1994 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-10-1994

Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Company

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 93-5553

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Recommended Citation

"Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Company" (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 45.

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1 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 93-5553 

___________ 

 ALBERT C. REEVES; 

 DOLORES REEVES, his wife 

 vs. 

 MOBILE DREDGING & PUMPING COMPANY, INC. 

 Albert C. Reeves and 

 Dolores Reeves, 

 Appellants

___________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civ. No. 93-cv-00776) 

___________ 

 

Argued 

April 12, 1994 

Before: BECKER, MANSMANN and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 

(Filed June 13, 1994) 

___________ 

David T. Lewis, Esquire 

George F. Kugler, Jr., Esquire (Argued) 

Archer & Greiner 

One Centennial Square 

P.O. Box 3000 

Haddonfield, NJ 08033 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS 

Mark F. Muller, Esquire (Argued) 

Freehill, Hogan & Mahar 

80 Pine Street 

New York, New York 10005 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE 

___________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT 
2 

__________ 
3 

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 

 On July 20, 1990, Albert C. Reeves was in the process 

of cleaning with a hose the cutter head on the dredging ship, the 

Becky Beth. Reeves was thrown off the dredge onto a blacktop 

ramp four to six feet below, suffering serious personal injuries. 

At that time, the Becky Beth was assigned to a non-navigable lake 

entirely within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

 Reeves filed suit in the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey against Mobile Dredging & Pumping 

Company, Inc., seeking relief under the Jones Act.0 Although 

Jones Act coverage requires that accidents occur on navigable 

waters, Reeves argues that under the "Fleet Seaman Doctrine" a 

seaman does not lose his seaman status when he is temporarily 

assigned to another vessel on non-navigable waters; and thus, 

because he had been assigned to a job on navigable water by a 

previous employer, he is entitled to coverage. 

 We have yet to adopt the Fleet Seaman Doctrine, and we 

take this opportunity to do so now. Nonetheless, because Reeves' 

only assignment with Mobile was on the Becky Beth, which was on 

non-navigable waters, and because his employment with Mobile was 

totally unrelated to his employment at Great Lakes, we hold that 

the Fleet Seaman Doctrine does not afford him relief. We also 

take this opportunity to re-examine our test for seaman status 

and modify it to bring it in line with recent Supreme Court 

 

0 Reeves was joined in the suit by his wife Dolores 

Reeves, whose claims are derivative of her husband's. 
4 

precedent. We will affirm the district court's grant of summary 

judgment to the employer/shipowner. 

I. 

 Mobile Dredging & Pumping Company, Inc., owner of the 

Becky Beth, employed Reeves as a welder for a dredging project 

that was to be performed on Lake Towhee in Quakertown, 

Pennsylvania. Reeves is a maritime dredge welder and has been a 

member of Local Marine Union 25, Operating Engineer's Marine 

Division, since 1956. Apparently the union places its members in 

their various positions when it finds openings. 

 Prior to his employment with Mobile Dredging, Great 

Lakes Dredge & Dock Company employed Reeves on a vessel moored on 

the Staten Island Sound. On January 2, 1990, Reeves was laid off 

temporarily. Pursuant to the union contract, he had the right to 

return to his job when work again became available. He was on 

first call with Great Lakes in late May of 1990 when the union 

asked him to go to work for Mobile Dredging on a temporary, twoweek basis. For reasons unique to his contract with the union, 

Reeves could not reject the offer without jeopardizing future 

employment opportunities with the union.0

 At the conclusion of his two week tenure, Mobile asked 

Reeves to stay on to replace another employee who had become ill. 

 

0 The union is Reeves' business agent. As soon as he is 

laid off from one job he applies to the union for a new position. 

Under the union contract he is not permitted to solicit jobs on 

his own. 
5 

As a result, Reeves continued to work for Mobile Dredging as a 

deckhand for six more weeks. 

 The facts of the accident itself are not in dispute. 

Reeves was assigned the task of cleaning the dredge's cutter head 

which was full of mud and silt from the lake's bottom. Usually 

employees cleaned the cutter head with a 1-1/2 inch fire hose 

attached to a small deck pump. For some reason a deck pump was 

not available, so Reeves attached a 2-1/2 inch fire hose to a 

larger stationary pump. The large pump created an amount of 

pressure in the hose strong enough to throw Reeves off the dredge 

and onto a blacktop covered ramp approximately four to six feet 

below the dredge. 

 As a result of the injuries Reeves received from the 

fall, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey.0 The district court granted 

Mobile Dredge's motion for summary judgment, finding that the 

Becky Beth was on non-navigable waters thereby precluding Jones 

Act benefits.0 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. 

II. 

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury 

in the course of his employment may, at his 

election, maintain an action for damages at 

law, with the right of trial by jury, and in 

such action all statutes of the United States 

modifying or extending the common-law right 

 

0 Reeves filed two separate workers' compensation 

actions, one through the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act, 

and the other pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers 

Compensation Act. The second claim has been stayed during the 

pendency of this admiralty action. 

0 We discuss "navigable" waters in Part II.C., infra. 
6 

or remedy in cases of personal injury to 

railway employees shall apply . . . . 

Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. In effect the Jones Act provides a 

cause of action in negligence for "any seaman" injured "in the 

course of his employment," the liability for which rests with the 

employer. Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231, 

235-36 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 329 (1991). 

 Establishment of seaman status is the threshold for a 

Jones Act trial. (The other elements, "injury" and "in the 

course of employment," are typically easily satisfied.) It has 

been nearly 20 years since we examined our test set forth for the 

establishment of seaman status. We held that an employee 

claiming seaman status must establish: 

"(a) that the ship be in navigation; (b) that 

there be a more or less permanent connection 

with the ship; and (c) that the worker be 

aboard primarily to aid in navigation." 

Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 36 (3d 

Cir. 1975), (quoting M. Norris, The Law of Seaman § 668 at 301 

(3d ed. 1970), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976)). See also

Evans v. United States Arab Shipping Co., 4 F.3d 207, 214-15 (3d 

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1065 (1994). We acknowledge 

that our test is somewhat dated, and informed by more recent 

Supreme Court precedent, we now set about to modify its course.0 

 

0 Other circuits have established different tests. The 

Firth Circuit maintains that: 

The worker claiming such status must 

establish (1) that he is assigned permanently 

to, or performs a substantial part of his 

work on, (2) a vessel in navigation and (3) 
7 

 In a recent Supreme Court decision, the Court 

reexamined seaman status and abandoned the "member of the crew" 

and "aid in navigation" tests, setting forth a new standard 

solely in terms of the employee's connection to a vessel in 

navigation.0 McDermott Int'l Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, ___ 

(1991). In McDermott the Court stated: 

The key to seaman status is employmentrelated connection to a vessel in navigation. 

We are not called upon here to define this 

connection in all details, but we hold that a 

necessary element of the connection is that a 

seaman perform the work of a vessel. In this 

regard, we believe the requirement that an 

 

that the capacity in which he is employed, or 

the duty which he performs, contributes to 

the function of the vessel or the 

accomplishment of its mission. 

Smith v. Odom Offshore Surveys, Inc., 791 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 

1986). 

 The Second Circuit holds that seaman status is met 

where the jury finds that: 

(1) the plaintiff contributed to the function 

of, or helped accomplish the mission of, a 

vessel; (2) the plaintiff's contribution was 

limited to a particular vessel or 

identifiable group of vessels; (3) the 

plaintiff's contribution was substantial in 

terms of its (a) duration or (b) nature; and 

(4) the course of the plaintiff's employment 

regularly exposed the plaintiff to the 

hazards of the sea. 

Latsis v. Chandris, Inc., 62 USLW 2619, 1994 WL 96619 (2d Cir. 

1994) (modifying test to comply with McDermott Int'l Inc. v. 

Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991)). 

0 The "member of the crew" language first surfaced in The 

Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903), and then reappeared in the 

Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, 33 

U.S.C. §§ 901-950. See McDermott, 498 U.S. at ___. The "aid in 

navigation" test was a product of early federal case law. Id. at 

___. 
8 

employee's duties must "contribut[e] to the 

function of a vessel or to the accomplishment 

of its mission" captures well an important 

requirement of seaman status. It is not 

necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or 

contribute to the transportation of the 

vessel, but a seaman must be doing the ship's 

work. 

Id. (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 

1959)). 

 Therefore, in order to comply with McDermott, we must 

abandon the "aid in navigation" element of our test and replace 

it with the apropos language. Hence, for Reeves to establish 

himself as a seaman, he must demonstrate that at the time of his 

injury: (a) he maintained a more or less permanent connection on 

(b) a vessel in navigation; and (c) that his employment 

contributed to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment 

of its mission. 

 Here, the parties do not dispute that Reeves had an 

employment relationship with the defendant Mobile Dredging at the 

time of the accident; nor do they dispute that he was injured in 

the course of his employment. Further, the parties concur that 

his employment with Mobile Dredging was on a vessel in nonnavigable water. The problem here with regard to his status as a 

seaman is whether Reeves' former employment with Great Lakes on 

navigable waters served to give him "seaman status" during his 

temporary assignment with Mobile Dredging on non-navigable 

waters, under the Fleet Seaman Doctrine. As constitutive of this 

inquiry, we will first examine the permanency and nature of 

Reeves' connection with the Becky Beth. 
9 

A. 

 There is seemingly an unresolved issue regarding 

whether the "permanent connection" requirement for seaman status 

has survived McDermott; however, because we find that Reeves 

would satisfy that requirement under either the pre- or postMcDermott analysis, we need not decide this issue. 

 The Fifth Circuit has maintained that the "permanent 

connection" requirement has survived McDermott. Bach v. Trident 

S.S. Co., 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 111 

S. Ct. 2253, reaff'd on remand, 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992). We have acknowledged this 

position, but have failed to reach the issue. Evans v. United 

Arab Shipping Co., 4 F.3d 207, 214-15 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 

denied, 114 S.Ct. 1065 (1994). The Supreme Court has held that 

it is a jury determination whether the injured worker was 

permanently attached to and employed by the vessel as a member of 

its crew. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 372 

(1957). 

 In Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 

F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976), 

we stated: "There must be a more or less permanent connection or 

attachment between the vessel and the worker as opposed to a 

temporary relationship." In Mach v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 317 

F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir. 1963), we held: "The duration of service 

for and upon a vessel may determine whether shipboard work which 

is not normally performed by a ship's company makes the worker a 
10 

crewman, but lack of long continued attachment to the vessel 

cannot, as a matter of law, serve to deny seaman's status under 

the Jones Act to an employee who is injured while assigned to and 

performing normal crew service." See Evans, 4 F.2d at 215 n.7.0

 We begin with the uncontrovertible fact that Reeves was 

hired as a temporary employee of Mobile Dredging. He was 

initially employed for a two week period and then asked to stay 

on to replace an ailing co-worker. Rather than determine whether 

the "permanent connection" requirement survives McDermott, we 

hold that even applying a "permanent connection" analysis, the 

employer's request for Reeves to stay on indefinitely provides 

him the permanent status contemplated in Griffith and Mach. In 

Griffith, the plaintiff's contact with the employer amounted to 

only 3-3/4 days out of the 74 days of his employment relationship 

with the defendant, which we found insufficient to maintain 

seaman status. Reeves' employment with Mobile Dredging was on an 

 

0 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held 

that the permanency factor is not a literal requirement. Ardoin 

v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 641 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981). 

The question whether a claimant was 

"permanently" assigned to a vessel is, thus, 

"more frequently an analytical starting point 

than a self-executing formula." The 

"permanency" requirement is, we think, best 

understood as indicating that in order to be 

deemed a "seaman" within the meaning of the 

Jones Act "a claimant [must] have more than a 

transitory connection" with a vessel or a 

specific group of vessels. 

Id. at 281 (citations omitted). Cf. Latsis v. Chandris, Inc., 

1994 WL 96619 (2d Cir. 1994) (defining permanency as substantial 

in terms of duration and nature). 
11 

indefinite, every day basis. This, we hold, gives him the 

permanent connection to the Becky Beth required under the preMcDermott analysis; notwithstanding that, he would certainly 

satisfy the connection contemplated in McDermott. 

 McDermott does not speak of permanency; rather its 

discussion centered on the requirement that the employee 

contribute to the function of the vessel or assist in the 

accomplishment of its mission. See Southwest Marine, Inc., v. 

Gizoni, 112 S.Ct. 486 (1991) (applying McDermott). Reeves became 

a deckhand for the Becky Beth and at the time of the accident was 

in the process of cleaning the silt and mud from the dredge's 

cutter head, which we assume to be the equipment performing or 

assisting in performing the actual dredging of the bottom of the 

waterway upon which the vessel was working. Thus, it is without 

doubt that Reeves was contributing to the function of the vessel 

and to the accomplishment of its mission; and therefore, assuming 

the non-existence of the permanency requirement, he satisfies the 

connection contemplated in McDermott. 

B. 

 A Jones Act claimant must also establish an employment 

relationship, either with the owner of the vessel or with some 

other employer who assigns the employee to a task creating the 

proper connection with a vessel. Guidry v. South Louisiana 

Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1980).0 

 

0 There is no requirement that the employer be the owner 

or even the operator of the vessel. Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda 
12 

 The existence of the employment relationship is a 

question of fact, and the inquiry turns on the degree of control 

the alleged employer exerts over the employee. Matute, 931 F.2d 

at 236.0 Here it is without doubt that Reeves was an employee 

of Mobile Dredging. Although he was first given a temporary twoweek assignment, the fact that Mobile Dredging asked him to stay 

on indefinitely to replace an ailing co-worker supports his claim 

of an employment relationship. Mobile Dredging does not dispute 

that Reeves was its employee. 

 Additionally, it is not sufficient that Reeves 

establish an employment relationship; as we stated above, he must 

also demonstrate that he contributed to the function of the Becky 

Beth or to the accomplishment of its mission. McDermott, 498 

U.S. at ___. As we so noted above, Reeves' task was cleaning the 

cutter head, and in this, he was contributing to the function of 

the vessel and assisting in the accomplishment of its mission. 

C. 

 

Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Volyrakis 

v. M/V Isabelle, 668 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1982)), cert. 

denied, 1125 S.Ct. 329 (1991). Independent contractors have been 

found to be liable under the Jones Act, and it is even possible 

for a seaman to have more than one Jones Act employer, Guidry, 

614 F.2d at 452, although only one could be sued as the employer 

responsible for the negligent act. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. 

McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791 (1949). 

0 Some of the factors demonstrating control include 

payment, direction, supervision, and discretion to hire and fire. 

Matute, 931 F.2d at 236. If a third party borrows an employee 

from a Jones Act employer, that third party may become a Jones 

Act employer if it assumes the requisite amount of control over 

the employee. Guidry, 614 F.2d at 452. 
13 

 Although the requirement is not expressly stated in the 

statute, the Supreme Court has long required that the injury 

occur through the employee's relationship to a vessel on a 

navigable body of water. Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 6 

(1946). See also McDermott, 498 U.S. at ___. A body of water is 

navigable for purposes of federal admiralty jurisdiction if it is 

one that, by itself or by uniting with other waterways, forms a 

continuous highway capable of sustaining interstate or foreign 

commerce. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). 

 Here Lake Towhee is a man-made, landlocked lake 

entirely within the borders of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

There are no waterways connecting it to any other state. 

Therefore, the district court was correct in holding that an 

intrastate, landlocked lake, in particular Lake Towhee, is nonnavigable for purposes of federal jurisdiction. 

 Reeves concedes that Lake Towhee is a non-navigable 

waterway, and thus the Jones Act is ostensibly unavailing. Reeves 

argues, nonetheless, that under the "Fleet Seaman Doctrine," a 

seaman does not lose his seaman status when his employer 

temporarily assigns him to another vessel on non-navigable 

waters. Although he had not previously worked for Mobile 

Dredging and although it assigned him to a single, non-navigable 

vessel, he suggests that the "Fleet Seaman Doctrine" would apply 

here. We have not had an occasion to examine this rule and 

therefore undertake this task now. 

III. 
14 

 The Fleet Seaman Doctrine is a product of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by virtue of 

Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523 (5th 

Cir. 1960). Braniff was employed as a superintendent in charge 

of maintenance on several ferries operating in the port of New 

Orleans. At the time of the accident Braniff was in a work boat 

tied to the side of one of the employer's ferries, and while he 

was making repairs to the machinery of the ferry, the work boat 

capsized and Braniff drowned. Id. at 525. 

 Braniff was not employed on any particular ferry; 

rather he was responsible for all maintenance and repair work to 

the marine and shore equipment belonging to the company. It was 

common for him and members of his staff to meet each morning at 

the waterfront. He would usually board each of the ferries to 

determine whether any repair or maintenance work was necessary. 

There were times when Braniff assigned tasks to be completed by 

other members of the maintenance crew, and times where his 

personal attention was required on the job. Occasionally, the 

work would take Braniff to the company's shop on shore. And of 

course, Braniff did not maintain his quarters on board any of the 

ferries. He lived ashore and worked daily hours; however, he was 

on 24-hour notice in case of emergencies. Id. at 525-26. 

 The district court held that because Braniff was not a 

member of the crew of a particular vessel, he was not a seaman 

for purposes of the Jones Act; the court therefore granted 

summary judgment for the employer. Id. at 526. The court of 

appeals disagreed, holding that although it is usual for a person 
15 

to have Jones Act seaman status in relation to a particular 

vessel, there is nothing in the concept which limits it to a 

single ship. Braniff, 280 F.2d at 528 (expanding on its decision 

in Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)). The 

court concluded that the elements of seaman status can be 

satisfied, in addition to the traditional way,0 if the employee 

is assigned to several specific vessels or performs a substantial 

part of his work on several specific vessels. Id. (citing 

Robison, 266 F.2d at 779). "Of course, it must not be spasmodic 

and the relationship between the individual and the several 

identifiable ships must be substantial in point of time and 

work." Id. at 528. Braniff was found to qualify as a seaman.0

 

0 In Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 

1959) the court of appeals had held: 

[T]here is an evidentiary basis for a Jones 

Act case to go to the jury: (1) if there is 

evidence that the injured workman was 

assigned permanently to a vessel (including 

special purpose structures not usually 

employed as a means of transport by water but 

designed to float on water) or performed a 

substantial part of his work on the vessel; 

and (2) if the capacity in which he was 

employed or the duties which he performed 

contributed to the function of the vessel or 

to the accomplishment of its mission, or to 

the operation or welfare of the vessel in 

terms of its maintenance during its movement 

or during anchorage for its future trips. 

Id. at 779. This test has been modified through the years. See

DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 959 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (1st 

Cir. 1992). 

0 In another Fifth Circuit case, the court of appeals 

concluded in a similar fashion, expanding on Robison without 

citing Braniff: 
16 

 Reeves relies on another fleet seaman case in support 

of his position: Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 

(5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). 

There a helicopter, used to ferry workmen to and from the 

offshore drilling sites, crashed into the Gulf of Mexico, and the 

estate of one of the passengers brought suit under, inter alia, 

the Jones Act. The district court found that the passenger, 

because he was employed on a fixed drilling platform and not a 

drilling barge, was, as a matter of law, not a seaman under the 

Jones Act. Id. at 432. 

 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that much of 

the evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that during the two 

years before his death, the passenger worked on submersible 

drilling rigs which were previously held to be Jones Act vessels. 

The evidence also showed that Mobil had temporarily assigned the 

 

We do not believe that Offshore Co. v. 

Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959), 

restricts a seaman to a person assigned only 

to one vessel. Rather, a person can be 

assigned to a fleet of vessels and the 

question is sufficient to go to the jury as 

long as he was assigned permanently to these 

vessels or performed a substantial part of 

his work on these vessels and if the capacity 

in which he was employed or the duties which 

he performed contributed to the function of 

these vessels, or to the accomplishment of 

its mission, or to the operation or welfare 

of these vessels in terms of maintenance 

during its movement or during anchorage for 

its future trips. 

Bazile v. Bisso Marine Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 

1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980)(footnote omitted). 
17 

passenger to the fixed drilling platform as a replacement for a 

vacationing co-worker. Id. 

 The court of appeals relied on the proposition that an 

employee may claim seaman status despite being stationed on 

several different vessels during the course of his employment. 

Id. (citing Braniff v. Jackson Avenue-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 

F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1960)). The court noted that once it is 

established that the injured party is a seaman, the Jones Act 

permits recovery even if the plaintiff sues for injuries received 

while off the ship and engaged in temporary work for the employer 

unrelated to the service of the ship. Id. (Citing Braen v. 

Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959)). Consequently, the 

Fifth Circuit held that the situs of work is not determinative in 

a Jones Act case; and thus, the passenger was a seaman despite 

his intermittent temporary assignments to the fixed platforms 

because he worked predominantly on the submersible drilling 

barges. Id. at 433. See Smith v. Odom Offshore Surveys Inc., 

791 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Neither the situs of the 

employee's work, nor the place of injury, is determinative in a 

Jones Act case. A seaman does not lose his status because he is 

temporarily assigned by his employer to duties off his vessel.") 

 In another Jones Act case addressing Higginbotham, the 

Fifth Circuit discussed the fact that once an employee is labeled 

a seaman, his status may be interrupted, either temporarily or 

permanently, depending upon the events that transpire; and 

notwithstanding his or his employer's intentions that he remain 

or again become a seaman. Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors 
18 

Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 1980). The critical inquiry is 

whether the injured party maintained his status as a seaman on 

the date of the injury. See Savoie v. Otto Candies, Inc., 692 

F.2d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith, 791 F.2d at 415. 

The seaman in Higginbotham remained in the 

employment of the same employer throughout. 

It follows from this decision that a seaman's 

status does not cease at the moment he is 

required by his employer to work ashore. 

However, Higginbotham does not imply that a 

maritime worker assigned to work ashore for a 

very long period of time would continue 

indefinitely to be a seaman merely because it 

is contemplated that he will someday return 

to the vessel, nor that a seaman's status 

continues if he commences work for another 

employer. 

Guidry, 614 F.2d at 453. See also Savoie, 692 F.2d at 365-66. 

 Having discussed the development of the Fleet Seaman 

Doctrine and noting that such has not been the rule for the Third 

Circuit, we must now determine whether we will adopt the Fleet 

Seaman Doctrine as espoused in the Fifth Circuit. 

 

IV. 

 The Fifth Circuit precedent is not at all a radical 

vein in maritime jurisprudence. In fact, we view it as a 

consistent expansion of United States Supreme Court precedent. 

For example, in Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 

(1956), the plaintiff, a handyman, was hired to assist in the 

employer's dredging operations. He was injured when a coal stove 

exploded while he was placing signal lanterns from the dredge 

into a shed on shore. The Supreme Court held that occurrence of 
19 

the injury on land was not material, rather Jones Act coverage 

depended only on a finding that the injured party was "an 

employee of the vessel, engaged in the course of his employment" 

at the time of the injury. Id. at 373 (quoting Swanson v. Marra 

Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946), citing O'Donnell v. Great 

Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943)). 

 In Swanson the Supreme Court held that Jones Act 

jurisdiction does not depend on the place of injury, but on the 

nature of the seaman's service, his status as a member of the 

vessel, his relationship to the vessel and its operation in 

navigable waters. Swanson, 328 U.S. at 4-5. Similarly, in 

O'Donnell, the Court held that Jones Act recovery depends, not on 

the place of injury, but on the nature of the service and its 

relationship to the operation of the vessel in navigable waters. 

O'Donnell, 318 U.S. at 42-43. 

 As we stated above, traditionally a seaman's status is 

tied to a particular vessel, resulting in an employee losing his 

seaman status if he is assigned to a non-navigable vessel, even 

if within the employer's fleet. The Fleet Seaman Doctrine in our 

view applies to an employee, one who is predominantly assigned by 

his employer to a navigable vessel, but who occasionally is 

assigned by that same employer to non-navigable vessels. It 

would also apply to one who is assigned to a number of navigable 

vessels and spends some time on shore, as in Braniff. The 

doctrine protects the employee from losing his status as a seaman 

when on temporary non-navigable assignments or when assignments 

to a number of vessels preclude attachment to one. As the 
20 

Supreme Court has recognized, stripping seaman status from such 

an employee, or allowing that same employee to oscillate between 

seaman and non-seaman status, is not only elusive, but in the 

face of injury would be a travesty of justice.0

 Nearly 60 years ago Justice Cardozo, in a case 

construing the meaning of the term "seaman" in the same statute 

that we examine here today, stated that a statute "must be read 

in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be 

obtained." Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934) (holding 

that the master of a tugboat is a seaman within the meaning of 

the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (the Jones Act)). The Court 

stated that the policy of liberal construction announced at the 

statute's inception has been steadfastly maintained. Id. at 156. 

In that vein, we have recently stated that because the Jones Act 

 

0 Seaman status cannot maintain indefinitely where the 

employee is not connected to a navigable vessel. In discussing 

the effect of an assignment to work ashore, the Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit has held: 

[H]ow long a seaman's status continues after 

a shoreside assignment is itself a fact 

question dependent on such factors as the 

duration of the assignment, its relationship 

to the employer's business, whether the 

employee was free to accept or reject it 

without endangering his employment status and 

any other factors relevant to the ultimate 

inquiry: at the moment of injury was the 

employee a seaman by conventional Jones Act 

criteria who happened not to be on navigable 

waters, or was he at that time no longer a 

seaman whatever his past relationship or his 

future prospects? 

Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 453 

(5th Cir. 1980). 
21 

creates new rights for seamen, it shall be liberally construed to 

accomplish its beneficial purposes. Evans v. United Arab 

Shipping Co. S.A.G., 4 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 

Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 

(1949)), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1065 (1994). 

 In light of that liberal construction and the purposes 

to be served by the Jones Act, the Fleet Seaman Doctrine is a 

reasonable extension of the Senko, Swanson and O'Donnell trilogy. 

Indeed, the cases from the Fifth Circuit establishing this rule 

of law have these cases as their genesis. See Magnolia Towing 

Co. v. Pace, 378 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1967); Braniff v. Jackson 

Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1960) 

(citing Robison); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 776-79 

(5th Cir. 1959). See also Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 

U.S. 129, 132-33 (1959). Therefore, we hold that the Fleet 

Seaman Doctrine shall be the rule of law in this circuit in 

analyzing Jones Act cases because we believe, as the Fifth 

Circuit has demonstrated, that the doctrine comports well with 

and flows logically from Supreme Court precedent. 

V. 

 We must now determine whether the Fleet Seaman Doctrine 

as applied to Reeves, affords him any relief. The key to the 

Fleet Seaman Doctrine is that the seaman maintain the employment 

relationship with the same employer. The term "fleet" refers to 

the fleet of vessels owned by the employer, not the fleet of 

vessels on which the employee has worked. See Bach v. Trident 
22 

Steamship Co. Inc., 920 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1991). The twist 

here is that Reeves had maintained the status of a seaman with 

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, but then was laid off prior to his 

injury. Upon taking the new position with Mobile Dredging, 

Reeves lost his seaman status. 

 Reeves asserts that his maritime union assigned him to 

the job, and thus, he should not be deemed to have lost his 

seaman status upon his layoff from Great Lakes. He had been a 

dredge welder for 33 years and a member of the maritime union 

since 1956. His assignment to the Becky Beth at the time of his 

accident was merely temporary, and he had the right to return to 

his position with Great Lakes when work again became available, 

even if it meant leaving the job with Mobile Dredging. Reeves 

submits that he had concurrent job assignments, similar to the 

employee in Higginbotham -- a permanent assignment on navigable 

waters and a temporary assignment on Lake Towhee. His 

assignment, although not by his maritime employer, was through 

his maritime union, which Reeves argues should be viewed as 

standing in the shoes of an employer for purposes of the Fleet 

Seaman Doctrine. 

 We understand Reeves' argument to be threefold. He is 

attempting to combine the status he enjoyed while working for 

Great Lakes with the status he maintained while working for 

Mobile Dredging, to associate himself with the navigable vessels 

comprising the Mobile Dredging fleet although he was assigned 
23 

only to the Becky Beth, and to combine the vessels from each 

employers' fleet into one single fleet.0

 The facts of Senko, Swanson and O'Donnell demonstrate 

that the plaintiffs were contributing to the function of the 

vessel, which, in each case, was operating in navigable waters. 

Only one employer was involved. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has 

held that a fleet is an "identifiable group of vessels acting 

together or under one control." Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., 

Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc). In Barrett

the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument Reeves is making here, 

that a fleet of vessels is any group of vessels an employee 

happens to work aboard. The Fifth Circuit concluded that 

"[u]nless fleet is given its ordinary meaning, the fundamental 

distinction between members of a crew and transitory maritime 

workers such as longshoremen is totally obliterated." Id.

 

0 Reeves further argues that the district court assumed 

for purposes of the defendant's motion that the Becky Beth was to 

be used on navigable waters in the future and that Reeves' 

service to the vessel at the time of injury was in preparation 

for the ship's use in navigable waters. This argument stretches 

the navigable water requirement beyond its limits. The Becky 

Beth was on a non-navigable waterway preparing to continue 

operation on the non-navigable waterway. It is of no matter that 

it was used or will be used again in navigable waters. Because 

the Jones Act protects only seamen, the claimant must be a seaman 

at the time of the injury -- the fact that he was once a seaman 

and that he or his employer intends for him to become a seaman 

once again will not suffice to cloak with seaman status the 

employee who has stepped out of seaman status, regardless of how 

near or remote in time or place, saving, of course, the temporary 

assignment exception set forth in the Senko, Swanson, and 

O'Donnell. Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 

447, 453 (5th Cir. 1980). 
24 

 Here, Reeves did not maintain a relationship with the 

same employer. He was first employed with Great Lakes Dredge and 

Dock and was subsequently laid off. The union then assigned him 

to a position with Mobile Dredging & Pumping. It is without 

doubt that Reeves was a seaman when working for Great Lakes --the 

Staten Island Sound is certainly a navigable waterway. However, 

Great Lakes did not direct Reeves to begin working on the Becky 

Beth, nor did it have any authority over him once he began 

working there. Reeves' employment with Great Lakes was simply 

unrelated to his employment with Mobile Dredging. The fact that 

Reeves came from Great Lakes with seaman status is of no account 

to Mobile Dredging. Therefore, Reeves' attempt to link the 

status he enjoyed while working for Great Lakes with the status 

he maintained while working for Mobile Dredging must fail. 

 Similarly, Reeves' attempt to associate himself with 

the fleet of Mobile Dredging vessels on navigable waters must 

also fail because he was assigned only to the Becky Beth. He was 

never assigned to any other Mobile Dredging vessel nor given any 

other assignment that would connect him to the Mobile Dredging 

fleet. 

 We agree with the en banc opinion in Barrett, that a 

fleet is an identifiable group of vessels acting together or 

under one control. Although the idea of "one control" is not 

entirely definite and will often depend on the circumstances, the 

Becky Beth and the vessels belonging to Great Lakes were 
25 

certainly not part of the same fleet.0 The case law uniformly 

rejects the claim that "fleet" means any group of vessels an 

employee happens to work aboard.0 At a minimum, the ships must 

take their direction from one identifiable central authority to 

constitute a fleet. Here, Great Lakes, because it was a 

 

0 For example, in Bertrand v. International Mooring & 

Marine Inc., 700 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 

1069 (1984), the court held that it would not allow employers to 

deny Jones Act coverage to seaman by arranging with third parties 

to supply its vessels and assign the work. However, the court 

also stated: 

We have never held that a seaman is barred 

from coverage under the Jones Act if the 

employer neither owns nor controls the 

several vessels upon which the seaman works. 

Instead, we have specifically held that in 

the context of the single vessel, the 

employer need not be the owner or operator of 

the vessel for Jones Act liability to attach. 

To require common ownership or control when 

seaman work on several vessels but not when 

they work on a single vessel is inconsistent 

with the liberal construction of the Jones 

Act that has characterized it from the 

beginning and is inconsistent with its 

purposes. 

Id. at 245 (citations omitted). But see Buras v. Commercial 

Testing & Engineering Co., 736 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1984) 

("Bertrand must be read in light of the factual situation it 

involved."). 

0 See Ardleigh v. Schlumberger Ltd., 832 F.2d 933, 934 

(5th Cir. 1987) (holding that employment on 30 unconnected 

vessels does not meet test for seaman status); Lirette v. N.L. 

Sperry Sun, Inc., 831 F.2d 554, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying 

seaman status to a worker who spent 75-80% of his time working on 

drilling rigs owned by 23 different companies) (Langston v. 

Schlumberger Offshore Services, Inc., 809 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th 

Cir. 1987) (working on 15 different vessels belonging to 10 

different employers does not qualify one as a seaman); Bach v. 

Trident Steamship Co., Inc., 920 F.2d 322, 324-26 (5th Cir. 1991) 

(seaman status denied a river pilot who worked on a large number 

of unconnected vessels). 
26 

different company and had no contractual or other similar 

relationship with Mobile Dredging, had no control over the Becky 

Beth. Thus, although Great Lakes had formerly employed Reeves, 

the Becky Beth was simply not part of its fleet. 

 In sum, we must reject Reeves' Jones Act claim because 

his only employment with Mobile Dredging was solely on the Becky 

Beth, which was on non-navigable waters, and because he was 

disassociated from the Great Lakes fleet of vessels at the time 

of his injury. Thus we conclude that the Fleet Seaman Doctrine 

does not save Reeves his Jones Act coverage.0 

 

 

0 We view our decision consistent with that of the Ninth 

Circuit in Stanfield v. Shellmaker, Inc., 869 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 

1989). Stanfield was a dredge surveyor. He designed the dredge 

cuts, plotted the positions and calculated the daily production 

of the vessel upon which he worked. When he completed a job, he 

was laid off until he was rehired for a new job. At the time of 

his accident, Stanfield was working on the dredge ship, the 

Traveler, on a non-navigable waterway -- a landlocked artificial 

waterway lying entirely within the state of California. Similar 

to this case, the dredge was capable of being disassembled and 

transported over land. Id. at 522. Also similar to this case, 

both Stanfield and the Traveler had previously worked on 

navigable waters. 

 Stanfield argued that despite the vessel's operation in 

non-navigable waters, the Fleet Seaman Doctrine, as articulated 

by the Fifth Circuit, qualifies him as a seaman. However, the 

Ninth Circuit, assuming without deciding that the Fleet Seaman 

Doctrine applied, stated that the doctrine was devised to ease 

the requirement that a seaman be assigned permanently to a 

vessel. The court interpreted the Fleet Seaman Doctrine to 

presuppose a permanent assignment to a number of vessels on 

navigable water, not a single vessel on non-navigable waters. 

Thus, because Stanfield was permanently assigned to a vessel 

operating in non-navigable waters, the Fleet Seaman Doctrine was 

unavailing. The court found irrelevant the fact that Stanfield 

had worked on other navigable vessels and that the Traveler had 

traversed on navigable waters. Id. at 525. 
27 

VI. 

 Therefore, although we take this opportunity to adopt 

for this circuit the Fleet Seaman Doctrine, because Reeves was 

not within the fleet of vessels owned by Great Lakes Dredge and 

Dock, his original employer, at the time of his injury, but 

rather was employed by Mobile Dredging on a single vessel on a 

non-navigable waterway, Jones Act coverage is not available to 

him. We will thus enter an order affirming the judgment of the 

district court.