UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JERMALL CAMPBELL, Defendant - Appellant. No. 19-3019 (D.C. No. 6:14-CR -10104-EFM-1) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , MURPHY , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Jermall Campbell appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised release. Exercising jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I In 2014, Campbell pled guilty to possessi on with intent to distribute cocaine. He was sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonm ent to be followed by 36 months of supervised release. Campbell was rele ased from custody in May 2017 and began serving his supervis ed release term.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 21, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Just two months later, the district c ourt held an informal hearing to address Campbell. It noted that the probation office had reported severa l violations of Campbell’s terms of supervised release in the short time he had been out of prison. The court declined to revoke Campbell’s s upervised release but warned him against further violations. In December 2017, the probation office moved to modify Campbell’s conditions to require a 90-day stay in a residential re -entry center. It noted numerous additional violations as the cause for this request. Campbell waived his right to a hearing, and the district court granted the modification. In November 2018, Campbell was arrest ed for aggravated domestic battery. The probation office requested the distri ct court issue a wa rrant for Campbell. It subsequently provided a vi olation report identifying ei ghteen alleged violations between May 2017 and November 2018. Sixt een were Class C vi olations and two were Class B violations. At his revocation hearing, Campbell adm itted to the sixteen Class C violations. The government requested that the rema ining two violations be dismissed. With Campbell’s category VI criminal histor y, the Guidelines policy statement on supervised release recommended a term of 8- 14 months’ imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). The district court imposed a sentence of sixteen months’ imprisonment to be followed by 24 months of supervised release. Campbell timely appealed.3 II We review a district cour t’s decision to revoke superv ised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 818 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2016). 1 Campbell argues the district court fail ed to consider th e Guidelines policy statements on supervised releas e and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although a district court is required to consid er those sources in imposing a sentence for violating the term s of supervised release, it “is not required to consider individually each factor listed in § 3553(a) , nor is it required to recite any magic words to show us that it fu lfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider before issuing a sentence.” United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2018) (quota tions omitted). We are satisfied, in light of the di strict court’s lengthy discussi on of its reasons for imposing a sixteen-month sentence, that it adequately considered the necessary factors. Next, Campbell argues the district c ourt violated § 3553(c)(2) by failing to provide a written statement of reasons for the senten ce imposed. Although the district court did not provide a written explanation, we conclude its error was harmless. Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d at 1264 (because the district court gave a

1 Although the government c ontends that plain error review governs, we do not need to resolve the question because Ca mpbell’s claims fail regardless.4 “comprehensive explanation for its deviati on from the guidelines in open court, the error it made by not submitting a written statement of reasons was harmless”). 2 Lastly, Campbell contends the district court erred in imposing a 24-month term of additional supervised release. The government concedes that under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), Campbell faced a maximum of 20 m onths of additional supervised release to follow his sixteen-month sentence. We agree and thus reverse that portion of the

sentence. 3
III For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the revocation of Campbell’s supervised release, REVERSE the district court’s im position of 24 months of additional supervised release, and REMAND for further proceedings. We DENY AS MOOT the government’s Motion for En forcement of Appeal Waiver.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge

2 The government contends that the foregoing arguments are barred by an appellate waiver. Because appellate waivers do not affect our jurisdiction, we exercise our “discretion to bypass the relatively complex waiver issue and resolve [Campbell’s] appeal on the me rits.” United States v. Black, 773 F.3d 1113, 1115 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014).

3 The government explicitly does not move to enforce the appellate waiver as to this issue.