### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON MA RC H 17, 200 5 S es sio n
CIT Y OF JACKS ON, TENNES SEE v . WALKE R-HALL , INC., ET AL 

### .

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty

No. C01-130 R oger A . P age, Judge

No. W2004-01612-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Augu st 3, 2005

This is an action t o rec over f or dama g e done to pe rsonal prope rty . During the cour se of a road improvement projec t, the city place d some heavy equipment and debris along side the roa dway being
re pa ir e d. An e mpl oy e e of the c or po rate ow ne r o f the la ndabu tti ng the ro a dw a y no tic e d th e de bris and an excavator parked adjace nt to the roadway during a route inspection of the pr operty . Be lieving the debris and excavator to be on his employ er’ s land, the employ ee ha d the excavator towed. Appar ently , the towing company selec ted by the l andowne r’s prope rty manag er se vere ly

damag ed the excavator

during the cour se of r emoving it. T he city subsequently

filed suit ag ainst the landowner and sever al other defe ndants claiming they had neg lige ntly harme d the city ’s p er s onal property . The trial court held that the landowner was neg lige nt and committed a trespass a g ainst the
c ity . T he la nd ow ne r a

pp e a le d, a ndwe re ve rs e the de c isi on of the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Da vidJ. Sne e d, B re ntw oo d, TN , f or Ap pe lla nts

J . Br andon McWherte r, L ewis L . Cobb, J ackson, TN , for Appe llee-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

I n 199 9, the City of Jac ks on , Te nn e sse e (“ City ” or “ Ap pe lle e ” ), un de rt oo k a pr oje c t to re pa ir and re surfa ce Walker

Road. Walker Road, which runs north and south, is bounded on the e ast by West Towne Commons Shopping Center (“West Towne Commons”). The City has a right- of-way encompa ssing e ight ( 80) fe et along W alker Road — forty (40) feet on each side of the ce nterline of the ro a dw a y . Wa lke r R oa d is app ro xima te ly tw e nty (2 0) fe e t w ide , th e re fo re , th e City po sse sse s a ri g ht- of -w a y c on sis tin g of

thi rt y (3 0) fe e t on e a c h s ideof the pa ve d s ur fa c e . In a dd iti on , th e City possesses a utility

ease ment which extends an additional twenty -five ( 25) fe et bey ond its right-of

way on either side of

Walker Road. Thus, the City has the a bilityto use fifty -five ( 5 5) fe et of the property located on e ither side of Walker Road. During the cour se of the p ro j ec t t o re p air a nd
resur fac e Walker Road, theCityplace d materia ls and equipment on the ea stern side of Walker Road closest to West Towne Commons in an area it used as a stag ing a

rea for the pr oject.

Walker-H a ll , In c

. , d

/b /a B r o a d mo o r

In v e s tm e n t C o r

p o r ation (“Walker- Hall” or “Appe llant”), a Te nnessee corpor ation, owns West Towne Commons. W alker-H al l h i red Trammell Crow Te nn e sse e , Inc ., d/b /a

Tr a mme ll Cr ow Re sid e nti a l Se rv ic e s ( “ Tr a mme ll Cr ow ” ), to man age Wes t Towne Commons. Maria H opper ( “Ms. Hopper ”), an employ ee of Trammell Crow, se rved a s the property manag er f

or West Towne Commons during the period of time at issue in this case

.
I n April of 1999, Wil liam Sca rbroug h (“Mr

. Scarbr oug h”), the direc tor of deve lopment for Wal ke r- Ha ll, up on re turnin g fr om a bu sin e ss tr ip i n A tla nta , s top pe d inJac ks on to i ns pe c t We st Towne Commons. Upon driving throug h West Towne Commons, Mr. Scarbroug h noticed piles of de bris a nda

19 88 mod e l J oh n De e re e xca vator sittin g a dja c e nt to Wa lke r R oa d. Mr . Sc arb ro ug h d id not ge t out of his vehicle an d stated that he did not see any marking s on the excavator ide ntify ing its owner. I n fac t, the excavator ha d a log o ab o u t t wo t o three fee t in siz e identifying it as the property of the City . Be lieving that the debris and the excavator wer e sitti ng on property owned by Walker-Ha ll, Mr. Scarbroug h called Ms. Hoppe r and instructed her to have the excavator r emoved. Ms. Hopper c ontacted thr ee towing companies and ultimately selec ted S & M Towing & Re covery (“S & M Towing ”), a

business operating within the City , to remove the excavator.

Whe n S & M Towing remove d the excavator , the key which oper ates the e lectric al components o n th e ma c h in e h a d b e e n r e mo v e d b y th e Ci ty ’ s e mp lo y e e s a f te r th e y p ark e d it

. The City ’s employ ees state d that the machine can be started and moved without the ke y , howeve r, a ke y is r equire d to ope rate the elec trical components on the excavator. When ope rating t h e m achine wi tho ut a ke y , th e drive r c a nn ot s wi tc h f ro m l ow g e ar t o a

hig he r g e ar. Emplo y e e s o f the City tes ti fi ed t hat th ey

lef t m achi ne i n l ow gear whe n they park ed it . They als o sta ted th at, befo re S & M Towing remove d the excavator from Walker Road, the excavator w orked pr operly . The supervisor fo r the Wal ke r R oa d p ro

je c t, O ’N e a l T ho ma s ( “ Mr . T ho ma s” ), state d th a t hi s c re w c he c ke d th e oil in the excavator e very

morning befor e they

beg an using it.T h e C ity’ s o rig ina l co m p la int d id no t na m e T ra m m e ll C ro w a n d M s. H o p p e r a s d e fen d a n ts. T h e C ity 1

su b se q u e n tly a m e n d e d it s c o m p la int to a d d the m a s d e fen d a n ts.

S & M T owi ng , o wne d a n d o pe r a t e d b y M i k e a n d S a r a h Pi e r c e , di d n ot f i l e a n ot i c e of

a pp e a l i n t h i s c a s e, 2

t herefo re, we d o not co nsi d er any i ss ues r el at ed t o the t ri al c o urt ’ s grant o f a d ef aul t jud gm ent to t he C i t y i n ad judicat i ng the insta n t ap p e a l.

W alke r- H all an d M r. S ca rb ro ug h fi l ed an o rigi na l an swe r an d t w o a m en d ed an swe rs i n thi s ca se. . T he t resp ass 3
defens e was r ai s ed i n t he s econd an d t hi r d amended ans wer s

. I n t he t hi r d amended ans wer , W al ker

- H al l as s er t ed s eve r al ad d i t i o na l d efen ses, which , fo r p urp o ses o f t his ap p ea l , w e n ee d no t ad d ress.

-3- After S & M Towing remove d the excavator and took it to its faci l i ty some ten to fiftee n miles from Walker R oad, the City sent two employ ees to re trieve it. One of the City ’s employ ees stated th a t, w h e n h e in s p e c te d th e ma c h in e a t S & M T o w in g , it w a s s ti ll in lo w g e ar

. T h e other employ ee se nt to retrieve the excav at o r stated that they had to add e leven qua

rts of oil to the machine. T he employ ees started the excavator, but w hen they attempted to load it onto the trailer, they noted that it did not have any power and would bar ely

move. The City ’s employ ees opine d that the damag e they

found wa s consistent with driving the excavator in low g ear for a pproxi mately

ten to fifteen miles. The Cityultimately had the e x cavator repaired.

Th e re a ft e r, on Ap ri l 16 , 2 00 1, the City fi le d su it a g a ins t Wa lke r- ha ll, Mr . Sc arb ro ug h, S & M Towing , Trammell Crow, a nd Ms. Hopper in the C ircuit Court of Madison County , Tenne ssee. 1 Whe n S & M T ow ing faile d to a ns we r the c omp la int , the City mov e d fo r a de fa ult jud g me nt a g a ins t them. On Marc h 13, 2002, the trial court enter ed an order g ranting the City a d efau l t j udg ment ag ainst S & M T o wi n g and re serve d an aw ard of damag es pending the outcome of the ca se. 2 Walker-Ha ll and Mr. Scar broug h filed an answer to the City ’s complaint asserting, a s an af firmative defe nse, that t he C ity trespasse d on property owned by Walker-Ha ll when it placed the materia ls and excavator w here it did. 3

I n b ri ng ing thi s la ws uit , th e City so ug ht d a ma g e s f

or the c os t of

re pa ir ing the e xca vator , lo ss of use of the excavator, and loss of the time e x pended by its employ ees in re covering the excavator. During the trial, the City ’s employ ees te stified as to the condition of the excavator befor e and a fter S & M Towing remove d it f rom Walker Road. Ba

rbar a L ong (“Ms. L ong ”), the Cit y ’s re cords custodian at the time of the events g iving rise to the lawsuit, prese nted an invoice in the amount of $11,296.14 repr esenting the cost of repairing the excavator and testified conce rning the number of ho ur s th e City ’s e mpl oy e e s spe nt re tr ie vin g the e xca vator

. Al tho ug h the re wa s no pro of that th e City actua lly rente d a re p l ac ement ex cavator or nee ded the use of one w hile its ex cavator was be ing repa ired, the City

nonetheless pr esented t es t imony conce rning the re ntal cost of a r eplac ement excavator. Following a benc h trial, the trial court entere d a final judgme nt on J une 2, 2004, in f avor of the City and ag ainst Walker-Ha l l an d S & M Tow ing in the amount of $11,296.14. The court dismiss ed the City ’s action ag ainst Trammell Crow, Ms. Hoppe r, and Mr . Scarbr oug h. I n issuing-4-

its final judgment, the trial court incor porate d its memorandum opinion issued just prior to the fina l judgme nt, where in the court stated:

Af te r c on sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e a ndthe c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the Court makes the f

ollowing de terminations by a preponderance of the evidenc e:
1. The e x cavator owned by the Cityof Jackson was in g ood working order

when plac ed nea

r the interse ction of Channing Way and Walker Road on A pril 29, 1999. 2. After

considering the testimony of the City employ ees and the ind ivi du a l de fe nd a nts a ndtho ro ug hly re vie wi ng the plat, deed, and pi cture s, this C ourt has conc luded that the excavator w as par

ked by the City o f J ackson e mploy ees on property owned or within control of the City of Jackson. 3

. T h e e x ca v at o r’ s en gi n e w as d am age d b y S & M T o wi n g & Recove ry when it was move d to that company ’s pre mises approximately

ten to fiftee n miles away

. The e x cavator was moved by someone who did not know t he proper method for
mov ing it. 4. The e x cavator was c lear ly marke d as prope rty of the City

of J ackson.

Th e Cou rt

ha d c on c lud e d th a t th e e xca vator was pa rk e d b y the City of Jackson empl o y ees in a proper are a. Mr. Sca

rbroug h saw the excavator in a n are a that he thought was owned by his employ er. H e admitted t h at he did not g et out of his automobile to examine the excavator. He also admitted that if he had known it was ow ned by the Cityof Jackson he would have handled the situation in a diff ere nt
manner . Under

the circ umstances, Mr. Scarbr oug h should have attempted to determine the owner ship of the ex cavator befor e having it t ow e d. Th e failu re to i nv e sti g a te the ma tte r w a s c le arl y ne g lig e nt.

. . . . Th e te sti mon y

of the City of J ack so n e mpl oy e e s h a s p ro ve n to thi s Court by a pre ponderance of

the e v i dence that the eng ine of the excavator w as dama g ed by the towing and had to be repla ced. T he Cityof Jackson has prove n the nec essity of re placing the eng ine. Def endants challeng e the rea sonablene ss of the amount char g ed for repla cing the engine. T his Court has considere d the amount of the b i l l for r eplac ing the eng ine and c oncluded that it is rea sonable. Moreover, De fenda nts presente d no evidenc e to contest the amount-5- of the re pa ir bil l. Th e Cou rt ha s als o co ns ide re d th e e vid e nc e of los s of use of the excavator

and loss o f t i m e of the city employ ees and
c on c lud e d th a t th e e vid e nc e is i na de qu a te to s up po rt a jud g me nt.

The Court has f

urther c oncluded that Wal k er- Hall, I nc. should be responsible for the neg lige nt acts of the e mploy ees of S & M Towing & Re covery . Mr. Scar

broug h was a cting in his c apac ity as ag ent of Walker-Ha ll, Inc. when he dire cted Ms. Hoppe r to have the excavator t o we d

. I n t h i s C o u rt ’s v i ew , W al k er -H al l , I n c. ex er ci s ed en o u gh
c on tr ol o ve r the ri g ht t o e mpl oy the t ow ing c omp a ny to i mpo se re sp on sib ili ty . In a d d i tio n, the Cou rt ha s c on c lud e d th a t Wa lke r- Ha ll, I nc . p artic ipate d in a tr e sp a ss an d is re sp on sib le fo r the a c tio n o f S & M T o wi n g. (citations omitted).

Walker-Ha ll filed a notice of appea l to this Court and prese nts the following issues f or our revie w:
1. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding that the C ity parke d the excavator on property

owned
o r w i t h i n t h e c o n tro l o f t h e C i t y at t h e t i m e o f i t s re m o v al b y S & M T o wi n g; 2. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding that Walker-Ha ll was neg lige nt in removing the excavator; a nd 3. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding that the Cityhad prope rly proven the amount of da ma g e s a wa

rdby the tr ia l c ou rt

.
F or the re a so ns se t f

orth m or e fu lly

he re in, we re ve rs e the de c isi on of the tr ia l c ou rt

.
II. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
Since we a

re a sked to revie w a dec ision render ed by the trial court sitt ing w ithout a jury , we mus te m p l o y

t h e s t a n d ar d o f

r e v i e w s e tf

o r t h i n R u l e 1 3 ( d ) o f

t h e T e n n e s s e e R u l e s o f

A p p e lla te P ro cedur e. Thus, we must review the r ecor d de novo a f f o r d i n g t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s f

i n d i n g s o f fa c t a pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss u nle ss the pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e pr ov e s o the rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) (2 00 4) ; se e als o Co na tse r v . B all , No. M1999-00583-COA- R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXI S 569, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. A u g . 3, 2001). We must review the trial court’ s conclusions of law under a pure de novo sta nd ardof re vie w w ith ou t a ff

ord in g an y pre su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss t o those conclusions. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001). A sig nificant portion of the evidenc e pre sented in this case wa s t es t i m o n i al in nature , the re fo re , w e are min df

ul that: Unlike appe llate courts, trial cour t s are able to obser ve wi tne sse s a s th e y

te sti fy a ndto a sse ss the ir

de me a nor, which be stT h e trial c o u rt d o e s n o t ela b o ra te o n w h e the r th e tre sp a ss w a s to re a lty o r c h a ttel. 4

-6- situates trial judg es to eva luate witness cr edibility

. S e e State v. Pr ue tt , 7 88 S.W. 2d55 9, 56 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) ; Bowman v. Bowman , 836 S.W .2d 563, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Thus, trial courts ar e in the most favora

ble pos i t i on to resolve f actua l disputes hinging on cre dibilit y deter minations. See Tenn-Tex Prop er t i es v. Brownell-Electro, Inc

. , 778 S.W .2d 423, 425-26 (Te nn. 1989); Mi t c h e l lv
. A r c h i b a ld , 9 7 1 S .W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Acc ording ly , appellate courts will not re-e valuate a trial judg e’s assessment of w itness cre dibilit y absent clear and convincing evidenc e to the contra

ry

. See H umphrey v. Dav id W

itherspoon, Inc. , 73 4 S. W.2 d 3 15 , 3 15 -1 6 ( Te nn . 1 98 7) ; Bi ng ha m v . D y e rsburg Fabrics. Co., Inc. , 567 S.W .2d 169, 170 (Tenn. 1978)

.
W e lls v . Te nn . B d. oO

f R e ge nts , 9 S.W. 3d77 9, 78 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; se e als o Mitc he ll v . A rc hib ald , 971 S.W .2d 25, 29-30 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1998).

III
. L AW AND A N A L Y SIS
A. The Location of the Excavator Although the Ci t y ’s o ri g inal complaint did not clear ly state the City ’s theory

of re covery ag ainst Walker-Ha ll, after re ad i n g its amended c omplaint and brief f iled on appea l, it appear s as though the Citysoug ht rec overy from Walker- Hall and the othe r def endants u n d er a neg lige nce t h e o r y. T h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s a l l u d e t o n e g l i g e n c e a s t h e C i t y’ s l e g a l b a s i s f o r r e c o v e r y. The trial c ourt determined that Mr. Scarbr oug h was neg lige nt in failing to investigate and de termine the ow ne rs hip of the e xca vator prior to h a vin g it t ow e d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a lso fo un d Wa lke r- Ha ll t o be responsible for the neg lige nt a cts of S & M Towing , citing to c ases discussing r espondeat superior and ag ency

law. Howe ver, the trial court a lso went on t o find that Walker-H all participated in a tr e sp a ss, a n in te nti on a l to rt

. 4
On appe al, Walker-H all contends that the tria l court er red in finding that the Cityparke d the
e xca vator on pr op e rt y

it e ith e r o wn e d o r h a d c on tr ol ov e r. Wal ke r- Ha ll arg ue s that the e vid e nc e in the re cord c lear ly

preponde rate s ag ainst this finding and shows t h at the excavator was located on property owned by

Walker-Ha ll. I t makes this arg ument in an ef fort to establish that the City , not Wal ke r- Ha ll, wa s th e tr e sp a sse r i n this case

. “ On e is s ub je c t to lia bil ity to ano the r f

or tr e sp a ss, irrespe ctive of w hether

he ther eby

cause s harm to any

l egally protec ted intere st of the other, if he intentionally

. . . enter s land i n the pos session of t he other, or causes a thing or a thi rd per son to do
so .” Re st ateme nt ( Se c on d) of To rt s § 15 8 ( 19 65 ); ac c or d Restatement (Sec ond) of Torts § 161 (1965).In t he p i ct ure dep i ct i ng t he l o cat i o n of t he excavator i s ano t her C i t y em p l o y ee who 5
appear s t o be t aki ng meas ur ement s

. M s

. Long t es t i f i ed t hat , af

t er t he exc ava t or h ad b e e n to w e d , t h e C ity se n t t w o e m p lo ye e s o u t t o W a lke r R o a d to tak e m e a su re m e n ts o f t h e rig h tof

- way

. I nt er es t i ng l y , none of t he wi t nes s es pre s ent ed by t he C i t y t es t i f i ed as to t he result s o f

such m ea sure m en t s.
-7- At trial, Mr. Thomas admitt ed that he neve r soug ht permission from Walker-H all to park the
e xca vator wh e re it w a s lo c a te d prior to be ing tow e d. An oth e r City e mpl oy e e te sti fi e d that, prior to
un de rt akin g the ro a d impr ov e me nt pr oje c t, the y loo ke d at the plat to de te rm ine the size of the ir ri g htof-way . On appe al, the City contends that the tria l court did not err in finding that the Cityparke d the excavator

on property it owne d or that came within its control. First, the City takes the position that its employ ees pa

rked the excavator w i t h i n t he City ’s rig ht-of-w ay which extended thirty

(30) fe e t on e ith e r s ide of Wal ke r Roa d. I n th e a lte rn a tiv e , th e City arg ue s th a t, e ve n it

its e mpl oy e e s d id not park the e x cavator within the rig ht-of- wa y , they did park it within the City ’s utilityease ment which extends twenty -five ( 25) fe et bey ond the rig ht-of-w ay . Whil e the tria l court dete rmined that t h e C i t y’ s e m p l o ye e s p ark e d t h e e x c a v a t o r w i t h i n p r o p e r t y “ o w n e d o r w i t h i n t h e c o n tr o l o f ” t h e C i t y, the c ou rt didno t det e rm ine wh e the r the e xca vator wa s par ke d with in the ri g ht- of

-w a y or the uti lit y e a se me nt. At trial, the City

introduced, throug h Mr. Tho m as , s ev era l photogr aphs as e x hibits. Mr. Thomas testified that one photog raph, e ntere d as “Exhibi t 5,” depicted the location of the excavator along Walker Road prior to it being towed by S & M Towing

. I n the photog raph, a Cityemploy ee is standing ne x t to track mar ks made in the dirt. Just bey ond the C ity ’s employ ee in the photog raph,
a ndtow ardWal ke r- Ha ll’ s pr op e rt y , is a pil e of de bris. (E xhibi t 5) . M r. Th oma s te sti fi e d th a t th e pil e of debris was twelve ( 12) to fiftee n (15) f eet f rom the edg e of the paveme nt on Walker R oad. He 5 also stated that the City ’s employ ees pa rked the excavator be tween the pile of debris depicted in the photo and Walker Road. Thus, acc ording to Mr

. Thomas’ testimony , the City ’s employ ees pa rked the excavator

no more than twelve (12) to fiftee n (15) feet from the edge of W alker Road, placing i tw i t h i n t h e C i t y’ s r i g h t

- o f

- w a y.
On cr oss-examination, Mr. Thomas reiter ated that the tr acks a nd the Cityemploy ee i n the photogr aph mar

k the location of the excavator prior to its removal, and he acknow ledg ed that the employ ee is standing underne ath a power line. I n fac t, Mr . Thomas admitted that if the e mploy ee in the picture w ere to look straight up he would be looki ng direc tly at t he power lines. Mr. Thomas also ac knowledg ed that, in the photog raph, the re are two siz eable trucks par ked par allel to Walker Road and sitting ne x t to each othe r. Be tween the employ ee standing under the power lines and the pa rk e d tr uc ks is a no the r e mpl oy e e , a nd Mr

. Th oma s a c kn ow le dg e d that the e mpl oy e e in the mid dle is five to ten fe et away

from the e mploy ee unde r the powe r lines.

I n support of its positi on that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’s finding
re g ard ing the loc a tio n o f the e xca vator on the day

S & M T ow ing re mov e d it ; Wa lke r- Ha ll p oin ts to the testimonyof Mr. Sca rbroug h. During his testimony , Mr. Scarbr oug h also identified the tra cks and the City employ ee in the photogr aph as an acc urate depiction of the location of the excavator on the day he visited the prope rty . Mr. S car broug h testified t hat, after the ex cavator had be en re moved,For pu r pos es of de t er mi n i n g w h et h er t h e Ci t y ha s en g ag ed i n a t r es pas s , i t i s s u f f i ci en t t h at e v en a por t i on of 6
the e x c a v a to r t o u c h e d lan d o w n e d b y W a lke r-H a ll. See R es t at eme n t (S ec on d) of T or t s § 158 cmt

. I ( 1965) ; 87 C. J. S. T resp a ss § 1 3 (20 0 0 ).

W e n ot e t h at , upon re v i ew i n g t h e docu men t pu r por t i n g t o g r an t t h e ea s eme n t , t h e or i g i n al g r an t or w as U n i on 7
U ni ver s i t y

. W hi l e n ei t her p ar t y p r es ent ed proof at t r i al t hat W al ker

- H al l became t he s ucc es s or i n i nt er es t t o t he s ubj ect p rop ert y burd ened by t he easem ent , t he evi d ence i n t he rec o rd b ef o re t hi s C o urt i nd i cat es t hat W al ker- H al l ow ns t he

se rv ie n t es ta te b u rd e n e d b y the e a se m e n t.
-8- he we nt back to Walker Road and took me asure ments. He stated that the distance from the c enter line of Walker Road to the utilit y pole is sixty -five (65) f eet. He was a lso give n a copy of the plat during his te stimony

. On the plat, Mr. Sca rbroug h marke d the location of the excavator the day he visited the property , marking the location as just bey ond the utilityease ment on Walker-Ha ll’s property

. Af te r r e vie wi ng the te sti mon y of the wi tne sse s a ndthe ph oto g ra ph s in tr od uc e d a s e xhibi ts at trial, we cannot sa y

that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst t he trial c ourt’s finding that the excavator w as par

ked on prope rty

the Cityhad the law ful ability to use. Howe ver, e ven a c ursory inspection of the photog raphs r evea ls that Mr. Thomas’ testimony to the eff ect that the e x cavator was pa rked no more than twelve ( 12) to fiftee n (15) fee t f rom the edg e of Walker

Road is inaccur ate. The only alternative measure ments prese nted to the trial court wer e those of Mr. Scar broug h, who stated that the utilitypoles depicte d in the photogr aphs ar e six ty -five ( 65) fe et from the c enter line of Wal ke r R oa d. We are c og niza nt of the fa c t that the City a dmi ts that th e ri g ht- of

-w a y a nduti lit y ease ment collectively

extend six ty -five ( 65) fe et from the c enter li n e of Walker Road. The photogr aphs, which w itnesses for both parties admit acc urate ly depict the location of the excavator
on the da y

it w a s r e mov e d, de pic t th e e xca vator ’s tr a c ks le a din g ri g ht u p to the uti lit y lin e s. There fore , the evidenc e plainly shows that the excavator was e ither entire ly or partially within the City ’s utilit y ease ment. We a re mindful that the re was conflicting testimony at trial co n ce rn ing 6 whether the excavator or parts there of extended over the utilit y line ease ment. We do not find clear
a ndc onvi nci ng e vid e nc e in t he re c or d to dis ru pt the tr ia l c ou rt ’s imp lic it f ind ing , w hic h w ou ld
ne c e ssa ri ly hin g e on c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio ns , that the e xca vator did no t e xten d b e y on d th e uti lit y ease ment. Se e W

e lls v . Te nn . B d. Of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)

.
I n 1975, the City , by

express g rant, obtaine d a utilityease ment extending twenty -five ( 25) f e e tb e yo n d i t s r i g h t

- o f

- w a y a l o n g W a l k e r

R o a d

. S a i d e a s e m e n tg r a n t s t h e C i t y:

7
[A] perma nent ea s ement and rig ht-of-w ay , for the f ollowing purposes, na mely : the perpe tual rig ht to en t er at any time and from time to tim e and to c onstruct, maintain, repair, re build, operate , and patr ol its e le c tr ic , g a s, wate r, a ndsa nit ary se we r l ine (s ) anda ll
nece ssary appurte nance s in, on, over, under and ac ross said rig ht-ofway toge ther with the rig ht to clear said ri gh t -o f-way

and kee p the
same c lear

of brush, tree s, buildings, and fire ha zards; and to remove-9- dang er [sic] trees, if any , located be y ond the li m i ts of said rig ht-ofway ; all over, upon, a cross, a nd under the following described land[.]
At trial, Mr. Thomas testified that the Walker Road proje ct had be en finished f or seve ral weeks prior to the excavator be ing towe d. At the time of its removal, the City was using the excavator

to remove debris plac ed on the property during the road resur fac ing project. Mr. Thom as also stated that, prior to the e xca vator

be ing re mov e d, it h a d b e e n sev e ra l day s si nc e the City la st u se d th e e xca vator

to move any of the de bris.

Whil e we cannot sa y

that the evidenc e pre sented at tria l p r e p o nderates ag ainst the trial court’s finding s of fa ct re g arding the location of the ex cavator (i.e. that it was pa rked on e ither of the City ’s rig ht-of-w ay

or t h e u t i l i t y ease ment), we must undertake a de novo revie w of a trial court’ s c on c lus ion s o f l a w. “ An e a se me nt i s a n int e re st in pr op e rt y that c on fe rs on its ho lde r an e nf or c e able rig ht to use another’ s property for a specific purpose.” Bradley v . McLeod , 9 8 4 S.W .2d 929, 934 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted), ov e rru le d o n o the r g ro un ds by Ha rri s v . Ch e rn , 33 S.W. 3d74 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; se e als o 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 2 (1996). An e aseme nt is not a form of tang ible rea l estate, a s it does not consist of a quantity of land, but it is merely

a privileg e to use the land of a nother. Y

ate s v. Me tro . G ov ’t

of N as hv ill e & Da v ids on Cou nty , 451 S.W .2d 437, 440-41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

Whe n we are a sk e d to de te rm ine if a pa rt y ’s us e of

la ndfa lls wi thi n th e sc op e of a n e a se me nt,
we a re mindful of the following principles of la w:

The use of

an ea sement must be conf ined strictly to the purposes for

which it was g rante d or re serve d. A principle w hich underlies the use of a ll easeme nts is that the owner of an ease ment cannot mate rially

incre ase the burden of

it upon the servient estate or impose thereon a

new a nd additional burden. A funda mental principle is that an ease ment for the benef it of a particular piec e of la nd cannot be enlar g ed and e x tended to other parc els of land, whether adjoining or distinct tra cts, to w hich the rig ht is n o t attache d. I n other wor ds, an ea sement appurtenant to a dominant tenement can be used only for the pur

poses of that tenement; it is not a persona l rig ht, and ca nnot be used, e ven b y the dominant owner, f

or any purpose unc onnecte d with the enjoy ment of his estate. The purpose o f t his rule is to prevent a n incre ase of the burden upon the servient estate, and it applies whether the ea sement is created by

g rant, re servation, prescription, or impl ication. A principle w hich under lies the use of a ll easeme nts is that the
owner there of ca nnot materiall y i ncre ase the burden of it upon the servient e state, nor impose a new and additional burden there on.

. . . I t m a y b e s a i d i n g e n e r a l t h a t i f a n e a s e m e n t i s p u t t o a nyus e-10- inconsistent with t h e p u rp ose for which it was g rante d, the g rante e be c ome s a

tr e sp a sse r t o th e e xten t of the un a uth orize d u se

. Ad am s v . W

inn e tt , 1 56 S.W. 2d35 3, 35 7 ( Te nn . Ct. A pp . 1 94 1) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Mc Cam mo n v .M

e re dit h , 830 S.W. 2d57 7, 58 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 1) ; Ogle v. Trotter , 495 S.W .2d 558, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). Moreove r, we are mindful that the C ity ’s ut ilityease ment takes the fo rm of a n e xpre ss g rant

. “I f th e ea se me nt i s c la ime d u nd e r a g rant, the e xten t of

the e a se me nt i s determined by

the lang uag e of the g rant.” Foshee v. Brigman , 129 S.W .2d 207, 208 (Tenn. 1939)

. There fore , the g rante e’s use of the e aseme nt must be strictly co n fi n ed to the purpose state d in the g rant. Henry v. Tenn. Elec . Power Co. , 5 Tenn. App. 205, 208 ( Tenn. Ct. App. 1927). When the g rant spec ifically

sets fo rt h the terms of the ease ment, the g rante e cannot use the ea sement for a purpose be y ond its int ended use

. Id.; ac cord 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts §§ 57, 148, 160 (1996).

I n the instant case , the City ’s utilityease ment expressly states that it is limit ed to activities related to public utilit ies (i.e. electric, g as, water, a nd sanitary sewe r lines). The Cityasserts that the
ease ment authorizes the Cityto “cle ar said rig ht-of-w ay and keep the same clea r of br ush, trees . .
. a ndto r e mov e da ng e r [s ic ] tr e e s, if a ny , lo cat ed be y on d th e lim its of the ri g ht- of

-w a y .” Whil e a c kn ow le dg ing that it

us e d th e pr op e rt y

a s a sta g ing are a

fo r i ts r oa d impr ov e me nt p ro je c t, the City
c on te nd s th a t, p ur su a nt t o th e lang ua g e in the e a se me nt, it i s p e rm itt e d to e nte r the pr op e rt y to
remove any

debris re maining a fter the projec t was complete d. We cannot ag ree

. Ordinarily , the holder of

an ea sement may

enter upon the prope rty

that is the subject of the
ease ment to remove an obstruction which occur s natura lly or is unlawfully place d there

. See R ollins
v . E le c . P owe r B d. Of the Me tro

. Go v ’t of N as hv ill e & Da v ids on Cou nty , No. M2003-00865-COAR3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 358, at *15-16 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 8, 2004) ( citation omitted); 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts §§ 181 (199 6 ). The utility ease ment at issue clea

rly incorporates this right into its express lang uag e. The City ’s right to enter the ea sement to remove obstructions is “toge ther wi th” the ma nn e r i n whi c h the City ma y us e the pr op e rt y

. Th us , the ri g ht to re mov e ob str uc tio ns is clea rly intended to furthe r the e numerated uses of t h e ea sement. I n this case, howe ver, the obstructions (i.e. the de bris rema ining f rom the roa d improvement projec t) exist ed on the e aseme nt by virtue of the City ’s ow n c on du c t. It is dis ing e nu ou s fo r the City to u til ize the uti lit y e a se me nt i n a manne r which is cle arly not contemplated by the express lang uag e of the ease ment (i.e. a s a stag ing
are a for a road construction project) and subsequently assert that it has t he authority , pursuant to the
sa me ease men t, to e nte r o nto the la ndto r e mov e that w hic h it c ou ld n ot p la c e the re in the fi rs t instance.

Ac c or din g ly , th e pr e po nd e ranc e of th ee v i d e n c e su pp orts the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that th e City pa rk e d th e e xca vator

on la nd“ ow ne d o r w ith in the c on tr ol of ” the City . A lth ou g h th e tr ia l c ou rt did
no t g o f urthe r a nd sa y wh e the r the e xca vator wa s pa rk e d on the ri g ht- of

-w a y or the uti lit y e a se me nt,
our re view of the rec ord reve als that the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e indicate s that the excavator
was at least partially parke d within the utili ty ease ment. Se e Ga nz e v oo rt v . R us se ll , 949 S.W .2d 293, 29 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) (“ Whe n th e tr ia l jud g e ha s faile d to make sp e c if ic fi nd ing s of fa c t, thi s Cou rt wi ll revie w the re cord to de termine the pr eponder ance of the e vidence .”). Howeve r, as a matter of la w,-11-

the City ’s use of the u t i lityease ment exceede d the scope of that ea sement, there fore , it became a trespasse r. Se e Ad

am s v . W inn e tt , 1 56 S.W. 2d35 3, 35 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 94 1) ; see also Henry v. Tenn. Elec. Powe r Co. , 5 Tenn. App. 205, 207- 08 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927). T hus, the trial court erre d in f ind ing that Wa lke r- Ha ll p a rt ic ipate d ina

tr e sp a ss.

B. Dam ages On appe al, Walker-H all raises two a dditional issues for our conside ration. F irst, WalkerHall ar g ues that the trial court e rre d in finding that it was neg lige nt in having the excavator r emoved from the pr operty

. Next, we are asked to examine whether the Citysufficie ntly

proved the amount of dama g es aw arde d by

the trial cour

t during the proc eeding s below.
Having determined that th e C i t y b ecame a tre spasser by exceeding the scope of the permissible use of the utilit y ease ment, Walker-Ha l l would be privileg ed to have the excavator
remove d. See Restatement (Sec ond) of Tort s § 77 (1965). As both parties acknow ledg e , “[t]he
owner of re alty

owes to a tre spasser the duty not to in

j u re h i m wi l lfully , maliciously , or intentionally .” Y

arbrough v. Potter , 207 S.W. 2d 58 8, 58 9 ( Te nn . 1 94 8) ; but see Hudson v . Gaitan , 675 S.W .2d 699, 703 (Tenn. 1984) (re jecting the common law cla ssifications of invitee a nd licensee
a nda do pti ng a

du ty of re a so na

blec are a s to the se ind ivi du a ls) . A pe rs on a c ts w ill fu lly wh e n h is actions ar e “voluntary

and intentional, but not nece ssarily malicious.” Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 1593 (7 th e d. 19 99 ); se e als o B ar k ley v . S tat e , 5 4 S. W.2 d 9 44 , 9 45 (Ten n. 19 32 ). “ A p e rs on a c ts maliciously

when the pe rson is motivated by ill will , hatre d, or per sonal spite.” Hodges v . S. C. Toof & Co. , 8 33 S.W. 2d 89 6, 90 1 (T e nn . 1 99 2) ; se e als o Ca rso n v . B air d , 900 S.W .2d 685, 690-91 (Te nn. 1 9 9 5 ). “A p er s o n ac t s i n t en t i o n al l y wh en i t i s t h e pe rs o n ’s co n s ci o u s o b j ec t i v e or d es i re t o en gage in the conduct or

cause the re sult.” Hodges , 83 3 S. W.2 d at 90 1; see also Carson , 900 S.W .2d at 690- 91. Thus, t o re co ver f

or the da mag e done to its excavator, the Cityneede d to present e vidence sh ow ing that Wal ke r- Ha ll’ s c on du c t, or that of its e mpl oy e e s or a g e nts , ro se to on e of the se le ve ls.

I t is clear f

rom rea ding the City ’s complaints and re viewing the evidenc e pre sented at trial that the Citysoug ht rec overy based on the alleg ed neg lige nce of Walker-Ha ll in having the e x cavator
remove d. I n fac t, the trial co u rt co n cl u d ed that, by failing to determine the owner ship of the excavator prior to having it towed, Mr. Scar broug h acte d neg lige ntly . Howeve r, we find no proof i n t h e r e c o r d t e n d i n g t o s h o w t h a tW a l k e r

- H a l l , i t s e m p l o ye e s , o r a g e n t s a c t e d w i l l f

u l l y, m a l i c i o u s l y, or intentionally

in damag ing the City ’s excavator while re moving it. Neg lige nce is not the standa rd by wh ic h the c ou rt s of this state mus t eva luate the a c tio ns of a la nd ow ne r a g a ins t a

tr e sp a sse r. Th us , even if the ac tions of Walker-Ha ll rose to the level of neg lige nce, the trial court e rre d in awar ding da ma g e s to the City

on thi s b a sis

.
Acc ording ly , we do not ne ed to r eac h the arg uments raised by the parties conce rning whether the Cityadequately

proved its damag es at trial beca use, based on the rec ord befor e this Court, t he-12-

City is n ot e nti tle d to re c ov e r fo r the da ma g e to its e qu ipm e nt. F urthe rm or e , s inc e Wal ke r- Ha ll d id
no t f ile a c ou nte rc la im f

or da ma g e s a g a ins t the City fo r tr e sp a ss, we ne e d n ot a dd re ss w hat dama g e s, if any , Walker-Ha ll would be entitled to.

IV. C ONCL US I ON

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e re ve rs e the de c isi on of the tr ia l c ou rt a nd re ma nd thi s c a se to the trial court for any further proce eding s which are nece ssary as a r esult of this opinion. C osts of this appeal a

re ta x ed to the Appe llee, the City of J ackson, Tenne ssee, for which execution may issue i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE