J-S38019-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHARIF COPELAND 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 579 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 25, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0002593-2010

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2022

Sharif Copeland (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his second

petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We 

affirm.

On October 1, 2009, at about 8:00 p.m., Sean Griffith (Griffith) left the 

house of his girlfriend, Tiera Hinson (Hinson). Griffith encountered his cousin,

Rashawn Woodson (Woodson). Griffith, Woodson and Hinson stood at the 

corner of Norwood Street and McKean Street in Philadelphia. After talking for 

a few minutes, Hinson began to walk away. The trial court described what 

next transpired as follows:

At that point, [Appellant] walked up to [] Woodson and “threw his 

shoulder” into him. [] Woodson laughed at [Appellant], who then 

pulled a silver .22 caliber handgun out of his waistband. [] 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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Woodson began to run away, but [Appellant] chased him and shot

at him two times. One of the gunshots hit [] Woodson in his back, 

entering his lung.

[] Woodson collapsed onto the sidewalk in front of 2012 

Norwood Street, coughing up blood. [] Griffith called 911 on his 

cell phone as [Appellant] ran away from the scene. Police arrived 

and immediately transported [] Woodson to the University of 

Pennsylvania Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The bullet 

had ruptured the blood vessels in his lung, causing him to die from 

internal bleeding. [Appellant] was arrested the next day.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/12, at 2-3 (citations omitted). 

During the investigation, Griffith gave Detective James Pitts (Detective 

Pitts) a statement identifying Appellant as the shooter. N.T., 7/12/11, at 241-

67 (Detective Pitts’s testimony). At trial, however, Griffith denied witnessing 

the shooting and could not recall portions of the statement he gave to 

detectives. See id.

Hinson, in a signed statement to Detective Domenic Mangoni (Detective 

Mangoni), stated that she saw Appellant running from the scene, with one 

hand down by his side, immediately after she heard gunshots. Id. at 215 

(Detective Mangoni’s testimony). At trial, Hinson denied portions of her 

statement and testified she did not recall seeing Appellant at the scene of the 

shooting. Id. at 174-78. The Commonwealth presented the prior inconsistent 

statements of Griffith and Hinson through the testimony of Detectives Pitts 

and Mangoni. See id. at 241-67, 208-19. 

The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Bijah Freeman 

(Freeman). Freeman testified that she was with Appellant as she walked on 
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McKean Street toward her boyfriend’s home at 2000 Norwood Street. Id. at 

70, 72. At 22nd and McKean Streets, Freeman continued walking toward 

Norwood Street; Appellant continued walking on 22nd Street. Id. at 72. After 

knocking on her boyfriend’s door, Freeman heard gunshots coming from 

Norwood Street. Id. at 78. Freeman testified she saw Appellant running 

toward a gold car. Id. at 80, 81. 

A jury subsequently convicted Appellant of third-degree murder, 

carrying a firearm without a license and possessing an instrument of crime 

(PIC).

2

 On September 30, 2011, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 20 –

40 years in prison for his conviction of third-degree murder, and concurrent 

prison terms of 2 - 4 years for his conviction of carrying a firearm without a 

license, and 1 - 2 years for his conviction of PIC. On direct appeal, this Court 

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Copeland, 64 A.3d 

833 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 

793 (Pa. 2013). 

Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on December 17, 2013. In an 

amended petition, Appellant claimed after-discovered evidence based upon 

Griffith’s claim that Detective Pitts had coerced him into implicating Appellant. 

Commonwealth v. Copeland, 63 A.3d 833, 2012 Pa. Super. LEXIS 5124, 

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2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 6106(a)(1), 907(a).
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*7 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). This Court denied relief

on the basis that Appellant had waived the claim. Id. *10. We further opined:

[E]ven if the jury heard Griffith testify that Detective Pitts 

threatened to charge him with the murder, the outcome of the 

trial would not likely be different as Griffith had already testified 

at Appellant’s trial that he was coerced into giving the statement. 

Therefore, Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim would fail 

with regard to [] Griffith’s affidavit.

With respect to Appellant’s argument that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from [] Griffith that 

Detective Pitts coerced him into giving his statement implicating 

Appellant, we likewise find that the claim would fail, as Appellant 

cannot prove prejudice. ... Given that the jury already heard

Griffith’s testimony that his statement was false because he was

coerced by the Detectives, additional testimony that his statement

was false because he was coerced by Detective Pitts by

threatening to charge him with the murder would not lead to a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome

of the trial would have been different.” See Commonwealth v.

Jones, 210 A.3d [1014,] 1018-19 [(Pa. 2010)]. Accordingly,

Appellant cannot show prejudice and his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim fails. Id.

Id. at *11-13 (some citations omitted).

Appellant filed the instant, counseled PCRA petition on February 10,

2021, and a supplemental petition on May 12, 2021. Appellant claimed newly

obtained affidavits from Freeman and Mitchell Spencer (Spencer), alleging

coercion by detectives, entitled him to relief.3 Following an evidentiary

hearing limited to Freeman’s recantation, the PCRA court dismissed

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3 Appellant additionally claimed the Commonwealth had violated Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (Pa. 1963), when it failed to provide him with

Detective Pitts’s police misconduct records. Appellant did not raise this issue

in his brief.
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Appellant’s second PCRA petition on February 25, 2022. PCRA Court Order,

2/25/22. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the PCRA court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Did the PCRA court err in finding, without benefit of a

hearing, that the newly discovered facts provided by []

Spencer in his September 28, 2020 affidavit that Det[ective]

[Charles Grebloski (Detective Grebloski)] fabricated his

statement lacked merit?

II. Did the PCRA court err in finding that the newly discovered

recantation of [] Freeman lacked merit. Specifically, that 1)

the statement taken by homicide detectives of 12[-]year[-

]old [] Freeman and her trial testimony at the age of 15

were not fabricated, tainted and/or the result of threats and

coercion and 2) her recantation testimony at the evidentiary

hearing was incredible?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

Our Supreme Court has explained:

Upon reviewing an order in a PCRA matter, we must determine 

whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the 

record and whether the court’s legal conclusions are free from 

error. The findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record 

are viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. The 

PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the 

record, are binding; however, this court applies a de novo

standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. We must 

keep in mind that the petitioner has the burden of persuading this 

Court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief. 

Finally, this Court may affirm a valid judgment or order for any 

reason appearing of record. 

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019) (citations 

omitted). 
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Appellant’s second PCRA petition, filed on February 10, 2021, was 

facially untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (requiring any PCRA petition 

to be filed within one year of the petitioner’s judgment of sentence). However, 

the PCRA court determined that Appellant’s claims 

qualified for the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA 

time-bar, since they were premised upon new witness statements 

that were unknown to [Appellant] and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/25/22, at 4 n.2; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4525(b)(1)(ii) 

(newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement). Our 

review confirms the PCRA court’s determination. Accordingly, we will review 

the substantive issues presented by Appellant. 

Appellant first challenges the PCRA court’s conclusion that the newly

discovered facts provided in Spencer’s September 28, 2020, affidavit did not

warrant relief. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant recognizes Spencer gave a

statement to Detective Grebloski the night of the shooting. Id. at 13. 

According to Appellant, Spencer arrived at the shooting scene just as police

left “with the victim in the backseat of their vehicle.” Id. Appellant states:

There was a large crowd and everyone was saying “they” shot

[Woodson]. The detective asked who shot him. Spencer

responded that “they” said [Appellant] did. No information was

requested by the detective as to who “they” were.

Id. 

In his September 28, 2020, affidavit, Spencer confirmed he gave

Detective Grebloski a statement, “but the statement that was given to the
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court is incorrect[,] I did not say what is stated in the statement the courts

have on record taken by [Detective Grebloski] on October 1, 2009 the night

of the murder.” Id. at 14 (quoting Spencer Affidavit, 9/28/20, at 1). 

Appellant quotes the following statement from Spencer’s affidavit:

Det. Charles Grebloski asked me what happened and I told

him I wasn’t there. Det. Charles Grebloski [asked me] what

[is] my relation to [Woodson] and I told him that he

([Wodson]) is my cousin. Det. Charles Grebloski asked me

did I know [Appellant] and I told him yeah that he

([Appellant]) is one of my friend[s] from middle school. Det.

Charles Grebloski asked me have I ever known [Appellant] to

carry a gun and I told him no, never!

Det. Grebloski altered the original statement by putting his own

statement together meaning the words in that statement the

courts have on record is not my words they are Det. Charles

Grebloski from the homicide unit words and back in 2009 I was

17 years old at the time[,] a minor being int[errogated] by this

detective without neither my father or mother present during this

inte[rrogation]/interview.

Id. at 15 (some spelling corrected, emphasis omitted).

Appellant acknowledges that Spencer was not called as a witness at trial. 

Nevertheless, Appellant asserts Spencer’s testimony would have supported

his claims that detectives had fabricated the statements of other witnesses.

Id. at 14-15. Appellant argues: 

The PCRA Court failed [] to take into consideration the fact that

Spencer could have testified to the tactics that Det. Grebloski used

in order to manufacture evidence that would inculpate the

Appellant. Spencer’s testimony would have established that

detectives had a pattern of misconduct. Importantly, Spencer’s

testimony would have put the trial recantation evidence from

Hinson and Griffith in a completely different light. Spencer’s

testimony would have made Hinson and Griffith’s recantation

testimony much more likely and credible.
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Id. at 15 (footnote omitted). Appellant claims the detective’s fabrication of

evidence “was a genuine issue of material fact” warranting an evidentiary

hearing on this issue. Id. at 18.

To be granted a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, an

appellant must show that the evidence “(1) could not have been obtained prior

to trial by exercising reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or

cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach a witness’s credibility; and

(4) would likely result in a different verdict.” Commonwealth v. Castro, 93

A.3d 818, 821 (Pa. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270,

292 (Pa. 2008)). The test is conjunctive; the defendant must show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that each of these factors has been met in 

order for a new trial to be warranted. Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 

356, 363 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s claim, stating:

According to Spencer’s statement to the police on the night

of the murder, Spencer said that he received a call from his cousin,

Demetrius Caldwell, who told Spencer that his other cousin,

[Woodson], had been shot. Second Petition Exhibit P1 at p. 1. 

When Spencer returned home, he saw police taking[Woodson] 

away and the crowd around the scene told him that [Appellant] had

shot [Woodson]. Id. at pp. 1-2. Spencer told police that he

believed the murder was gang related but that [Woodson] was not

involved in a gang. Id. at p. 2. Spencer claimed that members

of [Appellant’s] gang had previously shot at Spencer’s house but

that [Appellant] was not one of the shooters and Spencer had

never seen [Appellant] with a gun. Id. at pp. 2-3.

In his September 28, 2020, affidavit, Spencer claims that the 

only portions of his October 1, 2009, statement that are true are
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that [Woodson] and [Appellant] “did not have any beef,” that 

Spencer did not witness the shooting, that he was [Woodson’s]

cousin, that he knew [Appellant], and that he had never seen

[Appellant] with a gun. Second Petition Exhibit P2. Spencer then

alleges that Detective Grebloski “altered the original statement by

putting his own statement together.” Id. The rest of Spencer’s 

affidavit consists entirely of allegations of unrelated abuse by 

Spencer’s probation officer at the time. Id.

[Appellant] has failed to show how Spencer’s affidavit would

likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. 

Spencer did not testify at [Appellant’s] trial, nor was his statement 

to police ever introduced, so this newly alleged fabrication does not 

affect, at all, the evidence presented at trial that [Appellant]

committed the crimes for which he was convicted.

In addition, the affidavit fails to set forth any admissible

evidence helpful to [Appellant] were he to receive a new trial. The

only information beneficial to the Commonwealth contained in

Spencer’s original statement was that people in a crowd told

Spencer that [Appellant] shot [Woodson]. That portion of the 

statement, which reported what other people said to Spencer out of 

court, was inadmissible hearsay and would never have been heard by 

a jury. Because everything else in the statement was helpful to the

defense ([Appellant] was not involved in gang violence, 

[Appellant] had no beef with [Woodson], and Spencer never saw

[Appellant] with a gun), Spencer’s averment in his affidavit that

the police fabricated the statement is completely unhelpful to 

[Appellant]. The remainder of Spencer’s affidavit relating to his

probation officer is irrelevant to this case. No relief is due.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/25/22, at 5-6 (emphasis in original). The record 

supports the PCRA court’s findings, and we agree with its analysis and 

conclusion. See id. Thus, Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues the newly discovered affidavit of 

Freeman, a Commonwealth witness, warrants PCRA relief. Appellant’s Brief 

at 18-19. According to Appellant, Freeman testified at trial that she had just 

left Appellant and was knocking on her boyfriend’s door when she heard 
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gunshots. Id. at 19. Appellant acknowledges Freeman’s trial testimony that 

she then saw Appellant running toward a gold car. Id. In her December 15, 

2020, affidavit, however, Freeman stated she entered the house after hearing 

the gunshots. Id. Further, Freeman claimed that officers arrived at the house 

immediately thereafter and handcuffed her. Id. at 20. According to 

Appellant, Freeman could not have seen him running to a gold car because

she was inside of the house immediately after the shooting. Id. 

Appellant additionally directs our attention to Freeman’s explanation 

that she was twelve years old at the time of her police interview, officers 

refused her request to call her mother, and an officer coerced her to lie at 

trial. Id. at 20-22. Appellant claims this new evidence, if presented at trial, 

would support the fabrication of evidence claims by Hinson, Griffith and 

Spencer. Id. at 22. Appellant also asserts that Freeman’s identification 

testimony was forever tainted by police tactics. Id. at 22-23. 

In its opinion, the PCRA court detailed Freeman’s various versions of

events, addressed Appellant’s claim, and concluded it did not warrant relief:

Freeman testified at trial that sometime between 8 p.m. and

10 p.m. on the night of the murder, she was walking to her

boyfriend [] Spencer’s house from her house. N.T.[,]

7/13/2011[,] at 70-72. On the way, she briefly walked with and

spoke to [Appellant], whom she knew from the neighborhood. Id.

at 72-75. Freeman went straight to [] Spencer’s house after

parting ways with [Appellant]. Id. at 76. When she reached []

Spencer’s house and went to knock on the door, she heard a

gunshot from a few houses down. Id. at 78-79. All of this 

testimony was consistent with [Freeman’s] statement to police. 

N.T.[,] 12/3/2021[,] at 54-55.
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At trial, Freeman went on to say that after she heard the

gunshot, she saw [Appellant] running toward a car. N.T.[,]

7/13/2011[,] at 80-81. When questioned as to why this information 

was not in her statement to police, she testified that the police had

never asked. Id. at 84-85. She also claimed at trial that the

reason she did not tell police about seeing [Appellant] run to a car

was that the detectives did not give her a chance to do so. N.T.[,] 

7/13/2011[,] at 102-103; N.T.[,] 12/3/2021 at 86-87. Freeman

further testified at trial that she went inside [] Spencer’s house and

stayed there until the police arrived about five minutes after the

shooting. N.T.[,] 7/13/2011[,] at 83.

At the December 3, 2021, evidentiary hearing, on crossexamination, Freeman completely changed her account of the

timeline on the night of the murder. She claimed that she actually

saw [Appellant] earlier in the evening, then went to meet up with

her brothers before they all rode their bicycles to their uncle’s

house, eventually returning to the neighborhood in a cab and going

to [] Spencer’s house. N.T.[,] 12/3/2021[,] at 24-28. Just

minutes later during the hearing, Freeman changed her story

again. When confronted with a statement she gave to a defense 

investigator on December 15, 2020, Freeman testified that she 

actually did see [Appellant] on the way from her house to [] 

Spencer’s house, not after she had been to her uncle’s house. Id.

at 37-38. She claimed that she and her brothers went to their

uncle’s house after she was questioned by police. Id. at 37-39.

At the hearing, Freeman testified that the police fabricated

nearly her entire statement from the night of the murder. N.T.[,]

12/3/2021[,] at 11-12, 22, 50-52, 56. She testified that, after 

taking her in handcuffs from Spencer’s house to the Roundhouse,

detectives typed up a statement but did not show it to her or ask her

to sign it. Id. at 10-12, 16-17. Freeman did eventually admit 

that the signature on the statement was hers. Id. at 57-58.

At the hearing, Freeman also claimed that detectives coerced 

her testimony. She claimed that the night before she was due to

testify in court, when she was 15 years old and a new mother,

police again came to [] Spencer’s house looking for her. Id. at 17. 

They cuffed her, told her to leave her baby unattended, and

brought her to the Roundhouse. Id. at 17-18. Police sat her on

a bench and told her she would have to wait there until she was

due to testify in court the next morning. Id. at 19.
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Freeman further testified at the hearing that on the morning

of her trial testimony, police escorted her to court and brought her

to an anteroom where the same detectives to whom she had given

her original statement were waiting. Id. at 19-20. The detectives

threatened her with jail time if she did not testify in accordance

with her written statement, which she had never seen before that

morning. Id. at 20-21. In her 2020 statement to a defense

investigator, Freeman said that the detectives had read her

statement to her before court, but at the hearing she denied that 

they had read it to her. Id. at 60-61. She further testified that

the defense investigator told her to write that the detectives had

read her statement to her. Id.

During trial, Freeman gave very specific details about how

she perceived the shooting and the moments leading up to the

shooting. N.T.[,] 7/13/2011[,] at 79, 94, 109-110. When 

questioned by the Court during the evidentiary hearing, Freeman said 

detectives fabricated that level of specific detail for her to testify to

at trial and that she was able to remember it. N.T.[,] 12/3/2021[,]

at 89. Freeman claimed that, although she had never read her

police statement, she memorized what to say in the anteroom 

before taking the stand at [Appellant’s] trial. Id. at 64-65.

At the hearing, Freeman claimed that detectives told her to

say that she had heard [] Griffith say that [Appellant] was the

shooter even though she did not know Griffith. Id. at 68-69. 

However, at [Appellant’s] trial, Freeman did not give Griffith’s

name but rather described his physical appearance. N.T.[,] 

7/13/2011[,] at 58-59. Freeman also testified at trial that Griffith

was not the one who told her about the shooting, that it was

“another teenager.” Id. When questioned at the evidentiary

hearing, Freeman could not explain why she would have said that 

the speaker was another teenager when the police allegedly told

her to say it was Griffith. N.T.[,] 12/3/2021[,] at 75.

At the hearing, Freeman testified that, during her trial

testimony, she refused to say she witnessed the shooting, despite 

detectives telling her to do so, because she “wasn’t trying to lie” 

and did what she “felt was best.” Id. at 79, 83. Immediately 

thereafter, she said that the real reason she did not testify that she 

witnessed the shooting was because the prosecutor cut her off. Id.

at 80-81, 83.
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Based on this record, the Court found Freeman’s

testimony to be nearly incomprehensible and entirely 

incredible. N.T.[,] 2/25/2022[,] at 19. Additionally, “recantation 

evidence ‘is notoriously unreliable, particularly where the witness 

claims to have committed perjury.’” Commonwealth v. D’Amato,

856 A.2d 806, 825 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dennis,

715 A.2d 404, 416 (Pa. 1998)); see [Commonwealth v.] Small,

189 A.3d [961,] 977 [(Pa. 2018)] (noting that there is “no less 

reliable form of proof, especially where it involves an admission of

perjury”). It is impossible to discern which version of events,

among her statement to police, testimony at trial, statement to the

defense investigator, and frequently self-contradicting and 

inconsistent hearing testimony, Freeman is alleging is the truth. 

Unquestionably, her testimony would not result in a

different verdict if a new trial were granted. For that

reason, her recantation does not entitle [Appellant] to 

relief. See Padillas, 997 A.2d at 365 (In determining whether

after-discovered evidence would result in a different verdict, a

court is to “consider the integrity of the alleged after-discovered 

evidence, the motive of those offering the evidence, and the overall

strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.”).

As the record fully supports the Court’s finding that

[Appellant’s] proffered after-discovered evidence would not likely 

result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted, that finding

should not be disturbed. See (Commonwealth v.] Green, 14

A.3d [114,] 116 [(Pa. Super. 2011)]; [Commonwealth v.] Mason,

130 A.3d [601,] 617 [(Pa. 2015)]. No relief is due.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/25/22, at 4-10 (emphasis added). Upon review, we

agree with the PCRA court, and affirm on this basis with regard to Appellant’s 

second issue.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/2022