that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to the Children was in the Children’s best interests. GAL Yardy 

explained the reasons behind her opinion, stating as follows:

So this case has had a permanency plan of adoption since July of 

2018. I think the Court and the team have been very transparent 

with [Mother] that coming to a termination was a very real 

likelihood should [her] lack of engagement not change. I do not 

feel that [Mother has] shown an urgency in completing case plan 

goals, nor [has she] shown any desire to live a child[-]focused 

life. Which is a huge concern for me as the [GAL]. And I don’t 

feel [Mother] has been an active member of the treatment team,

or even just the team, not only for [her] own services, but to 

identify services for the children. And I heard earlier that there 

were issues with [Mother] feeling that there weren’t, there’s not a 

good fit in services for her, but the Department specifically put in 

a psychological evaluation referral to figure out services that

would be a great fit for her. So I feel like not taking advantage of 

that referral could have been detrimental to her as well, in 
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multiple ways I guess, but just in specifically getting treatments 

and services that would be tailored to [Mother]. And I just think 

that the children are doing great in their placements. [B.K.] has 

no knowledge of his Mother. I think that he would probably be 

able to go the rest of his life, if no one told him, he would think 

that [paternal grandparents] are his biological parents. When I 

came onto the case, there were a lot of issues with [K.B.] being, I 

guess kind of traumatized because of the lack of contact that he 

was having, specifically with [Mother]. He was wild and he at 

one point thought that he saw her, and it was a major issue. He 

was hurting people, hurting himself, throwing himself on the 

ground, crying and screaming. It was a huge full[-]blown 

tantrum, and it was really hard for [paternal grandmother] to 

manage that, and that had kind of been an ongoing issue. Where 

he was asking about Mom at first, and was obviously hurt when 

you would, when people would tell him that she’s not coming, or 

she’s not visiting. But we have really seen such a decrease in 

those behaviors, and I feel like [K.B.] is finally stabilized and able

to move on without [Mother].

Tr. Vol. II pp. 139 – 40. GAL Yardy further explained as follows:

Yeah, the kids are doing great. I actually came on the case at a 

really critical time for [K.B.]. So I was able to see those serious 

behaviors that he was having. The disruptive, harmful, even kind 

of self[-]harm behaviors that he was having. So it’s been really 

wonderful to see him transition into someone who can just be 

calm and communicate his wants and needs, and just with all the 

testimony that we’ve said today, I totally agree that I think it’s all 

because he’s able to communicate now, and he doesn’t feel like 

he has to be aggressive to get what he wants. It’s been really, 

really wonderful to see that. For [B.K.], I don’t think any of on 

[sic] the team have had any significant concerns for [B.K.]. He’s 

doing great in his placement as well.
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Tr. Vol. II p. 137. Considering the juvenile court’s unchallenged findings 

together with FCM Palacios’s and GAL Yardy’s testimony, we conclude that 

the juvenile court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is 

in the Children’s best interests is supported by sufficient evidence. Again, 

Mother’s claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for 

this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 

N.E.2d at 879.

II. Mother’s Due Process Claims

[23] Mother alternatively contends that she was denied due process because DCS 

did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the Children with her. (Appellant’s 

Br. p. 20) DCS asserts that Mother has waived her due-process argument on 

appeal because she did not raise it before the trial court. (Appellee’s Br. p. 30) 

“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed 

violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re 

N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016); see also Hite v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of 

Family & Children, 845 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“It is well 

established that we may consider a party’s constitutional claim waived when it 

is raised for the first time on appeal.”); McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 194–95

(providing that the mother waived her procedural due process claims by raising 

them for the first time on appeal). At the evidentiary hearing, Mother outlined 

some alleged communication issues she claimed to have with DCS during the 

underlying CHINS and TPR proceedings and asserted that she did not believe 

that the services offered by DCS were helpful to her. However, our review of 
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the record reveals that Mother never objected to the termination on the basis 

that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to provide her with services aimed at 

reunification. As such, Mother’s due process argument is waived on appeal.

[24] Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that Mother’s due process argument is 

without merit. Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.5 provides that after a child is 

found to be a CHINS, DCS “shall make reasonable efforts to preserve and 

reunify families.” In this case, DCS made reasonable efforts to do so. The 

record reveals that DCS offered Mother extensive services and made numerous

unsuccessful attempts to contact Mother during the pendency of both the 

CHINS and TPR proceedings. Mother, herself, testified during the evidentiary 

hearing that she believed that DCS had made reasonable efforts to reunite her 

with the Children. Specifically, when asked if she believed DCS had done 

everything it could to reunite her with the Children, Mother responded as 

follows:

Absolutely. They gave me their best plan and tried to put their 

best foot forward. And I just disagree with how the system is set 

up. Because I feel like it’s unfair to the parents. I’m grateful, so 

grateful that my kids have all this support and are loved and in a 

great place and well taken care of. And I am, I am very aware of 

that, that they are benefiting from where they are at, greatly. 

And I am happy about it, but it’s not fair to the parents that 

sometimes we all are expected to do the same things, when our 

recovery isn’t the same. I am not like every other parent that 

walks in here, just like they’re not like me. So why should I have 

to do the same plan? Sometimes it works for some, sometimes it

doesn’t work for others. And I feel like it’s nobody’s fault, I just 

feel like there should be a better program or something set up for 
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parents. Somebody to help support them a little more, and less in 

some other things, because it is overwhelming when you are 

trying to fix your own personal affairs plus what DCS wants you, 

is asking of you, and then also my own legal trouble with

Probation, trying to meet their quota as well. Everybody is 

pulling you in five different directions, it’s hard to do what 

everybody wants at once.

Tr. Vol. II p. 153. When pressed further about whether she believed that there 

were services that were not offered by DCS that could have been beneficial to 

her, Mother responded:

Yes. But I don’t think it’s something that they could have come 

up with either. It’s not their fault. I am not blaming anyone, I 

just found what works for me and started to go with it, tried a 

bunch of different things, and honestly it gets down to what they 

say at NA and AA meetings, you have to change your people, 

places and things.... I truly took a huge step to look and identify 

what I needed to do, and I’m taking the steps to fix it. It’s just 

not in the time frame that was asked.

Tr. Vol. II p. 154. Mother admitted, however, that she had been given enough 

time to participate in the offered services.

[25] In raising her contention that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify 

her with the Children, Mother asserts that a case worker discouraged her and 

suggested that she was “headed down the wrong path” and another “failed to 

make reasonable efforts to get in touch with” her. Appellant’s Br. p. 21. 

Mother relies on her self-serving testimony in support of her assertion that she 

was discouraged in her attempt to make progress toward reunification by a case 
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worker. The juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was not required to 

believe Mother’s self-serving testimony. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 

1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to 

believe a witness’s testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”).

[26] With respect to Mother’s claimed communication issues with DCS and service 

providers, Mother acknowledged that “it’s a two[-]way street on 

communication.” Tr. Vol. II p. 57. Mother further acknowledged that she had 

spoken to FCM Palacios “a couple of times” but expressed frustration that she 

had “tried to reach out a couple of times and not got returned phone calls.” Tr. 

Vol. II p. 57. Mother also acknowledged that at some point, she experienced 

issues with her phone and lost contact information for service providers and 

K.B.’s teacher. Mother did not reach out to DCS to re-obtain the lost contact 

information. Mother also indicated that due to her issues with her phone, she 

had to change her email address and was not sure if she provided FCM Palacios 

with her new email address. Mother relies on her self-serving testimony in 

support of her claim that DCS failed to make reasonable attempts to 

communicate with her throughout the pendency of the CHINS and TPR

proceedings. Again, the juvenile court was not required to believe Mother’s 

testimony. See Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149.

Conclusion

[27] DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove both that there is a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal from and 
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continued placement outside Mother’s care will not be remedied and that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. 

Furthermore, contrary to Mother’s claim, the record reveals that DCS made 

reasonable efforts to reunify her with the Children. We therefore conclude that 

Mother has failed to establish that she was denied due process in relation to the 

termination of her parental rights to the Children.

[28] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.