United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 97-1470

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United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Raymond Earl Combee, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: August 7, 1997 

 Filed: August 25, 1997

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Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

In April 1995, a confidential informant working with Pulaski County Deputy

Sheriff Chris Smith engaged in a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from

Raymond Earl Combee. Smith then arrested Combee, who was charged in Pulaski

County Municipal Court with drug-trafficking offenses. These charges were later nollprossed, and in May 1996, a federal grand jury charged Combee in a two-count

indictment with distributing methamphetamine, and with possessing methamphetamine

with intent to distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Combee moved to

suppress evidence seized following his arrest, and to dismiss the indictment on speedy-
The HONORABLE WILLIAM R. WILSON, JR., United States District Judge 1

for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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trial grounds. In November 1996, the district court held a suppression hearing and

1

bench trial, at the conclusion of which the court denied Combee&s pretrial motions and

found him guilty as charged. At sentencing, the court refused to depart downward from

the applicable Guidelines range based on Combee&s physical ailments. Combee

appeals the denial of his pretrial motions and the district court&s refusal to depart. We

affirm.

We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress, although we review

findings of historical fact only for clear error. See United States v. Weinbender, 109

F.3d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997). Smith testified that he and the confidential informant

entered Combee&s trailer home after Combee&s girlfriend invited them inside to wait for

him. When Combee arrived moments later, he indicated that he would be willing to sell

drugs to the confidential informant for redistribution to Smith. Combee then stepped

away with the informant--who had been given funds for the purchase and had been

searched for drugs--and engaged in an exchange. The confidential informant returned

to Smith and gave him a baggie of methamphetamine. At that point, Smith arrested

Combee, and during an ensuing pat-down search, discovered additional

methamphetamine in Combee&s jacket. 

Based on this testimony, which the district court credited, see United States v.

Adipietro, 983 F.2d 1468, 1472 (8th Cir. 1993), we conclude the court did not err in

denying Combee&s motion to suppress, see Conrad v. Davis, 1997 WL 398569, at *4

(8th Cir. July 17, 1997) (because custodial arrest of suspect based on probable cause

is reasonable intrusion under Fourth Amendment, search incident to arrest requires no

additional justification (cited case omitted)); United States v. Scott, 91 F.3d 1058, 1061

(8th Cir. 1996) (in determining whether probable cause exists to make warrantless 
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arrest, court looks to totality of circumstances to see whether prudent person would

believe individual had committed or was committing crime).

We also affirm the denial of Combee&s motion to dismiss the indictment. We

agree with the district court that the time lapse between Combee&s arrest by Pulaski

County officials and his federal indictment and trial did not violate his statutory right

under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), see United States v. Beede, 974 F.2d 948, 950-51 (8th Cir.

1992) (state arrest does not trigger the statutory thirty-day period), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 1067 (1993), or his constitutional rights. See United States v. Walker, 92 F.3d

714, 717 (8th Cir. 1996) (Sixth Amendment speedy-trial factors); Bennett v. Lockhart,

39 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1994) (Due Process Clause and pre-indictment delay), cert.

denied, 514 U.S. 1018 (1995).

Finally, after carefully reviewing the sentencing transcript, we conclude that the

district court was fully aware of its authority to depart under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, p.s.

(1995) (departure based on defendant&s extraordinary physical impairment), and made

an unreviewable discretionary decision not to do so. See United States v. Field, 110

F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.