alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.2**CERTIFICATIONI, Daniel T. Voelpel, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of First FranklinCorporation;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleadingwith respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issueras of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4 The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which this reportis being prepared;(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions aboutthe effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the smallbusiness issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small businessissuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe small business issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of the small businessissuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer’s abilityto record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the small business issuer’sinternal control over financial reporting.        Date: August 13, 2007 /s/ Daniel T Voelpel   Daniel T. Voelpel    Vice President and Chief Financial Officer  
18
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          11,271
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             150
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                16,165
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     39,503
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          27,838
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            28,154
<LOANS>                                        254,627
<ALLOWANCE>                                      2,513
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 357,023
<DEPOSITS>                                     309,746
<SHORT-TERM>                                    10,980
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,311
<LONG-TERM>                                      7,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     26,986
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 357,023
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 15,553
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,848
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   266
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                18,667
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               8,294
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,722
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            9,945
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       19
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 141
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  7,396
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,278
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       4,278
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,634
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.70
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.68
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.23
<LOANS-NON>                                        345
<LOANS-PAST>                                       218
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    563
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 2,848
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      422
<RECOVERIES>                                        68
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                2,513
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             2,513
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1862

Entitled ‘‘Vermont Infrastructure Bank Program’’.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 4, 1999

Mr. JEFFORDS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

A BILL

Entitled ‘‘Vermont Infrastructure Bank Program’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. STATE INFRASTRUCTURE BANK PILOT PRO4 GRAM.

5 Section 1511(b)(1)(A) of the Transportation Equity

6 Act for the 21st Century (23 U.S.C. 181 note; 112 Stat.

7 251) is amended by inserting ‘‘Vermont,’’ after ‘‘Florida’’.

Æ
Exhibit
10.66

# AMENDMENT
TO THE LOAN RESTRUCTURINGAND
RESTATEMENT AGREEMENT

This
Amendment to the Loan Restructuring and Restatement Agreement
(Amendment) dated this 7th day of April, 2003, is entered into by
GLOBAL MED CHINA & ASIA LIMITED, a British Virgin Isles corporation
(GMCAL) having a principal address of 2601 Island Place Tower, 510
Kings Road, Northpoint, Hong Kong China and GLOBAL MED TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., a Colorado corporation (Global Med) having an address of
12600 West Colfax Avenue, Suite C420, Lakewood, Colorado 80215 (collectively the
Parties).

Whereas,
Global Med and eBanker  USA.com,  Inc.  entered into the Loan  Restructuring  and
Restatement  Agreement ("Agreement") on November 19, 2000, which eBanker later
transferred to GMCAL; and

Whereas,
pursuant to the Agreement, Global Med is to repay the principal amount
($3,828,700.00) of the Agreement on July 1, 2003 and the Parties wish to extend
this repayment date;

In
Consideration of the promises, covenants, and the mutual agreements
contained in this Amendment and other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt, sufficiency, and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, Global Med
and GMCAL hereby covenant and agree to amend the Agreement as follows:

1.
Extension of Repayment Date. GMCAL agrees to extend the repayment date of
the principal amount of $3,828,700 (three million eight hundred twenty-eight
thousand seven hundred dollars) (Debt), from July 1, 2003 to January
1, 2004.

2.
Extension Fee. Global Med agrees to pay an Extension Fee of $287,152.50
(two hundred eighty seven thousand one hundred fifty two dollars and fifty
cents) to GMCAL. Further, Global Med agrees to pay this Extension Fee as
follows: $200,000 (two hundred thousand dollars) upon the execution of this
Amendment and the remainder, $87,152.50 (eighty seven thousand one hundred fifty
two dollars and fifty cents) on January 1, 2004. There shall be no prepayment
penalties on this Extension Fee. The Extension Fee incorporates and includes the
interest on the Debt for the period from July 1, 2003 to January 1, 2004.

Besides
the Extension of Repayment Date and the addition of the Extension Fee herein,
the Agreement, including the Guaranty and Security Agreement referenced and
incorporated in the Agreement, shall remain unchanged and in full force and
effect.

---

Global
Med represents that as of the date of this Amendment a check for the amount of
$200,000 issued by Global Med has been mailed to GMCAL.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment to the Loan Restructuring and Restatement
Agreement has been duly executed and delivered by the Parties hereto as of the
date first written.

|GLOBAL MED TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
By:/s/ Michael I. Ruxin, MD
Position: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Date: April 8, 2003 | GLOBAL MED CHINA & ASIA LIMITED
By: /s/ Tony Chan
Position: Director
Date: April 7, 2003
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

---
#### BOE, Appellant *v.*HAWES et al., Respondents.

(No. 1,571.)

*Appeal*— Implied *Finding*— Record *on Appeal*— Preservation *of Evidence*— Review.

In an action tried to the court, defendants denied all the allegations of the complaint and specially pleaded the statute of limitations. On appeal by plaintiff from the judgment, the only assigned error was that “the court erred in giving judgment against appellant, for in so doing he evidently held the statute of limitations had run against the action.” Held> that as chere was nothing in the record disclosing the reason why the court found and entered judgment in favor of defendants, it would be presumed— under the doctrine of implied findings — that the court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a *prima, facie*case on the merits, hence, the evidence not being in thek record, the judgment must be affirmed.

*Appeal from District Court, Flathead County; D. F.*Smith, *■Judge.*

Action by Christ Boe against Ira Hawes and others. Erom a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

*Mr. David Ross,*and *Mr. F. Joe*Rice, for Appellant.

Pee Oubiaj,c.

This action was brought against the defendants as sureties on the official bond of one Eugene M. McCarthy, constable. In the answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, defendants denied all the allegations thereof, and specially pleaded the statute of limitations. The cause was tried to the court without a'jury, and witnesses were sworn for the plaintiff. The *202court found for and entered judgment in favor of the defendants and against tbe plaintiff. The evidence is not in the record. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment.

The only assigned error is that “the court erred in giving judgment against appellant, for in so* doing he evidently held the statute of limitations had run against the action.” Them is not anything in the record disclosing the reason why the court found for and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. While not passing upon the question whether the court erred in its decision upon the point as to the statute of limitations— if it made onei — we may and do- say that, even if it erroneously found that the statute had run, it would not follow that the j udgment should be reversed, for the reason that the court may have found that the evidence of the plaintiff did not make out a *prima facie*case on the merits.

Under the doctrine of implied findings which prevails in this state, it must be presumed that the court correctly found in favor of the defendants.

There not being any of the evidence in the record, we cannot say that the court erred in finding for the defendants.

*Affirmed.*
No. 3,589.

#### GAVIN W. HAMILTON, Petitioners, *v.*DISTRICT COURT et al., Respondents.

Original application for writ of *certiorari*to the District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District in and for the County of Broadwater, and John A. Mathews, Judge thereof.

Decided December 14, 1914.

*Mr. Frcmlc A. Roberts,*for Petitioners.

PER CURIAM.

It is ordered that the above-entitled proceeding be, and the same is hereby, dismissed in accordance with motion of counsel for petitioners.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL HARPER,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

SGT. COSTA; MENDES,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-16988

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02149-LKKDAD

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 10, 2010** 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, HAWKINS, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

Daniel Harper, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants

violated his constitutional rights by issuing him a false disciplinary violation. We

FILED

AUG 27 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-16988

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Serra v. Lappin,

600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

Harper’s action was properly dismissed because his disciplinary violation,

and the associated penalties, were reversed through the prison’s administrative

appeal procedure, and because Harper did not allege facts suggesting that his

resulting administrative segregation imposed an atypical and significant hardship. 

See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (under the Due Process

Clause, a prisoner may challenge a state disciplinary action only if it “deprives or

restrains a state-created liberty interest in some ‘unexpected manner’” or “imposes

some ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life’” (quoting Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).

Harper’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit
99.4








CERTIFICATE
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Quarterly Report (the “Report”) on the Form 10-Q of
Sweetwater Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) for the three months ended June 30,
2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof,
I, Jaiju  Makiakal, Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Financial Officer
and Director, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge and belief:





1. The
Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15
(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. The
information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
Company.











JAIJU
MAKIAKAL


Jaiju
Makiakal


Chief
Accounting Officer


Chief
Financial Officer and Director











-1-
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-60019

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CALVIN ALLEN,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:15-CR-36-1

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Calvin Allen, federal prisoner # 18222-043, is serving a 188-month prison 

sentence following his 2015 guilty-plea conviction for possessing with the 

intent to distribute a controlled substance. Allen appeals from the district 

court’s denial of his pro se motion requesting a reduction of sentence pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). The Government has filed a 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 7, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-60019 Document: 00515067839 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/07/2019
No. 19-60019

2

motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, for summary affirmance in 

light of Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992).

This court reviews “de novo whether the district court had jurisdiction to 

resentence.” United States v. Bridges, 116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997). 

Resentencing under Rule 35(b) “is permitted only on the Government’s 

motion.” United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, to the 

extent that Allen’s motion sought resentencing pursuant to Rule 35(b), the 

motion “was unauthorized and without a jurisdictional basis.” Id.

To the extent that Allen’s motion sought review of the Government’s 

failure to file its own Rule 35(b) motion, the district court likewise had no 

authority to grant relief. “The government’s refusal to file a Rule 35(b) motion 

is not reviewable unless that refusal is based on an unconstitutional motive,” 

as discussed in Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86, or “the government has ‘bargain[ed] 

away’ its discretion.” United States v. Grant, 493 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2007)

(quoting United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 1996)). Allen has 

not shown that either circumstance was present here. 

In sum, Allen’s Rule 35(b) motion was unauthorized, and the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to consider it or to review the Government’s failure to 

file its own Rule 35(b) motion. See Grant, 493 F.3d at 467; Early, 27 F.3d at 

141. The judgment is AFFIRMED on that basis. The Government’s motion to 

dismiss the appeal or, alternatively, for summary affirmance is DENIED as 

moot.

 Case: 19-60019 Document: 00515067839 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/07/2019
II

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2213

To provide for the liquidation or reliquidation of certain entries in accordance

with a final decision of the Department of Commerce under the Tariff

Act of 1930.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 7, 2000

Mr. MACK (for himself and Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To provide for the liquidation or reliquidation of certain

entries in accordance with a final decision of the Department of Commerce under the Tariff Act of 1930.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. LIQUIDATION OR RELIQUIDATION OF CERTAIN

4 ENTRIES.

5 (a) LIQUIDATION OR RELIQUIDATION OF ENTRIES.—

6 Notwithstanding sections 514 and 520 of the Tariff Act

7 of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1514 and 1520), or any other provi8 sion of law, the United States Customs Service shall, not

9 later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
2

•S 2213 IS

1 liquidate or reliquidate the entries described in subsection

2 (c), in accordance with the final decision of the Depart3 ment of Commerce of February 7, 1990 (case number

4 A580–803–001).

5 (b) PAYMENT OF AMOUNTS OWED.—Any amounts

6 owed by the United States pursuant to the liquidation or

7 reliquidation of an entry under subsection (a) shall be paid

8 by the Customs Service within 90 days after such liquida9 tion or reliquidation.

10 (c) ENTRY LIST.—The entries described in this sub11 section are the following:

Entry Number Date of

Entry Port

E85–0001814–6 10/05/89 Miami, FL

E85–0001844–3 10/30/89 Miami, FL

E85–0002268–4 07/21/90 Miami, FL

E85–0002510–9 12/15/90 Miami, FL

E85–0002511–7 12/15/90 Miami, FL

E85–0002509–1 12/15/90 Miami, FL

E85–0002527–3 12/12/90 Miami, FL

E85–0002550–0 12/20/90 Miami, FL

102–0121558–8 12/11/91 Miami, FL

E85–0002654–5 04/08/91 Miami, FL

E85–0002703–0 05/01/91 Miami, FL

E85–0002778–2 06/05/91 Miami, FL

E85–0002909–3 08/05/91 Miami, FL

E85–0002913–5 08/02/91 Miami, FL

102–0120990–4 10/18/91 Miami, FL

102–0120668–6 09/03/91 Miami, FL

102–0517007–8 11/20/91 Miami, FL

102–0122145–3 03/05/91 Miami, FL

102–0121173–6 Miami, FL

102–0121559–6 Miami, FL

E85–0002636–2 Miami, FL

Æ
#### In the Matter of the Supplementary Proceedings of Clifford W. Higley and Lewis T. Barber, Judgment Creditors, Respondents, *v.*William Novark and Ida Novark, Judgment Debtors, Appellants.

Third Department,

May 16, 1911.

Supplementary proceedings — when referee disqualified.

An attorney at law holding an unsatisfied judgment against a debtor should not be appointed a referee to take evidence in supplementary proceedings brought against the debtor by another creditor. '

Appeal by the defendants, William Hovark and another, from an order of the County Court of Warren county, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 9 th day of March, 1911, denying the defendants’ motion to change the referee appointed to take evidence in proceedings supplementary to execution against said defendants upon the ground that said referee as attorney had recovered a judgment against them which.remained unpaid and was in his hands for collection.

*Henry W. Williams,*for the appellants.

*Rogers & Sawyer,*for the respondents.

Per Curiam:

Rule 79 of the General Rules of Practice prohibits, except ■ as therein mentioned, the appointment of any person as referee for any purpose in an action unless he 1⁄8 an attorney, and he must not be a partner or clerk of the attorney or counsel of the party in whose behalf such application is made or in any way connected in business with or occupy the same office with such attorney or counsel.'

This case is not within the express language of that rule, but is fairly within its spirit. The object of the rule is- to obtain a referee who is competent and who has no interest adverse to the party brought before' him: It is true, as alleged, that the referee in these proceedings has but very little to do,- but it is unseemly that a creditor should be brought before an officer of the court for examination at the instance of a party seeking to collect a claim when that officer is also seeking to collect a *8claim from him. It is unnecessary to consider in what respect the interest of the referee might prejudice the; defendant. It is sufficient to say that such an appointment is hot in the interest of. the due administration of justice. The order appealed from is, therefore, reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to be credited on judgment, and the matter remitted to the county judge to name a disinterested person as referee. '

All concurred.

Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, to. be credited on judgment, and the matter .remitted to the county judge to name a disinterested person as referee.
EXHIBIT 10.5



Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation

Non-Employee Directors Annual Compensation

As of December 31, 2004



|                                    |  |        |                
|----------------------------------- |  | ------ | ---------------
|Annual Retainer                     |  | Amount
|Service as Director for the Company |  | $      | 1,500          
|Service as Director for the Bank    |  | $      | 4,000          
|                                    | 
|Meeting Fees                        |  |       
|Committee Meetings for the Company  |  | $      | 250 per meeting
|Committee Meetings for the Bank     |  | $      | 250 per meeting