IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-10591

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

TARYN E. STUART, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

Northern District of Texas, Dallas

USDC 3:17-CR-103-14

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JONES and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Taryn E. Stuart has filed an interlocutory appeal 

with this court seeking to reverse the district court’s order denying her motion 

to revoke the magistrate judge’s detention order, which revoked her release 

pending sentencing. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Stuart’s motion, we affirm.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 6, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. Factual & Procedural Background

From approximately July 2012 to September 2015, Stuart worked as a 

Licensed Vocational Nurse for Novus,1 an approved hospice service agency in 

the Medicare and Medicaid systems. On February 23, 2017, Stuart and 

numerous others were indicted on fifteen counts of health care fraud and 

unlawful distribution of controlled substances. Stuart was individually 

indicted on one count of conspiring to commit health care fraud2 and one count 

of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance3 and aiding and abetting. 

The essence of the scheme was to over-bill Medicare and Medicaid by 

submitting fraudulent claims for hospice services. The stipulated facts section 

in Stuart’s presentence investigation report describes a particularly ominous 

part of the scheme wherein Stuart and others administered high doses of 

Schedule II controlled medications to hospice patients, whether they needed 

the medications or not, to ensure that their medical records contained 

documentation that would justify billing Medicare at the higher “continuous 

care” billing rate. This aggressive medication practice resulted in the death of 

numerous hospice patients. 

Stuart was arrested and made her initial appearance on February 28, 

2017 but she was released on her personal recognizance with pretrial 

supervision after being advised in writing of the conditions of her pretrial 

release. The conditions of Stuart’s release required that she, inter alia, not use 

or unlawfully possess a narcotic drug or other controlled substance as defined 

in 21 U.S.C. § 802, unless such was prescribed to her, and that she submit to 

testing for a prohibited substance if required to do so by the pretrial services 

office or a supervising officer. Stuart signed a form in which she acknowledged 

 

1 Novus is comprised of Novus Health Services and Optim Health Services.

2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347, 1349.

3 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

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that violating any of the conditions of her release may result in a revocation of 

her release and an order of detention.

On June 26, 2018, Stuart pled guilty before a magistrate judge, pursuant 

to a plea agreement, to conspiring to commit health care fraud, as charged in 

Count 1 of the indictment. The district court accepted the guilty plea and 

adjudged Stuart guilty. The district court also adopted the magistrate judge’s 

findings that Stuart was “not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person 

or the community if released and should therefore be released.” Stuart’s 

sentencing is currently set for December 6, 2019. 

On April 10, 2019, the probation officer filed a report of Stuart’s violation 

of the conditions of her pretrial release. The probation officer alleged that, on 

March 25, 2019, Stuart had submitted a urine specimen that tested positive 

for hydrocodone and hydromorphone. Stuart submitted another urine 

specimen the following day that also tested positive for hydrocodone and 

hydromorphone. Based on the violation report, the magistrate judge 

summoned Stuart to appear at a hearing on April 24, 2019. 

Stuart pled true to the allegation that she had violated the conditions of 

her release, but she argued that she should be allowed to remain on release 

pending her sentencing because she had been experiencing back pain she “took 

a hydrocodone that belonged to a family member to deal with those pain 

issues.” She pointed out that prior to this incident, she had complied with the 

terms of her release for over two years. The government stated that it would 

“defer to the Court and the advice of Probation on whether [Stuart] should be 

detained.” 

The magistrate judge determined that, based on Stuart’s admission, 

there was clear and convincing evidence that she had violated the conditions 

of her release by using a controlled substance without a valid prescription. The 

magistrate judge acknowledged that Stuart had complied with the conditions 

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of her release for two years and that she had “some physical issues.” The 

magistrate judge further observed, however, that Stuart had made a “conscious 

choice” to use a controlled substance that had not been prescribed to her, and 

that she had done so knowing “the consequences of not following” the 

conditions of her release. Reiterating that Stuart had knowingly violated the 

conditions of her release, the magistrate judge concluded that Stuart was 

“unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions of release” and 

revoked her release. 

Stuart then moved the district court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), for 

revocation or amendment of the detention order issued by the magistrate 

judge. The district court denied Stuart’s motion, explaining that “there is clear 

and convincing evidence that [Stuart] violated her conditions of release under

§ 3148(b)(1)(B), and that [Stuart] is unlikely to abide by any condition or 

combination of conditions of release under § 3148(b)(2)(B).” Stuart filed this

interlocutory appeal from the district court’s order denying her motion to 

revoke the magistrate judge’s order of pretrial detention. 

II. Standard of Review

“Absent an error of law,” this court will uphold a district court’s pretrial 

detention order “if it is supported by the proceedings below, a deferential 

standard of review that this court equates to an abuse of discretion standard.” 

United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). “The same standard applies to a determination 

in response to a motion to revoke a detention order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3145(b).” Id. The factual basis of the decision is reviewed under the clearly 

erroneous standard. See United States v. Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 

1990). 

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III. Discussion

Pursuant to § 3142, a judicial officer shall order the release of a 

defendant pending trial subject to certain required conditions and “subject to 

the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that such 

judicial officer determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person 

as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” See 18 

U.S.C. §§ 3142(c)(A)-(B). Such conditions may include a requirement that the 

defendant “refrain from . . . any use of a narcotic drug or other controlled 

substance, as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 

U.S.C. 802), without a prescription by a licensed medical practitioner.” Id. 

§ 3142(c)(B)(ix). However, “[a] person who has been released under section 

3142 . . . and who has violated a condition of [her] release, is subject to a 

revocation of release, an order of detention, and a prosecution for contempt of 

court.” Id. § 3148(a). Pursuant to § 3148(b), “[t]he judicial officer shall enter 

an order of revocation and detention if, after a hearing, the judicial officer finds 

that there is . . . clear and convincing evidence that the person has violated any 

other condition of release” and that “the person is unlikely to abide by any 

condition or combination of conditions of release.” Id. § 3148(b). “[A] district 

court’s finding that a defendant will not abide by any conditions of release may 

be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Aron, 904 F.2d at 224. 

In support of her argument that this court should reverse the district 

court’s order denying her motion to revoke the detention order, Stuart states 

that she is a single mother to a teenage daughter who routinely works long 

shifts and is on her feet most of the day. She avers that she has had chronic 

“back issues” for many years. She claims that, apart from this single violation, 

she has abided by the terms of her pretrial release while she awaits sentencing 

later this year. She argues that the district court’s determination that it is 

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unlikely that she would abide by any conditions of release, see § 3148(b)(2)(B), 

is an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

At Stuart’s detention hearing, her counsel was given an opportunity to 

argue that Stuart should be given another chance to abide by the conditions of 

her pretrial release. Although the magistrate judge commended Stuart for her 

honesty, she was not persuaded by her arguments. The magistrate judge

explained:

I understand that you’ve been complying with your

condition for two years. I understand that you have 

some physical issues. But when it comes down to it, 

this is the same violation that I just had. It was a use 

of a controlled substance that was not prescribed for 

you, a very addictive one, and it was a choice. In fact, 

that almost makes it worse, because it’s not a matter 

of addiction or disease. It was a conscious choice. And 

while you may have thought that that was your only 

choice or your best choice at the time, nevertheless, it 

was a choice. And I think I was very clear on the 

consequences of not following those conditions, and to

not follow through with that would be to treat you 

differently from other people in your same situation 

who appear before me under these circumstances. So I 

can’t find that you’re going to start following your

conditions now. You've violated your conditions 

knowingly. So, for that reason, I am revoking your 

conditions of release[.]

Likewise, in affirming the detention order, the district court reasoned:

When [Stuart] was placed on supervised pretrial 

release on February 28, 2017, [Stuart] signed the 

Order setting her conditions, acknowledging her 

understanding of the conditions and of the penalties 

for not complying with the conditions . . . Still, [Stuart]

used a controlled substance for which she did not have 

a prescription. Because [Stuart] violated the 

conditions of her release even though she understood 

the consequences of doing so, the Court finds that she 

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is unlikely to comply with the conditions or any 

amended conditions in the future. 

As the magistrate judge aptly observed, Stuart’s violation of her pretrial 

release conditions was no different from many of her admitted violations 

forming the factual predicate of her guilty plea offense—her unauthorized use 

of a controlled substance. That she is a single mother of a teenage daughter 

should have motivated her to abide by the conditions of her pretrial release, 

rather than, as she argues on appeal, constitute a reason for the district court 

to overlook her noncompliance. The district court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Stuart’s motion to revoke her detention order. See Hare, 873 F.2d 

at 798. 

IV. Conclusion

The district court’s order denying Stuart’s motion for revocation of her 

detention order is AFFIRMED.

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