Bernadette Fowler Lamson v. Montgomery County, M d. , No. 67, September Term 2017, Opinion by Hotten, J.

CIVIL LITIGATION

– M ARYLAND PUBLIC INFOR MATION ACT

– DISCRETION OF THE TR IAL COURT

– The Court of Appeals held that where there has been a denial of a Maryland Public Information Request , the proponent of the request is entitled to judicial review

. Upon review , the trial court must evaluate the sufficiency of the denial by employing one of three methods of review. The method employed is subject to the discretion of the reviewing court but must be sufficient to demonstrate that the agency has asserted an ex ception that is applicable to the disputed documents.

CIVIL LITIGATION

– M ARYLAND PUBLIC INFOR MATION ACT

– METHODS OF REVIEW
- The Court of A ppeals held that when reviewing the denial of a Maryland Public Information Request , the trial court may require the presentation of evidence such as testimony or affidavits, order a Vaughn index, or conduct an in camera review to determine whether the agency has offered an applicable ex ception

.Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 415227 Argued: May 7, 2018 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 67 September Term, 2017

______ ____________________________ BERNADETTE FOWLER LA MSON

v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, M D

______ ____________________________ Barbera, C.J. , Greene , Adkins , McDonald , Watts, Hotten , Getty , JJ.

______ ____________________________

Opinion by Hotten, J. Watts, J., concurs

.

______ ____________________________ Filed: July 3 1 , 2018The issue before us is a request for the release of notes containing possible personnel

information , relating to the performance of Bernadett e Fowler Lamson (“Petitioner”) as an employee of the Montgomery County Attorney’s office. Petitioner filed a Maryland Public Information Act (“MPIA”) 1 request relative to her personnel file , seeking the disclosure of supervisor y notes that were with held by her employer , Montgomery County ( “Respondent ”) and her supervisor , Silvia Kinch (“Ms. Kinch”)

. The disputed notes are divisible into two separate categories . The first consists of three pages of notes that were removed from Petitioner’s personnel folder prior to its disclosure and t he second set consist s of notes that are contained in a personal journal in the exclusive possession and
control of Ms. Kinch. With regard to both, Petitioner asserts that Respondent improperly
withheld the notes when responding to her MPIA request

. In response, Respondent
contends that the notes a re privileged , non - public information. Petitioner now seeks review of the grant of summary judgment in Respondent’s favor, to determine whether the disputed notes we re subject to disclosure under the MPIA. For the reasons discussed infra,

we shall vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand with instructions

.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUN D
Petitioner was an employee of the Office of the Montgomery County Attorney for

over twenty years
. D uring that time , she received “ highly successful ” reviews and top performance ra tings

. In 2015, Ms. Kinch downgraded Petitioner’s performance rating from “highly successful” to “successful,” which pr evented her from receiving a 20

- year,

1 The MPIA is codified as Md

. Code, (2014), § 4

- 101 et seq. of the General Provision s Article, (“Gen. Prov.”).2

2% performance bonus. Prompted by the negative rating , Petitioner requested access to her personnel file on September 1, 2015 , which was provided a fter three pages of supervisory notes were re dacted

. O n October 8, 2015 , a fter receiving this response , Petitioner filed a MPIA request specifying 16 categories of public records , including the missing notes

. Specifically , Petitioner requested the following categories of information:
1. Any and all supervisory notes or other materials written, authored or prepared by Silvia Kinch, John Markvos and Marc Hansen; 2. Supervisory notes removed from Ms. Lamson’s supervisory file by Ms. Kinch on or about September l, 2015, including all notes removed by Ms. Kinch prior to providing Ms. Lamson a copy of her supervisory file; 3. Any and all investigatory files, inquiries, negative statements, or complaints in which Ms. Lamson is the subject and/or is discussed therein; 4. Ms. Lamson’s proposed transfer from full time status to part time status; 5. Ms. Lamson’s move f rom her 4th floor office to a 3rd floor office in the Executive Office Building (“ EOB ”) ; 6. Ms. Lamson’s transfer from the Office of the County Attorney (“ OCA ”) Division of Human Resources to the Division of Finance and Procurement or any other OCA division; 7. Ms. Lamson’s removal as counsel to the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service ( “ MCFRS ” ); 8. Placement of Jodi Schultz or other OCA staff attor ney assigned to MCFRS matters

- except workers’ compensation cases; 9. Ms. Lamson’s proposed change in duty assignment from MCFRS to the Animal Matters Hearing Board; 10. Ms. Lamson’ s FY 2015 performance appraisal; 11. Copy of stateme nt from William “Bill” Scott complaining about Ms. Lamson and all records discussing Mr. Scott’s complaints about Ms. Lamson; 12. Any and all e

- mails or documents discussing Ms. Lamson between and/or among Marc Hansen, John Markvos, Silvia Kinch, Karen Federma n - Henry and Ed Lattner f

r om February 1, 2015 to the present; 13. Any and all e

- mails or documents between and/or among Marc Hansen, John Markvos, Silvia Kinch, Ed Lattner, and Assistant Chief Ed Radcliff related to Ms. Lamson’s MCFRS representation and/ or agency assignment, duties, and/ or responsibilities; 14. Requests, discussions and/ or inquiries to conduct electronic surveillance and/or tracking on Lamson or other OCA staff members; 15. Any and all data gathered as a result of conducting electronic surveillance and/or tracking o f Lamson or other OCA staff members; and3

16. Communications with any other agency concerning Bernadette Lamson or any person including, but not limited to, the Board of Investmen t Trustees, Montgomery County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Montgomery County Revenue Authority, Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service, Montgomery County Office of Human Resources, and retirement agency. O n January 27, 2016, Respondent provided several responses to the MPIA request. Regarding request number one, Respondent asserted that: First, while an employee such as Ms. Lamson may review her own personnel file under [Gen. Prov.] § 4

- 31 1 [ 2 ] , supervisory note s are not a part of an employee’ s personnel file under the County’s personnel regulations. MCPR § 4

- 8 [ 3 ] (“Supervisory notes are not considered official employee records and are not subject to review by the employee or others

. ”)

. Second, supervisory notes constitute “interagen cy or intra

- agency letters or memoranda” under [Gen. Prov.] § 4

- 344 and are also shielded fr om disclosure by executive privilege and the Morgan doctrine. [ ] These notes contain the mental imp ressions and reveal the internal deliberations of the writer , Ms. Lamson’s supervisor. Inquiry into the mental process es of an

2 Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 311 provides: (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, a custodian shall deny inspection of a personnel record of an individual, including an application, a performance rating, or scholastic achievement information. * * * (b) A custodian shall allow inspection by: (1) the person in interest; or (2) an elected or appointed official who supervises the work of the individual.

3 T he Montgomer y County Personnel Regulations p rovide: A supervisor may maintain informal notes regarding performance or other information about an employee under the supervision of that supervisor. Supervisory notes are not considered official employee records and are not subject to review by the employee or others. Montgomery County , M d

. Personnel Regulation § 4

- 8 (2001).4

administrative decision maker would be contrary to the public interest and inimical to the integr ity of the supervisory process. Respondent concluded by stating that the supervisory notes constitute attorney work product. Regarding the second request , Respondent re iterated the rationale advanced in request one

. Regarding the remaining requests, Respondent either provided the
documentation or denied the existence of the document

. Thereafter , Petitioner filed a C omplaint on February 24, 2016 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County , alleging that Respondent violated the MPIA , and requested that
the court order the disclosure of all relevant documents. In response, Respondent asse rted
that both sets of notes were not personnel records and we re privileged or confidential by law, privileged attorney

- client documents , attorney work p roduct, or not subject to
disclosure because of executive privilege . Thereafter , Respondent filed a Mo tion to
Dismiss , or alternatively , a Motion for S ummary J udgment. On May 10, 2016, Petitioner
filed a M otion for a Vaughn index , 4 seeking judicial review of the requested documents. Respondent proposed instead that the court conduct an in camera review , contending that

a Vaughn index wa s only appropriate when the documents are voluminous and suggested
that an in camera review wa s more practical. On June 22, 2016, the trial court considered

4 The term “ Vaughn index” originates from the case of Vaughn v. Rosen , 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973)

. This process requires the party in possession of a disputed document to submit a list of documents in possession, setting forth the date, author, general subject matter and claim of privilege for each document claimed to be exempt from discovery

. A discu ssion of this term occurs in detail, infra

.5

arguments and issued an oral ruling granting the Respondent ’s Mot ion to D ismiss. The
court stated: I find that all of these notes kept by Ms. Kinch that have been, the way it’s been argued to me and briefed to me, are not public records and that they’re supervisory notes. And they are not included in a personnel file . And they are exempted under the Montgomery County Code, which talks about supervisory notes that are excluded. And they’re not governmental. I don’t want to get to the slope that you guys keep talking about being slippery. I just don’t think that, I t hink a supervisor should be able to keep private notes under the law, and that’s what we have here, and not explain to the whole world every time he or she does as to what’s in them. And I use the example that if, in fact, she confides in someone, whether it be a friend or whether it be a relative or even whether it be another employee, does that have to be disclosed? In other words, if the [Petitioner] says under Freedom of Information, have you ever made any derogatory statements to any personnel member s for the Montgomery County? If she had to reveal that or he at any time, that [sic] , I believe, would be an abomination of this rule. I don’ t believe the Legislature i ntended it to be that way. I think the Legislature intended that what’s in your person nel file, and we all know what that means, don’t put that in my personnel file or put that in my personnel file, things that are going to go with you, be used to evaluate you, and that work product or mental impressions or discussions or thought processes or even discussions among other supervisors are not intended under this act the way I see it. As a result , t he trial court concluded that an in camera review was not required , because
the notes were not considered personnel records pursuant to Montgomery C ounty Personnel Regulation § 4

- 8 (2001)

. Thereafter , Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals issued its unreported opinion on August 25, 2017.
See Lamson v. Montgomery Cty ., No. 892, S ept

. T erm 201 6, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 25, 2017) , 2017 WL 3668171 , cert . granted , 456 Md. 523, 175 A.3d 151 (2017). T he Court rephrased the questions presented by Petitioner and addressed two primary issues

. The6

fir st issue addressed argument s relating to the trial court ’s review of the responses to her MPIA request. The s econd issue related to the finding that the personnel notes fell outside the parameters of an MPIA request. The Court began by outlining the purpose of the
MPIA , noting that the A ct was created t o grant access to sensitive information pursuant to several statutory limitations , such as where federal or state law prohibits it, or where the disclosure of information runs contrary to the public interest

. See Glenn v. Maryland Dep ’ t of Health & Mental Hygiene , 446 Md. 378, 384, 132 A.3d 245, 249 (2016). Next , the
Court observed that the MPIA generally allows individuals to obtain private records about themselves, including personnel records and that such records should be provided , in the
absence an a dequate justification

. Turning to the merits of the appeal , the Court of Special Appeals determined that Respondent sufficiently responded to requests three through sixteen, and that Petitioner did not allege sufficient facts to support challenges to th ose responses. Regarding request s one and two , the Court found that the “supervisory notes do not fit within the definition of excludable ‘supervisory notes’ under the Montgomery County Personnel Regulations, and
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to review them in camera to determine
whether non

- disclosure was justified on other grounds.” Lamson , 2017 WL 3668171, at *5. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the MPIA preempts any c ounty regulation imposed under Montgomery County Personnel Regulations and determined that

c ounty regulations could not preclude disclosure of Petitioner’ s personnel records. As
such , county regulations could not be used to justify the denial of an MPIA request.7

Regarding the notes contained in Ms. Kinch’s private journal , the Court determined that they were not subject to disclosure because they were made by Ms. Kinch in an un official capacity and kept outside of Petitioner’s personnel folder. As such, the Court determined that they were not pu blic in nature and thus , not subject to disclosure. Following this decision, Petitioner filed for certiorari , which we granted. 456 Md. 523, 175 A.3d 151 (2017).

STANDARD OF REVIEW “Judicial review of an agency’ s decision on MPIA requests is authorized by G en
. P rov
. § 4

- 362, which permits a person who is denied inspection of a public record to challenge the denial by filing a complaint in the circuit court. ” Action Comm. for Transit, Inc. v. Town of Chevy Chase , 229 Md. App. 540, 558, 145 A.3d 640, 650 (2016)

. “ The
standard of review for a trial c ourt’s decision on a government’ s response to an MPIA request is ‘ whether that court had an adequate factual basis for the decision it rendered and whether the decision the court reached was clearly erroneous. ’ ” Id . We have defined the clearly erroneous standard by stating, “[i] f any competent material evidence exist s in support of the trial court’ s factual findings, those findings cannot be held to be clearly

erroneous
. ” Webb v. Nowak , 433 Md. 666, 678, 72 A.3d 587, 594 (2013) . However, “ [t] o the extent the [c] ircuit [c] ourt’ s exercise of discretion is based on an interpretation of law, that aspect of the ruling below is reviewed de novo

... . ” Lamone v. Schlakman , 451 Md. 468, 479, 153 A.3d 144, 151 (2017). Moreover, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

. “We review the grant of a [M]otion to [D]ismiss8

de novo .” Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Roads Commission of the State Highway
Administration , 388 Md. 500, 509, 880 A.2d 307, 312 (2005)

. In determining whether the decision of a lower court was legally correct , we give no deference to the trial court findings
and review the decision under a de novo standard of review. See Walter v. Gunter , 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002). See also Breslin v. Powell , 421 Md. 266, 277, 26 A.3d 878, 885 (2011). As a result , we shall review the merits of this matter de novo to determine whether the MPIA was properly interpreted and the grant of the motion to
dismiss was legally correct.

DISCUSSION

The Purpose of the MPIA

The MPIA creates an affirmative right for all persons granting “access to information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.” Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 103. See also Glass v. Anne Arundel Cty., 453 Md. 201, 207

- 08, 160 A.3d 658, 661

- 62 (2017)

. We have explained this right , stating that the MPIA “was created to ‘provide the public the right to inspect the records of the State government or of a political subdi vision within the State.’” Glenn , 446 Md. at 384, 132 A.3d at 249. Additionally , we noted that public policy creates “a general presumption in favor of disclosure of government or public documents.” Id

. at 385, 132 A.3d at 249. See also Maryland Dep’t of State Police v. Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches , 430 Md. 179, 190, 59 A.3d 1037, 1043 (2013). H owever , in Glass , we outlined the numerous exceptions to disclosure contained in the MPIA and classified them into four categories

.9

The f irst ca tegory prevents the disclosure of documents controlled by other laws. Glass , 453 Md. at 209, 160 A.3d at 662. W here a law controls disclosure of a particular document , Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 301 prevents disclosure of the document. Id

. The second category identifies
documents or information that an agency may not disclose, also known as “mandatory exceptions.” Id

. The mandatory exceptions prevent the disclosure of documents or information and require the custodian of records to deny a request for those r ecords or
information outright. Moreover, “the statute forbids an agency from disclosing certain types of information that may appear in a record, even if other parts of the record are open to inspection.” Id . at 209, 160 A.3d at 662

– 63. See also Gen. P rov. § 4

– 328 et seq. The third category of exceptions consists of “discretionary exceptions.” Id . This category describes the exceptions in the MPIA that require a custodian of record to decide whether disclosure of the record or information would be contrary to the public interest

. The discretionary exceptions “are ‘discretionary’ not in the sense that the agency may withhold or disclose as it pleases, but in the sense that the agency m ust make a judgment whether the statutory standard for withholdin g a record

— that is, disclosure ‘ would be contrary to the public interest’

— is met. Id . at 210, 160 A.3d at 663

. Finally, the MPIA permits an agency to refuse disclosure subject to several en umerated limits. This “catch

- all exception” permits the temporary den ial of inspection of record s not otherwise exempt from
disclosure , if the custodian believ es that inspection would cause substantial injury to the public interest and the agency obtains a court order within 10 days

. Id

.10

One of the mandatory exceptions is set forth in Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 311 and controls the disclosure of personnel records and requires that the custodian of personnel records “deny inspection of a personnel record of an individual, including an application, a performance rating, or scholastic achievement information.” T he provision also contains a requirement
that the custodian permit inspection of the record when reque sted by the “person of
interest ” or a supervisor of the person in interest. Id . A “ person of interest ” is defined as “a person or governmental unit that is the subject of a public record or a designee of the
per son or governmental unit[.] ” Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 101 (g)

. A “person of interest” may have a broader right of access to a record than other persons that may pursue the right to inspect
a record. This provision is in contrast to the provisions governing general records subject
to disclosure and explicitly mandates that the records be kept private , unless requested by the person in interest or a supervisor of such a person. To be clear, while personnel records

are a sub

- category of “public records ,” they are lar gely exempt from disclosure. See Gen. Prov. § 4

- 304 ( stating, “ a custodian shall deny inspection of a public record, as provided in this part ”). As such, where there is an assertion that the records at issue may constitute personnel records there must be an inquiry into the nature of the records to determine which rules govern their disclosure . To pursue that examination we must first define both types
of records.

T he MPIA broadly defines a “public record” as any document that “is made by a unit or an instrumentality of the State or of a political subdivision or received by the unit or instrumentality in connection with the transaction of public business[.]” Gen. Prov. §11

4

- 101(j)(1)(i). It includes any copy of a public record, including w ritten documents, photographs, and drawings in both printed and electronically stored formats. This definition is in line with the purpose of the MPIA generally. Because the MPIA is designed to grant access to documents regarding the affairs of governmen t and the official acts of public officials, it follows that the definition of a public record should be broad enough to cover a wide range of document types. One type of public record is a personnel record.
These records, which are not explicitly define d by t he MPIA , have been addressed by the
Court in Kirwan v. The Diamondback , which discussed the definition of a personnel record
in some detail

. 352 Md. 74, 721 A.2d 196 (1998). T he Kirwan Court noted that Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 311 provides examples of the types of records that constitute personnel records

. Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 311 (a) states , “[s] ubject to subsection (b) of this section, a custodian shall deny inspection of a personnel record of an individual, including an application , a performa nce rating , or scholastic achievement information

. (Emphasis added)

. Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 311.
The Kirwan Court then explained that this enumerated list describes what the General Assembly intended to constitute a personnel record. Kirwan , 352 Md. at 82, 721 A.2d at 200. The Court went on to state that a personnel record consist s of “ those documents that directly pertai n to employment and an employee’ s ability to perform a job.” Id

. at 83, 721
A.2d at 200

. Further , the Kirwan Court indicated:
[T] he General Assembly intended that any record identifying an employee would be exempt from disclosure as a personnel record. Instead, the General Assembly likely intended that the term ‘personnel records’ retain its common sense meaning. This is indicated by the list following the prohibition on the re lease of the personnel records.12

Id . at 84, 721 A.2d at 200

. (Emphasis in original). With these definitions in mind, we must now determine how they influence the review of a denied MPIA request.
Review of a denied MPIA request Judicial review of a denied MPIA request is authorized by Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 362. The provision states that , “whenever a person or governmental unit is denied inspection of a public record or is not provided with a copy, printout, or photograph of a public record as requested, the person or governmental unit may file a complaint with the circuit court. ”
Gen

. Pr ov
. § 4

- 362 (a)(1)

. This subtitle also contains several prescriptions that govern the review of a denied request. Specifically, the provision instructs an aggrieved party on the proper venue for filing a compla int, articulates the limits of the reviewing court, and most importantly describes the methods that a court may use in evaluating the sufficiency of a
denial of an MPIA. See Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 362( c)(1) , ( 2) and (3). In reviewing the Motion to Dismiss , we first examine the procedure employed by
the Ci rcuit Court for Montgomery County. T he trial court determined that the notes were not subject to review because such disclosure was pre cluded by Mont gomery County Personnel Regulation § 4

- 8

. We agree with the finding of the Court of Special Appeals
and d etermine that Montgomery County Regulations cannot be invoked to prevent
disclosure of records. In reaching t his conclusion , we are reminded of our decision in
Police Patrol S ec. Sys., Inc. v. Prince George’ s Cty ., 378 Md. 702, 711, 838 A.2d 1191, 1196 (2 003) (hereinafter “ Police Patrol ”)

. In Police Patrol , we considered the relationship
between local ordinances and the prescriptions of the MPIA and determined that “a county13

charter is subordinate to the public general laws of Maryland.” Id . at 712, 838 A.2d at
1197. We went on to state that “[a] local government ordinance or charter that conflicts with a public general law enacted by the General Assembly is preempted and thus is
invalid. ” Id

. In the case at bar , the trial court permitted the invocation of Montgomery County Personnel Regulation § 4

- 8 to prevent the disclosure of Petitioner’s personnel
records in contravention of the MPIA. Mont gomery County Personnel Regulation § 4

- 8 categorially pre cludes the disclosure of records that ar e permitted under the MPIA. As such, the regulation conflicts with the ex press language of the MPIA. Pursuant to Police
Patrol , we must find the regulation invalid as it impermissibly limits the application of a state law enacted by General Assembly.
Thereafter, t he Court of Special Appeals made two determinations relative to the
notes at issue. Regarding the notes that were removed from Petitioner’s physical personnel file, the Court determined that an add itional review of the notes was required so t hat the
trial court could properly evaluate Respondent’s denial of the MPIA request. Specifically , the Court noted that the trial court’s reliance on Montgomery County regulations left “no independent basis for the court to review the notes in camera or to require an index.”
Lamson , 2017 WL 3668171, at *6

. The Court went on to determine that its analysis of the records reopened the question and required further proceedings. We agree. However, regarding the second set of notes , i.e. , the notes cont ained in Ms. Kinch’s personal journal,

we reach a different conclusion

. The Court of Special Appeals determined that the second
set of notes we re outside the definition of a personne l record because they we re contained14

in a personal journal that was never a part of Petitioner’s personnel file and were intended to be private. However, the mere physical location of a record is not necessarily dispositive of its characterization. It is equally possible that the notes contain entries that relate to
Petitione r’s employment and or the devaluation of her performance rating. In either instance, there is uncertainty regarding the nature of the records at issue and must be resolved by closely examining the notes at issue , as well as the exceptions offered thereto. The plain language of Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 362 permits the trial court to conduct an in

camera review of disputed materials to determine whether they are subject to disclosure. The subtitle provides “[t] he court may examine the public record in camera to det ermine whether any part of the public record may be withheld under this title. ” Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 362(c)(2). In order for a trial court to accomplish this goal , they must be satisfied that the agency rationale offered in denying a MPIA request is fully supported. With this idea in
mind , we turn to our discussion in Cranford v. Montgomery Cty., 300 Md. 759, 481 A.2d 221 (1984)

. In Cranford , we examined a trial court’s ability to conduct an inquiry into the denial of an MPIA request and evaluated what is necessary for the proper denial of a MPIA request. This case also provides an apt summation of the methods of evaluation and informs our decision today. At issue in Cranford was a Sentin e l Newspaper request for documents relating to a construction proje ct in Montgomery County Government Center.
Id . at 763, 481 A.2d at 223

. In reviewing the merits of the request, we articulated several holdings that are relevant to the instant dispute. T he C ourt noted competing interests that
are inherent in a MPIA req uest , which place at issue on e party’s statutory right to disclosure15

and another party’s assertion of an ex ception that prevents disclosure

. Id . at 777, 481 A.2d

at 230

. In addressing this tension, the Court noted that The [MPIA] imposes the burden on the records custodian to make a careful and thoughtful examination of each document which fairly falls within the scope of the request in order for the custodian initially to determine whether the document or any severable portion of the document meets all of the elements of an exemption. I d

. at 777, 481 A.2d at 230 . The Court explained this requirement a nd stated that “[t] he General Assembly did not intend for custodians broadly to claim [exceptions] and thereby routinely to pass to the courts the task of performing in camera inspections. ” With this in
mind , the Court established a rule that provides the trial court with discretion in reviewing disputed documents. The Court determined that , “the ultimate standard under th e [MPIA] for determining whether an in camera inspection is to be made is whether the trial judge believes that it is needed in order to make a responsible determination on claims of [exceptions]

. ” Id . at 779, 481 A.2d at 231

. To make a “responsible determination” the trial court must make two initial findings. First, the court must determine whether the documents at issue are a public “record.” This requires that the cou rt examine whether the notes “w ere made in connection with public business” as required by Gen. Prov. § 4

- 101. If the notes are not public “record,” then the MPIA does not apply and the records are not required to be disclosed
under the MPIA

. I f the notes are a public record then the trial court must determine what type of public r ecords are at issue. This second level of inquiry s eeks to classify the records in a manner that permits the court to apply the appropriate MPIA provision s while16

reviewing the denied request. This i s particular ly important in this case because Petitioner has asserted that the records are personnel records, which are generally subject to disclosure when requested by the person of interest. See Gen. Prov. § 4

- 311 (b) . In classifying the documents a second time , the trial court must determine whether the
ag ency’s rationale for denying the request is sufficient

. See Cranford , 300 Md. at 780, 481
A.2d at 231 (reaffirming that the burden rests with the agency to demonstrate that an exception justifies non

- disclosure). The second step in making a “reasonable
d etermination” requires that the trial court review the exceptions made by the agency to
determine whether they are justified

. With this step, the trial court must determine whether the exceptions offered by the agency sufficiently prevent the disclosure of the record. To make the required determinations , the trial court must apply one of the following
methods in evaluating an MPIA request

. Th e first method is a Vaughn index, which originates from the case of Vaughn v. Rosen , 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This method has also been described as “a system of itemizing and indexing that correlates each of the government’s justifications for its refusal to disclose the documents with the actual portions of the documents at issue.” Lewis v. I.R.S ., 823 F.2d 375, 377 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). We
described this method in Office of State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, Inc. , 356 Md. 118, 121, 737 A.2d 592, 594 (1999). There we indicated that a Vaughn index “required the responding party to provide a list of documents in possession, setting forth the date, author, general subject matter and claim of privilege for each document claimed t o be exempt from17

disc overy.” Id

. n.1, 737 A.2d at 593 n.1 The Cranford Court addressed this method and
determined that it is a viable alternative to an in camera review. The second method that can be employed is the submission of testimony or affidavits, which detail the nature of the denial and establish the basis for the denial. See Maryland Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 362. In describing this method, the Cranford Court determined that the agency must demonstrate that the ex ception applies and may do so by offering evidence by way of testimony or affidavits from the custodian of record. Cranford , 300 Md. at 779, 481 A.2d at 231. The final method permits the trial court to conduct an in camera review to evaluate the merits of an agency denial of an MPI A request . This method is enumerated in Maryland
Gen

. Prov

. § 4

- 362 and is appropriate where the submission of other evidence is not sufficient to evaluate a denial of an MPIA request. This method is also appropriate where
the documents at issue are not voluminous. See Cranford , 300 Md. at 779, 481 A.2d at
231. Regarding the three methods, the Cranford Court determined that the agency carries the burden to justify disclosure because of the Court’s refusal to accept conclusory statements in support of “generalized allegations of [ e xceptions] .” Cranford , 300 Md. at 778, 481 A.2d at 230. The Court also stated that there is an “ emphasis on an explanation which presents enough detail to make un derstandable the issues involved in the claim of [exception] without presenting so much detail as to compromise the privileged material ...”
Id

. , 481 A.2d at 230

- 31. In reaching this conclusion, the Cranford Court reasoned that18

there may not always be a nee d to conduct in camera review. As such , the Court
enumerated factors for a trial court to consider when deciding which method to apply. The
factors include judicial economy, the conclusory nature of the agency affidavits, bad faith on the part of the age ncy, disputes concerning the contents of the document, whether the agency has proposed in camera inspection , and the strength of the public interest in
disclosure. Cranford , at 779, 481 A.2d at 231

. In applying the Cranford factors to the case at bar, i n camera review may be the preferable method to review the disputed notes. The first factor , judicial economy , is best served by conducting in camera review because t he documents at issue are not voluminous

. The second factor , which examines the conclusory nature of the exceptions offered , require s the trial court to evaluate the exceptions and the rationale offered in support
thereof

. Where the trial court determines that the exceptions offered are general in nature, Cranford requires additi onal inquiry into the exceptions offered. Respondent’s primary
assertion is that the journal notes are privile ged attorney

- client documents. However, the
trial court did not evaluate the veracity of the assertion

. Because the assertion is general in

nat ure, the trial court must conduct a review that reflects an evaluation of the assertion. Finally, the last relevant factor considers the fact that the agency suggested in camera . In
th e instant case , Respondent , in responding to Petitioner’s request for a Vaughn index,
stated that an in camera review “is available” although Respondent disputed its necessity

. Nonetheless, the trial court should consider Respondent’s statement when deciding the
method of review f

or the disputed notes.19 CONCLUSION Where there has been a denial of a proper MPIA request the proponent of the request is entitled to judicial r eview to evaluate the sufficiency of the denial

. Further, the trial court in reviewing the denial must be sat isfied that the rationale offered by the agency supports the denial of the request. To make this determination , the trial court may require the presentation of evidence such as testimony or affidavits , order a Vaughn index, or conduct

an in camera review. While the trial court is free to employ the method it deems appropriate under the circumstances the re must be a showing t hat all the requirements of
the asserted exception have been met. Based on an application of the Cranford factors it
appears that in camera review will likely be the appropriate method for review of the disputed notes. However, regardless of the method applied, the trial court must not permit Respondent to make generalized allegations and must require that Respondent offer an explanation that reasonably demonstrates that the exceptions are applicable. In the case at
bar , the trial court granted Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss erroneously. As discussed
supra reliance on Montgomery County Regulations will not support the denial of a valid MPIA request. Because the trial court ruled on these grounds , the record is devoid of any evidence that suggests an inquiry was made into the ex ceptions offered by Respondent. As such, the trial court did not sufficien tly review the denial of Petitioner’s MPIA request.
Therefore , we must vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the
case to the circuit c ourt for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

.20 JUDGMENT OF THE COUR T OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS VACATED . CASE REMANDED TO THA T COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND RE MAND TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO B E PAID BY THE RESPONDENT .IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 67 September Term, 2018

____________ __________________________ BERNADETTE FOWLER LAMSON

v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND

__________ ____________________________

Barbera , C.J. Greene Adkins McDonald Watts Hotten Getty , JJ.

____________ __________________________ Concurr ing Opinion by W atts , J.

__________ ____________________________

Filed: July 31 , 2018 Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 415227

- V Argued: May 7, 2018Respectfully, I concur. I agree with the majority opinion’s holding remanding the

case for further proceedings, but I would remand the case to the Court of Special Appeals
with instructions to vacate the judgment of the Circuit Cou rt for Montgomery County and
order the circuit court to conduct an in camera review of the notes contained in Petitioner’s supervisor’s journal. The majority opinion remands the case for the circuit court to choose
th e method of addressing potential disclosure of the notes in the supervisor’s journal , stating that “the [circuit] court may require the presentation of evidence such as testimony or affidavits, order a Vaughn index, or conduct an in camera review.” Maj. S lip Op. at 19

. Indeed, the majority opinion states that, although the circuit “court is free to employ the method it deems appropriate under the circumstances[,]” “it appears that in camera review will likely be the appropriate method for review of the di sputed notes.” Maj. Slip Op. at
19. In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals authorized the in camera review of the supervisory notes contained i n Petitioner’s supervisory file. S ee Lamson v. Montgomery Cty. , 2017 WL 3668171, at *6

- *7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 25, 2017)

. And , I would expressly conclude that an in camera review is likewise warranted of the notes contained
in Petitioner’s supervisor’s journal as well. For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur.