|
|

" Distribution
June 1, 1999
GMA-009-99
Page 3
2
z

2000-hr working year from continuous occupancy in this afea. Use of wall Shielding
is not required at this time, and the area continues to remain as a non-RBA.

« AMTLDs in 18T dock area, north of the Room 3189 Drum Storage Area read 396
mrem/yr inside the posted RBA at the room entry door, and 222 mrem/yr to the west
of the roll-up door outside of the RBA. Occupancy is very low (<1/18), and personnel
normally only access these area while loading or unloading drums from Room 3189.
Unmonitored dose will not exceed 100 mrem/yr in the 18T dock area, and the currently °
posted RBA boundary is adequate to prevent unmonitored dose problems.

+ Room 4104, a tow occupancy room in the Bldg. 374 altic and posted RBA , had doses
of about 392 mrem/yr last quarter. This room is a permanenily posted RBA with
occupancy fess than 1/16. Due to its close proximity above the ceiling of the Room
3189 Drum Storage Area, this room will remain an RBA.

¢ RE has reviewed the list of currently installed AMTLDs (Attachment 1) and judged
these to be adequate for the past quarter, except for location errors noted. [tis
requested due to the Room 2202/2011 basement drum storage area expansion that
rmanent AMTLDs be added in the Room 31 Hallway and the S!
Offices above the drum storage areas commencing at the start-of the 37 Qtr. 99.
RE is available to work with Extemat Dosimetry in identifying locations. A list of new
locations where permanent AMTLDs are required is provided as Attachment 3.

in addition to the extensive AMTLD program, additional supplemental TLDs were
also deployed to measure short-term changes of dose rates in locations where
increases & decreases might be expected. Attachment 2 contains a summary of
the Building 371/374 supplemental TLDs deployed in-the 1* and 2TM Qir. timeframe.
These readings, adjusted for occupancy, also indicate that no individual would be
likely to exceed 100 mrem/yr unmonitored dose. .

Operational Management review and concurrence with this investigation per RSP 05.01

is provided below.
hock de

<a =a
S. M. Sax? Building 327374 Project Manager Date
Attachments: As Stated
cc:
J.T. Bruner wlo Ait. 7 J.-S. Jarvis SM Saxwio Ait. 1
M.F_ Durel wio Ait. 4 S.W.  Kranker w/o Ait. 4 T.L. Vaughn wio Att. 4
DS. Goble wio Ait. 1 AE. Light DL Wirkus wio Att. 1°
D.J.  Harward wio Ait. 4 LL Rands wio Ait t JK. Wrapp wio Att. 1

371/374 Area Monitoring Files



Page No.
11/15/90

EVENT EVENT

DATE

O9/16/S7,

01/03/38

01/17/58
03/10/58
05/29/58
06/09/58
06/20/58
wo”
07/01/58
07/07/58
07/08/58
07/21/58

07/29/58
08/06/58
08/29/58

09/08/58

10/07/58

2

NUMBER

~~ BUILDING

776,

47

776,
7%,
77,
467,
TM,

467,

467,

447,

RMIOS

RMI34

R134

RMIS9

RMIT

RMTBS

MISS

RM169

M105

RIGS

RMIOS.

RMI36

RMIO7

RMIOT

OUTSIDE

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

1952 TO 1988

DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES

COLLAR CUT OFF OF A PART AND
LEFT ON LATHE. ATTEMPTED TO
ADJUST MACHINE, EHD OF FINGER
cur OFF.

FIRE IN PORTABLE WET VACUUM
AND. MOTOR.

PU IGNITION.
CHIP FIRE.

CRIP FIRE.

ELECTRICAL FIRE.

ELECTRICAL FIRE.

‘SKULL FIRE.

CHIP FIRE.

RAG FIRE INSIDE SKULL BOX.
CHIP FIRE IN CRUSHER.

WETAL FIRE INSIDE K-4 FURNACE.

ELECTRICAL FIRE IM CONTROL
PANEL,

THERNOCOUPLE STUCK, CAUSING
TEMPERATURE RISE, IGNITING
OUTSIDE MATERIAL ON A-66 UNIT.
CHIP FIRE,

CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL.

COMBUSTIBLE TRASH IGHITION
INSIDE INCINERATOR.



SIGNED AFFIDAVIT - HEALTH EFFECTS
_May 17, 2005__ a

ANTHONY WILLIAM DEMAIORL, STEVE TRUJILLO, RUDY MASTELONE
SEC Tracking Number 00030

We, Anthony William DeMaiori, Steve Trujillo, and Rudy Mastelone, submit the following
letter as a signed affidavit in support of the Rocky Flats USWA Special Exposure Cohort
Petition. This affidavit is submitted in response to Mr. Larry Elliot's letter dated April 27,
2005, and in particular in response to Item 4 Clarification - “You agreed that additional
information would be provided in the form of an affavit. As discussed you have 30 days on receipt of
this letter .. . to submit signed affidavits.”

As President of the United Steelworkers of America, Co-Chair of the Hazardous and Toxic
Materials Committee, and Co-Chairman of the Safety Committee, we attest that the Rocky
Flats Class of Workers were harmed by their exposure to radioactive materials at Rocky
Flats. The federal government has recognized the role of plutonium exposure in causing
more than 20 types of cancers as addressed by the Compensation Act. In particular
plutonium has been linked to cancers of the bone, liver, lung and leukemia and
chromosome aberrations (Potential Health Problems from Exposure to Selected
Radionuclides, May 2000). Other research has suggested that plutonium exposure weakens
the immune system and leads to the development of cancers outside the lymph nodes. In
1987, a study by Gregg Wilkinson of Rocky Flats workers concluded that workers with
plutonium inside their bodies had an increased risk of lymphopoietic neoplasms (tumors
affecting white blood cells). One of the difficulties in assessing causation is the long lapse of
time between when exposure occurs and when cancers are developed and diagnosed. “For
plutonium exposure, the latency period is estimated to be more than 30 years, but it can
vary depending on the dose received (Voelz, 1991).” Another difficulty is that research has
yet to determine at what level plutonium exposure is harmful. In some cases an individual
‘with low exposures contracts cancer and other suspected plutonium-related ailments, while
in other cases an individual with abundant exposure does not. There are too many
unknowns with respect to individual susceptibility to cancer and individual body reactions
to plutonium exposure for causation determiners to set limits for an exposure level that is
deemed by them to be harmful. Additionally, the effects of synergism of exposures to
different toxins are not known. In particular the effects of combination exposures where an
individual has both plutonium and toxic chemical exposure, such as carbon tetrachloride,
trichloroethylene, nitric acids, and numerous other toxic chemicals used at Rocky Flats.
Synergism has been documented, for example, for the combination of plutonium exposure
and cigarette smoking. The result is that a person who was exposed to plutonium and also
smoked is 10 times more likely to contract lung cancer than a person who was not exposed

to plutonium and smoked.
lw SAP OS

44 5-17-07
Liver -5-/7-S



Page Wo.
11/15/90

event EVENT

DATE

02/23/61
02/26/61
03/14/61

06/30/61

05/05/61

05/08/61

05/13/61
05/17/61

9/08/61
06/13/61
06/21/61
07/06/61
07/04/61
07/08/61
07/09/61
07/10/61
07/12/61
07/21/61
07/21/61

07/22/61

‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS

1952 TO 1988
“BUTLDING ———Sescerrion 7
NUMBER
hb, RI101 CHIP FIRE.
ah, RNTOI CHIP FIRE.
771, RWI66 ALCOHOL IGNITION.
461, RUNIT MATERIAL IM GLASS CONTAINER,
UNDER EXPERIMENT, IGNITED.
776, R136 CHIP FIRE.
444, RMIO1 PLASTIC ATTACHED TO LATHE
IGNITED.
776, RATS SKULL FIRE.
444, RMIOT CHIP FIRE [INSIDE BARREL.
B81, M252 CHIP FIRE.
776, RMI34 CHIP FIRE IN LATHE.
776, RMI3& METAL FIRE INSIDE CONTAINER.
776, RUI34 CHIP FIRE.
776, RMI36 CHIP FIRE.
446, RNIOT CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL.
776, RMI36 MATERTAL BURNING IN GLOVE BOX.
776, RMI36 METAL FIRE.
778, RNI34 CHIP FIRE - BRIQUETTING.
776, RMI3L METAL FIRE ~ FURNACE.
776, RMI36 METAL FIRE ~ FURNACE.
776, BN134 CHIP FIRE - FURNACE.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:



CURRENT STATUS OF THOSE EMPLUYEES INVULVED IN
TRE FIRE UF 1965

(eont inued)
t
. Be. man No. Ss Terwinated : :
23. Man No. 2 Terwinated .
Ba. + Man No. Termindted -
> 2s. . Man No. Terminated, then returned ‘
to Rocky flats. Now working an ft Alarms & Comm,
26. man No. Ferminated ;

ww So pe?



Page No. 17
41/15/90

_—_—____——¥ENT——EVERT

DATE NUMBER

01/07/64

01/10/64

04/13/64

1/21/64

01/22/64

01/26/64

01/28/64

02/04/64

02/06/64

——BuTLiNg

SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

771, RALLWAY

776, TAPE MACHINE 748

776, TAPE MACHINE 739

721, RNI180
771, RMI8O

771, R&D CERAMICS LAB

771, RA260

771, RM237

1952 TO 1988

DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES

A HOLE WAS NOTICED IN A
CONTAMENATED WASTE BAG AND WAS
IMMEDIATLY TAPED SHUT. THE
BAG WAS MOVED DOWN THE HALLWAY
TO BE CHECKED ON A COUNTER,
THUS SPREADING CONTAHINATION
IN THE HALLWAY.

SERVO VALVE STUCK CAUSING
MACKINE TO RUN AWAY AND DO
TRREPATRABLE DAMAGE TO
ADJUSTIBLE ARBOR.

MMEN THE TOOL SLIDE CEASED TO
‘MOVE THE WORK SLIDE CONTINUED
CUTTING A HOLE THROUGH PART
AND INTO TRE POT CHUCK.

CHIP FIRE
PU EXPLOSION

WHEN FURNACE POWWER WAS
INCREASED TO 1/2 MAXIMUM
CAPACITY, THE COPPER ELECTRODE
HOLDER WAS CONSUMED BY HIGH
TEMPERATURE, RELEASING A SHALL
AMOUNT OF CONTAMINATED COOLING
WATER.

BURNING OF COMBUSTIBLES IN
INCINERATOR CAUSED FILTERS IN
PLENUM TO IGNITE

WELDER CUTTING PIPE CAUSED
PAPER WIPES TO IGNITE

IGNITION OF SOOT ACCUMULATION
ON FACE OF OF FIRST STAGE
FILTERS IN THE INCINERATOR
FILTER PLENUM,



Page No.

ee”

— EVENT EVENT _

DATE

09/04/63

09/05/63
09/07/63

09/12/63

09/14/63

eo”

09/17/63

09/17/63

09/17/63

09/19/63,

09/19/63
09720763

10/02/63

10/07/63

aby

NUMBER

SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 TO 1988

BUILDING

447,

466,

“47,

77,

776,

TM,

776,
76,

mH,

112,

SE OF BUILDING

RMIO5

RMTGE

RMIO5

RMI69

RMIB4

RMIBB

RHI3S

RMISS

RMIBO

RNIOT

DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES

WHILE LOADING GRAVEL, THE LEFT
TOGGLE ARM PIVOT BUSHING
BROKE, THE LOAD DROPPED
BREAKING THE LEFT LIFTING ARM
OF THE LOADER.

CHIP FIRE IN CRUSHER.
CHIP FIRE IM LATHE.

EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON GAGE
CLAMP BROKE MCLEGO GAGE,

BOLT PULLED OUT OF LEAD
COUNTERWEIGHT ON SHEFFIELD
GAGE. DAMAGE TO #V" TRACK AND
WECROMETER BRACKET.

CHIP FIRE IN BRIQUETTING.
WASTE DRUM LEAKED,
CONTAMINATING FORK TRUCK PANEL
‘TRUCK AND SEMI-TRAILER.

RAG AND GLOVE FIRE IN
DISSOLVER BOX.

CHIP FIRE IN BRIQUETTING.

‘A BANGDOWM TUBE FROM A THERMO
MICROBALANCE FEL( AND BROKE
SPREADING CONTAMINATION.

CHIP FIRE IN PRESS.

CHIP FIRE.

EMPLOYEE BROKE TYGOM DITE TUBE
WITH PORTABLE LADDER HE WAS

MOVING.

GREASE FIRE 1N OVEN.



Page No.

,~”

DATE
09/26/64

70/01/64

10/05/64

10/12/65

1/13/66
30/20/64
10/26/64,
11/02/66

1105/66

11/16/64
12/10/64
42/11/64
12/15/64

12/95/64

12/16/64

VENT —— EVENT

rai

NUMBER

‘SUHMARY OF EVENTS

1952 To 1988

~~ BUTLOING DESCRIPTION

771, RMI80A EXPLOSION INSIDE SHIPPING
CONTAINER

551 A 2200 LB POWER SUPPLY WAS
PICKED UP FROM WAREHOUSE WITH
A FORK TRUCK. AFTER FORK
TRUCK BACKED UP TO LEVEL
GROUND AND STARTED TO LET UNIT
DON, IT HAS ABOUT 8" HIGH AND
UNIT TIPPED OVER. CAUSE WAS A
BROKEN PALLET STICKING OUT
BELOW FORKS, AND UNIT

ouTSIDE COMBUSTIBLE TRASH

336, RMII7 ELECTRICAL FIRE IN WELDING
MACHING

776, RMISS CHIP FIRE

TH, HAGE GASKET FAILURE K-FURNACE

7%, RUI36 CHIP FIRE

771, RMU CHIP FIRE IN TROUGH BOX.

125, RM108 DUNHAM-BUSH UNIT CAUSED FILTER
TO IGNITE. .

771, RMI69 SMALL CHIP FIRE.

OUTSIDE VEHICLE FIRE.

447, RMSOZ CHIP FIRE IN BARREL.

111, RMZ3T COMBUSTIBLE TRASH 38 BASKET.

S1, EAST OF BLDG. WIND DESTROYED AIR INFLATED

STRUCTURE.

7% TWELVE PREHEAT COILS FROZEN.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

WAS NOT TIED DOWN TO TRUCK.



Page No. 13
11/15/90

____EVENT___-EVENt-—-———
DATE NUMBER

03/35/65

03/16/63

03/19/63
03/19/63
03 722/63

03/25/63

03/26/63

03/27/63

03/27/63

06/01/63

06723763
06/23/63

05/01/63
05/07/63

05/10/63

‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS

‘776, COMPRESSURE HOUSE

UNKNOWR

4A7, RMZOZ

771, RMS

663, OUTSIDE

771, REITG

776, LAUNDRY

TH, RM2KO

TT, RMIBT

heb, RMTCS
oursiDe

UNKNOWN

1952 TO 1988
BUT LD NG DESCRIPTION
OUTSIDE ELECTRICAL SHORT IM SUBSTATION
5S CAUSED OIL TO IGNITE.
UNKKOWN TOPS OF TWELVE OFFICE TABLES

WERE BLOW OFF DOCK AND
RECEIVED MINOR DAMAGE.

BROKEN CRANKSHAFT AND BLOCK ON
WAUKESHA ENGINE.

DROPPED SCREW MACHINE WHILE
MOVING.

FIRE IN DUCT AND OUTSIDE CHIP
INCINERATOR.

METAL FIRE IN SKULL BOX.

LEAKING WASTE DRUM
CONTAMINATED AREA.

LIGHTING BALLEST ON FIRE.

ELECTRICAL FIRE ON RELAY COIL
TO NO.1 DRYER.

COMBUSTIBLE TRASH BEING BURNED
IN INCINERATOR CAUSED IGNITION
OF FILTERS IN PLENUM.

‘A CRATE OF LEAD GLASS WAS
DROPPED.

CONTAMINATED NITRIC ACID
SPILL.

MAGRESIUM FIRE.

MOTOR FIRE.

CONDENSING VAPORS CAUSED VENT
TO COLLAPSE.

ADDITIONAL NOTES


SEL oso
Inaccurate Exposure Records

All the way through my records, there are quarters (there are 4 quarters in a
~ year) where there are missing dose records: have worked at Rocky Flats -
for years.

in* luclear material into the rin
Building “~~, 6 quarters out of 8, there is no data available for my dose.
This work had very high dose. Up to 8 R/br. Operators assigned were
routinely rotated, due to the high dose, but as a .

I was not.

Tn either or.. , aincidentinBuildmg  2oom~ a
glovebox bag came off. I was contaminated from head to toe and there was
ten to the sixth contamination on my full-face respirator. There was no fecal
sample taken but my lung count was positive. I was told that it was a
statistical high and was recounted in another room. I was told that I had not
received an inhalation. © » later, I was given a dose for this incident.

In _ I voluntarily gave 3 fecal samples and they came back positive. I
was not involved in any incidents. I was actually on restriction because of
and was only in a Radiological Area for sefore the

Si = gave-a fecal sample-voluntarily-_or.

involuntarily in my entire career.



Page No. = 3
11/15/90
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 To 1988
EVENT EVENT ——BuELD ERS DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES
DATE NUMBER
10/10/58 776, RM201 ELECTRICAL CONTROL PANEL FIRE.
10/17/58 OUTSIDE CONBUSTIBLE TRASH IN DUMPSTER
IGNITED.
10/22/58 447, RMT OVERHEAT CONDITION IM MAIN
EXHAUST PLENUMS.
11/1158 OUTSIDE VERICLE FIRE.
ANG /58 467, RST THO FILTERS UERE SHOULDERING.
11/24/58 OUTSIDE COMBUSTIBLE TRASH FIRE.
12/09/58 881, RM296 CHIP FIRE IN LATRE.
12/29/58 444 FIRE I€ OXIDE COLLECTOR.
1/06/59 Tet, RAILS COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL IGNITION
INSIDE PRECIPITATOR 90x.
01/24/59 771, MISE METAL FIRE.
01/28/59 881, RNZ3S SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION OF
NITRIC ACID AND RUBBER INSIDE
METAL DRUM.
02/13/59 444, R101 CHIP FIRE IN LATHE.
02/19/59 467, RM1OS CHLP FIRE IN CRUSHER -
BRIQUETTING.
02/26/59 771, RIGO CHIP FIRE.
02/26/59 TT, RMIS2 FLAMMABLE LIQUID IGNITION.
03/03/59 447, R108 MATERIAL INSIDE PIPE IGNITED
AS A RESULT OF MAINTENANCE
CUTTING OPERATION.
03/14/59 777, RWIS? FILM DRYER SMOKING.



orm,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Public Health Service.
C TZ0 ~ 286-936)

SEC Tracking Number 00030 : National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health
Robert A. Tait Laboratories
4676 Columbia Parkway
ot Ginéinnati, OH 45226-1998
Phone: 513-533-6825,
Fax: 513-533-6826

April 27, 2005

*
ort,

Se

Anthony W. DeMaiori

United Steelworkers of America, Local 8034
4510 indiana Street

Golden, CO 80403

Dear Mr. DeMaiori:

This letter is to summarize the telephone conversation in which we discussed the
results of the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) qualification process with you and
provided consultation on specific topics in your SEC submission. As you know from the
submission receipt letter sent to you previously, the NIOSH SEG Tracking number for
your submission is:

SEC 60030

e As required in the SEC Rule (42 C.F.R. §§ 83.7 through 83.9) and outlined in the
“Instructions for Completing Special Exposure Cohort Petition — Form B,” certain
elements are required to qualify a submission for evaluation. During the SEC
qualification phase, each submission is carefully examined to verify that it meets the
requirements of the Rule. We found that there were questions regarding your
submission that we needed to discuss with you for clarification, or that your submission
did not meet ail of the. requirements of the Rule. .

A list of the issues we discussed with you is attached. For each of these items we have
included remarks to summarize our conversation and to provide guidance intended to
help you provide a submission that could qualify for evaiuation.

NIOSH will complete the qualification process after you have submitted any necessary
revisions, informed us that you do not wish to make recommended changes, or after the
deadlines indicated below have expired. If your submission qualifies for evaluation, we
will beginithe evaluation process by notifying you and the Advisory Board on Radiation -
and Worker Health (the Board) that your submission has qualified for evaluation as a
petition and by providing you a summary of the evaluation process. At that time, we will
also post a summary of your petition on the OCAS web site

(http:/Avww.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas). |

Please respond to this letter by addressing the requests for information or changes fo
@ your submission as outlined in the attached document, which summarizes our

200 Tee Sd1d 6122 996 £0 XVA OT:FT SO0/O0T/SO



aprons for a high exposure job now has cancer in an area that was unprotected by his apron
(his larynx). He wore his dosimeter under the lead apron so his exposure was unrecorded.

His testimony letter is included as an attachment in response to Section 4-——------—-- »

During production days, each plutonium building had a calculated background dose that
was subtracted from the workers exposure. This was based on the exposure the TLD
received from just hanging on the storage board in the hallway. However, two things are
wrong with that scenario: 1) workers in the building, but not in the back area, were
receiving unmonitored dose just like the dosimeters on the board, and 2) many workers did
not store their dosimeters on the storage board so when the background was subtracted it
actually resulted in lesser exposure being recorded. Workers also frequently forgot to wear
their dosimeters into the production areas and most would not self-report so doses went
uncaptured.

Another issue surrounded proximity of glovebox lines. In many buildings there would be a
very “hot” operation requiring lead aprons going on next to a line that did not require lead
aprons. So workers working a couple feet from each other would not be wearing the same
protective equipment.

The practice of borrowing or assigning dose from an employee's co-worker when dose
information for the employee has been lost or was not gathered has created inaccurate dose
records for many employees.

Finally, in many instances workers would perform special “furtive” job tasks to help out
their supervisors or managers, many times to correct a problem, clean up a contamination
incident or perform rework. This work would be done outside the bounds of normal work
controls with no airborne contamination monitoring and with no special worker
monitoring. One RCT said that after such a job, he was highly contaminated and simply
took off his respirator and contaminated clothing and threw it in the same waste drum with
the mess he was cleaning up, This worker was working in an area with high fired oxide
contaminates. Because the work evolution was not documented, no nasal smears or
bioassays were conducted and-no monitoring for dose beyond FLD was conducted. ‘In
talking to numerous workers, this sort of practice was more common than not.

Rocky Flats workers were chronically and repeated the recipients of unmonitored.

exposures. The engineering, procedural and work practice deficiencies, examples of which
are outlined above, prevalent in Rocky Flats history make accurate dose reconstruction

impossible.

United Steelworkers of America, Local 8031



A @

4st Qtr, 1999 ! Attachment 2
i GMA-009-99
H Page 1 of t
Total | 2000-hr| Deep | Neutron [Gamma] [go004ir | Room | Bet Annual Supplemental !
Supp.| Date | Date | Hours | corr. | Dose} Cove | Dose Corrected fosoupaney} Individual TLD Location/ , |Comments/
TLO#| On) Off | opioyed| Factor | (mram) {nram) _} (mrem) Dose | Factor “1 as 5. Area Description (Discussion
3468 eso stm ates «7a [a6] 1. a? 7] ane [4s Stauth Hall By Man's Lev i | :
3469 amee eatin ses «ore | o8 | cst at 76 tne [~ ae . . , TM
3470 amo 6RIMe |= okes 78 20 58 34 70 16 4a ‘South Hall By Women’s Cay : }
3471 2/9 BRImMe §= besa | ae 87 . 28 67 16 42 . “
3472 2p Graiee = kes oa | on 82 20 66 16 3.6 Maln Entry Vestibule/Foyar |
3473 preso  Binte «2868 oa | 76 66 10 68 ne 3.7 . ' .
3474 zee sie § 2ses «= oa | sa 31 2 At 84 31.0 Room 8136 Shitt Mgr, Office
3475 2Rme diatmp 2868 «oe | ao 46 2 54 4 40.3 ’ |
3476 29 Betwe ~—-2B8 0.78 4% 48 29 63 8l4 49.2 ‘ t
3477 2name seins 2262 «os | 26 26; 0 24 16 ey Hall Outalde Rad Safely Office fe
2478 name spies 2sez «oes | 2g 23° ° 20 16 12 . '
3479 22a sieime 2862 0.86 80 a3 17 43 1ne 2.7 ‘Spoaker Quteide Women’s Lav |
3480 2zee siime az os | ge 92 16 40 we 2.5 8 i
3481 2name seties §=2a62 (os 62 f. 0 62 63 4 13.2 Room 8128 WO/Salt Office !
3482 2name Bima 2362 800.86 |} 22 22 ° 19 4 47 "
3483 2name sete 2a2 4088 | ae 24 18 36 |. 34 268 Rad Engineering Office !
3484 2name sate 2962 oes | 18 |. 16 16 13 ons EXA * i
3485 2nezse sine 2052 088 | 21 ° a 18 16 41 Room 2124 North Wall
9486 S889 S189 4608 1.24 as 26 .) 3t we 1.9 Orinking Fountaln Outekle 3128
3487 2Heme seine ‘2362 0.88 | 22 ° 2 19 ine 12 Room 2124 West Wail
3488 2eee Bio oss 0.85 a0 ° 30 26 1168 16 Room 2124 West Wal)
3489 shee sass 1608 61.24 | 90 er as 112 ine 7a Xerox Machine, Sout Hall :
3490. si6e9 saieo "tos 124 | 108 | 69 39 134 48 BA Xerox Machine, South Hell Li
8491 sieeo ERIhe 1608 1.24 119 | 78 86 141 We 70,3 A-Vestibule, Rm 3017A East 6 additipnal AMTLDs deployed
9492 snsmO sete 1608 = 1.24 | ae 48 o 87 12 28.6 A-Vastibula, Fim 9017A South | Average Z000-Hr Dose: ~87 mramyr
3493 ssh sRINS _ 4608 4.24 |: 60 22 21 82. 12 31.1 A-Vestibule, Ryn 30174 Table (Predominantly neutron)
3494 se1me BR19—«1aah «4.63 | or 67 30 168 18 198 in Women's Lav, Rms 3126/31 Est Side Locker Room
8495 suime aime 1224 61.68 | ap 87 80 142 18 17.8 in Women's Lay, Rms 3128/34 ' .
3496 sis1%9 Gato = 1204 163 | 146 7 48 237 18 29:6 In Women's Lav, Rime 3125/81 ‘Wast Side Looker Room
3497 sf149 GRIne  te24 163 } 4174 481 43 284 1 35.8 In Women's Lav, Fims 8128/21 | (North of Xerox)
8388 shi9 seima = 1224 1.63 a. a 10 77 8 9.6 Jn Women’s Lav, Pins 3128/31 Northwest: Stdg Locker Room
L339 atime sero izea tes | ge ae, © 7s 18 9.4 in Women's Lav, Aims 3128/31 maa)

Gereral NoteeiComments:

i
|



Se oooss

|

KAISER*HILL
COMPANY

May 19, 2005 05-RF-00505,

Anthony W. Demaiori
4510 Indiana Street
Golden, CO 80403

CHANGES JN INTERNAL DOSE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES AT THE ROCKY FLATS
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE — RJS-008-05

This letter is in response to your request for information on how intemal dose assessment methodologies
have changed over the years.

The methods for estimating internal dose have evolved over the past 50 years and are principally based
on federal regulations (10 CFR 835), DOE orders and the recommendations of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). During the period Rocky Flats operated, three basic
internal dose calculation methodologies were used.

Prior to 1989, internal dosimetry calculations were based on methodologies recommended by the ICRP in
Publication 2 ((CRP-2) and the-systemic burden equations derived from a modified Wright-Langham
equation.

With the publication of DOE Order 5480.11 in 1989, potential intake cases received follow-up sampling,
and if an intake occurred, the annual effective dose equivalents (AEDE) were calculated and assigned to
the individual’s exposure history record. The methodology employed during this time period was based
on tCRP-26/30.

When the DOE Radiological Control Manual was issued in 1993, intemal doses due to intakes of
‘radionuclides were calculated and assigned as committed effective dose equivalents (CEDE) using (CRP
26/30 methodologies.

In 1993, all systemic burdens (pre 1989 uptakes) for employees active at that time were converted to a
calculated “lifetime dose” (approximated CEDE) and the dose was assigned to 1989. Also in 1993, those
individuals assigned an AEDE since 1989 had a CEDE calculated and the remainder of the dose nat
already assigned was assigned to 1993 on the 1994 Annual Individual Occupational Radiation Exposure
Reports. Those actions resulted in a large number of internal doses reported in 1989 and 1993 dose
reports, the majority of which occurred in earlier years.

As am sure you recognize, intemal dosimetry is a complex subject and the information provided above
is a brief si ary of the techniques used. If you need additional information, please contact me or Steve
Baker of, Stee may be reached at (303) 966-2452.

Richard J. Sexton CH Steer
Program Manager H} BEFORE ME, IN THE COUNTY
Radiological Programs , STATE OF COLORADO.
e LEE
SCB:abm
co
Steve Baker
Kaiser Hill, LLC

Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, 10808 Hwy. 93 Unit B, Golden, CO 80403-8200+303-966-7000



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 ] Steve Trujillo
” “Hazardous and Toxic Materials Subcommittee

SUBSCRIBED AND ‘SWORN TO.
ory

Rudy Mastelone SSSR SSS SSeS Se
Co-Chair Safety Committee

Sworn to on May 17, 2005



v)

SACOM nels catrmatns

Rocky Flats Tecnology Site “a
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE ;

DATE: June 1, 1999

TO: "Distribution

FROM: : ‘GM. Fito Rosia Safety, Bldg. 374, X7175 ,

SUBJECT: BUILDING 371/374 AREA MONITORING TLD (AMTLD) INVESTIGATION

FOR THE 1* QUARTER, 1989 - GMA-009-99

Attachment 1 contains Building 371/374 Area Monitoring results for the 1* Quarter (Qtr), .
1999. In accordance with RSP 05.01 , Area Monitoring, the investigation required for
locations exceeding 75 mrem/year is provided below.

Hightiat ;
Increases were seen in Building 371 main floor south hallway, the Women’s Locker
Room/Lavatory, and several other areas ofthe main floor above basement Rooms
2002/2011', where expanded drum storage capacity is being utilized. None of the areas of
increase were spaces of full-time occupancy (offices). Radiation levels in rooms adjacent to
the Room 3189 drum storage appeared fo have decreased Slighily last quarter by about
15% from the previous period. A problem noted last year wi radiation levels in
the Shift Manager's Office, Room 3136 (resolved in the 4" Qtr. §3,3%28-confirmed to still be
resolvéd in the 1* Qtr. of 1999, due to effective ALARA recontiguitiag done by thé dri

"team and Radiological Engineeiifig (RE). Supplemental TLD results in the vicinity of the

Shift Manager's office averaged about 38 mrenvyr, adjusted for occupancy. -

Specific Areas investigated

All Building 374 or 374 rooms or areas that exceeded 75 mrem/yr were investigated.
Findings and actions taken are summarized below:

¢ The Room 3109 RCT-Break Area {79 mrem/yr on the north wall) and Room 3119
Instrumentation Storage (81 mrem/yr on the north wall) exceeded the trigger.

—_—
* Thé Reont 2002/2014 south basement contains a drum storage area with radiation feveis averaging -
between 45-30 mrenvhr (-50% of this is neutron dose). The basement floor is about 25 feet vertically

cement and some HYAC system components. Although gamma dose from these drums decreases
rapidly with distance, neutron Propagation is more tenacious, and does elevate ambient dose rates
in main floor areas above. {&. > Attachment 2 for AMTLD results) ~



SIGS 89e1 ~ py wey



worked in and when they worked there do not exist, and 4) expert testimony supports the
inability to reconstruct dose for high fired oxides; technical documents including site

- independent investigation reports, Price Anderson Amendment Act and-Defense Nuclear-—
Facility Safety Board reports support periods of inadequate monitoring. As applicable, these
reports and expert testimony are referenced and attached to the SEC Petition, Form B.

This petition is further based on the unique challenges of a closure site that render the
accuracy of future dose reconstruction impossible. This coupled with the passage of time,
the secrecy of the past weapons production mission and the elimination of the recall
programs that allowed for model refinement preclude accurate dose reconstruction. As
stated by R. Williams Field, M.S, Ph.D., from the College of Public Health, Department of
Epidemiology, “It is a fatal flaw to assume that an investigator, 30 to 50 years after the fact,
can validly reconstruct work conditions and processes that led to maximal exposures at the
time of employment. . . . Because of the secrecy of much of the former AEC/DOE work,
especially on bomb construction and dismantlement, much of the work process information
has been intentionally suppressed or destroy:

Resp ly,

CW St? os
Anthony DeMaiori
President

United Steelworkers of America, Loc:

Sworn-to on May'17, 2005



e GREG F908

__ Steve Trujillo
Co-Chair
Hazardous and Toxic Materials Subcommittee

Rudy Mastelone
Co-Chair Safety Committee

Sworn to on May 17, 2005



Qualification Phone Call Discussion and Agreements

A qualification phone call was conducted on March 28, 2005 by interviewer Pat K.,
Health Physicist Karin J., and Rob M. of HHS with Anthony DeMaiori, Steven Trujillo
and- Bob -Santangelo:- A detailed review -.of this phone call follows. ~The
questions/statements made by the interviewer or Health Physicist are stated first and
the responses of the interviewer and the applicants are stated in italics.

In addition, a follow up call was made on Friday, April 1, 2005, by Pat K. to answer your
question regarding documentation of chronic exposures. As discussed, chronic
exposures can be documented in Section F.

NOTE: Over 200 pages were provided with-this submission. The provided
documentation covers all of the information needed to continue with the qualification
process, however, the information is not necessarily behind the correct tab. Far
example, most of the information behind Tab E.5 is information needed for Section F.

NOTE: There is some information that has been provided that does not support the
qualification process. This information includes:

a) Tab E.5, p.14, the first full paragraph discussing multiple different dose Se sfor
calculations and changing methodologies is not supporting documentation.
The basie principle of dose reconstruction is to characterize the occupational
radiation environment to which a worker was exposed using available worker
and/or workplace monitoring information, In cases where radiation exposures in
the workplace environment cannot be fully characterized based on available
data, default values based on reasonable scientific assumptions are used as
substitutes. ~ .

b) Tab F.4, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNSFB) memorandum,
titled, “Trip to Review Feed Characterization for Rocky Flats Plant Building 707
Thermal Stabilization Process, January 20, 1994,” does not address monitoring .
issues.

. ¢) Tab F.4, Enforcement Conference Summary, does not address monitoring
issues.

1. Clarification. In Form B, Section E, Item E.2 you indicated locations, “Such
as Buildings 371, 374, 559, 707, 771, 776, 777, 778, 779 and any others to
be identified.”

You agreed that all buildings at the Rocky Flats Plant should be .
considered. As discussed, you have 10 days from the date on this letfer
to document any disagreement with this action or statement by writing to
the address given on the second page of this letter.

| :

| if
| ie
i \}
|

700 Tee SCE 6LZS 996 ¢0€ Xvd OT?FT GO/OT/SO



conversation. Please note that there are various time frames for responses on selected
items. These time limits are established by the Rule (42 C.F.R § 83.11). You may also

@ respond with corrections to your responses, if you believe such corrections are
necessary. Please be sure to include your NIOSH SEC Tracking Number on alt
correspondence.. Any correspondence should be addressed to:

SEC 00030

Office of Compensation Analysis and Support
NIOSH MS-C-47

4676 Columbia Parkway

Cincinnati, OH 45226

During this period, if you have any questions tegarding your submission, please contact
OCAS ioll-free at 1-800-35-NIOSH (1-800-356-4674), directly at 513-533-6800, or by
email at ocas@cde.gov . You may also contact our contractor toll-free at 1-800-322-
0111. Additional information about OCAS, the SEC Regutlation and the SEC

procedures can be found on the OCAS web site at hito:/Awww.cde.gov/niosh/ocas.
Sincerely,
© Lany J, Elliot, MSPH, CIH
4 Director
Office of Compensation Analysis and Support

@ Atectmert

Bob Santangelo
Steven Trujillo
EGEIVE
APR 28 205
. USWA LU8031

File: (17) Consult Letter [Final] (04-27-2005)

200R) . Tee OcTd 6LZS 996 Coe Xvd OT?¥T $0/0T/SO



a
* Distribution
June 1, 1999
GMA-009-99
Page 2

® oo
ee

The dose rates for both rooms decreased over the past two quarters due to completion
of the ALARA reconfiguration in Room 3206. Occupants will not exceed 100 frenvyr of
unmonitored dose due to relatively low occupancy factors (1/4 for Room 3109, and 1/8
for Room 3119). Neither room is posted as an RBA; though Room 3119 is controlled as
@ Radioactive Material Area during instrument performance checks and source use. .
Whenever penetrating radiation source use occurs in Room 3119, a temporary RBA or
RA is also established and TLDs required fo enter the affected area. °

.

+ Last quarter, AMTLDs ch the north wallAwest side of Room 3141A (Men’s Locker Room)
decreased from 173 mrenvyr to 98 mrenvyr. The north wall center ared also decreased
from 175 mrem/yr to an average of 144 mrem/yr, while the north wall/east side AMTLDs
increased from 124 mrem/yr to 142 mrem/yr. Overall, the Men’s Locker Room dose
tates decreased, and are expected to continue this trend as ALARA configuring of drum
storage area (Room 3420) is completed for NMH&P repacking operations. Other dose
contributions for this area originate from basement drum storage beneath it. However,
this room has not met RBA criteria due to low occupancy (~1/8). . The central areas of
the locker room have average dose rates around 76 mrem/yr for 2000-hrs or less than

@ 10 mrem/yr adjusted for typical occupancy. : ;

¢ The Room 3151 Tool Crib, to the south of Rooni 3206 Sand, Slag and Crucible and Salt
tepack operations had readings on the NE wall of 51 mrem/yr, down from 73 mrem last
quarter. This location has very low occupancy, < 4/16, but still should continue to be
tracked as Salt Repack operations ramp-up in June and July.

¢ Bldg. 374 Room 2107 Utilities West wall AMTLDs read 78 mrem/yr last quarter, down
"from 89 mrendyear the previous quarter. Doses in this area aré catised by drum storage
in the hallway to the west of the Utilities control room. ‘The area has low occupancy <
1/16. Workers are shielded from the-adjacent radioactive material storage by the
utilities contro! panels and a stand-off distance of 15-20 feet. No individual would be
expected fo receive more than 100 mrem/yr from full-time occupancy. .

¢ The Bidg. 374 Room 3159 Electrical Shop north wall AMTLD readings decreased last
quarter with average levels seen of 76 mrem/yr. Access to the north wall is restricted by
Situating storage cabinets. Craftsperson time in Room 3159 is <1/4, and AMTLD doses
decrease to about 22 mrem/yr at the room entrance. No individual could exceed 100
mremiyr unmonitored dose from current occupancy and use of this shop area.

* The Roem 3163 Planner Office in Bldg. 374 is not currently posted as an RBA, but has
been iiie past. AMTLD readings on the west wall last quarter decreased from 111 to
“69 mereinifr, and at the east entry from 24 to 21 mrem/yr. Though the occupancy in this
@ Office is fattly high (~3/4), occupants are administratively restricted from having cubicles
on the west side of the room adjacent to the Room 3189 drum storage area. Planners
would not be expecied to receive more than 50 mrem unmonitored dose over a full



of the proposed class have been lost, falsified, or destroyed. These letters
e@ should be listed under Section F, Item F.2. _
You agreed to submit the worker testimony letters as signed, witnessed” a
affidavits. As discussed you have 30 days upon receipt of this letter Gx’ ce
—— documenting the phone call fo submit-signed affidavits to the address | .- ~~
given on the second page of this ietter.

8. Clarification. At the bottom of the submission, you have stated, “The USWA,
Local 8031 reserves the right to provide additional information beyond that
which is included in this petition and in support of our ability to obtain Special
Exposure Cohort designation for the Rocky Fiats class of workers.”

We discussed that if additional information or clarification was needed we
would contact you. We also discussed that evaluation of your submission
would begin based on the information already received or received on the
basis of the discussion of the clarification/deficiency issues identified in
this letter. As discussed, you have 10.days from the date on this letter to
document any disagreement with this action or statement by writing to the
address given on the second page of this jetter.

Note: We want to make it clear that any additional information that is provided to
NIOSH after a submission is qualified for evaluation will not necessarily be considered
in the initial evaluation report that is provided to the Board. NIOSH may elect to
address such information in a supplementary report.

e Class Definition. Based on the previously discussed information you agreed
that the proposed class definition for this submission should include: Ail
represented members, past and current, of USWA Local 8031 and its
predecessors who have worked at all of the facilities at Rocky Flats Plant
between the time period of April 1952 and Feb. 15, 2005.

As discussed, you have 10 days from the date on this letter to document
any disagreement with fils ction or statement by writing to the address
- given on the-second page of this letter. --

9002) Tee SCI 6LZ¢ 996 Coe XVA TI:7T S0/ot/eo



SEC woo ime
@ High Fired Oxides

Went in and cleaned up numerous dry-box fires like when the incinerator
~ window blew off. We spent about 3- weeks cleaning it up, in half-mask

respirators.

ee —~Rediction Line, pressure vessel blew up under conversion from dirty PuF4 -_
to metal and blew it all over _ _ . This occurred twice, |
experiment failed.

Numerous fires on the MK line Gunk line) Pu scraps put on hotplate and
incinerated.

Several over-pressurizations of exhaust caused blow-backs into the rooms
with visible clouds of contaminants some of which had to be high fired
oxides.

Molten Salts Building 776, hole in the furnace (double lined) had eaten
through both walls, and made a hole. Other operators told not to use that
furnace, and later the furnace was loaded, heated and over-pressurized,

@ causing it to vent to the atmosphere in the room, personnel were without
respiratory protection. No bioassays were taken.

_—_________ Sent up to the’ . pre-filters before the main exhaust)tosee _
what had happened after the fire ( Was told to go up
and open the outer airlock door, which I did. The fire had been so intense,
that the filters were all bumed up and the fire was so hot that the gasket
around the inner door was gone. This allowed the contamination from the
plenum to come into the inner airlock. When I opened the door (outer

airlock), gross amounts of Pu contamination enveloped = __ aud
myself at levels greater than ten to the sixth. Airborne contamination was in
the millions of DAC.

The first air samples they took were greater than ten to the sixth for a 24
hour sample. We used Army assult masks with single canisters. An
individual was moving one of the pieces of chared metal, and as he turned
around, the piece of metal hit me in the leg and.

of high fired oxides.

oeeee
ee .

28



ROCKY FLATS UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 8031

SEC 00030

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, AFFIDAVITS,
AND CLARIFICATIONS

SUBMITTED TO:

SPECIAL EXPOSURE COHORT PETITION
OFFICE OF COMPENSATION ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

SUBMITTED BY:
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 8031
ON BEHALF OF OUR DEDICATED MEMBERSHIP

ZO ITU hz AU Soe



| Page No.

9
| 4415/98
‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS
4952 To 1988
EVENT EVENT BuTiDINs DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES
DATE NUMBER
10/26/61 776, RM134 BRIQUETTE IGNITION.
1109/61 881, RUGS CHIP FIRE IN LATHE.
1417761 776, RMI34 MATERIAL IGNITION -
BRIQUETTING.
12/06/61 776, RMISS CRIP FIRE.
12/15/61 TM, RAAT ELECTRICAL FIRE IN
‘TRANSFORMER.
12/28/61 776, RM224 EXHAUST LINE FOR COMPRESSED
AIR IGNITED.
0105/62 334 LIFTING WELDER ONTO TRUCK
WITHOUT HELP. SPRAINED BACK.
1405/62 776, RM134 SKULL BURNING INSIDE CAN.
02/08/62 776, RMI34 CHIP FIRE.
02/10/62 hb, 465 COVERED WALKWAY BETWEEN TO
BUILDINGS OVER RAIL TRACKS.
DERGW TRAIN BACKED INTO COVER
WALKWAY.
02/14/62 OUTSIDE COMBUSTIBLE TRASH IN BACK OF
PICKUP IGNITED.
03/14/62 776, RMI36 ELECTRICAL SHORT CAUSED CHIPS
AND INSULATION TO IGNITE.
03/15/62 OUTSIDE WIRE AND OIL UNDER 00D
BURNING.
04/09/62 776, RM134 METAL FIRE.
06/16/62 hb, RMI04 CHIP AND OIL FIRE.
05/10/62 4h, ELECTRICAL SHORT IN CONTROL

PANEL.



SEL coo3p

Fire of 1965

S005

On October 15, 1965 a fire occurred during a maintenance operation in Glovebox 752
in building 776/777. The fire bumed in an oil-laden pipe under the glovebox at
temperatures in excess of 1800 degrees Celsius. Finely divided plutonium burned in the
atmosphere outside of the box, causing air and surface contamination to spread
throughout most of Buildings 776,777, and 777A.

As a result of this incident, 25 people received significant internal depositions, some
as high as 30 times the maximum allowable lung dose which equated to lng burdens of
more than 480 nanocuries. These 25 people were restricted from working in areas that
may have lead to further exposure to plutonium. By January 1967, (one full year later) 14
of these Persons had their restriction lifted.

Following the accident, over 380 employees were body counted. It has since been
determined that many more than 25 people received exposures from the 1965 fire. The
direct cost due to the fire was estimated to be $17,500 dollars. The following two pages is
a status list of a few effected employees.

1 Steve Trujillo attest that the information presented in this letter to be to be true and
accurate.

Respectfully,
Ee S-20-65°
Steve Trujillo

Co-Chair
Hazardous and Toxic Materials Subcommittee



September 24, 2004

_. 1957 FIRE . aoe _

On September 11, 1957 at approximately 10:10 PM a fire was discovered in
a Plexiglas glovebox in a development laboratory in building 771. Plutonium
casting residues stored in a container on a shelf within the glovebox had self-
ignited. The heat from the container then ignited the Plexiglas wall of the
glovebox.

At 10:39 PM an explosion occurred in the plenum as a result of the
accumulation of the gases from the fire. This ignited the combustible type filters
in the plenum.

The fire was controlled at 2:00 AM on September 12 and was declared out at
11:28 AM on the same day. The fire inadvertently spread contamination
throughout the building and as a result of the fire getting into the filter plenum,
contamination was released to the environment.

‘SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN.
f| BEFORE NE, IN THE COUNTY OF

ff STATE OF COLORADO. THIS.
OF



Page No. = 22

F315 /90
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 TO 1988 ee
~ BUILDING DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES
12/17/64 771, RMD CHIP FIRE IN GRAPHITE BOX.
12/17/64 771, RUS ELECTRICAL ARC IN K~FURNACE

IGNITED PAPER WIPES.

12/23/64 7 WIND BLEW OFF RADSOGRAPHY
: ROOF.

12726164 776, RNIB CHIP FIRE IN CAN,

12/27/64 hb IND BLEW DISPATCH OVEN

CONTROL PANEL OVER.
01/28/65 771, RMIS9 SLUDGE IGNITED
92/20/65 776, R136 EMPLOYEE CUT HAND ON PLUTONIUM

PART WHILE FIGHTING A
PLUTONIUM CHIP FIRE INSIDE THE

@ LATHE GLOVEBOX..

02/26/65 446, RMZSZ CUTTINGS IGHITED ON POWER
HACKSAW

03/03/65 771, RM181 SLUDGE IGNITED

03/05/65 771, RMI49 WELDING SPARKS FROM OVERHEAD

WORK IGNITED FRESH PAINT
MATERIAL OH FLOOR

03/08/65 77h, RMI MATERIAL IN "TROUGH* BOX
IGNITED
03/15/65 77%, 77 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY POWER

LOSS CAUSED TAPE MACHINE TO
BECOME FAULTY AND PART HAD TO

BE SCRAPPED.

03/19/65 776, ROOK FOUNDRY FATLURE OF DRYBOX GLOVE ALONG
EDGE OF OUTER METAL GLOVE
RING.

03/25/65 771, RMI69 ACID FEED LINE VALVE

ACCIDENTLY OPENED.



Page No. 5

1/15/90
4 ‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 To 1988 a
——evenT EVENT — BuTLDTNG DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES
DATE NUMBER
01/25/60 42h, BASEMENT IGNITION OF GREASE AND

COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL.

02/29/60 446 FIRE IN ROTOR GENERATOR.

03/08/66 444, RMI07 BRIQUETTE ON FIRE.

05/06/60 467, R201 FIRE IN HOUSE VACUUM.

06/05/60 776, RMI34 OVERHEATED CAN OF MATERIAL.

06/06/60 464, RMIO1 CRIP FIRE IN BARREL.

06/17/60 776, RMI34 OVERHEATED MATERIAL IN CAN.

06/22/60 995, EAST OF BLOG. GRASS FIRE.

0622760 OUTSIDE COMBUSTIBLE TRASH INCINERATOR.
Osis 777, EAST OF BLDG. GRASS FIRE.

07/12/60 881, RM2S7 CHIP FIRE.

07/17/60 776, RM134 CHIP FIRE,

07/25/60 776, RMI34 OVERHEATED PU CHIPS.

07/29/60 oursto GRASS FIRE,

08/17/60 446, RIOT CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL.

08/22/60 771, RB180 HOT METAL CAUSED IGNITION OF

FILTER.
10719760 447, RMS CRIP FIRE 1N CRUSHER.
10/19/60 467, RMI05 CHIP AND BRIGUETTE FIRE IN
BARREL.
10/31/60 771, M180 PU IGNITION.
14/03/60 776, RKI36 ‘SKULL FIRE.



radiation program and was found to have a significant internal deposition that
had gone undetected and unrecorded for nearly 50 years.
~~ """"8)” Negative effects of site closure on accuracy of dose re ion. As a closure
site, Rocky Flats presents unique challenges for dose reconstruction in that the
entire infrastructure will be eliminated and with it the subject matter experts that
ptovide information and clarification for dose reconstruction questions. No one
will be left that understands the data. Currently the Rocky Flats dosimetry
department answers calls on a regular basis in support of dose reconstruction
where data is missing, or part of a file is missing, in particular with the change in
1989 from systemic burden to dose when the Radiation Control Manual was
implemented. When Rocky Flats is gone, there will be no one left who
understands these nuances, making accurate dose reconstruction impossible.

6) With closure, worker recall monitoring programs are going away. The contract
has ended for the former worker recall program through Oak Ridge where
workers were called back every three years. The Rocky Flats program that
recalls active employees on an annual basis will go away at closure. Currently
there is nothing in place to replace these important activities.

7) Exposure to plutonium has been causally linked to more than 20 types of
cancer as well as Jung fibrosis. Plutonium exposure, in particular to high-fired
oxides and their related ailments endanger the health of the members of this
Rocky Flats class of workers. DOE and the federal government have recognized
the causal role of plutonium exposure in these specific cancers as evidenced in
the Energy Employees Occupational Illnesses Compensation Program Act
(EEOICPA) which designates a list of cancers currently linked to radiation
exposure. Additionally, the effects of synergism of exposures to different toxins
are not known. In particular the effects of combination exposures where an
individual has both plutonium and toxic chemical exposure, such as carbon
tetrichloride, trichloroethylene, nitric acids, and numerous other toxic chemicals
used at Rocky Flats. Synergism has been documented, for example, for the
combination of plutonium exposure and cigarette smoking. The result is that a
person who was exposed to plutonium and also smoked is 10 times more likely
to contract lung cancer than a person who was not exposed to plutonium and
smoked.

Our petition is based on multiple unmonitored, unrecorded, or inadequately monitored or
recorded exposures that are not specific to specified incidents. Therefore, it covers the entire
time period of plutonium exposure at Rocky Flats from April 1952 to the date of petition.
submittal. Specifics regarding unmonitored, unrecorded, inadequately monitored or
recorded exposures are included in our SEC Petition Form B, Section E.5 and are provided
via affidavits such as this one. This petition is further based on the fact that records and
information are inadequate for individual dose reconstructions based. on the fact that 1)
certain types of radiation exposures and doses incurred by the Rocky Flats class were not
monitored for certain periods of time and certain types of exposure {Le. to high fired oxides)
are inaccurately modeled and reported on dose records; 2) for certain areas either no
monitoring occurred or dosimetry chips were destroyed or lost during processing resulting
inno data available; 3) for many employees accurate records of what facilities a person

GAA OS”



i
Page No. 10
12/15/90
‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 TO 1988
—EvENT EVENT ————S—SC~S~S~STL ING DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES
DATE NUMBER
05/12/62 444, RM101 CHIP FIRE.
05/16/62 771, RM1BO CHIP AND OLL FIRE.
05/18/62 771, RMI66 ACETONE IGNITION OUTSIDE BOX.
05/29/62 771, RMIGB HETAL EXPLOSION IN FURNACE.
06/05/62 Tl, RMIGS EXPLOSION IW K-FURNACE.
06/05/62 883, TUNNEL WELDER CUTTING UP METAL CAUSED
OLt Ta IGNITE.
06/25/62 4b4, RMTOSA FILTER UNIT ON FIRE, CAUSED BY
WELDERS.
07/06/62 ‘444, R101 CHIP FIRE.
7710/62 466, RNTOD CONTROL PANEL FOR FURNACE
REATED UP.
07/12/62 QUISIDE WEED FIRE.
07/13/62 ‘776, LAUNDRY FIRE IN STARTER BOX NO. 3
DRYER.
O7/19/62 666, RYIOT HIP FIRE IW LATHE.
09/07/62 771, RMI49 CHIP FIRE - IGNITION CAUSED BY
WELDERS,
09/15/62 776, RMI36 CHIP AND COMBUSTIBLE TRASH
FIRE.
09/19/62 771, HALLWAY ‘SPONTANEOUS CONBUSTION RUBBER
GLOVES AND NITRIC ACID.
10/08/62 771, RMIGG CHIP FIRE.
10/17/62 447, RUTOS CHIP FIRE - BRIQUETTING.
10/22/62 776, RMT34 CHIP FIRE - BRIOQUETTING.

Tes


SIGNED AFFIDAVIT - DEMAIORI

— oe May 17, 20088

ANTHONY WILLIAM DEMAIORI
SEC Tracking Number 00030

TL, Anthony William DeMaiori, submit the following letter as a signed affidavit in support of
the Rocky Flats USWA Special Exposure Cohort Petition. This affidavit is submitted in
response to Mr. Larry Elliot's letter dated April 27, 2005, and in particular in response to
Item 4 Clarification - “You agreed that additional information would be provided in the form of an
affavit. As discussed you have 30 days on receipt of this letter . . . to submit signed affidavits.”

As President of the United Steelworkers of America, Local 8031, 1 attest that the Rocky Flats
class of workers meets all the specifications and requirements for inclusion in the Special
Exposure Cohort based on the following factors:

1) Exposure to a unique form of plutonium referred to as high fired oxides or
super class Y materials that are metabolized differently and have self-shielding
properties which make accurate assessment of dose impossible. In addition, the
uniquely small particle size of high fired oxides ~ as small as 0.12 um Activity
Median Aerodynamic Diameter (AMAD) ~ makes current dose models
inaccurate. Dose models in use at Rocky Flats use a particle size of 1.0 um.
AMAD and underestimate high fired oxide doses by a factor of 1-3. Current
models in use by NIOSH - International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) 66 ~ use a particle size of 5.0 um AMAD and underestimate these doses
by as much as a factor of 10, High fired oxides were generated from the Building
771 fire in 1957, the Building 776 fires in 1965 and 1969, numerous other smaller
fires, and multiple high temperature processes in furnaces, incinerators and
production process areas used in multiple plutonium buildings at Rocky Flats. A
detailed accounting of these activities is included in our petition. The
impossibility of accurate dose assessment for high fired oxide exposure is
summarized in more detail under a separate affadavit.

Inability to link exposures to specific incidents or events as evidenced by the
Building 771 worker exposure issue as recently as 2000/2001. In this incident,
workers received undetected exposures through chronic long-term exposures
below the threshold of workplace monitors that were discovered only by
happenstance. Without a date to enter into the equation for bioassay results, an
accurate dose assignment is impossible.

Periods of inadequate monitoring, lack of monitoring, changes in
methodology, and inconsistency in procedures over the history of the Rocky
Flats site which make accurate dose reconstruction over time impossible.
Examples include: no routine lung counting unti the late 1960s, no monitoring
for neutron radiation prior to late 1950s and neutron measurements found in
error until 1970s.

Unmonitored exposures surfacing throughout time. As recently as 2004, a
former worker from the 1950s was monitored under a DOE former worker,

£. 17-05



2. Clarification: in Tab E.5, on page 20, you provide “all of the work activities
e described in response to Section E.2 of Form B were very high in penetrating
. tadiation exposure and known by employees as bum out lines.”
You agreed to change this reference to E.3, As discussed, you have 10
days from the date-on this Jetter fo document any disagreement with this
action or statement by writing to the address given on the second page of
this letter. .

3. Clarification: In Section E, Item E.3, you indicate the job titles and job duties
as “all” and you direct us to see Tab E.3 for additional information.
You agreed fo include all represented members, past and current, of
USWA Local 8031 and its predecessors (see page iii of the initial petition
submittal) who have worked at Rocky Flats. As discussed, you have 10
days from the date on this letter to document any disagreement with this
action or statement by writing to the address given on the second page of
this letter.
. 4./Clarification. In Form B, Section E, item £.5, you indicated in the check tox
\_..” that the submission was based on one or more unmonitored, unrecorded, or
inadequately monitored or recorded exposure incidents.
Qe You agreed that additional information will be provided in the farm of an
affidavit. As discussed you have 30 days upon receipt of this letter
wy documenting the phone call to submit signed affidavits.
& You agreed that the glovebox fire in 1965 should also include building
e 777. As discussed, you have 10 days from the date on this letter to
document any disagreement with this action or statement by writing to the
address given an the second page of this letter. , :
: . |
5. Deficiency. A letter was attached for Section F, Item F.2 (Tab F.2), to | t
support the basis that radiation monitoring records for members of the yet
proposed class have been lost, falsified, or destroyed (dosimetry chips were Col
Inadvertently lost or destroyed during the reading process).
You agreed that the applicants will submit a witnessed, signed affidavit. As
discussed you have 30 days upon receipt of this letter documenting the
Phone call to submit signed affidavits to the address given on the second
Page of this letter.

8. Clarification. Tab E.5, although intended to support Form B, Section E, Item
E.5, also supports Form B, Section F, including Items F.1, F.2, F.3 and F.4.
You agreed that this information may be considered in Section F. As
discussed, you have 10 days from the date on this letter to document any
disagreement with this action or statement by writing to the address given
on the second page of this letter.

7. Deficiency. Worker Testimony Letters were attached for Section F, Item F.4
(Tab F.4), to support the basis that radiation monitoring records for members

Tee ScId 6475 996 £0f YVd TT:$T $0/0T/s0

~ $00R



Y

Attachment 3

GMA-009-99
Page 1 of 7
s
Additional Building 371/374 Areas
~~~ Requirme AMTLD Coverage
Roont/Area ‘ Location Comments
3136 Under Desk, Facing Down Shift Manager’s Office
3128 Under Desk, Pacing Down Salt Repack Supervisor’s Office
3130 Under Desk, Facing Down “RE Office
3133 South | Under Locker Benches, Facing Women’s Locker Room
{Down : :
3006 Under Desk, Pacing Down Tap & Drain Office :
3116 Hall Outside Manager’s Office, Facility Managers Area .
Vestibule _| Facing Down :
3139 Men’s Lavatory, Facios Down Under sheet metal shelf



Page Wo. 20 '

11/15/90
SUMMARY OF EVENTS '
1952 To 1988 |
ve eve sors sero ADDITIONAL NOTES \ '
DATE ‘NUMBER \ '
{ |
907708764 77, RM66 EMPLOYEE DROPPED SAMPLE VIAL ;
HE WAS CARRYING, WHEN RE
BUMPED RIS ARM ON GLOVEBOX.
07/15/64 TH, RMSE YDROFLOURIC ACID SOLUTION WAS
PUMPED INTO AMMOW1A SOLUTION
STORAGE TANKS BY MISTAKE AS ;
‘TRE ACID DRUM LABEL RAD
WEATHERED AWAY.
O7/2b164 334, RMTIG CONSTRUCTION ACETYLENE
CYLINDER IGNITED
07/28/64 776 EMPLOYEE DID NOT HONTTOR
HIMSELF AFTER COMING OUT OF
GLOVES. CONTAMINATED OTHER
GLOVES AND FLOOR AREA.
08/17/64 774, RWIS3 CHIP FIRE
21564 hb, RMIOY CHIP FIRE IN BARREL
08/24/64 Sho, RMIOT CHIP FIRE IN LATHE
09/06/66 TT6, RWI3G CHIP FIRE IN CAN
09/09/66 Tt, RAT AN OPENED VALVE ON CENTRIFUGE
TANKS RELEASED CONTAMINATED
CARBON TETRACHLORIDE INTO ;
ROOM. |!
09/78/64 77, RMIST ELECTRICAL SHORT IN VACUUM POT |!
JGNITED WIRING
09/19/64 771, RMIST FIRE 1M ELECTRICAL TRANSFORMER
TO AJAX CONVERTER
09/25/66 TT, RMTBOA SHIPPING CONTAINER HOLDING 56

|
|
|
|
|
OF AM EXPLODED. NO INJURIES |
TIME 7:41 AH.
CONTAMINATED ROOM 180 AND |
480A. LOSS 2.56 AM. CAUSE |
UNKOWN. «COULD BE CHEMICAL |
EXPLOSION OR SLOW PRESSURE |

|

e@ BUILD-UP.



SSK aio |

pe RE — KAISER*HICE

COMPANY

May 17, 2005 05-RF-00487

Anthony Demaiori, President
United Steelworkers of America
P.O. Box 745370

Arvada, Colorado 80006-5370

TRANSMITTAL OF PAST EVENTS AT THE ROCKY FLATS ENVIRONMENTAL
TECHNOLOGY SITE ~ HEG-015-05

In response to your requesi, enclosed is a listing of occurrences that have occurred at
the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) between 1952 to 1988. This
listing is from the historical DOE occurrence reporting system.

lf you have any questions or need additional assistance, please contact me at 303-966-
Howard E. Gilpin, Director
Safety, Engineering and Quality Programs

HEG:rlm e Z ; YZ

W CLARENCE W. BUCHHOLZ, NOTARY PUBLIC ff
Enclosure: fl Wy COMMISSION EXPRES SEPTEMBER 2), 2006
As Stated

Kaiser Hil} Company, L.L.C.
Rocky Flats Environmenial Technology Site, 10808 Hwy. 93 Unit B, Golden CO 80403-8200 * 303-966-7000



Page No.
11/15/90

DATE

s252

08/22/53

02/23/54

03/25/54

06/23/54

V2I54

09/30/55

07/16/56

06/16/57

09/11/57

EveNT

NUMBER

‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS

1952 TO 1988

~ BUILDING

443

334

OUTSIDE, OFF SITE

334, CARPENTER SHOP

Oht

T71, RMI82

466, RMIOY

707, RMIG6

771, RMI80

DESCRIPTION

BOILER EXPLOSION. EXTENSIVE
SHELL DAMAGE, SOME TUBE AND
DRUM DAMAGE. ONE PERSON
RECEIVED A BRUISED BACK AND
TWO OTHER EMPLOYEES HAD MILD
NERVOUS SHOCK.

STEEL IN EYE.

OFF SITE PICKING UP SAMPLES.
JEEP OVERTURNED.

FIRE RUINED A PIECE OF
PROOUCTION EQUIPNENT.

EMPLOYEE CUT OFF FINGERS.

SLIPPED, HIT ELBOW ON EDGE OF
Door,

FIRE RESULTED FROM METAL
BRIQUETTE SPONTANEOUSLY
IGNITING. RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL BECAME UNCONFINED AND
CONTAMINATED AREA,

LACERATED HAND REMOVING METAL
TURNINGS FROM A LATHE.

A CHEMICAL REACTION EXPLOSION
OCCURRED SHOWERING EMPLOYEES
WITH GLASS OR METAL FRAGMENTS
AND CONTAMINATED SOLUTION.
EMPLOYEE SUFFERED MINOR
LACERATION OF RIGHT TEMPLE AND
LACERATED TIP OF LITTLE FINGER
OF RIGHT HAND.

FIRE AND CONTAMINATION OF ALL
BLDG. 771. BURNING PLASTIC
RELEASED HYDROGEN WHICH
RESULTED IN AN EXPLOSION IN
‘THE BUILDING EXHAUST DUCTS AND
FIRE IN THE MAIN PLENUM.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:



Page No. = 16

11/15/90
‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS
@ 1952 TO 1988 ee
gp — ah
ERT EVENT BUILDING DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES
DATE NUMBER
10/07/63. 771, RMS GASKET FAILURE IN K-FURNACE.
10/08/63 771, RMIG6 FIRE IN K-FURNACE.
10/08/63 771, RMI43 FIRE IW K-FURNACE DUE TO
GASKET FAILURE.
10/26/63 991 ELECTRICAL SHORT IN BIGH
TEMPERATURE LIMIT CONTROL.
40/29/63 776, RMISZ ATR BORNE CONTAMINATION WHILE
‘CLEANING PLATING MACHINE.
11/08/63 774, RMI48, 149, 165 CROSS CONNECTION VALVE BETWEEN
NITRIC ACID SUPPLY LINE AND
THE DISTILLED WATER SYSTEM WAS
LEFT OPEN AND ACID MIGRATED
INTO THE DISTILLED WATER
‘SYSTEM.
Oivc 771, RMS GASKET FAILURE RESULTING IN
FIRE.
11/20/63, T71, RMS GASKET FAILURE IN K-FURNACE.
12/07/63 775 TWO PINS SHEARED OFF ON LATHE . “|
TABLE “AND DAMAGED ADJUSTABLE
ARBOR AND SPINDLE. EMPLOYEE
ERROR WAS CAUSE.
12/20/63 771, RM260 BURNING TRASH IW INCINERATOR
CAUSED FILTER PLENUM TO
IGNITE.
12/22/63 771, PARKING LOT EMPLOYEE SLIPPED ON ICE -
‘SPRAINED BACK.
12/30/63 88t, RMI21 NITRIC ACID WAS BEING USED TO
LEACH OUT VACUUM LINE. THE
ACID DISSOLVED THROUGH BODY OF
2" NICKEL VALVE CAUSING SPILL. - \
AREA WAS CONTAMINATED BY
‘SPILL.



SIGNED AFFIDAVIT - HIGH FIRED OXIDES

wee May. 47, 2005. | .- - wen

ANTHONY WILLIAM DEMAIORI, STEVE TRUJILLO, RUDY MASTELONE
SEC Tracking Number 00030

We, Anthony William DeMaiori, Steve Trujillo, and Rudy Mastelone, submit the following
letter as a signed affidavit in support of the Rocky Flats USWA Special Exposure Cohort
Petition. This affidavit is submitted in response to Mr. Larry Elliot's letter dated April 27,
2005, and in particular in response to Item 4 Clarification - “You agreed that additional
information would be provided in the form of an affavit. As discussed you have 30 days on receipt of
this letter . . . to submit signed affidavits.”

As President of the United Steelworkers of America, Co-Chair of the Hazardous and Toxic
Materials Committee, and Co-Chairman of the Safety Committee, we attest that the Rocky
Flats Class of Workers was exposed to a unique class of plutonium and that this exposure
occurred as the result of numerous fires throughout the history of the Rocky Flats site and
through the subsequent cleanup of the facilities in which fires occurred. Due to the extreme
nature of high fired oxides, we have focused our basis for petition primarily on, but not
limited to this unique area. High fired oxides are a relatively recently identified class of
plutonium material. This form of plutonium is generated when plutonium is exposed to
high temperatures in excess of 600 degrees Celsius (some argue this number to be as low as
400 degrees Celsius). High fired oxides at Rocky Flats-were generated from the 1957 fire,
the 1965 fire, the 1969 fire, numerous smaller fires, and numerous high temperature
processes in several plutonium production facilities as described in response to Section E.2
of Form B, The 1965 fire had recorded temperatures in excess of 1800 degrees Celsius. High
fired oxides are also referred to as Super Class Y materials. “(T)he possibility of a super
class Y (super Y) form has been identified. Super Y was defined by the Hanford Internal
Dosimetry Program in 1988 to describe highiy nontransportable forms of plutonium based
on some actual observed cases at Hariford (Bihl ¢t al. 19887 Carbaugh, Bihl, and Sula, 1991).”
The presence of Super Class Y materials has also been noted by experts at Rocky Flats,
including Dr. Robert Bistline. The PNNL-MA-860 Chapter 8.0 issued January 31, 2003,
noted that Super Class Y material is highly insoluble with retention half-lives of transport
from lungs to blood 20 times longer than normal Class Y materials. It also noted the
uncertainty surrounding this new class of material: “The precise nature of super class Y
material is not known, although it appears to have been associated with processes
involving high fired plutonium oxides. The phenomenon has been mformally verified by
dosimetry personnel at Rocky Flats, Savannah River, and Los Alamos sites, and is
supported by literature (PNNL-MA-860 Chapter 8.0, Page 8.13).” In addition, British
literature in the last few years has also noted the unique attributes of high fired oxides.

What is known about high fired oxides at Rocky Flats are that they are highly insoluble,
may not be detected by standard bioassay, and result in particle sizes as small as 0.12 um
AMAD.

The following factors make accurate assessment of dose for high fired oxides impossible:
1) High fired oxides are highly insoluble. This means that they can take as long as

6,000 days or more to show up in a urine bioassay. So by the time a hi oxide
&. 17-05
ULES 5-17-25
SO P~ ES

Ciel



Page No. = 19

41/15/90
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 T0 1988
EVENT ___EVENT_______gurtDIng———SSSSSC«ESCREPT EON ADDITIONAL NOTES
“DATE NUMBER
04/15/66 466, RM101 CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL
06/16/65 777, RM430 WELDER ON ROOF CAUSED WOODEN
FILLER TO IGNITE
04/20/86 771, RMI6D PU CHIP FIRE
06/23/64 ‘OUTSIDE CARBURETOR FIRE
06/24/66 TH, RANG SLUDGE OW FIRE IN SKULL BOX
06/28/64 TT, RAILS FIRE IN *TROUGH" BOX
05/05/64 551, EAST DOCK COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL ON FIRE
05/05/64 TMmTM POTABLE WATER BACKED UP IN
COMPRESSED AIR LINES BECAUSE
VALVE WAS LEFT OPEN.
Qa 776, RMIGZ ELECTRICAL SHORT ON ELEVATOR
06/06/64 444, RM201 CHIP FIRE IN LATHE
06/12/64 776, RUI3S EXPLOSION IN DEGREASER
06/12/64 776, DRYBOX 25 ‘A SPARK WAS NOTICED IN BASKET
OF CHIPS. WHILE ATTEMPTING 70
. MOVE BASKET INTO POSITION FOR
EXTINGUISHMENT, BASKET SLIPPED
‘OUT OF HANDS AND FELL INTO PAN
OF CARBON TETRACHLORIDE.
06/18/64 771, RMS FIRE IN SLUDGE BOX
06/26/64 771, HALLWAY PARTIAL COLLAPSE OF FALSE
CEILING,
06/25/64 771, RNID OPEN VALVE ALLOWED ESCAPE OF
CONTAMINATED ACID.
97/01/64 467, RMIOS CHIP FIRE IM BRIQUETTING



Item 5. 5. Deficiency - April 27, 2005 Letter- “You agreed that the applicants will submit a
have 36 dls pan receipt. of tis eee $$
documenting the phone call to submit signed affidavits . .

Tab F2 Records Lost

: F.2 ATTACHMENT: Employee Testimony Letters (2) -
oo Letter signed as affidavit and notarized. ce
eo: Letter signed as affidavit and notarized.

Item 7. Deficiency — April 27, 2005 Letter- “These letter should be listed under Section F,
Item F.2 (we agree). You agreed to submit worker testimony letters as signed, witnessed
affidavits. As discussed you have 30 days upon receipt of this letter documenting, the phone call
to submit signed affidavits to the address given on the second page of this letter.”

Tab F.2 Worker Testimony Letters Representative Letters and Testimony
. Letter resigned and notarized affidavit.
. 3 Letter resigned and notarized affidavit.
. Letter resigned and notarized affidavit.
. g Letter resigned and notarized affidavit.
. etter resigned and notarized affidavit.
. Letter resigned and notarized affidavit.
. etter notarized individual acknowledgement.
. Letter resigned and notarized affidavit.



Page No.
11/15/90

evest «EVENT

DATE

07/25/61
07/27/61
08/06/61
08/06/61
08/08/61
GBs 17/64
08/17/61

08/21/61

@«

08/26/63
08/30/61
09/05/61
09/06/61
09/06/61
09/13/64
09/14/61
10/06/61
10/13/61

10/25/61

8

NUMBER

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

RMZOS

RMSE

RMI52

RMI34

RM166

RRTBS

RMISS

RMZOT

RM105

RMI34

1952 To 1988
pune DESCRIPTION ——=«=«=~*CDUTIONAL NOTES
RMI3G CHIP FIRE.
HIBS CHIP FIRE - BRIQUETTING.
RMI36 SKULL FIRE.
RMTS6 OVERHEATED MATERIAL.
RHI34 OVERHEATED MATERIAL.
RMIOT CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL.
RMIOT CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL.
VACUUM FURNACE #6 EXPLOSION OF HYDROGEN GAS

PROBABLY GENERATED FROM WET

BRIQUETTES WHEN AIR WAS

ADMITTED TO THE FURNACE.

FIRE IN PLATING FURNACE.

SKULL FIRE ~ FURNACE.

SMALL MOTOR FIRE.

OVERHEATED MATERIAL.

IGNITION OF FILINGS.

SKULL FIRE.

TRANSFER HATERTAL IGNITION.

CHIP FIRE IM BARREL.

CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL.

PU IGNITION.

BOILER EXPLODED WHILE IT WAS
BEING LIT OFF.



Page No. 6

4115/90
SOMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 To 1988
event __ sven agp ———_DeseiPtion ADDITIONAL NOTES
DATE WUNBER
11722760 776, RHI CHIP FIRE IN BRIQUETTING
PRESS.
12706760 716, RHI3S OVERREATED CAN OF CHIPS.
42/09/60 OUTSIDE BACK SEAT OF CAR ON FIRE.
42/97/60 hb, RIOT CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL.
42/17/60 351 ELECTRICAL FIRE IN DRINKING
FOUNTAIN.
12/20/60 776, RM WETAL SCRAP IGNITION,
12721760 771, RAS QVERHEATED HOT PLATE CAUSED
IGNITION OF MATERIAL.
12/22/60 718, RWB ELECTRECAL FIRE IN TRANSFER
unit.
12/26/60 776, RMI34 CHIP FIRE IN BRIQUETTING
PRESS.
01/13/61 4b’, RM203 CHIP FIRE.
01/18/61 46h, RMIOT CHIP FIRE IN TAP MACHINE.
+ O1N9/82 : 774, RMIS9 SPARKS IGNITED RAGS,
01/23/64 881, RNZ24 CHIP FIRE.
01/30/61 464, RMIOT CHIP FIRE.
02793761 4s, RMIOT CHIP FIRE.
02/16/61 445, RMIOT CHIP FIRE.
02/20/61 776, RNI36 CHIP FIRE.
02/20/61 OUTSIDE ELECTRICAL FIRE.
02/22/61 447, RM201 CHIP FIRE.



© Page2 _ May 16, 2005

May 15, 2005
To Whom It May Concer

1 worked in building at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology site from
through During my building occupancy, I rarely wore a dosimetry badge due to the site
monitoring policy. Employees were instructed to only wear their badge when physically
located within the production area. When workers worked in the office areas adjacent to the
Production area, their dosimeter badge was to be hung on the dosimeter badge board.
Additionally, in the tate « dosimeter badges were pulled from office workers located within
as a cost savings measure. Due to both of these policies, dese records for administrative
employees located within building: are inadequate.

@ Sincerely,



Page No.
41/15/90

_ Event
DATE

02/10/64

02/16/64

02/17/64

02/19/64

02/22/64

03/17/64

03/25/66

03/26/54

06/05/66

0408/64

06/41 766

06/16/64

6/14/64

1%

EVENT
NUMBER

‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS

1952 To 1988

—— Sue "DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES
771, RM159,160 AN ATTEMPT TO FREE A PLUGGED

VACUUM LINE WITH WATER

RESULTED IN THE RELEASE OF

CONTAMINATED WATER THROUGH A

PIN HOLE IN THE LINE.
454, RMIO9A CHIP FIRE IN BERYLLIUM
771, RM180 CHIP FIRE
771, RM155, 159, 160 EMPLOYEE CARRYING A LEAKING

7,

TM,

466,

7,

77,

7,

331,

M134

R187

PRECISION SHOP

COMPRESSURE HOUSE

RNTES

RMIBS

RMS

RMUIG

SAMPLE CARTON OF PU FLOURIDE.
OIL FIRE IN PIT UNDER PRESS

HEAT FROM REACTION CRACKED
REACTOR TUBE ALLOWING HOT PL
HYDRIDE 10 BECOME EXPOSED TO
AIR AND BURN.

GRINDER BROKE, PIECES
PENETRATED ARM.

BROKEN CONNECTING ROD CAUSED A
PIECE OF METAL TO SO THROUGH
HOUSING.

‘TWO 4 LITER BOTTLES OF L1QUID
SALVAGE LEAKED.

FIRE INSIDE CLEANING SOLUTION
LINE AS RESULT OF WELDERS
CUTTING PIPE

GASKET FAILURE X-FURNACE

URANIUM CHIPS IGHITED 14
HACKSAW

A PIECE OF WERCULITE TEMPERED
PLATE GLASS EXPLODED WHILE IT
WAS BEING TRANSPORTED BY HAND.



@ Page2 May 16, 2005

€an annual dese reading of 264 mrem. The Rad Engineers justified these exposures by writing
never spent more that 1/16 of their work

r . | spent at least an hour each day in the - for
several years. At 10:00 hours, we had the plan of the day (POD) pre-meeting to load work for
the building POD meeting, and at 13:30 hours we.met to.discuss procurement problems.or any.

issues that would impact work. As , | spent time also in room with the
planners, work control coordinator and the procurement specialist. As for the ny

~~ office for many years was between the andthe
During my years as‘ my office has always been within feet of the production
areas. Over the years | have had an office in © and in several locations in building
(rooms * and - see attachment 4). Prior to when the
radioactive material was transferred off site, nearly all rooms in . had annual

exposures well above the 200 mrem that was used for my dose reconstruction. Though | do
not have a lot of information on area dose in building © my office was adjacent to the
production area. { was able to locate the dose reading for re fy Office), south wail (my
desk location) for Aitachment 5 lists the dose adjusted for 2000 hours as 826.33 mrem.
Immediately south of the wall for was a high-level Americium processing line that
was abandoned prior t01983. The dose outside my office in the main corridor was high enough
to set-off the security alarms that were installed in the 1990s. My former office had to have
shieKing installed in the walls to prevent the security check point alarms from sounding.

The majority of my production years were spent in building This area had high-fired
oxides which according to Dr. Bistine, are not well correlated to actual exposures using the
ICRP 66 code methodology. Due to energy levels [one micron size], the old [CRP 26 model
more accurately reflects dose at Rocky Flats.

in summary, | have concems for the validity of this dese reconstruction for the following

reasons:

© Zeros that should read as extremely hightdosesTM

accuracy of the dose readings due to the lead shielding provided by the fead aprons
wom for bag cuts

. the significant dose that was not recognized during my salaried years as technical
support with my office areas located within feet of the production area

e dose adjusted for 4o hour week rather than actual work time of 45+ hours
« methodology used to determine my dose.
Took forward to your answers regarding these concems.

Sincerely,



4 Sec ov So

fF ©@ Table of Contents

Item 4. Clarification ~ April 27, 2005 Letter— “You agreed that additional information will
be provided in the form of affidavits. As discussed you have 30 days upon receipt of this letter
documenting the phone call to submit signed affidavits.”

Tab ES Unmonitored, Unrecorded (or Inadequately) Exposures
The following signed and notarized affidavits are provided in support of Section E, Item E.5 as
requested. .

e ire signed and notarized affidavit.

° ‘ire signed and notarized affidavit.

. v | Oct. 16, 2000 worker exposure incident signed and notarized
affidavit.

eu . 4 unmonitored exposures signed and notarized affidavit.

° _ aaccurate exposure records signed and notarized affidavit.

- . High Fired Oxide Exposure signed and notarized affidavit.
. signed and notarized affidavit - Changes in dose assessment.
@ 7 ~ High fired oxides signed and

notarized affidavit.

. signed and notarized affidavit.

. and ~- Work Practices leading to

as ~~" nmnonitored exposures signed and notarized affidavit. ~~ _

. . and ~ ~ Health Effects signed and

notarized affidavit.

© Howard Gilpin, Director of Safety, Engineering and Quility, signed and notarized ‘affidavit
attesting to a list of occurrences including list of dates of historic fires. Date information and
fire information was requested during the phone conversation and can be obtained from the
documents provided by Mr. Gilpin. This information documents high fired oxide exposure
sources from 1953-1988.

. signed and notarized affidavit regarding failure of TBD curreritly in use to take
into account incidents after 1976 and attached radiological incident reports from 1988 te 2003
illustrating chronic enduring exposure issues at Rocky Flats. This information provides Sites
and details as requested.

Moved to Tab E.3
. aned and notarized affidavit — Burn Out Lines and Lung Count History.



Anthony DeMaiori
President
United Steelworkers of America, Local 8031

Pa Sp
steve Trujillo
Co-Chair

Hazardous and Toxic Materials Subcommittee

file >

Rudy Mastelone
Co-Chair Safety Committee

Sworn to on May 17, 2005



S& ovo3o LA

@ When they did my dose reconstruction for the neutrons, they included
. Iwas on active duty in..... and had handled no
radioactive material while Twas away from mt Rocky Flats. _

Worked the - ‘ “and” - before they used shielding fot
neutrons.

Small Americium button made and a reading was taken and was
approximately 40 Rem there were no precautions for Gamma.

While we were working the Americiom line, our dose reports came back as
“no data available.” We were using the “old film badges” and the more
exposure that you received, the darker the badge would get. The company
Stated that due to the darkness of the badge, the individuals could net have
received that high of a dose. Therefore “no data available" was assigned for
dose.

While not in use, proper storage/placement for TLDs and film badges was
never enforced.

@ Personne! with lower doses could have actually received a higher dose than
those with the higher dose that improperly stored their badges.



Anthony DeMaiori, President
United Steelworkers of America, Local 8031

4510 Indiana Street
Golden, CO 80403
May 23, 2005

SEC 00030

Office of Compensation Analysis and Support

NIOSH MS-C-47

4676 Columbia Parkway

Cincinnati, OH 45226

RE: SEC 00030 RESPONSE TO APRIL 27, 2005, LETTER — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION,
AFFIDAVITS, AND CLARIFICATIONS AS REQUESTED

Dear Office of Compensation Analysis and Support — Larry Elliott, Director,

The United Steelworkers of America (USWA), Local 8031, in good faith submit the accompanying additional
information, affidavits and clarifications to our Rocky Flats Special Exposure Cohort Petition, Form B, SEC
00030. The information provided includes specific responses to Letter Items 4, 5, and 7, which pertain to
Tabs E.5 and F.2 of our original submittal.

‘This information is submitted in advance of the deadline of 30 days from our receipt of the April 27, 2005,
letter as required. The information and our petition is in full accordance with 42 CFR Part 83, Procedures for
Designating Classes of Employees as Members of the Special Exposure Cohort under Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, Final Rule. This additional information is
submitted on behalf of the dedicated members of USWA, Local 8031, through our right of representation,

We greatly appreciate the opportunity to petition for Special Exposure Cohort on behalf of our members and
will be extremely appreciative of your timely designation of our Rocky Flats worker class for Special
Exposure Cohort particularly in light of our rapidly approaching closure. Please let us know as quickly as
possible if any additional information is required. I can be reached at 303-278-4557 or 303-907-2185. Our
site closure is growing very near and anything that can be done to expedite the processing of our petition

would be greatly appreciated.

Respects” /7 oo.
Z f ye VN,
Anthony W. DéMaiori

President, USWA, Local 8031

C9 TT WY he AUL) $008



Page No. 11

11/15/90
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
@ 1952 To 1988
vent event)" sri tig ~ESERLPT ION ADDITIONAL NOTES

DATE NUNGER

10/22/62 883, RMI09 FELT PAD ON FIRE - "A® PRESS.

14/10/62 771, RISB ELECTRICAL ~ TRANSFORMER TO
LATHE ON FIRE.

11/22/62 fbb, RAVIO FIRE IN PLATING TANK.

12/04/62 TP, RM206 COMBUSTIBLE TRASH BEING BURNED
TW INCINERATOR CAUSED IGNITION
OF = PLENUM.

12/07/62 771, RUNGE FIRE WAS CAUSED DUE TO FURNACE.
INADEQUATE SEAL BETWEEN THE
FURNACE TOP PLATE AND THE
REDUCTION VESSEL. THE
INADEQUATE SEAL RESULTED WHEW
A GASKET FROM A PREVIOUS
REDUCTION STUCK IN THE FURNACE
CAUSING SECOND GASKET TO COOK

t ) DURING THE VESSEL INSERTION

INTO THE

01/10/63 7M, RMIGE FIRE AND CONTAMINATION
HAPPENED WHEN THE GASKET ON
THE REDUCTION VESSEL FAILED
CAUSING MOLTEN METAL TO BE
EJECTED FROM-IT, AND:
PRESSURIZED THE GLOVEBOX LINE
AND FATLURE OF THE GLOVES.

ort 776, RMI36 FIRE IM ROLLING KILL.

01/18/63 77h, RHI GASKET FAILURE IW K-FURNACE.

01/18/63 771, RNIB PAINT IGNITED - CAUSED BY
WELDERS.

oats 881, RMISZ URANIUM FIRE INSIDE BEAKER.

01724763 TP, RNB OUL FIRE 1 K-FURMACE.

O1s26/63 774, RAGE GASKET FAILURE IN K-FURKACE.



SIGNED AFFIDAVIT -WORK PRACTICES
_ May 17, 2005 ___ ee

[ONY WILLIAM DEMAIORL STEVE TRUJILLO, RUDY MASTELONE
SEC Tracking Number 00030

We, Anthony William DeMaiori, Steve Trujillo, and Rudy Mastelone, submit the following

| letter as a signed affidavit in support of the Rocky Flats USWA Special Exposure Cohort
Petition. This affidavit is submitted in response to Mr. Larry Elliot's letter dated April 27,

2005, and in particular in response to Item 4 Clarification - “You agreed that additional

information would be provided in the form of an affavit. As discussed you have 30 days on receipt of

this letter . . . to submit signed affidavits.”

As President of the United Steelworkers of America, Co-Chair of the Hazardous and Toxic

Materials Committee, and Co-Chairman of the Safety Committee, we attest that worker
exposures and doses have gone uncaptured due to a variety of engineering, poor work

| practices and procedural deficiencies throughout the history of Rocky Flats. We attest that

these conditions were chronic and are not readily documented.

For example, employees routinely removed lead-lined or water shielded glove port covers
because when the ports were opened they hit the employee in the chest while working.
Once removed, the employees frequently forgot or chose not to put these important
exposure shielding devices back on the gloveport. Then the employees would sit in chairs

r with their heads near the open glove ports. Your dosimeter is worn on the front of your
chest. There is no dosimeter for your head so exposure to the head goes unmonitored and
uncaptured.

Similarly, many glove lines had lots of different glove ports at different elevations. Some
operations required access from many different areas. Operators would open a glove port
for part of the job at waist level and leave it open and then open and work from another
glove port overhead. While working overhead their pelvic region was receiving exposure
from the open glove port below. This exposure was not monitored or captured because
there is no dosimeter at that level.

Another example is workers removing “produce” cans of material. The workers would be
wearing lead aprons and the cans were supposed to be shielded in a lead container, but
many times when the work took longer, workers would remove the produce cans and place
them under their arms or between their legs with no shielding in order to cut and tap it out
of the line faster. The workers would be gaining exposure to their underarms and legs
where no Jead apron was present and where no monitoring devices existed to capture this
exposure.

Lead aprons themselves presented a problem, because it was not clear to workers whether
their dosimeter was supposed to go under or over the lead apron. So, depending on the job
or building area, workers did it differently. Those who wore their dosimeters under the
lead apron would have no record of dose exposure to the rest of their bodies (head, arms,
legs, etc.). In particular with exposure to the head, a lawsuit involving an employee who

. ) contracted a brain tumor after receiving unmonitored exposure to the head was ruled in
favor of the deceased employee. In another instance an NDT operator who wore

17-08
BEd F-17-OS~
Arm ALSO



Page No.
11/15/90
‘SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 To 1988 ee
————vENT EVENT —surtpris DESCRIPTION ADOIYIONAL NOTES:
oATE NUMBER
05/26/59 T7t, RNIB ELECTRICAL FIRE.
05/26/59 7?1, RNIB? WELDERS CAUSED COMBUSTIBLE
MATERIAL TO IGNITE.
06/09/59 881, RMZ56 METAL FIRE.
06/09/59 881, RHZ56 METAL FIRE.
07/29/59 331 SAWDUST FIRE.
07/30/59 776, R134 METAL FIRE.
09/08/59 771, RM 267 CATALYTIC DECOMPOSITION OF
PEROXIDE IN AN INSULATED
STORAGE TANK. CATALYST IN
THE FORM OF NEOPRENE GASKET |
MATERIAL PROBABLY INTRODUCED
THROUGH FAULTY VALVE OR |
7 @ PIPING. |
|
09/17/59 776, RM134 SPLINTER OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL IN FINGER. LATER '
CREATED NODULE THAT HAD TO BE
EXCISED.
09/18/59 194, RM215 > MOTOR FIRE INSIDE IBM MACHINE.
10/01/59 771, RMI48 SPARK INSIDE SKULL BOX IGNITED
PAINT.
10/16/59 771, RMSE CHIP FIRE.
12/03/59 446, RMIOT CHIP FIRE INSIDE BARREL.
12/15/59 oh, RUTIS METAL FIRE.
04705760 776, RMI34 CHIP FIRE IN HYDROFORH PRESS.
01706760 466, RMIOT CHIP FIRE IN BARREL.
04/14/60 : 881, RMZ33 COMBUSTIBLE WASTE IGNITION.


@ exposure is detected in urine it is nearly impossible to link the exposure in time to
the actual exposure incident, making accurate dose assignment impossible. In

~ “addition; standard chemistry used int fecal bioassay is unable to dissoive high fired~ ~~
oxides, invalidating many fecal results in which special chemistry was not used.

2) Little is known about high fired oxides. Accurate dose modeling takes decades to
develop. Because high fired oxides are a relatively recent phenomenon, they are not
accounted for in dose modeling in use today by NIOSH or in dose modeling for
instance at Rocky Flats. Current models in use underestimate high fired oxide
exposure by as much as a factor of 10 according to Dr. Bob Bistline. For example,
high fixed oxides at Rocky Flats have been found to range from 0.12 to 0.3 um
AMAD, however NIOSH uses a particle size of 5.0 (ICRP 66) and even Rocky Flats
Dosimetry Department uses a particle size of 1.0.

3) High fired oxides have self-shielding properties that make accurate assessment, even
by lung count, impossible. When plutonium particles are heated to extreme
temperatures they become “ceramicized” or glazed over on the outside of the
particle. The hardened outer surface of the high fired oxide particle actually shields
or masks the plutonium alpha zadiation being emitted from the particle. This factor
tricks the lung counter into detecting less plutonium than is actually present in the
lung. According to Dr. Bistline with high fired oxides, the calculation of lifetime dose
based on lung count is usually in error,

4) Itis impossible to tell whether plutonium detected by lung count is soluble or
e@ insoluble so it is impossible to know what model to apply. Rocky Flats has both
soluble and insoluble forms of plutonium. Using even a moderately soluble
equation results in calculations that are completely in error. “Super Y screws up the
modeling,” said one dose assessment expert at Rocky Flats.

5) Because of the insolubility of high fired oxides, worker exposures can go undetected
for decades. “We have found a number of people now years later that have
plutonium in their bodiés that was iiever picked up by the monitoring in place at the
time,” Dr. Bistline said in a recent phone interview. These new-found exposures
cannot be tied to an incident date and so accurate dose reconstruction is impossible.
“Dose assessment works well when you know the incident that the dose came from,
not when you don’t,” according to a Rocky Flats dose assessment expert.

Respect 4

Anthony DeMaiori

e President
United Steelworkers of America, Local 8031



43,

314,
“3S.

16,

17.

EB

12
aa.

2%.

Terminated —
Died (2-9-1
Crostate comaerY
tetired *

erminated

Terminated
Terminated
Died 18-38-71.

Gererary occlusion with “anfaretiony

Terminated
Terminated
‘Terminated.
Fermi rags
Terms nated,

‘Terminated

Terminated sr —
Died 2-12-76

(Aeute myotard: al safarct tien).

Man No.
Plarmers

Man Ne.
Man No.
+ Man Now
(Preumonias
Man No.

lan No.

Man No.
Man NO.

Man Now

Stil, werkavg. at Rocky: Fyatens o

Terminated
Terminated’

Terminated
Died 10-25-83

myocardial infarction, emphysema)

Terminated f

Died 3-19-72
(Blaster Cancer)

Terminated
Terminated

Terminated



Page No. 12

1/15/90
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 TO 1988
—SVERT EVENT BUILDING DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES
DATE NUMBER
02/01/63 444, M109 FIRE 1M BUS-BAR IN NO, 1

02/05/63

02/09/63

92/09/63
,
02/14/63

02/18/53
02/19/63

02/21/63
02/26/63

02/28/63

O3f01463

03/09/63

UNKNOWN

776, RM134, BOX 823

UNKNOWN

TA, RMB

‘777, NE CORNER

771, RMSE

UNKNOWN

77?, STOREROGH

TH, RMI30

881, RM22B
TH, RBIEO

444, RM101

FURNACE.

CONTAMINATED FLUSHING WATER
RAN OUT OF BROKEN PIPELINE
‘ONTO FLOOR,

CONTAMINATED CARBON
TETRACHLORIDE BACKED UP IN
GLOVE BOX. GLOVE RUPTURED -
SPILLING CONTENTS ON FLOOR.
WRONG TYPE VALVE HAD BEEN
INSTALLED.

WASTE SAG BECAME LOOSE AND
FELL TO FLOOR CONTAMINATING
ROOM.

GASKET FAILURE TH K-FURWACE-

WELDER CAUSED PLASTIC SHEET TO
IGNITE.

PLASTIC FELL OFF DRYER INTO
TROUGH DISSOLVER, CAUSING IT
TO IGNITE.

FIRE IN DRYBOX, CONTAMINATION
DUE TO COOLING UNDERSIDE WITH
coz.

CHARGER OM BATTERY POWERED
EMERGENCY LIGHT UNIT SHORTED.

WELDER CUTTING ON GLOVEBOX
CAUSED COMBUSTIGLES TO IGNITE.

METAL AND ACETONE IGNITION.
CHIP FIRE.

PLASTIC CURTAIN ATTACHED TO
LATHE BURNED.



Page No. 16
41/15/90

[EVENT EVENT
DATE NUMBER

05/17/63

05/17/63

05/25/63

05/27/63,

06/20/63
7/10/63

07/14/63
07/15/63

07/15/63

07/19/63

07720763

99/03/63

‘BUILDING

TP, RHIGS.

771, RM168

464, RMZOS

4h, RM205

774, RMT

776

771, RMD
65, RMZOS

hh, ROS

716, RNIBS

3H

SUMMARY OF EVENTS
1952 TO 1988

DESCRIPTION ADDITIONAL NOTES

GASKET FAILURE IN K-FURNACE.

REDUCTION FURNACE GASKET
FAILED CAUSING DAMAGE TO
FURNACE HEATING COIL AND BLOCK
‘VALVE.

LITHIUM FIRE,

FIRE, TO VOLATIZE SUPERNATANT
NAPTHAMETHYLENE CHLORIDE
SOLUTION, AN ELECTRIC HOT
PLATE WAS BEING USED. THE HOT
PLATE WAS TURNED OFF AND AN
ARC IN THE SWITCH IGNITED THE
‘VAPORS.

PIN HOLE LEAK IN STAINLESS
STEEL LINE OVER FALSE CEILING,
LINE CARRIES HIGH PU SOLUTION.
HOLE CAUSED BY CHEMICAL
REACTION.

ELECTRICIAN STRUCK SCREWORIVER
IN FINGER. SEVERED TEHOOH.

‘METAL’ FIRE.
LITHIUM CHIP FIRE.

CHIP FIRE IN CENTRIFUGE
BASKET.

‘A CRACKED ELECTRODE CAUSED A
HOLE TO BE BURNED INTO THE
MOLD WELL OF THE FURNACE
FLOODING THE FURNACE WITH
COOLING WATER.

CHIP FIRE IN BRIQUETTING-

A BENZOIC ACID CELL BROKE WHEN
IT HET AGAINST BENCH.



NIOSH Tracking #

February 7,2005

ORAU
4850 Smith Rd., Suite 200
Cincinnati, OH45212. a

Dear Heather

| have received the draft copy of my dose reconstruction that was calculated by your office. |
have several concems regarding the accuracy of this report based on the values and
methodology that were used for the reconstruction. It is my understanding that the 21 missing
doses were replaced with a “below the ievel of detection value of 39 mrem”. These missing
doses were for years when | was a chemical operator in a plutonium processing area. My daily
Job scope included “hands on” Pu processing. As an operator, } was required to initial my dose
record every two weeks, At minimum, six of the-missing.doses were for instances when my
report came back “no data available’, and coincidentally, these doses are associated to times |
worked inside of a vault for inventory or performed other high dose activities. Or Dr.
Bistine a nuclear researcher at Rocky Flats informed me that “if the films were too dark to read
due to high exposure, zeros were assigned for those badge readings. | recall some high doses
that are not included in my provided records. My records also did not include the statements
that we signed when we were counseled for exposures above the mandated levels or actually
removed from the production floor due to high-dose badge readings. Records were allegedly
e artificially corrected for values that were above anticipated norms. Also, during that time
period, thie recorded dose readings are inaccurate due to the badge location. I was required to
Teed. Sree ter betige beneath my lead apron so my badge only relacis @ portion of what
received. Since } was surrounded ing production fines, my back side, head, and

In addition to the missing doses from mv vears in production, | have concems about the values
that were used from through _. As an exempt salary employee, | only wore my
- dosimeter when-1 entered: the production area;-dosimeters ‘were required to be hung onthe
dosimeter boards when not in the production area, These dosimeter boards were located
outside of the building in special structures because the background dose was too high within
the production buildings. From through Ay office was always within 50 feet of the
production areas, and at times immediately adjacent to the production area. Additionally, from

material drum storage including high level drums was immediately below my
office. Though area dose was not recorded until after timilar dose readings can be
assigned for earlier years as the building mission did not change from Kom when Pu
was shipped offsite. [ submitted a freedom of information request last September for these
records, | finally received these records last month; | am including a copy of these records for
your review.

These records are quite interesting for several reasons. Areas with extremely high doses were

not surveilled regularly, not usually more than a year. Several examples:

room nad quarterly readings of 300, 547, 1480, and 517 mrem for annual corrected

dose of 2844 mrem per year (attachments 1 and 2). This value has already been corrected to
e only reflect dose for a 2000 hour work year exposure. During this time period, work weeks

were usually 45+ hours so again dose was understated. ne planners’ office,

had an annual dose reading of 2120 mrem for Roorr 20m had