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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

September 18, 2018

v No. 338965

Kent Circuit Court

ROSEVELDT JARON BETTS, LC No. 16-005582-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, C.J., and CAMERON and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for felon in possession of a firearm, 

MCL 750.224f, felon in possession of ammunition, MCL 750.224f(6), and possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was 

sentenced as a fourth-habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 3 to 30 years’ imprisonment for both 

felon-in-possession convictions, to be served consecutive to a term of two years’ imprisonment 

for felony-firearm. On appeal, defendant claims the circuit court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the firearm and ammunition. We disagree and therefore 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the discovery of a firearm and ammunition found in the house of 

defendant’s girlfriend. On May 5, 2016, the police were called to the girlfriend’s house due to an 

altercation between defendant and his girlfriend. The police dispatch record indicates that the 

caller, who was the girlfriend’s daughter, reported that her mother was being assaulted by 

defendant and that he was “yelling something about a gun.” 

At approximately 1:30 a.m., defendant entered the girlfriend’s house. Then, around 1:42 

a.m., the Grand Rapids Police were dispatched to the house. After the police knocked on the 

door for “several minutes,” a female voice on the other side of the door eventually said “I’m 

okay” but then refused to open the door. Sergeant Charles Ware, as the officer-in-charge, 

directed the other officers to kick down the door because he believed that the situation was 

sufficiently urgent since a child, her mother, and a gun were involved. Defendant was 

immediately handcuffed and placed in a police car.

Once defendant was removed from the premises, the police entered the house and 

immediately began searching for other suspects or victims without the girlfriend’s consent. 
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During this search, Ware spotted a white and black jacket in the basement that appeared to 

belong to defendant given its size. Ware decided to take the white and black jacket to defendant, 

but in doing so, Ware noticed a heavy object inside the jacket pocket. The object turned out to 

be a “speed loader with several bullets in the speed loader.” Defendant’s Michigan Temporary 

Personal Identification Card was also found in the jacket. Ware did not immediately seize the 

ammunition. After finding the speed loader and bullets, Ware communicated his finding to 

defendant, but he denied that the white and black jacket belonged to him. 

While the house was being searched for possible victims and suspects, Officer Patrick 

Loeb talked to the girlfriend. Loeb testified that, at some point after the ammunition was found, 

he obtained the girlfriend’s consent “to search the home further for the firearm.” Loeb also 

testified that he asked for her consent to search for a gun because, although the girlfriend

suggested that there was no firearm in the house, Loeb “didn’t really believe that there was no 

gun involved because a 15-year-old wouldn’t be making up hearing something about a gun.” 

Once consent was given, Loeb went downstairs and seized defendant’s white and black jacket

along with the ammunition and identification card. 

Moreover, after Loeb obtained the girlfriend’s consent, Officer Michael Reed conducted 

an additional search for a firearm. He found a firearm upstairs inside an orange jacket hanging in 

the girlfriend’s bedroom closet. The girlfriend testified that she owned the orange jacket, but she

denied having any knowledge of the handgun inside its pockets. At trial, the prosecution 

connected the firearm to defendant by way of DNA evidence.

At the preliminary examination, Ware, Reed, Loeb, and the girlfriend testified.

Defendant opposed bindover on his charges claiming the firearm and ammunition should be 

suppressed because they were unlawfully seized. Two issues were ultimately raised at the

preliminary examination: defendant’s standing to challenge the search, and the lawfulness of the 

search and seizure. Upon considering these issues, the district court denied the oral request to 

suppress the evidence and granted the bindover.

On November 16, 2016, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm

found in the orange jacket and the ammunition found in the white and black jacket with the 

circuit court. The parties agreed that the motion to suppress would be decided on the record of 

the preliminary examination. At the suppression hearing, the circuit court held that it “did not 

find any testimony or evidence presented that [defendant] lived at [the girlfriend’s] address.” As 

a result, the circuit court held that defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of the 

girlfriend’s house. The circuit court also held that the firearm and ammunition were lawfully

seized. 

Defendant now argues he has standing to challenge the search as an overnight guest in 

the girlfriend’s house. Even if defendant does not have standing to challenge the search of the 

girlfriend’s house, he argues that he still has standing to challenge the search of his white and 

black jacket. Defendant further asserts that the searches and seizures were unlawful.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Application of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, § 

11 of the Michigan Constitution is reviewed de novo. People v Slaughter, 489 Mich 302, 310; 

803 NW2d 171 (2011). Appellate “review of a circuit court’s review of a district court’s order is 

also de novo.” Noll v Ritzer, 317 Mich App 506, 510; 895 NW2d 192 (2016). Findings of fact 

in deciding a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, thereby according deference to the 

circuit court’s resolution of credibility issues caused by conflicting testimony. People v Burrell, 

417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). Appellate review requires the examination of 

“information known to the court at the time it denied defendants’ motions to suppress the 

evidence.” Id. at 449. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous “if the reviewing court is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 

497-498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002).

III. ANALYSIS

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the parallel provision in 

the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . and 

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 

66; 468 NW2d 893 (1991); see US Const, Am IV, and Const 1963, art 1, § 11. The Michigan 

Constitution “provide[s] the same protection as that secured by the Fourth Amendment, absent 

‘compelling reason’ to impose a different interpretation.” Slaughter, 489 Mich at 311, quoting 

People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 25; 475 NW2d 684 (1991). Evidence seized in violation of the 

United States and Michigan Constitutions must be excluded from trial. People v Woodard, 321 

Mich App 377, 383; 909 NW2d 299 (2017).

A. STANDING

Defendant first argues that he was an overnight guest, and therefore, has standing to 

challenge the search of the girlfriend’s house. We disagree.

A person who brings a constitutional challenge has the burden of proving they have

standing to do so. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 130; 755 NW2d 664 (2008) (citation 

omitted). A person meets that burden if, upon a consideration of the totality of the 

circumstances, they have a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or location searched, 

which expectation society recognizes as reasonable.” Id., quoting People v Powell, 235 Mich 

App 557, 560; 599 NW2d 499 (1999). While an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of 

privacy, a person who is “merely present with the consent of the householder” does not. 

Minnesota v Carter, 525 US 83, 90; 119 S Ct 469; 142 L Ed 2d 373 (1998). 

This Court has held that a temporary visitor to a home does not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy there. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 340-341; 584 NW2d 336 

(1998). In Parker, the police traced a suspect to an apartment rented by two other people and 

found him asleep in bed with one of the lessees. Id. at 339. Later the same day, the police 

searched the apartment and seized evidence relating to the suspect’s crime. Id. The suspect’s 

codefendant testified that he and the suspect only intended to ask one of the lessees to borrow a 

car and did not plan to stay and sleep there. Id. at 340-341. On these facts, this Court concluded 

that the suspect was a mere visitor and was not an overnight guest. Id. at 340.
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In this case, similar to Parker, defendant cannot prove that he was an overnight guest 

who has standing to challenge the search of the house. At the suppression hearing, defendant 

argued that he had standing because he was in the house “well after midnight.” However, the 

preliminary examination record does not indicate when defendant entered the house nor does it 

show that he had permission to be there. Defendant is not an overnight guest simply because he 

was in the girlfriend’s house after midnight.

Defendant further argues that he has standing as an overnight guest because the witness

testified that they “went to bed together.” Because the girlfriend was the only witness at the 

preliminary examination to testify about the events inside her house before police arrived, it was 

her testimony that could determine whether defendant was an overnight guest. The girlfriend

initially testified that defendant was in her house, but suggested he was not in her room. She 

then changed her testimony and claimed that she and defendant “went to bed together.” As the 

district court found, and the circuit court affirmed, the girlfriend’s testimony was contradictory 

and lacked credibility. As previously noted, this Court cannot disturb the circuit court’s finding 

of fact regarding the girlfriend’s lack of credibility unless it is clearly erroneous. Burrell, 417 

Mich at 448. We do not detect any error in the circuit court’s credibility findings. Therefore, 

defendant cannot prove that he had standing as an overnight guest. 

Although the circuit court at the suppression hearing was limited to the evidence 

presented at the preliminary examination, we also acknowledge that there was evidence 

presented at the trial confirming defendant was not an overnight guest. Both the girlfriend and 

her daughter testified that defendant entered the house without permission around 1:30 a.m.

Shortly thereafter, the police were dispatched to the girlfriend’s house. At most, defendant was a

visitor and does not have standing to challenge the search of the girlfriend’s house and the 

seizure of the firearm and ammunition.

Defendant also argues he has standing to challenge the search to his white and black 

jacket that held the speed loader and bullets. We disagree. 

A coat is a personal effect that is protected under the Fourth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution and Section 11 of Article 1 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution. Armendarez, 

188 Mich App at 71. “This initial standing inquiry depends upon whether the defendant has a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular goods at issue.” People v Mamon, 435 Mich 

1, 6; 457 NW2d 623 (1990). The defendant has the burden of establishing that he has standing to 

bring a constitutional challenge, Brown, 279 Mich App at 130 (citation omitted), and the court 

must make its determination after examining the totality of the circumstances, People v Mahdi, 

317 Mich App 446, 458-460; 894 NW2d 732 (2016). “A person can deprive himself of standing 

by abandoning the object of the search or seizure.” People v Zahn, 234 Mich App 438, 448; 594 

NW2d 120 (1999). “Abandonment is an ultimate fact or conclusion based generally upon a 

combination of act and intent” to relinquish proprietorship. People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 65-

66; 378 NW2d 451 (1985), quoting Freidman v United States, 347 F2d 697, 704 (CA 8, 1965).

In this case, defendant arguably abandoned his white and black jacket when he told 

officers that the jacket was not his. See People v Rice, 192 Mich App 512, 516-517; 482 NW2d 

192 (1992) (holding that the defendant abandoned his luggage containing marijuana when he 
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“denied ownership of the[] bags”). Assuming he did have standing to challenge the search of his 

jacket, his claim still fails.

B. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless they are shown 

to fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. People v Lemons, 299 Mich App

541, 545; 830 NW2d 794 (2013). These exceptions include exigent circumstances, emergency 

aid, and consent. People v Davis, 442 Mich 1, 10, 12-20; 497 NW2d 910 (1993). Generally, it is 

required that illegally seized evidence be excluded from trial. Brown, 279 Mich App at 127. 

However, the inevitable discovery doctrine “permits the admission of evidence obtained in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the items found would have ultimately been obtained in a constitutionally accepted manner.” 

People v Hyde, 285 Mich App 428; 775 NW2d 833 (2009). 

Although defendant admits that the police had a right to enter his girlfriend’s house under 

the exigent circumstances and emergency aid exceptions “to find out what was going on,” he 

argues that the police exceeded the scope of their search on the basis of the incident to arrest 

exception. However, the prosecutor does not rely on the incident to arrest exception and instead 

argues: (1) the initial search for victims and suspects conducted without the girlfriend’s consent 

that resulted in the discovery of the ammunition were valid under the exigent circumstances and 

emergency aid exceptions; (2) the subsequent search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition 

was valid under the consent exception; and (3) even if the searches conducted prior to the 

girlfriend’s consent were unlawful, evidence of the firearm and ammunition are still admissible 

under the inevitable discovery rule. Because discovery of the evidence would have been 

inevitable, we need not reach the prosecution’s remaining arguments.

The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of evidence obtained in violation of 

the constitution so long as “the prosecution establishe[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the information . . . inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” People v 

Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 435; 622 NW2d 528 (2000). Three factors must be considered in 

applying this rule: (1) whether “the legal means [were] truly independent;” (2) whether “both the 

use of the legal means and the discovery by that means [were] truly inevitable;” and (3) whether 

“the application of the inevitable discovery exception either provide an incentive for police 

misconduct or significantly weaken fourth amendment protection.” Id. at 436 (citation omitted).

In this case, it was inevitable that the police would have found the ammunition by lawful 

means. Police were dispatched to the girlfriend’s home after her daughter called 911 to report 

that defendant was in the house and he was threatening her with a gun. Thus, Loeb reasonably 

believed that there was a firearm in the girlfriend’s house, and it was highly likely he would have 

sought permission to search the house regardless of Ware finding the ammunition. It is 

inevitable, then, that the officers would have found the ammunition in the white and black jacket. 

In sum, even if the search and seizure of the ammunition was unlawful because there was no 
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applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence is admissible under the inevitable 

discovery rule.

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Affirmed. 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron 

/s/ Anica Letica 

 1 Defendant argues that the girlfriend’s consent was tainted by the prior illegality of Ware’s 

search, and therefore, all evidence from the search based on the girlfriend’s consent should be 

suppressed. This argument fails. Defendant has provided no binding authority for this 

argument. Relying on secondary authority, defendant contends that it should be impermissible 

for police to obtain consent after finding incriminating evidence through an illegal search. This 

argument is unavailing because the inevitable discovery rule applies to the facts of this case.