FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAY 24, 2004

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 03-16383

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 02-00372-CV-OC-10-GRJ

MEREDITH T. RANEY, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus 

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

ALLSTATE FLORIDIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, 

OCALA WOMEN'S CENTER, INC., 

AWARE WOMAN CENTER FOR CHOICE, INC., 

EDWARD W. WINDLE, JR., et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(MAY 24, 2004)

Before CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:

Meredith Raney appeals the district court dismissal of his complaint for

extortion under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Raney charged several abortion providers and

his own insurance company with a conspiracy to extort money from him through

the filing of malicious lawsuits. Because the filing of a lawsuit may not state a

claim for extortion under the federal RICO statutes, we affirm the district court

dismissal of Raney’s complaint under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6).

For several years, Raney has actively opposed the provision of abortion in

Florida by engaging in numerous activities near the entrances to abortion clinics. 

See, e.g., Raney v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 224 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir.

2000). In 1998 and 1999, three abortion clinics filed separate lawsuits against

Raney, accusing him of violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act

(“FACE”), 18 U.S.C. § 248, as well as various other statutory and common law

injuries. In response to these lawsuits, Raney’s homeowner’s policy insurer,

Allstate, issued a reservation of rights letter outlining its position on coverage. 

Allstate also filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that it owed
This is common practice in Florida state courts. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 1

Cronk, 530 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 

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no duty to defend Raney. Each of these lawsuits was subsequently dismissed 1

without prejudice, and Allstate withdrew its declaratory judgment suit.

Raney filed suit in federal district court charging each of the clinics and his

insurance company with malicious prosecution, extortion and conspiracy to

destroy him and his business. According to Raney, Allstate signaled its complicity

in the baseless suits by issuing a reservation of rights letter rather than denying

coverage outright. Raney argued that Allstate benefits from abortion by avoiding

healthcare claims it would otherwise pay over the course of a child’s life. The

defendants responded that Raney had failed to state a claim because, as a matter of

law, the filing of a lawsuit cannot form a predicate act under RICO. The

magistrate judge recommended granting the defendants’ motion, and the district

court adopted that recommendation.

We review de novo the decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Lowell v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d

1228, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999). We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Roberts v. Fla.

Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir.1998). In order to survive a

motion to dismiss in a civil RICO case, a plaintiff must show a “pattern of
We also reject any potential state-law extortion or mail fraud claims as predicate acts in

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this case. Neither Raney’s complaint nor his appellate briefs identify any Florida statute that

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racketeering activity” by alleging that the defendants committed two qualifying

predicate acts. Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935, 948-49 (11th

Cir. 1997). This requires that a plaintiff allege facts that support each statutory

element of a violation of one of the state or federal laws described in 18 U.S.C. §

1961(1). 

In this case, Raney’s RICO claim depends upon his ability to show a

violation of the Hobbs Act, which bars interference in interstate commerce by

means of extortion. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Although Raney alleges various

specific complaints including mail fraud, extortion, and malicious prosecution, all

of these relate to the alleged conspiracy to extort money through the filing of

malicious lawsuits. We agree with the district court that Raney’s argument is

foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198

(11th Cir. 2002). In Pendergraft, the defendants allegedly threatened to sue a

county government by falsely claiming that the County Chairman had threatened

violence against their abortion clinic. We held that neither the threat to litigate nor

the fabrication of evidence behind the lawsuit made the action “wrongful” within

the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and therefore could not be a predicate act under

RICO. Id. at 1207. Raney’s claims are therefore barred by this decision.2
would give rise to a federal RICO violation. Moreover, in order for a state extortion offense to

qualify as a predicate act under the federal RICO statute, the conduct must be capable of being

generically classified as extortionate: that is, “obtaining something of value from another with

his consent induced by the wrongful use of force, fear or threats.” Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for

Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409-410 (2003) (quoting the Model Penal Code). In light of our

decision in Pendergraft, we doubt that the filing of a lawsuit could ever be “wrongful” for the

purposes of RICO. See also I.S. Joseph Co. v. J. Lauritzen A/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267-68 (8th

Cir.1984) (threats to sue, even if groundless or in bad faith, may be tortious under state law but

do not come within the federal extortion statute).

Similarly, we held in Pendergraft that, absent an intent to deceive the victim, the “mailing

of litigation documents, even perjurious ones, did not violate the mail-fraud statute.” 297 F.3d at

1209. Raney does not allege any intent to deceive him, and he therefore cannot establish mail

fraud as a predicate act for his RICO claims. 

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Raney argues that Pendergraft applies only to threats of litigation, rather

than actual litigation. We reject this argument. Although Pendergraft involved

only threatened litigation, the reasoning in that opinion applies equally to litigation

that has already commenced. We noted that courts possess adequate procedures to

distinguish valid claims from invalid claims and held that Congress did not intend

to punish citizens merely for accessing the legal system. Id. at 1206-07. We found

ourselves “troubled by any use of this federal criminal statute to punish civil

litigants.” Id. at 1207 (emphasis in original). We noted that “allowing litigants to

be charged with extortion would open yet another collateral way for litigants to

attack one another.” Id. We also expressed concern about transforming every

state-law malicious prosecution action into a federal crime. Id. at 1207-08. All of

these concerns apply to actual litigation with added force. Furthermore, other

courts have explicitly applied this reasoning to litigation that has already been
The sole case cited by Raney, Florida Evergreen Foliage v. DuPont, 135 F.Supp. 2d 3

1271 (S.D. Fla. 2001), involved a pattern of witness intimidation, fraudulent depositions, and

concealment of data and documents, and, in any case, predated Pendergraft.

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filed. See, e.g., Deck v. Engineered Laminates, 349 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir.

2003) (citing Pendergraft and rejecting “meritless litigation” as a predicate act

under RICO when the suit had actually been filed).3

We also reject Raney’s argument that the district court should have

exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The

decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state claims rests

within the discretion of the district court. Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114,

1119 (11th Cir. 1999). We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any

remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior

to trial. L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th

Cir. 1984). Nothing in this record suggests the district court abused its discretion

in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

AFFIRMED.