COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Senior Judge Hodges 

EDWARD E. STROUPE, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2261-01-3 PER CURIAM 

 FEBRUARY 5, 2002 

RADIO SHACK/TANDY CORPORATION AND 

 TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Edward E. Stroupe, Jr., pro se, on brief). 

 (Ramesh Murthy; Penn, Stuart & Eskridge, on 

brief), for appellees. 

 Edward Stroupe (claimant) contends the Workers' 

Compensation Commission erred in finding (1) he failed to prove 

that his alleged unpaid medical bills and mileage expenses were 

causally related to his compensable injury by accident because 

he failed to submit supporting documentation to the commission; 

and (2) the Harcourt Learning Direct Program, costing $818, and 

home equipment to establish a recording studio, costing 

approximately $18,000, were not employer's responsibility as 

reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation services. 

Upon reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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I. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence 

sustained his burden of proof, the commission's findings are 

binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael's 

Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 In denying claimant's request for reimbursement of various 

medical bills and mileage expenses, the commission found as 

follows: 

[Claimant] must prove that his medical 

treatment was causally related to an 

industrial injury. There is no opinion by 

Dr. [Cecil B.] Knox[, III] regarding a 

causal relationship between the treatment he 

has provided and the subsequent referrals, 

prescriptions, and laboratory work-ups. In 

fact, the only opinions about the claimant's 

current condition are from Drs. [Todd W.] 

Sweeney and [Thomas B.] Sato who conclude 

that [claimant] no longer requires ongoing 

treatment. From this evidence, we find no 

error in Deputy Commissioner Stevick's 

finding that the employer is not responsible 

for these outstanding costs, if any. 

 Similarly, we find that the claimant 

has submitted detailed evidence of his 

accrued mileage expenses for medical 

treatment. However, as stated, there is no 

medical evidence that the treatment is 

related to his compensable injury by 

accident. The claimant's personal opinion 

is not persuasive in light of Drs. Sweeney 

and Sato's conclusions that the treatment is 
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unnecessary, and given the lack of opinion 

from either Dr. [Charlene M.] Truhlik or 

Dr. Knox. 

 The record supports the commission's findings. In light of 

the lack of evidence causally relating claimant's medical and 

mileage expenses to his compensable injury by accident and the 

opinions of Drs. Sweeney and Sato, we cannot find as a matter of 

law that claimant's evidence sustained his burden of proof. 

II. 

 Under Code § 65.2-603(A)(3), an employer is required to 

furnish reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation 

training services at the direction of the commission. These 

"services shall take into account the employee's preinjury job 

and wage classifications; his age; aptitude, and level of 

education; the likelihood of success in the new vocation; and 

the relative costs and benefits to be derived from such 

services." Id.

 In denying claimant's request for reimbursement of the cost 

of the learning program and the home equipment as vocational 

rehabilitation services, the commission found as follows: 

As noted by Deputy Commissioner Stevick, 

there is no evidence concerning the 

claimant's disability, if any. No medical 

record establishes that he is unable to 

return to his preinjury employment. The 

vocational rehabilitation services proposed 

by the claimant represent a considerable 

investment. Given that the Commission has 

no proof of his disability, we cannot 

determine that vocational rehabilitation 

services are even warranted. We decline to 
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assume the likelihood of success or of the 

benefits to be obtained through these 

services. We agree that the Deputy 

Commissioner reasonably denied the request. 

 The record supports the commission's findings. In light of 

the lack of any medical documentation establishing claimant's 

disability or inability to work and the high cost of the 

services requested, we cannot find as a matter of law that 

claimant's evidence proved that the services he requested were 

compensable as vocational rehabilitation services under the Act. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

Affirmed.