Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices 26733 

1For the purpose of this Notice of Inquiry (NOI), 

the use of the word ‘‘cell phone’’ will refer to any 

wireless, portable device that is available to the 

public on a subscription or prepaid basis for 

delivering voice and/or data services such as text 

messages. It includes, for example, phones 

operating within the Cellular Radio Service in the 

800 MHz bands; broadband Personal 

Communications Services (PCS) in the 1.9 GHz 

bands; the Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) in 

the 1.7 GHz band; Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) 

services in the 800 and 900 MHz bands; and any 

future mobile wireless devices that plan to operate 

in bands such as the 700 MHz band. 

subject merchandise; and (3) no 

compelling reasons for denial exist, we 

are granting this request and are 

postponing the final determination until 

no later than 135 days after the 

publication of this notice in the Federal 

Register. Suspension of liquidation will 

be extended accordingly. 

ITC Notification 

In accordance with section 733(f) of 

the Act, we have notified the ITC of the 

Department’s preliminary affirmative 

determination. If the Department’s final 

determination is affirmative, the ITC 

will determine before the later of 120 

days after the date of this preliminary 

determination or 45 days after our final 

determination whether imports of 

copper pipe and tube from Mexico are 

materially injuring, or threatening 

material injury to, the U.S. industry. See 

section 735(b)(2) of the Act. Because we 

are postponing the deadline for our final 

determination to 135 days from the date 

of the publication of this preliminary 

determination, the ITC will make its 

final determination no later than 45 

days after our final determination. 

Public Comment 

Interested parties are invited to 

comment on the preliminary 

determination. Interested parties may 

submit case briefs to the Department no 

later than seven days after the date of 

the issuance of the last verification 

report in this proceeding. See 19 CFR 

351.309(c)(1)(i). Rebuttal briefs, the 

content of which is limited to the issues 

raised in the case briefs, must be filed 

within five days from the deadline date 

for the submission of case briefs. See 19 

CFR 351.309(d)(1) and 19 CFR 

351.309(d)(2). A list of authorities used, 

a table of contents, and an executive 

summary of issues should accompany 

any briefs submitted to the Department. 

Executive summaries should be limited 

to five pages total, including footnotes. 

Further, we request that parties 

submitting briefs and rebuttal briefs 

provide the Department with a copy of 

the public version of such briefs on 

diskette. In accordance with section 

774(1) of the Act, the Department will 

hold a public hearing, if timely 

requested, to afford interested parties an 

opportunity to comment on arguments 

raised in case or rebuttal briefs, 

provided that such a hearing is 

requested by an interested party. See 

also 19 CFR 351.310. If a timely request 

for a hearing is made in this 

investigation, we intend to hold the 

hearing two days after the rebuttal brief 

deadline date at the U.S. Department of 

Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution 

Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230, at 

a time and in a room to be determined. 

Parties should confirm by telephone, the 

date, time, and location of the hearing 

48 hours before the scheduled date. 

Interested parties who wish to request 

a hearing, or to participate in a hearing 

if one is requested, must submit a 

written request to the Assistant 

Secretary for Import Administration, 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 

1870, within 30 days of the publication 

of this notice. 

Requests should contain: (1) the 

party’s name, address, and telephone 

number; (2) the number of participants; 

and (3) a list of the issues to be 

discussed. At the hearing, oral 

presentations will be limited to issues 

raised in the briefs. 

This determination is issued and 

published pursuant to sections 733(f) 

and 777(i)(1) of the Act. 

Dated: May 5, 2010. 

Ronald K. Lorentzen, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2010–11342 Filed 5–11–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–S 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration 

[Docket No. 100504212–0212–01] 

Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use 

in Prisons 

AGENCY: National Telecommunications 

and Information Administration, U.S. 

Department of Commerce. 

ACTION: Notice of inquiry. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Commerce’s National 

Telecommunications and Information 

Administration (NTIA) seeks comment 

on technical approaches to preventing 

contraband cell phone use in prisons. 

Congress tasked NTIA with developing, 

in coordination with the Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC), 

the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 

and the National Institute of Justice 

(NIJ), a plan to investigate and evaluate 

how wireless jamming, detection and 

other technologies might be utilized for 

law enforcement and corrections 

applications in Federal and State prison 

facilities. To assist in its evaluation of 

these technologies, NTIA requests 

information from the public on 

technologies that would significantly 

reduce or eliminate contraband cell 

phone use without negatively affecting 

commercial wireless and public safety 

services (including 911 calls and other 

government radio services) in areas 

surrounding prisons. 

DATES: Comments are requested on or 

before June 11, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: Parties may mail written 

comments to Richard J. Orsulak, 

Emergency Planning and Public Safety 

Division, Office of Spectrum 

Management, National 

Telecommunications and Information 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, 

NW., Suite 600B, Washington, DC 

20005, with copies to Edward Drocella, 

Spectrum Engineering and Analysis 

Division, Office of Spectrum 

Management, National 

Telecommunications and Information 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue, 

NW., Room 6725, Washington, DC 

20230. Alternatively, comments may be 

electronically submitted in Microsoft 

Word format to 

contrabandcellphones@ntia.doc.gov. 

Comments will be posted on NTIA’s 

Web site for viewing at http:// 

www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/ 

contrabandcellphones/. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Richard J. Orsulak, Emergency Planning 

and Public Safety Division, Office of 

Spectrum Management, National 

Telecommunications and Information 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, 

NW., Suite 600B, Washington, DC 

20005; telephone (202) 482–9139 or email rorsulak@ntia.doc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Overview 

The mobile phone industry has 

enjoyed significant growth since the 

inception of the analog wireless cell 

phone network in the early 1980s.1 The 

1990s saw the development of digital 

networks, and thereafter, high-speed 

data networks became available to 

consumers. The growth of the mobile 

phone industry has been fueled, in part, 

by consumer demand for instant access 

anywhere and anytime. Features such as 

data, image, and video communications 

have also contributed to the 

overwhelming demand for mobile 

WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES

26734 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices 

2CTIA Wireless Quick Facts, available at http:// 

www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/ 

10323. 

3 Id. 

4At the end of 2008, Federal and State 

correctional authorities had jurisdiction over 

roughly 1.6 million prisoners, of which over 

200,000 (about 13 percent) were housed in Federal 

facilities. The Federal and State prison population 

rose by approximately 1 percent from year-end 2007 

to 2008. See Sabol, William J., Heather C. West, and 

Matthew Cooper, ‘‘Prisoners in 2008,’’ Bureau of 

Justice Statistics Bulletin, U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice 

Statistics, Dec. 2009, page 16, available at http:// 

bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf. 

5Special Report, Inmate Cell Phone Use 

Endangers Prison and Public Safety, Office of the 

Inspector General, State of California, May 2009, 

available at http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/ 

BCI/Special%20Report%20of%20Inmate

%20Cell%20Phone%20Use.pdf. 

6State of Maryland Fact Sheet, Keeping 

Communities Safe, Maryland Department of Public 

Safety and Correctional Services, Feb. 2010. 

7See, e.g., Department of Justice, Office of Justice 

Programs, National Institute of Justice, Cell Phones 

Behind Bars, Dec. 2009, available at http:// 

www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/227539.pdf; 

Washington Examiner, Drug Dealer Who Planned 

Murder Gets Life Sentence, Scott McCabe, May 4, 

2009, available at http:// 

www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/crime/Drugdealer-who-planned-murder-gets-life-sentence44327767.html; Wired Magazine, Prisoners Run 

Gangs, Plan Escapes, and Even Order Hits With 

Smuggled Cellphones, Vince Beiser, May 22, 2009, 

available at http://www.wired.com/politics/law/ 

magazine/17-06/ff_prisonphones. Contraband cell 

phone use is a problem in Federal prison facilities 

as well. See Testimony of Harley J. Lappin, 

Director, U.S. Bureau of Prisons before the U.S. 

Congress, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget 

Request for the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshal 

Service, and the Office of the Federal Detention 

Trustee, available at http://www.november.org/

stayinfo/breaking08/LappinTestimony.html. 

8S. 251, Safe Prisons Communications Act of 

2009, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/

cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong

_bills&docid=f:s251es.txt.pdf. The Bill is under 

consideration in the House. 

9S. 1749, The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 

2010, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ 

cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills

&docid=f:s1749is.txt.pdf. 

10H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111–336 (2009), Division 

B, Title 1, Page 619, available at http:// 

frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ 

getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports

&docid=f:hr366.111.pdf. The language specifically 

refers to methods of preventing contraband cell 

phone use within prison facilities. Jamming and 

detecting cell phone uses for other applications 

(such as within movie theaters) are not germane to 

either this NOI or NTIA’s evaluation. 

11 Id. 

12Although other contraband interdiction 

technologies may help to prevent the use of, or 

access to, contraband cell phones in prisons (such 

as x-rays, dogs, body scanning imagery, and other 

methods which detect contraband phones hidden 

on prison employees, visitors, and inmates), this 

NOI and NTIA’s subsequent report will be limited 

to radio frequency (RF)-based, wireless technology 

solutions. 

13 47 U.S.C. Sections 301, 302a, 333. The FCC had 

reiterated this fact in a Public Notice, Sale or Use 

of Transmitters Designed to Prevent, Jam or 

Interfere with Cell Phone Communications is 

Prohibited in the United States, DA–05–1776, June 

27, 2005, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 

edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-1776A1.pdf. 

14See, e.g., Letter from Devon Brown, Director, 

District of Columbia Department of Corrections, to 

Michael Copps, Acting Chairman, Federal 

Communications Commission, Feb. 2, 2009; Letter 

from Howard Melamed, CEO, CellAntenna 

Corporation, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, 

Federal Communications Commission, March 3, 

2009. The cellular radio service and other 

commercial wireless services fall under the 

auspices of the FCC rules and regulations, which 

are promulgated in Title 47 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (C.F.R.). See http://wireless.fcc.gov/

index.htm?job=rules_and_regulations. 

services and applications. As of 

December 2009, there were 

approximately 286 million wireless 

subscriber connections in the United 

States compared to nearly 208 million 

in December of 2005, which represents 

an increase of 38 percent.2 During this 

same time period, the number of 

minutes used (on an annual basis) 

increased by 150 percent, while the 

wireless penetration (as a percentage of 

total U.S. population) increased from 69 

percent to 91 percent.3 These trends 

indicate that more people are relying on 

wireless mobile devices to communicate 

for their daily business and personal 

needs. 

The use of contraband cell phones by 

inmates has risen as the U.S. prison 

population continues to expand.4 The 

number of cell phones confiscated by 

prison officials has dramatically 

increased in only a few years. For 

example, during 2006 California 

correctional officers seized 

approximately 261 cell phones in the 

State’s prisons and camps; by 2008, that 

number increased ten fold to 2,811.5

Maryland and other States have also 

seen a rise in the number of confiscated 

cell phones in their State prisons. In 

2009, Maryland prison officials 

confiscated nearly 1,700 phones, up 

from approximately 1,200 phones the 

year before.6 This increase in cell phone 

use by inmates is a mounting concern 

among correctional administrators 

across the country.7

Recognizing the need to take action to 

curb contraband cell phone use, the 

United States Senate passed a bill in 

2009 that would amend the 

Communications Act of 1934 to 

authorize the FCC to permit the 

supervisory authority of a correctional 

facility to operate a system within the 

facility to prevent, jam, or otherwise 

interfere with unauthorized wireless 

communications by individuals held in 

the facility.8 Also, legislation has been 

introduced and passed in the U.S. 

Senate that would prohibit Federal 

prisoners from possessing or using cell 

phones and similar wireless devices.9

In December 2009, Congress inserted 

language in the Conference Report to the 

Department of Commerce FY 2010 

Appropriations tasking NTIA, in 

coordination with the FCC, BOP, and 

NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate and 

evaluate how wireless jamming, 

detection, and other technologies might 

be utilized for law enforcement and 

corrections applications in Federal and 

State prison facilities.10 Congress also 

asked that the plan consider the adverse 

effects that these technologies impose 

on commercial wireless and public 

safety services in areas surrounding the 

prisons.11 This NOI seeks public input 

to assist NTIA with its evaluation of 

technologies to prevent the use of 

contraband cell phones in Federal and 

State facilities.12

NTIA understands that a number of 

technological approaches exist that 

could help prison officials block or 

reduce unauthorized use of cell phones 

by inmates provided that these 

approaches could be legally 

implemented. NTIA, in coordination 

with the FCC, BOP, and NIJ, have 

preliminarily identified three categories 

of contraband cell phone intervention: 

jamming, managed network access, and 

detection. 

Jamming 

Radio jamming is the deliberate 

radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of 

electromagnetic energy for the purpose 

of disrupting use of electronic devices, 

equipment, or systems—in this case, 

mobile devices such as cell phones. A 

cell phone works by communicating 

with its service network through a cell 

tower or base station. These cell towers 

divide an area of coverage into cells, 

which range in size from a few city 

blocks to hundreds of square miles. The 

base station links callers into the local 

public switched telephone network, 

another wireless network, or even the 

Internet. 

A jamming device transmits on the 

same radio frequencies as the cell 

phone, disrupting the communication 

link between the phone and the cell 

phone base station, essentially 

rendering the hand-held device 

unusable until such time as the jamming 

stops. Jamming devices do not 

discriminate among cell phones within 

range of the jamming signal—both 

contraband and legitimate cell phones 

are disabled. Currently, the operation by 

non-Federal entities of transmitters 

designed to jam or block wireless 

communications violates the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended.13 Nonetheless, several groups 

have filed with the FCC petitions for 

waivers to permit the use of cell phone 

jammers in prisons.14 Groups such as 

WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices 26735 

15Letter from Chris Fischer, President, 

Association of Public Safety Communications 

Officials International, Inc. to Michael Copps, 

Acting Chairman, Federal Communications 

Commission, March 13, 2009, available at http:// 

files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Position_Papers_

Letter_APCO_Re

_cell_phone_jamming_3_13_09.pdf; CTIA Policy 

Topics, Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons, 

available at http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/ 

policy_topics/topic.cfm/TID/58. 

16See, e.g., Wired, Prison Mobile Phone Debate 

Jammed up in the System, Ryan Singel, March 15, 

2010, available at http://www.wired.com/epicenter/ 

2010/03/prison-mobile-phone-debate-jammed-upin-the-system/. Also, a recent survey at the 

International CTIA Wireless Conference showed 

that nearly three-quarters of respondents favor 

jamming of cell phones in prisons. See http:// 

www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/survey-atinternational-ctiawireless,1231800.shtml#ixzz0ju7Exz3B. 

17See, e.g., Letter from James D. Schlichting, 

Acting Chief Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 

Federal Communications Commission to Devon 

Brown, Director, District of Columbia Department of 

Corrections, DA 09–354, Feb. 18, 2009, available at 

http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 

DA-09-354A1.pdf; Letter from James D. Schlichting, 

Acting Chief Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 

Federal Communications Commission to Howard 

Melamed, CEO, CellAntenna Corporation, DA 09– 

622, March 17, 2009, available at http:// 

fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09- 

622A1.pdf. 

18Maryland Department of Public Safety and 

Correctional Services, Overview of Cell Phone 

Demonstration, available at http:// 

www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/media/pdf/

FinalReport_2008-09-10.pdf. One managed access 

technology was demonstrated and operated 

pursuant to an experimental license granted by the 

FCC for this occasion. 

19Maryland Department of Public Safety and 

Correctional Services, Non-Jamming Cell Phone 

Pilot Summary, Jan. 20, 2010, available at http:// 

www.dpscs.state.md.us/media/Cell-Phone-PilotSummary_Final.pdf. 

20Supra note 18 at page 5. The conclusions 

reached from the demonstrations were that each 

State will have to identify its own specific needs 

since the technology is such that one solution may 

not work for every facility within a given State. 

Supra note 18 at page 6. 21 Id. 

the Association of Public Safety 

Communications Officials International, 

Inc. and CTIA have opposed the use of 

jamming for fear of interference to 

critical public safety operations and 

legitimate cell phone use in and around 

prisons.15 Others, however, have 

supported its use in prisons.16 Stating 

that it did not have the authority to 

permit such jamming, the FCC has 

denied the petitions.17

Managed Access 

Managed access systems intercept 

calls in order to allow corrections 

officials to prevent inmates from 

accessing carrier networks. The cell 

signal is not blocked by a jamming 

signal, but rather, is captured (or rerouted) and prevented from reaching the 

intended base station, thereby 

disallowing the completion of the call. 

This technology permits calls by known 

users (i.e., prison-authorized cell phone 

numbers) by handing them off to the 

network, and prevents others by 

denying access to the network. It is 

unclear whether or how well these 

systems can discriminate among prisonauthorized cell phone numbers and 

‘‘unknown’’ phones to avoid capturing/ 

cancelling calls that do not involve 

inmates. 

As a tool to deal with contraband cell 

phone use, some of these systems 

employ passive technology that detects 

cell phone use and collects data from 

active cell phones. Some systems deny 

access to calls from numbers they do not 

recognize. Other techniques redirect cell 

phone transmissions to portable 

antennas set up specifically around the 

prison, and only allow communication 

from prison-authorized cell phones to 

be forwarded to carrier cell towers. 

Denial of service approaches use 

electronic hardware located in the 

vicinity of the cell phone user to ‘‘spoof’’ 

the cell phone into thinking it is 

communicating with the carrier tower. 

The cell phone user receives a message 

that indicates that there is no service 

available. This type of denial of service 

system operates independently of the 

carrier and spoofs all cell calls. 

In an effort to eliminate the 

unauthorized use of cell phones in 

Maryland State prisons, in 2009 the 

Maryland Department of Public Safety 

and Correctional Services hosted a 

demonstration of various non-jamming 

technologies, including managed access 

systems.18 In January 2010, they issued 

a follow-on report.19 The demonstration 

showed, among other things, that: (1) 

Several intelligence gathering abilities 

could be implemented depending upon 

specific laws governing each State; and 

(2) the types of technology tested could 

allow certain phones to operate and 

allow 911 calls to be processed.20

Detection 

Detection is the process of locating, 

tracking, and identifying various 

sources of radio transmissions—in this 

case, cell phone signals. Detection, or 

direction finding, is used in a wide 

variety of applications including, for 

example, cell phone assignments, the 

location of 911 emergency calls and 

marine distress calls. For accurate 

position location in an environment 

such as within a prison facility, 

detection technology triangulates a cell 

phone signal and requires the use of 

correctional staff to physically search a 

small area (such as a prison cell) and 

seize the identified cell phone. This 

may involve placing direction-finding 

antennas or sensors (connected wireline or wirelessly) to a computer to 

identify a cell phone call and locate the 

origin of the call. Additionally, handheld cell phone detectors are able to 

scan frequencies within correctional 

facilities and detect the location of the 

caller. These systems can only detect a 

cell phone when it is in use—either 

placing or receiving a call. The devices 

are generally ‘‘passive’’ receive-only 

devices, and do not necessarily require 

any authorization or license for the 

equipment or the user to operate. 

Additionally, the Maryland 

Department of Public Safety and 

Correctional Services demonstration 

included a number of detection 

technologies, and the report concluded 

that there were varying degrees of 

accuracy in terms of cell phone 

detection based upon each vendor’s 

technological abilities.21

Request for Comments 

NTIA requests comment on the 

questions below in order to assist in 

evaluating technology solutions to 

prevent contraband cell phone use in 

prisons. These questions are not a 

limitation on comments that may be 

submitted. When making reference to 

studies, research, and other empirical 

data that are not widely published, 

commenters should provide copies of 

the referenced material with the 

submitted comments. Comments will be 

posted on the NTIA Web site for 

viewing at http://www.ntia.doc.gov. 

1. Technologies or Approaches 

We have initially identified three 

broad categories of approaches that 

provide solutions for preventing 

contraband cell phone use: jamming, 

managed access, and detection. Are 

these characterizations accurate and 

complete? Are there technologies other 

than these categories, and if so, how do 

they work? What approaches can be 

taken to jam within irregular structures 

such as prisons, within indoor and 

outdoor areas and within rural versus 

urban settings? What specific types of 

managed access and detection 

techniques are available? What risk does 

each system pose to legitimate cell 

phone use by the general public outside 

the prison? What risk does each system 

pose to public safety and government 

use of spectrum? How can any of the 

foregoing risks be mitigated or 

eliminated? What are the benefits and 

drawbacks of implementing these 

techniques? Are certain systems more 

suitable for certain prison environments 

or locations? To what extent does the 

installation of each system require a 

WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES

26736 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices 

22Supra note 13. 23A swept frequency jammer transmitter operates 

by repetitively frequency-sweeping (referred to as 

chirping) a carrier wave signal across the bands to 

be jammed. 

24The duty cycle is the fraction of time that a 

transmitter is in an ‘‘active’’ state. 

25The IPC is a relative or absolute interfering 

signal level at the receiver input, under specified 

conditions, such that the allowable performance 

degradation is not exceeded. 

customized approach for each prison? 

How disruptive is the installation 

process? What approaches can be used 

in the implementation of systems 

employing detection techniques? How 

does each system provide for 

completion of critical calls or radio 

communications such as those from 

public safety officers (including use of 

handheld two-way radios) or 911? What 

ability does each of these technologies 

possess for upgrades to include new 

frequency bands, technologies, 

modulation techniques, etc. as they are 

introduced into the marketplace? How 

quickly can they be upgraded? 

2. Devices and Frequency Bands 

Many types of wireless mobile 

devices are available to consumers from 

a plethora of commercial carriers (e.g., 

push-to-talk, cell phones, smart phones, 

personal digital assistants). These 

devices operate, consistent with FCC 

rules, in a number of frequency bands 

depending upon the types of services 

and capabilities/features that the 

wireless carriers offer. To eliminate 

contraband cell phone use in prisons, 

techniques must be identified that have 

the capability to thwart the use from the 

gamut of devices and spectrum bands/ 

frequencies in which these phones 

operate. These devices and associated 

frequency bands are: Cellular (824–849/ 

869–894 MHz); PCS (1850–1990 MHz); 

AWS (1710–1755/2110–2170 MHz); and 

SMR (806–824 and 851–869; 896–901 

and 935–940 MHz). Additionally, 

spectrum bands, such as the 698–806 

MHz (700 MHz) band, 2110–2170 MHz, 

and the 2500–2690 MHz band, will soon 

offer newer, faster, and more 

bandwidth-intensive features to the 

public. Further, other devices that 

operate in such radio services as the 

Family Radio (462.5625–467.7125 MHz 

band) and General Mobile Radio (462— 

467 MHz band) Services present 

possible avenues for illegal or 

unauthorized communications by 

inmates. While the range of these two 

services is relatively small, both use 

handsets for two-way voice 

communication and could be attractive 

to inmates in urban environments. 

Undoubtedly, any of these devices 

could find their way to prison inmates 

as well. What other frequency bands 

could be used by technologies that 

inmates could acquire with which to 

communicate? 

Do, or will, the technologies 

identified above effectively cover all of 

the bands likely to be used for 

commercial wireless services and how 

do, or will, they do so? Specifically, 

which frequency bands does each 

approach currently best address, and 

which could they best address in the 

future? How can the technologies 

prevent an inmate from communicating 

with a device employing proprietary 

technology (e.g., SMR radios)? Will the 

technologies deal with phones that plan 

to operate in other bands where new 

services will be offered in the future, 

such as in the 700 MHz band? What will 

be necessary to extend the capabilities 

of the technologies to new bands (new 

hardware or software, new antennas, 

agreements, etc.)? 

3. Interference to Other Radio Services 

Avoiding interference to authorized 

cell phone reception E83A; as well as 

other radio services outside the cell 

phone bands E83A; is a critical element 

in evaluating the various technologies. 

The longstanding radio spectrum 

regulation principle, embodied in the 

Communications Act of 1934, is to 

preclude harmful interference and not 

to block access to or receipt of 

information transmitted wirelessly.22 In 

addition to producing emissions in 

specific bands and within specific areas 

to deny service, jamming systems also 

produce unwanted signals outside of 

their intended operating bands and are 

not naturally confined to a prescribed 

area. These signals have the potential to 

produce interference to other radio 

services operating in numerous 

frequency bands (including Federal 

Government operations) and outside of 

the prison facility. 

If jamming configurations are set up 

properly (that is, based upon sitespecific radio frequency (RF) 

engineering), can these unwanted 

emissions be reduced or eliminated at a 

distance that is based on jammer and 

site parameters at each individual 

prison? Is the location of the prison 

(rural versus urban) also a factor, and if 

so, why and how would that affect the 

feasibility or implementation of a 

jamming system? 

What jammer system parameters (e.g., 

power levels, modulation, antennas) can 

be used to control out-of-band (OOB) 

and unwanted emissions? Which of 

these parameters have the greatest 

impact on the effectiveness of the 

jammer transmitter? Swept frequency 

techniques are often employed in 

jamming systems.23 What other 

jamming techniques can be employed to 

disrupt wireless communication 

systems? Are filters commercially 

available that could be used to reduce 

the OOB and unwanted emission levels 

from jammer transmitters? Commenters 

should provide details on the 

specifications for the filter (e.g., 

manufacturer, model number). Will 

jamming multiple frequency bands 

simultaneously affect the emission 

characteristics of the jammer transmitter 

(e.g., generation of intermodulation 

products)? 

NTIA also seeks comment on other 

techniques that cell phone jammers can 

implement to reduce interference to 

other radio services. Can spectrum 

sensing be used in conjunction with 

jamming techniques to reduce the 

transmit duty cycle of the jammer 

transmitter? 24 Are there variable 

strength cell phone jammers that are 

capable of dynamically adjusting their 

strength? What are the factors that can 

vary the signal strength of the jammer if 

it is putting out too much power? 

The emissions from jammer 

transmitters can potentially cause 

interference to receivers beyond the 

intended jamming area. A critical 

parameter necessary to assess the 

potential impact to a receiver is the 

interference protection criteria (IPC).25

There are currently no industry-adopted 

or Federally-mandated standards for inband interference from other systems to 

wireless mobile handset receivers. How 

should the IPC for these handsets be 

established? What IPC values should be 

used for assessing potential interference 

to these handset receivers? 

An approach to regulating jammer 

transmitters could be to establish a 

distance at which the jammer signal 

must be below a specified level 

necessary to protect in-band and out-ofband receivers. An alternative approach 

could be to specify maximum allowable 

equivalent isotropically radiated power 

(EIRP) limits necessary to protect inband and out-of-band receivers as a 

function of frequency. Since the 

variations in the jammer configurations, 

effects of multiple jamming transmitters, 

structural characteristics of buildings, 

and propagation factors will be different 

depending on the installation and the 

facility, can analytical analysis 

techniques be used to develop the 

distances or EIRP limits necessary to 

protect in-band and out-of-band 

receivers? If analytical analysis 

techniques can be employed, explain 

the methodology to be used and all 

appropriate conditions considered in 

the analysis, including, but not limited 

to, propagation loss modeling and 

WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices 26737 

26State governmental entities are eligible to hold 

authorizations for frequencies in the Public Safety 

Pool to operate radio stations for transmission of 

communications essential to its official activities. 

See 47 CFR 90.20. BOP uses medical telemetry at 

Federal Medical Centers and at some non-medical 

prisons. Additionally, some inmates have devices 

that are monitored remotely by local hospitals. 

27More than one in five households have 

discontinued wireline service (or chosen not to use 

it) and rely solely on wireless communications as 

their primary telephone service. See Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, Wireless 

Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the 

National Health Interview Survey, July-Dec. 2008, 

May 6, 2009, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 

data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless200905.pdf. 

28National Emergency Number Association, Cell 

Phones and 911, http://www.nena.org/cellularwireless-911. See also FCC Consumer Facts, 

Wireless 911 Services, available at http:// 

www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/ 

wireless911srvc.html. As a case-in-point, there has 

been a sharp increase by residents of Jefferson 

County, Arkansas dialing 911 from cell phones, 

where there are three State prisons. Nearly 70 

percent of calls to 911 in 2008 were made from a 

cell phone. See Arkansas Daily-Gazette, Cell Phone 

Calls Place Burden on Ark. 911 Dispatch Center, 

Mike Linn, Oct. 5, 2009, available at http:// 

www.firerescue1.com/fire-products/ 

communications/articles/595629-Cell-phone-callsplace-burden-on-Ark-911-dispatch-center/. 

29However, at some distance away from the 

prison which is unique to each prison’s features 

and jammer set-up, jamming contraband cell phone 

signals should not affect authorized or 911 calls. 

building attenuation modeling. How 

should the effect of multiple jammer 

transmitters and antennas be taken into 

consideration? Are there other 

approaches that can be used to regulate 

jammer systems? 

The impact of jamming signals would 

also depend on the prison environment. 

Outside of the facility, will the 

variations in the measured levels of the 

jammer transmitter signal make it 

difficult to distinguish such a signal 

from the cellular and PCS signals in the 

environment, for example? If so, is this 

problem exacerbated in areas where 

there is a high density of cellular and 

PCS signals, such as in and around an 

urban prison location. The variations in 

the measured jammer transmitter signal 

levels could likely be due to 

propagation effects and building 

attenuation losses that will be different 

at each facility and for each jammer 

installation. Furthermore, depending on 

the relative signal levels, it can be 

difficult to differentiate between the 

measured jammer transmitter signal and 

the cellular and PCS signals. Given 

variations in signal levels and the 

potential to distinguish the jammer 

signal from the background signals, is it 

possible to measure accurately the 

jammer transmitter signal outside of a 

facility? 

Within a facility, is it possible to 

distribute the jammer transmitter power 

spatially across an array of antennas (or, 

in some cases, lossy cables) in order to 

better control and provide lower power 

density around individual antennas 

than could be produced if a single 

antenna were used to radiate a highpower signal? What techniques can be 

employed in the design of the jamming 

system to reduce the potential for 

interference to in-band and out-of-band 

receivers? Can restrictions be placed on 

the jammer transmitter antenna height 

to minimize the potential for 

interference outside of the area that is 

being jammed? Is it possible to employ 

directional or sector antennas to focus 

the jammer transmitter signal in the 

intended areas within a facility while 

minimizing the signal levels outside of 

the facility? Can down tilting the 

antennas be used to minimize the 

jammer transmitter signal level at the 

horizon? What restrictions can be 

placed on the antennas without 

impacting the effectiveness of the 

jamming system? 

Each prison is unique in size, location 

and structure. Jammer set-up 

configurations cannot be applied 

broadly to all jammer systems in all 

locations. The variations in the jammer 

transmitter signal levels outside of the 

facility depend on a number of factors 

such as building structures, antenna 

deployment, and background signals. 

These factors could have an effect on 

the ability to measure accurately jammer 

transmitter emission levels. Given all of 

the possible variations in a jammer 

system installation, will operators need 

to conduct on-site compliance 

measurements at each facility? What 

techniques should be used to measure 

the emissions of a jammer system? Is it 

possible to accurately measure the 

jammer transmitter signals in the 

presence of other background signals? 

How shall an operator, in its request for 

authorization of such equipment, be 

required to demonstrate that it meets 

any interference protection 

requirements? 

Do other technologies or approaches 

have the potential to interfere with other 

authorized radio services within the 

same bands or adjacent bands? If so, 

under what conditions and how can an 

operator mitigate interference? In some 

of the bands identified above, public 

safety frequencies are interleaved or 

operate in close proximity with 

frequencies used by mobile devices, for 

instance in the 800 MHz SMR and 700 

MHz bands. How will internal and 

external land mobile systems, including 

systems used by the prisons themselves, 

as well as other public safety operations, 

be protected? Are there other radio 

communications systems within prisons 

that could also experience interference, 

such as internal private land mobile 

systems used by prison officials or 

medical telemetry devices in prison 

infirmaries? 26

4. Protecting 911 Calls and Authorized 

Users 

The preservation and protection of 

calls to 911 from cell phones is a 

paramount concern as more consumers 

rely on mobile devices.27 The number of 

cell phones calling 911 has been 

steadily increasing as more consumers 

are using them. The National Emergency 

Number Association estimates that 

wireless telephone users account for 

nearly half of the calls to 911.28

Jamming radio signals in and around 

prisons cannot differentiate between 

normal cell phone traffic and 911 

calls.29 Managed access systems, 

however, can be selective and designed 

to ignore 911 calls (i.e., letting them 

connect to the network), and detection 

systems typically use passive devices 

that do not affect transmission or 

reception. How are 911 calls preserved 

in areas around the prisons where the 

public is making a call to 911 if they 

come in proximity to the prison? Are 

there any other technologies identified 

that can protect 911 calls and how do 

they do so? 

Wireless consumers expect their 

wireless calls to be completed without 

being dropped or busy. In and around 

prisons, consumers and public safety 

officials, as authorized users of the 

system, will expect their wireless 

devices to communicate. How are 

authorized users allowed to make calls 

with the technologies described? If the 

caller passes through a ‘‘dummy’’ cell 

site set-up within the prison vicinity, 

will the call go through if a call is 

initiated within that cell (e.g., will it 

result in a busy signal or a dropped 

call)? Are calls handed off to the carrier 

cell site and network? How does 

managed access work if the caller is an 

authorized user, but the phone number 

is not known (i.e., in the database of 

authorized users) to the managed access 

system? 

5. Cost Considerations 

The cost of preventing cell phone use 

in prisons is a factor that must be 

considered and varies according to the 

type of technology, area to be covered, 

and additional features. What factors 

impact the cost of implementing each of 

the technologies as described above? 

Are there on-going or recurring costs 

associated with each? To what extent 

will installation costs vary in light of the 

particular characteristics of each prison 

(e.g., geographic setting)? What 

WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES

26738 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices 

30For example, cellular service rules are set forth 

in 47 CFR parts 1 and 22; AWS in 47 CFR part 27; 

and SMR in 47 CFR part 90. 

31See generally, NTIA Manual of Regulations and 

Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency 

Management, Sept. 2009, Section 1, available at 

http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/redbook/1.pdf. 

32CTIA estimates that the number of monthly text 

messages sent increased from 9.8 billion in 

December 2005 to 152.7 billion in December of 

2009. Supra note 2. See also CNet News, U.S. Text 

Usage Hits Record Despite Price Increases, 

Marguerite Reardon, Sept. 10, 2008, available at 

http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-10038634- 

94.html. 

characteristics are most likely to affect 

costs? What are the ancillary costs for 

each type of approach (e.g., maintaining 

network connectivity for managed 

access systems, resources required to 

physically locate the phone for 

detection/location systems such as 

canines, staff time, etc.)? Are there 

typical costs or a range for each, and if 

so, what are they? Is training required 

for prison staff to properly operate the 

equipment? What staff costs are 

associated with each technology? 

6. Locating Contraband Phones 

In order to completely eradicate 

contraband cell phone use, the cell 

phone must be physically located and 

removed, which can be labor-intensive. 

Inmates may use them for a short period 

of time and turn them off and then move 

them, making the devices more difficult 

to locate. Jamming cannot identify the 

specific location of a contraband cell 

phone. How do managed access and 

detection technologies locate a cell 

phone caller? What software and 

hardware is needed? How accurate are 

detection technologies? With the 

insertion of GPS chip-sets into mobile 

devices, are cell phone locations easily 

identifiable through managed access or 

are other means necessary (e.g., 

hardware or software)? Do managed 

access and detection technologies have 

the capability of providing intelligencegathering information for prison 

officials, and if so, what type of 

information? What other means are 

necessary to physically locate the 

phones once a position is known? 

7. Regulatory/Legal Issues 

The Communications Act of 1934 

established the FCC and set specific 

rules on wireless radio services.30 Both 

the operation of mobile wireless 

devices, and effective means and 

solutions to deny the use of them have 

regulatory and legal implications. The 

FCC has primary responsibility for 

regulating spectrum issues for the types 

of systems typically used within the 

State and local prisons and jails (for 

example, private internal radio 

communications and commercial 

systems used by prison staff). NTIA, on 

behalf of the President, authorizes the 

use of the radio frequencies for 

equipment operated by Federal entities, 

including the BOP.31

While the Communications Act 

prevents the FCC from authorizing 

jamming or other acts of intentional 

interference to the radio 

communications of authorized stations, 

those same provisions do not apply to 

the Federal government itself. 

Therefore, NTIA is not limited in its 

authority to permit jamming at Federal 

prison facilities. We seek comment on 

State/local or Federal laws, rules, or 

policies that need clarification or that 

may hinder deployment of any of these 

technologies or others that may be 

raised by commenters. These might 

include not only radio regulatory issues, 

such as the approval necessary to 

operate or conduct experimentation and 

demonstration, but also ancillary issues 

such as the privacy and legal 

implications of trap-and-trace 

technologies? What agreements, agency 

relationships, or licensing requirements 

between the prison, service provider, 

and access provider would be required 

for temporary or experimental 

demonstration or for permanent 

operation? 

8. Technical Issues 

The identification of technical issues 

is another factor in investigating and 

evaluating contraband cell phone use in 

prisons. Are there any technical issues 

to be considered for the technologies 

identified above? For example, the 

actual range of a jammer depends on its 

power, antenna orientation, and the 

local environment (size and shape), 

which may include hills or walls of a 

building (that could be made of a variety 

of materials) that block the jamming 

signal. How accurate are the location 

technologies? Does each site need 

specific RF engineering for each of the 

approaches? How do the technologies 

allow authorized users, including 911 

calls, to be protected? How are different 

modulation schemes or channel access 

methods (for example, Global System 

for Mobile Communications—GSM, or 

Code Division Multiple Access—CDMA) 

handled for each category and does the 

solutions depend on the type of access 

method that the wireless carrier is 

using? 

Text-messaging continues to increase 

as a form of communication from handheld wireless devices.32 Wireless handheld devices in the possession of prison 

inmates afford them this option as an 

alternative to talking. Is there a need to 

differentiate between voice and data, 

such as text messages, and are the 

technologies discussed above effective 

against data use by prison inmates? 

Does shorter air-time use from text 

messaging present problems with 

detection and/or capturing the call and 

ultimately locating the phone? Will the 

technologies identified above be 

effective against high-speed, highcapacity data formats, such as Long 

Term Evolution (LTE) for devices that 

are expected to operate in the 700 MHz 

band? 

Please note that all comments 

received will be posted on NTIA’s Web 

site. Commenters that submit any 

business confidential or proprietary 

information in response to this notice 

should clearly mark such information 

appropriately. Commenters should also 

submit a version of their comments that 

can be publicly posted on NTIA’s Web 

site. 

Dated: May 7, 2010. 

Kathy D. Smith, 

Chief Counsel. 

[FR Doc. 2010–11350 Filed 5–11–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–60–P 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION 

Sunshine Act Meeting Notice 

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: 

Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission. 

DATE AND TIME: May 19, 2010 at 9:30 

a.m. 

PLACE: Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 

St., NW., Washington, DC, Lobby Level 

Hearing Room (Room 1000). 

STATUS: Open. 

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Agenda: (1) 

Consideration of the trading of futures 

and binary options based on motion 

picture box office receipts and to gather 

the views of interested parties; and (2) 

Reestablishment of the CFTC 

Technology Advisory Committee. 

CONTACT PERSON: Sauntia Warfield, 

Assistant Secretary, 202–518–5084. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Commission is undertaking a review of 

issues related to the trading of futures or 

options related to motion picture box 

office receipts. The Commission will 

have oral presentations by panels of 

invited witnesses representing Media 

Derivatives Exchange (MDEX), Cantor 

Exchange (Cantor), segments of the 

motion picture industry, and other 

interested parties. 

WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES