CONCUR; Opinion Filed January 31, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00333-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF N.K.C., A CHILD 

On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DF-18-21825 

CONCURRING OPINION 

Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia 

Opinion by Justice Schenck 

I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order denying 

Father’s motion for enforcement of child–support provisions of a final decree of 

divorce. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the 

modification order is unambiguous and instead would address whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying Father’s motion without reaching construction of 

the modification order. 

FATHER FAILED TO SET FORTH SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS MOTION

I first note that I would apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a 

trial court’s decision to grant or deny the relief requested in a motion for 

enforcement. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); In re 
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W.R.B., No. 05-12-00776-CV, 2014 WL 1008222, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 

20, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (most appealable issues in family law case, 

including trial court’s ruling on child–support arrearages, reviewed for abuse of 

discretion). A trial court abuses its discretion by acting arbitrarily, unreasonably, or 

without reference to guiding principles. See In re W.R.B., 2014 WL 1008222, at *2. 

I agree, however, that when interpreting an agreed order for child support, this 

Court interprets the order as a contract between the parties and applies the general 

rules of contract construction. See Ex Parte Jones, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) 

(“This agreed judgment must be interpreted as if it were a contract . . . and the 

interpretation thereof is governed by the laws relating to contracts, rather than laws 

relating to judgments.”). In doing so, our primary concern is ascertaining the 

meaning of the contract and giving effect to the true intent of the parties. Seagull 

Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006); Frost 

Nat’l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310, 311–12 (Tex. 2005). 

According to Father, the Modification Order ended his obligation to make 

periodic payments of child support to Mother as of March 1, 2017, but did not 

modify his obligation to provide medical support until the date of the Modification 

Order of December 19, 2017.1

 Therefore, he argues the terms set forth in the Divorce 

1

 That order provided in relevant part as follows: 
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Decree apply to his motion for enforcement. However, even I were to assume 

Father’s interpretation of the Modification Order is correct and that until December 

19, 2017, he could seek reimbursement under the terms set forth in the Divorce 

Decree, I would conclude that he failed to offer sufficient evidence to obtain the 

relief he sought. 

The trial court denied Father’s motion for enforcement of child–support order 

without any findings of fact or conclusions of law to support the order. In a bench 

trial, as here, where no findings of fact or conclusions of law were filed, this Court 

is obliged to imply the necessary findings to support the trial court’s judgment. See 

In re N.A. F., No. 05-17-00470-CV, 2019 WL 516715, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

Feb. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Holt Atherton Indus. Inc. v. Heine, 835 

S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992)). Because a reporter’s record was filed, Father may 

challenge the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied 

findings. See id. (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 

795 (Tex. 2002); In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no 

THE COURT FINDS that due to the income of the parties it is in the best interest of the 

children that neither party be ordered to pay child support. THEREFORE, IT IS 

ORDERED that as of March 1, 2017, neither party shall be ordered to pay child support. 

IT IS ORDERED that [Father] shall provide health insurance for [N. K.C.], either through 

his own employment, that of his spouse, or privately. [Father] shall be responsible for all 

of [N.K.C.’s] out of pocket medical expenses. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that beginning tax year 2016, [Father] shall have the right to 

claim [N. K.C.] on his taxes. 
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pet.)). If the implied findings are supported by the evidence, we must uphold the 

trial court’s judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. 

In his motion, Father argued the terms of the Divorce Decree required Mother 

to compensate him for amounts of medical support he paid for N.K.C. He presented 

his own testimony, but that testimony primarily consists of his statements that he is 

the father of N.K.C., that Mother is N.K.C.’s mother, and that he filed his motion 

seeking to enforce provisions of the Divorce Decree. The Divorce Decree provides 

in relevant part that: 

if health-care expenses are incurred for a child, [Father] and [Mother] 

shall pay all reasonable and necessary health-care expenses not paid by 

insurance or covered by the amount of cash medical support ordered 

and incurred by or on behalf of the child in the following portions: 

a. If the health-care expenses are incurred by using a EPO, HMO 

or PPO plan, in an emergency, or with the written agreement of 

the other party, [Father] is ordered to pay 50 percent and 

[Mother] is ordered to pay 50 percent. 

What is absent from the reporter’s and clerk’s records is any evidence that the 

amounts Father claims are unpaid healthcare expenses that meet the terms of the 

Divorce Decree such that Mother is obligated to pay. Specifically, Father provided 

no evidence the claimed expenses were incurred by using an EPO, HMO, or PPO 

plan, in an emergency, or written agreement of Mother as the Divorce Decree 

requires in order for the expenses to be shared between the parents. Instead, Mother 

testified that at the time Father incurred the expenses, she “was already carrying 

insurance for both of the children on my policy, because [Father] had let their 
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insurance lapse.” She further testified the expenses were not incurred in an 

emergency or with her written agreement. Accordingly, I would not conclude the 

trial court abused its discretion by denying the enforcement motion and thus would 

affirm the trial court’s order without reaching construction of the Modification 

Order. 

IF PRESSED TO REACH AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MODIFICATION ORDER, I

WOULD CONCLUDE IT IS AMBIGUOUS

Mother argues, despite the fact that the Modification Order provides a specific 

date for the parties “child support” obligations and none for the parties’ health 

insurance and N.K.C.’s out-of-pocket medical expenses, the trial court intended for 

that same date to apply to both provisions. The majority apparently agrees with 

Mother’s interpretation and further finds no ambiguity in that order. 

According to the majority, when the Modification Order states that “neither 

party shall be ordered to pay child support,” the trial court intended to include 

monthly support payments, medical support, and health care coverage as part of 

child support. However, if “child support” includes those three categories of 

payment obligations, why would the Modification Order find and order that as of 

March 1, 2017, neither of the parties be ordered to provide monthly support 

payments, medical support, and health care coverage, but then in the next line order 

the parties to pay medical expenses and health insurance? And if the Modification 

Order was intended to make all changes retroactive to March 1, 2017, why was that 

date only included in the first paragraph regarding “child support?” 
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The Divorce Decree does not provide much in the way of illumination, as it 

provides monthly support payments under the heading “child support” and the 

parents’ respective obligations to provide medical support and health insurance for 

the children under the heading “health care.” Instead, the Divorce Decree might 

support an interpretation of “child support” that only refers to monthly support 

payments. 

I find no support in the Texas Family Code, either. For example, the code 

uses the term “child support” as the title of Chapter 154, which includes a section 

providing for application of guidelines to net resources “in rendering the child 

support order,” see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.0125, as well as a section requiring 

“an order for the medical support of the child.” See id. § 154.181. Thus, even within 

Chapter 154, “child support” may refer to either a monthly support obligation alone 

or to that obligation and a medical support obligation to a child. Compare id.

§ 157.005(a) (defining limitations for enforcement of “child support order”) with

§ 157.005(b) (defining time limitation for confirming arrearages of “child support, 

medical support, and dental support”). 

Although the parties’ briefings raised the issues of whether the Modification 

Order applied here and whether the medical-expense provision of that order was 

intended to have a retroactive effect similar to the child–support provision, I would 

not address either of those issues because neither is necessary to resolve this appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 
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Accordingly, I concur. 

200333CF.P05 

/David J. Schenck/

DAVID J. SCHENCK 

JUSTICE