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Filed 3/16/22 P. v. Scott CA1/ 5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. RALPH MANNING SCOTT, Defendant and Appellant. A161008

(Marin County Super. Ct. No. SC207280A)

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order finding defendant Ralph Manning Scott mentally incompetent to stand trial and committing him to a state hospital or treatment facility pursuant to Penal Code 1 sections 1367 and
1370. Defendant contends the court and appointed experts imprope rly relied on the “m ere fact” of his mental illness and ignored his “demonstrated ability to work and cooperate with his counsel” in finding him incompetent

. (Initial caps and boldface omitted.) We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I n December 2018, a complaint was filed charging defendant with stalking then

- Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom ( count 1 ) and his sister Hilary Newsom ( count 2 ) in violation of section 646.9, subdivision (a) . The

1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal Code.2

complaint further alleged defendant had one prior serious or v iolent felony conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)

– (d) , 667, subds. (b)

– (i) ) and one prior prison commitment ( § 667.5, subd. (b)). These charges stemmed from an incident on October 10 , 2018, wherein defendant took a taxi to Lieutenant Governor Newsom’s Marin County home
and lied to Newsom’s minor daughter to gain entry into the home. 2 Specifically, d efendant arrived with flowers on Lieutenant Governor Newsom’s birthday and falsely to ld the child that he was the son of President
John F. Kennedy (hereinafter, JFK) and a friend of her father and grandfather. At defendant’s request, the child led him into the home so that he could find a photograph of JFK on the family’s computer. A bout 10 or 15 minutes
after his arrival and before leaving , defendant signed and wrote his phone number on a birthday card for Lie utenant Governor Newsom. Later that day, the lieutenant governor’s sister Hilary Newsom called the phone number written on the birthday card and spoke to defendant. She determined defendant did not know her family but had researched them extensively, whi ch greatly upset her. The Newsom family thereafter had
defendant served with a temporary restraining order, which did not stop defendant from repeatedly leaving voicemail messages for and sending letters to family members, including Hilary Newsom and Lieu tenant Governor Newsom’s wife.
On May 21 , 2019, defendant pleaded not guilty to both counts and denied the enhancement allegations.
On June 6 , 2019, the trial court suspended the proceedings pursuant to section 1368 and appointed mental health experts, J onathan French, Ph.D. ,

2 These facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript.3

and psychiatrist Zachary Torry, M.D. , to evaluate defendant’s mental competency to stand trial. The se mental health experts interviewed
defendant and reviewed relevant medical and criminal records before submitting their reports. 3
In his July 9 , 2019 report, psychiatrist Dr. Torry diagnosed defendant with “Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type, Continuous.” (Boldface omitted.)
Dr. Torry noted defendant’s “understanding of the charges that he is facing
and his incarceration stem fr om a complex delusional belief system. He expressed his belief that his arrest was ‘a setup’ and ‘a ruse’ because those in law enforcement now ‘connected the dots’ and believed that he is ‘ JFK’s son.’ ” Further, defendant “believes that there will be no trial because of the dangers of exposing that JFK ’ s son has been arrested.” According to Dr. Torry , while defendant demonstrated “a coherent and rational understanding of the possible verdicts, the potential consequences of his charges, the roles of

court room personnel, and the trial process,” defendant’ s delusions interfered with his ability to understand “trial concepts” and to communicate with his attorney in order to prepare a defense.
Dr. French issu ed a report on July 12 , 2019 , provisionally diagnos ing
defendant with: “Delusional disorder, grandiose type, multiple episodes[;] [¶] Other specified personality disorder with antisocial, borderline, and
narcissistic features [;] [¶] (Rule out) mood disorder, not otherwise specified.”
Dr. French then opin ed that defendant’s pervasive delusional thinking, including his preoccupation with “being John Kennedy’s love child ,”

3 Defendant ha s a lengthy criminal record dating to 1976 that includes at least 52 arrests, 23 convictions (sev en of which were felonies) , and numerous parole violations. D efendant ha s been found incompetent to stand trial twice and hospitalized numerous times under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150.4

prevented him from “remain[ing] productively focused upon his case.” “[H]is record indicates that he has been acting in this manner for more than 40 years, with virtually no indication that he is prepared to change his ways.”
T hus, “ [n] ot only does Mr. Scott exhibition [ sic ] a flawed understanding of the nature of these criminal proceedings, but he is fairly devoid of any capacity to cooperate with counsel in a rational manner.” On July 16, 2019, defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the competency issue and unsucces sfully moved the trial court to appoint a third
doctor

. H e also unsuccessfully move d to remove his attorney under People v.
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118

. I n January and March 2020, the trial court delayed trial due to the
COVID

- 19 pandemic and ordered upd ated reports on defendant’s competency

. The court also appointed another psychiatrist , Omri Berger, M.D. , to e xamine him

. 4
Dr. Torry submitted his second report on February 18, 2020, after reevaluating defendant. This time, Dr. Torry opined that defendant was competent to stand trial , explaining: “The severity of Mr. Scott’s charges and his psychiatric history make this a complex case. Mr. Scott operates under a grandiose delusiona l belief system that can impair his thinking and decision

making. Based on this, I had previously opined that his delusions impaired his ability to proceed with trial. However, at this time, I opine that the impact from his delusions does not currently i nterfere with his ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or his ability to rationally assist counsel in the conduct of a defense.” Among other things, defendant “demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the nature and purpose of th e

4 By that time, Dr. French was no longer performing for ensic evaluations.5

criminal proceedings. He exhibited a coherent and rational understanding of the possible verdicts, the potential consequences of his charges, the roles of courtroom personnel, and the trial process. There was no evidence of delusional thinking or disor ganized or psychotic process while discussing the
trial fundamentals. He expressed a belief that he would get a fair trial

. ”
Dr. Berger drew the opposite conclusion in his March 11 , 2020 report

. F inding defendant incompetent to stand trial, Dr. Berger d iagnosed him with

“ D elusional D isorder , Grandiose Type , Continuous, ” and “Bipolar I Disorder.” (Underscoring omitted .) Similarly to his colleagues, Dr. Berger emphasized defendant’s persistent , grandiose , and delusional thinking regarding his parentage ( which d e fendant believe d w ould keep him out of prison) and his lack of insight into his mental illness and its role in his cri mes

. W hile
defendant appeared to understand the legal process (including his charges , plea options, and potential penalties ) , his mental state preclude d him from making rational and informed decisions regarding his case and undermine d his ability to rationally communicate with and assist counsel. At a status hearing on May 20 , 2020 , the court set the matter for trial

on June 17, 2020, and ordered updated reports from Dr. Torry and
Dr. Berger

. Dr. Berger submitted his updated report on June 12, 2020, after reexamining defendant on June 2 , 2020. Dr. Berger confirmed his opinion that defendant was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Berger opined that defendant continued to meet the diagnostic criteria for delusional disorder, grandiose type, continuous, and bipolar I disorder

. As before, defendant
demonstra ted an adequate understanding of the legal proceedings , but due to his psychotic and manic symptoms he still lacked the capacity to rationally cooperate with and assist counsel. Dr. Berger emphasized that defendant continued to express “grandiose delusion al beliefs in discussions of his alleged6

offenses, defense strategies, and his appraisal of the likelihood of prevailing at trial.” Dr. Berger was also concerned because d efendant told him , “ ‘I am going to get a new atto rn ey. He has gone backwards in ti me. He cannot be my attorney because I filed a claim against the county. It’s called conflict

- of

interest because you can’t be represented by someone who you are suing .

. . I am suing the atto rne y via the county, because the county pays my attorney.
Th ey raised my bail because of his negligence.’ ” ( Sic. )
Dr. Torry submitted his new report on June 30, 2020, after
reexamin ing defendant. Similarly to Dr. Berger , Dr. Torry diagnosed defendant with “ Delusional Disorder, Grandiose, Continuous. ” (Boldface omitted.) Nonetheless, Dr. Torry found defendant competent to stand trial, explaining that he “operates under a grandiose delusional belief system involving his belief that he is [ J FK’ s ] illegitimate son, that Marilyn Monroe and Joe DiMaggio r aised him, and that he knew Gavin Newsom’s father among other prominent figures. However, the impact from his delusions does not interfere with his ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to rationally assist counsel in the conduct of a defense.” A bench trial on defendant’s mental competency was held in the
summer of 2020. Drs. Berger and French testified for the prosecution, and
Dr. Torry testified for the defense

. T he reports of Dr. Berger and Dr. Torry
were also admitted into evidence

. Adding to the opinions in his reports, Dr. Berger testified as to defendant’s inability to handle the stress of trial. Defendant’s jail records
indicate h e con sistently exhibit ed mental illness symptoms while
incarcerated , including mani c behavior , impulsivity, agitation and suicidal
ideations result ing in his placement on suicide watch. Dr. Berger opined that defendant would exhibit similar symptoms if made to undergo trial, which7

would impair hi s ability to have rational and coherent dis cussions with his
counsel

. Similarly, Dr. French testified defendant was “extremely variable , ” even in a controlled hospital setting , and would not be able to remain competent for any length of time in a trial setting. While defendant has good

“ moments,” his history demonstrates the y are fleeting.
Dr. Torry di sagreed and opined that defendant pretended to be suicidal in jail in order to get assistance from jail staff. Dr. Torry stood by his opinion s in the June 2020 report that defendant suffered from d elusional
disorder that did not interfere with his ability to cooperate with counsel to present a defense. Last, d efen dant’s trial attorney testified , confirming that he was able to regularly communicate with defendant

. The attorney acknowledged their

at torney

– client relationship had been strained in the past but that it was

now repaired

. On July 15 , 2020, after taking the matter under submission, the trial court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and on September 2, 2020, ordered him committed to the State Department of State Hospitals pursuant to section 1370. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION The sole issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination under section 1367, subdivision (a) 5 that

5 Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides: “A person shall not be tried or adjudged to punishment or have their probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or parole revoked while that person is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this c hapter if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal8

defendant , “ as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability,

. . . is unable to und erstand the nature of the criminal proceedings
or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner .”

“ A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. ( § 1369 , subd. (f); [citation] .) On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict , supports the trial court’s finding. [Citation.] ‘Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value.’ ” ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.)
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, appellate court s generally give great deference to a trial court ’ s competency decision. “ As we
have said: ‘ “An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant ’ s conduct in the trial court as indi cating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper.” ’ ” ( People v. Marshall ( 1997 ) 15 Cal.4th 1, 3 3 [affirming trial court’s decision not to hold a second hearing on defendant’s competency to stand trial] ; accord, People v. Kaplan (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 372, 381

– 382 .) In this case, the trial court confirmed before ruling that it had
considered each of the mental health experts ’ evaluations and reevaluations , the trial testimony, preliminary hearing evidence, jail records, a nd t he court’s personal observations and interactions with defendant. The court then found
defendant in competent to stand trial for several reasons

. First, the court note d that while Dr. Berger’s and Dr. Torry’s
reevaluations wer e just weeks apart, they described defendant’s presentation quite differently. Most significant to our inquiry, Dr. Torry observed a

proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational

manner. ”9

respectful and collaborative relationship between defendant and his attorney ( Mr. Siroka )

. 6 Yet, defendant told Dr. Berg er that he had no confidence in
Mr. Siroka and intended t o sue him for ineffective assistance

. While acknowledg ing it did not know the reason for defendant’s changed behavior , the court found that it “ demonstrate [d] the continuing instability of
Mr. Scott’s thinking and behavior. [¶] I personally observed times in the
courtroom when Mr. Scott is very cooperative and respectful. And other
times when he has addressed the Court that he ’ s completely incomprehensible and there is absolutely no way to redirect him.” Second, the court found Dr. Berger’s opinions more persuasive than
Dr. Torry’s , explaining: “I found Dr. Berger’s opinions to be more compelling because they appeared to me to be based on a much more thoughtf ul and thorough analysis of Mr. Scott’s mental health and the information and documents provided to him. I was uncomfortable with the degree to which
Dr. Torry appeared to be willing to defer to [defendant’s counsel’s ] opinion
that Mr. Scott could rationa lly assist him with a defense. [¶] I don’t, in any way, wish to minimize [counsel’s] views, which I do think are important and
deserve serious consideration. But the issue of competence is not a legal
issue. It is a medical, psychiatric determination

. . . clearly beyond the expertise of, at least, most attorneys.” Third, the court “was concerned with the way in which Dr. Torry summarily dismissed the idea that Mr. Scott might also be suffering from Bipolar 1 Disorder, as diagnosed by Dr. Berger

. In fac t, Mr. Scott has told every evaluator to date that he had previously been diagnosed with Bipolar 2 Disorder, but that it didn ’ t fit him. Dr. Torry , essentially, relied upon self

reports by Mr. Scott that he did have, did not have periods of mania or

6 Attorney Siroka was prese nt for Dr. Torry’s evaluation.10

inability to sleep or other manic depressive symptoms. But we know that
Mr. Scott denies any mental health problems at all and has no insight into his mental health.” Further, although “ Dr. Torry indica ted during his testimony that he had reviewed the jail mental health records, he made no reference to anything that was contained in them. The mental health records do confirm that, every month, Mr. Scott spends days in safety cells on suicide
watch. I k now there ’ s been a suggestion that there ’ s some kind of secondary game for him in doing that, but I think that also speaks to his lack of rationality. ”
The court’s findings of incompetency under section 1367, subdivision (a) are fully supported by the rec ord. Without rehashing the evidence set forth
in detail ante , Dr. Berger , whose expertise is not in dispute, opined based on

two separate evaluations that notwithstanding defendant’s understanding of the criminal process, defendant lacked the capacity to rationally cooperate with counsel to prepare and present a defense due to his psychotic and manic symptoms. A t the hearing, Dr. French corroborated Dr. Berger’s opinion that the stressful environment of a criminal trial would likely trigger defendant’s

me ntal illness symptoms. Dr. French opined that defendant was “extremely variable,” even in a controlled hospital setting, and would not be able to remain competent for the duration of trial.
Defendant seeks to discredit these expert opinions , noting that
Dr. French , unlike Drs. Torry and Berger, failed to personally reevaluate
defendant before trial. In addition , defendant suggests the opinions of
Dr. French and Dr. Berger are fatally flawed because they conclude
defendant is incompetent to stand tri al even though he understands the nature of the criminal process

.11

We reject these arguments

. T he trial court appropriately weighed the opinions of all of the mental health experts and, after doing so, credited
Dr. Berger’s and Dr. French’s opinion s that defendant was mentally incompetent over Dr. Torry’s contrary opinion. 7 There is no basis on this
record to second

- guess the court’s judgment. ( People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 880

– 881 [ testimony of one psychiatrist and a supporting lay witness was sufficient evidence to find defendant competent, despite two psychiatrists ’ finding him incompetent ]; People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 797 [ trial court entitled to decide among conflicting psychiatrist reports ]

. ) Indeed, it is well e stablished that credible testimony from a single expert constitutes substantial evidence. ( People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507

– 508 [ “ ‘the substantial

- evidence test is satisfied’ ” where a treating psychiatrist opines under oath that the defendant is incapable of assisting in
his or her defense or cooperating with counsel due to mental illness ].) Moreover, the language of section 1367, subdivision (a) is clear: A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental illness, he or she is “unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational

manner .” ( Italics ad ded.) Here, the trial court, based on the experts’ opinions, found true the latter (inability to assist counsel in a rational matter) but not the former (inability to understand the nature of the

7 Defendant cites People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041 for the proposition that a defendant’s experience in the criminal justice system and participation in his or her own defense “ may belie a claim of incompetence.” (Ita lics added.) We do not disagree. However, contrary to this case, not a single psychiatrist opined that the defendant in Koontz was mentally incompetent to stand trial. ( See id. at pp. 1065

– 1066 .)12

proceedings)

. In doing so, the court fully complied with t he law. Accordingly, the order of incompetency stands

. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order finding defendant mentally incompetent to stand trial and committing him to a state hospital or treatment facility is affirmed.

_________________________ Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Simons, J.

_________________________ Needham, J.

A161008/ People v. Ralph Manning Scott