J-S03044-24

2024 PA Super 92

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

FAUSLET ALCEUS 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 534 MDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 22, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0005177-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION BY BECK, J.: FILED: MAY 8, 2024

Fauslet Alceus (“Alceus”) appeals from the order entered by the Dauphin 

County Court of Common Pleas denying his first petition filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)1 after an evidentiary hearing. Alceus 

claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or call 

character witnesses in support of his defense. Upon review, we apply 

longstanding precedent to conclude that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to investigate or call character witnesses in support of 

Alceus’ defense because (1) there were only two direct witnesses providing 

conflicting accounts of what occurred (the classic “he said/she said” case); (2)

character evidence would have bolstered counsel’s strategy of establishing the 

alleged victim was lying; and (3) Alceus was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 

____________________________________________

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S03044-24

- 2 -

omissions. We therefore reverse the order of the PCRA court and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this decision.

In a prior decision, this Court summarized the facts underlying Alceus’ 

convictions as follows:

On the night of September 8, 2017[,] and into the early 

morning of September 9, 2017, Angelica Fernandez Rodriguez 

[(“Rodriguez”)] was staying at her mother’s home in Harrisburg 

with her five children. Rodriguez, also five months pregnant, was 

planning on leaving her husband, [Alceus]. While sleeping in the 

early morning of September 9, 2017, Rodriguez was awoken by 

[Alceus] physically beating her. [Alceus] was able to gain access 

to the apartment building because the entrance to the apartment 

building was broken at the time. Rodriguez’s 8-year-old son

opened the apartment door for [Alceus] after he knocked. 

[Alceus] was screaming at her while the children watched him 

physically punch her body with closed fists. At one point, [Alceus]

put both hands around her neck. Rodriguez attempted to get her 

crying [] twins, [who were about thirteen months old,] but ended 

up falling with them due to what she believed to be a broken leg. 

Rodriguez attempted to leave the situation[;] however[,] she had 

a hurt leg and was holding one twin in each arm. While [Rodriguez 

was] sitting against a wall with her twins, [Alceus] used both 

hands around her neck until Rodriguez had difficulty breathing, 

became lightheaded, and had blurred vision. Rodriguez was not 

able to get to a cell phone to call for help because it was broken 

during the fight. [Alceus], knowing that [Rodriguez] was 

pregnant, continued to kick her along her stomach area.

Still angry, [Alceus] left Rodriguez’[s] mother’s home as the 

sun came up. [Rodriguez’s mother] came home later in the day 

and took Rodriguez and her children to Harrisburg Hospital.

On September 9, 2017, Officer Matthew Gallup was ... 

dispatched to Harrisburg Hospital for a report of an assault [and 

was then] directed to Rodriguez’[s] hospital room. Rodriguez 

indicated that she had been assaulted. Officer Gallup observed 

physical injuries on her face, including a swollen right eye, redness 

down her cheek, and scratches on her left eye, cheek area, and 

neck. She also complained of knee and side pain. [Rodriguez]

also indicated to Officer Gallup that she had been kicked or 
J-S03044-24

- 3 -

assaulted in her stomach area. [She] completed a domestic 

violence statement form[, as well as] a strangulation 

questionnaire. [Both forms were] in the victim’s own handwriting 

and in [her] own words. Rodriguez told Officer Gallup that 

[Alceus] was the one who assaulted her and her children.

Officer Gallup observed Rodriguez’[s] twins at the hospital. 

The male twin had a large lump on his forehead with an abrasion 

as well as a cut on the other side of his face and on his eyebrow. 

The female twin had a small cut or laceration on the top of her 

head towards the back of her head and side of her hair. [A] 

forensics officer[] came to the [hospital] to take photos of the 

twins and Rodriguez in the presence of Officer Gallup.

* * *

... [N]urse Faith Dreibelbis was working as a triage nurse 

[when Rodriguez and her children arrived] at the hospital at 

approximately 6:45 in the evening [on September 9, 2017.] 

Rodriguez told [Nurse] Dreibelbis that she had been assaulted. 

Rodriguez received an X-ray of her knee[ and] her spine, as well 

as an ultrasound. [Nurse] Dreibelbis observed a laceration above 

the eyebrow and alon[g] the right hairline of the male twin, and a 

laceration on the scalp of the female twin. [Nurse] Dreibelbis also 

observed redness and scratches along the male twin’s back that 

were not depicted in photographs.

[Nurse] Dreibelbis contacted [the] YWCA upon request of 

Rodriguez and a representative came to be with her when she was 

in the emergency department. She also contacted Harrisburg 

Police Department, which is typical practice when patients report 

that they have been assaulted. [Rodriguez] was discharged from 

the hospital around 1:00 a.m. on September 10, 2017. The 

children were discharged at 10:46 p.m. on September 9, 2017.

Commonwealth v. Alceus, 623 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 37460 at *1-2 (Pa. 

Super. Jan. 5, 2021) (non-precedential decision) (citation omitted; ellipses 

and some brackets in original).
J-S03044-24

- 4 -

Police subsequently arrested Alceus and the Commonwealth charged 

him with aggravated assault; aggravated assault of a victim less than 6 and 

defendant 18 or older (two counts); aggravated assault of an unborn child; 

strangulation – applying pressure to throat or neck; endangering the welfare 

of a child (two counts); and corruption of minors.2 The matter proceeded to 

a jury trial in October 2019. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

Rodriguez, Officer Gallup and Nurse Dreibelbis; the medical records of 

Rodriguez and the twins documenting their injuries; Rodriguez’s statements

at the hospital; and photographs of their injuries. Alceus testified in his own 

defense, which this Court previously summarized: 

[Alceus] ... denied he committed the assault on Rodriguez 

and the twins. He claimed he was not at Rodriguez’s mother’s 

apartment on the night of the incident, and that his relationship 

with Rodriquez had ended in early July 2017. [Alceus] claimed 

that on the evening of September 8, 2017, he was at the 

Hollywood Casino with a friend[, Paulin Thiombiano 

(“Thiombiano”),] until midnight. They then returned to 

[Thiombiano’s] apartment, where he had been staying.[fn] 

[Alceus] testified they talked for “a couple hours,” and went to 

sleep around 2:00 a.m. on September 9th. He claimed that 

Rodriguez’s mother called him around 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, 

which was the first time he learned of the allegations. [Alceus] 

denied ever harming Rodriguez or their children, and testified he 

had last seen Rodriguez on September 2, 2017.

[fn]

 [Alceus] also stated his car was “broken” at the time, so 

[Thiombiano] drove them to the casino and back home. 

N.T., 10/21/[20]19, at 128-29.

____________________________________________

2

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(1), (8), 2606(a), 2718(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 

6301(a)(1)(i).
J-S03044-24

- 5 -

Alceus, 623 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 37460 at *2 (record citations omitted;

footnote in original). After Alceus’ testimony, the jury was shown a video of 

a Child Resource Center (“CRC”) interview with one of Rodriguez’s minor

children, T.R., who was present at the time of the incident. Id. (citing N.T., 

10/21/2019, at 141).

Following trial, a jury convicted Alceus of all charges. On January 29, 

2020, the trial court sentenced Alceus to an aggregate term of seven to 

fourteen years of incarceration, followed by six years of probation. This Court 

affirmed his judgment of sentence and on June 28, 2021, our Supreme Court 

denied his petition for allowance of appeal. See Alceus, 623 MDA 2020, 2021

WL 37460, appeal denied, 257 A.3d 1212 (Pa. 2021).

On August 15, 2022, Alceus timely filed a counseled PCRA petition, his 

first. After the Commonwealth filed a response to the petition, Alceus filed an

amended PCRA petition. Alceus contended that he was entitled to relief 

because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call an alibi witness and failing 

to discuss, investigate, or call any character witnesses in Alceus’ defense. 

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on January 17, 2023, at 

which the court heard testimony from trial counsel, Alceus, and several 

character witnesses for Alceus. Wesley Laroque (“Laroque”) testified that he 

had known Alceus for many years, dating back to when the two were younger 

and living in Haiti. N.T., 1/17/2023, at 12-13. He stated he was willing to 

testify at Alceus’ trial and would have testified that Alceus has a good 
J-S03044-24

- 6 -

reputation for being peaceful in the small community of Haitians living near 

Central Dauphin High School. Id. at 14-15. 

Thiombiano, who stated he was also willing and available to testify at 

Alceus’ trial, testified that he had known Alceus for seven years and met him 

while working at a warehouse. Id. at 18. He likewise would have testified to 

Alceus’ good reputation in the Harrisburg Haitian community for being 

peaceful. Id. at 29-30. Thiombiano further testified in support of Alceus’ 

alibi, stating that he was with Alceus the night Rodriguez was injured. Id. at 

24, 31.

Alceus was prepared to present the testimony of a third potential 

character witness, Jean Coulange (“Coulange”). Because of time constraints, 

however, the parties stipulated that Coulange would have provided the same 

character-related testimony as the prior two witnesses—that Alceus had a

good reputation in the community for peacefulness and that he would have 

been willing and available to testify at trial. Id. at 37. 

Alceus also testified at the PCRA hearing. He stated that he asked trial 

counsel to call Thiombiano as a witness and that he was surprised when 

Thiombiano was never called to testify. Id. at 38. Trial counsel confirmed 

this in his testimony at the PCRA hearing and stated that he interviewed 

Thiombiano as a potential alibi witness. Id. at 6. Referring to notes he had 

prepared contemporaneously with his interview of Thiombiano, trial counsel 

stated that Thiombiano did not remember being with Alceus the night of the 
J-S03044-24

- 7 -

incident; instead, Thiombiano told trial counsel he was with Alceus the 

following afternoon and night.

3

 Id. at 6-7, 41. Trial counsel also testified, 

based on his conversation with Thiombiano, that even if he was with Alceus 

that night, the assault on Rodriguez occurred after the time Thiombiano 

indicated he had gone to bed. Id. at 41. In addition, Thiombiano told trial 

counsel during their pretrial interview that Alceus sometimes took his keys 

and used his car. Id. Trial counsel testified that he decided not to call 

Thiombiano as an alibi witness because “the risk was too high that he could 

have gotten confused with the dates on the stand” and the jury would hear 

that Thiombiano was not actually with Alceus during the time of the assault, 

contradicting Alceus’ alibi testimony. Id. at 42; see also id. at 7. 

Trial counsel admitted, however, that he never discussed the potential 

to call character witnesses with Alceus:

BY [PCRA COUNSEL]:

Q. ... Did you discuss with [Alceus] the issue of character 

witnesses?

A. We did not discuss character witnesses. I know he had 

indicated that the victim was a liar several times. He had told me 

– that came to me from him, [Thiombiano], and then Junior who 

I believe is a cousin. But character witnesses for him, no, we did 

not discuss that.

____________________________________________

3

 Trial counsel also investigated Alceus’ claim he had been at the casino with 

Thiombiano on the night of the assault. N.T., 1/17/2023, at 40. Alceus’ casino 

player card was not used that night and the casino could not provide trial 

counsel with any information to indicate Alceus had been there at that time. 

Id. Trial counsel also tried unsuccessfully to obtain Alceus’ cellular phone 

records to show his location on the night of the incident. Id. at 40-41.
J-S03044-24

- 8 -

THE COURT: Character witnesses for what?

THE WITNESS: For [Alceus] we did not discuss.

BY [PCRA COUNSEL]:

Q. So you said you did not discuss. Fair to say you did not 

know whether he had character witnesses for being peaceful?

A. I wouldn’t know either way.

Id. at 8. 

Trial counsel explained that his strategy was to show that Rodriguez was 

not telling the truth. Id. at 4-5. He did not discuss character witnesses with 

Alceus because he wanted to focus “on the child being the only one that didn’t 

have a reason to lie” and “the lack of investigation by the police”; he didn’t 

want to “confuse the jury” by calling character witnesses. Id. at 8. He 

therefore relied on the video evidence of the CRC interview with T.R., who was 

present the night of the incident, as the child did not “make any disclosures 

about the violence” in the video, and highlighted the lack of police 

investigation at the scene of the assault despite Rodriguez’s statements that 

Alceus had inflicted damage to the inside of the residence. Id. at 4, 8. Trial 

counsel was aware of the contentious relationship between Rodriguez and 

Alceus and decided that T.R. was the only person who did not have a reason 

to lie. Id. at 4, 9. He admitted, though, that he “couldn’t say” whether 

character testimony regarding Alceus’ reputation as a peaceful person would 

have impacted the jury. Id. at 9.
J-S03044-24

- 9 -

Following the hearing, the parties complied with the PCRA court’s order 

to file briefs and thereafter, the PCRA court denied relief. This timely appeal 

followed.

On appeal, Alceus presents one issue for our consideration: “Did the 

PCRA court err when it denied [Alceus]’ claim that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to call favorable character witnesses?” Alceus’ Brief at 4.

Our review of an order denying a PCRA petition “is limited to the findings 

of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA 

court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 132 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted). We review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party below and are bound by the PCRA court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations; we cannot disturb either unless they are unsupported by the 

record. Commonwealth v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 902 (Pa. 2021); see also 

Smith, 194 A.2d at 132. We are not bound by the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions, which we review de novo. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 

A.3d 959, 979 (Pa. 2023). 

Alceus’ claim on appeal sounds in ineffective assistance of counsel for 

failing to call character witnesses in his defense. In conducting our review, 

we are mindful that of the well-settled law 

... that counsel is presumed to have been effective and that 

the petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel’s alleged 

ineffectiveness. To overcome this presumption, a petitioner must 

establish that: (1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable 
J-S03044-24

- 10 -

merit; (2) counsel did not have a reasonable basis for his or her 

act or omission; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a 

result of counsel’s deficient performance, that is, [there is] a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s act or omission, the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A PCRA

petitioner must address each of these prongs on appeal. A 

petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal to the 

claim. 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 259 A.3d 395, 405 (Pa. 2021) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

In establishing whether defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call witnesses, [an] appellant must prove: (1) the 

witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the 

defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the 

existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for 

the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness 

was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 463-64 (Pa. 2015) (citation 

omitted).

Counsel may be deemed ineffective for failing to call character 

witnesses. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 785 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa. 

Super. 2001); Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 620 A.2d 1143, 1145 (Pa. 

Super. 1993). Although evidence of a person’s character is not admissible to 

show the person acted in conformity with such character on a particular 

occasion, Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1), in a criminal case, “a defendant may offer 

evidence of the defendant’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, 

the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it[.]” Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2)(A). 

Evidence of good character offered by a defendant in a 

criminal prosecution must be limited to his general reputation for 

the particular trait or traits of character involved in the 
J-S03044-24

- 11 -

commission of the crime charged. Such evidence must relate to 

a period at or about the time the offense was committed and must 

be established by testimony of witnesses as to the community 

opinion of the individual in question, not through specific acts or 

mere rumor.

Commonwealth v. Medina, 209 A.3d 992, 997 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted); see also Pa.R.E 405(a) (stating that admissible character evidence 

may be proved with testimony regarding the person’s reputation in the 

community, not by the witness’ opinion about the person’s character or 

character trait). On cross-examination, the Commonwealth may inquire into 

relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct that are probative of the 

character trait in question. Pa.R.E. 405(a)(1). The Commonwealth may not, 

however, inquire into allegations of other criminal conduct by the defendant 

that did not result in conviction. Pa.R.E. 405(a)(2). 

“Evidence of good character is substantive, not mere makeweight 

evidence, and may, in and of itself, create a reasonable doubt of guilt and, 

thus, require a verdict of not guilty.” Commonwealth v. Hull, 982 A.2d 

1020, 1025-26 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Weiss, 606 

A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 1992)). When character evidence is offered, the jury must 

be instructed that evidence of the defendant’s good character alone may 

create a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt, resulting in acquittal.

Commonwealth v. Neely, 561 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1989).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized the critical nature of 

character witnesses in cases where there are only two direct witnesses who 
J-S03044-24

- 12 -

testify—one telling the story for the Commonwealth, the other telling a 

completely different story for the defense—colloquially referred to as “he 

said/she said” cases. See Weiss, 606 A.2d at 442. In Commonwealth v. 

Weiss, a jury convicted the defendant of statutory rape and related offenses 

for crimes committed against his four-year-old daughter. Id. at 440-41. 

Weiss was accused of inserting his finger and penis in his daughter’s vagina, 

putting Cheerios in her vagina, cutting her vaginal area with a plastic knife, 

and pointing a gun at her when she screamed. Id. at 441. The child’s parents 

were involved in a bitter custody battle, and this incident was alleged to have 

occurred during an overnight visit with Weiss. Id. at 441 & n.6. According to 

the mother’s testimony, the child acted abnormally upon return from the visit, 

and she observed evidence of Weiss’ alleged assaults while bathing the child. 

Id. at 441. The mother took her to the hospital, where a doctor’s examination 

revealed “a one inch cut on the child’s genital area consistent with having 

been cut by a plastic knife” and “a torn hymen.” Id.

At Weiss’ trial, the child, the mother, the doctor, and two nurses testified 

to the allegations against Weiss, and although Weiss called several witnesses

(including one witness who testified that the child recanted), he was the only 

direct witness to testify in his defense. Id. Trial counsel called no character 

witnesses to testify on Weiss’ behalf. Id. Following his conviction, Weiss filed 

a PCRA petition asserting that trial counsel’s failure to call character witnesses 

constituted ineffective assistance. Id.
J-S03044-24

- 13 -

At the evidentiary hearing on his PCRA petition, Weiss offered the 

testimony of character witnesses, including his estranged wife’s parents and 

brother, all of whom would have testified “to [Weiss’] good character 

reputation and his wife’s lack thereof.” Id. at 442. Trial counsel testified he 

was not sure whether he contacted every potential character witness given to 

him by Weiss and admitted that he did not reach out to those he did contact 

until the day before trial. Id. at 442-43. Weiss’ trial counsel further testified 

that he was of the view that familial character witnesses, such as those 

advanced by Weiss, were thought of as “garbage” by the jury and he did not 

recall ever calling them to testify in any of his cases. Id. at 443.

The case reached our Supreme Court, which held that trial counsel’s 

failure to call character witness in Weiss’ defense constituted ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Id. Recognizing that the credibility of the witnesses 

was of “paramount importance” because the case involved only two direct 

witnesses, and further that character evidence is critical to the jury’s 

determination of credibility, the Court found Weiss’ claim had arguable merit. 

Id. at 442. 

The Court further found no reasonable basis for trial counsel’s decision. 

Id. at 442-43. Counsel’s strategy had been to establish that the mother was 

lying and that she, in fact, was likely responsible for the child’s injuries. Id.

at 443. The Supreme Court found:

In light of the overwhelming need for character evidence in a case 

such as this, counsel’s limited investigation into the quantity 
J-S03044-24

- 14 -

and/or quality of potential character witnesses on behalf of 

[Weiss], and counsel’s prejudice toward familial witnesses, we find 

no reasonable basis to support trial counsel’s decision not to call 

any character witnesses.

Id. at 443 (emphasis in original).

Turning to the prejudice prong, the Weiss Court recognized that a 

finding of prejudice required a demonstration “that the alternative not selected 

by counsel offered a substantially greater chance of success than the tactic 

chosen” and that its determination of prejudice required the Court to “focus 

on counsel’s overall trial strategy and view his performance as a whole.” Id.

(citations omitted). Applying this standard to the case before it, and 

ultimately concluding that Weiss was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to 

call character witnesses, the Court explained:

Counsel’s stated strategy was not to contest the physical 

findings of sexual abuse, but to focus on the fact that it may have 

been [Weiss’] wife, not [Weiss] who “set the whole thing up.” It 

would have been entirely consistent as well as highly beneficial, 

in light of this strategy, to present character witnesses, who not 

only would vouch for [Weiss’] good character, but would have 

impeached his wife’s character at the same time.

Whereas the defense did not attempt to refute the physical 

findings, the evidence regarding the perpetrator boiled down to 

[Weiss’] word against the word of his wife and daughter. The only 

issue then, was whether [Weiss] or someone else was responsible 

for what happened. Considering there was no overwhelming 

evidence of guilt in this case, credibility of the witnesses was of 

paramount importance, and counsel’s error not to employ 

character witnesses, familial or otherwise, undermined [Weiss’] 

chances of instilling reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury and 

resulted in prejudice to [Weiss].
J-S03044-24

- 15 -

We find, therefore, that even with the presumption of 

adequate performance, trial counsel’s defense was the result of 

unreasonable professional judgment, and there is a reasonable 

probability that, absent trial counsel’s error, the jury would have 

had a reasonable doubt respecting [Weiss’] guilt. Hence, the 

fundamental fairness of the proceeding has been undermined by 

the ineffective assistance of [Weiss’] trial counsel.

Id. (footnote and citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, our Supreme 

Court held trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call character witnesses 

and granted Weiss a new trial. Id. at 443-44.

In Commonwealth v. Hull, a case factually similar to the one pending 

before us, a jury convicted Hull of sex offenses committed against his adopted 

daughter. Hull, 982 A.2d at 1022. The only evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth to support Hull’s culpability was testimony by the victim and 

her brother, and no one other than the victim testified to the acts upon which 

the charges were based. Id. at 1022-23. Trial counsel’s strategy was to show 

that the children had a motive to lie—they testified that Hull and his wife struck 

them and they wanted to instead live with their mother—and that the crimes 

alleged did not occur. Id. at 1023, 1027. 

We affirmed Hull’s judgment of sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 1022. 

Hull then filed a PCRA petition alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing 

to call character witnesses in his defense. Id. The PCRA court agreed and 

granted Hull a new trial. Id. The Commonwealth appealed and we affirmed. 

Relying on Weiss, we agreed with the PCRA court that the case had arguable 

merit, as there were only two direct witnesses—one implicating Hull and one 
J-S03044-24

- 16 -

denying his involvement. Hull, 982 A.2d at 1023. We further agreed with 

the PCRA court that counsel did not act reasonably in failing to conduct a 

thorough investigation into the availability of character witnesses when 

counsel’s “overall strategy was to question the children’s credibility by 

formulating in the jurors’ minds a motive for the children to fabricate their 

allegations against [Hull] and his wife.” Id. at 1026. Lastly, the Court found 

Hull was prejudiced because “[e]vidence of [Hull’s] good character, 

particularly in the absence of any bad-character evidence outside of the 

children’s testimony, would have bolstered his defense,” and the character 

evidence would have been consistent with trial counsel’s strategy to show the 

jury that the children were lying about what they alleged occurred. Id. The

Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the evidence against Hull

was so overwhelming that the outcome would not have been different, as

character evidence could cast doubt on that evidence, i.e., the brother’s

testimony. Id. at 1026-27. 

Indeed, this Court has long recognized, and more recently reaffirmed in 

non-precedential decisions,4that in he said/she said cases, trial counsel may 

be found to have provided ineffective assistance for failing to present 

character witnesses. See Harris, 785 A.2d at 1001; Gillespie, 620 A.2d at 

1145; Commonwealth v. Luther, 463 A.2d 1073, 1078 (Pa. Super. 1983); 

____________________________________________

4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that non-precedential decisions of the Superior 

Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).
J-S03044-24

- 17 -

see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Raker, 609 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 

16754076 at *6 (Pa. Super. Nov. 8, 2022) (non-precedential decision); 

Commonwealth v. Soto, 170 MDA 2019, 2019 WL 4390716 at *7-8 (Pa. 

Super. Sept. 13, 2019) (non-precedential decision).

Turning to the instant matter, Alceus contends that trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and call character 

witnesses to testify at trial. Alceus’ Brief at 6, 8-14. Alceus states that trial 

counsel failed to inform him that he could present character witnesses, or that 

the jury would be instructed that character evidence alone can be the basis 

for finding a reasonable doubt. Id. Alceus argues that because the central 

issue at trial involved the jury weighing Rodriguez’s credibility against his own, 

trial counsel’s decision not to conduct a “limited investigation” into potential 

character witnesses or to call them to testify in Alceus’ defense was 

unreasonable. Id. at 10-11. Observing the “critical nature” of character 

testimony in cases like his, Alceus asserts that he was prejudiced by trial 

counsel’s failings. Id. at 12.

The PCRA court found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

call character witnesses in Alceus’ defense: 

[Trial counsel] specifically testified that adding character 

witnesses would have risked taking the focus away from his trial 

strategy. Further, [the PCRA court] did not find the testimony of 

the potential character witnesses at the evidentiary hearing 

credible. The character witnesses, [] Laroque and [] Thiombiano, 

testified that they know [Alceus] from Haiti. [] Laroque, 

specifically, could not remember the last year in which he spent 

time with [Alceus]. As [trial counsel] testified to [sic] at the 
J-S03044-24

- 18 -

evidentiary hearing, [Alceus] has a theft in his criminal record. 

Additionally, [the PCRA court] notes that the evidence in this case 

includes witness testimony by the victim’s mother and children, 

hospital records regarding injuries and statements, observations 

of the injuries by the police officer, and photographs of the injuries 

on the victims by a forensic officer. Thus, [the PCRA court does] 

not find that the absence of the witness’ testimony was so 

prejudicial as to have denied [Alceus] a fair trial. Further, [the 

PCRA court] find[s] that [trial counsel’s] decision to exclude the 

character witness testimony in order to strengthen trial strategy 

was reasonable.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/22/2023, at 11 (record citations omitted).

Our review of the record, along with long-standing precedent, requires 

us to disagree with the PCRA court’s conclusion. Beginning with the arguable 

merit prong, like Weiss and Hull, this is yet another he said/she said case—

it was Alceus’ word against Rodriguez’s—making Alceus’ credibility of 

“paramount importance.” See Weiss, 606 A.2d at 442; Hull, 982 A.2d at 

1023. Alceus testified at trial that he was not at Rodriguez’s mother’s 

apartment on the night in question and did not assault Rodriguez, while she 

maintained the opposite. N.T. 10/21/2019, at 50, 124, 127, 129, 131-32. 

Evidence of Alceus’ character was therefore critical to the jury’s determination 

of credibility and would serve as substantive evidence that, by itself, could 

create a reasonable doubt of guilt. See Weiss, 606 A.2d at 442; Hull, 982 

A.2d at 1025-26. Alceus’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel thus has 

arguable merit.

We now turn to whether trial counsel had a reasonable basis for failing 

to present character witnesses at trial. As our Supreme Court has recognized,
J-S03044-24

- 19 -

[s]trategic choices made [by trial counsel] after thorough 

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options 

are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made 

after less than complete investigation are reasonable 

precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 

judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other 

words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 

particular investigations unnecessary. In any 

ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate 

must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 

counsel’s judgments.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984); see

also Commonwealth v. Johnson, [] 966 A.2d 523, 535–36 

([Pa.] 2009) (“The duty to investigate, of course, may include a 

duty to interview certain potential witnesses; and a prejudicial 

failure to fulfill this duty, unless pursuant to a reasonable strategic 

decision, may lead to a finding of ineffective assistance.”).

Commonwealth v. Williams, 141 A.3d 440, 463 (Pa. 2016).

By trial counsel’s own admission, he never discussed character evidence 

with Alceus or investigated the availability of any such witnesses. N.T., 

1/17/2023, at 7-9. Trial counsel’s stated trial strategy was to show Rodriguez 

not telling the truth about Alceus assaulting her. Id. at 4-5. In explaining 

why he did not utilize character evidence of Alceus’ reputation for 

peacefulness, trial counsel said he believed “there was a risk” that it would 

take the focus away from what T.R. did (or, more to the point, did not) say 

during his interview with CRC, which he used to support his overall strategy 

of showing that Rodriguez was lying. Id. at 9. 

The PCRA court included trial counsel’s stated concern in its opinion 

denying PCRA relief, but offered no analysis to support its conclusion that this 
J-S03044-24

- 20 -

constituted a reasonable strategic basis for trial counsel’s failure to investigate 

and call character witnesses. It further did not explain how offering positive 

character evidence for Alceus would have been inconsistent with trial counsel’s 

strategy of showing that Rodriguez was being untruthful. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 5/22/2023, at 11. 

As this Court and our Supreme Court have repeatedly held, presenting 

character evidence under these precise circumstances is entirely consistent 

with—and indeed, bolsters—a strategy of establishing that the 

Commonwealth’s direct witness is lying. See, e.g., Weiss, 606 A.2d 439; 

Hull, 982 A.2d 1020; Harris, 785 A.2d 998; Gillespie, 620 A.2d 1143; 

Luther, 463 A.2d 1073; Raker, 609 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 16754076; Soto, 

170 MDA 2019, 2019 WL 4390716. Presenting witnesses who could vouch for 

Alceus’ reputation for peacefulness in the community would have aided, not 

detracted from, trial counsel’s strategy of challenging the veracity of 

Rodriguez’s testimony. Trial counsel’s failure to investigate or discuss 

character witnesses with Alceus demonstrates that he failed to recognize the 

crucial role character evidence would have played in support of his overall trial 

strategy. See, e.g., Luther, 463 A.2d at 1078-79 (“A trial counsel cannot 

fault his client for failing to provide names of character witnesses, if witnesses 

were available, when the trial counsel has been derelict in not adequately 

discussing with his client the importance of such a defense.”). 
J-S03044-24

- 21 -

Further, trial counsel did not claim, and the record does not indicate,

that his reason for not investigating or calling character witnesses was to 

shield the jury from negative character testimony. Although trial counsel was 

aware that Alceus had prior convictions for theft and driving under the 

influence, he recognized those convictions would not be admissible as bad 

character evidence to contradict witness testimony that Alceus has a 

reputation for peacefulness.

5

 N.T., 1/17/2023, at 10.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record does not support 

the PCRA court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s failure to conduct any 

____________________________________________

5

In its analysis, the PCRA court noted, without expounding, that Alceus’ 

criminal record included a theft conviction, purportedly as a basis for finding 

that trial counsel’s strategy of not calling character witnesses was reasonable. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/22/2023, at 11. This was error. As discussed supra, 

although a criminal conviction can open the door to attacking a defendant’s 

character with prior criminal convictions, the convictions must be for crimes 

pertinent to the character trait for which the defense provided testimony. 

Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2)(A). A theft conviction is pertinent to the trait of 

truthfulness, not peacefulness. See Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 

567, 572-73 (Pa. 2003) (plurality).

We further observe that Alceus testified in his own defense at trial and 

his theft conviction could have been used to impeach his testimony. 

Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 216 (Pa. 2016) (“Because 

appellant chose to testify on his own behalf, any of his crimen falsi convictions 

over the prior ten years would have been admissible in the Commonwealth’s 

rebuttal case regardless of whether appellant presented character 

witnesses.”); Commonwealth v. Washington, 269 A.3d 1255, 1264 (Pa. 

Super. 2022) (en banc) (“Crimes involving dishonesty or false statement are 

commonly referred to as crimen falsi crimes, for purposes of impeaching a 

witness’s credibility.”) (citations and brackets omitted); Commonwealth v. 

Cole, 227 A.3d 336, 340 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating theft is a crimen falsi 

offense).
J-S03044-24

- 22 -

investigation into the availability of character witnesses was reasonable and 

strategic. See Weiss, 606 A.2d at 443; Hull, 982 A.2d at 1026; see also 

Williams, 141 A.3d at 463; see also, cf., Johnson, 966 A.2d at 535–36. 

Under the circumstances present in this case, where there are only two direct 

witnesses, each providing contradictory testimony as to what occurred, trial 

counsel’s strategy was to show the jury that the Commonwealth’s witness was 

lying, and there was no known bad character evidence for the Commonwealth 

to present, there is no reasonable strategic basis to support trial counsel’s 

failure to investigate potential character witnesses.

Finally, we must determine whether Alceus was prejudiced by trial 

counsel’s failure to present character witnesses.

6

 In determining that Alceus 

was not prejudiced by the absence of character evidence, the PCRA court

____________________________________________

6

 As noted supra, to establish trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to call 

witnesses, Alceus must also satisfy a five-prong test. Treiber, 121 A.3d at

463-64. The record reflects, and neither the PCRA court nor the 

Commonwealth contests, that Alceus satisfied the first four prongs of the test. 

Alceus presented character witnesses at the PCRA hearing who testified that 

they were available and would have testified at trial as to Alceus’ reputation 

for peacefulness in the community. Trial counsel should have known about 

these witnesses—had he discussed the availability of character testimony with 

Alceus, Alceus would have provided him with this information. The only 

remaining issue is whether Alceus satisfied the fifth element of the test by 

establishing that he was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. As both the 

Supreme Court and this Court have tacitly recognized, establishing prejudice 

based upon trial counsel’s failure to call a witness utilizes the same standard 

as establishing prejudice generally to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. 

See, e.g., id. at 445, 464; Weiss, 606 A.2d at 443; Hull, 982 A.2d at 1026; 

Raker, 609 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 16754076 at *2, 5; Soto, 170 MDA 2019, 

2019 WL 4390716 at *5-6, 8.
J-S03044-24

- 23 -

found the proposed character witnesses not credible and generally pointed to 

the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial. PCRA Court Opinion, 5/22/2023, at 

11. The full extent of the PCRA court’s credibility finding was that it “did not 

find the testimony of the potential character witnesses at the evidentiary 

hearing credible. The character witnesses, [] Laroque and [] Thiombiano, 

testified that they know [Alceus] from Haiti. [] Laroque, specifically, could not 

remember the last year in which he spent time with [Alceus].” Id.

With respect to Laroque, the record reflects the following exchange 

occurred at the PCRA hearing:

BY [PCRA COUNSEL]:

Q. And how long had you known [] Alceus? How long do you 

know him?

A. That’s long time ago, that’s long time ago. I’m 55 now but 

he’s less than a year than me.

THE COURT: So you knew him when he was younger in 

Haiti?

THE WITNESS: Exactly.

THE COURT: Got it.

BY [PCRA COUNSEL]:

Q. And do you know other people that know [] Alceus?

A. Yes.

Q. And amongst yourself and those other people that know [] 

Alceus, does [] Alceus have a reputation in the community for 

being peaceful?
J-S03044-24

- 24 -

THE COURT: Well, before you get there, when’s the last 

time you actually had contact with the defendant?

THE WITNESS: Last time, before he go to the jail, he was, 

like, sitting with me and (sic) Thanksgiving.

THE COURT: Thanksgiving of what year, sir?

THE WITNESS: Um, I’m not remember. But, you know, 

that’s – but he get, like four years in jail now. But before 

that.

THE COURT: I missed the last part.

THE WITNESS: I think he got four years in the jail but 

before the date.

THE COURT: That’s what I’m asking. When is the last 

time you had contact with him before he went to prison?

THE WITNESS: The last time I’m sitting with them and 

another friend in my house at the table for the Thanksgiving. 

But I’m not remember that year before he go to the jail.

BY [PCRA COUNSEL]:

Q. Was it after he was arrested or before he was arrested?

A. Yeah.

Q. After?

A. No. After – I think he go to the jail first and then he come 

back. When he come back, I spending to him and then he back 

to the jail again.

THE COURT: And you don’t remember the year?

THE WITNESS: I’m not remember the year. But you got

four years on the jail now? I don’t know.

N.T., 1/17/2023, at 12-13. The PCRA court discounts Laroque’s testimony 

because he could not remember the specific year that he last spent time with 
J-S03044-24

- 25 -

Alceus. Although Laroque could not identify the year, as the above exchange 

reflects, he testified that he last saw Alceus the Thanksgiving before Alceus 

was incarcerated. Moreover, the date he last saw Alceus has little bearing on 

the testimony he provided, which related to his knowledge of Alceus’ 

reputation for peacefulness in the community. This requires that Laroque 

knew what others in the community thought of Alceus’ reputation at or around 

the time of the crime. Indeed, pursuant to Rule 405 of the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Evidence, Laroque’s personal opinion about Alceus was irrelevant and 

inadmissible. Pa.R.E 405(a). 

We are very aware that we must defer to the PCRA court’s findings of 

fact and credibility determinations, but this deference applies only insofar as 

they are supported by the record. See Flor, 259 A.3d at 902; Smith, 194 

A.2d at 132; see also Commonwealth v. Hereford, 1162 WDA 2022, 2024 

WL 507083, at *8 (Pa. Super. Feb. 9, 2024) (non-precedential decision)

(“[W]e are cognizant that our standard of review is very deferential to the 

PCRA court’s credibility assessments. However, the PCRA court’s credibility 

assessments are not absolute, and are still subject to review on appeal. 

Importantly, the PCRA court’s credibility determination must be supported by
J-S03044-24

- 26 -

the record.”) (emphasis and citations omitted). Simply put, the PCRA court’s 

finding that Laroque was not credible is not supported by the record.7

Regardless of whether the PCRA court properly discounted Laroque’s 

testimony, though, it made no credibility determination of Coulange, the 

character witness who provided stipulated testimony about Alceus’ good 

character and did not provide live testimony before the PCRA court. Nor could 

it have, as it did not have an opportunity to observe the witness firsthand. 

See Commonwealth v. King, 990 A.2d 1172, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(stating a judge “could not possibly have made fully informed credibility

determinations without observing the demeanor of the witnesses”); see also

Commonwealth v. Perrin, 291 A.3d 337, 348 (Pa. 2023) (Dougherty, J. 

concurring) (“in the stipulation context, as on appeal, there is no firsthand 

evaluation of the witness’s in-court testimony under oath and subject to the 

crucible of questioning, which is indispensable to an informed evaluation of 

credibility”) (citing King, 990 A.2d at 1180).

____________________________________________

7

 Although the PCRA court did not explain its credibility finding with respect 

to Thiombiano, there is ample record support for its determination that he was 

not credible as Thiombiano’s testimony before the PCRA court directly 

conflicted with the information he provided to trial counsel prior to trial. See 

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/22/2023, at 11; compare N.T., 1/17/2023, at 6-7, 41 

(trial counsel testifying at PCRA hearing that, during his interview with 

Thiombiano before trial, he told trial counsel that he was with Alceus the 

afternoon and night following the assault), with id. at 24, 31 (Thiombiano 

testifying at PCRA hearing that he was with Alceus the afternoon and night of 

the assault).
J-S03044-24

- 27 -

The PCRA also cited the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial in its 

conclusion that the absence of character evidence was not so prejudicial as to 

have denied Alceus a fair trial. PCRA Court Opinion, 5/22/2023, at 11. This 

was error for several reasons. First, some of the evidence the PCRA court 

cited in its opinion was not presented at trial. Contrary to the PCRA court’s 

statement, Rodriguez’s mother and children did not testify at trial.8 Compare

id., with N.T., 10/21-22/2019. Further, the PCRA court’s reliance on evidence 

of the physical injuries sustained by Rodriguez and the twins ignores the 

longstanding and well-settled precedent that character evidence is substantive 

evidence that, in and of itself, is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to a 

defendant’s guilt. 

Evidence of good character is substantive and positive 

evidence, not a mere [makeweight] to be considered in a doubtful 

case, and, according to all our authorities, is an independent factor 

which may of itself engender a reasonable doubt or produce a 

conclusion of innocence. To be sure, it is to be considered with 

all the other evidence in the case. But it is not to be measured

with or by other evidence. Its probative value, its power of 

persuasion, does not depend upon, and is not to be measured by, 

or appraised according to, the might or the infirmity in the 

Commonwealth’s case. Even though, under all the other 

evi[d]ence a jury could reach a conclusion of guilt, still if the 

character evidence creates a reasonable doubt or establishes 

innocence a verdict of acquittal must be rendered.

____________________________________________

8

 As noted supra, trial counsel offered, and the trial court admitted, a video 

of a CRC interview of one of the children. None of the children testified.
J-S03044-24

- 28 -

Commonwealth v. Padden, 50 A.2d 722, 725 (Pa. Super. 1947) (en banc) 

(emphasis in original; citations omitted).

Because trial counsel’s strategy did not involve an attempt to refute that 

Rodriguez and her children sustained physical injuries, evidence as to who 

caused the injuries boiled down to Alceus’ word against Rodriguez’s. The only 

question was whether Alceus or someone else was responsible for what 

happened. As Rodriguez’s testimony was the sole evidence that placed Alceus 

at the scene of the crime that night, the credibility of the witnesses was of 

paramount importance. Evidence of Alceus’ reputation for peacefulness would 

have bolstered his defense and was wholly consistent with trial counsel’s 

strategy to show Rodriguez was lying. Trial counsel’s failure to investigate, 

let alone call, character witnesses in support of his defense strategy 

undermined Alceus’ chances of instilling reasonable doubt in the minds of the 

jury. As such, and consistent with our prior case law, we conclude Alceus was 

prejudiced by counsel’s omissions. See Weiss, 606 A.2d at 443; Hull, 982 

A.2d at 1026.

Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court erred and abused its discretion 

by denying Alceus PCRA relief. Accordingly, we reverse the order the PCRA 

court, vacate Alceus’ judgment of sentence, and remand for a new trial.9

____________________________________________

9

 We are mindful that the Commonwealth now faces the prospect of retrial 

for an incident occurring more than six years ago. As we explained in Hull,

however, “the value of the character witnesses lies not in what they witnessed, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S03044-24

- 29 -

Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Olson joins the opinion.

Judge Nichols concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/08/2024

____________________________________________

but in directly supporting [Hull’s] defense and indirectly refuting the children’s 

allegations. Accordingly, permitting [Hull] the opportunity to assert a 

colorable defense properly constitutes the only fair remedy in this case.” Hull,

982 A.2d at 1027 n.3. In the same way, the value of character witnesses lies

in directly supporting Alceus’ defense and indirectly refuting Rodriguez’s

allegations. Permitting him this opportunity is the only fair remedy. See id.