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Filed 3/16/22 P. v. Scott CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RALPH MANNING SCOTT,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A161008

 (Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. SC207280A)

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order finding defendant Ralph 

Manning Scott mentally incompetent to stand trial and committing him to a 

state hospital or treatment facility pursuant to Penal Code1 sections 1367 and 

1370. Defendant contends the court and appointed experts improperly relied 

on the “mere fact” of his mental illness and ignored his “demonstrated ability 

to work and cooperate with his counsel” in finding him incompetent. (Initial 

caps and boldface omitted.) We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2018, a complaint was filed charging defendant with 

stalking then-Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom (count 1) and his sister 

Hilary Newsom (count 2) in violation of section 646.9, subdivision (a). The 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal 

Code.
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complaint further alleged defendant had one prior serious or violent felony 

conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)) and one prior prison 

commitment (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

These charges stemmed from an incident on October 10, 2018, wherein 

defendant took a taxi to Lieutenant Governor Newsom’s Marin County home 

and lied to Newsom’s minor daughter to gain entry into the home.2

Specifically, defendant arrived with flowers on Lieutenant Governor 

Newsom’s birthday and falsely told the child that he was the son of President 

John F. Kennedy (hereinafter, JFK) and a friend of her father and 

grandfather.

At defendant’s request, the child led him into the home so that he could 

find a photograph of JFK on the family’s computer. About 10 or 15 minutes 

after his arrival and before leaving, defendant signed and wrote his phone 

number on a birthday card for Lieutenant Governor Newsom.

Later that day, the lieutenant governor’s sister Hilary Newsom called 

the phone number written on the birthday card and spoke to defendant. She 

determined defendant did not know her family but had researched them 

extensively, which greatly upset her. The Newsom family thereafter had 

defendant served with a temporary restraining order, which did not stop 

defendant from repeatedly leaving voicemail messages for and sending letters 

to family members, including Hilary Newsom and Lieutenant Governor 

Newsom’s wife.

On May 21, 2019, defendant pleaded not guilty to both counts and 

denied the enhancement allegations.

On June 6, 2019, the trial court suspended the proceedings pursuant to 

section 1368 and appointed mental health experts, Jonathan French, Ph.D.,

2 These facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript.
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and psychiatrist Zachary Torry, M.D., to evaluate defendant’s mental 

competency to stand trial. These mental health experts interviewed 

defendant and reviewed relevant medical and criminal records before 

submitting their reports.3

In his July 9, 2019 report, psychiatrist Dr. Torry diagnosed defendant

with “Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type, Continuous.” (Boldface omitted.) 

Dr. Torry noted defendant’s “understanding of the charges that he is facing 

and his incarceration stem from a complex delusional belief system. He 

expressed his belief that his arrest was ‘a setup’ and ‘a ruse’ because those in 

law enforcement now ‘connected the dots’ and believed that he is ‘JFK’s son.’ ” 

Further, defendant “believes that there will be no trial because of the dangers 

of exposing that JFK’s son has been arrested.” According to Dr. Torry, while 

defendant demonstrated “a coherent and rational understanding of the 

possible verdicts, the potential consequences of his charges, the roles of 

courtroom personnel, and the trial process,” defendant’s delusions interfered 

with his ability to understand “trial concepts” and to communicate with his 

attorney in order to prepare a defense.

Dr. French issued a report on July 12, 2019, provisionally diagnosing

defendant with: “Delusional disorder, grandiose type, multiple episodes[;] 

[¶] Other specified personality disorder with antisocial, borderline, and 

narcissistic features[;] [¶] (Rule out) mood disorder, not otherwise specified.” 

Dr. French then opined that defendant’s pervasive delusional thinking, 

including his preoccupation with “being John Kennedy’s love child,” 

3 Defendant has a lengthy criminal record dating to 1976 that includes

at least 52 arrests, 23 convictions (seven of which were felonies), and 

numerous parole violations. Defendant has been found incompetent to stand 

trial twice and hospitalized numerous times under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 5150.
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prevented him from “remain[ing] productively focused upon his case.” “[H]is 

record indicates that he has been acting in this manner for more than 40 

years, with virtually no indication that he is prepared to change his ways.” 

Thus, “[n]ot only does Mr. Scott exhibition [sic] a flawed understanding of the 

nature of these criminal proceedings, but he is fairly devoid of any capacity to 

cooperate with counsel in a rational manner.”

On July 16, 2019, defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the 

competency issue and unsuccessfully moved the trial court to appoint a third 

doctor. He also unsuccessfully moved to remove his attorney under People v. 

Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

In January and March 2020, the trial court delayed trial due to the 

COVID-19 pandemic and ordered updated reports on defendant’s 

competency. The court also appointed another psychiatrist, Omri 

Berger, M.D., to examine him.

4

Dr. Torry submitted his second report on February 18, 2020, after 

reevaluating defendant. This time, Dr. Torry opined that defendant was 

competent to stand trial, explaining: “The severity of Mr. Scott’s charges and 

his psychiatric history make this a complex case. Mr. Scott operates under a 

grandiose delusional belief system that can impair his thinking and decisionmaking. Based on this, I had previously opined that his delusions impaired 

his ability to proceed with trial. However, at this time, I opine that the 

impact from his delusions does not currently interfere with his ability to 

understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or his ability to rationally 

assist counsel in the conduct of a defense.” Among other things, defendant 

“demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the nature and purpose of the 

4 By that time, Dr. French was no longer performing forensic 

evaluations.
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criminal proceedings. He exhibited a coherent and rational understanding of 

the possible verdicts, the potential consequences of his charges, the roles of 

courtroom personnel, and the trial process. There was no evidence of 

delusional thinking or disorganized or psychotic process while discussing the 

trial fundamentals. He expressed a belief that he would get a fair trial.”

Dr. Berger drew the opposite conclusion in his March 11, 2020 report.

Finding defendant incompetent to stand trial, Dr. Berger diagnosed him with 

“Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type, Continuous,” and “Bipolar I Disorder.” 

(Underscoring omitted.) Similarly to his colleagues, Dr. Berger emphasized

defendant’s persistent, grandiose, and delusional thinking regarding his 

parentage (which defendant believed would keep him out of prison) and his 

lack of insight into his mental illness and its role in his crimes. While 

defendant appeared to understand the legal process (including his charges, 

plea options, and potential penalties), his mental state precluded him from 

making rational and informed decisions regarding his case and undermined

his ability to rationally communicate with and assist counsel.

At a status hearing on May 20, 2020, the court set the matter for trial 

on June 17, 2020, and ordered updated reports from Dr. Torry and 

Dr. Berger. Dr. Berger submitted his updated report on June 12, 2020, after 

reexamining defendant on June 2, 2020. Dr. Berger confirmed his opinion 

that defendant was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Berger opined that 

defendant continued to meet the diagnostic criteria for delusional disorder, 

grandiose type, continuous, and bipolar I disorder. As before, defendant 

demonstrated an adequate understanding of the legal proceedings, but due to 

his psychotic and manic symptoms he still lacked the capacity to rationally 

cooperate with and assist counsel. Dr. Berger emphasized that defendant 

continued to express “grandiose delusional beliefs in discussions of his alleged 
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offenses, defense strategies, and his appraisal of the likelihood of prevailing 

at trial.” Dr. Berger was also concerned because defendant told him, “ ‘I am 

going to get a new attorney. He has gone backwards in time. He cannot be 

my attorney because I filed a claim against the county. It’s called conflict-ofinterest because you can’t be represented by someone who you are suing . . . I

am suing the attorney via the county, because the county pays my attorney. 

They raised my bail because of his negligence.’ ” (Sic.)

Dr. Torry submitted his new report on June 30, 2020, after 

reexamining defendant. Similarly to Dr. Berger, Dr. Torry diagnosed 

defendant with “Delusional Disorder, Grandiose, Continuous.” (Boldface 

omitted.) Nonetheless, Dr. Torry found defendant competent to stand trial, 

explaining that he “operates under a grandiose delusional belief system 

involving his belief that he is [JFK’s] illegitimate son, that Marilyn Monroe 

and Joe DiMaggio raised him, and that he knew Gavin Newsom’s father 

among other prominent figures. However, the impact from his delusions does 

not interfere with his ability to understand the nature of the criminal 

proceedings or to rationally assist counsel in the conduct of a defense.”

A bench trial on defendant’s mental competency was held in the 

summer of 2020. Drs. Berger and French testified for the prosecution, and 

Dr. Torry testified for the defense. The reports of Dr. Berger and Dr. Torry

were also admitted into evidence.

Adding to the opinions in his reports, Dr. Berger testified as to

defendant’s inability to handle the stress of trial. Defendant’s jail records 

indicate he consistently exhibited mental illness symptoms while 

incarcerated, including manic behavior, impulsivity, agitation and suicidal 

ideations resulting in his placement on suicide watch. Dr. Berger opined that 

defendant would exhibit similar symptoms if made to undergo trial, which 
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would impair his ability to have rational and coherent discussions with his 

counsel.

Similarly, Dr. French testified defendant was “extremely variable,” 

even in a controlled hospital setting, and would not be able to remain 

competent for any length of time in a trial setting. While defendant has good

“moments,” his history demonstrates they are fleeting.

Dr. Torry disagreed and opined that defendant pretended to be suicidal 

in jail in order to get assistance from jail staff. Dr. Torry stood by his 

opinions in the June 2020 report that defendant suffered from delusional 

disorder that did not interfere with his ability to cooperate with counsel to 

present a defense.

Last, defendant’s trial attorney testified, confirming that he was able to 

regularly communicate with defendant. The attorney acknowledged their 

attorney–client relationship had been strained in the past but that it was 

now repaired.

On July 15, 2020, after taking the matter under submission, the trial 

court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and on September 2, 2020, 

ordered him committed to the State Department of State Hospitals pursuant 

to section 1370. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the 

trial court’s determination under section 1367, subdivision (a)5 that 

5 Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides: “A person shall not be tried or 

adjudged to punishment or have their probation, mandatory supervision, 

postrelease community supervision, or parole revoked while that person is 

mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of 

this chapter if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental 

disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 
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defendant, “as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental 

disability, . . . is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings 

or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.”

“A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); [citation].) On appeal, the 

reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, supports the trial court’s finding. [Citation.] 

‘Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value.’ ” 

(People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.)

In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, appellate courts

generally give great deference to a trial court’s competency decision. “As we 

have said: ‘ “An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant’s 

conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign 

insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper.” ’ ” (People v. Marshall

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33 [affirming trial court’s decision not to hold a second 

hearing on defendant’s competency to stand trial]; accord, People v. Kaplan

(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 372, 381–382.)

In this case, the trial court confirmed before ruling that it had 

considered each of the mental health experts’ evaluations and reevaluations, 

the trial testimony, preliminary hearing evidence, jail records, and the court’s 

personal observations and interactions with defendant. The court then found 

defendant incompetent to stand trial for several reasons.

First, the court noted that while Dr. Berger’s and Dr. Torry’s

reevaluations were just weeks apart, they described defendant’s presentation 

quite differently. Most significant to our inquiry, Dr. Torry observed a

proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational 

manner.”
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respectful and collaborative relationship between defendant and his attorney 

(Mr. Siroka).

6 Yet, defendant told Dr. Berger that he had no confidence in 

Mr. Siroka and intended to sue him for ineffective assistance. While 

acknowledging it did not know the reason for defendant’s changed behavior, 

the court found that it “demonstrate[d] the continuing instability of 

Mr. Scott’s thinking and behavior. [¶] I personally observed times in the 

courtroom when Mr. Scott is very cooperative and respectful. And other 

times when he has addressed the Court that he’s completely 

incomprehensible and there is absolutely no way to redirect him.”

Second, the court found Dr. Berger’s opinions more persuasive than 

Dr. Torry’s, explaining: “I found Dr. Berger’s opinions to be more compelling 

because they appeared to me to be based on a much more thoughtful and 

thorough analysis of Mr. Scott’s mental health and the information and 

documents provided to him. I was uncomfortable with the degree to which 

Dr. Torry appeared to be willing to defer to [defendant’s counsel’s] opinion 

that Mr. Scott could rationally assist him with a defense. [¶] I don’t, in any 

way, wish to minimize [counsel’s] views, which I do think are important and 

deserve serious consideration. But the issue of competence is not a legal 

issue. It is a medical, psychiatric determination . . . clearly beyond the 

expertise of, at least, most attorneys.”

Third, the court “was concerned with the way in which Dr. Torry

summarily dismissed the idea that Mr. Scott might also be suffering from 

Bipolar 1 Disorder, as diagnosed by Dr. Berger. In fact, Mr. Scott has told 

every evaluator to date that he had previously been diagnosed with Bipolar 2

Disorder, but that it didn’t fit him. Dr. Torry, essentially, relied upon selfreports by Mr. Scott that he did have, did not have periods of mania or 

6 Attorney Siroka was present for Dr. Torry’s evaluation.
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inability to sleep or other manic depressive symptoms. But we know that 

Mr. Scott denies any mental health problems at all and has no insight into 

his mental health.” Further, although “Dr. Torry indicated during his 

testimony that he had reviewed the jail mental health records, he made no

reference to anything that was contained in them. The mental health records 

do confirm that, every month, Mr. Scott spends days in safety cells on suicide 

watch. I know there’s been a suggestion that there’s some kind of secondary 

game for him in doing that, but I think that also speaks to his lack of 

rationality.”

The court’s findings of incompetency under section 1367, subdivision (a)

are fully supported by the record. Without rehashing the evidence set forth 

in detail ante, Dr. Berger, whose expertise is not in dispute, opined based on 

two separate evaluations that notwithstanding defendant’s understanding of 

the criminal process, defendant lacked the capacity to rationally cooperate 

with counsel to prepare and present a defense due to his psychotic and manic 

symptoms.

At the hearing, Dr. French corroborated Dr. Berger’s opinion that the 

stressful environment of a criminal trial would likely trigger defendant’s 

mental illness symptoms. Dr. French opined that defendant was “extremely 

variable,” even in a controlled hospital setting, and would not be able to 

remain competent for the duration of trial.

Defendant seeks to discredit these expert opinions, noting that 

Dr. French, unlike Drs. Torry and Berger, failed to personally reevaluate

defendant before trial. In addition, defendant suggests the opinions of 

Dr. French and Dr. Berger are fatally flawed because they conclude 

defendant is incompetent to stand trial even though he understands the 

nature of the criminal process.
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We reject these arguments. The trial court appropriately weighed the 

opinions of all of the mental health experts and, after doing so, credited 

Dr. Berger’s and Dr. French’s opinions that defendant was mentally 

incompetent over Dr. Torry’s contrary opinion.7 There is no basis on this 

record to second-guess the court’s judgment. (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 

Cal.4th 856, 880–881 [testimony of one psychiatrist and a supporting lay 

witness was sufficient evidence to find defendant competent, despite two 

psychiatrists’ finding him incompetent]; People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 

769, 797 [trial court entitled to decide among conflicting psychiatrist 

reports].) Indeed, it is well established that credible testimony from a single 

expert constitutes substantial evidence. (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 

494, 507–508 [“ ‘the substantial-evidence test is satisfied’ ” where a treating 

psychiatrist opines under oath that the defendant is incapable of assisting in 

his or her defense or cooperating with counsel due to mental illness].)

Moreover, the language of section 1367, subdivision (a) is clear: A 

defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental 

illness, he or she is “unable to understand the nature of the criminal 

proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational 

manner.” (Italics added.) Here, the trial court, based on the experts’ 

opinions, found true the latter (inability to assist counsel in a rational 

matter) but not the former (inability to understand the nature of the 

7 Defendant cites People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041 for the 

proposition that a defendant’s experience in the criminal justice system and 

participation in his or her own defense “may belie a claim of incompetence.” 

(Italics added.) We do not disagree. However, contrary to this case, not a 

single psychiatrist opined that the defendant in Koontz was mentally 

incompetent to stand trial. (See id. at pp. 1065–1066.)
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proceedings). In doing so, the court fully complied with the law. Accordingly, 

the order of incompetency stands.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order finding defendant mentally incompetent to stand 

trial and committing him to a state hospital or treatment facility is affirmed.

_________________________

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Simons, J.

_________________________

Needham, J.

A161008/People v. Ralph Manning Scott