2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-26-2012

USA v. Marcellus Barfield

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-2688

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1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 11-2688

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v.

MARCELLUS BARFIELD,

 Appellant.

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 07-cr-00583)

District Judge: Honorable Legrome Davis

_____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

May 22, 2012

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 26, 2012 )

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, we are asked to consider the reasonableness of Marcellus Barfield’s 

sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment for violation of his supervised release. For the 

reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
2

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and 

procedural history relevant to our conclusion.

On November 15, 2002, Marcellus Barfield pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 

commit armed bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and using or carrying a firearm during 

and in relation to a crime of violence. The District Court sentenced him to 72 months’ 

imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, and a $300 special assessment.

After serving the imprisonment portion of his sentence, Barfield began his first 

term of supervised release on July 1, 2008. On December 17, 2008, his probation officer 

filed a petition for revocation of supervised release, alleging that Barfield failed to appear 

for scheduled appointments and drug tests, tested positive for drug use, failed to report 

for counseling sessions, and failed to make restitution payments. App. 13-14. On 

January 20, 2009, Barfield was arrested by the Delaware State Police for possession of 

marijuana, criminal impersonation, driving without a driver’s license, and failure to have 

a driver’s license. App. 17. These charges were added to an amended violation report 

and submitted to the Court. When Barfield failed to appear for his hearing on February 3, 

2009, the Court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. At the rescheduled revocation 

hearing on November 30, 2009, the District Court revoked Barfield’s supervised release 

and imposed a sentence of 10 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 36 months’ 

supervised release. It further ordered that Barfield serve the first six months of release in 

a halfway house.
3

Barfield’s second term of supervised release began on August 20, 2010 at the 

Kintock Residential Re-Entry Facility. Despite orders to remain there for six months, 

Barfield left the facility after only two days. App. 55. His probation officer filed another 

violation petition, which was subsequently amended to include his failure to report for 

scheduled appointments, notify his probation officer of a change in residence, and make 

scheduled restitution payments. App. 58-59. Before a hearing was scheduled, Barfield 

was arrested in Delaware County on December 2, 2010. He pleaded guilty to fleeing a 

police officer, possession of a controlled substance, and driving with a suspended license. 

He was sentenced by the state court to 5 to 23 months’ imprisonment. App. 68.

Upon completion of his state sentence, Barfield appeared at a second revocation 

hearing on June 9, 2011. At the hearing, Barfield admitted to all five alleged violations. 

The Guidelines range for Barfield’s offenses was 18 to 24 months, with a statutory 

maximum of 50 months. After explaining that the trust it placed in Barfield at the first 

revocation hearing was “not well-placed,” the District Court revoked his supervised 

release and sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment. Barfield timely appealed.

II.

We review the District Court’s sentence for procedural and substantive 

reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.1 United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 

766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010). We must give due deference to the District Court’s judgment

because “[t]he sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual 

 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e). 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
4

case and the individual defendant before him.” United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 

(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Barfield bears the burden of showing unreasonableness. We will affirm the 

sentence unless Barfield sufficiently establishes that “no reasonable sentencing court 

would have imposed the same sentence on [him] for the reasons the district court 

provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). This is 

an extremely high bar. Even if we might reasonably have concluded that a different 

sentence was appropriate, we may not supplant the District Court’s judgment with our 

own. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the District Court’s reasons for 

sentencing Barfield above the Guidelines range, we conclude that his sentence is both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable.2

As the record reflects, the District Court focused primarily on Barfield’s breach of 

trust as the justification for the sentence it imposed. Barfield asserts that the Court’s 

emphasis on breach of trust is inappropriate, but this Court has explained that “a district 

court’s primary consideration in handing down a revocation sentence is the defendant’s 

breach of trust.” United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006). Moreover, 

while the District Court did emphasize Barfield’s breach of trust, it also considered the 

other sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For example, with respect to 

deterrence, the Court explained that it had given Barfield multiple opportunities to 

 

2

 On appeal, Barfield does not assert a claim of procedural error. Nevertheless, 

we have considered the procedural reasonableness of Barfield’s sentence, and conclude 

that any such claim would be without merit.
5

demonstrate better behaviors, but that he seemed either “unwilling or unable” to satisfy 

the terms of supervised release. App. 112. The Court also considered Barfield’s personal 

circumstances, but found that they failed to outweigh his “utter and complete lack of 

effort.” Id. at 113. Indeed, the sentencing judge stated that Barfield “fundamentally 

misunderst[ood] the nature of Court supervision of an offender” and had an “unwilling”

state of mind towards rehabilitation. Id. at 114.

Ultimately, the Court handed down a term of imprisonment of 36 months. This 

sentence was 12 months higher than the top of the range, and 14 months lower than the 

statutory maximum. As Barfield had demonstrated his inability to comply with 

supervised release, the District Court decided to convert Barfield’s prior term of 

supervised released into a term of imprisonment. It felt that this sentence was “sufficient, 

but not greater than necessary” to meet the goals of sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and 

we do not think that the District Court’s judgment was unreasonable.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District 

Court.