22-6031

Raju v. Garland

BIA

Palmer, IJ

A216 589 122

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of April, two thousand twentyfour. 

PRESENT: 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

EUNICE C. LEE,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

MOHAMMAD RAJU, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 22-6031 

 NAC 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 
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FOR PETITIONER: Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux, 

Assistant Director; Duncan T. Fulton, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 

Petitioner Mohammad Raju, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks 

review of a December 16, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a December 4, 2019

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Mohammad Raju, No. A 216 589 122 (B.I.A. Dec. 16, 2021), aff’g No. 

A 216 589 122 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Dec. 4, 2019). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. 

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions with respect to the 

adverse credibility determination. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 

F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review adverse credibility determinations “under 

the substantial evidence standard.” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d 
3 

Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

The governing credibility standard provides as follows: 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, 

a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the 

consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral 

statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and 

considering the circumstances under which the statements were 

made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the 

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record 

(including the reports of the Department of State on country 

conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, 

without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.

Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, 

from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 

could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 

162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. 

Here, Raju alleged that members of the Awami League (“AL”) in 

Bangladesh assaulted him twice because of his involvement in the Liberal 

Democratic Party (“LDP”). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

agency’s adverse credibility determination. 
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First, the agency reasonably relied on an inconsistency between Raju’s 

application and testimony concerning whether he received medical records upon 

discharge from the hospital. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Raju stated in his 

affidavit that he brought medical records to the police station as proof of an assault 

by the AL members. However, he later testified that he did not receive medical 

records at the time he was treated, then when questioned about the discrepancy, 

stated that his father took the medical papers. When asked why he submitted 

medical summaries prepared years later rather than the original medical records, 

Raju replied, “I don’t know.” Certified Administrative R. (“CAR”) at 156. The 

agency was not compelled to accept these explanations as they did not resolve the 

inconsistency or demonstrate what happened to the original medical records. See 

Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than 

offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he 

must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his 

testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 

160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, 

the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (quoting 

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985))). 
5 

Second, the agency reasonably relied on a discrepancy between Raju’s 

statements and a corroborating affidavit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Raju 

claimed that he went to report the AL members’ assault along with his father and 

his witness Habibur Rahman, a villager who took him to the hospital after the

assault. However, Rahman’s affidavit does not confirm that he went to the police 

station with Raju and implies that he did not because he only “came to know” that 

Raju and his father had gone to the station. While an omission, particularly one 

from a third-party statement, is “less probative” than an inconsistency, Rahman’s 

statement both omits the information and at least implies inconsistency. Hong Fei 

Gao, 891 F.3d at 78; cf. id. at 81 (“[W]here a third party’s omission creates no 

inconsistency with an applicant’s own statements—an applicant’s failure to 

explain third-party omissions is less probative of credibility than an applicant’s 

failure to explain his or her own omissions.” (emphasis omitted)). Even viewed 

as an omission, it undermines Raju’s credibility because it does not corroborate his 

version of events. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(holding that “[a]n applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear 

on credibility”). 

Third, the IJ reasonably relied on the discrepancy between Raju’s credible 
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fear interview and asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). As a 

preliminary matter, the IJ was permitted to rely on the record of the credible fear 

interview because it displays the “hallmarks of reliability.” Ming Zhang v. Holder, 

585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009). In his application and testimony, Raju asserted 

that the police threatened to arrest him on false charges when he tried to report his 

attack by AL members. In contrast, at the interview, Raju did not allege any 

threats and, when asked what the police said when he made the report, he replied 

that “[t]hey just said we would see but did nothing.” CAR at 365. The IJ 

reasonably relied on Raju’s failure to specify at the interview that the police 

threatened him with arrest given that he was asked questions that should have 

elicited that fact, including why he did not think the authorities could protect him. 

See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 79–80 (“[I]n assessing the probative value of the 

omission of certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are ones that a 

credible petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose under the 

relevant circumstances.”). 

The adverse credibility determination was bolstered by the lack of reliable 

corroboration. See Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273 (“An applicant’s failure to 

corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of 
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corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that 

has already been called into question.”). As the IJ found, the family members and 

neighbor who wrote letters for Raju were not direct witnesses to his attacks and 

they were not available for cross-examination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 

149 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that “the IJ acted within her discretion in according . . . 

little weight” to letters from friends and family “because the declarants 

(particularly [petitioner’s] wife) were interested parties and neither was available 

for cross-examination”). Additionally, the medical evidence presented was not 

contemporaneous with the alleged treatment, Rahman’s letter was not wholly 

consistent with Raju’s testimony, and a State Department report did not confirm

that AL members have targeted LDP supporters for violent attacks. 

Taken together, the inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration

provide substantial support for the adverse credibility determination. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273; 

see also Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8 (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude 

an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple 

inconsistencies would preclude even more forcefully.”). The adverse credibility

determination is dispositive because asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 
8 

relief are all based on the same factual predicate. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court