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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

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No. 162 

Motorola Credit Corporation,

 Appellant-Respondent,

Nokia Corporation,

 Plaintiff-Counter-

 Defendant,

Motorola, Inc., et al.,

 Counter-Defendants, 

 v.

Standard Chartered Bank,

 Respondent-Appellant,

Murat Hakan Uzan, et al.,

 Defendants-Counter-

 Claimants,

Kemal Uzan, et al.,

 Defendants.

Howard H. Stahl, for appellant-respondent.

Bruce E. Clark, for respondent-appellant.

Institute of International Bankers et al.; Government

of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

Central Bank of Jordan; Committee on Banking Law of the

Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Securities

Industry and Financial Markets Association, amici curiae.

GRAFFEO, J.:

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit asks us whether the "separate entity" rule

prevents a judgment creditor from ordering a garnishee bank

operating branches in New York to restrain a judgment debtor's

assets held in foreign branches of the bank. We conclude that it

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does.

I.

Between April 1998 and September 2000, several members

of the Uzan family (the Uzans) induced plaintiff Motorola Credit

Corporation (Motorola) to loan over $2 billion to a Turkish

telecommunications company they controlled, purportedly to

finance a major expansion of the company's operations. 

Unbeknownst to Motorola, the Uzans diverted a substantial portion

of these funds to themselves and other entities they controlled. 

In 2003, after discovering that the Uzans had "perpetrated a huge

fraud" and concealed "their scheme through an almost endless

series of lies, threats, and chicanery," the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a

judgment in Motorola's favor for compensatory damages of about

$2.1 billion (Motorola Credit Corp. v Uzan, 274 F Supp 2d 481,

490 [SDNY 2003]). Three years later, the District Court awarded

Motorola an additional $1 billion in punitive damages (see

Motorola Credit Corp. v Uzan, 413 F Supp 2d 346 [SDNY 2006]).

The Uzans have gone to great lengths to avoid

satisfying the judgments and remain in contempt for failure to

comply with the District Court's orders, subjecting them to

arrest if they enter the United States. As a result of

enforcement obstacles, Motorola has pursued collection of the

judgments through third-party discovery and the District Court

has conducted postjudgment proceedings ex parte and under seal. 

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In February 2013, the District Court entered an order pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65 and 69 and CPLR 5222

restraining the Uzans and anyone with notice of the order from

selling, assigning or transferring their property.

Motorola served the restraining order on the New York

branch of defendant Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), a foreign bank

incorporated and headquartered in the United Kingdom. SCB, which

had no connection to Motorola's loan to the Uzans or the

underlying litigation, did not locate any Uzan property at its

New York branch. Two months later, a global search of its

branches revealed Uzan-related assets valued at roughly $30

million in its branches in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). 

SCB froze those assets in accordance with the restraining order,

but regulatory authorities in the U.A.E. and Jordan quickly

intervened. The Central Bank of Jordan sent a bank examiner to

seize documents at SCB's Jordan branch, while the U.A.E. Central

Bank unilaterally debited about $30 million from SCB's account

with the bank.

In May 2013, SCB sought relief from the restraining

order, claiming in the District Court that the restraint of the

$30 million in assets violated U.A.E. law and subjected it to

double liability. SCB also contended that, under New York's

separate entity rule, service of the restraining order on SCB's

New York branch was effective only as to assets located in

accounts at that branch and could not freeze funds situated in

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foreign branches. In opposition, Motorola asserted that the

separate entity rule was no longer valid law in light of Koehler

v Bank of Bermuda Ltd. (12 NY3d 533 [2009]), where we held that a

judgment creditor could seek the turnover of stock certificates

located outside the country so long as the court had personal

jurisdiction over the garnishee. In a sealed order, the District

Court agreed with SCB and concluded that the separate entity rule

precluded Motorola from restraining assets at SCB's foreign

branches. Nevertheless, the District Court stayed the release of

the restraint pending the outcome of Motorola's appeal.

The Second Circuit, recognizing that we have never

explicitly addressed the separate entity doctrine and finding

that its viability was unclear in the wake of Koehler, certified

the following question to us:

"[W]hether the separate entity rule precludes

a judgment creditor from ordering a garnishee

bank operating branches in New York to

restrain a debtor's assets held in foreign

branches of the bank" (740 F3d 108, 118 [2d

Cir 2014]).

We accepted certification (22 NY3d 1113 [2014]).1

II.

Motorola, as the judgment creditor, argues that the

service of a CPLR 5222 restraining notice on the New York branch

1

 The Second Circuit also certified a related question in a

companion case involving the application of the separate entity

rule in the CPLR 5225 turnover context (see Tire Eng'g & Distrib.

v Bank of China Ltd., 740 F3d 108 [2d Cir 2014]), but that

certified question was later withdrawn (22 NY3d 1152 [2014]).

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of a foreign bank garnishee is sufficient to freeze the funds of

the judgment debtor in any branch account with the bank,

regardless of where the assets are located. Motorola questions

whether the separate entity rule, which is not mentioned in CPLR

article 52, was ever the law of New York and asserts that, even

if it was, we necessarily abolished it in Koehler. In any event,

Motorola asks us to disavow the separate entity doctrine as

outmoded and unnecessary.

As the garnishee bank, SCB responds that the separate

entity rule is deeply rooted in New York banking law and that

foreign banks have reasonably relied on it over the years when

deciding whether to open branches and conduct business in New

York. Supported by several amici curiae, SCB asserts that

Koehler did not discard the separate entity rule and urges that

the rule remains vital in the context of international banking. 

Unlike our dissenting colleagues, we conclude that SCB has the

better argument.

The separate entity rule, as it has been employed by

lower New York courts and federal courts applying New York law,

provides that even when a bank garnishee with a New York branch

is subject to personal jurisdiction, its other branches are to be

treated as separate entities for certain purposes, particularly

with respect to CPLR article 62 prejudgment attachments and

article 52 postjudgment restraining notices and turnover orders

(see Matter of National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v

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Advanced Empl. Concepts, 269 AD2d 101 [1st Dept 2000]; Therm-XChem. & Oil Corp. v Extebank, 84 AD2d 787 [2d Dept 1981]; Allied

Mar., Inc. v Descatrade SA, 620 F3d 70, 74 [2d Cir 2010]). In

other words, a restraining notice or turnover order served on a

New York branch will be effective for assets held in accounts at

that branch but will have no impact on assets in other branches.2

Courts and commentators traditionally have ascribed

three basic rationales for the separate entity doctrine. First,

courts applying the rule have emphasized the importance of

international comity and the fact that "any banking operation in

a foreign country is necessarily subject to the foreign

sovereign's own laws and regulations" (Global Tech., Inc. v Royal

Bank of Can., 34 Misc 3d 1209[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50023[U], *3

[Sup Ct, NY County 2012] [internal quotation marks and citation

omitted]). Second, it was viewed as necessary to protect banks

from being "subject . . . to competing claims" and the

possibility of double liability (Shaheen Sports, Inc. v Asia Ins.

Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 919664, *5 [SDNY 2012]), a concern strenuously

voiced by the amici in this case. And third, the rule has been

2

 Most cases applying the separate entity rule involved

bank branches in foreign countries, but some have applied the

rule to bar a restraint even where the unserved branch is located

in New York (see e.g. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v Sabre

Shipping Corp., 341 F2d 50, 53-54 [2d Cir 1965]). In this case,

we have no occasion to address whether the separate entity rule

has any application to domestic bank branches in New York or

elsewhere in the United States. The narrow question before us is

whether the rule prevents the restraint of assets held in foreign

branch accounts, and we limit our analysis to that inquiry.

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justified based on the "intolerable burden" that would otherwise

be placed on banks to monitor and ascertain the status of bank

accounts in numerous other branches (Cronan v Schilling, 100

NYS2d 474, 476 [Sup Ct, NY County 1950], affd without opn 282 App

Div 940 [1st Dept 1953]; see generally Geoffrey Sant, The

Rejection of the Separate Entity Rule Validates the Separate

Entity Rule, 65 SMU L Rev 813, 814 [2012]).

The existence of the separate entity rule as a

component of New York's common law can be traced back to a 1916

decision (see Chrzanowska v Corn Exch. Bank, 173 App Div 285, 291

[1st Dept 1916], affd without opn 225 NY 728 [1919] ["With

respect to the question presented for decision, the different

branches were as separate and distinct from one another as from

any other bank."]). It was first applied in the postjudgment

context a few decades later in Walsh v Bustos, where the court

concluded that a restraining order served on a New York branch of

the bank garnishee did not "extend to the deposits of the

judgment debtor in the Mexican branch of this foreign bank" (46

NYS2d 240, 241 [City Ct, NY County 1943]). By the 1950s and

1960s, the separate entity rule was described by state and

federal courts as "well established" (Cronan, 100 NYS2d at 476)

and supported by "a consistent line of authority" (Det Bergenske

Dampskibsselskab v Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F2d 50, 53 [2d Cir

1965]). And its endurance continues into the 21st century in the

postjudgment context (see Gliklad v Bank Hapoalim B.M., 2014 WL

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3899209 [Sup Ct, NY County 2014]; Parbulk II AS v Heritage Mar.,

SA, 35 Misc 3d 235, 238-239 [Sup Ct, NY County 2011]; Fidelity

Partners, Inc. v Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guar. Corp.,

921 F Supp 1113, 1119-1120 [SDNY 1996]). Although we have not

expounded on the separate entity rule,3 contrary to Motorola's

suggestion, it is a firmly established principle of New York law,

with a history of application both before and after the 1962

adoption of the CPLR.

Motorola argues that we abrogated the rule five years

ago in Koehler v Bank of Bermuda Ltd. (12 NY3d 533 [2009]), a

case in which a judgment creditor secured a CPLR 5225 turnover

order directing a garnishee bank in Bermuda to deliver stock

certificates belonging to the judgment debtor. The bank

consented to personal jurisdiction based on the presence of a

subsidiary in New York.4 The question certified to us by the

3 We affirmed, without opinion, in two cases involving the

separate entity rule (see McCloskey v Chase Manhattan Bank, 11

NY2d 936 [1962]; Chrzanowska v Corn Exch. Bank, 225 NY 728

[1919]).

4 Similarly, in this case personal jurisdiction over SCB

was predicated on the presence of its New York branch. The

District Court noted that SCB did not dispute that personal

jurisdiction existed on this basis. Motorola, too, asserts in

its brief that SCB "has never contested personal jurisdiction." 

However, SCB now appears to challenge personal jurisdiction in

light of the U.S. Supreme Court's nascent decision in Daimler AG

v Bauman, which held that general jurisdiction over a foreign

corporation may not be predicated solely on the ground that the

corporation "engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic

course of business" in the state (134 SCt 746, 761 [2014]

[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Rather, as a

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Second Circuit was "whether a court sitting in New York may order

a bank over which it has personal jurisdiction to deliver stock

certificates owned by a judgment debtor (or cash equal to their

value) to a judgment creditor, pursuant to CPLR article 52, when

those stock certificates are located outside New York" (id. at

536). We answered that inquiry in the affirmative, concluding

that the "the Legislature intended CPLR article 52 to have

extraterritorial reach" and that "the key to the reach of the

turnover order is personal jurisdiction over a particular

defendant" (id. at 539-540). Because the bank admitted that the

New York courts had secured personal jurisdiction over it, the

turnover order was properly directed at the stock certificates in

Bermuda.

Notably absent from our decision in Koehler was any

discussion of the separate entity rule. We discern two reasons

for our silence on the subject. As an initial matter, the

foreign bank did not raise the issue so we had no occasion to

examine the doctrine. Second, the separate entity rule, as it

matter of due process, general jurisdiction exists only if the

corporation is "essentially at home in the forum State" (id.

[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), typified by

"the place of incorporation and principal place of business" (id.

at 760). Here, SCB observes that it is incorporated under the

laws of the United Kingdom and headquartered there. Whether New

York has personal jurisdiction over SCB -- and whether SCB may

still litigate the federal constitutional issue at this juncture

-- are questions that must be resolved by the federal courts. 

The sole issue before us on this certified question is whether

the common-law separate entity rule prevents Motorola's restraint

of assets held by SCB's foreign branches.

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has been applied by the courts, would not have aided the bank in

Koehler because that case involved neither bank branches nor

assets held in bank accounts.5

 In short, we did not analyze,

much less overrule, the separate entity doctrine in Koehler. 

Nor, as the dissent believes, is the rule irreconcilable with our

holding in Koehler that the scope of CPLR article 52 is generally

tied to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a garnishee. 

As a longstanding common-law doctrine, the separate entity rule

functions as a limiting principle in the context of international

banking, particularly in situations involving attempts to

restrain assets held in a garnishee bank's foreign branches. We

therefore reject Motorola's view that Koehler decided the issue

before us.

Motorola and the dissent further submit that the

separate entity rule is incompatible with CPLR article 52 because

nothing in CPLR 5222, governing postjudgment restraining notices,

expressly embraces the rule. Motorola cites Commonwealth of the

N. Mariana Is. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, where we

stated, in determining the expanse of CPLR article 52, that the

"starting point is the language itself, giving effect to the

5 It would appear that the judgment creditor in Koehler

also served the bank itself in Bermuda, not only its New York

subsidiary, providing yet another reason for the inapplicability

of the separate entity rule in that case (see Koehler v Bank of

Bermuda Ltd., 2005 WL 551115, *12 [SDNY 2005] ["Assuming service

to be proper, the separate entity rule has no role to play in

this case."]).

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plain meaning thereof" (21 NY3d 55, 60 [2013] [internal quotation

marks and citation omitted]). But Motorola's reliance on

Canadian Imperial Bank is misplaced because the separate entity

rule predates the CPLR by several decades and the issue is not

one of statutory construction but, rather, whether to retain a

common-law principle.

Finally, we decline Motorola's invitation to cast aside

the separate entity rule. As discussed, the doctrine has been a

part of the common law of New York for nearly a century. Courts

have repeatedly used it to prevent the postjudgment restraint of

assets situated in foreign branch accounts based solely on the

service of a foreign bank's New York branch. Undoubtedly,

international banks have considered the doctrine's benefits when

deciding to open branches in New York, which in turn has played a

role in shaping New York's "status as the preeminent commercial

and financial nerve center of the Nation and the world" (EhrlichBober & Co. v University of Houston, 49 NY2d 574, 581 [1980]).

In large measure, the underlying reasons that led to

the adoption of the separate entity rule still ring true today. 

The risk of competing claims and the possibility of double

liability in separate jurisdictions remain significant concerns,

as does the reality that foreign branches are subject to a

multitude of legal and regulatory regimes. By limiting the reach

of a CPLR 5222 restraining notice in the foreign banking context,

the separate entity rule promotes international comity and serves

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to avoid conflicts among competing legal systems (see generally

Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 SCt 746, 763 [2014] [recognizing the

importance of considering "the risks to international comity"]). 

And although Motorola suggests that technological advancements

and centralized banking have ameliorated the need for the

doctrine, courts have continued to recognize the practical

constraints and costs associated with conducting a worldwide

search for a judgment debtor's assets (see Samsun Logix Corp. v

Bank of China, 31 Misc 3d 1226[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50861[U], *4

[Sup Ct, NY County 2011] [stating that "the Banks submitted

numerous affidavits to the effect that the computer systems in

the New York branches of the Banks do not provide access to

customer account information at the head office or at branches

outside of the United States."]).6

Indeed, as the District Court observed, the facts of

this case aptly demonstrate that the policies implicated by the

separate entity rule run deeper than the ability of a bank to

6

 As the dissent highlights, one court questioned the

validity of the separate entity rule in light of computerized

banking (see Digitrex, Inc. v Johnson, 491 F Supp 66 [SDNY

1980]). But courts subsequently limited the so-called Digitrex

exception to cases where "(1) the restraining notice is served on

the bank's main office; (2) the bank's main office and branches

are within the same jurisdiction; and (3) the bank branches are

connected to the main office by high-speed computers and are

under the centralized control of the main office" (Limonium Mar.,

S.A. v Mizushima Marinera, S.A., 961 F Supp 600, 607 [SDNY 1997];

see also Matter of National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,

Pa. v Advanced Empl. Concepts, 269 AD2d 101, 102 [1st Dept

2000]).

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communicate across branches. In seeking to comply with the

restraining order, SCB faced regulatory and financial

repercussions abroad. Representatives of the Central Bank of

Jordan compelled SCB to disclose records and directed SCB to

immediately unfreeze the assets. The U.A.E. Central Bank, which

possesses regulatory oversight in that nation, would not allow

SCB's Uzan-related payment obligation to remain unsatisfied. As

a result, the U.A.E. Central Bank debited SCB's account with that

bank for an amount equivalent to the frozen funds --

approximately $30 million. In essence, SCB was placed in the

difficult position of attempting to comply with the contradictory

directives of multiple sovereign nations.

Consequently, in contrast to the dissent, we believe

that abolition of the separate entity rule would result in

serious consequences in the realm of international banking to the

detriment of New York's preeminence in global financial affairs. 

For all of these reasons, we conclude that a judgment creditor's

service of a restraining notice on a garnishee bank's New York

branch is ineffective under the separate entity rule to freeze

assets held in the bank's foreign branches.

* * *

Accordingly, the certified question should be answered

in the affirmative.

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Motorola Credit Corp. v Standard Chartered Bank

No. 162 

ABDUS-SALAAM, J.(dissenting):

Today, in the year 2014, the majority for the first

time expressly adopts the separate entity rule for post-judgment

enforcement proceedings under CPLR article 52. The rule has no

statutory basis and was initially formulated by the lower courts

nearly a century ago based on a rationale that has no application

to these modern times. In choosing this outmoded rule, the

majority has engaged in improper judicial legislation, avoided

the clear import of our recent decision in Koehler v Bank of

Bermuda (12 NY3d 553 [2009]) and given short shrift to the

compelling public policy reasons to reject such a rule.

The majority has, in this particular case, permitted

the judgment debtors, individuals who owe plaintiff over $2

billion in consequential damages and $1 billion in punitive

damages, who are subject to arrest orders from the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York and The

English High Court of Justice, and who have been convicted of

multibillion dollar bank frauds in Turkey, to evade enforcement
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proceedings in New York. As was described by the Second Circuit,

"[r]elying on their vast personal wealth, the Uzans have time and

again deployed their lawyers to raise legal roadblocks to the

enforcement of the judgment against them. They have persistently

endeavored to evade the lawful jurisdiction of the District Court

and undermine its careful and determined work" (Motorola Credit

Corp. v Uzan, 561 F3d 123, 127 [2d Cir 2009]). Standard

Chartered Bank, by persuading the majority of this Court to adopt

the obsolete separate entity rule, has aided its fugitive

customers by erecting a monumental roadblock to plaintiff's

enforcement of the staggering judgment. 

In broader terms, today's holding permits banks doing

business in New York to shield customer accounts held in branches

outside of this country, thwarts efforts by judgment creditors to

collect judgments, and allows even the most egregious and

flagrant judgment debtors to make a mockery of our courts' duly

entered judgments. In an age where banks are being held more

accountable than ever for their actions vis-à-vis their

customers,1 today's holding is a deviation from current public

1

(See e.g. USA Patriot Act, 115 Stat. 272 [2001][amending

Bank Secrecy Act to, among other things, "increase the strength

of United States measures to prevent, detect, and prosecute

international money laundering and the financing of terrorism," 

"provide a clear national mandate for subjecting to special

scrutiny those foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions

operating outside of the United States, and classes of

international transactions or types of accounts that pose

particular, identifiable opportunities for criminal abuse," and

"to ensure that all appropriate elements of the financial

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policy regarding the responsibilities of banks and a step in the

wrong direction.

I. 

CPLR Article 52 Neither Expressly nor Impliedly Incorporates a 

Separate Entity Rule.

I begin my analysis of CPLR 5222 (b) with the generally

accepted premise that the "starting point" is "the language

itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" (Commonwealth

of the N. Mariana Is. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 21

NY3d 55, 60 [2013] [internal citation and quotation marks

omitted]). The statute provides, in pertinent part, with respect

to third-parties served with a post-judgment restraining notice: 

"All property in which the judgment debtor or

obligor is known or believed to have an

interest then in and thereafter coming into

the possession or custody of such a person,

including any specified in the notice, and

all debts of such a person, including any

specified in the notice, then due and

thereafter coming due to the judgment debtor

or obligor, shall be subject to the notice." 

Nothing in the statute exempts third parties that are

banks, or branches of banks, from complying with the restraining

notice. As the Second Circuit noted in the companion case Tire

Eng'g & Distribution LLC v Bank of China (740 F3d 108, 115 [2d

services industry are subject to appropriate requirements to

report potential money laundering transactions to proper

authorities, and that jurisdictional disputes do not hinder

examination of compliance by financial institutions with relevant

reporting requirements"]; 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 [requiring riskbased customer verification procedures]).

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Cir 2014]), the separate entity rule "is not the product of a

textual analysis of the CPLR" but is instead a "judicially

created doctrine" that is "not tethered to the CPLR's text."

This Court has consistently clung to the principle of

plain statutory construction (see e.g. Matter of Di Brizzi

(Proskauer), 303 NY 206, 214 [1951] [although the statute was

enacted due to a war emergency, because the Legislature utilized

general terms, and did not either expressly or by implication,

limit its operation to a time of war, we may not do so]; Tucker v

Bd. of Educ., Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 82 NY2d 274, 278 [1993]

["where . . . the statute unequivocally describes in general

terms the particular situation in which it is to apply and

nothing indicates a contrary legislative intent, the courts

should not impose limitations on the clear statutory

language."]). 

We have also resisted the temptation to legislate,

mindful that "[c]ourts are not supposed to legislate under the

guise of interpretation, and in the long run it is better to

adhere closely to this principle and leave it to the Legislature

to correct evils if any exist" (Bright Homes v Wright, 8 NY2d

157, 162 [1960]; see also In re Amorosi, 9 NY3d 367, 372 [2007]

["[t]he courts are not free to legislate and if any unsought

consequences result, the Legislature is best suited to evaluate

and resolve them."]). The majority avoids any analysis of the

statute, reasoning that the separate entity rule is a creation of

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common law, which predates the CPLR by several decades. But the

point about the rule predating the CPLR is, to my mind, good

reason for us to conclude that the separate entity rule should be

rejected, not embraced. The fact remains that the rule finds no

support in the statutory framework of CPLR article 52, and

imports an exception to the statutory enforcement scheme. Such

an exception is solely the prerogative of the Legislature, not

this Court. 

II.

The Separate Entity Rule is Obsolete and Runs Counter 

to Public Policy

Lower courts in the early part of the last century

began to apply a separate entity rule on the theory that one bank

branch had no way to ascertain the status of a debtor's account

at another branch. Some subsequent courts followed suit. The

majority believes that this Court should adopt the rule today in

the name of stare decisis (majority op at 11) for the benefit of

the banks who prefer this extensive limitation on their

obligations. Initially, I note that the adoption of the rule by

some lower New York courts and some federal courts does not mean

that the rule is entitled to stare decisis effect. More

fundamentally, I cannot agree that the majority's stare decisis

rationale is a good reason to place our imprimatur on an

anachronistic rule that greatly diminishes the scope and reach of

post-judgment enforcement proceedings. 

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Notably, some of the first cases enunciating a separate

entity rule2 relied upon Chrzanowska v Corn Exch. Bank (173 AD

285 [1916], affd without opinion, 225 NY 728 [1919]). That 1916

First Department decision held that different branches of a bank

are "separate and distinct from one another as from any other

bank" because "[t]he Legislature did not intend, we think, either

to authorize or require a bank having branches to cash checks and

make loans to a depositor at any branch at which he may see fit

to call, for to do so would produce endless confusion. . ." (173

AD at 291). This observation is an indication of just how much,

with the advent of modern technology, the world in general, and

the banking industry in particular, has changed since 1916. It

also tells us that the underpinnings of the rationale for the

separate entity rule have long since decayed. 

In 1950, a trial court in New York County applied the

reasoning of Chrzanowska when it held: 

"Unless each branch of a bank is treated as a

separate entity for attachment purposes, no

branch could safely pay a check drawn by its

depositor without checking with all other

branches and the main office to make sure

that no warrant of attachment had been served

upon any of them. Each time a warrant of

attachment is served upon one branch, every

other branch and the main office would have

to be notified. This would place an

intolerable burden upon banking and commerce,

particularly where the branches are numerous,

as is often the case."

2These cases include Clinton Trust Co. v Compania Azucarera

Cent. Ramona, S.A. (14 NYS2d 743 [Sup Ct NY Co 1939], affd

without opinion 15 NYS2d 721 [1st Dept 1939]) and Bluebird

Undergarment Corp. v Gomez (249 NYS 319 [City Ct NY CO 1931]). 

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(Cronan v Schilling, 100 NYS2d 474, 476 [Sup Ct NY Co 1950]). 

In this day of centralized banking and advanced technology, bank

branches can communicate with each other in a matter of seconds.

Banks are no longer faced with this "intolerable burden" when

served with a restraining notice. That the separate entity rule

no longer made practical sense was recognized over 30 years ago

by the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York, when it noted in Digitrex, Inv. v Johnson (491 F Supp

66, 68 [SD NY 1980]) that "operations at most if not all New York

City commercial banks . . . have become largely computerized" and 

concluded that "it is clear that the argument in favor of the

rule set forth in 1950 in Cronan [ ] is no longer persuasive."

The First Department agreed in S&S Mach. Corp v Manufacturer's

Hanover Trust Co. (219 AD2d 249 [1st Dept 1996]), when it applied

the Digitrex rule to a post-judgment restraining notice and

information subpoena: 

"The Digitrex court argued persuasively that

the old New York rule, requiring that the

judgment creditor serve his postjudgment

process on the particular branch of the bank

where the judgment debtor's assets were

located, was obsolete in an era when large

commercial banks use centralized computer

databases to handle their accounts."

(219 AD2d at 252). And as the Second Circuit aptly noted in this

case, "the original basis for the separate entity rule may have

weakened or even disappeared over time" (740 F3d at 117). 

While the longstanding nature of certain common law

rules is important, that should not prevent this Court from being

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flexible enough to acknowledge that the world has changed and

that the law must change with it. As Judge Cardozo once

observed:

"I think that when a rule, after it has been

duly tested by experience, has been found to

be inconsistent with the sense of justice or

with the social welfare, there should be less

hesitation in frank avowal and full

abandonment. We have had to do this sometimes

in the field of constitutional law. Perhaps

we should do so oftener in fields of private

law where considerations of social utility

are not so aggressive and insistent. There

should be greater readiness to abandon an

untenable position when the rule to be

discarded may not reasonably be supposed to

have determined the conduct of the litigants,

and particularly when in its origin it was

the product of institutions or conditions

which have gained a new significance or

development with the progress of the years"

(Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process [1921 ed.], pp 150-

151, emphasis added). 

Our society has most certainly evolved since the

separate entity rule was first formulated, and the initial

reasons for the rule no longer exist. The majority notes that

banks have been relying on the separate entity doctrine for years

and posits that any change might negatively impact the banking

industry in New York. But while banks may place some technical

reliance on the separate entity rule, they cannot rely on blind

and unwavering adherence to legal norms birthed in the bygone era

which that rule represents, for the government, banks and bank

customers have shifted their practices and expectations to

conform to a very different modern reality. Banks in the United

States are now subject to complex and far-reaching government

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regulations regarding their relationships with their customers.

Yet banks continue to do business in this country. 

Both the New York and federal government have brought

enforcement actions against banks under the Bank Secrecy Act. 

Standard Chartered Bank in particular agreed to a settlement in

2012 with the New York State Department of Financial Services

(DFS) which included a civil penalty of $340 million and the

installation of a monitor to report directly to the DFS and to

evaluate the bank's money-laundering risk controls (See Press

Release, N.Y. Department of Financial Services, Statement of

Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services,

Regarding Standard Chartered Bank, Aug. 14, 2012). 

Additionally, "[i]n 2012, HSBC Holdings PLC paid $1.9

billion after admitting violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and

other laws. Regulators also reached a smaller settlement with

Standard Chartered PLC and cited Citigroup Inc. and J.P. Morgan

Chase & Co. for deficient money-laundering controls" (Andrew

Grossman, Banks Face New U.S. Moves Against Laundering, WALL ST.

J. [Jan. 9, 2014]). Recently, in September 2014, a jury in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District found Arab

Bank civilly liable for the material support of 24 Hamas terror

attacks, in violation of the civil provisions of the AntiTerrorism Act (Linde v Arab Bank, 04-CV-2799, NYLJ 9/23/14) and

the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

reinstated claims by victims of terrorist attacks against the

National Westminster Bank for supporting Hamas by handling money

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for the Palestine Relief & Development Fund (Weiss v National

Westminster Bank, F3d , 2014 WL 4667348 [2d Cir 2014]). 

Banks have apparently adjusted to the societal

expectation that they will be responsible corporate citizens,

presumably by using modern technology and a reasonable share of

their resources to shoulder the burden of compliance with a

regulatory regime of global reach. In this environment, surely

every bank knows that it no longer exists in a world where it can

shrug off a duly entered judgment for assets in its collective

coffers on the theory that it would have to resort to a long game

of international telephone tag, as opposed to a brief search of

its computer database, to restrain funds subject to collection.

The difficulties that banks will face should we require foreign

branches to comply with post-judgment proceedings to enforce the

rights of judgment creditors will likely pale in comparison to

banks' efforts to comply with the US Patriot Act and the Bank

Secrecy Act. 

In my view, any burden imposed on the banks is far

outweighed by the rights of judgment creditors to enforce their

judgments. While this case involves a judgment entered in favor

of a big corporation, our holding will affect all sorts of

judgment creditors. Take for example, employees who wend their

way through the court system and eventually obtain a substantial

judgment against their employer for labor law and human rights

violations, only to find that the employer has removed all assets

from bank accounts located in New York, and placed them in a

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foreign branch. By the majority's reckoning, these employees can

find no relief in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, because

it is too burdensome or problematic for the banks to enforce a

restraining order in a foreign bank branch. 

III.

A Blanket and All-Encompassing Separate Entity Rule is Not 

Necessary to Promote Comity

The majority reasons that the separate entity rule

promotes comity. But while the majority would apply the separate

entity rule in all instances where a judgment creditor seeks to

reach assets held in a foreign branch, there are many countries

where banks would not face conflicting laws, and where complying

with a restraining notice would be consistent with the law where

the foreign branch is located. Thus, there is no need for the

broad sweep employed by the majority to promote comity. 

"International comity comes into play only when there is a true

conflict between American law and that of a foreign jurisdiction"

(In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., plc, 93 F3d 1036, 1049 [2d Cir

1996]). That CPLR article 52 might conflict with some other

country's laws does not require that the separate entity rule be

imposed to protect accounts of judgment debtors deposited

anywhere outside of the United States. The majority's use of the

separate entity rule to address potential comity issues is akin

to using a cannon to kill a fly. Less extreme measures are more

appropriate and just as effective. 

As for jurisdictions where a bank is faced with

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potential liabilities for complying with a restraining notice,

CPLR 5240 gives a court discretion to deny, limit, condition or

modify the use of any enforcement procedure. Thus, we need not

adopt a categorical separate entity rule in the name of comity. 

A bank's concerns about double liability and other exposure may

be addressed by a court.3 Banks do not need to be protected

through application of this wide-ranging separate entity rule. 

IV.

The Majority's Reasoning Cannot be Reconciled with Koehler

Putting aside the obvious obsolescence and lack of

necessity for the separate entity rule, our decision in Koehler

makes it clear that we believe "that the Legislature intended

CPLR article 52 to have extraterritorial reach" (12 NY3d at 539). 

Answering a question certified to us by the Second Circuit

involving a garnishee bank and a turnover proceeding pursuant to

CPLR 5225, we held that "the principle that a New York court may

issue a judgment ordering the turnover of out-of-state assets is

not limited to judgment debtors, but applies equally to

garnishees"(id. at 541). Our reasoning was based on the words of

3In this case, the District Court was unpersuaded by

Standard Chartered Bank's "dire predictions" that it would be

subject to double liability, and further noted that even assuming

this would occur, banks assume that risk in New York as an

ordinary cost of doing business in multiple jurisdictions (978 F

Supp2d at 210). Furthermore, as plaintiff argues, Standard

Chartered Bank has not demonstrated that it is actually subject

to any liability in light of the indemnification agreement that

it has with the Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank, an Uzan proxy subject

to the District Court's Freeze Order. 

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the statute. 

"CPLR article 52 contains no express

territorial limitation barring the entry of a

turnover order that requires a garnishee to

transfer money or property into New York from

another state or country. It would have been

an easy matter for the Legislature to have

added such a restriction to the reach of

article 52 and there is no basis for us to

infer it from the broad language presently in

the statute" (id. at 539). 

The majority, focused on the common law, is unconcerned

with the wording of the statute. But Koehler's reasoning that

the statutory language answered the certified question with

respect to CPLR 5225 should apply with equal force in our

examination of CPLR 5222. Although the Koehler court did not

address the separate entity rule, Koehler's interpretation of

CPLR article 52 and its holding that article 52 has

extraterritorial reach cannot be reconciled with today's decision

adopting the separate entity rule. The scope of the Koehler

majority's decision was understood by the Koehler dissent: 

"If the bank has a New York branch—either one

that is not separately incorporated, or a

subsidiary with which the parent's

relationship is close enough to subject the

parent to New York jurisdiction—the judgment

creditor, having registered the judgment in

New York, can obtain an order requiring the

asset to be delivered here" 

(12 NY3d at 542 [Smith, J., dissenting]).

This is precisely the point that the majority here has

overlooked.

That recognition of the separate entity rule is

inconsistent with Koehler is reflected not only in the Koehler

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dissent's observation, but in legislation proposed by The

Clearing House Association and the Institute of International

Bankers (both appear as amici curiae in support of Standard

Chartered Bank in this action) to "correct" our decision in

Koehler by adding language to CPLR 5222 (b) providing that a

restraining notice served on a bank shall have no effect with

respect to property or accounts held at a branch or office of the

bank outside the state (see Jan. 19, 2010 Letter from the

Clearing House Association LLC and the Institute of International

Bankers addressed to Gov. David Paterson). Additionally,

legislation proposed by Senator Farley in June 2013 (s. 5734),

sought to amend CPLR 5222 to provide that a restraining notice

that seeks to restrain property or money outside the United

States shall have no effect except to the extent that it is

served on the judgment debtor. This underscores that the

majority's adoption of the separate entity rule is inconsistent

with Koehler, and that any implementation of the rule must be

done through amendment to CPLR article 52 by the Legislature, not

this Court. 

V.

Conclusion

Enforcement of money judgments is an integral and vital

part of our legal system, as evidenced by the extensive postjudgment enforcement scheme of CPLR article 52. A separate

entity rule that shields assets in foreign banks will serve

primarily to protect defiant judgment debtors, such as the Uzans,

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who have the means to maintain considerable amounts of money in

foreign accounts, to frustrate collection of large judgments, and

to immunize banks who benefit from doing business in New York

from their responsibilities under the statutory enforcement

provisions. 

Therefore, I would answer the certified question "No."

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Following certification of a question by the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit and acceptance of the question

by this Court pursuant to section 500.27 of this Court's Rules of

Practice, and after hearing argument by counsel for the parties

and consideration of the briefs and the record submitted,

certified question answered in the affirmative. Opinion by Judge

Graffeo. Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Smith and Rivera

concur. Judge Abdus-Salaam dissents in an opinion in which Judge

Pigott concurs.

Decided October 23, 2014

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