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THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ALEX WALKER and DANNI WALKER, 

individually and the marital community 

comprised thereof,

Appellants,

v.

RINA KHANNA and KUMAR VIJAY, a 

married couple,

Respondents.

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No. 81096-1-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

ANDRUS, A.C.J. — Alex and Danni Walker appeal the trial court’s order 

granting summary judgment for Rina Khanna and Kumar Vijay,1 in which it found 

Walker owed $66,466.70 in unpaid rent, late charges, and interest. Walker

contends the trial court erred in disregarding a request to continue the summary 

judgment hearing, in ignoring their response to the motion, and in awarding 

prejudgment interest. We disagree and affirm the order and award.

FACTS

In 2010, Alex and Danni Walker entered into a lease with Rina Khanna and 

Kumar Vijay, in which they agreed to lease Khanna’s residential property for a 

 1 Alex and Danni Walker and Rina Khanna and Kumar Vijay each form a marital community. For 

the purposes of this opinion, they will be respectively referred to as “Walker” and “Khanna.”
No. 81096-1-I/2

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period of eighteen months. After the lease term expired, it converted to a monthto-month tenancy. The original rent was $2,500 per month and increased to 

$2,700 per month in 2015. Khanna terminated the lease on May 30, 2017, but

Walker remained without paying rent until April 2019.

In June 2019, Khanna filed a complaint for unpaid rent against Walker. 

Khanna alleged Walker owed $54,000 in unpaid rent for the months of September 

2017 through April 2019, $5,130 in late charges, and $4,877.75 in interest. The 

parties reached a settlement agreement in July 2019 in which Walker agreed to 

pay Khanna $30,000 by July 31 at 4:00 p.m. On that date, Walker revealed he 

could not obtain the funds and requested an extension.

Khanna agreed to amend the settlement agreement and extended the 

payment deadline to October 11, 2019. In return, Walker agreed to pay $32,000

and to provide a signed and notarized amended settlement agreement, confession 

of judgment, and general stipulated agreement (“stipulated documents”). Walker 

signed the documents but failed to properly notarize them, citing the fact that he 

was on a work assignment in Ethiopia. On October 8, 2019, Walker informed 

Khanna that he was unable to make the payment by October 11 and requested 

another extension. Khanna rejected the offer and on November 8, 2019, moved 

for summary judgment for the entire unpaid rent. In the meantime, Walker’s 

attorney withdrew from the case on October 21.

The summary judgment hearing was set for December 13. On the morning 

of the hearing, Walker sent the court an email requesting a continuance to hire 

new counsel and respond to the summary judgment motion. Walker appeared and 
No. 81096-1-I/3

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orally requested this continuance because he had been out of the country until 

November 5 and had been unable to secure new counsel in advance of the 

December 13 hearing. The court expressed concern that Walker had taken no 

steps to retain counsel or had even read the summary judgment motion and 

accompanying documents since his return to the United States, but it nevertheless 

granted a continuance. The court set a new hearing for January 10, 2020 and 

gave Walker until January 6 to file a response to the motion.

Walker failed to meet the January 6 deadline. On the morning of January 

10, Walker sent another email to the court, requesting a second continuance and 

attached documents to support his claim that Khanna had violated the lease 

agreement. There is nothing in the record to show these documents were served 

on Khanna or considered by the court. The court struck the January 10 hearing 

and granted summary judgment for Khanna.

The order provided that Khanna was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

for unpaid rent from September 2017 to April 20, 2019, as well as late fees and 

prejudgment interest for October 2017 to April 2019. The court ordered that 

“[j]udgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Alex Walker, 

individually and as part of his marital estate with Danni Walker, for the amount of 

$66,466.70, with interest accruing on the judgment at the maximum legal rate as 

permitted by statute from the date of entry.” Walker appeals this order, the court’s 

refusal to grant him a second continuance on January 10, and the award of 

prejudgment interest.
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ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment

Walker argues that the trial court erred when it did not consider the materials 

he provided on January 10, 2020 as a response to the motion for summary 

judgment. We disagree. 

Appellate courts review a summary judgment order de novo and perform

the same inquiry as the trial court. Borton & Sons, Inc. v. Burbank Properties, LLC, 

196 Wn.2d 199, 205, 471 P.3d 871 (2020). A moving party is entitled to summary

judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact.” CR 56(c). After a motion for summary judgment is 

filed, “[t]he adverse party may file and serve opposing affidavits, memoranda of 

law or other documentation not later than 11 calendar days before the hearing.”

Id. The decision to admit or exclude evidence for consideration on summary 

judgment lies within the trial court's sound discretion. Int'l Ultimate, Inc. v. St. Paul

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 122 Wn. App. 736, 744, 87 P.3d 774 (2004). A trial court 

does not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider late-filed evidence. Garza v. 

McCain Foods, Inc., 124 Wn. App. 908, 917-18, 103 P.3d 848 (2004).

In this case, Walker failed to file a response to Khanna’s motion for 

summary judgment in advance of the December 13 hearing date. During the 

hearing, Walker alleged that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the 

amount he owes Khanna and requested a continuance so that he could retain 

counsel and submit evidence to support his argument. The court indicated that 
No. 81096-1-I/5

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under the rules, Khanna was entitled to summary judgment because he had failed 

to respond in a timely manner, but the trial court allowed Walker until January 6, 

2020 to file a response in advance of the new January 10 hearing date. Walker 

failed to meet this deadline and proffered no valid explanation for his delay in 

submitting a response to the summary judgment motion. The trial court acted 

within its discretion in declining to consider this late-submitted material.

B. Request for a Continuance

Walker next argues that the trial court erred when it did not address his 

January 10, 2020, request for a second continuance. We disagree.

Under CR 56(f), a court may order a continuance to allow the opposing party 

time to obtain and file evidence to oppose a summary judgment. We review the 

denial of a CR 56(f) motion for abuse of discretion. Tellevik v. 31641 W.

Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 90, 838 P.2d 111 (1992). A trial court does not 

abuse its discretion when it denies a motion to continue a summary judgment 

hearing when (1) the requesting party does not have a good reason for the delay 

in obtaining the evidence, (2) the requesting party does not indicate what evidence 

would be established by further discovery, or (3) the new evidence would not raise 

a genuine issue of fact. Id.

Walker did not demonstrate a basis for granting his second requested 

continuance. During the December 13 hearing, despite recognizing that Khanna 

was entitled to summary judgment based on the evidence then provided, the trial 

court appropriately exercised its discretion under CR 56(f) and granted Walker’s 

first request for a continuance so that he could secure counsel and respond to the 
No. 81096-1-I/6

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motion. Walker admitted he had been back in the United States since early 

November. The court gave Walker an additional three weeks to respond.

Walker argues that the first continuance “was not enough time for him to 

obtain legal counsel and to properly have the legal counsel to review and respond 

to [Khanna’s] motion for summary judgment.” Walker complains that he was out 

of the country before the December 13 hearing and, upon his return “was 

confronted by numerous urgent matters which required his immediate attention.”

But Walker had legal representation throughout 2019 to assist him in 

developing evidence to refute Khanna’s allegations. His attorney did not withdraw

until October 21 after Walker repeatedly failed to fulfill agreements he had entered 

into with Khanna. Walker then returned to the United States on November 5, 

before Khanna filed the summary judgment motion and over a month before the 

hearing was initially scheduled. Including the first continuance, Walker had over 

two months to provide a substantive response, but he did not do so. The trial court 

acted within its discretion in rejecting Walker’s claim that he lacked enough time to 

respond.

2

C. Prejudgment Interest

Walker argues the trial court erred in awarding Khanna prejudgment interest 

because “there is no clear record upon which to review the interest awarded.” We 

disagree. 

 2 To the extent that Walker argues the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance under CR 

6(b), his claim must fail for the same reasons. A request for the enlargement of time under that 

rule requires cause shown and, absent excusable neglect, must be “made before the expiration of 

the period originally prescribed.” CR 6(b)(1). Here, Walker made his request four days after his 

January 6 deadline to respond. Walker failed to show cause or excusable neglect, just as he failed 

to show good cause under CR 56(f). 
No. 81096-1-I/7

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Prejudgment interest is allowed in civil litigation at the 

statutory judgment interest rate, RCW 4.56.110, RCW 19.52.020, 

when a party to the litigation retains funds rightfully belonging to 

another and the amount of the funds at issue is liquidated, that is, the 

amount at issue can be calculated with precision and without reliance 

on opinion or discretion.

Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398, 429, 957 P.2d 632 (1998); see also Pub. Util.

Dist. No. 2 of Pacific County v. Comcast of Washington IV, Inc., 184 Wn. App. 24,

80, 336 P.3d 65 (2014). Walker admits that the principal amount owed is “easily 

quantified,” but contends that Khanna did not show how she calculated 

prejudgment interest. The record does not support this argument.

The trial court held that Khanna was entitled to prejudgment interest on all 

unpaid rent and resulting late fees. Khanna testified that the total amount owed in 

unpaid rent was $53,100, the total amount of unpaid late fees was $5,130, and the 

total unpaid prejudgment interest was $8,236.70. Khanna attached a spreadsheet 

to her declaration identifying the total amount of interest that had accrued on each 

missing rent and late fee payment between September 2017 and April 2019. This 

evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest.

That Khanna sought prejudgment interest at a rate of 12 percent could not 

have been a surprise to Walker. As early as May 2019, Khanna’s attorney sent 

Walker’s attorney a letter summarizing the amounts owed and indicated “interest 

shall accrue at 12% per annum until the total balance is paid in full.” This letter, 

like Khanna’s declaration on summary judgment, included a worksheet calculating

the total amount owed to that point, including interest. Furthermore, in August 

2019, Walker signed a stipulated confession of judgment in which he 

acknowledged prejudgment interest had accrued on this debt at a rate of 12 
No. 81096-1-I/8

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percent. Both the May 2019 letter and the August 2019 confession of judgment 

were submitted to the court by Khanna’s counsel as a part of the summary 

judgment evidence. The record thus supports the trial court’s order awarding

prejudgment interest to Khanna.

Affirmed. 

WE CONCUR: